Dt^classifit'd per Executive Order 13526, vSection 3,3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date; 2011 VLC Settlement of the Conflict ^6 Vols,) Histories of Contacts (4 Vols,) 2, Polish Track Declassified per Execuiive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Projeci Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Dale: 201 1 TOP SECRET - SEWSITIVII STATES 1945 VIETNAM RELATIONS - 1967 VIETNAM TASK FORCE OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 4lX TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE Dccbssified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 NND Projecn Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Dme: 201 1 f >! 1 r' VI. C. 2. VI. SET'XLEMEIff OF THE COBIFLICT t C. Histories of Contacts 2. Marigold Sec Def Cent Sr- X-, i :^5 Declassified per Execuiive Order 13526, Section 33 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: N WD Dale: 201 1 T > 5 -^ r> ^ D€cJassificd per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 NND Prtjject Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Diiie: 2011 TOP SECRET " NOBIS MARIGOLD This study consists of two parts ^ a chronology of the principal events in the negotiating initiative known as Marigold (Part II)^ and an analytic discussion of some of the principal questions raised by ferigold (Part 1). Part I is based on Part IIj with citations to it indicated by date, V/hile Part I can be read without reference to Part II J it may be easier going with Just a few of the main dates and happenings in mind: I^te in June 1966^ the Polish ICC Representative ^ Levandowski^ rettirned to Saigon from Hanoi vith some ideas he felt could serve as a basis for negotiations. These were conmunicated to the US through the Italian government and followed up by discussions in Saigon with Lewandowskij D'Orlandi (the Italian Ambassador) and Lodge participating in various combinations. In addition^ Lewandowski made several visits to Hanoi. On November 30 ^ he presented a 10 point formulation^ reflecting his understanding of the US position^ '>7hich he said Hanoi woxild accept as a basis for direct ^^conversation" betvreen US and DRV representatives in Warsaw. On December 2. Hanoi-;, vhich had not been bombed since mid- Aug:ustj was hit by US airstrikes. On December 3^ the Poles protested the attack as endangering the prospective Warsaw meeting; and the US officially accepted Levandovskl's 10 points^ subject to "important differences of interpretation." On December k^ Hanoi was bombed again. During the next 10 days^ the Poles and Americans argued about the pattern of US bombing and ttie "differences of interpretation" clause. In the interim (December 6)j how^ever^ Hanoi was officially informed of the US acceptance J as (qualified. On December I3 and Ik^, Hanoi was bombed again; and the DRV instructed the Poles to end all conversations about the proposed contact. On December 2^!-^ the US infonned the Ccmmunists that it would refrain from bombir^ within a 10 mile radius of Hanoi ^s center ^ expressing the hope that this vo^Jild permit the V/arsaw meeting to take place; but the offer was not accepted. Strictly J the irea within 5 miles of the center of Hanoi TOP SECRET - NODIS Declassified per Execuiive Order 13526, Section 33 NND Project Number: NND 633 16. By: NWD Diite: 201 1 .^ ^ O CO CO f ^ o Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 KND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 TOP SECRET - NODIS The Role of the Polish Intermedlar:^ The part played in Marigold "by the DRV is veiled in mystery^ because all US transactions in the matter passed through Polish hands* The initiative for the contact can only be traced back as far as the Poles, It begins with Levandowski*s retui\^ from Hanoi in late June 1966, Irfhether he acted on Hanoi's request^ on Soviet urging^ or his ovn sense of enterprise is not knovn. The sub servient flow of informa- tion on DRV vievs and reactions came almost entirely through the Polish channel J and the Poles verej intent icnallyj ambiguous in distinguishing between their own thoughts and Hanoi's, Drawing conclusions from the story is a compounded problem because the PoleSj by their own account^ conceived of their function as guite different from neutrally passing messages: — They acted as brokers^ probing us (and perhaps Hanoi) to find elements of "give'' that would narrow the gap between US and DRV posi- tions on the terms of settlement. Their most inventive act in this role was producing a Polish formulation of the official US position as a starting point for US-DRV talks. In this way^ each side had a glimpse of possible areas of negotiation ^ without first committing itself to specific language or firm concessions. — They tried to steer the exchanges away from topics we preferred (especially de-escalation) toward those they said had greater chance of acceptance in Hanoi (the terms of an overall settlemant). --They acted as friends of Hanoi^ not neutrals, "-Most importantly J they applied pressure on the U3 to participate in good faith J by the ever present threat of disclosing their version of the matter to influential world leaders or the public at large. Thus our first intimation of Marigold came via the Italian Government ^ which had been informed in Saigon and Rome by the Poles. ¥e knew immediately^ and were forcefully i^minded at critical moments later^ that US responses which might be viewed by others as reluctance in the pursuit cf peace ^ skepticism about finding a "political^' solution^ or intransigence on matters of substance j might be used against us. The only tenable working assumptions on the US side^ therefore j were that the Poles pursued at least three objectives in ferigold ^^ and most likely a fourth as well: (l) Ending the violence in Vietnam. (2) Doing so on teims relatively favorable to the Communist side. (3) Building a case that could be used against the US^ as pressure during the development of the contact or as a source of embarrassment to the US should the whole venture fail, (in addition^ the Poles no doubt sought to cast themselves in a role of historical importance.) TOP SECF^T - NODIS Declassined per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 TOP SECRET - NODIS As so often with multiple objectlTCSj none seams to have been maxi- mized. For example J if the Poles vere concerned solely vlth ending the var (regardless of the terms )j they should have acted vith greater discretion after the contact broke down, because this would better pre- serve their usefulness as an inteimediary in the future . On the other hand J had they been concerned solely with discomfitting the USj they could have used their ammunition to greater effect by leaking earlier and more sensationally to the press * Perhaps different individuals on the Polish side gave differing priorities to this objective or that,! In any case^ the fact that none of the objectives was pursued to its logical maximum must mean that^ in some larger Polish scheme of things ^ all were accorded considerable inportance • El is is critical in interpreting the episode as a whole j because it implies that^ with whatever degree of imprecision^ the Poles were in fact trying to find areas of compromise between the DEV and US on acceptable outcomes to the war, Their effort was taken seriously enough in Hanoi to result in DRV agreement to meet with a US representative in Warsaw, ^ This in turn must mean they received seme serious guidance on policy frcm the DEV^ even though it is quite unlikely that they were privy to Hanoi's minimum bargaining positions, V/hat they conveyed to us about promising directions for negotiations j therefore j should reflect something of Hanoi's considered judg:aentSj but cannot of course be read as a map of finn and final DEV positions. It was apparently not until after the Warsaw contact was canceled that the Poles were asked to specify those messages they had passed on explicit instruction from Hanoi. {Siere were three^ they said: Lewandowski's message to Lodge expressing DEV agreement to the Warsaw talks; the warning after the December 3 (sic) boaibing of Hanoi that the contact was being reassessed by the DEV; and the decision to cancel the Warsaw meeting after the December 13-14 bombing of Hanoi. In add it ion ^ the Poles said they had numerous exchanges with Hanoi during the period of Gronouski's contacts with Sapacki in Warsaw (i-e.j after December 5) and claimed that they were therefore able to reflect Hanoi's views accurately even when speaking on their own initiative, For e^xample^ the cable traffic conveys a picture of Lewandovski as mere detached than E^packij more concerned simply with bringing the contending parties together than with exacting concessions from the US or throwing the onus for failure upon it. On the other hand^ this may reflect differ* ences between the US reporters in Saigon and Warsaw as much as actual differences between the two Poles. ^e do not know what the DEV expected from the Warsaw meeting nor how its prospects were represented to Hanoi by the Poles. Bis evidence that the DEV did in fact agree to the meeting is examined in another section. "iQV ^y^zmii - NODIS Declassified pei Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 TOP SECRET - NOBIS How accurate and explicit they were in transmitting US views to Hanoi is not known. They seem to have made at least one major blunder (described in the next section)^ and may well have made others. 3 TOP SECRET NOBIS s Declassified per Executive Order J 3526, Section 33 NND Project Number: NND 03316* By: NWD Date: 20 i 1 TOP SECRET - NODIS Did the DRV Agree? It is at least possible that the Poles had no commi-biient from the DRV at all J but on balance this seems highly improbable. By the begin- ning of December J they had gone far out on a l±mb in their contacts and arrangements vith at least the Americans ^ the Italians and^ apparently^ the Russians, It is hard to see what could have motivated them to go this far purely on speculation^ given the consequences for them of a revelation that the vhole venture was built on air. Is: The evidence that the DRV did in fact agree to a meeting in Warsaw (1) Rapacki's statement to Gronouski that Levandovski i^ras acting on DRV instructions in "the message he gave to Lodge , , . upon his return from Hanoi expressing ^TVtT iDositive response to the Warsaw talks" (12/21/66); (2) Zinchuk^s statement to Bundy that "the Polish effort was serious and that the Soviets were fully with it" and that "he had been surprised J in discussing the Polish initiative in the Department . . , to see that it was treated as doubtful" (12/22/66); (3) Burchett^s statement to Isham that a DRV official had actually been en route to Warsaw for the proposed meeting when "the US resumed bombing Hanoi" and the contact was canceled (I2/6/67). If Eurchett's information is accurate j it would mean that Hanoi had been informed by the Poles of US acceptance of the Lewandowski formu- lation and was satisfied with the US response - The US formally accepted Lewandowski^s 10 points on December 3^ with the qualification that "several specific points are subject to important differences of interpretation." If the Poles accurately conveyed the US positioUj therefore; it would also follow that the DRV had acquiesced in this extremely broad reservation* Here J however^ some further questions arise, Hapacki^ in a meeting with Gronouski J indicated that Lodge had "confiimed" Lewandowski's formu- lation on December 1^ introducing the "important differences of interpre- tation" clause as a further condition two days later. (I2/5/66) ITnis would Imply that Lodge accepted Lewandowski^s 10 points without referring them to Washington J which seems extremely unlikely. Apparently the Poles informed Hanoi prematurely of US acceptance j omitting the qualification about interpretation- ( 12/6/ 66) But by December 6 they had conveyed the US message In its final form* (I2/7/66) If the DEV official was en route when the bombing of Hanoi resumed — December 13-14 — the interpre- tation clause must have been transmitted and accepted by the ^lorth Viet- namese. TOP SECRET - NODIS DeclassiOed per Executive OrcJcr 13526. Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 201 1 L / TOP SECHE^T - nODIS Tais would mean that the content of tiie interpretation clause did not in itself cause the contact to abort- However^ three days (December 3-^6) may have been lost vhile the Poles urged us to withdraw the clause and ve demurred. Woxild the Warsaw talks actually have begun before the December I3-IU bombing if this time had been saved? Would they have been continued if the bombing occurred after the first meeting or two? TOP SECRET - NODIS Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 i iO TOP SECRET " NODIS The Polish Vision of a Vietnam Solution At four points during JVlarigold^ Levando'wski offered sketches of a negotiated outcome to the war. None of these is precise or complete, Kone is an authoritative statement of what would be acceptable to the DEV, They differ in content^ each serving a different purpose in his development of the contact. All^ however^ are consistent with each otherj suggesting they derive from a single set of concepts. They are consistent J tooj with several key planks of the revised ULF Program^ released In Augus-fc I96T — in particular ; the call for new elections with universal sufferage and the establishment of a government with Communist participation. His revelations have a pattern; The first was the come-on^ cou^ hed in the most attractive but vaguest terois of all. The second and third were explorations of h.aw much the traffic would bearj testing in turn the reactions of the Italians (perhaps as bellwethers of 'Vorld opinion") and of official feshing^ton. The last was the most serious ^ his own fonnulation of the US posit ion j designed to provide a substantive basis for direct talks between the US and DRV. Its language had therefore to encompass the minimum outcomes acceptable to both sides ^ using ambiguity to cloak the differences his brokerage could not eliminate. 1' Apparently^ -the best terms he hoped to obtain were eventual US military withdrawal based on US acceptance of the NLF in a coalition governtnent^ along with a sharp reduction in the role played in that government by militant anti^ communists* The minimum he felt acceptable as a basis for talks Is^ naturally ^ harder to discern. It seems to have been less a final solution to the conflict than a change in the ground 3:iiles under which the struggle to rule SW would continue. The principal elements seemed to be acceptance of the Communists as legitimate contenders for power; and the substitution of international machinery of some sort for US artned participation in regulating the outcome. Left open is the question of whatj if anything^ the Communists would give in exchange (e,g.^ NVA withdrawal^ etc* ) Lewandowski^s thoughts on settlement are described briefly telow- MDre detail is given xa the chronology^ for which the relevant dates are also indicated below, (1) The Tteaser , US interest (and Italian) was first aroused by a statement of things the DRV did not demand as part of a final settlement, levandcwskij just back from a trip to Hanoi in June 1966^ billed this negative list as "a very specific peace offer/^ even though it lacked the positive demands that would inevitably be in a final settlement. >Jhat Hanoi did not demand included: TOP SECRET - ITODIS Declassined per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 KND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 [ TOP SECRET - NODTS immediate reunification; socialism in SVIT; a change in SW relations in foreign affairs; neutralization; immediate with- dxaval of US forces; DRV interference in the SVN government. The last pointy hovever^ vas modified to the extent of asking for a government led by "someone other than Ky." On the positive side^ Hanoi *s demands seemed to concern i^gotiation procedures. It would enter negotiations if the NLF could '^take part" (though not as sole representative of SWl) and if the bombing of the North vera suspended. The first of these demands J of course ^ is not purely procedural ^ since giving the NLF a formal role in negotiations would move it toward a position of legitimacy in SVN politics ^ whatever the outcome of the negotiations • Lewandowski^ then^ seemed to suggest that the war could be brought to an end by strengthening the position of the NLF^ weakening that of Ky (and^ no doubt j the anti- communist tendency in SVN he represented )j fudging all other issues over at least the short run. (6/27/6?) (s) Ruminations . During September^ Lewandowski communed with D'Orlandl in Saigon on possible solutions. All of his thoughts J however J returned to a single theiae: coalition government. The bulk of the ministers could be "sensible SVIT politicians/* with a man or two from the right (meaning the Ky government) and a man or two from the left (meaning the NLF) in "unimportant ministries." Of perhaps even greater significance ^ he firmly opposed any development designed to reinforce the status quo with respect to the then existing GVl" -- including ^ specifically J measures for mutual de-escalation of the war. (9/V66-9/1V66) Later j D^Orlandi outlined a settlement package that he thought would get immediate; seri.ous consideration in Hanoi. It included US withdrawal "eventually"; internationally con- trolled elections "after one or two years"; leading to a neutral J coalition government. Coalition^ in his mind^ was "not a 'must.f" V,Tiether this package rei^lected Lewandowski 's appraisal^ or D ^Orlandi^s softening of the Pole's vleWj is not clear. (10/I6/66) (3) Probing the US . Just before visiting Hanoi in mid- November^ Lewandowski tried to take a serious reading on US attitudes. His questions were so phrased as to make the response desired by the communist side apparent. They dealt with pro- cedures that might follow a ceasefire and were no doubt an effort TOP SECRET - NOBIS Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 ?Z TOP SECRET " NODIS to find a set of actions vhich^ if accepted by the US^ would ultimately result in a situation in SVN acceptable to the coEnnunists. Specifically^ he wanted to know if US troop withdrawal depended on GW control over areas then governed or contested by the VC; if the US would withdraw from combat areas and not interfere in the creation of a new government in SW; if the US would oppose progress toward peaceful reunification; if the US would accept the ICC as the machinery for bringing peace to SW, All but the third of these questions boil down essentially to one: to what extent would the US remove itself from the contest over who should rule in SVET? All were framed without indication of a quid pro quo. Thus they reveal nothing of DRV willingness to remove itself from the contest, (ll/lij^/66) (h) Speaking for the US . When Lewandowski returned from Hanoi at the end of Dlovember^ he brought along his own fozmula- tion of the US position on a final settlement. The critical points on the future of SVN include: US military withdrawal after the restoration of peace; US acceptance that ^'the present status quo in SW would be changed in order to take into account the interests of the parties presently opposing the policy of the US in SW'' ; and US acceptance of the results of ''free and democratic elections/' held 'Vith the participation of all/' under "the necessary control machinery." (I2/7/66) The political complexion of the new status quo is left open J but clearly SVTJ comiiunists would be entitled to contend for power* Clearly ^ tooj the phrase "necessary control machinery" could not refer in Communist minds to the US presence or the existing GVST, On the other hand^ no piece of "machinery" less forceful than these could be expected by the communists to enforce an electoral outcome regarded as unacceptable to the aimed parties contending in SVJI. Thus the formulation does not provide a peace- ful solution to the problem of who shall rale SW. It offers a way for the US to end its part in the war. It leaves open the question of what the communist side would do in return. Ttils, presumably J is what the foimulatlon left as the subject of nego^ tiation. 8 TOP SECRET - MODIS Duclassifled per Executive Order 13526, Section 3 J NND Pmject Number NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 i3 TOP SECHST - NODIS Unilateral Concessions Lewandovski probed for US concessions on the terras of final settle- ment beyond previously stated official positions ^ such as the Fourteen Points and the Manila Communique, His method of operation was such as to conceal vhat reciprocity (if any) might come from the DEV. In the end J hovever^ he got virtually no concessions of substance. As a result ^ it might be argued the greatest unilateral movement avay from previous positions vas on the DEV side^ which agreed to meet with the US without a cessation of the bombing of the Korth. IVhile the natiire of the pro- spective contact remained ±n total obscurity — we had no indication of what matters the DKV representative would be prepared to address -- the DPV must have hoped for something of value and was prepared to probe for it while the bombing continued. In effect ^ this meant tacitly accepting the bombing as an American blue chip in the bargaining process ^ something the DRV had sought tenaciously to avoid in the past. (See^ however ^ the XYZ episode.) In response to the four questions Lewandowski posed in mid-November ^ the US replied: the i^lanila formulation spoke for itself with respect to US troop withdrawal; the US supported the constitutional processes then emerging in Saigon as the route to representative government in SVN; the US would accept peaceful^ freely chosen reunification (as already indicated in the Fourteen Points); the machinery needed to enforce and supervise a final settlement should be decided hy negotiations j taking acco^ont of problems revealed in the recent past -^^ i-e.^ with the ICC. Nothing was conceded at all. (ll/lif-15/66) Tae US accepted Lewandowski's final 10 Point foimulation as broadly reflecting its position^ but qualified this by stating^ "We must add that several specific points are subject to important differences of interpre- tation/^ Q?he qualifier was not elaborated^ even though the Poles urged that the specific points at issue be indicated or that the formulation be revised to eliminate the need for this sweeping reservation. The point which raised the sharpest apprehension in Washington was that indicating US acceptance that the "status quo in SW would be changed" to take account of communist interests, E^^en this language^ however^ as State pointed outj was broad enough to mean aii^^thlng from putting the I^TLF into the government forthwith to a simple endorsement of the electoral pro- cesses then being elaborated in Saigon. US troop withdrawal is explicitly linked to the ^^anila Communique ^ though the specific conditions of the Manila offer are not repeated. Lewandowski^s fifth point j however ^ may have added something to the previous US stance ^ by calling for a GW based on '^the participation of all through free democratic elections j" held under "the necessary control machinery," The US seemed to be accepting universal suffrage (no exclusion of communists and neutralists ^ as later specified in the EM constitution) and supervisory machixiery not controlled by the non-Communist side^ though what all this could mean in practice would have emerged only through negotiations. (12/5/66^ 12/7/66) 9 TOP SECRET - NODIS Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3,3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 i^ TOP SECRET - I'ODTS Givea the suspicion vith which the DRV uadoubtediy views US intentions^ the Levandowski foimf-ilation^ especially when seasoned vith the "impoirfcant differences" clause j is unlikely to have struck the Morth Vietnamese as at all forthcoming. In spite of this^ they agreed to meet. While they may not have intended to offer much at Warsaw^ their willingness to come while the bombing continued undercut the seriousness we wo\ild attach from then on to their declarations of negotiating preconditions^ their confidence about their military progress^ etc, etc- OSiese factors are weighty enough to give importance to the question: why were they willing to meet at all? According to the reasoning above ^ the answer does not lie in our responses to Lewandowskl. If not^ we should look for factors external to Marigold — the rising confusion in China ^ perhaps ^ or a pessimistic estimate of Communist military prospects in SM^ or .... Furthermore^ if we did not lure them toward the conference table with the attractions of our offerj the possibility arises that the other pressures pushing them in that direction were sufficient to induce significant concessions j had the contact occurred. 10 TOP SSCBET - I^rODIS Declassified per Execuiive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Projeci Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 /, TOP SECRET - NOBIS The Soviet Role ia ^^^igold In the naaterials available for this study ^ the first explicit discussion of Marigold between US and Soviet officials does not appear until veil after the ¥arsav contact had been canceled; On December 22 ^ the Soviet Charge in Washington^ Alexander Zinchuk^ called on \llllxam Eundy to express Soviet support for the Polish initiative and to dis- courage the US from seeking a "militaristic^* solution in Vietnam, Zinchufc indicated that the matter had been discussed with DEV leaders visiting Moscow in late November and again in early December* He implied that the Soviet Union had felt unable to encourage the DSV to continue with the contact because of the bombing of December 2 and h. The lateness of Zinchuk^s approach to Bundy and the content of his message would suggest the Soviets played at most a passive role in lylarigold. This would be consistent with their abandoning sponsorship of the prospective Conference on Cambodia In May 1965j their refusal to transmit the US letter to the DRV Eubassy in Moscow during Mayflower {¥iB,y 1965)^ and their frequent rebuffs thereafter of US efforts to invoke their mediation* On the other hand^ the Italians on several occasions early in Marigold indicated that they understood the Poles to be acting on Soviet instructions. D^Orlandi also q^uoted Lewandowski as saying that Hanoi was "tightly controlled" by the Chinese and hence preliminary talks woTold have to be between Washington and MoscoWj with overt DEV participation only as an acceptable basis for negotiations emerged, (6/29/66^ 7/9/66^ 9/1 V66) There are no further references of this sort J however J after mid- September. It is at least possible ^ then^ that the Russians were the principal sponsors of Marigold. If so^ they minimized their v^isibility when Marigold appeared to be succeeding^ emerging to express their interest to us only after the bombing of Hanoi and the collapse of the Warsaw contact - TDiis is followed chronologically by the unusually active Soviet role in Sunflower, Given past Soviet reluctance to mediate ^ it is noteworthy that the Russians would come to the fore at a time when conditions seemed relatively unpropitious* 5his raises at least two q;aestlons: (1) As noted above (tender "Unilateral Concessions'*) the DRV may have had reasons external to the I&rigold exchanges for wanting direct talks with the US at just this tirne. Did the Russians receive encourage- ment from. Hanoi to try further? 11 TOPSECRST - N0DI3 \ Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Projet:! Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 20 U ^ TOP SECRET - I^JODIS (2) Or was it the Decerriber basbing of Hanoi that stimulatecl the Russians? Zinchuk expressed apprehension both to Burdy and Harry Mac- Hierson that Hanoi might call for Soviet volunteers under the tertns of the Bucharest Declaration ('^if the war escalates and if help is necessary")- The Russians no doubt wished to avoid such ^'escalations" whatever Hanoi's feelings in the natter. The Trinh foimula (of Januaiy 28^ 1967) iiiade these two possible motives compatible-, by tying US-DRY talks to the "unconditional cessation of US bombing and all other acts of war against the DRV," At this pointy the DRV attitude bad hardened in one important respect^ softened in another. It officially closed the door on the possibility of talks while the bombing continued^ but it implied publicly (and made explicit privately) its willingness to talk if its conditions on bombing were met. Hiis at last gave the Russians a license to try on Hanoi's behalf ^ even though worsening the chances for success because of the stiff conditions demanded of the US. I I 12 TO? SECRET - NOBIS Declassified pei Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 /; TOP SECRET - NOBIS Leaks and Pressures From the beginning^ Levandowski stressed the Importance of secrecy to the possible success of ^larigoldj the reason given being opposition by canmunist hardliners^ especially the Chinese. In spite of this^ the Poles leaked portions of their version of the episode at strategic noments during the contact in a relatively obvious effort to put pressure on the US. The US responded in part^ as the Poles wished^ by cooperating with Lewandovski 's initiatives, T-Jhere this proved inadequate^ ve took counter measures which combined the defensive leaking of the US version of por- tions of the episode on the one hand with incentives and exhortations intended to induce other participants to maintain the privacy of the con- tact on the other. The first Polish approach to the US in Iferigold vas conveyed through the Italians: D'Orlandi contacted Lodge in Saigon; Fenoaltea contacted State in Washington* Meanwhile ^ Fanfani described the matter to U Thant, Somevhat later ^ Saragat took it up with Goldberg, It vas iRnr^ediately recognized in feshington that any indication of US reluctance to respond would quite soon be -widely interpreted as lack of interest in a peaceful end to the war* ¥e therefore undertook to develop the contact^ even though skeptical about the real promise it held forth. At the same time^ ve protested politely to the Italians about trying to do business in this manner. (6/27-30/66, ?