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\vc are also there iiisc there Eire great stakes in the balanc Let no one think for a moment that t fron Yiet-Nam would

bring an end to conflict The battle would be renewed in one conn try and then another. The central 1 :i of our time is Unit the a; ite of aggression is never satisfied. To withdraw from on? batl !d means only to prepare for the next. "We must star in Southeast. Asia—as we did in Europe—in the word.-? of the Bible: "Hitherto Shalt tliou come, but no further/ 3

There are those who say that all our effort there will be futile— that China's po is such that it is bound to dominate all Southeast Asia. But there is no end to that argument until all of the nations of Asia are swallowed up.

There are those who wonder why we have a responsibility there. Well, we have it there for the same reason that we 1 b a responsibility for the defense of Europe. World War II was fought in 1 Europe and Asia, and •;>. it ended we found ourselves with continued responsibility for the defense of freedom.

Our objective is the in Lepei of South Vietnam and its free-

dom fr ittaclc We want nothing for ourselves—only that the people of South Yiet-jXam be allowed to guide their own country in their own way. We will do everything necessary to reach that objective, and we will do only what is absolutely necessary.

In recentmonthsattacks on South Yiet-Xam were stepped up. es, it became necessary for us to increase our re [ and to make attacks

by air. This is not a change of purpose. It is a change in what we* believe that purpose requires. We do this in order to slow down ag on.

We do this to in ase the confidence, of the brave people of Sou Viet-2\am who hare bravely borne this brutal battle for,so many years with so many casualties.

And we do this to convince the leaders of Xorih Yiet-Xam—and all who seek to share their conquest—of a simple fad : We will not be defeated. . We will no' grow tired. • We will not withdraw 1 ) either openly or under the cloak of a meaningless u.

We know that air attacks alone will not accomplish all of these purposes. But it is our best and prayerful judgment that they are a necessary part of the surest road to peace.

Wo hope that peace-will come swiftly. But that is in the hands of others besides ourselves. And we must be prepared for a long continued conflict. It will require patience as well as bravery—tie will to endure as well as the will to resist.

I wish it were possible to convince others with words of what we now find it necessary to say with guns and planes: armed hostility is futile—our resources are equal to any challenge—because we Sght for values and we fight for principle, rather than territory or colonies, our p: ice and our determination are unending.

Once this is clear, then it should also be clear chat the only path for 'reasonable men is thejpath of peaceful settlement. Such peace demands an independent bouth Ytet-Xam—securely guaranteed and able to shape its own relationships to all others- f::? from outside interference—tied to no alliance—a military base for no other country.

These are the essentials of any final settlement.

We will never be second hi the search for such a peaceful settlement in Yiet-Xam.

There may be many ways to this kind of peace: in d ission or negotiation with the governments concerned: in large gro or in small o in the reaitinnarion of old agreements or their streng i-mg with new ones.

We have stared tins position over and over . tin 50 tin and more to friend foe alii - And we i i ready with (his purpose for

unc->i d i t iona 1 d iscussi ons.

And until that bright j - lt day of peace we will try to keep

conflict iron: . hi,:. We have no d ire to see thousands die m battle—A s or Ameri ?. We have no desire ,to d»-. tate that which the people of North Yiet-Xam h '■-. built with toil and sacrifice. We will • ■.•ur p ^vith restraint and with all the lorn that wa

can command.

Fyat we will Use it,

3-3 •

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f

This war, like most wars, is filled with terril irony. For what do the prop]'? of North Yiet-Xam want ? They want v. their neighbors also desire—food for their hunger, health for their bodies, a chance to

in, progress for their country, and an end to the bondage erial

•tv. And they would find all these things far more readily in

peaceful i iciation with others than in the endless course of battle:

These countries of Southeast Asia are homes for millions of impoverish <• pie. Each day these people ris dawn and stru tli h until the night to w existence from the soil. They are oftenVracked by diseases, plagued by hur. . and CiQu.Cn c'o at the

rly ago of 40.

Stability and peace do not cor asilv in such a land, Neither inde-endenee nor human dignity will i von, though, by arms atone,

t also requires the wi of peace. The American people hi ve helped generously in times past in these works, and now there must be a much more massive effort to improve the life of man in that conflict-torn corner of our w< ; .

The first step is for the countries of Southeast Asia to stssocii themselves in a greatly expanded cooperative effort for develop] We would hope that Xorth Yiet-Xam would take its place in the common effort just assoon as peaceful cooperation is possible,

The United Nations i already actively engs 1 m develop*! in this area, and as far back in 10G1 I conferred with our authorities in Yiet-Xam in connection with their work there* And I would hope tonight that the SeereUuy-G ral of the. United Nations could use the prestige of his great office and his deep knowledge of Asia to initiate, as soon as possible, with the countries of that area, a plan -for cooperation in increased aerelc t.

For our part I will ask the Congress to join in a Lillion-dollnr American investment in this effort as soon as it is underway. And 1 would hope that all other industrialized countries, including the Soviet Union, will joint in this effort w r ce d ii with hope and terror with progress.

The task is nothing less than to enrich the hopes and fcxisi e of more than a hundred million people. And there is much to be done.

The vast Mekong River can provide food and water and power on a scale to dwari even our own TVA. The wonders of modern medicine can be spread through villages where thousands die every year from lack of care. Schools can be established to train people ir ills

needed to manage the process of development. And these fcs,

and more, are within the reach of a cooperative and d mined effort.

I also intend to expand and speed up a program to make available our farm surpl s to assist in feeding and clothing the needy in Asia. We should not allow people to go hungry and wear rags whi 1 wn

wa relic overflow with an abundance of wheat and corn and ri

and cotton. . « -v

So I will very shortly name a special team of outstanding patriotic, «..d distinguished America] to inaugurate our participation in these programs. This team will be headed by Mr. Eugene Black, the very ableformcr President of the World Bant.

This will be a disorderly planet for a long time. In Asia, ana elsewl - the forces of the oclern world are shaking old w and uprooting anei ivilizations, There will be turbulence and struggle and even violence. Great social change—as we see in our own country—does not alway come without conflict,

We must also ex; that nations will on occasion be in di te with us. It may be because we are rich, or powerful, or because we have made semel s, or b iusq they honestly fear our intentions.

However, no nation need ever fear that we desire their land, or to impose our will, or to dictate their in ■ nations.

But we will always oppose the effort of one nation to conquer an-

'other luttion.

We will do this because our own security is at stake.

But there is more to it than that For our ration has a dream. It is a very ol 1 dream. But w a the power, and now we have the

opportunity to E hat dream c

For cento re struggled among each other. Bur v

dzeam of a world where disputes are settled by law and reason. And we will t ry to make it so.

r: T :

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For most of history men have hated and killed one another in battle. But we d " of an end to war. And we will try to make

it so.

For all existence most men hare lived in poverty, threatened by hunger, But we dream of a world where all are fed and charg with h - a. And we will help to mal so.

The ordinary men and women of Xorth Vietnam and South Yiet-Xam, of China and India, of Russia^and Americ re brave peo] They are filled with the i porti »ns of h ue and fear, of love and

hope, Most of them want the s; thii for themselves and thrir families Host of them do not wane their sons to ever die in battl or to see fcl homes, or the homes of others, destroyed.

Well, tliis can be their world yeL Man now lias the knowledge— always before denied—to make this planet serve the real needs of the people who live on it.

I know this will not be easy. I know how difficult ir is for reason to guide ] ion, and love to master hate. The compl tes of this world do not bow easily to pui^ and consistent answers.

But the simple truths are there just the same. We must all try* to follow them as best we eon.

We often say how impressive power is. But I do not find it impressive at all. The guns and the bombs, the rockets and the warships, are all symbols of human failure. They are necessary symbols. They protect what Ave cherish. But they are witness to hitman folly.

Adam built across a great river is impressive.

In the countryside where I was born, and where I live, I have seen the night iMumhialed, and the kil n warmed, and the home heated, where once the cheerless night and the ce ' cold held sway. And all this happened because electricity came to our area along the humming wires of the RE A. 1 ation of the countryside-

yes, that, too, is impressive.

A rich harvest in a hungry land h impressive.

The sight of healthy children in a classroom is impressive.

These—not mighty arms—arc the achievements which the American nation b to be impressive. And if we are steadfast, the time may come when all other nations will also find itso.

Every night before I turn out the lights to sli ' I ask myself this question: Have f done even tiling that I can do to unite tills country? Have I done everything I can to help unite the world, to try to bring peace and hope to all the peoples of the world ? Have I done enough I

Ask Yourselves that question in your homes—and in this hall to-night. Have we, each of us, all done all we can do? Have we done enough?

We may well be living in the time foretold many years ago when it was said: c; I call heaven and earth to record this day against you, that I have set before you life and death, blessing and cursing: therefore choose life, that both thou and thy seed may live/ 5

This generation of the world must choose: destroy or build, kill, or aid, hate or understand. We can do all these things on a scale thai has never been dreamed of before.

Well, we will choose life. And so doing, Ave will prevail over the enemies within man, and over the natural enemies of all mankind.

15

■-ifepareaeat of Stat* BvTUtln, Apr. 23, LSS5, p< --A0,

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EXTRACT OF SPEECH BY SOUTH VIETNAMESE FOREIGN

MINISTER TKAN VAX DO ON THE OCCASION OF THE "DAY FOR INTERNATIONAL AID," June 22, 1965

For many Years, South Vietnam has been plunged into a war imposed on it by the Communists- It has been abk to preserve the integrity of its territory and dom only because of the courage of its son/and the friendly countries of the free world, which have not spared either their friendship or their generous assistance.

To the representatives of those countries present at this ceremony, I express, in the ie of the Republic and people of South Vietnam, our profound gratitude, which I ask them to convey to their Government,

It is also my duty to tell them what we are doing with their assistance. Some is usee! to relieve the misery and suffering of our people as a result of the war, to rebuild on our ruins, and to reconstruct our nation; some to help us defend ourselves against the Communist aggression. 1 say "defend ourselves" advisedly, for our primary objective continues to be the search for peace and not the spread or prolongation of the war. We do. certainly, want peace, but not peace at any price. If it is to be a just and enduring peace, the following conditions must be met:

1* Since- the war now in pro] ress in Vietnam was provoked by Communis' aggression and subversion, it is essentia!, first of all, that these subversive and military activities undei ken, directed,' and supported from abroad again J ■ independence and freedom of tlv people of South Vie) i cease, and that the principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of the two zones, ji principle that was laid down in the 1951 Geneva eemer id in international law, be respected. Consequently, the Communist regime of Hanoi must dissolve all these front organizations and age it has created in

South Vietnam under the title the "Front for the Liberation of the South/' "Liberation Radio Station," and "People's Revolutionary Party/' and, it must remove from South Vietnam the troops and the political and mili li d rsithas ) illegally.

2. The internal affairs of the South Vietnamese people must be left to the disc ton of those people in conformity with democratic principles and without any foreign interference from w' ever source. That will be feasible, obviously, only when ti aggression by the Communist regime of K i and its campaign of intimidation to which the people of South Vietnam have been subjected have been terminated.

3. As soon as aggression has ceased, the Government of the Republic of Vietnam and the nations that come to its aid will be able to suspend the military measures in the territory of South Vietnam and bey T ond its boundaries that are now n sary to defend that territory against Communist aggression. Moreover, the Government of the Republic of Vietnam is prepared to ask friendly nations then to remove their military forces from South Vietnam, It reserves the ri^ht, however, to take whatever measures are necessary to see that law and order are respected throughout the territory of South Vietnam and to insure the safety of the South Vietnamese people, as well as the right to appeal again for foreign assis : the case of further aggression or thre or ag .

•i. Lastly, the independence and freedom of.the people of South Vietnam must he i tiveiy guaranteed.

If th" Gonur I v ?inte in Hanoi sn eerely wants peace, if it puts t } l( , interests t £ the nation above those of an hi y or a party, wants the Vi< ti : people and the other peoples 01 southeast Asia

to Hve hi peace i of w. / instead of poverty, treedom

instead of slavery, it has only to put an end to aggression^

ThU is the onfv pal we believe can lead to peace it the south

Vietnamese people to be able to enjoy the full b .its ol tne aid that the friendly nations have so ge usly lavished upon it.

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t

»

77.-78. V l -GS ACTA ON VIE NAM BY PRESI-

DE] iSTSON AT RIO PRESS CONF3 DE OF

JULY : , i

We Will Stand j:; Vietnam

My fellow At: : :\n< t not loi g ago 1 received a letter ' a a worn n in the Mid .vi t. She wrote.

Dear Mk. President: In my hu ay I am writing to yoi " i the orh

in Vietnam. 1 have i who : i ■•■ h\ Yi ftuam* My husband served in World War II. Our country was at war, but now, this time, it is just i Ling that I

don't undei ad. Why? ,

Wellj ] have tried to answer that question dozens of times and more in practically cvay State in this Union. I have discussed it fully in Baltimore in April, in VFashii ton in May, in San Francisco in Juno. Lel'ine again, now, discuss it here in the east room of the White j Louse.

Why must young Americans, bom into a land exultant with hope find with golden promise, toil and suffer and sometimes die in such a remote and distant place?

THE LESSON OF HISTORY

The answer, like the wt r itself, is not an easy one, but it echo clearly from the p os of half a century, Three times in my

lifetime, in two World Wars and in Korea, Americans have gone to far lands to fight for freedom. We have learned at a terrible a brutal cost that retreat does nut bring safety and weakness dues tiof bring pgace*

It is this lesson that ha b tght us to Vietnam. Tins is a different kind of war. There are no marching armies or solemn declaration Some citizens of South Vietnam, at times with understandable grievances, have joined in the attack on their own government.

Bni we must not let this mask the central fact that this is really war. It is guided by North Vii m, and it is spurred by Communist China. Jls goal is to conquer the South, to defeat American power, and to extend the Asiatic dominion of communism;

There are great si tikes in the balance.

Most of the non-Communist n tiona of Asia cannot, by themselves . and alone, resist growing might and the grasping ambition of Asi communism.

Our power, therefore, is a very vital shield. If we arc driven from the,field in Vietnam, then no nation can ever again hare the sail confidence in .American promise or in American protection.

In each land the fee of independence would be considerably weakened and an Asmso threatened Communist domin n would certainly imperil the security of the United States itself, ■ We did not choose to be the guardians at the gate, but there is no one else.

Nor would surrender in Vietnam bring peace, because we learned • from Hitler at Munich t success only Feeds the appetite of aggre sion. The battle would be renewed in one country and tl anothi country, bringing with it perhaps even larger and cruder conflict, as we have learned from the lessons of history.

Moreover, we are in Vietnam to fulfill one of the most sy mi

5>ledges of the American Nation. Three Presidents—President Eisenhower, President Kennedy, and your present President—over 13 y L have committed themselves and have promised to help defend - this small and valiant nation.

Strengthened by that promise, the people of Soul: Vietnam have fought For many long ye . . Thousands of them 1 .■'. e died. Thousand hs ve 1 crij ! I fxnd scarred by vyar. We just c ot bow dishonor our word, or Ion our tmitment, or leave those who believed I who ' to the terror and repression and murder that- would fellow. ^ This, then, my ( v Americans, is why we are in Vietnam*

'' DcpArti iteiit oCSc*.:? Publication 7937, Rd&ued August I"53.

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■ *

-

»

JXCi . IN U.S. 1 OKCES

What are our goals in thai v : 1 ;■ nd?

First, we intend to convince Cbmnumists that wo c ot 1 defeated bj ; j nis or b-j si ior ] ower. 5 hey an ! •: i ily

convinced* In re n d mo ■ the} ' atly ii creased their fight-

ing forces and their tcks and the number of im nts. 1 have asked the ter-fil, ( 1 [\i C] Westmoreland, what

more he r to meet this Mounting He has told me.,

We will meet his m eds,

I have today o: > Vietnam tl \LM<: iDlvi nd ceriai

other forces w : will rais< [febthi* strength from 00 to

125,090 men almost immediately. Additional foici i will be : I 1 later, and they will be qn J* This will i ike it n ssary

to Increase our active fighting fore by raisin* cmthly draft call

from 17,000 over a period of time to 35,000 per i h, and for us to step up our campaign for voluntar enlistments,

After this past week of deli 1 -., I hare eonclud that it is

not essential to order Reserve units into serviccnow. If that n ity should later he indicated, I will give the n . »§{ careful considera-

tion and 1 v, 331 give the country clue and adequate notice before takiu< such action, but only i fter full preparations,

Wc have also disc d with the Government of South Vietnam lately the steps that we will Like to substantially increase their own effort, both on the battl Id and toward refc and \ s^ in the villages. Amh dor Lodge is now formuiatiifg a new p: ogram, to ho tested upon his return to that area,

CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW

I have directed Secretary Rust and Secretary McNamara to be available immediately to the Congress to review with these co mittees, the appropriate congression '1 committees, what we plan to to in these areas. . 1 have asked them to be iible to answer the questions of any Member of Co; >s.

Secretary McNamara, in addition, will ask the Senate Appropriations Committee to add a limited nount to present legislation to h meet part of this new cost until 8 supplemental measure is ready, and hearings can be held when the Congress asses ! 3 in January,

In the meantime, we will use the authority contained in the \ sent defense appropriations bill under consider ^n, to transfer funds in addition to the additional money that we will ask.

These steps, like our actions in the past, are carefully meas d to do what must be done to bring an end to aggression and a peaceful settlement.

We do not want an expanding struggle with conscque • that no one can perceive, nor will we bluster or hull}* or flaunt our power, but we will not surrender and we will not retreat, for behind our Ameri pledge ties the determination and resources, I believe, of all of the "American Nation.

U.S. WELCOMES UNCONDITIONAL DISCUSSIONS

Second, once the Communists know, as we know, thai a violent solution is impossible, then a peacefid solution is inevitable.

We are ready now, as we have always been, to move from the battlefield to the conference table. I have stated puhlicly and^m times, fi and again, America's willingness to begi unconditiom ]

discussions with any gove nent at any place at any time. Fj fita efforts have been made to start these disci) -: i with the help of 4 nation:, throughout the world, but there has been no answer.

But we to continue to pr 3 if p \ must, until

death and desol ti n have led to the rue c i t ble where

others could now join us at a much si tier cost

18

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] have spok m m my times i f our objectives in Vietnam, So 1'.-- the Government of South Vi< tn. Hanoi has set forth it own prop> ds. "We are ready to discuss their proj b and our proposals and ai proposals of any govefmi ml whose p oplc may be affected, for we fear the meeting room no mora tin n we fear the battl Id.

In this pursuit we welcome and we ask for the c :ra and the assistance of any nation ai 11 nations. Jf the United Nations and its officii or any one of its 114 members can by deed or word, private initiative or public action, bring us r an honorable peace, tin

they will have the support and flu gratitude of the United States of America-

I have directed Aroba lor Goldb to New York today and

to present immediately to Secret ry Gel 1 U Thant a letter from mo requesting that all of tit ^sources, energy, and immense prestige of the United Nation: be employed to find ways tu halt aggr >n and to bring peace in Y am.

ruitPosB or "U.&. action

I made a similar request at San Francisco a few weeks ago, because we do not seek the destruction of any government, nor doVe covet a foot of any ten story, but we insist and we will always Insist the

people of South Vietnam shall have the righl of choice, the.right to shape their own destiny in free elections in the south, or through 01 all Vietnam un•!■ international supervision, and they shall not have any gov lent imposed upon them by force and terror so long as we can prevent it.

This was the purpose of the 1951 agreements which the Communists have now cruelly shattered. If the machinery of those agr ments was tragically weak, its purposes still guide our action. As battle n » we will continue as best we can to help the good people of South Vietnam enrich the condition of their life, to feed the hungry, and to tend the sick, and teach the young, and shelter the homck , and help the farmer to increase props, and the worker to find o job.

It is an ancient but still terrible irony that while many leaders of men create division in pursuit of grand ambitions, the children of man arc really united in the simple, elusive desire for a life of fruitful and rewarding toil.

As J said at Johns Hopkins in Baltimore, I hope that one day we cau help all the people of Asia toward that desire, Eugene Black has made great progress since ray appearance in Baltimore in that direction—not as the price of peace, for we are ready always to bear a more painful cost, but rather as a part of our obligations of justice toward our fellow man.

- A PERSONAL NOTE

Let me also add now a personal note. I do not find it easy to send the flower of our youth, our .finest yoi men, into battle. I have spoken to you today of the divisions and the forces and the battalions and the units. But I know them all, every one. J have seen them in a tin ! streets, of a hundred towns, in every State in this Union —

workh ! lair ing and building, and filled with hope and life. I

think that I know, too, how their mothers weep and how their families sorrow. This is the most agonizing and the most painful duty of your President. *

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LETTER FROM PRESIDENT JOHNSON TO U TIIANT, SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS, JULY 2S, 1965 [

His Excellency U Tkaxt,

Secretary General oj ike United Nations,

United Nations, X.Y.

Deaf. Mr. Secretary General: I want you to know from me di Ij of the \ great persona! confidence which I place in Ambassador G . IIi> a] intraent as permanent representative of the United States to the United Nations—and his &c< *i e of this

jupport I have instructed Ambassador Goldberg especially to maintain close contact with you on the situation in Vietnam. Your efforts in the past to find some way to remove that dispute from the battlefield to the negoti tg table are much appreciated tghly valued by

my Gu ;t. J trust they will be continued.

Meanwhile, as I stated pufilicly last April, the Government of the United States is prepared to enter i to negotiations for peaceful settlement without conditions^ That remains our policy.

And as I si J in San Francisco last month, we hope that the members of the United Nations, individually and cotlectirelv, will u their influence to bring to the negotiating table all go; ments involved in an attempt to halt all ; ion and evolve a pe ;tl

solution, ^continue to hope that the United Nations can, in fact, be effective in this regard*

I hope that you will cor inicate to us, through Ambassador Goldberg, any helpful suggestions that may occur to you that can strengthen our common search for the road to peace in southeast Asia.

Sincerely,

Lyxdox B. Jorxsox.

LETTER FROM AMBASSADOR ARTHUR J. GOLDBERG TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, JULY SO, 1265 ■

Dear Mr. President: The President of the United States announced on July 2S, 1905, certain steps being taken by my Government to lend farther assistance totheEe] £ Vietnam in resisting armed aggression.

At the ie time the Prescient reaffirmed to the Secretary General of the United Nations the Willi ess of the United States to enter into negotiations for peaceful settlement without conditions, and again invited all members of the United Nations, individually and collectively, to asc their influence to bring about d~ tons in a negotiating forum. On Jury 29 the Secretary General Immedi ly sent a most welcome and appreciated reply, stating his d ruination to pursue his efi is to remove the dispute over Vie:.. . : . the battlefield to the negotiating table,

The Security Council, which has a legitimate interest in the peace of south: ; Asia, 1 een kept informed of the policy of niy Government with respect to the dangerous co: of Events in that part of

e world. For e I ?, my late predecessor, Ambassador Adlai 'E.

Stevenson, told the Council more than year ago on May 21 1964:

* * * the "United r ?r.o, rep \ aal military objective anywhere

in 5 ist Asia. U. ; !icy for southeast Asi It i< the r na-

tion of peace so that the i Ft! ■■ ;i c:;:i go ;: ; out their own independent

bushv i .■ iv] ver n y freely cl - for themselves with

interference frons the o We,

Membersof the Council also are aware of the pi ] zed and ited efi U.S. Governi:: ' a path to peaceful soli of

the dispute? of southeast Asia, begun with our acceptai ce of the terms of the C va Accords of 1954, . These efforts have included— 20

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

Various approaches to Ha:mi, Pdping, and Moscow,

Support of pe*c< fill overtures by the United K: : rn, Canada,

,d the British Common Ith of Nations.

Favorable reactions to pro] U made by 17 nonaliitcd nations, and later by the Go^ eminent of India.

Approval of efforts by the Secretary Genera] of the United Nations to rail e peace talks,

Endorsement of a larger role for the United Nations ia southeast Asia, including a U.N. mission of observers along the frontier between Vietnam and Cambodia, a L.N. mission to investigate alleged suppression of minority rights in Vietnam, and a U.X-invitation to Hanoi to participate in Security Council discussions of the incident in the Gulf of Tonkin.

Major participation, directly and through the United Nations, in economic and social development projects in sout! ' Asi

A direct appeal by the President of the United States to the members of the United Nations to use their influence in bringing all parties to the peace table.

Repeated 8 lions on the highest authority that the United States is prepared to-engage in negotiations or discussions of any character with no prior conditions whatever.

On at least 15 occasions in the past four and a half years, the United States has initiated or supported efforts to resolve the issues in southeast Asia by peaceful negotiati .

lam sure that the other members of the Security Council share the deep regrets of my Government in die fact that none of these initiatives has met with any favorable response whatever. It is especially unfortunate that iie regime in Hanoi, which, along with'the Republic of Vietnam, is most di tly involved in the conflict, has dented th competence of the United Nations to concern itself with this dispute in any manner and has even refused to participate m the dis> ions in the Council.

Nonetheless, our commitments under the Charter of the United Nat' require u^ to persist in the search for a negotiated end to the cruel and futile violence that ravages the Republic of Vietnam, This responsibility— to persist in the search for peace—weighs especially upon the members of the Security Council, the primary organ of the United Nations for peace and irity affairs.

The purpose of this communi Eon therefore is to reemphasize 1 the members of the Council the following points:

First, that the United States will continue to provide, in whatever measure and for what r period U necessary, assistance to the people of the Republic of Vietnam in defending their independence, their soverehmtv. and their right to choose their own government and make their own decisions.

Second, the United States will continue to assist in the economic and social advancer of southeast Asia, under the leadership of Asian countries and the United Nations, and will continue to explore all additional possibi , especially in connection with the great projects taking shape in the Lower Mekong Basin,

Third, the United States will continue to explore, independently and in conjunction with oth all possible routes to an honorable and durable peace in southeast Asia,

Fourth, the U ■! States stands ready, as it has in the p-\<i> to collaborate u tditionally with members of the Security" Council in the search for an acceptable formula to restore peace and security to that area- of the vorld.

It is the hope of my rernment that the i :\)tvs of the Security Council will sos ' w find the means to respond effectively to the challenge raided by die r " 'e of affairs in southeast Asia.

I respectfully : ; this comnmnk n be circulated to the

members of the United Nation.-? a< a irity Council document

Accept, E:-. ^y. cue asauran : of my I I consideration,

Arthur J. Goldberg.

'U.S.: :-;<a to the l": '> 1 N .t!oi\sp«.3S :'..: r:*\ r -^

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CORRESPOXDKXCK WITH FOREIGN MINISTER FAXFAXI OF ITALY, NOVEMBER-DECEMBER, 1985 1 '

Foreign Minister Faxkaxi's Le r to President Johxsqx,

November 20, 19G5

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Hon. Lyndon* B. Johnson, President of the United S'

Mr. President: In the interview which you graciously accorded n at the end of May you repeated anew your firm intention to seek assiduously a negotiated solution for the conflict in Vietnam.

In the hope of being able to assist in the realization of thi- noble purpose, I brfog to your attention the following;: " On Thursday, X'ov er 11, in Hanoi, Ho Chi Minh, and the President of the Council, Van Dong, expressed to two person? (known to me) tl; strong desire to find a peaceful solution to the conflict in Vietnam and, in summary, stated—accounting to what they wrote me—that—

in order for the peace totiations to come about, there will be accessary (a) a cease-fire (by air, by sea, by tend) in the entire territory of Yl m (north and south); the cessation— that is, of all beltgerent operations (including therefore also tfc ssation of debarkation of further American troops); (b) a declaration according to which the Geneva agreements of 1954 will be taken as basis for

the negotiations — a declaration made up of the four points formulated by Hanoi! points that are i. ility the explanation of the Geneva text and which, ther -fore, can be reduced to a single point; application, In other words, of the Geneva accord.

The text of the commimieation which I have received adds that "the government in Hanoi is prepared to initiate negotiations without first requiring actual with ! awal of the Ameri an troops,"

To the same interlocutors Ho Chi Minh said: "I am prepared to go any where; to meet anyone." m

These are the e tial points that one of the two interlocutors of Ho Chi Minh an an Dong sent me in writing last night and which, in this letter of mine—c I ed to Mr. A. Gofdb the U.S. representative to the U.X., so, that he can deliver it promptly and conSd tally—I bring word for word to Your attention.

You surely have "her elements by which to judge the important of the above. As President of the 20th Assembly, as a high official of Italy, as a sincere friend of the United States and of yourself, I hope that this contribution to the sought-for peaceful solution, always more necessary and more urgent, may be a useful one. And I ai at your disposition for any step thai you consider opportune in the matter.

With sincere pleasure at your recovery nnd with best wishes for your high mission, I send my respectful greetings. Yours,

Amtxtore Faxfaxi.

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Secretary Rusk's Reply to Foreigx Minister Faxfaxi,

December 4, 1965

His Excellency Auixxoins Faxfaxi,

Foreign Minuter of Italy.

Dear Mr. Faxfaxi: My Government k most grateful to you for your-help and cooperation in transmit tin <r views" attributed" to the North Vietnamese G rnraent on :• rations to denl v.ith the problem of Vietnam. We have c: illy examh the suggestions you have conveyed, and I wish to make the foUowinsr co rents:

1. A? it has repeatedly suited, the United States is prepared to enter into discussions or negotiations with any govcr; m nt at anv time without any preconditions whatsoever- We reaffirm this willingness.

2. Although there is so: Lhiguity in tbe statement of Hanoi's position, your source seems to h ' ate that Hanoi would a e that negc tions mighl be ui d taken on the bj is-of tl .. -va , i :-meats of 1954 withoul any qualifications or condi . We for ou part would be willing to engage in negotiations on this bads without any qualifications or conditions. ^o

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3- The United States docs not, hi rer, agree with the contention that the four points advaj i by Hanoi constitute an authentic interpretation of the Geneva ngrc s of 1954. 1 U >nts in the four points, i blr the political pi n of the so-called National Liberation Front, have no b in the Geneva agreements, and Hanoi's apparent in on a prior dec] accepting the four points thus appears both to be ina nsistcnt with the agreements to require a substantive condition to negotiations. Nevertheless, we are prepared to include these four points fur consideration in m ' peace talks al< with any prop >a!s wMch the United States, South Vietnam, and other governments may wish to advance.

4, Your soiu also n tion another ^app; it Hanoi condition calling for a cease-fire and other ml res prior to negotiations. be United States would be prepared for negotiations without the imposition of any conditions of this nature. However, if a reduction cessation of hostilities were to be arranged prior to negotiations, it seems self-evident that it would have to be on an equitable and reciprocal basis. If tli were a cessati< of certain military activities on the one side, there would have to be an equivalent cc :i of military activities on the other. The formulation prop* by Hanoi's leaders does not a] r to meet this test, for example, in that it inipe no restraint on the continued infiltration of forces and equipment from North to South Vietnam.

5. The U.S. Government notes the message conveyed that North Vietnam wuiild not insist on the actual withdrawal of American for prior to the initi ton of negotiations. However, the clarification of

* this point, though not without significance in the light of conflicting public statements by Hanoi on the subject, still leaves the questions discussed in 2 and 3 above,

We are thus far from persuaded that statements by Ho Chi Mb and Fham Van Dong quoted by your Italian sources indicate a real willingness for unconditional negotiations. We woidd be pleased, for our part, however, on the basis of the considerations set forth above and perhaps in lighl of any further soundings your sources may make with Hanoi to discuss this matter further with you. 1 have asked Ambassador Goldberg, who bears this letter, to make himself available to you at any time for this purpose.

Further, if it develops foil' tg such discussions, or further contact by you with your sources, that a direct discussion with your Italian sources is deemed fruitful, a representative of the United States ivould be authorized to meet with them priva.b ly.

Finally, let me make it clear that you are free to draw on the contents of this letter, in any way you may desire, in communicating with vour sources. We would welcome your continuing assistance on this important matter.

With tin assurance of my highest consideration, Sincerely yours,

Deax Rusk.

Foreign Minister Fastfaxi's Reply to Secretary Rusk,

December 13, 1965

Dear Mr. Secretary: I received on December 6 your letter which Ambassador Goldberg had previously announced to me on November 29.

The same day I summarized in a document of mine essential observations i; by you on various points and I have jus: received word that on Wednesday last, Decern! S % si has been

confidentially delivered into the hands of a qualified rep esentativei order to be forwarded to Hanoi I think, i of today, said document has already reached its final destination.

* I would like to add I desire, Mr, Secretary, to thank you very much for the confidence .1 trust in my person you and the American Government have confirmed in your let: --. *f c rre yon tl

as soon as I receive any reaction on the points contab. the le*

I will inform you i iy.

Anticipating the pleasure of meeting you next week in Washington, I remain, Mr. Secretary,

AmixTore Fanta.vi.

' £>■:; ; af Stsfc* Egft&s, Jan. 3, r-v, pp. 11-13.

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STATEMENT CONC ENG 1964 PEACE OVERTURES

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The North Vietnamese regime has made it clear again and again that it will not enter into any discussions unless the conditions it has set down for sett] nt are accepted as the basis of negotiation. These conditions, amounting to a surrender of South Viet-Nara to Communist domination s and formulated most forcefully on April 8, 1965 by Premier Pham Van Dong in his "four points/ 1 include the withdrawal of United States Military Forces and acceptance of the program of the Viet Cong. Not only have the North Vietnamese reiterated these conditions on numerous occasions, but they have peremptorily rejected the repeated attempts of the United States to find an avenue to peaceful settlement, including notably the President's declaration of April 7, 1965, that we stand ready to engage in unconditional discussions.

>

In this regard, the Secretary made»the following statement in his , press conference of November 26, 1965:

- f, »..It is true that last autumn Ambassador 'Stevenson was informed by the Secretary General that he had been informed indirectly that Hanoi would be willing to have a contact with the United States and that the Secretary General had suggested Rangoon as a suitable site.

«

"When this matter arose, it was considered in the light of a great deal of information available at the time about the attitude of the authorities in Hanoi and, indeed, of other governments in the Communist world. I am not at liberty to cite all of these ccmi its, which were numerous, &ut you Will recall that the Canadian Minister of External Affairs reported to his House of Commons in June of this year that the Canadian Commissioner on the ICC had made several trips to Hanoi over the eight months prior to the end of May. There were other public indications such as the failure of the Polish proposals on Laos and the refusal of Hanoi to attend the UN Security Council in August. I myself had a number of discussiops with the representatives of other governments, including Communist governments. It seesn© cleg? beyond a peradventure of doubt chat Hsnai v/ss no: prepared to discuss peace in Southeast Asia b&5 upon the agreements of 1954 and 1962 and looking t.&w&rd ^he lifting of aggression against South Viet-Nam. Indeed-, in the latter part of 1964 Hanoi increased its infiltration, including units of its regular army* They undoubtedly felt they were on the threshold of victory. Just yesterday Hanoi denied that they had made any proposals for negotiations.

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"Throughout all of last year, the general attitude of the Communist world was that they might consider soma device to save the face of the United States while they themselves imposed their will upon South Viet-Nam. Our attitude was and is that we are not interested in saving face but in saving South Viet-Nam. *

* ■

"It is worth recalling that President Kennedy and his principal advisers made a far-reaching review of the situation in Southeast Asia early in 1961, and determined to do everything possible to find a peaceful settlement based upon the integrity and the safety of the smaller nations of Southeast Asia. President Kennedy's talks with Chairman Khrushchev in June 1961 led tp_ agreement__in principle on Laos but not on Vief-Nam. - The Laotian Conference succeeded in concluding the agreement of 1962, an agreement which failed because Hanoi refused to comply with it in any way, shape or form. Nevertheless, during and after thaL conference the United States' has had repeated discussions about the possibilities of a peaceful settlement in Southeast Asia. * ~T

"Hanoi, in their well known four points, has indicated its basic position on Viet-Nam. They have refused to accept the suggestion that their points can be discussed along with all other points presented by other Governments,-They, therefore, exclude in advance the position which they know the United States will take, namely, that North Viet-Nam must stop its aggression against South Viet-Nam and discontinue its effort to impose the program of the National Liberation Front on South Viet-Nam by force.

"There have been many efforts by the United States and by other governments throughout the past five years to achieve peace for the nations of Southeast Asia, Leaving aside all questions of diplomatic procedure there has not been and there is not now any indication from Hanoi that they are prepared to accept the self-determination and independent existence of their neighbors as free countries rather than what the economist countries have come to call their wars of national liberation.

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"You are familiar with many initiatives which have been taken during the past year to bring this matter from the •battlefield to the conference table but you are also familiar with the increased infiltration by North Viet-Nam to

impose their will by force* *

• - • • «

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"Our task remains, therefore, that which President Johnson has often stated, namely, to assist our friends in South Viet-Nam to repel the aggression against them and, at the same time, to keep open every possibility of a peaceful settlement. For this purpose, as President Johnson has repeatedly declared, we are prepared for unconditional discussions with the governments concerned, or, as the 17 non-aligned nations phrased it, negotiations without preconditions/ 1 *

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4/17d - 1266BT

Office of Public Services Bureau of Public Affairs Department of State Washington, D.C. 20520

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SECRETARY RUSK'S NEWS CONFERENCE, NOVEMBER.26,

19G5 (Excerpts) l

Since my return from the Inter-American Conference I have read wh&thasl i said during my absence about the so-called peac< fe of last autumn, I hare ako seen the fragment on this subject which app d recently in a national magazine. It is true that last autumn Ambassador Stevenson vvas informed by S --vy General U Tbant that he had been informed indirectly that Hanoi tvould be willing to have a em .t with the United States and that the Sec :y General had susr^ested Rangoon as & suitable site.

Vfhen this matter arose, it- was considered in the light of a great deal of information^available at the time about the attitude of the authorities in Hanoi find, indeed, of other governments in the Communist worlds I am not at liberty to cite all of these contacts, which were numerous, but you will recall that the ( clian Minister of External Affairs reported to his House of Commons in June of this year that the Canadian Commissioner on the ICC had made several trips to Hanoi over the S months prior to the end of May, There were other public i: ations such as the failure of the Polish proposals on Lao? and the refusal of Hanoi to attend the U.N. Security Council in August. I myself had a number of discussions with the representatives of other government--, including Communist governments. It seems clear be}"ond a perad venture of doubt that I- o? was not prepared to discuss peace in southeast Asia based upon the agreements of 1954 and 1962 and looking toward the lifting of ajsgn : : g jainst South Vietnam. Indeed, in the lattt art of 1964Hanoi incre I its infiltration, including units of its regular armjr. They undoubtedly felt that they were on the threshold of victory. Just yesterday Hanoi denied that they had made any proposals for negotiations.

Throughout all of last year, the general attitude of the Communist world was that they might consider some device to save the face of the United States while they themselves imposed their will upon South Vietnam. Our attitude was and is that we are not interested in saving face but in saving South Vietnam.

It is worth recalling that President Kennedy and his principal advisers made a far-reaching review of the situation in southeast Asia early in 1961, and determined to do even-thing possible to find a peaceful settlement based upon the integrity and the safety of the smaller nations of southeast Asia. President Kennedy's talks wi

Chairman Khrushchev in June 1961 led to agreement in principle on Laos but not on Vietnam. The Laotian Conference succeeded in concluding the agreement of 19&2, an agreement which f d becau Hanoi refused to comply with it in any way, shape, or form. Nevertheless, during and after that conference the United State:; has had repeated discussions about the possibilities of a peaceful settlement in southeast Asia.

Hanoi, in their well-known four points, has indicated its basic position on Vietnam. They have refused to accept the suggestion that their points can be discussed along with all other points present by other governments. They, therefore, exclude in advance the position which they know the United States and others will take; namely, that North Vietnam must stop its aggression t fast South Vietnam and discontinue its efiori to impose the program of the National Liberation Front on South Vietnam by force.

There have been many efforts by the United States and by other governments throng] out the past 5 years to achieve peace for the nations of southeast Asia. Leaving aside all questions of diplomatic procedure, there has not been and there 3s not now any indie n from Hanoi that they are prepared to accept the self-determination and the independent existence of their neighbors as free countries rati than wbnt the Communist countries have come to call their wars of national liberation.

. You arc familiar with many initiatives which have been taken during the past year to bring this matter from the 1 -Id to the con-

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

fercnce table and you are also familiar with the increased infiltration by North Vietnam to impose*their will by fores

Our task remains, therefore, that which President Johnson has often stated; namely, to assist our friends in South Vietnam to repel the aggression against i and, at the same time, io keep open every

Josstbilky of a peaceful settlement. For this purpose, as Pre ohnson has repeatedly declared, we are prepared for unconditional discussions with the govern rtts concerned, or, as the 17 nonalined nations phrased it, negotiations without preconditions.

Question. Mr. Secretary, in the Unfit of your statement about the Vietnamese situation, ij today we had such an indication through Mr, Thant or any other channel that they were prepared to contact, apparently without specific conditii ' we aa

Answer. Well, the President has said, on more than one occasion, and so have I, that we are prepared for unconditional discussions or, as the 17 nations put it, negotiations without precondition.

In view of the statement made by Hanoi in the last 24 hours, 1 would not predict that this is likely to occur in the next week or

Question. Well, icould you say, then, that we ha softened

our position; that Is rem last year we sensed — we ati I some conditions to our position, that this time

Answer. No, I think this is a problem of nuance here.

President Johnson said in April of this year, publicly and clearly, without any doubt whatever, that we are prepared for uaconditidn discussions.

Prior to that time the discussions had been private; that is, our attitude on this had been private.

I have myself spent hours and hours and hours since 1061 with representatives of the other side talking about peace in southeast Asia. There was never any period when we were unwilling to talk about peace in southeast Asia.

Now, at the time last autumn, I want to c ient, and I cannot pursue it, that this was not the only contact by* any means. Then?

re many contacts with the other side, including fianoi. This was not the only contact. ^

This particular incident had to be lot at in—against the background of a very considerable activity that was going on among the foreign offices of the world, to d termiue whether or not this particular

"ng made a significant difference.

Question. Mr, Secretary, are you saying thai there was no change in American policy in so Jar as negotiations are concerned dating from last April 71

Answer. Well, in April the President said at Baltimore that we are prepared for unconditional di ssions. I think that perhaps that was the first time that it had been said in just those words publicly. But this was not a major change in tL- souse that for the past 5 years we have been in continuous contact with representatives of the Communist world^ about peace in southeast Asia, There has never been any cessation of discussion on this subject. There has has never been any lack of c rtunitv to bring this matter of peace to the conference table, if the other side is prepared to stop trying to impose their will be force on South Vietnam.

So that if there was a difference in the public way in which this matter was stated, e vv as no difference in the basic objective of

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number; NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 I

the United States, and no difference on the point that we were in regular con tad with the Communist world.

Question. V/hcn you say without precondition^ liQWi r, you are talking only about without preconditi is of getting in the m to

open discussions, are ; i not, I- ■ tst you li f ! - numl r of conditions which the U I Stati ^ould have in U rms of the settlement to be reached at an\ \ch discussions.

Answer. Well, I do not suppose that anyone would expect the United States, in agreeing to discussions without preconditions, to imply thereby that we are going to accept the program of the oth side in such cV -ions.

Question. Therefore you concede that the other side irtll also com with its preconditions.

Answer. Well, we have already said to the other side—we have already said publicly to the other side thai we are prepared to talk about "their proposals along with the proposals of all the other governments concerned, and they have tun that down.

Question. Your point is thai as of today, aside from the technical problem which you cj Jt <: tth v a ling started, tfte situation is that v:c are willing to listen to their preconditions for settlement as 3 as our own, that they ere not willing to listen to our preconditions as well as theirs.

Answer. Well, the question of whether, for example, their four points, Mr. Roberts, are preconditioned to any discussion, or any conference, lias varied a little oyer time.

There have been moments, quite frankly, when it has appeared ths i they were rigid preconditions, that these four points would have to 1 accepted 1 lore there can he any serious discussions.

There have been other t' when we had the impression that there were not necessarily preconditions to discussions, but that they would be the points on which the other side would sist as necessary fc

peace.

I would—one has (he impression that in recent w their attitude has been moving toward these four points as preconditions somewhat more than might have been our impression for a time. We don't know. We don't know,.

But what we are saying is that if they want to come to the conference table, if they want to have discussions, we will d ss, and in those discussions iher can say anything that they want to. But we must be free to say anything that we want to. And then we will try to find our whether there is a basis for peace.

But we are not going to limit discussions to their four points.

Now, these have got to be discussions in which governments can talk like governments, discuss their problems, their interests, their demands, to see whether in that kind of mutual discussion there is any basis for peace.

Now, we did that in 1961, on Laos, and it seemed, in the Vienna conversations between Chairman Khrushchev and President Kennedy, that there was a basis for a settlement of the Laotian question.

No such basis appeared in discussing Vietnam.

We got tl inference and the agreement on Laos.

And as I pointed out in my statement, the problem with that is that Hanoi never complied with it.

But I don't want to leave the impression that we are—I think it is import to be clear on two things; that we are prepared for discussions, without.conditions, without preconditions. But we are not going to promise in advance or at an}' time that we are going to give away the basic interests of the South Vietnamese people and South Vietnam, and theint of the United States w] we go into such

discussions. The other side h not going to do that

So the problem is to find out whether, given the attitudes, the interests, the commit of the two s" , if peace is [ ible.

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i Dep.2r:^±— '-• ■ :; •-"---^ Ko. tt, £mi Not. 15,1^3,

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LETTER PROM AMBASSADOR ARTHUR J. GOLDBERG, U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED NATIONS, TO SECRETARY GENERAL U TIfANT, JANUARY 5, 19G6 '

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His Excellency U Tnaxt, Secretary General, U: I Nations.

Dear Mr, Secretary General: My Government has during the past 2 weeks been taking a number of steps in pursuit of peace which How in part from our oSligations under the United Nations Charter, of ^> a we arc most mindful, and in part from the appeals which His Holiness the Pope and you add sed just before Christmas to us and to others, I beli ve it would be of interest to you, in addition to what we have already communicated to you privately, all

States members of the United Nations to know more precisely what we have done, and what we have i ind.

You will observe that we have already responded in terms which go somewhat beyond the appeals earlier addressed to us. President Johnson dispatched messages, and in several cases personal representatives, to His Holiness the Pope, to the Secretary General of the United Nations and to a considerable number of chiefs of state or heads of gov*, meiit, reaffirming our desire promptly to achieve a peaceful settlement of the conflict in Vietnam and to do all in our power to move that conflict from the battlefield to the co nee table, In this connection, our bombing of Xorlh Vietnam has not been resumed since the Christmas truce.

Among the points made in our me :es conveyed to a number of governments are the following: That the UniUd States is prepared for discussions or ne^otia 5 without any prior conditions whatsoever or on the basis of the Geneva Accords of 1054 and 1962, that a reciprocal reduction of hostilities could be envisaged and that a cease-fire might be the first order of business in any discussion or negotiations, that the United States remi prepared to withdraw its forces from South Vietnam as soon as South Vietnam is in a position to determine its own future without external interference, that the United States desires no continuing military presence or bases in Vietnam, that the future political struc in South Vietnam should be determined by the South Vietnamese people themselves through democratic processes, and that the que of the reunification of

the two Vietnams ild be decided by the free decision of their two peoples,

I should appreciate it if this letter could be communicated to all members of the United Nations as a Security Council document.

I should urge them in exami to recall President - ason's

letter of July 2S. 1965, to the Secretary G al in which the President invited all members of the United Nations, individually and collectively, to use their influence to bring about unconditional discussions, and tax letter of July 31, 1865 (document S/6575) to the President of the Security Council in which I said, inter . that the United States stands ready, as it lias In the past, to collaborate unconditionally with members of the Security Council in the search for an ace formula to restore peace and security to that area of the world. I should hope that on the present occasion also organs of the United Nations and all States would give even more earnest thought to what they might do to help to achieve these ends. Sincerely yours,

Arthur J. Goldberg,

i U.S. iz&ifoa to Vzi VslU ! Kitfdna press reteise >ro, i*3l, : ' fis. 5. iSsd,

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U.S. OFFICIAL POSITION ON VIETNAM: Slate Department

Press Release* January 7, IS66 l

The following statements are on the public record about elements which the United States believes can go into peace in southeast Asia:

1. The Geneva Agreements of 1954 and 1962 are an adequate basis for peace in south I Asia;

2. We would welcome a conference on southeast Asia or on any part thereof;

3. We would welcome ''negotiations without preconditions" as the 17 nations put it;

4. We would welcome unconditional discussions as President Johnson put it;

5. A cessation of hostilities could be the first order of busin at a conference or could be the subject of preliminary discussion

6. Hanoi's four points could be discussed along with other points which others might wish to propose;

7. We want no U.S. bases in south Asia;

S. We do not desire to retain U.S. troops in South Vietnam after peace is assured;

9. We support free elections in South Vietnam to give the South Vietnamese a government of their own choice;

10. The question of reunification of Vietnam should be determined by the Vietnamese through their own free decision;

lh The countries of souti la can be non alined or neutral

if that be their option;

12. We would much prefer to use our resources for the economic reconstruction of southeast Asia than in war. If there is peace, North Vietnam could participate in a regional effort to which we would be prepared to contribute at least SI billion;

13. The President has said:

The Victeong would not have difficulty being represented and having their views represented if for a moment Hanoi decided she wanted to cease 'aggression* 1 don't think that would be an insurmountable problem.

14. We have said publicly and privately that we could stop the bombing of North Vii m as a step toward peace although there has not been the slightest hint or suggestion from tlie other side as to what they would do if the bombing stopped.

i Depsrtmg&t of State pn sa release Xo. 4 thtvi Jzn. 7,1965.

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

EXTRACT FROM THE PRESIDENT'S STATE OF THE

UNION M 1SAGE. JANUARY 12, 19G6 > *******

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Not too tii any years ago Vietnam was a peaceful, if troubled, land. In the north was an mdepend Communist government. In the south a people struggled to build a i ;on, with the friendly help of the United States. m _ . ■

There were some in South Vietnam \yho wished to force Conimuni: rule on their own people. But their progress was slight. Th hope of success was dim. Then, little m than 6 years ago, North Vietnam decided on conquest. From that day to this, soldiers and supplies have moved from north to south in a swelling stream— swallowing the remnants of revolution in aggression.

As the assault mounted, our clu gradually became clear. We could leave, abandoning South Vietnam to its attackers and to certain conquest, or we could stay and fight beside the people of South Vietnam,

We stayed.

And we will stay until aggression has stopped.

We will stay because a jus nation cannot leave to the crueltii of its enemies a people who have staked their lives and independence Oil America's solemn pledge—a pledge which has grown through the commitments of three American Presidents.

Wo will shay because in Asia—and around the world—are countries whose indepe I >ee rests, in large measure, on confidence in America's word and in America's protection. . To yield to force in Vietnam would weaken that confide would undermine the independence of many lands, and would whet the appetite of the aggr< or. We would have to fight in one! 1, and we would have to fight in another— or abandon much of Asia to the d of Communists,

And we do not intend to abandon Asia to conquest.

Last year the nature of the war in Vietnam changed again. Swiftly inc " .; numbers of armed men from the north crossed the ] ler to join forces that were already in the south. Attack and ten increased, spurred and encour 1 by the belief that the United Star lacked the will to continue and that their victory was near.

Despite our desire to limit conflict, it was i to act: to hoi!

back the mounting aggression, to give courage to the people of the south, and to make our firmness clear to the north.. Thus we began limited air action against military targets in North Vietnam. We increased our fighting force to its present strength tonight of 190,000 rmiu

These moves have not ended the aggression but they have prevented its succe The aims of the enemy have been put out of reach by the skill and the bravery of Americans and their allies—and by the enduring courage of the South Vietnamese who, I can tell you, have lost eight men last year for every one of ours.

The enemy is no longer close to victory. Time is no longer on his side. There is no cause to doubt the American commitment.

Our decision to stand firm has been matched by our desire for peace.

In 1963 alone we had 300 private talks for pe in Vietnam with friends and adversaries, throughout the world.

Since Christmas your Gov ; meat has labored again— regul-

ation and endurance—to remove any barrier to peaceful settlement

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For 20 davs now we and our Vietnamese allies have dropped no bombs in North Vieti .

Able and experienced spokesmen have visited, in behalf of America, more than 40 countries. We have talked to more than a hundred governments—all 113 that we have relations with, and some that we don't. We talked to the United Nations and we have culled upon all of its members to make any contribution that they can toward helping obtain peace.

In public s ements and in private communications-—to adversaries and to friends, in Borne and Warsaw, in Paris and Tokyo, in Africa and throughout this hemisphere—America has made her position abundantly clear.

We seek neither territory nor bases, economic domination or military alliance in Vietnam. We fi for the principle of self-determination— that the people of South Vietnam should be able to choose then* own Course, choose it in free elections without vj ce, without terror, and without fear. The people of^ all Vj nam should make a free decision on the great quo tiou of reunification.

This Is ell we want for South Vietnam. It is all the people of South Vietnam want. And if there is a single nation on this earth that desires less than this for its own people, then let its voice be heard.

We have also made it clear—from oi to New York—that there

are no arbitrary limits to our search for peace. We stand by the Geneva agreements of 1954 and 1962. We will meet at &ny conference table, we will discuss any prop —4 points or 14 or 40—and we will consider the views of any group, We will work for a cease-fire now or once discussions have begun. We will n ; -id if others reduce their of force, and we will withdraw our soldiers once South

Vietnam is securely guaranteed the right to shape its own future.

We have said all this, and we have d—and hoped—and we have waited for a response.

So far we have received no response to prove cither success or failure.

We have carried our quest for peace to many nations and peoples because we share this planet with others whose fut lire, in large measure, is tied to our own action, and whose counsel is nee ty to our own hopes.

We have found understanding and support. And we know they wait with us tonfeht for some response that could lead to peace.

I wish tonight that I could give you a blueprint for the course of this conflict over the coming month *, but we just cannot know what the future may require. We may have to face long, hard combat or a long, hard conference, or even Loth at once.

Until peace comes, or if it does not come, our course is clear. We will act as we must to help protect the independence of the vali people of South Vietnam. We will strive to limit the conflict, for we wish neither increased destruction nor do we want to invite increased

danger.

But we will give our fight: 1 g men what they must have: every gun, every dollar, and every decision—whatever the cost or whatever the challenge.

And we will continue to help the people of South Vietnam care for those that are ravaged by battle, create progress in the villages, and carry forward the i ting hopes of peace as best the}" can amidst the uncertain terrors of war.

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And let me be absolutely clear: the days may become months, and the months may become y* ars, but we will stay as long as on

commands us to battle.

There may be some who do not want peace—whose ambitions stretch so far that war in Vietnam is but a welcome and convenient episode in an immense desfen to subdue history to their will. But for others it must now be clear the choice is not between peace and victory. It lies between peace and the ravages of a conflict fro which they can only lose.

The people of Vietnam, Xorth and South, seek the same things; the shared needs of man, the needs for food and shelter and cd ucation— the chance to build and work and till the soil, free from the arbitrary horrors of battle—the desire to walk in the dignity of those who master their own destiny. For many painful years, in war and revolution and infrequent peace :y have struggled to fulfill those needs.

It is a crime against mankind that so much courage, and so much will, and so many dreams, must be flung on the fires of war and death.

To all of those caught up in this conflict, we therefore say again tonight: Let us choose ; eace, and li it the wondrous works of peace, and beyond that, the time when hope reaches toward consummation, and life is the servant of life*

In this work, we plan to discharge our duty to the people whom we

serve.

This is the state of the Union.

But over it all—wealth, promise, and expectation—lies our troubling awareness of American men at war tonight.

How i i tea who listen to me tonight have served their Nation

in other wars? How very many are not here to listen?

The war in Vietnam is not like these other wars. Yet, finally, war is always the same. It is young men dying En the fullness of th promise. It is trying to kill a man that you do not even know well enough to hate.

Therefore, to know war is to know that there is still madness in thi

woi

Many of you share the burden of this knowledge tonight with me. But there is a di6 ence. For finally I must be the one to order our

funs to fire, against all the most inward pulls of my desire. For we ave children to teach, and we have sick to be cured, and we have men ,to be freed There are poor to be lifted up, and there are cities to be built, and there is a world to be helped.

Yet we do what we must,

I am hopeful, and I will try as best I can, with everything I have got, to end this battle and to return our sons to their desires.

Yet as long as others will challenge America's security and test the dearness of our beliefs with fire and steel, then we must stand or see the promise of two centuries tremble. I believe tonight that you do not want me to try that risk. And from that belief your Pre it summons his strength for the trials that lay ahead in the days to

come.

The work must be our work now. Scarred by the weaknesses of man, with whatever guidance God may offer us, we must nevertheless and alone with our mortality, strive to ennoble the life of man on earth.

K-Eoise'Decides? X* &t, ; -'- C^.;., :i x*s.

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ADDRESS BY AMBASSADOR ARTHUR J, GOLDBERG, US. REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED NATIONS, AT HOWARD UNIVERSITY, WASHINGTON, D.C.

February io, ig6j

I appreciate very deeply the honor which Howard University has paid me today. The ideals Howard has stood for, and the pioneering things it has achieved, in its first century are not merely of local but of national and indeed international significance. For the future of our democracy depends on the opportunity—such as Howard has always sought to provide—for eve y American to develop to the fullest his inborn potential of character and intellect. In pursuit of this ideal I feel certain chat Howard will provide its second century a leadership no less important than in the century you have just completed.

You may be sure that when I use the word "leadership" in connect:* with Howard University I am not thinking in the abstract; I am thinking with great admiration and gratltud< ' one particular leader, your eminent President and my dear friend and colleague, Dr. James M. Nabrit, Jr.

As you know, when the President asked me to assume the post of United States Representative to the United Nations and I had to find a Deputy Representative who could share the immense difficulties of that vital work : peace, I sought out Jim Nabrit; and by dint of hard negotiating I manag to get him for one year. During that year I had countless occasions to be grateful for his clear and vigorous mind, his ability to see to the heart of a complex problem, his force of character, his charm and persuasiveness—all of which made him a most effective and memorable advocate of the United States in the ecu ncils of the world.

I know you are as proud as I am of the services Dr. Xabrlt has rendered his country. And much though we at the US miss him, we must acknowledge that here at Howard University he is still rendering an outstanding service to his country.

h seems to me fitting that, in the presence of Dr. Nabrit who shared with me for more than a year in the search for peace. I should report from my

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United Nations vantage [ • or. where we now stand in the uneeasin; effort to achieve a just and honorable negotiated settlement of the conflict in Vietnam. It is equally fitting that this report should he made 'vers ley

campus, for no issue of our day has brought forth a greater involvement on the part of our universities than I nc question.

Our effort to open the door t< In

recent wee! public aa ' been foebssed o n this effort by an i iJL

r, -r I ; .;> a nd-events: p ronoun : . :its_by_the_£

meats involved, appeals b\ rid leaders including Po] General U_TJ • Sadcs 3J I uueh^arien:-. | $ ' -

and the perplexing events in Mainland China, Right now we are in the midst of another pause in the fighting, the Lunar New Year truce. Thus this may be a good moment to assess the present status of our efforts for peace.

In such an assessment, a responsible official must, in all that he says in public, avoid damaging the hopes for progress through private diplomacy. But in a free society he must also accept the inescapable responsibility to keep the public adequately informed. h is difficult to deal on both levels at once but it is essentia! to do so as well as we can.

Let mc begin, then, by recalling the basi aims i n Viet-

nam._ These aims have been stated man) times by President Johnson and other responsible spokesmen of the United St They have been stated

over a span of two years, but t bb a ad Row of the military situation during that time has not made them any less valid as guidelines for peace negotiations. We do not subscribe to the false notion that a strong military position obviates the desirability seeking peace through negotiations, Today, therefore, I wish to re the essence of these American aims.

The United States se eks a ' solution ld YJeJ - V* &

the of our adversaries. W e seek a .< ttlement whose

terms will result no t from dictation, but ' negotiations—a

settlemen t who se .terr. will not s: ifice the vital interest of any p arty. In

the words of the- N rirnjJ •: : "The scrr' r in Yiet-

nam de pends on the readings ajad ft'llli j ' pa rties concerned to

exp lore a nd work i ' &j jmj ;md reasonable soluthv,." As President

Johnson said a week ago here in Washington: Such a solution "will in-

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We are not eng aged in a "holv war" against comr ism. We do r. seek an Am >. &pi ; JKfcJuO A;n; nor_.a .permanent American

"presence" of any kind—military or otherwise—in Vieir. ■ ; nor the impositi on of a milita allianceon South Vi \ si.

We do not s • '. i i do any injury to Mainland China nor to threat any .of its legitimate interests-

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Wc seek to assure to tl c of South Vietnan rtl 3 ffin ft live c

of the rig ht of s elf-determi nation—: hc right to decide th n pol iti

destiny free of. external jiKcr:'-r-n-r \ . and through d tic

processes In kcej ._ j h theann .... | 5 ' Vietnamese Gove icnti policy of na ■ncilinci ;^. '■• : ■ not seek to i ny;j

South Vietnamese people fi peaceful garticij n in thei r c ount ry s future, Wc are t .. red to ; Its of that dec] wha tevci it

may_bc. Wc support the early c'onsum :,ofa-" .era":: cons:; rial

system in S tl Vietnam, and frclcome the gi .• ; being ; to this en

As regards North Vj t, we have no i • on its ten

do not seek to i row its go] i ' itevej its i deolo gy. Wc are

prepared fully to r :t its sovereignty and ten integrity and to ent

into specific undertakings to that end.

We " vc the reunification of Vietnam should be deci de 1 uj i th igh a free choice by the peoples o f both the North and the South without any outside interference; an J the results of that choice also will have our full support. Finally*-.when peac tgred v., are wilting ke a major cornrnj

p n mt of money, talent and resources to a multilateral coo per b ring to all of S outheas t A including N . ., the benefit!

.economic and social jrj tjort and devdopn rrt whicj tl ; eajo

^sorely needs,.

These, then, are the peace aims of the United States. They parallel the objectives stated by the South Vietnamese Government at Manila. Our aims are strictly limited and we sincerely belie contain nothing in-

consistent with the interests of any party. Our public pronouncement? of them—both in Washington and a: the United Nations—are solemn commitments by the United States.

Our adversaries have also placed their aims and objectives on the public record over the past two years. The n ; aims is thj

well-known "Four; Poii ' " >], which I wtU summarize witho ut

trtfag too much from their owi trratnol

The n.-.-: ;'-';:; c.ois to: pjco c ;.: : A : ;l of th. basic national rights of the Vi etnamese peop l e: pe . s overeig n:;., unit ricori !

inte grity. It als o calls for the ces all_a.; £ war ag >t thcNortl

thcjmdin g of Unite d Stat es intervents - in the S h; the withdi i_alj

U nited States tr oops, mili: :;■ pe rsonnel and w is of all kin mantling of A merican bases and the c •■■-..! : of what i. tejrju t! United States "milit ar y alliance' 1 with So uth Vietnam.

The United States would not find any essentia! difficulty with a reasonable interpretation or any of the terms included in this point. Our chief concern is what It does not in : namely, that North Vietnam also ce its inter-

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vendon in the South, end alljjf its acts of w j unst the S >uth, and vvith-^ draw its forces from the South* Such a requirement is obviously essentia! to the 'pence" to which this first point refers.

The sec ond p oint relates to the military'clauses.of Scneya agreements^ It provides that, y: . b lj the peaceful reunil J^jjL^em3jii,«UQSiJLJ^ North and t he South must refrain from joining any milita ry and,

that there should be no foreign bases, tr ; - or military personnel in the*£ jcsy<cciiyc_lt rritQric.?*_

Here again, the only real difficulty is the omission of any obligation on the North to withdraw its military forces from the South—altru the Geneva Accords which established the demarc n line in Vietnam forbid military interference of any sort by one side in the affairs of the other, and even go so far as to forbid civilians to cross the demilitarized zone.

The third point calls for th e settlement of the Sou th'. ! affairs "in __

accordai with the . . : the National Liberation Front for South

Vietnam". /This point, of rje, was not a ggn oj the Geneva Accg r.ds at all. [t introduces a new clement which I shall d iscuss late i irj thi s anal ysis*/

The fourth p oint calls for the p eacef ul ion of Vi . to bo.

settled by the people of both zpnes without any foreign interference . We have no difficulty with this point as was indicated in my speech to the General Assembly on September 22.

There has apparently been added a . fifth .point—put forward and repeatedly endorsed by both H .1 and the Nations! Lib.:. :" \ ront since th eenui : ion of i in April, 1905. This fifth point was stated

by Ho Chi Minhjn January, 1966, when he said that if the United Stafc really wants peace, it must rc o;^:.:?- the X a] Liberation Front as the "sole genuine represent, ti ve" of the people of Soul "■. j . 1, and engage in negot iation w ith it^/This, like the third of the "Fpug Poin ts", introduces a new element which was not part of the Geneva Accords. /

Now, from this brief summation of our aims and those declared by Hanoi, it is clear that there are areas of agreement and areas of disagreement. Recent public statements by Hanoi have been helpful in certain aspects, but how great the disagreements are is still uncertain because the stated aims of Hanoi still contain a number of ambiguities. I would like to discuss some of these ambiguities because they relate to very consequential matters-There is ambiguity, for example, on the ro' e of the National Ltl Front in peace ne gotiati I have already noted the statement of Ho

Chi Minh and other spokesmen for our adversaries who have said that we must recognize the Front as "the sole genuine representative of the South Vie t na mese pe op!e f and nego t \ a te wi di it**. If thi s m e 3 n s th 31 we a - asked to cease our rec of the Government in Saigon and ' ' 0 dy with the

Front, insistence on this polnC would imperil the search for peace. For the

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Front has not been chosen by any democratic process to represent the j of South Vietnam. Nor has the Front been recognized by the world community, h h pertinent to recall that more than 69 nations recognize the Government of the Republic of Vietnam in Saigon, whet is none recognizes the National Liberation Front as a government.

On the other h \ - ;ue pvK' ■ tc?_call ff ; r the N \ sal

Liberation Ft-.:.: to be g iven a place or voice at the nej gating table. t his were the p n of our j I versa ^t! ts would, be brigh t :: I

President Johnj ::, as I . > as July, Lpf^jgajd shaj "the Viet CpngWj

not have difficulty in being rep ated and in 1 taVi|tg th eir view s presented if Hanoi for a moment decides that it wants to cease ession". He added

:-" "oct

.th at this did not see: e "an insurm ible problem / 1 and that

"I think that could be vvoi ked ou t M .

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A f r am biguity re] ' to the roj - J Liberatio n From

in the future political li fe of . Vietnam , Hanoi asks that the affairs of

South Vietnam be settled "in accordance with the program of the National Liberation Front". Our adversaries, in their various comments on this point, take no notice of the internationally recognized Government of So uh Vietnam or of the steps which the South Vietnamese leaders have taken, and have currently under way, and the institutions they are now creating, for the purpose of providing their country with a constitutional and representative | mmeru.

Nor would their statements seem to leave any place for the South Vieti mese who have participated in and promoted such steps. Such an interpret

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tation would pose serious obstacles to a settlement.

