Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 NND Project Number; NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 / V.B Justification of the War d! Vols.) Internal Documents (9 Vols.) 4. The Kennedy Administration: (2 Vols.) Book I Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By; NWD Date: 201 1 TOP SECR SENSITIVE UNITED STATES - VIETNAM RELATIONS NAM OFFICE OF THE S K FORCE ETARY OF 5* & TOP SECRET ■ SENSITIVE N Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number; NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 ) TOP SECRET - Sensitive /' ■ V.B.4. U.S. IWOLWMHNT IN THE WAR - INTERNAL DOCUK .""-" •P*^%^» The Kennedy Administration : • :> ^/ January 1961 - November 19^3 BOOK I 0295 Sec Daf Coat Br. X- «.a-*< TOP SECRET - Sensitive Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 TOP SECRET - Sensitive V.B.U. U*S. INVOLVEMENT IN THE WAR -- INTERNAL DOCUMENTS The Kennedy Administration: January 1961 - November 1963 Foreword This volume contains a collection of Internal U.S. Government docu- ments and position papers regarding U.S. policy toward Vietnam* The volume of materials for this period is so large as to preclude the inclusion in such a collection of more than a sample of the docu- ments in the files. Those classified materials that are included, however, were circulated at the highest levels of the Government and either bore directly on the process of policy formation or were decision -making instruments* The collection is organized chrono- logically and devoted exclusively to the Kennedy years. A separate volume covers the Johnson Administration. BOOK I : January thru December 1961 BOOK II : January 1962 thru October 1963 TOP SECRET - Sensitive . > Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 NND Project Number; NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3,3 NND Project Number; NND 633 16. By: NWD Date: 201 1 TOP SECRET - Sensitive V.B.1+. U.S. IMVDLVEMEKT IN THE WAR ~- INTERNAL DOCUMENTS The Kennedy Administration: January 1961 - Hovember 19^3 Contents and Chronological List of Documents 1. 2. l h 5 1961 Page General Lansdale reports on his January visit to Vietnam: "The U.S. should recognise that Vietnam is in a critical condition and should treat it as a combat area of the cold war # , :# " He recommends strong support for Diem personally as the best available South Vietnamese leader, and the prompt transfer of Ambassador Durbrow, whose relations with Diem .are poor. Memo for Secretary of Defense, IT January 196l s . 1 Embassy Saigon is advised that Kennedy lias approved Counter - Insurgency Plan (prepared by previous Administration) calling for increases in U.S. support for Vietnamese armed forces, contingent on reforms by Diem. State to Saigon 105^, 3 February 196] i-h The President requests the SecDef to examine means for placing more emphasis on the development of counter guer- rilla forces. NSAM 2, 3 February 1961 17 The Secretary of Defense is instructed to report his views on actions in the near future to launch guerrilla opera- tions in Viet Minh territory. HSAM 28, 9 March 1961 18 The JCS comment on the recommendations of Lt Gen Trapnell. In addition to the Trapnell recommendations, the JCS suggest that the U.S. provide Defense support funds on the same basis for 170,000 forces as for 150,000; that the U.S. pro- vide MAP support for the entire 68, 000 -man Civil Guard; and that the U.S. exploit these contributions to induce the GVK to accept the Counter Insurgency Plan. Memorandum reflects conflict of views between MAAG and Embassy in Saigon. JCS Memorandum for Secretary of Defense, JCSM 228-61, 11 April 1961 * . . • ........ % 19 TOP SECRET - Sensitive Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 rr> TOP SECRET - Sensitive Page 6. Unsigned paper, apparently by Lansdale, proposes a Presi- dential directive organizing a Task Force to come up -with an approved plan of action in Vietnam. The goals of U.S. policy in Vietnam fall into three interrelated parts: (l) pacifi- cation, (2) stabilization and (3) unification of Vietnam under ant i -communist government. Tasks axe outlined in this memorandum to accomplish these three goals. Paper in Deputy Secretary of Defense Task Force file, 19 April 1961 22 7. General Lansdale provides a detailed description of Presi- dent Diem and his family apparently intended for Vice President Johnson's use. Lansdale first met Diem in Saigon in 195^- • "Here is our toughest ally... a 60-year old bache- lor who gave up romance with his childhood sweetheart ... to devote his life to his country." Lansdale Memorandum for Deputy Secretary of Defense, 25 April 1961 36 8. In view of the serious military deterioration within South Vietnam, and in order to accomplish the U.S. objective of preventing communist domination of the South, this first draft of the Vietnam Task Force report calls for a compre- hensive political, economic and military program of U.S. support. Among other recommendations are an increase in MAAG and MAP and a visit by the Vice President in the near future. Task Force Draft "Program of Action," 26 April 1961. . * . . . * ••*«.. hz 9 # The effect of a political settlement in Laos would be (l) to inhibit U.S. assistance in preventing a communist take-over in SVN; and (2) to permit an expansion of the VC effort in SW owing to the greater possibilities for uninhibited in- filtration; and (3) give complete control to the North Vietnamese of the three passes through the Annamite Moun- tains. With an expanded training program in SVN, however, the GW .should be able to defend itself even in the event of a Laotian settlement. Second Draft "Laos Annex" to Task Force report, 28 April 1961 58 10. Attorney General Kennedy asks the question "Whe re would be the best place to stand and fight in SKA — where "to draw the line?" Secretary Melfemara thinks the best place to take a stand is in Thailand and SVN. General Decker thinks there is no good place to fight in SEA. State Department Memorandum of Conversation, 29 April 1961 11 # Secretary Rusk decides at this meeting at the State Depart- ment that "We should not place combat forces in SVN at this time." Colonel Robert M. Levy Memorandum for Record, 5 May 1 1961 * 67 ii TOP SECRET - Sensitive Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 TOP SECRET - Sensitive 12 13-' lU. 15. l6« 17. Final Draft of the Task Force Report recommends sending U.S. Battle Groups and an Engineer Battalion for train- ing purposes; the assignment of coastal patrol missions to Cli'CPACFLT; and the air surveillance and close-support role to CDICPACAF. It also recommends the Vice-Presi- dential trip, a letter to Diem from Kennedy, increased MAP and other assistance, and a general U.S. commitment to support of Diem. Final Draft Task Force Report "A Program of Action, " 6 May 1961 . . . . , OSD requests the JCS to review and study the military advisability of possible commitment of U.S. forces to SVN. Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum for Chairman, JCS, 8 May 196i mmmi c * • . President Kennedy provides Vice President Johnson with a personal letter to present to President Diem. Kennedy sug- gests that, in addition to actions in the Counter-Insur- gency Plan, the U.S. is prepared to; (l) augment the personnel of MA AG, (2) expand MAAG's duties, (3) provide MAP support for the Civil Guard, and (h) provide support for the Vietnamese Junk Force. President Kennedy letter to President Diem, 8 May 1961.. . o • a . a C . * . # . C . .fl.ee e * a . The President makes the following decisions: (l) the U.S. objective is to prevent communist domination of SVTJ and to create in that country a viable and increasingly democratic society, (2) the President directs full examination of the size and composition of forces which would be desirable in the case of a possible commitment of U.S. forces to Viet- nam, (3) finally, the President approves continuation of the special Task Force on Vietnam. The decisions of this KSAil are based on the report "A Program of Axtion to Pre- vent Communist Domination of SVff." NSAM 52, 11 May 1961, *> o . President Diem asserts that the recent developments in Laos emphasize the grave Vietnamese concern for the security of their country with its long end vulnerable frontiers. President Diem states that "as a small net ion we cannot hope to meet all of our defense needs alone.. . " and expresses confidence that the Vietnamese needs will be given consider- ation in Washington. President Diem letter to President Kennedy, 15 May I96L o c Lansdale summarizes information on the possible deployment of U.S. combat forces in TO. He refers to a conversation between Diem and Vice President Johnson on the subject. Page 69. 131 132 136 155 111 TOP SSCH3I - Sensitive Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 TOP SECRET - Sensitive Page 18. 19. 20. 21. "Much of the thinking has been on stationing U.S. combat forces in the high plateau. . .however, General Williams has written a brief memorandum to me recommending such U.S. forces to be stationed on the coast..." Lansdale Memorandum for Deputy Secretary Gilpatric, l8 May I96I. The Vice President reports on his mission to SEA. Johnson feels , on the basis of his visit, that the situation in Laos has created doubt and concern about U.S. intentions through- out all of SEA. "No amount of success at Geneva can, of itself, erase this." It is Johnson 1 s impression that his mission arrested the decline of confidence in the U.S. "We didn't buy time — we were given it. If these men I saw at your request were bankers, I would know — without bothering to ask — that there would be no further exten- sions of my note." The fundamental decision required of the U.S. is whether we are to attempt a major effort in support of the forces of freedom in the area or "throw in the towel." Johnson recommends "we proceed with a clear- cut and strong program of action." Vice President Johnson Memorandum to President Kennedy, 23 May 1961. 157 159 President Diem sends the U.S. a study on Vietnamese needs to meet the insurgency situation in the South, Diem sug- gests that, in light of the current situation, an addi- tional 100,000 men above the new force level of lTO^OOO will be required to counter the threat of communist domi- nation. Diem recommends a considerable expansion of the U.S. Military Advisory Group in SVN as an essential require- ment, and, finals, Diem expresses his mistrust of Sihanouk T s communist sympathies and antagonism of SW. President Diem letter to President Kennedy, % June 1961.... x&J President Kennedy requests that the Secretary of Defense estimate requirements and make recommendations with respect to the anticipated future U.S. needs in the field of un- conventional warfare and paramilitary operations. HSAM 56, 28 June 1961 nk Lansdale relates a conversation between Vice President Tho and Colonel Black. In discussing the Staley Mission, Tho concedes that it is impossible for the U.S. to provide SW with piastres. The GVN feels an increase in piastre return per dollar would cause inflation and, in turn, an inevitable demand for wage increases. Tho further concedes that the basic problem in VH is more political than economic. Tho's impression of the current situation in SVfr is more pessimistic IV TOP SECRET - Sensitive Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 633 16. By: NWD Date: 201 1 TOP SECRET - Sensitive ^~ ■— *■ - — — ^—^—ii . — - Page than that of the Americans. Lansdale Memorandum for Deputy Secretary Gilpatric, 12 July 1961 jj5 22. Mr, William P. Bun dy' forwards the joint action program pro- posed by the GVlf-US Special Financial Group to the I Assistant Secretary of Defense. The report prepared by Dr. Eugene Staley, Chairman of the Group , has been submit- ted to President Hgo Diem and President John F. Kennedy, and includes the fiscal and economic implications of in- creasing the Vietnamese armed forces to 200,000 strength. The military portions, in addition to the requirements already planned, would require approximately $1*2 million, during the 18-month period, July 6l -December 62. Bundy Memorandum to Gilpatric, 25 July 1961, (Staley Report attached) . .,...,... 177 23. General Lionel C. McGarr, Chief, MAAG-Vietnam, reviews the military situation and offers recommendations for continued improvement of the situation in SVN to President Diem. Among the recommendations made by McGarr are: (l) that a national internal security council be established to prepare and execute the Vietnamese National Counter Insurgency Plan; (2) that effective border and coastal surveillance capa- bilities be initiated; (3) that U.S. advisers be more effectively utilized by accompanying ARVN units on combat operations; and (k) finally, that the reorganization of the military command structure and establishment of* a single chain of command be implemented as recommended in the Counter Insurgency Plan. Aide -Memo ire for President Diem, received Secretary of Defense, 2 August 1961. ............. . 227 24. The JCS do not believe that an alternate force of 270,000 would be required to enable the HVMAF to conduct counter - insurgency operations and, concurrently, be prepared to meet overt aggression. They recommend that the strategic force objectives for W remain at the 9 division level (200,000) subject to further assessment. JCS Memorandum for Secretary of Defense, JCSM 518-61, 3 August 1961 mmmm 239 25„ The President approves the Staley recommendations and decides that the U.S. will provide equipment and training assistance for an increased RVNAF from 170,000 to 200,000. It is hoped that President Diem will get the maximum mileage in terms of internal political support from this new commitment, and that he will involve more elements of the non-communist political opposition in the civic action program, NSAM 65, 11 August 196l 2^1 TOP SECRET - Sensitive Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 201 1 TOP SECRET - Sensitive Page 26. The situation in Worth and South VN is analyzed and the scope of the communist threat to SVN is estimated for the following year. The analysis concludes that the DRV is in thorough political control in Worth VN and "when Ho is no longer active, there will probably be a I struggle for power between the Moscow-oriented and the I t Peking -oriented elements of the Party." Dissatisfaction continues in South VN with Diem's leadership. The Array continues to be a major factor in future political devel- opments in the South. The outlook is for a prolonged and difficult struggle between the VC insurgents and the GVN. HIE lU. 3/53-61, 15 August 1961 21*5 27. The President approves the following actions: (l) inten- sification of diplomatic efforts to achieve Souvanna's agreement to the Paris proposals; (2) authorization to undertake conversations with SEATO allies on an enlarge- ment of the concept' of SEATO Plan 5* an ^ (3) an increase in U.S # advisors in Laos. NSAM 80, 29 August 1961......... 