/ 6- 10/66) During the rest of the summer and fall^ as Levandowski felt he vas making progress ^ the problem of leaks abated. Immediately following the December 13-14 "bombing of Hanoi and the DRV*s cancellation of the Warsaw ineetingj however^ pressure through leaks resigned • On one day alone ^ December L5> Lewandowski revealed emotional tidbits of the episode to the Dutch Charge in Saigon , the Polish Anbassadcr in Some managed to have the Pope quiz him about Vietnam^ and Hanoi cabled Harrison Salisbury permission to visit the DSV, A few days later, the Polish Ambassador gave the Pope ''the vhole story." (IP/15-I9/66) Ve responded first by suspending the Hanoi targets in Rolling Thunder 52 J then by offering to halt all strikes within a 10 mile radius of the center of Hanoi ;ji exchange for a similar show of restraint by the VC around Saigon, and finally putting the 10 mile Hanoi sanctuary Into effect unilaterally — when the prospects of getting explicit reciprocity seemed too faint, Tnus in order to revive Marigold^ we offered formal assurances of restraint on our bombing that went well beyond those the Poles had urged us to accept informally after the strikes of December 2 and h. (12/15/66, 12/21/66, I2/2V66) The US version of Marigold was explained in some detail to the Pope, U Thant^ and the Canadian, Italian, Australian^ 13 TOP SECRET - KODTS Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 NND Project Nutnber: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 I TOP SECRET - NODIS New Zealand and Eritisli Governments. The 10 mile sanctuary around Hanoi vas stressed as a potential basis for reviving the contact ^ reflecting US goodwill and making it essential that the widening circle of those privy to the matter preserve the utmost discretion about itj secrecy being the sine qua non for success » tfeanv/hile a m.uch less detailed report on the contact was given the GW and other troop contributing countries J to forestall possible misgivings should they hear of the matter first from other sources* I^ mid -January J then. Marigold was knovm in varying degree to a large circle of diplomats^ some briefed by us^ some by the Poles and most by both sides. On January ig^ a brief reference to l^rigold and its dis- ruption by the mid-December bombing of Hanoi was filed in the press from Ottawa. The information was attributed to "high Cans.dian officials." By Februarj^ h^ a much more complete version had been filed from UK Head- quarters in New York, kt this point j with so many possible sources for the story, there was no agreement among the Americans on the origin of the leak to the press, Goldberg thought the Poles were responsible j while Gronouski argued that it had been the Canadians. (2/I-2/67, 2/7-8/67) The wai- of leaks gradually escalated during the spring. By May^ the Poles were expressing concern to Gronouski over a z*umor they had picked up in Washington — that the US contemplated publishing a white paper on Iferigold. Hxis would force them^ they said^ to retaliate in kind Just at this time^ an e:x±reniely detailed account of the episode was pub- lished by John Hightower of the AP. The most controversial point in his story was the statement that US "officials were not sure the Poles had any commitment from North Vietnam to begin talks- Some ... doubted that Mr. Papacki was in fact ,,* making kno^ni Washington's readiness for talks to Hanoi/' Washington felt the Hightower account was ^'essentially accurate and reasonably favorable-'" The Poles were told the US would publish no white paper. They replied that "US officials had apparently chosen another way to put out the story." However, no official Polish rebuttal vas made public and the war of leaks simmered down on this acrimonious note. (5/3-9 /67) Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the war of leaks is the silence of the DEV, Although Hanoi did mount a propaganda campaign against US bombing of the DEV immediately after the collapse of the Marigold contact — e.g.^ through the Harrison Salisbury visit^ etc,-- no mention was ever made of the prospective Warsaw contact and its cancel- lation after the mid -December bombing. Properly handled^ this could have been made a telling point with world opinion. Presumably^ secrecy about the contact was of greater value to the DHV. It is quite possible^ there- forOj that the Polish leaks were not appreciated in Hanoi and the Polish handling of the matter was criticized there ^ as in Washington, (Alterna- tively^ however J it may be that the Polish leaks satisfied the URV^s propaganda req^uirements ^ within the constraints imposed by DRV relations with Chinaj the maintenance of rank-and-file morale among Vietnamese communist forces ^ etc. In that case, Hanoi '2 silence would not in itself imply an adverse jud^ent on the Polish role.) 1^ TOP SECEET - xVODIS /7 DccJassilled per Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 NISTD Project Number: NND 63316. By; NWD Date: 201 1 TOP SECRET - NOBIS Bombing the North I; Blue Chip or Topic for Talkst The US proposed repeatedly duriia^ J-larigold that de-escalation be taken as the first topic between the two sides » What would the Conmu- nlsts do if the US stopped bombing? Lewandowski with eaual persistence refused to accept this question as a point of departure. The DRV woiild reject it^ he sald^ because de-escalation would be viewed as strengthening the governmental status quo in SWj whereas it was precisely a change in the SVR government that the Communist side required. Instead^ therefore ^ he urged that this subject be left for last- Once both sides agreed on tertas for the ultimate situation in SVU^ finding the route there via de-escalation would be easy. Although Lewandowski never j of course^ made the argument himself j his approach meant Communist acceptance of the bombing as a blue chip in the bargaining process because the talks on settlement terms would have to take place while the bombing continued. One inducement the Cormunists would have to accept terms desired by the US would be that this would end the bombing. ToOj his approach saved more face for the Communist side than ours^ which required that the bombing be addressed explicitlv. When^ finally J the US went along with Lewandowski^s approach ^ it upped the ante by the December bombings of Hanoi. The DRV cancellation of the contact meant, then^ that It would neither accept de-escalation as a starting point for talks nor accept augmentation of the US blue chip through strikes on more sensitive targets. The cancellation of the talks over this issue measures the failure of Lewandowski's brokerage- He had not narrowed the gulf between the two sides sufficiently. His version of possible settlement terms was not attractive enough to make the US forego upping the ante^ on the one hand J or to induce the DRV to accept the higher ante^ on the other. 15 TOP SECi^ET - N0DI8 DeclassiHed per Executive Order 13520, Sectiun 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 633 16. By: NWD Datei 201 1 r TOP SECRET - NODIS Bombing the North II: Signals, Intended and Inadvertant As is shown in a separate study ^ beginning in June 1966^ there vas a marked increase in the amount of ordnance e:,3>ended against north Viet- nam^ Itiis was time for the country as a whole ^ for Eoute Package VI and for the areas within 10 miles of the center of Hanoi and 5 miles of the center of Haiphong, The general level of ordnance expenditure remained high until mid-JTovember. During the last two weeks of November ^ probably on account of weatherj air strikes against the M'orth were at their lowest level since June^ rising markedly again during the first and second weeks of December. The most sensitive area of all, that within 5 miles of the center of Hanoi^ was str^ack (with about 25 tons of ordnance) for the first time in the war during the last week of June^ as part of a general attack on ^GL facilities , About 3 tons more were expended in this area in mid- Au^gust. It was not hit again until the first week in December (the 2nd and ii'th) when almost 50 tons were ejcpended, then hit yet again during the second week in December (the 13th and iHh) -with over 100 tons. The intended targets in all of the December attacks were the Yen Vien Rail- road Yard and the Van Dien Vehicle Depot , but apparently there was collateral damage in all cases. In particular, during the December 13-1^1- attacks, the Chinese and Rumanian Etnbassies seem to have been hit, along with some residential structures in central Hanoi. From the ground, then, there might appear to have been an increase in the intensity of attack, measured both in tons of ordnance expended and type of target j commencing December 2, i.e.^ immediately following Hanoi's assent to some form of US-DEV meeting in Warsaw. ^e Poles expressed alarm about the '^intensification of the bcanbing" on December 2, 7, 8^ and 9^ arguing that ''such attacks could only threaten or destroy the possibility of contact in Warsaw," They expressed these views as their own, not as a message transmitted from Hanoi. However, I^wandowski told D 'Orlandi (who in turn told US on December 9) that he believed Hanoi had attached significance to the fact J:hat during the two weeks he had been in Hanoi ( approximately Novanber I6-3O) the bombing had appeared to be at a reduced level. Lewandowski thought Hanoi had interpreted this as a tacit signal of US support for his mission - In fact, the targets near Hanoi which were the object of attack in December had been authorized as part of Rolling Thunder 52, for which the execute message was sent on November 10, This was prior to Lewandowski 's departure for Hanoi, though the approximate timing of his impending visit ("after the US elections") was known in Washington when the execute message was sent. (IO/15-I6/66) Presumably^ had weather not intervened, the strikes near Hanoi might well have occurred during his visit, rather than after his return with Hanoi ^s "positive response.'' Hanoi's review of Lewandowski 's proposals would have occurred in quite a different con- text, one reflecting more accurately, perhaps ^ US attitudes. 16 TOP SECRhIT - NODIS Duclassiried per Executive Order 13526, Section 3 J NND Project Number NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 f/ TOP SECRET - NODIS On December 10^ Washington inTormed both the ¥arsaw and Saigon Enabassies that it had been decided to leave the bombing pattern unchanged. Gronouski vas forewarned that this might involve some targets Rapacki would Insist reflected further escalation. Apparently J the strikes of December 13-14 vers so inteorpreted in Hanoi ^ which instructed the Poles on December ik to terminate all conversations . On December 2^^ the US informed the Communists that bombing within 10 miles of the center of Hanoi had been suspended as an act of goodwill in the hopes of reviving the ¥arsaw contact. Ihis vas a more substantial concession on the bombing than the Poles had urged after the December 2 and k strikes^ in that it reflected an explicit^ well-defined commitment j rather than the tacit^ unformalized restraint suggested by the Poles. The DRV may have concluded that propaganda repercussions ^ actual and prospective J had forced a change in the US posture ^ causing Hanoi in turn to stiffen the conditions it imposed in exchange for talks . The Trinh formula of January £8^ 1967^ demanding an end to all bombing of the DRVj may reflect this calculation. IT ■ TOP SECPJilT - rroDis n Docliissifit'd per Executive Order 13526. Section 3,3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date; 2011 TOP SECRET - NODIS US Good Faith Prior to the Decemher 2 bombing of Hanoij no conditions vith respect to US military actions had been demanded by the Communists as a price for the Warsaw meeting. The only terms ^ as expressed by Levandowski to Lodge on I^ovember 30^ vere: "I am authorized to say that if the US are really of the vievs vhich I have presented (i-e.^ his 10 points)^ it would be advisable to confirm them directly by con- versation vith the North Vietnamese Ambassador in Warsaw/^ In addition to this^ he urged only speed and secrecy. The US had several times previously suggested that mutual de- escalation be undertaken by the two sides. In a major policy state- ment ^ Goldberg offered "a cessation of all bombing of North Vietnam— the moment ve are assured^ privately or other^/Zisej that this step vill be answered promptly by a corresponding and appropriate de- escalation on the other side/' (9/22/66) But de-escalation was rejected ^u^ lewandowski as the wrong subject with which to start. Thus the US had no cominitment to avoid bombing Hanoi stemming from the agreement to meet in KarsaWj and in fact^ as noted above, strikes against Hanoi had been authorised since mid-November but had not occurred J presumably for reasons of weather. The Poles argued that there was a difference between de-escalation and non- escalation, ¥3 should have been willing to trade the latter for talks J even if not the former, Secondlyj they stretched the meaning of our official position, Eapacki claiiaed, "yo^ have said over and over again that you would end all bombing if there was an assurance from Hanoi that there would be a response toward peace from Hanoij however ^ we did not ask that you stop bombing but only that you not intensify it." And "recalling speeches of Goldberg ^ the President ^ Secretaiy Rusk and others ^ once we received the signal we dld^ we would have had every right to call for a stop in the bombing," (I2/19/66) Without eiKiorsing this particu- lar formulation^ E'Orlandi indicated his general agreement with the Polish Interpretation, (I2/18/66) Gronouski feared it would be widely shared and that the Communists "will have no trouble convincing the leadership in every capital of the world that our stated desire for peace negotiations is insincere." (I2/1 4/66) In their minds^ the issue t'orned less on the precise language of previous US expressions than on a general tenor which they felt was undercut by the December bombings. Washington apparently soon came to share this view^ and the 10 mile bombing sanctuary around Hanoi's center was established to underline the seriousness of US intentions. 18 TOP SECRET - NODIS Declassified perExecuiive Order 13526, Section 33 NNDPmjea Number: NND 63316. By: NWDDaie: 201 1 \ O ID O o Declassified per Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 201 1 ^ The £ollo^i±n.g chronology consists of brief summaries and interpretative statements about each date J follovred by indented documentation. . *^ Declassified perExecuiive Order 13526, Section 33 NND Pmjecn Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Dme: 201 1 'ZY Declassified pei Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 201 1 2a TOP SECRET - NOD IS June 27, 1966 * — ' — ^ — '- — If ■ ■ — ■ Jfe.rigold begins with a contact between D'Orlandi^ the Italian Ambassaclor in Saigon ^ and Levandovskij the Polish Representative on the ICG J also working out of Saigoa. Lewandowski^ just returned from Hanoi ^ reported that he had a ^Very specific peace offer^^ to transmit^ one that vouJ.d lead to a "political compromise" settling the whole Vietnam question once and for all. The attractive features were (a) Hanoi would not ask for immediate reunification^ (b) it would not demand a socialist system in SVlTj (c) SM would not have to change its relation- ships in the field of foreign affairs^ (d) ^'neutralization" would not "be demanded _j (e) U.S. withdrawal could be sdieduled along a "reasonable calendar J " (f) Hanoi did not seek to interfere with the SVTI government. Hanoi's conditions for entering negotiations were that (a) the HLF "take part'' and (b) there be a "suspension" of the bombing* D'Orlandi communicated all this to Lodge In Saigon^ two days later (June 29); on instructions from Fanfanij who was also transmitting it directly to Washington. Saigon 58^0 (to SecState)^ TS/l^odis^ 29 June I966 (Section 1 of 2} Literally Eyes Only for the President^ The Secretary^ and the Acting Secretary "1. This afternoon D^Orlandi^ Italian Ambassador, telephoned to say it was xirgent that I come to his office as soon as the Catholic service honoring the anniversary of the coronation of Pope Paul VI had ended. I went to his office at about 6;45j ^^d he began as follows: - ICC "2. Two days agOj the Polish representative on the J Levandowskij came to him with a ^very specific peace offe ■y* "3« D*Orlandi said he had requested instructions from Fanfanij who told him (1) to submit the whole pro- posal to me^ and (2) said that he^ Fanfanij would send the whole thing to Washington for their consideration," "9« ^e Pole began "oy saying that Hanoi has been deeply disappointed lij the proposals made by Ronning which J they are surCj had emanated originally from the United States and not from the Canadians. Ronning had TOP SECRET " NODIS Declassified pei Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NNTD 63316, By: NWD Date: 201 1 ^^' TOP SECRET - N0DI3 proposed that the U.S. stop the "boml^ing if Forth Viet-KTam stopped the Irifiltratlonj and had talked alDout the exchange of prisoners- parcels and letters- T^is had bitterly dis- appointed North Vietnam, ©le first pointy they had said^ vonld be unconditional surrender j and they could not accept it J but they are open to a 'political compromise' settling once and for all the entire Yiet-TTaiu q_uestion- '^10. When D'Orlandi said that he was skeptical^ the Pole said that Hanoi 'was prepared to go 'guite a long way.' 'It is useless for me to add^' said the Pole^ 'that should there not be any kind of a preliminary agreement ^ Hanoi will deny flatly ever having made any offer,* According to the Pole, the Forth Vietnaiaese are 'tightly controlled' by the Chinese Communists. Hie preliminary talks, therefore , should be between Moscow and Washington. Waen and if proposals should emerge which could be considered as a basis for negotiations , Hanoi woiild at that time and under those circmtstances get into it. Eie Pole said that Hanoi was afraid of the Chinese Concmunists who have an interest in dragging on the war for many years. D'Orlandi added that the Pole was evidently 'proud of himself for having brought these proposals about, "U- The proposals are as follows: A. They insist that the so-called National Libera- tion Front 'take part' in the negotiations. The key word is 'take part.' According to D'Orlandi, there is 'no question of their being the representative; they are not to have bxpj monopoly,' B. There must be suspension of the bombing. "12- These are the two proposals. "13, Then there are other points^ which D'Orlandi called 'negative ones,' which are that (a) Hanoi will not ask for Immediate reunification, either \i'^ elections or otheiTwise, of North and South Vietnam'' LODGE (Section £ of 2) "(b) They will not ask for establishment of a 'socialist' system in South Viet-ITam; (c) They will not ask South Viet-Nam to change the relationships which it has in the field of foreign affairs; and (d) They will not ask for neutralization. TOP SECRET - II0DI3 i? Dedassificd per Executive Order ^526, Section 33 NND Project Number: NND 633 i 6. By: NWD Date: 201 1 TOP SECRET - NOriS (e) Although they will ask for U,S. vithdravalj they are ready to discuss a ^reasonable calendar,^ (f) Although 'we would like scmeone othur than Ky' - to quote the words of Hanoi - they do not want to interfere with the South VietnsJaiese Government." *^18. The Pole said that his Government would be villlng to arrange for D'Orlandi to meet with appro- priate Polish spokesmen any^^rhere -- Hong Kong or Singapore, In response to a question by D'Orlandi as to why they had come to himj the Pole said they wanted 'an able debater to put the case to President Johnson ^ and we feel that the Italian Government has the sym- pathy of the United States Government,' Moreover ^ the Italians have the same interest we have in agreement bet^/een Washington and Moscowj and in shutting out Peking . "19. D'Orlandi's impression is that the Poles are desperately seeking a way out on Moscow's instruc- tions* BiiSj he said J may need further exploration. He had the definite impression that noi^ Hanoi 'was amenable to common sense' saying 'they do not want anything that would not stop the whole war, They want a political settlementj and are prepared tc go a long vay, *" LODGE June 29, 1966 On the same day that D'Orlandi saw Lodge in Saigon^ the Italian Ambassador Fenoaltea brought the information to the State Department in Washington, State saw little new in it, with two exceptions. The Italians were therefore asked to inquire discreetly if there was real movement on the following points : (1) Did the condition that the TTLF '^talce part" in negotiations mean it need no longer be accepted as the ^'oole representative" of the SW people? (2) Did the woi-d ^^suspension" mean that a bombing "cessation" was no longer a prerequisite to negotiations? 3 TOP SECRET - N0DI3 J.t Declassified per Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 TOP SECRETi: - NODIS State i;108 (to .Amemljassy Saia*on)j TS/NodiSj 29 June 1966 Literally Eyes Only for Ambassador Embtel 58UO "Italian Ambassador Fenoaltea came In today with Faxochej Italian Ambassador-designate to Canada j who had hand -^carried message similar to that contained reftel and who said he was under instructions to hand- carry our reply back to Rome ir • * • '^Je told Fenoaltea that^ except for use of term 'participate' with respect to DILFj vhich couJ-d have ioiplication Hanoi was not insisting NLF be "sole representative^ of SVHj and 'suspension of bombing' in place of ^cessation of bombing^' position Hanoi indicated to Pole was very similar to previous indications their position. Thus in light of various translations these woi^s have gone through ^ it is not clear whether their use has any significance* Therefore ^ without indicating to Pole that message had been passed to USG^ suggested Italian Government on its own responsibility j guery Polish Eep on these two terms to determine whether form- ulations contained in Polish version of Hanoi ^s position were used advisedly by Hanoi and indicate some shift in position or were accidents of translation.,,," BALij June 3Qj I966 xhisk expressed skepticism about the value of the DEV proposal^ even if there were some movement on the points enumerated^ because allowing the KLF to "take part" might lead it eventually to a major -- even ''fatal" — role in SW politics^ however the negotiations caLne outj and because a bombing "suspension" would produce pressures for a "cessation." Given the risks of recrimination from ?anfani and Eapackij though^ he felt it necessary to follow up. He also predicted ^ correctly J that the POL strikes then prograrnmed for Rolling Thunder might stiffen the DRV position momentarilyj arguing against trying to move too fast. Lodge J on the other hand^ thought the package so forthcoming as to arouse suspicions about the intermecliary. Presumably ^ he was less familiar than State with the content of previous Hanoi communica- tions of the sort. Much of the proposal^ as conveyed^ ^7as old^ but two points to which hc; drew attention were new: the apparent acceptance of the existing Saigon government and of its foreign relationships. TOP SECRZT - NODIS Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3J NND Project Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 201 1 TOP SECRET - NOBIS Canberra 58 (to SecState)^ S/jrodis^ 30 June I966 Syes Only for Acting Secretary ar^i Ambassador from Secretary * m "2. I cannot from here make any full assessment of that message. The NLF part seems vague^ encouraging only in that it abandons the *sole representative* position- Hovever^ this position has always seemed a maximum opener^ and we must keep in mind alvays that even 'taking part* on a full basis vould go very far to give the NLF a majors and likely fatal j part in SVN politics. On the bombing^ a 'suspension' could easily lead to heai'y pressure for a 'cessation'. For the rest^ the disclaimers of any ioimediate 'Socialist' set-up in SVN or of Immediate reunification plans have a familiar ring from some past noises by DEV Eeps trying to make them- selves sound reasonable^" * • "^, All this being saidj I suppose that if Fanfani asks us to let D'Orlandi follovr up^ we would virtually have to agree*... With careful instructions and reasonable precautions ^ we should be able to minimize risks. In any case refusal to follow up — even if message wholly phony ^~ would expose us to recrimination from Fanfani and Eapacki alike*.,," "5* Moreover J there might o^st be something in It. Poles and Italians may seem devious channels ^ but not all that implausible if Hanoi is having any second thoughts. If so J POL strike might stiffen them momentarily ^ to avoid any appearance of weakness or effect of strike ^ and this argues for not moving too fast." . . EUSK Saigon 5855 (to SecState)^ TS/i^Todis^ 30 June I966 Literal.ly Eyes Only for the President ^ the Secretary and the Acting Secretary , * * "3* I^e proposals attributed to Hanoi j as a package j ;o far beypnd anything we, have heard mentioned Joe fore. .n fact J they appear So forxhcoming as xo arouse TOP SECRET - l^IODIS Dccbssified perExecuiive Order 13526, Section 33 NNDPmjea Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 %t) TOP SECRI^ - NODIS suspicion concerning the credibility of the Polish intemedip.ry. It seems to us that not only is the so- called KLF being abandoned as the sole bargaining agent J but so also is the NLF progi-am of a 'socialist' state J of unifying the Uorth and South j and of * neutralization. ' Also the phrase 'reasonable calendar* Indicates a definite softening of position regarding IGMS. Ttroops, IHae same is true of acceptance of the Government of South Viet-ITgm and its foreign relation- ships." * • LCCiGE July 6 & 7 , 1966 Fanfani also described the contact to U Hiantj who in turn passed it on to Goldberg at UTT headquarters » This increased fears of a leak from Fanfani on the US side. In fact^ the disclosure to U Thant vas considered such a leak and doubtless put pressure on the USG to pro- tect itself by piorsuing the contact j on the one handj and by taking defensive positions on the other* Geneva 6I (to State)^ TS/ETodis^ 6 July I966 For Acting Secretary from Ambassador Goldberg "5- Syg informed me that on recent visit to Italy Fanfani reported to him that POL ICC Ambassador had had conversation with Ho Clii Minh on June 27 in which Eo presumably said that they would be prepared to engage in serious discussions with us^ no'tv^ithstanding Chinese and Soviet objections j it bombings were suspended and If Vlet^Cong participated in talks. According to Thant^ this inforcaation relayed by POL ICC Ambassador to Italian Ambassador in Saigon who in turn communicated it to Fanfani. Ihant further reported that Fanfani believed message contained two new elements: (A) that Ho was not insisting on unconditional cessation of bombing, merely a suspension; and (:3) Ho not insistent that Viet- Cong be sole representatives of South Vietna- mese people at such negotiations. Fanfani had also told the Secretary General that he thought this message of such importance that it warranted sending a special Italian emissaiy to Washington to communicate the sub- stance of it to United States officials. Syg said Fanfani did this and that special emissary was asked in Washington to remain there pending a probe through 6 - TOP SECRET - N0DI3 Declassified pei Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NNTD 63316. By: NWD Dale: 201 1 TOP SECRET - NODIS Fanfani of the vord^ suspension^ and also to inquire vhat Ho meant b^ saying Viet- Cong would have to participate in the talks. Fanfani swcx*e U Thant to secrecy and the Secretary General therefore imparted this information to me in the strictist confidence saying he had not coimnuni- cated to anyone in Secretariat, He asked in particular that I not raise this ^ith Fanfani^ but if latter mentioned I it to me J I should disclaim knowledge of it from Syg^ except as I might receive knowledge of it from Washington." TUBBI I State 2673 (to J\men"bassy Tol;ski can judge the relative influence of these £1 TOP SECHHIT - NOD IS Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3 J NND Project Number NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 ^ TOP SECRET - NODIS men in the l^noi power structure. D'Orlandi refuses to pick up the lead given by Goldberg ^s IM speech and help devise a bombing- infiltration formula that might be acceptable to Hanoi. He says Levandovskl is interested only In a total package j son^thing ^'finalj" not de-escalation or even a ''truce to allov conversation," To illustrate the total package he suggests ; internationally con- trolled elections after one or two years; a neutral government; US withdrawal "eventually"; a coalition government ("not a 'must'V.) In response to State's guery^ Lodge reports that Lewandovrski plans to go to Hanoi shortly after the U.S. elections. Saigon 8583 (to SecState); S/NodiSj I6 October I966 "1. This is in reply to your 66655* '^2- On Saturday I asked D'Orlandi this question; Does Lewandowski's strong position against what he calls any form of ^barter*^ i.e. 