The pre-war estimate of Iraq's nuclear program, as reflected in the October 2002 NIE Iraq's Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction, was that, in the view of most agencies, Baghdad was "reconstituting its nuclear weapons program" and "if left unchecked, [would] probably...have a nuclear weapon during this decade," although it would be unlikely before 2007 to 2009. 3 The NIE explained that, in the view of most agencies, "compelling evidence" of reconstitution was provided by Iraq's "aggressive pursuit of high-strength aluminum tubes." 4 The NIE also pointed to additional indicators, such as other dual-use procurement activity, supporting reconstitution. The assessment that Iraq was reconstituting its nuclear program and could therefore have a weapon by the end of the decade was made with "moderate confidence." 5

Based on its post-war investigations, the Iraq Survey Group (ISG) concluded--contrary to the Intelligence Community's pre-war assessments--that Iraq had not tried to reconstitute a capability to produce nuclear weapons after 1991. 6 Moreover, the ISG judged that Iraq's work on uranium enrichment, including development of gas centrifuges, essentially ended in 1991, and that its ability to reconstitute its enrichment program progressively decayed after that time. 7 With respect to the aluminum tubes, the ISG concluded that Iraq's effort to procure the tubes is "best explained by its efforts to produce 81-mm rockets," and the ISG uncovered no evidence that the tubes were intended for use in a gas centrifuge. 8

The Community was, in brief, decidedly wrong on what many would view as the single most important judgment it made. The reasons why the Community was so wrong are not particularly glamorous--failures of analysts to question assumptions and apply their tradecraft correctly, errors in technical and factual analysis, a paucity of collection, and failure by the Community to authenticate relevant documents. But these seemingly workaday shortcomings collectively led to a major mis-estimation of a critical intelligence question.

This chapter details our review of the Intelligence Community's performance on the nuclear issue. Like the chapters that follow on the Community's assessments of other aspects of Iraq's weapons programs, this chapter is divided into three sections. First, we review the Intelligence Community's pre-war assessments of Iraq's nuclear program. We then summarize the findings of the ISG regarding Iraq's nuclear efforts and how those findings compare to the Intelligence Community's assessments. The final section contains our findings concerning the causes of the Intelligence Community's failures on the aluminum tubes issue and the now-infamous Niger story.

The Intelligence Community's Pre-War Assessments

The Intelligence Community's assessments of Iraq's pre-war nuclear program were not made in a vacuum. Rather, as the Intelligence Community later explained, its assessments were informed by its analysis of Iraq's nuclear ambitions and capabilities spanning the preceding fifteen years, as well as by "lessons learned from over a decade of dealing with Iraqi intransigence on this issue." 9 Thus the proper starting point for an evaluation of the Intelligence Community's assessments lies at the conclusion of the first Gulf War--when the Intelligence Community reviewed the state of Saddam Hussein's nuclear programs and was surprised by what it found.

Post-Gulf War. Following the Gulf War, based on a variety of sources of intelligence including reporting from defectors, the Intelligence Community learned that Iraq's nuclear weapons program went "far beyond what had been assessed by any intelligence organization" in 1990-1991. 10 Before the Gulf War, in November 1990, the Community had assessed that, because analysts had not detected a formal, coordinated nuclear weapons program, Iraq likely would not have a nuclear weapon until the late 1990s. 11 Thus after the war the Intelligence Community was surprised to discover the breadth of Iraq's nuclear weapons program, including the wide range of technologies Iraq had been pursuing for uranium enrichment, which in turn indicated that Iraq "had been much closer to a weapon than virtually anyone expected." 12 This humbling discovery that Iraq had successfully concealed a sophisticated nuclear program from the U.S. Intelligence Community exercised a major influence on the Intelligence Community's assessments throughout the early 1990s and afterwards.

Iraq's subsequent and continuing attempts to evade and deceive international inspectors heightened analysts' concerns. 13 In a 1994 Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee (JAEIC) assessment, Iraq's Nuclear Weapons Program: Elements of Reconstitution, the Intelligence Community agreed that the "Iraqi government is determined to covertly reconstitute its nuclear weapons program," and that, although Iraq had not yet begun reconstitution, it "would most likely choose the gas centrifuge route" and would "invest a great deal of time and effort" to "conceal its efforts from long-term monitoring." 14

Mid-1990s. Still, through the mid-1990s, analysts continued to assess that Iraq had not yet reconstituted its nuclear program. Most agencies judged in a 1993 NIE that "if sanctions are lifted and especially if inspections cease, Baghdad will rapidly accelerate its effort" to produce nuclear weapons. 15 And all agencies agreed in a September 1994 JAEIC assessment that Iraq "still seems to be pursuing" its former program. 16 The Intelligence Community believed that if Iraq were able to mount a dedicated centrifuge program, it would probably take the Iraqis five to seven years to produce enough fissile material for a nuclear weapon. 17 This consensus was best reflected by an October 1997 assessment by the JAEIC, which reaffirmed its previous judgments that Iraq would need five to seven years to produce fissile material indigenously, assuming some availability of foreign technical assistance and supplies. 18 Whether that five to seven year clock had started to run, however, was unclear: this assessment noted that although there was "no firm evidence that reconstitution had begun, six years had passed since the Gulf War and the Community could not be certain whether the starting point for the five to seven year timeline was in the past or future." 19

During this period, the lack of specific intelligence on the subject continued to complicate analysts' abilities to assess Iraq's ability to reconstitute its nuclear program. The Intelligence Community noted in a 1998 assessment, for instance, that there was limited and often contradictory human intelligence reporting on Iraqi nuclear efforts, with some human intelligence sources indicating that Iraq was continuing "low-level theoretical research for a weapons program" while other sources reported that "all nuclear-related activity [had been] halted." 20 The Intelligence Community acknowledged that it had an "incomplete picture of the Iraqi nuclear program." 21

Post-1998. The end of international inspections in 1998, prompted by Saddam Hussein's preventing the inspectors from doing their work, increased concern among analysts that Iraq would use that opportunity to reconstitute its nuclear program. Accordingly, in 1999, the JAEIC noted that although it still had no specific evidence that reconstitution had begun, the absence of inspectors gave Iraq greater opportunity to conduct covert research and development. 22 As of December 2000, however, an Intelligence Community Assessment noted that Iraq still did not appear to have taken major steps toward reconstitution. 23 Thus, after the departure of inspectors, the Intelligence Community assumed that Iraq had the opportunity and the desire to jumpstart its covert nuclear weapons program; by the end of 2000, however, the Community had seen no firm evidence that this was actually happening.

This judgment began to shift in early 2001 as a result of a discovery that, in hindsight, was the critical moment in the development of the Intelligence Community's assessment of Iraq's nuclear program. In March 2001, intelligence reporting indicated that Iraq was seeking high-strength tubes made of 7075 T6 aluminum alloy. 24 The Intelligence Community obtained samples of the tubes when a shipment bound for Iraq was seized overseas . 25

At this point, a debate began within the Intelligence Community about the reason why Iraq had procured the tubes. The CIA assessed that the tubes were most likely for gas centrifuges for enriching uranium and believed that the tubes provided compelling evidence that Iraq had renewed its gas centrifuge uranium enrichment program. 26 CIA subsequently identified possible non-nuclear applications for the tubes, 27 but continued to judge that the tubes were destined for use in Iraqi gas centrifuges 28 --even while acknowledging that the Intelligence Community had very little information on Iraq's WMD programs to corroborate this assessment. 29

This judgment concerning the tubes' likely intended use was echoed by another expert technical entity within the Intelligence Community. Analysts from the National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC), a component of the U.S. Army recognized as the national experts on conventional military systems, judged that while it could "not totally rule out the possibility" that the tubes could be used for rockets and thus were not destined for a nuclear-related use, the tubes were, technically speaking, poor choices for rocket bodies. NGIC's expert judgment was therefore that there was a very low probability the tubes were designed for conventional use in rockets. 30 Because of NGIC's expertise on conventional weapons systems such as rockets, NGIC's view that the tubes were poor choices for rocket bodies gave CIA analysts greater confidence in their own judgment that the tubes were likely for use in centrifuges. 31

Other entities took a different view, however. The Department of Energy (DOE), the U.S. government's primary repository of expertise on nuclear matters, assessed that the tubes--although they "could be used to manufacture centrifuge rotors"--were "not well-suited for a centrifuge application" and were more likely intended for use in Iraq's Nasser 81 millimeter Multiple Rocket Launcher (MRL) program. 32 The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) agreed with DOE's assessment, concluding that the tubes were usable in a gas centrifuge application but that they were not directly suited to that use. 33

Despite this disagreement, the CIA informed senior policymakers that it believed the tubes were destined for use in Iraqi gas centrifuges. 34 While noting that there was disagreement within the Intelligence Community concerning the most likely use for the tubes, the CIA pointed out that there was also interagency consensus that the tubes could be used for centrifuge enrichment. 35 This consensus on capability led many analysts at both CIA and DIA to think that the tubes supplied the evidence that Iraq was starting to "reconstitute" its nuclear program. 36

Other streams of evidence also raised flags. At about the same time, analysts began to see indications that Iraq was seeking procurement of other dual-use items that would be consistent with a possible renewed effort at developing centrifuges. 37 This activity concerned even DOE, which had expressed skepticism that the intercepted tubes had centrifuge applications. 38 These concerns were affected by the Intelligence Community's history of underestimating Iraq's nuclear program; as the National Intelligence Council (NIC) would later observe, analysts became concerned during 2002 that "they may again be facing a surprise similar to the one in 1991." 39

In the months before the October 2002 NIE, the CIA continued to assess that the tubes were intended for use in gas centrifuges, albeit with slight variations in the strength of that formulation, pointing out that Iraq's interest in the tubes was "key" to the assessment that Iraq was "reconstituting its centrifuge program." 40 CIA presented this view in an Intelligence Assessment, entitled Iraq's Hunt for Aluminum Tubes: Evidence of a Renewed Uranium Enrichment Program, in which CIA concluded that the aluminum tubes "are most likely for gas centrifuges for enriching uranium" and that Iraq's pursuit of such tubes provided "compelling evidence that Iraq has renewed its gas centrifuge uranium enrichment program." 41 The assessment noted that "some" in the Intelligence Community believed conventional armament applications, such as multiple rocket launchers, were "more likely end-uses," but the assessment noted that NGIC, the "national experts on conventional military systems," had found such uses "highly unlikely." 42 At the same time, DOE disseminated a separate assessment arguing that, while the tubes could be modified for use as centrifuge rotors, "other conventional military uses [we]re more plausible." 43 The Department of State's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) agreed with DOE's assessment. 44

October 2002 NIE . The Intelligence Community judged in the NIE with moderate confidence that "Baghdad ha[d] reconstituted its nuclear weapons program." 45 Only INR dissented from this assessment, although INR judged in the President's Summary of the NIE that the overall evidence "indicates, at most, a limited Iraqi nuclear reconstitution effort." 46 By reconstitution, the Intelligence Community meant that Iraq was in the "process of restoring [its] uranium enrichment capability." 47 To the relevant CIA and DIA analysts, the pursuit of aluminum tubes provided "compelling evidence" of reconstitution. 48 In particular, the composition, dimensions, cost, and tight manufacturing tolerances for the tubes were assessed by CIA and DIA to exceed by far those needed for non-nuclear purposes, thus demonstrating that the tubes were intended for a nuclear-related use. 49 At the interagency coordination meeting for the NIE, both NSA and the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) agreed with the CIA/DIA position on the tubes. 50 DOE and INR dissented from the tubes judgment, assessing that the tubes were more likely for use in tactical rockets. 51

The NIE stated that the conclusion that the tubes indicated reconstitution was bolstered by additional evidence that suggested Iraq could be rebuilding its nuclear program:

1. Other Dual-Use Procurements. Reporting indicated that Iraq was attempting to procure other dual-use items that would be required to build a gas centrifuge plant, such as magnets, "high-speed balancing machines," and machine tools. 52 These items are all dual-use materials, however, and the reporting provided no direct indication that the materials were intended for use in a nuclear program, as indicated in the NIE. 53

2. Nuclear Cadre. The NIE also pointed to evidence that Iraq was making efforts to preserve, and in some cases re-establish and enhance, its cadre of weapons personnel. 54 Reporting indicated that some scientists had been reassigned to the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC) and that Iraq had "reassembled" many scientists, engineers, and managers from Iraq's previous nuclear program. 55

3. Activity at Suspect Sites. Sources indicated that Iraq was trying to procure a magnet production line in 1999-2001 and one report indicated the plant would be located at Al-Tahadi, where analysis suggested construction of buildings in late 2000 that could have housed a magnet production line. 56 Both sources indicated, however, that magnet procurements were likely affiliated with Iraq's missile program, rather than with nuclear applications, though some reporting noted that the cadre of scientists and technicians at the site formerly worked in the nuclear program. 57

Uranium from Niger. Although the NIE did not include uranium acquisition in the list of elements bolstering its conclusion about reconstitution, it did note that Iraq was "vigorously trying to procure uranium ore and yellowcake" from Africa. 58 This statement was based largely on reporting from a foreign government intelligence service that Niger planned to send up to 500 tons of yellowcake uranium to Iraq. 59 The status of the arrangement was unclear, however, at the time of the coordination of the Estimate and the NIE therefore noted that the Intelligence Community could not confirm whether Iraq succeeded in acquiring the uranium. 60 Iraq's alleged pursuit of uranium from Africa was thus not included among the NIE's Key Judgments. 61 For reasons discussed at length below, several months after the NIE, the reporting that Iraq was seeking uranium from Niger was judged to be based on forged documents and was recalled. 62

In short, all of the coordinating agencies, with the exception of INR, agreed that Iraq was reconstituting its nuclear program. 63 Of those agencies that agreed on reconstitution, all but DOE agreed that the tubes provided "compelling evidence" for that conclusion. DOE reaffirmed its previous assessments that, while the tubes could be modified for use in a gas centrifuge, they were poorly suited for such a function and were most likely designed for use in conventional rockets. 64 On the question of reconstitution, DOE believed that the other factors--the attempted procurement of magnets and balancing machines, efforts to reconstitute the nuclear cadre, activity at suspect sites, and evidence of Iraqi efforts to obtain uranium from Africa--justified the conclusion that Iraq was reconstituting its nuclear program. 65 None of the other agencies placed significant weight on reporting about attempts to procure uranium from Africa to support their conclusion of reconstitution. 66

Post-NIE. The publication of the NIE did not settle the dispute about the aluminum tubes and so, in the period between the NIE and the invasion of Iraq, debate within the Intelligence Community over their significance continued. INR, for its part, continued to see "no compelling reason to judge that Iraq ha[d] entered" the timeframe of at least five to seven years that the Intelligence Community agreed Baghdad would need to produce sufficient fissile material for a nuclear weapon. 67 DOE, meanwhile, continued to believe that reconstitution was underway but that the "tubes probably were not part of the program," 68 assessing instead that the tubes were intended for use in conventional rockets. 69 On the other side of the dispute, NGIC and CIA continued to assess that the tubes were destined for use in gas centrifuges. 70 Outside the Intelligence Community, the IAEA, after inspections resumed in fall 2002, also weighed in on the dispute, concluding with DOE and INR that the tubes were likely intended for use in Iraq's 81 millimeter rocket program. 71

During this time the CIA continued to explain to senior policymakers that the Intelligence Community was not of one view on the most likely use for the tubes, 72 but CIA offered its own view that the "alternative explanation" for the tubes' intended use--that they would be used for rockets--was likely an Iraqi "cover story." 73 The CIA also noted the overall paucity of information on Iraq's programs, but suggested that the lack of information was due in part to Iraq's successful efforts to hide its illicit activity. 74

Other countries' intelligence agencies views of the tubes were, on balance, somewhat more circumspect than that of the majority in the NIE. For its part, the British Joint Intelligence Committee assessed, as did the NIE, that the aluminum tubes, with some modifications, would be suitable for use in a centrifuge, but noted that there was no definitive intelligence that the tubes were destined for the nuclear program. 75 The views of the Australian Office of National Assessments on the relevance of the tubes to Iraq's nuclear program were "inconsistent and changeable." 76

Post-War Findings of the Iraq Survey Group

The Iraq Survey Group concluded that Iraq had not tried to reconstitute a capability to produce nuclear weapons after 1991. 77 It concluded that Iraq's efforts to develop gas centrifuges for uranium enrichment ended in 1991, as did Iraq's work on other uranium enrichment programs, which Iraq had explored prior to the Gulf War. 78 The ISG also found no evidence that Iraq had taken steps to advance its pre-1991 work in nuclear weapons design and development. 79 Although the ISG did find indications that Saddam remained interested in reconstitution of the nuclear program after sanctions were lifted, it concluded that Iraq's ability to reconstitute its program progressively decayed after 1991. 80

Not long after the start of the Iran-Iraq war in 1980, Iraq started to pursue formally a uranium enrichment program using a variety of uranium enrichment techniques. 81 By 1990, Iraq had built two magnetic-bearing centrifuges (with foreign assistance) using imported carbon fiber rotors and two oil-bearing centrifuges. 82 During the first Gulf War, however, nearly all of the key nuclear facilities in Iraq--those involved in the processing of nuclear material or weapons research--were bombed and many of the facilities were largely destroyed. 83

After the Gulf War, Iraq initially chose not to disclose the extent of its nuclear program and instead sought to hide any evidence of it. Accordingly, the director of Iraq's Military Industrialization Commission, Hussein Kamil, ordered the collection of all inculpatory documents and equipment. The equipment and documentation were then moved to a variety of locations to hide them from the IAEA. Hussein Kamil ordered at least one set of all nuclear-related documents and some equipment to be retained by a senior scientist. 84

Despite Iraqi efforts, in early summer 1991 the IAEA confronted Baghdad with evidence of uranium enrichment components during the course of its inspections. At that point Baghdad admitted to its large pre-war enrichment programs, but still did not fully declare the extent of its centrifuge program. 85

Indeed, Iraq continued to resist more comprehensive disclosure of its pre-1991 nuclear program until after the defection of Hussein Kamil in 1995, when a large number of documents and equipment fell into the hands of UNSCOM and the IAEA. From this point forward, according to the ISG, the Iraqis appear to have been more cooperative and provided more complete information. For example, the Iraqis largely declared their pre-1991 centrifuge program, although a full set of documents obtained by Iraq from German engineers in the 1980s was not supplied to IAEA inspectors. 86

Although the Iraqis did not make more comprehensive disclosures about their nuclear program until 1995, the Iraq Survey Group concluded that Iraq had actually ended its nuclear program in 1991. More specifically, the ISG assessed that Iraq's development of gas centrifuges essentially ended in 1991 and that Iraq did not continue work on any of the other pre-1991 enrichment methods it had explored, including electromagnetic isotope separation (EMIS). 87 The ISG did point out, however, that many of the former EMIS engineers and scientists continued to work for either the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission or the Military Industrialization Commission in roles that could preserve their technical skills. 88

Despite these efforts to preserve the skills and talent of the nuclear cadre, the intellectual capital underlying Iraq's nuclear program decayed in the years after 1991. 89 For example, starting around 1992, the Director of Iraq's Military Industrialization Commission transferred personnel from the former nuclear program to various military research and production facilities. Some of the work performed by these former nuclear scientists by its nature preserved for Iraq capabilities that would be needed for a reconstituted nuclear program. Still, the ISG noted that the overall decline of the Iraqi economy made it very difficult to retain scientists, many of whom departed for better prospects abroad. 90

With the influx of funds from the Oil-for-Food program and later the suspension of cooperation with UNSCOM, Saddam began to pay renewed attention to former members of the Iraq nuclear program. In the late 1990s, for instance, he raised salaries for those in the Military Industrialization and Iraqi Atomic Energy Commissions, and new programs, such as joint programs with universities, were initiated to employ the talent of former nuclear program employees. 91 In the year before Operation Iraqi Freedom, Iraq's Military Industrialization Commission also took steps to improve capabilities that could have been applied to a renewed centrifuge program for uranium enrichment. But the ISG did not uncover information indicating that the technologies being pursued were intended to support such a program. 92

With respect to Iraq's interest in procuring high-strength aluminum tubes, the ISG concluded that the Iraqi attempt to procure the tubes is best explained by Iraq's efforts to produce effective 81 millimeter rockets; the ISG uncovered no evidence that the tubes were intended for use in a gas centrifuge. 93 The ISG arrived at this conclusion only after investigating the key indicators that suggested a possible centrifuge end-use for the tubes--for example, the tubes' dimensions and tight manufacturing tolerances--and found no evidence of a program to design or develop an 81 millimeter aluminum rotor centrifuge. 94

What the ISG found instead was that, with respect to the dimensions of the tubes, Iraqi nuclear scientists thought it was at best impractical for Iraq to have made a centrifuge with 81 millimeter rotors. For example, Ja'far Diya Ja'far, the head of Iraq's pre-1991 uranium enrichment program, stated in post-war debriefings that, while it was possible to make a rotor from the tubes, he thought it would be impractical to do so. 95 He also said that using 81 millimeter rockets as a "cover story" for a centrifuge project would not have been very useful, because Iraq had difficulty importing any goods. 96 Ja'far similarly did not consider it reasonable that Iraq could have pursued a centrifuge program based on 81 millimeter aluminum tubes, judging the technical challenges to doing so were too great. 97

Conversely, the Iraq Survey Group investigation did uncover what it judged to be plausible accounts that linked the tubes to 81 millimeter rockets, and which answered questions about why the Iraqis had sought such tight manufacturing specifications for the tubes. For example, some sources indicated to the ISG that the tight tolerance requests were driven by a desire to improve the accuracy of the rockets. Inconsistencies among rockets had resulted in past variations in range and accuracy, according to these sources, and the Iraqis chose to address this problem by tightening specifications. 98 Another explanation was that the engineering drawings for the Iraqi 81 millimeter rocket, which was originally reverse-engineered from an Italian air-to-ground rocket (the Medusa), had undergone many ad hoc revisions over the years because the Iraqis were using their 81 millimeter rockets as ground-to-ground rockets. An Iraqi military committee was convened to return the design to the original Italian-based design, according to the ISG report, and that military committee then set new, and more strict, specifications. 99 The ISG also learned that misfires sometimes resulted from pitting in the tubes caused by improper storage and corrosion, a problem that could explain the requirement that the tubes be anodized and shipped carefully. 100

Though ultimately concluding that the evidence did not show that the Iraqis intended a nuclear end-use for the tubes, the Iraq Survey Group did note some inconsistencies in the explanation that the tubes were intended for use in tactical rockets. 101 For example, the ISG found technical drawings that showed that Iraq's 81 millimeter rocket program had a history of using tubes that fell short of the strict manufacturing standards demanded in the procurement attempts before the war. 102 Also, the ISG found evidence that, in the months just before the war, the Iraqis accepted lower-quality, indigenously produced aluminum tubes for its 81 millimeter rockets, despite the continuing efforts to procure high-specification tubes from abroad. 103 Iraq also explored the possibility (about a year before the war) of using steel for the rocket bodies. This approach was rejected, however, because it would have required significant design modifications for the existing 81 millimeter rocket design. 104 The ISG noted that these efforts raise questions about whether high-specification tubes were really needed for rockets. 105

The ISG reconciled this evidence by judging that Iraq's continued efforts to obtain tubes from abroad, even while simultaneously accepting some indigenously produced tubes for use in rockets, could be explained in large measure by bureaucratic inefficiencies and fear of senior officials in the ranks of the Iraqi government. 106 For example, Dr. Huwaysh, the head of the Military Industrialization Commission, "exhibited a rigid managerial style" and frequently made unreasonable production demands. The fear of being held responsible for rejected tubes or components affected the lead production engineer and he therefore decided to tighten specifications for the rocket program. Similarly, a report from the rocket program noted that some engineers requested tight specifications in order to appear effective in addressing problems. Also, because Huwaysh demanded results quickly, the engineers did not have time to attempt a detailed analysis of the causes for rocket scatter and inaccuracy; instead, the engineers simply tightened some specifications in the hope that that would improve accuracy. 107 Other factors influencing the continuing efforts to procure tubes from abroad included the "lack of sufficient indigenous manufacturing capabilities"--an effort that Iraq only began in 2002--the high costs of production, and the "pressure of the impending war." 108

The ISG noted that one other factor that the Intelligence Community had cited as evidence that the tubes were intended for use in a centrifuge was that the potential supplier was asked to provide 84 millimeter tubes--a change that would have meant the tubes could not be used in an 81 millimeter rocket. 109 But the ISG found no clear indication that it was Iraq (or an Iraqi entity) that was making these inquiries about 84 millimeter tubes. 110 In any event, the ISG concluded that, although a larger diameter tube would be better for use in a centrifuge, Iraq already had 500 tons of 120 millimeter diameter aluminum shafts which it had imported before sanctions were imposed in 1990. And, furthermore, Iraq was using those shafts in the months before Operation Iraqi Freedom to support the flow-forming operations related to the 81 millimeter rocket program. 111

With respect to alleged "high-level interest" in tubes by Iraqi leaders, the ISG concluded that such interest in the tubes appears to have focused on efforts to produce 81 millimeter rockets rather than on any element of a nuclear program. 112

The Iraq Survey Group also found no evidence that Iraq sought uranium from abroad after 1991. 113 With respect to the reports that Iraq sought uranium from Niger, ISG interviews with Ja'far Diya Ja'far, the head of Iraq's pre-1991 enrichment programs, indicated that Iraq had only two contacts with the Nigerien government after 1998--neither of which was related to uranium. 114 One such contact was a visit to Niger by the Iraqi Ambassador to the Vatican Wissam Zahawie, the purpose of which Ja'far said was to invite the Nigerien President to visit Iraq (a story told publicly by Zahawie). 115 The second contact was a visit to Iraq by a Nigerien minister to discuss Nigerien purchases of oil from Iraq--with no mention of "any kind of payment, quid pro quo, or offer to provide Iraq with uranium ore, other than cash in exchange for petroleum." 116 The use of the last method of payment is supported by a crude oil contract, dated June 26, 2001, recovered by the ISG. 117

The ISG found only one offer of uranium to Baghdad since 1991--an offer that Iraq appears to have turned down. 118 The ISG found a document in the headquarters of the Iraqi Intelligence Service that reveals that a Ugandan businessman had approached the Iraqi Embassy in Nairobi with an offer to sell uranium, reportedly from the Congo. The Iraqi Embassy in Nairobi, reporting back to Baghdad on the matter on May 20, 2001, indicated that the Embassy told the Ugandan that Iraq did not deal with "these materials" because of the sanctions. 119

Finally, and on a broader plane, even if an order to reconstitute had been given, Iraq Survey Group interviews with former senior officials indicated that Iraq would not have been able to do so given the conditions inside the country in 2002. 120 Unsurprisingly, therefore, the ISG found no indication that Iraq had resumed fissile material or nuclear weapon research and development activities after 1991. 121

Analysis of the Intelligence Community's Pre-War Assessments

This marked disjuncture between the Intelligence Community's assessments and the findings of the Iraq Survey Group about Iraq's purported nuclear weapons program was not solely the product of bad luck or the inherent difficulties of making intelligence judgments. It arose out of fundamental flaws in the way the Intelligence Community approached its business.

Above all, the Intelligence Community's failure on the nuclear issue was a failure of analysis. To be sure, the paucity of intelligence contributed to that failure. Although signals intelligence played a key role in some respects that we cannot discuss in an unclassified format, on the whole it was not useful. Similarly, though imagery intelligence showed some construction at a possible suspect nuclear site in or around 2000, imagery provided little helpful insight into the purpose of that activity and nothing beyond that. And, other than information on the alleged uranium deal that was later determined to be unreliable, very little human intelligence was available to provide insight into Iraq's intentions. The time pressures of the October 2002 NIE also may have hampered the normal thorough review before dissemination. 122

But on the crucial question of whether the aluminum tubes were for use in a gas centrifuge or in tactical rockets--an analytical question--the Intelligence Community got it wrong. 123 And, notably, it was not one of the difficult and inherently speculative questions intelligence analysts often confront; it was not a question that required the Intelligence Community to make a prediction about future events or to draw conclusions about the state of the world based upon limited information. Rather, the critical question was, at bottom, largely a technical one, where the critical facts were known or knowable: namely, how well-suited were the aluminum tubes for tactical rockets and centrifuges, respectively? An even-handed assessment of the evidence should have led the Intelligence Community to conclude that the tubes were more likely destined for tactical rockets. This section examines this analytic failure and other issues uncovered by our review of the Intelligence Community's performance.

The judgment of most agencies that Baghdad's pursuit of aluminum tubes "provide[d] compelling evidence" that Iraq was reconstituting its weapons turned upon two separate but related analytical determinations. 124 The first was that the tubes would not have been well-suited for use in Iraq's conventional military arsenal--in particular, as a conventional rocket casing. The second was that the tubes were a suitable fit for centrifuges in a nuclear program.

This section addresses the soundness of each of these conclusions in turn. We find that the Intelligence Community--and in particular, conventional weapons analysts at the National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC) in the Defense Department--got the first of these two questions completely wrong; the intercepted tubes were not only well-suited, but were in fact a precise fit, for Iraq's conventional rockets, and the Intelligence Community should have recognized as much at the time. The second question--whether the tubes would have been well-suited for centrifuge applications--was a closer one, but we conclude that certain agencies were more wedded to the analytical position that the tubes were destined for a nuclear program than was justified by the technical evidence. We also conclude that these misjudgments, while reflecting lapses in basic tradecraft, ultimately stemmed from a deeper source: analysts' willingness to accept that a superficially enticing piece of evidence confirmed the prevailing assumption--that Iraq was attempting to reconstitute its nuclear program--was wrong. That CIA and DIA reached this conclusion was a product of, in our view, an effort to fit the evidence to the prevailing assumptions.

Suitability of the tubes for conventional rockets. The most egregious failure regarding the aluminum tubes was the inability of certain agencies to assess correctly their suitability for a conventional weapons system. While the CIA and DIA acknowledged that the tubes could be used for rockets, these agencies believed it was highly unlikely that the tubes had been intended for such a use. 125 But these agencies' basis for believing this was wrong. Iraq had been seeking tubes composed of a particular material--high-strength 7075-T6 aluminum--which CIA and DIA viewed as suggestive of a nuclear end-use. 126 But that material is wholly consistent with a non-nuclear end-use. This same material in fact has been used in rockets manufactured by Russia, Switzerland, and twelve other countries, according to Department of Defense rocket design engineers. 127 Indeed, Iraq itself had used this kind of aluminum in its Nasser 81 rocket program and had declared that use in its 1996 declaration to the IAEA. 128

Yet NGIC, the national experts on conventional military systems, assessed in September 2002 that the material and tolerances of the tubes sought by Iraq were "highly unlikely" to be intended for rocket motor cases. 129 That assessment was clearly mistaken and should have been recognized as such at the time. NGIC later conceded, in written testimony to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, that "lightweight rockets, such as those originally developed for air-to-ground systems, typically use 7075-T6 aluminum for the motor casing." 130 As the experts on such systems, NGIC should have been aware of these facts. Similarly, although NGIC assessed that the tolerances of the tubes Iraq was seeking were "excessive" for rockets, NGIC was not aware at that time of the tolerances required for the Iraqi Nasser 81 rockets, for the Italian Medusa rocket on which the Nasser 81 was based, or for comparable U.S. rockets. 131

NGIC also believed that the tubes would make poor choices for rocket motor bodies because the walls of the tubes were too thick. 132 But the tubes Iraq was seeking had precisely the same dimensions--including the same wall thickness--as the tubes that Iraq itself used in its Nasser 81 rockets in 1996. 133 This fact also should not have come as a revelation to NGIC analysts, as DOE had published detailed assessments of the tubes used in the Nasser 81 rocket--including their dimensions--in August 2001, and as the IAEA had noted Iraq's use of the Nasser 81 rocket in its earlier catalogs of Iraq's weapons programs. 134 Yet the two primary NGIC rocket analysts said that they did not know the dimensions of the Nasser 81 rockets at that time. While these analysts assert that they had no access to IAEA information and did not receive the DOE reporting in question, 135 we believe that NGIC could and should have conducted a more exhaustive examination of the question. We agree with the conclusion of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence that NGIC's performance represents a "serious lapse" in analytical tradecraft. 136

CIA and DIA's confidence in their conclusions also led them to fail to pursue additional, easily obtainable data on the tubes that would have pointed them in the direction of conventional weapons applications. For example, though elements of the Intelligence Community were aware that the Nasser 81 millimeter rocket was likely reverse-engineered from the Italian Medusa air-to-ground rocket, neither DIA nor CIA--the two most vociferous proponents of a nuclear end-use--obtained the specifications for the Medusa rocket until well after the commencement of Operation Iraqi Freedom. 137 Indeed, CIA appears to have consciously bypassed attempts to gather this crucial data. A CIA officer had actually suggested that CIA track down the precise dimensions and specifications of the Medusa rocket in order to evaluate the possibility that the tubes Iraq was seeking were in fact intended for rockets. CIA rejected the request in early September 2002, however, on the basis that such information was not needed because CIA judged the tubes to be destined for use in centrifuges--a textbook example of an agency prematurely closing off an avenue of investigation because of its confidence in its conclusions. 138

Suitability of tubes for nuclear centrifuges. As discussed above, a debate raged within the Intelligence Community in the months preceding the Iraq war on a second question as well: namely, whether the intercepted aluminum tubes were well-suited for use in nuclear centrifuges. According to both DOE and CIA centrifuge experts, the resolution of this issue depended primarily on the answer to two highly technical questions: first, whether the tubes had a sufficiently large internal diameter (and hence could allow the requisite gas flow) to enrich uranium effectively, and whether the walls of the tubes were too thick for use as centrifuge rotors. 139 While generally the analytical issue of the tubes' suitability for centrifuges was more technically complex than that of their fit for conventional rocket applications, the manner in which certain agencies answered these two technical questions about centrifuge-suitability suggests that their analysis was driven more by their underlying assumptions than by the available scientific evidence.

For example, to answer the first question, analysts from CIA's Weapons Intelligence, Non-Proliferation, and Arms Control Center (WINPAC) sought the assistance of the DOE National Laboratories--specifically, Oak Ridge National Laboratory--to test the tubes. 140 The Oak Ridge laboratory concluded that, while it was technically possible to enrich uranium using tubes of the diameter the Iraqis were seeking, it would be suboptimal to do so. 141 The prototype design unit that Iraq built before the Gulf War--which used carbon fiber rotors and was built with the assistance of German engineers using the European Urenco design--had a separative capability four to five times greater than would a centrifuge built using the 81 millimeter tubes for rotors. 142 Accordingly, to support a program that could produce one nuclear device per year, Iraq would need to manufacture and deploy 10,000 to 14,000 such machines. 143 The number of tubes Iraq was seeking, however, would be enough to manufacture 100,000 to 150,000 of these machines, which could produce 170-260 kg of highly enriched uranium per year (enough for 8-10 nuclear devices per year). But DOE pointed out that no proliferator has ever operated such a large number of centrifuges. 144 In other words, the tubes Iraq was seeking were so suboptimal for uranium enrichment that it would have taken many thousands of them to produce enough uranium for a weapon--and although Iraq was in fact seeking thousands of tubes, DOE assessed it would have been highly unlikely for a proliferator to choose a route that would require such a large number of machines.

With respect to the second suitability question--whether the walls of the tubes were too thick for centrifuge use--CIA's WINPAC sought the assistance of a contractor to perform separate tests (a "spin test") of the tubes in order to determine if they were strong enough to withstand the extremely high speeds at which centrifuge rotors must spin. 145 The initial test performed by the contractor was reported to have resulted in successfully spinning a tube at 60,000 revolutions per minute (rpm). 146 The NIE included these test results and explained that this test provided only a rough indication that the tubes were suitable as centrifuge rotors. The NIE noted, however, that additional tests would be performed at higher speeds to determine whether the tubes were suitable for operations under conditions that replicated gas centrifuge operations. 147

Unfortunately, these subsequent tests--performed by CIA contractors in January 2003--only clouded an already murky picture. The contractors' initial findings gave the appearance that the tubes were of insufficient strength for use in centrifuge equipment. The CIA, however, questioned the methodology used by its contractors, asserting that the test results had failed to distinguish between the failures of the tubes and failures of the test equipment itself. 148 The contractors then provided a "correction" with new test data, which, the CIA believed, demonstrated that the tubes had sufficient strength to be spun at speeds of 90,000 rpm. 149 But DOE was unpersuaded by the corrected findings and argued that the CIA's conclusions were not supported by the test results. 150 At bottom, the ineptly handled spin tests did little more than deepen the divisions between CIA and DOE over the tubes' intended use; in the words of one former senior Intelligence Community official, the tests were "like throwing a lighted match into gasoline." 151

In any event, the initial technical tests led all agencies to agree that the tubes could be used to build gas centrifuges for uranium enrichment. 152 DOE, however, did not believe that tubes were intended for such use, a view with which INR agreed. DOE's view was based on disagreement with CIA's view on both counts--DOE argued that the diameter of the tubes was too small and the walls were too thick for centrifuge use. The tubes, in DOE's judgment, were therefore "not favorable for direct use as centrifuge rotors." 153

CIA countered that the dimensions of the tubes were "similar" to Iraq's pre-war Beams gas centrifuge design and "nearly matched" the tube size used in another type of gas centrifuge, the Zippe design. 154 Nuclear analysts from WINPAC explained that prior to the Gulf War Iraq had pursued the development of a Beams centrifuge with aluminum rotors that had a wall thickness in excess of 3.0 millimeters, and that Iraq had built an oil centrifuge with aluminum rotors in excess of 6.0 millimeters. CIA also asserted that the unclassified document describing Zippe's design could be interpreted as using rotors with wall thicknesses that ranged from 1.0 millimeter to 2.8 millimeters. 155 WINPAC reasoned that, although these dated models for centrifuges were not ideal, Iraq was likely to build what it could rather than what would be the optimal design. 156 Specifically, old centrifuge designs using aluminum rotors were the only ones Iraq had successfully built in the past without extensive assistance from foreign experts. 157 Similarly, DIA assessed that "[a]lternative uses" for the tubes were "possible," but that such alternatives were "less likely because the specifications [of the tubes] are consistent with late 1980s Iraqi gas centrifuge rotor designs." 158

DOE disputed this analysis on several grounds. From the outset, DOE believed that Iraq would pursue a more advanced design, such as the Urenco-style centrifuge that Iraq had pursued with the covert assistance of German engineers before the Gulf War. 159 DOE also disagreed with CIA's technical conclusion that the tubes were a plausible match for the Zippe design; it asserted that the optimum Zippe design required a wall thickness no greater than a certain figure (the figure itself is classified) . 160 Finally, DOE noted that the Beams design had never been successfully used to enrich uranium--Beams himself could never get his design to work beyond pilot-plant operation. 161 As DOE subsequently explained, in DOE's view it was therefore irrelevant, and misleading, to point to similarities with this design as evidence the tubes were intended for use in a centrifuge. 162

In sum, although even DOE agreed that the tubes could be used for centrifuges, DOE's assessment that such use was unlikely proved closer to the mark. DIA and CIA analysts overestimated the likelihood that the tubes were intended for use in centrifuges, an erroneous judgment that resulted largely from the unwillingness of many analysts to question--or rigorously test--the underlying assumption that Iraq would try to reconstitute its nuclear program.

The influence of assumptions on the analytical process. As we have seen, the majority of intelligence agencies--and in particular, CIA and DIA--were simply wrong on the question of whether the aluminum tubes were suitable for conventional rocket applications. A similar dynamic emerged during the intra-Community debate on whether the tubes were a good fit for centrifuge designs; while the judgments were in this case more defensible, CIA and DIA consistently construed quite ambiguous technical data as supporting the conclusion that the aluminum tubes were well-suited for use as centrifuges. A consistent pattern emerges: certain analysts, and certain agencies, were clearly inclined to view evidence--even exceedingly technical evidence--through the prism of their assumptions that Iraq was reconstituting its nuclear program.

This tendency is reflected in the way these analysts interpreted other information about the tubes as well. For instance, CIA and DIA assessed that the tight manufacturing tolerances that Iraq required for the tubes pointed towards centrifuge use, because of the increased cost and manufacturing challenges that would result from these stringent requirements. 163 But as DOE pointed out, although the specifications did seem excessive for use in conventional rockets, the tolerances were also a peculiar requirement if they were destined for centrifuges; the specifications were neither as tight as those previously used by Iraq for centrifuges nor as tight as those typically desired for high-speed rotating equipment. 164 Moreover, the tubes would have required substantial modifications to make them suitable for centrifuge use, 165 and the required modifications would have been inconsistent with the tight manufacturing tolerances demanded. 166 Finally, the tight specifications were not inconsistent with conventional rocket applications; as DOE pointed out to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, it is in fact quite common for inexperienced engineers to over-specify tolerances when trying to reverse-engineer equipment. 167

The focus of certain intelligence agencies on the cost of the tubes offers another example of analysts straining to fit the data into their prevailing theories. The NIE cites reporting indicating that Iraq paid "up to" $17.50 for the tubes, and noted that the willingness to pay this "high" price was indicative of the high priority of the purchase--a fact which, it is suggested, supports the view that the tubes had nuclear application. 168 But in fact this price was not unusually elevated. DOE obtained a price quote from a U.S. manufacturer--without the tight tolerances--of $19.27 per tube. 169

Adherence to prevailing assumptions also led analysts to discount contrary evidence. Both CIA and DIA were quick to dismiss evidence which tended to show that the tubes were intended for use in Iraq's rocket program, instead attributing such contrary evidence to Iraq's "deception" efforts. Analysts were well aware that Iraq historically had been very successful in "denial and deception" 170 activities, and that, at least in part because of such activities, the Intelligence Community had underestimated the scope of Iraq's pre-Gulf War nuclear program. So analysts, in order to ensure that they were not fooled again, systematically discounted the possibility that the tubes were for rockets.

Indeed, in some instances, analysts went even further, interpreting information that contradicted the prevailing analytical line as intentional deception, and therefore as support for the prevailing analytical view. For example, NGIC characterized the Iraqi claim that the tubes were for use in tactical rockets as "a poorly disguised cover story," reasoning that Iraq was claiming such an end-use for the tubes because Iraq was aware that its intentions to use the tubes in a nuclear centrifuge application "have been compromised." 171 CIA also noted in a Senior Executive Memorandum that Iraq "has established a cover story...to disguise the true nuclear end use" for the aluminum tubes, explaining that Iraq may be exploiting press reports regarding the disagreement within the Intelligence Community about the tubes. 172 In some quarters, then, the thesis that the tubes were destined for centrifuges took on the quality of a hypothesis that literally could not be disproved: both confirming and contradictory facts were construed as supporting evidence. 173

The unwillingness to question prevailing assumptions that Iraq was attempting to reconstitute its nuclear program therefore resulted in faulty analysis of the aluminum tubes. While CIA analysts now agree with the ISG position that the tubes were most likely intended for use in rockets rather than in centrifuge applications, 174 as of March 2005, CIA had still not published a reassessment of its position on the tubes. 175

Until now, this review has focused on flaws in the Intelligence Community's assessment concerning the likely uses of the aluminum tubes--the central basis for the overall judgment that Iraq was reconstituting. But the Intelligence Community also identified in the NIE other evidence to support this conclusion, including Iraq's attempts to procure other dual-use items needed for a gas centrifuge such as magnets and balancing machines, efforts to reconstitute its nuclear cadre, and activity at suspect sites. This evidence, however, was based on thin streams of reporting (and indeed, as will be shown, the NIE's recitation of this evidence was also marred by inaccuracies). 176 Analysts are of course often called upon to make judgments based on limited information, particularly on difficult targets such as Iraq's nuclear program. With that said, the NIE too often failed to communicate the paucity of intelligence supporting its assessments and also contained several inaccurate statements.

