Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 IV.C Evolution of the War (26 Vols.) Direct Action: The Johnson Commitments, 1964-1968 (16 Vols.) 3. ROLLING THUNDER Program Begins: January - June 1965 Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE UNITED STATES - VIETNAM RELATIONS 1945 - 1967 VIETNAM TASK FORCE OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE it TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE S€T 13 «*& Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 TOP SECRET - Sensitive V iv. C. 3* EVOLUTION OF THE WAR THE ROLLING THUNDER PROGRAM BEGINS TOP SECRET - Sens it iv See Def Cont Hr. Xr. 0295 Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 > CO CO o n Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 ■ TOP SECRET - Sensitive THE ROLLING THUNDER PROGRAM BEGINS SUMMARY and ANALYSIS The United States decisions, in the early months of 19^5 , "to launch a program of reprisal air strikes against North Vietnam, ^ evolving progressively into a sustained bombing campaign of rising intensity, were made against a background of anguished concern over the threat of imminent collapse of the Government of South Vietnam and of its military effort against the Viet Cong. The air war against the North was launched in the hope that it would strengthen GVN confidence and cohesion, and that it would deter or restrain the DRV from continuing its support of the revolutionary war in the South. There was hope also that a quite modest bombing effort would be sufficient; that the demonstration of US determination and the potential risks and costs to the North implicit in the early air strikes would provide the US with substantial bargaining leverage; and that it would redress the "equation of advantage" so that a political settlement might be negotiated on acceptable terms. Once set in motion, however, the bombing effort seemed to stiffen rather than soften Hanoi T s backbone, as well as to lessen the willingness of Hanoi ! s allies, particularly the Soviet Union, to work toward compromise. Moreover, compromise was ruled out: m any event, since the negotiating terms that the US proposed were not "compromise" terms, but more akin to a "cease arid desist order that, from the DRV/VC point of view, was tantamount to a demand for their surrender. As Hanoi remained intractable in the face of a mere token demonstration of U.S. capability and resolve, U.S. policy shifted to a more deliberate combination of intensified military pressures and modest diplomatic enticements. The carrot was added to the stick in the form of an economic development gesture, but the coercive element remained by far the more tangible and visible component of U.S. policy. To the slowly but relentlessly rising air pressures against the North was added the deployment of US combat forces to the South. In response to public pressures, a major diplomatic opportunity was provided Hanoi for a quiet backdown through a brief bombing pause called in mid -May, but the pause seemed to be aimed more at clearing the decks for a subsequent intensified resumption than it was at evoking a reciprocal act of de-escalation by Hanoi. The U.S. initiative, in any event, was unmistakably rebuffed by North Vietnam and ~by its Communist allies, and the opposing positions were more hopelessly deadlocked than ever before. TOP ^ HRET - Sensitive Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 TOP SECRET - Sensitive It is the purpose of this study to reconstruct the immediate circumstances that led up to the U.S. reprisal decision of February 1965, to retrace the changes in rationale that progressively trans- formed the reprisal concept into a sustained graduated bombing effort, and to chronicle the relationship between that effort and the military-political moves to shore up Saigon and the military- diplomatic signals t*o dissuade Hanoi, during the crucial early months of February through May of 19&5- # ■* ■* *• #• # * Background to Pleiku . The growing realization, throughout 196k, that the final consolidation of VC power in South Vietnam was a distinct possibility, had led to a protracted US policy reassessment and a determined search for forceful military alternatives in the Worth that might help salvage the deteriorating situation in the South. The proposed program of graduated military pressures against North Vietnam that emerged from this reassessment in late 196^ had three major objectives: (l) to signal to the Communist enemy the firmness of U.S. resolve, (2) to boost the sagging morale of the GVN in the South, and (3) to impose increased costs and strains upon the DRV in the^North. Underlying the rationale of the program was the hope that it might restore some equilibrium to the balance of forces, hopefully increasing the moment of US/GVN bargaining leverage sufficiently to permit an approach to a negotiated solution on something other than surrender terms . Throughout the planning process, (and even after the initiation of the program) the President's principal advisors differed widely in their views as to the intensity of the bombing effort that would be desirable or required, and as to its likely effectiveness in influencing Hanoi T s will to continue its aggression. The JCS, for example, con- sistently argued that only a most dramatic and forceful application of military power would exert significant pressure on North Vietnam, but firmly believed that such application could and would affect the enemy T s will. Most civilian officials in State, OSD, and the White House, on the other hand, tended to favor a more gradual, restrained approach, "progressively mounting in scope and intensity," in which the prospect of greater pressure to come was at least as important as any damage actually inflicted. But these officials also tended, for the most part, to have much less confidence that such pressures would have much impact on- Hanoi T s course, making such equivocal assessments as:- "on balance we believe that such action would have some faint hopo of really improving the Vietnamese situation." ii TOP SECRET - Sensitive Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 r TOP SECRET - Sensitive Reprisal Planning . In spite of these rather hesitant judgments, • the graduated approach was adopted and a program of relatively mild military actions aimed at Worth Vietnam was set in motion beginning in December 196h. At the same time, detailed preparations were made to carry out bombing strikes against targets in North Vietnam in reprisal for any future attacks on U.S. forces. These preparations were made chiefly in connection with the occasional DESOTO Patrols that the US Navy conducted in the Gulf of Tonkin which had been fired upon or menaced by North Vietnamese torpedo boats on several previous occasions during 1964. In order to be prepared for an attack on any future patrol, a pre-packaged set of reprisal targets was worked up by CINCPAC on instructions from the JCS, and pre- assigned forces were maintained in a high state of readiness to strike these targets in accordance with a detailed strike plan that provided a range of retaliatory options. In late January, a DESOTO Patrol was authorized to begin on Feb. 3 (later postponed to Feb. 7) and Operation Order FLAMING DART was issued by CINCPAC, providing for a number of alternative US air strike reprisal actions in the eventuality that the DESOTO Patrol were to be attacked or that any other provocation were to occur, such as a spectacular VC incident in South Vietnam. At the last moment, however, the Patrol was called off in deference to Soviet Premier Kosygin T s imminent visit to Hanoi. U.S. officials hoped that the USSR might find it in its interest to act as an agent of moderation vis a vis Hanoi in the Vietnam conflict, and wished to avoid any act that might be interpreted as deliberately provocative. Nevertheless, it was precisely at the beginning of the Kosygin visit, during the early morning hours of February 7; "tile the VC launched their spectacular attack on US installations at Pleiku, thus triggering FLAMING DART I, the first of the new carefully programmed US/GVN ■ reprisal strikes . Imperceptible Transition . By contrast with the earlier Tonkin strikes of August, 1964 which had been presented as a one-time demonstration that North Vietnam could not flagrantly attack US forces with impunity, the February 1965 raids were explicitly linked with the "larger pattern of aggression" by North Vietnam, and were a reprisal against North Vietnam for an offense committed by the VC in South Vietnam. "When the VC staged another dramatic attack on Qui Nnon on Feb. 10, the combined US/GVN response, named FLAMING DART II, was not characterized as an event-associated reprisal but as a generalized response to "continued acts of aggression." The new terminology reflected a conscious U.S. decision to broaden the reprisal concept as gradually and imperceptibly as possible to •accommodate a much wider policy of sustained, steadily intensifying air attacks against North Vietnam, at a rate and on a scale to be determined by the U.S. Although discussed publicly in very muted iii ' v TOP SECRET - Sensitive Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 TOP SECRET - Sensitive tones , the second FLAMING DART operation constituted a sharp break with past US policy and set the stage for the continuing bombing program that was now to be launched in earnest. Differences in Adv ocacy. "While all but one or two of the President's principal Vietnam advisors favored the initiation of a sustained bombing program, there were significant differences among them. McGeorge Bundy and Ambassador Maxwell Taylor, for example, both advocated a measured, controlled sequence of raids, carried out jointly with the GVN and directed solely against DRV military targets and infiltration routes. In their view, the intensity of the attacks was to be varied with the level of VC outrages in SVN or might be progressively raised. But whereas McGeorge Bundy T s (objective was to influence the course of the struggle in the South (boosting GVN morale, improving US bargaining power with the GVN, exerting a depressing effect on VC cadre), Ambassador Taylor f s principal aim was tL to bring increasing pressure on the DRV to cease its intervention." It was coercion of the North, rather than a rededication of the GVN to the struggle in the South that Taylor regarded as the real benefit of a reprisal policy. CINCPAC, on the other hand, insisted that the program would have to be a very forceful one -- a "graduated pressures" rather than a "graduated reprisal" philosophy --if the DRV were to be persuaded to acceed to a cessation on U.S. terms. The Joint Chiefs, in turn, (and especially Air Force Chief of Staff General McConnell) believed that the much heavier air strike recommendations repeatedly made by the JCS during the preceding six months were more appropriate than the mild actions proposed by Taylor and Bundy. Initiating ROLLING THUNDER . A firm decision to adopt "a pro- gram of measured and limited air action jointly with the GVN against selected military targets in the DRV" was made by the President on February 13, and communicated to Ambassador Taylor in Saigon. Details of the program were deliberately left vague, as the President wished to preserve maximum flexibility. The first strike was set for February 20 and Taylor was directed to obtain GVN concurrence. A semi-coup in Saigon, however, compelled postponement and cancellation of this and several subsequent strikes. Political clearance was not given until the turbulence was calmed with the departure of General Nguyen Khanh from Vietnam on Feb 25- U.S. reluctance to launch air attacks during this time was further reinforced by a UK-USSR diplomatic initiative to reactivate the Cochairmanship of the 195^- Geneva Con- ference with a view to involving the members of that conference in a consideration of the Vietnam crisis. Air strikes executed at that moment, it was feared, might sabotage that diplomatic gambit, which • Washington looked upon not as a potential negotiating opportunity, but as a convenient vehicle for public expression of a tough U.S. IV TOP SECRET - Sensitive Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 TOP SECRET - Sensitive position. The Co- Chairmen gambit, however, languished -- and eventually came to naught. The first ROLLING THUNDER strike was finally rescheduled for Feb 26. This time adverse weather forced its cancellation and it was not until March 2 that the first of the new program strikes, dubbed ROLLING THUNDER V, was actually carried out. In the closing* days of February and during early March, the Administration undertook publicly and privately to defend and pro- pound its rationale for the air strikes, stressing its determination to stand by the GVTNT, but reaffirming the limited nature of its objectives toward North Vietnam. Secretary Rusk conducted a marathon public information campaign to signal a seemingly reason- able but in fact quite tough US position on negotiations, demanding that Hanoi "stop doing what it is doing against its neighbors" before any negotiations could prove fruitful. Rusk ! s disinterest in negotiations at this time was in concert with the view of virtually all the President's key advisors, that the path to peace was not then open. Hanoi held sway over more than half of South Vietnam and could see the Saigon Government crumbling before her very eyes. The balance of power at this time simply did not furnish the U.S. with a basis for bargaining and Hanoi had no reason to acceed to the hard terms the U.S. had in mind. Until military pressures on North Vietnam could tilt the balance of forces the other way, talk of negotiation could be little more than a hollow exercise. Evolving a Continuing Program . Immediately after the launching of the first ROLLING THUNDER strike, efforts were set in motion to increase the effectiveness, forcefulness and regularity of the program. US aircraft loss rates came under McNamara T s scrutiny, with the result that many restrictions on the use of U.S. aircraft and' special ordnance were lifted, and the air strike technology improved. Sharp annoyance was expressed by Ambassador Taylor over what he considered an unneces- sarily timid and ambivalent US stance regarding the frequency and weight of U.S. air attacks. He called for a more dynamic schedule of strikes, a several week program, relentlessly marching North, to break the will of the DRV. Army Chief of Staff General Johnson, returning from a Presidential survey mission to Vietnam in mid-March, supported Taylor T s view and recommended increasing the scope and tempo of the air strikes as well as their effectiveness. The President accepted these recommendations and, beginning with ROLLING THUNDER VII (March 19), air action against the North was transformed from a sporadic, halting effort into a regular and determined program. Shift to Interdiction . In the initial U.S. reprisal strikes • and the first ROLLING THUNDER actions, target selection had been 'completely dominated by political and psychological considerations. With the gradual acceptance, beginning in March, of the need for a militarily more significant sustained bombing program, a refocusing TOP SECRET - Sensitive Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 TOP SECRET - Sensitive • of target emphasis occurred , stressing interdiction of the DRV ! s lines of communication (L0C ! s) -- the visible manifestations of North Vietnamese aggression. The JCS had called the SecDef f s attention to this infiltration target complex as early as mid- February, and an integrated counter- infiltration attack plan against LOC targets south of the 20th parallel began to be developed by CINCPAC, culminating at the end of March in the submission of the JCS 12-week bombing program. This program was built around the "LOC- cut" concept developed by the Pacific Command and was strongly endorsed by General Westmoreland and Ambassador Taylor. The JCS recommended that only the first phase (third through fifth weeks) of the 12-week program be adopted, as they had not reached agreement on the later phases. The JCS sub- mission, however, was not accepted as a program, although it strongly influenced the new interdiction-oriented focus of the attacks that were to follow. But neither the SecDef nor the President was willing to approve a multi-week program in advance. They preferred to retain continual personal control over attack concepts and individual target selection and to communicate their decisions through weekly guidance provided by the SecDef T s ROLLING THUNDER planning messages. April 1 Reassessment . By the end of March, in Saigon T s view, the situation in South Vietnam appeared to have rebounded somewhat. Morale seemed to have been boosted, at least temporarily, by the air strikes, and Vietnamese forces had not recently suffered any major defeats. " Washington, on the other hand, continued to regard the^ situation as "bad and deteriorating," and could see no signs of on the part of Hanoi. None of the several diplomatic initiatives that had been launched looked promising, and VC terrorism continued unabated, with the March 29 bombing of the US embassy in Saigon being by far the boldest provocation. Ambassador Taylor returned to Washington to participate in a Presidential policy review on April 1 and 2, in which a wide range of possible military and non-military actions in South and North Vietnam were examined. The discussions, however, did not deal principally with the air war, but focused mainly on the prospect of major deployments of US and Third Country combat forces to South Vietnam. As a result of the discussions, the far-reaching decision was made, at least conceptually, to permit US troops to engage in offensive ground operations against Asian insurgents. With respect to future air pressures policy,, the actions adopted amounted to little more than a continuation of "roughly the present slowly ascending tempo of ROLLING THUNDER operations," directed mainly at the LOC targets that were then beginning to be struck. The •Director of Central Intelligence John McCone demurred, arguing that a change in the US ground force role in the South 'also demanded comparably more forceful action against the North. He felt that the ground force decision was correct only "if our air strikes against the North are sufficiently heavy and damaging really to hurt the North Vietnamese." vi TOP SECRET - Sensitive 9 TT Rive Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 TOP SECRET - Sensitive A "Carrot" at Johns Hopkins . Although devoting much effort to public explanation and private persuasion, the President could not quiet his critics. Condemnation of the bombing spread and the President was being pressed from many directions to make a major public statement welcoming negotiations. He found an opportunity to dramatize his peaceful intent in his renowned Johns Hopkins address of April 7, in which he (l) accepted the spirit of the 17-nation Appeal of March 15 to start negotiations "without posing any preconditions/' <2) offered the vision of a "billion dollar American investment" in a regional Mekong River basin development effort in which North Vietnam might also participate, and (3) appointed the illustrious Eugene Black to head up the effort and to lend it credibility and prestige. The President's speech evoked much favorable public reaction throughout the world, but it failed to silence the Peace Bloc and it failed to move Hanoi. Premier Pham Van Dong responded to the President's speech by proposing his famous Four Points as the only correct way to resolve the Vietnam problem and, two days later, denounced the President's proposal as simply a "carrot" offered to offset the "stick" of aggression and to allay public criticism of his Vietnam policy. But this is as far as the President was willing to go in his concessions to the Peace Bloc. To the clamor for a bombing pause at this time, the Administration responded with a resounding "Wo." Consensus at Honolulu . By mid- April, communication between Washington and Saigon had become badly strained as a result of Ambassador Taylor's resentment of what he regarded as Washington's excessive eagerness to introduce US combat forces into South Vietnam, far beyond anything that had been approved in the April 1-2 review. To iron out differences, a conference was convened by Secretary McNamara at Honolulu on April 20. Its main concern was to reach specific agreement on troop deployments, but it also sought to reaffirm the existing scope and tempo of ROLLING THUNDER. 'The conferees agreed that sufficient pressure was provided by repetition and continuation of the strikes, and that it was important not to "kill the hostage" by destroying the valuable assets inside the "Hanoi do-not." Their strategy for victory was "to break the will of the DRV/VC by denying them victory." Honolulu apparently succeeded in restoring consensus between Washington and Saigon. It also marked the relative downgrading of pressures against the North, in favor of more intensive activity in the South. The decision, at this point, was to "plateau" the air strikes more or less at the prevailing level, rather than to pursue the relent- less dynamic course ardently advocated by Ambassador Taylor and Admiral Sharp in February and March, or the massive destruction of the North Viet lamese target complex consistently pressed by the Joint Chiefs. ♦ Following Honolulu, it was decided to publicize the fact that "interdiction" was now the major objective of the bombing, and Secretary McNamara devoted a special Pentagon briefing for the press corps to that issue. Vll TOP SECRET - Sensitive Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 TOP SECRET - Sens itive « ■ 1 1 ■ ' ■ ■ * * « First Bombing Pause . Pressure for some form of bombing halt had mounted steadily throughout April and early May and, although the President did not believe that such a gesture would evoke any response from Hanoi he did order a brief halt effective May 13, to begin 11 as he expressed it "to clear a path either toward restoration^ of peace or toward increased military action, depending on the reaction of the Communists." The political purpose of the pause -- to test Hanoi T s reaction -- was kept under very tight wraps, and the project was given the code name MAYFLOWER. A great effort was made to inform Hanoi of the fact of the pause and of its political intent. Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin was given an oral explanation by Secretary Rusk, confirmed by a tough written statement, reasserting Rusk T s public position that the cessation of the DRV T s attacks upon South Vietnam ms the only road to peace and that the US would be watchful, during the pause, for any signs of a reduction in such attacks. A similar statement was sent to U.S. Ambassador Kohler in Moscow, for personal transmittal to the DRV Ambassador there. Kohler, however, met vith refusal both from the DRV Ambassador to receive, and from the Soviet Foreign Office to transmit, the message. A written note, sent to the DRV embassy, was returned ostensibly unopened. . Nevertheless, it is quite clear that Hanoi was more than adequately advised of the contents of the U.S. message through the various diplomatic channels that were involved. Given the "rather strenuous nature" of the U.S. note to Hanoi and the briefness of the pause, it is hardly surprising that the initiative encountered no receptivity from the Soviet government and evoked no positive response from Hanoi. The latter denounced the bombing halt as "a worn out trick of deceit and threat ... and the former, in the person of Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko in a conversation with Rusk in Vienna, branded the U.S. note to Hanoi as "insulting". Having thus been unmistakably rebuffed, the President ordered the resumption of the bombing raids effective May 18. The entire pause was handled with a minimum of public information, and no announcement was made of the suspension or of the resumption. But prime ministers or chiefs of state of a half dozen key friendly governments were briefed fully after the event. A still somewhat ambiguous diplomatic move was made "by Hanoi in Paris on May 18, a few hours after the bombing had been resumed, in which ^Mai Van Bo, the DRV economic delegate there seemed to imply a significant ^ ^ ^ softening of Hanoi's position on the Four Points as "prior conditions. But subsequent attempts at clarification left that issue as -ambiguous as it had been before. viii TOP SECRET - Sensitive Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 r o a n Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 IV. C TOP SECRET - Sensitive A- CHRONOLOGY OF ROLLING THUNDER MISSIONS FEBRUARY - JUNE, 1965 CHRONOLOGY DATE 6 Jan 1965 8 Jan 1965 27 Jan 1965 28 Jan 1965 29 Jan 1965 h Feb 1965 EVENT OR DOCUMENT William Bundy Memo- randum for Rusk 2 , 000 Korean troops arrive in SVN Huong Government ousted McNaughton Memorandum for Secretary of Defense JCS- message k2kk to CINCPAC JCSM-7O-65 CJCS massage 1+6 12 to CINCPAC DESCRIPTION Taking note of the continued politi- cal deterioration in SVN, Bundy con- cludes that, even though it will get worse, the US should probably pro- ceed with Phase II of the December pressures plan, the escalating air strikes against the North. South Korea sends 2,000 military advisors to SVN, the first such non- US support. General Khanh ousts the civilian government headed by Huong and assumes powers of government himself. McNaughton is as pessimistic as William Bundy about prospects in the South. He feels the US should evacu- ate dependents and respond promptly at the ne:rt reprisal opportunity. McNamara T s oencilled notes reveal more optimism about the results of air strikes than McNaughton. A resumption of the DESOTO Patrols on or about 3 February is authorized. The JCS urge again that a strong reprisal action be taken immediately after the next DRV/VC provocation. In particular, they propose targets and readiness to strike should the forthcoming resumption of the DESOTO Patrols be challenged. In view of Kosygin's impending visit to Hanoi, authority for the DESOTO Patrol is cancelled. IX TOP SECRET - Sensitive Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 TOP SECRET - Sensitive DATE EVMT OR DOCUMENT h Feb 1965 (Continued) 6 Feb 1965 7 Feb 1965 IE 53-65 "Short Term Prospects in South Vietnam" Kosygin arrives in Hanoi VC attack US base at Pleiku President decides to retaliate McGeorge Bundy Memo- randum to the President: "The Situation in South Vietnam" 8 Feb 1965 FLAMING DART I DESCRIPTION The intelligence community does not see the conditions of political in- stability in SVN improving in the months ahead. The political base for counter insurgency will remain weak. Soviet Premier Kosygin arrives in Hanoi for a state visit that will deepen Soviet commitment to the DRV, and expand Soviet economic and mili- tary assistance. Well-coordinated VC attacks hit the US advisors' barracks at Pleiku and the helicopter base at Camp Holloway. The NSC is convened in the evening (6 Feb. Washington time) and with , the recommendation of McGeorge Bundy, Ambassador Taylor and General West- moreland from Saigon, decides on a reprisal strike against the North in spite of Kosygin's presence in Hanoi. Completing a fact -gathering trip to SVN on the very day of the Pleiku attack, Bundy acknowledges the bad state of the GVN both politically and militarily, but nevertheless recommends that the US adopt a policy of "sustained reprisal" against the North and that we evacuate US depen- dents from Saigon. The reprisal policy should begin from specific VC attacks but gradually escalate into sustained attacks as a form of pres- sure on the DRV to end its support of the VC and/or come to terms with the US. k9 US Navy jets conduct the first FLAMING DART reprisal- attack on the Dong Hoi army barracks; a scheduled VNAF attack is cancelled because of bad weather. TOP SECRET - Sensitive Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 TOP SECRET - Sensitive DATE 9 Feb 1965 10 Feb 1965 11 Feb 1965 J EVENT OR DOCUMENT VNAF strikes North Embassy Saigon message 2kk$ VC attack US billet in Qui Nhon FLAMING DART II Embassy Saigon message 2^-95 JCSM-lOO-65 12 Feb 1965 Embassy Saigon message 2536 DESCRIPTION The previously aborted VNAF strike is carried out against the Vu Con Barracks with US aircraft flying cover • Taylor cables his support of the McGeorge Bundy proposal but lays, his stress en the- sustained air campaign as a means of pressuring the DRV to "cease its intervention/ 1 rather than as a means of strengthening the allied position in the South. In an act of defiance, the VC bomb a US enlisted men T s billet in Qui Nhon, killing 23 Americans. Within 2k hours of the VC attack, the US retaliates in an air attack on the Chap Le and Chanh Hoa Army Barracks. The attack is not linked specifically by the White House to Qui Khon but to a list of VC inci- dents. Taylor outlines tough terms for any end to the bombing. The DRV must cease its intervention, the VC end the insurgency, both return to the 195U and 1962 accords. Responding to a McNamara request and within his limitations, the JCS recommend an 8-week air campaign against the North confined mostly to panhandle targets and with targets to be attacked in the order of ascen- ding risk. General McConnell did not feel the proposal was adequate. To carry out the program, additional deployments are requested. Taylor further spells out his "gradu- ated reprisal" concept, giving as its objectives in the order of their importance: (l) to affect the will of Hanoi; (2) to bolster GVN morale; and (3) to physically damage the DRV and thereby reduce its ability to support the VC. XI TOP SECRET - Sensitive Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 TOP SECRET - Sensitive DATE 13 Feb 1965 17 Feb 1965 18 Feb 1965 19 Feb 1965 EVENT OR DQ C UMENT B-52s sent to area ROLLING THUNDER approved by President; DEPTEL to Saigon 1718 CINCPAC message 170217 February to JCS UK reports Soviet interest in Geneva Talks President schedules ROLLING THUNDER SNIE 10-3/1-65 Thao "semi-coup" Embassy Saigon message 2665 DESCRIPTION Approval is given for the dispatch ' of 30 B-52s to Guam and 30 KC-135s to Okinawa for contingency 'use in Vietnam. The President decides to inaugurate ROLLING THUNDER sustained bombing of the North under strict limitations with programs approved on a week-by- week basis. Admiral Sharp urges that the strikes be conceived as "pressures" not "reprisals" and that any premature discussions or negotiations with the DRV be avoided. We must convince them that the cost of their aggression is prohibitive. The UK Ambassador j Lord Harlech, in- forms Rusk that the Soviets have approached the UK about reactivating the 195^ Geneva Conference in the current Vietnam crisis. After an initial US interest, the Soviets back off and the matter dies. President Johnson sets February 20 as the date for the beginning of ROLLING THUNDER and informs US Ambassadors in Asia. The intelligence community gives its view that sustained attacks on the DRV would probably cause it to seek a respite rather than to intensify the struggle in the South. Colonel Thao, a longtime conspirator, launches a "semi-coup" against Khanh, designed to remove him but not the Armed Forces Council. He is quickly defeated but the AFC decides to use the incident to remove Khanh itself. The events drag on for several days. Taylor recommends urgently that the ROLLING THUNDER strike be cancelled until the political situation in Sai- gon has clarified. The President agrees xii TOP SECRET - Sensitive Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 TOP SECRET - Sensitive DATE 19 Feb 1965 (Continued) 21 Feb 1965 2k Feb 1965 27 Feb 1965 28 Feb I965 2 Mar 1965 EVENT OR DOCUMENT CM-438-65 Khanh resigns U.S. reassures Peking State Dept. issues "White Paper" on DRV aggression ROLLING THUNDER announced First ROLLING THUNDER strike DESCRIPTION In a memo to McNamara, Wheeler proposes a systematic attack on the DRV rail system as the most vulner- able link in the transportation system. Military as opposed to psychological value of targets is already beginning to enter discus- sions. Unable to rally support in the Armed Forces Council, Khanh resigns. In a meeting in Warsaw the Chinese are informed that while the U.S. will continue to take those actions required to defend itself and South Vietnam, it has no aggressive in- tentions toward the DRV. The State Department issues a "White Paper" detailing its charges of ag- gression against North Vietnam. UoS and G"VN make simultaneous an- nouncement of decision to open a continuous limited air campaign against the North in order to bring about a negotiated settlement on favorable terms. 1(A USAF planes attack Xom Bang ammo depot and 19 WAF aircraft hit the Quang Khe Naval Base in the first attacks of ROLLING THUNDER. 3 Mar 1965 President decides to send CSA, H.K. Johnson, to Vietnam Tito letter to Johnson The President decides to send Army Chief of Staff, Gen. H.K. Johnson, to Saigon to explore with Taylor and Westmoreland what additional efforts can be made to improve the situation in the South, complementarily to the strikes against the North. Yugoslav President Tito, in a letter to Johnson, urges immediate negotia- tion on Vietnam without conditions on either side. • • • Xlll TOP SECRET - Sensitive Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 DATE 5-12 Mar 1965 6 Mar 1965 8 Mar 1965 9 Mar 1965 10 Mar 1965 TOP SECRET - Sensitive EVENT OR DOCUMENT Gen. Johnson trip to Vietnam Marines sent to DaNang Marines land at Da Nang Embassy Saigon msgs 2888, and 2889 U Thant proposes big power conference U.S. rejects Thant proposal Some bombing restric tions lifted CJCS memo to SecDef CM-I169-.65 DE SCRIPT J ON Army Chief of Staff, Gen. H.K. Johnson, tours Vietnam on a mis- sion for the President. Two Marine Battalion Landing Teams are ordered to Da Nang by the Presi- dent to take up base security func- tions in the Da Nang perimeter. The two Marine battalions land at Da Nang and set up defensive posi- tions. Taylor expresses sharp annoyance at what seemsto him an unnecessarily timid and ambivalent U.S. stance on air strikes. The long delay between strikes, the marginal weight of the attacks, and the great ado about diplomatic feelers were weakening our signal to the North. He calls for a more dynamic schedule of strikes, a multiple week program re- lentlessly marching North to break Hanoi f s will. U Thant proposes a conference of the big powers with North and South Vietnam to start preliminary nego- tiations. The U.S. rejects Thant T s proposal until the DRV stops its aggression. The President lifts the restriction on the use of napalm in strikes on the North, and eliminates the re- quirement for Vietnamese co-pilots in FARMGATE missions. In a memo to SecDef with preliminary- reports on U.S. aircraft losses in hostile action, "Wheeler requests better ordnance, more recce, and greater field command flexibility in alternate target selection for weather problems. xiv TOP SECRET - Sensitive r Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 TOP SECRET - Sensitive DATE EVENT OR DOCUMENT 12 Mar 1965 _ State msg. 1975 to Saigon President replies to Tito 13 Mar 1965 Embassy Saigon msg 29^9 13-18 Mar 1965 Conference of non- aligned nations in Belgrade 14-15 Mar 1965 ROLLING THUNDER VI Ik Mar 1965 Gen. Johnson submits his report to SecDef 15 Mar 1965 President approves most of Johnson report 19 Mar 1965 ROLLING THUNDER VII xv DESCRIPTION ROLLING THUNDER VI is authorized for the next day; it is subsequently de- layed until the l^th because of weather. In his reply to Tito the President indicates the only bar to peace is DRV aggression which must stop before talks can begin. Taylor complains about the postpone- ment of RT VI, stating that too much attention is being paid to the speci- fic target, any target will do since the important thing is to keep up the momentum of the attacks. Tito calls a meeting of 15 non- aligned nations in Belgrade. The declaration calls for negotiations and blames "foreign intervention" for the aggravation of the situation. The delayed RT VI is carried out and is the heaviest attack thus far with over 100 U.S. aircraft and 2h VNAP planes hitting two targets. Gen. Johnson submits a 21-recommenda- tion report including a request that the scope and tempo of strikes against the North be increased and that many of the restrictions on the strikes be lifted. Having reviewed the Johnson report, the President approves most of his recommendations including those for expanding and regularizing the cam- paign against the North. The new guidelines apply to RT VII on 19 Mar. The first week's program of sustained bombing undjr the name ROLLING THUNDER VII begins. TOP SECRET - Sensitive Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 TOP SECRET - Sensitive DATE 20 Mar 1965 EVENT OR DOCUMENT STEEL TIGER Begins 21 Mar 1965 CINCPAC msg. to JCS 210525 Marc 2k Mar 1965 McNaughton memo "Plan of Action for South Vietnam" 27 Mar 1965 JCSM-221-65 29 Mar I965 VC bomb US Embassy DESCRIPTION Acting on a CINCPAC recommendation the Administration had approved the separa- tion of the ant i- infiltration bombing in the Laotian panhandle from the BARRELL ROITj strikes in support of Laotian forces* The former are now called STEEL TIGER. In a long cable, CINCPAC proposes a program for cutting, in depth, the DRV logistical network, especially below the 20th parallel o The plan calls for initial intensive strikes to cut the system and then regular armed recce to eliminate any residual capacity, or repair efforts McNaughton concludes that the situation in SVN probably cannot be improved without extreme measures against the DRV and/or the intervention of US ground forces o He gives a thorough treatment to the alternatives and 'risks with par- ticular attention to the strong air campaign on the North, He takes note of the various escalation points and tries to assess the risks at each level. He evaluates the introduction of US troops and a negotiations alternative in the same manner. The JCS formally propose to SecDef a plan already discussed with him for an escalating 12 -week air campaign against the North with a primarily military-* physical destruction orientation. Interdiction is the objective rather than will -breaking. In a daring bomb attack on the US Em- . bassy, the VC kill many 'Americans and Vietnamese and cause extensive damage. Taylor leaves almost simultaneously for talks in Washington. xvi TOP SECRET - Sensitive Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 TOP SECRET - Sensitive DATE 31 iMar 1965 EVENT OR DOCUMENT CINCPAC msg. to JCS 310407 Mar. DESCRIPTION CINCPAC recommends a spectacular attack against the North to retaliate for the bombing of the Embassy. The President rejects the idea. NSC meeting with Taylor The President meets with Taylor and the NSC to begin a major policy review. 