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At this point Hanoi probably felt it had replied affirmatively and officially to the "prompt'' and "productive" conditions- (in public state ments^ the DRV-had indicated that talks could begin ''as soon as" the boiribin^^ and all other acts of v/ar stopped^ and that the subject of the talks vjould be ^'q^uestions related to a sett lenient of tlie Vietnam problem on the "bas'is of the 195^^ Geneva agreements on Vietnam.,,-also questions->j^iich could be raised by either side.") Assmrang Su >ras accurately reported J it had also gone part of the v/ay on "no axlvantage^j" though not so far as to acknowledge it had troop.^ in the South or to (^ive us an official pledge against vrhich we could allege violations^ resume bombing or break off talks.

In early Aprils Hanoi indicated its representative at the contact would have ambassadorial rank and would be empowered to agree on a date^ place and level for "formal talks^' af'ter the bombing cessation. In the events tlie DRV representative Xuan Thuy^ has ministerial rank and his proposed contact with us in I^.ris has been described by Ha^noi (in English) as "formal talks."

V/hat follow are the majoi' statements ^ public and private ^ made by the two sides since SUNFLOV/ER-

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DEV {S/lh/Sl )- Tlie DRV Ambassador to Peking^ RgO;, told the Kor^':egian Ambassador there that the cessation of U,S, bombing is the-only condition for their coming to the conrerence table,

OSLO lf531 to SecState (ESCRKT-EXDIS)^ ik June I967:

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"2. Fo]JLo;;ing is my informal rendition Algard's report^ transposed frt^ra-first'to third person: -

"3* Aiabassa,rjor Mgo underlined strongly Horth Vietnatiese Govt disposed to-;a,rd negotiations; At same time they vrere deeply mistrustful of A^aericans''intentions in Vi^driam;, Steady escalation and sending of nsv; troops indicated A?aericans had intention of staying pernanently in Vlotnairi. r

"k. l-Igo underlined TTorth Vietnamese Govt imposed only -one condition for negotiations> namely that bombing of Ilorth Vietnam, be Ktoppc;d* Clearly having in mind tlie Chinese^ he -went to lengths to underliriO that spe^:^ches froia other quarters vrhich imposed other conditions including full /aierican vrithdra',-;al from South Vietnam did not RPT not reflect North Vietnam Govt's thought. On North Vietna.Tiese side one" ga.vc decisive veight to stop in bomb-" ing because this was vievred as respect for Korth Victnainese sovereignty and such a respect was an absolute condition for coming to conference ts-ble, but vras also the orJ-y condition• ' 'Vrnen they had cor.ie to conference table^ ITorth Vietnain position vpuld be Ycry flexible. 'Vi^e are^' said Arfoassador MgO;^ 'ready for very far rea.chir.g coniproniises to get an end to the vrar,', Ambassador Algard noted that recently one had i:ripression that North Vietna:ae3e side \;as cooler'toward negotiations, Ariib.assa-dor Mgo denied this strongly» He said that fcrirrerly v:hen t,-crth Vietnaivx shov/ed an interest in negotiations Americans had taVien such interest as a sign of vreakness and v;ith results of st? nger escalation* This v;as background against vrhich one nust judge •some recent speeches on North Vietnamese side. Provided there vroiild be a stop in, bonbing^ North Vietna^fi was ready at any "f-iiue * fpr negotiations and far reaching coiaproniise.s*.

U,S, (6/20/67) > The U.S. repeated that it reQuired "at least som private assurance of appropriate reciprocal action by North Vietnam/'.

State 213389 to Oslo (SECRET-EXDIS)^ 20 June 19j7:

■ ^2.0, Expressed concern that U.S. intends to stay perr:a^ nently in Vietnam is of inteVest, 'Ve assii_mo GOIT is fully avrare

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of our repeatGd statements of intent to withdraw and most specifically the precise wording used in the Manila Communique, which your should furnish them.

f "d. Discussion of cessation of bombing of only condition

^ for tallts fits with other private readings as well as Trinh-

Burchett interview and appears to us highly plausible.

"c. USG accepts that 'cessation' of the bombing of the North and military action against the North is only NVN condition for holding talks. NVN has referred to cessation being on 'unconditional' basis: What is meant by this? (Purpose here is to clarify whether there may be any distinction between usual NVW statements that bombing must be stopped 'indefinitively and unconditionally' --which we have construed to mean pernia-nently -- and occasional other statements that stoppage of bombing must merely be 'unconditional.' We ourselves have assumed that no difference is intended between these two foi"TmilationSj but direct inquiry could be useful in nailing this down.)

'^d. Assuming that WN condition calls for^ in effect^ permanent cessation of bombing^ USG position remains as it has been stated throughout and particularly by ^bassador Goldberg in September I966 at UN and by Secretary Husk in January. U,S„ view is that cessation of bomhingj v/ithout at least some pi-ivate asstdraace of appropriate reciprocal military action by NVN^ would create situation of major military advantage to WVN and would not be conducive to fruitful talks. USG has put forward several general suggestiotts for timing and nature of NVI^ reciprocal actions^ and President's letter to Ho contained one specific proposal that added the element of stopping of reinforcement by USG in the South. Canadian proposal of April called for link between cessation of bombing and restoring demilitaris^ed status of DMZ under effective supervision, but Hanoi rejected this. Vrtiat is present Hanoi view on these proposals^ or do they have any other suggestion to make?

DRV {ll?nl^l) ' Pbam Van Dong told Aubrac and Marcovich (PENNSYLVANIA) that the DRV would settle for a de facto stoppage^ though it preferred a public statement.

"Now I shall talk to you about negotiations and solutions. We have been fighting for our independence for four thousand years. We have defeated the Mongols three times. The United States Army^ strong as it isj is not as terrifying as Genghis Khan. We fight to have peace at homej we have no wider aims. We have made

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clear our position in our four points and in the interview of January 28, I967* /Vha^n Van Dong did not explain what this interview was5 Aubrac and Marcovich did not khbWj nor do J^J We are ready to talk at any time provided that actions against the North are unconditionally ended. I want to repeat what I said yesterday: we are , willing to settle for a defacto stoppage*" Marcovich interrupted to ask whether he correctly understood that no public acknowledgment of an end of bombing was needed. PhaiQ Van Dong replied that he would prefer a public statement^ but would settle for a de facto cessation* ^here was disagreement between Aubrac and Marcovich about the meaning of de facto cessation. Aubrac thought that a bombing pause could be followed within a few days by an invitation to negotiate* Marcovich was of the view that Hanoi might want a more formal—though secret— assurance_*y

TJ^S, (8/2^/67}. The *'no advantage" formulation was passed to the DRV via Kissinger and Mai Van Bo in Paris. (PEM'SYLVAMIA)

Messrs A and M rr;et with Bo in Paris to Inquire why their visas had not been received* Bo told them it vjas too dangerous to visit Hanoi due to the boiabing, M and A then informed Bo they had assurances in that respect^ without identifying the nature of the assurances^ which would be effective until September U»

Messrs M and A then presented the US message as set forth below to Bo for the first time♦ He read it vrlth interest and observed that it was ^^clearly significant". Bo queried them about the significance of para. 2 of the message. He was informed that it expressed US doubt that the existence of US/DRV discussions could be kept secret if bombing ended, and Bo recognized that this would be a problem. Bo was impressed and was told that the message vms authorized by top levels of the USG. M and A gaVe Bo a--vnritten description of their contacts with Kissinger. Eo agreed to cable the message to Hanoi and to report their desires to visit Hanoi

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to discuss t:hG ncsnago. Bo belicrved' a reply shou 1 d boa va ilab 1 e by Augiis t 2 9 ,

The Kn^llfih liexC of the xao-is^.ge given to Bo in both French and English is as'iollovrs:

"Xhe baited States is v;ill:lng to stop the aerial and naval bom-bardiiierit of North Viet-ITam with the understanding tliaL: this will--lead prOTopL-1 y to produ c tive di f^ cus s ioris b e tv;ecn* reorc s g nta tives of the Uiu't;;

-■ "" " ■ -"It ^-

^"Stat.es and the Dc^raocrrct5-C P.cpubllc of VieL--Hani looking tovrard a resolvition oi: the issues between llie^n, VJhile dlscusso'-ons proceed ^Dxther v:5,t:h public knqvjledge or seci:etly^ the United States

. . '\-} D u 1 d a H s It-lie t h a t t h e E s :no c ra t i c 71 e puh 1 i c of Viet -li a en \vO u 1 d not take advantage oil the boablng cesf;ation. Any such ruove on the

, part of the Democratic Republic of Viet-'Nam v?ould obviously be iTicqnsistont v:xth the Tnoveiuent tmcard resolution of the issues bev/Gcen the United States and the Deraocratic Republic of Viet-Main vliich th.e discussions are intended to achieve.

* m

The United States is prepared to enter into 'discussions either openly or secretly. It vouXd seern^ hovvcverj that a ' . • total cessation of Che borabing is inconsistent v?ith keeping secrxit- the fact - tha t dis o ussions\a re taking place - Accord 1 n^],y ^ the Deraocratic Republic of Viet-Kara ir;ay prefer to consider the _alternat:Lve of a cutback in the ir.agnitude or scope of the bombing

vhile secret .discussions are in progress. * " ■ y

■> •

^ The United States is ready to have iF-mediate private contact

v?iththa DeriOcratio Republic of Viet'-uaTn to explore the above

approach or .any suggestions the'Democratic Republic of Viet-1'ara

■ laight v?ish to propose in the savue direction," *

*

'" DRV (s / J-\/6y) . A number of nc\Ty sensitive DRV targets were struck

; . QXi Au^;:u5^t 2V22j 19^73 but restrikes and strikes near Hanoi were sus-.

pended on August 2k as a gesture or goodwill. The DRV reacted negatively^ however^ to both the gesture and the "no advantage" proposal^ terming them tlireatanlng^ conditipnalj etc.^ in line Vfith the general DRV objec- ' , tive of removing the bombirig as a bargaining blue clrJp for the U E "

jpi ' In response to a phone recjuest from Bo at

6:00^ p. in, (Paris time) ^ Sunday^ Septerr.ber 10^ llarcovich called on Bo at 9:30 a-ra^ After

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an GXchange! of pleasantrlGS ■ Bo handed 'co M the ■ J:ollov7ing .I:G3<t'- of Hanoi^'s offIcial'reply Co the

^ *^The essence of thei /iniG;rlcau propositious. Is the stopping of the boinbicg under coudltion?;. The American bombing of the DeiiiOeratlc Republic of Viet-Nant i^ illegal- The United States' 'an\ .should put an end to the bombing, and cannot pose / conditions* ' ^ '

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**Xhe American message has been cor;':::iLmicatGd after an escalation of the attacks against Hanoi and under the threat (mennnce) of continuation of the attacks against Hanoi. It is clear that this constitutes an ultimatui^i to the Vietnamese people* ^ , - '^

.V *,''The bovernmont o f ' th-e 1)emoeratic"" ^ -^ ;■ ■'-^'' ^"'^ v-"''''^-'"

Republic of Vlet^-Ham energeticfply rejects

the Ainerican propositions-. , ..- ^ --,*,/... ,

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vv.VThc;position of the Gove'rnn.ient of the, \...^\^:-\: -Democratic Republic of Yiet-^Maiu is^ that the United States shuuld^ cease definit^ely and v?ithDut conditions the boLiibing and all other acts of A7ar against the Democratic ' Republic of Viet-'Na:iu It should vjithdrav; American troops and satellites from South Vie t^IJam ^ r ecogn i2.e the Na t iona 1 L5.be"ra t ion \. Front of South Yiet-n-?am and. 1-c^t the Vietnamese people themselves regulate their "internal affairs • It is ,only after the un-conditional stopping by the United States of ,the bombing and all other acts of v?ar against the Democratic Republic of Viet-'Kam, that it

v?ould be possible to engage in. conversations

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X^^f^official^ translation; ■ .

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Bo told H to give the text to Kissinger and added that-'V.s soon as there is a reply'* M should romiaun 1 cate \-i 1 th 13o a(: .any 15me of day or night* VJhen K urged Eb to meet Kissinger^ ' .

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Bo f^aicl '^give tae ir.essc^e to Kissinger and vhen the reply is here \:e shrill sa g-about: nioetiag"* In co:-nrf.anting on the text of the DRV mess^.^e Bo made the. following- stateraent:

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'^Xhe bombing of ^Hanoi at the same time as the £ ending of the (August 21) tuessagc conc^titutes a pressure- Stopping of the bombing along v7ith 'the threat of a rehev:al lias the character of an ultimatura.'' . (Paris 3097).

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U»^' (9/ 16/6 7), Vfe protested tlmt the DRV must Viave misunderstood the Q/2^j6j messageJ as it contained neither conditions nor threats. V/e iQerely wished to confirm that a bombing cessation vrould lead promptly to productive discussions leading to peace. VJe did not ask the DRV to reply to the "no advantage" assuir.ption. (PEJMISYLVATITA)

js

M and A met vjith Bo' for over- an hour^ starting at noon. A^ \Aio did most of the talking at the meeting v^ith Bo and kept the.notes^ reported on the meeting. Ro greeted A and M affahlv- and ^'offered theai drinks* Bo said Ho had charged him \v'ith inquiring about the health of A's J:aiQi 1 y. A then handed to Bo in a sea 1 a d envelope French and English texts of the follovzin;^, US message:

t' e

September 13. 1967

'''The USG believes that the September 11 message from the DRV may be based on a misunderstanding of the American proposal of

August 25. The American proposal contained neither conditions nor threats and should

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not be. rejected on these .grounds.

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**Xt\Iias been the under standing of the AISG that the DRvt v/oul'd be v^illing promptly to enga^jG in proJuctive diseusslons leading to peace v^hen there \ms a cessation of aeriaX and riava 1 bombardment, . The USG soiijrht to conf iriii, this fact in its' proposal V/hich the DRV has in .front of itt

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'^As a demonstratio[i of its^-gpod faith and in order to create the best atmosphere for the consideration of its proposal the US voluntarily undertook not to bomb Hanoi from August 25 onward - the day on v^hich itp pro^josal V7as sub[aitted to Hanoi- This restraint has been rnaintaincd \?ithout time 15_mit even thouj-h activities by opposing forces 5n the south have in if:act been stepped up since August 25-.

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The August 25 proposal of the USG remains -open.'^ (END OF >ESSAGE) ■

.... * *" . , , .. . A told 15o he did not knov; the content of ^the Tiiessage but described it as ^Conciliatory", a v;ord v^hich Eq made him v/rite down.- Bo did not opea the envelope "in l\ and A s presence.

A asked ho about the significance of the AFP ' / September 14 Hahoi story (State 38031)^ quoting "reliable sources" as indicating that talks v;ould .start three or four x-;eeks after a bombing j cessation^ "and" A shov;ed 156 Paris press stories based on the AFP r-eport» Bo replied that the ,

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three-*to four-V7eek in terva 1 be tvreen the -end ■ ' of bombing and the beginning of negotiations* V7aS "an invention, of journalists"o ' He noted that Pham Van Dong's statement had given no ground lor the time period mentioned in the nev.'spaperS; . * ' .

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' ' U/S' ,(9/^ 5/67 ) * We ask Hanoi to confim oiu* understanding of U,S-/ DHV dirferencGs: We are irilling to £jtop bombing if Hanoi coiifUi'ms that this vil2. lead promptly to productive negotiations; Hanoi has 3.Trplied^ but not confirniedj th,at this vrould be the result. (BilMNSyiTVAI'IIA)

M callGd on Bo a,!: 8:30 a,m, and read to Eo the

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iio 1 ] aw i n ^ five point rae s s a g e f r 010 Kiss in

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^^ J_ ^ ..^Lli *>.i-^x »_r J.J-J^v,. J- ,

*'(!) 1 v?ill transnit to the appropriate. ' * ^

Vashington officials later today the nrossage -^ you (Bo) gave M yesterday. (2) X see no point

xn trading charges and countercharges about [^ past activities', Iii fact Washington has oiiered

to stop^ houibing based on the assumption it . -^^ou 1 d 1 e a d t o p romp t ^ p r o dn c t iv e t a J,k s , Ttia t

o f i e r r evaains o 'p'c^ n , 11: \7 a s xne. d e s inc ox e 1 y . ■'If accepted^ there v/ill b.e no need to cliseuss escalation or borabing prpblcitis. (3) The exchange indicates that VJashington and lla'noi - have groat difficulty unde:rstand5.ng each

o tI'l e r ' s 1:1^ ough t p r o c e s s e s . Th i s mak e s d i r e c t ' 11S /D ?sV c on t act ess en t i a 1. 1111 e v m e d i a/i" i e s ^ n o matter how trustv^orthy^ are not satisfactory .substitutes. {A) y^^merican military actions ■

during the past month reflect in part the I

extrerae secrecy v?ith v?hlch VJashi/ngton has , "'handled this exchange. The USG has considered ' 'it unwise to change decisions made prior to the. - ^ -rep'c>r t o f II and A ^ s t r i p to Han.oi 3 exc ep t in

regard to bombing Hanoi itself^ because it^ )

* v?anted to l:eep the circle of avrareness of tliis cxchan<^,a as sraall as possible to avoid v,7:eiiiatura public debate. (5) The'difference in the positions of the tv7o governments "could be surr::Liari?; ' a's f 6 ] 1 ov? s : 11 a s h i ng t on ha s ind i c a ted i t s ■ readiness to stop borabing and has pnly asKed ' t o c o n f i r m i. t s \m d e r s I: an d 5.n k o 1: II i ino i' s ' '

viev; that this t^^ould lead proi^iptly to pro [ '

ductive negotiations. Hanoi has in'iplied that an end of boiubing v;ouXd in fact have this result If this is indeed the, viev; or both governtAents^ the reuiaining obstacles to direct talks can be

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overcoaie* I am certain that the abDve correct:!}" reflects US views. Could Bo confina th?-t it also reflects the vigw of Hano?!.-.", * "■ ^

H said Bo's response to the foregoing message v?as favorable; M the a questioned Bo about

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P'Av . (9/^9 /^^0 * T^^ President speaks at San Antonioj publicly confirming the **no advantage'' foririnlation and noting that it had been given repeatedly to Hanoi,

"As ¥e have told Hanoi time and time again, the heart of the matter is this: The United States is grilling to stop a3.1 aerial and na.val bombardment of Nortli Vietnam vhen this vrill . lead pi^omptly to productive discussions. V/e^ of course^ assume that v:hile discussions proceed, North Vietnam would not take advantPvge of the boBibing cassation or lindtation-" (President's remarks in San Antonio before the National LeElslative Conference,)

flRV ( 10/2 /67)' Marcovichj after taking careful notes on Mai Van Bo's coMnents^ described Trinh's I/28/67 statersient as a "soleron engagement to talk after the unconditional end of the bombing*" TvfO days later, Bo denied using the term "solemn engagementy^^ to vzhich J-iarcovich took strong except ion. ( PEM^IS^T^VAmA)

. ^,,\A follov?ing the; uieetiug and alter a flight

'to Home v^here he discussed the ir,essc:,^';e in

deta X 1 V?i th. A fro:a Toza e -. • ^ n^ax 1 cd it by ^' -

special delivery air-post to Kissinger in

Boston late on October 2, The te^t of the'

no t e r ec e i v e d b y Kiss in 5; e r f o 11 ow s t ,

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; ''The position of the RD\^^ reraains alvjays

1 tbe-samCe If the United States really

■ VJished .to talk^ let them stop first v?lthout • conditions the bombardment of the territory . • , oi the lUXV;^. ■ ^ - ■ ■ .

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(a) A pviblic declaration ^by the Gover nine tit of the United States about the cessation* This declaration could take place either

'- before or after the cessation,

(b) An official declaration but non-public precGding the cessation of the bombardment. This declaxation could be coiamunlcated by the channel K/A-M (officieusement)-not quite officiallyj and after this indication it can be transmitted officially by an accredited person,

(c) An end of bombardment without preceding official declaration follo'i-red by an official but not public communication of the Government of the United States.

"Eventuality (a) vould represent a public declaration replying to that made on the 28th of January by M, Trinh^ Minister of Foreign Affairs of the EDVIIj vhich constitutes a solemn engagement to talk after the unconditional end of bombing. This public declara-tion would be follovred by the transmssion of an official text by an accredited person.

U.S. (10/8/67) - We offered to set a date for stopping the bombing and a date and place for beginning discussions if the DKV indicated it vould enter promptly into productive discussions on U.Se/l)RV issues.

M and A called on Eo at 9^00 s--^- Paris time and spent 1^ hours >rith him. As in the past Bo vms cordial to his visitors throughout the meeting;,

M and A handed the written portion of the message from Kissinger to Bo5 which Bo read closely. M and A then read to Bo Kissinger's four ''oral pointsj" and Bo ^JTote them down carefully in his ovni notes. (M and A did not leave with Bo the "oral'' part of the message.) The written message and oral points are as follows:

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^'M should tell B that K woxild be authorized to deliver to B in v/riting the following message whenever B is prepared to meet with him officially or unofficially:

'The United States Government understands the position of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam to be as follovrs: That upon the cessation hy the United States of all forms of bombardment of the Democratic Republic of Yietnam^ without expression of condition^ the Democratic Republic of Vietnam would enter promptly into productive discussions with the United States. The purpose of these discussions would be to resolve the issues betv/een the United States and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam,

^Assuming the correctness of this understanding of the position o_f the Democratic Republic of Vietnam^ the United States Government is prepared^ in accordaace with its proposal of August 25, to transmit in advance to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam the precise date upon which bombardment of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam would cease and to sxiggest a date and a place for the commencement x)f discussions.'

"In addition M should convey to B the following oral points from K:

"1. K believes that this understanding is consistent with E*s statements of October h^ as reported by M^ and with the proposal of the United States Government of August 25»

"2. When B meets with K^ K would also be prepared to state the precise date on which the cessation of bopibardment would occur

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fmd t:o\^,ive t:bc aur;e,est:ions of the United St:c:tcs , v;xt:b respect to the elate and s'lte of the clis^" .cy\ ssions fo].3.ov;:lng the cessa15,oh of borabarct:riant^ and K v.'OLild be authorized to receive the viev;s ^ of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam vjith respect to tiiese and other modalities. ' , ^ ' .

3. K noted that the Deinocratic Republic of Vietnam had not commented on observations by ■^ the United States Government on August 25 v;itn respect to secrecy of the fact of discussions, bctv?een the Deiaocratic Republic of Vietnam and the United States Qovernir.Gnt'^ :

Vi. K observed that officials of the United States Government had taken note of a reduction of military activities * in the vicinit}^ of the d Citiil it: a r iz e d z o n e o Un do ub t e dl y 3 the Demo or a t ic Republic, of Vietnam had noted the absence in recent v?eeks of aerial'b ombardment in the ' ij^imediate vicinity of Hanoi0"

V ]Bo told M to tell Kissin^^er hov? much Bo appreciated K^s personal effortSo Bo then dictated to H and A the follov:in?, short messac'G of acknovjledfjuent to K:

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he'V7ill make it tbrou^'h this channel

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U.5, (10/12/6 7)■ The San Antonio formula was erplained to tVe &recles- "No advante^e^e" vjas not a "condition** l)ut a "self-evident description" of \vhat would constitute good faith. They were asked to find out if Hanoi \:ould agree to a degree of restraint that vould compromise a no adva.ntage situation in return for stopping the bombing*

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STATE 51^361 to /ciieiiibEissy Stockholm (SECRET, KODIS, ARPE^l), 12 Oito'Der I967.

, "lu IXiring this conversation the Sec'rotEiry'nade a nujnber of observations on the main poinis raised by the J'oreign Minister's -p^-^ev. Fe voald, have nothing-to add to his corrjTients at this tjjne beyond reaffiming the ijiipor-. tance of eliciting any additional dotBlls on Foreign Minister Trinh's remark: to fefoassador Petri in Jun- that

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Hanoi 'understood' the ir^iportance the United States ■ attaches to reciprocal action on the part of North Viet-* iiamese in connection v:ith a halt in the bombing- We note Ambassador Petri's view that some concrete act of reciprocity can be expected after the cessation of the . borabing^. ^even if .Foreign Minister Trinh gave no jjrecise

indication that Hanoi v/as considering taking such a stepj and Ve vould of course always be keenly interested in any new evidence which /iiabassador Petri might obtain from North Vietnamese officials which would bear out his view.

"5» Since the Secretary's conversation with I^'oreign Minister llilsson^ President Joh.nf^on in his speech of Eepteinber 29 has set forth our willingness iiiiniediateDy to stop aerial and naval bor^ibardment of 'North Viet-Ksm when this will, lead j^romptJy to productive discussions- As the Foreign ■ Minister will hrive seen from this speech^ as veil as from Ambassador Goldberg's September Si speech at the United

\ . Nations J we are interested in two poii;its — whether there

vould be productive discussions^ and whether we could reasonably assiune that K^noi v:oiLld not take advantage of a

( bombing stoppage* The latter point has not been posed as

a 'conditionJ ' but rathbr as a self-evident description of a state of affairs that would evidence good faitli on both sides* Foreign Minister Nilsson may note that the desired 'no advantage' situation would rocxuire restraint from Hanoi^ but this might fall short of total cessation of anus dispatcli end infiltration to South Viet'-Kajri. If Hanoi were pr-spared to consider such a cessatlonj a balanced arrangerricntj not only

f>toj>ping the bonibing but also cessation of reinfoj^cenent ,

by United States and others} would be possible. But : there remains the possibility that Hanoi might*be pre-

pared to agree to some lesser restraint^ in return for '

stopping the boribing only^ that could comprise an \

' . effective 'no disadvantage' situation. " '^ • -

*'6. II' Ambassador Petri could eli.cit any precise information on Hanoi's position concerning these points dio'ing his forthcoming visit to Ilanoij this could be of !

the greatest ii^portnnce- As the Secretary remarked at the conclusion of the conversatlonj we would hope that ve eoulcl be infon.'Led^ in advance-of the tiraing of .febassador Petri's next visit to Hanoi so that we might consider vrliether we could submit aiiy additional points to make during his dlscusisions vitli North Vietnamese officials," ^ . i

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pPN (1 0/17/ 67)^ Through the PKm\fSyLVAIO'A channel,^ Bo o^^^ ^^ ^ vrittcn massage chansing the verb "could^" (Trxnh's I/28/67 intervlevr) to '^can/^ He also, indicated the DRV toolc "productive" to mean that the U.S. insisted on discussing SVN in U,S./^^V exchanj^es*

lt^*M

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K sa^.r.BOj expz^essed }iop3 to keep the churmel open^ and handed M" the following lEiessage:

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"Actually the U.S, has been follovrinj^ a policy of escalation of an extremely serious nature. In thecc conditions the U.S. proposals of poace are double-faced. At a tiirie vrlien the U,S, is piu-^suing a policy of escalation we cannot're ceive^ Kiss inj^er 5 nor connri^^nt on the Ainerican proposals transiriitted through this channel,

"The position of the Governinent of the DRV is perfectly clear: it is only vhen the U.S. has ended v.^ithout condition^ Ihc bombardjnent that discussions c^.n take place."

'^M and IjO discussed what *the conditions' vrere in the U,S, proposal. M said he thought tha,t th,e U.S, nsant that vre vanted a guarantee of serious discussions vrhen ^^e used the word 'productive-' Bp said the ])RV tliought that by use of the word 'productive' we meant that we wanted to talk ^.bout object:lves in the South also^ since discitssions could not be fu.lly productive i^itiiout this subject bein^ considered* 5

WI-^L^^^'^J-^lL).' Burchett reported the DKV vrould offer nothing "except taiks^^ for a cessation of the bombardmeni:.- He stressed the distinction betv;een "talks'" and "negotiations," without making clear what the difference vrould be. He quoted. Trinh. as. saying the talks would be "meaningful^" but whether they vrould be "fi^uitful" or "productive" vjoiild depend on the U.S.

;■ I'he. follovring article by V'ilf^^ed J>iii*chc.tt v/as-z-ead in irashj.ngton on-tMs date: ' - ^ - " " '.-,:■• " ■ . - .

"Hanoi5 North Vietns^ni AP - There is no possibility of any talks or even contacts betvfeen Hanoi and the U.S. government unless the boriibardnient and other acts of war against North Vietnara are definitively }]alted-

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J ''This is the position stated to i!>e cliirini^ conversations

in the 3^st fevr days vith Premier Kiam Van Uon^^ Hgi^Jyen I>ay Trxxil'jj foreign ninister and deputy premier^ and ot}ier high-ranking {government and party leader;^.

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- ' -Jlanoi is in no mood for concessions or bax^gaining

and there is an absolute refusal to offer anything — except talks -- for a ce*ssation of Die boribardnicnt- The v;ord stressed is 'talksj' not negotiations/ . . .

"j'iuring an informal talkj lictfeverj Trinh repeated ^ that Id^ statenent to this cor.^'-i^Tipond^nt last ^Januo^ry 26 --that talks could start if the L^\.:bing vas halted -- still held good. He said there could be- 'mea,ningfi).l' talks-Wiiether they would be 'fruitful' or ^product5.ve' depended on the United States,

U. S. (11 / 3/67 ). The Eussla^ns Mere told that ve vould stop the bombing if they coiiid tell us that the DRV would stop its infiltrationr

MemCon, dated Nov 3. 196? (approved in S: II/8/67) (SECRET/nODIS)

Part II of IV

Sub j e c t: V i e tnam

Rirticipants: U.S.

The Secretary

Foy D. Kohler^ Deputy Undersecretary

Johji M, Leddyj Assistant Secretary for EUR

MalpoLni Toon^ Country Director^ SOV

USSR

Y- V< Kuznetsov^ First Deputy Foreign Minister

Anatoliy F, ■Dobr;inainj Soviet Ambassador

Yui^i N. Chernyakovjj Minister^-Counseloif;-; Soviet Ei-ibass^

Igor D. BubuQYj Counselor;j Soviet Efubassy

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■"TrIE'SECRETARY said v.^e had no proW^era-with this at all- The Soviets^ however J must be perfectly clear on one fimdartiental point. V,e v;ill con** tinue to oppose the spread of vrorld revolution by force* V7ith regard to Vietnam the Secretary sav; no need for a conflict of interest betv:Den the United States a.nd the Soviet Union, It was important that the Soviets recognize that \re have a vital interest in what happens in South Vietnaraj just as we recognize that the Soviets liave B.n interest as to what happens in Rorth Vietnam- We are prepared to stop the bombing nov/ if the Soviet Union can tell us th€i.t the Kortli Vietnamese \nJJi stop its infiltration."

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'U. S.- (1 1/2 3/67) ^ The Svredes vere given iXlustra-lions of DRV action; that v^ould run counter to the ^^x\o advantage" asEumption* They v;ere aslred to seek clarification from the DRV.

•

*;7< The third point relates to the understanding of a ''no acivantago' situation^ as described in the President's San i\nt02iio speech and In ry October 6 message to you in connection with a bOLibing cessation and the start of talks. One way to clai\liy this is in texv^.s of questions that I en^phasi%e are illustr^Ltivc oV cxarriples only, T^fiint vould happen witli respect to the flow of supplies and men into South Vict-Kam and to positions directly tlrt^eatenin^ South Viet-^KaTi? For exsniplej if following a cessation or lljriitation of boi^ibj.ng^ there was a marked -incresse in the flow of'trucks southvardj if a nevj North Victnanese regiment vere to appearj or if v:e saw a ;nassive increase in the flow of supplies just to the north of the DMZj we woald be negatively ircipressed, S5inilarlyj to take another example^ we would vrant to iinow what vrould happen W'ith respect to the three Korth Vietnamese Divisions now In the area of the De-militarized Zone v-^hich have been erjployed as part of offensive ©Derations against our forces south of the niZ. Vfould artillery located noii:h of the demarcatioji line be eriployecl against our forces? And^ if soj would ire be expected not to boiab these artillery positions? *

"8- These questions ai'ej of coiU'sej not easy ones to ansvrer. K3vert}ielessj ve believe they are central to an accm^ate understanding of what is involved on both sides. Ve vould be grateful for any clarificatzon that you night be able to obtsin through yovir contacts vith North Vietnamese ropre-" sentatives on these matters,"

U.S, (12/^7/67). The Russians gave their understanding of S^n Antonio as requiring Hanoi to agree in advance to a de--escalation of the conflict before tlie bonibing vfould stop. HarriTna^n corrected thep.^ drawing attention to the DMZ as a special problem^ however.

MeinCon/;. p:-..ted December 27. 196? CsSCR]?t/nOD1S) TIME: 12:li5 to 3:^5

PIACE: 3033 \\ Street

Participants; Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin

Aitibassador at Large W, Aver ell Harr:>.an

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'**,-, (3) I stated that the San Antonio formila was certainly a reasonable one and vrent as far as the US GoYerrimeut could be expected ,to go. I asked v:hether his Government could inform hs \fhy it had been rejected by Hanoi and al^o whether the Soviet Union had a practical alternative suggestion* He asked some detailed questions regaaxling the San Antonio foriaila. I repeated wliat I had told him in my last conversa^ tion- 'Productive discussions' did not^ as Hanoi had interpreted it^ mean a guarantee of favorable conclusion^ bvit considering our Korean experience5 \ie wanted assua^ance that talks vjould be serious and in good faith and in an attempt to find an agreement. He told nitj that his Govern-ment had gained the mpression that the Bresident's statement 'we v:ould^ of course- assume that vrhile discussions proeaed North Viet--fern v/ould not take advantage of the bombing cessation or limitation' neant that Hanoi would have to agree in advance to a de--escalation of the conflict. I stated that this vms not true* 'Taking advantage* meant what it said^ namely^ tha.t Hanoi would not use the advantage of no boinbing to send more supplies and reinforcements to the South than vrere now getting through, I also referred to the DI^Z as a special proBlem* They were using artillery, and oua^ bombing of tlie gun positions ar-d other bases just north of the DMZ was a tactical operation which wou3.d have to continue unless there was inutua.l restreant in that area which ve thought vmuld be the best solution,

" Dobrynin said that he vrould inform his Government, but \mderlined that both his Government and Hanoi believed that Hanoi had interpreted the San Antonio forimlajtaken in connection v;ith other statements> to mean that Hanoi v:ould have to agree in advance to some sort of de-escalation of it5 operations if v:e were to stop the bombing/"

DRV (12/g 9/67) > Tri'iih, Speaking publicly, changes the verb from "could"

to "will^^ talk,

* . *

^ On peceiri ber. 2 9^ Trinh spoke at a Mongolian reception. TJie substance of his talk vras broadcast by Hanoi Vll\ in English on January 1. He stated" in part: • . , .

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^ c' ^ . • / The stand of the Vietnamese people is quite clear, That

. • " . is the .four-^point stand of the DHV GoverrL^iient and the political program of the IffLSV. Tliat is the basis for the settlement of the VietnaKi question.

* PI,

1 . '. ' • '^*the U.S. GoveiTmerit ha.s" unceasingly c:iaimed that it v:ants\

to talk with Hanoi but has received no response- If the U.S, Government truly wants to talk 5 it must^ 'as v^as made clear in , our statement on 28 January 12o7^ first of all stop unconditionally the bonfoiiig and all other acts of war against the DliV, After the United St^/ces has ended imconditionally the bombing and all other acts of war against the DHV^ the DRV will hold talks with the United States on questions concerned."

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DBV (1/V6 8), Tlie S^/j-edes were told of DKV conccrii that /'no advantage'^"v/ould "leave our brothers In the South unprotected "

STOCKHOIM 662 to SecState (SECRET^ KODIS^ ASPErO^ January hj I968. Ref: Stockliolrn 6^9.

''*3, Oberg saw Ch.^irge Vu Each Kai (Oberg's spelling) Dec 21 nnd handed over paper described Para 2A* Paper had been translated into French; illustrative exa:^ples para 7 State 73693 vere also given in English.

"h. WW CViarge raised three points v;hich Oberg on instructions refused to discuss saying that Swedes had this paper froni US aide and that Sv.^edes not competent go beyond vhat was in psper. ' ' -

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5, Three points l^E Charge raised v;cre;

A- Did Sv;'edes have any suggestions on how to

M.

describe bombing pause? t^

; . , B- On question of flow of innterlal in no-advantage situation Charge said 'we cannot leave our brothers in the South unprotected*' It vas not clear to Oberg v/hether he was referring to NI.P in South Vietnam or to f:ujjplieG to INii troops north of II'IZ- (Oberg coiT^aented that in his contacts IWl^ representatives never referred presence KVi^J troops in South ^Vietnam-)

C- On question seriousness of negotiations Charge said this vas unclear to hiM. In any negotiation both sides started froni positions widely apart and with quite different' aiias. In such' cases there would be different interpretation^ of ^serious or productive. '*' ^ .

* DRV (l/ ^/63). The Kumanians reported that Trinh made clear to them that the condition for talks vas an "unconditional" bvit not "permanent" bombing cessation. They also claiiaed that the DRV would not insist on U.S. acceptance of the k Paints as the basis for negotiations; each side would come t^ith its ovni viev;s* . . ■ ' .

■ ■ ■■

"Material in quotation narks v:as read slowly and carefulHy by Macoyescu, ^ . ■ ' "

"Jlcre is the answer to the question that you asked Mr. Harriu^^^n T^-om this point on there is a passage v/hich in the tort is in quotation marks.

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■ 'V;e affirm 'the fo3J,ov:ing-, If tlie USG really v;ants dif^cussions v;ith the Government of the TfxVJ it should first K ' ■ " uncontlitionally cease borriing and B.ny other act of v/ar

.against tlT(r-DRV. "After the unconditional cessation of all bomhing and of a,ny other U.S, act of var against the DRV and t ' ' ' at the end of an appropriate period of time the governrrxent

of the DRV will enter into serious discussions vrith the USGp'

"VHiile he vas reading this paragraph I stopped hini and told him comrade Minister \ihen I mentioned cessation I said final and unconditional, Trinh looked at^^e and reread the sentc^'.ce, I said I , mentioned * final a,nd unconditional cessation.' He reread the sentence again. I interrupted for the third time- May I under-& - stand you are no longer speaking of final cessation. His ansv;er ^ was, that publicly we may continue to r:;5ntion it t .it vrith a, view to negotiations, V/liat I have said is our position-

r . •■ "l asked him vrhether the CovGrnrfient of RoiTiania is authorized

to i^ss this coifununication to the USG- He s*aid yes* He repeated it but he said to retain spirit of tl^e messarce/*

Harrirnan jsaid th_at the Trinh public statement was much the same as the M & I rr.essagej hut that the K & I statenvent placed more emphasis on .^ the acceptance of the four points as a basis of negotiations. M said that he did not establish any connection bctvreen his visit to VJashington^ unknov/n to Han_oi^ and the TrinJi public £tatet^:ent- Harrirnan argued that.

,^^there must be some connection/' M responded that he did not believ LI ■ .there was a contradiction between-the tvjo messa,p:es:

e

"in the publ.}c statement it says the basis for negotiations

is the four points^ but in private conversation they say vre V7ill

come ivith this basis but the U.S. side, we expect^ will comie

with its Qvm point of viev;, Hiey especia,lly said this-"

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Harrirnan then questioned vjhether it was the DRV view that discussions vrill be fruitful only if v,^e accept their foiu^ points. M responded:

"That is not the impression I gained from my discussions- *" j ' ■ They will come v;ith their claims but would have to negotiate on T . vrtiat the U.S. puts forth- They said this specifically.'*

With resp3ct to the tiraing of discussions^ M said that Trinh stated C . there could be no contacts "as long as U.S. acts of war continuej,..

\\^ ' but as soon as bombing and other acts of aggression a-gainst North Vict-

■ ' namese c^ase^ we are prep?,red to receive anybody*..*" Trinh added: . "V/e shall consider these contacts as normal diplomatic activities. The A^rierican rejjresentcative will be received by our diplori^ats at their suggestion

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"they v:i.ll try to test (l don't knovr hy vrhat means) the sincerity of your 5ntsntions—ycur 'i-jish to havG discupsians, I could not deduce the period^ but I do not think it v:ill "be too long. If an understanding, is reached, that'you stop> -at a certain established period^ discussions^ not negotiations^ i-rill take place."

.V.

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4&

U then read from a document:

*'As long as the US acts of v;ar go on we cannot have any contacts vrith the:n> Ap. soon ?,s* they cease the bo^^ibings' and discontinue the act£; of aggre^vsion we shaDJL be prepared -to a^eceive rmy person^ even a re"presentatiYe of the United States^ vjho may wish to inake kiiov/n to us the /Lnierican point of view or to get in-formed on our vievraalnt. VJe shall regard these fixture contacts as norrnal diploir.atic activity. The ;\jnerican representatives will be received by our representatives rit tlie fornici^'s suggestion.^' . -- ' -

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"3-. The Democratic Republic of Vietnam has co^rimunica-ted to the United States Cover orient this staterr.ent of the Democratic Republic of Vietiiam position:

• * ■ ■

'If the United %States Governm.ent rea^lly vrants discussions vrith the Governjnent of the Democratic Republic

* ' of Vietnam it should first unconditionally cease bombing and any other acts of war against the Deniocratic Reixiblic of Vietnam, After the unconditional cessation of all bombing and of any other United States act of war against

' / thCj/Deifiocratic Republic of Vietnam and at the end of an

appropriate period of time the Goveimment of the De]T:o'cratic 'Republic of Vietna^m \vill enter into serious discussions with the United States Governinent-*

*

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DRY (a/l6/68). Bo says that talks vrould begin V.fter a suitable time follov'-ing'^ the halt of attacks ;^ a.nd tlmt the tvro parties would then raeet to agr^se on the level and scope of their talks*

I ■ ■ ' ' ' • ■ ■ ■ ■

f QVES ?i -J^E HALTIK^G OF THE BOHBING IS CLF-AR.. fiUT WHAT DOES '^THE

CES?;ATiDN Or ALL OTH[:r acts of WAf^ AGAINST THE DEi-iOCRaTIc RfPIjBLIC Or VIEV WAMe'* ^EAN TO YCUv

^'^^^^ ?^'^^ ^^„?^^Jl^^^^L! ^^^ ^^^^' J'IILjtary ACTIo^' that vioLATrs THM

SOVERF: GnTT and Tlit TERRTrO^Ry""OF^V'Mr''br'^' OF'

*J

vtE^r'FAr^U"

>'4'-<H*_^kl

i«^i*^k.>«,*#'4i1fentt4^..«ir>dtH.~h*^ ^'-.V-

b« Vb^ATLd ^H-b^ta ^t.-

QUES 3£ I'K' what WaY MUsT THEViSERIcaK GOVE ANK^OUNCE THE END OF THE BOHBIMG? > . '^ '

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ANSf THE US GOVT MAY ANNOUNCE THIS UK'CON'D IT ^ OMAL HALTING OF THE B0M3 IJ^G "aU d" 0 F " ALX ' 0 T HER AC T s ^ 0r " K' aT^ " THf?0UGH 'A 0ECL ARAT J 0N OR Vl MAV"7lTr£''^0SE'Dr^ANY'' OTHER" "PRhCEOURr

RE>:arn'

'-' —^*i- i^i^^fct

■fr^Mh'^T'^ ■.«■'- ^ wvb .^■^''.V'''-^«B--

.^.ti--"^-'^* t .lm.#^««>^ .^>^-k—«>i^«'~*

QUES ^n HOW MUCH TIME WILL ELAPSE BETWEEN THE END OF THE nOf^^BING

akd the Opening or the negotiations?

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ANSf THE TALKS WILL BEG FN AFTER A SUITABLE J^lME FOLLOWING THE UNCONOITIoITaL "halting' of'the BOi^iGiNG AND* OF ArC'O'TlkR^AXTS^nF WAR

AGAINST THE D^^VN*

■i ^aa-^'^'ri*^^ «-^A»-V^~^-1b>b.*4 ■'■^■^k^- *#— Rf'-J

4'^ «V< V^^^H--^

QUES Hf aT what level IN YOUR OPiNlON, ARE THESE NEGOTIATIONS TO BE HELD AND WITH WHAT QUEST toNS ARE THEY Tq DEAL?

ANSs TOLL The UNCOND I T I NAL CfSS ATJON OF BOMBINa ANp OF ALL OTHER ACXS^Qf_yijRlATiAlHsY^^ THE TWO-PART I FS'^^'nTLL 'HE'ft TN"(DRn"ER TO REACH AGpEEMENT On" GUCH^ QurSTlTDNSV^'^^ "-" ^: —

■■— » >|. ] j M j .

(Birphasis Added)

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U.S. (1/25/68). Clifford defined the "no advantage" assumption to tile ^Senate.Armed Services Coiimiittee as ?--r.siLTiing the enemy vfill continue to transport the normal ai5iount of goods j munitions ^ men^ to SVN."

"SEiiaTOR (STROM) TIIURMOim: Vflien you spoke of negotiating^ in that case you would "be vfilling to have a cessation of bordDing. I pre-suine that that would contemplate that they would stop their military activities J too^ if vre vould be expected to have a cess action of bombing*

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*'A- NOj that 5l^ not what I said- I do not expect them to 3top their military activitiGs- I vould expect to fol3.cn'j the langua^je of the Pt^esident whe3i he said that xf they vould agree to start negotiations promptly and not take advantase of the -r . pause ±n the bombings

[

"Q, l^^lat do you mean by taking advantage if they continue their nilitary activities?

"A- Their military activity vill continue in South Yietnafa^ I assuiiiG, imtil there is a cease fire agreed upon- I assurrie that

Cthey will continue to transport the normal aiTiount of goods ^ munitions ^ men, to South Vietnam, I assume that vre vzill continue to ^raintain our forces during that period. So v;hat I am suggesting iSj in the r language of the President^ that he would insist that they not take

\ advantage of the suspension of the bombing.

"Qp How v:ould you keep them from taking advantage if v^e had a cessation of bombing? . ^ ^

"Ar There is no v.-ay to keep them from taking adve.ntage. If they state they are going to refrain from taking advantage^ and then refuse to do so^ then they have not met their agreem.ent^ and the conditions for the negotiations have failed.

"Q. And then J if they did violate tliiat^ you v/ould favor then l^esundng bornbing^ I vould prefjtrme.

"A- I would assiHiie ve wou3-d have'no alternative- If they did not meet their obligations or w^e do not meet our obligations^ tl'ien I assume there is absolutely no sense in negotiating- It would be a useless task. 1o negotiate there has to be good faith if any result is to be achieved and if^ during the negotiations^ bad faith is evidenced then there is no need to negotiate-"

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DRV (g/8/68). Trinh defined the questions to be raised in "talks^' as -^questions related to a settlement of the Vietnam problem on the

C basis of the 195^1 Geneva agreements on Vietnam, Tbsy are also other

> . * * '^ tt *

■ questions vrhich could be raised by either side." This blurred^^ possibly erased^ the distinction that may have existed earJler betvzeen '^talks" and "negotiations." He also said talks would begin "as soon as" the U.S, "proved" it had stopped attacks. . ;

r" "Question: In yoiu"- 29 December 196? speech^ you stated in part;

) After the unconditional cessation*of the bo^nbings and all other

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acts of v^ar a^jainst the DBM^ the DRV will hold ta,lks with the United States on relevant prohlams. VJliat do you ir.ean by x^elevant j prohlems?'

"Ansifer: They are questions related to a settlement of the Vietnam problem on the basis of the 195'^ Geneva agreements on Vietnam. They are also other questions i/hich could be raided by either side.

"Questionr It liu?. been subsequently clarified that the talks can begin after an appropriate time folloT-ring the uixconditional cessation of the bombings and all other acts of irar against the DRV- Could -■' you clarj.fy further the meaning of ai:»propr3.ate tme? ' ;

"Ansver: The talks vrill begin as soon as the United States has

proved that it has really stopped unconditionally the bombings ■

and all other acts of vrar against the Demoeratlc Republic of Vietnam/'

U,S , (g/17/68). The a-redes were asked to explain the San Antonio formula to the DRV- "Productive" \ib.s defined as "serious exchanges" in vrtiich either side could raise "any matter-" Attention was called to the Tet offensive^ as casting doubt on Hanoi's Intentions^ but it V7as not labeled a breach of '*no advantage*"

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"The U,S,^ cons;i stent with President Johnson's stateinent of April 7J 3,955:► remains wi:i.ling to enter into talks viithout preconditions at any time. *

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-"The U.S, position on the cessation of the bombardment of North Viet-Mam is set forth in President Johnson's Septeirlier ?-95 1967 speech in San Antonio, As the President said: ,

'The U,S* is vnMling to stop a.lj_ aerial and naval bombardment of Nortli Viet-rian when this wil-1 lead promptly to productive discussions • "VJgj of course^ assiirae that vniile discussions proceed^ North Viet-Nam v^ould net take adva.2itage-of .the bombing cessation or limiitation-'

"The U.S. is not assuming that North Vlct-Nam will cease its " support to its forces' in the South. ' On the contrary^ as Secretary of Defense designate Clark Clifford tet^^tif5;ed before the Senate Foreign Relations Commtteo^ we assu?Tie tbat until a'cease fii^e ^ is agreed on^ Hanoi 'v;ill continue to transjaort the noriTial amount of goods J men and munitions.'

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Dcclassined per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NKD Projeci Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

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- "in sotting forth its assumption^ the U,»S. is not sett5.ng a I" pond it 5 on "but attempting to 2iiar:e clear to ITortli Viet^Kom that

any'cessation of U.S. bombing foUowed V/ actions by Hanoi taking advantage; of the cessation (such as a,n increase by Hanoi of its infiltration of men a.nd supplies ox' attacks in the area of the DMZ) ¥ould constitute such bad faith on Hanoi's part a.s to jiiake . continued U.S. forebearance iir^ppssible. IfJIanoi^ by taking advantage;^ forces the U.S. to resa^ne bombing; the possibilities of a riegotiated solution vould drastically recede. Under such cdrcui^stances calls for. intensified U,S. iralitary action vould increase-and the possibi3-ity of another halt in the bombing vrould be lovr. ihe U.S. is trying to ascertain whether Hanoi p.ppreciates [_ this vital fact and fully understands the jirfportance the U*S.

attaches to the no-advantage assuj^ption. ^ :

"At San Anto^do the President^ in addition to setting forth his assimiption^ stated his, readiness to stop the bombing vrtien such action v:ould lead''pro27ij:jt3,y to productive di^^cussions. * 'Productive discussions* are serious exchanges in v:hich either side vi3-l be ^ a.l\lc to put foi^.7ard for fixll consideratioii in good faith its potation on any iriatter, 'Prompt' of course refer/? to a ^/illingness by Hanoi to begin discussions vith the U.S. ijnmediate3.y after cessation of bombing, * . - - * .

"it is worth noting that JIanoi is imvrilling to give a clear xoz^gonse to questions as to the length of time betvreen a U*S, bombing cessation ancl the beginning of talks. If Hanoi \;ere serious in desiring talks then surely 'its response vrould have been one of uneq^uivocal readiness to begin im^icdiately.

"The U.S, evaluation of Hanoi's ciurrent position takes into account Hanoi's actions as v/ell as its words. The unprecedented offensive, against most of South Viet-Kam's urban centers^ which Hanoi treacherous.ly launched in the midst of the traditional Tet holidays J causing v^ide spread civilian ca^sualties and suffering 3 " . was Tfiadc notvrlthstanding the fact that we vrere still exploring with JIanpi its position through diploma^tic channels^ and that we had exercised restraint in bombing targets in the immediate vicinity of Hanoi and Ha^iphong. * In this context^ v^e ca^mot but. vjcigh . . j Hanoi's words v:lth great skepticism and caution. These actions carry a h^irsh political message. / ^ , * , 1

•

"The U.S. favors every effort to obtain clarification of Hanoi's position- Vie shall continue to evaluate all inforir=ation and to pui%sue every possible avenue which prdjnlses to bi'ing us closer to the resolution of this cofiflict through serious negotiations."

(State 117383)

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3J NMD Project Number: NND 03310. By: NWD Date: 2011

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U ,*S. (2/20/68 ), The :DTQrvreglans v?ere asked to convey the same message as the Swedes, .

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"'I'he US, consistent vrith President Jo}inson's stateriient of April 7J 1965 J remains vriUJ-ing to enter into talks i;ith/out -amended State 118719/ prcconditiDns at any tlme^

*'The US po^iltion on the cessation oi* the bcinbe-rdnent of North Vlet-ITara \7as set forth in President Johnson's Septerriber 29;> 1967 speech in San Antonio, As the President said:

.'The US is vrillinf^ to stop all Pvcrial and naval _ "^

borrPoardjp.cnt of Korth Viet-JTatri vhen this \;ill lead promptly to productive discussions. We^ of course^ assii^ae tl'iat v;hilo, discussions proceed^ Korth .Viet-Nam vould not take adva^nta^e of the bombing cessation or lirriitation,'

"The US is not assu_mins that Kortl^ Viet-riaia ^^'ill cease its sujjport to its forces in the South', On the contrary/ as.Secrc^ tary of Defense designate Clark Clifford testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Corniaitteoj v;e assu/ne tliat until a ceasefire is agreed on^ Hanoi ■'vrill continue to'traaisport the nonr-al amotint of goods^ men and munitj.ons,'

, "In setting forth its assu^ription^ the US is not setting a condition but a-ttenrptlng to i>:ake c].ear to TTorth Viet-rTa!a that any cessation of US bombing follovred by actions by llazioi taking advantage of the cessation (such,as an increase by Hanoi of its v'* . infiltration of riien and supplies or attacks in the area of the WxY^) vould constitute such bad faith "on Hanoi's part as to make continued US forebearance impossible. If Hanoij by taking a^dvaritageJ forces the US to resmne bombing, the possibilities of a negotiated solution v;ould drastically recede. Under such circm:istances^ ca,lls for intensified US iinJatary action vrould increaf^e and the possibility of another halt in the bo^/bing ^ vould be lovr. The US is trjrlng to ascei-^tain Vfhether Hanoi appreciates this vital fact and fully rjiderstands the'iiriporta,nce tlie OS'attaches to the. no--advantage assun-ption.

*

- '^'At San Antonio the President^ in additj.on to setting forth his a,s sumption J slated his readiness to stop the bombing v;hen such action vould load 'proinptly to productive discussions.' 'Productive discussions' are serious exchanges in-v;hich either side vill be a^ble to put fon/ard for full consideration in good

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faith its position on aily matter* 'Prouspt' of course refers to a vrillingness by Hanoi to begin Jiscusf-ions vitli the US 3irjrtec]iately after cessation of bor;l

''it is V70rth notiiig that Hanoi is unvrilHng to give a clear response to questioais as to the length of tfee betvreen a, Ufi bonibing cessation and the beginning of talks. If Hanoi }jcre serious In desiring talks then surely its response v:oulcl have been one of uneciuivocal rea^viness to begin^iir.ni-^diately.

*'The US evaluation of Hanoi's current position takes into fiiccount Hanoi's .actions as i;c3.1 as its vords. The unprecedented offensive against j^ost of South Viet--Islam's lux^an centers^ which Hanoi treacherously"la.miched in the nidst of the traditional Tet ho3.idaySj causing V7idespread civilian casualties and suffering^ vas niade notvithstanding the fa^^t that v;e v;ere still exploring with Hanoi its position through di'ploBiatic chaimels^ and that \:e had exercised restraint in hoinbing targets in the iiriiiiedia-te vicinity of Hanoi and Haiphong- In this context J. \ie camiot but weigh Hanoi's v;ords wS.th great skepticism and'^caution, niesc actions carry a harsh political

laessage.

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''The US favors every effort to obtain clarification of Hanoi's position. We shall continue to evaluate all informtign and to pursue every possible avenue vrhich promises to bring us closer to the rec'J^lution of this conflict through serious negotiations," - ' ' -

(state n8092)

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DRV (g/2H/63), '^All other acts of war" was defined to mean that '*no airplanes vrere per^iitted to fly over JIRV territory,"

*"Mr. Chan repeated the statement of/his Foreign Minister January I967 -and of the .29th of Doccraber 1957- He tlius repeated that negotiations would begin as soon as the United Sto^tes had proved tliat it has stopped eJX bomb5xdir-ents and iall other acts of .var against the Darr-ocratic KepubD.ic of Vietnam. He specifiecl 'all other acts of var' to rcean that no- air\Dlancs v.'ere permitted to fly over. PHV territory and no naval vessels were to have their guns or other weapons directed against DliV territory after th.at had been done, the Democratic Itepublic of Vietnarii would negotiate \;ith the United States about relevant auestions. , Tlie Ainbassador in'this comieGtion

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^ also referred to Foreign Sinister Trinh^s statemGnt of the 8tli or February 3.968, to the effect that the Vietnain conflict had to be f^olved on the basis of the 19^'^ Gent^va A^jreernents and that ^ negotiations could begin as soon as the United States had shov?n ■ that it vould stop the boirliardrients of Tv'orth Yietna^u and all . other actions of v/ar against the DSV* He rrzentioned a delay of some three V'eeks 'or less',"

(STOciaiOM 901)^

DRV (3/1/68), DRV AintjaRsador Su told d'Orlandi that his "personal ,aev v/as there vould be no assault on IQie Sanh^ etc.^ etc,^ once the jtv.^o sides had begun to talk.

■I

D'Orlandi m% iJith Meloy and Davidson to report on his March 1 meeting in Ecague v;ith Ambassador Su, D^Orlandi asked Su if he v;ere ready to ansvvor the (iuestiorx concerning the period of delay between the stopping of the boi^ibing and the first U*S.-Hanoi meetings? Su responded rather lartiely that he thought this contact had coLie to an end a.nd, therefore^ he tras not able to supply a precise ^ansvrer. "He could stat'e that the matter of a date would be no prob3-em. The real problem ivas San Antonio,"

^' D'Orlandi said that he had dictated to Su t}]e first portion of the-. ^ ^ . ]>aYldson MemCon of the February 28 meeting to the Horth Vietn^jiiese^ but

the Worth Vietnamese did not cojTi^ient on this,

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CJ ' The most iraportant point that Su made in these talks was \rxth respect

to '^no ad\'antage-" Although he said he iras speaking personally, it is / highly doubtful that he v/ou.ld have said the rollov;ing without specific instructions: . - '

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L.",,, .D'Orlandi then tol^^ Su that .if bombing stopped and . talks began, assaulting Khe Sanli, invading or trying to detach ■ the two northern provinces of South Vxct^^rTani^ loAuiching a second

L* * . wave of. attacks against one gr more cities or creating a sensa- . tion \/ith something else like an assault on Caj^tip Carrol, would sink the whole tiling.^ "Su replied that3 speaking personally and not on instructions, sucli thing would be ^out, that from the ' morcient the tv;o sides meet it v;as obvious no such thing could

■ happen* {1 questioned d'Orlandi about this rema^rk of S\V s and- ' ^

.- d'Orlandi replied that while he took no notes he is certain this

Cis the sense of \i:hat Su said,) D'C.^ UKii "told Su that whatever he or Su thought of the efx'cct of bo:::bing, it is a fact th?,t .the US Governjiient and US public opinion considers bonbing of the f Kortli a m.ost ijr^portant v;eapon and that no President could give

L away such a w^eapon vrhile soniethnng terrible was happening either

in the K-IZ or the South. Su did not respond to this coioent* r ^ l)'0r3.andi also reLiarked that it might be necessary for him to go

1 ^ to Hanoi to receive assua^ances directly from the top and again Su

did not re^Dly,"

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DI^V (3 /10 /68). Trinli gave ]\^or-^regian Ambassador Algard to under tand that-the DRV did not req^uire the U.S. to accept its h Toints '^"beforeliand" (apparently before negotiations) though the BRV v/ould insist on them as the "fotindation for a political resolution of the conflict" at the talks-

OSLO 35YO " Simi?s^ry of Ainbassador Algard's visit to Kanoi^ March 3--10

• •

"7* Tlie Foreign f-ii-nisterjunderlined also_^that the_lforth Vi etziamese hzP^.-^-P. P.^'^S^IIL mist be the' |5;vtndail^-i^ polltic:?J^_resolution of the

-^ *^^EQ^-^?-^; Apart fi^om vh?.t co>icernect the stopping of the boiribing and

J cessation of the acts of 'v/ar against l^Iorth Vietnatn^ he did not set

^ n^ntters forth in such a vray that theJJnited States beforehand pust accept^

- tBe^entire 'j-:point'progr^, He did "hot say anything on the point of r tiifie for American vjithdrav:al but gaid that vas a question v/hich inust be

4-^ . handled at tlie conferc^nce table* i^ror v:ould he say anything on ho-.^ t}ie

reiurlfication x:)roble:n ivould be settled nor hov/ long it vrould take but ^ he repeated that fir^t there must be a political solution in South Vietnam and referred to the "ULF program: \."hich assumed a separate South Vietnamese state for the immediate fivuure. Insofar as it concerned a-p* ^ political solution for South Vietn^^-ni^ the Foreign Minister repeated the

Iforth Vietnejnese position that this vras a ciuestion vrhich must be discussed ivith the riLF and t]iat Hanoi cannot speak on behalf of South Vietnam., He underlined very strongly that i*ecG?rt events i?i South Vietnam had shovm I * that the regime in Saigon vas totally without political b^asis but at the.

^ same tSjiie events made clear that there ^-as a possibility of cooperation

b'etvreen the KLF and other political groups, Ho^'ever he did not go into detail on this point/' (Emphasis added) ^ ■

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DKV, (^'/8/68), Trinli:, in his interview ifith Colfiing-rood^ repeated

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DKV V:,ttacks'on reciprocal restraint as the condition for a complete ' ■ bombing ha3,t* He specified that the DRV representative at the contact to comp3.ete the bombing halt would have Ambassadorial rank and would be prepa^red to reach agreement on "the da-te^ place and level of the formal talks" bctvjcen the DRV and U.S. ■ '

''Question: President Johnson said that 'even this limited bombing of tlie north CQuld come to e-n early end if our restraint is matcl^ed by restraint in Hanoi-'- Would your government be willing to make such a move?

Deila^isifled per Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316, Byi NWD Date: 2011

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"Answer: The Democrs-tic Republic of Vietnejji is an ixidepc^ndent Said sovereign country .sorr.G 10^000 -nxLles B,\jB,y from the United States, and has done no harm v/hatsoever to It. Tlie unvjarranted U.S. t^ombing of the Der^ocratic Eepublic of Vietnam is an impudent act of a£;5gression- Tlie United States Must bring it to an end.

^^To ask for 'reciproeity' as a conditionj or 'restraint' as P a price; is nothing but a trick to blur the distinction bet\7een

C ' the aggressor and the victim of aggi^ession. The United States has

shown no 'restraint' in using its huge war inachine against a small r countrj^j and still deBiands that we should sho^v 'restraint' a2id should

not exercise our sacred rights to defend our fatherland, Tiiis is-pure nonsense,"

'^Question: In its 3 April statementj youj: govermnent declared 'its I readiness to appoint its representative to contact a U.S, representative vjith a view to deteriidnlng with the Araoi^ican side the unconditional cessation of the U,S, bombing raids and all other acts of v;ar against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam so that the talks may startr' Ih'* Minister^ w^hat v.dll be the rank of your representative? Wien and vzhere vrill he J^ake contact with the U,R, representative? Wien and whei'e will the formal talks between the Deiaocratic Republic

\ ! of Vietnaiii and the United States startj and at what level?

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Ansvrer: A representative with ambassadoi^ia^l rank of the Govermrient of the Democratic Republic of Vietna-m is "ready to make contact with a representative of the U.S. Government in Phnom PenJi or in another place to be mutually agreed upon. In the course of this contact, the Mierican side will specify the date when tlie unconditional cessation of the U.S* bombing raids and all other acts of war against the Deino-cratic Republic of Vietneo-n will become effective; then the two sides vrill reach agreement on the date^ place^ and level of the formal talks between the Derjocratic ReTDublic of Vietnam s^nd the United States.'*

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■ DRV'.{5/3/fS)' The DRV appointed Xuan Thuy as its representative to entei^'foTinal "talks" v/lth the US in Paris,

I ' . " . •» the DRV Government is of the view that the formal

■ talks betv;een Hanoi and Vasiiington should be held iiriinedlately

The DHV Goverri]nent has decided to appoli.it Minister Xuan Thuy

Cas its representative to enter into foi^ial talks with the U-S Government's representative^ to determine wiL]i the U.S* side the unconditional cessation of the U.S. hanbang raids and all f other acts of v,^ar against the DRV> and then hold tallis on

i ._. other problej^is of cpncerii to the tv/o sides-"

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SETTLEI-KHT TERI-4S

X- Kutu^.\ Withdrawal

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[Hie U.S. position on withdrawal of JTorces is clear and^ y^t,

r leaves us \?ith a (pi-eat deal of flexibility. VJe have said In the

lU Points (1/3/66) that "vre vant no U,S* bases in Southeast Asiaj" and that "we do not desire to retain U-S. troops in Soxxth Vietnam after peace is as^^ured." In other \;ords^ the U.S. is on record as f^ being cpiiiniitted a£-a,inst keeping its forces in South Vietnara when peace

L ■ is restored- The U.S, record is also clear in insii^tiilg on mutual

withdraxval of forces- In the k Points which \ieTe pft-ssed to the DEV

Lin Rangoon (PIFIA 2/16/66)^ we stated that dlsciiSBions should consider 1 "appropriate inean-G^ including agreed stages ^ for the vrlthdrawal of , • , jnilltaiy and qucvsi-^uiilitary personnel and weapons introdixced into ^, South Vietnam or North Vietnaja ftom one ai-ea to the other or into ■

I either area from any other outside soxn-ce*. ,and the regroxjping a.nd

^ ' redeplo^'ment of indigencais forces," U.S. flexibility on withdrawal

is built into its "until peace" qualification. In the Manila Declara-p tion (10/25/66)^ v.^e stated that all.ied forces "shall be vrithdrawn^ after

L close consultation^ if the other sicfe vjithdraws its forces to the norths

' ceases infiltration^ a.nd the level of violence thus subsides- Those f forces will be withdraim as soon as possible and not later than six

months after the above conditions have been fulfilled."

The DRV has always given the prlneiple of U.S. withdrawal top

[ : billing. Pham Van Dong directly told^us TP>-i^3:iSYLVAMA 7/25/6Y) that

the end of the wo.r means "a withdravral of U.S. forces*" In the h Points^ for exajiip3-,e;, JIanol states:. "The US Goverrjr.ent must withdi^aw from South Vietnam US troops^ military personnel^ and weapons of all kinds5 dismantle all US military bases there> and cancel its mili-tary alliance with South Vietnam." Hanoi has^ however^ displc^yed increasing flexibility

Con the timing of U.S. withdravral* Recent statements indicate that they ■ vmuld be prei:^ared for ns to stay imtil a political settlement in the south had been achieved* Hanoi's hooker on this issue is'similar to

C those other matters on which it has evinced flexibility (reunification

'and free elections)j namely^ that this Is an issue of secondary Importance compared to the crunch point on v^ho governs in the south. Tactically^ then^ ?Iajioi is likely to present an initial hard front on this iiiatter and r then "give in" in order to gain concessions 021 the central issue of power

LL . ' . ' in *the south- . ■ , . ^ ' %

Wk presence in S o u th Vietna m

Hanoi has repeated3.y denied the presence of regular PAVS forces or even Korth Vietnamese volunteers in South Vietnam. Tiiese public denials are iiaportant to Hanoi for several reasons: the denials reaffirm their propaganda about the war being essentially a South Viet-nam.ese affa^ir fought by the South Vletnaanesc thex:;selveSj that is a

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civil vjar. The denials may also hcvvc been tied to their anti-U^S* bombing campaign^ allovjirjg them to niaintain that the U.S* vras comrratting aggression against the noxH-h -^-^ithout tht: north- coinrnitting aggression against the soiith, Also^ a,t this tiiae^ Hanoi has an interest in not making itself out to be a liar for all these years. As far as vre luiov/j they have even been telling the Eussians that they do not have regular forces in the south- In other vords^ this fiction has assi^i^ed propaganda and leverage value uhich Hanoi v:ill not give up easily-

>Biile Hanoi^s public record on this issue has been consistent^ there Imve been two private slips in v/hich they vcre on the verge of admission* The first occasion ivas in the XYZ conta.cts vjhen Bo did not deny DEV troop presence in South Vietnam (8/18/65) ^'^ even that the'^ 325th WA division vzas in South Vietnam—altliou^h he claimed tljat ^^it vas not then engaged in military operations" (9/3/65)' After the XYZ contacts had ended^ Bo said there v:ere no regular troops in Saigon5 but laorthern volunteers might have joined the Viet Cong (11/27/65)- The" second occasion of near truth telling came during the MRIGOLD contacts,, Lev;andov7ski asked us (11/1^4/66)^ regarding the offer at Manila coiicernlng the withdrawal of U,S, forces from Vietnam on the condition that the troops of Ifcrth Vietnaro- v;ould v-^ithdraw^ and> he said^^Morth Vietn^^m^ of course^

doesar't admt that they are there at al3 " Lifter in Vr.z 10-Point

MARIGOLD formulation (11/30/66)^ the 8th Point read; "in this regard the US is prepared to accept DKV modalities on the cessation /of bombing/ and not reciuire the DRV to admit infiltration into South Viet nam •"

Would tlie ])RV withdra-^r?