For example, the NIE indicated that according to sensitive reporting, Saddam Hussein was "personally interested in the procurement of aluminum tubes." 177 This sensitive reporting was a single report from a liaison service which reported that Saddam was "closely following" the purchase of the tubes. 178 Yet even this single report was under dispute. According to one CIA officer, it was the service's intelligence officer who said Saddam was following the purchase, although another CIA officer at the meeting remembered the exchange differently. 179 Even though fundamental doubts existed about the validity and ultimate source of this information, CIA was not able to clarify this point (which was understandable, given the uncertainties inherent in working with liaison services) and allowed the NIE to use the information without reflecting this uncertainty (which was not understandable). 180

In other places, the NIE's assertions concerning Iraq's nuclear program were simply factually incorrect. First, the NIE pointed to Iraq's attempts to procure a permanent magnet production capability as evidence that Iraq was reconstituting its uranium enrichment program. It noted that "a large number of personnel for the new production facility worked in Iraq's pre-Gulf War centrifuge program." 181 This, however, was a mistake; the National Intelligence Officer (NIO) for Strategic and Nuclear Programs subsequently noted that the workers had not been associated with Iraq's centrifuge program but with the former EMIS program. 182 And the NIE misidentified a front company involved in procurement efforts and the items being procured; the company involved in the initial aluminum tube procurement was seeking high-speed spin testing machines, while another company, also involved in tube procurement, was seeking balancing machines. 183

In light of this, DOE's position on Iraqi nuclear reconstitution appears rather dubious. DOE was alone in its view that these other procurement attempts, combined with the later-recalled reporting regarding uranium from Africa, provided sufficient evidence to conclude that Iraq was reconstituting. Leaving aside the factual errors noted above, there was no evidence that Iraq had actually obtained the dual-use items it was seeking, and DOE conceded that there was no evidence that the magnets Iraq was seeking were intended for the nuclear program. 184 With respect to the alleged uranium enrichment procurement efforts in Africa, DOE reasoned that any indication that Iraq was attempting to procure uranium covertly would be a significant indication of Iraq's intention to pursue a nuclear program. 185

The gossamer nature of the evidence relied upon by DOE, and the doubts expressed about the attempts to procure uranium from Africa long before the reporting was recalled (more in a moment about this) had led senior officials in other agencies to question the substantive coherence of DOE's position. The former NIO for Strategic and Nuclear Programs, for one, said that he had not fully understood the logic supporting DOE's conclusion that Iraq was reconstituting despite specifically questioning DOE on this point during the NIE coordination meeting. 186 Similarly, a former senior intelligence officer remarked in November 2004 that DOE's position had "made sense politically but not substantively." 187 In fact, the DOE intelligence analyst who participated in the coordination meetings for the NIE--while maintaining that there was no political pressure on DOE, direct or indirect, to agree with the reconstitution conclusion at the NIE coordination meeting--conceded to this Commission that "DOE didn't want to come out before the war and say [Iraq] wasn't reconstituting." 188

As mentioned above, DOE's position rested in part on a piece of evidence not relied upon by any of the other intelligence agencies in the NIE--that of Iraq's attempts to procure uranium from Niger. 189 This evidence was unconfirmed at the time of the NIE and subsequently shelved because of severe doubts about its veracity. As will be shown in the next section, the Intelligence Community was right to have its doubts about this story, and DOE was wrong to rely on it as an alternative piece of evidence confirming Iraq's interest in reconstitution.

Intelligence Community agencies did not effectively authenticate the documents regarding an alleged agreement for the sale of uranium yellowcake from Niger to Iraq. The President referred to this alleged agreement in his State of the Union address on January 28, 2003-- evidence for which the Intelligence Community later concluded was based on forged documents. 190

To illustrate the failures involved in vetting this information, some details about its collection require elaboration. The October 2002 NIE included the statement that Iraq was "trying to procure uranium ore and yellowcake" and that "a foreign government service" had reported that "Niger planned to send several tons" of yellowcake to Iraq. 191 The statement about Niger was based primarily on three reports provided by a liaison intelligence service to CIA in late 2001 and early 2002. 192 One of these reports explained that, as of early 1999, the Iraqi Ambassador to the Vatican planned to visit Niger on an official mission. The report noted that subsequently, during meetings on July 5-6, 2000, Niger and Iraq had signed an agreement for the sale of 500 tons of uranium. 193 This report stated that it was providing the "verbatim text" of the agreement. 194 The information was consistent with reporting from 1999 showing that a visit to Niger was being arranged for the Iraqi Ambassador to the Vatican. 195

Subsequently, Vice President Cheney requested follow-up information from CIA on this alleged deal. 196 CIA decided to contact the former U.S. ambassador to Gabon, Ambassador Joseph Wilson, who had been posted to Niger early in his career and maintained contacts there, to see if he would be amenable to traveling to Niger. Ambassador Wilson agreed to do so and, armed with CIA talking points, traveled to Niger in late February 2002 and met with former Nigerien officials. 197

Following the trip, CIA disseminated an intelligence report in March 2002 based on its debriefing of Ambassador Wilson. 198 The report carried the caveat that the individuals from whom the Ambassador obtained the information were aware that their remarks could reach the U.S. government and "may have intended to influence as well as to inform." 199 According to this report, the former Prime Minister of Niger said that he was not aware of any contracts for uranium that had been signed between Niger and any rogue states. He noted that if there had been such an agreement, he would have been aware of it. 200 He said, however, that in June 1999 he met with an Iraqi delegation to discuss "expanding commercial relations" between Niger and Iraq, which the Prime Minister interpreted as meaning the delegation wanted to discuss yellowcake sales. The Prime Minister let the matter drop, however, because of the United Nations sanctions on Iraq. 201

The British Government weighed in officially on the Niger subject on September 24, 2002, when it disseminated a white paper on Iraq's WMD programs stating that "there is intelligence that Iraq has sought the supply of significant quantities of uranium from Africa." 202

The story grew more complicated when, on October 9, 2002, several days after the NIE was published, an Italian journalist provided a package of documents to the U.S. Embassy in Rome, including documents related to the alleged agreement for the sale of uranium from Niger to Iraq. 203 The State Department passed these documents on to elements of the CIA. Although the documents provided to the Embassy by the Italian journalist related to the purported agreement, these elements of the CIA did not retain copies of the documents or forward them to CIA Headquarters because they had been forwarded through Embassy channels to the State Department. 204

WINPAC analysts, for their part, only requested and obtained copies of the documents several months later--after State's INR had alerted the Intelligence Community in October 2002 that it had serious doubts about the authenticity of the documents. 205 And, even after this point, CIA continued to respond to policymakers' requests for follow-up on the uranium deal with its established line of analysis, without attempting to authenticate the documents and without noting INR's doubts about the authenticity of the information--despite not having looked at the documents with a critical eye.

For example, in mid-January 2003, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff requested information--other than information about the aluminum tubes--about why analysts thought Iraq was reconstituting its nuclear program. In response, WINPAC published a current intelligence paper pointing to Iraqi attempts to procure uranium from several African countries, citing "fragmentary reporting," and making no reference to questions about the authenticity of the source documents. 206 Shortly thereafter, the National Security Council and Office of the Secretary of Defense requested information from the NIO for Strategic and Nuclear Programs and from DIA, respectively, on the uranium deal. The responses included information based on the original reporting, without any mention of the questions about the authenticity of the information. 207

The CIA had still not evaluated the authenticity of the documents when it coordinated on the State of the Union address, in which the President noted that the "British government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa." 208 Although there is some disagreement about the details of the coordination process, no one in the Intelligence Community had asked that the line be removed. 209 At the time of the State of the Union speech, CIA analysts continued to believe that Iraq probably was seeking uranium from Africa, although there was growing concern among some CIA analysts that there were problems with the reporting. 210

The IAEA, after receiving copies of the documents from the United States, reviewed them and immediately concluded that they were forgeries. 211 As the IAEA found, the documents contained numerous indications of forgery--flaws in the letterhead, forged signatures, misspelled words, incorrect titles for individuals and government entities, and anomalies in the documents' stamps. 212 The documents also contained serious errors in content. For example, the document describing the agreement made reference to the legal authority for the agreement, but referenced an out-of-date statutory provision. The document also referred to a meeting that took place on "Wednesday, July 7, 2000" even though July 7, 2000 was a Friday. 213

When it finally got around to reviewing the documents during the same time period, the CIA agreed that they were not authentic. Moreover, the CIA concluded that the original reporting was based on the forged documents and was thus itself unreliable. 214 CIA subsequently issued a recall notice at the beginning of April, 2003 for the three original reports, noting that "the foreign government service may have been provided with fraudulent reporting." 215 On June 17, 2003, CIA produced a memorandum for the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) stating that "since learning that the Iraq-Niger uranium deal was based on false documents earlier this spring we no longer believe that there is sufficient other reporting to conclude that Iraq pursued uranium from abroad." 216 The NIO for Strategic and Nuclear Programs also briefed the Senate and House Intelligence Committees, on June 18 and 19, respectively, on the CIA's conclusions in this regard. 217

Given that there were already doubts about the reliability of the reporting on the uranium deal, the Intelligence Community should have reviewed the documents to evaluate their authenticity as soon as they were made available in early October 2002, rather than waiting over six months to do so. The failure to review these documents caused the Intelligence Community to rely on dubious information when providing highly important assessments to policymakers about the likelihood that Iraq was reconstituting its nuclear program. The Community's failure to undertake a real review of the documents--even though their validity was the subject of serious doubts--was a major failure of the intelligence system. 218

The Intelligence Community's Pre-War Assessments

The Intelligence Community's assessment of Iraq's BW program--like its judgments about Iraq's other WMD programs--evolved over time. The October 2002 NIE reflected a shift, however, in the Community's judgments about the state of Iraq's BW program. Previous Community estimates had assessed that Iraq could have biological weapons; the October 2002 estimate, in contrast, assessed with "high confidence" that Iraq "has" biological weapons. This shift in view, which began in 2000 and culminated in the October 2002 NIE, was based largely on information from a single source--Curveball--who indicated that Iraq had mobile facilities for producing BW agents.

Background. In the early 1990s, the Intelligence Community knew little about Iraq's BW program. 224 Prior to the Gulf War, the Intelligence Community judged that Iraq was developing several BW agents, including anthrax and botulinum toxin, at a number of facilities. 225 The Intelligence Community further assessed that Iraq might have produced up to 1,000 liters of BW agent, and that Iraq had used some of it to fill aerial bombs and artillery shells. At that time, however, the Community judged that it had insufficient information to make assessments about BW agent testing and deployment of filled munitions. 226 Between 1991 and 1995, the Intelligence Community learned little more about Iraq's BW program. However, there was some additional human intelligence reporting indicating that pre-Gulf War assessments of Iraq's BW program had substantially underestimated the quantities of biological weapons that Iraq had produced. Moreover, this reporting suggested that the Intelligence Community was unaware of some Iraqi BW facilities. 227

It was not until 1995--when UNSCOM presented the Iraqis with evidence of continuing BW-related imports and Saddam Hussein's son-in-law, Hussein Kamil, defected--that Iraq made substantial declarations to the United Nations about its activities prior to the Gulf War, admitting that it had produced and weaponized BW agents. 228 These declarations confirmed that the Intelligence Community had substantially underestimated the scale and maturity of Iraq's pre-Desert Storm BW program. Iraq had, before the Gulf War, weaponized several agents, including anthrax, botulinum toxin, and aflatoxin; produced 30,165 liters of BW agent; and deployed some of its 157 bombs and 25 missile warheads armed with BW agents to locations throughout Iraq. 229 Following these declarations, the Intelligence Community estimated in 1997 that Iraq was still concealing elements of its BW program, and it assessed that Iraq would likely wait until either sanctions were lifted or the UNSCOM presence was reduced before restarting agent production. 230

After 1998, the Intelligence Community found it difficult to determine whether activity at known dual-use facilities was related to WMD production. The departed inspectors had never been able to confirm what might be happening at Iraq's suspect facilities. Accordingly, the Intelligence Community noted that it had no reliable intelligence to indicate resumed production of biological weapons, but assessed that in the absence of inspectors Iraq probably would expand its BW activities. 231 These assessments were colored by the Community's earlier underestimation of Iraq's programs, its lack of reliable intelligence, and its realization that previous underestimates were due in part to effective deception by the Iraqis. 232 By 1999, the CIA assessed that there was some Iraqi research and development on BW and that Iraq could restart production of biological weapons within a short period of time. The 1999 NIE on Worldwide BW Programs judged that Iraq was "revitalizing its BW program" and was "probably continuing work to develop and produce BW agents." 233

Growing concern. The Intelligence Community's concern about Iraq's BW program increased in early 2000, and the Community began to adjust upward its estimates of the Iraq BW threat, based on a "substantial volume" of "new information" regarding mobile BW facilities in Iraq. 234 This information came from an Iraqi chemical engineer, subsequently codenamed Curveball, who came to the attention of the Intelligence Community through a foreign liaison service. That liaison service debriefed Curveball and then shared the debriefing results with the United States. The foreign liaison service would not, however, provide the United States with direct access to Curveball. Instead, information about Curveball was passed from the liaison service to DIA's Defense HUMINT Service, which in turn disseminated information about Curveball throughout the Intelligence Community.

Between January 2000 and September 2001, DIA's Defense HUMINT Service disseminated almost 100 reports from Curveball regarding mobile BW facilities in Iraq. 235 These reports claimed that Iraq had several mobile production units and that one of those units had begun production of BW agents as early as 1997. 236

Shortly after Curveball started reporting, in the spring of 2000, his information was provided to senior policymakers. 237 It was also incorporated into an update to a 1999 NIE on Worldwide BW Programs. The update reported that "new intelligence acquired in 2000...causes [the IC] to adjust our assessment upward of the BW threat posed by Iraq...The new information suggests that Baghdad has expanded its offensive BW program by establishing a large-scale, redundant, and concealed BW agent production capability." 238 In December 2000, the Intelligence Community produced a Special Intelligence Report that was based on reporting from Curveball, noting that "credible reporting from a single source suggests" that Iraq has produced biological agents, but cautioned that "[w]e cannot confirm whether Iraq has produced...biological agents." 239

By 2001, however, the assessments became more assertive. A WINPAC report in October 2001, also based on Curveball's reporting about mobile facilities, judged "that Iraq continues to produce at least...three BW agents" and possibly two others. This assessment also concluded that "the establishment of mobile BW agent production plants and continued delivery system development provide Baghdad with BW capabilities surpassing the pre-Gulf War era." 240 Similar assessments were provided to senior policymakers. 241 In late September 2002, DCI Tenet told the Senate's Intelligence and Armed Services Committees (and subsequently the Senate Foreign Relations Committee) that "we know Iraq has developed a redundant capability to produce biological warfare agents using mobile production units." 242

October 2002 NIE. The October 2002 NIE reflected this upward assessment of the Iraqi BW threat that had developed since Curveball began reporting in January 2000. The October 2002 NIE reflected the shift from the late-1990s assessments that Iraq could have biological weapons to the definitive conclusion that Iraq "has" biological weapons, and that its BW program was larger and more advanced than before the Gulf War. 243 Information about Iraq's dual-use facilities and its failure to account fully for previously declared stockpiles contributed to this shift in assessments. 244 The information that Iraq had mobile BW production units, however, was instrumental in adjusting upward the assessment of Iraq's BW threat. 245 And for this conclusion, the NIE relied primarily on reporting from Curveball, who, as noted, provided a large volume of reporting through Defense HUMINT channels regarding mobile BW production facilities in Iraq. 246 Only in May 2004, more than a year after the commencement of Operation Iraqi Freedom, did CIA formally deem Curveball's reporting fabricated and recall it. 247 At the time of the NIE, however, reporting from three other human sources--who provided one report each on mobile BW facilities--was thought to have corroborated Curveball's information about the mobile facilities. 248 These three sources also proved problematic, however, as discussed below.

Another asylum seeker (hereinafter "the second source") reporting through Defense HUMINT channels provided one report in June 2001 that Iraq had transportable facilities for the production of BW. 249 This second source recanted in October 2003, however, and the recantation was reflected in a Defense HUMINT report in which the source flatly contradicted his June 2001 statements about transportable facilities. 250 Though CIA analysts told Commission staff that they had requested that Defense HUMINT follow-up with this second source to ascertain the reasons for his recantation, DIA's Defense HUMINT Service has provided no further information on this issue. 251 Nor, for that matter, was the report ever recalled or corrected. 252

Another source , associated with the Iraqi National Congress (INC) (hereinafter "the INC source") , was brought to the attention of DIA by Washington-based representatives of the INC. Like Curveball, his reporting was handled by Defense HUMINT. He provided one report that Iraq had decided in 1996 to establish mobile laboratories for BW agents to evade inspectors. 253 Shortly after Defense HUMINT's initial debriefing of the INC source in February 2002, however, a foreign liaison service and the CIA's Directorate of Operations (DO) judged him to be a fabricator and recommended that Defense HUMINT issue a notice to that effect, which Defense HUMINT did in May 2002. Senior policymakers were informed that the INC source and his reporting were unreliable. The INC source's information, however, began to be used again in finished intelligence in July 2002, including the October 2002 NIE, because, although a fabrication notice had been issued several months earlier, Defense HUMINT had failed to recall the reporting. 254

The classified report here discusses a fourth source (hereinafter "the fourth source") who provided a single report that Iraq had mobile fermentation units mounted on trucks and railway cars.

Post-NIE. After publication of the NIE in October 2002, the Intelligence Community continued to assert that Baghdad's biological weapons program was active and posed a threat, relying on the same set of sources upon which the NIE's judgments were based. 255 For example, a November 2002 paper produced by CIA's Directorate of Intelligence (DI) reiterated the NIE's assessment that Iraq had a "broad range of lethal and incapacitating agents" and that the "BW program is more robust than it was prior to the Gulf War." 256 The piece contended that Iraq was capable of producing an array of agents and probably retained strains of the smallpox virus. It further argued that technological advances increased the potential Iraqi BW threat to U.S. interests. And a February 2003 CIA Intelligence Assessment anticipated Iraqi options for BW (and CW) use against the United States and other members of the Coalition; the report stated that Iraq "maintains a wide range of...biological agents and delivery systems" and enumerated 21 BW agents which it judged Iraq could employ. 257

Statements about biological weapons also appeared in Administration statements about Iraq in the months preceding the war. Secretary of State Colin Powell's speech to the United Nations Security Council on February 5, 2003, relied on the same human sources relied upon in the NIE. 258 Secretary Powell was not informed that one of these sources-- the INC source --had been judged a fabricator almost a year earlier. And as will be discussed at length below, serious doubts about Curveball had also surfaced within CIA's Directorate of Operations at the time of the speech--but these doubts also were not communicated to Secretary Powell before his United Nations address.

Reliance on Curveball's reporting also affected post-war assessments of Iraq's BW program. A May 2003 CIA Intelligence Assessment pointed to the post-invasion discovery of "two probable mobile BW agent productions plants" by Coalition forces in Iraq as evidence that "Iraq was hiding a biological warfare program." 259 Curveball, when shown photos of the trailers, identified components that he said were similar to those on the mobile BW production facilities that he had described in his earlier reporting. 260

Post-War Findings of the Iraq Survey Group

The Iraq Survey Group found that the Intelligence Community's pre-war assessments about Iraq's BW program were almost entirely wrong. The ISG concluded that "Iraq appears to have destroyed its undeclared stocks of BW weapons and probably destroyed remaining holdings of bulk BW agent" shortly after the Gulf War. 261 According to the ISG, Iraq initially intended to retain elements of its biological weapons program after the Gulf War. UNSCOM inspections proved unexpectedly intrusive, however, and to avoid detection, Saddam Hussein ordered his son-in-law and Minister of the Military Industrial Commission Hussein Kamil to destroy, unilaterally, Iraq's stocks of BW agents. 262 This took place in either the late spring or summer of 1991. 263 But Iraq retained a physical plant at Al-Hakam and the intellectual capital necessary to resuscitate the BW program. 264 Simultaneously, Iraq embarked on an effort to hide this remaining infrastructure and to conceal its pre-war BW-related activities. 265

In early 1995, however, UNSCOM inspectors confronted Iraqi officials with evidence of 1988 imports of bacterial growth media in quantities that had no civilian use within Iraq's limited biotechnology industry. 266 This confrontation, followed by the defection of Hussein Kamil in August 1995, prompted Iraq to admit that it had produced large quantities of bulk BW agent before the Gulf War. 267 Iraq also released a large cache of documents and issued the first of several "Full, Final and Complete Declaration[s]" on June 22, 1996, further detailing its BW program. UNSCOM subsequently supervised the destruction of BW-related facilities at Al-Hakam in 1996. 268

The Iraq Survey Group found that the destruction of the Al-Hakam facility effectively marked the end of Iraq's large-scale BW ambitions. 269 The ISG did judge that after 1996 Iraq "continued small-scale BW-related efforts" under the auspices of the Iraqi Intelligence Service, and also retained a trained cadre of scientists who could work on BW programs and some dual-use facilities capable of conversion to small-scale BW agent production. 270 Nevertheless, the ISG "found no direct evidence that Iraq, after 1996, had plans for a new BW program or was conducting BW-specific work for military purposes." 271

With respect to mobile BW production facilities, the "ISG found no evidence that Iraq possessed or was developing production systems on road vehicles or railway wagons." 272 The ISG's "exhaustive investigation" of the two trailers captured by Coalition forces in spring 2003 revealed that the trailers were "almost certainly designed and built exclusively for the generation of hydrogen." The ISG judged that the trailers "cannot ... be part of any BW program." 273

Analysis of the Intelligence Community's Pre-War Assessments

The Intelligence Community fundamentally misjudged the status of Iraq's BW programs. As the above discussion demonstrates, the central basis for the Intelligence Community's pre-war assessments about Iraq's BW program was the reporting of a single human source, Curveball. This single source, whose reporting came into question in late 2002, later proved to be a fabricator.

Our intelligence agencies get burned by human sources sometimes--it is a fact of life in the murky world of espionage. If our investigation revealed merely that our Intelligence Community had a source who later turned out to be lying, despite the best tradecraft practices designed to ferret out such liars, that would be one thing. But Curveball's reporting became a central part of the Intelligence Community's pre-war assessments through a serious breakdown in several aspects of the intelligence process. The Curveball story is at the same time one of poor asset validation by our human collection agencies; of a tendency of analysts to believe that which fits their theories; of inadequate communication between the Intelligence Community and the policymakers it serves; and, ultimately, of poor leadership and management. This section thus focuses primarily on our investigation of the Curveball episode, and the findings we drew from it.

The problems with the Intelligence Community's performance on Curveball began almost immediately after the source first became known to the U.S. government in early 2000. As noted above, Curveball was not a source who worked directly with the United States; rather, the Intelligence Community obtained information about Curveball through a foreign service. The foreign service would not provide the United States with direct access to Curveball, claiming that Curveball would refuse to speak to Americans. 274 Instead, the foreign intelligence service debriefed Curveball and passed the debriefing information to DIA's Defense HUMINT Service, the human intelligence collection agency of the Department of Defense.

The lack of direct access to Curveball made it more difficult to assess his veracity. But such lack of access does not preclude the Intelligence Community from attempting to assess the source's bona fides and the credibility of the source's reporting. Indeed, it is incumbent upon professional intelligence officers to attempt to do so, through a process referred to within the Intelligence Community as "vetting" or "asset validation."

Defense HUMINT, however, did not even attempt to determine Curveball's veracity. A Defense HUMINT official explained to Commission staff that Defense HUMINT believed that it was just a "conduit" for Curveball's reporting--that it had no responsibility for vetting Curveball or validating his information. 275 In Defense HUMINT's view, asset validation is solely the responsibility of analysts--in their judgment if the analysts believe the information is credible, then the source is validated. 276 This line echoes what Defense HUMINT officials responsible for disseminating Curveball's reporting told the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence; they told the Committee that it was not their responsibility to assess the source's credibility, but that it instead was up to the analysts who read the reports to judge the accuracy of the contents. 277

The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence concluded that this view represents a "serious lapse" in tradecraft, and we agree. 278 Analysts obviously play a crucial role in validating sources by evaluating the credibility of their reporting, corroborating that reporting, and reviewing the body of reporting to ensure that it is consistent with the source's access. But analysts' validation can only extend to whether what a source says is internally consistent, technically plausible, and credible given the source's claimed access. The process of validation also must include efforts by the operational elements to confirm the source's bona fides (i.e., authenticating that the source has the access he claims), to test the source's reliability and motivations, and to ensure that the source is free from hostile control. 279 To be sure, these steps are particularly difficult for a source such as Curveball, to whom the collection agency has no direct access. But human intelligence collectors can often obtain valuable information weighing on even a liaison source's credibility, and the CIA's DO routinely attempts to determine the credibility even of sources to whom it has no direct access. In light of this, we are surprised by the Defense HUMINT's apparent position that it had no responsibility even to attempt to validate Curveball.

As a footnote to this episode, while DIA's Defense HUMINT Service felt no obligation to vet Curveball or validate his veracity, it would later appear affronted that another agency--CIA--would try to do so. On February 11, 2003, after questions about Curveball's credibility had begun to emerge, an element of the DO sent a message to Defense HUMINT officials expressing concern that Curveball had not been vetted. The next day the Defense HUMINT division chief who received that message forwarded it by electronic mail to a subordinate, requesting input to answer CIA's query. In that electronic mail message, the Defense HUMINT division chief said he was "shocked" by CIA's suggestion that Curveball might be unreliable. The reply--which the Defense HUMINT official intended for Defense HUMINT recipients only but which was inadvertently sent to CIA as well--observed that "CIA is up to their old tricks" and that CIA did not "have a clue" about the process by which Curveball's information was passed from the foreign service. 280

As we have discussed, when information from Curveball first surfaced in early 2000, Defense HUMINT did nothing to validate Curveball's reporting. Analysts within the Intelligence Community, however, did make efforts to assess the credibility of the information provided by Curveball. In early 2000, when Curveball's reporting first surfaced, WINPAC analysts researched previous reporting and concluded that Curveball's information was plausible based upon previous intelligence, including imagery reporting, and the detailed, technical descriptions of the mobile facilities he provided. 281 As a WINPAC BW analyst later told us, there was nothing "obviously wrong" with Curveball's information, and his story--that Iraq had moved to a mobile capability for its BW program in 1995 in order to evade inspectors--was logical in light of other known information. 282

At about the same time, however, traffic in the CIA's Directorate of Operations began to suggest some possible problems with Curveball. 283 The first CIA concerns about Curveball's reliability arose within the DO in May 2000, when a Department of Defense detailee assigned to the DO met Curveball. The purpose of the meeting was to evaluate Curveball's claim that he had been present during a BW accident that killed several of his coworkers by seeing whether Curveball had been exposed to, or vaccinated against, a BW agent. 284 Although the evaluation was ultimately inconclusive, 285 the detailee raised several concerns about Curveball based on their interaction.

First, the detailee observed that Curveball spoke excellent English during their meeting. 286 This was significant to the detailee because the foreign service had, on several earlier occasions, told U.S. intelligence officials that one reason a meeting with Curveball was impossible was that Curveball did not speak English. Second, the detailee was concerned by Curveball's apparent "hangover" during their meeting. The detailee conveyed these impressions of Curveball informally to CIA officials, and WINPAC BW analysts told Commission staff that they were aware that the detailee was concerned that Curveball might be an alcoholic. 287 This message was eventually re-conveyed to Directorate of Operations supervisors via electronic mail on February 4, 2003--literally on the eve of Secretary Powell's speech to the United Nations. The electronic mail stated, in part:

I do have a concern with the validity of the information based on Curveball having a terrible hangover the morning of [the meeting] . I agree, it was only a one time interaction, however, he knew he was to have a [meeting] on that particular morning but tied one on anyway. What underlying issues could this be a problem with and how in depth has he been vetted by the [foreign liaison service] ? 288

By early 2001, the DO was receiving operational messages about the foreign service's difficulties in handling Curveball, whom the foreign service reported to be "out of control," and whom the service could not locate. 289 This operational traffic regarding Curveball was shared with WINPAC's Iraq BW analysts because, according to WINPAC analysts, the primary BW analyst who worked on the Iraq issue had close relations with the DO's Counterproliferation Division (the division through which the operational traffic was primarily handled). 290 This and other operational information was not, however, shared with analysts outside CIA. 291

A second warning on Curveball came in April 2002, when a foreign intelligence service, which was also receiving reporting from Curveball, told the CIA that, in its view, there were a variety of problems with Curveball. The foreign service began by noting that they were "inclined to believe that a significant part of [Curveball's] reporting is true" in light of his detailed technical descriptions. 292 In this same message, however, the foreign service noted that it was "not convinced that Curveball is a wholly reliable source," and that "elements of [Curveball's] behavior strike us as typical of individuals we would normally assess as fabricators." 293 Even more specifically, the foreign service noted several inconsistencies in Curveball's reporting which caused the foreign service "to have doubts about Curveball's reliability." 294 It should be noted here that, like the handling foreign service , this other service continued officially to back Curveball's reporting throughout this period.

Again, these concerns about Curveball were shared with CIA analysts working on the BW issue. 295 But none of the expressed concerns overcame analysts' ultimate confidence in the accuracy of his information. Specifically, analysts continued to judge his information credible based on their assessment of its detail and technical accuracy, corroborating documents, confirmation of the technical feasibility of the production facility designs described by Curveball, and reporting from another human source, the fourth source mentioned above . 296 But it should be noted that during the pre-NIE period--in addition to the more general questions about Curveball's credibility discussed above--at least some evidence had emerged calling into question the substance of Curveball's reporting about Iraq's BW program as well. 297

Specifically, a WINPAC BW analyst told us that two foreign services had both noted in 2001 that Curveball's description of the facility he claimed was involved in the mobile BW program was contradicted by imagery of the site, which showed a wall across the path that Curveball said the mobile trailers traversed. Intelligence Community analysts "set that information aside," however, because it could not be reconciled with the rest of Curveball's information, which appeared plausible. 298 Analysts also explained away this discrepancy by noting that Iraq had historically been very successful in "denial and deception" activities and speculated that the wall spotted by imagery might be a temporary structure put up by the Iraqis to deceive U.S. intelligence efforts. 299

Analysts' use of denial and deception to explain away discordant evidence about Iraq's BW programs was a recurring theme in our review of the Community's performance on the BW question. 300 Burned by the experience of being wrong on Iraq's WMD in 1991 and convinced that Iraq was restarting its programs, analysts dismissed indications that Iraq had actually abandoned its prohibited programs by chalking these indicators up to Iraq's well-known denial and deception efforts. In one instance, for example, WINPAC analysts described reporting from the second source indicating Iraq was filling BW warheads at a transportable facility near Baghdad. When imagery was unable to locate the transportable BW systems at the reported site, analysts assumed this was not because the activity was not taking place, but rather because Iraq was hiding activities from U.S. satellite overflights. 301 This tendency was best encapsulated by a comment in a memorandum prepared by the CIA for a senior policymaker: "Mobile BW information comes from [several] sources, one of whom is credible and the other is of undetermined reliability. We have raised our collection posture in a bid to locate these production units, but years of fruitless searches by UNSCOM indicate they are well hidden." 302 Again, the analysts appear never to have considered the idea that the searches were fruitless because the weapons were not there.

The Community erred in failing to highlight its overwhelming reliance on Curveball for its BW assessments. The NIE judged that Iraq "has transportable facilities for producing bacterial and toxin BW agents" and attributed this judgment to multiple sources. 303 In reality, however, on the topic of mobile BW facilities Curveball provided approximately 100 detailed reports on the subject, while the second and fourth sources each provided a single report. (As will be discussed in greater detail below, the reporting of another source-- the INC source --had been deemed a fabrication months earlier, but nonetheless found its way into the October 2002 NIE.) 304 The presentation of the material as attributable to "multiple sensitive sources," however, gave the impression that the support for the BW assessments was more broadly based than was in fact the case. A more accurate presentation would have allowed senior officials to see just how narrow the evidentiary base for the judgments on Iraq's BW programs actually was.

Other contemporaneous assessments about Iraq's BW program also reflect this problem. For example, the Intelligence Community informed senior policymakers in July 2002 that CIA judged that "Baghdad has transportable production facilities for BW agents...according to defectors." 305 Again, while three "defector" sources (Curveball, the second source , and the INC source ) are cited in this report, Curveball's reporting was the overwhelmingly predominant source of the information.

And the NIE should not only have emphasized its reliance on Curveball for its BW judgments; it should also have communicated the limitations of the source himself. The NIE, for instance, described him as "an Iraqi defector deemed credible by the [Intelligence Community]." 306 The use of the term "credible" was apparently meant to imply only that Curveball's reporting was technically plausible. To a lay reader, however, it implied a broader judgment as to the source's general reliability. This description obscured a number of salient facts that, given the Community's heavy reliance upon his reporting, would have been highly important for policymakers to know--including the fact that the Community had never gained direct access to the source and that he was known at the time to have serious handling problems. While policymakers may still have credited his reporting, they would at least have been warned about the risks in doing so.

After the NIE was published, but before Secretary Powell's speech to the United Nations, more serious concerns surfaced about Curveball's reliability. These concerns were never brought to Secretary Powell's attention, however. Precisely how and why this lapse occurred is the subject of dispute and conflicting memories. This section provides only a brief summary of the key events in this complicated saga.

The NIE went to press in early October 2002, but its publication did not end the need to scrutinize Curveball's reliability. To improve the CIA's confidence in Curveball, the CIA's Deputy Director for Operations (DDO), James Pavitt, sought to press the foreign intelligence service for access to Curveball. 307 Mr. Pavitt's office accordingly asked the chief ("the division chief") of the DO's regional division responsible for relations with the liaison service ("the division") to meet with a representative of the foreign intelligence service to make the request for access . 308 According to the division chief , he met with the representative in late September or early October 2002. 309

At the lunch, the division chief raised the issue of U.S. intelligence officials speaking to Curveball directly. According to the division chief, the representative of the foreign intelligence service responded with words to the effect of "You don't want to see him [Curveball] because he's crazy." Speaking to him would be, in the representative of the foreign service 's words, "a waste of time." The representative , who said that he had been present for debriefings of Curveball, continued that his intelligence service was not sure whether Curveball was actually telling the truth and, in addition, that he had serious doubts about Curveball's mental stability and reliability; Curveball, according to the representative , had had a nervous breakdown. Further, the representative said that he worried that Curveball was "a fabricator." The representative cautioned the division chief , however, that the foreign service would publicly and officially deny these views if pressed. The representative told the division chief that the rationale for such a public denial would be that the foreign service did not wish to be embarrassed. 310 According to the division chief , he passed the information to three offices: up the line to the office of CIA's Deputy Director for Operations; 311 down the line to his staff, specifically the division's group chief ("the group chief") responsible for the liaison country's region ; 312 and across the agency to WINPAC. 313 At the time, the division chief thought that the information was "no big deal" because he did not realize how critical Curveball's reporting was to the overall case for Iraqi possession of a biological weapons program. 314 He assumed there were other streams of reporting to buttress the Intelligence Community's assessments. He could not imagine, he said, that Curveball was "it." 315

Several months later, prompted by indications that the President or a senior U.S. official would soon be making a speech on Iraq's WMD programs, one of the executive assistants for the then-Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (DDCI) John McLaughlin 316 met with the group chief to look into the Curveball information. 317 This meeting took place on December 18, 2002. 318 Although the executive assistant did not specifically recall the meeting when he spoke with Commission staff, 319 an electronic mail follow-up from the meeting--which was sent to the division chief and the group chief --makes clear that the meeting was called to discuss Curveball and the public use of his information. 320

As a result of this meeting, the division sent a message that same afternoon to the CIA's station in the relevant country again asking that the foreign intelligence service permit the United States to debrief Curveball. 321 The message stressed the importance of gaining access to Curveball, and noted the U.S. government's desire to use Curveball's reporting publicly. On December 20, the foreign service refused the request for access, but concurred with the request to use Curveball's information publicly--"with the expectation of source protection." 322

By this point, it was clear that the division believed there was a serious problem with Curveball that required attention. A second meeting was scheduled on December 19 at the invitation of DDCI McLaughlin's same executive assistant. 323 According to the executive assistant, he called the meeting because it had become apparent to DDCI McLaughlin that Curveball's reporting was significant to the Intelligence Community's judgments on Iraq's mobile BW capability. 324 The invitation for the meeting stated that the purpose was to "resolve precisely how we judge Curveball's reporting on mobile BW labs," and that the executive assistant hoped that after the meeting he could "summarize [the] conclusions in a short note to the DDCI." 325 The meeting was attended by the executive assistant, a WINPAC BW analyst, an operations officer from the DO's Counterproliferation Division, and the regional division's group chief . Mr. McLaughlin, who did not attend this meeting, told this Commission that he was not given a written summary of the meeting and did not recall whether any such meeting was held. 326

Although individuals' recollections of the meeting vary somewhat, there is little disagreement on the meeting's substance. The group chief argued that Curveball had not been adequately "vetted" and that his information should therefore not be relied upon. In preparation for the meeting, the group chief had outlined her concerns in an electronic mail to several officers within the Directorate of Operations--including Stephen Kappes, the then-Associate Deputy Director for Operations. The electronic mail opened with the following (in bold type):

Although no one asked, it is my assessment that Curve Ball had some access to some of this information and was more forthcoming and cooperative when he needed resettlement assistance; now that he does not need it, he is less helpful, possibly because when he was being helpful, he was embellishing, a bit. The [foreign service] ha [s] developed some doubts about him. We have been unable to vet him operationally and know very little about him. The intelligence community has corroborated portions of his reporting with open source information ... and some intelligence (which appears to confirm that things are where he said they were). 327

At the meeting, the group chief stated that she told the attendees that the division's concerns were based on the foreign service representative's statements to the division chief , the CIA's inability to get access to Curveball, the significant "improvement" in Curveball's reporting over time, the decline of Curveball's reporting after he received the equivalent of a green card, among other reasons . 328 She also recalled telling the attendees the details of the foreign service representative 's statements to the division chief . 329 In the group chief's view, she made it clear to all the attendees that the division did not believe that Curveball's information should be relied upon. 330

With equal vigor, the WINPAC representative argued that Curveball's reporting was fundamentally reliable. 331 According to the WINPAC analyst, Curveball's information was reliable because it was detailed, technically accurate, and corroborated by another source's reporting. 332

Both the group chief and the WINPAC analyst characterized the exchange as fairly heated. 333 Both of the two primary participants also recalled providing reasons why the other's arguments should not carry the day. Specifically, the group chief says she argued, adamantly, that the supposedly corroborating information was of dubious significance because it merely established that Curveball had been to the location, not that he had any knowledge of BW activities being conducted there. In addition, the group chief questioned whether some of Curveball's knowledge could have come from readily available, open source materials. 334 Conversely, the WINPAC BW analyst says that she questioned whether the group chief had sufficient knowledge of Curveball's reporting to be able to make an accurate assessment of his reliability. 335

It appears that WINPAC prevailed in this argument. Looking back, the executive assistant who had called the meeting offered his view that the WINPAC BW analyst was the "master of [the Curveball] case," and that he "look[ed] to her for answers." 336 He also noted that the group chief clearly expressed her skepticism about Curveball during the meeting, and that she fundamentally took the position that Curveball's reporting did not "hold up." 337 The executive assistant further said that while the foreign service officially assessed that Curveball was reliable, they also described him as a "handling problem." 338 According to the executive assistant, the foreign service said Curveball was a handling problem because he was a drinker, unstable, and generally difficult to manage . In the executive assistant's view, however, it was impossible to know whether the foreign service 's description of Curveball was accurate. Finally, the executive assistant said that he fully recognized Curveball's significance at the time of the meeting; that Curveball "was clearly the most significant source" on BW; and that if Curveball were removed, the BW assessment was left with one other human source, "but not much more." 339

The following day, the executive assistant circulated a memorandum to the WINPAC BW analyst intended to summarize the prior day's meeting. 340 Perhaps in keeping with his reliance on the WINPAC BW analyst as the "master of the case," the executive assistant's "summary" of the draft of the memorandum, titled "Reliability of Human Reporting on Iraqi Mobile BW Capability," played down the doubts raised by the DO division :

The primary source of this information is an Iraqi émigré (vice defector) ... After an exhaustive review, the U.S. Intelligence Community-- [as well as several liaison services]... judged him credible. This judgment was based on:

The detailed, technical nature of his reporting;

[Technical intelligence] confirming the existence/configuration of facilities he described (one Baghdad office building is known to house administrative offices linked to WMD programs);

UNSCOM's discovery of military documents discussing "mobile fermentation" capability;

Confirmation/replication of the described design by U.S. contractors (it works); and

Reporting from a second émigré that munitions were loaded with BW agent from a mobile facility parked 341 within an armaments center south of Baghdad. 342

The memorandum then continued on to note that "[w]e are handicapped in efforts to resolve legitimate questions that remain about the source's veracity and reporting because the [foreign service] refuses to grant direct access to the source." 343 Later, in the "Questions/Answers" section, the memorandum stated:

How/when was the source's reliability evaluated-- [One foreign service] hosted a...meeting in 2001, over the course of which all the participating services judged the core reporting as "reliable." [One of the other services] recently affirmed that view--although the [service] ha [s] declined to provide details of sources who might provide corroboration. Operational traffic ... indicates the [hosting foreign service] may now be downgrading its own evaluation of the source's reliability. 344

It does not appear that this memorandum was circulated further; rather, the executive assistant explained that he would have used the memorandum to brief the DDCI at their daily staff meeting. 345

Former DDCI McLaughlin, however, said that he did not remember being apprised of this meeting. 346 Mr. McLaughlin told the Commission that, although he remembered his executive assistant at some point making a passing reference to the effect that the executive assistant had heard about some issues with Curveball, he (Mr. McLaughlin) did not remember having ever been told in any specificity about the DO division's doubts about Curveball. 347 Mr. McLaughlin added that, at the same time, he was receiving assurances from the relevant analysts to the effect that Curveball's information appeared good. 348

At about the same time, the division apparently tried another route to the top. Within a day or so after the December 19 meeting, the division's group chief said that she and the division chief met with James Pavitt (the Deputy Director for Operations) and Stephen Kappes (the Associate Deputy Director for Operations). 349 At this meeting, according to the group chief , she repeated the Division's concerns about Curveball. 350 But according to the group chief , Mr. Pavitt told her that she was not qualified to make a judgment about Curveball, and that judgments about Curveball should be made by analysts. 351

When asked about this meeting by Commission staff, Mr. Pavitt said that although he knew there were handling problems with Curveball, he did not recall any such meeting with the division chief or the group chief . 352 Mr. Pavitt added, however, that he would have agreed that the call was one for the analysts to make. He also noted that he does not recall being aware, in December 2002, that Curveball was such a central source of information for the Intelligence Community's mobile BW judgments. 353 For his part, Mr. Kappes does not specifically recall this meeting, although he said that the concerns about Curveball were generally known within the CIA. He also said that he did not become aware of the extensive reliance on Curveball until after the war. 354

That is where matters stood for about a month. But the issue arose once again in January 2003. During December and January, it became clear that the Secretary of State would be making an address on Iraq to the United Nations Security Council and that presenting American intelligence on Iraq's WMD programs would be a major part of the speech. In late January, the Secretary began "vetting" the intelligence in a series of long meetings at the CIA's Langley headquarters. In connection with those preparations, a copy of the speech was circulated so that various offices within CIA could check it for accuracy and ensure that material could be used without inappropriately disclosing sources and methods. 355 As part of that process, the group chief received a copy. 356 According to the group chief , she said that she "couldn't believe" the speech relied on Curveball's reporting, and immediately told the division chief about the situation. 357 The group chief also said that she edited the language in a way that made the speech more appropriate. 358

According to the division chief , he was given the draft speech by an assistant, and he immediately redacted material based on Curveball's reporting. He then called the DDCI's executive assistant and asked to speak to the DDCI about the speech. 359 When interviewed by Commission staff, the executive assistant did not recall having any such conversation with the division chief , nor did he remember seeing a redacted copy of the speech. 360 However, another Directorate of Operations officer, who was responsible for evaluating the possible damage to DO sources from the release of information in the speech, remembers being approached during this time by the division chief . According to this officer, the division chief said he was concerned about the proposed inclusion of Curveball's information in the Powell speech and that the handling service itself thought Curveball was a "flake."

The DO officer responsible for sources and methods protection summarized these concerns in an electronic mail which he sent to another of the DDCI's aides for passage to the DDCI. The DO officer responsible for sources and methods did not recall that the division chief made any specific redactions of language from the draft. 361 The DDCI's executive assistant has no recollection of such an electronic mail or of any concerns expressed about Curveball. 362

Later that afternoon, according to the division chief , he met with the DDCI to discuss the speech. The division chief recounted that he told the DDCI that there was a problem with the speech because it relied on information from Curveball, and that --based on his meeting with the foreign intelligence service representative--the division chief thought that Curveball could be a fabricator. 363 Although the division chief told the Commission that he could not remember the DDCI's exact response, he got the impression that this was the first time that the DDCI had heard of a problem with Curveball. Specifically, the division chief recalled that the DDCI, on hearing that Curveball might be a fabricator, responded to the effect of: "Oh my! I hope that's not true." 364 It was also at this time, according to the division chief , that he ( the division chief ) first learned that Curveball provided the primary support for the Intelligence Community's judgments on BW.