1 Apr 1965 McGeorge Bundy memo NSC meeting Rostow memo to SecState 2 Apr 1965 NSC meeting McCone dissents from Presidential decision Canadian Prime Minister suggests pause 5 Apr 1965 JCSM-265-65 Bundy recommends little more than a con- tinuation of the ongoing modest RT pro- gram, gradually hitting the LOC choke points. He does, however, recommend re- moving the restriction on the Marines to static defense. Focus is on winning in SVN. The White House policy review continued with another meeting of the principals. In a memo to Rusk, Walt Rostow proposes knocking out the DRV electric power grid as a means of bringing her whole urban industrial sector to a halt. At the NSC meeting the President approves the Bundy recommendations including the proposal to allow US troops in Vietnam a combat role. CIA director McCone circulates a memo dissenting from the Presidential decision to have US troops take part in active combat. He feels that such action is not justified and wise unless the air attacks on the North are increased sufficiently to really be physically damaging to the DRV and to put real pressure on her. Canadian Prime Minister Lester Pearson in a speech In Philadelphia suggests that the US call a halt to the bombing in the in- terests of getting negotiations started. The JCS report confirmation of the con- struction of a SAM missile site near Hanoi and request authority to strike it before It becomes operational. Their request is not acted on at the time. xvii TOP SECRET - Sensitive Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 TOP SECRET - Sensitive DATE 6 Apr I965 EVENT OR DOCUMENT NSAM 328 7 Apr I965 President's Johns Hopkins Speech 8 Apr 1965 Pham van Dong's "Four Points" 17 Apr 1965 Presidential press conference Rusk press conference 18 Apr 1965 Taylor opposes the ground build-up 19 Apr 1965 20 Apr 1965 Hanoi rejects 17- nation appeal Honolulu Conference DESCRIPTION The Presidential decisions of April 2 are promulgated using the verbatim language of the Bundy memo. In a major speech at Johns Hopkins Univ- ersity,, the President outlines his hope for a peaceful^ negotiated settlement in Vietnam o He names Eugene Black as the US negotiator and offers to assist both North and South Vietnam on a regional basis to the tune of $1 billion in the post-war reconstruction and economic de- velopment of SEA. Rejecting to the President's initiative, the DRV Foreign Minister, Pham van Dong announces his famous "Four Points" for the settlement of the war. Each side sees settlement in the caputulation of the- other. Peking denounces the President's speech also. In a press conference the President ack- nowledges the failure of his most recent peace overtures Secretary Rusk rejects suggestions from Canada and others to suspend the bombing in order to get peace talks started He reiterates the President's view that Hanoi does not want peace. Having been bombarded with cables from Washington about a build-up in ground forces to carry out NSAM 328, Taylor re- acts opposing the idea in a cable to McGeorge Bundy. Hanoi rejects the proposal of the 17 non- aligned nations for a peace conference without pre-conditions by either side. Secretary McNamara meets with Taylor, Westmoreland, Sharp, Wm. Bundy, and McNaughton in Honolulu to review the im- plementation and interpretation of NSAM. xvin TOP SECRET - Sensitive Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 TOP SECRET - Sensitive DATE EVENT OR DOCUMENT 21 Apr 1965 SecDef memo to the President 22 Apr 1965 Intelligence assessment TS #l858^3-c 23 Apr I965 Rusk Speech 2k Apr 1965 U Thant calls for pause 25 Apr 1965 McGeorge Bundy memo 26 Apr 1965 McNamara press briefing 28 Apr 1965 McCone resigns and submits last memo DESCRIPTION 3280 A plateau on air strikes, more ef- fort in the South, and the specifics of force deployments are agreed to. Secretary McNamara reports the results of the Honolulu Conference to the President and indicates that harmony has been res- tored among the views of the various advisors. The intelligence community indicates that without either a massive increase in the air campaign or the introduction of US combat troops, the DRV would stick to its goal of military victory. In a speech before the American Society of International Law, Rusk makes first public mention of interdiction and pun- ishment as" the purposes of the US bombing rather than breaking Hanoi 1 s will. U Thant asks the US to suspend the bombing for three months in an effort to get ne- gotiations. The proposal is rejected in Washington. In an effort to clarify internal govern- ment thinking about negotiations, Bundy outlines his view of US goals. His expo- sition is a maximum US position whose acceptance would amount to surrender by the other side. In a special briefing for the press com- plete with maps and charts, McNamara goes into considerable depth in explaining the interdiction purposes of the US strikes against the North. McCone who is leaving his post as CIA Dir- ector (tb be replaced by Admiral Raborn) submits a last memo to the President op- posing the build-up of ground forces in the absence of a greatly intensified cam- paign against the North. xix TOP-SECRET - Sensitive Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 TOP SECRET - Sensitive DATE k May 1965 EVENT OR DOCUMENT President denies DRV willingness to nego- tiate Embassy Saigon msg. 3632 6 May I965 CIA Director Raborn assessment CM-60O-65 10 May 1965 State Department msg c 2553 11 May 1965 Embassy Saigon msg. 3731 State Department msg 2557 DESCRIPTION In a speech at the White House, the Presi- dent indicates that the DRV has turned back all peace initiatives , either from j the US or from neutral parties. Taylor confirms the President's view about the DRV by noting that in Hanoi's esti- j mates they are still expecting to , achieve a clear-cut victory and see no reason to negotiate. Commenting,, at the President's request, I on McCone's parting memo on Vietnam, Ra- ! born agrees with the assessment that the I bombing had thus far not hurt the North I and that much more would be needed to force them to the negotiating table « He . suggests a pause to test DRV intentions j and gain support of world opinion before beginning the intensive air campaign that he believes will be required. The Chairman of the JCS recommends to the Secretary that the SAM. sites already iden- tified be attacked o j The President informs Taylor of his inten- tion to call a temporary halt to the bomb- ing and asks Taylor to get PM Quat's con- currence. The purpose of the pause Is to gain flexibility either to negotiate if j the DRV shows interest, or to intensify j the air strikes if they do not. He does not intend to announce the pause but rather to communicate it privately to Moscow and Hanoi and await a reply. Taylor reports Quat's agreement but pre- ■ ference not to have the pause linked to Buddha's birthday. State confirms the decision, agrees to avoid reference to the Buddhist holiday, and indicates that the pause will begin on May 13 and last for 5-7 clays. xx TOP SECRET - Sensitive Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 TOP SECRET - Sensitive DATE EVENT OR DOCUMENT Department of State msg. 3101 12 May 1965 Embassy Moscow msg 3391 13 May 1965 Presidential speech DESCRIPTION Kohler .in Moscow is instructed to contact the DRV Ambassador urgently and convey a message announcing the paus6. Simul- taneously^ Rusk was transmitting the mes- sage to the Soviet Ambassador in Washing- ton. In Moscow, the DRV Ambassador refuses to see Kohler or receive the message „ A subsequent attempt to transmit the message through the Soviet Foreign Office also fails when the Soviets decline their assistance*, The President avoids reference to the pause in a major public speech, but does ; call on Hanoi to consider a "political solution" of the war. Ik May 1965 Embassy Moscow msg 3425 British Consul-Hanoi transmits the pause msg MACV msg 16006 15 May 1965 Rusk-Gromyko meet in Vienna 16 May I965 Embassy Saigon msg 3781 Kohler suggests that the language of the message be softened before -it is trans- mitted to Hanoi via the British. Consul in the DRV capitalo Having rejected Kohler 1 s suggestion, State has the British Consul in Hanoi transmit the message • The DRV refuses to accept it. i Westmoreland, with Taylor* s concurrence, recommends the use of B-52s for patterned saturation bombing of VC headquarters and other area targets in South Vietnam, : In a meeting between the two men in Vienna, Gromyko informs Rusk that the ! Soviet Union will give firm and full sup- port to the DRV as a "fraternal socialist state." j Taylor suggests that the DRV T s cold re- . sponse -to our Initiative warrants a re- sumption of the bombing o The level should be linked directly to the intensity of VC activity in the South during the pause. \ xxi TOP SECRET - Sensitive Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 TOP SECRET - Sensitive DATE d. Authority was requested to strike the first SAM site during the ROLLING THUNDER 15 period (immediately following the bombing pause) but it was denied. e. Armed recce targets were expanded during this six-week period to include railroad rolling stock, trucks, ferries, lighters, barges, radar sites, secondary bridges, road repair equipment, NW naval craft, bivouac and maintenance areas Emphasis was placed on armed recce of routes emanating from Vinh in order to restrict traffic in and out of this important LOC hubo ROLLING THUNDER 18 added the provision that authorized day armed route recce sorties could include selected missions to conduct small precise attacks against prebriefed military targets not in the JCS target list, and thereafter conduct armed route recce with residual capability o f o ROLLING THUNDER 1^ added authority for returning aircraft to use unexpended ordnance on Hon Nieu Island Radar Site, Hon Matt Island Radar Site, Dong Hoi Barracks, or rail and highway I£>C T s targets, in addition to Tiger Island previously authorized for this purpose. XXVI . TOP SECRET - Sensitive Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 TOP SECRET - Sensitive THE ROLLING THUNDER PROGRAM BEGINS TABIE OF CONTENTS AND OUTLIKE I. INTROrUCTION--Pleiku Pulls The Trigger 1 * II. THE LONG ROAD TO PLEHCU--A Retrospective View 2 A. 196k: Year of Political and Military Decline 2 B. Evolution of a New Policy 2 C. Signals to Hanoi • 6 D. Ominous Developments in Saigon 8 E. More Agonizing over Additional Pressures 11 III. DESOTO PATROL AS A REPRISAL OPPORTUNITY- -AND THE D. JCS Eignt-Week Program -, r DECISION TO SUSPEND lo IV. FLAMING DART I AND II --THE IMPERCEPTIBLE TRANSITION 23 A. The First Reprisal 23 B. Timing of Pleiku and the Kosygin Visit 23 C. The Reprisal Rationale and its Public Handling 2k D. An Act of Defiance 27 E. Reactions at Home and Abroad 29 V. "SUSTAINED REPRISAL." AND ITS VARIANTS - -ADVOCACY SHIFTS INTO HIGH GEAR 31 A. Yae McGeorge Bundy Recommendation 31 B. The Taylor Conception of "Graduated Reprisals'- 39 C. . CBfCPAC's "Graduated Pressures" Philosophy ^3 hk VI. INITIATION OF "ROLLING THUIIDSR"--l8 DAYS OF MANEUVER AND DELAY • ^8 A. The Presidential Decision and Taylor's Response ^8 B. ROLLING THUNDER I is La-id On--and Cancelled 52 C. The UK/USSR Co -Chairmen Gambit 53 a ' TOP SECRET - Sensitive Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 TOP SECRET - Sensitive D. Efforts at Public Justification and Persuasion 59 VII. ROLLING THUNDER BECOMES A COHTUTOHTG PROGRAM 6k A. McNamara's Concern Over Cost -Ineffectiveness of Strikes 6k B. Taylor's Concern Over Feehle, Irresolute Action 66 C. President's Concern Over Insufficient Pressure in South Vietnam 69 D. Rolling Thunder VH— Enter "Regularity" and "Determination" 71 VIII. TARGET RATIONALE SHIFTS TOWARD INTERDICTION 7^ IX. REASSESSMENT AS OF APRIL 1 AND THE NSAM 328 DECISIONS 8l A. The Situation in South Vietnam 8l B. International Diplomatic Moves 83 C. An End to "Reprisal" 5h D. NSAM 3^8- -Issues Posed and Decisions Made. 85 E. The Director of Central Intelligence Demurs 90 X. APRIL 7th INITIATIVE --THE BILLION DOLLAR CARROT 9^ A. Mounting Public Criticism 9^ B. Ingredients for Johns Hopkins 95 C. Hanoi and Peking "Close the Door" * 96 D. President's Reprise: Tragedy, Disappointment — But No Bombing Pause 97 XI. HONOLULU, APRIL 20th— IN SEARCH OF CONSENSUS 99 A. Background and Conclusions of Conference . 99 - B. Interdiction is Surfaced " 101 C. Political Objectives are Reviewed 102 >, l O w-i-w~~ w^w j-'^w^ m y~ TOP SECRET - Sensitive Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 TOP SECRET - Sensitive XII, PROJECT MAYFLOWER— THE FIRST BOMBING PAUSE 106 A. The Background 106 B. Setting the Stage ' HO C. Transmitting the Message H6 D. Awaiting a Response 122 E. Resuming the Bombing 12o F. The Aftermath 128 XIII. DEBATE OVER BOMBING STRATEGY AND EFFECTIVENESS CONTIFJES ' • 131 A. The Rostov "Victory" Thesis 131 B. "ARC LIGHT" Comes to South Vietnam- -Attacks on the North Edge Upward 133 C. McNamara Reviews the Program 135 FOOTNOTES 1^1 • TOP SECRET - Sensitive c Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 TOP SECRET - Sensitive EVOLUTION OF THE WAR THi; ROILING THUTTDER PROGRAM BEGINS I. INTRODUCTION— Pleiku Palls the Trigger At 2:00 a.m. on the morning of February 7, 1965, at the end of five days of Tet celebrations and only hours after Kosygin had told a cheering crowd in Hanoi that the Soviet Union would "not remain indifferent" if "acts of war" were committed against North Vietnam, Viet Cong guerrillas carried out well-coordinated raids upon a U.S. advisers' barracks in Pleiku and upon a U.S. helicopter base at Camp Holloway, some four miles away. Of the 137 American soldiers hit in the two attacks , nine eventually died and 76 had to be evacuated; the losses in equipment were also severe: 16 helicopters damaged or destroyed and six fixed-wing aircraft damaged , making g this the heaviest communist assault up to that time against American installa- tions in South Vietnam. • The first flash from Saigon about the assault came on the ticker at the National Military Command Center at the Pentagon at 2:38 p.m. Saturday, February 6, Washington time. It triggered a swift , though long- contemplated Presidential decision to give an "appropriate and fitting" response. Within less than Ik hours, by U:00 p.m. Sunday, Vietnam time, 49 U.S. Navy jets — A-k Skyhawks and F-8 Crusaders from the Seventh Fleet carriers USS Coral Sea and USS Hancock — had penetrated a heavy layer of .monsoon clouds to deliver their bombs and rockets upon North Vietnamese barracks and staging areas at Dong Hoi, a guerrilla training garrison kO miles north of the 17th parallel. On the following afternoon, a flight of 2k VNAF A-1H Skyraiders, cancelled the previous day because of poor weather, followed up the attack by striking . a military communications center in the Vinh Linh area just north of the border. Though conceived and executed as a limited one-shot tit-for-tat reprisal, the dramatic U.S. action, long on the military planners 1 drawing boards under the operational code name FLAMING DART, precipitated a rapidly moving sequence of events that transformed the character of the Vietnam war and the U.S. role in it. It was also the opening move in what soon developed into an entirely new phase of that war: the sustained U.S. bombing effort against North Vietnam. It is the purpose of this paper to reconstruct the immediate circumstances that led up to the FLAMING DART decision, to retrace the changes in rationale that progressively transformed the reprisal concept into a sus- . tained graduate c bombing effort, and to chronicle the relationship between that effort and the military-political moves to shore up Saigon and the military-diplomatic signals to dissuade Hanoi, during the crucial early months of February through May of 1965. TOP SECRET - Sensitive Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 ' TOP SECRET - Sensitive II. THE LONG ROAD TO PLEIKU--A Retrospective View ■ ■ m i ■ ■ i i h i ■ i i ■ i ■ ■ ■ ■ i r*~ - -- — A. 1964: Year of Political and Military Declin e The year 1964 was marked by a gradual American awakening to the fact that the Viet Cong were winning the war in South Vietnam. Almost ^ . uninterrupted political upheaval in Saigon was spawning progressive mili- tary dissolution in the countryside. Constant changes within the Vietnamese leadership were bringing GVN civil administration into a state of disarray and GVN military activities to a near- standstill. ARVN forces were becoming more and more defensive and demoralized. At the same time, the communists were visibly strengthening their support base in Laos, stepping up the rate of infiltration of men and supplies into South Vietnam, and mounting larger and more aggressive attacks. The GVN was still predominant, though not unchallenged, in the urban population centers; there were also a few areas where traditional local power structures (the Hoa Hao, the Cao Dai, etc.) continued to exercise effective authority. But the rest of the country was slipping, largely by default, under VC control. By the end of 1964, all evidence pointed to a situation in which a final collapse of ^ the GVN appeared probable and a victorious consolidation of VC power a distinct possibility. Ironically, it was left to Senator Fulbright to state the harsh realities in terms which set the tone for much of Administration thinking as it was to emerge in the months to come -- though his views then were hardly consistent with the opposition role he was increasingly to take later on. As early as March 1964, in a celebrated speech entitled "Old Myths and New Realities" he observed that "the hard fact of the matter is that our bargaining position is at present a weak one; and until the equation of advantage between the two sides has been substantially altered in our favor, there can be little prospect of a negotiated settlement." B. Evolution of a New Policy With the growing realization that the ally on whose behalf the United States had steadily deepened its commitment in Southeast Asia was in a near state of dissolution, Washington launched a protracted reassess- ment of the future American role in the war and began a determined search for new pressures to be mounted against the communist enemy, both within and outside of South Vietnam. High level deliberations on alternative U.S. courses of action in Southeast Asia were started as early as March 1964, and a military planning process was set in motion in which much attention was given to the possibility of implementing some sort of pressures or reprisal policy against North Vietnam. The first of these planning efforts, authorized by the President on 17 March 1964 (NSAM 288), led to the development of CINCPAC OPIAN 37-64, a three-phase plan covering operations against VC infiltration routes in Laos and Cambodia and against targets in North Vietnam. Phase I provided for air and ground strikes against selected targets in Laos, together with TOP SECRET - Sensitive Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 TOP SECRET - Sensitive hot pursuit actions into Laotian and Cambodian border areas. Phase II provided for Tr tit-for-tat" air strikes, airborne/amphibious raids , and aerial mining operations against targets in North Vietnam. Phase III pro- vided for increasingly severe air strikes and other actions against North Vietnam, going beyond the Tr tit-for-tat" concept. According to the plan, air strikes would be conducted primarily by GVN forces, assisted by U.S. aircraft . As part of OPLAN 37-64, a detailed list of specific targets for air attack in North Vietnam was drawn up, selected on the basis of three criteria: (a) reducing North Vietnamese support of communist operations in Laos and South Vietnam, (b) limiting North Vietnamese capabilities to take direct action against Laos and South Vietnam, and finally (c) impairing North Vietnam's capacity to continue as an industrially viable state. Detailed characteristics were provided for each target, together with damage effects that could be achieved by various scales of attack against them. This target list, informally called the "94 Target List," became the basic reference for much of the subsequent planning for air strikes against North Vietnam, when target selection was involved, l/ The Tonkin Gulf incident of 4-5 August, which precipitated the first U.S. reprisal action against North Vietnam, had enabled the Adminis- tration to obtain a broad Congressional Resolution of support and had brought with it a prompt and substantial forward deployment of U.S. military forces in Southeast Asia, to deter or deal with possible communist reactions to the U.S. reprisal strike. Encouraged somewhat by the fact that no such reaction occurred, U.S. officials began to look more hopefully toward force- ful military alternatives that might help salvage the deteriorating situation in South Vietnam. A new wave of disorders and governmental eruptions in Saigon gave added impetus to a succession of JCS proposals for intensified harassing and other punitive operations against North Vietnam. Their recom- mendations included retaliatory actions for stepped up VC incidents, should they occur, and initiation of continuing air strikes by GVN and U.S. forces „ against North Vietnamese targets. 2, A Presidential decision was issued on 10 September.* Besides some modest additional pressures in the Lao panhandle and covert actions against North Vietnam, it authorized only preparations for retaliatory actions against. North Vietnam in the event of any attack on U.S. units or any extra- ordinary North Vietnamese/vC" action against South Vietnam. The forward deployments that had been carried out in connection with the Tonkin incident and in accordance with OPLAN 37-64 were kept in place, but the forces involved were precluded from action in South Vietnam and no decision was made to utilize them in operations in Laos or North Vietnam. Throughout September and October, the JCS continued to urge stronger U.S. action not only in North Vietnam, but also "in Laos, where infiltration was clearly on the increase, and in South Vietnam, where GVN survival was becoming precarious and time seemed to be running out. * National Secur Ity Action Memorandum No. 3l4, 10 September 1964 (TS) TOP SECRET - Sensitive Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 TOP SECRET - Sensitive These urgings reached a crescendo on 1 November 1964 when, just three days prior to the U.S. Presidential elections, the VC executed a daring and dramatic mortar attack on the U.S. air base at Bien Hoa, killing five Americans, wounding 76, and damaging or destroying 27 of the 30 B-57's that had been deployed to South Vietnam to serve notice upon Hanoi that the United States had. readily at hand the capacity to deliver a crushing air attack on the North. The attack was the most spectacular anti-American incident to date and was viewed by the JCS as warranting a severe punitive response. Their recommendation, accordingly, went far beyond a mere reprisal action. It called for an initial 24-36 hour period of air strikes in Laos and low-level air reconnaissance south of the 19th parallel in North Vietnam, designed to provide a cover for the introduction of U.S. security forces to protect key U.S. installations, and for the evacuation of U.S. dependents from Saigon. This would be followed, in the next three days, by a B-52 strike against Phuc Yen, the principal airfield near Hanoi, and by strikes against other airfields and major POL facilities in the Hanoi/ Haiphong area; and subsequently by armed reconnaissance against infiltration routes in Laos, air strikes against infiltration routes and targets in North Vietnam, and progressive PACOM. and SAC strikes against remaining military and industrial targets in the 9k Target List. 3/ That the JCS recommendations were not accepted is hardly sur- prising, considering the magnitude and radical nature of the proposed actions and the fact that these actions would have had to be initiated on the eve of the election by a President who in his campaign had plainly made manifest his disinclination to lead the United States into a wider war in Vietnam, repeatedly employing the slogan "we are not going North." In any event, as subsequent developments indicate, the President was not ready to approve a program of air strikes against North Vietnam, at least until the available alternatives could be carefully and thoroughly re- examined. Such a re -examination was initiated immediately following the election, under the aegis of a NSC interagency working group chaired by Assistant Secretary of State William Bundy. After a month of intensive study of various options, ranging from an intensification of existing programs to the initiation of large-scale hostilities against North Vietnam, the working group recommended a graduated program of controlled military pressures designed to signal U.S. determination, to boost morale in the South and to increase the costs and strains upon the North. A basic aim of the program was to build a stronger bargaining position, to restore an "equilibrium" in the balance of forces, looking toward a negotiated settle- ment. The recommended program was in two phases: Phase I, which was to last about 30 days, consisted of little more than an intensification of earlier "signals" to Hanoi that it should cease supporting the insurgency in the South or face progressively higher costs and. penalties . Thus the program upped several of the military pressures already being applied, and added armed aerial reconnaissance missions against infiltration routes and facilities in Laos; it also provided for' possible individual reprisals for TOP SECRET - Sensitive Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 TOP SECRET - Sensitive future VC provocations similar to the attack on Bien Hoa. Coupled with these military measures was to be a continuous declaratory policy com- municating our willingness to negotiate on the basis of the Geneva accords. It was recommended that successive actions would be undertaken only after waiting to discern Hanoi 1 s reactions to previous actions, with the commit- ment to later stages, such as initiation of air strikes against infiltration targets across the 17th parallel, kept unspecific and dependent upon enemy reactions . The recommended program also included a Phase II, a continuous program of progressively more serious air strikes possibly running from two to six months. The attacks would at first be limited to infiltration targets south of the 19th parallel, but would gradually work northward, and could eventually encompass all major military-related targets, aerial mining of ports, and a naval blockade, with the weight and tempo of the action being adjusted to the situation as it developed. The approach would be steady and deliberate, "progressively mounting in scope and intensity," with the U.S. retaining the option to proceed or not, escalate or not, or quicken the pace or not, at any time. It was agreed, however, that this second phase would not be considered for implementation until after the GVN had demonstrated considerable stability and effectiveness. As part of this "progressive squeeze," the working group recom- mended that the U.S. be willing to pause to explore negotiated solutions, should North Vietnam show any signs of yielding, while maintaining a credible threat of still further pressures. In the view of the working group, the prospect of greater pressures to come was at least as important as any damage actually inflicted, since the real target was the will of the North Viet- namese government to continue the aggression in the South rather than its capability to do so. Even if it retained the capability, North Vietnam might" elect to discontinue the aggression if it anticipated future costs and risks greater than it had bargained for. kj The JCS dissented from the working group's program on the grounds that it did not clearly provide for the kinds and forms of military pressures that might achieve U.S. objectives. They recommended instead a more accel- erated program of intensive air strikes from the outset, along lines similar to the actions they had urged in response to the Bien Hoa incident. Their program was in consonance with the consistent JCS view that the way to exert significant military pressure on North Vietnam was to bring to bear the maximum practicable conventional military power in a short time. 5/ The working group's proposals for a graduated approach were ham- mered out in a series of policy conferences with Ambassador Taylor, who had returned to Washington for this purpose at the end of November, and were then presented to the President, who approved them conditionally on 1 December, without, however, setting a timetable or specifying precise implementing actions. Allies had to be brought in line, and certain other TOP SECRET - Sensitive Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 . - .• . - .- TOP SECRET - Sensitive diplomatic preliminaries had to be arranged , before the program could. be launched. More important, it was feared that possible enemy reactions to the program might subject the GVN to severe counter-pressures which, in its then enfeebled state, might be more thai- it could bear. Thus securing some GVN leadership commitment to improved performance was made a prerequisite to mounting the more intensive actions contemplated. In fact, Ambassador Taylor returned to Saigon with instructions to hold out the prospect of these more intensive actions as an incentive to the GVN to "pull itself together" and, indeed, as a quid pro quo , for achieving, in some manner, greater stability and effectiveness. The instructions, however, contained no reference to U.S. intentions with respect to negoti- ations. Any mention of U.S. interest in a negotiated settlement before the initiation of military operations against North Vietnam was regarded as likely to have the opposite effect from the desired bolstering of GVN morale and stamina, as well as being premature in terms of the hoped-for improvement in the U.S. bargaining position vis-a-vis Hanoi that might result from the actions . The President's 1 December decisions were extremely closely held during the ensuing months. The draft NSAM that had been prepared by the working group was never issued and the decisions were only informally communicated. Ambassador Taylor, upon returning to Saigon, began his dis- cussions of the proposed actions with the GVN, and received certain assurances. Several allies, including the UK, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, were given a fairly complete description of U.S. intentions. Others, such^as Thailand and Laos, were informed about Phase I only. Still others, like Nationalist China, Korea, and the Philippines, were simply given a vague outline of the projected course of action. 6/ The first intensified military pressures in the program— more high level reconnaissance missions over North Vietnam, more extensive 3^A mari- time operations with VNAF cover south of the l8th parallel, and RLAF air strikes against PL/NVA forces in Laos— were begun on ik December, along with a new program of limited USAF-Navy armed reconnaissance missions against infiltration routes and facilities in Northern Laos under the code name BARREL ROLL. The strikes were not publicized and were not expected to have a significant military interdiction effect. They were considered useful primarily for their political value as another of a long series of signals to Hanoi to the effect that the U.S. was prepared to use much greater force to frustrate a communist take-over in South Vietnam. C. Signals to Hanoi Throughout 196k 9 a basic U.S. policy in Vietnam was to severely restrain any expansion of the direct U.S. combat involvement, but to carry out an essentially psychological campaign to convince Hanoi that the United States meant business. The campaign included repeated reaffirmations of the U.S. commitment to the defense of Southeast Asia, made both in public and in diplomatic channels; hints and warnings that the U.S. might expand TOP SECRET - Sensitive Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 TOP SECRET - Sensitive the war with countermeasures against North Vietnam, such as guerrilla raids, air attacks , naval blockade , or even land invasion, if the aggres- sion persisted; and a number of overt military actions of a precautionary nature j intended more to demonstrate U.S. resolve than to affect the mili- tary situation. Taken together, however, the signals were somewhat ambiguous. Among the more important military-political actions, carried out with considerable publicity, were the accelerated military construction effort in Thailand and South Vietnam, the prepositioning of contingency stockpiles in Thailand and the Philippines, the forward deployment of a carrier task force and land-based tactical aircraft within close striking distance of relevant enemy targets, and the assignment of an unprecedentedly high-level "first team" to man the U.S. Diplomatic Mission in Saigon. These measures were intended both to convince Hanoi and to reassure the GVN of the seriousness and durability of the U.S. commitment. In addition, the U.S. undertook a number of unpublicized and more provocative actions, primarily as low-key indications to the enemy of the U.S. willingness and capability to employ increased force if necessary. Chief among these were the occasional DE SOTO Patrols (U.S. destroyer patrols conducted deep into the Gulf of Tonkin along the coast of North Vietnam), both as a "show of strength" and as an intelligence gathering device; Laotian air strikes and limited GVN cross-border operations against VC infiltration routes in Laos; GVN maritime raids and other harassing actions against North Vietnam; YANKEE TEAM, low-level photo reconnaissance missions over Laos, conducted by U.S. jet aircraft with fighter escorts for suppres- sive or retaliatory action against enemy ground fire; and finally, the initiation at the very end of 196^ of BARREL ROLL, armed reconnaissance missions by U.S. jet fighters against VC infiltration routes and facilities in Laos . The fact that these actions were not publicized- -although most of tbem eventually became public knowledge — stemmed in part from a desire to communicate an implicit threat of "more to come" for Hanoi's benefit, with- out arousing undue anxieties domestically in the United States in a Presi- dential election year in which escalation of the war became a significant campaign issue. 7/ Within this general pattern of subtle and ngt-so-subtle warning signals, the- U.S. reprisal strike, following the controversial Gulf of Tonkin incident of k-5 August, stands out as a single forceful U.S. reaction, the portent of which could hardly have escaped Hanoi, its effect, however, may have been gradually diluted, first by the care that was taken to allay public fears that it represented anything more than an isolated event, and subsequently by the failure of the U.S. to react to the November 1 attack at Bien Hoa or to the Christmas Eve bombing of the Brink BOQ. 8/ Even this signal, therefore, may not have been, in Hanoi's reading, entirely unambiguous. TOP SECRET - Sensitive Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 TOP SECRET - Sensitive For Hanoi , the U.S. public declaratory -policy during most of 196^ must have been a major source of confusion. Presidential statements alternated between hawk-like cries and dove-like coos. Thus, in February I96U, in a University of California speech, the President issued the thinly veiled threat that "those engaged in external direction and supply would do well to be reminded and to remember that this type of aggression is a deeply dangerous game." But for the rest of the year and particularly during the election campaign, the President was saying, emphatically and repeatedly, that he did not intend to lead the United States into a wider war in Vietnam. He ridiculed the pugnacious chauvinism of Barry Goldwater and contrasted it with his own restraint. "There are those that say I ought to go north and drop bombs, to try to wipe out the supply lines, and they think that would escalate the war," he said in a speech on September 25. "But we don't want to get involved in a nation with seven hundred million people and get tied down in a land war in Asia." But if there' was reason for confusion in Hanoi's reading of the public declaratory signals, there was no shortage of opportunities for transmitting more unequivocal signals through quiet diplomatic channels. The clearest explanations of U.S. policy, and warnings of U.S. intent, were communicated to Hanoi on June 18, 196^, by the Canadian International Control Commissioner Seaborn. In a long" meeting with Premier Pham Van Dong, . Seaborn presented a carefully prepared statement of U.S. views and intentions to the North Vietnamese Premier, clearly warning him of the destructive con- sequences for the DRV of a continuation of its present course. Pham Van Dong fully understood the seriousness and import of the warning conveyed by Seaborn. But in this, as in a subsequent meeting with Seaborn on August 15, Pham Van Dong showed himself utterly unintimidated and calmly resolved to pursue the course upon which the DRV was embarked to what he confidently expected would be its successful conclusion. On balance, while U.S. words and actions were not always ^ in con- sonance, while public and private declarations were much in conflict, and while U.S. reactions fluctuated between the' unexpectedly forceful and the mystifyingly hesitant, the action- signals were sufficiently numerous and the warnings sufficiently explicit to have given Hanoi a fair awareness^ that the U.S. was likely to respond to the deteriorating situation by intensifying the conflict. How far this intensification would go, neither Hanoi nor the U.S. could have foreseen. D. Ominous Developments in Saigon . , The first of the new military pressures against the North- - BARREL ROLL air strikes in Laos --authorized in the 1 December decision,^ went into effect on Ik December. The hoped-for improvement in GVN stability, however, did not materialize. To the contrary, on 20 December the erratic SVN Premier Lt. Gen. Nguyen Khanh abruptly dissolved the High National Council which the U.S. Mission had been supporting as a device for encour- aging a transition from military to civilian rule. As a result, U.S. -GVN relations were placed under extreme strain including, among other things, ♦ an open personal rift between General Khanh and Ambassador Taylor. 8 TOP SECRET - Sensitive Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 TOP SECRET - Sensitive The crisis of confidence that developed was one reason for the lack of a U.S. response to the bombing of the Brink BOQ in Saigon- on Christmas Eve. As pointed out earlier, it was the kind of incident which had been contemplated in the approved Phase I guidelines as warranting a U.S. reprisal action, and the JCS did recommend such an action. They pro- posed an immediate air strike against Vit Thu Lu army barracks just north of the 17th parallel, employing up to 40 aircraft sorties, with Vietnamese participation if feasible. It was to be a one-day strike, on a much smaller scale than those recommended by the JCS on earlier occasions. 9/ However, both because of the unsettled situation in Vietnam and because of the Christmas Season—which caught the President and the Secretary of Defense out of town and Congress in recess—Washington was hesitant and reluctant to press for a prompt reaction. By the time the issue was discussed with the President on 29 December, it seemed too late for an event-associated reprisal and the decision was negative. In the meantime, GVN forces had experienced major reverses. ARVN as well as the Regional and Popular Forces had been seriously weakened by defeat and desertions in the last few months of I96U. A highly visible setback occurred from 26 December to 2 January 1965 at Binh Gia, where the VC virtually destroyed two Vietnamese Marine battalions. Viet Cong strength, augmented by infiltrating combat forces from Worth Vietnam, increased, and their hit-and-run tactics were increasingly successful. The government of Tran Van Huong came to an abrupt end on 27 Janu- ary 1965 when the Vietnamese Armed Forces Council ousted him, leaving only a facade of civilian government. The continuing power struggle clearly impeded military operations. Large elements of VHA.F, for example, were maintained on constant "coup alert." 10/ Washington reacted to these developments with considerable anguish. "I think we must accept that Saigon morale in all quarters is now very shaky indeed...." wrote Assistant Secretary of State William P. Bundy on Janu- ary 6, and he continued: We have not yet been able to assess the overall impact of the continuing political crisis and of the Binh Gia military defeat, but there are already ample indications that they have had a sharp discouraging effect just in the last two weeks. By the same token, it is apparent that Hanoi is extremely confident, and that the Soviets are being somewhat tougher and the' Chinese Communists are consolidating their ties with Hanoi... they see Vietnam falling into their laps in the fairly near future .... The sum total of the above seems to us to point... to a prognosis that the situation in Vietnam is now likeJy to come apart more rapidly than we had anticipated * in November, ll/ A similarly gloomy view "was taken by Assistant Secretary of Defense John McNaughton. In a February I965 memorandum (no exact date), 12/ he characterized the situation as "deteriorating": TOP SECRET - Sensitive Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 i TOP SECRET - Sensitive "Bien Hoas" cannot be prevented; the new government will probably be unstable and ineffectual , and the VC will probably continue to extend their hold over the population and territory. It can be expected that soon (6 months? two years?) (a) govern- ment officials at all levels will adjust their behavior to an eventual VC take-over , (b) defections of significant military forces will take place, (c) whole integrated regions of the country will be totally denied to the GVN, (d) neutral and/or left-wing elements will enter the government, (e) a popular- front regime will emerge which will invite the US out, and (f) fundamental concessions to the VC and accommodations to the DRV will put South Vietnam behind the Curtain. These views were fully consistent with USIB-approved national intel- ligence estimates which, as early as October 196U, predicted: ...a further decay of GVN will and effectiveness. The likely pattern of this decay will be increasing defeatism, paralysis of leadership, friction with Americans, exploration of possible lines of political accommodation with the other side, and a general petering out of the war effort.... 