'We stop doing this and you stop doing that' reflect his own appraisal of Hanoi's position or is it based explicitly on what he has been told by North Viet- namese? "3* D'Orlandi^s reply: 'Eiis question is not phrased so as to reflect the realities, Lewandovski's views reflect Fnaoi Van Long and Vo Nguyen Giap who are the only t>70 North Vietnamese with whom Lewandowski has been in contact. Are or are these not the real power in Hanoi? Lewandowski does not know. D'Orlandi believes you know more than we do about that. ^%* Question: Could Lewandowski envisage any variation on Goldberg's September 22nd bombing- infiltration formula which would be compatible both with the principle of reasonable reciprocity and with Hanoi's apparent determination to avoid actions which could be interpreted as bowing to U.S. pressure? ''5* Answer: D'Orlandi says: I don't thinly he would answer that question. It would be going back on what he has said he refused to do. He w^ants an over- all agreement — not a truce which would allow conversa- tions. He wants a "package deal* "which covers eveiy- thlng and which thereby avoids any chance of publicity. Hanoi will buy something that is 'final,' 2^ TOP SECHLT - NODIS "/7 i J 1 I Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 NND Project Nutnber: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 TO? SECRET - NOBIS ^^6, VJhen I asked D'Orlandi what would be the elements of a package deal he said for illustration: after one or two years ^ elections internationally controlled; a Vietnamese C-overnment which would abide by a policy of neutrality; the United States to leave 'eventually' (this word was stressed); a coalition government (which he said was not a *m.ust') which voiild contain representatives of so-called 'extremists' having nominal ministries. By 'extremists' he meant the Ky regime on the one hand and the Viet Cong on the other. D'Orlandi was sure there would never be an answer to the Q_uestion 'what will you do if the bomb- ing stops?* But a ^real package deal' would get 'very serious' consideration and it would get it 'Immediately, I" • « • *'8. As far as the question of your paragraph 2 is concerned I think it is answered effectively by Lewandowski^s intention to go to Hanoi immediately after the U,S, elections, Lewandowski says he 'attaches special importance' to these elections. Even though he says he does not understand our national politics he knows that the fact that the elections have been held will 'clear the air^ whatever the results may be*' It will mean that the electoral question will have been removed arid he will know that the United States 'can deal if it wants to.' "9. Comment: I find this interesting since it confirms the belief which you and I have had for a long time that they must at all costs avoid publicity and consequent loss of face. I think long drawn out peace talks ai^e very dangerous for us. It appears now that they are convinced that long drawn out peace talks are utterly unacceptable for them. End comment." October 25, I966 Ttie USGj GVl^ and Troop Contributing Countries propose settlement terms at the Manila Conference. Ihese include an end to aggression; territorial integrity for SVTI; reunification by free choice^ resolution of internal differences in SVE through a program of national reconcilia- tion; and removal of all allied military forces and installations no later than srx months after "the military and subversive forces of North Vietnam are withdrawn^ infiltration ceases j and the level of violence thus subsides." The settlement would be assured by international guarantees, particulars of which are open to negotiation. 23 TOP SECRET - ITODIS Declassifled per Executive OrcJcr 13526. Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 201 1 TOP SECRET - NOBIS Eie pivotal^ features of the proposal are that (l) the future of the insurgents is to be settled through the national reconciliation program; and (2) allied ^rithdraval is to come after law and order are restored. These provisions would not allov a coalition government in which the Communists or i^TLF participated as an organized entity. Few York Times , 26 October I966 TEKTS OF COIU'fuNIQUE MD DECLARATIONS SIGNED AT CLOSE OF THE MANILA CONFERENCE The Communique "27. So that their aspirations and position would be clear to their allies at Manila and friends every- where , the Government of the Republic of Vietnam solemnly stated its views as to the essential elements of peace in Vietnam: (i) Cessation of aggression. At issue in Vietnam is a struggle for the preservation of values which people eveiywhere have cherished since the dawn of history: the independence of peoples and the freedom, of individuals, Olie people of South Vietnam ask only that the aggression that threatens their independence and the externally supported terror that threatens their freedom be halted. No self-respecting people can ask for less. No peace-loving nation should ask for more, (ii) Preservation of the territorial integrity of South Vietnam* The people of South Vietnajn are defending their own territory against those seeking to obtain by force and terror what they have been unable to accomplish by peacefxil means, l^Jhile sympathising with the plight of their brothers in the North and whife disdaining the regime in the North j the South Vietnamese people have no desire to threaten or harm the people of the North or invade their country. (ill) Reunification of Vietnam, The GovernLient and people of South Vietnam deplore the partition of Vietnam into Horth and South. But this partition brought about by tha Geneva agreements in 195^^ however unfortunate and regrettable ^ will he respected until j by the free choice of all Vietnamese ^ reunification is achieved. 2k TOP SECHET - N0DI3 Duclassifled per Executive Order 13526, Section 3 J NND Pmject Number NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 ^7 TOP SECHSr - NODIS (iv) Eesolution of internal problems. The people of South ^?"ietnain seek to resolve their own internal differ- ences and to this end are prepared to engage in a program of national reconciliation. \Jhen the aggression has stopped J the people of South Vietnam will move more rapidly toward reconciliation of all elements in the society and will move for^^ard^ through the democratic process j toward human dignity^ prosperity and lasting peace. (v) Removal of allied military forces, ^e people of South Vietnam will ask their allies to remove their forces and evacuate their installations as the mill- tary and subversive forces of North Vietnam are withdrawn, infiltration ceases ^ and the level of violence thus subsides Effective guarantees. The people of South Vietnam^ mindful of their experience since 195^^ insist that any negotiations leading to the end of hostilities incorporate effective international guarantees. They are open-minded as to how such guarantees can be applied and made effective. "28, The other participating governments reviewed and endorsed these as essential elements of peace and agreed they would act on this basis in close consultation among themselves in regard to settlement of the conflict. "29. In particular J they declared that allied forces are in the Republic of Vietnam because that country is the object of aggression and its Government requested support in the resistance of its people to aggression. They shalJ. be withdrawn^ after close consuJ-tation^ as the other side withdraws its forces to the North, ceases infiltration^ and the level of violence thus subsides. Those forces will be withdrawn as soon as possible and not later than six months after the above conditions have been fulfilled , " .... November 10 ^ I9 66 Rolling Thunder 52 is authorized. The targets include the Yen Vien Eailroad Yard and the Van Dien Vehicle Depot near Hanoi ^ the Thai Nguyen Steel Plant ^ the Haiphong Cement Plant and two other targets near Haiphong 25 TCP SECRIin? - NODIS [' ^ ■Q Declassified per Executive Order 13526. Section 3,3 NND Prujeci Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date; 2011 TOP SSCRin' - IT0DI3 JCS 7735 (to CINCPAC), TS/LTM)IS, 10 November I9 66 Refs: (a) JCS 6008 (b) JCS 3kZJ "1. (U) This is an execute message. "2. (5S) Guidance goveriEmg ROLLING THUNDER 5I set forth in reference (a) remains in effect for ROLLING 33EMDER 52, except for added targets and additional guidance contained in this directive. "3. (TS) Effective upon receipt of this message;, you are authorized to conduct air strikes against the following objectives in North Vietnam; TCT # N.AME BE NUl'IBER a. l8.i|-2 Xuan Mai Hwy Br 616-024^^ h. 19 Yen Vien ES Clf Yazxi 6l6-022l c. 51.1 Ea Gia POL St or SSV/ (Former Phuc 616-O662 Yen POL Stor) d. 51.18 Can Then POL Stor (Former l^e-p POL 616-I340 Stor) e. 63.11 Van Dien Vehicle Dpo (Note 2) 616-O696 f . Kinh Uo SAM Stor 6l6-009ll^ g. Banoi SM Stor W, 6l6-025T h. Haiphong SMA Assembly 6l6-. of your 8 378 cT was not lost: on 33 TO? 3ECR2T - NODIS DeclassiHed per Executive Order 13520, Section 3.3 NKD Project Number: NND 633 16. By: NWD Datei 201 1 TOP SECRET - NOD 13. Levandovski. Comment: I am beginning to vonder if this is not becoming the crux of the loatter. End Comment. "o * • • • LODGE November 16-gOj I966 A separate attempt to elicit a response to the Phase A - I^ase E fozmulation is made by passing it to the Russians via George Brown during his visit to Moscow. Ihey indicate interest^ provided that the DRV"s k points and the NLF*s 5 points are accepted as a ''basis for discussion" in the negotiations that follow. Brown is not informed of the Lewandowski contact^ and it does not come up during his talks in Moscow. State 86196 (to Amembassy London) j S/jTodiSj 16 Tfovember I966 Please pass following message from Secretary to FonSec Bro^m "•..Bear George: Your forthcoming visit to Moscow is obviously of the greatest importance in sounding out the Soviets on the possibilities of action toward peace in Viet-nam..,/' "As one way of saving Hanoi's face^ you may wish to explore on your otm initiative the possibility of a package deal vhich in its totality represented what both we and Hanoi would agree to as a reasonable measure of mutual de-escalation J but which would have two separate phases in Its execution. Phase A would be a bombing suspension^ while Phase B^ which woiold follow^ would see the execution of all the other agreed de- escalatory actions. I^noi's actions taken in Phase B might appear to them to be in response to our actions in Phase E rather than to the bombing suspension. Obviously J Fanoi cannot have the bombing suspension without also accepting Phase B. \le would^ of course^ like to hear Moscow or Hanoi *s reaction to this admittedly general proposition before we make any specific commitments/^ RUSK TOP SECRET - NOBIS 3^^ Declassified pei Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NTsTD 63316, By: NWD Date: 201 1 S7 TOP SECRET - M'CDIS State 91787 (to Amembassy London)^ S/lTodiSj 20 I^Tovember I966 El^es Only for Ambassador from Secretaiy "I* Following text message to me from George Brown delivered by UK Mbassy here,... "On the first day I tried hard to get Gromyko to lay off his gramophone record and get down to the q^uestion of the three issues (paragraph 10 of your message). However^ he gave no ground but his interest was sufficiently intent to encourage me to give him an outline of the package (paragraph 1^ of your message). This I did orally before dinner on the first evening^ giving it to him as my ovn pro- posal, ivjext morning J purely for the sake of clarity ^ I gave him a piece of paper. Tae actual words used are enclosed. He was pretty suspicious but promised to pass it on to Kosygin only. ''It was on the basis of this piece of paper that I talked with Kosygin this morning On his side after a lot of the usual stuffy pretty muted ^ about American aggress ion^ he said that they were prepared to make the IJorth Vietnamese four points and the HLP five points 'a basis for discussion.^ When I said that I had interpreted a basis of dis- cussion as meaning that they wovild be flexible neither he nor Mr, Grcmyko contradicted me. ISieir package woixLd seem to be an unconditional stopping of the bombing J some de-escalation in the South and then negotiations on the basis as above...-" EUSK November 30-December 1, I966 Lewandowski returns from Hanoi. He has formulated 10 points to reflect the US position with respect to an overall solution of the Vietnam war. There is sufficient interest in Hanoi^ he says^ that the U.S. should^ if the foi^ulation is acceptable^ confirm it directly to the DEV Ambassador in Warsaw. He urges speed to guard against a leak or sabotage by those "working against a solution." His source in Hanoi^ he says^ is Fhata Van Loag^ who has the "Presidium behind him/* Most of Lewandowski 's 10 points reiterate familiar US positions. His principal imiovaticn is US acceptance that "the present status quo in S^/N must be changed in order to take into account the interests of 35 TOP SECRET - NODIS Declassified pei Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NTsTD 63316, By: NWD Date: 201 1 CO TOP SECRFT - NODIS the parties presently opposing the policy of the U.S. in SM." He does not include the Phase A - Phase B foimula for de-escalation^ hut states that the US would stop bombing to facilitate a peaceful solution^ ■would "accept DE^y modalities on the cessation^" and "would not require the DRV to admit infiltration into SVH. Lodge believes ^ however^ that he did give his presentation in Hanoi in accord vith the full Phase A - Phase B fonnulatiorii Lodge refers the 10 points to Washington^ to see if they are an accepta^ble representation of the US position. He points out two difficulties hj[j:aself ^ however: the phrase "status ^uo in SW must change" would be more acceptable if it read "status quo in STO would change"; and the terms for de-escalation are poorly expressed. Saigon 122^^-7 ^ TS/NodiSj 30 November I966 "Lewandovski summarized the 10 points to Lodge as follows : (1) The U.S. is interested in a peaceful solu- tion through negotiations. (2) Negotiations should not be interpreted as a way to negotiated surrender by those opposing the U.S. in Vietnam, A political negotiation would be aimed at finding an acceptable solution to all the problems^ having in mind that the present status quo in SVN must be changed in order to take into account the interests of the parties presently opposing the policy of the U.S. in South Vietnam. (3) ^e U.S. does not desire a permanent or a long-term military- presence in SW. (U) The U.S. is willing to discuss all problems with respect to the settlement. (5) ^e U.S. is willing to accept the partici- pation of 'all* in elections and the supervision of these elections by an appropriate international body. (6) The U.S. believes that reunification should be settled by the Vietnamese themselves after peace and proper representative organs are established in SVH. (7) Tne U.S. is prepared to abide by a neutral South Vletnaci, 36 TOP SECRET - NODIS Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 NND Project Nutnber: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 ' CI TOP SECRFTT - NODIG (8) The U.S, is prepared to stop bombing *if this will facilitate such a peaceful solution,^ In this regard the U.S, is prepared to accept DRV modalities on the cessation and not require the DRV to admit infiltration into SVIff. (9) The U.S. will not agree to * reunification under military pressure.* (10) The U.S. 'will not declare now or in the future its acceptance of Korth Vietnam's i; or 5 points,' "Lewandowskl asked if these 10 points were a proper fozmulation of the U.S. position. Lodge said that they seemed to be in order ^ but that the matter was of such sensitivity and importance that he would have to refer the points back to Washington for approval. Lodge added ^ however j that he saw two difficulties right off. First^ he suggested changing Point 2 to read 'would' instead of *must.' Second j he guestioned the phraseology in Point 8 — 'if this would facilitate such a peaceful solution. * "Lewandowski insisted that his statement was a serious proposition "based on conversations with the 'most respectable government sources in Hanoi-* Later Lewandowski admitted that Hiam Van Dong was the source and that he had the ^Presidium behind him,' "Lewandowski stated: 'I am authorised to say that if the U.S. 3^e really of the views which 1 have presented^ It would be advisable to confirm them directly by conversation with the JJorth Vietnamese Ambassador in Warsaw.* "Lewandowski said that there was a vital need to move quickly because (l) there was a danger of a leak and that secrecy was essential for Hanoi; and (£) that delays would give those 'working against a solution' time to 'put down the clamps on talks.*" State 9U66O (to Amembassy Saigon) ^ TS/l^Tcdis 1 December I966 . > . "(5) Do we interpret your comment at the end of para D-8 correctly to mean that Lewandowski presented our phasing formulation fully and accurately?" EUSK TOP SECRST - N0DI8 Declassified per Execuiive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Projeci Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Dale: 201 1 TOP SECRET " NODIS Saigon 12323 (to SecState), TS/Hodls, 1 December I966 Eef: State 9^660 * * ■ • "5* Your para 5. Lewandowski did not repeat not present your phasing formulation 'fully and accurately' in his conversation vith me- He merely cited ^our Phase A and Phase B, ' with clear implication that HS (Sic) had giren his presentation in Hanoi in accordance vith your formulation," LODGE December 2, I966 Air strikes are run against the Van Dien Vehicle Depot and the Ha Gia POL Storage Facility 6.7 and I6 nautical miles ^ respectively^ from the center of Hanoi. December 3, I966 (NB- DOD files do not contain Washington- Saigon or Washington-Warsaw traffic on Marigold for December 2-4. What follows is derived fron later cables. ) On instructions from State ^ Lodge meets Levandovski again to state that: i. The U.S* Snbassy in Warsaw will contact the LRV Bnbassy on December 6 or soon thereafter; ii, Levandovski's 10 points broadly reflect the US position; but 111* "Several specific points are subject to important differences of interpretation." Lewando^/Jskij in turn^ expresses concern about US bcsmbing of Hanoi ^ acting on instructions frcm Eapacki. (Saigon 12^28) De cember k^ I966 Air strikes are run against the Yen Vien Piailroad Yard and the F^ Gia POL Storage Facilityj 5»5 ^^d I6 nautical mileSj respectively, from the center of Hanoi, 38 TOP SECRET " NODIS ^3 I f Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 NND Project Number: NND 63316* By: NWD Date: 201 1 TOP SECR^E?! - NODIS December 5j I966 Groxmouski is suHanoned by the Foreign Minister in Warsaw and giv^en a Polish recapitulation of Marigold, According to Kapacki's account of the December 1 meeting in Saigon^ Polish support for a US-DRV contact in War^ saw was extended "after Lodge confirmed Levandowskl's resume." Thus Lodge's December 3 statement about "important differences of interpreta- tion" appears as a revision of earlier U3 acceptance, Rapacki argues that the US reservations about interpretation are so broadly stated as to put the whole basis for the contact in doubt. Alsoj coming "after all the conversations which were held/' the statement might undermine the role of Poland as intermediary. He urges instead that it be replaced by a statement defining the differences of interpretation the U£G has in mind and asks Gronouski to take this up with the President. He also refers to the "intensification of bombing near Hanoi subse- quern: to the Lodge-Lewandowski conversations" as likely to create doubts on the DEY side. It is hard to know precisely what has happened in Polish-DBV communi- cations at this point, Rapacki 's account suggests that the Poles told Ife,noi they had US approval of Lewandowski's 10 points after the December 1 meeting. If so, the events of December 3 (the air strikes near Hanoi and the "differences of interpretation") migjit well have been viewed in Hanoi as casting doubt on Polish reliability, on the sincerity of US interest in negotiations^ or both- Alternatively^, Eapacki may simply have been trying to extract additional concessions or statements of position from the Americans^ using these developments for leverage. Warsaw I363 (to SecState)^ 5 December I966 For the President and Secretaiy "1- I was called to FornMin 11:30 a.m. Dec 5 by Dir- gen Michalowski who^ after determining that I knew what meeting was about j took me in to see FornMin Eapacki," » » ^%* Eapacki continued that on Dec 1^ after return of Lewandowski from Hanoi j Lewandowski had third meeting with Lodge in which he gave a resume of USG position as he had understood it from the two previous conversations* After Lodge confirmed Lewandowski's resumOj Lewandowski said contact of USG and ITorth Vietnamese Ambassadors In Warsaw^ would have supDort of Poles, TOP SECRET - NODIS 39 i (^ Declassined per Executive Order 13526, Section 3 J KND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 TOP SECRET " WODIS "5- Continuing his accoiont of prior events ^ Eapacki said that on the afternoon of Dec 3j at a fourth meeting "between Lodge and Le'vjandowsl^ij Lodge ^ on the basis of the President's instructions ^ read a statement as follows: A. Kie President vill instruct the U.S. PiOibassy in Warsav to contact the ITorth Vietnamese Ambassador In Warsaw on Dec 6 or as soon as possible thereafter* B, [Hie U,S» Einbassy in Warsaif vill be in a position on Dec 6 to confirm to the North Vietnamese Ambassador that the Levandowskl Dec 1 resume of the Lodge- Levandowski conversations broadly reflects the position of the USG. C» 'We must add that several specific points are sub^ject to important differences of interpretation,*" "6. Kapacki said that Lodge was unable at the Dec 3 meeting to precisely say which points were subject to differences of interpretation and -what the nature of these differences of interpretation might be* "7* Eapacki then stated that question of interpre- tation put in doubt whole basis on which contact with North Vietnamese Ambassador in Warsaw was to have taken place - He expressed grave concern as to how equivocation will be read by Hanoi* He added that Poles must transmit USG position to ETVIT Govt.; and that rather than a general reference to differences of interpretation it vould be better if position transmitted contained statement defining differences of Interpretation ^e have in mind. He said such a statement might have a significant effect on Hanoi's attitude toward both a meeting in Warsaw and the whole problem- "8* Eapacki then asked what can be the position of Poland in its role as intermediary if after all the con- versations which were held and statements made there still remains this doubt? He asked again how this reservation will be read by Hanoi j particularly with intensification of bomb lug near Hanoi subsequent to tlis Lodge-Levandowski conversations? He said these questions had already been raised by Levandowski during his Dae 3 conversation with Lodge*" « ■ « ''0 ■+ TOP SECRET " i^rCDIS Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 cs TOP SECREIT " NODIS "12 • Eapacki asked that I transmit to the Presi- dent the Poles deep concern caused by modification of USG position which has 'been signaled by the Dec 3 declaration of Mr. Lodge and his hope that para on differences of interpretation can be deleted on grounds that it vas based on misunderstandings vhich have since been clarified/^ • « ■ GR0N0U3KI December gj I96 6 Gronouski is instiructed to stick with the reservation as vorded on the grounds that ve might be charged vith bad faith if we did not make clear the wide latitude for interpretation of the general language used by Lewandowski, State 97016 (to Amembassy Warsaw )j ITodis^ 5 December I966 Ambassador Eyes Only TOSBC 1^ Secretary E^es Only Pef : Your I363 ■ « • » We might expose ourselves to charges of bad faith in any subsequent negotiations if ve did not make clear that there is a wide latitude for interpre- tation of the general language used by Lewandowski- '^Lewandowski^s formulation broadly reflects the position of the US Government on the issues covered and we would be prepared to accept it as the basis for direct discussions with the Korth Vietnamese if they are in fact interested in pursuing the matter j and if they wsre informed that latitude for inter- pretation of such general language is inevitable," • • December 6, I966 Gronouski carries out his instructions and is told by Eapacki that the US statement will now be transmitted to Hanoi. Eapacki says that the LEV expects to receive at the first Warsaw 1 meeting the precise and official position of the USG in order that it can express its position at an appropriate time. He apparently i 1^1 TOP SECRg? - N0DI3 Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 KND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 a / TOP SECREH? - riODIS tmderstands Lodge to have indicated that such a package proposal vould be forthcoming. Gronouski replies that he had anticipated a more limited scope for the first meeting — confi2:*ining Le-v7andovrski^s formulation^ dealing vith matters such as time and place j etc. He refers the matter to Washington. Meanwhile^ Lewandowski makes many of the sajue points to Lodge in Saigon* He adds that the ^'V/arsav contact vas shadowed by the bcmhing of Hanoi" and asks the U3 to ^^avoid addins to the difficulties/^ Warsaw 1375 (to SecState)^ TS/Nodis^ 6 December I966 Eef: State 970I6 "1, tfet with Fonl4in Hapacki I3OO hours Dec 6 and conveyed material in reftel," w m M "5- Eapacki said that he understood Lodge to have done the following: A. Presented official USG position or principles for peaceful solution; B, Stated that a new package deal of tJ3G proposals would be forthcoming: C- Expressed willingness o± USG to discuss fo^jr points and any other points raised by other side, (FYI: TJiis summary was apropos of nothing. It was simply interjected in the conversation,} '*6, After repeating his view that proposal for meeting in Warsaw was a significant 'ETVN response ^ he said Poles must reserve judgment until they can study situation further to determine whether USG had actually made step forward. He expressed the opinion that what had transpired betvreen Lodge and Lewandowski prior to la,tter*3 trip to Hanoi did represent step forward but the aualifi cations made by Lodge on Dec 3 cast doubt on this judgment." .... "9* Eapacki said that at any rate they cannot delay any longer in transmitting information to Hanoi TOP SECRET - NODIS 1^2 . ill. r ii Doclassifit'd per Executive Order 13526. Section 3,3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date; 2011 TOP SECRET - NOD IS He added that the original position of Lodge is liiiovn to Hanoi; and it remains a qiiestion as to how the qualification of Dec 3 vill be interpreted by sensi- tive elements in the iwi Go^/t, Eapacki said that infommtion transmitted to NVN will reflect the material presented to hi^i today ^ but Poles must also express their own doubts and misgivings over the question of interpretation raised by Lodge, "10. Eapacki then turned to the substance of the first Warsav meeting vith TIVN Ambassador *in the event it takes place.* He said it is his understanding that during that meeting ve -will present to the NVN side the position of USG in order that the W^ Govt can express his position at an appropriate time on the attitude of the USG and on subsequent modes of pro- cedure. He said the NVK Govt- expects to receive at the first Warsaw meeting the precise and official position of the USG and he assumes (with a smile) that it will not be different than the one presented to Lewandowski* He said he presumed I already have locked in my safe such a statement which will be able to identify the specific points on which there is wide latitude for interpretation, (FYI: Rapacki read from a Dec 3 statement given to Lewandowski ^^^ Lodge when making his reference to specific points.) He said he hoped at that meeting we will be able to discuss differences in intarpretation (adding that he still was looking for an answer to the question ^differences vith whom' inasmuch as the NVI^ Govt, has not yet pre- sented their interoretation, ) "11, I said that I had presided that the first meeting would be more limited in scope. I expected that the first meeting would be primarily concerned vith establishing that both sides were interested in beginning negotiations^ and deal vith such matters as time and place of negotiation session. I added that we would also expect at the first meeting to confirm Mr. Lewandovski's foim^ilation of our position as broadly reflecting the position of the USG with the qualifi- cation regarding interpretation. I added ^ however^ that 1 would inform Washington of his understanding of the nature of the first meeting," GHOJroUSKI ^3 TOP SECRET - NODIS Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 20t I TOP SEGHST - NOD 13 Saigon 12601 (to SecState)^ TS/Fodls^ 6 December I966 "1. Levandowski asked to meet me at D'Orlandi's today. He began by saying that he had asked for the in3eting "because of a communication which he had received from Mr, Eapacki in Varsav^ which asked him: "2- *Please turn the attention of Ambassador Lodge to the fact that the form^Jilation oi" the last para- graph of the statement of December Hiree may be under- stood as raising a question about the whole position embodied in the ten paragraphs and which was to form the platform for the Warsaw Meeting.