Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 IV.B Evolution of the War (26 Vols.) Counterinsurgency: The Kennedy Commitments, 1961 1963(5 Vols.) 2. Strategic Hamlet Program, 1961-63 \r Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 ^VIETNAM TASK FORCE OF THE SECRETARY OF TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE \jt /^ Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 TOP ST^CRET - Sensitive IV. B. 2. EVOLUTio:; of t:he wae strategic liamlet Program f-J^r»:arii.fc ■#Jinl^ 1961 - 1953 II TOP SECRET - Sensitive 029 5 Sec Def Cont Hj>. X-_____ „_„ Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 o >> C/) o- O L Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 TOP SECRET - Sensitive IV.B-2. STPu/lTEGIC HAl-'iLST PROGRM I 1961 - 1963 SUZ#mRY AIHD MALYSIS I I c A specific strategy by vhich the U.S. and (mi wiold attempt to end the insurgency in Soitth Vietnam had never been agreed upon at the time that the U.S. decided, late in 196lj to increase materially its assist- ance to GW and to expand its advisory effort into one >7hich would implement a "limited partnership." By early 1962, however, there v^as apparent consensus among the principal participants that the Strategic Hamlet Program, as it came to be called, represented the unifying concept for a strategy designed to pacify rubral Vietnam (the Viet Cong's chosen battleground) and to develop support among the peasants for the central government. The Strategic Hamlet Program v?as m.uch broader tha^ the construction of strategic hamlets per s_e. It envisioned sequential phases which, beginj-iing with clearing "the insurgents from an area and protecting the rural populace, progressed tlirough the establishment of QW infrastructure and thence to the provision of services which would lead the peasants to identify with their government. The strategic hamlet program was, in short, an attempt to translate the newly articulated theory of counter- insuj^gency into operational reality. The objective was political though the means to its realization were a mixture of military, social, psycho- logical, economic and political m.easiu^es. The effect of these sequential steps to pacification was to make it very difficult to mek.e intermediate assessments of progress. One could not really be suj:^e how one was doing until one was done. Physical security by itself (the so-called "clear and hold" initial step) was a necessary condition for pacification, not a sufficient one. The establish- ment of governmental functions was not, by itself, necessarily conducive to a successful effort; the quality of those functions and their respon- siveness to locally felt needs was critical. This inherent difficulty in assessing progress did not simply mean that it was difficult to identify problems and to make improvements as one v^ent along -- which it was. It also meant that it v^as quite possible to conclude that the program as a whole was progressing well (or badly) according to evidence relating only to a single phase or a part of a phase. A related problem arose from the uniqueness of this program in American experience -- pacification by proxy. The theory of sequential TOP SECRET " Sensitive I r • I Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 TOP SECRET " Sensitive phases could be variously interpreted. This is not the problem of the three blind men describing the elephant; it is the problem of men with different perspectives each moulding his own conception of a proper body to the same skeleton. If the final product vere to have some sem- blance of coherence and mutual satisfaction it was necessary that the shapers came to agreement on substance and operational proced'or-e^ not Just that they agree on the proper skeleton upon which to work. The problem vrith the apparent consensus which emerged early in I962 was that the principal participants did view it with different perspec- tives and expectations. On the U.S. side, military advisors had a set of preferences which affected their approach to the Strategic Hsinlet ■ Program. They wanted to make RVDTAF more mobile, more aggressive, and better organized to take the offensive against the Viet Cong. They vrere, consequently, extremely leery of proposals which might lead it to be tied dovm in strategic defenses ("holding'^ after "clearing" had been completed) or diverted too much to military civic action iindertakings. The i\merican political leadership, insofar as a generalization may be attempted, may be said to have been most concerned with the later phases of the progrsim -- those in which GVIT services were provided, local governments established, and the economy bolstered. Military clearing operations were, to them, a distasteful, expensive, but neces-^- sary precondition to the really critical and important phases of the effort. Both of these U.S. -groups had perspectives different from those of the Diem administration. In the U.S. view the insurgents were only one of Diem's enemies; he himself was the other. In this view the process of pacification could proceed successfully only if Diem reformed his own government. It was precisely to achie/e these, goals simultaneously that the U.S. agreed to enter a ''limited partnership" with GVi: in the counter- insurgent effort. The Strategic Hamlet Program became the operational symbol of this effort. « President Diem --^ unsurprisingly -- had a very different view. His need, as he saw it, w^as to get the U.S. coimnitted to South Vietnam (and to his administration) without surrendering his independence. He knew that his nation would fall without U.S. support; he feared that his goA^erimient would fall if he either appeared' to toady to U.S. wishes or allowed any single group too much potential pov/er -" particularly coer- cive power. The Strategic Haralet Program offered a vehicle by which he could direct the counterinsurgent effort as he thought it should be directed and without giving up either his prerogatives to the U. S or his mantle to his restless generals. The program, in tlie form of a plan for pacification of the Delta, was foz=mally proposed to Diem in November I96I by R. G. K. Thompson, head of the newly arrived British Advisory Mission. U.S. military ii TOP SBCRET - Sensitive ~A Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 r ii TO? SECRET - Sensitive advisors favored at that time an /JIVJ^I penetration of the VC redoubt in War Zone D prior to any operations aimed specifically at pacification. But UcS. political desires to start some local operation which could achieve concrete gains combined V7ith Diem's preference for a pacifica- tion effort in an area of strategic iraportance led to the initial effort in March I962, "Operstion STjllRISE," in Binh Duong Province north of Saigon. This was a heavily VC-infiltrated area rather than one of minimal penetration^ as Thompson had urged. But planning — as distinct from operations — continued on the Delta plan and strategic hamlets were constructed in a variegated, uncoordinated pattern throughout the spring r and early summer. The U.S. had little or no influence over these activi- ties; the primary impetus was traceable directly to the President's brother and political counsellor, I.go Dinh I\hu. In August 1962, GW produced its long awaited national pacification plan with four priority areas and specified priorities within each area. At the same time, however, it indicated that over 2,500 strategic hamlets had already been completed and that work was already under^^/ay on more than 2,500 more. Although it was not ujitil October I962, that GW-i explicitly announced the Strategic Plamlet Program to be the unifying concept of its pacification and counterinsurgent effort it was clear earlier that the program had assumed this central position. Three important implications of this early progress (or, more pre- cisely, reported progress) are also clear in retrospect. These impli- cations seem not to have impressed themselves acutely upon U.S. observers at the time. Eirst, the program was truly one of GVII initiative rather than one embodying priorities and time phasing recommended by the U.S. Diem was running v/lth his own ball in programmatic terms, no matter who articulated the theory of the approach. The geographic dispersion of hamlets already reported to be completed indicated that there was, in fact, a conscious effort to implement this phase almost simultaneously throughout the entire nation rather than to build slowly as Diem's foreign advisors (both U.S. and British) recommended. Finally, the physical aspects of Diem's program were similar if not identical to earlier population resettlement and control efforts prac- ticed by the French and by Diem. The long history of these efforts was marked by consistency in results as well as in techniques: all failed dismally because they ran into resentment if not active resistance on the part of the peasants at wiiose control and safety, then loyalty, they were aimed. U.S. desires to begin an effective process of pacification had fastened onto security as a necessary precondition and slighted the historic record of rural resistance to resettlement. President Diem and his brother, for their part, had decided to emphasize control of the rural population as the precondition to winning loyalty. The record is inconclusive with respect to their v;eighing the record of the past but it appears that they, too, paid it scant attention. Thus the early operational efforts indicated a danger of peasant resistance, on one hand, iii TOP SECR}^ - Sensitive I. Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By; NWD Date: 201 1 I I I I I r • TOP SECRET " Sensitive and of divergent approaches betv:een, in the initial steps , the U.S. (focused on security measures) and Diem (concerned more vith control measures) . Since the physical actions to achieve security and those to impose control are in many respects the same, there vas generated yet another area in which assessments of progress would be inconclusive and difficult to majie. U.S. attention, once an apparent consensus had been forged con- centrated on program management efforts in two categories: to convince CtVj^T to proceed at a more measured^ coherent pace with a qualitative ' j improvement in the physical construction of strategic hamlets; and to schedule material assistance (fortification materials, etc.) and train- ing for local defense forces to match the rate of desired hamlet con- struction. U.S. assessments, at the same time, concentrated on the physical aspects of the program and on VC activity in areas where strategic hajnlets had been constructed. Assessments tended to be favorable from a security (or control) viewpoint and uneven with respect to political development. The general conclusion was aMost always one of cautious optimism when security (control) was emphasized, one of hopeful pessi- mism v/hen political follow-up was stressed. The impression in Washing- ton was typically slanted toward the more optimistic appraisals if for no other reason than that hamlet constr'uction and seciirity arrangements were the first chronological steps in the long process to pacification. Was it not, after all, "progress" to have moved from doing nothing to doing something even though the something was being done imperfectly? These U.S. assessments changed only marginally throughout the life of the progra:n. By the time, j.n 1963, that the hopeful pessinrist voices were clearer, it was also much clearer that the Ngo brothers had made the Strategic Hamlet Program into one closely identified with their regime and with Diem's rather esoterically phrased "personalist revolu- ! tion." Fears grew that Diem was attempting to impose loyalty from the j top through control rather than to build it from the bottom by deeds. These fears were not limited to the Strategic Hamlet Program, however; they extended to urban as well as rtiral phases of South Vietnamese life and were subsumed, as the Buddhist question moved to the fore, by the I general issue of the viability of Diem's regime. President Diem grew increasingly unwilling to meet U.S. demands for reform. He believed that to do so would cause his government to fail. U.S. observers held that failure to do so would cause the nation, not just the goverrmient to fall. In the event the government fell and the nation* s counterinsurgent program took a definite turn for the worse, but the nation did not fall. The Strategic Hamlet Program did. Closely identified witli the Ngo brothers, it was almost bound to suffer their fortunes; when they died it died, too. The new government of generals, presumably realizing the extent of peasant displeasure with resettlement and control measur^es, did nothing to save it. iv TOP SECBET Sensitive I I Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 TO? SECRET " Sensitive A number of contribixtory reasons can be cited for the failure of the Strategic Hamlet Prograia. Over-expansion of construction and poor , quality of defenses forins one category. This reason concentrates only on the initial phase of the progrmn, ho^^ever. While valid, it does little to explain vhy the entire program collapsed rather than only some hamlets vrithin it. Rural antagonisms "vrhich identified the program with its sponsors in the central government are more suggestive of the basis for the complete collapse as Diem and Khu departed the scene. The reasons why they departed are traceable in part to the different expectations which combined in the apparent consensus at the program^s beginning: ^ to ^ Diem's insistence on material assistance and independence, to U.S. vrilling- ness to provide assistance only if its advice was heeded, and to the failure to resolve this question either by persuasion or leverage. Having said this, it does not automatically follow that the prograin would have succeeded even if Diem had met U.S. demands for change. To point to the causes of failure is one thing; to assume that changes of style would have led to success is culte another. It may well be that the program was doomed from the outset because of peasant resistance to measures which changed the pattern of rural life "- whether aimed at sectirity or control. It might have been possible, on the other hand, for a well-executed program eventually to have achieved some me^-sure of success. The early demise of the program does not permit a conclusive evaluation. ■The weight of evidence suggests that the Strategic Hamlet Prograia was fatally flawed in its conception by the unintended consequence of alienat- — ■ ing many of those whose loyalty it aimed to V7in. ^ This inconclusive finding, in turn, suggests that the sequential phases embodied in the doctrine of counterinsurgency may slight some very important problem areas. The evidence is not sufficient for an indictment; still less is one able to validate the coujiterinsvnrgent doc- trine with reference to a prograiii that failed. The only verdxct that may be given at this time with respect to the mlidity of the doctrine is ji that used l^y Scots coiu:ts --■ "case not proved;*' r TOP SECRET_-_Sensitdve Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 o O a o o t I o Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 T- - rn TOP SECRET - Sensitive IV»B.2. CPIEC::OLOGY DAT] ■^^E c 1953-1959 1959 Late i960 Early I96I May 1951 July 1961 15 September 1961 18 October I96I r 27 October I96I 3 I\[oveinber I96I /* 13 P'Ovember I90I c 15 November I96I 22 November I961 15 December I96I 2 February I962 3 February 1962 OCClTFPvEiTCE French and GVl'" early attanpts at population resettle- ment into defended communities to create secure zones. Rural Community Development Centers (Agroville) Pro- grajii initiated by GWT. USI^iAAG Counterinsiirgen cy Plan Vietnam completed, Agroville ProgTam modified by construction of "Agro- Hamlets" to meet peasant objections. Vice President Johnson's visit to RVI^I. Staley Group report on increased economic aid and increase in RICTAF strength. USMA^G Geographically Phased Rational Level Operation Plan for Couxiterinsurgency . ■ General Taylor arrives in RVI\"; President Diem declares national emergency. R.G.K. Thompson submits to President Diem his Appreciation of Vietnam^ November 196 1-April I962 . General Taylor siibmits his report and reconmiendations to President Kennedy. RcG.K. Thompson submits his draft plan for pacification of the Delta to President Diem. NSC drafts FS/:i 111. Cable to i^jnbassador Nolting^ instructing him to meet vith Diem^ lays out proposed U.S. assistance and expected GVN effoi't. NSA.M 111, First Secretary of Defense Confer ence^ Honolulu. Roger Hilsman's A Strategic Concept for South Vietnaia. Diem creates Inter-Ministerial Committee on Strategic Hamlets. VI TOP SECRET - Sensitj.ve Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 TOP SECRET - Sensitive I i DATE c- 19 March 19&2 22 March 19&2 8 August 1962 28 October I962 8 May 1962 2h August 1963 iO September 1963 r. 2 October I963 1 November 1963 OCCURRENCE Diem approves Thompson's "Delta Plan'' for execution. "Operetion SUrlRISE" commences in Binh Duong Province. GVi^l LTational Strategic Ksjiilet Construction Plan. GViv devotes entire issue of The Times of V ietnejn to "The Year of the Strategic Hamlet 7' Buddhist controversy erupts "vxhen GW/ troops fire on demonstrators in Hue. State to Lodge^ Message 2^135 says that U.S. can no longer tolerate LIhu's continuation in povfer. General TCrulak and Mr. Mendenhall give contradictory reports on progress of var to I\SC. Secretary McEajnara reports to President Kennedy follow- ing his visit to RVI-] with General Taylor. Coup d^etat "by group of generals against Pi-esident Diem. \ vii TOP SECRET - Sensitive Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 TOP SECRET - Sensitive THE STRATEGIC HAJVILET PROGRA M 1961 - 1963 TABLE OF COIMTEIITS AND OUTLINE PaRe o C I ( t I. INTRODUCTION A. Scope and Terminology B. Antecedents C. The Situation in Late I961 II. THE FORMUT.ATION OF TIffi STRATEGIC HAMLET PROGRAM. A. U.S.-GW Consultations B. "Limited Partnership". o a G. U.S. -Proposed National Plans D. Initial Vietnai'aese Reactions Eo Thompson's Counterproposals III. ■ DE\/ELOPING A CONSEISUS AMONG THE ADVISORS ■ # — ^ — p- A. Initial Reaction of UoS. Military Advisors B. Reactions in Washington C. The Advisors Reach Agreement IV. . THE ABVISORS "SELL" DIM (OR VICE^VERSA) A. Where to Begin? B. Concurrent GVN Activity C. Early Signs of GVN Expectations V. DIEFERING PERSPECTIVES AM) EXPECTATIONS A. U.S. Military Advisors B. UoS, Political Leadership,. « a e o o 1 1 1 3 h h 7 7 8 10 12 12 13 Ik 15 15 16 17 18 18 18 a TOP SECRET - Sensitive i > I n Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 TOP SECRET - Sensitive Pa^e C. President Diem c . . . ^ 19 D. The CentraH. Issue. e « 20 E . The Problem of Asse ssment .,....»....«*•«••• • • • C VI. THE mTION-AL PLAE" E^/[ERGES A. Awareness of the Unifying Potential B. "Operation Sunrise" C. Other Early Programs D. At Last -- A National Plar E. Effect on U.S. Perceptions * « • o»cocoo»» VIII. M IICOWCLUSIVE SUMMABT. ■ I I ■i'» — ■■ »■■■» >-.» I ■, p^ ^.ip - J a.. . . 1. — J- - ««»•••«« 20 20 22 22 24 2k 30 F. Differences Begin to Ernerge , „ » . « . . VII . THE PATH TO THE MTD • 35 » . . » .. » ^...— »■ . ■!» . t ■■-^ . .. .,..^~.r~- A. Diem's Position Hardens, .,....».