2k*J 28. The JCS sends the Secretary of Defense a draft memorandum for the President on military 'intervention in Laos. The JCS suggests that if the President decides that U.S. forces should be employed in Laos, that SEATO Plan 5 is the proper basic vehicle for the contemplated action. The political objective of the intervention is to confront the Sino -Soviet Bloc with a military force of Asian and West- ern powers capable of stopping the communist advance. JCS Memorandum for Secretary of Defense, JCSM 661-61, 20 Septem- t ber, I96I 2k$ 29. The Bureau of Intelligence and Research assesses the crisis in South VN and analyzes the short term prospects. The study recognizes that communist progress toward its objec- tive of overthrowing President Diem has been substantial. Since I960, more than 6,500 civilians, officers, and military personnel have been killed or kidnapped. Recent U.S. support has raised Diem's political stature, but there has been no conclusive, reversal of deteriorating trends. The security situation remains unimproved. However, the Government's comprehensive CIP, supported by U.S aid, is beginning to show favorable results. Over the next year, developments in Laos may have more influence on VN than any improvement in the Diem Government. Department of State Research Memorandum RFE-1, 29 September 1961 258 30. It is estimated that present armed, full-time VC strength is about 16,000, an increase of 12,000 since April of i960, vi TOP SECRET - Sensitive Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 NND Project Number; NND 633 16. By: NWD Date: 201 1 TOP SECRET - Sensitive and of 1+,000 in the past three months. While only 10-20$ of this strength consists of cadres infiltrated from North' VN, the remaining 80-90$ includes remnants of the approxi- mately 10,000 stay -behind personnel who went underground during the 195^-^1955 regroupment and evacuation of Viet- namese communist army units following the Indo-China War. Though some weapons and equipment have been infiltrated into South W, there has been no positive identification of Communist Bloc -manufactured military equipment in South W. SNIE 53-2-61, 5 October 1961 31. The JCS feel the time is now past when actions short of in- tervention by outside forces can reverse the rapidly worsening situation in Southeast Asia. They consider the execution of SEATO Plan % or a suitable variation thereof, to be the military minimum commensurate with the situation. JCS Memorandum for Secretary of Defense, JCSM 704-6l, 5 October 1961 32. It is the opinion of the JCS that the use of SEATO forces at the greatest possible number of entry points along the whole South Vitf border, i.e., over several hundred miles, is not feasible. Further, the alternative of using SEATO forces to cover solely the 17th parallel is militarily un- sound. "What is needed is not the spreading out of our forces throughout SEA, but rather a consolidated effort in Laos where a firm stand can be taken..." A limited interim course of action is provided herewith in the event SEATO Plan 5 i s considered politically unacceptable. JCS Memo- randum for Secretary of Defense, JCSM 716-61, 9 October 1961. 33. "For what one man's feel is worth, mine — based on very- close touch with Indo -China in the 195^ war and civil war afterwards until Diem took hold — is that it i£ really now or never if we are to arrest the gains being made by the Vietcong." Bundy suggests that an early, hard-hitting operation has a 70$ chance of success. "The 30$ is that we would wind up like the 'French in 195^; white men can't win this kind of fight. On a 70-30 basis, I would, myself, • favor going in." Bundy memorandum for Secretary McFamara, 10 October 1961 3^-. It is estimated that the Communist Bloc would not commit North Vietnamese or Chinese Communist forces to a large- scale military attack against South VW or Laos in response to an assumed SEATO action to patrol the GVN coast Page 291 295 297 312 t vxi TOP SECRET - Sensitive Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 NND Project Number: NND 633 16. By: NWD Date: 201 1 TOP SECRET - Sensitive and secure the border involving about 25,000 men. Neutral- ist governments in SEA would be most concerned at the increased tension and danger of general hostilities. Nationalist China would be elated with the SEATO action. SHIE 10-3-6, 10 October 1961 . 313 35 •' At a meeting with President Kennedy, the following actions were agreed upon: (l) the Defense Department is authorized to send the Air Force Jungle Jim Squadron to VN; (2) Gen- eral Maxwell Taylor will leave for SVN on a Presidential mission; and (3) the State Department will pursue specific political. actions, i.e., protest to the ICC on North VN support of the VC; table a White Paper at the UN; and con- sult with our SEATO allies regarding support in VN. Gil- patric Memorandum for Record, 11 October 1961 322 36. "With respect to training the Vietnamese Array for the 'wrong war 1 , it seems clear that in recent months the insurgency in South Vietnam has developed far beyond the capacity of police control. All of the Vietnamese Army successes this past summer have met Viet Cong opposition in organized battalion strength. . .This change in the situation has not been fully understood by many U.S. officials. In this regard, there is some concern that the Thompson Mission may try to sell the Malayan concept of police control without making a suffi- ciently careful evaluation of conditions in South Vietnam." JCS Memorandum for General Taylor, CM-390-61, 12 October I96I. 32^ 37 . The President requests that General Taylor proceed to Saigon to appraise the situation in South Vietnam and to report his views on the courses of action which the U.S. might take to avoid further deterioration in the situation and eventually to eliminate the threat to the independence of South Vietnam. President Kennedy letter to General Taylor, 13 October I96I. <>* 32? 38. The President directs the following actions be taken: (l) make preparations for the publication of the White Paper on North Vietnamese aggression; (2) develop plans for presen- tation of the VN case In the UN; (3) introduce the Jungle Jim Squadron into SVN for the purpose of training Vietnamese forces - He indicates that General Taylor should undertake a mission to Saigon. NSAM 10^, 13 October 1961 323 39- It is the conclusion of the HoD General Counseltliat the pro- posed introduction of U.S. combat and logistic forces into VN would constitute violations of Articles l6 and 17 of the viii TOP SECRET - Sensitive Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 633 J 6. By: NWD Date: 201 1 TOP SECRET - Sensitive Page Geneva Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in TO of July 20, 195^- Introduction of U.S. troops even for pur- poses of flood control would still constitute a violation of the Geneva Accords by the Government of TO. If a deci- sion is made to send U.S. troops into TO, the U.S. should justify it on the ground of collective self-defense. "Nothing in the Geneva Accords should be read as abridging the inherent right of Vietnam and the United States to take actions in collective self-defense." DoD General Counsel Memorandum for Mr. Hadyn Williams, 26 October 1961.. 329 kO. General Taylor summarizes the fundamental conclusions of his group and his personal recommendations. Taylor con- cludes there is a double crisis in confidence: doubt that the U.S. is determined to save SEA, and doubt that . Diem's methods can defeat the Communist purposes and methods. Taylor recommends that the U.S. Government join with the GTO in a massive joint effort as part of a total mobilization of GTO resources to cope with both the VC and the ravages of the flood. Specifically, the U.S. Govern- ment will provide individual administrators, conduct a joint survey of conditions in the provinces, assist the GTO in effecting surveillance and control over the coastal waters, and finally, offer to introduce into South TO a military Task Force to operate under U.S. military control* General Taylor telegram (cite BAGI00005) for President Kennedy, 1 November 1961 331 Jfl. Taylor presents his reasons for recommending the introduc- * tion of a U.S. military force into South Vietnam. "I have reached the conclusion that this is an essential action if we are to reverse the present downward trend of events... there can be no action so convincing of U.S. seriousness of purpose and hence so reassuring to the people and govern- ment of STO and to our other friends and allies in SEA as the introduction of U.S. forces into STO. 1 ' Taylor suggests that the stx^ategic reserve of U.S. forces is seriously weak 1 and that U.S. prestige would be more heavily engaged in I I STO by this action. However, the size of the U.S. force J J introduced need not be great to provide the military pres- ence necessary to produce the desired effect. General Taylor telegram (cite BAGI00006) for President Kennedy, 1 November 1961 337 k2 m The JCS and Secretary McNamara do not believe major units of U.S. forces should be introduced in STO unless the U.S. is willing to commit itself to the clear objective of pre- venting the fall of STO to communism and to support this ix TOP SECRET - Sensitive Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 633 16. By: NWD Date: 201 1 TOP SECRET - Sensitive -ge commitment by military action, and preparation for pos- sible later action. They recommend that the U.S commit itself to this objective and support the recommendations of General Taylor toward its fulfillment. Secretary of Defense Memorandum for the President. 8 November 1961 3**3 43. The head of the British Advisory Mission submits to Diem his plan for clearing the VC from the Delta, The central idea is the creation of a network of "strategic hamlets 1 ' akin to those employed successfully by Thompson in defeating the communist guerillas in Malaya, R.G.K. Thompson letter to Diem, 11 November 1961 , . . . , . 3I+5 I k^ Reversing the November 8 Defense recommendation for a com- mitment of substantial U.S. ground forces to South Vietnam this November 11 Rusk-McNamara memorandum to the President (perhaps prepared at Kennedy's specific direction) escalates the rhetoric regarding U.S, interest in a free South Viet- nam, but restricts the military recommendation: (a) employ only support forces now; (b) defer any decision to send "larger organized units with actual or potential direct mil- itary missions, 11 Whether Kennedy fully accepted the high- 1 blown statements of U.S. interest and commitment to the GVN is not known. State/Defense Memorandum to the President, 11 November 1961 359 1*5. The Joint Staff submits to the Chairman, JCS, briefs of the military actions contained in the draft National Security Action Memorandum resulting from the Taylor Mission Report, The military actions indexed pertain to the use of signifi- cant and/or substantial U.S. forces, provision of increased airlift, provision of additional equipment and U.S. per- sonnel, provision of training and equipment for the Civil Guard and SDC, and finally, overhaul of the GVN military . establishment and command structure. In connection with the draft memorandum, the Joint Staff considersit militarily desirable to pre-position forces and equipment and is cur- rently considering augmentation of U.S. Army Forces Pacific, with one infantry division plus appropriate logistic and combat support units. Joint Staff Memorandum for the Chair- man of the JCS, 14 November 1961 368 1+6. Rusk instructs Ambassador Nolting to seek an immediate ap- pointment with President Diem to inform him that President Kennedy has decided that the Government of the U.S. is pre- pared to join the Government of VN in a sharply increased joint effort to avoid further deterioration in the situation of SVN. The joint effort requires certain undertakings by k x TOP SECRET - Sensitive Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 i TOP SECRET - Sensitive hi k8. . Pel both governments. On Its part, the U.S. would immediately support the GVN with increased airlift, additional equip- ment , U.S. personnel, expedited training and equipping of the Civil Guard and increased economic aid. The GVTI, how- ever, would Have to initiate the following actions: (l) begin prompt legislative and administrative action to put the nation on a wartime footing to mobilise its resources; (2) give governmental wartime agencies adequate authority to perform their functions effectively; and (3) overhaul the military establishment and command structure to create an effective military organization. "President Kennedy con- templates an immediate strong affirmative reply to satis- factory letter along indicated lines from President Diem, which will simultaneously be made public. " Rusk NIACT 619 to Saigon, 15 November 1961 After three days of talks in Saigon, Ambassador Galbraith feels there Is scarcely "the slightest practical chance that the administrative and political reforms being pressed upon Diem will result in real change." Gailbraith sees a comparatively well equipped army of a quarter million men facing 15 to 18,000 lightly armed men. "...there is no solution that does not involve a change of government,., to say there is no alternative (to Diem) is nonsense." Ambassador Gailbralth Memorandum for the President, 20 November 1961. . . . • . . * . . "The key and inescapable point then is the Ineffectual! ty (abetted debatably by the unpopularity) of the Diem Govern- ment. This is the strategic factor. Ifor can anyone accept the statement of those who have been either too long or too little in Asia that it is the Inevitable posture of the Asian mandarin. For one thing, it isn't true, but were it so, the only possible conclusion would be that there is no future for mandarins. The communists don't favor them." Gailbraith feels that it is politically naive to expect that Diem will reform either administratively or politically in any effective way. "However, having started on this hopeless game, we have no alternative but to play it out for a minimum time. . .since there is no chance of success we must do two things to protect our situation. One is to make clear that our commitment is to results and not to promises. , .and we can press hardest in the area of Army reform where the needed changes are most specific and most urgent." It follows from Gailbraith 1 s reasoning that the only solution must be to drop Diem, and we should not be alarmed by the Army as an alternative. Gailbraith New Delhi 99^1 for President Kennedy, 21 Novera- 1*00 Uoe & ber 1961 klO XI TOP SECRET - Sensitive Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 TOP SECRET - Sensitive Jj-9. The U.S. is prepared to join the VII Government in a sharply- increased joint effort to avoid a further deterioration in the situation in SVN. This joint effort is contingent upon initiation of certain actions on the part of the GVN and consists of increased economic and military support by the U.S., based on recommendations of the Taylor Report. N3AM 111, 22 November 1961 . 