^" « a "5- Lewandowski then said^ rather as an after- thought ^ that 'the overture of the Warsaw contact was shadowed by the bombing of Hanoi and we should therefore ^ avoid adding to the difficulties.'" December 7j I96 7 . .- Gronouski is told that the USG position was conveyed to Hanoi the previous day^ that the intensification of the bcmbing is raising suspicions in Warsaw as well as Hanoij and that the DEV will be keenly disappointed if the first meeting doss not include a direct statement of the USG position. Kie DRV "is not interested in what Lewandowski said," With respect to the bombing problem^ the Poles reject the explana- tions that the target list cannot be suddenly altered without alerting many people that something unusual is happening and that what appears as an intensification of bcmbing is in fact due to improved weather conditions, Eapacki says "policy is more important than weather j" and we are urged not to bomb in the vicinity of Hanoi and Haiphong, Warsaw I376 (to SecState)^ TS/Nodis^ 7 December I966 Hef ; State 97016 and Warsaw I375 , * "3- Mlchalowski said Rapackl had conveyed USG position to Hanoi shortly after my meeting with him Dec 6...," • • , ■ "5- Michalowski said,., that ITOT Go^rb, and even some in Polish Govt, are suspicious that recently ^^ TOP SECRST - NODig Dedassificd per Executive Order ^526, Section 33 NND Project Number: NND 633i6. By: NWD Date: 201 1 /j (.'i TOP SECRSP ~ nod:k stepped up bambing outside Hanoi is the vork. of same elements in USG who are tiying to undercut Presi- dent's peace move. He added that vhen this question -was raised vith Lodge the latter had replied that such raids are planned long in advance j and that a quick reversal would alert many people that some- thing unusual vas happening. Michalowski said that to many people this is an unconvincing answer^ and expressed fervent hope that we can avoid future highly sensitive honibing raids in vicinity of Hanoi and Haiphong.,,, "6, Michalowskl said he wanted to underscore Rapacki's insistence that at the first meeting with the NVTT Ambassador in Warsaw we do more than con- firm^ with qualification j Lewandowski's resume of Lodge's ten points. He said the NW Govt, is not interested in what Lewandc^-rski saidj but rather in hearing USG position directly from us. He stressed extreme importance of first meeting ^ and said the NVN Govt. viH be keenly disappointed if its expec- tation of receiving direct statement of USG posi- tion at first meeting Is not realized..,." GRONOUSKI t^farsaw^ I376 (to SecState)j TS/Nodis^ T December I966 Eef : Warsaw I376 "1. FouMin Rapacki called me to his office at 1800 hours Dec T ■•--'' * . * • **3- Rapacki then said that Poland could not continue in its role unless it is convinced that we have or will put an end to this intensified bombing - He added that if Poland has been satisfied on this score J and if it so happens that contact in Warsaw between the USG and NM Govt, will occurs then 'I avail myself of this opportunity to state * that it is necessary for the USG to recapitulate to the ITVK Representative its whole position as described by Lodge with a degree of clarity so that the other side would no longer fear that the USG position as formu- lated might subsequently be changed through recourse to Lodge's 'important differences of interpretation' clause , . , , ^5 TOP SECRET - rrODTS ^Ib Declassifled per Executive OrcJcr 13526. Section 3.3 NND Pmject Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 201 \ TOP SECRET " NOBIS "^. •..! said that if I recall correctly^ there vas a lull in bonibing flights in late October and early Novem- ber simply because of bad weather conditions^ and what appears to him to be an intensification of bombing may simply be a resumption of bombing to its nonaal level. "5* Eapacki responded that 'policy is more impor- tant than weather ' - . . • "6, .• .bombing against the vhole of NVU vas intensi- fied and also was more directed to Hanoi. KiiSj he added^ clearly appears to he provoking." * * . • GRONOUSKI December 7, 19^6 Gronouski^s instructions for the first meeting are refined. He is to stick with Levandovski f s formulationj jjidicating its acceptability as a basis for negotiation even though subject to further elaboration and clarification as talks proceed. \le do not wish to reformulate it our- selves because we would have to take harder positions than Lewandowski * s if we were to be held to precise language and because any formulation attributable directly to us could be used to embarrass the GM or our relations with them. Gronouski is therefore to avoid being drawn out on specifies J though for purposes of illustration he may point to the following : 1. In negotiating a bombing cessation (point 8)^ the Phase A - Phase B formula might be considered. ii. Changes in the governmental status quo would have to be made in accordance with the desires of the people of SW. Electoral procedxires or other arrangements cotild be ascertained through consultations and negotiations there (points 2 and 5). (!Ehe most contentious pointy he is warned^ is that calling for a change in status quo^ as it could m^an anything from putting the NLF into the government immediately to a simple endorsement of the election process under the Constitution then being drafted by the GW. Gronouski is to resist discussing this altogether.) He is to reassure the DRV that oar reservation about "differences of interpretation'' means only that complex matters are inevitably subject to clarification. For example j the phrase "long-term" in point 3 has been partially clarified by the 6 months provision of the Manila Comtnuniq^ue , kG TOP SECRRT - HODIS Doclassifit'd per Executive Order 13526. Section 3,3 NND Prajeci Number NND 63316. By: NWD Date; 2011 TOP SECRET - NODIS ¥e urge direct^ secret discussion with the DRV as a matter of the highest importance and urgency. We hope that the Poles have no idea of pajt;iGipating and Gronouski is to avoid further substantive discussions ¥ith them if the DRV contact materializes. State 9T930 (Memhassy Warsaw) , TS/Nodis^ 7 December I966 Kef: Warsaw's I375 "!• Your reference telegram will receive urgent consideration here tcmorrow and you will receive further guidance from us then. ^'2. In the meantime^ you should take no further initiative with GOP, "3. In the unlikely event that^ before receiving further instructions ^ you should receive notice that HVI^I representative is ready and available for talks with us J we submit the following for your interim "i^. If such a meeting with FVW representative should occur J you should follow prior instructions. If desirable^ you are then authorized to read rpt read to him Levandowski ' s 10-point presentation of USG position as set forth at end of this cable ^ stressing that it is Lewandowski^s formulation. "5 ' You should then inquire whether points as presented ^y you are the same in all particulars as those passed on to Hanoi by Lewandovski. "6. For your information only^ one of our princi- pal conceiTis about the ten points is set forth in the next following paragraph^ but even if pressed you should avoid discussing the substantive problems re- lating to these points with the Wvll representative at this stage and stress that such discussions should be the subject of actual negotiations. We would assiune that WVDT representative would have no authority on this first contact to do more than report ycur presentation to Hanoi so we vould not anticipate such probing at this time. Further cable tomonrow will spell out our thinking in greater detail and may suggest initiative to be taken if you have heard nothing after additional lapse of time. 1^7 TOP SECRH' - KODIS Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 '/Z TOP SECHET - NODIS "7* Lewandovski ' s point two relating to change of present status quo in SW is obviously most troublesome. ^is point could be interpreted variously to mean (a) NLF must be put into government of South Vietnam forth- with or (b) simple endorsement, of election process under constitution now being drafted. If it is necessary to point out ambiguities in Lewandowski's statement^ however^ you should not refer to this point but allude to less contentious ambiguities elsewhere in statement, "8* Lewandowski's ten point statement follows: '1. I have insisted that the United States is interested in a peaceful solution through negotiations, '2- Negotiations shouJ-d not be interpreted as a way to negotiated sixrrender ^j those opposing the United States in Viet-Namt. A political negotiation would be aimed at finding an acceptable solution to all the problems J having in mind that the present status quo in South Viet- Nam would be changed in order to take into account the interests of the parties presently opposing the policy of the United States in South Viet-NarCj and that such a solution may be reached in an honorable and dignified way not detrimental to national pride and prestige. (FII: Lewandowski's original presentation states status quo 'm.ust' be changed but when Lodge questioned this point Lewandow^ski said he would be glad to change word from *must^ to Hjould'j EI^Ei Til). '3- That the United States are not interested from a point of view of its national interests in having . a pez^inanent or long term military in South Viet-Nam once a peaceful solution to the reached. Ihat is why the offer made in Manila regarding the withdrawal of U.S, troops and the liquidation of iimerican bases should be considered in all seriousness, ^k* The United States would be ready , should other parties show a constructive interest in a nego- tiated settlement J to work out and to discuss with them proposals of such a settlement covering all important problems involved from a cease-fire to a final solution and wi-chdrawal of U. S. troops . '5* That the United States ^ within a general solution^ would not oppose the formation of a South Vietnajnese Government based on the true will of the Vietnamese people with participation of all through, free democratic elections ^ and that the United States would ^8 TOP SECRSr - PiODIS Declassifled per Executive OrcJcr 13526. Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 201 1 73 TOP SECRHL" - MODIS be prepared to accept the necessary control machinery to Eeciire the democratic and free character of such elections and to respect the results of such elections. '6- The United States held the viev that unification of Viet-Nam must he decided by the Viet- namese themselves for vhieh the restoration of peace and the formation of proper representative organs of the people in South Viet-Ham is a necessaiy condition. '7. The United States are ready to accept and respect a true and complete neutrality of South Viet-Nam, *8, 5he United States are prepared to stop the bombing of the territory of Forth Viet-Fam if this will facilitate such a peaceful solution. In doing so^ the United States are ready to avoid any appearance that North Viet-Nam is forced to negotiate by bombings or that North Viet-lTam have negotiated in exchange for cessation of bombing. Stopping of bombings vould not involve recognition or confirmation by North Viet-Nam that its aimed forces are or were infiltrating into South Viet-I^am.' "At this point you should interrupt recitation of Lewandovski's points and state as follows: QUOTE I^. Le'wandowski clearly implied to Ambassador Lodge that in Hanoi he had given his presentation in connection with the point on the bombing of North Viet-Nam in accordance with Ambassador Lodge's earlier formulation^ which was as follows: A package could be worked out which in its totality represented what both the United States and North Viet-Nam would agree to as a reasonable measure of de-escalationj but which would have two separate phases in its execution. Phase A would be a boabing suspension^ while Phase B^ which would follow after some adequate period ^ would see the execution of all the other agreed de-escalatory actions. North Vlet-r^am's actions taken in Phase B would appear to be in response to United States actions in Phase E rather than to the bombing suspension^ EEffi QUOTE. You should then resume the recitation of the ten points. '9- I have InforEned the proper governmental sources that at the same time^ the United States^ while not excluding the unification of Viet-Nam^ would not agree to unification under military pressure. ^10, ^Jhlle the United States are seeking a peaceful solution to the conflict^ it would be unreal^ istic to expect that the United States will declare h9 TOP SECHET - rroDis Declassifled per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 'fi TOP SECBET - NODIS now or in the future its acceptance of TTorth Viet-Nan's four or five points.^ (EM) OF EWAITOOVSKI'S ST^'EEME^TT) "9» If N"^^ representative probes further on cessation of bombing^ you should merely state that as you have already indicated Mr, Levandovski has suggested a possible procedure for agreeing on phasing and timing which could be the subject of later discussions ." KAOEENBACH State 9875^ (to Amembassy Warsaw )j ffi/llodis 7 December I966 Eef: State 97930 "1- If a meeting vith the ITorth Vietnamese is arranged J you should proceed in accordance with instructions contained in State 96235 and State 95711 except as modified belov. As regards the presenta- tion to the JTorth Vietnamese representative of our position^ you should follov closely the following formulation: ^a. Lewandowski has informed us of his discussions with your government in Hanoi and of the position he conmunicated to them as that of the U,S,^ based on Levandowski's prior oral discussions with Ambassador Lodge in Saigon. Ve assume that his dis- cussions in Hanoi were conducted entirely orally as they were with Lodge in Saigon and that no pieces of paper have been exchanged which purport to state governmental positions. We are prepared to enter into direct disciissions with yo^or government on the basis of the position which Lewandowski has informed us he presented to your government in Hanoi* 'b. The position was stated to us by Lewan- dowski as follows: (Here you should read the ten points as contained in State 979 30 j para 8 with the additional point about bombing covered uner Point 8), *Co We wish to emphasise that this language is that of Lewandowski and not that of the United States • Kevertheless it presents a general statement of the US position on the basis of which we would be prepared to enter into direct discussions,' 50 TOP SECRET - NODIS Declassifled per Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 NND Prnject Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 201 1 ?J TOP SEGRHI - I^^ODIS "2- FII The North Vietnamese aM perhaps the Poles as veil appear to be seeking a reformulation of our position in order to compare it vith vhat Lewandowski ha^ said, v/hile we are entirely prepared to have Lewan- dlovski's formulation stand as ^presenting a general statement of the US position^' we are anxious to avoid a restatement of our position in our o"^m words because (a) this vould oblige us to take some harder positions than those put forward by Lewandovski which apparently have gone far enough to make the Horth Vietnamese ready to consider talking vith us and (b) any formulation which can be attributed directly to us could be used to embarrass the GVK or to embarrass us in our relations with them. In other words ^ if we stand on Levandowski^s formulation thi'ough the first step in discussions with the North Vietnamese ^ we can always say with regard to any specific point that we don't accept just those words used by Lewatidowski and thus maintain some room for maneuver at least until we know the discussions are really under way. EMD FIX. "3- After reading the ten points you should point out to the J^orth Vietnamese that some matters j because of their complexity aixL the danger of varying interpreta- tiotij would be the subject of further elaboration by us as soon as discussions were to get under way- One of these has to do with the package agreement containing the so-called phases A and B vith respect to bombing and a program of de-escalation. The second relates to certain points which directly involve matters of basic concern to the people of South Viet-^Nam (as for example points 2 and 5)* Vlhatever detailed arrangements are made on those matters would have to be acceptable to the South Vietnamese people; however ^ this could be ascertained tha^ough consultations and negotiations there* ^'k. If the I^Torth Vie t name se refer to the earlier . point made by us that several specific points are sub- ject to important differences of interpret at ion ^ you should explain that this is not intended to suggest that the statement as it stands is any less a general state- ment of the U»S^ position but rather that it is inevitable with matters as complex and controversial as those covered in the ten points that they would be subject to interpre- tation and that their clarification would be the noimal function of the discussions which we hope ve will be embarking on. If the l^orth Vietnamese press for an Illustration you might refer to the phrase 'long-term' in Point 3^ noting that it was specifically to clarify this point that the I/ianila Communique specified a six- month period. 51 TOP SECRET - NOBIS % Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3,3 NND Project Number: NND G3316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 TOP SECRET - NOD IS "5- otherwise you should be guided in your discussion with the ETortli Vietnamese "by the limi- tation set forth in para 6 of State 97930^ stress^ ing that fxirther discussion of substantive questions should be the subject of the actual direct negotia- tions vhich ve hope can be got under way promptly. fT In conclusion you should say that yoiir governinent is prepared to enter into secret dis- cussions with the ETorth Vietnataese Governmant at any time and "^e regard this as a matter of the highest importance and urgency. ''T* We understand from your latest repoi'ts that the next stepj if all goes wellj vill be the opening of the direct discussions with the Forth Vietnamese and if this in fact materialities you should avoid any further substantive discussions vith the Poles, Vfej of course j are anxious for direct and private discussions vith the ITorth Viet name 3 e and hope that the Poles have no idea of participating therein." • A • KAOEEffiACH Dec^^ber 8, I966 Rusk and Katzenbach reiterate ouj: willingness to consider a bombing cessation or other de-escalatory measures on terms previously indicated J but not as a precondition for talks. If Eapacki threatens to interrupt the contact over this issue ^ he is to be 'warned the responsibility for the breakdown will be his. State 9S924 C"*^o Amembassy Warsaw)^, TS/iTodis^ 8 December I966 For Mbassador Gronouski from Katsenbach "1. In response to Eapacki's statements reported in your 139^** -you should remind Papacki that the sub- ject of bombing was one of the matters discussed in Hanoi by Lewandowski and that ve are prepared to pursue this matter with the -forth Vietnamese in the same tenns vhich \ie, affirmed to him. You should read reference on package contained in paragraph 3 of Levandowski's 10 points (state 97930) to remind him of Levandowski's statement to Lodge ^ You should underline that inherent in this formulation is the paci^age approach to de- escalation. 52 TOP SEC RUT - HOD IS 77 Declassiflecl per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 TOP SECRE?r - NODIS "2. If Eapacki attempt to nail us to anythim on bombing beyond our first contact with the Jorth Vietnamese J or again threatens to break off tiie ope rat ion J you should infora him in no uncertain terms that if he maintains this position he will have to accept the full responsibility for the breakdo^'m of what appears to us to be a promising possibility for peace." KATZEMBACH Taipei 10T2 (to SecState)^ TS/Nodis^ 8 December 1966 Ref: TOSEC 6^ FOR the Acting Secretary from the Secretary ft » • • • 1 do not believe we should be drawn into conunitments about our o>ni military operations with- out some Indication from the other side as to what they are going to do about their military operations Ifevertheless^ we should be ready to discuss this problem alongside or before a broader discussion of political matters." * » • KcConaughy December 6- 9^ I966 Eapacki protests the differences of interpretation" clause and the bombing of Hanoi in a strong demarche to Fanfani and^ through Lewandowskij to D^Orlandi and hence Lodge in Saigon. Hanoi cannot be expected to enter discussions in the face of such "escalation/' Fanfani on the one hand urges Eapacki to go ahead and arrange the contact in ¥arsaw^ on the other instructs D'Orlandi to convey the message to Rusk (then in Saigon) and to seek a reply. At their meeting on Dacember 8^ D'Orlandi tells Lewandowski that no contact has yet taken place because of Eapacki *s apparent refusal to convey the US message to Hanoi. He is apparently unaware that the message was passed December 6. On December 9j Eusk asks D'Orlandi to tell Lewandowski and Fanfani that we are in direct touch with Eapacki on both points. He adds that bombing can be the first topic for discussion^ if this is of especial concern to Hanoi. 53 TOP SECRET - KODIS Ik p DtcJassificd per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 NND Prtjject Niimben NND 63316. By: NWD Diite: 201 1 TOP SECRET - NODIS D'Orlandi gives the following as vievs of LevELadowski : i. Clarifications prereqiiisite to the Warsaw contact should occur in Saigon j vith a Levandowski visit to Hanoi immediately possible if needed. Thus D'Orlandi surmises that Eapacki's taking over this phase may bs an effort ^'to "be clever and get the U.S. to withdraw "all reservations" before the contact is made. ii. De-escalation is a difficult topic to start on. It is more promising to look for a final package. This might be a cabinet of Ik positions J 2 each for the Ky Group and the NLFj the remaining 10 for "neutrals or whatever." (This is the formula proposed by Lewandowski September 18.) lii. During November 16-30^ when Lewandovrski was in Hanoi^ ba-ubing appeared to be at a reduced level at least in the Eanoi area. Tais was interpreted in Hanoi as a tacit signal of US support for Lewandowski 's mission, (fffi. in fact^ these were the first two weeks of ET 52- Presumably^ weather accounts for the lack of action against targets near Hanoi. ) Eusk stresses to D'Orlandi several times that the USG is indicating its position with no reciprocity from Ifenoi or even assurance of how Lewandowski has presented the points to Hanoi. D'Orlandi urges "a little faith in Lewandowski," He himself completely credits Lewandowski ^s claim to have gotten Hiaci Van Dong to obtain Presidium agreement to the Warsaw contact. Saigon 12953 (to SecState)^ TS/Nodis^ o December 1966 '*D*Orlandi asked to see Secretary and Ambassador this evening following dinner party in Secretary's honor. Conversation w^as a follows: "1. Lewandowski had cs-lled urgently on D'Orlandi evening of December 8^ on instructions ^ to express grav^e concern that U,S* had carried out heavy bombing attacks in Hanoi area on December 2 and December k^ directly following December 1 conversation between Lewandowski and Lodge. Lewandowski conveyed lurid reports from Polish attache Hanoi alleging that December 2 attack had Included bombing and machine- gunning within city ax^ea and I^d caused 6C0 casualties. December h attack also described as serious and in Hanoi area. Lewandowski protested to D'Orlandi - urgin htm to convey message to Lodge and to Secretary if possible " that such attacks could only threaten or destroy possibility of contact in Vfersaw. Lewandow^ski argued that Hanoi could not be exnected to enter 5^ TCP SSCRHT - NODIS nccbsslfied per Execuiive Order 13526, Section 33 NND Project Number: NND 633 16. By: NWD Dale: 201 1 7? TOP SECRET - NODIS discussions in face of such escalation, (Wiile vhole tenor of message vas extremely strong^ Lex^randa^^ski did not repeat not state that hs was actually report- ing Hanoi *s expressions of vieVj hut rather ¥arsav Judgment.) ^'2- D'Orlandi had responded to Lewandowski that no contact had in fact taken place as yet because of apparent refussJ. of Eapacki to convey firm message ^ that U*S, had taken forthcoming action in declaring itself ready for discussions and prepared to make contact on December 6; and that it was thus not fair to say possibility of contact destroyed by U,S. action D^Orlandi went on to say that his hope had been to make contact in any event. "3, In addition to Lewandowski message December 8 J D'Orlandi had just received cable from Fanfanij on evening December 9j reporting that Eapacki had sent Fanfani strong demarche protesting U, S, insistence on reservations of interpretationj and further protesting U,S, bombing attacks. In this cable^ Fanfani had instructed D'Orlandi to convey substance of message to Secretary^ if possible^ and ask for reply- Fanfani had also included in the cable statement that he him- self had replied to Rapacki urging that he go ab.ead and arrange contact nonetheless- TT) 4* Secretary responded to D'Orlandi as follows: A, He asked D'Orlandi to tell Lewandowski that we were in direct touch with Rapacki on the points raised , , . , B, D'Orlandi should reply to Fanfani with same first pointy adding that if Hanoi was concerned about bombing^ this could be first topic in discussions <*» . *'5* During course of conversation j D'Orlandi pro- vided following additional conjecture and infonnatioa: A, D'Orlandi was fairly sure that Lewandowski had wished ¥arsaw contact to take place ^ with any points requiring clarification to be explored through tripartite talks in Saigon and possible Lewandowski further visit to Hanoi (which Levandov/ski had also suggested D'Orlandi as immediate possibility), D'Orlandi therefore surmised that Kapacki had 'tried to be clever' and get U.S. to withdraw all reservations before contact made. (U.S, side at no time conf ironed that this was in fact exactly what Eapacki had said in Warsaw.) Secretary suggested 55 TOP SECRCT - NODIS go Declassifled per Executive OrcJcr 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 201 1 TOP SECRET - NOBIS that - in light of prior expressed statement that Soviets informed - Eapacki actions might have heen dictated from Moscov. D^Orlandi expressed doubt^ on basis his reading of LewandotTslsLi attitude and reirarks by Levandav/ski about Rapacki over a period of time, flatter was dropped at this point. B, , . *Lewandowskl had particularly expounded to him diffictilties he saw in getting discussions started on reciprocal actions in connection with bombing. Hence, at D*Orlandi's suggestion Lewandovski had started to vork out hovr sitiiation in SVTJ might look one or two years hence and might be described in acceptable form to Hanoi and Washington^ so that in effect a package deal would emerge. D^Orlandi stated that, when he asked Levandovski just vhat kind of role VC might have - would it be like Czecho- slovakiaj or what - Lewandowski had come up with sample formula of Ik cabinet positions with 2 each for present Ky Group and VC/KLF, and remaining 10 allotted to 'neutrals or whatever.* (This is of course fonnula given by D'Orlandi to Harrimanj as D*Orlandia paper ^ on the subject.., V Behind the Lines— Hanoi , hj Iferriscn E. Salisbury tBantacij July 1967)^. p. 8 ^^^en^ on the morning of December 15^ Seymour Topping^ the foreign editor of Tb^ Tmes^ walked over to my desk and put a cablegraci before me.... The visa to Hanoi did^ indeed, await me in Paris." December IJj I966 State expresses alaim over the possible impact on the talks in Warsaw and also on Ky. should Lewandowski's leak to the Dutch Charge reach him. Lodge is told to give Ky a lew key Indication that a possible lead toward peace is being investigated. State 10i^673 (to Aiaeiabassy Saigon)^ TS/jIodis 17 December I966 Kef: Saigon 136^0 "1. Lewandcwski ' s indiscretions are indeed most unfortunate and potentially harmf^ja to talks in Varsaw, .. 