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Bombing the North I; Blue Chip or Topic for Talkst

The US proposed repeatedly duriia^ J-larigold that de-escalation be taken as the first topic between the two sides» What would the Conmu-nlsts do if the US stopped bombing?

Lewandowski with eaual persistence refused to accept this question as a point of departure. The DRV woiild reject it^ he sald^ because de-escalation would be viewed as strengthening the governmental status quo in SWj whereas it was precisely a change in the SVR government that the Communist side required. Instead^ therefore^ he urged that this subject be left for last- Once both sides agreed on tertas for the ultimate situation in SVU^ finding the route there via de-escalation would be easy.

Although Lewandowski neverj of course^ made the argument himselfj

his approach meant Communist acceptance of the bombing as a blue chip

in the bargaining process because the talks on settlement terms would

have to take place while the bombing continued. One inducement the

Cormunists would have to accept terms desired by the US would be that

this would end the bombing. ToOj his approach saved more face for the

Communist side than ours^ which required that the bombing be addressed explicitlv.

When^ finally J the US went along with Lewandowski^s approach ^ it upped the ante by the December bombings of Hanoi. The DRV cancellation of the contact meant, then^ that It would neither accept de-escalation as a starting point for talks nor accept augmentation of the US blue chip through strikes on more sensitive targets.

The cancellation of the talks over this issue measures the failure of Lewandowski's brokerage- He had not narrowed the gulf between the two sides sufficiently. His version of possible settlement terms was not attractive enough to make the US forego upping the ante^ on the one hand J or to induce the DRV to accept the higher ante^ on the other.

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Bombing the North II: Signals, Intended and Inadvertant

As is shown in a separate study^ beginning in June 1966^ there vas a marked increase in the amount of ordnance e:,3>ended against north Vietnam^ Itiis was time for the country as a whole ^ for Eoute Package VI and for the areas within 10 miles of the center of Hanoi and 5 miles of the center of Haiphong, The general level of ordnance expenditure remained high until mid-JTovember. During the last two weeks of November^ probably on account of weatherj air strikes against the M'orth were at their lowest level since June^ rising markedly again during the first and second weeks of December.

The most sensitive area of all, that within 5 miles of the center of Hanoi^ was str^ack (with about 25 tons of ordnance) for the first time in the war during the last week of June^ as part of a general attack on ^GL facilities, About 3 tons more were expended in this area in mid-Au^gust. It was not hit again until the first week in December (the 2nd and ii'th) when almost 50 tons were ejcpended, then hit yet again during the second week in December (the 13th and iHh) -with over 100 tons. The intended targets in all of the December attacks were the Yen Vien Railroad Yard and the Van Dien Vehicle Depot, but apparently there was collateral damage in all cases. In particular, during the December 13-1^1-attacks, the Chinese and Rumanian Etnbassies seem to have been hit, along with some residential structures in central Hanoi. From the ground, then, there might appear to have been an increase in the intensity of attack, measured both in tons of ordnance expended and type of targetj commencing December 2, i.e.^ immediately following Hanoi's assent to some form of US-DEV meeting in Warsaw.

^e Poles expressed alarm about the '^intensification of the bcanbing" on December 2, 7, 8^ and 9^ arguing that ''such attacks could only threaten or destroy the possibility of contact in Warsaw," They expressed these views as their own, not as a message transmitted from Hanoi. However, I^wandowski told D'Orlandi (who in turn told US on December 9) that he believed Hanoi had attached significance to the fact J:hat during the two weeks he had been in Hanoi (approximately Novanber I6-3O) the bombing had appeared to be at a reduced level. Lewandowski thought Hanoi had interpreted this as a tacit signal of US support for his mission-

In fact, the targets near Hanoi which were the object of attack in December had been authorized as part of Rolling Thunder 52, for which the execute message was sent on November 10, This was prior to Lewandowski's departure for Hanoi, though the approximate timing of his impending visit ("after the US elections") was known in Washington when the execute message was sent. (IO/15-I6/66) Presumably^ had weather not intervened, the strikes near Hanoi might well have occurred during his visit, rather than after his return with Hanoi ^s "positive response.'' Hanoi's review of Lewandowski's proposals would have occurred in quite a different context, one reflecting more accurately, perhaps^ US attitudes.

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On December 10^ Washington inTormed both the ¥arsaw and Saigon Enabassies that it had been decided to leave the bombing pattern unchanged. Gronouski vas forewarned that this might involve some targets Rapacki would Insist reflected further escalation.

Apparently J the strikes of December 13-14 vers so inteorpreted in Hanoi^ which instructed the Poles on December ik to terminate all conversations.

On December 2^^ the US informed the Communists that bombing within 10 miles of the center of Hanoi had been suspended as an act of goodwill in the hopes of reviving the ¥arsaw contact. Ihis vas a more substantial concession on the bombing than the Poles had urged after the December 2 and k strikes^ in that it reflected an explicit^ well-defined commitmentj rather than the tacit^ unformalized restraint suggested by the Poles. The DRV may have concluded that propaganda repercussions^ actual and prospective J had forced a change in the US posture^ causing Hanoi in turn to stiffen the conditions it imposed in exchange for talks. The Trinh formula of January £8^ 1967^ demanding an end to all bombing of the DRVj may reflect this calculation.

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US Good Faith

Prior to the Decemher 2 bombing of Hanoij no conditions vith respect to US military actions had been demanded by the Communists as a price for the Warsaw meeting. The only terms^ as expressed by Levandowski to Lodge on I^ovember 30^ vere: "I am authorized to say that if the US are really of the vievs vhich I have presented (i-e.^ his 10 points)^ it would be advisable to confirm them directly by conversation vith the North Vietnamese Ambassador in Warsaw/^ In addition to this^ he urged only speed and secrecy.

The US had several times previously suggested that mutual de-escalation be undertaken by the two sides. In a major policy statement ^ Goldberg offered "a cessation of all bombing of North Vietnam— the moment ve are assured^ privately or other^/Zisej that this step vill be answered promptly by a corresponding and appropriate de-escalation on the other side/' (9/22/66) But de-escalation was rejected ^u^ lewandowski as the wrong subject with which to start. Thus the US had no cominitment to avoid bombing Hanoi stemming from the agreement to meet in KarsaWj and in fact^ as noted above, strikes against Hanoi had been authorised since mid-November but had not occurredJ presumably for reasons of weather.

The Poles argued that there was a difference between de-escalation and non-escalation, ¥3 should have been willing to trade the latter for talks J even if not the former, Secondlyj they stretched the meaning of our official position, Eapacki claiiaed, "yo^ have said over and over again that you would end all bombing if there was an assurance from Hanoi that there would be a response toward peace from Hanoij however^ we did not ask that you stop bombing but only that you not intensify it." And "recalling speeches of Goldberg^ the President^ Secretaiy Rusk and others^ once we received the signal we dld^ we would have had every right to call for a stop in the bombing," (I2/19/66) Without eiKiorsing this particular formulation^ E'Orlandi indicated his general agreement with the Polish Interpretation, (I2/18/66) Gronouski feared it would be widely shared and that the Communists "will have no trouble convincing the leadership in every capital of the world that our stated desire for peace negotiations is insincere." (I2/14/66) In their minds^ the issue t'orned less on the precise language of previous US expressions than on a general tenor which they felt was undercut by the December bombings. Washington apparently soon came to share this view^ and the 10 mile bombing sanctuary around Hanoi's center was established to underline the seriousness of US intentions.

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The £ollo^i±n.g chronology consists of brief summaries and interpretative statements about each date J follovred by indented documentation.

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June 27, 1966 *—'—^—'-— If ■ ■ — ■

Jfe.rigold begins with a contact between D'Orlandi^ the Italian Ambassaclor in Saigon^ and Levandovskij the Polish Representative on the ICG J also working out of Saigoa. Lewandowski^ just returned from Hanoi ^ reported that he had a ^Very specific peace offer^^ to transmit^ one that vouJ.d lead to a "political compromise" settling the whole Vietnam question once and for all. The attractive features were (a) Hanoi would not ask for immediate reunification^ (b) it would not demand a socialist system in SVlTj (c) SM would not have to change its relationships in the field of foreign affairs^ (d) ^'neutralization" would not "be demanded_j (e) U.S. withdrawal could be sdieduled along a "reasonable calendarJ" (f) Hanoi did not seek to interfere with the SVTI government.

Hanoi's conditions for entering negotiations were that (a) the HLF "take part'' and (b) there be a "suspension" of the bombing*

D'Orlandi communicated all this to Lodge In Saigon^ two days later (June 29); on instructions from Fanfanij who was also transmitting it directly to Washington.

Saigon 58^0 (to SecState)^ TS/l^odis^ 29 June I966 (Section 1 of 2}

Literally Eyes Only for the President^ The Secretary^ and the Acting Secretary

"1. This afternoon D^Orlandi^ Italian Ambassador, telephoned to say it was xirgent that I come to his office as soon as the Catholic service honoring the anniversary of the coronation of Pope Paul VI had ended. I went to his office at about 6;45j ^^d he began as follows: -

ICC

"2. Two days agOj the Polish representative on the J Levandowskij came to him with a ^very specific

peace offe

■y*

"3« D*Orlandi said he had requested instructions from Fanfanij who told him (1) to submit the whole proposal to me^ and (2) said that he^ Fanfanij would send the whole thing to Washington for their consideration,"

"9« ^e Pole began "oy saying that Hanoi has been deeply disappointed lij the proposals made by Ronning whichJ they are surCj had emanated originally from the United States and not from the Canadians. Ronning had

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proposed that the U.S. stop the "boml^ing if Forth Viet-KTam stopped the Irifiltratlonj and had talked alDout the exchange of prisoners- parcels and letters- T^is had bitterly disappointed North Vietnam, ©le first pointy they had said^ vonld be unconditional surrenderj and they could not accept itJ but they are open to a 'political compromise' settling once and for all the entire Yiet-TTaiu q_uestion-

'^10. When D'Orlandi said that he was skeptical^ the Pole said that Hanoi 'was prepared to go 'guite a long way.' 'It is useless for me to add^' said the Pole^ 'that should there not be any kind of a preliminary agreement^ Hanoi will deny flatly ever having made any offer,* According to the Pole, the Forth Vietnaiaese are 'tightly controlled' by the Chinese Communists. Hie preliminary talks, therefore, should be between Moscow and Washington. Waen and if proposals should emerge which could be considered as a basis for negotiations, Hanoi woiild at that time and under those circmtstances get into it. Eie Pole said that Hanoi was afraid of the Chinese Concmunists who have an interest in dragging on the war for many years. D'Orlandi added that the Pole was evidently 'proud of himself for having brought these proposals about,

"U- The proposals are as follows:

A. They insist that the so-called National Liberation Front 'take part' in the negotiations. The key word is 'take part.' According to D'Orlandi, there is 'no question of their being the representative; they are not to have bxpj monopoly,'

B. There must be suspension of the bombing.

"12- These are the two proposals.

"13, Then there are other points^ which D'Orlandi called

'negative ones,' which are that (a) Hanoi will not ask for

Immediate reunification, either \i'^ elections or otheiTwise, of

North and South Vietnam''

LODGE

(Section £ of 2)

"(b) They will not ask for establishment of a 'socialist' system in South Viet-ITam; (c) They will not ask South Viet-Nam to change the relationships which it has in the field of foreign affairs; and (d) They will not ask for neutralization.

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(e) Although they will ask for U,S. vithdravalj they are ready to discuss a ^reasonable calendar,^ (f) Although 'we would like scmeone othur than Ky' - to quote the words of Hanoi - they do not want to interfere with the South VietnsJaiese Government."

*^18. The Pole said that his Government would be villlng to arrange for D'Orlandi to meet with appropriate Polish spokesmen any^^rhere -- Hong Kong or Singapore, In response to a question by D'Orlandi as to why they had come to himj the Pole said they wanted 'an able debater to put the case to President Johnson^ and we feel that the Italian Government has the sympathy of the United States Government,' Moreover^ the Italians have the same interest we have in agreement bet^/een Washington and Moscowj and in shutting out Peking.

"19. D'Orlandi's impression is that the Poles are desperately seeking a way out on Moscow's instructions* BiiSj he saidJ may need further exploration. He had the definite impression that noi^ Hanoi 'was amenable to common sense' saying 'they do not want anything that would not stop the whole war, They want a political settlementj and are prepared tc go a long vay,*"

LODGE

June 29, 1966

On the same day that D'Orlandi saw Lodge in Saigon^ the Italian Ambassador Fenoaltea brought the information to the State Department in Washington, State saw little new in it, with two exceptions. The Italians were therefore asked to inquire discreetly if there was real movement on the following points:

(1) Did the condition that the TTLF '^talce part" in negotiations mean it need no longer be accepted as the ^'oole representative" of the SW people?

(2) Did the woi-d ^^suspension" mean that a bombing "cessation" was no longer a prerequisite to negotiations?

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State i;108 (to .Amemljassy Saia*on)j TS/NodiSj 29 June 1966 Literally Eyes Only for Ambassador Embtel 58UO

"Italian Ambassador Fenoaltea came In today with Faxochej Italian Ambassador-designate to Canadaj who had hand-^carried message similar to that contained reftel and who said he was under instructions to hand-carry our reply back to Rome

ir

• * •

'^Je told Fenoaltea that^ except for use of term 'participate' with respect to DILFj vhich couJ-d have ioiplication Hanoi was not insisting NLF be "sole representative^ of SVHj and 'suspension of bombing' in place of ^cessation of bombing^' position Hanoi indicated to Pole was very similar to previous indications their position. Thus in light of various translations these woi^s have gone through^ it is not clear whether their use has any significance* Therefore^ without indicating to Pole that message had been passed to USG^ suggested Italian Government on its own responsibilityj guery Polish Eep on these two terms to determine whether formulations contained in Polish version of Hanoi^s position were used advisedly by Hanoi and indicate some shift in position or were accidents of translation.,,,"

BALij

June 3Qj I966

xhisk expressed skepticism about the value of the DEV proposal^ even if there were some movement on the points enumerated^ because allowing the KLF to "take part" might lead it eventually to a major --even ''fatal" — role in SW politics^ however the negotiations caLne outj and because a bombing "suspension" would produce pressures for a "cessation." Given the risks of recrimination from ?anfani and Eapackij though^ he felt it necessary to follow up. He also predicted^ correctly J that the POL strikes then prograrnmed for Rolling Thunder might stiffen the DRV position momentarilyj arguing against trying to move too fast.

Lodge J on the other hand^ thought the package so forthcoming as to arouse suspicions about the intermecliary. Presumably^ he was less familiar than State with the content of previous Hanoi communications of the sort. Much of the proposal^ as conveyed^ ^7as old^ but two points to which hc; drew attention were new: the apparent acceptance of the existing Saigon government and of its foreign relationships.

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Canberra 58 (to SecState)^ S/jrodis^ 30 June I966 Syes Only for Acting Secretary ar^i Ambassador from Secretary

* m

"2. I cannot from here make any full assessment of that message. The NLF part seems vague^ encouraging only in that it abandons the *sole representative* position- Hovever^ this position has always seemed a maximum opener^ and we must keep in mind alvays that even 'taking part* on a full basis vould go very far to give the NLF a majors and likely fatalj part in SVN politics. On the bombing^ a 'suspension' could easily lead to heai'y pressure for a 'cessation'. For the rest^ the disclaimers of any ioimediate 'Socialist' set-up in SVN or of Immediate reunification plans have a familiar ring from some past noises by DEV Eeps trying to make themselves sound reasonable^"

* •

"^, All this being saidj I suppose that if Fanfani asks us to let D'Orlandi follovr up^ we would virtually have to agree*... With careful instructions and reasonable precautions ^ we should be able to minimize risks. In any case refusal to follow up — even if message wholly phony ^~ would expose us to recrimination from Fanfani and Eapacki alike*.,,"

"5* MoreoverJ there might o^st be something in It. Poles and Italians may seem devious channels^ but not all that implausible if Hanoi is having any second thoughts. If soJ POL strike might stiffen them momentarily^ to avoid any appearance of weakness or effect of strike^ and this argues for not moving too fast."

..

EUSK

Saigon 5855 (to SecState)^ TS/i^Todis^ 30 June I966 Literal.ly Eyes Only for the President^ the Secretary

and the Acting Secretary

, * *

"3* I^e proposals attributed to Hanoij as a packagej

;o far beypnd anything we, have heard mentioned Joe fore. .n factJ they appear So forxhcoming as xo arouse

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suspicion concerning the credibility of the Polish intemedip.ry. It seems to us that not only is the so-called KLF being abandoned as the sole bargaining agent J but so also is the NLF progi-am of a 'socialist' state J of unifying the Uorth and South j and of *neutralization.' Also the phrase 'reasonable calendar* Indicates a definite softening of position regarding IGMS. Ttroops, IHae same is true of acceptance of the Government of South Viet-ITgm and its foreign relationships."

* •

LCCiGE

July 6 & 7 , 1966

Fanfani also described the contact to U Hiantj who in turn passed it on to Goldberg at UTT headquarters» This increased fears of a leak from Fanfani on the US side. In fact^ the disclosure to U Thant vas considered such a leak and doubtless put pressure on the USG to protect itself by piorsuing the contactj on the one handj and by taking defensive positions on the other*

Geneva 6I (to State)^ TS/ETodis^ 6 July I966 For Acting Secretary from Ambassador Goldberg

"5- Syg informed me that on recent visit to Italy

Fanfani reported to him that POL ICC Ambassador had had conversation with Ho Clii Minh on June 27 in which Eo presumably said that they would be prepared to engage in serious discussions with us^ no'tv^ithstanding Chinese and Soviet objectionsj it bombings were suspended and If Vlet^Cong participated in talks. According to Thant^ this inforcaation relayed by POL ICC Ambassador to Italian Ambassador in Saigon who in turn communicated it to Fanfani. Ihant further reported that Fanfani believed message contained two new elements: (A) that Ho was not insisting on unconditional cessation of bombing, merely a suspension; and (:3) Ho not insistent that Viet-Cong be sole representatives of South Vietnamese people at such negotiations. Fanfani had also told the Secretary General that he thought this message of such importance that it warranted sending a special Italian emissaiy to Washington to communicate the substance of it to United States officials. Syg said

Fanfani did this and that special emissary was asked in Washington to remain there pending a probe through

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Fanfani of the vord^ suspension^ and also to inquire vhat Ho meant b^ saying Viet-Cong would have to participate in the talks. Fanfani swcx*e U Thant to secrecy and the Secretary General therefore imparted this information to me in the strictist confidence saying he had not coimnuni-cated to anyone in Secretariat, He asked in particular that I not raise this ^ith Fanfani^ but if latter mentioned I it to meJ I should disclaim knowledge of it from Syg^

except as I might receive knowledge of it from Washington."

TUBBI

I

State 2673 (to J\men"bassy Tol<yo)j TS/lTodis^ 7 July I966

For the Secretary from the Acting Secretary 1

"As you vill have already seen from TOSEC 188^ Fanfani has already begun to leak, having told U Thant of Polish message and in turn U Thant having passed it on to Goldberg

• •

K

*

"I privately spoke to Fenoaltea today and^ without mentioning Goldbergj said that ve had indirectly heard that Fanfani had mentioned matter to U Tbant. Fenoaltea said he would drop a private note to Fanfani. Fenoaltea expressed full understanding of problem of attempting to do business in this manner and much skepticism as to whether there was any real substance in approach* He said though thatJ as we kneWj Fanfani felt impelled to 'do something**

u

* *

state 2619 (to US Mssion G^neva)^ TS/l^odis, 7 July I966 Literally Eyes Only for Ambassador Goldberg from Acting Secretary

"Re paras 5 and 6 of Geneva's 6I strictly FTIj we have received report from Italians along lines indicated by Fanfani to XJ Iliant,.,ve are folJ^owing up in very discreet manner to test its authenticity "

July 7^9, 1966

Lodge was instinicted to develop the contact further^ by meeting with D'Orlan^i and Lewandovrski himself in Saigon^ but to tell Ky something of

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a general na.ture in case niEnors "began to circulate p Lodge's inquiries were to address procedures ^ but one matter of substance was raised^ as it woiild be again and again from the US side: ^That would Hanoi do to reciprocate the suspension of bombing? He carried cut these instructions two days later (July 9).

State 2626 (to Amembassy Saigon)^ OS/jTodiSj 7 July I966

"...we suggest that .Ambassador D'Orlandi seek discreetly to arrange a meeting between himselfj Lewan-dowski and iimbassador Lodge in Saigon*

"—• At such a meeting you should^ referring to USG*s understandings of Levandowski-s statem^ents to B'Orlandlj and making clear that you are acting under instructionsJ state as follows:

"1. State that the United States shares the desire for an over-all political settlement.

"2. Inquire when^ where and with what parties Hanoi contemplates that negotiations would take place.

"*3' Inquire what if any action Hanoi on its part would propose to take or not tal^e during the period of suspension of bombing*

"k* inquire whether Hanoi believes it realistic to keep negotiations secret if the United States suspends bombing with the inevitable speciJilation this vould entail*

".... ¥e are inclined to feel it wouJ.d be desirable for you to say something of a general nature to Ky without disclosing specifics ^'

BALrL

Saigon 60k (to SecState)^ TS/lTcdiSj 9 July I966

"1, Lewandowskij D'Orlandi and I met at D'Orlandi's office at 1^:30 July 9.

^*2. After mj^ saying it was a personal pleasure for me to see him again, I began^ pursuant to your 2626_, by referring to our understanding of Lewandovski's indication that Hanoi was open to a 'political settlement' which would settle the Viet-I^Tam Question once and for all*

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"3* I added that ve understood that Lewandowski had said to D'Orlandi that Hanoi in effect made tvo proposals:

(a) nihe ITational Liberation Front would 'take pa-rt' in the negotiations.

(b) Biere must be a suspension of the bombing in 3^Torth Vietnam-

"ii-. Our understanding of Amb. Lewandovski * s approach to Amb. D'Orlandl vaSj I said^ that if proposals emerged as a basis for negotiations^ then Hanoi -would be prepared to enter into negotiations.

"5» I then said that acting under instructions of the United States Government^ I was authorized to state the follovin,^:

"6- And I stated the four points in your 2626^^^

• t *

LODGE

July 9, 1966

Saragat gives Goldberg an account of the D'Orlandi-Lewandowski contacts in Saigon similar to that already passed by D'Crlandi to Lodge and by Fanfani to U Thant and Washington.

He adds two points to the previous versions:

1. Lewandowski^s intention is that the negotiations take place substantially between Moscow and Washington. If secrecy is preserved^ this will permit Peking to be ignored.

ii* Sie US airstrikes against oil depots near Ifenoi and Haiphong on June 25 have not^ in Lewandowski's viev^ prejudged the effort to arrange contact.

Rome 1^5 (to SecState)^ TS/lTodis^ 9 July I966 From Goldberg and Sisco

*'Amb Goldberg saw Saragat privately Friday night July 8 "

* • •

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*^Following in fiill is text of document which Saragat gave to Mb, Goldberg*... Begin text: On June 27 the Italian Ambassador in Saigon D'Orlandi reported that the Polish representative to the ICC Amhassador Savira just "back froBi Hanoi had told him that the riorth Vietnam Govermnent Yere prepared to enter secret pourparlers in order to reach a political compromise with the United States at two preliritinary conditions: i-e,^ suspension of bombing over North Yietnam and Viet Cong participation in the negotiations. As to the nature of such compromisej the Hanoi Government were willing: (l) not to ask for the immediate reunification of North and South Vietnam; (2) to relinquish their claim to imposition of U,S, socialist system in South Vietnam; (3) not to ask for changes in the existing relations between South Vietnam and the western countries; (^) to discuss the timing of the withdrawal of xAmerican troops from South Vjetna^m while maintaining their request for such withdrawal.

"MoreoverJ the Polish representative made it clear that in his own opinion negotiations were to take place substantially between Moscow and Washington, If absolute secrecy were maintained about the preliminary contacts^ HanoiJ he thought^ could have ignored Peking*

^^On Jijne 28 it was reported that oil depots in Hanoi and Haiphong had been bombed, The Polish Ajiibassador expressed seme reservations as to the conset^uences of such initiative but later reported that the attempt to open negctiatioriS was not in his o\ni eyes pre-judged.

"In connection with Ambassador D^Orlandi^s reportsj the Italian PriMin and the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs J who were then in Bonn^ decided to send Signor Farace^ Deputy Dir Gen for Political Affairs^ to Washington so that he may sound^ together with Ambassador Fenoalteaj the reactions of the American Govt..,, Farace and Fenoaltea on July 1 met in Washington Acting Secy of State Ball (Rusk was then in Australia) and Ball's Deputy Alexis Johnson, The t^ro Amc^rican officia.Is-. .suggested that D^Orlandi should request clarification from the Polish Rep on two points: (l) He should find out whether the words 'participation of the Front of Liberation to the negotiations' were meant to exclude the Go'.^ of Saigon; (2) He should also find out whether the word * suspension' as applied to bombing was deliberately meant as something different from 'cessation,' On Jijily 2j 3, and k Ambassador D^Orlandi made clear that JTorth Vietnam sImply asked for suspension of the bombing as a preliminary condition for the beginning of negotiations aimed at reaching a political

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comproniLlse on the above-msntioned lines» Viet Cong participation^ furtheimore^ obviously did. not rule out the paartlcipation of the South Vietnam Govt. It vas only suggested that once the negotiations had begun General Ky may be replaced vith a less extremist political personality. On July 5 Fenoaltea aiad Farace in the course of a new meeting vith Ball and Alexis Johnson passed on to these tvo American officials the inToriiiation received from D^Orlandi. The Americans,*, reserved their position because President Johnson vas avay in Texas and Ltr, Rusk vas still abroad. According to Ambassador Fenoaltea^ further American communications vould not he forthcoming for tvo or three days.

"On July 7 Ambassador Fenoaltea reported that he had again met together vith Farace the tvo American officials They had expressed their opinion that Ambassador D'Orlandi and Ambassador Cabot Lodge should get in touch jointly and unofficially vith the Polish Ambassador to explore the possibilities of the Jlorth Vietnamese offer ^"

July 10, 1966

T'Jhen Lodge inentioned the matter to Ky^ he expressed doubt that it vould tixrn out to have any real substance j but said it vould be folloved up. Ky apparently vent along graciously^ suggesting that it might be a

good time for a US leaflet campaign in the negotiations.

DRV. stressing our desire for

Saigon 6h2 (to SecState)^ S/Nodls^ 10 July I966

"1, Pursxiant your 2626^ I csLlled on Ky ostensibly to discuss General Tiai and acquisition of suitable premises for the US consul in Danang. But as I vas leaving J I remarked that 'by the vay' ve had been getting some rumors out of Hanoi indicating a desire to find a way out. None of these seemed to have any real substance^ but we vould follow all of them up and^ if ariything important occurred^ we vould of course tell him at once,"

* • 4

*'3p He made the folloving suggestion which I thought interesting:

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"^. The time has come for the -Americans to put on another 'gooti vill leaflet^ cainpaign. The message on the leaflets should bg that ve (Yietnamese and Americans) want negotiationsj it is your rulers ¥ho don't,"

■ ■ *

rODGE

July 2^, 1966

When Levandowski replied to Lodgej under instructions from Warsav^ he could say only that there could "be no results without a bombing cessationJ that the DEV's k points nust be recognized^ etc. This seemed a step bacfarard to all participants. The matter vas left for some veel^.

Saigon 1785 (to SecState)^ S/Hodis^ 2^ July I966

"1, D'Orlandij Lewandovski and I met at D'Orlandi's office at ^:30. The meeting lasted for t-^renty minutes. Lewandowski talked as follows:

"2. 'I have the following instructions from Warsaw which 1 have been asked to transmit to Ambassador Lodge:

A» 'It is difficult to discuss any proposition dui'ing the current important escalation of war activities in the South^ and of the bombing in the E"orth.

B, 'To hold such discussions could be looked upon as a maneuver to force the DUV to negotiate under American conditior^*

C. ^-Je know very well that the DRV will not give up the fight while the United States pursues its present policy of military pressui^e.

D, 'We have reasons to state that no proposition without the cessation of the bombing of the DRV will produce results*

E. 'United States Government has no ri^t to bomb the DEY and no right to propose conditions for its cessation,

F» *If the United States desires a peaceful

solution, it must recognise the four points proposed by the DSV and prove it in practice•

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G, 'The United States must stop bombing and other militazy activit^r against north Viet-Nam, Only then can a political solution be expected.'"