13/ By February 1965, the intelligence community saw "the present polit- ical arrangements in Saigon /as/ avowedly temporary" and detected no more than "a faint chance that the scenario announced for the ensuing weeks /would/ hold promise for improved political ^stability in SVN." It judged the odds as "considerably less than even. . ./that/ the spring and summer might see the evolution of a stronger base for prosecuting the counter- insurgency effort than has heretofore existed." lV These views were most authoritatively endorsed by the President's highest national security staff advisor, McGeorge Bundy, who undertook an urgent fact-finding trip to South Vietnam at the beginning of February. In a pivotal memorandum to the President 15/ (which will be referred to in greater detail subsequently) he characterized the general situation as follows : For the last year — and perhaps for longer--the overall situation in Vietnam has been deteriorating. The Communists have been gaining and the anti- Communist forces have been losing. As a result there is now great uncertainty among Vietnamese as well as Americans as to whether Communist victory can be prevented. There is nervousness about the determination of the U.S. Govern- ment. There is recrimination and fear among Vietnamese political leaders. There is an appearance of weariness, among some military leaders. There is a worrisome lassitude among the Vietnamese generally. There is a distressing absence of positive commit- ment to any serious social or political purpose. Outside observers are ready to write the patient off. All of this tends to bring latent anti -Americanism dangerously near to the surface. 10 TOP SECRET - Sensitive Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 >*.. TOP SECRET - Sensitive To be an American in Saigon today is to have a gnawing feeling that time is against us . Junior officers in all services are able, zealous and effective within the limits of their means. Their morale is sustained by the fact that they know that they are doing their jobs well and that they will not have to accept the responsibility for defeat. But near the top , where responsibility is heavy and accountability real, one can sense the inner doubts of men whose outward behavior remains, determined. Interestingly, McGeorge Bundy saw the military situation as moder- ately encouraging and the Vietnamese people still remarkably tough and resilient, though the social and political fabric was stretched thin. "Nevertheless," he warned, "...extremely unpleasant surprises are increasingly possible—both political and military." E. More Agonizing over Additional Pressures In the face of these uniformly discouraging appraisals, both Saigon and Washington continued their long debate over ways and means of mounting new or more intensive pressures against the enemy- -and most notably over the desirability and likely effectiveness of reprisal strikes and "Phase II operations" against the DRV. But enthusiasm for these operations was far from boundless. The' intelligence community, for example, had expressed, ever since May of l$6k, very little confidence that such added pressures would have much impact on Hanoi's course. The 9 October I96U national estimate considered probable communist reactions to "a systematic program of gradu- ally intensifying US/GVN /air/ attacks against targets in the DRV...." The' estimate tended only very hesitantly to the judgment that such a program of air attacks, if protracted, might "on balance" cause the DRV to stop its military attacks in SVN, to press for a negotiated cease-fire in the South, and to try to promote an international conference to pursue their ends, expecting, however, to fight another day. State dissented from even this ambivalent judgment, believing that the DRV would carry on the fight regard- less of air attacks. 16/ In February 1965* they reiterated this hesitant view, again with State dissenting: • If the United States vigorously continued in its attacks and damaged some important economic or military assets, the DRV. . .might decide to intensify the struggle, but... it seems to us somewhat more likely that they would decide to make some effort to secure a respite from US attack. . . . 17/ 11 TOP SECRET - Sensitive Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 TOP SECRET - Sensitive Parenthetically , even this equivocal judgment was reversed in effect, though not explicitly, in a June, 1965 estimate, this time with USAF ACS/l dissenting: Our present estimate is that the odds are against the postulated US attacks leading the DRV to make conciliatory gestures to secure a respite from the "bombing; rather, we believe that the DRV would persevere in supporting the insur- gency in the South. 18/ On top of these by no means reassuring estimates, Ambassador Taylor's hopes for a more stable GVN had been badly shaken by his abrasive experi- ences with General Khanh during the late-December episode. The Ambassador- Premier relationship was now ruptured beyond repair, and highest-level contacts between the USG and the GVN" had to be carried on through Deputy Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson. For the first time Maxwell Taylor talked seriously of possible U.S. disengagement, and even suggested a new role for air attacks on the North in such a context. In a year-end joint Taylor -Johns on cable to the Secretary of State, 19/ the Mission leadership actually suggested, as one possible alternative, "disengaging from the present intimacy of relationship with the GVN, withdrawing the bulk of our advisers. . .while continuing sufficient economic and MP aid to keep the GVN going." In such a situation, they would shrink MACV to the status of a MAAG and USOM to that of an economic- r~ budgetary advisory group, but. continue to accept responsibility for air and maritime defense of South Vietnam against the DRV. The danger in such a course, however, would be that "panicked by what would be interpreted as abandonment , the Jgyn/ leaders here would rush to compete with each other in making deals with the NLF." Taylor and Johnson, however, believed that this danger could be offset by an energetic U.S. program of reprisal attacks and Phase II operations against the DRV. Thus, in the Taylor /Johns on view, there were now three conditions in which reprisal attacks and Phase II operations might be conducted: (i) In association with the GVN after the latter had proven a reasonably stable government "able to control its armed forces" -- the condition originally laid down in the President's 1 December decision, but which now appeared unlikely to be attained. (ii) Under the prevailing acutely unstable conditions "as an emergency stimulant hopefully to create unity at home and restore failing morale . " (iii) As a unilateral U.S. action "to compensate for reduced in- country U.S. presence," if such reduction were to be undertaken. A similarly unprepossessing view of "stronger action" alternatives was probably presented to the President by Rusk. The files contain no 12- TOP SECRET - Sensitive Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 TOP SECRET - Sensitive direct record of the Secretary's presentation to the President during this period , .but a set of notes 20/ put together in preparation for a Rusk • meeting with the President on January 6 by Assistant Secretary William Bundy, Special Assistant Michael Forrestal and Deputy Assistant Secretary Leonard Unger, laid out tne alternatives in some detail. Recognizing that a "coming apart" of the GVN would most likely take the form of covert nego- tiations by key governmental groups with the NLF, leading eventually to the U.S. being invited out, Rusk's principal Vietnam advisers argued that this was one possible "Vietnamese solution," but hardly a desirable one: It would still be virtually certain that Laos would then become untenable and that Cambodia would accommodate in some way. Most seriously, there is grave question whether the Thai in these circumstances would retain any confidence at all in our continued support. In short, the outcome would be regarded in Asia, and particularly among our friends, as just as humiliating a defeat as any other form. As events have developed, the American public •would probably not be too sharply critical, but the real question would be whether Thailand and other nations were weakened and taken over thereafter. The alternative of stronger action obviously has grave diffi- culties. It commits the US more deeply, at a time when the picture of South Vietnamese will is extremely weak. To the extent that it included actions against Worth Vietnam, it would be vigorously attacked by many nations and disapproved initially even by such nations as Japan and India, on present indications. Most basically, its stiffening effect on the Saigon political situation would not be at all sure 'to bring about a more effective government, nor would limited actions against the southern DRV in fact sharply reduce infiltration or, in present circumstances, be at all likely to induce Hanoi to call it off. 'Nonetheless, on balance we believe that such action would have some faint hope of really improving the Vietnamese situation, and, above all, would put us in a much stronger position to hold the next line of defense, namely Thailand. Accepting the present situation-- or any negotiation on the basis of it- -would be far weaker from this ; latter key standpoint. If we moved into stronger actions, we should have in mind that negotiations would be likely to emerge from some ; t quarter in any event, and that under existing circumstances, even with the additional element of pressure, we could not expect to get an outcome that would really secure an independent South Vietnam. Yet even on an outcome that produced a progressive deterioration in South Vietnam and an eventual Communist takeover, we would still have appeared to Asians to have done a lot more about it." J Turning then to specific alternatives, Bundy and his colleagues envisioned five proposals: 13 TOP SECRET - Sensitive I Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 TOP SECRET - Sensitive . a. An early occasion for reprisal action against the DRV. b. Possibly beginning low-level reconnaissance of the DRV at once. c. Concurrently with a or b, an early orderly withdrawal of our dependents. We all think this would be a grave mistake in the absence of stronger action, and if taken in isolation would tre- mendously increase the pace of deterioration in Saigon. If we are to clear our decks in this way- -and we are more and more inclined to think we should — it simply must be, for this reason alone, in the context of some stronger action. d. Intensified air operations in Laos may have some use, but they will not meet the problem of Saigon morale and, if continued at a high level, may raise significant possibilities of Communist intervention on a substantial scale in Laos with some plausible justification. We have gone about as far as we can go in Laos by the existing limiting actions, and, apart from cutting Route 7? we would . not be accomplishing much militarily by intensifying US air actions there. This form of action thus has little further to gain in the Laos context, and has no real bearing at this point on the South Vietnamese context. 'e. Introduction of limited US ground forces into the northern area of South Vietnajn still has great appeal to many of us, con- currently with the first air attacks into the DRV. It would have a real stiffening effect in Saigon, and a strong signal effect to Hanoi. On the disadvantage side, such forces would be possible attrition targets for the Viet Cong. For your information, the Australians have clearly indicated (most recently yesterday) that they might be disposed to participate in such an operation. The New Zealanders are more negative and a proposal for Philippine participation would be an interesting test." Whether and how these alternatives were posed for the President is not recorded, but at least two of the actions --getting the U.S. dependents out of Vietnam and reacting promptly and firmly to the next reprisal oppor- tunity—were also recommended to another top presidential advisor, namely to Secretary McNamara, by Assistant Secretary John McNaughton, in a McNaughton memorandum 21/ that he discussed with McNamara on January 27. The memorandum contains McNaughton' s pencil notations of McNamara 1 s com- ments on various points, which suggest that the Secretary of Defense was dissatisfied with the way U.S. Vietnam policy was "drifting" and seemed a good deal less dubious tha,n was McNaughton about the potential benefits to be derived from initiating air strikes against the DRV. - * Ik TOP SECRET - Sensitive Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 TOP SECRET - Sensitive In the meantime, a 7 January 1965 conference of SEACORD (the coordinating mechanism of the U.S. ambassadors and military commanders in Southeast Asia) had reviewed the accomplishments of the first few weeks of Phase I— the 30-day program of mild BARREL ROLL, YANKEE TEAM and other operations --and had concluded that the results were militarily negligible. SEACORD recommended an extension: of the operations for another 30 days, and their intensification as "an effective tonic /for the GVN7, particularly if accompanied by serious joint preparations and timely initiation of retaliatory and Phase II operations against the DRV." 22/ - The most forceful restatement of the reprisal policy, however, came from the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the end of January, in the form of a memorandum to the Secretary of Defense 23/ reviewing earlier JCS recommendations on reprisals and noting that the "continued lack of a U.S. response to major enemy provocations risked inviting more such actions. They urged that the next significant provocation be met with a "positive, timely, and appropriate response .. .undertaken preferably within twenty- four hours, against selected target's in the DRV." 2kJ They appended to their, memorandum a resume of possible reprisal actions of varying intensities, for which plans were available and the strike forces at hand to carry out these actions. The most intensive preparations had already been made, particularly in connection with the forthcoming resumption of the DESOTO Patrols, to which a reprisal operation was explicitly linked as a contin- gency option, under the code name FLAMING DART. These preparations and the evolution of the readiness posture associated with this and other potential, reprisal actions is reviewed briefly in the next section. 15 TOP SECRET - Sensitive Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 TOP SECRET - Sensitive III. DESOTO AS A REPRISAL OPPORTUNITY --ACT THE DECISION TO SUSPECT Detailed and specific reprisal preparations had been under way for many months prior to February 1965, most prominently in connection with . the periodic DESOTO Patrols in the Gulf of Tonkin, The patrols were suspended after the August 2 and k 9 I96U incidents , when the destroyer patrol group had been fired upon, giving rise to the first U.S. retalia- tory strikes. They were resumed on 12 September, and at that time were believed to have been again attacked, or at least "menaced," by unfriendly- vessels on the night of 18 September. That incident, however, was ^con- sidered as too ambiguous by Washington officials to justify a reprisal action. The patrol was once more suspended on 20 September. In order to be properly prepared for an attack on any future patrol, military authorities began to work up a pre-packaged set of reprisal targets that might be politically acceptable, with pre-assigned forces that would be in a high state of readiness to strike these tar-gets, and with a detailed strike plan that would provide a range of retaliatory options. Accordingly, CINCPAC, on instructions from the JCS, developed appropriate plans and issued a series of Fragmentary Operations Orders under the colorful caption, "Punitive and Crippling Reprisal Actions on Targets in HVBf." 25/ The orders provided for air strikes to be conducted against selected targets in Horth Vietnam in retaliation for DRV attacks against the DESOTO Patrol, if the patrol were resumed and attacked. ^ T-o levels of retaliation response were prescribed, with two target options each (all located" south of the 19th parallel), with the various options scaled to the extent and severity of damage inflicted upon the patrol „ A high alert posture was to be maintained during the days the patrol was in progress, such that the strikes could be launched within one hour after receipt of the execution order. The retaliatory forces were to be carefully prepositioned and rules of engagement were meticulously spelled outo 26/ ' While these preparations were initially associated exclusively with the DESOTO Patrol, it was recognized that reprisals might also be called for in retaliation for any type of serious provocation which could occur without warning, could be caused by the DRV or by the VC, and might be- directed against US or GVN forces. But the high alert status ordered in connection with the DESOTO Patrols could be maintained for only short periods of time. A more sustained capability was also needed, and the JCS prepared an outline plan for further elaboration by CINCPAC, calling for a more limited reprisal action that could be launched with the least i possible delay with forces in place and with a readiness posture normally ! maintained. 27/ The forces expected to be available for such strikes were I ' one CVA air wing, two squadrons of B-57, two squadrons of F-105, three ! squadrons of F-100, and approximately one squadron of VBAF A-lHj and the targets considered most suitable were: 16 TOP SECRET - Sensitive Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 TOP SECRET - Sensitive Target No. 33 - Dong Hoi Barracks • 36 - Vit Thu Lu Army Barracks 39 - Chap Le Army Barracks ' 52 - Vinh Army Supply Depot E 71 - Ben Thuy Port Facilities All of these preparations came to a head at the end of January, when a tentative decision had evidently been reached in Washington to authorise resumption of the DESOTO Patrols on or about 3 February. A JCS directive to that effect vent out to CIKCPAC on 28 January, 28/ requesting CINCPAC to issue the necessary Operational Plan, covering a two destroyer Patrol Group with on-line Crypto HATT and Star Shell illumination capabilities. Interestingly, the instructions were explicit to the effect that the^ "Patrol track shall not be provocative, with the Patrol Group remaining 30 nautical miles from both HVN mainland and Hainan Island and South of ^ 20 degrees North latitude." The Patrol was to be continued for a period of three days, during which time SP-2 aircraft with searchlight and flare capability were to support the Patrol Group during hours of darkness^ by • assisting in contact Investigation and clarification, and a Combat Air Patrol was to be airborne in the vicinity of the Patrol during daylight and to be on immediate call during darkness." Instructions also called for carefully dissociating the Patrol from OPIAli 3 L 'rA operations in and over the Gulf of Tonkin kQ hours before, during, and k8 hours following completion of the Patrol. | . Rules of engagement, in the event of attack, were as follows: i a. The Patrol ships and aircraft are authorized to attack with the objective of insuring destruction of any vessel or aircraft which attacks, or gives positive indication of intent to attack, US forces operating in international waters or air- space over international waters. ho In event of hostile attack, the Patrol ships and aircraft are directed to fire upon the hostile attacker with the objective of insuring destruction. Ships are authorized to pursue ^the j • enemy to the recognized three mile territorial limit o Aircraft I ' are authorized hot pursuit inside territorial waters (three miles) ; against surface vessels and into hostile air space (includes DRV, ; Hainan Island and Mainland China) against attack aircraft when ! necessary to achieve destruction of identified .attack forces . Ships and aircraft will confine their actions to the attacking ships and/or aircraft. In the days following, attention centered on plans for the reprisal strike. A number of last-minute changes were made in the targets that had been recommended by CINCPAC and the JCS, in order to reduce the risk of aircraft losses and to reduce sortie requirements. The launcmng date for the DESOTO Patrol was postponed from the 3rd to the 7th of February, and the JCS. asked CIKCPAC 29/ to re-order its reprisal targets 17 TOP-SEC RET - Sens i tive Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 TOP SECRET - Sensitive into three attack options, consisting respectively of three, five, and seven specified targets, and to plan to conduct the air strikes against them, as directed, by option or by target, in any combination. The options and targets, together with estimated sorties, were as follows: Strike Flak CAP TOTAL Option One Tffts 33 Dong Hoi Barracks 2k 8 8 ko 36 Vit Thu Lu Barracks 2k 8 k 36 39 Chap Le Barracks ko 12 k 56 Total. . . . 80 28 16 132 Option Two 12 12 52 8 k 22 k8 32 206 Tgts 33, 36, 39 of Option One, plus: 2k Chanh Hoa Barracks 28 32 Vu Con Barracks 10 Total 126 Option Three ^ . Tgts 33, 36, 39, 2k, 32 of Option Two, plus: Ik Thanh Hoa Bridge 32 12 k kQ 7k Quang Khe Naval Base 22 k 2 28 * * Total 180 6k 38 282 Of these seven targets, six were south of the 19th parallel, and on the November working group T s reprisal target list: one, the Thanh Hoa Bridge, Target -lk in Option Three, was north of the 19th parallel. The strikes against these targets were to employ the US forces then in mainland Southeast Asia in their alerted and augmented state (with an additional F105 squadron from the Philippines at Da Nang), plus up to 3 CVAs; but they would also provide for strikes from a non-alert status, i.e., with US forces normally in-country, plus CVA normally on station. Strikes from a non-alert status, if ordered, would be simultaneous, launched within the minimum feasible reaction time, and as near as prac- ticable to first light following the reprisal incident. CINCPAC was also asked to make "preliminary provisions" for a strike at Target 32-- Vu Con Barracks in Option Two above — to be conducted by VNAF, with assistance from US flak suppression, CAP, pathfinder, and SAR. These provisions were not to be revealed to the GVK at that time, since the inclusion of this WAF strike might or might not be ordered, depending on the circumstances <, 30 CINCPAC responded the following day by issuing Operation Order FIMUNG DART, directing its Air Force and Navy Component Commands to be prepared to conduct air strikes when directed, against the above targets by option, or against any combination of the above targets within or between options, in retaliation for attacks on the DESOTO Patrolo 13 TOP SECRET - Sensitive Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 TOP SECRET - Sensitive CINCPACFLT was assigned Targets 33 and 36 of Option One, 2k of Option Two, and 7^ of Option Three. CINCPACAF was assigned Targets 39 of Option One, 32 of Option Two, and Ik of Option Three. Aircraft would be armed with optimum conventional ordnance for the target to be attacked, excluding napalm. 31/ Operation Order FLAMING DART placed the US in a highly flexible position. It provided a vehicle for a quick reprisal decision in the eventuality of an attack on the DESOTO Patrol or of any other provocation, such as a dramatic VC incident in South Vietnam. The particular targets involved had been briefed to the principal decision-makers , had the virtue of being known and understood by them, and even had their tentative appro- val. Moreover, nearly all the targets were in the far south of North Vietnam and all could be associated with infiltration, which were two of the conditions laid down in the guidelines for retaliating against the North for spectacular incidents in the South. The Operation Order there- fore, served well as a generalized pre-planned reprisal target package, offering a wide spectrum of choices. To gain an impression of the alert posture of the strike forces poised for action, the table below sets forth the varying weight of attack that could be brought to bear at different reaction times: (CHART, page 20) The DESOTO Patrol, however, which had been the major focus for the reprisal planning, was never to carry out its assigned role. On k Febru- ary, three days before the Patrol was to begin its operation, the Chair- man of the JCS informed CBICPAC and all interested posts and commands . that authority to execute DESOTO was cancelled, in view of Soviet Premier Kosygin 1 s Imminent four-day visit to Hanoi that was to begin on 6 February.' "DESOTO patrol concurrent with Kosygin visit or immediately thereafter," wrote the CJCS, "could be interpreted as reaction to visit, thereby im- pairing ard complicating US-Soviet relations." 33 / The decision to call off the Patrol in deference to Kosygin' s visit, reflected a growing feeling in some parts of the Administration that the renewed involvement of the Soviet Union in Southeast Asia, after its hands-off policy of almost three years 1 standing, might, on balance, be a good thing for the U.S. While some American experts interpreted Moscow's November, l$6k pledge of military assistance to Hanoi and Kosygin 1 s visit in February 1965 as a sure sign that the Soviet Union saw the collapse of the US venture in SVN as imminent and wanted merely to stake its claim in apposition to Peking before it was too late, others Relieved that the USSR might well find it in its interest to act as an agent of moderation and compromise, providing the U.S. with an avenue of graceful retreat from a seemingly irretrievable situation. ■ 19 TOP SECRET - Sensitive Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 TOP SECRET - Sensitive STRIKE FORCES AVAILABLE FOR REPRISAL ACTIONS AGAINST TARGETS IN ■ LAOS AMD NORTH VIETNAM (as of 29 Jan 6$) ■*>£/ " • STRIKE* FORCES REACTION TIME "(HOURS) li/ 2/ 6^ 12 3/ k8r- V 72 'AFTER ! 72 iUSAF (DeSoto Patrol ) B-57 :'28-Bien Hoa. i F-100* 36-Da Nang , jl8-Takhli j F-105 4 l8-Da Nang 18-Korat B-52 h- | 28-Bien Hoa Same as 48 far. 1 column plus fol- lowing j deploy- ments : "O 5-Bien Hoa : 12 -Da Nans 12-Takhli 2-6-Da Nan 6- 10-Korat 36-Da Wang 18-Takhli 18 -Da Nan 18-Korat A M E 18-conus ! to Clark ; ' l8-Conus j to Clark S A M E 30-Guam CVA ~&k A-l A- 3 F-k/8 kQ 2k 9 ko-k6 2k 12 6 20-23 2k 12 6 20-23 ! 48 2k 9 ko-k6 s A M E 72 36 15 6O-69 USMC MAG [VNAF kl-Da. Wang' A-1H f i 11 11 60 NOTES: 32/ "( Keyed -to reprisal actions described in Appendix 5 to JCa-1 .70-65/29 Jan 65, TOP SECRET) * l/. DeSoto Patrol reprisal forces.. Only case in which forces are prepositioned, held in alert status and prepared to conduct reprisal attacks without delay. 2/ Forces immediately available under normal conditions. 3/ USAF fully deployed. Only one carrier available. %/ Could conduct all strikes in CINCPAC FRAG ORDER #3. 60 VNAF . sorties available .each day at expense of pacification program. By 31 Jan 65 , 75 VNAF sorties available. • • 20 TOP SECRET - Sensitive Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 TOP SECRET - Sensitive This view was certainly held by some State Department experts , par- ticularly in the Office of Asian Communist Affairs (ACA) and in the Office of Intelligence and Research (HvR). In an interesting memorandum of February 5, 19&5 to William Bundy, Lindsay Grant of ACA saw the impli- cations for American policy of the Kosygin visit to Hanoi as "enormous," It is possible to hypothesize that the Soviet initiative may be intended to present the United States with an acceptable, . albeit difficult, choice. They may presume that the situation in the South would deteriorate to the point where we could foresee ourselves confronted with the possibility of: 1) a series of defeats on the ground and/or total collapse of authority in Saigon, or 2) a rapid movement in the direction of neutralism, lead- ing to our being invited out, or 3) some kind of negotiated settlement which would permit us to reduce our commitment to the bare bones, and thereby at least minimize a generally distasteful loss. The last prospect , which would represent the best of a bad choice, could possibly result from an increased Soviet presence in North Viet-Nam. Thus , the Soviets might find it in their own interest to ' • • propose to Hanoi a solution of the war in Viet-Nam along the following lines: 1) North Viet-Nam would remain untouched, with the Soviet Union guaranteeing to provide major economic and other help; 2) South Viet-Nam would be neutralized, with some sort of paper guarantee offered by outside powers, including the Soviet Union; 3) The National Front for the Liberation of South Viet -Nam would participate in a neutralist coalition government. (The Soviet Union would, presumably, give North Viet-Nam private assurances that it would not stand in the way of further Front and Viet Cong efforts to gain a complete political victory in the South. ) The author of the memorandum, of course, recognized that it would be only \inder the prospect of a collapse of the GVN or of being requested to leave that the U.S. would be willing to accede to the solutions suggested But he stressed, as the major benefit of this course, that: . . .the Soviet presence would represent a major deflection of the rising Chinese Communist tide in Southeast Asia in par- ticular, and in its world-wide efforts at subversion in generalo 21 TOP SECRET - Sensitive Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 TOP SECRET - Sensitive A somewhat similar view was echoed subsequently in a SEACORD con- ference, the sense of which was reported in a Saigon message to the . Secretary of State. 3h/ The relevant arguments were to the effect that: ' (1) The DRV is almost entirely dependent both economically and militarily upon the Chinese Communists who see great value in having the DRV continue this exclusive dependence; (2) The Soviet Union is the only alternative source of economic and military support to Hanoi which would enable the DRV to remain viable if it decided to cease its aggression; (3) It is therefore important that the Soviets receive accurate indications that we would not oppose a continuing Soviet role in the DRV, although this is not a matter on which the U.S. can take an initiative. Subsequent events on the negotiating front, and the role we believed the USSR could play on that front, also lend support to the view that, at least in the early part of I965, there was a fairly widespread belief among U.S. policy-makers that the Soviet Union could and probably would exert a benign influence upon Hanoi. There is, indeed, some evidence that the USSR itself had some such thought in. mind in connection with Kosygin f s February visit. Peking, at least, has charged that Kosygin had tried at that time to persuade both Hanoi and Peking to negotiate some kind of settlement with the United States, reportedly involving a "face-saving" U.S. withdrawal. 35/ In any event, there seems little doubt that the decision to forego the DESOTO Patrol was inspired by the hope, if not expectation, that Kosygin would, from the US point of view, weigh in constructively in the Vietnam stru^sle. • 1 * 22 TOP SECRET - Sensrbiv Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 TOP SECRET - Sensitive IV. FLAMING DART I AKD II — THE IMPERCEPTIBLE TRANSITION A. The First Reprisal The lorg months of contingency planning, hesitation, and agonized debate were suddenly cut short on February 7th, when the VC struck the American installations at Pleiku and Camp Holloway. This time the ^Presi- dent showed the same decisiveness and swift reaction that he had displayed six months earlier in the Gulf of Tonkin. The decision to strike back was reached in a 75 minute meeting of the National Security Council on the evening of February 6 (Washington time) in the Cabinet Room of the White House, and in the presence of Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield and House Speaker John McCormack. McGeorge Bundy, on his mission to Saigon at the time, had joined Ambassador Taylor and General Westmoreland in recommending prompt retaliation in telecoms with the President from the communications center in Saigon. The strike, carried out during the early morning hours of the 7th (Washington time) was, at least militarily, something of a fizzle. The mildest of the three attack options was selected for the strike, but when - the executive order was flashed, only one of the three CVA's (USS Ranger) was "on station at Point Yankee. The other two (Hancock and Coral Sea) had been stood down to a 96-hour alert after the cancellation of the DESOTO Patrol and were enroute to assignments elsewhere. They were urgently recalled by CINCPAC to participate in the strike, which had to ' be delayed until the CVA f s returned to points from which their aircraft could reach the assigned targets. The weather, however, was very adverse, causing a large number of sorties to abort, with the result that only one of the three assigned targets was struck in force. 36/ In order to stiffen the reprisal and to make it clearly a joint US-GVN response, the target was restruck the following day (February 8) by the US carrier aircraft that had aborted the previous day, and a VNAF strike by 2k A-lH's supported liy USAF pathfinder, flak suppression and CAP aircraft, was carried out against target 32 (Vu Con Barracks) concurrently. 37/ B. Timing of Pleiku and the Kosygin Visit As was indicated earlier, the U.S. had put off the DESOTO Patrol that had been scheduled for February 7 so as to avoid any appearance of provocativeness vis -a- vis Kosygin, who was to arrive in Hanoi on February 6. And yet it was precisely then, at the very beginning of the Kosygin visit, that the VC launched their spectacular attack on the US installations. This had led many to conjecture that the raid was deliberately organized and timed by the hardliners in Hanoi so as to nip in the bud any possible Soviet peace initiative or in other ways to put Kosygin on the spot. Whether Hanoi specifically ordered the Pleiku attack or whether the VC merely received Hanoi's blessing for the attack remains speculative. ■ There can be little doubt, however, that Hanoi was fully informed and had ample reason to favor the action. Robert Shaplen argues that, from Hanoi's point of view, 23 TOP SECRET - Sensitive Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 TOP SECRET - Sensitive it had more to gain than lose by having the attack take place while Kosygin -was present , even though it might embarrass him, as it very likely did. If the Americans failed to respond, the North Vietnamese could argue that the United States was . indeed a paper tiger , and that all that was needed for the war to be brought to a successful conclusion in the south was some additional military assistance. If the United States did respond, the North Vietnamese could claim that more aid was necessary to prosecute the war under more difficult circum- stances , and they could then reasonably. ask for planes and de- fensive missiles with which to protect their own cities, too. Since Kosygin was wooing North Vietnam for Russia T s own purposes as much as Hanoi was wooing him to help it regain some balance between Moscow and Peking, the Russian Premier was hardly in a position- to leave Hanoi in a huff, which besides would have made him look foolish. 38/ Although the onset of the bombing no doubt took the Russians by surprise, they probably viewed it as a futile last-ditch effort by Washington to strengthen its bargaining position rather than as a prelude to new escalation. In any event, Kosygin 1 s reaction in Hanoi was re- strained. He pointed out that the situation was "fraught with serious complications" and seemed to be favoring a negotiated termination. 