71 TCP SECRETT - NOBIS DeclassiHed per Executive Order 13520, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 633 16. By: NWD Datei 201 1 r TOP SECRET - IT0DI3 "2. This leads us to suggest you should te prepared vith line to use vith Ky should outright leak occur ^ should Ky raise with you on has is rumors floating around Saigon J or should you feel rumors ha^^e reached point vhere you should take initiative vith Ky as preventive measures. Our thought is that in such eventuality^ you would simply in low key take following line: As ve have told Ky before we get many apparent leads on subject of peaceful settlement. ¥e feel responsibility not to over- look any possible lead which might offer soiae promise - Most of these leads dissipate iJBmed lately j sane seem slightly more productive and are pursued further. Lewandowski contact with us over past few months has been such lead. At times it has appeared to offer more possibilities and at times less, Yj may be assured that if any lead offers any real prospect of discussions with Hanoi J he will be promptly consulted." KATLMBACE December 18. I9 66 iriH D'Orlandi tends to reject our ratioriale for what has happened in favor of the Polish version. He feels there is a "strong prima facie case against us" and that we should do "something quickly In Warsaw." much the same view expressed by Gronouski on December 1^. Saigon I3618 (to SecState)^ TS/Kodis 18 December I966 Bef : State 10^^673 * * "6. D^Orlandi then said to Habib that he was himself surprised at bombing on the l4th. Ee wondered 'If there were not some people in the US who had deliberately sought to create a problem. » Hiis was denied in precise terms and with an expression of surprise that D^Orlandi would have such a thought. It was pointed out that as D'Orlandi knew there was no connection between bombings and Lewan- dowski^s proposals. Habib then gave D-Orlandi the rebut- tal material contained in State's Circular 1038^1-9 and went over it in detail ^ suggesting it be used if Lewandowski again raises issue of banbings." . * • 72 TOP SSCHZT - NCDIS Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 r/ TOP SECRET - NODIS "12, Comment: Our Judgment is that foregoing confirms correctness of changing venue to Warsaw- D'Orlandi is not only shoving his personal pique at turn of events ^ but is displaying definite tendency to discard our explanations while endeavoring to induce us to do ^something quickly in Warsaw,' Instead of focusing on infonaation provided "by Habihj he launched into extended presentation of Lewan- dowski's latest animadversions (sic)^ adding his own belief that there is ^strong prima -facie case against us' as well as exhortation mentioned preceding sentence,^' « « • * PORI!EIR Deceiriber ig^ I966 Gronouski carries out Staters instructions of December 15 . In an angry exchange ^ Eapacki attacks both the accusations leveled against the Polish role and the US suggestion that the Warsaw contact still be attempted , In Rome J the Pope is given the ^^whole story" on Marigold by the Polish Ambassador J who later reports the episode to Fanfani^ adding that he had been contacted by the Pope on December 15^ to ask if the Poles "could tell him anything with respect to Vietnam,'^ Warsaw I513 (to State )^ TS/jTodis 19 December I966 Eef : Warsaw I50S * « fe "9 He (Eapacki) added that Poles did not put forth new conditions but 'recalling speeches of Goldberg j the President^ Secretaiy Busk and others ^ once we received the signal we did we would have had everj'' right to call for a stop in the bombing,* He said^ *you have said over and over again that you would end all bombing if there was an assurance from Hanoi that there would be a response toward peace from Hanoi; however , we did not ask that you ston bombing but only that you not intensify it.^" • • 4 73 TOP SECRsrr - zioms Declassified pei Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NTsTD 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 TOP SECRET - UIODIS "13 He saidj 'I am astonished that at came time you accuse us of stalling talks j you ask us to help you get them going again. ^ * Inasmuch as NVW asked Poles to discontinue these discuss ions ^ vhat vas nev to justify returning to wm on this matter? .../' GPOI^TOUSKT Rome 31^09 CtQ Sec State )j TS/Nodis 28 Decembei* I966 • • "^- Fanfani said that according to the Polish Ambassador the Pope on December I5 sent word to the Polish Government asking if they could tell hija anything with respect to Vietnam. On December 19 the Polish Government responded by telling the Pope the vhole story, Fanfani indicated he did not ]rpt not know just what the Polish Ambassador meant oy the 'whole story' but presumably the Polish Governm,ent had told the Pope everything they knew." * » « » EEBIHAPDT December 21, ig66 M M l i ■ » ■-■li» ■ ■ T il I I , „ ,^ Eapacki clarifies the Polish role in I^rigold, The following were conveyed to us on instruction from Hanoi: i. Lewandowski's message to Lodge immediately upon his return from Hanoi expressing a positive response to the Warsaw talks. ii. Eapacki 's warning after the December 3 bambing^ that Ife^noi would have to reassess the situation, iii. The decision to terminate discussions in Warsaw. He added that there had been frequent exchanges between Hanoi and Warsat/ during the conversations and felt confident the Poles accurately expressed Hanoi's views j even when acting on their o\m initiative. While Gronouski is learning this in Warsaw^ instructions are enroute for him to tell the Poles that ary deinage from US ordnance within Hanoi city limits was accidental. We are now prepared to state there will be no TOP SFCFJ^T - KODIo Y4 ' ^ Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3,3 NND Project Nutnber: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 I yr TOP SECRET - rraDis bombing vlthin 10 miles of the center of Hanoi for an indefinite period if talks with the DEV can begin shortly* We "anticipate'* some "appro- priate reciprocal action" vith respect to HLF activities within 10 miles of the center of Saigon as "evidence of Rood faith." Warsaw I535 (to SecState)^ TS/Nodis 21 December I966 Eef : State IO5909 « m ''2, X asked Eapacki to clarify for me the role that Hanoi played in our discussions. Eapacki replied that the message lewandowski gave to Lodge (he referred to 'three sentences*) upon his return from Hanoi expressing W^ positive response to Warsaw talks ^ Eapacki *s warning after the Dec 3 bombing j that Hanoi would have to reassess the situationj and the decision to tennir^te discussions in Warsaw were all decisions by ETVK which were conveyed to us oy the Poles . He said further that comnients Poles made regarding danger of creating the impression of pressure on Hanoi were comments of the Polish Govt, but the fears that Poles expressed in this regard were verified subsequently by Hanoi. He also said that during process of Warsaw discussions there vere a number of other exchanges between Warsaw and Hanoi j adding that the Poles are confident that what they expressed on their own initia- tive acciorately reflected Hanoi's opinton. "3. Eapacki then made the pointy in reference to our accusation that Poles have raised new conditions since tallcs shifted to Warsaw^ that interpretation clause question was raised by Lewandowski immediately upon hearing it expressed by Lodge on Dec 3- He said 'clearly you kiiov that we felt this was a matter of concern from the very beginning; it wasn't scm,ething interjected as a new condition after^^-rards . * He added^ ^our concern was well taken because the reaction to interpretation clause from Hanoi turned out to be what we iDredicted. ' " ... GEONOUSICI ^^ TO? SECRET - KODIS r f:>o Dcclassined per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 TOP SECRET - KODIS State 106358 (to Ataembassy Warsaw) 21 December I966 • • • "1. Our investigation of alleged bomtiag in Hanoi has been thorough. The only targets were military ones more than five miles from the Hanoi city center. How- ever we cannot rule out completely the possibility of an accident. Any US ordnance that may have fallen within the Hanoi city limits vas the result of such an accident. "2* Nonetheless we are prepared to state that there will be no bombing within ten miles of Hanoi city center measured from 21 degrees 1 minute 37 seconds north J 105 degrees 5I minutes 21 seconds East^ for an indefinite period if talks with ]Sorth Vietnamese can be gotten unden-zay shortly. Appropriate reciprocal action with respect to bombs ^ mortar and similar terrorist activities within ten miles of the center of Saigon measured from 10 degrees j k6 minutes ^ 28 seconds north; 106 degrees J kl minutes ^ 10 seconds East, would be anticipated by us as evidence of good faith/^ > « EUSK December 22, 1966 ^ ' ■ I ■ I I I ■ I W I Kapacki prefers to wait a day or two (by which time Gronouski is to have returned to Washington for consultations) before transmitting the new US position to Hanoi. He is afraid the suspension of bombing near Hanoi appears to depend on reciprocal action frcm the HLF and a signal that Hanoi will establish contact. Gronouski argues that we are not asking a quid-pro-quo but simply removing the factor that had blocked the contact and suggesting a quiet way for Hanoi and the NLF to indicate readiness to discuss peace. Rapacki repeats a theme expressed (less clearly) by him earlier: ildberg stated that if there was some indication from Hanoi regardin 1_ * !__»__ ^ ... ^_ __ _ _ . _ _ _ _ "Goldb negotiations J bombing would cease throughout W/IJ and not simply around a small area of Hanoi. ^^ He is presumably referring to Goldberg's September 22 speech, though neither it nor Goldberg's December 20 letter to U Thant contain such a sweeping proposal. On the same day, Zinchuk sees Bimdy in \Fashington to indicate Soviet awareness of I^arigold and Soviet support both for Polish actions 76 TO? SECRKT - NODIS Declassified pei Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NTsTD 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 ml TOP SECR5LC - NODIS and the Polish interpretation of developments to date. He is appre- hensive that the US vill adopt a militaristic approach to the var. (The Soviet concern to get US-DEV talks started arises in large part the possibility that Hanoi will call for volunteers under the Bucharest Declaration (^^if the war escalates and if help is necessary")* Warsaw 15 37 (to SecState)^ T3/B[odis 22 December I966 Ref : State IO6358 * « • "2* Eapackij expressing desire to understand pre- cisely^ asked for reiteration of message. In response to his question as to whether this meant we had no intention to bcmh Hanoi proper but that it was possible we could have inadvertently hit residential area^j 1 responded I did not exclude that possibility- In response his question whether orders would be issued to exclude from bombing area within coordinates described for indefinite period^ I responded that this my under- standing reftel* After brief discussion of relationship of cessation of terrorist activities in Saigon to cessation bombing in Hanoi perlmeterj I reread section again and pointed out there was no direct auid-pro-quo on cessation Saigon activities but that this was anticipated reaction l>y Hanoi as measure of good faith. "3, I expressed again my personal conviction that this proposal provided basis for movement in resolving the problem of initiating negotiations.*.. "k Eapacki noted however that t^ro things intraded which might reduce the significance of this step: (a) The text of the coiMiunication appears to make U,S, action dependent on some signal that a contact will be established by Hanoi; (b) There is an indirect linking — or request — that an appX'opriate step (re Saigon) will be taken by the other side. He added that it would be vexy nojipQi'tant to avoid the appearance of forcing JIW into negotiations,,,. Cjoldberg stated that if there was some indication from Hanoi regarding negotiations _, bombing would cease throughout IT^li and not simply aroxmd a small area of Hanoi. Furthermore ^ regarding the alleged NLF activities around Saigon^ while this is admittedly expressed in terms of an expectation^ the impression is given that you are tiyin,^ to 'kill too many biirds with one stone.' This is a matter to be resolved with the WLF and I (Eapacki) have tried to dissuade you from linking NVIT action with ITLF matters . . . . " ■ J • 77 TOP SECPJUT - rJODIS • ml ( Dccbssificd per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 NNDProjeci Number: NND 63316. By: NWDDiite: 201 1 TOP SECRET - NODIS "8 I argued that RapacM must view our proposal not as an exercise of pressure "by making cessation of bcmbing dependent on Hanoi's indication of a willingness to talkj but as a removal of what Poles had regarded as overt pressure which Eapacki had Insisted interfered with the prospects for talks Cessation of action in Saigon was not a direct quid- pro^quo but a quiet way for Fanoi and the IJLF to give an indication of readiness to discuss peace* "9- Eapacki, * .concluded with statement that he would prefer to delay day or two before trans- mitting our proposal but expressed willingness to convey it now if that was what I desired. "10, I e>5>ressed willingness to discuss matter immediately on my arrival in ¥ashin,gton/^ • • GE0N0U3KI MemCon^ TS/Kodis/lMEIGOLDj 22 December I966 Participants: Alexander Zlnchuk^ Soviet Charge William P. Bundy * n "2. immediately after these exchanges^ Zinchuk launched into a discussion of MASIGOID. After learning that I was fully aware of the exchanges between Lewan- dowski and Lodge j as he put it initially ^ he said that it was very hard for them to understand why we had intensified the bombing of the Ilorth with the attacks on December 2nd and ^th^ and then again on December 13th and lij-th. He said that there was great sensitivity in Hanoi an. this subject^ and strongly Implied -- without directly saying so — that there were differing schools of thouglit. Our bombing actions had left the Soviets — and by implicationj Hanoi — in complete doubt as to what our intentions and views really were. Speaking more specifically for the Soviets j he said that he had thought they pretty well understood our views ^ but that this episode left them in real doubt whether there were military forces at work and whether they simply did not understand fully what we thou^t and meant to do* 78 TOP SECRET - NODIS b2 Declassified pei Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NNTD 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 TOP SEORET - NODIS "3. More specirically^ he said that he himself had been in Moscow^ in late N"oveiiiber and had gained the impression that Hanoi (or elements in it) were seriously interested in starting something. 'Biey had been encour- aged by the apparent slackening In the pace of onr bomb- ing during this period. I at once askied '^rhether this was just a general impression or whether it had something more specific behind it. He replied that it was 'more than a general sense,' Then^ following the bombings of December 2nd and kth^ some Hanoi leaders (un-named) had been in Moscow on their way back from Budapest ^ and had met with top Soviet leaders. (I think he mentioned Kosygin and Brezhnev specifically)* In the face of our bombings J the Soviet leaders had been unable to clarify U.S. thinking or (by clear implication) to encourage Hanoi to pursue the Lewandowski avenue. Then^ he himself had seen Ambassador Kohler on December 9thj intending to convey a clear message against continued intensif Icstion of the bombing* He thus found it particularly difficult to understand our actions." * * . . "6. I then said specifically that^ while we had made a considered decision that we should not alter the planned bombing pattern earlier^ we were definitely aware of Hanoi's sensitivity to intensification of the bombing, I said that therefore we had made a specific proposal within the last 2^ hoxors^ directed to precisely this point I also noted that within the last 2^^- hours we had had a contact that had substantially ill^jminated exactly what the Polish contacts and discussions with Ifenoi had been. Finally J I reiterated that ve were prepared to see really quiet and secret talks get under way on the basis of the approaches that had been made.'* "8. In short J Zinchuk did not really seek to defend Polish handling of the matter^ but was most emphatically tiying to get it across that the Polish effort was serious and that the Soviets were fully with it*...'' "9* * • -he said that he had been surprised j in dis- cussing the Polish initiative in the Department at some earlier stage In December^ to see that it was treated as doubtful . . , . " 79 TOP SECRET - IvODIS r dH Declassified pei Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NTsTD 63316, By: NWD Date: 201 1 TCP SECKET - NODIS ■5f ^ ^ * * • "2* He then said (as he had to Harrj'' P-fecFherson on Monday) that the Soviet concern to get something started arose from a number of factors j but above all the possibility that Ife^noij under the Bacharest Declaration ('if the var escalates and if help is necessary^ ' in essence) might at some point be faced with a Hanoi request for military'" volunteers. He noted the report today of No3rth Korean pilots (which I of course did not deny) and something unspecified that the Cubans vere doing. He said that the Soviets vould be put in a most avkvrard and difficult position if ifenoi asked for volunteers^ and they hoped the issue vould not arise, '*3* He then 8,sked me about soirie coimnentator's statement that the President saw tvo alternatives j seeking a peaceful solution or escalating the war markedly by bombing so that the American people vould become engaged in simple loyalty to their aimed forces TT « <• * ■ * • December £3^ I966 Ttie problems of reciprocal de-escalation are illustrated by a cable from SaigoHj "a3Si:c!iing" that the proposed cessation of terrorist activity in the Saigon area does not require a cessation of GW/US counter-VC activities. Saigon 1^039 (to SecState}^ TS/Fodis^ 23 December I966 Kef: A. State IO6358 E. State 105909 "1, ...we assume department proposal on cessation terrorist activity in Saigon area does not envisage cessation GVI^US counter- VC activities/' • • • POEOIER 80 TOP SECRirr - NODIS Decla.ssified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 i^:^ TOP SECRET - NODIS December 24 j I966 We drop the request for reciprceal action from the DHV in maintaining tlie 10 mile bomting Ifjnit around Hanoi • (lIB. source needed) December 26--£7j I966 After newspaper reports of bombing ^^12 miles from Hknoi/' the Poles inquire if our circle about Hanoi is measured in nautical or statute miles. Gronouski expresses concern over strikes this close to the proscribed circle. He is told ^'not to be diverted from the main effort '^y niggling and haggling about whether a particular bomb fell on this side or that side of this or that circle." Warsaw I567 (to SecState), TS/HodiSj 27 Decenaber I966 Ref : State IO79II "1- ..,Michalowski.,. asked 'for the record' whether reference in re ft el to ten miles from Hanoi was in nautical or statute miles,,,. "2. *,.NY Times- AP Dispatch speaks of * target only twelve miles from Hanoi * • • . • "3 T am most concerned if we are choosing targets so close to the margin that even a slight error could put us in technical violation of our commitment...." • • GEOKOUSKI State 10Q66h (to Amembassy Warsaw )j TS/Uodis 27 December I966 "...you may Inform I^chalowski or Eapackl that orders have been issued to refrain fx^om bombing within the ten nautical miles from Hanoi city center.-., it is very important for you and the Poles not to be diverted from the main effort by niggling and haggling about whether a particular bomb fell on this side or that side of this or that circle. The important thing is that an area of some Slk square nautical miles will be free from bombing and that; thus farj we have not seen an^^' readiness on the T)art of Hanoi to sit down 81 TOP SECRUJ} ' WDIS Ibt I f DeclassiOed per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 MND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 TOP SECRET - NOBIS and talk business. The next move is up to them and ve cannot let them play games with a side issue in view of the major concession we have made to clear the way for talks .. .military briefers are not aware of MAEIGOLD and that some looseness in language can be anticipated,^^ RUSK December 27-28, I966 Fanfani is told by the Polish Ambassador about the latter 's contact with the Pope, We in turn tell Fanfani of the 10 mile bombing sanctuary around Hanoi and of our continuing hopes to get talks started. We stress the importance of secrecy^ if talks are to succeed. Meanwhile we decide to move the operation out of Saigon to the maximum extent ^ for security reasons. Gronouski is instructed to take up the security problem with Eapacki^ with special reference to the leak to the Pope . He is also apprised of doubts by Eusk that the Poles ever intend.ed to press Eanoi for talks irithout an unconditional and unreciprocated cessa- tion of the bombing. Rome 31^09 (to SecState)^ TS/NodiSj 23 December I966 "1. Points contained State IO8773 were conveyed privately to Fanfani evening Dec 28, "2. Fanfani said he had been very severe in his conversation with Polish _Ambas3adorj he had emphasised that; A. Poles should initiate US contact with Hanoi without further delay; B* Lewandowski should by all means remain in Saigon as would D'Orlandij and C. It was a great mistake break secrecy hy informing the Pope, "3- Fanfani said Polish Ambassador had returned to see him evening December 27. Polish Aiabassador had said: A. Poles cannot undertake initiate US contact with Hanoi unless there is a cessation of bombing; B, Lewandov7ski will repeat will remain in Saigon; and Co It was not repeat not the Polish Government which had taken the initiative in informing the Pope but rather it was the Pope who had approached the Polish Government , 82 TOP SECB^ - N0DI3 icn Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3 J NND Project Number NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 TOP SECEET - NODJS "4* Fanfani said that according to the Polish Ambassador the Pope on December 15 sent word to the Polish Government asKing if they could tell him anything with respect to Vietnam, On December 19 the Polish Government responded by telling the Pope the whole story. Fanfani indicated he did not rpt not know ^just what the Polish Ambassador meant by the ^whole story ' but presumably the Polish Govern- ment had told the Pope everything they knew.'^ EEHmAEQ']? State 109639 (to Amembassy Warsaw)^ T3/Kodis 28 December I966 FOE OHS AI^ASSADOR FROll THE 3ECRETAEY ^\ . , • I call your attention to the statement made by the Polish Ambassador to Fanfani on the even- ing of December 2J that Q3S Poles cannot undertake initiate US contact with Hanoi unless there is a cessation of bombing IWQTE. Ihis could result from Polish Amba.ssador Home not being informed of our move on December 2^. But it also raises the possibility that the Poles have never had any intention of pressing Hanoi for talks without an unconditional and unreciprocal cessation of bcmbing*'' EUSK State 106773 (to Amembassy Eome)^ TS/Nodis 27 December I966 "1. * * • a. ¥e are most grateful for prompt Fanfani report of his conversation with Polish Ambassador Rome J • * V b. Fanfani himself should be aware that on Dec 2k ve conveyed to Hapacki that we had given firm orders not repeat not to bomb within ten nautical miles of point ±n center of Hanoi for an indefinite period. . , , ' Q-3 TOF SECP^ - NODIS Declassified per Executive Order 13526» Section 33 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 \ Z^- TOP SECRET - NODIS c, ¥e are most grateful to Fanfani for expressing concern that Pope has heen informed* We too are concerned over this and would na^ appreciate Fanfani advice vhether ve should ourselves indicate to Popti our knowledge that he has been infonaied. We recognise that it may he desirable not repeat not to indicate such awareness ^ in order to preserve Fan- fani's ovm sources and channels; however^ we are also concerned if Pope may be receiving one-sided account. • • • • "2, Saigon should take no action. For security reasons alone j we are trying to get this operation out of Saigon to maximum extent possible* . . * "3 If Eapacki or Michalowski admit that Pope has been inf orxned you should say that jou must report this to Washington and have no doubt it will have disturbing effect on security grounds alone,. **"^ RISK December 30. I966 Eapacki tells Cjronouski the 10 mile sanctuary has come too late and that the Poles now consider their role "at this stage as teiralnated/' In Washington, Dobrynin tells Thompson the Soviet Government is "frankly baffled by (US) action in Vietnam,--, He said there were mar^-^ and he was one^ that wondered whether some of our military were deliber- ately trying to frustrate a policy of moving toward negotiations." Warsaw I596 (to SecState), TS/lJodis^ 30 :December I966 Section 1 of 2 "1. Rapacki opened by saying Poles have taken further action on j^" statement of Dec 2^, but un- fort^jnately this step could v^ot make up for damage done by previous actions, particularly Air Force, during first part of December. "2. Rapacki added that *we have to consider our role at this stai^ce as terminated -.,,." 4 * . « TOP SFCRST - NODIS m Declassified pei Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NNTD 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 TOP SECPET - N0D:C3 fti 7* Eapaeki saidj •••if that step you brougttfrcan Washington (on 2h December) had occurred on December h -- admittecliy after the first bo^nbing of Hanoi — then I feel personally tre "^iould have had the first contact vlth the DHV behind us. Moreover^ I think I have sufficient reasons for inj^ personal feeling. Even betveen Dec ^4- and Dec 13^ the matter was again actively being re- considered. There had been no negative reaction as yet. ¥e know J because we had contact with the proper quarter. The decision regarding breaking off the talks was made after Dec I3 " «-'* * * MemConj TS/lIodis/l-IABIGOLD^ 30 December I966 Participants: Ambassador Dobrjuinj USSR Jimbassador Thompson "I asked the Ambassador if he had brought back any reply to the President's letter to Kosygin. He replied that if he could speak completely off the record he could tell me that a reply had nearly been completed and that it was one ve would have liked but then the bombing of llano 1 had occurred and this draft had been torn up and another one of quite a different character started. He said he had seen the report from their Enbassy in Hanoi and that there was no doubt in the Soviet minds as a result of this report that our bombs had fallen on Hanoi itself... a reply would be made in due course,^' <■ . "The ^^bassador remarked that the initial stages of this affair had given the Soviet Governoient con- siderable hope and he said rather cryptically that they had other reasons for some optimism but that our action in bombing Hanoi had spoiled BYer^thln^^ I pointed out that o^Jir targets were selected several weeks in advance and that it had been pure coincidence that the attacks on the targets near Hanoi had occurred at this time. "The Ambassador said that his Government was frankly baffled by our actions in Viet-tlam and did not kno;/ how to judge our policy. He said there were many^ N 85 T7^ TOP SECPia? - NOD IS no Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3,3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 I TOP SEGRBI - NODIS and he vas one of them^ that vondered whether some of our military were deliberately trying to frustrate a policy of moving toward negotiations or whether our policy really was one of military victory," December 31^ I966 Porter suggests from Saigon that we switch to a more trustworthy channel J from the Poles to the Canadians. Saigon 1^+702 (to SecState)^ TS/ETodis 31 December I966 "1, We have been watching with increasing puzzle- ment the Polish Minuet danced by Eapacki..., ¥e cannot disregard possibility that Poles constantly manipulated tei"ms of understandir^ whether involving 'ten points' or later 3,ttempts to add provisos. Rapacki's frequent return to question of cessation of bambing and his allure to arrange contact with Hanoi are suspicious," « • "3, With the breakdown of the Polish charjiel,.. we suggest Department consider bringing in another party more trustworthy as an intermediary from US point of "T View, . ., ti • * "6. We lean in favor of the Canadians. It just so happens that the Canadia.n Commissioner Victor Moore is going to Hanoi on January 6 to spend a few days making his farewell cslls at the end of his tour.,.." ■ • PORTER January 3. I90T Goldberg gives the US view of Ifeirigold to U Thant^ who promises to hold it in confidence . 86 TOF SECRSr - NODIS Declassified pei Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NTsTD 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 il^ TOP SECRHT - NODIS As incidental intelligence ^ U Thant mentions that Peter^ the Hungarian Foreign Minister^ vas visited in Bncapest by Le Duan (Secretary General of the Lao Dong) early in December. Le Duan took a very hard line J much harder^ Peter believes ^ than vould Trinh^ the DRV Foreign Minister. The latter had been expected ^ but urgent problems in Hanoi detained him and LeDuan came instead. USUK 3l;53 (to SecState), TS/Nodis^ 3 January I967 "As agreed upon with the Secretai^'-j I had an extensive discussion vlth U Thant this afternoon lasting almost 1-1/2 hours. "I gave azm the full account of Iferigold^ " * * i • '^Syg assured me tliat he ¥ould keep this in confidence and I do not believe that ve need be concerned about his making a public disclosure absent any additional dramatic events." • ■ "...he told me that ^hen FiA Peter of HvLngar;>^ was at the W.J Peter had told 5;/-g th^t they vere expecting a visit from the North Vietnamese PM in Budapest in early December. Syg said that he had since been advised by the Hungarians -^ presumably the Hungarian OTT Rep — that the North Vietnamese FM found it impossible make the visit because of urgent problems at home. In his place Hanoi dispatched the Syg of the Communist Party who visited Budapest early last month and who has since returned to Hanoi, Hungarians reported that Syg of Communist Party took a very hard line about settlement of Vietnamese conflict — a harder line than they believe would have been taken by North Vietnamese JM. Of possible interest to US in this connection was the observation of Syg of Communist Party that it was by iio means cerbain that the NLF would support any peace proposal which might be acceptable to Hanoi, Syg observed that this ^^jas a similar line taken l:y ]Jorth Vietnamese 'Re;^^ in Algiers in September of last year as reported to him by his Algerian sources . . * GOLDBUSa Q^, TOP SEO^^ - NODIS 07 — r^^ Declassified pei Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NTsTD 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 ill TOP SECR3T - nODIS J anuary kj 1$&J Rusk soothes George Brovn's injured feelings over finding that he vas not the sole inteimediary for the Phase A-Ptiase B de-escalation proposaJ. , State 112632 (to Membassy London) ^ TS/Uodis h January I967 PERSOFAL FOE AiMBASSADOR FROM SECKEmEY "Please deliver following personal message to Foreign Secretary George Brown: QTE Dear George: Thank you for your message- I do want to clear up one point J namely^ that there was nothing on which we could have informed you prior to your visit- to Moscow Your vis3.t came at the time of Lewandowski's visit to Hanoi "but "before we had any infonriation whatever from him on his visit. We understand he was in Hanoi most of the last half of November ^ and our first report upon his return to Saigon was received in a meeting on December 1, In faetj ve gave you for your trip a major concession to the other side in the form of a two-phased proposal in which we would stop the bombing if they would agree that subsequently there could be a de-escalation of the violence, I am sorry if there has been any misunderstanding on this point. With personal regains ^ Sincerely ^ Dean Rusk, KJS-K January h^ I967 Gronouski takes issue with Porter ^ that the Canadians replace the Poles as our channel to Hanoi because they are more ^^trustworthy." He considers the Poles better suited to the mission because they carry more weight in Hanoi. Warsaw 163I (to SecState); TS/Nodls^ k January I967 Eef : Saigon iJ^TOS ■ . • "3 The fact that Poles presumably acted in Jfenoi's interests in attejnntiup: to extract from US best possible terms prior to actual negotiations is no basis for concluding that Poles were not interested in initiating Warsaw talks as soon as feasible. 