•«

"l6* D^Orlandi then spoke as follows:

"17. '^is is definitely a step backward. I had thought that the first meeting was rather encouraging. Both the opening and the American questions were encouraging. I felt something might come out and^ as a matter of fact^ I still feel this as a hunch. AccordinglyJ I hope the stiffness of your reply today is due to prevailing circumstances^ and that this channel may be kept open and resumed as soon as possible. ¥e vere expecting a reply* Now we have a statement* I understood what led to this statement. It is the circumstances of the moment.'

"18* I asked to vhat circumstances he vas referring. He said to all of the rumors in the newspapers of peace talk."

^;

»««

LODGE

September t-8, I966

•^^^^ ~' —*• 11 I

After a period of inactivity and a discouraging visit to Hanoi by Lewandowskij D'Orlandi and Lewandowski att^anpted to revive the contact. Ihey saw two main problems: that their exercise not be viewed as probing for Hanoi^s minimum position; and that it not be directed at reinforcing the status quo or facilitating deescalating^ but rather at finding an overall settlement that would penait the war to end.

Saigon 5229 (to SecState)^ S/l^^odis, h September I966

"1. D'Orlandi said that Lewandowski had returned from 16 days in Hanoi profoundly discouraged. His two closest contacts Fna:m Van Dong and General Giap were both away. His talk with Ho Chi Minh produced nothing of interest. There vas absolutely no sign of a desire to stop the war."

'«.

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"4. D'Orlandi said he would "be willing to work with Lewandawski to tiy to develop a compromise formula^ which could then he submitted to Moscow or Washington.

"5- Comment: V?hat are Department's views of this suggestion? It could "be that some ideas and clarification mi^t come out of itj and that it would not J of course J commit us to anything. I doubt whether the Pole will be authorized. End Comment,"

LODGE

State ^1695 (to AmEHbassy Saigon)^ 6 September I966

"... we see no objection to D'Orlandi's pursuing this with Pole if latter is so author!::ed..."

Saigon 5517 (to SecState)^ S/lJodis^ 8 Septes^ber I966

"1. D*Orlandi told me that in his recent talk with Lewandowskij the problem referred to in my last telegram regarding Lewandcwski and D'Orlandi working up a proposal to submit to Washington and Moscow was discussed. Lewandowski made three points:

"A. He did not "waut the only outcome of the procedure between D^Crlandi and himself to be to inform the United States as to ^ just how far the North Vietnamese would give in.'

^'3. Although Lewandowski recognizes that I had already given him ample assurances, he feels that emphasis must be given to the need of the U*S« approaching the problem so as to concern South Viet-Nam alone and not South Viet-IIam as a 'piece of a general Chinese puzzle.' Lewandcwski feels that the problem could be 'simple enough' if limited to South Viet-Nam — but not if the United States is thinking of using conversations with Lewandowski (and Lewandowski^s talks in Hanoi) as a way of getting at China or Chinese cuestions "

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"C. Levandowski said that it vas only fair to state that the 'aim of the exercise' hetween him and D'Orlandi should not be to reinforce the status guo^ but to get a ^global' settlement. ^^Jhen he says 'global'j he obviously does not mean vorld-vide; he means 'over all' as regards South Viet-Nam. ThiSj said D'Orlandi^ quoting tewandowski^ means 'guarantees^ etc*'; therefore *iiot just de-escalation. ^^^

* *

"5. Lewando^.rski said he was sure that something could be done, Hanoij he sald^ looks at the situation through the distorted spectacles of the Viet Cong through vhom they get all their information about the situation. ^My Job^* said Levandowski_, 'is to e^lain to Hanoi that they have a vrong vie'w.' !I?he last time he had been in lianoi neither PhamVan Dong nor General Giap vere there^ and 'they are the only two in the whole place who talk sense and understand the real situation in the south*'"

• * • •

LODGE

September 12^ 9_^_

State agreed that the contact be pursuedj reserved its position on ^^changes in the status quo/^ and offered to look for a gesture of good intent to encourage Hanoi (and D'Orlandi}^ such as a proposal of

mutually-timed withdrawal^ or trading a bombing cessation plus a halt in the US troop buildup for an end to infiltration.

State ^^917 (to Amembassy Sai^n)^ S/Nodis^ 12 September

1966 Bef: Saigon 55IT

"2, Lewandowski-s remark that the aim of the exercise should not be to ^reinforce the status guo' is all right if he is talking about the present status quo in South Viet-iram. But we cannot "buy a discarding of the status quo ante^ i.e. the 195^' and 1962 Agreements.*.we do not rule out consideration of revisions of the 'Drovisions, of the Geneva AgreeHonxs iDut \re coula a'ceepc- no changes uncj-l we

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had a clear picture of what vas the total context of an underst.anaing vith the Coinniuiiists

11

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5- -HP. ve vill consider here whether there is something that could be given to D^Orlandi for his 'possible agreement foroiula' vhich could demonstrate our earnest desire move forward and smoke out Hanoi^s intentions, This might lie^ for example J in realm of mutually-timed withdrawal formula J or qtuid pro cjuo on cessation of bombing and halt in expansion US forces against end to infiltration by Hanoi."

m *

RUSK

September lU^ I966

D'Orlandl reports that Lewandovski is not interested in Sees calat ion or any other sequence that will lead to preserving the present personnel of the GM, It is this part of the "status quo" which must change* On the other hand^ the Geneva agreements of 195^1-and 1962 need not be affected.

Saigon 5965 (to SecState)^ S/lTcdiSj ll^ September I966

"1. Pursuant to your kk^lj I had a long session

with D'Orlandi.

"2, He says the phrase 'status quo* refers exclusively to the political and governmental status quo in Saigon and has nothing whatever to do with the 195^ and I962 agres:rients....

"3. Lewandowski was definitely not referring to the 195^ and I962 agreements, Ke is not interested in de-escalation or any kind of negotiation which would lead to a settlement and which would at the same time perpetuate the personnel of the present government. Lewandowski means that those on his side are not interested in ending military activities ifj by so doing, the political and governmental situation in Saigon is thereby frozen."

t J

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*^12. D'Orlandi would like to test how influential Levandov^ki is vith Pham Van Dong and Vo Ilguyen Giap^ with vhouL Lewandowski claxEns to be so close. He is looking around for ^some little thing' which could be interpreted as an indication. He is sure Levandowski speaks for Eapacki and with Moscow approval every inch of the way. He is inclined to believe that Lewandovskl speaks for Pham Van Dong and Vo Nguyen Giap, but would like to iHake sui-e,

"13. I ventured the guess that nothing could be expected out of Hanoi until our November elections were over* The time between now and then^ thereforej I suggested J could be valuable in discussing and fortnu-lating proposals.

*^lk* D'Orlandi did not agree. He thought we should not ^discard the possibility of discussions ncyw' due to the internal upheaval in Chinaj which he believes brought the Peking Government very close to a breach of diplomatic relations witii Moscow, ThiSj he surGiised--and not our elections—was dominating official thinking: in Hanoi "

k • . *

LODGE

September I8, I966

Lewandowski tells D'Orlandi that a coalition government should be consideredJ the bulk of which would be "sensible SW politiciansj" with a man or two from the right and a man or two from the NLF in "unimportant ministries/^ SVII would become a "second CaaiQodia/' But he is discouraged about US intentions because of the incompatibility of "military escalation and political proposals."

Saigcn 628O (to SecState)^ S/Nodis, I8 September 1966

"1. D'Orlandi had a meeting with Lewandowski Friday night. It started as a social affair on D'Orlandi's invitation and on Lewandowski's initiative became a discussion of the war. According to Orlandij Lewandowski said the following:

*»■ *

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"5* If the ^ericans ever raally cared^ they should especially concentrate on Hiam Yan Dong's fourth point concerning ^¥ho is to speak for South Vietnam.' This does not mean that Hanoi vould he trying to ram the Viet Cong down our throats. We could consider the setting up of a coalition government the bulk of which vould be made up of ^sensible South Vietnamese politicians.* To preserve appearances you could have 'on the fringe' men from the 'right' in one or two 'unimportant ministries' and from on * the 'left' fill one or t^^ro 'unimportant ministries with the Bo-called NLF.*

"6- D'Orlandi — this is unthinkable. If this is what you want to talk about^ it is better for us to stop the talks.

"7.. Lewandowski asked whether D'Orlandi realized that what he meant to say was that this would be the last step not the first,

"8, D*Orlandi said; What would be the ultimate goal? If it is to have the Viet Cong in the Government of Viet Jlam^ I won't even submit such a proposal to Ambassador Lodge,

"9. Lewandowski said that is r^t at all vhat he meant to put to D'Orlandi, Plainly^ the ultimate aim would be: *to make of South Vietnam a second Cambodia,'

"10. D'Orlandi said that makes more sense^ it is at least worth talking about,

"11. LewaMovski said: 'But I don't believe the Americans really wish to talk. They are trying to do two things at once: military escalation grouped with political proposals„ You can't do both. So long as they won't make up their minds^ we can't do anything. We must wait until November.'"

. •.

LODGE

September 22 I966

Goldberg's speech to the OTT General Assembly stresses the US desire for a negotiated settlement^ proposing a reduction in Communist milltai^^ activities in SVI^ in response for a bombing cessation^ and mutual withdrawal of militai*y forces under International supervision^ He re.iter-ates President Jonnson's statement that Vietcong" representation m peace

negotiations would not be an insijrmountable problem.

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Kew York Tlises ^ 23 September I966

^'Otext of Goldberg's Address"

United IJationSj New York^ Sept* 22nd

• •

"U.S. Offers 'First Step'

"...United States is villing once again to take the first step. ¥e are prepared to order a cessation of all bombing of Ij'orth Vietnam -- the moment ve are assured^ privately or otherwise^ that this step vill be answered promptly by a corresponding and appropriate de-escalation on the other side. We therefore urge before this Assembly that the Government in Hanoi be asked the folloving question^ to which we would be prepared to receive either a private or a public response;

'Vould itJ in the interest of peace^ and in response to a prior cessation by the United States of the bombing in North Vietnam^ take corresponding and timely steps to reduce or bring to an end its own military activities against South Vietnam?

"Another obstacle is said to be North Vietriain^3 conviction or fear that the United States intends to establish a permanent military presence in Vietnam. Ihere is no basis for such a fear- The United States stands ready to "vjithdraw its forces as other w^ithdrav theirs so that peace can be restored in South Vietnamj and favors international machinery -- either of the United Nations or otlier ma,chinery -- to insure effective supervision of the withdrawal. We therefore urge that Hanoi be asked the following question also:

*%Jould IToirth Vietnam be willing to agree to a time schedule for supervisedj phased withdrawal from South Vietnam of all external forces — those of North Vietnam as well as those from the United States and other countries aiding South Vietnam?

"A further obstacle is said to be disagreement over the place of the Vietcong in the negotiations. Some argue that J regardless of different vie'v/s on who controls the Vietcong^ it is a combatant force and^ as such^ should take part in the ne.TOtlations.

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"Some tiioe ago otot view on this matter vas stated by Rresident Johns on ^ who made clear that^ as far as we are concerned^ this question would not be *an insur-mountaljle problem.' We therefore invite the anthorities in Hanoi to consider whether this obstacle to negotiation may not be more imaginary than real."

October 5. I966

' ■ I

i

When D*Orlandi tells Levandowski he plans to return to Rome shortly^ the latter protests^ "You must not leave; there will be much to do after the 15th of ITovember*"

Saigon T712 (to SecState)^ S/KodiSj 5 October I966

"1. On Tuesday* October h^ at the Apostolic Delegate's receptionj D'Orlandi said to Lewandovski that he intended to say to Fanfani that there was no longer any reason for him to stay on in Saigon at the expense of damage to his health when thex^e was absolutely nothing to do.

"2, According to D'Orlandi^ Lewandovski said with great emphasis and earnestness^ *^You must not leave; there will be much to do after the fifteenth of November.'"

• •

LQDGS

October lU., I966

Lewandovski probes D'Orlandi with respect to possible US-Chinese collusion^ reporting that Chinese permission for Soviet flights to Vietnam have been withdrawn. He also raises the possibility of ousting ^f:j^ though whether as part of the negotiating arrangements or part of their outcome is not clear.

Saigon 8567 (to Sec vState)^ S/JTodis, 14 October I966

•..

"5* Levandowski went on to say that he was worried about reports about the(^inesej pairbicularly that the

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'Americans are trying to feel out the Chinese.* He added: *In such a case^ ve are out*'

"6. He said there vere 'added strains' between China and Russia and thatj due to a recent Chinese decisionJ there are now 'no Russian flights going through China to Viet-ITam.^

"7- Lewandovski then^ according to D^Orlandi^ asked whether he thought 'Ky could be ousted**

"8. D^Orlandi says he replies that he absolutely refused to ^haggle* and would not get into a situation in which they agreed to this in exchange for our agreeing to that. In any case^ this was a matter which vould *take care of itself in a few months when the new constitution goes into effect/^

• * •

LODGE

October 15^ 1966

State inquires if Leva,ndcwski liad a particular reason for attach, ing importance to the date of l^Tovember 15.

State 66655 (to AinEmbassy SAIGON), S/ilodis

15 October I966 Eef: Saigon 7712

* *

"2, D'Orlandi at next suitable occasion should ask LeiTandowski if he had particular reason to attach Importance to the date of November I5 after which according to him there vould be 'much to do^ (Para 2^ Saigon 7712)."

HUSK

October ig, I966

D'Orlandij on probing from Lodge^ indicates that Lewandow'ski reflects the views of Pham Van Dong and Vo Nguyen Giap, Bleither D^Orlandi nor Lewando>;ski can judge the relative influence of these

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men in the l^noi power structure. D'Orlandi refuses to pick up the lead given by Goldberg^s IM speech and help devise a bombing-infiltration formula that might be acceptable to Hanoi. He says Levandovskl is interested only In a total package j son^thing ^'finalj" not de-escalation or even a ''truce to allov conversation,"

To illustrate the total package he suggests; internationally controlled elections after one or two years; a neutral government; US withdrawal "eventually"; a coalition government ("not a 'must'V.)

In response to State's guery^ Lodge reports that Lewandovrski plans to go to Hanoi shortly after the U.S. elections.

Saigon 8583 (to SecState); S/NodiSj I6 October I966

"1. This is in reply to your 66655*

'^2- On Saturday I asked D'Orlandi this question;

Does Lewandowski's strong position against what he calls any form of ^barter*^ i.e. 'We stop doing this and you stop doing that' reflect his own appraisal of Hanoi's position or is it based explicitly on what he has been told by North Vietnamese?

"3* D'Orlandi^s reply: 'Eiis question is not phrased so as to reflect the realities, Lewandovski's views reflect Fnaoi Van Long and Vo Nguyen Giap who are the only t>70 North Vietnamese with whom Lewandowski has been in contact. Are or are these not the real power in Hanoi? Lewandowski does not know. D'Orlandi believes you know more than we do about that.

^%* Question: Could Lewandowski envisage any variation on Goldberg's September 22nd bombing-infiltration formula which would be compatible both with the principle of reasonable reciprocity and with Hanoi's apparent determination to avoid actions which could be interpreted as bowing to U.S. pressure?

''5* Answer: D'Orlandi says: I don't thinly he would answer that question. It would be going back on what he has said he refused to do. He w^ants an overall agreement — not a truce which would allow conversations. He wants a "package deal* "which covers eveiy-thlng and which thereby avoids any chance of publicity. Hanoi will buy something that is 'final,'

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^^6, VJhen I asked D'Orlandi what would be the elements of a package deal he said for illustration: after one or two years^ elections internationally controlled; a Vietnamese C-overnment which would abide by a policy of neutrality; the United States to leave 'eventually' (this word was stressed); a coalition government (which he said was not a *m.ust') which voiild contain representatives of so-called 'extremists' having nominal ministries. By 'extremists' he meant the Ky regime on the one hand and the Viet Cong on the other. D'Orlandi was sure there would never be an answer to the Q_uestion 'what will you do if the bombing stops?* But a ^real package deal' would get 'very serious' consideration and it would get it 'Immediately,

I"

•«•

*'8. As far as the question of your paragraph 2 is concerned I think it is answered effectively by Lewandowski^s intention to go to Hanoi immediately after the U,S, elections, Lewandowski says he 'attaches special importance' to these elections. Even though he says he does not understand our national politics he knows that the fact that the elections have been held will 'clear the air^ whatever the results may be*' It will mean that the electoral question will have been removed arid he will know that the United States 'can deal if it wants to.'

"9. Comment: I find this interesting since it confirms the belief which you and I have had for a long time that they must at all costs avoid publicity and consequent loss of face. I think long drawn out peace talks ai^e very dangerous for us. It appears now that they are convinced that long drawn out peace talks are utterly unacceptable for them. End comment."

October 25, I966

Ttie USGj GVl^ and Troop Contributing Countries propose settlement terms at the Manila Conference. Ihese include an end to aggression; territorial integrity for SVTI; reunification by free choice^ resolution of internal differences in SVE through a program of national reconciliation; and removal of all allied military forces and installations no later than srx months after "the military and subversive forces of North Vietnam are withdrawn^ infiltration ceasesj and the level of violence thus subsides." The settlement would be assured by international guarantees, particulars of which are open to negotiation.

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Eie pivotal^ features of the proposal are that (l) the future of the insurgents is to be settled through the national reconciliation program; and (2) allied ^rithdraval is to come after law and order are restored. These provisions would not allov a coalition government in which the Communists or i^TLF participated as an organized entity.

Few York Times , 26 October I966

TEKTS OF COIU'fuNIQUE MD DECLARATIONS SIGNED AT CLOSE OF THE MANILA CONFERENCE

The Communique

"27. So that their aspirations and position would be clear to their allies at Manila and friends everywhere , the Government of the Republic of Vietnam solemnly stated its views as to the essential elements of peace in Vietnam:

(i) Cessation of aggression. At issue in Vietnam is a struggle for the preservation of values which people eveiywhere have cherished since the dawn of history: the independence of peoples and the freedom, of individuals, Olie people of South Vietnam ask only that the aggression that threatens their independence and the externally supported terror that threatens their freedom be halted. No self-respecting people can ask for less. No peace-loving nation should ask for more,

(ii) Preservation of the territorial integrity of South Vietnam* The people of South Vietnajn are defending their own territory against those seeking to obtain by force and terror what they have been unable to accomplish by peacefxil means, l^Jhile sympathising with the plight of their brothers in the North and whife disdaining the regime in the Northj the South Vietnamese people have no desire to threaten or harm the people of the North or invade their country.

(ill) Reunification of Vietnam, The GovernLient and people of South Vietnam deplore the partition of Vietnam into Horth and South. But this partition brought about by tha Geneva agreements in 195^^ however unfortunate and regrettable^ will he respected untilj by the free choice of all Vietnamese^ reunification is achieved.

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(iv) Eesolution of internal problems. The people of South ^?"ietnain seek to resolve their own internal differences and to this end are prepared to engage in a program of national reconciliation. \Jhen the aggression has stopped J the people of South Vietnam will move more rapidly toward reconciliation of all elements in the society and will move for^^ard^ through the democratic process j toward human dignity^ prosperity and lasting peace.

(v) Removal of allied military forces, ^e people of South Vietnam will ask their allies to remove their forces and evacuate their installations as the mill-tary and subversive forces of North Vietnam are withdrawn, infiltration ceases^ and the level of violence thus subsides

Effective guarantees. The people of South Vietnam^ mindful of their experience since 195^^ insist that any negotiations leading to the end of hostilities incorporate effective international guarantees. They are open-minded as to how such guarantees can be applied and made effective.

"28, The other participating governments reviewed and endorsed these as essential elements of peace and agreed they would act on this basis in close consultation among themselves in regard to settlement of the conflict.

"29. In particularJ they declared that allied forces are in the Republic of Vietnam because that country is the object of aggression and its Government requested support in the resistance of its people to aggression. They shalJ. be withdrawn^ after close consuJ-tation^ as the other side withdraws its forces to the North, ceases infiltration^ and the level of violence thus subsides. Those forces will be withdrawn as soon as possible and not later than six months after the above conditions have been fulfilled,"

....

November 10^ I966

Rolling Thunder 52 is authorized. The targets include the Yen Vien Eailroad Yard and the Van Dien Vehicle Depot near Hanoi^ the Thai Nguyen Steel Plant^ the Haiphong Cement Plant and two other targets near Haiphong

25

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JCS 7735 (to CINCPAC), TS/LTM)IS, 10 November I966 Refs: (a) JCS 6008 (b) JCS 3kZJ

"1. (U) This is an execute message.

"2. (5S) Guidance goveriEmg ROLLING THUNDER 5I set forth in reference (a) remains in effect for ROLLING 33EMDER 52, except for added targets and additional guidance contained in this directive.

"3. (TS) Effective upon receipt of this message;, you are authorized to conduct air strikes against the following objectives in North Vietnam;

TCT # N.AME BE NUl'IBER

a. l8.i|-2 Xuan Mai Hwy Br 616-024^^

h. 19 Yen Vien ES Clf Yazxi 6l6-022l

c. 51.1 Ea Gia POL St or SSV/ (Former Phuc 616-O662

Yen POL Stor)

d. 51.18 Can Then POL Stor (Former l^e-p POL 616-I340

Stor)

e. 63.11 Van Dien Vehicle Dpo (Note 2) 616-O696

f. Kinh Uo SAM Stor 6l6-009ll^

g. Banoi SM Stor W, 6l6-025T

h. Haiphong SMA Assembly 6l6-<y2.Qhh

i. 76 Kiai Nguyen Steel Plant (Areas 616-O2U

G, Kj All Rolling Stock) (Notes 1 and 3)

3. 76 Thai Nguyen Steel Plant (Area Q) 6l6.021i)-

(Notes 1 and 3)

k. 77.1 Haiphong Cement Plant (Note 3) 6I6-O706

1. 80 Haiphong IPP W (iTote 3) 616-OOO7

m. 82.12 Haiphong O^PP E (Note 3) 616-OO5I

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November 11^ I966

Rolling Thunder 52 is amended to defer strikes against the Eiai l^guiyen Steel Plant and the three targets near Haiphong,

JCS 7783 (to CIKCPAC), TS/L]M)ISj 11 HoTember I966 Ref: JCS T735

"1, (TS) Air strikes vill be deferred repeat deferred (not canceled) against the following objectives in Eforth Vietnam*

^T # 76

NAI^ffl

Thai Nguyen Steel Plant

77-1 Haiphong Cement Plant

80

Haiphong TPP W

82.12 Haiphong TPP

BE mJMBER

616-0214 616-0706 616-0007 616-0051

November 13^ I966

On the eve of a major visit by Levanfiowski to Hanoi^ State tries' through Lodge to clarify Levandovski^s relationship to Hanoi and his ovn conception of his role. His concept of offering Hanoi a "'final" settlement is challenged j on the grounds that it req^uires the US to modify its position before an^"" indication of concessions from the other side. Another attempt at finding a de-escalatory fomiiila is offered^ the "Phase A-Phase B" package. (Under this concept^ the US would suspend bombing as Phase A, After a while, mutual de-escalatory steps would be taken as Phase B, Thus all the reciprocit;)'' would appear to be contained in Phase Bj even though the total de-escalation on each side over both phases would be matching.) This formula is offered by State as a way to save face for Hanoi while retaining reciprocity for a bombing suspension.

State 83786 (to Amembassy Saigon)^ TS/Nodis

13 November I966 Eef: Saigon's I07IU

* • *«

*^3. These are queries to be put to Lewandowski;

a. "What role does he envisage for himself? Is he J on the one hand^ seeking merely to facilitate a

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better understanding on each side of the other*s position in order to pave way toward some kind of direct contact^ and^ if soj does he have reason to "believe Hanoi will agree to such contact? Or^ on the other hand^ does he contemplate serving as an intermediaryJ conveying a series of proposals and counterproposals between two sides to try to achieve agreement on specific issues?

b. What does Hanoi consider to be his role? Has Hanoi entrusted specific messages to him andJ if soj to whom were they to be conveyed?

c. As we understand it^ Lewandowski wants an overall agreement and says Hanoi will buy something that is 'final^' he doesn't want a truce just to 'allow conversations.' How does he px'opose to get from here to there? How would he envisage overcoming our considerable reluctance to modify our position on one point or another without having any indication of what if ai^ helpful response this would evoke from Hanoi?

d, X-/e understand that considerations of face inevitably play a role in Hanoi's thinking* Does this perhaps explain^ in Lewandowski^s view^ why we are unable to get any meaningf^ol response to the question ^what would happen if the bombing of IP/N stopped? ' Does Lewandowski see any way around this? Could some package deal be worked out which i n its totality represented what both we and Hanoi Would agree to as a reasonable measure of mutual de-escalationJ but which would have two separate phases in its execution, Faase A would be a bombing suspension^ while Phase Bj which would follow after some adequate period^ would see the execution of all the other agreed de-escalatory actions• Hanoi's actions taken in Phase B would appear to be in response to our actions in Phase B rather than to the bombing suspension-

'^t* Lewandowski should understand that none of the foregoing represents a position which he is authorised to put to Hanoi on our behalf. ¥e will review his replies to our q^uestions and will then wish to determine what we wish to propose concerning his forthcoming visit to Hanoi."

RUSK

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November 1^-lg, I966

Lewandovski answers State's queries: His rcle is part broker^ part interlocutor. If he can narrow differences between the two sides sufficiently^ they vould wish to talk directly with each other and he would step out completely. He evades as "theoretical" the difficulties in his "final" settlement concept and chooses to interpret the Hiase A -Phase B proposal as a US recognition that "you can^t trade the bombing suspension for something else*" He expects the package deal to begin its evolution without a bombing suspension^ but with an end to the bombing fitting someTfhere in the evolutionary process,

He too has questions to pose:

i- Does the ^!anila offer mean US troop withdrawal depends on GW control of areas not now under Saigon control?

11- In case of a cease-fire^ would the US withdraw from I combat areas and not interfere in the creation of a new government in

i Vietnam?

iii, in case of.a cease-firej would the U5 not interfere in peaceful reunification^ whether brought about by referendum or election?

iv. In the case of a cease-fire and negotiations^ would the US publicly declare its willingness to use the Geneva machinery and ICC to bring peace to Vietnain?

Staters replies are carefully worded and not full;'' responsive to Lewandowski^s probing:

1. The Manila formulation speaks for itself. It offers a "definite withdrawal period" as a basis for negotiations which could include the mechanics of phased withdrawal.

ii* We support the presently emerging constitutional process in Sm and would abide by the results of free elections/

ill* ¥e would accept peacefulj freely chosen reunification^ a pre-requisite for which is the restoration of peace and order in SW.

iy for peace may be needed.

lY, The 195^ aJ^d I962 Geneva agreements are an adequate basis in SE Asia J but developments since 195^ suggest better laachineiy

State reiterates tliat the route to a final settlement must bes^in with de-escalation and asks again what Hanoi would do if we stopped bombing.

The meaning of this exchange is not very clear. Lewandowski seons

to be asking if we would accept procedu^t^s (tvoon withdrawal. Inter^ national inspection^ ei;c.) tuax vo^uld allow cnanges m the tfiW

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government favorable to the communists. We seem to reply negatively.

Secondly^ Levandovskij hj ostensibly putting the bombing question aside until more of the total package emergesj may be villing to accept our attack on tha North as a pressure on Hanoi for comprGmlsing other issues. State^ l:)y attempting to address bombing as an identifiable issueJ may be aggravating Hanoi^s problem of face. The difficulty from Staters point of vleWj of course^ is knowing what^ if any^ concessions Hanoi is making on other issues as the total package is built up- Having Levandovskij a Communistj as middleman aggravates this problem,

Saigon IO856 (to SecState), TS/NodiSj Ik November I966

*'l- I met Lewandotrski at D^Orlandi's apartment at 3:00 p.m. Saigon time.

"2. .*,on the eve of his visit to Hanoi.... He had four questions^ as follows:

a, 'Eegarding the offer at fenila concerning the withdrawal of U^S, forces from Viet-Nam on the i

- condition that the troops of Ilorth Viet-Nam would with '_ ^

draw (and^ he said^ North Viet-ITamj of course^ doesn't ,

admit that they are there at all)j does this condition mean the United States withdrawal depends on control by the present South Vietnamese Government of territories not now under the control of Saigon^ 1

b. 'In case of a cease-fire^ would the United ' ,1 States be prepared to withdraw from the combat areas and

not to interfere in the creation of a new government in 1

Viet-Nam? Ihe question of how the new government of Viet-Nam will be formed will certainly arise.

c. 'In case of a cease-firej would the United States undertake not to interfere in peaceful progress

toward unification of Viet-Nam if the people so wish^ , i

whether hj referendum or by election?

d. 'In the case of a cease-fire and negotiations ^ would the United States be ready to use the Geneva. Agreement and the machineiy of the International Commission in bringing peace to Viet-Nam^ and if so^ would the United States pubicly declare its intention to this effect?'