50. Bundy comments on the command arrangements for VN and recom- mends that General McGarr be elevated to the new position or that a replacement be found. He also recommends sending Lansdale back as Diem has requested. Bundy Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, 25 November 1961.... . .♦.. 51 - General Taylor relates a list of questions proposed by President Kennedy to be used at a meeting of his key ad- visors. Among the questions are: (l) what is the situa- tion with regard to Diem as reported by Ambassador Holting; (2) can we delay longer in obtaining an answer from Diem; (3) what are the views of the JCS on the military organi- zation required to support the new program; (h) what is our plan for flood relief; (5) who should the President regard as personally responsible for the effectiveness of the Washington end of this operation? General Taylor Memo- randum for Secretary McNamara, 2J November 1961. 52. The President approves U.S. participation in a selective and carefully controlled joint program of defoliant operations in VN starting with the clearance of key routes and proceed- ing thereafter to food denial. TISAM 115, 30 November 1961 53- McNamara confirms to Rusk the command arrangements under which the senior U.S. military commander in Vietnam will have the title "Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Forces - Vietnam" and will have equivalent rank to the Ambassador, reporting through CINCPAC to the JCS. Secretary of Defense Memorandum for the Secretary of State, 18 December 1961 54. Diem is apprehensive about giving control authority to Big Minh as military field commander because of his fear of a coup. While U.S. policy is to support Diem and he has been so informed by the President, we must find a way to reassure him about a coup. "It is the basis for his real reluctance to do what the Americans want him to do and this basic point needs resolving. . .what realistic assurances can we give Diem that the action he fears won't take place?" Lansdale Memorandum for the CJCS, 27 December 1961 Page U19 422 h23 425 426 427 11 TOP SECRET - Sensitive Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number; NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 201 1 TOP SECRET - Sensitive a a Page 1962 55. The Chairman of the JCS summarizes the current situation in VN, methods of VC operations, routes of infiltration and supply } relative strengths, and discusses U.S. mili- tary units in place or enroute to VN. "The objectives of the Diem Government in SVU include not only survival against the communists, but also improvement of the national economy, enhancement of SVN f s position among Southeast Asian nations, creations of an effective armed force, and preservation of a pro-Western orientation. "Policies directed toward the achievement of these ob- jectives suffer from the concentration of power in the hands of the President, Mgo Dinh Diem, and a small clique headed by his extremely influential and power- ful brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu." Chairman JCS Talking Paper for Brief ing President Kennedy, 9 January 19&2. ............ ^28 56. The JCS agree that the basic issue of Diem ! s apprehen- sion about a coup needs to be resolved. "I don T t be- lieve there is any finite answer to the question you pose as to how to convince Diem he must delegate authority to subordinates he doesn't fully trust." JCS Memorandum for General Lansdale, CM-^91-62, l8 January 1962, hkO 57. The President establishes a Special Group (Counter Insur- gency), the functions of which are as follows: (l) to insure proper recognition throughout the U.S. Government that subversive insurgency ("wars of liberation") is a major form of politico -military conflict equal in impor- tance to conventional warfare; (2) to insure that such recognition is reflected in the organization, training, equipment and doctrine of the U.S. armed forces and other U.S. agencies; (3) to continually review the adequacy of U.S. resources to deal with insurgency; and (k) to insure the development of adequate programs aimed at preventing or defeating insurgency. HSAM 12^, 18 January I962. 1*42 * 58. State Department agrees that an increase in the Vietnamese armed forces to the 200,000 man level should be supported provided the following factors are considered: (l) that U.S. military advisors and the Vietnamese authorities continue to set valid tactical and strategic plans; (2) the rate of increase should consider the ability of the Army , i to absorb and train the additional men and the manpower j ; resources of SVN; (3) that the armed forces should level 1 off at 200,000 and further efforts should be devoted to » ! t xiii TOP SECRET - Sensitive • Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 633 16. By: NWD Date: 201 1 59.' 60. 6l u 62 . TOP SECRET - Sensitive strengthening the Civil Guard and Sell 1 -Defense Corps; and (k) that our training programs for ARVM be based on the concept that the Vietnamese Amy will start winning when it has the confidence of the Vietnamese populace. U. Alexis Johnson letter to Mr. Gilpatric, 26 January 1962 \ Secretaiy McNamara forwards a JCS Memorandum to the Presi- dent with the comment, "I am not prepared to endorse the views of the Chiefs until we have had more experience with our present program in SVN." The JCS Memorandum recommends that if, with Diem's full cooperation and the effective employment of SVN armed forces, the VC is not brought under control, then a decision should be made to deploy suitable U.S. military combat forces to SVN sufficient to achieve desired objectives. Secretary of Defense Memorandum for the President, 27 January 1962 ( JCSM-33-62, 13 January 1962, attached) . 0.00 The President requests that AID review carefully its role in the support of local police forces for internal security and counter -insurgency purposes^ and recommend to him through the Special Group (Counter Insurgency) what new or renewed emphases are desirable. WSAM 132, 19 Februaiy 1962 The President approves training objectives for personnel who may have a role to play in counter insurgency programs as well as in the entire range of problems involved in the modernization of developing countries. The training objec- tives include the study of: the historical background of counter Insurgency, departmental tactics and techniques to counter subversive Insurgency, instruction In counter insurgency program planning, specialised preparations for service in underdeveloped areas. Training of foreign nationals will also be Included in the program* The Presi- dent desires that current counter insurgency training be examined to ascertain if it meets the above training objec- tives. NSAM 331, 13 March 1962. .»•«.•*•••• •«*••«< o a o a The President forwards* a memorandum on the subject of VN from Ambassador Galbralth and requests Department cf Defense com- ments. The Gailbraith Memorandum (h April 62) asserts that the UoSo is backing a weak and Ineffectual government In SVN and that "there Is a consequent danger that we shall replace the French as the colonial force in the area and bleed as the French did." Gailbraith urges that U e 3„ policy keep open the door for political solution, attempt to involve other countries and world opinion in a settlement, and reduce our commitment tr e present leadership of GVN. In Page U5 kkj ^55 If 57 * xiv TOP SECRET - Sensitive Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 TOP SECRET - Sensitive ao«ooo0O**oooa*ooao*«**oo*aoo«oo#ooio«a0o#o*«*ao#Q Page addition to recommended specific actions, Gailbraith sug- gests the U.S. should resist aXL steps to coimit American troops to combat action and dissociate itself from pro- grams which are directed at the villagers, such as the re- settlement programs . White House Memorandum for Secretary of Defense, 7 April 1962 (Galbraith Memorandum attached). .. 460 ■ 63 . The JCS comment on Ambassador Galbraith' s Memorandum to ., President Kennedy. The JCS cite the Kennedy letter of l4 December 1961 to President Diem as a public affirmation of the intention of the U.S. Government to support Presi- dent Diem to whatever extent necessary to eliminate the VC threat o In sum, it is the JCS opinion that the present U.S. policy toward SV3S" as announced by the President "be pursued vigorously to a successful conclusion. IT JCS Memo- randum for the Secretary of Defense, JCSM 282-62, 13 April 1962 464 64 . ISA discusses the circumstances surrounding the Defense reply to Galbraith* s Memorandum and notes the absence of formal staffing by the State Department . In a penciled note "Secre- tary of Defense has talked to Ambassador Galbraith and feels no reply needed. Mr. Forrestal informed this date that none would be sent." ISA Memorandum to Secretary of Defense, 65. The President requests contingency planning in the event of a breakdown of the cease -fire in Laos for action in two major areas: (l) the holding by Thai forces with U.S. back- ! * up of that portion of northern Laos west of the Mekong River; and (2) the holding and recapture of the panhandle of Laos from Thakhek to the southern frontier with Thai, Vietnamese or U„S. forces o Kennedy indicates that he contemplates keep- ing U.So forces in Thailand during the period of the nego- tiations by the three Princes and the early days of the government of national union. NSAM 157, 29 May 1962. 467 66 9 In an evaluation of the first three months of systematic counter -insurgency, Hilsman of State's IHR reports some prog- ress and reason for modest optimism although acknowledging the great amount yet to be done. State Department IHR Research Memorandum REE-27j 18 June 1962 . O .«.oao. e9a «. e9 «.» 469 67. The President approves assignments of responsibilities in the development of U.S. and indigenous police ? par amilitaryj and military resources to various agences as recommended by the Special Group on Counter Insurgency. Deficiencies revealed in the study pursuant to NSAM 56 Include: country 1 xv TOP SECRET - Sensitive Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 TOP SECRET - Sensitive Page internal defense plans, improvement of personnel programs of agencies concerned with unconventional warfare, orienta- tion of personnel, deployment of counter insurgency person- nel^ support of covert paramilitary operations, increased use of third-country personnel, exploitation of minorities, improvement of indigenous intelligence organizations, and research and development for counter insurgency* KSAM l62, 19 June 1962 e . . . . . . D . . ^1 68. The President approves a national counter insurgency doctrine for the use of U.S. departments and agencies concerned with the internal defense of overseas areas threatened by sub- ' versive insurgency. KSAM 182, 2k August 1962 •••••*««** ^5 69* In a year -end summary of the Vietnamese situation and prog- nosis, Hilsman (State 1KB) concludes that at best the rate of deterioration has been decreased. GVN control of the countryside, the Strategic. Hamlet Program notwithstanding, has increased only slightly. State Department IMR Research Memorandum RFE-59, 3 December 1961. ...... o ................ . ^7 I963 70. A national Intelligence Estimate states that "Communist progress has been blunted and that the situation is im- proving. Strengthened South Vietnamese capabilities and effectiveness, and particularly U.S. involvement, are causing the Viet Cong increased difficulty, although there are as yet no persuasive indications that the Communists have been grievously hurt." The VC will continue to wage a war of attrition and there is no threat of overt attack from the North. On the basis of the last year's progress the VC can be contained but it is impossible "to project "the future course of the war with any confidence. Decisive campaigns have yet to be fought and no quick and easy end to the war is in sight." NIE 53-63, "Prospects in South Vietnam," 17 April 1963 • *. 5^2 71 • Ike President approves and directs certain actions outlined in the Department of State Memorandum of 17 June 1*963* rel- ative to Laos planning. The President wishes to obtain suggestions for actions in Laos in light of the deteriora- ting situation and from the British and the French before initiating any action under the Memorandum. Kennedy asks about additional U.S. actions to be taken in Laos before any action directed against NVN. KSAM 2^9, 25 June 1963... 525 72. The President is briefed on developments in Indonesia, Laos i and W. Specifically, onSVI^ discussions cover the possibility xvi TOP SECRET - Sensitive Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 TOP SECRET - Sensitive of getting rid of the Nhus (the combined judgment was that it would not be possible), pressure on Diem to take political actions, possible results of a coup, and the replacement of Ambassador Nolting with Ambassador Lodge, Department of State Memorandum of Conversation, 1+ July 1963... oo.e.«.«06.* 75* U.S. policy with respect to a coup is defined in more detail for Lodge and Harkins as a result of an NSC meeting with the President. ir The USG will support a coup which has good chance of succeeding but plans no direct involvement of U.S. armed forces e Harkins should state (to the generals) that he is prepared to establish liaison with the coup planners and to review plans, but will not engage directly in joint coup plan- ning." Lodge is authorized to suspend aid if he thinks it will enhance the chances of a successful coup. State Depart- ment Message 2J2, State to Lodge and Harkins, 29 August 1963.. Page o * * o a o 76 # Rusk raises with Lodge the possibility of a last approach to Diem about removing Nhu before going ahead with the coup. He notes that General Harkins favors such an attempt. Rusk 526 73- A Special National Intelligence Estimate evaluates the political crisis in South Vietnam arising from the Buddhist protest. It concludes that if Diem does not seek to con- ciliate the Buddhists new disorders are likely and there will be better than even chances of coup or assassination attempts. U.S-GVN relations have deteriorated as a func- tion of Diem ! s distrust of U.S. motives in the Buddhist affair and he may seek to reduce the U.S. presence in Viet- nam. The Communists have thus far not exploited the Buddhist crisis and they would not necessarily profit from a non -Communist overthrow. A successor regime with con- tinued U.S. support would have good chances of effectively pursuing the war. SNIE 53-2-63, "The Situation in South Vietnam, " 10 July 1963. 