The group chief provided indirect confirmation of the exchange; she remembered the division chief telling her about this exchange shortly after it occurred. 365 Similarly, former DDO James Pavitt told the Commission that he remembered the division chief subsequently relating to him that the division chief had raised concerns about Curveball to the DDCI around the time of the Secretary of State's speech. 366

By contrast, former DDCI McLaughlin told the Commission that he did not remember any such meeting with the division chief . Specifically, the former DDCI said that he was not aware of the division chief contacting his (Mr. McLaughlin's) executive assistant to set up a meeting about Curveball; there was no such meeting on his official calendar; he could not recall ever talking to the division chief about Curveball; and he was not aware of any recommended redactions of sections of the draft speech based on Curveball's reporting. Moreover, Mr. McLaughlin told the Commission that the division chief never told him that Curveball might be a fabricator. 367 The former DDCI added that it is inconceivable that he would have permitted information to be used in Secretary Powell's speech if reservations had been raised about it. 368

On January 24, 2003, the CIA sent another message to the CIA's relevant station asking for the foreign intelligence service's "transcripts of actual questions asked of, and response given by, Curveball concerning Iraq's BW program not later than ... COB [close of business], 27 January 2003." The message further noted that the CIA had "learned that [the President] intend[ed] to refer to the Curveball information in a planned United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) speech on 29 January 2003." According to the division chief , this message was sent on behalf of the DCI's office, but was "released" by the group chief . 369

Three days later, on January 27, 2003, the relevant station responded and said that they were still attempting to obtain the transcripts. The message then noted:

[The foreign liaison service handling Curveball] has not been able to verify his reporting. [This foreign service] has discussed Curveball with US [and others] , but no one has been able to verify this information.... The source himself is problematical. Defer to headquarters but to use information from another liaison service's source whose information cannot be verified on such an important, key topic should take the most serious consideration. 370

Shortly after these messages were exchanged with the relevant station, the division chief told the DDCI's executive assistant that the foreign service would still not provide the CIA with access to Curveball. 371 The division chief also sent an electronic mail--the text of which was prepared by the group chief --to the DDCI's executive assistant from the DO, which noted (in part):

In response to your note, and in addition to your conversation with [ the division chief ], we have spoken with [the relevant] Station on Curve Ball:

We are not certain that we know where Curve Ball is...

Curve Ball has a history of being uncooperative. He is seeing the [handling foreign service soon] for more questions. The [handling foreign service] cannot move the meeting up, we have asked.

[The foreign service] ha[s] agreed to our using the information publicly, but do [es] not want it sourced back to them. Neither the [foreign service] nor, per [the foreign service's] assessment, Curve Ball, will refute their information if it is made public and is not attributed. Per Station, and us, we should be careful to conceal the origin of the information since if Curve Ball is exposed, the family he left in Iraq will be killed.

The [handling foreign service] cannot vouch for the validity of the information. They are concerned that he may not have had direct access, and that much of what he reported was not secret. (per WINPAC, the information they could corroborate was in open source literature or was imagery of locations that may not have been restricted.)

[A magazine says that the handling foreign service has] intelligence information on the mobile poison capabilities of the Iraqis, but that they will not share it. 372

As a result, according to the division chief , the executive assistant told the division chief that the DDCI would speak to the analysts about the issue. 373 Although the executive assistant did not remember such a conversation, former DDCI McLaughlin told the Commission that he remembered talking to the WINPAC BW analyst responsible for Iraq about Curveball in January or February 2003. 374 Mr. McLaughlin said that he received strong assurances from the WINPAC analyst that the reporting was credible. 375

By this time, there was less than a week left before Secretary Powell's February 5 speech, and the vetting process was going full-bore. 376 On February 3, 2003, the DDCI's executive assistant who had previously participated in meetings about Curveball sent a memorandum titled " [Foreign service] BW Source" to the division chief . 377 The memorandum, addressed to the division chief, read:

[ T] his will confirm the DDCI's informal request to touch base w/ the [relevant] stations once more on the current status/whereabouts of the émigré who reported on the mobile BW labs. A great deal of effort is being expended to vet the intelligence that underlies SecState's upcoming UN presentation. Similarly, we want to take every precaution against unwelcome surprises that might emerge concerning the intel case; clearly, public statements by this émigré, press accounts of his reporting or credibility, or even direct press access to him would cause a number of potential concerns. The DDCI would be grateful for the [Chief of Station's] view on the immediate `days-after' reaction in [the handling foreign service country] surrounding source of this key BW reporting. 378

Preparations for the United Nations address culminated with Secretary Powell, Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet, and support staff going to New York City prior to the speech, which was to be delivered on February 5, 2003. 379 Until late in the night on February 4, Secretary Powell and Mr. Tenet continued to finalize aspects of the speech. 380

According to the division chief , at about midnight on the night before the speech, he was called at home by Mr. Tenet. As the division chief recalls the conversation, Mr. Tenet asked whether the division chief had a contact number for another foreign intelligence service (not the service handling Curveball) so Mr. Tenet could get clearance to use information from a source of that service . 381 The division chief told the Commission that he took the opportunity to ask the DCI about the " [foreign service country] reporting" from the liaison service handling Curveball . Although he did not remember his exact words, the division chief says that he told Mr. Tenet something to the effect of "you know that the [foreign service] reporting has problems." 382 According to the division chief , Mr. Tenet replied with words to the effect of "yeah, yeah," and that he was "exhausted." 383 The division chief said that when he listened to the speech the next day, he was surprised that the information from Curveball had been included. 384

In contrast to the division chief 's version of events, Mr. Tenet stated that while he had in fact called the division chief on the night before Secretary Powell's speech to obtain the telephone number (albeit in the early evening as opposed to midnight) there had been no discussion of Curveball or his reporting. 385 Nor was there any indication that any information in the speech might be suspect. Mr. Tenet noted that it is inconceivable that he would have failed to raise with Secretary Powell any concerns about information in the speech about which Mr. Tenet had been made aware. 386 Moreover, he noted that he had never been made aware of any concerns about Curveball until well after the cessation of major hostilities in Iraq.

In sum, there were concerns within the CIA--and most specifically the Directorate of Operations' division responsible for relations with the handling liaison service --about Curveball and his reporting. On several occasions, operations officers within this division expressed doubts about Curveball's credibility, the adequacy of his vetting, and the wisdom of relying so heavily on his information.

These views were expressed to CIA leadership, including at least the Associate Deputy Director for Operations and the executive assistant to the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, and likely the Deputy Director for Operations and even--to some degree--mentioned to the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence himself. It would appear, however, that the criticism of Curveball grew less pointed when expressed in writing and as the issue rose through the CIA's chain of command. In other words, although we are confident that doubts about Curveball were expressed in one way or another to the Deputy Director for Central Intelligence, it is less clear whether those doubts were accompanied by the full, detailed panoply of information calling into question Curveball's reliability that was presented to more junior supervisors. We found no evidence that the doubts were conveyed by CIA leadership to policymakers in general--or Secretary Powell in particular.

As the discussion above illustrates, it is unclear precisely how and why these serious concerns about Curveball never reached Secretary Powell, despite his and his staff's vigorous efforts over several days in February 2003 to strip out every dubious piece of information in his proposed speech to the United Nations. It is clear, however, that serious concerns about Curveball were widely known at CIA in the months leading up to Secretary Powell's speech. In our view, the failure to convey these concerns to senior management, or, if such concerns were in fact raised to senior management, the failure to pass that information to Secretary Powell, represents a serious failure of management and leadership.

A team of Intelligence Community analysts was dispatched to Iraq in early summer 2003 to investigate the details of Iraq's BW program. The analysts were, in particular, investigating two trailers that had been discovered by Coalition forces in April and May 2003, which at the time were thought to be the mobile BW facilities described by Curveball. As the summer wore on, however, at least one WINPAC analyst who had traveled to Iraq, as well as some DIA and INR analysts, became increasingly doubtful that the trailers were BW-related. 387

The investigation also called into question other aspects of Curveball's reporting. According to one WINPAC BW analyst who was involved in the investigations, those individuals whom Curveball had identified as having been involved in the mobile BW program "all consistently denied knowing anything about this project." 388 Furthermore, none of the supposed project designers even knew who Curveball was, which contradicted Curveball's claim that he had been involved with those individuals in developing the mobile BW program. 389

Additional research into Curveball's background in September 2003 revealed further discrepancies in his claims. For example, WINPAC analysts interviewed several of Curveball's supervisors at the government office where he had worked in Iraq. Curveball had claimed that this office had commenced a secret mobile BW program in 1995. But interviews with his supervisors, as well as friends and family members, confirmed that Curveball had been fired from his position in 1995. 390 Moreover, one of Curveball's family members noted that he had been out of Iraq for substantial periods between 1995 and 1999, times during which Curveball had claimed he had been working on BW projects. 391 In particular, Curveball claimed to have been present at the site of a BW production run when an accident occurred in 1998, killing 12 workers. 392 But Curveball was not even in Iraq at that time, according to information supplied by family members and later confirmed by travel records. 393

By the end of October 2003, the WINPAC analysts conducting these investigations reported to the head of the ISG that they believed Curveball was a fabricator and that his reporting was "all false." But other WINPAC analysts, as well as CIA headquarters management, continued to support Curveball. 394 By January 2004, however, when CIA obtained travel records confirming that Curveball had been out of Iraq during the time he claimed to have been working on the mobile BW program, most analysts became convinced that Curveball had fabricated his reporting. 395

Mr. Tenet was briefed on these findings on February 4, 2004. CIA management, however, was still reluctant to "go down the road" of admitting that Curveball was a fabricator. 396 According to WINPAC analysts, CIA's DI management was slow in retreating from Curveball's information because of political concerns about how this would look to the "Seventh Floor," the floor at Langley where CIA management have their offices, and to "downtown." CIA's Inspector General, in his post-war Inspection Report on WINPAC, concluded that "the process [of retreating from intelligence products derived from Curveball reporting] was drawn out principally due to three factors: (1) senior managers were determined to let the ISG in Iraq complete its work before correcting the mobile labs analysis; (2) the CIA was in the midst of trying to gain direct access to Curveball; and (3) WINPAC Biological and Chemical Group (BCG) management was struggling to reconcile strong differences among their BW analysts." Senior managers did not want to disavow Curveball only to find that his story stood up upon direct examination, or to find that "the ISG uncovered further evidence that would require additional adjustments to the story." 397

Any remaining doubts, however, were removed when the CIA was finally given access to Curveball himself in March 2004. At that time, Curveball's inability to explain discrepancies in his reporting, his description of facilities and events, and his general demeanor led to the conclusion that his information was unreliable. 398 In particular, the CIA interviewers pressed Curveball to explain "discrepancies" between his aforementioned description of the site at Djerf al-Naddaf, 399 which he had alleged was a key locus for transportable BW, and satellite imagery of the site which showed marked differences in layout from that which Curveball described. 400 Specifically, there was a six foot high wall that would have precluded mobile BW trailers from moving into and out of the facility as Curveball had claimed. Curveball was completely unable or unwilling to explain these discrepancies. The CIA concluded that Curveball had fabricated his reporting, and CIA and Defense HUMINT recalled all of it. 401

The CIA also hypothesized that Curveball was motivated to provide fabricated information by his desire to gain permanent asylum. 402 Despite speculation that Curveball was encouraged to lie by the Iraqi National Congress (INC), the CIA's post-war investigations were unable to uncover any evidence that the INC or any other organization was directing Curveball to feed misleading information to the Intelligence Community. 403 Instead, the post-war investigations concluded that Curveball's reporting was not influenced by, controlled by, or connected to, the INC. 404

In fact, over all, CIA's post-war investigations revealed that INC-related sources had a minimal impact on pre-war assessments. 405 The October 2002 NIE relied on reporting from two INC sources, both of whom were later deemed to be fabricators. One source-- the INC source --provided fabricated reporting on the existence of mobile BW facilities in Iraq. The other source, whose information was provided in a text box in the NIE and sourced to a "defector," reported on the possible construction of a new nuclear facility in Iraq. The CIA concluded that this source was being "directed" by the INC to provide information to the U.S. Intelligence Community. 406 Reporting from these two INC sources had a "negligible" impact on the overall assessments, however. 407

Another serious flaw affecting the Intelligence Community's pre-war assessments was its inability to keep reporting from a known fabricator out of finished intelligence. Specifically, the INC source, handled by DIA's Defense HUMINT Service, provided information on Iraqi mobile BW facilities that was initially thought to corroborate Curveball's reporting. The INC source was quickly deemed a fabricator in May 2002, however, and Defense HUMINT issued a fabrication notice but did not recall the reporting on mobile BW facilities in Iraq. Despite the fabrication notice, reporting from the INC source regarding Iraqi mobile BW facilities started to be used again several months later in finished intelligence--eventually ending up in the October 2002 NIE and in Secretary Powell's February 2003 speech to the United Nations Security Council. 408

This inability to prevent information known to be unreliable from making its way to policymakers was due to flawed processes at DIA's Defense HUMINT Service. Specifically, Defense HUMINT did not have in place a protocol to ensure that once a fabrication notice is issued, all previous reporting from that source is reissued with either a warning that the source might be a fabricator or a notice that the report is being recalled. 409 Though a fabrication notice was sent out, the reporting was never recalled, nor was the fabrication notice electronically attached to the original report. Analysts were thus forced to rely on their memory that a fabrication notice was issued for that source's reporting--a difficult task especially when they must be able to recognize that a particular report is from that source, which is not always obvious from the face of the report. 410

Some steps have been taken to remedy this procedural problem. First, DIA's Defense HUMINT Service has now taken steps to ensure that reporting from a fabricating source is reissued with either the fabrication notice or recall notice electronically attached, rather than simply issuing a fabrication notice. 411 Second, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency is currently working to establish Community-wide procedures to ensure that the information technology system links original reports, fabrication notices, and any subsequent recalls or corrections. 412 Unfortunately, however, the Intelligence Community continues to lack a mechanism that electronically tracks the sources for finished intelligence materials or briefings. This makes "walking back" intelligence papers or briefings to policymakers difficult, as there is no way to know which pieces relied upon what information. 413

This failure properly to inform others that the INC source's reporting was not valid, however, was not merely a technical problem. DIA's Defense HUMINT Service also allowed Secretary Powell to use information from the INC source in his speech to the United Nations Security Council--even though a Defense HUMINT official was present at the coordination session at CIA held before the speech. A Defense HUMINT Division Chief, who was aware of the fabrication notice on the INC source , attended both of the February 2 and 3 coordination meetings for the Powell speech yet failed to alert the Secretary that one of the sources the speech relied upon was a fabricator. 414 That Defense HUMINT official said that he was not aware that the information being discussed came from the INC source , indicating that Defense HUMINT had not adequately prepared itself for the meeting by reviewing the information Secretary Powell was considering using in the speech. 415

Conclusion

This section has revealed that Intelligence Community management was remiss in not taking action based on expressed concerns about Curveball's reliability. In retrospect, we conclude that the Intelligence Community's leadership should have more aggressively investigated Curveball's bona fides, rather than seeing the confidence of the analysts and the responsible liaison service as sufficient reason to dismiss the rival concerns of the operators and other liaison services. These leaders also should have pushed harder for access to Curveball--even at the cost of significant inter-liaison capital--given that the source's reporting was so critical to the judgment that Iraq was developing a mobile BW capability. After the NIE, CIA leadership should have paid closer heed to mounting concerns from the DO and, at the very least, informed senior policymakers about these concerns.

This said, the Community's failure to get the Iraq BW question right was not at its core the result of these managerial shortcomings. We need more and better human intelligence, but all such sources are inherently uncertain. Even if there had not been--as there was--affirmative reason to doubt Curveball's reporting, it is questionable whether such a broad conclusion (that Iraq had an active biological weapons production capability) should have been based almost entirely on the evidence of a single source to whom the U.S. Intelligence Community had never gained access. The Intelligence Community's failure to get the BW question right stemmed, first and foremost, from the strong prevailing assumptions about Iraq's intentions and behavior that led the Intelligence Community to conclude that Curveball's reporting was sufficient evidence to judge with "high confidence" that Iraq's offensive BW program was active and more advanced than it had been before the first Gulf War. The Intelligence Community placed too much weight on one source to whom the Community lacked direct access--and did so without making clear to policymakers the extent of the judgment's reliance on this single, unvetted source.

The Intelligence Community's Pre-War Assessments

The Intelligence Community's assessment of Iraq's CW programs and capabilities remained relatively stable during the 1990s, judging that Iraq retained a modest capability to restart a chemical warfare program. The October 2002 NIE therefore marked a shift from previous assessments in that it concluded that Iraq had actually begun renewed production of chemical agents on a sizable scale. 423 This shift was based primarily on imagery, although analysts also saw support for their assessment in a small stream of human and signals intelligence on Iraq's CW capabilities. 424

Background. For more than ten years, the Intelligence Community believed that Iraq retained the capability to jumpstart its CW program. After Operation Desert Storm in 1991, the Community judged that Iraq retained CW munitions and CW-related materials; the Community based these judgments primarily on accounting discrepancies between Iraq's declarations about its chemical weapons program and what UNSCOM had actually discovered. 425 As with assessments of Iraq's nuclear and biological weapons programs, the conclusion that Iraq still had CW munitions was "reinforced by Iraq's continuing efforts to frustrate" United Nations inspectors. 426 Encapsulating this line of reasoning, in 1995 the CIA judged that Iraq could "begin producing [chemical] agent in a matter of weeks after a decision to do so," based on the assessment that Iraq had "sequestered ...at least some tens of metric tons" of CW precursors. 427 This assessment cautioned, however, that building Iraq's "CW program to its previous levels" would require two to three years. 428

Mid-1990s: Growing concern. The Intelligence Community's understanding of Iraq's CW program was altered with the defection in August 1995 of Hussein Kamil, the head of Iraq's Military Industrialization Committee and, as such, the head of Iraq's WMD programs. Among a host of damning revelations, Kamil released details previously unknown to the U.S. Intelligence Community about Iraq's pre-1991 production and use of VX nerve gas. More specifically, Iraq subsequently admitted that it had worked on in-flight mixing of binary CW weapons before the Gulf War, produced larger amounts of VX agent than previously admitted, and perfected long-term storage of a VX precursor. These admissions about Iraqi work on VX--a potent nerve agent and an advanced chemical weapon--all played an important role in shaping subsequent Intelligence Community assessments about Iraq's CW program. 429

Two further revelations about the extent of Iraq's pre-1991 CW efforts also markedly influenced the Community's view of Iraq's CW programs. First, in June 1998, U.S. tests of warhead fragments from an Iraqi al-Hussein missile yielded traces of degraded VX. 430 This finding was noteworthy to Community analysts because it established beyond any doubt (in analysts' eyes) that Iraq, before 1991, had successfully weaponized VX--a technical advance that Iraq refused to admit in its United Nations declarations both before and after the United States became aware of the test results. 431

Second, in July 1998, weapons inspectors found documents--now commonly known as the "Air Force Documents"--that detailed Iraqi CW use in the Iran-Iraq War. 432 This finding was significant because the documents indicated Iraq had expended far fewer CW munitions in the Iran-Iraq War than previously thought, thus suggesting that Iraq possessed more unexpended CW munitions than analysts believed. Analysts lent additional credence to the information because Iraqi officials refused to let inspectors actually keep the relevant document, which suggested to analysts that the documents were incriminating and important. 433 Though both of these revelations concerned Iraq's pre-1991 CW effort, analysts saw them as lending support to the assessment that Iraq was continuing its deliberate efforts to obscure elements of its CW capabilities.

By 1998, the Intelligence Community was continuing to assess that Baghdad retained "key elements of its CW program including personnel, production data, and hidden stocks of production equipment and precursor chemicals" and that "Iraq could begin limited CW agent production within weeks after United Nations sanctions are lifted and intrusive inspections cease." 434 The Community noted, however, that it lacked "reporting to confirm whether [CW] production [was] taking place." 435

2001-2002: Little change. The Community continued through 2001 to note that there was no evidence that Iraq had started large-scale production of CW. 436 Though analysts continued to believe that Iraq's capability to produce CW was increasing, primarily through the development of an indigenous chemical industry, and that Iraq might have engaged in small-scale production, 437 the Community continued to assess that Iraq had not restarted large-scale production. 438 Even after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001--when the Intelligence Community detected what it determined to be the dispersal of Iraqi military units in anticipation of U.S. military strikes 439 --the CIA found no evidence that the munitions Iraq was moving were CW-related. 440 And additional reporting during this time did not reveal whether certain suspect sites were actively engaged in CW weapons production--although it remained impossible to determine whether dual-use precursor chemicals were being produced for illicit purposes. 441

With respect to possible CW stockpiles, as of 2002 the Community assessed that Iraq possessed between 10 and 100 metric tons of CW agent and that it might have had sufficient precursors to produce an additional 200 metric tons. 442 This estimated stockpile was smaller than the stockpiles Iraq possessed before the Gulf War, as an early 2002 Senior Executive Memorandum noted. 443 But according to a CIA analyst's mid-2002 briefing to senior officials, Iraq could restart CW production in a matter of days by using dual-use facilities and hidden precursors. 444 These assessments, however, did not go so far as to conclude that Iraq had restarted production or, relatedly, had sizable CW stockpiles.

The October 2002 NIE. The October 2002 NIE reflected a shift in the Intelligence Community's judgment about Iraq's CW program in two ways: (1) the NIE assessed that Iraq had large stockpiles of CW; and (2) the NIE unequivocally stated that Iraq had restarted CW production. 445

Regarding stockpiles, the NIE stated that "[a]lthough we have little specific information on Iraq's CW stockpile, Saddam probably has stocked at least 100 metric tons and possibly as much as 500 metric tons of CW agents--much of it added in the last year." 446 This judgment represented a significant increase in the Intelligence Community's estimate of the size of Iraq's CW stockpile.

This stockpile estimate rested primarily on Iraqi accounting discrepancies, Iraq's CW production capacity, estimates of Iraqi precursor stocks, and--at the upper limit (500 metric tons)--on practical considerations such as the size of pre-Gulf War stockpiles and Iraq's limited delivery options. 447 This calculation was also informed by the Intelligence Community's assessments of Iraqi military requirements, ammunition demand, and possible changes in Iraqi use doctrine. 448

The lower end of this stockpile range (100 metric tons) was premised on the aforementioned 1999 estimate that Iraq possessed between 10 and 100 metric tons of CW agents and that Iraq "could" produce an additional 200 tons of agents "using unaccounted-for precursor chemicals." 449 This 1999 estimate was itself premised on previous Iraqi CW accounting irregularities. 450 The Community assessments of the range of Iraq's CW stockpile thus rested largely on what analysts estimated Iraq could do with unaccounted-for precursors and production capabilities.

In addition to assessing the size of the Iraqi CW stockpile, the NIE judged that "much" of the CW stockpile had been "added in the last year." 451 This latter assessment, in turn, rested on the NIE's second major CW conclusion: that Baghdad had "begun renewed production of mustard, sarin, GF (cyclosarin), and VX."

The NIE's judgment that Iraq had restarted CW production was based primarily on imagery intelligence. 452 As analysts subsequently explained, this imagery showed trucks transshipping materials to and from ammunition depots, including suspect CW sites, in Iraq. These transshipments began in March 2002 and continued until early 2003. 453 At approximately 11 sites, imagery analysts saw a number of "indicators" in the imagery that suggested to them that some of the trucks were possibly moving CW munitions; then, because imagery analysts observed evidence of numerous such shipments, CW analysts in turn assessed that Iraq was moving significant volumes of CW munitions and therefore that Iraq had restarted CW production. 454 These indicators included the presence of "Samarra-type" trucks--a distinctive type of tanker truck--which were regularly associated with CW shipments in the late 1980s and during the Gulf War; atypical security patterns "associated with" the Special Republican Guard, which was believed to be responsible for protecting parts of Iraq's WMD programs; at least at one site, the grading of the topsoil, which likewise suggested to analysts deliberate concealment of suspect activity ; and other indicators . 455

Although the NIE's judgment that Iraq had restarted CW production was based primarily on imagery, that judgment was also supported by small streams of human and signals intelligence. The NIC subsequently explained in its Statement for the Record that this human intelligence reporting consisted of "a number of specific reports alleging that Iraq had resumed large-scale production of CW agents." 456 None of these reports was considered "highly reliable," however, and only six were deemed "moderately reliable." 457

Of these reports, Community analysts identified to us several as having been most significant, although subsequent analysis of the reports revealed--in some cases--serious flaws in the reporting. The key reports were: one involving a foreign source in 1999 who reported that two Iraqi companies were involved in the production of nerve gas; 458 reporting concerning a factory for the production of castor oil that could be used to make "sarin"; 459 information from an Iraqi defector, who claimed to be an expert in VX production, describing the production of "tons" of nerve agents in mobile labs; 460 reporting from a source with "good but historical access" asserting that, as of 1998, mustard and binary chemical agents were being produced in Iraq; 461 a source who reported that Iraq was producing a binary compound and mustard as of fall 2001; 462 and reporting on the production of CW at dual-use facilities. 463

Finally, a liaison service reported in September 2002 that a senior Iraqi official had indicated that Iraq was producing and stockpiling chemical weapons. 464 Although this report was distributed to a very small group of senior officials prior to the publication of the NIE--including to the NIE's principal author--it was not made available to most analysts. 465 In any event, as described below, the senior Iraqi official later denied having made such statements.

In addition to these imagery indicators of transshipment activity and human intelligence, the NIE also drew upon a handful of additional pieces of information--based largely on other Intelligence Community reporting --to support the assessment that Baghdad had restarted CW production. This information suggested suspect activity at dual-use sites and included: indications that Iraq was expanding its indigenous chemical industry in ways that were deemed unlikely to be for civilian purposes, specifically by increasing the indigenous production capacity for chlorine--despite the fact that Iraq's civilian chlorine needs were met through United Nations-permitted imports; 466 the "management" of key chemical facilities by "previously identified CW personnel"; 467 attempted procurement of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons defensive materials; and the attempted procurement of dual-use materials associated with CW. 468 Although the NIE noted that the Intelligence Community could not "link definitively Iraq's procurement of CW precursors, technology, and specialized equipment from foreign sources directly" to its CW program, 469 it nevertheless assessed that "Iraq's procurements have contributed to the rebuilding of dual-use facilities that probably are adding to Iraq's overall CW agent capability." 470 In drawing this conclusion, the NIE drew particular attention to Iraq's attempts to obtain necessary precursors for nerve agents. 471

Finally, reporting on other aspects of Iraq's unconventional weapons programs also influenced some analysts' CW-related conclusions. Specifically, reporting on the existence of Iraqi mobile BW production facilities--namely, reports from Curveball--buttressed some analysts' certainty in their CW judgments. As one CIA analyst put it, "much of the CW confidence [in the pre-war assessments] was built on the BW confidence." 472 In other words, although some CW analysts at times questioned the existence of significant Iraqi CW stockpiles, the reports that Iraq had a hidden, mobile BW program pushed the analysts "in the other direction" and helped convince them of their ultimate conclusion: that Iraq was hiding a CW program. 473

Post-October 2002 NIE reports. In November 2002, the NIC published a Memorandum to Holders of the October NIE entitled Iraq's Chemical Warfare Capabilities: Potential for Dusty and Fourth-Generation Agents. 474 The Memorandum warned that Iraq might possess dusty agent 475 and that it had the technical expertise to develop fourth-generation agents 476 that could be extremely lethal. Identifying the "Key Intelligence Gaps" on Iraq's CW program, the Memorandum observed that although the Intelligence Community "assess[ed]" that Iraq was producing blister and nerve agents, the Intelligence Community had not "identified key production facilities" and did "not know the extent of indigenous production or procurement of CW precursors." 477 But just as the NIE had cautioned that the Intelligence Community had "little specific information on Iraq's CW stockpile," the Memorandum stated that the Intelligence Community had "almost no information on the size, composition, or location of Iraq's CW stockpile." 478 In a separate NIE published in January 2003, however, the Community reiterated its estimate that Iraq "ha[d] 100 to 500 metric tons of weaponized bulk agent." 479

In December 2002, CIA's WINPAC published a coordinated Intelligence Community paper that reiterated its belief that "Iraq retain[ed] an offensive CW program," but it did not specifically describe the extent of any CW stockpiles. 480 In addition, the CIA reported the Intelligence Community had "low confidence" in its ability to monitor the Iraqi CW program due to "stringent operational security" and "successful denial and deception practices." 481

Post-War Findings of the Iraq Survey Group

The Iraq Survey Group's findings undermined both the Intelligence Community's assessments about Iraq's pre-war CW program and, indeed, the very fundamental assumptions upon which those assessments were based. The ISG concluded--contrary to the Intelligence Community's pre-war assessments--that Iraq had actually unilaterally destroyed its undeclared CW stockpile in 1991 and that there were no credible indications that Baghdad resumed production of CW thereafter. 482 Iraq had not regained its pre-1991 CW technical sophistication or production capabilities prior to the war. Further, pre-war concerns of Iraqi plans to use CW if Coalition forces crossed certain defensive "red lines" were groundless; the "red lines" referred to conventional military planning only. 483 Finally, the only CW the Iraq Survey Group recovered were weapons manufactured before the first Gulf War; the ISG concluded that, after 1991, Iraq maintained only small, covert labs to research chemicals and poisons, primarily for intelligence operations. 484 However, "Saddam never abandoned his intentions to resume a CW effort when sanctions were lifted and conditions were judged favorable," and Iraq's post-1996 infrastructure improvements "would have enhanced Iraq's ability to produce CW" if it had chosen to do so. 485

Despite having "expended considerable time and expertise searching for extant CW munitions,"--the vaunted stockpiles--the ISG concluded with "high confidence that there are no CW present in the Iraqi inventory." 486 The ISG specifically investigated 11 sites that were associated with suspected CW transshipment activity, conducting an in-depth inspection of two of the sites, which were "assessed prior to war to have the strongest indicators of CW movement." 487 Neither of these sites revealed any CW munitions. 488 Further, the ISG's "review of documents, interviews, intelligence reporting, and site exploitations revealed alternate, plausible explanations" for pre-war transshipment activity that the Intelligence Community judged to have been CW-related. 489

Regarding Iraq's dual-use chemical infrastructure and personnel, the Iraq Survey Group found no direct link to a CW program. Instead, investigators found that, though Iraq's chemical industry began expanding after 1996, in part due to the influx of funds and resources from the Oil-for-Food program, the country's CW capabilities remained less than those which existed prior to the Gulf War. 490 The ISG also interviewed 30 of the approximately 60 "key" Iraqi CW scientists, all of whom denied having been involved in any CW activity since 1990 and the vast majority of whom denied having any knowledge of any CW activity occurring. 491

The ISG also cited a number of reasons why Iraq's expansion of its chlorine capacity was not, contrary to the NIE's assessment, capable of being diverted to CW production. 492 Specifically, Iraq experienced a "country-wide chlorine shortage," and Iraq's chlorine plants "suffered from corroded condensers and were only able to produce aqueous chlorine." 493 Further, "[t]echnical problems and poor maintenance of aging equipment throughout the 1990s resulted in many chemical plants, including ethylene and chlorine production plants, operating at less than half capacity despite the improvements to the chemical industry." 494

In sum, the Iraq Survey Group found no direct link between Iraq's dual-use infrastructure and its CW program. However, "concerns" about some aspects of the infrastructure 495 arising out of "an extensive, yet fragmentary and circumstantial body of evidence" suggested Saddam intended to maintain his CW capabilities by preserving CW-related assets and expertise. 496

Regarding Iraqi decisionmaking about its CW program after 1991, the ISG concluded that, in the aftermath of the Gulf War, "Iraq initially chose not to fully declare its CW" in anticipation that inspections would be short-lived and ineffective. This position changed after a particularly invasive search in late June 1991, after which Iraq destroyed its hidden CW and precursors while retaining some documents and dual-use equipment. Iraq kept these latter items for the next five years, but did not renew its CW efforts out of fear that such a move would imperil its effort to have sanctions lifted. In August 1995, however, after the defection of Hussein Kamil, Saddam relented and revealed to inspectors extensive VX research and other, more advanced, technologies. 497

Overall, although the vast majority of CW munitions had been destroyed, the Iraq Survey Group recognized that questions remained relating to the disposition of hundreds of pre-1991 CW munitions. 498 Still, given that, of the dozens of CW munitions that the ISG discovered, all had been manufactured before 1991, the Intelligence Community's 2002 assessments that Iraq had restarted its CW program turned out to have been seriously off the mark. 499

Finally, on two ancillary issues the ISG found little or no evidence to support indications of Iraqi CW efforts. First, with respect to a "red line" defense of Baghdad, the ISG found no information that such a defense--which amounted to a multi-ring conventional defense of the city--called for the use of CW. 500 According to a senior Iraqi military officer, the "red line" was simply the line at which Iraqi military units would no longer retreat. 501 At the same time, both generals and high-level defense officials believed that a plan for CW use existed, even though they themselves knew nothing about it. 502

Second, with respect to CW work by the Iraqi Intelligence Service, there was "no evidence" of CW production in clandestine labs, other than the Service's laboratory effort to develop substances to kill or incapacitate targeted individuals. 503

Analysis of the Intelligence Community's Pre-War Assessments

As the foregoing comparison illustrates, the Intelligence Community's pre-war assessments of Iraq's CW program were well off the mark. Iraq did not have CW stockpiles; it was not producing CW agent; and its chemical infrastructure was in far worse shape than the Intelligence Community believed. It is a daunting task in any circumstance to distinguish a normal chemical infrastructure and conventional military establishment on the one hand from a chemical warfare program on the other. But the Community made more difficult the challenges of identifying a CW program in Iraq by latching on to ambiguous imagery indicators and by failing to collect enough good intelligence to keep analytic judgments tethered to reality.

There are several reasons for the significant gap between the Intelligence Community's pre-war assessment of Iraq's CW program and the Iraq Survey Group's findings. Chief among these was the over-reliance on a single, ambiguous source (the Samarra-type tanker trucks) to support multiple judgments. Less central, although still significant, were the failure of analysts to understand fully the limitations of technical collection; the lack of quality human intelligence sources; the lack of quality signals intelligence; and, on a broader plane, the universal difficulty of establishing the existence of a CW program in light of the prevalence of dual-use technology.

As noted, the pre-war assessment that Iraq had restarted CW production relied primarily on CW analysts' assessments of imagery intelligence. 504 This imagery showed trucks transshipping materials to and from ammunition depots, including suspect CW-sites, in Iraq. 505 In the late spring of 2002, analysts started to believe that these shipments involved CW munitions. 506 This belief was based on the aforementioned "indicators" seen on the imagery--that is, activity and circumstances surrounding the shipments that were thought to be indicative of CW activity. The most important of these indicators was the presence of "Samarra-type" trucks--a distinctive type of tanker truck--which had been regularly associated with Iraqi CW shipments in the late 1980s and during the Gulf War. 507 Based on the assessment that the presence of these Samarra-type trucks (in combination with the other indicators) suggested CW shipments, CW analysts then judged that the frequency of such transshipments pointed to the assessment that "CW was already deployed with the military logistics chain," which, in turn, indicated to these analysts that Iraq had added to its CW stockpile in the last year. That assessment, in turn, indicated to analysts that Iraq had restarted CW production.

In short, the key pre-war assessments about Iraq's CW program--that Iraq was actively producing CW and had increased its stockpile of CW--rested on the following evidence and associated reasoning:

Imagery revealed the presence of Samarra-type trucks at suspect weapons sites;

The presence of Samarra-type trucks indicated CW activity;

The scale of the Samarra-type trucks' involvement demonstrated Iraq had already deployed CW with their forces; and

For CW to be deployed with Iraqi forces, Iraq had to have restarted CW production within the past year--the period during which analysts had seen Samarra-type trucks.

As this logic train illustrates, the final conclusion regarding restarted CW production was, therefore, fundamentally grounded on the single assessment that the Samarra-type trucks seen on imagery were in fact CW-related. 508 This assessment, however, proved to be incorrect--thereby eliminating the crucial pillar on which the Community's judgment about Iraq's CW program rested.

Post-war investigation revealed how the Intelligence Community ran astray. After the war, NGA "reassessed" the imagery from one of the sites thought to bear the strongest indications of CW activity--the Al Musayyib Barracks--by incorporating information from ISG inspections and debriefings of key personnel. 509 Contrary to pre-war assessments, NGA concluded that the activity represented "conventional maintenance and logistical activity rather than chemical weapons." 510 NGA analysts drew this conclusion in part after reexamining imagery and in part on ISG debriefs of former commanders of the Al Musayyib site. 511

More detailed analysis of other imagery intelligence--in particular, surface grading-- also revealed the absence of a clear link to CW. 512 NGA assessed that grading could be associated with innocuous, routine activities . 513 The rationales behind that assessment are discussed in the classified report.

The story is much the same with respect to pre-war assessments of other imagery evidence regarding certain security patterns. 514 Post-war analysis by NGA could not confirm pre-war assessments that these security patterns were indicative of Special Republican Guard activity associated with security at CW-related sites. Indeed, at least one human source debriefed after the war said the security activity in question was not related to the Special Republican Guard and that it was actually related to the performance of miscellaneous jobs associated with the ammunition depot. 515

Finally, post-war debriefings suggested that other CW-related imagery evidence was also innocuous, although this suggestion was neither definitively confirmed nor refuted by the imagery reassessment. 516 And NGA notes that it is generally not possible to determine from imagery whether some activities, such as certain safety measures, are intended to support the training of offensive or defensive chemical warfare troops. And NGA has noted that imagery, when used alone, may not definitely determine the intended purpose of an adversary's activity.

The Community's over-reliance on ambiguous imagery indicators thus played a pivotal role in its ultimate misjudgment that Iraq had restarted CW production and had increased its CW stockpiles. In our view analysts relied too heavily on the presence of Samarra tanker trucks--backed by other, even more ambiguous imagery indicators--to support multiple, interdependent, and wide-ranging judgments about Iraq's chemical warfare program. And the Community did so despite the truism about which NGA itself has cautioned: imagery alone can neither prove nor disprove a CW association. 517

Building one assessment upon another in this fashion--without carrying forward the uncertainty of each "layer" of assessment--results in a false impression of certainty for analysts' ultimate judgment. We believe, therefore, that at a minimum analysts must communicate the uncertainty of their judgments, and the degree to which they rely on narrow assessments about specific indicators. Moreover, avoiding the pitfalls of such layering requires careful consideration of alternative hypotheses, such as, in this case, the possibility that the shipments involved conventional weapons and that the trucks were for water supply or fire suppression.

We do not discount the fact that analysts must sometimes focus on seemingly mundane indicators. But at the same time analysts must always recognize, and communicate to decisionmakers, the tenuous quality of their reasoning.

Analytical flaws in assessing the significance of the imagery indicators were not the only factors leading to the misassessment of the imagery intelligence. In addition, analysts may have misperceived the significance of the imagery on Iraq's supposed CW program because they did not fully understand--and the collectors did not fully explain--the scope and nature of imagery collection against the target. Indeed, we cannot rule out the possibility that the analytic judgment that Iraq had added to its CW stockpile in the preceding year rested, at least in part, on a simple increase in collection and reporting rather than any rise in Iraqi activity.

Pre-war, analysts relied upon imagery to detect transshipment activity at suspected CW sites, and beginning in March 2002, analysts believed that they were seeing an "increase" in such activity. 518 In reality, however, the "increase" in transshipment activity that analysts saw starting in March 2002 may have been due, at least in part, to an increased volume of imagery collected by U.S. satellites rather than to any increased activity by the Iraqis. To only somewhat oversimplify the matter, it wasn't that the Iraqis were using Samarra trucks more often in 2002--it was that in 2002 the United States was taking more pictures of places where the Samarra trucks were being used. And this failure to distinguish between actual increased activity at suspect CW sites and the appearance of increased activity due to increased imaging likely contributed to the mistaken assessment that Iraq was ramping up CW production in 2002.

This error sprung from the fact that not all Community analysts were fully cognizant of a major change in NGA collection that occurred in the spring of 2002. 519 Until 2000, imagery collection on Iraq had been oriented primarily toward supporting military operations associated with the no-fly zones. 520 But in 2001 and 2002, imagery collection against Iraq WMD more than doubled, prompted by recommendations that more attention be given to the target. 521 Most significantly, the United States began "expanded imagery collection over Baghdad [and] suspect WMD sites" in March 2002--not coincidentally the same time that analysts began to "see" new activity they associated with CW transshipments. 522

Thus, in drawing their conclusions about the state of Iraq's CW production based on increased transshipment activity, analysts did not realize the necessity of distinguishing between the "new" activity they saw, on the one hand, at sites that had been previously imaged on a regular basis (e.g., suspect WMD sites) and, on the other, at sites that had not been previously imaged on a regular basis (e.g., ammunition depots that had not been previously associated with WMD). 523 Whereas increased activity at the former could be attributed to changes in Iraqi behavior (since the United States had been photographing the sites prior to March 2002), the same could not be said for the latter category (since there was no "baseline" of activity with which to compare levels of activity seen from March 2002 on). 524

This problem extended to one of the sites that was key to analysts' conclusions about Iraqi CW production--the Al Musayyib Barracks. According to NGA, Al Musayyib had not been regularly imaged prior to the March 2002 imaging blitz because it had not been previously associated with Iraq's chemical or biological weapons programs. 525 Unaware of this important fact, analysts confidently assessed that the Iraqis had expanded transshipment activity at Al Musayyib, as well as other sites, when they began to see more images of Samarra-type truck activity. In short, analysts attributed what they saw to nefarious Iraqi activity when it could just as easily have been attributed to changes in U.S. collection priorities. In our view, this failure is the direct result of poor communication between analysts and collectors about a crucial change in the scope and nature of collection against a vital target.

C onclusion

Similar to its assessments about Iraq's nuclear and biological efforts, the Intelligence Community's mistaken assessments about Iraq's chemical weapons program can be traced in large part to a single point of failure--the Community's over-reliance on ambiguous imagery indicators. But the Community's bottom line on Iraq's chemical weapons capabilities was further influenced by a breakdown in communication between imagery collectors and analysts; a basic paucity of quality intelligence, particularly quality signals intelligence; and the fact that much of the human and signals intelligence that was collected was bad.

It is, however, understandable that analysts assessed--as they did throughout the 1990s--that Iraq retained a chemical warfare capability. Iraq's pre-Gulf War chemical weapons stockpile was large and relatively sophisticated. Nor did Saddam's uncooperative and secretive behavior after the war encourage confidence that he had converted from the CW path. The Community's failure on CW was therefore not in thinking that Iraq had such a capability--that was, in many ways, the only sensible conclusion, given the evidence. Rather, analysts erred in their assessment--based largely on ambiguous imagery indicators that could not logically support the judgment--that Iraq had in fact resumed producing and stockpiling significant quantities of CW.

The Intelligence Community assessed in the October 2002 NIE that Iraq was developing small Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) capable of autonomous flight, which most agencies assessed were "probably" intended to deliver biological warfare agents. 548 The Intelligence Community also judged that these UAVs could threaten the U.S. homeland. 549 This latter assessment was based on an Iraqi attempt to procure commercially available civilian U.S. mapping software for its UAVs. That attempted procurement, the Intelligence Community assessed, "strongly suggest[ed] that Iraq [was] investigating the use of these UAVs for missions targeting the United States." 550

By January 2003, however, the Intelligence Community had pulled back from its view that Iraq intended to target the United States. 551 This re-assessment reflected a belief among CIA analysts that the Iraqi attempt to procure U.S. mapping software may have been inadvertent. 552 As a result, the Intelligence Community assessed in January 2003 that while the mapping software could provide the capability to target the United States, the purchasing attempt did not necessarily indicate an intent to do so. 553 By early March 2003, CIA had further retreated from the view that the purchase of the mapping software evidenced an intent to target the United States and, in early March 2003, on the eve of the invasion of Iraq, CIA advised senior policymakers that it was an open question whether the attempted software procurement evinced the intent to target the United States at all. 554

Following its exhaustive investigation in Iraq, the Iraq Survey Group concluded that Iraq had indeed been developing small UAVs, but found no evidence that the UAVs had been designed to deliver biological agent. 555 Instead, the ISG concluded that Iraq had been developing and had flight tested a small, autonomous UAV intended for use as a reconnaissance platform, 556 and had developed a prototype for another small UAV for use in electronic warfare missions. 557 Although both UAVs had the range, payload, guidance, and autonomy necessary to deliver a biological agent, the ISG found no evidence that Iraq intended to use them in such a way. 558 With respect to the mapping software, Iraqi officials told ISG investigators that the software in question had been included as part of a package deal with autopilots they had purchased for the UAVs; the Iraqis, the ISG judged, had not actually intended to buy the mapping software. 559

The October 2002 NIE had also examined whether Iraq was deploying missiles capable of reaching beyond the 150 kilometer limit imposed by the United Nations. The NIE assessed that Iraq was deploying two types of short-range ballistic missiles capable of flying beyond the United Nations-authorized range limit. 560 The NIE also assessed, based largely on Iraqi accounting discrepancies and incomplete records and record keeping, that Iraq retained a covert force of up to a few dozen Scud-variant missiles in defiance of United Nations resolutions. 561 The ISG concluded--consistent with this assessment--that Iraq had been developing and deploying ballistic missiles that exceeded United Nations restrictions, although the ISG also found, contrary to pre-war assessments, that Iraq had not retained Scud or Scud-variant missiles after 1991. 562

The Intelligence Community's assessments of Iraq's delivery systems developments offered both a bright and a dark spot on its Iraq record. While far from perfect (which can never be reasonably expected in intelligence work), the Community's judgments about the progress of Iraq's ballistic missile programs were substantively accurate. As the ISG discovered, the Iraqis were indeed violating United Nations strictures by working on missiles that exceeded the 150 kilometer range limit. But on the issue of whether Iraq was developing UAVs to deliver biological agent against U.S. targets--including the U.S. homeland--the Community erred, once again attributing more to spotty intelligence than that information could bear.