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>?hen played off against the public sta^tements of denial^ these private statements in-ovide a hint as to how the DRV mght handle this issue. The fiction of no presence will be maintained^ but it v;^ill not be allowed to stand in the way of actual I^Iorth Vietnamese troop v/ithdrawals should the conditions be appropriate. In all livelihood- hov:cver; these withdrawals vfill be de facto, unannounced^ ujiilaterally made — and not ■ necessarily back into North Vietnara itself. The more likely stopping 'place "on their way home from South Vietnam v.^ould be the Laotian Banhandle. The furthest Hanoi ever v/ent on dealing with this issue was again in the XYZ contacts- Because Bo did not deny FVA troop presence in South Vietnam^ he was ab2.e to agree with the principle that troop withdrawals would have to ,be mutual^ balanced and phased (8/15/65)' Bo reaffirmed his agreement to this principle (8/18/65)^ but then denied any such agreements (9/3/65)'

vniat emerges is the link between North Vietnamese troop withdra\vals and their control of the south- Wien Lewandowski,asked us about the Manila withdrawal formula (ll/lJi/66)j the tie vms clear: ".-*does this condition mean the U*Sa withdrawal depends on control by the present South Vietns^iesG government of territories not novf under the control of Saigon?" Ha?ioi will asX ns this Question again^ arnd depending upon our answer will decide to vrithdraw or not.

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TiiTiinf^ — the DRV vievi^ on the tining or U,S. vrithdravral.

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As the DKV began to play out its diplojna.tic hand over the last t\ro years 5 It has becoine increasingly flexible .on when it would like the U.S. to leave* Bo told iis that U,S, withdrawal vras a "technical problem" (11/16/65). Lewandowski said that they could take place according to a "reasonable guarantee" (6/27/66)* Loan told Algard (OHIO^ 8/16/6?) that the tiirdng '*was not a decisive question-" In this connection, Lewandot-rski pointed out the agreement on withdrawal of l^*ench troops as an example* He added that the Americans "would have to accept the political situa.tion in South Vietnam as it is 5 as De Gaulle did in Algeria." All this does not mean that Hanoi V7ill leave the issue open .' to principle- One of Lewandowski's 10 Points (MA.RIGOLDj II/30/66) stated: *^The U.S. does not desire permanent or long-term nilit^^^y presence in South Vietnam/' The Tnost forthcoming of all DHV statements on this issue was the one made by Fnam Van Dong (PSMSYLVAKA^ 7/25/67): ."Some US troops vjould have to stay /in South Vietnam/ until the end of political settlement." This probably means that the U*S, forces would be allov/ed to linger on as long as they did not interfere with the process of political settleinient- Indeed^ the contijiued presence of U,S, troops in South Vietnam during this period could a.dd legitimacy to the now governiiient.

Non-I]"Ltervention

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The DRV also w^ants to get some guarantee in principle that the U,S, vrill refrain from intervening in Vietnam after a political settlement has taken place. In the 'j Points^ Hanoi states tMt the U.S, "must end its policy of intervention and aggression in South Vietnam^" and that during the period pendiilg reunification^ the two zones must refrain from entering into any military alliances vrith*foreign countries and there rmst be no forej.gn military bases;i troops;^ or foreign m^-litary personnel in their respective territory.

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2. Se.lf"Deternn\natloh' for SVN: i^'-ec Elections?

The main parties to the v/ar agreed early on the principle of self-detGrnination for the people of SV^* .It xs endorsedj Inter e^lis.^ in the first KTLF program (i^/ll/6l)> President Johnson^ s Johns-Hopkins speech (^^/7/65), the DRV's k Points (h/3/6^) and the GVlVs k Points (6/22/6^), The Vietne^rfi Alliance of l^tional, Deinocrei-tic and Peace Forces (A.MDFF) is for itJ too (1^/26/68)- But the different sides haye different ideas ahout hov tlie people of SVN should orpress their vriU- Tlie U,S. and the GVN prefer the elector^.l processes of the cuj?rent Constitute on ^ vfhereas the' DRV and KLF v;ant to scrap that Constitution and set up a nei-7 electoral authority. The ANDH? has not stated a formal position on the Constitution^ but is clearly opposed to the GVN as the country's electoral authority. Everyone no doubt susx^ects that the outcome of elections will be determined by vho runs them. Thus to a large extent^ the war is now being fought over who shall run future elections^ making the apx>arent agreeinent on ''self-determination'^ illusory. In addition;; vrhile "both sides "have exprevssed themselves favorably about elections^ neither is irrovocab-ly co:nmitted to elections as the o)ily means of self-determination.

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Tile k l^oints (k/Q/G'^) call only for self-deterinination "in accordance v/ith the program of the i^fLF without any foreign interference-" V/hen these Points were first published;, the M^F prograra (issued 2/U./6l} called for overthrowing Diem and substituting a coalition government as one phase^ apparently the first^ in bringing about "pi'ogressive democracy^'' inpluding a new constitution and elections.

+ • Later in 19^5^ Kai Tan Bo stressed self-deterjiilnation* as the "one

basic premise" that vould permit all other problems to be, solved (XYZ, 7/16/65)5 but he subseq.uently amended this to say that self-detelimination .through elections would only he possible after U-S, military withdrawal {XIZ^ i/SY/66)* As he explained^ "How can elections be held in a country over which no authority is exercised?" (XYZ^ 5/6/66) Ke was probs^bly not worried about the meche^nlcs of holding elections. Kore likely, he felt the eiectoral authority v:ould determine the outcome.

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These stands were x-epeated by Trinh (to the Sv:edes)j v:ho said he wanted a coalition government and general elections (ASPEN> II/11/66).

Waen Lewandowski was probing us on settlement terms (l.tAKiaOXD, ll/l^t/66)> he asked J "in case of a cease-fire^ v;ould the US be prepared to withdraw from the combat areas and not interfere in the creation of a .new government in Vietnam?" He also wanted to know if t'ne Manila withdrawal provisions depended on GVI^I control of areas not then under its control and v/hetlicr w^e v?ould declare our willingness to accept the Geneva and ICC machinery in "bringi;ig peace to Vietnam^^' perhs.ps including inspection of an election.

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H'^ was no doubt searching for a foruiuJ^a under Kliich IttF authority could be exercised prior to U,S, withdrawal, VH'ien he formalated his 10 Points (M^iRIGOLD, I1/30/66), he indicated o\iT irillingne.ss to "accept -, "bhe participation of 'all' in e,lections and the supervision of these elections by an appropriate international body*'' If^ as the Poles a2id Russians clainijad^ the DKV was willing to enter discussions on this basis^ they ]T\B-y }iave been willing to see elections of this sort before U,S. vithclrawa,!, V/lio v;ou3.d run the elections^ and how^ would be subject to legotiation—as^ therefore^ in DRV eyes would be the probable outcome.

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I VJl'ien the new IMLF Pr'ograHi was issued^ just aftei' the election of

Thieu, Ky and the lower house^ it lists first the goal of abolishing the "puixpet administration^^ the "puppet national asseiribly^" and their '

1 constitution- It called for "free general elections^" for a new nfttiohal

■ asscDibly that wou3,d w-ork out a nev/ con^stitution^ and for the establishment of a "national union deinocratic government*" Wiile it does not

. specify the order in which things are supposed to happexij it is clear enough that abolishing the GYIJ and its con,stitution would have to come before new elections^ etc. In the li>st of objectives^ new elections and the ncvr constitution also cosie before. establJ^shing the coalition government* Perhaps this hints that the issue is negotiable (9/5/6?)'

However^ at the end of February 1968^ the DRV position expressed to Fanfani by Ajnbassador Su was: Hanoi wanted "absolutely free general elections. To insure liberty of vote^ it was necessary to constitute a government vrith very broadly based participation" (KIIiLy;^ 2/23/68),

Tlie AlffiPF Pi'cgram attacks the GVN as a "lackey administration/' calls for setting up a coalition "governjnent and speaks of the future political regime in SVW as a "republic" with "just and honest jslections." Again the sequence is not crlsp3-y specifiedj but the program seems to caLl for setting up the coalition government as a condition necessary to "wirjiiia*^ back national sovereignty." This would make it a condition for ending the war—something to be negotiated or won on the battlefield^ rather than the outcome of an electoral process (k/2^/68).

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3- The LegitImatG HerKreGentativG of SVN: GVN or TfLF?

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As noted in the previous sectionj elections as an impartial v;ay of r - deciding wlio shall govei-n SVIT nay not solve the problem. The ccTiposi-L tion of the {^overniBent may have to be negotiated or decided in battle.

A prime v;ar aim of the coniniiuiists is establishing legitimacy for the KIjF^ while undercutting that of the GVN- The GVIF is fighting to bolster its authority;i v;hile destroying that of the I^ILF* Th~as "v:hD shall govern SVi^l" is what the vrar is all abovit^ and "v;ho shal-1 represent SVM^' in negotiations is one round in thG battle-

As DpX->osed to the principle of "self*-deterx.iinationj" the issue ■ of who shall represent SVTJ"-at the conference or in Saigon--is one on whicli almost no agreement has been reached betvjeen the U.S. and DRV-EssentiallyJ each side has insisted on the legitimacy of its party in SVJ\% denied the J.egitimacy of the other ^s^ but offered a way for individuals from the other's party to enter political life by ^'reconciling" thainselves* The communists are probably prepared to go beyond this^ accepting tlu^ee 'Apolitical tendencies" (right^ neutral and left) as theoretically co-cciual^ in exchange for our a,greeirig that a nev; government be foiTied by the "tendencies"—after the model of the 19o2 Agreements on Laos,

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I'he DRV and W...S.

From the outset^ the communists' carrot has been their willingness to see "no]i"Conjmunists" included in the governrjient or at the conference table. The vmpalatable part has been their insistence on a role for the ' KLF and no role for the GVN as an institution/

In June 196^^ Hiain Van Dong insisted to Seaborn, "The Laos pattern of 1962 sliould serve as a guide for SVN-" Ttiore should be a coalition^ iiacluding the KIF- Wien -Seaborn said the MjF might dominate^ Dong said only^ "There is no reason to have such fears." •

In his/sta1;ement anbodying the h Points^ Eham Van Dong said the HLF * v/as "more'and more recognized by., *v."02\ld opinion as the sole genuine representative of the SViI i:>eople" (^1/8/65)- The follovring January;i Ho Chi Minh saidj "if the US readily vants peace it irrust recognize the iffiF as the ■ sole genuine representative-.-" (l/2if/66). Tliis i^ublic stance v.-as softened in various private communications passed subseciuentlyj but never to the extent of conceding legitimacy to the GVII.

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The DRV rcljuttecl the U,S- 1^1 Points (Eangoon, I/31/66) by rejecting the legitiiijacy of the GVIT: asking the IJLF to "lay dovni its arms and ask amnesty'* aii^oimted to jriaintaining a "puppet re^irne"' in Saigon. ^

In Lewando^fski's first overctures (VAKLGOJJ)^ 6/29/66)5 he repre-sented the conimimists as asking only that the HJjF "take part" in negotiations--"they are tiot to have any monopoly"'---and said that Ka.noi did "not vant to interfere with the SW Governjnent," tho-jgh "vre vould like someone other than Ky." L?^ter ha suggested a coalition government made up ji^ainly of "sensible SVN politicians" i^?ith men "on the fringe" from the "right'* and the left^ "the so-called I^JLF/* in one or tv:o "anirnportaut Lainistrie>s" each" (MRIGOLD 9/18/66), This too is after the Laos pattei-n, (Souvahna's neutralists \n.th 11 ministries^ Eoun Oum vri'^-h h and Soux:?h?^ndvong v;ith h.) . .

Much the saine propositio?i came to us thrL^ough the Swedes (ASPSN^ 11/11/66).

Burchett^ claiming to reflect the yievrs of senior DEV and TTLF officials;i reported that Ky and Thieu vould not "be acceptable in a coalition J, but ''some members of their cabinet or. *-previous Saigon-governments" rndglit he- The communists considered "negotiations beti/een Hanoi and the Ky goverriment" as "an ImxDOssibJ.lity." Ky and his top '' supporters were expected to emigi'ate (2/10/67)-

I In Ju3_y 19675 Pham Van Dong repeated that the coalition could be

^ "broad" and cduld include members "du gouvernement fantoche et cadres

d'ai'^iiee fantoche-" He said the IBLF need not participate in negotiations--as long as the issues do not concern SVN (PEMSYLVAICTA, 7/^5/67)-

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The latter point vas repeated through the Koivegians in August (OlilOj 8/16/67). But in the end^ the Amerlca,ns would "have to accept tlie political situation in SVN as it is^ as de Gaulle did in Algeria." "The question of representation was of great importance" (OHIO^ 8/16/67)-Jiater^ the Hon-regians were asked to find out if the U->S. was "willing to ■ ■ accept the liberation front as a political factor" (OiriO^ 6/21/67)- .The * Kon'^Ggians took this to mea^n as a "factor in prelimina-ry talks^ actual negotiations (c-^nd) in a post-settlement situation," * They also conveyed to us the DHV's desire for a "non-cojiir;iianist" coalition government in SVN. (The DriV^indic:ated to thein that it considered the I&F "non-communist" too*) llioir interXocutor's "tone gave the ijnpression" that neinbers of the QYH v?ould be acceptable 5 a3-though this was not n^ade exp3-icit; the North Vietnamese did concede that the GVN "was a political factor in SVN (9/B/67). This too is in the patteD^n of the 1j?.os settlement j. in which representation at the conference finally devolved upon three political "tendencies" .(^rightj neutral and left)^ which ultlt.iately becarae the three elements of a coalition goveriHient.

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Last Fe'bruaryj DKV Arabassador Su told the Italj.ans that there should be a ^Wery broadly based" {^overimient^ "excluding oiily 'v/ar crmins'ls' (md.efined)"(KILLY^ 2/23/68). . -

As late as Mar eh ^ the Norwegiaiis were told regain that a poli.tical solution for SYtJ "^i-jas a question v/hich n-iust be discussed v/ith the KLF and llo^noi cannot speak on belialf of SVN-"

The ANDH^ Program denomices the GVN as a ^^laekey adrranistraticia'^ and says th^ KLF "cannot be excluded froir- the settle?iient of all problen^s in SVN. We advocate contacts with the KT^F.-*-" But it offers^ apparently acting alone^ "to discuss these problems with the US governrrieut'* (h/2^/CQ). This is possibly intended as a face saving way for the U.S. to begin negotiations with tlje coimnmiists without according status to the IUjF-The ATOFF may also offer the "neutralist" political tendency from i^hich a solution after the Laos p?vttern could be fashioned: i^3LF members on the left; AEIDPF in the middle: selected GVU meirijers on the richt.

The GVi^

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Tlrjroughoutj the GVTT has insisted u^jon its sole right to speak for SVlf* Its k Points state J "the Hanoi Coirjmmist regime must dissolve all the puppet organizations it has formed in SVK' under the names of * Front for the Liberation of the South/ 'Liberation Radio* and the ^Peoples Eevolutionary Party* (6/22/65)' Thieu's current position is that the GVN and Hanoi are the parties to the v:ar» If there are to be negotiations^ they should be the protagonists vn-th no role for the NIiF. His pr5j[ie objective is clearly to van iVcognition for his governinent from Hanoi^ v/it}ioat our according any fitrther status to the I!LF, Although the preseiit GVN constitution excludes commvmists and "pro-coimnmiist. neii1:^ralists" from the electora>l process^ Kiieu has e,ccepted the principle of "one m?.n-one vote^" and agreed to meet v:ith Individuals v7ho leave the ¥(LF^ but he v/ould not accept the IJLF itself as a "political entity" (Bunker's Meet the Press interview;, ll/ig/67). ■ ^ '

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Our position has been consistently that the PJI^F had no role "as of right" in SVII and that vre would not guarantee a role for it before elections J because to do so vrouLd be contrary to free dstei'inination. Individual members of the TJLFj hovrever^ could ps^rticipate in the political process in SVII (XYZ; 9/8/65J Pangoon^ 2/1&/66). Should the BRV decide to negotiate^ "the Viet Cong would not have difficulty being represented and having their views presented" (U,S. 1^ Points^^ I/3/66; Golciberg, 2/10/67)' We drevr attention to the internationally reeognl:ied status of the GVF and argued that the GV1\^'b Mtional Reconcilation Program offered a route by' v^hich individual members of the I^!LF could participate in the "normal political processes of SVIV'" under GVN ausi^ices (iJanila Com^viuniciue^ IO/25/66; Goldberg, 2/lO/67)-

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Several episodbc may have s'.ugc^ested to the BRV some elements of ?^glvG^^ in our position: Gullion's instinictions stated> "At most^ the futiure'of the l^fLF shouJ,d he a matter for discussion, not something settled in principle before ne^^otia^tions begin" (XYZ^ 8/15/65)' ^evrandovjGki' s 10 points^ accepted by us "subject to important differences-of interpretation" said^ ^'tbe present status q.uo in SVN vould be changed in order to take into account the interests of the parties presently opposing the policy of the US in SVK" (MRIGOLD, 11/30/66),^ Goldberg (11/2/67) told the Senate Foreign Relations Cornraittee that the U.S. 'Vould not stand in the way of groups^ including the ELFj" being invited to ap^jear before the UlT Security Council* Tlie U.S* privately indicated to the UJI Secretariat tliat visas would be Issued for such a group if Certain clarifications ijcre obtained; the latter, however^ vero apparently not forthr:or,iing and no visas \;ere actually issued. In his March 3I speech^ President Jolmson said^ "tbere may come a time when South Vietnamese--• on both sides—are able to work out a v/ay to settle their ov:n differences by free political choice rather than by war."

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RGunification

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Tlie U,S- position on reunification of Vietnam can be separated into what v^e have been saying publicly and what we really want* 1Mb-licly, the U.S. ik Points (1/3/66) state:

"10, T}ie question of reunification of Vietnam sliould be

determined by the Vietna7iiese tlii^ough their ov:n free decision;

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'^11, The cauntries of Southee-st Asia can be nonaligned or neutx'al if that be their option;"

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Tlie U.S. position is parhaps more accurately stated in the ]4anila Coriiiiiuiiq,ue (IO/25/66):

"The Govertment and people of South Vietnam deplore the partition of Vietnam into iJorth and South- But this partition brQU{^ht about by the Geneva Agreements of 195^^ however unfortunate and regrettable^ will be respected untilJ by the free choice of all Vietnpanesej reunification is achieved."

Pi^esident Johnson has gone even farther O'Jl/S^) when he said that "our objective is the independence of South Vietnam and its freedom from attack." Oar preference is clearly for the conti2uied sei>arate existence of South Vietnajiij but the 5jnpression of our public statements has been that we favor reunification through free Vietnam-wide elections after aggression has ceased-

The North Vietnariese position appears forthcorrdng and appears similar to the impressions of our own public statements< They have indicated that they v;ould not press for reunification^ that reunification could be determined vrell in the future by free decision of all the Vietnamese x^^ople, and that the interim state in South Vietnam would be non-socialist and neutral. ^Hanoi can afford to make their reunification position look appealing beca^use it is really a secondary issue. T^ieir position is a.nd they will press for a political solution in Soutii Vietnam favorable to themJ and tben let the issue of reunification take care of itself ™- in a t^me period when U.S. interests will not be hujiiiliated.

VJViat i.ri t he DRV p osition?

There are several statements in the k Points -which bear on this issue: (a) "The USG must.. .dismantle all U.S, military bases /in SVN/^ and cancel its military alliance with SVir'-j (b) "Pending the peaceful reunification of Vietnam^ vjhile Vietnam is still temporarily divided

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to be settled by the Vietnamese people in both xones^ v/ithout any V foreign interference*"

In June 195U^ Biam Yan Dong told Blair Seaborn that reunification is a "drame national^ fonclajnents^.1-" He added^ somewhat inconsistently^ that neutrality for SVK'^ and by ii^iplicatlon remiiflcationj ^joulcl 1)g something for the people of SVN to decide; he did not "prejudge^^ the outcoTfte, More recently (PEiWSYLVAI^JA 7/25/6?) j» Pham Van Dong said Uiat Hanoi goals for South VietnaTn vera "indepezidencej deiaocracyj peace^ and neutrality."■

VJliat do these general sta^terientK add u-d to in operatlonpvl terms? VBien? ,*

On the timing of reunification^ the YS^ has given a rs.nge of statements including, "no hurry" (XYZ 7/16/65), ''indefinite postponement" (Ojiio ^/xG/Qj)^ "until Soxith Vietnam is ready/' "3.0 or 20 years" (Burchett 2/II/67). But, as the Swedes informed us (ASPM ll/ll/66)j Trinh said to then that it is necessary to qreate such conditions as ifiXl pari?iit a move in the direction of reunification* In other v:ords, rejmification, according to the DKV need not occur at B^ny specific or early time, but that it v:i3.1 hax:)pen at some future point mast he assured by present decisions. These decisions basically seem to revolve around a political settlement in South Vietnam, As Loan told A3.gard (OHIO 3/3/67)5 "first there must be a political solution in South Vietnam." At first glance, Hanoi's position on reunification looks .liKe a compromise. Indeed, "Hanoi has been p3_aying it up a,s a comprom/ise, indicating that postponement of reimification is at va^riance vjith the Xd')h Geneva Accords vfhich called for reunification within fc-?o years of settlement, i*e*, 1956, The hooker, of course> is that the realization of reunification in the fixture is merely a corollary of other points, mainly control of the government in the south, and need not be fought for in its own terms*

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would be a Vietnam-^vide single issue vote on reunification- By elections,

the could have meant that reunificevtion would be decided on a government to goveriTnent basis (the DRV with the new South Vietnam government);, each government having been chosen by "fi-ee elections-" In support of tx^e latter method, Pnam Van Dong stated (PSm\iSYLVAI^nA 7/25/67): "Once the war in the

L South is sett led,, vre shall ^discuss with the South ,and find the best means,"

Additionally, and to confuse the issue further^ virtually all the DKV statements on this issue stress that reunification is to come through free r determination "by the pejople in both zones" (the h Points), This is the'

I wording of the 195^^ Geneva Accords, and it means that the people of South

Vietnam alone will not decide the matter, that the people in the north must haTC their say as well. By this country-wide vote for-uula^ it is likely that even a solid majority vote in SVH against reunification would be oyer-t?.kcn by the neC':T unanimous vote for reunification in North Vietnam.

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A final and related ciualifiGr is that the Tree decision on remiification* must* "be v;ithout foreie;n interference. IVest'ana'blyj this is to convey the DRV belief that ho outsiders can or shoiild be present in Yietnani when the decision on reunification is being raade.

r^yature of interim state in Sou th Vietnam?

The DRV has used three elements to define \diat the Government of louth Vietnam v;ould look like pending'reunification. Firsts Hanoi has Jescribed it as neut ral in the ''Cambodian inanner" (l^iARIGOia) 9/18/66). This implies indexjendence^ but more reliance on Asian a^ld particularly Asia^n co:mr:U.nist influences. Carrbodian neutrality is not noted for bGing sympathetic to the U.S*^ nor is it noted for knuckling uaider to China or Ifortli VietnauK Cambodia has also renounced SMTO protection. Hanoi ^ has also described thie governxient as bein^ ^' non-social 1st ." After talking , with the DRV leadership^ Eurchett (2/11/67) said that Hanoi thought of ■ itself as a "soci3.1ist countt^y and ?- mesnber of the socialist world but . without military alliances or foreign military bases;j militarily Init not politically neutral^" and thought of the south as '^nan-socialist and neutral mlltarily^ politically, and diplornatically." In a very revealing statement (PEi^H^ySYLVANIA 7/25/67), Tham Van Dong said: "Some people think we want to impose socialism on the south, We are convinced that the NLF will not make such an error," It is important to recall^ however, tlmt the comjLUnists consider the KJjF to be "non-coifanunistj" a front of diverse political groupings. The third element has been the implication that there need be no change in the foreign affairs of the interim South Vietnam goverjB:ient (KVRIGOID 6/^7/66}. Such a statement would imply tha.t South Vietnam could continue under western alliance protection and that the government wov^ld be able to receive aid from all countries. This element^ reported only in the first-WvRIG01 tD conta^ct, is in contradiction vrith the first element emphasizing neuti^lity. Except^ perhaps^ for the aid proviclon^ it is probably nothing'more than a come-on-

V?hat do these statements add up to? . *

Tliey seem to mean that Hanoi understands that the U.S. has a definite stake in South Vietnam^ and that even in the future would not take happily to the appearance (or the reality?) of South Vietnam being absorbed into the communist bloc, ^rnan Kiam Van Dong said that "the MLP will not make such an error/^ he probably meant that they imderstood the Importance in U.S. eyes of appearances* Tlie DliV must get its v:ay^ but it is saying that . it wi;Ll not^do so in a way that will threaten western interests.

Relation of interim South Vietnam government to DRV?

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Burchett (2/11/67) even gives us a glimpse of ho\7 Hanoi views relations betvreen t)ie two Interim zones or goverm-isnts- Ke says; "For regulating north-south reJ^ations^ there would be a tj'pe of general assembly^ presiunably nOBiinated by the respective parliaments to handle questions important to both zones^ such as, trade> post and telegraphy inter-i*.onal

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travel J inc3_ucUng sports and culbui^a.! ezchaxiges, Tlie assembly^ in fact J T:ould have some rese^riblance to the inter-German council^ an idea bein£5 tried out by the V7est German social deinocratics as a means to handle current practical xjroblems betv;een East and VJest Gerimny, This idea goes back as far as 1955> ^rtien the DW introduced the proposal for the Fatherlcmd Front,

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5- ir^n?ERNATIOPI?iL GUAMI^?JEEG AND .WSP]':CTION

This has alvja;y"s been a very real and jjriportant issue to the U.S. and the GVH on the one handj and kind of a non-isGue to Hanoi on the otlier hand. In the four points vhich \re handed to the DRY in Rangoon (PIMTA 2./2£/&6)^ \re stated: "Strict compliance v.^ith the military provisions of the Geneva Accords must he aciileved in accordance with schedules and ap23ro2"3rlate safeguards to be agreed upon in the said discussions or negotiations." Later^ in the Manila Communigue (10/25/66)J it was stated that: "Tlie people of South Vietnamj mindful of their ex^jerience since 195^^> insist that any negotiations leading to the end of hostilities incorporate effective international guarantees. Tney are open-rrtinded as such guarantees can be applied and jnade effective."

There are four DSV statements on this subject;

First J Pham Van Dong has stated (SEfflOl^IE 6/l8/6^0 that "as far as the ICC is concerned^ we are very glad to have you here. But don't put too many items on the %igendaj don't give yourself too nmch work to do,"

Second; I^ewandowski asXed us (iviARIGOLD JJ./lh/66): "to the ease of a ceasc-fire and negotiations; would the U.S- be ready to use the Geneva Agreanent and the Jnachinery of the International Cormisslon in bringing peace to Vietnamj and if soj v;ould the U^S publicly declare its intention to this effect?"

TMjrd, in Lewandov^ski' s ten pojjits (i-yiRIGOID II/30/66), the fifth point states: "The U/d. is willing to accept the participant ion of 'all' elections and the supervision of these elections by an appropriate international body."

Fourth; Su told d'Orlandi (KEELY 2/S3/68); "Both parties felt that problem of guaranteeing an agreement vras Increasing to r . decisive jjnportance," Accox-ding to d'Orlandi^ S:\ seemed to categorically 1^ ■ exclude tlie UTf as a guaranteeing agency and Fanfani and Su agreed

that the ICC was not in a position to guarantee anything. ^

I ^ These dtateiaents do not add up to muchj but they are suggestive

• ' bf the bWd irillingness to compsromise on a point that they know

is iiux>ortant to the U-S- -- as in the case of many other issues^ so

rlong as it does not detract from the central issue of w^ho controls the govex-mient In the Soiith. Hanoi's opposition to the VB is wellkno^in ■ and of long standing^ and they would probably object to UN supervision.; The problem of Worth Vietnam and Communist China not being members of the UN would seem to preclude the UT'J's playing a role* SJmilarlyj the DKV has evinced no affection for the ICC. However^ the DRV has over

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the years continued to report violations or the Geneva Accoi-ds to the ICCj and because of the importance which the DRV attaches to the Geneva Accordn^ vrould not likely take a stand against a future ICG role* In all probab:Llityj neverthelecsj Eanoi would not itself prajjose the ICC- It is also doubtful that they vould accept an enlarived and strengthened ICC proposed by us* The possibility ranains of an all-Asian supervisory body established on an ad hoc basis to deal v/lth Vietnaj^ij but we liave no evidence that IfeLnoi vrould be receptive to this*

As long as the DltV feels assured that their control In the South is becoming a reality or is a reality^ they are not likely to quarrel seriously over inspection and guarantee machinery- ;

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6. CmSB-PIRE

J Although Kanoi has repeatedly stated^ .and* we have assijmed all

jalongj t?]at the DRV vill adoi)t a flghtixig-vhile-negotlatins strategy^ there Is seme chance that they vill take the Initiative in proposing a cease-fire once negotiations are imdervray*

* We have had two hints on this possihility- The firbt came from Lewandowski (il4KIG0ItD ll/jA/66); i/hen he asKed the following questions:

^'Si case of a cease-^firej would the United States be prepared to withdravr from the ccjnbat areas and not to interfere in the creation of a new goyernitient in Viet«Nam? The question of ho\i the new goveriiment of Viet^-Kam w:l11 he fori^cd will certainly arise*

"In case of a cease-fire^ vould the United States undertake not to interfere In peaceful progress toward unificatioji of Viet-NaiTi if the peoi^le so wishj whether by referendum or by election? ^

"In the case of a cease-fire and negotiations^ would the United States be ready to use the Geneva Agreement and the niachinery of the International Coiiimission in bringing peace to Viet-Nain^ and if -so^ v/ould the United States publicly declare P , its intention to this effect?"

The second indicatj'on^ came from the very reliable Algard Loan exchanges ,(OHI0 2/lO/6S). Loan said that,"Hanoi presupposed (assumed) that the military opex-ations be stox^iiscd v.diile negotj'atipns are being conducted .

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Hanoi's interest in a cease-fire does not mean that they would be interested in a genuine cease-fire. More like_lyj as in the case of LaosJ they will pursue a strategy of negotiate-cease fire-fight-cease fire-I c -figlit,'breaking the ground rules v/henever they believe it appropriate. .

Hanoi's possible interest in a cease-fire has a readily determinable purpose. If agreed to by us^ it would give the MF uncliallengcd authority "in th^ areas it now controls. Such civil administration arrangements as rnay be made (as in the period foi_lQwing the 195*^ Geneva Accords) would allovf the KLF to develop local coalition governments. ■ ' '

The U*S* is on record publicly as favoring a cease-fire. The U.S, Fourteen Points^ for exaiiiplej state: "A cessation of hostilities could be the first order of business at a conference pr could be the subject of preljjninary discussions,"

President Jolmson has m.ade repeated and unqua,lifled statements about duJT vrillingnoss to accept a cease-fire-

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S MEORIT laSSION TO IRITOI, jmm 3.8, 3JjSk

3CCEKPTS)

Seaborn Report on Initial Visit to Hanoi:

n.;-S»"

Call o n BA Fiaaj^i Ve.n Pon/^

"7- Fna"[n Van Dong o^jGned rcniarkfi by saying v/e ifiust learn to

'joexlst and to find solution to prol>lem irhich has vrracked Indochina ;or 25 years- But just solution is only v:ay to provide stability-

VTliat just solutio]! means in DKW is^ as Prosidont Ho Chi Minli has

J explained (a) USA wlthdi^s.wal (b) i:jeace and neiitrality for SYfJ in ""anibodian pattern in accovdance vdth pro^-L^ajriniG of Liberation Front

, v/hich must p9.rtieipate in deterniinationof Vietnora as result of

'negotiation vhen SVN ready for negotiation*"

^'10. In separate tel vrithout 'Bacon' restrictions I sha3.1 z^eport in greater detail P^i's comments on Laos situation- Essence of his remarks i^ras (a) only viable solution i\;as return to status quo ante April couj) d'etat and Govt* of national Coalition as per Geneva Accord of 1962 (b) necessity of convening Ik nation conference to achieve this result and (c) essentiality of no RFf no American interference in Laos, Pie said DHVil vas 'very vrorried by step-up of USA military activities in Lacs and complained of USA overfliglits of DRVl^I territoi^y and of coinuiando raids across border. He denied that PAVN had sent QTE units UilQTE across border to aid Pathet Lao but did not RPJ? not specifica3-ly* deny my earlier statement that VSk v;as avare DRVTJ vjcre helping Pathet Lao and Viet Cong, with men^ a^rins and ir-aterial

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I said I \jd.s interested to heai^ from him that as a condition for restoring peace SVl^f should become neutral as a first step prior to reunification. He stopped me and said he had not RPT not referred J:o neutrality as a first step only* V/liether .SVXr vrould continue neutral Tmuld depend upon people of SVN. He did not KPT not prejudge. As for Liberation Front I said I realized it represents a certain force in SVN^ though not RPT not in noy viev; all people as the proj^^ganda asserted nor even majority. He did not RPT not demur at this downgrading. I said I aj^preciated that the-Front v^^ould have to participate should a coalition ever emerge. My fear houever vas that coalition vould soon be taken over by Fron.t as had happened in other countries and that other rep elements \70uld suffer or be ousted. Ed merely said there \fas no RPJ? no reason to liave such fears."

^^15. 1 then asked i/hether H-i ai>precia,ted fully that USA's continued accej^temce of obligations tovards aillies in SVi"I liad implications ijhich extended far beyond Southeast Asiy, and related to USA deterraii^ation to

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resist gi^errilla subversion in Asiaj Africa and Lo^tin-Anierica? FA laughed anci said he did indeed appreciate It. A USA defeat in SVJI vould in all probability start a chain reaction vhich vould extend much .farther J hut UBA should understa.nd that principles and stakes* involved vere just as high for Liberation Front in SVil and its supporters and this helped to explaim their determination to continue to struggle regardless of sacrifice*"

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SEVEORji ^.g SSI on to hai'Ioi, jum ^; i8, 196U

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(EXCERPTS)

Ke mx-kr. o f Px^lme J-Iinister Bjain Van^Dong to J.Bp Seaboirn, Hanoi. June iB, 19&h

"President Ho Chi Minh ha^s explained what ve itiean by a just solution* First it requires aai American i-jlthdra^-ral from InclocMna* Secondly it means that the afTairs of the Srjuth must be arranged by the people of the South- It m^st provide Tor the participation of the Liberation Front. No other group represents the broad i-rishes of the,people. The prograriirrie of the Front is the best one possibJ.e* There must be peace and neutrality for South Vietnam^ neutrality in the Carrliodian manner. Thirdly^ a just solution means re-unificaption of the comitxy- This is a VVrame^ national^ fonde.mental' - But ve \mnt peaxeful reunification^ vrithout ;nilitAi"*y pressures • We vzant negotiation 'i^ound a table. Maere must be sincere satisfaction v;ith the arrangement for it to be viable. We are in no hurry• TJe are i?illing to te/Xk but ^^e shall v:ait till STO is ready- \le are a divided people^ without even personal links across the dividing 3,ine.

"The United States must shoif good vill^ but it is not easy for the USA to do so. Meanwhile the vrar intensifies, USA aid may increase, in all areas ^ not only for the SVN ariry but in terms of USA army per-sonnel as well. I suffer to'see the var go on^ dovelopj intensify. Yet ciir people are determined to struggle- It is iiripossiblcj quite iinrpos--sible (excuse me for saying t]iis) for you I7esterners to understand the force of the people's will to resist and to continue. The stru^^gle of the people exceeds the imagination. It has astonislied us too- *

' "Since the fall of the KTro brothers, it has ^been a 'cascade' -

The prospect for the USA and its friends in SVN is sans issu' . Reinforcing the Khanh army doesn't count. The people have had enough. The SVN m.ercenaries have sacrificed themselves vithout honom^* The

Americans, are jiot .lovesj for they eoiriiplt atrocities. Ecvr can the -neo-ple suffer such exactions and terror?"'

"Let me stress^ insofar as the internal situation in SVN is concerned^ the realistic nature of the Libei-ation I^^ont's progrcjVinie, It is impossible to have a representative government v;hich excludes

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the rVont. llie idea of a government of national coalition 'fait boulc de riiege' in the South. Tlje L'dos pattern of I96H should serve as a guide for SVIT.

"As for Laos^ ve are not reassured l>y the USA i^oil.c, \le must retimi to the *62 Geneva Accord* The pi-esent eovernmciat of l£.os is 'fan-toche'- Souvanna Fnouma^ \jho is no better than a prisoner of the liillitary^ has acted like a co'^-jard. His present government provides no solution.

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"We do not send units to the FatViet Lao. \Iq do not deniand nore than a return to the situation irhich existed prior to the April coup-Eat there nust be no American interference in Laos* There are daily incursions of our air space across the Laotian border by overflights of military aircraft and by coiMiande units bent on sabotage,"

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'A nev conference of the fourteen parties is necessary- Restoration of peace and neutrality for Laos are im^^ossible otheriflse. There is little utility in the Polish proposal. Only the lU-nation conference is competent to deal v/ith the L?.os si'tuation-

"To return to Vietnaraj it is a q^uestion of a 'guerre a outrance' ^ \7hich the U8A won't V7in in ?Jiy events or neutrality* He had not (as I had suggested) referred to neutrality as a first step only, VJliether SVN would continue neutra.l would depend upon t}ie people of SVN, Pie did not prejudge the issue.

"The DRVK realize that the * loss ' of.SViM for the ABericans v?-ouT,d S£?t off (v/hat was the atomic e>q)ression?) 'a chain reaction which would extend much fm-'ther. The USA is in a difficult position, because Khanli's troops \v^ill no longer figlit- If the war gets w^orse> we shaLl suffer greatly but i;e shaU_ win* If v^e vrin in the Souths the peoj^le of. the world will tirrn against the USA. Our people l-rt 11 therefore acceiut the sacrifice^ whatever they rrjay be- But the DRVI^ v;x3.1 not enter the war.

"if the war were pushed to the Worth, 'nous somrnes un pays soei-aliste, vous savez et le pcuple se dressera*- But \re shall siot force the UjSA,- vre.shall not provoke the USA.

^'As far as the ICC is concerned^ we are very glad to have you here. But don't put too Mtny items on the agenda, don't give yourself too much work to do." - .

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PI^EGIDBHT J Qim SOE, ^' BvTTERI? POE PMCE HT SOUTIffAST ASTy\ ''

April 7 , 196:j

Cf^^ccidrpis)

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"Oiu- objective is the InclepenclencG of South ViGt-lfem and its " i^eedom fi'om attack, We v;ant notMng fox- oui^selves—only that the people of South Viet-Ham be allo\vetl to guide theii-* ovm country in their oi-m leay. We vriU do ei'^rything necessary to reach that objec-tive^ and vre ?7il]. do only v?hat is pJ^ifjolutely necessary."

"These are the essentials of any final settleinent*

"VJe vjill never be second in the search for such a peaceful settlement in Viet-'Kajn. &

'^There F^y be irany ways to this kind of peace: in discussion or negotiation vrith the f^oTerniaents concerned; in large groups or ' in small ones; in the reaffirjiiation of old agreements or their

strengthening vith nev7 ones*,

ij '*We have stated tliis position over and over again 50 times and

more to friend and foe alike- And ve remain ready >^ith this piu^pose for unconditional discussions-

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"And until that bright and necessary day of peace \je will try to keep conflict from spreading. VJ"e have no desire to see thousands die in battle—Asians or Americans, T/e have no desire to devasta-te that T/hich the people of. North Viet-IIoin have built vath toil and sacrifice-\le vill use our power with restraint 8.nd with all the vasdom that we can command- * .

"But \iQ will use it;

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"The first step is for the countries of Southeast Asia to associate themselves in a greatly expanded cooperative effort for deveD-opment. Vfe would hope tha-t Korth Viet-Mam vrould take its place in the coiriii^cin effox't just as soon as peaceful cooperation is possible,"

"For oiu' ij3,rt I will ask the Congress to join in a biindon-dollar American iuvestiricnt in this effort as soon as it is uiider^iay- And I I would hope that all other industrialir^'^ed couj'itries^ including the Soviet Union^ v:iU- join in this effort to replace despair with hope and terrox^

\7ith progress . "

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EXTRACT 1^-; QM Hl/VH VAN DOKG SiRECH ■" April 8, ig^lj '

DBV FOUR POIilTS

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' .,,The xlnswerving policy of the DBV Goyern-ment is to respect strictly tbo 195^1^ Geneva agree3r]3n"ts on Vietnam and to ijrip3,enent correct-ly their basic provisions as embodietl in the follo^vins points:

"1. KecognitioD of the basic national rights of the Vietna^nese people— peace;! independence- soreTelQi^ty^ unity^ Pvnd territorial integrity. According to the Gene\^ agreer^ients^ the U.S. Governinant rauct v;ithdravr from South Vietnam U.S. troops^^ millta^ry personnels and v^eapons of all kindsj disiiiantle all U,S, iiiilitary "bases there; and cancel It-s military aUaance vrith Sotith Vietnam, It must end its policy of intervention and aggression in South' Vietnam, According to the Geneva agrceineats^ the U.S, Goverrjment miat stop its acts of \ra,r against Korth Vietnam p^nd comx^letely cease all enc^^^oachjnents on the territory and sovereignty of the DRV.

"2, Pending the peaceful reunification of Vietnam^ v/hile Vietnam is still tempoi^arily divided into t\jo zones the military provisions of the 195'l Getieva agreements on Vietnam must be-^strictly respected. Tlie ti70 zones must refrain from entering into any raj-litary alliance vjith foreign counti^ies and there must be no foreign military bases^ troops ^ or niilitaj^y personnel in their respective territoi^jj-.

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^'3* K^e internal affairs of South Vietnam must be settled by the South Vietnamese people themselves in accordance vrith the program, of the NHiSV without any foreign iirterference.

"^N The peaceful reunification of Vietnam is to be settled by the Vietnamese people in both ^ones, i-zithout any foreign interference. ,

"This stand of the D.RV Government unquestion^,bly enjoys the approval and support of all peace and ju3tiae-3-oving governments and peoples in the vrorld* The government of the DRV is of the vlexf that the-utand expounded here is the basis for the soundest x^-bitical settlement of the Vietnam problem, * ■ . ■ ■ .

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"if this ba.sis is recognized;^ favorable conditions wii,l be created for the peaceful settlement of the Vietnam people > and it v.all be possible to consider the reconvening of an international conference along the xJ^-'ttern of the 195^ Geneva conference on.Vietnam.."

* t m *

"The Kl^LSV;, the mobillzer and organizer of the patriotic forces in South Vietxiamj the loader which has taken the people to ever greater victories 5 is no\7 controlling tlxree-foux-ths of the teridtory and ti-ro-thirds of the population of South Vietnam. It has ever higher inten:^ational prestige and position^ and is being jaore and more recognised by foreign coLmtrles and world public opinion as the sole genuine x'epresentative of the South Vietnamese people•"

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EXTitACT OF SP2J5CH BT so uTii v:r]-:'fi mM

FOHKIG-Jl MIIsnS':!.'i':R TPaFj VAN "00

I .l \ V * -"^

June £2, I965

. ' 1. Since the present vsr in V-et-Kon vas provo!-:ed by Cc:rr;unlot oggression and subversion^ -first of all^

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urJ^Ier^akc"J directed and supported b/. outside forces against the independence arA IToerty of th3 peaple o; South Viet-Nein niust reas5- The tjrinciole of non-interference in the Internal affairs of the tvo parts--principles declared in the Geneva Accords of IQ^^i as Veil OS by inter*'iational r.orality -« r/iUst be respected-Con sequ-^n tly^. the Hanoi Ccr.:3iLnist Te^pme must dissolv-:^ all the p\:ppet organizations it has forrned in South Viet-Nan under the n^^^T^es of *'?ront for the Idberation ol^ the South/' ''Liberation Radio" and the "People's Revolutionary Party." Also it rnust vithdi^av frcr.i South Viet-Karri troops, political and military/ cadres It had illesaUy introduced into South Viet-irr-r:.

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2. South Viet-Na::i nust be left alone^ to choose and shape for its self its d^^t;i destiny in accordance vith established dericcratio processes vithout any intervention of whatever for:.i and vhatever source* Obviously these could be realised only vhen the aggression initiated by the Hanoi regir.e is ended ana its inti:;idaticn cazrpai^^ against the South Vietnajnese people decisively st:ppr333ed*

3' Only when aggression has ceased, and crj^ then, it vill be pooslble for the Government of the Republic of Vietna:^! and for nations vhich provide it vith. assistance, to withhold defensive nilitai^' Lieasi^es on the territory of South Viet"?fen and outside its borders. Such neasures are presently necessary for defending the territoi^ of South Viet-^Ka^n against CcTi^runist aggression. Besides, the Govern;.:ent of the Republic of Yiet-?ian is ready to ask these friendly countries to «"ithdrav their nilltary forces frc^L SQuth-Vietnan. iJo^-rever, it shall reserve its ri^ht to take ali.neasures to restore order and lav on the entire territory' of Souta-Viet-J^am and t6 ?.ssure security for the people of South Viet--Nam as well as the right to call again for foreign assistance in case of renewed aggression or renewed threat of aggre.ssion-

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h. Flna2.2:y'^ the independence and liberty of the Vietnamese people must be effectively g^iarantecd*

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PRESIDEI'FJ JOim SOH, "H^PS CO JJTEB^IfC E,"

July 28/ll9o5"

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^'Wiat are our goals in that uar-stained .land?

^'First^ we intend to couviiice the Corrxmup-ists that vre cannot he defea^tcd l^y force of arms or by superior pov^er. Tliey a,re not e?..sily convincedi.--"

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"SeconcT^ once the Coipijimxists knovr^ as \7e kno^v^ that a violent solution is iLmpossible^ then a. i;)3aceful so3_ution is inevitable,

"We are ready navi^ as v;e have alvrays been- to move fron the bo>ttlefield to the conference table- I have stated publicly and many times^ again and again^ America''s vallingness to begin imcon-ditional dif^cussions vith any govermient at ^aiy place at any time.

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". , .we do not seek the ^destx"*uction of any governjiientj nor do \io covet a foot of any territory;^ but x-re insist e.nd \ie will alvrays insist that the people of South Vietnsj^i shall have the right of choicej, the right to shape their own destiny in free elections in the souths or throughoi:t £vll Vietnam under internatlona>l supervision^ and they sliall riot have any goveriirp.cnt imposed upon them by force and terror so long as we can prevent it,"

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U.S.-DRV COICT/iCTS ("XY Z" FO'JR FOIHTS),

August 6. I9S5

Tile folJ_owlng v.ms given to ^lai Van Bo on August 6^ 3.965:

"Point I - The basic rights of the Vietnamese pe&x>^-e to peace^ independence J sovereifnity-^ unity and terrxtori?vl integrity are recognized as set forth in the Geneva Accords of 195^^* Obtaining compliance vith the essential principles in the Accords is an a;fyp,i*Dpriate subject for iirdTiediatO; international discussions without preconditions and sub-seq^uent negotiatloiiB. Such dlSGUSslong and negotiations should consider^ among other things^ a>ppropriate means^ including agreed stages^ for the.-withdrawal of foreign military and quasi-iailitary personnel and weai:>ons fron} South and North Viet-ITam; the dismantling of foreign military bases in both areas; the cancellation of military alliances In contro-vention of the Accords; and the regroux:)ing and redeploj^rrient of indigenous fofees*

"Point II - Strict co:i:x^liance v/ith the military provisions of the Geneva Accords must be achieved in accordance v;lth schedules a/nd a,T>pro^ priate safeguards to be agreed upon in the said discussions and subsecxuent negotiations.

"Point III - The internal affairs of South and Forth Viet-Ham must be settled by the South and"Korth Vietnamese peoples themselves in conformity vrith the principles of self--determination vrithout anj'^ foreign interference-

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"Point IV " The issue of reunification of Viet-Kam must be decided peacefully, on the basis of free determination by the peoples of Sotith and North Viet-Kam without foreign Interference."

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' tei V an Bo Sta teire n ts l>, u-xnf;: ^^XYZ" C ontacts

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During these contacts^ I3o did not deny DRV troop presence in STO (6/18/65), or even that the 325th NVA Division v/as in SVN^ but claimed it v?as not then engaged in military operations (9/3/65). After the XY^ contact had ended^ Bo said there vzere no regular northern troops in SVK but tliat northern volunteers mijsht have joined the Viet Conrj (1/27/66),

Because Bo did not deny WVA troop pre.?enee in SVN/ he was able to agree v/ith the principle that troop \?ithdrawal would have to be mutual^ balanced J and phased (8/1S/65). Bo reaffirjned his agreement to this principle on 8/l8/65j but then denied any such agreements on

9/3/65 -

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On the timing of U.S, troop withdrawals^ BO;^ at firsts said that thi,s would be a "technical problem^ as easily solved as vrith the French in 195^/^ and that "it could take place over 2 or 3 years" (7/I6/65)- ^ Bo also said that the final settlement should sec troop vithdi^av/als completed (8/18/65)• At the end of these contacts^ Bp was insisting that U.S. troops must lesive before elections v;efc? held (9/3/65).

After the contacts v.^ere over^ Bo told a French Journalist: "it contemplates three stages-^ln the first stage^ the U.S. ifould agree en the principle of their departure before the South Vietnan^ese settled by themselves their probleins^ whicli cannot be resolved so long as a foreign arjiiy is on their n?-tlonal territory- llie second - Btage is that of negotiation. The third is departure*" {5/6/66)

VJith respect to self-deternnna.tion^ Bo had said to Dantov that this j'jas '^the one basic prerfiise" needed for a solution to the Vietnam problem C7/I6/65). Later^ Bo seemed to be a,rgi:ing that the Vietnanose \jlXl be left to solve their problems through elections only after the Americans have left (I/27/65). Much later^ Bo told a French journalist (5/6/66): .'^How^can elections be held in a country over whicli no ■ '■ authority is exercised?" Did he mean the exercise of authority is

decisive in the electoral process? No doubt. In vjhich case^ the question of who should organise the elections--the MjF with DRV help^ or the GVN with U.S. help—;7ould.be the real issue.

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The U.S. position throughout the contacts was that the ITLF had no role "as of right" in South Vietnam (9/O/65) and vrould not guarantee a role for it before electioiis because to do so would be contrary to "free determination,^* Individual members of the tU^F could participate in the political process. At most^ the future of the IJJJF should be

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a matter for discuss ion ^^ not something settled in principle before negotiations began (8/15/65)* In tlie event of a cease«fire^ it was the U,S, intention to insist on the GVH's ri^ht to operate throughout

svK (9/1/65)'

With respect to reunification^ both the U.S, 3Aid Bo agreed (8/6/65) that it come about "on the basis of free determination.'^ Bo said that the jyRV \•^^.B in a hurry to see rcimification accomplished (7/16/65)*

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UMT-ED STATES FOURTHEJI POIFXS

* w

January 3, 1Q66

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t ' 1. The Geneva Af^reements of 195-1 ^'-nd 1962 a.re an adecLX^ate basis

for peace in Southeast Asia;

2. We vould welcoraG a confex^ence on Southeast As5,a or any pr.rt thereof;

3* ' We vould ^jelcome ''negotiations without pre--conditions" as the 17 nations put it;

I U. ¥e ifould welcome imconditional disOT.ssions as pi."esident Johnson^

L put it; '

5- A cessation of hostilities could be the first order of business L at a conference or could be the subject of preliijiinary discussions;

6. Hanoi's four points could be discussed along vjith other points vjhich others ml^}t -^-zish to propose; ^^

7- V^e Trant no U*S, bases in Southeast Asia;

■I-

8 IJe do not desire to retain U.S. troops in South Vietnain after peace is assiu^ed;

C3 9' VJe support free elections in South Viet--Haiii to give the South

Vietnamese a goveriiment ef their own choice;

10, The question of reimification of Vietnam should be determined by the Vietna^nese through their own free decision;

11- The countries of Southeast Asia can be non-aligned or neutr£?J-if that be their option; ' ' ,

12,. \]p would m'ach prefer to use our resources for tlie economic reconstruction of Southeast Asia than in war. If there is peace^ North Vlet~Nam could participate in a regional effort to wKich we would be prepared to contribute at least one billion dollars;

• 13. -The President has- said "The Yiet.Ccng vrould not have difficulty being represented ajid having their viev7s represented if for a moment Hanoi decided she v:anted to cease aggression, I don^t think tliat would be an insurmountable problem.."

1^, V^e have said publicly and privately that v;e coiild stop the bojnbing of North Vietnairi as a step toirard peace although there has not been the slightest*hint or suggestion from the other side as tiD i-rhat thoy \70uld do if the borrbing stopped.

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Je.}Taavy 31 , I966

E/VKGOO¥ 392

'^Toxt of Aide memoire rex erred to in Etnbtel 391 as follcAjs: Quote 1 ajji ,forrfarding to you the statement attacliecl hcrervritli made \yy the spokes-iL'in of the Foreign Kinistry of tho Democratic Republip of Vietn^jn dated -^anuary h^ 1$66 rega/rding the so-called 'Peace-efforts' jiiade recently by he United States.

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i "With regards to the 14 points and the cubseqvxent statements of the

" nited States Government I hold that the American authorltiGG utill refuse

jOo recognise the fnndajnental national rights of the Vietnamese and people

namely peace irjdepandencc^ sovereignty^ unity and territorial integrity

of Vietnam as stipulated by the 195^1 Geneva agreements of Vietnam-

I "The United States Government states that \7itbdra-jal of its troops from South Vietnain vill be effected only under /^^ierica,n terms j that means the United States refuses to vithdra'^f its troops from South Vietnam.

"The United States Goveriment states tl'^at it seeks no military bases -in South East Asian countries but on the otliar hand says it has to fulfil its comMtments vzith the S, E,A, T, 0, Bloc,

"Tlie United States Governanent says it respects the right to sclf-deteirtJiinatlon of the South Vietnarnesc people on condition that the South Vietnam National Front for Liberation lay dovm arms and be granted amnesty --that means the United States tries to maintain a. puppet reg:une in poorer countering the South Vietnainese people^ does not recognize the South Vietue;jii National Front for Liberation as the sole genuine representative of the entire South Vietna^nese people and i/ill not engage in negotiations vith the Front- Tlie United States Governji'-ent refo.sGs to accept Point 3 .of the ^^-point sfc^jid of the government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam^ that s.mounts to A)'nerica.n rejection of a.11 the foui' points,

VConcerning the J[--point stand of the Governraent of the Democratic Republic of Vietna^a* . I beg to quote the above-said stateznent of the spokesman of the Foreign Ministry of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam; 'A poliltical settlement of the Vietnam problaiB can be envisaged only vhon the United ^States Government has accepted the i^-j^oint stand of the Goverrmfent of this Democratic Republic of Viotnamj has proved this by actual deeds; has stoppsd unconditional3,y and for good its air raids and all other acts of v-ar against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.

'^X am ready to listen to what the Ambassado> :nay ifish to e:vpound on the United States position/'

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MRIGQLD TE?T POIi^TJ^S ATO IffilATED C/VBI^FS,

' ■ F -•—, i l^-F . .. I 11.^^^, ^ , , , .i, ., , _ i^

Se'pteinbGr-];)G ceirib £r, 1966

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p Saigon 62OO (to SecState), s/i^oclis, 18 September X966

► "1- D^ Or land! had a iieeting with LsT)'andov:ski Frldtay ni^ht-It started as a social a,rfa:i.r on D^Orlandi^s invita^tion and on [ Lewandow»^>^i's initiative became a discussion of the var- According

* to Orlandl J Levrandov/ski said the following;

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* * i *

"7, LeTrandcnrski asked vrhether D'Orlandi rea^lis^ed that v:hat he meant to sa,y was that this would be the le.st step not the first.

"8, B'Or land! said: Vmat would be the ultiTJiate goal? If it is to have the Viet Cong in the CovcrniTient of Viet Nam^ I won't even subijvlt such a proposal to Ambassador Lodge*

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^^9» Lewandov/ski said that is not at all what he Bieant to put to D'Orlandi. ElaipJ^y^ the ultimate aim vrould be: _\to make of South Vietnam . a second Cambodia-'

"10. D'Orlandi said that makes laore sensej it is'at least v:orth

talking about* . - ^ ^ .-. ^ . . ■ ' .

"11. Lewandovrskl said: 'But 1 don't believe the AXiiericans really wish to talk. They are trying to do two tilings at once: military escalation groupsd with political proposals. You can't do both. So long as ttiey won't make up their minds^ we can't do anj'iihing* VJe must wait imtil November.'"

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5' If the Americans ever really cs>red; they should especially f concentrate on Hiam Van Dong's fourth point concerning 'who Is to J

I speak for South Vietn.aBi. * This does not mean that Hanoi would be

trying to ram the Viet Cong down oujt throats. V/e could consider _ !

Cthe setting up of a coa.lition goverma^nt the bulk of which would be made up of 'sensible South Vietnamese^ politicians.' To preserve ^

appearances you could have 'on the fringe' m.en from the 'right' in I

one or two 'un'Jjiiportant mdnistries' and from on the 'left' fill one ;

or two ^miimportant ministri.es vrith the so-called NLF.'

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"6* D'Orlandi -- this is unthinkable- If this is w-liat you r- want to talk about^ it is better for us to stop the talks»

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Dcila^isifled per Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 2011

(

SEXT OF THE JOII^T GOM-^TDmQUE ISSUED AT THE MANILA SUMMIT C0WEREH(S1^ MAMLA^ THE PIGLIPPIl^S^

IHTEODUCTION

|l. In response to an invitation from the Pi^esident of the Hepublic of the Philippines J after consultations mth the President of the Hepuh-lic of Korea and the Prime Ministers of Thailand and the fiepublic of Vietnam^ the leaders of seven nations in- the Asian and Pacific region hr\d a summit conference in Manila on October 2h and 25^ 1966;^ to CGiiSider the conflict in South Vietnam and to review their \rlder pur-PQses in Asia a.nd the Pacific, The participants ^^ere Prime Minister Harold Holt of Australiaj President Pax*k Chung Hee of the Republic of Korea^ Prime Minister Keith Holyoalce of New Zealand^ President Ferdinand E* Marcos of the Philippines, Prime Minister Thanom Kittikachorn of Thailand^ Pi^esident Lyndon B. Johi:LSon of the United States of America, and Chairman Nguyen Van Thieu and Prime Minister ITguyen Cao Ky of the Republic of Vietnam,

BASIC POLICY

2, The nations represented at this conference are united in their determination that the freedom of South Vietnam be secured^ in their resolve for peace, and in their deep concern for the future of Asia and the Pacific. Some of us are now close to the actual danger, while others have learned to know its significance through bitter past experience. This conference symbolizes our common purposes and high hopes,

3* VJ'e are united in our determination that the South Vietnamese people shall not be conquered by aggressive force and shall enjoy the inherent right to choose their own way of life and their own form of government. We shall continue oiir military and all other efforts, as firmly and as long as may be necessary, in close consultation among ourselves until the aggression is ended.

k* At the same time our united purpose is peace—peace in South Vietnam and in the i^est of Asia and the Pacific, CXir common coiiimit-ment is to the defense of the South Vietnamese people. Our sole demand on the leaders of Horth Vietnam is that they abandon their aggression. We are prepared to pursue aiiy avenue which cotild lead to a secure and just peace, whether through discussion and negotiation or through reciprocal actions by both sides to reduce the violence.

5, We are united in looking to a peaceful and prosperous future for all of Asia and the Pacific, We have therefore set forth in a separate declaration a statement of the principles that guide for common actions in this vdder sphere.

6, Actions taken in pursuance of the policies herein stated shall be in accordance \d.th our respective constitutional processes.

PROGRESS AM) PROGRA^^LS IN SOUTH VIETNAM^ THE MLITARY EFFORT

7, The Governjnent of Vietnam described the significant military progress being made against aggression. It noted with particular gratitude the substantial contribution being made by free world forces,

"I White House press release dated Oct. 25j 1956.

DeclassiHed per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 NND Project Nmnber: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

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3, Nonetheless J tlie leaders noted that the movement of rorces from Ulorth Vietnam continues at a high rate and that firm military action and free Tforld support continue to be required to meet the tlireat. The necessity for such military action and support must depend for its size and duration on the intensity and duration of the Communist aggression itself.

9. In their discussion^ the leaders revleved the px^oblem of prisoners of -w^ar* The participants observed that Hanoi has consistently refused to cooperate with the International Coirimittee of the Red Cross in the application of the Geneva Conventions^ and called on Hanoi to do so. They reaffirmed their determination to comply fully with the Geneva Conventions of I9J19 for the Protection of War Victims> and welcomed the resolution adopted by the Executive Committee of the League of Red Cross Societies on October 8, 1966^ callin- for complicanc with the Geneva Conventions in the Vietnam confl." ^ full support for the International CoiTmiittee of the Red Cross5 :ind Immediate action to repatriate seriously sick and wounded prisoners of war^ They agreed to vork toward the fulfillment of this resolution^ in cooperation with the International Committee of the Red Cross^ and indicated their willingness to meet under the auspices of the TCRC or In any appropriate forum to discuss the immediate exchange of prisoners*

PACIFICATION AM) EEVOLUTION DEVELOBfENT

10. The participatifiLg governments concentrated particular attention on the accelerating efforts of the Goverrunents of Vietnam to forge a social revolution of hope and progress. Even as the conflict continues^ the effort goes for^^rard to overcome the tyranny of poverty, disease^ illiteracy and social Injustice.

11. The Vietnamese leaders stated their intent to train and assign a substantial share of the armed forces to clear^and-hold actions in order to provide a shield behind which a new society can be built,

12. In the field of Revolutionary Development^ measures along the lines developed Xu the past year and a halt will be expanded and In-tensifled, Tlie training of Revolutionary Developjnent cadres will be improved. More electricity and good water will be provided. More and better schoold will be built and staffed. Refugees will be taught ne\-r skills. Health and medical facilities will be expanded.

13* The Vietnamese Government declared that it is working out a series of measures to moderrfize agriculture and to assure the cultivator the fruits of his labors* Land reform and tenure provisions mil be granted top priority. Agricultui^al credit will be expanded. Crops will be improved and diversified,

1^, The Vietnamese leaders emphasized that underlying these measures to build confidence and cooperation among the people there must be popiilar conviction that honesty^ efficiency and social justice form solid cornerstones of the Vietnamese Governm_ent's programs.

15. This is a program each of the conferring govertmients has reason to applaud recognizing that it opens a brighter hope for the people of Vietnam, Each pledged its continuing assistance according to its means J whether in l\inds or skilled technicians or equipment* They noted also the help in non-military fields being given by other countries and exi^ressed the hope that his help will be substantially Increased.

Declassified per Executive Order 13^26, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By; NWD Date: 2011

ECOi^ICMC STABIIJTY MJD PHCCFvESS

16. The Conference was told of the success of the Government of Vietnam in controlling the inflation i^hich^ if unchecked^ could undercut all "efforts to bring a more fulfilling life to the Vietnamese people* However J the .Vietnamese leaders reaffirmed that only by constant effort cotild inflation be Xept under control. They desci^ibed their intention to enforce a vigorous stabilization program^ to control spendingJ Increase revenues^ and seek to promote savings in order to hold the 1967 inflationary gap to the minimum practicable level.

Thf^y also plan to take further measures to insiire maximmn utiliza-t m of the Port of Saigon^ so that imports urgently needed to fuel the military effort and buttress the civil economy can flow rapidly into Vietnam.

17. Looking to the long-te2?m future of their riclily endowed country^ tl i Vietnamese representatives described their views and plans for the building of an expanded postwar economy,

, 18. Military installations ^^^here appropriate will be converted to this pvirposGj and plans for this will be included.

' 19* The conferring nations reaffirmed their continuing support for Vietnamese efforts to achieve economic stability and progress, Thailand specifically noted its readiness to extend substantial new credit assistance for the purchase of rice and the other nations present reported a number of plans for the supply of food or other actions i-elated to the economic situation. At the same time the pai'ticipants agreed to appeal to other nations and to international organizations committed to the full and free development of every nation^ for fui^ther assistance to the Republic of Vietnam,

20. The representatives of Vietnam noted that^ even as the Conference anetj steps were being taken to establish a new constitutional system for the Republic of Vietnam through the work of the Con-' stituent Assembly, chosen by so large a proportion of the electorate last month. -

21. The Vietnamese rei>resentatives stated their expectation that work on the Constitution would go forward rapidly and could be completed before the deadline of March 196?* The Constitution will then be promulgated and elections will be 2ield within six months

to select a representative goverrmient.

22. The Vietnamese Government believes that the democratic process must be strengthened at the local as well as the national level. The Government of Vietnam announced that to this end it

will begin holding village and hainlet elections at the beginning of 1967-

23. The Government of Vietnam announced that it is preparing a program of National Reconciliation. It declared its determination to open all doors to those Vietnamese who have been misled or coerced into casting their lot mth the Viet Cong. The Government seeks to bring them back to participate as free men in national life under amnesty and other measures. Former enemies are asked only to lay down their weapons and bring their skills to the service of the South Vietnamese people.

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2^1. The other paxticipatin^ nations '^^relcOFled the stated expectation of the Vietnamese representatives that work on the Constitution vdll proceed on schedule, and concurred in the conviction of the Gov ermaent of the Republic of Vietnam that building representative^ constitutional government and opening the vay for national reconciliation are indispensable to the future of a free Vietnajn. .

THE SEARCH FOR PEACE

25. The participants devoted a major shai^e of their deliberations to peace objectives and the search for a peaceful settlement in South Vietnam. They revievred in detail the many efforts for peace that have been undertaken^ hy themselves and other na^tions^ and the actions of the United Nations and of His Holiness the Pope. It was clearly understood that the settlement of the war in Vietnam depends on

the readiness and willingness of the parties concerned to explore and work out together a just and reasonable solution. They hoced that Hanoi still showed no sign of taking any step toward peace, either by action or by entering into discussions or negotiations. Nevertheless^ the participants agreed that the search for peace must continue,

26, The Covernraent of the Republic of Vietnam declared that the Vietnamese peoplej having suffered the ravages of war for more than

two decades, were second to none in their desire for peace> It welcomes any initiative that wiH lead to an end to hostilities^ preserves the independence of South Vietnam and protects the right to choose their o^m way of life*

27- So that theii* aspirations and position would be clear to their allies at Manila and friends everywhere^ the Governiaent of the Republic of Vietnain solemnly stated its views as to the essential elements of i^eace in Vietnam:

* ' (1) Cessation of aggression.—At issue in Vietnam is a struggle for the preservation of values which people every^.^here have cherished since the dawn of history: the independence of peoples and the freedom of individuals. The people of South Vietnam ask only that the aggression that threatens their independence and the externally supported texror that threatens their freedom be halted. No self-respecting people can ask for less. No i^eace-loving nation should ask for more.