529 jh. In a subsequently controversial cable, State informs Lodge that if Diem is unwilling or unable to remove Nhu from the government, that the U.S. will have to prepare for alterna- tives. Lodge is authorized to inform the Vietnamese generals plotting a coup that if Nhu is not removed we will be pre- pared to discontinue economic and military aid, to accept a change of government and to offer support in any period of interim breakdown of the central government mechanism. State Department Message to Saigon 2^3> State to Lodge, 2^ August 1963 536 538 xvii TOP SECRET - Sensitive Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 TOP SECRET - Sensitive Page feels that if accompanied by the threat of a real sanction -- i.e., the withdrawal of U.S. support — such an approach 1 could he timed to coincide with the readiness of the generals ( to make their move and might, therefore, offer some promise of getting Diem to act. State Department Message 279, State to Lodge, 29 August 1963. •••*«•••., . . 539 77* Vice President Johnson presides over a meeting at the State 1 Department on the subject of ST?E. The generals 1 plot having 1 aborted, Rusk asks what in the situation "lead us to think ; well of a coup," Farther, Rusk feels that it is unrealistic now "to start off by saying that Nhu has to go." McNamara approves Rusk's remarks. Hilsman presents four basic factors bearing on the current situation: (l) the restive mood of the South Vietnamese population; (2) the effect on U.S. pro- I grams elsewhere in Asia of the current GVH policy against the I Buddhists; (3) the personality and policies of Hhu; and (h) U*S. and world opinion. Vice President has great reserva- tions about a coup because he sees no genuine alternative to Diem. General Krulak Memorandum for the Record, 31 August 1963 i-. ...-♦.,• • = . 780 Lodge is instructed by the White House that since there is no longer any prospect of a coup,pressure must be applied to Diem to get him to adopt an extensive list of reforms. In particu- | lar Lodge is authorized to hold up any aid program if he thinks such action will give him useful leverage in dealing with Diem. CAP Message 63516, White House to Lodge, 17 September 1963. 5U0 O o ■ • a 5^5 79. The President explains to Lodge his urgent need for the McNamar a -Taylor assessment of the situation.. The visit is not designed to be a reconciliation with Diem, rather he expects McNamara will speak frankly to him about the military consequences of the political crisis. State Department Message ^31, The President to Lodge, 18 September 1963.*.. 0000 5'48 80 • Lodge's reply to the White House CAP Message 63516^ indicates agreement that a coup is no longer in the offing, but opposes both an approach to Diem on reforms or the use of an aid suspension as a lever. He regards both as likely to be un- productive or worse. Embassy Saigon Message 5^S Lodge to State for President Only, 19 September 19630 .......<> - - . 5^9 81. President Kennedy outlines his reasons for sending McNamara and Taylor to VH: "I am asking you to go because of my desire to have the best possible on-the-spot appraisal of xviii TOP SECRET - Sensitive Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 NND Project Number; NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 TOP SECRET - Sensitive Page the military and paramilitary effort to defeat the VC." While the results from programs developed after Taylor's Mission in 1961 were heartening , the serious events in the South since May 1963 have prompted the President to ask Mclfemara to make a fresh, first-hand appraisal of the situa- tion. "In my judgement the question of the progress of the contest in SW is of the first importance. ." President Kennedy Memorandum for Secretary of Defense, 21 September 551 » 82. Pending McWamara's visit and the subsequent review of policy, Lodge is given the following interim guidance: "(l) The United States intends to continue its efforts to assist the Vietnamese people in their struggle against the Viet Cong. (2) Recent events have put in question the possibility of success in these efforts unless there can be important im- provements in the government of South Vietnam* (3) It is the policy of the United States to bring about such improve- ment," State Department Message ^58, Eyes Only for Lodge from Ball, 22 September 1963. . 090 . . «, e 553 83* The McNamara-Taylor Mission Report concludes that the mili- tary campaign has made great progress, and, vhile the political crisis in Saigon is serious, "there is no solid evidence of the possibility of a successful coup..," The Report recommends against promoting a coup and, although it is not clear that U.S. pressure will move Diem to the modera- tions and reforms we desire, nevertheless, as the only course of action with any prospect of producing results, the report recommends the application of selective economic sanctions, including a suspension of funds for the commodity import program. The Mission further recommends a shift of military emphasis to the Delta and a consolidation of the Strategic Hamlet Program. In addition, it is recommended that a training program be established for HVHAF such that the bulk of U.S. personnel may be withdrawn by the end of 1965* In conjunction with this program, the U e S. should announce plans to withdraw 1, 000 U.S. military personnel by the end of 1963.. 55^ 8k 9 Lodge is advised that as a result of the policy review just completed, the "President today approved recommendation that no initiative should now be taken to give any active covert encouragement to a coup*" Efforts to build and maintain con- tacts with "alternative leadership" is authorized, however, CAP Message 63560, to Lodge via CAS channel, 5 October 57^ 1 85, Contact has been renewed by the generals with a CAS agent who has been apprised of the reactivation of plotting. In the xix TOP SECRET - Sensitive Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 TOP SECRET - Sensitive Page meeting, General Minh states that he must know the U.S. position on a coup. He stresses that a coup is urgently needed to prevent the loss of the war to the VC. The U.S. contact is noneommital. CAS Saigon Message 14^5, Lodge H to State, 5 October 1963 575 86. Washington reaffirms Lodge's guidance that he is not to promote a coup. Neither, however, is he to thwart one. He should try to obtain as much information as possible from the plotters about their plans on which to base an American judgement about their likelihood of success. CIA Message 7^228, 6 October 1963. • o ..*... * . . . . . 577 87. The President approves the detailed military recommendations contained in the McNamara-Taylor Report, but directs that no announcement of the implementation of the 1,000-man with- drawal plan be made. NSAM 263, 11 October I963..00 578 • 88. A Department of State Research Memorandum contends that the statistical indicators on the war in Vietnam reveal "that the military position of the Vietnam Government may have reverted to the point it had reached six months to a year ago." The analysis angers the JCS and Rusk subsequently apologizes to McNamara. Department of State, 1KB Research Memorandum REE-90, 22 October 1963, 579 89 • With the coup plotting now far advanced and the U.S. clearly committed to the generals 1 attempt, Lodge seeks to calm Washington's anxieties about the lack of detailed informa- tion on the generals 1 plans. He is at pains to oppose any thought of thwarting the coup because he thinks the mili- tary will create a government with better potential for carrying on the war, and because it would constitute undue meddling in Vietnamese affairs. Embassy Saigon Message 196^, Lodge to McGeorge Bundy, 25 October 1963 0*. 590 90. While thanking Lodge for his views, the White House indi- cates that short of thwarting a coup we should retain the prerogative of reviewing the plans and discouraging any attempt with poor prospects of success. CAP Message 63590* McGeorge Bundy to Lodge, 25 October I963 592 91. The White House instructs Lodge to bring General Harkins completely up to date on the coup plotting, and asks that * Harkins, Lodge and the CIA Station Chief provide a com- bined assessment of the prospects of the plotters. Indi- vidual comments are to be sent if desired. With these assessments, a decision can be made telling the generals: xx TOP SECRET - Sensitive Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 201 1 TOP SECRET - Sensitive Page (a) we will maintain a hands -off policy, (b) we will posi tively encourage the coup, or (c) we will discourage it. More detailed military plans should be sought from Minh. CAS Message 79109, McGeorge Bundy to Lodge, 30 October 1963 - ».-., O C • • * D 6 c tt 95. Taking note of the difference of opinion on the advisa- bility of a coup between Lodge and Harkins, the White House specifically informs Lodge that he is to discourage the generals from any attempt that in his judgement has a poor prospect of success. Lodge is given full authority for country team actions in the event of a coup; if he has left for Washington, Harkins will have charge. In the event of a coup, U.S. policy will be: (a) to reject appeals for direct intervention from either side; (b) if the contest is indecisive, U.S. authorities may perform any actions agreed 593 92. After complaining about Lodge's failure to keep him in- formed about the coup planning, General Harkins opposes the proposed coup against Diem. He does not see an alterna- tive leadership with Diem's strength of character, espe- cially not among the generals. The war continues to go well. MACV Message 2028, Harkins to Taylor, 30 October 595 1963 93* General Harkins takes detailed exception to the interpreta- tions of a deteriorating war effort that Lodge has been transmitting throughout October He offers an optimistic appraisal of the trend of the war and sees the political crisis as having only a marginal effect on troop morale and military effectiveness MACV Message 2033, Harkins to Taylor, 30 October I963 . Q , e . o • ....*.. *» 6 . 597 $h m Lodge argues forcefully for the coup. "It is theoretically possible for us to turn over the information which has been given to us in confidence to Diem and this would undoubtedly stop the coup and would make traitors out of us Eor practi- cal purposes, therefore, I would say that we have very little influence on what is essentially a Vietnamese affair," In the event the coup fails, he believes we should do what we can to help evacuate the generals 1 dependents. Lodge believes the generals are all taking enormous risks for the sake of their country and their good faith is not to be questioned. "Heartily agree that a miscalculation could jeopardize position in Southeast Asia, We also run tremen- dous risks by doing nothing." General Harkins did not concur in the cable. CAS Saigon Message 2063, 30 October 1963 600 xxi TOP SECRET - Sensitive Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 TOP SECRET - Sensitive Page to by "both sides; (c) in the event the coup fails^ asylum iTiay be offered to anyone to whom ve have an obligation; but (d) once the coup has started^ it is in our interests to see that it succeeds. CAS Washington Message 79^07, 30 October 1963. . • ' €Ch xxii TOP SECRET - Sensitive Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 NND Project Number; NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 ) > I T V I [ [ ■ Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 SECRET JAU [ [ L ■ As desired by you, 1 visited Vietnam 2-14 January 1961. After twelve days of intensive looking and listening over some old familiar N ^ r- ground, I have come to the following personal convictions: *"* MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE i. * From; BrigGen Lansdale, OSO/OSD . "' Subj: Vietnam t a. 1961 promises to be a fateful year for Vietnam, 4 * SEC IOET • " p ■ » ■"•*•.. .^' .IE " : *--.. b. The Communist Viet Cong hope to win back Vietnam south of the 17th Parallel this year, if at all possible, and are much further along towards accomplishing this objective than I had realized from reading the reports received in Washington, £3 % ^O c. The free Vietnamese, and their government, probably will be able to do no more than postpone eventual defeat - - unless they find a Vietnamese way of mobilizing their total resources and then utilizing them with spirit, ■ d. The U, S. team in Vietnam will be unable to help the Viet- namese with real effectiveness, unless the U,S. system of their operation is changed sufficiently to free these Americans to do the " * job that needs doing, and unless they do it with sensitive understanding and wisdom, t ■ . e. If Free Vietnam is won by the Communists, the remainder of Southeast Asia -will be easy pickings for our en^my, because the toughest local force on our side will be gone, A Communist victory also would be a major blow to U. S. prestige and influence., not only in Asia but throughout the world, since the world believes that Vietnam . has remained free only through U,S„he,lp, . "Such a victory would tell leaders of other governments that it doesivt pay to be a friend of the * U, S. , and would be an even more marked lesson than Laos, . \* f, Vietnam can be kept free, but it will require a changed U*S. attitude., plenty of hard work and patience, and a new spirit by the Vietnamese, The Viet Cong have been pushing too hard militarily to get their roots down firmly and can be defeated by an inspired and • y determined effort. ■ . . . X Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 633 16. By: NWD Date: 201 1 [ r ; L [ v * [ SEC RET g, Ngo Dinh Diem is still the only Vietnamese with executive ability and the required determination to be an effective President. I believe there will be another attempt to get rid of him soon, unless the U.S. makes it clear that we are backing him as the elected top man. If the 11 November coup had been successful, I believe that a number of highly selfish and mediocre people would be squabbling among them- selves for power while the Communists took over. The Communists will be more alert to exploit the next coup attempt. At present, most Vietnamese oppositionists believe that the U. S. would look favorably upon a successful coup. i Vietnam has progressed faster in material things than it has spiritually. The people have more possessions but are ,. tarting to lose the will to protect their liberty. ' There is a big lesson here to be learned about the U.S. aid program which needs some most serious study. ■ Recommendations |M .. | m M || Mill «|| Ml ■ -_— - _■ - Before I left Saigon, I discussed my impressions with Ambassador Durbrow who was most gracious towards me during the visit. Included in these impressions was my feeling that many of the Americans in Saigon perhaps subconciously believed in defeat, probably had spent too much time and energy on the politic?.! situation in Saigon Instead of on the very real Viet Cong menace, and were in need of some bolstering up by the Chief of Mission. In this feeling of defeat, I would have to except the Chief of MAAG and the local CIA Chief who believe we can win. Ambassador Durbrow told me of the memo he had issued to all Americans in Saigon after the 11 November coiip attempt. I said this was a good move, but much, more than writing a paper was needed. * * He asked me what suggestions I had. I said that I didn't have . * much immediately, and would have to do a lot of thinking about it. The situation in Vietnam is not black and white, but a most complex one in all shades of gray. Many Americans and Vietnamese expected me to come up with some sort of a miracle, to turn Ngo Dinh Diern into an Americanized modern version of the ancient. Vietnamese leader Jje Loi, However, the task requires more than a gimmick or some simple answer. It will take a lot of hard work and follow- through. In 12 days, all I could do was learn as much as I could and to "plant a seed or two 11 with Ngo Dinh Diem and other Vietnamese leaders who know that I speak out of deep affection for the free Vietnamese. .