39/ In any event, in keeping with the view held in several influential Administration quarters that the USSR might be a valuable moderating influence upon Hanoi, Washington took pains to assure Moscow that Kosygin T s presence in Hanoi during the US reprisal strikes of February 7-8 was an unfortunate coincidence and no affront to the Soviet Union was intended. C. The Reprisal Rationale and Its Public .Handling On the morning after the reprisal order had been issued -(Febru- ary 7) , a second NSC meeting was convened at the White House to agree on an appropriate text for the White House statement and to discuss the content of a McNamara press briefing at the Pentagon, called for that afternoon. The public handling of the raids was of crucial importance in conveying to Hanoi some inkling of what the implications of the reprisal action were for future U.S. responses and for the future U.S. role in the Vietnamese war, without at the same time arousing undue anxieties at home and in the rest of the world. It is worth noting that there were important differences between the February 7-3 raids and the earlier strikes in the Gulf of Tonkin incident. The August Tonkin strikes had clearly been presented as a one- time retaliatory action in response to a North Vietnamese attack on US naval power in international waters. In more or less tit-for-tat fashion, the strikes had been carried out by US Navy aircraft and had been directed primarily against the offending NVN patrol boats in their bases. As an extra punitive measure, POL storage tanks associated with one of the 2k TOP SECRET - Sensitive Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 i TOP SECRET - Sensitive true patrol boat "bases were also hit, but no attempt was made to destroy base facilities, and the entire operation was a unilateral U. So action. Publicly, the Tonkin strikes had been depicted as a "positive reply" — one which was "limited but fitting" — to an unprovoked attack on US vessels operating within their rights on the high seas. The "one-shot" nature of 'the strikes was stressed, and it was explicitly stated that, provided there were no further enemy attacks, the US con- sidered the incident closed. Together with declarations that the US strikes were not intended to expand or escalate the guerrilla war in Southeast Asia, this tended to make the strikes appear as an isolated action, bearing only incidental relationship to the war itself. The war continued to be officially pictured as one being fought by the South Vietnamese, with the US in a strictly limited supporting role. It is that stiff warnings were sent to Hanoi through discrete diplomatic channels (ICC Commissioner Seaborne T s August visit), stressing that US patience was wearing thin and that the DRV could expect to suffer the consequences if it persisted in its aggressive course, but U.S. public statements made it clear that the strikes were not intended to change the basic ground rules of the conflict at that time. The strikes were intended primarily to demonstrate that North Vietnam could not flagrantly attack U.S. forces with impunity; but nothing was said publicly to imply that the North could not continue its activities in the South without fear that its own territory would be placed in jeopardy. By contrast with the Tonkin strikes , the February 1965 raids , while also initiated as reprisals, were intended to be explicitly linked with the "larger pattern of aggression" by North Vietnam, and were designed to signal a change in the ground rules of the conflict in the South c By retaliating against North Vietnam for a VC incident in the South, the US consciously made its first open break with self-imposed ground rules which had permitted the North to direct and support the war in the South, but which had precluded direct US countermeasures against the North's territory. The strikes thus were to serve clear notice upon all concerned that the US would not abide by such rules in the future. But the change in ground rules also posed serious public infor- mation and stage managing problems for the President. Until the February raids, and especially throughout the election campaign of I96U, the case had regularly been made that the insurrection in the South was essentially a home-grown affair and largely self-supporting; now the argument had to be turned around and public opinion persuaded that there really wouldn't be much difficulty cleaning up the South if infiltrators from the North would just go home and "leave their neighbors alone." In the White House press release immediately following the re- prisal, therefore, major emphasis was placed on Hanoi's role in the South: ...these attacks were only made possible by the continuing infiltration of personnel and equipment from North Vietnam. This 25 TOP SECRE'T - Sensitive Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 TOP SECRET - Sensitive infiltration markedly increased during I96U and continues to increase." ... "The key to the situation remains the cessation - of infiltration from North Vietnam and the clear indication that it is prepared to cease aggression against its neighbors. hOJ Another major new departure of the 7-8 February strikes was that they were intended to be at least a first step in more directly and actively associating the US with the South Vietnamese in "their" -war. Thus while the retaliation was precipitated by the Pleiku incident, it was considered essential to justify it in broader terms — not merely as a response to a single outrage committed against Americans, but as a response to a series of outrages, committed against South Vietnamese as well as Americans. Thus, the White House press release and, even more explicitly, the McNamara press briefing of February 7 4l/ spoke of three VC attacks, all "ordered and directed by the Hanoi regime," but only one of these was the Pleiku-Camp Holloway raid against U.S. installation. The two others cited in justification of the reprisal were attacks on Viet- namese villages in which, it was carefully pointed out, -no American ^ casualties were sustained. I This effort to link the reprisal to VC offenses against both j parties was reinforced by having the reprisal strikes conducted by both South Vietnamese and US forces. McNamara's. statement heavily stressed the fact that "elements of the U.S. and South Vietnamese Air Forces j were directed to launch joint retaliatory attacks..." j By demonstrating that the US was prepared to join with the : South. Vietnamese in military reprisals against North Vietnam for actions committed against either or both parties in the South, the strikes tended ; to weaken the policy line, assiduously adhered to up to that time, that the war was essentially a Vietnamese war with US involvement confined to i advice and support. Once the US began participating in such military I reprisals on a regular basis, it would unavoidably begin to appear as j more of a co-belligerent, along with South Vietnam, against the VC and j their sponsors in North Vietnam. j The practical significance, of this point is obvious. As long ! as the U.S. maintained the policy line that it was not really directly engaged in the war, it had to deny its forces many proposed military actions in Southeast Asia, and had to impose on itself severe political constraints in its military operations. The abandonment of this policy ! line as a result of reprisal actions like FLA^UNG DAJRT would open the ! .way to a much wider range of politically acceptable US military options In Vietnam. The 7-8 February strikes, however, were only a limited and tentative first step, aaad far from an irrevocable commitment to the broader course of action they foreshadowed. The governing concept 26 TOP SECRET - Sensitive Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 TOP SECRET - Sensitive was still "tit-for-tat". The White House statement stressed the phrase "appropriate reprisal action" and, likening it to the Gulf of Tonkin incident , characterized the response as similarly "appropriate ajid j?' 4-4- 4 „ _ tt fitting o The idea of equivalent punishment was conveyed "by confining the strikes to a quite limited number of targets plausibly associated with infiltration. Thus the possibility was left open that these reprisals were strictly one-shot operations that would be carried out only in the ( event of spectacular enemy actions. But the public language was both ominous and ambiguous: "As the U.S. Government has frequently stated, we seek no wider war. Whether or not this course can be maintained lies with the North Vietnamese aggressors." In fact, however, there was little expectation, that the North Vietnamese would "cease their agression," and every expectation that the U.S. would go beyond a policy of event- associated reprisals. For immediately following. the first press release, the White House issued another significant presidential statement, order- ing what had long been recommended: i " ...I have directed the orderly withdrawal of American : dependents from South Vietnam. . .We have no choice now but to clear the decks and make absolutely clear our continued de- ! termination to back South Vietnam..." h2/ And. as further indication that much more than a mere occasional reprisal was in the offing, McNamara met with the JCS on the following day to request that they prepare and submit to him their recommendations for an eight-week air strike camuaim against infiltration-associated tar- gets in the lower portion of North Vietnam as a sustained reply to any further provocations. {43/ D. An Act of Defiance The flashing red warning signals -- if that is what they were -- were not heeded n oy Hanoi. On the contrary, in what was regarded by some observers as a calculated act of defiance, the VC staged another dramatic attack on 10 February, this one against a US enlisted men f s billet in Qui fthon, inflicting the heaviest single loss of American personnel yet. Within 2k hours, US and South Vietnamese aircraft executed the largest retaliatory air strike of the war up to that time. Named FLAMING DART II, 28 VNAF A-lH T s and 20 USAF F-100's hit Chap Le. Simultaneously, Navy aircraft struck Chanh Hoa not far from Dong Hoi, just north of the DMZ. This time, significantly, the strikes were not characterized as a reprisal linked to the immediate incident. Instead, the White House release of February 11,. kk/ listed a long series of VC incidents and attacks that had occurred since February 8, most of which were not "spectacular" but quite normal features of the Vietnam war. The state- ments moreover characterised the US air strikes as -a more generalized 27 TOP SECRET - Sensitive Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 TOP SECRET - Sensitive response to these "further direct provocations by the Hanoi regime," and to these "continued acts of aggression." The words "retaliation" and "reprisal" were carefully avoided and the joint US/GVN statement ^released in Saigon the same day actually characterized the air attack action for the first time as "air operations." The change in terminology from "retaliation" or "reprisal" to "response-," from a specific set of incidents to "continued aggression," and from a single attack to "air operations" was clearly deliberate. A strict reprisal policy, although permitting the US to strike the North, would have left the initiative in the enemy 1 s hands and would have re- stricted the US to the kinds of responses that could he represented as equivalent or "fitting." But, more important, the new terminology re- flected a conscious U.S e decision to broaden the reprisal concept as gradually and as imperceptibly as possible to accommodate a much wider policy of sustained, steadily intensifying air attacks against North Vietnam, at a rate and on a scale to be determined hj the U. S As will be discussed further in the next section, that decision was being force- fully pressed upon the President by his principal advisers immediately after FLAMING DART 1 (February . 7) . Whether the President had tacitly or explicitly accepted this course before FLAMING DART II (February 11) , is not recorded. But it would have been important to him politically in any event to play it with a minimum of drama and to preserve maximum • flexibility. It seemed sensible to make it all appear as a logical sequence of almost unavoidable steps, to avoid portraying any single move as a watershed or any single decision as irreversible. The February 11 strikes did constitute a much sharper break with past policy than any previous US action in Vietnam: they set the stage for the con- tinuing bombing program that was now to be launched in earnest; but they were presented and discussed publicly in very muted tones. Some of the President's private comments on the attacks are reported by one of his more perceptive biographers, Philip Geyelin, in the following terms: His discussion of the first two retaliatory attacks, follow- ing Pleiku and Qui Nhon, was almost offhand. To one visitor, he lampooned the 'crisis 1 tones of the television broadcasters, the . long faces, and the grim talk of big, black limousines assembled for weight ly policy-making. They woke us up in the middle of the night, and we woke them up in the middle 'of the night. Then they did it again, and we did it again, was the way he described it. If he sus- pected he was on the front edge of a major plunge into a fair- sized ground war in Asia, he hid his concern masterfully, dis- missing all the excitement as the sort of thing that happens periodically. 28 TOP SECRET - Sensitive Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 K= TOP SECRET - Sensitive Geyelin gives the President very high narks for his performance: • ..his handling of Vietnam in the early months of 1965 was more than just skillful, it was a triumph of international and domestic politics. For if one accepts the need to right the 'equilibrium, ■ -yien it cannot he denied that Lyndon Johnson moved to do so with a bare minimum of dissent at home and less foreign opposition than might have been expected. And he did it, at least for a good many months, without giving the Coimu- nist Chinese or the Russians provocation in such intolerable degree that they felt obliged to move in any drastic way to the defense of Hanoi. Kp/ E. Reactions at Home and Abroad Official and public reactions to the retaliatory strikes were fairly predictable. In the U.S. , as Newsweek put it, the decision "touched off -a wave of national concern and international jitters unequalled since the US-Soviet confrontation over the Cuban missile build-up'." k6/ Much of the US press expressed serious doubts about where the US was heading in Vietnam. A great majority of the nation's newspapers regarded the strikes as necessary and justified and the notion that Pleiku was a deliberate VC provocation was widely accepted. But many admitted to confusion as to just what U.S. policy in Vietnam was; (e.g., Kansas City Star : "Do we have a specific, unwavering policy or are we improvising from crisis to crisis?" St. Louis Post -Dispatch : "A strike for strike strategy. . .without any ultimate objective except to hang on in Vietnam, is not much of a policy." New York Times ( James Reston): "We do not know what the President has in mind... For the moment we seem to be standing mute in Washington, paralysed before a great ^ issue and merely digging our thought deeper into the accustomed military rut.") In Western Europe reactions were less uniform. To the dismay of leftist members of his own Labor Party, the U.K. f s Harold Wilson phoned a message of solid support to President Johnson. Moreover, the London Economist saw the bombing as part of a drama acted out for the benefit of Mr. Kosygin as a warning to all communist countries "that there are limits beyond which the Viet Cong cannot push things in the South without bringing down' American reprisals on the North. There is no call to specify exactly what these limits are: but to make it clear that they exist, the shot across Mr. Kosygin 1 s bow was essential." WjJ By contrast, de 'Gaulle issued a cool statement that the Southeast Asia crisis "cannot be settled by force of arms" and called again for a new Geneva conference to end the war — ■ a recommendation that was echoed by India's Prime Minister Shastri and U.N. Secretary General U Thant. The pro-Western nations in Sou theast Asia that live in the shadow' of Communist China -- Thailand, Malaysia, Taiwan, Australia -- 2Q TOP SECRET - Sensitive Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 TOP SECRET - Sensitive were visibly cheered, kQ / In South Vietnam, General Nguyen Khanh pro- claimed that the VNAF reprisal strike after Pleiku marked "the happiest day of my life . " . " The most interesting reactions, of course, were those of the Bloc countries . As predicted in CIA f s October I96U estimate, h$/ the reactions of the three principal Communist powers to the limited US repri- sal strikes were relatively restrained, with both Moscow and Peking promptly and publicly pledging unspecified support and assistance to Hanoi. Beneath the verbiage of condemnation of the U.S. "provocation," however, there was a measure of caution in both pledges. Neither raised the specter of a broad conflict or portrayed the U.S. actions as a threat to "world" peace. Peking T s propaganda, though full of bellicosity and bluster, and publiciz- ing huge anti-U.S. rallies organized in China's major cities, carefully avoided. threatening any direct Chinese intervention. Thus it warned that, if the U.S. spread the flames of war to the DRV, "the Vietnamese people will, most assuredly, destroy the U.S. aggressors lock, stock, and barrel on their own soil." 50/ The propaganda line also suggested that only actual U.S. invasion of North Vietnam would precipitate direct Chinese intervention in the war. Moscow's response was even more restrained. "In the face of U.S. actions" the Soviet statement said, the USSR "will be forced, together with its allies and friends, to take further measures to safeguard the security and strengthen the defense capability of the DRV." And it added that "no one should doubt that the Soviet people will fulfill its international duty to the fraternal socialist country." Like Peking, however, it derided U.S. statements that the air strikes were retaliatory, and Soviet media widely publicized international expressions of indignation and popular, protests in the USSR. While indicating that "DRV defenses" would be strength- ened, some Moscow broadcasts took note of growing interest in the United States and elsewhere for a negotiated settlement in Vietnam. 51/ Hanoi f s voluble, heated propaganda reaction to the air strikes pictured the incident as a sequel to previous air and naval "provocations" against the DRV rather than as a move which essentially altered either America's or North Vietnam's positions in the conflict. DRV propaganda hailed the "heroic exploit" of the antiaircraft units and claimed that, in the first raid, 12 planes were downed. . , Officially, Hanoi responded in a more carefully worded fashion. A Defense Ministry statement on the 7th warned that the United States must "bear the responsibility" for the "consequences" of its "aggression" and demanded an $nd to "provocative and war-seeking acts against the DRV and the aggressive war in South Vietnam." Implying that the air raids would not deter future rebel aggression in the South, the DRV Government declared that "the Vietnamese people will never shrink before any threat of the United States" and will "further increase their forces and step up their struggle." The Viet Cong's Liberation Radio on the 8th pro- tested the air raids and said they had "heightened the determination of our people throughout the country to fight and win." 52/ 30 TOP SECRET' - Sensitive Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 n TOP SECRET - Sensitive Yo "SUSTAINED REPRISAL" AM) ITS VARIANTS — ADVOCACY SHIFTS INTO HIGH GEAR A. The McGeorge Bundy Recommendation Pleiku, and the first FLAMQTG DART reprisal, caught the McGeorge Bundy group (which also included Assistant Secretary of Defense John McNaughton, White HotiSe Aide Chester Cooper, and Chairman of the Vietnam Coordinating Group Leonard linger) in the midst of intensive discussions with the US Mission in Saigon. These discussions covered the whole range of US-Vietnam policy options , particularly the complex issue of future pressures on the Horth. Immediately following the reprisal decision of February 7? the group returned to Washington via Air Force One. Enroute and airborne, they drafted a memorandum to the President which was intended to reflect in some degree the consensus reached among the Bundy group and with the U.S. Mission in Saigon. 53/ But in an unmistakable way, the memo- randum also represents a highly personal Bundy assessment and point of view. For this reason, and because of its unique articulation of a rationale for the ROLLING THUNDER policy, it is reproduced here in con- siderable detail. The Summary Conclusions, presented at the very outset of the memorandum, set the tone of the more detailed elaboration that is to follow: The situation in Vietnam is deteriorating, and without new U.S. action defeat appears inevitable -- probably not in a matter of weeks or perhaps even months, but within the next year or so. There is still time to turn it around, but not much* - The stakes in Vietnam are extremely high. The American investment is very large, and American responsibility is a fact of life which is palpable in the atmosphere of Asia, and even elsewhere. The international prestige of the United States, and a substantial part of our influence, are directly at risk in Vietnam. There is no way of unloading the burden on the Vietnamese themselves, and there is no way of negotiat- ing ourselves out of Vietnam which offers any serious promise at present. It is possible that at some future time a neutral non- Communist force may emerge, perhaps under Buddhist leader- ship, but no such force currently exists, and any negotiated U.S. withdrawal today would mean surrender on the installment plan. The policy of graduated and continuing reprisal outlined in Annex A is the most promising course available, in my judgment. That judgment is shared hy all who accompanied me from Washington/ and I think by all members of the country team* 31 TOP SECRET - Sensitive Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 TOP SECRET - Sensitive The events of the last twenty- four hours have produced a practicable point of departure for this policy of reprisal, and for the removal of U.S. dependents.. They may also have catalyzed the formation of a new Vietnamese government. If so, the situation may he at a turning point. There is much that can and should "be done to support and^ to supplement our present effort, while adding sustained repri- * sals. But I want to stress one important general conclusion which . again is shared by all members of my party: the U.S. mission is composed of outstanding men, and U e S. policy within Vietnam is mainly right and well directed. None of the special solutions or criticisms put forward with zeal by individual reformers in government or in the press is of major importance, and many of them are flatly wrong. Wo man is perfect, and not every tactical step of recent months has been perfectly chosen, but when you / described the Americans in Vietnam as your first team, you were right . After a brief description of the general situation in Vietnam as the Bundy group found it, the memorandum explains the crucial question of whether and to what degree a stable government is a necessity for the successful prosecution, of U.S. policy in Vietnam. It is well to bear in mind that the achievement of considerable government stability had been made, in all previous "pressure guidance," a sine qua non of any transi- tion to Phase II action against the North. And yet GVN stability con- tinued to be a most elusive goal. Bundy now seemed to be arguing that the U.S. may have been insisting on a more perfect government than was really necessary, at least in the short run: For immediate purposes -- and especially for the initia- tion of reprisal policy, we believe that the government need be no stronger than it is today with General Khanh as the focus of raw power while a weak caretaker government goes through the motions. Such a government can execute military decisions and it can give formal political support to joint US/GVN policy. That is about all it can do. - In the longer run, it is necessary that a government be established which will in one way or another be able to main- tain its political authority against all challenges over a longer time than the governments of the last year and a half. The composition and direction of such a government is a most difficult problem, and we do not wholly agree with the mission in our estimate of its nature. The mood of the mission with respect to the prospect of obtaining such a government is one of pessimism and frustra- tion. This is only natural in terns of the events of the past many weeks. . 8 . 32 TOP SECRET - Sensitive Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 TOP SECFET - Sensitive 'Specifically, we believe that General Khanh, with all his faults, is by long odds the outstanding military man currently in sight — and the most impressive personality generally. We . do not share the conclusion of Ambassador Taylor that he must somehow be removed from the military and political scene. There are strong reasons for the Ambassador's total lack of confidence in Kharih. At least twice Khanh has acted in ways that directly spoiled Ambassador Taylor's high hopes for Decem- ber. When he abolished the High National Council he undercut^ the prospect of the stable government needed for Phase II action against the North. In January he overthrew Huong just when the latter, in the Embassy's view, was about to succeed in putting the bonzes in their place... • . . ...our principal reasons for opposing any sharp break with N Khanh is that we see no one else in sight with anything like his ability to combine military authority with some sense of politics. Bundy also differed from the Embassy on the necessity of "facing down" the Buddhist leaders, believing instead that they should be "incorporated" into GVN affairs rather than being "confronted." He stressed the significance of these differences, but then generously en- dorsed the Mission's overall relationship to and handling of the GVN. Having registered these two immediate and important differ- ences of emphasis, we should add that in our judgment the mission has acted at about the right level of general involvement in the • problem of Vietnamese government -making. American advice is sought by all elements, and all try to bend it to their own ends. The mission attempts to keep before all elements the importance of stable government, and it quietly presses the value of those who are known to be good, solid, able ministerial timber... ...It is important that the mission maintain a constant and active concern with the politics of government -making. This it is doing. Bundy then went on to pay obeisance to the need for a stronger pacification program and for greater recognition that the Vietnamese need "a sense of positive hope": If we suppose that new hopes are raised — at least tem- porarily -- r by a reprisal program, and we support further that a government somewhat better than the bare minimum is established, the most urgent order of business will then be the improvement and broadening of the pacification program, especially in its non-military elements... ...Vietnamese talk is full of the need for 'revolution.' f>s Vietnamese practice is empty of action to match the talk — 9 33 TOP SECRET - Sensitive Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 TOP SECRET - Sensitive so much so that the word 'revolution 1 sometimes seems to have no real meaning. Yet in fact there is plainly a deep and strong yearning among the young and the unprivileged^ for a • new and "better social order. This is what the Buddhist leaders are groping toward; this is what the students and young Turk generals are seeking. This yearning does not find an adequate response in American policy as Vietnamese see it. This is one cause of latent ant i -American feeling. We only perceived this problem toward the end of our visit. We think it needs urgent further attention. We make no present recom- mendations. We do believe that over the long pull our military and political firmness must be matched by our political and eco- nomic support for the hopes that are embodied to Vietnamese in the word 'revolution. x Bundy harbored no illusions concerning the enemy's ability .and determination: The prospect in Vietnam is grim. The energy and persis- tence of the Viet Cong are astonishing. They can appear anywhere -- and at almost any time. They have accepted extra- ordinary losses and they come back for more. They show skill in their sneak attacks and ferocity when cornered. Yet the weary country does not want them to win. There are a host of things the Vietnamese need to do better and areas in which we need to help them. The pla.ce where we can help most is in the clarity and firmness of our own commitment to what is in fact as well as in rhetoric a common cause. Finally, Bundy explained the central rationale of his recommen- dations: . There is one grave weakness in our posture in Vietnam which is within our own power to fix -- and that is a wide- spread belief that we do not have the will and force and patience an determination to take the necessary action and stay the course. This is the overriding reason for our present recommen- dation of a policy of sustained reprisal. Once such a policy is put in force, we shall be able to speak in Vietnam^on many topics and in many ways, with growing force and effectiveness. One final word. At its very best the struggle in Vietnam will be long. It seems- to us important that this fundamental fact be made clear and our understanding of it be made clear 3 ^ TOP SECRET - Sensitive I Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 TOP SECRET - Sensitive to our own people and to the people of Vietnam. Too often in the past we have conveyed the impression that we expect an early solution when those who live with this war know that no early solution, is possible. It is our own belief that the people of ^he United States have the necessary will to accept and to execute a policy that rests upon the reality that there is no short cut *to success in South Vietnam." • Appended to the Bundy memorandum as Annex A is a detailed, care- fully formulated explanation of his "sustained reprisal" policy , including specific action recommendations. Because of its explicitness and clarity, it is reproduced in full: ! "~ "A POLICY OF SUSTAINED REPRISAL "i . Introductory "We believe that the best available way of increasing our chance of . success in Vietnam is the development and execution of a policy of • sustained reprisal against North Vietnam --a policy in which air and naval action against the North is justified by and related to the whole Viet Cong campaign of violence and terror in the South. "While we believe that the risks of such a policy are acceptable , we emphasize that its costs are real. It implies significant U.S. air losses . even if no full air war is joined , and it seems likely that it would eventually require an extensive and costly effort against the whole air defense system of North Vietnam. U.S. casualties would be higher -- and more visible to American feelings — than those sustained in the struggle in South Vietnam. "Yet measured against the costs of defeat in Vietnam, this program seems cheap. And even if it fails to turn the tide -- as it may -- the value of the effort seems to us to exceed its cost. "II. Outline of the Policy ■ ■■'■ • "l. In partnership with the Government of Vietnam, we should develop and exercise the option to retaliate against any VC act of violence to persons or property. "2. In practice, we may wish at the outset to relate our reprisals to those acts of relatively high visibility such as the Pleiku incident. Later, we might retaliate against the assassination of a province chief, but not necessarily the murder of a hamlet official: we might retaliate against a grenade thrown into a crowded cafe in Saigon, but not neces- sarily to a shot fired in a small shop in the countryside. "3. Once a program of reprisals is clearly "underway, it should not be necessary to connect each specific act against Eorth Vietnam to a 35 TOP SECRET - Sensitive Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 TOP SECRET - Sensitive particular outrage in the South. It should "be possible, for example , to 'publish weekly lists of outrages in the South and to have it clearly understood that these outrages are the cause of such action against the North as may be occurring in the current period. Such a more generalized pattern of reprisal would remove much of the difficulty involved in find- ing precisely matching targets in response to specific atrocities. Even in such a more general pattern, however, it would be important to insure that the general level of reprisal" action remained in close correspondence with the level of outrages in the South. We must keep it clear at every stage both to Hanoi and to the world, that our reprisals will be reduced or stopped when outrages in the South are reduced or stopped — and that we are not attempting to destroy or conquer North Vietnam. "U. In the early stages of such a course, we should take the appro- priate occasion to make clear our firm intent to undertake reprisals on any further acts, major or minor, that appear to us and the GVN as indicating Hanoi's support. We would announce that our two governments have been patient and forebear ing in the hope that Hanoi would come to its senses without the necessity of our having to take further action; but the outrages continue and now we must react against those who are responsible; we will not provoke; we will not use our force indiscrimi- nately; but we can no longer sit by in the face of repeated acts of terror and violence for which the DRV is responsible. «. "5. Having once made this announcement, we should execute our re- prisal policy with as low a level of public noise as possible. It is to our interest that our acts should be seen -- but we do not wish to boast about them in ways that make it hard for Hanoi to shift its ground. We should instead direct maximum attention to the continuing acts of violence which are the cause of our continuing reprisals. "6. This reprisal policy should begin at a low level. Its level of force and pressure should be increased only gradually -- and as indicated above it should be decreased if VC terror visibly decreases. The object would not be to "win" an air war against Hanoi, but rather to influence the course of the struggle in the South. "7» At the same time it should be recognized that in order to main- tain the power of reprisal without risk of excessive loss, an. "air war" | may in fact be necessary. We should therefore be ready to develop a separate justification for energetic flak suppression and if necessary I for the destruction of Communist air power. The essence of such an I * explanation should be that these actions are intended solely to insure ■; the effectiveness of a policy of reprisal, and in no sense represent j any intent to wage offensive war against the North. These distinctions I should not be difficult to develop. "8. It remains quite possible, however, that this reprisal policy would get us quickly into the level of military activity contemplated in the so-called Phase II of our December planning. It may even get us 36 TOP SECRET - Sensitive Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 TOP SECRET - Sensitive "beyond this level with Hanoi and Peiping, if there is a Communist counter- action. We and the GVN should also be prepared for a spurt of VC terror- ism.., especially in urban areas, that would dwarf anything yet experienced. These are the risks of any action. They should be carefully reviewed — but we believe them to be acceptable. "9. We are convinced that the political values of reprisal require a continuous operation. Episodic responses geared on a one-for-one basis to "spectacular 7 ' outrages would lack the persuasive force of sustained pressure. More important still, they would leave it- open to the Communists to avoid reprisals entirely by giving up only a small element of their own program. The Gulf of Tonkin affair produced a sharp upturn in morale in South Vietnam. When it remained an isolated episode, however, there was a severe relapse. It is the great merit of the proposed scheme that to stop it the Communists would have to stop enough of their activity in the South to permit the probable success of a determined pacification effort . "III. Expected Effect of Sustained Reprisal Policy * "1. We emphasize that our primary target in advocating a reprisal policy is the improvement of the situation in South Vietnam. Action against the forth is usually urged as a means of affecting the will of Hanoi to direct and support the VC. We consider this an important but longer-range purpose. The immediate and critical targets are in the South --in the minds of the South Vietnamese and in the minds of the Viet Cong cadres. I "2. Predictions of the effect of any given course of action upon the states of mind of people are difficult. It seems very clear that if the United States and the Government of Vietnam join in a policy of reprisal, there will be a sharp immediate increase in optimism in the South, among nearly all articulate groups. The Mission believes and our own conversations confirm -- that in all sectors of Vietnamese opinion there is a strong belief that the United States could do much mere if it would, and that they are suspicious of our failure to use more of our obviously enormous power • At least in the short run, the reaction to reprisal policy would be very favorable. "3. This favor abl reaction should offer opportunity for increased American influence in pressing for a more effective, government -- at least in the short run. Joint reprisals would imply military planning in which the American role would necessarily be controlling, and this I ' " new relation should add to our bargaining power in other military efforts 1 — and conceivably on a wider plane as well if a more stable government is formed. We have the whip hand in reprisals as we do not in other fields. ft k* The Vietnamese increase in hope could well increase the readi- ness of Vietnamese factions themselves to join together in forming a more effective government. 37 TCP SECRET - Sensitive Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 TOP SECRET - Sensitive n 5« We think it plausible that effective and sustained reprisals, even in a low key, would have a substantial depressing effect upon the morale of Viet Cong cadres in South Vietnam. This is the strong opinion of CIA Saigon* It is based upon reliable reports of the .initial Viet Cong reaction to the Gulf of Tonkin episode, and also upon the solid general assessment that the determination of Hanoi and the apparent timidity of the mighty United States are both major items in Viet Cong confidence. "6. The long-run effect of reprisals in the South is far less clear. It may be that like other stimulants , the value of this one would decline over time. Indeed the risk of this result is large enough so that we ourselves believe that a very major effort all along the line should be made in South Vietnam to take full advantage of the immediate stimulus of reprisal policy in its early stages. Our object should be to use this new policy to effect a visible upward turn in pacification, in govern- mental effect iveness, in operations against the Viet Cong, and in the whole US/gVN relationship. It is changes in these areas that can have enduring long-term effects. . * "7» While emphasizing the- importance of reprisals in the South, we do not exclude the impact on Hanoi. We believe, indeed, that it is of great importance that the level of reprisal be adjusted rapidly and visibly to both upward and downward shifts in the level of Viet Cong offenses. We want to keep before Hanoi the carrot of our desisting as well as the stick of continued pressure. We also need to conduct the application of the force so that there is always a prospect of worse to come . ^ "8. We cannot assert that a policy of sustained reprisal will succeed in changing the course of the contest in Vietnam. It may fail, and we cannot estimate the odds of success with any accuracy — they may be somewhere between 25/£ and 79$* What we can say is that even if it fails, the policy will be worth it. At a minimum it will damp down the charge that we did not do all that we could have done, and this charge will be . important in many countries, including our own. Beyond that, a reprisal policy — to the extent that it demonstrates U.S. willingness to employ this new norm in counter-insurgency — will set a higher price for the future upon all adventures of guerrilla warfare, and it should therefore somewhat increase our ability to deter such adventures. We must recognize, however, that that ability will be gravely weakened if there is failure for any reason in Vietnam. • "IV. Present Action Recommendations "1. This general recommendation was developed in intensive discus- sions in the days just before the attacks on Pleiku. These attacks and cur reaction to them have created an ideal opportunity for the prompt development and execution of sustained reprisals. Conversely, if no such 38 TOP SECRET - Sensitive i Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 TOP SECRET - Sensitive policy is now developed, we face the grave danger that Pleiku, like the Gulf of Tonkin, may be a short-run stimulant and a long-term depressant. We therefore recommend that the necessary preparations "be made for con- tinuing reprisals. The major necessary steps to "be taken appear to us to be the following: n (l) We should complete the evacuation of dependents. "(2) We should quietly start the necessary westward deploy- ments of back-up contingency forces. » "(3) We should develop and refine a running catalogue of Viet Cong offenses which can be published regularly and related clearly to our own reprisals. Such a catalogue should perhaps build on the founda- tion of an initial White Paper. n (k) We -should initiate joint planning with the GVK on both the civil and military level. Specifically, we should give a clear and strong signal to those now forming a government that we will be ready for this policy when they are. , A TT (5) We should develop the necessary public and diplomatic state- ments to accompany the initiation and continuation of this program. "(6) We should insure that a reprisal program is matched by renewed public commitment to our family of programs in the South, so that the central importance of the southern straggle may never be neg- lected. "(7) We should plan quiet diplomatic communications of the precise meaning of what we are and are not doing, to Hanoi, to Peking and to Moscow. "(8) We should be prepared to defend and to justify this new policy by concentrating attention in every forum upon its cause -- the aggression in the South. .T (9) We should accept discussion on these terms in any forum, but we should not now accept the idea of negotiations of any sort except on the basis of a stand down of Viet Cong violence. A program of sus- . tained reprisal, with its direct link to Hanoi's continuing aggressive actions in the South will not involve us in nearly the level of inter- national recrimination which would be precipitated by a go-North program which was not so "connected. For this reason the international pressures for negotiation should be quite manageable." B. The Taylor Conception of "Graduated Reprisals" * At about the same time that the McGeorge Bundy memorandum was being submitted to the President, Ambassador Taylor, in a cable from 39 TOP SECRET - Sensitive Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 TOP SECRET - Sensitive Saigon, ^h/ conveyed his own views concerning a future reprisal program to Washington. Not surprisingly, (since they had exchanged ideas ex- tensively in Saigon) Taylor's concept closely paralleled Bundy 's in many of its features. But in at least one significant respect it diverged •sharply. Whereas Bundy ? s main objective was to influence the course of the struggle in the South (providing a boost to GVN morale and cohesion, affording an opportunity for increased American influence upon and bar- » gaining power with the GVN, and exerting a depressing effect upon VC cadres), Taylor's principal aim was "to bring increasing pressure on the DRV to cease its intervention." The areas of agreement between Taylor and Bundy were considerable. Like Bundy, he recommended ,T a measured, controlled sequence of actions against the DRV taken in reprisal for DRV-inspired actions in South Vietnam... ...carried out jointly with the GVN and ... directed solely against DRV military targets and infiltration routes..." The reprisals could be "initiated on the basis of a general catalogue or package of VC outrages, no one particularly grave itself...! 