(2) Preservation of the territorial integrity of South Vietnam,— The people of South Vietnam are defending their own territory against those seeking to obtain by force and terror what they have been unable to accomplish by peaceful means, 1/hile sympathizing with the plight of their brothers in the North and while disdaining the regime in the North, the South Vietnamese people

have no desire to threaten or harm the people of the North or invade their country.

(3) Reunification of Vietnam,—The Government and people of Soxith Vietnam deplore the partition of Vietnam into North and South. But this partition brought about by the Geneva Agreements of I95U however unfortunate and regrettable^ will be respected until by the free choice of all Viotnajnesej reunification is achievedl

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(k) Resolution of internal x^roblens.—The people of South Vietnam seek to resolve their own internal differences and to this end are prepared to engage in a program of national reconciliation. When the aggression has stopped^ the people of South Vietnam vill move more rapidly tovard reconciliation of all elements in the society and mil move forward^ through the democratic process, tov/ard hiiman dignity, prosperity and lasting peace,

(5) Removal of allied military forces.—The people of South Vietnam vill ask their allies to remove their forces and evacuate their installations as the military and subversive forces of North Vietnam are withdrawn, infiltration ceases;> and the level of violence thus subsides,

(6) Effective giiarantees.""The people of South Vietnam, mindful of their experience since 195^ insist that any negotiations leading to the end of hostilities incorporate effective internatioual--guarantees. They are opetmrdnded as such guarantees can be applied and made effective.

The other participating governments reviewed and endorsed these as essential elements of peace and agreed they would act on this basis in close consultation among themselves in regard to settlement of the conflict.

29* In particular, they declared that Allied forces are in the Republic of Vietnaja because that country is the object of aggression and its government requested supx:)ort in the resistance of its people to aggression. They shll be withdrawn^ after close consultation, as the other side withdraws its forces to the Horth^ ceases infiltration^ and the level of violence thus subsides. Those forces v;ill be v/ith-drawn as soon as possible and not later than six months after the above conditions have been fulfilled»

COIWIMJING COWGULTATION Af40NG THE PARTICIPATING HATIOHS

30. All the participants agreed that the value of a meeting among the seven nations had been abundantly demonstrated by the candid

and thorough discussions held. It was further agreed that, in addition to the close consultation already maintained tlirough diplom^atic channels, there should be regular meetings ai^ong their Ambassadors in Saigon in association with the Government of the Republic of Vietnam- Meetings of their Foreign Ministers and Heads of Government will also be held as required.

31. At the close of the meeting, all the visiting participants expressed their deep gratitude to President Marcos and to the Government of the Republic of the Riilippines for offering Manila as the conference site, and expressed their appreciation for the highly efficient arrangements.

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SVmDISH-DRV. COmYiCTS (ASPBKt ) (Excerpts from Rusk^Mlsson MernCon,^ K'oyember 11 ^ I96S)

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tti-

II• The &fedish Ambassador in PeKansj Mr. Petri;j recently visited Hanoi and had a conversation with the Foreign Minister of North

Vietnam^ Mr. Trinh.

I 1

"a) Vo:^ Trinh strongly emphasiz^ed that the Tlorth Vietnamese

Governjiient alraed at a political solution of the Vietnairicse conflictj

not a inildtary one* ilr* Trinh said tliat tvro conditions ]a^st be fill-

filled in order to bring about.a climate for negotiations^ which could

lead to a political solution*

1- The bonibing of Kort}^ Vietnam must be put to an endj without any conditions and def5.nitely.

8. Tl:e FNTj must be accepted by the US Government as one of the spokesmen for the South Vietnai^iese people and, as l^, Trinh expressed it^ the most valid one,

"if both tliese conditions v;erc f^ilfilled and the US Govermnent thus took Vfhat he called *an ai}propriate attitude' then5 Ut. Trinh said^ know v;hat \\'e \rlH have to do',

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**It should be added- that> in this connection, the q.uestion of a tiirie-table for the withdrawal of US troops v/as not raised*

*'b) As to the possibility of a final settlement of the Vietnamese conflict^ Ifv, Trinli said that - in addition to the vn'.thdrawal of US and other foreign troops - both the Hanoi Govermiont and the FMj had the following req,uests: , , ' . -

1- Tbe creation of a national coalition goveiniinent founded on a very broad basis and including all political and religious groupings as w^ell as all social classes^* genuinely desiring to achieve national independence,

2,'' General elections in an'atrnosjibere of freedom and democracy,

3, Although no inimediate reunification was envisaged;^ it vras necessary to create such conditions in South Yietnaic as to permit a move in the direction of a fature reimifloation of North and South Vietnam-

"Mr, Trinh reiterated that if the US Govern^fient gave proof of goodwill 5 they would find that ^'the Vietnamese side knew v^hat they lioxl to ^Lo

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m/vrigoIpD tebt FOii^jrn ai^id retated CAm^is

Septe^ru^er-Da ceniber j 1966

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Saigon 108^^6 (to SocState};, T,s/Lrodis, llf NoyeJ^iber I966

*'3_, I met Lc^Tandovrski bX D^Orlaiidi*s p.partment nt 3:00 p,]n, Saigon t^jne-

"2 on the eve of his A^dnit to Hanoi*-., Jle had four questions^

as follo\is:

a* * Regarding the offer at Manila concGrning the withdrr^val 0'£ U*S* forces, from Viet-]\^a,m on the condition th^j.t the troops of Korth ' Vict--flam vould v.athdraw (^^nd^ he Kaid^ I\^orth Viet-l^raia^ of course^ doesji't adt3iit tha.t they are there at aU,)^ does tMs condition mean the United States v:ithdraival dependf^ on control by the present South Vietnamese Governjnent of territories not now under the control of Saigon?'

h, 'In case of a ceevse-fire^ v7ou].d the United States he pi^e-pared to withdrav; Trom the coiribat areas and not to interfere in the creation of a new government in Viet-Nara? The question of how the nev? goverjunent of Viet-^ITan will be formed will certainly arise.'

c, 'In case of a cease-fire^ v:ould the United States undertake not to interfere in peaceful progress toward unification of Viet^Nam if the peoi:)le so wlsh^ v/hether \>^' referonclum or by election?'

d» 'In the case of a cease-fire'^and negotiations^ woi^ld the UUited States be-rea-dy to use the Geneva Agreement and the machinery of the International Comjiiission iti bringing peace to Viet-Nam^ and if £o^ would the United Slvates publicly declare its intention to thns effect?'

"3. I said that there were questions which I would have to refer to the U,S. Government5 and that I would do so and provide ansvrers as soon as- I could/^

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mRlGOLD TEN POIKTS AITD RELATED CABIilS

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Saigon ISg'fY^ .Tfj/Nodis^ 30 Novernber I966

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■ "Lev;andov/Gki siLTiii^ai^ized the 10 points to Lodge as foDJovrs:

'^(1} The U.S. is interested in a peacoful Eolution through negotiations,

"(2) Negotiations should not he interpreted as a \vay to negotiated surrender by those opposing the U,S, in Vietnam* A political ^ ' nogotiation would be aiiaed ^t rinding an acceptable solution to all , the problems-^ having in Blind that the present status quo in SVW must be changed hi order to take into accoimt the interests of tlie parties presently opposing the policy of the U.S. in South Vietnam.

"(3) The U,S, does not desire a permanent or a long-tei^ military preseJice in SVT^.

"(h) The U.S. is willing to di.scuss all problems v/ith respect to the settlement.

"(5) Ttje U,S, is V7illing to accept the participation of *all* in elections and the supervision of these elections by an apj^ropriate international body,

^^(6) The U.S. believes that reunification should be settled by the Vietnamese themselves e.fter peace and'proper representative organs are established in SVIT-

"(7) Ihe U.S. is prepared to abide by a, neutral South Vietnam,

"(8) Tile U.S. is prepared to stop bombing 'if this will facilitate such a peaceful solution,^ In this regard the U.S. is prej^ared to accept 'DRV modalities on the cessation and not require the DRV to admit infil--tration into SVN,

*U9) . Tlie U.S. v;ill not agree to 'reunification under military pressure-.' - . ^ ^

"(10) The U.S. 'vdll not declare no'.-; or in the future it>s acceptance of I\^orth Vietnam's h or 5 points.'

"Lewandowski asked if these 10 points vrere a proper formulation of the U.S. position- Lodge said that they seeiT^ed to be in order^ but that the matter was of such sensitivity and import^^jice that he i;ould have to

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'*Levranclov:ski insisted that Ms stateirient was a serious proposition based on conversations with the 'most respectable goveriTinent sourceft in Hanoi,' , Later Lei:andovjGki ads^itted that Eoam Van J)oi*f{ vas the source and that he had the ^PresidiULi beliind him.'

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*'Levjandovr3ki stated: ^I a^n a^uthorized to say that if the U-S, are really of the yievrs vvhich I have presented, it woula be advif^ab^e to confirm them directly by conversation vlth the Horth Vietnaniese

iUnbassador in 17arsa¥* *

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"LcwaMovrski said that there was a vital need to move ciuickly because (l) there was a danger of a leak ?.nd that secrecy v:as essential " for Hanoi J and (2) that delays vrould .give those ^forking aga^inst a solution' time to 'put down the clamps on talks,'"

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

ADDRESS BY AMBASSADOR ARTHUR J. GOLDBERG^ UiaTED STAT His REPEECSEMTATIVE TO TliE UmTEC NATIOIJS^ AT A SPECIAL CONVOCATION AT HOWilRD UmVERSITY, 1 WJi^IilNGTON, D,C,, FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 10, I967 j^xcerpts/

Oixr effort to open the cloor to p^ace in Vietnam has been continuous • In recent weeks public attention has been focused on this effort by an unusual nuraber of statements^ reports and events: pronouncements by the governments involved^ appeals by vrorld leaders including Pope Paul and Secretary General Thant^ nei^r stories and interviews with various personalities—and the perplexing events, in Mainland China. Right now we are in the midst of another pause in the fighting, the Lunar i}Jew Year Truce. Thus this may be a good moment to assess the present status of our efforts for peace.

In such an assessment^ a responsible official, must in all that he says^ in public, avoid damaging the hopes for progress through private dix^lomacy. But in a free society he must also accept the inescapable responsibility to keep the public adequately informed, It is difficult to deal on both levels at once but it is essential to do so as well as we can.

Let me begin, then^ by recalling the basic Anerican peace aims in Vietnam, These aims have been stated many times by President Johnson and other responsible spokesmen of the United States, They have been stated over a span of two years, but the ebb and flow of the military situation during that time has not made them any less valid as guidelines for peace negotiations. We do not subscribe to the false notion that a strong military position obviates the desirability of seeking peace through negotiations. Today, therefore, I wish to review the essence of these American aims.

The United States seeks a political solution in Vietnam, We do not seek the unconditional surrender of our adversaries, VJe seek a settlement whose terms will result not from dictation, but from genuine negotiations—a settlement whose terms will not sacrifice the vital interest of any party, Iti the words of the Manila Commiinique: "The settlement of the war in Vietnam depends on the readiness and willingness of the parties concerned to explore and work out together a just and reasonable solution." As President Johnson said a vraek

1 U,S« mission to the United Nations press release No. 13^ dated Feb, 10, I967

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ago here in V7ashington: Such a solution "will involve . . . concessions on both parts."

V7e are not engaged in a "holy v:ar" against con3r:unism. We do not seek an Merican sphere of influence in Asia; nor a permanent American "presence*^ oa ny kind--milltciry or otherwise--in Viet-najn] nor the imposition of a military alliance on South Vietnajn,

We do not seek to do any injury to Mainland China nor to threaten any of its legitimate interests*

We seek to assure to the people of South Vietnam the affirmative exercise of the right of self-deteiinination—the right to decide their pvm political destiny f^ee of external interference and force and t' :ough de2rLOcratic processes. In keeping with the announced South Vietnamese Government's policy of national reconciliationj we do not seek to exclude any segment of the South Vietnamese people from peaceful participation in their country-s future. We ai-^e pre-p ;ed to accept the results of that decision v/hatever it may be. We support the early consummation of a democratic constitutional system in South Vietnam^ and welcome the progress being made to this end.

As regards ITorth Viet nam ^ ve have no designs on its territory^ 8ind we do not seek to overthrow its govermnent whatever its ideology. We are prepared fully to respect its sovereignty and territorial integrity and to enter into specific undertakings to that end.

We believe the reunification of Vietnam should be decided upon through a free choice by the peoples of both the North and the South without any outside interference; and the results of that choice also will have our full support.

Finally J when peace is restored we are willing to make a major commitment of money^ talent and resources to a multilateral cooperative effort to bring to all of Southeast Asia^ including I^orth Vietnam, the benefits of economic and social reconstruction and development which that area so sorely needs.

These, then^ are the peace aims of the United States. They parallel the objectives stated by the South Vietnamese Government at Manila. Our aims are strictly limited and we sincerely believe they contain nothing inconsistent with the interests of any party. Our public pronouncements of them—both in Washington and at the United H'ations--are solemn commitments lyy the United States.

Our adversaries--have also placed their aims and objectives on the public record over the past two years. The major statement of these aims is the well-known four points of Hanoi, which I will summarize without departing too much from their own terminology.

The first point calls for recognition of the basic national rights of

the Vietnamese people: peace, independence^ sovereignty, unity and

territorial integrity. It also calls for the cessation of all acts of war

against the North; the ending of United States intervention in the

South; the withdrawal of all United States troops^ military personnel

and weapons of all kinds^ the dismantling of American bases and the

cancellation of what they term the United States "Military Alliance"

with South Vietnam.

The United States would not find any essential difficulty with a

reasonable interpretation of any of the terms included in this point.

Our dhief concern is what it does not include; namely, that North

Vietnam also cease its intervention in the South^ end all of its acts

of war against the South, and withdraw its forces from the South.

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Such a requirement is obviously essential to the **peace" to ifhich this first point refers.

The second point relates to the military clauses of the Geneva agreements. It provides that;, pending the peaceful reunification of Vietnanij both the North and the South jnust refrain from Joining any military alliance; and that there should he no foreign bases^ troops of military personUel in their respective territories,

! Here again^ the only real difficulty Is the omission of any obligation on the north to withdra-w its military forces from the South—although the Geneva Accords which established the demarcation line in Vietnam forbids military interference of any sort by one side in the affairs of t' ^ other^ and even goes so far as to forbid civilians to cross the demilitarized zone.

The third point calls for the settlement of the South's Internal affairs *'in accordance vith the program of the National Liberation T. jnt for South Vietnam/^ This pointy of course^ was not a part of the Geneva Accords at aJ.l, It introduces a new element which I shall discuss later in this analysis.

The fourth p^^int calls for the peaceful reunification of Vistnamj to be settled by the people of both ^ones without any foreign interference, V7e have no difficulty with this point as was indicated in my speech to the General Assembly on September 22,

There has apparently been added a fifth point—put forward and repeatedly endorsed by both Hanoi and the National Liberation Front since the enunciation of the four points in April I965* This fifth point was stated by Ho Chi ^iinh in January I9S6 when he said that if the United States really wants peace, it must recognize the National Liberation Front as the "sole genuine representative" of the people of South Yietnamj and engage in negotiation with it.. This^ like the thli^d of the "Four Points," introduces a new element which was not part of the Geneva Accords.

Iffow, from this brief suinmaJ;ion of our aims and those declared by Hanoi^ it is clear that there are areas of agreement and areas of disagreement. Recent public statements by Hanoi have been helpful in certain aspects, but how great the disagreements are is still uncertain because the stated aims of Hanoi still contain a number of ambiguities. I would like to discuss some of these ambiguities because they relate to very consequential matters.

There is ambiguity^ for example, on the role of the National Liberation Front in peace negotiations. I have already noted the statement of Ho Chi Minh and other spokesmen for our adversaries who have said that we must recognize the Front as "the sole genuine representative of the South Vietnamese people^ and negotiate with it." If this means* that we are asked to cease our recognition of the Government in Saigon and deal only with the Front, insistence on this point would imperil the search for peace. For the Front has not been chosen by any democratic process to represent the people of South Vietnam, Nor has the Front been recognised by the world community. It is pertinent to recall that more than 60 nations recognize the Government of the Republic of Vietnam in Saigon, whereas none recognizes the National Liberation Front as a government.

On the other hand, some public statements seem to call for the National Liberation Front to be given a place or voice at the negotiating table. If this were the position of our adversaries^ the prospects

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vrould be brighter; for President JohnsoHj as long ago as July 1965, said that "the Viet Cong would not have difficulty in being represented and in having their Tievs presented if Hanoi for a moment decides that it wants to cease aggression." He added that this did not seem to him to be "an insurmountable problem^" and that "I think that could be worked out."

A further ambiguity relates to the role of the National Liberation Front in the future political life of South Vietnam. Hanoi asks that the affairs of South Vietnam be settled "in accordance with the program of the National Liberation Front," Our adversaries, in their various comments on this point, take no notice of the internationally recognized Governjiient of South Vietnam or of the steps which the South Vietnamese leaders have taken^ and have currently under way, and the institutions they are now creating, for the pui-pose of providing their country with a constitutional and representative government, ^

Wor would their statements seem to leave any place for the South Vietnamese who have participated in and promoted such steps. Such an interpretation would pose serious obstacles to a settlement.

However^ some claim that what the National Liberation Front really seeks is no more than the opportunity to advance its program peacefully along with other elements and groupings in the South in a free political environment.

We have already made it clear that v?% do not msh to exclude any segment of the South Vietnamese people from peaceful participation in their country's future and that we support a policy of national reconciliation endorsed by the South Vietnamese Government in the Manila Coimnunique. Indeed^ as Secretary Rusk said in an interview last week J if the Viet Cong were to lay down their arms^ ways could be found to pei^mit them to take part in the normal political processes in South Vietnam,

Further ambiguities arise concerning the question of foreign troops in South Vietnam, VHiat does Hanoi mean by "foreign troops?" They clearly include in this term the forces of the United States and other countries aiding the South, but they have never admitted the presence of their own forces in the South, Of course, a one-sided i-rLth-drawal by our side would not lead to an acceptable peace. All external forces must withdraw, those of Hanoi as v^ell as oursj if peace is to be achieved.

There is ambiguity also in Hanoi's position on the timing of the withdrawal of external forces, "Do our adversaries consider x^rithdrawal of forces as a precondition to negotiations, as some of their statements imply? If so^ this again would raise a serious obstacle to progress. But if they look on withdrawal of forces as a provision to be incorporated in a settlem.ent this clearly could be worked out* ^he United States and its allies are already on record in the Manila Communique that their forces "will be withdrawn , . , as the other side withdraws its '. forces to the Norths ceases infiltration, and the level of violence tVius I subsides. Those forces will be withdrawn as soon as possible and not ; later than six months after the above conditions have been fulfilled." Further, we have indicated our willingness to join in a phased and supervised withdrawal of forces by both sides.

Next, there is ambiguity in Hanoi's position on the cessation of bombing of North Vietnam. At times their public statements have I demanded that the bombing be end^-d unconditionally, ■in.thout any ;

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reference to a possible response from their side. On the other hand quite recently a spokesman of Hanoi said that ^'if^ after the definitive and iinconclitional cessation of the bombardjnents^ the American CiOYernment proposes to enter into contact with the /North Vietnamese/ Government. . , . this proposal \fill be exa-^ned and studied," And Just this weelc ve have seen a farther statement^ in an interview hy the North Vietnamese Foreign Ministerj that cessation of the bombings "could lead to talks between North Vietnam and the U*Sj^ Many of their statements^ insisting that the bombing ce^se have also contained other expressions^ such as that the American military presence in South Vietnam be completely withdrawn and that the "Four Points" of Hanoi must be reeognized and accepted as "the" basis—or possibly as "a" basis—for settlement of the conflict. This creates an additional ambiguity as to whether Hanoi means to add still other prenegotiating conditions.

The position ■ of the United States on this bombing question has been stated by a number of Acljiiinistration spokesmen^ including me at the United Nations* The United States remains prepared to take the first step and order a cessation of all bombing of rforth Vietnam the moment we are assuredj privately or otherwise^ that tlais step will be answered promptly by a tangible response toward peace from North Vietnam. In his letter of February 8 to His Holiness^ Pope Paul^ President Johnson said: &

... I know you would not expect us to reduce military action unless the other side is vrilling to do likev^ise. We are px^epared to discuss the balanced reduction in military activity^ the cessation of hostilities or any practical arrangements which could lead to these results. We shall continue our efforts for a peaceful and honorable settlement until they are crowned with success.

Some analysts contend that our terms of settlement should be more precisely defined. But it is very difficult to be more precise in advance of nef^otiation and particularly in light of the substantive ambiguities on the other side. But whatever questions may be raised^ they should and can best be resolved in discussions between the parties who have the povfer to resolve them. For our part^ we stand ready to negotiate in good faith unconditionally to resolve all outstanding questions.

The United States approach to negotiations is flexible. We and our applies do not ask our adversaries to accept, as a pre-condition to dis-cuss ions or negotiations ^ any point of ours to vrhich they may have objections. Nor do we rule out the discussion of any points of theirs^ however difficult they might appear to us. We are willing to discuss and negotiate not only oui" own points but Hanoi's four points and points emanating from any other sources, including the Secretary General of the United Nations, . ;

It remains to be seen whether our adversaries share this concept of negotiations♦ As I have already pointed outj their various public declarations of peace aims have often been coupled with statem.ents that the goals they put forward must, for example^ be "accepted" or "recognized" as the "sole basis" or *'the most corsrect basis" or "the only sound basis" or "the basis for the most correct political solution." ;

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Such statements contain ^stiLl further ajnbiguity--in one sense the most fundamental of all^ since it relates to the concept of negotiation itself. Do these statements mean that Hanoi is willing to enter negotiations only if there is an assurance in advance that the outcome will he on their terms and villj in effect, simply ratify the goals they have already stated? Such an attitude Kould not he conducive to peace and would make the outlook for a settlement hleak indeed.

If J on the other handj North Vietnam were to say that their points are not pre-conditions to discussions or negotiations^ then the prospects should he more promising.

Our negotiating approach would permit each side to seek clarificat-tion of the other side's position. It does not require the acceptance in advance of any points^ least of all those whose meaning may be in need of clarification. We do not ask that of Hanoi—and progress toward a settlement will be facilitated if Hanoi does not ask it of us*

In this situation J how can we best move toward a sett].F^ nent?

One essential eai'ly step is to analyze the positions of all parties in order to ascertain whether there is some element or some kernel common to all. Many students of the subject have pointed to one fact vrhich may prove to be such a kernel—namely ^ the fact that both sides have pointed to the Geneva Agreements of 195^4 and 1962 as an acceptable basis for a peaceful settlement.

But I must add quickly that this does not necessarily indicate a real meeting of the minds^ because of doubts that all sides interpret the Geneva Agreements in the same light. Hanoi has said that the essence of the Geneva Agreements is contained in its "four points," But the toivrt points would not put Hanoi under any restraint or obligations in its hostile activities against the South, which the Geneva Accords explicitly prohibit. Besides^ as I already pointed out^ these points insist that the South's future be regulated in accordance with the program of a group which was not referred to in the Geneva Accords and did not even exist when they were -m^itten, and in any case J if the Geneva Accords were to serve as a basis for settlement, it would obviously be necessary to revitalize the international ma-cinery which they provided for supervision--v/hleh is presently operating under severe limitations; to incorporate effective international guarantees; and to update other provisions of the Accords vrhich on their face are clearly out of date.

Despite these problems of interpretation, it can be said that if the meaning of the Geneva Agreements were accepted as a matter for genuine negotiations^ then the constant reference to th"$se agreements by both sides would be more than a verbal similarityj it would be a significant and hopeful sign of the prospects for settlement.

Fi^om all this analysis^ there emerges one basic and practical question^ and it is this: How are all these apparent obstacles to a settlement to be overcome?

The first and essential pre-requisite is the will to resolve them— not by unconditional surrender or by the dictation of terms, but through a process of mutual accomjuodation whereby nobody's vital interests axe injured^ which would be a political solution. Speaking for the United States. Govern-ment^ I affirm without reservation the willingness of the United States to seek and find a political solution,

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The next question^ tlien^ is by v/hat procedures such a political settlement can "be reached. One veil-tested and tijne-proven vay is-the conference table. Pi^esident Johnson has repeatedly stated our readiness to join in a conference in Geneva^ in Asia, or in any other suitable place* V/e remain prepared today to go to the conference table as soon as^ and-wherever^ our adversaries ai^e prepared to join us,

■ There is also a second procedure by which to pursue a political settlement: namely^ private negotiations--either by direct contact or tlirough an intermediary. There is much to be said for this private method^ for ain a situation as grave as thiSj -isrith its complex historical 1: ^kground and its present political cross currents, it would be exceedingly difficult to negotiate in a goldfish bowl.

■ I therefore affirm that the United States Government stands ready to take this route also toward a political settlement* And we give our a? iurance that the secrecy and security of such private explorations iw^Otild be safeguarded on our side* Of course we do not and should not ask that freedom of expression be curtailed in the slightest degree* Nevertheless--as that conspicuous champion of free e^^^jression^ Dr* Er^'^in D. CanhajBj recently reminded us—no one's credibility ought t'o suffer because of what is better left unsaid under such circuinstances.

Let me quickly add that at this Juncture I do not want to raise any false hopes by this remark. I am simply stating a principle vhich is inherent in the concept of the secrecy and security of private explorations,

Such then is my analysis of the problems involved and the methods to be employed in seeking a negotiated solution of the Vietnamese conflict. Nor should we overlook the possibility that negotiations private or public^ might be preceded or facilitated by the process of imitual de-escalation or a scaling down of the conflict without a formally negotiated ceasefire, This^ of course,, would be welcome on our part.

It is altogether possible^ too^ that there will be no negotiations cuLninating in a formal agreementj that our adversaries will sooner or later find the burden of the war too exhausting and that the conflict will gradually come to an end.

Perhaps this will indeed prove to be the outcome. But our most respected military authorities have cautioned us not to expect that this will happen quickly, and that we must face the possibility of a long struggle. Surely^ if there is any contribution tliat diplomacy can make to hastening a just and honox^able end of this struggle, we cannot in all conscience spare any effort or any labor, day or night, to make that contribution—no matter how difficult and frustrating the effort may be^ or how many false starts and failures and new beginnings it may entail.

As students of history know, one obstacle to a negotiated end of any war can be psychological. The frame of mind appropriate to fighting and the frame of mind appropriate to peacemaking are by nature very different. And yet a stage inevitably comes when both these seemingly contradictory efforts must go on side by side.

DLxJassiHed per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Projeci Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date; 2011

Many citizens, viewing this complex dual process, are likely to "be confused and distressed "by vhat se'ems like an inconsistency in their leaders' policies. Some coraplain that the talk of peace suggests a weakening of our resolve and of our v^ill to van. Simultaneously others complain that the continued military effort suggests an attempt to bring the adversary to his knees, to hreak his vill^-and thus casts doubt on the sincerity of our will to peace.

The great difficulty of achieving peace should serve to remind us that there are substantial conflicting interests at stake which stub-bo^^nly resist solution; that peace cannot be bought at any price, nor c^ . real conflicts of purpose be waved away with a magic wand. By the same token^ the ferocity of war should not be an incitement to h4tred but rather a stern discipline—a reminder of the imperative di^^^y to define responsibly the limited interests for which our soldiers f^jht and which a peace settlement must protect.

! The effort to make such a responsible definition^ and to carry it through the process of peace negotiations, is *'piled high with difficulty." A genuine meeting of the minds may never be wholly achieved. It is unlikely that terms of settlement for this stubborn conflict can.

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be found which would be wholly pleasing to either side. But it is in our highest national interest that an acceptable^ livable solution should be found.

I Lt no one suppose that patriotism^ which is so inspiringly displayed on the battlefield, is not also present at the negotiating table. All cur i"ecent Pi^esidents have testified to our country's dedication to negotiation as a means of peacefully bridging difference.

President Eisenhov;er said in 1955? on the eve of the first Suiiimit

Conference with the Soviet leadership; I

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We shall work with all others so that peaceful and reasonable negotiations may replace the clash of the battlefield,

I^esident Kennedy, in his Inaugural Address,, said:

Let us neYer negotiate out of fear. But let us never fear to negotiate.

An President Johnson has summed up the true value of negotiation as follows:

To negotiate is not to admit failure. It is to show good sense* We believe that collective gargaining is working as long as parties stay in negotiation. Only when bargaining breaks off do we speak of failure. And so also in foreign policy. There, too, the rule of law and the resort to the bargaining table are the hallmnarks of success*

An to these words the President added specifically:

This rule applies without qualification to Vietnam. Vl^e shll count it a mark of success when all the parties to that dispute are around a conference table. VJe Americans ai'e experienced in bargaining; we have nothing to fear from negotiation. And we Americans know the nature of a fair bargain; none need fear negotiating with us.

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I am sure all three of these Presidents vould a^^ree today that the effort to discover through negotiation^ the common ground on vhich to build a Just and honorable peace^ is worthy of our most sincere and dedicated efforts.

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WRITER GIVES PLMS OF HAI^OI AND VIETCONG FOR

FUTURE VIEXHAM "^

The Associated Fx-ess asked Wilfred Burchett^ an Aiistra-lian Conmiunist vrriter^ to report the strategy of Hanoi and the Vietcong as he ha.d been able to discern it in his trips to Vietnasi, Eurchett has often been a Communist spokesnaa in Korea J Vietnam and Germany,

Phnom Penh^ Cambodia^ Feb. 10 (AP)—Hov Hanoi and the Vietcong viev a future Vietnam vhich might einerge out of any negotiated settlement was revealed in a series of talks I recently had with top Vietnamese leaders of North Vietnam plus Liberation Front (Vietcong) representatives in Hanoi and talks last August with the Front's president^ Nguyen Huu Tho^ whom I met ifor the foux^th time in his ^

jungle headquarters in South Vietnam.

The general idea is that Viethan as such must be an independent country without any foreign presence. Reunification is a long-range project realizable only in the far distant future^ which Vietnamese leaders in the North and Liberation Front leaders in the South privately agree may be 10 to 20 years away*

Meantime, the J!forth would remain a Socialist country and a member of the Socialist world but without military alliances or foreign military bases^ militarily but not politically neutral* The South would be non-Socialist and neutral militai-ilyj politically and diplomatically.

The seeds for all this are provided for in North Vietnam's four-point plan enunciated by Premier Phain Van Dong in Aprilj 1965j ^"^^ acceptance of which until very recently had been thought in Washington to be a precondition for talks.

But in Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh's replies to my questions, in which he said talks could start if bombings stopped^ it was made clear that acceptance of the four points was not posed as a precondition, and far less was withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Vietnam made a prior condition, as seems to have been though over a long period in Washington.

The formula used by Foreign Minister Trinh was that the "four-point stand and correct attitude the government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam enjoy were sure of even stronger approval and support from all peace^-and justice—loving peoples and-governments the world."

That this is not being posed as a precondition is one of the most important of the clarifications in the Foreign Minister's statement.

But if Washington took a long, hard look at the four points one top Vietnamese official said, it would find they entail important concessions compeared to the Geneva agreements.

The latter provided reunification by 1956^ with the assumption that ^

the pro "Communist Vietminh would rule over the whole country.

1 From the VJashington Post, by Wilfred Burchett, Feb, 11, I967

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The four points;, which neatly dovetail into the five-point plan of the

Kational LilDeratioa Front^ vere specifically formulated, according

to the sasiie official^ to facilitate American disengagement. While the

plan contains nothing contrary to the Geneva agreements, it makes

an important'concession the indefinite postponenent of reunification^

halts the spread of communism south of the 17th Parallel^ and accepts

certain restrictions on the sovereignty of the North,

^he Geneva agreements of July 21^ 195^j which partitioned Vietnam along the 17th Parallel^ provided for unification elections by July 20, 1956. However^ the Ngo Dinh Diem regime in South Vietnaia sp'-irned any such vote.

j/pham Van Dong's four points of April, 1965^ included: (l) Withdrawal of all U.S. military forces from South Vietnam and an end tcj) all acts of vrar against the Northj (2) No foreign military alliances fc"^ either North or South; (3) Settlements of South Vietnam's internal a: Tairs in accordance with the program of the National Liberation Front; {k) peacef^Il reunification without foreign interference^^? I What type of regime could the North and the Liberation Front accept in the South? The Liberation Front considers it is in a strong ehought position militarily and politically to have a "decisive place and voice'* in any settlement of the Southern half of the problem.

In fact^ as the Front's President Nguyen Huu Tho told me last August^ he envisages that a "broad coalition government of national union" could be formed which, while excluding personalities like deuerals Nguyen Cao Ky and Nguyen Van Thieu^ the present Premier and President respectively^ would not exclude some numbers of their cabinet or others who served in previous Saigon governments far back> even including that of Diem.

Such a government must be iz^revocably committed to an autonomous South Vietnam independent and neutral* But explicit in the Liberation Front and the North's five and four points is that independence means withdrawal of all U.S, forces and the dismantling

of bases»

^,S, officials in Washington examined v^ith interest the Communist viewpoint as reported by Burchett^ John Hightower of the Associated Press reported,

/rae officials said Comjnunist acceptance of the idea of a long-term non-Communist regime in the South was an interesting indication of flexibilityJ Hightower reported.

/The plan for a coalition government in the South was also viewed with interest J but the United States was pictured as being unwilling to accept any such coalition that included "a decisive place and voice" for the National Liberation Front. Tlie U.S. view is said to be that participation in South Vietnamese political life hy individual Vietcong leaders who would be loyal to an independent government would be acceptable 3 hut not participation by the NLF as an organization^

The Front's leaders^ including those of the Marxist Revolutionary Party J insist that although they vfould carry out the distribution of land—this has already been done in areas administered by the Front— they do not intend the collectivation of land or the socialization of industry and commerce. They would accept aid from the West and East^ protect existing foreign interests^ and would accept foreign

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investments to help rebuild and develop the country vhen this did not infringe national sovereignty.

In this connection it is interesting to note that Mhan Dan (The People)"-which is North Vietnam's BraTada*---camjnenting on the Foreign Mnister's statement on the possibilities of talks^ seven times mentioned the term ''x^^^*^^ ^^^ independence" as defining the Vietnamese main aiins^ hut not a single mention of socialism. This fact is noted by foreign diplomats in Hanoi. This certainly does not imply any intention of abandoning socialism in the PTorth^ but does mQ^n that the emphasis is on national aims^, which do not foresee a SociEilist regime for the South. And ^'socialism for the north^ Democracy in the South" i^as the title of speech by Le Buan^ secretary of the North's Communist Party, early in January.

A fei^r months ago a bureau of the National Liberation Front was establi3hed in Hanoi—housed in the repaintedj refurnished former American consulate.

Unlike other diplomatic missions it is not accredited to the government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam^ but in careful political distinctions is called the "representation of the National front for the liberation of South Vietnam in North Vietnam,"

Tlie desired implication of thls^ as carefully explained by gray-haired NLF central committee member Nguyen Van Tien, vho has the "representation/' is that it is a "concrete image of reunification*' with the clear implication of South and North enjoying equal status,

VHien I asked if there vms not a contradiction between the North's stated aims of "defending the North, liberating the South and reunifying the country," the Front's program of independence and neuti^ality^ and his own statement that reunification is nearing^ he said "no" and then gave the clearest exposition of how the North and South—as represented by the Liberation Front—viev;ed the future of North and South relations if the war ended and the Front was the dominant element of a government in the South.

His views are shimmed up as follows:

North and South Vietnam remain autonomous in internal and foreign affairs. The North would remain Socialist and a member of the Socialist bloc. The South would be neutral, unallled to any blocs. Each v;ould have its own foreign ministries and own diplomatic representatives abroad. The Front already has over a dozen de facto embassies abroad.

For regulating North--South relations, there would be a type of general assembly, presumably' nominated \>y the respective parliaments to handle questions important to both zones such as trade, post and telegraphs, interzonal travel, including sports and cultui^al exchanges. The assembly in fact would have some resemblance to the inter ^German council, an idea being tpyed with by the VJest German Social Democrats as a means to handle current practical problems, between East and West Germany.

The question of negotiations between Hanoi and the Ky government in Saigon is seen as an iBipossibility, The latter is considered as representing no national interests or any section of the population and would die a natural death the moment serious negotiations started.

It is assumed Ky and a handful of Ms top supporters would make suitable dispositions, as so many of their predecessors did, for a com-

fr fortable exile. But it is also considered that national reconciliation is

I entirely possible with personalities and groups less engaged, if they ^

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are prepared to take a cleai"* stand on the question of complete aational independence. On that belief everyone is adamant- Ho Chi Mlnh told a group5 Including niyselfj "the United States is offering us the choice of colonial slavery or victory, Ohviously we fight till the end."

Another personality^ in replying to a question whether North Vietnam is prepared to offer anything in exchange for an American withdrawal^ shrugged his shoulders^ laughed and said:

"VJhat do they ^';ant?

"Do they want us to invite into the North ^400^000 Chinese^ ^40^000 Forth Koreans and a few thousand Cubans and then propose their withdrawal as a counterpart for withdrawal of the United States and her Allies from the South? Is that what they are after?"

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iroRVfflG.mM-DRV coifJACT S (OlflO)

OSLO ^531 to SecState (SECEET-EXIiIs)^3.4 June I967,

"U- Loan uncierlilned Nortli YxetneMiese Govt lmx:)osecl only one condition for negotiations^ namely that boniJDiiig of Forth Vietnpjn be stopped* Clearly having in mind the Chinese^ he went to lengths to underline that speeches from other quarters vrhich imposed othei* conditions including fu:i.l Anicrican vjithdrEvral from South Vtetnej^ did not R?T not. reflect Drorth Vietnam Govt's thought- On TTorth Vietnamese side one gave decisive vjeight to stop in "boiribing because this v;as viewed as respect for North Vietnamese sovereignty and sxxch a respect wa.s an absolute condition fo^ coming to conference table^ but vjas also the only condition, Wien they had come to conference table^ North Vietna-m position v^oulcl be very flexible *¥e are^' said JVmbassador Loan 'ready for very far reaching coiriprcvuises to get an end to the ^-mr. ' Arribassador Algard noted that recently one had impression that fforth Vietnamese side vas cooler tov^ard negotiations. Ambassador Loan denied this strongly. He said that formerly when North Vietnam shovred an interest in negotiations toericans had taken such interest as a sign of vea>uiess and v:ith results of stronger esca.lation. This v;o,s background against vrhich one must judge some recent speeches on North Vietnamese side. Provided there V70uld be a stop xn bombing^ Morth Vietnam was ready at any t'me for negotiations and fa.r reaching com]pro3aises."

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KISSJ.KgTC R-BO CONTACTS ( HUm-i aYLVANIA ) Jxxly - October 196?

Second Meetinr^ v.'xth Fnarg Van Dong, July 25^ 196?- Present: Aubrac^ Marcoviehj Fnara Van Dongj Tachj note-taker.

"Hiam Van Dong resumed. * Ending the war for us has tuo meanings: l) An e3id of boir=blng \rhich is perrrianent and unconditlona.!; 2) A vithdrawal ;0f United States forces, lie like the formula of President de Gaulle• ' Marcovich interrupted to say that it uas not realistic, Biaia Van Dong .greed and said that he reali^.ed that sone U*S* troops vould he.Ye to stay juntil the end of the process of political sett-TeTr,ent, He added: 'V/e ^o ;not \;ant to huiniliate the U.S. Lenin did not llhe \:ar but fought v^hen ■ necessary. As Lenin we are CoM:iunists, '

^ '"'Novr 3.et me speak of U.S. policy and the KLP. Vfe should have had imification in 1956- ITae period 19^6-'^9 vras a political fight- It sa^; the mutual assistance pact bet^-;^een the U.S. and Saigon and the introduction of U.S, staffs. Tlais led to the formation of the ITl^, The second period, 1960-6^^ saw a disintegration of the U.S, position to which the U.S. responded by 'special' war* /I suppose he meant 'special forces' war_-7 In 196^5^ the United States started a * limited' war which lasts until today. At the same ^ titne the NLF has expanded its activities frora the country into the cities

and from inside Vietnam to t2ie outside. Our position is: Forth Vietnam is ^ socialist and vjants to remain so- As for the South^ our goals are national independence J democracy, peace and xieutrality* So:ne people thinl^: vj-e want to impose Socialism on the South, We are convinced that the NLF will not make Sjich an error* Tlie NLF envisages a broad-coalition goverixment,, ineludnig all significant groups and religions wit h out consideration of past a ctivities inc lu di n g rfiembers du g ouverneme nt f anto che et cadr es d^ar n>e e f antoche. ^ZF® repeated the underlined vrordsT/ The essential,thing is to forget the po,st,

" ^As for unification^ v/e recognize that the important first step is a political settlement of the South. We agree not to push things toward unifice«tlon. Once the war in the South is settled^ we shall discuss with the South and find the best m.eans. Our people are magnificent-

"'Peace-would have been easy for the U.S, three years ago. But . HWith'uvery ^'ear tlie political situv^.tion worsens» VJe do, not like secret-. negotl?vtions^ but w^e recognise their necessity in tins situation. As long as the issues do not concern South Vietnajn^ the VILF need not partici-pate- However J we do not beLieve that the United States is ready for a settlement.' 'Ihen turning to Aubrac he asked: '-Que veulent les Aiaericains?''^

These statements were confirmed by Bo on October 9^ -^9^7—after pei^sist^ ent requests by the U.S. through II 8c A for confirmation. Bo said: "He who does not say 'no' agrees,^'

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-gORVffiC-TAN--D KV CO1 ITACTS (OIHO)

OSLO 66U to SecState (SECKET-liKDIS), l6 Auglist'lS'S?

'"., <-Ainbloan thGH discussed the assiLmptions for the staxtlxi^ of negotiations and repeated the position that an absolute^ but the only^ condition for negotiations vas a cesf^ation of the bojTibin'^ by Americans,

. He attain pointed out that this i-ras a question %;hich involved the sov-

' ereignty of North VietnaiEi. It \?ould be to admit the existence of a state of war if Rorth Vietnarn accepted to QUOTP] respond UijQUOTii; in the form of

i a corresx^oiiding reduction of forces* In this connection I stated that "^ it was probably not EFT not certain thp.t e;a official declaration by North'

. Vietxiam on the extent of a possible QUOTE response UNCiUCfE v;as asstoicd. A confidential coimriunication indicating v.^hat the Horth Vietnamese intended to undertake might be sufficient* Amb Loan said that unsuccessful necoti--ations v/ould be vorse than no RFf no negotiations r^t all, Tlie opening of negotiations v:ould create a i/ave of optimism throughout the vjorld^ and a possible breakdovai might Xmd to con^ecLuences iriiich v;ould be difficult to foresee. It therefore appeared desirable to a^ssure^^ prior to the starting of negotiations^ that they would yield re:Hu3,ts, The possibilities for a faYoz^£Jl)le result vjoiil^d thus have to be clarified to a certain degree in adva-nce. If negotiations >;ere started^ the florth Vietnamese attitude vmuld be flexible^ as the Airb had stated previously^ and the Tforth Vietnamer^e vcre prepared to enter into far-reaching compromises. But as he did not RPT not possess exact in^'^orifiation* he vas not EHT not in a position to indicate in concrete tenuis, where this willingness to compromise v^ould express itself on the North Vietnamese side- He did^ hovreverj mention the Kortli Vietnamese attitude with regard to the demarcation 3.ine dui'ing the Geneva negotiations as an exa/:iple of North Vietnamese readiness to com,-prondse* If^irthei-morej he said^ North Vietnam had P^Iready made known a

, very significant concession^ based on a rea-listic eve.luation of the situation. The Geneva agreei^ient stipulated that Vietnam should be unified within two years- Our objective today^ he ss^id^ is considerably lower-The question of unification is postponed to an indefinite point of time■ in the future. North VietnaE-i is toda-y ready to accept a separate South Vietnamese state vjhich is neutral and based on a coalition govb. Such a govt could have connections both with East and Ivcst and accept assistance from couixtries^that nrlght \i±^h to give sucJi assistance." -^e Amb stated that the time of t]:te irithdrawal of the Ar/iericp^n troops was not RPT not a. decisive quefc^tipn. In this connection he pointed to the agreement on the withdravjal of the l^^ench troops. Hca-jever; the question of representation was of great importance. On thj.s point the Araericans \vonld have to accept the political sitvation in South Vietna.m as it is^ as de Gaulle did in Algeria, North Vietnapj could not RPT not negotiate on be}ialf of the South Vietnamese, Amb Lor-.n finally said th?.t he appreciated the contact established with tJ^e Norv-regian Ejnbassy^ and that lie vmuld like it to bo jriaintained.,. J^

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WmmotMl-DR V COIlQlCTS (OIIIO)

OSLO 722 to SecState (SECRET-EXDIS), 21 August I967:

^^2, ,,-Loan asked if Algard v^illliig to accept ^jrivitation to Hanoi, Algard proinised earHy reply. Lo?.n gave no RPT no dilreat reaction to our previous coMnunication. He again underlined tjie q.uestion of the ces^^a-tion of borabing. national sovereignty and di(3nity^ but at the sarfle time test the Bincere vrill of the M^ericans to negotiate. Hovrever^ interested in concrete information about ¥hat is meant by /u.S^ QUOTJil flexible as to form and nature of some coi:*r^spondlng restraint Ul^Pj.^'^TE In above men*^ tioned telegi^am^, Point B< ^oan/ said Airiericaii recognition national self-determination decisive point. Concretely he a.sked us find out if USA wiUang to base possible negotiations on this principle e^nd billing accept liberation front as political factor..,-"

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OSLO 1063 - Meeting on Fr5-day^ September 8

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"5* /cooper/ soug;ht clarification of Loan's cornments on the role of the lUJF^ specifically whether 'political factoi^' meant as a factor in preliminary talks^ acti^al negotiations^ or in a post-£:ettleuient situation-Algard said his iiripression i-ras that Loan ineant all three stages, I then elaborated on the extent to which \re recognitLod the ELY as a political factor in a post-settle^ient situation a,nd/or the vays they might particle pate in negotiatiorts, IVe cannot recognxEe them as a go. eniinent or as the ►sole representative for the pedpleof Vietnajn, In the last analysis^ we believe the W^ question should be resolved in South Vietnam hy the various elements there- \le will be pirepared to accept anything v?iich the Government of South Vietna!Ji is ready to accept. It v-rill be troublesome if in the preliminary negotia,tions the JffiF must particix)ate in every stage-We need c3-arif 1 cation on this point. . Algard said he was not quite sure^ but he had the 3jT)]pression that the North Vietnamese divided the problem into q,ue/3tlons affecting rela,tions between Hanoi and the U.S. on the one hand- and South Vietnainese problems on the other. Loan had stx^essed that Hanoi could not spsak for the Ii[LF on matters affectirj^j South Vietnam-Algard said Loan had not been inore specific on this point/'

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7- On the question of 'non^-cor.'miunist South Vietnam^* I said that^

if indeed Loa,n had said they \-70uld accept a non-couEiimist South Vietnam a,nd had sa-id so under instructions^ this v:as probab3,y the first time this formula had been used- Algard said Loaii had stressed that Hanoi was vrilling to accept a non-commimist govermaent which was a neutral government > and which would have relations with both East and West and received -aid* from both sides. Sub sequent ly^ at a reception on the day before Algard left^ Loan had said that Ifenol recognisted the fact that they had to live for some years to corie in a Vietnam which v:ould have two different social and political, situations.

"8. Loan had not explained what he meant by a -t coalition govern3r.e2-it' andj in fact^ used the term_s 'coalition goveriiment^ and 'non^corrinunist goverriinrtnt*. a.lmost interchangeably without giving an indication as to the ■ poss*ible'. ;^ tract ure of the governineKt." political grouping, etc. He had ■.. not stated that they w^ould accept representatives of the present South Vietnojnese Government^ but his tone gave the impjression that they v?ould-In fact J Loan had said he de^;.^ly disliked the South Vietnamese Government but^ nevert}ieless> it was 'a political factor' in South Vietnam. (Algard cautioned that in cozisidering the tei"]!! 'non-communist government' Loan has indicated from time to time he does not consider the IiL-F corii^iunist.) Loan told Algard he envisages a govemnient ijith cor.jnixnist participation

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but vbicli is not commmist-controlled* Loan had repeated his reTTiarks about a non-coonimiet govGrnment directly to Algard in I^Vendi at a subseq^uent casual meeting^ again usjng the phrase *noz:i"Comnunist*'

"9* 1 raised the CLUestion concerning Loan^s co:miient that the matter of the U.S. withdra^wal v/as not decisiye. Algard said Loan had referred to the Geneva, Agreement in this context using the examx^le of the v/ithdrawal of French troops \ih±ch^ he said> had been no problem-"

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BUmTtlj\]\f-DfiV COr^ACTS ( PACKl^RS), December 16 ^ 1967

January 5^ I968 - Hax^i^iTnan-Macovescu Merrioranclui.i of Conversat.ldn:

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Hie follovdng statements vere me.de by Trinli:

*"Tbe basis for settlement of the Vietnamese issue is provi^ded by the four po?lnts of April 8^ 19^5J the Ministry of Foreifsn Affairs subseq.uently issued its January 28^ I967 statement- This is our posi^ tion of principles on v*ich no concession is possible.'"

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"'We are not against discussiozis but a,ny diticussions should take place according to principle. As soon as discussion engaged in^ our attitude irill be serious and responsible but it depends on attitude of the U.S, v^hether such discussions are fruitful.'"

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NOm??;GIAW-DRVCCBT ACTS (oino.l

OSLO 3275 to Seestate (SECRET-IvODIS), 10 February I968

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"2 /Lo-ii/ sa-id tim-1; Hanoi presupposed (assumed) that the . Llitary operations be stopped ivliile negotiations are being con-ducted. ..,''

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ITALUN-DRV C ONTACTS (KILLY) Feb ruG.ry"Mar oh , 19S8 -

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Excei^pts from feGting of D*0rlaih1i-Su*

'\,,.Botla parties felt that prolDlem of guaranteeixis an agreem^^nt vas increasing to decisive importance. Su cGe!rtcd to categorically exclude tlie UK as a gua-ranteeing agency and Faufani a,nd Su agi'eod that the ICC was not in position to gu?.ra.ntee anything/'

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^'(J) Su stated tha,t declared s.nd also real aim of Hanoi w8>;^ to have a,bsolutely free general elections- To insure liberty of vote^ it vas necessary to constitute a govern_Tient with very broadly based participa,tion excluding only S-^r criminals^ (undefined). Thei^e was discussion of various South Vietnamese personalities as possible msrriijers of a Govermnent, Su v;ould raise a name and d'Orlandi vzoiLld cozrjiient. Su generally did not reveal his opinion hut ICy was obviously unacceptPvhle to him."

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OSLO 3570 « SWiimary of Ajnbassador Algard's visit to Hanoi^ March 3-10:

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"7< 1^16 ForGign Minister underlined also that the North Vietnairiece

U^point progra;ja must be the fomxlation for a po3,itical resolution of the

conflict- Apart from what concerned the stopping of the bombing and

cessation of the acts of war agciinst I^orth VietnejA^ he did not £:et

Letters forth in such a wcay that the United State^i beforehand must accept

the entire ^l-point prograjn. He did not say anything on the point of

time for A^-icrican wibhdrs7;;al but said that \:as a question irhich znust be

^ndled at the conference table. Nor i^pidd he say anything on how the

tt'eunificatlon problem vjould be settled nor how long it would take but

ne repeated that first there vmBt be a political solution in South

Vietriain and referred to the WIF prograjn vzhich assiimed a separate Sovith

Vietnamese state for the imniediate f\iture. Insofar as it concerned a

,political solution for South Vietnam^ the Foreign Minister repeated the

North Vietnamese position that this was a q^uestion i;Aich must be dis--

cussed with the NLF and that Hanoi camiot speak on behalf of South Vietnam

! He ujiderlined very strongly that recent events in South Vletnairi had shewn

\ that the regnjiie in Saigon v.^as totally without political basis but at the

same time events made clear that there was a possibility o£ cooperation

between the NLF s.nd other political groups < Hovrever he did not go j.nto ■

detail on this point

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HOR\-?EGIMI-HORTH VIS Timi.IESE COMTA.CTS, JUl^rS I967 - raSRUARY I968

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June 1-13, 1967 - Meeting; Wo. 1

OHIO began^ in effect^ with a transmission by Ambassador Tibbetts of a conversation in Peking on 1 June between Ambassador Ole Algard^' Norwegian Ambassador to Pekingj and the North Vietnamese Ambassador to Peking J ITgo Loan* Norwegian Foreign Minister Lyng gave the substance of the Algard-Loan ODnversation to Tibbetts, Despite some very interest ing and important statements made by Loan^ this cable and subseguent cables for several months were EXDIS and were not given a code name.

Loan stressed four points to Algard: (l) NVN fear that the U.S. intended to stay permanently in Vietnam; (2) that Hanoi had only one condition for negotiations (sic)^ na.mely the cessation of U.S. bombing; (3) that when Hanoi came to the conference table, it ^'would be very flexible/^ and is ^'ready for very far-reaching compromises to get an end to the war"; and (k) that Hanoi felt it was able to cope with a.lLnost any U.S. military activity with its own resources --- except for direct occupation of all North Vietnam.

Algard ex-pressed concern about North Vietnamese treatment of U.S* prisoners* Loan said that formal recognition of these men as anything but "war criminals" would "legalize American participation in the war-"

OSLO U53I to SecState (SECRET-EXDIS)^ 1^^ June I967:

'*2. Following is my informal rendition Algard's report^ p transposed from first to third person;

"3, Ambassador I^Igo underlined strongly North Vietnamese Govt disposed toward negotiations- At same time they were deeply mistrustful of Americans' intentions in Vietnam, Steady escalation and sending of new troops indicated Americans had intention of staying permanently in Vietnam-

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^%, Mgo underlined North Vietnamese Govt imposed only one condition for negotiations^ namely that bombing of North Vietnam be stopped. Clearly having in mind the Chinese^ he went to lengths to underline that speeches from other quarters which imposed other conditions including full American withdrawal from South Vietnam did not EFT not reflect North Vietnam Govt's thought On North Vietnamese side one gave decisive weight to stop in bombing because this was viewed as respect for Iforth Vietnamese sovereignty and such a respect was an absolute condition for coming to conference tablej but was also the only condition-VJhen they had come to conference tabJ.e^ North Vietnam position would be very flexible. 'We are^' said Ambassador Mgo^ 'ready for very far reaching compromises to get an end to the war,* Ambassador Algard noted that recently one had impression that North Vietnamese' side was cooler toward negotiations. Ambassador Mgo denied this strongly* He said that formerly when North

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Vietna-m showed an interest in negotiations Ajsiericans had taken such interest as a sign of weakness and with results of stronger escalation* This was background against v/hich one must judge some recent speeches on Morth Yietnamese side. Provided there would be a stop in bombing^ Worth Vietnam was ready at any time for negotiations and far reaching compromises-

"6* Arab Mgo said he hoped developments would not RPT not take such form that North Vietnam must ask for foreign^ and in first Instance Chinese, help. That was one thing that they would do their utmost to avoid. To question under what conditions would North Vietnamese Govt feel forced to ask for help, he said that beforehand one could not KPT not determine fixed criteria* He said however that an American invasion of Tforth Vietnam in itself would not EPT not necessitate foreign help- North Vietnam had an army of UOO thousand men w^hich would be capable of mastering such a situation, Amb Algard had mpression that only danger of direct occupation of all North Vietnam would force North Vietnamese Govt to ask foreign help. It was plain Pjrh ^!go considered it very important to clarify IJIorth Vietnamese position on question of foreign help."

TIBBETTS.

Jmie 20, 1967

State responded with an exprei^sion of interest and a desire to have the Ulorwegiaris continue the contact- Noting the four major points in the l^ first Algard-Loan conversation^ and admitting that Loan's statement that

bombing was the only condition for talks, was "highly plausible^" State suggested Algard react as follows: (l) ascertain the authority with which

CLoan spoke; (2) stress the Manila Communique in general terms in response to Loan's fear of the U,S, intending to stay permanently in Vietnam; (3) ascertain whether North Vietnam was insisting on a permanent bombing cessa-

Ltlonj* (k) stress the U,S. view that the bombing cessation must be accompanied by '^at least some x^^^vate assurance of appropriate reciprocal action by North Vietnam"; (5) indicate that the Geneva Accords of 195^ p, could be a basis for settlement and try to probe Loan on the compromises f envisaged by WJ>h

State 213389 to Oslo (SECRET-EXDIS), 20 June I967:

"2,c. Expressed concern that U*S, intends to stay permanently in Vietnam is of interest- V7e assiLme GON is fully aware r of our repeated statements of intent to withdraw and most speci-

[ fically the precise wording used In the Manila Communique, which

you should furnish them.

'M, Discussion of cessation of bombing as only condition for talks fits with other private readings as well as Trinh-Eurchett interview and appears to us highly plausible.

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e. Key passage appears to us to be reference to IJVN position being 'very flexible' and ITOJ being 'ready for very far-reacbing compromises -'

\\

Statements on NTO view of U Tliant likewise seem plausible^ although GOM' may be interested that we had strong indications IWTJ was displeased with U Thant*s latest initiative teijag launched after IWII had apparently given negative reaction in Hangoon meeting.

M

References to fTOI reluctance to seek Chinese help are highly interesting. Ife are not repeat not ourselves sanguine that HTO woiUd not call for Chinese help in event of U,S, invasion ^ but report of Loan position remains extremely interesting as indicating depth of IJVIi reluctance.

"h. We arc particularly appreciative of Algard remarks on U,S* prisoners In NVTT, v^hich we believe hit exactly right note*

"3- On basis of this evaluation, we believe it would be extremely useful for Algard to have farther conversation with Loan, This could be through special meeting or chance encounter^ aiid we would see no problt^m with speciaJ_ meeting^ since we surmise Loan remarks were intended to elicit some reaction and that NVIT would have assumed that we would be informed*

'^U* Points we suggest Algard make would be as follows:

ir

a. Earlier conversation reported to USG, and GON has reviewed U.S. views on matters stated. Both GON and IJ,S, that Loan was speaking with authority- (This could be so put as to elicit any contrary indication,)

assiane

, From conversations with USG^ GON is clear that USG fully understands IWN concern as to whether USG intends to stay permanently in Vietnam, From discussions v/ith USG over long period, GON is convinced that USG is toteilly sincere in repeated statements that it would seek no permanent military presence or bases in Vietnam once settlement is reached^ and that USG and other nations assisting SVIT meant just what they said in Manila Coinmunique, (We would prefer that this portion of message be left in this general form* It is possible that Loan would pick up elements of Manila statement, such as req.ulrement of withdrawal of both 'military and subversive' forces. If this question should arise ^ Algard might say that it is GON understanding that U.S. is referring to regular NVN military forces but also to personnel originally from South who accepted move to WT^ in 195^ ^^"^^ were thereafter sent back to South* Algard might say that he would be glad to get further clarification on this point if desired*)

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"d. Assuming that I^JW condition calls for^ in effect,

r permanent cessation of bombing^ USG position remains as it has

been stated throughout and particularly by Ambassador Goldberg In September I966 at TJU and by Secretary Rask in January. U,S, p view is that cessation of bomhingj without at least some private

[^ assurance of appropriate reciprocal military action by NW,

would create situation of major military advantage to N\'n and P would not be conducive to fruitful talks. USG has put forward

j several general suggestions for timing and nature of KVIir recipro-

^ cal actions J and President's letter to Ho contained one specific

proposal that added the element of stopping of reinforcement by USG in the South. Canadian proposal of April called for link between cessation of bombing and restoring demilitarised status of DI4Z under effective supervision^ but Hanoi rejected this* What is present Hanoi view on these proposaJ-s^ or do they have any other suggestion to make?

"c. USG accepts that 'cessation' of the bombing of the JS^orth and military action ..^^.Linst the Korth is only NVW condition for holding talks. NTO has referred to cessation being on 'unconditional' basis; V/hat is meant by this? (Rirpose here is to clarify whether there may be any distinction between usual IJVN statements that bombing must be stopped 'indefinitively and unconditionally' -- which we have construed to mean perr.a-nently -- and occasional other statements that stoppage of bonib-ing must merely be 'unconditional.' We ourselves have assumed that no difference is intended between these two formulatioiiSj -but direct inqtuiry could be useful in nailing this down.)

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"e- USG natux^ally particularly interested in Loan remark that WT^ v^ould be flexible and prepared for compromises. !fesie USG position is that settlement could be based on Geneva Accords of 1954J and USG would be prepared an any time to talk directly ^or indirectly about all the elements of such a settlement, including any aspects WTO wished to discuss. If Loan could at least indicate areas in which MVIT envisages 'compromises^' this might be helpful in furthering better understanding of positions. Would the areas of possible compromise include the timing and sequence of actions related to withdrawal of forces on both sides J for example? Would they relate to position of UILF in the South? USG has consistently taken position that lUSF cannot possibly be regarded as 'sole legitjjnate representative* of SV]^ and has also made clear that it cannot accept third of Hanoi four points, for which it finds no warrant in Geneva Accords of I95U? Is Hanoi suggesting its position on these points is now flexible? (Purpose of this inquiry is of course to feel out the key question of what Loan had in mind. If we f knew the area Loan was referring to, a most fruitful exchange of views might then become possible> and we v/ould of course be

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prepared to discuss these issues in depth with GOrL ) In this connection, USG has made it clear to GOIf that it too is prepared to discuss realistic compromises^ viewing the matter of an ulti-I mate settlement from the standpoint of the Geneva Accords of . 195^' USG has repeatedly noted IWIi statements likewise expressing approval of Geneva Accords of 195^^> ^nd areas of common ground of compromise might well be found within this framework.

"f • We would leave it to Algard whether to raise the suh-. ject of prisoners again. We v^ould have nothing to add to his i excellent presentation^ and it may be that he should merely say that his previous remarks reflected GON view^ and that he would be interested in anything Loan might have to say to him on this subject, (We think representations on prisoners can be more effective coming^ as they did in first conversation, from viewpoint of GON itself, a.nd that USG support might if anything be less helpful in explicit form.)

"g. We would not repeat not suggest Algard try to reflect r ' any USG views on conditions of MVl^ calling for Chinese help. L. \ If this topic should come up, Algard might express clear GOrf

understanding that USG has repeatedly said it does not threaten HV¥ territory or regime and has no objective other than permitting l_ SVH to detez^mine its own future without external interference."

KATZENMCli (Drafted by W.P, Bundy)

1 June 2 9. I967

[

Tibbetts reported that after his first conversation with Algard, Loan had left for Hanoi, and that he was not expected to return to Peking until August. Algard was going back to Oslo for further instructions.

August 5-lS, 1967 - Meeting J7o. 2

■ The second meeting between Algard and Loan carried both dialogue and

f substance forward, Algard made it plain that he was informed of U.S. views,

^ and Loan said that he would report to Hanoi. Loan did add, however, that

he was prepared to comment "from a personal nature." This may indicate that Loan's standing in party circles is quite high and secure.

After reiterating the two mjxin points of the first meeting (bombing pause is the only condition for talks and flexibility and compromise once talks

! begin), Loan made several interesting observations. He said that every time

NVN "had previously shown willingness to negotiate, it had been misunderstood in the U.S. and seen as a weakness* The conseq^uence.. .each time /being7

r a new escalation on the American side." In this respect, he noted that

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world opinion was against the U.S. and that negro riots in the U,S. were part of this overall picture.

CLoan eraphasized a very new element in Hanoi's thinking* He said that "unsuccessful negotiations would be worse than no repeat no negotiations I at all...It therefore appeared desirable to assure^ prior to the starting

Cof negotiations^ that they would yield results." As a sign of Hanoi's flexibility in this regardj Loan gave examples of compromise: (l) re-I unification could be ''postponed to an indefinite point of tinie in the

f" future"; (2) ".WN is today ready to accept a separate South Vietnamese ; j state which is neutral and based on a coalition government" j and (3) that ^ the timing of the withdrawal of U.S. troops is not a decisive issue.

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There was some question as to whether Loan used the phrase "non-communist" when describing this South Vietnamese state. It subseq^uently turned out that he had.

Loan expressed a desire to maintain the contact.

OSLO 66^4 to SecState (SECIIET-EXDIS), 16 August I967 (Section 1 of 2):

^

tJ

"3 ^^hen North Vietnam had previously shown willingness

to negotiateJ it had been misunderstood in the U.S. and seen as a sign of weakness. The conseq.uence had each time been a new

I . escalation on the Ajn^i^ican side. It was obvious that tTorth

Vietnam did wish to reach a peaceful solution^ but the military

f-n situation was from the North Vietnamese vie\-rpoint very favora-

ble^ and there was no HFF no reason for North Vietnam to let itself be forced into negotiations- QUOTE Sooner or later we will win this war UNQUOTE, he said. QUOTE V^e know how to

f fight J and m^QUOTE^^ he added with a smile, QUOTE We are not

^ RPT not any Middle Eastern nation UNQUOTE. He also pointed out

that the Amex^ican position was weakened by the pressure of world

C# opinion on the U.S. and by the internal problems of the Americans, particularly the recent race riots which he considered had a direct connection with the resistance of the American ne-

Cgroes against the war in Vietnam- In this connection he recalled that the French did not RPT not lose Vietnam at Dien Bien Riu, but in P5.ris. However^ even if North Vietnam did not RPT not feel herself under pressure^ militarily or otherwise, to enter into negotiations, it was of course realized that it would be of benefit to end the war, and he underlined that the previous declarations on willingness to negotiate, provided that the bombing be stopped^ remained valid."

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Section 2:

"....Amb Ngo then discussed the assumptions for the starting of negotiations and repeated the position that an absolute^ but the only, condition for negotiations was a cessation of the bombing by Americans, He again pointed out that this was a

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question which involved the sovei^eignty of ITorth Yietnam* It v/ould "be to admit the existence of a state of war if North Vietnam accepted to QUOTE respond UNQUOTE in the form of a corres-ponding reduction of forces. In this connection I stated that it vras probably not KPT not certain that an official declaration by Iforth Vietnam on the extent of a possible QUOTE response UNQUOTE vj^as assumed. A confidential communication indicating what the North Vietnamese intended to undex^take might be sufficient, Amb Ngo said that unsuccessful negotiations would be worse than no RPT no negotiations at all. The opening of negotiations would create a v:ave of optimism throughout the worlds and a possible breakdown might lead to conseq^uences which would be difficult to foresee. It therefore appeared desirable to assui^ej prior to the starting of negotiations^ that they would yield results- The possibilities for a favorable result would thus have to be claz^ified to a certain degree in ad'^'ance^ If negotiations ^vere started^ the North Vietnajnese attitude would be flexible^ as the Amb had stated previously^ and the Iforth Vietnamese were prepared to enter into far-reaching coirrpromises. But as he did not RPT not possess :exact information, he was not HPT not in a position to Indicate in concrete terms where this willingness to compromise would express itself on the North Vietnamese side. He did^ however^ mention the North Vietnamese attitude with regard to the demarcation line during the Geneva negotiations as an example of North Vietnamese readiness to compromise. Furthermore, he said. North Vietnam had already made knovm a very significant concession^ based on a realistic evaluation of the situation- The Geneva agreement stipulated that Vietnam should he unified within two years. Our objective today J he said> is considerably lower. The qxiestion of unification is postponed to an indefinite point of time in the future. North Vietnam is today ready to accept a separate South Vietnamese state which is neutral and based on a coalition govt-Buch a govt could have connections both with East and West and accept assistance from countries that might wish to give such assistance. The Amb stated that the tiiae of the with-drait;al of the American, troops was not HPT not a decisive question* In this connection he pointed to the agreement on the withdrawal of the French troops. Hov^ever, the question of representation was of great importance. On this point the Americans would have, to accept the political situation in South Vietnam as it is, as de Gaulle did in Algeria. North Vietnam could not HPT not negotiate on behalf of the South Vietnamese, Amb Ngo finally said that he appreciated the contact established with the Norwegian Embassy^ and that he vould like it to be maintained,--

TIBBETTS,

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August 18, 1967

^' — III -' . ■ J J

State responded matter-of-ractly to the second meeting between Algard and Loan- While there seemed to be rc^riy provocative statements made^by Loan^ State's analysis said that except for the point about talking in advance of negotiations in order to assure that the negotiations are successful, everything else was old hat- Further explanation on this talks-negotiations point was needed.

rStat.e also began to grapple vith the thorny problem of North Vietnamese reciprocity for U.S. bombing pause. The cable said that the U*S. was "flexible as to the form and nature of some corresponding restraint." In other words J Hanoi need not make a formal declaration of reciprocity. A bone \ was th.rown in to the effect that we would discuss at a very early stage

recognition of Ilorth Yietnamese sovereignty.