However, some claim that what the National Liberation Front real!) seeks is no more thin the opportunity to advance its program peacefully along with other elements and grc gs in the South in a free political environment

Wc have already made It clear that we do not wish to exclude any segment of the South Vietnamese people from peaceful participation in their country's future, and that we support a policy of national reconciliation endorsed by the South Vietnamese Government in the Manila Communique, Indeed, as See:.:, ry Rusk sai \ In an interview I week, if the Viet Cong were to lay down they -. vvays cpul ' ; found to permit them to take

part in the normal ;■■ Itti i\ proces ses in South Vietna m.

Furthe r frmfoi j e>_anse q . rjpung d : : foreign_troops_in.

South Vie tnam, What dees Hanoi mean by "foreign troops*'? Tl

clearly include In this term the forces of the United States and other countries aiding [he South, but they have never admitted the presence of their own forces in the South. Ot course, a one-sided withdrawal by our side

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would not lead to an acceptable peace. All external forces must withdraw, those of Hanoi as well as ours, i: peace is to be achieved.

T here is ambiguity al so in Han *: osttion on the timin g of the with -drawal of external forces. Do oar adversaries consider withdrawal of forces as a precondition to negotiations, as some of their statements tmpij ? It s< this again would raise a serious obstacle to progress. But S£ they look on withdrawal of forces as a provision to be incorporated in a settlement, this clearly could be worked out. The United States and its allies are already on record m the Manila Communique that their > "will be withdrawn , .-.

as the other side withdraws its forces to the Nbrchj ceases infiltration, and the level of violence thus subsides. Those forces v. ill be withdrawn as sooi as possible and not later than six months after the above conditions have been fulfilled". Further, we have indicated our willingness to join in a phased and supervised withdrawal of forces by both sid •■.

Next, there is ambiguity hi Hanoi's positio n on the ce; of North Vietnam. At times their pujblj re dej ' xl.that

thc_bombing he ended uncc ' ' ally, ■• j ' ny reference v . | : '' |

response from tlte!r side. O n the oj h r hand, qui*.- re cc a -spokes man [

Hanoi said that "if, after the definitive and unconditional cessation of the

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bon " American Government pr £0 enter into contact

with the [..'■ h Vietnamese! Govs nent, . . , this pro] • \ will he ej a mine d and studied *'. And just this week we have seen a further statement, in an interview by the North Vietnamese foreig n Minister, t 1 atces the "could i : between North Vic acJL/.S.'i

Many of their stater: that the bombing cease have also con-

tained other expressions, such as that the American military presence in South Vi an be completely withdrawn, and that the "Four Points' 1 of Hanoi must be recognized and accepted as "the" basis—or possibly as "a" basis—for settlement of the conflict. This c 5 an additional ambigui" as to whether Hanoi means to add still other prenegottadng conditions.

The position of the United States on this bombing question has been Stated by a number of Administration spokesmen, including me at the United Nations. The United States re: :d to take the first step

and order a cessation of all I a ' ing of_North Vietnam the m :e

.a ssured, | l y or ot h rwhe, that this step will ,•_; .-.J prompdy \

a ta v ^Gi\^ toward per-. N :*h Viet nam, In his letter of

February S to His I ess, Pop-e Paul, President Johnson said: "... I know you would not expect us to reduce military action unless the other side is willing to do likewise. We are prepared to discuss the b ed reduction

in military activity, the cessation of hostilities or any practical arrangements

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which could lead to these results. We shall continue our efforts for a peaceful and honorable sc tent until they are crowned with success.* 1

Some analysis contend that our terms of self eiit should be more p; eiseJy defined. But it is very dil uh to be more precise in advance of negotiation and particularly in light of the substantive n tries on the other side. But whatever questions may be raised, they should and can best I resolved in discussions between the parties who have the power to resolve then). For our part, we stand ready to v. tate in good faith unconditionally to resolve all outstanding questi

The. Unit ■: J State s_agpro .:!i to neg otiations is flexible . We and our allies do nptask our ad; J esjo a ; | - LJ . j ■ di c usslon j ■>

JEtatipjis, any | pf_gtfi5JQ_! ' is. Nor do we

rule out the discussion of any | > of theirs, ho*.vc ■ r difficult they might appear to us. We are willing to discuss and negotiate not only our ov points but Hanoi's "Four Points" and points emanating from any other source, including the Secretary General of the United Nations.

I t remains to be seen vv j < ur advers aries share this concep t of ncgo-

;_tjatjo ns. As I have already pointed out, their various public declarations of peace aims have often been coupled with statements that the goals they put forward must, for example, be "accepted 11 or "recognize as the "sole basis" or "the most correct basis" or "the only sound basis" or "the basis for the most correct political solution".

Such statements contain still further ambiguity—in one sense the most fundamental of all, since it relates to the concept of negotiation Itself. Do these statements mean that Hanoi is willing to enter negotiations onlv if there is ah assurance i t the l outcome will be on ■: tr terms

will, in effect, simply ratif y the goals they have already s:a:cd? Such an attitude would not be conducive to peace and would make the outlook for a settlement bleak indeed.

If, on th othei ! tnd, Nbfth. Vie! were.to t! t! ir_points ire

no: pre.co;:d:*:ons_to ill $ g '' : s,_thcn the prospects^

be more promising.

Our negotiating approach would permit each side to seek clarification of the other side's position. It dees not require the acceptance in advance of any points least of all chose whose meaning may be in need of clarification. We do not ask that of Hanoi—and progress toward a settlement will be faciltt;ited if Hanoi does not ask it of us.

In this situation, how can we best move toward a settlement:

One essentia! early step is to analyze the positions of all parties in order to ascertain whether there is some element or some kernel common to all. Many students of the subject have pointed to one fact which may prove to be such a kerne!—namely, the fact that both sides have pointed to the

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Geneva Agreements of 1954 and 1^62 as an acceptable basis for a peaceful Settlement,

But I must add quickly that this di not necessarily indicate a real meeting of the minds, because of doubts chat all sides interpret the Geneva Agreements in the same light. I lanoi has said that the essence of the Geneva Agreements is contained In its "Four Points". But the four points would not put Hanoi under any restrain:, or obligations in its hostile activi against the South, which the Geneva Accords explicitly prohibit. Besides, as I already pointed out, these points insist that the South's future be regulated in accordance with the program of a group which was not referred to in the Geneva Accords and did not even exist when they were written. And in any case, if the Geneva Accords were to serve a? a basis for settlement, it would obviously be necessary to revitalize the international machinery which they provided for supervision—which is presently operating under severe limitations; to incorporate effective international guarantees; ^nd to update other provisions of the Accords which on their face are clearly out of date.

Despite these problems of interpretation, it can he said that if the meaning of the Geneva Agreements were accepted as a matter for genuine negotiation, then the constant reference to these agreements by both sides would be more than a verbal similarity; it would be a significant and hopeful sign of the prospects for settlement.

From all this analysis, there emerges one basic and practical question, and it is this: How are all these apparent obstacles to a settlement to be overcome?

The first and essentia! "pre-requisiie is the will to resolve them—not by unconditional surrender or by the dictation of terms, but through a process of mutual accommodation whereby nobody's vital interests are injured, which would be a political solution. Speaking for the United States Government, I affirm without reservation the willingness of the United States to seek and find a political solution,

The next question, then, is by what procedure such a political settlement can "be reached. One well-tested and time-proven way is the conference table. President Johnson has repeatedly stared our readiness to join in a conference in Geneva, in Asia, or In any other suitable place. We remain prepared today to go to the conference table as soon as, and wherever, our " adversaries are prepared to join us.

There is also a second procedure by which to pursue a political settlement: namely, private negotiations—either by direct contact or through an intermediary. There is much to be said for this private method, for in a situation as grave as this, with its complex historical background and its present political cross currents, i: would be excec ly difScult to negotiate in a goldfish bowl.

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I therefore affirm that the United States Government stand tdy to take

its route also toward a political mem. And . ive our ;;e

that the secrecy and security of such private explorations would be safeguarded on our sid^:. Of course we do not and should not ask th.it freedom of expression be curtailed in the slightest degree, Nevertheless-that conspicuous champion of free expression, Dr. Enrin D.. Canham, recently reminded us—no one's credibility ought to suffer because of what is better left unsaid under such circumstances.

Let me quickly add that at this juncture I do not want to raise any false hopes by this remark. I amply stating a principle which is inherent in the concept of the secrecy and security of private explorations.

Such then is my analysis of the problems involved and the methods to be employed m seeking a negotiated sol of the Vietnamese conflict Nor

should we overlook the possibility that neg< ti ions, private or public, might be preceded or facilitated by the process of mutual de-escalation or a scaling down of the conflict without a formally negotiated ceasefire. This, of course, would be welcome on ourpart.

It is altogether possible, too, that there will be no negotiations culminating in a formal agreement; that our adversaries will sooner or brer find the burden of the war too exhausting and that the conflict will gradually come to an end.

Perhaps this will indeed prove to be the outcome* But our most re* spected military authorities have cautioned us not to expect that this will happen quickly, and that w c must face the possibility of a long scruple, burely, it tncre is any contribution that diplomacy can make to hastening a just and honorable end of this struggle/we cannot in all conscience spare any effort or any labor, day or night, to make chat contribution—no matter how difficult and frustrating the effort may be, or how many false starts and failures and new beginnings it may entail.

As students of history know, one obstacle to a negotiated end of any war can be psychological. The frame of mind appropriate to fighting and the frame of mind appropriate to peacemaking are by nature very different. And yet a stage inevitably comes when both these seemingly contradictory efforts must go on side by side.

^ Many citizens, viewing this complex dual process, are likely to be confused and distressed by what seems like an inconsistency in their leaders' policies. Some complain that the talk of peace suggests a ! ;!ng of our resolve and of our will to win. Simultaneously others complain that the com tinned military effort suggests an attempt to bring the adven : ; to hi knees, to break his will—and thus casts doubt on the sincerity of our will to peace.

The great difficulty of achieving peace should serve to remind us that there are r^by -1 conflicting interests at stake which stubbornly resist

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solution; that peace cannot be bought at any nor can real conflicts of

purpose be wave J away with a magic wand. By the same * ken, the ferocity of war shi did not be an incitement to hatred but rather a stern discipline—a i Jer of the imperative duty to define responsibly the ! :d interests for which our soldiers fig] and which a peace settlement must protect.

The effort to make such a res; ible definition, and to carry it through the process of peace negotiations! is "piled high with diSculty'*. A genuine meeting of the minds may never be wholly achieved. It is unlikely that terras of settlement f this stubborn conflict can be found which would be wholly pleasing to either side. But it is in our highest national interest that an acceptable, livable solution should be found.

Let no one suppose that patriotism, which is so inspiringly displayed on the battlefield, is not also present at the negotiating table* All our recent Presidents have testified to our country's dedication to negotiation as a means of peacefully bridging differences.

President Eisenhower said in 1955, on the eve of the first Summit Conference with the Soviet leadership: "We shall work with all others so that peaceful and reasonable negotiations may replace the clash of the battle* field."

President Kennedy, in his Inaugural Address, said: "Let us never negotiate out of fear. But let us never fear to negotiate "

And President Johnson has summed up the true value of negotiation as follows:

"To negotiate is not to admit failure. It is to show n 0 od sense. We believe chat collective bargaining is working as long as parties stay in negotiation. Only when bargaining breaks off do we speak ol Failure. And so also in foreign policy. There, too, the rule of law and the resort to the bargaining table are the hallmarks ot success." And to these words the President added sp-:cir" catly:

"This rule applies without qualification to Vietnam. We shall count it a mark of success when all the parties to that dispute are arotu a conference table. We Americans are experienced in bargaining; wc have nothing to fear from negotiation. And we Americans kn the nature of a fair bargain: none need fear negotiating: with us." I am sure all three of these Presidents would agree today that the effort to discover through negotiation, the common ground on which to build a just and honorable peace, is worthy of our most sincere and d d

efforts.

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-His Excellency • ' . ...'

Ho Chi Minn " . '

President

Democratic Republic of Vietnam ' . '"

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I a.

Dear Mr. President: . ."" . •

4

I am writing to you in the hope that the conflict in Viet nam can be brought to an end. That conflict has already taken a heavy toll — in lives lost, in wounds inflicted, in property destroyed, and in simple human misery. If we fail to find a just and peaceful solution, history will judge us harshly.

Therefore, I believe that we both have a heavy obliga to seek earnestly the path to peace. It is in response to obligation that I arn writing directly to you.

ion that

We have tried over the, past several years, in a variety of ways and through a number of channels," to convey to you cmd colleagues our desire to achieve a .peaceful sett!

your w * 0

For whatever rraso

suits,

tlciuent.

these efforts have not achieved any re-

, It may be that our thoughts and yours, our attitudes and

yours, have been distorted or misinterpreted as they passed

through these various channels, Certainly that is always a danger in indirect communication, • • * -- .

F

There is one good way to overcome this problem and to move forward in the search for a peaceful settlement. That is for us to arrange for direct talks between trusted represent ts in & secure setting: and away from the glare of publicity. Such talks should not be used as a propaganda exercise* but should be a serious effort to find a workable and mutually acceptable solution.

In the past two weeks, I have noted public statements by representatives of your government suggesting that you would be prepared to enter into direct bilateral talks with representatives of the US Government : provided that we ceased "uncon-aition«ily ?l snd pe*? : tly our bombing operations against your* country and alL-military actions against it. In the last dav serious and responsible parties have a

that this is in fact your proposal,

assured us indirectly

Let tne frankly state that I see two great difficulties with this proposal, In view of your public position, such. action on our part would inevitably produce worldwide specula tion that discussions were under way and would impair the

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privacy and secrecy of those discussions. Secondly, there would inevitably be grave concern on our .part .whether your government would make use of such action by us to improve 5.ts military position, .. .

With these problems in mind, I am prepared to move even further towards an ending of hostilities than your Government has proposed in either public statements or through private. diplomatic channels. I am prepared to order a cessation of bombing against your country and the stopping of further augmentation of US forces in South Viet-Nam as soon as I am assured that infiltration into' South Viet-Nam by land and by sea has stopped. These acts of restraint on both sides v/ould i 1 believe, make it possible for us to conduct serious and private discussions leading-toward an early peace.

■' I make* this proposal to you now with a specific sense of urgency arising from the imminent New Year holidays in Viet-Nam. If you are able to accept this proposal I see no reason why it could not take effect at the end of the New Year, or Teti holidays. The proposal I have made would be greatly strengthened if your military authorities and those of the Government of South Viet-Nam could promptly negotiate an extension of the Tet truce, , ^ \

As to the site of the bilateral discussions I propose, there are several possibilities. We could, for example, have our representatives meet in Moscow where contacts have already occurred. They could meet in some other country such as Burma. You may have other arrangements or sites in mind, and I would

try to meet your suggestions. * •

<

The important thing is to end a conflict that has brought burdens to both our peoples, and above all to the people of South Viet-Nam. If you have any thoughts about the actions I propose, it would be most important that I receive them as soon as possible. , *

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

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To His Excellency Mr. Lyndon B# Johnson,

President,

United States of America,

Your Excellency; . ;

On February 10, l$"67j 1 received your message. This is my reply.

Vietnam is thousands of miles-away from the United States. The Vietnamese people have never done any harm to the United States. But contrary to the pledges made by its representative tit the 19fj'i Geneva conference, the U.S. Government has ceaselessly intervened in Vietnam, it has unleashed and intensified the war of aggression in South Vietnam with a view to prolonging the partition of Vietnam and turning South Vietnam into a neo-colony and a military base of the United States, For over two years now, the U.S. Government has, with its air and naval froces, carried the war to the Democratic Republic of (North) Vietnam, an independent and sovereign country

The U.S. Government has committed ww crimes, crimes against peace and Against mankind. In South Vietnam, half a million U.S. and satellite troops have resorted to the most inhuman weapons and the most barbarous methods of warfarej such as napalm, toxic chemicals and gases, to massacre our compatriots, destroy crops, and raze villages to the ground. In North Vietnam, thousands of U.S. aircraft have dropped hundreds of thousands of tons of bombs, destroying towns, villages, factories, schools. In your message, you apparently deplore the sufferings end destruction in Vietnam, May I ask you: Who lias pei'petrated these monstrous crimes? It is the B United States and satellite troops. The U.S. Gov tment is entirely responsible for the extremely serious situation in Vietnam,

The U.S. war of aggression against the Vietnamese people constitutes a challenge to the countries of the socialist camp, a threat to the national independence : } and a serious danger to peace in Asia and the world.

The Vietnamese people deeply love independence, freedom and peace. But in the face of the U. S. aggression, they have risen up, united as one man, fearless of sacrifices end hardships. They are determined to carry on their resistance until they have won genuine independence and freedom and true peace. Our just cause enjoys strong sympathy and support from the peoples of the whole world, including broad sections of the American "people«

The U.S. Government has unleashed the war of aggression in Vietnam. It

must cease this aggression* That is the only way to the restoration of

peace, The U.S. Government must stop definitively and unconditionally

its bombing raids and all other acts of war against the Democratic Republic

of Vietnam, withdraw from South Vietnam all U.S. and satellite troops,

recognize the South Vietnam National Front for Liberation, and let the

Vietnamese people settle themselves their own affairs* Such is the

basis (sic) content of the fi ve-point s J 1 of the government of the

Democratic Republic of Vietnam, which embodies the essential principles

and provisions of the 195U Geneva agreements on Vietnam, it is the basic (sic)

of a correct political solution to the Vietnam problem.

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In your message 3 you suggested direct talks between the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the United States, If the U« S. Gove^nment^eally^ vants_these talks, it must fir; L of aX] stop, unconditionally its bombing falds and all othei :ts of war against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. It is only after the unconditional cessation of the U.S. bombing raids and all other acts of war against the Ecriocratic Republic of Vietnam 1 the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the United States ^corJxl enter into talks cud discuss questions concerning the two sides. • _ .-

The Vietnamese people will never subrait to force, talks under the threat of bombs.

ey vill never accept

I

Our cause is absoultely just. It is to be hoped that the U,S." Government vill act in accordance -with reason.

Sincerely,

ti -

Ho Chi Kinh

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• MARCH 28, 19^7

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SECRETARY RUSK'S NEWS CONFERENCE OF MARCH 28, 19 67

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"The following is the State Department's release

of Secretary of State Dean Rusk's news conference, which is authorized for direct quotation:

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SECRETARY RUSK: Earlier today, the Secretary

General of the United Nations ,, U Thant, made public

. . # . . .. . .

some proposals which he had offered to a number of govern

i

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ments involved in the problem in Viet-Nam on March 14.

The following day, we gave the Secretary General our

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interim reply, stating that we welcomed his initiative/ and,.after consultation with the Government of Viet-Nam aid other allies, we would give him a more considered

reply.

On March 18, we delivered that reply to th*

Secretary General; and you now have that in front of you.

In essence, the Secretary General proposed that there be a general standstill truce in Viet-Nam, that there then be preliminary talks leading to a

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^reconvening of t\\e Geneva Conference.

In our reply ( we "(stated tha,t we accepted the

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outline of his proposals, that we would fce glad to

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' negotiate .the standstill truce f and .take part in pre-

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liminary discussions leading to a reconvening of that

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conference, . 4 v .,

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We do not yet have in front of us the full text

of whatever reply Hanoi may have delivered to the Secretary General. Whether Hanoi will make that public I do not now Know* We do have a public statement from Hanoi which seems

to indicate their attitude. That public statement of

. _ -**•■*

yesterday said that:

"To call on both sides to cease fire and bold

>

unconditional negotiations, while the United States is committing aggression against Viet-Nam, and taking "serious steps in its military escalation in both zones of Viet-Nam, is to make no distinction between the aggressor and the victim of aggression, to depart from reality, and to demand that the Vietnamese people

'accept the conditions of the aggressors,"

And then it adds:

*

"And, by the way, it is necessary to underline

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PR TO

once again the views of the Government of Hanoi, which

* ■

ha$ pointed out that*the Viet-Nain problem has no concern V/ith the United Nations, and the United Nations has •

»

absolutely no right to interfere in any way in the Viet-Najn question," ' ". * *- >*?.._... *

The indications are, therefore, that Hanoi has once again taken a negative vlev; toward an initiative taken by someone else to move this matter

toward peace.

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I might say that the recent publication of

the exchange between President Johnson and Ho Chi Minhj

a*£ todeiy's publication of the proposals of the Secretary

General, and the responses to it, illustrate the problem

that" we have had from the beginning in bringing the « ■

* Viet-Nam problem to a peaceful conclusion.

Many governments, many groups of governments,

9

many world personalities, have tried to take an initia~

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tive to move this conflict toward a peaceful settlement.

■

Thejre has invariably been a positive and a constructive response from the United States; and there has invariably been a, negative and hostile and, at times f vituperative

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response from the authorities in Hanoi, When* one looks "b^ck oyer the long record of initiatives taken by many personalities and governments, and groups of governments, one sees the record of Hanoi's injiransigeance, vzith such phrases as "swindle," and "farce, !t and words of

tf

that sort

= ...^ . . . ♦ . . .',

Now, we do not ourselves believe that peace is

not the business of the United Nations,, We believe-that no nation can say that a world organization representing 122 nations'cannot properly take up the 'question of

-_ • «

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"maintaining -the" peaceV " The Charter provides for it? the obligations of the nations of the wo,rld are involved; and the issue of peace is at

• -M. '

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stake,

Nevertheless, we have never insisted that the

United Nations is the sole mechanism for dealing with

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this question.

There is now pending before the Security Council a resolution offered by the United States -calling for a peaceful settlement of this problem.

\

That has been resisted in the United Nations because of

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the attitude of Hanoi and Peking toward the involvement

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...,"' ■ • .-...-.. • . ■• .

"of the United Nations. V.hen the Soviet Ambassador

......

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said at the Security Council that ,f This is not the

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business of the U, N., it is a matter for the Geneva

t

- machinery/' Ambassador Goldberg said, "All right. If

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that is your view, we will agree with that; "then let

._ * . _

us use the Geneva machinery."

But the Geneva machinery has been paralyzed

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. Py the ^tt^tude of H^noi and Peking. For example,

;"•■*. 'th.evt, jn^chinery has jiot been available to respond favor-

"-_*- * *. * -

'-"' &£>Xy to Prince Sihanouk's request that the Inter-national Control Commission step up its activities to

,^iisure the neutrality and the territorial integrity

of Cambodia- That machinery was not available to ensure . the demilitarization of the Demilitarized Zone between

North and South Viet-Nam.

So we would say to the authorities in Hanoi

F

that, surely f there must be some machinery somewhere which can open the possibilities of peace. If not the United Nations, then the Geneva machinery; if not the Geneva machinery, then the resources of quiet

diplomacy

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I can tell you* now that the exchange between

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President Johnson and Ho Chi Minh has been made public, and U Thant's proposals and our reply have been made

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public, that there is nothing in the private record

... .

which throws any different light on this situation than

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you now have in the public record. Despite all of the

m

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efforts made privately by many people in many places, the private record and the public record are now in

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agreement. ... ... :/

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I do hope that the authorities in Hanoi would give serious thought to the present situation, a If they have supposed that they would be able to obtain a miii-

. tary victory in the South, they must, surely, now put that hope aside* If they have had any hope that there would be a political collapse in South Viet-Nam, surely,

, they must now know that all of the groups in South Viet-Nam, who have some differences among themselves, are resolved to bring into being a Constitutional Government in which those various groups can work to-

i

gether on a basis of the free choice of the South Vietnamese people with respect to their future; and that one point, on vhicfr they are generally agreed

PR 70' 1J

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in South Viet-Nam, is that they do not wish the program •?%

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of Hanoi or the Liberation Front•

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If Hanoi supposes that somehow international

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opinion will come to their rescue, surely . they must know that when they rebuff the United Nations Organi&a~

■mm a ■<

tion, an organization of 122 members, that this will not bring them support in other parts of the world. "And, surely, they must understand that all small nation Who are within the reach* of some greater power have a

>

r ~ stake in the ability of South Viet-Nam to determine its

c,«.

own future for itself. And, surely, Hanoi must not be

•

- .tinder continuing misapprehension .that, somehow, some

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'fl.AYisi.ons within the United States might cause us to c h^nge our attitude toward our commitments to So\ith Viet"Nam. Because although there may be some differences among us, those differences are trivial compared to the

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differences between all of us, on the one side* and Hanoi

on the other. .

»

So we would hope that in some fashion; in

sows way* at sone tune, the authorities in Hanoi will

make use of some machinery in which to be responsive

to the many efforts which we and others have been making toward peace over the Mast 'several years.

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. It is no good to brush aside the 17 nonaligned

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. pationp, and the British Commonwealth of Prime Ministers,

and His Holinesp the Pope, the Secretary General,- and . the President of India, and all the others who have

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been trying to find some basis on which this matter could be moved toward a peaceful conclusion, and suppose

that, somehow, world opinion is supporting them in

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. their efforts to se£z@ gouth Viet-Nam by force,

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{3o we would advice them to believe that, as

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: fa,r .as we are concerned, we are not calling the search

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for a peaceful settlement to an end because of Ko Chi Minh's reply to President Johnson, or because of the .altitude which they seem to be taking toward U Thant's

most recent proposals

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We ^r:a

continue that effo:

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j>y private and public means, aid we would hope that we

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would get some response through some channel that would begin to bring this thing within the range of discussion

*

and ni&ke it possible to move toward a peaceful settlement,

Nov/, I "am ready for your questions.

QUESTIONS £HD ANSWERS;

Q

Mr. Secretary, you have outlined all of

. the reasons why they/ surely, must not believe these

various elements. What is it then you think that makes

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them keep on fighting and refusing to negotiate in the

face of v^hat must be a loss of international support,

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and these other adverse factors?

A

Well, it is very hard to say, I can't

enter into the minds of the leaders in Hanoi on a matter

-

of 1 that sort* I would suppose, really, that they are under pome misapprehension. They are making some mis-judgments and miscalculations on some point; either the state of international opinion, or the state of

■:

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Opinion within the Uji^ted States, It's possible even

that they still have some slender hopes of some military

. * ■

success in the South,

puf

Y':;

I just don't know what is in their minds. P.u Vat I am saying is that, so far as we understand their

poi,nt of view, the principal pillars of their hopes are eroding from under them, and they should become interested in peace, and at an early date and not at some long delayed future date.

Q

Mr, Secretary; your statement today in

*

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reply to U Thant has said that there would be "an appropriate involvement for the Government of South Viet-Nam throughout

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j tfte entire procesp of* arranging a peace* 1 '

':'_ .Would, you ppell that out a little more, sir? --.Premier Ky has been indicating that we haven't

j>

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called him in. . St . .

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,_A ."Well/ obviously, any discussion with

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:-North Viet~Nam about.peace in Viet-Nam must directly

involve the Government of South Viet-Nam, Indeed , as

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-vyo.u.know,. the Government; of South,Viet~Nam has on

p ■

,-r.fliore. than one .'occasion, suggested direct talks between

"South Viet-Nam and North Viet-Nanu They have proposed, .

"^fox"-example,_ that the two .governments there get together - on the question of possibly extending the Tet standdown,

the Tet Cease-Firs,

We would support that as a means for coming

i

to grips with this problem, We would think that it

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would be a very good idea if Hanoi v/ere to accept the

proposals of'South Viet-Nam for direct talks to move this toward a peaceful solution.

Thex'e are many opportunities available/ you

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r, see,

; There would, be direct talks between Saigon and

Hanoi* There would be talks between ourselves and

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y

Hanoi* There would be talks under the auspices of the two

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Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conferences, or under the

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auspices of the three members of the International Control Commission* Or there could be intermediaries,

such as the Secretary General of the United Nations,

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or, some other distinguished governmental or noji-

i governmental leader, Any of these methods are

appropriate and useful, as far as we are concerned.

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5?he problem is that no one 'has been able to

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find a procedure or a method v/hich, apparently, is

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agreeable to Hanoi. ' . .

0

A

Mr* Secretary?

Yes,

Q

If Hanoi persists for months and ev©n

years in its attitude r what vn.ll our response then be?

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What will mir course be?

A

We shall meet our commitments in South

, iet-'tfax. We shall do our duty there

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Q Mr. Secretary, at the end of the Korean 2 recall, we entered into talks without a truce

and the fighting continued for two .years. V/ould you

explain, would this formula to which you have responded

*

today, could it be a lead to that same sort of thing,

• peace talks without any change "in the fighting?

m

A Well, let me remind you, Mr. Harsch, of

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our most elementary position on this matter of talks.

We will talk this afternoon or tomorrow morning without

*

~any conditions of any sort on either side. We are pre- •■ pared to talk while the shooting is going on. If the

*

other side wishes to raise major conditions, as they have

+ ■

with their demand that there be an unconditional permanent cessation of the bombing, we are prepared to talk about conditions. We will discuss the conditions which must precede the initiation of formal negotiations.

Or if they do not wish to start at that end--

* ■

that is, what do you do about the shooting—we are

orojjaroo

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he

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what do you do about

a final settlement cf the problem? And work back froir:

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that to the practical means by which you reach the final

settlement.

So we are prepared to talk without any

conditions of any sort, or about conditions.

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Now, let me say that we don't ourselves fully

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understand why there cannot be discreet talks even

*

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though the shootihg is going on. Now, we are aware of

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the element of so-called face, but face is not a substi-•tute for very serious practical problems that we face-

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on the military side, *

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Now, I remind you that we discussed Berlin while the blockade was s^ill i'n effect. We discussed

Korea while the hostilities were still in effect. In-

■

deed, we took more casualties in Korea after the negotia-

i

tions started than had occurred before the negotiations started. We talked about the Cuban missiles while the Cuban missile sites were being built by the hour in Cuba.

■

So we are prepared to talk without any change in the

■

military situation whatever.

But we are also prepared to talk about .changes in the military situation. What we cannot do is to commit ourselves to a permanent and unconditional stoppage of the bombing without knowing what the practical results of that will be on the military side.

No one has been able to tell us, for example,

just as one example, that i'f we stop the bombing those

three divisions or more of North Vietnamese troops that

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if

are now in and on both sides of the Demilitarized Zone

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will not advance to attack our Marines who are six miles

away

Now, obviously, these are important practical

. questions. So we will talk at this moment, or we will talk about any other circumstances in which the other side might think that they might wish to talk. But what we cannot do is to stop half the war and let the other half of the war go on unimpeded.

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Q Mr. Secretary, when you refer, when we re-ferred in our reply to the Secretary General to a general

* ■ •" >

stand-still truce, are we talking at that pointy of a

■

cessation of the bombing, and cessation of infiltration

from the North?

A I would suppose that a general stand-still truce would involve an elimination of all military action of all sorts on both sides. Mow, one reason why there has to be some discussion of that is that it is necessary for both sides to understand what in fact will.happen, particularly in a guerrilla situation where the situation on the ground is somewhat complicated. And so there needs

—

to be some discussion of that point if it is to be a pro-

tracted stand-still. . ' ' . • ^

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Q Mr. Secretary, just how does this formula today differ from Mr. Thant's previous formula?

A Well, I think that he would perhaps be ■the better one to comment on that. If there is a major difference, I think that this does place emphasis upon

*

a mutual stop of the military action on both sides as

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an important first step.

As far as his earlier proposals were concerned,

■

the three-point proposals, you recall that they envisage that we would stop the bombing as the first point. The second point, that there would be a mutual de-escalation of the military action; and, third, there would be discussions among all those involved in the conflict.

. . We said, "Your point one, stopping the bombing, gives us no particular problem, but what do you have from

But- if that can be achieved, then we can move ^ _

■ into the preliminary political discussions which might

open the way for a reconvening of the Geneva Conference

or some other appropriate foriim. But a military stand-

-

still would involve the concept of stopping the military action on both sides, and that .certainly would include stopping the bombing.

the other side about point two?" Well, what he had from

63

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the other side about point two was a complete rejection

-

. that there will be no mutual de-escalation of military

f

m

action. • - / . .

/

And on point three, the question of discussions

■

■

with all the parties involved in the fighting, the other

*-* side has consistently said in and out--from time to time f

rather—that the Liberation Front must be accepted as

the sole spokesman for the South Vietnamese people,

*

« m

We find disturbing the refusal of Hanoi to en-gage in discussions with' the Government in Saigon. We

■

' think that would be an appropriate way to begin such dis~

-

■

cussions, and the possibilities of peace might be opened up if that channel were to become active. But thus far Hanoi has refused to asrcise it.

■

Q Mr, Secretary, how would you distinguish between this proposal and the Presidents proposal to Ho

Chi Minh?

A Well, I think that perHaps the Secretary

General's proposal is somewhat broader, in that it would presumably apply to a cease-fire throughout all of Viet-Nam, South Viet-Nam as well as.the disengagement mili-

*

tarily between North \Uet-Nam and South Viet-Nam. So to that extent, it is somewhat broader. But, nevertheless,

>••

U

)

■ 6k

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FK /U

r ■ '•' - . ! ■ --■■.

t that is soraething which we are perfectly prepared to

*

discuss with representatives from the other side, or are perfectly prepared to have the Government of Saigon

-

discuss with the representatives from Hanoi.

Q Mr. Secretary, what is your answer to those critics who say that the President's letter in

9

■

, effect raised the American price? . " . .

A Well, I don't understand what they are talk-

ing about.

-

- „ Q Well, they say that in this letter the

-. .

United States is demanding proof in advance that infil-

^ :

f tration would have stopped.

1

, ' A We didn't talk about proof in advance. The words used were "assurances that infiltration had stopped. 11

>

Q Well, it is your contention that the price

I . '

v&s not raised, that you're on the status quo ante as

far as that is concerned?

■

A The principal point here is that Hanoi has increasingly emphasized during this past year its inflexible demand that a stop in the bombing be permanent and unconditional, and that in exchange for

'

.J

*

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PR 70

-that, there would be no indication from Hanoi as to ^

4

What comparable or corresponding military action they

* -

would take on their side,

. Now, just recall, for example, during the 37-day pause at the beginning of last year, Ho Chi Minh sent a letter to the Heads of Communist States, and in that letter he demanded that the United States must end

unconditionally and for good all bombing raids and other

. -

-acts, war acts against the Democratic Republic of Viet-

^... *

Nam. Only in this way can a political solution of the Viet-Nam problem be envisaged.^

* Nov;, that insistence upon the stoppage of the

— 0 — -

1

bombing, which would be permanent and unconditional, has been a major increase in the public demands of Hanoi during this past year. And that makes it necessary for us to know what would happen if we committed ourselves

to any such cessation,

* The North Vietnamese representative in Paris

on February 2 2nd said that we must state in advance at the time of any cessation of bombing that it would be

*-

J

permanent and unconditional. Well, that means that we

must know what the eff&cts would be. Will the infiltra-

tion continue? Will those three divisions move against

.r*.

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PR 70

;:

i i

-

our Marines? Are they going to continue their half of

*

the war?' No one has been able to whisper to us that

that would not be the result. No one, private citizens;

:

governments, Hanoi's own representatives, governments

\ \

-

friendly to Hanoi. No one has been able to whisper to '

a

us that there v/ould be any change "in the present military

tactics and strategy of Hanoi with respect to seizing "

South Viet~Nam by force,

*

' r . . . „ If any of you gentlemen have any information

— -

to the contrary, I would be glad to hear it.

Q Mr. Secretary—

A

Yes?

' t ' Q May I ask you if the channels directly to

Hanoi remain open after this exchange of letters, and if

so, are we putting these propositions that you have just

■ ■

stated directly to them?

*

A As far as we are concerned, the channels remain open. They have been open all along, I have referred to the fact that nothinq we have had privately throws any different light on what you now know publicly _ about tha^ attitude of the two sides. But I shouldn't exaggerate the point that channels remain open. V7hen..you

-t

i.

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«

PR /U

n -

pick up the telephone and nobody answers on the other

*>.

r*

, end, is that a channel or not? Or if you find yourself

-

. in. ci telephone conversation and the other end hangs up, I will leave it to you as to whether that is a channel. :■ I can^say at the moment that our channels are not very

— — — —■ ^ ■* ■

efficient, to say the least. „ • .

m _

. .. »

Q Mr. Secretary, is the amount of reciprocity.

- *

that we would require for stopping the bombing a negoti-

*

able commodity, or is there a decisive--iausfc there be a '

complete stoppage xn infiltration, "or is

- *

it negotiable? . •■'- — ■'

- -'»_ t • ■■ - — ■

A

I don't want to give a categorical response.

%, , —.

■

to that because President Johnson in a recent press con-

■*

» m

fer'ence said that we would be glad to hear of almost any-thing from the other side. But that doesn't mean that we

-

can live on just nothing from the other side, just nothing,

*

I point out to you that during the Tet pause, at the end of which Ho Chi Minh gave his reply to the letter which President Johnson had sent to him at the beginning of the Tet pause, he had some other alternatives open to him. p If there was a problem of time, he could

*

. have said, "Mr. President, time is rather short here, Vie

«*

\

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TT'

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* * *

i

\

I

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': . v : ;; .: ■ PR 70

need a little more time on this." He didn't say that.

*

r

Or he could have said, "I don't particularly like your proposal, but here are my counterproposals." He didn't

*

say that. In effect, he called for the capitulation of South Viet-Nam and capitulation of the American forces in South Viet-Nam, and a permanent and unconditional stoppage of the bombing. That we can't take. ■ L

*

Yes, sir? « ',

* ■

■ Q Mr. Secretary, when you talk about the

.

—. r

public and private record, being the same, what exactly

-" do you mean? Do you mean there is nothing outstanding

-now privately in the way of negotiation?

- A No, What I f m saying is there is nothing

in the private record that reflects any different view

*

on the part of the authorities in Hanoi than you now have on the public record.

-

Q Mr, Secretary, could you explain why you

9

haven't published the text of four other letters that you recently sent to Hanoi? . ..

" A Because we do not wish" ourselves to

-

establish the point that a private communication with us is impossible. Xf Hanoi wishes to make public a

••

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*

ti< /u

communication from us> as they did in connection with the exchange between President Johnson and Ho Chi Minh,

I - m

m

that is a choice which they can make. But I think it could be very important in the future that Hanoi at

*

-...* least know that it is possible for" them to communicate

privately with us without its becoming public, to the

-

i*

extent that you gentlemen would let us get away with

>>

! :•.

.- -»« » — • «

that.

0 ■ Mr/ Secretary, Point (b) of the United

. - -

States answer talks about preliminary talks. What's

< ■ *

your understanding of who would take part-in those talks—just Hanoi and Washington, or would it be Saigon

or the NLF?

A Well, we haven't formulated that in

great detail because we need to know what the attitude of Hanoi would be and what the general situation would be. In our reply we did say that of course the Govern-jnent cf South Vic-t-Nam will have to be appropriately involved throughout this entire processj and that the interests and views of our allies would also have to be

r

taken fully into account. So we did not try to make that

*

* - -

precise in detail because we would be interested in

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. PR 70

knowing what Hanoi's response to the Secretary General's initiative would be. • •"•

Q Mr. 'Secretary, you referred to the fact that there was no contradiction between the public and private record as far as peace talks are concerne I wonder if you would be prepared to comment now on reports concerning the possibility of negotiations in Warsaw. f

3'.f your question is would I be willing to,

the answer is no. I think the attitude of Hanoi on

*

these matters is fairly clear at the present time, but

I do not want to point the finger to, or close the door on,

any contacts that might occur anywhere in any capital

■

as far as the future is concerned.

i

Q Mr. Secretary, thank you very much.

*

*

\

-

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5"

HE P. 'fO V 3 .':■■. '-HAM: - 3

ji; INVQLVEMEKf by Willi na P. Bu.n->/, A v s i s t - jat S©cr t . / for 1 st Asian and Pacific: Affairs.

* * * *

Cornerstones of U.S. Policy

*

In essence:

(a) Our objective remained solely that of protecting the independence.^ South Viet-Nam from external interference and force. We deetiiu h and still decline, to threaten the regime in North Yiet-Xam itself or the territory and regime of Communist China.

(b) Ve indicated in April of 1965 that vre were prepared for discussions or negotiation-, without condition, and we have relentlessly pursued our own efforts to enter into meaningful discussions as veil as following up on a host of peace initiatives by others. Unfortunately, Hanoi has clung firmly to the objective of insuring a Communist takeover of booth Viet-Nam "and has refused to enter into any fruitful discussions. Indeed, Hanoi has rejected any discussions whatever—initially unless its basic objective was accepted in advance through the so-called "third point," more recently unless we agreed to a complete cessation of the bombing without any responsive action on their part. Hanoi's philosophy toward negotiation hasnmv become authoritatively available, particularly in the section on "fighting while negotiating'' in the captured remarks of one of the North*Vietnamese leaders, Comrade Vinh.

(c) We continued to place every possible emphasis on the crucial nonmilitary aspects of the conflict, greatly strengthening our own contribution to the essentially South Vietnamese task of restoring stability and control in the countryside and working for the welfare of the

people* . ,

(d) Militarily, our actions were d ted to proving to North Viet-Nam that its effort to take over the S th by military force mui I ail and to extending and enlaj g the areas in which the vital business of bringing real se-

curity and peace to the c tryside could go forward with all th stn | h we could hope to give it. The total effort in I .itli remained

primary, even n- bombing of military targets in the North was carried on—i. tally to demonstrate resolve but alwnvs and basically to make Hanoi's irrfilt ton far more difficult and cosily and to prevent levels of new men and equipment that, could only, in the arithmetic of guerrilla warfare, multiply many times over, for each addition from North Viet-Nam, the requirement for forces in the South.

(e) Wo encouraged the South Vietnamese in their own resolve to move to a constitutional basis of governmentj a process sc1 underway formally by Prime AIini= t Ky in January of 1?G6 and followed since that tune in the face of all the difficulties and dan: of attempting to create such a basis in a country without political i ; ' ce a [id ravaged by terrorism and by guerrilla and conventional military act inn.

(f) We encouraged the South Vietnamese at the same time to proceed on the track that has now become reconciliation, the holding out to members of the Viet Cong of the possibility of reentering the political life of their country under peaceful conditions. In ace, we

and would accept a fair determination of the. will of the people of South Viet-Nam along the lines well summarized by Ambassador Gold-berirs Chicago s\ of May 12, iS)67. w

These were the South Vietnamese aspects of our policy. But then, as previously, the policy was seen in the wider context of the future of Southeast Asia. So it was that President John-sou lent our strong support in April of 1985 to the development of regional cooperation and of econoinic projects created through Asian initiative! By this vital element in our policy, we made Hear again that our underlying objective was [to do what we could to assist in the constructive task of bringing about a South-. east A : i of cooperative and independent nations, whatever their international postures

might be.

We bad a security job to do in Viet-Nam and were joined over tii by five other area nations in supplying military forces to do that job. And we are assisting Thailand against a concerted Chinese Communist and North Vietnamese effort at external subversion, an effort begun—to keep the record straight—as early as 1082 and clearly and definitively by December 19G1, before our major decisions* in Viet-Nam. Our SKATO and ANZUS undertakings remain firm.

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But we looked b 3 cl tb ■■ . and * ■ rcra •still loo!: !>:/ '1 these, to tlie who] qi of the future of South •. and fcn the role

that we canplay in assi lienatii \* oft;

area to cons tte their national mdopend* and to improve the welfare of their people.

This, then, is a barebones a e< imi of 'The Path to YietN; m." J Itch within its own tei •■■■•■: \ it may omit what others would include. And, long as it may seem, if is still incomplete in two respects that it would take far too much time to cover.

First, it is plainly inadequate to fccti solely on dor policies toward Yiet-Kain or evftii toward Southeast Asia as a whole. Those policies are intiinal ely r* :1 to the res( of Asia; to the implications of A developments for o' 1 areas and, in the last analysis, for our own nation."] security; and to our central world pur-; —the creation of an international order of independent states.

Secondly, I have tried to i re what I con-sidcr to have been the major policy decision Obviously, policy is hot fnsf a matter of single decisions, however fully considered. A vast number of lesser policy d- ions have accompanied these basic ones, and the way in which a basic policy is carried out in the end affects its substance. I have not tried to cover, for example, decisions 01 the balance of effort within South

VicNNam, decisions on particular negotiating proposals, decisions on the pace and nature of the i bing of North Mel-Nam, or the subtle and difficult problem, over the years, of United States influence toward political progress in the South. I know full well that these are areas in which many of yon undoubtedly hold strong views. I welcome discussion of therm

"The Lesson in Involvement

What, then, is "the lesson in involvement"?

—Is it that we have been trapped into a difficult situation by a series of lesser decisions taken with no clear view of their implications?

—Is it that we should never have become engaged in Southeast Asia ?

—Is it that we should never have attempted to support South Yiet-Narn ?

—Is it that, having supported South Viet-JNVirn in certain respects (including a treaty) and having become deeply engaged in Southeast Asia, we should nonetheless have decided— or should now decide—to limit the actions we take or even to withdraw entirely?

The first que?'" seems to me both? te

and d^ It. At so point in tl ve

recited we became < liimitted, delll id

by formal constitute al proc to the support of the freed of South Yiet-Nam from external interference. That commitment included a strong t y obligation, and that is a clear part of the story. But what is perhaj 1 ore to the ] int is that greaf powers must free two central points:

(a) As Irving Kristol has pointed out in his . recent article in 1 ign Affairs, the very definition of a great power is that not only its actions but the c in which it declines to act have major consequences. At every e in the Viet-Nam story, it has : med clear to the leaders of this country that not to act would have the gravest effects. This is the way that successive choices have appeared to four . essive Presidents.

(b) The second point that u great pi 1-not c ; is that its actions in themselves affect the stakes. When great powers commit themselves, by treaty and by a total course of eon-duct extending over many years, an element of reliance comes into being, both within the area and within other areas in which commitments have also been undertaken.

Yet, all this being said, I do not think one can conclude that b we said or did a, we

must necessarily say or do b —in a e

of Bismarck's. So I, for one, do n believe that the Wesson in involvement" is that we are the prisoners of history.

Rather, I think we should be focusing on the second, third, and fourth questions I have listed above.

These are big questions, and if I have tried to do liny thing today it is to stress that the. matter has really been looked at for at least the last 13 years in this kind of larger framework. The policies followed today are, as th$y must be, the policies of this administration. Xo one can say whether another administration would have done the same. YThat can be said is that the underlying viewpoint and analysis of factors have b en largely similar throughout the last. 13 years, if not longer.

This does not prove, of course, that this analysis has been correct. The United States has no divine dispensation from error, and the most that your leaders at any time can do is to exerl the best human jucl mi and m 1 sense of which they are cap? 1 ! . 1, for one, am convinced that this has been done, at all stn£«

Declassified per Executive Order J3526, Section 3 3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By; NWD Date: 20JI

tjt*i& y if^c^/L^f^^i^p jt*

VmTBD NATIONS, K Jf„ Sept. 21 —*otfowitig is th text of a speech to Zmerol Assembly delivered tod Arthur J, Goldberg, United States chief representative:

•*?.

loday, as every year at this time. We open a new chapter in the history ■ of the United Nations. We open on a Uopciul note with your [Corneliu Mao-5 SCU of }: tion as President,

for you are noL only known a p. J respected by your colleagues thrc tfce World £5 an able and cfistfagal WPK isl; you also have the d tson of being the first representative of a country of Eastern Europe to be e ^ i high office. We of the United

States welcome this development as furthei sign of the evolution which h been taking place in the relations among the states or Has Europe and of other^ parts of the world May all members tane this new stcj s a reminder of i" truth which a modern-Danish saga h compressed Into jhes m - Is: "Coexistence — or no e nce. ?l

■ We congratulate you, Mr. President, and pledge to von our cooperation in the discharge of your difficult and important of f ice,

I take this occasion aiso to pay tribute to your distinguished predecessor, the President of the Twenty-First Ses-r "X Ambassador Pazfa

■ We share the admiration of all atfons for the resourcefulness znd patience with which he guided us tnrough more meetings of the General Assembly than have been presided over by any other man in the history of this organization.

This annual genera! debate serves the. Important purpose of allowing e?.ch' member to lay before the entire Assembly, at the outset of our session, its major concerns in the international sphere. I shall not attempt to touch on all the issues on the agenda to which my country attaches importance. This statement will concentrate on certain issues which, in our view, are of trans-• cendent significance to world peace.

The Conflict in Vietnam

First among these is the continued tragic com! | im. For the entire community of nations, the search for peace in Vietnam remains a matt— of the firs! r v. for peace in Vietnam must and should hi our major concern. Indeed, pvr, to its Charter, the United Naii . has the most explici right and duty to concern itself wfch tnis.quest:. n. as it toes with any breach of or threat to the peace anywhere in e world. _ __

KoMfng this convL

it continues to seek ti part' '_ Eion of the V : Nations in the quest for \ in Vietnam. Every member and every organ of the Unite." Nations, this Assembly include \ shares the Charter obli of lej . its

weight and influence to help resolve disputes and conflicts between nations fry peaceful means. Today, c irjs past disappointments, I reiterate our appeal to all members of United Nations, • dividuaHy and collectively, to accept that obligation — to use their Influence to help bring the Vietnam conflict to an end by peaceful means.

The distinguished delegates who participate in this debase will undoubtedly make observations and offer su« gesti ns as to how this can be brought about My delegation wilt listen to them with close attention and rasps

As our contribution to the Assembly's discussion of this issue, let me state as precisely as possible the views and ides

of my Government,

Our basic view is one which, I am sure, is shared by the great majority of this Assembly: that this conflict can an " should be ended by a political solution at the earliest possible fee. A military solution is not the answer. For our part, we do not seek to impose a,military solution on'North Vietnam oTc . i ad-} , By the same token, in fidelity

to a political so 1 ^SLe^Uj^OUIJ

^orth^yietnanj^andjts i qntsjtojnv pose a military solution uob'n South Vietnam.

4 »

Procedures for a Solution

The question then naturally arises: By what procedure can a political solution be reached? Qne well-tested way is the conference table. We are prepared to follow this path at any time—to go the conference table in Geneva or any other suitable place.

There is a second way to pursue a political settlement: through private negotiations or discussions. The United States stands ready to take this route also — and, in so doing, to give assurances that the confi :: 1 privacy of such negotiations or discussions would be fully respected by our Government

It may be that negotiations or discussions might be preceded or facilitated by mutual military restraint, by the scaling down of the conflict, bye 5-escalation either with or w:: t a formal ceasefire. This route, too, we are prepared to follow.

There is, on the other hand, the danger that the Cj^nfllet nry continue until

one side finds t [ :r6Qn of war too exhausting or too cosily, and that the fighting will only gradually end, with* ou: negotiations and without an agreed settlement Certainly this is a grin prospect, for it would mean prolonged conflict and tragedy. It is in essence a

•rmhtary solution, and ii is not one we seek. We earnestly hope that it is not th :rse in which our adversaries will persist In any event, there will be no stack g in our resolve to help South Vietnam defer.d its right to deti . ;e its own future by peaceful means and

•free from external force,

7k

most third party

/ /-— - j

Committed as we are to a political solution through di ssions or ne^o-tiati /;', we regret that, many

efforts, North Vietnam and its adh: -ents Have not yet :-. ■ ' to this obj: -live. But we shall continue in our efforts; and we hone what we say today may help to bring the time when the two sides will sit down

together. #

The Attitude of Hanoi

It is said by some that Hanoi will agree to I \ egotiations if the United States c-: ' . ti ; nj of North

Vietnam—that this b bing is the sole obstacle to negc tons. I would note that in its public stater mts Eianoi has merely indicated that there "could" be negotiations if i bombing stopped. True, some governments-—as we'd as our distlnguts- ed Secretary - General and other individuals —- have expressed their belief or a thai nego-

tiations "would" begin, perhaps soon, if the bombings were stopped. We have given these expressions of belief our careful attention. But no^si

-Jr. j ji the U >vern :

men '-.l^zJ.-l I }_L

fri I s"'— _ ha&_ com 3 to j arty

f sra Hanoi that

there' would in JStcCI Qf

the bombing J&pre >■ oped. We have

sought such a message 'directly from Hanoi without success.

On its part, the United States would be glad to Cv ": and discuss any proposal that would lead promptly to productive discussions that might bring

about peace to the area.

We do not, however, conceive it to be unreasonable for us to seek entight-tenment on this important question:

Does North Vietnam conceive that the cessation of bombing would oi should lead to any other results than meaningful negotiations or discussions under circumstances which would not disadvantage either side?

Moreover, we believe we also have A a right to address ourselves to those tents which support Hanoi's cause and which have stated their^

beliefs about Hanofs intentions and to-

Dut this cuestion to them:

If the I IS* tes were to ' first sien and order a prior cessation of the bombing, what would they men do or refrain from doing, and how would they then uses their influent and power, in order to move the Vietnam conflict pre:, ptiy toward a peaceful re5 m?

Constructive answers to these questions v : r aid in the search for peae

A Further Necessity

In U-ie minds c" s: mo, there is a further necessity; r. ly, to art ate

l

/ 3 /.-.■". -'Z^ by my Gov-

ernment in as precise a manner as is poss::: prior to negotiz 5 -7 and without in any way pre-conditioning or prejudicing such 1 niatkms.

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It is widely accepted that the Geneva Agr of 1954 and 1952 si outd

constitute the basis for settlement We agree. In our view, this entails:

1. A complete cease:":- and disen -_jemcnt by all ?:r^d personneTln

sped [, Such ac$bn was called

fdnpTEe Geneva Agreemen Es.*

2, Ko mill tar v forces, armed persqn-net o r b aseV to fie* main! TcfKorth oT~S6uth Vietnam except these under the control of the respective governments. This would mean wtthdcawu or demobilizing all other troops, with* drawing external i / and related personnel introduced from outside South Vietnam, and the evacuation of military bases, as soon as possible under an agreed time sche dule* This too was con te m. r i J u nrfeF'ffie" Genc va Agre merits.

3. Full respect for the international ' frontiers of the states bordering on North and South Vietnam, as well as for the demarcation line and demilitarized zone between North and South Vietnam. This too was called for by the Geneva Agreements.

4 t Peaceful settlement by the people in both North and South Vietnam of the questionrof reunification, without foreign interference. This too was called for by the Geneva Ag its.

5- Finally, gupervi sion of all the foregoing by agreed uoprj ir. x^tip^alnia-.<&&£&. this too was calted i^r by the Geneva Agreement

thus summarizing the central e! ments of the Geneva Agreements, I tnat, as_cvidcnced H the communique issued at Manila last October 25, the Government of South Vietnam holds sm> ilar views.

We make this authoritative statement, Mr. President, in the hope that a settlement can be reached by reaffirming the principals of the Geneva Agreement and by making use of the machinery created by those agreements — including m particular a reconvened Geneva Conference in which all concerned parties can appropriately participate.

An Additional Question

* And we suggest that a further ques-tion is in order:

Does North Vietnam agree that the . foregoing points are a correct interpretation of the Geneva Agreements to which it professedly subscribes? t

To this question hi me appeal this plain statement about the alms 01 tne United States toward North Vietnam. The United States has no designs on the territory of North Vietnam: we co not seek to overthrow its gaveramej whatever its ideology; and we are fuliy prepared to respect its sovereignty arid territorial integrity and to enter mto specific undertakings to that end.

By the same token, it rem our view that the people of South Vietnam should have the right to work out their own. political future by peaceful m« in accordance with the principle cf seir-determmatlon, and without external h-terfcrence; and that this ri^ht too should ,be respected by sit.

And it is our further view that s Soutii Vietnamese who are willing to pari v m i Kfe

Cf"Sottt*TVI . - - • -.".

**■-■-

cif^hce" as first-class • ms wtth'fuTl

rtgfitSTn i y^scnseTWc

qo no: co

.-(P.

te:ee T that" a; v segment cf the South .Vietnamese people should be excli from such peaceful participation. We wouJcLco::sx ! er. it altogether wise arid proper,, if vvoujdLji • YfCeb;

stacle tojseacSi § — assur-

ances oh this matter be consfde 'in connection \ fth a IE

It should be on

that the Government cf So^ih Vietnam has stated th*t it has "no desire to threaten or harm the people of V North;" that it seeks only to'resolve its political problems without externa! interference; and that it is prepared for "reconciliation of a'I elements in the society/ 1 It is also noteworthy that the people of S Vietnam have Just concluded a peaceful election under a new constitution, and have made progress in trie democratic process.

Let me add that my Government remains willing, and indeed has already begun, to make a major commitment of resources m a multilateral cooperative effort to accelerate in all of Souther Asia the benefits of economic development so sorely needed there. When the conflict is ended and peace is restored, we would hope to see North Vietnam included in that effort.

' Constructive Replies Urged

■

In the interest of progress along tl road to peace, we earnestly hope that constructive answers to the questions we have raised will soon be forthcoming. We are all too conscious that the present reality is one of grim and harsh conflict — already tragically and unduly prolonged. Surely if iV re is any contribution that diplomacy, whether bilateral or multilateral, can make to hasten the end of this conflict, none in this Assembly can in good conscience spare &ny effort* or any labor to make that contribution — no matter how frustrating past efforts may have been, or how many new beginnings may be required.

We of the United States, for our part, stand ready to make that effort and to persist in trying to overcome all obstacles to a settlement

The President of the United States, speaking specifically of Vietnam, has said: '"V/e Americans know the nature of

a fair bargain; none need fear negotiating with us." In the flexible spirit that statement, and speaking for the United States Government, I affirm without reservation the willingness of the United States to seek and find a political solution cf the conflict in V: n.

I turn now to the Middle East, a second area of go t which is both tragic in itself and dan :. us to the peace of world.

The views of the United States on the requirements of peace in the Middle East have been se I rth by President Johnson, notably in his statement of June 19 which remains bur policy. In that state t my Gove:. . ' appealed to all the parties to ado; no rie."d view on the method cf bringing peace to the area. Rather, we have emphasized throughout that there is something more basic than methods: the simple will to peace. There must be present on both

des an affirmative will to resolve t : issues, not V gh the dictation of terms by either side, but through z. process of mutual accommodation in which nobody's vital interests are injured; I hortj both sides must have the" will to work out a political sol a; both must be committed to the peace; and no appropriate method - h as good Offices or mediation, si excluded.

Emergency

*Tftirfrtn«*

Ion's Work

In candor it must be said that such a will to peace was not mani in the recent emergency s ion of the Assembly. It is greatly to be hoped that, af sihz? reflection by all concerned, a and better mood wilt emerge — a mood of reconciliation znd n ntmlty.

Surely the purposes of peace cannot be served if the right of a n :r state to its national life h not accepted end respected by its f s; nor if mili-

tary success blinds a member state to the fact thai its neighbors have rights and interests cf their own.

In realism, it is perhaps not to be expected that reconciliation and magnanimitywill appear ov« but surely enmity must at least give way to tolerance and to the will to live togeil in peace. Once that v. ill is manifest, the terms of settlement can be evolved.

The principles which my Government believes can bring peace to the region are these:

SEach nation in the area must accc the right of others to live. The least that this requires is that ail should renounce any state or claim of belligerency, which as Ions ago as 1931 was found

75

by the Security Council to be inconsistent with peace.

ciroops must be withdrawn — and withdrawn in a context of peace. For some parties cannot be left free to assert the rights of war while oLhers are called upon to abide by the rules of peace,

SThcre must be justice for the re' gees. The nations of the area must address themselves at last, with new energy and new determi m to succeed, to the plight of those who have been rendered homeless or displaced by wars and ct is of the past, both distant and recent.

*iFree and innocent passage throu international waterways must be assured for all n at; One of tli of tire recent conflict is that mari rights must be respected.

CThe wasteful and destructive arms* race in the region must be cur'ted, tl by making i ;es available for

economic development, - .

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tfThe states of Jerusalem must notbe

decided unilaterally but in consultation

v-th at! concerned, and in recognition

e historic interest of the tnree great

Lotensin the Holy Places.

qThe political independence arid ter utonalir: ity of t all states in the ares must be respected.

<»Boundaries must be accepted ana other arrangements made, superseding temporary and often violated armistice

a

lines, so as to afford security to 2II parties against terror, destruction and war.

These are important general principles on which* we believe, rests the peace of the area. White the- main responsibility lies with the parties, the Urn-id Nations and every member state, including my own country, must help m the search for peace. For it is in i highest international int-;->t, as well as in the national interests of the parties, that peace should be achieved as soon as possible.

, As for my own country, bur most cherished wish for the Middle East has long been an age of peace in wmch we could enjoy good relations with every .nation of that region. In such a climate of peace there is much that we could do, and would bs glad to do, in cooperation with other members and with the gifted people of the region itself. Regional economic development; the full habitation-of the refugees; the de-Iting of water and the restoration or -iie desert to human u=e — the not war or armaments, are the

works to

which my country, and I am sure many both "in end outside the Middle E;

would prefer to devote our energies.

I turn now to a third momentous problem: the search for reliable programs of International disarmament ai arms control, particularly in the field Of nuclear weapons.

Step-by-step progress in this field, which seemed out of reach for so many years, has more recently become a reality. Significant limitations regarding nuclear weapons have been accepted by the nuclear powers in the Antarctic Treaty of 1959; in the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty cf 1963; and only last year in the Outer Space Treaty.

These successive steps have encouraged us to continue to tackle one of the most basic aspects of the nuclear dilemma: the threat of the spread of nuclear weapons to more and.more nations. This 'poses one of the gravest dangers to peace and, indeed, to the survival of mankind. The longer this problem remains, the graver the danger becomes.

My Government has long been very much alive to this danger. In response ■* it we have given th: highest priority the IS-Xatlon Disarmament Committee to the objective of a non-proliferation treat} .

Last month tin's long effort culminated in the simultaneous tabling by the United States and the Soviet Union of iden- . tical drafts of a non-proliferation trea-

ty -a- complete 13 ail exC cpt its safeguard provisions. The texts of these drafts will re available in document form to all members of the General Assembly.

a

comply Problems Remain

Complex problems still remain. But we arc: hopeful that a.complete treaty draft, including a generally accept; safeguard provision,-wit! be presented to this session in time to allow for c sideration and action by the Assembly, under whose general direction and guidance this treaty Is being iiegotia

The presentation of such a^cdmpleted draft will, of course, not be the cad of the process. There wilt remain the understandable d of certain non-nuclear countries for assurances against nuclear blackmail. In? Assembly , in ad* dition to endorsing the treaty as we hope it will, can make a significant contribution to the treaty's objective of r: .proliferation by helping to "develop t solution to this related problem.

' We fully understand that the drafts which have been tabled in Geneva are far too important to admit of hurried consideration by prospective signatories. But neither does this urgent matter admit of procrastination. All concerned powers, nuclear and non-nuclear alike, should press forward with all practical speed to the conclusion of a final treaty. Indeed, the General Assembly itself spoke to all of us last year when it unanimously declared in Resolution 2149 (XXI): ^

First, that states taf:e all necessary steps to facilitate and achieve at the earliest possible time the conclusion of a non-proliferation treaty; and

Second, that all states refrain from any actions conducive to proliferation or which might hamper the conclusion of an agreement.

' Mr, President, our preoccupation with the non-proliferation treaty lias not diminished my Government's concern over other major problems in the arms control field. High on the list of thmt problems Is the growing arsenal of strategic offensive and defensive missiles. Some time ago we expressed to the Soviet Union .our irt: rest in an understanding which would limit the deployment of such missiles.

In the interim, we in the United States have been obliged to review carefully our strategic position. Our conclusi from this review was that our security, including particularly security against the threat of a missile attack by Wain-land China, required us to embark upon the construction of a limited ant'-ballis-tic missile system — and 1 emphasize the word 'limited." No nation, nuclear or non-nuclear, ^ should feel that its security is endan-

76

gered by this decision. On the contrary, to the extent that the United States will be better able to meet its international defensive resoonsf] s, and to respond to appeals from states threatened by nuclear blackmail, the present safety of many other countries may in fact be enhanced.

a

t ' No Illusions on Missiles

However, we have no illusions that

the construction and deployment of missile 5 of any kind is t referred ro: ! to security. It is not. The events which Jed to our decision simply underscore the urgeni importance of pursuing negotiations on a limitation of s gic of; fensive and defensive missiles. Despi our lack of success thus far, the United States remains ready to open talks on this subject at any time. . ,

Mr, President, these developments once again demonstrate the urgenj need not only for a non-proliferation treaty, but for all the necessary steps toward ■aeral and complete disarmament. Let no one imagine that the building or acquisition of a nuclear bomb buys cheap security. True security for all powers, nuclear and non-nuclear alike, lies in progress on the entire range of an control and disarmament measures —-including control of the strategic arms race, a verifiable comprehensive test .ban, and a cut-off of production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes. The sum of such acts will help to build a more secure world for all.

Mr. President, the fourth great problem which I wish to discuss is that of assuring self-determination and full n tionhood to all peoples who still live in colonial subjection.

Our Assembly agenda reminds us that the work of ending the colonial age is far from finished. In fact, the hardest problems have remained until the last. This is true above alt in the southern

■ portion cf the African continent, where white minorities have become deeply entrenched in their dominion over black

* majorities. In much of this area we see not one evil but two evils which, under one guise or another, go hand in hand: colonialism and that particularly cruel offense against human rights, racial discrimination.

The opposition of the United States to these twin evils draws strength from two of the deepest elements in our own national life: our historic stand as an anticolonial power and our continuing struggle against racial injustice among our own people.

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_ My country, founded on the proposl-lion that all men are created equal* and have equal rights before the law — and currently engaged in a vigorous nationwide program to make that equality real Jot all its citizens — cannot and will pot adopt a double s of what is

happening in tfte southern pan or rtifit«t.

To those who arc impatient for redress of grievances we shall show that we sympathize with them and support their objectives, even though we may not alwavs aqreo on the specifics steps to be taken "by the international community.

To those who, on the other hand, resist all change, we shall continue to insist that the way to preserve peace is not the subme :e of legitimate grtev-• ances, but their timely redress. And we shall unceasingly bring home to them America's profound conviction that apartheid—like every other form of white supremacy—is, as my predecessor Adtai Stevenson said, 'Vac 1st in its origins, arrogant in its implementation", and, in its consequences, potentially dangerous for all"

Mr. President, during th^ coming'three months the General Assembly will address itself not only to the questions we have discussed in. this sta> at but to a vast range of i i > ajffeciing the peace "and welfare of mankind, both now and in the long future. My delegation will seek to participate constructively in the Assembly's many concerns: and on a number of topics of particular interest we shall present proposals of our own.

The United States turns to these tasks in a mood of sober determination. Our disting'i' d Secretary General, in the introduction to his annual report, has made clear his view that this has not been a good year for the United Nations; and we agree with that assessment. The fault lies not in the organization itself but in ourselves, its members; and it is to our own policies that we must all look if \ sire a better future.

In serving the cause of a just ai peaceful world, we are not permitted the luxury of being easily discouraged. Indeed, the most forbidding obstacles are precisely those which should call forth our most persistent efforts. Nor should we look for any alternative to the United Nations, for there is none. Year in and year out, through all the'difficulties that may arise, we must strive to be true, both in word and dQQd } to the permanent pledge of peace and justice which we, as members, have made to the United ftpJ.ions and to one another.