88 TOP SHiCRET - KODIS DeclassiOed per Executive OrcJcr 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 201 \ TOP SECRET - KDDIS Feasil3ilityj however, depended on Hanoi's agreement^ and I submit Poles had no reason on their own initiative to delay that agreement ten minutes..,. "4. Given this analysis^ I cannot conceive of Canada or ar^- other friend of the USG heing more satisfactory than Poles as intermediary (see also paras 3 and k^ ¥arsav I630); true^ they "vrould he more trustvorthy from our point of viev. But for this reason they would also he even less effective than Poles >rere in convincing Hanoi. I have no doubt that Poles had access to and exchanges vith top officials of WJ!\^ and that they delivered our messages, I am also convinced^ especially after Dec 2k ^ that they encouraged Hanoi to meet vith us in Warsaw. A trustwoi^thy friend of USG could do no more and I suspect would be able to do much less. What we need is help of someone with more influence on Hanoi than PoleSj not less. It is for this reason that I suggested we turn immediately to Soviets," « • GEONOUSKl January h^ I967 Goldberg gives U Thant and Ignatief f ( Canadian Ambassador to the VE) a review of "the entire ferigold episode" along the lines suggested dj the Depar-tzaent . (Source; USUU SkS'^y lA/^Tj TS/nodis) January ^j I96T Saigon reports I3 YC incidents in the Saigon^Gia Dihh area. Saigon ikS^k (to SecState)^ TS/jfodis^ 5 January I967 "1, ¥e have been keeping a special vatch on incidents and actions in the Saigon Gia^-Dinh area ever since Christmas. As a rough approximation border of Gia-DirJi province averages about 11 miles from the center of Saigon, "2. From Dec 23 to Jan 3 there were I3 incidents clearly initiated by VC in the area , • * • • Q9 TOP S'filCBKr - ITODIS Declassified pei Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NTsTD 63316, By: NWD Date: 201 1 li I TOP SECRET - NOBIS "5 In order not to call attention to our interest in the 10 mile radius ve are using standard statistics derived from police reports vliich are not alvays complete or absolutely accurate/' January 5j ^967 Heirihardt gives the Pope a similar review. He stresses that the US has been forthcoming by offering its Phase A- Phase B fomiulaj by affirming Lewandovski*s statement of the US position with no recip- rocal act from the DPV side^ and by offering to meet with the DKV to discuss all outstanding issues^ and that no militaiy preconditions for the talks were initially asked by the other side. Even nowj we are keeping open our suspension of bombing within 10 niles of Hanoi's center. IVtille the DRV has given a negative response ^ we continue to tiy to open talks. Secrecy is imperative if this effort is to succeed. We therefore request the Pope's cooperation in maintaining complete discretion* State 112886 (to Amembassy Rome)^ s/]^Todis 5 January I96T "Eyes Only for .Ambassador "1* Ambassador should see Pope Paul coonestj Since Poles ^ and according to their report Hanoi j have stressed vital need for complete secrecy^ USG is deeply conscious of need to maintain rigid security this matter. However^ in view of importance these discussions and their possible bearing on other initiatives to which His Holiness is a party J ve now believe it essential that His Holiness receive full and accurate account." * * "7* At this stage^ the US had taken two Important steps. It had put forvrard the possi- bility of a two-phase handling of the bombing question^ together with the possibility of dis- cussing in one setting the whole range of issues including the future situation within South Viet- nam. Moreover J the USG had agreed to affirm the statement of its position to Hanoi ^ subject only to the obvious necessity of interpretation while Hanoi itself had indicated only^ as reported to us J that it was prepared to listen to such an affirmation. The USG- at this point had not — and still has not — received any statement of Hanoi's own views. Moreover ^ the message con- veyed by Lewandco-rski contained no mention of any prior condition other than secrecy^ for the direct contact in Warsaw that was proposed.^' TOP SECRET ^0 DJ0DI3 Declassified per Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 ftS TOP SECK^T - K'ODIS T * • « "Ik* On December 22 j Gronouski again saw Rapacki to convey a new proposal on l:ehalf of the USG. Ttls vas tliat the USG was prepared to undertake that there would he no hombing within ten miles of the center of Hanoi for an indefinite period^ if talk^ with the llorth Vietnamese could begin shoarfcly; in the original proposal of December 22 ^ this ^ras linived with evidence of good faith in the form of action on the other side with respect to incidents near Saigon, However^ when Eapacki demiirred to the proposed linkage and asked reconsideration^ Gronouski was authorised en December 2^^- to state that the US had now given firm orders not to bomb within ten miles of the center of Hanoi for an Indefinite period. !Ehis revised US proposal stated the understanding thatj on the basis of what Bapacki had told us J direct talks could now begin shortly, ^e message also noted thatj in judging the good faith of the other side^ we would be 'impressed* hj similar restraint^ for ezaaiple^ with respect to incidents^ movement of forces (itself a violation of the Geneva Accords) in the D^E^ or action with respect to infil- tration; it was stressed that there were examples ^ and the phrasing made clear that these were not pre- conditions, Hapacki indicated that he would convey this message promptly to Hanoi. "15- On December 30 Hapacki reported to Gronouski that Hanoi had given a negative response and was flatly not prepared for talks in Warsaw , " "Suiamary of Key Points • * « "6, Most basically of ell^ the US rejuains entirely prepared for secret bilateral contacts with Eanoi. Even though Rapacki has stated that he considers the channel nc^^ dead^ the US order of December 2k remains in force and will so remain for the present. ¥e have in fact reviewed this whole matter carefully ^rith Soviet repre- sentatives j pointing out our difficulty in understanding Polish actions at several points. Moreover j we have in mind the continued possibility of constructive action by the Secretary' General, For all these reasons^ and in the light of our basic view that any disclosure of this whole series of discussions could affect Hanoi ^s willin^q; ness to participate^ we have maintained the tightest security on the whole project,; will continue to do so^ and must ask you in the strongest terms to act in same manner . o n • • o • misK 01 TOP SEGHET - NODIS Declassifled per Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 201 1 i\h i> TOP SECRET " KODIS January 6, 19 67 Saigon is instructed to tell Ky a little more about Iferigoldj interpreting it priinarily as a DEV peace offensive designed to get the bombing stopped and reassuring Ky about our resolution. Rome is to tell Fanfani that we etill hope to open contact with the DRV and it is, therefore, iiLit)erative to maintain the strictest secujTity concerning what has happened in the past. In Warsaw J the Poles tell Gronouski that the December 13-1^+ attacks typed the scale in favor of DEV Presidium members who felt that talking with the USG made little sense. Only a complete cessation would restore the necessary level of confidence. On the other hand^ if we stopped bombing it should be possible to get negotiatioxis going over Phase B in 3-^ weeks. Gronouski urges the Poles to try again^ proposing Instead a Phase B agreement between the two sides before the bombing cessation and the opening of talks* State replies by instructing Gronouski to avoid further initia- tives for the tiaie belnp:. State 114277 (to Amembassy Saigon) ^ TS/Nodis 6 January I967 EYES OLILY FOR PORTm MD HABIE TT-i -..Canadians on January 2 gave us report they had obtained from U Ihant on December 28^ and whidi U Ihant had received from Poles on December 23j ...» "2. to seek to minimize leak riskj decision was taken to inform Pope^ SYG^ Canadians ^ and also British '' ''5< Cur conclusion is that time has come when it is wise to convey word to Ky that would mitigate anj'- MAEIGOID disclosure or any stories based on Indian or Salisbury matters. Moreover^ Salisbury speculation gives us good cover for making statement to Ky now. I. '^6. Accordingly J you should see Ky if possible ^ and Tran Van do as well^ to say that GVJJ may be noting wave of speculation on DRV willingness to talk. USG has been receiving a number of third countx^- messages sometimes based on conversations with DRV representativeSj 92 TOP SECRET - KODIS ' la Declassified pei Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 TCP SECRET - NOBIS from "whicli third nations are on occasion drawing conclusions ve do not "believe warranted. Ve our- selves are inclined to believe that DEVj as Salis-, hury visit alone shows ^ has become nuch more sophisticated in building up world opinion against the bombing. They may well be engaged j with help fxan. U Thantj Soviets^ and others^ in a determined effort to get us to stop the bombing or cut it back in return for hints of DEV willingness to talk. Moreover J DKV may be probing for any change in our position, GVN may be assured that ve have no intention cf changing our well-known position on conditions for the cessation of bombing j or yielding to pressures on any eleiaent of our posi- tion. As i\mbassador Lodge told Ky last July (Saigon 642 of July 10 ) we will of couxse be following up any nimors^ ho^^ever unlikely j that might indicate Hanoi was really seeking a way out. If anything of real substance or importance happens ^ we will of course be in touch with GW at once " EUSK State 11^+278 (to Amembassy Eome)^ TS/?]odis 6 January 19 6T Kef: State 112886 "1 You should emphasise to Fanfanl that although ^^^arsaw phase of exercise appears to have come to tei'iporary conclusion we still mean to con- tinue in whatever manner feasible to proiiiote initia- tion of substantive discussions with North Viet- namese. Therefore it continued to be of prime importance that strictest security be maintained conceriilng what has occurred in past.'^ « . . * EUSK Warsaw l6k6 (to SecState)^ TS/l^fodis 6 January I967 Section 1 of 2 w « "4. Michalowski opened his reply hj observing that at one point in my discussions vith Eapacki I 93 TOF SECRET - N0DI5 ti? DtcJassint^d per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Diite: 201 1 TOP SEGEET " NOBIS hatS e^ressed the hope that someone vas putting as much pressure on Hanoi as Poles were placing on us to get negotiations started. He said with some feeling that he could assure ne that Poles put hea^/y pressure on Hanoi and in fact put prestige of GOP on line in getting Hanoi to agree at outset to idea of having talks in Warsav. He added that he personally knev how much pressure was brought to "bear because he was engaged in exercising some of it. He went on to say that leader- ship in Hanoi is by no means a monolithic group and that from the beginning^ when Poles got agreement from Hanoi to initiate talks in Warsaw^ it was a Tery close decision vith many of the Hanoi leadership strongly opposed. He said they obtained such agreement after exerting strong pressure and putting Polan^i's prestige on the line; but it was a delicate matter in Hanoij implying that agree- ment vras by a narrow margin anxong the leadership. He said at this point the Poles had been able to convince Hanoi to have at least a small degree of confidence in intentions of U.S. He added that bombing of Dec 3 had given a \reapon to those in Hanoi who had not wanted to agree to negotiations in first place. He said it was for this reason that Poles had repeatedly conveyed to Lodge and me their fear of negative effects of a repetition of Dec 3 bombing. But he said even after Dec 3 when bombing was explained by Lodge as no new departure but smply something in the military pipeline, Poles were able to prevail in Hanoi to keep possibility of talks open^ and 'believe me we talted to them several times a day to keep pressure on them and con- vince them*' But he said bambing of Dec 13-14 'under- cut our whole argument ^ destroyed that little bit of confidence that exist; ed in Hanoi about intentions of U.S.J and left us wide ox^^en to charges of being com^ pletely naive,' He said with bcaabing of Dec 13-lij- those who had initially been skeptical about negotiations were gi^^en a powerful tool to support their case and in fact prevailed. He added that even with Dec 3 bonbing, if we had been able to interval between Dec 3 and I3 to come in with the message we did cane in with on the 2Hhj that part of leadership in Hanoi which wanted negotia- tions vould have prevailed and he is confident that talks would have happened. But he said by Dec 2k a whole new condition existed; *Ve were accused of being naive and had lost our effectiveness and those who on Dec 3 had been able to control situation and m.ove toward negotia- tions were 'bj this time discredited.' Hius he said situation by Dec 2U in Hanoi had so changed that it was Sh TOP SECP1]T - NODIS DeclassiOed per Executive OrcJcr 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 201 1 in TOP SECRET - NODIS impossilDle to go back to Dec 1 or the Post -Dec 3 period M'ow lie said he feels that only stopping ETOT baabing completely -w^ill restore influence of those who are interested in negotiations* He said if bombing stopped Poles would be willing to tzy for a third time and that he is guite confident that three or four weeks there- after negotiations between U, S> and Hanoi on Phas e_ B could become a reality^ He said^ ^ short of thiSj I am vevy pessimistic of any effective role we coizld play^, given pressure we had exerted in ETov and Dec and the undercutting of our position in Hanoi by events of Dec 13"1)+, ' He vent on to say that he will never under^ stand how this could possibly have happened but 'this is past history^ I guess »'" GHOMUSKI Warsaw l6h6 to State Section 2 "Conversation between Michalowski and Grcnousfci, ^'Michalowski said that the situation had now entirely changed. Hie Poles ^ he said^ had been able to convince Hanoi to go on with the possibility of con- tact after the December 3rd U.S. bombings^ but that the bonbings of December I3 and 1^ had made the future of negotiations between the DHV and the IJ,3. very bleak. He now maintained that only a coaplete cessation of U,S, bombings will restore the necessarj^ level of confidence needed to get negotiations started. He added that Hanoi's original decision to talk with the U.S. in Warsaw had heen hotly contested in the Presidium and that the bombings had now persuaded those who wanted to talk with the U.S. that there was little sense in doing so. ^Gronouski noted that this now put the parties back where they had started from. He suggested that the Poles try- to get the thing going again by proposing to the DEV an initial Phase S agreesnent prior to the meeting between the U.S. and the DRV in Mcscow. Thls^ Gronouski said^ would (1) meet Hanoi's insistence on stopping the bombing Defore talks began^ and (2) meet the U*S. desire for some sort of indication that talks would occur in order to stop the bombing. 95 TOP SECRI?r - HODIS Declassified per Execuiive Order 13526, Section 33 NND Projeci Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Diite: 201 1 !lO TOP SECRET - NODIS State 11^^370 (to Amam"bassy Warsaw)^ TS/Koais 6 January I967 Hef: Warsaw's l6i^ "1. In viev of complex of developments relating to Vlet-IIam problem we would like you to avoid for the present any further initiatives along lines section 2 reftel," *- • « * "3 It has he en our conception that . . Hanoi's actions under Phase B vould he expected to he generally equivalent to our actions in Phase B plus repeat plus our cessation of homhing of Forth Viet-I^Tam, " * » • HJSK Jan u,ary 9-10. I96 7 Saigon and Ronie carry out their instructions to hrief the GW^ the Pope and Fanfani, The results reported are satisfactory. In Washington J ve learn that Brown is still very hurt. Btmdy points out how complex the matter is and explains the necessity for the US to mana.^e its own role. Saigon I5POI; (to SecState)^ T8/Nodis 9 January I967 Eef : State 11^^277 **1, I sent Hahib to see Tran Van do to convey substance paragraph 6 reftel. This was done, rather than a direct approach to Prime Minister^ to keep our d ial og^ae with Gv^i in appropriate low key**.. ''2 He was pleased to note our assurance that we have no intention of changing our position on cessation of bombing. . _ ." • PORTER ^g ' TOP SECPirr - NODI S f \ Declassifled per Executive OrcJcr 13526. Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 201 1 I'OP SECRET - NODIS Some 3531 (to SecState)^ S/TTodis 9 January I967 -#■''• "2. [The Pope reiterated his deep appreciation of being infoimed He told me that he had publicly encouraged the Vilson-Broi^n initiative because they had officially informed him of it. Ke had been unable to do the same i^ith respect to U Thant's efforts because he had not been officially adv^ised of them. He had however sent a private message to the Secretary General to avoid any feeling on his pa3rt that the Pope was shovinf^ preferences vith respect to various initiatives for peace." n m m EEIMAEDT Rome 3571 (to SecState)^ TS/Hodis 10 Januaiy I967 Eef : State 111^278 "1- I saw Fanfani last night Jan 9 ^^^ carried out lnstru.ctions in reftel. Ee told me that shortly after the It'ew Year^ Polish Ambassador had informed him of the interr^uption of the procedural ta2ks In Warsaw an(3 had said that it was impossible to expect Jlorth Vietnamese to enter into discussions with the US as long as the bombing of ITorth Vietnam continued Fanfani said he had taken strong exception to this statement and had pointed out that US proposal envis- aged terminatioa of bombing and that Poles had known this all alonR, ../' • a « • RSBIHARDT State 1189 05 (to Ansaibassy Ioiidoa)j S/Jiodls 10 January loBj LITERAiLY FjfES OtILY FOR At^BASSADOB FKO!^ SECSETMY • # ^'2. Sean said Broviia still very hurt over our failure to tell him we were conveying n^w tvro-stage 97 TOP SECB"^ - !:ODIS 121 Declassified per Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 TOP SECRET - NODIS proposal on stopping "bombing through Lewandcvski channel at same time that Brovn was going to Moscow with it. Brown did not wish to raise direct wioh mOj hence Bundy. '*3* Bandy made following points in reply^ which we now assume will go direct to Brown and also to PM: a. We gave proposal to Lewaudowski on IS^h or iHh and to Brown on l6th,.*, b. , . *we felt that we should honor Polish Insistence that 1 channel be kept totally secui^e^-... c. Brown message was the clear and solid one we were sure would get through • !foreoverj Brown was armed in the rest of our letter to discuss the underlying principles in depth^ as L was not* Brown could have a real exchange of views on the basis of total knowledge of our position. d. In response to Dean remark that Soviets must have known of message to L^ and that this perhaps accounted for cross-examination of Brown *s authority to talk for uSj Bundy said that we did not see how Brown's opportunity could have been prejudiced by this even if true . . ,we had always regarded Soviets as much more serious and responsible^ and Grcmyko in October had responded to Secretary's question which Eastern l^JLropeans were closest to Hanoi by saying pointedly: 'We are * ' ^^h Speaking on private basis^ Bandy added that we recognized absolute obligation never to put British in false position and hence to provide them with all infortiiation they needed for any contacts they had. This applied to forthcoming Kosygin visit. At same time^ we were playing a multiple chess game and could not be expected to cut the British in on all boards at all times.,.*., "5- Bundy then. , .reminded Dean of account Secre- tary had given Friday night of cur ccnTidential read- out from Salisbury J in which Pham Van Dong's unpublished parts of interview had spoken of Hanoi taking 'an appropriate stand ' and also said 'we kriow what we should do' if US stopped bombing; Secretaiy had told Dean this was same formula used last summer to Sainteny and that^ since Pham Van Dong resolutely refused to elaborate ^ it 98 TOP SECPET - NOBIS Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 ^^iT. ,i' TOP SECRET " NODIS was at most atmospherics and did not get us mucli further Since Friday night report to Deanj there had been follow^ ing developments; a. Baggs-Ashmore team had come out of fianoi and voula be giving us their report this veek . b, Sainteny had made strong pitch to go to Hanoi to pursue what would happen if bombing stopped and to get general reading. We were taking him up on this and would be arming him with the two-phase proposal t m c. Thompson would be talking Vietnam seriously in TfoscoWj probably this week " "7- In light of all this^ I am seeking authority for you to see Wilson soonest j perhaps Monday *^ • * • "11. For yoxor call en Wilson-, you shotild know that he has sent two-sentence message to Pi*esident speaking of his talk with you on matter seriously affecting our relationships . , * . " EQSK January l3j I 967 Brown has forgiven us . London 5692 (to SecState), TS/i^odis IS January I96T FOR SEGRESffiX MIOM COOPER • B • "2, All is well. Fc apologies from me. from Brown, Ifo whining from ?M ^' Ho abuse BRUCE January/- 19j I96T ^ I » l I ^»| l »^Ff -■ Salisbury's interview with Fham Van Dong produces a number of apparently forthcoming statements couched in very general language. 99 TOP SECPJH! - I^JODZS DtcJassint^d per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Diiie: 2011 TOP SECRET - WDIS ¥e surmise they are essentially mood music^ accompanying a strong attempt to get us to stop bccibing without reciprocity. Gronouski is to tell the Poles ^ if they raise the subject ^ that there must be reciprocal actions. State 121586 (to Amembassy Warsaw) j S/lIodis 19 January I967 . « "3. Ve have also received an extensive account from Harrison Salisbury of his ob:^ervation.'=5 in H8.no i^ highlighted by Hiam Van Dong*s response to Salisbury" ^s question as to what actions Hanoi would take if the US stopped bombing J natnely *we will talce an appro- priate stand.' He also said; (l) if the US 'stops doing harm to the North ^ we know what we should do'; (2) the moment the ^US puts an end to the war^ we will respect each other and settle every guesticn'; and (3) after the cessation of hostilities^ there will be 'no lack of generosity on our pai-t.^ Our net judgment is that these statements are interesting mood music but do not get us very far, The first two statements are replays of earlier statements to other sources. The latter two appear to be without substance. "l^'. At the same timej while ve are treating these reports seriously for action purposes^ we believe we may be dealing with a strong atteiapt hj Hanoi ^ perhaps aided consciously by the Poles and in any case sympathized with by the Indians ^ to get us to stop bombing fully without anj.^ reciprocal action e:4- "5* •.^if the Poles raise the subject^ you leave them in no doubt whatever that any stopping of the bombing on our part requires a clear picture of reciprocal actions repeat actions that amount to an equitable * reduction of hostilities/' HUSK tTanuary 19 , I967 Estabrook of the Washington Post files a story fram Ottawa which apparently alludes to l^Iaxigold: "Canadian authorities blame some of the difficulty (in beginning US-^DEV talks) on the accidental US bombings of Hanoi in mid -December. Private soundings then under.;ay were disrupted^ they say^ and the attitude in JTorth Vietnam apoeared to harden. ..." 