■ SECRET 2 - _ V m I * Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 20! I SECRET s Since leaving Vietnam, I have spent many hours thinking about the ituation there* I am far from having a complete proposal to solve the situation. However, I do have some recommendations now for steps which should be taken to start remedying the downhill and dangerous trend in Vietnam. They are: ■ . «a. The U. S, should recognize that Vietnam is in a critical con- dition and should treat it as a combat area of the cold' war, as an area requiring emergency treatment. b. When there is an emergency, the wise thing to do is to pick the best people you have, people who are experienced in dealing with this precise type of emergency, and send them to the spot with orders to remedy the situation. When yout get the people in petition and free them to work, you should then back them up in every practical way you can. The real decisions will be made in little daily actions in Vietnam, not in Washington. That ! s why the best are needed on the spot. c. Our U.S. team in Vietnam should have a hard core of experi- enced Americans who know and really like Asia and the Asians, dedicated people who are willing to risk their lives for the ideals of freedom, and who will try to influence and guide the Vietnamese towards U.S. policy objectives with the warm friendships and affection which our close alliance deserves. We should break the rules of personnel assignment, . if necessary, to get such U.S. military and civilians to Vietnam. ■ d. Under emergency conditions, our aid to Vietnam should be treated as contingency business and be given expedited priority handling until we can afford to take a breathing spell. e. Ambassador Durbrow should be transferred in the immediate future. He has been in the "forest of tigers* 1 which is Vietnam for nearly four years now and I doubt that he himself realizes how tired he has become or how close he is to individual trees in this big woods. Correctly or not, the recognized government of Vietnam does not look upon him, as a friend, believing that he sympathized strongly with the ■ -coup leaders" of f% November. , . * . fc - . , , * -. * " " £. The new Ambassador should arrive as many weeks as possible before the April elections, for which the Communists are now actively L preparing with their "political struggle" tactics almost unhindered. The new Ambassador should be a person with marked leadership talents who ■ * can make the Country Team function harmoniously and spiritually, who * ;. S'ECRET . Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number; NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 SECRET can influence Asians through understanding them sympathetically, and who is alert to the power of the Mao Tse Tung tactics now being em- ployed to capture Vietnam and who is dedicated to feasible and practical democratic -means to defeat these Communist tactics. c J c r. . - g. Serious consideration should be given to replacing USOM Chief Gardiner* A number of Vietnamese pointedly answered my ques- tions about .Gar diner by talking about his deputy, Coster, while admitting that "Gardiner seems to be a nice man who has fallen asleep in our r* imate. ri h. U.S. military men in Vietnam should be freed to work in the combat areas. Our MAAG has a far greater potential than is now being utilized. U.S. military men are hardly in a position to be listened to when they are snug in rear areas and give advice to* Vietnamese officers who have attended the same U.S. military schools and who are now in a combat in which few Americans are experienced. MAAG personnel from General McGarr on down expressed desire to get more into real field work; let's give them what they want as far as U.S. permission is concerned and let them earn their way into positions of greater influence with the Vietnamese military in the field. i. A mature American, with much the same qualifications as those given above for the selection of the next Ambassador, should be assigned to Vietnam for political operations which will start creating J a Vietnamese-style foundation for more democratic government with- jjout weakening the strong leadership required to bring about the defeat of i the Communists, This must F_ot be a "clever" type who is out to gain a reputation as a "manipulator* 1 or a word- smith who is more concerned about the way his reports will look in Washington than in implementing U.S. policy in Vietnam. - j j. We must support Ngo Dinh Diem until another strong execu- - ] tive can replace him legally. President Diem feels that" Ams ricans : have attacked him almost as viciously as the Communists, and he has ! withdrawn into a shell for self-protection. We have to show him by deeds, not words alone, that we are his friend. This will make our *■•*-»„ * ■influence effective again, K. We must do much, much more constructive work with the oppositionists, I suspect that the U.S. has taught them to be carping critics and disloyal citizens by our encouragement of these traits. ! They need to put together a constructive program which can save. SECRET % 'A r - -** » * Declassified per Executive Order 13526. Section 3,3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 [ [ [ C SECRET I I m 1 Vietnam from the Communists by building something worth a man's j life to prese-rve, If it's a good program, we should encourage one ; strong political opposition to emerge, without endangering the national security. Here is where out political skill needs to' be used. This political work is needed as a m?vtter of grave urgency. Unless a con- . structive outlet 'is found quickly, the opposition in Saigon is going to explode in violence again and the Viet Cong are wide awake to exploit i f this time* The Communist Threat It was a shock to me to look over maps of the estimated situation with U.S. and Vietnamese intelligence personnel, as well as with President Diem who held similar grim views. The Communist Viet Cong now dominate much of the 1st and 5th Military Regions, as well as being active in spots in other regions, according to these estimates, The probable strength of the Communist armed forces in South Vietnam was given to me in various guesses from 3, 000 to 15, 000, My guess is that the strength is now closer to the latter figure and that only Hanoi knows accurately. ■ « This strength estimate by itself isn't what shocked me. The shocking part was to realize that the thousands of disciplined and trained Communist graduates of "proletarian military science 11 had been able to infiltrate the most productive area of South Vietnam and to gain con- trol of nearly all of it except for narrow corridors protected by military actions and for a few highly -localized spots v/here loyal paramilitary forces (Civil Guards and Self-Defnese Corps) have undertaken inspired counter- guerrilla actions or where villagers work closely with the military. The Viet Cong have the initiative and most o"f the control over the region from the jungled foothills of the High Plateau north of Saigon all the way south down to the Gulf of Siam, excluding the big city area of Saigon.- Cholon. This is "Vietnam's n brea.d-basket ,r where most of • * • ■ * its rice and rubber are grown. Unlike the Philippines or Malaya, the Communists cannot be cordoned off at the country's borders and then dealt with as an internal ■ security problem alone. The borders of Vietnam are long and include some of the most difficult terrain in the world to patrol. It is apparent that many of the Viet Cong infiltrate from Cambodia, particularly from Svayrieng Province, Also, southeastern Laos has a reported Communist - \ "V <** ~^ r* *£> TT 1 T m m 5 Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 201 1 I SECRET build-up, with RLG forces committed elsewhere, and increasing infiltration into Vietnam is reported, [ t [ u [ [ [ ... mi There is an intense psychological attack being waged against Free Vietnam by the Communists. This not only includes an almost constant barrage from powerful Radio Hanoi, which is reportedly relayed from Cambodia and is received as a loud ?,nd clear signal in South Vietnam, but also a heavy campaign by on-the-spot agitprop agents. A part of the psychological attack is directed against Ameri- cans, particularly against U.S. MAAGf personnel, along the lines of the Chinese Communist n hate America" campaign. 1 did not have the time or means to assess the effect of this psychological attack which has been going on for years. The big city area of Saigon-Cholon undoubtedly is a target of Communist operations, although I was able to find out little about either the Communist organization or its operations in this city area. U.S. intelligence personnel believed that Vietnamese counter-intelli- gence organizations were so actively ri hustling rr so. many suspects that the Communists have been unable to institute much of an organi- zation, president Diem believed that the Communists were concentrating their work elsewhere, following the dictum: n first the mountains, then the countryside, and then the city. 1 ' The attitude of Vietnamese and U.S. officials reminded me of the French and Vietnamese officials in Hanoi in 1953-54, who were so surprised later to discover that a complete, block-by-block clandestine Communist apparatus existed there. Ox, of Filipinos and Afnericans .who believed the Huks were in central Luzon in 195 and were so surprised when an, entire Communist politburo was captured in the city of Manila. I believe that the people in Saigon-Cholon have been the target of considerable subversive effort by the Communists and that it takes an in -place organization. tQ. carry this out. ... Communist strength figures are difficult to determine due in part to the different categories of personnel. I was able to get no estimate ■on the number of.Comnvunist political-psychological operators, although the DRV reportedly have trained many for work in the south. Also, the Communist military personnel include regulars who have infiltrated from the north, plus territorial forces and guerrillas who apparently are recruited locally. Colonel Tranh Thien Khiem, who commands the 5th Military Region, broke his estimate of some 7, 000 Viet Cong military in his region into 3,320 regulars, 1, 170 territorials, and 2,590 guerrDlas. When the Vietminh troops were transferred to the north in 1954-55 under the Geneva Agreemr . ma^y b»ft *=irnUes. --■»■■ .-..'• . .--,.. -*■ - .** .,*• ,*--- 0LUi\LI ft . * Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 i L [ E 1 I f I I [ ! SECRET behind in the south, along with stay -behind organizations and arms, caches. Although the pacification campaigns of 1955-56 cleaned up v/Jiat the Communists had left behind to sornq extent, there were remnants remaining which the Viet Cong have since exploited and augmented** greatly over the past 5 years. - President Ngo Dinh Diem President Diem and I are friends". Also, he is a man who put other Vietnamese friends of mine in jail or exiled them. It is hardly a blind friendship. Prior to my departure from Y/ashmgton, Jeff Pardons asked if I would please size-up President Diem carefully to see if he had changed much from when I had worked with him so closely in 1954-56. In our first meeting, he was a bit cautious with me. I suspected that he was waiting for me to drop Y/ashington's other shoe as a follow-up to the Ambassador's demands that he reform his ways. So, I reminisced on what we had been through together in the past and he joined in, adding the story of the 11 November coup as he saw it. Our meetings" from then on became more like the. old days, with plenty of give and take, .- , " but only after I convinced him that I still had affection for the Viet- namese people and was trying to understand their problems before c . sounding off. » He seems to have a better grasp of economic matters than formerly. Also, I believe he sincerely wants to pass some of his daily burden of work to others. He said that he had found this extremely hard to do, since too many others were soft in carrying out responsibilities or else were too vain to knuckle -down to hard work. This has forced him to over-burden Nguyen Dinh Thuan, Secretary of State for the Presidency, wlio doesn't hesitate to make tou^h decisions when needed, who has had to act as hatchet-man when others were too soft to get rid of incompe- - tents, and who has been loyal to his boss (although he* speaks right up for his own views). Vice President Tho is so soft-hearted that he ; really never takes corrective action against wrong doers. Vu Van Thai is a n blackmailer rr by threatening to resign after convincing the Americans that he is the most "brilliant Vietnamese in economic matters, although he is a poor executive whose work is in bad shape; if Diem accepted Thai's resignation, the Americans would feel that the Vietnamese Gov- ernment v/as going to hell. (Unfortunately, there's some truth in these .feelings of Diem T s about Tho and Thai). SECRET ^ 7 7 I [ Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 633 16. By: NWD Date: 201 1 'SECRET I believe President Diem Is more screened in by his "palace guard' 1 than he realizes - - but then much the same could be said of other leaders elsewhere. I noted that he still has a personal informant - net and I managed to talk to soitxc of them privately. The largest influence, rbut not the only one, is wielded by his brother Ngo Dinh Nhu. However, I found President Diem unusually well informed on the situation in Vietnam, • including the bad aspects - - better informed than any ether Vietnamese among the many with whom I talked. In reflecting on our conversations, I have concluded that most folks Uv/ho talk to him have little empathy for, or sensitve understanding of, him. They fait to realize that Diem is human and doesn't like the idea of people trying to kill hirn out of hatred; the coup attempt of 11 November, opened at 3 a.m, by bursts of heavy machine gun fire into his bedroom [ in an obvious try at liquidating him in his bed. On top of this, he has no;. r had nearly 7 years of venomous attack by the Communists who know Lthat he is a major obstacle which must be destroyed before they can win. This