As this Twenty-second General Assembly opens, the United States once again solemnly reaffirms its devotion that pledge,

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Clfi <n i >h f 1/7 fin fi n f

Fllilv&IUli/lM i 1

1 ) U f O ,!

r

<*,

/i j.6i\! 1 a

Week Ending Friday > October 6> 1967

1372

VIETNAM " '

The President's Remarks in San A nlonio Jiefare the National Legislative

Confirmee* September 29, 19G7

•

Speaker Barnes, Governor Hughes, Governor Smith, Congressman Kazen, Representative Graham, most distinguished legislators, ladies and gentlemen:

I deeply appreciate this opportunity to appear before an organization whose members contribute every day such important work to the public affairs of our State and of our country.

This evening I came here to speak to you about Vietnam,

I do not have to tell you that our people are profoundly concerned about that struggle.

There are passionate convictions about the wisest course for our Nation to follow. There are many sincere and patriotic Americans who harbor doubts about sustaining the commitment that three Presidents and a half a million of our young men have made.

Doubt and debate are enlarged because the problems of Vietnam are quite complex. They are a mixture of political turmoil—of poverty— of religious and factional strife—-of ancient servitude and modem lonnm for freedom. Vietnam is all of these things.

Vietnam is also the scene of a powerful aggression that is spurred by an appetite for conquest.

It is the arena'where Communist expansionism is most aggressively at work in the world today—-where it is crossing international frontiers in violation of international agreements; where it is killing and kidnaping; where it is ruthlessly attempting to bend free people to its will.

Into this mixture of subversion and war, of terror and hope, America has entered—with its material power and with its moral commitment.

Why?

Why should three Presidents and the elected representatives of our people have chosen to defend this Asian nation more than 10,000 miles from American shores?

We cherish freedom—yes. We cherish self-determination for all people—yes. We abhor the political murder of state by another, a : the bodily murder of any people by gangsters of whatever ideology. And for 27 years—since the days of lend-lease—we have sought to strengthen free people against domination by aggressive foreign powers.

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But the key to all we have done Is really our own security. At tin of crisis—before asking Americans to fight and die to resist aggression in a foreign land—every American President has finally had to answer this question:

" Is the aggression a threat—not only to the immediate victim—but to the United States of America and to the peace and security of the entire world of which we in America are a very vital part? ■

That is the question which Dwight Eisenhower and John Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson had to answer in facing the issue in Vietnam.

That is the question that the Senate of the United States answered by a vote of 82 to 1 when it ratified and approved the SEATO treaty in 1955, and to which the Members of the United States Congrc responded in a resolution that it passed in 1964 by a vote of 504 to 2, "the United States is. therefore, prepared, as the President determines, to take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force, to assist any member or protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty requesting assistance in defense of its freedom."

■ Those who tell us now that we should abandon our commitment—■ that securing South Vietnam from armed domination is not worth the price we are paying—must also answer this question. And the test they must meet is this: What would be the consequence of letting armed agression against South Vietnam succeed? What would follow in the time ahead? What kind of world are they prepared to live in 5 months or 5 years from tonight?

For those who have borne the responsibility for decision during these past 10 years, the stakes to us have seemed clear—and have seemed high.

President Dwight Eisenhower said in 1959;

"Strategically, South Vietnam's capture by the Communists would bring their power several hundred miles into a hitherto free region. The remaining countries in Southeast Asia would be menaced bv a ereat flank-ing movement, The freedom of 12 million people would be lost immediately, and that of 150 million in adjacent lands would be seriously endangered. The loss of South Vietnam would set in motion a crumbling process that could, as it progressed, have grave consequences for us and for freedom, .,...* '

And President John-F. Kennedy said in 1962:

* c . . . Withdrawal in the case of Vietnam and the case of Thailand might mean a collapse of the entire area."

A year later, he reaffirmed that: " :

"We are not going to withdraw from that effort. In my opinion, for us to withdraw from that effort would mean a collapse not only of South Vietnam; but Southeast Asia, So we are going to stay there," said President Kennedy.

This is not simply an American viewpoint, I would have you legislative leaders know. T am going to call the roll now of Owbc who live irf that part of the world—in the great arc of Asian and Pacific nations—and who bear the responsibility for leading their people, and the responsibility for the fate of their people.

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1374

V/SE'UY CO.MNLAT10N OF PRESIDENTIAL PCCUAti:

,Thc President of the Philippines had this to say:

"Vietnam is the focus of attention now. ... It may happen io Thailand or the Philippines, or anj^wherc, wherever there is misery, disease, ignorance, . . , For you to renounce your position of leadership in Asia is to allow the Pvcd Chinese to gobble up all of Asia."

The Foreign Minister of Thailand said:

"(The American) decision will go down in history as the move that prevented the world from having to face another major conflagration."

The Prime Minister of Australia said: : *

"\Ve .are there because while Communist aggression persists the whole of Southeast Asia is threatened."

President Park of Korea said:

"For the first time in our history, we decided to dispatch our combat .troops overseas . . . because in our belief any aggression against the Republic of Vietnam represented a direct and grave menace against the security and peace of free Asia, and therefore directly jeopardized the very security and freedom of our own people,"

The Prime Minister of Malaysia warned his people that if the United States pulled out of South Vietnam, it would go to the Communists, and after that, it would be only a matter of. time until they moved ^ against neighboring states.

The Prime Minister of New Zealand said:

"We can thank God that America at least regards aggression in Asia with the same concern as it regards aggression in Europe—and is prepared to back up its concern with action."

The Prime Minister of Singapore said:

"I feel the fate of Asia—South and Southeast Asia—will be decided in the next few years by what happens out in Vietnam."

I cannot tell you tonight as your President—with certainty—that a Communist conquest of South Vietnam would be followed by a Communist conquest of Southeast Asia. But I do know there are North Vietnamese troops in Laos. I do.know that there arc North Vietnamese trained guerrillas tonight in northeast Thailand. I do know that there are Communist-supported guerrilla forces operating in Burma. And a Communist coup was barely averted in Indonesia, the fifth largest nation in the world.

So your American President cannot tell you—with certainty—that a Southeast Asia dominated by Communist power would bring a third world war much closer to terrible reality. One could hope that this would not be so. . -

But all that we have learned in this tragic century strongly suggests to me that it would be so. As President of the United States, I am not prepared to gamble on the chance that it is not so. I am not prepared to risk the security—indeed, the survival—of this American Nation on mere .hope and wishful thinking, I am convinced that by seeing this struggle through now, we are greatly reducing the char of a much larger war— perhaps a nuclear war, I would rather stand in Vietnam, in our time, and

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by meeting this danger now, and facing up to it, thereby reduce the dang for our children and for our grandchildren.

I want to turn now to the struggle in Vietnam Itself.

*

There are questions about this difficult war that must trouble every really thoughtful person-. I am going to put some of these questions. And I am going to give you the very best answers that I can give you.

First, are the Vietnamese—with our help, and that of their other allies—really making any.progress? Is there a forward movement? The reports I sec make it clear that there is. Certainly there is a positive mover ment toward constitutional government. Thus far the Vietnamese have

met the political schedule that they laid down in January 1966.

The people wanted an elected, responsive government. The}- wanted it strongly enough to brave a vicious campaign of Communist terror and assassination to vote for it. It has been said that they killed more civilians in 4 weeks trying to keep t! from voting before the election than our American bombers -have killed in the big cities of North Vietnam in bombing military targets.

On November 1, subject to the action, of course, of the Constituent Assembly, an elected government will be inaugurated and an elected Senate and Legislature will be installed. Their responsibility is clear: To answer the desires of the South Vietnamese people for self-determination and for peace, for an attack on corruption, for economic development, and for social justice.

There is progress in the Avar itself, steady progress considering the war that we arc fighting; rather drama I >rogress considering the situation that actually prevailed when we sent our troops there in 1965; when we intervened to present the dismemberment of the country by the Viet-cong and the Nortli Vietnamese.

The campaigns of the last year drove the enemy from many of their major interior bases. The military victory almost within Hanoi's grasp in 1965 has now been denied them. The grip of the Vietcong on the people is being broken.

Since our commitment of major forces in July 1965 the proportion

of the population living under Communist control has been reduced to

"well under 20 percent. Tonight the secure proportion of the population

has grown from about 45 percent to 65 percent—and in the contested

areas, the tide continues to run with us.

But the struggle remains hard. The South Vietnamese have suffered severely, as have we—particularly in the First Corps area in the north, where the enemy has mounted his heaviest attacks, and where his lines of communication to North Vietnam are shortest. Our casualties in the war have reached about 13,500 killed in action, and about 85,000 wounded. Of those 85,000 wounded, we thank God that 79,000 of the 85,000 have been returned, or will return to dutv shortly. Thanks to our great American medical science and the helicopter.

I know there are other questions on your minds, and on the minds

of many sincere, troubled Americans: ,c Why not negotiate now? so many ask me. The answer is that ^ve and our South Vietnamese allies are wholly prepared to negotiate tonight.

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1376

WEEKLY COMPILATION Or PRESIDENTIAL DOOj; t \^uZ

I am ready to talk with IIo Chi Miiih, and other chiefs of state concerned, tomorrow,

J am ready to have Secretary Rusk meet with their foreign minister tomorrow.

I am ready to send a trusted representative of America to any spot on this earth to talk in public or private with a spokesman of Hanoi.

We have twice sought to have the issue of Vietnam dealt with by the United Nations—and twice Hanoi lias refused.

Our desire to negotiate peace—through the United Nations or out—lias been made very, very clear to Hanoi—directly and many times through third parties.

. : As we have told Hanoi time and time and time again, the heart of the matter really is this: The United States is willing to stop all aerial * and naval bombardment of North Vietnam when this will lead promptly to productive discussions. We, of course, assume that while discussions proceed, North Vietnam would not take advantage of the bombing cessation or limitation.

But Hanoi has not accepted any of these proposals.

So it is by Hanoi's choice—and not ours, and not the rest of the world's—that the war continues. * „

Why, in the face of military and political progress in the South, and the burden of our bombing in the North, do they insist and persist with the war?

- From many sources the answer is the same. They still hope that the people of the United States will not see this struggle through to the vci y end. As one Western diplomat reported to me only this week—he had just been in Hanoi—"They believe their staying power is greater than ours and that they can't lose." A visitor from a Communist capital had this to say: 'They expect the war to be long, and that the Americans in the end will be defeated by a breakdown in morale, fatigue, and psychological factors." The Premier of North Vietnam said as far back as 1962: 'Americans do not like long,-inconclusive war. , . . Thus we are sure to win in the end." .

Are the North Vietnamese right about us?

*

- I think not. No. I think they are wrong. I think it is the common failing of totalitarian regimes, that they cannot really understand the nature of our democracy: \

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—Theymistake dissent for disloyalty;

-—They mistake restlessness for a rejection of policy;

■—They mistake a few committees for a country;

—They misjudge individual speeches for public policy.

They are no better suited to judge the strength and perseverance of America than the Nazi and the Stalinist propagandists were able to judge it. It is a tragedy that they must discover these qualities in the American people, and discover them through a bloody war. " , ■

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And, soon or late, they will discover tlxem.

In the meantime, it shall be our policy to continue to seek negotiations—confident that reason will some day prevail; that Hanoi will realize that it just can never win; that it will turn away from fighting and start building for its own people.

Since 'World War II, this Nation has met and lias mastered many challenges—challenges in Greece and Turkey, in Berlin, in Korea, in Cuba. --

Wc met them because brave men were witling to risk their lives for their nation's security. And braver men have never lived than those who carry our colors in Vietnam at this very hour.

The price of these efforts, of course, has been heavy. But the price of not having made them at all, not having seen them through, in my judgment would have been vastly greater.

Our goal has been the same—in Etifope 3 in Asia, in our own hemisphere. It has been—-and it is now—peace,

And peace cannot be secured by wishes; peace cannot be preserved by noble words and pure intentions. "Enduring peace/ 5 Franklin D. Roosevelt said, "cannot be bought at the cost of other people's freedom."

The late President Kennedy put it precisely in November 1951, when he said: "We are neither warmongers nor appcasers, neither hard nor soft. Wc are Americans determined to defend the frontiers of frecdoi n by an honorable peace if peace is possible but by arms if arms are used against us."

. The true peace-keepers in the world tonight are not those who urge us to retire from the field in Vietnam—who tell us to try to find the quickest, cheapest exit from that tormented land, no matter what the consequences to us may be.

The true peace-keepers are those men who stand out there on the DMZ at this very hour, taking the worst that the enemy can give. The true peace-keepers are the soldiers who are breaking the terrorist's grip around the villages of Vietnam—the civilians who are bringing medic care and food and education to people who have already suffered a generation of war. ■•

And so I report to you that we are going to continue to press forward. Two things wc must do. Two tilings we shall do.

First, we must not mislead our enemy. Let him not think that debate and dissent will produce wavering and withdrawal. For I can assure you they won't. Let him not think that protests will produce surrender. Because they won't. Let him not think that he will wait us out. For he won't.

Second, wc will provide all that our brave men require to do the job that must be done. And that job is going to be done.

These gallant men have our prayers—have our thanks—have our heart-felt praise—and our deepest gratitude.

Let the world know that the keepers of peace will endure through

every trial—and that with the full backing of their countrymen, they are

going to prevail. * ■

• * note: The President spoke at 8:34 pin., c.d.t., at the Yilltta Assembly Hal! in San Antonio, Texas. The speech was broadcast nationally.

The National Legislative Conference is an operation of the Council of St; Governments with headquarters in Atlanta, Ga. The group included approximately .2,000 delegates to the Conference.

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SUBMISSION OF THE VIETXA3I COXPJLICT TO THE

■ UNITED XATIOXS

thursday, nov3ssibek 2, 1937

United States Senate,

.COMMITTEE OX FoilEIGX RelaTIQXS,

Washington-, U,C\

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m., in room 4221, New Senate Office Building, Senator J. W. Fulbright (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Fulbright, Sparkman, Mansfield, Morse, Gore, Laiiscbc, SymingtOn, Pell, McCarthy, and Aiken.

The Chairman. The committee \ral come to order.

Wo meet this morning to continue a series of heatings on the role that the United Nations should play in settlement of the Vietnam conflict. The committee is considering two resolutions covering the

§u est ion of submitting the Vietnam war to the United Nations ecurity Council. Both Senate Concurrent Resolution 44, introduced by the distinguished Senator from Oregon, Senator Morse, and Senate Resolution ISO, introduced by the senior Senator from Montana, Mr. Mansfield, with 57 cosponsors, are being considered by the com4 mi I tec. ^ ^

We are very happy indeed this morning to welcome the Representative of the United States to the United Nations, Ambassador Arthur Goldberg. Mr. Ambassador, will you proceed?

STATELIEST OF HON, ARTHUR I. GOLDBERG, "U.S. REPRESENTATIVE

TO THE UNITED NATIONS, ACCOMPANIED BY JOSEPH J. SISCO,

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OP STATE FOR INTERNATIONAL

- ORGANISATION AFFAIRS -

. "**

Ambassador Goldberg. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and members of this committee. I should like to say I am accompanied here today by Mr. Joseph Sisco, the able and dedicated Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs.

Mr, Chairman and gentlemen, I appreciate very much your invitation to appear before this committee and to give testimony in public session on the important subject of the responsibility of the United Nations in the search for peace in Vietnam, This is the grara-men of Senate Concurrent Resolution 44 introduced by Senator Morse, and of Senate Resolution ISO introduced by Senator Mansfield and many other Senators.

I should like also, Mr. Chairman, to express my appreciation to the committee which had scheduled me to appear last week to defer my appearance which was impos 1! k ; i thai time because of a meeting

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SUBMIT VIETNAM CONFLICT TO UNITED NATIONS

of Jie Security Council and other consultations on the Middle Eastern £'YJ3is ftt the U.X. I. should like aba to thank Dr. Ma rev who was Vind as to arrange fur this day which was mure coin en rent.

At the very outset let me say that I a ly with the

concept of the responsibility of the United Nations which tttulerTu both resolutions*

In preparing my testimony I have taken note of Senator Morse's comment in the hearings before this committee on October 20, referring to Senator Mansfield's resolution and 1 quote Senator Morse, who said in part: "I think it probably would be the most appropriate type of resolution to send to the President, for, after all, this ought to be a teamwork play."

I need scarcely add at this time that the Senator made it very clear this was without prejudice to his own views in the matter.

It is my considered view as the U.S. Representative to the United Nations that the adoption of Senator Mansfield's resolution at this time will sttpjx efforts I have been making at the United Nations

at the direction of the President to enlist the Security Council in the search for peace in Vietnam.

U.X. RESFOXSiiilU'l V UNDEI; THE CHARTER

Any analysis of the problem of .U.X. involvement in Vietnam nuisi start with the United Nations charter. Under the charter, the United Nations and its members have a specific obligation to cooperate in the maintenance of international peace and security. This obligation is clearly set forth in the provisions of the charter, including specifically the following:

Article 1, paragraph I, which states the first purpose of the United Nations as:

To maintain international peace and scanty, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and ro bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of jir and international Luv, adjustment or settlement of iuternufional disputes or situations which lui^ht lead to a breach of the peace.

Article 2, paragraph 3, which includes among the principles binding upon all members the following: * "

All members shall settle their international disputes by .peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice are not endangered.

Article 24, paragraph 1: -

In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nation?, its Members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf.

■ : Article 25:

The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter*

And to these provisions should be added all of chapters VI and VII of the charter which confer broad powers on the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security. • Moreover, it is obvious that these powers and obligations of the United Nations pply to the situation in Southeast Asia in general and Vietnam in particular. *

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In saying this I ant mindful of the argument that is sometimes made, both tn and out of the United Nations, that several of the principal parties—the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, theRcpublic of Vietnam, and the People's Republic of China—are not in the United Nations and that it i>, therefore, not a suitable place to deal with the Vietnam qw -'; >n. The premise is, of course, a fact, but the conclusion is incorrect. The charter explicitly provides for the responsibility and participation of notmiembers; for example:

Article 2, paragraph 6, provides—

The Organization shall ensure that states which arc not Memberi of the raited Nations n accordance with thfso principles so fur as may 1 cessary for the niaintcnaro ' rnatloual peace and security.

Arid article 32 provides in part, and I again quote, that—

Any state which ta not a member of the United Nation?, if it U a party to a di<-ptfte InuI'T consideration by the Security Council, shall be invited to participate, without vote, in the discussion relating to the dispute.

—It Is clear, .therefore, Mr. Chairman, that the United Nat inns has a dutv to act for peace in Vietnam, and that the involvement of nonmembers is no obstacle to such action. The question therefore arises: Why has such action not taken place?

I believe it would be useful to tlm committee if I review briefly the record of our endeavors in the Security Council to obtain such action.

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ATTITUDE OP COUNCIL MEMBERS TOWARD DEBATE

Ambassador Goldberg. It is important to note also, Mr, Chairman and gentlemen, that the Soviet Union and Bui la refused throughout to even join in the consultations which Ambassador Matsui held among the Council members. The Soviet representative. Ambassador Fcdc enkOj sent a letter to the President of the Council stating his "stro: objections" to the procedure followed by Ambassador Matsui, and charging him with "steps that go beyond the limit of his confidence and violate the Security Council's rules of procedure and established practice-" A si? t letter Was also sent by the Bulg a representative, I need scarcely add, Mr. Chairman, that in our view and I think in the view* of many members of the Council Ambassador Matsui acted uitc properly in doing what he did and quite within his authority as Resident of the Council in reporting to the members of the Council the results of his consultations.

My own canvass taken independently of that of Ambassador Matsui confirmed his assessment that the members of the Council were generally unwilling to proceed with a substantive discussion despite the strong and express preference of the United States that we get on

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SUBMIT VIETNAM CONFLICT TO UNITED NATIONS

-with the debate. I should also like to add we did have somewhat of a •substantive debate as happens in the U.X. even i:i the process o inscribing an item. I made a statement of a substantive character in support of Inscription because I could hardly avoid it, and other members spoke to the substance in dealing with the inscription matter as is apparent from the record you have kindly allowed me to file with t ■committee.

Indeed my canvass showed that this unwillingness to get on villi the debate was found even among those members who had voted affirmatively on i riptioii in the hope that such a vote might-sway the negative attitude of the Soviet 1 ti and France in particular,

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EFFORTS ON BEHALF OF THE ADMIXlSTilATlOX

Now, Mr. Chairman, this is the record of my efforts on behalf of the Administration and the President to enlist the United Nations and specifically the Security Council in the search for peace in Vietnam,

I must confess that the failure of these efforts has been my keenest disappointment and my^ greatest frustration during my service for our Government at the United Nations, I frankly had hoped for a much more constructive and positive role of the United Nations when I took on this ! ssignment for our country. But, Mr. Chairman, in spite of these rebuffs, I do not intend, as long as I occupy my present post, to diminish my efforts hi this cause. - . .

I repeat my co&victioo that Senator Mansfield's resolution, if it is . adopted by the Senate, as I hop and trust it will be, will support the efforts I am makim at the United Nations at the President's direction. -The resolution, as I understand it, is intended to express the sense of the Senate and appropriately leaves the timing and circumstances of . action in the Security Council for Presidential determination.

For my part, I promise this committee and the American people, in keeping with the spirit of the resolutions that you are considering, to persevere with all the resources at my command to the end that the Security Council may cany out its clear responsibilities under the charter with respect to Vietnam. I shall do so in the conviction that if there is any contribution that diplomacy—in or out of the United Nations—can make to hasten the end of this conflict, none of us can in good conscience spare any effort or any labor to make that contribution—no matter how frustrating past efforts may have been, or how • many new beginnings may be required. The admirable courage and perseverance of our men on the "battlefield must be fully matched by our perseverance in seeking, through diplomacy, to find the common ground on which a fair and honorable political settlement can be

built.

I thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. . .

The Chairman, Thank you, Mr. Ambassador,

I third: that is an extraordinarily clear and very fine statement, and I think it does great credit to your representation of this country in the United Nations. _ i . *

There are a few questions I want to go into quickly, much quicker than I would like, m order that other members may have an opportunity to put questions.

INTENTION TO RECONVENE GENEVA CONFERENCE

May I ask regarding the current prop 1 that you have or expect to submit, which—

Calls for the convening of an international conference for the purpose of establishing a permanent peace in Southeast Asia based upon the principles of the Geneva Agi- ■ -'s.

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■ . SI'BMJT VIETNAM CONFLICT TO UNITED NATIONS

Is it proper to Interpret that as meaning the ssmc as the reconvene of the Geneva conference under the cocbairniaiiship of the United Kingdom and the U.S.S.K., with the same membership parti* ting?

Amb^ 1 >r Goldberg. Yes, Mr. Chairman,

It is intended to reaffirm our Mfillin to have that done. It is

also intended to .add a little more flexibility because there bare been some indications from the other side that perhaps some other conference might b i .Me. But we would bo entirely will and we would be interpreting this clause to menu that the Geneva coi Mice, With tho same membership should be reconvened.

The Chairman. On several occasions, the other side, the North Vietnamese and, I thinly as one of your citations of the Chinese said, ■that that is the competent forum in which this matter should be settled; is that not correct?

Ambassador Golmerg, There have been some recent statements particularly from China further quaKfiying their former position, and pur formulation was intended to be more encompassing so as not to exclude-any type of international conference, but we believe the most •appropriate would be the reconvening of the Geneva Conference as yon have said, ' ^ ' j " . .

The Chairman. And from time to time, the Soviet Union has also stated that the conference was a proper forum; is that not correct?

Ambassador Goi/dkkiig. That is correct, but the Soviet Union has not responded to our repeated invitation to them to join with the British in reconvening the conference.

The Chaikman. I realize that, "" '" ::

RECONVENING OF GENEVA CONFERENCE

Let me say, I certainly am sympathetic with your view that Hanoi lias been very unresponsive to these offers and it is cmitc beyond my comprehension as to why. I don't understand their reluctance or their refusal to do it except possibly they may interpret this move to mean the United Nations is going itself to undertake to deal with the substantive question. Nov.', this may be a point, I am not clear, I don't faiow, of course, whether or not mat is their reason, but if that should be so that they interpreted this as "a move on our part to use the U.N-to solve the problem then they, not being a member have some reason for it Even so, I would not agree with their position at all. I think that it would be perfectly proper if they would agree to come and submit the matter to the United Nations. ^ ^ .

But in any case, seeking to find some basis upon which we might get a reconvening of the Geneva conference, it has seemed to me that this point is very important. I confess that if this is the purpose, to reconvene the Geneva conference, I cannot possibly understand the attitude of the French Government or of the Soviet Government in refusing to take the position in the Security Council that this would be a proper mode of procedure because you do not deal with it

substantively,

I think some of the statements of the Soviets and of the French that I have seen and some which you cite seem to indicate that ther believe, too, that we are attempting to use the Security Council itself to deal with the substantive question; is that correct?

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; SUBMIT VIETNAM CONFLICT TO UNITED NATIONS

"Ambassador Gold};:. I shared your apprehensions about this,, Mr. Chairman, and in the inscription debate in 1686 after listening to the comments made by the Soviet Union and by France and having read sonic- of these editorials which appeared at the time, 1 specifically addressed myself to that problem in the same light as you have hist done, trying to make clear that while we believe, and had to believe under the charter, that the Security Council had competence, nevertheless, in Ikjit of v.hat they are saying about it, it was not our proposal that the U.K. itself settle the matter, but rather, we were trying to get the great influence and prestige of the Security Council behind the reconvening of the Geneva conference, and I think the statement you made today is a helpful statement. I endorse it completely, and I also am puzzled why, in light of their contention on the basis that the Geneva conference is the forum, why they can possibly object to a Security* Council resolution which supports the reconvening of the forum which it is asserted by them is the appropriate

forum.

The Chaikman, That is right. This really raises a question of their good faith, in toy mind. If they really are interested in being of assistance in stopping this serious conflict, I am at a loss to understand why they would refuse to reconvene the conference if the members of the Security Council so recommend; That would particularly apply to France and the Soviet Union who have both on numerous occasions stated publicly that this was the way to proceed.

ATTITUDE OF NONPBR11ANBNT MK.MBEK5 OF COUNCIL

Now, I am not aware of the previous statements of some of the nonpermauent members of the Security Council. You don't have time, of course, to outline them, but in your consultations, I can't understand why they would not, at least nine of them, agree to this. 00 you think they understand this point?

Ambassador GoitDBEHG, I think they must understand it, Mr. Chairman, and gentlemen, I have before me the statement I made, which is in your record, after the debate that we had in February of 1966, and I said this—I should like to read, if I may, just a paragraph or two, : *

Now I shall turn to some of the questions raised by members in the course of our discussion. I should like to deal with what was first pointed out by my friend, our former President, the Representative of France, whose vrisdom I have learned to appreciate very much and whose friendship I deeply value. The question he raised is an important and lias been raised by others, the representative of Mali, the representative of Uganda, and it has been adverted to by the representative of Bulgaria and I think was mentioned also by our esteemed colleague, Mr. Fcdorenko of the Soviet Union. Their point is this: It has been pointed out by them that the Geneva conference at which all parties to the conflict are represented, has been the international body which has In the past dealt with the Eroblems of Vietnam, it lias been claimed that it still remains t ■ ■.- appropriate

ody to do so. The United States has no quarrel with this contention. We have repeatedly stated that we would welcome the reconvening of the Geneva conference for this purpose. It has been correctly pointed out that the purpose of our draft resolution is to assist in what thus far it has not been possible to realize, the reconvening of the Geneva Conference. That has not been possible to realize not because of any opposition on the part of the Unite tes.* Quite the con

at least for the time being closed and the question we have to decide is a plain

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SUBMIT VIETNAM CONFLICT TO UNITED NATIONS

find simple one: Do we wish also to close the door to the V fJ ! Nations? What wilt the people of the world say if we do?

The Chairman. You have made that very clear this morning much clearer than it Las ever beetk made before, although I think your speech in August went very far in this direction. I must say I thought it was an excellent speech and I am at a loss to understand why so many members of the Ass My haver tly made spec-critical of our country, and of the bombing in view of your speech. I can't believe they understand what we really mean. So I am particularly pleased that you support this resolution of Senator Mam f: kh I predict that if this is property handled, and I have every confidence it will be by you, that this will make a great impression upon a number of those people' who have been critical. J don't see how they could object to this procedure.

Senator Spark man?

Senator Sparkman. Mr. Chairman, let me say that I certainly endorse everything the Chan-man has said. I have been very much impressed with your statement, Ambassador Goldberg. It seems to me that you have gone into the matter most carefully and pointedly, and 1 don't see much left to question you about.

I am puzzled as is the Chairman, about the attitude of many of these countries, as to why they could not accept what seem- to be the clear responsibility of the Security Council under the charter of the United Nations to take some kind of action. It seems to me that you have probed in just about every direction that you can to find some action that they could agree to take.

AGREEMENT OX RECONVENING GENEVA CONFERENCE

Does the Geneva Conference have the power to reconvene itself?

Ambassador Golti Under the rules of the conference, the two

cochairmen, the Soviet Union and Great Britain, may reconvene the* conference.

Senator Sparkman. But it cannot be reconvened unless bot chairmen agree to it? ^

Ambassador Goldberg. That is correct.

Senator Sparkman. And so far the chairmen have not agreed

to do so?

Ambassador Goldberg. The British have repeatedly indicated their wi!lingn to do so by public statements and bv private letters to the other cochairman as recently as in the Assembly of the United Nations last month. ..* -

Senator Sparkman. Does the Soviet representative give reasons for his unwillingness to reconvene the conference?

Ambassador Goldberg. Basically, if I were to interpret his reasons, his reasons are that Hanoi does not want the conference reconvened. He always says that the Soviet Union docs not want to, but lie always reads the statements made either by Hanoi or the NLF, and my interpretation is that that is the basis for the ck m taken by the Soviet Union. That is my interpretation, Mr. Chairman. He also asserts that they are unwilling, but that is my inter! rotation.

Senator Sparkman. How many countries constitute the Geneva Conference? ■-

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Ambassador Goldbkrg, The Geneva Conference, there are quite a number,

•'The Chahlmax. Are you^ talking about the 1951 one or tlie 19G2.

one? There arc nine in the first; M in the second.

. Ambassador Goli^i. it a. There are a 1:: er Dumber.

: Senator Spaekmax. Fourteen hi the one that prevails at the present

time. I believe, you have put to them that we would be willing to

proceed under either the 1951 or the 1902 arrangement; is that right?

Ambassador Ggldekkg, That is correct. Although we do feel that if a conference were to be held it would be highly desirable to deal •with both issues because it would be necessary to deal with peace iu that part of the world, and would be highly desirable to deal with the problems in Laos, Cambodia! because they are related problems, as well as Vietnam, •

Senator Spark-max. But the membership is powerless to act in the absence of the. agreement of the two chairmen.

Ambassador Goldbjuig. That is correct, Senator Sparkman.

Senator Spakkmax. Mr. Ambassador, 1 want to commend you for what 1 consider the excellent job that you have been doing for us in the United Nations and for your presentation here today.

Ambassador Goldberg. Thank you.

Senator SrAUKMAX. That is all, Mr. Chairman, :

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MEMBEK5HTP OF GENEVA CONFERENCES

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The Chairman. For the record, Mr. Ambassador, unless it is already in would you insert the membership of both Geneva conferences and also the present membership of the Security Council? Ambassador Goldberg Yes; J shall be very glad to do so, , (The material referred to follows:) ■ : ■•

■- ■ Membership of Geneva Conferences

195-1

1962

I. PARTICIPANTS

Cambodia Chitia (Communist) France Laos

United Kingdom United States .

U.S.S-) :

Vietnam, State of (South) Vietnam, Democratic Republic of ■ (North) »

Burma Cambodia Canada

China (Communis?) France India Laos : Poland Thailand United Kingdom United States U.S.S.R".

Vietnam, Republic of (South) Vietnam, Democratic Republic of (North)

* Fopuhrlv Known as Viet Mlnh,

» During me conference, there m ea Lrsot??.n representatives Invited to sit nt the table v.ith eq'.:it

status: one representing the neutral fcclion, one renro renting the leftist taction, and one representing the-rightist fiction.

The U .5.3.1:. looked upon the neutral (action ss represent! _- Bie Royal Lio Government; the United States looked upon the t m 25 representins the Royal Lio Go-.rem . t. 1 he conference &tt*

Jourced for sever*] 1 His to permit the three (actions to untangle their conflte;ln; cl-'.ims. They firm'iy reached an agreement (In June of 1562) to establish a government of notional •■, end it svas this

governniei-t nhlchaccej :■ I \hi I - Bleats read I it the con&rgnee. »

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SUBMIT VIETNAM CONFLICT TO UNITED NATIONS

PARTICIPATION IK FO&XULATIQN OF T7.S* VIETNAM WAR POLICY

.1 have another question. You may answer it or not, just as you liKc. Did you or Mr. Sisco participate in formulating our government's Vietnamese policy in carrying out of the war?

Ambassador Goj lg, J would )< say this: I am often talked

to about these matters, but T do operal e under the restrictions that are imposed by the United Nations Participation Act by Congress, which I tluuk are appropri restrictions.At the U.N. 3 slate the viev at of the U.S. Government as determined by the President, and I have participated in many meetings, however, on the subject of Vietnam.

Senator J\u\v.x. 1 notice in the last paragraph of your statement you say that you promise to persevere with all trie resources at your core d to the end that the the Security Council mar carry out its clear responsibilities under the charter with respect to Vietnam.

Now, the resources at your command would be whatever the President decides you should have?

Ambassador Goldberg* That is correct, and I am confident that those resources will be available if the Senate sees fit to pass this resolution.

Senator Aiken. Of course, I will say this. It is entirely possible that the President and the Secretary of State might not see eye to eye on the degree of resources which you should have.

Ambassador Goldberg. Well, I know only one way to use my resources and that is to use them full}-. I don't know any other way to use them.

Senator Aiken. Yes, I am saying that. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

The Chaibman. Senator Mansfield?

LIMITATIONS APPLICABLE TO THE UNITED NATIONS

Senator Mansfikld. Mr. Ambassador, I want to congratulate you on an excellent statement. 1 think you have put the question in proper

Eerspective before tbis committee. I very much appreciate the colloquy otween you and the Chairman of this committee relative to the limitations which apply to the U.N., and a recognition of tl ict that it is not the UN, which will make the final decision but, let us hope, something like a reconvened Geneva conference.

This resolution docs not hand you any blank check, and I think that ought to be kept in mind. Nor docs it allow, if it is passed, any authority to the U.N. to dictate a peace in Southeast Asia.

MANSFIELD RESOLUTION IS AD VIS OK Y

by 5S Senators. It places the President in no straitjacket, > conduct of foreign policy on Vietnam where, in the end.

The pending resolution is entirely advisory, at least the resolution -cosponsored 1 It leaves the only it can be, in the hands of the President.

In my view the adoption of this resolution would say to the President most respectfully, that the Senate hopes that he would see the desirability of trying again to open the question of Vietnam to formal consideration by the U.N. Security Council. Furthermore, we would say to him that we thin!; it is desirable to take timely nofce of the deep concern over Vietnam winch has been expressed by more than

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slto.iit Vietnam conflict to united nations

100 nations during the current session of the General s erably and try to convert these wards of concern into a U.N. action for peace.

Vie would say further by the passage of this resolution, in effe thnt if a U.N. contribution to peace i$ not forthcoming it ought not to be because this Nation has been unwilling to act positively under the charter. * \

On the contrary, we would ask the President to consider making, clear to the world that this Nation will submit the issues of Viet-nam to the formal procedures of the Security Council in an effort to move the search for solutions from the battlefield to the negotiating

table.

In sum, the Senate resolution would suggest to the President that he consider acting on the premise that the U.N. could be a point of entry to the road to peace even if it is not the place where peace is negotiated in the end.

The U.N. may not prove useful in this connection, but no one can blame the IV i ] ''nl or this Nation of not acting in good faith to t to find out by an initiative involving votes who is willing to try for a just peace % this route and who is not willing.

In my judgment, win, lose, or draw*, this Nation has everything to gain and nothing to lose by taking that initiative.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. t - - ■

. The Chairman. Senator Morse. ■' -

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COOPERATION IN" SETTLEMENT OF VIETNAM ISSUE

Senator Mokse, Mr. Ambassador, I think you have made a powerful statement this morning. My prediction is, in light of future developments in Asia, it is going to be a historic one. I have in mind your views in regard to United Nations participation and settlement pf tins war from the very beginning. I think I violate no confidence by saying, at your invitation, I went to your Supreme Court office three days after your nomination and prior to your confirmation and we talked about my views in regard to United Stations responsibilities. You will recall at the time of the steel case we were down at the White House together and the President asked us to talk about it further. G I mention that only because I think many people do not know what the President's position was from the very beginning. There is no doubt that he has always welcomed appropriate United Nations participation and intervention in trying to seek a peace in Southeast Asia. And, as you point out this morning, as his Ambassador you have sought to serve that purpose on the part of the President-It is true, as you point out in your statement, that I quickly endorsed the Mansfield resolution. In that record which you accurately quoted from, I pointed out I thought it was important that we build a bridge between the Congress and this Administration in trying to resolve some of these foreign policy differences. 1^ think it is a great mistake when people don't want to cross those bridges. You have crossed one this moraine by appearing before this committee in a public hearing, as I think you should have done, as you were always trilling to do, and which I think ism keeping with our whole S3 T stem of representative

government.

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ADMINISTRATION ATTITUDE

TOWARD NEUTRALIZATION OF SOUTH VIETNAM

Now, as far as neutralization, we have said that we clo not as a matter of principle, ami 1 repeat here, do not, in ony way oppose neutralisation ot South Vietnam if South Vietnam wants to be neutral Why do I not extend it to North Vietnam? We would welcoE the neutralization of Nortli Vietnam, but I am being realistic. North Vietnam is^a Communist regime, professedly so, and I don't want to put a barrier in the way of settlement by adding a new term since my idea is to have a settlement. If we, the United States, were to put forward a position today that the price of a settlement in Vietnam is "u neutralization of North Vietnam" we would be putting a barrier in the way of a settlement in light of the nature of their regime. So we hare gone as far as we can reasonably go in saying that so far as U.S. policy is concerned, if the people of South Vietnam want to be neutral, nonalined that is then- decision, that is acceptable to the United States. # . .

The Chairman. I think Senator Gore has raised a very valid point that has bothered me, but it seems to me this is the hind of question that the conference at Geneva should decide. We don't have to decide that in advance. It is a problem that has always bothered me.

Ambassador Gqm>beuo. Yes, I would agree that is a proper subject within the competence of the conference. I gave an interpretation.

Senator Gore. Mr. Chairman, the contradictions has not been resolved at all. The resolution provj I the Geneva accord would 1 adequate basis for peaceful settlement. The Geneva accord does not make reference to two separate political entities; in fact, it definitely rules them out.

The Chairman. The Senator is correct, but there is a proposal for discussion before the Security Council to seek a reference. They don't have to accept this interpretation.

U.S. POSITION TOWAKD NEUTRALITY AS BASIS FOB PEACE

Senator Gore. I know, but what is the position of the U.S. Government? This is the point at which I am aiming.

Ambassador Goldberg. May I answer it. t .

Senator Gore, Will we accept the neutrality of Indochina as a basis of peace? Will we, in fact, accept reunification, self-determination of one country? Will we, in fact, be satisfied with the Geneva accord as a bnsis for peace? It appears now that we will not.

The Chairman. I am not sure about that. • # •

Ambassador GoIiDBEug. I want to make it explicitly clear and it does not appear to be now. With due respect, I want to make it explicitly char we accept the Geneva accord as a b:isis for peace, I also want to no ke it explicitly clear when we offer a resolution that is the offer. We are ready to heat other views, including the vi s of this committee. When I put a piece of paper for informal discussion, it is quite agreeable to me to put a piece of pager before the Security Council without going hi to controversial detail, saying we accept the Geneva accord as a basis fur peace. We ask for the reconvening of the conference and we recognue the competence of the conference to settle, adjudicate it or related problems. I am perfectly willing to put that in the resolution and 1 think that meets your point of view, Senator.

The Chairman. The Senator from Ohio.

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praise for documentation of u.s.-kffokts i.\ u.x.

'Senator Lausche. Ambassador Gold: , I am grateful to you for your very lucid presentation and documentation of tlte efforts of thei united States to have the United Nation be ji n of the

Vietnam dispute,

•Unfortunately t!i ;h the propaganda of the Communists and in many instances through statements of uninformed individuals within our own country, the imprc n has been gained that we sought to escape the rights and the powers of the- United Nation; to intervene for the establishment of peace in arc f the world ■where violence existed. ^ .

/ Your pre. tation regrettably vv31 not be heard fully by the people of the Nation. But the documentation which you have gi i refutes completely every argument that has been made that our Government lias not extended its efforts to have the United Nations take jurisdiction.

I vauit to chronologically follow your presentation of what has been done. You cite the efforts of the Cambodian Government to have the United Nations check to ascertain whether or not there were unlawful transgressions on their border by the Communists. And the United Nations did take jurisdiction, but Cambodia finally dropped its petition. Is that correct? ^ . -,

Ambassador Goldberg. That is correct, Senator.

# *

*. *-

IS CESSATION OF I50MBIXG PREREQUISITE TO SETTLEMENT?

» -

I have been struck by the unanimous recommendation of all the witnesses who have come up on the Mansfield and Morse resolutions heretofore to the effect that we didn't have a chance of securing action in the Security Council unless there was a cessation of the bombing first- Each witness ated this in the record. .

I was wondering what your own views were with regard to this point.

Ambassador Golm;vkg. Well, my own < tew about that is that at the moment that is probably not the d mining factor. It may affect, as I said, other countries, but the determining factor from the standpoint of countries that could obstruct Security Council action has been this concept of no competence, because Hanoi says no competence. But, as I have said, I don 1 ! think it serves their interest to pursue that, and I am going to make another effort.

Senator Tell. But would it not be correct, to put it in a more affirmative way, that the chances of,success of some positive action involving cither resolution would be better if there were a cessation of the bombing?

Ambassador Goldheuo. I don't, frankly, know the answer to that question because of the experience that we had during the bombing

pause.

Senator Pell. Excuse me for interrupting, I do not mean a bomb-in 0 * pause. I am among those who are rather concerned at the idea of a pause because I can see the thing blowing up further at the end of it. I mean cessation.

Ambassador Goldberg. Even with respect to that. You will remember I said that at that time when we were engaged in an indefinite pause, I consulted. Now, the viewpoint then on the part of many countries was that if this was the situation we ought to develop private diplomacy. If we brought it to the Security Council, there would be a public exposition, people would have to take a position, and it would be far better, therefore, to explore by private diplomacy the prospect of another forum, the Geneva conference, and so on. ■ -

So I really cannot honestly say. • I will say in cand« in answer to your remark, that I have no doubt that that would affect the judgment of some. But with respect to those countries that can obstruct the action, those with the veto power, at the moi i I don't think it would affect their judgment.

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Senator Pell. Right,.1 appreciate your position, and your offid position, too. But 1 think the record mid very clearly show that every witness who has come here on this resolution has specifically stated that the resolution did not have a chance unless there was a cessation of the bombing.

Ambassador Goldbeeg. Senator, I might say this is a subject I am quite prepared to talk about; we talk about everything in negotiating & resolution, but I am quite clear in mv own mind that < the .basis of everv talk I have had this is not the'determining factor for the Soviet Union and perhaps France, but that does not mean that we ought not to try*

Senator Pxll. Thank you.

VIETCOXG MILITARY BASES AXD FOECES

Finally, I have one specific question on your testimony in connection with the draft resolut section (b), the same one that Senator Symington drew our attention to. It says—

That there should be no military forces or bases maintained or supported in North or South Vietnam other than those under the control of the respective governments, and all other troops and si mod per I should be withdrawn or

demobilized * * *.

Docs this apply to the Vietcong;?

Ambassador Gori r::uc. Yes.

By the way, this is not intended to be a formulation of ours. This is intended t> be our interpretation of what the Geneva accords would require, and again this was put, and specifically put by me in the form of a question to the other side, is there disagreement that tL is what the Geneva accords require?

Senator Fell. But would this not, in fact, be almost a preventive factor in anything coming out? In other words, would it be conceivable, in your view, that that portion of South Vietnam which is under Communist discipline or Vietcong discipline would willingly drop its weapons and demobilize while those portions which are under the Ky government's regime maintained then* weapons?

Ambassador Goldberg. Again, I would answer in terms that the Chairman put it. This is what the Geneva accords, in our view, provide; and there is a matter which ought to be discussed in the Geneva conference as it was discussed in 1954 and in 1962. There were decisions made in both 1954 unci 1962 about the disarming oj irregular forces, and this obviously would be a subject appropriate for discussion in the Geneva conferences. This is not put forward to be any barrier. " • . --

Senator Pell. I understand.

Ambassador Goldberg. As I said, the language of the resolution is subject to discussion. This is intended to be a statement in response to the statement very often made that we don't state what we think about the Geneva accords. This is what we think. We are ready to talk about what other people think about the Geneva accords.

Senator Pell. Right I think we have made a great step forward here today in the assertion of our willingness, if necessary, to negotiate with the representatives of the XLF because that has been am inhibiting factor.

Ambassador Goldberg. Well, I think the President has frequently said that is not an insurmountable problem, and I was repeating it in that context.

Senator Pell, I understand and I thank you very much *and I think we are very lucky indeed to have you as our Ambassador to the United Nations, and I wish you the best in your efforts along this line.

Ambassador GolbbErg, Thank you.

The Chairman, Senator McCarthv?

.T /

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SUKMIT VIETNAM CONFLICT TO UN1TKD NATIONS

U.S. WITHUKAWAL OF TKQOPS FROM VIETNAM

-

Senator McCarthy. Mr, Ambassador, I have a few questions, one which moves on from the reference Senator Pell has made to your discussion °f the Geneva accords. Do I understand that this is the Administration's position in the United Nations, should these other conditions prevail: that you would withdraw troops? -Ambassador Goldberg. This is what the Geneva accords >rovide And we said we would be willing to use them as a basis for sett emenl.

Senator McCarthy, Is this limited to what happens in Vietnam?

Ambassador Goldberg. I am sorry I am not following you.

Senator McCarthy, The consideration of whether you would -withdraw is limited to what might happen in Vietnam. Does this have reference to other parts of Southeast- Asia or not?

Ambassador GoldbSjicG We are ; very interested in observance ... of the 1902 accords in Laos, very much so. We would like the Laos accord to be complied with.

Senator McCarthy* Where would this leave us in the light of what the Secretary of State said in his rather well publicized press conference of ( r 12 when he talked about the threat of a billion Chinese with nuclear weapons to all Southeast Asia and beyond that to the United States itself?

Are we going to leave this critical area open to a billion Chinese if the Question of South Vietnam should be settled within the limits you have defined or not?

Ambassador Goldberg. I think that question ought to be addressed to the Secretary of State.

Senator McCarthy. All rights I will ask the Secretary.

Senator Fell. When?

■ Senator Mouse. Where? [Laughter.]

IS PROCEEDING THROUGH THE U.N. AX EXERCISE OF FUTILITY?

m *

-Senator McCarthy, One other question relating to that press conference* You seem to think that proceeding this way through the United Nations is worthwhile, at least the efforts you are talking about, even though it mav not come to very much.

Now, the Secretary, when he held a press conference, said about what you have said in terms of process but then said, "On the other hand, there are some problems about going through an exercise of futility, if this is what it appears to be, to satisfy some critics among our own people/'

This is not particular to the process he was thinking about. But, on the record, you don't think this is necessarily an exercise of futility?' Ambassador Goldukkg. If I thought it was an exercise of futility, I would not engage in it^ -Senator McCarthy. Very good. Thank you very much. t

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O

Z3

o

u

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2. bvh position sia5eemekts (unclassified)

INDEX

SUBJECT

n 11

PAGE

Extracts from North Vietnamese Statements on The Four Points . . . 100

Extracts from North Vietnamese Statements on the Front's Position. 105

Extracts from North Vietnamese Statements on r 33he Geneva Agreements. Ill

Extracts from North Vietnamese Statements on the U»H 115

-

Extracts from North Vietnamese Statements on Mediation Efforts

by other Countries • . . 117

m

Extracts from North Vietnamese Statements on the Bombing Pause . . 119

Extracts from North Vietnamese Statements on U.S. Moves 121

Excerpts frcm South Vietnamese National Liberation Front — North

Vietnamese Fatherland Front* Joint Stat at of October 30A9& 2 ' 129

Ho Chi Minh's Interview with Akahata, April 5, 1965. ....... 133

Report of the DRV Government Submitted by Pham Van Dong to the

DRV National Assembly on April 8, 1965 136

VKA "Authorized" Statement Rejecting the 17 Nqn-Aligned Nation

Appeal 1^2

Khan Dan editorial, April 21, 1965 on the NFLSV as the Only

Genuine Representative of the South Vietnamese People. ..... lkk m

DRV "White Paper" on "U*S, Aggression and Intervention in

Vietnam" « 2h6

DRV Government Statement on President Johnson's July 28, 19^5

Press Conference Statement 152

Le Monde Interview with Ho Chi Minh, August 15, 1965 15^

Quan Doi Nhan Dan Editorial of August 20, 1965 Criticizing Attempts at Mediation in Vietnam 156

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SUBJECT PAGE

DRV Embassy in Moscow Issues "Correction* 1 of Lord Brockway

Press Interview 159

DRV Foreign Ministry Memorandum of September 23, 1965 l60

Vietnam Courier Article on "How Should the Most Correct Solution

to the Vietnam Problem be Understood" l£h

Joint Asahi-Mainichi Interview with Phain Van Dong in Hanoi on

October h, 19&5 . • • • » • • 166

Mai Van Bo Statement, January 5, 1967 177

Trinh Interview with Burchett 179

Mai Van Bo Statement, February 22, 1967 l8l

* Pham Van Dong Speech, 1 Sept 19&7, on 22nd Anniversary of the

Founding of the DRV ...,♦.. 183

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EXTRACTS ERgl KORTII VISTIIAMaSE STATS^ffflS ON

T r KK FOUR POINTS

(Report of ?har.i Van Done to National Assembly April 8, 1965 -Tab^H, pp. 1-2)

11 .. .The unswerving policy of the DRV Government is to respect strictly the 195U Geneva agreements on Vietnam and to implement correctly their "basic provisions as embodied in the following points

it

* * *

"The government of the DRV is of the view that the stand expounded here is the*basis for the soundest political settlement of the Vietnam problem."

"If this basis is recognized, favorable conditions will be created for the peaceful settlement of the Vietnam people, and it vill be possible to consider the reconvening of an international conference along the pattern of the 195^ Geneva conference on Vietnam*"

"The DRV .Government declares that any approach contrary to the aforementioned stand is inappropriate; any approach tending to secure U.K. intervention in the Vietnam situation is also inappropriate. Such approaches are basically at variance with the 195^- Geneva agreements on Vietnam. .

ii

ii ■«■■ aiiLi

(VKA statement rejecting 17 non-aligned nation appeal -

Tab J, pp. 1-2)

"To settle the Vietnam problem at present, the only correct way is to carry out the points laid down by DRV Premier Fhara Van Dong on 8 April I965."

-

■

"The DRV Government is of the view that the above-expounded stand is the basis for the soundest political settlement of the Vietnam problem.-. If this basis is recognised, favorable conditions will be created for the peaceful settlement of the Vietnam problem and it will be possible to consider the reconvening of an international conference in the pattern of the 195** Geneva conference on Vietnam."

"The DRV Covernraent declares that any approach contrary to the above stand is inappropriate; any approach tending to secure a U.TT. intervention in the Vietnam situation is also inappropriate, because such approaches are basically at variance with the 195'+ Geneva agreements on Vietnam."

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(Attack on President Johnson's May 13, 1965 speech - Tab IA, p. 2)

"Trie DRV Government has shown them a most correct way out in the four-point stand prgsented "by Premier EhSrn Van Dong at the second session of the DRV Rational Assembly — that is> to withdraw from South Vietnam, stop its acts of war against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, and let the Vietnamese -DcoaLe settle themselves their own affairs, • * ."

(DRY Foreign Ministry statement on suspension of U.S. Attacks, May 18, 19^5 Tab Kj p. 2)

"The DKV Government affirms once again that the four-point stand made public on 8 April I965 is the only sound basis for a political settlement of the Vietnam problem*"

(No DRV reaction to Canadian disclosure of mission to Hanoi - Tab 0, p. l)

■

"The Foreign Minister stated repeatedly that the four conditions which had previously been outlined by the Prime Minister of North Vietnam on April 0, taken as a whole, represented the Hanoi government's approach to a settlement

,4- «

(Mhan Dan protests U.K. Government's connivance with U*S 7 June 1965 - Tab P, : p. k)

"Once agaliij we stress that the Vietnam problem can be solved only in accordance with the four points mentioned in the statement and resolution of the DRV Government and Hational Assembly and the five points of the 22 March 19 65 statement of the 3I?ISV and on the condition that the U.S. imperialists stop their aggression, withdraw from South Vietnam, stop their attacks against the DRV, respect and implement the 195U Geneva agreements on Vietnam, and let the Vietnamese people solve their own problems without any foreign intervention."

("White Paper" on "US aggression £^d intervention in Vietnam - Tab Q, p. 6)

"The unswerving policy of the DRV Government-is to strictly respect the 195*r Geneva agreements on Vietnam and to correctly implement their basic Drovisions as embodied in the following Joints."

101

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"The DRV Government holds that the above -mentioned stand is the oasis for the soundest political settlement of the Vietnam problem. If this oasis is accented, favorable conditions vill be created for the peaceful settlement of the Vietnam problem and it will be possible to consider the reconvening of an international conference of the type of the 195^ Geneva conference on Vietnam."

"The Government of the Damoeratic Republic of Vietnam declares that any approach contrary to the above stand is irrelevant, any approach leading to a U.I7. intervention in the Vietnam situation is also irrelevant, because such approaches arc basically at variance "with the 195^ Geneva agreements on Vietnam/ 1

(Thong Eat (Reunification) Article by Nguyen Van Vinh July I965 - Tab R, pp. k-6)

"The DRV Government is of the opinion that the above-mentioned stand is the b asis for a correct political solution to the Vietnamese problem. Only through recognizing this basis will the peaceful settlement of the Vietnamese problem be afforded the conditions in which it can be conducted favorably and will it be possible to think of convening an international conference of the type of the 195 h Geneva conference on Vietnam,"

"The four-point program as set forth by Premier Pham Van Dong and the views as set forth by the WISV in its 22 March statement are truly constructive and practical*"

"If the U.S. imperialists agree to accept the above-mentioned conditions of the people in both North and South Vietnam, we will readilv negotiate

o

i. 1:

with them anywhere at any moment.

(DRV Eeport on Ghanaian mission to Eanoi - Tab S)

"Presented the four-point stand of the DRV Government , the basis for the soundest political settlement of the Vietnam problem."

(DRV statement on President Johnson's July 23, 1965 Dress conference -Tab T, p.2)

"For the U.S. Gove;; ent there is only one way to an honorable peace;

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"that is , to correctly iupiejaent the 195^ Geneva agreements on Vietnam and accent l:he four-"ooint stand of the DRY Government,"

"IJore recently, on 8 April 1965, it made clear its four-point stand as a oasis for the soundest political settlement of the Vietnam problem."

(Le Monde interview with Ho Chi Minh - Tab U)

"The U.S. Government must give tangible proofs that it accepts the four-point stand of the Government of the DRY which conforms to the essential political and military clauses of the 195 *>■ Geneva agreement on Vietnam; it must immediately stop the air attacks against DRV territory, stop forthwith the aggressive war against the south of our country, and withdraw fron there all U.S. troops and weapons. That is peace in honor; there is no other way out."

(Duan Doi loan Dan Editorial of August 20, 1965 -'Tab V, p. l)

"Only when the U.S. Government shows concrete manifestations of its recognition of the four-point stand of the DRV Cover: nt and the five-point stand of the KFISV can there be a basis for the peaceful settlement of the war in Vietnam."

. 1 >~ — ,.**. ««>. ■ I ' ll

(DRV Embassy in Moscow issues "correction" of Press Interview - Tab W )

, "The four-point stand of the DRV Government as ocpounded by Premier Hiam Van Dong on 8 April 1965 is the basis for all soundest political solutions to the Vietnam question. If this basis is recognized, favorable conditions will be created for the peaceful settlement of the Vietnam problem and it will be possible to consider the reconvening of an international conference of the type of the 195U Geneva conference on Vietnam."

(pham Van Dong's national Day report August 31, 1965 - Tab X, p. 6)

"This four-point stand fully conforms to the most important political and military provisions of the ISoh Geneve agree its on Vietnam, and the whole world is now of the view that these agreements must be correctly implemented. This four-point stand must be solemnly accepted by the U.S. Government before a political settlement of the Vietnam "problem can be contemplated."

■ *

103

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(lEV Foreign Ministry memorandum of September 23, 1965 - Tab Z, p. U)

-

"The four-point stand of the DRV Government . • t is the sole correct "basis for a settlement of the Vietnam problem. Any solution at variance with it are inappropriate and so are any soultions which seek U. K- intervention in the Vietnam situation,, because such solutions are fundamentally contrary to the 195^ Geneva agreements on Vietnam."

"The U.S. Government must solemnly declare its acceptance of this four-point stand before a political settlement of the Vietnam problem can be considered. ,

it * ■

(Joint Asahi-I-lainichi interview with Fnam Van Dorgin Hanoi in October U, 1965 - Tab CC, pp. 1-2-H-9-10-11)

"Premier Fnam Van Done of the DRV stated in a YeT'j strong tone on k October that 'The present Vietnam war can never be settled unless the United States accepts the four conditions presented by our side. And without that, there also can be no discussion. 1 "

"We proposed four conditions for the settlement of the present war Boise time ago. They asked for respect of the Geneva agreement of 195^ concerning the Vietnam question and sought the correct observance of the basic clauses of this agreement. We proposed at the time that if the United States were to issue a statement to the effect that it accepts the four conditions, we will agree to negotiate at any time."

"If the United States wants negotiations, it must accept the four conditions and recognize the TCETSV."

"We have announced that if the United States issues a statement to the effect that it will recognise the four conditions, we will respond to talks. The United States, however, has no such intention."

"The only just way to settle the Vietnam issue is to accept; in line with the 195^ Geneva agreement, the four conditions proposed by the Ilorth Vietnamese Government and the stand explained in the KFLSV's March statement." .

"Ilorth Vietnam's four conditions are in complete accord with every one of the essential, political, and military provisions in the Geneva accords of 195^- ^ ne feur conditions alone can be the basis to bring a correct solution to the Vietnam issue* The U.S. Government must declare clearly that it accepts the four conditions. A political solution can be considered after that."

lOh

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•«

EXTRACTS FROM K07FH VX3TNA3SS3 STATEMENTS ON THE FRONT'S POSITION

*

(Excerpts from Joint Statement of October 30, I962 - Tab A, pp. 2, 4)

11 ••.The Vietnam Fatherland Front holds that the NFLSV, which cane into being owing to the growth of fchj South Vietnamese people's struggle and which rallies broadly the patriotic and anti-U.S.-Diem forces in South Vietnam, is the genuine representative of the people there, and is one of the decisive factors for their certain victory. " The Vietnam Fatherland Front fully supports the program and the urgent steps advocated by the NFLSV to realise independence, democracy, improvement of the people's living conditions, and peace and neutrality in South Vietnam, in an advance tov;ard the peaceful reunification of the fatherland. The program and urgent steps of the KFLSV meet the interests and aspirations of the South Vietnamese people and conform to the practical situation in South Vietnam at present..

n

• m

"..•The 1^ million South Vietnamese compstriots vri.ll develop more and more their valiant and indomitable tradition and unite more and more vridely and closely within the KFLSV to directly oppose the U.S.-Diem clique.)

(Sxcerpts from National Assembly Statement Published July 5, 196^ Tab B, pp. 1 and 2)

1

if

• * •

The U.S. Government must put an end to its aggressive wa

r* *,*"3 "r* **

n

South Vietnam, withdraw all its troops and weapons from there, and let the South Vietnamese people settle their own internal affairs by themselves in accordance vrith the program of the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam..•"

"...The National Assembly of the DRV vrholeheartedly supports the National Front for the Liberation 01 South Vietnam and firmly bel eves that the South Vietnamese people, who are closely united under the front*s banner and are heightening their determination to fight and to van,.."

(Excerpt from Text of DEV-USSK Delegations 1 Joint Statement, February 10, loi- - Tab F, p. 2)

"...The Soviet Union fully supports the just and heroic straggle for independence, democracy, peace, and neutrality which tfc^s South Vietnamese people are waging under" the leadership of the National

Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam* v* fl

m

105

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(Report by Phaxn Van Dong to the National Assembly April 8, 19&5 -Tab H, ?. 5)

"...In response to the appeal of the NFLSV, the South Vietnamese cadresj arstymen, and ordinary citizens rogrowp©d to the north have enthusiastically voiced their readiness to return to their, native land and to fight, anr*s in hand, or to do any work to contribute to the annihilation of the enesiy and to national salvation..."

(DRV-SOVIET Communique issued April 1?, 19&5 - Tab I, p. 1)

• "...the National Front of Liberation is the genuine exponent of the will and aspirations of the people of South Vietnam, its only legitimate representative. The program of the front enjoys (the broad?) support of the mass of the. people because it proclaims independence, democracy, peace, an end to (imperialist?) intervention and the formation in South Vietnam of a national, democratic coalition government carrying through a policy of independence and neutrality in full conformity with the Geneva agreements of 195^««» u

(VNA on l?~Non~aligned Nation Appeal, April 19, I965 - Tab J, p. 1)

"...The NFLSV is now controlling three-fourths of South Vietnam's territory and two-thirds of its population. It is clear that at the present time any solution to the South Vietnam issue without the decisive voice of the NFLSV is impractical..."

("Shan.Dan 1 ' Editorial April 21, 1965 on the NFLSV - Tab K, pp. 1,2)

"...In the world, the voice of the NFLSV is the decisive one in the settlement of the South Vietnam question..."

"... A. >!• Xosygin declared: Today everybody must see that the NFLSV, which is leading the South Vietnamese people's struggle, is a real force which decides the present as well as the future of South Vietnam. Premier Chou En-lax has on many occasions asserted that the NFLSV is the only legal representative of the South Vietnam

population..." " .

■

Declassified per Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

"...Just as the NFLSV Central G&K&ittee declared in its communique of 15 Aprilj any settlement of the South Vietnam question will lose its practical and positive meaning if it is undertaken without the participation of the NFLSV in a decisive role..."

f » , #% and all negotiations with the U.S. imperialists at this moment are entirely useless if they still refuse to withdraw from South Vietnam all their troops and all kinds of war materiel and means—and those of the satellites—if they still do not dismantle all their military bases in South Vietnam, if the traitors still surrender the South Vietnamese dsodIc's sacred rights to independence and democracy to the U«S* in-

4b * *"* * V

perialists-, and if the NFLSV—-the only genuine representative of the 14 million South Vietnamese people—does not have its decisive voice*"

(DRV White Paper on "United States Aggression and Intervention in Vietnam" Tab Q, pp. 1 3 2, k and 6)

".♦•The NFLSVj founded on 20 December 1960, more and more clearly proves to be the sole genuine representative of the people, the mobiliser and organizer of all patriotic forces in South Vietnam..."

"...To date, the NFLSV has gained control of four-fifths of the territory and 10 million people; that is5 two-thirds of the population in South Vietnam. It has become a powerful force which has a decisive voice in the South Vietnam problem.

f*

* *

"...The United States talks about its desire to hold discussion with a view to finding a peaceful solution to the South Vietnam question, but it refuses to recognise the 1IFL5V as the sole genuine representative of the South Vietnam people. It is obvious that the United States wants neither peace nor negotiation..."

"...All negotiations at this moment are entirely useless if the U.S. imperialists still persist in refusing to withdraw from South Vietnam all their troops and war materials of all kinds and those of their satellitiesj and to dismantle all their .nilitary bases in South Vietnam, if the Vietnamese traitors continue to surrender to the U.S.

imperialists the South Vietnamese people*s sacred rights to independence,

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 2011

and if the NFLSV—the only genuine representative of the 3A million South Vietnamese people—is not asked to say its decisive say.,."

(Excerpts from Nguyen Van Vinh's Jfr-part article issued in "Reunification", a Vietnamese language newspaper on July 2, o» 9 and 13 - Tab R, pp. 2,3 )

" # ..?he United States still carries on viar in the south and still refuses to recognize the presence of the NFLSV—which controls most of the territory and population of the south and which leads the sacred resistance of 1^ million people in South Vietnam. Therefore, the United States continues to be fought against by the South Vietnamese people, and there can be no peace..."

-

n ...Moreover, they have brazenly stated that they are determined to eliminate the KFLSV from all International conferences, and, at worst, they can regard the SFLSV only as the tail of North Vietnam,.•"

"...In the past the Americans did not want to negotiate with the CPR or to recognize the Pathst Lao. The French did not want to recognise the Viet Minh and the Algerian FLH. But finally they were defeated and forced to negotiate with them. Concerning this point, in "its famous 22 March statement the MFL3V declared: 'Any negotiation with the U.S. imperialists about the South Vietnamese.problem will be useless if the U.S. imperialists refuse to respact and strictly implement the Geneva accords, abolish the U.S. military bases, and withdraw from South Vietnam all the soldiers 5 weapons, and other war materiel of the United States and its satellites, if the sacred rights of the Vietnamese people—independence and democracy—continue to be offered to the U.S. imperialists by the kneeling traitors, and if the NFLSV—the only - legitimate representative of 1^ million southern people—does not have a decisive voice..."

(DRV on President Johnson's July 28, 19^5 Press Conference Statement Tab T, p. 2)

11 ♦*,The U.S. Government must stop at once its air war against the DRV and completely cease all encroachments on the sovereignty and security of the DRV. It must put an Immediate end to the aggressive war in South Vietnam, withdraw all U.S. troops and weapons therefrom, and let the South Vietnamese people settle their own affairs in accord* ance with the program of the liFLSV —the only genuine representative of the South Vietnamese people..."

Declassified per Executive Order 13^26, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

(L Au

E H0KD3 interview with Ko Chi Kinh—Hanoi Broadcast in English, ztgast 15. 1965 - Tab U, p. 1)

"•••(Q)...the South Vietnamese people must be left to solve their own affairs themselves without foreign interference and on democratic bases?

■

(A) "•••on the basis of the program of the NFLSV, the sole authentic representative of the South Vietnam people,•♦"

(Phasi Van Dong's National Day Report, August 31 ? 1965 - Tab X, p. 1)

"•••In response to the pressing requirements of the patriotic struggle, in i960 the IFISV ca into being, closely uniting all strata of the people holding high the banner of patriotism, and starting the resistance war against U.S. imperialist aggression..."

".••The KFLSV, now controlling .-ore than four-fifths of South Vietnam's territory and over two-thirds of its population, is the only genuine representative of the people of South Vietnam. The Front's international prestige and influence increase with every passing day. The Front is now the real master 01 the situation in South Vietnam. It must have a decisive say in the settlement of the South Vietnam question..."