This section describes the Community's analysis of Iraq's work on delivery systems between the first Gulf War and Operation Iraqi Freedom, as well as the ISG's findings concerning the same. The Commission then offers its findings based on a thorough investigation into the Community's efforts on Iraqi delivery systems, concentrating particularly on the analytical flaws apparent from the Community's products on the uses of Iraqi UAVs.

The Intelligence Community's Pre-War Assessments

As with other aspects of Iraq's WMD programs, the Intelligence Community's assessment of Iraq's delivery systems evolved over the course of many years and was heavily influenced by Iraq's past actions and intransigence.

Background. Before the Gulf War Iraq had been in the early stages of a project to convert the MiG-21 jet aircraft into UAVs for BW delivery. 563 In addition, Iraq had experimented in 1990 on a BW spray system, designed to be used with the MiG-21 UAV. 564 Iraq admitted to this program in 1995, after the defection of Hussein Kamil. 565 Subsequent UNSCOM inspections discovered video showing the spray-system experiments. 566 Also, analysts in the early 1990s had observed continued activity at Salman Pak--Iraq's primary BW research and development facility prior to the Gulf War--where, UNSCOM reported, work continued on modified commercial crop sprayers for BW delivery and the presence of UAV program personnel. 567 Iraq claimed that, because of the war, it had abandoned the MiG-21 UAV project after conducting only one experiment in 1991, but UNSCOM inspections could not confirm this claim. 568 In the mid-1990s Iraq also began testing another modified jet aircraft, the L-29, as a UAV, that analysts believed was a follow-on to the converted MiG-21 program. 569

These discoveries also cast new light, in analysts' minds, on UNSCOM's earlier discovery of 11 small-to-medium sized UAV drones at the Salman Pak compound in 1991. 570 Although Iraq denied having developed these UAVs for BW delivery, Iraq's later admission--after an initial denial--that the MiG-21 program was for the purpose of delivering biological agents led analysts to believe, given Iraqi deception, that Iraq's small UAVs had a similar purpose. 571 Analysts also focused on Iraqi admissions--in their 1996 declaration to the United Nations--that, in the late 1980s, senior Iraqi officials had met to discuss the feasibility of using small UAVs as BW delivery vehicles. 572

This history, along with evidence that Iraq had flight-tested small and medium-sized UAVs, led most Intelligence Community analysts to conclude consistently from the late 1990s through 2002 that Iraq was maintaining its UAV program for BW and CW delivery. 573 Briefings and written products to senior policymakers in mid-2002 reflected this assessment. 574 As with the other elements of Iraq's purported weapons programs, however, intelligence on UAVs in the years preceding 2002 was partial and ambiguous. While it was clear that Iraq did have a UAV program, the key question--whether that program was meant to be a delivery system--remained unanswered. Therefore, analysts' judgments again depended heavily upon assumptions based on Iraq's earlier behavior and Community views about Iraq's sophisticated denial and deception activities. 575

With respect to ballistic missiles, the Intelligence Community judged in 1992 that Iraq's ballistic missile programs were more advanced than the Community had assessed before the Gulf War. 576 Iraq was further along in its production capability for Scud and Scud-derivative missiles and had produced more components indigenously than the Intelligence Community had assessed before the Gulf War. 577 By 1995, the Intelligence Community judged that Iraq was developing liquid-propellant missiles with an expected range of about 150 kilometers. 578 In 1998, the Community assessed that these missiles, named the al-Samoud, were capable of flying farther than the 150 kilometer limit imposed by the United Nations and that Iraq was also developing solid-propellant missiles. 579 By early 2002, the Intelligence Community judged that Iraq probably still retained a small force of Scud missiles and that both its liquid-propellant and solid-propellant missiles were capable of flying over 150 kilometers. 580

October 2002 NIE. The October 2002 NIE judged, with a dissent from the Director of Air Force Intelligence, that Iraq was developing small UAVs "probably" for BW delivery which could be used against U.S. forces and allies in the region. 581 In addition, the NIE mentioned the concern of most agencies about the possible intent to use UAVs as delivery systems against the U.S. homeland. 582 This possible use was based on the attempted procurement of U.S. mapping software by an Iraqi procurement agent. 583

As noted, the Director of Air Force Intelligence dissented from the majority view. In contrast to other organizations, the Air Force judged that Iraq was developing UAVs "primarily for reconnaissance rather than [as] delivery platforms for [CW or BW] agents." 584 The Air Force further noted that CW or BW delivery is "an inherent capability of UAVs but probably is not the impetus for Iraq's recent UAV programs." 585

Analysts' judgments that Iraq's small UAVs were intended for BW delivery were based on the following logic: the Iraqis had admitted that the MiG-21 program was intended for BW delivery, and analysts judged that the L-29 program, for which there was some evidence of a BW-delivery mission, was the successor to the MiG-21 program. Because the L-29 program had suffered set-backs in late 2000 after a crash, analysts then deduced that Iraq's new, small UAVs may have been designed to replace the L-29 effort, and that they were therefore also intended to deliver BW agents. 586

There was very little reporting, however, to support the conclusion that the small UAVs were "probably" intended for BW delivery. Only one human intelligence report indicated that small UAVs were intended for CW or BW delivery. 587 Given the dearth of reporting on the purpose for the small UAVs, analysts instead deduced their intended purpose from Iraq's previous admissions and from what was assessed about the characteristics of Iraq's other UAV programs.

For example, analysts pointed to several human intelligence reports that suggested that Iraq's L-29 UAV program could be used to deliver CW or BW agents. 588 Only one of those reports, however, stated explicitly that the L-29 UAV was intended for biological or chemical weapon delivery, and that early 1998 report was based on a report of unknown reliability. 589 Analysts believed, though, that this conclusion was reinforced by separate reporting indicating that Iraq was prepared to use modified L-29 UAVs against U.S. forces in the Persian Gulf area; these UAVs, the reasoning went, would have been useless for delivery of conventional weapons and BW was therefore a likelier function. 590

But there were other indications that the UAVs were not intended for BW delivery. Iraq's 1996 declaration to the United Nations indicated that the drones discovered in 1991 were actually intended for reconnaissance and aerial targeting--not BW delivery. 591 Intelligence reporting supported this view; Iraq was attempting to procure equipment for its small UAVs, which suggested the UAVs' purpose was reconnaissance. 592 Finally, as noted in the Air Force dissent, the small UAVs were not ideally suited for BW or CW delivery; the Air Force assessed instead that "the small size of Iraq's new UAV strongly suggests a primary role of reconnaissance, although chemical/biological weapons (CBW) delivery is an inherent capability." 593 Although CIA's WINPAC had published an Intelligence Assessment in 2001 that discussed these possible non-BW delivery missions for Iraq's UAVs, such alternative missions were not emphasized in the October 2002 NIE because WINPAC's "focus [in] the NIE was WMD delivery systems and not the Iraqi UAV program as a whole." 594

In sum, the evidentiary basis for the pre-war assessment that Iraq was developing UAVs "probably intended" for BW delivery was based largely on the BW focus of Iraq's pre-1991 UAV programs and a thin stream of (primarily human intelligence) reporting that hinted at such a function for post-1991 UAVs. 595

As noted above, the NIE also judged that Iraq's UAVs "could threaten...the U.S. Homeland." 596 This assessment was based on two streams of reporting: first, intelligence reporting indicating that the UAVs had a range of over 500 kilometers and could be launched from a truck; and, second, reporting that an Iraqi procurement agent was attempting to buy U.S. mapping software for its small UAVs. 597 The latter piece of information was, however, the only evidence that supported Iraq's intent to target the United States. Based on this stream of reporting, the NIE reasoned that, because the mapping software would be useless outside the United States, its procurement "strongly suggest[ed]" Iraq was interested in using the UAVs to target the United States. 598

The procurement effort revealed by the reporting was spearheaded by an Iraqi procurement agent who had been involved in the pre-Gulf War Iraqi UAV program ("the procurement agent") . The procurement agent had subsequently emigrated to another country where he ran an illicit procurement network for Iraq. 599 In late 2000 or early 2001, the procurement agent received a "shopping list" from an Iraqi general associated with the UAV program that included autopilots and gyroscopes. To fill this request, the procurement agent researched potential suppliers for these items, and in May 2001 he submitted requests for price quotes to a manufacturer and a distributor for the requested items, which included autopilots and gyroscopes but also included "Map Source" mapping software. The distributor responded with a price quote for the autopilot package, which included "Garmin 50 State" topographic mapping software, also sold as "Map Source." After consulting with Baghdad and soliciting a final price quote, in early 2002 the procurement agent submitted a final procurement list, which included the Garmin 50 State mapping software, to the distributor. 600

Although the distributor had been assured by the procurement agent that the end-user was "legitimate," the distributor remained concerned about the procurement agent 's interest in these items and contacted its own country's authorities in March 2002. The distributor also removed the mapping software from its website. 601

Following the attempted procurement, several analytical assessments were published regarding the attempted procurement of the mapping software. An Intelligence Community Assessment titled Current and Future Air Threats to the US Homeland, published July 29, 2002, noted that Iraq was seeking route planning software and an associated topographic database "likely intended to use with its UAVs" and "almost certainly relate[d] to the United States." 602 CIA's Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis also disseminated an intelligence assessment on August 1, 2002, observing that the mapping software would "provide precise guidance, tracking, and targeting in the United States." 603

A liaison intelligence service subsequently approached the procurement agent to question him about the attempted procurement. 604 In these discussions, the procurement agent claimed that he had not intended to purchase mapping software of the United States. Although he admitted that the software he had ordered had not been "bundled" with other items he ordered, he explained that he had not well understood all of the elements of the package and had not wanted to miss out on an important piece of software. He said he had been concerned that the other system pieces might not work if he did not purchase the mapping software; it was cheap; and he had thought the system would allow the user to scan maps and program them into a GPS. Asked by the liaison service to submit to a thorough examination, the procurement agent refused. 605 Thus, by fall 2002, the CIA was still uncertain whether the procurement agent was lying.

While the October 2002 NIE was being coordinated, a CIA analyst interview ed the procurement agent in an effort to determine if his attempted procurement of the U.S. mapping software had in fact been inadvertent, as he claimed. The analyst initially concluded that the procurement agent was lying because a review of the website showed that, contrary to the procurement agent 's claims, the option to purchase the mapping software was not on the page with the autopilots and gyroscopes. After further research, however, the analyst determined that the version of the website that the procurement agent had accessed in early 2001 had in fact contained the configuration and software option that the procurement agent described. This discovery led the analyst to believe that the purchase order may have indeed been inadvertent. 606

Although the CIA was now beginning to obtain indications that the procurement agent 's attempted purchase of the U.S. mapping software may in fact have been inadvertent as the procurement agent claimed, CIA remained uncertain whether the procurement agent was lying. 607 As the National Foreign Intelligence Board was convening to review and approve the NIE, several CIA analysts expressed concern about its use of the words "strongly suggests" and recommended that the language be toned down. But these concerns did not reach the DCI himself until the Board process had concluded. 608 With the lengthy Board meeting finished, the DCI concluded that the word "strongly" would remain in the NIE because the coordination process was complete at that point and the new information had not been confirmed. 609

As noted, the NIE also stated that gaps in accounting suggested that Iraq retained a small covert Scud force, and the NIE assessed that Iraq was deploying missiles capable of flying farther than the United Nations limit of 150 kilometers. 610

Post-NIE. The Intelligence Community's assessment that the UAVs were "probably" for BW delivery remained unchanged in the run-up to the war. 611 In a paper sent to the National Security Council in January 2003, the CIA noted that an Iraqi Ministry of Defense official had indicated that Iraq considered its UAVs to be an important strategic weapon. 612 And in testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence in early February 2003, DCI Tenet stated that "[w]e are concerned that Iraq's UAVs can dispense chemical and biological weapons." 613

The Intelligence Community did, however, begin to retreat from its assessment that Iraq intended to target the U.S. homeland, though not quickly enough to prevent the charge's inclusion in the President's speech in Cincinnati in October 2002. In the immediate aftermath of the publication of the October 2002 NIE, CIA increasingly believed that the attempted purchase of the mapping software--on which this judgment was based--may have been inadvertent. 614 Accordingly, at least one CIA analyst recommended that a reference to the UAVs targeting the United States be deleted from a draft Presidential speech. Because of persistent uncertainty within the analytical ranks about the significance of the mapping software, however, CIA and the Intelligence Community's official position remained unchanged from the NIE. The President's speech, which was delivered on October 7, 2002 in Cincinnati, therefore expressed concern "that Iraq is exploring ways of using these UAVs for missions targeting the United States." 615

Subsequent analytical products did begin to reflect the uncertainty over the significance of the mapping software, though. An NIE addressing the UAV question, entitled Nontraditional Threats to the US Homeland Through 2007, which was approved by the National Foreign Intelligence Board in November 2002, was not published for two months because of disagreement over whether the order for the U.S. mapping software indicated Iraqi intent to target the U.S. homeland. 616 The Nontraditional Threats NIE ultimately addressed the UAV issue in terms of capabilities rather than intent. That is, that NIE phrased the first judgment like the October 2002 Iraq NIE, noting that Iraqi UAVs "could strike the US Homeland if transported to within a few hundred kilometers," but phrased the software judgment only in terms of capability, noting that this "[route planning] software...could support [the] programming of a UAV autopilot for operation in the United States." For their parts, the Air Force, DIA, and the Army assessed that the purpose of the acquisition was to obtain generic mapping capability and that that goal was "not necessarily indicative of an intent to target the US homeland." 617

By early March 2003, days before the March 19 invasion of Iraq, the CIA had further pulled back from its October NIE view, concluding in a memorandum to the Chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence that it was an open question whether the attempted procurement of the mapping software had been the result of a specific request from Baghdad or had been inadvertent. 618 CIA also advised senior policymakers of this change in view. In the memorandum, the CIA stated that it "[had] no definite indications that Baghdad [was] planning to use WMD-armed UAVs against the U.S. mainland....[Although] we cannot exclude the possibility that th[e] purchase [of mapping software] was directed by Baghdad, information acquired in October suggests that it may have been inadvertent." 619

With respect to ballistic missiles, CIA's position remained unchanged after the NIE. 620 Subsequent to the NIE, the Intelligence Community confirmed from Iraq's December 2002 declaration to the United Nations that Iraq had two versions of the al-Samoud missile, as described in the NIE. The longer-range version was inefficiently designed and did not go as far as the NIE had postulated, but it did have a range in excess of 150 kilometers. 621

Post-War Findings of the Iraq Survey Group

The Iraq Survey Group concluded that, although Iraq had pursued UAVs as BW delivery systems in the past, Iraq's pre-Operation Iraqi Freedom program to develop small, autonomous-flight UAVs had actually been intended to fulfill reconnaissance and airborne electronic warfare missions. The ISG found no evidence suggesting that Iraq had, at the time of the war, any intent to use UAVs as BW or CW delivery systems. 622

The ISG concluded that Iraq's purpose in converting a MiG-21 into a Remotely Piloted Vehicle (RPV) in early 1991 had been to create a CBW delivery system. 623 After the MiG-21 RPV program failed, Iraq in 1995 resumed efforts to convert manned aircraft into RPVs, this time with an L-29 jet trainer. 624 The ISG, however, was unable to establish whether the L-29 had an intended CBW role, although the ISG did obtain some indirect evidence that the L-29 RPV may have been intended for CBW delivery. 625 The ISG also concluded that Iraq had the capability to develop chemical or biological spray systems for the L-29, but found no evidence of any work along these lines. 626 The L-29 program ended in 2001. 627

After several crashes of the L-29s, Iraq began to pursue long-range UAV options, probably at some point in 2000. 628 The ISG assessed, however, that these small UAVs had not been intended for use as chemical or biological delivery systems. 629 Specifically, although these small UAVs had the range, payload, guidance, and autonomy necessary to be used as BW delivery platforms, the ISG found no evidence that Iraq had intended to use them for such a purpose, had a suitable dispenser available, or had conducted research and development activity associated with use as a BW delivery system. 630

The more advanced of Iraq's two UAV programs, the Al-Musayara-20, had actually been developed for use as a reconnaissance platform, according to a senior Iraqi official. 631 An interview with an Iraqi military official after Operation Iraqi Freedom revealed that many general officers had been shot down on helicopter reconnaissance missions during the Iran-Iraq war and therefore the military was interested in developing a UAV to perform such missions. 632 According to another official, although the Al-Musayara-20 was developed for a reconnaissance role, other roles, such as for the delivery of high explosives, were also considered. 633

A competing program to the Al-Musayara, the Al Quds UAV program, had been less advanced but had included prototypes of varying sizes and weights. 634 The ISG concluded that the Al Quds program had been intended as an airborne electronic warfare platform. 635 Like the Al-Musayara, the Al Quds UAV had the range, autonomous guidance, and payload to enable it to deliver CBW. 636 The ISG uncovered no evidence, however, that Iraq had been developing a dispenser or had the intent to use the UAV as a BW delivery system. The Al Quds UAV was still in development when the war started. 637

According to the Iraq Survey Group, Iraqi officials denied deliberately seeking to acquire mapping software for the United States, but did say they received mapping software that came as part of the package with the autopilots they purchased. 638 An official claimed to have received several autopilots for UAVs through the procurement agent, but asserted that these autopilots were never installed because they arrived on the eve of the war. The official was unaware of the current location of the autopilots. 639

Regarding missile systems, the Iraq Survey Group concluded that Iraq had been developing and deploying ballistic missiles that exceeded United Nations restrictions. 640 The ISG concluded that Iraq had not possessed Scud or Scud-variant missiles after 1991, having by then either expended or unilaterally destroyed its stockpile. 641

Analysis of the Intelligence Community's Pre-War Assessments

The Iraq Survey Group's uncovering of ballistic missile work that violated United Nations' restrictions affords a bright spot for the Intelligence Community's record of assessments on Iraq's unconventional weapons programs. The NIE accurately assessed that Iraq was deploying ballistic missiles with ranges exceeding United Nations restrictions. 642 And although the NIE did not assess accurately the status of Iraq's Scud missile force, we are not especially troubled by this inaccuracy in light of the NIE's clear statement that this assessment was based merely on accounting discrepancies. 643

The record of the Intelligence Community's performance on the UAVs is more mixed (in part because the Intelligence Community's assessments themselves shifted during the pre-war period). While these assessments accurately described the Iraqi UAVs technical capability to deliver BW, the Intelligence Community's assessments that the UAVs were intended for this purpose--or that Iraq intended to strike the United States--were not borne out by the ISG's findings.

It is worth considering why the Intelligence Community's assessments were more correct in this area than they were with respect to other aspects of Iraq's arsenal. One possible answer is that--unlike the status of Iraq's BW and CW stockpiles--certain questions about Iraq's delivery systems--especially missiles--could be answered through technical means that operate from outside of the denied area, and which are generally less subject to questions about reliability. The intentions of a closed regime, however, are difficult to penetrate, and the reliability of any such information is difficult to determine. In areas of analysis that turn largely on intent, therefore, such as whether a regime is producing BW or intends to use its UAVs for BW delivery, the quality of the analysis will be largely dependent on the quality of the available human intelligence and on the ability of signals intelligence to penetrate communications. This highlights the imperative for analysts to explain the premise of their judgments, particularly when the ultimate judgment may rest on a very thin stream of information or on a chain of assumptions about intent.

With that said, the pre-war assessments on Iraq's delivery systems reflect significant shortcomings in analysis.

The NIE went beyond what one could reasonably conclude from the intelligence by judging that Iraq's UAVs were "probably intended to deliver biological warfare agents." Although past Iraqi interest in UAVs as BW vehicles was a reasonable indicator that the interest may have continued, the paucity of subsequent evidence should have led to a more nuanced statement in the NIE--such as that BW delivery was a possible use, but not necessarily an intended one. That the NIE did not discuss in any detail other possible missions for the UAVs only compounded this problem. 644 Moreover, most analysts discounted specific reporting indicating that Iraq was seeking equipment suited to a reconnaissance mission for its UAVs.

The Intelligence Community's assessments about the purpose of Iraq's UAV programs rested largely on inferences drawn from the inherent capabilities of such UAVs and knowledge about Iraq's past UAV programs, as discussed above. The conclusion that the UAVs were probably intended for BW delivery, however, reached beyond what the intelligence would reasonably bear.

Similarly, the single stream of reporting that the Iraqi procurement agent was attempting to purchase U.S. mapping software was insufficient to justify the NIE's statement that this interest "strongly suggest[ed]" that Iraq was investigating ways to target the U.S. homeland with UAVs. While certain analysts took the proper steps to push the Intelligence Community back from this judgment after doubts about this reporting emerged, the Intelligence Community as a whole was slow to assimilate this new information--particularly given its critical importance.

Whether or not any statement about attacking the U.S. homeland merited inclusion in the NIE, it is clear that the rather thin foundation for these assessments was not clearly communicated to policymakers. And the NIE's assessment that the UAVs were "probably intended" for BW delivery did not make clear that this conclusion rested largely on analytical assumptions about Iraqi intent based on the history of Iraq's UAV programs and on the UAVs' inherent capabilities. Nor did the NIE explain why it focused only on a possible weapons-related role for UAVs. A WINPAC analyst subsequently explained that the NIE's purpose was to discuss Iraq's WMD programs, and that accordingly the UAV section addressed the UAVs' use as a BW delivery platform and not their other possible uses. The failure to explain that reasoning in the NIE, however, leaves the impression that other possible uses for the UAV had been rejected rather than simply not discussed. 645

Finally, once again, the UAV episode reflects the tendency of Intelligence Community analysts to view data through the lens of its overall assumptions about Saddam Hussein's behavior. As noted, the NIE itself did not discuss other possible purposes for the UAVs or explain why the Estimate focused only on a weapons-related purpose. In addition, however, the Intelligence Community was too quick to characterize evidence that contradicted the theory that UAVs were intended for BW delivery as an Iraqi "deception" or "cover story." And a Senior Executive Memorandum warned that Iraq "probably will assert that UAVs are intended as target drones or reconnaissance platforms" to counter the claim in the British and U.S. "white papers" that the UAVs have a BW delivery role. 646

We commend the Intelligence Community for correctly assessing that Iraq was working on ballistic missile programs that violated United Nations strictures. As the ISG's findings demonstrate, however, many of the Community's specific estimates were off the mark. The Community judged, for instance, that Iraq retained a force of "up to a few dozen Scud-variant SRBMs [short-range ballistic missiles]." 647 The ISG concluded, however, that Iraq did not have any Scud missiles after 1991. 648 Similarly, the Community stated in the NIE that "in January 2002, Iraq flight-tested an extended-range version of the al-Samoud that flew beyond the 150-km range limit." The Community subsequently learned that it had misidentified the missile and had incorrectly deduced the missile's range; in actuality, the missile, while it had a range that exceeded 150 kilometers, did not exceed that limit by as much as analysts initially thought because the engine was less effective than they estimated. 649

In short, while the Community was technically correct that Iraq's missile systems violated United Nations strictures, it erred significantly in degree.

Conclusion

As has proven the case with other pre-war Intelligence Community judgments about Iraq's unconventional weapons programs, the assumptions held by Iraq analysts about Saddam Hussein's behavior were not unreasonable ones. These assumptions, however, drove the Intelligence Community to make overly inferential leaps about Iraq's UAV program based on thin evidence, and to fail to communicate this thin evidentiary basis to policymakers. While we fully understand that, in the wake of September 11, the Community felt obliged to report even relatively unlikely threats against the United States, the Community should have at a minimum explained more fully the uncertainties underlying its assessments.

The Intelligence Community failed to examine seriously the possibility that domestic or regional political pressures or some other factors might have prompted Saddam Hussein to destroy his stockpiles and to forswear active development of weapons of mass destruction after the first Gulf War. 650 The Community was certainly aware of the overall political dynamics that underpinned Saddam Hussein's regime--that he was a brutal dictator who ruled Iraq through a combination of violence, secrecy, mendacity, and fear--but the Community did not seriously consider the range of possible decisions that Saddam might make regarding his weapons programs given his idiosyncratic decisionmaking processes.

Though the likelihood that one of those possible decisions was to destroy his weapons seemed very remote to almost all outside observers, it was one that Community analysts at least should have seriously considered. In truth, any assessment of the effect of Saddam's political situation on his decisions about WMD in the years from 1991 to 2003 would more likely than not have resulted--and, in point of fact, did result--in the conclusion that Saddam retained his WMD programs. 651 But whether or not it was extraordinarily difficult (if not effectively impossible) for the Intelligence Community to have discerned Saddam Hussein's true intentions, the Community's lack of imagination about the range of strategies and tactics Saddam might adopt left the Community with an incomplete analytical picture.

Having gained access to Iraq and its leaders, the Iraq Survey Group concluded that the unlikely course of voluntary abandonment by Saddam Hussein of his weapons of mass destruction was, in fact, the reality. According to the ISG, Saddam's regime, under severe pressure from United Nations sanctions, reacted by unilaterally destroying its WMD stockpiles and halting work on its WMD programs. 652 Saddam decided to abandon his weapons programs because the economy and infrastructure of Iraq were collapsing under the weight of the sanctions. Saddam therefore ordered the unilateral destruction of biological and chemical weapons stockpiles in 1991 and chose to focus on securing sanctions relief before resuming WMD development. 653 At the same time, in an attempt to project power--both domestically as well as against perceived regional threats such as Iran and Israel--Iraq chose to obfuscate whether it actually possessed WMD. 654 As a result, the U.S. Intelligence Community--and many other intelligence services around the world--believed that Iraq continued to possess unconventional weapons in large part because Iraqis were acting as if they did have them.

Like previous chapters, this section begins with a brief description of how the Intelligence Community assessed Baghdad's decisionmaking before the war and then compares that with the ISG's findings. We then describe the Community's lack of creative thinking about Saddam's motives that led to the failure even to consider the possibility that Saddam Hussein had decided to abandon his banned weapons programs.

The Intelligence Community's Pre-War Assessments

The Intelligence Community's assessments of Saddam's thought processes in the decade before Operation Iraqi Freedom are reflected in two broad lines of analysis: the threats to Saddam's regime and his threat to regional security. Throughout both these areas, one aspect remained relatively constant--the Intelligence Community emphasized repeatedly that it lacked "solid information about the activities and intentions of major players in Iraq" and was, in the words of one senior intelligence official, "flying blind" on the subject. 655

Regime stability and decisionmaking. The Intelligence Community early on identified sanctions as a significant threat to Saddam's regime, but never assessed whether Saddam might address that threat by destroying his WMD. Immediately after the Gulf War, for example, the Intelligence Community prepared a Special National Intelligence Estimate assessing Saddam's prospects for survival in power. 656 That assessment noted that economic vulnerabilities presented a threat to Saddam's regime and that the "lifting of sanctions...would provide relief to the regime and would strengthen Saddam's prospects for survival." 657 The Special Estimate therefore assessed that Saddam would concentrate on getting sanctions eased or removed. 658

Through the mid-1990s, the Intelligence Community continued to judge that the sanctions were a threat to the regime, but that Saddam "probably believe[d]" he could "outlast" them. 659 For example, in December 1993, the Intelligence Community produced another NIE on Saddam's prospects for survival, judging that the United Nations sanctions were "Saddam's Achilles' heel" because of their debilitating effect on the Iraqi economy. 660 The NIE did not consider the possibility that Iraq would actually comply with United Nations resolutions. In fact, the Estimate identified as one of the assumptions underlying the analysis that "Saddam Husayn would not fully comply with U.N. Resolutions." 661

By June 1995, as living conditions and the economy continued to decline, the Intelligence Community assessed that Saddam's overall strategy was to seek a lifting of sanctions with the lowest possible level of compliance with UNSCOM's demands for a full accounting of Iraq's WMD programs. 662 Laying out Saddam's options, a June 1995 Special Estimate judged that in the short term Saddam was "likely to make a gesture to UNSCOM...by providing limited additional information on Iraq's BW program." 663 If that gesture failed to achieve relief from sanctions within three months, however, Saddam "probably [would] return to a confrontational mode." 664 Such a "confrontational mode" included suspending cooperation with UNSCOM, sabotaging or obstructing UNSCOM monitoring, and expelling or taking hostage United Nations personnel. 665 In short, the Intelligence Community judged that Saddam would choose confrontation over greater cooperation with the United Nations as a way to end sanctions. 666

Throughout the remainder of the 1990s, the Intelligence Community continued to assess that sanctions threatened Saddam's regime, but also that "Saddam [was] determined to maintain elements of his WMD programs and probably calculate[d] he [could] stonewall UNSCOM while wearing down the Security Council's will to maintain sanctions." 667 Saddam's success in undermining international support for the sanctions and in repressing internal dissent also gave him greater confidence and resolve. 668 But more importantly, the commerce allowed under the Oil-for-Food program fueled international perceptions that sanctions had weakened. 669 This weakening, combined with the failure of UNSCOM to "uncover tangible proof of Iraqi concealment of weapons of mass destruction," bolstered domestic and international perceptions of the regime's strength. 670

At the same time, by the end of the decade the Community assessed that Saddam "appear[ed] to have made a strategic decision that confrontation would be necessary to gain an end to the sanctions." 671 Saddam felt "that putting pressure on UNSCOM and the Security Council [was] the only way to achieve his goal of ending sanctions," according to the Intelligence Community, because Saddam did "not intend to fully comply with relevant Security Council resolutions." 672

The Intelligence Community viewed Iraq's behavior vis-à-vis the United Nations inspections during this time against the backdrop of these assessments and of Iraq's history of concealing its WMD programs. 673 Accordingly, the Community judged that Iraq would continue to obstruct inspections "to the degree they believe[d] the inspections [would] undermine the security apparatus or uncover proscribed materials." 674 Thus, when Iraq agreed to the resumption of inspections in 2002, the Intelligence Community judged that Iraq did so in part because of confidence in its ability to hide its weapons-related activities. 675 The Community also assessed that Saddam was motivated to reengage with the United Nations in order to avoid U.S. military intervention. 676 If such delaying tactics failed to divert an attack, Iraq "could make a tactical retreat by acceding to some United Nations and U.S. demands and then reneg[ing] on them at the earliest opportunity." 677 Although Iraq had tried to open several back channels to the United States seeking improved relations, the Community viewed these moves as public relations efforts and did not consider as an option the possibility that Iraq would actually comply with United Nations resolutions. 678

Still, analysis of Saddam's thinking and motivations remained largely speculative. In addition to the simple lack of information on Saddam's plans and intentions, the nature of Saddam's decisionmaking process, which the Intelligence Community assessed as highly centralized and therefore difficult to penetrate, compounded analysts' difficulties. 679 Saddam made "all key policy decisions" with little input from the bureaucracy, and he usually acted quickly and decisively. 680 He could also be "impulsive and deceptive" about his decisions. 681 Moreover, the Intelligence Community judged that Saddam "rule[d] primarily by fear," using his control over the military, security, and intelligence services to "impose his absolute authority and crush resistance." 682 Saddam reinforce[d] this control through "prominent members of his Tikriti clan who occup[ied] key leadership positions." 683 As a result, "all major decisions [were] made by Saddam and a few close relatives and associates." 684 The Intelligence Community noted that these characteristics of Saddam's leadership style made it very difficult to read his intentions. 685

Regional security and decisionmaking. The Intelligence Community assessed that regional supremacy for Iraq remained Saddam Hussein's fundamental goal from 1991 through 2003. 686 The Community judged, though, that to achieve that goal Saddam would need to rebuild Iraq's military might--including weapons of mass destruction. 687

But, according to the Intelligence Community, Iraq's conventional military capabilities had deteriorated significantly during this time. By 1999, after four more years of sanctions and damage inflicted by U.S. military operations, Saddam's military was "smaller and much less well-equipped than it was on the eve of his 1990 invasion of Kuwait." 688 By 2002, the Community assessed that "Iraqi military morale and battlefield cohesion [were] more fragile today than in 1991." 689

With respect to WMD capabilities, on the other hand, the Community's assessments that Iraq "retain[ed] residual chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction" remained constant. 690 Although cautioning that reading Saddam's intentions was difficult and that "critical factors important in shaping his behavior [we]re largely hidden from us," the Community nonetheless assessed that Saddam was "determined to retain elements of his WMD programs so that he [would] be able to intimidate his neighbors and deter potential adversaries such as Iran, Israel, and the United States." 691 Given Iraq's history with WMD, its desire for regional dominance, and the weaknesses in its conventional military forces, the Community did not consider the possibility that Saddam would try to achieve such intimidation and deterrence while bluffing about his possession of WMD. 692

Post-War Findings of the Iraq Survey Group

The Iraq Survey Group concluded that Saddam Hussein unilaterally destroyed his WMD stocks in 1991. Saddam apparently concluded that economic sanctions posed such a threat to his regime that, although he valued the possession of WMD, he concluded that he had to focus on sanctions relief before resuming WMD development.

Background. Iraq's successful use of CW to repel human-wave attacks in the Iran-Iraq war had convinced Saddam Hussein of the importance of WMD and it became an "article of faith" for Saddam that WMD and theater ballistic missiles were necessary to secure Iraqi national security. 693 Saddam also believed that Iraq's possession of WMD and Iraq's willingness to use it "contributed substantially to deterring the United States from going to Baghdad in 1991." 694

The destruction of WMD. After the Gulf War, however, the United Nations passed resolutions explicitly linking the removal of economic sanctions with Iraq's WMD disarmament. 695 Saddam Hussein initially judged that the sanctions would be short-lived, that Iraq could weather them by making a few limited concessions, and that Iraq could successfully hide much of its pre-existing weaponry and documentation. 696 Accordingly, Iraq declared to the United Nations part of its ballistic missile and chemical warfare programs, but not its biological or nuclear weapons programs. 697 But after initial inspections proved much more thorough and intrusive than Baghdad had expected, Saddam became concerned. In order to prevent discovery of his still-hidden pre-1991 WMD programs, Saddam ordered Hussein Kamil to destroy large numbers of undeclared weapons and related materials in July 1991. 698

According to the Iraq Survey Group, Saddam's decision to destroy Iraq's WMD stockpiles in 1991 was likely shared with only a handful of senior Iraqi officials, a decision that would have important and lasting consequences. 699 Saddam so dominated the political structure of the Iraqi regime that his strategic policy and intent were synonymous with the regime's strategic policy and intent. 700 Moreover, in addition to dominating the regime's decisionmaking, Saddam also maintained secrecy and compartmentalization in his decisions, relying on a few close advisors and family members. 701 And Saddam's penchant for using violence to ensure loyalty and suppress dissent encouraged a "culture of lying" and discouraged administrative transparency. 702 As a result, the ISG concluded that instructions to subordinates were rarely documented and often shrouded in uncertainty. 703 The decision to destroy the WMD stockpiles was therefore confined to a very small group of people at the top of the Ba'ath pyramid.

The sanctions bind. By the mid-1990s, United Nations sanctions were taking a serious toll; removing them therefore became Saddam's first priority, according to the ISG. 704 Iraq's failure to document its unilateral destruction of WMD, however, complicated this effort. Also complicating Saddam's goal of sanctions removal was his continuing concern with regional threats to his security. Although he had destroyed his militarily significant WMD stocks, his "perceived requirement to bluff about WMD capabilities made it too dangerous to clearly reveal" Iraq's lack of WMD to the international community, especially Iran. 705 Saddam was therefore in a bind, on the one hand wanting to avoid being caught in a violation of United Nations sanctions but, on the other, not wanting his rivals to know of his weakness.

Saddam decided to strike the balance between these competing objectives, according to the ISG, by preserving Iraq's ability to reconstitute his WMD while simultaneously seeking sanctions relief through the appearance of cooperation with the IAEA, UNSCOM, and, later, the United Nations Monitoring Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC). 706 Iraq's behavior under the sanctions reflects that the Iraqis "never got the balance right." 707 Though Saddam repeatedly told his ministers not to participate in WMD-related activity, he at the same time was working to preserve the capability eventually to reconstitute his unconventional weapons programs. 708 And the Iraqis continued to conceal proscribed materials from United Nations inspectors. 709 Moreover, even when there was nothing incriminating to hide, the Iraqis did not fully cooperate with the inspectors, judging that an effective United Nations inspection process would expose Iraq's lack of WMD and therefore expose its vulnerability, especially vis-à-vis Iran. 710

The regime's decision to disclose long-concealed WMD documents in the wake of Hussein Kamil's defection in 1995 further eroded confidence in the credibility of Iraqi declarations. The ISG concluded that the release of these documents served only to validate UNSCOM concerns that Iraq was still concealing its WMD programs. 711

Suspending cooperation with the United Nations. Angered by the continuing sanctions, inspections, and military attacks such as Operation Desert Fox, Saddam Hussein in a secret meeting in 1998 unilaterally abrogated Iraqi compliance with all United Nations resolutions, though, according to the ISG, it is unclear if anything concrete followed from this decision. 712 Meanwhile, Iraq continued to take advantage of the Oil-for-Food Program to augment regime revenue streams. Saddam Hussein used much of Iraq's growing reserves of hard currency to invest in Iraq's military-industrial complex, to procure dual-use materials, and to initiate military research and development projects. Sanctions remained in place, however. 713

With international scrutiny bearing down on Iraq in late 2002, Saddam Hussein finally revealed to his senior military officials that Iraq had no weapons of mass destruction. 714 His generals were "surprised" to learn this fact, because Saddam's "boasting" had led many to believe Iraq had some hidden WMD capacity and because Saddam's secretive decisionmaking style fostered uncertainty. 715 In fact, senior officials were still convinced that Iraq had WMD in March 2003 because Saddam had assured them that if the United States invades, they need only "resist one week" and then Saddam would "take over." 716

Analysis of the Intelligence Community's Pre-War Assessments

Saddam Hussein's decisionmaking process was, as the Intelligence Community assessed before the war and the Iraq Survey Group confirmed, secretive and highly centralized. And in this sense, the Intelligence Community cannot be faulted for failing to penetrate this process. But we believe the Community is open to criticism for failing to appreciate the full range of Saddam's strategic and tactical decisionmaking options regarding his weapons programs. At the very least, the Community should have considered the possibility that Saddam had halted active pursuit of his WMD programs after 1991.

Saddam and his regime repeatedly insisted that all of Iraq's banned weapons had been destroyed and that there were no active programs to reconstitute the capability. The United Nations inspectors, after 1996, found no conclusive evidence that these claims were wrong. In retrospect, as found by the ISG, it is clear that the stockpiles and programs were not there to be found. The question therefore arises of why the Intelligence Community did not discover that fact before the war, or at least consider the possibility that, however improbably, Saddam was telling the truth.

As discussed above, the Intelligence Community made multiple--and avoidable--errors in concluding "with high confidence" that Saddam retained WMD stockpiles and programs. It is a separate question why the Community failed to conclude affirmatively that he did not have them.

In large part the explanation lies in Saddam's own behavior. He had concealed crucial facts about his WMD efforts. He did repeatedly and continually obstruct the inspectors, to the point, in 1998, of completely terminating cooperation and forcing the inspectors to conclude that they could no longer do their work. When someone acts like he is hiding something, it is hard to entertain the conclusion that he really has nothing to hide.

The failure to conclude that Saddam had abandoned his weapons programs was therefore an understandable one. 717 And even a human source in Saddam's inner circle, or intercepts of conversations between senior Iraqi leaders, may not have been sufficient for analysts to have concluded that Saddam ordered the destruction of his WMD stockpiles in 1991--and this kind of intelligence is extremely difficult to get. According to Charles Duelfer, the Special Advisor to the Director of Central Intelligence for Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction and head of the Iraq Survey Group, only six or seven senior officials were likely privy to Saddam's decision to halt his WMD programs. 718 Moreover, because of Saddam's secretive and highly centralized decisionmaking process, as well as the "culture of lies" within the Iraqi bureaucracy, even after Saddam informed his senior military leaders in December 2002 that Iraq had no WMD, there was uncertainty among these officers as to the truth, and many senior commanders evidently believed that there were chemical weapons retained for use if conventional defenses failed. 719

That it would have been very difficult to get such evidence is, however, not the end of the story. Failing to conclude that Saddam had ended his banned weapons programs is one thing--not even considering it as a possibility is another. The Intelligence Community did not even evaluate the possibility that Saddam would destroy his stockpiles and halt work on his nuclear program. The absence of such a discussion within the Intelligence Community is, in our view, indicative of the rut that the Community found itself in throughout the 1990s. Rather than thinking imaginatively, and considering seemingly unlikely and unpopular possibilities, the Intelligence Community instead found itself wedded to a set of assumptions about Iraq, focusing on intelligence reporting that appeared to confirm those assumptions.

Over the course of 12 years the Intelligence Community did not produce a single analytical product that examined the possibility that Saddam Hussein's desire to escape sanctions, fear of being "caught" decisively, or anything else would cause him to destroy his WMD. 720 The National Intelligence Officer for Near East and South Asia noted that such a hypothesis was so far removed from analysts' understanding of Iraq that it would have been very difficult to get such an idea published even as a "red-team" exercise. 721 An intellectual culture or atmosphere in which certain ideas were simply too "unrespectable" and out of synch with prevailing policy and analytic perspectives pervaded the Intelligence Community. But much of the conventional wisdom that led analysts to reject even the consideration of this alternative hypothesis was itself based largely on assumptions rather than derived from analysis of hard data. 722 In our view, rather than relying on inherited assumptions, analysts need to test favored hypotheses even more rigorously when the paucity of intelligence forces analysts to rely, not on specific intelligence, but on a country's history, politics, and observed behavior. 723

Conclusion

Iraq's decision to abandon its unconventional weapons programs while simultaneously hiding this decision was, at the very least, a counterintuitive one. And given the nature of the regime, the Intelligence Community can hardly be blamed for not penetrating Saddam's decisionmaking process. In this light, it is worth noting that Saddam's fellow Arabs (including, evidently, his senior military leadership as well as many of the rest of the world's intelligence agencies and most inspectors) also thought he had retained his weapons programs, thus responding to charges that the Community was projecting Western thinking onto a product of a foreign culture.

What the Intelligence Community can be blamed for, however, is not considering whether Saddam might have taken this counterintuitive route. Community analysts should have been more imaginative in contemplating the range of options from which Saddam might select. While such imaginative analysis would not necessarily or even likely have ultimately led analysts to the right conclusion, serious discussion of it in finished intelligence would have at least warned policymakers of the range of possibilities, a function that is critically important in the inherently uncertain arena of political analysis.

Collection

The task of collecting meaningful intelligence on Iraq's weapons programs was extraordinarily difficult. Iraq's highly effective denial and deception program (which was employed against all methods of U.S. collection), the absence of United Nations inspectors after 1998, and the lack of a U.S. diplomatic presence in-country all contributed to difficulties in gathering data on the Iraqi regime's purported nuclear, biological, and chemical programs. And these difficulties were compounded by the challenge of discerning regime intentions.

Nonetheless, we believe the Intelligence Community could have done better. We had precious little human intelligence, and virtually no useful signals intelligence, on a target that was one of the United States' top intelligence priorities. The preceding sections, which have focused on the Intelligence Community's assessments on particular aspects of Iraq's weapons programs, have tended to reflect shortcomings in what is commonly referred to as "tradecraft"; the focus has been on questions such as whether a critical human source was properly validated, or whether analysts drew unduly sweeping inferences from limited or dubious intelligence. But it should not be forgotten why these tradecraft failures took on such extraordinary importance. They were important because of how little additional information our collection agencies managed to provide on Iraq's weapons programs.

This was a problem the Intelligence Community saw coming. As early as September 1998, the Community recognized its limited collection on Iraq. 725 The National Intelligence Council noted these limits in 1998, the specifics of which cannot be discussed in an unclassified forum. 726 Yet the Intelligence Community was still unwilling--or unable--to take steps necessary to improve its capabilities after late 1998. In short, as one senior policymaker described it, the Intelligence Community after 1998 "was running on fumes," depending on "inference and assumptions rather than hard data." 727

This section examines and assesses the performance of each of the collection disciplines on Iraq's weapons programs.

Analysis

Intelligence analysis is a tricky business. Analysts are often forced to make predictions in the absence of clear evidence--and then are pilloried after twenty-twenty hindsight reveals that they failed to paint a full picture from conflicting and scattered pieces of evidence. As we have seen, assessing the scope of an adversary's nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons programs poses an especially formidable challenge in this regard; extrapolations from past experience and thin streams of reporting are usually necessary.