•«•» "^"^ B. The Program Dies With the Ugos * • • * ^^ 36 TOP SECRET - Sensitive I r^ X Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 TOP SECRET - Sensitive IV. B. 2. THE STRATEGIC IIAJ'^ILET PROGRAM, I96I-I963: ( AN APPRAISAL I. IKTTROPUCTION A. Scope and Terrainolo g/- The Strategic Hamlet Prograra in the Republic of Vietnara (RW) -- articulated and carried forward from late I96I until late I963 -- has cre- ated some confusion because of terminology. One source of confusion stems from the similarity betvreen the physical aspects of the program and earlier fortified communities of one kind or another. Another source of confusion rises because of the loose usage of "ham-let" as compared to "village" and because of the practice of referring to these communities as "defended/' "secure/' and fortified" as well as "strategic." But the greatest source of confusion lies in the distinction between a strategic haraJ-et £er se and the strategic hamlet program . The ha7-Q_let is the smallest organized community in rural South Viet- nam. Several hamlets (typically 3-5) comprise a village. During the stra- tegic hamlet program both ham.lets and villages were fortified. The distinc- tion is unimportant for the present analysis 5 except as it bears on the defensibility of the community protected. The several adjectives coupled with hamlet or village were occasional3_y used to differentiate communities according to the extent of their defenses or the initial presumed loyalty of their inhabitants. More often no such distinction was m,ade; the terms were used interchangeably. Where a distinction exists^ the following ac- count explains it. The phrase Strategic Ham_let Program when used to represent the pro- gram is much broader than the phrase applied to the hamlets themselves. The program^ as explained below^ envisioned a process of pacification of which the construction of strategic hamlets was but part of one phase , al- beit a YQTj important part. This paper exajnines the program, not just the hamlets . B. Antecedents , . Population relocation into defended villages was by no means a recent development in Southeast Asia. Parts of South Vietnam had experi- ence with the physical aspects of fortified communities going back many TOP SECRET - Sensitive 1 Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 r I .1- ^ TOP SECRET - Sensitive I — - ■ ■--■■■,,,■■--■ years. As the intellectual godfather of the Strategic Hamlet Program has put it, the concept's use as one of the measures to defeat conmiunist insur- gency "...has only meant that the lessons of the past had to be relearn-^," 1/ ( - The administration of President Diem had relearned these lessons much earlier than late I96I. There was, in fact, no need to relearn them because they had never been forgotten. The French had made resettlement and the development of "secure zones" an important element in their effort near the end of the war with the Viet Minh. The government of newly-created South Vietnam, headed since 19^k by President Diem, had continued resettle- ment schemes to accommodate displaced persons, to control suspected rural populations, and to safeguard loyal peasants in the threatened areas. None of these efforts involving resettlement had succeeded. Each had in- spired 8.nta.gonism among the peasants who were moved from their ancestral lands and 8.way from family burial plots . Diem*s actions in late I96I were thus inescapably tied to earlier actions by proximity in time, place, and the personal experiences of many peasants. Chief among the earlier programs W3.s that of the so-Gs.lled Agrovilles or "Rural Community Development Centers," launched in 1959- The Agrovilles, groupments of 3OO-5OO fa.milies, were designed to afford the peasantry the social benefits of city life (schools and services), to in- crease their physical security, and to control certain key locations ^by denying them to the comraunists. 2/ They were designed to improve simultane- ously the security and well-being of their inhabitants and the government's control over the rual population and rural areas . The Agroville program was generally unsuccessful. The peasants ^ had many com.plaints about it ranging from clum.sy, dishonest administration to the physical hardship of being too far from their fields and the psy- ■ chological wrench of being separated from ancestral hom^es and burial plots. 3/ By i960, President Diem had slowed the program in response to peasant com- plaints and the Viet Cong's ability to exploit this dissatisfaction, k/ The transition from Agrovilles to strategic hamlets in I96I was marked by the so-called "Agro-hamlet" which attempted to meet some of the peasants ' ob j ections : The smaller 100 family Agro-hamlet was located more closely to lands tilled by the occupants. Construction was carried out at a slower pace filled to the peasant's plant- ing and harvesting schedule .. .By the end of 196I, the Agro- hamlet had become the prototype of a vast civil defense scheme known as strategic hamlets, A^ Chien Luoc . ^ It was inevitable, given this lineage, that the strategic haml.et program be regarded by the peasants as old wine in nev/ly- labelled bottles. The successes and failuj^es of the past were bound to condition its acceptance -- and by late I96I the Diem governm.ent was having m^ore failures than successes. TOP SECRET - Sensitive 2 I r Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 TOP SECRET - Sensitive C. The Situation in Late 1961 By late I96I5 if not earlier, it had become clear in both Siagon and Washington that the yellow star of the Viet Cong was in the ascendancy. Following the I96O North Vietnamese announcement of the twin goals of oust- ing President Diem and reunifying Vietnam under communist rule^, the Viet Cong began sharply to increase its guerrilla, subversive, and political warfare. 6/ Viet Cong regular forces, now estim.ated to have grown to 25,000, had been organized into larger formations and employed with increas- ing frequency. The terrorist-guerrilla organization had grown to an esti- mated 17,000 by November I96I. 7/ During the first half of I96I, terror- ists and guerrillas had assassinated over 5OO local officials and civilians, kidnapped more than 1,000, and killed almost 1,500 RVNAF personnel. 8/ The VC continued to hold the initiative in the countryside, controlling major portions of the populace and drawing an increasingly tight cinch aroimd Saigon. 9/ The operative question was not whether the Diem govern- ment as it was then moving could defeat the insurgents, but whether it could save itself. Much of this deterioration of the situation in RVN was attributable, in U.S. eyes, to the manner in which President Diem had organized his goverza- ment. The struggle -- v/hether viewed as one to gain loyalty or simply to assert control -- was focused in and around the villages and hamlets in the cou-iitryside. It was precise>^ in those areas that the bilineal GVN organi- zation (ARVN and civilian province chiefs) most lacked the capability for concerted and cohesive action. The Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) was developing a potentially effective institutional framework under U.S. tutelage, but that effectiveness against the VC, Diem realized, could po- tentially be transferred into effectiveness against himself. The abortive coup of late I96O had made Diem even more re3.uctant than he had earlier been to permit power (especially coercive power) to be gathered into one set of hands other than his own. Still, the establishment of an effective military chain of command which could operate where necessary in the country- side remiained the prim^e objective of U.S. military advisors. lO/ A unitary chain of command had recently been ordered into effect within ARVN, but this had not solved the operational problems, for mili- tary operations were inescapably conducted in a.reas mider the control of an independent political organization with its own military forces and in- fluence on opera.tions of all kinds -- military, paramilitary, and civic action. The province chiefs, personally selected by President Diem and presumably loyal to him, controlled politically the territory in dispute with the VC and within which ARVN must operate. They also controlled terri- torial forces comprising the Civil Guard (CG) and Self Defense Corps (SDC). For President Diem's purposes this bilineal organization offered an opportunity to counterbalance the povzer (and coup potential) of the generals by the power of the province chiefs. It was a device for sui'vival. But the natural by-product of this duality, in terms of the effectiveness of actions against the VC, was poor coordination and imperfect cooperation TOP SECRET - Sensitive Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 i I I i I TOP SECRET - Sensitive in intelligence collection and prodaction^ in planning^ and in operational ^^ _ execution in the countryside, where the battles were fought -- both the "battle for men*s minds" and the more easily understood battles for con- trol of the hamlets^ villages , districts, and provinces. The U.S. and GVN were agreed that in order to defeat the insurgency it was necessary that the rural populace identify with at least the local representatives of the central government. They were agreed, too, that some measure of physical security must be provided the rural population if this end were to be achieved. Both agreed that the GVN must be the 1^ principal agent to carry out the actions which would bring the insurgency to an end. The high level U.S. -GVN discussions held during President Kennedy's first year in office focused on what the U.S, could provide GVN to assist the latter 's counterinsurgency efforts and on what GVN should do organi- zationally to make its efforts more effective. A subsidiary and related discussion revolved around the U,S. advisory organization to para.llel the GVN reorganization. The problem of how additional resources in some im- proved organizations^l framework were to be applied operationally was frag- mented into many sub-issues ranging from securing the border to building social infra.structure. The story of the Strategic Hamlet Program, as it came to be called, is one in which an operational concept specifying a sec[uence of concrete i steps was introduced by an articulate advocate, nominally accepted by 8,11 i . , of the princ3.pal actors, and advanced to a position of appa.rent centrality in which it became the operational blueprint for ending the insurgency. But it is also the story of an apparent consensus built on differing, some- I times competing, expectations and of an effort which was, in retrospect, ' doomed by the failure to resolve in one context the problem it was designed I .- to alleviate in another — the .problem" of GW stability," II. THE FORMULATION O F THE STRATEGIC HAMLE T PROGRAM ^-^^^"^^^*™' ' ' * " ^^— ^^^ — *^ ■ ■ ^— ■^— ^fc , ■ ■ -■-■.■J t-ui-m - -TM— ■■■ LJ _-i_-..i - ■--LL ■■ lM I 'ii I r r ' A . U.S. -GVN Con sultations Beginn.in.g in May I96I, the U.S. and GY'!