(DRV .Foreign Ministry Memorandum of September 23, 19°5 - Tab Z, pp. 1,2,3)

"...U.S. troops will not withdraw, but will cling on to South Vietnam; the United States always regards South Vietnam as a separate nation, that is to say, it wants the partition of Vietnam to be prolonged indefinitely; it does not recognize the KFLSV, the sole genuine representative of the people of South Vietnam. As a matter of fact, its scheme is to try to achieve at the conference table tihat it has been unable to gain on the battlefield..."

"...The NFL3V 5 the organizer and leader of the South Vietnamese people's fight against the U.S. aggressors, has gained sympathy 3 support, and recognition from ever broader sections of the world's peoples. Yet the U.S. Government refuses to recognise it as the sole genuine representative of the people of South Vietnam. It has declared that it does not regard the front as an independent 'party in negotiations. This

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

*

This further exposes its talks about negotiations as a mere swindle* There cannot be any negotiations en the South Vietnam problem without the VSLSV having its decisive say.,/ 1

"..•This stand also proceeds fror* tKe legitimate aspirations of the Vietnamese people in both -zoness, as embodied in the pragraia of ths

Vietnam Fatherland Front and that of the NFLSV; namely, peace, independence, unity, and democracy..."

Message to the Austrian Red Cross Society, September 25, 19^5 -Tab kk)

"•.•The only genuine representative of the South Vietnamese people is the KFLSV. The Red Cross organization sat up by the front is the only organ serving the interests of the South Vietnamese people*••"

(Joint Asahi-Kainichi Interview with Pham Van Dong in Hanoi, October k 9 19°5 Tab CC_, w 3> ^ 8 nd 9)

"...It is very foolish of the United States not to recognize this Liberation Front which is the only force which has the ability to settle the Vietnan problem..."

"...The best way is for the United States to negotiate first with the Liberation Front. That is only natural, considering that the United States is actually fighting the Liberation Front..,. The United States should negotiate with the Liberation Front of the South first of all. However, it will be out of the question if it were to take the attitude of negotiating with the Liberation Front as if it vie re conveying a favor. The primary and decisive party for the United States to deal with is the Liberation Front..."

"...as long as the United States does not recognize the People's Liberation Front of the south, there cannot be any negotiations..."

"...Who is fighting the United States in the south? It is the liberation array. And yet, the U.S. side is escalating the war against the north. Does it think that it can negotiate with the north alone and settle the problem?..."

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

EXTRACTS FRO! EteTH VI" I STAT \ TS C

r

(Joint Statement October 30, 19o2 - Tab A, pp. 1-2)

« ## .the Vietr. se people and the Government of the DRV constantly implement correctly the 1954 Geneva Agreements on Vietnam,.. rr

"...This is a just struggle, which conforms to the 1954 Geneva agreements on Vietnam,. . ,!

(DRV National Assembly Statement July 5> 1964 - Tab B, pp 1-2)

"...The U.S. Government as well as the governments of the countries which took part in the 1954 Geneva conference on Indochina must live up to their

I * _ • » _ • 1 * _ ■ _L __ S A _ _i*J J. — ,--? ~*i

commitments: respect and sovereignty, index ience, unit;/, and 1 integrity of Viet-Kam, and refrain from interfering in its inter:

territorial ernal affairs..,.'

t! ...we demand that the 195'* Geneva agreements on Indochina be strictly imolemented.. *. 1f

(DRV Foreign Ministry Letter September 4, 1964 - Tab C, pp 1-2)

»...The DRV Government has more than once stated its eagerness for peace and its constant desire of respecting and correctly implementing the 1954 Geneva agreements on Viet-nanu •* n

■

l! ...The DRV Government.•• earnestly requests the eochaimen and the participants of the 1954 Geneva conference on Indochina, in accordance with point 13 of the final declaration of the conference, jointly to study such measures as might prove to be necessary to secure from the U.S. Government an immediate end to all acts of provocation and sabotage against the DRV and to the aggressive war in South Vietnam, as well as the withdrawal of all U»S. troops, military personnel, and arms from South Vietnam, thereby i iring respect for and correct implementation of the 1954 G va agreements on Vietnam with a view to maintaining and consolidating peace in Indochina and southeast Asia...

(DRV Note of Protest Issued February 9 5 1965 - Tab S, pg 2)

"...The Vietnamese people and the DRV Government, who have always respected and correctly implemented the 1954 Geneva agreements en Indochina, will certainly r *°^ be cowed by the U.S. attempts at intimidation.... 11

,T ...It resolutely demands that the U.S. Government correctly implement the 1954 Geneva agreements en Vietnam, and stop at once the aggressive war in South Vietnam and all acts of war against the DRV.... 11

"Th

e

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

"The D?-V Cover:: \z earnestly requests the cochairnan and the govern- * ment of .the participating countries of the 1954 Gen conference on Indochina and all ce-Ieeving countries cf the world to take timely and

C.lGCulV Colons tt — t/. d. v-L^;, uO CneC-xl-.^ ^~.^ .ncuiU" o_ Uii.e . __>^ c-.,^

aggressive U.S. imperialists, Insuring ^ correct implementation of the 1954 Geneva agreements on Vietnam, and defending peace in Indochina and Southeast

Asia,"

(Joint Statement February 10, 19o5 - Tab ?, pp. 2-3)

,.."The two govern its...regard these acts as completely inconsistent v/ith international law and the 1954 Geneva Agreements.... n

,.."The two sides unanimously note that, for the past 10 years and more the U,S. Government has sabot 4 the 1954 Geneva agreements on Vietnam, sought to hinder the reunification of Vietnam, and turned South Vietnam into a nc/.-tyce colony and a military base of the United States..,."

... "The two governments f :'...". y stand for the defense and implementation of the 1954 Geneva agreements en Indochina, resolutely oppose the U.S. violations of the said agreements., and demand that all participants of the 1954 Geneva conference respect and correctly implex them.- As a. coehairman of the Geneva conference on Indochina, the Soviet Union v;ill do its best to ensure international support for the 1954 Geneva agreements on Indochina,..; 1

(Ho Chi Kinh's Interview with Akahata April 5> 19&5 - lab G, pp. 2-3)

"...The U.S. imperialists 1 acts of agression and war in Vietnam are of the utmost gravity; they grossly trample upon the 1954 Geneva agreements on Vietnam and constitute violations of international law and manifestations of disregard for world public opinion..,,"

"...To settle the South Vietnam question, first of all the United States must miihdrav; from South Vietnam, let the South Vietnamese people themselves decide their own affairs, and stop its provocative attacks against the DRV. The carrying out of these basic points will bring about favorable condition for a conference along the pattern of the 1954 Geneva conference. Such is a reasonable and sensible approach which is beneficial to peace and to the U.S.

■oeoole.... !1

(?ham Van Dong's Report to DR7 hational Assembly April 8, 19op - Tab H, pp 1,2,4)*

"...If this basis is recognised, favorable conditions will be created for the peaceful sei,"_3merm ci tne vne:n::. people, ana ro wall oe possnojue to consider the reconvening of an international conference along the pattern of the 1954 Geneva conference on Vietnam...."

»■ v>

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number; NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 I

"...V/e believe the world's people were awakened on hearing President -Johnson speak of a return to the 1954 Geneva agreements en Vietnam. This was a lau~h. Everyone knows the U.S. imperialists are the energy of the Geneva agreements..«« l(

"...By attacking the DRV they have completely scrapped the Geneva agreements* and grossly violated international lav; and all human lavs. They must r>ay for their crimes....»

*■ **

(DRV Stat.osr.ont on 17 Katiom Appeal - Tab J, pg, l)

«...,It is the unswerving policy or the DRV Cover.:stent to strictly respect the 1954 Geneva agreements on Vietnam and to correctly implement their basic provisions as embodied in the following points:.,."

* > ■

(DRV Statement on Suspension of U.S. Attacks Hay 18, 19o5 - Tab N* pg* 2)

"...The peace-loving peoples and governments in the world are firmly demand! that the United States end its aggressive war in South Vietnam* stop for good the savage bombing and strafing raids ■ inst the DHV* and scrupulously observe and correctly implement the 1954 Geneva agreements on Vietnam..."

(DRV "White Paper - Tab Q* pp. 1, 6) I

"...But the heroic South Vietnam people have risen up in arms against the aggressors for national salvation and self-liberation. Theirs is a thoroughly just struggle which fully conforms to the 1952- Geneva agreements

and to international lav;...."

"The DHV Government has always held that the correct implementation of the 1954 Geneva agreements on Vietnam is the correct way of settling the South Vietnam problem...."

(Thong Hat Article July I965 - Tab R* v>g. 2)

"...If the U.S. imperialists really respect the 1954 Geneva agreements on Vietnam* they must first of all recognize the fundamental provisions cf the Geneva agr^ -nts on the sovereignty^ unity* independence* and territorial integrity of Vietnam and the subsequent provisions insuring the implementation of the Geneva agreements; also* the United States must immediate!;/ abolish all U.S. military bases* withdraw,all troops* weapons* and van equipment of the United States and its satellites from South Vietnam* and stop all forms of aggression in South Vietnam and all war activities against

the DRV...."

Declassified per Executive Order 13326, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63310. By: NWD Date: 2011

(Q&an Boi Khan Dan Editorial August 20, 19o5 - Tab V, pg. 1)

H »..Eo» the Vietnamese people only deaand that the U.S. Imperialists return to the 1954 Geneva agreements: they nust stop their aggression, withdraw U.S. troops from South Vietnam, stop air raids on North Vietnam and let the Vietnamese people settle their internal affairs themselves.,»*

(Joint communique September 16, 19&5 - Tab Y, pg l)

"...The fundamental rights of the Vietnajaese people to independence, sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity of their country were solemn? recognised by the 1954 Geneva agreements and must be respected..., 1 '

(DRV Foreign Ministry Memorandum September 23, 19&5 - Tab Z, pp. 2-3)

"...The DRV Government has on repeated occasions declared that internationally spec ing the consideration of the-U.S. Governments war acts against the DRY and the U.S. war of aggression in South Vietnam falls within the competence of the participants in the 1954 Geneva, conference on Indochina, and not of the United Nations. Any U.K. resolution in furtherance of the above U.S. scheme will be null and void and will completely discredit the United Hat ions.... ,:

-

"This stand proceeds from the fund: tal principles of the 1954 Geneva agreements, which recognize the national rights of the Vietnamese people — independence, sovereignty, unity, and territorial, integrity — and* from the essential military clauses of the said agreements. !:

"The 1954 Geneva agreements are an international legal document which all participants must respect and correctly Implement. At the 1954 Geneva conference the U.S. Government, through its delegate, recognized and pledged respect for them. Yet throughout the past 11 years it has systematically violated them and had thus brought about a serious situation in Vietnam.• .."

(Vietnam Courier Article - Tab E3, ?■?, 1-2)

"...The only way out for the U.S. imperialists is to put an end to thei aggressive war, to withdraw all their troops and weapons as well as those o their satellites, to respect the independence, sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity of cur country as stipulated in the 1954 Geneva Agreements...."

.

Declassified per Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

■ ■ ■ ■ I ■ ■ ■»» » ■ ■ ■ M ■ II ■ ■ » ■ Ml ■' I I—^^^M^fc. ■ | ■ M ——i^^^-^—

irl:- -J. :..

(Phea Van Dora's Report to DRV National ALjembly - Tab H, pg. 2)

,: ,..any approach tending to secure V.":. intervention ir. the Vietnam situation is also inappropriate. Such approaches are basically at variance with the 1954 Geneva agreements en Vietnam ll

(DRV Statement Rejecting 1? ration Appeal - Tab J, pg* 2)

"...The DRV Goverment declares that any approach contrary to the above stand is inappropriate: any approach tenaing to secure a U,N« intervention in the Vietnam situation is also inappropriate, because such e roaches are basicallv at variar.ee with the 1954 Geneva agreements on Vietnam, -."

■(DRV ^vhite Paper" - Tab Q, Pg. 6)

", ## The Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam declares that any approach contrary to the above stand is irrelevant, any approach leaci: to a Ujl. intervention in the Vietnam situation is also irrelevant, because such approaches are basically at variance with the 1954 Geneva agreements on Vietnam. - •."

(Statement on President Johnson ! s July 28, 19&5 Press Conference Statement Tab T - pg- 2)

■

"...There is no other way^ not even the resorting to U.M. intervention in Vietnam,.. . !r

■ (DRV Foreign .ministry Meadrandian September 23, 19op - Tab Z, pp. 2-4)

"...The UJS. authorities are also feverishly trying by every means to secure a UAL intervention in Vietnam, ^heir have Requested help fron the Uniued Nations membership at larje in getting peace talks started, ! This is a maneuver to use the United Nations to impose on the Vietnamese people negotiations under U.S. terms...,"

''.♦.Any U.N. resolution in furtherance of the above U.S. scheme will be null and void and will completely discredit the United Nations.,.."

STHp

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 2011

ezijoyins £H ever*-

*■ "I 1 j*v*. -"-.■•■» " V. .',. t"">^'l .^ 'JT. ", C ~~ '-i A Q-s ' ^ j^ ---■.■ * -. -•-* V*5«-|c ***>•** £ cr -.*- 4" "1 ""^ r^ ""*"■" -^

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

fvn-) ♦, rirfiQ —17; -v * r-*- n-j if TV* ■ • -- ^~i qo ■ .-1r-»- r?-V*

*'_I,L)±^. v.., _J_'L...l^ . , U "-• v. j ... .O

(aaV Rejection of Hadhakrishnan Proposal - Tab L)

nient of' as Asian-African force to (^supervise) the demarcation line between ::crth and South Vietnam and (?ccnsidered) it a necessary measure for the (.'^restoration of) peace in this area T:

(Khan Dan Protests U.K. *s Connivance with U.S. June 7, 19o5 - Tab P^ pg> 3)

«..,To £z~sxx a pease-fire as mentioned in the British Government vlnn^ or the Indian Gov* ascitis proposal sc:;,e time ago., is deliberately to ignor the nature and the origin of the v:ar in Vietnam.*."

(Quan Doi :-:han Dan Editorial August 20 > 19o5 - Tab V^ pg. 3)

(Joint Asahi-::ainichi Interview with Phsa Van Dong October 4, 1965 - Tab'CC, pp. 2, 3, 9)

,: ...The United States is proposing peace talks 5 in which it doe. not I believe, in order to escape criticise frcn these third parties of good in-tention and vrorld public clinic;-, tthich is steadily counting against it, Through these various methods the United States is trying to test our attitude...

r V.. # It is not possible to seise this opportunity and move forward toward

T^e^iCe «^o•!-.c*v»w« w..^ v*>^ Lj—v-tv^ ..v*-* --^ wj.^-.'w.^— ->j v c--/ c,— * —i —w -^*> wW^w—.**/,—^ ow *..»--— -js-»

\73 i:e1cc:za ^oza people v;ho are niaking various efforts^ vrith good intentions of ueace. I'Je are planning to prove to ;hese people 07 actual deeds hov: lacking in good indentions ths united Stages is. Tne \:a^r to prove this lies solely in driving the A rican ag^re_ : 5 to the v;ell and by pressing

*J

« • III V

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3-3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 I

.nd the liberation Front of the South frill cake the ulti~£t;

,- s sa *— - L —i j> c r t**■■ a *" m b s^ r t ~ ri"^ "■ <* '-■---'-

i:

Liberation

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

(JEW Foreign Ministry Stetesent, Hey IS, 1965 - Tab £, pp. 1-2)

• 1, e 3.CGQ- vi2,U^ UO /£LIU,UU5 SUtii^C*c:Sp L»*.-S w«^>* Uv., v vliv *.c_i» -^iU-wSu

a nuaher of other governments that air raids upainsi the DRY are to be suspar.dc;d frora noon (VJashingicn time) 12 Kgy 1S^5 till the follo-vjing

VrB$l£ g a.,C k»Hcu Mil© UTiiwU wwi^S —5 .o'cC^/ v*C> *co :. i—3 rfilGS x-i U.*^« ana CVl^^Bu w>i OOUo £X e S*wj^C<-»;j'~* oO ^ ^ ^.-^_ c^VOc^C%S —. D^uuH /IcJl—--*

> i »

in teafcitsg this perfidious allegation., the U.S. aggressors have no ether aim than to cover up their emtremely dangerous acts intensifying the icar in Vietnam and Southeast Asia and at the sane tine to deceive ;.orld public opinion on the so-called U*S/ peace will..,"

''•♦•This time % in the face cf the counting movement for an end to the aggressive war in Souuh Vietnam and mo the bos&ins Sfcd strafing of the DRY* the U»S. Government has put forward the so-called suspension of air raids against icrth Vietnam* It h^s gone so far as to siame arrogantly that the suspension of U.S. air raids on the north must be responded to by a cessation of attacks against the 0-»S« aggressors and their agents oy the people and liberation army in South Vietnam*.•"

,J «.#The D3V Cover, ut resolutely exposes the U e S. Government's trick in the so-called suspension of air raids against Korth Vietnam as a deceitful maneuver dec id to pave the way for n:u: U.S. acts of v:ar. The p^ ..-loving peoples and governments in the v:orld are firmly demanding that the united States end its i ressive m:.u in South Vietnam 3 suop for good the savage bombing and strafing raids against the DRV 5 and scrupulously observe aid correctly implem.ent the 195^ Geneva agreements on Viei,nam. The DRV Government affirms once a,gain that the four-point stand made public on 8 April 19^5 is the only sound basis for a political settlement of the Vietnam problem« n

(!:han Dan Protests U.K. Governr.ent* s Connivance lith the United States., June 7, 19o5 ^:Tab P s ?- 3)

; 'wln isid-Kay, -ivhile the U.S* leading circles boasted about a pause in the airstrikes against lorih Vietnam^ the U.S. imperialisms did not cease sending aircraft to reconnoitsr and strike North Vietnam and rushing more u.S» troops and ireapens into South Vietnam, These facts enable v,s zo unaers^anci mnam xnmenf^iacamion ana expansion 01 the^ aggressive T .;ar in Vietnar* is the basic policy of the u*S* imperialists* As for the arguments about negotiations and cease-fire» ^~zy are but tricks aimed at creating favorable conditions for the carrying out of their policy J 1

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3-3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 I

T&b CC S p?. 4, ?)

-.-*/■

r-ha^: Van Dons In Hanoi October ^ 19°5?

''•••The unrtea stages "cer.porari.iy suspanc^a coir.oxngs against "tna north at one tisie but that ^as on3; pra^ r strer*gthenir.S e se&X&ticm

u u o

"v#»Barlier 3 the United States propagandized that it had suspended bombings against the north for so:.:a days* HosreVer 5 -ca vera not, able to respond 5 as the s^ , ansion of the bonbin^s were airbed &t eliciting cur consent *co aenancis ivaiOii ire cannon possxoiy accept, Tr.e temporary suspe on was rather a prst^xt for further escalation. "We cannot possibly accept such temporary suspension or such de: is/-. 11

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 2011

extracts ?rc:»: ::cr:?H vitt na: ■ stati^nts cm

U.S. K0V:-3

■ — I

(DRV Statement July 5, 1964 - Tab B, ??. .1-2)

"...V/ith regard to North Vietnam, the U.S. imperialists have intensified their provocative and sabotage activities and threatened to extend their v;ar to the north,., ."

"...the National Assembly of the DRV resolutely demands that the U.S. Government stop at once all its provocative and sabotage activities against

the DRV.?

"Should the U.S. imperialists and their stooges be rash enough to expand their war to North Vietnam, all people of North Vietnam, millions as one man, would stand up together with the people in the south to defeat them..."

(DRV Foreign Ministry Letter September 4^ 19&4 - Tab C, pg. 1)

11 ...Since its unwarranted attack against the DRV on 5 August 1964* the U.S. Government has increased its military build-up in South Vietnam and southeast Asia.... ■'

"While carrying out this large-scale movement of troops, the U.S. authorities have openly announced the possibility that wider action against North Vietnam night become necessary.,,,"

(Khan Dan Editorial, December 19, 1964 - Tab D)

"...While being unable to win in South Vietnam, they even threaten to attack the North, thus opening a new war...."

(DRV Note of Protest February 9, 1965- Tab E, pg, l)

"...The 7 and 8 February 19o5 air attack is a new, extremely serious act of war perpetrated by the United States against the DRV, a most brazen violation of international lav; and the 1954 Geneva agreements on Vietnam, and an intolerable challenge to the world's peoples...."

(DRV-USSR Joint Statement February 10, 1965 -* Tab F, pg. 2)

"The two governments energetically condemn the aggressive acts on 5 August 1964 of the United States, especially the barbarous attacks by the

U.S.

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3-3 NND Project Number; NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

U.S. Air Force on the territory of the DRV on 7 and 8 February of this year . in the areas of Dons ^-oi- and Virih Linh. 7hoy regard these acts as completely inconsistent with international law and the 1954 Geneva Agreements .. m ."

(Ko Chi Minhjs Interview with Akahata April 5, 19o5 - Tab G, pp. 1-2)

"...For over 10 years now, the U.S. Imperialists have waged an aggressive war in South Vietnam in an attempt to turn that zone into a U.S. new-type colony and military base and to prolong the partition of our country.,.."

,: In an attempt to extricate themselves from their impasse, the U.S. imperialists are feverishly intensifying and steooing uo the aggressive war in South Vietnam,. .the war is being carried to the north with repeated air and naval attacks being brazenly launched on many places of the territory of the DRV "

n 0£ late, the U.S. imperialists have put forward misleading talk about peace and negotiation. The peoples of the world are fully aware of their aggressive and warlike nature. To step \xp aggression in South Vietnam and to bomb the no. th are part of their policy of special warfare. oy such acts, they also aim at bri: g about an advantageous position so as to be able, in case of necessity, to negotiate from a position of strength. This policy is wrong and cannot be carried out...."

(Pham Van Dong's Report to DRV National Assembly April 8, 1965 - Tab H, pp.2,3,5)

"...Today, the U.S. imperialists are oblighed to refer to the Geneva agreements on Vietnam but with the aim of distorting the basic principles of the agreements in order to perpetuate our country's division and to consider the north and the south as two entirely different nations...."

"...In his speech, President Johnson spoke of peace, the end of. the war, and unconditional negotiations,however, the U.S. government is now intensifying the aggressive war in South Vietnam and extending the war to North Vietnam, and according to General Taylor's statement,-there will be no limit to the aggression against North Vietnam,..."

m

"...By engaging in this highly dangerous military adventure, they stupidly hope to cow our people and also intimidate peace-loving governments and peoples in the world. ?hzy hope that our people and the peoples of the world will flinch out of fear, and thus they will* be in a position to shift from a weak to a strong position!"

"...VJhat causes us to be moved and enthusiastic is that in recent months, in the United States itself, a movement has been developing widely to oppose the U.S. imperialists who are stepping up the war of aggression in South/ Vietnam and increasing their acts of war against North Vietnam...."

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Pruject Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

(Joint communique April 17, 1965 - Tab I, pg. 1)

"It is significant that the statement oy the U.S. President on a so-called peaceful settlement has been made at athne when further bcnfoings of the territory of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam are taking place, whan there are further movements of American military units and weapons to South Vietnam to step up the blood;/ aggression against the people of South Vietnam — and these aggressive actions continue.... 11

(DRV Statement Rejecting 17 Nation Appeal - Tab J, pg. l)

"...To soothe and mislead public opinion, on 7 April 1965, U.S. President Lyndon Johnson spoke of peace and independence in South Vietnam, of unconditional negotiations toward a political solution to the war in South Vi im. He even promised to set aside 1 billion dollars to develop t" economy and raise the living standard of the peoples in southeast Asian countries. But in this -very speech, Johnson declared that the United States vail not withdraw from South Vietnam and will intensify its air raids against North Vietnam.

(llhan Dan Attack on President Johnson's Kay 13, 1965 Speech - Tab M, pp. 1-2)

"...Cnce again Johnson clamored that the United States is ready for ' unconditional discussions. But he could not hide his sinister design, which is disclosed in his own speech. Before speaking of unconditional discussions, Johnson declared that the United States will not abandon its commitment to its henchmen in Saigon, and right after speaking of unconditional discussions, he threatened that if North Vietnam refuses to negotiate on U.S. terms, this will only mean damage to North Vietnam;..."

"...As regards fforth Vietnam, the U.S. imperialists have unceasingly intensified their war of destruction.... 11

"...The U.S. aggressors are escalating the war in a dangerous manner. This is an undeniable fact. The so-called unconditional discussions are obviously a big swindle...."

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number; NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 I

(D2V Statement on Suspension of U.S. Attacks May 13^ 19o5 - Tab S, pp. 1-2) -

"« # .The U.S. trick is nothing new. It is to be recalled that on ? April 1965 U.S. President Johnson had to speak of unconditional discussions and peaceful settlement of the Vietnam.problem.,. .Tut within one month after these hypocritical words^ another 3.6*000 U.S. troops have been sent to South Vietnam 9 thus bringing the strength of U.S. troops there to nearly 50^000. U.S. air raids against iCorth Vietnam have increased fourfouid as compared with the period frorn 5 August 1964 to 7 April 19o5...."

"By making the cessation of the South Vietnamese people's just straggle a condition for the ending of the U.S. bombing and strafing of fforth Vietnam* the U.S. Government has clearly revealed its scheme to prepare for an intensification and expansion of the war against the DRV...."

"The DRV Government resolutely exposes the U.S. Goverrmient• s trick in the so-called suspension of air raids against North Vietnam as a deceitful maneuver designed to pave the way for new U.S. acts of war...."

(Khan Dan Protests U.K's Connivance with the U.S. June 7, I965 - Tab ?, pg. 2)

"...Being bitterly defeated in" South Vietnam and strongly protested and condemned by the world peoples > the U.S. imperialists are madly stepping up and expanding the war, hoping by so doing to get out of their Isroasse.,.. 11

(DRV "White Paper" ~ Tab Q, pp.2-5)

"...In an attempt to find a way cut of this crumbling position,, the United States plots to extend the war beyond South Vietnam 1 ^ borders.

"Since early 1964 the U.S. ruling circles in Washington have envisaged carrying the war to 1,'orth Vietnam...."

*

"...Noteworthy is plan No. 6 worked out by Walt T .v. Rostov^ the policy planner of the U.S. State Department. This plan envisages three stages; first stage: naval blockage of Haiphong port: second stage: naval attacks on North Vietnam coastal installations; and third stage: air berthings of

North Vietnam...."

"...The United States says that it wants a peaceful.settlement of the war in Vietnam., but at the ssme time it declares that it will not withdraw, either openly or under the cloak of a : ningless agreement, A peaceful settlement which does not include the withdrawal of U.S. satellite troops from South Vietnam cannot be regarded as such by sound-minded people../,"

"The United States says that it wants to seek a peaceful settlement of the war in Vietnam because it wants peace to be quickly restored } but it deems it necessary to increase its response and make attacks by air...."

22k

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 i

"^•.vlhile talking about peace , the United States continue to intensify the war in South Vietnaa and to extend the war with its air force and navy

to North Vietnam. This niay lead to unforeseeable consequences.... t!

"The aggressive and bellicose features of the U.S. Gove: t are furt;: laid bare by the following arrogant action: Cn 24 April 19o5 President Johnson designated the whole of Vi.efcnsa and the waters adjacent thereto u? to ICO miles from the Vietnamese coasts, and part of the territorial waters of the Chinese Peoples Republic around the Paracels of Islands, as a combat zone of the U.S. armed forces. This is in essence a move toward a blockage of the DEV and, at the same tine^ a preparation for larger-scale ailit&ry

adventures....

tr

(Thong Nat Article July 1965 - Tab R, pg. 2 )

^..Obviously, as long as the U.S. imperialists continue to spin such nonsensical stories and to explain the southern people's uprising as a reaction to North Vietnamese aggression so as to have a pretext for attacking the D3V, this will mean that the U.S. imperialists still want to continue war and that it will be impossible to achieve peace; in other words, the United States will continue to attack the North and the northern people will be obi: i to return blows ,... f i

(DRV Government Statement on President Johnson's July 2S, 19o5 Press Conference Tab T, pg. 1)

truth.

11 ...This hypocritical talk cannot possibly cover up and distort the In fact, the U.S. Government has sabotaged the 1954 Geneva agree-on Vietnam, trampled upon international laws., continuously intervened in the internal affairs of the Vietnamese people, sent U.S. troops against the South Vietnamese people, bombed and strafed the territory of the DRV, and has gone to the length of bluntly stating that it will not withdraw from South Vietnam...."

"...It is talking about peace discussions to conceal the plan for intensified war. Its design is to prolong indefinitely the partition of Vietnam and to stick to South Vietnam in a bid to turn that zone into a U.S. new type colony and military base for attack against the DRV, t£us jeopardis:

\2in2 rseace in asia and the world..

n

. V

"The DRV Government once again exooses the U.S. authorities 1 deception

J^A

,1

,L, ^

of unconcr&xonai discussions, wnicn is in essence a pernoious maneuver

to impose hy force on the Vietnamese people submission to the U.S. policy o

agression... •

I!

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

(Quan Doi Hhan Dan Editorial August 2C, 1965 - Tab V, pg. 2)

^..To beat a drua Tor this deceitful peace, Johnson has been bslly-hooir.g that the United States has made considerable concessions, that VJash-ington tried again and again to change its attitude, that the United States does not oppose free elections throughout all Vietnam and is ready to discuss Hanoi f s proposals.... !:

a. ..the Vietnamese people have "seen clearly the U.S. aggressive design through their peaceful negotiations smokescreen: the United States never speaks of withdrawal of U.S. troops and weapons from South Vietnam, abolition OJC liV^i. niilitary bases in Son^h Vietnam, and a definite end to fcholr crteixftvX bembing raids on Korth Vietnam. This means that the U.S. imperialists will continue to carry out their aggress in Vi< -m and violate most seriously the basic provisions of the Geneva agre; roc while unleashing their peaceful negotiations swindle.- Moreover, right at the moment when they were speaking of peaceful negotiations, they have brazenly poured tens of thousands of aggressive troops into South Vietnam and increased bombing raids on north Vietnam to an ever fiercer extent. By so doing, unquestionably the U.S. imperialists are deliberately throwing every possibility on the political settlement of the Vietnam issue into the

greatest impasse....

■

ry—•*<— w*--*t

■

■ _ =- . _ - _• ... - -. , , . I^fcX—

* - ■ - ....

(?ham Van Dong's National Day report August 31> 1965 - Tab X, pp. 2-4, 6)

"...The extension of air attacks on Ilorth Vietnam by the U.S. imperialists is an extremely blatant war act against the DRV, an independent and sovereign country. This is a rr.ost serious violation of the 19o4 Geneva agreements on Indochinaj of the U.l\ Charter, and of international law. In their escalation

;ainst Month Vietnam the U.S. imperialists have committed inhumane crimes, bombing and strafing densely populated areas, many hospitals..."

"...The U.S. imperialists still continue the escalation in the north...."' They may even start a nm Korean war in this area...."

■

"...In his speech on 23 July President Johnson even began to talk about his readiness to discuss Hanoi's proposals, to mention the question of reunifying Vietnam, and the ?!?LSV. Why is there such a change? Is that an indication of Washington's willingness for ^eace?

"Heplying to this question, we must consider not the statements by the

U.S. ruling circles, but their deeds-

:iat have fcney done

^hey have

been intensifying the aggressive war in South Vietnam and stepping up the

escalation in the north....

1:

T>V*a«4j4&v«£

4-~1 1

enn iionnson ^aiKS aocut t;eace m an attest;

^ -

♦ j.

-us

cover up his war schemes; the more he talks about peace the more he steps up

• •

u

V.

• * • r.b

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3-3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 I

,: «..As for the U«S. escalation of the war to the north-, it obviously constitutes an intolerable act of agression* ...To bov; devm before the

threats of the U.S. imperialists or to compromise with them would consti-

tute a

n act of encourag ::t fraught with incalculably serious consequences

t:

t • # •

(ERV Foreign Ministry Memorandum September 23, 19&5 - Tab Z, pp. 1-2)

/ *-

,! # . .Since 7 April 19o5 the U.S. authorities have on repeated occasions professed readiness to engage in r unconditional discussions' and made proposals for a 'cease-fire, r a ! suspension of the bombing of the north. 1 But is is in this very period that U.S. President Johnson has decided to send in 50,000 more U.S. combat troops, raising the U.S. strength in South Vietnam to nearly 130,000; and a further dispatch has also been

announcea.**.

ii

"The 'unconditional discussions' proposal of the U.S. authorities is but an attempt to compel the Vietnamese people to accept their own

t*erms..*.

». # .The T cease-fire r trick of the U.S, authorities is designed in fact to compel the Vietnamese people in both zones to lay down their arms while U.S. troops continue to be reinforced, to occupy and commit aggression against Vietnam. This is also an attempt to play for tine to consolidate the puoset administration and ar&y, to increase forces for further expansion of the war in Vietnam....»

*—■*.**. ,

* - -.. ■■

(Vietnam Courier Article - Tab 33, pg. l)

If ..,Such allegations as peace, discussions — put forth by the imperialists — are but deceitful words. The U.S. imperialists have openly unleashed war against the DRV...."

(Jo int Asahi-Hainichi pp. 1-2, 7, 10)

Interview with ?ham Van Dong October 4, 1965 - Tab CC

no the

"...Mo, the United States is definitely not desiring peace. They have intention at all of ending the war..*.are they not expanding war in both south and the north, while talking about peace? Tiiey still believe in

power, and they think that if they further increase their forces and strengthen the bombings against the north, they will produce effects. That is very foolish, but it happens to be the truth. That is why we do not trust thei

&c ^rcoosal.

continuing the war, we chose the course of continuing war without the slightest nosn^a^—on. • •«

"...

Q

Declassified per Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 NND Project Number; NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 2011

"...The v,:i:^8a S: es 1 escalation £;a:ns; i,te north nas izzlea so iar. Its ^re^cst failure lies in its having bean unable to brin£ the north to

■"^V-L~- fi^% +\ *■"•

~ ~t

xne conference ^ao~e sy

threatening its people*.• . ,J

tr # . .President ciohnscn beran to talk about oeace ne"-:otiatior.s half a

»^"» l»rV>-^

x~

year a^o, no^rever^ vnoneYer ne spo.ee asou^ peacej ne oraerea remicrce-nent of the U.S. forces in South Vic - :. and !I escalaied If the v;ar against

GENEVA

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

EXC ERPTS FROM SOUTH VI^Ti-: .-V: 35 NATIONAL LIBERATION FR0i;T — I:0a?H VI ST: FATrE3LAI!I) FRO^T^ J0j?:T

STAT^MEiJT OF'CCTOB?:^ 30, 19o2

(The Joint Statement was issued on the occasion of a visit to Hanoi from October 19 to 31, 1962 of a NFLSV delegation led by Secretary General Kguyen Van Rieu. The Statement, broadcast in English by Hanoi's VKA on October 30, 1962 accuses the U.S. and the Diem "clique" of violating the Geneva Agreements. It also states the Front, which came into being owing to the growth of the South Vietnamese, is the genuine representative of the South Vietnamese people. It calls for neutrality of South Vietnam, and for peaceful reunification.)

11 ...1. Both parties note that over the past eight years or so the

fe red nore and more de eply in South Vietnam arid directed the ilgo Dinh Die authorities to seriously sabotage the implementation of these agrel s. The U.S. imperialists are plotting to partition Vietnam permanently, turn South Vietnam into a new type U.S. colony and military base...Over 10,000 U.S. j officers and men and hundreds of thousands of Mgo Dinh Diem troops armed with

modern U.S. weapons and noxious chemical are repeatedly conducting terrorist raids and barbarously persecuting the South Vietnamese people, regardless of age, sex, religion, nationality, or political tendency. Millions of South Vietnamese peasants have been herded by the U.S.-Diem clique into concentration camps, so-called strategic hamlets,••.

,f The U.S. imperialists are also plotting to use South Vietnam as a ba.sb ! to sabotage the peace and neutrality of Cambodia and Laos, threaten peace in

j ' southeast Asia and the world, and, at the same time, to make South Vietnam a | " proving ground for the suppression of the national liberation movement in" ; Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

''Both parties denounce to world public opinion the criminal U.S.-Diem schemes and acts, severely condemn the aggressive and warlike policy of the U.S. imperialists and the antinational and antidemocratic policy of the Ngo Dinh Diam authorities, hangers-on of the United States.

,r 2. In the face of the U.S. imperialists 1 aggressive acts and Ngo Dinh Diem's traitorous acts, the South Vietnamese people have been compelled to rise up to straggle for their right to live and for independence, democracy, GENEVA and peace. This is a j ust strug gle 3 which conforms to the 1 9 54 G eneva

j *?he Fatherland Front of ::orth Vietnam is the replacement for the Viet Minh

group. The Front organizes and coordinates all the mass organizations, the trade unions and the three political parties. (All members of the National Assembly are elected as members of the Fatherland Front.) All these organizations operate under the aegis of the Fatherland Front as well as independently,

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1

n Viet nam, to the principles of the U.N. Charter and the spirit Bandung conference. This struggle is an integral part of the

agreements on_

of the 1955 Bana

movements for national liberation and peace in the world. Yet, in oheir^ special report to the cochaixmen of the 1954 Geneva conference"-, the Indian and Canadian delegates to the International Commission have deliberately tuned into the tf.S.-Biea allegation, misrepr; snting the South Vietnamese peopled just struggle as infiltration and subversion by the North. This is an offense to the sacred patriotism of the Vietr. se people. The Vietnamese people fr North to South energetically object to it.

1 FRONT n ^e_ Vietn am Fath e rland Front held stha t the HF LSVj ...which came_into^

bein? owinn: to "the growth of the South Vietnamese people's struggle and which ralli es broadl y the patriotic and. anti-U.S.-Diem xorces dji South Vietnam, is^ 1 the g enuine repre se ntative of the people there, arid is one of the decisive

j factors for their certain v . "The" Vi etnam Fatherlan d Front fully: suopoarts

\ the pro gram and the urg ent steps advocated by the NFLSV to realize indepen-

■? dence~de mocra cy, inprovenent of the people?s ; conditions, and peace and .

I neutral it y in South Vietnam 5 in an adv an ce t d thepeacefii reunification^

j of the fath erland. The pro-ram a nd v :nt steps of the IIFLSV me et th e

interestsand aspirations of the South Vietnamese people and conform to the

practical situation in South Vietnam at present

V • « #

"3. ...The delegation of the NFLSV welcomes the policy of the Vietnam Fatherland Front for national reunification on the basis of independence, democracy, and by peaceful means, without coercion or annexation of one side by.the other, and taking into due consideration the legitimate interests and aspirations of the people of all shades in the two zones. This policy matches

| the political program of the NFLSV, which provides for Reunifying the country

step by step by peaceful means on the basis of negotiations between the two

i - zones and discussions in all forms and measures beneficial to the Vietnamese

people and fatherland'.

■

r, 4* In the face of the present extremely serious situation in South ] * Vietnam created by the U.S.-Diem (clique?) both parties hold that the urgent | DRV TERMS t asks of the people in both zones are t o str engthen solidarity 3 resolutely ; - strur^ le against the U.S. -Diam (clic ) urge an end to war and persecution, j - dissolve th e "strategic h amlets" and other concentration camps in South ! VietnamT^amand the dissoluti on of the U.S. Military Co: .: r.and in Sai gon and the

j withdra wal of U.S ._troops, mili tary pers onnel, a rms, and wa r material f rom

I • South Vietnam. The U.S. Gov er nment must respect the soverei gnty and indepen--^

denc e of the S outh Vietnamese people. The latterjjs intern a)., a ffairs must be settled by themselves; no foreign country has the right to interfere in them.

M ■ ■ ■■ ■ r fc—fc^ MH Ill II »■ II 1 ■ II I I'll — . I ■ I ■ ■ . , i I,, | | » ■ 1. ■ —■ .11 I ^— — n —>——m—M^J— n MB p) « II I 1 ■ I —— I i Ml

I

I

t

i

* Special report to the Co-chairmen of the Geneva Conference on I ri Jo-China, issued in Saigon on June 2, 1962.

! - 130

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

!, Eoth sides hold that, at a time when the country is still temporarily divided it as a must to boost the struggle Tor normal relations between the people of the zones in the economic,, cultural, and postal fields. The Vietnam Fatherland Front and the NFLSV vail strive to overcome difficulties, create favorable conditions for representatives of mass oi'ganizations of the two zones - to contact each other, and at the same time, to exchange cultural articles of these mass organizations, such as films > books,and papers.

"5. Both sides are very happy to note that the just struggle of South Vietnamese compatriots for the emancipation of South Vietnam and that of all the Vietnamese people for peaceful national, reunification have won the active and warm approval and support of the world's peoples, including the progressive people in the United States, and the governments of many countries. On behalf, of the people of both zones, the two sides express thanks for that valuable support.

"Both sides hold that the Vietnamese and the world's people have a common enemy, U.S. imperialism, the war-seeking diehard of the colonialists and imperialists. The anti-U.S. struggle of the Vietnamese, people and the struggle of peoples for national independence and peace are closely connected with each other. That is why both sides warmly welcome the peaceful settlement of the Laotian question and the formation of the national Union Government in Laos. The peaceful settlement of the Laotian issue proves that international disputes can be settled satisfactorily,by means of negotiations, Both sides demand the . scrupulous respect for and strict implementation of the 1962 Geneva agreements on Laos, and the complete withdrawal from Laos of all military men of the United States and its satellites.

"The two sides protest against the infringement upon the sovereignty and territory of Cambodia by the South Vietnamese and Thai authorities on U.S. orders. They welcome the proposal of Head of State Prince Norodom Sihanouk for convening an international conference to discuss a guarantee of Cambodia's independence and neutrality.

"The two sides demand a complete withdrawal of American troops from Thailand, and the dissolution of the aggressive SEATO military bloc headed by the United States.

"Both sides support the struggle of the Chinese people to liberate Taiwan and oppose the scheme to create two Chinas, support the Chinese people in their defense of national sovereignty and territory, support the proposal of the CPR . " Government for the settlement of the Sino-Indian border question by peaceful negotiations, and demand restoration of the legitimate position of the CP?w in the United Nations.

" "6. The two sides unanimously hold that nowadays the world's people l s forces of national independence ana peace are stronger than the aggressive and bellicose forces of the imperialists headed by the United States, No matter I how small they are, the peoples are able to win if they are united closely and

struggle valiantly. Though the U.S.-Diem clique still has mjvj evil designs and the South Vietnamese compatriots' struggle is still difficult, hard, and

■

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

FROKT

long; no reactionary force can check the growth or the patriotic movement in South Vietnam.

"The 1 4 mil lion So uth Viet: :>se com patriot s will develop more and more.. their val iant and ir.de-itable trad ition arid unite rr.ore and ir:ore widely and. closely within the ] S V to dir ectly oppose the U.S.-Diem clique* The 16 m il"! inn North Vietnamese compatriots will support more actively the South Vietnamese cc .trlots* liberation struggle, and endeavor to emulate with each other to build North Vietnam into a strong and firm basis for the struggle to reunite the country. The socialist countries > the peaceful and neutral countriesj the peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, and peace-loving people throughout the world will obviously support more wholeheartedly and practically (word Indistinct) South Vietnamese and all the Vietnamese, people. The U.S.-Diem clique will certainly meet with failure. The Vietnamese people from north to south who are closely united and who struggle resolutely, will undoubtedly achieve success/'

■

Declassified per Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 2011

HO CHI KIKH'S INTERVIEW VJITH AK AHATA

APRIL 5, 19^5

a

(Ho's interview with Xoshita Takano of Akahata > organ of the Japanese Communist Party, was broadcast by Hanoi VNA in English on April 9> 1965* Ho expressed the view that to settle the South Vietnamese question first of all the U.S. must withdraw from South Vietnam, let the South Vietnamese people decide themselves their own affairs, and stop their provocative attacks against the DRV. "The carrying out of these basic points will bring about favorable conditions for a conference along the pattern of the 1954 Geneva conference. Such is a reasonable and sensible approach which is beneficial to peace and to the U.S. people. n ) » "Question: The U.S. imperialists have suffered repeated defeats in South Vietn Howeverj they are still contemplating bringing in superweapons, up-to-date weapons in an attempt to subjugate the Vietnamese people. From the people T s viewpoint what is the character of the war in Vietnam and what is its significance in contemporary history? The U.S. imperialists are said to have landed themselves in an embarrassing dilemma in South Vietnam- YJhat is the relation between this position and their recent frenzied aggressive acts vis-a-vis North and South Vietnam? In such circumstances, what is the most important immediate task of the Vietnamese people?

DVES "Answers For over 10 years now, the U.S. im peria lists have waged an ag gressive war in South Vie tnam i n an a t tempt to turn that zone into a U.S. new-type colon y and military base and to prolong the partition of our countr y. They Eave^brought in over 30,CCQ troops and military personnel, thousands of aircraft, hundreds of warships and hundreds of thousands of tons of arms, they have carried out a most ruthless policy of terror and repression against all patriotic people in South Vietnam.

■

"Confronted with such a situation* our comoatriots in the south have had to rise ud agains t the U.S. stressors in defence of their life and their country. This struggle has recorded tremendous victories. Over three-quarters of the area with two-thirds of the population have been liberated. The United States and its agents have sustained heavy defeats. The U.S. special war in South Vietnam is going bankrupt.

"If the South Vietnamese people are becoming every stronger and winning ever greater victories, as "the fight goes on, that (proves that?) their cause is iust, because they a re a nimated with an ardent patriotism and guided bv the

V J v ** '"' ■ • ' ■ ■ ■ ' 11 ill. ^ «|| . II I, , «■ ■ 1 1 1, ■ ii ■ ■ ■■ II ■ 1 H i — ■ H liri . P - 1 . ■■ - fi ll ** L, . -

sound policy of the M?LSV. The war being waged by our. compatriots in the south * is a peoples revolutionary war against foreign aggression, for national in-

dependence and peace. It is an active part of the world peoples movement against ..imperialism colonialism, and neocolonialism, headed by U.S* imperialism, for national independence, democracy, peace, and social progress.

FRONT

~v _ _ -i

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3,3 NND Project Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 2011

US MOVES

GENEVA

That is precisely the reason why the peoples of the whole world are extending us their sympathy and support* The increasing victories of the South Vietnamese people show that in our epoch, a nation closely united and waging a resolute struggle is fully capable of defeating the imperialist aggressors, however ferocious, cruel, and well armed they may be.

"In an attempt to extricate themsel*v

from their imoasse. the U.S.

it.— i -i . - .iinii i~ ■' ■ i "i .!■■■ ■ r ~\mi - i— ■ ~i' ^~ r ■ ■■ i i ■ ^ -~~ ■^

imperialists are feverishly intensify. and stepping up the asrHressive war in So u th Vietnam. They have brought in U.S. marines and South Korean mercenaries , their planes are daily strafing and dumpting napalm bombs and toxic gas on liberated areas, destroying hospitals, schools, and p das, and massacring the civilian population including old people, women, and children. On the other hand, the war is bei r-r carried to t h e north with repeated, air .and naval attacks being brazenly laun 1 on m any places of the territory of the DRV. Meanwhile the war is intensified in Laos and provocations are staged against" -Cambodia. The IK S, im perialists 1 acts of aggression and war in Vietnam are of the utmost gravit y; they -os sly tramp le upon the 195k Geneva a greements on Vfetnam^ and const itute violati ons of ititernationaf lav/" and mani festatio ns of disregard for world public opinion •.

"The U.S. rulers claim that the north is waging aggression on South Vietnam and that their attacks on the north aim at putting an end to the assistance extended by the north to the South Vietnamese people. These are deceitful contentions designed to fool the world's peoples and to cover up the U.S. aggressive acts. It must be pointed out that it is the legitimate right of the South Vietnamese people to drive out the U.S. aggressors, to defend their country and to decide themselves their own international affairs. It is the sacred right of the Vietnamese in the north as well as in the south to oppose and defeat the U.S. imperialists 1 aggressive acts to defend their national independence and their life. The U.S. imperialists 1 acts, however frenzied and reckless they may be, cannot prevent the Vietnamese people.from carrying on their patriotic struggle until final victory.

"Question: There is now much talk about a peaceful settlement and negotiations., to end the war in South Vietnam, What is in your view the inijnimum basis for the settlement of the Vietnam problem?

US MOVES "Answer: Of late, the U.S. imperialists have p ut forwa rd misleadi n g talk about

peace and negotiation. The peonies of the world are fully aware of their

—*- L -^-

siv< and war like nature, To step up aggression in South Vietnam and to

bomb the north are Dart of their policy of special warfare. By such acts, they also aim at bringing about an advantageous position so as to be able, in case of~necessity. to negotiate from a position of s trength. This policy is

out.

wron? ana cannon oe wj

carried

"The Vietnamese people cherish peace and have always respected and correctly implemented the 1954 Geneva agreements. However, they are determined to fight to the end against the aggressors. If the U.S. imperialists stubbornly persist in their policy of aggression and war, they will, certainly suffer a humiliating defeat.

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Pmject Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

TERMS "To settle the South Vietnam question , first of all the United Stat es

_must withdraw from South Vietnam let^: So uth Vietj ^.pjaoplejihgraselves dpcjde their own affairs, z stou its provocative,Al;ta-d^_aisaii^tLJJbe.ja^ Thi» carrvin^ out of these basic joints will bring about favorable cond

GENEVA for a conference along the pattern o f the 1954 Geneva c onference* Such is

a reas onab le and sensib le ap proach which is^b eneficial to peace a nQxTtne U.S. pcodIc.

rm

"Question: What is your appraisal of the Indoehinese peoples' conference recently held in Phnom Penh?

"Answer: The Indoehinese peoples 1 conference convened at the initiative of Prince Norodom Sihanouk,, the Cambodian head of state, has recorded good successes* This is a bis victory for the peoples of Vietna, Cambodia, and Laos in their united struggle against their common enemy, the U.S. imperialists While the United States is stepping up and expanding the aggressive war in South Vietnam, attacking the DRV, intensifying the war in Laos, and repeatedly ' encroaching on the territory and national sovereignty of Cambodia, the success of the conference shows the determination of the three Indoehinese peoples to fight against the U.S. imperialists in defense of national independence and peace in Indochina and southeast Asia.

"Question: Of late, the U.S. imperialists have schemed to direct the reactionary and militarist Japanese administration to rapidly conclude the Japan-ROK talks. They also plan to set up the SEATO aggressive military bloc. This is directly related to their aggressive acts in South Vietnam. What are your assessments of the dangerous de " *ns and activities of the U.S. and Japanese reactionary forces on Japanese soil and of the Japanese peoples struggle against these dangerous schemes and acts?

"Answer: The Japan-ROK talks are a maneuver of the U.S. imperialists aimed at establishing the SEATO aggressive military bloc and intensifying war preparations. This maneuver is in complete contradiction with the interests of the Japanese and Korean peoples and poses a threat to peace in the Far East and the world. The U.S. imperialists who are the aggressors in South Vietnam are also occupying the Japanese islands of Okinawa and Ogasawara and occupying South Korea. The Japanese militarists who have colluded with the United States and repressed the Japanese people have also sent sailors and technicians to help the United States in South Vietnam and allowed Japanese territory to be used as a base for aggression against South Vietnam. The U.S. imperialists are the common enemy of the peoples of Vietnam, Japan, and Korea. The same may be said of the Japanese militarists and the South Korean puppets. The Vietnamese people fully support the struggle of the Japanese people against the Japan-ROK talks and the reactionary policy of the U.S. imperialists and Japanese militarists. They sincerely thank the Japanese people for warmly supporting their struggle against the U.S. aggressors,

"I take this opportunity to convey my cordial greetings to the editorial board of AXAHATA and request your paper to convey to the fraternal Japanese people the greetings of militant solidarity of the Vietnamese people."

Declassified per Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

REPORT -OF T.-iK DRV GOVSfttS-ISriT SUBMITTED BY PHAI-I VAN D0;.G TO TtW, DRY KATIOIiAL ASSI-ilBLY

ON APRIL 8, 1965 .

— mm I ' -

(The first section of this report was broadcast by Hanoi VMA in English on April 12, 1965- The concluding section containing Pham Van Dong's four points was translated by FBIS from a Hanoi domestic broadcast on April 13* The four points and other pertinent excerpts from the report are included below, The report contains a lengthy indictment against U.S. activities in South Vietnam as veil as a report on conditions in North Vietnam.)

"...The unswerving policy of the DRV Government is to respect strictly the 1954 Geneva agreements on Vietnam and to implement correctly their basic provisions as embodied in the following points:

h POINTS M l« Recognition of the basic national rights of the Vietn amese

p eopTe^^pcacej independence,' sovereignty, unity , and'territorial integ rity. Accor ding to the Geneva agreements 3 t he U.S. Government must withdra w from South Vi etnam U.S. troops > m ilita ry perso nnel, and weap on s of all kinds, dismantle all U.S. military bases ther e, and cancel its mili tary allianc e with South Vietnam. It must e nd i ts p olicy ^ interventi on and aggression in South Vietnam, Ac coining to the Gene agreements, the U.S. Government must stop its

J M w ■ ■■■»■ .

acts of war against Ko rl h Va :.n and completely cease all encroachments o n the territory and sovereignty of the DRV.

j ^ .11 || '■^ — ■i ■ m, ■!.-■■■ i i » -ii ■ M i, i U<B ^^■j__Mi_| „

n 2. P ending th e peacef ul re u nificat i on of Vietnam, while Vietna m is still temp orarily divi ded into two" zones tn e^JTitary"'provis ions of^the 1954 Geneva a greements on V ietnam mus t "be strictl y respe cted. The two zones mu st refrain from entering into an y mili t ary alliance wit h forei gn countries and ther e must he_• no^oreigq^niXjtar y bases, troop s, or mi litary personnel in their "respective territory.

i

"3. The in ternal affairs of South Vietnam must be settled b y t he Sou th Vietnamese p eople themselve s in accordance with the program of the NFLSV with-out any foreign interference.

"4• The p eaceful reunification of Vietnam is t o b e settled by the Vietnamese people in both zones, without any foreign interference.

"This stand of the DRV Government unquestionably enjoys the approval and support of all peace and justice-loving governments and peoples in the world. The government of the DRV is of the view that the stand expounded here is t he basis for the J>oundest_politic al settlement of the Vietnam prob lem.

GENEVA "If this basis' is recognized, favo rable c onditions will be created for the

.peaceful settlement of the" Vietnam people, and it wiUTbe possiBIe to cons'id er"

the reconvening of an international conference alo ng the pattern of the 1954 Geneva conference en Vietnam.

"The DRV Government declares that any approach contrary to the aforementioi.

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

" 1T N stand is inappropriatej any apr r cach tending to secure U.N, i ntervention in *

the Vietnam situation is also ina ppro priate. Such appro aches e basica lly at "variance wltTTLne rfrlffPffeneva eements on Viet nam,....

I GENEVA n We believe the world's people were awakene d on hear ing President

US MOVES Johnson streak of a return to the 1954 Geneva agreements on Vietnam. This was

a laurch, ver yone knows the U.S. im peri alists are the en a ny of the Gen eva agreenientp. Never have they and their Saigon henchmen officially recognized 3 these agreements. Worse still, they have never officially recognized the

i ICG's execution of the Geneva agreements. At this very moment they are down-

trodding the Geneva agreements more brazenly than ever. The U.S . imp cripQ.ists have n ever resp ect ed the 1954 Gene va agree ments o n Camb odia and th e 1954_and 1962 Geneva agree <s on Lao s, At present, they persistently refuse to reconvene the international conference on Cambodia and Laos. Today, the U.S. imperi alists are oblige d to refer to the Geneva agreements on Vietnam bu^vri.th the aim of distorti n g the b asic principles of t he ag reements in order.to perpetuate our c ountry' s division and to con si der the nor th and the south as two entirely different nations.

"As for our government and people, they have continuously struggled to maintain the Geneva agreements on Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia and considered these agreements as a legal basis for the sacred and inviolable national interests of the people of the three friendly countries.

"President Johnson's 7 April speech is full of irreconcilable contradictions between the deceitful words and the criminal acts of the U.S. Government in Vietnam.

US MOVES "1- In his speech, President Johnson spoke 01 peace, the end of t he war,

and uncond xtional negoti ations, howgvgr, the U.S. government is now intensi-f yinr; the aggressive war in Sout h Vietnam and ex t endin g the war to North Vietnam, and according to General Taylor's statement, th ere will be no limit t o the aggression against North Vietnam.

•■■k^ilWa..^ »^1

"2. President Johnson spoke a lot about S outh' Vietnam's indepen dence: South Vietnam will not be bound to any foreign intervention or bound to any alliance and will not allow any country to set up its military base there. However, it is the U.S. imperialists who are seeking at all risks to cling to South Vietnam and have increased the number of U.S. combat units in South Vietnam and the number of aggressive acts against North Vietnam in an attempt 'to cling to South Vietnam. It is crystal clear that the U.S. Government is* waging this aggressive war against South Vietnam, but it has brazenly accused North Vietnam of being the aggressor. President Johnson stated in his speech that "we will not withdraw publicly or under any (word indistinct) agreement." This brazen statement has completely laid bare the U.S. policy on Vietna. It is a threat to world public opinion.

develo

"3 * Pr q s ident.^ J o hn son^l sa_g££ t end ed „ frj^Qjaaan^ £ ^ec.31 is

waenb andthe imm^v^ent^

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

1 trU!ion dollars, but his rjuroose was to woo the southeast Asian peoples. The U.S. imperialists are really the creators of all danger of war in Vietnam, Laos, and other places. They have committed considerable criminal acts and have feven -used toxic gas not only in the war, but in the repression of anti-U.S. people in the urban centers,

"A. President Johnson threatened to continue the use of force. This

"^ w i - ——— * — ii —-————— ■-■

threat cannou ingnten us. The Vietnamese people are determined to fight and win. Triey are not afraid of any difficulty or enemy* As they are suffering defeats, the U.S. imperialists v;ill certainly be defeated completely. As the U.S. Government has been urged by public opinion the world over and in the United States to withdraw its troops from South Vietnam and put an end to the war against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, President Johnson was obliged to utter demagogic words, and these were only maneuvers or tricks aimed at deceiving public opinion and appeasing the increasingly widespread and vigorous opposition in the United States and the world over to the war of aggression in Vietnam.

*

"So, our Vietnamese people and the world's people must heighten their vigilance against the U.S. imperialists 1 new acts of war and, at the same time, against their deceitful move to intensify the war under the label of peace and negotiations and to slander other people as warmongers,...

US MOVES "The NFISV

V, the mobjlizer and organizer of the patriotic forces in South eader wnxch has t n the people to ever greater victories, is

Vietnam, t he J e;

now controlling three-fourths of the territory and o-thir ds of the popu latio n of South Vietnam. It ha^eyer hig her international prestige and posit ion, afid is bean tore and more recognized by foreign countries and i Id public

"-"* . . m mm „ T _ ! twill ii '■ * I ^~»fc i,l ■■■■ LI-" ■ *m I ii «i ^ ' i~ -——U—m' i * ■ — fa — ■ ■■ ^™ — '■ ■ —wW ^l ■ ■» ■— ■ — ■ i — n . !■ ■ — i» ' ■ ■ ■> ■ ■ ■ i ■ ■ * ■ " ■ ■ ■ ■ * ' " ■* *^ J ■ ' "" mm ^^—^~ ^—— • •— **'*' ■■■ «■•*

opinion as the sole genuine representative of the South Vietnamese people.

"Its sound program constitutes the banner of unity and struggle for national salvation.• .with a view to achieving independence, democracy, peace, and neutrality in South Vietnam, and eventual peaceful reunification of the country. The statement of 22 March 1965 of the front is resounding in the world as the strong voice of a people determined to fight and to win, the voice of justice, the voice of the just cause of the Vietnamese people and of the present epoch,,..

"The Government of the DRV sternly exposes and denounces to compatriots in the whole country and to the peoples of the world the, new, extremely serious war acts of the U.S. imperialists: on the one hand the latter are intensifying the aggressive war in the South, and on the other they are launching air and naval attacks on the north.

US MOVES "By engaging in this highly dangerous military adventure, they stupidly

hooe to c ow our people a nd also int imidate oeace-lovin? governments and peonies ^in the world. They hope that our people and the peoples of the world will flinch out of fear, and thus they will be in a position to shift frem a weak to a strong position!

"

.

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

"But in the face of their new aggressive acts, the Vietnamese people from the south to the north are waging an all the more resolute struggle* and the world's peoples are extending us an all the more vigorous support* It is clear that still heavier defeats are in store for the U.S. imperialists

4 # • •

"Ten years ago the French Expeditionary Corps, in spite of its 200*000 crack troops, ended in defeat at Dien Bien Fhu. AU.S, expeditionary corps will inevitably meet with the same ignominious fate in South Vietnam. For their part, our s out hem compatriots are prepared to fight with determination, to fight to the end, and to fight until not a single U.S. soldier is any longer to be seen in our country, even if they will have to fight for 10 or 20 years or more, and however great their difficulties and hardships may be (22 March ! 1965 statement of the NFLSV).

*

"While intensifying the aggressive war in South Vietnam, the U.S. im-; perialists are expanding it to the North with their air force on the grounds

that the DRV is at the origin of the patriotic struggle in South Vietnam. I These are obviously impudent acts and perfidous tricks of corsairs....

GENEVA "By attacking the DRV they have completely scraoued the Geneva agreements

and crossly violated international law and all human laws. They must pay for their crimes....

"The entire people of the north, united as one, are determined to struggle - in a self-sacrificing spirit to defeat all enemy aggressive schemes, to defend the north, and, more closely than ever, to stand side by side vrith our southern compatriots and wholeheartedly support their liberation struggle till final victory.

"In laying hands on the north, the U.S. warmongers expose themselves not only to well-deserved counterblows in the north, but also to still more telling blows in the south, as was pointed out in the 22 March 1965 statement of the liberation front:

1 "To defend the beloved north, the army and people of the

j south have vented their flames of anger at the U.S. aggressors

| and their agents. If the U.S. imperialists lay hands on the

| north of our fatherland once, the amy and people of the south

are resolved to strike twice or three times as hard at them,..

; "In these circumstances, the more frenzied the United States attempts to

j . extend the war to North Vietnam, the more disastrous will be their defeat! An

| anti-U.S. wave of indignation is now surging up in the world. The governments

i and people of the socialist countries, nationalist countries, international

organizations, peoples the world over, and progressive circles and various

i social strata in the United States itself are extending an ever more resolute

i and vigorous support and assistance to our just struggle

i #

"Today we are much stronger than before, strong in the north; strong 5ji the south, and strong in worldwide support. For their part the U.S. imperialists are

139

—

Declassified per Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

FRONT

being bogged down in South Vietnam and encountering great difficulties in various fields in many places. That is why our people are all the more heightening their will and determination, are animated with even greater enthusiasm and confidence in their just and certainly victorious struggle, and are resolved to devote all their forces to drive the U.S. aggressors out of our countryj to defend the north, to liberate the south, to eventually build a peaceful, reunified, independent, democratic, and prosperous Vietnam, arid to contribute to the defense of peace in southeast Asia and the world...*

"The whole peo ple of t he north are warml y re sponding to the statement^

ofjLhe_^rPLSV and the statement of the Vietna m Fathe rland Front, they are simultaneously carrying out production, fighting, and combat preparations, determined as they are to do their best to build and defend the north and to extend wholehearted support to the cause of the liberation of the south. In the present juncture, all social strata and all citizens must work more with a higher sense or urgency and higher productivity. Everybody must, according to his capacity and strength, make his most effective contribution to the common i cause of the country.

*

^In response to_the_appeal of the NFXSV, it the South Vietnamese _cadr es_^ arm ymen^ and ordin ar y citizens regroup ed to the nort h have enthu siastically

'voiced their readiness to return to their na t ive la nd and t o fig ht, arm s in h^nd, or to do any work to contribute to the annihilation of the en emy and to national salvation. Pe nding o rders to this effect, all of them are striv ing

' with one Hiind^t"bo ost up pro duction and ac"£ively^brir"to contribute to the defense and the building of the nor th. \!e warmly hail their patriotism and

^^bat^cadincss!...

1 * "In-the process of production and fighting, the administration in the

north will be ever more consolidated and ever stronger. The northern part of

' our country, the DRV, will bring into play its great impact as the base for the

liberation of South Vietnam and the peaceful reunification of the fatherland...

ttq Mmreo "VJhat causes us to be moved and enthusiastic is that in recent months, in

i th e United States itsel f, a movement h as been developing widely to op pose the

j U.S. imperialists who are stepping up the war of a g gression in South Vie tna m and

I increasing their act s of wa r against North Vietnam. This'movement includes a

great numbers of American people from all walks of life — workers, youth, women

i students, intellectuals, religious people, congressmen, and journalists. The

: * struggle forms have gradually become stronger and more abundant.*..

: • * "Dear comrade deputies of the National Assembly, the anti-U.S. struggle of ; our people has received never-before-seen sympathy and wide support from the

: people in the world, from fraternal socialist countries to people from all

walks of life of various Western countries, including the United States. This is an event having an international meaning of great importance....

"We must carry out this task properly because the U.S. Imperialists : . continuous! ;/ seek aH means to deceive world opinion and to sow confusion

concerning prob l ems (several words indistinct). "Worse still, they are so

,'

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

I

crafty as_to_jtry to (wipe out? ) and t o chang e black into white. For exam plej they say they have to expand the war to the north because the DItV has cause d the 1x1 ition war in the south.

! 1fe must unmask the U.S. aggressors in time and vigorously and sharply because they are used to stealing while crying for help, V/e must awaken the world's people to these dishonest tricks of the U.S. bandits. Ca.ro must be taken when they speak of love and justice because they surely want to get in a house-without having to break down the door."..*-

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

■ _

VIIA, "AbTKOElIZSD" STATZISKT jSJSC TIKG THE

17 i;o:;-AiiG:ia3 ij-vrio;; appeal

(VKA. "broadcast a st&tenent April 19; 19^5 in Snglish which d "been "authorized 11 to issue rejecting the 17 Non-Aligned

it

FROI.T

Nation appeal passed at the Belgrade meeting of non-aligned countries on March 15, 1965* Eae "authorization 1 ' presumably was by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.)

Ijjll BSJBEKSLiOMfl^ ^-Qf^SputhJ/i stnam's

territory and fofp ^thirds iu off its 'population* It, is , clc-.:^ thqt_.a t r the

present time any solution to the South Vietnam issue without the jsili&isAve voi c q^s£^ tl i^JSELSlL i s inpracti e al...

"To soothe and mislead nubile opinion, on? AxpriLl 1965, U.S. President Ir/ndon Jc on suoke of r>eace and independence in South Vietnam, of

US MOVES

economy and raise the living standard of the peoples in southeast Asian

'-*-•,»*-- -^■■•^■—*rX*** f~*~ » - -^-- -

...• r.r,^~.

-• - .-'-..• t*kr/itn4i

countrie s < But iti this very speech^ j' dec b t; tps

iri.ll not withdraw from South Vietnam and -will'intensify its air raid:-, agains Korth Vietnam*

jj-_ -»._^ J k.