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state 23083 to Oslo (SECEET-SrXDIS), l8 August 196?

"1, Vfe have read with greatest interest Ambassador Algard's full report of his August 5 conversation with North Vietnamese Ambassador Loan. For most part^ views expressed by Loan do not represent substantive change from known Hanoi positions^ e.g, seeming flexibility on such matters as timing of U,S, withdrawal and reunification coupled with unbudglng Insistence that U.S-accept TILF-type coalition and apparently recognize and negotiate with IttiF on Algerian parallel. This of course goes to heart of matter J whether HLF is to be permitted dominant role in souths and Loan's comments add nothing to what vre already know on this score*

C^'2* Nevertheless J one passage of report we find of considerable interest^ namelyj Loan's conclusion that if 'negotiations' were begun and broke dovm^ this might lead to consequences which

C*would be difficult to foresee^ and that it would therefore appear desirable to assure in advance that negotiations would yield results. Loan's subse<iuent statement that 'the possibilities for - a favorable result would thus have to be clarified to a certain

i degree in advance' represents perhaps clearest indication that

^' we have had thus far that Hanoi might be interested in preliminary

secret, private discussions in order to explore outline of possi-r ble settlement.

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^"3* We think it important to clarify this point without waiting for response from. Hanoi to Loan's report of August 5 conversation- (We note Loan's expression of doubt on August 15 that he would receive any reaction.) We would therefore propose that Algard be instructed to contact Loan right away and take following line:

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(a) Horv-^egian governinent has noted Loan's observation that unsuccessful negotiations would be vorse than no negotiations at all and th^at it is desirable to explore in advance all possibilities to that negotiations could yield results- The Nor^fegian govermiLent has reason to believe that the USG is prepared to consider practical means to avoid this difficultyjt if in fact it arises J and to explore all possibilities that exist for favorable outcome of negotiations, Non-fegian government would be interested in learning Ambassador Loan's views on this.

(b) In this connection^ v^ith respect to Ambassador Loan's ccrmnent that cessation of bombing was <iuestiQn involving sovereignty of North Vietnam^ and that if North Yietnam agreed to responsive action it v/ould h?.ve to admit existence of a state of war with U,S, ^yorwegian govertment believes that this issue does not in view of USG represent insuperable obstacle. USG has never sought any formal declaration by 5orth Vietnamese government as to what it might do in response to bombing cessation and has always made clear that it was flexible as to form and nature of some corresponding restraint. On this point also Norwegian government be-

I 11 eves USG could furnish assurances as to recognition of Iforth Vietnam sovereignty and that this question should be subj'ect for preliminary secret discussions mentioned above."

RUSK (Drafted by E- I sham)

In Oslo 693J Tibbetts clarified Loan's "non-communist" statement. Tibbetts reported: "Algard said Loan had spoken of a separate South Viet' namese state which would be neutra.! in foreign affairs and of which coali tion govt would be non--communist and that Loan clearly assumed such govt would not repeat not be communist dominated *, even though it would have Viet Cong participation,"

State responded on the same day in 23631^ saying that "We have heard ^ the sfeiae noise beforej" but w^ould be interested in seeing if Algard could

1^ elicit "specifics on safeguards against eventual communist domination."

^ust 21, 1967 - Meeting No, 3

Loan invited Algard to come to Hanoi for further discussions. The jWori'/egians recommended Algard's accepting the invitation. Loan also showed Interest in what the U.S. meant by being "flexible" on "some corresponding restraint,"

OSLO 722 to SecState (SECRET-EXDIS), 21 August I967:

"2. ...Loan asked if Algard willing to accept invitation to Hanoi. Algard promised early reply* Ugo gave no RPT no direct

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I reaction to our previous communication. He again underlined the

question of the cessation of bombing^ national sovereignty and

^^ dignity, but a-t the sane time test the sincere will of the Ameri-

cans to negotiate- Hov/ever, interested in concrete information about vhat is meant by QUOTE flexible as to form and nature of some corresponding restraint UNQUOTE in above mentioned telegram^

r Point B* He said American recognition national 3elf-determination

decisive point- Concretely he asked us find out if USA v^illing to base possible negotiations on this principle and v/illing accept r^ liberation front as political factor- Eepeated that Eanoi accepts

i non-cormp-unist coalition govt neutral in foreign affiars. Grate-

ful early reply invitation Hanoi. Desirable consultations in Oslo before possible trip. UNQUOTE- "

Y TIBBETTS.

August 22 - September 1$, 1967

^ Ambassador Algard returned to Oslo from Peking, and on September 8

and 13 met with Chester Cooper to receive further instructions. In this

C meeting the Norvfcglans stressed that they "wouJ^d not in any sense serve as a mediator-" Cooper c[ueried Algard'on a number of points- First, Algard said th3,t it was his impression that Loan intended the NLF role as a "political factor" in all stages of negotiations. Cooper said tliat it ¥Ould be troublesome to have the IttF represented at the preliminary negotiations- AJ-gard said that he had the impression that WN divided the negotiations into q_uestions "affecting relations between Hanoi a.nd •^ the U.S. on the one hand and South Vietne.mese problems on the other." 12 Secondly, on the "non-communist issue," Algard said that Loan stressed

Hanoi's recognition of the need to live with two differexit social and

E political situations "for some years to corae*" Third, Loan said that the present GVN was "a political factor" in SVTTj implying that there would have to be dealings with it.

Cooper Indicated to Algard that we would be "prepared to indicate near the beginning of negotiations and in detail our conception of the final settlement,"

There was much discussion about obtaining a visa to Hanoi for Algard, and gezieral acceptance that some considerable delay would be entailed.

L State Memorandum from s/aH - Chester L. Cooper for s/S - Benjamin H.

ReadJ dated September 15j 19S7j Subject: Report on Conversations in Oslo with Mr- Jacobsen of the Norwegian Foreign Office and f Ambassador Algard, Norwegian Ambassador to Peking:

"a. Meeting on Friday, September 8 (sent as Oslo IO63)

"5- I sought clarification of Loan's comments on the role of the NLF, specifically whether 'political factor' meant

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as a factor in preliminary talks j actua.l negotiations ^ or in i^ a post-settlement situation* Algard said his impression was that

Loan meant all thz*ee stages. I then elaborated on the extent

Cto which we recogni2ed the NLF as a political factor in a post-, settlement situation and/or the ways they might participate in negotiations. We cannot recognize them as a government or as the

Csole representative for the people of Vietnam.. In the last analysis^ we believe the ELF q^uestion should he resolved in South Vietnam by the various elements there. We will be prepared to accept anything which the Government of South Vietnam is ready I to accept. It will be troublesome if in the preliminary nego-^

L. tiations the riLF must participate in every stage. We need clari-

fication on this point. Algard said he was not C3^uite sure^ but r he had the impression that the North Vietnamese divided the problem

} into cLuestions affecting relations between Hanoi and the U-S,

on the one handj and South Vietnamese problems on the other*

rLoan had stressed that Hanoi could not speak for the JJIiF on matters affecting South Vietnam. Algard said Loan had not been more specific on this point.

''7, On the cLuestlon of/non^communist South Vietnam^' I said that^ if indeed Loan had said they vrould accept a non-coEmiunist South Vietnam and had said so under instructions^ this was probably the first time this formula had been used, Algard said Loan had stressed that Hanoi was wlU.ing to accept a non-communist government which was a neutral governmentj, and v/hich would have relations with both East and West and received aid from both sides. Subseq.uently> at a reception on the day before AJ^gard left^ Loan had said that Hanoi recognized the fact that they had to live for some years to come in a Vietnam which would have two different social and political situations,

^'8, Loan had not explained what he meant by a 'coal-»ition goverimicnt'andj in fa,ctj used the terms 'coalition government" and 'non-communist government' almost interchangeably without giving an indication as to the possible structure of the government^ political grouping, etc. He had not stated that they would accept representatives of the present South Vietnamese Goverrmientj but his tone gave the impression that-they would. In fact. Loan had said he deeply disliked the South Vietnamese Government but, nevertheless, it was 'a political factor' in South Vietnam. (Algard cautioned that in considering the term 'non-conmiunist government* Loa.n has indicated from time to time he does not consider the NLF communist.) Loan told Algard he envisages a government with communist participation but which is not cammunist-controlled. Loan had repeated his remarks about a non-communist government directly to Algard in French at a sub-sea^ent casual meeting^ again using the phrase 'non-communist.'

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L ■ ^*lU, In response to questions^ I dealt at seme length

I' on our recognition of the problem of 'face* for North Vietnam.

CI I said we can go fairly far^ but there are Worth Vietnamese troops ; in South Vietnam (v/e have ]}forth Vietnamese prisoners as well as ' documentary evidence); they must get out and their departure must be monitored. This would be a matter for the negotiations phase rather than for Algard to deal vrith. We are very flexible as to ^ hew the negotiations should proceed> whether in secret or public

viewJ and also flexible as to level andj within limits of security J and commimications^ place. The problem of withdrawing military

forces is extremely complicated and will present great difficulties for the Worth Vietnamese if they refuse to acknowledge their

C presence in South Vietnam. But so long as they get out and we

are sure they get outj Hanoi can deal with its "face* problem.

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^^9* I raised the question concerning Loan's com^ient that the matter of the U.S, withdrawal was not decisive. Algard said Loan had referred to the Geneva Agreement in this context using the exanrple of the withdrawal of French troops which^ he said J had been no problem-

"10. I asked about the statement Loa,n had made to the effect that if negotiations failed* it would be worse than no negotiations at all* Algard said this had been a rather sudden statement by Loan who had not elaborated further.

'*11. I said we had thought it might be useful to have a type of pre-negotiation negotiation which would create the setting and mood and clear away some of the problems; Jacobsen said this would give them no trouble • Algard said it would depend on where the preliminaries ended.

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"15• Algard said It seemed that we were thinking of two pliases^ the first to establish the conditions of negotiations, the second the negotiations themselves; his mission would be in the first phase* I said that we are prepared to indicate near the beginning of negotiations and in detvail ovx conception of the final settlement. In effect^ we are prepared to settle first and negotiate later- Hanoi knows pretty much already from our public statements what we will agree to, including our willingness to"accept self-determination within South Vietnam and for Vietnam as a whole. We are ready to have the people of South Vietnam decide the extent to which the I^fLF participates in its government *

"B. Meeting on Wednesday^ September 13 (sent as Oslo IO87)

*^7* Algard said his Swedish colleague in Peking is convinced that there is a marked divergence between Hanoi and the IffiF,

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to which I replied that there may^ of Gourse^ be naturaJ_ differences of view between North and South and long-time combatants as opposed to more recent reinforcements^ but this did not change the basic factor of North Vietnamese control* Algard said that in Peking the Viet Cong representative apparently had very few contacts with the Vietnamese Embassy which could^ of course> be part of the pretense."

L

State 35015 sent on 9 September indicated that further study was required of the NorT/7egian conversations. State also indicated seme concern p about Cooper's remarks to Algard with respect to his impending trip being 1^ "construed as an insurance related to our bombing of Hanoi," Tibbetts

responded in Oslo 1079 of H September that the insurances given Algard P^ were vague and that there was no problem with respect to commitments on

U-S. bombing while Algard would be In tla^noi.

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State responded to both Oslo conversations T^ith instructions to hold off on the "immediate pursuit of OHIO channel" since USG was now in "indirect channel of communication to Hanoi," Responding to Cooper's suggestion on rejecting the IvJAllIGOLD ten points^ State suggestedj instead^ confining Algard's fut^ire conmients to the North '\[ietnamese to points previously made by Loan ajid to the reciprocity issue,

STAEE 36328 to AmEmbassy Oslo (SECKET-NODIS), 12 September 1967j Kef: State 35015; Oslo 1063j 108?:

"l- As you can surmise^ developments in another area have caused us to hold off in giving you instructions on message that Algard might take- Weighing delay and possible GON feeling that we have lost interest, we now believe you should inform them in utmost confidence that indirect channel of .communication to Hanoi opened up following Algard's last contact^ and that we are now pursuing cer-^ tain inq^uiries through that channel. Response is so far negativeJ but we are continuing to probe^ and therefore frankly feel immediate pursuit of Ohio channel could be embarrassing to Algard and ourselves. Please request Algard to notify us as soon as he has heard from his post in Peking re travel permit to Hanoi, and advise him that we will then give him most meaningful^ timely message we can then devise in light of all developments up to point of his departure,

"2. In conveying this message^ you might add that^ since Hanoi is of course aware of the indirect channel *

currently in use^^ it would be our best guess that they Will hold off in giving Algard his visa. In shorty they • will probably be playing a waiting game just as we are.

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"3- You should make clear that this reflects no decline whatever in our interest in develorping the Algard channel* As sophisticated diplomats^ they must realize that this kind of duplication of channels can arise in a situation of this sort, and that it then becomes unwise to attempt duplicate channel- At same time^ other channel is tenuous and may break down^ and this among other factors prevents us from describing to GON what exactly is being discussed.

r"4, FYI. Provisionally we are negative on injecting the Polish Ten Points^ which Hanoi has never taken up in any way. We dre more inclined to thiols: that any use-r' ful message through Algard will confine itself to the

1^ subjects^ other than reciprocal action fox bombing, on

which he has had faintly interesting comments from Loan.

LBut we are holding our fire couipletely until we see how the next few days develop. End FYI."

Tibbetts responded in Oslo 1132 of 13 September^ saying that the Nor-l wegians understood the sensitivity andLwould wait for further instructions

L> from Washington.

r Oslo 1366 of £8 September and Oslo 1J4O7 of 30 September dealt with

the problem of Algard's returning to his post in Peking. It was learned that Ambassador Loan had departed Peking for Hanoi on 7 September and had returned to Peking probably around 29 September- Loan ha,d not as yet

[.. given any indication regarding the authorization of Algard*s visit to

Hanoi J nor did he give any sign of interest on substantive matters. In the meantime J a Norvregian journalist indicated that he suspected Algard's return to Peking might have something to do with North Vietnamese contacts and a Vietnam peace settlement.

# 3-17 October 1967

State (^7603) responded to Oslo I366 and 1^07 on 3 October. Ihe gist of the message was that USG^ desired that Algard stay on in Ilorway until at least the end of that week, giving "further time both to see whether Hanoi follows up in providing visa, and to permit us to weigh other indi-cations'of Hanoi's attitude that might emerge following Pi^esident's speech of September 29 and other developments.

Bovey replied in Oslo 1^57 on 3 October that there vrould be no diffi- , culty in Algard remaining at least to the end of the week- Some problems > were also raised with respect to communications betv/een Oslo and Peking, It was decided that communications were not adeq.uate for rapidity or security.

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On 5 October^ Bovey sent Oslo I5O3 which repeated that there were no further developments on the Algard trip to Hanoi^ and that Algard felt he should not delay his return to Peking. Algard's intention was to leave Oslo on 19 Octoher unJ.ess he hears othei-^^ise regarding authorisation to visit Hanoi, In this same cable^ Bovey reported that the Norwegian Charge in Peking passed the following message: "During absence Loan in September NVN Embassy Peking had stated that Hanoi still interested in contact and Algard did not HPT not think this v/as merely casual remark." Algard explained Hanoi's Inaction regarding his visit in terms of increased U.S. bombing in JWN,

On 9 October in Oslo 1567> Bovey reported the following message from Norwegian Charge in Peking:

"2. Begin text --^ Ambassador Kgo emphasized in a long conversation today that a visit to Hanoi for the

rtlme being is not EPT not in q^uestion^ because of the American escalation/ The Pforth Vietnamese Ambassador stressed in particular that Hanoi views with distrust all American peace proposals and that Hanoi cannot J EPT not be forced to negotia1?e, A visit can be possible

L only after cessation of the bombing. The Amb Indicated

that further contact in Peking v/ould be unwise for all parties^ and mentioned possible contact Hanoi-Washington via the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs. End text,"

Algard^ therefore^ decided to depart for his post on 12 October,

• On 10 October> State 51536 reported that U,S. still regarded an Algard

trip to Hanoi as constructive^ and that "v/e are interested in obtaining

E elaboration of mention by Loan of possible contact Hanoi-V^ashiiigton via Soviets as well as other aspects of Loan's remarks to Charge." Bovey responded in Oslo 1597 on 11 October that State 51536 had been received and feocuted.

October 18, 1967

■I ■ I I 1^1 I r -

On 16 October J AJ^gard transmitted further details on conversation between NoiTfegian Charge and Loan,

OSLO 1739 to SecState (SECRET-NOJ)IS)> I8 October I967, Ref: Oslo 1567 and 1597

''2, Begin Msg - Amb Ngo used the expression QUOTE insecure to both parties UNQUOTE regarding a continuation of exchange of views in Peking. The reference to the Soviet Ministry of foreign Affairs

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was clearly intended to give a hint to alternative possibilities for contact. The general tenor of Aifib Ngo's statement gave the impression^ on the other hand, that Hanoi for the time being is not HPT not very interested in making contact. End Msg<"

Ifcveinber 2. I967

The Tforvegians ha^nded Bovey a farther elaboration of recent despatches

rfroin Peking. One point that emerged clearly was Loan's questioning of Norway's role as a middleman in negotiations ^ implying that the Norwegians yrere T ally bartering for the Americans* Loan also gave the Norwegians to r uaderstand that H3,noi would not negotiate under present circumstances^ [^ especially the U.S. bombings. Loan added that Peking vas an "insecure"

^lace for contactsj and that Moscow would be more desirable.

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OSLO 1903 to SecState (SECRET-MODIS)^ 2 November I967, Hef: Oslo 1739

"1, PonOff (SecGen Boye and Desk Sandegren) handed me evening Nov one translation of (a) despatch dated Oct I8 from Ainb Algard in Peking and (b) enclosure thereto which is Norwegian Charge's fuller report of his talk with Loan Oct 10^ mentioned reftel.

^ , ; A, QUOTE enclosed is a note of the 11th

OctoberJ 19^7j on the conversation between Secretary of Embassy Tangeraas and the Amb of North Vietnam the 10th Oct J 1967> in Peking p Amb Ngo's remarks

Cseem to indicate not RPT not only that a harder attitude on the question of peace negotiations in general is evident in Hanoi^ but also that the desirability p of using Norvray as a middle-man has been reconsidered-

I While Ngo as late as the 19th August expressed full

confidence in the Koi'wegian government xa this matter^ it is now being^said that Norway is QUOTE indirectly r involved EPJD QUOTE. The Amb also used^ in a different

L context^ the term QUOTE Amez'ican satellite countries

UNQUOTE> but it was not HFT not clisar whether this ^ referred to Norway as well,, . .Obsei'vers in Peking

L agree that the North Vietnamese attitude towards nego-

tiations for peace has hardenedj while at the same p . time believing that a struggle concerning the future

line in this question presently is taking place within the party leadership in Hanoi, It is being pointed out that the intensification of the American bombing j attacks probably has strengthened the more extremist

^ group^ led by Le .Duan and Truong Chinh- In the summer

the impression was that this group v^as in a weaker

L position^ as a consequence of the death of

General Thanh UNQUOTE-

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B, QUO'rE Having received the Ministry's instructions the 6th October^ I immediately contacted %Oj who J however J did not EPT not receive me mitil the 10th October* I began by asking if there was anything new with regai-d to the time for the planned visit of Amb Algard to Hanoi, I said that \^e vjould appreciate it if we could receive a reaction if possible within the next day^ as l^r- Algard planned to retiu'U to Peking the iHh Oct if the visit only could take place later* I emphasized that Algai'd was ready to postpone his departi^r-o if a visit could take place in the near future- Ngo replied that the situation in Vietnam had totally changed in the course of the last few months, since he last law ¥r. Algard, The reason was the American bombing of North Vietnam and the general escalation of the war. He underlined that Hanoi is stronger militarily and that American losses constantly increase. The frequent peace feelei's from the American side via Airier lean QUOTE satellite countries UNQUOTE is now being viewed with suspicion a^d considered as attempts to lur,e Hanoi into a trap, Ngo stressed that because of this a visit by ]-lr» Algard was not RPT not desirable for the time being-If a visit had taken place not it could do more harm than good as far as a futtire soJ.ution was concerned. Ngo asked if I knew the contents of Mr- Algard's in^ structions and he appeared very interested in this. I replied that I was not EPT not infoi-med of the contents and that I asstimed they would be ready only liTimediately before the visit takes place. 1 emphasized that Algard J for this reason, later would have to return to Oslo for consultations if the visit did not RFr not take place in the immediate future, Kgo then said that US iias no EPT no business at all being in Vietnam and that one should rather attempt to in-flueiice Washington to Initiate cessation of the bombing and a military de-escalation^ which can lead to a Bolutiouj than constantly to exert pressure on Hanoi. To this I replied that the Norvregian Govt was interested^ indeed that negotiations would start, which of cotirse did not EPT not presume that a solution should tax unilaterally the interests of Hanoi, Ngo answered that he was aware of the Nor^;egian position on the Vietnam question, but he added that Norway vas not EPT not neutral, but QUOTE Indirectly involved

UNQUOTE vmen I was about to leave, Mr. Ngo said

that further exchange of opinions in Peking was QUOTE insecure for both parties UNQUOTE and that Hanoi had, in other places, contacts able to convey messages, if further contact is desired. He mentioned the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Moscow as

one of these contacts,"

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. r rrovember ik^ 196?

L ^

I In Oslo 2033J Tibbetts reported that Norwegian politics might coBipli-

rcate and compromise the OHIO track* It seemed that in a recent visit of Prime Minister Lyng to Poland, he and Rapacki exchanged inforniation about negotiations contacts, Lyng claimed that Rapacki had told him ''in great

C detail about the Polish effort 'on U.S. behalf to open contact in December 1966/' In replyj Lyng said that the Norwegians had also unsuccessfully tried to open contact. Jacobsen brought to Lyng's attention^ in the meantime J that "Algard channel not HFT not so dead as FonHln seemed { to believe J since on November 9j ^^^e day I<yng left for Poland, a message

had been received from Algard stating that Loan had expressed interest in continuing discreet contacts with Algard (as well as telling Algard he had been satisfied with Mr, Lyng's speech in the Ulf)-" T-^^bbetts feared that Lyng might be tempted to use the Forvregian contact as ^*a possible easy way out of domestic difficulty over foreign policy," Tibbetts asked

r State authorisation to tell Lyng that "we consider this channel too important to Create prejudice against it-" On 1^^ November in State 69391^ State concurred in Tibbett's request. On I6 Noveoiber in Oslo 2120, Tibbetts said: "Estimates are that government will survive debate with narrow margin

L despite pigheadedness of sone liberals ^ So maybe Lyng will relax for time being."

December 1^^ I967

Loan sought out Algard on two occasions in early frovember. Loan's P message was simple — American escalation meant that there was no puz^pose

in Hanoi negotiating at this time.

p OSLO 2501 to SecState (SECEET-NODIS), ik December 1967,

L Ref: Oslo 2083:

"1* There follows text Ailler report received by FonOff by pouch from Axrh Algard Peking re further contacts with WM Amb Loan (Ngo), This report, which is dated Nov 10, expands info already given by under Secy Jacobsen (para four reftel) to Amb Tibbetts Nov ik. QUOTE Some time after iny return to Fekii^ I met Amb Ngo at a reception and had an opportunity to exchange a few words with him. The Axobassador regretted that my trip to Hanoi could not RPT not take place, and he maintained that the American escalation of the air war the last few months had confirmed that the distrust of the North Vietnamese vrith regard to the intentions of the Americans was Justified. There was for Hanoi no RPT no purpose in negotiating under these circuiristances.

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Amb Hgo approached me dui^ing the reception at the Soviet Embassy Nov ?• He let it be understood that he rather wished that our contacts continue^ in a discreet manner^ that is, that we exchange points of view when meeting accidentally at receptions and sijnilar occasions. Without stating it directly, he let me understand that there would be other days after this one and that our contacts then could prove to be useful. UNQUOTE

"2- In conveying this report Desk Officer Sande-gren called my attention to phrasing which indicates that Loan appears to have taken initiative on both occasions and that on second he seems to have sought Algard out,

"3- Norwegian FonOff regards second Loan apprach Nov 7 ^'3id Implications of last sentence, however deviously conveyed, as hopeful indication WN desire not RFf not to close down circuit entirely. Sandegren said expression QUOTE days after this one UNQUOTE liaplies in Norwegian that better days may lie ahead."

BOVEY

I-

January H, 1958

OSLO £727 to SecState (SECKET-NOJ}IS), h January I968, tr Ref; Oslo 2501-

"1. Ans teen sen called me on January h to give me the following translation of a cable sent by GON Amb to Peking January 3j. I968.

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"2. QUOTE A representative of the Embassy of North Vietnam yesterday (January 2) said to Ambassador Algard that the Foreign Minister's speech on C December 295 I967 contained 'new elements,' He

declined to make further coirj3ients, but would-send the complete text as soon as it was received in r PekingJ 'as it will be of interest to the Norwegian

L Government *' Letter follows. UNQUOTE"

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TIBEETTS

January 9> 1968

r OSLO 2789 to SecState CSECEE'T-KODIS), 9 January I968,

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"1. Ansteensen gave me January 9 following two texts: First text is tVanslation of pouched report dateci January U from Ambassador Algard in Peking amplifying report sent by cable reftel:

I *At a Cuban reception on 2nd inst, a younger

staff member of the North Vietnamese Embassy approached me and asked if I had heard that the North Vietnamese Foreign Minister I^Jguyen Trinh had made an important speech on December 29^ 196?? in the Mongolian Embassy in Hanoi. I replied that X had hea.rd over the radio ; the Agence Finance Presse report on the speech^ but, \ as far as I understood/ some uncertainty was prevail-

ing as to whether the I^ench correspondent had understood the speech correctly. The said staff member I stated that the North Vietnamese Embassy not yet had

received the full text of the Foreign Minister's ; speech. Nevertheless^ he could say that the speech ^' contained QUOTE new elem^ents UMQUOTE He declined

to make further comments ^ but would send me the complete text as soon 3,s it was received in Peking, I QUOTE as it certainly will bq of interest to the j Norwegian Government UNQUOTE.

"2. Second text is the translation of a cable received by Foreign Office from Ambassador Algard in Peking dated January 3-

■

; . 'The said representative of the North Viet-

^ namese Embassy confirms that AFP's (Agence France Press^

account of the Foreign Minister's speech is accurate.

C North Vietnam is prepared to undertake genuine talks

as soon as the bombing ceases. Hie word QUOTE permanent UNQUOTE has consciously been omitted. He expressed C disappointment with the fact that so far there had

been no Amt=:rican reaction* He saw this as a demonstration of lack of will to negotiate.

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'East European sources are confident that there is now KPT now a genuine North Vietnamese will to negotiate. They refer to the fact that China^ due to her internal situation^ is not RPT not In a position to exert decisive influence on Hanoi. East European sources likewise distrust the American intentions.'"

February 10., I968

Loan once again invited Algard to come to Hanoi, and he also indicated a desire to send an NVl^ representative to Norway, Loan also introduced a very new element into the play: "that Hanoi presupjjosed (assumed) that

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the military ox^erations be stopped while negotiations are being conducted,**

+

OSLO 3275 to SecState (SECRET-NODIS), 10 February I968, Kef: Oslo 2930:

"1. Boye and Ansteensen called me in morning February 10 and passed me following message from Algard in Peking received late February 9 ^^ Osloi

"2. QUOTE Ambassador Ngo who has just returned

Cfrom Hanoi today (February 9) conveyed a message from the Foreign Minister that Algard would be welcome Hanoi whenever convenient. He emphasized that the visit should take place at earliest possible time-

CAmb TTgo also req.uested that a Vietnamese repres-^nta-tive^ presumably an ambassador in Eastern Ei:irope, shouJ.d visit Norway. Algard asked for further details

r concerning the character of this visit and emphasized

that N"orway is only interested to assist in establishing possible contact between the combatant pa^rties. rNgo promised details and stated that the visit was not RPT not intended as propaganda, ITgo emphasized that last week's events had not RPT not changed Hanoi's desire for negotiations and that the Foreign Minister's statement of Dec £9, I967 was still valid. He said l_ that Hanoi presupposed (assumed) that the military

operations be stopped while negotiations are being p conducted. Cable soonest whether in principle North

L Vietnamese representative welcome in Oslo, Suggest

I leave Peking February ik for consultations Oslo, UNQUOTE

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"3. Boye said with respect to foregoing that if US Govt feels Norwegian Foreign Service can be of any help in establishing contacts with Hanoij they are prepared to do so but^ of course^ GON does not EPT not want to mess up anything which may be in progress* If USG considers it desirable^ GON prepared to ask Algard to come to Oslo for consultations with a US rep either from Embassy or from Washington in middle of February* Algard could then be asked to proceed to Hanoi as soon as possible although GOH will have to think hard as to what would be a^px^ropriate cover story for such visit at this time* As regards proposal for arranging a journey to Oslo for some North Vietnamese rep, further info will be passed on to USG as soon as received from Norwegian Embassy Peking as indicated Algard's tel^ but in meantime GON would appreciate any views and comments USG might have on this subject, Norwegians standing hy for earliest possible reply from Washington*"

TIBBETTB

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^ J'Gbruary 19, 1968

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The Uon-regians informed Tibbetts that the Ilorth Vietnamese Ambassador in Moscow might be planning a trip to Norway as well, (OSLO 339^)

February 20, 1968

In the event of the North Vietnamese Ambassador's visit to Oslo^ State sent the follm^ing explanation of "no advantage" for use by the : rion^egians. The explanation of "no advantage" stressed our desire "to

^ ascertain whetlier Hanoi appreciates /the consequences of taking advantage/"

and understands the importance the U.S, attaches to the *no advantage' ^ as suogptlon."

"The US, consistent with President Jolmson's statement of p April 7, 1965^ remains vailing to enter into talks withy^ut -

i ■ amended State ]J_87197 preconditions at any time.

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"The US position on the cessation of the bombardment of Iforth Viet-Nam was set forth in President Johnson's Septeml)er 29^ 1967 speech in San Antonio. As the President said:

'The US is wilJ-ing to stop all aerial and naval ■ l^ bombardment of Worth Viet-Wam when this will lead

promptly to productive discussions, \Je^ of couz'se, I ^ assimie that while discussions proceed^ ^orth Viet-Nam

U would not take advantage of the bombing cessation or

^ limitation.'

r"The US is not assuming that North Viet-Nam will cease lbs support to its forces in the South, On the contrary, as Secretary of Defense designate Clark Clifford testified before the r Senate Foreign Relations Committee, we asstmie that until a cease-

^ fire is agreed on, Hanoi *vill continue to transport the normal

3^i0unt of goods, men and munitions-'

[ "in setting forth its assumption, the US is not setting a

■^ condition but attempting to roake clear to Noi^th Viet-Nam that any

cessation of US bombing followed by actions by Hanoi taking r advantage of the cessation (such as an increase by Hanoi of its

L. infiltration of men and supplies or attacks in the area of the

DMZ) would constitute such bad faith on Hanoi's pax't as to make continued US forebearance impossible. If Hanoi, by taking j

advantage, forces the US to resume bombing, the possibilities f *" of a negotiated solution would di^astically recede. Under such ,

circumstances, calls for intensified US military action v/ould I increase and the possibility of another halt in the bombing

^ would be low. The US is trying to ascertain whether Hanoi

appreciates this vital fact and folly understands the importance ( the US attaches to the no-advantage assumption, I

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*^At- San Antonio the President^ in addition to setting forth his assuiription*, stated his readiness to stop the bombing vfhen 1 I such action T'?oiild lead 'promptly to productive discussions*'

'Productive discussions' are serious exchanges in v;hich either side V7111 be able to put foxn-;axd for full consideration in good faith its position on any matter* 'Prompt' of course refers to a villingness by Hanoi to begin-discussions with the US immediately after cessation of bom[DJ.ng*

r

"It is vrorth noting that Hanoi is unwilling to give a "^ ' clear response to q^uestions as to the length of time between

a US bombing cessation and the beginning of talks. If Hanoi { [ were serious in desiring talks then surely its response v/ould

V ha,VG been one of uneq.uivocal readiness to begin immediately*

■I *

p ■ "The US evaluation of Hanoi's current position takes into

/ account Hanoi's actions as well as its words. The unprecedented "" offensive against inost of South Viet-Ham's urban centers^ which

[[ Hanoi treacherously'launched in the. midst of the traditional Tet holidays^ causing widespread divilian casualties and ■ suffering^ was made notwithstanding the fact that we were still exploring with Hanoi its position tiirough diplomatic channels^ and that we had exercised restraint in bombing targets in the ixnmediate vicinity of Hanoi and Haiphong. In this context> we cannot but weigh Hanoi*s words with great , skepticism and caution. These actions carry a harsh political

}— " message-

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"The US favors every effort to obtain clai*ification of Hanoi's position. We shall continue to evaluate all infoi*mation and to pursue every possible avenue which promises to bring us closer to the re>solution of this conflict through serious negotiations."

(State 118092)

February 2;^, I968

The Iforwegians reported that they had heard nothing further about the rjorth Vietnamese Ambassador's visit to Oslo. A Stredish radio report said that he was returning to Moscow from Stockholm- (OSIX) 3^^i6)

February 2h^ 1968

I'

Boye and AnSteeuseu informed Tibbetts that on February 23 Loan again approached Algard concerning the latter's visit to Hanoi and suggested the date of February 29- (OSLO zkSk)

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* 1"* »^ 1 4 ^^ '

I Jacob sen infoitoed Tlbbets that Algard had left for Hanoi hy plane on. February 29• The U,S* had not been consulted prior to Algard'a departure. Jacobsen offered domestic politics as the explanation of the need for the Algard trip. (OSLO 3570}

April 5. 1968

t

Following is a sumnary of Ambassador Algard's visit to Hanoi^

Me ch 3-10:

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'^5- Foreign Fdni^ster Trinh reiterated that his speeches of December 29 and Februaiy 2 still vere valid- He considered these speeches to be an ansv/er to the repeated American demand for a clarification whether the tTorth Vietnamese would be willing to have negotiations if the bombing and other acts of \var against North Vietnam should be stopped. It was now up to the Americans to take the next step but because of the reaction up to now the Foreign Minister concluded the United States v^as not interested in negotiations.

''6. The Foreign Minister discussed the San Antonio formula and said it could not be accepted even in the somewhat diluted form which the new Defense Mnister Clifford had given in his meeting with the Senate. The North Vietnamese insist that there must be a distinction between the attacker and the attacked and acceptance of any form of reciprocity would be inconsistent with North Vietnam's sovereignty. I remarked in this connection that in and for itself it was understandable that tlie Americans would view with disquiet a situation where negotiations could result in a serious change in the military positions of strength. Even if the North Vietnamese side could not accept any form of recipz'ocity^ I said I assumed they already had laid out what policy they v;ould follow in practice when it concerned the question of suspending acts of war under eventual negotiations. The Foreign Minister answered that would depend on the Americans' position. Negotiations must not lead to a change in the relative positions of strength to the advantage of the Americans. He v/as not v/i3_lirig to develop this point fui^ther^

p "7- The Foreign Minister underlined also that the North

I Vietnamese ^h point program must be the foundation for a political

resolution of the conflict. Apart from what concerned the stoppiiig

Lof the bombing and cessation of the acts of v/ar against North Vietnam^ he did not set natters forth in such a way that the United States beforehand must accept the entire ^l-^point program.

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He did not say anything on the point of time for American witli-

drawal but said that was a (luestion which must be handled at

the conferencB table. Nor would lie say anything on how the

remiification problem would be settled nor how long it would

take but he repeated that first there must be a political

solution in South Vietnara and referred to the MIF program \

which assumed a separate South Vietnamese state for the ijTimedi j

ate future* Insofar as it concerned a political solution for

South Vietnam^ the Foreign Minister repeated the North Vietnamese '

position that this was a question which must be discussed with

the NLF and that Hanoi caimot speak on behalf of South Vietnam,

He underlined very strongly that recent events in South Vietnam

had shown that the regime in Saigon v/as totally without political ,

basis but at the same time events ma.de clear that there was a

possibility of cooperation between the NIjF and other political

groups- However he did not go into detail on this point.

'*8- Eoth Foreign Minister Trinh and his civil servants underlined that Hanoi desired a political solution of the coirflict. At the sajne time they aisserted that if the Americans did not want negotiations, Hanoi was in a position to continue the war indefinitely and they were convinced that eventually they would gain a military victory-

"9 It was clear that Hanoi because of the military

advances in the South now felt that politically their position I j^- ' had been strengthened-" (OSLO ^4120, Sections 1 & 2 of 2)

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April g, 1968

Algard sent a second report on his visit to Hanoi, This.one dis cussed the leadership in ITorth Vietiiam.

"labels 'Hawk-Dove' are said to be no longer valid within the top leadersh5,p. Up until late autinnn of 1967 it v^as said — but without identification of individuals concerned -- that inside top leadez'ship there were two lines of thought about continuing the v/ar* Today it appears such is not the case* The reason is said to be both the American escalation of last autumn and the military victories in the South• The comjnon denominator now believed to predominate is supposed to be nearer the Hawk standpoint than the Dove's." (OSLO kl2"j)

A .pril 5, 1968

Algard met with Loan in Peking,

''Loan said even though still fearing American initiative was political maneuver with eye on world opinion and internal situation USA, and even though strong bombing still 'continuing^

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Hanoi in any event had chosen to treat it as genuine peace initiative and depart from fundamental position not rpt not to negotiate so long as bombing proceeded• He strongly emphasized Hanoi ready for real negotiations if USA really desires them. Hanoi's latest reaction \ia.B proof of will to negotiate and to compromise." (OSLO U133)

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SVJEDISH - NORTH VICTNMESE COI,TACTS, OCTOBER, I966 - I968

' ■ I " • ■ ^' ' — ■ ■■ ■ I T 1

Novembe r llj I966

The first exchange in the Aspen track came on 11 November in a meeting between Secretary Rask and Swedish Minister of Foreign Affairs Nilsison. Nilsson infoiiued Rusk of Swedish contacts with the DRV in Warsaw and in Hanoi. Both contacts with the DRV dealt Vlth *'creating a climate favorable to negotiations," The DRV contact in Varsaw called for; (1) "an unconditional and unlimited stop of the banbing of Vietnamese territory^ North as well as South Vietnam;" (2) "the FNh must- be regarded as a legitimate party to negotiations*" He added that "no military actions should be undertaken in the Eiffi" and a "process of evacuation' of allied forces should be begun-" The Hanoi contact^ also talking about a climate for negotiations^ listed two conditions that appeared a little softer than the Warsaw counterpart; (l) "the bombing of Korth Vietnam must be put to an endj without any conditions and definitely;" (2) "recognition of the FMj 'as one of the spokesmen for' the South Vietnamese pejople; " in addition; the Hanoi contactj Mr. Trinh^ described additional matters for *'a final settlement": coalition government^ general elections^ and eventual steps toward reunification-

In response^ Secretary Eixsk indicated that "we could not impose a coalition government on the south/' He also said that; DRV insistence on a permanent end to the borabing represented "an increased demand on their part and we must have something in exchange for a permanent cessation*" i As a way out of the reciprocity dilemma, Secretary Rusk suggested a process ^ of deescalation by mutual example rather than final agreement- Rusk also .

recognized the difficulty of proceeding with bargaining at initial stages because "Hanoi was hesitant about discussing the first step until they saw how the negotiations would end-"

Department of State Memorandum of Conversation (TOP SECRET^ MODIS; aspen); dated November 11^ 1966^ Subject: Swedish Diplomatic contacts with North Viet-Nam. Participants -U nited States : Secretaiy Rusk; Leonard Unger (Dep Asst Secy); David McKillop (eUR/scAN); Hey^ward Is ham (EA/vn) . Sweden: Minister of Foreign Affairs Tprsten Nilsson; R- Hichens-Bergstrcm (Dir of Political Affairs^ Foreign Ministiy); Hubert de Besche (Ambassador to United States); J. C. S. Oberg (First Secretary; Pol. Div-^ Ministiy of For, Affairs).

"After preliminary exchange of greetingS; Foreign Minister Nilsson read a report of two recent conversations between Swedish diplomats and representatives of North Viet-Nam which took place In Warsaw and Hanoi (The text of this paper is attached).

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(text)

^^The Sfedish Government hasj since 19^5j c»n its Gfwn initiative J been in contact^ in various places j with representatives of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam and also with representatives of t)ie Hanoi Government. Those contacts hJve been kept secret and they have been taken for the only purpose of obtaining general information on the vievs of the 'other side' in Vietnam.

"l. Some weeks ago a representative of the Swedish Foreign Ministry met in Iv^arsaw a senior member of the North Vietnamese Embassy there* Dulling their conversation the North Vietnamese diplomat made some remarks which seemed to differ sonievhat frcm the oxiicial statements Issued earlier by the Eanoi Government re^rdlng the possibilities of creating a climate favourable to negotiations.

^'According to the North Vietnamese diplomatj the US Goverrmient must give ^tangible proofs^ of its willingness to negotiate- In reply to a question asked by the Sv/edish diplomat what such proofs should amount tOj the A^orth Vietnamese ansvered that such proofs shouldj first ; of all J be: an unconditional and unlimited stop of the

L- bombing of Vietnamese territory^ North as veil as South

Vietnam. ITurtheimore; no military actions should be ^^ undertaken in the demilitarized zone and a process of

i^ evacuation of allied forces should be begun. Finally:

the FItt must be regarded as a legiti^Jiate party to negotiations •

"The North Vietnamese diplomat said that his remarks could be transmitted to the US Government^ while adding that the official North Vietnamese standpoint on the question of negotiations was made clear in Premier Pham Van Dong's speech of April 8^ 19^5; i-e. the so-called four points. The North Vietnamese diplomat also mentioned that his Government appreciated this contact with Sweden, He hoped that this channel would rernaip available-

"II. The Swedish Ambassador in Peking^ Mr- Petrij recently visited Hano i and had a conversation with the Foreign Minister of North Vietnam^ Mr, Trinh.

"a) Mr- Trinh strongly emphasized that the North Vietnamese Government aimed at a political solution of the Vietnamese conflict^ not a military one- Mr, Trinh said that two conditions must be fulfilled in order to bring about a climate for negotiations, which could lead

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to a political solution.

1. The bombing of Nortia Vietnam must be put to an end J without any conditions and definitely,

2. The FIIL must be accepted by the US Government

as one of the spokesmen for the South Vietna:mese people and J as Mr. Trinh expressed it^ the most valid one.

"if both these conditions were fulfilled and the US Government thus took what lie called 'an appropriate attitude' theHj Mr. Trinh said^ 've know what we will have to do'*

"it shoTxId be added thatj in this connection^ the question of a time-table for the withdrawal of US troops was not raised.

"b) As to the possibility of a final settlement of the Vietnamese coiiflictj Mr. Trinh said that - in addition to the withdrawal of US and other foreign troops - both the Hanoi Government and the FKL had the following requests:

1-

2.

3.

The creation of a national coalition government founded on a very broad basis and including all political and religious groupings as well as all social classes genuinely desiring to achieve national independence.

General elections in an atmosphere of freedom and democracy*

Although no immediate reunification was envisaged^ it was necessary to create such conditions in South Vietnam as to pexi^iit a move in the direction of a future reunification of North and South Vietnam.

iti

'Mr. Trinh reiterated that if the US Government gave proof of goodwill J they would find that 'the Vietnamese side knew what they had to do'-

"^ftiat characterised the two talks refer red to was^ in the view of the Swedish participants^ the moderate tone in which the views of the Noi'th Vietnamese side were conveyed." (EMD text)

Having read the paper^ the Foreign Minister summarized the salient points of what DKV Foz-eign Minister Trinh had told Ambassador Petri in Hanoi: iv'orth Viet-Wam preferred a political to a military solution and was interested in a climate favoring

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a political settlement provided certain conditions vere fulfilled; withdrawal was not specifically jnentioned; the National Liberation Front was described as one of the spokesmen for the South Viet"Nam people although the most valid one* Regarding the possibility of reaching a final settlement^ the JELF and Hanoi supported the formation of a l^lational Coalition Government in South Viet-Nara founded on a broad basis including all political and religious groupings as well as all social classes generally desiring to achieve national independence. Moreover^ conditions should be created peiTmitting moving in the direction of future re-unification* < * <

"....The Secretary went on to note that there were one or two positive and one or two negative elements in v^hat had been told to the Swedish representatives* On the positive slde^ I^noi's interest in a political rather than a military solution represented a small step forward.

"..-.After all thiSj Trinh had sent him an invitation to come see hiiui Petri had not asfced to be received by Trinh. \Vhile there was no discussion of conveying Trinh's remarks to the United StateSj neither did Trinh say Petri could not do so and he emphasized the iiirportance of maintaining secrecy* The Swedes interpreted Trinh*s attitude as a tacit indication that his remarks could be conveyed to the United States.

"The Secretary^ continuing his coninentary on Trinh* s remarks said the missing element was what Hanoi would in fact do on the military side. At least 19 regular North Vietnamese regiments were in the South and tliree Noirth Vietnamese divisions were in the UAZ and north of it. They could attack our Marines at any moment. If v/e committed ourselves to stop bombing pennanentlyj we must know what would happen on the gi'ound militarily. We could not possibly make a commitment on the ground unless we Imew what Hanoi would do with those 19 regiments. Trinh had used the phrase J 'We know what we will have to do' in the event their conditions were accepted. The Secretary said we would want to know what that plurase means.'

"...•Ambassador Petri had observed to Trinh that if the two conditions were fulfilled^ the North should follow suit. Bergstroa did not Indicate whether there had been any comment to his remark.

The Secretary said that Ifenol had denied^ even to the Soviets^ that they had troops in the South. However, we must have corresponding action on the ground; we could not be children ' in this matter. As to the role of the Front, v;e knew who their leaders were including north Vietnamese Generals in the South using a variety of names. The Liberation Front is Hanoi. Some '

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southern individuals i/ith other associations were included in the Fronts but they had no influence. When Trinh said the Pront was the most valid spokesman for the South Vietnamese people and that the situation must be consistent vith moving tovrard reunification^ he was expressing Hanoi's political objective of permanently unifying the country on a Communist basis. We were prepared to have South Viet-Kam decide on a solution through elections but so far Hanoi vas not prepared to do so. The Secretary said we could not irripose a coalition governiaent on the South; we could not turn our men around and start them shooting in the other direction to impose a coalition government* If the South Vietnamese people were to decide on this it was up to them and ve would abide by the result^ but a coalition would not be imposed by our arms and our power

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The Secretary added that the other side had made clear we must end the bombing pexmanently^ since they insisted that a suspension would imply an ultimatum. This represented an increased demand on their part and we must have something In exchange for a penaanent cessation.

"The Swedish Foreign Minister noted that they had contacts x^ith the Front or Hanoi in Algiers^ Warsawj Moscow/ end Hanoi as well as Peking. The Secretary noted tliat the only serious Interlocutor was Hanoi - not the Front. The Secretary said that we did not discount the importance of any third party channels. In past crisesj we naver knew which channel would be important. In this case J we did not know whether Hanoi would say soraething iDiportant through the Swedes rather than through someone else.-

•.

*Vne Secretary vent on to say that the 3!^stern H^uropean countries would probably be Interested in settling for the status quo ante at the IJth Parallel but on account of Peking^ were unable to move forv/ard. We axe prepared^ he said^ to accept the Communist world's interest in North Viet-N"am if they are prepared to accept otu* interest in the South- Until Hanoi abandoned its objective of seizing South Viet-Nainj there could be no peace. It was as simple as that.-.*The Secretary continued that two things were vital: (l) Hanoi must abandon its attempt to seise South Viet-Nam hy force^ and (2) the people of South Viet-Nam must have a chance to decide what government they want and to express their views on reunification without being subjected to force by the t]orth..-.We liad suspended bombing in the DMZ to see if there would be any response, but there was none and the ICC had been denied access to the area under the North. Nevertheless the Trinh statement could be important if we had more precision-

"Ambassador Unger caJJ-ed attention to the reference by the North Vietnamese in Warsaw to 'no military action being undertaken in the demilitarized zone'. He suggested^ and the Secretary agreed, that this was also a point on wMch the Swedes might make further

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soimdings In Hanoi* Ve t^ere certainly ready to see the zone truly demilitarized and would velccme an ^nd^ to violations of it by Jlorth Viet-Nam.

"The Foreign Minister mentioned possible differences of opinion between the Front and Hanoi and pointed out that all elements of the Front were not CoBnnunists, The Secretary responded there was no problem about contact with the Frontj the South Vietnamese were able to coimuniGate with its representatives. South Viet^Nmn could take care of the indigenous problem through reconciliation and bringing the dissidents back into the body politic- United States troops had only entered when North Viet-Nam regulars had come down. If the Swedes were _. in the same position^ they would not accept a cc-ilition government thus imposed on them.

".,*-The Secretary noted tliree channels to Hanoi: the direct one through which little was said because of Hanoi's fear of Peking; the ctennel through Moscow to which we attach importance because of Moscow's attitudes and influence — but here again Hanoi was probably afraid of Peking; and finally a channel through a third party^ which could be Sweden- Eut^ he continued^ this represented perhaps 5^^ of the q^uestion; the other 5^^ ^^^^^ the possibility of resolving the problem by defacto action on the ground in the pattern of the Greek insurrection and the Quemoy-Matsu crisis. Ho Chi Minh might prefer to pull back troops rather than enter negotiationSj calculating that itaericans might go home and could not come bockj although^ the Secretary saldj we can get back faster than they can. We would be prepared to try this route. There need be no confessions that they have 19 regijnents in the South.

"In response to an analysis by the Foreign Minister of Hanoi's problemj the Secretary noted that we had reports from Eastern European sources that confirmed this precisely: Hanoi feared the effect of negotiations on the morale of the Viet Cong and Hanoi's present leaders feared that they could not survive a failui"*e to achieve their objectives. However^ the Seeretaiy said on this we cannot help them; they are^ in places they have no right to be*

"Further^ on the point of gradual de-escalationj the Secretary said that since January we had made clear our interest in responding to actions on the ground — wliat we call a process of 'mutual example* — without evoking thus.far any interest on Hanoi*s i:3art. If Ti'inh's phrase pointed in the direction of positive Hanoi responsej this could be important.

^^As to'Trinh's ovm alignment in the regime as between hawks and doves^ l^i'- Bergstrcm commented that the French considered

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him pro-Chinese but that A^nbassador Petri did not have that impression.

"The Foreign Minister asked whether it would be necessary to specify hov long v/e would halt the bombing. The Secretary said that under our system the press and Congress would force us to answer this question. A permanent bombing halt would require a very important reciprocal action. Ambassador Unger commented that Trinh's remarks implied some readiness to discuss now not only conditions for negotiation but also the terms of ah eventual settlement. Ihe Secretary agreed that Hanoi was hesitant about discussing the first step imtil they saw how the negotiations would end. He indicated that another reason for keeping further inquiries on the basis of a Swedish-DRV dialogue was to avoid having to bring Saigon into the picture^ which we were disinclined to do at this stage*

' L '^G?he Secretary suggested as a technical point it night not

I be wise to pursue the dialogue with Kanoi through other capitals*"

Clh order to protect Trlnh's position if there are divisions within the leadership it vj^as important not to have coiimiunications from abroad available to too v^ide a group in Eanoi. Foreign Minister NilssoQ agreed with this suggestion* The Secretary emphasized ; the importance of examining very carefully all indications bearing

on Hanoi's position but as he had told the press on another occasion ' we could only negotiate with those who could stop the fighting.

] ^' If we entered into too great detail on our conditions for settle-

G mentj the other side would just put that in their pockets and then

propose to ^plit the difference. We were not worried about real

L southern insurgents — 16^000 of them had defected this year —

but the Northern Generals must go home. \Je would even be prepared to give them a villa on the Hiyieral....

".,,.Responding to a final question from the Foreign Minister about Hanoi's difficulty of believing tliat the United States could abandon such expensive United States bases^ the Secretary pointed out that the United States' capacity in this regard should not be underestiiaated* We had built reads in_^Ihdiaj over the hnmpj and Alaska during the war which we had never used^ and we had demobilized 100 divisions after World War II. In the last five years we had closed 600 bases. As the President had saidj we had no intention of leaving our soldiers in South Viet-Nam as tourists.

"Following the general conversation^ Ajnbassador Unger privately mentioned to Minister Nilsson and Mr. Bergstrcm our r concern over reports that Ambassador Petri had spoken rather

}_ openly about his contacts in Kanoi, They agreed and said that

recently they had twice communicated with Petri and instructed him to treat this subject with maximum discretion-"

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Hovember l8j XS66

As a result of the Rusk-I^ilsson meeting^ State cabled Stockholni on "points for clarification."

STATE 88123 to Amembassy STOCKHOIM (TOP SECRET;, NODISj ASPEN)j l8 November I966.

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'1- What does the llorth Vietnamese Foreign Minister intend that his government woLild do when he says 'We know what ve will have to do'/i.e-^ if US stops bombing of NV^? Mr- Trinh" named two conditions which the United States must fulfill to bring about a climate for negotiations. It is understood of course that if those conditions vmre fulfilled^ negotiations could promptly be undertaken^ but since the fulfillment of those conditions \70uld represent significant steps for the United States^ what would be the reciprocal actions by Morth Viet-Nam? It is encouraging to know that the Noi'th Vietnamesq apparently recognize this reciprocity but it is essentialj if their position is to be accurately evalu-atedj to know what it is that they recognize they 'will have to do'-

C, '2, Wiiat is the significance of the FWL being charac-

terizedj as Mr. Trinh puts itj as 'the most valid* spokesman for p "the South Vietnamese people? ^^hat is this intended to convey con-

Lj cerning the status of the FNL vis-a^-vis other spokesmen?

'3* With reference to the q^uestion of reuniTicationj Mr. Trinh referred to the necessity of creating conditions in South Viet-Nam'to pernait a move in the direction of a future reunification'. The conditions in South Viet-Nam as Mr. Trinh himself implied would grow out of general elections held In an atmosphere of freedom and democracy. Would Mr. Trinh not envisage that the question of unification would be resolved at that time in accordance with the mandate given a new government by the people through tho^se general elections?

^h. If Mr. Trinh should mention the point raised by the North Vietnamese representative in Warsaw^ namely that no military actions should be taken in the demilitarized zone% Mr. Trinh might be asked whether this is Intended to be in effect a proposal for the strict observance of the Geneva Accords in the demilitarized zone north and south of the demarcation line with the full functioning of the ICC throughout the zone,'"

<

"6. There was some substantive discussion of the issues which might arise in Petri's next conversations in Hanoi^ it being understood that this exchange was between the Svredes and ourselves

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rand not for discussion in Hanoi, Unger mentioned Goldlaerg * formula's referenda to private and other assurances about a

/ response to bombing cessation and illustrated the kinds of

de-escalator/ actions by Ifenoi which ve would take to be appro-

tpriate responsesj such as a cessation of infiltration^ a reduc j

tlon of the level of military activity and/or terror in South j

Viet~i!^sm or some troop withdrawal fron South to North. In r* response to further Swedish probing as to what would come next »

I ' after these first steps toward de-escalation and their mention

of a possible ceasefire^ Unger said it was not possible without

r knowing more of E^noi's views^ to carry the process farther,

j We would hope that once a beginning has been made it would

; be possible to establish some mode of communication with I^anoi

: to arrive at some understanding of the next phases of de-e:^calation^

p ; although it was not to be ruled out that this might proceed by

L ■ mutual example. He also made clear our recognition of the prob-

lem of face for lianoi and our readiness to consider ways to meet El with problem. With reference to the fourth point in the ^^Points

! for Clarification" Unger emphasized that we were suggesting this

' be raised only if the North Vietnamese themselves refer to the j'

WZ problem. He added that it would alvrays have to be understood that any arrangements that might conceivably be worked out for i-^ the DM2 would have to provide for a reasonably reliable means of

detecting and dealing with viola t Ions j we couD-d not agree to i

f" putting American and Vietnamese forces in jeopardy exposed to '

[^ surprise action by the North Vietnamese or Viet Cong."

EUSK (Drafted by Unger) I November 28 thru December 21j I966

t

On 28 November J Parsons cabled State^ in Stockholm &i-lj saying that "Swedes will not repeat not be ready talk with me before mid-week at earliest*''

On 29 Novemberj responding to State 88128 with Stockholm 652;, Parsons said that in ajnplifying aide memoire "there was no doubt at all in Petri's mind that Trinh meant and expected whtat he had said would be passed on to

EUS.^' Petri also wanted to qualify that when Trinh used the phrase "most valid spokesman" with respect to NLFj that these were not Trinh's precise wordsj but the meaning. Petri also emphasised that he could not draw Trinh out on meaning of his "we know what we will have to do" statement. AlsOj r on 29 November J in Stockholm 653^ Petri confinned the contents of the memo

L transmitted to Secretary ftusk on 11 November. The intention was that Petri

return to Hai^oi by way of Peking about 10 December.

I On 30 November^ in Stockholm 659^ Parsons added a piece to the

previous conversation with Petri in Stockholm 652* This was th^t: "also^ Petri had not repeat not put in his reportSj Trinh had shown 'good deal

r of understanding' that problem of face existed also for US/'

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On 3 December J State (STi^E 95326) queried about cryptographic facilities foi" Petri, and worried about public speciilatlon on Petri's "frequent visits to lianoi," State added: "This will also bear on question of when we bring GVW into picture, something we do not contemplate for present."

On 5 December Bergstrom and Parsons met once again.

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STOCKHOIM ^1 to SecState (TOP SECBErj?, IIODIS^ ASPEN), December 6, I966, Ref: State 96236-

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^ "3' As Swedes feel there Is no denyii:tg they have been

in touch with us at Fon Minister levels formula arrived at j in Petri's instructions Is for him to describe what he tells I Trinh as ^iimressions % perhaps 'general impressions' foimed ; by Nils son in Washington* Precise formula t ion has to be : left to Petri's discretion. However^ he is enjoined to be I most careful not to say he is speaking at our reqxiest or

conveying message fram us* Bergstrcm says Petri will also I take 'great care not to affect any American interest in a

negative v/ay, ' »

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"i|-. On substance^ primary point of interest for Petri to emphasize is that Nilsson felt we were interested In finding road to political solution and that this road not closed• Petri is not to volunteer any suggestions or attribute any to us. However^ he will try hard to ascertain what response there would be from Hanoi's side if US should—as xaentioned in first of our points—stop bombing Korth Viet"Nam. Here again exact foruiulatlon will depend on Petri's judgment in light clrcucastances of talkj but I vras assured he will try to cover points on which we need more infom^tloni

"5. If Petri concludes Trinh does not want to react at time J he is not to press but merely say tliat he would be at Trinh's disposal at any time

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PARSONS

On 9 Dec ember J in StockhoJ-m 702^ Parsons reported that Obergj Foreign Ministry Officer in Charge of Asian ATfairs^ indicated that the British Embassy was probing for information once again- On 10 December^ in Stockholm TOT; Parsons reported that Trinh was at a Communist Party meeting in Budapest and was not expected In Hanoi until the IgK^h. It was agreed that Petri should wait for Trinh to return to Hanoi rather than intercepting him en route. On 10 December^ in State 1006^^5^ State agreed on holdirtg the line against British probes and on waiting for the Trinh return to Hanoi-On 21 December^ in Stocldiolm 739j Parsons reported that BergstraTi had informed him that Petri had not yet been granted an entrance visa to Hanoi. Petri could not explain the delay.

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January 11^ 1967

On 11 January; in State ll6773> State wanted Bergstrom to query Petri on the latter's assessment of recent Hanoi efforts to increase pressures for unilateral bombing halt. State also wanted to "know if Petri felt there vas any connection in the delsy in obtaining his visa and recent U.S. bombings-

January 13j 1967

Word had been received from Petri that Hanoi wanted him to cane to liorth Vietnam as soon as possible. Because of the delay^ the GOS had decided on its own to reactivate its I-farsav channel-

Bergstrom questioned Parsons on whether a declaration on Hanoi's part to negotiate would lead to a U^S, bombing stop.

STOCKHOII-1 822 to SecState (TOP SECRET, WDIS, ASPEW), January 13^ 1967- Ref: State 116773.

"4. Late on 12th word came from Petri that North Vietnamese wanted him come to Hanoi by January 16. He had replied in accord his Instructions on giving Stockholm adequate lead-time that he could not make it before 19th, This response has today'been approved here*

'^5. In meantime^ not having heard from Hanoi^ GOS decided reactivate Warsaw channel which they had earlier avoided so as not to cross wires. (Response to my query \ihy was so vague as to lead me believe second and third rationales paragz^aph 3 above weighed more with Swedes than Bergstrom admitted-) Bergstrom said Oberg of Ministry had this week been sent Warsaw renew his contact with North Vietnamese representative there* (This is first disclosure to us of this previously tightly held channel to DRV and it is interesting to note Swede is regular PouMinistry official-)

"6. Oberg's instructions signed out by Nils son were to pave way for Bergstrom himself proceed Warsaw about l6th to explore situation. Now that Petri has his visa^ Ministry today has hastily instructed Oberg not to make contact in Vj^arsav/^ but it is not yet known whether he had already done so. In any event Bergstrom will not now go there next week-"

"8. One question which Bergstrom put to me for referral Washington was whether a tlrm^ or at any rate more precise^ declaration on Hanoi's part of its willingness to negotiate could load to a bombing stop. On this pointy I described-

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Department's impressions of Dong's prepared statement to Salisbury• Bergstrcm is of coiirse thoroughly faniiliar vith Hanoi's obvious tactics in seeking obtain unilateral cessation of bCMbing but there is lingez'ing disposition to hope Dong statement is significant •"

PARSOIJS

January 1?^ I967

Bergstrom reported on an Oberg contact in Warsaw. The North Viet-(* namese contact told Oberg: (l) ^^^A final and unconditional cessation

j 1^ of the bombing vas an absolute and indispensable prerequisite in order

to pave the ^^sy for negotiations- As soon as the bombings had ceased^

ri the North Vietnamese GOVT was prepared to take all. peace offers from

the American Government under considerationj'" (2) The four points vere not a precondition for negotiations but only a foundation for negotia tions^ (3) the NLF problem could be disposed of "through recognition on

tthe part of the Americans of the right ^of the Front to take place at the negotiation table; ^^ (h) Reunification v^as an internal matter to be settled "after the restoration of the peace/'

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STOCKKOm 831 (CC) to SecState (TOP SBCEEP, KOBlSj ASPEN), January ITj I96T. Hef: State 118951.

I "3* Oberg (knowledge of liis identity as source should

^ not rpt not be revealed) has reported frofli T/^rj^aw (para 5

Stockho.hn 822)* His visit there required no special rationale

Cas North Vietnamese reps had agreed he would take contact from time to time- As this visit was pre-arranged^ Hanoi rep had had time to inform his principals and in Oberg's opinion had been

L carefully briefed by them- At outset Oberg's contact^ who vas

second-ranking man in Hanoi representation^ said door was always open to Oberg and then proceeded to give following as Hanoi^s position- Text in sub-paragraph below is Bergstram's translation from Oberg's Swedish message except where Oberg incorporated Hanoi reps exact words in French:

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'A final and unconditional cessation of the bombing was an absolute and indispensable prerequisite in order to pave the way for negotiations- As soon as the bombings had ceased^ the I^orth Vietnam.ese Govt was prepared to take all peace offers from the American Government under consideration ('pret a considerer toutes offres de paix de la part des Ajaericaines quelles que soient'), A bomb-stop was essential- On the other liandj the four points of Hanoi were no 'precondition' for negotiations but only 'une base a la negotiation*. The contents of the four points could always be discussed at the negotiation table.' (Ccmirient by Oberg; 'Contact man gave the jjnpression of ]

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being authorized to express liimGeJjf in the vfay he did, ) The question of 'FllL could be solved^ for instance^ tirrough recognition on the part of the American side of the right of the Front to take place at the negotiation table. The q^uestion of reunification was an Internal matterj which could be solved later on between North and South Viet-I^am after the restoration of peace.' (Coniment by Oberg: 'Generally speaking^ the contact-man this time ^ve the impression of considerable flexibility as to Hanoi's position in regard to the contents of a possible negotiation if only a climate could be created which rendered negots possible,')

'%» Although Hanoi rep in Warsaw was aware of Ifilsson's visit to XJ-S. in November, he did not rpt not ask Oberg about any talks with U<S. officials and latter did not rpt not refer to Nilsson's talks with Secretary and Vice Pres in any way.

"5, Oberg also explained to DRV man that when he had proposed Bergstrcm also visit Warsaw to meet Hanoi reps^ COS had not rpt not known that Petri was about to visit Hanoi, Now that this visit was to take place (which was obviously already known to ¥arsaw Hanoi rep)j there seemed no need for Bergstrom visit Warsaw nov»

• •

'^6. Oberg's report has been repeated to Petri in Peking^ 1 with coimnent tliat GOS will be interested to learn if Trinh

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parallels exactly Warsaw Hanoi xe^s statement to Oberg . PARSONS

January 20^ 1967

in ^Stockholm 8^7j Parsons reported that '^Oberg found PICL rep /in \JaTBa\f/ both knowledgeable and Intelligent, Tliere was 'mutual briefing' on previous Swedish contacts with FNL reps at Algiers and Moscow,•,." State queried on the same day (State 122506) on more ijaformation about Swedish-IJLF contacts in Algiers and Moscow.

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January 26j I967 _

In Stockholm 8^^ Parsons reported that a Social Democratic afternoon tabloid had revealed from authoritative sources that: "Ambassador Petri durjng his talks with the Hanoi Goveriiment and the FKL 'is naturally also seeking to send sentiments and views' concerning the proposals for peace negotiations,"

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Seciion ^3 MND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

TS - NODIS

January 27, 19 67

In Stockholm SjO^ Parsons cabled that Petri had retiirned to his post In Peking and had only sent a brief telegram on his Hanoi talk In the raeantime^ Parsons noted press publicity continued and vas probably designed "to serve democratic political needs of social demo crats/'

s.

F jruary gj I967

1 ; In StockhoJiTL ^^Tj Parsons indicated that the Svredes seem to be

getting "a bit nervous about their Aspen role noi^," Bergstroci did not w: it to wind \ip '^looking foolish-'' Bergstrcan also indicated that Petri's I report vas not sufficiently precise and that the Foreign Ministry was ^ waiting for a full written report before passing it on to the U.S*

Bergstrom did say that the brief telegram from Petri contained "nothing

C spectacular *" Bergstrom addedj however^ that 'there were one or two possible signs,'

p I Bergstrom avoided answering questions about Swedish contacts with the I KLF- Bergstrom 's remarks^ howeverj indicated seme syinpathy for the IJLB'.