Even the best analytical practices, therefore, will sometimes result in assessments that later prove inaccurate. But given the difficulties inherent in analyzing WMD programs--and the serious consequences for judging the capabilities and intentions of such programs incorrectly--it is imperative that the analysis on which such judgments are based be as rigorous, thorough, and candid as possible. In the case of Iraq, the analytical community fell short of this standard.

Analysts have indicated that their starting point for evaluating Iraq's WMD programs was Iraq's past. Analysts' assumptions were formed based on Iraq's history of producing CW and BW, its use of CW, its history of effectively concealing its nuclear program before the Gulf War, and the regime's failure to account for its previously declared stockpiles. 764 Thus, the analysts operated from the premise that Iraq very likely still possessed CW and BW, was still hiding it from inspectors, and was still seeking to rebuild its nuclear weapons program. The analytical flaw was not that this premise was unreasonable (for it was not); rather, it was that this premise hardened into a presumption, and analysts began to fit the facts to the theory rather than the other way around.

One consequence of this tendency was that analysts effectively shifted the burden of proof, requiring proof that Iraq did not have active WMD programs rather than requiring affirmative proof of their existence. Though the U.S. policy position was that Iraq bore the responsibility to prove that it did not have banned weapons programs, the Intelligence Community's burden of proof should have been more objective. CIA's WINPAC nuclear analysts explained that, given Iraq's history of successful deception regarding the state of its nuclear program and evidence that Iraq was attempting to procure components that could be used in a uranium enrichment program, they could not envision having reached the conclusion that Iraq was not reconstituting its nuclear program. The analysts noted that they could have reached such a conclusion only if they had specific information from a very well-placed, reliable human source. 765 By raising the evidentiary burden so high, analysts artificially skewed the analytical process toward confirmation of their original hypothesis--that Iraq had active WMD programs.

Indeed, it appears that in some instances analysts' presumptions were so firm that they simply disregarded evidence that did not support their hypotheses. As we saw in several instances, when confronted with evidence that indicated Iraq did not have WMD, analysts tended to discount such information. Rather than weighing the evidence independently, analysts accepted information that fit the prevailing theory and rejected information that contradicted it. 766 While analysts must adopt some frame of reference to interpret the flood of data they see, their baseline assumptions must be flexible enough to permit revision by discordant information. The analysts' frame of reference on Iraq's WMD programs--formed as it was by Iraq's previous use of such weapons, Iraq's continued efforts to conceal its activities, and Iraq's past success at hiding such programs--was so strong, however, that contradictory data was often discounted as likely false.

Analysts' discounting of contradictory information reflected, in part, an awareness of Iraq's sophisticated denial and deception efforts and of Iraq's past success in hiding the extent of its WMD programs. Reacting to that lesson, analysts understandably (if not wholly defensibly) began to view the absence of evidence of WMD as evidence of Iraq's ability to deceive the United States about its existence. For example, both CIA and the National Ground Intelligence Center simply assumed that Iraq's claims that the aluminum tubes were for rockets was a "cover story" designed to deflect attention from Iraq's nuclear program. Similarly, analysts had imagery intelligence from 2001 that contradicted Curveball's information about mobile BW facilities, but analysts believed that this discrepancy was attributable to Iraq's denial and deception capabilities. 767

The disciplined use of alternative hypotheses could have helped counter the natural cognitive tendency to force new information into existing paradigms. Alternative hypotheses are particularly important for assessing WMD programs, which can be easily concealed under the guise of dual-use activity. With the aluminum tubes, the "transshipment" activity at ammunition depots, and the development of small UAVs, analysts did not fully consider the alternative (and non-WMD related) explanations. Analysts set aside evidence indicating a reconnaissance mission for the UAVs, and did not fully explore the possibility that the transshipment activity involved only conventional munitions. And with respect to the aluminum tubes, CIA and DIA analysts concluded that the tubes were destined for use in a gas centrifuge largely because they could be used for such a purpose, in the process discounting evidence that the tubes were in many respects better suited for use in rockets. 768

The widely recognized need for alternative analysis drives many to propose organizational solutions, such as "red teams" and other formal mechanisms. Indeed, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act mandates the establishment of such mechanisms to ensure that analysts conduct alternative analysis. Any such organs, the creation of which we encourage, must do more than just "alternative analysis," though. The Community should institute a formal system for competitive--and even explicitly contrarian--analysis. Such groups must be licensed to be troublesome. Further, they must take contrarian positions, not just ones that take a harder line (a flaw with the Team B exercise of the 1970s). 769

The Iraq case shows, however, that alternative analysis mechanisms offer, at best, an incomplete solution to the problem. In addition to testing fully-developed judgments with formal red team exercises, analysts must incorporate the discipline of alternative hypotheses into the foundation of their analytical tradecraft, testing and weighing each piece of evidence. It would be unrealistic to "zero-base" every assessment, or to ignore history when forming analytical judgments. But the conventional wisdom must be tested throughout the analytical process to ensure that a position is not adopted without rigorous questioning. We offer a variety of approaches to this problem in Chapter Eight (Analysis) of our report.

Competitive analysis must also take place at the institutional level. In other words, the need for individual analysts to question their hypotheses and challenge the conventional wisdom also applies to the Intelligence Community as a whole, and suggests the need to strengthen competitive analysis among agencies in the Intelligence Community. 770

After September 11, the Intelligence Community was criticized for its failure to communicate and share information across agency lines. That failure prevented analysts from "connecting the dots" because information known to one agency was not put together with information known to another. With each agency holding one or two pieces of the puzzle, none could see the whole picture. The logical response, therefore, was to recommend the formation of centers to bring all the relevant information together. The Iraq story, however, presents a different set of problems. As discussed, the strength of the prevailing assumptions about Iraq presented a distinct picture to analysts and pieces of the puzzle that did not fit that picture were either made to fit awkwardly or discarded. The problem, therefore, was not that analysts lacked awareness of what other analysts were thinking; rather, the problem was that most analysts were thinking the same thing.

Strengthening competitive analysis among components of the Intelligence Community could help alleviate that problem. There was of course some competitive analysis on Iraq--the NIE contained dissenting positions from State's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR), DOE, and the Air Force. 771 And those dissenting positions were at least somewhat closer to the truth than the majority position. Although reasonable minds can differ as to how significant the dissents were (at least in the cases of INR and DOE), 772 such competitive analyses in general encourage the consideration of alternative views and ensure that those independent views reach policymakers.

The problem of discounting contrary evidence was compounded by inexcusable analytical lapses. One reason that CIA analysts were confident in their conclusion that the aluminum tubes were for use in centrifuges and not rockets was that the "rocket experts" in the Intelligence Community, the National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC), assessed that the tolerances of the tubes Iraq was seeking were "excessive" for rockets. But NGIC rocket analysts told Commission staff that at the time they made that assessment they were not aware of the tolerances required for the Iraqi Nasser 81 rockets, for the Italian Medusa rocket on which the Nasser 81 was based, or for comparable U.S. rockets. 773 NGIC should have been aware of these facts.

The reasons for this failure of technical analysis were not particularly grand. Rather, analysts in NGIC, used to focusing almost exclusively on Soviet weapons systems, simply did not do their homework in tracking down information about Iraqi and U.S. weapons that would have shed light on the question whether the aluminum tubes could be used in conventional rockets. CIA analysts, for their part, were too quick to see confirmation of their hypothesis--that Iraq would seek to reconstitute its nuclear program at the first opportunity--based on somewhat dubious technical evidence.

A related concern is the problem of layering of analysis: the building of one judgment upon another without carrying forward the uncertainties of the earlier judgments. 774 The judgment in the October 2002 NIE that Iraq was reconstituting its weapons programs was built on previous assessments about Iraq's weapons programs. These earlier assessments, however, were based on relatively thin streams of reporting, yet the cumulative level of uncertainty was not reflected in the Key Judgments nor in some of the NIE's discussions. In brief, previous assessments based on uncertain information formed, through repetition, a relatively unquestioned baseline for the analysis in the pre-war assessments.

The NIE's CW assessments offer an example of the phenomenon. The NIE's estimates that Iraq had up to 500 metric tons of chemical weapons were based largely on accounting discrepancies and Iraq's CW production capacity rather than positive evidence. 775 Although the NIE conceded that "we have little specific information on Iraq's CW stockpile," it did not make clear that the baseline assumption rested largely on Iraqi accounting discrepancies. Because that baseline assumption was not made clear, the NIE gave the impression of greater certainty about the actual existence and size of stockpiles than was warranted. Similarly, the assessment that "much" of that stockpile was "added in the last year" was based largely on imagery evidence of "transshipment" in the spring of 2002. 776 Analysts assessed that Iraq had added to its CW stockpile in the previous year because the level of transshipment activity seen on imagery indicated that "CW is already deployed with the military logistics chain." 777 But that assessment in turn rested on whether the activity seen on imagery was CW-related. As the post-war reassessment by NGA concluded, it was not. By building one assessment on top of another without carrying forward the uncertainty from the first layer, the NIE gave the impression of greater certainty about its judgments than was warranted. 778

This "layering" phenomenon occurred not only with respect to one line of analysis over time, but it also occurred across analytical lines. For example, a senior CW analyst related that he and other CW analysts had been "drifting" in the direction of concluding that Iraq did not have much of a CW program. The appearance of Curveball's reporting on BW, however, "pushed [CW analysts] the other way." The analyst explained that if Iraq was producing and hiding BW, then it was probably also producing and hiding CW. In other words, "much of the CW confidence was built on the BW confidence." 779

Another shortcoming of the pre-war assessments of Iraq's WMD programs was the failure to analyze the state of these programs within the context of Iraq's overall political, social, cultural, and economic situation. 780 In short, the Intelligence Community did not sufficiently understand the political dynamics of Saddam Hussein's Iraq, and as a consequence did not understand the political and economic pressures that led to his decision to destroy his WMD stockpiles while continuing to obfuscate about Iraq's possession of WMD.

As the Iraq Survey Group found, Saddam was facing two opposing pressures--the need to get relief from sanctions and the need to project strength at home and abroad. Saddam reacted to these pressures, according to the ISG, by destroying his WMD stockpiles after the Gulf War and focusing on sanctions relief before resuming WMD development. At the same time, Saddam continued to hinder the inspectors and sow confusion about Iraq's WMD programs. 781

Yet the weapons analysts did not consider how the political situation might have affected Baghdad's decisions regarding its weapons programs. To be sure, it is doubtful that such consideration would have changed the analytical outcome--the regional analysts were also operating under certain assumptions about Saddam's regime, and those assumptions did not allow for the possibility that Saddam would destroy his CW and BW stocks and halt work on his nuclear programs, as the ISG found. But the failure even to consider how the political dynamics in Iraq might have affected Saddam's decisions about his WMD programs was a serious shortcoming that resulted in an incomplete analytical picture. 782 The failure by the Intelligence Community to entertain the possibility that Saddam was actually telling the truth also inclined analysts to accept deeply problematic evidence that might have been more rigorously questioned if the Community had actually considered the possibility that Saddam had abandoned his banned programs.

Several related problems contribute to the lack of context in analytical products. One, there is not yet an institutionalized, effective method to exploit open source resources that would have allowed a better understanding of developments in Iraq. Two, analysts are rarely assigned to one substantive account for any length of time (with the exception of INR analysts) and cannot therefore develop the requisite expertise to evaluate contextual influences. (Of course, longevity on one account can exacerbate the problem of over-reliance on past judgments.) And three, the pressure to respond to current intelligence needs as opposed to long-term research efforts degrades the overall level of expertise on all accounts. Given limited analytical resources, the demand for current intelligence suffocates long-term research and therefore largely precludes development of the kind of in-depth knowledge that such research fosters. 783 A related aspect of this problem is the current system of incentives for analysts, which rewards analysts for the quantity of finished intelligence pieces produced, and therefore encourages analysts to focus on current intelligence. CIA's Directorate of Intelligence is exploring ways to provide incentives for long-term research. Also, the Directorate's creation of a Senior Analytical Service to enable analysts to continue at the working-level (instead of moving into management) and still be promoted should help build expertise. We address these and other related issues in Chapter Eight (Analysis).

More generally, the pre-war assessments highlight the importance of correct presentation of material to consumers, particularly regarding the uncertainties of given judgments and how these judgments were made. While finished intelligence needs to offer a bottom line to be useful to the policymaker, it should also clearly spell out how and from what its conclusions were derived. In the case of WMD programs in hard target nations like Iraq, this means that policymakers must be made aware when--as will often necessarily be the case--many of the Community's estimates rely largely on inherently ambiguous indicators such as capabilities assessments, indirect reports of intentions, deductions based on denial and deception efforts associated with suspect WMD sites, and on ambiguous or thin pieces of "confirmatory" evidence. For example, the fact that the evidence for Iraq's biological weapons program relied largely on reporting from a single source, and that the evidence for Iraq's chemical weapons program derived largely from limited signature-based evidence of "transshipment" activity, should have been more transparent.

Such context is largely absent from the daily products provided to senior policymakers, however, and the daily dose of such products may provide a cumulative level of "certainty" that is unwarranted. Moreover, with respect to NIEs, the "confidence measures" used to describe the level of certainty in the judgments are not well-explained or understood. A more detailed description, explanation, and/or display of what those confidence measures mean should be incorporated. And those measurements should be rigorously and consistently applied.

Ironically, the NIE did contain numerous caveats, but their impact was diminished by their presentation. For example, as noted, the NIE stated that "[t]oday we have less direct access and know even less about the current status of Iraq's nuclear program than we did before the Gulf War." 784 Yet that caveat came on page 13 of the NIE, after it had twice stated that Iraq was reconstituting its program and could have enough fissile material for a nuclear weapon in the next several years.

The fundamental assumptions and logical premises on which analytical judgments are based should be clearly explained. Analysts noted that the "impending war" influenced their approach to the pre-war assessments of Iraq's WMD programs, particularly the October 2002 NIE. That is, with the knowledge that U.S. troops would soon have to face whatever WMD capabilities Iraq had, analysts adopted more of a worst-case-analysis approach. 785 Yet that approach was not identified or explained to the reader of the NIE. By contrast, when the CIA's Counterterrorism Center prepared a paper on possible links between Iraq and al-Qa'ida, it clearly identified the analysis underlying that paper as of the aggressive, "dot-connecting" sort. 786

Although too many qualifications can lead to equivocal analysis, when the evidence is equivocal, the conclusion must be as well. This must especially be the case when the results of debate about intelligence data or analysis will influence important policy decisions. Flagging the logical premises and baseline assumptions for the ultimate judgment would produce a better understanding by policymakers of the possible logical weaknesses in the assessment. It also would likely improve the analytic process as well, by forcing analysts themselves to articulate clearly their operative assumptions. Similarly, analysis that relies heavily on a single source, such as on Curveball's reporting and on the presence of Samarra-type trucks to support the conclusions that Iraq had BW and CW, respectively, should be highlighted.

Information Sharing

In addition to illuminating shortcomings in intelligence collection and analysis, our study of Iraq also highlighted a familiar challenge: that of ensuring effective sharing of information. In the Iraq case, the information sharing problem manifested itself in three specific ways: intelligence was not passed (1) from the collectors to the analysts; (2) from the analysts to the collectors; and (3) from foreign liaison services to the Intelligence Community.

The lack of an effective system for information sharing between collectors and analysts is a well-known systemic problem, but one that has proven highly resistant to resolution. Intelligence Community collectors retain a strong institutional bias against sharing operational information with analysts--CIA's Directorate of Operations is often reluctant to share relevant operational information with CIA's Directorate of Intelligence, let alone with the rest of the Community or with policymakers. Similarly, NSA is reluctant to share raw data with anyone outside of NSA. 787 Both NSA and the DO have legitimate concerns for the protection of sources and methods, and this concern must be weighed carefully when determining whether, and in what form, to share information across the Community or even across directorates.

Our review of the Intelligence Community's performance on Iraq identified several specific shortcomings in the way that collectors share intelligence with analysts. First, the source descriptions on raw human source reporting often provided insufficient detail and clarity to allow analysts adequate insight into the source's reliability. For example, the CIA report on the alleged uranium deal that was sourced to Ambassador Wilson described him (unhelpfully) as "a contact with excellent access who does not have an established reporting record." 788 Source descriptions that provide more explicit information on the context in which the information was obtained can significantly improve analysts' ability to gauge the credibility of that information. In September 2004, the CIA's DO implemented new source descriptions that are designed to provide additional such contextual detail. 789 This is an important step in the right direction, but more needs to be done.

Second, with CIA reporting, analysts were often unable to determine whether a series of raw human intelligence reporting came from the same source. For most reporting, there is currently no way to determine from the face of the CIA report whether a series of reports represents one source reporting similar information several times or several different sources independently providing the same information. For obvious reasons, it is important to distinguish corroboration from repetition. The improved source descriptions should help alleviate this problem, as will increased dialogue between collectors and analysts.

Finally, analysts often obtain insufficient insights into the operational details bearing on the reliability of sources. 790 Such information sharing is not an end in itself, of course. In the case of Curveball, for example, the DO did share operational information with DI analysts--including information that indicated possible problems with the source's reliability--but analysts' belief in Curveball's information remained unshaken. Increased dialogue, rather than simply sharing traffic, may help bridge these gaps.

It must be acknowledged that sharing operational details presents a great threat to the protection of sources and methods. Accordingly, any information sharing protocol must therefore be carefully tailored. The CIA recently conducted a DI-DO information sharing pilot program, which addressed the operational as well as technical barriers to effective information sharing within CIA. 791 Such pilot programs, however, are of little use if the recommended protocols are not implemented across the board.

A separate, but related problem is the lack of a mechanism to ensure that information calling into question a prior piece of intelligence is swiftly communicated to those analysts (and policymakers) who received the intelligence. This problem was most acutely demonstrated in the case of the Iraqi National Congress source , in which Defense HUMINT failed to reissue the reporting (either with the fabrication notice or recall notice attached)--a failure that led analysts and senior policymakers to accept the reporting months after it was known to be worthless. Defense HUMINT has taken steps to ensure that fabricated reporting is recalled, and the Director of the CIA is currently working to establish Community-wide standards to ensure that the original reporting, the fabrication notice, and the recalled reporting are electronically linked. It remains to be seen, however, whether the information-technology hurdles involved in linking related reporting can be overcome.

Dissemination

The collection, analysis, and dissemination of finished intelligence is a cycle, and many of the issues related to collection and analysis also affect dissemination of the product. But at least one issue merits separate discussion. The interface between the Intelligence Community and the policymaker--the way that intelligence analysis is conveyed to the consumer--needs reexamination.

As part of its investigation, this Commission was provided access, on a limited basis, to a number of articles from the President's Daily Brief (PDB) relating to Iraq's WMD programs. Although we saw only a limited cross-section of this product, we can make several observations about the art form. In short, many of the same problems that occurred with other intelligence products occurred with the PDBs, only in a magnified manner. For instance, the PDBs often failed to explain, or even signal, the uncertainties underlying their judgments. Information from a known fabricator was used in PDBs, despite the publication of a fabrication notice on that source months earlier. PDB articles discounted information that appeared to contradict the prevailing analytical view by characterizing, without justifications, such information as a "cover story" or purposeful deception. The PDBs attributed information to multiple sources without making clear that the information rested very heavily on only one of those sources. And the titles of PDB articles were sometimes more alarmist than the text would support.

In addition to the problems it shares with other intelligence products, the PDB format presents some unique problems as well. As discussed above, the emphasis on current intelligence can adversely affect the distribution of analytical resources and can reduce the level of expertise needed for contextual analysis. But the focus on current intelligence may also adversely affect the consumers of intelligence. In particular, the daily exposure to current intelligence products such as the PDB may create, over time, a greater perception of certainty about their judgments than is warranted. And the way these products are generated and disseminated may actually skew the way their content is perceived. For example, when senior policymakers are briefed with the President's Daily Brief or a similar product, they often levy follow-up questions on the briefer. The response to those questions is then typically disseminated in the same format. Therefore, if one policymaker has an intense interest in one area and actively seeks follow-up, that questioning can itself generate numerous PDBs or Senior Executive Memoranda. A large volume of reporting on one topic can result, and that large volume may skew the sense among other policymakers as to the topic's importance.

Politicization

Many observers of the Intelligence Community have expressed concern that Intelligence Community judgments concerning Iraq's purported WMD programs may have been warped by inappropriate political pressure. 829 To discuss whether those judgments were "politicized," that term must first be defined.

Accountability

Numerous failures within the Intelligence Community contributed to the flawed estimates on Iraq. Many of these failures are systemic--flaws in the way the Intelligence Community is managed, organized, and structured. Part Two of this report contains dozens of recommendations for systemic reform based on the lessons learned from Iraq and other case studies. But reform requires more than changing the Community's systems; it also requires accountability.

Individuals. There are unfortunately a number of examples in the Iraq assessments of individuals whose conduct fell short of what the Intelligence Community has a right to expect. Among these is the handling of Curveball's reporting on mobile BW. In late January of 2003, the Secretary of State was engaged in an intense personal effort to explore every flaw in the intelligence he was about to present to the United Nations Security Council. By then, a division in the CIA's Directorate of Operations had spent months pointing out Curveball's flaws with some persistence. Yet the Secretary of State never learned of those doubts.

A number of individuals stood between the two and could have made the connection. Some acknowledge knowing about Curveball's problems but did not understand that he was the key to the entire BW assessment. Others knew how central Curveball was to the BW case but deny knowing about Curveball's problems. Still others--particularly in CIA's WINPAC--were aware of both sides of the issue and did not present the doubts to the Secretary or other policymakers. Finally, the most senior officials of the Agency insist the serious concerns expressed about Curveball's reliability were never conveyed to them--despite assertions to the contrary.

This Commission was not established to adjudicate personal responsibility for the intelligence errors on Iraq. We are not an adjudicatory body, nor did we take testimony under oath. We were not authorized or equipped to assign blame to specific individuals, particularly when there are disputes about critical facts. We are, however, equipped to address the question of organizational accountability.

Organizations. Almost every organization in the Intelligence Community--collectors, analysts, and management--performed poorly on Iraq. But there are differences among the agencies, both in their initial performance and in how they responded when their mistakes became clear. The National Intelligence Council, for example, faltered badly in producing the flawed NIE on Iraq's WMD programs. But it also learned from its errors. It now brings the collection agencies into the NIE process to evaluate their sources, and its recent estimates are more candid about intelligence gaps, weak sources, and divergent viewpoints.

For some organizations, however, problems run deeper. Three agencies made such serious errors, or resisted admitting their errors so stubbornly, that questions may fairly be raised about the fundamental culture or capabilities of the organizations themselves.

1. The performance of the National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC) in assessing the aluminum tubes was a gross failure. NGIC got completely wrong the question of the tubes' suitability for conventional rockets--a question that is at the core of NGIC's assigned area of expertise. And NGIC was not aware of, and did not pursue, basic information that was critical to its assessments. 861

2. The Defense HUMINT Service inexcusably failed to recall reporting from a known fabricator, and compounded that error by failing to notice when its discredited reporting crept into Secretary Powell's speech. Defense HUMINT also bears heavy responsibility for the Curveball episode. Defense HUMINT disseminated Curveball's reporting while taking little or no responsibility for checking the accuracy of his reports. In fact, Defense HUMINT still calls itself merely a "conduit" for Curveball's information and resists the idea that it had any real responsibility to vet his veracity. 862

3. CIA's Weapons Intelligence, Nonproliferation, and Arms Control Center (WINPAC) is the Intelligence Community's center for all-source analysis on weapons of mass destruction. As such, it was at the heart of many of the errors discussed earlier, from the mobile BW case to the aluminum tubes. Just as bad, some WINPAC analysts--and WINPAC as an institution--showed great reluctance to correct these errors, even long after they had become obvious. 863 Creating an intelligence center always carries some risk that alternative views will be sacrificed in pursuit of consensus, and we fear that a culture of enforced consensus has infected WINPAC as an organization.

In short, we have doubts that the broad reforms described in Part Two will be enough to change the organizational culture of NGIC, Defense HUMINT, and WINPAC. Yet the cultures of each contributed crucially to the Iraq WMD debacle. We therefore recommend that the Director of National Intelligence give serious consideration to whether each of these organizations should be reconstituted, substantially reorganized, or made subject to detailed oversight.

INTRODUCTION

On December 19, 2003, the Libyan government announced that it would halt all efforts to produce or acquire chemical or nuclear weapons, and pledged to eliminate any existing stockpiles of such weapons or materials. 1 To ensure compliance, Libya agreed to formally "declare" the existence of all relevant weapons, materials, and facilities, and to permit a series of inspections in Libya, commencing in January 2004. As a result of these declarations and visits, inspectors were able to speedily remove key materials related to missiles and weapons of mass destruction (WMD)--including centrifuges, an entire uranium conversion facility, nuclear weapons designs, uranium hexafluoride, and guidance packages for the Scud-C missile--and ensconce them safely in the United States. By March 2004, inspectors confirmed that Libya had destroyed its unfilled chemical munitions and secured its chemical weapons stockpile of approximately 24 metric tons of mustard gas for eventual destruction. 2 This unprecedented disarmament effort resulted in significant steps toward the normalization of U.S.-Libyan relations, including the lifting of most economic sanctions on Libya and the unfreezing of its assets in the United States. 3

As directed by the Executive Order establishing this Commission, we have compared the Intelligence Community's judgments concerning Libya's weapons programs before Tripoli's decision to open them to international scrutiny with current assessments, thereby providing a rare "before" and "after" study of U.S. intelligence assessments. In so doing, we interviewed policy officials as well as intelligence analysts and collectors. We also consulted finished intelligence production, the written "collection requirements" sent to intelligence agencies, and other intelligence documents.

We conclude that collection and analytic efforts with regard to Libya's weapons programs and in support of the U.S./U.K.-led efforts represent, for the most part, an Intelligence Community success story. The Community collected significant intelligence on Libya's nuclear and missile programs, providing a vital lever used by policymakers to pressure Tripoli to openly declare its nuclear and chemical materials and disavow its WMD and long-range missile programs.

Some discrepancies did exist between analysts' judgments prior to 2003 and the realities found in Libya; for example, analysts overestimated certain capabilities and developmental timelines relating to Libya's nuclear program and underestimated some elements of Libya's missile program. And no evidence of an expected small-scale Libyan biological weapons program has been uncovered. However, the Community's key pre-December 2003 intelligence and assessments as to Libyan nuclear procurement and chemical production appear to have been largely confirmed by the facts on the ground.

While the discrepancies that were found did not affect the general accuracy of the judgments that Libya was actively pursuing development of a nuclear weapon and possessed chemical weapons, they do point to some weaknesses in collection and analysis. It is apparent to us that the Community is not well-postured to replicate such successes.

COMPARING INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENTS WITH U.S. FINDINGS IN LIBYA

THE UNDERPINNINGS OF SUCCESS

This section examines the contribution of the collection and analytical disciplines to achieving the success described above. While it appears the Community was able to achieve more with regard to Libya's nuclear and missile programs than its chemical and biological programs, the Community's overall record illustrates multiple examples of ways in which intelligence can succeed. These include: seamless partnerships between analysts and collectors; the availability of a variety of reporting from human and technical collectors; and the ability of analysts to be flexible in their judgments while tracking and monitoring programs over time. These kinds of successes may be among the best the current intelligence system can offer.

LOOKING AHEAD

The Intelligence Community's efforts are currently focused on supporting U.S. government efforts to assess Libyan compliance with the terms of its agreements to dismantle its chemical, biological, nuclear, and missile programs. With the establishment of an official presence in Tripoli, the United States has had, since January 2004, a standing presence in-country that will provide continuous assessment of Libya's compliance with its dismantlement commitments. 45 In addition, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Libya have established a standing trilateral mechanism called the Steering and Coordinating Committee to address future weapons-related issues. 46 As a result, many in the policy and intelligence communities believe there is an "extremely low probability of things going wrong" with regard to the Libyan agreements. 47

These positive developments aside, the Intelligence Community bears a significant and ongoing burden relating to Libya. The Community must continue to assist in verifying Libyan disclosures.

Moreover, it is clear that Libya has been considerably less forthcoming about the details of its chemical and biological weapons efforts than about its nuclear and missile programs. The analysts we interviewed agreed that if Libya maintained any biological or chemical programs, they would be small-scale. 48 And whatever may be said about the current state of the Libyan programs and the veracity of Tripoli's disclosures, it remains true that the mercurial regime may suddenly shift its plans and intentions, leading to a covert resuscitation of these programs that the Intelligence Community will be expected to detect.

There are, moreover, other significant ongoing intelligence challenges concerning the Libya target. For instance, the policy community will look to the Intelligence Community to answer questions surrounding Libyan compliance with its pledge to renounce and cease the use of terrorism. 49 For the reasons discussed below, we have some doubts about whether the Intelligence Community is well postured to confront these challenges.

CONCLUSION

The Intelligence Community should be commended for its contributions to forcing Tripoli to openly declare its nuclear and chemical materials and abandon development efforts, as well as hand over parts of its missile force and cancel its long-range missile projects. Such renunciation is, we believe, the real measure of a WMD-related intelligence success. At the same time, the Intelligence Community should recognize the ways in which it can improve its collection and analysis efforts, and how the shift of resources and emphasis away from Libya may--in the future--create difficulties.

ENDNOTES

1 Remarks by the President, President Bush: Libya Pledges to Dismantle WMD Programs, White House Press Secretary (Dec. 19, 2003), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/ releases/2003/12/200331319-9.html (accessed March 7, 2005).

2 Interview with senior administration officials (Sept. 22, 2004). The teams did not uncover any evidence of a current biological weapons program, nor has Libya admitted the existence of biological weapons materials or facilities as part of the disclosures made under its agreement with the United States and United Kingdom. DIA, Title Classified (Feb. 24, 2004).

3 Executive Order No. 13357 (Sept. 22, 2004) (terminating the national emergency with respect to Libya, which led to the effective end of that sanctions regime). Libya continues to be designated as a State Sponsor of Terrorism, however, and sanctions based on that designation remain in place.

4 Reporting may have slightly understated the quantity of yellowcake. NIC, Title Classified (NIE 2004-05HJ) (May 2004) at p. 48.

5 Interview with State Department/INR analysts (Sept. 8, 2004). Department of Energy analysts announced in February 2005 their view that the material was from North Korea. Glenn Kessler, "North Korea May Have Sent Libya Nuclear Material, U.S. Tells Allies," Washington Post (Feb. 2, 2005) at p. A1.

6 NIC, Title Classified (May 2004) (NIE 2004-05HJ).

7 Id . at p. 48.

8 The CIA caveated this assessment, noting that Libya would "face significant technical challenges" to its nuclear program "that could lengthen the time needed to begin producing nuclear warheads." CIA, Title Classified (SPWR 021602-5) (Feb. 16, 2002). Moreover, an NIE cautioned that the judgments were based on the assumption that Libya would receive "foreign assistance in its fissile material production and weapon development efforts." NIC, Title Classified (NIE 2001 19HJ-I) (Dec. 2001) at p. E-37.

9 NIC, Title Classified (NIE 2004-05HJ) (May 2004).

10 Id. at p. 49.

11 Id .

12 Interview with CIA analysts (Sept. 10, 2004).

13 NIC, Title Classified (NIE 2004-05HJ) (May 2004).

14 Id . at p. 49.

15 Interview with State Department/INR analysts (Sept. 8, 2004).

16 CIA, Title Classified (SPWR 021602-5) (Feb. 16, 2002).

17 CIA, Title Classified (SPWR 012203-02) (Jan. 22, 2003); Interview with CIA analysts (Sept. 10, 2004).

18 NIC, Title Classified (NIE 2004-05HJ) (May 2004) at p. 49.

19 Interview with State Department/INR analysts (Sept. 8, 2004).

20 NIC, Title Classified (NIE 2004-05HJ) (May 2004) at p. 50; Interview with State Department/INR analysts (Sept. 8, 2004).

21 CIA, Title Classified (SEIB011104-02) (Jan. 12, 2004) at p. 3.

22 Interview with senior administration officials (Sept. 22, 2004).

23 CIA, Title Classified (SEIB011104-02) (Jan. 12, 2004) at p. 3.

24 Id .

25 Id .

26 Interview with CIA analysts (Sept. 10, 2004).

27 Id .

28 NIC, Title Classified (NIE 2004-05HJ) (May 2004).

29 CIA, Title Classified (WINPAC IA 2004-003HCX) (Feb. 12, 2004) at pp. 14-15.

30 Interview with CIA officials (Sept. 14, 2004).

31 George J. Tenet, Director of Central Intelligence, Speech at Georgetown University, February 5, 2004, available at http://www.cia.gov/cia/public_affairs/speeches/2004/tenet_ georgetownspeech_02052004.html (accessed Jan. 18, 2005)

32 Interview with CIA officials (Sept. 14, 2004).

33 CIA, Title Classified (WINPAC IA 2004-003HCX) (Feb. 12, 2004) at p. 6.

34 Interview with CIA officials (Sept. 14, 2004).

35 Id .

36 Interview with CIA analysts (Sept. 10, 2004); see also , e.g., Senior Panel Review, Mediterranean WMD Implications Game II (Dec. 12, 2002).

37 Interview with CIA analysts (Sept. 10, 2004).

38 NIC, Title Classified (NIE 2001 19HJ-I) (Dec. 2001).

39 Interview with CIA officials (Sept. 14, 2004); CIA, Submission to the Commission (March 9, 2005).

40 Interview with CIA analysts (Sept. 11, 2004).

41 CIA, Title Classified (July 18, 2003). Similarly, since the disclosures, analysts have asked the red cell to examine the possibility that Qadafi's agreement to abandon these programs is merely temporary. Interview with CIA ballistic missile analysts (Sept. 10, 2004). See, e.g., Senior Panel Review, Mediterranean WMD Implications Game II (Dec. 12, 2002). Analysts have also worked closely with collectors to reassess existing sources and information in light of the revelations.

42 Interview with CIA analyst (Nov. 14, 2004).

43 NIC, Title Classified (NIE 2001 19HJ-I) (Dec. 2001).

44 Chapter One (Iraq).

45 Interview with State Department/INR analysts (Sept. 8, 2004); Interview with State Department official (Sept. 24, 2004).

46 Interview with senior administration officials (Sept. 22, 2004); Interview with State Department/INR analysts (Sept. 8, 2004).

47 Interview with State Department/INR analysts (Sept. 8, 2004)

48 Interview with NGA analysts (Sept. 9, 2004); Interview with CIA analysts (Sept. 10, 2004).

49 Policymakers are also concerned with Libyan progress on human rights, domestic political and economic modernization, and regional political developments; the Intelligence Community will be expected to provide key support on these more traditional intelligence issues. Interview with State Department official (Sept. 24, 2004).

50 See, e.g., Interview with CIA officials (Sept. 14, 2004) (noting that the priority for new sources will be to verify Libya's past disclosures).

51 Interview with CIA analysts (Sept. 10, 2004).

INTRODUCTION

On October 7, 2001, less than a month following the September 11 attacks, the United States began combat operations over the skies of Afghanistan. Operation Enduring Freedom's initial objectives were to destroy terrorist training camps and infrastructure, capture al-Qa'ida leaders, and force the cessation of all activities by and in support of terrorists within Afghanistan's borders. As a byproduct of these operations, the U.S. Intelligence Community was able to collect documents, conduct detainee interviews, and search former al-Qa'ida facilities, assembling intelligence that shed startling light on al-Qa'ida's intentions and capabilities with regard to chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons.

As directed by Executive Order, the Commission compared Intelligence Community assessments regarding al-Qa'ida's weapons of mass destruction programs in Afghanistan prior to the war with evidence obtained as a consequence of military operations and the updated assessments that resulted. In so doing, we reviewed raw and finished intelligence products, conducted interviews with analysts, and examined collection requirements documents and other information.

We found that just prior to the war in Afghanistan in 2001, the Intelligence Community was able to correctly assess al-Qa'ida's limited ability to use unconventional weapons to inflict mass casualties. Yet when the war uncovered new evidence of WMD efforts, analysts were surprised by the intentions and level of research and development underway by al-Qa'ida. Had this new information not been acquired, and had al-Qa'ida been allowed to continue weapons development, a future intelligence failure could have been in the offing.

A note before proceeding: this unclassified review of the Intelligence Community's performance on Afghanistan is necessarily more limited than the classified version. In particular, it does not go into great detail on the Intelligence Community's continuing efforts to collect and analyze intelligence relating to al-Qa'ida and its chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons. The reason for this is that any such discussion would invariably pose too great a risk of disclosing to al-Qa'ida (and other adversaries) information that could be used to defeat our intelligence capabilities in the future. Consequently, significant portions of our classified report are simply too sensitive for public disclosure.

COMPARISON OF INTELLIGENCE: "BEFORE" AND "AFTER" SNAPSHOTS OF AL-QA'IDA'S WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION PROGRAMS IN AFGHANISTAN

AWAKENING TO A NEW THREAT: COLLECTION SHORTFALLS AND ANALYTIC UNCERTAINTY

The war in Afghanistan and its aftermath confirmed two key intelligence judgments made before the September attacks: al-Qa'ida did not have a nuclear device, nor did it have large-scale chemical and biological weapons capabilities. However, information obtained in the course of the war revealed that analysts were largely unaware of the extent of al-Qa'ida's weapons of mass destruction research and development (especially with regard to Agent X) in Afghanistan. Moreover, while analysts had suspected that al-Qa'ida was interested in sophisticated weapons, including nuclear devices, the war provided real information about specific efforts to obtain these weapons.

Our study revealed a number of overarching problems that help to explain why the Intelligence Community assessed al-Qa'ida's capabilities the way it did. These problems are likely to affect the Intelligence Community's future performance with regard to assessing the unconventional weapons programs of al-Qa'ida, other terrorist groups, and rogue states.

CONCLUSION

Key questions remain about al-Qa'ida and Afghanistan. There are critical intelligence gaps with regard to each al-Qa'ida unconventional weapons capability--chemical, biological, and nuclear. To address these problems, it is essential that the Community focus resources on the difficult task of increasing human intelligence collection on terrorist groups in general, and on al-Qa'ida in particular. We offer recommendations on how to improve our nation's human intelligence capabilities in Chapter Seven (Collection) of this report.

ENDNOTES

1 National Intelligence Council (NIC), Title Classified (ICA 2001-07HC) (Oct. 22, 2001) at p. 4.

2 Id . at pp. 4-5.

3 Id . at p. 1.

4 Id . at p. 7.

5 Id . at p. 8.

6 DCI's Counterterrorist Center, Title Classified (May 23, 2002) at p. 1.

7 NIC, Title Classified (NIE 2004-08HC/I) (Dec. 2004) at p. 117; DIA, Submission to the Commission (March 2, 2005).

8 Id .

9 Id . at pp. 117-118.

10 Id . at p. 118.

11 DCI's Counterterrorist Center, Title Classified (May 23, 2002) at p. 2; DIA, Submission to the Commission (March 2, 2005).

12 Id . at p. 1.

13 NIC, Title Classified (ICA 2001-07HC) (Oct. 22, 2001).

14 Id .

15 Id .

16 Id . at p. 1.

17 DCI's Counterterrorist Center, Title Classified (May 23, 2002).

18 In August 2002, CNN obtained a large archive of al-Qa'ida video. Among the 64 cassettes was material showing operatives experimenting with lethal chemical gas on three dogs. Nic Robertson, Tapes Shed New Light on Bin Laden's Network (CNN Aug. 18, 2002), available at archives.cnn.com/2002/US/ 08/18/terror.tape.main/ (accessed March 10, 2005).

19 DCI's Counterterrorist Center, Title Classified (May 23, 2002) at p. 4.

20 Id .

21 CIA, Submission to the Commission (March 10, 2005).

22 NIC, Title Classified (ICA 2001-07HC) (Oct. 22, 2001) at p. 8.

23 Id .

24 Id . The Intelligence Community was also aware that during the U.S. trial of Usama Bin Laden and others for the August 7, 1998 bombings of the East African embassies, prosecution witness Jan Ahmade al-Fadl detailed efforts to assist Bin Laden in an attempt to acquire uranium from a source in Sudan in late 1993 and early 1994.

25 Tim Weiner, "Bin Laden Asserts He Has Nuclear Arms," New York Times (Nov. 10, 2001) at p. B4 (recounting Bin Laden's assertion in the Pakistani English-language daily newspaper, Dawn , that "[w]e have chemical and nuclear weapons as a deterrent and if America used them against us, we reserve the right to use them").

26 CIA, Title Classified (WINPAC IA 2001-060) (Nov. 23, 2001).

27 NIC, Title Classified (ICA 2001-07HC) (Oct. 22, 2001) at p. 8.

28 DCI's Counterterrorist Center, Title Classified (May 23, 2002).

29 NIC, Title Classified (ICA 2001-07HC) (Oct. 22, 2001).

30 DCI Counterterrorist Center, Title Classified (May 23, 2002) at p. 3.

31 Id .

32 Id .

33 Id . at p. 4.

34 CIA, Submission to Commission (March 4, 2005).

35 Id .

36 NIC, Title Classified (ICA 2001-07HC) (Oct. 22, 2001) at p. 12.

37 Id . at pp. 9, 12.

38 Id . at p. 12.

39 Interview with CIA analysts and other Intelligence Community senior analysts (Sept. 28, 2004).

40 Id .

41 Id .

42 It was perhaps never more so than during much of the decade leading up to the September 11 attacks, when the Intelligence Community was only beginning to awaken to and focus in earnest on the emerging threat of non-state terrorist groups. During that time, collection and analytical emphasis remained primarily focused on state actors, rather than terrorist organizations. Concurrently, the Intelligence Community was facing a resource crisis as a part of post-Cold War budget cuts. In addition, based on our interviews with analysts from several agencies and our review of the written record, it is clear to us that between 1991 and 1996 (while Usama Bin Laden was operating in Sudan), the Intelligence Community paid little attention to collection activities in Afghanistan, or maintenance of the covert infrastructure the CIA had developed there as a result of its anti-Soviet activities in the 1980s.

43 Interview with CIA analysts and other Intelligence Community senior analysts (Sept. 28, 2004).

44 Title Classified (ICA 2001-07HC) (Oct. 22, 2001) at p. 12.

45 We found one exception to the general lack of technical analysis and context, involving a Senior Executive Intelligence Memo in early 2001 in which CIA and nuclear experts speculated on why Usama Bin Laden might be seeking to use uranium with conventional explosives. Several technical scenarios were briefly examined.

46 CIA, Title Classified (WINPAC IA 20001-060) (Nov. 23, 2001) at p. 1.

INTRODUCTION

Providing intelligence that facilitates the global war on terrorism and warns against terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction is currently the Intelligence Community's most vital mission. There is every reason to believe that this will remain the top priority for a generation or more. As a result, it is impossible to reach broad conclusions regarding the Intelligence Community's overall performance, and develop meaningful suggestions for improvement and reform, without an understanding of Intelligence Community capabilities with regard to countering the terrorist threat--both now and in the future.

We did not set out to study "terrorism" writ large; such an ambitious endeavor is beyond the scope and time allotted to this Commission. Rather, we chose to focus narrowly on examining several well-documented weaknesses inherent in the Intelligence Community's counterterrorism capabilities prior to the September 11 attacks, and on measures the Intelligence Community has subsequently taken to remedy those deficiencies. Our work thus focused on four primary areas:

1. The status of information sharing among federal agencies with foreign and domestic intelligence and law enforcement responsibilities, as well as between federal agencies and state, local, and tribal law enforcement;

2. The effectiveness of the threat-warning mechanism by which policymakers are kept informed of potential terror threats;

3. The ability to synthesize relevant all-source terrorism analysis in a timely manner; and

4. The Intelligence Community's ability to provide the intelligence necessary to interdict a planned terrorist attack using a weapon of mass destruction.

We conclude that although the Intelligence Community has made significant strides in each of these areas, much remains to be done. We found substantial evidence that information flows between the federal level and the state, local, and tribal levels--both upward and downward--are not yet well coordinated. The roles and responsibilities among Intelligence Community agencies charged with primary responsibility for terrorism intelligence--both tactical and strategic--are not clearly defined. Sustained bureaucratic infighting and poor coordination prevent the Community from optimizing its resources to fight terrorism and alert policymakers to terrorist threats. Moreover, Community efforts to integrate technical and regional intelligence expertise with counterterrorism analysis do not provide sufficient focus on the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction in the hands of terrorists.

Resolving complex bureaucratic issues that transcend agency and subject-matter boundaries is usually difficult. However, three and a half years removed from the September 11 attacks, the persistence of agency coordination problems and unclear definitions of responsibility suggest to us a lack of Community leadership. The intelligence entities responsible for counterterrorism, especially terrorism analysis and threat warning, must be properly aligned, supported, and integrated for the task at hand.