is a daily psychological attack on hirn in his own country, in his' own language, and listened to by his own people. The only way he f could shut this off today would be to give up what he, and we, believe in. On top of this, he has criticism heaped on him by many who are simply being destructive, he has administrators who are disloyal or whose vanity is expressed in talking a better job of work than in doing it. And then, to cap the criticisms, he feels that n\any Americans have con- tempt for him - - that the .IT, S 4 which sould be Vietnam's staunchest P i frit ad is somehow taking the same psychological line with him as do the Coinmanists, that somehow our nobly -expressed policies get carried out with much pettiness in actual practice. ■ * If the next American official to talk to President Diem would have the good sense to see him as a human being who has been through a lot of hell for years -- and not as an opponent to be beaten to his knees -- we would start regaining our influence with him in a healthy way. .Y/hat- fcvftr else we might think of him, he has been unselfish in devoting his life to his country and has little in personal belongings to show for it. If we don't like the- heavy influence "of Brother Nhu, then "let's move . someone of curs in clone. This someone, however, must be able to look, at problems with understanding, suggest better solutions than does Nhu, earn a position of influence. The next time we become "holier than thou", we might find it ottering to reflect on the DRV, Do the Soviets and the Chinese Com- munists give Ho Chi \iinh a similar hard time, or do they aid and *hot hirn? ■ ? - ■ ■: ,- r i ■ t \ - "---■' J 8 Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 [ [ [ SECRET U. 5. Political Efforts The United States has been the main forearm political mentor for • Free Vietnam since it became an independent nation, Of course other nations have had their influence. But we were the ones who have spoken with authority, who have held the purse- strings, who trained and advised the government personnel, and to whom most Vietnamese in political life have looked for guidance. It is only human to want to find someone else to blame for what has gone wrong* But, we won't be able to start '". doing effective political work until we admit that our own actions carry responsibilities with them. There are plenty of Aaron Burr's, a few Alexander Hamilton's and practically no George Yfashir ^ton's, Tom JeffersonJc or Tom Paine 's in Saigon today , . , largely as a result of our U.S. political influence, This certainly is not the U.S. policy we had hoped to implement. Ambassador Durbrow seemed genuinely surprised when I told him that the Can Lao. Party in Vietnam was originally promoted by the U„S, State Department and was largely the brain-child of a highly- respected, senior U.S. Foreign Service professional. Several weeks after this action was undertaken originally, I learned of it and warned that the benefits were extremely short-term and that great lasting harm could result by a favored party forcing older parties to go under- ground. However, the decision had been made, the Can Lao party had been started, and we had to start working from that reality. We cannot go back to living in the past and must keep moving ahead, but that doesn't mean that we have to pay forever for our mistakes. However, the real point is that we don't seem to have very long memories or enough solid feeling of responsibility for out acts/ Many U,S, Foreign Service officials leap into attacks on the Can Lao Party. I agree with their reasons. Any thinking American would. But I sure would feel better about it if they could only remember the consequences of their own actions for a few short years - and learn from that memory. I cannot. truly sy rnpa th'i z e v/ith Americans who help promote a fascistic state and then" get angry when it doesn't act like a democracy, ■ So, what should we do about it? I have a concrete recommenda- tion, V/e need an American in Saigon who can work, with real skill, with great sensitivity to Vietnamese feelings, and with a fine sense of the dangerous limits of Vietnamese national security in a time of emergency. This upusual American should be given the task of creating > * * SECRET v.' - ■ ^ -J- Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 633 16. By: NWD Date: 201 1 I [ I [ ( i i [.-■ ■ ■ ■ ' SECRET r • ■ ^ X an opposition party Which would coalesce the majority of the opposition into one organisation, of helping this new party adopt a platform which contains sound ideas for building national entities which the Vietnamese people v/ould find worth defending against the Communists, and of strongly influencing it to play the role of loyal opposition while President •• . Diem is in "power and the nation is in such great danger. r This* work with the opposition is a matter of grave urgency , f i Unless the energies of the malcontents, the frustrated, the patriots on the outs are quickly channeled into constructive political works, they are going to explode into de s t r ue live political"wo rk . This opposition situation in Saigon-Cholon is at the bursting point, and there is no • safety valve. Y/hen it next blows, and if Diem cannot cope with it, \ the Siagon political scene has all the makings of turning into anarchy. j It can happen, and soon. 1 saw a number of opposition people, officials of various' parties, members of the National Assembly, and disgruntled members of President Diem's administration. They eagerly told rne how they were criticizing Diem's actions more and more openly. I asked them what their own program was, other than to seize power for themselves oar to have me pat them on the head for being critics. Few of them had I any sensible ideas. I told them they'd better get busy scratching for a better program themselves or else I could only assume that they C l were being disloyal or treasonous in a time of great national danger, 1 trust that other Americans 'calking to these oppositionists will do the same or we will be inviting disaster by listening to this and keeping | mum when we should be working like beavers to turn it into constric- tive channels. . If we c3.11 get most of the oppositionists meeting with cadi other - to try to put together a platform they can all agree on, and can pro- tect such work so that it can be done fairly openly, we will have an extremely useful political action in motion. It will absorb months !of political energies which otherwise will -go towards the solution of ■ armed overthrow, A major opposition party, once it starts becoming *a reality,, will tend to make the several governmental groupings such jas the Can Lao, MNR, and Nhu's labor organizations start coalescing /into one stronger group. In this way, we can help promote a two-party I system which can afford to be surfaced, end much of the present j clandestine political structures, and give sound encouragement to ; the development of new political leaders. There are many fine younger ^ ^>atr?-*ts who need this sort 0/ a healthy political atmosphere to develop \ ia, ii v/s"evcr expect Vietnam to have a real future. v. . -.* • „ -SACHET 1 n Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 [ SECRET Cojnmcntfl [ : • [ r * * Hcrti are some addition?.! thoughts; ' a. President Diem said that if it hadn't been for the dedicated an ti- communism of about a million Catholics, Vietnam could never have kept going this long. Yet his brother, Archbishop Thuc, told me that the refugees from the north (including many Catholics) had been settled into such remunerative new lives in the south that they had gone soft, no longer wanted to fight, and criticised the govern- ment for wanting to continue the war. Also, the Saigon -Choi on area is seething with political discontent while the people are f?,r better off in material possessions than ever before, The shops are full of goods for Tet and the people are buying heavily « Somehow, the U, S, has 1 filled their bellies but has neglected their spirit. b. Many of the Vietnamese in the countryside who v/cjre right xip against the Viet Cong terror were full of patriotic spirit, Those who seemed to be in the hardest circumstances, fighting barefoot and with makeshift weapons, had the highest morale. They still can lick the Viet Cong with a little help. There's a lesson here on our giving aid. Maybe we should learn that our funds cannot buy friends or a patriotic spirit by mere materialistic giving. Perhaps we should help those who help themselves, and not have a lot of strings on that help. * j. m ■ c. The Viet Cong crowded a lot of action into the year I960, They infiltrated thousands of armed forces into South Vietnam, recruited local levies of military territorials and guerrillas, and undertook large scale guerrilla and terroristic operations, In so doing ..they neglected doing sound political work at the grass roots level and broke one of Mao Tse Tung's cardinal rules. Many people - in the south now under their thumb are unhappy about it, but too terrified to act against these new rulers. The Viet Cong apparently havc'been working hard recently, to- rectify this error, and now have political cadres in the field, Y/e still have a chance of beating them if-wc can give the people some fighting chance of gaining security and some political b?,sis of action, Since both of these actions will have to be carried out by Vietnamese forces in their Defense estab- lishment, it is worthwhile to make U.S. help to the Vietnamese in the contested provinces along these sorely needed lines a priority mission of the U.S. military in Vietnam, The political actions should ,}e ^tve implementing of Vietnamese governmental policy W V5.e*ii>me5e v ' * •J r Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 SECRET rce commanders, aided by Vietnamese psychological warfare units. If the U, S, military doesn't ride herd'on this, it is apt to be neglected and is too vital to keeping Vietnam free to be made a secondary work. • d, I am passing a copy of this to Admiral Felt at CINCPAC- Suggest that copies be passed also to selected persons in Defense, State, and CIA, ' 1 G, \/J)ja &LvJU. Edward G. LANSDALE Brigadier General, U. S. j .F.. i L [. .. ■ • L i ' * 4 * 1 " .-_ - -V SI SECRET ' . ~ - - - - • Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 NND Project Number; NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 SECRET THE WHITE HOUSE Washington January 30 s 196l MEMORiUftDUM FOR: The Secretary of State The Secretary of Defense You should understand that as a result of our meeting on Saturday morning, January 28 ? I authorize an increase of expenditure of $28 .k million to expand the Viet-Nam force level by 20,000; and an increase in expenditure of $12.7 million for a program to improve the quality of the Viet-Nam civil guard. i Initialed/j.F.K. SECRET 13 SecDef Cont Wo. 188 Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3,3 NND Project Number: NND 633 16. By: NWD Date: 201 1 OUTGOING TELEGRAM DEPARTMENT OF STATE •SECRET SENT TO: AMEMBASSY SAIGON PRIORITY 10 k RPTD INFO: CINCPAC POLAD AMEMBASSY VIETINNE AMEMBASSY BANGKOK llh6 AMEMBASSY LONDON AMEMBASSY PHQM PHEN AMEMBASSY PARIS JOINT STATE -DEFENSE- ISA MESSAGE ■ 2761 (nvnaf) i Counterinsurgeney Plan, including 20,000 men increase VN armed forces/and provision training and equipment 32,000 Civil Guard, approved on basis following FY 6l funding: $28. 1+ million MAP for expanded NVNAF and $12.7 million MAP for Civil Guard. $660,000 as proposed for psychological operations and com- munications equipment also approved. Highly command Ambassador, Country Team and staffs. Recognize Plan allows considerable latitude for changes and refinements as implementation worked out * with GVN and as situation requires. However , U S„ would as Plan provdes expect GVN absorb local currency costs these increases aid does not contemplate farther US dollar grants to generate additional local currency for this purpose. - preparation abridged version plan suitable for use Ambassador and in presenting plan to Diem. In presenting plan to Diem recommend you emphasize implementation will require extraordinary effort US -GVN cooperation, but that if implemented promptly and vigorously, we believe it will give GVN 1 means turn tide against VC and at same time improve GVN capacity resist evert aggression. Immediate purpose Plan is to enable GVN defeat insurgency, but Plan also envisages that GVN must move on political front towards liberalization FE;SEA;CTWood;tha;erc 2/3/61 The Secretary SEA - Mr. Anderson FE - Mr. Parsons BOD - Adm Rainz ICA - Mr. Sheppard C/MBC - Mr. Ball S/S - Mr. Seip (in substance) SECRET , Ik Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number; NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 Page 2 of telegram to AMEMBASSX SAIGON SECRET to retain necessary popular cooperation; that various economic steps be ■ taken j and that there be adequate cooperation with KKG on frontier control. It considered US view that success requires implementation entire plan. Should make clear our present commitment to support Counter insurgency Plan is only for FY 6l part of program. Future funding will require Congressional approval. Views Congress likely be influenced by developments in political as well as security situation. FY 6l component represents large increase in US support Viet -Nam. If GVN willing to accept the obligations involved in its implementation, the US is ready give full and immediate support in carrying it out. Suggest proposeing to Diem that members US Missions ready confer with GVN opposite numbers work out agreed version Plan within, say, two week time limit. Urge changes be kept minimal to avoid necessity referred CINCPAC. and Washington. In implementing Plan recommend that Country Team: a) Conduct annual or more frequent review question balance as between forces committed primarily against VC and those intended primarily resist external aggression. b) Emphasize importance GVN-KKG border control. c) Urge GVN improve treatment VC prisoners, as done by Magaaysay, to encourage desertions. d) Urge GVN increase efforts to infiltrate VC in SVN. In view Congressional interest monetary reform advise whether GVN should be pressed for early establishment unitary rate or whether additional costs SECRET 15 Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 Page 3 of telegram to AMEMBASSY SAIGON 105^ SECRET imposed on GVTJ by Plan will have same affect <, If Ambassador considers GVltf does not provide necessary cooperation^ he should inform Washington with recommendations which may include suspension r US contribution. RUSK Pouched by DCT SECRET 16 Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 THE WHITE HOUSE Washington February 3j 196l TOP SECRET NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. 