100 TOP SECRET - [[GDIS Declassified pei Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NTsTD 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 \1 TOP SECRET - NODIS Paris Heraia Tribune ^ 20 January I967 Es tab rook - "Ottava Sees Hanoi Eeady to Ease ¥ar" - Ottava^ Jan I9 ^^Some high Canadian officials believe that ITorth Vietnam is now prepared to de-escalate the war in the south if the U.S. halts bombing in the North. Ihis is essentially what United Hatioas Secretary General U Ihant and others have been saying for some time-j but there are two important distinctions: firsts Canada has a representative on the ICC who regijilarly visits Hanoi and talks directly with authorities there; second^ Canada is a close friend and ally and does not want to see the U.S. disadvantaged. The key unresolved question authorities here assert is how soon af'cer a bombing halt a reciprocal move 'by NVN would take place. This move could be an end to the infiltration of the south J where U,S, sources say there are 20 identified North Vietnamese regiments j but It probably could not be expected immediately* These cor3 elusions persist despite the fact that feelers for peace discussions haive.. produced nothing tangible so far and are in abeyance at the moment. Canadian authorities blame some of the difficulty on the accidental U»S. bombings of Hanoi in mid-December. Private soundings then underway were disrupted they say and the attitude in North Vietnam appeared to harden. Fov they cannot be sure whether Iforth Vietnam wants to talk seriously because of the propaganda success it has enjoyed through world protests at the bombing. Nevertheless ^ they would take the change dn the ground that discussions J once started ^ and even with North Vietnam's unacceptable li-points as part of the agenda J would inevitably broaden. They do not believe that Hanoi has really retracted its offer to make the i|-points a basis for discussion rather than a mandatoiy outline for settlement. Although they believe that the U.S. must be a bit more flexible ^ they do not believe that a bcombing halt must be unconditional* They view as a distinct advance the U.S* offer to halt the bombing upon some signj public or private ^ that the other side would be willing to mak^ some comparable move, 'If 1 were the Px^esident^* said one higji Canadian official J *I would simply announce that the bombing had been stopped with no reference to conditions. If nothing developed over a period or if JMJ took advantage of the situation the Ijomblng of military' targets could always be resi^med and the world would know that the U.S. had tried »' Canada's ovm confidential initia-cives on VN have ^01 TOF SILCJ^KI - NOBIS Declassified pei Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NTsTD 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 r- /\ b TOP SSCRin^ - NODIS been centered in the ICC in which it shares responsi- bility vith Poland and Tn^ia, The Canadian Bepre- sentativej Victor ViDore^ has just been siomaoned home after a 10-day visit to Hanoi aryl will be replaced by Norman Dier. Simultaneously ^ Canada is pressing Poland to agi'ee to a meeting of the ICC powers at an ^bassadorial level in the hope that this will lead to a meeting of foreign ministers. Poland last week rejected an Indian suggestion for a con-ference in New Delhi." Janu ary 20-21, I967 I I ■ ' - -- - rf' ii 11 1 ^ „ i II ' 1 1 Saigon continues to check on VC incidents in Saigon-Gia Dinh area There uiay be some ditEinution. Permission is reqiiested^ therefore^ to inform ¥estmoreland about Marigold so that he may participate more effectively in the incident watch. State doubts that there has been a real VC slowdown and does not wish to enlarge the circle priv^- to details of Marigold. Saigon l6ll^.i^ (to SecState), TS/llcdis 20 Januaiy I96T Ref \ Saigon 1^4-89^1- "1. A continuing check on VC incidents in the Saigon-Gia Dinh area raises question of whether there is not some d iminution in number of incidents initia- ted by YC since Januaiy k. This report is a seguel to that given reftel. (underlining supplied) ''2. As best we can detexmine there have been five incidents of this sort from January k to 20 as follows : A- January k; Chclon; Body of Policeman found. Presumed to have been victim of terrorist act. E, January 5; Go Vap (5 ^ from Saigon); Two U.S. soldiers injured when terrorists tossed grenadri into their jeep- C. January 6; Thu Due (ll km from Saigon); Two APAli soldiers injured when their steamroller exploded a mine , D. January I3; Thu Due (11 ion from Saigon); National Police apprehended two VC in terrorist iit'&^^S>t s..3glnst equipment. Inc. facility. One VC BbCcL^Feaj o^ner captui'ea. ^ "^ 102 TOP SECEKU - NODIS ^^■^^■■^^^ ^, »: \i'\ Declassified perExecuiive Order 13526, Section 33 NNDPmjea Number: NND 63316. By: NWDDute: 201 1 TOP 3ECREI' - NOD IS E. January l8; Eastern Gia Dinh Province (l6 km nortlieast of Saigon); Vietcong platoon attacked three bridge sites ^ slightly damaged one. Fo^or friendly -wounded. "3- ^e question nov arises 'whether we are seeing a VC pause in the area ten miles around Saigon as a response to our own action in the Hanoi area. So far the answer on the surface "would appear to be negative J but the number of incidents is small recently and some of them may not be properly counted as either VG initiated or within the t^n. mile limit j e.g. J items A and E in Paragraph 2- ^%. General Westmoreland is not aware of the Marigold Er-^ercise* He ISj therefore^ not avrare of any connection between the Hanoi bomb-free area and our search for an equivalent VC pause in Saigon area. I "vTould like to be able to tell him that we have made such a proposal to Hanoi ^ without revealing the ^fe,rigold conte:d:.. I tliink we will be able to analyze VG actions in the Saigon area better with his help and J more significantly^ we might possibly be able to use the knowledge to our oi/n military advantage/' LODGE State 123198 (to Amembassy Saigon) ^ S/lIodis 21 January I967 Ref ; Saigon I60I7 and l6li;4 "1, Keur iSll^-Uj our impression is that recent action not far from Tan Son Ilhut may have cancelled out yoiir iiapression that there may be a real slowdovrn of any sort on other side* Moreover ^ ve wculd prefer not to enlarge circle privy to details in this series, Can you not create a special quiet watch on incident rate within designated radius of Saigon on general basis without informing: Westmoreland? " • • EUSK Januarj^ 23 ^ ^967 In Moscow^ Podgorny says that mediation ^rj the USSR would be fruit, less until the bombing stopped. With respect to Tliompson's question 103 TOP S ECRET - NODIS Declassified pei Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NTsTD 633 16. By: NWD Date: 201 1 iia TOP SECREi: " NODIS about what the BRV or USSR vould do if we did stop bombing^ Podgorr^ suggests we stop and see. Eiompson draws attention to the agreements about Laos^ which were not kept by the other side. Moscow 3159 (to SecState)j S/Nodis 23 January I967 • * * "h Podgornj^ then asked whether end to Vietnam war was in sight. ''5. I replied we all very much hoped war would end soon and also hoped USSR could help us in bringing this about,... Podgorny said it was difficult e: * . THOMPSON '*' ^P SECRET - BIODTS Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Dute: 201 1 T\ TOP SECP-LT - N0DI3 January 27 j 196? Fried J the IJI Daily Jlevs correspondent^ tells Lodge in Saigon that he knows of Gronouski^s contact vith the Poles in Warsaw, Saigon 16677 (to SecState)j TS/Nodis 27 January I967 ''Joseph Fried J Viet-KTaia correspondent of the New York Daily Nevs^ told me on Friday that he Umav* that A^iba.ssador Gronouski and the Polish Government had been having conversations about settling the war in Viet-]}Iam." LODGE January 29, I967 J "-^^1 Saigon continues to feel that VG incidents in the Saigon- Gia Dinh area may have abated. Saigon I6785 (to SecState)^ S/Nodis 29 Januaiy I967 Eef : A. Saigon l6li^^ B, State 123193 "1, This is another in the series of reports ■we have been providing on VC initiated incidents within ten miles of Saigon. We shall send these reports each week. '^2- For the period January 21-27 within the zone there were fo^jr incidents that can be char- acterized as VC initiated : A. January 22 j four miles west of Saigon^ an unkno^-m number of enemy fired two rifle grenades at police station^ wounded 2 W civilians . B. January 23 j Gia Diuh City^ unknown person threw grenade at house, no casualties, V C. January 23 j 9 miles west of Saigon j booby trap J 2 VJT killed and two wounded, D. January 24 ^ Saigon ^ unknown per^^on threw grenade J wounded three W civilians. 105 TOP SFCRRT - NODig Declassified pei Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 JiO TO? SKcmni " iTODis "3. In addition to these incidents ^ there vere t'wo others in the area resulting from VIJ police and AEVIj rtiakijig a sveep and running on to VC* QIaese do not meet the criteria cf being VC initiated. ^%, With respect to the action not f!ar from Tan Son Mint on January 20 (cited para one ref B)^ we have looked into this. The record of the action shovs that elements of two AEvlT hattalions on a search and destroy mission encountered a VC force nine miles vest northvrest of Saigon, The ensuing fight st.^:iiiaied from that contact. There is no infor- iiiai:ion. as to "^Jhether VC was on the way to Tan Son Whutj or any other special target. ITo available information as to vhich side fired first shot. A2M ■units J however J were definitely on the prowl. From interrogation prisoners taken day later VC force was sixth battalion from VC I65 Regiment which is regularly present on fringes Gia Dinh Province, ^'5* ^e have also examined the record of VC initiated incidents during the area for the m.onth of K'overaber I966. During that period thex^e were 11 incidents J ranging frcm the shelling of Saigon on Koveraber 1^ National Day^ to platoon and S(^uad attacks to isolated grenadings. Of the 11 incidents, seven can be characterised as serious in the sense that they were obviously well-planned attacks l:^j small VC units, ^' LODGE A I February 1-2, I967 Estabrook files a more complete stor^^ on T^ferigold from IJIew York. In private J he gives different versions of the story's source • He apparently first got word of the matter from the Canadians in Ottawa and later confirmed it with U Thant. In one conversation he indicates that he also "had it from a high Polish so^urcs.,- corroborated by * other Eastern E'jiropean sources,^" In another ^ he denies that it "came from the Poles." Goldberg believes the Poles to be the original source of the story and recommends that neither they nor ar^y other Bloc countrj'" be used as a channel to Hanoi* USUIT 3SI17 (to SecState)^ S/iJodiSj 2 February I967 "Estabrook (Wash Post Correspondent) told Nisoff Feb 2 that his story, in Feb 2 Post about Hanoi readiness to talk jus-& prior to Sec I3 106 TOP SKCRET - NODIS DeclassiHed per Executive Order 13520, Sectiun 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 633 16. By: NWD Datei 201 1 l3\ 1^ TOP SECR^ " NOD IS boinbing of Hanoi vas founded on several sources. He had it from high Polish Gource vhich he vould not identify. It was corroborated by 'other Eastern European sources.' He had been given similar impres- sion earlier in Jan from Can ForJ^Iin Martin. He had taken story to U Thant i^ho stated his belie v that it was correct." 9 • ''(Trt separate brief conversation with Pedersen Estabrook denied story came from Poles. Said it came from Martin^ while Estabrook was in Canada^ and then from U Thant. Estabrook said he had had story for couple of weeks. In response expression of surprise he had used word 'learned' instesi-d of something like ^alleged' J Estabrook indicated this based on evalua- tions both of Martin and U Thant.)" • . "^"'ty assessment is that the original source of this story is the Poles themselves- They have ci_uietly been spreading this story throughout the UK; I even got some of it from the Danish Deputy Fon Min the other day^ who attributed it to roles." • « • tt • * • This leads me to reconiTLendation that we siioixld no longer use Poland or any other Bloc country as channel to Hanoi, It vcuJ.d be far preferable in my opinion to deal directly or through Sovs than to continue vlth this type of intermediary/' GOLDBERG is State 131^2 (to Jkaembassy \Ja,Tsa\r)y C/Nodi k Pebruaiy 1967 Ref ; Warsaw I695 "Test of February k V/ashington Post story by Estabrook will reach you in form clrctel. Text of February 2 stozy filed from New York ^under FebI^7ary 1 dateline follows: 107 TOP SECRET " N0DI3 131- Dt^classifit'd per Executive Order 13526, vSectitin 3,3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date; 2011 TOP BECFim - NODTS BEGDI TEXT: "A Polish initiative to establish peace dis- cussions between north Vietnam and the United States failed because of American bombing of the Hanoi area in mid-December J it has been learned on excellent authority, 'Exactly hov far the Poles had succeeded in obtaining CDmraitments from Hanoi is not clear ^ but high-level outr.iders ^jho knev7 about it regarded the initiative *as promising before the bombing hardened Hanoi's attitude. QUOTE The Americans bungled it mD QUOTE^ one informed source stated. '.S. officials said that any bombing of non- military targets was accidental^ af-cer Western reporters observed damage to civilian areas that the North Vietnamese claimed vas caused by U.S. bombing. Since December _, U.S. planes have report- edly been ordered to stay away from the Eanoi area unless engaged in self-defense. "At the momenis the Poles are said to have suspended their efforts. Tliey are represented as extremely frustrated^, not merely over the effect of the bombing J but more particularly vith the uncooperative attitude of JIanoi. "Recently Poland declined a suggestion of India that representatives of the three countries constituting the Intermt ioixal Control Commission in Vietnam - Poland^ India and Canada - meet in New Delhi to consider vhat could be done* Use of the Commission framework to promote peace discus- sions is an old suggestion of Can-adian External Affairs Mnister Paul Martin. "I?ven after the attitude in lianoi changed in the wake of the bombing^ the Poles kept tiylng. Among other moves a top Polish diplomat^ Jer^y Michalowskij made an urureported visit to the United States in January. "X'/hether any American representative saw him cannot be learned ^ but two Canadian diplomats were sent to talk with him. 108 TOP SEOP^r ^ NODIS Declassified pei Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NTsTD 63316, By: NWD Date: 201 1 i66 TOP SECRET - N0D:3 "Michalowskij a foimer delegate to the United TTatloris and more recently in the Polish Foreign Office J went on a special Mission to Hanoi in Januar^^ 19^6^ as the resxilt of the visit to Warsaw of roving U.S. Ambassador W, Averell Harrinian* "Apparently the Polish effort stemmed in part from a conversation between Foreign Minister Adam Eapacki and Martin vhen the Canadian Foreign Minis- ter visited fersav last December. "All this has transpired outside the United Nations , Although he has been given a mandate by the United States to do what he can to facilitate peace discuss ions ^ Secretary General U Thant is said by others to feel that nothing more can be accomp- lished at the moment, "Diplomats from 11 non-aligned coup„tries have met here three times within the last 10 days to discuss whether they can undertake any initiative to ad^^ance a solution. As a result j Sudanese dele- gate Fal^hreddime Mohamed was designated to call on Thant to inquire whether a new initiative would be useful. He reportedly received no encouragement. END T2KT." RUSK February 3. I96T At his press conference j the President says it would not be helpful "to comment on any particular channel or communications at this point." Referring to Hanoi's attitude, he adds, ^'I must say that I da not interpret any action that 1 have observed as being a serious effort to either go to a conference table or to bring the war to an end." Hew York Times, 3 February I967 Transcript of the President's ])Tews Conference "FolloTring is a transcript of President Johnson's news conference in Washington yesterday as recorded by The New York Times : . ■ 109 TOP sec?;et - noDis •■ ? Declassifled per Executive OrcJcr 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 201 \ 13H TO? SECBET - NODIS ''1- Prospects in Vietnam Q, ¥e've *been reading and writing a good deal lately about diplomacy aamed at a Yietriam settlement, I vender if you could give us your assessment of the peace front at this tiiae. A. !4r. (Frank) Cormier of the Associated Press states a question that I knoir is on the minds of all the people here today and all the people in this country. As you knoVj I have underlined over and over again the very deep interest of the United States in a prompt and peaceful settlement of all of the problems in Southeast Asia. I have said many times that ve are ready to go more than half way in achieving this result. I would remind all of you that we v/ould velcome a conference in Southeast Asia and this might be a Geneva conference j it could be an all- Asian conference j or any other generally acceptable forum. ¥e vould be glad to see the unconditional dis- cussions to which I referred in my statement of A.pril^ 19^5; at Johns Hopkins. We would participate in preliminary discussions which might open the way for forsial negotiations* \le are prepared today to talk about mutioal steps of de-escalation* Me would be prepared to talk about such subjects as the exchange of prisoners ^ the demilitarization or the demilitarized zone or any other aspect which might take even a small step in the direction of peace. We should be prepared to discuss any points which the other side wishes to bring up along with points which we and our allies very much want to raise ourselves^ or there couJd be preliminary discussions to see whether there could be an agreed set of points which could be the basis for negotiant ion. So it is against this background that we study veiy carefully all of the public statements made which appear from time to time and which bear upon Southeast Asia and all the views which we receive from or through other governments. It would not be helpful to me -- and I do not intend to do so -- to comment on an^^ particular cliannel or communications a*t: this point. But you may be sure that we are diligent in our search for the ) possibility of a peaceful settlement. 110 TOP SECRET - HCDIS Declassified per Execuiive Order 13526, Section 33 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWDDute: 2011 TOP SECRET - NODIS In all candor I must say that I am not avare of any serious effort that the other side has made in my Judgment to hring the fighting to a stop and to stop the var . " "2. Personal Role in Tall^ Q< You've heen so eloquent in the past about express- ing your desire for peaceful negotiations. I'd like^ to ask you whether or not If you thought it would speed this var dovrn the road to peace whether you vouJ-d be willing personally to participate in negctia- tion^ with scone of your opposite numbers j such as the leadership in Hanoi? A. We have made clear that if the other side desires to discuss peace at any time well ve will be very happy to have appropriate arrangements made to see that that's carried out, VJhere we would talk and who would talk and what we would talk about are all mattei's that could be worked out between the two governments involved, Ve have made clear to them and to the world th& principles that we believe m.uEt govern a peace moeting of this klnd^ and a settlement that we wo^old hope would corae out of it like the honoring of the Geneva accords of ^5t and '62^ the right of self-determination of the people of South Vietziamj and to insure that they are freed from the threat or use of force. But we have J 1 must say^ as of today j no indica- tion that the other side is prepared in any way to settle on these limited and decent teims. ¥e hope very much that we can have some signals in that direction^ but I^ in candor^ must say that as of now we do not have." "3- Concessions for Peace Q. Mr, President J does your expressed willingness to negotiate a peaceful settlement imply any willingness to compromise on any of our stated objectives in that part of tiie world? A. I think that any peace agreement will involve understanding on both parts and certain concession on both parts and a certain understanding. I don*t think we can determine those before we come together or through any press conference tech- niques • 1 can only repeat what I said in the State F 111 TOF SECRET - K0DI3 Declassified pei Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Dale: 201 1 l^J ^«s TOP SECRET - NODIS of the Uniorij that I wish that the conflict in Vietaaza -was over and I can only repeat vhat I^ve said so many times "- I vill do arching I can on the part of this Government to go more than halfway to hring it at an end I must say that we face great costs j we face agony, ¥e do plan to carry out our effoi'ts out there ^ we are going to support our troops in the field ^ we are going to work with our Vietnamese allies toward pacification and constitutional government^ tfut while we're doing that J every hour of every day the spokesmen for this Government are under instructions to explore every possi- bilD^ty for peace. But I do not vant to disillusion any of you and I don*t want any of you to be caught by speculation. As of this moment I cannot report that there are any serious indications that the other side is ready to stop the war." ^%» Indications From Enemy 11. Q, You have three times now used that phrase: "no serious efforts by the other side to bring the war to a close." Kow would you characterize what has been going on in the last couple cf weeks? Do you recognise any signs of ma,neuverability or fluidity in their position? A. I see alines t every day some speculation by some individual^ or some hope or desire expressed by some Government • And I assume that different individuals get different impressions j certairily they have different hopes . I can only 'speak for myself; John-* And with the information that I have^ with the knowledge that's brought to me J I must say that I do not interpret any action that I have observed as being a serious effort to either go to a conference table or to bring the war to an end," a ■ • "Q, Woiild you discuss the reports thi,t there has been a decline in the infiltration rate to the South and say whether you think the bombing has had any effect? A. Well J I stated in my Baltimore speech in early '65 vhat we expected to come from the bombing, ¥e felt that it would improve the morale of the people in South Viet- nam who felt that they'd almost lost the war. We felt that it would make the North Vietnamese pay a much heavier price for what they were doing and we felt that it would make the infiltration more difficult. ll2 TOP SECR^ " NODIS Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3 J NND Project Number NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 \n TOP SECPJIiT - HODIS We think it has achieved all of those ei^ressed purposes, \Ie cannot speak with cold assurance on the inTiltration and the mjnibers each day or each week or each month. In soine quarters of the year oxir indications are that they Increase. In other periods of the year — the next quarter — then they go down some. I know of nothing that I can conclude as highly significant from the guesses and the estimates that we have made. Q, Sir J we have said in the past that we would be villing to suspend the bombing of North Vietnam in exchange for some suitable step by the other side* Are you prepared at all to tell us what kind of other steps the other side should take for this suspension of bombing? A. Just almost any step. As far as we can see^ they haven't taken any yet and we would be glad to explore any reciprocal action that they or any of their spokes- men would care to suggest. We have made one proposal after the other to — we'd like to have a cease-fire; we'd be very glad to stop our bombing as we have on two previous occaslonSj if we could have any indication of reciprocal act ion j but as of now they have given none and I assume they are willing to give none until I hear further," February Ji^ I967 In Saigon J the VC are reported to mortar the 7th Precinct and carry out k grenade attacks diaring the period January 28-February 3. Meanwhile^ Ky is distressed l>y news stories of US-DEV contacts and asks Lodge if we still require concessions in return for a bombing suspension and whether there are "divergences on such matters between Washington and Saigon • Lodge is instructed to reply by giving Ky more background on ferigoldj stressing (a) our doubts about the genuineness of the Polish contact ^ (b) on the other hand oin: obligation to follow all potential leads^ and (c) the need to avoid publicity during this "extremely interesting and delicate^' phase of diplomacy. In connection with the latter J his attention is to be drawn to the "recent public comments of Presidential Advisor Walt Sostow." 113 TCP SECRET - NOD IS Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 32 TOP SECRET " rJODIS Saigon 17295 (to SecState)^ S/lfodis k February 19^7 ^'Following is the record of VC initiated incidents vithin 10 miles of Saigon during the period Jan 28 to Feb 3. A. Jan 30* Saigon- grenade superficially vounds two US servicemen. B, Jan 30j Saigon- grenade injures one US serviceman and one VII civilian. ■I C< Jan 31 J 5 miles W of Saigon- grenade killing policeiLien and civilian^ wounding school- teacher . D. Feb Ij Saigon-six mortar shells fired into seventh precinct ;, wounding seven VU civilians. F, Feb 2 J Saigon- VC small arras and grenade attack on seventh precinct outnost^ one civilian killed . " LODGE Saigon I7317 (to SecState)^ S/E:^dis k February I967 Eeadd: CBTCPAC (KFiOM CJCS- INCLUSIVE FOR AOM SmBF) "1. During a call on Ky. ,. • "2, .,* he said^j 'Does Washington agree that there should be no publicity of any kind until there has been a concrete offer from the Communist side?' "3* 1 said that I felt sure that Washington vas very much in favor of not having publicity ^ since publicity not only presented awkward problems for us and for the Government of South Vietnam < but also made it difficult to get any kind of a peaceful understanding "With Hanoi. He agreed that we should avoid forcing Hanoi up against the wall by making them lose face. "i;. It was evident that his attention had been attracted by the statements of Senator Robert Kennedy and the apparent leaks of the messages from Cairo and New Delhi to a point vhere he wanted to be sure that there were no ^divergencies ' between Washington and Saigon • He asked whether we still believed that in lilt TOP SECRIJr ■ NOD IS , \2Pi Declassified per Executive Order 13526» Section 33 NND Project Nutnber: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 TOP SECRET - iroD.13 exchange for a bonbing suspension ve vanted some sort of concession on their part. Did we envisage a bar- gaining process or vere ve to suspend bombing with no quid pro quo? ^^5* I called his attention to the President's press conference and to the fact that on three sepa- rate occasions during the press conference j the Presi- dent had said that so far there was nothing of sub- stance from Hanoi- . , , " « * * « LODGE State I3ITI5 (to Amembassy Saigon), S/!Iodis 1;- February' I96T Eef : Saigon IT3I7 • » 4 "3- Believe you should also give Ky fill-in generally.,,. For his information^ story is^ as he may imagine^ quite incomplete and misleading in a number of respects • , . * We were never sure whether the Poles were speaking for Hanoi or entirely for themselves and we concluded ultimately that the exercise had been primarily a fishing expedition by the Poles in order to get us to change our position with respect to bombing of IJIorth Viet-IIam Through- out this exercise we had not undertaken to vmke any change in our basic position. At the same time we had indicated a readiness to consider the possibility of direct talks without conditions with Horth Viet -Ham with the ob^3 active of bringing about a peaceful settlement. You should add that we would naturally be in touch with the GW if there were really sub- stantive de^/ielopments in this field. ^%. VJlth reference to Ky's query (para 2 of reftel) about Washington views on publicity ^ suggest you call to his attention recent public conmients of Presidential Advisor VJalt Bostow, After referring to 'extremely interesting and delicate' phase of diplomatic probes now under way Eos tow noted that publicity could destroy effectiveness of behind-the-scenes efforts to ascertain Banoi's intent and added 'this is a bad time to talk about an^- partic^olar stand which might turn out to be a negotiating situation,'" HJSK TOP SECRET -^ TOiDlS 115 \^t) Declassified pei Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NNTD 63316, By: NWD Date: 201 1 TOP SECESE - NOD 13 Washington Post j 5 February I967 U.S. Is Wary on Eeport of Peace Bid^ oy Murrey ^^rder "United States attempts to launch peace talks vith ETorth Vietnam are now in 'an extremely interesting and delicate phase ^^ a Iftiite House adviser said yesterday. 'Vith that cot3ment and variations upon it^ the Administration declined to confirm or deny a report that the United States and North Vietnajn had tried to start peace talks in Warsaw in December ^ at American initiative. "Walt W» Rostov^ President Johnson's special assistant for national security affairs^ said; "*I!his is an extranely Interesting and delicate phase in what is or what might turn out to he a negotiating process, Nothing has yet happened that would justify us in saying we have a serious offer to negotiate, This is a had time to discuss any particu- lar negotiating track. ' " Lack of V igor. Postow's commeats were made during a panel debate at a conference of college news- paper editors at the Sheraton- Park Hotel, Another panelist J Richard N. Goodwin j who had served as an adviser to "both Presidents Kenndy and Johns on ^ charged there was a lack of vigor in the present pursuit of negotiations. "'If Hanoi wishes to negotiate seriously^ ^ said Rostov^ 'yoi^i* government vould not be embarrassed. It vould he delighted . ^ "Rostow was questioned specifically hy the students about the validity of a report in TJie Washington Post yeste2rday^ by staff writer Robert H. Es tab rook at the United Nations. "It reported that an authoritative Western source said that U,S. Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge j in Saigon on Dec. 2 and 3^ asked a Polish diploinat to set up contacts with North Vietnam. On Dec* kj the report said J Polish Foreign ^iinister Adam Rapacki said Hanoi agreed to have ambassadorial-level talks with the United States in Warsaw, The report said that Hanoi attached no conditions about first halting the Ameri- can bombing of North Vietnam. 116 TOP SECRST - NOD IS \'\\ Declassified pei Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 TOP SECRET - NOBIS "Withdrew In Ar^er , According to the report Hanoi angrily vitlidrev its agreement after American bombing raids near Hanoi on Dec, 13-1^^- allegedly hit civilian areas. "Eostov declined to get any more specific about that account except to repeat that 'this is a bad time to tallc about a pairticular strand of vhat might be a negotiation.* ^^Other soiirces sought to emphasize that the frus- trated negotiating effort described in the report from the United Nations vas only one of many efforts being made to launch talks. ^^Scme Administration soui'ces said the point in ■Ihe Washington Post account that they ^ould challenge was that Hanoi had 'agreed* to the Warsaw talks, JTo official^ however J would discuss whether this question of agreement was a matter of differing interpretations or not. 5^.ere was no challenge by any official of the reported Lodge-initiative to arrange for talks in Varsaw. "The State Department ^ in coBimenting Friday on earlier and considerably less -detailed versions of a similar report 1::^ The Washington Post and others said it saw 'no merit' to contentions that the bombing of North Vietnam interfered with efforts to start peace talks. said; "m a new comment yesterday the State Department "'As a matter of policy we do not believe it would promote the cause of peace in Vietnam to comment on accoiints of an^- alleged private talks or events relating to them. The President fully characterized the situation at his press conference last Ilhursday.