Along this same line^ Bergstrom threw out the thought tliat Sweden might be interested in establishing consular relations with Hanoi^ but then back tracked when pressed on this point*

"if. ^flien I asked Bergstrom substance and timing of ^ J Swedish-NLF contacts in Algiers and in Moscow, he replied that pj ' his memory not sure enough to attempt answer without having records

available. He agreed without much enthusiasm to revert to this

C later. In the meantime all he could recall was that contact In

Algiers began about August 1965^ ^t tiJiie when many people looked toward MLP as perhaps authoritative source for bringing war to end- (Under circumstances I did not challenge this to me strange

C statement.) i^^ow hovrever it was more apparent that Hanoi was

focal point and so there was less interest in WLF contacts. Wachtmeisterj new Ambassador in Algiersj had seen ULF repre-sentative^ but not with any prescribed mission-

"5- Given frequent de facto contacts in Hanoi and need for channel to handle Swedish medical and other relief assistance to Worth Viet-Wamj Bergstrom 'would be tenpted' to recommend establishment consular relations were it not for 'German problem'.* I said if this happened^ he might also have an 'American problem* on his hands. He then backtracked^ saying that he had no thought of recommending this to Minister

• •«•

PARSONS

Dedassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

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February 7^ I967

C Still not having parsed on the substance of exchanges In.Hanoi and

WarsaWj the Swedes suddenly asked "if appropriate Anerican could be available at Stockholm or possibly Warsav in utmost secrecy to talk with Hanoi representative daring TET talks while bombing suspended."

L • STOCHIOIM 926 to SecStatG (TOP SECKET^ KODIS, ASPEN),

February 7^ 19^7- Ref: Stockholm 91O.

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"1. After having met with Foreign Minister Nilsson on reports from Petri in Peking and Oberg again in Warsaif Belfrage and Eergstrom sent for me ten p.m. Stockholm tliae Seventh. V/hile emphasizing their information vas difficult to evaluate perhaps insubstantial; they inclined to believe Hanoi had moved quite a bit towards real dev^ire for 'contact' (as distinct from negotiations) with American official qualified to talk.

"2. As possibility of 'contact' apparently linked to TEf truce which litiiitedj so they uiiderstoodj to four days beginning February 8^ it was of utmost urgency to know If appropriate American could be available Stockiiolm or possibly Warsaw in utmost secrecy to tali: with Hanoi representative during TSI truce while bombing suspended. Bergstrom Is proceeding Warsaw Thursday the ninth to explore situation further and also so as to be in position relay any /imerican reaction to infoimation which he and Belfrage gave me tonight and which I am reporting in message to follow this one.

"3. I can not evaluate how seriously we should take this but there is no doubt Swedes privy to Petri and Oberg reports think Hanoi may be in earnest provided there is face saving formula. V/hether Hanoi is in earnest about (l) seeking peace, (2) prolonging TKT bomb pause or (3) searching for basis on wiiich to negotiate, S^^edes could not say. However, they pre^ pared send Bergstrom to Warsaw anyway and first point on which they hope to have imniediate answer is whether we can get someone here or to Warsaw during TST truce. If so..they think they will be in position to find out if Hanoi could and would also authorize someone (probably their Warsaw Ambassador) to be available for contact during truce.. . ."

PARSONS

That same evening^ the Sv.'^edes finally passed on Petri's report and the report of Oberg^s recent and unreported crash mission to Vfarsaw.

Vmile admitting that the Petri-Trinh talks "did not yield much, " the Swedes felt there were some encoui^aging signs. Most important in their

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 NMD Project Number: NND 03310. By: NWD Date: 2011

[

minds was the indication frcm the Warsaw contact tliat the North Vietnainese ^Vas apparently willing to have a direct contact with U.S. even without luiowing how long hambing was suspended (so long as this not announced)." The Swedes apparently felt that this position in Hanoi was a sux'ficieht response to the President's policy of talking "whenever we can get other side to do so*"

Petri's contacts with Trinh in Hanoi did not yield much by way of clarifying the four State queries (the four queries in State 88l28 of 2B Hoveniber 1966). Trinh talked about the JNL being "a spokesman" or "the spokesman."

STOCKHOIM 927 to SecState (TOP SEOREff, IffiDIS^ ASPEN); February Tj I967- Ref; Stockholm 926.

"2, In Hanoi; Petri-Trinh talks 'did not yield much.' Trinh tras bitter about alleged intensification of war sijice October and emphasized unconditional bomb stop was prerequisite to anything else. There could be no preconditions to bombntop. This was closest Petri got to answer to point 1 set forth in State 88128 for clarification of meaning Trinh's cryptic remark Ve know wtiat we will have to do.'

"3. Trinh encouraged Petri to think Swedish effort for" peace L, was laudable- He did so with apparent but not explicit recog-

nition Swedes had been in touch with Washington- On Point 2 p Trinh said merely Fill could be 'a spokesman* or 'the spokesman'

[2 for South Vietnamese people- Petri did not raise Point 3 on

reunification. He thought answer to query in final sentence

Cwas 'yes* but that it would have been useless to press Trinh on this. Point k on UAZ which contingent on mention by Trinh did not come up.

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"4. After Petri returned to Peking about Januaiy 25th Hanoi charge there sought him out and drew his attention to Trinh's statement to Australian journalist Burchett th^t talks could take place as soon as bombing stopped. Petri told Charge's US wanted scane indication fii^st that Vietnamese willing deescalate war. Hanoi Charge replied .such request from Americans would appear to make bomb stop conditional and would therefore be unacceptable.

"5. When this word reached Ministry seme days ago Foreign Minister decided send Oberg back to Warsaw- On taking contact Ob erg was received not by subordinate as before but by North Vietnamese Ambassador; a change which Swedes though significant. Oberg told his superiors on returning to Stockholm this evening that it was clear I/arsaw Ambassador >ras fully briefed on Petri's recent visit to Hanoi as he had been en earlier one. He said he told Ambassador that since he had been received at higher level his principals would be willing to send Bergstrcm to Warsaw. Ambassador replied in French this would be "suitable-' Accordingly Foreign Minister has told Bex-gstrom proceed (as reported Stockliolm 926).

Deila^isifled per Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 2011

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'^6. Crux of Oberg^s taXk In Varsav was possibility that TET stand dovm in military opei^tions might provide opportunity for contacts between Hanoi and USA organized by and in presence of Swedes, Place not mentioned but Swedes assumed VJarsaw, Stoc'KiioInij even third capital possible. Ob erg got iinpreesion that if bombing was in suspense even fox- an unspecified period, Hanoi v/ould want to have contact with us* However^ if we annoimced bombing would stop for four days only^ Hanoi would not agree to contact. (Thus possibility if any may be foreclosed). It was clear to Oberg tl:iat it was intended that this message should reach us.

"T» 3^ thinking foregoing oyer Si^edes said they irjpressed . that (l) Hanoi has moved Warsaw contact to a higher level and (2) ^ j Hanoi Warsaw Embassador evidently interested in i^^ierican contact

L if fGce can be saved all. around* Wlien I reiiaai'ked it did not appear

Hanoi had met our view that some signal must first be given as to what Hanoi wouJ,d do if we stopped bombing Swedes replied that was true but on other hand' Hanoi was apparently willing to have a direct contact with us even without knowing how long bombing was suspended (so long as this not announced). Maybe^ Swedes conceded^ Hanoi only maneuvering to get bombing stopped by diplomatic maneuver but they thought Hanoi's situation might have become such^ especially given China situation^ that their desire for contact with us was genuine. This is what led Swedes to ask If when Bergstrom met L Hanoi Ambassador in Warsaw he could say US vras also prepared to

send representative to make contact in utmost secrecy.

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"8* In this context Belfrage cautiously observed Hanoi has never told Swedes it would be willing to talk v^ith us if bomb stop not explicitly unconditional; it has merely shown some signs of interest in talking if we did not put an explicit date on resumption -of bombing, Belfrage concluded that he understood President had said that our policy was to talk whenever we could get other side to do so. I reminded him of distinction between 'unconditional discussions' on one hand and some prior private or public indication of v^hat Hanoi would do if we stopped bombing on other hand (State 130520 Circular)."

PAESOJVS

February 8^ 1967

State wanted clarification on statement frcai Warsaw contact suggesting ^ a desire for preliminary contact during TET and the statement to Petri that unconditional bombing was a prerequisite to anything else. State also wished Bergstrom to explore military reciprocity* On the point of the readiness of the U.S. representative, State said that the U.S. would be prepared to respond to "talks without conditions,'*

STATE 133671 to Amembassy STOCKHOIM (TOP S:ECHHTj NODIS^ ASPffl), February 8^ 1967' Eef; Stockholm 926^ 9^7-

Dcclassffied per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

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"1. It is not clear on the basis of information reported reft els precisely what DRV i\aibassador in Warsaw told Swedes which gave them impression that Hanoi loight have real desire for contact vith American official qualified to talk: dui*ing Tet truce period. As reported by Swedesj Ifenol would not agree to contact if we announced bombing would stop for four days only^ and ve have already announced (and presi^me Hanoi aware of it) that duration of Tet truce would be for ^^ hoursj with implication bombing could rcGume thereafter. Nevertheless we certainly wish to leave no poi^sibility unexplored and^ while recognising domestic political pressures which may lead Swedes to grasp at straws^ we accept as you do their good faith in passing this information along. Vfe therefore suggest you convey following to Foreign Ministry^ bearing in mind we are not sanguine anylihing can in fact be worked out in ' connection Tet truce and we do not wish to seem to be urging Warsaw trip on Bergstrom:

a. ¥e are most grateful for these recent reports of Swedish conversations with DHV representatives in Hanoi and Warsaw. We think Bergstrom visit and talk with DRV Ambassador could be useful in clarifying ^DHV position- Among points on wliich he could seek further precision are relationship between DRV Ambassador's stai;ements to Oberg suggesting desire for preliininai-y contact with US representatives during foiir-day Tet truce and DRV Foreign Minister's statement to Ambassador Petri that unconditional bombing halt was prereq^uisite to anything else, Bergstrom could emphasize his conviction that US remains prepared for secret discussions at any time^ without conditions^ and such discussions might cover whole range to topics relevant to peaceful settlement-

b. In connection with finding mutually acceptable basis for initiating preliminary talks^ Eergstroni could express opinion that some reciprocal restraint to indicate that neither side intended to use the occasion of the talks for military advantage would provide tangible evidence of good faith of all parties in prospects for negotiated settlement,

c. As to Swede's specific question whether appropriate Ajnerican official could be available Stockholm or possibly Warsaw in utmost secrecy to talk with Ifenoi representative during Tet" truce^ US would be prepared to respond immediately and positively to any serious indication of Hanoi interest in having talks without conditions-

d. Bergstrom should know that decision on duration of Tet truce and arrangements for carrying it out were made some time ago. If press stories refer to 96 hour period because of information given out earlier pui^suant to these decisions and arrangements J Hanoi would have no basis for charging that US had disregarded suggestion made February 8 to Swedes in Warsaw, That suggestion was known in Washington well after our position

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DeclassiHed per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 NND Project Nmnber: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

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on duration truce had been made public in Saigon. \{e trust Eergstrom will bear this fully in mind 1q case DRV Ambassador takes that' line,"

RUSK

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^ebrusry 9j 1967

The Swedes indicated that although they had nothing tangible to go on^ they v^ished to pursue the contacts. They were pegging what optiraism they had on the DRV statenient to the effect that Hanoi will talk if the bombing stopped unconditionally•

STOCKIIOM 93^^ to SecState (TOP SECREIj WDIS^ ASPEN), Februaxy 9, I96T- Kef: State I33671.

"2. Bergstrom had time only to say that Swedish impression based on admittedly tenuous evidence but^ as described 927, sufficiently impressive to lead them to actions which they have j

taken, namely, report to me and sending Oberg back to Warsaw eight to make appointment for Bergstrom there ninth (which is to be at 9 P-M, Feb 9), Warsav^time, presumably to allow ,

Ambassador time obtain further instructions from Hanoi). He ,

added possibly there has been wishful thinking by Petri and Oberg, but nevertheless Swedes felt they should act as they have.

*^3' Belfrage in^accordance his usual caution began by saying that only fortnal statement DRV Reps have made to S^-zedes on talks is to stress their willingness if unconditional bomb stop- He too said evidence tenuous, but they were encouraged by progression from Trinh's opening attitude in p:fenoi Jan 23 which^was harsh and terse to point reached in l^arsaw sixth when Amb 'jumped at' proposal meet with Bergstrom. Belfrage said initially on 23rd Trinh said in effect 'since our Oct talk whatever you said to Americans led them to intensify bombing and war' - feter he wa;:; somevhat mollified and in end Petri was launched by Vice Minister and urged to come back again. Then came North Vietnamese Chargers innsolicited approach to Petri in Peking which struck vSv/edes as possibly more a Bign of interest in talks than in propagandizing them with Burchett article- Fina2_ly, as Petri's contacts inconclusive, the decided send Oberg to Warsaw where higher level and interest in pursuing subject brought Swedes to present position*

^'h, Belfrage asked if Bergstrom definitely could say American ;

could come during Tet truce or after and I referred him text para C REFIEL adding that trouble to get talks vas not repeat not with US but Hanoi, I also reiterated per para B Bei^gstrom could emphasize his conviction U.S. prepared for secret discussion at anytime i/ith-out conditions* We then had some discussion of mechanics and agreed that if Bergstrom receives impression tonight tliat leads him to take responsibility of urging an American should come at once, Bergstrom

DLxJassiHed per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 N^fD Ptojeci Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date; 2011

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should via Ministry send me flash report to this effect. I added that If he vere to to urge without firni assurance that a DRV Bep would duly be made available to talkj I personally thought Washington wou.ldj if willing at allj have to opt for StocMiolm where American visitors presence could probably be kept secret-

tt

* •

PARSONS

I

Belfrage indicated that v/e should he prepared for sudden contact*

STOCKEOM 935 to SecState (TOP SECRET, IIODIS, ASPEN), February 9^ ±967. Ref: Stockholjii 93^-

**1. Belfrage telephoned me In guarded terms message received six P.M. local time Feb, 9 frcm V/arsaw where Bergstrcm has already had meeting with DRV representative.

'^2, He said message said DRV shovmd Interest and expected give reaction February 10. Oberg will remain to receive reply while Bergstrom returns here morning of 10th-It obvious DRV rep is consulting Hanoi.

"3- Umpression gained was that if reply is affiimative, Warsaw is likely be favored over Stockholm as locale- However ^ this J like natui^e of reply its elf j 'very doubtful' and Belfrage cautioned agaaaist optimism. Koweverj he thought we would be well-advised have 'someone on starting line' as idea had been certainly not repeat not turned down."

February 11^ 1967

Bergstrom ret turned from Warsaw^ leaving Cfl^erg in case a folJIox^'-up was needed. Parsons got the itapression that Bergstrom had not fully communicated the U,S* position*

STOCKHOIM 9^0 to SecState (TOP SECRET^ KODIS, ASPElOj Februaxy 11, 1967- Ref: Stockholm 935; State 133671^

"2. Bergstrcm confirmed DRV ambassador took his approach seriously and said he would communicate at once to Hanoi- Ambassador had Deputy with him vfho intervened from time to time with usual -ifenoi line but Ajnbassador himself did not indulge in arguments and was matter-of-fact.

"3, Bergstrom said he stressed point set forth in para C State reftel and also closely related point in last

sentence Para A* Thus he believes it entirely clear to Hanoi reps that US would respond positively at once if

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DLxJassiHed per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date; 2011

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there vere Hanoi desire for 'contact.' Bergstrom said he stressed idea of 'contact' rather than negotiation..*-"

"5' Bergstrom said that while he had well in mind sub-^ stance Para D State reftelj question of charge of had faith did not come up and so this never seemed germane to his discussion with DRV /^bassador* As Bergstroni also remarked that he did not emplmsize all the other points in reference message^ I suspect he touched only lightly on substance Para B State reft el on recipx^ocal restraints during truce which must have been over kO hours old^ by time of his talk. ..."

PAESONS

February I2j 19&J

STOCKPIOIM 9kl to SecState (TOP SECRET^ BODIS^ ASPEN)^ Pebruary 12^ 1967- Vi^^t: Stockholm 9^0.

[ "1. Oberg called Bergstrom from Warsaw February 12 to

report that when he went to say goodbye at DRV embassy he was urged to stay although apparently with no promise of an answer. Bergstrom on own authority authorised Oberg remain

^ V/arsaw until February 13-

P "2. Bergstrom also authorized Oberg to tell DRV Embassy

D that Americans had asked 'if there was any news.' Bergstrom

had cleared this gambit with Nils son but not repeat not with me

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''3. Bergstrom aware risks in international phone call from Warsaw but he believes caution plus pre-ari'anged signals have masked game -"

PAI^ONS

February: 13; 19^7

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STOCKIiOIM 9hh to SecState (TOP SECRET, NODISj ASPEI^)^ February 13^ 1967- Ref: Stockholm 9^1,

"1. About noon 13th Bergstrom told me Oberg in Vfersaw has had no reply yet from DR7.

"2* COS has authorized Oberg remain over Tuesday.

"3, FonMinister has also authorized h.tm to tell DRV Ambassador tliat should latter wish to see Bergstrom again^ Minister would be willing to make him available*"

PAHSODIS

Declassified per Executive Order 13^26, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By; NWD Date: 2011

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STOCKHOIM $hQ to SecState (TOP SECRET, KODIS, ASPEN), February 13, 19&[' Ref: Stockholm 9^^; State I3367I.

"1, In talks vitli Bergstrom over week end snd again today we went over several points connected with his Warsaw visit reported Stoekhoim 9^0»

A. He showed me his record of briefing he had received from jne before leaving for Warsaw early 9"^^ (Stockholm 93^) which was based on State reft el. Prom this I am satisfied there could have been no misunderstanding of US posiulon by Swedes on this first occasion when^ as Bergstrom pointed out^ Swedes could acknowledge they were £ .thorized transmit our views.

B* Bergstrom thought it best in Warsaw not to emphasize 9^ hour Tet tiTice period in connection Para C State reftel*

I C- Contrary to my earlier understanding he didj

however J remind DEV ambassador in accordance Para D that sequence of events was such that press references to already settled 96 hour period could provide no basis for any Hanoi

Lj charges of bad faith in regard to February 6 suggestions to

Swedes in Warsaw* I am quite sure he did this on his own

p Initiative rather than because DBV ii-aibassador took any such

[^ line.

D* As I suspected^ Bergstrom did not discuss Para B State Reftel (reciprocal military restraint during any preliminary US-DRV tall^s) because he felt it would merely touch off staixdard DRV recriminations •"

• •

PARSONS

February 15, 196T

STOCKHOm 961 to SecState (TOP SECRET, NODIS, ASPEN), * Februaiy 15^ 1967- Hef: Stockholm 9^3.

"1. Belfrage and Bergstrom remained behind vrhen Eonl'Iin Hilsson left after lunch at residence Feb 15 to discuss possible future contacts between Swedes and DRV Mbassy Warsaw.

"2. &vedish position is now that Oberg instructed remain Warsaw until morning Feb 17 when he is to tell DHV Eiibassy he must return Stockholfn for personal reasons but that Bergstrom or he available return Warsaw on short notice should WV ask.

Declassified per Executive Order 13^26, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By; NWD Date: 2011

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"3* After probing without success for any infoimation frcm us on Kosygln-Wilson activity re Viet-Nam^ Eergstrom then outlined Swedes' estimate present situation:

a) Swedish contacts with DKV apparently independent of other channels US may have available;

B) Because Bergstrom did not repeat not mention 'bomb stop' or 'boLiib pause' at any time in his taH^s with DJHj Swedes do not consider that either end Tet cease-fire .or resumption US booibing DRV has estopped their channel from further possible use;

C) Swedes therefore feel free make offer availability set forth para 2 above;

D) In addition^ Swedes would want feel free at some time in future to return to DHV in Warsaw saying that Swedish appreciation US position such that Swedes on own initiative (not on our behair) would ask If DRV lias anything to say^ and

E) Swedes would at that time ask if DRV still Interested preliiiiinaTy contact with us on general lines originally set forth Stockholm 926.

^%. I replied that 3 D and 3 E went beyond my current instructions in so far as availability US official is concerned,

"5. In giving detailed account atmospherics of his talk: with DRV Ambassador^ Bergstrom raised point of whether or not DRV were under necessity checking with FKL before replying to Swedes. Questioning of Bergstrom elicited that Swedes see problem that DRV may be interested in US-DHV contact without prejudice to ML political position or FNL political and military activity South Viet-Nam* Belfrage at this point offered that he would think such contact v;ould be 'of interest' to us.

"6- I replied that Secretary's statements seemed clear that we want to talk to Hanoi and added we considered FNL not independent Hanoi.

[ [ [

''7' Only other operational problem arose earlier in lunch

rwhen Nilsson pointed out that he must face foreign affairs council Feb 16 when he expects to be asked specifically what GOS has done to get peace in Viet-Nam and when question may well be put in texTTis of what Petri has done in Hanoi, Despite seme constitutional T risks in not being frank^ Nilsson proposes disclose nothing of

ti; Aspen operation- I reiterated our position that strict secrecy

has been and continues essential in order not damage any possible r prospective channel for peace."

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^ DLxJassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3

NND Ptnjeci Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Dale: 2011

TS " NOD13

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February l6j 196j _

State indicated no objection to the Swedes renewing their offer of availability to return to Warsaw on short notice should the DRV ask. -State J hoveverj had a number of problems on substance-

SOIATE 138786 to Amembassy STOCKEOm (TOP SECRETj NODlSj ASPEN)^ February I6, 1967- Kef: Stockholm 961.

L".,-.In connection with question raised paragraph 1- b. State reftel (reciprocal restraint during prelidinary talis as tangible evidence of good faith)^ you should explain to Eergstran tliat this obsei'vation was not restricted to effort to arrange talfes during Tet truce^ but has general applicability b3 means of creating favorable atniosphere for holding of talks* On the other hand agreement on reciprocal restraints is not intended by us / to be a precondition to talks.

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"(c) We vish to avoid linking any US/dRV contacts with

C explicit or implicit understandingj as suggested by Swedes^

that DKV would be speaking for itself^ not for NLF* As you correctly pointed out^^ it is our position that ifenoi is ultliaate center of power and dec is ion-ma king relative to settleraent; should Hanoi decide to have unconditional bilateral talks with USj ^ including discussions of niatters which noiriinally fall within

purview of Frontj this would be problem for Hanoi to handle-It should be noted that B^noi in its campaign to exchange peznanent banblng halt for indication of vague bilateral talks has Itself not mentioned participation or role of Front* We see no reason to introduce this subject gratuitously.

^^(d) We remain interested In keeping Swedish channel open and are grateful for efforts of Swedes thus far in probing Hanoi's intentions. Continued secrecy is of course niandatoiy if this channel is to have continued usefulness. We trust Swedes will ' not jeopardise their potential role as mediators by any considerations of teiiiporaiy political advantage."

-* KATZENBAGH

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February i B, 1967

STOCKEOM 970 to SecState (TOP SECRET^ NODIS^ ASPM)^ February l8, 1967. Ref: State I38786.

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"1* At JToon 17th I briefed Bergstran on contents reftel.

"2, Ori Para C^. Eergstrom seemed at first to interpret this as indicating we would not object to Swedes volimteering to DRV Ambassador that IJIF could come independently to talks with us.

N Dcclussifii'd per Executive Order ]3526> Section 3,3

NND Project Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Dale: 20! 1

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^ I said that from final two sentences of Para C^ it was guite

clear S^vedes should not do so on our behalT* He then asked

C if we would object in event Hanoi Amb should take initiative

L„ in seeking to bring FI'JL rep with hi^ii to any talks which it

might be possible to arrange. I replied that in my opinion we

^ . would not object should DRV in effect sponsor F^IL rep as

j paxiiicipant."'

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February 22 thru March 8j 196T

Estate (state 1^2081) approved the line the American Bnbassy vras taking in Gtockholm on clarifying I^LF participation and on discouraging another Sv^edish effort to ca^amunicate with the DBV in l^arsaw. State believed that the DRV was stalling. On February 23j in Stocltholca 99^^ Parsons reported r that on leaving Warsaw on the ITth Ober^ had already made a firm appoint-

La meat for himself for March 1- If the DRV representative at the March 1

meeting raised the subject of a Bergstrom visits Oberg was to be non-cormittal. On Mai'ch 8, in Stockholm 10^5^ Parsons repoz-ted that Cberg was returning i^ frcm VJarsaw and that ^^nothing ±mpoxi:ant transpired" in the contact*

[ March 11 j I967

STOCKIIOIM 1069 to SecState (TOP SECHET^ WDIS, ASFEN); March 11^ 196?. Ref: Stockholm 10^5.

"1* late Tenth Bergstrom reported:

A. Oberg's trip Warsaw March 1-3 had been undertaken despite seme doubts as to wisdom of going at all and with strict instructions to listen and not exert any Swedish pressure at all-

B. Cberg gained impression Hanoi Rep under similar wraps. Xn any event no real dialogue developed.

C. Honoi rep asked if Bergstrom was in Warsaw.

D- Both Hanoi rep and Oberg were reluctant to refer to contacts during Tet truce.

d

E- Hanoi rep asked for briefing on Swedish internal political situation on which he showed Jiimself knowledgeable. He also asked especially about Riksdag discussion on possible recognition of DRV* (Nilsson discouraged this), ^ '

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|_ G- Hanoi rep e^xtremely bitter in word and

manner at resuniption US Tbtaiibing plus mining coastal waters^

C naval and trans WiZ shelling- He said this prime example

us bad faith just whon Trinh through Burchett had payed way for entering on talks with US,

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H* It was agreed keep channel open for future and Hanoi rep professed great gratitude for Swedish efforts

"h* Bergstrcm cocnmented bit ruefully on report Italian Foreign Minister had publicly claimed he had had private channel to Hanoi too* He added that when he visits Rome next week he would be careful in any discussion with Italians if Vietnam came up. He wondered if Italians had had valid channel, 1 said I didn't know/^

* ■

PARSOMS

a

March l8, I96T

STATE 1^58220 to Amembassy STOCKHOLM (TOP SECRET, NOBIS, p' aspen), March 18, I9ST. Ref: Stockholm IO69).

"1. At next appropriate occasion you should express our appreciation for latest word on S^^'edes V/ar^aw talks^ noting continuing jjiiportance of keeping contact secret notwithstanding sterility of latest phase since one can never foretell when this channel might usefully be reactivated

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RUSK (drafted by Isham).

April 13, 1967

ST0CKH0.U4 118T to SecState (TOP SECRET, NODIS, ASPEN), April 13, 1967-

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"1. During call on SecGen Belfrage 13thj I asked if there had been any ASPEN developments. He said no^ but he has accepted invitation Polish Vice Minister Winiewicz to visit Warsaw May 8-13• Ministry now considering whether Belfrage should attempt contact Hanoi ambassador Just to see if latter has an^hing to say and how he says it.

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J'2, later FoiiI^Iin Hilsson voliinteGred that if US has any'proposal to make through Swedish channel^ GOS remains ready to pass it along to Hanoi representative.'*

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PARSONS

April .]A, 1967

STOCKHOm 1199 to SecSbate (TOP SECRETj KODIS, ASPEW), r . April ^h, 1967. Ref: Stockholm II87.

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"2. Bergstrom said that it now probably that Belfrage vould be asked to contact Hanoi representative In Warsaw next month andj if so^ It vould be useful to liave 'Bomethlng tangible in his baggage',.•.

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"3* Eergstrcm said GOS would probably send Petri to Eanoi again in May or June to leax^n what he could,

'%, Continuing in speculative veinj Bergstrom said that Nilsson thought there vas only one card left for Swedes to play. On own responsibility they might say privately to Hanoi they vere convinced frcm their contacts with Americans that -^if Hanoi vould do thus and so^ S^/edes confident such and such vould happen on American side'* GOSj however J could not come up with any vSpecifics on 'thus and so' and 'such and such'. They therefore uncertain if or hov they could proceed^ but they did feel Hanoi had ^<j^^ confidence their good faith. Minister himself might find it possible to seek meeting witli Trinh. Bergstrom then said it vould be useful to know if we saw any possible opening or had any ideas on such a give-and-take process for which Swedes vould in effect be guarantors of genuineness of proposals."

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April 18, 1967

«• mO:iY:^£>}M 1219 to Sec State (TOP SECRET, JX^ODIS, ASPEff),

April 18, 1967. Ref: Stockholm II99.

PARSONS

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'^1* During discussion at residence April l6 about Foreign Minister's annoimced intention reduce level Swedish

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diplomatic representation in Saigon^ Bergstrom cominented on anomalj^ of fact that this anno one ement made only 2^ hours after he had talked April 1^ with Ambassador Parsons about possible next steps in Swedish V/arsaw initiative on Foreign Minister's instructions. He left Impression that foreign Minister's statement or at least its timing had taken professionals in Ministry by surprise.

"2, In foliow-up talk April 17^ Bergstron speculated that one possible effect of Swedish action might be to increase Hanoi's receptivity to S!-?edish efforts promote peace negotiations^ Bergstroia coinraented that now 'Hanoi may listen to us more' (StockhoJjn 1207). In this connection^ Foreign Minister quoted in Svenska Dagbladet April l8 as saying in reply question: 'Ue have not offered to appear as mediator but rather to negotiate contacts which could lead to mediation J"

CMEHON.

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With some Swedish pressure for a new U-S- move on negotiations^ State responded to the effect that the U.S. stands on the President's letter to HOj the President's Nashville speech and Secretary Rusk's 9 February press conference.

State also showed dismay at the fact that the GOS could not renew; accreditation of its ambassador to the GVIfl.

STATE 180598 to Ajnerabassy STOCKHOm (TOP SECREPj NODIS^ ASPEN)^ April 22^ 1967, Eef: Stockholm II87, 3.I99.

"1< We are not sanguine about possibility of giving Belfrage something 'tangible in his baggage' for his visit to Warsaw next month- Hanoi does not nu'i^ seem interested in discussing tangiblesj as witness its treatment of offer contained in President's February 8 letter to Ho, and seems unwilling to consider any offer short of US acceptance of the Trinh-Biu-chett f ortnula. Swedes are of course familiar with our position on that formula (president's Nashville speech^ Rusk February 9 press conference).

• *

"3' In meantime, we cannot refrain from expressing our disappointment over apparent GOS decision not to renew accreditation to GVM of Swedish /^nbassador Thailand after

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f^ present inouiabent departs- Our views on this development

[_ are contained in separate message but in your discretion may

be drawn upon in tills channel. In particular, considering

tStockholin's 1219 just received^ you should convey our skepticism Over Bergstrcm's remark that nov *Hanoi may listen to us more*' Any increased Hanoi receptivity to Svedes as a result of this ' action in our judgment is likely to be marginal. In fact, if

I ' Sv,''edes should appear over-eager to sell GYK short, Hanoi's

L most likely reaction would be to toughen its position regarding

Swedish mediatory efforts, not to moderate it."

Excerpts from HUSK NSVfS COKPEBEiilCE on Vietnam^ Februazy 9, 1967, as recorded by The Nev York Times,

"There's been a good deal of discussion in recent days about the prospects for peace in Yietnam,

"President Johnson has pressed for peace in Southeast Asia in capitals all over the world, over and over again-

"We've made it clear that we want no bases in Southeast Asia J and do not wish to retain United States troops in Viet nam after pence is assured-

"V/e have affirmed our full support for free elections in South Vietnam, to give the South Vietnam^ese a government of P their own choice, and have stated that the question of reunl-

t3 fication should he detei^nined by the Vietnamese through their

own free decision.

"We have emphasized that we would much prefer to use our resources for the economic reconstruction of Southeast Asia rather than war and that peace could permit I^oi'th Viet nam to participate in a regional effort to which we would be prepared to contribute at leasl; one billion dollars.

"On the military side, we have on two occasions stopped the bombing of North Vietnam*

"lii May, 1965J ^ pause was limited to five and a half days, because it was rejected by the principal Communist capitals during the first three days.

"At the beginning of I966, there was a cessation for 37 days--a period m.uch longer than had been indicated might produce sane constructive results^

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"Our objective in Yietnam is and always has been a r I limited one* A South Vietnam able to deteimine its own L. j future without external interrerence. I need hardly repeat

that this and this alone is our objectiTe^ but for the r"' benefit of members of the press who may not be fully faeiiliar

with all our statements^ I am today making available points

we made last year under l^i- different headings annotated to

reflect developments in 1966*

"it elicited no response other than the continuation of the movement of men and arms into the souths and an assertion^that Vietnam m-ust be settled on Conmiimist terms,

"¥e must know the military consequences of such a military action on our part. They must not expect us to st-op our military action by bombing ifhile they continue their military action by invasion* Ho one has been able or willing to give us any information on this subject-

'VeWe been trying in erery vray kno^m to us to invite and to engage in such talks-

"Unf ortunately^ I cannot report to you today any tangible forward movement in this direction.

"But all channels remain open and are being utilized.

"These are^ and remain^ not in any sense preconditions for discussions but rather statements of the elements which we believe could produce peace in Vietnam-

"Let me say guietly and sincerely to all capitals on the other S3.de^ let good sense take charge for all of us in this situation- Recognize the necessity for elementary reciprocity."

QUESTIONS

"Q. Mr, Secretary^ you mentioned the ih points that were put put a year ago- Would you say that the atmosphere or the climate for peace negotiations has improved in any way since that time J particularly since the conflict in China has become so intense?

"a* It's hard to judge atmosphere^ because what we really must count upon is specific^ tangible indications of a readiness to move toward peace-

"So what the atmosphere really will amount to turns upon whether we can in fact engage the other side at points where

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we and they^ together^ can move this matter toward the conference table or toward a peaceful settlement,

"Q- Mr. Secretary^ you have talked al^out the need to, recognize the principle of elementary reciprocity* Since so much of the current discussion seems to hang on thiSj sir^ could you give us some idea of whether by this you mean a specific promise to negotiate if we stop the bombing or specific military action?

"A. WeUj I have pointed out in my statement that we cannot stop our military actions involving the bombing while they continue their military actions of Invasion-

"l think some elementary reciprocity is required and common fairness would require that if there is an interest towaz^d peace that both' sides help move toward it because you can^t stop this war simply by stopping a half of it<

"Q, Here's another question^ Mr* Secretaiy. Are there Bx^ contacts or discussions of any kind going on to extend that four-day cease-fire in the seven-day cease-fire they say they're going to honor?

"a* Wellj Prime Minister Ky has indicated some time ago that he would be prepared to discuss with the j}forth Vietnam authorities the question of that cease-fire.

"This is something which can be discussed^ which can be looked intOj but I could not give you any details today as to whether or not there are discussions pointing in that direction. There ai^e some difficult operational questions about that-

^*Q. Mr. Secretary^ a year ago^ you recall^ we offered to maintain our bombing pause if the other side would only come to talk. In fact we sent convoys around the world looking for some signal frcon Hanoi of a willingness to talk. Why is it that now we are unwilling to make such an offer during the current pause?

"A. Well let me point out that the other side is not talking about a pause* The other side is demanding an unconditional and permanent cessation of the bombing.

"Now that is a very significant military step for us to take; and unless It is accompanied by military action on their part^ dt would create a situation in v/hich they would be safe and secure add comfortable while sitting there

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sending their men and their arms doxm. the Ho Chi Minh Trail and across the ITth parallel to attack South Vietnam*

*

"Q, Is it the shift in position on Hanoi's side in the terms for the bonibing cessation that has caused the shift in our position?

"a. Wellj there's no shift in our position. In the sense that ve are prepared to take up political questions through political channels. We are prepared to deal with military matters as militazy matters. And ve are prepared to discuss with the other side what action each side might take of a military character that would move this matter toward peace-*'

Secretary Rusk said that the Coiiniiunist side Is waging a "systematic canrpaign" to bring about a permanent cessation of U.S. bonibing "without any corresponding military action on their side." He rejected the Januai'y 28 Trinh fonaulatlon that stopping the b'H::^blng could lead to talks. The U.S.j he decJ^redj is not prepared to end the bombing in exchange for some "formless" possibility of talks. Before the U.S. will take such a step,, he emphasizedj ^'we must knov the military consequences-'^

March 15, I9SI ^ President Johnson's Nashville Speech-

The central element of this speech was the President's statement that "reciprocity must be the fundamental principle of any reduction in hostilities."

"Our Position Today^" by Lyndon B. Johnson, President of the United States, Delivered before the Tennessee LegislatureJ Nashville, Tennessee, March I5, l^^T-

. * • •

'*Now this brings me to final point; the peaceful and Just world that we all seek.

^^■7e have just lived through another flurry of rumors of 'peace feelers.' Our years of dealing with this problem have taught us that peace will not come easily.

"The problem is a very simple one: It takes two to negotiate at a ppace table, and Hanoi has just simply refused to consider coming to a peace table.

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"I don't believe that our cmn position on peace negotiations can be stated any more clearly than I have stated it many times in the past—or that the distinguished Secretary of State^ Mr. Rusk^ or Ambassador Goldberg^ or any number of other officials have stated it in every forum that ve could find. But I do want to repeat to you this afternoon and through you to the people of Merica the essentials now lest there be any doubts:

"The United States represent at i-ves are ready at any tiiae for discussions of the Vietnam problem or any related matter^ with any government or governrEientSj if there is any reason to believe that these discussions will in any way seriously advance the cause of peace,

"We are prepared to go more than halfv/ay and to use any avenue possible to encourage such discuss ions j and we have done that at every opportunity.

'Ve believe that the Geneva accords of 195^ and 1962 could serve as the central elenients of a peaceful settlement* These accords provide in essence that both South and ITorth Vietnam should be free from external Interference^ while at the same time they would be free independently to determine their positions on the guestion of reunification*

"We also stand ready to advance tov/ard a reduction of hostilities without prior agreement, The road to ^eace ^ could go from deeds to discussionsj or it could start with

discussions and go to deeds.

"We are ready to take either route. We are ready to move on both of them,

"Eut reciprocity must be the fundamental principle of any reduction in hostilities. The United States cannot and will not reduce its activities unless and until there is stxie reduction on the other side. To follow any other rule would be to violate the trust tliat we undertake when we ask a man to risk his life for his country.

"V7e will negotiate a reduction of the bombing whenever the Government of Nox^h Vietnam is ready^ and there are almost innumerable avenues of commxmication by which the Government of North Vietnam can make their readiness known*

"To this date and this hour there has been no sign of that readiness* Yet we must and ve will k.eej> on trying.

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. "As I speak to you today^ Secretazy Riisk and our repre-sentativec tliroughout the vorld are on a constant alert. Hundreds and hundreds of quiet diplomatic conversations free from the glare of front-page headlines, of the klieg lights— these conversations are being held and they will be held on the possibilities of bringing peace to Vietnam.

"Governor Averell Harriman^ with 25 years of experience in trouble-shooting on the most difficult international prob i

lems that America has ever hadj is carrying out my instructions that every possible lead^ however slight it may first appear^ frcm any source, public or pri-</ate^ shall be followed up.

"So let me conclude by saying this: I so much wish that it were within my power to assure tliat all those in Hanoi could hear one simple message—America is caraaitted to the defense of South Vietnam until an honorable peace can be negotiated."

&

April 25-26, 1967

In Stockholm 1266, Cameron cabled that he had given Bergs tram the text of the Secretary's press conference and the President's Nashville P» speech* On April 26^ Cameron cabled (Stockholm 1273) that Bergstrom ^^ and Oberg "seem more inclined than earlier to accept possibility that

Swedish action on its representation in Saigon now followed by lack of

L effective action on 'Russell tribunal^ would cause Hanoi totighen its position and make their efforts establish useful contacts more difficult-" Ihe Sv/^edes, nevertheless^ placed increased importance on JBelfrage's May r visit to Warsaw and said that "it now even more essential for Sweden to t make evexy effort explore possibilities'on other side,'"

[ . [

_ STOGKEOIM 1358 (CG) to SecState (TOP SECiSa?, NODIS, ASPEN),

f May 9) 196T-

V

MQy 9> 1967

Hilsson-Quang Tliu (NVN Ajnbassador, Bucharest) Conversation-

Nothing new in this contact. Thu merely reemphasized the January Trinh position and Ho's letter to the President. The Swedes, however, showed a strong disposition^^ as they have done before, to playing very active role in bringing the two sides together.

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"3* Thu said he had read encoui'^agirtg reports of Rassell Tribunal meeting Stockholm and that he appreciated GOS attitude toward Viet-Nam issue• This attitude not only expressed in press but had been sho^/m by Petri talk in Hanoi with Trinh and Bergstroia's talks in Warsaw.

■

^%* liTilsson explained Swedish desii^e explore if in some \m^ Sweden could help produce contact between warring parties.

' "5- Thu stated ITOJ position is based on Trinh-Burchett

four points and Ho Chi Minh correspondence with President, j It would be^ he said^ simple to organize a contact if US

would without conditions finally and definitely stop its bombing of North Viet-rfeui. US would gain prestige in ^y^s of -' world. (At this pointy Bergstrom said his notes were not

\ clear^ but he believed Thu said *Ve don't want the Chinese"*)

In any event, Thu concluded that West must understand that after centuries of fightJng invaderSj such as Chinese and French^ ^ Vietnamese people will in the end win however big militaiT'

i effort US makes. ...

''6- Mlsson said he did not believe in militai^ solution X^ but in a political solution which must start somewhere. Thu

said it must start with boriibing stop- Nilsson said he under-I stood this J but asked was a contact or a dialogue in present

situation at all 'thinMble' if Horth Viet-Nam did not give any sign J even the smallest ^ which US could seize upon? If Sweden could be of any use^ Nilsson concluded^ it v;ould be at disposal r both parties.

"7- Hilsson then explained that theoretically speaking he could conceive of situation under certain circumstances where Sweden might even take responsibility for a position which it felt convinced about . For instance^ if &/eden were convinced of it J GOS might say that if the South would do one thlngj the North would do another.

"8, Thu concluded that he appreciated Nilsson good will and he would carefully and immediately report talk.

"9* Bergstram also told us that Belfrage trip Warsaw put off for another ten days or so."

CAMERON

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public position on this was to be that the "GOS wanted to be informed of Hanoi^s position on war in Vietnam/' The Worth Vietnamese Esibassy in Warsaw was evincing seme alann about putilicity. The reporter who bad the story was told that publication "would severely lajnlt possibility for Sweden to be helpful in contributing to peace

« m

As an interest aside^ Bergstrom ask^d Cameron^ without pressing Itj what he could tell him about the Lewandowski affair. The Higlitower story had recently broken.

I

On 12 May (Stockholm 1382)^ Cameron reported that &^edes had been successful in at least temporarily halting the publication of the story.

On 17 Mayj in Stockholm 1^05j Oberg rex)orted that the only matter of substance raised in his talk with his North Vietnam contact on May 9^11 was with respect to the 20 April U.S. bombing of Haiphong. The North Vietnamese contact said this represented a "new stage in war." According to Oberg^ Eelfrage planned to follow up his Bucharest talk when he arrived In Warsaw, On l8 May^ State responded (SOIATE 19753^) that the S^v^edes should continue these contacts, divorced from domestic political considerations, and that they should continue to explore and clarify Hanoi*s attitudes.

my 27. 1967 ' -

Eelfrage-North Vietnam Ambassador, Warsaw Conversation, May 18, 1967-

Nothing new emerged from this contact. The Nox^th Vietnamese Ambassador resisted any thought of reciprocal action from Hanoi. The Swedes warned of an intensification of the war,

STOCKIIOIM l463 to SecState (TOP SECRET, KODIS, ASPEN), May 27, 1967.

"1* Foreign Ministry Secretary General Eelfrage asked DCM to come see him late afternoon May 26- Bergstron also present most of talk.

"2, Eelfrage said he wanted give us run-down on his talk with NVN Ajiibassador in Warsaw May 2.8 which Eelfrage said had taken place in friendly, quiet atmosphere. Because nothing new had come out of this conversation he had not called us earlier-

"3, Eelfrage said he told NVN Ambassador that he came with no message. He explained that COS appreciated opportunity maintain contacts with Ifenoi through MN Ambassador.

^%* According Belfrage, KVIJ Ambassador had repeated well known Hanoi position. NVN Ambassador said U.S* bombing in noi*th must cease before there could be 'contacts, taUcs or negotiations NW Ambassador commented that U.S, talks peace but intensifies the war. He alleged U*S, not sincere about negotiations and

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cited President's letter to Ho as evidence- NVN Ambsssador asserted it not reasonatile for U.S, to ask reciprocal action from Koiioi; aggressor and victim could not be treated alike. He told Belfrage NVIJ would resist ail aggression.

"5- Belfrage said W^ Ambassador seemed particularly interested in possible effect of increasingly critical international opinion on U.S» policy in Viet-Nam. Belfrage acknowledged to him that perhaps international opinion was ■ becoming more critical of U.S* Viet-Nam policy. Howeverj he said it was Sv/edish assessment that effect of this development on U.S. policy determination should not be overemphasized-Belfrage said he made this x^oi^t several times. He told NVH AmbasGador Swedes thought that very large U*S, majority was behind President Johnson's policy* He also told i^VK AJnba£;sador that since there seemed to be a deadlock in UcS, and WN positions on negotiations^ it was Swedish impression that intensi-fication of the war could be expected."

"10. Belfrage said he had also discussed the Viet-I^am v/ar with Rapacki and Winiewici&, Poles emphasized necessity for

[_ U.S. to stop bombing in Korth before talJ^s could take place.

Poles also specu]_ated that Hanoi did not understand realities

|— U.S. political situation. Accordir^ Belfrage^ Poles said they

feared that escalation of war might bring in Chinese. Bergstrom injected at this point that Yugoslav Foreign MJ-tiister currently on visit to Sweden had doubted Chinese intervention unless China

Y itself was touched."

HEATH.

June 20, I96T

STOCKHOBl 1518 to SecState (TOP SECREJ!, A^ODIS, ASFElOj June 20, I96T. Ref: StockhoLn IU63

"1'. Oberg (l^ar East Desk Font^inistry) informed us June 20 that Petri departing Peking for Hanoi June 21 or 22. He will remain Hanoi until June 27j probably then returning directly to Peking prior to hoGEie leave in Sweden from early JiHy until September.

'^2. Petri had originally requested WT^ visa May 29^ explaining he wanted be able bring back latest information

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to Stockholm. He was told Jvine 15 that ne could not be received until 'late July. ' On June 19 he was told "by IHVW EiTibassy Peking that he vas 'welcoae at any tlmej in fact right now.*

"3. Fonllinistry instructed Petri June 20 that there was nothing new to say to NVT-I after Warsaw and Bucharest conversations^ but Petri was to listen to anything ITOJ wished to say or to have him i-eport. These instructions in accord Petri's own estimate that present time not ripe for any Initiativej according Oberg*"

HE^\TH

Jime 23, 1967

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STATE 21575^1- to Amembassy STOCKHOm (TOP SECRET^ NODIS^ AGPEN)j June 23J 1967- Ref: Stockholm I518,

"2* FYI* HVW Ambassador in Peking recently approached Norwegian Ambassador stressing Planoi's readiness for 'compromises' if negotiations began on basis bombing halt* WVW Ambassador said he would be making similar approach to Swedish and Danish colleagues. Without revealing source you might have opportunity to ascertain whether Petri was in fact approached along these lines

KATZEHBACH

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Jiay 6, 1967

PAEIS 2i|U to Sec State (SECRKP;, NOBIS, MARIA THREE)j July 6, 1967-

"3- Z?^^^i7 ^^^ ^^^ Soviet ABibassador to Hanoi^ Mr. Tcherbakovj with v/houi he has some personal ties. He said that he obtained from him soLzie interesting revelations regard3-ng the respective influence of the Soviet Union and China in North Vietnam, ^'/hile carefully maintaining a balance between the two coimrLunist giants^ North Vietnam relies above all on the Soviet Union. Since Mr- Kosygin's visit in 1965^ the Soviet Union has promised and fni^nished ±nportant, massive assistance on a steady basis. The increased prestige gained by the Soviet Union because of this assistance has, according to Mr. Icherbakov, even helped the USSR to gain the support of the North Korean Communist Party which hasj since then^ drawn progressively further avray from China. This

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prestige continues to exist araong the North Vietnamese leaders despite the ^Chinese Clan' within the Workers' party. Sooner or later the Soviet Union vants to eliminate an^ kind of North Vietnamese dependence on China^ even If this can only he achieved at the price of establishing a 'national commi^ism' (in North Vietnam)* I transmit these statements with the usual reservations.

"^. l-/liatever influence the Soviet Union and China might have J the DRV vv^ill under no condition accept the dictation of decisions hy these countries in its present conflict with the US, Mr, Petri drew this conclusion as result of his contacts with North Vietnamese learners-"

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July .1.2, 19 6t

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STOGKHOnvI 063 to SecStete (TOP SECEETT^ T^^ODIS^ i\SPEEOj July I2j 1967. Ref: . State 21575^^

^*1, Oberg (Far Ifestern Desk Fonlviinlstry and currently aide to FonMinister) gave Plocouns run-down on four Petri dispatches from Peking on evening JuJ,y 11 at meeting set hy Oberg- Despatches dated between June 28 and July 1 and received in Stockholm morning July 10

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"2, First despatch covered visit to Hanoi which ended June 27. Petri met DRV Fonlviinister Trinh and Deputy Huang Van Lo (phonetic). At separate interviews both told Petri that January statement to Burchett remained DRV position on negotiation3J i.e.j bcnibing of North and 'other acts of war' must be stopped before talks could begin. Trinh added tliat Ho letter to President remained 'road to peace,'

"3. Trinh expressed appreciation of Bucharest talks (Stockholm I358} and of Belfrage's 'good' talk in Warsaw (Stockholm Xh6^)* Trinh also said Eussell proceedings in Stockholm were 'appreciated'by DRV; Petri repoi^ted he made no comment on this last-

"1;, Petri told Trinh that he understood that January statement to Burchett was still valid^ and Petri added that when bombing stopped^ it was important that DRV take some 'practical step' which could be 'noticed in Vfashington-Trinh did not coisiment but said he 'understood this way of

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thinking*' Trlnh concluded that DEV interested in keeping open channel to &^edes. Petri who was midex instructions to "keep a formal line* reciprocated COS interest in conversations with DRV.

"5. Petri's evaluation of foregoing is ^there is no change.

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STATE 63T5 to Amembassy STOCKHOM (COWFIDSIWIAL, LBTOIS), _ J-uly 13j 1967. Ref: Stockholm 065.

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"1. Would appreciate your clarifying as soon as possible with Oherg following points on his conversation with North Vietnamese representatiyes at StockholirL Viet-Nam Conference;

a • Did Hgiiyen Minh Vy employ term hombing 'pause' rather than ' cessation % and if so was his use of this term consistent throughout conversation? If he blurred distinction between teniporaiy pause and permanent uncon^ dltional cessation as stipulated by DRV Foreign Minister ^ Trinh January 28^ does Oberg think this \i^b by accident

or dealRn?

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b. nil saying that unconditional bombing stop

is not necessary and all that was needed was 'proof of good faith% did Vy in Oberg's jud^ent mean to imply that proof of good faith could take forms other than unconditional bombing stop?

c. IrThat was date of Oberg's conversations^ and did he see two reps separately or together? Wl'iy did he discount significance of their comments?

d. Does Oherg know whether DRV or Front delegates took similar line with other foreign contacts in Stockholm inasmuch as our reports indicate uniformly hard line characterized their statements?

e. Does Oberg have any conflnpj3tion of reports he cited that conference had been threatened with a split between KLF and DRV reps on conditions for negotiations?"

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J^jly li^, 196T

STATE T393 to Amembassy STOCKHOM (TOP SECRET^ WDIS, ASPM)j July 1^^ 1967. Ref: Stockholin 063,

r"l, V^e note th3t Petri makes no particular mention in his recent dispatches of having had conversations with North Vietnamese Ambassaaor Loan, From other sources ^ ve understand loan was anxious to talk with all Scandinavian

L; representatives in Peking.•..Knowing Petri's reputation for I thorough and meticulous reporting and his good contacts with many Coinmunist representatives in Peking^ we are somewhat p j surprised that by now we have not had some reports frcm him i^ i on Loan -"

RUSK (drafted by Isham)

July Ig, I96T

Oberg-Vy Conversation.

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Oberg clarified Yy's remark to the effect that the word "pause" ^ . was used intentionally ttiroughout the conversation- The Korth Vietnamese

also told Oberg that negotiations could begin **very soon after a bombing pause" and that the dui^ation of the pause need not be announced by the ^,- U.S. in advance, Oberg also reported that rumors of differences between ^ -the NLF and the DRV were being bandied about town.

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STOCKIiOIM 071 to SecState (SECRST, EXDIS)^ July 15, I967. Ref: State 6375-

"1. Oberg gave us July 1^ following clarification his July U remarks:

a) Vy began by quoting Trinh-Burchett January 28 conversation using term 'permanent unconditional cessation'. Then Vy switched to term 'pause' and used latter term thi'ough-out conversation- Oberg thinks term 'pause' intentionali Oanh said negotiatione could begin 'very soon after bombing pause ^ and dui^ation of pause need not be announced in advance*

b) Oberg has no indication that say 'US act of good faith' other then bombing stop would be acceptable to DRV*

C) Itete of interview July 11, Vy and Oanh were together- Oberg feels that their comments were not e:Kpresslng a change in policy but in 'nuance' (his word) which might be more personal than official. He does not take their statements

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to be a signal*

d) Oberg 'knovs of no siinilar conTersation with other foreign contacts.

E) Oberg has no confirmation of split but heard around town of disagreement between IffiP and DVIS oyer preconditions for negotiations with FITL talcing harder line.*'

"3» Vy and Oanh expressed fear US will bomb Red River Delta dams during rainy season causing 1 to 1,5 laillion dead plus additional 5C^0 thousand refugees. Bombing T"Ould be blamed on mistake but vould really be by design because US has run out of military targets in m^U Even such losses would not >reaken liW resolve. Oberg said he had spoken to General 'Big' Minh a fev years ago who had cited same figures-Oberg passed Vy-Oanh prediction to Swedish Foreign Minister Nilsson who made no comment,"

HEATH

i July 18, I96T

STOCKHOIM 083 to SecState (TOP SECRET, ilODIS, ASPEN), July 18, 1967- Ref: State 7393-

''Oberg told E^ibassy officer July 18 that he was not aifare any recent conversations between DRV Ambassador Loan and Swedish Ambassador Petri. In ne:Kt few days Oberg wiJ.l have opportunity check this point with Petri who is in S^'/eden on leave. Oberg will then get in touch with us."

HEATH

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STOCKHOIM C9h to SecState (TOP SECRST, KODIS, ASPEN), Jxily 20, 1967. Ref: Stockholm O83.

"Oberg told us July 19 that DRV Ambassador Loan made a courtesy call on Petri on June Ij but according Petri nothing repeat nothing of interest was discussed. Petri told Oberg that Loan called upon Norisregian and Danish Ambassadors about the same time."

HEATH.

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August Ij 1967

The Svedes began to push two lines of thought: (l) that the DR7 had softened its position on talks and was not now demanding a public TJ*S, statement that the bombing cessation be unconditional; (2) that Hanoi was no longer using intractible language on the issue of reciprocityj but was stating that they '^understand" the U.S. position*

STOCKIiOM 116 to SecState (TOP SECRET, KODIS, ASPEN), August Ij 1967* Kef: Stockholm 09^.

"1p In a call August 1 on Oberg at Foreign Ministry about another matter, Oberg raised subject of Viet-Nam, He said that in recent talks with Petri (who is in Sweden on leave) an attempt had been made to assess significance Petri's last talks in Hanoi. Oberg said Swedes think they have detected that North Vietnamese may have shifted their position somevhat concerning preconditions for 'talks' which might lead to negobiations, Oberg was ajsipreclse in explaining this shift and he turned aside^ repeated efforts to clarify his language*

''2. Oberg said that Swedes do not believe that DRV demands public statement by U.S. that a bombing stop is unconditional for such a stop to lead to 'talks.* The U^S- could let Hanoi know this privately*

''3. In respect to U.S. demand for W^J reciprocity for boaibing stop, the DRV position has softened somewliat, he said, \ftienever Swedes explained U.S. demand for reciprocity from DRV in the past, Hanoi answered 'why should we reciprocate, we are not bombing Wasliington- ^ In recent talks, however. North Vietnamese told Petri they 'understand' U.S. position on reciprocity. Oberg said Svredes interpret this to mean that DRV might be prepared take reciprocal action in a way U.So would understand but not in a way which would cause DRV lose face publicly."

HEATH

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September 27^ 1967

LRusk-Nilsson Conversation. Mcmiorandum of Conversation (Sent [ USUi^ 10V6)j Subject: The Secretary and .Swedish Foreign Minister

' Nils son's Discussion Regarding Vietnam^ Wednesdayj September 27^

1967^ 3:30 F*M. usury. Participants: U.S. : The Secretary^

CMr, Glitman (notetaker)^ Vir. Clement (Intei^reter); Foreign ; Foreign Minister NilssoD;, Ambassador deBesche^ Mr, Bergstrom (Director General for Political Affairs^ MFA)^ Mr. Ob erg r (Ciief de Cabinet)

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Mr. Nilsson called at his request. He said he preferred to open the conversation by reading the attached paper concerning recent Svedish contacts with Hanoi^ because the sub- ' t ject vas important and required precision.

r I AOTACHMENT QU05E.

L ^ ' I* Since ve last met a year agOj the S^/edish

Government has been in contact with the North

CI Vietnamese Governmerit through new visits to

! Hanoi made by the Swedish Ambassador in Peking^

Mr. Lennart Petri^ as well as through frequent meetings in V/arsaw between vSwedish diplomats sent from Stockholm and representatives of the ^ North Vietnamese Embassy there. Earlier this

yearJ in connection with an official visit to I Romania J I myselS had a conversation with the

O North Vietnamese Ambassador in Bucharest about

the whole Vietnam issue. These contacts have been

Cof an infoimative character and have mainly aimed at keeping the Swedish Government continuously informed about lianoi's views on the conflict in Vietnam.

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II, In I^noij as well as in Warsaw^ representatives of the North Vietnamese Government have referred to the interview of January 28 this year^ granted hy the North Vietnamese Minister for Foreign Affairs^ Mr. Nguyen Duy Trinhj to the Australian journalist Wilfred Burchettj where Mr. Trinh said that talks could take place between North Vietnam and the United States provided the bombing of Noii^h Vietnamese territory and all other acts of war against North Vietnam ai^e ended unconditionally and definitely.

In Warsaw^ on September 7, the North Vietnamese Ambassador told a Swedish diplomat that "North Vietnam desired to start talks with the United States/' He added "that such contact could take place as soon as the bombing of the North had

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stopped and the North Vietnamese Government had been convinced that the cessation of the bombing was unconditional and definite/^ The Ambassador added that '^thls he could assure without consulting his Government-"

During AmbaGsador Petri's latest visit to Hanoi in June this year^ the North Vietnamese Foreign Minister Mr. Trinh confirmed that "North Vietnam was prepared to begin talks with the United States IT the bombing and other acts of var against North Vietnam were stopped^ but not previously-"

On his return to Peking a few weeks ago^ Ambassador Petri got in touch with the North Vietnamese Cbarse' d'Affaires there. Yesterday^ the North Vietnamese Charge d'Affaires in Peking said to Ambassador Petrij acting upon instruction^ that the declaration of Foreign Minister Trinh of January 28 was still valid: preparedness for talks but only after unconditional and definite cessation of i^erican acts of war against North Vietnam• He added that the United States claimed they desired peace and negotiations but were, insteadj increasing the escalation of the var.

Ill* AlthoughJ of courseJ there can be no certainty In matters of this kind^ it is my feeling that the North Vietnamese Government iSj in fact, seriously interested to engage in talks with the U-S. Government. Thereforej a cessation of the bombing might be a decisive step towards a negotiated solution of the conflict in Vietnam. I am fully aware that the U*S. Government has always requested some fomi of assui^ance that a cessation of the bcmbing be followed by scane reciprocal move from the other side" Mr- Trinh said in Hanoi to our A-mbassador that he understood the importance the U,S- Government attaches to the question of reciprocity- Even if no precise reciprocal step has been indicated during Ambassador Petri's talks in Hanoi^ his view is that some concrete act of reciprocity can be expected after the cessation of the bombing-

IV. After his last visit to Hanoi^ Ambassador Petri has a general iiiipression tliat Hanoi is expecting an intensification of the war fraai the American side and prepares for a lengthy var*

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V- It is my Intexitlon to instruct Ambassador Petri to make a new visit to Hanoi. I would^ of eoursej higlily appreciate any information or clarification as regards the situation in Vietnam that you would care to give me* ATSAClMEm Eim QUOTE

"Following Nilsson^s presentation the Secretary said he had been particularly irrterested in the sentence which stated that North VietHamese Foreign Minister Trinh had told Swedish Ambassador Petri that Hanoi understood the iiiiportance the U,S. attaches to reciprocal action on the part of North VietTIam in connection with a halt in the bombing. He asked whether Mr. Wilsson could provide any further details on this point.

"Mr. Nils son said he had already asked Mbassador Petri for more details but Petri had replied he did not believe he could obtain specific details. However^ Petri said he -was absolutely convinced Hanoi would take reciprocal steps if the US stopped the bombing.

—1

"The Secretary said the US also has contacts with i^noi and it is the U.S. impression that reciprocal action would not follow upon a cessation of the boabing. Indeed^ the p U.S. has never succeeded in obtaining a specific statement

1^ regarding what steps S^noi would take if the U.S. stopped

the baTibing. More over^ captured North VietNamese docu/aents

rtalk of a fighting/negotiating strategy. The U.S. could not accept an arrangement under which it stopped the bombing and negotiated while North VietNam negotiated and continued fighting.

"'Ihe question of reciprocity is vital. The U,S. had said it would take the first step but It could not accept a permanent and unconditional cessation of the bombing without knowing what steps Hanoi would take. Hanoi^ he addedj in response to Mr, Nilsson's queBtionj had indicated a halt in the bombing must be accompanied by a clear statement that it v/as pennanent.

"No oncj the Secretary saidj has been able to tell us what Hanoi would do if we stopped bombing. Indeed^ the U.S. has not found anyone who can even tell us if their view would change should we take this step. Would Sweden^ he asked support us if we stopped bombing and I^noi continued the war?

"Sweden is a small country Mr. Nllsson replied. How-ever^ Sweden would ask Hanoi to begin negotiations and to

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take i^eclprocal action of the U.S, stopped bcubing. Sweden wants to see the vbt ended because it is disturbed that the U.S. has,surrered a loss of good will in Scandanavla and because it is concerned over the deterioration in relations between the UtS. and the USSR caused b^ the war-

"Hd one wants peace more than President Johnson the Secretary replied^ but the U»S* cannot purchase a temporary improvement in relations by abandoning its coiiimitments. The issue involves more than Viet Nam for it also embraces Australia^ NewSealand^ Thailand and Korea • The fundainental point in the jnatter^ he continued is that the U.S. maintains the same standard of fidelity in the Pacific as it does in MTO. 1/e have no inaster race theory which permits us to be loyal in Europe and disloyal in Asia,

"The alternative to the maintenance of our coinmitmezitj the Secretary said^ is isolationism. The same senators who oppose U-S. involvement in VietNam also oppose U.S, presence in Europe and interest in the ^Middle East.

^*The Secretary said he appreciated Sweden's interest in attempting to bring an end to the Viet Nam war* The Swedish paper merited a considered written reply. His comment during the discussion regarding the points raised in the paper should notj thez^efore^ be taken as definitive and repeated to Hanoi* The Secretary said he would have to consult with the President but he hoped he could respond before Mr. Nilsson returned to Sweden on October 7-

"The Secretary also suggested the S^v^edish Government provide the U.S. with three or four days advance notification of Arabassador Petri's next trip to Hanoi^ since the U,S. might be able to provide the Ambassador with some useful information. 14t> Nilsson said Ambassador Petri's next visit to Hanoi would probably take place in October or November. The Svredish Government would give the e:xact date to the U.S. Eiabassy in Stocklioljn. Mr. Nilsson noted that Pl^noi had shown an interest in using the Swedish channel for coimnunlcating with the U.S. and said he hoped Sweden could continue to play a useful role in this regard.

"The conversation ended on the same note of cordiality which had marked its entire course/'

October 12, 19^7

On 6 October,; Secretary Rusk approved a response to the conversation in the form of a written message delivered to Nilsson before his departure on 7 October. The key elauent in this written message was an elaboration

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and explanation of the meaning of the San Antonio formula- The message made clear that "no advantage'* has "not been posed as a 'condition^ ' but rather as a self-evident description of the state of affairs that vould evidence good faith in both sides/^ "No advantage. --would require restraint from Kanoij but this might fall short of total cessation of arms dispatch and infiltration into South Vietnam*" It should be noted that this Interpretation of ^^no advantage" was not the same as the one given to the Rumanians on 1 November- This latter ti^an&misslon talked about "not ihc^reasingj ^* and added the no "attack /of/ forces from north of the DMZ»" The "no advantage** message to the Swedes was one in a series

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STATE 5^^361 to Ajn^aaibassy Stockholm (SECRET^ KODIS^ ASPEN)^ 12 October 1967.

P

I of many different explanations of the San Antonio speech-

[

"if. During this conversation the Secretary made a

C number of observations on the main points raised by the

Foreign Minister's p^per- We would have nothing to add to his comments at this time beyond reaffinning the importance of eliciting any additional details on Foreign L Minister Trinh's remark to Ambassador Petri in J-une that

Hanoi 'understood* the importance the United States attaches to reciprocal action on the part of North Yiet-namese in connection with a halt in the bombing. We J nofe Ambassador Petri's view that some concrete act of

reciprocity can be expected after the cessation of the P booibing^ even if Foreign Minister Trinh gave no precise

indication that Hanoi was considering taking such a stepj and we would of course always be keenly interested in any new evidence which Ambassador Petri might obtain from North r ' Vietnamese officials which would bear out his view*

"5* Since the Secretary's conversation with Foreign Minister Nllsson^ president JohJison in his speech of September 29 has set forth our willingness imraediately to stop aerial and r^val bombardment of North Viet-J^Iam when this will lead promptly to productive discussions* As the Foreign Minister will have seen from this speechj as well as frou Ambassador Goldberg's September 21 speech at^the United NationsJ we are interested in two points -- whether there would be productive discussions^ and whether we could reasonably assume that Hanoi w^ould not take advantage of a bombing stoppage. The latter point has not been posed as a 'condition^' but rather as a self-evident description of a state of affairs that would evidence good faith on both sides* Foreign Minister Nilsson may note that the desired 'no advantage' situation would require restraint from Hanolj but this might fall short of total cessation of anas dispatch and infiltration to South Vlet-Namt If Hanoi were prepared to consider such a ties sat ionj a balanced arrangement^ not only

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stopping the bombing but also cessation of reinforcement by United States and othersj would be possible. But there remains the possibility that Hanoi might be prepared to agree to some lesser restraint^ in return for stopping the bombing only^ that could comprise an effective 'no disadvantage' situation.

"6- If Ambassador Petri could elicit any precise inforniatlon on Hanoi's position concerning these points dui'lng his forthcoming visit to Hanoij this could be of the greatest importance. As the Secretary remarked at the conclusion of the conversation^ ve would hope that ve could be Infornied in advance of the timing of Anibassador Petri*s next visit to Hanoi so that \-re might consider whether we could submit any additional points to make during his discussions vith Uorth Vietnamese officials*"

HJSK (drafted by Isham)

October 26, I967

Sa?OCKHOm ^123 to SecState (SECEET^ NOBIS-, ASPEN) ^ October 26^ 1967- Hef: State 5^1^361.

"1, At lunch at n^ residence October 26 Nilsson and Bergstrom told me that latter had returned from V7arsaw October 23. In Warsaw Bergstrom had seen North Vietn^amese Ambassador and had conveyed to him summary of Swedish presentation to Secretary Husk (State 5^36l) and summary substantive points of Secretary's reply (state 5^lS^). In addition Bergstrom gave summary Swedish impressions US attitudes.