^ conducted a series of high level conferences to fashion responses to the insurgent challenge. The first, of these was the visit to Saigon by the Vice President, Lyndon B. Johnson. The Vice President's consu2_tations were designed to reinforce the U.S. commitment to RVN and to improve the image of President Diem's government . In a comm.uniq.ue issued jointly in Saigon, it was agreed that the RVNAF was to be increased to 150,000 men, that the U.S. would support the entire Civil Guard v/ith military assistance funds, that Vietnamese and U.S. military specialists would be used to support village-level health and public works activities, and that the two governments vrould "discuss TOP SECPJ]T - S ensi tive Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 # I TOP SECRET - Sensitive new economic and social measures to be undertaken in rural areas to accompany the 6.nti -guerrilla effort...." ll/ These discussions implied tha.t more GVN effort should be devoted to rural pacification and civic action and acknowledged that more regular militaz-^y forces were needed, but they did little to clarify the relationships of these parts to the whole or to an overall scheme by which the process V70uld develop. The Staley group, a joint economic and financial committee co- chaired by Dr. A. Eugene Staley, Stanford Research Institute, and Vu Quoc Tuc, GVN, follov^ed m_uch the same pattern. Meeting in Saigon in Jime I96I, the comjnittee agreed that RVMF strength should be increased to 200,000 during CY I962 and that U,S. f\mding should be provided to various emergency economic and social programs. 12/ But the group did noghing to tie together the strands of what it recognized as the central problem: to achieve a simultaneous "breakthrough" on both the military-internal security front and the economic-socia.1 front. I3 / Its recommendations v/ere restricted (in part, no doubt, because of its limited charter) to specific program increases and to a restatement of the dimensions of the problem. The devastation caused by the September m.onsoonal floods (320,000 refugees, 1,000 kilometers of road destroyed, 10 million acres of rice and other crops lost), combined v/ith the losses attributable to increased insur- gent activity, led President Diem to declare a state of national emergency on 19 October I96I. This declaration coincided with the visit to Southeast Asia (15 October - 3 November) of General MaxweU- D. Taylor, heading a mission asked by President Kennedy to appraise the situation in South Viet- [ ^-^ nam. The President stated the scope of Taylor* s mission in the broadest terras: While the military part of the problem is of great importance in South Viet-Nara, its political, social, and economic elements are eq.ually significant, and I shall ex- pect your appraisal and your recommendations to take full account of them, ik/ In his report to the President, General Q'aylor sketched out the nature and aim.s of the Viet Cong threat and assessed the strengths and weaknesses of the Diem government. He proposed a U.S. strategy for "turn- ing the tide and for assuming the offensive in Vietnam." I5/ The report warrants summarizing in some detail, not because it outlined the main thrust of the pacification effort (it did not), but because it represents the best document to portre.y the ra.nge of U.S. concerns at the time the U.S. v^as making a major commitment to South Vietnam and because it lays out the major elements of the U.S. strategy of response. The Viet Cong, Taylor judged, were militarily powerfu.1 and becom- ing more powerful. But they were not yet ready to move to the third, climactic phase of Mao's classic format for guerrilla warfare: « The military strategy being pursued is, evidently, to pin down the ARVN on defensive missions; to create a per- vasive sense of insecurity and frustration by hit-3.nd-run raids on self-defense corps and militia units, ambushing TOP SECRET - Sensitive r — Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 TOP SECRET - Sensitive II I the reserve forces if possible as they come up to defend; 8.nd to dramatize the inability of the GVN to govern or to build;, by the assassination of officials and the sabotage of public works. 16/ The purpose of this military strategy^ Taylor asserted, was apparently not to capture the nation by force. Rather, in concert v/ith non-military means, it wSvS to produce a political crisis which would topple the goverranent and bring to power a group willing to contemplate the unification of Viet- nam on Hanoi * s terms . YjJ It was in the U.S. interest, Taylor reasoned, to act vigorous3-y -- with advice as well as aid --- in order to bioy the necessa.ry time for Vietnam to mobilize and to organize its real assets so that the Vietnamese them- selves might "turn the tide" and assume the offensive. 18/ But U.S. aid and U.S. advice on where to use it were not enough. The Diem Government itself ha^d to be reformed in order to permit it to mobilize the nation. Diem had, in Ta.ylor^s assessm.ent, allowed two vicious circles to develop which vitiated government effectiveness. In the first of these circles poor military intelligence led to a defensive stance designed primarily to guard against attacks, which in turn meant that m.ost of the military forces came under the control of the province chiefs whose responsibility it v^as to protect the populace and installations. This control by province chiefs meant that reserves could not, because of tangled lines of command and control, be moved and controlled quickly enough to be effective. The effect of high losses in unsuccessful defensive battles served further to dry up the basic sources of intelligence. 19/ The second vicious circle stemmed from Diem's instinctive attempts to centralize power in his own hands while fragmenting it beneath him. His excessive mistrust of many intellectua.ls and younger Vietnam-ese, in- dividuals badly needed to give his administration vitality, served only to alienate them, and led them to stand aside from constructive participation thereby farther increasing Diem's mistrust. 20/ This administrative style fed back, too, into the military equation and through it, created another potentially explosive political-m-i2.itary problem: The ine,bility to mobilize intelligence effectively for operational purposes directly f3-ov/s from this fact /piem's administrative pra.ctice/ as do the generally poor relations between the Province Chiefs and the military comma.nders, the former being Diem*s reliable agents, the latter a povzer base he fears. The consequent frustration of Diem's mili- tary commianders --a frustration well-knovm to Diem and heightened by the November I96O coup — leads him to ac- tions which further complicate his problem; e.g., hj.s un- willingness to delegate military operations clearly to his generals . 2l/ General Taylor *s recoiranended actions for the U.S. were designed to demonstrate U.S. commitment in order to strengthen Diem*s stand and. > TOP SECRET - Sensitive Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 r I TOP SECRET - Sensitive simultaneously, to broaden U.S. participation in the hope of "bringing , about necessary reforms in Diem*s regime. The President's emissary rejected the alternatives of a military takeover v/hich would make the generals dominant in all fields. He rejected^ too, the alternative of replacing Diem with a weaker figure who vrould be V7illing to delegate authority to both military and civil leaders. 22/ The first course would emphasize the solution to only one set of problems while slighting others; the second would permit action, but not coordinated action. 4 B.- "Lmited Rirtnershi-p" In order to move in a coordinated way on the intermingled military, politice^l, economic, and social problems facing South Vietnam, General Taylor recommended that the U.S. initiate a "limited partnership" which would stop short of direct U.S. action but would also, through persuasion at many levels judiciously mixed with U.S. leverage, ". . .force the Viet- namese to get their house in order in one area after another." 23/ In- crea.sed ma.terial assistance from the U.S. would be accompanied with increased U.S. participation at all levels of government in which the American advisors must "...as friends and partners -- not as arms-length advisors -- show them how the job might be done -- not tell them or do it for them." If strongly motivated, tactf\il Americans were assigned primarily outside Saigon, thus avoiding the establishment of large headquarters not actually engaged in operational tasks, Taylor thought that this increased U.S. participation would not be "counter-productive"; e.g., lend substance to claims of U.S. imperialism and dominance of the Diem Govermnent. 2_^/ '.^ Thus, Taylor consciously opted for a U.S. course of action in which the major thrust of effort would be to induce Diem to do the things that the U.S. thought should be done: to draw the disaffected into the national effort and to organize and eq.uip so that effective action would be possible. General Taylor did not a,rgue explicitly that success would follow automatic- ally if Diem's practices could be reformed and his operational capabilities upgraded, but he implied this outcome. The question of an overall strategy ■ to defeat the insurgency came very close to being regarded as a problem in the organizs.tion and management of resources. Since GVN had no national plan, efforts were concentrated on inducing them to produce one. There v/as much less concern about the substance of the non-existent GVN plan. It was almost as though there had to be something to endorse or to criticize before substantive issues could be treated as relevant. C. U.S. -Proposed National Plans f Tliis priority of business is reflected in the U.S. plans which were proposed to GVN for adoption by the latter. In late I96O the U.S. Country Team in Saigon produced an agreed " Count erinsujrgency Plan for Viet-Nam" (CIP). The plan was an attempt to specify roles and relation- ships v^ithin GVN in the counter insurgency effort, to persua.de Diem to abandon his bilinea,l chain of command in favor of a single command line with integrated effort at all levels within the government, and to create the governmental machinery for coordinated national planning. 25/ It TOP SECRET - S e nsitive ^ ' 7 Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 TOP SECRET - Sensitive v/as recognized that these recommendations were not pa,latable to President Diem^ but reorganization along the lines specified was regarded as essential to successfu.l accomplislrtnent of the counterinsurgent effort. 