1 and could be varied "with the general level of VC outrages in SW or, if we so desired, progressively raised.... Thus it would be tantamount to the so-called Phase II escalation, but justified on the basis of retaliation." Like Bundy, he believed "that we should limit US/GVN publicity to the bare minimum..." and he also cautioned that "we should attempt to avoid in the present situation a general letdown in morale and spirit which followed our action in the Tonkin Gulf." But Taylor's concept was much more directly aimed at bringing pres- sures to bear against the DRV, to give them "serious doubts as to their chances for ultimate success" and to cause them to cease their aggression and to accede to a rigorously enforced 195^/1962 Geneva-type settlement. 55/ It was this focus on the North , rather than a rededication of the GVN to the struggle in the South , that Taylor considered to be the real benefit • of a reprisal policy. Integrating the Vietnamese in a program against the DRV, he believed, would, have an exhilarating effect which, if exploited early "could lead to a greater sense of purpose and direction both in the government *nd the military and awaken new hope for eventual victory on the part of the Vietnamese people." In a subsequent cable, 56/ Taylor spelled out his "graduated reprisal" concept in a more orderly fashion: » In review of the rationale for concept of graduated repris- als we are of the opinion that, in order of importance, it should have the following objectives: (a) The will of Hanoi leaders; (b) GVN morale; and (c) Physical damage to installations having some bearing on the DRV ability to support VC. kO TOP SECRET - Sensitive Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 TOP SECRET - Sensitive Of these three, first appears to us "by far the most important , since our effectiveness in influencing Hanoi leadership will, in the long run, determine the success or failure of our efforts in both North and South Vietnam, Second objective, effect on GFVH morale, is also important md fortunately the requirements for building morale in the South are roughly the same as those for impressing Hanoi leaders with the rising costs of their support of the VC. In this case, -what is bad for Hanoi is generally good for Saigon. | Effect of the physical destruction of material objects and infliction of casualties will not, in our judgment, have a decisive bearing upon the ability of DRV to support VC. However, j degree of damage and number of casualties inflicted gauge the j impact of our operations on Hanoi leadership and hence are im- * portant as a measure of their discomfort. ...We should keep our response actions controllable and optional to maximum degree possible so that we can act or withhold action when and as we choose. This need for flexi- bility argues strongly for vagueness in defining criteria for situations justifying retaliation and for retention of freedom of action to make ad hoc decisions in light of our interests at the moment. But in any case, complete flexibility will not be possible... « • Assuming that we have achieved control and flexibility, we will then need to think of the tempo which we wish to communi- cate to the retaliatory program, with primary consideration given to effect of the program on Hanoi leadership. It seems clear to us that there should be a gradual, orchestrated accele- ration of tempo measured in terms of frequency, size, number and/or geographical location of the reprisal strikes and of related activities such as BARREL ROLL and 3^-A. An upward trend in any or all of these forms of intensity will convey signals which, in combination, should present to the DRV leaders a vision of inevitable, ultimate destruction if they do not change their ways. The exact rate of acceleration is a matter of judg- ment but we consider, roughly speaking, that each successive week should include some new act on our part to increase pressure on Hanoi ... We do not believe that our reprisal program will lead the GVN to believe that we have taken over their war and that they can reduce their anti-VC activities. We hope that the opposite will be the effect and the retaliatory actions in the North will give impulsion to the defensive efforts in the South. However, the Dept's fear can certainly not be ruled out and we shall watch closely the GVL reaction to the program as it unfolds." Ul TOP SECRET - Sensitive Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 TOP SECRET - Sensitive One of Ambassador Taylor's major concerns was that, if a graduated reprisals program were adopted, it would be necessary to begin discus- sions with the GW to seek agreement on mutually acceptable terms for the ultimate settlement of the conflict. Taylor thought of this 'as a •process of education by which he would guide the GW towards formulat- ing a "framework of demands to be made on the DRV as well as the general negotiating procedure^." He outlined his proposed "terms for cessation of our reprisal attacks" as follows: 57/ A* Demands 1. DRV return to strict observance of I95H accords with respect SW and the 1962 agreement with respect to Laos — that is, stop infiltration, and bring about a cessation of VC armed insurgency. (With respect to Laos strictly observe the 1962 accords with respect to Laos, including the with- drawal of all Viet Minh forces and personnel from Laos and recognize that the freedom of movement granted therein in Laos ■ under those accords is not subject to veto or interference by any of the parties in Laos.) B. In return and subject in each instance to a judgment that DRV is complying faithfully and effectively: 1. U.S. will return to 195^- accords with respect to ' military personnel in SW and GW would be willing to enter into trade talks looking toward normalization of economic relations between DRV and GW. 2. Subject to faithful compliances by DRV with 195I+ accords, U.S. and GW would give assurances that they would not use force or support the use of force by any other party to upset the accords with respect to the DRV. 3. Within the framework of the 195*4- accords, the GW would permit VC desiring to do so to return to the DRV without their arms and would grant amnesty to those peacefully laying down their arms and desiring to remain in SW. C. If and when Hanoi indicates its acceptance of foregoing conditions, careful consideration must be given to immediate subsequent procedures which will avoid danger of: (a) becoming involved in a cease fire vis-a-vis the DRV and/or the VC accompanied by strung-out negotiations; fb) making conditions so stringent as to be unworkable from practical point of view. Probably best procedure would be to have the GW and DRV meet in the DMZ at the military level under ICC auspices with U.S. observers to reach agreement mechanics of carrying out under- standing while action against the VC and DRV cc>ntinues, at k2 TOP SECR'SI - Sensitive Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 TOP SECRET - Sensitive least in principle. RLG would have to be associated with these negotiations at some point. It is evident from these and similar tough settlement terms and cessation "demands" that were "being discussed "between Saigon and Washing- ton at that time that there was a real expectation that the kinds of reprisal pressures contemplated would inflict such pain or threat of pain upon the DRV that it would be compelled to order a stand-down of Viet Cong violence and accept conditions that, from their point of view, were tantamount to surrender. Such a view is even more clearly implicit in the comments and proposals on reprisal programs emanating from the U.S military leadership. C. CINCPAC's "Graduated Pressures" Philosophy Admiral Sharp, commenting on Ambassador Taylor's reprisal and negotiating concepts, called attention to the need to make the reprisal program a very forceful one, if the DRV was to be persuaded to accede to a cessation on US terms: While it may be politically desirable to speak publicly in terms of a "graduated reprisal" program, I would hope that we are thinking, and will act, in terms of a "graduated pressures" philosophy which has more of a connotation of steady, relentless . movement toward our objective of convincing Hanoi and Peiping of the prohibitive cost of them of their program of subversion, insurgency and aggression in SEAsia. If a firm decision is made to embark upon a graduated pressures program, the recommendation contained in ^Taylor's Feb 11 message/ to undertake discussions with the RVN refer- ence joint US/GVN military actions is most necessary. Failure to develop firm arrangements concerning roles and responsibili- ties could result in over reliance on the U.S. contribution to the war effort, and perhaps GW resorting to rash military actions from which we would have to bail them out. There is no question of the desirability of concurrently educating the GVTT, as also proposed in Ref b, toward formula- tion of war objectives, demands and negotiating procedures to be employed against the DRV. I believe that sueh an educational process, combined with a graduated military pressures program will further contribute to GVS stability. We must be certain that we are dealing from a posture of strength before we sit down at the bargaining table. Success- ful direct increasing military pressures against KVN must be complemented by a reversal of the trend toward VC success within RVN. We must also exhibit- complete confidence in our ^3 TOP SECRET - Sensitive Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 TOP SECRET - Sensitive ability to win in Vietnam and so indicate by our "willingness to rely on our military superiority if need be. We must not be driven to premature discussions with the DRV in our eagerness to find a solution to the Southeast Asian problem. We should continue our military pressures, making (our) general objectives publicly known, while awaiting ! some sign that the DRV is ready to negotiate towards achieve- ment of those objectives... . * • ..Finally, any political program which is designed to formulate terms and procedures for reaching agreement on cessation of a graduated military pressures program, will be successful in proportion to the effectiveness of the military pressures program itself. 58 y ■ D. JCS Eight -Week Program As these discussions continued, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, re-* sponding to a McNamara request of 8 February, sent to the Secretary of Defense their recommendations 59/ for an initial program of military actions against the DRV, extending over a period of eight weeks. In accordance with McNamara ! s instructions, the program was to be confined generally to targets along Route 7 and south of the 19th parallel, was to employ both RVK and US forces, and was to be primarily a plan for air strikes. Since it was so constrained, the JCS program does not fully reflect the preferences of the Joint Chiefs. But it does reveal some- thing of their thinking. The context in which the program would be undertaken is described as follows: It is visualized that the initial overt air strikes of this program will have been undertaken as a retaliation in response to a provocative act by Viet Cong or DRV forces against US or RVM personnel or installations. Successive overt operations to provide sustained pressures and progressive destruction will be continued on the plausible justification of further provocations, which on the basis of recent past experience seem quite likely to exist. As this program continues the realistic need for precise event -association in this reprisal context will progressively diminish. A wide range of activities are within the scope of what may be stated to be provocations justifying reprisal* . The program called for two to four US-TOAF strikes per week, ini- tially against targets along Route 7 south of the 19th parallel and near the Laos border. Specifically, the program was conceived as follows: » The air attacks are scheduled for the first eight weeks at . the rate of four fixed targets a week... These initial targets are located South of the 19th parallel with the exception of 44 TOP SECRET - Sensitive Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 TOP SECRET - Sensitive Target 89, an Armed Route Reconnaissance of Route 7> in the DRV close to the Laos border. BARREL ROLL missions in Laos- will "be coordinated with air strikes in the DRV near the Laos border to ensure maximum effectiveness. a. The targets are attacked in the order of ascending risk to attacking forces and are attacked at a frequency that assures that continuous and regular pressure is maintained against the DRV. Authority should be delegated to CBTCPAC to select alternate weather targets from the list of previously approved targets for the eight weeks program. Subsequent weekly operations would be adjusted as appropriate when alter- nate targets are attacked. b. Airfields north of the 19th parallel are not scheduled for attack in the first eight weeks. However, if, during the scheduled attacks in this program, DRV or CKCOM aircraft attempt intercept of US/EVH forces, the communist air threat involved should be eliminated. The program of gradu- ated pressures would then have reached a higher scale of esca- lation and would require reorientation. • 4 The program also provided for naval gunfire bombardment and for con- tinuation of already ongoing activity, including 3^A operations, resump- tion of DESOTO Patrols, and authorization for ground cross border operations. To carry out this program, the JCS wished to deploy about 325 more aircraft to the Western Pacific to deter or cope with any escalation that might result. " This would include dispatch of 30 B-52 T s to Guam, deployment of 9 more USAF tactical fighter squadrons and a fourth air- craft carrier'. Some Marine and Army units would go to Thailand, and other units would be alerted. As for the risks of escalation, the JCS considered these as manage- able: The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the DRV, Communist China, and the Soviet Union will make every effort through pro- paganda and diplomatic moves to halt the US attacks. The DRV also will take all actions to defend itself, and open, overt aggression in South Vietnam and Laos by the DRV might occur. In addition, the mere initiation of the new US policy almost certainly would not lead Hanoi to restrain the Viet Cong; Hanoi would probably elect to maintain the very intense levels of activity of the past few days. However, if the United States persevered in the face of threats and international pressures, and as the degree of damage inflicted on North Vietnam increased, the chances of a reduction in Viet Cong activity would rise. 45 TOP SECRET - Sensitive Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 TOP SECRET - Sensitive They further "believe that the Chinese communists would "be reluc- tant to become directly involved in the fighting in Southeast Asia; however, as the number and severity of US attacks against . the DRV increase , they probably would feel an increased compul- sion to take some dramatic action to counter the impact of US pressures. There is a fair chance that Peiping would introduce limited numbers of Chinese ground forces as "volunteers" into North Vietnam, and/or northern Laos, intending to raise the • spector of further escalation, to underline its commitment to assist the North Vietnamese, and to challenge the Soviets to • extend corresponding support. They also' believe that the probable Soviet response to these US courses of action would consist both of a vigorous diplomatic and propaganda effort to bring the United States to the conference table and the provision of military sup- port to North Vietnam. While the extent and nature of the latter are difficult to predict, it almost certainly would include anti- aircraft artillery and radars. In order to provide a more effec- tive defense against the US air attacks, North Vietnam would probably press for surface-to-air missiles. The chances are about even that the Soviets would agree to provide some SA-2 defenses, but they would do so in ways calculated to minimize the initial risks to them. By providing the necessary Soviet personnel in the guise of 'technicians, 7 the USSR could preserve the option of ignoring any Soviet casualties. In the event the DRV and Com- munist Chinese openly undertake aggressive actions, the United States and its allies can deal with them adequately.... It is the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the program herein proposed will demonstrate to the DRV that con- tinuation of its direction and support of insurgencies will lead progressively to more serious punishment. If the insurgency con- tinues with active DRV support, strikes against the DRV will be • extended with intensified efforts against targets north of the 19th parallel. While the Joint Chiefs recommended approval of the recommendations, not all considered them adequate. General McConnell, Air Force Chief of Staff, believed that the much heavier air strike recommendations, made by the JCS in late I96H were more appropriate than the mild actions now proposed. 60 / General Wheeler backed deployment of more USAF and other air units but pressed for an integrated air program against the North 1 s transportation system, especially railroads. He also believed, along with General Harold K. Johnson, Army Chief of Staff, that three U.S. ground divisions might have to be sent to Southeast Asia. The JCS chairman directed the Joint Staff to examine the possibility of placing one or two of these divisions in northeast Thailand and a third, aug- mented n oy allied personnel, south of the demilitarized zone in South Vietnam. k6 • TOP SECRET - Sensitive Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 TOP SECRET - Sensitive Some of these JCS recommendations were quickly accepted, particu- larly those having to do with Air Force deployments. Thus the Adminis- tration approved the dispatch, from 11 to 13 February, of 30 B-52 f s to Guam and 30 KC-135 f s to Okinawa. Designated Arc Light, these bombers and tankers of the Strategic Air Command (SAC) initially were earmarked- (though never used) for high-altitude, ail-weather bombing of important targets in the North .* 6l/ The particular JCS air strike program, on the other ha$d, was. never adopted. The detailed JCS' target proposals did figure prominently in the intensive highest-level reprisal and pressures planning that con- tinued during the succeeding weeks and months, but that planning was conducted essentially on an ad hoc basis, strike by strike, and did not at this stage embrace a multi-week program^ «• • 14-7 TOP SECRET - Sensitive Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 TOP SECRET - Sensitive VI. INITIATION OF "ROLLING THUNDER" — 18 DAYS OF MANEUVER AMD DELAY A. The Presidential Decision and Taylor y s Response The fonal Presidential decision to inaugurate what eventually emerged as the ROLLING THUNDER program' was made on Sunday , February 13. It was reported to Ambassador Taylor in a NODIS cable 62 / drafted in the White House and transmitted to Saigon late that afternoon. The full text of the message follows: The President today approved the following program for immediate future actions in follow-up decision he reported to you in Deptel 1653* ,/The first FLAMING DART reprisal decision//" 1. We will intensify by all available means the program of pacification within SVN. 2. We will execute a program of measured and limited air action jointly with GVN against selected military targets in DRV remaining south of 19th parallel until further notice, FYI. Our current expectation is that these attacks might come about once or twice a week and involve two or three targets on each day of operation. END FYI. 3. We will announce this policy of measured action in general terms and at the same time, we will go to UN Security Council to maJke clear case that aggressor is Hanoi. We will arlso make it plain that we are ready and eager for 'talks' to bring aggression to an end. k. We believe this 3-part program must be concerted with GVN, and we currently expect to announce it by Presidential statement directly after next .authorized air action. We believe this action should take place as early as possible next week. 5. You are accordingly instructed to seek immediate GVN agreement on this program. You are authorised to emphasize our * conviction that announcement of readiness to talk is stronger diplomatic position than awaiting inevitable summons to Security Council by third parties. We would hope to have appropriate GVN concurrence by Monday jjel> l^th/ if possible here. In presenting above to GVN, you should draw fully, as you see fit, on following arguments: a. We are determined to continue with military actions regardless of Security Council deliberations and any 'talks T or negotiations that may ensue, unless and. until Hanoi has brought 48 TOP SECRET - Sensitive Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 • • TOP SECRET - Sensitive its aggression to an end. Our demand would be that they cease infiltration and all forms of support and also the activity they are directing in the south. b. We consider the UN Security Council initiative, following another strike, essential if we are to avoid being faced with really damaging initiatives by the USSR or perhaps by such powers as India, France, or even the UN. c. At an early point in the UN Security Council initia- tive, we- would expect to see calls for the DRV to appear in the UN. If they failed to appear, as in August, this will make doubly clear that it is they who are refusing to desist, and our position in pursuing military actions against the DRV would be strengthened. For same reason we would now hope GVN itself would appear at UN and work closely with US. d. With or without Hanoi, we have every expectation that any f talks' that may result from our Security Council initiative would in fact go on for many weeks or perhaps months and would above all focus constantly on the cessation of Hanoi's aggression as the precondition to any cessation of military action against the DRV. We further anticipate that any detailed discussions about any possible eventual form of agreement returning to the essentials of the I95U Accords would be postponed and would be subordinated to the central issue. For your private guidance, the following draft language is under consideration for Presidential announcement: BEGIN QUOTE : The aggression has continued. It has continued against the Vietnamese, and it has continued against Americans. In support of the independence of Vietnam, in the service of our nation, and in fulfillment of the solemn public obligation of our nation, and in our individual and collective self-defense, the Govern- ment of the United States, with the Government of Vietnam, has now decided that further action must be taken. The actions we have agreed upon are three: First and most important, we will continue and will intensify still further our campaign against terror and violence in South Vietnam itself. The establishment of civil peace and the disarm- ing of the Communist forces are the first order of business for both our Governments. Our military and police actions will be increasingly energetic and effective. We will also strengthen and enlarge our efforts to move forward with the peaceful de- velopment of a society set free from fear. We will never make 1^9 • TOP SECRET - Sensitive Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 TOP SECRET - Sensitive * the mistake of assuming that there is any substitute for victory against aggression "where it shows its open face — inside the borders of South Vietnam itself. Second -- and at the same time -- we will carry out measured but effective actions against military targets in North Vietnam. These actions will be reported to the United Nations' Security Council under the Provisions of Article 51 of the United Nations Charter — and each such report will include a full account of the continuing acts of aggression which make our actions neces- sary. These actions will stop when the aggression stops. Third, we will press with urgency for talks designed to bring an end to the aggression and its threat to peace. I have today instructed Ambassador Stevenson to seek such action urgently, in the Security Council of the United Nations, and if that body should be hamstrung by any veto, we shall then press for. talks in another appropriate forum. We believe that in any such talks the first object must be an end of aggression, and we believe that the government in Hanoi must be brought to the conference room. Our common purpose — and our only purpose — is to restore the peace and domestic tranquility which others have so savagely attacked. END QUOTE Several aspects of the. message are of interest. First, it features- intensified pacification as the first order of business and as a major point in the contemplated Presidential announcement. This stress on action in the South reflected a serious concern at high levels in the White House and the State Department at that time, that a growing pre- occupation with action against the North would be likely to cause the US Mission and the CVN leadership to neglect the all- import ant struggle within the borders of South Vietnam. Second, the description of the air strike program in the message is extremely cursory, suggesting that the President at this time still wished to preserve as much flexibility as r possible concerning the future scope and character of the program. And third, the message reveals the Presidents intention, as of that date, to take the DRV aggression issue and the US bombing response promptly before the UN Security Council — an intention that was dropped several days . later in favor of a quite different approach, namely the UK/USSR Co-Chairmen initiative recounted below. In actuality, instead of mount- ing a major UN approach, the President contented himself initially with a brief public statement 63 / of US objectives in Vietnam, which formed the keynote of the official line, and was to be frequently quoted by Administration officials in subsequent weeks: • As I have said so many, many times, and other Presidents ahead of me have said, our purpose, our objective there is clear. That purpose and that objective is to join in the de- fense and protection of freedom of a brave people who are under attack that is controlled and that is directed from outside their country. 50 TOP SECRET - Sensitive Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 TOP SECRET - Sensitive We have no ambition there for ourselves. We seek no dominion. We seek no conquest. We seek no wider war. But we must all understand that we will persist in the defense of freedom and our continuing actions will be those which are justified and those that are made necessary by the con- tinuing aggression of others. These actions will be measured and fitting and adequate. Our stamina and the stamina of the American people is equal to the task. Ambassador Taylor received the news of the President's new program with enthusiasm. In his response, however, he explained the difficulties he faced in obtaining authentic GW concurrence "in the condition of virtual non-government" which existed in Saigon at that moment. The Vietnamese Armed Forces Council had arrogated unto itself the authority of appointing the Chief of State and the Premier, and had left him to his own devices in trying to form a cabinet. Any GW concurrence that Taylor could obtain would have to be a consensus of a lame-duck acting prime minister, a widely mistrusted military commander-in-chief, a prime- minister -de sign ate with uncertain prospects, and assorted other power figures in a foundering caretaker government. This Alice -in -Wonder land atmosphere notwithstanding, Taylor was undaunted: It will be interesting to observe the effect of our pro- posal on the internal political situation here. I will use the occasion to emphasize that a dramatic change is occurring in U.S. policy, one highly favorable to GW interests but de- manding a parallel dramatic change of attitude on the part of the GTO. Now is the time to install the best possible govern- ment as we are clearly approaching a climax in the next few months. The U.S. Mission and the GW will have serious prob- lems to work out together, many of them complicated matters in the field of foreign affairs where the GW must strengthen its professional representation. We need the first team and we need it fast. There is just a chance that the vision of possible victory may decide Khanh to take over the government at this juncture. Alternately, it may create some measure of national unity which will facilitate the task of Quat or of any other Prime Minister who succeeds in forming a new government. Gh/ Quat's charces for creating national uni+y -- even with the assist of an imminent "dramatic change in US policy" — were slim indeed. Quat's government was the ninth attempt to form a viable structure since the overthrow of Diem. It was obvious from the outset that it would be under the domination of the Armed Forces Council which had publicly declared that it would "act as a mediator until the government is popularly elected. 51. TOP SECRET - Sensitive Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 TOP SECRET - Sensitive The mediator himself, however, was to be rent asunder within days of Quat's assumption of office in one of those explosions that had become so typical in Vietnam since Diem's demise. That political explos.ion was particularly unfortunate in its timing in relation to the "dramatic" new ROLLING THUHDER program just then set to get under way. B. ROLLING THUNDER I is Laid On- -and Cancelled A refinement of the February 13 decision on ROLLING THUHDER, including determination of the timing and character of the first air strike, was evidently made by the President on February 18. A NODIS cable 65/ of that date informed nine American posts in the Far East of the decisions in the following words: Policy on Viet-Nam adopted today calls for following: 1. Joint program with GW of continuing air and naval action against North Viet-Nam whenever and wherever necessary. Such action to be against selected military targets and to be limited and fitting and adequate as response to continuous aggression in South Viet-Nam directed in Hanoi. Air strikes will be jointly planned and agreed with GVN and carried out on joint basis. 2. Intensification by all available means of pacification program within South Viet-Kam, including every possible step to find and attack VC concentrations and headquarters within SVN by all conventional means available to GVN and US. 3* Early detailed presentation to nations of world and to public of documented case against DRV as aggressor. Forum and form this presentation not yet decided, but we do not repeat not expect to touch upon readiness for talks or negotiations at this time. We are considering reaffirmation our objectives in some form in near future. • h. Careful public statements of USG, combined with fact of continuing air action, are expected to make it clear that mili- tary action will continue while aggression continues. But focus of public attention will be kept as far as possible on DRV aggression, not on joint evil/US military operations. There will be no comment of any sort on future actions except that all such actions will be adequate' and measured and fitting to aggres- sion. (You will have noted President's statement of yesterday, which we will probably allow to stand.) Addressees should inform head of government or State (as • appropriate) of above in strictest confidence and report re- actions. In the case of Canberra and Wellington you may indicate we would be prepared respond to questions through embassies here tomorrow. 52 • TOP SECRET - Sensitive I Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 •> 7 TOP SECRET - Sensitive ion may indicate that we will seek to keep governments infomed, subject to security considerations, of each opera- tion as it occurs } as we did with respect to operations of February 7 and 11, 66/ Although the cable does not indicate it, the first air action under the new program was set for February 20th. Dubbed ROLLING THUM)ER I, it called for US strikes* against Quang Khe Naval Base and concurrent VNAF strikes against Vu Con Barracks, with appropriate weather alternates pro- vided. The above cable was sent from Washington at 8:00 p.m. on February 18th. Five hours later, at 1:00 p.m., February 19 (Saigon time), Colonel • Pham Ngoc Thao, a conspiratorial revolutionary figure who had been active in the coup against Diem, began his infamous semi-coup to oust General Khanh -- but not to overthrow the Armed Forces Council. Aided by General Phat, his forces succeeded in occupying the ARVN military headquarters and other key government buildings in Saigon, including the radio station. Until the coup was defeated and Khanh 1 s reslgna/tion submitted some ^-0 hours later, pandemonium reigned in Saigon. Ambassador Taylor promptly recom- mended cancellation of the February 20 air strike and his recommendation was equally promptly accepted.' In a FLASH message to all recipients of the cable quoted above, Washington rescinded the instructions to notify respective heads of state until further notice "in view of the disturbed * situation in Saigon."" 67/ The "disturbed situation" was not to settle down completely for almost a week. Even though the semi-coup failed quickly and the Aimed Forces Council reasserted its full authority, the AFC continued the anti- Khanh momentum of the coup-plotters by adopting a "vote of no confidence" in Khanh. The latter made frantic but unsuccessful efforts to rally his supporters. Literally running out of gas in Nha Trang shortly before dawn on February 21, he submitted his resignation, claiming that a "foreign hand" was behind the coup. Ho one, however, could be ouite certain that Khanh might not "re-coup" once again, unless he were physically removed from the scene. This took three more days to accomplish. On the after- noon of February 25, after some mock farewell performances designed to enable Khanh to save face, he left Vietnam to become an Ambassador-at- Large. At the airport to see him off and to make sure that he was safely dispatched from the country, was Ambassador Taylor, glassily polite. It was only then that Taylor was able to issue, and Washington would accept, clearance for the long postponed and frequently rescheduled first ROLLING THUNDER strike. - C. The UK/USSR Co-Chairmen Gambit • Political turbulence in Saigon was net the only reason for delay- ing the air action. Even before the semi-coup broke out, forcing can- cellation of the February 20 strike, a diplomatic initiative was taken by the Soviet Foreign Office in Moscow, that was eagerly picked up by London and Washington,, and that quickly drew attention to- the adverse consequences that might flow from an air strike executed at that very moment, concurrently with the diplomatic initiative in question. 53 TOP SECRET. - Sensitive J Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 T TOP SECRET - Sensitive On February 17, the UK Ambassador to Washington, Lord Harlech, in- - formed Secretary Rusk that the Soviet Foreign Office had approached the British with the suggestion that the UK-USSR Co-Chairmanship of the ■ 195^ Geneva Conference might be reactivated in connection with the ! current Vietnam crisis. Secretary Rusk described the possibilities of such a gambit in a message 68/ to Ambassador Taylor as follows: British apparently expect that next Soviet step might j be to propose a joint statement by two Co-Chairmen on bomb- ings in North Viet-Nam as reported to Co-Chairmen by regime in Hanoi. Interest of Soviet Government in co- chairmanship, though not yet confirmed, might also reflect some relief for Moscow regarding dilemma in which they may find themselves in dealing with Hanoi, Peiping and Southeast Asia issues. It may prove desirable for us to provide, to UK and USSR full statement of facts as we' see them, US purposes in Southeast Asia and our concept of necessary solution. . .We would stop short of ourselves proposing formal systematic negotiations but assumption of 195^- co-chairmanship by two governments would imply that they might themselves explore with in- terested governments possibilities of solution, which we could encourage or otherwise as we see fit. If message is . , made to two Co-Chairmen, which would be made public, it may mean that better procedure would be to present full documen- tation on North Viet-Namese aggression to /U N. Secretary General/ in writing for circulation to members rather than make oral presentation in meeting of Security Council which might require Soviets to act as defense counsel for Hanoi. • "Obviously, this has bearing on timing of next strike. Hope to be in touch with you within next several hours on our further reflection on this problem. Do not believe a Thursday /February 18/ strike therefore feasible because of this time factor and because these possibilities have not been explored here at highest level. * With encouragement from Rusk, the British Foreign Office showed itself eager to pick up the Soviet hint. London proposed to make a formal ap- proach to the Soviet Government ? through UK Ambassador Trevelyan in Moscow. Specifically, they wished to instruct the Ambassador to propose to the Soviet Government that the Co-Chairmen of the 195^- Geneva Conference re- i ' quest the Governments which were members of that Conference and those I ' represented on the International Control Commission "to furnish the Co-Chairmen without delay with a statement of their views on the situa- tion in Viet-Nam and, in particular, on the circumstances in which they cpnsider that a peaceful settlement could be reached. . In a further discussion with Lord Harlech on February 19, §9/ Secre tary Rusk agreed to the proposed British action and. Ambassador Trevelyan was duly instructed to approach the Soviet Foreign Office in Moscow on February 20. 