2 : The Secretary of Defense SUB JE CT : Development of Counter- guerrilla Forces At the National Security Council meeting on February 1, 1961, the President requested that the Secretary of Defense , in consultation with other interested agencies > should examine means for placing more emphasis on the development of counter- guerrilla forces. Accordingly, it is requested that the Department of Defense take action on this request and inform this office promptly of the measures which it proposes to take. Copy 1 of h (Signed) McGeorge Bundy Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs TOP SECRET v 17 Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number; NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 ■■■■■■:■ * ■ C [ [ [ THE WHITE HOUSE WA SHINGTON . 1961 MAR 10 m r 05 OFFICE OF ?i€ SECRETARY 0" DEFENSE TOP SECRET March 9, 1961 NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. 28 ^ ■ -' ■■ ■ ■ ■ - ■ ' i — ■ — ■ — — — i ■ ■ — ■ — i ■ — »- — ^— ■ - — — — TO:VTHE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE - Subject: Guerr illa Operation s in Viet-Minh Territory In view of the President's instruction that we make every possible effort to launch guerrilla operations in Viet-Minh territory at the earliest possible time, would you report to the President as soon as feasible your views on what actions might be undertaken in the near future and what steps might be taken to expand operations in the longer future. J [ CC: The Secretary of State McGeorge Bundy * * C I P 9- TOP SECRET Copy 1 , f f5C*L& £MJ * \ ■•■?• of f pages sz'Aoz Co Dic>s eccii \ /? -• 13 c«. • ^ '"\ N Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 n r-rr* i\ * % a? Ms V _ a t.1 3 [ [ I ( [ I ij 2, .On 31 March 1961, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the recon^endations listed in subparagraphs la, b and c above and requested the Secretary of Defense. to take action deemed- appro- priate. The recc;r/::iendations listed in subnarag:raphs 1 & a e \ . f and g above were forwarded to CI__G?AC for c cffifinent and recom- mendation. The recommendations listed in subparagraphs 1 h- .. and j above were referred to CtllGTkC for action deemed aoor-o- priate, with advice to the Joint Chiefs of Staff of action taken, and of requirements for further assistance on such action 3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have received ana considered the coirrr.ents of C_C_IC?AC. and his reports on action taken. The Joint Chiefs of Staff approve the Trapncll recoi-Mendations below subject to the following considerations: a. Provide Defense Support funds on same basis for 170,000 force as for 1$0,000, /The Joint Chiefs of Staff have taken clue cognisance of _3ia primary functions and responsibilities assigned to the State Department ana ICA in determining the source and allocation of Defence Support . funds. However 1 j the Government of Vietnam apparently feels it cannot provide the financial support required in the Coimterinsurgsncy Plan* Furthermore, the Joint Chiefs of - Staff feel that prompt acceptance of the Counterin^ursency . Plan by the Goverarasnt of Vietnam is a natter of overriding concern In that country's present critical situation. Therefore^ the Joint Chiefs of Staff request the Secretary of Defense to take action to the end that Defense Sunoort funds are provided for a 170,000 _san force on the sane basis as that nov; provided for 150,000. | ' ' ' b. Provide FAP support for entire 68*000 Civil Guard* ■"_-_. _• . __ J. _»*t?_ _*__-»_. rt «-» .r. _ -_ ■_ _ _ _ _. _._,___! . -» _____ _ , »___._» (1) mately $20 million be adde ceiling* -to support this. . c, Provide MAP FOL. support for Civil Guard. ' Chiefs of Staff recommend approval for provision to the Civil Guard. ' . . * I * : . i The Joint of MA? ?0L , i - _r « *\ Or Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 f - c cU Provide MA? support for British-make personnel carriers and scout cars. The Joint Chiefs of Staff re contend approval for MA? support of British vehicles in Vietnam to the extent only of providing general supply and repair- parts of iteiss / j. j- conL'non co cne wait. i 4 . The. Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the increased US contributions to the Government of Vietnacij proposed abovej be appropriately exploited by US representatives in Vietnam to i induce that government ?s acceptance of the Counter ins urgency 1 Plan 1!J 5. The Joint Chiefs of Staff appropriate action to implement Trapnell: note that OIKCPAC has taken the recommendations of General ZJ r *«* r > t. a. To airlift 12,000 carbines, b. To expedite shipment of needed radios and generators.. c. To expedite shipment of Claymore mines. For the Joint Chiefs of Staff: * ■• f r-r V -V; v r } 1. £^^> T/ L." L* H5MHITZEH Chairman int Chiefs of St i' ii — # -x-' /■■ U~t *+- [ [ J T * • - [ r - E [ & Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3,3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 . * 19 April 1961 VIETNAM 1. Background Vietnam today is largely the child of the 1954 Geneva Agreement. The Geneva Agreement was billed as a "cease-fire 11 between the French and Vietminh armed forces for all of Indo- China, and was forged in the gloom of the French disaster at Dicn-Bien-Phu. The British and Soviets were its sponsors. The U.S. was an observer, not a signatory. The political portions introduced into the agreement by the Communists should be noted carefully. Among these are the temporary partition of Vietnam with provision for a plebiscite, the establishing of an international inspection commission, and a proviso for keeping a military status quo in weaponry. Vietnam was partitioned at the 17th Parallel. This gave the Communist North the majority of the population (estimated then at * 14 million) and its most important industries (including coal and cement}. The Free South had an estimated 12 million people and an export potential of rice and rubber. The plebiscite was to be held in 1956, to determine whether Vietnam was to be Free or Communist. Communist control over the majority of the population seemed to make the outcome plain to predict. However, the vigor of the Ngo Dinh Diem government in making Free Vietnam a viable state, plus the movement of nearly a million refugees from the Communist North to the Free South, changed the political climate strongly by the end of 1955. The Soviet and British sponsors of the agreement then decided that the plebiscite should be postponed indefinitely.' '•*"■•.* i / ii fv-pnn ' 1*7 i * i in • V .1 '■ ■''■ 99 (^ C * ■ 1 i; Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 C E [ [ [ [ [ [ * ■ The International Control Commission was established, with Polish, Indian, and Canadian members. It is still in "being* a monument to the ineffectiveness and dangers of such an international body; the. Free South is observed far more closely than the Communist North, because we play the game legally. As to the military status quo there were two points: a prohibition on introducing new weapons into Vietnam and a ceiling on foreign military personnel in the country {the number to be no more than were in Vietnam at the time of the "cease-f re"). There were some 400 U.S. military in Vietnam at that time, plus the many thousands of French military . No foreign communists were reported, and the Vietminh had no aircraft at the time. II. Today • In the North is the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. Its Constitution in key provisions makes it into a Communist state in the image of the Soviet Union. In January 1961, its population was estimated at 16, 375, 000. Its armed forces total around 300, 000, with reported heavy fire power capability in new artillery and tanks. Also, aircraft have been reported, not only transports, but jet .fighters. In March I960, it was estimated that there were 6 to 10 / thousand Bloc personnel in the North, most of whom were advisors • to the Vietnamese. About two-thirds were Chinese, the remainder I being mostly Soviets, East Germans, .and Czechs. In the South is the Republic of Vietnam, with a government somewhat patterned on ours. In January 19&Lj its population was . estimated at 14, 300, 000. Its armed forces total* about 150, 000, not counting 64, 000 in the Civil Guard (similar to a state constabulary) or the 40, 000 in the Self Defense Corps, which is the ill-equipped I and untrained .village militia. Official Americans in Vietnam are: | 98 in "the Embassy, 685 in MAAG, 230 in USOM (ICA), and 30 in i US1S. There are more than a thousand other Americans, dependents of officials, business people, and missionaries. Only a few French and British remain in Vietnam. U.S. aid to the South, in millions of dollars, is indicated as: s- . t 23 [■•' • E C [ r C [ r . * I Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 633 16. By: NWD Date: 201 1 SlCKcJ. Cm— ' » * t » i In local piastres (for Defense Support, etc) n U.S. currency (for technical services, etc.) FY I960 156 FY 1961 % ■ m ■ ••— 160 % 3.8 3.8 73.9 65. M 233.7 228.8 \ . Since 80% of the population in the South is employed in agriculture, much of the U.S. aid to South Vietnam in the years right after 1954, (estimated at over $l-billion), went to rehabilitate the agrarian economy and to settle some 900,000 refugees. The ever-present threat of invasion from the North, and large scale subversive activities has required continued expenditure by the new government to give unusually heavy support to its national security forces. The South now is self-sufficient in basic food- stuffs, but has no heavy industry. III. Situation Analysis * . . . The situation map at MAAG in Saigon early this month shows the South's major current problem at a glance; the Communist 'internal security threat. (Map attached) The Communist f, National Liberation Front 11 claims that the Communists will 'liberate 1 ' the South in 1961. The main reliance : is on Communist armed forces, now estimated at about 10, 000, who ; have been infiltrated into the South from the North (overland through Cambodia ciad L/aos, or by sea in coastal junks), and who fight as m --%. j*- '4 — / <^ guerrillas. These are the Viet Cong, * m M ■ As the Free Vietnamese become more effective at countering these Communist guerrillas, (in January and February, the govern- ment initiated 529 attacks on the guerrillas, compared to 310. attacks initiated by the Viet Cong), the Communists have been forced to consider further means for winning. Current Communist plans include: ^ * ■' 1 • -' Or *• * *L ;.' Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 c ■ c If c c [ [ [ ■ ■ » I • I r ,-n. SECRET a. Readiness to exploit any future coup d'etat attempts in the South* (The Communists were caught unprepared in last November's attempt at a no3i-Comimmist coup in ^ai^on). » ■ % , ? b. Use the proposed forthcoming 14 nation conference on Laos as a forvxm to gain political agreement to a j \ew partition of Vietnam at the 13th Parallel. c. Possibly establish an enclave in the Kuntum area >f South Vietnam, using forces from Attopen in Laos to do this, and start a revolutionary government there* ■ Meanwhile, Free Vietnam has just completed a successful Presidential election, returning Ngo Dinh Diem to office, with Nguyen Ngoc Tho as Vice-President, The U.S. Country Team has taken up with Diem f s government a Counter -Insurgency Vlan, mostly written by Americans in Vietnam last year* It is hoped that the implementation of this plan will solve the Viet Cong internal threat. In addition, MAAG- Vietnam has produced a work, "Tactics and Techniques of Counter -Insurgent Operations, tr which is being translated for use in Vietnamese military manuals and texts. The Counter -Insurgency Plan calls for better-integrated control of the military-economic -political effort against the Viet , Cong, a more effective chain-of-command, improvement of military strength and structure, coordinating and unifying the intelligence effort, gaining more popular support, changing some of the political ' structure, and increasing the Vietnamese contribution to the economic support of the struggle* The Vietnamese have adopted a number of these proposals, have changed some to more acceptable j Vietnamese forms, and balked at part of the political proposals (the ! inclusion of opposition politicians in the Cabinet and elimination of : the Can Lao party which has supported President Diem). - • ■ -•.**■♦ , ■ •.. * ' . Diem ! s actions to achieve objectives of the Counter-Insurgency Plan include: . . ■ a. The Civil Guard (constabulary) was transferred from the Department of interior to Department of Defence* 32, 000 Vj: SFPon * ■ >T. V f*> f"" * y > f '* ' f— L ~i [ c [ [ Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 ■" ' ..-■• ••■<■• SECRET; of the Civil Guard are now being trained and equipped by the Army. Since the "Vietnamese are hard put to pay the cost of the increased burden, U.S. Defense officials suggest that we train and equip the remaining 3 6, 000 Civil Guard immediately. They figure that $20 -million would cover the initial equipment and first year costs. We could start training and equipping the best of the remaining 36, 000 from FY 61 funds. b. Control and power of the Joint General Staff has been improved, with U.S. advisors in a more favorable position to assist. The Director of the Civil Guard is now subordinate to the Chief of Staff. Time las between alert and air strike has been shortened considerably. Logistical methods are being improved. c. The Internal Security Council was founded and now meets weekly. Other structural changes of the government, i (such as having "super-Secretaries n in charge of a group of related Departments), have been announced but await implementation. • - The Vietnamese agreed to having a national planning system, as recommended in the U.S. Plan, and progress is reported. "■ ' i * i * d. The Vietnamese government published a decree $ on the tactical zone organization, although not as complete as in the U.S. Plan. At the same time, the" Vietnamese have accepted, de facto, closer MAAG help at the tactical level; U.S. military are now actually visiting small tactical units on operations, e. The Vietnamese have agreed to Chief MAAG's *) proposed 20,000 additional troops, as in the Plan, Implementation of tliis increase is tied-up with discussions on the Plan in Saigon. Our Ambassador wants the Vietnamese to accept responsibility for pay and allowances of this increase; U.S. Defense officials propose that the inqrease be supported the same as other MAP forces. On top of the problem of the Viet Cong actions, and getting the Counter-Insurgency Plan implemented, there still remains the continuing threat of a coup against President Diem. Much of this is still parlor talk in Saigon and other urban areas, but there reportedly are groups seriously plotting. Some plain, private * , . -- -/ ' 28 t •- • Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By; NWD Date: 201 1 r L c [ - talk with key Vietnamese leaders by a responsible U,S» official would end this plotting, especially if the political oppositionists had another outlet for their energies. A small start on providing another use of political energies has been made by the younger leaders of the Northern Dai Viets, who have started trying to coalesce ^Lll the non-Communist opposition parties in a "Front cor Democratization, ft In the propaganda field, the Communists are way out in front. They have made this a major effort, while we have done too little, too late. Radio facilities in the South are still inade- quate, with Radio Hanoi coming in more powerfully to many areas than do Free Vietnamese broadcasts. The Communists reportedly have ten transmitters in the Hanoi area, all 100 KW medium and short-wave; relay transmitters built by Chinese Communists in Cambodia apparently give Ra,dio Hanoi strong broadcast coverage of the South, The South has 15 transmitters listed, with 9 in the Saigon area; 4 are medium wave (IKY/ to 5KW), 5 short-wave (12 KW and 25 KW); the remainder are l'KW transmitters scattered around the country. [ ; ,*«* ■ In this connection, Vietnam is the Asian counterpart of Germany, as far as being a showplace of direct competition between the Free World and the Bloc is concerned, Americans in Vietnam too often forget that they haye Bloc opposite numbers just to the North of them, working like beavers to make the place get ahead of us or at least appear that way, a. fr * a One of the customary working groups in Washington is -being called together next week by John Steeves, Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs. It Will be composed of "desk" personnel handling Vietnam's daily problems in State, Defense, ICA and CIA. It will address itself to some of the current questions arising out of the U.S. formulated Counter-Insurgency Plan. £ ' * + '4 - -r I ^ Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 201 1 SEC m; \\L IV. Action Proposed [ [ [ r [ [ [ r \ The President should at once determine that conditions- in Vietnam are critical and establish a Washington task force for that country. This will permit the task force to come up with an approved 1 plan of action prior to sending a new U.S. Ambassador to Vietnam, so that he can start moving towards U.S. goals upon arrival. Initial Actions ^ - . . . ,..