26/ The CIP was an indictment of GVJ^"" failure to organize effectively and to produce coordinated national plans. 27/ It advanced no operational concepts for adoption "by GVN, This obvious omission was corrected in the "Geographically Phased National Level Operation Plan for Counterinsurgency" which MAAG Vietnam published on 15 September I96I. 28/ Not only did this p].an specify the areas of primary interest for pacification operations -- as its title indicates -- it also set forth a conceptual outline of the three sequential phases of actions which must be undertaken. In the first/ "preparatory phase/' the intelligence effort vras to be concentrated in the priority target areas ^ surveys were to be made to pinpoint needed economic and political reforms, plans viere to be drawn up, and military and politi- cal cadres were to be trained for the specific objective area. 29/ The second, or "military phase," vrould be devoted to clearing the objective area with regular forces, then handing local security responsibility over to the Civil Guard (CG) and to establishing GVN presence. 30/ In the final, "security phase," the Self Defense Corps (SDC) v/ould assutne the civil action-local security mission, the populace was to be "reoriented," politi- cal control wa.s to pass to civilian hands, 8.nd economic and social pro- grams were to be initiated to consolidate government control. Military units would be withdrawn as security v/as achieved and the target area would be "secured" by the loyalty of its inliabitants -- a loyalty attribu- table to GVN's successful responses to the felt needs of the inhabitants, 31/ Pirst priority in this plan (I962 operations) was to go to six provinces around Saigon and to the Kontum area. Second priority (I963) would be given to expansion southv/ard into the Delta and southward in the Central Highlands from Kont-oia. Third priority (196^) would continue the spread of GVN control in the highlands and shift the emphasis in the south to the provinces north and east of Saigon. Before any of these priority actions were undertaken, however, it v/as proposed to conduct an ARVN sv/eep in War Zone D, in the jungles northeast of Saigon, to reduce the danger to the capital and to increase ARVN^s self-confidence. 32/ (See Map 1.) The geographically phased plan comp3.emented the earlier CIP. Together, these two U.S. efforts constituted an outline blueprint for action. It is, of course, arguable tha.t this was the best conceivable blueprint, but it was at least a comprehensive basis for refinement — for arguments for different priorities or a changed "series of events" in the process of pacification. D. Initial Vietnamese Reactions This is not how matters proceeded, ixi the event. Ambassador Durbrov;, General McGarr, and others urged acceptance of the CIP upon President Diem., but with only partial success. 33/ Diem stoutly resisted the adoption of a single, integrated chain of operational comjnand, showed no enthusiasm for detailed prior planning, continued his practice of cen-- tralized decision-marking (sometimes tanta.mount to decision piegoiiLioling) , 8 TOP SECRET - Sensitive Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 ,^i • U.S. jyiMG Geographically Phase'd Plan ;■—- — V* AILAND / •^^,^;f*^^'^ BS''**^^. r C A I ~~^ \ ^ I *c^.^™.-^..^— • 17(h PARALLEL V f ■:V Ql i f?.w^ j-e-INH^ ptlUOG >|;.^S^-?^|v-^'- :vU^^'^'^ ^-Ij^q LONG V i-*^^-^ 'L -.V^ ^uong Province on 22 March I962 vhen vork commenced on Ben Tuong^ the first of five hatnlets to be con- structed for relocated peasants in the Ben Cat District in and around the Lai Khe rubber plantation^ (See Map 2.) Phase I of the operation -- the military clearing phase -- was conducted by forces of the 5th AEW Divi- sion reinforced by ranger companies^ a reconnaissance company^ two rein- forced CG companies^ and a psychological warfare company. The Viet Cong . simply melted into the jungles. With the Viet Cong out of the way — at least for the time being - the relocation and construction of the new hamlet commenced. The new program got off to a bad start. The government was able to persuade only seventy families to volunteer for resettlement. The 135 other families in the half dozen settlements vrere herded forcibly from their homes. 8k/ Little of the $300^000 in local currency provided by USOM had reached the peasants; the money was being withheld until the resettled families indi- cated they would not bolt the new hamlet. Som.e of them came with most of their meager belongings. Others had little but the clothes on their backs. Their old dwellings — and many of their possessions — were burned behind "t-hem. 85 / Only 120 males of an age to bear arms were found among the more than 200 families -- indicating veiy clearly that a large number had gone over to the VC^ whether by choice or as a result of intimidation. ^Q ' ^** Other Early Programs Progress in Binh Duong continued at a steady pace^ beset by diffi- |l ^^' culties. By midsummer '2900 persons had been regrouped into three strategic hamlets. 87 / Elsewhere^ the pace quickened. Although the Delta Plan^ as a coordinated effort^ had not been im.plemented by the sumimer of 1962^ Secretary McNamara found in May an aggressive effort under way without U.S. help near Ca Mao: Here the comma.nder of the 31st Infantry Regiment had gone into an area 95^ controlled by the VC^ declared martial law^ and resettled 11_,000 people (some under duress) in 9 strategic hamlets_, while fighting the VC wherever he foiond them. Since inception I of the program^ none of his villages have been attacked^ and the freedom f rom VC taxation (extortion) is proving most appealing to the people. It is the commander^ s hope (doubtless optimistic) that he will be able to turn the whole area, over to the civil guard and self defense corps mthin 6 months. 88/ These resettlement efforts in areas which had been under VC domination were not the extent of the early hamlet "program^" however. Many exist- ing hamlets and villages were "fort-ified" in one degree or sjiother early in 1962 follo\^7ing no discernible pattern. This appears to have been the natural product of the varied response to ffiiu's injunction to emphasize strategic hamlets. In April^ the GW Ministry of the Interior informed the U.S. that I3OO such hamlets were already completed, 89 / "Operation Sunrise" had by this time been broadened to embrace efforts in several provinces o 90 / Several other Strategic Hamlet Programs were begun: "Operation Hai Yen II" (Sea Swallow) in Phu Yen Province with a goal of 281 hamlets^ 157 of which were reported, as completed within two months: 22 TOP SECRET - Sensitive Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 ■ ■*>. MAPS, '*.:BIKH DUONG pRovno «SUI,-JII5E" HAMLETS .1 . ' . . ... ■ , ■ ' . ■ ■ • . ■ :- 1 " W l\ .-: '.• -'■■■■■. ■■.;■,■■■-. ' • ■.- ; -r- 23. i Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 - • TOP SECRET - Sensitive "Operation Dang Tlen"(Let^s go)' In Blnh Dinh Province with a goal of 328 strategic hamlets In Its first yearj and "Operation Phuong Hoang" (Royal Phoenix) in Quang Nai Province vith a goal of 125 strategic harnlets by the end of I962. D- At Last -- A National Plan The GW drew all of the partiallstlc programs together in its August 1962 national priority plan_, mentioned earlier. The nation was divided into four priority zones (Map 3). First priority was assigned to the eleven provinces around Saigon. This included essentially the area of the Thompson Delta plan plus the original area of "Operation Sunrise" plus Gla Dinh Province (Map k) , Priorities within each zone were further specified. Within the zone of first national priority^ for example_j the provinces of Vinh Long^ Long An^ and Phuoc Try were assigned the highest priority; Blnh Duong -- where operations were already in progress -- was given priority three (Map 5). Dy the end of the summer of 1962 GW claimed that 3^225 of the planned 11^3l6 ham.lets had already been completed and that over 33 percent of the nation's total population was already living in completed haralets (See Table l). October 1962^ when Diem made the Strategic Hamlet Program the avowed focus of his counterinsurgent campaign_, marks the second vmtershed in the development and implementation of the program. The first such watershed had been the consensus^ on the potential value of such a pro- gram_j which had been developed at the end of I961 and early I962. There .--. would be no others until the program died with Diem. E. Effect on U.S. ' Perceptions 1 The effect of the G W s concentraion on strategic hamlets was to I make U.S. assessments focus on several sub-aspects of the problem. Atten- ; tion tended to be directed toward how well haralets were being fortified and whether or not the implementation phase was well managed; i.e._, whether peasants were paid for their labor^^ reirabursed for their losses^ and given adequate opportunity to attend their crops. Conversely^ attention was - ■ directed away from the dlfficult-to-assess question of whether the follow- up actions to hamlet security were taking place -- the actions which would convert the peasantry from apathy (if not opposition) to identification ' with their central' government. This focusing on details which diverted attention from the ultimate objective took the form of reports^ primarily statistical^ which set forth the construction rate for strategic hamlets^ the incident rate of VC activities^ and the geographical areas in which GW control was and was not in the ascendancy. These "specifics" were coupled to generalized assess- ments which almost invariably pointed to shortcomings in GW s execution of the program. The shortcomings^ however^ were treated as problems in efficient management and operational organization; the ineluctability of increased control (or security) leading som.ehow to popular identification TOP SECRET - Sensitive 2k II # ; i :.-'■■■' -■;■>.■/.■'-■'■ . ..■ • -i A'' ■■ " ■ I ' Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 \< • ' ,. • .1 • t • . t. . « GVN PRIORITIE: FOk 1^ ct RATEGIC KAMLE:TS BY ZONES '. r Tl i/MLAND '-**^-^''*^'*' ^ai ■»■ ■■■ ■ ■ 17lh PARALLUL LAOS S^L-/ouAHcr>k'^ v<^^v>^^/:^^?fhT-^ ■■ ■ ■■■:■■■» • :a . ',^ V . C A M ;b .V (A. ■' '■ I'ji'I^Sa.l ■ ■' »'"\V *•• ' ■ ■■■■■. t p / / PHU zsi". QUOC, ,^>^''''^'V v-::^ ■■■-■■ :;^Y AN- KLt ...