"3* I said that there ware questions which I would have to refer to the U*S, Government^ and that I wo^old do so and provide answers as soon as I could.

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"4. I then said T had scrae questions to askj and I asked hitn the four sets of questions listed in your State

• •««

* * m

"6* Without any prodding at all from me or D^Orlandi^ he said *Vellj some of your questions cannot be answered novf. As to your Question ITo, 1^ my present role is in accord vith the instructions of my government vho vould be prepared for me to take any role which would bring peace nearer* The two roles set forth in your questiouj that isJ on the one hand^ to work to facilitate a better understanding and pave the way to contact or^ on the otherJ to be an intermediary^ do not exclude each other. In factJ they could be done together. If the ideas which can be developed are not too far apartj then there can be talks J and if the ideas then start separating^ both sides can withdraw- On the other handj if I am successful in bringing the two sides together and they agree on something together J I can withdraw feeling that I have achieved sonething useful.

"7- As to the secoM questioUj Lewandowslu. said *you have worked in Southeast Asia and you realize that diplcoiiacy in Vlet-ITam is different than what it is in Europe or the United States. Clear-cut answers are very difficult to get^ one has to be very patient and look for indirect symptoms.^ He was not^ he saidj an agent of the Hanoi Governiaentj but 'if and when they decide they want you to know something/ he saidj *they would tell me. Of this I am confident. Each time I go^ the Prime Minister asks me about Americans and what the Americans think.'

"8* 'On your third qaestion^ it is a frame without a pictureJ it is very theoretical.'

"9* 'Ajb to the fourth question^ it recognizes that-you can't trade bombing suspension for something else. The question of bcmclng suspension in the first instance could be discussed informally. B-it if well founded hopes developed for reaching soin.e agreement^ then the bombing suspension could be brought in in-the second phase.'

"10. D'Orlandi remarked that in the beginning of our talksJ Lewandowski had agreed that the bombing suspension would not be a precondition^

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"11. Lewandowski said^ 'Yes^ there must be positive steps -- not speeches or declaratiotir.. A package deal is not only the most practical way of going at it; it is the only one- The A and B in your fourth question are the beginnings of the alphabet. It might be quite useful, ¥e must go right through to Z^ including everything that needs to be in the package deal,'-^

* « M •

LODGE

State 8k233 (to Amembassy Saigon);, TS/l^Iodis^

Ik November I966 Hef: (a) Saigon's IO856 (b) State 83786

* ■

''t. ...while -^e remain intent on finding a path to a reasonable and honorable settlement, we are not prepared to irlthdrav and find that armed subversive elements from the ETorth have moved in again. Ve are serious in expressing our vlllingness to remove our troops ^ to dismantle our bases^ and accept a non-aligned South Viet-Fam so long as It is genuinely non-aligned. We do not regard the genuine neutrality of South Viet-JI^n as opposed to our interests. With respect to our efforts to find an approach tovrard reciprocal actions of de-escalationj we are aware that Hanoi must assign veight to considerations of face J and -tre have said that so long as we were certain that the elements from the Jlorth were removed^ we would not Insist on any acknowledgement that these forces had ever been in the South.

"5* In addition to the foregoing^ we have the following specific comments on Lewandowski's four questions:

A* The Manila formulation on withdrawal was considered and worded with the greatest care - It was included in the communique in the light of specific indications from Eastern European sources that such a mention of a definite withdrawal period would help in establishing an acceptable basis for negotiations. The mechanics of a phased withdrawal would probably have to be a matter for negotiation although the initial de-escalatory steps might be taken by mutual examnle.

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B. ¥e have often said that we supported free elections in South Viet-Nam to give the South Vietnamese people a government of their own choice. We are pre-pareii to abide by the genuine manifestation of that free choice. \Je support the emerging constitutional process Id. South Yiet-Nam. The orderly formation of a responsive and representative government based on free elections will receive our support,

C. We are on record that the question of the reunification of Viet-Ham should be determined by the Vietnamese of both Uorth and South through their o'^n free decision^ without any interference from outside.

Eow soon that can take place depends on a number of factors^ above all the restoration of peace and order in South Viet-Fam so that South Viet-DTam will be in a position to treat freely with MVil on this matter,

■B

D. We have already declared our view that the 195^ sl^^ 1962 Geneva agreements are an adequate basis for peace in Southeast Asia, Since 195k there have been many developments which have revealed sharply the need for an effective and truly neutral mechanism of supervision and control. We wo^old be prepared to discuss all m=E.tters bearing upon this complicated problem.

"6, We would also observe that what Lewandowski terrris our 'theoretical' third question of how we get from here to there bears most directly upon his proposal for a 'package deal^ including^ as he put it^ not only A and B but all the other letters of the alphabet. These range all the way from the reciprocal measures of de-escalation to the components of a final settlement. The immediate issue is to find out precisely and concretely even if quite privately what steps Hanoi would take if we stopped bombing..,,"

• •«

KATZEmkCS

Saigon IO955 (to SecState)^ TS/lTodiSj I5 November I966

"2. When we three met^ I read him slowly the full text of your 8^38. Then T read it a second tima. Both B'Orlandi and Lewandowski took very careful notes and

were at great pains to get evervthing exactly right. 1^ reference to Item 3.1>. of your 8378cTwas not lost: on

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Levandovski. Comment: I am beginning to vonder if this is not becoming the crux of the loatter. End Comment.

"o

* • • •

LODGE

November 16-gOj I966

A separate attempt to elicit a response to the Phase A - I^ase E fozmulation is made by passing it to the Russians via George Brown during his visit to Moscow. Ihey indicate interest^ provided that the DRV"s k points and the NLF*s 5 points are accepted as a ''basis for discussion" in the negotiations that follow. Brown is not informed of the Lewandowski contact^ and it does not come up during his talks in Moscow.

State 86196 (to Amembassy London)j S/jTodiSj

16 Tfovember I966 Please pass following message from Secretary to

FonSec Bro^m

"•..Bear George: Your forthcoming visit to Moscow is obviously of the greatest importance in sounding out the Soviets on the possibilities of action toward peace in Viet-nam..,/'

"As one way of saving Hanoi's face^ you may wish to explore on your otm initiative the possibility of a package deal vhich in its totality represented what both we and Hanoi would agree to as a reasonable measure of mutual de-escalationJ but which would have two separate phases in Its execution. Phase A would be a bombing suspension^ while Phase B^ which woiold follow^ would see the execution of all the other agreed de-escalatory actions. I^noi's actions taken in Phase B might appear to them to be in response to our actions in Phase E rather than to the bombing suspension. Obviously J Fanoi cannot have the bombing suspension without also accepting Phase B. \le would^ of course^ like to hear Moscow or Hanoi*s reaction to this admittedly general proposition before we make any specific commitments/^

RUSK

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State 91787 (to Amembassy London)^ S/lTodiSj

20 I^Tovember I966 El^es Only for Ambassador from Secretaiy

"I* Following text message to me from George Brown delivered by UK Mbassy here,...

"On the first day I tried hard to get Gromyko to lay off his gramophone record and get down to the q^uestion of the three issues (paragraph 10 of your message). However^ he gave no ground but his interest was sufficiently intent to encourage me to give him an outline of the package (paragraph 1^ of your message). This I did orally before dinner on the first evening^ giving it to him as my ovn proposal, ivjext morning J purely for the sake of clarity ^ I gave him a piece of paper. Tae actual words used are enclosed. He was pretty suspicious but promised to pass it on to Kosygin only.

''It was on the basis of this piece of paper

that I talked with Kosygin this morning On his

side after a lot of the usual stuffy pretty muted^ about American aggression^ he said that they were prepared to make the IJorth Vietnamese four points and the HLP five points 'a basis for discussion.^ When I said that I had interpreted a basis of discussion as meaning that they wovild be flexible neither he nor Mr, Grcmyko contradicted me. ISieir package woixLd seem to be an unconditional stopping of the bombingJ some de-escalation in the South and then negotiations on the basis as above...-"

EUSK

November 30-December 1, I966

Lewandowski returns from Hanoi. He has formulated 10 points to reflect the US position with respect to an overall solution of the Vietnam war. There is sufficient interest in Hanoi^ he says^ that the U.S. should^ if the foi^ulation is acceptable^ confirm it directly to the DEV Ambassador in Warsaw. He urges speed to guard against a leak or sabotage by those "working against a solution." His source in Hanoi^ he says^ is Fhata Van Loag^ who has the "Presidium behind him/*

Most of Lewandowski's 10 points reiterate familiar US positions. His principal imiovaticn is US acceptance that "the present status quo in S^/N must be changed in order to take into account the interests of

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the parties presently opposing the policy of the U.S. in SM." He does not include the Phase A - Phase B foimula for de-escalation^ hut states that the US would stop bombing to facilitate a peaceful solution^ ■would "accept DE^y modalities on the cessation^" and "would not require the DRV to admit infiltration into SVH. Lodge believes^ however^ that he did give his presentation in Hanoi in accord vith the full Phase A -Phase B fonnulatiorii

Lodge refers the 10 points to Washington^ to see if they are an accepta^ble representation of the US position. He points out two difficulties hj[j:aself^ however: the phrase "status ^uo in SW must change" would be more acceptable if it read "status quo in STO would change"; and the terms for de-escalation are poorly expressed.

Saigon 122^^-7^ TS/NodiSj 30 November I966

"Lewandovski summarized the 10 points to Lodge as follows:

(1) The U.S. is interested in a peaceful solution through negotiations.

(2) Negotiations should not be interpreted as a way to negotiated surrender by those opposing the U.S. in Vietnam, A political negotiation would be aimed at finding an acceptable solution to all the problems^ having in mind that the present status quo in SVN must be changed in order to take into account the interests of the parties presently opposing the policy of the U.S. in South Vietnam.

(3) ^e U.S. does not desire a permanent or a long-term military- presence in SW.

(U) The U.S. is willing to discuss all problems with respect to the settlement.

(5) ^e U.S. is willing to accept the participation of 'all* in elections and the supervision of these elections by an appropriate international body.

(6) The U.S. believes that reunification should be settled by the Vietnamese themselves after peace

and proper representative organs are established in SVH.

(7) Tne U.S. is prepared to abide by a neutral

South Vletnaci,

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(8) The U.S, is prepared to stop bombing *if this will facilitate such a peaceful solution,^ In this regard the U.S, is prepared to accept DRV modalities on the cessation and not require the DRV to admit infiltration into SVIff.

(9) The U.S. will not agree to *reunification under military pressure.*

(10) The U.S. 'will not declare now or in the future its acceptance of Korth Vietnam's i; or 5 points,'

"Lewandowskl asked if these 10 points were a proper fozmulation of the U.S. position. Lodge said that they seemed to be in order^ but that the matter was of such sensitivity and importance that he would have to refer the points back to Washington for approval. Lodge added^ howeverj that he saw two difficulties right off. First^ he suggested changing Point 2 to read 'would' instead of *must.' Secondj he guestioned the phraseology in Point 8 — 'if this would facilitate such a peaceful solution.*

"Lewandowski insisted that his statement was a serious proposition "based on conversations with the 'most respectable government sources in Hanoi-* Later Lewandowski admitted that Hiam Van Dong was the source and that he had the ^Presidium behind him,'

"Lewandowski stated: 'I am authorised to say that if the U.S. 3^e really of the views which 1 have presented^ It would be advisable to confirm them directly by conversation with the JJorth Vietnamese Ambassador in Warsaw.*

"Lewandowski said that there was a vital need to move quickly because (l) there was a danger of a leak and that secrecy was essential for Hanoi; and (£) that delays would give those 'working against a solution' time to 'put down the clamps on talks.*"

State 9U66O (to Amembassy Saigon) ^ TS/l^Tcdis 1 December I966

. >.

"(5) Do we interpret your comment at the end of para D-8 correctly to mean that Lewandowski presented our phasing formulation fully and accurately?"

EUSK

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Saigon 12323 (to SecState), TS/Hodls,

1 December I966 Eef: State 9^660

* * ■ •

"5* Your para 5. Lewandowski did not repeat not present your phasing formulation 'fully and accurately' in his conversation vith me- He merely cited ^our Phase A and Phase B,' with clear implication that HS (Sic) had giren his presentation in Hanoi in accordance vith your formulation,"

LODGE

December 2, I966

Airstrikes are run against the Van Dien Vehicle Depot and the Ha Gia POL Storage Facility 6.7 and I6 nautical miles^ respectively^ from the center of Hanoi.

December 3, I966

(NB- DOD files do not contain Washington-Saigon or Washington-Warsaw traffic on Marigold for December 2-4. What follows is derived fron later cables.)

On instructions from State^ Lodge meets Levandovski again to state that:

i. The U.S* Snbassy in Warsaw will contact the LRV Bnbassy on December 6 or soon thereafter;

ii, Levandovski's 10 points broadly reflect the US position; but

111* "Several specific points are subject to important differences of interpretation."

Lewando^/Jskij in turn^ expresses concern about US bcsmbing of Hanoi^ acting on instructions frcm Eapacki. (Saigon 12^28)

De cember k^ I966

Air strikes are run against the Yen Vien Piailroad Yard and the F^ Gia POL Storage Facilityj 5»5 ^^d I6 nautical mileSj respectively, from the center of Hanoi,

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December 5j I966

Groxmouski is suHanoned by the Foreign Minister in Warsaw and giv^en a Polish recapitulation of Marigold, According to Kapacki's account of the December 1 meeting in Saigon^ Polish support for a US-DRV contact in War^ saw was extended "after Lodge confirmed Levandowskl's resume." Thus Lodge's December 3 statement about "important differences of interpretation" appears as a revision of earlier U3 acceptance,

Rapacki argues that the US reservations about interpretation are so broadly stated as to put the whole basis for the contact in doubt. Alsoj coming "after all the conversations which were held/' the statement might undermine the role of Poland as intermediary. He urges instead that it be replaced by a statement defining the differences of interpretation the U£G has in mind and asks Gronouski to take this up with the President.

He also refers to the "intensification of bombing near Hanoi subse-quern: to the Lodge-Lewandowski conversations" as likely to create doubts on the DEY side.

It is hard to know precisely what has happened in Polish-DBV communications at this point, Rapacki's account suggests that the Poles told Ife,noi they had US approval of Lewandowski's 10 points after the December 1 meeting. If so, the events of December 3 (the air strikes near Hanoi and the "differences of interpretation") migjit well have been viewed in Hanoi as casting doubt on Polish reliability, on the sincerity of US interest in negotiations^ or both- Alternatively^, Eapacki may simply have been trying to extract additional concessions or statements of position from the Americans^ using these developments for leverage.

Warsaw I363 (to SecState)^ 5 December I966 For the President and Secretaiy

"1- I was called to FornMin 11:30 a.m. Dec 5 by Dir-gen Michalowski who^ after determining that I knew what meeting was aboutj took me in to see FornMin Eapacki,"

»»

^%* Eapacki continued that on Dec 1^ after return of Lewandowski from Hanoij Lewandowski had third meeting with Lodge in which he gave a resume of USG position as he had understood it from the two previous conversations* After Lodge confirmed Lewandowski's resumOj Lewandowski said contact of USG and ITorth Vietnamese Ambassadors In Warsaw^ would have supDort of Poles,

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"5- Continuing his accoiont of prior events ^ Eapacki said that on the afternoon of Dec 3j at a fourth meeting "between Lodge and Le'vjandowsl^ij Lodge^ on the basis of the President's instructions^ read a statement as follows:

A. Kie President vill instruct the U.S. PiOibassy in Warsav to contact the ITorth Vietnamese Ambassador In Warsaw on Dec 6 or as soon as possible thereafter*

B, [Hie U,S» Einbassy in Warsaif vill be in a position on Dec 6 to confirm to the North Vietnamese Ambassador that the Levandowskl Dec 1 resume of the Lodge-Levandowski conversations broadly reflects the position of the USG.

C» 'We must add that several specific points are sub^ject to important differences of interpretation,*"

"6. Kapacki said that Lodge was unable at the Dec 3 meeting to precisely say which points were subject to differences of interpretation and -what the nature of these differences of interpretation might be*

"7* Eapacki then stated that question of interpretation put in doubt whole basis on which contact with North Vietnamese Ambassador in Warsaw was to have taken place-He expressed grave concern as to how equivocation will be read by Hanoi* He added that Poles must transmit USG position to ETVIT Govt.; and that rather than a general reference to differences of interpretation it vould be better if position transmitted contained statement defining differences of Interpretation ^e have in mind. He said such a statement might have a significant effect on Hanoi's attitude toward both a meeting in Warsaw and the whole problem-

"8* Eapacki then asked what can be the position of Poland in its role as intermediary if after all the conversations which were held and statements made there still remains this doubt? He asked again how this reservation will be read by Hanoij particularly with intensification of bomb lug near Hanoi subsequent to tlis Lodge-Levandowski conversations? He said these questions had already been raised by Levandowski during his Dae 3 conversation with Lodge*"

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"12 • Eapacki asked that I transmit to the Presi-dent the Poles deep concern caused by modification of USG position which has 'been signaled by the Dec 3 declaration of Mr. Lodge and his hope that para on differences of interpretation can be deleted on grounds that it vas based on misunderstandings vhich have since been clarified/^

•«■

GR0N0U3KI

December gj I96 6

Gronouski is instiructed to stick with the reservation as vorded on the grounds that ve might be charged vith bad faith if we did not make clear the wide latitude for interpretation of the general language used by Lewandowski,

State 97016 (to Amembassy Warsaw)j ITodis^

5 December I966 Ambassador Eyes Only TOSBC 1^ Secretary E^es Only Pef: Your I363

■ « • »

We might expose ourselves to charges of bad faith in any subsequent negotiations if ve did not make clear that there is a wide latitude for interpretation of the general language used by Lewandowski-

'^Lewandowski^s formulation broadly reflects the position of the US Government on the issues covered and we would be prepared to accept it as the basis for direct discussions with the Korth Vietnamese if they are in fact interested in pursuing the matterj and if they wsre informed that latitude for interpretation of such general language is inevitable,"

• •

December 6, I966

Gronouski carries out his instructions and is told by Eapacki that the US statement will now be transmitted to Hanoi.

Eapacki says that the LEV expects to receive at the first Warsaw 1

meeting the precise and official position of the USG in order that it

can express its position at an appropriate time. He apparently i

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tmderstands Lodge to have indicated that such a package proposal vould be forthcoming.

Gronouski replies that he had anticipated a more limited scope for the first meeting—confi2:*ining Le-v7andovrski^s formulation^ dealing vith matters such as time and placej etc. He refers the matter to Washington.

Meanwhile^ Lewandowski makes many of the sajue points to Lodge in Saigon* He adds that the ^'V/arsav contact vas shadowed by the bcmhing of Hanoi" and asks the U3 to ^^avoid addins to the difficulties/^

Warsaw 1375 (to SecState)^ TS/Nodis^

6 December I966 Eef: State 970I6

"1, tfet with Fonl4in Hapacki I3OO hours Dec 6 and conveyed material in reftel,"

w m M

"5- Eapacki said that he understood Lodge to have done the following:

A. Presented official USG position or principles for peaceful solution;

B, Stated that a new package deal of tJ3G proposals would be forthcoming:

C- Expressed willingness o± USG to discuss fo^jr points and any other points raised by other side, (FYI: TJiis summary was apropos of nothing. It was simply interjected in the conversation,}

'*6, After repeating his view that proposal for meeting in Warsaw was a significant 'ETVN response^ he said Poles must reserve judgment until they can study

situation further to determine whether USG had actually made step forward. He expressed the opinion that what had transpired betvreen Lodge and Lewandowski prior to la,tter*3 trip to Hanoi did represent step forward but the aualifications made by Lodge on Dec 3 cast doubt on this judgment."

....

"9* Eapacki said that at any rate they cannot delay any longer in transmitting information to Hanoi

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He added that the original position of Lodge is liiiovn to Hanoi; and it remains a qiiestion as to how the qualification of Dec 3 vill be interpreted by sensitive elements in the iwi Go^/t, Eapacki said that infommtion transmitted to NVN will reflect the material presented to hi^i today^ but Poles must also express their own doubts and misgivings over the question of interpretation raised by Lodge,

"10. Eapacki then turned to the substance of the first Warsav meeting vith TIVN Ambassador *in the event it takes place.* He said it is his understanding that during that meeting ve -will present to the NVN side the position of USG in order that the W^ Govt can express his position at an appropriate time on the attitude of the USG and on subsequent modes of procedure. He said the NVK Govt- expects to receive at the first Warsaw meeting the precise and official position of the USG and he assumes (with a smile) that it will not be different than the one presented to Lewandowski* He said he presumed I already have locked in my safe such a statement which will be able to identify the specific points on which there is wide latitude for interpretation, (FYI: Rapacki read from a Dec 3 statement given to Lewandowski ^^^ Lodge when making his reference to specific points.) He said he hoped at that meeting we will be able to discuss differences in intarpretation (adding that he still was looking for an answer to the question ^differences vith whom' inasmuch as the NVI^ Govt, has not yet presented their interoretation,)

"11, I said that I had presided that the first meeting would be more limited in scope. I expected that the first meeting would be primarily concerned vith establishing that both sides were interested in beginning negotiations^ and deal vith such matters as time and place of negotiation session. I added that we would also expect at the first meeting to confirm Mr. Lewandovski's foim^ilation of our position as broadly reflecting the position of the USG with the qualification regarding interpretation. I added^ however^ that 1 would inform Washington of his understanding of the nature of the first meeting,"

GHOJroUSKI

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Saigon 12601 (to SecState)^ TS/Fodls^ 6 December I966

"1. Levandowski asked to meet me at D'Orlandi's today. He began by saying that he had asked for the in3eting "because of a communication which he had received

from Mr, Eapacki in Varsav^ which asked him:

"2- *Please turn the attention of Ambassador Lodge to the fact that the form^Jilation oi" the last paragraph of the statement of December Hiree may be understood as raising a question about the whole position embodied in the ten paragraphs and which was to form the platform for the Warsaw Meeting.^"

« a

"5- Lewandowski then said^ rather as an afterthought ^ that 'the overture of the Warsaw contact was shadowed by the bombing of Hanoi and we should therefore ^ avoid adding to the difficulties.'"

December 7j I96 7 . .-

Gronouski is told that the USG position was conveyed to Hanoi the previous day^ that the intensification of the bcmbing is raising suspicions in Warsaw as well as Hanoij and that the DEV will be keenly disappointed if the first meeting doss not include a direct statement of the USG position. Kie DRV "is not interested in what Lewandowski said,"

With respect to the bombing problem^ the Poles reject the explanations that the target list cannot be suddenly altered without alerting many people that something unusual is happening and that what appears as an intensification of bcmbing is in fact due to improved weather conditions, Eapacki says "policy is more important than weatherj" and we are urged not to bomb in the vicinity of Hanoi and Haiphong,

Warsaw I376 (to SecState)^ TS/Nodis^ 7 December I966 Hef; State 97016 and Warsaw I375

, *

"3- Mlchalowski said Rapackl had conveyed USG position to Hanoi shortly after my meeting with him Dec 6...,"

• •, ■

"5- Michalowski said,., that ITOT Go^rb, and even some in Polish Govt, are suspicious that recently

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stepped up bambing outside Hanoi is the vork. of same elements in USG who are tiying to undercut President's peace move. He added that vhen this question -was raised vith Lodge the latter had replied that such raids are planned long in advancej and that a quick reversal would alert many people that something unusual vas happening. Michalowski said that to many people this is an unconvincing answer^ and expressed fervent hope that we can avoid future highly sensitive honibing raids in vicinity of Hanoi and Haiphong.,,,

"6, Michalowskl said he wanted to underscore Rapacki's insistence that at the first meeting with the NVTT Ambassador in Warsaw we do more than con-firm^ with qualificationj Lewandowski's resume of Lodge's ten points. He said the NW Govt, is not interested in what Lewandc^-rski saidj but rather in hearing USG position directly from us. He stressed extreme importance of first meeting^ and said the NVN Govt. viH be keenly disappointed if its expectation of receiving direct statement of USG position at first meeting Is not realized..,."

GRONOUSKI

t^farsaw^ I376 (to SecState)j TS/Nodis^ T December I966 Eef: Warsaw I376

"1. FouMin Rapacki called me to his office at 1800 hours Dec T ■•--''

*. * •

**3- Rapacki then said that Poland could not continue in its role unless it is convinced that we have or will put an end to this intensified bombing-He added that if Poland has been satisfied on this scoreJ and if it so happens that contact in Warsaw between the USG and NM Govt, will occurs then 'I avail myself of this opportunity to state * that it is necessary for the USG to recapitulate to the ITVK Representative its whole position as described by Lodge with a degree of clarity so that the other side would no longer fear that the USG position as formulated might subsequently be changed through recourse to Lodge's 'important differences of interpretation' clause,.,,

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"^. •..! said that if I recall correctly^ there vas a lull in bonibing flights in late October and early November simply because of bad weather conditions^ and what appears to him to be an intensification of bombing may simply be a resumption of bombing to its nonaal level.

"5* Eapacki responded that 'policy is more important than weather'-..•

"6, .•.bombing against the vhole of NVU vas intensified and also was more directed to Hanoi. KiiSj he added^ clearly appears to he provoking."

* *. •

GRONOUSKI

December 7, 19^6

Gronouski^s instructions for the first meeting are refined. He is to stick with Levandovskifs formulationj jjidicating its acceptability as a basis for negotiation even though subject to further elaboration and clarification as talks proceed. \le do not wish to reformulate it ourselves because we would have to take harder positions than Lewandowski*s if we were to be held to precise language and because any formulation attributable directly to us could be used to embarrass the GM or our relations with them. Gronouski is therefore to avoid being drawn out

on specifies J though for purposes of illustration he may point to the following:

1. In negotiating a bombing cessation (point 8)^ the Phase A -Phase B formula might be considered.

ii. Changes in the governmental status quo would have to be made in accordance with the desires of the people of SW. Electoral procedxires or other arrangements cotild be ascertained through consultations and negotiations there (points 2 and 5).

(!Ehe most contentious pointy he is warned^ is that calling for a change in status quo^ as it could m^an anything from putting the NLF into the government immediately to a simple endorsement of the election process under the Constitution then being drafted by the GW. Gronouski is to resist discussing this altogether.)

He is to reassure the DRV that oar reservation about "differences of interpretation'' means only that complex matters are inevitably subject to clarification. For examplej the phrase "long-term" in point 3 has been partially clarified by the 6 months provision of the Manila Comtnuniq^ue,

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¥e urge direct^ secret discussion with the DRV as a matter of the highest importance and urgency. We hope that the Poles have no idea of pajt;iGipating and Gronouski is to avoid further substantive discussions ¥ith them if the DRV contact materializes.

State 9T930 (Memhassy Warsaw), TS/Nodis^

7 December I966 Kef: Warsaw's I375

"!• Your reference telegram will receive urgent consideration here tcmorrow and you will receive further guidance from us then.

^'2. In the meantime^ you should take no further initiative with GOP,

"3. In the unlikely event that^ before receiving further instructions^ you should receive notice that HVI^I representative is ready and available for talks with us J we submit the following for your interim

"i^. If such a meeting with FVW representative should occurJ you should follow prior instructions. If desirable^ you are then authorized to read rpt read to him Levandowski's 10-point presentation of USG position as set forth at end of this cable^ stressing that it is Lewandowski^s formulation.

"5' You should then inquire whether points as presented ^y you are the same in all particulars as those passed on to Hanoi by Lewandovski.

"6. For your information only^ one of our principal conceiTis about the ten points is set forth in the next following paragraph^ but even if pressed you should avoid discussing the substantive problems relating to these points with the Wvll representative at this stage and stress that such discussions should be the subject of actual negotiations. We would assiune that WVDT representative would have no authority on this first contact to do more than report ycur presentation to Hanoi so we vould not anticipate such probing at this time. Further cable tomonrow will spell out our thinking in greater detail and may suggest initiative to be taken if you have heard nothing after additional lapse of time.