5k TOP SECRET - Sensitive Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 TOP SECRET - Sensitive What were US expectations with respect to this initiative, and how did it rebate to the new policy of pressures against the DRV? An excel- lent indication of State Department thinking on these matters at that moment is contained in an unfinished draft memorandum dated February 18, prepared by William P. Bundy and entitled "Where Are We Heading?" Because it is addressed to the relevant issues of that moment and surveys the political-diplomatic scene, it is reproduced here in full: This memorandum examines possible developments and prob- lems if the US pursues the following policy with respect to South Viet -Ham: a. Intensified pacification within South Vietnam. To meet the security problem, this might include a significant increase in present US force strength. b. A program of measured, limited, and spaced air attacks, jointly with the GVN, against the infiltration complex in the DRV. Such attacks would take place at the rate of about one a week, unless spectacular Viet Cong action dictated an immediate response out of sequence. The normal pattern of such attacks would comprise one GVH and one US strike on each occasion, confined to targets south of the 19th parallel, with variations in severity depending on the tempo of VC action, but with. a slow upward trend in severity as the weeks went hy* •c. That the US itself would take no initiative for talks,, but would agree to cooperate in consultations -- not a confer- ence -- undertaken by the UK and USSR as Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conferences. As an opening move, the British would request an expression of our views, and we would use this oc- casion to spell out our position fully, including our purposes and what we regard as essential to the restoration of peace. We would further present our case against the DRV in the form of a long written document to be sent to the President of the • United Nations Security Council and to .be circulated to members of the UN. * 1. Communist responses a. t Hanoi would almost certainly not feel itself under pressure at' any early point to enter into fruitful negotiations or to call off. its activity in any way. They would denounce the continued air attacks and seek to whip up maximum world opposi- tion to them. Within South Viet-Nam/they might avoid spectacular actions, but would certainly continue a substantial 'pattern of activity along past lines, probably with emphasis on the kind of 55 TOP SECRET - Sensitive Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 TOP SECRET - Sensitive incidents we have seen this week, in which Communist agents stirred up a village protest against .government air attacks, and against the US. Basically, they would see the situation ■ in South Viet -Nam as likely to deteriorate further (crumble as they havs put it), and would be expecting that at some point someone in the GW will start secret talks with them behind our backs. * b. Communist China might supply additional air defense equipment to the DRV, but we do not believe they would engage in air operations from Communist China, at least up to the point where the MIGs in the DRV were engaged and we had found it necessary to attack Fukien or possibly --if the MIGs had been moved there -- Vinh. ■ c. The Soviets would supply air defense equipment to the DRV and would continue to protest our air attacks in strong terms. However, we do not believe they would make any new commitment at this stage, and they would probably not do so even if the Chicams became even more deeply involved -- provided that we were not ourselves attacking Communist China. At that point, the heat might get awfully great on them, and they would be in a very difficult position to continue actively working as Co- Chairman. However, their approach to the British on the Co- Chairmanship certainly suggests that they would find some relief in starting to act in that role, and might use it as a hedge against further involvement, perhaps pointing out to Hanoi that • the Co-Chairman exercise serves to prevent us from taking extreme action and that Hanoi will get the same result in the end if a political track is operating and if, in fact, South Viet-Nam keeps crumbling. They might also argue to Hanoi that the exis- tence of the political track tends to reduce the chances of the Chicoms having to become deeply involved -- which we believe Hanoi does not want unless it is compelled to accept it. • 2* Within South Viet -IT am the new government is a somewhat better one, /Note : this was written one day before the semi- coup/ but the cohesive effects of the strikes to date have at most helped things a bit. The latest MACV report indicates a deteriorating situation except in the extreme south, and it is unlikely that this can be arrested in any short period of time even if the government does hold together well and the military go about their business. We shall be very lucky to see a level- ing off, mrch less any significant improvement, in the next two months. In short, we may have to hang on quite a long time before we can hope to see an improving situation in South Viet- nam — and this, in turn is really the key to any negotiating position we could have at any time. 56 TOP SECRET - Sensitive Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 TOP SECRET - Sensitive 3. On the political track we believe the British will under- take their role with vigor , and that the Soviets will be more reserved. The Soviets can hardly hope to influence Hanoi much at this point, and they certainly have no leverage with Communist China. In the opening rounds, the Soviets will probably fire off some fairly sharp statements that the real key to the situa- tion is for us to get out and to stop our attacks, and the opposing positions are so far apart that it is hard to see any- useful movement for some time to come. We might well find the Soviets -- or even the Canadians -- sounding us out on whether we would stop our attacks in return for some moderation in VC activity. This is clearly unacceptable, and the very least we should hold out on is a verified cessation of infiltration (and radio silence) before we stop our attacks. Our stress on the cessation of infiltration may conceivably lead to the Indians coming forward to offer policing forces --a suggestion they have made before -- and this would be a constructive move we could pick up. But, as noted above, Hanoi is most unlikely to trade on this basis for a long time to come. k. In sum -- the most likely prospect is for a prolonged period without major risks of escalation but equally without any give by Hanoi . " In retrospect, Bundy's expectations appear appropriately sober and realistic in comparison with more euphoric views held by some of his ^con- temporaries. Particularly with respect to the Co-Chairmen gambit, his predictions were strikingly close to the mark. The British did in f act . ^ "undertake their role with vigor" and, as it turned out, the Soviets were indeed "more reserved." So much so, that the Co-Chairmen initiative eventually came to naught. * At this point in time, however, (in the days following February 20th) the Co-Chairman proposal was in orbit and real hopes were held- out for it. Trevelyan had approached Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Lapin with the proposal and the Soviet officials had agreed to take it under advisement, warning Trevelyan that absolute secrecy was essential. U.S. Ambassador to Moscow Foy Kohler, upon learning of the UK/Soviet undertaking, ex- pressed his concern that the air strikes on the DRV planned for February 20 would put the Soviets on the spot, and frould cause them to reject the British proposal. 70 / r ' Washington reassured Kohler by advising him that the scheduled strikes were being postponed and also informed him th?t, when rescheduled, the strikes would be tied to a major DRV aggressive act which had just come to light. 71/ It appears that, on February l6, an armed ocean-going North Vietnamese vessel, carrying large quantities of arms and ammunition, was intercepted and captured as it was infiltrating into Vung Ro Bay in South Vietnam, to deliver its cargo to the VC. It was thought that, by 57 TOP SECRET - Sensitive Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 TOP SECRET - Sensitive pegging the strikes primarily to that boat incident , and by directing the strikes in part against a DRV naval base, the risk of an adverse Soviet reaction would be minimized. During the next several days, Washington was in almost continuous communication (l) with Taylor in Saigon -- to ascertain whether the political situation had stabilized sufficiently to permit rescheduling the postponed air strikes; (2) with Kohler in Moscow — to feel the pulse of the Soviet government and its likely reaction to the upcoming air operation; and (3) with Ambassador Bruce in London — to monitor the progress of the Trevelyan approach to the Soviet Foreign Office concern- ing the Co-Chairman process. Throughout this time, Secretary Rusk was visibly torn on the question of whether or not to proceed with the air strikes. He wanted very much to push ahead immediately, in order to exploit promptly the DRV arms ship incident which seemed to beg for some response. But he hesitated to launch a strike on behalf of and in con- cert with a government that was teetering and whose Commander-in-Chief was in the process of being deposed; he also wished to avoid angering the Soviets, thus possibly sabotaging their Co-Chairmen effort. On the other hand, he wanted to make it clear that the U.S. would not indefinitely accept a "unilateral ceasefire" while the Co-Chairman effort dragged on. It is important to note that the Co-Chairmen gambit was not viewed by anyone involved on -the US side as a negotiating initiative. On the j contrary, every effort was made to avoid giving such an impression. Instead, the gambit was intended to provide a vehicle for the public ex-' pression of a tough U.S. position. This was clearly implied in Washing- ton messages to Saigon and London on this issue, as, for example, in a cable from Unger to Taylor: 72/ You should not reveal possibility this UK/USSR gambit to GTO for time being. We naturally wish have it appear entirely as their initiative, so that our reply would not be any kind of initiative on our part and would, in its content, make clear how stiff our views are. . Finally, by February 2^th, since no reply had as yet been received from Moscow and the situation in Saigon had begun to settle down, Secre- tary Rusk felt he could hold off no longer. In a message to Bruce in London, he wrote: * 'We have decided that we must go ahead with next operation Feb. 26 unless there should be further political difficulties in Saigon. Taylor will be seeking political clearance after- noon Feb. 25 Saigon time once Khanh is off the scene. We told Harlech this decision today stating that while we recognized British concern and possibility some Soviet reaction we cannot even by implication get into position of withholding 58 TOP SECRET - Sensitive Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 TOP SECRET - Sensitive - continuation of program. We may hear further from London following his report "but would now expect to maintain decision and indeed Taylor would probably have gone ahead on political side. If matter comes up you may of course note that we have held off five days "but that British have not had any indication of Soviet response so that further delay now appeared unwise. We continue of course attach major importance to UK/Soviet gambit. . . 73/ Confidence that the Co-Chairman initiative would pay off was beginning to wane , and the air strikes were indeed being rescheduled for February 26 • A continuous readiness to launch had in fact been maintained every since February 20, by simply postponing the strikes for 2k hours at a time and laying on new strikes whenever a change in targets or in operating rules had been decided upon. The February 26 operation was the fourth repro- gramming of the strikes and thus went by the code, designation ROLLING THUNDER IV, even though RT's I through III had been scratched, jh/ Fully expecting that the February 26 air operation would go off - as planned, State sent out a cable 75/ to thirteen posts, quoting the probable text of a joint GVN/US announcement that was to be made at about 2:00 a.m. Washington time on February 26, and instructing all addressees to contact their respective host governments as soon as FLASH notification was received that the mission had in fact been executed. The execution messages however, never came. Weather over the entire target area in North Vietnam had closed in, forcing another postponement and, ultimately, cancellation of the strikes. The weather remained adverse for four more days. It was not until March 2 that the first of the new program strikes, dubbed ROLLING THUNDER V was actually carried out. a D. Efforts at Public Justification and Persuasion The need to communicate the new policy promptly and persuasively to the public had been recognized throughout the I96U planning process as an essential ingredient of any graduated pressures campaign. Now the time had come to put the information and education plans into effect. Over the weekend of February 12, serious work was begun in the State Department on the preparation of a "White Paper" on the infiltra- . tion of men and supplies from the North. Sueh a public report was con- sidered essential to justifying any program of U.S. military operations against North Vietnam. The compilers of the. exhibits for the public record were handicapped however s by the fact that the most persuasive evidence on DRV infiltration and support was derived from Special Intelli- gence sources which could not be revealed without embarrassment and detri- ment to other U.S. security interests. The White Paper that was submitted to the U.S. public and to the. United Nations on February 27. therefore, did not make as strong a case as it might have of the extent and nature of DRV involvement in the war in the South. It did serve, however, to put the U.S. case in the public record and to affirm the limited nature of U.S« objectives toward North Vietnam. 76/ 59 TOP SECRET - Sensitive Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 TOP SECRET - Sensitive Concurrently, the Administration undertook to communicate to "both foreign and domestic audiences its determination to prevent Communist destruction of the Government of South Vietnam and to underline the limited character of its objectives in Southeast Asia. A series of "leaked" press analyses suggested that the most recent and the antici- pated air strikes constituted a clear threat of extensive future destruc- tion of North Vietnamls military assets and economic investments. They inferred that such consequences could be avoided if Hanoi would agree to cease its direct support of the insurgency in the South, At the same time, privately the State Department asked the Canadian ICC representative Blair Seaborn again to act as a discreet intermediary with Hanoi , conveying to the DRV leadership the same statement on Viet- nam that had been handed by U.S. Ambassador Cabot to Chicom Ambassador Wang Kuo-chuan in Warsaw on February 2k 9 reaffirming that the United States had no designs on the territory of North Vietnam, nor any desire to destroy the DRV. On his March visit to Hanoi, Seaborn sought an appointment with Prime Minister Pham Van Dong, but was obliged to settle for a meeting with the chief of the North Vietnamese Army T s Liaison Section, to whom he read the statement. This officer commented that it contained nothing new and that the North Vietnamese had already received a briefing on the Warsaw meeting from the Chi corns. The Canadian Govern- ment publicly noted in April that Seaborn had two important conversations with DRV officials in recent months, but did not go into details. In the closing days of February and continuing through the first week of March, Secretary Rusk conducted a marathon public information campaign to explain and justify the new U.S. policy and to signal a seemingly reasonable but in fact quite tough U.S. position on negotia- tions. In part, the Rusk campaign was precipitated by a press confer- ence comment by U Thant at the United Nations on February 2k , implyin a- o that the U.S. had perhaps not been as zealous in its quest for peace as it might have been. Thant went so far as to assert that "the great American people, if they only knew the true facts and the background to the developments in South Vietnam, will agree with me that further blood- shed is unnecessary." The suggestion that the U.S Government wasn't leveling with the U.S. public produced a sharp retort from Secretary Rusk; • We have talked over the past 2 years informally and on a number of occasions with the Secretary-General. . .as well as with many governments in various parts of the world... But the proposals that I know about thus far have been procedural in nature. The missing piece continues to be the absence of any indication that Hanoi is prepared to stop doing what it is doing against its neighbors. ...This question of calling a conference, under what circumstances -- these are procedural matters. What we are interested in, what is needed to re- store peace to Southeast Asia, is substance, content', and indication that peace is possible in terms of the appetites and the attitudes of the other side. 77/ 60 TOP SECRET- Sensitive Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 TOP SECRET - Sensitive This and similar themes were endlessly reiterated in the ensuing days:- . The key to peace in Southeast Asia is the readiness of all in that area to live at peace and to leave their neigh- bors alone.... A negotiation aimed at the confirmation of aggression is no.t possible. And a negotiation which simply ends in "bitterness and hostility merely adds to the danger. 78 / South Viet-Nam is being subjected to an aggression from the North, an aggression which is organized and directed and supplied with key personnel and equipment by Hanoi. The hard core of the Viet Cong were trained in the North and have been reinforced hy North Vietnamese from the North Vietnamese army ... Our troops would come home tomorrow if the aggressors would go north - go back home, and stay at home... The missing, piece is the lack of an indication that Hanoi is prepared to stop doing what it is doing, and what it knows that it is doing, to its neighbors. 79/ m But when asked under what circumstances the U.S. might sit down to talk to Hanoi, Rusk was clearly as yet unwilling to appear publicly receptive: I am not getting into the details of what are called ' . preconditions, because we are not at that point - we are not at that point. Almost every postwar negotiation that has managed to settle in some fashion some difficult and 'dangerous question has been preceded by some private indi- , cation behind the scenes that such a negotiation might be possible. That is missing here -- that is missing here. 30/ Rusk's disinterest in negotiation -- except on "absolutist" terms — was, of course, in concert with the view of virtually all the President's key advisors, that the path to peace was not open." Hanoi, at about that time, held sway over more than half of her southern neighbor and could see the Saigon Government crumbling before her very eyes. The balance of power in South Vietnam simply did not furnish the United States with . a reasonable basis for bargaining and the signals from Hanoi and Moscow — or lack thereof — did not encourage Optimism about the sort of hard settlement the U.S. had in mind. All this pointed directly to military pressures on North Vietnam and to other, urgent measures to tilt the balance of forces the other way. Until these measures could have seme visible and tangible effect, talk of negotiation could be little more than a- hollow exercise. « At the same time, while neither Moscow nor Hanoi seemed in the least •interested in U.S. style "conciliation," the likelihood of explosive escalation also seemed remote. So far there was no visible sign of 61 TOP SECRET - Sensitive Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 TOP SECRET - Sensitive ominous enemy countermoves. An assessment of probable Soviet responses to the evolving U.S. f 'pressures" policy, cabled to the Department by. Foy Kohler in Moscow, 8l/ was moderately reassuring and indeed quite perceptive: 1. Soviets will make noises but not take decisive action 1 'in response to specific retaliatory strikes in southern areas DRV, probably including -- after publication "White Paper" — strike against DRV sealrft capabilities in this area. Indeed, Soviets, likely to read our failure to continue carry out such strikes as confirmation their estimates re weakness our basic position in SW. » 2. Soviet military aid program in DRV is probably defen- sive in nature and Soviets would wish to keep it that way. However, if attacks on DRV become general, particularly if they are extended to industrial or urban target s_ and areas • beyond border zone. Soviets will reassess our intent as well as basic politico-military situation. If reassessment leads them to see U.S. aim as ending existence of DRV as socialist state, Soviets will not only step up defensive aid but supply means of counterattack, e.g., aircraft for raids on SVH cities . and heavy ground equipment. While aware of risk that this might bring Peiping actively into picture, Soviets will not hold back if existence of DRV seems threatened. 3* There seems no possibility of change in present hard Soviet posture at least until after March 1 CP meeting and its aftermath or until they somehow convinced of real danger of major escalation and direct confrontation. k. Major factor underlying Soviet position is conviction . that in Vietnam situation, unlike Cuban crisis, we are almost alone among allies and even U.S. public opinion seriously divided; any real and publicized improvement in this picture would correspondingly influence Soviet policy. 5. Apart their estimate as to our relative isolation, Soviet failure move toward negotiations on any basis con- ceivably acceptable to USC- also reflects DRV and CPR posture and Moscow's unwillingness or inability to impel DRV to call off activities in SW or yield control of territory they now hold. To extent Soviets can influence communist attitude toward negotiations, they might in face cf increasingly dangerous situation decide to work toward settlement based on coalition Govt in SW, convincing own allies that this only temporary situation. 6. Major Soviet Dilemma - Imperatives of commitment and position in communist world vs. interest in developing rela- tions with US and West - will -oersist during Vietnam crisis. 62 TOP SECRET - Sensitive Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 ■ TOP SECRET - Sensitive If they consider necessary to protect position in own camp 5 Soviets are probably prepared to see relations vrith US suffer for indefinite period. With the immediate fear of escalation thus somewhat allayed and the public concern temporarily pacified^ attention began to shift toward de- veloping ROLLING THUNDER into a more forceful continuous program. 63 TOP SECRET - Sensitive Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 ~ TOP SECRET - Sensitive VII. ROLLING THUMPER BECOMES A CONTINUING PROGRAM A. McNamara T s Concern Over Cost-Ineffectiveness of Strikes As has "been indicated, ROLLING THUNDER was finally inaugurated, after much delay and postponement, on March 2. On that day, 10U USAF aircraft (B-52 T s, F-100 ! s, F-105 ! s, and refueling KC-135 T s) struck the Xom Bang Ammo Depot, while 19 VNAF A.-lH T s hit the Quang Khe Naval Base. 82/ This was the first strike on the North in which USAF aircraft played the dominant role. Although the attack was officially proclaimed "very suc- cessful," the loss of four USAF aircraft, three to antiaircraft fire, in- tensified earlier OSD concern over the effectiveness of the strikes and over the vulnerability of US aircraft. Shortly after the first two February reprisal raids, the Secre- tary of Defense had received some disturbing bomb damage assessment reports that indicated that, ...with a total of 267 sorties (including flak suppression, etc.) directed against U91 buildings, we destroyed ^7 buildings and damaged 22. The reports caused McNamara to fire off a rather blunt memoran- dum to the CJCS, dated 17 February 1965, which stated in part: Although the four missions left the operations at the targets relatively unimpaired, I am quite satisfied with the results. Our primary objective, of course, was to communi- cate our political resolve. This I believe we did. Future communications of resolve, however, will carry a hollow ring unless we accomplish more military damage than we have to 'date. Can we not better meet our military objectives by choosing different types of targets, directing different weights of effort against them, or changing the composition of the force? Surely we cannot continue for months accom- plishing no more with 267 sorties than we did on these four missions. The Chairman of the JCS promptly asked his staff to look into the matter and reported back a few days J_ater on seme initial points of interest: (1) We do not have sufficient or timely information about the results of the strikes; (2) In light of prior detailed study of the targets (9U Target Study), the weight of effort expended against at least two of them is open to question; (3) The weaponeering against the directed targets is . open to question. 6k TOP SECRET - Sensitive Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 TOP SECRET - Sensitive In view of these deficiencies, the CJCS continued, ...I intend to ask the Joint Staff, in drafting its proposals for future strikes, to insure that the critical elements of target selection and weight of effort are evaluated as carefully as possible against specific and ■ realistic military objectives. At the same time, I believe the commander of the operating force should have a degree of flexibility with respect to the weaponeering of the strikes and their timing. My concern here is that the operational commander be given adequate latitude to take advantage of his first-hand knowledge of the target and its defenses as well as of the changing conditions of weather and light. '2. I am also asking the Director, DIA, to propose a standardized and streamlined system of after-action re- porting so that prompt and responsive analysis of strike results can be made available to those who require it. 83 / Immediately after the first ROLLING THUNDER strike on March 2, Deputy Secretary of Defense Cyrus R. Vance convened a meeting attended by Air Force Secretary Eugene M. Zuckert and other USAF officials to consider using the high-flying B-52 T s for pattern bombing in either North or South Vietnam to avoid Communist ground fire. The Air Staff and SAC recommended reserving B~52 f s for use against major targets in the North. ' The idea of B-52 pattern bombing was not again seriously considered until April. On the same date (March 2) Secretary McNamara asked that the Joint Staff prepare as soon as possible an analysis of US aircraft losses to hostile action in Southeast Asia. Qk / An expe- dited review and analysis of this subject was promptly undertaken, covering the experience in YANKEE TEAM (Reconnaissance), BARREL ROLL (Armed Reconnaissance/interdiction) , BLUE TREE (Photo Reconnaissance), PIERCE ARROW (Tonkin Gulf Reprisal) , FLAMING DART and ROLLING THUNDER operations. The results were reported to the Secretary of Defense on March 10, 85/ and, aside from presenting some early and not too reveal- ' ing statistical findings, the report urged that consideration be given to several measures that, the Chairman felt, might help minimize loss rates: (1) Authorize use of NAPALM. * - r (2) Provide "optimum" strike ordnance not yet available in the theater. (3) Allow the operational commander flexibility in strike timing and selection of alternate targets so as to minimize weather degradations and operational interferences &t target. £ 65 TOP SECRET - Sensitive Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 TOP SECRET - Sensitive (h) Conduct random and frequent weather reconnaissance, and medium and low-level photo reconnaissance, over prospec- tive strike areas of North Vietnam to reduce the likelihood of signaling our intentions . ■ (5) Improve security and cover and deception measures at US/VNAF air base au uo/ vrirvr cxjlX uuocS. These and other measures were explored in greater depth in a EFSAP Study Team effort launched on March 15 and reported on in late May. 86/ Many of the recommendations to lift restrictions and improve air strike technology were "being acted upon during this period and in subsequent days and weeks. For example, the restrictions on the use of FARMGATE and PACOM aircraft were lifted, permitting their use in combat opera- tions in South Vietnam with USAF markings and without VNAF personnel aboard, effective 9 March; 87/ and use of napalm against North Viet- namese targets was approved by the President on the same date. 88 / B . Taylor's Concern Over F e eble, Irresolute Action Sharp annoyance over what seemed to him an unnecessarily timid and ambivalent US stance on air strikes was expressed by Ambassador Taylor. The long delays between strikes, the marginal weight of the attacks, and the great ado about behind-the-scenes diplomatic feelers, led Taylor to complain: I am concerned from standpoint our overall posture vis-a-vis Hanoi and communist bloc that current feverish diplomatic activity particularly by French and British tends to undercut our ability to convey a meaningful signal to Hanoi of USG determination to stick it out here and pro- gressively turn the screws on DRV. Seaborn' s estimate of mood of confidence characterizing DRV leadership despite our joint air strikes to date almost identical our estimate. . .It appears to me evident that to date DRV leaders believe air strikes at present levels on their territory are meaningless and that we are more susceptible to international pressure for negotiations than are they. Their estimate may be based in part on activities of "our friends" to which we seem to be active party. , ' * In my view current developments strongly suggest that we follow simultaneously two courses of action: (l) attempt to apply brakes to British and others in their headlong dash to conference table and leave no doubt in their minds that we do not intend to go to conference table until there is clear evidence Hanoi (and Peking) prepared to leave neighbors alone; and (2) step up tempo and intensity of our air strikes in southern part of DRV in order convince Hanoi authorities they 66 TOP SECRET - Sensitive Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 TOP SECRET - Sensitive face prospect of progressively severe punishment. I fear that to date ROLLING THUKDER in their eyes has been merely a few isolated thunder claps. (The sam3 general considerations apply re our urging British to undertake further early soundings re Article 19 Laos Accords as Ambassador Martin so cogently states in his EXDIS 1278 to Dept. fin which Martin expresses concern over the risks of moving to the conference table too soon/. Many of the problems which worry him are also applicable to Vietnamese here and I share his reasoning and concern. It seems to me that we may be in for a tough period ahead but I would hope we will continue to do whatever is required and that we try to keep fundamental objectives vis-a-vis Hanoi clear and simple. 89/ In a separate cable of the same date, 90/ Taylor , with General Westmoreland's explicit concurrence, offered his specific recommenda- tions for increasing the tempo and intensity of the air strikes. In effect, he called for a more dynamic schedule of strikes, a several week program relentlessly marching North to break: the will of the DRV We have a sense of urgent need for an agreed program for the measured and limited air action against military targets in DRV previously/ announced. The rate of once or twice a week for attacks involving two or three targets on each day appears to us reasonable as to frequency, and leaves open the possibility of. increasing the effect on Hanoi by adding to the weight of the strikes (in types of ordnance and sorties per target) and by moving northward up the target system. What seems to be lacking is an agreed program covering several weeks which will combine the factors, frequency, weight and location of attack into a rational pattern which will convince the leaders in Hanoi that we are on a dynamic schedule which will not remain static in a narrow zone far removed from them and the sources of their power but which is a moving growing threat which cannot be ignored. I have seen the JCS proposed eight-week program which has much to recommend it but, I believe, remains too long South of the 19th parallel, fit IsJ Seaborn T s opinion that Hanoi has the impression that our air strikes are a limited attempt to improve our bargaining position and hence are no great cause for immediate concern. Our objective should be to induce in DRV leadership an attitude favorable to US objectives in as short a time as possible in order to avoid a build-up of international pressures to negotiate. ' But our efforts to date are falling far short of achieving the 67 • TOP SECRET - Sensitive Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 TOP SECRET - Sensitive necessary impact. In formulating a more effective program of future attacks , I would be inclined to keep the rate as indi- cated , maintain the weight on target as for recent strikes, • but begin at once a progression of US strikes North of 19th parallel ir a slow but steadily ascendinf movement. The tar- gets in the area South thereof could be reserved largely for VKAF and FAPIIGATE. It is true that the KEG threat will grow as we move North but we have the means to take care of it. If we tarry too long in the South, we will give Hanoi a weak and misleading signal which will work against our ultimate purpose. • • General Westmoreland Concurs. Taylor ! s dissatisfaction with the tempo of the air campaign was by no means mitigated by the decision to launch the next scheduled attack, ROLLING THUNDER VI on March 13, as another isolated, stage-managed joint US/GVN operation. Notification of the decision to strike came to him in the following FLASH message; 91/ Decision has been taken here to execute ROLLING THUNDER VI during daylight hours Saturday 13 March Saigon time. If weather precludes effective strike Phu Qui ammo depot (Target Uo) on this date, US portion of ROLLING THUNDER VI will be postponed until Ik March Saigon time or earliest date weather will permit effec- tive US strike of Target - 1+0. However if US strike weathered out, VNAF strike (with US support) on its own primary or alternate targets is still authorized to go. Request you solicit Quat's agreement this arrangement. If joint US/GVN strike goes .. .would expect GW/US press announcement be made in Saigon. NMCC has furnished time of launch in past and this has proven eminently satisfactory. Will continue this arrangement. ' - ■ If US strike weathered out and GVN strike goes, reconmiend that GVN make brief unilateral press statement which would not detract from already agreed US / GVN statement, which we would probably wish use at time Qt US strike against Target 1+0. GVN unilateral press announcement should indicate strike made by GVN aircraft supported by US aircraft. Would hope that announce- ment, although brief, could also mention target, identifying it as military installation associated with infiltration. Request reply by flash cable. Washington's anticipation that the strike might be weathered out proved correct, and Taylor's pique at the further delay is reflected in his reply: 68 •* TOP SECRET - Sensitive Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 TOP SECRET - Sensitive As reported through military channels , VNAF is. unable to fly today. Hence, there will be no ROLLING THUNDER Mission and. no present need to see Quat. I am assured that VNAF will be ready to go tomorrow, Ik March. With regard to the delays of ROLLING THUNDER VI, I have the impression that ;we may be attaching too much importance to striking target lj-0 because of its intrinsic military value as a target. If we support the thesis (as I do) that the really important target is the will of the leaders in Hanoi, virtually any target North of the 19th parallel will convey the necessary message at this juncture as well as target kO. Meanwhile, through repeated delays we are failing to give the mounting crescendo to . ROLLING THUNDER which is necessary to get the desired results. . \ 5. Increase the scope and tempo of US air strikes against the DRV. This action could tend to broaden and escalate the war. However, it could accomplish the US objective of causing the DRV to cease its support and direction of the Viet Cong aggression. To date, the tempo of punitive air strikes has I been inadequate to convey a clear sense of US purpose to the ! DRV. 70 ' TOP SECRET - Sensitive Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 TOP SECRET - Sensitive 6. Remove self-imposed restrictions on the conduct of air strikes against North Vietnam which have severely reduced their effectiveness and made it impossible to approach the goal of h missions per week. Restrictions which should be lift-ed are; •a. Requirement that a US' strike be conducted concurrently with a VNAF strike. only. b. Requirement that US aircraft strike the primary target c. Ban on use of classified munitions. d. Harrow geographical limitations imposed on target selection. v e. Requirement to obtain specific approval from Washing- ton before striking alternate targets when required by adverse weather conditions or other local conditions. 9§/ After reviewing these recommendations, the President approved most of General Johnson f s program. In regard to the air strikes against the North, the President authorized important new actions, as subsequently described by the JCS: 97/ Action (paras 5 & 6) : The scope and tempo of air strikes against HVH is being increased in current plans. Depots, LOCs, . and air defense ground environment facilities will be stressed in operations in the near future. The requirement for concur- rent US-VNAE strikes has been removed. Only prime targets will be designated as primary or alternates for US aircraft, thus lifting restriction in 6b above.. Greater timing flexibility will • be provided for weather and other delays. Tactical reconnaissance has been authorized at ■ medium level for targets south of the 20th parallel to support the expanded program. Specific recommendations on para 6c, quoted above, are requested. Restrictions in 6d and e, quoted above, have been lifted in ROLLING THUEDER SEVEN and will so remain in subsequent programs. The Presidential decision marked a major turning point in the ROLLING THUNDER operation. Air action against the North was being trans- formed from a sporadic, halting effort into a regular and determined program.' ■ D. ROLLING THUNDER VII — Enter "Regularity" and "Determination" The March 15 Presidential guidelines were clearly reflected in the instructions that Washington sent to Saigon describing the new character of ROLLING THUNDER to begin with RT VII on March 19 . The in- structions contain at least six novel features: 71 TOP SECRET - Sensitive Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 TOP SECRET - Sensitive (i) The strikes "were to "be packaged in a week's program at a time; (2) precise timing of the strikes -were to be left to field commanders; (3) the requirement for US -WAP simultaneity was to "be dropped; (k) the strikes were no longer to be specifically related to VC atrocities; • (5) publicity on the strikes was to be progressively reduced; and • (6) the impression henceforth to be given was one of regularity and determination. Here is the full text of the Secretary of State's message to Ambassa- dor Taylor, describing the new program: 98 / Having in mind considerations raised your reftel ^/Taylor's Saigon 2889 of March 8th, quoted on pp. 66-6fJ and recommenda- tions of General Johnson following his return, longer range program of action against North Viet Nam has been given pri- ority consideration here and program for first week for ROLLING THUNDER VII, has been" decided, for execution this week. Details this program which includes one US and one VNAF strike together with one US and two VNAF route armed recce is subject of instructions being sent through military channels. You will note these instructions leave to military commands in field decisions as to specific timing within period covered. Execution of first action under ROLLING THUNDER VII may take place anytime from daylight March 19 Saigon time. Although program contains full measure' VNAF participation, requirement that US and VNAF operations proceed simultaneously is dropped. You are requested to see Pri Min ASAP in order to outline to him this further program we have in mind and to solicit GVN participation as specified therein. You should convey to PriMin that proposed program, on which you will be providing him with further information in successive weeks, is designed to maintain pressure on Hanoi and persuade North Vietnamese regime that costs of continuing their aggression becoming unacceptably high. At same time Quat should understand we continue seek no enlarge- ment of struggle and have carefully selected targets with view to avoiding undesirable provocation. Further objective is to continue reassure Government and people South Viet Nam we are 72 " TOP SECRET - Sensitive Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 . TOP SECRET - Sensitive and will continue fight by their side and we expect they will also be making maximum efforts in South Viet Nam where a real setback: to Viet Cong would do more than perhaps anything else to persuade Hanoi stop its aggression. With initiation ROLLING THUNDER VII we believe publicity given US and VNAE strikes should be progressively reduced, although in its place there should be picture of GVN and US pursuing with regularity and determination program against the North to enable South restore its independence and integrity and defend itself from aggression from North. Larger strikes (ROLLING THUNDER VII A and VII B) be announced as before but suggest in future that such announcements' not contain references to Viet Cong atrocities, etc. Instead, these matters, which should get full attention, might be subject of separate and perhaps regular press briefings by GVN with full US support. As regards route recce, we question whether we should take initiative to announce these missions since this could contri- bute to impression of substantial increase in activity. At ■ same time we presume reporters will get wind of these missions, Hanoi will report them and WAP may not wish maintain silence. Therefore seems difficult avoid replying to inevitable press questions. Request PIO meeting opening tomorrow Honolulu to look into this one and give us and Saigon its recommendations; possibility it should consider passing off all route recce missions in low key replies to queries as "routine recce.". ROLLING THUNDER had thus graduated to the status of a regular and continuing program. What now remained to be more carefully re-examined — though hardly resolved -- was the problem of target emphasis. 