"In point of fact; since 7 April 19o5> *he U.S. imperialists have introduced into South Vietnan two more "battalions of U.S. Marines totaling 3 j 000 men and a large quantity of modern weapons• American aircraft have continually "bombed many towns and vi.llases^ sovdng so much mourning and devastation in both South end Ilorth Vietnam. It is clear that Johnson's speech is but a smokescreen to cover up the U.S. imperialists 1 new military adventures in Vietnam, directly jeopardizing peace and security of the peoples in this area*

"To se ttle the Vietnam problem at present, the only correct way is to k POINTS carry out the points laid down by DRV Pr emi er Pharq V an Donp; on S~A~orii 1955*

n It is the unswerving poli c y of the E RV Government to_ stric.tly_respec_t the 19^^ Geneva agreemen ts on Vietnar.i azia to correctlv implement their basic provisions as embodied in the f ollowing points:

"1* Recosnition of the basic national rights of the Vietnamese people: peace^ independence 3 sovereignty > unity ; and territorial integrity. According to the Geneva agreements } the U.S. Government must Withdraw from South Vietnam all U.S. troops } military personnel, and weapons of all kinds, dismantle all U.S. military bases there, canc'cl its military alliance with South Vietnam. It must end its policy of intervention and aggression in South Vietnam. According to the Geneva agreements, the U.S. Government must stop its acts of war against North Vietnan, completely cease all encroachments on the territory and sovereignty of the DRV.

Declassified per Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

I

"2. Pending the peaceful reunification of Vietnam, vhile Vietnam is

still temporarily divided into two zones, the military provisions of the

19;; h Geneva agreements on Vietnam must "be strictly respected (vhile?) the

two zones must refrain from joining any military alliance with foreign

countries; there must he no foreign military "bases, troops, and military personnel in their respective territory.

"3» The internal affairs of South Vietnam must he settled "by the South Vietnamese people themselves in accordance vith the KFISV program, vithout any foreign interference.

"U. The peaceful reunification of Vietnam is to he settled hy the Vietnamese people in hoth zonesj without any foreign interference.

»

"This stand unquestionably enjoys' the approval and support of all peace- and justice-loving governments and peoples in the world.

* » ■

" The 333V Government is of the vi ev tha t the above -expou nded s ta nd is b POINTS the basis far the sou n dest p olitic al sett lemen t of t h e Vi eta _pri>blenij JX

this oasis is ^recogni zed, favorable coi blon s m il, be cr eated for the " peacefu!_ggtole::-:e nt of th e Vietnam pro' t and it vill be possible tn "consi der the reconvening of an international conference in the pattern of th e 15?5 j 4- G eneva conference on Vie tnam,

U1J

"The DRV Government decla r es that any approach contrary to th e abov e ^st andTs inappropria te; any approach tending to secure a U.II. interv ention in the Vi e tnam s ituation is also, inap propria te,, because such approaches are basically at variance vith the 195^ Geneva agreements on Vietnam.

"Among the 17 countries vhich sent representatives to the meeting held in Belgrade on 15 March 19o5 ; some did not sign the appeal issued by this " meeting. Others, vho signed it because they were not accurately informed about the bloody var provoked in South Vietnam by the U.S. imperialists and the latters* piratical attacks against the DRV, have now shown unwillingness to support that appeal...."

.

FRONT

Declassified per Executive Order 13326, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

MHAli DAM EDITO RIAL, AP RIL 23, 19 6 5 ON THE KFLSV AS THS OIXY GXWr k- K ^JSS^TATITO 0? THS SOUTH

viet;:a:;hsk pkopls

(The Khan Dan editorial marks a strengthening of the DRV characterization of the KFLSV role in South Vietnam, marking it out as the "only'genuine representative" of the South Vietnamese people which must have "its decisive voice." The following extracts from the editorial were broadcast in English by Hanoi Radio April 21, 19&5-)

"From a place in the liberated area in South Vietnam, on 22 March 19&5 the epic statement of the JIFLSV Central Committee was broadcast all over the world. Within only a month, this appeal for national salvation has rapidly^ won a broad and powerful response throughout Vietnam, .In^the^^rlc^jbhe voice of the K FLSV is the deci sive one in the settlement of t he South Vietnam _ question, one of the most important questions at present on which all of mankind is focusing its attention.

'With its just cause of national liberation and its correct line of resistance for national salvation, the MFLSV has continually led the^S outh Vi etnamese people from one vic tory to,another. At present, over t hr ee-fourths of the territox y and two -thirds of t he South Vietftamese^pptLLations„.have_been liber ated. The front has actually become the organizer and guide of all facets of the life of the 9 million people in the liberated areas, while the people in areas under the temporary'control of the enemy are constantly turning their thoughts to the front and responding to and carrying out all its policies, The front 1 s prestige in the world is growing daily. The front and the mass organizations affiliated with it have established relations with hundreds of

international and national organizations in the world. It h as setr.up

rcoresentat ive organs in man y co untries in As ia., Europe,, Jlfric.a,_and,Latin America, The front's Central C ittee has regularly exchanged letters and messaged with the governments and state leaders of many countries.

-"The foundation day of the front, 20 December, has become one of the : anniversaries to which progressive people and political circles in many

countries are paying great importance. On the rostrums of various international conferences of mass organizations, the voice of the front's delegates is regarded by all as that of a valiant fighter on the front line against U.S. imperial ism. The NFLSV representative attended the Indoc hin ese p _eonle r s conference last February and the recent 10th anniversary of_the_Bandung^con-

^fgrence as the only ge nuine representa tive of the heroic South Vietnamese,

people.

■

"Faced with the great prestige of the KFLSV, the U.S. imperialists and their lackeys are extremely frightened. In an attempt to overshadow the front r s role, the U.S. aggressors have endeavored to doll up the Saigon puppet administration. But they will never be able to achieve their goal. Chairman

A. N. K o in declared: Today everybod y must see t hat the KFLSV, which is

leading the So uth Vietnamese people *s struggle 5 is a rea l force which decides the pre s ent as well as the future of South Vietn am._ Premier Chou 5n-lai has on many occasions asserted that the KFLSV is the only legal representative

Ikk

* •

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

of the South Vietnam^ population , and the Chinese people firmly* respond to Ther"22'Karch"st; merit of the KFLSV and will send to the South Vietnamese people all material aid to defeat U.S. imperialism. President Sukarno has very correctly remarked that nobody regards the Saigon regime as a government* It is the United States which is occupying Saigon.

ll The role and mission of the NFLSV have been entrusted by history and recognized by all the Vietnamese people and people all over the world. Just as t he I'lFLSV C entral Committee> declared in,_itg__communique_qf__15_April-.j _&ny ■ settlement of the South Vietn am fpggffi/^gl?'. 1 lose its pracl^ip^^and posj-tiye

Secisive role.

"The U.S. imperialists and their lackeys are stubbornly intensifying and expanding their war of aggression in South Vietnam. They will cert airily receive more telling blows from the KFLSV and the 14 million South Vietnamese people. The front has clearly defined its stand:

"The South Vietnamese people and their armed forces are resolved never to relax their grip on their anas so long as they have not reached their goals: independencej democracy, peace, and neutrality..., and all negotiationsjwith the U.S. imp er ial is t s at* this _mc t_ _ar e. entirely., us el ess .if..they FRONT still refuse to withdraw from South Viet nam all their troops and all^kinds_

of war materiel and means — and those of the satellites — if they still do

.-*/—.. — =^

not^digjriantle all their n iilitary_bases in South Vietnam^ if the traitor ^ still surrender t he Sout h Vie tnamese people's sacred rights to^independence and ~" democrac yjto_jbh e U.S. Impe rialists y and if the N FLSV ^^ heTon^ representat ive of the 14 million South Vietnamese people—doe s not h ave its ctecisive voice. 1 '

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number; NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 I

DRV "WHITE PAPER" ON "US AGGRESSION AMD INTERVENTION IN VIETNAM"

(On July 10, I965 North Vietnam released a "White Paper" on "US Aggression and Intervention in Vietnam" which had been prepared by the DRV Foreign Ministry, The timing of release of the white paper was related to the 11th anniversary of the signing of the Geneva Agreements on Vietnam on July 20, 195^» but the paper itself was prepared in flay, 19&5* The full text of the paper was released by Hanoi VKA in English July 16. The white paper is divided into six chapters,

1 — First US intervention in Vietnam,

2 — Second US intervention in Vietnam, systematic sabotage of

the 195^ Geneva agreements.

3 — US armed aggression against South Vietnam,

h — The United States launched air and naval attacks on the DRV.

5 — The so-called will for peace of the aggressors.

6 — The sound basis for a settlement of the Vietnam problem.

Excelpts from chapters two, three, four and five and the full text of chapter six are given below.)

> .

GENEVA

:

I

1

FRONT

Chapter 2

"...The U.S. policy of intervention has trampled upon the deep aspirations of the people of South Vietnam and of all Vietnam for peace, unity, independence, and democracy. Even the rights to life and peaceful labor have not been respected by the ruthless fascist dictatorial policies of the Ngo Dinh Diem administration. Therefore, exercising their rights of self-defense and self-determination -- which are the inalienable rights of all peoples — the undaunted South Vietnam people have resolutely risen up against the U.S. imperialists and their agents. ;

"The patriotic movement in South Vietnam has rapidly developed into a mightly tidal wave which threatens to sweep away the positions of the United States and its agents. Once again the U.S. policy of intervention in South Vietnam has sustained disastrous failure,.*"

Chapter 3

"But the heroic South Vietnam people have risen up in arms against the aggressors for national s: ;tion and self-liberation. Theirs is a there iust struggle which fully conforms to the 195^ Geneva agreements and to

international law♦

*., , ..—*—.— *-

"The NF ISV, founded on 20 Dec ember 19 & 0, more and more clearly proves to be th e sole genuine r epresen tative of the peo ple 3 .the,.localizer and org aniser of all ratriotic forces in South Vie tnam. Born in the midstTof the anti~U.S,~Diem upsurge, the NFLSV, with Lawyer Ngueyn Huu Tho as its*

» ■* ■-

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3-3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 I

president, unites all social strata, classes, nationalities, political parties, organization s^ re l ig ious groups* and patriot ic personalities^

irr espec e of ^political tendency^, to. fight, and overthrow .the rule,.of the U,S^_imp_erialists and, their,agents, achieve^independence^ democracy, bett er livi ng; conditions, peace^^^ neutrality for South Vietnam jipd, event ual peac efuljia tional reunificfi tipn,

"The front has succeeded in rallying oven broader patriotic forces to the struggle against the U.S. imperialists and their South Vietnam agents. Our southern compatriots, who enjoy the broad sympathy and vigorous support of the peoples of the socialist countries and peace-loving people throughout the world, have scored increasing victories. Tojiate , the NF LSV has gained control of four-fifths._of. the _territory ar^JjjnijJ.ion people; that is , tw o-thirds _of^the__populatipn_ ; in. South Vietna m. It has become a powerful force which has a decisive voice.in jflte South Vie tnam p y oblew.

lr The front is enjoying growing prestige in the world. It has successively established official representations in Cuba, Algeria, the GDR, Chechoslovakia, Indonesia, China, and the Soviet Union. It has also established a permanent representation to the Afro-Asian People's I Solidarity Council in Cairo and a permanent observer near the executive

r committee of the International Union of Students in Budapest,

"Its delegation have been warmly welcomed to various international conferences, where they were regarded as the genuine representatives of I the South Vietnam people. In particular, three major international con-

I • ferences were recently held to express the world people's full support \

for the patriotic movement in South Vietnam, They are: the meeting of the International Trade Union Committee for Solidarity With the Workers ' and People of South Vietnam, held in Hanoi at the end of October 1963;

the International Conference for Solidarity With the People of Vietnam Against U.S. Imperialist Aggression and for the defense of peace, held in Hanoi in November 19&V, and the Indochinese People's Conference held early in March 19^5 in Phnom Penh. Committees for solidarity with the South Vietnam people are being set up in an increasing number of countries,.."

Chapter k

"The question no longer is whether war is being lost, but how fast the United States and South Vietnam are losing it and., whether there

: still is any flimsy hope of saving the situation.

■

US MOVES "I n an at tem pt to find a way out of this crumbling p o sition, the

Unit ed States plots to extend the war beyond South Vietnam's borders.

"Since early 196'f- the U.S. ruling circles in Washington have envisaged

^ , * . — 1 .—— V _, ,_ ■_ _. , ■ , ■ . .—„_ ■J -- - » _

carrying the war to North Vi e tnam . Many plans have been mapped out by the U.S. strategists in the State Department and the Pentagon, noteworthy

1

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

is plan_No. _6_}£orked out by Vfelt_W,_,Ro_stgw,_the^j>olicx P_lanner_o£^the U.S.' State Department. Thisj>larL_envj ^jthree^stages: first-stagci

jmv^J^lockag e °^ Haiphong port; j§BCond^teiiei-_^ Vietnam coastal instal lation s; and third stage: a ir bombinEsof.North_

Vietnam,..

"These are cynical premediated war activities, brazen violations of the sovereignty and territory of the DRV, undeniable violations of the 195^" Geneva agree ts on Vietnam and all norms of international law. They pose a heavy threat to peace in Indochina and southeast Asia. That is the reason why the U.S. air and naval attacks on the territory of the DRV have been sternly condemned by the peoples of the whole world and by many governments,..

■

*

"The U.S. Government has put forward one argument after another, and published a blue book and a white paper in an attempt to cover up its aggression in South Vietnam.

4

" Since ? A pril 19&5 U«S, President Johnson has repeatedly stated that the United States has come to South Vietnam to defend freedom, to allow the people of South Vietnam to guide their own country in their own way. He also has accused North Vietnam of aggression against South Vietnam, and he has said that th e Un ited S ta tes is re ady to engage i n unconditional discussions to find a peaceful settlement of the war i n Vietnam,,.

■ ■ II I ■ !■ ■ ■ IP - "-

"After the conclusion of the 195^ Geneva agreements, when Vietnam' was temporarily partitioned into two zones, the South Vietnam people longed to see South Vietnam achieve independence, democracy, peace and •neutrality. But the United States had set up a fascist regime under the Ngo Dinh Diem brothers and, later on, under a succession of military dictators, it sabotaged the peaceful reunification of Vietnam as provided for in the Geneva agreements. It has brought into South Vietnam nearly 50,000 troops from the United States and thousands of mercenaries from a number of satellite countries to wage, together with the Saigon puppet army, an undeclared war, thus encroaching on the sovereignty and territory of Vietnam. It is crystal clear that the United States, instead of defending freedom, is carrying out an armed aggression in South Vietnam. It docs not allow the people of South Vietnam* to guide their own country in their own way, but is stifling their deepest and most sacred aspirations in an attempt to turn South Vietnam into a U.S. military base and new-type colony

., •

" The South Vietn amese people have e v: :y right to rise up_ in arms against t he H«5, aggres sors and th eir lackey to defend their country and their fr eedom 3 and _the y are full y entitle d to us e all necessary :?ans in accordance with t heir right of self-defense and self-determination,

— — -_ — » ■ ■ ■ " * —fa———' » ■'"■■■ ""M*^"*— *- J—■— 11. 11 — . — - — 'MBHAA ■ — . — -_____. ' _ — __ _ _ . _ _ _ *"

includin g an appeal to peace- and .just ice-lovin g countries for mora 1 support,and material_aid in .the form of funds^. weaponsj and volun teers .

3A8

<r ,

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Dale: 2011

"Is it true that the United State s is r eady to_ engage, in,,uncgndltiQnaX US MOVES disousslons with a view to findin g a peac eful_£Lettlement^^

' in Vietnam? - .

. . "It will be recalled that net long a to Pr esi dent Johnson d ei nded. a*s a precondit ion to any neg otiations for a settlem e nt of the JSouth Vie tnam_ question, that IIorth Vietnam should stop its,.aggression against South

Vietnam. This t: J}£.J?E9£9. S 23 >^ c P^^^9P a .L c *S} 3 , 3 ^ or }*i.PT Q:r -' -9^-y ,De P? us 5.

" he wan ts to r;ive_ better proofs of '^^^J^^^^^^J^^PjuJ^d^v&i of his_ desire

to raise t te Jtivia tandards of s out heast. Asian peoples. The U.S. ruling

circles probably hope that Johnson's 7 April.speech might mislead the

■world's peoples into taking this as the sign of a change in U.S. policy.

"Unfortu nately, th e 7..April speech is full of contraditions:

"It is a fact that U.S. puppet troops are fighting against the South Vietnam Liberation Army and peg-pie which are led by the NFLSV. ThsJttoi-t-ad States talks_about its_desire to hold discussion v;j th a view to finding ■ FRONT a peacef ul "solu tion to th e South Vietnam g tion, but it refuses to

recognise the IIFLSV as the sole genuine representative of the South ^Vietnam people * It is obvious that the United States want s neither peace nor

"negotiation•

,0VES

" The United States says that it wants a peaceful settlement of the war in Vietnam , but at the same time it declares that it will not withdraw, either openl y or .under ifae cloak of a meaningless agreement. A peaceful settlement_which d oes n ot include the withdrawal of U.S. satellite,jtroops. from South Vietna m cannot be regarded as such b y sound-minde d people. It "only mea"ns"That the United States, which has launced as armed aggression against South Vietnam, is insolently asking the heroic South Vietnam people to lay down their arms and surrender to those on whom they have inflicted defeat after defeat. This is the kind of negotiations from a position of strength repeatedly mentioned by the U.S. ruling circles, from Johnson to Deak Rusk and McKamara. But they should not have any illusions about it. The indomitable South Vietnam people deeply love peace, but they are determined to struggle against the U.S. imperialist aggressors; never will they lay down their arms until they win final victory.

"The United States says that it wants to seek a peaceful settlement of the wa r in Vietna m jbecause_it .v its peace to, be quickl;/ restored,„ but_ it deems_it necessary to increa se i ts response and r a ttack s by ai r» 1ifeile~President Johnson says that the United States will strive not to extend the hostilities, Maxwell T aylor, the initiator of the theory of special war, who is now the plenipotentiary representative of the U.S. Government in South Vietnam for carrying out this kind of war, bluntly state s that no limit exi - to the potential escalationof.jthg^war. and that America may directly enter the ground fighting; if necessa ry.

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number; NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 I

US MOVES l^e

"Wh ile talking about peace, the United States con tinuejto J : ntensif^ war in South Vietnam and to extend the war with its air force and

FRONT

navy to North Vietnam . This may lead to unforeseeable consequences. It is clear that the U.S. aggressors and warmongers are using double talk to cover up their new dangerous military adventures in this area

...

"The aggressive and bellicose features of the U.S. Government are

:._

furth e r laid bare by the following ; arroga n t action: On ?Jh A pril 19o5 ^Presiden t Johnson designated the whole of Vietnam and the^a±er~a"d"jacent the reto up to 100 miles from the Vietnamese coasts, and part of the territorial watersjpf the Chinese Peoples Rep u blic around the Paracels I s lands , as a combat zone of the U.S. armed forces . This is in essence a move toward a blockag e of the DRV and, at the sane time, a prep a ration for larger^scale military adventures.

" In fact, the United States is frenziedly intensifying; the aggressive war in South V ietnam, stepping up the war of destruction with it s

air

force against Worth Vietnam , and menacing the territorial waters of the DRV with its naval forces, in an attempt to turn defeat and weakness into victory and strength, get out of its present impass in South Vietnam,

and obtain at the conference table what it cannot win on the ba tt lefie ld.

■

"The so-called will for peace and economic aid recently mentioned by Johnson are but familiar tricks of psychological warfare of the U.S. imperialists designed to soothe and deceive public opinion and cover up their attempt to extend the war and enslave the IndoChinese and southeast Asian peoples. But such tricks, however perfidious, can fool no one. The U.S. rulers know better than anyone else how many countries have courageously denounced the noose of U.S. aid and how many U.S. personnel'carrying out the Food for Peace and Alliance for Progress programs have been expelled from Asian, African, and Latin American countries."

Chapter 6

"The South Vietnam Army and^ people, starting with almost-bare hands, have scored great achievements, recorded glorious victories, and driven "the U.S. imperialists and their agents into a corner. In an attempt to retrieve this critical position, the U.S. imperialists are embarking on new, extremely dangerious military adventures, thereby threatening peace in Indochina and southeast Asia jnore seriously than ever.

"In its 22 March 19^5 statement, the JIFLSV Central Committee exposed

the U.S. imperialists 1 policy of aggression and

',Mcxr_j

demonstrated the inevit*

ability of their defeat, and made clear its stand on the South Vietnam problem:

• s^.

a

"The South Vietnam people and their armed forces are resolved never to lose hold of their arms so long as they have not reached their basic goals, namely, independence, democracy, peace, and neutrality. The South Vietnam people aredetermined to go on striking hard at the U.S. aggressors

■ 150

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3-3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

and their lackeys, and they are sure to win final victory. All negotiations at this moment are entirely u seless if the U.S, i mpe riali sts stil l persist in refusing t o withdraw from So uth Vi etnam all th eir troops

"and war materials of all k inds and those of th eir sa teliites, and to

d.smantle all their military bases in South Vietnam^ if the Viet ese

tr aitors continue to surrender to the U»S. imperialis ts the South Viet-Saniese people's sacred rights to independence, and if~~the NFLSV — the

only genuine representative of the 1^ million South Vietnamese people — ,is not asked to say its decisive say,

" All the Vietnamese people and the DRV Government warmly hail and support this correct stand of the NFLSV ,

1 ' The DRV Government has always held that the correct,j^ GENEVA of the 195^ Geneva agreements on Vietnam is the correct way of settlin g

the South Vietnam problem.

.

1 *

"On 8 Ap^il at the second session of the third National As^enibly of the DRV, Premier Pham Van Dong once again made clear the position of .the DRV Government regarding the present situation in Vietnam.

4 POINTS "T he unswervin g policy of the DRV Government is to str i ctl y respect

t he 195** Geneva agreements on Vietnam and to corre ctl y imp le ment thei r..

basic pro visions as embodied in tie following points : /See Pham Van Dong's

" -7

k .points at Tab tL/

"This stand unquestionably enjoys the approval and support of all peace- and justice-loving governments and people in the world.

" The DRV Government holds that the above-mentioned stand is t he basis for the soundest political settlement of the Vietnam problem. If thi s basis is accepted, favorable conditions will be created for the, peaceful settle-ment of the Vietnam problem and it will be possible to consider the recon-verting of an international conference of the type of the 195-^ Geneva con-■ " ference on Vietnam,

" The Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam declares tha t UN # an^ ap proach contrary to the above stand is irrelevant, any approach leading to a U,N, intervention in the Vietnam situation is also irrelevant, because such appr oahes are bas ically at variance with the 195^ Geneva = nts on Vietnam,

Hanoi, May 1965.

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number; NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 I

B3V GOVSRH SITP STAT S-SI?? Oil gRgSID^TT JOTIIISOIT'S JUIZ 28, 1965 E^3S CC <] S&ITHI-SKT

(Following Resident Johnson's press conference Statement on July 28, the DRV issued a Government statement (on August 2) r conde:min;3 the Statement but oisitting any reference to the

President's references to the IRV's "four points 1 ' or the KFL. The Statement focused on criticism of the build-up of U.S. forces in South Vietnam and the continued U.S. bor.foin^ of llorth Vietnam. Following are excerpts from the English-language broadcast of the Statement by Hanoi Radio.)

" ■' *In_ an attemp t t o de ceive the Amor lean people and world gubllc jygjnion and to justify the massive dispatch of U.S. troops for intensified agression

discussion and claimed himself to be ready to move from the battlefield to the conference table*

"This hypocritical talk cannot possibly cover up and distort the truth.

US

internal affairs of the Vietnamese people, sent U*S. troons against the South

■ .—,— _-,,,«,•>-.-

Viet:

"It is also a fact that the U.S. Government is waging a var of aggression in Vietnam. It is talking about peacediscussio ns to conc eal t he p lan for intensified war* J ts d esign is to prolonrc indefinitely the partition of" Vietnam and to sticl: to South Vietnam in a bid to turn that zone into a U.S. nev type colony and military base for attack.against the DRV, thus jeopardizing peace in Asia and the "world..

..

"The D3V Government once again exposes the U.S. authorities 1 deception

■** .j ■ *■■

, _._,.__-,.-,-■ .*.

>w -J"*--*-*—"■v** M -*~»■*■ -=-■

■ 1 a ..

of unconditional discussions, vhich is in essence a perfidious maneuver to imoose by force*on the Vietnamese "oeo'ole submission to the U.S. nolicy of

aggression-

. 1■ 11 11 —

"The ERV Government solemnly declares that Vietnam is one, the Vietnamese people are one. The U.S. imperialists having encroached on Vietnamese territory, every Vietnamese is duty-bound to fight against the U.S. aggressors for national salvation. This is an imprescriptible sacred right of the Vietnamese people. The yietharrse.se people, millions as one, are determined to stand firm on the frontline of the vorld people's struggle against imperialism, colonialism, and neocolonialism for peace, national independence, democracy, and social progress."

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3-3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 I

"Even if the U.S. imperialists send in 100,000 or 200,000-or more • American troops, even if the struggle is to last 10, 20 years, or more, The Vietnamese people are determined to fight until complete victory.

"This stand as veil as the 22 Kareh 19o5 statement "by the KRLSV have elicted vara approval and support from many governments and from the world's people.

"For t: U._S. Government there is only one vay to an honorable peace; >k P0I>3TS that 1& 7 "to^cpr rectly^Itaglement the 1 93^ G eneva cements on^Vietnam and

accept the four -poi nt s tana of the DRV Government. *"* * "^

,! Ihe U.S. Government must stoD at once its ail* war against the DRV and comple tely cease all_encroachmgnts on the sovereignty and securlier.of the ];;/. It must -out an immediate end to the a ive war in South Vietnam, withdraw all U.S. troops and veanons therefrom, and let the South _Viet:: se -T^nvp -pebble^settle"their own affairs in accordance irith the -nrosran of the R5T£"

the only genuine representative of the South Vietnamese neople.

M 11 r -*-_t j~r>i ■■ r ^' * *rj ■■—r -i _■_■ ■ p . ■ _ ■! _prtir . •»■* fn^i ii i i u.j I i i j mIm tm b i m rt ■ • ■>ii ~-it-ii i i i -' . ■■ - r i — ■ ■ 11 ii—r t

"There is no other v ay, not even the reso rting toJJjJj._in^i^ention

1 UK in Vietnam....

"U.S. President Johnson has spoken ahout an honorable peace. It will . be recalled that all along for the past 11 years the Government of the DHV has repeatedly put forward reasonable and sensible proposals with a view to achieving a peaceful settlement of the Vietnam problem on the basis of the 195^ Geneva agreements*

"More recently, on 8 April 1965* it made clear its four~noint stand 4« POINTS as a basis for the soundest political settlement of the Vietnam problem."

._—v

Declassified per Executive Order 13326, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

LE MONDE INTERVIEW WITH HO CHI MHJH

(On August 15> 1965 Hanoi broadcast in English the text of Ho Chi Jlinh's responses to four questions submitted in writing by Fren ch c or respond en t f 0 r_Le Kqnde, Philippe Deyillers. Ho insisted that the US must give "tangible proofs" that it accepted the DHV's "four points" and appeared to completely rule out any role for the GVM in any negotiations.)

"Question: Does the position of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam remain that which was defined by Premier Pham Van Dong on 8 April, namely the South Vietnamese people must be left to solve their own affairs themselves without foreign interference and on democratic bases?

"Answer: That's right, and this on the basis of the program of the NFLSV, the tkuwi so "L e authentic reoresentative of the South Vietnam ueo-ole.

»-^-.^'j'^>-. , -» -*■■"■

miWHl~ "'" *V.*"V*%»«" -.»• ■-'■■'.'i .. «.!-•■-^. k l ,^> BU ,„ , l ^_ J %„ 4*—,» »T .*■-■— '.'_'— lii«<M

.,_ ,*-..*- - - ».-».-»+ ~ * -_,(■_»-.•*■

"Question: Is the Democratic Republic of Vietnam ready to accept, so long as the South Vietnamese people will so desire, the existence of an autonomous South Vietnam, neutral of course, but disposed to establish with the north the relations implied by fraternity and a common nationality?

"Answer: Of course, Along with preparations for the national reunification of Vietnamjwhich wil lbe carried out through peaceful means, o n the basis of the free consent of the north and the south, according to the program of thg^KFI SV - .and "the program, of .the Vietnam Fat heriancL_Eront, our entire people are How struggling with their main and might against the U.S. aggression in our countrj to defend the DRV, liberate South Vietnam, and achieve peaceful reunification, highest goal of all the Vietnamese.

"Question: In case the U.S. Government would solemnly reaffirm its will to respect the basic principles of the Geneva agreements — namely, unity and independence of Vietnam and prohibition of any base and any presence of foreign troops on its soil — would the Government of the DRV agree to discuss with it the conditions and guarantees for disengagement which this U.S. declaration would imply? Also, in your opinion, is an end to the U.S. air attacks aga5_nst the DRV territory a sine qua non condition leading to a settlement of the Vietnam problem?

"Answer: To this end, theJLS. Gover nment m ust _ give_ta^?ibIf^prpofS-Jtha,t,-it,

is,

precr.ent on Vie tn am; itjnust Immediately, stop the air attacks .eg eABSfiJQSSL £ e r r it'pry, stop forthwith the^ggr essive vrar against the south' *_ of our c ountry , and withd ra w from there all U.S. tr oops and weapons. That is peace in honor; there is "no other way out* ~" *

* •,

Declassified per Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

\

!! Question: Do you think, Mr, President, that the solution to the Vietnam problem depends directly on the Hanoi and Washington governments — withoir the holding of an international conference — or do you think that it rest; essentially with the NFLSV and the Vietnamese authorities in Saigon to fin< a settlement?

o

"Answer: The four-point stand of the Government of the DRV gives a clear answer to this question, and t he re is no question of Saig on authorjAieSj_ a creation of the Americans which is c u rsed by our peo ple t and which, jiobojfc 55Tthe world takes seriously.

"Friendly greetings."

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

QUAN DPI mm DAN EDITORIAL 0? AUGUST 20, I965 CRITICIZING ATTEMPTS AT MEDIATION IN VIETNAM

(A commentaiy signed "Observer" in the PAVN daily-newspaper, Chi an Pol Nhan Dan , makes the first open criticism of attempts at outside mediation of the Vietnam conflict and also expresses DRV sensitivity to U.S. bombing raids. The following excerpts wore taken from the text of the commentary as broadcast August 20, 19^5 over Hanoi VNA in English.)

"..♦Can there be any conciliation between these two diametrically incompatible stands? Conditional or unconditional?

"The Vietnamese people have always been stressing that only /i TytrwTQ when the U.S. Government shows concrete manifestations of its_

recognition of_ the four~ooint stan d of the DRV G overnme nt and the

settlement of the war in Vietnam.

■■*»■.* ■!%■**• »■• » v ^—- *• »_-»■»<■» p wp %*» ^a 1 1 .*.■%»* *> - ■

t fc

"The U.S. imperialists have talked so ranch of their stand of peaceful negotiations, unconditional discussions..• «At first hearing, people may think that the U.S. imperialists put forward no conditions

whereas the Vietnamese people raise certain conditions.

-

"The truth is that the Vietnamese people do not put any conditions to the UeSo imperialists. They only demand that the latter strictly implement the provisions of the Geneva agreements which were signed " 11 years ago and which the U.S. imperialists undertook to respect. The content of the four point stand of our government conforms to the main political and military provisions of the 195^ G e neva agreements on Vietnam.

nr _ Trvir . f, Now the Vietnamese people only demand that the U.S. imperialists

return to trie 195^ Geneva agreements: they must stop their a ggression* withdraw uVg. tr oor ro^South V^ *

Tii^alTlmd l et the Vietnamese people settle their internal affairs

themselves.

n By so doing, how can it be said that the Vietnamese people put forward new conditions to the U.S. imperialists?

I ' "vrnat is the stand of the U.S. imperialists? Since 195^ the

U.S. imperialists have sabotaged all political and military provisions

« of the 195^ Geneva agreements. Whereas these agreements recognize 1

the sovereignty, independence, unity, and territorial integrity of

US MOVES

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

Vietnam, thjgJB^S^imperiali st s_have,. turned .South Vietnam into a colony, set up in South Vietnam a separate state, plotting to perpetuate" - partition of ~J/iet:v.. ■. 3 and a re now brazen ly ^carrying out ^combing raids against the DRV, thus violating her sovereignty

. « » *

"I5y raising the stand of peaceful negotiations and unconditional discussions* tho U-S, imporialist*? pursuo a dark schema of legalizing their acts of serious violations of the 195** Geneva .agreements over the past 11 years, compelling the Vietnamese people to recognize the presence of U.S. troops and the existence of U.S, military bases in South Vietnam, and imposing on the South Vietnamese people their lackey governments.

"Therefore, the so-called unconditional discussions proposal of the U.S. imperialists actually asks for one basic condition: recognition of the sabotage of the 195^' Geneva agreements by the U.S. imperialists and recognition of their aggression in Vietnam in the past as well as at present,

•'To.Jbeat_a_drum_for; this deceitful peace* Johnson has be en ballyhooing that the United States has made considerable concessions, %h&t WasHxr^onTtrxeS again and again to change its attitude 4 that the United States doe s not oiraose_fge&jelactoons.J^hf^ng3b^mJL>al3 i .^yiatna^ and is ready to discuss Hanoi's proposals....

„~vw*.~-rrv«»-».^ ■ >~-~ -■-■'■■->r~^ ■ >CV*»*

i . \

"This psychologica l wa r trick of the United Sta tes K as exposed

ty the*TT7S~ press itself, AP cc mted that what seems to be concessions was"considered by Washington as a tactical measure, and that negotiations. mght_be,^Dr.olpn£ed so as to eive. the South Vietnam puppet administration a breathing soell.

"Indeed, -without waiting for the disclosure by U.S, papers of this U.S. trick, the Vietnamese people have seen clearly the U.S.

ag gressive d esign through their peaceijil^negotiati ons s aokescre en s the~~United States never s peak s of *dthdrawal of UiS.__troops^ and weaoons i^m^S'outTn~Viet t. am, aBoTx^ion of U.S. military bases in Soircn Vxetnam, ana a deixnx te en a ^o_ thexr crxrixn al bomo xng raxds orTlvorth Vietnam. This ns that the U.S. imperialists.will continue

peaceful negotiations swindle* Moreover- right at the moment when TSey~wcre speaking of peaceful negotiations, they have brazenly poured

,-._...,,, *_

tens of thousands of aggressive troops into South Vietnam and increased bombing raxcis on North Vietnam to an ever fiercer extent m 3y so doing* uncuegM^abjy^ the _U.5._ _imperi.ali st s are_deliberately throwing every r . possi bility on the political settlement of the Vietnam issue.into the greatest impasse.

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

"The policy of using violence to force the Vietnamese people to recognize the U.S. conditions and to submit themselves to the aggressors has been openly stated by Johnson. He said that to continue bombing North Vietnam along with intensifying terrorist raids in South Vietnam remains a key to victory and only this double blow can pprsUitda North Vietnam. Tha United St&tos still holds that it is necessary to continue raiding and killing until the Vietnamese people lose all hopes in victory. That means the I United States must fight until their aggressive goal is achieved.

KBDKTI03

"Obviously, while talking of peaceful negotiations the United States has not in the least given up its aggressive stand.

,J So long as the UcS. aggression continues* the Vietnamese people are resolved to resist aggression until complete victory■

"The aggressors cannot be put on a par with the victims of aggression.

"The U.S. imperialists are the aggressors, the Vietnamese people arc victims of aggression. In order to solve the war issue in Vietnam, the U.S. aggressors must stop their aggression. That is the only correct measure to restore peace in Vietnam....

"Our people j who have suffered over 20 years of war, profoundly cherish peace, but peace must always link with national independence. One cannot mediate between the U.S. imperialists' stand to carry out aggression to the end and the Vietnamese people's thorough stand to

_oppp_se aggressipn. i i anyoedy wants to stand as mediator without condemning_the aggress i demanding t the latter 'stop"their aggression and without approving and su pportin g the victims of ag~

"gresslon^in~t7Tei r*stni^gle^^ins'E^he*"alj^ressors7~Ke^irPbut "en-courage^the .aggressors, to.continue their .aggression. The situation

"in Vietnam at present is very tense. The only cause of this tension is the war acts committed by the U.S. aggressors. To relax the tension, the question now is not to recommend that both sides show less intransigeance, but to compel the United States to give up its aggressive scheme. As for them, the Vietnamese people hold that only by determinedly straggling against the U.S. aggressors can the situation be relaxed. 11

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 20L1

. . DH7 EMBASSY IS KCSCGW ISSUES "C0RRSCTI0N n OF LORD

BEDCKWAY PRESS. BiTERVISf.

(On August 2Uj 1965 a DRV spokesman in rloscov issued a statement stressing the DEV's h points vera the basis for the soundest political solution to the Vietnamese question* This statement vas issued after -western press agencies including (AP. A?? and UP) had quotio lord Brockvay as saying that the North Vietnamese ambassador in Koscow told him that "Hanoi has novor caict that all U*3 fc forces must be tfithdravrTL before negotiations for a cease-fire or peace begin* They did not insist on this©-* 1 lord 3roclcv;ay also said the DKV ambassador told him Hanoi v:as prepared to rcake one concession I; beyond the Geneva Agreements ie South Vietnam should have tempoz^arilly a separate government, a democratic y national coalition, both politically and militarily neutral*)

" #€ .According to a TOA correspondent in Moscow, the spokesman of the DRV Embassy in the Soviet Union has issued the following statement:

"On 19 August 1965 Nguyen Van Xinh^ I)R7 ambassador to the Soviet Union,, received Brockway, chairman of the British Committee for Peace in Vietnam, at the latter 1 s cm request*.

"The spokesman of the DRV Embassy in the Soviet Union recalls that at this meeting Ambassador Nguyen Van Kinh explained to Brockeay that thejfour-^ point stand of the I3HVGovernment asexpounded by Premier Pham Van Dong k POim S cn ~'$~£yr il "fiyffili the basis for all soundest, pqlitic?a^plutiorus.,to. the .

Vieinam question* If this basis is recognj d, favorable conditions -tfill_; bVjgreated_for the peaceful settlerr jbf J \ e^y3?etSim^ problem,jmdlit, ifill be possible to co nsider 'the rec qnvenin g, of u an in ternational conf eirence jaf the type of the 19$k Geneva Sonference on Vietnam*

' "All the reports released by a number of Western agencies vhich do not conform to these explanations are without foundation and intended to distort the truth*"

* ■

i

J

i

Declassified per Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

-

DRV FOREIGN MINISTRY MEMORANDUM OF SEPTEMBER 23, 19&5

(The DRV Foreign Ministry Memorandum broadcast in English by Hanoi ViIA September 23, 1965 states that the DRV's four points are the "sole correct basis 11 for a settlement, Following are excerpts from the Memorandum,)

v

1 US MOVES " ,.*. : Since ? April 19&5 the U.S. authorities have on repeated occa-

sions professed readiness to engage in 'unconditional discussions f _and

made proposals for a ' cease-fire , * a f suspension of the bombing of the "north. r ~ But it is in this very period that U.S. President Johnson has^ decided to send in 50>000 more U.S. combat troops, raising the U.S. • \ ' i strength in South Vietnam to nearly 130,000; and a further dispatch

has also been announced. 11

"Along with the Introduction of various types of modern weapons' into the South Vietnam battlefield, the U.S. authorities have used B-52 strategic bombers and toxic gas to massacre the people and raze • villages in South Vietnam. They have unceasingly * escalated 1 the air war of destruction against the DRV. U.S. aircraft have bombed even l' schools, hospitals, dams, and densely populated areas, massacring civilians and disrupting the peaceful labor of the people in North Vietnam. 11

•-•

•»

} : "The above facts show that the U.S. Government talks peace to

j [." cover up its war designs, and each time it speaks of f peace negotiation'

it takes a further step in intensifying the war of aggression in South. % Vietnam and in 'escalating 1 the war in North Vietnam. Faced "with ever . j ; ? stronger protests from the peoples of the world, including the Amer-

i * \ ' ican people, it has been compelled to resort to hypocritical talks

* •! , _about f peace negotiations 1 with a view to_ deceiving and appea sing ' .

{- \ paace-and justice-loving public opinion•"

I • "The junconditional discussions* proposal of the U.S. authorities

is but a n atte mpt to compel the Vietnamese people'to accept their own

terms, 11

"Thesejare; U.S. troops will not withdraw ? but will cling on to South Vietnam; jthe United States always regards South Vietnam as a separate nation, that is to say, it wants the partition of Vietnam to FROST be prol on ged indefinite ly Tit does V>ot "'recognize the'NFLSV/ the sole,

■ m

w

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 I

genuine representative of the people of South Vietnam. As a matter of fact, its scheme is to try to '.achieve at the conference table what it has been unable to gain on the battlefield. The Vietnamese people will never accept such insolent conditions. 11

"The •cease-fire 1 trick of the U.S. authorities is designed in

o'

US KGVE5 fact to compel the Vietnamese people in both zones to lay down their

arms while U.S. troops continue to be reinforced, to occupy and cossnit aggression against Vietnam. This is also an attempt to play for time to consolidate the puppet administration and anqy* 9 to- increase forces for further expansion of the war in Vietnam. But the Vietnamese people will never slacken their fight so long as U.S. troops still occupy Vietnamese territory and so long as their sacred national rights—independencej sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity-arc not achieved and guaranteed. Let the United States stop its

■» *" mm

aggressive war against Vietnam and withdraw from South Vietnam av.d peace wall be immediately restored.... 1 '

"What xs more, they brazenly arrogate to themselves the right of bombing the DRV, an independent and sovereign country. They have seriously violated the 195'!- Geneva agreements on Vietnam, grossly trampled underfoot international law, and eoiGEsitted monstrous crises against the Vietnamese people. Now they are saying that they •will-cease bombing the north' if there is some 'response' from Hanoi. u

"The DHV Government solemnly declares that the U.S. authorities ■ must stop their criminal war acts against the DRV. They have no right to impose any condition on the DRV Government. Besides, they must end the war of aggression in South Vietnam.... u

FRONT "The KFLSV, the organizer and leader of the South Vietnamese

people's fight against the U.S. aggressors, has gained sympathy 5 support, and recognition from ever broader sections of the world's peoples. Yet the U.S. Government refuses to recognize it as the sole genuine representative of the people of South Vietnam. It has declaimed

"that it does not regard the front as an independent party in negotiations. This further exposes its talks about negotiations as a mere

* swindle. There cannot be any negotiations on the South Vietnam problem ^without thteTSFXSV having its decisive say."

Ujj m "The U.S. authorities are also feverishly trying by ever/ means

to secure a U.K. intervention in Vietnam. They have 'requested help from the United Nations membership at large in getting peace talks started, f This is a maneuver to use the United Nations to impose on the Vietnamese people negotiations under U.S. terms."

"The DRV Government has on repeated occasions declared that G2XSVA internationally speaking the consideration of the U.S. Government's^

war acts against the DRV and, the U.S. war of s ession in South Vietnanjfalls within the competence of the participants in the 195^

■

■

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 I

Geneva conference en Indochina* and-not of the United Nations. Any UN U.N. resolution in furtherance of the above U.S. scheme will be null and v oid and vail c ompletely discredit the United Nations■■■«•■«"

"They have striven to entice political circles in a number of countries to respond to their proposals and to come out with c nds for 'negotiations, 1 for 'a cessation of all hostile activities* 1 and for 'concessions 1 from both sides, but to equate the victim with the aggressor is to fall into the U.S. imperialists 1 trar> and to negate all elementary principles of freedom and justice. Therefore the U.S. scheme can by no means deceive peace-and freedom-loving people in the. world."

FOUR

z^SVA

"The lofty aims of the Vietnamese people's just struggle have

POiNTS been fully embodied in the four-point stand of the DRV Government• "

"This stand proceeds from the fundamental principles of the 195*** Geneva agreements, which recognize the national rights of the Vietnamese people—independence, sovereignty, unity, and territorial "integrity—and from the essential military clauses of the said agreements." -——

"The 195^' Geneva agreements are an international legal document which* all participants must respect and correctly implement. At th e 195^ Geneva conference the U.S. Government, through its delegate, jrecognised and pledged respect for them. Yet throughout the past 11 years it has systematically violated tl and has thus brought about a serious situation in Vietnam."

"The four-point stand of the DRV Government also conforms to the actual situation prevailing in South Vietnam and throughout Vietnam .for more than 11 years now—the United States has engaged in aggression against Vietnam and sabotaged peace in Indochina and southeast Asia, and the Vietnamese people have been fighting against the aggressors in defense of their sacred national rights."

"To settle the Vietnam problem it is essential to remove the roots of the serious situation in Vietnam—U.S. aggression. Any approach ■ which puts the aggressor and the victim on the same footing or which does not proceed from the real situation in Vietnam will fail to bring about a settlement of the Vietnam problem,"

"This stand also proceeds from the legitimate aspirations of the

Vietnamese people in both zones, as embodied in the program of the

FRONT "Vietnam Fatherland Front and that of the KFLSV; namely, peace, independence , unityj and democracy."

FOUR POINTS

Declassified per Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 2011

"Trie Vietnamese people and the DRV Government earnestly call on the governments and peoples of the world to resolutely struggle and demand that the U.S. Government accept the four-point stand of the DRV Government. The U.S. Government must put an icrxediate end to the air war against the DRV and completely stop encroaching on the

-

latter 1 s sovereignty and security. It must immediately end tne wa of aggression in South Vietnam and withdraw all U.S. troops and weapons from there.... 1 '

1r*

J[The_ four-point stand_pf the DRV Government is enjoying an ever-warner sympathy and support from the peace-loving govern seats and peoples all over the world. It is the sol-e correct basis for a settlement of the Vietnam problem. Any solutions at variance with it are inappropriate and so are any solutions which seek U«H» intervention in the Vietnam situation, because such solutions are fundamentally "contrary to the 195^"Geneva agreements on Vietnam. 11

'jTheLKS. Government must solemnly declare its acceptance of this four-point stand bafore a political settlement of the Vietnam probl em can b e considered.

...

it

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

vikti:a:i courier artici- o:t u nc:: sho ul d tie ::ost cohrs

SOLUTION TO TIE VI: ,:: PHG3L2S 33 UiID^RSTCCD"

(On September 27 Hanoi's VIIA in English, broadcast a "Vietnam Courier" article entitled "how Should the Most Correct Solution to the Vietnam Problem be Understood?" This article was originally published en July 9 in the Vietnamese~lan| ;e newspaper^ Thong Kat (Reunification) as Part III of a four port series called "With any type of war the U.S. imperialists will surely fail and we will surely win.* 1 The July 9 edition states that "the DRV Government is of the opinion that the above-mentioned stand (four points) is the basis for a correct political solution. The September 2? article states "the DRV Government is of the view that the stand esa>ounded above (four points) is the basis for the soundest political settlement of the Vietnam problem. The article has scue.=additions, which are given below, which do not appear in the original July 9 article.)

"...These dictators succeed one another at the beck and call Department and the CIA.

of the State

"According to many American congressmen and newspapers, the Saigon Government, which is something completely alien to the South Vietnam people, cannot exist even for a week without American dollars and troops, even in 1958 and 1959 when it was said to enjoy a certain stability. Whom does it claim to represent, especially in such a deteriorating situation as today?...

*

"If the defense of the North is the bounden duty of_ our southern ccmr p^riots , in return the sup port given to the So uth i s the s acred dut y of our 'norther n people. Vi e tnam is on e, the Vietn amese people are_one. U.S. "imperialism is invading our fatherland. Each Vietnamese is dutybound to fight it and save the country. This is a natter of course and an inviolable right of all people suffering from imperialist aggression.

* •

US K0V33

SAsHtVA

"Following the 22 March 1965 NFLSV statement, the Central Committee of the Vietnam Fatherland Front issued a declaration on 2? March and an appeal on 6 April 1965j excerpts of which are as follows: if the U.S. Government is adamant not to implement the Geneva Agreements on Viet . and does not respect the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Vietnam and is rash enough to step up its aggressive war in North Vietnam, it will certainly suffer a bitter failure at the hands of over 30 million" Vietnamese people.

"Such alle g ations as p e ace, dis cussions — out forth by the imperialists — gre but deceitful words . The U.S. imperialists have openly unleashed war against the DRV. They have torn away the 1954 Geneva Agreements, outrightly violated the independence and sovereignty of our people, seriously threatened the peace of Indochina, Southeast Asia, and the world. The on ly Vfay out for theU.S. imperialists is to put an end to their aggressive war, to withdraw ail their troops and weapons as well as those of their satellites, to resoec

«

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

the_independence, sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity of oui country as stipulated, in the l§5j* Geneva Agreements.•.

Ir lf we do not solve the South Vietnam problem on the basis of these fundamental conditions put forth by the people of the tvro zones of Vietnam and if \>:e accept the U.S. imperialists 1 unconditional discussions offer, this would bo tantsjr^ount to coining to this conference table to recognize their aggression and their parliament presence in

South Vietnam and negotiate under the pressure of their bombs. If a countiy face s imperial ist aggression and is compelled to sit at the xon£erence_table_whil.e_it5_e: ; srsistsTn his ^aggression until"* it_

accepts_his_terms,__can that country y ie ld t o its enemy? Certainiy

not,"

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

JOINT ASAHI-MAINIGHI INTERVIEW WITH PHAM VAN DONG TH HANOI IN OCTOBER 4, 1965

(The Asahi interview published inJapanese in Tokyo on October 5 and The Mainichi interview published in Japanese on October 5,plus written questions answered b y Pham Van Dong for Mainichi published in Tokyo on October 9 are included below. Both articles and the written questions spell out the DRV 1 s position that if the US wants negotiations it must declare clearly that it accepts the four points. )

*

Asahi Foreign News Editor Weiryu Hata on Interview With Vietnamese

_ | i . V.... . .. 1 I ■ ■ ■■■! I * I II | | | | . ■

Prem i er Pham Van Dong :

-

4 "Premier Pham Van Dong of the DRV stated in a very strong tone

• on 4 October that ' The pr esent Vietna m war c an ne ver be settled unless

POINDS the United States accepts the four conditions presented by our si de. And without that, there also can be no discussions. '

■■ffTpiW*'"»j"V»»*t»>l -■ .it rt

"During the interview, we asked considerably frank questions, but on each occasion, the Premier smiled calmly, and as if to say that he had been waiting for that question. He explained carefully why North Vietnam is taking the position that it is now taking. He also repeatedly asked us "to understand this point fully and make it known not only to Japanese people but*also to American people. The Premier is a quiet gentleman with a reddish face 3 aged 57. The gist of the questions and answers exchanged between us was as follows:

"Question: The peaceful settlement of the Vietnam war is the most pressing question today. We have come to your country, seeking an opening to settlement. What are your views toward negotiations?

* ■

"Answer: Your question touches upon the most important and basic question of the present time. However, as a friend 3 there is one thing which 1 wish to ask you first. Do you think that United States is really seeking an armistice and peace?

(We replied that the United States can probably end the war itself tjq if it tried; but that we think that since the United States has committed

MOVES itself in various places, it find it difficult to end the war unless it can save

face, and in response to this, he replied); No, the United States is definitely not desiring peace . They have no intention at all of ending the war. Asa

/matter

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

matter of fact, are they not expanding war in both the south and the north, while talking about peace ? They still believe in power, and they think that if they further incr^ase^their^ foix^^jinc^strengthen the bombings against "the north* theywill produce effects. That is very foolish, but it happens to be the truth. That is why we do not trust their peace proposal. In the choice between accepting the Johns_on proposaland con tinuin g the war, we chose the course of continuing war without the slightest hesitation.

■,»-. m - • *--.,

"Question: The U.S. authorities concerned say, however* f We wish to settle the problem in accordance with the spirit of the Geneva Agreement, The United States does not have any territorial ambitions toward Vietnam. It does not even wish to set up military bases there. Vietnam should settle its own internal problems without receiving inter ~ « ference from outside, ,! If your contention is that their words contain no sincerity, why do you not respond to such discussions, or advocate negotiations from your side? Frankly speaking, why can you not take the initiative in order to eliminate th e possibility of the misunderstanding that it is the Uni ted States which is proposing unconditional discussions and it is the North Vietnamese side which is insisting on continuing the war?

4

POINTS

MEDIATION

"Answer: Y/e proposed four conditions for the settlement of the

present war some time f^g^.* They asked for respect of the Geneva A<?;ree-

ment of 1954 concerning the Vietnam question and sought the correct observance of the basic clauses of .this agreement. We proposed at the time that if the United States were to issue a statement to the effect that it accepts the four conditions, we will agree to negotiate at any time. However, the United States refuses to accept these conditions. They have no intention of ending the war, We must expose this fact thoroughly. There is no other way for us to expose this fact to the whole world and shame them except by firmly fighting against their aggression and defeating them completely. We are determined to do so.

"Question: What is your evaluation of the activities of third parties, such as the call for the suspension of the bombings against the north and peace negotiations, advocated by Ghana and other nonaligned nations?

"Answer: The United States is proposing peace talks, in which it does not believe, in order to escape criticism from these third parties of oood intention and world public opinion which is steadily mounting against it. Through these various methods the United States is trying to test our attitude. Their peace calls are a threat to us, similarly as their war expansion policy.

■

Question:

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

MEDIATION

FRONT

"Question: If that is so, there is the method of vising the same means against them, seizing this opportunity when the United States is talking about peace*

*

"Answer: It is not possible to seize this opportunity and move forward toward peace because the US side has no sincerity at all. It is

- *»* i **™ * *

a ^ v «^, ». + -_ «-«i-»i ^ .-___-+ T „ — -,-v- „ #v ^ t a ++.m

possible to seize this opportunity and expose the true nature of the United States. Of_co\irsej we welcome those people.who, are making various^efforts, with good intentions of peace. We are planning to prove to these people by actual deeds how lacking in good intentions the United States is. The way to prove this lies solely in driving the American aggressors to the wall and by pressing them to the last point, or in other words, in continuing the war,

"The Liberation Front in the South and we in the North must fight and win. Until then, the United States will not wake up. The leaders of the United States are fools. Therefore, we must fight more fiercely and win -greater victory. Of course, we will have to be prepared to sustain still greater hardships and sacrifices in the future, but we will never give up,

"Question: We understand fully your side's determination. However, we wish to ask you once again whether there is room for third-party nations of Asia to act within this difficult situation. At the same time, in the sense of moving forward even by one step, what will you do if the United States were to agree to suspend bombings against the North?

"Answer: (With a big smile) We and the Liberation Front of the -South will make the ultimate provisions for the settlement of the Vietnam

SH

estion. Of course, third parties can fulfill certain roles, but the final

deciders are ourselves and the t>eople of the Liberation Fronts

"The most important thing is for the United States to recognize the stren gth of the Liberation Front , We highly evaluate the Liberation Front 1 s military and political power. It is a very great force, and it is the only force which truly represents the people of South Vietnam, I ask you to study their policy platform very carefully. Their policies are very correct and are exactly suited to the actual situation in the South . It i s very foolish of the United States not to recognize this Liberation Front which is

o

"• " --."*- ■ *• *~ l - ". - * -.-,.» »»—*--_.-rt ».-».*,»,- - .*, , «... »,, % ~ .-

the on ly force which has the ability to settle the Vietnam problem. It must be said that that is why the United States is repeating failures.

* »

Question:

fro;

POINTS

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

"Question: Can negotiations be realized if the United States recog nizes The People 1 s Liberation Front of the South? The United States is saying that it may recognize it as a party to negotiations,

"Answer: The best way is for the United States to negotiate first

•—■ —* > * ■ ■ a _ ■ ■■■■!, ■ I ^fc — 1 ■ ■ ■ —■ — »■

with the L iberation Front, That, is only_natural, considering that the United States is act^lly fighting the Liberation Front. The United States

■ - -

is spreading the argument that we of the North are the enemy, but that is only an excuse for expanding the war to the North, It has already been made clear that the question of the South cannot be settled through bombings against the North. The United States should negotiate with the Liberation

Front of i South first of jail. However, it will be out of the question if it were to take the attitude of negotiating with the Liberation Front as if it were conveying a favor. The primary and decisive party for the United States to deal with is the Liberation Front M

r ^, m £m<»mw*---m.^ ■*• . •? •■m*mr*r »-* • *"^i ■ "*r p»*%*-W ~— * nt *m\^mw ■ _ »-*#, ag \*

Full Ja panese Version of MAINICHI Correspondent Minoru Omori' s Report From Hanoi o n Interview With DRV Premier Pham Van Dong ;

"MAINICHI head office foreign news department editor Omori--This reporter had an interview with North Vietnamese Premier Pham Van Dong for one hour and fifteen minutes from 3:00 p.m. on 4 October, The premier, at this interview, clarified a very firm determination of resistance against the United States and made the following points, saying that there is no room for negotiations: To uphold four conditions to the last, no intention of negotiating with the United States under the present situation.

"The premier made clear the following points: 1) He has no inten-4 tion at all of negotiating with the United States under the present situation;

Z) If the United States wants negotiations, itjnust accept the four conditions and recognize the NFL5V; 3) The United States temporarily susDended ^, bombings against the north at one time but that was only a pretext for

strengthening esca lation; 4) His side is using missiles, and in the future, anti-air firepower, from missiles to rifles will be strengthened; 5} He " relies on aid from brother socialists countries; 6) The Liberation Army side did not lose in the fighting .in Chu Lai; 7) Media tion by third powers will have some effects but final settlement must be made bv the parties directly involved in the war; and 8) His side is strengthening close contacts with the South Vietnamese People 1 s Liberation Front.

■

The interview

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

t

"The interview with the premier took'place in the reception room of the president' s office; it w?-s a joint interview by this reporter and the ASAHl' s foreign news department editor Hata, The premier was wearing an old but clean white shirt and well-creased yellow trousers. He has a broad forehead, and his eyes are mild. However, when he talks about the United States, his eyes gleam with the fierce flame of fighting spirit. He was deeply impressive, voicing throughout the interview his fierce determination that the present situation leaves no room for negotiations. The contents of the interview with Premier PhaiT Van Dong were as follows:

"Omori: Today, in 1965, when the 20th century is nearing its end, it is not reasonalbe that war is still going on. We can well understand North Vietnam' s position, but is there no room for negotiations between the north and the south?

"Premier Pham Van Dong: Your question is a basic question, and I think it also has news value, I will tell you about the possibility of stopping the war. Mr. Omori says that he understands our position, but the most important thing is whether the politicians of the United States have any intention of stopping the war. The United States reinforced its military strength in the south by 100, 000 men in a very short period of time. Why did it do so? That is because the United States has been repeating mistakes and failures in the south to date, and has fallen into a bog. The United States will be crushed in the south if it does not send in huge reinforcements. That is why it has brought in a large number of troops,

"However, a very important point is that even if it brings in huge military strength, the situation in the south will not change. The United States and allied satellite force's number 150, 000 men, and the puppet troops number 600, 000 men. They certainly have great firepower, but it v/ill not change the victory in the liberation army side. The United States is providing a very good target for the people of the south. You know from your own experience of fighting the Americans that they have no spiritual power. Furthermore, the United States is waging a war which is against justice. It is the U.S, soldieiswho are at a loss in a battlefield where the topography and climate are unsuited to them. Therefore, the Liberation Army will win without fail. The Liberation Army will secure greater victory than that in the battle of Ban Tsuon (meaning the fighting in Chu Lai~~MAINICHI} in the future,

■ /"Omori:

Declassified per Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 i

"Omori: The U.S. side says that it won in Chu Lai, but what is the true situation?

"Premier: The United States claimed a false victory for propaganda purposes. It bro\ight in huge forces, and it has to make propaganda to encourage them and also public opinion within the United States, In fact, the United States suffered a big failure in Chu Lai. The Liberation Army completely destroyed four battalions consisting of 1, 000 men, You will find out about this if you go to Saigon and ask American soldiers who actually took part in the battle of Chu Lai. Next, I wish to touch upon questions of politics. The United States sent its expeditionary forces into South Vietnam* and has decided to carry out direct aggression by itself. This proved to the South Vietnamese people that the United States is a robber. All strata of the people, even the puppet military forcesj will come to stand up and fight against the U.S. forces. The United States has already lost face. This, too, has brought good results for the Liberation Army side. The people do not yet know the huge size of the military forces the United States has brought into South Vietnam, and in South Vietnam, a sacred war of resistance against the U.S. forces is continuing.

"Meanwhile, the United States is even resorting to atrocious methods; The people 1 s sense of resistance is being fanned by these atrocious methods. The U.S. forces are like an island isolated in a sea of people 1 s hatred, and if they were to take even one step out of the island, they will be destroyed. What can the U.S. forces, isolated on an island, do? This is proved by the history of the war of resistance against France,

"Omori: What the United States really wants is to stop the war. The problem lies in the fact that the United States has made a promise to the South Vietnamese Government and the world, and I think the key to

settlement lies in how the United States can save face.