-■i^ t': r.\ri If I', PRIORITY I "^IVrIORITY 2 [ r r^'VJiPRlORiTY 3 •pr~" Y PRIORITY 4 'O CON SON <:>' 'i r I. 1 ■ t .■ - t^ .y-.-.. .-i^.v/-'- t" ;■- .\£ >' • • ■-J V 0' -' ^-*.-»nm— » ■ * s^ MAP 3 25' SOUTH VIET-NAM UATIOJIAL BOUiiDARY Vrovihce COUMDARY vj ..-■■" '■-.^^ ;-• •■ KIEN \k!EN .PHorj(;;^U0N'r; VL, . PHU QUOC yC HUONG ^s /ba xuyen f/ AREA INCL.UDED IN THE DEL.TA PL.AN >V/!/ AREA INCLUDED IN THE NEW '^ GVN PLAN AS PRIORITY NO. 1 --.^ i- IN PROGRESS CON SON ■PRIORITY Z » -"., .,1. .>< . ": PRIORITY 3 MAP. :4 SOUTH VIET-NAM NATIONAL COUIIDARY tROYWICE BOUHDARY -r ■ ^^"^ I ■ i I., Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 k - ^ ir • *. GVN PRIORITIES FOR STRATEGIC HAMLETS WITHIN THE FIRST PRIORITY ZONE I I il u - uaNG \— ^ r DUG /-^ ■ / *» TUYEN DUG '' /^ ' I***'", rntfJi-i *'' ;>■' ■jUOiJG . fHAtir .\:.«ffiB />■■■- .;:■ N i'tUy/6^ PHU QUOG «■ "fV 1, y CHUONG ^S /l*A XUYEN y :q ■ , .._- iPRIORlTY I/I l^IilpRlORITY 1/2 ll-l2l}>KlORITY !/3 LIT !:1f*RioRiTY 1/4 CON SON J<^^ .ht" 1- .*• 'MAP .'5 SOUTH ;VIET-1SIAM . NATIONAL BOUfJDARY. PROVINCE BOUHDARY 27 •■ ■ ■ »• . . 1 ' .-i ..— — • »^'- li- Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date; 201 1 TOP SECRS'T -• Sensitive TABLE 1 GVII REPORT ON STATUS OF STPx.'^.TSGIC K^u'ILETS /-, As of 30 September 1962 * i - I 1 lii i. I r I k^ Area SOUTESRI^ : Saigon Strategic Hamlet ^^ SUB-^TCyrAL CENTRAL: Central Lowlands High Plateau Sli3"T0TAL k> Planned — ■ ^ fa»-»jj 1^-33 Eastern Rcovincfts 1^595 VJestern Provinces h,'J2Q 6,756 3.630 930 i^,560 GRAim TOTAL 11^316 Strategic Hcunlets Completed Strategic Eamlcts Under Population in Const:nJ.ction Co:npleted Hejclets 105 291 1,236 1,632 l,ii90 10^ 1,593 3,225 115 501 702 1,31s 682 217 899 2,217 26l,ii-70 Ji23,o6o 1,87^1,790 2,559,320 1,65^^,^70 108, 2J!-'l 1,762, 71'^ ^,322,03^^ - Percentage of planned havnlets ccapleted 28.14-9^ - Percenta.Ge of total population in completed hamlets 33'39io * Adapted frora Tha Times of Vietnara, 28 October 1962, p. I7. /^ TOP S3CRET - Sensitive 29 J Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 rr TOP SECKST - Sensitive TABLE 1 I GVK REPORT ON STATUS OF STPATSGIC IIAl^fliSTS /-, As of 30 Septem'ber 1962 * Area SOUTHESK : Saigon Strategic Hojnlets Planne d ^33 Eastern Provinces 1>595 VJestern Provinces h,'J2Q SUB-TOTAL 6,756 Strategic Haralets Completed 105 ' 291 1,236 1,632 Strategic Hamlets Under Population in Construction Completed Hejilets 115 501 702 1,318 263., 1^70 J+23, 060 l,07'i,790 2,559,320 I " I CEimi'iL: Central Lowlands 3^630 High Plateau •930 SUB-T0TA>L hj 560 GMKD TOTAL ll,3l6 1, 1+90 103 1,593 3,225 682 217 89^^ •. 2,217 108, 2't'+ 1,762,711+ U, 322, 03^1- - Percentage of planned hamlets completed. .28.49>j - Pei'centage of total population in completed hamlets. .. .33- 39p * Adapted from The Times of Vietnam, 28 October 19^2, p. 17- TO? SECRET - Sensitive 28 ):- Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 TOP SECRET - Sensitive ■ I ■ ■ ■ . ^ «-^ m- I ■ ^•' ■ » ■ ■ — •-• by a process akin to the economic assiitnption of "flotation to stability through development" vent xmchallenged as a basic assumption. Critics pointed to needed improvements j the question of T.^hether or not these could be accomplished^ or vliy_j almost never was raised. ^ "Operation Sunrise"^ for exaraple^ vas criticized in some detail by the US MA.A.G. Much better planning and coordination was needed in order to relocate effectively: Aerial surveys were necessary to pinpoint the ( , number of families to be relocated; ujianticipated expenditures needed to be provided for; preparation of sites should begin before the peasants were moved; and (WE resource commitm-ents should be carefully checked by U.S. advisors at all levels. 92/ There was no discussion of the vulnera- : , bility of the strategic hamlets to VC infiltration (as against VC attacks) - or of the subsequent steps to \rlnning support. That was not^ one may assume^ the military's prime concern. Political observers who examined this follow-on aspect were cautiously optimistic: The strategic hamlet program is the heart of our effort and deserves top priority. "While it has not — and probably i will not -^ bring democracy to rural Vietnam^ it provides truly ; ■ local administration for the first time. Coupled mth measures to increase rice production and farmer income^ these local administrations can work a revolution in rural Vietnam. 93/ . I The same tone wa.s reflected in Michael Forrestal^s report to President ■ Kennedy in February I963 following his visit to Vietnam with Roger Ililsmaxi. 94/ The visitors found Ambassador l^o3-ting and his deputy^ William C. Trueheart^ optimistic about the results which the program might achieve once the materials for it^ then just beginning to come in^ reached full volume. 95_/ The Department of Defense was devoting considerable effort to insuring that these materials did reach Vietnatn In^ the quantities needed and in timely fasliion. Secretary McHamara had been stuck with this prob- lem during his May I962 visit to "Operation Sunrise". He saw especiaiay a need to program SDC^ CG^ and Youth Corps training so that it would match the role of hamlet building and to insure the provision of proper commu- nications for warning purposes. 96/ A substantial amount of the MAAG-DoD effort subsequently went into programming. The Agency for International Development had agreed to fujid the "Strategic Hamlet Kits" (building materials^ barbed \7ire and stajies^ light weapons^ a^mnunition^ and commu- nication equipment)^ but in August I962 it demurz^ed, stating that support- ing assistance funds in the MAP were inadequate for the purpose o 97/ Secretary McNsmara agreed to ujidertalie the financing for I5OO kits (13 million) but asked if the additional 35OO kits requested were real3y necessary and^ if so^ on vrhat delivery schedule. The target levels and^ delivery dates under^vrcnt more or less, continuous revision from then until the question became irrelevant in late I963. 98/ A separate but related effort went into expediting the procurement^ delivery^ and installation of TOP SECRET - Sensitive — - I ■ 1 ■ 1 1 — ■ I 1 " I -- t — '29 Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 TOP SECRET - Sensitive radios in the strategic haiinlets so that each vould have the capability to somid the alartu and request the employiiient of mobile reserves when attacked. I II r- F. Differences Begin to Emerge All of these "program management" activities were based on the imstated assumption that the strategic hamlet program wo\ild lead to effec- tive pacification if only Diem wotild malve it work. As it toirned out^ there was some disagreement between what the U.S. considered needed to be done and what }?resident Diem knew very wel,l he was doing. He was using ■the Strategic Hamlet Program to carry forvrard his "persona^ist pliilosophy." 99/ As brother Ehu visibly took the reins controlling the prograsn and began to solidify control over the Youth Corps it became increasingly clear that Diem was emphasizing government control of the peasantry at the expense (at least in U.S. eyes) of pacification. lOO/ ■ ■ ■! I ■ ■ PI ■ ■ -■ I ■■ . ■ ■11* . As awareness in Washington increased that strategic hamlets could serve several purposes^ there developed also a divergent interpretation of v/hether or not the GW was "winning the war." >?hen General KrulaJi^ SACSA^ and Joseph Mendenhall^ an ex«counselor in Saigon then at State^ visited RW in September I963, President Kennedy -^nryly asked upon receiving their conflicting reports^ "ibu two did visit the same country ^ didn't you?" 101/ The answer is that they had^ but the general stressed that the m,ilitary war was going well while the diplomat asserted that the political war was being lost. The arguraent was not^ it 'should be stressed, one between the generals and the diplomats; experienced diplomats disagreed fundamental]^ \dth Mendenhall. The disagreement was between those who pointed to signs of progress and those who held up examples of poor planning, corruption, a.nd alienation of the peasants whose loyalty was the object of the exercise. Criticisms ^" frequently accompanied by counterbalancing assertions that "lijuited progress" was being achieved .-« mentioned corvee labor, GW fail- ures to reimburse the farmers for losses due to resettlement, the dishonesty of some officials, and Diem's stress on exhortations rather than on the provision of desirable social services, 102 / Those who emphasized that the program, was sho-^^dng real progress -- usually mth a caveat or two that there was considerable room for Improve- ment — stressed statistical evidence to portray the exi^onential increase in strategic hamlet construction (Table 2), the declining trend in Viet Cong-initiated incidents (Table 3), therise in VC defections (Table 4), and the slow but steady increase in GVW control of rural areas (Table 5). The JCS observation \rith respect to the estaJ^lishment of strategic hamlets, for instance, was that since fewer than two tenths of one percent (0.2/0) of them had been overrun by the VC, "The Vietnamese people must surely be finding in them a m.easure of the tra.nquility which they seek. 103/ RGK Thompson later claimed that the ve3ry absence of attacks was an indicator that the VC had succeeded in infiltrating the hamlets o 10^/ The point is not Thom,pson^s prescience but the difficulty of reasoned assessment to which this analysis has already pointed. The U.S. course, 30 TOP SECRET - Sensitive Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 } •-■ -I V . ■ , V ■■'w' '■ ■,.'.'. * I STRATEGIC HAMLET GROWTH SOUTH VIETNAM ♦ 3 1 a. 8 y o I o o z 10. 000 - wmtmn -»««a t *' ' MOKW* '"■"■'" """""" " ■'"" stasiNci' KSACs **"*" * 1 * ■WHTl-ff^ * ■ - ■ 1 ■ 9000 — , * ■ i 1 Q 1 1. 1 B500 GTKATEGIC HAMUET9 ^ • ESTIMATED TO T-E COMPUETEO ' 1 ' BY 1 .lULV. . 1 £ i B ■ ■9 , 1 ' P *i !» ' 1 . , ij 1 ' 1 8000 ^ 1 (a ' * Vi U , f ' - M « ■ ■ > ^ V * ■ » *a 1 , , . ■r \ ', ^ , ■ ■ • - ta \ • ■ to 5 ^ ^ ■ ■ 7000 1 ■■. ■I «r < . y « 1 * , I *« , u » ■• , , . * ' • I ■ ' . H ' ' - • ■ ■■ te » * ■ ^ ■ •b , « * , ■■ H fl Hi . * ' 1 «» ^ cAnn < ? AF^PROXIMATELY * ' ! oouu — ■ • ■ -GOOD HAM DTK/- LETG iiTt.1.