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"7* Lewandovski's point two relating to change of present status quo in SW is obviously most troublesome. ^is point could be interpreted variously to mean (a) NLF must be put into government of South Vietnam forthwith or (b) simple endorsement, of election process under constitution now being drafted. If it is necessary to point out ambiguities in Lewandowski's statement^ however^ you should not refer to this point but allude to less contentious ambiguities elsewhere in statement,

"8* Lewandowski's ten point statement follows:

'1. I have insisted that the United States is interested in a peaceful solution through negotiations,

'2- Negotiations shouJ-d not be interpreted as a way to negotiated sixrrender ^j those opposing the United States in Viet-Namt. A political negotiation would be aimed at finding an acceptable solution to all the problems J having in mind that the present status quo in South Viet-Nam would be changed in order to take into account the interests of the parties presently opposing the policy of the United States in South Viet-NarCj and that such a solution may be reached in an honorable and dignified way not detrimental to national pride and prestige. (FII: Lewandowski's original presentation states status quo 'm.ust' be changed but when Lodge questioned this point Lewandow^ski said he would be glad to change word from *must^ to Hjould'j EI^Ei Til).

'3- That the United States are not interested from a point of view of its national interests in having

. a pez^inanent or long term military in South

Viet-Nam once a peaceful solution to the

reached. Ihat is why the offer made in Manila regarding the withdrawal of U.S, troops and the liquidation of iimerican bases should be considered in all seriousness,

^k* The United States would be ready, should other parties show a constructive interest in a negotiated settlementJ to work out and to discuss with them proposals of such a settlement covering all important problems involved from a cease-fire to a final solution and wi-chdrawal of U. S. troops .

'5* That the United States^ within a general solution^ would not oppose the formation of a South Vietnajnese Government based on the true will of the Vietnamese people with participation of all through, free democratic elections^ and that the United States would

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be prepared to accept the necessary control machinery to Eeciire the democratic and free character of such elections and to respect the results of such elections.

'6- The United States held the viev that unification of Viet-Nam must he decided by the Vietnamese themselves for vhieh the restoration of peace and the formation of proper representative organs of the people in South Viet-Ham is a necessaiy condition.

'7. The United States are ready to accept and respect a true and complete neutrality of South Viet-Nam,

*8, 5he United States are prepared to stop the bombing of the territory of Forth Viet-Fam if this will facilitate such a peaceful solution. In doing so^ the United States are ready to avoid any appearance that North Viet-Nam is forced to negotiate by bombings or that North Viet-lTam have negotiated in exchange for cessation of bombing. Stopping of bombings vould not involve recognition or confirmation by North Viet-Nam that its aimed forces are or were infiltrating into South Viet-I^am.'

"At this point you should interrupt recitation of Lewandovski's points and state as follows: QUOTE I^. Le'wandowski clearly implied to Ambassador Lodge that in Hanoi he had given his presentation in connection with the point on the bombing of North Viet-Nam in accordance with Ambassador Lodge's earlier formulation^ which was as follows: A package could be worked out which in its totality represented what both the United States and North Viet-Nam would agree to as a reasonable measure of de-escalationj but which would have two separate phases in its execution. Phase A would be a boabing suspension^ while Phase B^ which would follow after some adequate period^ would see the execution of all the other agreed de-escalatory actions. North Vlet-r^am's actions taken in Phase B would appear to be in response to United States actions in Phase E rather than to the bombing suspension^ EEffi QUOTE. You should then resume the recitation of the ten points.

'9- I have InforEned the proper governmental sources that at the same time^ the United States^ while not excluding the unification of Viet-Nam^ would not agree to unification under military pressure.

^10, ^Jhlle the United States are seeking a peaceful solution to the conflict^ it would be unreal^ istic to expect that the United States will declare

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now or in the future its acceptance of TTorth Viet-Nan's four or five points.^ (EM) OF EWAITOOVSKI'S ST^'EEME^TT)

"9» If N"^^ representative probes further on cessation of bombing^ you should merely state that as you have already indicated Mr, Levandovski has suggested a possible procedure for agreeing on phasing and timing which could be the subject of later discussions."

KAOEENBACH

State 9875^ (to Amembassy Warsaw)j ffi/llodis

7 December I966 Eef: State 97930

"1- If a meeting vith the ITorth Vietnamese is arrangedJ you should proceed in accordance with instructions contained in State 96235 and State 95711 except as modified belov. As regards the presentation to the JTorth Vietnamese representative of our position^ you should follov closely the following formulation:

^a. Lewandowski has informed us of his discussions with your government in Hanoi and of the position he conmunicated to them as that of the U,S,^ based on Levandowski's prior oral discussions with Ambassador Lodge in Saigon. Ve assume that his discussions in Hanoi were conducted entirely orally as they were with Lodge in Saigon and that no pieces of paper have been exchanged which purport to state governmental positions. We are prepared to enter into direct disciissions with yo^or government on the basis of the position which Lewandowski has informed us he presented to your government in Hanoi*

'b. The position was stated to us by Lewandowski as follows: (Here you should read the ten points as contained in State 97930j para 8 with the additional point about bombing covered uner Point 8),

*Co We wish to emphasise that this language is that of Lewandowski and not that of the United States• Kevertheless it presents a general statement of the US position on the basis of which we would be prepared to enter into direct discussions,'

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"2- FII The North Vietnamese aM perhaps the Poles as veil appear to be seeking a reformulation of our position in order to compare it vith vhat Lewandowski ha^ said, v/hile we are entirely prepared to have Lewan-dlovski's formulation stand as ^presenting a general statement of the US position^' we are anxious to avoid a restatement of our position in our o"^m words because (a) this vould oblige us to take some harder positions than those put forward by Lewandovski which apparently have gone far enough to make the Horth Vietnamese ready to consider talking vith us and (b) any formulation which can be attributed directly to us could be used to embarrass the GVK or to embarrass us in our relations with them. In other words^ if we stand on Levandowski^s formulation thi'ough the first step in discussions with the North Vietnamese^ we can always say with regard to any specific point that we don't accept just those words used by Lewatidowski and thus maintain some room for maneuver at least until we know the discussions are really under way. EMD FIX.

"3- After reading the ten points you should point out to the J^orth Vietnamese that some mattersj because of their complexity aixL the danger of varying interpreta-tiotij would be the subject of further elaboration by us as soon as discussions were to get under way- One of these has to do with the package agreement containing the so-called phases A and B vith respect to bombing and a program of de-escalation. The second relates to certain points which directly involve matters of basic concern to the people of South Viet-^Nam (as for example points 2 and 5)* Vlhatever detailed arrangements are made on those matters would have to be acceptable to the South Vietnamese people; however^ this could be ascertained tha^ough consultations and negotiations there*

^'k. If the I^Torth Vietnamese refer to the earlier . point made by us that several specific points are subject to important differences of interpretation^ you should explain that this is not intended to suggest that the statement as it stands is any less a general statement of the U»S^ position but rather that it is inevitable with matters as complex and controversial as those covered in the ten points that they would be subject to interpretation and that their clarification would be the noimal function of the discussions which we hope ve will be embarking on. If the l^orth Vietnamese press for an Illustration you might refer to the phrase 'long-term' in Point 3^ noting that it was specifically to clarify this point that the I/ianila Communique specified a six-month period.

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"5- otherwise you should be guided in your discussion with the ETortli Vietnamese "by the limitation set forth in para 6 of State 97930^ stress^ ing that fxirther discussion of substantive questions should be the subject of the actual direct negotiations vhich ve hope can be got under way promptly.

fT

In conclusion you should say that yoiir governinent is prepared to enter into secret discussions with the ETorth Vietnataese Governmant at any time and "^e regard this as a matter of the highest importance and urgency.

''T* We understand from your latest repoi'ts that the next stepj if all goes wellj vill be the opening of the direct discussions with the Forth Vietnamese and if this in fact materialities you should avoid any further substantive discussions vith the Poles, Vfej of coursej are anxious for direct and private discussions vith the ITorth Viet name3e and hope that the Poles have no idea of participating therein."

• A •

KAOEEffiACH

Dec^^ber 8, I966

Rusk and Katzenbach reiterate ouj: willingness to consider a bombing cessation or other de-escalatory measures on terms previously indicated J but not as a precondition for talks. If Eapacki threatens to interrupt the contact over this issue^ he is to be 'warned the responsibility for the breakdown will be his.

State 9S924 C"*^o Amembassy Warsaw)^, TS/iTodis^

8 December I966 For Mbassador Gronouski from Katsenbach

"1. In response to Eapacki's statements reported in your 139^**-you should remind Papacki that the subject of bombing was one of the matters discussed in Hanoi by Lewandowski and that ve are prepared to pursue this matter with the -forth Vietnamese in the same tenns vhich \ie, affirmed to him. You should read reference on package contained in paragraph 3 of Levandowski's 10 points (state 97930) to remind him of Levandowski's statement to Lodge^ You should underline that inherent in this formulation is the paci^age approach to de-escalation.

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"2. If Eapacki attempt to nail us to anythim on bombing beyond our first contact with the Jorth Vietnamese J or again threatens to break off tiie operationJ you should infora him in no uncertain terms that if he maintains this position he will have to accept the full responsibility for the breakdo^'m of what appears to us to be a promising possibility for peace."

KATZEMBACH

Taipei 10T2 (to SecState)^ TS/Nodis^

8 December 1966 Ref: TOSEC 6^ FOR the Acting Secretary from the Secretary

ft

»• • •

1 do not believe we should be drawn into conunitments about our o>ni military operations without some Indication from the other side as to what they are going to do about their military operations Ifevertheless^ we should be ready to discuss this problem alongside or before a broader discussion of political matters."

*»•

KcConaughy

December 69^ I966

Eapacki protests the differences of interpretation" clause and the bombing of Hanoi in a strong demarche to Fanfani and^ through Lewandowskij to D^Orlandi and hence Lodge in Saigon. Hanoi cannot be expected to enter discussions in the face of such "escalation/' Fanfani on the one hand urges Eapacki to go ahead and arrange the contact in ¥arsaw^ on the other instructs D'Orlandi to convey the message to Rusk (then in Saigon) and to seek a reply.

At their meeting on Dacember 8^ D'Orlandi tells Lewandowski that no contact has yet taken place because of Eapacki*s apparent refusal to convey the US message to Hanoi. He is apparently unaware that the message was passed December 6.

On December 9j Eusk asks D'Orlandi to tell Lewandowski and Fanfani that we are in direct touch with Eapacki on both points. He adds that bombing can be the first topic for discussion^ if this is of especial concern to Hanoi.

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D'Orlandi gives the following as vievs of LevELadowski:

i. Clarifications prereqiiisite to the Warsaw contact should occur in Saigonj vith a Levandowski visit to Hanoi immediately possible if needed. Thus D'Orlandi surmises that Eapacki's taking over this phase may bs an effort ^'to "be clever and get the U.S. to withdraw "all reservations" before the contact is made.

ii. De-escalation is a difficult topic to start on. It is more promising to look for a final package. This might be a cabinet of Ik positions J 2 each for the Ky Group and the NLFj the remaining 10 for "neutrals or whatever." (This is the formula proposed by Lewandowski September 18.)

lii. During November 16-30^ when Lewandovrski was in Hanoi^ ba-ubing appeared to be at a reduced level at least in the Eanoi area. Tais was interpreted in Hanoi as a tacit signal of US support for Lewandowski's mission, (fffi. in fact^ these were the first two weeks of ET 52-Presumably^ weather accounts for the lack of action against targets near Hanoi.)

Eusk stresses to D'Orlandi several times that the USG is indicating its position with no reciprocity from Ifenoi or even assurance of how Lewandowski has presented the points to Hanoi. D'Orlandi urges "a little faith in Lewandowski," He himself completely credits Lewandowski^s claim to have gotten Hiaci Van Dong to obtain Presidium agreement to the Warsaw contact.

Saigon 12953 (to SecState)^ TS/Nodis^ o December 1966

'*D*Orlandi asked to see Secretary and Ambassador this evening following dinner party in Secretary's honor. Conversation w^as a follows:

"1. Lewandowski had cs-lled urgently on D'Orlandi evening of December 8^ on instructions^ to express grav^e concern that U,S* had carried out heavy bombing attacks in Hanoi area on December 2 and December k^ directly following December 1 conversation between Lewandowski and Lodge. Lewandowski conveyed lurid reports from Polish attache Hanoi alleging that December 2 attack had Included bombing and machine-gunning within city ax^ea and I^d caused 6C0 casualties. December h attack also described as serious and in Hanoi area. Lewandowski protested to D'Orlandi - urgin htm to convey message to Lodge and to Secretary if possible " that such attacks could only threaten or destroy possibility of contact in Vfersaw. Lewandow^ski

argued that Hanoi could not be exnected to enter

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discussions in face of such escalation, (Wiile vhole tenor of message vas extremely strong^ Lex^randa^^ski did not repeat not state that hs was actually reporting Hanoi*s expressions of vieVj hut rather ¥arsav

Judgment.)

^'2- D'Orlandi had responded to Lewandowski that no contact had in fact taken place as yet because of apparent refussJ. of Eapacki to convey firm message^ that U*S, had taken forthcoming action in declaring itself ready for discussions and prepared to make contact on December 6; and that it was thus not fair to say possibility of contact destroyed by U,S. action D^Orlandi went on to say that his hope had been to make contact in any event.

"3, In addition to Lewandowski message December 8J D'Orlandi had just received cable from Fanfanij on evening December 9j reporting that Eapacki had sent Fanfani strong demarche protesting U,S, insistence on reservations of interpretationj and further protesting U,S, bombing attacks. In this cable^ Fanfani had instructed D'Orlandi to convey substance of message to Secretary^ if possible^ and ask for reply- Fanfani had also included in the cable statement that he himself had replied to Rapacki urging that he go ab.ead and arrange contact nonetheless-

TT)

4* Secretary responded to D'Orlandi as follows:

A, He asked D'Orlandi to tell Lewandowski that we were in direct touch with Rapacki on the points raised,,.,

B, D'Orlandi should reply to Fanfani with same first pointy adding that if Hanoi was concerned about bombing^ this could be first topic in discussions <*» .

*'5* During course of conversationj D'Orlandi provided following additional conjecture and infonnatioa:

A, D'Orlandi was fairly sure that Lewandowski had wished ¥arsaw contact to take place^ with any points requiring clarification to be explored through tripartite talks in Saigon and possible Lewandowski further visit to Hanoi (which Levandov/ski had also suggested D'Orlandi as immediate possibility), D'Orlandi therefore surmised that Kapacki had 'tried to be clever' and get U.S. to withdraw all reservations before contact made. (U.S, side at no time confironed that this was in fact exactly what Eapacki had said in Warsaw.) Secretary suggested

go

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that - in light of prior expressed statement that Soviets informed - Eapacki actions might have heen dictated from Moscov. D^Orlandi expressed doubt^ on basis his reading of LewandotTslsLi attitude and reirarks by Levandav/ski about Rapacki over a period of time, flatter was dropped at this point.

B, ,. *Lewandowskl had particularly expounded to him diffictilties he saw in getting discussions started on reciprocal actions in connection with bombing. Hence, at D*Orlandi's suggestion Lewandovski had started to vork out hovr sitiiation in SVTJ might look one or two years hence and might be described in acceptable form to Hanoi and Washington^ so that in effect a package deal would emerge. D^Orlandi stated that, when he asked Levandovski just vhat kind of role VC might have - would it be like Czecho-slovakiaj or what - Lewandowski had come up with sample formula of Ik cabinet positions with 2 each for present

Ky Group and VC/KLF, and remaining 10 allotted to 'neutrals or whatever.* (This is of course fonnula given by D'Orlandi to Harrimanj as D*Orlandi<s o^^mj in Rome conversation in early HoYember.)

C, In connection with 2fe.noi attitudes on U.S. bombing of ITorthj Lewandowskl had told D*Orlandi that he "believed Hanoi had attached significance to fact that during the two weeks Levandowski had been in Hanoi (approximately November I6-30} bombing had appeared to be at reduced level at least in Hanoi ai^ea. D'Orlandi said Lewandowski thought Hanoi had interpreted this as tacit signal of U.S. support for Lewandowski mission.

^^6. Secretary several times pointed out that whole episode to this point vas unique in that we were acting on.Lewandowskif£ statement of U.S. position without any clear indication whatever of Iianoi position, or even an^^ assurance Lewandowski had discussed points with Hanoi in manner covered by statement. L^Orlandi appeared to accept that we had indeed taken forthcoming attitude in view of these circimistanceSj although he himself stressed view that one had to have a little faith in Lewandowski^ and he appeared to credit completely Lewandowski claim that he had finally got Fnam Van Dong to obtain Presidium agreement to Warsaw contact/'

. •. *

LODGE

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December 9^ I966

In Warsaw^ Gronouski assures the Poles that the Levandotrski fonuu-lation is consistent vith our vie^rs^ that he ^'assumes" Phase A - Phase B de-escalation formula is the "new package deal^^ the Poles believe Lodge to have promised^ and that the pattern of cur bombing is not related to the projected US-DHV contact.

Eapacki is satisfied with respect to the interpretation clause* He rejects de-escalation as too narrow a pac^ge but blurs the issue by suggesting that "de-escalation'' may be US shorthand for a deal including all outstanding issues.

On the bombingj he is adamant in his dissatisfaction. He reads what he says is a November 1^ statement by Lodge^ declaring USG willingness to hear suggestions on "practical measures^* it might take to show its good intentions and allay the distrust the IfLF and Hanoi may have of it. He feels the Pole^s bombing suggestions were not received in this spirit- He implies that Lodge's statement was not conveyed to Hanoi,

As Gronouski found no threat to break off the talks^ he did not issue the warning on his instructions of December 3.

Warsaw 11^^21 (to SecState)^ TS/l^TodiSj 9 December I966 Section 1 of 2 Ref: State 9892!^

"1. Met Eapacki at my request at I6OO Dec 9, Michalowski and Jancsewski present,

'^2, ity opening reniarkSj based on reftel^ were as follows:

A. J, have requested today's meeting as a result of consultations I have had with Vashlngtcn since oar meeting Wednesday afternoon.

B» I can now assure you that at the time of the first Warsaw mseting with representatives of the Iforbh Vietnamese Governmentj I will be prepared to confirm to the INl^ Go^/i: the position of the USG with respect to negotiations. I can also assure you that this confirmation will be consistent with the discussions Mr. Lewandowski had with them and with us.

C. ¥ith respect to the question you raised Wednesdajv- on bombing^ I can state flatly that the pattern of our bombing in ]\n/TJ has nothing to do with with the current efforts of the Polish and USG's to get underway the projected US-tlW talks

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D, You vill recall that the sul^ject of bombing IWTf was one of the imtters discussed in Hanoi by Mr. Levandowski. After his return froi]i Eanoi Mr. Levandovski clearly implied to Amb Lodge that he had discussed this matter In Hanoi in accordance with Amb Lodge's earlier formulation. Amb Lodge had suggested that a package could be vorked out.... Inherent in this forraulation is the package approach to de-escalation which I assume you had in mind vhen you referred to ^a nev package deal' during our conversation last T^uesday,"

. V a *

"3 * Eapacki responded..•."

"J+» ., .vith respect to my first point (presentation of USG negotiating position to WVIf) he said if this is done in a way which vill dispel doubt on invoking interpretation clauseJ then one of the difficulties has been reduced,

"5- On bombing guestioUj he said.*.bombing was clearly intensified at tlie precise tiiae it would create provocation. •,.

"6. Rapacki read what he said was Nov. Xk statement by Lodge: USG understands that the Liberation Front and Hanoi have deep-seated distrust of USG; that is why USG is willing to take practical measures to show good intentionsJ and would be willing to hear any suggestions. Rapacki said this statement by Lodge was treated as addressed 'only to Polish ears^' adding Poles have been proved right in treating it so because in the case of their b0:11bing suggestion they have not found such readiness to listen to suggestions as Lodge indicated»

"T* Eapacki expressed concern over my use of term Me-escalation^^ noting that Lodge said Washington was convinced that not much can be accomplished in getting talks under way with partial de-escalation. He said lodgers accent was on the package deal which would cover all problems J including withdrawal of US troops. If my use of de-escalation represents a short-cat for a package deal including cessation of hostilities and the resolution of a variety of other outstanding problems^ then his concern over my use of the term is simply a matter of semantics. Ha asked if ir^^ use of the term was consistent with Lodgers declaration on a package deaL"

GSONOUSKI

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¥arsair lUl2 (to SecState)^ 9 December I966 Section 2 of 2

"8. I sal3 I did not clearly rnderatand vhat he ¥as driving at "but referred to my opening text and pointed out that the degree or manner of de-escalation, is not subject to unilateral determination. I said that this -would have to be resolved in negotiating sessions between the U3G and JTOI..,"

I

« a •

*^1T* Ccmnient: Hapacki's position was much less intransigent toiay than during Dec 7 meeting» I thought it significant that when I stressed importance of initiating talks Mchalowskij Eapaclii's major adviser on Vietnam war^ nodded his head affirmatively three or four times. Because I found no threat to break off talks that was implied Dec 7^ I did not use para 2 of reftel/'

GROIJOUSKI

De cember I Q, 1956

Rusk and Gronouski are informed that Washington does not wish to withdraw authorization for RT 52 at this time. It is anticipatedj therefore^ that some targets may be hit which Rapacki will insist reflect further escalation.

State 10062^ (to Amembassy Saigon)^ TS/l^'odis

10 December I966 Eef: A. Saigon 12953

B, Warsaw 1^21

C, Warsaw 1^22

For Secretary from Katzenbach

4 *

"2» On the bombing pointy you should teow that R2^-52 stands as it was at time of your departlore from

Washington and targets earlier set anide rems-in in suspense.''

KAVZmBACH

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state 10067 (to Amembassy Warsaw)j TS/Kodis

10 Dacember I966 Bef: A. Vfarsav 1^21 B. Warsaw 1422

« a *

'%. FYI only (rpt. FYI only). You should be aware that for the immediate future the bombing pattern vill remain unchanged from ^irhat it has been over the past several veeks. This may well involve some targets which Eapacki will insist represent further escalation^ just as in the past he took to be escalation certain variations in our bombing pattern which in fact represented no real new departures in the pattern as a whole* With foregoing in mind you should avoid giving Poles even any slight indications which they mi^t take to mean that we are escalating or de-^escalating at present-Present bombing pattern has been authorized for scms titne and we do not wish to withdraw this authorization at this time."

•«

KATZiENBACH

December 13^ I966

Eapacki quotes a US Navy spokesman as saying that new targets have recently been placed on the bombing list^ adding "you can assume what effects such statements have in Hanoi^ given the fact that in recent weeks new targets have in fact been added/' He again urges restraint in bombingj arguing that overt pressure "will be utilized by all those who have a different vision of this peace move than we have here in Warsaw•"

Warsaw 1458 (to SecState}^ TS/i^odis^ I3 December I966 Section 1 of 2 Eef; Warsaw l'+29

4 4

"8, Bapacki added that we shc^aid realise that leadership of DE1T^/J[ does n^t want to and cannot yield under pressure; every step tvo^ our side that evokes impression that W^ is acting under pressure would be interpreted as sls^n of weakness and be utilised by all those who have a different vision of this peace move than we have here in Warsaw. (Comment; Sapacki repeated this point with emphasis and was^ I believej making a clear reference to Communist China.)

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"9- Eapackl said that in first position expressed by Lodf^e it appeared that this truth was grasped by USG and this Is why Poles were so hopeful. However the events of Deceinber mean^ if the working hypothesis Poles are using is sound^ that US does not fully appreciate this situation. He added that recent statements by USG officials leave the impression that USG- wants to evoke pressure. He quoted from Renter news stoiy of Dec 12 US ITavy spokesman's statement that US intends gradually to increase air raids oa '^M; Rapacki interjected at this point his realization that Navy spokesman may not have known all that was going on and this coxxld very well be an old Idea, Bit he added that the Navy spokesman's subsequent reference to escalation and to new targets having been recently placed on bombing list represented current information* He said 'you can assume what effects such statements have in Hanoi, given the fact that in recent weeks new targets have in fact been added.^"

GSONOUSKI

December 13-IJ^^, I966

The Yen Vien Railroad Yard and Van Dien Tehicle Depot are bombed. They are both 5 nautical miles from the center of Hanoij and have been struck previously. Tass cla^ias^ in addition^ that residential areas in Hanoi and its suburbs were hit.

A later US official investigation shows that only these targets were intended, but it is possible that US ordnance fell within the Hanoi city limits by accident.

State IO35S6 (to ^embassy Warsaw)^ s/NodiSj 15 December I566

* * •

"2. .., Washington approval of targets including high level review by Defense and State is required and takes into consideration location of targets with respect to population centers in effort to minimize civilian casualties. T^ype3 of targets struck have included lines of communication^ bridges^ POL storage, selected thei^nal power plants, militaiy installations^

and anti-aircraft missile sites and missile facilities that are a threat to o^ar aircraft.

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"3* Latest strikes near Hanoi were Yen Vien railroad yard ^M Van Dien vehicle depot ^ vhich are 5 nautical miles northeast and south of Hanoi respectively_^ and well outside of Hanoi city iDjnits, Both of these targets were struck on December 13 and 1^ but this was not first time in either case,*..

"4, [Eass alleges our aircraft bombed built-up area of Hanoi at west end of Bed River bridge and suburb of Dhatran to the southwest (have been unable locate Dhatraa on any map). Hanoi has made similar charge. We have not received complete reports; however ^ nothing in reports so far to substantiate this and area alleged to have been attacked nowhere near areas targetted for attack. It is important to note that there was heavy SA^-l^ anti-aircraft and MIG activity and our aircraft took action against SM sites. Qiiite a number of SAt^ were fired at our aircraft; errant SATls or anti-aircraft shells of course could cause damage.

^ • ft. *.

(e) There is no basis for charging us with escalation of conflict over past few daySj either in geographic terms or as to t^'pes of targets. Hanoi's FOL facility three nautical miles from center of Hanoi was struck on June 29^ and FOL facilities on edge of Haiphong were struck June 29 j July T and August 2, Two targets of December Ik are both five nautical miles from Hanoi's center (farther than June 29 strikes); both had been struck earlier."

. . 4

"(f) .... In comparable periods of good weather^ e,g.^ November 22 and 23^ December 2j 3^ k and 5; and Dec 13-1^ essentially same type of targets were struck^ Some intensity of air activity in and around Hanoi took place as has frequently been the case for at least six months..*."

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TQ? SECRET - M)DIS State 106358 (to Amenibassy Warsaw)^ 21 December 1966

* • *

**1. Our investigation of allegata bombing in Hanoi has been thorough, The only targets vere military ones more than five miles from tlie Ifenol city center. However we cannot rule out completely the possibility of an accident. Any US ordnance that may have fallen within the Hanoi city limits was the result of such an accident/^

EUSK

December ik^ I966

State does not interpret Rapacki^s December I3 statement as a negative reply from Hanoi^ closing the Marigold door. It Is^ however^ now Inclined to wonder whether the Poles ever had a commitment from the DEV for the Warsaw contact. In any case^ further conversations in Warsaw are to have two objectives:

i. Keeping the door open for talks to develop,

ii. lettii^ the record show our persistent efforts to move forwardJ while refuting Polish contentions that our actions and statements blocked the opening of conversations.

Gronouski is therefore instmcted to make the follow^ing points to Papacki:

i. Military" actions oj both sides were taking place througihout the conversations in Sai^oriT

ii. As soon as the US began talking with the Poles preparatory io meeting with the DEV^ new terms and conditions were put forward for opening the talks,

iii. We are now confused about what reflects the views of Hanoij

as opposed to the Polish Government. Direct contact is needed,

iv. To leave no stone unturned^ we suggest taking up de-escalation along the lines of the Phase A.-Phase B formula^ as a manageable opening piece of the total picture.

V. If the other side prefers^ though^ we will start at the other end^ looking first at possible terms of an agreed settlement,

vi. Eapackl is to be warned that he will bear full responsibility if Polish obstructionism prevents the contact,

^^ile these instructions are en route^ howeverj Gronouski is summoned by Rapacki to learn that the DRV has asked for all conversations to be terminated. The "brutal raid on the residential area in Hanoi

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precisely at the moment vhen the USC- knev that the matter of a Varsa-vr contact with Hanoi was actively "being considered" is the reason, Eapacki claims that immediately after the Poles transmitted "a direct^ positive response from Hanoi ahout the possihllity of talks in VarsaVj -•-the USG reserved the possibility of modifying its attitude and^ of far greater Importance^ entered a new stage of escalation/'

Gronouski appeals to the President* If the newspaper accounts of the Hanoi raids are true^ "then ve are in an incredibly difficixlt position. I am convinced that if this represents the breakdown of the current peace initiative-.-the Soviets, the Poles and the Worth Vietnamese T?ill have no trouble convincing the leadership in eveiy capital of the world that our stated desire for peace negotiations is insincere .-•• We have no choice but to take iinmediate action to tiy to get dis-. cussions back on the track."