SYSTEMIC FLAWS AS OF THE "SUMMER OF THREAT"

It is well-established that the Intelligence Community's structure and practices prior to the September 11 attacks were simply not up to the task of waging a global war on terror and protecting the homeland. The systemic Intelligence Community deficiencies during the "Summer of Threat" leading up to the attacks were summed up by the 9/11 Commission in two short sentences: "Information was not shared... Analysis was not pooled." 1 For present purposes, we highlight three of the specific failings identified by the 9/11 Commission in its examination of the Intelligence Community before September 11.

First, prior to September 11, there was a failure to share terrorism-related information rapidly and efficiently within agencies; among entities within the Intelligence Community tasked with producing intelligence to support counterterrorism efforts, and with state, local, and tribal law enforcement. For example, the FBI lacked basic computer capabilities, and did not share information even within its own organization. The CIA and the FBI were unwilling or unable to exchange information quickly and effectively with each other. And the Immigration and Naturalization Service and FBI did not learn from the CIA which identified terrorists were entering the United States and where they might be. 2

Second, the Intelligence Community's analysts were ill-equipped to "connect the available dots" that might have led to advance warning of the September 11 attacks. 3 The "dispersal of effort on too many priorities" and the "declining attention to the craft of strategic analysis" were among the shortcomings identified by the 9/11 Commission's staff. 4 The CIA published many useful analytical reports on terrorism before the attack, but the Intelligence Community failed to produce a comprehensive, cross-cutting assessment of the threat. Analysts had difficulty carving out time to work on longer-term analyses that could have unified disparate elements of intelligence and pointed to the existence of a growing threat or particular vulnerability. 5

Third, there was a lack of coordinated effort among the major federal agencies tasked with counterterrorism responsibilities, and confusion as to the roles and responsibilities of those agencies. Because the CIA and FBI lacked an optimized, cooperative analytical and operational effort, they were not well configured to detect and counter a threat, like that posed by the September 11 plotters, which "fell into the void between foreign and domestic threats." 6

NOTABLE IMPROVEMENTS SINCE THE SEPTEMBER 11 ATTACKS

We found evidence that this grim picture has improved in many respects since September 11. In the information sharing arena, for example, consolidation of terrorist "watchlists" and expanded use of those lists for screening purposes have increased the likelihood of detecting known or suspected terrorists and obtaining additional information about them. 7 Moreover, counterterrorism information sharing has increased in quantitative terms--that is, terrorism intelligence products are disseminated more broadly, and are produced by more agencies, than before September 11. 8

Similarly, the Intelligence Community has remedied many of the analysis-related problems it faced leading up to the September 11 attacks. In particular, the Community increased its analytic efforts on terrorism-related issues, including analytic support to operations, and at the President's direction established the Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC, now the National Counterterrorism Center, or NCTC) as the Community's center for analysis on these topics. 9 Many analysts arrive with substantial experience gained from working on terrorism accounts at the DCI's Counterterrorist Center (CTC), 10 an organization originally based at the CIA and staffed primarily by CIA officers that also includes representatives from throughout the Community. Analysts are increasingly being assigned to the NCTC for two-year rotations instead of short-term, stop-gap stints, enabling it to develop some badly-needed depth of expertise among its analytic corps. 11 Perhaps most significantly in light of the criticisms leveled by the 9/11 Commission, the NCTC is producing analytic products that integrate the comments and concerns of analysts across the Community. 12

Moreover, the President's Terrorist Threat Report, a daily analytic publication produced by the NCTC, is truly a Community effort--with five agencies regularly contributing and a production schedule established by regular interagency meetings. 13 Prior to the September 11 attacks, it was far from clear that the intelligence resources of all the relevant agencies in the Intelligence Community were being tapped to create a complete picture of terror threats for senior policymakers. In contrast, the NCTC now hosts "ecumenical" meetings five days a week, in which managers representing CIA, FBI, DIA, NSA, and the Departments of State and Homeland Security 14 share and discuss intelligence regarding key terror threats. 15 The NCTC also meets five times weekly with senior representatives of CIA, FBI, DIA, and Homeland Security at a formal planning production board to divide responsibility for drafting analytical products (mainly those which will appear in the President's threat report) and to share information. 16 This process represents a level of formal and informal interaction on the terrorist threat among the primary intelligence agencies that simply did not exist prior to September 11, and that seems to clearly represent an improvement in the identification of threats and the mechanism through which threat warning intelligence is provided to senior policymakers. 17

In our view the overall quality of finished analytic pieces on terrorism has also improved. Analysts in the Community now have access to substantially more information as the result of the Intelligence Community's heightened prioritization of the terrorism issue, the availability of intelligence from new collectors (particularly FBI and Homeland Security), and expanded access to information about human intelligence sources. 18

Perhaps most importantly, from an operational perspective it is clear that many of CTC's efforts to disrupt terrorist networks and plots--partially enabled by its in-house analytic cadre--have been extraordinary successes. Put simply, CTC has brought the fight to the terrorists.

Finally, we have found that September 11 and the subsequent anthrax attacks not only triggered an aggressive counterterrorism response throughout the U.S. government, but also prompted the Community to reconsider its approach to the possible acquisition and use of weapons of mass destruction by terrorists, which we refer to by short-hand throughout this case study as "WMD terrorism." In December 2002, in the midst of post-September 11 bureaucratic realignment, the President announced a national strategic policy on weapons of mass destruction. 19 The President called for the application of new technologies, increased emphasis on intelligence collection and analysis, the strengthening of alliance relationships, and the establishment of new partnerships with former adversaries. The main pillars of the President's program included interdiction efforts, nonproliferation programs, and consequence management. In particular, he called for an emphasis on improving intelligence regarding weapons of mass destruction facilities and activities, expanding the interaction among U.S. intelligence, law enforcement, and military agencies, and enhancing intelligence cooperation with friends and allies. 20

High-level attention within the policy and intelligence communities has had an important impact on the WMD terrorism issue. Our interviews suggest that the Intelligence Community now has a more extensive operational capability dedicated to the problem, has enhanced its intelligence reporting and analysis functions, and has instituted a more robust effort to address the problem domestically. Moreover, the Community appears at least to recognize the unique characteristics of unconventional weapons in the terrorism context, as other organizations have followed the CIA's lead in placing additional--although not yet sufficient--resources for WMD terrorism into the counterterrorism effort.

Since September 11, the reallocation of resources to respond to WMD terrorism has resulted in significant improvements in both foreign and domestic intelligence. We understand that within the Intelligence Community, sources have gotten better, the amount of data available has dramatically increased, and intelligence is more harmonized, consistent, and less reliant on vague "chatter." On the domestic side, there have been significant attempts to disrupt terrorist means of delivery. 21

Despite all of these noteworthy developments, our study found that the Community still has a long way to go before it can claim to have optimized its counterterrorism capabilities or fully fixed the serious deficiencies that existed prior to September 11. We thus turn to the areas where the picture is not as promising.

We begin by focusing on needed improvements in the sharing of terrorism information with state, local, and tribal governments. Next, we examine the more general bureaucratic "turf war" between agencies, and the pronounced lack of clarity as to the roles, responsibilities, and authorities involving various entities tasked with the counterterrorism mission--particularly the NCTC and the Counterterrorist Center. Finally, we examine the continuing coordination problems between the CIA, FBI, and Homeland Security in addressing the threat posed by WMD terrorism.

INFORMATION SHARING:
MUCH ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT

For a number of years before the September 11 attacks, the Intelligence Community closely followed the al-Qa'ida terrorist threat, yet failed to adequately exploit information it had concerning several individuals who were either involved in the planning of or participated in the attacks. 22 Although the 9/11 Commission did not find that better information sharing would have prevented the attacks, at least nine of the ten "operational opportunities" that the commission identified as missed opportunities to possibly thwart the plot pertain to some form of a failure to share information. 23 These perceived failures have made "information sharing" a mantra for intelligence reform for the three and a half years since the attacks.

We have found that as a general matter, the Intelligence Community has sought to improve terrorism information sharing by modifying the structures and processes for sharing that were in place prior to September 11--rather than establishing wholly new approaches. We agree with the recent assessment of the Intelligence Community Inter-Agency Information Sharing Working Group, which found that "[a] great deal of energy...is being expended across the [Intelligence Community] to improve information sharing. However, the majority of these initiatives will not produce the enduring institutional change required to address our current threat environment ." 24

The importance of effective sharing of information at all levels of the Intelligence Community is discussed in several chapters of our report, but particularly in Chapters Nine (Information Sharing) and Eight (Analysis). In this section, we specifically address the Intelligence Community's efforts, since September 11, to improve the sharing of terrorism information across the Intelligence Community and with state, local, and tribal governments. Our specific findings are categorized in four broad areas.

First, we found substantial improvement in information sharing relating to terrorist watchlisting and screening. "Watchlisting"--the process of assembling databases of known or suspected terrorists--was not well coordinated among federal agencies prior to September 11, but several effective reforms have been implemented in the wake of the attacks. 25 For example, the new Terrorist Screening Center--an interagency effort to consolidate terrorist watchlists and provide operational support for federal employees around the world, 24 hours a day, seven days a week--now administers a single database that combines international and domestic terrorism data provided by the NCTC and FBI. The database also integrates information from immigration and customs offices, the Transportation Security Administration, the U.S. Marshals Service, Department of Defense, and Interpol. The Terrorist Screening Center ensures that government investigators, screeners, and agents are working from the same comprehensive information and that they have access simultaneously to information and experience that will allow them to act quickly when a suspected terrorist is screened and stopped.

Second, we have found that the sharing of counterterrorism information has increased in quantitative terms--more terrorism information is being shared with more entities both inside and outside the Intelligence Community than before the September 11 attacks. This has largely occurred through the increased use of "tearlines"--the practice of generating intelligence reports at several different classification levels so it can be shared with a cross-section of federal, state, local, and tribal officials--which has resulted in more releasable information being provided to consumers. 26 And security-based sharing restrictions have been substantially reduced, allowing analysts and security personnel greater access to the information they need to do their jobs. 27

All this being said, problems remain. While the Intelligence Community has reduced its use of restrictions on further dissemination of intelligence products without the consent of the originator, 28 inconsistent application of dissemination restrictions, such as ORCON ("originator controlled"), continue to impede the flow of useful terrorism information. 29 In relations with state, local, and tribal authorities, more terrorism information is being shared, but federal officials continue to have difficulty establishing consistent and coordinated lines of communication with these officials. 30 In this regard, we have found that there is no comprehensive policy or program for achieving the appropriate balance regarding what terrorism information to provide to state, local, and tribal authorities and how to provide it. Additionally, the redundant lines of communication through which terrorism-related information is passed--for example, through the Joint Terrorism Task Forces, Anti-Terrorism Advisory Councils, Homeland Security Information Network, TTIC Online, Law Enforcement Online Network, Centers for Disease Control alerts, and Public Health Advisories, to name just a few--present a deluge of information for which state, local, and tribal authorities are neither equipped nor trained to process, prioritize, and disseminate.

Our third category of findings relates to the sharing of information to ensure that analysts throughout the Intelligence Community have the widest possible access to information regardless of which agency collects the information. Today, the primary means of sharing information throughout the Community continues to be through interagency personnel exchange programs, such as the model used by the NCTC. These personnel exchanges can be quite effective, but they do nothing to improve the flow of information throughout those agencies or enable agencies to engage in competitive analysis based on access to the same set of information. Collectors of information continue to operate as though they "own" information and, in fact, collectors largely control access to the information that they generate. Decisions to withhold information are typically based on rules that are neither clearly defined nor consistently applied, with no system in place to hold collectors accountable for inappropriately withholding information.

Finally, we have found that there is currently no single entity in the Intelligence Community with the responsibility and authority to impose a centralized approach to sharing information. Although the NCTC model has certainly facilitated improved information sharing on counterterrorism issues, it lacks sufficient authority and resources necessary to provide strong leadership in this area.

COUNTERTERRORISM WARNING AND ANALYSIS:
A STRUGGLE BETWEEN AGENCIES

Notwithstanding significant gains in terrorism intelligence since September 11, a number of problems remain. Our study found evidence of bitter bureaucratic "turf battles" between agencies, and a pronounced lack of clarity as to the roles, responsibilities, and authorities of various entities tasked with the counterterrorism mission. Specifically, this interagency jockeying over overlapping counterterrorism analytical responsibilities indicates that major organizational issues affecting the allocation of resources, assignment of responsibilities, coordination of analysis, and effective warning remain unresolved.

THE FAILURE TO MANAGE COMMUNITY RESOURCES IN RESPONSE TO THE WMD TERRORISM THREAT

Recognizing that the worst terrorist attack would be one involving weapons of mass destruction, some elements within the Community have begun to incorporate analytic and collection capabilities with respect to the WMD terrorism threat into their counterterrorism organizations. At the same time, the CIA's Weapons Intelligence, Nonproliferation, and Arms Control Center provides intelligence support aimed at protecting the United States and its interests from all advanced weapons threats. Our review of the relationship among these various entities reveals that some systemic weaknesses are preventing the development of a focused, integrated, well-resourced bureaucracy that can most effectively combat the worst-case threat of a homeland terrorist attack. Specifically:

There is no clear leadership or bureaucratic architecture defining roles and responsibilities for WMD terrorism. This adversely affects analysis, collection, and threat warning; and

The domestic intelligence effort on WMD terrorism is lagging behind the U.S. government's foreign intelligence capabilities.

CONCLUSION

The Intelligence Community's capabilities with regard to current terror threats have improved significantly since September 11, 2001. Nevertheless, the continued lack of definitional clarity as to roles and responsibilities in the war on terrorism, and ongoing conflicts among key counterterrorism agencies, constitute an ongoing challenge--and one that we believe should be foremost on the mind of the new DNI.

ENDNOTES

1 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission Report (2004) (hereinafter "9/11 Commission Report") at p. 353.

2 Id . at p. 371.

3 Id . at pp. 277, 408-09.

4 Eleventh Public Hearing of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Staff Statement Number 11 (April 14, 2004) at p. 3.

5 Id . at p. 5.

6 9/11 Commission Report at p. 263.

7 Interview with Terrorist Screening Center official (Nov. 9, 2004).

8 Interview with TTIC senior officials (Oct. 19, 2004); Interview with DIA (JITF-CT) analysts (Oct. 26, 2004); Interview with Department of State (INR) analysts (Nov. 3, 2004).

9 NCTC was created on December 6, 2004 pursuant to Executive Order. The establishment of NCTC is also codified by the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (hereinafter "IRTPA"). Under IRTPA, NCTC subsumes the primary duties of TTIC, and is intended to serve as the governmental entity responsible for counterterrorism analysis and warning and for developing strategic operational plans for counterterrorism operations conducted by the U.S. government. Nevertheless, although the name has changed, the organization and its bureaucratic challenges remain essentially the same, and the identical problems surrounding TTIC that are discussed in this report threaten to envelope the newly-created NCTC. In this report, for ease of reference, when we use the term NCTC, we refer to both NCTC and its predecessor, TTIC, unless otherwise noted.

10 Interview with TTIC senior analyst (Nov. 5, 2004).

11 Interview with TTIC (WMD) analysts (Oct. 19, 2004).

12 Id .

13 Interview with TTIC senior analyst (Oct. 19, 2004); Interview with TTIC senior analyst (Nov. 5, 2004).

14 Along with NCTC, these agencies have been dubbed the "Warn 7." Interview with TTIC senior analyst (Oct. 19, 2004).

15 Interview with TTIC senior analyst (Oct. 19, 2004). During the "Summer of Threat" prior to the September 11 attacks, the interagency Counterterrorism Security Group (CSG), headed by Richard Clarke, had access to disseminated intelligence from several agencies, but it did not have the capability to integrate intelligence from each agency on a daily basis, nor did it have access to the internal, non-disseminated information of intelligence agencies. 9/11 Commission Report at p. 255.

16 Interview with NCTC senior official (Feb. 4, 2005); Interview with TTIC senior analyst (Oct. 19, 2004); Interview with TTIC senior analyst (Nov. 5, 2004).

17 The PTTR is produced six days a week, usually runs three to five pages in length, and may have, on average, one to four articles. It is delivered to the President and senior policymakers by the PDB briefers. Interview with TTIC senior analyst (Nov. 5, 2004).

18 Interview with CTC (WMD) official (Oct. 22, 2004).

19 National Security Presidential Directive 17, National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction (Dec. 2002).

20 Id .

21 Interview with FBI (WMD) officials (Oct. 14, 2004); Interview with FBI (Counterterrorism) official (Oct. 22, 2004).

22 The 9/11 Commission identifies several instances in which sharing of information might have led to further investigation that could have revealed the plot, but does not conclude that the sharing of any specific pieces of information actually held would have likely led to preventing the attacks. See, e.g ., 9/11 Commission Report at pp. 272, 276.

23 Id . at pp. 355-356.

24 Calibration Report: Intelligence Community Collaboration and Information Sharing to Win the War on Terrorism: Phase 1 (May 2004) at p. ES-1 (hereinafter "IC Inter-Agency ISWG May 2004 Calibration Report") (emphasis in original).

25 These watchlisting reforms were undertaken at the direction of the President, primarily under Homeland Security Presidential Directive 6, Integration and Use of Screening Information (Sept. 16, 2003).

26 This finding is consistent with the conclusion of the Inter-Agency Information Sharing Working Group. FY2004 Congressionally Directed Actions on Information Sharing, Consolidated Report of the Information Sharing Working Group (Dec. 14, 2004) at p. 23.

27 Interview with TTIC senior analyst (Oct. 19, 2004); Interview with TTIC senior official (Oct. 19, 2004); Interview with DIA (JITF-CT) analysts (Oct. 26, 2004); Interview with State Department (INR) analysts (Nov. 3, 2004); Interview with FBI (National Joint Terrorism Task Force) official (Nov. 5, 2004); Interview with CIA (DO) official (Nov. 8, 2004).

28 Interview with TTIC senior official (Oct. 19, 2004); Interview with DIA (JITF-CT) analysts (Oct. 26, 2004). Between 2001 and 2003, the rate of use of originator controls on terrorism-related reporting across the Intelligence Community dropped by approximately 50 percent. Seventh Public Hearing of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (Jan. 26, 2004) (Statement of Russell E. Travers, TTIC Deputy CIO for Information Sharing).

29 The rule of originator control, or ORCON, allows the agency that originates information to retain control over its dissemination and declassification (if it is classified) or its release to non-governmental parties. See, e.g ., IC Inter-Agency ISWG May 2004 Calibration Report, NRO submission, Appendix B at p. B-37 (listing ORCON as a cultural barrier that "must...be addressed"); id., DIA submission, Appendix B at p. B-12 (citing FBI and NSA ORCON dissemination as constraining assembly of terrorism intelligence database).

30 Interview with CIA (Collection Concepts Development Center) official (Oct. 7, 2004); Interview with FBI (WMD) officials (Oct. 13, 2004); Interview with emergency preparedness official of the Office of the Governor of Virginia (Nov. 10, 2004); Homeland Security Advisory Council, Final Report: Intelligence and Information Sharing Initiative (Dec. 2004).

31 Markle Foundation Task Force on National Security in the Information Age, Creating a Trusted Information Network for Homeland Security (2003) at pp. 7-8. The Markle Foundation funds a variety of studies that analyze the potential of new technologies to address critical public sector needs, particularly in the areas of health and national security.

32 Letter from Thomas J. Ridge, Secretary of Homeland Security; Robert S. Mueller, III, Director Federal Bureau of Investigation; George J. Tenet, Director of Central Intelligence; and John O. Brennan, Director Terrorist Threat Integration Center; to The Honorable Susan M. Collins, Chairwoman Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, and The Honorable Carl Levin, Ranking Member (Apr. 13, 2004) at p. 2.

33 Id .

34 Memorandum from John O. Brennan, TTIC Director, to Director of Central Intelligence (May 19, 2004) at pp. 2-4, 6-8.

35 Memorandum from John O. Brennan, TTIC Director, to Director of Central Intelligence (June 23, 2004).

36 Id .

37 Memorandum from John E. McLaughlin, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (July 2, 2004).

38 Interviews with John O. Brennan, TTIC Director (Sept. 22, 2004 and Feb. 8, 2005).

39 Interview with John O. Brennan, Interim Director of NCTC (March 15, 2005). The July 2 memorandum does not directly discuss the counterterrorism responsibilities of FBI, DHS or the Defense Department, which are mentioned briefly in Director Brennan's first memorandum.

40 Id .

41 Interview with Director of CTC (Nov. 5, 2004). Other CTC personnel expressed the same sentiment, using nearly identical language. Interview with senior CTC official (Oct. 22, 2004).

42 IRTPA at § 1021 (adding section 119 to the National Security Act to establish the NCTC in law, provide its primary missions, and outline the reporting chain of its director).

43 Id . at § 1021 (adding section 119(d) to the National Security Act to provide that one of the primary missions of the NCTC is to "serve as the primary organization in the United States Government for analyzing and integrating all intelligence...pertaining to terrorism").

44 See, e.g ., Interview with TTIC senior official (Feb. 4, 2005).

45 Interview with TTIC senior analyst (Oct. 19, 2004).

46 Interview with TTIC senior official (Feb. 4, 2005).

47 NCTC, CIA, FBI, DIA, NSA, and the Departments of State and Homeland Security comprise the so-called "Warn 7." Id.; Memorandum from John O. Brennan, TTIC Director, to Director of Central Intelligence (May 19, 2004) at ¶ 7.

48 Letter from Thomas J. Ridge, Secretary of Homeland Security; Robert S. Mueller, III, Director Federal Bureau of Investigation; George J. Tenet, Director of Central Intelligence; and John O. Brennan, Director Terrorist Threat Integration Center; to The Honorable Susan M. Collins, Chairwoman, Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, and The Honorable Carl Levin, Ranking Member (April 13, 2004) at p. 3; IRTPA at § 1021(f)(D).

49 Interview with TTIC senior analyst (Oct. 19, 2004).

50 Under IRTPA, NCTC serves not only as the governmental entity responsible for counterterrorism analysis and warning, but is also responsible for developing strategic operational plans for counterterrorism operations conducted by the U.S. government. It is our understanding that details regarding how NCTC will perform its strategic operational planning role have not fully been resolved. Accordingly, this report does not address NCTC's responsibility for this strategic planning function. IRTPA at § 1021.

51 Interviews with CTC senior officials (Oct. 22, 2004 and Nov. 5, 2004).

52 The law vests the NCTC with authority to "disseminate terrorism information, including current terrorism threat analysis," to senior policymakers, but does not grant it exclusive authority to do so. Moreover, the NCTC is given "primary responsibility within the United States Government for conducting net assessments of terrorist threats." But the law also states that nothing in its text "shall limit the authority of [other agencies] to conduct net assessments." IRTPA at §§ 1021(f)(1)(G), 1021(f)(2).

53 Interview with FBI (Counterterrorism) official (Nov. 4, 2004).

54 Interview with CTC official (Oct. 22, 2004); Interviews with TTIC senior analyst and TTIC (WMD) analysts (Oct. 19, 2004); Interview with DIA analysts and managers (Oct. 26, 2004); see also Interviews with former senior Intelligence Community officials (Sept. 28, 2004 and Oct. 15, 2004).

55 Interview with TTIC senior analyst (Oct. 19, 2004).

56 Interview with TTIC (WMD) analysts (Oct. 19, 2004).

57 Interview with FBI (Counterterrorism) official (Nov. 4, 2004).

58 CTC cited burnout as a critical retention problem. Interview with CTC (WMD) official (Oct. 22, 2004). DIA cited examples of analysts leaving to work fewer hours for higher salaries with contractors. Interview with DIA analysts and managers (Oct. 26, 2004).

59 Interview with TTIC (WMD) analysts (Oct. 19, 2004).

60 Interview with senior CTC official (Oct. 22, 2004).

61 IRTPA at § 1021.

62 Interview with FBI (WMD) officials (Oct. 14, 2004). See also Interview with former senior intelligence official (Oct. 15, 2004) (discussing Collection Concepts Development Center (CCDC) study on the active interdiction of weapons of mass destruction, which underscored that one of the main underlying problems was that no one owned the problem of WMD terrorism); Interview with CTC (WMD) official (Oct. 22, 2004) (suggesting dedicating a NSC policy staffer to the issue); Interview with FBI (Counterterrorism) official (Oct. 22, 2004) (noting how the pre-election threat is an example of how U.S. government lacks a national WMD terrorism strategy).

63 Interview with FBI (WMD) officials (Oct. 14, 2004).

64 Interview with TTIC senior analyst (Oct. 19, 2004).

65 Interview with CTC (WMD) official (Oct. 22, 2004); Interview with FBI (WMD) officials (Oct. 14, 2004).

66 Interview with FBI (WMD) officials (Oct. 14, 2004).

67 Id .

68 Interview with CTC (WMD) official (Oct. 22, 2004); Interview with FBI (National Joint Terrorism Task Force) official (Nov. 5, 2004).

69 9/11 Commission Report at p. 263.

70 Even the two groups' jargon differs. Those working on state-based programs talk of "WMD;" while those working on terrorism programs talk of "CBRN" (i.e., chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear devices).

71 An example of positive coordination is provided in our classified report, but cannot be discussed in an unclassified format.

72 Interview with FBI (WMD) officials (Dec. 2, 2004).

73 Id .

74 See, e.g ., Interview with CTC (WMD) official (Oct. 22, 2004).

75 Interview with FBI (WMD) officials (Oct. 14, 2004).

CHAPTER FIVE
IRAN AND NORTH KOREA: MONITORING THE DEVELOPMENT OF NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES

PART TWO
LOOKING FORWARD

Until now, this report has focused on the limitations and strengths of today's Intelligence Community. We reviewed the Intelligence Community's recent performance in assessing the unconventional weapons programs of Iraq, Libya, and Afghanistan. We also assessed the Intelligence Community's current capabilities to confront several of today's priority intelligence challenges - including Iran, North Korea, and terrorism. (As we have noted elsewhere, while classification concerns precluded us from including our Iran and North Korea findings in our unclassified report, the lessons we learned from these reviews inform our recommendations.) And we complemented the formal "case studies" that appear in Part One of this report with reviews of other important challenges the Intelligence Community faces today, including the need to share intelligence across the Intelligence Community and the difficulties of coordinating intelligence across the foreign-domestic divide.

We found an Intelligence Community that has had some significant successes, but that is, on balance, badly equipped and badly organized to confront today's threats. We found human intelligence collectors who have struggled in vain to find sources with valuable information - and often failed to vet properly the sources they did find. We found technical intelligence collectors whose traditional techniques have declining utility against threats that are increasingly elusive and diffuse. And we found an analytical community too quick to rely upon assumptions or conjecture, and too slow to communicate gaps and uncertainties to policymakers.

But above all, we found an Intelligence Community that was too disorganized and fragmented to use its many talented people and sophisticated tools effectively. There are not enough coordinated and sustained Community-wide efforts to perform critical intelligence functions - ranging from target development to strategic analysis - and critical information still too often does not get to the analysts or policymakers who need it most. On the flip side of the same coin, we found that many of the Intelligence Community's recent successes stemmed from cross-agency efforts - such as the innovative fusing of different collection capabilities to penetrate a particular intelligence target. We found, in short, an Intelligence Community that needs to be better integrated and more innovative if it is to be able to confront today's intelligence challenges.

With these lessons in mind, our report now turns toward the future. In the chapters that follow, we set forth our recommendations for change within the Community. We begin our discussion of proposed reforms with a chapter on leadership and management (Chapter 6). However, the task of transforming the Intelligence Community, if it is to be complete, must go beyond questions of organization. As a result, we make recommendations addressing several specific areas of intelligence (or challenges the Intelligence Community faces): Collection (Chapter 7); Analysis (Chapter 8); Information Sharing (Chapter 9); the challenge of uniting intelligence efforts across the foreign and domestic divide (Intelligence at Home, Chapter 10); Counterintelligence (Chapter 11); and a largely classified chapter on managing covert action (Chapter 12). Finally, we conclude with a stand-alone chapter examining our intelligence capabilities with respect to the most dangerous unconventional weapons threats the United States faces today, and offer recommendations on how to improve those capabilities (Proliferation, Chapter 13).

CHAPTER SIX
LEADERSHIP AND MANAGEMENT: FORGING AN INTEGRATED INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

INTRODUCTION

Today's Intelligence Community is not truly a community at all, but rather a loose confederation of 15 separate entities. 1 These entities too often act independently of each other. While a "community" management staff has long existed in the Office of the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), it has never had the authority or resources it needed to manage all these disparate components.

The diffuse nature of the Intelligence Community does have important merits--for example, the existence of different agency cultures and ways of doing business increases the likelihood that hypotheses about key intelligence issues will be "competitively" tested, and allows for the development of diverse pockets of expertise. While such advantages should be retained, they aren't a reason to tolerate the current lack of coordination. As our case studies aptly demonstrate, the old, single-agency methods of gathering intelligence are losing ground to our adversaries. And conversely, many of our recent intelligence successes have resulted from innovative cross-agency efforts--but such laudable examples are the exception, the products of ad hoc efforts rather than institutionalized collaboration.

Concern about the harmful impact of disunity on national security was a major factor leading to passage of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 . In creating a Director of National Intelligence (DNI) with substantial (though not sweeping) new authorities, the act created the framework for an integrated management structure for the United States' intelligence apparatus. However, passage of the intelligence act is merely prologue; the hard work of forging a genuine Intelligence Community, linked for the purpose of optimizing its capabilities and resources, must now begin.

We are realists. We recognize that effecting such a transformation in intelligence will take years to accomplish--and, indeed, will fall short without sustained leadership from the Director of National Intelligence and continued support from the President and Congress. This chapter offers our view on the essential tasks the new DNI might prioritize--and the challenges he will confront--as he begins this effort. We also offer, at the end of the chapter, a notional organizational structure for the new Office of the DNI, which we believe would serve the DNI well in confronting these tasks and challenges.

BUILDING AN INTEGRATED INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

A DIFFERENT KIND OF "CENTER": DEVELOPING THE NATIONAL COUNTER PROLIFERATION CENTER

In the preceding section we recommended that the new Director of National Intelligence take several steps aimed at forging a better integrated Intelligence Community. In this section we address whether this objective could be further advanced through the creation of a National Counter Proliferation Center (NCPC). The recent intelligence reform legislation envisions the creation of an NCPC modeled on the newly-created National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC). 14 But the act also gives the President the opportunity to decide not to create the center--or to modify certain characteristics--if the President believes that doing so serves the nation's security. 15

Although we endorse the idea of creating an NCPC, we believe it should look very different from the NCTC. The distinguishing feature of the NCTC is its hybrid character: the NCTC serves simultaneously as an integrated center for counterterrorism intelligence analysis and as a driver and coordinator of national interagency counterterrorism policy (the new intelligence legislation describes this latter responsibility, in rather confusing fashion, as "strategic operational planning"). As a result of these two roles, the Director of the NCTC has a dual-reporting relationship; he reports to the DNI on terrorism intelligence matters, and reports to the President when wearing his policy coordination hat. While we understand the motivations that may have led to these overlapping intelligence and policy functions in the counterterrorism area, we doubt that it is a good idea to replicate the model--and the mixed reporting relationships it creates--in other substantive areas.

We are also skeptical more generally about the increasingly popular idea of creating a network of "centers" organized around priority national intelligence problems. While we sympathize with the desire for better coordination that animates these proposals, centers also impose costs that often go unappreciated. As our Iraq case study aptly illustrates, centers run the risk of crowding out competitive analysis, creating new substantive "stovepipes" organized around issues, engendering turf wars over where a given center's mission begins and ends, and creating deeply rooted bureaucracies built around what may be temporary intelligence priorities. In most instances we believe that there are more flexible institutional solutions than centers, such as the national Mission Managers we propose.

So, while we recommend the creation of a National Counter Proliferation Center, the center we envision would differ substantially from both the NCTC and from the large analytical centers that some have suggested might serve as organizing units for the Intelligence Community. The NCPC we propose would serve as the DNI's Mission Manager on counterproliferation issues: it would not conduct analysis itself, but would instead be responsible for coordinating analysis and collection on nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons 16 across the Intelligence Community. As such, it would be much smaller than the NCTC (it would likely require a staff of no more than 100 people) and would not perform a policy planning function. Specifically, the Director of the NCPC would:

Develop strategies for collecting intelligence on the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons (and their delivery vehicles). The Director of the NCPC would manage the target-development process for nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. Like any Mission Manager, the NCPC would develop multi-disciplinary collection strategies to attack hard targets, and would review the performance of collection agencies in gaining access to these targets. Similarly, it would have full visibility into all compartmented intelligence programs, thus ensuring that relevant capabilities are fully employed by collectors and considered by analysts.

Coordinate, oversee, and evaluate analytic production. As already noted--and in contrast to the National Counterterrorism Center--the NCPC would not contain a large staff of analysts working on proliferation. Rather, the NCPC would coordinate decentralized analytic efforts occurring at various agencies. This would increase the likelihood of competitive analysis of proliferation issues across the Community. In some cases, the NCPC might determine that no part of the Community is addressing a proliferation-related issue sufficiently and designate a small group of resident NCPC analysts drawn from throughout the Community to work on the issue.

With these analytic oversight responsibilities, the NCPC will fulfill several critical functions, including ensuring that appropriate technical expertise is focused on state weapons programs; that gaps in the Community's knowledge about the relationship between state actors and non-state threats ( e.g ., black- and gray-market proliferators such as A.Q. Khan) are addressed; and that the NCTC has access to subject matter expertise on nuclear, biological, and chemical questions. We do not believe that the NCPC should take the lead on the crucial question of the terrorist procurement of unconventional weapons. That responsibility should, in our view, fall to the NCTC. But the Director of the NCPC should support the NCTC and be prepared to step in and appeal to the DNI if this crucial area is receiving insufficient resources and attention.

Participate in setting the budget associated with nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. As the 9/11 Commission correctly noted, true management authority also must include some budget authority. 17 In line with this observation, the NCPC would make recommendations regarding counterproliferation-related budget submissions for National Intelligence Program funds. The NCPC would also support the DNI in fulfilling his statutory responsibilities to "participate" in the development of counterproliferation-related program funds in other military intelligence budgets.

Support the needs of a Counterproliferation Joint Interagency Task Force, the National Security Council, and other relevant consumers as the Intelligence Community's leader for interdiction-related issues. Counterproliferation interdiction, in a variety of forms, will remain an important part of combating the spread of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. The NCPC would play a vital intelligence support role both in helping to formulate U.S. interdiction strategies and in assisting in individual interdiction operations. The NCPC would also support strategic planning for interdiction efforts pursued by other government entities, including the Departments of Defense, State, Homeland Security, Commerce, and Treasury. Developing plans for and executing interdiction operations using the full capabilities of interagency, private sector, and international partners is a role appropriately played by a new Counterproliferation Joint Interagency Task Force, which we propose in Chapter Thirteen (Proliferation).

As noted above, we do not believe that, in addition to these important responsibilities, the NCPC should also be the focal point for strategic policy planning on countering nuclear, biological, and chemical proliferation. The Intelligence Community will inevitably be a major force in any interagency strategic planning process, but we believe it is inadvisable to "double-hat" another intelligence component with what is fundamentally a policy role, or to bifurcate the command structure overseeing it. 18

Nevertheless, it is self-evident that someone should be performing strategic interagency planning on counterproliferation issues. As we will discuss in detail in Chapter Thirteen (Proliferation), the task of collecting intelligence on biological weapons and other proliferation threats is notoriously difficult; and we cannot reasonably expect intelligence alone will keep us safe. A successful counterproliferation effort will require a coordinated effort across the entire U.S. government, from the Intelligence Community to the Department of Defense to the Department of Commerce to the other agencies involved in this important work. In our more comprehensive later treatment of the counterproliferation challenge, we offer several recommendations on how to build such a sustained interagency coordination process, including the creation of a joint task force for counterproliferation.

POTENTIAL PITFALLS ON THE PATH TO INTEGRATION

Our recommendations to this point have involved management strategies and organizational structures that could support the DNI's effort to forge an integrated Intelligence Community. In this section, we briefly identify two formidable challenges that may stand in the way of this objective. They both involve potentially problematic relationships for the Intelligence Community's leadership: namely, with the FBI and the Department of Defense.

SUSTAINED OVERSIGHT FROM THE OUTSIDE AND IMPROVED SELF-EXAMINATION FROM WITHIN: MAKING SURE REFORM HAPPENS

Many--perhaps most--of the recommendations contained in this report have been made before. That we find ourselves proposing several sensible changes that former Secretary of Defense and Director of Central Intelligence James Schlesinger endorsed in 1971 suggests to us either that the Intelligence Community is inherently resistant to outside recommendations, or that it does not have the institutional capacity to implement them. 25 In either case, we are left with the distinct impression that meaningful intelligence reform proposals are only likely to become reality if the Intelligence Community receives sustained, senior level attention from knowledgeable outside observers. Today the Community receives only episodic oversight from the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB), Congress, and a thinly-stretched National Security Council. We recommend several changes to improve this state of affairs.

We recommend that the Joint Intelligence Community Council (JICC) serve as a "customer council" for the Intelligence Community. The JICC, which was created by the recent legislation, consists of the heads of each department that has a component in the Intelligence Community. Chaired by the DNI, the JICC will include the Secretaries of State, Treasury, Defense, Energy, and Homeland Security, the Attorney General, and other officers designated by the President. 26 Although not a perfectly representative group of consumers, the JICC should provide the DNI with valuable feedback on intelligence products. 27 We do not think, however, that the JICC is the appropriate body to perform more sustained oversight of the Intelligence Community. Since the DNI chairs the JICC, and the members of the JICC are heads of departments containing intelligence components, the body would have a "conflict of interest" that would impair its ability to play an independent oversight role.

We recommend that the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board assume a more vigorous role with respect to the Intelligence Community. The PFIAB as it is currently constituted, however, is insufficiently equipped to accomplish this task. In addition to the seasoned national security policy experts now on the Board, a reinvigorated PFIAB would need more technical specialists able to assess Intelligence Community performance, as well as a larger staff to support the review and investigation tasks inherent in meaningful oversight. Such a PFIAB is not impossible to conceive, for it has existed in the past--as it should in the future.

As a commission established by the President, we tread onto the terrain of congressional reform with some trepidation. The new intelligence legislation, however, contains a provision requiring the delivery of our report to Congress. As a result, we believe that it would not be inappropriate for us to make suggestions for reform in this area that the President could, in turn, recommend that the Congress implement.

The 9/11 Commission concluded in its final report that the Congressional intelligence committees "lack the power, influence, and sustained capability" necessary to fulfill their critical oversight responsibilities. 28 The 9/11 Commission offered two alternatives for overhauling the intelligence committees: (1) creating a bicameral committee, modeled on the Joint Atomic Energy Committee; or (2) combining intelligence authorization and appropriation authorities into a single committee in each chamber. 29 The House and Senate have not adopted either of these options. While we echo the 9/11 Commission's support for these proposals, we also recommend a number of more modest suggestions for improving Congressional oversight of intelligence.

Limit the activities of new intelligence oversight subcommittees to strategic oversight. Both the House and the Senate intelligence committees have indicated their intention to establish oversight subcommittees. 30 But these subcommittees will not improve intelligence if they simply demand additional testimony from top intelligence officials on the crisis or scandal of the day. We suggest that, if created, the oversight subcommittees limit their activities to "strategic oversight," meaning they would set an agenda at the start of the year or session of Congress, based on top priorities such as information sharing, and stick to that agenda.

Adjust term limits. The Senate has voted to remove term limits for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. 31 While the House may consider this too large a step, it could consider alternatives that would ensure the survival of institutional memory while also bringing in "new blood" and providing more members with exposure to intelligence issues. For example, the House could lengthen or even eliminate the term limits for some of the committee slots rather than for all of the slots. We suggest making the House leadership's authority to waive term limits explicit in the rules, and specifying that some positions on the intelligence committee would be free of term limits.

Reduce the Intelligence Community's reliance upon supplemental funding. There were good reasons for supplemental funding requests following the September 11 attacks. But for fiscal year 2005, nearly two-thirds of the key operational needs for counterterrorism were not included in the President's budget, and instead were put in a supplemental budget request later in the year. 32 This reduces the Intelligence Community's ability to plan operations and build programs. Instead of continuing to rely on large supplemental appropriations, we recommend that Congress and the President develop annual budgets that include the Intelligence Community's needs for the entire year and better allow planning for future years.

Adjust budget jurisdiction. Currently, the House and Senate oversight committees have different jurisdictions over the various components of the intelligence budget. Both committees have jurisdiction over the National Intelligence Program (NIP). The House intelligence committee also shares jurisdiction with the Armed Services Committee over the Joint Military Intelligence Program (JMIP) and Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities (TIARA) budgets. The Senate intelligence committee has no jurisdiction over JMIP or TIARA, although it provides advice to the Armed Services Committee on both budgets. This complicates conferences on the intelligence authorization bill and reduces intelligence committee input into the JMIP and TIARA budgets. We recommend broadening the Senate intelligence committee's jurisdiction to include JMIP and TIARA in order to integrate intelligence oversight from the tactical through to the national level.

Allocate the intelligence budget by mission, rather than only by program or activity. The DNI can also take steps to streamline and professionalize the intelligence oversight process. One impediment to Congressional evaluation of the intelligence budget is the way the budget is presented. Because line items track specific technologies or programs rather than mission areas, it is nearly impossible for Congress--or the Executive Branch--to evaluate how much money is being spent on priority targets such as terrorism or proliferation. We recommend that the DNI restructure the budget by mission areas, thus permitting greater transparency throughout the budget cycle. This mission-centered budget would permit the individual Community elements to track their expenditures by mission throughout the year, affording the DNI greater flexibility in managing the Community, and the Executive Branch and Congress an increased ability to provide effective oversight.

Deter unauthorized disclosures. More substantive Congressional oversight must be accompanied by a strengthened commitment to protect sensitive information from unauthorized disclosure. The Congress has rules to protect sensitive information and a process for investigating and penalizing those who violate those rules. 33 In some instances, however, unauthorized disclosures have either been ignored or treated lightly. The Senate and House leadership should place greater emphasis on ensuring that all members understand the need to carefully protect sensitive information and the penalties for unauthorized disclosures. For example, the leadership could make clear that all unauthorized disclosures of classified information will be referred to the ethics committees. Furthermore, both Senate and House members who are read into sensitive compartments should follow the same nondisclosure procedures applicable to the Executive Branch. 34

Improve committee mechanisms to encourage bipartisanship. Partisan politics should never be allowed to threaten national security. To foster bipartisanship, we recommend that the House intelligence committee consider adopting provisions similar to those in the Senate, such as designating the ranking member as the Vice Chairman of the committee, requiring that the majority maintain no more than a one-member advantage in membership, and ensuring that the rules provide the majority and minority leaders with equal access to committee information. The committees could also take concrete steps to reinforce close, cooperative relationships among the entire staff. For example, regular joint staff meetings could be encouraged or even required. Perhaps most importantly, the staff should consist of national security professionals focused on the objectives and priorities of the committee.

Encourage more informal discussions and collaboration between the Intelligence Community and its congressional overseers. The Intelligence Community typically interacts with Congress in formal ways, through briefings to the intelligence committees and formal testimony. However, there also have been occasional "off sites" at which senior lawmakers and Intelligence Community leaders have met in a more informal and less adversarial setting. Both sides have stressed the value of these informal sessions, both in fostering cordial cross-branch relationships and in increasing bipartisanship among lawmakers. We encourage the expanded use of these and other informal collaborative efforts.

Consider an intelligence appropriations subcommittee. While the intelligence authorizing committees are well-staffed and completely focused on the Intelligence Community, the intelligence appropriations are simply a small part of the Defense and other appropriators' jurisdiction, so staffing and attention to intelligence issues are in short supply on the appropriations committees. The resulting mismatch reduces oversight and coordination of policy within Congress. While we recognize the difficulties, we suggest that serious consideration be given to the establishment of an appropriations subcommittee focused exclusively on the intelligence budget.

Look for ways to reduce the cost of oversight in the Intelligence Community. With so many congressional committees with jurisdiction over aspects of foreign and domestic intelligence, the oversight process--between staff requests, formal testimony, congressionally directed actions, and budget reviews--imposes great demands on the resources of the Intelligence Community. Intelligence Community professionals collectively appear before Congress in briefings or hearings over a thousand times a year, and also respond to hundreds of formal written requests from Congress annually 35 --and the latter number will only increase in light of the recent intelligence reform legislation, which itself added 27 one-time and 16 annual reports to the DNI's annual congressional reporting requirements. While we recognize that congressional oversight inherently has costs, we encourage the Congress to look for ways to streamline their interactions with the Intelligence Community.