*

"Premier: All questions focus on that point. The United States

~~~~ — — ■ ■ , IM ■ ■ .1 11

has no intention of stopping the war; it is rather strengthening the war. It has sent huge forces into the south and is also preparing escalation toward the north.

,l Omori: What do you think of the mediation efforts of the special envoy of Ghanaian President Nkrumah and the 17 neutral nations ?

/ u Premier:

Declassified per Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

US MOVES

^Premier: Unless we see the United States' .real sincerity_and eff o r t s fo r settlemen t > w e canno t feel 1 ike trusting the United St a te s at the moment, the Uni ted States is testing us. Whilg^ talking about

pe ace, it is threatening us. At the same time, it is laying plots against world public opinion, too. World opinion is fiercely against the United States, ■

n (In reply to Hata 1 s question asking, n The United States must talk about peace to the world J is it not possible to grasp and utilize this point?) Premier: It is not yet possible to grasp that chance and move forward to peace. We will prove justice to the world with actual deeds and drive the United States to the wall. We intend to fight through fiercely, in both North and South Vietnam , prepared for still greater difficulties and further sacrifices. Therefore, we want you to understand our position. For that purpose, I will explain briefly the important points of the present war situation in the north and the south. The U,S. forces carried out operations to build foothold bases, just as in the case of French General (Tussini--phonetic), but failed* Neither U.S. Ambassador Lodge nor General Lansdalc has been able to bring about big political results. Their v/ay is no different from that of Ngo Dinh Diem, The United States definitely cannot win even if it increases its forces in the south.

US

PAUSE

"Oinori: However, there is order in matters, and as it is not possible to settle everything at once at one stroke, what will you do if the United States were to suspend bombing against the north for a long

pe

riod of time.

1 'Premier: The United States 1 escalation a gainst the north has

KOVKS - —-

failed so far. Its greatest failure lies in its having; been unable to bring

the north to the comerenee table by thre atening its people. World

opinion, on the contrary, is starting to demand the suspension of U.S. bombings against the north. Earlier, the United States propagandized that it h ad suspen ded._bombings against^the north for some days. However, we were not able to respond, as the suspension of the bombings were aimed at eliciting our consent to demands which we cannot possibly

- — j

*" -■-*--. - .* n *.. A

accept. The temporary suspension was rather a pretext for further "escalation. We cannot possibly accept such temporary suspension or such demands. Rather, we are pushing forward preparations to expose

/further

Tf2

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

*

FRONT

further the United States 1 plots. We will further strengthen our anti-air power without fail. And, we will prove the unprofitableness of the United States 1 escalation.

n Omori: Is North Vietnam using missiles for the defense of Hanoi? Premier: Yes, we used them, exactly as you say, Omori: How many times have you used them? Premier: I do not remember exactly how ynany limes wo used them, but our p*iv dofenso weapon:;, from nii^rjilop to rifles, are effective, and we will strengthen all of them in the future. -And, we will effectively increase damage to U.S. planes and pilots. The pilots are all excellent American fliers, but if escalation is fnrther pushed forward, the casualties among them will rise to several thousand,

"Toward Hata 1 s three questions, that is, 1) the people of the north all have rifles today, so does the strengthening of anti-air firepower mentioned by the government mean the increasing of missiles?; 2) Do you intend to attack the other side 1 s take-off (hasshin-kichi) bases for planes, from the North?; and 3} Are you using planes for defense battles? The premier said that he could not reply to question 2, but said as follows in ansv/er to questions 1 and 3: Premier: We will strengthen all kinds of weapons, and in the future, we shall rely on brother socialist nations. We are also using planes,

"Omori: Is the north in contact with the People 1 s Liberation Front in the south? Premier: We are in full contact. Omori: In what way are you maintaining contact? Premier: That, I cannot say. However, what I wish to say is that the Liberation Front has great authority and prestige in the south.

n I hope you will tell the United States this fact. The people now holding political power in the United States are fools. They cannot see this fact. We have been saying that the sole representative government in the south is the Liberation Front side. The United States should know that. Mr. Omori urges negotiations, but as long as the United States does not reco gni ze the Pe ople s Liber at i on F ront of the south, th e re cannot be any negotiations. The Liberation Front side holds the key, "both politically and militarily. We highly esteem and respect the People 1 s Liberation Front, .

"Omori: If the United States were to recognize the People's Liberation Front as a party to negotiations, v/ill it be possible to discuss the problems of the south?

/"Premier: 173

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

FHOIft

MEDIATION

4 POINTS

"Premier: That would be most desirable, but that is the problem , Who is fightlng^aeJJnited States■ in_the south ?„It. is Jthe. liberation, army. And yet, the U.S. side is escalating the wat against the north. Does it think that it can negotiate with the north alone and settle the problem? A third party 1 s contribution to settlement is limited.

n Omori: Before coming here, I stopped in Djakarta and discussed with Indonesian President Sukarno about the possibility of seeking a way to settlement by holding a summit conference of the leaders of Asian nations near Vietnam and about the possibility of adopting a declaration for settlement of the issue at an Afro-Asian conference. What do you think of these ideas?

"Premier: The most important point in regard to the Vietnam question is that all matters must be pushed forward in close liaison with our side and with the People 1 s Liberation Front in the south. It is possible for third parties to make co ntributions to a certain extent, but the final settlers, or deciders, are ourselves and the Liberation Front of the south.

-i-*"**-***-

"Hata then asked: n The United States says that it respects the Geneva agreement and that it does not have territorial ambitions. It also says that the Vietnam question should be settled by the Vietnamese people themselves. Is it not possible for you to take hold of these statements and propose negotiations on the basis of your four conditions from your side? There are some people even in Japan who think that it is the North Vietnamese side which is rejecting negotiations. " To this, the premier replied as follows: Premier: In that regard, we have announced that if the United States issues a statement to the effect

that it will recognise the four conditions, we will r^Ppj^d.*? tf^ks. The United States, however, has no such intention. We are ready to fight

as lon<? as necessary. We have faith in the Japanese people 1 s friendship The United States is attacking Vietnam from bases in Japan, we hope that the good sense of Japan will stand up and see to it that trie ground is laid for the maintenance of truly friendly relations in the future when our country becomes united, -

Main ichi Questionnaire to Pham Van Dong:

"Minoru Omori, chief foreign news editor of Mainichi, submitted a questionnaire regarding a peaceful solution to the Vietnam dispute to

/North

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

North Vietnamese Premier Pham Van Dong, irrespective of the 4 October interview with him, MAINICHI received a cable reply from Fha.niVan Dong on 8 October. Here follow excerpts from Pham Van Dong 1 s important answers, omitting the same answers made by him in the above interview,

*

"Question: What do you think about President Johnson s proposals for "unconditional talks 11 and "peace talks?"

"Answer: President Johnson began to talk about peace negotiations

m ■ i i ■ . r _ ' "i"^ i ii i ■ i i ■ ■ i i i ■ j ii ■ ■ i ■ i ■ i !■ n ■!!■ i ■ ■ ■ ■ ^ i ■■■!■» i —i ■■■■-■ i ■ "p»* ■"»•■■•»■ ■ ™ — m **-

US half a year ago. However, whenever he spoke about peace,^he ordered

MOVES xe info rcem e nt of the U.S. forces in South Vi etnam and "esc ala t e d^ the war a gainst j^ort^Vietnairi. Johnson has been speaking about peace while carrying out the war. His "unconditional talks" would b e n othi ng but the Vietname se peo ple's acceptance of the U. S. -proposed conditions. In a word, President Johnson s hypocritical appeal for peace is designed to cover up war activities, to cheat the world, and to dodge the protest of the "people of the world, including the United States.

"Question: What is your opinion of the neutral Afro-Asian nations 1 wish for a settlement of the Vietnam war?

"Answer: The Vietnamese people and the DRV Government heartily appreciate the fact that many Afro-Asian peoples and governments are worried about the Vietnam issue, that they bitterly denounce the U.S. imperialist aggression in our country, and that they support our patriotic fighting from the bottom of their hearts. We believe that the socialist countries and the people of the world, including Asia and Africa, will strengthen their sympathy with us and their support for us to completely smash the U.S. imperialist aggression. The only just way to se ttle the, 4 Vietnam i ssue is to accept, in li ne w ith th e 19 54 Geneva agreement, JUhs

POINTS four conditions p ro posed by the North Vietnamese gov ernment a nd the

stand explained in the NFLSV 1 s March statement.

.•.■•-+>"«.-*»%.*»-'—»■-- V

"Question: Concerning the so-called four conditions which you submitted to the DRV }£. Parliament last April, should we understand them as your ultimate conditions? Can we not consider them precon-itions for talks ?

/Answer:

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number; NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 I

"Answer: North Vietnam s four conditions are in complete

..>

A accord with ever y one of the ess fcial, political* and milit ary pro visions

POlriiS £ n the Geneva accords of _ 1_954» The four condit ions alone can b e the

basis to bring a correct solution to the Vietnam issue. The U«S. Govern-

i v

ment must de clared ea r ly_th a t_ it__^£cept s the_fgur_c onditipai s . A political "solution can be considered after that*

. . „ - —-

"Question: What will be your country 1 s response if the United States suspends its northern bombing for a due period? Also, do you think the U.S. forces will bomb Hanoi in the near future?

"Answer! The U.S. imperialists are shamelessly 'escalating 1 the war and bombing North Vietnam* As the result, however, they are meeting an intensified offensive by the South Vietnamese people, as well as huge losses inflicted by the North Vietnamese people. Not being the least daunted, and intensifying their enmity against the U.S. aggressors, all the Vietnamese people are strengthening their determination to fight for national salvation. Availing myself of this occasion, I ask MAINICHI to convey to the Japanese people our deep gratitude for extending warm help to our patriotic anti-U.S, war. u

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

MAI VAN BO STATEMENT, 5 JANUARY I967 THE MEW YORK TIMES, FRIDAY, JANUARY 6, 1967

,\

NZW YORK TIMES /JANUARY 1967 P-I

nRIW

By KICIIAKH E. MOONEY

SpceJM lo Tti* Star York Ti

PARIS, Jan. 5—North Vietnam's chief diplomatic rep sentative in Western Europe said today that if the United States stopped bombing ht3 country, "definitively and un conditionally," the Hanoi Government would ''examine and study" American proposals for negotiations to end the war.

He denounced several recent peace initiatives, including the efforts of the United Nations' Secretary General, U Thant, and 0 inted that his Government v.\,„.u be more responsive If the bombing stopped. His remarks were interpreted here as pos* sibly, but not certainly, a favorable signal to Washington.

However, he did not meet Washington's requirement that Hanoi give assurances of scaling down its own effort if the bombing stopped,

U. S. Aggression Charged

Rather, he said that the United States "could not hope for reciprocal action of any sort/' noting that "the Ameri* can aggression" was still undeclared war and that Hanoi had insisted on an unconditional cessation of the bombing from the very start.

The remarks came in r luncheon talk to French and foreign correspondents here by Mai Van Bo, wfio is, in a sense, Hanoi's ambassador here although officially he heads a diplomatic, office that is called a "general delegation." Mr. Bo holds the personal rank of minister plenipotentiary.

Everything he said was in response to questions—eight of an. Much of what he said was ■ insistent repetition of hts coun-! try's charges against Washington and of his countrymen's determination- and ability to v.in § the war. His hint of flexibility ; ion peace talks, if it was that, was well padded with combative remarks to the contrary.

) vench Reds Hear Talks By coincidence or design there were also speeches hers ^ today by a North Vietnamese CJorrtmunlst leader and a loader of the National Liberation front, the political arm of the Viet-cpng. Both were made at the

I French Communist Party con-gre ; in suburban Lcvalloi Neither hinted at flexibility

Nguyen Van Tntti, secretary of the North Vt tn m;.* re Workers party and Minister for Heavyy Industry in the Hanoi! Government, said thai United states peace initiatives were a farce.

Dang Quau£ Mirth, reprosi ut-Ing the Nathmal Liberation Front, said that "the possibility! of winning militarily has become a living reality for us."

At the press luncheon, Mr. Bo maintained a sober and unemotional expression throughout. He was derisive toward recent peace appeals of Wash-: ington's United Slates dele-' gate, Arthur J. Goldberg, and the British Foreign Secret-George Brown.

He called Mr. Goldberg's effort "the same old song." Mr. Brown's proposal for immr ate talks, lie said, "is the English version of the Amcrk proposal of unconditional negotiation, designed to placate British public opinion, which demands that its Government break away from the American policy,"

In the same response he said of Mr. Thant's efforts that "the Government of the Democratic Republic of [North] Vietn rejects all intervention by the! United Nations in the Vietnam affair for the good reason that this intervention would be contrary to the Geneva agr merits" of 1934, which ended the French Indochina war. He made no distinction between the United Nations and Mr. Thant.

!

177

"Every proposal aimed at pro-' moting a settlement of the Vietnamese problem must conform to the reality of the war," he said. "In other word.?, the distinction must be made between the American aggressor and the Vietnamese victim, and the responsibility of the American aggressor must be well defined. '

On a question about Premier Pham Van Dong's interview in Hanoi yesterday with Harrison E. Salisbury, an assistant managing editor of The New York Times, and particularly on the status of Hanoi's four-point peace program, Mr* Bo refus to comment on the published article, but said the following:

'The United States must f; recognize the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam,

which is the only authentic representative of the South Viet-

rr\Qt* people, to negotiate with them arid settle all the questions of South Vietnam. [Hanoi], for its part, insists that the United States recognize the four-point program as a basis for a settlement of the Vietnamese problem, and to demonstrate its goodwill by stopping the bombing of North Vietnam definitively and without conditions."

In this, Mr. Eo seemed to repeat the Premier's declaration that the four points are a ba ifor settlement rather than a :condition for talks.

Hanoi's four points are: Recognition of the Independent sovereignty, unity and tcrrito-rr-l integrity of Vietnam and the withdrawal of United States forces from the area pending reunification of Vietnam; respect for the military provisions of the 1$5& Geneva agreement

rring foreign forces; settlement of South Vietnam's Internal affairs by the South Vietnamese in accordance with the program of the National Liberation Front and peaceful reunification of Vietnam by the peoples of North and South without foreign interferenfo.

Questioned about 11, | istMl-ity of allowing other Western Journalists to visit North Vietnam now, Mr. Bo said that he could not understand their en-th: lasm for such a risky assignment, and expressed regr that considerations of safct\ 3 not permit his Government to admit as many as it would like to.

it-

'In the light of their ineffectiveness, and the' unanimous

condemnation of which they are

the object," he said, "if the

United States comes to halting

the bombardment definitively

and without conditions, this fact will be examined and studied by the i 1] Government,

"If, after the definitive and unconditional cessation of the b anbardmonts, the Amei Government proposes to enter into contact with the [HanoiJ Government, I believe that t! proposal will be examined and studied, too."

Mr. Bo was not asked about and did not volunteer to comment on the Chinese Soviet S] as it relates to the wa*—a fa-|vorite theme at the French party's current congress.

Arvid Y. Pel she, a member of the Politburo of the Soviet party, told the congress today that China's refusal to act jointly with other Communist countries in supporting Vieit. "carries water to the mill of the American imperialists and encourages : them to enlarge their aggression."

Mr. Peishe reported that more

than eo Communist parties had

1 arcd that they favor a world

Communist conference. But Lui*

pi Longo, the Italian partj

icf, and the most import foreign Communist at the C01 gross, said that he prrfered "exchanges of opinion" and "rnul Utateral meetings" rather th a world assembly.

Asked whether there were North Vietnamese troops in South Viet Mr. Bo did not

respond d tly. He said that "the armed forces of the Nail Liberation Front [the Viet con;;] and the people South Vietnam arc sufficient to hold in check t mierican expeditionary force," and that the rebels could also "recall to

uth Vietnam the men who

ve been regrouped in t north."

In a preface to his ansv to one question, Mr. Eo said, "For thousands of years tl Vietnamese people have be one nation, one people, spen Ing the same languai

"While it has sometimes been divided, it has been able to 1 establish its national unit ch time it has rec d its in-

dependence."

Of the bon gs, Mr. Bo said that they had failed to undermine morale, disorganize the economy or shake the Government.

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

JJJ 1 \ ;

•""

• N 0 li T H Vlli 1* l\ A H

-' ' 30 January log?

■ *

Hanoi VKA International Service in English OlfJO/Gl-lT 23 January 1967--23

(£e>:t) Hanori , £8 January—ilguyen Buy Srirth* DRV foreign minister, has granted an interview to Australian journalist. Wilfred Burehest* Questions and answers follow:

Question: I : ". Minister,, what in your view are the most significant recent develop- . merits in the Vietnam war. and tfoat are the prospects for fcne immediate future?

Answer: She P*S. imperialists are waging tne most barbarous war of aggression against our epuntry. threatening more and more seriously peace in southeast Asia and the world,* But; they have sustained heavy defeats ;ri South and ±n lloi-ih Vietnam.* '- people of South Vietnam., figi: ^ uith great heroism, have foiled all their military plana in spite or the commitments of over 1 million U.S., puppet, and satellite troops* 5he people of iterth Vietnati h&vo not been and will never be cowed by the barbarous bombing "raids af the U.S. imperialists and have dealt them well-deserved counterblows, . > ■ •

All Vietnamese people are resolutely fighting against- the U.S. aggressors to defend .their sacred hatiotul rights and fulfill their duty to the peoples of the friendly countries now struggling for their independence and freedom. The fotuvpoint stand of the DUV Government is a stand of independence and peace, md it is the expression of the fundamental priti&af&cs and fefce pain pr Lsions of.the 1S5^ Geneva agreements on Vietnam* It is the basis for the cost correct political solution to the Vie than problem^ a basis which fully meets the deep aspirations of the Vietnamese people, and fully conforms to she spirit of the five-point statement of the NFLSV, the only genuine representative of the people of South Vietnam.

ffiie peoples of the world; including verj large sections of the population of the United States itself, more and more strongly support our jus*; stand and demand ever more firmly that the U,S. Imperialists stop their war of agression in Vietnam and let the Vietnamese people settle their ov;n affairs themselves

'L*

The U,S. imperialists tall; of peace negotiations, but they still show great obduracy, President Johnson recently stated tilth impudence that he will- go on intensifying »nd expanding the ^ar of aggression in an attempt to cling tc- the south and to prolong the partition of Vietnam. But however perfidious the i.aneuv.en 'of the U.S. imperialists j;iay be, the Vietnamese people, united as one nan and fearing neither hardships nor sacrifices, are determined to carry on their resistance v;ar to the end to safeguard the independence and freedom of the fatherland, and contribute to the.maintenance of peace in southeast Asia and the world.

The Vietnamese people will win. the U.S. imperialist aggressors will be defeated-

Question: In the face of documentary evidence and eyewitness reports from foreign witnesses, ineludihj American journalists, tfashington continues to claim that U.S. aircraft have b^ea striking only at solitary targets and not at civilian targets In lior'ch Vietnam. What are your views on this subject?

Answer: The 3RV is an independent and sovereign country and the U.S. imperialists have absolutely ne right to violate this independence and sovereignty.

• . • . : 1T8 • * •

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

■■* -*

;i0 January -$ui

OuJ,?

iioiim i-jm

U.S. bobbing o£ any point of its territory, uhethes 1 a military or a civilian r-ii^et, is a blatant act of aggression and em unpardonable c: : ir.e. It is an undeniable facs thtit civilian targets iri Hortfc Viet: have been attacked. The peoples of the world, including la:*£o sections of the American i ' c 3 are strongly protesting against the U.S. imperialists 1 savage acts of a^grc^sion.

-

The U.S. imperialists r,iust stop definitively and unconditionally the bonbang raids and all other acts of war against tiie DUV.

Question: The United States has spoken of the need for dialer; or contact between itself and the DTiV. Would you comment en this statement?

>

Answer; r i % r.z United States has made such statements, but in its deeds it has shown the utmost obduracy and perfidy aitd continues the escalation, stepping up and expanding the aggressive war. If it veally wants talks, it must first halt unconditionally the bonbjjjtfi raids and aX3 other acts of War against the DRW It i^ only after the unconditional cessation of U.S. bombing and all other acts of war against the DRV mat there could be talks between the DRV and the United States,

/

The four-point stand and the cor. attitude of the EOT Government enjoy, v;e

are sort:- ever stronger approval and support fjwaa all peace loving;'and justice-\o^.inz peoples and governments ii\ the world. If the United St^uc-s refuses to

■

lister; to reason, it nil! further unnas« ,itself as an obdurate a^^res^cr. The Viefcaam^s^ people are deteraxj to tigjtit- u&tsl (ot&l victory to d d ihs north, literate the souiJT, achieve the pea:- (el reunification of the fath-r-rland, and* contribute to the in&inter*a&ee of peace- i: this area and in the world.

i t

!

*

i ■

:•

:

-i

i

t

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■ -'

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

MAI VAN BO STATEMENT, 22 FEBRUARY I967

THE NEW YORK TIMES > THURSDAY 5 FEBRUARY 23, 1967

V

NEW YORK TIKES

23 February 1967 II

Hanoi Offers Anew To Join U.S. in Talks If Bombing Is Ended

1 -**"*■

By HENRY TANNER

Spec!*! 10 The Kew Verk Tlmti

PA HIS. Fob. 22—A spokesman for Hanoi reaffirmed today its o!f<T to enter into talks with the United Stales if American bombing attacks against North Vietnam were unconditionally ar permanently halted.

Mai Van fib. the North Vietnamese representative in Paris, indicated that his Government's position on this point had not changed in spite of the resumption of American bombing Feb. 14 following a six-day suspension.

Mr. Bo made \vs statement in a conversation with reporters from The New York Times at the headquarters of the North Vietnamese mission near Montparnasse on the Left Bank of Paris.

Before his statement, there had been widespread speculation for several days that the North Vietnamese position had hardened after the resumption of the bombings

and the failure* of the mediation attempted in London by Prime Minister Wilson and the Soviet Premier, Aleksei N. Kosygin.

The principal reason fnr this spc Ion was a message

from President Ho Chi Minh to Pope Paul VI on Feb, 13 restating Hanoi's four-point demands, including withdrawal American forces from Vietnam.

As originally put forward in April 1965 by North Vietnam's Premier, Pham Van Dong, these demands were described as the basis for a peaceful settlement. They called for United Stat withdrawal from South Vietnam, a prohibition against the stationing of any foreign troops in Vietnam, a settlement of South Vietnam's internal affairs In accordance with the political program of the National Liberation Front, and a reunification of North and South Vietnam without foreign interference.

Uo Chi Minh (Hps IJmnhlilg

President Ho Chi Minh, in his message to the Pope, phrased the demands as follows:

"The U.S. imperialists must put an ond to their aggression in Vietnam, end unconditionally and definitively the bombi and all other acts of war against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, withdraw from South* Vietnam all American and satellite troops, recoqnize the South Vietnam National Liberat Front and let the Vietnamese people thomselyes jsctUe their

own affairs,* 1

Mr. Bo said today that Hi* President's message ind referred to the terms of a settlement and imt to the proec of getting peace talks started. Therefore, he added, it did not constitute a change in the Vietnamese position.

Mr. Bo repeated over and . over that the Italt of American bombing had to be "permanent and unconditional.''

He said the North Vietnamese would not talk "under bombs" or "the threat of bombs." He said that any cessation of bombing that was not clearly label "permanent and unconditional" would leave the "threat of bombing" intact and thus would constitute an unacceptable interference with the negotiation.

Asked how a distinction could be made between a temporary and a permanent halt to bombing, he answered that the United States would have to declare at the outset that the halt was "permanent and unconditional,"

Trhi h Interview Recalled

Mr. Bo said that Nguyen Duy Trinh, the North Vietnamese Foreign Minister, made an important gesture of goodwill toward the United States in late January when he told Wilfred Burchctt, an Australian cor* , respondent, that talks between Washington and Hanoi would be possible If the bombing stopped.

The North Vietnamese representative said that that had constituted a basic change in Hanoi's position. Earlier, he said, his government's stand was that if the United States stopped bombing unconditionally, this new fact would be studied and that, if Washington then proposed to negotiate, this proposal also would be studied.

Declassified per Executive Order 13526 Section 3 3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By. NWD Date: 2011

Mr. Bo charged that the

United States Government had

ponded in "bad faith" to the

kh Vietnamese "gesture of

goodwill."

He asorlcd that neither President Johnson nor Secretary of State Dean Rusk had ever quoted Mr, Trinh's statement fully or accurately.

This, he added, was proof of bad faith si nee Hanoi's real position was fully known and understood in Washington.

He repeated several times that the Hanoi Government bad made its "gesture" and that it was up to the United States now to make the next move. I said a "concession" of the kind that was made by Mr, Trinh in the Burchett interview remained "valid" only it if was followed up by the other side.

Mr. Bo's remarks indicated that the North Vietnamc would not be moved by President Johnson's demand for a reciprocal move on their part to accompany any United States cessation of bombing,

Mr. Eo. a slightly built man in his late forties or early fifties, was wearing a business suit when he received his visitors in a sitting room that was simply but comfortably furnished.

Deep green upholstered chairs and a sofa were grouped around a low table. Deep-red azalea plants were standing on the table and on a high sideboard. The only decoration on the wal! was a portrait of Ho Chi Minn.

Mr. Bo carries the rank of a minister plenipotentiary and is Hanoi's chief representative J ln Europe,

Hi* mission occupies a mod-' >t three-story brick house at 2 Rue le Verrior. Over the en-tram c is the rmblrm of North Violin in. a g,,Jd star and a g fcojrwhcel on a red but Rgr*iund.

Mr. Bo, underlining his remarks In turn with easy smiles and cnioUnn-chokod scowls, answered questions freeiv and extemporaneously in perfect Kivii.'h,

He made it clear that t! was a "conversation' 1 and not an "iiitmi, y,V He sr\4 that fur ail interview he would have insisted on written qi ins

and would have given written answers. He asked that his remarks be reported fairly and correctly.

Mr. Bo indicated, but did not specifically say, that the four point program of Hanoi was subject to negotiation once United States-North Vietnamese talks had started.

When asked whether the four points constituted absolute terms for a settlement or whether a. compromise might be possible, he answered that he could not say what would happen In any talks since no talks were now taking place,

Mr. B. called the four points "the most correct" solution. Asked whether this could be translated into English as "the best" solution, he said "no."

It is "the most correct** solution, he declared, because K would assure the North Vietnamese people the full exercise of their national rights, real independence and lasting peace.

Declassified per Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

Strong Bucking for Front

Mr, Bo was asked about the third of the four points, which calls for the settlement of the affairs of South Vietnam according to the program of the National Liberation Front.

He said that the North Vietnamese Government regarded the National Liberation Front as the only "authentic representative"' of the South Vietnamese people.

He said the program of the front was to give South Vietnam independence, democracy, peace and neutrality. He added that Hanoi supported this program and regarded all the pn terns of South Vietnam as the sole concern of the front.

Therefore, he stated, there could be peace only If the United States settled South Vietnamese problems with the fmnt.

Mr. Bn denounced in strong emotional terms the continuation of United States bombing.

He charged that the United States government was committing "crimes" In Vietnam — "crimes which are worse than those of Hitler." He said "millions" of Vietnamese suffered

Mr, Bo.asserted that the origin of the war lay in the American decision to support the "phantom government" of the late President of South Vietnam, Ngo Dinh Diem, and to

bring in an expeditionary force of more than 400.000 men to wage what he described as a colonial war,

■ He said the American people had to be told about the crimes" committed by Government.

Mr. Bo's voice choked when he said:

, "One must demand that the American Government stop the war against an entire people whose only crime Is to refuse

"war their

to accept American law.

"That's what the war is about —Vietnamese independence. All the rest is propaganda, lies turned out by a propaganda machine/"

Mr. Bo made a distinction between the American people and leaders of the American Government. He said the people "like all peoples," wanted peace and that the North Vietnamese knew this.

He said the spirit of American officials was illustrated recently by a statement by Gen. Curtis LcMay form Air

Force chief of staff.

Mr. Bo charged that the general had advocated saturation bombing of the North and had declared that, even if two brk remained untouched it was too much.

,Thc North Vietnamese representative said this was the language of "the cannibals of ilie 20th century." He added that he could not believe that the general, though retired, did not reflect the state of mind of official Washington.

Criticism by LeMay H**en1l*»cl

General LcMay has frequently called for stepped-up bombing of North Vietnam.

In an article for U.S. News and World Report last October, he denounced the United States strategy in Vietnam as the "ultimate in military blindness" and said:

"ThQ only way to win a war is to escalate it one way or ( another above what the enemy can take."

Last month he said In an interview with The Associated Press:

"It Is not our aim to invade North Vietnam or destroy North Vietnam. What we want to do is stop them from carry-: ing out their aggression."

182

*

Declassified per Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

NORTH VIET N A I J 1 September 1967

HANOI MEETINGS HELD TO MARK NATIONAL DAY

Pham Van Dong Speech Hanoi VNA International Service in English I506 GMT 31 Aug 67 B

/Text/ Hanoi--The 22d anniversary of the foixnding of the DRV has just "been celebrated at a grand meeting in Hanoi.

President Ho Chi Minh was present on the Presidium.

Among those on the Presidium were Vice President Ton Due Thang; Le Duan, first secretary of the VWP Central Committee; Truong Chinh, member of the Political Bureau of the VWP Central Committee and chairman of the national Assembly Standing Committee; Premier Pham Van Dong., member of the political bureau; and Vice Premier General Vo Nguyen Giap, member of the Political Bureau and commander in chief of the Vietnam People's Army.

Nguyen Van Tien, head of the permanent NFLSV representation in the DRV was present. Members of the diplomatic corps in Hanoi and foreign guests now visitii Vietnam also attended the celebration.

After the opening speech by Chairman Truong Chinh, Premier Pham Van Dong delivered an important speech in which he reviewed the situation in Vietnam expounded the just stand of the Vietnamese people, and reiterated their determination to march forward still more vigorously in order to win final victory over the U.S. aggressors.

Premier Pham Van Dong recalled the brilliant victories won by the armed forces and people in both the north and the south in their fight against U.S* aggression and for national salvation, as well as in economy, culture, and other fields. He stressed that all this had driven the U.S. imperialist aggressors into a serious impasse and isolation in the United States and in the world. He particularly pointed to the growing indignation among the American people of all strata over the U.S* ruling circle's policy in Vietnam and expressed the Vietnamese people's firm support for the just struggle of black people in the United States for freedom and equality.

Premier Pham Van Dong vehemently denounced the U*S. imperialists, who, although suffering heavy defeats, are still obdurately intensifying their war of aggression in South Vietnam, escalating their war of destruction against North Vietnam, and, at the same time^ staging an election farce in South Vietnam in the hope of dolling up their puppets and making fallacious allegations about peace negotiations in an attempt to mislead world public opinion.

Recalling the stand of the Vietnamese people regarding a political settlement of the Vietnam problem and the question of negotiations, Premier Pham Van Dong said;

On these questions, the standi viewpoint and attitude of the Vietnamese people, the DRV government, and the NFLSV are very clear and correct. On our government's four-point stand: This stand is the basis for a correct political

solution to the Vietnam people.

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

1 September 19&7 NORTH VIETNAM

*

In the very days when the United States ex led the war from the south to the north, brazenly carrying out air attacks against the DRV; our government proclaimed its four-point stand and the MFLSV issued its five-point statement. That is the standpoint of our people's inalienable national rights, and an expression of the main military and political provisions of the Geneva agreements. That is our people's fighting stand against the U,S 0 wax of aggression*

Along with our military and political victories and, at the same tempo, the

strength and justness of this stand have become ever clearer, and have won ever

more resolute and vigorous approval and support from the world's peoples, world opinion, and progressive American opinion*

On its side, the U 0 S. Government has so far completely failed to propose any solution to the Vietnam problem* All it has been doing is quibbling and resorting to hypocritical talk, putting forward now 1^, now 7 points, with the sole purpose of camouflaging its aggressive design to cling to South Vietnam at all costs and to prolong the partition of our country.

On the 28 January 1967 statement of our Ministry of Foreign Affairs: We know quite well that the United States does not want to negotiate a settlement of the Vietnam problem, because imperialism is aggressive and warlike by nature. All it wants is war and it is stepping up its aggressive war. To make it possible for everybody and for world opinion to see clearer through the U.S. peace negotiation hoax, and, at the same time, to show our good will, our foreign minister issued his statement of 8 January 1967*

The U.S. Government has brazenly unleashed a criminal war against the DRV, an independent and sovereign state, a socialist state. It must therefore definitively and unconditionally stop its bombing and all other acts of war against the DRV, and respect its independence, sovereignty, and territory. Tbit is a legitimate demand of the Vietnamese people, and also an elementary requirement of international law. If the American side really wants to talk it must first of all stop unconditionally the bombing and all other acts of war against the DRV.

The United States has no right to demand any reciprocity whatsoever. Yet it is asking for mutual deescalation, and to back this piratical claim, each time it clamors about peace negotiations, it steps up its aggressive war in the south and its escalation against the north. By so doing, the U.S 0 ruling circles hope, through bombing, and under their conditions, to force us to the conference table. With regard to the world's peoples, including the American people, they hope to confuse white and black, and blur the line between the aggressor and the victim of aggression.

Our people deeply love peace, but this must be real peace closely linked to independence and freedom, not the kind of American peace under the iron heels of the aggressors. So long as the United States pursues its aggression, we will continue to fight. As the KFLSV has said in its statement, our southern compatriots will resolutely fight on until not a single American aggressor is left on their beloved soil. Our people will never submit to force and will never talk under the threat of bombs.

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

1 September 1967 WORTH VIETNAM

Our people are making every effort to step up the military and political fight on the battlefield, and, at the same time, the struggle on the international front. They have unceasingly developed their initiative and offensive position and exposed the true features of the perfidious U.S. aggressors.

The U.S. government has provoked the war of aggression in Vietnam, It must cease its aggression; that is the only way to peace in Vietnam. The U.S. Government must definitively and conditionally stop the bombing and all other acts of war against the DRV, withdraw all U.S. and satellite troops from South Vietna^ra, recognize the NFLSV, and let the Vietnamese people settle their own affairs. There is no other way!

Premier Fham Van Dong pointed out: Our people's great resistance war against the U.S. aggression and for national salvation is a concentrated expression standing on the frontline of the revolutionary struggle of the worl i ; people and the oppressed nations in the world against the U.S. imperialists and for peace, national independence democracy, and social progress. Our victories are also victories of the revolutionary forces in the world. Other peoples fully understand this fact, which is why the support movement for our people is gaining in strength, scope and depth. As a matter of fact, a world people's front in support of Vietnam against the U.S. imperialist aggressors has gradually taken shape. The more our patriotic war drives the United States into the impasse and records great victories, the mightier, the deeper, and the broader the world people's movement in support of us grows, taking on diverse forms.

On the 22d celebration of National day, our people extend cordial greetings and heartfelt thanks to the fraternal socialist countries which are granting to them wholehearted support and assistance in all fields—moral and material, political, military, and economic. We warmly hail the fraternal Soviet people who are recording great achievements in building the material and technical basis of communism. This year, we warmly celebrate the 50th anniversary of the Great October Revolution which ushered in a new era in the history of mankind, strongly Inspired the working class and the oppressed nations, and showed them the way to make revolution, to wipe out, step by step, imperialism and the other reactionary forces, and to win victory for socialism on a world-wide scale. We are unswervingly following the path of the October Revolution, the path of the Great Lenin, as we have been doing since the founding of our party. We are doing our utmost to brang into play the revolutionary ardor of the masses and to overcome all difficulties, determined to win victories in our revolutionary cause and, in the immediate future, to win victory in the struggle against U.S. aggression and for national salvation and, at the same time, make our worthy contribution to the revolutionary cause of the world's peoples.

We warmly hail the fraternal Chinese people who are successfully building socialism. In our present struggle against U.S. aggression and for national salvation, the great Chinese People v s Republic is our great rear and the Chinese people are brothers, as close to us as the lips and the teeth. The resist the United States and aid Vietnam movement of the several hundred million-strong Chinese people, a broad, deep, powerful and diversified movement, is a brilliant manifestation of the militant solidarity between the two peoples.

«

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

1 September 1967 WORTH VIETNAM

China's successful test of Its hydrogen bomb and nuclear warhead missiles is a positive contribution to strengthening the socialist countries, vigorously stimulates the peoples who are struggling for national independence, and is a great encourage-eitt to our people's struggle against U.S. a assion and for national salvation.

True to Marxism-Leninism, our party and people have always been strengthening

solidarity with the fraternal socialist countries and the international communist

and workers movement on the basis of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism.

On the 2Pd celebration of National Day, our people extend cordia] greetings and sincere thanks to the fraternal Khmer and Laotian peoples who have always been standing on our side in a spirit of mutual approval and support in the struggle against the common eneray, U.S 0 imperialism, to defend national rights. We deeply rejoice at the happy development of the militant solidarity between our people and the Khmer people as shown by the establishment of diplomatic relations at ambassadorial level between the two countries and by our country's statement to recognize and respect the present frontiers of the Kingdom of Cambodia. Our people resolutely and unreservedly ' support the people of Arab"countries who continue to carry aloft the banner of struggle against the U.S. imperialists and the Israeli reactionary forces, in defense of their national independence and territorial integrity.

On the 22d celebration of National Day, our people extend cordial greetings and sincere thanks to the international working class, the Asian, African and Latin American peoples, and the peace-loving peoples throughout the world, including the ^American people, who are actively supporting our resistance against U.S. aggression and for national salvation.

We are very glad to note that the movement of support for our people is being mo^e and

more closely combined with the struggle of the working people and oppressed nations in the world for independence, freedom and their vital interests and against the U.S. imperialists 1 policy of intervention and aggression in various countries. We highly appreciate the success of the first session of the Bertrand Russell International Tribunal to judge the U.S. imperialist aggressors and expose their odious crimes in the south and in the north of our country: crimes of aggression, crimes of war, and crimes against mankind. The Bertrand Russell International Tribunal clearly shows that the broad sections of world opinion and the conscience of progressive mankind are on our side.

Pham Van Dong said: More than ever our compatriots and fighters all over the country nurture deep hatred for the landgrabbers, resolutely turn their hatred into strength and determination to fight and to win, give play to their initiative and offensive position on all fronts—military, political, and international—and strike even harder and more accurately at the U.S D aggressors. On the occasion of the current National Day, all our people further arm themselves with the rock-like will of President Ho as expressed in his 17 July 1966 appeal: We are determined to fight until total victory, to perseveringly fight a protracted war, fearing no difficulties, hardships and sacrifices. Nothing is more precious than independence and freedom1 Once victory is won, our people will rebuild our country and provide it with bigger and more "beautiful constructions!

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 2011

1 September 19^7

NORTH VIETNAM

This splendid victory day is awaiting us. Compatriots and fighters, march forward with the mettle of victors, with the determination to defend the n fa 9 liberate the south, proceed toward the peaceful reunification of the fatherland, build a peaceful, unified, independent, democratic, prosperous and powerful Vietnam, thus contibuting to the defense of peace in southeast Asia and in the world. The U 0 8«, imperialist aggressors will surely be defeated! Our people will be victorious!

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 2011

o

j

i

CO

C/3

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GO *•»

CD

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

3. kflsv position statements

(unclassified)

INDEX

•—

SUBJECT

KFLSV program Enunciating Major Aims., Made Public in February, 19^1 .....,«...

Statement of Central Committee of KFLSV, March 22, 1965, Pro-claiming the KFLSV 1 s Five Points Concerning the War in South Vietnam and its Settlement . .

PAGE

I89

193

Statements of KELSV Central Committee Spokesman on May 12, 1 965, Reiterating the Central Committee's Statement on Mar 22, I965. 199

KFLSV Central Committee Statement of June 12, 1965 Assailing U.S. Aggression

KFLSV Restates Peace Conditions Against Military Escalation

KFLSV Spokesman in Algiers, December 20, 1965

Liberation Radio on Bombing Suspension, January 11, 1966 , KFLSV Will Mot Recognize U.K. Decisions, February 3, 1966. KFLSV Presidium Hails President Ho's Appeal, July 21, 1966 KFLSV Attacks Peace fr Farce" of ASA Countries, August 22, 1966 Interview with the VC on Huntley-Brinkley Show, Aug. 27, 1966 Burchett Interviews KFLSV Presidium Head, September 1^, 1966

. 203 . 206

- 207 . 208 • 209 . 211 . 213 . 215 . 218

Political Program of the SVM KLF - full text adopted by congress of the Front convened mid-August 19&7; September 1, 1967 • * • 222

•

:

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

NFLSV PROGRAM ENUNCIATING MAJOR AIMS, ' ' MADE PUBLIC IN FEBRUARY, 196l

■ -

(The ten-point program of the NFLSV was radioteletyped by VNA in English to Europe and Asia on Februaiy 11, 19^1. i ' VNA staCcB^aTthe program of the "newly founded" NFLSV

! had "recently 11 been released by LNA (Liberation News Agency),

I ( - the official organ of the NFLSV. Listing of the ten points

• t is prefaced by mention of the struggle of the South Vietnamese

! people against Japanese and French domination, and the crimes

r ■ perpetrated by the cruel and dictatorial United States-Diem

rule*)

"♦••The NFLSV undertakes to unite people of all walks of life, all social classes, nationalities, political parties, organizations,

; religious communities, and patriotic personages in South Vietnam,

-without distinction of their political tendencies, in order to struggle and overthrow the rule of the U.S* imperialists and their henchmen, the Ngo Dinh Diem clique, and realize independence, de-

i ' mocracy, life improvement, peace, and neutrality in South Vietnam,

: ' * and advance toward peaceful reunification of the fatherland.

■

| FRONT . "The program of the NFLSV includes the following 10 points:

"1—To overthrow the disguised colonial regime of the U.S. imperialists and the dictatorial Ngo Dinh Diem administration, lackey of the United States, and to form a national democratic coalition administration* ~*

"The present regime in South Vietnam is a disguised colonial regime of the U*S. imperialists. The South Vietnamese administration is a lackey which has been carrying out the U.S* imperialists political lines* This regime and administration must be overthrown, and a broad national democratic coalition administration formed to include representatives of all strata of the people, nationalities, political parties, religious communities, and patriotic personages; to wrest back the people 1 s economic, political, social, and cultural interests; to realise independence and democracy; to improve the people 1 s living conditions; and to cany out a policy of peace and neutrality and advance toward peaceful reunification of the fatherland•

M 2»—To bring into being a broad and progressive democracy.

,! To abolish the current constitution of the Ngo Dinh Diem dictatorial administration, lackey of the United States, and to ele ct a new National Ass e mbly throu gh universal suffrage*

-

!

i

i J

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1

"To promulgate all democratic freedoms: freedom of expression, of the press, of assembly, of association of i movement*..(ellipsis as received); to guarantee freedom

j of belief with no discrimination toward any religion on

| the part of the state; and to grant freedom of action to

I the patriotic political parties and mass organizations 9

j irrespective of political tendencies.

"To grant general amnesty to all political detainees, dissolve all concentration camps under ai$r form whatsoever, abolish the fascist lav: 10-59 and other antidemocratic laws J and to grant the right of repatriation to all those who had to flee abroad due to the U.S.-Diem regime• «..

fl To abolish the economic monopoly of the United States and its henchmen; to build an independent and sovereign economy and finance, beneficial to the nation and people; and to confiscate and nationalize the property of the U»!Si ^imperialists"and"theTruling clique, their stooges...*

"To help northern compatriots who had been forced or enticed ty the reactionaries to go south after the restoration of peace to return to their native places if they so desire...

H 5-«To build a national and democratic education and culture....

w 6~To build an army to defend the motherland and the people.

♦'To build a national arny defending the fatherland and the people; and to cancel the system of U.S. military advisers..

"To abolish all the militaiy bases of foreign countries in South Vietnam."

* ■

"7—.To guarantee the right of equality between nationalities...; i to protect the legitimate rights of foreign residents and overseas

; Vietnamese.

"To insure the right of autonomy of the national minorities; to set up, within the framework of the great family of the Vietnamese people, autonomous regions areas inhabited by minority peoples;...to abolish the U.S.-Diem clique's present policy of ill-treatment and forced assimilation of the minority nationalities. ..

190

-» ■ ■'.—.^*»

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

in Vietnam; and to defend and care for Vietnamese nationals

"To protect the legitimate rights of foreigners residing et abroad♦

"£U~To carry out a foreign policy of peace and neutrality.

11 To cancel all unequal treaties signed with foreign countries by the U.S. henchmen which violate national - sovereignty.

"To establish diplomatic relations with all countries irrespective of political regime, in accordance with the principles of peaceful coexistence as put forth at the Bandung conference.

"To unite closely with the peace-loving and neutral countries; and to expand friendly relations with Asian and African countries, first of all, with neighboring Cambodia

and Laos*

"To refrain from joining any bloc or military alliance or forming a militaiy alliance with any country.

"To receive economic aid from any country ready to assist Vietnam without conditions attached.

"9—To establish normal relations between North and South ' Vietnam as a first step toward peaceful reunification of the country.

•'The urgent demand of our people throughout the country is to reunify the country ty peaceful means* The NFLSV undertakes the gradual reunification of the country by peaceful means, on the principle of negotiations-and discussions between the two zones of all forms and measures beneficial to the people and fatherland. Pending the national reunification, the governments of the two zones I will negotiate and undertake not to spread propaganda to divide the

t . peoples or favor war, nor to use military forces against each other; J to cany out economic and cultural exchanges between the two zones;

! . and to insure for people of both zones freedom of movement, of liveli-

! hood, and the right of mutual visits and correspondence.

"10—-To oppose aggressive jwar and actively defend world peace*

, "To oppose aggressive wars and all forms of enslavement

| by the imperialists; and to support the national liberation

struggles of peoples in various countries.

i

; ' ' •

• ■ 191 • •

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

n To oppose war propaganda; and to demand general disarmament, prohibition of nuclear weapons, and demand the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes.

M To support the movements for peace, democracy, and social progress in the world; and to actively contribute to the safeguarding of peace in Southeast Asia and the world..•♦"

192

Declassified per Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

ST ATEMENT OF CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF KFLSV, MARCH 22, 1965 PROCLAIMING TKS .NFLSV'S FIVE POINTS CONCERNING THE WAR

IN SOUTH VIETNAM AND ITS SETTLED i

(According to a Liberation Radio broadcast of March 23, 1965, in Vietnamese to South Vietnam, the NFLSV Central Committee held an important press conference to proclaim the NFLSV* g five-point atjafcam^mfc concerning fcho escalation of the war. The lengthy statement contains only a small paragraph on negotiations. It states "at present all negotiations are useless as long as:

*

a. The U.S. imperialists do not withdraw all the troops, weapons and means of war of the United States and its satellites from South Vietnam and destroy their military bases in South Vietnam; —'

b. "As long as the sacred rights of the South Vietnamese people--rights to independence and democracy—are still sold by the Vietnamese traitors to the U.S. imperialists;

* a

c. "As long as the NFLSV--true and only representative of 14 million South Vietnamese people—does not have the decisive voice.")

FRONT n »»«A t thepres s conference > Cha irman Nguyen Huu Tho

p rocla im ed an im portant fivepoll ii: s t atemen t condemning £he systematic wa r-se eking _atid aggressive policy of the U.S. imperial i-Sjbsr in S outh_ Vi e tn am and enunciating the hero ic Sou th Vietnamese people's unchanged_standpoint wh ich is resol utely to kick out_the_U»S ; imp erialis ts

/in order

1/ We understand that the correct Vietnamese translation of this point states that negotiations are useless as long as the U,S. imperialists' have not yet withdrawn all the troops, etc.

Declassified per Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 2011

In order to liberate the south 3 build an independent, democratic, peaceful, and net al South Vietnam, and "achieve national unification. Here is the NFLSV statement about the intensification and enlargement by the U.S. imperialists of their aggressive war in South Vietnam:

"♦..Faced with the present and extremely grave situation, the NFLSV deems it necessary to solemnly proclaim once more Its unchanged stand of struggling GMEVA against the Americans to save the country. The IKS.

Imperialists are saboteurs of the Geneva Accords, extremely rude and cruel aggressors and warmongers, and deadly enemies of the Vietnamese people,

. * n ,,.The Vietnamese people are well aware of the value of those accords. The Vietnamese people have always and correctly applied those accords and resolutely struggled so that those accords would be implemented in accordance with the spirit and letter of this international document which ha^ all the characteristic s of leg ality. US MOVES On the other hand, U.S. imperialists and their lackeys

South Vietnam have gra dually and in an inc reasingly jyzazen manner tram gled on_J|he j3eneva_Accords^ and (word indistinct) destroying those accords by openly waging an atrocious war in South Vietnam over the past 11 yea rs wi th a v iew to enslaving and oppressing the South Vietnamese p eople, turning" South Vietnam into one of their colonies and military bases, and -partitionihg"

Vietnamese territory forever

"..•Naturally the criminal actions of the U.S. imperialists and their lackeys aroused hatred throughout Vietnam and gave rise to a wave of boiling anger throughout the world. Public opinion in Vietnam, public opinion in Asia, and the impartial public opinion the world over severely condemned and energetically protested against the cruel actions of the U.S. imperialists and their lackeys and loudly demanded that they put an end to their war-seeking and aggressive actions against the

/South

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

US MOVES

South Vietnamese people and that they correctly implement the 1954 Geneva Accords, But all this fell on deaf ears. The U.S. imperialists continued to trample on justice and to rush ahead with their piratical war in South Vietnam.

2/ !1 2. The heroic South Vietnamese people are

determine d t o" kick"~ out^theTUVS ,~~ iuiperialists in order to

liberate S outh Vie tnam; buil d an jmdgyjenden t~, democraticj_

peaceful, and neutral South Vietnam; and ad vance to ward

national unification.

"The South Vietnamese people are fond of peace, but the South Vietnamese people cannot stand idle and let the U.S. aggressors and their lackeys freely trample on the country and dominate the nation. They prefer death to bondage. The 14 million people have risen in one bloc and struggled gallantly to defeat the U.S. invaders and the country-sellers, liberate South Vietnam, achieve independence, democracy, peace, and neutrality in South Vietnam, and contribute to maintaining (peace in Indochina?) and southeast Asia.

11 . « J o esc a pe th i s dan g erous sit uation, the U.S. imperia lists are en ga ging in ex tremely danger ou s adwnHirous military actions. The fact that they introduced into South Vietnam combat units of their air, naval, and ground forces, additional U.S. weapons, and mercenaries from South Korea and other satellites and used planes to bomb the DRV and the Laotian Kingdom and so forth does not reflect their strength at all. On the contrary, these are the crazy actions of a (hooligan?) who, faced with deadlock, engages in adventurous actions. They cannot threaten anyone. 3y its nature, the U.S. imperialist scheme of intensifying and enlarging their present aggressive war reflects one of their humiliating defeats. It proves that their 11-year-old colonialist and aggressive policy in South Vietnam and their so-called special war have gone bankrupt.

/ n ...Since

2/ The preceding part vas not numbered.

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Pruject Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

,J Since the U.S. imperialists have bogged down and almost died during the special war, they will be completely wiped out in (the regional war?). If they dare to extend the war to North Vietnam, to all of Indo- . china, and further, they will face more humiliating defeats more quickly. Previously, with empty hands the southern pciopla ctaaXt heavy blows on the U.S. imperialists and their lackeys and fulfilled a great and glorious revolutionary task. Now, with their own strength, with the wholehearted support of powerful North Vietnam and the rich and powerful socialist countries, and with the sympathy, support, and encouragement of the Asian, African, and Latin American countries and all peace-and justice-loving peoples the world over, the South Vietnamese people will surely and gloriously triumph over the U.S. aggressors and their lackeys in any regional or special war waged by the latter. Now more than ever b efore, the South Vietnamese people must firmly^hold rif les in hand and struggle to achieve their fundamental goal, which is to kick out the U.S. imperial-i s t_s and bu ild a n in d e pen den t, deirio crati c, _ peaceful, and neutral South Vietnam,

US MOVES ' " The NFL SV asserts once mo re that th e U.S. scheme

of introducing U.S. and satellite air, naval, and ground -force units into South Vietnam and bombing North Vietnam and Laos to reduce the combativity of the South Vietnaraese people, to stop the aid of the North Vietnamese and world peoples to the just struggle of the South Vietnamese people, and to_cr^eate_ a_st_rong position fro m which they can fotrce the KFLSV and the South Vietnamese people" to~sell their fa th erland to t he m ch eaply through certain nego~-~ *tiations i s on ly an empty dream of ma n who "are " crazy"" politically and adventurous militarily"

*" ~ - — m i —i ■ i ■ i ■» ■ ■ 1 fr_ | ■— — ->- -m i ■■ ■ ■ ■ i H ill ■■■

""T he Sou th Vietnamese people^inform the U.S.

imperiali sts and th eir lac keys: ^ou are hooligans""' You

are stupid. -How can you hope to deceive people when each

/time after hitting the nor th without warning you repeat again"~^da gain~~that you do not~inten3 to "ehT ar ge the \ 7 ar ,

/that

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

that the attacks are retaliatory measures, that the attacks are aimed a;t b ring ing about negotiations, and so forth? You _are more stu pid when you say you want to negotiate fr om a position of strength. The South Vietnamese people point their fingers in the faces of the U.S. imperialists and their lackeys and tell them: 'Your only way out is to withdraw from South Vietnam* If you stubbornly pursue the war, you will suffer the greatest and most humiliating defeat you have ever suffered. 1

FRONT n ,.. At nresent all n egotiations are useless as long

as the U.S. imperialists do not withdraw all the troops, weapons, and .means of war of the United States and its satellites from South Vietnam and destroy their military bases_in SouthVietnam;__as_ long as the sacred rights of the South Vietnamese people —ri ghts to independence and~~ d emo cracy-~(are s till _s o^d?)_^by^_the_ Vietnamese traitors to_the U.S. imperialists; and as long as the NFLSV—true

§ndU9J^y-Jr-£. P ^Bsen t atlve^ of 14 mil lion S outh Vi etn ame se -people —doe s not have the de cisive voice . With regard to the South Korean clique and other satellites of the Americans who are planning to introduce mercenaries into South Vietnam, the South Vietnamese people tell them the following: Although you are involved in waging the war, you will never be given your share. You are simply shameful scapegoats for U.S. imperialism. Since nearly 30,000 U.S. generals, field grade officers, and men with nearly half a million lackey troops are being heavily beaten by the army and people in South Vietnam, what can a handful of you do?

"•••3. T he heroi c S outh Vi etnamese people and liberation troons are determined to fulfill their sacred mission

which_is to^chase^away the U.S. imperialists to liberate "South Vietnam and t o def end Nort h Vie tnam, Vietnam is one, the Vietn amese people are one, nor th^a nd south "afe_ pne_. Their affection is as high as a mountain c as deep as the sea. Ttrs truth is as sure as the sun rises in the east. Nothing can change it. In their hot and

/deadly

■

Declassified per Executive Order 13526* Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 2011

deadly struggle against the U.S. Imperialists and their lackeys, the South Vietnamese people have always received the great and extremely precious assistance of 17 million northern brothers. The northern compatriots are enthusiastically working day and night for the southern part of the country,

" On behalf of the 14 million South Vietnamese people, the NFLSV wishes to extend its full confidence and unchangeable promise to the 17 million northern compatriots. The South Vietnamese people are determined to fight and defeat the U.S. imperialists. The heroic South Vietnamese people and liberation troops are determi ned to fulfill t he ir sac red mi s si on_:_to chase^ away the U»S, imperialists, to liberate Sout h Vie tnam, to defend the north, and to advance toward the reunific ation of the countr y,

11 •. , The K?LSV alway s r elies prim ar i 1 y on its own force and a bility , but i s re ady to continue to receive all as sistance , moral and material, including assistance in weapons an d wa r materiel from the^so'cialist^countries" a nd n a tionalist c ountries, jail world organizations and a ll peace-lovin g people^ the w orId. Moreover,

the front reserves for itself the right to buy weapons and war materiel from any country and organization ready to sell them to the South Vietnamese people to help them strengthen their defensive potential,

"•••All people must be united. All people must be armed and must heroically continue to move forward with the determination to fight to win over the U,S, enemy and the Vietnamese traitors,

",..We are absolutely convinced that wa will certainly be victorious. We also pledge to our beloved Vietnam that wa are determined to strike strongly, truly strongly; to strike to the last man, to the last breath, to the last drop of blood; and to strike very accurately at the heads of the U,S. enemy and his lackeys* We are

determined to liberate the south, protect the north, and

«**—-—

raunify the fa the*1 an ^ *

•

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

STATEMENT 0? NFLSV ClOiTR/ L COMMITTEE SFOXSSM

ON MAY 12, 1965, REITERATING THE CENTRA:

—^^^* ^ i MM i i ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ i .

COMMITTEE l S STATEMENT OF MARCH 22, 19 65

(Liberation Radio broadcast on May 14, 1965, in Vietnamese to South Vietnam., a May 12, 1965 statement of a NFLSV Central Coiamttee spokesman. The broadcast reiterates the NFLSV' 1 s five points. It also cqitraeiits on recent 0*3. actions, including "the economic trick, called cooperation for economic development" and the creation of "smokescreens of deceitful peaceful negotiations". The statement stresses the role of the NFLSV as the true master of South Vietnam.)

"The South Vietnamese people, as well as the Cambodian people and other fraternal peoples in southeast Asia and throughout the world, will never forget the past 11 years of misery, shame and suffering caused by the 4 billion dollars of U.S. aid* President Johnson made a great mistake. U.S. dollars cannot corrupt, seduce, or subject the Vietnamese and other Asian peoples. (?We say) to the U.S. imperialists' face that the Asian peoples, with their culture dating back thousands of years s with their traditional respect for justice and disdain far ill-gotten wealth, and with their respect for moral principles and virtues, can never be subjected by violence. Poverty cannot change 'their hearts and misery cannot soil their purity and honor. You U.S. imperialists are conceited and disdainful, because you are well-off, but you have gained and will gain only insults, shame, and bankruptcy. Your 4 billion dollars cannot purchase (few words indistinct) South Vietn am and cannot purchase p eace""fo r"the pirat es.

"At present, with even 40 billion dollars you can purchase only the souls of a few more scores of country-selling, traitorous Vietnamese such as Ngo Dinh Diem and Phan Huy Quat. Formerly, in order to deceive, the fascist Hitler had to invent something called spiritual values. Today U.S. President Johnson need only wear dollars and guns on his chest in place of a religious medal....

US n At present, it is obvious that because of their heavy military M defeats and their considerable political isolation, the U.S. imperia-0 lists have re sort ed to the economic trick called cooperation"";for -aeve^-2 foment id the label of fal se peace while_stubbornly intensifying and q expanding the war of acqression acainst bur'countrvT

-» _■>

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

i

"What is noteworthy in this trick is the U.S. imperialists? evil effort to create a smokescreen to cover up their colonialist and beli-icose nature3~ ar ^ fooiishnilitaryjactions in South Vietnam

anc forth Vietnam. Of course, if the U.S. aggressors carry out aggress ion""by"resorting to military means, we the Vietnamese people, will fight; if they carry out aggression by resorting to the label of false peace, we will fight. Vie will fight until final victory, until not one U.S. aggressor remains on our Vietnamese territory. To carry out their colonialist, aggressive policy, the U.S. imperialist?have resorted to numerous cunning stratagems and tricks and (word indistinct) the traditional wicked effort to sow disunion.,..

"Is the South Vietnamese people's resolute struggle against the aggressive U.S. imperialists .to save the country and win back independence and freedom and unjust struggle? Is progressive mankind's spiritual and material assistance to our struggle for national liberation, including weapons and (few words indistinct), an illegal act? Is it incorrect to say that the foreign intervention in many forms that aggravates the Vietnamese situation is none other than the war of aggression waged by the U.S. imperialists against our country? W hat is the si gnif icance of Johnson 1 s unc ond it ional negotiations? Do they_ mean that our^peoplemust lay^ ■t'lo-vh their wea pons and receiTve^che qj. S. "b ahd its"in thei r homes as honored guest's?'

"At present, the nationalist countries in southeast Asia and Africa constitute a great force unanimously supporting the Vietnamese people f s patriotic struggle. Therefore, in their attempt to isolate us and reduce their shameful isolation, the U.S. imperialists have not concealed their evil and vile intention of sowing disunion among them and taking advantage of them. But in face of the correct attitude shown by these nationalist countries, Johnson has lost his enthusiasm. It is crystal clear that the U.S. imperialists are very cruel and cunning, especially when they have suffered heavy defeats and are on a desperate path. However, diamond cuts diamond..,,

"As everyone knows, the British government is a cochairman of the

Vi *. .- J= - ~ — T7-' - J . * * _ _ -: 1_ 1 _ / *> JH J -I i

T Minister Wil son co ntinues to assert tha t hi s policy is to agree and \ support the"U.S. imperialists 1 aggressive policy and war In South' If Vietn< _At present r JP ripe minister Wilson is carrying out tie duty

pf a stooge for ^e_t3mSj^^^^d£tipTi8Liy__. troops , while Pre sident"Johnson

Is calling for peaceful negotiations.

II AT

Now more than ever, all the U.S. imperialists 1 deceitful an< psychological warfare measures are useless, no matter how cunning and brazen. It cannot be otherwise. Even their most recent measure (?has only aroused) the anger of progressive mankind and millions of hon American people.

:ic

P ^?or_our_part,_our stand_ is extremely clear. The NFLSV 22 March

statement has_ful_iy_ reflected the nnchanged aspirations, stand, and" 2 .determ:' tion o_f 14 million southern people ^ It is al so the unswerv-^ ing line oz the" NFLSV, the only^ leg al and urue repr esentative of 14 : million southern compatriots:

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number; NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 I

ir

1— The U.S. imperialists are the saboteurs of the Geneva

^accords, the extremely rude aggressors and Warmongers, ancTtlie deadly enemy of the Vietnamese people.

national unification.

Qj* ,. — - .- . ——■—. —— . *-—— ■-

"3—The people and liberation troops of heroic South Vietnam are re solved t o fulfill co mplet.e ly their sac red dut y ^ which is to kick "the JJ. S. jjaperialists o ut in or d er t o libera.t e So uth Vietnam and_ proteci:

North Vietnam, *— —

"4—-The South Vietnamese^people are deeply grateful to all the peace-andpeace ioving peopies~~thfdughout the world for their warm suoport and declare that they are ready to receive any aid from friends on the five continents, including weap ons and other war materiel.

«-

'5—All the united and armed people are rising up heroically in order resolutely to defeat the U.S. bandits and their lackeys. In the name of 14 million South Vietnamese people, the NFLSV s olemnly d eclared in its five-point statement that "the South Vietnamese t and their

armecPforces are resolyed not tb_ ab ando n their Weapons""as^long""as™"thair basic objective s— independence, democracy, peace, and "neutr'ality-^-aVe -not achieved.

I. ■ III Mil ■ 1 m»» ll -jw — . ■ ' ■■ ■ ■ '■ ■ 1 ■ . ■ !>' » ^ ■ ■ Ml

"The South Vietnamese people are resolved to continue dealing heav blows to the U.S fr imperialists and their lackeys in order to achieve final victory. All negotiations with the U«S« imperialists at the present time are"" entirely meaningless 1 .-..'.ess the -U7s\ "imperialists with draw""all" troops and war materiel and a.bons — df "the tfnxte"d""St'afes^anc"

*. . m __

its satellites from South Vietnam and destroy all their military base : in South yi^nak, u nless the Vietnamese traitors stop sacrificing the ' South Vietnamese people*s_sacred rights to independence "and democracy and unless the NFLSV-Hbhe only tme_rep^seii€atTve*"of "14 'million" South Vietnamese people—has the right to exparess'^eir^deci'siv e voice,

"Through the U.S. president's 7 April speech, and (several words, indistinct) one can see that the U.S. imperialists are extremely frightened by the brilliant image of the NFLSV, the single and genuine representative of the South Vietnamese people and the organizer and leader of the South Vietnamese people's struggle for self-liberation, against the U.S. imperialists 1 warlike and agressive policy and against the oppression of the lackeys and traitors to the fatherland. The ". NLPSV is the i mage of the solidarity and unity of a ll patriotic ana" " ^emocr^tic forces in South Vietnam, The NFLSV is now _the"true"master of South Viet nam a nd controls f our-fifths_o f the t erritory and " 10 r " mill people^ With its liberated armed forces and' paraiSIlarEary^ xorces, the NFLSV is the victor which is smashing the strength of th U.S. imperialist and colonialist aggressors.

201

3

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

"Everyone knows that (few words indistinct) the USSR, China/ and the socialist countries nave bean actively supporting the South Vietnamese people in their struggle for self-liberation. It is thus clear that the South Vietnam revolution has been organized and led by the NFLSV. This truth is as shining as the sun. The U.S. imperialists, the most stubborn people, can no longer deny tTiat "the South Vietnam problem cannot be solved without the NFLSV and without the NFLSV plate-

for jfi~&&" ™ri §q6Tg VVQ cla rriQ nt in vi cv; o £ iih o p ru ;,cnt b^lanco o-~ forcas m

SoutH" Viet nam'."

*

"In Vietnam, in Asia and the world, where will the U.S. imperialists go if they stubbornly continue to intensify the war in South Vietnam and to strike North Vietnam? It is clear that in the present situation in our country, President Johnson can only choose and is obliged to choose one of these two decision; either to prolong and expand the accressive war in our country or to follow the way out reserved for the U.S. imoerialists, that is, to cruit South Vietnam as soon as possible,

"As for the South Vietnamese, and the rest of the Vietnamese people, they will continue the resistance for five or ten years more. In reality we will have to lose only (word indistinct) final vict cry will certainly be ours. The South Vietnamese and Vietnamese people have sworn that they prefer death to bondage, and they are determined to fight until final ictory, and to exterminate the U.S. bandits to the last man in their country, no matter wha%> sacrifice they have to endure.

• •

"In the struggle against 14 million South Vietnamese people, you are unable to win and are, on the contrary, being bitterly defeated, and now you are planning to (?fight) all 31 million Vietnamese people. It is true that you want to rush to death, unless you are great impostors (few words indistinct) the people of North and South Vietnam have answered and are answering you (few words indistinct) all the people are prepared and (passage indistinct) 700 million peoples of the . brotherly countries, with their fraternal close friendship are also ready to cooperate closely with the Vietnamese people in resolutely exterminating the U.S. aggressors to the last man if they venture to expand the war to North Vietnam and Indochina and encroach on China.