■- — _ — . .. . _ _. — - — 1. A Presidential directive should name a Director and provide for members of a Vietnam Task Force from Defense, State, CIA, ICA, and USIA. The organization providing the Director will support the Task Force administratively. 2. The Task Force will submit a statement of U. S. goals and implementing planning to the President for approval by 21 April. 3. The Task Force will prepare a list of candidates for a special three- man staff for the Ambassador (plans officer, opera- tions officer, fiscal officer), and will have this staff selected and appointed with the Ambassador 1 s approval. 4. The Task Force will brine? the Ambassador a,nd his three- man staff together in Y/ashington, "marry 11 them, and present them to the President for his instructions. - * « 5. The Task Force will then supervise and coordinate the activities of every U.S. agency carrying out operations pursuant to the plan in Vietnam to insure success of the approved plan, until the contingency in Vietnam is determined to have been overcome and that U. S. goals can be'achicved by normal procedures. Goals - » « •• Present U.S. policy objectives are now stated In general terms. Detailed plans, such as the Counter-Insurgency Plan, only cover part - of the actions needed to reach U.S. goals. A fresh statement of goals and tasks, making use of work now underway, would provide firmer purpose to U.S. efforts. True objectives in Vietnam seem to fall into three inter-related parts: - * - _ • • * * »«. . . r I 1 1 - J no _ > • • r v [ [ •r L Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 SECRET 1. Pacification - to end the internal Communist threat in South Vietnam. / « J 2. Stabilization - to promote the growth of hoilthy democracy in South Vietnam. ■ 3. Unification - to provide a favorable climate for a free choice b, the Vietnamese to unify their country, and then to give thern the opportunity to make that choice. Tasks Pacification i - Assign top priority to the defeat of Viet- Cong forces and the denial of South Vietnam to further entry of Communist para-military and subversive forces. " Aggressively implement the Counter-Insurgency Plan, while recognizing that it probably requires adjustment to fit both native Vietnamese needs and the newest U.S. military techniques and hardware. - Give Vietnam stronger U.S. psychological-political support. The Vice President might visit Saigon and announce U.S. determina- tion to support Vietnam's desire to remain free. ^ Concentrate U.S. military research and development to develop better military equipment for use in resolving insurgency problems in Vietnam, The area should be treated as a laboratory and proving ground, as far as this is politically feasible, - Eliminate artificial restrictions imposed by the strict U.S. Interpretation Of the Geneva Agreement so to permit as many U. S, personnel in Vietnam as are needed to help the Vietnamese help them- selves effectively, « • - -'"Use the force of world opinion to stop Viet-Cong transit of Cambodia, A task force of journalists should visit Cambodia to report on activities in border provinces such as Svayrieng and on policies being implemented by Sihanouk and other officials. v , * t ■ ' - 2 V* i- ;..< i -, .- ^ ; IV '^ V 1 - r ■ * . Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 633 J 6. By: NWD Date: 201 1 [ [ [ | SECRE - i • i » Stabilizati o n ■ I - Good public administration should % follow the troops, moving immediately into pacified areas. The U. S. Peace Corps can be used dynamically to assist in this, particularly in fields of public health, •education, and agriculture. Community development -in the democratic jt r idition can be undertaken by combined teams of U.S. Peace Corps, Vietnamese Civic Action, and Filipino Operation Brotherhood. i « ~ With the agreement of the Vietnamese government, the U. S. should use its "good offices 11 to bring out all political parties, to help them define party platforms for the national good, to encourage the coalescing into two major political groupings, and to redefine political crimes in realistic objective, rather than subjective terms. * - Communications and transport should be expanded rapidly to knit national unity. Light aircraft capabilities should be improved. Government officials should be induced to get away frequently from their desks in Saigon for more direct actions in the field. The President should be encouraged to hold occasional Cabinet meetings in the provinces, particularly in newly pacified areas. i m - The Washington Task Force should send into Vietnam a practical economic team, which should include representatives of U.S. business, to work out with the Vietnamese effective plans to speed up national development, give Vietnam a better tax structure, and establish a sound basis for foreign investment. The numerous U.S. and other economic plans for Vietnam should be re-examined for sound ideas to be incorporated into a firm new pla„n. / • -• Viet-Cong prisoners should be rehabilitated along the lines ! of experiences with Communist prisoners in Greece and in EDCOR in the Philippines. U.S. teams, headed by U.S. military, should assist the Vietnamese in this work, • " ■ '* . m * Unification - Communist North Vietnam should be subjected immediately to a heavy and sustained psychological campaign; a first step would be to beef up radio broadcast capabilities beamed to the North. v,' *.. ■ -,>;-■' ■ C: w . '■ - - * i- ' .- o Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 r Si -XKtl ! [ - Areas just south of the 17th Parallel in Free Vietnam should be developed as show-places, particularly in agricultural improve- ments. News about n fish-ponds n built in Vietnam by Filipinds of Operation Brotherhood travelled throughout the north rapidly, giving a highly desirable contrast between the methods of free men and .' those of the "Chinese Communist agricultural advisors. i - Introduce teams of Free Vietnamese into the North to create 1 the means for the people to liberate themselves from Communist controls and coercion. Related actions could be undertaken by Chinese Nationalists in Southern China. Hope could be awakened by taking initial actions against symbols of Communist power; the rail- i road, the cement plant, and the large modern printing plan in Hanoi : (which the Viet-Minh took in 1955). - Encourage again the movement of refugees into the South by stimulating the desire to do so among the people in the North, by establishing better means of ingress to the South, and by re-estab- lishing the highly successful refugee settlement program. Sustained world opinion should be focused on the plight of the Northern people in order to bring pressure on the International Control Commission ; to assist the "movement of refugees. The goal should be a million J refugees, , - - • - An internal liberation movement "should be created in the ' North, organized along lines of political- revolution,' with the goal I of freeing the North of Communist control and eventually unifying a Free North with a Free South. The movement should be affiliated with the government of South Vietnam. --When a' clear majority can be counted upon* to vote for free- dom, and election machinery can be set up to protect a free vote, the sponsors of the Geneva Agreement of 1954 should be induced to hold the plebiscite promised in that document. It was written to ■accommodate the then-known control of "the -electorate by the Com- munists, but there is no reason why the Free World should not turn the table when it is able to do so. • ■ 4 <: 1 . . ' 6X ^- ^> I K*y- Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 633 16. By: NWD Date: 201 1 SECRET c E I V. Immediate Steps * Fullest use should be made of the existing position of personal 'confidence and understanding which General Lansdale holds with President Diem and other key Vietnamese. In addition to giving a major assist to the new Presidential Task Force for Vietnam in Washington, General Lansdale should accompany the new U.S. Ambassador to Saigon to facilitate good working relations with the Vietnamese Government from \ the earliest moment and to be in command of the initial imple- mentation of President Kennedy's Task Force Plan for Vietnam. • This would speed early actions in the field and assure, upon Lansdale 's return to Washington, that the Task Force in Washington applied itself to practical priorities to win this one. ' While in Vietnam, Lansdale also could obtain President Dierr^s permission and then call non -Communist political opposition leaders together and encourage them to rely on legal means of opposition, to help in the fight against the Communist Viet Cong, and to cease scheming coup d f etats. Other actions he could take while in Vietnam include; . a. Confer with President Diem on expediting of . obtaining a popular base through such means as a "Presidential Complaints and Action Commission. n This would fit appropriately into the tasks of the Secretary of State for the Presidency, where President Diem now has one of his ablest executives, Nguyen Dinh Thuan. The Filipino expert on this subject, Frisco Johnny San Juan, who assisted Mags ays ay and who is favorably known to President Diem, could be brought to Saigon to help establish this. It would give the i^eople an immediate feeling of personal connection, with a responsive government", . ' • b. Visit the Hue area, just south of the demarcation line of the 17th Parallel/ to see what might be done to dramatize the benefits of U.S. -Vietnam friendship. The Communists are highly aware of what goes on in this region. If American youth from the Peace Corps worked side by side with Vietnamese on ■ ; . I ip % > i r - i _* '3 32 / - Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 SECRtl • • L [•• . % i • r ^. ■r* • » • * • some dramatic agrarian projects, in this area, word of tins would spread among the farmers throughout the Communist North and offer a sharp contrast to the Chinese advisors on the land there. This could be strengthened quickly by adding a team of Filipinos from Ope ration Brotherhood to work side by side with Americans and Vietnamese c. Radio broadcasts should be surveyed realistically, for facilities and content, to be certain that the word of what free men are doing in Vietnam is heard loudly and acceptably by Vietnamese who are staking their lives on freedom's cause in the South, by Vietnamese ^vho dream of lost freedom in the Communist North, and by neighbors in Cambodia and Laos. Any mobile radio broadcasting equipment and staffs available to the U.S. should be brought in to action here as a priority matter. d. A small R&tD section could be established in the Vietnamese Army, to work closely with a small team from U.S. Defense, which could be attached to MAAG. This R&D section would actually produce locally materiel for use in the fight against the Viet Cong, as well as offer a Vietnamese means of introducing improved American techniques and materiel . A similar section in the Philippine Army produced- faulty ammunition and booby- trapped grenades which were sold secretly to the Huks; it was a highly effective operation. All available Americans who played key action roles in helping the Vietnamese in the 1954-55 birth of their nation should be mustered to assist Lansdale both in South Vietnam and in appropriate North Vietnam operations. This could include members of Lans dale's 1954'- 56 team as well as Generals O'Daniel and Williams. Also, other selected personnel with practical experience in the fields of work required could be listed by Lansdale and assigned on a priority basis.- ' * A special economic -trade mission of- highly- regarded American * leaders, to include Dean James Landis if possible, shouJd visit Vietnam. "This mission would step-up existing projects and to demonstrate the strong, new U.S. initiative in support of the Vietnamese government ■ under Diem. • *~* v^-- Jo 4 * • Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 r I SECRET I C Dramatic visits by Americans who would capture .world head lines should be scheduled. The proposed visit to Vietnam by Vice President Johnson is a case in point. If other duties prevent this, then consideration should be given to the possibility of Eisenhower or Nixon visiting Vietnam for President Kennedy. r r •. i . . -%. stcatf 4 * * ~\ • _ . . ."* <.• - *\ * m o • » --* Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 * . » - v.. - \ * r\ oO - . V 4 " 4 Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 C ||jt^^#l||, OFFICE Of 7I|!? FFICE ° F THE SECRETARY Or ;A'i ^ ' : /U ,v "aCR ETA RY Or DEFENSE Washington 2S,iJ.c. DEFENSE- V- [ [ r; •" ** 25 April 1961 MEMORANDUM FOR DEPUTY SECRETARY GILPATRIC Frpm: Brig. Gen, Lansdale^