"2. Bergstrom said dominant impression he got froin. North Vietnamese in Warsaw was that they wanted to find face saving formula which will allow them to come to negotiating table.

j^-

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I showed definite interest in clarification of 'no disadvan^

tage situation. In one and a half hour conversation North Vietnamese Ambassador returned continually to this point.

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Bergstrom said he felt diffident about attempting an explication of this point and therefore did'not go very far."

*'6, Nilsson said Petri would probably be going to Hanoi this ;fall- Foreign Minister promised let us know In advance*"

ILEATH

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November 4j 1967

A Bergstrom-Heath conversation on three successive days did much to cloud the Swedish role. Bergstrom tried to argue that recent Swedish goverrmient denunciations of US policy in Vietnam did not impair the Swedish negotiating rolej but^ in factj strengthened it- He tried to explain recent GOS actions as S^-/eden's way of extricating sinking U,S» prestige in the vorld over Vietnam and avoiding further U.S. escalation along the Chinese border- He added that his government ^^are convinced MVK interested in negotiations or at least talks preliminary to negotiations.*' On instructions^ Bergstrom pressed very hard for a Nilsson interview with President Johnson, He warded this effort off strongly-

STOCKIiOM \% to SecState (SECRET, NODIS^ ASPEN), 3 Sections, November 3, I967 (rec'd 0332 h Nov 67). Ref: Stockholm 423.

Section 1

"3- Eergstrcm then repeated his impression of keen North Vietnamese interest in clarification ^uo disadvantage' situation as evidenced NVN Ambassador in Warsaw (Stockliolm 423)* Eergstrcm said PonI4in Nilsson would therefore like to discuss clarification with Secretary-

L;

"J+, Nilsson was thinking in terms of going back to UN — soon for week or ten days, ostensibly for UN reasons but

\^ really to go fran there to Ifeshington, if appointment could

be arranged with Secretary "

b

T ^*6. At November 1 meeting,.--Bergstrom then said that

L he, Fonl^in and PriMin had reviewed November 1 histoiy of

their contacts with NVN (i.e* Aspen history) and agreed latest p Warsaw conversation most hopeful- They are convinced NVN

I interested in negotiations or at least talks preliminary to

negotiations. Therefore Nilsson was requesting appointment with Secretary (tlurough de Besche) and he repeatedly said

LPriE^iin would like^ me to personally arrange for Nilsson an appointment with President for two reasons:

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a) This would convince North Vietnamese th^t they were receiving latest US position fran highest authority;

B) The president might make a more liberal clarification of US conditions than Secretary Rusk-

^'7, Upon inquiry as to timing of proposed visit, he insisted it must be prior to their Poland and Moscow visits. I replied I must be frank—while the decision obviously was not mine, I pex'sonally felt that for President Johnson so soon after PriMin, PonMin and party's bitter denunciations

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of USA and Pril^in's public association of Swedish Govern-meot vith ITorth Viet-iVam (NLF) seemed to me inconipatible and possibly could be used either for their political advantage and our resulting disadvantage in their ^balancing act' of on the one hand catering to our enemies by abusing us and jjmnediate];/ thereafter proving to our friends in Sweden and the world that they must be all right after all because their FonMin had been .received by our President at PHiite House..*/'

Section 2

"11. Next morning Hoveniber 2 Bergstrom called and said be had just reported our latest convei^sation and they decided not to rush things but would now have de Besche see if Secretary were available in 'next several weeks' for discussion with Nilsson. On other matter (i.e.j Presidential appointment) they thought 1 should wait and they would call me when they had appointment with Secretary. He indicated concern Secretary not think Hhey were trying to go round State to President.' j*

'*12. This morningj Nov 3> Bergstrom telephoned again and said 'they' had talked with de Besche again last nighty that Secretary Rusk had kindly agreed to see Ponllin Nilsson on date not yet detei-mined probably around Nov 13 or ikj that Bergstrom and Nilsson were leaving for UN Tuesdayj Nov 7j ret mining in time for the Polish and Moscow trips j that upon reflection they had concluded it best for Fonl^lln to request directly of Secretary Rusk that he arrange appointment with President Johnson^ and that therefore my further helpfulness in that regard would not be needed

11

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Section 3

"13- Coaiment: A) I have strong doubts about meaningful response from North Vietnamese through i^ubassador in Vfarsaw*

(b) I am also aware that whi3_e Swedes profess to want to keep (l) their criticism of us on Viet^Nam and (2) their negotiation efforts in separate watertight compartments^ this would not. be possible in case of high level Washington visits,-,.

(c) I am also somewhat concerned over vagueness of exact NVN 'interest^ in these 'clarifications/"

"l6. However J I assume Department does not want to allow any possibility for peace in Viet-Kara to go \xnexplored and therefore I recommend that if possible the Secretary agree to see Nilsson and offer him such clarifications as may be possible.- - *

'^17 • I think we shoiild not seek to involve the President in this exercise at this time.../'

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JN^ovember Tj 1967

STATE 6&l2k to Amembassy Stockholni (SECRET^ KODIS^ ASFEN)^ November J^ 19&f - Eef: StockhoLa ^^-23^ k^G.

"!• We think that you took exactly right line in speaking frankly to Bergstrom-,. ► .You should know that de Beschej under instructions^ told us and l-Jhite House that you had recommended to KiJ.sson that he call on the President. This distortion your views did not succeed. Appointment will not rpt not be made- However^ Secretaiy will receive Minister at 12:15^ rfovember 15-"

HJSK (drafted by Isham)

November 21. I96T

STOCKHOIM 511 to SecState (SECBET, NODISj ASPEN)^ November 21j 1967* ^

"1- Oberg reports he is going to Warsaw I^ovember 24^ as Bergstrcm apparently told Assistant Secretary Bundy November 18-

1)

2. Oberg^ Bei-gstraa and Nils son due in Moscow November 26*"

HEATH

Novemb e r 23., I967

FonMin Nils son met with Secretaiy Risk on I6 NovGanber. He recapitulated recent contacts in Warsaw^ adding that the North Vietnam Ambassador had remarked that a "new element" may liaye been introduced if the President's "no advantage" formula Indicated that the U»S. was dropping its demand for reciprocity.

In this cable, which is a response to the Nilsson memorandum, U*S, set out three basic elements for getting ta.Ucs started: (l) '^^ny contact at any time without any conditions-^; (2) "contacts accompanied only by a modest and unpublicized reduction in the level of areas of bombing"; (3) the San Antonio formula

In this message. State also inquired into three general areas of Hanoi's position: (l) the public description of a bombing cessation; (2) the nature of the talks that would follow; (3) Hanoi's understanding of "no advantage-" Illustrative examples of "no advantage" were given, and special emphasis was addressed to the K^IZ situation. It seemed clear

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that State was asking two things: (l) Did Hanoi understand what the U.3 meant by "no advantage?" and (2) V/hat would Hanoi do to demonstrate that

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SaiATE 73^3 to Anembassy Stockholm (SECFETj NOBISj ASPEN), November 23j. 1967-

"1» During Hoyember l6 meeting with Secretary, Mlsson presented memoranduTii recapitulating what Swedes had already told you about October £2 discussions in Warsaw between Bergstron and North Vietnamese jSmbassador-Nilsson added no new details except for North Vietnamese Ambassador's rer^ark that 'new element' might have been introduced if formulation on ^no advantage* indicated elimination of reciprocity. In addition^ Nilsson passed on subsequent coDiment by North Vietnamese Embassy Warsaw official on October 28 who said intensification of bombing in Hanoi area had affected general atmosphere in negative way^ while at same time stating that wliat was said dui^ing October 22 conversation 'continued to be relevant-'"

^*3' Please convey following message to Nilsson from Secretary: BEGIN TEXT....The observations which follow win summarise what Mr. Bundy, with my approval, told Ambassador Eergstron on November l8-

"hn There are tliree bo sic elements in our position with respect to getting talks started. Consistent with the prissident's statement of April 7, 19^5^ ^e are prepared to have any contact at any time without any conditions* Second, we are prepared to consider at any time possible contacts accompanied only by a modest and impublicized reduction in the level or areas of bombing- We would be impressed by some corresponding action on the other side^ but this Is not to be understood as imposing a condition. Third, there is the President's San Antonio proposal to which I referred in my message of October 6. In additionj there are three points which call for clarification.

"5- First, how is a cessation of bombing to be described publicly, and what is to be the private understanding of this tenn? On the basis of Hanoi's' position as formulated in the January 28, 1967 interview of Foreign Minister Trinh with Wilfred Burchett, we are bound to interpret Hanoi's teims as requiring that the cessation be permanent and be characterized as permanent. It would be useful to know whether this is what Hanoi means or whether there is some other condition attached.

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i "6, The second point- turns on the nature of any talks

that might take place following such a cessation^ however defined. f~ What degree of assurance would there he that talks would actu-

L I ally take place? IIov soon would they take place following a

bombing cessation? How serious or productive would they be? Our own viewpoint on these questions is clear: We would expect our representatives to sit down somewhere for hard discussions of the main Issues covering dll points the other side wished to discuss.

J "7- The third point relates to the understanding of a

^no advantage' situation^ as described in the President's San Antonio speech and in my October 6 message to you in connection^ j with a bombing cessation and the start of talis. One way to, * clarify this is in terms of questions that I emphasize are

■ illustrative of examples only* Ifnat would happen with respect ^' to the flow of supplies and men into South Viet-Nem and to

positions directly threatening South Viet-Wam? For example^ if following a cessation or limitation of borabing> there was a marked increase in the flow of trucks southward: if a new I North Vietnamese regiment were to appear; or if we saw a

massive increase in the flow of supplies Just to the north of the LlMZj we would be negatively impressed* Similarly^ to take another example^ we would want to know what would happen with respect tp the three North Vietnamese Divisions now in the area ^ , of the Demilitarized Zone which have been employed as part of

! offensive operations against our forces south of the fflZ.

U Would artillery located north of the demarcation line \>e employed

against our forces? And^ if so^ would we be expected not to bomb these artillery positions?

"8, These questions are^ of course^ not easy ones to answer. Neverfchelessj we believe they are central to an accurate understanding of what Is Involved on both sides- We would be grateful for any clarification that you might be able to obtain through your contacts with North Vietnamese repre-entatives on these matters,"

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(Drafted by Isham) December o igSj

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Oberg indicated to Cameron that the "Swedes would probably back us if Hanoi failed respond bombing halt^ although Oberg talked in temais 6-8 weeks grace period for Hanoi response." Oberg told us thiSj and that he would be going to Warsaw to meet the DRV Afnbasssdor in a week's time.

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STOCKHOLM 585 to SecState (SECa^^ NODISj ASPEN)j December 9j 1967*

* ^'1. Oberg (FonMin's aide) told EnbOff Dec, 8 he leaving for Paris Dec. 10 Council Europe Mijaisterial Meeting and fxom there going Warsaw Dec- 15 or l6 to meet DRV Ambassador who is now in Hanoi-

"2. Cberg plans give TM<! Ambassador verbatim exanrples no-advantage situations outlined Secretary's reply to Mlsson paper (state 73693)-

"3* Oberg suromed up Swedish view DRV attitudes:

a) DRV expects levelling Hjsnoi^ Ilaiphong; bombing ■ dikes and invasion W^i plans made Xov movement governrtient frou Hanoi,

B) DRV really has no expectations US elections will change anything;

C) Swedes still see split between DHV and W^a^ with speqlTic point being absenct^ reunification plank in NFL^s nGvf programs first phase.

^%. In Moscow (reported Stockholm 58O and being amplified in follow-up telegram) Soviets were persistent in stressing Hanoi's independence 4

"5* Oberg repeated point made para 2 d) Stockholm 58O that S^fedes would publicly back us if Hanoi failed respond bombing haltj although Oberg talked in ternis of 6-8 weeks grace period for Hanoi response;

"6< Petri not rpt not planning go Hanoi in immediate future unless something worthwhile develops..,." .

CAMERON

December 11^ 19^7

STOCKIiOM 590 to SecState (SECRET^ Iv^ODIS, ASPEN)^ Ref: Stockholm 5^1*

"To complete record^ Oberg (PonMin's aide) told RnbOff Dec 8 that his meeting with DRV Ambassador in Warsaw Nov 2lf vas 'routine contact.' DRV Ambassador did re-state bis interest In 'no advantage situation.' Oberg did not have Secretary's reply to Nilsson's paper (State 73693) giving examples of 'no advantage situation' at that time-"

CAMERON

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January 3^ 1968

Bundy-de Besche Conversation-

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I De Besche indicated to Bundy that the North Vietnamese Qharge said he would promptly pass the illustrative examples of "no advantage" to Hanoi- He also asked for Buiidy^s interpretation of the 29 December 19^7 Trinh statement. Bundy indicated there was in fact a change from "could" f^ "willj" that there might be a change in talking about the bombing _ iuse as unconditional rather than peimanentj but that this was not clearj and that Trinh was still silent on "no advantage^ " and Trinh*s emphasis on the k points and the NLF progi^am still indicated hard line*

STATE 931^0 to ^ijnembassy Stockholm (SECRET^ KODIS^ ASPEN), January 3> 1967-

"2. --..Nilsson has instructed Oherg to travel to Warsaw (probably January i^) to obtaiji exact text of statement from North Vietnamese. Foreign Office queried whether US desired to transmit any questions at this time or otherwise seek clarification of Trinh statement.

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"3* In reply Bundy said that while ve vere obviously Interested in obtaining any clarification of what might underly Trinh statejiientj choice of available channels and timing of their use required greatest possible care and precision in order to avoid creating confusion- Moreoverj ' it would in any event be difficult to frame careful and

Q precise questions in short time remaining before Oberg's

departure for Warsav# At this jmicturej Bundy saidj we

p would not therefore there be inclined to ask GOS to put

[ any specific questions to North Vietnamese which could be

construed as coming frau us. Bundy said he would check this with Secretary and be in touch with de Eesche; this position was later confirmed and de Besche infoiioed, Bundy noted that

^ the Swedish Government could of course seek any clarification

on its own behalf, De Besche accepted this and promised to keep us Informed-

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"if. In response to de Besche's request for interpretation of latest Trinh statement^ Bundy commented:

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(a) use of verb Vill' in context of talks was plainly a change from previous Trinh foi^uulation of 'could*;

(b) use of term * unconditionally' rather than 'permanently' or ^definitively' could be construed as a more gentle fonuulation^ although it was not yet possible to draw any clear conclusions on this pointy particularly because of the reference In the latest statement to the January 28; 19^7 Trinh Interview which with accompanying Hanoi commentary posed

condition of permanent cessation;

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(c) Trinh remained silent on issue of mutual restraint or 'no advantage'j although Eundy noted one would not necessarily expect this to be covered by public statement; and

p (d) Hanoi's basic hard line reflected in Trinh's

[ eanphasis on Hanoi*s Four Points and NLF political program

"^ as the basis for Viet-Nam solution.

"5» 1^ shortj Bundy cooKaented that questions qontained in Secretary's memorandum to Mlsson rar^ained highly relevant-

r* * "6, Foregoing drafted before receipt of Stockhoija 662*

L Oberg's detailed report of conversation with North Vietnamese

Charge is most useful and it appears clear that Foreign Office

Lis not yet providing de Besche with as much detail as Ob erg is conveying directly to us in Stockholm-

''7. We would in any event prefer that Oberg or his f7 superiors be authoritative source of such reporting."

KUGK (drafted by Isham)

Januaiy h^ igffl

Report on Oberg-Warsaw Talk of December 21-22^ 1967

Before describing his conversation in Warsa\7j Oberg said that (' verbatim examples of **no advantage^' situations as outlined in State T3693

U. have bcea given to the DRV Ambassador without catmaent* Oberg also noted

that during Nilsson's recent visit to Moscow^ the Soviets were no longer r" ux^ging the Swedes to play an intermediary role. The Swedes inferred from

^ this that the Soviets were pessimistic about chances for peace-

In response to i3.1ustrative examples of "no advantage" the DRV Charge made three points. . (l) How would the bombing pause be described? (2) "¥e cannot leave our brothers In the South mii:>rotected;'* (3) V.Qiat would productivity and seriousness of negotiations mean? His second point indicated that either he had not understood the "no advantage" formiLla or that he was referring to the MLF rather than W^ troops,

STOGKHOffl 662 to SecState (SECRET, NODIS^ ASPEN),

JanuaiT ^^ I968* Ref: Stockholm Qx^.

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"3* Oberg saw Charge Vu Each Mai (Ob erg's spelling) Dec 21 and handed over paper described Fara 2A* Paper had been translated into French; illustrative e:xamples Para 7 State ^'iSS^ were also given in. English.

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"4. WN Charge raised three points which Ob erg on instructions refused to discuss saying that S\/edes had this paper from US aide and ttet Swedes not competent go beyond what was in paper.

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"5* ynree points I^/IT Charge raised were:

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describe bombing pause?

B- On question of flow of material in no-advantage situation Charge said 'we cannot leave our brothers in the South unprotected,' It was not clear to Oberg whether he was referring to NIiP in South Vietnam or to supplies to NVN troops north of n^. (Ob erg coHimented that in his contacts WP^ representatives never referred presence NW troops in South Vietnam.)

C- On question seriousness of negotiations Charge said this was unclear to him. In any negotiation both sides started from positions widely apart and with quite different aims. In such cases there vmuld be different interpretation of 'serious or productive- ' "&

"7. Oberg's general Impression ^side from fact tliiat paper had been well received was ttet Charge seemed much more relaxed than Mbassador and much less dogmatic. He also seemed much better inforraed on conditions in US and seems to have no illusions that election year 'would make btx^ difference or that American

n domestic differences over Vietnam would seriously influence

policy.

C"8. In Jan 2 conversation Oberg did not mention any fui^ther Swedish move at this time presumably because Foreign Ministry thinks KVN may ccmment on paper» However^ Oberg J IT caJJ_ed Jan 3 to say he v/as returning to Warsaw Jan h on Foreign

. f Minister's instructions to attempt to get clarification and

text Trinh statement on lianoi radio, De Besche being instructed

Einfonn Department of this and to say that Swedes do not consider it connected to Aspen operation."

CAMERON.

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February l6, 1968

CThe Sv;'edes informed Heath that they were expecting a yiisit from the Worth Vietnamese Ambassador in Moscow, The IVorth Vietnamese Ambassador ims scheduled to arrive in Stockholm on February 20, p (STOCKIIOM 877)

^ ibruary 17. 3-968

1 The Sv/edes were given the same private statement of the U.S. position

*^ as had been given to the Nor^^egians to U£e in their talks with the PTorth

^'letnameee Ambassador to Moscow*

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of April 7J 1965 J remains willing to enter into talks without preconditions at any time-

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"[Ehe U*S< position on the cessation of the bombardment of North Viet-Nam is set forth in President Jolinson's September 29j 1967 speech in San Antonio, As the President said:

'The U.S, is willing to stop all aerial and naval .

bombardment of North Viet-Nam when this will lead promptly ^ to productive discussions, We^ of course, assume that

while discussions proceedj North Viet-Nam would not take f advantage of the bombing cessation or limitation-'

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"The U,S, is not assuming that North Viet-Nam will cease its support to its forces in the South, On the contrary^ as Secretary of Defense designate Clark Clifford testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Comjnittee^ we assume that until a cease fire is agreed on^ Hanoi 'will continue to transport the normal amount of goods ^ men and munitions -'

"in setting forth Its assumption^ the U-S* is not setting a condition but attempting to make clear to North Viet-Nam that any cessation of U,S» bombing followed by actions by Hanoi taking advantage of the cessation (such as an increase by Hanoi of its infiltration of men and supplies or attacks in the area of the DMZ) would constitute such bad faith on. Hanoi's part as to make continued U.S< forebearance impossible. If Hanoi^ by taking advantage, forces the U.S. to resume bombing the possibilities of a negotiated solution would drastically recede. Under such circumstances calls for intensified U.S. military action would increase and the possibility of another halt in the bombing would be low. The U.S. is trying to ascertain whether Hanoi appreciates this vital fact and fiLlJLy understands the impoi"tance the U,S, attaches to the no-advantage assumption.

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"At San Antonio the President^ in addition to setting forth his assu2uption> stated his readiness to stop the bombing when such action would lead 'promptly to productive discussions.^ * Productive discussions' are serious exchanges in \Aich either side will be able to put fon-rard for roll consideration in good faith its position on any matter* 'Prompt' of course refers to a willingness by Hanoi to begin discussions with the U,S, iiiimediately after cessation of bombing.

"it is worth noting that Hanoi is unwi3_ling to give a clear response to g^uestions as to the length of time between a U.S. bombing cessation and the beginning of talks* If Hanoi were serious in desiring talks then surely its response v;ould have been one of uneq^uivocal readiness to begin immediately-

"The U.S* evaluation of Hanoi's current position takes into accoimt Hanoi's actions as well as its words- The unprecedented offensive against most of South Viet-I^am*s urban centers^ v/hich Hanoi treacherously launched in the midst of the traditional Tet holidays^ causing widespread civllia,n casualties and suffering^ was made notwithstanding the fact that we were still exploring with Hanoi its position through diplomatic channels^ and that we had exercised restraint in bombing ta^rgets in the iamnediate vicinity of Hanoi and Haiphong- In this context^ we cannot but vfeigh Hanoi's words with great skepticism and caution, Tliese actions carry a harsh political message,

"The U,S- favors every effort to obtain clarification of Hanoi's position- V/e shall continue to evaluate all information and to pursue every possible avenue which promises to bring us closer to the resolution of this conflict through serious negotiations-"

(State 117383) February SO ^ I968

Petri suggested that he visit Hanoi on February 22 and his Foreign Ministry had given approval- The Swedes said there v:as nothing special about the date or the visits merely that "it was tiiae for him to go to Hanoi again." Cameron suggested that the S\^edes defer the Petri/Oberg trip to Hanoi until after the North Vietnamese Stockholm visit* (STOCKHOLM O83)*

February 23 ^ I968

Foreign Office Political Director Wachtmeister told Heath that he " believed the Korth Vietnamese Ambassador's "main purpose for Stockholm visit was to impress S^-redes with North Vietnam's 'self-confidence' in its position-" (SIOCICHOIM 896) ^

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Foreign Minister Nils son sent Heath a '^short account" of his talks with the ^[orth Vietnamese Ambassador. The Ambassador> Mr* Chan j elaborated on the Trinh statement of December 29.

"Mr. Clian repeated the statement of his Foreign Minister of January I967 and of the 29th of December I967. He thus

r repeated that negotiations would begin as soon as the United

States had proved that it has stopped all bonibardments and

all other acts of war against the Democratic Republic of

Vietnam. He specified 'all other acts of V7ar* to mean that I no airplanes vjere permitted to fly over DRV territory and no

u. naval vessels were to have their guns or other weapons directed

against DHV territory after that had been done^ the Democx-atic f ■ Republic of Vietnam would negotiate vfith the United States

[^ about relevant q.uestions. The Ambassador in this connection

also referred to Foreign Minister Trinh's statement of the 8th

Cof Februaz^y 1968^ to the effect that the Vietnam conflict had to be solved on the basis of the i95U Geneva Agreements arid that negotiations could begin as soon as the United States had shown that it would stop the bombardments of Worth Vietnam and all other actions of war against the DRV. He mentioned a delay of some three weeks 'or less'."

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DEPAP/r\rEXT OF ?TATE

. ' Office nf Ambassvduk At L.utnii

August 2, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOP. XtiE NEGOTIATIONS CO^:^aTTEE

EYE S ONLY PARTICIPANTS

FROM: S/AH - Chester L. Cooper

SUBJECT: Visit to Hanoi by Two Unofficial p French Representatives

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Early in June a sraall group of Pugwash participants met in Paris to discuss the situation in the Middle East and Vietnam. Representatives of the group came from die Soviet I Union J the UK^ France and the US^ The American participants were Kissinger^ Doty (Harvard), ^and Feld (MIT). As an outgrowth of this discussion, one of the Franch participants, Marcovich of the Pasteur Institute^ and Kissinger (with the knowledge and endorsement of the Soviet participant) agreed that it would be useful for Marcovich to proceed to Hanoi for-the purpose cf sounding out the North Vietnamese on their views toward negotiationsj and to' present unofficially the Phase A - Phase B formula which had been discussed in general terms at the Pugwash session, Marcovich was to be joined by a M. Aubrac, an official of FAQ who knew Ho Chi Minh personally (Ho had stayed in Aubrac's home during the 1946 negotiations with the French). De Gaulle was made aware of the trip and interposed no objection on the condition that the tv7o Frenchmen were acting "unofficially''.

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Marcovich and Aubrac arrived in Hanoi -by way of Phnom Penh on July 21, They left Hanoi on July 26 and returned to Paris via Phnom Penh. Kissinger saw them '/within hours of ' their return to Paris".

Duri.ng their stay in Hanoi Marcovich and Aubrac had two conversations with Pham Van Dong and one with Ho Chi Minh. They were also shown a hospital^ some damaged dikes and other evidence of American"aggression". They were given a bamboo surgical kit (which they said was developed to meet the

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shortage of steel surgical instruments)^ a propaganda film on American bombing and some pellets from "anit-personnel bombs". (Arrangements are being made to get these to us.)

Attached are Kissinger's notes describing the sessions between the two Frenchraea and the Vietnamese officials. The material preceding the notes of the conversations ( pages 1 - 11 of Kissinger's notes) is a lengthy background discussion and a chronology of the trip.

Several interesting points emerge from the conversation with Pham Van Dong.

*

1. Bong's reiteration of the offer to negotiate soon after a bombing cessation and, in particular^ his statement that the cessation need only be a ^'de facto",one. (pp 12 and IS)

2. Dong's statement-to the effect that they v;ould be prepared to negotiate secretly with the U.S. on matters directly affecting North Vietnam and that the NLF need not be present.

(p 17). In subsequent sessions in V7hich the political problems of South Vietnam were to be discussed the NLF would have to be present, (p.13).

3. Pong's recognition that^ "some U.S. forces would have to stay until the end of the process of political settlement", (p. 16).

4. Dong's statement that the NLF envisaged a "broad coalition government" which would include members of the present GVN. (p. 17)

5.' Dong's statement that Hanoi would not "push things toward unification" until after there was a political settlement, (p. 17)

6. Dongas sense of optimism about the eventual outcome^ (p.15)

The conversation with Kq is more interesting in terms of color and n^od than in terms of substance.

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An analysis of these conversations and some possible follow-up actions VJill be the principal matter for discussion on Thursday^. August 3, la Governor Harriman's office. It Is hoped that participants will have an opportunity to read

the attached before the meeting.

ATTACH>iENT: As stated

Chester L, Cooper

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Mr - Rostow Gov, Harriman Mr. Sisco Mr, Warnke Mr. Habib Mr, Read

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IIX. CONVERSATION'S V7ITH PHAI^I VAN DONG A>n) HO

A- Meeting v.'ith Pham Van Dong^ July 24^ 9 a.m.

B. Meeting v/ith President Ro, Afternoon^ July 24,

C. S^ecorrd Meeting v;ith Pham Van Donq.

Y >TE: These conversations are dravm from reports by Aubrac and Marcovich v/ithin hours of their return to Paris, Quotations are direct quotes as they appeared in Aubrac's notes mads during the ir.eeting. The conver-e ^tions are reported in the order in v;hich they occurred

^» Meeting v/ith__Phan Van Don g^ July 24 ^ 9 a.m . Present .

Aubrac^ Marcovich^ Phaui Van Dong, Tach (Minister of Health}, note-taker.

\ • PhauL Van Dong opened the rnsating 1:>y saying that he v/as happy to see A.ubrac and Marcovich. The visas had been given on the basis of Aubrac's reputation^ therefore^ it v;as up to Aubrac to present his ideas. ' Aubrac then describad the background of the trip to Hanoi as sketched in Part I. Ke said that he v;ould report to .T.a and I v/ould report to the U.S. governuient. Marcovich continued by outlining -as a private idea the tv/0"part proposal: 1) an end to U.S. borribing^ 2] coupled v/ith an assurance by North Vietnarii that "le tau:< das approvisionTLent ne sarait pas accru a la faveur de. cette arrete." Aubrac interruoted to say that the control problern v/ould have to be solved and Hanoi should make proposals. Pham Van Dong replied that he had been v/ondering v/hen that issue v/ould be raised. Marcovich said that part of the control might be through overflights for reconnaissance purposes, Pham Van Dong said: "This is our country. ■ V7e cannot discuss the problem in this manner." Pham Van Dong added: "vre want an unconditional end of bombing and if that happens, there will be no further obstacle to negotiations." A.ubrac asked v;hat he meant by unconditional. Pham Van Dong replied that North Vietnam could not negotiate v;hile being bombed. Aubrac asked v;hether Pham Van Dong wanted an official declaration that the bombing had stopped, or would he ba satisfied with a de facto end of bombing. Pham Van Dong replied that a de facto cessation v/ould be acceptable. Aubrac asked v;hether there should be some delay between the end of borpbing and the beginning of negotiations.

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Phara Van Dong replied: *'Tnis is not a probleni,'* AujDrac asked v;hat channels should be used, Pha-n Van Dong replied; ''This is not a problem but it should be soineone authorized by both parties," He then v^ant on to say init,lal negotiations could be on those natters affecting the U.S. and North Vietnan^. as principals, vrnen issues affecting South Vietna:a v;are raised^ the >7LF v/ould have to be present. /Aubrac and Marcovich had the impression that the scenario anvisaged by Pharri Van Dong involved B.n end of U.S. bontbing to be follovrad v;ithin a matter of days by the opening of negotiations under acceptable auspices^

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Pham Van Dong then said that he thought that the next escalatory step v;ould be a bor:>bing of the di'kes,. All preparations had heen made to mitigate the consequences, but the human suffering v;ould be severe. He as'-ced Marcovich and Aubrac to help influence svorld opinion against such a step. Aubrac replied that their usefulness depended on hot joining any propaganda effort. Hov^'ever^ they might talk to the pacal mission in Paris about the

problem. - ^ * ^ -^ ^

**

Pham Van Dona then closed the meetinc: v/ith a little speech; "You sea, dear frlends^ that the problem is very iromplicated. You may thinX your 'travels are useless. In fact you have given us much to thinT< about. I will see you again and v;e will tai:< again."

mention Communist China,

Tach remained behind. He joined Aubrac and Marcovich at lunch and told them that the two-step bombltig proposal should be discussed officially rather than informally-

B. Meeting v;ith President Ho, Afternoon- July 24 .

Present; Ho- Aubrac, Pham Van Dong, Tach and not taker.

e^_

Aubrac said that what struck hiiri iii'_medlately was . how old Ho had become. He v/as dressed in a Chinese go-.vn and walked with the aid of a cane. Hovrever, his intelligence was unimpaired; his eyes still had their

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old sparkle. He seamed to enjoy pla.ying the role of a grandfather-'figurej not concerned v/ith details. Aubrac had brought as a gift a little colored stone egg. Ho gave three presents in return; silk for Aubrac's daughter^ sorae books and a ring made of metal from the 2000th U.S. plane claLTied to have been shot dov,Ti over Vietnam--He remembered the first names of all of Aubrac's three children. After speaking about Avforac's family for about 15 minutes, Aubrac said: ">Ir. President do you knov; V7hy I have come?" Ho ansv;ered "Yes." Aubrac asked v/hether he had any comments* Ho replied by saying, that he did not like the phrase "peace in Vietnam, " It gave an impression of moral equivalence bet\v-een the United States and North Vietnam; in fact the U.S. is the aggressor and must be condemned. Ho praised De Gaulle for under-standing this distinction. Moreover the details of negotiations v/ere in the hands of Pham Van Dong, Ho then added: "Rememberj many people have tried to fool me and have failed. I knov/ you don't v;ant to fool ma." He then turned the conversation back to fam.ily matters* He expressed regret that Aubrac had sold the house v/here he had stayed t\venty-ons years ago, "^vhere shall I live v/hen I next coma to Paris?" He then asked v/hether he would be v/elccme in Parisj but- avoided the question of v/hether he wanted an invitatioh.

He terminated the conversation after fifty minutes and wa,s escorted from the room by Tach. Pham Van Dong v/alked v;ith Aubrac to his car. He'said that "we try to spare President Ho as many details as we can. He is an old man; we v;ant him to live to see his country unified." He told Aubrac that he was thinking about their conversation of the m.orning* He moved up the next day's appointment by an hour to allow mare time before Aubrac *s and I-larcovich * 3 deoarture in the evening.

C. Second Meeting with Pham Van D ong. Present: AubraCj Marcovich, Pham Van Dong, Tach^ note-taker.

The meeting consisted of a talk by Pham. Van Dong speaking from notes. Aubrac reported that the talk went something like this: "Dear friends. Our conversation yesterday v;as very useful. If you v/ant to understand the problem in Vietnam., I advise you to r^aad the book by Morris vrest called The ?rp.bassador . ^^"either Aubrac

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DedaKsiBcd per Executive Order t3526. Section 33 NND Project Number; NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 2011

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nor Marcovich l^nev; of the existence of this "book_*y We

rare facing a pr-oblem v/hicii is at the same time very simple J very complex and of great irrtportance for the world. It is simple because it concerns tha freedom of a people. It is complex because many considerations are involved. It is of great importance because it has

nvolved so many peoples, vfe have co:ae to the opinion ■ that the U.S. government is trying to solve the problem within its present limits. /^Aubrac and Marcovich too)c this to mean that Pham Van Dong v/as convinced that the T .S. was not in Vietnam as a prelude to an attaGl< on China^ We also thin"I< that the U.S, government is trying -to get a clear picture of the present position. Our view is this: U.S. pav;er is enormous and the U,S.' government v.-ants to win the v;ar* President Johnson is suffering from a pain and this pain is called South Vietnam, V'e agree that the situation on the battlefield

L'is decisive; the game is being played in South Vietnam. From the nev;spaoers we see that seme oeople want to confine the war to the South. Kov/ever^ the Vfnite House and Pentaaon seam determined to continue the war acrainst the North, Therefore v/e think that attacks on the North are likely to increase. V7e have made provisions for attacks On our dikes; v^e are ready to accept v;ar on our soil* ^ Our military potential is growing_ because of aid from ^ \ the USSIi and other Socialist counrtries, /Aubrac and

' Marcovich pointed out that this v;as the only tim.e a

C Communist country v/as mentioned ^oy i^-eme in the tv/o conversations extending over five hours, Aubrac and Marcovich also felt that Pham Van pong v;as eager to r . give the impression that the situation v/as under control_J7

As for the situation on the battlefield, it is r improving all the time. The dry season was good and the I - wet season v/ill be better. The Marines are in difficulty.

The United States is forced to replace its well-trained ^ ■ ' troops by ever-younger soldiers, We fight only \^fnaTL we [ choose; we economize on our resources; we fight only for

political'purposes.

*

For example, nev/s from Saigon suggests that Ky ,is considering"moving his capital because it is no longer safe. Tnis is true. Tve could easily step up our actions inside the city. But v/e take only those actions which have political meaning and v/hich economize human lives. •

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"Nov;' I shall talk to you about negotiations and solutions. We have been fighting for our independence for four thousand years. We have defeated the Mongols three times-. The United States Army, strong as it is, is not as terrifying as Genghis Khan- We fight to have peace at home; v/e have no v;ider aims. We have mads clear our position in our four points and in the interviev/ of January 28, 1967 • /Pham Van Dong did not explain v;hat this interyiav/ was; Aubrac arid Marcovich did not knov/j nor do I^ We are ready to talk at any time provided that actions against the North are unccnditionally ended, I v;ant to repeat v/hat I said yesterday; v;e are willing to settle for a de facto stoppage^" Marcovich interrupted to ask v/hether he correctly understood that no public acknov;ledgjient of an end of bomZ^ing v/as needed. Pham Van Dong replied that he vrould prefer a public statement, but v/ould settle for a de facto cessation. /There v;as disagreerr.ent betv;een Aubrac and Marcovich about the meaning of de facto cessation, Aubrac thought that a bo.-iibing pause could be follovred v.-ithin a fev/ days by an invitation to negotiate; Marcovich v;a5 of the viev; that Hanoi miaht v/ant a more forrnal— assurance.

hiougn secret—

Pham Van Dong resumed, "Ending the v;ar for us has tv/o m.eanings: 1) An end of bombing v;hich is permanent-and unconditional; 2) A withdrav/al of United States forces. We like the formula of President de Gaulle Marcovich interrupted to say that it v;as not realistic, Pham Van Dong agreed and said that he realized that some U.S. troops would have to stay until the end of the process of political settlement. He added: "We do not want to humiliate the U.S. Lenin did not like war but fought v;hen necessary. As Lenin we are Communists,"

"Nov/ let me spaal^ of U.S. policy and the NLF. V.'a should have had unification in 1955. Tae period 1955-59 was a political fight. It sav; the nutual assistance pact betv;esn the U.S. and Saigon and the introduction of U.S. staffs. This led to the formation of the NL?. The second period, 1950-54, sav^ a disintegration of the U.S. pos^ition to v;hich the U.S. responded by 'soecial* war. "/I suppose he meant "special forces" v/ar_^ In 1955,' the United States started a 'limited' war which lasts until today 1 At the sa:r:e time the tTLF has expanded its activities from the countrv into the cities and' fro.-a inside Vietnam

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to the outside. Our position is; North

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Vietnam is socialist and v.'^nts to remain so. As for the

South J our goals are national independence* de:i\ocracyj

peace and neutrality. Soma pecp^le think vre v;ant to

impose Socialism on the South. l\\e ara convinced that the

NTjF v/ill not make such an error*-^ The NLF envisages a

' road coalition government, including _ all significant

grouns and religions v;ithout consideration of oast activities

including mervoers du gouvernement fantoche et cadres

6 ' armee fantoch e, /He repeated the underlined v;ords^

"j ae essential thing is to forget the past,

"As for unification^ v/e recognize that the important first step is a political settlement of the South, V,'e agree not to push things tovrard unification. Once the v/ar in the South is settled; v;e shall discuss v.'ith the South and find the best means. Our people are m.agnii

■ ; "Peace v;ould have been easy for the U.S. three years ago. But v;ith every year the political situation v/prsens. Qre do not like secret negotiati^ons^ but v;e recognize their necessity in this situation,^ As long

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the issues do not concern South Vietnam^ the

not participate. Kowevsr, v;e do not believe that

United States is ready for a settlement." Then turning

the

to Aubrac he aske

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"Que veulent les J-jmericains?"

Aubrac ansv/ered that he had been convinced by me that the U,S, v/anted an honorable ^ettlem.ent end that an end to bombing could be envisage'd provided it v/as not used as a breathing space to step up the v/ar in the South, -'This led to a discussion of the m.eaning of the term reinforcement.7 -'^-^^i^ Van Dong again stressed that an end of bombing v;ould lead to negotiations. Marcovich said that if negotiations go on any length of time, the problem of reinforcem.ent is serious. Pham Van Dong replied "If the Americans stop bombing and we understand that they arev/illing to talk there is no question of delay,"

Pham Van Dong then told Aiibrac and Marcovich that . they could comm.unicate v;ith him through 3o or Sung in Paris. Aubrac and Marcovich said that they vrould inform him of the U.S. reaction.

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"^ Dcclassifii'd per Executive Order ]3526> Section 3,3

NND Project Number: NND 03316, By: NWD Dale: 2011

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On August 11J 1967J L-he President approved the following message and asked that Dr. Henry Kissinger use M and A to convey it to Phara Van Dons:

"The United States is willing to stop the aerial and

C naval bombardment of North Vietnam if this will lead

promptly to productive discussions between representatives of the U.S* and the DHV looking toward a resolution of the

U issues between them* We v^ould assume that^ while discussions

proceed either with public knowledge or secretly^ the DRV would not take advantage of the bombing cessation or limitation^ Any such move on their part would obviously be incon-^ si stent with the movement tov/ard resolution of the issues

L between the U_S. and the DRV which the negotiations are intended

to achieve."

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Dr- Kissinger was given the follow^ing additional instructions:

"You should say further to Messrs. Marcovich and Aubrac that the United States is prepared to negotiate either openly or secretly- It would seem^ however;, that a total cessation of the bombing is inconsistent v;ith keeping secret the fact that negotiations are taking place. Accordingly3 the DHV may prefer to consider the alternative of a cutback in the magnitude or scope of the bombing while secret negotiations are. in progress,

"The U,S* is ready.to have immediate private contact with the DRV to explore the above approach or any suggestions the DRV might wish to propose in the same direction."

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DecJassifiiMl per Executive Order 13526, Section 3J NND Project Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 2011

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AuR List 17, 1967 •■

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Revised and supplemcated after revlev; by ICissinger SepCembsr 8, 1967". - ' \

Pursuant to USG instructions, Henry Kissinger met for 5 hours v:ith Messrs. Aubrac and l-Iarcovich (hereinafter A and M_) in Paris at the latter's house. Kissinger repeated Washington's understanding of M and A's conversations in Hanoi on July 24 and 25,and M and A confirmed these interpretations Tvitiithe already reported differon betv7een theui that A thought that an end to borribing v?ould be enough to start US/DPvV talks, v;hile^M thought some secret comir-unications betvjeea US and DRV might be necessary before talks started. Mr* Kissinger follov?ed his instructions and handed A and M tha Tnessage v;hich he request them to take to Hanoi, In ansvjer to a question Kissinger stated that the message reflected the viev7S of the Secretaries of State and Defense and'had been approved by Piesident Johnson- -During the discussion Kissinner made the £ollov;ing points ;

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(1) The phrase ''take advantage" refers to '^any increase in the movement of men and supplies into the south"*

(2) The phrase "productive" discussions indicated the determination to avoid extended Korean-type negotiations during unabated military operations;

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(3) The bombing pause might make it impossible to keep the fact of negotiations secret for more than three v;Geks at the outside ^ though we could of course guarantee secrecy as to their substance. Therefore it might be desirable to conduct preliminary talks v;hile tonnage, geographic or sorty limitations or reductions

in the bombing occurred, ^^^ith a complete end of the bombing \;hen final negotiations took place. But the choicG of secret or open talks I'jns up to Hanoi; and

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(4) The decision to add nevj^ targets v;as made before iuforGiation of A and M's Pianoi discussions had i^eached V7a?hington and in the absence of

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Decbssified per Executive Order 13526, Secnon 33 NND ProjecL Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 20U

August 17, 1967

August 17J 1967

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meaningful negotiations the intensity of violence vas likely to continue to rise. Debate of specific escalation vas futile since the offer included stopping bombing all together.

A and M suggested substituting another plurase for the word ''if^' in the first sentence of the message- They said that they vere persuaded that a trip to Hanoi >j-ould be useful and proceeded to discuss mechanics of travel. At the end of the conversation A and M asked whether some restriction would he placed on the bombing of Hanoi for reasons of personal safety and to show good faith. See Kissinger memcon.

Kissinger cabled the Department suggesting elimination of the vord "if" in the first paragraph of the message and its replacement by "with the understanding that" and this authority was granted Paris 1997^ 2017 and 203^, 207^; State 2312 and 22969, Other minor changes in French text were agreed to in the same messages.

M and A requested an appointment with DRV Rep SungJ which was granted on 20 minutes notice* Sung was cordial and said he had been instructed to transmit messages fi^om A and M to Hanoi. When M and A requested visas for Hanoi^ hov7everj SuxLg said he had no instructions concerning visas and would refer the requests to Hanoi.

Mr, Kissinger met with M and A at M's house in the morning^ and the latter reported on their meeting with Sung on the evening of August 17. Kissinger told A and M that Washington accepted their language change and a further minor modification was suggested. The rest of the conversation concerned technical problems of visas J travel costs and A's scheduled two-weeks leave, A code was agreed to between lAr* Kissinger and A and M to cover certain likely requests for clarification or debriefing, A and M, stated they had not talked to the Elyses or to

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Decbssified per Executive Order 13526> Secnon 33 NND ProjecL Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

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August 18, 1967

August 18, 1967

August 19J 1967

August 19> 1967

anyone else and, Mr. Kissinger urged contiauing secrecy,

Mr. Kissinger met with M and A in the afternoon to introduce Mr. Chester Cooper in case he should have to pick up the contact in the future and to give a greater formality to the message. See Kissinger memcon,

M and A sent their first message to Hanoi requesting visas to travel to the DRV during the veek of August 20. •

I'ir. Kissinger met Messrs M and A for the fourth time the morning of August I9 at the Pont Royal Hotel, 1-lr. Cooper ^^as present part of the time. As instructed by Secretary Mcljajnara Mr, Kissinger told M and A "that effective Augui^t 24' there vould he a noticeable change in the bombing pattern in the vicinity of Hanoi to guarantee their personal safety and as a token of our good will/* There was no mention of exact distances. Mr, Kissinger said these orders were ^'generally good for 10 days*" I^Hien M and A asked whether this was an ultimatum^ Kissinger replied that we would hardly talk of an ultimatum when we had offered to end bombing altogether.

During the early evening of August I9 Mr. Kissinger met again with Messrs, M and A at the Pont Royal Hotel, After fui^ther discussion between Mr. Kissinger and.Secretary McNamara^ Mr, Kissinger said that he wished to make clear that the restrictions on bombing in the imiriediate vicinity of Hanoi would end September 4., M and A indicated that they were well impressed mth US seriousness and considered the US offer very meaningful, Tliey stated they thought it essential to take *the text of the message to Hanoi themselves and present it with background inforjiiation. They reviewed a cable which they had prepared to send to Hanoi through the DHV Mission in Paris if Hanoi rejected their visa applications or if no answer had been received by August 22.

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August 21,

19 57 " M phoned Kissinger in Paris on the evening of

August 21 to tell him of Hanoi's refusal of their visa application. Mr, Kissinger told them to pass the message v:hich he had discussed v:ith them on August 19 to Ranoi through the Paris DRV Mission if the ansv;er to their first tele^^ram

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remains negative. See Kissinger mem con.

AuRUSt 21, 1 967 - Messrs. M and A gave the DRV mission the second

message urgently requesting visas to travel to Hanoi V7ith an important message. See Kissinger conversations v/ith Messrs M and A. . ^

on

Augus t 22, 19 57 - Mr. Cooper informed the Department that A and M

got a turn dov?a on their initial visa request and had sent an urgent 3-p"peal by telegram.

August 2 5, 1967

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Messrs A and Mjnet with Bo in Paris to inquire why their visas had not been received. Bo told them it v?as too dangerous to visit Hanoi due to the bombing. H and A then informed Bo they had assurances in that respect, without identifying the nature of the assurances^ which would be effective until September 4.

Messrs M and A then presented the US massage as set forth below to Lo for the first time. He read it v;ith interest and observed that it was '^clearly significant"* Bo queried them about the significance of para, 2 of the message. He V7^ inforLLied that it exnressed US doubt that the existence of US/DRV discussloris could be kept-secret if bombing ended^ and Eo recognised ' that this would be a problem. Bo was impressed and v/as told that the message v;as authorised by top levels of the USG. M and A gave Eo a written description of their contacts v?ith Kissinger. Eo agreed to cable the m.essage to Hanoi and to report their desires to visit Hanoi to discuss the message. Eo believed a reply

should be available by August 29.

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The English text of the message given to Eo. in both French and English is as follows:

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The United States is v;illing to stop the aerial and naval be-. :

^ bardment of North Viet-Narn i;ith the uadersbanding that this \iiXX lead promptly to productive discussions bctvreen representatives of the Mv^6^.

L ''^States and the Democratic Republic of Viet-^I^am looking tov;ard a j

resolution of the issues between them. VJhile discussions proceed i

r 'either V7ith public knoTjledge or secretly^ the United States . \

L i7Duld asGurae that the Eerr.ocratic Republic of Viet-*Nam would not

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take advantage of the bombing cessation. Any such raove on the : P part of the Derr.ocratic Pvepublic of Viet'-Nam \?ould obviously be ; L inconsistent v;ith the rrioven^ent tov?ard resolution of the issues ■

bev?eeen the United States and the Deraocratio Pvepublic of Viet-lTam

which the discussions are intended to achieve*

The United States is prepared to enter into discvtssions r either openly or secretly. It v;ould seem, hovrever, that a ^ .. total cessation of the bombing Is inconsistent with keeping

C secret the fact that discussions -a^re taking place. Accordingly, the Democratic PvCpublic of Viet-Nain may prefer to consider the alternative of a cutback in the ir^^agnitude or scope of the bombing vhile secret discussions are in progress.

The United States is ready to have immediate private contact %^xth the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam to explore the above Q approach or any suggestions the"Democratic Republic of Viet^Nam, might v7ish to propose in the same direction,"

[According to M and A^Bo's cable to H^noi, after transmitting the . I

above message in English and French texts ^ noted that texts were [confirmed by Cooper and that both Kissinger'and Cooper had stated i they were prepared at a very high level of the USG and approved by, the President* A mressao:e sent to Hanoi also included the follo^jin^

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points which had been made by ^Kissinger according to M and A;

(a) The US is handling this problem confidentially and requests J^rlanoi to do likewise; --- ■ "" "^ ^ ■

(b) The US is particulax^ly interested in ,the possibility that

i ::he DRV envisages direct secret discussions; '- , , ^

(c) The attacks oil the dikes vera accidental; ,|

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(d) The US requested massage"to"be.brought to the attention of '^nam Van Dong as soon as possible;

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I or Paris "vrere suggestod as possible sites; and

(c) The US is read}' to submit the information in the nessage directly and secretly by special representative. Vientiane^ Moscov;

(f) The US v7oald contiaue ^to utilise the Ki s singer-A/M channel if Hanoi wished. • -•

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In addition3 M and A said that the August 25 message stated that "for personal assurances of safety and to establish authenticity^ bombing attacks in the immediate vicinit}^ of Hanoi*' would stop for ten da^s^ beginning August 24. Finally^ M and A urged that they be permitted to come to Ifenoi as requested by Kissinger,, to provide additional information.

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August 29. 1967

Bo told Messrs* M and A that he had not recGived a response but expected a reply_

on August 30*

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Au .q :ust 30> ig &7^- Bo told M and. A that there hnd been a ''technica

break in coiinnunications v;ith Hanoi" but Bo expected a reply by COB August 30 and he assured M and A that their raessage \-;as bein.^ taken very seriously.

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Au^u$t 31* 1967 - Aubrac visited Bo* ivho told him that he still

had no ans^cer to the August 25 message, but he had heard fro^ii Kanoi rejecting II and A's August 21 appeal of the turn dovjn o£ thr^ir visa applications* Bo stated that his government noted unfavorably that the receipt of the August 21 paessage coincided with the escalation of borabing of the North v;ith . • Hanoi as^ its objective. Under these conditions

it is impossible for the DRV to grant visas to permit M and A to carry the August 25 message to " ■ ' Hanoi. VJhen Aubrac told Bo of his intent to

return to Rome on September 2, Bo asked him to stay in Paris until Septenber 5, particularly since M i;as out of to\m for a short ^v^hile*

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September 1, 1967- M returned to"Paris.

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September 2, 1967- M and A visited Bo ^.vho repeated his comments

of August 31 o A indicated that M's return . . should permit A to leave for Roma on September 3 but Bo asked him to stay until September 5 since a message fx*om Hanoi could arrive at any time*, Bo asked M to make sure that nothing "happened to Hanoi in the next few days*". Bo said he '^ wjould talk to M and A again on September 4.

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Dcclassined per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NKD Projeci Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 20U

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Scptcinber 3. 1957 - K and A sav: Bo after recGivinf; infoririatioa

from Mr. Kissinger that the bombing pattern around Kanoi voald remain in effect three days longer^ They told Bo that the bombing .■ - .T- -- pattern around Hanoi V7as extended for another

72 hours through September 7* Bo received j this information "icily'' but asked H and i^. A again not to leave tov/n because Bo still ' had not received an answer. |;

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^?£l;emJiej^^^_196X " Bo told M and k that he st^Ml had no answer* ||

from Hanoi. Bo indicated that an ansver V70uld have been simple if it hadn't been for US ^ bombing actions on August 21^ 22 and 23. Bo U told M and A to come back on September &. A j| told Eo that he planned to go to Rome and Bo raised no objections.

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S e J)tember _5^. 19 67^ - Aubrac returned to Rorae-

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"" Septemb er 6, 1967 - Bo told M he still had no ansvrer and again

■ referred to the fact that M and A's second

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cable urgently requesting visas arrived in

Hanoi on a day V7hen the city v?as hit particularly

hard.

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mb er 7... 1967 - After conversations mth Kr. Kissinger and A

and a phone call from A v;ith Bo^ M called on Bo after receiving an appointment 15 minutes \ after it \vas requested. M told Eo the USG . | was "standing by - waiting for an answer,";. M said the atmospheiti during the convers' tion -■> "'■■-*'-■>'-:;: was friendly and relaxed and Eo said several

times that he hoped M and A's efforts would work out better than past efforts by others . VThen Bo was informed (incorrectly) that Kissinger would be la Paris on the V7eekend of September 16^ Bo said on his own initiative that he VJould ask the DPvV immediately for authority to see Kissinger^. VHien M said he did not know;whether Kissinger would be authoriz.ec "to see Bo and suggested that Bo might want to see s.omeoae ^ less izlose to the USGj such as Bernie Feldj Bo rejected the suggestion and said he

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September 7, 1967 '(cont'd)

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Granted to have authority to see Kissinger so that a diroct conversation between Bo and ICissinger V70uld be possible. Bo said he still had no answer from the DRV to the USG message; Bb again cautioned "strictest secrecy'' regarding 'the contact and M gave him this assurance.

l^Jhen N told Kissinger of the preceding conversation^ Kissinger asked M to call Bo to inform hira that Kissinger would be in Paris on September 9 to correct the information he had given him. earliero M reported back tlia t he had called Bo later on the afternoon of September 7 to correct [ ^ the dates of Kissinger's Paris visit^

Septem,ber 7-8, 1967 ^ Klsa nger came to Washinf^ton to discuss

B I 'iff i'lj riB ri m ii i i n r i ii ■ ' ' ^^-^ ^^

his raeetlag V7ith M this coming v;eekend at Paris and possible meetings with Boo I ' Mr. Kissinger left Boston on evening flight

for Paris on September S.

At 11:00 a.m. EDT on September S, Kissinger phoned k in Rome from Washington to ask k to return to Paris vvhile K was there.

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M visited Bo and told Bo of Kissinger's request today that A return to Paris- M told 3o that A and N vouched for K^ but if Bo v;anted additional reassurances Klllionshikov (Vice Chairman of the Soviet Academ.y of Science and Presindent of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Soviet Republic) could coiTie to Paris to vex-ify the origin of the m-ission. Bo rejected this proposal and said the existing M/A-*K channel V7as satisfactory. Bo cautioned about the great need for secrecyo In response to Bo's question J M said K planned to be in Paris for about 10 days. Bo said if there vrere

Septe mber 8 . 1967 -

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September 8, 1967 (Cont'd)

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no bonibing of Hanoi "something could v:ell happan'' during that period (Paris 3070).

Kissinger arrived in Paris in the morning, just before Aabrac \dio returned fropi Pome at K's request. After a conversation beti;een .K, M and A (Paris^ 3070) A called Bo to arrange ran appointmsnt for k and I-I^ which v:as set for 4:00 p.Di, Paris tin:e. At the meeting %vith Bo J the latter told A and M he had been instructed by Hanoi to keep in close touch vjith A and M^ and Eo was available to A and M at any tirrEe, M told Eo that Kissinger had been in touch Xvith senior USG officials, later identified as the President, Secretary Rusk and Seer-etary MciTaiiiara, v/no were "grov:ing impatient with the absence of any response frora Hanoi". Bo asked if Ualt Pvostow had cleared the message, and A and K had not heard his name mentioned by Kissinger. M reported that Washington did not know v;hether the (August 25) message had ever been received in Hanoi. To this J Bo replied that his government accepted the message as "absolutely authentic" and "it was .being studied aov; in the light of developing conditions". -Bo added that A and M must recognize the DRV situation is quite complex. M urged Bo to meet Kissinger and Bo replied that he had not yet received authorization to talk to Kissinger J but that he was in effect talking to Kissinger now through A and M* In response to a question, A told Bo that Kissinger had indicated a desire to"*discuss some matters with Bo privately vjithout the presence of A and M, and A recoirirnended private meeting,

although M urged that M and A be present* Bo

TOP SECRET/K0t)IS/PEi\^7SYLVANTi^

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Septei^i'oer ,9 ^ , 1 967" -^ vi^s noncommittal but said if a ifiecting (Cont'd) . . _ %';ith Kissinger iras arranged thrca^/n any

other channal he V70uld let M arid A knov;-' Bo then said "v7hat I really want to know is v^hetber the (August 25) message is still valid''* A and M assured him that It v;as bat repeated Kissinger's statement about US restiveness with respect to the long delay in Hanoi's responsec M and A told Bo ' .-they were personally convinced by Kissinger that the August 21-23 bombings were un--

related to the August 25 message* Bo asked

^ . .^ *■ ^ " ^hnnt tha ^^McNamara line'' (barrier) and said

/Hanoi viewed it as "political ■ action to make ,

P ' the separation of brothers permanent*'* M viewed

1 , it as "an alternative to bombing"• Bo hoped

'- ' A would not return to Rome and again stressed "

secrecy, (After checfking V7ith K. A re*-

-turned'to Rom^ to be on call*) - ■ -"" .:.;.,

* ' September 11^ 1967 - In response to a phone request from Bo at ^^ ■ 6:00 p.m. (Paris time), Sunday, September 10^

[2 . \ Narcovich called on Bo at 9:30 a.m^ After

an exchange of pleasantries Bo handed to N the follov.'ing text of Hanoi's official reply to the

c

August 25 message:

4

f~ "The essence of the Arr.erican propositions

L '': is the stopping of the bombing under conditions.

' ^ The American bombing of the Democratic Republic r ^ * of Viet-Nam is illegal. The United States an)

L ^ ■ . should put an end to the bombing and cannot pose /

conditions* - *

*" ^ ' "The American m_essage has been cona^iunicated

after an escalation of the attacks against Hanoi

f ■ , and under the threat (menance) of continuation

of the attacks against Hanoi. It is clear that this constitutes an ultimatum to the

f ■ ■ " Vietnamese people.

\ ' ' "■' *' ' "TOP SECRET/KODIS/PEKNSYT.VANIA • '

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Septetrtber 1,1,. 1967, -"^^^ (Cont'd) " ' '

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/'The GoveraTient of the Democratize * '' \ " '■' ' Republic of Viet-^Kam energeticcflly rejects the /imericaa propositions.

/-"The .posit3,on of the Government of the ■ . ■ ■■ Democratic Republic of Viet**Nani is that the United States should ce^se definitely and i^?ithout conditions the bombing and all other acts of v?ar against the Democratic Republic of Viet-Kanio It should vjithdraw .-American troops and satellites from South" Viet "Nam ^. recognize the National Liberation Front of South Viet "Nam and let the Vietnamese people themselves regulate their internal affairs• It is only after the unconditional stopping by the United States of the bombing and all other acts of v?ar against the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, that it

Tvould be possible to engage in conversations»"

*

" (uno ffic ia1 transla tion)

Bo told M to give the text to Kissinger and added 'that "as soon as there is a reply" M should communicate ^';ith Bo at any time of day or night• V/!ien M urged Bo to meet Kissinger^ Bo said "give the message to Kissinger and when the reply is here x-;e shall see about meeting"* In comi^ienting on the text of the DRV message Bo made the following, statement:

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"The bombing of Hanoi at the same time as the sending of the (August 21) message constitutes a pressure. Stopping of the bombing along v;ith the threat of a renewal has the character of an ultimatum^."^ . X^^.^i^ 3097).^^ . , ■ .

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

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Sppt Grr-ber, 1,3, 1,967 - M mst for 35 minutes with Eo oa short

Pursuant to revised

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noLice at noon. Departmental instructions to Kissinger (State 35567 and 36554) v:hich K discussed v;ith M in part at bre^ikirast on September 13 (Paris 3242)^ M handed Bo the follov:ing message from K in a sealed envelope:

"I have a reply frora the USG to the Hanoi message x^7hich v?as received on Monday (Septem^bor 11). I have also been given a'cbmnientary on this message. Because o£ the importance of the United States reply and because the coiLmentary refers to other discussions v?ith Hr.noi which we have promised not to reveal I have been instructed to deliver it personally. I am available for a meeting at any time and any place v/hich is convenient to Mr, Mai Van Eo/*

Bo asked M v/aether he had seen the message from K, N said he had not^ and Bo did not show the message to M. In response to M's urging that Bo see K^ Bo said '^because of the continued threat of bombing Hanoi which has' the character of an ultimatum, a direct meeting with Kissinger cannot take place." M asked what assurances Hanoi wanted. Bo replied that this V7as a US problem* M asked whether contacts through the M/A channel should continue and Bo replied "definitely yes. We consider that we wish to continue talkiQg through this channel." Bo said he would accept aviy comjnunication open or sealed through this channel^ specifically includiag any such message from Kissinger-Bo ^' ^ ""reiterated "We want to keep this channel open". In reply to a question Bo said that as long as M was in Paris he saw no need for A to return from Rome-

NODIS / TOP S ECRET/FEM^-lSyLVANIA

Declassified per Executive Order 13526> Section 33 NND ProjecL Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 20U

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L Sep tember 14. 1967

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\'0D IS / T 0 P S E C RET / P E 1<V. S YLVr " lA

Bo then turned to the (September 11) bombing of Haiphong* He said thst bombing within one kilometer of the center of tov7n in effect meant attacking populated areasi He did not establish atiy relationship betv;een the borribing of Haiphong and the sending of any message in the M/A channel. Bo emphasized to M Pham Van Dong's view that the DRV xcould continue fighting no matter how badly it was bombed -even if Hanoi v.^as totally destroyed* He referred M to the Schoenbrun September 10 television program as evidence of Hanoi^s determination to continue fighting (Paris and 325 7).

3288

M saw Bo at noono In accordance V7ith instructions to Kissinger (State 36927 approving Paris 3257) \vhich Kissinger discussed with him on the niorniag of September 14 (Paris 3329)^ M -handed Bo the. following messa^^e from K in a sealed envelope:

"Hanoi^s attitude with respect to the kind of restraint we have employed in this channel is baffling • . If we bomb near Hanoi we are accused of bringing pressure- If vje voluntarily and without any suggestion from Hanoi impose a restraint on our actions and keep this up without time limit we are accused of an ultimatum- In fact^ the American proposal contained neither threats nor conditions and should not be rejected oa these grounds".

did not open it but said he would study it later. He asked whether it contained the principal message^ and M said K had asked for instructions about whether the principal message could be transmitted through A and Mo Bo asked vjhether Vi vjas sure there was a message and Bo said he was certain there was and that K would receive instructions soon- M then read to Bo from his handv/ritten notes containing the follox^;ing official explanation:

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'The enclosed paper contains VJashington's r view about the significance of the restraint

L ' in the Hanoi area and the unconditional

nature of our message of August 25."

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L ' M then gave Bo Kissinger's "personal"

explanation as follows:

"The enclosed declaration in ray judgnient erases the possibility^ of any charge that x-je.-are proceeding by ultimatum."

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Thenas arranged v?ith Kissinger (Paris 3329), M gave Bo the follovjiug "official" coranient from Kissinger:

Washington does not consider the attacks of September 11 as escalation- The attacks closest to the center of Haiphong vjei'e in an area V7hich had been attacked three times previouslyJ most recently on June 26. Mro Kissinger is prepared to give more detailed clarifications".

M then added Kissinger's "personal" comiiient:

"(A) Bo should remember that the number of officials av/are of the current exchange of viev7s is very small. This makes it very difficult to reverse decisions taken prior repeat prior to the decision to send the message of August 25 and maintain secrecy. (B) It seems m.ore useful to seek a solution to the present situation than to debate about how we got there. Hanoi should remLember that Che U.S. message of August 25 offered to end the bombing and all other acts of war against the DRV in circumstances which the United States Government considers not to involve conditions but which rather repeat statements m.ade by Hanoi. If Bo v.-anLs clarification, I staid ready to grve It. ' '

NO DIS/TOP SEC RET/? EI\-MSYLVA NLA

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M also gave Bo Kissinger's concluding "personal" comraent:

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"The present exchanges can be useful if they enable both sides to gain a clearer undorstanding of the issues before them. I must point out, however, the concern expressed to me by high officials in Washington that too often these coinmunications are one~v?ay streets."

M agreed to Bo's request that he leave his notes containing the above conm^nts for Bo to study and Bo v;ould return them on the morning of September 15.

ft

M mentioned that at sonie point the Elysee v;ould

have to be informed but Bo replied ''The fewer

people knov7 about this the better." M again

said he hoped Bo and Kissinger would be in ^

direct contact soon (Paris 3333; -3329; and

(French text)'- 3415).

Q Septemb e r 16 , 1967 - Kissinger met for about tv;o hours V7ith M and A,

iiiiniediately after A's return frcni Rome on the ,f

C morning of September 16* K told M and A he was

authorized to give them the sealed message from Washington for delivery later in the day to Bo

Cand turned over the message to them. K cautioned M and A not to tie the continuation of their channel to K's presence in Paris but suggested that they ask Bo about Bo's views on how to continue the channel thereafter. K reminded N and A that the US 'Is prepared to talk

Eon an official level at any rautually convenient place- M and A indicated their viLlingness to continue on the present basis and reluctantly f" agreed to hand sealed envelopes for delivery to

NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

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Kissinger to an Embassy officer (later specified as Hallner) af'cer K left Paris, although they indicated a preference for communicating with K by ordinary mail or telephone*

K urged M and A not to permit Bo to gain any misimpression that he had a future assurance from the USG against bombing in the Hanoi area and M and A promised to leave - 'no ambiguity on this point. . Kissitiger asked M and A to make the points with Bo that (a) the US has consistently attempted to phrase its "proposals in conciliatory and realistic language, but the repli^es from Hanoi have not been responsive and have not addressed key elements of the US proposals; and (b) the failure of Hanoi to deal vjith US proposals and the interjection of outside elements^ such as specific military actions^ have raised doubts in the minds of US officials about the willingness of Hanoi to enter into productive discussions (Paris 3492)*,

September 16 , 1 . 967 - M and A met with Bo for over an hour, starting

at noono A, who did Qiost of the talking at the meeting with Bo and kept the notes, reported on the meeting. Bo greeted A and M affably and offered them drinks<. Bo said Ho had charged him with inquix-ing about the health of A's family. A then handed to Eo in a sealed envelope French and English texts of the follov/iag US message:

September 13, 1967

"The USG believes that the September 11 ' raessage from the DRV may be based on a misunderstanding of the American proposal of

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August 25• The American proposal contained neither conditions nor threats and should not be rejected on these grounds*

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It has been the understanding of the USG that the DRV would be willing promptly to engage in productive discussions leading to peace when there was a cessation of aerial and naval bombardment* The USG sought to confirm this fact in itS"proposal which the DRV has-in .front of it*

'*As a demonstration of its j:ood faith and in order to create the best attr.osphere for the coQsideratlon of its proposal the US voluntarily undertook tiot to bomb Hanoi from August 25 onward - the day on which its proposal was submitted to Hanoi* This restraint has been maintained without time limit even though activities by opposing forces in the south have .in fact been stepped up since August 25.

It

Q The August 25 proposal of the USG remains

open."- (END OF MESSAGE)

A told Bo he did not know the content of the message but described it as "conciliatory", a v7ord which Bo made him v/rite down. Bo did not open the envelope in M and A's presence.

A asked Bo about the significance of the AEP September 14 Hanoi story (State 33031)^ quoting "reliable sources" as indicating that talks would start three or four weeks after a bombing cessation^ and A showed Bo Paris press stories based on the APP report* Bo replied that the ^

three-to four^week interval between the end of bombing and the beginning of negotiations was "an invention of journalists"o He noted that Pham Van Dong's statement had given no ground for the time period m.entioned in the neV7Spapers. .