73 TOP SECRET - Sensitive Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 TOP SECRET - Sensitive VIII. TARGET RATIONALE SHIFTS TOWARD INTERDICTION Late February and early March* 1965 saw a significant refocusing of target emphasis. Up to that time --in the initial U.S. reprisal* strides and the first ROLLING THUNDER' actions -- target selection had been com- pletely dominated by political and psychological considerations. Para-' mount in the Administration's target choices were such complex and often conflicting objectives as boosting the GVJVs morale, evidencing the firm- ness of UoS. resolve , demonstrating the potential for inflicting pain upon the DRV, providing a legal rationale for our actions, and so forth. Relatively little weight was given to the purely physical or more directly military and economic implications of whatever target destruction might be achieved. With the gradual acceptance, beginning in March, of the need for a militarily more significant, sustained bombing program, serious attention began to be paid to the development of a target system or systems that would have a more tangible .and coherent military rationale. The first and most obvious candidate for such a target concept was that of inter- dicting the flow of men and supplies into South Vietnam by striking the lines of communication (lOC 's)' of the DRV. Since North Vietnamese "aggression 1 ' was the principal legal Justification for U.S. bombing raids upon the DRV, attacking and impeding the visible manifestations of this aggression — the infiltration — also seemed logical and attractive from this international legality -point of view. The Secretary of Defense's attention was called to this target con- cept as early as 13 February, when the Joint Chiefs briefed McNamara in the Chairman's office on an analysis of the southern portion of the North Vietnamese railway system. It was pointed out in the briefing that South of the 20th parallel there exists about 115 miles of operable rail systems and that the vulnerable points on this southern portion of the system are five bridges of 300 feet or greater length and the railway classification yards at Vinh. It was argued that the bridges were very lightly defended and that only the rail yards at Vinh would pose any serious anti-aircraft defense problem. -The CJCS felt that: There is no doubt but that the six targets mentioned com- prise an attractive, vulnerable and remunerative target system which would hurt the North Vietnamese psychologically, econo- mically and militarily. As regards the latter, the destruction . of the southern bridge system would hamper and delay the move- ment of DRV/CHICOM ground forces to the south and, likewise, would place a stricture on the quantities of materiel and per- sonnel which can be infiltrated through Laos and South Vietnam. A minimum of 201 strike sorties would be required to attack with a high degree of assurance the six targets simultaneously which would be militarily the most desirable timing of attack. » 1 fh . TOP SECRET - Sensitive Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 TOP SECRET - Sensitive In a follow-up memorandum, 99/ the CJCS forwarded to the Secretary of Defense a DIA analysis of VC attacks on the South Vietnamese railway system during 1963 and I96U, and indicated his concurrence with Ambassa- dor Taylor that these attacks justified US/GVE strikes against the rail system* in North Vietnam. The CJCS then added the following recommenda- tion:. As discussed with you on 13 February, while I strongly ' recommend that we attack the Korth Vietnamese rail system as soon as possible, I would recommend against first striking the southern elements thereof. Should we do so I would anti- cipate that the DRV would take both passive and active defense measures to protect rolling stock and bridges and, probably, would start work on train ferries or truck by-passes in order to ameliorate the effects of our strike. As pointed out . earlier I would advocate militarily that the entire southern . ".. segment of the rail system be struck simultaneously. Should this be politically objectionable, I would recommend that the two northern targets -- Dong Phuong rail/highway bridge and Thanh Hoa bridge (prestige bridge) -- be the first targets attacked in order to trap the maximum quantity of rolling stock south of the 20th parallel where we could destroy it at least. . The. Secretary of Defense responded to this recommendation by invit- ing the JCS to develop a detailed" plan for an integrated attack on the DRV rail system south of the 20th parallel, with the option of attackinr the targets individually on an incremental basis rather than all at once. 100 / This request set in motion a planning effort by the Joint Staff and by U.S. military commands in the Pacific area, and gave rise to spirited discussions and recommendations that culminated at the end of March in the submission of the JCS 12 -week bombing program, essentially built around the LOC interdiction concept. General Westmoreland, with Ambassador Taylor's concurrence, strongly endorsed the interdiction rationale in mid-March. In a LH-IDIS cable to Admiral Sharp and General Wheeler, 101 / he called attention to the ■ mounting VC attacks on transportation targets in South Vietnam, and argued that: The Viet Cong ! s intensive efforts against lines of communi- cations would mate strikes against DRV LOC's highly appropriate at this time. In view heavy traffic recently reported moving south, such strikes would also be military desirable. Moreover, these attacks by interrupting the flow of consumer goods ^ to southern DRV would carry to the NVXT man in the street, with minimum loss of civilian life, the message of U.S. determination. Accordingly, early initiation of ROLLING THUHDER strikes and armed reconnaissance is recommended against DRV lines of communi- cation with initial emphasis on railroad and highway bridges south of 19 degrees north. 75 TOP SECRET - Sensitive ^ Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 TOP SECRET - Sensitive Counter- infiltration operations also received a "boost from the recommendation in General Johnson's report to the effect that BARREL ROLL "be re-oriented to increase its military effectiveness against . Lao Panhandle infiltration routes into South Vietnam. Acting upon •that recommendation and upon a Presidential directive to make a maxi- mum effort to shut off infiltration into SW, a new program, nicknamed STEEL TIGER, was developed, for the conduct of greatly intensified air operations against routes and targets in Laos associated with infiltra- tion. 102/ At about the same time, a Pacific Command study group developed - a more comprehensive concept of air operations "to attrit, harass, and interdict the DRV south of 20 degrees." In a lengthy cable to the Joint Chiefs excerpted below, Admiral ShariD described the concept as follows: 103/ The program calls for an integrated strike, armed recce and recce program designed to cut, in depth, the KW logistic network south of 20 degrees, and to continually attrit and harass. by-pass and repair reconstitution efforts. . This program provides for primary bridge/ferry cuts and highway blockage/take out cuts on major long-haul road and rail routes. It additionally cuts the full road network in- cluding all feeder and by-pass routes which develop into k main entry/funnels to Laos and SW. All targets selected -are extremely difficult or impossible to by-pass. The program also provides for concurrent disruption of the sea-carry to SW with strikes against suspect coastal staging points supporting end-running shipping into the area, as well as SVN. L0C network cutting in this depth will degrade tonnage arrivals at the main "funnels" and will develop a broad series of new targets such as backed-up convoys, off-loaded materiel . dumps, and personnel staging areas at one or both sides of cuts. Coupling these strikes with seeding and re-seeding missions to hamper repa.irs, wide ranging armed recce missions against "developed" targets, and coastal harass and attrit missions against coastal staging facilities, may force major DRV -log flow to sea-carry and into surveillance and attack by. our SW coastal sanitization forces... In summary: recommend concerted attacks against L0C targets recommended herein be initiated concurrently with interdiction targets programmed for ROLLING THIHDER 9-13* Preferentially, recommend a compressed "L0C cut program" .similar to my proposal for a "Radar Busting Day." This should be followed by completion of attacks on other than ?6 TOP SECRET - Sensitive Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 TOP SECRET - Sensitive LOG targets in ROLLING THUiDER 10-13, Phase II armed recce would "be conducted concurrently with these actions and would be con- tinued indefinitely to make DRY support to the VC in SVN and PL/VM in Laos as difficult and costly as possible. As these recommendations reached the JCS, the Joint Chiefs were intensely pre-occupied with an inter service division over the issue of the nature and extent of proposed large-scale U.S. troop deployments to South Vietnam, requiring adjudication among at least 10 separate pro- posals, and among widely differing views of the several Service Chiefs. There were also substantial differences over the future character of the bombing program. On this latter issue, Air Force Chief of Staff General McConnell took a maverick position, opting for a 23-day air program against North Vietnam to destroy all targets on the ok-t&rget list. He proposed beginning the air strikes in the southern part of Korth Vietnam and continuing at two- to six-day intervals until Hanoi itself was attacked. "While I support appropriate deployment of ground forces in South Vietnam," McConnell wrote, "it must be done in concert with /an/ overall plan to eliminate the source of /the/ insurgency." McConnell believed that his proposal was consistent with previous JCS views on action against the Korth and would be a strong deterrent against open Chinese intervention. 10U/ General McConnell withdrew his 28-day proposal from JCS considera- tion when it became apparent that the Joint Chiefs were inclined to accept much of the CIRCPAC recommendation for a "LOC-cut program" as summarized above, and to incorporate some of McConnell 1 s concepts in a 12-week air strike program that the Joint Staff was preparing in response to the Secretary of Defense's request and in accordance with his guidance The JCS 12 -week program was briefed to the Secretary of Defense con- ceptually on March 22 and submitted to him formally on March 27 under cover of a JCS memorandum of that date. 105 / The- program is described in a detailed Annex to the memorandum as follows : I. Conce pt. The concept, simply stated, is to conduct an air strike- program during the remaining 10 weeks of a 12 -week program which increases in intensity and severity of damage over the period. The program can be considered in four phases. a. The initial phase consists of a three -week inter- diction campaign against the vulnerable Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DPV) LOCs south of the 20th parallel. The concept of this campaign is to conduct strikes against a number of inter- related but separated choke points which will disrupt the flow of military supplies and equipment and tax the DRV capability . to restore these facilities. Essential to the success of this phase is the initial attacks on targets No. lU. and 18.8 /Thanh 77 TOP SECRET - Sensitive Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 TOP SECRET - Sensitive Hoa and Dong Phuong RR/Highway bridges/. The dropping of at least one span in either and preferably both of these bridges will sever the main north-south railroad and highway routes in sufficient depth for an effective follow-on program. This initial action would be accompanied by an intense armed recon- naissance mission to destroy the isolated transport equipment. Subsequent strikes against choke points throughout the isolated area are designed to make the program effective and to compli- cate the DRV recovery program. Day and night aimed reconnais- sance would be conducted at random intervals to harass these recovery efforts and to sustain the interdiction, including armed reconnaissance against junk traffic over sea LOCs. This initial program should bring home to the population the effects of air strikes since consumer good will be competing with mili- tary supplies for the limited transport. An effective inter- diction in this area will also impede the DRV capability to mass sizeable military, forces and to deploy air defense resources. The remaining few installation targets in this area would be left for later strikes by VKAF. Also, the interdiction in this area would be sustained by VTTAE as US strikes moved to the north. b. The second phase, the launching of the interdiction campaign north of the 20th parallel, introduces a consideration which was not a major factor in the campaign in the southern DRV; i.e., the possibility of LUG intervention as strikes are made against targets progressively closer to the Hanoi-Haiphong area. In order to reduce this possibility to a minimum, the first week of air operations north of the 20th parallel includes strikes against the radar net in the delta area to blind or minimise DRV early warning and intercept capability. Following these preparatory attacks, operations against the LOCs north of the 20th parallel are scheduled with the primary objective of isolating the DRV from external overland sources; i.e., rail and highway supply routes from Communist China. Subsequent to cutting these primary LOCs, the initial phase of the interdic- tion campaign would be completed by striking LOC targets in depth throughout the area of the DRV north of the 20th parallel. c. Having completed the primary interdiction program in the delta, area, a substantially lower effort should maintain its effectiveness. With his overland LOC cut, blocked, and harassed, the enemy can be expected to turn more and more to his port facilities and sea LOC. The ninth week air strikes will include attacks against these port facilities and the mining of seaward approaches to block the enemy from relieving his resupply problems over the sea LOC. Strikes will be initi- ated during the tenth week against ammunition and supply dumps to destroy on-hand stores of supplies and equipment to further aggravate his logistic problems. 78 TOP SECRET - Sensitive Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 TOP SECRET - Sensitive d. In the wind-up phase of the 12 -week program (during the eleventh and twelfth week) , strikes against on-hand supplies., equipment , and military facilities will be continued, attacking remaining worth-while targets throughout the DRV. As a part of this phase, industrial targets outside of population areas will be struck, leading up to a situation where the enemy must realize that the Hanoi and Haiphong areas will be the next logical tar- gets in our continued air campaign. 2. /The program includes/ an anti-MIC- strike package ; how- ever, as provided in the policy guidance furnished the Joint Chiefs of Staff, this mission will not be executed unless the DRV MIG aircraft are able to impair the effectiveness of the strike forces. Combat air patrol aircraft, in sufficient num- bers to deter MIG attack, will accompany all missions and will engage these DRV aircraft as required to protect the force. Strike forces and armed reconnaissance aircraft may persist in their missions but other reconnaissance missions will break off mission to avoid contact with LUG aircraft if feasible. Heavily populated areas will be avoided by both strike and armed recon- naissance missions. 3. Strike sorties for the next ten weeks would total ap- proximately 3,000 or roughly 300 per week. CINCPAC has reported a capability to conduct approximately 1,600 strike sorties per week on a sustained basis. This leaves ample margin for US air support within South Vietnam and Laos and substantial armed reconnaissance to sustain the L0C interdiction. . . Interestingly, the Joint Chiefs did not endorse the entire air strike program they submitted to the Secretary of Defense. They recommended that only the first phase (third, fourth, and fifth weeks of the program) be approved for execution. They had evidently failed to reach agreement on the later phases (weeks six through twelve), and indicated to the Secre- tary of Defense that they were still in the process of "considering alternatives for a follow-on program of air strikes beginning with the sixth week. They will advise you further in this regard, taking account ( of the developing situation, the current policy considerations, and mili- tary measures available to us." As matters developed, however, even the three-week program endorsed by the JCS was not approved by the Secretary of Defense, T though it strongly influenced the new interdiction-oriented focus of the attacks that were to follow, as well as the particular targets that were selected. But neither the Secretary of Defense nor the President was willing to approve a multi-week program in advance. They clearly preferred to retain continual personal control over attack concepts and individual target selection. Consequently, although the Joint Chiefs strongly urged 79 TOP SECRET - Sensitive Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 TOP SECRET - Sensitive that "the field commander be a"ble to detect and exploit targets of oppor- tunity.. . " 5 action in the air war against the DRV continued to be directed at the highest level and conmunicated through weekly guidance provided by the Secretary of Defense's ROLLING THULDER planning messages. 30 TOP SECRET - Sensitive Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 TOP SECRET - Sensitive EC. REASSESSMENT AS OF APRIL 1 AIID THE KSAM 328 DECISIONS A* The Situation in South Vietnam A curious phenomenon concerning the period of late March and early April 1965 was the great divergence among views that were being expressed about the then prevailing state of affairs in South Vietnam, Some quite favorable assessments emanated from Saigon. For example, MACV's Monthly Evaluations for March and April were most reassuring: March , 1965: Events in March were encouraging. . .RVMF ground operations were highlighted by renewed operational effort... VC activity was considerably below the norm of the preceding six months and indications were that the enemy was engaged in the re-supply and re-positioning of units possibly in preparation for a new offensive... In summary, March has given rise to some cautious optimism. The current government appears to be taking control of the situation and, if the present state of popular morale can be sustained and strength- ened, the GTO, with continued U.S. support, should be able to counter future VC offensives successfully. April, 196$: Friendly forces retained the initiative during April and a review of events reinforces the feeling of optimism generated last month... In summary, current trends . are highly encouraging and the GVN may have actually turned the tide at long last . However, there are some disquieting factors which indicate a need to avoid overconf Idence . A test of these trends should be forthcoming in the next few months if the VC launch their expected counter-offensive and the period may well be one of the most important of the war. Similarly encouraging comments were contained in Ambassador Taylor's KODIS weeklies to the President — e.g., in Saigon 2908, March 11, 19°5: The most encouraging phenomenon of the past week has been the rise in Vietnamese morale occasioned by the air strikes against Horth Vietnam on March 2, the announcement of our in- tention to utilize U.S. jet aircraft within South Vietnam, and the landing of the Marines at Danang which is still going on. The press and the public have reacted most favorably to all three of these events. And in Saigon 2991, March 17, 1965: With the growing pressure on North Vietnam, the psycho- logical atmosphere continues to be favorable. What ■ is still missing in this new atmosphere is the image of a Vietnamese Government giving direction and purpose to its people. 81 TOP SECRET - Sensitive Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 TOP SECRET - Sensitive Gn the other hand, a much more sobering assessment was contained in General Westmoreland T s Commander f s Estimate of the Situation in South Vietnam , dated 26 March 1965, which bluntly asserted that 3VKAF would not "be able to build up their strength rapidly and effectively enough to blunt the coming VC summer offensive or to seize the initia- tive from them. The document also estimated that the program of air activity against the North, while it might ultimately succeed in caus- ing the DRV to cease its support of the war, would not in the short run < have any major effect on the situation in the South. The view from Washington was even less hopeful. Assistant Secretary of Defense John UcKaughton summed ud the situation in the following words: 106/ The situation in general is bad and deteriorating. The VC have the initiative. Defeatism is gaining among the rural population, somewhat in the cities, and even among' the soldiers -- especially those with relatives in rural areas. The Hop Tac area around Saigon is making little progress; the Delta stays bad; the country has been severed in the north. GW. control is shrinking to enclaves, some burdened with refugees. In Saigon we have a remission: Quat is giving hope on the civilian side, the Buddhists have calmed, and the split generals are in uneasy equilibrium. A more complete and balanced' overview was prepared by McGeorge Bundy in a memorandum outlining "Key Elements for Discussion" for an April 1 meeting with the President: Morale has improved in South Vietnam. The government has not really settled down, but seems to be hopeful both in its capacity and in its sense of political forces. The armed . . forces continue in reasonably good shape, though top leader- ship is not really effective and the ratio of armed forces to the VC build-up is not good enough. The situation in many areas of the countryside continues to go in favor of the VC, although there is now a temporary lull. The threat is particularly serious in the central provinces, and the VC forces may be regrouping for major efforts there in the near future. Hanoi has shown no signs of give, and Peiping has stiffened its position within the last week. We still believe that attacks near Hanoi might substantially raise the odds of Peiping coming in with air. Meanwhile, we expect Hanoi to continue and step ud its infiltration both bv land through Laos and by sea. There are clear indications of different viewpoints in Hanoi, Peiping, and Moscow (and even in the so-called Liberation Front), and 82 • TOP SECRET - Sensitive •: Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 TOP SECRET - Sensitive continued sharp friction "between Moscow and Peiping. However, neither such frictions nor the pressure of our present slowly- ascending pace of air attack on North Vietnam can he expected to produce a real change in Hanoi T s position for some time, probably 2-3 months, at best. A key question for Hanoi is whether they continue to make real headway in the south, or whether the conflict there starts to move against them or at least appear increasingly tough. If the former, even a major step-up in our air attacks would probably not cause them to become much more reasonable; if the latter, the situation might begin to move on a political track — but again in not less than 2-3 months, in our present judgment. B. International Diplomatic Moves On the diplomatic front, there had been no indication of any desire for talks from Hanoi, Peking, or Moscow. The British Co-Chairmen initiative had been turned down oj the Soviet Government, which first floated a totally unacceptable counterproposal -- in the form of a statement condemning the U.S. "gross violation of the Geneva Accords" and calling on the U.S. "to immediately cease their aggressive acts against the DRV and to withdraw their troops..." -- and then totally rejected the British proposal. By March lo, when Gromyko met with UK Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart in London, it had become quite clear that the two Geneva Co -Chairmen would not be able to agree on a message sufficiently objective to be mutually acceptable to other members of • the Conference. 107-/ Gromyko had made a public statement after the meeting in London to the effect that the United States would have to deal directly with Hanoi on the Vietnam situation, to which Secretary Rusk had replied. 108/ I agree with Mr. Gromyko that Hanoi is the key to peace in Southeast Asia. If Hanoi stops molesting its neighbors, then peace can be restored promptly and U.S. forces can come home. I regret that the Soviet Union, which was a signatory of the 195^ and 1962 accords, appears disinclined to put its full weight behind those agreements. A second initiative had been launched by President Tito of Yugoslavia in early March. Tito had '-written to President Johnson on March 3, urging immediate negotiations on Vietnam without either side imposing conditions. The President had replied on March 12, describing the background of our involvement in Vietnam and stating that there would be no bajr to a peaceful settlement if Hanoi ceased "aggression against South Vietnam. r ' Tito T s concern prompted him to convene a conference' of 15 nonaligned nations which met in Belgrade from March 13 to 18 and issued an appeal, ultimately signed by 17 nations. (Afghanistan, Algeria, Cyprus, Ceylon, 83 TOP SECRET - Sensitive Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 TOP SECRET - Sensitive Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, India, Iraq, Kenya, Nepal, Syria, Tunisia, UAH, Uganda, Yugoslavia, and Zambia,) The declaration blamed "foreign inter- vention in various forms r? for the aggravation of the Vietnam situation and repeated Tito's call for negotiations without preconditions. Yet another third-party peace initiative came from U.K. Secretary General U Thant. U Thant proposed a three-month period in which there would be "a temporary cessation of all hostile military activity, whether overt or covert, across the 17th parallel in Vietnam." McGeorge Bundy commented on these propositions in his April 1 "Key Elements for Discussion" Memorandum in a manner suggesting that he had very little expectation that any of these initiatives would lead to an early conference: We think the U Thant proposal should be turned off. (Bunche tells us U Thant will not float it publicly if we reject it privately). It is not clear that the trade-off would be to our advantage, even if it could be arranged, and in any case, we prefer to use U Tha.nt for private feelers rather than public proposals. We can tell U Thant that we have no objection on his sounding out Hanoi on this same point, however, and that if he gets a response, we would be glad to comment on it. The 17 nation proposal is more attractive. We are in- clined to propose to Quat that both South Vietnam and the U.S. should accept it with a covering statement of our good, firm, clear objectives in any such negotiation. The Presi- dent has already made it clear that he will go anywhere to tali with anyone, and we think the 17 nation proposal is one to which we can make a pretty clear response. Tactically, it will probably not lead to any early conference, because the position of Hanoi and Peking will be that they will not attend any meeting until our bombings stop. The Secretary of State will elaborate on these propositions. C. An End to "Reprisal" In mid-morning of March 29, VC terrorists exploded a bomb out- side the U.S. embassy in Saigon, killing and wounding many Americans and Vietnamese. It was the boldest and most direct Communist action against the U.S. since the attacks at Pleiku and Qui l T hon which had precipitated the FLAMIHG DART reprisals. Almost simultaneously, Ambassador Taylor enplaned for talis in Washington- -and both cities were instantly abuzz with speculation that the war" had entered a new and perhaps critical Dhase. Indeed, Admiral Sharp promptly urged the JCS to recommend a forceful reply to the VC outrage, in the form of an out-of-turn 8U TOP SECRET - Sensitive Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 TOP SECRET - Sensitive ■ spectacular bombing attack upon a significant target in the DRV outside of the framework of R0LLU7C THUNDER • 109/ The plea, however, did not , fall on responsive ears. At this point/ the President preferred to . maneuver quietly to help the nation get used to living with the Vietnam crisis. He played down any drama intrinsic in Taylor r s arrival by hav- ing him attend briefings at the Pentagon and the State Department before calling at the White House; and he let it be known that the U.S. had no intention of conducting any further specific reprisal raids against Korth Vietnam in reply to the bombing of the embassy. Instead, he confined himself to a public statement: jL'he terrorist outrage aimed at the American Embassy in Saigon shows us once again what the struggle in Viet -Nam is about. This wanton act of ruthlessness has brought death and serious injury to innocent Vietnamese citizens in the street as well as to American and Vietnamese personnel on duty." He added that the Embassy was "already back in business," and that he would "at once request the Congress for authority and funds for the immediate construction of a new chancery. • After his first meeting with Taylor and other officials on March 31* the President responded to press inquiries concerning dramatic new developments by saying, "I know of no far-reaching strategy that is being suggested or promulgated." But the President was being less than candid. The proposals that were at that moment being promulgated, and on which he reached signifi- cant decisions the following day, did involve a far-reaching strategy change: acceptance of the concept of U.S. troops engaged in offensive ground operations against Asian insurgents. This issue greatly over- shadowed all other Vietnam questions then being reconsidered. D. N SAM 3^8 -- Issues Posed and Decisions Made The underlying question that was being posed for the President . at this time was well formulated by Assistant Defense Secretary John McIIaughton in a draft memorandum of March 2k 5 entitled "Plan of Action for South Vietnam." The key question, McNaughton thought, was: 'Can the situation inside SVH be bottomed out (a) without • extreme measures against the DRV and/or (b) without deploy- ment of large numbers of US (and other) combat troops inside SVH?" And the answer, he believed,, was "perhaps -- but probably no. - ♦ • To get closer to an answer, McKaughton began n oy restating U.S. ob- jectives in Vietnam, and by attempting to weigh these objectives by their relative importance: 85 TOP SECRET - Sensitive . Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 TOP SECRET - Sensitive 7e that Korth Viet -Ram would 95 TOP SECRET - Sensitive Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 TOP SECRET - Sensitive The first step is for the countries of Southeast Asia to associate themselves in a greatly expanded cooperative effort for development, We would hope that North Viet -Nam would 95 TQP _-S5CR5T - Sensitive r~ But. despite the full use of his power to influence, the President could not stop the critics. Condemnation of the bombing spread to the campuses and to a widening circle of Congressmen. From many directions the President was being pressed to make a major public statement wel- coming negotiations. Up to this time,, the official U.S. position had been unreceptive to negotiations, although the President had paid lip-service to his willingness to "do anything and go anywhere in the interests of peace." Past inaction he blamed entirely on Hanoi. It was, he said, Hanoi that would not talk peace, Hanoi that was subverting South Vietnam, Hanoi that was making it possible for the war to continue by funneling supplies and manpower over the Ho Chi Minh trail. Washington was not to blame. • t But now the formula no longer seemed adequate, and the President began . J to look for a more spectacular way of dramatizing his peaceful intent. He found it in -three ingredients which he combined in his renowned Johns Hopkins address of April 7th. B. Ingredients for Johns Hop kins Three elements combined to make the President's Johns Hopkins speech an important initiative: First, .a new formulation of U.S. readi- ness to negotiate, in the shape of an acceptance by the President of the spirit of the 17-Hation Appeal of March 15~ which had called upon the belligerents to start negotiations as soon as possible "without posing any preconditions." Here are -the words of the speech which the Presi- dent hoped would satisfy the principal demand of the doves: We will never be second in the search for... a peaceful settlement in Viet-Kam. There may be many ways to this kind of peace: in dis- cussion or negotiation with the governments concerned; in large groups or in small ones; in the reaffirmation of old agreements or their strengthening with' new ones. We have stated this position over and over again 50 times and more to friend and foe alike. And we remain ready with this purpose for unconditional discussions. ; A second key element of the soeech was drawn fr.om ideas long pro- pounded by such old Southeast Asia* hands as former U.S. Ambassador to Thailand Kenneth Young, involving a massive regional development effort for the area, based on the Mekong River basin. ° This was precisely the kind of hopeful and positive gesture the President needed to put a bright constructive face on his Vietnam policy. Painting the picture of a potentially peaceful five-nation area, the President said: Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 TOP SECRET - Sensitive * take its place in the common effort just as soon as peaceful cooperation is possible. And the President then offered his munificent carrot: For our part I will ask. the Congress to join in a billion- dollar American investment in this effort as soon as it is underway. And he underlined the grandioseness of the vision by characterizing the effort as being conceived "on a scale to dwarf even our TVA. There was a third key element to the Johns Hopkins speech which the President added almost literally at the last minute -- an illustrious name, a person of unquestioned stature, to lend some credibility and prestige to the somewhat improbable peaceful development gambit in the midst of war. The President found that ingredient in the person of Eugene Black, foiraer President of the World Bank, a figure of high prominence in international finance, and a politician enjoying Con- gressional confidence and open lines to both Democrats and Republicans. In a whirlwind performance, the President recruited Black just a few short hours before his scheduled appearance at Johns Hopkins, and was 1 able to announce that appointment in his speech. C. Hanoi and Peking "Close the Poor" While the President's speech evoked a good press and much favorable public reaction throughout the world, 112/ its practical consequences were meager. It failed to silence the Peace Bloc and it failed to bring the Communists to the negotiating table. It is worth noting that the President's initiative of April 7 was in accord with the "pressures-policy" rationale that had been worked out in I-Iovember, 196k, which held that U.S. readiness to negotiate was not to be surfaced until after a series of air strikes had been carried out against important targets in North Vietnam. Significantly, during ' the two weeks prior to the President's address, EOLLISG THUIIDER VIII ..(the "Radar Busting Week") and IX (the first week of the "anti-LOC" cam- paign) had inaugurated an almost daily schedule of bombing. 'Thus the U.S. was now attempting to achieve, through a deliberate combination of intensified military pressures and diplomatic enticements, what it had hoped would result from a mere token demonstration of capability and resolve. The carrot had been added to the stick, but the stick was still the more tangible and visible element of U.S policy. And the President made sure that this coercive element would remain very much in the fore- ground, when he stated, in the April 7 speech: I wish it were possible to convince others with words of what we now find it necessary to say with guns and planes: armed hostility is futile - our resources are equal to any 9'6 TO P SECRET - Sensitive Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 TO? SECRET - Sensitive challenge - because we fight for values and we fight for prin- ciple, rather than territory or colonies, our patience and our determination are unending. But neither pressures nor blandishments succeeded in moving Hanoi. On the day following the President's speech, ITorth Vietnamese Premier Pham Van Dong published his f amour "Four Points," recognition of which he made clear, was the sole way in which "favorable conditions" could ■be created for peaceful settlement of the war. Two days later, in a telling denunciation of the President's Johns Hopkins speech, north Vietnam said that the United States was using the "peace" label to conceal its aggression and that the Southeast Asia development proposal was simply a "carrot" offered to offset the "stick" of aggression and to seek to allay domestic and international criticism of U.S. policy in Vietnam. The following day, an article in a Chinese Communist newspaper denounced President Johnson's proposal for unconditional discussions as "a swindle pure and simple." To complete the rejection of Western initiatives, Hanoi turned down the appeal of the seventeen non-aligned nations on April 19, reiterating that Pham Van Dong's "Four Points" were the "only correct way" to resolve the Vietnam problem; and three days later Peking's Peoples' Daily gave the coup-de-grace to the 17-nation . appeal, saying that it amounted to "legalizing the United States im- perialist aggression" and that "the Viet-Namese people will never agree to negotiations 'without any preconditions.'" D . President's Reprise: Tragedy, Disappointment -- But No Bombing Pause The rejection of the President's initiative had been total. And other Western peace feelers were equally bluntly turned away. British former Foreign Secretary Patrick Gordon Walker who sought to visit Peking and Hanoi on a self-appointed peace mission to sound out both governments on the possibilities of negotiations was unceremoniously denied entry to both Mainland China and North Vietnam. * In the light of these developments , the President made another public statement, 113/ opening with the words, "This has been a week of tragedy, disappointment, and progress ." We tried to open .a window to peace," the President said, "only to be met with tired names and slogans and a refusal to talk." But he tried once more: They want no talk with us, no talk *ith a distinguished Briton, no talk with the United Nations. They want no talk at all so far. But our offer stands. We mean every word of it . . . The window to peace is still open. We are' still ready for unconditional discussion. We will impose no conditions 97 . TOP SECRET - Sensitive Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 TOP SECRET - Sensitive of any kind on any government willing to talk, nor "will we accept any. On this "basis we are ready to begin discussion next week, tomorrow, or tonight... To thoce governments who doubt our wMlingness to talk the answer is simple - agree to discussion, come to the meeting room. We will be there. Our objective in Viet -Nam remains the same - an independent South Vietnam, tied to no alliance, free to shape its relations and association with all other nations. This is what the people of South Vietnam want, and we will finally settle for no less. But this is as far as the President was willing to go in his con- cessions to the Peace Bloc at this time. To the clamor from many directions, including from Senator Fulbright and from Canada's Prime Minister Lester Pearson, that the U.S. should pause in its air strikes to bring about negotiations, the Administration responded with a resounding "No. Tr Secretary Rusk made the U.S. position clear on this, in a statement read to news correspondents on April 17: We have thought long and soberly about suspending, for a period, the raids on North Viet -Nam. Some have suggested this could lead to an end of aggression from the North. But • we have tried publicly and privately to find out if this would be the result, and' there has been no response. Others say such a pause is needed to signal our sincerity, but no signal is needed. Our sincerity is plain. If we thought such action would advance the cause of an honorable peace, we would order it immediately, but now our best judgment tells us it would only encourage the aggressor and dishearten our friends who bear the brunt of battle. 