- 1 CON y 1 PLE-l ED. ■ ■ ' k ■ - ^ ■ % ' 4 ^ ' / * * * 5000 " • X ' 1 f / ■ ^ ' * . . 4000 - ' / 1 . a c * 3000- A . /y INCOMPLETE DATA ■ f ^^ PRIOR TO BEfTEMHER 196?. I t ■ ■ . t 1 r ■' 1 ■ g n2000 - if 1 h' \ * " s J 1 1 ■ « -4 1000- * .( • ■ • y ■ l'-J ■ « » r.T_ -jjct =;ri*»KS; ^.-lUJi-na, fw=T.^^-rr: \ O ND J F MA M.J JAS O.N D J F M A M A 1 I 1962 \ \ 1963 f." I, t 31' t 1964 TABLE 2 ^i» / 1 I ' I i ttoo tooo '. . 900 800 ■\ . ■ 700 z bJ a u z iL o on z 600 500 400 300 \ 200 ■ X t ■ too Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 VIET CONG INITIATED INCIDENTS BROKEN DOWN INTO CATEGORIES (AHACKS, TERRORISM, SABOTAGE, PROPAGANDA). » > «, ' 1 [ — 1 — T"" 1 1 ' rnmrnn ATTACKS ■■Ml TERRORISM iigiDifi SABOTAGE ' cri 1 tri PROPAGANDA 4 f 1 ■ - !■ ^ , , ~re— • i ^ ^ I \\ ■ ■ B ■ ' 1 \ TEFlROnrDM J 1 « ^ ^v - ' , • L' 1 » * ■ > II /; ■ . C ^ f t J I] "I B C Is ■ — 1 ' •_ - 1 1 — 1' I I I ■ t 1 G f] V i 1 r ■ ' • 6 J ■ • U I) > - -. - 1*- ' 1 I />~ , , V ^ ^ ■ s & 1 i 4 % T 1 ■ ■ ' . fi < ■ G fl fl J til fi g f \ .H c 'J \ y \ \\ ■J ■ \\ c fl h ■ \ k ! ■^^ c 1 - ' * I / \ > ATTACKS \ . \\ ti \ _^-..-r 4 . *y — ' — 1 re y i" I ' Ml \ \ 1 ? t 1^ s. S m^^^ 1 — ■ ■ \ 11 \ -3; ■ ^s ■ 1 ^•. PROP . 1 L :: AGAN DA \ [\ V Vv !' 1 •• « 1 itcti A.BOT Hill AGE t i^;; 1 I * p « , \ ^'f. ^ f f \~ f" '^ V. ' 1 ' MlMlf J F ^ k 1 . 1 J / i c ' h \ c ) . f ' ^ ^ /* V r A- J f J / < £ i * c ) I ^ D ■M96a 1963 3X TABLE 3 '"-, .' ■■:J Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 r. vv •t'i ■■ r ..( .J. » 4.1 VIET CONG DEFECTIONS 400 ^ \ I 1962 I [.^■wJ— . » I : -33 Ti\BLE i|^ Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 ( ■ COMPARISON OF CONTROL;"GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM AND VIET CONG JULY. OCTOBER AND DECEMBER 1902, ••■ AND APRIL 1963 ■ '* -* '\j ( SITUATION AS OF 1 JULY 1962 SITUATION AS or I OCT 1962 SITUATION AS or t DEC -1962 SITUATION AS OF I APRIL 63 CHANGES JUL 62 TO APRIL 63 NUMBER OF VILLAGES RURAL POPULATION %Or RURAL POPULATION NUMBER or VILLAGES RURAL POPULATION % OF RURAL POPULATION NUMBER or VILLAGES RURAL POPULATION % OF RURAL POPULATION NUMBER OF VILLAGES RURAL POPULATION % or RURAL POPULATION NUMBER or VILLAGES RURAL POPULATION % or RURAL POPULATION .GOVERNMENT or VIETNAM EFFECTIVE CONTROL 859 5, 600. 000 47% 929 6,071.000 19% 951 6,300,000 51% 935 6.724.000 54% + 76 + 924,000 + 7% GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM IN ASCENDANCY 710 3,622.000 29% 613 3, 246, 000 27% 666 3.331,000 27% 73! 3.356.000 27%. + 21 -266. 000 -2% NEITHER GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM NOR VIET CONG CONTROL 34 ■. • 137.000 1% 148 717.000 6% 120 643.000 ■ 5% 139 609. 000 ■ 5% + 105 + 472, 000 + 4% VIET CONG IN ASCENDANCY VIET CONG EFFECTIVE COf-JTROL • 422 454 1.702.000 14% 1. 157.000 9% 329 437 1.275.000 1.008.000 10% 8% ■ 340 445 1. 143.000 9% 926.000 8% 34S 390 9C2. 000 1 ' 657. 000 ■ - • 7% "'■'7% • -74 -64 -300. 000 -2% -74G. OOO -7% I < . J N. ". . NOtt":" IN ORDER TO PRESENT A BETTER PICTURE OF CONTROL OF or RURAU vmTNAM, 1. 600, 000 POPULATION Or AUTONOMOUS -'CITIES OF SAIGCT4. DANANG. HUE. At-O DALAT UNDER GVN COfnROL WAS HOT USED IN THIS STUDY. (POPULATIONS ARE ESTIMATES) ■'•^^"--■'-^ "-- -^ •<-"- ,_fc JJ -r - • . ■ ^ '' > :;. -.- ~ • '■^ ':./ - '> u zjsn u- V V // ;,:fv:^v-. i. U '3^ KJ ■'• S/U3LE 5 Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 l-i TOP SECRET - Sensitive in the face of these cautiously optimistic and hopefully pessimistic reports^ was to continue its established program of material support coupled Y^ith attempts to influence Diem to make desired changes. VII* TEE PATH TO TIIS EliD A. Diem'g Position Hardens The obvious U.S. alternatives, by mid"19b3;. remained the sailie as they vere in late I96I: (l) to induce changes vrithin the Strategic li'amlet Program (among others) by convincing Diem to make such changes- (2) to allow Diem to run things his o>:n vray and hope for the best^ and (3) to find an alternative to President Diem. The U.S. continued to > pursue the first course; Diem insisted increasingly on the second. Finally, due to press'ores from areas other than the Strategic Hamlet Program, the U.S. pursued the third alternative. The Strategic Hamlet Prograra, in the event, died vith its sponsors. Far from becoming more reasonable, in U.S. eyes, President Diem by mid- 1963 had become more intractable. He insisted, for example, that the U.S. cease to have an operational voice in the Strategic Hamlet Program. 1!he multiplication of U.S. advisors at many levels, he claimed, was the source of friction and dissension. The remedy ^^'as to remove the advisors. 10^/ The essence of Diem's position was that Taylor's "lianited partnership" would not work. . Other U.S. missions visited Vietnam to assess the conduct of the war. The result was much the same as reported by Krulak and Mendenhall. This was essentially the findings of the McKaniara-Taylor mission in September; the military campaign is progressing, political disaffection is growing; U.S. leverage is questionable. 106 / B. The Program Dies With the IT^os The rest may be summarized: the U.S. attempted to insist on a program with more emphasis on broad appeal rather than control; Diem, findixig himself increasingly embroiled in the Buddhist controversy, increased repressive measures; a coup toppled the Diem regime on 1 KoveBiber; the deposed President and his brother llhu, "architect of the Strategic Hamlet Program," were killed. The Strategic Hamlet Program— or at least the program under that name which they had made the unifying theme of their counterinsurgent effort--died with them. The inhabitants who had wanted to leave the hamlets did so in the absence of an effective government. The VG took advantage of the confusion to attack and overrun others. Some off erred little or no resistance. The ruling 'junta attempted to resuscitate the program as "Kew Life Hamlets" early in I96U, but the failures of the past provided a poor psychological basis upon which to base hopes for the future. TOP SECRET - Sensitive 35 Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 TO? SECl^:iT - Sensitive VIII. M INCOI^CLUSIVE Sm^I/U^Y The dominant U.S. view has been that the Strategic Haialet Program failed because of over-expansion and the establishment of hsmlets in basically insecure areas. 10?/ That there vas overexpansion and the . establishinent of inany poorly defended hamlets is not questioned. ^This contributed, beyond doubt^ to the failure of the program. But this view finesses the problem of the process for \&i±ch the strategic hamlets ^vere but the tangible s:jnnbol. The present analysis has sought to emphasize both the essentially political nature of the objective of the Strategic 'Hamlet Program and the political nature of the context in which the process evolved -- of expectations, bargaining^ and attempts to exert ^ influence on other participants in policy formulation and implementation. In this context it is the U.S. inability to exert leverage on President Diem (or Diem's inability to reform) that emerges as the principal cause of failure. Yet, both of these attempts to pinpoint the reasons why the strategic hamlet program did not succeed fail to get at another whole issue: the validity of that body of writings which one may call the theory and doctrine of counterinsurgency. ITeither the military nor the political aspects of this doctrine can be upheld (or proved false) by an examination of the Strategic Kamlet Program. Quite aside from f whether or not Diem was able to broaden the program's appeal to the peasantry, what would have occurred had he made a determined and sustained effort to do so? V?ould this have led in some more-or-less direct way to stability or to even greater dissatisfaction? V;e simply do not know. The question is as unanswerable as whether tlie appetite grows with the eating or is satisfied by it. The contention here is that claims of mismanagement are not sufficient to conclude that better management would necessarily have produced the desired results. - In the military sphere the unanswerable questions are different. It is said that the military phase of the Strategic Kamlet ^ lYogram progressed reasonably well in many areas; the failure was in the political end of the process. But did the military actions succeed? Might failures to develop adequate intelligence and to weed out VC infrastruc care m these hamlets not as easily be attributable to' the fact that the inhabitants knew they were not really safe from VC intimidation and reprisals? Does the analogy to an "oil spot" have operational meaning when sruall bands can carry out hit and run raids or when many small ^ bands can concentrate in one location and achieve siu-prise? Where is the key to this vicious circle -- or is there a key? In conclusion, while the abortive Strategic Kamlet Program of 1961-1963 may teach one something, the available record does not permit one to conclude either that the program fell because of the failure of a given phase or that other phases were, in fact, adequate to the challenge. One may say that the program was doomed by poor execution and by the inability of the ilgo family to reform coupled with the in- ability of the U.S. to induce them to refonii. The evidence does not warrant one to proceed further. ' 36 TO? SECRET - Sensitive Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 I ; I Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 TOP SECRET --Sensitive lY. B. 2 FOO^^IOTES ■» ■ ^ 1. Sir Robert Thompson^ D efeati ng, C oEimmiist Insurgency (Kew York: Praeger, I966), p. 123. . ■ 2. Seven Years of the ITgo D inli Diem AcM jJiistra tion, 19 3^L-J:96l (Saigon: 26 October l^oll, pp. 357-3^0. 3. See Are J J.J. Lasloff, " Rural Resettlerosnt in South Vietnff nj__Tii3 ■■oville Program " , Pacific Affairs, Vol. XXXV^, Kr n- (Win-ce 1952-63), PP. 327-3^0. k. Despatch, Saigon to State Er 278, 7 March I960, Iiitelligence Eo-i:>ort Ir 2137251, 7.^. ik (s/HF) , *■' 1 " ■!■■— ■-■T — * ■■■'■■■■■■'■■ "^ "*" 5. William A. Kighswmger, Rural PacifiGation _in. Vlctnsjn (Nev? York: Praeger, I966), p. 46. 