NQDIS/Tu^ SE CRET/PE?<WSYL VANIA

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DecJassifiiMl per Executive Order 13526, Section 3J NND Project Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 2011

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A asked Bo x^^iether thare was any utility in the coatinuation of the M and A channel and \7ondGred whether they should nov? ' withdraw* Bo replied that M and A had been received as friends and they were "not at the end of the tether" because of the continued validity of the channel. Bo said: ''We trust you and you trust Kissinger. IJhat you have bean doing is useful ..^ You see you have produced t*esults. There was a 'message to us from the USG V7hich we acceptedc. We replied^ to be sure^ negatively. This X\?eek we have had tv/o brief conuiumicritions and today n formal message^ so you are being useful." Bo again referred back to the fact that their visa request had been turned down because it had been made concurrent with the bombardmeQt of Hanoi and to live let them come to Hanoi at that tiaxe "would have discredited us and ultimately you".

M again urged Bo to see K^ and Bo asked a number of questions about K*s plans for the comiLig wee'k, VJhen M suggested he could arrange coffee for K and Bo at a private residence^ Bo said "Let me think about how best to arrange a meeting and I v^ill let you know* I w^ill call you as I called you last week."

Xslien M mentioned reporting to the Ely see if the present effort failed. Bo said again that the M and A channel is "not at the end of its usefulness- I see no need to bring anyone else in. Complicated matters may take some time to mature and become more complicated if . too many people intervene

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\^en M asked whether Dzu^ runner-up in the SVN Presidential campaign, would be acceptable to the NLF in a more broadly based government. Bo said that Dzu v;as a "heel", how^ever, and there were many reasonable' people in the south.

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TOP S EC R 'ET / NOD I S / PE^INS YL VA N l A

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including high-ranking military officers/' When A asked about Thieu^ Bo replied that he did not under.stand a man who got hiraself elected "on the basis of inviting foreigners to borab his compatriats''^ but A -^^jas struck by the relative mildness of his connment-

When asked about the political situation in the US J M and A said that the main lines of American foreign policy would not change no matter who won in 1968, unless it was Reagan -in which case "there would be a greater possibility of escalation than of peace overtures." ^Bo seemed surprised^

Bo returned M's handv/rittcn notes of a meeting of SeptGQiber 14 and said they had been useful but he had studied thera sufficiently. (Paris 3501)

TOP SECRET/NODlS/PE>^MS^n.VANIA

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^^Dtemter 21j 1967

Aubrac called on Bo for fi,ve mlautes on the >7ay to the airport on the Eiorning of September 18* (A is leaving for Rorae and v:ill be back on Septeraber 20.) At K's request J A told Bo that Hanoi's response need not be confined to any one particular channels A suggested the follovjing possibilities: (a) a persotial meeting between Bo and K; (b) a message in a sealed envelope via A and M to K; '(c) an open message via A and M^as Hanoi's -note of September 11; (d) a message to be given to a US official in Paris or elsewhere; (e) any other channel that seemed appropriate to Hanoi* Bo replied: '^There ivill be (sic) . ansvjere' Things may seem to move slov^ly. In fact^ they .are moving at their 'normal speed for exchanges of this kind"- (Paris 3536)

George Brown received message dated September 19 from Secretary Rusk informing him of the texts of the US raessages of August 25 and Septetiiber 13 and the DRV message of September 11- Brown will pass on information to Prime Ministeir Wilson only. (State 39656; London 2126)

A returned to Paris from Rome and phoned Bo to suggest jokingly that Bo have dinner with K. Bo laughed and said he V7as still without instructions. (Paris 3765) ' % . ,

F

A and M met with Bo for an^'hour-and-a^half starting at noon, M read to Bo the following message from K, which he left with Bo at Bo's request:

"I am leaving Friday evening to give a speech in Hannover Sunday- I plan ^ to return to the US on Sunday. If before Saturday evening you know that there will be' a reply from Hanoi either Sunday or TOP SECRET/NODIS/PENMSYLVAMIA

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Monday, please inforia M and I shall retura via Paris-

^'Washit^gton is still standing by for an ansv;er to its message of Septembei^ 13.

'*We have noted your interest in the A & M channel and we are ready to'* continue it,

'*! remain available at Caaibridge to receive message either directly or through A & M. If desirable, I could come to Paris to receive messages directly or through A & M either in sealed envelope or openly.

"-Alternatively, Washington is ready to send an official to receive any message either directly or through A & M in a sealed envelope or not."

In response to a question M told Bo that the text of the message had been agreed by K. Bo replied, according to A's notes: "This channel is very convenieri: for us* If I have a reply before Saturday evening (9/21) I shall call you (M) . ' I shall- also be in touch vith you afterwards as soon as I hear something but you should be av;are of the mood Hanoi has expressed in our Foreign Ministry statement of September 19''. (Ed.: the DRV ForMin statement was a detailed complaint about US bombing in the area immediately above the 17th parallel.) Bo also mentioned the bombardment of Haiphong, but briefly and without conviction according to A. *

TOP SECRET/MODIS/PEMySYLVANIA

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When M argod Bo to see K^ Bo replied that he could see private Americans at his discretion^ but he could not see any 1

American v;ho spoke for the USG or reported \

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M showed Bo the text of the draft report

(3?aris 3804) he intended to give the Ely see I ^ ~ ' if the channel failed or V7as publicised and

told Bo of K^s desire to delete the text of I I , the US and DRV messages; a point Tvhich Bo

n agreed upon. Bo said if the report was given

to the Elysee^ it should be made clear that

Cit was not done at Bo's request or instigation. (Paris 3803; Paris 3765)

S eptember 22, 1967 , - M saw Bo and gave him the following message:

[ [

"Washington is still waiting for an answer to its message of September IJ. The offer of August 25 as farther explained in the message of September 13^ remains open. 'At present Washington has nothing further tosay." (Paris 3908)

J Waen M delivered this note. Bo saw him only

^ briefly because he was tied up with Columnist

Jog Krafts Bo said that he still had no j „ instructions and if he had something he would

^ get back in touch with M. (Kissinger/Read

■ . TOP SECRt-:r/ M OD IS /PElv^-TS YLVAt HA -

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directly to the USG without Hanoi authori t

zation^ which he had not received* _. " {

Bo added that Hanoi is reluctant to talk [

under duress vjith any officially connected ■

American. Bo said "the Americans are playing a double gam.e-on the one hand they are offering us peace; on the other they increase their bombing." At the same time Bo repeated'his desire to keep the Pennsylvania channel open ]

and said "he will accept a communication at any time. ^ He will be in touch as soon as ]

he has anything to say-.-vre v^ant you (A and M) and Kissinger to continue/'

Dedassiikd per Executive Order 13526. Section 33 NND Project Nmnber: NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 2011

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DISFATCHEO September 23> 1967 -

1967 OCT 10 ]0 53

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Bo called M at 1300 and asked H to come over M met v;ith Bo for more than an hour starting at 1800, Bo read the following message to Mj which M took dov;n in his own notes- aid read back to Bo to check for accuracy:

''1» The vjhole world knov?s that the US has pursued a constant policy of escalation against North Vietnam.

I

''2* After Hanoi was hombad, US planes hit Campha and Haiphong. As regards Haiphong^ US planes have bjrfjed it several times in a rov? and very violently attacked the DMZ and Vinh Linh Province. ,

''3. As a result every one agrees that the bombing has been intensified in recent weeks."

^'4.. Washington's explanation about the bombing of Haiphong cannot be received,

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"5. These are the circumstances under which you have suggested contacts V7ith Kissinger. I accept your expression of confidence in Kissinger, but at the -moment v/hen US is increasing its escalation ^ it was not possible for me to see him.

''6. Turning to more general topics, I have spoken to you of the two-faced policy of the US, - ' ^

"7. What has happened has confirmed me in that opinion^for the attitude of the US exhibits all kinds of contradictions. It is possible to highlight this by a few examples;

(a) Together with the message of August 25j Kissinger has let me

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.know thz^ough you as intermediaries that the US has stopped bombing of Hanoi for 10 days; then for 72 hours^ and now the US tells us that the bombing of Hanoi is suspended %^jithout time limit, vrnat do you think of the assertion that the USG of its own free will has suspended the bombing without setting a time limit?

(b) In fact what has happened is the stopping of bombing of Hanoi but the intensification of bombing elsewhere ^ as in Campha^ Haiphong and Vinh Linh Province^ where the bombing has the character of extermination and system.atic destruction,

(c) To say that by stopping of bonibing of Hanoi the UG has wanted to create better atmosphere is not true,

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''8. With respect to the August 25 message^ the essence of the US position is to offer to stop bombing v;ith conditions» In a message delivered by sealed envelope the US has replied that the offer is without conditions while asserting that the m^essa^e of August 25 is still valid.

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"9, As far as you and A are concerned^ I have received you any time"you have requested, I listen to you. I accept messages from you, I transmit them, I report fully to Hanoi» I call you v;hen I'have something to say. I believe that this demonstrates our good will sufficiently. However^ as I have pointed out earlier^ we have no illusions about ^American policy. What do you think of all this?'^ (end of message)

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When Bo asked M for his reactions, M said that:

(a) M would state his own personal view that each US message had been accompaniGd by ' deescalatlon. With respect to Haiphong, M said he knew only v;hat K had told him, which was confirmed by the press reports^-that US attacks had concentrated on communication links, not on t e ma t i e ^ 5 *^ -oi" \1{^I^ t ov7n itself. N ev er 111 ■

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agreed that American actions had made discussions

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m.ore complicated,

(b) M thought that the US suspension of bombing of Hanoi, first for ten days^ then 72 hours J then vjithout time limit^ reflected contradictions i-n American approach to the channel.

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(c) M asked vjhether a reversion by the US to the ^'level of bombing in early August" \vOuld permit initiation of discussions. On the last point ,Bo replied that his Prime Minister had "already ansv7ered that question".

Finally J. M. asked Bo to ascertain from Hanoi v;hether M and A had correctly understood Pham Van Dong's remark to M and A in July^ \;hich M read to Bo from A*s notes. (The portion of the exchange is fouad on pages 12-13 ana 16 of the Kissinger memorandum .-O.f,August Ij 1967 ' " ' ' . in v?hich

Dong is reported to have indicated that delay following a ds facto cessation v:ould not be a problem- and that talks should be conducted by Dersons authorized by both sides.) Bo said that bong's reported statements to A and R differed from the public position-'of his government: ,/^i3o would send the exchange to Hanoi to ask if it were a true representation ot Dong's position.

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Bo again enjoined them to use greatest secrec}'. (Source: Kissinger/Road 9/24 telecon)

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..pte:nber 25, 1967

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called on Bo at 8:30 a.m. and read to Bo the follovjiag five point message from Kissinger:

*Xl) I will transmit to the appropriate VJastiington officials later today ttie message

* you (Bo) gave M yesterday, (2) I see no point in trading charges and countercharges about past activities. In fact Washington Ihs offered to stop tombing based on the assumption it would lead to prompt j» productive talks * That offer remains open. It v?as made sincerely. ' If accepted^ there will be no need to discuss escalation or bombing problems, (3) The exchange indicates that Washington and Hanoi have great difficulty understanding each other's thought processes. This makes direct US/DPvV contact essential. Intermediaries ^ no matter hosi? trustworthy^ are not satisfactory substitutes. (4) American military actions during the past month reflect in part the extrem.3 secrecy with which VJashington has handled this excha^nge. The USG has considered it unwise to change decisions made prior to the report of M and A's trip to Hanoi^ except in regard to bombing Hanoi itself^ because it' wanted to keep the circle of av;'areness of this exchange as sm.all as possible to avoid premature public debate. (5) The difference in the posi* | tions of the two governm.ents could be suiiLmarij^ed. as £ollov:s ; Washington has indicated its \ readiness to stop bombing and has only asKod to confirm its understanding ot Hanoi's view that this would lead promptly to productive negotiations. Hanoi has implied that an end of bombing would in fact have this result' If this is Indeed the view or both governments^ the remaining obstacles to direct talks can be ^ overcome. I am certain that the above correctlj^= reflects US views. Gould Bb confirm that it

. also reflects the view of Hanoi/'

M said Bo's response to the foregoing m.essage ^^as favorable. M then questioned Bo about

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\^?hat: Eo had mean I: in their conversation of September 23 when Bo had said that his Prime Minister had already ans^-jered M's question about v^hether US/DPvV talks v?ould be possible if the US cut baci:c to the level of bombing of early Augusts Bo replied that the DRV Prime Minister had made clear publicly that there could be no formal discussions betv^een the US and the DRV as lotig as any level of bombing continued in the North. Eo added^ hov7Gver, that pxeliminary discussions betueen Bo and Kissinger might not fall under such prohibit ion J and Bo said that he v;ould let M knov7 in a few days whether such prelininary dis cuss ions v;oiild be possible, (Sortrce; Kissinger/Pvead 9/25 telecon)

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M and A called, on Bo at 9:00 a.m. on September 30 and spent two hours with him. The atmosphere v?as friendly and cordial throughout and Bo gave them tea,

M and A told Bo that they had been in touch with K, and K had had further discussions with his Washington friends, M and A noted thar K and the USG had put a proposal and questions to the DRV through the Bo channel to v.^hich. there had been no substantive responses. The US August 25th-offer without conditions remained open, M and A noted than K's W^shin^ton friends vjere

inteas ted in learning whether Bo had received

an answer to liie point Bo had raised on September 25

about the possibility of '^preliminary discussions/^

Bo replied that he had an answer to the latter point. Bo said that he could not talk directly to a US validatied individual even in a preliminary v?ay because ^'too much had happened since July.'' (M and A got the im.pressioa from Bo tnat he feared that ''preliminary discussions'' v;ould sim.ply be a ruse on our part to get into substantive talks V7ith the DPA'' vjhile the bombing continued.)

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When Bo referred again to the 'Conditions'' contained in the US position^ M and A asked him to point out what conditions he ^cas' referring to. Bo said in the first paragraph of the US August 25 proposal the vjords 'Sjith the understanding that" really amounted to a condition on our part, as did the \:ords ''productive'^ and "prompt"o He indicated there ^^ere other complications vjith the proposal.

M and A referred to the forthcoming sentences in President Johnson's September 29 speech which repeated iJS v;illiaigness to stop the bombing "when this will lead promptly to product5.ve discussions"oa the assumption tnat the DP^V V7ould "not take advantage of the bombing cessation-or limitation" during the discussions. Eo said he had not had a chance to study the President's speech, but he v;as glad that they had brought this portion of the speech to his attention, because . the French press headlines made the US position sound conditional.

They discussed the Viet-Nam statements in the U.N, debate to date, and Bo said the DRV was highly displeased V7ith George Brovni's speech but pleased v7ith the French and Canadian stacement5.=, in New Yorko Bo added jocularly that he "claimed some credit" for the French position. Since H and A did not know the content of the French or Canadian positions and Bo did not elaborate, there vjas no discussion about v;hat features of the GOC or GOF positions Bo was referring to^

Bo expressed the thought that the"present political trend" in the US V7as favorable to the DRV,

At one stage of the discussion M and A found the opportunity to underscore the point that the US had made no commitments regarding its future 'actions.,

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A asked whether Bo had received an answer to the September 23 inquiry regarding the accuracy of A's notes of hts discussion in Hanoi with Pham Van DoQg on the point that there would be "no question of a delay" betv;een the end of bombing and talks both sides "knew hov? to meet each other o" A again vouched for the care and accuracy-of the notes of his conversation with Dong. Bo said he had not had an answer to this inquiry whi,ch he had made on September 23, but he expected'an answer early next week. Bo did say that if tiiere v;as a halt in the bombing "Kissinger should put Oil his hat and come to Paris imraediato-ly." When A and M asked for clarificad.on of the conflicting reports of the DRV position regarding the delay between a borabing halt and talks as reflected in September 26 AFP coUimn and a September 28 Le Moada article. Bo said he hoped that the answer he woiild geL from Hanoi to the question regardirig the Dong/M and A July exchange . would clarify this issue,

M and Bo arranged to meet again on Wednesday ^ October 4^ Bo repeated the point he had made before: he \^7as availatlB at any time to M and A to talk to them, meet V7ith them, discuss matters v/ith them3 and report to Hanoi on their, discussions. He said he uould advise them as soon as he had received anything from his government.

On his ov;n initiative H v;ent to see Bo on the afternoon of October 2 and spent an hour and a half with himo M said that he ha.d sought the appointment to pass on inform.ation received from K that morning that indicated growing impatience in Washington and the feeling on the part of K's VJashington colleagues that they had received almiost nothing from Hanoi through the M and A channel. It V7a3 decided that a message should be sent to Kissinger, and M staued that he took elaborate notes on v:hich to base the j message, which v?as put together in final form

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by M following the meeting and after a 'flight to Rome where he discussed the ices sage in detail V7ith A froLr.lbrae they mailed it by special delivery air-post to Kissinger in Boston late on October 2, The text of the note received hy Kissinger follows:

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"The position of the RD\1\^ remains always the same. If the United States really wished to talk, let them.stop first without conditions the bombardirient of the territory ot the RDTOo

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"Starting from that position there are several eventualities:

(a) A public declaration ty the Goverament of the Uniced States about the cessation. . This declaration could take place either before or after the cessation*

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(b) An official declaration but non^-public preceding the cessation of the bombardir.ent, This declaration could be conimunicated, by the channel K/A**M (officieusemant)-not quite officially^ and after this indication it can be transmitted officially by an accredited person,

(c) An end of bombardment V7ithcut preceding « .-official declaration follov7ed by an official

but not public communication of the Govern-Bient of the-United States,

"Eventuality (a) v;oald represent a public declaration replying to that tnade on the 28th^ of January by >!= Trlnh^ Minister of Foreign Affairs of the EDWI^ vjhich constitutes a solemn en^^agement to talK after the unconditional end of bombing. This public declaration v:oald be followed by the transniission of

an official text by an accredited person, 1

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''Eventualities (b) and (c) reflect the propositions of M and A as they result £mm their understanding of their conversation in July in Hanoi with the Prime Minister. A confirmation is expected soon/' (End of message)

As explained by letter from M^ point (a) in the above message was written entirely hy Bo as v^ell as the preao/ible^ Points (b) and (c) vjere v;ritten on M^s suggestion but practically controlled anct re-read phrase by phrase by Bo. The point about the non-public declaration v?af also discussed at length'o M and Bo also discussed the v;ord '*officieusG^' and agreed that it v;as a term applying to-a person m.andated by the Government of the United States» According to M ^ Bo said "on several occasions" that Trinh s February 28 speech constituted a "solemn engagement" by the DRVbe3xEworld opinion;j and a public declaration by the US vjould be a reply having the same character of coriunitment.

told M to be sure to report to Eo immediately by phone what Kissinger's reactions to the message were, (Sources: M's October 2 letter to K; Kissinger/Read 10/4^ 1 p.m.^ telecon.)

i October 4^ 1967 (p^m,) _ - At K*s request M took the m.essage received in

the m-ail by Kissinger to Bo on the afteoioon of October 4 to seek confirmation of paragraph (b) . Bo read the document and then said that he had still no t received word from Hanoi about the accuracy of M and A's understanding of his July talk v;ith Fham Van Dong^ so Bo could not comitient at this time on the formulation of eventualities (b) and (c),

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Bo did confirra the accuracy of the opening

paragraph of the coiraminicatJ-onj the for-mulatioii

of eventuality (a) and the paragraph of

description of eventuality (a), excep t Bo said

he had not used the v7ords *'solenm engagement".

M took strong exception vjith Bo^ saying that

M's own notes and clear recollection ot their

October 3 conversation on this point v?ere very

• clear, M said to Eo that if he (M) \cas capable

of such uiisunderstanding M's usefulness v;as at

an end* Bo energetically denied that M^s utility

was at an end and expressed the view that the

channel \7rs of definite continuing utility. Bo

and M discussed what phrase should be used in

place of "solemn engagement" without reaching

a firm conclusion, (Source: Kissinger/Read 10/4, 1:00 p.m. telecon)

October 4. 1967 (later - After a full discussion V7ith K, M called Bo

pom^ ) to say that K's reaction to the last M/Bo

conversation was that Bo^s backing away from the phrase "solemn engagement" v,''ould be viewed in Washington as a serious substantive change» -" He also passed on K's viev; that it would have been better' to receive no communication then one in which a key point had been retracted. Bo instructed M to come over and see Bo immediately. (Source: Kissinger/Read 10/4, ■ 4:00 p.m., telecon) October 4. 1 967 (late , , ; ■

' ~~ evenin^T ^^ visrted Bo and spent an hour and a halx wxtn

' "^ him at approximately 2230-2400 Paris time. M

told Bo of K*s views of the serious reactions ' " ' in Washington to the change of the text vjhich

K had received this morning^ and he asked Bo to revievj that text again with him* Again Bo confirmed the accuracy of the opening paragraph of the earlier text and the accuracy of the statement of the first eventuality ("A public declaratzion by the CoverniTLent of the United States about the cessation* This declaration could take place either before or after the cessation/') Bo said since ha had not heard from Hanoi about the N and A conversation there in July^ he could not coiTJuent on the other two eventualities which were mentioned in the niessas^ K received this

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morning • Bo \jould not discass furth?!r his renegging on the \vords '^solemn engagement" or the paragraph in v:hich those V70rds appear^

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Eo then said that he wanted M to send a message to K i?hich would come as close as possible to eventuality (b) in the conLmuni" cation K received in the mail. K vncote out the text in French and read it through with Bo three times to assure its accuracy<. M also did an English translation for Bo.

p Message fraaM to K:

After having discussed with Bo and after having obtained confirmation of his ] country's position regarding the e\;entuality = of talks you should know that if the US really wants to talk it is necessary first to stop without conditions the bombing and all , other acts of war against the DRV. I have come ^ to the conclusion^ recalling also a previous conversation in the presence of A^ that the scenario could be the following; The Coverntnent of the United States would send a first message through our channel (K/M-A) announcing unequivocally the unconditional cessation of bombing. Once this has been effectively '

realized, a second message still through our I channel might suggest the opening of the dialogue at a date and site proposed by you. If you and your friends agree on such a scenario, let Bo know this agreement through a written message w^hich I will then transmit to Eog I do not; know if what I say is appropriate you knox'^ this better than I/'

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added X'7hen Bo told M to end with something "friendly and conciliatory''^ Bo told M he would stand by to get K's reaction (Source: Kissinger/ f Read 10/4, 8:30 p.m^ telecou)

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DISPATCHED

October 8, 1967 ~

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M and A called on Bo at 9:00 a^m time and spent 1% hoars with him

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throughout the meeting

M and A handed the vjritten portion of the message from Kissinger to Bo, which Bo read closelyo M and A then read to Bo Kissinger's four ''oral points*'3 and Bo vjrote them down carefully in his own notes* (M and A did not leave with Bo the "oral" part of the messagec) The v;ritten message and oral points are as follows:

"M should tell B that K would be authorized to deliver to B in v/riting the following message whenever B is prepared to meet with him officially or unofficially:

^The United States Government under-

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stands the position of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam to be as follows: That upon the cessation by the United States of all forms of bombardment of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam^ without expression of condition^ the Democratic Republic of Vietnam would enter promptly into productive discussions with the United States & The purpose of these discussions would be to resolve the issues -betv;een the United States and the Democratic . . R^epublic of Viet nam»

'Assuming the correctness of this understanding of the position of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, the United States Government is prepared^ in accordance V7ith its proposal of August 25 J to transmit in advance to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam the precise date upon which bombardment of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam %';ould -cease and to suggest a date and a place

for the coizmencement of discussions q

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"In addition M should convey to B the follovjing oral points" from K:

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1, K believes that this understanding is consistent vjith B^s statements of October 4^ as reported by M^ and with the proposal of the United States Government

of August 25.

''2r Wnen B meets with K, K would also ' be prepared to state the precise date on which the. cessatiOQ of bombardment V70uld occur and to give the suggestions of the United States tflith respect to the date and site of the discussions following the cessation of bombardment, and K would be authorised to receive the views of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam with respect to these and other modalities*

"3, K noted that the Democratic Republic of Vietnam had not commented on observations by the United States Government on August 25 with respect to secrecy of the fact of discussions bGtV7eea the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the United States GovGrnmenCg

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*'4. K observed that officials of the United States Governmeat had taken note of a reduction of military activities in the vicinity of the demilitarized zone*. Undoubtedly, the Dem.ocratic Republic of Vietnam had noted the absence in recent weeks of aerial bombardraent in the imiuediate vicinity of Hanoi"'/'

Bo told M to tell Kissinger hox^ much Bo appreciated K's personal efforts- Bo then dictated to M and A the following short message of acknowledgr^ient to K;

"M and A have passed the note from K to B. In case B will have a reply to make, he"Will make it through this channels"

M suggested that Bo add a seatence saying that

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Bo'^-^as stady5-ng the message but Bo refused*

Bo then said on first reading of the xvritten' note from K^ it seemed to him that all that appeared after the opening phrase stating US ^willingness to stop the bombing without conditions did in fact constitute conditions*, la particular B characterized as "conditions" the words ''prompt*'^ "productive" and "in accordance with the proposal of August 25/'

M and A said that the latter phrase really meant that neither side should take advantage of a standdovjn of bombing while US/DRV dis** cuss ions w^ere in process, as stated in the August 25 proposal and the President's San Antonio speech<» In this regard M and A mentioned specifically that serious hostilities in the DMZ vJOUld make productive talks impossible (M and A noted that Bo made no

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rejoinder to the point about the DMZ in the oral message from K or when thay referred to the Di-IZ at di is place in the conversa tion•)

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M asked 'ivhat Bo s response i^jould be if the words ''proiBpt'^ and "productive" were taken out. Bo replied that if this happened he V70uld have to refer back to his governjnent before ans^^eringo

Bo read the third oral point in K's message as referring back to the portion of the August 25 message which referred to the possibility of partial limitations of actions against the DRV because of the dijSculty of keeping discussions secret after bombing stopped altogether. Bo said thiij V7as "clearly unacceptable".

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double game" ^that on September 29 or 30 ^

US planes hit a school in Flaiphongj killing ■ • 30 children^ ' ' .

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M and A underscored to B the nev7 features ■

in the Kissinger message^ (Sources: State 49772 and Kissinger/Read 10/8 telecon)

Oc tober 9, 19 67 - On his owui initiative M called on Bo for an

hour early on the afternoon of October 9^ 1967* M told Bo that K had made three principal points in his phone discussions with M and A following the latter's October 8 meeting with Bo:

(1) Tlie message given to Bo from K on October-8 had been prepared v^ith great care. It represented an important and detailed suggestion about bringing about discussions to resolve US/DRV differences follovving a cessation of bombiaga

(2) As K's Washington colleagues continued to notGj there had been a virtual

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absence of considered responses from Hanoi to US proposals in this channel to date.

(3) K i-S holding open the possibility of coming to Paris next v.^eekend (as A and M had urged him to do) but K's decision on making the trip V7ill be influonced by tvhat we get: back through this channel during this v/eeko

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Bo professed surprise that K or M and A saw anyti^ing nev; in the October S message, and M pointed out to Bo that for the first time in the October 8 message the US was offering to provide a specific date for the cessatloQ of bombings

M pressed Bo for an answer to the inquiry Bo had informed M and A earlier he v?a3 sending to Hanoi regarding confirmation of the July conversations with Pham Van Dong regarding the delay between a stopping of the bombing and talks^ Bo replied with a French idiom which translates as follows: '^Jhp does not say 'no', agrees"*

Bo mentioned unidentified'French reports charging new US air attacks on Hanoi and other reports about the concern on the part of the diplomatic community in Hanoi of possible strikes against dikes•

Bo took careful notes of the points made by M and said that if K came^- to Paris next weekend he (Bo) would be available all day Saturday and Sunday to see M and A, (Source: Kissinger/Read 10/9 telecon)

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October 10-11., I967

Kissinger received a phone caU ftrom "m" who pleaded with "K" to come to Paris this weekend • "K" advised against his returning to Paris at this tiJiie in order to continue to raaximiae pressures on Bo to get something back through the channel. (Kissinger/Read telecon.)

"K" phoned ^'M" on 11 October to say that he would i^eturn to Ib.ris as soon as it becomes clear that Hanoi will not respond to the channel, "k" made three points to "m'': (l) that he would not come to Paris this weekend; (2) that the past U,S, messages * to Bo are clear and speak for themselves; and (3) V7ashington has nothing further to say* (Kissinger/Read telecon^ U October)-

October 17, 196?

"M" saw Bo J expressed hope to keep the channel open> and handed "M" the following message:

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"Actually the U*S. has been follo^-^ing a policy of escalation of an extremely serious nature. In these conditions the U.S. proposals of peace are double-faced. At a time when the U.S. is pursuing a policy of escalation we cannot receive Kissinger^ nor comment on the American proposals tx-ansmitted through this channel-

^'The position of the Governiuent of the DRV is perfectly clear: it is only when the U.S. has ended without condition the bombardment that discussions can take place."

"M and Bo discussed \fbB.t ^the conditions' were in the U.S. proposal. M said he thought tliat the U.S. meant that we wanted a guarantee of serious discussions when we used the word 'productive,' Bo said the DRV thought that by use of the word 'productive' we meant that we wanted to talk about objectives in the South also^ since discussions could not be fully productive without this subject beixig considered.

^^Bo asked M if K was coming to P^ris this weekend^ and when M informed him that K and A would both be in Paris, Bo said that these were 'positive factors' and indicated satisfaction."

(Kissinger/Read Telecon, October 17, 1967)*

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October 19j 196?

*'K'' was giyen guidance for his discussion with "M" and "A". Tliese were viewed as talking points exclusively for use with "M" and "A"-

"1, Rrom the time of your opening discussions with M. tonight J you should make it entirely clear to him that Washington considers that the DRV has rejected the forthcoming USG proposals to bring about an en3 to the bombing and prompt and productive US/dRV discussions with no advantage being taken by the DRV on the ground. You should indicate that we base this conclusion not only on the negative DRV message of Oct* 17 but also upon Hanoi's negative public statements5 and^ most iinportantly, upon renewed DRV hostile actions in the vicinity of the DMZ..*.but it should be your objective from the start to indicate that the patience of your Washington friends is running out and that they feel that Hanoi has been xmwilllng to respond on any significant point,"

"2

'*g. You should emphasize that when the DRV messages I in this channel of September 11^ September 23 ^nd October 1?

\ p are analyzed they shcAsr that the DRV has been unwilling at

. any tiijie (l) to indicate in this channel or othen^ise that

"* for its part it will engap.e in discussions with the US even

if the bombing had stopped in accordance with US proposals; or (2) to make any substantive counter proposal on how to proceed to discussions leading to peaceful settlement of differencesp

:[

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'^h. DTote that on this date^ October 19^ a Reuters dispatch from liong Kong Indicates that 'North Vietnam today rejected the American offer for a conditional bombing pause in return for peace talks' as offered by President Jotason on September 29 and repeated by Secretary Rusk at his October 12 press conference....''

"3- In reviewing this channel with M, and A. you are authori^^ed to show to them the text of the September 13 USa message and other messages which you sent during your last visit in I^ris v/hich they have not yet seen.

"i^■. Without requesting M- and A* to see Bo^ which we

C assume they will promptly do to report your mood of discourage-

ment and concern, you should indicate interest in learning

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what essential differences Bo (not M- and A.) could find, if any 5 vith the main points in your review of the channel-

"5' If pressed^ you are authorized to state that the US proposals do remain open at this time "but that you are not empowered to speak about future US views or actions-"

(state 56516 to Ajnembassy Paris^ 1$ Oct 67}.

October 20, 1967

"K" had the foUowxng conversations vrith M, & A. on this date^ They added up to a stalemate in the channel*

1 '

C"M, met me at the airport in a state of adva.nced euphoria- According to him, the last message from Bo roade all the frustrations worthwhile, Wlien I asked

Chim for the cause of his optimism-> he called attention to the distinction betiveen escalation ajid bombing and the change of tense in the last sentence, I q_uickly disillusioned him, I said that the issue was really q.uite simple* If Hanoi v/anted to negotiate it should be able to find some way of expressing this fact by means other than subtle changes in tense and elliptical references full of double fr meanings/* (Amembassy Paris 5^+72 to State-)

"A, replied that he did not think it was quite fair to charge Hanoi with failing to respond completely- They had given up the demand for a public declaration that bombing would stop. Their last message was much soberer I j than the first and said nothing about the withdravml of

L American forces from SVN. J^fevertheless he thought it

urgent that he and M see Bo as soon as possible. I said that the decision was up to him as long as it was clear

Cthat the USG had nothing to say* If they met Bo they should understand, that four points were of particular concern to VJashington; (a) that a bombing stop be followed by prompt negotiations^ (b) that these negotiations Cnot be indefinitely delayed^ (c) that no advantage would be taken on the groundj (b) the special situation alon^ the DMZ." (Amembassy Paris 550? to State-)

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" •. - -A then wrote down the following phrases and asked me about my reaction: *The bombardment and other acts of war against the territory of the DRV are the sole obstacle to meaningful negotiations. As soon as the l>ombing ceases^ negotiations can begin,' A, said that he was prepai^ed to put his personal position vfith Ho behind these phrases-I replied tliat while I could not speak for the US Government

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these phrases v7ould be a big step fonfard- The DMZ problem woiild still have to be dealt with. (l had not seen the Burchett interview reported in your 57^198 then),

"l left H's house at 203O and returned to my hotel to avait word about the appointment with Bo< At 213O A* called in great distress that Bo had refused to see them, We agreed to meet at 223O, The following is their report of the conversation, A did the talking and M* listened on the extension and took notes.

^*A: V/e would like to see you ur^gently,

"Bo: There is nothing new to say. The situation is worsening. There is no reason to talk again-

"A: There is repeat is sometliing new and ybty important.

''Bo: Repeated word for ijord the same phrase as before.

^^A: Theire is something very important - perhaps the most important junctui'e of our exchanges.

"Bo: Repeated word for vrord the same phrase but then added: Vfliat is the Important matter.

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"A: It has to do with the meaning of the last sentence of your last message and the seq.uence with v;hich steps have to be taken.

"Bo: CXir position is perfectly clea-r. We stand on the Trinli interview with Burchett of January 28. Bo then repeated word for word the original phrase."

(Amembassy Paris 55^5 to State.)

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October 20, I967

The following article by Wilfred Burchett was read in Washington on this date:

"Hanoi5 North Vietnajn AP - There is no possibility of any talks or even contacts between Ha.noi and the U,S. government unless the bombardment and other acts of vrar against North Vietnam are definitively halted.

"Tliis is the position stated to me during conversations in the last few days with Premier Pham Van Dong^ [Tguyen Duy Trinh^ foreign minister and deputy premier^ and other high-ranking governinent and party leaders.

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"Hanoi is in no mood for concessions or l^argaining and there is an absolute refU-sal to offer anything -t except talks — for a cessation of the bombardment. The word stressed is 'talksj' not negotiations.

'^During an inforinal talk> however> Trinh repeated that his statement to this correspondent last January 28 — that talks could start if the bombing vjas halted — still held good. He said there could be 'meaningful' talks. IVliether they vrould be 'fruitful' or 'productive' depended on the United States.

"The mood of Hanoi is one of toughness and confidence. Although leaders expect Hanoi and Haiphong will probably be destroyed and that the war may last many more years^ they feel the worst is behind them.^ that the dally bombings are absorbed into the country's organism.

"Despite the air assault on Haiphong and intensified attacks on bridges along the rail linl^ with China^ traffic continues to move out of Haiphong almost normally over pontoon bridges J and the rail link with China is still functioningJ although occasionally halted for a day or two. Many tens of thousands df Chinese are working along this line and elsewhere> keeping rail and road communications open and repairing bridges."

C"It is repeated at every level tliat total independence with complete American withdrawal from South Vietnam is the unalterable aim of the Hanoi government and the Liberation p Zront for South Vietnam. They are prepared to fight 10 or

(^ 20 years to achieve this^ and life is being reorganized on

this basis.

"Hanoi denies that this means export of communism to the South and insists it agrees with the Liberation Front that the South should remain a separate entity with a neutral, non-Socialist regime as advocated in the recently published new political progi^am of the fronts having its independent entity^ with reunification a ^reT■^ long-ran^e^ step by step process."

October gP, 196?

Bunker was informed by Bundy that the FEI^^T^^'SYLVAWIA track "came to a negative conclusion on I^iday^ with opposing party refusing even to accept further contact with intermediaties. We ourselves read this J in conjunction with concurrent publication of Burchett article

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from Hanoi (sent to you septel) as clear indication that Hanoi rejects the San Antonio/UH formula and appears to be thoroughly dug in at least for the time being*" (State 5807O to Amembassy Saigon*)

October 23, I967

Ambassador fiohlen reviewed PEMSYLVAJNIA and made the following suggestion:

"*..-For example to the commimist mind for us to insist that talks must be 'productive' means that we would already have determined how the talks should come out and would amount to the acceptance of an American solution to the talks before they have even begun. Since no one can possibly tell whether the talks would be productive^ I would recommend that this and any other q^ualification be dropped- A simple statement to the effect that as soon as a date and place have been agreed upon for a meeting we would cease all aerial and naval bombardment of Horth Vietnam should be sufficient."

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ROMANIAN-NORTH VIETI^yJESE CONTACTS, QCTOBEB I966 - NQVElvTBER 1967

October 22, 1966

Ambassaclor Goldberg had a series of conversations with Romanian Foreign Minister Manescu in late Octoher, The thrust of Manescu's remarks was that a U.S. bombing cessation was necessary to create a better climate^* for negotiations. Goldberg responded with a new bombing formula to the effect that. Hanoi only needed to give "an indicaticn as to what fltj would do in response to a prior cessation of bombing by the U.S/^ Goldberg emphasized the importance of the words "indication" and "prior-"

USQN New York 1777 to SecState (BECEET-NODIS),

22 October I966, Refs: USUirs I76J4 and Deptel 69^1^0:

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"if. Said (reftel) *We woiild vrelcome from Hanoi

r through your good offices — if that is their desirej

as it is ours -- or^ if notj through any other cha.nnel of their choosing^ an indication as to what North Vietnam would do in response to a prior cessation n ' of bombing by the US. ' Goldberg then repeated this i-j statem^ent, Manescu then inquired what Goldberg con-

f sidered new in this statement compared to past posi-

tions. Goldberg said words chosen carefully^ that he did not want to assert anything was new but that J he presiimed most important word is ^indication.'

Manescu, stating he needed to understand precise mean-ingj then inquired 'are you ready, then, to cease bombing in return for an indica.tion?' Goldberg replied that significance V7as that w^e not asking for advance agreement but rather a statement through a trusted intermediary as to what North Vietnam would do if US following suggestions h^ tfe^nescu and others to

C cease bombing. Manescu remarked Hhis means that

QUOTE indication OTIQUOTE has to liave a certain content, ' Goldberg replied 'we do not believe we can C specify the contents in advance^ as that would sug-

gest we imposing conditions^ We merely say we willing consider suspending bombing if we receive encouraging indication. Of course, if nothing is going to C follow, and the war is continued by North Vietnam

as noT^, US will not suspend bombing.* Manescu then stated; 'Vietnam question very important, very sensi-

Ltive, Smallest mismiderstanding in this regard could have consequences no one desires* VJar in Vietnam does not cause victims only in Vietnam- No mi sunder-r standing or misplaced words can be allowed. It may ;

not be possible to have another mtg prior to rr^ departure since I am leaving Oct 26 or 27^ so this ^ 'may be final talk. V/hen I said that cessation of

bombing can create better climate for solution, I

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did not put that forward as a personal opinion. The answer I am taking to .Bucharest is the follo^-^ing-QUOTE On the basis of an indication by North Vietnaia, you would consider cessation bombing. In answer my question as to what indication should consist of you said It they go on with v/ar, you vrould not cease bombing UNQUOTE .' Goldberg clarified this by emphasizing: 'If they go on with the war as they are going on with it now.' He added *an indication of value to US would have to demonstrate a desire to move toward peaceful settement. I cannot define it further- I would rather say QUOTE We are willing to take a step toward peace if they are willing to take a step toward peace UlTQUOTE. We understand you think cessation bombing by US would create better climate- V7e v/ant to know what step by them would create better climate. We do not say what this step should be because we feel this would be badly received. Steps can be later discussed.' Manescu observed that when Eomani-ans discuss problem of Vietnam among tbemseJ-ves, they realize US has its honor and prestige to consider in approaching a solution. 'Please take into account that other party has same consideration.' Goldberg replied that we had chosen words to take that into account. He emphasized the word 'prior' stating we were not asking for 'prior' move by Ha^noi^ such as removing its 19 regiments from South Vietnaj3i prior to US suspension of bombing. We had deliberately indicated US wo\ild make 'prior' move if we got indication as to what would follow from North Vietnam after prior suspension of bombing by US. Manescu then concluded by making special appeal for discretion and agreeing that any inquiries about meeting would be met with statement that discussion concerned matters on agenda of UN of common concern to both parties. Goldberg assured Manescu that as far as US concerned he would share Contents of discussion only with Secretary and President —"

GOLDBERG

On the same day^ Acting Secretary Katzenbach saw Italian Ambassador Fenoaltea at the latter's request. The Ambassador repeated the Romanian message. It should be noted that Katzenbach's e>rplanation of the response which the U.S. desired from Hanoi differed from the Goldberg explanation. Katzenbach said that the U.S. would want to know "in specific terms^ publicly or privately^ what response would be forthcoming."

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S[EATE 71^^60 to AinEinbassy Manila^ Manila TOSEG 52^ 22 October I967;

"1- ..-RoBianian Ambassador had informed Italians that, after careful analysis of Vietnam situation and on basis of their various contacts, RcHianian govt had concluded that if US were to suspend boinbing of IWN -without any time limit or conditions 'appropriate and positive reaction would not be lacking.* <...

■I

"2. Acting Secretary said that"US position on bombing cessation is as stated by Goldberg, Acting Secretary noted that it vas difficult to knovr who was speaking for Hanoi, if they were actually able to speak for Hanoi, ajid furthermore what specific response to bombing cessation would be. Acting Secretary expressed some skepticism regarding Bomanian approach and suggested that Italian Foreign Minister might push Romanian Ambassador hard on v^'^hat specific response US bombing suspension likely to be- Acting Secretary pointed out that USG could not turn bombing of IWIT on and off lightly and that we had to know in specific terms, publicly or privately, what response would be forthcoinlng* ,,•"

KATZENBACH (Drafted by R.H. Miller, YZ/w)

\^'

January 23, 196?

Returning by train from the "annual hunt," Ambassador Davis was called in for a late night conversation by the Eomanian President, Council of State, Chivu Stoica, and Foreign Minister Manescu, They told Davis that they were now giving him the "signal" which the Americans had long awaited from Hanoi. Davis req.uested permission to follow up this conversation.

I

BUCHAREST 892 to SecState (SECRET-NODIS 23 January 196?:

i "5- Discussion then turned to Vietnam, and we

v;ent over familiar ground with difference this time, which may be important that Manescu (Stoica let Manescu conduct almost all conversation on Vietnam). In context of referring to necessity of cessation bombing C North Vietnam in order that peace talks could begin

said 'yo^ always say you must have signal as to what would happen, Vifhat I tell you is the signal.' I ^ probed as deeply as I could asking specifically whether

this was based on recent contact with North Vietnamese. Manescu refused to be drax^n out insisting that Romanians had continuous contact with them and that Romanians

L convinced information or 'signal' he had given me

was accurate. He specifically requested I convey

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this Information to Washington, At orv^ point during this dialogue Stoica intervened to emphasize that I should note Homania did not seek to blame either party for Vietnam situation; they were interested only in peaceful settlement of problem. Romanians realized US prestige involved but Vietnamese haa problem with 'face^ too. At another point both Stoica and Manescu responded .in negative to my question whether import of what they telling ne meant Romania offering to mediate,,.."

DAVIS

January 25. 1967

State gave Davis authorization to follow; up his conversation. Davis' instructions stressed the need for "concrete" reciprocity from Hanoi* Exaiijples of reciprocity were also given: infiltra-^ tiou and reduction of incidents in South Vietnam, Goldberg's UN speech of 22 September was stressed as authoritative.

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STATE 125269 to AmEmbassy Bucharest (SECRET-NODIS)^ 25 January 1967^ Ref: Bucharest 892:

* I

"3- HoweverJ it must be made clear to the Romani-ans that the United States could in no event stop the bombing in return'for mere agreement to ta]k since the stopping of our bombing would improve Hanoi's military Q position and expose our troops to the dangers of in-

creased DRV infiltration and military action. The C Secretary's conversation with Manescu on October 5,

1966 emphasized this lack of reciprocity in an exchange of no bombing for talks. Thereforej the reciprocal response required from Hanoi must be concrete and one that gave promise of setting in motion a true process of de-escalation* Actions relating to infiltration appear to be those which would have greatest promise.

CA significant reduction in the number of Viet Cong attacks and incidents of terror while important and to be considered, would be somewhat less satisfactory

C since such actions could be resumed easily whereas

reduction or stoppage of infiltration automatically reduces Viet Cong capability.

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"!+• You should also state that the US is not thinking in terms of a written and categorical statement by Hanoi of what it will do if ve stop bombing. We appreciate the difficulty Ilejaoi might find in admitting openly or even in an indirect message to us what they are doing. Eut^ particularly after the failure of last January's bombing pause^ we cannot

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accept simple statements that ^sometliing* would happen. We must have some sub^stantial information from a reliable soiirce of Hanoi's position. Vie >rould want to have, "in advanceJ a reasonably accurate picture of what Hanoi's meaningful, dlscemablej responsive action would be-

"5. You should also point cut the possibility raised in Ambassador Goldberg's UDJ speech of September 22 of a stopping of bombing 'prior* to the other side's taking 'timely' responsive action providing we had received assurances J private or othen^lse;, that the other side will take such action- That speech remains an authoritative statement of the US position-

^6- You should assure the Romanians of the seriousness of the US undertaking, spelled out in the Manila Comuiunique, to withdraw its troops from STO within six months after the fulfillment of the stated conditions,

"7. You should try to find out whether the 'signal' relates to Hanoi's willingness to begin negotiations if the bombing stops, or whether it relates to responsive reciprocal actions as described above. You should also continue your efforts to determine the extent to which the 'signal' comes from Hanoi as well as the precise details of the 'signal.'

"8. If the Romanians are at all forthcoming, you should ask them to tell Hanoi that the US is prepared at any time to hold direct and discreet talks with Hanoi

BUSK (Drafted by D,I, Davidson, EA)

January 28, I967

Davis met with Manescu to emphasize Washington's feelings on reciprocity and to inquire further about the "signal.^' Manescu admitted that he had ho specific knowledge for this signal•

BUCHAiffiST 913 to SecState (SECRET-NODIS), 28 January 1967> Ref: State 125269 :

"2* . »,I wanted to mention two ijiiportant points: (a) United States could in no event stop bombing in return for a mere agreement to talk. Secretary Rusk emphasised in his conversation with the FonMin on October 5 the lack of reciprocity in an exchange of no bombing for talks; (b) the reciprocal response req.uested from Hanoi must be concrete and one that

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gave promise of setting in motion true process of de-escalation, I then asked if Manescu's statement concerning the 'signal' related onJ-y to Hanoi's willingness to talk if bombing stops or whether it related to some responsive reciprocal actions by Hanoi*

"U. I then asked if Manescu could tell me whether his statement to me on train had been based on any new information or recent contact with Hanoi^ i.e-^ something new, say in the period between his October talk with the Secretary and now. Correctly speaking^ he replied5 no^ but it was based on all information and developments which Ronanian government had noted."

DAVIS

Ja,nuary 31. 19^7

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Davis met with Deputy Foreign Minister Kacovescu and Secretary General Ceausescu- Ceausescu said he was not clear on what guarantees U.S* wanted. The DRVj he said, "wants ^.S. bombing cessatiori/ as a deliberate decision of U.S. itself." Cessation of bombing, Ceausescu concluded, had to be the first step. The second.step, according to Ceausescu> was recognition of the IWF^ for "it not possible for DRV to speak on behalf of I^ILF/' In an important addition^ Ceausescu said that "leaders of DRV do not wish to have inteimediaries but would like to talk directly with you."

^ BUCMREST 925 to SecState (SECRET-MODIS)^ 3I January 1967,

Ref: Bucharest's 913:

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"5. I then went beyond these points made with Manescu on January 28 and in accordance with State 125269 said US not thinking in terms of written and categorical statement by Hanoi but we must have some substantial information from reliable source of Hanoi's position and reasonable accurate picture of what Hanoi's responsive action would be to cessation bombing.

"8. Ceausescu said US referred to wanting guarantees or assurances but he was not clear what guarantees US wanted. DRV does not rea^iire cessation of bombing as something forced on US but wants this as deliberate decision of US itself. This would in no way affect prestige of US but on contrary strengthen that prestige. Must also think of Hanoi's prestige. If US looking for honorable solution why not give other side opportunity for honorable way out. In

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summaryJ Ceausescu concluded, his view was first step must be unconditional cessation of bombing,

"9- Second was problem recognition of NLF. Negotiations with Hanoi not alone sufficient and it not possible for DKV to speak on behal.f on NLF. Romania believed political solution must be found.--

"11. Ceausescu replied he could not foresee but under present circumstances 'I cannot obtain* assurances which US seeks. He not do so but It was his firm belief that cessation bombing would smooth way to negotiations*..At this point he made only remark which I would consider of possibly new significance, Ceausescu said 'insofar as I knowj leaders of DRV do not wish to have intermediaries but would like to talk directly with you- Intermediaries tend to get things mixed up and DRV does not like intermediaries* '

^'12. *. .In accordance with paragraph 8 State Tel 125269 I said US is prepared at any time to hold direct and discreet talks with Hanoi and if Romanian government felt it possible we would appreciate their telling Hanoi this..-They would tell Hanoi this-*."

MVIS

O February 1, I967

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Davis summarized the current status of the Roimnian track

BUCHAREST 932 to SecState (SECRET-NODIS), 1 February 1967> Ref: Bucharest's 925:

"2, He neither expected nor received any hint of change in Romanian position^ i*e.j first step toward peaceful^ settlement should be unconditional cessation of bombing of North. But it is perhaps noteworthy that his references to recognition and negotiations with NLF and withdrawal of US troops were not as categorical as expressed in Warsaw Kict declaration on Vietnam of last July to which Romania had affixed its signature. Moreover^ though declining in any respect to act as intermediary^ he did tell us on his own initiative Hanoi preferred to talk directly to US and he assented to convey to Hanoi that US prepared to have direct and discreet talks . "

DAVIS

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October 2^, I967

On no ^notice and several weeks after his i;eturn from llanoij Prime Minister Maurer called in Davis for a Vietnam discussion- Maurer began

rby recalling bis, conversations v^ith Secretary Eusk and President Jolinson during the time of the extraordinai-y General Assembly session. He stressed the President's central point — the South Vietnamese being able to decide

C their ovm destiny^ i*e.^ "if they want to adopt coiTMunisnij let them or vice versa; if they wish to unify with NVj let them or vice versa." The '':hrust of Maurer's position was contained in a two-point proposal: (l) "US ^ mst stop^ immediately^ unconditionally, and once for all bombing MVI^; I and (2) "r]VN must declare its agreement to start negotiations.-,." Maurer

*- assumed that "talks vrould start with armed action in SVW continuing," He

.dded that "military actions can cease only when both sides find satisfac-r uory political solution." Maurer explained that Hanoi's willingness to '

'I L ^ start negotiations was tied to l^esident Johnson* s acceptance of the Geneva i ■ Agreements of 195^ 3,s a "real basis for discussions." Davis asked Maurer

r whether Hanoi accepted the principle of the South Vietnamese deciding their . own destinyJ and Maurer responeded in the affirmative.

Ambassador Davis asked Maurer whether the President's San Antonio I speech made any impact on his discussion in Hanoi, and Maurer replied that I the speech was available but that the official text v^as not received by Hanoi at that time. Arguing that NVI^ did not really have many troops in the South, as the whole US approach to MI^ infiltration asserted, Maurer said that the President's no advantage formula is "not based on reality and cannot be followed by NWI," Diet fully understanding the formula, Maurer said that Hanoi could not stop supporting v/hatever troops it had - in the South.

Maurer stressed that this was, indeed, a propitious time to get negotiations started, that the Soviet Union and Hanoi were in agreement with the information he had just passed on to Davis, Maurer concluded with a very interesting approach to the problem, saying that the two sides were indeed far apart, but once both sides were at the table, "then the other nations desirous of seeing an end to conflict would try to push two sides together."

BUCHAREST 60^ to SecState (SECRET-EXDIB), 25 October, 1967

1 r ^*3, , . , He summarized these vievrs, which he pre-

^ t sented to Hanoi, as follows: world wants to see end of

j Vm war, not only public opinion but governments.

\ r There was unity in USG on Vietnam (Question* V/itness

I 1 his separate conversations with President and Secretary

i Rusk, and he described to North Vietnamese USG position

t' as outlined by them, Romanians believed that under

present circumstances prospects were opening up for ^ i discussions with possibility discussions leading to

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peaceful solution. Certainly solution would not come immediately after sitting down at negotiating table. But if talks conducted in constructive and realistic fashion with aim to provide Vietnajnese people right to decide their own destiny: to take Into account dig-* nity and prestige of each state and to create conditions for establishment of normal relations and stability between VI^ and US^ then possibility solution existed----

"^, Maurer then said that after this e:cposition to Hanoi leaders, they discussed possibilities of starting negotiations- Maurer had explained Romanian position as follows: US must stop immediately^ un-conditionally^ and once for all bombing MN; JWXT must declare its agreement to start negotiations ' ith US on elimination of conflict. Certainly at this time armed action in SVIJ would not cease. It is one thing to mobilize and demobilize a force such as US has in STO* US could leave within three days and come back a,gain within three days. But if popular forces in SVIif demobilized J then remobilizatlon would require much more time. So talks would start with armed action in SVJ)f continuing. Aim of negotiations would be to put an end to these armed actions. They would cease effectively when discussion would lead to aiutually acceptable decisions and details could be discussed further.

"5. At this point, 1 broke in to ask whether Maurer was saying that initial discussions would center on cessation of military actions to be followed by political discussions,

^*6, PrimeMin replied he did not separate these 01 q.uestions then or now- Military actions can cease

/ j only when both sides find satisfactory political

solution. As long as no guarantees existed that SVN could decide its own destiny^ there was no reason n for them to put aside weapons. So, Maurer continued^

wi he had regimes ted Worth Vietnamese friends "to declare

categorically that, in case bombardment ceased unconditionally and forever, they would be willing to start negotiations because US position as explained to him by President Johnson and Rusk for a solution p within framework Geneva Agreements of 195^ provided

!" z^eal basis for discussions,

"7. According to Maurer, Vietnamese replied P in a sense which essentially agreed with Romanians,

L' i.e,, if bombardment ceased, they would be prepared

to enter negotiations. To my question whether Vietnamese would state readiness to negotiate before or after

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bombardment ceased, Maurer replied he did not dis-I j cuss details: it was possible Vietnamese could make

^ this statement before or after; this was up to them.

"8, Maui^er commented that his discussions with Iforth Vietnamese had covered many aspects, but he would emphasize only those of interest for US to know.

"a. Tliey had reviewed capacity of North Vietnamese resistance in case war goes on. From all points of view^ military economic, political and socia.lj 'I can tell you KVW can carry on long-term struggle*' This affirmative WN assertion well known throughout world.

"B- Worth Vietnamese leaders are aware they cannot and could not try to humiliate US. Discussions should be conducted in such way so that actual recognition of South Vietnamese people to decide on destiny should have agreement and support of US, Besides, ■ Worth Vietnamese do not look upon settlement of SVM problem as necessarily leading to immediate reunification. It would depend upon what SVN would decide,

''D. In sum J Maurer asserted that he found in HVff 'position much more rational than we found year ago in talks of much same content,* lie asserted

^ this position ^^/as not determined by diminuition KVN

military capacity; it was no secret fighting capacity of MHa growing and would continue to grow because of

Pj more Important aid from socialist countries.

"9. Matirer then said he would like to add some other aspects as he saw them in conjimctlon his desire to put at disposal of US the most complete information possible to help USG with its judgment. Remarking he was not telling US a secret, he said that to a great extent the hard stand of Hanoi was influenced by the hard line of China. In Romanian view, this Chinese influence in Vietnam at present moment 'from war viewpoint' is diminishing

"12. At this point, X asked whether WN had accepted this principle of full liberty SVM people decide ^ own destiny. Maurer replied 'jes «- absolutely yea,* i

He asserted that from their common discussions there ■

emerged quite clearly acceptance principle SVI^ should decide own destiny and indeed there emerged possi--bility of diplomatic relations and special ties between US and SVN state as result of talks ending conflict. i

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"13- This shows TWH leaders do not see aim of solution as reunification< <..

"15. ' At this pointy I asked v/hether President's San Antonio speech on Vietnam had been available to him d\iring course his discussion in Banol* Maurer replied in affirmative> saying it had conie over radio during course their discussions last day- I then had interpreter read President's two sentences in regard cessation bombardment HVH as q^uoted in Secretary Husk's opening statement his news conference October 12 and asked whether North Vietnamese had reacted to this to PrimeMin. Maurer replied negativelyj saying President's statement came by radio on eve bis departure and north Vietnamese had no definitive text.

C; "16• Ma,urer then said that he wished to make

^ clear his view on a central problem which in his

I . opinion is looked upon in an erroneous way in bSA-

He said he did not^ of course, discuss with North

CI Vietnamese leadership WK i^ifiltration into SV^,

} However^ he would like convey his ovm impressions,

U OTNj of course J denied sending men into SVIJ. Accord-

^ ing to Maurer's impressions^ this is not quite true

though we might be wrong. He knows they're sending to SVK supplies^ weapons^ munitions^ medicine, food ^ . and possibly specialists and teclmicians for training*

f His impression is that IiIVN troops even if they are

to be found are few- So when Pi^esident Johnson speaks about obligation not to take advantage

Cof cessation of bombardment^ he is referring to things which are not based on reality and cannot be followed by NVN. For example^ KVN could not cease to support

C' struggle in SVPT because struggle is going on. At any rate, US doing same thing for SVII armed forces* Maurer repeated, according his view, KVN troops as

Csuch are few if any and that during cessation of bombing, ITTIT vrould continue to supply SVN struggle with food and munitions and indeed some of the aid socialist countries give to NVW. He concluded

C President Johnson's formulation does not seem satis-

factory as it proposes a unilateral condition.

"17* I explained our point of view and the necessity of some indication from Hanoi of reciprocity if we should cease bombardment, I cited our experience when on past occasions we had ceased bombardment HWr. l^urer showed himself well aware of our position, but said he thought more than that could be done. US a great and powerful nation and could do more with

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their possibilities without risking failure- 'Possible military disadvantage would be compensated by political advantage.' In Maurer's opinion^ there had never before existed so many favorable conditions for reaching political settlement,

'^18, •*-Soviets had expressed agreement vith Romanian position saying they looked at things in same way^ but emphasized decision must remain with Hanoi, Maurer added that moreover he had stressed to Soviet leaders that increase in economic and military aid by socialist countries to MVN is apt to assure greater liberty to Hanoi* According to Hordanian judgment^ this would make Hanoi less dependent on Chinese*

"19' I-faurer summed up by saying his thoughts were very clear: negotiations would start; US would put forward list of' proposals unacceptable to NVN ajid Hanoi would do likewise- Then the other nations desirous of seeing bai end to conflict wo\ild try to push two sides together* 'lliis is our hope and our desire*^ Friends of both sides would compel each t6 give a little here and there and both sides would be compelled to listen to them. Tliusj in end a solu--

I / tlon could be found."

DAVIS

November 1, I967

State responded with interest and a good many precise and exploratory questions to the Maurer interview. State also indicated that Governor Harriman^ on his way back from Pakistan^ could pursue the matter should Bucharest desire. The questions State was interested in focused on:

(1) v/hether the bombing stop had to be permanent as well as unconditional;

(2) the distinction among contacts, talks and negotiations; and (3) the authorization for the Maurer statements.

State also instructed Ambassador Davis to pursue the B^esident's San Antonio speech and clarify its meaning. Daris was told to say that the speech was *'not assuming North Vietnam would cut off its support to its forces in the South while the armed struggle was continuing. At the same time USG would feel if KVN sought to take advantage of the bombing cessation or limitation to increase its support of its forces in the South, to attack our forces from north of IMZ or to maintain large-scale visible resupply efforts now impossible..."

STATE 63057 to AmEmbassy Bucharest (SECRET-NODIS)^ 1 November 1967j Ref: Richarest 60ki

I "U. ..-Por example^ as reporte;d reftel, Maurer

^ explained Romanian position as requesting North Vietnam

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to declare categorically that in case bombarlment ceased unconditionally and Torever North Vietnam would be willing to start negotiations for a solution within the framework of the 195^ Geneva Accords* According to Maurer the NVll replied in a sense which essentially agreed with Rortta^nia, i.e., if bombardEient ceased they would be prepared to enter negotiations* The precise wording of the reply is obviously of great significance to the USO, Did Hanoi ask for cessation of bombardment? Did Hanoi use the words permanently or unconditionally? Did Hanoi differentiate (as it has in the past) among contacts^ talks and negotia^tions and which word did they use to describe the discussions that would take place after the stopping of the bombing? Was it clear that the stopping of bombing would be foliated by talks within a short ti:ne? What indications were there of the matters that would be taken up at the talks? What was Tianoi's reaction to Maurer's req.uest that it ^categorically' declare its readiness to begin talks after the stopping of the bombing? FXX Usual DRV formulation Is that talk 'could' follow bombing halt. End FYI. ^

"5- Other specific points on which we hope Maurer will be willing to furnish farther information include:

"a) ^-niether the expectation that fighting f^ will continue in South Vietnam concurrently with nego-

tiations is Romanian or North Vietnamese andj if NVHj the reasoning behind their expectation*

%) T-aiether iWB" agreed with Romania that basic provisions of ^^k Geneva Accords provided real basis for discussions. If so^ can Kaurer provide any specific indication of how North Vietnamese view basic provisions?

'*c) What did Hanoi indicate as its conception of conditions under which South Vietnamese people could decide their own destiny?

"d) V;hat ^special ties' between South Vietnam and the US did North Vietnam see as possibly emerging as result of talks ending conflict?

"e) 1-fhat is the basis for Maurer's distinction between the ITVN leaders who use their own brains and those who make judgments under Chinese influence? What underlies his judgment that Chinese influence on North ,Vietnam 'from war viev.^oint' is diminishing? Wliat 'elasticity' in position of USG does Maurer suggest would strengthen independent elements in North Vietnam?

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"f) Ifhat further information can Maurer provide as to North Vietnam's views on reunification of Vietnam?

"g) To what extent did North Vietnam leaders authorize Maurer to give report to USG?

"6- You should enq.uire whetherj since Maurer's conversations in iianoij Romanians have received any indication of Hanoi*s reaction to the President's September 29 San Antonio formulation. In connection with this enquiry you should state that the President has instructed you to ioform Maurer of two important points:

"a) There can he no doubt as to the magnitude of IVm infiltration into South Vietnam. Through the

C capture of hundreds of prisoners^ thousands of docu-

ments ^ the interrogation of nmnerous defectors from the Wl] army and other means of intelligence collec-

Ction the USG can state categorically that there are now in South Vietnam at least 5*^,000 regular soldiers of the Iforth Vietnamese Army foz^med into at least 80 battalions. Furthermore^ the USG estimates on the basis of reliable evidence that MN infiltration has averaged approximately 5jOOO men per month over the last two years* Finally you should note that continued artillery and other attacks upon US positions In South Q Vietnam just below the K'iZ are being made solely by

regular units of the ITOi army which are not included in the figures given above.

"b) The President> in making his assumption that the North Vletnamf^se would not take ad van-P tage of the bombing cessation or limitation vrhile

L. discussions proceed^ i-ras not assuming Worth Vietnam

I would cut off entirely its support to its forces in

Cthe South while the areed struggle was continuing• At the same time USG would feel if IWn sought to take advantage of the bombing cessation or limitation to increase its support of its forces in the South, to

L at tack our forces from north of J)MZ or to mount large-

scale visible resupply efforts now impossible it would not be acting in good faith/'

[ RUSK (Drafted by s/aH: Davidson/lsham

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November 2-1^, I967

On 2 November in Bucharest 61^8j Davis said that since Maurer was r in Moscow^ he had sought an appointment with Macovescu and conveyed contents

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of paragraph 3^ State 63057- Macovescu said that he would handle the matter with dispatch. On h November in State 64852^ State indicated that Governor Harrloian could be in Bucharest anytime from November 27 to Novem* her 30- On 3 November^ in Bucharest S?!? Davis requests permission to give Macovescu q^uestions and information contained in State reftel in order to facilitate Maurer's discussions in Moscow. State concurred (State 65068} with this course of action on k November- On 6 Novemberj, as stated ,in Bucharest 668^ Davis handed the paper to Kacovescu. Cabling on 6 November in Bucharest 66^^ Davis reported that the Eomania^n government agreed :o the Harriman visit at the end of November. On ik November in Bucharest ^12J Davis reported that Maurer had granted him an appointment for the fo3J_owing day.

November lg> 196?

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; Maurer accompanied by Macovescu had a long and very careful session

C. with Ambassador Davis in which Matirer responded in detail to the questions . contained in State 63O57, While the cable is more revealing of Romanian thinking on Vietnam than on Hanoi's positions^ Maurer's presentation seemed to clarify a nuniber of points- It should be noted^ hcwever, that many

Cof these ^'clarifications" were out of-whack with other signals and read-i Ings the USG was taking at the same time. Maurer's key responses were: 1 (1) that the bombing cessation had to be permanent and unconditional be-

' fore talks can startj (2) that the Romanian objective was to get negotia-

t J r tions started "without interrupting armed actions in SVTf^J (3) that a

real basis for reaching a solution existed "because essential points of ^ ^ NVN position are based on 195^ Geneva Accords Just as essential points »» ' President Johnson's position based on Geneva"; (k) that Hanoi made "no ^ differentiation,. ^between contacts^ talks and negotiations," aiid that "only

reference was to discussions which would lead to solution of conflict...";

C(5) that Hanoi believes there should be a "certain lapse of time" between cessation of bombardment and start of negotiations; (6) that Hanoi "understood necessity of assertion of clear stand in regard to negotiations,"

Maurer made clear that Hanoi in no way authorized this report

BUCJiAJffiST 718 to SecState (SECRET-NODIS), I5 November 1967^ Refs: State 63O57 and Bucharest 668:

"l, ErimeMin Maurer received me for two hoiU'S this morning Nov I5 accompanied by Acting FonMin Macovescu and same interpreter as at first meeting. Today Maurer had before him paper which contained Romanian translation of questions embodied in paper which I had handed Macovescu on Sunday Nov 5 (Romanian translation was in script which indicates strict security control these conversations by Romania,ns about which Pi^imeMin Maurer aga.in made special point several times during ensuing discussion),

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"2. Beginning with para k State 630>7, Maurer proceeded to read and answer questions seriatira.

C"3' To question did I^noi ask for cessation of boBibardment;, Maurer answered ^yes and no,' In eicplana-tion^ he went on to say that both in his talks with Hanoi and on other occasions ^ Hanoi has said that per-

Cmanent and unconditional cessation of bombardment is necessary before talks can start- This is also the EOEianian vlex-rpcint. He left Vietnam convinced that

Lthis was Hanoi's view. Hanoi more or less xsresented this view in the statement by their Fonl^in in January 1966 although it was 'more hazily^ expressed in this statement and more linked with other things. Maurer I continued that objective his discussions was ^hat

I cessation of boiobardiiient must lead to negotiations with-

out interrupting amed actions in SVH. Obvious there C existed possibil-ity of reaching solution because essen-

tial points of KVtJ position are based on 195^ Geneva Accords Just as essential points President Johnson's

C position based on Geneva, Thus there is a basis for

discussions. Certainly there may be certain nuances how one side or the other understand provisions of J Geneva Accords^ but this is why talks should be held

to bring to common" denominator all aspects.