As important as executive and legislative oversight is, they will never be a substitute for an Intelligence Community that takes self-evaluation seriously. But the Intelligence Community has done far too little to institutionalize "lessons learned" studies and other after-action evaluations that are commonplace in the Department of Defense and other government agencies. Of course, when human resources are stretched thin, the idea of devoting good personnel to examine the past often seems a luxury that intelligence agencies cannot afford.

Understandable as it is, this view must be resisted. Over the long run, an organization with sound "lessons learned" processes will be more efficient and productive--even if those processes seem to be distracting good people and resources from the imperatives of the moment. We recommend that the DNI develop institutionalized processes for performing "lessons learned" studies and for reviewing the Intelligence Community's own capabilities, rather than waiting for commissions like ours to do the job. In a separate chapter we offer a recommendation in this regard that is specific to analysis, (see Analysis, Chapter 8)--but this is a problem that affects all areas of intelligence. While we think it advisable that organizations devoted to self-evaluation exist in all major intelligence agencies, the DNI must drive an independent "lessons learned" process as well--for it is the DNI who will have insight into shortcomings and failures that cut across the intelligence process. We also note that whatever entities at the DNI or agency level assume these after-action responsibilities--be they agency inspectors general or other offices--they should not conduct these reviews to justify disciplinary or other personnel action, but rather to identify shortcomings and successes and to propose improvements to aspects of the intelligence process.

CONCLUSION

The creation of an integrated Intelligence Community will not happen merely by improving activities within different agencies, and it will most certainly not happen spontaneously. It will take assertive leadership by the new DNI, vigorous support from senior policymakers and Congress, and sustained oversight from outside the Intelligence Community. Provided all that, and substantial time, a Community that has resisted management reform--and often management of any sort--can emerge better configured to deal with the pressing challenges of the new century.

ADDENDUM: THE OFFICE OF
THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE

In our discussion of management issues the DNI will confront, we have tried to eschew the "boxology" that often dominates discussions of government reform. While it is obviously important to consider what staff functions will be performed in the Office of the DNI, precise organizational questions about the structure of the office--such as, for instance, the number of deputies the DNI should have and their responsibilities--are questions to which there is no "right answer." Nonetheless, when considering the tasks that will need to be performed in the office of the DNI, we necessarily had to consider how the office might be organized to perform these functions. We offer here the result of these considerations, but we emphasize that the model we propose is a notional one that we offer only to facilitate further discussion.

The new legislation creates a number of positions in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. The statute creates a Senate-confirmed principal deputy to the DNI, and empowers the DNI to appoint up to four deputy directors. In addition, the statute also states that the Office of the DNI shall contain a General Counsel, a Director of Science and Technology, a National Counterintelligence Executive, a Civil Liberties Protection Officer, and the National Intelligence Council. Finally, the legislation provides that the Office of the DNI may include "[s]uch other offices and officials as may be established by law or the Director may establish or designate in the office," including "national intelligence centers." Of these various mandated and discretionary offices, only one--the Civil Liberties Protection Officer--is required by the act to "report directly to" the DNI; 36 in our view, the remainder can therefore report to the Director through one of the four Deputy DNIs (DDNI) permitted under the legislation.

The notional model described below--and depicted on the wiring chart at the end of this chapter--is structured around four Deputy Directors: a Deputy Director for Integrated Intelligence Strategies; a Deputy Director for Collection; a Deputy Director for Plans, Programs, Budgets, and Evaluation; and the Chief Information Management Officer. We also suggest the creation of two additional positions: an Assistant DNI for Support to Military Operations, and an Assistant DNI for Human Resources. The section that follows briefly describes the responsibilities of each of these subordinate offices.

Assistant DNI for Human Resources

The intelligence legislation provides the DNI with substantial personnel authorities, and we recommend earlier in this chapter that a DNI-level Human Resources Authority be established to develop and implement appropriate personnel policies and procedures for the Intelligence Community. We would propose that an Assistant DNI for Human Resources oversee this Human Resources Authority, and oversee the substantial changes in recruiting, training, and personnel policy that we believe are necessary. The Assistant DNI for Human Resources would also oversee the National Intelligence University that we recommend in this chapter.

A Notional Organization of the Office of the
Director of National Intelligence

ENDNOTES

1 While the 15 organizations within the Intelligence Community are not all technically "agencies"--some are instead designated as "bureaus" or "offices" within executive departments or military services--we at times refer to them collectively as "agencies," for the sake of simplicity and convenience. For a more detailed description of the components of the Intelligence Community, please see our Overview of the Intelligence Community at Appendix D of this Report.

2 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 at § 1011, Pub. L. No. 108-458 (hereinafter "IRTPA").

3 Interview with senior Department of Defense official (Oct. 4, 2004).

4 The DNI is to "determine" and guide the development of the NIP and the budgets for the Community's component agencies. IRTPA at § 1011. Moreover, in contrast to the DCI, whose formal participation in the budget process ended when the annual budget was prepared, the DNI both directs the allocation of National Intelligence Program appropriations and can "ensure the effective execution" of the annual intelligence budget. Perhaps most importantly, while the DCI could not transfer national intelligence program funds within the budget of an intelligence agency without approval of the agency's department head, the DNI can transfer up to $150 million annually (or 5 percent of a given intelligence agency's budget) without approval. Id .

5 The overall budget for intelligence is divided into three separate programs: the National Intelligence Program; the Joint Military Intelligence Program (JMIP); and the programs for Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities (TIARA). The Secretary of Defense has primary authority to develop the annual JMIP and TIARA budgets, although the new legislation states that the DNI shall "participate" in the development of these processes. Id .

6 The DNI has exclusive Milestone Decision Authority only for major system intelligence acquisition programs that are not in the Department of Defense. The DNI must share Milestone Decision Authority with the Secretary of Defense for systems funded by the NIP that are within the Defense Department, and lacks even joint Milestone Decision Authority over major system intelligence programs that rely in whole or in part on the Defense Department's joint military or tactical intelligence program funds. Id .

7 Id .

8 Id .

9 Some have suggested--drawing on a loose analogy to the military's use of "joint commands"--that the best way to accomplish this task is to divide the universe of intelligence into "national intelligence centers." As we discuss later in this chapter, while we believe that centers can and should be used in certain circumstances, we are less enthusiastic about the idea of using centers as a generally applicable organizational model for tackling intelligence problems, and believe the Mission Manager concept to be superior for this purpose.

10 IRTPA at § 1011.

11 See, e.g ., James R. Locher, Victory on the Potomac: The Goldwater-Nichols Act Unifies the Pentagon (2002); Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the United States Intelligence Community (i.e., Aspin-Brown Commission), Preparing for the 21st Century: An Appraisal of U.S. Intelligence (1996).

12 DCI Community Management Staff, NFIP--Funds by Selected Topic: Education and Training (Dec. 7, 2004) (prepared at the Commission's request).

13 Interview with senior CIA official (Dec. 9, 2004).

14 IRTPA at § 1021 (on the NCTC) and § 1022 (on the NCPC).

15 Id . at § 1022.

16 While we believe that chemical weapons are not a threat of the same order as nuclear and biological weapons, there are sufficient areas of overlap between the processes for collecting intelligence on these three categories of weapons to justify the inclusion of chemical weapons in the NCPC's mission. It is critical, however, that resources at the NCPC be allocated among these weapons types in a manner that is proportionate to the threat.

17 Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (2004) at p. 410 (hereinafter "9/11 Commission Report").

18 We recognize that the Intelligence Community implements policy when it executes covert action, but this is done (we think appropriately) with very strict oversight and in relatively limited circumstances.

19 Interview with R. James Woolsey, former Director of Central Intelligence (Aug. 24, 2004).

20 Interview with senior Defense Department official (Feb. 3, 2005).

21 Interview with senior Defense Department official (Jan. 13, 2005).

22 Id .

23 Interview with senior Defense Department official (Feb. 3, 2005).

24 IRTPA at § 1013.

25 James Schlesinger, A Review of the Intelligence Community (Mar. 10, 1971).

26 IRTPA at § 1031.

27 The JICC as currently composed does not include a representative from the Executive Office of the President, or other parts of the Executive Branch that do not include elements of the Intelligence Community. The President could easily solve the problem of no White House representation by making the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs a member of the Council.

28 9/11 Commission Report at p. 420.

29 Id .

30 The U.S. House of Representatives has created a Subcommittee on Oversight for the 109th Congress. The Senate has to date not created one although there is ongoing discussion of the issue.

31 Senate Resolution 445, 108th Congress, 2nd Session (Oct. 9, 2004).

32 Interview with DCI Community Management Staff official (Feb. 23, 2005); CIA, Response to Document Request # 74, Question 2 .

33 Rules of the Select Committee on Intelligence, Congressional Record (Feb. 25, 2003) at pp. S2689-S2694.

34 HPSCI staff members are required by HPSCI Rules 12(b)(2) to sign a Non-Disclosure Agreement. Both Members and staff are bound by the House Rules regarding non-disclosure of classified material. Senate Rule 10.5 also contains a requirement of a Non-Disclosure Agreement for SSCI staffers.

35 Office of the DCI, Submission to Commission (March 2005).

36 IRTPA at § 1011.

37 Id .

38 Id .

CHAPTER SEVEN
COLLECTION

Shaping the Force: A Larger and Better Trained Human
Intelligence Officer Cadre

Signals and Imagery Intelligence

Signals intelligence and imagery collection systems are obviously critical to the Intelligence Community's ability to collect information. Unfortunately, as our Iraq case study vividly illustrates, a combination of factors--most relating to our adversaries' increasingly effective use of denial and deception--have significantly eroded the utility of the Community's legacy signals and imagery systems. In our classified report, we specify examples highlighting the scope of the problem.

The Community is investigating and developing numerous technologies and methods that can potentially surmount some of these collection challenges. These technologies cannot be discussed in detail in an unclassified report. However, we recommend that the DNI should, as an early priority, delve into the complex technical issues that surround these innovations. The DNI should also assist collectors in developing and operationalizing the most promising innovations, while redoubling efforts to improve existing means of countering and reducing the distorting effects of denial and deception.

To aid him in the latter effort, the DNI will inherit a commendable roadmap previously developed by the DCI. Among other things, this strategy establishes efforts to counter-denial and deception by our adversaries as "a top priority for the Intelligence Community." 24 Yet, like many DCI strategies, we are concerned that the prose has not fully translated into practice. To ensure effective implementation, we suggest a mid-course review of the strategy's first five years: a thorough examination of accomplishments and shortfalls, an update of the principal actions that specific Intelligence Community entities have taken and should take, and a renewed effort to solicit the full backing and resources of relevant planning and acquisition professionals across the Community. The effort to overcome foreign denial and deception will be ongoing; there is no easy or quick fix for the problems that plague technical collectors.

In the short term, technical collectors' most important contributions to the Community's mission may occur when they operate in conjunction with other collection disciplines. As a result, we believe that implementation of the integrated collection enterprise we recommend in this chapter will significantly enhance the Community's ability to optimize its existing technical collection capabilities. Target Development Boards, in particular, will provide an ongoing opportunity to engage in cooperative collection efforts among collection disciplines--specifically to capitalize on the joint capabilities of technical and human collectors. Such joint activities have been at the source of some of the Community's most notable successes in recent years. In our classified report, we cite examples of types of joint efforts which we cannot discuss here.

Signals Intelligence in the United States

Measurement and Signature Intelligence

Open Source information has long been viewed by many outside the Intelligence Community as essential to understanding foreign political, economic, social, and even military developments. 30 Currently, the Intelligence Community has one collection organization, the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), that specializes in providing some of these vital elements--particularly the rapid reporting of foreign print, radio, and television news. While this service is highly valued within the Community and academia, the Community does not have any broader program to gather and organize the wealth of global information generated each day and increasingly available, if only temporarily, over the Internet.

We also believe that the need for exploiting open source material is greater now than ever before. Today, the spread of information technology--and the ever increasing pace at which it advances--is immune to many traditional, clandestine methods of intelligence collection. Whereas advanced technological research once occurred only in large facilities and within enormous government bureaucratic institutions, today it can (and does) occur in non-descript office parks or garages, and with very small clusters of people. And for these new challenges, many open source materials may provide the critical and perhaps only window into activities that threaten the United States.

Much has happened in the world of open source in the past ten years. Internet search tools like Google have brought significant new capabilities and expectations for open source information to analysts and users alike. Regrettably, the Intelligence Community's open source programs have not expanded commensurate with either the increase in available information or with the growing importance of open source data to today's problems. This is an unacceptable state of affairs. Consider the following:

The ever-shifting nature of our intelligence needs compels the Intelligence Community to quickly and easily understand a wide range of foreign countries and cultures. As we have discussed, today's threats are rapidly changing and geographically diffuse; it is a fact of life that an intelligence analyst may be forced to shift rapidly from one topic to the next. Increasingly, Intelligence Community professionals need to quickly assimilate social, economic, and cultural information about a country--information often detailed in open sources.

Open source information provides a base for understanding classified materials. Despite large quantities of classified material produced by the Intelligence Community, the amount of classified information produced on any one topic can be quite limited, and may be taken out of context if viewed only from a classified-source perspective. Perhaps the most important example today relates to terrorism, where open source information can fill gaps and create links that allow analysts to better understand fragmented intelligence, rumored terrorist plans, possible means of attack, and potential targets.

Open source materials can protect sources and methods. Sometimes an intelligence judgment that is actually informed with sensitive, classified information can be defended on the basis of open source reporting. This can prove useful when policymakers need to explain policy decisions or communicate with foreign officials without compromising classified sources.

Only open source can "store history." A robust open source program can, in effect, gather data to monitor the world's cultures and how they change with time. This is difficult, if not impossible, using the "snapshots" provided by classified collection methods.

We believe that this gap between the Intelligence Community's needs and its capabilities must be addressed on two fronts: collection and analysis. The former we discuss here; the latter is discussed more fully in Chapter Eight (Analysis).

We recommend that the DNI create an Open Source Directorate in the CIA to develop and utilize information processing tools to enhance the availability of open source information to analysts, collectors, and users of intelligence. At a minimum, such a program should gather and store many, if not most, of the digital newspapers and periodicals available over the Internet, regardless of language. (Daily storage is required because most of these newspapers and periodicals are on the Internet for only short periods of time.) We believe that this open source information will be invaluable to those charged with watching emerging threats and would provide a baseline for intelligence collectors and analysts when issues suddenly rise to national security significance. In addition, it can tip off analysts and collectors to changes that warrant more focused intelligence collection.

In the near term, we believe that without an institutional "champion" and home, open source will never be effectively used by the Intelligence Community. It is our hope that open source will become an integral part of all intelligence activities and that, at some point in the future, there may no longer be a need for a separate directorate. We acknowledge that our recommendation could create one more collection specialty. But, for now, open source is inadequately used and appreciated and is in need of the high-level, focused attention that only a separate directorate can provide.

As important as collecting open source material, however, is the task of getting the material to the analysts who need it. We were repeatedly told that analysts have difficulty accessing open source information at their desks. 31 The Intelligence Community must make a concerted effort to solve the technology and security challenges associated with getting open source information to every analyst's desktop.

Authorized Disclosures of Sources and Methods

The Problem of Media Leaks

The scope of damage done to our collection capabilities from media disclosures of classified information is well documented. Hundreds of serious press leaks have significantly impaired U.S. capabilities against our hardest targets. In our classified report, we detail several leaks that have collectively cost the American people hundreds of millions of dollars, and have done grave harm to national security. We cannot, however, discuss them in an unclassified format. These and hundreds of other leaks have been reported to the Justice Department by the Intelligence Community in the last ten years. However, to date, not a single indictment or prosecution has resulted.

According to past government studies, the long-standing inability of the U.S. government to control press leaks results from a combination of factors--the use of unauthorized disclosures as a vehicle to influence policy, the lack of political will to deal firmly and consistently with government leakers in both the executive and legislative branches, the difficulty of prosecuting cases under existing statutes, and the challenge of identifying the leaker. 33 The government's impotence in dealing effectively with this problem was well characterized by then-Deputy Assistant Attorney General Richard K. Willard, in 1982:

In summary, past experience with leaks investigations has been largely unsuccessful and uniformly frustrating for all concerned....The whole system has been so ineffectual as to perpetuate the notion that the Government can do nothing to stop the leaks. 34

The Commission recognizes the enormous difficulty of this seemingly intractable problem and has considered a broad range of potential solutions. We conclude that the long-standing defeatism that has paralyzed action on this topic is understandable but unwarranted. Leaks cannot be stopped, but they can be reduced. And those responsible for the most damaging leaks can be held accountable if they can be identified and if the government is willing to prosecute them.

INTRODUCTION

Analysts are the voice of the Intelligence Community.

While intelligence failures can certainly result from inadequate collection, recent experience shows that they can also occur when analysts don't effectively assess all relevant information and present it in a manner useful to decisionmakers. Improving the business of analysis should therefore be a major priority of the new Director of National Intelligence (DNI).

As in our chapter on collection, our recommendations--supported by vivid examples taken from our case studies--focus both on integrating analytical efforts across the Community and improving the overall quality of analysis.

The analytic effort in the Intelligence Community is hardly a monolithic enterprise; most of the Community's 15 organizations have at least one analytic component. Some of these agencies specialize in meeting the needs of particular users--notably the Defense Department's DIA and the State Department's INR. Some specialize in analyzing particular types of data--signals intelligence at NSA and geospatial intelligence at NGA. Some, such as the intelligence element of the Department of Energy, specialize in substantive intelligence topics, such as nuclear technology issues.

The separation of these analytic units serves a vital function; it fosters competitive analysis, encourages a diversity of viewpoints, and develops groups of analysts with different specialties. Any reform of the Community must preserve these advantages; our suggested move toward greater integration should not mean the homogenization of different viewpoints. Nevertheless, there is a great and growing need for Community analytic standards, interoperable and innovative technologies, access to shared information, and a common sense of mission. In many cases today, analysts in the 15 organizations are unaware of similar work being done in other agencies. Although analysts may develop working relationships with counterparts in other organizations, there is no formalized process or forum through which to do so. These dysfunctional characteristics of the current system must change; collaboration must replace fragmentation as the analytic community's primary characteristic.

Despite the fact that the analytic units are largely isolated and autonomous, we have been deeply impressed by pockets of excellence within them. The Community is blessed with a highly intelligent, dedicated analytic workforce that has achieved significant successes. We also note that, in response to Iraq-related failures, the Intelligence Community has recently undertaken several serious (although scattered) efforts to improve the overall quality and integrity of its analytical methods and products.

We conclude, however, that these strengths and reforms are too few and far between. Our investigation revealed serious shortcomings; specifically, we found inadequate Intelligence Community collaboration and cooperation, analysts who do not understand collection, too much focus on current intelligence, inadequate systematic use of outside experts and open source information, a shortage of analysts with scientific and technical expertise, and poor capabilities to exploit fully the available data. Perhaps most troubling, we found an Intelligence Community in which analysts have a difficult time stating their assumptions up front, explicitly explaining their logic, and, in the end, identifying unambiguously for policymakers what they do not know . In sum, we found that many of the most basic processes and functions for producing accurate and reliable intelligence are broken or underutilized.

This Commission is not the first to recognize these shortcomings--we trod a well-worn path. Again and again, many of the same obstacles to delivering the best possible analytic products have been identified. The Church Committee's 1976 report, the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence's 1996 study of the Intelligence Community in the 21st Century, the 1998 Rumsfeld Report side letter to the President, the 1999 Jeremiah Report, the Markle Foundation's 2003 Task Force, and the 9/11 Commission Report all pointed to the problems created by the poor coordination and resistance to information sharing among Intelligence Community agencies. Some studies, notably the 1996 report by the Council on Foreign Relations and the 1996 study by the Aspin-Brown Commission, noted the need to systematically engage in and use competitive analysis. As early as 1949, the Hoover Commission faulted the Intelligence Community for failing to improve relations with decisionmakers, and these concerns were echoed by the Aspin-Brown Commission and, most recently, the Markle Foundation Task Force. 1 Finally, the House and Senate intelligence committees have both noted the problems the Intelligence Community faces in processing the collected information available to it, as well as the difficulty analysts have engaging in long-term analysis, given the press of daily demands. 2

In other words, many of the problems we have identified have been apparent to observers of the Intelligence Community--and to the Community itself--for decades. Nevertheless, they have remained largely unresolved, due largely to institutional resistance to change, the classified nature of the work, and a lack of political will to enforce change.

We believe the creation of the Office of the DNI offers a unique opportunity to finally resolve many of these issues by infusing the analytic culture with new processes and Community standards. We believe that this new management structure can foster a new sense of community among analysts. Until the analytic community adopts a new approach, analysts at one agency will continue to be denied access to critical reporting from others; analysts will resist collaborating and coordinating across units; managers will persist in placing the need to answer the "daily mail" over the need to develop true expertise; and new commissions will be appointed in the wake of future intelligence failures. As discussed in previous chapters, we believe that the creation of Mission Managers will be an important factor in avoiding this grim outcome.

Our recommendations, therefore, focus on exploiting the opportunity presented by the new legislation and the creation of the Office of the DNI, as well as on instituting changes to the Community's culture that will improve analytic performance. In doing so, we offer specific suggestions for how the community of analysts can be better integrated without sacrificing all-important independent analysis, and how the Intelligence Community can ensure that analysts have the tools, training, and "tradecraft" practices to ensure that the analytic community is prepared to meet today's and tomorrow's threats.

MANAGING THE COMMUNITY OF ANALYSTS

As we have discussed in our chapters on management and on collection, no single individual or office in today's Intelligence Community is responsible for getting the answers right on the most pressing intelligence issues of our day. We have recommended the creation of Mission Managers to fill this role, and they will perform a variety of essential tasks--including leading the development and management of collection strategies against high-priority intelligence targets. Because we believe that analysis must drive the collection process, it will be vital that Mission Managers also act as leaders in the analytic community. First and foremost, they must assess the strengths and weaknesses of analytic production in their areas of substantive responsibility. These assessments will enable Mission Managers to develop strategic analysis plans to guide the Community's analytic efforts over the long term. Moreover, the assessments will guide Mission Managers in their role as chairs of Target Development Boards; their understanding of the gaps in analysts' knowledge will ensure that these gaps do in fact drive collection.

Armed with a clear understanding of where expertise resides in the Community, Mission Managers will also be able to foster competitive analysis. We expect that Mission Managers will ensure that finished intelligence routinely reflects the knowledge and competing views of analysts from all agencies in the Community. In particular, we expect that Mission Managers will encourage analysts to make differences in judgments, and the substantive bases for these differences, explicit in all finished products.

TAPPING NON-TRADITIONAL SOURCES OF INFORMATION

Analysts have large quantities of information from a wide variety of sources delivered to their desktops each day. Given the time constraints analysts face, it is understandable that their daily work focuses on using what's readily available--usually classified material. Clandestine sources, however, constitute only a tiny sliver of the information available on many topics of interest to the Intelligence Community. Other sources, such as traditional media, the Internet, and individuals in academia, nongovernmental organizations, and business, offer vast intelligence possibilities. Regrettably, all too frequently these "nonsecret" sources are undervalued and underused by the Intelligence Community. To be true all-source analysts, however, Community analysts must broaden their information horizons. We encourage analysts to expand their use of open source materials, outside experts, and new and emerging technologies.

To facilitate analysts' productive use of open source information, the Intelligence Community should create an organization responsible for the collection of open source information. We discuss the need for an open source organization in greater detail in Chapter Seven (Collection). It merits emphasis here, however, that simply creating this organization is unlikely to be sufficient. Analysts who routinely receive clandestine reporting too often see unclassified reporting as less important, and they spend too little time reviewing and integrating data available through open sources. Analysts on lower priority accounts use open source materials because they have difficulty getting clandestine collectors to assist them, but even they receive little or no training on how to evaluate available open sources or find the best information most efficiently.

MANAGING THE INFLUX OF INFORMATION

As countless groups both inside and outside the Intelligence Community have commented, there is a dire need for greater information sharing--or, as we prefer to put it, information access in the Intelligence Community. We address this topic more fully in Chapter Nine (Information Sharing).

But analysts not only need more information, they also need new ways to manage what is already available to them. Analysts today "are inundated and overloaded with information." 6 A study published in 1994 revealed that analysts on average had to scan 200 to 300 documents in two hours each day, just to discover reports worth writing about. 7 If we assume that relevant information has doubled for most analytic accounts over the past ten years (a gross understatement if open source information is considered)--and if we depend on analysts not just to pick reports to write about but instead to "connect the dots" among names, phone numbers, organizations, and events found in other documents--the typical analyst would need a full workday just to perform the basic function of monitoring new data.

The private sector is already using tools and techniques to handle the greatly increased flow of information in today's world; many of the best of these operate even before a user begins to look for relevant information. By the time an Internet user types search terms into Google, for example, the search engine has already done a huge portion of the work of indexing the information and sorting it by relevance. In fact, Google already has educated guesses about what information will be most useful regardless of the breadth of the user's search.

The Intelligence Community's widely used tools for processing raw intelligence traffic are far weaker. According to a senior official at CIA's In-Q-Tel, when analysts enter the Intelligence Community they discover that they have "left a world that was totally wired." 8 Today, an analyst looking for information on Intelligence Community computers is effectively performing a keyword search without any relevance ranking or additional context. The Community has been largely resistant to efforts to import tools from the private sector that offer new and different ways of using technology to exploit data. 9 While this resistance is often driven by legitimate concerns about security, these concerns can (and must) be overcome in the development of information technology for the Intelligence Community.

FOSTERING LONG-TERM RESEARCH AND STRATEGIC THINKING

Managers and analysts throughout the Intelligence Community have repeatedly expressed frustration with their inability to carve out time for long-term research and thinking. This problem is reinforced by the current system of incentives for analysts, in which analysts are often rewarded for the number of pieces they produce, rather than the substantive depth or quality of their production.

Analysts are consistently pressed to produce more pieces faster, particularly those for current intelligence publications such as the President's Daily Brief (PDB). One analyst told us that if an office doesn't produce for the PDB, its "cupboard is bare." 10 But constant pressure to write makes it hard for analysts to find time to do the research--and thinking--necessary to build the real expertise that underlies effective analysis. In one particularly alarming example, an Iraq analyst related that the demand for current intelligence became so acute that he not only gave up long-term research, but also stopped reading his daily in-box of intelligence reporting. That task was delegated to a junior analyst with no expertise on Iraq weapons of mass destruction issues who pulled traffic he thought might be of interest. 11 Although this is an unusually dramatic example, we provide additional classified statistics illustrating this problem in our classified report.

The drive to fill current publications can also crowd out work on strategic military and proliferation issues. As with long-term research, work on these issues may fall by the wayside as analysts respond to immediate, tactical policymaker interests. And strategic work may be discouraged simply because presenting it in a format usable by current intelligence publications is difficult or impossible. Technical assessments are generally seen as too cumbersome for daily intelligence and more difficult for the non-technical briefers to discuss should the President choose to have a dialogue on the issue. Although some of these products reach senior policymakers separately, the fact that they are typically excluded from the publication designed to inform the President about the most important issues of the day likely suggests to analysts that this work is not as highly valued as other topics.

Managers with whom we spoke are aware of the dearth of strategic, long-term thinking, and are seeking ways to remedy the problem. However, we think that part of the solution lies within the new office of the DNI.

ENCOURAGING DIVERSE AND INDEPENDENT ANALYSIS

Throughout our case studies we observed the importance of analysts clearly identifying and stating the basis for their assessments. But good analysis goes well beyond just saying what is known, what is unknown, and what an analyst thinks. It is critical that analysts find ways of routinely challenging their initial assumptions and questioning their conclusions--in short, of engaging in competitive (or, as we prefer to call it, independent) analysis.

IMPROVING TRADECRAFT THROUGH TRAINING

A common theme from our case studies is that the fundamental logical and analytic principles that should be utilized in building intelligence assessments are often inadequately applied. There are several reasons for this. Key among these is a leadership failure; managers of analysts have neglected to demand the highest standards of analytic craft. This management weakness has been compounded in recent years by the lack of experience among analysts, caused by the more than 33 percent decline in the number of analysts from the latter part of the 1980s through most of the 1990s. On top of the numerical reduction, many of the best analysts left during this period because they were the ones who could easily get jobs outside of government. The outflow of knowledge was even greater than the outflow of people.

The Intelligence Community started slowly to hire more analysts in the late 1990s, and recent congressional and executive branch actions are now resulting in further expansion of the analytic corps. As a result, the Intelligence Community is now populated with many junior analysts and few mentors. And the focus on current intelligence has meant that few analysts are given the time to develop expertise, while managers have little time to develop management and mentoring skills.

These difficulties have reduced the quality of finished intelligence. When we reviewed finished intelligence, we found egregious examples of poor tradecraft, such as using a piece of evidence to support an argument when the same piece also supported exactly the opposite argument--and failing to note this fact. In some cases, analysts also failed to update or correct previously published pieces, which led other analysts and policymakers to make judgments on faulty or incomplete premises.

But far and away the most damaging tradecraft weakness we observed was the failure of analysts to conclude--when appropriate--that there was not enough information available to make a defensible judgment. 14 As much as they hate to do it, analysts must be comfortable facing up to uncertainty and being explicit about it in their assessments. Thankfully, we have found several instances of recent efforts by individual analysts to clearly admit what they do and do not know. In particular, a recent National Intelligence Estimate used new processes to ensure that source information was carefully checked for accuracy before inclusion in the estimate. In addition, the Estimate clearly highlighted the intelligence collection gaps on the topic and analysts' level of confidence in their judgments. In our classified report we discuss the particulars of this Estimate in greater depth. Still, these efforts have not been institutionalized, nor are they widespread. We heard many times from users of intelligence that they would like analysts to tell them up front what they don't know--something that intelligence analysts apparently do too infrequently.

MAKING ANALYSIS MORE TRANSPARENT

Training analysts and managers to use better "tradecraft" is only half the battle; rigorous analytic methods must be demanded in every intelligence product. One way of doing so--and at the same time ensuring that customers are confident in the intelligence they receive--is to make the analytic process more transparent. Although we recognize that real security issues make total transparency impossible, we fear that protecting sources and methods has resulted in the shrouding of analysis itself, not just the intelligence on which it is based. This tendency must, we believe, be actively resisted.

IMPROVING SCIENTIFIC, TECHNICAL, AND WEAPONS INTELLIGENCE

SERVING INTELLIGENCE CUSTOMERS

Analysts are the link between customers and the Intelligence Community. They provide a conduit for providing intelligence to customers and for conveying the needs and interests of customers to collectors. This role requires analysts to perform a number of functions. Analysts must assess the available information and place it in context. They must clearly and concisely communicate the information they have, the information they need, the conclusions they draw from the data, and their doubts about the credibility of the information or the validity of their conclusions. They must understand the questions policymakers ask, those they are likely to ask, and those they should ask; the information needed to answer those questions; and the best mechanisms for finding that information. And as analysts are gaining unprecedented and critically important access to operations traffic, they must also become security gatekeepers, revealing enough about the sources for policymakers to evaluate their reporting and conclusions, but not enough to disclose tightly-held, source-identifying details.

Analysts fulfill these functions through interactions with a wide range of intelligence customers, who run the gamut in terms of rank, area of responsibility, and understanding of intelligence. "Typical" customers include not only the President and senior policymakers, but also members of Congress, military commanders, desk officers in executive agencies, law enforcement officers, customs and border patrol officials, and military units in the field. We do not attempt to examine each of these relationships, but we do note some challenges in this area. Specifically, we address how the Intelligence Community might modernize some customer relationships, some components of an "appropriate" relationship between analysts and customers, and how the President--and to a lesser degree other senior policymakers--should be supported.

RETAINING THE BEST ANALYSTS

The Intelligence Community is unlikely to have the funding necessary to rely exclusively--or even primarily--on economic incentives to recruit and retain the best and the brightest. The Community, however, has always offered analysts something more: the opportunity to play a role in shaping the decisions of the nation's top leaders and to help maintain the security of our nation. To the extent that the Community loses sight of this as a motivating factor for its employees, it loses its most valuable tool for recruitment and retention.

LEARNING FROM PAST MISTAKES

The new intelligence reform legislation requires the DNI to assign an individual or entity the responsibility to ensure that finished intelligence products are timely, objective, independent of political considerations, based on all sources of available intelligence, and grounded in proper analytic tradecraft. In the course of conducting relevant reviews, this entity is further directed to produce a report of lessons learned. 32

CONCLUSION

The changes that we recommend are significant departures from the current way in which the Community conducts the business of analysis. Some run counter to long-standing, embedded practices, and we are mindful that they may be resisted by analysts and managers alike. We believe, however, that these changes are essential to improving the Community's capability to accurately assess threats and to provide timely, relevant, thoughtful support to policymakers. Intelligence analysis faces unprecedented challenges; unprecedented measures to strengthen the analytical process are well warranted.

ENDNOTES

1 U.S. Senate, The Final Report of the Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities (April 26, 1976) (i.e., Church Committee Report); Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, U.S. House of Representatives, IC21: Intelligence Community in the 21st Century (1996); Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States (i.e., Rumsfeld Commission), Side Letter to the President (March 18, 1999); CIA, The Jeremiah Report: The Intelligence Community's Performance on the Indian Nuclear Tests (June 1, 1998); Markle Foundation Task Force, Creating a Trusted Information Network for Homeland Security (Dec. 2003); National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States ( i.e. , The 9/11 Commission Report) (2004); Council on Foreign Relations, Making Intelligence Smarter: The Future of U.S. Intelligence: Report of an Independent Task Force (1996); Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the United States Intelligence Community ( i.e. , Aspin-Brown Commission), Preparing for the 21st Century: An Appraisal of U.S. Intelligence (1996); Report of the Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government ( i.e. Hoover Commission Report) (1949).

2 Staff review of House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Markups of Intelligence Authorization Bills, 1991-2005.

3 Interview with senior intelligence official (Sept. 22, 2004).

4 The CIA has had similar programs in the past whereby the agency introduced analysts who were tools experts to work alongside other analysts. These analysts were just like their analytic colleagues, except that they were also specialists in how to use analytic technologies and could help counterparts learn to use these tools to structure research problems. CIA Office of Research and Development, Office of East Asian Analysis Testbed Project Final Report (Sept. 30, 1994).

5 Interview with biosecurity expert (Feb. 4, 2005).

6 Inter-agency Information Sharing Working Group, Consolidated Report (Dec. 14, 2004) at p. 5. We provided an additional footnote illustrating the magnitude of this challenge in our classified report.

7 CIA Office of Research and Development, Office of East Asian Analysis Testbed Project Final Report (Sept. 30, 1994).

8 Interview with senior In-Q-Tel official (Feb. 3, 2005). In addition, a senior manager of analysis told us he knew there is a need to make better use of open sources but that this could not be achieved without assistance in the form of preliminary correlation of the data. Interview with senior CIA DI official (Feb. 10, 2005).

9 Interview with senior In-Q-Tel official (Feb. 3, 2005).

10 Interview with CIA analysts (Jan. 24, 2005).

11 Interview with former CIA WINPAC analysts (Nov. 10, 2004).

12 These formal alternative analysis programs are also reinforced by the existence of multiple analytic units in the Community, which often reach different analytic conclusions.

13 The DNI is statutorily required to assign responsibility "for ensuring responsibility that, as appropriate, elements of the Intelligence Community conduct alternative analysis." Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 at § 1017, Pub. L. No. 108-458 (hereinafter "IRTPA").

14 Chapter Three (Afghanistan).

15 Interview with senior CIA official.

16 There currently exist several very successful joint training programs. The Joint Military Intelligence College, for example, currently operates a very successful program--a structured intermediate/advanced curriculum for Intelligence Community officers across the Community. At the same time, many similar efforts have failed for various reasons, including insufficient funding and lack of bureaucratic clout. The Defense Department Chancellor for Civilian Education's program is one such example of an unsuccessful cross-agency effort. Interview with former senior staff of the defunct Department of Defense Office of the Chancellor for Civilian Education and Development (Jan. 13, 2005).

17 Some, but not most, of the finished intelligence provided to the Commission included lists of reference numbers identifying particular sources, but we understand that such lists are not routinely provided to policymakers. In any case, these lists provide no indication of how one could determine which specific document supported facts included in the piece.

18 We recognize that the DCI is currently working to establish Community procedures for such a system, and we commend this development. Chapter One (Iraq) provides a detailed discussion of how analysts and intelligence users continued to use reporting considered unreliable.

19 DCI Intelligence Science Board Task Force, The State of Science and Technology Analysis in the Intelligence Community (April 2004) at p. xiii (hereinafter "ISB Report").

20 Id. at p. xiii; Interview with senior intelligence official (Oct. 7, 2004); Interview with senior DIA analyst (Sept. 23, 2004).

21 ISB Report at pp. 26-27.

22 Id. at p. 27.

23 Id. at pp. 26, 28; Interview with administration official (Sept. 30, 2004); Interview with administration official (Sept. 10, 2004).

24 Interview with senior administration official (Oct. 12, 2004).

25 IRTPA at § 1011.

26 In addition, several senior policymakers expressed concerns about the utility of the PDB in its current incarnation.

27 Interview with senior intelligence analyst (Nov. 8, 2004).

28 We understand that the CIA is already moving in this direction and we commend it for doing so.

29 Interview with DIA analysts and managers (Oct. 26, 2004).

30 See, e.g. , Interview with CIA WINPAC analysts (Oct. 14, 2004).

31 Id.

32 IRTPA at § 1019.

33 Interview with DIA analysts (Nov. 22, 2004).

CHAPTER NINE
INFORMATION SHARING

INTRODUCTION: THE LAY OF THE LAND

The 9/11 Commission Report depicted a number of failures by one agency to pass terrorism warning information to other agencies, resulting in missed opportunities to apprehend terrorists. 1 Although the problem of information sharing was not a central part of the Intelligence Community's failure to assess Iraq's weapons programs properly, our study of Iraq found several situations where key information failed to reach those who needed it: for example, poor information systems resulted in a failure to recall reporting from a source who was determined to be a fabricator, and early reporting raising questions about the credibility of Curveball was not widely distributed to the analytical community. 2 Our review of other aspects of the Intelligence Community--and in particular, the Intelligence Community's current capabilities to combat the terrorist threat--revealed other shortcomings in the way in which information is communicated between and among intelligence agencies.

Our study is hardly the first to identify the need for information sharing, both within the Intelligence Community and in other areas of the government. 3 The Intelligence Community has taken its own steps to address the problem internally, and has launched more than 100 initiatives since September 11 to improve information sharing. 4 While some of these steps deserve praise, progress has been uneven and sporadic. As demonstrated in our terrorism case study, the Terrorist Threat Integration Center, now absorbed within the National Counterterrorism Center, has succeeded in establishing connections to dozens of networks at its new terrorism warning center--but obstacles remain. Representatives from one agency still face legal and policy barriers that prevent them from gaining access to the databases of another. 5 Collectors of information continue to operate as though they "own" the information, and collectors continue to control access to the information they generate. 6 Decisions to withhold information are typically based on rules that are neither clearly defined nor consistently applied, with no system in place to hold collectors accountable for inappropriately withholding information. 7

In short, while some progress has been made since September 11, we are still quite far from the goal of enabling personnel from across the Intelligence Community to access information from anywhere in the Community through their own network-based connections. In our terrorism case study, we agreed with the recent assessment of the DCI's Information Sharing Working Group, which found that "[a] great deal of energy...is being expended across the [Intelligence Community] to improve information sharing. However, the majority of these initiatives will not produce the enduring institutional change required to address our current threat environment." 8

Recognizing the incomplete nature of the Intelligence Community's efforts, the President and Congress have taken their own steps in recent months to address the problem. The new reform legislation built upon Executive Order 13356 by mandating the creation of an "Information Sharing Environment" for all "terrorism information," and created a new office--a "Program Manager" who reports to the President--to administer it. 9 The purpose of the Information Sharing Environment is to ensure "the sharing of terrorism information among all appropriate Federal, State, local, and tribal entities, and the private sector through the use of policy guidelines and technologies." 10 The new law also recast the Information Systems Council established by Executive Order 13356 as the "Information Sharing Council" with responsibility to oversee the development of the Information Sharing Environment. 11 Most everyone now "gets it"; when we asked the most distinguished leaders of the Intelligence Community to name their first priority for reform, many responded "information sharing." There is broad consensus on the big picture. But the problem is hard to fix. While some technical barriers exist, policy barriers are the real problem. One must not dismiss concerns about security or the protection of sources and methods as illegitimate; but, at the same time, such concerns must not force a stalemate, which is too often the result when interagency initiatives move from rhetoric to implementation.

The initial implementation plan of the Information Sharing Council exemplifies our concern. The President directed the Council, within 120 days, to produce a "plan, with proposed milestones, timetables for achieving those milestones, and identification of resources" to execute the plan. 12 While the initial plan proposes milestones and timetables, the plan lacks specific quantitative metrics by which to measure success or failure over time. 13 In many cases, the Council seems to have defaulted to consensus, 14 which in most cases means that many hard decisions were not made. A senior member of the Information Sharing Council described the Council's product as a "plan to make a plan," 15 and we agree.

We recognize that, in addressing the information sharing problem, we do not write on a blank slate. Our recommendations therefore will focus on questions of implementation and enforcement. We offer recommendations on how to smooth out ambiguities in information sharing responsibilities that the intelligence reform legislation created, and more generally on how we believe the new Director of National Intelligence should manage the information sharing effort. Success will require strong, centralized leadership and an enforcement regime that is based on clearly defined milestones, carries substantial penalties for failure to meet them, and has minimal tolerance for excuses. The recommendations below offer our views on how to get there.

IMPLEMENTING THE NEW INTELLIGENCE LEGISLATION: DISENTANGLING OVERLAPPING AUTHORITIES

MANAGING INFORMATION ACCESS, INFORMATION SECURITY, AND INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY

Of course, if the DNI is to exercise such authority, the DNI must demonstrate a commitment and an ability to achieve information sharing across the government. That will not be easy. So far, information sharing among intelligence agencies, even regarding terrorism, is intense but ad hoc. As we described in our terrorism case study, terrorism information sharing depends far too much on agency-specific workarounds. There has not been strong leadership or a centralized approach. Agencies have resisted broader solutions for two plausible reasons: first, because of technological incompatibilities; and second, because of security and privacy restrictions on sharing data. Neither of these objections is trivial, but the Community only makes matters worse by allowing them to fester for lack of decisionmaking authority. For that reason, we recommend that responsibility for security and technology issues in the Intelligence Community be combined into a single office reporting directly to the DNI or his principal deputy. This office would oversee and manage the policy, security, and technical dimensions of all information sharing within the Intelligence Community. To make clear that its responsibilities exceed those of the traditional federal government Chief Information Officer, it could be called the Chief Information Management Officer (CIMO).

LEARNING FROM PAST INFORMATION SHARING EXPERIENCE

We do not propose to tell the DNI and the chief information management officer how to resolve all of the difficult technical and policy issues associated with creating an Information Sharing Environment that works. Nonetheless, we can offer some insights that may be of use as the DNI sets forth on this difficult endeavor. Many of these insights arise from the Intelligence Community's experience with Intelink, which functions as a kind of Internet for the secure sharing of intelligence in parts of the Intelligence Community.

SETTING UNIFORM INFORMATION SHARING POLICIES

The fundamental barriers to information sharing are not a matter of technology; they arise from the legal, policy, and cultural "rules" that pervade the system. That is why information sharing cannot be a matter of issuing one edict or adopting one technology. It requires a patient sorting out of many complex policy threads and adapting systems and policies to emerging Intelligence Community and government processes. Without pretending that we have identified all of the problems, let alone all of the solutions, we have been able to isolate several of the policies that stand in the way of information sharing. In many cases we suggest solutions to these problems.

EMPLOYING STRONG ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS AND INCENTIVES TO DRIVE CHANGE

The Information Sharing Environment envisioned by the President and Congress faces innumerable pragmatic obstacles to speedy implementation. Transition to new technology, new data standards, and new procedures will disrupt existing agency functions, some of which may serve a vital national security role. For critical systems, it may be necessary to create a parallel infrastructure for the Information Sharing Environment, keeping legacy systems fully operational until the new one is built, tested, and ready for switch-over. Agencies will procrastinate for fear of degrading mission performance. Security apprehensions will sprout. The DNI will need to drive change relentlessly or the sharing environment will founder.

PROTECTING PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES

No discussion of information sharing initiatives would be complete without noting that the sharing of information has raised privacy and civil liberties concerns in the wake of September 11.