He proposes J thereforej to accept Eapacki's reasoning: to give no impression of bombing intensification during the negotiations about opening talks in Warsav — in particular^ to halt bombing near Hanoi and Haiphong, 'Ve would again express our deep desire for the initiation of talks and ask the Poles to continue their efforts,"

Thus just as Gronouski is ordered to launch a pre--emptive offensive^ he is himself recommending retreat.

State 162295 (to Amembassy PiffilS) TS/Uodis I4 December I966

For the Secretary from the Acting Secretary Eef: SEGTO 62

"I do not rpt not interpret Hapacki's statement of December I3 to Gronouski as a negative reply from Hanoi in effect closing the ferigold door- Firm instructions are being prepared for Gronouski designed to keep the dialogue

goingJ while at the same time making a clear record of the legitimacy of our participation in the MAEIGOID effort since its inception."

• '•'*•

/

State IC2960 (to Amembassy Warsaw). TS/lfodis Ik December I966

Eef: Warsaw 1429

(info to Amembassy Paris & Saigon: Paris for Secretary

E^es Only; Saigon for Ambassador Porter Only)

"1, *,-, In light of Polish tactics we are now inclined to wonder whether they ever had any WM

.commitment to a meeting in Warsaw or whether it is not more likely that they have been engaging in an effort to get us committed to something as close as possible to our maximum position and then see whether they could get Hanoi lined up to talk on that basis. In any event we must bear two following objectives in mind in further conversations with Poles on this subject:

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(a) We msan to keep the door open as long as there seems to be any possibility of talks developing ^ but at the same time sticking to our position as generally represented by Levandovrski's 10 points j and

(b) We sincerely want to begin substantive talks and the record shoizld clearly show our persistent efforts to move forv^ard and that Polish contention that our actions and statements have thrown roadblock in the way of opening -of conversations in Warsaw are thoroughly refuted.

"2* Therefore you should ask fox further meeting with Eapacki and present him with following full statement of our position at present time:

(a) You should first review history of Lodge-D'Orlandi-Lsvandowskl conversations starting with Kovember ll|^~15 conversations in Saigon

(b) You should then point out to Papacki that beforeJ during and after all this was taking place^ the conflict in Viet-Nam continued^ including the bombing of North Viet-Nam^ the infiltration of North Vietnamese men and supplies into South Viet-Hamj Viet Cong terrorist bcmbingSj assassinations^ kidnappings^

e u c • • c,

(c) As soon as we began to talk with the Polish Goverrjnent in Warsaw^ presumably preparatory to our meeting directly with the North Vietnamese representatives ^ we found that new teims and conditions seemed to be put forward with the opening of direct talks contingent on our f ulf iUin,^ them. . ..

(d) But our desire is to move toward peace and our conviction is that the best road to take is one of direct discussion with Hanoi^s representatives. We are somewhat confused as a result of the conversations in Warsaw as to what Hanoi has said and what represents the views of Polish Governments Our strong impression is thatJ in spite of our readiness both In Saigon with Lewandawski and now in Warsaw to present quite fully and frankly our posit ion ^ we have not received any communication at all froni the North Vietnamese Government ,,.,

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(e) Nevertheless ve want to leave no stone unturned in our search for peace and vould like to turn for a moment from the total picture to one sector of it in which coaceivably ve might begin to move !Hiis is with respect to the possible beginning of de-escalation through a two-'ohased arram^ement referred to in Lewandowski's eighth point.... Perhaps the coining holidays and the truces associated with thenij offer an opportune occasion to take some useful steps along these lines; this in turn shoiild make it easier for the authorities in Hanoi to proceed then to discuss other matters standing between us and a peaceful settlement,

(f) On the other handj if they wish to proceed promptly to a total agreement representing the terms of an agreed settlementj we are prepared to move along that track including de-escalation as the final item, (FII: In other words we will start at either end of a total agreement, EMD FIX)

(g) You should conclude your statement of our position with the language contained in para 2 of State 9892^^-J leaving Eapacki in no doubt that we have done ever^rthing possible to open up the way to peaceful settlement and we are very much disturbed at our having been unable to move for^^a2rd at Warsaw as we had been led to expect from the earlier conversations in Saigon."

KAOEMffiACH

Warsaw 11^71 (to SecState)^ TS/Kodis,

15 Decembler I966 For the President from Ambassador Gronouski

"1, I met with Eapacki (Michalowski and Janczew-ski present) at Poles* request at ISOO Dec 1^!-, (in contrast to previous meetings^ Hapacki entered the room unsmiling^ and during entire meeting maintained a calirij serious and matter-of-fact attitude.)

fi.

2- Eapacki said that first he would like to bring some precision with respect to our conversation of yesterday (V^arsav ItjS). He said that this conversation took iDlace before Poles were aware of last

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bombing of Hanoi. He said^ 'If I had had this news then^ our eouversation of course would have had different character than it did.'

^^3* Eapacki continued^ 'Today I must state the follcn^ing facts. Firstj that the U.S. had to be conscious of and realize the importance of establishing direct contact vith Hanoi,' He added^ 'You had stressed the unique possibility of a peaceful settlement that the Warsaw talks vith Hanoi presented,' He continued^ 'We thought so tooJ ever since ve obtained the signal for vhich the USG had asked for for so long in so many official statements.' He added^ 'In this instance we received more than a signal; we received a direct^ positive response from Hanoi about the possibility of talks In Warsaw,'

"t, Eapacki said that immediately after this direct response was transmitted to the USG the US reserved the possibility of modifying their attitude and^ of far greater importancej entered a new stage of escalation.

"5- Rapacki continued that the USG was bound to be conscious of the reaction which its conduct would evoke and of the consequences of such action. He added that the Poles have done everything in their power to dispel any illusions^ noting that on six occasions in Warsaw and Saigon^ *We have warned the USG- side in all seriousness ar,d with the greatest emphasis of the conse-guences of their actions.'

"6- 'Yesterday/ Hapacki continued, 'The US Air Force engaged in a new and particularly brutal raid on the residential area in Hanoi precisely at the moment when the USG knew that the matter of a T-Farsaw contact with Hanoi was actively being considered. This^^ he added J «was the last drop that spilled over the cup. From the moment^ in Hanoi and Warsaw^ all doubts as to the real Intentions of the USG disappeared^ including doubts not only in the present case but with respect to all other instances in the past when the US has advanced positions which it has described as peaceful initiatives.'

"T* Papacki then said^ 'We understand therefore and fully share the wish of the Leraocratic Republic of Worth Vietnam J which was transmitted to us today j that we terminate all conversations begun months ago in Saigon. The Polish Go^^i: states that the whole responsibility for losing this chance of a peaceful solution to the Vietnam

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var rests on the USG.' He added^ 'I vould like to express nore than regrets because of the utilization by the USG of our good will. Once again it "becomes clear how difficult it is to believe in your words.* He added^ ^In future only facts can be taken into consideration.'

"8, I said that I would have no comment except to say that I regretted this turn of events and would inimedlately convey these observations to ¥ashington.

"9* Comment: If Moscow dateline account of latest Hanoi bombing published in Dec 1^ Paris edition of New York Times and Herald Tribune^ and recounted to me tonight by Eapackij is true then we are in an incredibly difficult position. I am convinced that if this represents the breakdown of the current peace initiative — and it surely does unless we take decisive and Immediate action — then the Soviets^ the Poles and the North Vietnamese will have no trouble convincing the leadership in every capital of the world that our stated desire for peace negotiations is insincere. If we treat this turn of events as anything less than a crisis in our worM leadership role then I believe we are making a tragic mistake.

"10. I am convinced that up till now the Poles^ accepting the genuineness of our interest in negotiation^ have used whatever influence they have in Hanoi (in all likelihood with Soviet backing) in an effort to initiate US-ITV?! peace talks, I also am convinced that Rapacki was expressing genuine concern when he warned that the increase in bombing was destroying what appeared to him a good chance that WTi^ would over come Chinese influence and encase in Warsaw talks.

"K«_

"11. We have no choice but to take immediate action to try to get discussions back on track. For any chance ox" success this would requirej in my judgment^ conveying to Poles that we are willing to accept Bapacki's Dec I3 reasoning (iv'arsaw 1^58) and are prepared now to assure the Poles that we will take care not to create impression of bombing intensification in DA/II during the period of delicate negotiations over the holding of Warsaw USG-l^IVIT peace talks. We would also assirre the Poles that we do not intend to bomb in the immediate vicinity of Hanoi and Haiphong during this period. We would again express our deep desire for the initiation of talks and ask the Poles to continue their efforts."

a . • «

GEOITOUSKI

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Decemljer 1^^ I966

After consulting the Presidentj State again instructs Gronouski to present a strong rejection of Bapacki's arguments, ¥e doubt the accur- . acy of the Communists' bombing accounts and that the Poles really intend to sell their view of Marigold to world opinion.

At the sane time, Rolling Thunder 52 is amended to suspend strikes against the two Hanoi targets hit December l3"lli*. This is not comiiani-catedj however^ to the other participants in iMarigold,

Meanv/hile Lewandovski has begun to leaic his version of Marigold by giving a few salient points to the Uutch Cliarge in Saigon, Ve do not learn of this until December 17^ and know only that Lgvrandowski^s conversation with the IXitch Charge occurred sametime between November 30 and December I5.

Harrison Salisbury of the New York Times receives a cable from Hanoi, A visa to visit the DKY, for which he had applied some months earlierJ has been granted and may be picked up immediately in Paris,

^e Polish tohassador in Heme is contacted by the Pope who inquires if the former can '^tell hiia anything with respect to Vietnajnj" according to a later conversation betvreen the Polish Ambassador and Fanfani, (For source^ see December I9 entiy,)

State 1033if2 (to Aiaembassy Warsaw)^ IS/llaUs^

15 December I966 For -Ambassador Gronouski from Acting Secretary Pef: (a) Warsaw IU7I

(b) State 102960 (info to Amembassy Paris & Saigon: Paris for Secretary

'Eyes only; Saigon for Ambassador l^as only)

"1, Your message (reftel a) has been discussed with the President and he has approved the comments and additional instructions w^hich are set forth below.

"2» -41 though Rapacki's message to you reported ref (a) is also discouraging it does not alter our basic

assessment as conveyed to you in State's IO2960 In

spite of his reference in paras 6 and 7 reftel (a) to views and decisions of ilVKj we remain doubtful about hew much part Hanoi has played in scenario which has unfolded in Warsaw over past two weeks."

. •

*^7- Finally J and in spite of the fact that Bapacki's line as reported reftel (a) makes it essential that he get

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the full force of our rejection of his arguments and our indignation at the Polish Governirent's changing the signals and then seeking to put the blame on us^ ve feel neTert?ieless that you should In the course of your presentation to Eapacki leave no doubt about our continuing strong desire to move forward in direct conversations vita the North Vietnarnase ^^

'*8. Your further interpretation and discussion contained Varsav^s 1^75 i^ very much appreciated and 1 am sure you fully realize that all of us here profoundly share your concern over the tui-n events have taken in the last fev days. Likewise I can veil imagine that in the atmosphere of Warsaw and without full information available^ particularly concerning the bombing of ITorth Viet-^Nanij the Polish position may appear to be a strong one, whatever their motivation in presenting it as Rapacki has just done. Ve want to as&i.ire youj however^ that on the basis of the over-all picture as we can see it from Washington^ the Polish case^ except for some fairly superficial and transitory matters^ is a weak one and we wonder whether they will tiy to sell it to world opinion."

*«

KATZENBACH

JCS Ikrjl (to CUTCPAC), TS/LB1DISj IS Decem"ber I966 Ref: JCS 7735

"1, (TS) Ref authorizes air strikes against folloving targets in Hanoi area.

TARGET NO.

ITBffi

BE HUMBER

19 63.11

Yen Yien EE Clf Yd

Van Dien Veh Dpo

616-0221 616-0696

"2. (TS) Suspend further air strikes against these targets until further notice."

TO

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Saigon I364O (to SeeState), TS/Nodis 17 December I966

*'l. CAS Station Chief came to political counselor Dec 17 and reported that one of his officers had been queried by Netherlands Charge Derksen about a statement by Lewandowski concerning negotiations vlth Hanoi,..#

"2, In response to retiuest CAS submitted following as ^lemorandum of conversation with Terksen:

A. In a conversation vhich took place in Saigon on an unspecified date between Nov 30 and Dec 15^ 1966J Ambassador Levandovski told Mr. Derksen that he vas recently in Hanoi for a somewhat longer period than usual. He vent on to say that 'an organization' — later he used the vord 'group' — was negotiating with Hanoi on the subject of peace talks. I^h:. Lewandowski did not further identify the group or organization.

B, Mr. Lewandovski was bitter because pro^ grass in these talks was halted by the recent American bombing of Hanoi (dates of air raids not specified). He told Mr. Derksen he was so bitter than he planned to write >a paper^ on the subject..,

V

Behind the Lines—Hanoi , hj Iferriscn E. Salisbury tBantacij July 1967)^. p. 8

^^^en^ on the morning of December 15^ Seymour Topping^ the foreign editor of Tb^ Tmes^ walked over to my desk and put a cablegraci before me.... The visa to Hanoi did^ indeed, await me in Paris."

December IJj I966

State expresses alaim over the possible impact on the talks in Warsaw and also on Ky. should Lewandowski's leak to the Dutch Charge reach him. Lodge is told to give Ky a lew key Indication that a possible lead toward peace is being investigated.

State 10i^673 (to Aiaeiabassy Saigon)^ TS/jIodis

17 December I966 Kef: Saigon 136^0

"1. Lewandcwski's indiscretions are indeed most unfortunate and potentially harmf^ja to talks in Varsaw,..

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"2. This leads us to suggest you should te prepared vith line to use vith Ky should outright leak occur^ should Ky raise with you on has is rumors floating around Saigon J or should you feel rumors ha^^e reached point vhere you should take initiative vith Ky as preventive measures. Our thought is that in such eventuality^ you would simply in low key take following line: As ve have told Ky before we get many apparent leads on subject of peaceful settlement. ¥e feel responsibility not to overlook any possible lead which might offer soiae promise-Most of these leads dissipate iJBmedlatelyj sane seem slightly more productive and are pursued further. Lewandowski contact with us over past few months has been such lead. At times it has appeared to offer more possibilities and at times less, Yj may be assured that if any lead offers any real prospect of discussions with HanoiJ he will be promptly consulted."

KATLMBACE

December 18. I966

iriH

D'Orlandi tends to reject our ratioriale for what has happened in favor of the Polish version. He feels there is a "strong prima facie case against us" and that we should do "something quickly In Warsaw." much the same view expressed by Gronouski on December 1^.

Saigon I3618 (to SecState)^ TS/Kodis

18 December I966 Bef: State 10^^673

* *

"6. D^Orlandi then said to Habib that he was himself surprised at bombing on the l4th. Ee wondered 'If there were not some people in the US who had deliberately sought to create a problem.» Hiis was denied in precise terms and with an expression of surprise that D^Orlandi would have such a thought. It was pointed out that as D'Orlandi knew there was no connection between bombings and Lewan-dowski^s proposals. Habib then gave D-Orlandi the rebuttal material contained in State's Circular 1038^1-9 and went over it in detail^ suggesting it be used if Lewandowski again raises issue of banbings."

. * •

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"12, Comment: Our Judgment is that foregoing confirms correctness of changing venue to Warsaw- D'Orlandi is not only shoving his personal pique at turn of events^ but is displaying definite tendency to discard our explanations while endeavoring to induce us to do ^something quickly in Warsaw,' Instead of focusing on infonaation provided "by Habihj he launched into extended presentation of Lewan-dowski's latest animadversions (sic)^ adding his own belief that there is ^strong prima-facie case against us' as well as exhortation mentioned preceding sentence,^'

««• *

PORI!EIR

Deceiriber ig^ I966

Gronouski carries out Staters instructions of December 15. In an angry exchange^ Eapacki attacks both the accusations leveled against the Polish role and the US suggestion that the Warsaw contact still be attempted,

In Rome J the Pope is given the ^^whole story" on Marigold by the Polish AmbassadorJ who later reports the episode to Fanfani^ adding that he had been contacted by the Pope on December 15^ to ask if the Poles "could tell him anything with respect to Vietnam,'^

Warsaw I513 (to State )^ TS/jTodis

19 December I966 Eef: Warsaw I50S

*«fe

"9 He (Eapacki) added that Poles did not put

forth new conditions but 'recalling speeches of Goldbergj the President^ Secretaiy Busk and others^ once we received the signal we did we would have had everj'' right to call for a stop in the bombing,* He said^ *you have said over and over again that you would end all bombing if there was an assurance from Hanoi that there would be a response toward peace from Hanoi; however, we did not ask that you ston bombing but only that you not intensify it.^"

• • 4

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"13 He saidj 'I am astonished that at came time

you accuse us of stalling talks j you ask us to help you

get them going again. ^ * Inasmuch as NVW asked Poles

to discontinue these discussions^ vhat vas nev to justify returning to wm on this matter? .../'

GPOI^TOUSKT

Rome 31^09 CtQ Sec State )j TS/Nodis 28 Decembei* I966

• •

"^- Fanfani said that according to the Polish Ambassador the Pope on December I5 sent word to the Polish Government asking if they could tell hija anything with respect to Vietnam. On December 19 the Polish Government responded by telling the Pope the vhole story, Fanfani indicated he did not ]rpt not know just what the Polish Ambassador meant oy the 'whole story' but presumably the Polish Governm,ent had told the Pope everything they knew."

*»«»

EEBIHAPDT

December 21, ig66

M M l i ■ » ■-■li» ■ ■ T il I I , „ ,^

Eapacki clarifies the Polish role in I^rigold, The following were conveyed to us on instruction from Hanoi:

i. Lewandowski's message to Lodge immediately upon his return from Hanoi expressing a positive response to the Warsaw talks.

ii. Eapacki's warning after the December 3 bambing^ that Ife^noi would have to reassess the situation,

iii. The decision to terminate discussions in Warsaw.

He added that there had been frequent exchanges between Hanoi and Warsat/ during the conversations and felt confident the Poles accurately expressed Hanoi's viewsj even when acting on their o\m initiative.

While Gronouski is learning this in Warsaw^ instructions are enroute for him to tell the Poles that ary deinage from US ordnance within Hanoi city limits was accidental. We are now prepared to state there will be no

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bombing vlthin 10 miles of the center of Hanoi for an indefinite period if talks with the DEV can begin shortly* We "anticipate'* some "appropriate reciprocal action" vith respect to HLF activities within 10 miles of the center of Saigon as "evidence of Rood faith."

Warsaw I535 (to SecState)^ TS/Nodis

21 December I966 Eef: State IO5909

« m

''2, X asked Eapacki to clarify for me the role that Hanoi played in our discussions. Eapacki replied that the message lewandowski gave to Lodge (he referred to 'three sentences*) upon his return from Hanoi expressing W^ positive response to Warsaw talks^ Eapacki*s warning after the Dec 3 bombingj that Hanoi would have to reassess the situationj and the decision to tennir^te discussions in Warsaw were all decisions by ETVK which were conveyed to us oy the Poles. He said further that comnients Poles made regarding danger of creating the impression of pressure on Hanoi were comments of the Polish Govt, but the fears that Poles expressed in this regard were verified subsequently by Hanoi. He also said that during process of Warsaw discussions there vere a number of other exchanges between Warsaw and Hanoij adding that the Poles are confident that what they expressed on their own initiative acciorately reflected Hanoi's opinton.

"3. Eapacki then made the pointy in reference to our accusation that Poles have raised new conditions since tallcs shifted to Warsaw^ that interpretation clause question was raised by Lewandowski immediately upon hearing it expressed by Lodge on Dec 3- He said 'clearly you kiiov that we felt this was a matter of concern from the very beginning; it wasn't scm,ething interjected as a new condition after^^-rards. * He added^ ^our concern was well taken because the reaction to interpretation clause from Hanoi turned out to be what we iDredicted.'"

...

GEONOUSICI

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State 106358 (to Ataembassy Warsaw) 21 December I966

• • •

"1. Our investigation of alleged bomtiag in Hanoi has been thorough. The only targets were military ones more than five miles from the Hanoi city center. However we cannot rule out completely the possibility of an accident. Any US ordnance that may have fallen within the Hanoi city limits vas the result of such an accident.

"2* Nonetheless we are prepared to state that there will be no bombing within ten miles of Hanoi city center measured from 21 degrees 1 minute 37 seconds northJ 105 degrees 5I minutes 21 seconds East^ for an indefinite period if talks with ]Sorth Vietnamese can be gotten unden-zay shortly. Appropriate reciprocal action with respect to bombs^ mortar and similar terrorist activities within ten miles of the center of Saigon measured from 10 degreesj k6 minutes^ 28 seconds north; 106 degrees J kl minutes^ 10 seconds East, would be anticipated by us as evidence of good faith/^

>«

EUSK

December 22, 1966

^ ' ■ I ■ I I I ■ I W I

Kapacki prefers to wait a day or two (by which time Gronouski is to have returned to Washington for consultations) before transmitting the new US position to Hanoi. He is afraid the suspension of bombing near Hanoi appears to depend on reciprocal action frcm the HLF and a signal that Hanoi will establish contact. Gronouski argues that we are not asking a quid-pro-quo but simply removing the factor that had blocked the contact and suggesting a quiet way for Hanoi and the NLF to indicate readiness to discuss peace.

Rapacki repeats a theme expressed (less clearly) by him earlier: ildberg stated that if there was some indication from Hanoi regardin

1_ * !__»__ ^ ... ^_ __ _ _ . _ _ _ _

"Goldb

negotiations J bombing would cease throughout W/IJ and not simply around a small area of Hanoi. ^^ He is presumably referring to Goldberg's September 22 speech, though neither it nor Goldberg's December 20 letter to U Thant contain such a sweeping proposal.

On the same day, Zinchuk sees Bimdy in \Fashington to indicate Soviet awareness of I^arigold and Soviet support both for Polish actions

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and the Polish interpretation of developments to date. He is apprehensive that the US vill adopt a militaristic approach to the var. (The Soviet concern to get US-DEV talks started arises in large part the possibility that Hanoi will call for volunteers under the Bucharest Declaration (^^if the war escalates and if help is necessary")*

Warsaw 1537 (to SecState)^ T3/B[odis

22 December I966 Ref: State IO6358

*«•

"2* Eapackij expressing desire to understand precisely^ asked for reiteration of message. In response to his question as to whether this meant we had no intention to bcmh Hanoi proper but that it was possible we could have inadvertently hit residential area^j 1 responded I did not exclude that possibility- In response his question whether orders would be issued to exclude from bombing area within coordinates described for indefinite period^ I responded that this my understanding reftel* After brief discussion of relationship of cessation of terrorist activities in Saigon to cessation bombing in Hanoi perlmeterj I reread section again and pointed out there was no direct auid-pro-quo on cessation Saigon activities but that this was anticipated reaction l>y Hanoi as measure of good faith.

"3, I expressed again my personal conviction that this proposal provided basis for movement in resolving the problem of initiating negotiations.*..

"k Eapacki noted however that t^ro things

intraded which might reduce the significance of this step: (a) The text of the coiMiunication appears to make U,S, action dependent on some signal that a contact will be established by Hanoi; (b) There is an indirect linking — or request — that an appX'opriate step (re Saigon) will be taken by the other side. He added that it would be vexy nojipQi'tant to avoid the appearance of forcing JIW into negotiations,,,. Cjoldberg stated that if there was some indication from Hanoi regarding negotiations_, bombing would cease throughout IT^li and not simply aroxmd a small area of Hanoi. Furthermore^ regarding the alleged NLF activities around Saigon^ while this is admittedly expressed in terms of an expectation^ the impression is given that you are tiyin,^ to 'kill too many biirds with one stone.' This is a matter to be resolved with the WLF

and I (Eapacki) have tried to dissuade you from linking NVIT action with ITLF matters ...."

■ J •

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"8 I argued that RapacM must view our

proposal not as an exercise of pressure "by making cessation of bcmbing dependent on Hanoi's indication of a willingness to talkj but as a removal of what Poles had regarded as overt pressure which Eapacki had Insisted interfered with the prospects for talks Cessation of action in Saigon was not a direct quid-pro^quo but a quiet way for Fanoi and the IJLF to give an indication of readiness to discuss peace*

"9- Eapacki,*.concluded with statement that he would prefer to delay day or two before transmitting our proposal but expressed willingness to convey it now if that was what I desired.

"10, I e>5>ressed willingness to discuss matter immediately on my arrival in ¥ashin,gton/^

• •

GE0N0U3KI

MemCon^ TS/Kodis/lMEIGOLDj 22 December I966 Participants: Alexander Zlnchuk^ Soviet Charge

William P. Bundy

* n

"2. immediately after these exchanges^ Zinchuk launched into a discussion of MASIGOID. After learning that I was fully aware of the exchanges between Lewan-dowski and Lodgej as he put it initially^ he said that it was very hard for them to understand why we had intensified the bombing of the Ilorth with the attacks on December 2nd and ^th^ and then again on December 13th and lij-th. He said that there was great sensitivity in Hanoi an. this subject^ and strongly Implied -- without directly saying so — that there were differing schools of thouglit. Our bombing actions had left the Soviets — and by implicationj Hanoi — in complete doubt as to what our intentions and views really were. Speaking more specifically for the Sovietsj he said that he had thought they pretty well understood our views^ but that this episode left them in real doubt whether there were military forces at work and whether they simply did not understand fully what we thou^t and meant to do*

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"3. More specirically^ he said that he himself had been in Moscow^ in late N"oveiiiber and had gained the impression that Hanoi (or elements in it) were seriously interested in starting something. 'Biey had been encouraged by the apparent slackening In the pace of onr bombing during this period. I at once askied '^rhether this was just a general impression or whether it had something more specific behind it. He replied that it was 'more than a general sense,' Then^ following the bombings of December 2nd and kth^ some Hanoi leaders (un-named) had been in Moscow on their way back from Budapest^ and had met with top Soviet leaders. (I think he mentioned Kosygin and Brezhnev specifically)* In the face of our bombings J the Soviet leaders had been unable to clarify U.S. thinking or (by clear implication) to encourage Hanoi to pursue the Lewandowski avenue. Then^ he himself had seen Ambassador Kohler on December 9thj intending to convey a clear message against continued intensifIcstion of the bombing* He thus found it particularly difficult to understand our actions."

* *..

"6. I then said specifically that^ while we had made a considered decision that we should not alter the planned bombing pattern earlier^ we were definitely aware of Hanoi's sensitivity to intensification of the bombing, I said that therefore we had made a specific proposal within the last 2^ hoxors^ directed to precisely this point I also noted that within the last 2^^- hours we had had a contact that had substantially ill^jminated exactly what the Polish contacts and discussions with Ifenoi had been. FinallyJ I reiterated that ve were prepared to see really quiet and secret talks get under way on the basis of the approaches that had been made.'*

"8. In short J Zinchuk did not really seek to defend Polish handling of the matter^ but was most emphatically tiying to get it across that the Polish effort was serious and that the Soviets were fully with it*...''

"9* * •-he said that he had been surprised j in discussing the Polish initiative in the Department at some earlier stage In December^ to see that it was treated as doubtful..,."

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^

^

*

* •

"2* He then said (as he had to Harrj'' P-fecFherson on Monday) that the Soviet concern to get something started arose from a number of factorsj but above all the possibility that Ife^noij under the Bacharest Declaration ('if the var escalates and if help is necessary^' in essence) might at some point be faced with a Hanoi request for military'" volunteers. He noted the report today of No3rth Korean pilots (which I of course did not deny) and something unspecified that the Cubans vere doing. He said that the Soviets vould be put in a most avkvrard and difficult position if ifenoi asked for volunteers^ and they hoped the issue vould not arise,

'*3* He then 8,sked me about soirie coimnentator's statement that the President saw tvo alternativesj seeking a peaceful solution or escalating the war markedly by bombing so that the American people vould become engaged in simple loyalty to their aimed forces

TT

« <• *

■ * •

December £3^ I966

Ttie problems of reciprocal de-escalation are illustrated by a cable from SaigoHj "a3Si:c!iing" that the proposed cessation of terrorist activity in the Saigon area does not require a cessation of GW/US counter-VC activities.

Saigon 1^039 (to SecState}^ TS/Fodis^

23 December I966 Kef: A. State IO6358 E. State 105909

"1, ...we assume department proposal on cessation terrorist activity in Saigon area does not envisage cessation GVI^US counter-VC activities/'

• • •

POEOIER

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December 24j I966

We drop the request for reciprceal action from the DHV in maintaining tlie 10 mile bomting Ifjnit around Hanoi •

(lIB. source needed)

December 26--£7j I966

After newspaper reports of bombing ^^12 miles from Hknoi/' the Poles inquire if our circle about Hanoi is measured in nautical or statute miles. Gronouski expresses concern over strikes this close to the proscribed circle. He is told ^'not to be diverted from the main effort '^y niggling and haggling about whether a particular bomb fell on this side or that side of this or that circle."