6. Si^IIE 10-Jt-6l, 7 November 1961, P robable Coim miigtjteactions in South Vietnara, p. 3 (TS) 7. Brie Di riefing Paper, n.rl.. The Korth Vietnej nese Rol eJji_theJ3jagin, Irection, and Su-oport of t he War in South Vietnaia, p. iv {S) ; State Departiuent Bureau of Intelligence .and Research, RFE-3, 1 November lOol^ Coinmunist Threat Mounts in South Vietnsjin, p. 4 (s) 8. Ibid . 3 p. 5 9. NIE 50-^61, 28 March 1961^ Outlook in Mairagi^^Soirtjga^t^^^ p. T (S) 10. MAAG, Vietnaia, 1 September I96I, Fi^stJ^fe]^^ Chiex' KMG, Vietnajn , p. 10 (S) 11. U;S. Senate Camriiittee on Foreign Relations^ 89th Congress^ 2nd Session^ Backgr o -jr>d In formation Rela-tog_to_So}jtljga and Vietngjn (2nd Revised EdTJ^ V3.sh±nB'^<)r., GPO^ 19^6, pp. c)6"T. 12. Letter of Traismittal to President Diem end President Kennedy, n.Q. (June I961), Joint Action Progrej.i P roposed by the _ Viet Eajn. United States Special Financial Groups (S) 13. See Ibid. ^ Introduction^ p. 1^ passim ^ TOP SECRET" Sensitive 37 Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 r^ / Ik. 15. TOP SECRET - Sensitive Letter^ President Kennedy to General Max\-/ell D. Taylor^ 13 October 1951 (C) Report on General Taylor ^s Mission to SouthJ/ietn8,m^ 3 November 1961^ borad in loose' leaf vitli letter'of trcinsinittal, evaluations and conclusions^ and Appendices A-I, (TS) Cited hereafter as Tnvlor ReiDort. All references are to tbe section on evaluations and conclusions. . . 16. Ibid . J p. 2 17. Ibid ., p. 3 13. Ibid ., p. 8 19 • ™^'^ PP- 6"T. 20. Ibid ., p. 9 21. Ibid., p. 7 22. Ibid ., p. Ik 23. 2k. 25. Poid . , See also pp. 11 -lo. Ibid., pp. 11-12 The plan, cited hereafter as CrP-196o, is contained as axi inclosure to Despatch ITr. 276, Saigon to State, k Januar;y' I96I; Covaater Insurgencj^ Plan for So'iith Vietnam. (S) ^■M fl »■ J I *■ ■ ■!!> ■! fc'l"! ■ ■ P — H IB^ ■! ■■!■ ■ ■ — II I ■■■^■^^- I flPP^ »»■! P'«-*l JPPjfcl Jil l 26. Despatch ITr. 276^ Saigon to State, op. cit . , p. 3 27. See for example. Ibid., Annex 3. 28. MAAG Vietnam, 15 September I961, Georgrap hically Pha^Jfetional Level Operation Plar. for Co uJiterins urgengyTc) (Secret), cited hereafter as Georgra-ohiically Phased Coia^terins urgency Plan . 29.. Ibid . , pp. A1«A3. 30. Ibid. , pp. A3-A4. 31. Ibid.,, pp. Ali--A7. 32. Ibid., p.C2. 38 TOP SECPUT - SE^SITI\Ti: 3 Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 TOP SECKET - Sensitive "« *■ 33. Soe^ for example^ Telegrco-a^ Saigon to State I^Tr. l466^ l6 March IQol (S), 8Jid"Aide Memoire, McGarr to Dien^ 3 July I96I, Hevievr of Milit'ary Situation and Eecoirjuendations fo r Continued Improvement (s). — ■■ I I ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ * ■ k. Telegram^ Saigon to State, ITr. 508, I8 October I96I (S). 35. Study^ HGK Thompson to President Diem, 2? October I90I, Appreciation of Vietnam, ITovember I 96I -April ig6g (S), Incl. to letter Lt. Gen. Lionel C, McGarr to Secretary of Defense, 20 ITovember 19ol^ SecDef Control I'Tr. 2G^k (s). 36. Ibid. 37- Ibid. 38. Copies of Thompson's covering letter' and m.ejnorandiirn to Diem are .-.enclosed mt>rmsg, Saigon to State; Er. 205; 20 liiovember I96I, Thompson Mission Recoir aT iendations to Presiden t Diem (S). The memorandi:jn is cited hereafter as Thompson Memorandum. 39. Ibid. ».■■ » " .1 I'M, - i{-0. Ibid., letter of transmittal. (Emphasis added). ' 111. Letter, McGarr to Admiral H.D. Felt (CE-ICPAC), 27 November I96I (S), Incl. to letter, McGarr to Secretaiy of Defense, 27 November 1961, op» cit. k2. Ibid. if3. Ibid. kk. U.S. Militar-y Advisoiy Group, CH-iAAG Guidance Paper to Pield Advisors in Coxnrte.T Insurgency, Fourth Revision, 10 Februaiy I962, Tac tics and Techniques of Co uxiterinsurge nt Operations (S) 45. Despatch ITr. 205, Sa,igon to State, 20 Hoveraber 19^1; op. cit. 46. D-partment of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, 2 February I962, A Strate gic Coiicept for South Vietnam (s); on the President's interest and Thompson's effect on Hilsma^a^ see Roger Plilsman, To Move a l?atior^ _The^Politics of Foreign -- " ■ *' •' •Policy in the Admiiiistrati on of Job^- F. Kennedy ^ new York: Doubledsy ,'1967), pTdT ^27 -39 . 00 TOP SECRET - Sensitive Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number; NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 hi. 50. 51. 52. 53. 5h. 55. 56. 57 TOP SECRET - Sensitive A Strategic Concept I'or^ Sout h Vietnam, op_. cit , , pp. 9~l'^. The third principle i's Hilsmsri's owii contribution, drawing heavily on his personal experiences with the OSS during World War II. i^8. 'ibid., pp. 15-19. k9. Ibid., pp. 15 ^-2l^. Ibid,, p. 9 Department of State^ Task Force Vietnsan^ ih December 196l_, Status Report of Developments Sirce Decemb er 8 ^ p. 3 (S) HQCraCPAC, l6 December I961, Transcript, Fir st Secretary of Defense Conference, pp. 1-2 (S) ^ Personal notes of Assistant Secretar^^ of Defense Arthur Sylvester, 16 December 1961, SecDef Conference, Honolulu. Memoranduju, McGarr to Mr. Thus2i, I8 December 19^1^ Civi^,, Covernment Paxamj.lit-ary Infrastructure ( Or gan! z a-U.on)_gequire£_^£^ Integrate^ P?:r-rof Military Phase of Pacification Effort (sj^ Ibid. "— — ■ — • — . . The GW plan and actions are not well ddcujnented but are referred to in U.S. UkliQ Vietnam Report, 31 July I962, i^esso^^is^J^efm]^ Nr. 19. John C. Donnell and Gerald C. Hickey, Th^J/i^tnamese^J^trat^^ Hamlets:" A Preliminary Report (RAND Memoraxidum Wi 320b -ARPA, 30 August 1962), p. 2^ (C). 58. Letter McGarr to Pelt, iB December I96I, op. cit_. 59. HQCMCPAC, 15 Januarjr 1952, Record of Second Sec retary of Defense ' Co rif e r enc e , pp. 5A-1 - 5A--3 JsJ~ 60. Ibid., pp. 6-1 - 6-5. 61. Department of State, Research Project 63O, ^QriX^Merlc&n^V^^ and Diplomacy Concerning Vietnam, 1960-1963 ^ P. 99 (^''8) 62. Telegraxa, Saigon to Sts,te, Kr. 1031^ 10 February 19^2 (S). 63. Donnell and Kickey, op. clt., pp. 3-^;-. ko TOP SECPvET- Sensitive Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 f TOP SECRET - Sensitive Gh. Ibid,, p. \. 65. Department of State, Task Porce Vietneiu, 28 December I96I, Status ReT)ort of Developraents Since December 21, p. 2 (S), 4 ■ 66. Ibid., p. 3. 67. Telegram, Saigon to State Nr. ^95^ I6 October I961 (S). The UoS. proposals are recorded in National Security Action Memorariduin No. Ill, 22 ITovember 1961, First Phase of Vietnejn Program (TS) . ■ II ■ I ■ r I G^. Telegrcm^ Saigon to State' Er. 687^ 22 November I9SI (S). . , TO. Ibid . •., ■ " . . 71. Telegrojtn, Saigon to State Kr. 708, 25 November I961 (S). 72. Telegrain^ CAS New Delhi to Director Ko 99^1^ ^^o'" Ambassador Galbraitii for the President, 21 November I96I (TS). 73. See Homer C. Bigart, " VietnaineseOpen a Drive o n_Reds," New York Times 29 March I962 . ~~ ih. Telegram Saigon to State Nr. 1367, 22 Mcly I962 (S), 75. Telegram, Saigon to State Nr. 133^ 8 August 19^2 (c); Airgrams,^^ Saigon to State, Krs. A-85 and A~110, 9 August and 27 August I962 (C). 76. "The Times of Vietnam, "Vol IV, Nr \'i, 28 October I962. 77. Ibid,, p. 6. ■ 78. Ru.fus Phillips, A Report on Counter --Ir^sjargency^ 31 August 1962, p. 5 Cc). 79. See for example, De-oartment of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research Research MemorandujJi RPE..27; l8 June 19^2, P£0£E5^^.-5ai9£i on South Vietnajn (sAlP), 80. Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Research Memoranduju RPE-62, 5 December I962, Saigon^s Strategic Concept for Counter "Insurgency a Progress Report (S/iCf'j. TOP SECRET - Sensitive 41 I I I r \ . Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 TOP SECRET - Srensitive I 81. Visit to Southeast Asia by the Secretaxy^of^DeTense^, 8---11 Maylgfe, 57^^"Tt§77 Inclosure to Memo, CJCS to SecDefTT^May 19^2, Visit to Southeast Asia. 82. Vie tnam; ?ree -World CliallengG in Southeast Asia (Department of State .Publication T338)^ pp. 16-^17. . 83. Remarks to press, 2l| July I962, in OSD Historical Files. 8^. Homer C. Bigart, ^^US Helps Vietnen in Test of Strategy" IJew York Times , 27 March I962. IS ' * ' 85. Ibid . . . ■ • .• 86. "No \l±n," The Nev Rep ublic , 9 April I962. 87. US I/IAAG, 31 July I962, Lessons Learned Nr. 19, P- 2. (c). Visit to Soy.thea-,st Asia by the Secretaryof Defensj^j:;3J__May_1962, op. cit .j p. 2 89 Buream of Intelligence and Research, RFE^27; l8 June 1962, op. cit. '^ 90. MAAG Lessons Learned Fr. 19, op. cit . 91. C0I4US]/iAGV lless8^e DA IN 262596, 8 September I962, Province Rehabilitation Program (S). o ■■>- ■' » «- 92. I-IAAG, Lessons Learned l\^r. I9 , op. cit. 93. Theodore J.C. Ee8,vTLer, Deputy Director Working Group Vietnam; Report on Visit to Vietnam, October l8"Kovember^_26^jL9H2;» P- ^ (S) 9l|.- Michael, V. Porrestal, Memorandum for the President, A_Repoi;t_on South Vietnam. • ' _ 95. Hilsmaai, To Move a Iva^tion , op. cit . ^ p. ^53* 96-. Visit to Southeast Asia by t he Secretary of Defense, 8-11 May I962 , op . cit. 97. Memo, ASD/iSA to SecDef, 9 August I962, Fundln^of_Stx^ Kits, Vietnam. 98. See, for example, JCSM 73^-62, 22 Septem.ber 19^2, Funding of Strategic Hamlet ICits, Vietnam. j^a-Ti,i-. — -■ -■,■■ ■- -J.. -. .-■ . ^ ^ ^ - _ l!-2 TOP SECRli^T - Sensitive Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 r n TOP SECRET - Sensitive r 1 1 1^ <^^. CIA M5.BO for SecDef, 28 September 19o2 (S). 100. Depajrtment of State, Burea;a of Intelligence srtd Research^ RFE-42^ 27 May 1963, lEiplications of GW Difficulties in Vietnam (s). 101. Eilsrnan^, To Move a Nation , op. cit . ^ p. 502. 102. See^ for example^ USOM Rural Affairs Office^ 1 Septem"ber 19^3^ Second Inforraal Appreci ation of the Sta tus of th e Strategic fej alet Pr ogrsm, Incl. to Manioraji-duan^ Michael V. Forrestal to Secretary Mcj^laniaraj 20 September 1963^ Vietnam^ S'JcDef Control Nr. i|97. 103. Joint Chiefs of Staff ^ 11 May I963, Trends in the Counterinsurgency Effort in South Vietnam, p. 60 (S/Fif^TT" 10^. Thompson, Defeatin g Co mir.ur:ist Insurgency ^ ^, cit . ^ p. I36. 105. Department of State, 'W^.A?.^ 27 May I963, op. c it . 106. Memorsn.dum for the President, 2 October 19o3, Report of the McIIgmara-Taylor Mission to South Vietnam (TS). 107. See, for example, Depajrtment of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, RFE-102, 20 December 19o3, Trends in the War Effort i n South Vietnam (S): See also William A. Nighswi'^nger, Rural Pacification in Vietnam. M M 2DP SECRET - S-rsitive