F30J5T ""At present, it is clear that it would be wise for U.S. officials %<^^t^dr^^ll^rbpps_j^ m J&jSL UnitedStates" ancf its" satellites and wea-p ons an d war material from Sout h Vietn am a nd let the Vietnamese people" settle, .their own affair s—i n accordance^ w ft h _ t ne~N F '£sV~p late f o rm- - and .st op their ag gressi on a gainst Nor th Vie tna m. Thi s is the only way out which (few words indistinct)."

Declassified per Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

/

US MOVES

IIFLSV CENTRAL CGMITTSS ST ? 0? JIEJE 12, 1965

ASSAILING U.S. AGGHSSS

(Liberation Radio released on June 14, 1965, a KFLSV Central Cccrrdttee statement of June 12, 1965 aimed at "the U.S. imperialists' new adventurous acts and deceitful tricks l: of escalating the war in South Vietnam. It also reiterates the NELSV's five points of March 22.)

"...During the past few months, face d with h eavy defeats, the_Johrsson_ ^ovemnmeiTu has openly and directly carried on the plan to intensify and enlar

he U.S. aggressive war in our country, its attitude arid acts have beer: those

of a group of 100 percent colonialists*. Regardless of public opinion and international law, the U.S. administration has ordered units of U.S. combat expeditionary troops and troops from satellite countries sent to South Vietnam ■with an unprecedentedly great quantity of weapons and war material.

...

"Faced with these concrete actions, can one say anything except that the U*_S-. authorities are crazily eri^ging thei r desp icable aggressive war in Vietnam? Is it possible to b elieve tha t thee i ons are t he mani fest a tions of_Fresident Johnson's genuine desire for peace and of the U.S. authorities' determina tion to respect and protect the 1954 Gene va ac cords on Vietnam? A normal man — one who is not crazy and who is not an accomplice of the U.S. bandits — must conclude that the actions of the U.S. imperialists are the rudest possible aggressive and warlike actions,..*

"Thus^ wh ile inten sifying arid enlarging their aggressive war,_they set forth deceitful pea ce p roposes L Recently U.S. L President Johnson, with one hand, raised hi^hjhis^ comm and baton — thus "giving the signal" for U.S." officers, soldiers, planes, and war shipsPto" come to South Vietnam in large numbers — and

ful arguments, especially in the speech delivered in Baltimore on ? April.

lt Concerning so-called unconditional discussions, Johnson contradicted himself in trying to explain the content of his policy: He said that the Americans would stay in Souths Vietnam at any cost and that the Americans are preparing for a long and continuous war. This is the same as if Johnson ordered the South Vietnamese people to lay down their weapons and surrender to the * Americans in order to have the so-called peace that would be enjoyed in their lifetime* only as slaves to the invaders and traitors. The_result of the U#5» authoritie s' trick of unc on dition al disc ussions would be t hat the Am eric ans would conifxnue_ to occupy and rule South Vietnam and that Viet nam would be partitioned for ever .

"Johnson set forth conditions not only for_discussions, but also for arri^ng"^t^di£cu??^5?JLi --e U.S. authorities continuously shouted that if the Vietnamese refused to hold discussions with them, they would destroy Vietnam on an unprecedented scale. This means that the U.S. administration

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

\ ' gives itself the right to wage aggressive wars and Sow destruction a. any

moment and any place in accordance with its colonialist desires.

"In fact, Johnson's arguments about peace discussions constitute a policy of brazen bandilry. That is why" the South" Vietnamese people are not alone in "their hatred of the U.S. bandits and their determination, millions as one, to oblige the latter to pay for their crimes and why the world peoples, including the U.S. people, are also angry at then. (Several words indistinct) the Vietnamese people have estimated their strength and (?elearly realized) the extremely cruel nature of U.S. imperialism^ the international gendarme. They are resolved to keep thoir word — wc prefer to die than to become slaves — and to fight to vanquish the U.S. bandits.

"Johnson a lso, in exp la inin g why the Americans are attacked, Inven ted the legend that I*orth_Vietnam invades South Vietnam andthat China forces the Vietnam ese p eople'to" struggle'agairist the M£fxcans. Then "he "invented the trickiTof esc^ation aM^&istto^ of North Vietnam, without

deceitful and contradictory — that the Vietnamese aggress against the

Vietnamese and that the Americans are under attack although their country, in which there is not one single liberation soldier, is separated from Vietnam by a whole ocean,

f 'It is necessary to remind the U.S. authorities that the Vietnamese nation not only has personal experiences in the struggle against colonialism and im-s . . perialism, but also has survived and prospered by itself for thousands of years

before the birth of U.S. capitalism. In fact, it is necessary to stress that the rudely aggressive and warlike policies :and acts by the U.S. authorities""] in our^co^€ry^during. the p lastT!I years, especially during the last few * ** months, have erased for a long time theoreticall y as wel l as practically t he temporary, d^arcation line at the 17th parallel which divides Vietnam into two zones — north and south. Our compatriots^ in both ilorth and South lrietnant~ffi c[0€ssi i "l^~nece3gai y and consider i t a sacred duty to pay attention to and settle definitely this problem^ "It is clear that the "U.S." authorities have intentionally fired smoke flares with a view of escaping the court of world public opinion, including that of U.S. public opinion, which .is severely denouncing the U.S. imperialists as colonialist aggressors and war criminals in Vietnam, They thought that in so doing they could sow disunity inside the steel solidarity bloc of the Afro-Asian peoples who are actively directing the spearheads of their attacks at the common enemy — the U.S, imperialists. Tney were, however, greatly mistaken.

"It is clear that in inventing the legend of aggression against South Vietnam by North Vietnam, the U.S. authorities have intentionally concealed a real fact vrhich has been considered as striking truth. It is the South

"°

PT> -^ Vietnamesg_peop le' s pat riot ic struggle its elf 3 wh ich has been wag ed under "the banner of the HSLSV the organization that represents them truly T ^.t*

v -r-

ruly. Naturally,

all deceitful and threatening actions of the U.S. imperialists are completely

ineffective.-..

20*f

T-

FRONT

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

continue t

,s The KFLSV sternly warns the U.S. imperialists that if .they stubbornly o step up and enlarge their aggressive war, 31 million Vietnamese people certainly will not tolerate their crimes; their blood debts should be paid for by blood; and that the U.S. imperialist failure will be extremely lamentable and will happen within a shorter period of tinie;. At present 3 no cunning ruse of the U.S. imperialists and no reactionary power in the world can ameliorate their deteriorating deadlock situation in South Vietnam,...

on

a

■*ln view of the fact that the U.S. imperialists are recklessly (?embarki:v

adventurous step, the NFLSV finds it necessary to assert once

i«j-

nev; mixiLa

'r;

again the unchanged adamant stand and determination of 14 million South

u

'*-•

Vietnamese people^ v'hicii was clearly stated in the front's five point statement of 22 March. Trie So uth Vietnamese people and their armed forces are detc mined never to lay down arras before achieving their basic goal of independence, democra cyj peace, and neutrality. The South Vietnamese people are determined to deal thundering blows onto the heads of the U.S. aggressors and their henchmen and will surely achieve final success. At_present, all negotiations^ with the U. S. impe rialists are useless if the U.S. imperialists have rjotyet withdrawn from Sout h Vi etnam all troops and war equipment and means bel in.g to them and their satellites, if the" Vietnamese traitors continue to kneel down and offer the U.S.'"imperialists the South Vietnamese people*s sacred rights concerning independence and democracy, i f the ri?LSV — the unique legitimate representative of 14 million South Vietnamese people — '3 ls not allowed to raise i ts decisive voice, and if the U.S. imperialists still ^refuse to stop air strikes against the nor£hern""piFf~of our country. If.. •

•*

205

f

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

NFLSV RESTATES PEACE CONDITIONS AGAINST MILITARY ESCALATION

(On September 29 Hanoi broadcast in English a statement released on September 25 by the Presidium of the Central Committee of the NFLSV condemning expanded U.S. and South Vietnamese military operations in Vietnam and reiterating the Front r s conditions for a settlement of the conflict*)

"...Therefore, the pre sidium of the NFLS V Central Committee deem s it n ecessary to declare solemn l y once again thaiTXr~~the U.S. iri i perraXisXs~ F cfus e to withdraw the^ troops and dismantlei th eir mili tary base s in South Vietnam but continue to send more troops andT build new military "Eases, refuslTto stop all war acts but continue to use B-52's and other aircraft and artillery to carry out wanton bombardments against the South Vietnamese people, if th e y refuse to st op usin g chemicals and other lethal gases , refuse to stop their bloody repression of unarmed people's demonstrations and definitively put an end to their public execution or other acts of murder of prisoners of war, political detainees as well as demonstrators, if they d o not respect and implement the 1954 Geneva a greem ents on Vietnam in the spi rit of re spe cting the in dependencg and sove reignty's? the Sou t h Vietna mese people, and leaving the latter alone to settle their own affa irs 5 if they persist in their stubborness, there can b e no contact nor political solution with them . It is impossible to have conditions leading to a real and guaranteed peace in South Vietnam as long as the South Vietnamese army and people have not yet completely defeated the U.S. aggressors and completely liberated their country... ■"

Declassified per Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

RETYPED

FBIS 50 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

KFLSV SPOKESMAN IN AKJIEBS

PARIS AFP in English 13^6Z 20 Dec 65 E

(Text) Algiers-A.-leading member of the South Vietnam National Liberation Frontj Huynh Van Tarn, said here today there is no question of negotiating a peace settlement in South Vietnam as long as it is oc cu pied by the Americans Huynh Van Tam, who expressed his faith in final victory, said his National Liberation Front now occupies four-fifths of Vietnam, containing 11 million out of 1^ million inhabitants.

He said: All negotiation with the Imperialists would be absolutely useless at this time as long as they have not withdrawn all their troops and all their war material and those of their satellites outside South Vietnam *

Referring to recent statements by U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Huynh Van Tarn warned against fallacious American declarations of peace. A3.! such declarations always had been followed by a new U.S. war effort, he said, he added that Vietnam had known 31 days of peace in 25 years of struggle.

Huynh Van Tarn claimed that in one month, between 15 October and 15 November, the National Liberation Front had destroyed more than half the number of planes and more than all the enemy tanks put out of action in the first nine months of the year. He was giving a press conference under the auspices of the Algerian National Liberation Front, during the Algerian-Vietnamese Solidarity Week.

Speaking of French President Charles De Gaulle, he said the NFLSV appreciated the realistic positions he adopted, he added: Our position vis-a-vis France is very clear: We consider President De Gaulle's position on the South Vietnamese problem to be realistic. Here, in Algiers, we have relations with the French Embassy. We do not consider France to be a satellite of the United States.

He said he had never had discussions or official or unofficial meetings with representatives of President Johnson or of U.S. satellite countries. He charged that Britain, though not the British people, (word indistinct) in the forefront of American satellites. It was followed by countries that sent mercenaries to Vietnam or helped the U.S. war effort: these were Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, Japan, South Korea, Nationalist China, and so forth, he said.

20 Dec 152UZ RW/AC

•%

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

FBIS U3

LIBERATION RADIO OK BOMBING SUSPENSION

FOR YOUR INFORMATION

LIBERATION RADIO (CLANDESTINE) IN VIET EESE TO SOUTH VIETNAM AT 2330 GMT ON 10 JANUARY I966 CARRIES A SIX-MINUTE COMMENTARY ENTITLED "THE MONK'S CLOAK BEARING THE U.S. TRADEMARK CANNOT COVER UP THE TRUE NATURE OF A BRIGAND, WHICH HAS NOT BEEN REVEALED."

THE COMMENTARY SAYS: "THE U.S. AGGRESSIVE CHIEFTAINS HAVE RECENTLY INITIATED THE SO-CALLED TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM TO CREATE CONDITIONS FOR NEGOTIATIONS. THIS IS A SORT OF U.S.-LABELLED MONK'S CLOAK DONNED BY CHIEFTAIN JOHNSON IN AN ATTEMPT TO COVER UP THE U.S. IMPERIALISTS' NEW DARK PLOTS AND ACTIONS."

LIBERATION RADIO CONTINUES "AT PRESENT, THE UNITED STATES WANTS TO USE THE TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF BOOTING OF NORTH VIETNAM AS A CONDITION FOR THE NORTH. VIETNAMESE PEOPLE'S WITHDRAWAL OF SUPPORT FOR THE SOOTH VIETNAMESE COMPATRIOTS. THE CUNNING U.S. MANEUVER IS TO MAKE US TAKE THE AGGRESSORS FOR THOSE ATTACKED."

"IN INITIATING THE SO-CALLED TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM," THE COMMENTARY CONTINUES, "THE UNITED STATES EXPECTS TO REAP WHAT IT HAS NOT OBTAINED ON THE BATTLEFIELD. FOR THIS REASON, WHILE SHOUTING THAT THE BOOTING OF NORTH VIETNAM HAS BEEN TEMPORARILY SUSPENDED TO CREATE CONDITIONS FOR NEGOTIATIONS, THE UNITED STATES HAS STRIVEN TO DOUBLE ITS MILITARY EFFORTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM. AS EVERYONE KNOTS, WHILE CARRYING OUT THE SO-CALLED TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF BOOTING OF NORTH VIETNAM, THE UNITED STATES HAS HAD ITS AIRCRAFT INTENSIFY THEIR ACTIVITIES IN SOUTH VIETNAM."

■LIBERATION RADIO CONCLUDES: "THESE FACTS ARE ENOUGH TO SHOW US THAT THE PEACE DOVE OF JOHNSON IS REALLY THE DECEITFUL MANEUVER OF A MEAT-EATING MONK. BECAUSE IT IMPLIES A NEW PLOT TO ESCALATE THE WAR OF THE U.S. IMPERIALISTS. THE MONK'S CLOAK OF SUSPENSION OF BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM TO CREATE CONDITIONS FOR NEGOTIATIONS CANNOT COVER UP THE TRUE NATURE OF A U.S. BRIGAND, WHICH HAS BEEN COMPLETELY EXPOSED.

11 JAN 08152 AHD/GS

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 I

SOUTH VIETNAM 3 February 1966

NFLSV WILL WOT RECOGNIZE U.N. DECISIONS

Hanoi VNA International Service in English 17U9 GMT 2 February I966--B

(Text) Hanoi, 2 February—The NFLSV today declared that the United Nations has no right to decide on problems of the South Vietnamese people and that it will consider all decisions of the U.N. Security Council on Vietnam as null and void. In a statement made by its Central Committee spokesman and released by South Vietnam LIBERATION PRESS AGENCY, the NFLSV said:

According to Western reports, on 31 January, right after sending planes to resume the bombing of North Vietnam, the U.S. authorities requested a meeting of the u 0 N. Security Council so that they could present a complete report on Vietnam and a resolution which might open the door to negotiations.

This is an arrogant and perfidious move of the U.S. imperialists. By resuming its air raids against North Vietnam, after failing in their peace efforts farce, the U.S. imperialists once again crudely challenged the Vietnamese people and all of peace-loving and justice-loving mankind. Yet, they try to gloss over their unjust act by asking the convening of the U.N. Security Council, attempting to use this organization to spread their fallacious good will for peace, slander the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, and distort the just struggle for national salvation of the South Vietnamese people in the service of their schemes and acts of increasing and widening the war.

During the pause in the bombing of North Vietnam, to open the way for negotiation, the U.S. imperialists continued to send reconnaissance planes to make repeated encroachments upon the airspace of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, sent 13>000 additional U.S. troops to South Vietnam, increased raids and massacres, and committed many new crimes against the South Vietnamese people.

At the same time they used the U.S. Air Force for intensive bombings of the liberated areas of Laos, instigated the Thai and South Vietnamese puppet armies to launch repeated provocative attacks against the border areas of the Kingdom of Cambodia-, and made active preparations to increase and expand the war in Indochina.

All the aforesaid acts of the U.S. imperialists have laid bare the essence of the so-called U.S. peace efforts and have been condemned by public opinion all over the world. Decidedly, the U.S. imperialists cannot use the U.N. Security Council to cover up the truth and justify their schemes and acts of aggression in South Vietnam, still less to negate the South Vietnamese people's right to self-determination and force them into submission.

The NFLSV energetically condemns the U.S. imperialists 1 bombing of North Vietnam, intensification of the aggressive war in South Vietnam and Laos, and their attacks of provocation and sabotage against Cambodia. The U.S. imperialists must bear full responsibility for all the extremely serious consequences arising from their acts.

The NFLSV resolutely exposes before public opinion the perfidious attempt of the U.S. imperialists to hide under the U.N. banner to intensify their war of aggression in South Vietnam and sabotage the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number; NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 I

3 February 1966 SOUTH VIETNAM

The KFLSV solemnly declares that the United Nations has no right at all to decide problems of the South Vietnamese people. The front will consider all decisions of the U.K. Security Council on Vietnam as null and void and as an act of encroachment on the principles of independence, sovereignty 3 unity, and territorial integrity of Vietnam which were guaranteed by the 195^ Geneva agreements on Vietnam.

The only correct solution to restore peace in South Vietnam is that the U.S. imperialists must withdraw all troops and weapons of the U.S. and its satellites from South Vietnam, dismantle all U.S. military bases there, and let the South Vietnamese people settle by themselves their own internal affairs.

Should the U.S. iirrperialists refuse to abandon their aggressive ambition, they will in no way be able to avoid complete and most ignominious failure, whatever barbarous and perfidious maneuvers they may resort to.

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Dale: 2011

r

*i

>.*, *

SOUTH "VIET K A M

21 July 196*6*

NFLSV PBESIDIUH KAILS PRESIDE:;? HO'S APPEAL

Liberation Radio (Clandestine) in Vietnamese to South Vietnam Q5?0 GOT 20 July 1966—S

(South Victnan National Liberation Front /UFLSY/ Central Cetsaiittee Presidium statement,

20 July) '

. ...

(Text) On 17 July President Ho called on the compatriots and combatants throughout the

country to step up resolutely the resistance war against the U.S. imperialist aggressor?;

to protect the north M to liberate the south, and to \ nee toward the reunification

of the country. President Ho said: \For the sake of the fatherland's independence

and out of s sense of duty toward the peoples who are struggling against U,S; imperialism,

all of our people and combatants are united and of one mind, are not afraid of sacrifices

and hardships, and are determined to fight until complete victory.

Also on 17 July, President Ho ordered partial mobilisation in'-the north in order to step up the resistance war. The T"FLSV warmly responds to the appeal of Preside: J Ho, the leader of al] the people, and regardsithis appeal as a reflection of our peopled stand, will, and aspirations* The 1IPLSV warmly acclaim? this new effort of the northern people, In contribution to the sacred ariti-U f S„ national salvation struggle of the entire people* This is a tremendous encouragement for the southern eoripatri:ts on the anti-U<S, frontline. The KFLSV is deeply grateful to our northern compatriots for the unreserved support of the beloved north for South Vietnam,

The entire people and Liberation Armed rorses in South Vietnam are resolved to devote all of their material and moral strength to fulfilling their duty to the fatherland: Defend the north, liberate .the;.south, and reunify'the country, --This is a sacred c : \. . duty and a high honor* The southern combat and people, who do not snare their blood, are resolved to fulfill that duty at any cost.

The \Jt.S» imperialists are plunging more decplv into the criminal war of aggression in Vietnam, After being defeated in their special"war, they have sent U,S* and satellite troops "to occupy South Vietnam brazenly and have intensified and escalated the war of destruction against North Vietnam, They have even attacked the Hanoi and Haiphong areas* In South Vietnam, they have occupied many cities and territories of our fatherland, used all kinds of weapons to kill our people, and applied the scorched-earth "burn all, kill all, destroy all" policy. They have killed old as well as young people and men as well as women in both the cities and rural areas. Worse still, they have killed Innocent children.

In North Vietnam, they have Indiscriminately bombed and strafed hospitals, schools, factories, dikes, and dams in order to sew mourning and destruction, and thereby force our people to submit. In the world, they have professed the will for peace negotiations to fool public opinion and conceal their extremely ruthless, brazen, warmongering, aggressive faces* But, our people are determined not to submit, nor are they letting themselves be fooled by the U.S, imperialists

■Z

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

+ -

i

21 July 19C6

:.%

*

•

.'

SOUTH VlEftfAK

The South Vietnamese people, who have long nurtured a deep hatred for the U.S. aggressors, are resolved not to tolerate then or live with then under the same sky. Rivers may run dry and mountains nay wear a way, but the oath of determination not to serve as slaves of the aggressors taken years ago still regains fresh In the minds of the South Vietnamese people. As months and years go by, it will become even none resounding.

•r^'*

The South Vietnamese people, together with the people throughout the country, ar determined to fight the Americans until complete victory, even though they have to fight for 5, 10, or 20 years, or longer. Like the people throughout the country, the South Vietnamese people ardently cherish peace. To our people, peace near that not a single U.S. aggressor or mercenary remains on Vietnamese soil to provoke war against our people. This Is the only way to restore peace. As long as the U.S. Imperialists cling to our country, the South Vietnamese will continue to fight them until independence and democracy are achieved and peace is accordingly established,

Responding to President Ho's appeal, the people and the Liberation Armed Forces in South Vietnam are determined to strive to learn from the northern people, to emulate one another in scoring achievements in all fields, and to step up the national salvation resistance war. The southern amy and people are determined to march forward urgently to annihilate and whittle down many mere forces of the U.S. and puppet army, and In the immediate future to score the greatest victories in all activities during the current rainy season.

The southern army and people are determined to overcome all difficulties and hardships to buildup their forces in all fields, enthusiastically'step up the movement to join the liberation army, or c?£cr free labor, or join shock youth teams in order to contribute to the victory. The southern army and people are determined to maintain and expand the liberated areas, to cling to their land and houses, to strive for an increase in production, and to foil the pacification plan of the U.S. aggressors and their lackeys.

The southern urban people are determined to strengthen and broaden unity, build up a strong force, step up the struggle against the.U.S. imperialists and their lackeys to achieve national and democratic rights and vital Interests, obliterate the oppressive machinery right in the heart of the cities, and be ready to take advantage of opportunities to score great achievements.

■

Our army and people are victoriously fighting against the U.S. imperialists and their lackeys and will certainly win complete victory. The resistance war of our. armies and people is making big leaps forward. The situation at hone and abroad Is very favorable for us. Our army and people will certainly defeat the U.S. imperialists, as they once defeated the Japanese fascists and the French colonialists.

Signed: Tr^ tfPLSV Central Committee Presidium, South Vietnam, 20 July i960

Declassified per Executive Order !3o26. Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

. * -

SOUTH V X E T U A K

s s

22 August I960

(

i

KFLSV ATTACKS PEACE 'FARCE' OP ASA COUOTHIES '■ " . -

Hanoi VSA International Service in English 0553 g:?T 22 August 1966—B

(Text) Hanoi, 22 August—Tito spokesman or the Commission for External Relations of the Smith Vietnam National Liberation. Fro.it (IfFLSV) issued a statement or. 19 August strongly condemning the so-;uIled peace Initiative of the Association-of Southeast fcsia (ASA J countries regarding a solution to the Vietnam problem. The statement, released by the South Ylefcr&a Llii| -I 'ATXOa PRESS AGEXCZj said:

™

As is kno^n to everybody* each tine the U,S, imperialists take a new step in expanding their war of aggression in Indochina, particularly in South Vietnam, they stage a ns * ; peace farce in an.attempt to ctislead public opinion end Bitigate the wrath of the Vietnamese people: the people in the United States, and other peace-loving people of the worlds

In a few nonthSj the stateaen^ went on, the chief war crir tlSj Johnson, BcKajaara, zn& their accomplices, have introduced into South Vietnam some 10,000 additional U.S t troops* They are preparing to increase the number of V.S* troops in this area to ^00,000, 500,000, or even more by the end cf this year. Besides, they have pu " ed their war escalation in forth Vietnam to a very dangerous decree by bombing several areas in ih*2 periphery of H-moi and Haiphong,

The statement strongly denounced the willful U.S, servants in Thailand, t: Philippines, and Malaysia for contributing to the US. aggressive war in Vietnam While brutally repressing the movements for genuine independence and peace at home* It pointed out that the Thai ruling circles, uh> are noisily campaigning for a peace conference of Asian countries, are actually those who have been no£t zealously serving the aggressive U.S. plans in southeast Asia. They have not enly sent Thai navy an:! air force units to South Viet to take part in the U t S. war fcut also

of fere;! all of Thailand to the U.S. imperialists, turning their country into a huge U.S. tase of agression against Vietnam and other countries in Indochina and southeast Asia,

The statement continued* It is thus stark clear that the ASA peace Initiative is but another peace farce of the type already staged by the Johnson-Bean Jtask clique aimed at serving the U.S* schemes of war expansion and intensification agai-st the Vietnamese people and other peoples in Asia. Tna ASS. peace proposal cells for settlement of Asian problems by Asians-, but in fact it serves the classic "J.S t policy of using Asians to fight Aszans, That is \;hy several Asian countries have sternly co:riemr.ed and rejected -ho proposal*

m

The statement stressed: The 3PLSV once again reaffirms its immovable st^;: that so long as the U.S. imperialists hive not recognized the South Vietnamese people's legal right to independence, democracy, peace, neutrality, and national reunification., so long as they have not evacuated all U,S and satellite troops and weapons from South Vietnam and disranvled all their military bases in this area, so long as they have not recognised the SfJISV as the enly genuine representative of the South Vietnamese people, and so long as they have not let the South Vietnamese people settle their internal affairs themselves, there will be no genuine peace in South Vietnam ar.d all conferences on the South Vietnar, issue will fee null and void-

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

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22 August I566

•- south viEiiiA:-:

After reiterating the South Vietnamese people's determination"to carry through to the end their resistance Against the U.S. aggression, Tor national salvation, the statement stress*;!: Any peace frauds of the U.S. aggressors and their satellites, including the so-called Asian peace conference proposed "by Thailand at U.S. instigation, will end in ignominious .failure. .

• TRI-THIE^' PROVINCES URGED TO FIGHT HARDER

Liberation Radio (Clandestine} in Vietnamese to South Vietnam OJOO GMT 19 -August 1566--S

. .- ■ (Commentary: "The troops and people of 'Tri-Thien' must strike more strongly,

uninterruptedly, and spontaneous].y" )

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_

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.T .

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(Excerpts) Quang Tri and Thua Thien are the too northernmost provinces lying close to the southern side of the temporary border. The U.S. aggressors and their lackeys have attempted all ruthless :»nd .insidious plots to transform the Tri-Thien provinces into an absolutely safe area for the;:.. Aside from the police, civil guards, and Ranger forces, they have stationed the First Infantry Division of the puppet army in the Tri-Thien area in addition to one armored regiment, four U.S. Marine battalions, and recently, three to five airborne and carina battalions of the puppet .army's general vzztvvc Which have been regularly ■deployed in the Tri-Thien theater if war. A network of posts dot the area from Route 1 and Route 9 to inter-provincial roads. Moreover, the U.S. aggressors have built special forces camps posfciaiid'ca directly by the Americans alor* the Vietnamese-Laotian border.

* a *

■» ■ "

In conjunction with the military measures, the U.S. aggressors and their lackeys have resorted to bribery and flattery to buy off the people of Tri-Thien, particularly those who live close to the demarcation 3ine, However, the indomitable people of Quang Tri and Thua Thien, bearing in mind the thought of attacking the cr.orvj, have bravely moved ahead to wage political and armed struggles at the same tir.e and are winning greater and greater successes. With ardent patriotism,, the people and youth in Hue have risen to face the enemy with forms of struggle ranging from meetings and demonstrations to denounce the enemy's crimes to armed occupation of the Rue broadcasting station, the. ranseaking of the U.S. information office and the U.S. Consulate, and demonstrations to demand that the Americans 50 home and that the Thieu-K^ clique be overthrown. Proa towns and municipalities to rural areas, successive political struggles have erupted to jheck the bloody hands of the enemy.- ■ .

-".The guerrilla warfare which has been vigorously developed in the mountainous Y. areas as well as in tie lowlands and coastal region has delivered stunning blows

s head, flank, and back. The guerrillas have not enly surrounded,

to the enemy'

encroached or. the enemy's territory and forced him to withdraw from some posts such as the A Luoi outpost in western Thua Thien, and sniped at and killed dozens of Americans at Fhu Bai each month, but have also regularly -attacked the wicked self-defensemen in the support of our compatriots living -".. in strategic haslet's. The guerrillas and regional troops have also launched .successive attacks against Route $ 2nd against military convoys on the Ea Sang-"Hue Highway, have destroyed bridges zn£ attacked reinforcements coming to repair the bridges or rone's, and have regularly shelled the enemy' 5 military sub-rector

Zlh

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number; NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

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UNCLASSIFIED

y

' t

FAR EAST

^.^Hy^HLllJ:^ 1 the ,Y C on HuntlG y-Briiikley Sho7; - In a 10-

minute film interview made August 27 with KBC ! s Sander Van

m

ociir-" and Tran Haoi Nam, NLF representative in Algiers th

i

following points were developed:

e

• s.

a. Peace . ~ According to Tran, real peace can only come to Viet-Kam when the U*S* and its allies withdraw all their troops and dismantle their bases. Until then the South

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Vietnamese people resolve never to give iru

b. A Ceasefire ~ The U*S. talks of peace and negotiations but each time it is preparing to send more reinforcements to escalate the war. At the same time U.S. rulers try to fool

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world opinion by blaming "the Vietnamese people for not negotiating. The U*S # is attempting to change its .position of weakness on the battlefield to a position of strength at a conference table. This is a move to cover U*S t weaknesses and to hoodwink U.S. public opinion.

c* Political Aims of the NLF - To overthrow the disguised

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colonial government; to form a coalition of all elements in

*

South Vietnamese life and hold general elections; to set up a progressive democracy; this unaligned government would

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number; NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 201 I

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UN CLASS I FIED

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establish diplomatic relations with all governments In the spirit of the Bandung Conference, and would accept aid from all countries; it would desire to live in peace with its neighbors*

4

d* Unification of the two Viet-Nams « The Front stands

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for gradual unification by discussions and negotiations between the two zones. It would hold elections with this in mind, the same elections spoken of before♦ Organized general elections are not possible as long as the U*S* does not withdraw its

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presencec The present election plan is a political bluff and

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will not be recognized by the Liberation Front*

Prisoners ~ As long as the IKS* does not recoproize

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w

% the Liberation Front, it.is not possible to discuss the exchange or release of prisoners*

f e Meetings with U*S* Officials - Leaders of the Front

■ r >.-—e,. h i r T--.n i ■ < ■■» . m i ) mi i i i ■ * ! ■» .■♦■ I'M —' —., ■ — * ■ m f ■ ii _ , . ,

have never - met with U*S # officials. We consider any U*S*

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proposal for meetings now as a cover up for the aggressive' plans

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of President Johnson and* his. intentions to hoodwink U.S., and world opinion. ^ •

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f>L. 1954 Geneva Accords *» The essential spirit of the 1954 Geneva agreements recognizes the independence, sovereignty

Declassified per Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 633 16- By: NWD Date: 2011

UNCLASSIFIED

and territorial unity of Viet-Nam, While the NLF did not participate in the Accords and is not hound by them, nevertheless the NLF is in agreement with the basic principles of the Geneva Accords because they represent the just aspirations of the Vietnamese people.

h. Postscript - Tran Haoi Nam added at this point in the interview his thanks to those members of the intelligentsia workers y students, and religious groups in the U.S. who manifest and have manifested solidarity with the struggle of the Vietnamese people.

(UNCLASSIFIED) NBC News Huntley-Brinkley Report, 8/31 19*+5

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

SOUTH V I E T N A M ik September 1966

BORCHETT IIWERVIEWS KFLSV PRESIDIUM HEAD

Liberation Radio (Clandestine) in Vietnamese to South Vietnam 1000 GMT 13 September 1966--S

(Text) On 25 August, Australian journalist Burchett met with lawyer Nguyen Huu Tho, chairman of the KFLSV Central Committee Presidium^ in a place in the liberated area of South Vietnam. During this meeting Australian journalist Burchett interviewed Chairman Nguyen Huu Tho about the development of the war in South Vietnam and about the policies and 3i.ne of the KFLSV,, the only true leader of ik million South Vietnamese people in the struggle against U.S. aggression. Here are the questions and answers of this interview:

Question: Since the day the Americans started their military buildup in South Vietnam and escalated their air war of destruction to Worth Vietnam > have the basic combat objectives of the KFLSV been changed?

Answer: Our unchanged combat objectives are: to completely defeat the aggressive war of the U.S. imperialists; to overthrow the Saigon puppet authorities: to set up a wide and democratic national coalition government composed of

•^ _ M 1, _ 1 __ ■*** 1 J — m j 1 I 1 rm 1 n ■-- I r 1 i i n 1 'h i i i i ■ ■■■!■ ■ ■ m\ ■■! ■ ■■ ■■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■!■!■» m i. ■ ■ 1 11 ■ 1 ■ ■ - 1 1 ■ 1 1 ' *t I I ■ II 11 ■ 1

representatives of the people from all strata, all nationalities, all religions, all political parties, and patriotic personalities ; to restore the sacred national rights of the South Vietnamese people; to achieve independence and democracy; to improve the living conditions of the South Vietnamese people; and to achieve peace, neutrality ? and national unification.

The intensification and widening of the aggressive war by the U.S. imperialists has demonstrated that our previous assessment of the U.S. imperialists 1 nature and plans is completely correct. Since nothing is more precious than independence and freedom, we feel it impossible to detach ourselves from these basic combat objectives, no matter how savage the U.S. imperialists 1 means of war are and no matter how cunning their political tricks are. All the people and armed forces in South Vietnam are determined to fight and fight strongly. Final victory will surely be ours.

Question: Is it true that the introduction of U.S. and satellite troops into South Vietnam has shrunk the liberated areas and reduced their population?

Answer: Nothing is farther from the truth. (?It is true that) in certain areas., at certain times-, the U.S. imperialists have occupied a small portion of the liberated areas. But, generally speaking, we have enlarged our areas and liberated an additional million people (?in very) important areas. I must add that although at present almost k million of our compatriots still live in disputed areas and areas under temporary control of the enemy, the great majority of these people-including officials,soldiers, and officers of the Saigon puppet authorities—are fed up with the Americans and their lackeys and feel sympathy for and support the front.

Question: A number of people are of the opinion that neither the Americans nor the KFLSV will win militarily in South Vietnam. "What do you, Chairman,, think of this

view?

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

Ik September 1966 SOUTH VIETNAM

Answer: These distorted opinions have usually been set forth by the Washington ruling circles so that they could present themselves in a favorable light by restricting the importance of our victories and making everyone doubt our chances of achieving complete victory. In fact, we have achieved victory after victory in the struggle against the U.S. aggressors and their lackeys. We have defeated the "special war" strategy and overwhelmed the puppet troops who have been organized , equippedj trained, and commanded by the Americans.

Rushing in to participate directly in combat since mid-1965 by massively introducing their troops in South Vietnam—Including the seasoned units of which Mc-Namara has often boasted—the U.S. imperialists have been unable to change the situation. On the contrary, they have suffered ignominious defeats. The fact that the Pentagon is continuing to pour more troops into South Vietnam, raising the total strength to 300^000 men, and is making preparations to send more reinforcement troops is eloquent proof that the South Vietnamese troops and people are winning, have the initiative on the battlefield, and are attacking continuously.

It is necessary to recall that at one time McEFamara promised to withdraw U.S. troops from South Vietnam by the end of 1965. The ignominious failure of the I565-66 dry season counteroffensive of the Americans, although the latter had carefully worked out the plan and (several words indistinct) forces, proves that they have been powerless In carrying out their plot aimed at recapturing the initiative and changing the war situation.

Participating in glorious combat with their bare hands, our people have quickly built a firm, strong political and military force and are achieving increasingly important victories. The Americans have the most powerful military and economic potentials in the Western world, but we have the invincible power of the people's war and the creativeness which is being developed to a high degree.

We are of the opinion that in a war, military power is composed of many factors, the most decisive being the political and moral ones. Politically and morally we are absolutely stronger than the Americans. Our people across the country are carrying out the war without yielding before sacrifices and hardships, with the determination never to put down their weapons so long as our combat objectives have not been reached.

We are also stronger than the Americans in other basic factors, such as strategy, rear areas, war leadership, and ground forces; these are the factors that decide the final victory of a war. Although they are strong materially and technically, the U.S. bandits have basic weaknesses in the political, military, strategic, and tactical fields. The factors of U.S. power are not limitless, partly due to their policy of dominating the world, to the fact that they are undertaking an aggressive war in our territory (several words indistinct), and partly due to the fact that they are powerless in (several words indistinct) any portion of our territory (several words Indistinct). On the contrary, their weaknesses are truly basic and unsurmountable.

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

lh September 1966"

?:

sotr::? vi£?mt

During the process of war develop 3 there basic weaknesses have become inc.:-?i singly

obvious and prominent and will finally lead the Americans to an unavoidable d~f'.-t. The eve*i* great victories which we have achieved since the U.S. miliary buildup, and especially curing the 1953-66 dry season, prove thai thee:.*? *■ ieally as weli as .practically we are fully able to exterminate not* only the puppet troops, but also the most seasoned units of the U.S. expeditionary forge; we are fully abljj to maintain the initiative on the battlefield arid the tempo *f our attacks and "wcTare fully able to victoriously oppose the new U.S. reinforcements and militarily defeat the U.S. aggressors ur?dez- any situation. ~

Question: in your opinion, chair ., is there now a possibility of cooperating with the other political organizations in South Vietnam?

Answer: Our unchanged policy has always been to achieve a large d»cX-z &- national un i ty a i m :* d a t car i y i i \ g ou t the res 5 s tanc e a g a i ns t the U.S. aggre s s oj-s aa J f o r national salvation. Thank:- to this correct policy, we have succeeded in building a national united front based on a sound foundation and having a large i&effibership. Apart froa patriotic uoliticnl parties, religious and national groups : , and individuals who have joined the front, we have succeeded in cooperating with ether patriotic political and religious organizations andindividuals, On this basis, ve have scored great victories. »

* •

At pre lent, the U.S. troops are directly participating on a large scale in fcl aggressive war in South Vietnam, fcrai . [ ng underfoot our country, usin^" extremely cruel means of war to massacre our compatriots, and e-oscnitting extremely barbarous

rimes. The traitors Nguyen Van ?hiou and Nguyen Cao Ky have fully obeyed America/;

r**ers and have scld national sovereignty for U.S. dollars arc; weapons, nevertheless, apart rton\ a small group of reactionaries dependent on the Americans, all other Vietnamese are patriots who feel great indignation toward the U.S. aggressors and their henchmen. Therefore, we can say that there is a possibility of enlarging our cooperation with other organizations, forces, and individuals in South Victnam, regardless of their previous .activities.

Question: By this, do you mean all the people who had participated in the If go Dinh Diem government and the governments that succeeded it?

Answer: Yes. Regardless of their past activities, political tendencies and views, or their nationality or religion, (rev; words indistinct) aimed at the following objectives: opposition to the war of the Americans and their henchnen, restoration of nati ona 1 s ov e re ign ty, a ch 5 rit of der.oc rati c f reed cms , c c ss ation o f the U.S. interventionist and aggressive policy, achieve! I of peace and neutrality in South Vietnam, and improvement of the living conditions of the people. Bat the strength of the NFISV political and military forces will certainly be the decisive factor for victory.

Question: Chairman, can you let us know the conditions for a political solution to the South Vie: i problc: •

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 i

111 September JS»£

^

SOffl'iJ Vjiv

,.<..,.,. For many months the Johnson administration ha, never stopped tr^pc. InHioUt the so-called "desire for peace* ■* «* i»«WiM«*l ^*f£n ta g abo k. the llkc vords> howe ver, are in full contradiction w t-w

FT? c- Sn £. criming acts. At the very time when the President of U» S±,! sSS and his Secretary of State utter fine «df, the U. . O^rmsnt

l»^4!eive war 5.. Sooth Vietnam and continue to escalate tat expands the M^*?*™ "1 Washington wants the VI y_Pl : ' ej^accept

r^iSoS thfs^ W^SS-STlI^^Sr I the dot: .M *

^-^^^r^t^rSv' to restore the" sacred Ration al sovereignty and to

f^U S C countii C i'"^.h^Uo:°-ic are read, to fight to the end. aUhough liberate t.ie coun ^ v?m to . face

o,,r ancMU.rs •» litarstefl tjrw the U.S. • re rM.ow< yofce.

, , ^ t-i-n nMn?H^ fo- ?0 years, the Vietnamese people are eager

on the basis of ind ependence and democracy .

wT«S imperialists arc invaders in South Vletnap. The 0,S> imperialists have f Sfa So foot the basic national sovereignty of South Vietnam. Therefore tramyled ****** ™ „ f . ace n SOufch vie£n am and, at the sane tine, for

ot- .r f ' f v a^ressive war in South Vie tnam, withdraw U.S.

^SiiaifflajH-^ffia OM?_j^ Ljss&a^ Y **** .- an, oi s-

tey ri : 1fi an y.S, military bases in South Ytetg gfiu

,.-«« Americans must respect thJJ^aUo^yj^ts^ ih^So^h^tp^ U<*h that 3s, i ndij ien^eTdeidcracy, peace, and neutrality. .©• lnvjru.1 Pe 5t B of South Vietnam must be .solved by the South Vietnamese people yne,,-Sr a J wS ^eign intervention. Reunification of Vietnam must he ^T**i t* hv the reoplc of both zones.^

^-;;;; ■V>.^v:oJce_L 1 ^y._PPX5tie i a ..scOutj^in.? -^Vie^u*.

^estien: Chairman, can yon tell us the "g^™**™ SiSSS? have used Modern means of war such as B-52 bombers ana Lew

,,, r „,i..-r to barbarous means of war such as B-52 bombers, toxic Answer: *"**»« ££££! and to a scorched-earth policy of kill all and f S ;*?anfbuSnvSlSS! the U.S. imperialists want to oppress orr people an f £r?c - £> sunnier.*" B ul those means of war can only <%™"£ ^MoSriots' indignation at the aggressors and further strengthen ««* S5S tion to Ji*t bravely until final victory, in defiance of a 1 dif£ eu.i : 'es The use of a strategic air force (.for tactical purposes) is - 1. report in the war and proves the confusion of the aggressors; i, «ill no, bri them the expected results, as you can sec.

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

* >

5 September 19' 7

text of political frog ram adopted by KFLSV

Hanoi VICA International Service in English 1710 Gin 1 S?o 67 B

SOU'iil VIETNAM

tcuth

[Text] Har.ci--Following is the full te;:l of iha political program of the Scutl Vietnam National Front fer Lite ration adopted by an extraordinary congress of th Front convened by its Central Committee in mid-August 1967, The program was distributed to Vietnamese and foreign pressmen'at a news conference here today by Nguyen" Van Tien, head of the NFLSV permanent representation in North Vietnam

Political Program of the South Vietnam national Front for Liberation

In i960, the South Vietnam National Front for Liberation came imo being with its 10-point progran aimed at uniting the entire-people against the ii.S* imperialist? and their lackeys. Since then, the Front has achieved a broad union of the various sections of the people, the political parties, organizations, nationalities religious coramuni ties, and p 31 ri 01 i c perscna li ties wi th a vi ew to Jointly f i gh ting ag al ns t U.S. aggression, for national salvation, It has success fully consolidated its base among the broad masses of the people; at the same time, it has achieved joint action with many political and religious forces and won over many industrialists and traders, many officials and functionaries of the puppet a dm tration, and many officers and

men of the puppet amy,

■ The Front has constantly enjoyed wholehearted encouragement and assistance from our compatriots in the north and abroad. It has also enjoyed ever stronger approval and support fron the peoples of neighbor 5 Cambodia and Loas, from the peoples cf the socialist, nationalist, and other countries in the world, including progressive people in the United States,

Under the leadership of the ISFLSV, our people in the south have gone fron victory victory. The prestige of the Frort has been unceasing!; enhanced at home and abroad. The South Vietnam National Frunt for Liberation has hecome the sole genuine representative of the heroic South Vietnamese people.

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These great achievements have proved that the line and policy of the front are correct, and that the strength of our people*s unity and struggle is invincible.

At present, despite heavy defeats, the U.S 4 imperialists are still unwilling to give up their aggressive designs against Vietnam. They are stepping up the war, trampling upon the south, p.n* intensifying th« MmV.r.- ^ * , .*!n rn^t*? of ot i r coir.tr n

monstrous crimes of the U.S. imperialists, houever, have only served to deepen our people : s hatred and increase their indomitable will. The people of South Vietnam, regardless of social standing, and even a number of persons in the puppet army and administration, have seen through the true features of the U.S. imperialists and their lackeys, hate then, and want to contribute to the struggle against U.S. aggression, for national salvation.

Never before in our nation's history has the mettle of our entire people united for the fight to wipe out the enemy and save the country been so strong as now. Our people are in a victorious, initiative, and offensive position. The U-S. imperialist and the lackeys hav e been increasingly drive;, into passivity and embarrassment; they are in an impasse and are sustaining defeats.

Declassified per Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

5 Septcinl :• 291

SOUTH VIETVr.K

A: this K " ■ , ni spirit of develop!: the form m, the IIFkSV has •

lipis : Leal pro, rai with a I w to furth r broadening the bloc of j. • '

: Lcn, encouraging ' ■ stimulating the en:: : | _; to rush forward* res 3 to fi

id dei ; aggressors, and to build ah independent. tic, peaceful,

n-_ is South Vietnam.

I. Unite the Entire People* Fight the U.S. Aggressors * Save the Country.

1—During 4*000 years of their history, the* Vietnamese people have united and fought gainst foreign invasion to preserve their indepenuc and freedom. Ever since our cc was conquered by the French colonialists, our people have fought u ly f v their liberation. In 15^5, our people from north to south rose up, sueces:: ly carried out the August revolution, seized political power from the Japanese militarists and tfreir lackeys, and founded the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.

When ;he ! ch colonialists came hack to invade our country a&a our en* people heroically Touch', for nearly nine years, brought our sacred resistance to the great victory of Di en Bien Phu, smashing the aggressive schemes of the French colonialists and the interventionist policy of the U.S. imperialists.

Th> independence, savor- nty, unity, and territorial intc pity of Vietnam were formally recognized by the 195 ; J Geneva conference, Since then, our eompariots in South Vietnam together wit.* the people all over the country* should have been living in peace and building a free and happy life. However, the U.S. imperialists have sabotaged the Geneva agreements, ousted the French colonialists, set up in South Vietnam an extremely cruel puppet regime, and tried to turn the southern part of Vietnam into a neoeolony and a military base in an attt: to prolong the partition of our country, conquer the whole of Vietnam, and impose their domination throughout Indochina and Southeast Asia.

The U.S, imperialists have shrunk from no cruel method to carry out their dark design. Defeated in their special war, they have switched to a local war, using over half a million U.S. and satellite troops, along with more than half a million puppet soldiers, for aggression against South Vietnam, At the same time, they have undertaken a war of destruction against the northern part of our count:; They have also stepped up their special war in Laos and carried out continual provocations aimed at wrecking the independence and neutrality of Cambodia*

The U S. imperialists are daily causing untold sufferings and mourning to our cam-patriots thrc ; hout the country! They have resorted to all kinds of modern war means and weapons, inclu strategic aircraft, napalm bombs, toxic chemicals, and poison s to massacre cur follow countrymen. They have launched repeated operations, again and again sweeping many areas, carrying out the k;ll ai!, burn all, destroy all policy to raze villages and hamlets to the ground. They have herded the population, grabbed land, and set up a ncnan's land and fascist-type concentration camps dubbed strategic hamlets, prosperity zones, resettlement areas, and so on. In the north, have wantonly .bed and strafed streets, villages, industrial centers, and heavily populated areas. They have even struck at dikes, dams, schools, hospitals, churches, and pagodas*

Obviously the U.S. imperialists are the most ruthless aggressors in hist , the saboteurs of the 1954 Gmova agreements, the saboteurs of the peace and security of the peoples in Indochina, Southeast Asia, and the world--the enemy number one of our op 1 e and of man); i no .

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

5 Scpl ■ - or 1 S

VIETOAK

Over the past few years, the U.S. imperialists h c -. escalated the uai* t

yet they have unceasingly clamored about peace negotiations in an attempt to fool the American and world people.

T.c) £ igon puppet administration has sold out South Vietnam to the U.S. Imperialists. It has oppressed znd exploited our southern compatriots in an extremely ruthless .. y. It has forced South Vietnam youth into the army to serve the United States in ssassactfing our fellow countrymen-. In a demagogic bid, it has also staged the farce of working out a constitution and holding elections. It is only a clique of traitors, an instrument for the U.S. imperialists to enslave the South Vietnamese people, prolong the partition of our country and further the U.S. war of aggression.

2--The U.S. aggressors and their lackeys think they can in lidate i *r people bi the use of force and deceive them by means of tricks, Bu" they are grossly mistaken, Our people definitely will never submit to force, never let themselves be deceived! Bringing into play our nation's tradition of undauntedness, our 31 million compatriots from the south to the north have resolutely stood up and united as one man to fight against the U.S. aggressors and save the country.

On the frontline of tue fatherland, our southern fellow countrymen have over the past 13 years shown marvelous heroism Irrespective of nge, sex, political tendencies, religious beliefs, and no matter whether * they live in the plains or in mountain areas, our people of all strata and all j Legalities nave resolutely fought shoulder to shoulder to liberate the south, defend the north, and proceed toward the reunification of the 2atherland«

Since 1959-1960, our compatriots in the South Vietnamese countryside have carried out successive, simultaneous uprisings, destroyed a sor of concentration camps

and prosperity somes of the U.S. imperialists and the puppet administration and • liberated vast rural areas. Our armed forces and people then rushed forward, destroyed thousands of strategic hamlets, liberated millions of people, and defeated the U.S. special war.

Since 1965, although the U.S. aggressors have brought in hundreds of thousands of U.S. expeditionary troops for direct aggression against South Vietnam, our armed forces and people have repeatedly won big victories, smashed two successive t'.s* dry-season strategic counteroffensives, defenzcd over 1 million enemy troops--U.S., puppet, and satellite.

The liberated areas have continuously expanded and now e up four-fifths of th

South Vietnam territory with two-thirds of its population. In .these liberated are:., . a national and democratic power Is taking shape ar.d a new life is blossoming. In addition to big military victories, we have also recorded important successes xn the political, economic, cultural, and diplomatic fields,

In the beloved northern part of the fatherland, our 17 million compatriots are heroically defeating the U.S. imperialist's war of destruction, maintaining and boosting production, and wholeheartedly encouraging and helping the cause of liberating the south, thus fulfilling the obligations of the great rear toward the great front.

In the world, the peoples of the soci :±st, notionalist, and other countries, including the progressive people in the United States, are sternly condemning the U.S. imperialist's war of aggression, and are giving their approval, support, I assistance to our people's struggle against U.S. aggression and for national salvation.

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

5 September I967 SOUTH VIETNAM

Facts have clearly shown that the more the U.S. imperialists obdurately intensify and expand their war of aggression against our country, the more they sustain bitter defeats and are driven into isolation; on the other hand, our people win greater victories and get more friends.

3—The most dangerous enemies of our people at present are the U.S 0 imperialist aggressors and their lackeys—the traitorous puppet administration.

The tasks and objectives of the South Vietnamese people in the struggle for national salvation are now as follows: To unite the entire people, resolutely defeat the U.S. imperialist's war of aggression, overthrow their lackey puppet administration, establish a broad national union and democratic administration and build an independent, peaceful, neutral, and prosperous South Vietnam, and proceed toward the peaceful reunification of the fatherland.

The force that guarantees the fulfillment of the above task of fighting against U.S. aggression and saving the country is our great national union. The MFLSV constantly stands for uniting all social strata and classes, all nationalities, all political parties, all organizations, all religious communities, all patriotic personalities, all individuals, and all patriotic and progressive forces, irrespective of political tendencies, in order to struggle together against, the U.S. imperialists and their lackej^s, wrest back our sacred national rights, and build up the country.

The MFLSV is prepared to invite and welcome all patriotic forces and individuals who oppose the U.S. aggressors to join its ranks, and to shoulder together the common duties. It proposes that any force which, for one reason or another, does not adhere to its ranks, take joint action against the common enemy--the U.S. aggressors and their lackeys.

The KFLSV pledges itself to strive, shoulder to shoulder with the Vietnam fatherland front, to fulfill gloriously the common task of fighting against U.S 0 aggression to liberate the south, defend the north, and proceed toward the peaceful reunification of the fatherland.

While fighting for their sacred national rights, the people of South Vietnam actively accomplish their internationalist duty. Their resistance war against U 0 S 9 aggression is an integral part of the revolutionary struggle of the people all over the world.

The EFLSV undertakes to stand within the united b3.oc of the Indochinese peoples to fight against the U.S. imperialists and their lackeys, to defend to fight against the U.S. imperialists and their lackeys, to defend the independence, sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity of Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos.

The JJFLSV pledges to take an active part in the common struggle of the world's people against the bellicose and aggressive imperialists headed by U.S. imperialism, for peace, national independence, democracy, and social progress.

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

5 September 1967 ■ SOUTH VIETNAM

h —The cruel U,S* aggressors are trampling upon otir homeland* We, the people of South Vietnam> mast stand up to make revolution and wage a people's war with a view to annihilating tfcera, driving them out of our borders, and wresting back national independence and sovereignty.

Having experienced over 20 years of war, our southern compatriots eagerly want to live in peace and rebuild our war-devastated country. But the U 0 S« imperialists have trampled underfoot this legitimate aspiration. That is why our people have to fight against them to win peace in independence. Nothing is more precious than independence and freedom. Only when real independence is secured can we have genuine peace I

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

::ib:

-I'

south . a::

The enemy of nation is ruthless and obdurate* : our entire people ar<

rained to fight and to defeat the U.S. aggro: and their lackeys. So lortg

as the U.S. Lalists do not end their war of a: ssion, u ; ull U.3. a

satel] '■' troops from our country, and lot the South 7J i less people settle then-selves t i -rr.al affairs of South V: tci without foreign iat< .e:^io:i, our pec:"

will rcsolu : -:;.' fight on until total victory, The South Yietnaaese peoi 'a liberation war ia a long and hard one, but it is sure to end in victory,

■

Our people rely Da.inly on their own forces; at the sane time th strive to win the ,*npathy. sup] rt, and assist-an of the world's peoples.

s

-

To defeat the U.S. aggressors and their lackeys, our people do not spa: c

sacrifice, They enthusiastically contribute mnnj r, aa -rial resources, and talent

-q the national liberation war in the spirit of doing everything for victory,

ie HFIiSV undertakes to develop the Liberation Armed Forces cornea Eg the nain fo units j the regional troops. and the militia and guerrilla units, with the a In

of pronoti.no people's war, combining guerrilla war far wip . out

as nany live eaeny forces as p hie, crushing the enemy r s i/ill for aggression, and

winning the final victory.

The f:\mi s to build and develop the political forces of the masses...

promote movement of political s'truggl e armed struggle with political

: le and ag: a aiaong enemy troopsj thus To . :y three converging : >ngs to defeat the eaafiiy

The MPLSV undertakes to encourage all strata of the population in v towns an ral areas still under cnc.sy control to unite and struggle in every possible : to break

g Lp if e U S, aggressors and u^:.^ lackeySj des*. the Fhuong (co | .rati )

and s ;gic tablets, demand Icinocratic freedoms national sovere and a better

life, oppose the pressg _. of troops a.id forcible leosr draft, struggle against

ftslavin£j and • spraved culture and march foivard, together with th ire people,

to overthrow -- enorr, r s rule ^.nd seize political power.

■

At ;he sane bixtCj the Front undertakes to encourage all . ata of poop! • in the liberop ! areas to unite closely be build the people ! 5.relf-nanagenort.syst^ia, to achieve s .;' hy step a loea? national democratic administration, so build ireaSj

rj 5

■•: :■ to produce tid fight against U S, aggress . 'or national salv ■ e\

• . .icced with a good settlement of tii agrarian question q build * le -•■ ~ :: v -

2,-5 Is.c : :>f the liberated areas,, to foster the people's f i is with a view

,:,i,i: i M l : • s for '-lie front and carrying the resistance war 1 a to

etc vict ):y.

II, Build oi. Xndcj at, D> ratio. Peaceful, fifcutral, and Prosperous Sou . naci

T..o people of South Vietnam a determined to defeat the U.S, aggress . one loIv lackeys. and to devote their might and nain to build a political system ante

the indej . .~ ice and sovereignty of the nation and the freedosi and . per. 1' ; to hoal the wounds of war, to liquidate the social evils left over by the U,3«

regirae, to restore moral life and build an independent, democratic, peaceful, {■■ tral, an J prosperous South Vietnam.

To achieve so objectives, the MFLSV lays down the following concrete policies:

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

5 Septe: V 19&J SOUTH VIET',;:"

1—To achieve a broad and progressive democratic regimes

To abolish the disguised colonial regime established by the U.S. imperialists 'r. South Vxetnant, to overthrow the puppet administration, hireling of the United States, not in recognize the puppet national assembly :ed up by the U.S. imperialists and their lae'.ieys, to aboJ ish the constitution and, all antj: Lonal and anti-rdexapcratie laws enacted by the U.S. imperialists and the puppet administration.

Tc hold free general elections, to elect the national assembly in - really democratic way in accordance tilth the principle of universal, equal* direct suffrage and secret ballot This national assembly will be the state body with the highest ity * in South Vietnam. It will work out a democratic constitution which • bodies the most fundane I and most eager aspirations of all social strata in South yi&tn and guarantee the establishment of a broad, progressive, democratic state str uefrurg, To guarantee thcTTnnunity of the depu to the national assembly.

To set up a national union democratic government including t represent persons among the various social strata, nationalities, religious communities, patriotic and democratic parties, patriotic personalities, and forces which have contributed to the cause of national liberation,

To proclaim and enforce broad democratic freedoms--freedom of speech, freedom of the press and publication, freedom of as ibly, trade union freedom, freedom of association, freedom to form political parties, freedom of creed, freedom to demonstrate.

To guarantee to oil citizens inviolability of the human person, freedom of residence and lodging, secrecy of correspondence, freedom of movement, freedom to work and rest, and the right to study,

To enforce equality between nan end woman and equality among the various nationalities.

To set free all persons detained by the U S S, imperialists and the puppet administration on account of their patriotic activities.

To dissolve the concentration camps set up in oil forms by the U,S* imperialists and their lac':eys.

All these people who have had to see:: asylum abroad because of the U*S. and puppet regime, have the right to return to the country to serve the fatherland-

■

To severely punish the diehard cruel agents of the U.S. imperialists.

c

2--Tc build an independent and self-supporting economy, to improve the oeople T living conditions. To abolish the policy of economic enslavement and monopoly of the U„S* imperialists. To confiscate the property of the l.S. imperialisms and their diehard cruel agents and turn it into state property. To build an independent and self-supporting economy. To rapidly heal the wounds of war, to restore and develop the economy so as to make the people rich and the country powerful, To protect the right to ownership of the means of production and other property of the citizens under the laws of the state.

To restore and develop agricultural production. To improve farming, animal husbandry, fish v^^ring, and forestry.

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

L September 19 1

S UTJ VICTNAH

•The state will encourage the peasants to unl&e and help orn another n boosting product : ■ ■. grant them loans at low interest for the parol I buffaloes, oxer,,

farming implements, agricultural machines, seeds, fertilizers, etc, Help theni develop irrigation works, and apply advanced techniques in agriculture. To guarantee outlets for agricultural products.

ri%,

To restore and develop industry, snail industries and handicrafts, to guarantee to workers and empl< ees the right to take part in the tent of enterprises.

ne

The state will encourage the capitalists in industry and trade to help develop industry small industries and handicrafts. To enforce reedom of enterprise to the benefit of nation-building and the people's welfare; to apply a customs policy designed to .? encourage and protec ;home—production. To restore and develop communications and trans port To encourage and step up economic exchanges between t and country, bet-.ee:-) the plains and the mountain areas. To give due consideration to the interests of the small traders and petty shopkeepers. To set up a state bank. To build an independc: currency* To apply a fair and rational tax policy The state will adopt a policy of

rp.

granting loans at low interest to encourage production, and will prohibit usury, develop economic relations with be north; the two zones will help each other so thai Vietnam's economy may prosper rapidly.

In accordance with the front's policy of neutrality and on the principle of equality, mutual benefit and respect for the Independence and sovereignty of the Vietnamese nation, trade with all countries will be ex ie-d, and economic and technical assistsn fron foreign countries will be accepted, regardless of political and social i e&s

3—To

onr: -

en=*ct the land policy, to carry out the slogan "Land to the Tiller. '• cate th; lands of the US. imperialists and the ; : d cruel landlords — I ■;_ lad allot those lands to landless o: land-poor peasants To confirm and protect the Ownership of the lands allotted to peasants by the revolution..

The state will ner, ate the purchase of* land from landlords who possess land upward of a certain amount, : varying with the situation ir each locality. It will allot these lands to landless or lar.d-pocr peasants. The recipients will receive the lands free of charge and will not be bound by any condition whatsoever. In areas where the required conditions for land reform do nc: yet obtain, land-rent reduction will be carried out.

To entrust the lands be! ; ing to absentee landlords to peasants for cultivst 3 enjoyment of the produce. Adequate steps will be taken on this subject at a iat£j stage in consideration of the political attitude of each landlord. To allow landl.: to offer land to the Liberation Peasants Association; the state will allot these Isnc.

to landless or land-poor peasants. To encourage fcH* -- -^ f *id»*?tf r 'te*t ^rons or

fruit-tree plantations to keep their farms going. To respect the legitimate right to ownership of land b; the churches t lagodas, and noly sees of religious sects. To carry out a fair and rational redistribution of communal lands, o guarantee the legitimate right to ownership of reclaimed lands to those who reclaim them.

Those compatriots who have been forced into strategic hamlets, or concentration canps In any other form, will be free to return to their former villages.

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

1 $! • • i \bvr • ■

SOUTH Viil

T? : . have b-•■ : compelled to evacuate or to ch abodes atnd who wish f

living ' i re. Mil' , recognition . i eir ewnershi] ai the 1

prey * '*'-' re-su] i from their labor, ana will be helped tc ci

Living in the saine place? the. ,;no wisi to rr~>jr:~i to their native places .■ also re:eiv p

■ 4—To Id a national democratic culture and education.) to develop £ ..ce »2o£

bo promote public ~o fight .against the American -type e and j.

culture and education now adversely affecting our people*3 fine, lcn£; ■ • traditions;. To build a national democratic culture and education, to develop science and technology in of national construction and defense. To educate the r :

in the Viet] ■ e nation's tradition of struggle against forej its

pole history To preserve and develop the fine culture ana good oust ais and ha o. Its of our nation.

To raise tnc ple»s cultural standards; to liquidate illiteracy, to pr e

complementary education, no open new genera] education schools, t.iri^fr learning establishments, and voc na2 schools. 7c an all-out effort to train and fost

a eontJ of scientific workers, technicians, and skilled workers. : e

V ■ amese language as'Jtte teaching medium Ln h Ler learning establishments T*-reduce school fees for pupils and students, To exempt poor pupils and student from school fees, or grant them scholarships. ^o reform the system of examinations.

Til- s;ate will give every possible ht-lp to those youth and children who have render-services to the fight against U\ S, aggression and for national salvation, to t children born into the fan: lies who have rendered serv s to the revolution, and to ot: t outstanding youths so as to enable then to studj and develop their capabilities.

Kvcrj citizen is free to carry out scientific and te alogical research, to indulgt in literary and artistic creation, and to participate in otner cultural activities. To encourage the intellectuals writers, artists, ana scientists and, to afford them the required conditions for research work, creation, and invention in the service of the fatherland and the people. To afford opportunities to those cultural work , writers and artists who have been persecuted by the US, imperialists and their lack for their patriotic activities. To develop health service and the movement for hyglei d prophylaxis. To attend to the people's health. To control epidemics. ic a&ay

irith dangerous diseases left over by the U.S. and puppet regime. To develop r-he movement for physical training and sports. To develop cultural relations v;; ; the

h; the two zones will help each otner to raise the people's educational level and uho (development) or qualified people, ^o prontote cultural relations with foreig :-Ies on the basis of equality and mutual benefit.

j) To guarantee the rights and cater to the livelihood of wooers, laborers, and civil

rvants* To promulgate labor legislation. To put into practice the eight-hour working day. To provide for a regime of rest and recreation. To set up a rational system of wages and bonuses for increased productivity. To improve tne living and working conditions of th( workers, laborers, and civil servants. To apply a policy of adequate remuneration for apprentices. To provide jobs to the workers and th^ poor people in the towns. To make every effort to do away vMth unemployment. t put Into practice a policy on social security to care for and assist workers, labors and civil servants in case of disease, incapacitation, old age, or retirement. To Improve living conditions in working people's residential quarters.

rs

t ■

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

sci n . i.

T»c se ■ kes between employers and h n between

tiro sidj3 an Li&tioji :•;. the national aertocratic administrate n

; K - ' : of workers and laborers, to strictly : hi-bit fines ; Croc

v; md unjttstifi i sacking of workers.

--To build up strong ttli Vietnam J Lis &r<3 ■ i itrme.d F •■■■ is with a view to liberat .;; the people mti h -tm<iUx fatherl I ' 5Si oouth 7,et>nas Liberation A^ned Pj:

ccr . Lai c tile main force units > the : : r. , a: th« militia and guerrillas--

are the children 01 s ' people, and are bound tssly loyal to the interests of t1

Eierland and the people, and are du abound so fight shoulder to shoulder with the gjiti ■ &o 1 fcj*e south, defend che fatherland, an Lv ^ontri-

on to tl ■ : >?ense of peace in k\ tnd in the world . To pa:; duo attention !

:j tdini " be I*ib ration fcrmed Forces, To strive to rai3: their quai2 ; asc

41 <<r fight ' capacity with a vie;; to copies war, do; she U.S.

satellite, and pupoet troops--j and bringing; the fight against U\ S i -on, rcr

national salvation co total victor. To s n the political work with a view ;

enhancing .; pal ' ls-m and determination to fight and to win of tne U \ »ra1 .:. Aran Forces , enhancing the sense of discipline, and continuously tightening the "fish a: water 11 relations between the army and the population.

7--To show z r a 1- '-' ld ° ** ° ^ ho M J '*y rs * fc ° ca T< G : " f ° r f -^^ s s ' i:> oa a ™yifto n ■ to rewar J., ti

hte rs a nd c o mpa t ri ot s i rti ! \ - vt a n qutstaa id j nr roc c rd in t h e f i ent aga i nsfc 0 . S. agression and for national salvatic The entire people are fateful to, and .-on-j r in mind the moxtory of the maj ho belonj : to the Liberation A

pees or ;o - i,ous services and revolutionary Qrcanisations, and those who laid down their lives in political stru£jjloi Their fa;; lies are catered for and ssisted by the state and the people. Aril ijapatriots disabled in the course of tr.

armed and political struc^le are tar 1 for and feelpe To reward i - wbr jnanher

all fighters and compatriots who have an outstanding record in the struggle U 3 a£G^ es ^i° n crrL ^ or national salvation The entire people are grateful to and help the families who have rendered services to the re julioru

* -To organise social relief. To five relief to the compatriots--victims c: tie mi of across ion unleashed by the U.S. imperial ;jts and the p ; regime To attenc to

orphans f old folks, and invalid people. To organ se relief for the areas affected b; natural calamities or bad crops. Consideration is also riven to disabled puppet arry-men and to the i'aisilies of puppet arrr.ymen killed in action, who are poor and forloris To help those veev'le driven cc desperation by the U.S. imperialists and their laefc to rebuild their lives and serve the fatherland and <;he people.