Warsaw I567 (to SecState), TS/HodiSj 27 Decenaber I966 Ref: State IO79II

"1- ..,Michalowski.,.asked 'for the record' whether reference in re ft el to ten miles from Hanoi was in nautical or statute miles,,,.

"2. *,.NY Times- AP Dispatch speaks of * target only twelve miles from Hanoi *••.•

"3 T am most concerned if we are choosing

targets so close to the margin that even a slight error could put us in technical violation of our commitment...."

• •

GEOKOUSKI

State 10Q66h (to Amembassy Warsaw)j TS/Uodis 27 December I966

"...you may Inform I^chalowski or Eapackl that orders have been issued to refrain fx^om bombing within the ten nautical miles from Hanoi city center.-., it is very important for you and the Poles not to be diverted from the main effort by niggling and haggling about whether a particular bomb fell on this side or that side of this or that circle. The important thing is that an area of some Slk square nautical miles will be free from bombing and that; thus farj we have not seen an^^' readiness on the T)art of Hanoi to sit down

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and talk business. The next move is up to them and ve cannot let them play games with a side issue in view of the major concession we have made to clear the way for talks.. .military briefers are not aware of MAEIGOLD and that some looseness in language can be anticipated,^^

RUSK

December 27-28, I966

Fanfani is told by the Polish Ambassador about the latter's contact with the Pope, We in turn tell Fanfani of the 10 mile bombing sanctuary around Hanoi and of our continuing hopes to get talks started. We stress the importance of secrecy^ if talks are to succeed. Meanwhile we decide to move the operation out of Saigon to the maximum extent^ for security reasons. Gronouski is instructed to take up the security problem with Eapacki^ with special reference to the leak to the Pope. He is also apprised of doubts by Eusk that the Poles ever intend.ed to press Eanoi for talks irithout an unconditional and unreciprocated cessation of the bombing.

Rome 31^09 (to SecState)^ TS/NodiSj 23 December I966

"1. Points contained State IO8773 were conveyed privately to Fanfani evening Dec 28,

"2. Fanfani said he had been very severe in his conversation with Polish _Ambas3adorj he had emphasised that;

A. Poles should initiate US contact with Hanoi without further delay;

B* Lewandowski should by all means remain in Saigon as would D'Orlandij and

C. It was a great mistake break secrecy hy informing the Pope,

"3- Fanfani said Polish Ambassador had returned to see him evening December 27. Polish Aiabassador had said:

A. Poles cannot undertake initiate US contact with Hanoi unless there is a cessation of bombing;

B, Lewandov7ski will repeat will remain in Saigon; and

Co It was not repeat not the Polish Government which had taken the initiative in informing the Pope but

rather it was the Pope who had approached the Polish

Government,

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"4* Fanfani said that according to the Polish Ambassador the Pope on December 15 sent word to the Polish Government asKing if they could tell him anything with respect to Vietnam, On December 19 the Polish Government responded by telling the Pope the whole story. Fanfani indicated he did not rpt not know ^just what the Polish Ambassador meant by the ^whole story' but presumably the Polish Government had told the Pope everything they knew.'^

EEHmAEQ']?

State 109639 (to Amembassy Warsaw)^ T3/Kodis

28 December I966 FOE OHS AI^ASSADOR FROll THE 3ECRETAEY

^\ ., • I call your attention to the statement made by the Polish Ambassador to Fanfani on the evening of December 2J that Q3S Poles cannot undertake initiate US contact with Hanoi unless there is a cessation of bombing IWQTE. Ihis could result from Polish Amba.ssador Home not being informed of our move on December 2^. But it also raises the possibility that the Poles have never had any intention of pressing Hanoi for talks without an unconditional and unreciprocal cessation of bcmbing*''

EUSK

State 106773 (to Amembassy Eome)^ TS/Nodis 27 December I966

"1.

* * •

a. ¥e are most grateful for prompt Fanfani report of his conversation with Polish Ambassador Rome J

• * V

b. Fanfani himself should be aware that on Dec 2k ve conveyed to Hapacki that we had given firm orders not repeat not to bomb within ten nautical miles of point ±n center of Hanoi for an indefinite period..,,'

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c, ¥e are most grateful to Fanfani for expressing concern that Pope has heen informed* We too are concerned over this and would na^ appreciate Fanfani advice vhether ve should ourselves indicate to Popti our knowledge that he has been infonaied. We recognise that it may he desirable not repeat not to indicate such awareness^ in order to preserve Fan-fani's ovm sources and channels; however^ we are also concerned if Pope may be receiving one-sided account.

• • • •

"2, Saigon should take no action. For security reasons alone j we are trying to get this operation out of Saigon to maximum extent possible* .. *

"3 If Eapacki or Michalowski admit that

Pope has been inf orxned you should say that jou must report this to Washington and have no doubt it will have disturbing effect on security grounds alone,. **"^

RISK

December 30. I966

Eapacki tells Cjronouski the 10 mile sanctuary has come too late and that the Poles now consider their role "at this stage as teiralnated/'

In Washington, Dobrynin tells Thompson the Soviet Government is "frankly baffled by (US) action in Vietnam,--, He said there were mar^-^ and he was one^ that wondered whether some of our military were deliberately trying to frustrate a policy of moving toward negotiations."

Warsaw I596 (to SecState), TS/lJodis^ 30 :December I966 Section 1 of 2

"1. Rapacki opened by saying Poles have taken further action on j^" statement of Dec 2^, but un-fort^jnately this step could v^ot make up for damage done by previous actions, particularly Air Force, during first part of December.

"2. Rapacki added that *we have to consider our role at this stai^ce as terminated -.,,."

4 *.«

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fti

7* Eapaeki saidj •••if that step you brougttfrcan Washington (on 2h December) had occurred on December h --admittecliy after the first bo^nbing of Hanoi — then I feel personally tre "^iould have had the first contact vlth the DHV behind us. Moreover^ I think I have sufficient reasons for inj^ personal feeling. Even betveen Dec ^4-and Dec 13^ the matter was again actively being reconsidered. There had been no negative reaction as yet. ¥e knowJ because we had contact with the proper quarter. The decision regarding breaking off the talks was made after Dec I3 "

«-'* * *

MemConj TS/lIodis/l-IABIGOLD^ 30 December I966 Participants: Ambassador Dobrjuinj USSR

Jimbassador Thompson

"I asked the Ambassador if he had brought back any reply to the President's letter to Kosygin. He replied that if he could speak completely off the record he could tell me that a reply had nearly been completed and that it was one ve would have liked but then the bombing of llano 1 had occurred and this draft had been torn up and another one of quite a different character started. He said he had seen the report from their Enbassy in Hanoi and that there was no doubt in the Soviet minds as a result of this report that our bombs had fallen on Hanoi itself...a reply would be made in due course,^'

<■.

"The ^^bassador remarked that the initial stages of this affair had given the Soviet Governoient considerable hope and he said rather cryptically that they had other reasons for some optimism but that our action in bombing Hanoi had spoiled BYer^thln^^ I pointed out that o^Jir targets were selected several weeks in advance and that it had been pure coincidence that the attacks on the targets near Hanoi had occurred at this time.

"The Ambassador said that his Government was frankly baffled by our actions in Viet-tlam and did not kno;/ how to judge our policy. He said there were many^

N

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and he vas one of them^ that vondered whether some of our military were deliberately trying to frustrate a policy of moving toward negotiations or whether our policy really was one of military victory,"

December 31^ I966

Porter suggests from Saigon that we switch to a more trustworthy channelJ from the Poles to the Canadians.

Saigon 1^+702 (to SecState)^ TS/ETodis 31 December I966

"1, We have been watching with increasing puzzlement the Polish Minuet danced by Eapacki..., ¥e cannot disregard possibility that Poles constantly manipulated tei"ms of understandir^ whether involving 'ten points' or later 3,ttempts to add provisos. Rapacki's frequent return to question of cessation of bambing and his allure to arrange contact with Hanoi are suspicious,"

« •

"3, With the breakdown of the Polish charjiel,.. we suggest Department consider bringing in another party more trustworthy as an intermediary from US point of

"T

View,..,

ti

• *

"6. We lean in favor of the Canadians. It just so happens that the Canadia.n Commissioner Victor Moore is going to Hanoi on January 6 to spend a few days making his farewell cslls at the end of his tour.,.."

■ •

PORTER

January 3. I90T

Goldberg gives the US view of Ifeirigold to U Thant^ who promises to hold it in confidence.

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As incidental intelligence^ U Thant mentions that Peter^ the Hungarian Foreign Minister^ vas visited in Bncapest by Le Duan (Secretary General of the Lao Dong) early in December. Le Duan took a very hard line J much harder^ Peter believes ^ than vould Trinh^ the DRV Foreign Minister. The latter had been expected^ but urgent problems in Hanoi detained him and LeDuan came instead.

USUK 3l;53 (to SecState), TS/Nodis^ 3 January I967

"As agreed upon with the Secretai^'-j I had an extensive discussion vlth U Thant this afternoon lasting almost 1-1/2 hours.

"I gave azm the full account of Iferigold^ "

* * i •

'^Syg assured me tliat he ¥ould keep this in confidence and I do not believe that ve need be concerned about his making a public disclosure absent any additional dramatic events."

• ■

"...he told me that ^hen FiA Peter of HvLngar;>^ was at the W.J Peter had told 5;/-g th^t they vere expecting a visit from the North Vietnamese PM in Budapest in early December. Syg said that he had since been advised by the Hungarians -^ presumably the Hungarian OTT Rep — that the North Vietnamese FM found it impossible make the visit because of urgent problems at home. In his place Hanoi dispatched the Syg of the Communist Party who visited Budapest early last month and who has since returned to Hanoi, Hungarians reported that Syg of Communist Party took a very hard line about settlement of Vietnamese conflict — a harder line than they believe would have been taken by North Vietnamese JM. Of possible interest to US in this connection was the observation of Syg of Communist Party that it was by iio means cerbain that the NLF would support any peace proposal which might be acceptable to Hanoi, Syg observed that this ^^jas a similar line taken l:y ]Jorth Vietnamese 'Re;^^ in Algiers in September of last year as reported to him by his Algerian sources.

. *

GOLDBUSa

Q^, TOP SEO^^ NODIS 07 —

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J anuary kj 1$&J

Rusk soothes George Brovn's injured feelings over finding that he vas not the sole inteimediary for the Phase A-Ptiase B de-escalation proposaJ.,

State 112632 (to Membassy London)^ TS/Uodis h January I967

PERSOFAL FOE AiMBASSADOR FROM SECKEmEY

"Please deliver following personal message to Foreign Secretary George Brown: QTE Dear George: Thank you for your message- I do want to clear up one pointJ namely^ that there was nothing on which we could have informed you prior to your visit-to Moscow Your vis3.t came at the time of Lewandowski's visit to Hanoi "but "before we had any infonriation whatever from him on his visit. We understand he was in Hanoi most of the last half of November^ and our first report upon his return to Saigon was received in a meeting on December 1, In faetj ve gave you for your trip a major concession to the other side in the form of a two-phased proposal in which we would stop the bombing if they would agree that subsequently there could be a de-escalation of the violence, I am sorry if there has been any misunderstanding on this point. With personal regains^ Sincerely^ Dean Rusk,

KJS-K

January h^ I967

Gronouski takes issue with Porter^ that the Canadians replace the Poles as our channel to Hanoi because they are more ^^trustworthy." He considers the Poles better suited to the mission because they carry more weight in Hanoi.

Warsaw 163I (to SecState); TS/Nodls^ k January I967 Eef: Saigon iJ^TOS

■. •

"3 The fact that Poles presumably acted

in Jfenoi's interests in attejnntiup: to extract from US best possible terms prior to actual negotiations is no basis for concluding that Poles were not interested in initiating Warsaw talks as soon as feasible.

88

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Feasil3ilityj however, depended on Hanoi's agreement^ and I submit Poles had no reason on their own initiative to delay that agreement ten minutes..,.

"4. Given this analysis^ I cannot conceive of Canada or ar^- other friend of the USG heing more satisfactory than Poles as intermediary (see also paras 3 and k^ ¥arsav I630); true^ they "vrould he more trustvorthy from our point of viev. But for this reason they would also he even less effective than Poles >rere in convincing Hanoi. I have no doubt that Poles had access to and exchanges vith top officials of WJ!\^ and that they delivered our messages, I am also convinced^ especially after Dec 2k^ that they encouraged Hanoi to meet vith us in Warsaw. A trustwoi^thy friend of USG could do no more and I suspect would be able to do much less. What we need is help of someone with more influence on Hanoi than PoleSj not less. It is for this reason that I suggested we turn immediately to Soviets,"

«•

GEONOUSKl

January h^ I967

Goldberg gives U Thant and Ignatieff (Canadian Ambassador to the VE) a review of "the entire ferigold episode" along the lines suggested dj the Depar-tzaent. (Source; USUU SkS'^y lA/^Tj TS/nodis)

January ^j I96T

Saigon reports I3 YC incidents in the Saigon^Gia Dihh area.

Saigon ikS^k (to SecState)^ TS/jfodis^ 5 January I967

"1, ¥e have been keeping a special vatch on incidents and actions in the Saigon Gia^-Dinh area ever since Christmas. As a rough approximation border of Gia-DirJi province averages about 11 miles from the center of Saigon,

"2. From Dec 23 to Jan 3 there were I3 incidents clearly initiated by VC in the area ,

• * • •

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li I

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"5 In order not to call attention to our

interest in the 10 mile radius ve are using standard statistics derived from police reports vliich are not alvays complete or absolutely accurate/'

January 5j ^967

Heirihardt gives the Pope a similar review. He stresses that the US has been forthcoming by offering its Phase A-Phase B fomiulaj by affirming Lewandovski*s statement of the US position with no reciprocal act from the DPV side^ and by offering to meet with the DKV to discuss all outstanding issues^ and that no militaiy preconditions for the talks were initially asked by the other side. Even nowj we are keeping open our suspension of bombing within 10 niles of Hanoi's center. IVtille the DRV has given a negative response^ we continue to tiy to open talks. Secrecy is imperative if this effort is to succeed. We therefore request the Pope's cooperation in maintaining complete discretion*

State 112886 (to Amembassy Rome)^ s/]^Todis

5 January I96T "Eyes Only for .Ambassador

"1* Ambassador should see Pope Paul coonestj Since Poles^ and according to their report Hanoij have stressed vital need for complete secrecy^ USG is deeply conscious of need to maintain rigid security this matter. However^ in view of importance these discussions and their possible bearing on other initiatives to which His Holiness is a partyJ ve now believe it essential that His Holiness receive full and accurate account."

* *

"7* At this stage^ the US had taken two Important steps. It had put forvrard the possibility of a two-phase handling of the bombing question^ together with the possibility of discussing in one setting the whole range of issues including the future situation within South Vietnam. MoreoverJ the USG had agreed to affirm the statement of its position to Hanoi^ subject only to the obvious necessity of interpretation while Hanoi itself had indicated only^ as reported to usJ that it was prepared to listen to such an affirmation. The USG- at this point had not — and still has not — received any statement of

Hanoi's own views. Moreover^ the message conveyed by Lewandco-rski contained no mention of any prior condition other than secrecy^ for the direct contact in Warsaw that was proposed.^'

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T

* • «

"Ik* On December 22j Gronouski again saw Rapacki to convey a new proposal on l:ehalf of the USG. Ttls vas tliat the USG was prepared to undertake that there would he no hombing within ten miles of the center of Hanoi for an indefinite period^ if talk^ with the llorth Vietnamese could begin shoarfcly; in the original proposal of December 22^ this ^ras linived with evidence of good faith in the form of action on the other side with respect to incidents near Saigon, However^ when Eapacki demiirred to the proposed linkage and asked reconsideration^ Gronouski was authorised en December 2^^- to state that the US had now given firm orders not to bomb within ten miles of the center of Hanoi for an Indefinite period. !Ehis revised US proposal stated the understanding thatj on the basis of what Bapacki had told us J direct talks could now begin shortly, ^e message also noted thatj in judging the good faith of the other side^ we would be 'impressed* hj similar restraint^ for ezaaiple^ with respect to incidents^ movement of forces (itself a violation of the Geneva Accords) in the D^E^ or action with respect to infiltration; it was stressed that there were examples^ and the phrasing made clear that these were not preconditions, Hapacki indicated that he would convey this message promptly to Hanoi.

"15- On December 30 Hapacki reported to Gronouski that Hanoi had given a negative response and was flatly not prepared for talks in Warsaw,"

"Suiamary of Key Points

• *«

"6, Most basically of ell^ the US rejuains entirely prepared for secret bilateral contacts with Eanoi. Even though Rapacki has stated that he considers the channel nc^^ dead^ the US order of December 2k remains in force and will so remain for the present. ¥e have in fact reviewed this whole matter carefully ^rith Soviet representatives j pointing out our difficulty in understanding Polish actions at several points. Moreoverj we have in mind the continued possibility of constructive action by the Secretary' General, For all these reasons^ and in the light of our basic view that any disclosure of this whole series of discussions could affect Hanoi ^s willin^q; ness to participate^ we have maintained the tightest security on the whole project,; will continue to do so^ and must ask you in the strongest terms to act in same manner.

o

n

• • o •

misK

01

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i\h

i>

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January 6, 1967

Saigon is instructed to tell Ky a little more about Iferigoldj interpreting it priinarily as a DEV peace offensive designed to get the bombing stopped and reassuring Ky about our resolution.

Rome is to tell Fanfani that we etill hope to open contact with the DRV and it is, therefore, iiLit)erative to maintain the strictest secujTity concerning what has happened in the past.

In Warsaw J the Poles tell Gronouski that the December 13-1^+ attacks typed the scale in favor of DEV Presidium members who felt that talking with the USG made little sense. Only a complete cessation would restore the necessary level of confidence. On the other hand^ if we stopped bombing it should be possible to get negotiatioxis going over Phase B in 3-^ weeks. Gronouski urges the Poles to try again^ proposing Instead a Phase B agreement between the two sides before the bombing cessation and the opening of talks*

State replies by instructing Gronouski to avoid further initiatives for the tiaie belnp:.

State 114277 (to Amembassy Saigon)^ TS/Nodis

6 January I967 EYES OLILY FOR PORTm MD HABIE

TT-i

-..Canadians on January 2 gave us report they

had obtained from U Ihant on December 28^ and whidi U Ihant had received from Poles on December 23j

...»

"2. to seek to minimize leak riskj decision

was taken to inform Pope^ SYG^ Canadians^ and also British ''

''5< Cur conclusion is that time has come when it is wise to convey word to Ky that would mitigate anj'- MAEIGOID disclosure or any stories based on Indian or Salisbury matters. Moreover^ Salisbury speculation gives us good cover for making statement

to Ky now.

I.

'^6. Accordingly J you should see Ky if possible ^ and Tran Van do as well^ to say that GVJJ may be noting wave of speculation on DRV willingness to talk. USG has been receiving a number of third countx^- messages sometimes based on conversations with DRV representativeSj

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from "whicli third nations are on occasion drawing conclusions ve do not "believe warranted. Ve ourselves are inclined to believe that DEVj as Salis-, hury visit alone shows^ has become nuch more sophisticated in building up world opinion against the bombing. They may well be engagedj with help fxan. U Thantj Soviets^ and others^ in a determined effort to get us to stop the bombing or cut it back in return for hints of DEV willingness to talk. Moreover J DKV may be probing for any change in our position, GVN may be assured that ve have no intention cf changing our well-known position on conditions for the cessation of bombingj or yielding to pressures on any eleiaent of our position. As i\mbassador Lodge told Ky last July (Saigon 642 of July 10) we will of couxse be following up any nimors^ ho^^ever unlikelyj that might indicate Hanoi was really seeking a way out. If anything of real substance or importance happens ^ we will of course be in touch with GW at once "

EUSK

State 11^+278 (to Amembassy Eome)^ TS/?]odis

6 January 19 6T Kef: State 112886

"1 You should emphasise to Fanfanl that

although ^^^arsaw phase of exercise appears to have come to tei'iporary conclusion we still mean to continue in whatever manner feasible to proiiiote initiation of substantive discussions with North Vietnamese. Therefore it continued to be of prime importance that strictest security be maintained conceriilng what has occurred in past.'^

«.. *

EUSK

Warsaw l6k6 (to SecState)^ TS/l^fodis

6 January I967 Section 1 of 2

w «

"4. Michalowski opened his reply hj observing that at one point in my discussions vith Eapacki I

ti?

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hatS e^ressed the hope that someone vas putting as much pressure on Hanoi as Poles were placing on us to get negotiations started. He said with some feeling that he could assure ne that Poles put hea^/y pressure on Hanoi and in fact put prestige of GOP on line in getting Hanoi to agree at outset to idea of having talks in Warsav. He added that he personally knev how much pressure was brought to "bear because he was engaged in exercising some of it. He went on to say that leadership in Hanoi is by no means a monolithic group and that from the beginning^ when Poles got agreement from Hanoi to initiate talks in Warsaw^ it was a Tery close decision vith many of the Hanoi leadership strongly opposed. He said they obtained such agreement after exerting strong pressure and putting Polan^i's prestige on the line; but it was a delicate matter in Hanoij implying that agreement vras by a narrow margin anxong the leadership. He said at this point the Poles had been able to convince Hanoi to have at least a small degree of confidence in intentions of U.S. He added that bombing of Dec 3 had given a \reapon to those in Hanoi who had not wanted to agree to negotiations in first place. He said it was for this reason that Poles had repeatedly conveyed to Lodge and me their fear of negative effects of a repetition of Dec 3 bombing. But he said even after Dec 3 when bombing was explained by Lodge as no new departure but smply something in the military pipeline, Poles were able to prevail in Hanoi to keep possibility of talks open^ and 'believe me we talted to them several times a day to keep pressure on them and convince them*' But he said bambing of Dec 13-14 'undercut our whole argument^ destroyed that little bit of confidence that exist;ed in Hanoi about intentions of U.S.J and left us wide ox^^en to charges of being com^ pletely naive,' He said with bcaabing of Dec 13-lij-those who had initially been skeptical about negotiations were gi^^en a powerful tool to support their case and in fact prevailed. He added that even with Dec 3 bonbing, if we had been able to interval between Dec 3 and I3 to come in with the message we did cane in with on the 2Hhj that part of leadership in Hanoi which wanted negotiations vould have prevailed and he is confident that talks would have happened. But he said by Dec 2k a whole new condition existed; *Ve were accused of being naive and had lost our effectiveness and those who on Dec 3 had been able to control situation and m.ove toward negotiations were 'bj this time discredited.' Hius he said situation by Dec 2U in Hanoi had so changed that it was

Sh

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in

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impossilDle to go back to Dec 1 or the Post-Dec 3 period M'ow lie said he feels that only stopping ETOT baabing completely -w^ill restore influence of those who are interested in negotiations* He said if bombing stopped Poles would be willing to tzy for a third time and that he is guite confident that three or four weeks thereafter negotiations between U,S> and Hanoi on Phas e_ B could become a reality^ He said^ ^short of thiSj I am vevy pessimistic of any effective role we coizld play^, given pressure we had exerted in ETov and Dec and the undercutting of our position in Hanoi by events of Dec 13"1)+,' He vent on to say that he will never under^ stand how this could possibly have happened but 'this is past history^ I guess»'"

GHOMUSKI

Warsaw l6h6 to State Section 2

"Conversation between Michalowski and Grcnousfci,

^'Michalowski said that the situation had now entirely changed. Hie Poles^ he said^ had been able to convince Hanoi to go on with the possibility of con-tact after the December 3rd U.S. bombings^ but that the bonbings of December I3 and 1^ had made the future of negotiations between the DHV and the IJ,3. very bleak. He now maintained that only a coaplete cessation of U,S, bombings will restore the necessarj^ level of confidence needed to get negotiations started. He added that Hanoi's original decision to talk with the U.S. in Warsaw had heen hotly contested in the Presidium and that the bombings had now persuaded those who wanted to talk with the U.S. that there was little sense in doing so.

^Gronouski noted that this now put the parties back where they had started from. He suggested that the Poles try- to get the thing going again by proposing to the DEV an initial Phase S agreesnent prior to the meeting between the U.S. and the DRV in Mcscow. Thls^ Gronouski said^ would (1) meet Hanoi's insistence on stopping the bombing Defore talks began^ and (2) meet the U*S. desire for some sort of indication that talks would occur in order to stop the bombing.

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State 11^^370 (to Amam"bassy Warsaw)^ TS/Koais

6 January I967 Hef: Warsaw's l6i^

"1. In viev of complex of developments relating to Vlet-IIam problem we would like you to avoid for the present any further initiatives along lines section 2 reftel,"

*- •«*

"3 It has he en our conception that ..

Hanoi's actions under Phase B vould he expected to he generally equivalent to our actions in Phase B plus repeat plus our cessation of homhing of Forth

Viet-I^Tam,"

*»•

HJSK

Jan u,ary 9-10. I96 7

Saigon and Ronie carry out their instructions to hrief the GW^ the Pope and Fanfani, The results reported are satisfactory.

In Washington J ve learn that Brown is still very hurt. Btmdy points out how complex the matter is and explains the necessity for

the US to mana.^e its own role.

Saigon I5POI; (to SecState)^ T8/Nodis

9 January I967 Eef: State 11^^277

**1, I sent Hahib to see Tran Van do to convey substance paragraph 6 reftel. This was done, rather than a direct approach to Prime Minister^ to keep our dialog^ae with Gv^i in appropriate low key**..

''2 He was pleased to note our assurance

that we have no intention of changing our position on cessation of bombing.._." •

PORTER

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Some 3531 (to SecState)^ S/TTodis 9 January I967

-#■''•

"2. [The Pope reiterated his deep appreciation

of being infoimed He told me that he had publicly

encouraged the Vilson-Broi^n initiative because they had officially informed him of it. Ke had been unable to do the same i^ith respect to U Thant's efforts because he had not been officially adv^ised of them. He had however sent a private message to the Secretary General to avoid any feeling on his pa3rt that the Pope was shovinf^ preferences vith respect to various initiatives for peace."

n m m

EEIMAEDT

Rome 3571 (to SecState)^ TS/Hodis

10 Januaiy I967 Eef: State 111^278

"1- I saw Fanfani last night Jan 9 ^^^ carried out lnstru.ctions in reftel. Ee told me that shortly after the It'ew Year^ Polish Ambassador had informed him of the interr^uption of the procedural ta2ks In Warsaw an(3 had said that it was impossible to expect Jlorth Vietnamese to enter into discussions with the US as long as the bombing of ITorth Vietnam continued Fanfani said he had taken strong exception to this statement and had pointed out that US proposal envisaged terminatioa of bombing and that Poles had known this all alonR,../'

• a « •

RSBIHARDT

State 118905 (to Ansaibassy Ioiidoa)j S/Jiodls

10 January loBj LITERAiLY FjfES OtILY FOR At^BASSADOB FKO!^ SECSETMY

• #

^'2. Sean said Broviia still very hurt over our failure to tell him we were conveying n^w tvro-stage

97

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proposal on stopping "bombing through Lewandcvski channel at same time that Brovn was going to Moscow with it. Brown did not wish to raise direct wioh mOj hence Bundy.

'*3* Bandy made following points in reply^ which we now assume will go direct to Brown and also to PM:

a. We gave proposal to Lewaudowski on IS^h or iHh and to Brown on l6th,.*,

b. ,. *we felt that we should honor Polish Insistence that 1 channel be kept totally secui^e^-...

c. Brown message was the clear and solid one we were sure would get through • !foreoverj Brown was armed in the rest of our letter to discuss the underlying principles in depth^ as L was not* Brown could have a real exchange of views on the basis of total knowledge of our position.

d. In response to Dean remark that Soviets must have known of message to L^ and that this perhaps accounted for cross-examination of Brown*s authority to talk for uSj Bundy said that we did not see how Brown's opportunity could have been prejudiced by this even if true..,we had always regarded Soviets as much more serious and responsible^ and Grcmyko in October had responded to Secretary's question which Eastern l^JLropeans were closest to Hanoi by saying pointedly: 'We are *'

^^h Speaking on private basis^ Bandy added

that we recognized absolute obligation never to put British in false position and hence to provide them with all infortiiation they needed for any contacts they had. This applied to forthcoming Kosygin visit. At same time^ we were playing a multiple chess game and could not be expected to cut the British in on all boards at all times.,.*.,

"5- Bundy then.,.reminded Dean of account Secretary had given Friday night of cur ccnTidential readout from Salisbury J in which Pham Van Dong's unpublished parts of interview had spoken of Hanoi taking 'an appropriate stand' and also said 'we kriow what we should do' if US stopped bombing; Secretaiy had told Dean this was same formula used last summer to Sainteny and that^ since Pham Van Dong resolutely refused to elaborate^ it

98

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^^iT.