93 . TOP SECRET - Sensitive Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 ' TOP SECRET - Sensitive XI. HONOLULU, APRIL 20 - SI SEARCH OF CONSENSUS A. Background and Conclusions of Conference ■ ■ W ■ i ii ■ i ■ ■ ■■■■» ■■■■■■ — ■ * . By the middle of April, communications between Washington and Saigon were becoming increasingly strained, as it began to dawn upon Ambassador Taylor that Washington was determined, with the President's sanction, to go far beyond the agreements to which Taylor had been a party at the beginning of April and that had been formalized in NSAM 328. From April 8 onward, Taylor had been bombarded with messages and instruc- tions from Washington testifying to an eagerness to speed up the intro- duction to Vietnam of U.S. and Third County ground forces and to employ them in a combat role, all far beyond anything that had been authorized in the April 2 NSC decisions. Ambassador Taylor's ill-concealed annoy- ance at these mounting pressures and progressively more radical proposals changed to outright anger and open protest when, on April 18, he received another instruction, llU/ allegedly with the sanction of "highest authority," proposing seven additional complicated measures haying to do with combat force deployment and employment, on the justification that "something new must be added in the" South to achieve victory." Taylor's exasperated response to McGeorge Bundy the same day made it clear that meaningful communication. between Washington and Saigon had all but broken down and that something needed to be done quickly to restore some sense of common purpose and to provide Taylor with a revised set of instructions It was with this background that -Secretary McNamara convened a conference in Honolulu on very short notice, bringing together most of the key personalities involved in Vietnam policy-making: Chairman Wheeler of the JCS, General Westmoreland, COMUSMACV, Admiral Sharp, CINCPAC, Ambassador Taylor from Saigon, William Bundy of State, and John McNaughton of Defense. Precisely what transpired during the one-day meeting in Honolulu on April 20th is not known to this writer. But clearly the meeting was called for the explicit purpose of ironing out differences and smoothing ruffled feathers. The immediate concern was to reach specific agreement on troop deployments; but an underlying objective was to restore a sem- blance of consensus about assessments and priorities. ■: The record contains two documents that report on the results of the meeting, (l) The minutes of the meeting prepared by John McNaughton, and (2) a Memorandum for the President prepared by the Secretary of Defense on April 21 which is almost, but not quite, identical with McNaughton' s mirrites. The differences are significant in that they suggest an effort on McNamara 's part to stress even more than did McNaughton the unanimity of view that was achieved at Honolulu. • • Sections of the two documents relevant to the air war are quoted below. Where the two texts differ, both versions are shown -- McNamara' s in brackets £~_J> McNaughton' s in parentheses ( ): - • 99 TOP SECRET - Sensitive Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 TOP SECRET -. Sensitive • (Secretary McNanara, accompanied by) Mr. William Bundy (and) Mr. McNaughton /and i/ met with Ambassador Taylor, General Wheeler, Admiral Sharp and General Westmoreland in Honolulu on Tuesday, April 20. (The minutes of that meeting follow:) /Following is my report of the meeting^/ 1. (There was consensus that) /None of them expect 7 the • DRV/VC (cannot be expected) to capitulate, or come to a position acceptable to us, in less than six months. This is because they believe that a settlement will come as much or more from VC failure in the South as from DRV pain in the North, and that it will take more than six months, perhaps a year or two, to demon- strate VC failure in the South. 2. With respect to strikes against the North, (it was agreed) /they all agree/ "that the present tempo is about right, that sufficient increasing pressure is provided by repetition and con- tinuation. All of them envisioned* a strike program continuing at least six months, perhaps a year or more, avoiding the Hanoi- Haiphong-Phuc Yen areas" during that period. There might be fewer fixed targets, or more restrikes, or more armed reconnaissance missions. Ambassador Taylor stated what appeared to be a (shared) ^/majority/ view, that it is important not to "kill the hostage" by destroying the North Vietnamese assets inside the "Hanoi do-nut." (it was agreed) /They all believe/ that the strike program is essential to our campaign -- both psychologically and physically -- but that it cannot be expected to do the job alone, /ihey/ All considered it very important that strikes against the North be continued during any talks. 3. None of (the participants) /them/ sees a dramatic improve- ■. ment in the South in the immediate future. (The) /Their/ strategy for "victory" (proposed by Ambassador Taylor, General Wheeler, Admiral Sharp and General Westmoreland) /however/ is to break the will of the DRV/VC by denying them victory. Ambassador Taylor ^put it in terms of a demonstration of Communist impotence, which will lead eventually to a political solution. They see slow improve- ment in the South, but all (participants) emphasized the critical importance of holding on and avoiding -- for psychological and morale reasons -- a spectacular defeat of GVN or US forces. And they all suspect that the recent VC lull is but the quiet before a storm. ... The documents continue with specific force deployment recommendations that were agreed upon at the meeting. In addition, Mci:aughton T s minutes contain the following concluding item: It was agreed that tasks within South Vietnam should have first call on air assets in the area and that, .if at any time there are not enough air assets in the area to perform all 100 TOP SECRET - Sensitive Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 TOP SECRET - Sensitive necessary tasks, more air should be brought in. Secretary UcITamara directed that this policy be implemented at once. • From this evidence, it seems apparent that Honolulu marked the relative downgrading of pressures against the North, in favor or more intensive activity in the South. The key to success, it was now felt, was not to destroy or* defeat the enemy, but to frustrate him -- "to break the will of the DRV/VC by denying them victory" and, above all, to avoid, for our part, a' dramatic defeat. Thus the decision at this point was to "plateau" the air strikes more or less at the prevailing level, relying on "repetition and continuation" to provide increasing pressure, rather than to pursue the relentless dynamic course that had been so ardently advocated by .Ambassador Taylor and Admiral Sharp in February and March, or the massive destruction of the North Vietnamese target complex so consistently advocated hy the Joint Chiefs. If Honolulu represented more than a "shotgun wedding-," if it reflected m fact a relatively uncoerced expression of views, the leading U.S. actors in the Vietnam drama must have undergone, in the intervening weeks, a reordering of expectations with respect to the results that bombing might achieve. Their views at- this point, in any event, 'were strikingly more restrained on the bombing issue than they had been previously. • •An alternative -- and less charitable -- explanation might be that, in the meantime, attention had shifted from the air war to the subject of U.S. curing the attack the target area became completely covered by smoke and resulting bomb pattern was spotty. BDA photography shows that as a result, the distribution of bombs throughout the target was poor« Some areas received a heavy concentration of bomb impacts while other parts of the target area received no hits. If an attack could have been launched in which the bombs were evenly distributed, results would have been far more effective , An attack compressed into a shorter period of time would also have been much more likely to kill VC before they could evacuate the area and would have allowed ground troops to enter the area the same day h. It is essential that we keep these selected VC headquarters and units under attack. We are developing target information on the headquarters of the 325th PAVN Division, Headquarters Military Region V and Headquarters Military Region VII where current reports indicated a large VC troop build-up. We know from interrogation of VC captives and from agent reports that VC fear air attacks. We also know that their plans can be upset by unexpected events. The best way for us to keep them off balance and prevent large-scale VC attacks is to keep them under constant pressure in their base areas. ■ ' 5o Continued use of tactical fighters for pattern bombing does not get the job done properly; it diverts them from other important work for which they are better suited; it creates an unacceptable drain on ordnance assets; and it disrupts all SEA air programs in and out of country. We will, of course, continue to use tactical fighters as the major punch against tactical' targets which constitute the vast majority of the in-country air requirements, but for attacks on VC base areas, ve must provide a capability which will permit us to deliver a well planned pattern of bombs over large areas and prefer- ably within a short period of time. 6. The problem has been discussed with representatives of the Strategic Air Command and believe that their conventional bombing tactics basel on pattern bombing technique j are ideally suited to meet this requirement. I strongly recommend, therefore, that as a matter of urgency, we be authorized to employ SAC B-52 aircraft against selected area targets in RVW.„„ ]_^ . TOP SECRET - Sensitive Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 TOP SECRET - Sensitive Washington first authorized the use of ARC LIGHT B-52 forces for radar photography over target areas in the Kontum and War Zone D regions on May 17 , 151 / A month later., despite the misgivings of the Air Staff and^the SAC commander, the first B-52 bombing raid was authorized (ARC LIGHT I, June 18, 1965) attacking the War Zone D VC stronghold near Saigon. On July k and 7 further attacks were undertaken, and ARC LIGHT became a regular bombing program in South Vietnam , -As the weight of air attacks increased significantly in South Vietnam, there was also some rise in the level of air strikes in the North . Combined UoS.-VNAE combat sorties totaled about 3,600 in April, ^-,000 in May, and 1^800 in June. USAF aircraft flew less than half the mission. But an analysis by JCS Chairman Wheeler on k April and another by the CIA and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) early in July showed that the strikes had not reduced appreciably North Vietnam* s -ability to defend its homeland, train its forces, and infiltrate men and supplies into South Vietnam and Laos. 152/ But this rising level of attacks did not satisfy the Air Staff, At the end of June, General McConnell continued to stress the need for more air pressure on Hanoi, saying he was: more convinced than ever that these /air/ operations cannot be ^divorced from and are the essential key to the eventual defeat of the Viet Congo In November 196^,., /the/ JOS unanimously agreed that direct, decisive, action against the DRV was. needed immediately. This course of action was not adopted and intelligence reports indicate that the ^ cur- rent air strike program, while inconveniencing the DRV had done ^ little to curtail or destroy their will and capability to support the insur- gency, largely due to the restraints on the air strike program. In fact, the restraints have provided the DRV with the incentive and opportunity to strengthen both their offensive and defensive capabili- ties o , • So /the/ C/S USAF considers an intensified application of air power against key industrial and military targets in North Vietnam essential to the result desired. During the period of time required to intro- duce more forces, any build-up .of and support for the Viet Cong offensive should be denied, . . oFailing this, more serious difficulties and casualties for U.S, and allied troops can be expected, McConnell urged again that the Air Force be allowed to strike targets in the $k target list, as well as others, 153/ ■ C. McNamara Reviews the Program At the end of July, in response to a Presidential request, Secretary McNamara undertook a review and evaluation of the bombing program 135 TOP SECRET - Sensitive Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 TOP SECRET - Sensitive against North Vietnam*, The results of this review were forwarded to the President in a memorandum, dated July 30, 1965<, Since it represents an effective wrap-up, the memorandum is reproduced in full. lo Ra tionale for bombing the North , The program of bombing RVN began in an atmosphere of reprisal. We had had the August Tonkin Gulf episode; we had absorbed the November 1 attack on Bien Hoa Airfield and the Christmas* Eve bombing of the Brinks Hotel in Saigon o The attacks at UoSo installations at Pleiku on February 7 and Qui Nhon on February 10 were the immediate causes of the first strikes against North Vietnam*, The strike following Pleiku was announced as a 'response' -- a 'reprisal*'; our strike following Qui Nhon was called a response to more generalized VC terrorism. The major purposes of the bombing program, however, were: a. To promote a settlement o The program was designed (l) to influence the DRV to negotiate (explicitly or otherwise), and (2 J to provide us with a bargaining counter within negotiations . b. • To interdict infiltration ,, The program was calculated to reduce the flow of men and supplies from the North to the South -- at the least, to put a ceiling on the size of war that the ^ enemy could wage in the South /Author's Note: This is not entirely accurate; interdiction did not become a program rationale within ^ the • Administration until late March, and publicly not until late April (see Sections VIII and XIoB.)/ Supplemental purposes of the program were (c) to demonstrate to South Vietnam, North Vietnam and the world the UoSo commitment to see this thing through, (d) to raise morale ^ in South Vietnam by punishing North Vietnam, the source of the suffering in the South, and (e) to reduce criticism of the Administration from advocates of a bombing program • 2. Achievement of major purposes . The potential targets, targets struck and per cent" of destruction are shown at Tab A, In terms of the purposes of the program, its results have been as follows: a. To promote a settlement. Obviously, this objective has not yet been attained. We recognized at the start of the program, as we do now, that the influence of the bombing on a settlement would not be great until the North Vietnamese had been disappointed m their hopes for a quick military success in the South. There is no doubt that the bombing program has become an important counter in the cur- rent tacit and explicit bargaining process and will be an important counter in any future bargaining. b. To interdict i nfiltration. It is believed that regu- ■ lar North Vietnamese units now in South Vietnam (estimated oo be one TOP SECRET - Sensitive Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 \ TOP SECRET - Sensitive ' division) require about h tons of supplies daily for the 'current' level of combat but would require 67 tons of supplies daily for 'light' combat. ('Current 1 levels are operations conducted largely^ in small units; 'light 1 combat would involve larger elements in action on the average of every third day, with expenditures of one -third of each unit's basic load of ammunition on each action*) It is believed that regular Nortlj Vietnamese units and Pathet Lao forces in the Laos Binhandle require about 21 and 51 tons daily respectively for the two levels of combat . Viet Cong arms, ammunition and other supply require- ments are estimated at 8 tons daily for 'current' combat and 115 tons for 'light' combat. The effect of the interdiction program on the movement of supplies is summarized below: The 1^0-ton per day rail traffic from Hanoi south to Vinh has been cut off at Ninh Binh (k-0 miles south of Hanoi) . Supplies still move by sea and over the parallel highway systemo . The latter has-been badly damaged and is subject to armed reconnaissance; sea traffic into SW is under surveillance . At a minimum, supply is slower and less regular and delivered at increased cost in resources and energy expended . Roads into Laos have been subjected to similar interdiction and armed recce. Only limited interdiction has been imposed on the key rail and road net northwest of Hanoi, and none on the railway net northeast of Hanoi; and port destruction has been minimal. Thus, substantially uninterrupted supply continues from China by rail into Hanoi and by- sea into Haiphong to meet major North Vietnamese military, industrial ( ' and civilian needs. The effect of the bombing on military operations is estimated to have been as follows: (1) For regular North Vietnamese and Pa thet Lao forces o The interdiction program has caused North Vietnam increasing diffi- culty in supplying their units in Laos and South Vietnam,, How severe this difficulty is or how stretched North Vietnam's supply capabili- ties are cannot be estimated precisely Our interdiction efforts may have either prevented or deterred the North from sending more^troops • than they already have. The interdiction programs in North Vietnam and Laos also may have influenced a Communist decision to forego a 1965 offensive in Laos (2) For Viet Cong forces . Because the VC require signifi- cantly less infiltrated arms and ammunition and other supplies than do the North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao forces, the interdiction program probably has had less of an adverse effect on their operations . By raising VC fears concerning adequacy of supplies, however, the program may have caused the VC summer offensive to be less intense, aggressive and unrelenting than it would otherwise have been*. ^oj ' TOP SECRET - Sensitive n Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 TOP SECRET - Sensitive It should be noted that the program has not been a 'strategic 1 bombing piogram; it has been limited to selected targets of fairly direct mili- tary relevance o Populations and targets such as dikes and basic industries have not been strucko Furthermore, the immediate vicinities of Hanoi and Haiphong have been avoided, partly because the targets there are primarily of the 'strategic 1 type and partly because strikes there would involve even more serious risks of confrontations with the Soviet Union and China o 3» Other effects of the program , a. Deterrence of VC terrorises There is no evidence that strikes against North Vietnam have affected one way or another the level or kind of VC incidents of terror in South Vietnam. bo Morale in South Vietnam . Morale in South Vietnam was raised by the initiation of the bombing program (as, later, by the de- ployment of additional troops ). Now -- with the bombing programs having become commonplace and with the failure of the situation to improve — . morale in South Vietnam is not discernibly better than it was before the bombing program began. In a sense, South Vietnam is now 'addicted 1 to the program; a permanent abandonment of the program would have a distinct depressing effect on morale in South Vietnam. Co Reduction of criticism of the Administration . Some critics, who advocated bombing, were silenced; others are now as vocal or more vocal because the program has been too limited for their taste. The program has generated a new school of criticism among liberals and 'peace' groups, whose activities have been reflected especially in teach-ins and newspaper criticisms. do- Damage to peaceful image of the US . The price paid for improving our image as a guarantor has been damage to our image as a country which eschews armed attacks on other nations. The hue and cry correlates with the kind of weapons (e.g., bombs vs. napalm), the kind of targets (e g 9; bridges vs. people), the location of targets (e.g., south vs. north), and not least the extent to which the critic feels threatened by Asian communism (e.g., Thailand vs. the UK) » Further- more, for a given level of bombing, the hue and cry is less now ^ than it was .earlier, perhaps to some extent helped by Communist intransigence toward discussions. The objection to our 'warlike' image and the approval of our fulfilling our commitments competes in the minds of many nations (and individuals) in the world, producing a schizophrenia. . Within such eilied countrn m »r tttt «^ ja^n. nonular antagonism to I Within such allied countries as UK and Japen, popular antagonism^ to the bombings per se, fear of escalation and belief that the bombings are the main obstacle to negotiation, have created political problems for the governments in their support of US policy. joq TOP SECRET - Sensitive Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 TOP SECRET - Sensitive e. Pressures to settle . More countries are now., as a con- sequence of the bombing program, more interested in taking steps to help bring the war to an end. f . Impact on US-Soviet detente , The bombing program — because it appears to reject the policy of T peaceful co -existence , T because it involves an attack on a f fellow socialist country/ because the Soviet people have vivid horrible memories of air bombing, because it challenges the USSR as she competes with China for leader- ship of the Communist world, and because US and Soviet arms are^now striking each other in North Vietnam -- has strained the US-Soviet detente, making constructive arms -control and other cooperative programs more difficult. How serious this effect will be and ^whether the detente can be 'revived depend on how far we carry our military actions against the North and how long the campaign continues. At the same time, the bombing program offers the Soviet Union an oppor- tunity to play a role in bringing peace to Vietnam, by gaining credit for persuading us to terminate the program. There is a chance that the scenario could spin out this way; if so, the effect of the entire • experience on the US-Soviet detente could be a net plus, go Risk of escalation . The bombing program -- especially as strikes move toward Hanoi and toward China and as encounters with Soviet/Chinese SAMs/MIGs occur-- may increase the risk of escalation into a broader war o 4o " The future of the program . Even with hindsight, "I believe the decision to bomb the DRV was wise and I believe the program should be continued. The future program should: .a. Emphasize the threat . It. should be structured to " capitalize on fear of future attacks. At any time, 'pressure 1 on the DRV depends not upon the current level of bombing but rather upon the credible threat of future destruction which can be avoided by agreeing to- negotiate or agreeing to some settlement in negotiations, b. Minimize the loss of DRV T face . ! The program should be designed to make it politically easy for the DRV to enter negotia- tions and to make concessions during negotiations. It may be politic- ally easier for North Vietnam to accept negotiations and/or to make concessions at a time when bombing of their territory is not currently . taking place, ; c. Optimize interdiction vs, po liti cal costs . Interdic- tion should be carried out so as to maximize effectiveness and to minimize the political repercussions from the methods used. Physical- • ly, it makes no difference whether a rifle is interdicted on its way 139 * TOP SECRET - Sensitive Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 TOP SECRET - Sensitive into Worth Vietnam, on its wa;y out of North Vietnam, in Laos or in South Vietnam. But different amounts of effort and different political prices may be paid depending on how and where it is done. The critical variables in this regard are (l) the type of targets struck (eogo ; port facilities involving civilian casualties vs. isolated bridges), (2) type of aircraft (e.g., B-52s vs. F-1Q5b), (3) kind of weapons ■ (e.g., napalm vs ordinary bombs), (k) location of target (e.g., in Hanoi vs. Laotian border area), and (5) the accompanying declaratory policy (e.g., unlimited vs. a defined interdiction zone). d* Coordinate with other influences on the DRV . So long as full victory in the South appears likely, the effect of the bombing program in promoting negotiations or a settlement will probably be small. The bombing program now and later should be designed for its influence on the DRV at that unknown time when the DRV becomes more . optimistic about what they can achieve in a settlement acceptable to .. us than about what they can achieve by continuation of the war. e. Avoid undue risks and costs . The program should avoid . bombing which runs a high risk of escalation into war with the Soviets or China and which is likely to appall allies and friends. C^v> r- n -*- A -i 3^0 ^P JT.CKET - Sensitive Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 o r O o r o m CO Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 TOP SECRET - Sensitive FOOTNOTES 1. JCSM i*60-6U, 30 May 196^' TOP SECRET; JCS 23^3/383-2, 2U August 196k, TOP SECRET. (Subsequently, of course, the list grew to comprise many hundreds of targets.) 2. JCSM 746-64, 26 August 1965, TOP SECRET; CM 124-64, 9 September 1964, TOP SECRET. 3. These recommendations were made orally to the SecDef on ain-RW? and subsequently formalized in JCSM 933-64, k November 1964, TOP SECREi. 4. Draft NSAM on Southeast Asia, 29 November 196^, TOP SECRET. 5. JCSM 955-64, 14 November 1964, TOP SECRET; and JCSM 982-64, 2 3 November 1964, TOP SECRET. 6. See JCS 2339/164, 12 December 1964, TOP SECRET. 7. In this connection, it may be noted that the small e ^ n * ion ° f ,Sj; U.S. military contingent in South Vietnam that occurred during £££, from 16,000 to 23,000 men, did not take place until after zae 8. A U.S. officers 1 billet in the heart of Saigon which was b °f <;d by the VC with the loss of two Americans killed and 63 in J u ; ed ' -. %• p ' cisely the type of incident which seemed to fall ^J^^J^^ guidelines as to what would justify a reprisal, ine ^ . .. such a reprisal (JCSM 10 7 6-64, 24 December 1964, TOP SECRET), but tne timing was unpropitious — with Saigon in the throes _ of a poii^ ^ crisis and Washington disinclined to launch a reprisal sxr Christmas day. 9. JCSM 1074-64, 24 December 1964, TOP SECRET. 10. Jacob Von Staaveren, USAF Plans ».nrt Operations Injouth east Asia, 19 5, October, 1966, pp. 1-2 (TOP SECEET). 11. Memorandum for the Secretary from William P. Bundy '„ S "'' b + e ^ t T„ v ,, 1 i° & l on the South Vietnamese Situation and Alternatives, dated janu<«y , 1965 (TOP SECRET). 12. Cut and Paste of McNaughton Ideas (from drafts August 1964 to February 1965) —"Action for South Vietnam," TOP SECRET. 13. 1 October 1J64 SNIE 53-2-64, The Situatiou_i nJgu*iLXig£g£' T ° P ^^ Ik. 4 February 1965 SNIE 53-65, Short Term Pro£pe£bg_in_SV^. TOP SECRET. 15. Memorandum to the President from McGeorge Bundy re The — 1__ Vietnam , dated February 7, 1965 (TOP SECRET). n TOP SO CKET - Sensitive Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 TOP SECRET - Sensitive 16. 9 October 1964 SNIE 10-3-64, Probable Communist Reactions . . . (TOP SECRET). 17. 18 February 1965 SNIE IO-3/I-65, Communist Reactions to Possible U.S. Courses of Action Against North" Vietnam , (TOP SECRETJ. 18. 2 June I965, SIHE IO-6-65, Proba ble Communist Reactions... (TOP SECRET, SENSITIVE). * ~~ 19. Saigon 2010, 31 December 1964 (TOP SECRET - NODIS). 20. Memorandum for the Secretary, "Notes on the South Vietnamese Situation and Alternatives, 6 January 1965 (TOP SECRET). 21. McNaughton Papers, "Situation in SVN After Khanh Re -coup," 27 January I965 (TOP SECRET). 22. Saigon 208o, 8 January 1965 (TOP SECRET). 23. JCSM-7O-65, 29 January 1965 (TOP SECRET). 24. Deputy SecDef Cyrus Vance assured the CJCS, in a Memorandum dated 4 February I9S5, that their views "will be given the fullest considera tion in determining future courses of action." 25- CINCPAC Frag Order Nr. 2 18 Sept. 1964 TOP SECRET. CINCPAC Frag Order Nr. 3 28 Oct. 1964 TOP SECRET. 26. Appendix B to JCSM-7O-65, 29 Jan 65 TOP SECRET. 27. JCS 1887 to CINCPAC (j-3 sends) l4 Nov 64 TOP SECRET. 28. JCS 4244 to CINCPAC 28 Jan 65 TOP SECRET LIMDIS. 29. JCS 4484 to CINCPAC 3 Feb 65 TOP SECRET. 30. JCS 4484 to CINCPAC 3 Feb 65 TOP SECRET. 31. CINCPAC to CINCPACFLT, CINCPAC AF and COMUSMACV 4 Feb 65 TOP SECRET LIMDIS. 32. JCSM 70-65, 29 Jan 65, Appendix B TOP SECRET. 33. CJCS 4612 to CINCPAC 4 Feb 65 SECRET. 34. Saigon 2762 (?) March 1965 TOP SECRET EXDIS. 35. "Refutation of the Hew Leaders of the CPSU on 'United Action/" Peking Review No. k6, November 12, 1965, pp. 15-l6. See also the Chinese account reported "by Peter Grose, The New York Times , Sept. 12, I966, 142 ' TOP SECRET - Sensitive Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 TOP SECRET - Sensitive 36. CINCPAC to CIJMCPACFLT 5 Eeb 65 SECRET LIMDIS; J-3M 181-65 from Director of Ops, Joint Staff to Military Assistant SecDef , dated 9 Feb 65- SECRET 37. Jacob Von Staaveren, USAF Plans and Operations in Southeast Asia , I965 , p. T ''TOP SECRET^ To the consternation of careful U.S. target planners, Air Vice Marshal Nguyen Cao Ky who led the VNAF attack, in a last*-second switch, dumped his flight's "bomb loads on an unassigned target in the Vinh Linh area, in order, as he ' later explained, to avoid colliding with USA? aircraft which, he claimed, were striking his originally assigned target when his flight arrived over the target area. CEMCPAC 100100 February to JCS, TOP SECRET. 38. Robert Shaplen, The Lost Revolution , New York: Harper & Row, 1965, P. 305- 39. See p. 30 below. hQ. Department of State Bulletin , Vol LII, ITo. 1339, Feb 22, 1965, P- 238. kl. Ibid ., p. 239. k2. Ibid ., p. 239. ii-3. . Van Staaveren, op. cit . , p. 7- kk. Department of State Bulletin , 1 March 1965, p. 290 and 291. k5. Philip Geyelin, Lyndon 3. Johnson and the World , pp. 2lU and 219 . I4-6. Newsweek , Feb 22, 1965, p. 19. li-T • Economist , Feb. 13, 1965 pp. 637-8. I4-8- CIA -EI "Free World Reaction to the Vietnamese Air Strikes" 9 Feb I965 CONFIDENTIAL. k$. SNIE 10-3-6^-, 9 Oct 195i{- TOP SECRET 50. Foreign Broadcast Information Division, Special Memorandum , 10 Feb 1965, p. 3, CONFIDENTIAL. 51. Ibid . , p. 1. 52. Ibid ., p. k. 53. Memorandum to the President from McGeorge Bundy, Re: The Situation in Vietnam , February 7, I9S5 T0P SECRET 5I1. Saigon Shk5, February 9, 1965, TOP SECRET EXDIS - ll^3 ' . TOP SECRET - Sensitive Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 TOP SECRET - Sensitive 55. Saigon 2^5, February 9, 1965 TOP SECRET EXDIS 56. Saigon 2536, February 12, 1965 TOP SECRET EXDIS 57. Saigon 2^95, February 11, 1965 TOP SECRET EXDIS 58. CHICPAC 1T021T Feb to JCS TOP SECRET 59. • Memorandum to the SecDef JCSM-lOO-65, February 11, ±$&, TOP SECRET SENSITIVE 60. Van Staaveren, op. cit ., p. 10. 61. Memo Maj. Gen. S. J. McKee D/plans, DCS/P&O to C/S USAF, 7 Mar 65, subj: "Use of 3-52' s in SV2T" (TOP SECRET). 62. Deptel 1718 to Saigon, Feb 13, 1965 TOP SECRET NODIS 63. Made at the close of an address before the National Industrial Con- ference Eoard at Washington, D. C, on Feb 17 (White House press release). Department of State Bulletin . March 8, 1965, p. 333- 6i. Saigon 2583, Feb 1^, 1965 TOP SECRET NODIS - 65. Deptel 1268 to Bangkok Feb 18, 1965 TOP SECRET NODIS (also sent to Vientiane, Canberra, Wellington, Tokyo, Seoul, Taipei, Manila; Info CINCPAC, Saigon, London) 66. Saigon 2665, Feb 19, 1965 TOP SECRET 6T. Deptel Bangkok 1270, Feb 19, 1965 TOP SECRET 68. Deptel Vfhh for Ambassador from Secretary, Feb 17, 19^5 TOP SECRET HODIS 69. Memcon "Conversation with Lord Karlech, British Ambassador", Feb 19, 19o5 TOP SECRET 70. Moscow 2^30 to SecState, Feb 19, 1965 TOP SECRET m 71. Deptel 2268 to Moscow, Feb 20, 1968 TOP SECRET NODIS 72. Deptel 1783 to Saigon, Feb 20, 1965 TOP SECRET NODIS 73. Depel 5327 to London, Feb 2k j 1965 TOP SECRET NODIS TOP SECRET - Sensitive Ikk n Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 TOP SECRET - Sensitive Jk. The ROLLING- THUITD5R Program: JCS Proposals and Implementation , Feb 20-Jun 3, 19^5 TOP SECRET 75. Deptel kkkk to Paris, Feb 25, 1965 SECRET EXDIS 76. U. S. Department of State, Aggression from the ITorth: The Record of North Vietnam's Campaign to Conquer South Vietnam . Tj7 S. Government Printing Office, February 1965. 77. Secretary Rusk's News Conference, Feb 25, 1965, Department of Stat e Bulletin , March 15, 1965, 78. Ibid , , - 79. Address by Secretary Rusk, "Some Fundamentals of American Policy", March k, I965, Department of State Bulletin , March 22, 19^5- 80. Secretary Rusk's interview of "Face the Nation", March 7, 1965, Department of State Bulletin , March 29, 1965. 81. Moscow 2569 to SecState, March 2, 1965 SECRET NOBIS 82. . B-52 f s on Guam were alerted but not used. See Van Staaveren, op. cit ., p. 13. 83. Memorandum for the SecDef CM-^6-65, 23 February 19o5 SECRET. 8J4.. Memorandum for General Wheeler from Military Assistant to SecDef , • March 2, 1965 SECRET. 85. CJCS Memorandum for the SecDef, CM-^69-65, 10 March 1965 TOP SECRET. 86. Memorandum from Secretary of the Air Force to SecDef, "Report of U3AF Combat Operations in SEA.", May 22, I9S5 SECRET. 87. JCS 6692 (JCS send) to CINCPAC, 9 March 1965 TO? SECRET. 88. As noted by McNamara's hand on McNaughton Memorandum to SecDef, Subject: "Use of Napalm Against HVH Targets", 9 March 1965 TOP SECRET. 89. Saigon 2889 to SecState, March 8 I965 SECRET NODIS. 90. Saigon 2888 to. SecState, March 8, I9S5 TOP SECRET NODIS. 91. Deptel 1975 to Saigon, March 12, 1965 TOP SECRET EXDIS. 92. Saigon 29^9 to SecState, March 13, 1965 TO? SECRET EXDIS. 93. COmStmV Situation Report, appended as Tab B to Report of General :h 1965, Subject: CXBOEMCY Situation Report, appended as Tab B to H. K. Johnson, Army c/s to SecDef et.al. 1^ Marcl 'Vietnam Trip 5-12 March 1965" TC~SECRET. TOP SECRET - Sensitive 1^5 - Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 . TOP SECRET - Sensitive $k. DEF 6l8l to Saigon March 2, 1965 TOP SECRET NODIS. 95. CBJCPAC 262155 February 1965 to CJCS TOP SECRET. See also CINCPAC 050400 March 1965 to Gen. Westmoreland from Sharp TOP SECRET. 96. C/S Army Report to SecDe'f, March ill-, 1965 TOP SECRET. 97. JCS Ik^h to CINCPAC (JCS send) 20 March 1965, TOP SECRET SENSITIVE EXDIS. 98. Deptel 3000 to Saigon March 16, 1965 TOP SECRET EXDIS. 99. CM-438-65 to the SecDef, 19 February 1965 SECRET. 100. SecDef Memo to CJCS, 27 February 1965 SECRET. 101. COMUSMACV MAC J31 7315 March 10, 1965 TOP SECRET 102. Deptel 809 to Vientiane, March 20, 1965 TOP SECRET LIMDIS. 103. CINCPAC 210525 March 1965 to JCS TOP SECRET LIMDIS. 10^. Van Staaveren, op. cit ., p. 22. ■ 105. JCSM-221-65, 27 March 1965 TOP SECRET SENSITIVE 106.- Draft Memorandum, "Plan of Action for South Vietnam" dated March 2k, I965 TOP SECRET. 107. "Recent Exchanges Concerning Attempts to Promote -a negotiated Settle- . ment of the Conflict in Vietnam", Series Vietnam No. 3 (1965). , Pre- sented to Parliament by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs by Command of Her Majesty, London, August 19^5- 108. Statement by Secretary Rusk, released March 19, W&5t Department of State bulletin , April 5, I965, p. ^89. 109. CINCPAC 3101^07 March 1965 to JCS TOP SECRET. 110. National Security Action Memorandum No. 328, April 6, 1965 TOP SECRET 111. Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, Lyndon 3. Johnson: The Exercise of Power, New York, i960, p. 539. 112. USIA Research and Reference Service, "Foreign Reaction to President Johnson's Johns Hopkins Speech," R-I&-65, April lh, 19^5- 113. Made to news correspondents at the L3J Ranch on April 17, 19*>5 , Department of State Bulletin . May 3, 1965, pp. 650-52. 146 • TOP SECRET - Sensitive Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 TOP SECRET - Sensitive llV. Joint Defense/State cable to Ambassador Taylor from Asst. Secy. McNaughton, dated April 18, I965 TOP SECRET. .115. Address made "before the American Society of International Law at Washington, D. C. (Department of State Press Release 82). 116. In his "Key Elements" Memorandum (see Sections IX A and D). 117. See Evans and Novack, op . eit .j p. 5^7. 118. Remarks by President Johnson at the White House to a group of Senators and Congressmen on May k, 1965. Deipartment of State Bulletin , May 2k, 1965, p. 819-20. ~~ " • 119. Saigon 3^32 to SecState, May k, 1965 SECRET LBlDIS. 120. Memo TS #l858^3-c, revised April 22, 1965 TOP SECRET. 121. JCSM-275-S5 to SecDef, lk April 1965 TOP SECRET. 122. CM-60O-65 to SecDef, 6 May 1965 TOP SECRET; the Joint Chiefs con- tinued to urge throughout May and June that attacks he authorized against the SA-2 sites near Hanoi as well as against IL-28 ! s and MIG f s at Phuc Yen. But since the SAM's had not then interfered with US operations, and since Ambassador Johnson, with General Westmoreland's concurrence, recommended against striking the IL-28's, Secretary McITamara disapproved (Memo for CJCS from SecDef., 15 June I965 TOP SECRET). 123. Deptel 2553 to Saigon, May 10, 1965 TOP SECRET NODIS- 12k. Saigon 3731 to SecState, May 11, 1965 TOP SECRET NODIS. 125 v Deptel 2557 to Saigon, May 11, 1965 TOP SECRET NODIS. '• 126. DEF001900 SEC DEE SENDS, 11 May 1965, TOP SECRET LBlDIS. 127. Deptel 2565 to Saigon, May 12, 1965 TOP SECRET NODIS. 128. Deptel 3101 to Moscow (info, to Saigon) May 11, 19^5 TOP SECRET NODIS (STRICTLY EYES ONLY FOR AMBASSADORS FR02! SECRETARY). ■ 129. Deptel 310^ to Moscow, May 11 1965 (info Saigon) TOP SECRET NODIS (STRICTLY EYES ONLY FOR AMBASSADORS FROM SECRETARY). 130. Made before the Association of American Editorial Cartoonists at the White House on May 13 (mite House press release; as -delivered text ) . 131. Moscow 3373 to SecState, May 12 1965 TOP SECRET NODIS. TOP SECRET - Sensitive lU-T Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 • TOP SECRET - Sensitive 132. Deptel 3105 to Moscow (also transmitted London for Secretary's eyes only) May 12, 1965 TOP SECRET NODIS. 133. Moscow 3393 to SecState May 13, 1965 TOP SECRET. 134. Moscow 3391 to SecState (info London, for Secretary's eyes only) May 12, I965 TOP SECRET NOBIS. 135. Moscow 339^- to SecState (info London for Secretary's eyes only) May 13, 1965 TOP SECRET NODIS. 136. Moscow 3^25 to SecState (info Vienna for Secretary's eyes only) May ik, I965 TOP SECRET NOBIS. 137. Saigon h-08k to SecState, June 6, 1965 TOP SECRET EXDIS. 138. Saigon 3781 to SecState, May 16, 1965 TOP SECRET NODIS. 139. Moscow 3395 to SecState (info to London - eyes only for Secretary) May 13 > 1965 SECRET NODIS. lh6. Moscow 3kl6 to SecState, May lk, 1965 SECRET NODIS. ihl. Vienna 29 to SecState (For Undersecretary from the Secretary) May 15, 1965 SECRET NODIS. 142. Deptel 7323 to London (1211 to Ottawa) from Secretary to Ambassadors May 17, 1965 TOP SECRET NODIS. 3A3. Moscow 3kkk to SecState, May 17, 1965 TOP SECRET NODIS. Deptel 3171 to Moscow, May 17, 1965 TOP SECRET KODIS. Ikk. Deptel 2^-25 to Nev Delhi (From Secretary to Ambassadors) May 18, I965 SECRET NODIS. ■ 1^5- Saigon 1^083 to SecState, June 6, 1965 CONFIDENTIAL LIMDIS. Ik6. Deptel 3696 to Bonn, June 9, 1965 TOP SECRET EXDIS. 1^7- JCS 002230 to CINCPAC (JCS send), 171201Z May 1965 TOP SECRET. II4-8. Memorandum to the Secretary from W. W. Rostov, Kay 20, 1965 SECRET. 1^9. Memorandum to the Secretary from W. W. Rostov, "An Electric Power 2 Cut -through in North Vietnam", April 1, 1965 SECRET. 150. COmmACV l6006 (from MAC J-312) to CINCPAC, May l4, I965 TOP SECRET. TOP SECRET - Sensitive 148 • 1 Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 TOP SECRET - Sensitive 151. JCS 0022^-9 (JCS send) to CIHCPAC, CINCSAC, COMUSMACV, 17 May 19^5 TOP SECRET. 152. Memoranda for the SecDef CM-53IV-65, 6 April 19^5 i J CSM ^98-65, 2 July I965 TOP SECRET. 153. Memorandum for the JCS, CSAE M-IO5-65, 30 June 19&5 TOP SECRET. ih9 TOP SECRET - Sensitive