Our recommendations in this chapter rest securely in the belief that all concerned will follow provisions in the new legislation and executive orders that are designed to make the protection of civil liberties an ongoing priority for the intelligence and law enforcement communities. The recent executive orders establishing the NCTC and mandating greater sharing of counterterrorism information each included the protection of "the freedom, information privacy, and other legal rights of Americans" as part of the underlying policy. 44 And on the same day the President issued these orders, he established the President's Board on Safeguarding Americans' Civil Liberties. 45

Building on these executive orders, the legislation establishes a Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board within the Executive Office of the President. 46 The Board is tasked with reviewing regulations, policies, and laws relating to counterterrorism, including those that address information sharing, to ensure that each of these takes account of privacy and civil liberties concerns. 47 The Board is also charged with regular reviews of the information sharing practices of the executive branch to address the same concerns. 48

Further, the new law places a Civil Liberties Protection Officer in the office of the DNI, 49 who, alone among the legislatively-mandated staff, must directly report to the DNI. 50 The statute also recommends, although it does not require, that other entities establish similar positions. 51 The officer is specifically charged with ensuring that policies and procedures protect civil liberties, that the use of technology does not erode privacy protections, and that U.S. persons information is handled in compliance with existing legislation. 52

Provisions of the legislation specifically calling for more information sharing also take care to address privacy concerns. Indeed, the new system must "incorporate[] protections for individuals' privacy and civil liberties." 53 Even before implementation of the new Information Sharing Environment, the President, in consultation with the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board, must issue guidelines to "protect privacy and civil liberties in the development and use" of the Information Sharing Environment. 54 And the separate implementation plan must include a "description of the means by which privacy and civil liberties will be protected in the design and operation" of the Information Sharing Environment. 55 Further underscoring the centrality of this issue, the Program Manager for this effort must "ensure the protection of privacy and civil liberties" when he sets policies and procedures for information sharing. 56 And oversight of this issue will be ongoing. The President's annual report to Congress on the status of information sharing must address, among other things, "actions taken in the preceding year to implement or enforce privacy and civil liberties protections." 57

Thus, the law already provides the framework for appropriate protection of civil liberties in the context of information sharing. Adequate protection will, however, require detailed implementation in the development of the system itself, perhaps assisted by the oversight board and privacy experts and groups outside the Intelligence Community. In our view, an equally important protection is in the technology and the culture of the agencies that do the sharing. Much new technology can be used effectively to protect information from misuse. The intelligence reform act recognizes this possibility by calling for the use of audit, authentication, and access controls in the Information Sharing Environment. 58 These technologies impose accountability on every user of the Information Sharing Environment. They also allow agencies to know who is accessing particular files and to determine, in advance or after the fact, whether access is proper. Data can be tagged to identify which people or organizations are entitled to access it, and strong authentication can dramatically reduce the risk that an unauthorized user will gain access. Auditing techniques allow the system to find users whose access is unusual or not clearly justified and to alert supervisors or security personnel to the need for further investigation--a technique that is unavailable when information is shared by paper. All of these techniques can provide added privacy protection for Americans.

The pursuit of privacy and national security is not a zero-sum game. The same technologies that protect against violations of privacy can also provide strong counterintelligence capabilities--something that will be essential if the Information Sharing Environment is to work over the long run. As the Markle Foundation plainly put it, any information sharing system must come with mechanisms designed to foster trust, "[f]or without trust, no one will share." 59

ENDNOTES

1 For example, CIA failed to pass names of suspected terrorists to the Federal Aviation Administration and Customs, and the FBI failed to disseminate a warning from its St. Louis Field Office to any other agency. Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (2004) (hereinafter "9/11 Commission Report") at p. 258.

2 Chapter One (Iraq).

3 See generally 9/11 Commission Report; Markle Foundation Task Force, Creating a Trusted Information Sharing Network (Dec. 2003).

4 DCI Community Management Staff, Calibration Report: Community Intelligence Community Collaboration and Information Sharing to Win the War on Terrorism: Phase 1 (May 2004) (unclassified excerpt) (hereinafter "IC May 2004 Calibration Report").

5 Chapter Four (Terrorism).

6 Id.

7 Id.

8 IC May 2004 Calibration Report at p. ES-1 (emphasis in original).

9 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 at § 1016, Pub. L. No. 108-458 (hereinafter "IRTPA").

10 Id. at § 1016(b)(2).

11 Id. at § 1016(a)(1).

12 Executive Order 13356 (Aug. 27, 2004) at § 5(c).

13 The failure of the Information Sharing Council to specify quantitative metrics for accountability may have resulted from the overlap in responsibilities between the Council as provided by Executive Order 13356, and those of the Program Manager as provided by the Intelligence Reform Act of 2004.

14 The Information Sharing Council report is replete with phrases like "mutually satisfactory approach." See generally Information Systems Council, Initial Plan for the Interoperable Terrorism Information Sharing Environment (Dec. 20, 2004) (hereinafter "ISC Report").

15 Interview with Department of Defense counterintelligence and security official (Feb. 8, 2005).

16 IRTPA at § 1011 (amending § 102A of the National Security Act).

17 Id.

18 Id. at § 1021.

19 Id.

20 Id.

21 Id.

22 Id. at § 1016(b).

23 While the act gives the information program manager responsibility (without limitation) for "information sharing across the Federal Government," the provisions creating this office are in the context of legislation that deals only with "terrorism information" as expressly defined. IRTPA at § 1016(a)(4).

24 Id. at § 1016(f)(1).

25 In discussion of the Conference Report, Senator Collins stated: "The legislation provides that the program manager is to serve for two years, during the initial development of the ISE, to ensure that the project gets off to a sound start. As part of the implementation plan to be submitted to Congress after one year, the program manager is to recommend a future management structure for the ISE, including a recommendation as to whether the position of program manager should continue." Congressional Record--Senate (Dec. 8, 2004) at p. S11973.

26 This and future references in the text to the Information Sharing Council refer to the legislatively created body; previously the term referred to the one created by Executive Order.

27 IRTPA at § 1016(g)(1).

28 The legislation provides that the Program Manager will "assist in the development of policies, procedures, guidelines, rules and standards" for the ISE. Id. at § 1016(f)(2)(A).

29 Executive Order 13356 established the Information Systems Council, chaired by the Office of Management and Budget, and directed it to "report to the President through the Assistants to the President for National Security Affairs and Homeland Security." Executive Order 13356 (Aug. 27, 2004) at § 5(c). IRTPA renamed the "Information Systems Council" to be the "Information Sharing Council" and gave it responsibility to "assist the President and the program manager in their duties" with respect to information sharing. IRTPA at § 1016(g)(1).

30 Interview with senior National Counterterrorism Center official (Feb. 8, 2005).

31 Chapter Four (Terrorism).

32 IRTPA at § 1016(b)(1)(B). We do note, however, that in the discussion of information sharing in connection with the Conference Report on the intelligence reform act, Senator Collins stated, "It is not our intent that the DNI also assume further responsibilities of program manager." Conference Report--Senate (Dec. 8, 2004) at p. S11973.

33 Executive Order 12968 (Aug. 4, 1995) at § 2.5(b).

34 Many of the future "milestones" described in the Information Sharing Council's report have already been achieved by Intelink: "At the core of this interoperable terrorism sharing environment, is an environment resembling the Internet. The environment would have a variety of sites managed by participating organizations with tools to help link users ( i.e. , information producers and consumers) with the information they need. Unlike the Internet, however, this is not a loose, voluntary association of parties, but rather a disciplined structure for the creation, protection, dissemination, retention, and use of actionable information across seven related communities." ISC Report at p. 24.

35 The Information Sharing Council's report describes Intelink services on JWICS and SIPRNET as follows: "The networks provide sophisticated search and discovery capabilities, support email and collaboration, and maintain directories and other services making it easy for users to find and use information." Id. at p. 35.

36 This is done by metadata tags specifically referencing the identity of individuals authorized to have access to a particular document.

37 Interview with CIA counterintelligence officials (Jan. 27, 2005).

38 Markle Foundation Task Force on National Security in the Information Age, Creating a Trusted Information Sharing Network (Dec. 2003) at p. 140.

39 "Agencies within the Intelligence Community are authorized to collect, retain, or disseminate information concerning United States persons only in accordance with procedures established by the head of the agency concerned and approved by the Attorney General." Executive Order 12333 (Dec. 4, 1981) at § 2.3.

40 This might require a change to Executive Order 12333, which directs individual agencies to establish their own U.S. persons rules (subject to Attorney General approval) and does not expressly interpose the DNI in that process. As we note in Chapter Ten (Intelligence at Home), our envisioned Assistant Attorney General for National Security would be the natural office to take the lead in securing Justice Department approval of such guidelines.

41 Interview with Department of Defense counterintelligence and security official (Feb. 8, 2005).

42 Chapter Four (Terrorism).

43 The program managers of Special Access Programs have wide discretion to set security rules applicable only to their program.

44 Executive Order 13354 (Aug. 27, 2004) at § 1(b); Executive Order 13356 (Aug. 27, 2004) at § 1(b).

45 Executive Order 13353 (Aug. 27, 2004).

46 IRTPA at §1061.

47 Id. at § 1061(c)(1).

48 Id. at § 1061(c)(2).

49 Id. at § 1011.

50 Id.

51 Id. at § 1062.

52 Id. at § 1011.

53 Id. at § 1016(b)(2)(H).

54 Id. at § 1016(d)(2)(A).

55 Id. at § 1016(e)(8).

56 Id. at § 1016(f)(2)(B)(viii).

57 Id. at § 1016(h)(2)(H), (I).

58 Id. at § 1016(b)(2)(I).

59 Markle Foundation Task Force on National Security in the Information Age, Creating a Trusted Network for Homeland Security (Dec. 2, 2003) at p. 18.

INTRODUCTION

The events of September 11 made clear that terrorists can operate on both sides of the U.S. border. Terrorists are seeking nuclear and biological weapons outside the United States, but they long to use them here.

This new reality requires first that the FBI and other agencies do a better job of gathering intelligence inside the United States, and second that we eliminate the remnants of the old "wall" between foreign intelligence and domestic law enforcement. Both tasks must be accomplished without sacrificing our domestic liberties and the rule of law, and both depend on building a very different FBI from the one we had on September 10, 2001. It is these two tasks to which we now turn.

CHANGE AND RESISTANCE TO CHANGE
AT THE FBI

It has now been three and a half years since the September 11 attacks. A lot can be accomplished in that time. Three and a half years after December 7, 1941, the United States had built and equipped an army and a navy that had crossed two oceans, the English Channel, and the Rhine; it had already won Germany's surrender and was two months from vanquishing Japan.

INTEGRATING THE FBI INTO THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

The FBI's intelligence capabilities plainly require continued attention. But strengthening the FBI's national security capabilities is not the only task at hand. The FBI must also interact effectively with the rest of the Intelligence Community. The FBI has 1,720 professional intelligence analysts, 28 more than 12,000 agents capable of collecting valuable information in the field, 29 and the primary responsibility for counterintelligence and counterterrorism in the United States. 30 As such, it is a large and critical contributor to U.S. intelligence efforts.

The need for better intelligence coordination across the foreign-domestic divide was identified by the 9/11 Commission and was a moving force behind the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act. Creating a DNI with explicit responsibility for coordinating and managing domestic and foreign intelligence agencies serves as an important step in the right direction. But the legislation cannot create a community by itself. In fact, if nothing is done, a determinedly independent FBI could largely elude the DNI's intended authorities. To understand the risk, it is necessary to understand the mechanisms by which the DNI is expected to lead the Intelligence Community.

In writing the intelligence reform legislation, Congress did not create a Secretary of Intelligence or move all of the intelligence agencies under the direct command of the DNI. Congress left the intelligence agencies where they were--the Defense Department in most cases--but it also granted the DNI substantial authority over those agencies. NSA is typical. Though it is a Defense Department agency, NSA is part of the Intelligence Community. To ensure that NSA is responsive to the DNI, Congress gave the DNI significant authority over both NSA's budget 31 and a say in the appointment of its director. 32 The intelligence reform law applies the same basic authorities to the FBI but, in the case of the FBI, the DNI's principal tools for ensuring influence remain troublingly vague.

ENDING THE TURF WAR BETWEEN THE FBI
AND THE CIA

THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE: THE REMAINING REORGANIZATION

THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY: MORE WALLS TO BREACH

The Department of Homeland Security is the primary repository for information about what passes in and out of the country--a critical player safeguarding the United States from nuclear, biological, or chemical attack. Yet since its inception Homeland Security has faced immense challenges in collecting information efficiently, making it available to analysts and users both inside and outside the department, and bringing intelligence support to law enforcement and first responders who seek to act on such information.

Although we have included Homeland Security in our discussion of intelligence collection within the United States, we have not completed a detailed study of the Department's current capabilities. We will therefore make only one formal recommendation with respect to Homeland Security. Nonetheless, it is plain that Homeland Security faces challenges in all four of the roles it plays in the Intelligence Community--as collector, analyst, disseminator, and customer.

The Department of Homeland Security has no shortage of intelligence collectors. With 22 agencies, Homeland Security commands more than 180,000 personnel from the U.S. Coast Guard, Customs and Border Protection, Secret Service, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), Transportation Security Administration, and Office of Infrastructure Protection. 97 ICE has more than 3,000 employees.98 ICE collects reams of data on foreigners entering the United States and manages the Student and Exchange Visitor Information System database, which includes information on foreign students studying in the United States. However, whether agencies like ICE are equipped to make this information available to the Intelligence Community in useable form remains unclear. ICE officials explained that they would not give other agencies unfettered access to their databases (despite those agencies' wishes) because of unspecified legal constraints. 99 We find this September 10th approach to information sharing troubling; it deserves careful scrutiny from the DNI and the new Secretary of Homeland Security, to ensure there is full information sharing consistent with intelligence needs and valid civil liberties concerns.

A critical Homeland Security function is disseminating threat information to law enforcement and other officials at the federal, state, local, and tribal level. The Department of Homeland Security currently faces many difficulties in this regard. According to one Homeland Security official, local law enforcement officials are currently "shotgunned" by the information flow coming from a variety of federal sources, and confused as to who has the lead in supporting their information and intelligence needs. 100 Senior officials at Homeland Security emphasize that the process of declassifying information takes too long and frequently prevents the department from quickly sharing concrete, actionable information with law enforcement. 101 Instead, law enforcement officials often receive a steady steam of vague threat reporting, unsupported by adequate sourcing, and incapable of serving as a basis for action.

Homeland Security's problems with sharing national security information do not end there. Like many other intelligence organizations, Department of Homeland Security officials expressed concerns about the lack of procedures for sharing intelligence across agencies. As an example, Homeland Security officials have expressed concern that they have no mechanism for getting answers to "hot questions" they pose to the FBI and the National Counterterrorism Center. 102 Some of the obstacles to interagency collaboration are even more basic. As one senior Homeland Security official in the Information Analysis section remarked about the FBI, "I still can't send them an e-mail, and they can't send one back." 103 Finally, in a variation on a familiar theme, some law enforcement agents at Homeland Security have expressed unwillingness to share operational information out of concern that other agencies might seek to "steal" their cases. 104

ENDNOTES

1 The FBI refers to itself in these terms. According to the FBI, "now that the Intelligence Program is established and developing, we are turning to the next stage of transforming the Bureau into an intelligence agency." FBI, The FBI's Counterterrorism Program Since September 2001, Report to the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (April 14, 2004) at p. 31. Director Mueller also refers to the FBI as "both a law enforcement and an intelligence agency." Testimony of Robert S. Mueller, III, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Before the United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary (May 20, 2004).

2 Interview with U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement official (Feb. 28, 2005).

3 According to Director Mueller, in 2004, 30 percent of new hires had accounting, law enforcement, and military backgrounds. Interview with Robert Muller, FBI Director (Oct. 20, 2004).

4 Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (2004) at p. 425 (hereinafter "9/11 Commission Report").

5 As a result of the FBI's strategic plan of 1998, the Bureau created an Office of Intelligence. One year later, in November 1999, the FBI created an Investigative Services Division that subsumed the Office of Intelligence and was designed to "house a new Information, Analysis and Assessments Branch." FBI, Press Release (Nov. 11, 1999). According to a 1999 FBI press release, the aim of the Investigative Services Division was to extract information from case files "and other existing sources to identify future trends and means of preventing crime and threats to national security. The FBI intends to increase its reliance on information analysts and to devote additional efforts to recruiting highly qualified persons to perform this function." Id.

6 According to a 9/11 Commission staff statement, at the time that the Investigative Services Division was set up, an internal FBI review "found that 66 percent of the bureau's analysts were not qualified to perform analytical duties....The new division did not succeed. FBI officials told us that it did not receive sufficient resources, and there was ongoing resistance to its creation from senior managers in the FBI's operational divisions. Those managers feared losing control. They feared losing resources. They feared they would be unable to get the assistance they wanted from the new division's analysts." 9/11 Commission Staff Statement # 9, Law Enforcement, Counterterrorism, and Intelligence Collection in the United States Prior to 9/11 (April 13, 2005) at pp. 5-6; see also Alfred Cumming and Todd Masse, FBI Intelligence Reform Since September 11, 2001: Issues and Options for Congress (CRS Report RL 32336) (updated Aug. 4, 2004) at p. 58.

7 Interview with FBI Directorate of Intelligence official (Jan. 19, 2005).

8 Interview with FBI Special Agent in Charge (Dec. 8, 2004) (using this example to describe how the demands on field offices may vary, in part, according to location).

9 Id.

10 Simply in quantitative terms, the majority of FBI's reporting comes in the form of Intelligence Information Reports (IIRs), unfinished intelligence products. In recent years the Bureau has dramatically increased the number of IIRs it produces. Further details are provided in our classified report that we cannot reference here.

11 FBI Directorate of Intelligence, Report to the President of the United States: Comprehensive Plan for the FBI Intelligence Program with Performance Measures (Feb. 16, 2005) at p. 28 (hereinafter "FBI, Comprehensive Plan").

12 FBI Directorate of Intelligence, Cincinnati Division Field Intelligence Group On-Site Review (Oct. 13, 2004) at p. 6.

13 National Academy of Public Administration, Transforming the FBI: Progress and Challenges (Jan. 2005) at p. xv. The report notes that "[i]n-depth strategic collection and analysis efforts tend to be deferred at the FBI." Id.

14 Further details are provided in our classified report that we cannot reference here. In Fiscal Year 2004, the FBI published 250 Intelligence Assessments. FBI, Office of Intelligence Response to Request # 15 (Jan. 5, 2005).

15 Interview with FBI official (Oct. 22, 2004).

16 9/11 Commission Staff Statement # 9, Law Enforcement, Counterterrorism, and Intelligence Collection in the United States Prior to 9/11 (April 13, 2004) at p. 9.

17 FBI Directorate of Intelligence, Office of Intelligence On-Site Review of Field Intelligence Groups (Sept. 10, 2004) at p. 6.

18 Currently 25 percent of the Bureau's analytic cadre has an advanced degree. Interview with FBI Directorate of Intelligence official (Oct. 18, 2004). In comparison, 60 percent of analysts in CIA's Directorate of Intelligence have an advanced degree. Interview with CIA Directorate of Intelligence Human Resources official (Jan. 10, 2005).

19 The failure to communicate fabrication notices properly was, specifically, a problem for Defense HUMINT Service. Chapter One (Iraq).

20 Interview with FBI counterintelligence official (Feb. 18, 2005).

21 Id.

22 See, e.g., Interview with FBI Field Intelligence Group official (Feb. 3, 2005).

23 Interview with FBI official (Jan. 24, 2005).

24 Senator Shelby wrote, "The FBI has never taken information technology very seriously, and has found itself left with an entirely obsolete information technology infrastructure that is wholly inadequate to the FBI's current operational needs, much less to the task of supporting sophisticated all-source intelligence fusion and analysis." Richard C. Shelby, Vice Chairman, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, September 11 and the Imperative of Reform in the U.S. Intelligence Community (Dec. 10, 2002) at p. 72.

25 Testimony of Robert S. Mueller, III, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Before the Untied States Senate Committee on the Judiciary (May 20, 2004) ("Our goal is to deliver Virtual Case File capabilities by the end of this year").

26 National Research Council of the National Academies, James C. McGroddy and Herbert S. Lin (Eds.), A Review of the FBI's Trilogy Information Technology Modernization Program (2004) at pp. 3-4, 26.

27 Interview with FBI official (Dec. 15, 2004).

28 FBI Directorate of Intelligence, Response to Commission FBI Request # 15 (Jan. 5, 2005).

29 The FBI has a total of 12,254 Special Agents. Interview with FBI Directorate of Intelligence official (Jan. 19, 2005).

30 Executive Order No. 12333 (Dec. 4, 1981) at § 1.14(a).

31 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 at § 1011, Pub. L. No. 108-458 (hereinafter "IRTPA").

32 Id.

33 Id.

34 See, e.g., Interview with FBI official (March 7, 2005).

35 See, e.g., Interview with Office of Management and Budget officials (Feb. 8, 2005). While the FBI's NIP dollars are appropriated through the House Subcommittee on Science, State, Justice, and Commerce, and Related Agencies and the Senate Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, and Science, these dollars are identified as part of the NIP budget.

36 FBI, National Foreign Intelligence Program FY 2005 President's Request (Jan. 27, 2004).

37 Interview with Office of Management and Budget officials (Feb. 8, 2005).

38 IRTPA at § 1014(b)(2)(H).

39 Id. at § 2001(f); see also 9/11 Commission Report at p. 426 (recommending that the FBI "align its budget structure according to its four main programs...to ensure better transparency on program costs, management of resources, and protection of the intelligence program").

40 FBI, Comprehensive Plan at p. 9.

41 Id. at p. 10 (noting that the FY 2005 Intelligence Decision Unit Budget is $819,108,658 and that 39 percent of the Intelligence Decision Unit Budget goes to the Directorate of Intelligence, Criminal program, and Administrative Support combined). The Directorate of Intelligence, Criminal Division, and Administrative Support are not included in the National Intelligence Program budget. FBI, National Foreign Intelligence Program FY 2005 President's Request (Jan. 27, 2004); see also Interview with Office of Management and Budget official (March 16, 2005).

42 FBI, Comprehensive Plan at p. 9.

43 Interview with Office of Management and Budget official (March 8, 2005).

44 FBI, Comprehensive Plan at p. 10.

45 Id.

46 Interview with Office of Management and Budget official (March 8, 2005) (suggesting, nevertheless, that several of the Executive Assistant Director's various specific budgetary authorities relative to the Intelligence Decision Unit may be currently undetermined). FBI states that the only individual with budget execution authority is the Director of the FBI. Interview with FBI official (March 7, 2005).

47 FBI, Comprehensive Plan at p. 10.

48 IRTPA at § 1014.

49 The Attorney General's Guidelines on General Crimes, Racketeering Enterprise and Terrorism Enterprise Investigations (May 30, 2002) at p. ii.

50 IRTPA at § 1014(b)(2)(H).

51 Id. at § 2002(c).

52 Id. at § 2002(c)(1) & (3).

53 FBI, Comprehensive Plan at p. 15. The Directorate of Intelligence indicates that field intelligence operations constitute the process of "identify[ing]" intelligence gaps, "lev[ying]" requirements as "tasks," providing "support" to the intelligence cycle, "conduct[ing] intelligence assessments" and "know[ing] and report[ing] the scope and extent of [Field Office] collection capabilities." Id. at pp. 3-4. In some cases, Field Intelligence Groups are like other FBI field office components, or "squads" (e.g., counterterrorism, counterintelligence, criminal, and cybercrime). In other cases, they are more nascent and embedded in existing operational squads. FBI Directorate of Intelligence, FBI Field Office Intelligence Operations: Concept of Operations (Aug. 2003) at p. 2.

54 FBI, Response to Commission FBI Request # 16-1 through 16-10 (Feb. 3, 2005) at pp. 3-4.

55 Interview with FBI Directorate of Intelligence officials (Nov. 18, 2004).

56 Interview with FBI official (Jan. 18, 2005); Interview with FBI Field Intelligence Group official (Feb. 3, 2005).

57 FBI, Directorate of Intelligence, Columbia Division Field Intelligence Group On-Site Review (Jan. 3, 2005) at p. 12.

58 9/11 Commission Report at p. 423.

59 Interview with Directorate of Intelligence official (Jan. 19, 2005). In contrast, the FBI's operational divisions are explicitly given authorities to task field offices as well as initiate and terminate cases.

60 FBI, Comprehensive Plan at p. 15.

61 As defined, the Field Intelligence Groups do not have authorities to drive counterintelligence and counterterrorism investigations, collections, and operations. Interview with Directorate of Intelligence official (March 8, 2005).

62 FBI Directorate of Intelligence, Response to Commission FBI Request # 15 (Jan. 5, 2005).

63 FBI Directorate of Intelligence, Response to Commission FBI Request # 10 (Sept. 30, 2004).

64 IRTPA at § 2002(c)(6).

65 Interview with Directorate of Intelligence official (Jan. 19, 2005). As noted earlier, the Bureau has stated that it plans on adding a strategic analysis unit to the Directorate of Intelligence. However, it is not clear whether this unit will conduct strategic analysis or instead provide guidance for the field offices on how to produce such reporting. FBI, Comprehensive Plan at p. 28.

66 Interview with Directorate of Intelligence official (Jan. 19, 2005).

67 Id.

68 Id.

69 Id.

70 Id.

71 They are a Deputy Assistant Director in the Counterterrorism Division (an evaluation that is then reviewed by the head of the Counterterrorism Division) and two section chiefs in the Criminal and Counterintelligence Divisions. In the first case, the Deputy Assistant Director is rated by one component of the FBI and reviewed by another. Even more peculiar, while the Directorate of Intelligence has rating authority for a Deputy Assistant Director in Counterterrorism, in the Criminal and Counterintelligence Divisions the Assistant Director of the Directorate of Intelligence is the rating official for a Section Chief. Id.

72 Interview with Directorate of Intelligence official (March 8, 2005). Although the Assistant Director of the Directorate of Intelligence does not rate the heads of the field offices like the Assistant Directors in these other divisions, the Assistant Director does provide input into these evaluations. Id. The Assistant Directors in FBI's Counterintelligence, Counterterrorism, and Criminal Divisions rate the heads of FBI's 56 field offices on a rotating basis.

73 Id.

74 IRTPA at § 1073.

75 This was one proposal that the 9/11 Commission considered. According to the 9/11 Commission Report, "we have considered proposals for a new agency dedicated to intelligence collection in the United States....We do not recommend the creation of a new domestic intelligence agency. It is not needed if our other recommendations are adopted--to establish a strong national intelligence center, part of the NCTC, that will oversee counterterrorism intelligence work, foreign and domestic, and to create a National Intelligence Director who can set and enforce standards for the collection, processing, and reporting of information." 9/11 Commission Report at p. 423.

76 Id. at p. 425.

77 According to Executive Order 12333, CIA shall "[c]ollect, produce, and disseminate foreign intelligence and counterintelligence, including information not otherwise obtainable. The collection of foreign intelligence or counterintelligence within the United States shall be coordinated with the FBI as required by procedures agreed upon by the Director of Central Intelligence and the Attorney General." Executive Order 12333 at § 1.8(a). The FBI shall "[c]onduct within the United States, when requested by officials of the Intelligence Community designated by the President, activities undertaken to collect foreign intelligence or support foreign intelligence collection requirements of other agencies within the Intelligence Community, or, when requested by the Director of the National Security Agency, to support communications security activities of the United States Government; produce and disseminate foreign intelligence and counterintelligence." Id. at § 1.14 (c)(d). According to the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, the CIA shall "provide overall direction for and coordination of the collection of national intelligence outside the United States through human sources by elements of the Intelligence Community authorized to undertake such collection." Id. at § 1011. The act is silent on CIA's domestic responsibilities for foreign intelligence.

78 Classified CIA report.

79 Interview with senior FBI officials (Dec. 22, 2005).

80 Classified CIA report .

81 Id.

82 Id.; FBI, Response to Commission FBI Request # 16 (Feb. 3, 2005).

83 Interview with Counterterrorist Center WMD Unit official (Oct. 22, 2004).

84 9/11 Commission Report at p. 263.

85 FBI, Draft Memorandum of Understanding Between the Central Intelligence Agency and the Federal Bureau of Investigation Concerning the Coordination of CIA Activities in the United States and FBI Activities Abroad (Dec. 13, 2004) (hereinafter "FBI Draft MOU").

86 Classified CIA report.

87 FBI, Response to Commission FBI Request # 16 (Feb. 3, 2005).

88 Interview with FBI official (Dec. 22, 2004).

89 The Attorney General's Guidelines for FBI National Security Investigations and Foreign Intelligence Collection (Oct. 31, 2003).

90 CIA, Guidance for CIA Activities Within the United States (HR 7-1) (Dec. 23, 1987) at Annex B.

91 Id. In a submission to the Commission, the Center for National Security Studies expressed serious concerns about the degree to which the CIA's domestic activities were regulated. See generally Letter to the Commission from Kate Martin, Center for National Security Studies, Re: Intelligence Activities in the U.S.: Current Proposals' Risks to Civil Liberties (Feb. 16, 2005). More specifically, the Center recommended that the CIA's activities "be carried out pursuant to guidelines that are written by the Attorney General." Id. at p. 8. As we have just noted, this is already the case. And although we cannot, due to classification, discuss details of the current Attorney General-approved guidelines that regulate the CIA's activities in the United States, we can say that the guidelines are highly detailed and significantly more restrictive than those applicable to the FBI. Furthermore, the Department of Defense is subject to similar Attorney General guidelines for Defense Department intelligence activities affecting U.S. persons. Department of Defense, DoD Regulation 5240.1-R, Procedures Governing the Activities of DoD Intelligence Components that Affect United States Persons (Dec. 1982).

92 Department of Justice, Office of Intelligence Policy and Review (Dec. 12, 2003) available at http://www.usdoj.gov/oipr (accessed March 12, 2005).

93 Final Report of the Attorney General's Review Team on the Handling of the Los Alamos National Laboratory Investigation (May 2000) at p. 767 (hereinafter "Bellows Report").

94 The Bellows Report identifies a further reason to have a single individual below the Deputy Attorney General to supervise OIPR: the need to have a single individual who is knowledgeable about FISA to review FISA applications that are rejected by OIPR. Id. at pp. 767-768. The lack of such an individual in the Wen Ho Lee investigation caused serious problems. An Assistant Attorney General for National Security would fit the bill perfectly.

95 Prior to the Church and Pike investigations, the Department of Justice had such a unit. Since September 11, Justice officials have considered, but not pressed forward, with such a reorganization. Interview with former Assistant Attorney General (Nov. 30, 2004).

96 The Department currently has a single Associate Attorney General who supervises the Civil Rights, Antitrust, Tax, Civil, and Environmental Divisions, along with several other smaller offices. Department of Justice Organizational Chart (July 14, 2003). There is no such intermediary between the Criminal Division (and several other offices) and the Deputy Attorney General.

97 Interview with Department of Homeland Security Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection official (Oct. 7, 2004).

98 Id.

99 Interview with Immigration and Customs Enforcement officials (Sept. 27, 2004).

100 Interview with Department of Homeland Security Office of State and Local Coordination official (Dec. 9, 2004).

101 Interview with Department of Homeland Security Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection official (Jan. 6, 2005).

102 Interview with Department of Homeland Security Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection official (Dec. 17, 2004)

103 Interview with Department of Homeland Security Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection official (Oct. 7, 2004).

104 Interview with Department of Homeland Security official (Jan. 6, 2005).

105 Treasury Order 113-01 (Dec. 19, 2002) (superseding provision of same order).

106 Id. at § 4.

107 Interview with Department of Homeland Security Office of General Counsel official (March 2, 2005).

108 Homeland Security Act of 2002 § 1512, Pub. L. No 107-296 (providing that the orders of an agency transferred to DHS shall remain in effect according to their terms until lawfully amended, superseded, or terminated).

INTRODUCTION

Enthusiasm for spying on the United States has not waned since the Cold War. Quite the reverse. The United States is almost certainly one of the top intelligence priorities for practically every government on the planet. Faced with overwhelming American military and economic might, our adversaries increasingly rely on intelligence to gain comparative advantage. A wide range of intelligence activities are used to attack systematically U.S. national security interests worldwide. Yet while our enemies are executing what amounts to a global intelligence war against the United States, we have failed to meet the challenge. U.S. counterintelligence efforts have remained fractured, myopic, and only marginally effective.

Today, we mostly wait for foreign intelligence officers to appear on our doorstep before we even take notice. The lion's share of our counterintelligence resources are expended inside the United States despite the fact that our adversaries target U.S. interests globally. Needless to say, the result is that we are extremely vulnerable outside of our borders.

The losses the United States has sustained within its borders are formidable as well. Spies such as Walker, Ames, Hanssen, and Montes have significantly weakened our intelligence and defense capabilities. Hanssen alone compromised U.S. government secrets whose cost to the nation was in the billions of dollars, not to mention the lives of numerous human sources. Our adversaries have penetrated U.S. intelligence agencies (by recruiting spies) and operations (by running double agents). 1 The theft of some our most sensitive military and technological secrets allows states like China and Russia to reap the benefits of our research and development investments. 2 And while our defense is lacking, our current counterintelligence posture also results in the loss of offensive opportunities to manipulate foreign intelligence activities to our strategic advantage.

Moreover, while stealing our secrets, our adversaries also learn how we spy, and how best to counter our efforts in the future, which in turn renders our remaining sources and methods even less effective and more liable to compromise and loss--a cycle of defeat that cannot be indefinitely sustained. As former Director of Central Intelligence Richard Helms once said, "No intelligence service can be more effective than its counterintelligence component for very long." 3

We believe that U.S. counterintelligence has been plagued by a lack of policy attention and national leadership. We hope this is now coming to a close with the signing of the first national counterintelligence strategy, approved by the President on March 1, 2005. The National Counterintelligence Executive (NCIX)--the statutory head of the U.S. counterintelligence community--has characterized the new offensive counterintelligence strategy as part of the administration's policy of pre-empting threats to the security of the United States. 4

But a new strategy alone will not do the job. As in the old--and clearly unsuccessful--approach to homeland security, U.S. counterintelligence is bureaucratically fractured, passive (i.e., focusing on the defense rather than going on the offense), and too often simply ineffective. 5 But unlike homeland security, counterintelligence is still largely neglected by policymakers and the Intelligence Community. In fact, counterintelligence has generally lost stature since September 11, eclipsed by more immediate counterterrorism needs. While not denigrating it outright, our top policymakers and Intelligence Community management have traditionally paid lip service to counterintelligence. Until, that is, a major spy case breaks. Even then, bureaucratic defensiveness tends to win out. Senior officials have largely addressed counterintelligence issues ad hoc, reacting to specific intelligence losses by replacing them with new technologies or collection methods, without addressing the underlying counterintelligence problems.

We offer four recommendations to improve counterintelligence. First, that the NCIX serve as the planner, manager, and supervisor for all United States counterintelligence efforts. Second, that CIA create a new capability dedicated exclusively to attacking intelligence threats outside the United States--a capability our nation currently does not have. Third, that the Department of Defense's Counterintelligence Field Activity be given operational and investigative authority to execute department-wide counterintelligence activities. Fourth, and as discussed more fully in Chapter Ten (Intelligence at Home), that the FBI establish a National Security Service that is fully responsive to the DNI.

Counterintelligence efforts across the Intelligence Community must be better executed in support of the foreign intelligence mission. At the heart of our recommendations is the belief that an integrated and directed U.S. counterintelligence effort will take advantage of intelligence collection opportunities; protect billions of dollars of defense and intelligence-related investments, sources, and methods; and defend our country against surprise attack.

THE COUNTERINTELLIGENCE CHALLENGE

Spies have always existed, but currently our adversaries--and many of our "friends"--are expanding and intensifying their intelligence activities against U.S. interests worldwide. They target virtually all of our nation's levers of national power--foreign policy and diplomatic strategies, strategic weapon design and capabilities, critical infrastructure components and systems, cutting edge research and technologies, 6 and information and intelligence systems. 7 Our rivals use a range of sophisticated human and technical intelligence techniques, including surveillance, spies, attempts to influence the U.S. media and policymakers, economic espionage, and wholesale technology and trade secret theft . Further, there are indications that foreign intelligence services are clandestinely positioning themselves to attack, exploit, and manipulate critical U.S. information and intelligence systems.

The United States has not sufficiently responded to the scope and scale of the foreign intelligence threat. The number of foreign agents targeting the United States is disturbing--and the majority of them are targeting U.S. interests outside the United States. Despite this fact, a very large proportion of U.S. counterintelligence resources are deployed inside the United States 8 --a percentage that has changed very little since the end of the Cold War.

Although we cannot discuss details at this level of classification, suffice it to say that a number of sophisticated intelligence services are aggressively targeting the United States today. These include traditional players such as China and Russia, both of whom deploy official and non-official cover officers to target American interests. 9

But it is not only major nation states which employ aggressive intelligence services. Terrorist groups like Hizbollah and al-Qa'ida also conduct intelligence operations within the United States. The 9/11 Commission Report, for instance, detailed how the al-Qa'ida hijackers targeted U.S. sites, cased them, and otherwise engaged in classic intelligence activities such as reconnaissance. 10 According to a senior counterintelligence official at CIA, the Agency is only just beginning to understand the intelligence capabilities of terrorist organizations. 11

Then there are adversaries who attempt to undermine the United States in more subtle ways--through covert influence and perception management efforts. A 1997 Senate investigation found that as many as six individuals with ties to the People's Republic of China sought to channel Chinese money covertly into the 1996 U.S. presidential campaign in order to influence the American political process. 12

The sum total of these foreign intelligence efforts is striking. During the Cold War, every American national security agency--with the possible exception of the Coast Guard--was penetrated by foreign intelligence services. Moreover, in just the past 20 years CIA, FBI, NSA, DIA, NRO, and the Departments of Defense, State, and Energy have all been penetrated. Secrets stolen include nuclear weapons data, U.S. cryptographic codes and procedures, identification of U.S. intelligence sources and methods (human and technical), and war plans. Indeed, it would be difficult to exaggerate the damage that foreign intelligence penetrations have caused.

THE STATUS QUO

While our rivals have become ever more imaginative and aggressive, our own counterintelligence services remain fractured and reactive. Each U.S. counterintelligence agency pursues its own mission from its own vantage point, rather than working in concert guided by nationally-derived strategies. Our counterintelligence effort has no national focus, no systematic way to coordinate efforts at home and abroad. 13

Among United States agencies, the FBI dominates counterintelligence within the homeland. 14 Until recently the Bureau focused its resources and operational efforts on foreign spies working out of formal diplomatic establishments--classic official-cover intelligence. The covert foreign intelligence presence was largely unaddressed. Today, despite bolstering its counterintelligence resources in all field offices, the FBI still has little capacity to identify, disrupt, or exploit foreign covert intelligence activities. 15

Outside the United States, the CIA has primary responsibility for counterintelligence, 16 a task which, in practice, it defines very narrowly. CIA does not systematically or programmatically undertake the counterintelligence mission of protecting the equities of other U.S. government entities, nor does it mount significant, strategic offensive counterintelligence operations against rival intelligence services. Its focus is mostly defensive; the CIA's Counterintelligence Center and the counterintelligence elements within the Directorate of Operations aim primarily to protect CIA operations. 17 CIA's current approach to counterintelligence is in contrast to its approach during the Cold War, when CIA case officers routinely targeted Warsaw Pact officials, an effort that led to a considerable number of successful counterespionage investigations. 18

The Department of Defense, with its component counterintelligence units located within the military services, principally focuses on protecting the armed forces. 19 But no counterintelligence organization has the operational mission for the Department as a whole, leaving large swaths of unprotected areas, including highly sensitive policymaking, technology, and acquisition functions. The current system assigns each of the armed services responsibilities for counterintelligence activities in other agencies that lack their own internal capability. The services, however, do not have the range of capabilities necessary to perform this role. While the Department's Counterintelligence Field Activity (CIFA) has taken steps towards implementing a more comprehensive approach to counterintelligence, CIFA currently does not have adequate authority or resources to take on this Department-wide operational mission. 20

As if agency-level concerns are not enough, the absence of effective and adequately empowered national counterintelligence leadership makes the situation even worse. The National Counterintelligence Executive (NCIX) is the theoretical "head" of counterintelligence, 21 but NCIX has little control over the scattered elements of U.S. counterintelligence. NCIX has only advisory budget authority, little visibility into individual agencies' counterintelligence operations, and no ability to assign operational responsibility or evaluate performance. 22 The recent intelligence reform act did not alter this situation, but it did take what we believe is a useful step--placing the NCIX in the Office of the DNI. 23

INSTITUTIONALIZING LEADERSHIP

INSIDE THE AGENCIES

Primary responsibility for carrying out counterintelligence activities should remain with CIA, FBI, and the Department of Defense. These agencies, however, need to change the way they fulfill their missions. Under stronger NCIX leadership, they must become the core of the U.S. counterintelligence community--a community with common purpose, focus, and unity of effort.

CONCLUSION

Since the passage of the National Security Act of 1947, counterintelligence has been treated as a kind of second-class citizen in the intelligence profession. The result is that the subject is pushed to the periphery, our adversaries take advantage of our neglect, and American national security suffers. It is all too easy to forget counterintelligence because, other than periodic spy controversies, there is little public sign that we are doing it poorly. But we are. And our adversaries know it. Our recommended changes--centralizing management and planning, expanding our overseas efforts, and integrating and directing the counterintelligence components of the CIA, Department of Defense, and FBI--are long overdue and will help to stanch the hemorrhaging of our secrets and take the fight to our adversaries.

ENDNOTES

1 A double agent is a person pretending to work as a spy for one government while actually working as a spy for another government.

2 Christopher Andrew, The Sword and Shield: The Mitrokhin Archive (1999) at pp. 215-220.

3 Richard Helms, A Look Over My Shoulder (2003) at pp. 34-35.

4 Interview with National Counterintelligence Executive (March 10, 2005).

5 Interview with National Counterintelligence Executive (Sept. 13, 2004).

6 FBI, Title classified (Nov. 2004) at pp. 17-18.

7 Classified intelligence report .

8 Interview with Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive staff (March 9, 2005).

9 In our classified report, we include statistics on the estimated Russian and Chinese intelligence presence that we cannot include in our unclassified report.

10 Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (hereinafter "9/11 Commission Report") (2004) at p. 158 & nn. 54, 56; pp. 244-245 (noting al-Qa'ida's casing activities).

11 Interview with Terrorist Threat Integration Center official (Oct. 6, 2004).

12 Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, The China Connection: Summary of the Committee's Findings Relating to Efforts of the People's Republic of China to Influence United States Policies and Elections (1997) at pp. 5-9.

13 Congress acknowledged this in 2002 when it created the NCIX and, disappointingly, not much has changed. S. Rep. No. 106-279 (2002) at p. 16 (noting inadequate coordination, cooperation, and information-sharing among agencies; a lack of strategic threat analysis; the lack of a national plan to integrate information and analysis; an inadequately prepared workforce with insufficient, diffused resources; and the lack of a national advocate and program for resources, policies, and proactive initiatives).

14 Executive Order No. 12333 at § 1.14(a).

15 Interview with FBI Assistant Director for Counterintelligence (Oct. 7, 2005).

16 Executive Order No. 12333 at § 1.5(e).

17 Interview with CIA counterintelligence official (Nov. 19, 2004).

18 See, e.g., Interview with senior official from the Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive (March 9, 2005).

19 Interview with Department of Defense Counterintelligence and Security official (Oct. 14, 2004); Interview with Department of Defense Counterintelligence Field Activity official (Dec. 14, 2004). "The primary problem is that [Department of Defense] counterintelligence is assigned, under Title X of U.S. law, to the military services as their responsibility, controlled and conducted by them. The military services limit their counterintelligence routinely to support their own missions." Walter Jajko, "The State of Defense Counterintelligence," Journal of U.S. Intelligence Studies (Winter/Spring, 2004) at pp. 7-9.

20 Department of Defense Directive No. 5105.67 (Feb. 19, 2002) at § 6.2.

21 50 U.S.C. at § 402b.

22 Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 at §§ 902, 904.

23 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 at §1011, Pub. L. No. 108-458.

24 The concept of a Mission Manager is defined more fully in Chapter Six (Leadership and Management), Chapter Seven (Collection), and Chapter Eight (Analysis).

25 The other exception is the director of the National Counterterrorism Center, the DNI's Mission Manager for Terrorism, who will also be responsible for producing strategic analysis.

26 We examined other options for improving counterintelligence, but decided that a strengthened NCIX was the best and least disruptive option. Creating a separate national counterintelligence agency, for instance, would involve new legislation, a significant outlay of organizational effort and funding, and disruption of current operations.

27 See generally National Intelligence Council, Cyber Threats to the United States Infrastructure (NIE 2004-01D/I) (Feb. 2004).

28 Department of Defense Directive No. 5105.67 (Feb. 19, 2002) at §§ 6.2.4.1 & 6.2.9.

29 Id. at § 6.2.

30 Within the Department of Defense, counterintelligence functional support includes investigations, operations, collection, analysis, and functional services. Currently, only the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps have authority to do all five activities.

CHAPTER THIRTEEN
THE CHANGING PROLIFERATION
THREAT AND THE INTELLIGENCE
RESPONSE