,i'

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was at most atmospherics and did not get us mucli further Since Friday night report to Deanj there had been follow^

ing developments;

a. Baggs-Ashmore team had come out of fianoi and voula be giving us their report this veek .

b, Sainteny had made strong pitch to go to Hanoi to pursue what would happen if bombing stopped and to get general reading. We were taking him up on this and would be arming him with the two-phase proposal

t m

c. Thompson would be talking Vietnam seriously in TfoscoWj probably this week "

"7- In light of all this^ I am seeking authority for you to see Wilson soonestj perhaps Monday *^

• * •

"11. For yoxor call en Wilson-, you shotild know that he has sent two-sentence message to Pi*esident speaking of his talk with you on matter seriously affecting our relationships.,*."

EQSK

January l3j I 967

Brown has forgiven us.

London 5692 (to SecState), TS/i^odis IS January I96T

FOR SEGRESffiX MIOM COOPER

• B •

"2, All is well. Fc apologies from me. from Brown, Ifo whining from ?M ^'

Ho abuse

BRUCE

January/- 19j I96T

^ I » l I ^»| l »^Ff -■

Salisbury's interview with Fham Van Dong produces a number of apparently forthcoming statements couched in very general language.

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¥e surmise they are essentially mood music^ accompanying a strong attempt to get us to stop bccibing without reciprocity. Gronouski is to tell the Poles ^ if they raise the subject^ that there must be reciprocal actions.

State 121586 (to Amembassy Warsaw)j S/lIodis 19 January I967

.«

"3. Ve have also received an extensive account from Harrison Salisbury of his ob:^ervation.'=5 in H8.noi^ highlighted by Hiam Van Dong*s response to Salisbury"^s question as to what actions Hanoi would take if the US stopped bombing J natnely *we will talce an appropriate stand.' He also said; (l) if the US 'stops doing harm to the North^ we know what we should do'; (2) the moment the ^US puts an end to the war^ we will respect each other and settle every guesticn'; and (3) after the cessation of hostilities^ there will be 'no lack of generosity on our pai-t.^ Our net judgment is that these statements are interesting mood music but do not get us very far, The first two statements are replays of earlier statements to other sources. The latter two appear to be without substance.

"l^'. At the same timej while ve are treating these reports seriously for action purposes^ we believe we may be dealing with a strong atteiapt hj Hanoi^ perhaps aided consciously by the Poles and in any case sympathized with by the Indians ^ to get us to stop bombing fully without anj.^ reciprocal action e:<cep" possibly some claimed willingness to talk..,.

>4-

"5* •.^if the Poles raise the subject^ you leave them in no doubt whatever that any stopping of the bombing on our part requires a clear picture of reciprocal actions repeat actions that amount to an equitable

*

reduction of hostilities/' HUSK

tTanuary 19, I967

Estabrook of the Washington Post files a story fram Ottawa which

apparently alludes to l^Iaxigold: "Canadian authorities blame some of

the difficulty (in beginning US-^DEV talks) on the accidental US

bombings of Hanoi in mid-December. Private soundings then under.;ay

were disrupted^ they say^ and the attitude in JTorth Vietnam apoeared to harden...."

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Paris Heraia Tribune ^ 20 January I967 Estabrook - "Ottava Sees Hanoi Eeady to Ease ¥ar" -Ottava^ Jan I9

^^Some high Canadian officials believe that ITorth Vietnam is now prepared to de-escalate the war in the south if the U.S. halts bombing in the North. Ihis is essentially what United Hatioas Secretary General U Ihant and others have been saying for some time-j but there are two important distinctions: firsts Canada has a representative on the ICC who regijilarly visits Hanoi and talks directly with authorities there; second^ Canada is a close friend and ally and does not want to see the U.S. disadvantaged. The key unresolved question authorities here assert is how soon af'cer a bombing halt a reciprocal move 'by NVN would take place. This move could be an end to the infiltration of the southJ where U,S, sources say there are 20 identified North Vietnamese regiments j but It probably could not be expected immediately* These cor3elusions persist despite the fact that feelers for peace discussions haive.. produced nothing tangible so far and are in abeyance at the moment. Canadian authorities blame some of the difficulty on the accidental U»S. bombings of Hanoi in mid-December. Private soundings then underway were disrupted they say and the attitude in North Vietnam appeared to harden. Fov they cannot be sure whether Iforth Vietnam wants to talk seriously because of the propaganda success it has enjoyed through world protests at the bombing. Nevertheless^ they would take the change dn the ground that discussions J once started^ and even with North Vietnam's unacceptable li-points as part of the agendaJ would inevitably broaden. They do not believe that Hanoi has really retracted its offer to make the i|-points a basis for discussion rather than a mandatoiy outline for settlement. Although they believe that the U.S. must be a bit more flexible^ they do not believe that a bcombing halt must be unconditional* They view as a distinct advance the U.S* offer to halt the bombing upon some signj public or private^ that the other side would be willing to mak^ some comparable move, 'If 1 were the Px^esident^* said one higji Canadian official J *I would simply announce that the bombing had been stopped with no reference to conditions. If nothing developed over a period or if JMJ took advantage of the situation the Ijomblng of military' targets could always be resi^med and the world would know that the U.S. had tried»' Canada's ovm confidential initia-cives on VN have

Declassified pei Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NTsTD 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

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been centered in the ICC in which it shares responsi-bility vith Poland and Tn^ia, The Canadian Bepre-sentativej Victor ViDore^ has just been siomaoned home after a 10-day visit to Hanoi aryl will be replaced by Norman Dier. Simultaneously^ Canada is pressing Poland to agi'ee to a meeting of the ICC powers at an ^bassadorial level in the hope that this will lead to a meeting of foreign ministers. Poland last week rejected an Indian suggestion for a con-ference in New Delhi."

Janu ary 20-21, I967

I I ■ ' - -- - rf' ii 11 1 ^ „ i II ' 11

Saigon continues to check on VC incidents in Saigon-Gia Dinh area There uiay be some ditEinution. Permission is reqiiested^ therefore^ to inform ¥estmoreland about Marigold so that he may participate more effectively in the incident watch.

State doubts that there has been a real VC slowdown and does not wish to enlarge the circle priv^- to details of Marigold.

Saigon l6ll^.i^ (to SecState), TS/llcdis

20 Januaiy I96T

Ref \ Saigon 1^4-89^1-

"1. A continuing check on VC incidents in the Saigon-Gia Dinh area raises question of whether there is not some d iminution in number of incidents initia-ted by YC since Januaiy k. This report is a seguel to that given reftel. (underlining supplied)

''2. As best we can detexmine there have been five incidents of this sort from January k to 20 as follows:

A- January k; Chclon; Body of Policeman found. Presumed to have been victim of terrorist act.

E, January 5; Go Vap (5 ^ from Saigon); Two U.S. soldiers injured when terrorists tossed grenadri into their jeep-

C. January 6; Thu Due (ll km from Saigon); Two APAli soldiers injured when their steamroller exploded a mine,

D. January I3; Thu Due (11 ion from Saigon); National Police apprehended two VC in terrorist

iit'&^^S>t s..3glnst equipment. Inc. facility. One VC BbCcL^Feaj o^ner captui'ea. ^ "^

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^^■^^■■^^^

^, »:

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E. January l8; Eastern Gia Dinh Province (l6 km nortlieast of Saigon); Vietcong platoon attacked three bridge sites^ slightly damaged one. Fo^or friendly -wounded.

"3- ^e question nov arises 'whether we are seeing a VC pause in the area ten miles around Saigon as a response to our own action in the Hanoi area. So far the answer on the surface "would appear to be negative J but the number of incidents is small recently and some of them may not be properly counted as either VG initiated or within the t^n. mile limit j e.g.J items A and E in Paragraph 2-

^%. General Westmoreland is not aware of the Marigold Er-^ercise* He ISj therefore^ not avrare of any connection between the Hanoi bomb-free area and our search for an equivalent VC pause in Saigon area. I "vTould like to be able to tell him that we have made such a proposal to Hanoi^ without revealing the ^fe,rigold conte:d:.. I tliink we will be able to analyze VG actions in the Saigon area better with his help andJ more significantly^ we might possibly be able to use the knowledge to our oi/n military advantage/'

LODGE

State 123198 (to Amembassy Saigon)^ S/lIodis

21 January I967 Ref; Saigon I60I7 and l6li;4

"1, Keur iSll^-Uj our impression is that recent action not far from Tan Son Ilhut may have cancelled out yoiir iiapression that there may be a real slowdovrn of any sort on other side* Moreover^ ve wculd prefer not to enlarge circle privy to details in this series, Can you not create a special quiet watch on incident rate within designated radius of Saigon on general basis without informing: Westmoreland? "

• •

EUSK

Januarj^ 23^ ^967

In Moscow^ Podgorny says that mediation ^rj the USSR would be fruit, less until the bombing stopped. With respect to Tliompson's question

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about what the BRV or USSR vould do if we did stop bombing^ Podgorr^ suggests we stop and see. Eiompson draws attention to the agreements about Laos^ which were not kept by the other side.

Moscow 3159 (to SecState)j S/Nodis 23 January I967

• * *

"h Podgornj^ then asked whether end to

Vietnam war was in sight.

''5. I replied we all very much hoped war would end soon and also hoped USSR could help us in bringing this about,... Podgorny said it was difficult e:<pect something new and stressed that since main parties to conflict were US and Viet^ n^m one could hardly count on mediation. He then said he did not exclude possibility of Vietnam taking csx'tain steps but pointed out pre-condition for that irould be at least minim^am move by US^ such as. initially^ cessation of bombings* Since no such move evident^ hardly anyone could mediate.

I I rir

D. I said.... It would be helpful if we knew at least when a response could be expected. Alsoj as Secretary had said to Dobiyniaj it would be interesting to know what USSR would do if we stopped boanbings and other side continued its activities.

"7- Podgorny asserted US had always placed conditions on cessation of bombings. US had said it would stop bombings if other aide gave certain guarantees...,

"8 As to reference to guarantees if we

stepped bombing J we did not ask for guarantees but only for indication as to what would happen in response. For reason I mentioned earlier^ this important to us, Podgorny interjected -we could stop banbings and then we would see. 1 continued that in considering situation ve had also to keep in mind fact that despite agreements which had been reached on Ia:oSj leotian territoiT li^^ been used hy Horth Vietnam to infiltrate south

. > *.

THOMPSON

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January 27j 196?

Fried J the IJI Daily Jlevs correspondent^ tells Lodge in Saigon that he knows of Gronouski^s contact vith the Poles in Warsaw,

Saigon 16677 (to SecState)j TS/Nodis 27 January I967

''Joseph Fried J Viet-KTaia correspondent of the New York Daily Nevs^ told me on Friday that he Umav* that A^iba.ssador Gronouski and the Polish Government had been having conversations about settling the war in Viet-]}Iam."

LODGE

January 29, I967

J "-^^1

Saigon continues to feel that VG incidents in the Saigon-Gia Dinh area may have abated.

Saigon I6785 (to SecState)^ S/Nodis

29 Januaiy I967 Eef: A. Saigon l6li^^ B, State 123193

"1, This is another in the series of reports ■we have been providing on VC initiated incidents within ten miles of Saigon. We shall send these reports each week.

'^2- For the period January 21-27 within the zone there were fo^jr incidents that can be characterized as VC initiated:

A. January 22j four miles west of Saigon^ an unkno^-m number of enemy fired two rifle grenades at police station^ wounded 2 W civilians.

B. January 23j Gia Diuh City^ unknown person threw grenade at house, no casualties,

V

C. January 23j 9 miles west of Saigonj booby trap J 2 VJT killed and two wounded,

D. January 24 ^ Saigon ^ unknown per^^on threw grenade J wounded three W civilians.

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"3. In addition to these incidents^ there vere t'wo others in the area resulting from VIJ police and AEVIj rtiakijig a sveep and running on to VC* QIaese do not meet the criteria cf being VC initiated.

^%, With respect to the action not f!ar from Tan Son Mint on January 20 (cited para one ref B)^ we have looked into this. The record of the action shovs that elements of two AEvlT hattalions on a search and destroy mission encountered a VC force nine miles vest northvrest of Saigon, The ensuing fight st.^:iiiaied from that contact. There is no infor-iiiai:ion. as to "^Jhether VC was on the way to Tan Son Whutj or any other special target. ITo available information as to vhich side fired first shot. A2M ■units J however J were definitely on the prowl. From interrogation prisoners taken day later VC force was sixth battalion from VC I65 Regiment which is regularly present on fringes Gia Dinh Province,

^'5* ^e have also examined the record of VC initiated incidents during the area for the m.onth of K'overaber I966. During that period thex^e were 11 incidents J ranging frcm the shelling of Saigon on Koveraber 1^ National Day^ to platoon and S(^uad attacks to isolated grenadings. Of the 11 incidents, seven can be characterised as serious in the sense that they were obviously well-planned attacks l:^j small VC units, ^'

LODGE

A

I

February 1-2, I967

Estabrook files a more complete stor^^ on T^ferigold from IJIew York. In privateJ he gives different versions of the story's source• He apparently first got word of the matter from the Canadians in Ottawa and later confirmed it with U Thant. In one conversation he indicates that he also "had it from a high Polish so^urcs.,- corroborated by * other Eastern E'jiropean sources,^" In another ^ he denies that it "came from the Poles." Goldberg believes the Poles to be the original source of the story and recommends that neither they nor ar^y other Bloc countrj'" be used as a channel to Hanoi*

USUIT 3SI17 (to SecState)^ S/iJodiSj 2 February I967

"Estabrook (Wash Post Correspondent) told

Nisoff Feb 2 that his story,in Feb 2 Post about Hanoi readiness to talk jus-& prior to Sec I3

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boinbing of Hanoi vas founded on several sources. He had it from high Polish Gource vhich he vould not identify. It was corroborated by 'other Eastern European sources.' He had been given similar impression earlier in Jan from Can ForJ^Iin Martin. He had taken story to U Thant i^ho stated his believ that it was correct."

9 •

''(Trt separate brief conversation with Pedersen Estabrook denied story came from Poles. Said it came from Martin^ while Estabrook was in Canada^ and then from U Thant. Estabrook said he had had story for couple of weeks. In response expression of surprise he had used word 'learned' instesi-d of something like ^alleged'J Estabrook indicated this based on evaluations both of Martin and U Thant.)"

•.

"^"'ty assessment is that the original source of this story is the Poles themselves- They have ci_uietly been spreading this story throughout the UK; I even got some of it from the Danish Deputy Fon Min the other day^ who attributed it to roles."

•«•

tt

• * •

This leads me to reconiTLendation that we siioixld no longer use Poland or any other Bloc country as channel to Hanoi, It vcuJ.d be far preferable in my opinion to deal directly or through Sovs than to continue vlth this type of intermediary/'

GOLDBERG

is

State 131^2 (to Jkaembassy \Ja,Tsa\r)y C/Nodi

k Pebruaiy 1967 Ref; Warsaw I695

"Test of February k V/ashington Post story by Estabrook will reach you in form clrctel. Text of February 2 stozy filed from New York ^under FebI^7ary 1 dateline follows:

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BEGDI TEXT:

"A Polish initiative to establish peace discussions between north Vietnam and the United States failed because of American bombing of the Hanoi area in mid-DecemberJ it has been learned on excellent authority,

'Exactly hov far the Poles had succeeded in obtaining CDmraitments from Hanoi is not clear^ but high-level outr.iders ^jho knev7 about it regarded the initiative *as promising before the bombing hardened Hanoi's attitude. QUOTE The Americans bungled it mD QUOTE^ one informed source stated.

'.S. officials said that any bombing of non-military targets was accidental^ af-cer Western reporters observed damage to civilian areas that the North Vietnamese claimed vas caused by U.S. bombing. Since December_, U.S. planes have reportedly been ordered to stay away from the Eanoi area unless engaged in self-defense.

"At the momenis the Poles are said to have suspended their efforts. Tliey are represented as extremely frustrated^, not merely over the effect of the bombing J but more particularly vith the uncooperative attitude of JIanoi.

"Recently Poland declined a suggestion of India that representatives of the three countries constituting the Intermtioixal Control Commission in Vietnam - Poland^ India and Canada - meet in New Delhi to consider vhat could be done* Use of the Commission framework to promote peace discussions is an old suggestion of Can-adian External Affairs Mnister Paul Martin.

"I?ven after the attitude in lianoi changed in the wake of the bombing^ the Poles kept tiylng. Among other moves a top Polish diplomat^ Jer^y Michalowskij made an urureported visit to the United States in January.

"X'/hether any American representative saw him cannot be learned^ but two Canadian diplomats were sent to talk with him.

108

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"Michalowskij a foimer delegate to the United TTatloris and more recently in the Polish Foreign OfficeJ went on a special Mission to Hanoi in Januar^^ 19^6^ as the resxilt of the visit to Warsaw of roving U.S. Ambassador W, Averell Harrinian*

"Apparently the Polish effort stemmed in part from a conversation between Foreign Minister Adam Eapacki and Martin vhen the Canadian Foreign Minister visited fersav last December.

"All this has transpired outside the United Nations, Although he has been given a mandate by the United States to do what he can to facilitate peace discussions^ Secretary General U Thant is said by others to feel that nothing more can be accomplished at the moment,

"Diplomats from 11 non-aligned coup„tries have met here three times within the last 10 days to discuss whether they can undertake any initiative to ad^^ance a solution. As a resultj Sudanese delegate Fal^hreddime Mohamed was designated to call on Thant to inquire whether a new initiative would be useful. He reportedly received no encouragement. END T2KT."

RUSK

February 3. I96T

At his press conferencej the President says it would not be helpful "to comment on any particular channel or communications at this point." Referring to Hanoi's attitude, he adds, ^'I must say that I da not interpret any action that 1 have observed as being a serious effort to either go to a conference table or to bring the war to an end."

Hew York Times, 3 February I967

Transcript of the President's ])Tews Conference

"FolloTring is a transcript of President Johnson's news conference in Washington yesterday as recorded by The New York Times:

. ■

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''1- Prospects in Vietnam

Q, ¥e've *been reading and writing a good deal lately about diplomacy aamed at a Yietriam settlement, I vender if you could give us your assessment of the peace front at this tiiae.

A. !4r. (Frank) Cormier of the Associated Press states a question that I knoir is on the minds of all the people here today and all the people in this country. As you knoVj I have underlined over and over again the very deep interest of the United States in a prompt and peaceful settlement of all of the problems in Southeast Asia.

I have said many times that ve are ready to go more than half way in achieving this result. I would remind all of you that we v/ould velcome a conference in Southeast Asia and this might be a Geneva conferencej it could be an all-Asian conferencej or any other generally acceptable forum.

¥e vould be glad to see the unconditional discussions to which I referred in my statement of A.pril^ 19^5; at Johns Hopkins. We would participate in preliminary discussions which might open the way for forsial negotiations* \le are prepared today to talk about mutioal steps of de-escalation* Me would be prepared to talk about such subjects as the exchange of prisoners^ the demilitarization or the demilitarized zone or any other aspect which might take even a small step in the direction of peace.

We should be prepared to discuss any points which the other side wishes to bring up along with points which we and our allies very much want to raise ourselves^ or there couJd be preliminary discussions to see whether there could be an agreed set of points which could be the basis for negotiant ion.

So it is against this background that we study veiy carefully all of the public statements made which appear from time to time and which bear upon Southeast Asia and all the views which we receive from or through other governments.

It would not be helpful to me -- and I do not intend to do so -- to comment on an^^ particular cliannel or communications a*t: this point. But you may

be sure that we are diligent in our search for the )

possibility of a peaceful settlement.

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In all candor I must say that I am not avare of any serious effort that the other side has made in

my Judgment to hring the fighting to a stop and to stop the var."

"2. Personal Role in Tall^

Q< You've heen so eloquent in the past about expressing your desire for peaceful negotiations. I'd like^ to ask you whether or not If you thought it would speed this var dovrn the road to peace whether you vouJ-d be willing personally to participate in negctia-tion^ with scone of your opposite numbersj such as the leadership in Hanoi?

A. We have made clear that if the other side desires to discuss peace at any time well ve will be very happy to have appropriate arrangements made to see that that's carried out,

VJhere we would talk and who would talk and what we would talk about are all mattei's that could be worked out between the two governments involved,

Ve have made clear to them and to the world th& principles that we believe m.uEt govern a peace moeting of this klnd^ and a settlement that we wo^old hope would corae out of it like the honoring of the Geneva accords of ^5t and '62^ the right of self-determination of the people of South Vietziamj and to insure that they are freed from the threat or use of force.

But we have J 1 must say^ as of todayj no indication that the other side is prepared in any way to settle on these limited and decent teims. ¥e hope very much that we can have some signals in that direction^ but I^ in candor^ must say that as of now we do not have."

"3- Concessions for Peace

Q. Mr, PresidentJ does your expressed willingness to negotiate a peaceful settlement imply any willingness to compromise on any of our stated objectives in that part of tiie world?

A. I think that any peace agreement will involve understanding on both parts and certain concession on both parts and a certain understanding.

I don*t think we can determine those before we come together or through any press conference techniques • 1 can only repeat what I said in the State

F

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of the Uniorij that I wish that the conflict in Vietaaza -was over and I can only repeat vhat I^ve said so many times "- I vill do arching I can on the part of this Government to go more than halfway to hring it at an end

I must say that we face great costsj we face agony, ¥e do plan to carry out our effoi'ts out there ^ we are going to support our troops in the field^ we are going to work with our Vietnamese allies toward pacification and constitutional government^ tfut while we're doing that J every hour of every day the spokesmen for this Government are under instructions to explore every possi-bilD^ty for peace.

But I do not vant to disillusion any of you and I don*t want any of you to be caught by speculation. As of this moment I cannot report that there are any serious indications that the other side is ready to stop the war."

^%» Indications From Enemy

11.

Q, You have three times now used that phrase: "no serious efforts by the other side to bring the war to a close." Kow would you characterize what has been going on in the last couple cf weeks? Do you recognise any signs of ma,neuverability or fluidity in their position?

A. I see alinest every day some speculation by some

individual^ or some hope or desire expressed by some Government• And I assume that different individuals get different impressionsj certairily they have different hopes.

I can only 'speak for myself; John-* And with the information that I have^ with the knowledge that's brought to meJ I must say that I do not interpret any action that I have observed as being a serious effort to either go to a conference table or to bring the war to an end,"

a ■ •

"Q, Woiild you discuss the reports thi,t there has been a decline in the infiltration rate to the South and say whether you think the bombing has had any effect?

A. WellJ I stated in my Baltimore speech in early '65 vhat we expected to come from the bombing, ¥e felt that it would improve the morale of the people in South Vietnam who felt that they'd almost lost the war. We felt that it would make the North Vietnamese pay a much heavier price for what they were doing and we felt that it would make the infiltration more difficult.

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We think it has achieved all of those ei^ressed purposes, \Ie cannot speak with cold assurance on the inTiltration and the mjnibers each day or each week or each month.

In soine quarters of the year oxir indications are that they Increase. In other periods of the year — the next quarter — then they go down some. I know of nothing that I can conclude as highly significant from the guesses and the estimates that we have made.

Q, Sir J we have said in the past that we would be villing to suspend the bombing of North Vietnam in exchange for some suitable step by the other side* Are you prepared at all to tell us what kind of other steps the other side should take for this suspension of bombing?

A. Just almost any step. As far as we can see^ they haven't taken any yet and we would be glad to explore any reciprocal action that they or any of their spokesmen would care to suggest.

We have made one proposal after the other to — we'd like to have a cease-fire; we'd be very glad to stop our bombing as we have on two previous occaslonSj if we could have any indication of reciprocal act ion j but as of now they have given none and I assume they are willing to give none until I hear further,"

February Ji^ I967

In

SaigonJ the VC are reported to mortar the 7th Precinct and

carry out k grenade attacks diaring the period January 28-February 3.

Meanwhile^ Ky is distressed l>y news stories of US-DEV contacts and asks Lodge if we still require concessions in return for a bombing suspension and whether there are "divergences on such matters between Washington and Saigon• Lodge is instructed to reply by giving Ky more background on ferigoldj stressing (a) our doubts about the genuineness of the Polish contact^ (b) on the other hand oin: obligation to follow all potential leads^ and (c) the need to avoid publicity during this "extremely interesting and delicate^' phase of diplomacy. In connection with the latter J his attention is to be drawn to the "recent public comments of Presidential Advisor Walt Sostow."

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Saigon 17295 (to SecState)^ S/lfodis k February 19^7

^'Following is the record of VC initiated incidents vithin 10 miles of Saigon during the period Jan 28 to Feb 3.

A. Jan 30* Saigon-grenade superficially vounds two US servicemen.

B, Jan 30j Saigon-grenade injures one US serviceman and one VII civilian.

■I

C< Jan 31J 5 miles W of Saigon-grenade killing policeiLien and civilian^ wounding schoolteacher .

D. Feb Ij Saigon-six mortar shells fired into seventh precinct;, wounding seven VU civilians.

F, Feb 2 J Saigon-VC small arras and grenade attack on seventh precinct outnost^ one civilian killed . "

LODGE

Saigon I7317 (to SecState)^ S/E:^dis

k February I967 Eeadd: CBTCPAC (KFiOM CJCS-INCLUSIVE FOR AOM SmBF)

"1. During a call on Ky.,.•

"2, .,* he said^j 'Does Washington agree that there should be no publicity of any kind until there has been a concrete offer from the Communist side?'

"3* 1 said that I felt sure that Washington vas very much in favor of not having publicity^ since publicity not only presented awkward problems for us and for the Government of South Vietnam < but also made it difficult to get any kind of a peaceful understanding "With Hanoi. He agreed that we should avoid forcing Hanoi up against the wall by making them lose face.

"i;. It was evident that his attention had been attracted by the statements of Senator Robert Kennedy and the apparent leaks of the messages from Cairo and New Delhi to a point vhere he wanted to be sure that there were no ^divergencies' between Washington and Saigon• He asked whether we still believed that in

\2Pi

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TOP SECRET - iroD.13

exchange for a bonbing suspension ve vanted some sort of concession on their part. Did we envisage a bargaining process or vere ve to suspend bombing with no quid pro quo?

^^5* I called his attention to the President's press conference and to the fact that on three separate occasions during the press conferencej the President had said that so far there was nothing of substance from Hanoi-.,,"

«* *«

LODGE

State I3ITI5 (to Amembassy Saigon), S/!Iodis

1;- February' I96T Eef: Saigon IT3I7

• » 4

"3- Believe you should also give Ky fill-in generally.,,. For his information^ story is^ as he may imagine^ quite incomplete and misleading in a number of respects•,.* We were never sure whether the Poles were speaking for Hanoi or entirely for themselves and we concluded ultimately that the exercise had been primarily a fishing expedition by the Poles in order to get us to change our position with respect to bombing of IJIorth Viet-IIam Throughout this exercise we had not undertaken to vmke any change in our basic position. At the same time we had indicated a readiness to consider the possibility of direct talks without conditions with Horth Viet-Ham with the ob^3active of bringing about a peaceful settlement. You should add that we would naturally be in touch with the GW if there were really substantive de^/ielopments in this field.

^%. VJlth reference to Ky's query (para 2 of reftel) about Washington views on publicity^ suggest you call to his attention recent public conmients of Presidential Advisor VJalt Bostow, After referring to 'extremely interesting and delicate' phase of diplomatic probes now under way Eostow noted that publicity could destroy effectiveness of behind-the-scenes efforts to ascertain Banoi's intent and added 'this is a bad time to talk about an^- partic^olar stand which might turn out to be a negotiating situation,'"

HJSK

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Washington Post j 5 February I967

U.S. Is Wary on Eeport of Peace Bid^ oy Murrey ^^rder

"United States attempts to launch peace talks vith ETorth Vietnam are now in 'an extremely interesting and delicate phase^^ a Iftiite House adviser said yesterday.

'Vith that cot3ment and variations upon it^ the Administration declined to confirm or deny a report that the United States and North Vietnajn had tried to start peace talks in Warsaw in December^ at American initiative.