* "At that press conference j President Johnson repeatedly said that 'I do not interpret any action that I have observed as being a serious effort to either go to a conference table or to bring the war to an end,' The Unitecl States^ he said^ was anxious 'to explore any reciprocal action' to curb or end the war. "That comment J Administration sources said^ amounted to turning do^m^ as inadequate^ a bid by North Vietnam's Foreign mnister in which he said there 'could' be talks 117 TOP SECRET - NOD IS Declassified per Execuiive Order 13526, Section 33 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Diite: 201 1 TOP SECRST - NODIS if there was an Uinconditiona.!' end to the "bcEibings of his coiontiy. '^ Administration officials emphasized that the offer only held out the possibility^ not the proraisej of talks^ in any event, "The Soviet news agency^ Tass, charged yesterday that President Johnson had spurned the 'good"yfill* gesture by North Vietnamese Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh. Ikss said the minister had displayed an 'indication of willingness' by the Hanoi regime to talk with the United States- ■ "!Dae Soviet news agency added: "*Bie unwillingness of U.S. ruling circles to stop the critninal bombing of the D.R.V. (North yietr.am) can only be regarded as a refusal to ineet around the conference table ^ and as a sign of their deteimination to further escalate the aggressive war in Vietnam.' "Tass's correspondent in Hanoi said President Johnson's statements pi^oduced ^legitimate indignation' in Hanoi, '" February 6-Tj I96T Australia and ITew Zealand are briefed on I&rigold in seme detail. More general acco^^nts are given to the GVhJ and the I^nila countries. Ky accepts our explanation in good spirit ^ but points to alaim about so-called ^^peace" talk among Catholic leaders ^ certain Buddhists and the military in SVM, His and Thleu's strong anti-coTmnunisni would be reassuring to these elements ^ he believe; 3, State I323W (to Amembassy Canberra; i^embassy Wellington) , TS/NodiSj 6 February I96T Ref : DEPCmTEL I3170O EVES OKLY FOR AlfflASSADOR "1. On February k Bundy separately gave Ambassador Waller and Charge d^Aff aires Shepherd a full account of the discussions between USG and Poles about the possi- bility of direct discussions betvreen USG and Hanoi...." .... ■■^^ TOP SSCBET -HODIS Declassified pei Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NTsTD 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 TOP SECRET - nODIS "27 I^Tille ve may have erred in not informirii you fully on this matterj we vere guided throughout by the absolute necessity of secrecy in seeking to deter- mine whether Hanoi was in fact prepared to sit do"v/n quietly without preccaditions . » . . "28. Ihis full account is being given to Australia and New Zealand ^ with the request for the jpreservation of total confidence. A more general account Is being given to Saigon and to the Manila countries. We have assured Saigon^ as we have repeat- edly assured you^ that if we should get clear evidence of a serious change in Ifenoi^s position we would keep them fully informed." RUSK Saigon 17l|8£ (to SecState)^ S/Kodis T Februaiy 1967 Kef: State I3ITI5 "1* Pursuant to your I31715J I called on Prime Minister Ky ^esday morning ,,,•" « ■ ■ "3» Ky seemed to accept all of the above in good spirit. He evidently thinks that the purpose of the rather careful wording is to make it possible to achieve scMe kind of understanding irithout making Kknoi lose face* In all my many talks with himj he has often voiced his belief that ve should be trying to persuade Hanoi and make it easy for them to go along with uSj and that we did not want to humiliate thenij make them lose face J put them up against the wall- "U. Changing the subject slightly ^ he then said that Catholic leaders in Viet-BIam were becoming alarmed by the so-called fpeace^ talk which they feared would actually mean military advantage for Kanoi^ and were taking an attitude very different fran that of the Pope. He was afraid that similar divisions laight occur among Buddhists and among the military. The hopeful element of the situation was that 'everyone knew^ how strongly anti-Communist he^ Kj, and Ihieu were." LODGE 119 TOP SECRET - FODIS Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 201 1 l^-t TOP SECRET - KODIS F ebruary- 7- 8 ^ 19 6? Wilson comments in Parliament about discussion ^ith the Poles and a definite ^^peace feeler^^ last December. Highest levels in Washington fear this may undercut the President's Februaiy 3 remarks. Gronouski takes issue ^fith Goldberg^ arguing that the Canadians vera probably Estabrook's source and that the Poles remain a better channel for communication with I^noi- State 133105 (to Amembassy London) j S/lIodis 8 Februaiy I967 FOE AMBASSADOR AIE) COOPER "1* Highest levels are deeply disturbed by Wilson reference to December discussions with Poles in Parlia- mentary response yesterday. Wilson comment is of course being widely reported as confiimng that some definite 'peace feeler' did exist at that time^ and is therefore being construed to 'undercut' President's remarks of last week. Moreover^ revelation that Wilson has 'all the details' is bound to have serious complicating effect on our relations with Saigon and with S^Ianila allies J who had not repeat not received any similar full account , . , * " * • HJSK Warsaw I939 (to SecState)^ TS/Nodis 8 February I967 Eef: (A) State I305SO (B) State 131716 "1. Based on person-al knowledge of the precedents^ I have reached quite different inferences and conclu- sions regarding Es tab rook articles than those drawn ^oj Amb. Goldberg in reftels* With respect to Feb 2 story j while Esta crook referred to high Polish sourceSj he denied that story came from the Poles. Rather ^ he said it came from Canadian Fou Min I^^rtin while Ss tab rook was in Canada ^ and that he had story a couple of weeks. This rings tr-ae^ for Estabrook on Jan I9 filed from Ottawa essence of his Feb 2 stoiy (which appeared in Jan 20 Paris Herald Tribune) saying 'Canadian authorities blame some 120 TOP SEGRFT - NOBIS Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3,3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 I (^< TOP SBCRKJ? " NOD IS of the difficiilty on the accidental U.S. bombing of Hanoi in mid-December. Private soundings then under Tr/ay were disrupted ^ they say^ and the attitude in Uoiiih Vietnam appeared to harden.' Alsoj note that in his Feb 2 article Estabrook speaks of 'high level outsiders' as source^ and links Polish peace effort to r&ftia-Kapacki discussions in December (which is not true J btit it does not hurt Martin's iniage to be case in this role}^ alsoj note that Estabrook spoke of Westem sources In his Feb h story*" ^'5* What does surprise mSj if we accept Esta- brook 's statement that story came from Martin (and I see no a priori reason for Estabrook to implicate fertin and U Ohant and protect the Poles )j is that Feb 2 story places developments in so unfavorable a light from standpoint of USG,,*," * ■ "8. I am particularly concerned vith recommen- dation in final para of reftel A^ that 've shouJ_d no longer use Poland or ar^ other Bloc country as channel to Hanoi,* As I noted in m^f analysis of Marigold role played by Poland (Warsaw 1631)^ I too had hoped that Soviets might play an Intermediary role. But to my knowledge experience has been that Poles are only Communist countiy willing to take on this chore ■ > 4 tt GROKOUSKT Febniaxy 10^ l8j 20 ^ I967 Sizeable TC incidents within 10 miles of Saigon lead Lodge to suggest that there is no further need to look for indications of reci- procity to oLir suspension of bombing near Hanoi. He suggests that the 10 mile limit around Hanoi be dropped. Saigon 1T759 (to SecState)^ S/KTcdis 10 February 1967 "Following is the record of VC initiated inci- dents within ten miles of Saigon during the period Febn^axy k to February 9." * . 121 TOF SECRET - NOBIS 1 . €J Declassified pei Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NNTD 633 16. By: NWD Date: 201 1 TOP SECRET - NODJS ^ — ^.^ — ^ ^^C. February 6^ four miles west of Saigon unirlentified platoon- sized unit fired submachine bursts near police station aad then withdrew." «■« 'd » LODGE Saigon IS329 (to SecState), S/Uodis 18 February I96T "Following is the record of VC initiated inci- dents within ten miles of Saigon during the period February 10 to February 15/' * ■ • "C. February 13^ Saigon - VC fired four mortar rounds in vicinity of MCV-I (details have been reported separately)." « « "2. With this spate of activity it is clear that considerations behind preparing this series of reports are no longer relevant. This villj therefore^ be the last telegraphic repoi't of this sort." LODGE Saigon l8>35 (to SecState)^ TS/liodis 20 Feb27uary I967 * w m "2. [Jhe recent mortaring in town, other terror- ist incidents in the Saigon area^ and the likelihood that we will get niore^ prompts me to suggest we con- sider Infonning Hanoi j via the Poles ^ that we no longer consider ourselves bound by the 10 miles liiait." LODGE O March 3, I967 Goldberg (acconipanied by Lodge) sees D*Orlandi in Saigon^ to hear the D.atter's version of Marigold* His objective is a first-hand confirm^ at ion from an inclependent source of the inaccuracy of the Polish version conveyed to U Thant. D'Orlandi^s account^ he finds^ contains "no 122 TOP SECPH' - NOD IS DeclassiOed per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 201 1 m TOP SECRET - NOD IS ^ discrepancies from the version we already have- In particular D^Orlandi is guite categoric in stating that the 10 points passed to Hanoi were foroiulated by Lewandowski^ not by Lodge — as Goldberg believes the Poles told U Thant. On the other side, D^Orlandi is of the view that the December 13-lt bombing derailed the Warsaw talks. He expresses great confidence in Lewandovski's Integrity, USIM 1^238 (to SecState), S/ETodis 6 lylarch I967 FROM GOIDBEEiG + "On ferch 3^ day before leaving Saigon ^ I arranged entirely private and off record meeting with D^Orlandi^ with agreement of and in presence -Amb Lodge . l^ objec- tive was to secnre first-hand confirmation from entirely independent source of inaccuracy of Polish version of late IToveniber^early December Marigold events ^ i.e.^ that it was Lodge who had formulated ten point proposal Lewandowski transmitted to Hanoi ^ only to take position subsequently that some of these points needed clarifica- tion, (underlining furnished) "Without any prompting on my partj D'Orlandi really and fully recited course of events. His recital contained no discrepancies from version we already had and he was guite categoric in stating that ten points passed Hanoi by Levandowski had been formulated by Lewandowski himself," ■ * * 4' "It is necessary to add^ however^ that D^Orlandi is of view that bombing of Dec 13-1^ derailed Warsaw talks. He also expressed view that it would have fu3rbhered progress towards negotiations if Rapacki had not insisted upon transferring venue to Warsaw. D*Orlandl's view is that it would have been preferable to carry on discussions through himself and lewandowski In Saigon^ with Lewandowski commuting to Hanoi. ^'D^Orlandi expressed great confidence in Lewan- dowski 's integrity and confirmed that both Lewandowski and he will be leaving Saigon for respective home or other posts • " BUFFUH 123 TOP SECPI?r - NODIS Vi^ DeclassiDed per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 TOP SECRPT - NODIS March Ik, 19 67 On returaing to ITew York^ Goldberg tries to arrive at a common version of the facts about J-feirigold with the Polish TOT Representative^ Tomorowicz. The Polish version agrees 'vrith ours that the 10 points -were formulated by LevaMowski . Goldberg ndt^B three points of difference J however: i. Their version does not mention that Lodge indicated the need to clarify certain points at the December 1 meeting in Saigon. ii. Their version indicates that Lodge first raised clarifica- tion at the December 3 meeting ^ through the "important differences of intei^pretation" clause, iii. According to their version^ the Poles stressed avoiding intensification of the bombing either before or during talks from the December 1 meeting on, Goldberg urges Tomorcwicz to revlev Marigold with Warsai; so that these factual differences can be cleared up. USIM 4390 (to SecState)j S/Nodis 15 mvch 1967 "1, I arranged meet with Polish Perm Eep Tomoro- vicz Mar ll|. FM shortly after he had called on SIG and just before he was due leave for roughly ten days con- sultation in ¥arsaw," A m "3- Specif ically^ I noted there is one point of some importance re developments in early Dec on vhich there are two differing versions ^ namely ^ who formu- lated ten points which lewandowsKi presented tc Hanoi- ''k. I said I had talked with D^^rlandi privately while in Saigon^ that D^Orlandi had reviewed ^krigold developments without any prompting from me^ and that his review entirely confirmed our understanding of facts on this point, Tomorowicz said that^ In princi- ple j facts of this point as we understood them were quite accurate, (underlining furnished) 5. His further comments ^ however^ engendered discussion of Marigold developments throughout Dec which revealed three other points on which we and Poles have differing facts, specifically: 124 TOP SECRET - ffODIS Duclassifled per Executive Order 13526, Section 3 J NND Pmject Number NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 TOP SECHEl^ - I70DIS a) PoliE^h vers ion J as presented by Tomoro- wiczj makes no mention of fact that at Dec 1 mtg in Saigon, when Levandowski pre sent ed ten points to Lodge^ Lodge raised question of need to clarify some of points^ noting Points B and H in particular » (underlining furnished) B) Acco3?ding Polish version^ Lodge first mentioned need for clarification at Dec 3 jtntg j when he said there were important differences of inter- pretation on 'serious matters^ in ten points ^ although Lodge would not reply when asked to identify points in need of clarification, (underlining furnished) C) According Polish version^ Poles placed stress on relation between bombing and progress toward US-TTOI talks from Dec 1 mtg on: Lewandowski allegedly told Lodge on Dec 1 that there must be no intensification of bombing either before or during talks; at Dec 3 mtg with Lodge ^ he allegedly made strong representations re Dec 2 bombings; and^ on Dec 5 J Rapacki allegedly made another strong repre- sentation re bombing to Gronousklj claiming Dec 2 and 3 bombings had not ruled out chances of direct US-IIVJr talks but had certainly made progress toward talks more difficult, (underlining furnished) "6. As these differences carae to light during discuss ion^ I presented our understanding of facts and urged Tcmorowicz to review Marigold developments while in Warsaw so that -we could clear up factual differences betveen us * , , . '* GOLDBERG March l6-lTj I96T Fanfani writes Rusk that Lewandowski has proposed a new initiative to D'Orlandi, Lodge is instructed to follow up^ but he replies that D'Orlandi has left Saigon for Rome, Reinhardt is therefore instructed to contact D*Orlandi later in Home, F.QEie 4767 (to SecState)j s/Fodis^ I6 March I96T • • "My Dear Secretary of State ^ 125 TOP SECRET - ITODIS Declassified pei Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NTsTD 63316, By: NWD Date: 201 1 fo TO? SEGHST - NOBIS '^I voiild feel remiss in my duty if I failed to infoiTiL you of what Aml^assador D^Orlandi has communis cated to me after meeting vith Lewandovskij a few days ago J and reviewing with him the current Viet- namese situation* D'Orlandi felt he had to tell me that J in the present circumstances ^ a resumption of negotiations wotild require a three week long sus- pension of baiEhings and the admission^ on the part of the United States ^ that they are still willing to accept the well known ten points. "D^Orlandi adds that the duration of the sus- pension Gould he kept secret and that it should not rpt not he difficult to seciire a substantive counter^ part from Hanoi j to be presented as a compensation for Some otherj purely token^ concession frcei the United States/* • • • * KEimiAEDT State 156826 (to Amembassy Saigon) ^ S/Kodis 16 March I96T *'l. By now you will have seen* . .message from FonMin Fanfani to Se dietary Rusk * * * "2* Points of greatest interest on which we most want clarification are following: (a) When would the negotiations be resumed J after suspension had run three weeks or at initiation of three-week period? If the former^ should it be assumed that suspension would be expected to continue as negotiations proceeded? (b) V/hat would be the 'substantive counterpaii}' from Hanoi? Presume it would not merely be resumption of negotiations but rather some de-escalatory action affecting infiltrationj guerrilla or terror activity in the South or the like . (c) In phrase 'resumption of negotiations* does this refer to (i) direct UPV/US talks which were to hav^ been undertaken in Warsaw last December 2 and which we welcomed ^ or (li) resumption of arid exchanges between C-ronouski and Papacki? 126 TOP SECRET - NOD IS \s Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Seutiim 3 J NND Project Number NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 TOP SECRET - NOBIS (d) vihat is entailed in 'accepting* the ten points? ¥e assi*me this means nothing more than that ve have in no vay receded from acceptance in terms ve made known to Lewandov/ski and Rapacki in November and December. ^'3. Please review these matters vith D^Orlandi Saigon 20590 (to SecState)j S/Nodis 16 ferch 1967 "1. In response to your 156826^ D'Orlandi left Saigon yesterday, Thursday, March l6.,.," LODGE State 158132 (to Ameiabassy Rome)j s/Nodis 17 March I967 Ref : (a) Saigon 20590 (b) Rome kjBj (c) State 156826 « • • ''2 The Secretary vould be most grateful if Minister Fanfani vould let Ambassador Reinhardt know when Ambassador B'Orlandi has reached Rome so that the two Ambassadors miglit discuss Lewandcwski's approach . "3- For Reinhardt, Assuming the arrangement outlined above works out, we would appreciate your following up vith D*Orlandi along lines slcetched out Deptel I56826 '" RUSK ^ ) March I9, 19 67 Rapacki has told Uilson and Brown that (l) Lodge first accepted Lewandovski's 10 points, then reneged through the "important differ- ences of interpretation^^ clause^ and (2} the December 13-1^ bombing had sabotaged the entire project. State cables a rebuttal: (ij Lodge reserved the US position on the 10 points when first presented, December 1; hence he did not renege^ (2) Although Lewandowski complained on December 3 about our bombing Hanoi ^ "there was no suggestion that the prospect for DRV-U8 talks depended in any direct way on such matters*" 127 TO? SECRET " I;0DI3 1^1, \ I Declassified pt^r Executive Order 13526, Section 3,3 NND Project Niiitiber". NND 63316. By: HWD Date: 2011 TOP SECBET " NODIS State 1582U6 (to Amembassy London) ^ TS/TTodis 19 Iferch 1967 Hef: London's 6998 and 7172 and State's lli6303 "Account in London's 6998 of Ea^acki's conver- sations with Bro-vm and Wilson about the events of December provide further evidence of Kapacki's con- tinuing Yindictiveness. \Je assume that his feelings will badly discolor the Polish contribution to a 'more detailed post mortem' between the British and the Poles. "During his London vis it , Eapacki evidently made two charges against us: (l) Lodge had reneged after giving firm agreement to the Lewandowski Ten Point package and (2) the December 13-1^ bombing had sabotaged the entire project, "The cable exchanges between Lodge and the Department in the early days of December provide an absolutely clear record that Lodge did not repeat not agree to Lewandowski's version of the Ten Points and therefore did not repeat not renege- On Decem- ber Ij Lewandowski told Lodge he had presented to Hanoi his understanding of the US position based on his conversations with Lodge on IJovember Ik and earlier. He then read his Ten Points ^ which Lodge recorded precisely. Lodge was not^ however j shown a paper containing the Ten Points. "At the end of his statement ^ Levandowski asked Lodge if he had correctly stated the US point of view. Lodge responded carefully that 'obviously on a matter of such importance J I would have to refer to my government for a definitive reply ^ but I could say off hand that much of what he cited was in keeping with the spirit of our policy*' He then pointed out specific difficulties with Point 2 and Points 8. Neither in this nor in later discussions with Lodge did Lawandowski indicate any misunderstanding of the qualified riature of Lodge's response to his presen- tation of the Ten Points, For example. Lodge informed him on December 3 that our Snbassy in Warsaw would contact the DRV representative on December 6 to confirm 'that the Lewandowski formulation broadly represented our posit ion J although several specific points were subject to important differences of interpretation,,,. 11 .... It is also worthy of hate that D^Orlandi told the Secretary on December 9 that Eapacki had 128 TOP SECBFTT- KODIS Declassified pei Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 IS TOP SECRET ' r:oDis 'tried to be clever' aM to get the US to withdraw all its reservations about the Lewandowski formu- lation before he established a direct contact in Warsaw between the US and DRV representatives*..* tt mm* It is tiijie that on December 3; Levan- dowski under instructions ^ coiriplained to Lodge about bombings in the vicinity of Hanoi but there was no suggestion that the prospect for DEV-US talks depended in any direct way on such matters, "Subsequently J while Eapacki haggled^ we wez^e blocked from a direct contact with the DEV at which this and all other pertinent subjects could have been discussed.,,/^ KATZEE^IBACH Apri l Tj ^I j. IggT Eeiriha.rdt reviews prospects for resuming contact via Lewandowski with D'Orlandi in Rome, State instructs him to arrange a three-party meeting when Lewandowski passes through Rome in May. Rome 326G (to SecState)^ S/lTodiSj T April I967 State 164750 (Eef?) "1. In lengthy private conversation today at villaj D'OrlaMi exposed his conviction that possi- Dility to achieve something through Lewandowski was good and should be pursued without undue delay since Pole would be leaving Saigon in >Iay. D'Orlandi believed lesson of last try was that more details should be clarified and nailed dovna through Lewan- dowski channel before actual negotiations between principals initiated. No doubt^he had discussed these and other views in detail with Lodge* It was clear to me that D^Orlandi considered himself essential link to Lewandowski channel. . Regardirig specific questions (State 156826^ para 2)j he stated: A, Lewarjiowski thought that suspension of bombing sho^jad be initiated not later than his arrival in Hanoi to sound ITorth Yietnamese and that three or four weeks would be necessary to allow sufficient time for initial exchanges ^ suspension would of coui'se be without any comiuitment^ and whether it continued firrther would presi^jnably depend on whether constrictive developments take place. 129 TOP SECRET - nODE 3 •■ liTIf Dccbssiried per Execuiive Order 13526, Section 33 NND Project Number: NND 633 16. By: NWD Diile: 201 1 TOP SECRET " noDia B. » Substantive contribution' would ^ he imagined J be something specific in military field which US Command considered useful. C. ^Resumption of negotiations' he thought meant US/DEV but vas not sure that Hapacki/ Gronouski stage could be completely finessed if venue were Warsaw, D. 'Accepting ten points' he understood simply to mean reaffirmation of previous position including US reservations on interpretation and assurance that there had been no recession in US position. *'3» D'Orlandi said Lewandovski had revealed nothing rpt nothing in his conversation vhich might cast light on why Hanoi published Johnson- Ho- Chi Minh. exchange . " * » « « REBIHAFDT State 180271 (to Memhassy Eome)^ TS/Nodis 21 April 1967 Eef: Rome 5266 "1, \Je appreciate having these additional comments by D'Orlandi and suggest that in order to explore Hanoi's position further j as it is untier- stood by Lewandowski^ you propose quiet meeting between the three of you next month when Lewandowski passes through Rome en route to Warsaw/' RUSK May 8- I967 Hightower files a lengthy account of ^3arlgold from Washington, The story contains enough detail to Indicate that some of his sources were insiders. It is critical of the Polish role and reflects Washington's doubts the reliability of Poland as a channel to Hanoi, 130 TOP SECRET - NODIS ^ \ss Declassified perExecuiive Order 13526, Section 33 NND Pmjecn Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 TOP SECRET - NODIS Key York Times , 9 May I96J k-mWUil U.S. BID IGNORED BY HAITOI, by John M. Eight over of the Associated Press • • * "One of the 10 points provided that the United States voiild not insist that North Vietnai]i acknowl- edge publicly the presence of its forces In South Vietnam. The Johnson Administration decided this should be clarified to require that if the troop issue was to be covered up for face-saving purposes ^ then the Uorth Vietnamese forces should be with^ drawn from the South. ''Mr. Lewaudowski was infortned of this and other clarification points. The others seemed mainly matters of wording. But this one seemed to be sub- stantial," "Mr. Eapacki*s strong resistance to the clari- fication proposal caused some concern in Washington, Officials were not sure the Poles had any coniniitment from North Vietnam to begin the xalks. Some high officials here doubted that I-lr. Hapacki was in fact relaying United States views and making known Washington's readiness for talks to Hanoi-" ^ m * "Informants say an Important element in the Administration decision not to suspend the bombing plan was an attack by Communist forces on Saigon's main airfield and an unsuccessf-ol attempt to blow up a major bridge in Saigon," • * » • "United States officials publicly took issue with this. Privately they said that while the attack at Hanoi might have destroyed the Polish plan J it might also have presented Hanoi or Warsaw with a convenient pretext for not going through with it." # > • « May 9-10, I967 In Warsaw^ Polish concern is expressed over rumors that the US plans to publish a white paper on Marigold* This would force them^ 1^1 TOP SECH^ - rrODIg Declassifled per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 201 1 ^^^^ IC^'>? TOP SECRST - NOBIS reluctantly J to publish their own account, Gronouski recoHsnends against publication, Washington replies that the Eightover piece is ^^essentially accurate and reasonably favorable from our point of view." The Poles are to be told that ve will not publish a white paper. When so infonnedj the Poles respond that "US officials had apparent- ly chosen another way to put out the stoiy," They are especially dis- tressed at the question raised as to whether they had actually transmitted US messages to the Ifforth Vietnamese, Tliey state that they had delivered the messages . Warsaw 2T00 (to SecState)^ S/Nodls^ 9 May I967 "1. During my separate calls on Winievicz and Mlchalowski this morning ^ both of them expressed Polish concern about news reports originating in U.S. that U.S. intends to publish within next few days a white book covering Warsaw talks of last December,,.." * • ■ "5 Poles WQf-ild be most reluctant to pub- lish their own white book but they would be left with no alternative if U*S. published its own," . ■ "T* -..- I wouJ.d therefore recomraend against publication of official dept. version of MARIGOIiD events. . , J^ GEOi^'OUSKI State 190899 (to Amembassy Warsaw)^ S/lTodis 9 May 1967 Eef : Warsaw 2699 and 27OO "We consider news stories filed yesterday on December peace probes to be essentially accurate and reasonably favorable from our point of view. We would prefer let matter rest there avoiding to extent feasible public exdaange of interpretations with the Polish Government, When queried about story yesterday^ official spokesman said he pre- ferred not rpt not to comment on STJory^ adding FOR BACKGEOUDID that he 'would have no q.i.u3,rrel with it, ^ We intend maintain this position. ^ TO? SECRET - NODIS Declassified pei Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 ^5^ TOP SECKST " NODIS "Since we have no desire exacerT^ate US-Pol ish \ relations over "fchis matter ^ we have no present intentions publish H'Tnite Book' on this subject* You should so inform Michalowski • > • > » •' RUSK Warsaw 272? (to SecState)^ s/JIodis 10 I4ay 1967 Eef; State I90899 "1 \Ihen Kaiser said U.S. has no present intention of publishing white book^ Michalowski responded that U.S. officials had apparently chosen another way to put out the story- He then referred to Hightower article which j he said^ according to summary received by Polish FonMinj seemed to be based on high level official sources. There were disturbing distortions j errors and innuendos challenging the integrity of Rapacki and question- ing whether Polish side had actually transmitted messages to North Vietnamese. He added that Poles had of course delivered messages," M m w * jEiocras fey 28 J 1967 US Eabassies in Tol^o and Seoul are given background information on l^Iarigold . State 2039314- (to AmSnbassies: Tokyo^ Seoul)^ s/Nodis 28 fey 1967 Kef: State 197li.26 to Tokyo . State 198946 to Seoul "We are repeating to you State's 1582^5-6 and 1323^7 which provide bac'^xground info on Polish initiatives re Vietnam which aborted last December. Text of Lewandovski's Ten Points which were pre- sented to Aabassador Lod,^e on December 1 follows:" ^o' . b SUSK 133 TOP CTC-HKT - IFODIS 15S DcL-lassified per Execuiive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 TOP SECRET - PJODIS June 6, I96T The three-party talks in Eome vill not be possible as Levandovskl is not passing through. Rome 6506 (to SecState)j s/Uodis 6 June I96T State 191171^ and Home 599I "D'Orlandi has informed me that Lewandowski is not repeat not coming to Rome," RErNILAH)a? December 6j I967 Wilfred Burchett tells US officials in Paris that the DPV had an official en route to the Marigold Warsaw meeting at the time of can- cellation — "vhen the US resinned bombing Hanoi/' Paris 75^0 (to SecState)^ S/Nodis^ 6 December I967 * * "Burchett said North Vietnamese accuse us of talking peace vhile intensifying war. For example; ITorth Vietnainese had agreed to talk at Warsaw last December and even had official en route when US resumed bombing Hanoi- He also mentioned North Vietnamese readiness to talk at Rangoon during 37 day pause/' « a • * 13!^ TOP SECRET - NODIS