"^, Maurer said this justified his first assertion that reply v;as 'yes,' *But why^ * Maurer asked, 'did I also say no.' Beceaise during these discussions there was not one single moment when the people to whom we talked referred to this as their desire -- only a necessity resulting from respect for international norms j for sovereignty of WH and it was presented as practical possibility to bring inatters to discussion, ' Maurer concluded this is why his reply was made in such 'circumstantial manner because I want my reply to be clear and definite-'

"5. Did Hanoi use words 'permanently'^ or 'un-conditionally'? Maurer replied;, 'yes,' saying French word 'definitivement' had been used for 'permanent.'

'^6- Did Hanoi differentiate among contacts^ talks and negotiations and which word did they use to describe discussions after stopping of bombing? Maurer replied this was not toviched upon in Hanoi, He only touched upon subject of discussions which would lead J, if possible, to cessation of war and settlement of conflict in Vietnam* No differentiation was made between these words. Only reference was to discussions which would lead to solution of conflict and

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'I did not notice-any nuances' in position IIVN, Goal is political settlement "based on essential point of Vietnamese and 'as I understand it President Johnson's viewpoint' that right of South Vietnamese people to determine freely and of their own accord their destiny must be recognized-

"7- ^as it clear stopping of bombing would be follo\';ed ty talks in short time? Mauxer replied that there was a rather longer discussion on this point because NVH viewpoint was that 'certain lapse of time' * should pass between cessation of bombardment and start of discussions, tfeurer said^ S,^e tried to show them that it was not g.uite necessary for this lapse of time, 1 should like to say in this xegoxd. that my impression is that at end our talks KVN adhered to theii' original viewpoint, i.e.^ a certain lapse of time should ensue. We talked quite a lot auDut this. Perhaps they have certain reasons better understood by them than by us,'

"8, Here Maurer said he would like to interject his oifn opinion. Should liVW adhere to this position, nevertheless cessation of bombing would constitute a start of friendly actions upon NVN in order to make this interval as short as possible. 'I think there would be many states^ not only Romania and not only socialist countries^ who would be ready to exert pressure by friendly advice on NVI^ to follov/ cessation of bombing by something to shorten interval between this and start of discussion.' Maurer concluded that though this was personal reflection he wished to emphasize that there were iriany socialist and other countries who could have a certain influence on NW.

"9- l^liat indications were there of matters that would be taken up at talks? Maurer answered cryptically, 'none* I avoided discussing such subjects and I continue to do so. I am not mandatary of either INN or USA. In doing what I did^ I did not defend either USA, (vjhich doesn't need it) or MH (though I wish to defend it). Tfttat made us go to Planoi? Our friendly relations with Hanoi are quite obvious and our friendship grows greater so long as those events go on and on. So we decided to go to Hanoi to discuss these events as I described to you last time* V7e agreed we should meet from time to time to consult each other. Moreover, I had advantage of talks with President Johnson and Secretary Rusk, I thought I noted something very positive in these discussions which led me to folowing absurd conclusion.'

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"12. To question Vfhat i^as Hanoi's reaction to Prime l-linister's request that it 'categorically* declare its readiness begin talks after stopping of bombingj Maurer replied their discussions on tbis topic vere rather long and they ended with North Vietnajnese statement that it seemed to them 'Roinanian point of view as presented logical one and they would think about it and how it could be practically implemented*' Maurer said they had not been so punctilious about certain words, but his idea as presented to Hanoi was that it should state clearly that if bombing ceases then talks v;ould start, ^Since it and Wm said QUOTE your stand logical one^ UMQUOTE 1 can only understand that such a statement must be made from HVH ovm fjords. I did not think of formulation for such a declaration because of nature of our discussions. Moreover^ there was no evidence that WN had thought of formulation. We discussed certain ideas and result is tliat WJl^ understood necessity of assertion of clear stand In regard to negotiations-'

**13, Ee questions.A through G in paragraph 5 State 63057, Maurer answered as follows:

*^A- Both Romanian and IJVN point of view is tliat fighting will continue in SVTJ concurrently with negotiations, Maurer asserted he did not discuss I j^ reasoning for common acceptance this expectation but

i ^ ' remarked INN standpoint might have some different

nuances as compared with his own. His own viewpoint

Cis that while easy for US to mobilize or disband great military force in Vietnam on side IWI^f is completely different. They need more than 1^8 hours to mobilize or disband their forces. This was no secret. This was i r not first time 'strategy' of popular war is being dis-

L. ' cussed, J^laurer asserted it was quite logical that

i military actions would be ended only when discussions

L created for both sides certainly of mutua3J.y accepta-

ble conditions. ^ 'This is reason why 1 believe military J . actions and political discussions will continue in

parallel.'

"B. Maurer stated that NVN has always asserted that I95U Geneva Accords provide real basis for negotiations- This is something which constantly appears in statements issued by leaders of NTO and EOF* 'Deliberately we did not discuss any subject which night be the subject of negotiations between the two sides. This is for the Vietnamese and Ameri-

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* "C- To question what did lianoi indicate as its conception of conditions which SVN people could decide their own destiny^ Maurer said he did not ask as he did not ask President Johnson a'bout US conceptions. * (Comment: Here for first and last time he mentioned the name of NW Prime Minister Phan Van Dong as ^ participant in talks•)

"5. As to ^special ties' between SVK and US emerging as result of talks^ Maurer said if SVN decided to remain separate state this would mean it could establish not only diplomatic hut econoiEiCj cultural^ etc, J ties with many states of its own choosing j including USA.

"E. To question what is basis for Maurer's ; distinction between NVN leaders who use their own

El brains and those who make judgments under Chinese in-\ fluence^ Maiirer replied simply^ 'I am basing myself

on 65 years experience of life-' He continued there

Cj was complete unity of IWN leadership concerning secur-

J ing for SVI^ people right to-decide their own destiny

i but he thought It logical there would be nuances in

their way of thirxking which would be determined by fact that 'some of them have wider liberty in their thinking while others have a more influenced pattern of thinking p' Here Maurer paused and said he would like to say something v^xj important though he was s.ware z^ ^ of the risk in imparting to US his view; *My firm

Impression is that at present in ITO)f there are men in the leadership holding the most responsible positions who enjoy great liberty in their thinking.' At this juncture^ Maurer with a somewhat wry smile rema^rked^ 'what would Chou En Lai say if he knew what 1 told you? ^jfhat would tlie North Vietnamese leadership say? What would happen to relations between Eomania, China, and North Vietnam if they knew? As regards what underlies Maurer's judgment that Chinese Influence on MVIJ 'from war viewpoint' is diminishing;, Maurer said he would prefer not to answer; there was great risk for Romanian government policy here and exclaimed 'think what would happen if China or !WN knew I admitted this affirmation. But I said this and I stick to it. V/liy did 1 tell you this? Because I think this is a QUOTE conmiandlng UNQUOTE thing on part of he who wishes to obtain certain results. For this reason I said it was logical US should heed this fact; that

C policy shduld be flexible enough in order to allow

free thinking people to develop wiJJLingness to adhere to such v^ays of thinking.' To question of what 'elasticity' in position of USG does Maurer suggest would

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strengthen Independent elements ITTO^ Maurer replied cessation of "bombing is cried out every^-^here. It vould constitute an act of great political wisdom, Maurer said lie was not taking liberty of trying give lesson to leaders USA but he thought it was good to say what he had told US frankly and openly. He believed leaders USG have wisdom and insight to see what in his thinking might contribute to peace and interests of US itself-

"F, To q^uestion re further inforniation as to NVI^ views on reunification Vietnam^ Maurer simply replied he had nothing to add to what he had already said on this :5ubject»

"G- To what extent did KVDI leader" authorize Maurer to give report to USG? Maurer replied^ 'absolutely none. It vras my own exclusive responsibility. ' Maurer then explained at some length why he had done this. Essentially because he believed there exist conditions which can lead to political solution. Existence of conflict, troubles3 many important things in which Romania is interested. Especially after ffew York and Washington discussions, Maurer was confident USG was ^garbl^ solution. He went to Hanoi to explain that a coiTimoii basis existed for discussions to end hostilities. lie was far from thinking in Hanoi that he would inform USG of his discussion there^ but in the end and upon further reflection he thought it important to move this unhappy situation tov^ard more reasonable solution- He was not pushed by WF but acted solely on own initiative* It might be that NVN would reproach him greatly for this but objectively he believes a reasonable solution is near*

"1^. Maurer stated that subseq^uent to his visit in Hanoi Homanian government has not repeat not received any indication of Hanoi's reaction to President's September 29 San Antonio formulation. In answer to my question^ he stated flatly that Romani-ajis had not participated in discussions on'Vietnajn during their recent visit to Moscow."

MVIS

November 17, I967

^ F 1 1 1 * "I K —^^^^^^

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that there are divided councils in Hanoi and that dairiese hard stand influence is diminishing." Davis accepted Maurer's statement of basic Romanian policy -- "existence of conflict troubles many important things in vhich Romania is interested/'

November £9, 1967

' In Bucharest 802j Davis reported on a discussion with Ceausescu* ^eausescu took a very hard line in this conversation and argued^ in effect^

hat the ^'DHV and rffiF represented South Vietnamese people p" He farther stated that US was repeating the mistake of great povrers in the past by ignoring the opinion of others and carrying out an imperialist policy, ' s to why Hanoi refused to accept the San Antonio formula^ Ceausescu main-^ained that the formula imposed conditions> and that a formal declaration' l}y the US was in order.

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; BUCH/IBEST 802 to SecState (SECRET-NOBIS), 29 JTovember

; 1967:

"5' Ceausescu referred to my morning conversation with PrimeMin and in particuJ_ar to request that PriineMin try and help br.ing US and Vietnam together* Ceausescu's opinion any such attempt now would not lead to very 'spectacular' results until cessation of bombing* VJlaile Ceausescu agreed tliat reunification of divided countries should not be achieved through force^ yet blandly argued that riLF had put forth program for reunification only as long-time and peacei*ul development with which DKV agreed. He asserted that DRV could not wage war in Sduth which did not have support of people there and suggested US policy based on incomplete information and incorrect assumptions. To my repeated questions why Hanoi had slammed door in face President's generous San Antonio offer and wliy Hanoi refused to say either publicly or privately what would happen after permanent cessation of bombing, Ceausescu took line we were imposing conditions; that a bombing pause w^ouJ.d be only another form of ultimatumj that absence of formal declaration of war raised problems in international law (i.e.^ bombing) not in favor of US and that if US would only cease bombing permanently and unconditionally other countries would exercise pressure on both sides to bring them to negotiating table, Ceausescu also argued that cessation bombing would be act of political wisdom."

DAVIS

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I?ove!nber 29, 1967 -^ Harriman-Maurer Conversations

Maurer cairied on a monologue in ^-rhich he reviewed the points he had previously mde in Bucharest 60k of 25 October, Kaurer again focused on only one objective — getting negotiations started "and nothing more-" In this respectJ *he repeated that world opinion would push the two powers toward a settlement once negotiations began-

,' Maurer was told a very Interesting story about Hanoi *s view on getting r* is cuss ions started. In his first nee ting with Phara Tan Dong, it v:as his

nrpression that Hanoi did not wish to enter discussions • During the next day's talk with Dongj Hanoi's position softened. Dong took the position [that T^orth Vietnam "should enter discussions while continuing the struggle *^n the South as long as there is uncertainty as to the right of the SVN

.^eople to decide their destiny/* Dong^ expressing what Maurer considered-I to be the leadership position in Hanoi^ desired a "rather more circumstan-tial" statement on Hanoi's part. "IWN was to declare that it was ready to start discussions with the US if the US declared and ceased unconditionally and permanently for ail time bombardment over IWK DMZ^ if US declared that 'it would 'never resuiae*'" Even in this event, Hanoi "wou3.d allow certain time to pass to enable it to test sincerity of such declaration and action,"

Maurer^ as hefore, continued to stress that a very serious part of the problem was China, Although he believed that the Chinese faction in Hanoi was losing some influence^ it was still quite strong.

HarrimaUj, in response, said that what was missing from this dialogue was "any indication that Hanoi wants serious negotiations, that Hanoi says that US should stop bombing, but does not even say that they will talk." Harriman gave the impression that all. we were waiting for was a message from Hanoi that they would enter "meaningful talks*" Harriman also noted Hanoi*s demand for a "r^ermanent cessation."

BUCHAREST 8O3 to SecState (SECHET-NODIS), 29 November, 19671

"1- After briefly touching on Middle East and l-lanescu's election and performance at UH^ I brought Up Vietnam and conveyed the President's gratitude ^ for the complete account Kaurer had given Ambassador

Davis- I asked Maurer if he had given full attention

Cto the President's San Antonio speech. I told him this was as sweeping a statement as had ever been made during war and showed the President's desire for negotiated peace. I informed him that the interpretation of the 'no advantage' formula-tion which we had previously given him had been conveyed to Hanoi through channels then open. I told him of our disappointment at Hanoi's having turned down the offer so coldly and asked for his judgment as to why Hanoi had done so.

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p "2, MaiJirer then launched into what was virtually

I a tvfo-hour monologue out of a three hour discussion.

He said he did not know directly why San Antonio offer had been turned down since speech was given on last

Cday of his talk with Iham Van Dong and neither of them had text available.

"3- His talks with the President and the Secretary had convinced him that primary and overriding American goal was to guarantee right of South Vietnamese people to determine their own destiny and only secondarily to fulfill commitment to GVtT, Based on this belief^ he advised Hiam Van Dong that without ceasing military action in Souths IIVM should enter into discussions with US, He told Dong that the struggle in the South should conclude only when US and W^ both agree on how SVN people can define freely their own destiny. Then as President Johnson told him categorically American troops will go -home.

C"J|. Maurer deliberately focused on only one thing; 'The starting of negotiations and nothing more.' Maurer believes that once discussions begun the nations of the world will throw their influence behind reaching a successful conclusion and would put pressure both on Hanoi and the US that would push them towards solution acceptable to both sides. US and WN both agree that SVK people p should decide their own destiny and discussions could

work out different understandings each side may have of this principle.

"5. At the end of the first day of conversations with Pham Van Dong (interrupted once or twice by having to go down to air raid shelter)j Maurer concluded from the hazy and contradictory answers he received that Hanoi did not wish to enter discussions. Maurer decided not to pursue the matter further. The next day Kaurer suggested that they discuss bilateral relations but a.fter a short morning devoted to bilateral matters Dong brought the talks back to negotiations-, Dong then asked Maurer to allow him to present Hanoi's sta,nd-poiat on the statement Maurer had asked Hanoi to ma.ke to the effect that if bombardment would cease^ they would enter into discussions with the US,

"6. I questioned his use of 'would/ saying that Hanoi usually uses 'could-' Kaurer replied that it is difficult for him to recall precise word but that it didn't matter since they were talking in French^ and Dong'.s French is so poor that no such nuances could be retained;

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C"7' Maurer continued that this time Dong's position was very clear and logical, Dong asserted that you (>Iaurer) arc right. The DRV must make such a statement. It should enter discussions while continuing the V struggle in the South as long as there is uncertainty

L as to the right of the SVTT people to decide their des-

tiny.

"8, l!aurer and Dong then discussed details on how such discussions could begin, Dong thought that Hanoi's statement must be ^rather more circumstantial^ that is to mean NW was to declare that It was ready to start discussions with the US if US declared and ceased unconditionally and permanently for all time bombardment over IWf Dl-iZ if US declared that it would 'never resume^j' Hanoi would allow certain time to pass to enable it to test sincerity of such delcara-tlon and action, Maurer asked why these conditions^ when one condition could be enough ^^ tliat the US declare that it ceases imcondltlonaHy and for a3_l time and that it would not resume the bombing. Vfliy^ Maurer asked3 should there be an Interval between end of bombing and start of negotiations?

^^9* Maurer apparently did not receive an answer to his question- He indicated his personal belief that there exists within the North Vietnamese leader-; p ship some with points of view more reserved towards

j \ _^^ negotiations than one with which Dong finally agreed*

He thought such reserve might be the result of the Chiiiese viewpoint. Maurer told me that the US should exercise flexible judgment meant to strengthen the Vietnajnese (as opposed to Chinese) way of thinking,

"10, Maurer emphasized that the Important thing was that on the second day Pham Van Dong was expressing the opinion of the North Vietnamese leadership-While Maurer did not see Ho^ Maurer believes that at every intermission Ho was told of the discussion* Maurer believes that on the night of the first day^ Ho was consulted and that there might even have been a meeting of the North Vietnamese leadership.

"11. Maurer then turned his monologue to what he described as the 'serious angle to problem': China-He said that if the Chinese leadership know of today's discussion^ Romanian and Chinese relations 'would be burled* *.

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*^12- . Maurer said that the Clainese reply ^was 'disconcertingly short.' They said that they agreed partially with Maurer's judgment, that they thought that the US had only two choicesj either leaving VN, or expanding the wa:^p If the US extended the war, then it was inevitable that it would e>rpand over China. The Chinese said that 've are ready for this and are waiting for it.^ ..- I asked whether he thought the Chinese did want war, Maurer said that he wouldn't say they wanted it, hut he wouldn't say they don't want war. --Maurer said he knew the evolution of the position of the socialist states on VTr, At the beginning they furnished less support to W^ than they do now. Continuation of the situation would bring them closer together.

"lU. I told him that what is missing is any indication that Hanoi wants serious negotiations, that Hanoi says that the US should stop bombing, but does not even say that they will talk. They ask not only for unconditional but permanent cessation of bombing. I pointed out that Hanoi is,now attacking US forces just below the DMZ, and that since the President will not permit the invasion of HVll, the only way we can slow down their attack is to hit their positions in KVIT. I mentioned the Canadian suggestion of the re-establishment of a demilitarized IMZ and Hanoi's rejection. I said there seems to be a strange idea that the bombing of the North is not part of the military action of the war, but is somehow disconnected. Hanoi is asking the US to commit itself not to resmie bombing while leaving itself free to do anything It wants. I said it was our impression that Hanoi has no serious intention of entering meaningful talks^ for if they had^ they would send US a message either through Maurer or other channels. If they sent US a message privately or talked with US privately on conditions necessary prior to beginning of negotiations^ or if they told US what they intended to do, this would be another matter. I pointed out that we have no intention of destroying the regime in NVW, but Just want to stop it from taking over the South 'b^ force. I told him that I would have thought the socialist states would be putting pressure for negotiation on Banoi, rather than encouraging it by escalating aid, and that I thought the socialist countries should recognize that we are not threatening the regime in NW^ but that we are under treaty obligation to defend SVlf against aggression from NVN. I said it was my impression that the Soviet Union and the Eastern European states, but not Peking, want the fighting stopped, and that if

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f^ concern exists d.bout major confrontation, we should

|_ get together to agree upon ending of conflict*

"15, I said we thought that the San Antonio state ment^ supplemented by the e^lanation given Kaurer, made clear a possible way to end conflict.

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(_ above all the President wanted negotiations for a

peaceful settlement^ and asked him if he had any doubt

C about this- He replied that he had none, that if he

had any he wouldn't have talked to jNW as he did-I asked him if he thought KVU had a right to enter

CSW, and whether he thought ¥est Genra^ny had a right to enter East Germany, I recalled that we fought in Korea because the ETorth entered the South- 1 said divided countries were unhappy situations^ but the r' us has agreed, and we consider that the socialist

L countries have agreed, that there will be no unifi-

cation by force* I told him that perhaps he hoped C reunification of Germany would never come, bvit that

while we hope that it will^ we do not want it to come through force, 1 referred to our SEATO commitment undertaken in 195^ during the Elsenhower Administrati on> and said that the socialist states should real* ise the seriousness with which we consider our obligation and should try to induce Hanoi to terminate its ^ aggression.

"17. I asked Matirer how he thought the President

C could contribute to a change in Hanoi's attitude•

I said a pause miglit be considered, though unless Hanoi acted differently than last time, it would be of a short duiration and create a more difficult situ-

Cation. 1 explained how Hanoi had taken advantage of the Tet pause* I said I hoped the Soviet Union, Eomianiaj and other Eastern European countries would use their r influence to get talks started imder conditions which

{^ would give some hope of a successful conclusion- I

said that asking for a permanent cessation without any indication of what might result — perhaps nothing --is like asking us to tie our right hand behind our back while fighting continues* It wou.ld be different if they said stop bombing for two weeks or a month

t while we talk^ but they ask for a permanent stop,

I asked how this could be taken seriously.

"18. Kaurer said he ^absolutely agreed' that bombing is a part of general military action, and said he would go further, by saying that from the mj.litary point of view not only could bombing be recommended,

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\^Mt that the occux:ation of IJYN as a way of destroying the 'backyard' of SVTT could be recommeiided- After NW was temporarily occupied and the war in the Iforth became a guerrilla one^ the same military recommendation could be n^de concerning China, which would become the new backyard, But^ said Maurer, it would not be Justified from the political viev;point. War is nothing but politics conducted by other means* It is waged to bring one side in a political conflict a decisive advantage* This is why political considerations should be dominant and it is why President Johnson does not permit his troops to cross the DMZ» From the military point of view he said the President was wrong in not ordering the crossing of the DMZ^ but from the political point of view he is correct, and that is why he /garble/not justified on military grounds*

"19- Maurer admitted that the cessation of bombard ment involved risks that talks n^y not start for some time> that negotiations may start but be unduly prolonged, or that they may not result in a solution. But he thought that with all countries (except possibly China) exerting their influence^ there would be a settlement.

"20, I commented that the President is using limited means beca^use of the limited character of our objectives* r, He did not want to' inva.de IWN because he had no inten-

]^2 tion of interfering with a solialist regime which he

knows socialist states will defend. He ordered attacks * on supply routes 8,nd military targets but against the

[ advice of the military he has not ordered mining of

Haiphong harbor and interference with its shipping, ^ We have not attacked the dikes or engaged in area

C bombing of population centers as v^as done in World

War II. The President's military advisors say the situation in the south would become substantially r more difficult if NVN were permitted to freely move

[ men and supplies South. I appealed to Maurer as a

man in a strategic position who has the ear of President Johnson^ of the Soviet Union, of China and Hanoi, to advise us as to how we can bring about negotiations* I repeated that it was impossible for the President to stop bombing permanently^ without some indication from Hanoi as to what would happen, I said the President had made his proposal in San Antonio, and that he would be willing to receive any other reasonable r proposal from Maurer, Ma\irer replied that the Presi-

I dent might put more hope in Romanian action that was

justified, Maurer said that he believed there was now a consensus between the US and OTN that people

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of SVN should have right to decide their ovm destiny, lCno\-^ing that^ said Kaurerj we will see what we can do. 'There is no doubt that we will try to do something about it -'

"21. l»5aurer did not think it was necessary to involve SoTiet Union yet. ^^en that time camSj he thought US was in a better position to do so than Romania,

'*22* The discussion continued after lunch. I then asked Maurer whether he had any steps in mind now. He replied affirmatively^ but said he could not name them yet, that the subject must be thought over and studied, I asked hiia to keep Ambassador Davis informed. '*

DAVIS

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PAC KERS (RUyiAMAN-WN TRACK): NQVEI^ER 196? - FEBRUAR Y 1968

It was only after the Harriman-Maurer discussions in Bucharest on Noveniber £8j I967 that the Rum^anian track began to receive high level attention and priority in Washington* Maurer had recently returned from North Vietnam in an attempt to convince the DRV, so he said> to malie a statement about entering discussions with the U.S. v/hile continuing the struggle in the south. Maurer said that he stressed to Pham Van Dong that self-determination was the essence of the U.S. position-

*

Harriman explained the San Antoaio formula to Maurer. -"The North could,^^ Harriman indicated, ^*continue supplying its force, to the extent it does now but that it must not increase-" Harriman expressed the hope that GOR would take appropriate steps with Hanoi to explain this- Maurer said that he would take such steps under consideration. Harriman concluded that V/hat was lacking was any ^Vindication" or '^impression" or "message" that Hanoi wanted serious negotiations.

On December 12, ^9^ Xi^ First Deputy Foreign Minister Macovescu and First Secretary of the GOR Enibassy Iliescu (hereafter ^^ l) left Bucharest, They arrived in Hanoi on December lU'and stayed until the l8th. They arrived a few hours after a U.S, strike on the Doumer Bridge, v;hich was restruck on December 17-

Their schedule of meetings was as follovrs; (a) dinner on Friday, the 15th, with Foi:eign Minister Trii*., (b) a meeting with Ti^inJi in the morning of December I6, (c) Sunday afternoon meeting with Pham Van Dong, r (d) on the morning of the l8th there was a DRV Politbm^o meeting, (e) another {-. meeting with Trinh after the Politburo session la which Trinli spoke to

M & I from a written text. Rumanians left Hanoi on the evening of the l8th.

The Rumanian discussions with the DRV leadership v^ere not revealed to the U.S. until M & I visited Iv^ashington on January 5j I968. (Substance will be treated at that point in the chronology.) In other words, the Trinh statement of the DRV position made on December 29 was already public knowledge.

From December ik through I8 , while M & I were in Hanoi, Ceaucescu and Maurer visited Moscov;, informed the Soviets of the Harriman talks and the M & I mission. They reported that the Soviets vrish success to the GOR mission in Hanoi,

On December 19 , M £c I visited Peking and saw Deputy Foreign Minister Gua. Gua said "it is the Vietnamese people who will have to decide,"

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On DeCGmber 2^^ M ^ I returned to Bucharest•

On December 26 , Ambassador Eogdan advised that Ceaueescu and Maurer had a message and ^-/anted to send an emissary to the U.S. Harriman advised Bogdan that he would be glad to receive the envoy.

On December 29, Trinh spoke at a Mongolian reception. The substance of his talk was broadcast by Hanoi YM. in English on January 1- He stated, in part:

"The stand of the Vietnamese people is quite clear- That is the four-point stand of the DRV Govermnent and the political program of the NFLSV* That is the basis for the settlement of the Vietnam q_uestion.

"The U.S. Government has unceasingly claimed that it x^ants to talk with Hanoi but has received no response. If the U.S. Government truly wants to talk^ it must^ as vjas made clear in our statement on 28 January 196?j first of all stop unconditionally the bombing and all other acts of v;ar against the DRV. After the United States has ended unconditionally the bombing and all other acts of war against the DRV, the DRV will hold talks with the United States on q.uestions concerned."

On December 20 . Ambassador Eogdan informed Harriman that M would be pj the special envoy.

On January 3 ^1963^ the U.S. prohibited bombing within five miles of the center of l-IanoTTJCST502 DTG O32158Z) until further notice (JCS 67OO DTG 062l48z)-

On January g > Ajnbassador Harriman met with Kacovescu, Eogdanj IliescUj and Celack (Third Secretary of the Embassy),

M & I said that they had presented \]SG views as expressed by Harriman. ^ These views were that the U.S. is ready to cease bombing (l) ifj within a

^ reasonable period of time^ the DRV would come to serious and productive

discussions/negotiations J and (2) if the DRV would not-take advantage of the bombing halt to increase its inx'iltration. The GOR representatives

Csaid that they stressed to the BRV that they should m.ake a "gesture" or "sign" publicly or privately that Hanoi vranted negotiations* M & I said that they repeatedly stressed that the U.S* goal for South Vietnam was self-determination.

Throughout their stay, the North Vietnamese stressed to H & I that the military situation was good for them. Hanoi leadership also repeated that they did not trust U.S. peace feelers^ that the Harriman exposition was nothing new, that It was essentially as conditional as the San Antonio speech.

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M & I said that they were quite pessimistic atout the success of their mission until after the Politbui^o meeting on the morning of December l8th. It was only after that meeting that Trinh came to them with ^fhat they believed would be a responsive m.essage, Trinh spoke from a prepared Vietnamese text and M & I^ when speaking to Harrimanj translated the document into French, M explained that Trinh "began in even harsher terms than Pham Van Dong had the previous day, M said that he was "not going to give a presentation of all /xrinh^s/ exposition, but as I proBiised Trinh^ I shall at least give you spirit of his document

"it is clear that it is equally as difficult for the U,S. to put an end to the ^var as to broaden it. The U.S. is bound to strive to prevent the situation from getting worse and to avoid serious defeats until after the I^ovember election.

"The U.S.'s aggressive designs against Viet-Nam remain tmchanged.

"The U-S declares that it will continue its aggressive war in Vietnam. In the San Antonio speech and in other statements by the President and Rusk it is emphasized that the U.S. will stay in Vietnam in the interest of its own security and that it wili abide by its coi^imitment and that it wiUL continue the fight. Thie U,S, perseveres in its double faced policy of stepping up the war while the U.S, administration feels compelled to take peaceful action to deceive and to appease public opinion.

"It is now clear that conditions are not yet ripe for peaceful settlement because the U.S. is unwilling to do so. The U,S. cannot intimidate by force the Vietnamese people nor deceive them by false maneuvers of peace. As long as the U,S, continues this aggression the Vietnamese people will fight to final victory-The position of the DRV is clear:

'Tlie basis for settlement of the Vietnamese issue ^. is provided by the four points of April 3^ 19^5; the

I Ministry of Foreign Affairs subseq.uently issued its

^ January 28, I967 statement* This is our position of

principles on which no concession Is possible,'

"Macovescu read the material in quotes twice from the paper in front of him-

"Harrim^an; No concession on the four points or on the January statement?

"Macovescu: 5o concession possible. I would ask you to note this for coinment for he also gave me oral comments-

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"He said the Harriman proposal contains nothing new. Essentially the U,S1 continues to clam reciprocity and ^^111 not stop until specific conditions are fulfilled* The Vietnamese people will not I hold discussions under pressures or the menace of bombs. So far I thought this was repetition of their position. But from here on there is something which Interested me and precisely because it was near the end I paid greater attention to it*

"Foreign Minister TrirJi continued reading:

'¥e are not against discussions but any discussions should take place according to principle- As soon as discussion engaged in^ our attitude \7ill be serious and responsible but it depends on attitude of the U,S, whether such discussions are fruitful.'

"Material in quotation marks was read slowly and carefully by Macovescu.

"Here is the answer to the qtuestion that you asked Mr. Harriman* From this point on there is a passage which in the text is in <iuota-tlon marks,

'We affirm the following. If the USG really wants discussions with the Government of the DRV it should first unconditionally cease bombing and any other act of war J against the DRV. After the unconditional cessation of all

bombing and of any other U.S. act of war against the DRV and at the end of an appropriate period of time the government of the DHV will entei" into serious discussions with the USG. '

"While he was reading this paragraph I stopped him and told him comi^ade Minister when I FiCntioned cessation I said final and unconditional- Trinh looked at me and reread the sentence, I said I mentioned 'final and unconditional cessation, ' He reread the sentence again, I interi'upted for the third time- May I understand you are no longer speaking of final cessation. His answer was that publicly vre may continue to mention it but with a view to negotiations, VJliat I have said is our position-

"l asked him whether the Government of Romania is authorized to pass this communication to the USG, He said yes. He repeated it but he said to retain spirit of the message/'

Harriman said that the Trlnh public statement was m_uch the same as the M & I message J but tlaat the M & I statement placed more emphasis on the acceptance of the four points as a basis of negotiations, M said that he did not establish any connection between his visit to Washington, unknown to Hanoi^ and the Trlnh public statement. Harriman argued that

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"there must be some connection," -M responded that he did not believe there T^as a contradiction between the two messages:

"in the public statement it says the basis for negotiations is the four {joints ^ but in private conversation they say we will come with this basis but the U.S. side, we expect, will come with its own point of view* They especially said this,"

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Harrliiian then questioned whether it was the DRV view that discussions P ■ ►ll be fl-uitful only if we accept their four points, M responded:

"That is not the impression I gained from my discussions-They will coine with their claims but would have to negotiate on what the U,S. puts forth. They said this specifically-"

■ With respect to the timing of discussions^ M said that Trinh stated there could be no contacts "as long as U.S, acts of war continue,.-* but as soon as bombing and other acts of aggression against North Vietnamese cease^ we are prepared to receive anybody,..*" Trinh added: "We shall consider these contacts as normal diplomatic activities. The American representative will be received by our diplomats at their suggestion."

' Harrimaai questioned further on the timing^ specifically as to the meaning of "after a suitable length of time," Here, M retreated to the DRV text—"the appropriate and necessary period of time/^ M explained tMs as a period in which

: "they will try to test (I don't know by what means) the sincerity of your intentions—your wish to have discussions, I could not deduce the period, but I do not think it wiU. be too long. If an understanding is reached that you stop, at a certain established period, discussions, not negotiations, will take pJ^ce."

■1

Harriman asked if the NLF had been mentioned,. M responded: "Once, by Dong-.*in connection with the program of the TILF and on their points which they would like to discuss at negotiations." M reported that there was no mention of involving the KI^ in discussions but that this may have been a slip.

C Harriman specifically queried on the w:}J reaction to the San Antonio

speech* M said that they would not give any assurances on 'no advantage' because "they believe it is a condition and consequently cannot be dis-

L cussed," M and Hari^iman then argued about whether 'no advantage' was conditional, Harriman said: "The important thing is that they are on notice, that taking advantage could have serious consequences." Harriman ^- repeated that there was a danger of talks breaking down "for physical \ reasons--because of difficulty in negotiations." Harriman said that "this

^ is not a condition but a notice to Hanoi."

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Harriinan asl^ed if the rJorth Vietnamese thoroughly understood the jjnplications of San Antonio- M said that he could not draw conclusions^ but

"They have a political attitude towards it-^no preconditions— iDut if you met them and discussed it at your first contact you niay well find a solution which will not break down the military situation. We must not forget that tlii'ough the other door the U.S. is pouring in men and supplies. Furthermore^ you only stop in the North and fighting and bombing in the South will go on/*

In response to a q^uestion by Daniel Davidson> Special Assistant to Harriman, M said that the period after the bombing and before talks is the same as the period after the bombing and before contacts-

M^ again responding to Davidson^ said that it was only his impression that military matters could be discussed at the first contacts^ that Hanoi had said nothing to him on this matter.

M concluded that: "We Rumanians believe they have done it—given you the sign you wanted."

0x1 January 6 , there vjas another meeting by the Rumanians and Governor Harriman, with Secretary Rusk participating as well. This discussion was very geiieral and added only a few points to the substance of the preceding day.

Secretary Rusk said that "some of ^anoi*s leadershij^ thirlc of talks as a mea.ns of stopping the bombing while the rest of the war gees on without limitation. This is not acceptable/^ He added that: "The problem on our side is that the principle o£ reciprocity is rather important to us."

In a response to a Rusk truest ion j M said that Hanoi would favor "private discussions," M said that he had not discussed the secrecy issue in Hanoi. M addedj however^ that:

"There is no doubt that at the present stage^ the Vietnamese side wants ^contactsj kept confidential* But after the cessation of bombing a way in which future procedures are directed towards starting 'conversations proper' will depend on your discussions through a third party-"

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M then read from a document:

"As long as the US acts of war go on we camiot have any contacts with them. As soon as they cease .the bombings and discontinue the acts of aggression we shall be prepared to receive any person, even a representative of the United States, vrho may wish to make known to us the American point of view or to ^et informed on our viewpoint. V?e shall regard these future contacts as normal diplomatic activity- The American representa,tives will be received by our representatives at the former's suggestion."

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"Secretary Husk and Governor Harriman met with Messrs Macovesu^ Iliescu and Bodgan from 12:^^5 p.m, - 1:15 P-^-* a,nd the Secretary gave Macovesu two papers containing the 7 written parts and k oral points set forth below. At 5:15^7:15 p-m-Governor Harriman and Mr. Bundy met with the Romanians to explain further our drafts and to give them our French translation of our written points. Harriman told Maeovesu we left it up to the latter's judgment as to what part and how to convey our points in Hanoi,

" U.S. Wr itten Points

'^1. The Democratic Republic of Vietnam has corrimunicated to the United States Government this statement of the Democratic Eepublic of Vietnam position:

'If the United States Government really wants discussions with the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam it should first unconditionally cease bombing and any other acts of v^ar against the Democratic Eepublic of Vietnam- After the unconditional cessation of all bombing and of any other United States act of war against the Democz^atic Republic of Vietnam and at the end of an appropriate period of time the Government of the Dem.ocratic Republic of Vietnam will enter into serious discussions with the United States Government.'

The United States Goverimient welcomes this statement.

"2, VJe understand that Foreign Minister Trinh has stated that 'as soon as' all bombing ceases^ the Democratic Republic of Vietnam 'shaU be prepared to receive' a United States representative. The United States Government will be prepared to have its representative have contacts with a representative of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam as soon as all bombing ceases- (The United States Government believes that the first contacts should take place almost immediately, perhaps one or two days^ after the cessation of bombing.) The purpose of these contacts, which might be in Vientiane> Rangoon^ Bucharest, or some other suitable third-country location^, would be to fix the time and place of the serious discussions referred to by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, Ai^rangemjent of the necessary modalities for the serious discussions should take no more than a few days, j

"3, The United States Government takes note of the fact that a cessation of aerial and naval bombardment is easily verifiable. In fact, the act of cessation would be observed immediately internationally and become a matter of public kno^'^ledge and specuJ.ation, ' In these circumstances, the United States Government believes that ^

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the 'serious discussions' referred to by the Democratic Republic of VietnajB should commence immediately on the conclusion of the arrangements tlirough the contacts.

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I "^, Obviously it will be important at an appropriate time^

r: in connection with the serious discussions^ to accommodate the

interests of all parties directly concerned with the peace of Southeast Asia, One such means is -that the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the United States Government might suggest to the two co-chairmen, and possibly to the tlrt^ee Intez^national Control ■ Commission members^ that they be available at the site chosen for the serious discussions in order to talk to all parties interested in the peace of Southeast Asia. This procedure could avoid the \^ i problems of a formal conference-

"5- The United States Goyernment understands through representatives of the Romanian Government tliat the serious discussions contemplated by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam would be without Imitation as to the matters to be raised by either side< The attitude of the United States Government toward peace in Southeast Asia continues to be reflected in" the lU points and in the Manila Com2nunlq.ue,

"6- The United States Government draws attention to the statement of President Johjison in San Antonio on September 29 in which he said:

'The United States Is willing to stop all aerial and naval bombardment of I^orth Viet-Nam when this will lead J. promptly to productive discussions. We^ of course, assume

c that v.^hile discussions proceed^ DIorth Viet-Nam would not

take advantage of the bombing cessation or limitation.'

The aide memoire handed to the Romanian Goverrmient in IJovembeXy 19&7? which we understand was communicated to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in mid-December;, explained this statement in the following language:

'The President J in making his assumption that the North Vietnamese woxild not take advantage of the bombing cessation or limitation while discussions proceed, was not assuming North Viet-Nam would cut off entirely its support of its forces in the South while the armed struggle was continuing; at the same time the United States Government would feel if North Vietnam sought to take advantage of the bombing cessation or limitation to Increase its support of its forces in the SouthJ to attack our forces from north of the Demilitarized Zone or to mount large-scale visible resupply efforts^ now impossible, it would not be acting in good faith.'

Declassified per Executive Order 13^26, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By; NWD Date: 2011

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The United States Government wishes to confirm to the Democratic Republic of Vietnaj^i that this statement remains the position of the United States Goyernment.

"7- "rhs United States GoYerninent would inform the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in advance of the exact date of the cessation of aeria-1 and naval bomtiardnient in order to enable the Democratic Republic of Vietnam to have its representative prepared to meet the reiDresentative of the United States Government-

" U.S. ORAL POirJTS i

III < I

"(a) Tlie Romanian representative should be thanked for his efforts and told that we are confident that he has f^^lly and faithfully reported the positions of both sides in these matters, Vfc are grateful for this action and have confidence that he will continue to do so,

"(b) He should understand that the first sentence of paragraph h in the written message is intended to refer to the Importance of the South Vietnajnese Government and other interested parties being present at the site of the discussions in order to play an appro-prlate role-

''(c) The United States Government wishes to avoid any misunderstanding also with respect to any allegations which may be made concerning specific military actions by the United States Government against the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam prior to cessation-In deference to the serious intent and sincere objectives of the mJ.ssion of the Romanian Government^ the United States Government will refi-ain for a limited period of time fi^om bombing within five miles of the center of Hanoi or of Haiphong. This information is for the Romanian Government only. The United States Government states this as a fact and not as a commitment as to the future^ but the United States Government would not wish the Democratic Republic of Vlet-Nam to be informed of this fact for fear thatj, as in the past, it could be misinterpreted by them.

"(d) The United States Government awaits with interest the report of the Romanians, after consulting Hanoi, on the foregoing written and oral points.

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"(l) US Cessation 1 , '1(a) Harriman stated that we ^pointed out* or 'took note'

"lAiring the course of the January 11, 12:15 and 5 = 15 discussions, clarification of the USG position was given as indicated under the several headings below:

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that cessation would be public knowledge, but said j ifTe hadn't thought about a public announcement and

P opined that ^^^e would simply stop*

"(b) Bundy stated personally that we would probably , confirm an answer tp q^uestions that cessation was a high-level decision without amplification and Harriman agreed^ adding that we would not mention a time limit or condition it.

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"(2) First Contacts

^'(a) Timing - Harriman said 'should take place' is merely our interpretation of *as soon as' and not an ulti-jsiatiim {^Des que' was actual French preposition used by DRV). WAH underscored verb 'believes' as opposed to 'insists' in same sentence 'one or two days after cessation'•

'Ihe maximum GOR can get us is that they will meet us in 2 or 5 days 'after cessation' - the more you can get of this the better but we are not asking for those x^recise answers,*

^'(b) D u-ration - Harriman noted US opinion that modalities to be agreed on in contacts should not drag on more than a few days^ but invited DKV's different opinion on duration.

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V ^^(3) 'Serious Discussions'

"(a) Rusk noted it will be difficult to conduct them

secretly J and if they are public many governments and parties -will feel entitled to participate. M^e could lose months'. Accordingly we suggest

L'one such means' in the Para* k that the Co-Chairman and 3 ICC members send representatives to the location dnd 'any one else* could be there to discuss with the 2 or the 5 or with each other* Peking could be present. This procedure could avoid the problem of a formal conference- \Je don't anticipate a big meeting with 8, 12 or 15 present but the 2 or 5 could put their heads together on the possibility of agreement,

I "(b) Harriman assumed that 'all parties directly concerned'

P ■ with peace in SEA' would include any socialist state

L aiding DRV and SVIT and the TCC's on our side. He

noted J since the DRV third point covered internal SVDT

f affairs J that the 'US won't talk about anything

^ [ ' specifically in SVN without a GVW rep being present.''

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GVN should have an opportunity to come into talks 'at an early point', 'We donH want to

C. exclude anyone who has a legitimate right to be I ' present at an appropriate time .' Our para

f four proposal is 'complicated' and 'quite

p open to their suggestions,*

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''(c) NLF - Harriman no'ted validity of our 13th point

that the VC 'would have no difficulty "being represented and having their views presented,'

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"(d) O pen Age nda - Eundy said 'we would take very seriously* DRV confirmation of the wide open agenda of -'serious discussions,' Bundy and Harriman confiiraed J our view that both sides could discuss their bases

I for peaces ours would be reflected in the 1^^ pts

and Ptiras 25-29 of the Manila communiq^ue. We feel f . both sides should be prepared to negotiate.

"(U) Bi>.teral US/PRV Discussions

"(a) Rusk noted that at the location of the Co-Chairman and/or ICC members meeting 'any one else could*-* discuss,, -with each other-'

*'(b) Rusk said if talks became public^ as he^ thought they would 'both sides will have a serious tme' holding discussions (beyond contacts) without other, parties 'associated'. But 'this does not mean there cannot stiUL be bllaterals^ but we cannot have a situation where everyone else is excluded*' If Hanoi makes that suggestion 'we will look at it but it v^ill be difficult.' ,

"(c) Harriman: 'There are many things that we can talk to WI? about that relate to us and MM. '

"(5) 'Ko advantage'

"(a) Macovescu said the spirit of our November 'promemoi^ia' had been given to Hanoi and he would repeat it there • '

"(b) Harriman. said the President used the 'no advantage' assximption to inform Hanoi what he would be assuming if he stopped bombing* Tlie US does not ask advance DRY agreement*

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98130).

'*(c) Harriman said ve coiild negotiate under better conditions if the level of hostilities were reduced. The DMZ would be the easiest place to deescalate- The GOR may have other suggestions.

"(d) Amb. Bogdan said the Homanians understood 'no advantage' is 'not a condition but a warning/ and Harriman said the US was not requiring Hanoi to agree to any conditions in advance-

"(6) Miscellaneous

"(a) The GOR intends first to inform Hanoi^ and then if they approve^ to convey the gis^^ of the discussions with us to M0SCOV7 and Peking* We would be happy to have the Soviets informed.

''(b) Macovesu said he left Washington, as he had left Hanoi5 with the feeling that 'this is a new step towards a peaceful settlement-'"

On January 12 ^ Ambassador Bunker was given a summary of PACKERS (State

On January l^ j President Johnson sent a letter of appreciation for the Rumanian efforts to President Ceaucescu (State 98J+9O),

*^^ January l8 j Macovescu^ Iliesco and Celack left Bucharest for Hanoi via Moscow and Peking. Ambassador Bogdan informed Harriman of this trip on the 18th,

Also on January l8^ Ambassador Harriman informed Bogdan that the President's January 17 State of the Union remarks "confirmed the San Antonio formula." Harriman said; "The U.S. has not changed its position."

* On January 20 j Bunker gave Thieu a general suimation of U.S. probes

I of the December 29 Trinh statement—without revealing the PACKERS channel

(Saigon I65OI). Bunker did so in accord vath his request (Saigon I6081) and cable of instruction (State SSQ^Z) ^ Bunker was permitted to tell Thleu

Lthe ejcplanation of 'no advantage' as given by Governor Harriman to the Riimanians, In his talk with Th3.eu he made "a distinction between the contacts to explore Hanois position and possibly to set up any 'serious p discussions' and the discussions themselves." He assured Thieu that "any \ further decision will be a matter of full consultation with you and v/lth

our Manila allies." Thieu expressed no reservations, about the U,S* approach

r Thieu expressed the view that the Trinh statement was good propaganda by Hanoi. Bunker had urged permission to speak to Thieu on the basis of Bui Diem's "implication that U.S.-Hanoi contacts to bring about a negotiation would be tolerable "Bo the GW^ provided /rhieuJ ^^^s kept informed of them

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and giren an opportunity to express his views before a raijidly movliig sitxiation becomes a fait accompli ."

^ J8>nu ary gg^ Macovescu et al arrived in Hanoi. The U.S, was not informed of the results of his visit until February 12.

On February 12 j Ambassador llarriman was informed of the results of the GOS visit to Hajioi by Ambassador Bogdaja. Bogdan reported that Macovescu had been in Hanoi from January 22nd to the 28th^ and Macoyescu talked n^inly with Dong and Trinh,

The GDRV asserted to Macoyescu that "it did not consider the proposals of the USG an answer to the Trinh declaration of 29 December^ and that San Antonio conditions remain. "

At this pointy Bogdan dictated the following j^ssage;

"The position of the Vietnamese people and of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam is very clear-There are the four points of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnaja and the political program of the National Liberation Eront of South Vietnam, This is the basis for the solution (reglementation) of the Vietnamece problem. We stated clearly: if in actuality the United States Government desires conversations^ as it says it does^ it must in the first place stop unconditionally the bombardment and all other acts of war against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. After a convenient period of time^ following the unconditional cessation of bombardment and all other Ajnerican acts of war against the Democratic Republic of Vietn8>m^ the Democratic Republic of Vietnam will start conversations with the United States of America on the q.uestions of interest to the two parties /The Ambassador --understands this to mean the interest of either side^ not Sl Common interest/* Tiie convenient period of time is the time necessai*y to prove that the United States has really and without conditions stopped bombardment and all other acts of war against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, After the unconditional cessation of the bombardment and all other acts of war against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam a meeting will take place between the two sides to reach an agreement on the place ^ the levels and the contents of the conversation. The right position and the correct attitude of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam have been warmly welcomed and supported by the peoples of the world. Tlie attitude of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam is serious. If the !-conversations are leading or not to results^ this depends on the I United States.'' I

Bogdan added that the GOR was ready to transmit communications to either side and that when Ambassador Davis returns to Bucharest he could ^ ^ obtain further details from M, Bogdan said that M was in Peking on

. . January 31 and informed the Chinese Government of the various positions, ■

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The Chinese repeated that "it was up to North Vietnam^" would soon be fully informed as well.

Ee said that Moscow

Governor Harrimaa took note of the continued threat to U.S. forces in the DMZ area and said that ''his unofficial reaction is that Hanoi does not wish talks,..."

On February 2^1 j Ajafoassador Davis spoke to M (State 117922), M told D. -is that after his discussions in V^ashington^ Hanoi quickly responded to his travel request to Hanoi. M noted that when he reached Hanoi there was no U.S. bombing^ but in accord with U,S, wishes he said nothing about this U.'^* decision to the North Vietnamese-

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M conveyed to Trinh the GOR belief that "minimum of conditions now created to take stride fonvard on road to negotiations-"

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KILLY

ITALIOH - NORTH VIETNAI^IEJSE TRACK, KEBRUAHY -MRCH. I968

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The following account of Italian-North Vietnamese contacts was given on February 2hy I968 (ROM kh^^).

January or February, 196?

Fanfani stated that he had been asked through a channel v.^hich he did not reveal whether he vas prepared to receive an unidentified I^orth Vietnamese. Secretary Rusk was informed and suggested that Fanfani first find out who the contact was and what authority he would have- Fanfani asked these questions^ they were never answered^ and he heard nothing further from this contact.

July or August lg67

Fanfani was asked by a different contact (also unspecified) whether he would be interested in sending d'Orlandi to get in touch with tlie Ifcrth Vietnajnese Ambassador in Erague. The unspecified contact was a\'?'are of the January contact- Fanfani said that there was no doubt that the initiative for the Pi^ague meeting came from Hanoi,

September $, 19^7 - First Meetin g

On instructions from Fanfani^ D'Orlandi flew to Pi^ague and met with North Vietnamese Ambassador Su- D'Orlandi asked Su why he had sought this meeting J but did not receive an answer- Su did say that he was aware of d'Orlandi's role in MRIGOLD. D'Orlandi advised Su that Hanoi should move rapidly to seize the opportunity of a trip Fanfani vrould make to Washington in mid-September and authorise Fanfani to transmit something new- D'Orlandi specifically req^uested that Hanoi set a period after the stopping of the bombing for the first contact with the U,S. D'Orlandi told Su that Fanfani i^ould carry weight in Washington if he could present a time and place for the meeting between the DRV and the U,S* Su replied that he would be unable to obtain instructions fl'om Hanoi prior to the Fanfani trip to V7ashington.

Early Novemberj 196? - Second Meeting

After a delay of more than 50 days^ d'Orlandi returned to Prague and said to Su that he was entitled to a reply to his suggestions of September» Su said that the matter v^as being considered in Hanoi^ but that he had not received a reply. D'Orlandi again stressed the importance of the need for Hanoi to set a tme and place for negotiations after the cessation of U.S, bombing, Su said everytime Hanoi produced something in favor of negotiations the Americans backed out and showed bad faith, D'Orlandi stressed to Su a

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favorite theme of some substantive agreements prior to the first face-to-face contacts bet^men Hanoi and Washington. He said the Italians vjould be glad to transmit such issues between the two parties. Su said that he ?might soon be going back to Hanoi,

Su stated that if d*Orlandi's trips to Prague became known the Horth Vietnamese would deny everything. Su also asked d'Orlandi not to get in toTch with the DRV Prague Embassy unless it was most urgent because he would hi. leaving for Hanoi within a week, Su would contact d'Orlandi the moment he returned to Prague. ''

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Ja-iuary, I968 _ Thi rd Mee ting

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^ D'Orlandi flew to Prague- Su said there was general approval in Hanoi I p of the idea of starting negotiations< Su said that he had been authorized j to talk to Fanfani. It was arranged that Su would come to Rome on February k

February 17, 1968

^

State sent out to Eom^e some follow-up comments of Fanfani's which had been transmitted to Secretary Husk by Ortona on February I6. There were two main points: (a) That the Italiazis do not have the ^'impression" that San Antonio has been substantially rejected- They do believe;» hov;everj that although reciprocity is xmacceptable to Hanoi^ Hanoi might consider some ! "concession"J and (b) That a direct U.S.-JWN meeting was unlikely but that " Hanoi may be interested in preliminary soundings and direct channel^ possibly

the Italians-

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^ The cable also noted the Washington Post storyj date of Februa,ry 16^

dateline Rome-, which went into considerable detail on Italian-North Vietnamese conversations.

State also indicated reserve with respect to this track.

The Killy slug began with this cable-

(State II738U)

Daniel Davidson, Special Assistant to Governor Harriman^ was dispatched to Rome to arrive on February 20- (State II7385)

February 18, I968

D'Orlandi was told that Su could receive him in J^^ague on the 21st. D'Orlandi told Fanfani that he was expected in Hanoi on the 21st and Fanfani expected him to defer his trip. Su had been expecting d'Orlandi for several days J and d'Orlandi had not given him any reason for the delay.

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Februa r y £3? 1968

Davidson and Melojr met with d'Orlandi and Fanfani* Fanfani, in translating his notes from Italian to English, repeatedly Biade a more positive translation than was warranted by the Italian- -

"Major points in his notes were:

"(a) Su (N^/H Ambassador to Prague) described IffiF as the representative of a great number of Southeimers, j

"(b) Su flatly rejected reciprocity but suggested that when contacts had been established after cessation of bombing^ North Vietnamese could certainly take favorable measux^es and might also suggest some act bf good will to the NLP, Fanfani asked if among those measirres Hanoi was thinking of humanitarian measures such as liberation of H-fs and received an affirmative reply* Fanfani suggestedj as example^ that it would be useful in order to ijuprove atmosphere for Hanoi either before or on first day of the meetings to free PI*,^s against previously agreed upon concessions on part of United States- Su replied that he agreed but was not authorized to answer- He did say that much will depend on attitude of US representatives at first encounter.

"(C) It is very apparent from notes that each time I^IAJRIGOLD -1 ten points were mentioned, they were dragged in from deep left

field by Fanfani. For example, initial reference to them came when Fanfani rem^arked that freedom of South Yiet-Nam and nonintervention which North Vietnamese said should be part of settlement appeared already in the ten points 'of Trij^rtite Agreement of Saigon,' Fanfani asked whether Su meant to refer to those understandings and Su replied that the ten points had been bypassed

Lby events but perhaps they can be referred to in broad outline. The only other reference to I-'IAEIGOLD occui-red when Fanfani recalled that the 'three negotiators' to get around problem of reciprocity

r accepted Fnase A-Hiase B formula- Su replied that he was not

authorised to discuss Tripartite contacts or cui'rent validity of the ten points but that he would submit the question to Hanoi,

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L"(d) Fanfani pressed Su extremely hard for the specific number of days (e-g. t^fo days) between cessation of bombing and initiation of a dialogue between Hanoi and US. He said that it would certainly

Lease his task of assuring V/ashington that Hanoi really wanted to establish contact with it if he was given an answer. Su said he understood perfectly, would submit the question to Hanoi and might be in position to give an answer to d'Orlandi at his next meeting. j Fanfani Insisted on at least being assured that a specific period

already existed in Hanoi's mind. Su spoke very slowly in reply /' and d*Orlandi is cex'tain .that following is verbatim record. 'We

r agree for Foreign Minister Fanfani to let it be known in comjnunica-

i_ ' tions he will make to the Government of the United States that in

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case of unconditional cessation of the bombing, the delay of "X" days already exists for a first meeting of representatives of the two parties, Hanoi and Washington, with a view to establish contacts for serious conversation on q,uestions concerning the two parties<'

j^ "(e) Faxifani told Worth Vietnamese that they had not been

forthcoming enough to put Vfeshington under an obligation to reply. Panfani asked to be put in a position to tell Washington

\ something about the date> place^ and subject of the meeting* Su

*^ was unresponsive-

r^^(F) Fanfani asked \^hether Hanoi was attempting contacts tlirough other channels or had already established a direct channel to Washington* Su excluded this possibility, Fanfani r commented that he was astonished at flat statement that Hanoi

||^ had no contacts with Washington. Su again gave categorical denial,

I He said there were no direct contacts and although Hanoi often

L received visitors they were not q^ualified nor in the least author-

ized to talk on behalf of the US Government.

"(g) IJ"orth Vietnamese had suggested communig^ue but did not push idea very hard. Their apparent motive was to demonstrate that they were in fact duly authorized representatives of Hanoi and therefore in a position to release communique- VJhen Fanfani pointed out obvious detriiiiental effects of publicity^ particu-j larly predictable reaction of USG, Su quickly backed off.

"(H) Points H to J come from notes d'Orlandi made after \ informal discussion during which no notes were to be kept. The

^ North Vietnamese took copious notes any^/fay. (This portion of the

notes was not read to North Vietnamese.) Both parties felt that r problem of guaranteeing an agreem.ent was increasing to decisive

[_ iiflportance. Su seemed to categorically exclude the UN as a

guaranteeing agency and Fanfani and Su agreed that the ICC was

not in position to guarantee anything.

"(l) Fanfani asked*if there would be any objection if he informed Tran Van Do or even Thieu of fact that conversations f^ with an authorized representative of Hanoi had taken place* Su

L stated he had no objections*

^'(j) Su stated that declared and also real aim of Hanoi was to have absolutely free general elections* To insure liberty of vote, it was necessary to constitute a government with very broadly based participant ion excluding only 'war criminals' (undefined). There was discussion of various South Vietnamese personalities as possible members of a Government. Su would raise a name and

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d'Orlandi would conoent, Su generally did not reveal his opinion but Ky was obviously unacceptable to him.

"(k) Although not reflected in notes, conversation closed ¥ith discussion of moda3-ities of next meeting, Su suggested that d'Orlandi come to Prague on February 21 but exact date was left undetermined.'^

Fanfani confirmed that there was no discussion of the San Antonio formula and that they were unaware of the Clifford explanation, Dayidson gave Fanfani the U,S, position as contained in State II7383. (ROIffi iiUl8 Sections 1 & 2 of 2) '

AlsoJ on February 23^ Davidson cabled some additional, points which he had made to Fanfani and d'Orlandi- Davidson said;

^*The Important thing was that there must be no doubt in Hanoi's mind that it had coimnitted itself not to take advantage of a bombing cessation by such actions as increasing its infiltration of munitions and supplies or attacking U.S. positions in the area of the DMZ."

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.1 suggested that it might repeat might be sufficient if Hanoi stated that it recognised that during a period when the US was not bombing and v/hile talks wei*e continuing that such acts as attacks on US positions in the area of the DMZ^ massive terror against the cities such as the Tet campaign or increased infiltration, v/ould show bad faith on its part and that it;, of course^ would never do anything that smacked of bad faith. Hanoi could then discuss vath us at the first meeting more precise definition of actions which would constitute bad faith,"

Fanfani and d'Orlandi understood that this was "merely a verbal gimmick to permit Hanoi to accept all requirements of the 'not take advantage' formulation without having to actually promise 'not to take " advantage'." Fanfani said that if the U*S. appx^oves^ he will disi^itch d'Orlandi again to Prague. (ROME ifi|19)

February 2k^ I968

Fanfani gave an exposition on the Italian motivation for Vietnam negotiations• He said that he was prepared to drop the matter entirely if the U.S. desired or if H^noi did not give evidence of seriousness. He warned of escalation^ and the conseauences of escalation on the policy of detente with the Soviet Union- He said that an intensification of the v/ar in Vietnam would help the communist vote in Italy, (ROI^ ^422)

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date; 201 \

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Fetiruary; 2 6 ^ 196 8

Bavidson cabled additional information on the February 22 meeting mth Fanfani and d'Orlandi. After he touched on "the terrible consequences" of the U,S, stopping bombing and being forced to resume because Hanoi took advantage J Fanfani remarked that "l had used almost exactly the same expressions in discussing that contingency as Su had used." According to Fanfani, "Su told him that if the bombing stopped and then were resumed it would be 'the end of the v^orld'*"

Fanfani also discussed a coalition government-general elections Issue.

C"ln thinking out loud of an ultimate solutionj Fanfani discussed the 'hypothesis' of a government which v^ould be composed of elements of the existing government and other forces p . and would have the task of preparing for free general elections. l^ He said that the creation of such a government would avoid

the problem of which elements are a majority or minority since

Lthe task of the government would be technical. He recalled that it was a non^elected Italian ^Government which successfully prepared the Italian elections of 19^6, Fanfani said he mentioned this idea to the North Vietnamese and they didn't object to it, Su said that they thought they would win an election and that is why they want one. Fanfani mentioned that Su had asked d'Orlandi for his opinion of personalities who were clearly not rpt not part of the FtN. ' I asked d^Orlandi who they were and he said several professional men^ members of jast goverriment, religious personalities ^ all in allj some 20 or 25 names, Su P did not rpt not comment after d'Orlandi gave his frank evaluation

I of each name except to say that Foreign Minister Do was a gentle-

^ man and a man of international stature vfho had little internal

influence, D'Orlandi said it was clear that the FLN was thinking r of a government that would include people who had not rpt not

L fought with it but who were nonetheless patriots, I remarked

that it sounded to me as if these other elements would be largely f* the Bogus Committees that were being set up in connection with the

J Tet offensive- D'Orlandi said he thought I was mistaken."

Su told Fanfani that he "didn't consider any of the Eastern European T channels as serious^'* and "Fanfani had specifically asked Su about P. M.

L Maurer^ and the two North Vietnamese laughed as if to say that he could not

rpt not conceivably be a serious channel/' Tliey also flatly ruled out the

LUN and the ICC in bringing about negotiations or in guaranteeing a settlement. (ROME kkkO, Sections 1 & 2 of 3)

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February 26^ I968

1 Davidson cabled urging continuation of this track. He argued that

Italy was the first Western European nation to receive authorised repre-,%u ' sentatives of Hanoi ^ and that Su had authorised Fanfani to convey his

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^ comments to the USG;, and that Su had again invited d'Orlandi to Prague

(d^Orlandl had been e:5rpected there by Su since February 21).

t Davidson said that the press leak on the North Vietnamese visit to

Rome was by a communist newspaper and "it appears that the leak did not come from the Italian Government/^ Davidson was sympathetic to Fanfani's explanation that he had^ for political reasons^ to unilaterally release a statement to the press on the visit of the two North Vietnamese representatives to discuss a basis for starting negotiations.

Davidson concluded that the U.S. had every reason to continue vith the track. He noted that there was a ^^danger of letting d'Orlandi go to ^ Prague" in that "he might succeed and we might face prospect of negoti-«- ations at time when the political-military situation iiiakes negotiations

undesirable*" He added: "However> if Hanoi now wishes to try to force r negotiations on USG^ it can create other situations at least as awta-mrd 1^ as one that might result from telling d'Orlandi that it accepts essence

of San Antonio•" (ROME kkhl)

February £7^ 1968

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State agreed that "we should give a constructive response to the proposal that d'Orlandi make another visit to Prague as suggested by Ambassador Su-" State added: "However^ under existing circumstancesj it would be unwise to suggest new formulations (as you propose para k Rome U^19) which might give Hanoi the idea that we were weakening on the San Antonio position-'^

State vrent on to issue guidance for the d'Orlandi«Su talk:

"However J it appears to us that Hanoi is imdertaking a combined diplomatic and propaganda offensive rather than shovring a serious intention to negotiate in good faith at the moment. It would be useful for the Italians to try to discover whether the North Vietnamese look upon contacts with the Italians as expressing a serious negotiating position or as part of a rather widespread exercise to impress a variety of governments,

"(c) As you suggest in lO-A Reftel M+^fl, it appears useful for d'Orlandi to visit Prague in order to tell Su:

"(l) his statements have been communicated to the US and after careful analysis did not seem to US Government to be any more forthcoming than public statements of Hanoi. If Hanoi has any intention of conveying anything new^ Su should be req.uested to point it out.

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definite on timing and particularly any statements Hanoi would be vrilling to BiPvke as to their intentions relating to the mill-

t^' tary problem of 'no advantage-' D'Orlandi may draw on explanations

you have provided him as to meaning of Ban Antonio formula. FYl ' We have "been informed by French and through U Thant on information

rhe received from French that negotiations would start immediately if we announced publicly unconditional cessation of boH^bing and other acts of war against INlh Therefore there is no value in making an issue of this point through Su. ERD FYI-

L "(3) In addition*^ d'Orlandi might wish to point out to

Su that since Hanoi had rejected San Antonio formula^ Americans had

f^ asked number of questions. For example^ does this mean that Hanoi

l^ feels free to move men and supplies to the South as they did during

the Xet truce last year? Would Hanoi feel free to move troops

p to the BMZ area in positions to attack US forces south of the DMZ?

j Would Hanoi consider it has the right to intensify artillery and

other fire across the DMZ into US positions in South Viet-N"am?

r"5- If the Italians express disappointment at the lack of detail in this messagej please tell them that we are understandably cautious because of the major military operations now in progress f" or being planned by North Viet-Navm in the DMZ and the Laos Pan-

handle* We cannot ignore Hanoi's actions on the ground in interpreting what Hanoi's intentions may be/'

(State 120937)

MarchVj 1967

Report on d'Orlandi-Su meeting.

L D'Orlandi met with Meloy and Davidson to report on his March 1

meeting in Prague with Ajiibassador Su. D*Orlandi asked Su if he were ready to answer the (Question concerning the period of delay between the stopping p^ of the bombing and the first U.S.-Hanoi meetings? Su responded rather II lojnely that he thought this contact had come to an end and^ therefore j he

^ was not able to supply a precise answer- "He could state that the matter

of a date wouJ.d be no problem, Hie real problem was San Antonio."

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L, D Orlaiidi said that he had dictated to Su the first portion of the

I Davidson MemCon of the February 28 meeting to the North Vietnamese ^ but

r the North Vietnamese did not comment on this.

I ' The most important point that Su made in these talks was with respect

to "no advantage." Although he said he was speaking personally^ it is [ f highly doubtful that he vjould have said the following without specific L L., - instruct ions:

p ".—D* Or land! then told Su that if bombing stopped and

talks began J assaulting Khe Sanh, invading or trying to detach f

Declussifled per Executive Order ]3526> Section 3,3 NND Project Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Dale: 2011

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J the ti'/o northern provinces of South Viet-Nam> launching a second

^ ifave of attacks against one or more cities or creating a sensa-

tion with something else like an assault on Camp Carrolj would Csink the whole thing. Su replied thatj speaking personally and not on instructions J such thing would be out^ that from the moment the two sides meet it was obvious no such thing could ;* . happen, (l q^uestioned d'Orlandi about this remark of Su's and

I d'Orlandi replied that while he took no notes he is certain this

is the sense of what Su said*) D'Orlandi told Su that whatever he or Su thought of the effect of bombing^ it is a fact that

Cthe US Government and US public opinion considers bombing of the Korth a most important weapon and that no President could give away such a weapon while something terrible was happening either

Ein the DMZ or the South. Su did not respond to this comment* D'Orlandi also remarked that it might be necessary fc"^ him to go to Hanoi to receive assurances directly from the top and again Su did not reply,"

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Su said that he will contact d^Orlandi when he receives a reply and arrange another meeting in Home or in Prague.

(ROME h590) h

March g, I968

Davidson cabled another exchange with Fanfani and d'Orlandi* Referring to a Hanoi broadcast about the I^Torth Vietnamese visit to Rome **to discuss negotiations J" Fanfani argued that this was Hanoi's way of verifying that the Italian channel is the one it wishes to use.

L Fanfani reviewed Su's statements about "no advantage/' and told exactly

the same story as he had on the previous day.

I ' [^ (ROME kSzk)

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State cabled "a s]j.ght preference for Eragae as slt'e of next meeting." State 129885)

f March 16, 1968

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(1*^ Lodge arrived in Rome to speak with the Italians. Toothing new was

added to previous communications-

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