"Walt W» Rostov^ President Johnson's special assistant for national security affairs^ said;

"*I!his is an extranely Interesting and delicate phase in what is or what might turn out to he a negotiating process, Nothing has yet happened that would justify us in saying we have a serious offer to negotiate, This is a had time to discuss any particular negotiating track.'

" Lack of V igor. Postow's commeats were made during a panel debate at a conference of college newspaper editors at the Sheraton-Park Hotel, Another panelist J Richard N. Goodwinj who had served as an adviser to "both Presidents Kenndy and Johns on ^ charged there was a lack of vigor in the present pursuit of negotiations.

"'If Hanoi wishes to negotiate seriously^^ said Rostov^ 'yoi^i* government vould not be embarrassed.

It vould he delighted.^

"Rostow was questioned specifically hy the students about the validity of a report in TJie Washington Post yeste2rday^ by staff writer Robert H. Es tab rook at the United Nations.

"It reported that an authoritative Western source said that U,S. Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodgej in Saigon on Dec. 2 and 3^ asked a Polish diploinat to set up contacts with North Vietnam. On Dec* kj the report saidJ Polish Foreign ^iinister Adam Rapacki said Hanoi agreed to have ambassadorial-level talks with the United States in Warsaw, The report said that Hanoi attached no conditions about first halting the American bombing of North Vietnam.

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"Withdrew In Ar^er , According to the report Hanoi angrily vitlidrev its agreement after American bombing raids near Hanoi on Dec, 13-1^^- allegedly hit civilian areas.

"Eostov declined to get any more specific about that account except to repeat that 'this is a bad time to tallc about a pairticular strand of vhat might be a negotiation.*

^^Other soiirces sought to emphasize that the frustrated negotiating effort described in the report from the United Nations vas only one of many efforts being made to launch talks.

^^Scme Administration soui'ces said the point in ■Ihe Washington Post account that they ^ould challenge was that Hanoi had 'agreed* to the Warsaw talks, JTo official^ howeverJ would discuss whether this question of agreement was a matter of differing interpretations or not. 5^.ere was no challenge by any official of the reported Lodge-initiative to arrange for talks in Varsaw.

"The State Department ^ in coBimenting Friday on

earlier and considerably less-detailed versions of a

similar report 1::^ The Washington Post and others said

it saw 'no merit' to contentions that the bombing of

North Vietnam interfered with efforts to start peace talks.

said;

"m a new comment yesterday the State Department

"'As a matter of policy we do not believe it would promote the cause of peace in Vietnam to comment on accoiints of an^- alleged private talks or events relating to them. The President fully characterized the situation at his press conference last Ilhursday.*

"At that press conferencej President Johnson repeatedly said that 'I do not interpret any action that I have observed as being a serious effort to either go to a conference table or to bring the war to an end,' The Unitecl States^ he said^ was anxious 'to explore any reciprocal action' to curb or end the war.

"That commentJ Administration sources said^ amounted to turning do^m^ as inadequate^ a bid by North Vietnam's Foreign mnister in which he said there 'could' be talks

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if there was an Uinconditiona.!' end to the "bcEibings of his coiontiy.

'^Administration officials emphasized that the offer only held out the possibility^ not the proraisej of talks^ in any event,

"The Soviet news agency^ Tass, charged yesterday that President Johnson had spurned the 'good"yfill* gesture by North Vietnamese Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh. Ikss said the minister had displayed an 'indication of willingness' by the Hanoi regime to talk with the United States-

■

"!Dae Soviet news agency added:

"*Bie unwillingness of U.S. ruling circles to stop the critninal bombing of the D.R.V. (North yietr.am) can only be regarded as a refusal to ineet around the conference table^ and as a sign of their deteimination to further escalate the aggressive war in Vietnam.'

"Tass's correspondent in Hanoi said President Johnson's statements pi^oduced ^legitimate indignation' in Hanoi,'"

February 6-Tj I96T

Australia and ITew Zealand are briefed on I&rigold in seme detail. More general acco^^nts are given to the GVhJ and the I^nila countries.

Ky accepts our explanation in good spirit^ but points to alaim about so-called ^^peace" talk among Catholic leaders^ certain Buddhists and the military in SVM, His and Thleu's strong anti-coTmnunisni would be reassuring to these elements^ he believe;

3,

State I323W (to Amembassy Canberra; i^embassy Wellington),

TS/NodiSj 6 February I96T Ref: DEPCmTEL I3170O EVES OKLY FOR AlfflASSADOR

"1. On February k Bundy separately gave Ambassador Waller and Charge d^Affaires Shepherd a full account of the discussions between USG and Poles about the possibility of direct discussions betvreen USG and Hanoi...."

....

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"27 I^Tille ve may have erred in not informirii

you fully on this matterj we vere guided throughout by the absolute necessity of secrecy in seeking to determine whether Hanoi was in fact prepared to sit do"v/n quietly without preccaditions.»..

"28. Ihis full account is being given to Australia and New Zealand^ with the request for the jpreservation of total confidence. A more general account Is being given to Saigon and to the Manila countries. We have assured Saigon^ as we have repeatedly assured you^ that if we should get clear evidence of a serious change in Ifenoi^s position we would keep them fully informed."

RUSK

Saigon 17l|8£ (to SecState)^ S/Kodis

T Februaiy 1967 Kef: State I3ITI5

"1* Pursuant to your I31715J I called on Prime Minister Ky ^esday morning,,,•"

«■ ■

"3» Ky seemed to accept all of the above in good spirit. He evidently thinks that the purpose of the rather careful wording is to make it possible to achieve scMe kind of understanding irithout making Kknoi lose face* In all my many talks with himj he has often voiced his belief that ve should be trying to persuade Hanoi and make it easy for them to go along with uSj and that we did not want to humiliate thenij make them lose face J put them up against the wall-

"U. Changing the subject slightly^ he then said that Catholic leaders in Viet-BIam were becoming alarmed by the so-called fpeace^ talk which they feared would actually mean military advantage for Kanoi^ and were taking an attitude very different fran that of the Pope. He was afraid that similar divisions laight occur among Buddhists and among the military. The hopeful element of the situation was that 'everyone knew^ how strongly anti-Communist he^ Kj, and Ihieu were."

LODGE

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l^-t

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F ebruary- 78 ^ 19 6?

Wilson comments in Parliament about discussion ^ith the Poles and a definite ^^peace feeler^^ last December. Highest levels in Washington fear this may undercut the President's Februaiy 3 remarks.

Gronouski takes issue ^fith Goldberg^ arguing that the Canadians vera probably Estabrook's source and that the Poles remain a better channel for communication with I^noi-

State 133105 (to Amembassy London)j S/lIodis 8 Februaiy I967

FOE AMBASSADOR AIE) COOPER

"1* Highest levels are deeply disturbed by Wilson reference to December discussions with Poles in Parliamentary response yesterday. Wilson comment is of course being widely reported as confiimng that some definite 'peace feeler' did exist at that time^ and is therefore being construed to 'undercut' President's remarks of last week. Moreover^ revelation that Wilson has 'all the details' is bound to have serious complicating effect on our relations with Saigon and with S^Ianila allies J who had not repeat not received any similar full account,.,*"

* •

HJSK

Warsaw I939 (to SecState)^ TS/Nodis

8 February I967 Eef: (A) State I305SO (B) State 131716

"1. Based on person-al knowledge of the precedents^ I have reached quite different inferences and conclusions regarding Es tab rook articles than those drawn ^oj Amb. Goldberg in reftels*

With respect to Feb 2 storyj while Esta crook referred to high Polish sourceSj he denied that story came from the Poles. Rather^ he said it came from Canadian Fou Min I^^rtin while Ss tab rook was in Canada ^ and that he had story a couple of weeks. This rings tr-ae^ for Estabrook on Jan I9 filed from Ottawa essence of his Feb 2 stoiy (which appeared in Jan 20 Paris Herald Tribune) saying 'Canadian authorities blame some

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of the difficiilty on the accidental U.S. bombing of Hanoi in mid-December. Private soundings then under Tr/ay were disrupted^ they say^ and the attitude in Uoiiih Vietnam appeared to harden.' Alsoj note that in his Feb 2 article Estabrook speaks of 'high level outsiders' as source^ and links Polish peace effort to r&ftia-Kapacki discussions in December (which is not true J btit it does not hurt Martin's iniage to be case in this role}^ alsoj note that Estabrook spoke of Westem sources In his Feb h story*"

^'5* What does surprise mSj if we accept Estabrook's statement that story came from Martin (and I see no a priori reason for Estabrook to implicate fertin and U Ohant and protect the Poles)j is that Feb 2 story places developments in so unfavorable a light from standpoint of USG,,*,"

* ■

"8. I am particularly concerned vith recommendation in final para of reftel A^ that 've shouJ_d no longer use Poland or ar^ other Bloc country as channel to Hanoi,* As I noted in m^f analysis of Marigold role played by Poland (Warsaw 1631)^ I too had hoped that Soviets might play an Intermediary role. But to my knowledge experience has been that Poles are only Communist countiy willing to take on this chore

■ > 4 tt

GROKOUSKT

Febniaxy 10^ l8j 20 ^ I967

Sizeable TC incidents within 10 miles of Saigon lead Lodge to suggest that there is no further need to look for indications of reciprocity to oLir suspension of bombing near Hanoi. He suggests that the 10 mile limit around Hanoi be dropped.

Saigon 1T759 (to SecState)^ S/KTcdis 10 February 1967

"Following is the record of VC initiated incidents within ten miles of Saigon during the period Febn^axy k to February 9."

*.

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1 . €J

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^—^.^—^

^^C. February 6^ four miles west of Saigon unirlentified platoon-sized unit fired submachine bursts near police station aad then withdrew."

«■« 'd»

LODGE

Saigon IS329 (to SecState), S/Uodis 18 February I96T

"Following is the record of VC initiated incidents within ten miles of Saigon during the period February 10 to February 15/'

* ■ •

"C. February 13^ Saigon - VC fired four mortar rounds in vicinity of MCV-I (details have been reported separately)."

««

"2. With this spate of activity it is clear that considerations behind preparing this series of reports are no longer relevant. This villj therefore^ be the last telegraphic repoi't of this sort."

LODGE

Saigon l8>35 (to SecState)^ TS/liodis 20 Feb27uary I967

* w m

"2. [Jhe recent mortaring in town, other terrorist incidents in the Saigon area^ and the likelihood that we will get niore^ prompts me to suggest we consider Infonning Hanoij via the Poles ^ that we no longer consider ourselves bound by the 10 miles liiait."

LODGE

O

March 3, I967

Goldberg (acconipanied by Lodge) sees D*Orlandi in Saigon^ to hear the D.atter's version of Marigold* His objective is a first-hand confirm^ at ion from an inclependent source of the inaccuracy of the Polish version conveyed to U Thant. D'Orlandi^s account^ he finds^ contains "no

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^

discrepancies from the version we already have- In particular D^Orlandi is guite categoric in stating that the 10 points passed to Hanoi were foroiulated by Lewandowski^ not by Lodge—as Goldberg believes the Poles told U Thant. On the other side, D^Orlandi is of the view that the December 13-lt bombing derailed the Warsaw talks. He expresses great confidence in Lewandovski's Integrity,

USIM 1^238 (to SecState), S/ETodis

6 lylarch I967 FROM GOIDBEEiG

+

"On ferch 3^ day before leaving Saigon^ I arranged entirely private and off record meeting with D^Orlandi^ with agreement of and in presence -Amb Lodge . l^ objective was to secnre first-hand confirmation from entirely independent source of inaccuracy of Polish version of late IToveniber^early December Marigold events^ i.e.^ that it was Lodge who had formulated ten point proposal Lewandowski transmitted to Hanoi^ only to take position subsequently that some of these points needed clarification, (underlining furnished)

"Without any prompting on my partj D'Orlandi really and fully recited course of events. His recital contained no discrepancies from version we already had and he was guite categoric in stating that ten points passed Hanoi by Levandowski had been formulated by Lewandowski himself,"

■ * * 4'

"It is necessary to add^ however^ that D^Orlandi is of view that bombing of Dec 13-1^ derailed Warsaw talks. He also expressed view that it would have fu3rbhered progress towards negotiations if Rapacki had not insisted upon transferring venue to Warsaw. D*Orlandl's view is that it would have been preferable to carry on discussions through himself and lewandowski In Saigon^ with Lewandowski commuting to Hanoi.

^'D^Orlandi expressed great confidence in Lewandowski's integrity and confirmed that both Lewandowski and he will be leaving Saigon for respective home or other posts•"

BUFFUH

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March Ik, 1967

On returaing to ITew York^ Goldberg tries to arrive at a common version of the facts about J-feirigold with the Polish TOT Representative^ Tomorowicz. The Polish version agrees 'vrith ours that the 10 points -were formulated by LevaMowski. Goldberg ndt^B three points of differenceJ however:

i. Their version does not mention that Lodge indicated the need to clarify certain points at the December 1 meeting in Saigon.

ii. Their version indicates that Lodge first raised clarification at the December 3 meeting^ through the "important differences of intei^pretation" clause,

iii. According to their version^ the Poles stressed avoiding intensification of the bombing either before or during talks from the

December 1 meeting on,

Goldberg urges Tomorcwicz to revlev Marigold with Warsai; so that these factual differences can be cleared up.

USIM 4390 (to SecState)j S/Nodis

15 mvch 1967

"1, I arranged meet with Polish Perm Eep Tomoro-vicz Mar ll|. FM shortly after he had called on SIG and just before he was due leave for roughly ten days consultation in ¥arsaw,"

A m

"3- Specifically^ I noted there is one point of some importance re developments in early Dec on vhich there are two differing versions ^ namely^ who formulated ten points which lewandowsKi presented tc Hanoi-

''k. I said I had talked with D^^rlandi privately while in Saigon^ that D^Orlandi had reviewed ^krigold developments without any prompting from me^ and that his review entirely confirmed our understanding of facts on this point, Tomorowicz said that^ In principle j facts of this point as we understood them were quite accurate, (underlining furnished)

5. His further comments^ however^ engendered discussion of Marigold developments throughout Dec which revealed three other points on which we and Poles have differing facts, specifically:

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a) PoliE^h vers ion J as presented by Tomoro-wiczj makes no mention of fact that at Dec 1 mtg in Saigon, when Levandowski presented ten points to Lodge^ Lodge raised question of need to clarify some of points^ noting Points B and H in particular» (underlining furnished)

B) Acco3?ding Polish version^ Lodge first mentioned need for clarification at Dec 3 jtntg j when he said there were important differences of interpretation on 'serious matters^ in ten points^ although Lodge would not reply when asked to identify points

in need of clarification, (underlining furnished)

C) According Polish version^ Poles placed stress on relation between bombing and progress toward US-TTOI talks from Dec 1 mtg on: Lewandowski allegedly told Lodge on Dec 1 that there must be no intensification of bombing either before or during talks; at Dec 3 mtg with Lodge ^ he allegedly made strong representations re Dec 2 bombings; and^ on Dec 5J Rapacki allegedly made another strong representation re bombing to Gronousklj claiming Dec 2 and 3 bombings had not ruled out chances of direct US-IIVJr talks but had certainly made progress toward talks more difficult, (underlining furnished)

"6. As these differences carae to light during discussion^ I presented our understanding of facts and urged Tcmorowicz to review Marigold developments while in Warsaw so that -we could clear up factual differences betveen us *,,. '*

GOLDBERG

March l6-lTj I96T

Fanfani writes Rusk that Lewandowski has proposed a new initiative to D'Orlandi, Lodge is instructed to follow up^ but he replies that D'Orlandi has left Saigon for Rome, Reinhardt is therefore instructed to contact D*Orlandi later in Home,

F.QEie 4767 (to SecState)j s/Fodis^ I6 March I96T

• •

"My Dear Secretary of State^

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'^I voiild feel remiss in my duty if I failed to infoiTiL you of what Aml^assador D^Orlandi has communis cated to me after meeting vith Lewandovskij a few days agoJ and reviewing with him the current Vietnamese situation* D'Orlandi felt he had to tell me thatJ in the present circumstances^ a resumption of negotiations wotild require a three week long suspension of baiEhings and the admission^ on the part of the United States^ that they are still willing to accept the well known ten points.

"D^Orlandi adds that the duration of the suspension Gould he kept secret and that it should not rpt not he difficult to seciire a substantive counter^ part from Hanoij to be presented as a compensation for Some otherj purely token^ concession frcei the United States/*

• • • *

KEimiAEDT

State 156826 (to Amembassy Saigon) ^ S/Kodis 16 March I96T

*'l. By now you will have seen*. .message from FonMin Fanfani to Sedietary Rusk

* * *

"2* Points of greatest interest on which we most want clarification are following:

(a) When would the negotiations be resumedJ after suspension had run three weeks or at initiation of three-week period? If the former^ should it be assumed that suspension would be expected to continue as negotiations proceeded?

(b) V/hat would be the 'substantive counterpaii}' from Hanoi? Presume it would not merely be resumption of negotiations but rather some de-escalatory action affecting infiltrationj guerrilla or terror activity in the South or the like.

(c) In phrase 'resumption of negotiations* does this refer to (i) direct UPV/US talks which were to hav^ been undertaken in Warsaw last December 2 and which we welcomed^ or (li) resumption of arid

exchanges between C-ronouski and Papacki?

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(d) vihat is entailed in 'accepting* the

ten points? ¥e assi*me this means nothing more than that ve have in no vay receded from acceptance in terms ve made known to Lewandov/ski and Rapacki in November and December.

^'3. Please review these matters vith D^Orlandi

Saigon 20590 (to SecState)j S/Nodis 16 ferch 1967

"1. In response to your 156826^ D'Orlandi left Saigon yesterday, Thursday, March l6.,.,"

LODGE

State 158132 (to Ameiabassy Rome)j s/Nodis

17 March I967 Ref: (a) Saigon 20590

(b) Rome kjBj

(c) State 156826

«• •

''2 The Secretary vould be most grateful

if Minister Fanfani vould let Ambassador Reinhardt know when Ambassador B'Orlandi has reached Rome so that the two Ambassadors miglit discuss Lewandcwski's approach.

"3- For Reinhardt, Assuming the arrangement outlined above works out, we would appreciate your following up vith D*Orlandi along lines slcetched out Deptel I56826 '"

RUSK

^ )

March I9, 1967

Rapacki has told Uilson and Brown that (l) Lodge first accepted Lewandovski's 10 points, then reneged through the "important differences of interpretation^^ clause^ and (2} the December 13-1^ bombing had sabotaged the entire project. State cables a rebuttal: (ij Lodge reserved the US position on the 10 points when first presented, December 1; hence he did not renege^ (2) Although Lewandowski

complained on December 3 about our bombing Hanoi^ "there was no suggestion that the prospect for DRV-U8 talks depended in any direct way on such matters*"

127

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State 1582U6 (to Amembassy London)^ TS/TTodis

19 Iferch 1967 Hef: London's 6998 and 7172 and State's lli6303

"Account in London's 6998 of Ea^acki's conversations with Bro-vm and Wilson about the events of December provide further evidence of Kapacki's continuing Yindictiveness. \Je assume that his feelings will badly discolor the Polish contribution to a 'more detailed post mortem' between the British and the Poles.

"During his London visit, Eapacki evidently made two charges against us: (l) Lodge had reneged after giving firm agreement to the Lewandowski Ten Point package and (2) the December 13-1^ bombing had sabotaged the entire project,

"The cable exchanges between Lodge and the Department in the early days of December provide an absolutely clear record that Lodge did not repeat not agree to Lewandowski's version of the Ten Points and therefore did not repeat not renege- On December Ij Lewandowski told Lodge he had presented to Hanoi his understanding of the US position based on his conversations with Lodge on IJovember Ik and earlier. He then read his Ten Points^ which Lodge recorded precisely. Lodge was not^ howeverj shown a paper containing the Ten Points.

"At the end of his statement^ Levandowski asked Lodge if he had correctly stated the US point of view. Lodge responded carefully that 'obviously on a matter of such importance J I would have to refer to my government for a definitive reply^ but I could say off hand that much of what he cited was in keeping with the spirit of our policy*' He then pointed out specific difficulties with Point 2 and Points 8. Neither in this nor in later discussions with Lodge did Lawandowski indicate any misunderstanding of the qualified riature of Lodge's response to his presentation of the Ten Points, For example. Lodge informed him on December 3 that our Snbassy in Warsaw would contact the DRV representative on December 6 to confirm 'that the Lewandowski formulation broadly represented our positionJ although several specific points were subject to important differences of interpretation,,,.

11

.... It is also worthy of hate that D^Orlandi told the Secretary on December 9 that Eapacki had

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'tried to be clever' aM to get the US to withdraw all its reservations about the Lewandowski formulation before he established a direct contact in Warsaw between the US and DRV representatives*..*

tt

mm*

It is tiijie that on December 3; Levan-dowski under instructions ^ coiriplained to Lodge about bombings in the vicinity of Hanoi but there was no suggestion that the prospect for DEV-US talks depended in any direct way on such matters,

"SubsequentlyJ while Eapacki haggled^ we wez^e blocked from a direct contact with the DEV at which this and all other pertinent subjects could have been discussed.,,/^

KATZEE^IBACH

Apri l Tj ^I j. IggT

Eeiriha.rdt reviews prospects for resuming contact via Lewandowski with D'Orlandi in Rome, State instructs him to arrange a three-party meeting when Lewandowski passes through Rome in May.

Rome 326G (to SecState)^ S/lTodiSj T April I967 State 164750 (Eef?)

"1. In lengthy private conversation today at villaj D'OrlaMi exposed his conviction that possi-Dility to achieve something through Lewandowski was good and should be pursued without undue delay since Pole would be leaving Saigon in >Iay. D'Orlandi believed lesson of last try was that more details should be clarified and nailed dovna through Lewandowski channel before actual negotiations between principals initiated. No doubt^he had discussed these and other views in detail with Lodge* It was clear to me that D^Orlandi considered himself essential link to Lewandowski channel.

. Regardirig specific questions (State 156826^ para 2)j he stated:

A, Lewarjiowski thought that suspension of bombing sho^jad be initiated not later than his arrival in Hanoi to sound ITorth Yietnamese and that three or four weeks would be necessary to allow sufficient time for initial exchanges^ suspension would of coui'se be without any comiuitment^ and whether it continued firrther would presi^jnably depend on whether constrictive developments take place.

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3

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B. »Substantive contribution' would^ he imagined J be something specific in military field which US Command considered useful.

C. ^Resumption of negotiations' he thought meant US/DEV but vas not sure that Hapacki/ Gronouski stage could be completely finessed if venue were Warsaw,

D. 'Accepting ten points' he understood simply to mean reaffirmation of previous position including US reservations on interpretation and

assurance that there had been no recession in US position.

*'3» D'Orlandi said Lewandovski had revealed nothing rpt nothing in his conversation vhich might cast light on why Hanoi published Johnson-Ho-Chi Minh. exchange."

*»««

REBIHAFDT

State 180271 (to Memhassy Eome)^ TS/Nodis

21 April 1967 Eef: Rome 5266

"1, \Je appreciate having these additional comments by D'Orlandi and suggest that in order to explore Hanoi's position furtherj as it is untier-stood by Lewandowski^ you propose quiet meeting between the three of you next month when Lewandowski passes through Rome en route to Warsaw/'

RUSK

May 8- I967

Hightower files a lengthy account of ^3arlgold from Washington, The story contains enough detail to Indicate that some of his sources were insiders. It is critical of the Polish role and reflects Washington's doubts the reliability of Poland as a channel to Hanoi,

130

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Key York Times , 9 May I96J

k-mWUil U.S. BID IGNORED BY HAITOI, by John M. Eightover of the Associated Press

• • *

"One of the 10 points provided that the United States voiild not insist that North Vietnai]i acknowledge publicly the presence of its forces In South Vietnam. The Johnson Administration decided this should be clarified to require that if the troop issue was to be covered up for face-saving purposes^ then the Uorth Vietnamese forces should be with^ drawn from the South.

''Mr. Lewaudowski was infortned of this and other clarification points. The others seemed mainly matters of wording. But this one seemed to be substantial,"

"Mr. Eapacki*s strong resistance to the clarification proposal caused some concern in Washington, Officials were not sure the Poles had any coniniitment from North Vietnam to begin the xalks. Some high officials here doubted that I-lr. Hapacki was in fact relaying United States views and making known Washington's readiness for talks to Hanoi-"

^

m *

"Informants say an Important element in the Administration decision not to suspend the bombing plan was an attack by Communist forces on Saigon's main airfield and an unsuccessf-ol attempt to blow up a major bridge in Saigon,"

• *»•

"United States officials publicly took issue with this. Privately they said that while the attack at Hanoi might have destroyed the Polish planJ it might also have presented Hanoi or Warsaw with a convenient pretext for not going through with it."

# > •«

May 9-10, I967

In Warsaw^ Polish concern is expressed over rumors that the US

plans to publish a white paper on Marigold* This would force them^

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reluctantly J to publish their own account, Gronouski recoHsnends against publication,

Washington replies that the Eightover piece is ^^essentially accurate and reasonably favorable from our point of view." The Poles are to be told that ve will not publish a white paper.

When so infonnedj the Poles respond that "US officials had apparently chosen another way to put out the stoiy," They are especially distressed at the question raised as to whether they had actually transmitted US messages to the Ifforth Vietnamese, Tliey state that they had delivered the messages.

Warsaw 2T00 (to SecState)^ S/Nodls^ 9 May I967

"1. During my separate calls on Winievicz and Mlchalowski this morning^ both of them expressed Polish concern about news reports originating in U.S. that U.S. intends to publish within next few days a white book covering Warsaw talks of last December,,.."

* • ■

"5 Poles WQf-ild be most reluctant to publish their own white book but they would be left with no alternative if U*S. published its own,"

. ■

"T* -.. I wouJ.d therefore recomraend against publication of official dept. version of MARIGOIiD events. ., J^

GEOi^'OUSKI

State 190899 (to Amembassy Warsaw)^ S/lTodis

9 May 1967 Eef: Warsaw 2699 and 27OO

"We consider news stories filed yesterday on December peace probes to be essentially accurate and reasonably favorable from our point of view. We would prefer let matter rest there avoiding to extent feasible public exdaange of interpretations with the Polish Government, When queried about story yesterday^ official spokesman said he preferred not rpt not to comment on STJory^ adding FOR BACKGEOUDID that he 'would have no q.i.u3,rrel with it, ^ We intend maintain this position.

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"Since we have no desire exacerT^ate US-Polish \ relations over "fchis matter^ we have no present

intentions publish H'Tnite Book' on this subject* You should so inform Michalowski

• > •

> » •'

RUSK

Warsaw 272? (to SecState)^ s/JIodis

10 I4ay 1967 Eef; State I90899

"1 \Ihen Kaiser said U.S. has no present

intention of publishing white book^ Michalowski responded that U.S. officials had apparently chosen another way to put out the story- He then referred to Hightower article whichj he said^ according to summary received by Polish FonMinj seemed to be based on high level official sources. There were disturbing distortionsj errors and innuendos challenging the integrity of Rapacki and questioning whether Polish side had actually transmitted messages to North Vietnamese. He added that Poles had of course delivered messages,"

M m w *

jEiocras

fey 28J 1967

US Eabassies in Tol^o and Seoul are given background information

on l^Iarigold.

State 2039314- (to AmSnbassies: Tokyo^ Seoul)^ s/Nodis

28 fey 1967 Kef: State 197li.26 to Tokyo . State 198946 to Seoul

"We are repeating to you State's 1582^5-6 and 1323^7 which provide bac'^xground info on Polish initiatives re Vietnam which aborted last December. Text of Lewandovski's Ten Points which were presented to Aabassador Lod,^e on December 1 follows:"

^o'

. b

SUSK

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June 6, I96T

The three-party talks in Eome vill not be possible as Levandovskl is not passing through.

Rome 6506 (to SecState)j s/Uodis

6 June I96T State 191171^ and Home 599I

"D'Orlandi has informed me that Lewandowski is not repeat not coming to Rome,"

RErNILAH)a?

December 6j I967

Wilfred Burchett tells US officials in Paris that the DPV had an official en route to the Marigold Warsaw meeting at the time of cancellation— "vhen the US resinned bombing Hanoi/'

Paris 75^0 (to SecState)^ S/Nodis^ 6 December I967

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"Burchett said North Vietnamese accuse us of talking peace vhile intensifying war. For example; ITorth Vietnainese had agreed to talk at Warsaw last December and even had official en route when US resumed bombing Hanoi- He also mentioned North Vietnamese readiness to talk at Rangoon during 37 day pause/'

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