j--Tc put into practice equality b- en r i and w i an, to protect mothers 1 emldi' n r 2o pa: -■.' ion to raisir^ the political, cultural, and vocational r- tard-i :

.. r; in a :. :\or fitting with their v. is in tto stru£;jle ' s/z U. S r. ;ressioi ; i

for national salvation, To develop fno Vietnamese women's traditions of her , ui -

aauntedness, loyalty, and aptitude to shoulder every responsibility V/ ;qi

clan politically, ec onomic ally, cult ura lly/and socially. V/om, n who do sam

receive the same salary ^nd allowances, and enjoy all other rights as men. Wo:: :. Workers and ■ s rvants enjoy two months maternity leave with full pay before ..: arter chi i db1rth.

230

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number; NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 I

5 September J 67

SOU'l'lI VJETJ3 "

*

-\ put :. ;-■ Lee a \ Licy of a ly helping perf< ■. w 1

7.- r; > jn U ; , regressive r - and fain actions. To pre 1 ;h1 r

gjid children. 7u develop a r t* ; or maternity homes, c: , anJ ir.

lali -ts and

To do aw 11 social evils brought about by :he 0 J.

lackeys, which are harmful to women 1 s health and dignity,

1C--T& strengthen unity, to practice equality and tsutual assistance at ... nati

a'pplish - systems and policies applied by the imperialists and tin :■ lac3 1 fch

a view to divit ../, oppressing, ond exploiting the various . ies.

ciisc tati< : - forcible assimilation of the nationality Tc •

Ion i-s-taiiding tra&i on of unity and mutual assistance amen ;arious fraternal

: i&litie

\ ¥ .

nationalities witli view to defending and building the country a re eq , 1 l ] in right s 3 n & ob 1 icat i or.

To implement the agrarian policy with : minority peasants To encourage ar them settle down in 1 ::q<1 residences, to improve their lands, to deVeloj J culture, to raise thear living standards so as to keep abreast of the general level, The nations,! minorities have the right to use th own spokei and wr ! a languages to a eve lop own culture and art and to jaaintain or to change their customs and habits.

To strive to train minority cadres so as to quickly brine about conditions for good management of the local affairs by the concerned minority itself, In the areas inhabited by big communities of a specific minority and where the required cone exist, autonomous zones will be established within in lent and free Vietna:

11--To respect freedom of creed, to achieve unity and equality among the different religious communities. To firfit against all maneuvers and trices of the imperialists and their lackeys who use a number of persons under the cloak of religion to oppose our peoplc ! s struggle against U.S. aggression and for national salvation, to sew issen-sion between believers and nonbelievers and among diff 1 nt religious commui to harm the country, the people, and the religion. To inspect freedom of creed and

are

worship, To preserve pagodas, churches, holy sees, temple All religions and none is to be discriminated against, to achieve unity among; believers of various :■ ligions and between believers and the entire nation for the sa) of the s: le against* U.S. aggression and their lackeys to defend and build the country.

\2 —Welcome puppet officers and men and puppet officials back to th just cause, sac\-: leniency, and give a humane treatment to rallied armymen and prisoners -of -war. To oppose the U.S.. imp-: lists and the puppet administration 1 s attempts to pressgan mercenaries to serve the U.S. a£gressors against the fatherland and massacre the pec; To severely punish the diehard thugs acting as efficient agents of the U.S. impe: .lists.

7

fford conditions for puppet officers and puppet officials to cone back to the j;

cause and Join the people's figh against U.S. aggression to save and build the country.

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NMD 63316, By: NWD Date: 2011

• a

Sen -7

SOUTu VIETIIliM

Riots individuals, groups, or units of the puppet amy and administration whc render services to the cause of fighting against l\S aggression for - Ltional salvation 111 be reuzvCed and entrusted with responsible jobs, Those who sympathize with ana support the etr le against U.S. aggression for national salvation or those who refus- > carry put orders of the United States and puppets to harm the people will have t c ne r 11 s : • e c o r d e d.

individuals, groups, or vnits who have broken away fro: fche .uppet amy and voluntarily apply to join the Liberation Armed Forces for fighting against the bed

States to save the country are welcomed and enjoy equal fcre tent* Regarding those individuals or units who have broken away from the puppet army and administration :.: riser, against the LLS, aggressors to save the country, the front st redely to Jc

actions . itii them in the fight against the IKS. aggressors on a basis of equality,

ual respect, and assistance so as together to protect the pecple andliberate the fa the -id.

Those functionaries of the puppet administration who iroluntear to serve the country and the people in the state machine after the liberation or South .ill

enjoy equal treatment. Those in the puppet amy and the puppet adt Ihlstration at any level who have committed crimes against the people but are how sincerely repentant Hill be pardoned, There who redeem their crimes by meritorious deeds ..ill be rewarded accord! ' y Captured officers and men of the puppet array Jill enjoy humanitarian treatment and clemency.

Those in the U.S. Army and its satellite armies who cross over to the people's side will be given hind treatment end helped t - return to their f Lies when conciil ss permit. Captured U.S. and satellite troops will be treated as captured puppc troops.

Xj To protect the rights and interests of overseas V aese.

To welcome the patriotism of overseas Vietnamese and highly value all their contributions to the resistance to U.S.. aggress for national salvation of the people. To protect the rights and interests of overseas Vietnamese, To help these overseas Vietnamese who wish to return to take pare in the building of the country,

14--To protect, the legitimate rights and interests of foreign residents in South Vietnam To -welcome those foreign residents who have contributed to the Vie riese pec: r s resistance to U*S« aggression for national salvation All foreign residents lli r'-r in South Vietnam must respect the independence and sovereignty of Vietnam and obey law of the national democratic administration To protect the legitimate rights a. interests of all foreign residents who do not cooperate with the U.S. imperialists and their henchmen in opposing the Vietnamese people and who do not harm the independence and sovereignty of Vietnam, To give adequate consideration to the rights and interests of those foreign residents who have directly or indirectly supported the Vietnamese people's resistance to U.S. aggression for national salvation.

232

*

Declassified per Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

* <

i - .:;; er IS

v; :■;■;

?: re&o] ''"; f oppo: • ' tsh all do cies ; the 1. S : t m< their-

hi •.-:. ained at s**s lsc< ' betweei i W« e C nese resi'iy:*"

Ln Victnsyn aru exploiting, repressing, and fore tese res ten" :'

Vietn ness clsizenshl; To punisl ird ag nts and seere agents t>j the

imperialists and a South Vie- tw ippet £ it til b ration.

II,! to Restore Iior::.:0 Relations 3etweei vf-Iortli an th Vietnam Proceed Ten

Peaceful Reunification of the Fatherland

Vietnam is one. Ths Vietn&j pe< . ••.■• one. Ho force can i & &ur fat! i rlar

Reunification of the country is the sac rod aspiration of c - c entire le, Vic

■ be reunifie :

The policy of the: BFLSV consists of the following:

1--The retn fieation of Vietnam will be realized step :y step and through peaceful means on the principle of negotiation between the two zone: without eifche ie

using pressure against the other and without foreign interference

2—Fending the . Ificatior. of the country, the people in \ -ones will nakc joint

efforts to oppoc reign invasion and 'oCend the fatherland at the sane ti:

endeavor to e^psiftc! ec ;ic and cull 1 exchanges* The pe,< in both zones arc

free to e:.c!in:^e letters, to go fron one rone to another, an to choose tl * pla cf residence

IV. To App\y a Foreign Policy of Peace and neutrality

rrv

The IFPXiSV applies a foreign policy of peace and neutrality, a foreign policy L;hiel guarantees the independence, sovereignty, unity, and t- LtoriaJ integrity cf the country a a helps safeguard world peace. In ctore concrete terots this policy c of the following points;

l--To establish djplonatic relations with all countries regardless of their social and political : tern on the principle of mutual respect for each other's indeps: ace, sovereignty, and territorial integrity » without infringement upon each other, without interference into each other's internal affairs, territory, equality, mutual benefits, and peaceful cc istence To abolish all unequal treaties which the puppet

ijnistration has signed with the United States or any Other country To re;,pec the cononic and cultural Interests of those countries which sympathise with, support or assist the str ■■ ! e against U.S. aggression for national salvation of the Vi -;c3o fie. To accept technical and economic assistance from any covntr; withcu*

ions attached. To join no military alliance, to accept no military personnel or nil: ary bases of foreign countries on South Viethaa territo

2--To strengthen friendly relations with all countries which pathise fc'ith, support,

or assist the struggle against U.S. aggression for national salvation of the Vietnamese people To strengthen relations of good neighborhood with Can 1 - a and Lacs. To unceasingly consolidate solidarity and mutual assistance between the rjcooles of the Indochinese countries with a view to defending their respective independence! sovcrei, , and territorial integrity against the aggressive and ; r-

: revocation policy of the U.S. imperialists and their henchr.ien.

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NMD Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 i

i ■p I e;.. i I r

SO'.': ViE ;

-- Active . support the] nationa] iiteration mo«Ffcoen1 of the peoples in .'.sia. ":;:>?&, and latin America against imperialism and old ar lialisci Active

Support th* stru >f the American people agairst t- e t'.3. imperisli war of

aggression m iTietnas Actively sapport trie sr,ru£s2e for peace, democracy, and sog iail pr ogre ss in aJ c on n t r ie s ih th e w arid*

-

f r *~ :uivc.'jy struggle? to contribute to the safeguarding of world peace, oppose bellicose and aggressive iroperiaxisl u by U.S. imperial 1-s Demand the

dissolution of the fiscres&lyfc military blocs and forei _;.\ military bases o:

ceasii ;' ; consolidate arid develop relations with international democratic organisations and the peoples of alJ count] ss mcM 5U •., the ;ari people Actively

itribute to the consolidation and devel >p nt of the worig pe ple : s front lupi of Vietnas alalia I 'j 3. imperialist aggre&s ■„ for natici se and

peace

truggle against n ; aggression, for ... i nai saival oi aur people is e

t&elj ■ 5 b**i -ici'LOur, cause It concerns not only vhe dest of our people a

present and all a future jfenera tons au* also the Interests of the peoples in t: world who are strug Lxng for peace t nations] independence, democracy t and social progress In order to accomplish tnat glorl- cause, our people, already united j n at unite still more closely and broadly

The tJJvLSv teralj welcomes all pblil parties, r.a^3 organizatidhSj and patridti

and progressive personalities who broadly rail} within and outside the front in order-to defeat together the U.S. aggressors and their :

te struggle against 0 S, agaves- ,, for rmfcionaa salvation ot our people is - Jusi cause Oar peopJe throughout country &£*e of one rcind to fight a defeat the If.5,

aggressors and their henchmen, s rapathy, support j and assistance of the people

c socialist countries, tin Asian, African arid Latin American countries, and peace-loving, Justice-loving people alj wgr'the world, inc. ting the progre&i re pe pie in

te United Stater, are oecoming deeper ami stronger daj &y clay V'e are billing z< will surely win complete victory,

IIo matter how frenzied, brutal, obdurate, and perfidious the U S. imperialists raaj be, they will inevitably meet with bitter failure In their criminal schemes^

In the supreme interests of the fatherland, Jet our entire people in South Viet iai Stren^.thc t..elr solidarity, millions as one, and rush roruzrd shoulder to s! In the impetus of bur victories to completely defeat the t] a pressors anrj theii

stooge administration, and together with 'our northern compatriots to fulfil] the great and glorious cause of liberating the souths defend ij the north, %n& pv ■• Ji -.; toward the peaceful reunification of the fatherland

The WfltSV pledges to be always worthy of the confidence of our compatriots and our Trie:lis the five continents Vie Vietnamese people wi!3 surely be victor

0 Z. aggressors and their henchmen trill certainly be de eo, The "FLSV program

for liberation is "sure to materialise( Fighters and compatriots throughout Soutl Vietnam, under the glorious banner of the IfFLhV, M?.rch forward heroically!

234

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h. ADDENDA (UMCLASSIFIED)

INDEX

Subject

Page

Hanoi Attitude on Bombing, 10 September I967 . . 236

Chronology of Viet Peace Efforts December 1966-February 3.967 237

The Ashmore letter to Ho Chi Minli - 1967. 238

Publication of Ashmore Peace Feeler Attempts:

*

New York Times ... 239

Washington Post . 2**1

Comparison of Ashmore-LBJ Letters (by New York Times ) 2kk

State Department Denial of Ashmore Charges ( "NY Times Account) 2^5

Text of State Department Comment on Ashmore Episode. 246

State Department Press Conference Held by William P. Bundy on

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

Sunday, 5«»tf. 20, 1961 • THE WASHINGTON POST

• . » I"lJ

'

Hanoi Stifle s"'.

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amide i

Doiab Step-111.

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-

By Murrey Mardcr * Was&tnttoa To.^ staff Writer

North Vietnam is growing; ~Schocnbrun, who was In

North Vietnam for nine clays,

*>

more unyielding about peace talks, rather than more flexible, as American bombings intensify, according to diplomatic reports reaching Washington.

This rising mood of militan-cy in Hanoi was one reason why Secretary of State Dean Rusk on Friday deliberately downgraded prospects for negotiations.

All accounts coming out of Hanoi, through public and private channels, »how that the

related his experiences in Bangkok on Thursday. They were broadcast last night tABC Television's "Scope/' to be reb road cast here at 1 p.m. today on Channel 7;.

Pham Van Dong was dos* cribed as "planning for an Ai. jrican invasion and expecting the aerial devastation of Hanoi.

*

Prepared lo Fight On

"He believes," said Schoen-brun t "that in a hist act of desperation we ate going to wipe out Hanoi. . . , He is prepared to fight on in the mountains

officially disseminated view of for as long as it can possibly the- war from there is pre-' take."

ciscly Jhc reverse of the official version in Washington.

North Vietnam contends, and what is more, perhaps believes, that time and strategy are on its side for outlasting the United States.

Premier Is Quoted

In an interview in Hanoi last week with North Vietnamese . Premier Pham Van Dong by American newsman David Schoenbmn, the Premier was quoted as saying:

"As for peace talks . . , the* initiative Is up to the United States. You have to stop bomb ing us unconditionally. Jf you want peace talks, they can fof low, but . . . there wMl be no reciprocity. There will be H*J bargaining. There will bo no blackmail, and wc will not pay ransom to pirates."

As for the subject of talks, according to other reports relayed to Washington, Hanoi maintains there is essentially only one real topic: Withdrawal of United States forces from Vietnam.

The Premier was reported reluctant even to talk' about the possibility of peace discussions. ''He is, I think" said Schocnbrun, "totally a hawk.* 1

Despite the heavy American bombing of North Vietnam Schoenburn, like other visitors, said he could detect "no evidence of fatigue" among the people but only resiliency —strengthened, not weakened,

by the escalating air war.

Pham Van Dong was quoted as saying:

"We have one overriding problem only, and that is how to exist and how lo survive, and our whole country is geared to this.

"You Americans have other problems, You have racial problems. You have world commitments. Vietnam is only one of your problems. Maybe you have got a million—maybe you have got 2 million—Americans who are. devoting themselves seriously, full time to the Vietnamese war. We have 16 million. So wc outnumber I you 8 to L"

kike a Time Bomb*

In focusing on the racial rioting in American cities as a major plus in North Vietnam's favor, Dong in an Aug. 31 speech said: "This struggle is like a time bomb at the heart of the U.S. capitalist society/ * Dong *3S reported by Schoonbrun to have scoffed at the Sept. 3 presidential election in South Vietnam m the same vein as have North Viet* nam's public statements scorning it as "low comedy/ 1 But American analysts believe the election seriously discomfited Hanoi. They note that the pro-pram of the National Liberation Front, the political arm of the Vkteong guerrillas In South Vietnam, has been revised lo pledge a "really democratic" election.

At the Texas'White House yesterday, press - secretary Georse Christian said the President "is aware" of reports that South Vietnam has advised Great Britain that it means to approach North Vietnam soon with an offer of db rcct peace talks that would in* elude the NLF-Vietcong. .•

Secretary Husk on Friday Said the United States "would welcome some basis on which there could be a general re-there could be a general reconciliation among the people ble basis." But"*he said "that doesn't mean that the NLF has a status as a government . . . or that it should be given a veto on the possibility of pulling North Vietnam and South Vietnam apart militarily."

A leading House Kept* can, Jtfelvin R. Laird (R-Wis.), said in Chicago on Thursday night that: "It's increasingly evident that the Administration is pressing Saigon to I gotiate directly with the Viet-cong." Laird said "they (the NLF) have the power in South Vietnam at the present time and must take part in negotiations."

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

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Hhrono&osrv

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By Chalmers M. Roberts

T7asb!nstoa Post Staff Writer

The record indicates that the Ashmore-Baggs peace effort ran afoul of a change in American policy which occurred at the moment they were involved in Vietnam diplomacy.

This is the record, as far as it is now known, of the pertinent events:

D33C- 4, 19G$—Poland reported to the United States that North Vietnam was prepared to send a man to Warsaw to meet an American representative and to do so without demanding as a precondition an end to the American bombing of the North. . ■

American officials subsequently contended that independent checks showed this to be a Polish view, not that of North Vietnam.

Dec. 13-14—A merican planes raid near Hanoi, Poland later privately blamed the raids for ending chances "or a meeting. Aficr the aids Hanoi began to stress the demand that bombing must cease unconditionally before there could be talks.

Dec. 26-Jan. 6, 19C1—Harrison Salisbury of the New York Times created a furor with dispatches from Hanoi picturing civilian destruction from the American raids. Officials here said Hanoi had let Salisbury in as part of a campaign to force an end to the bombing. Ashmore and Baggs arrived in Hanoi the day Salisbury left.

Jan. 12 — Ashmore and Baggs met Ho Chi Minn who stressed an end to the bombing Ashmore now writes that "we had not brought back" from this interview "any hard proposal" from Ho "beyond the reiteration of his unqualified commit-

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ment to enter into negotiations' 1 if the U.S. halted the bombing.

Ashmore reported to State Department officials that he and Baggs fejt that "Ho seemed prepared to consider a specific proposal based on a formula of mutual de-escalation* 3 of the fighting.

Early January to early February — The United States secretly sent four memoranda to Hanoi describing, officials say, possible methods of deescalation. These messages, yet to be made public' were handed by an American embassy official in Moscow to a North Vietnamese representative.

Jan. 27 —Hanoi's man in Moscow gave a reply to the American official. Later the State Departmnt described the reply as "a diatribe against the United States"

Jan. 28—North Vietnamese Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh in an interview" with Australian Communist journalist Wilfred Burchctt said that "it is only after the unconditional cessation of U.S. bombing and all other acts of war against the DRV (North Vietnam) that ■ there could be talks between the DRV and the U.S."

Feb, 2—President-Johnson prepared a.letter to Ho in which he took up the Bur-chett interview points. Mr./ Johnson said he would "or- ■ der a cessation of bombing" and also halt "further augmentation of U.S. forces in South t Vietnam as soon as I am assured that infiltration into South Vietnam by land and sea has stopped." These "acts of restraint," he said, "would make possible serious private discussions." This letter, however, was not turned over to Hanoi's man in Moscow until Feb. 8 and the delay has never been explained^

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Feb* 4—A shmore and Baggs met at the Stateo Be* partment with Undersecretary Nicholas deB. Katzen-bach and other top officials but not including Secretary Dean Rusk,

A letter from Ashmore to Ho was drafted with Assistant Secretary William P. Bundy, whose area includes Vietnam, as the chief departmental draftsman.

The key sentence in the letter stated that "senior officials" at State "expressed opinion that some reciprocal restraint" was necessary along with a halt to the bombing and an end to the influx of American troops if talks were to take place.

Feb. 5—The draft letter was delivered to Ashmore at Fu lbright's house, Ashmore mailed it that afternoon. The letter did not specify the "reciprocal restraint" although the President's letter of three days earlier had specified an end to North Vietnamese infiltration into the South.

In addition, on the day (Feb.« 2) the Administration said the Presidential letter was drafted, Mr. Johnson told a press conference that "just almost any step" would be a suitable response from Hanoi. He also had said that "we would be glad to explore any reciprocal action." Sometime between Feb. 2 and 9 the official American terms were hardened.

Feb. S — Soviet Premier, Alexei Kosygin, who. was in London Feb. 613, said at a press conference that the Trinh interview with Burchctt "boils down" to saying that if the U.S. unconditionally stopped the bombing, "then it would be possible" to open talks, Kosygin thus publicly changed Trihh's crucial word "could" into "would." He was never

contradicted by Hanoi on. this. Furthermore, Kosygin passed the word to Washington, which had inquired as to when talks would begin, that they could start in three or four weeks,

Feb. 9 — Secretary Husk, at a press conference which had been announced by the White House, said that "for

' some time now there has been evident a systematic

^campaign by the Commu-

nist side to bring about an unconditional and permanent cessation of the bombing of North Vietnam without any corresponding military action on their side, in exchange for the possibility of talks — talks which are thus far formless and without content."

Rusk also distinguished between a "pause in the bombing (here he seemed to indicate he would agree to a pause in exchange for talks) and a "permanent cessation." For the latter to take place, he said, "we must know the military consequences." The U.S., he said, cannot stop the bombing without reciprocity for that would be "closing off one-half of the war while the rest of it goes on full force,"

In short. Busk was surfacing the central point of the President's letter to Ho, the contents of which were not made public until Hanoi broadcast it March 21.

Feb. 10 — Ho said he received the Johnson letter on this day. Ashmore assumes it arrived before his own letter with the less specific request on the point of reciprocity.

During this period, Feb.-8-14, there was a pause in the bombing over the Tet holiday in Vietnam, including a Presidentially ordered short extension. ^

Feb. 13—Ho in a letter to Pope Paul VI assailed the U.S. He coupled an uncon-. ditional end to the bombing with the withdrawal of American forces and the recognition of the National Liberation Front, the political arm of the Vietcong. In Washington this was taken as a reply to the President. Resumption of the bombing was ordered.

Feb. 15—Ho replied to the President in words similar to the Pope. "A little later," writes Ashmore, he and Baggs received a reply to the Ashmore letter saying there did not seem to be any point to their making a second visit to Hanoi.

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

(n»\^J\s 1<1 wforeran tW,. IS ^<t : Y. KitV

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I Letter to ■ Hanoi Chief

FoHou big is the text of the letter by Harry S. Ashmore £o President Ho Chi Mink:

Dear Mr. President:

Mr. William Baggs and I

•have made a full report to

appropriate officials of the

United States Government on

■,our recent conversation with

you in Hanoi. Ambassador Luis Quintanllla has communicated his views to the U.S. Ambassador in Mexico City.

The State Department has • expressed itself as most grateful for your thoughtful approach to the possibility of an ultimate settlement of the hostilities between the United States and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.

In our several discussions with senior officials of the \ State Department they took occasion to reiterate points .we believe are already known to you. They emphasized that the U.S. remains prepared for .secret discussions at any time, without conditions, and that such discussions might cover the whole range of topics n vant to a peaceful settlement. They reiterated that the Geneva Accords might be the framework for a peaceful so-lution.

They expressed particular-interest in your suggestion to us that private talks could begin provided the U.S. stopped bombing your country, and ceased introducing additional U.S. troops into Vietnam, They expressed the opinion that some reciprocal restraint to Indicate that neither side intended to use the occasion of the talks for military advantage would provide tangible evidence of the good faith of all parties in the prospects for a negotiated settlement.

In the light of these concerns, they expressed great interest in any clarification of this point that you might wish to provide through a communication to us.

Speaking now wholly for ourselves, we believe the essentia! condition for productive talks is an arrangement under which neither side stands to gain military advantage during the period of negotiation. To achieve this end it mny be that preliminary secret discussions would be helpful to determine the out-- line of a possible peaceful

settlement. 'As we see it, these are practical considerations that have nothing to do with questions of "face." There is no doubt in our minds that the American Government genuinely seeks peace. As private citizens, our sole concern is in facilitating a discussion that will bring all matters at issue to official consideration. It is in this sense that we convey these comments, and invite any reply you may wish to make, which' of course we would report to our Government in complete discretion.

May I take this occasion to renew our thanks for the courteous and considerate treatment we received in Hanoi throughout our visit and for the honor of our most useful conversation with you.

If you feel that further personal conversation with IUr. Baggs and me is in order we would, of course, return to Hanoi at your convenience.

HAKRY S. ASHMORE I

Declassified per Executive Order J3526, Section 3 3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 20JI

i

'Ashmore, Editor Who Met

With Ho Chi Minb, Says

Efforts Were Undercut

TWO LETTERS AT ISSUE

One From the White House i Said to Have Conflicted With Intermediary's

By HEDRICK SMI7

5?«tel lo The Sfc* York H

■ WASHINGTON, Sept. 17—The! editor and writer, Harry S. Ash-more, reported-today that he relayed a peace bid to Ho Chi Minh on behalf of the State De-. partment last February. But Mr. Ashmore charged that President Johnson then "effectively and -utafly canceled" the secret .ittfativc by sending an uncompromising letter to the North Vietnamese President

Mr, Ashmore said his letter had been written in response to a "conciliatory" conversation he had had with Ho Chi Minh in Hanoi last January* He added that Mr. Johnson's letter, setting forth "most stringent" American terms for peace, reached Hanoi before the message that Mr. Ashmore had been authorized to send.

'Duplicity* Charged

Ho Chi Minh, in a letter to ,Mr. Johnson dated Feb. 15— which became public last March 21—rejected Mr. John-

• son's demands. ■ As a consequence, Mr. Ashmore has indicated, the secret State Department message routinely re-

* ceived a . negative response from Hanoi.

" Mr. Ashmore, former execu-Itive editor of The Arkansas Gazette, is now executive vice esident of the Center for the .^itudy of Democratic Institutions at Santa Barbara, Calif.

■'•He said President Johnson's letter had contradicted the terms,

*~of the message approved by[

1

the State Department. Mr.'Ashmore also accused the President of "crude duplicity" 2nd I the Administration of ^'double dealing."

. William P. Bundy, Assistant Secretary of, State for East Asian Affiars, said the State De-apartment "had discussions with .Mr. Ashmore and Mr. Baggs, as we would with any American who has talked with leaders in Hanoi."

But he refused to comment on Mr. Ashmore's reported peace approach or his charge that the President's intervention had upset the effort

Intensive Efforts Recalled

"Any comment must await a careful study_of Mr, Ashmore's -story " Mr. Bundy said. "I cannot comment on something like this uver the phone." Y Other officials, without confirming the report, recalled that ♦last winter was a time of complicated contacts with Hanoi. The State Department has previously disclosed that the United States Embassy in Moscow made five contacts with . North Vietnamese diplomats in [January, culminating with the ;. delivery of President Johnson's -letter.

Early in February, the United States was also communicating with Hanoi through Prime Minister Wilson of Britain and Premier Aleksei N, Kosygin of the Soviet Union, who were meeting in London.

Mr. Ashmore told of the peace approach in a 15,000-. word article, "The Public Pveia-tions of Peace," printed in Center Magazine, a new bimonthly publication of his organization. The peace approach, he re-; ported, was an outgrowth of a .trip he took to Hanoi last Jan-I uary with William 0. Baggs, * editor of The Miami News. They -'arrived in Hanoi Jan, 6, had a - private two-hour conversation .with Ho Chi Minh Jan. 12, left Hanoi on Jan, 14 and reported to the State Department on ■ Jan. 18. . In a telephone interview today, Mr. Ashmore said he had .refrained from disclosing the ; episode until now because "we -thought that as long as we

'

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might bo a useful channel we didn't want to jeopardize it."

But he said the latest expansion of the war indicated tl "whatever kind of channel we bad is no use now" and that there was no longer any point in keeping secret the unsuc-i cessful maneuvering of last ' winter.

Mr. Ashmore said that during the contacts with North

■ Vietnamese leaders he and Air.

• Baggs four.d Ho Chi Minh and J other senior officers "deliver-l ately conciliatory"

Ho seemeel prepared to consider a specific proposal based on a formula of mutual de-escalation/ 1 Mr. Ashmore added. "Ho had understood that we

■ would report our conversation ■to the State Department and ' expected some response, since

* he had made arrangements to have any,further message sent

■ directly to him."

• t In the telephone Interview, Mr. Ashmore recalled that Ho ■Chi Minh had insisted on a halt in American bombing of Norih .Vietnam as a requisite for peace talks. Ho Chi Minh also indicated that Hanoi would like to sec a halt in the steady build-up of American forces in South Vietnam before talks began, Mr. Ashmore went on.

In his article, Mr, Ashmore says he ihan drafted, in collaboration with Mr. Bundy, a carefully worded letter of a page and a half. It was sent to Hanoi Feb. 5 through a previously established channel in Cambodia.

Mr. Ashmore says the letter appeared to reduce American conditions for a halt in bomb-' ing, asking for some move of "reciprocal restraint" by Hanoi.

In public statements, administration officials were dsmand-: ing a "reciprocal reduction" of the fighting by Hanoi.

Key passages of the Ashmore . letter, as reported in the article,

■ were as follows:

Key sections of the letter, as reported in the article, referred to the efforts of Mr, Ashmore

. and Mr, Baggs as follows:

"In our several discussions with senior officials of the State Department they emphasized that the U.S. remains prepared for secret discussions at any time, without'conditiers, and that such discussions mi cover the whole range of topics relevant to a peaceful settlement, They reiterated that the Geneva, accords might be the framework for a peaceful solution.

- "They expressed particular interest in your f :tion to us that private tall >utd begin provided that U.S. stopped bombing your country, m and

•_ ceased introducing additional U.S. troops into Vietnam. They

Declassified per Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 i

expressed the opinion that some reciprocal restraint to indicate that neither side intended to use the occasion of the talks [for military advantage would I provide tangible evidence of I good faith of all parties in the prospects for a negotiated settlement." *

President Johnson's letter to Ho Chi Minh, dated Feb. 2, was relayed through the United States Embassy in Moscow to North Vietnamese diploma President Chi Minh said he received President Johnson's letter on Feb, 10.

Mr. Ashmore charged that tlie Presidential message contradicted the Ashmore-Baggs message In several important respects and thus nullified it. He noted that the Presidential letter did , not mention the Geneva accords as a basis for negotiation, as the other message had.

He also, noted that the President had offered to stop the bombing and the American troop build-up in South Vietnam, but to do so only after receiving assurances that North Vietnamese infiltration into South Vietnam had ceased.

Mr. Ashmore referred to this passage from the Johnson letter:

"I am prepared to order a cessation of bombing against your country and the stopping of further augmentation of U.S. forces in South Vietnam as soon as I am assured that infiltration into South Vietnam by land and by sea has stopped. These acts of. restraint on both sides would, I believe, make it possible for us to conduct serious arid private discussions leading toward an early peace. Mr. Ashmore maintained that j-the Presidential letter #was timed to put a "time squeeze" on Hanoi, an aspect that had carefully been avoided in the drafting of the Ashmore-Baggs message. He referred to this excerpt:

"I make this proposal to you now with a specific sense of urgency arising from the imminent new, year holidays in Vietnam, If you are able to accept this proposal I see no reason why it could not take effect at the end of the new year, or Tet, holidays. The proposal I have made would be greatly strengthened if your military authorities and those

of the Government of South Vietnam could promptly negotiate an extension of the Tet truce.' 1

Mr. Ashmore's article comments: "William Budy and the' others who labored over our draft letter had insisted that it would be a mistake to tie any proposal to the Tet bombing pause, sir.co this would be interpreted by Ho as an effort to

force his hand without adequate

opportunity to consult with his

own people and the National?

Liberation Front," or Vietcortg.! The bombing pause, part of Tet, began 7 A.M. Feb, S. It Feb. 12, but President Johnson extended it about 40 hours to avoid embarrassing Premier Kosygin, who had bQQii in London over the Tet period trying to arrange peace talks.

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Ashmore Says Feeler lo Hanoi Was Nullified

m

By Murrey Marder

Washington Fast StafC Writer

A prominent former newspaper editor charged yesterday thai the Johnson Administration joined In and then "effectively and brutally cancelled' 1 a previously undisclosed peace overture to Hanoi last February.

The disclosure plus accusations of "double dealing 1 * and an "almost total absence of candor" on the part of President Johnson and the State Department were made by ' Harry S. Ash more, executive vice president of the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions at Santa Barbara, Calif. -

Ashmore visited Hanoi in January. He portrayed the President, and by implication, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, ^as nullifying a secret "conciliatory" letter to Hanoi that her State Department officials joined Ashmore in draft* ing, by sending a presidential letter setting tougher terms for peace talks.

The conditions for halting the American bombing of North Vietnam to produce negotiations are still at the center of current national and international debate.

White House Press Secretary George Christian said last night that he was unfamiliar with Ashmore's account or the letter he cited. Secretary Rusk said he had not talked with Ashmore or his associates and thus felt it inappropriate to get into the matter now, a spokesman said. Other officials had no immediate comment

Ashmore, formerly the Pulitzer Prize-winning editor of the Arkansas Gazette of Little j Rock, Ark., met. with .North

Vietnamese President Ho Chi Minh in Hanoi last Jan. 12. With Ashmore were William *C. Baggs, editor of the Miami (Fla.) News and also a dlrec-r of the Santa Barbara Denver, and Luis QuiniamUa, former Mexican Ambassador to the United States.

Their meetings with North Vietnamese leaders were described at the time only as an effort to solicit North Vietnam's attendance at an unofficial peace convocation sponsored by the California-based Center at Geneva, last May.

Ashmore, in a lengthy article written for his organization's Center Magazine, said the trip was undertaken with secret recognition by the Administration that it also might "open up a useful channel of[ communication with the North Vietnamese."

Newsman Departs 4

At the State 3 ; tment, he said, "we were asked to keep the trip secret as long as possible . . ." They entered Hanoi on Jan. G, the day that Harrison Salisbury of The New York/Times was departing on

the International Control Commission plane that carried them to North Vietnam from Cambodia, and the news of the Ashmore * Baggs - Quinanilla visit became known.

They saw President Ho for about two hours on Jan. 12.

By the time Ashmore and Baggs returned to Los Angeles on Jam 15, Ashmore wrote, the, Salisbury articles about civil- j ian casualties caused by bombing North Vietnam had "creat-' ed a national furore," with a "concerted effort" in Washington "to discredit Mr. Salisbury . . ™ Ashmore said "our reports were a complete vindication of Mr, Salisbury," but he and Baggs avoided any comment about their, attempts to open private communications with Hanoi.

"At the State Department's request," said Ashmore, he and Baggs "managed to hide out for three days after our return, and to meet secretly in Washington with the Department's top echelon."

Departmental Briefings

"The briefings (at State) went on intermittently .for a day and a half," said Ashmore, and covered the conversation with Ho in great detail.

"We had not brought back, any hard proposal from Ho ; Chi Minh," Ashmore continued, "beyond the reiteration of his unqualified commitment to enter into negotiations if the United States halted the bombing of NQrth Vietnam. This could not on its face be said to meet the stated American requirement of a recipro-

cal gesture of reduced military action by Hanoi.

"But Mr. Baggs and I/' Ashmore said, "could offer our judgment that the tone of the conversation had been deliberately conciliatory and that Ho seemed prepared to consider a specific proposal based on a formula of mutual de-escalation. ,

"Moreover, no real risK was entailed m finding out whether this was so. Ho had understood that we would report our conversation to the State Department and had made arrangements to have any response sent directly to him." 'Schizoid Quality'

Ashmore and Baggs then left Washington. Ashmore said "our dealings with the Department had begun to take on a pronounced schizoid quality/

Baggs, he said, had done some confidential diplomatic, errands for the late President Kennedy in the Caribbean, and "was on fairly intimate terms with a good many" top State Department officials.

Ashmore described himself as "encumbered by identification with the eclipsed Adlai Stevenson wing of the Democratic Party and by a long personal association with the Johnson Administration's lead-in* bete noire, (Sen.) J. \\ litem Fulbright" Added Ashmore, "Finally, we represented the Center, an unconventional, and therefore automatically ■ suspect, institution."

Ashmore wrote that we soon began to feel that we were confronted by two distinct State Departments."

"One, which obviously regarded us with profound distrust, apparently was headed by Secretary Rusk," said Ashmore, "who never saw us or otherwise acknowledged our

presence.

"The other (State) Department," said Ashmore, "which appeared to be seriously interested in negotiations with Hanoi, included Under Secretary Nicholas deB. Kat-zenbachf Averell Harriman, the elder statesman who speaks with the authority of a personal representative of the President, and Assistant Secretary William Bundy. who is immediately in charge of [Southeast Asian Affairs."

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Invitations Rejected I The composition of a page-

J fand-a-half letter, to bo sent

At the State Department's over Ashmore's signature, request, said Ashmore, he and! "consumed most of a Saturday Baggs rejected invitations to afternoon" he said. "It was *p**ify before either Senate or .allowed to simmer overnight, se committees, and to stay! was reconsidered without our ~««. of the news as much as j presence at an upper-echelon possible during "the next few meeting on Sunday after-weeks, while our report pre-: noon," said Ashmore, and ""the sumably bounced back and final version was delivered in forth between the two (State) a plain manila envelope to the Departments." J residence of Sen, Fulbright,

Finally, he said, Sen. Ful

i

1

brig h t expressed surprise-when he asked Baggs if they had reported their conversation with Ho to President Johnson personally, and was told no. Fulbright raised that with the President at a White House function, said Ashmore, "and thereby pinked the nerve

that activates the President's consensus reflex."

Ashmore related that the President said he thought it unwise to see Ashmore and Baggs personally" and start speculation, but wanted Ful-bright "to be absolutely satisfied that we were being taken

where Mr. Baggs and I had

gone for luncheon."

"I mailed it myself that afternoon, Feb. 5," said Ashmore, "under the perhaps pro-'pbetie postmark of the John Foster Dulles International Airport, By prior arrangement, the letter was to be mailed to Cambodia by regular mail and forwarded from there to Hanoi."

Ashmore said:

"The key passages in our letter (to Ho) read:

" In our several discussions with senior officials of the Slate Department . . . they emphasized that the U.S. re-

seriously and treated proper- mains prepared for secret dis-ly" The President, Ashmore cussions at any time, without said, suggested that the Sena-, tor sit in at the next session.

at the State Department, ,

"The President's interven-" Ashmore continued, pro-, u ,ed a meeting with the "De-; partmcnl's upper hierarchy, (minus Secretary Rusk)," and: Fulbright, "plus a silent While House observer as witness,"

Ashmore said last night that, they met in Under Secretary; Katzenbaeh's- office on the morning and afternoon of

conditions, and that such discussions might cover the whole range of topics relevant to a peaceful settlement. They reiterated that the Geneva Accords (of 1954 and 1962 on Southeast Asia) might be the* framework for a peaceful solution, i

" 'They expressed particular interest, in your suggestion to us that private talks could begin provided the U.S. stop-; ped bombing your country,

Feb. 4. The principals there A an( j ceased introducing addi-' he said, also included William ^ional U.S. troops into Viet"

Bundy and Harrmian. |

"When Sen. Fulbright had finished" outlining his views, Ashmore wrote, "and the air-con ditionins had whisked

iaway the last traces of brim-[stone, the decision was taken

to dispatch a reply to Ho Chi Minh..."

In it, Ashmore, it was agreed that Baggs and he "would express the Department's view that it might be possible to suspend the bombing and initiate negotiations, without specific concessions beyond an agreement that neither side .would use the occasion to improve Us military position/ 1

'The letter also was to suggest that Mr. Baggs and I 1 return to Hanoi for fur-inform ?.l discussions, or that arrangements could be made to phase us out if it were desired that the matter proceed directly to the official level."

nam. They expressed the opinion that some reciprocal restraint to indicate that neither side intended to use the occa-sion of the talks for military'

advantage would provide tangible evidence of the good faith of all parties in the prospects for a negotiated settlement ..."

,The key phrase here was -the call for "reciprocal re-'straint," sources on the Ash-more-Baggs side of the issue stressed last night. These sources said it was emphasized in the discussions in the State Department that this terminology would leave open many

options, without settin* out *ny specific demand for*what would be termed adequate™e ciprocal restraint" on either side s military actions

Said Ashmore:

"This conciliatory feeler was effectively and brutally cancelled before there was any chance to determine what response Hanoi might have made.

Cessation for Holiday

"On Feb. 14, after a temporary cessation of the bombing for the Tet holiday (in Vietnam) and an ostentatious two-day extension beyond the originally announced termination, the aerial attack on North [Vietnam was resumed and escalated"

But it was not until afterward that Ashmore and Baggs learned, apparently when the rest of the world did, that a presidential letter considerably different than the one they collaborated on, was written even before theirs was, on Feb. 2.

"Later (on March 21, 1967)

it was revealed in Hanoi, and

confirmed in Washington, that

the President, under date of

Feb. 2, had already dispatched

fan offsetting message," said

[Ashmore, "to Ho Chi Minh

(over his own signature.

"This was transmitted from' Moscow on Feb. 8, the day the bombing was suspended and received in Hanoi on Feb, 10. It was certainly in Ho's hands when ours arrived "

That letter from the President, Ashmore contended, "set forth ... the most stringent demands yet made for advance assurance that Hanoi would halt infiltration of troops to the South, The uncompromising tone of the presidential message thoroughly disposed of the careful tempering we

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had undertaken In those Ion* said Ashmore, '*, . . the dis-. fly-specking sessions** in the:Maimers consisted of no more

State Department.

The key language in Presidents message was:

"I am prepared to order a ( cessation of bombing against] your country and the stopping]** jW - - • may he less a case ol further augmentation 0 r of deliberate dissembling than United States forces in South of Pervasive ignorance of ulti-Vietnam as soon as I am w ™Uc POtay that goes right jo sured that infiltration into the to P of the Cabinet * Ic South Vietnam by land and

than assurance that those he was addressing, at least, were sincerely seeking a settlement." , -

Ash more said "the credibil-

sea has stopped.", Extending Truce

President Johnson also told Ho that the proposal "would be greatly strengthened if your military authorities and those of the Government of South Vietnam could promptly! inally responsible/'

negotiate an extension of the charges ^onMe-DeaHa*'

Tet (lunar New Year holiday)

the said:

"A President who insists on keeping his options open as long as possible, and personally revealing his choices, leaves even his own most exalted associates embarrassing* ly mute in'regard to large affairs for which they are nom-

truce/* then under way.

Hanoi, however, always had adamantly refused any negotiations with the regime in Saigon,

Ashmore said that "William Bundy and the others who labored over our draft letter had insisted that It would be a mistake to tie any proposal to the Tet bombing pause, since this would be interpreted by Ho as an effort to jforce his hand without adequate opportunity to consult with his own people and the NLF" (National Liberation Front, the political arm of the Vietcong guerrillas in South Vietnam.)

"Under date of Feb. 14,"

Ashmore charged, "Mr, John-

json got from Ho Chi Minh the

sharp, negative reply he must

have expected/*

"Ours came a little later,"

Ashmore said that the President "has taken a ping-pong approach" to Vietnam to try to get out of Southeast Asia without appearing to have suffered a major military and political defeat." He said "the , double-dealing to which William Baggs and I were subjected" reflects alternate presidential responses to military pressure and the unpopularity of the war.

The Administration, Ashmore charged, set out "to discredit" the unofficial conference on peace held in Geneva in May entitled "Pacem in Terris II."

The intensified American bombing of the Hanoi-Haiphong area in April, he said, led to North Vietnam's refusal to attend the conference, undermining the concept of the original conference objective.

Ashmore said the State De«

f.said Ashmore, "the simple, un- partment sent a young diplo-exceptionable statement that there did not seem to be any point in Messrs, Ashmore and Baggs coming back to Hanoi at that time."

^Necessarily Subjective*

Ashmore said he could only offer a "necessarily subjective" account of "what actu-

mat, Frank Sieverts, to Geneva in line with its "successful effort to implant in the American media the notion that the Convocation was deliberately and suspiciously loaded against the United States.".

President Johnson, in his dealings with "the American

ally went on in the upper[? reaches of the Administration" mteilmual community. Ash-to account for the diverse let-' mQre charged, "made the ters. i tactical error of confusing his

"From beginning to end of critics with his enemies." Ash-our dealings with the Depart • more salci that "preaching con-ment," he charged, "there was sensus/' the President "had an almost total absence of ni2fJc il impossible of attain-candor on the official side/ ment &>' constant resort to the

". . m We never got a satis- kind of crude duplicity that factory answer," he said, ku>* s l » me but destroys con-"whether the Administration fidence." was realty willing to negotiate! "What the Administration a compromise settlement in desperately needs," said Ash-Victnam or was committed to more, "is the support of men a military victory." !of intellectual capacity and

When Fulbright, at one of ; nioral passion, but these are the State Department meet-! qualities primarily associated ings, "bluntly stated his view!with those Lyndon Johnson that the latter was the case,"'no Idi)£gt» tolerates."

Hi

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Johnson and Ashmore Letters to Hanoi Compared

Following is a comparison

0 flble evidence of the good faith

highlights o*f a letter by Presi-;° f aI1 P ar "? s t *? ^prospects dent Johnson to President Ho^^^.g*g55^ Chi Minh of North Vietnam,!. PRESIDENT JOHNSON. Thete

sent Feb. S, and a letter by^. 0 * 0 *?? d w f y f to overc <? n e Harry S. Ashmore, the editorjthis problem [of communica-

sent Feb 5 tKm J an£ * t0 rnove forward

" President Johnson wrote:

"I am prepared to order a cessation of bombing against for direct talks between trusted your country and the stopping representatives in a secure set-of further augmentation of ting and away from the glare

of publicity. Such talks should

greatly strengthened if your where contacts have already

;

search for a peaceful settlement. That is for us to arrange

occurred. They could meet in

no other country such as

Burma, You may have other

United States forces in South Vietnam as soon as I am assured that infiltration in South Vietnam by land and by sea has stoppea.

"These acts of restraint on >oth sides would, I belie%'e, nake it possible for us to con-iuct serious and private discus-dons leading toward an early

>eace.

MR. ASHMORE wrote; "They high officials of the State Department] expressed particular nterest in your suggestion to js that private talks could be-J £in provided the United States stopped bombing your country and ceased introducing additional United States troops into Vietnam. They expressed the opinion that some "reciprocal restraint to indicate that neither side intended to use the occasion of the talks for military year, or Tet, holidays. The pro-advantage would provide tangi-|posal I have made would be

not be used as a propaganda exercise, but should be a serious effort to find a workable and mutually acceptable solution."

MR. ASHMORE: "They [State Department officials] emphasized that the United States remains prepared for secret discussions at any time, without conditions, and that such discussions might cover the whole range of topics relative to a peaceful settlement/*

PRESIDENT JOHNSON: "I make this proposal to you now

military authorities and thosa of the Governent of South Vietnam could promptly negotiate an extension of the Tet truce." arrangements or sites in mind, MR. ASHMORE relate a pos- and I would try to meet vge: sible agreement to the new year's truce in Vietnam,

MR, ASHMORE: "They [i State Department officials] reiterated that the Geneva accords might be the framework for a peaceful solution."

PRESIDENT JOHNSON did not mention the Geneva gree-ments of 1954 as a possible framework.

PRESIDENT JOHNSON: "As to the site of the bilateral discussions I propose, there arc several possibilities'. We could, for example, have our representatives meet in Moscow

suggestions.

MR. ASHMORE's letter proposed no specific meeting place.

PRESIDENT JOHNSON: "If you have any thoughts about the actions I propose, it would be most important that I receive them as soon as possible."

MR, ASHMORE: "in the light of these concerns, they [trie State Department officials] expressed great interest; in any clarification of this poire [about mutual restraints] that you might wish to provide through a communication to us."

with a specific sense of urgency arising from the imminent new year holidays in Vietnam. If you are able "to accept this proposal I see no reason why it could not take effect at the end of the new

i

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In addition, taking direct issue with Mr. Ashmore, Mr. Bundy said there was "no inconsistency** between the Gov-

Bul when a reporter asked «if the Administration had been

K-j bi

n , ;a „ B

Rejects Ashmore Contention

That White House Letter

to Hanoi Stiffened Terms

; stringing along" the two men, - Mr. Bundy replied, "Absolutely

I not."

ernment - drafted message sent ; The Government's chagrin to Hanoi on Feb. 5 through Mr. P ver the disclosure of the Ash-

more-Baggs peace effort was evident both in Mr. Bundy's *• comments and in a statement ; issued by the State Department. The statement ended

Ashmore and a letter that President Johnson sent to Ho Chi Minh through the Moscow channel on Feb. 8. Mr. Ashmore had contended that the President's letter contradicted the one given him and thus "effectively and brutally canceled' 1 his efforts.

with the observation that the disclosure "will not reassure Hanoi" that future private peace contacts would remain secret.

<i,

Mr. Bundy also spoke of "u Mr. Ashmore, reached by \ dertaklngs" from Mr. Ashmore

and Mb Baggs that thev "would

Text of the State Department statement is on Page 24.

Ey HEDFJCK SMITH

SpgdiX to The Sew 5*rt Times

WASHINGTON, Sept. IS— The Administration today denied charges that President Johnson had "effectively and brutally" sabotaged a peace approach to Hanoi through private channels.

The State Department went to elaborate lengths to reply to the charge by the editor and writer Harry S. Ashmore. Mr. Ashmore wrote yesterday that he acted as a Government-approved intermediary last February only to be undercut by the President, who hardened American terms.

The controversy has arisen out of a trip to Hanoi last Jan. 6 to 14 by Mr. Ashmore and William C. Baggs, editor of The Miami News. They brought back reports of a "conciliatory" conversation with President Ho Chi Minh and were later given a State Department message to send to Hanoi.

Bundy Gives Account

William P. Bundy, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, confirmed today that the Ashmore peace effort had taken place, but he said at a crowded news conference that Mr. Ashmore's version of the events was "misleading."

The burden of his argument was that the Ashmore efforts had been "subsidiary" to a far more active, important and direct official contact with North Vietnamese representa-

ves" in Moscow in January ,and early February. m

telephone late today, said the

Government's argument

"doesn't add up very well/ 1

"My view is that the two let-£ters are inconsistent in tone

and content," he added, "Any* .one can figure it out: they're -both available, now. The tone

of ours is quite conciliatory.

The tone of the President's is : quite harsh/*

; The President's fetter to .Hanoi was published in The

New York Times last March 22

"and Mr. Ashmore's today.

If the Moscow contacts were

so vital. Mr. Ashmore asked,

"why did they send our letter?"

"They were under no com*

pulson," be added. "They could

Ihave said to us: Thank you very much, gentlemen. If you're ever back in Hanoi, send us a

*psstcard/ That would have

\ closed the matter."

Mr. Bundy, who was one of Mr. Ashmore's principal Government contacts last winter, dismissed as nonsense'Mr. Ashmore's assertion that his role

■ had been undermined by conflicts between "two State Departments"— one sympathetic

"to conciliatory efforts and the

/other taking a hard line toward

-Hanoi.

// "Ashmore understandably

-felt his own channel was at e center of the stage/' Mr,

-Bundy said. "It was not."

Mr, Bundy said the Administration had been concentrating

, on its exchanges in Moscow,! which North Vietnam disclosed last March 21. He said he was,

r "simply astounded" that Mr. Ashmore, in his published ac-

- count of last winter's maneuvering, had failed to "consider" the impact of the Moscow contacts. ,

„ Not 'Stringing Along 1

In an hour-long news briefing, unusually detailed for a .subject so delicate as peace approaches, Mr. Bundy said Mr. * Ashmore and Mr. Kaggs had Miot at the time been told of J the Moscow efforts. It would -have been "very unwise*' to ^'disclose them to private citizens, Mr. Bundy added.

not publish" details of their tion, the North Vietnamese effort leader was "deliberately con-

Mr.* Ashmore disclosed the cHiatory" and "seemed pre-i- ■ ica™ pared to consider a specinc

peace approach m a 15,000- proposal fcased m a form * uIa of

word in Center Maga- mutual de-escalation" of the

fighting.

The State Department, while conceding that the two men

zinc, a new bimonthly publication ef the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions tn Santa Barbara, Calif. Mr. Ashmore is executive vice president of the -center and Mr. Baggs one of its directors.

In his article, Mr. Ashmore said they went to Hanoi to arrange for North Vietnamese participation in the convocation Pacem in Terris II, a world forum on peace. It was being arranged by the center to open in May in Geneva.

had reported a "conciliatory tone" in their Hanoi conversations, asserted that their reports, dictated to the Government on Jan, IS, "did not indicate any give" in Hanoi's terms.

"In this conversation, Ho had insisted that there could be no talks between the U.S. and Hanoi unless the bombing were stopped, and also unless

the U. S. stopped all rein force-Mr. Ashmore wrote that on merits during the period of the Jam 12, h and Mr. Baggs met talks," the State Department President Ho Chi Minh and said.

that, in a two-hour co nversa- Contradicting the Ashmore —^~ r " * * J--.. ——— ■* ,,.

v vi sron— dt —tnc™ epiauue;—cnC

Government statement went on ;to say, "Ho was reported to be adamant against any reciprocal military restraint by North (Vietnam/*

Mr. Bundy reported that at the time, Government officials saw "nothing hopeful" in the Ashmore-Haggs efforts but felt that it should not be neglected.

"You have to go on probing," he explained.

On Feb. 4, Mr. Ashmore and Mr. Baggs were called to the State Department to meet with top officials including Mr. Bundy and Under Secretary Nicholas deB, Katzenbach," Senator J. W. Fulbright. chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, was also present.

Declassified per Executive Order 13526* Section 3.3 NND Project Number; NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

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' -

\Text of SUde Department Comment on Peace Feeler

*

Special to The N>w York Tln« j ng jy f the pos ; t j on 0 f the

WASHIXGTOH, Sept 18— United States Government on

'ollowing Is the text of a state fa v issues relating to peace

.tent issued by the State Dc was discussed at some length,

Ipartment today regarding a so that Ba „ and Ashmore

: report that President Johnson cou]d represent it accurate _

had undermined a peace op i v in vranni

proach to North Vietnam: ty m * ian0L

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We have had a number of inquiries concerning news stories published today, based on an article by Mr, Harry Ashmore in a publication of the Center for the Study of Democratic Insti-v-tutions (C.S.D.L). J,; The facts concerning i department's contacts with { Messrs. Ashmore and Baggs [William C. Baggs, editor of ; The Miami News] are as i follows:

in

* During the summer of *- 196G, Mr. William Baggs told t the department that C.S.D.L ** was planning a major con-; ference in May of 1967 in » Geneva, to follow up on the 'first Pacem in Terris meeting held in New York in February of 1965. Mr. Baggs disclosed to us efforts that the center was making to invite North Vietnam to attend, and the department responded sympathetically to * the idea of the conference "and to these efforts. These r initial contacts were with Mr. George Ball and Mr, Wil-J liam Bundy. The President t and Secretary Rusk were in-■ formed, and Mr. Ball, was i" directed to handle contacts with Mr. Baggs on behalf of the United States Govern-

I

'.

♦*.

r ment

[2]

In mid - November and ; x again m early December, Mr. Baggs was joined by Mr. Ashmore in calls at the department In these calls, the J progress of the conference plans was reviewed, and the '; two visitors indicated that t they had a tentative invita-4 tion to go to Planoi, with Mr. Luis Qulntanilla of Mex-

* ico. Messrs, Baggs and Ashmore also suggested that, if they were able to visit Hanoi, they might be able to conduct useful explorations of North Vietnamese views

* wards peace. Mr. George I Ball having then left the department, the primary re-

. sponsibility for these conversations passed to his successor, Mr, Katzenbach, who kepC the President and the Secretary of State informed as a matter of course. In these conversations, de-

* partnvent representatives acn : ceptcd the Baggs-Ashmore

suggestions and undertook to cooperate fully. Accord-

m

^ On Dec, 23, Baggs visited the department just prior to the departure of the three-man group on Dec. 23. At that meeting, the basic understanding of the United States Government position was reaffirmed, and it was further agreed that Baggs and Ashmore would report confidentially what they were able to pick up in Hanoi.

Messrs, Baggs and Ash-» 2K l?Sy S l ^o^is channel (of which;

fore Hanoi in these Moscow

contacts, without at any time

producing any useful response.

[61

Toward the end of January, Messrs, Baggs and Ashmore returned to Washington and expressed to the department the strong hope that they could be given'a message for transmission to Hanoi. The department decided t!;at, while the direct channel in Moscow was crucial and must at all costs be preserved, it would be useful to send a more general message through Messrs. Baggs and Ashmore, which would be consistent with the important messages being exchanged in Moscow, In

returned to the U.S. and on Jan. IS dictated for the department a full and confiden-ticular a conversation with President Ho on Jan. 32. In this conversation, Ho had insisted that there could be no talks between the U.S. and Hanoi unless, the bomb* ing were stopped, and unless also the U.S. stopped all reinforcements during the period of the talks. Ho was reported to be adamant against a/iy reciprocal military restraint by North .Vietnam. The record does not show that he solicited any

Hanoi from f v ]

Baggs-Ashmore

were, una- , ware) there was some ques- ■ tion as to the further utility ; of detailed informal com-munications. *

It seemed clear from the account given by Messrs. Baggs and Ashmore that their channel of communication had been established with thB primary purpose of exchanges concerning North Vietnamese attendance at the May conference. Nevertheless, Baggs and Ashmore said they could send any messages for Hanoi through the regular mail to a North Viet-se ' representative in

name

Ji±<!=™ nt reS '° nSe t0 l Pnompenh, "who in turn

J would relay it to a North

these remarks.

[5]

Vietnamese official who had

Concurrently, prior to Jan. 18,^ on U.S. initiative and without any connection to the Baggs-Ashmore actions, U.S. Government representatives had established a direct channel for communication with North Vietnamese representatives in Moscow. With the apparent agreement of both sides, this channel was being kept wholly confidential, and was therefore not revealed to Messrs. Baggs.and Ashmore in their discussions at the department. .

It is, of course, fundamental to the U.S. Government dealings with Messrs. Baggs and Ashmore that there existed at the time this direct and secret channel. Exchanges through this direct channel continued through January and early February and culminated in President Johnson'sJetter to President Ho of Feb. S (mistakenly stated by Mr. Ashmore as Feb. 2). As has been stated by representatives of the department, a wide variety of proposals was put be-

been the principal contact of Messrs. Baggs and Ashmore in Hanoi, Accordingly, the letter now published by Mr. Ashmore worked out with the representatives of the department, and authorized to be sent on Feb. 5, We were \ subsequently informed by Mr.. Ashmore that this letter reached Pnompenh on Feb. 15.

[7]

tter/ :ebJ

.V

f No useful purpose could be served by giving further details on what took place in the Moscow channel. We can jsay, however, that on Feb. 7, while that channel was FStill opsn and in operation, ■separate discussions v/cre initiated in London between Prime Minister Wilson and .Premier Kosyg'm of the U.S.S.R.

* The combined reading of the Moscow channel and of these discussions led to the dispatch on Feb. S of President Johnson's letter to President Ho. This letter was of course published unilaterally by Hanoi on March 2i, and

■

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is a matter of public record. It rested on, and was of course read by Hanoi in relation to, the" various proposals that had been conveyed in the Moscow channel. There was no change of basic position whatever between Feb. 5 and T^b. S, but President Johnson's letter did include a specific action proposal that speaks for itself, as docs the tone of his communication.

[SJ

As already noted, Hanot had not responded in any useful way to the variety of suggestions conveyed in the Moscow channel.'Its sole and j apparently final response was reflected on Feb. 13, in a letter by President Ho to •Pope Paul VL This letter, in the words of one press account today, "coupled an un-. conditional end to the bombing with the withdrawal of American forces and the recognition of the National Liberation Front" On Feb. 15, President Ho replied formally to the President in similar terms. At the same time, Hanoi broke off the Moscow channel.

Hanoi's attitude remained negative throughout. The Baggs-Ashmore efforts w*re necessarily handled by the department with an eye to the direct and then-confidential channel that existed concurrently to Hanoi. .The latter appeared to be by far the more reliable and secure method of ascertaining Ha-. noi's views* I

; -. [10]' • :>

Finally, we note with regret that Mr. Ashmore is apparently ignorant of the sub- * sequently published reports' of the Moscow contacts, and of their confirmation by department representatives. We noted with still greater regret that at no time since has he consulted with the department in order to attempt to understand the interrelationship that necessar- -ily obtained between the Moscow channel and his own efforts. As this case shows, the Administration has been prepared at all times to cooperate with private individuals who may be in contact with Hanoi in any way, and who are prepared to act responsibly and discreetly. This policy continues, although it seems clear that/ the present disclosure will! not reassure Hanoi that such private contacts will be hop secret.

. I ,* • 2i

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(DISTRIBUTION OF "STATEMENT 3Y THE DEPARTMENT OF •STATE* 1 DATED SEPTEMBER l8/> 1967* ,

1!06 P«Mo

QUOTE MR« ;MCCLOSKEYj IT APPEARS THAT iMOST OF YOU NC I HAVE BEEN ABLE 'TO GET THROUGH THE STATEMENT^' ■ :; IS A DEPARTMENT OF STATE STaTEMEHTo

AS ONE OF THE 6ENTELMEN CONCERNED

MESSRS* BAGGS AND ASHMORE^

OU ESTI 0 N £ T H A T Y 0 U M A Y H A V E j> A F 7 £ R

247

Tl ■ CONVERSATION WITH 3UN0Y ! HERi TO HAVtNQ Rl D THE / . . IT.

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MR* hCCOSKFY* ON HE RECORD*

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assistant secretary wills-aw bundys i will 3 c on the : - . ; in responding to your questions* in tri" scope of this diso'jssio? a\ : d all of what has been s'-aio about mr« ashttore's an.£ r« baggs; contacts with us- ano .so on

/*

■

r DO WANT TO SaT' ONE THINS* I:" I HAY* On BACKGROUND* .»

READ THE WHOLE Of-" Th£ ARTICLES THR0U£H*'TH£ S&l :RC'S.1TY OF

ONE OF THE LOCAL NEWSPAPERS! AND/ THAT . WITH RES?

ALL THE W'iCuE SWEEP OF KiS ALLEOATEqNS PC imlitQ THE MEETING

IN GENEVA* IN MaY; I ^0! : T WAN' TO COMMENT ON THOSE IN DETAIL*

A GREAT DEAL COULD BE SAID; AND 'WE aRE DOING SOME WORK

THAT MAY RESULT IN SOMETHING LATERc BUT LET HE JUST

SAY* ON

ACKGROUNDa THAT ALL OF ¥01 RE WELL AWARE i AM S-■■>: $ ^::H : ";; TO ONE POINT IN THAT »« AMBASSADOR GOLQ6ERG WAS* IN "ACT* SCHEDULED TO APPEAR IN GENEVA AT THAT tfEETlNSi AS A SENIOR ADMINISTRATION SPOKESMAN a THE FACT THAT .HE C0ULDN»T S£ THERE'/- AND THAT NO SENIOR MAN .:/.£: ,,V,'.-', z JO TAKE . -3 P.-ACE; WAS DUE ENTIRELY TO THE FACT THAT THE MIDDLE EAST CRISIS CAME IN THa" WEEK. AND I MEREL'Y 3~ATE THaT TO REMIND YOU OF WHAT TOOK PLACE/ ON ONE PARTICULAR POINT ON UbKCn KE IS CRITICAL Or US,

WITH THAT 3*Ci<3R0UNL> QUESTIONS 0

COMMENTj I AM OPEN 70n ON Tri

RECORD

QUcTSTrONS^ AND ANSWERS BY KR.o £ JNDYs

•

Q WILL YOU RESPOND DIRECT V TO WHAT SEEM To BE THE NEWS PO] -OF THE ASHMGRE MAGAZINE ARTICLEi JHaT. 'THE PRESIDENT -S LETTER* IN FEBRU, ', I THINK THE QUOTE «A§ "EFFECT;VELY AND I.,' '.";■„.. CANCELED THIS WHOLE EFFORT "0 DRAW HO INTO A PEAT. ./,

A WELL; LET ME SAY AT THE C^rr: ...... ,.-. s IS OBVIOUS FRO

BEFORE YOU;. THAT THE PRINCIPAL REM . E ■ ,vNQ . .,

secure -- channel :;.' cgj'.munic* no ~g 33 .- in'm this was the one to kh; we ws devoting all our ■■

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AMH f l '"AS '- HAT 0J. r < I THE BA £S/7 E HATTER

V !N a\. ! R£JU0:ci THE SECREC : THAT CHi .Ei

I ■■.- 'S ! E ■ JRSSED SI """ t ! t "O ^S MUCH ►£ H, 1 : ■■■ "_

SMTtS€STJS WOULD ■ . . rOOK PLACE ON i'HA iANh!? .

■ ■■ ' 4 N .. ;.;; F PRC . S -:■ pORWj s: : \:,,(

■ A'SAfNPT TH£ BACkORSUNi 0.F THOSE ' LS TH/ THE PR] 'T'S

i - . . w> . ;f .c ac" reN p* ■ - . • .0 .3 was

READ *N KAM<

THE POSS i : i. ITT 0!" A NNSL pSVf O.P.ING : . B AND

t TV riofcn WA£, or COURSE

, ur (,u«i«»i THE :, BJ, WE 3 HO D 3?

• H4.NO- W a S REAt LIST YIN6 TO V. ! iff AS SAiD IN KOS'COWj

-AMD TH.TS W . ' CULMINATED IN THE I'DENT'S LETTER*

SE1 0 INCONSISTENCY 8ETWEEI THE TWO*

ONE IS THE KTNO Of »ESSA1 TOO WqULO ■- . ' EXPLORATORY

3ASIS JN A NCW A"-:'; AN U. I CHAN'NEi , i'HE OTHER 3 A V V

ECSflC SUBSEST;0?v POLLC !*G MORE 5EN.ER ... SUSGES'VlSNS I'N •:$TA8L*S '"'' CWA^^ELs TH£ {:? r ;-,. ■ ■ O C : V>l i 5 "HE KAlN '.' ■ JK.6 • . . .

I V

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jrj a N'JTSHELL.^ WHAT - i E " ! ! 3

ASHMORE ' WHILE WE TREATED IT SE^T . A.N'D IT .• ! £ V HAVE

L E 0 T 0 A C h * \ -N E I 0 '- C GtlMUN IC A T I 0 N - . W AS D E> I N ." 7 E „ T S . . 1. ft R V »

5 IN OTHER wORDSj v C. DPN*T R SARD | '. s£ : RLV :'■':'-H

restra::nt*« «hsch v ;■ ^hs ,-..,;■: v..".

AS GREATLY OlEF! ;.a'.' FRO* THE PRESh"iE S ^^ WW . c. LED r 0S

A MUTUAL DE-Es ' 1 :OK; ! ^; S ;C 1 '■

* HAT s :r :ECT wha' . ; ; , -:- ■ :.

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PAGE f* STATE 33365

IN A CONTENT THAI ACTIONS DN QUfi PART*

PART OF HANOI 0

W A S

CALLED FOR VERY SPECIFIC AT '£

B0TH S T 0 P P 3 N •:: V H E 3 QMS. N ■

A VERY Si : C FORM G RES' N ■ CJN THE

Q COULD WE CLARIFY THIS QUESTION OF THE DATES OF THE F .0E.\T'S LETTERS? THIS IS NOW SEPTE1 :R-, OX' MARC* 2 31 WhEN f'iESE LETTERS WERE MADE P'OE : 3Y HANOI* tHE'S ATE TOLD

US THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER ■ DATED F^3^<j. NQWj

SEVERAL MONTHS LATER* WHEN THE DA' Y HAVE . CE*

YOU SUDDENLY SAY. 1R« A- ' HAS MISTAKENLY S7a" - S .:;T;,"

AT THE HANDED

OF THE

rim you

0 V E R i N

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TOLD US

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THE 51 R' . - ■

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THE 8TH !E NEVER 37 AM £'/:. .. .':. ' 0

WHY IS jfT THAT SUDDENLY Tr DATE IS BEING CHANGED?

A i U i rit

;S7 OF MY KNOWLEDGE* IT INS C T-

; HAVE BEFORE MS THE PUBLIC :, . RMATION SERIES 0" :>;• DEPAHTME OF STATE, UNDATED* WHICH WAS HE COMPENDIUM :,.' A .vlUHBEU DF TH ! NOS » TH;: S Is 1 AS LATE MARCH- 5UT I AM SURE . T F : 7 S WITH W. 1AT WAS SAID-BEFORE - - WHICH DA' . S THE LETTER AS J>:E 8TH IH ALL RESPECTS* I WILL SAY; FOR THE RECORD,' THE LETTER fS - ■-> \ TRANSMITTED ON THE EARLY MORNING OF THE i-' tN MOSCOW* AND* FT S DATED THE SAME DAYc

Q WHEN WaS IT WRITTEN?

-

A IT IS "K£ .EFFECTIVE DATE* I WJL- N( GO \. j THE

t* /\ ,*% »..

DATE ON WHICH IT Was WRITTEN; ' , ," SEEMS To ME /•

INTERNAL GOVERNMENT BUSINESS* BUT "HAT'S jY WAS WRITTEN*" AND DELiVERED»

n::.

DATE ON WHI

H

G YOU A«£ CONTRADICTING F STATEMENT Tl "..' DEPARTMENT GA' A T T H E T IM£ I T WAS W '^.""L N * 0 N 1 HI ? N D' :

A T F

THE

DATE

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HAS NEVER BEEN THE THAT ^AS INVOLVED*

MADE . ; [S'f _i ON ; -16HTEST DO IN OUR rtJ'KOS

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PAGE 0.6 STATE 39365 THE 7TH?

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W0N r T GO INTO THAT OTHER THAN "C S AT W IN THE LETTER TOG:.: ACCOUNT OF ALL THE • AM ABuS

TO US ON ALL CHANNELS=

Q THERE HAVE SEEN A NUMBER OF THESE PEACE PROPOSAL ! 5r ONE KIND OH ANOTHER* AND' IN" MY MEMS .V.- ' STATE D£?/ '• " HAS N£tfES RESPONDED. TO IT v m SUCH DETAIL D WITH SUCH GF, T El ASORA'TE C^RE CAN YCU .EXPLAIN '■. YO E DOING IT Itt THIS

case* and did not In , iese previous ga-Jes.?

A HELL j £T DEPENDS ON THE CASE* JN TH : »E ARE :C0I !TED WrTH A VERY. DETAILED SET OF ALLEGATIONS? IDS ' EVERY SENTENCE -N THIS RESPONDS IN ONE WA* OS ANC HER DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY TO THE ACCOUNT 1 T MR* AS! jRE HAS GjVEN* 2 fVCNK WE OWE IT-TO EVERYBODY TO GIVE A FULL ACCOUNT AND SINCE Hi DEALING KITH A "FULL > AND I AM AFRAID 'M*SLEAt 10 ACC > WE THOUGHT WE HAD TO DEAL WITH 'HIS 0N§ ,■ THE MANNER THA*: E HAVE DESCRIBED,

m= MCCL03KEY« EXCUSE ME* YOU MIGHT ALSO RECALL fHAT . 1 EXCHANGE :n THE ITALIAN CHANNEL THERE &AS /, VERY CQMPREHE.VS -'£ ACCOUNT OP THAT PROVIDED KZRZ*

Q .THE FANEANI?

MR-, MCCLOSKEy* FANFANIo

A | M R« BU N C Y CONTINUED A N S W £ R .. N G Q J E S 1 "OH)

WE HAVE HAD TO DO THIS ViHE?^ Vl;?. MISLEADING *£££ 'NTS " W-

TOOK PEACE ARE PUT Q'jT IN DETAIL* THERE IS NO OTHER - _"ER TVE

Q FROM HINDSIGHTj IT IS ALWAYS E Eft _C FIGURE jKESE "»riXNGs. OUT; BUT FROM WHAT YOU HAVE SAID YOU THOUG! T THE :"E/ BAGGS CHaNNEI MIGHT OFFEi TOM, BOBi I. ■ V ASSIST. i . 'THIS THlNGo IN TRCZPZC", WAS :>!£SE '. CONSIDERAT A 1 JUST POSTPONING ACTiON fHROUSi tl UNTIL ' DENT

H^D GO vt Hi L.E; ic

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CONTENDS WAS &LL. IN THE WORKS . -\ ;?

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A WEIX*.: HAVE Of' THE .LAST. I

COMMENTED

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WOK 5 : TAKE '.'OUR

stand on a ; e sTa>em r

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H AOi ' BE 0R E -

LET ME S*Y WHAT THE PROBLEM THAT.-' MESSRSo BaGSS AND .A. A R E S P 0 N S E B 1 • i. ■■ 0 £ J A N D M, THEY HAD SOME IinD.CaT.DNG RECORDED ACCOUNT; ■■H- D': 0 WJTH HO.. I WAVE CHECKED-T1 THE-Y . WERS URGING US VERY ST I rlMED 1 A'TG RESPONSE •

I THINK.' FRANKLY.-. THAT HAD

WGUL 3 WAVE SEEN* ' fT* t :aRL 11

.Hi.

MORE WERE .URGING VERY STRONGLY MAT

E GUTCKL /. . S£ ■>■".■ '

I HAVE DESCRIBED* PROM

TAKE PLACE t;N rKEIR OONVERS ,7 : JH

AGAINST THE' : R£CORD ThE'Y DICTATED* R'ONGLY TO £0 a- EaD' fcNO MA

SORT j

OR SOMETHING OF THAT

ELSE WAS GOING OMp pR THAI

0F WHICHs VHE LA" I ER 0 7 ■ UHI WOULD HAVE BEEN AROuSED^ AN PREJUDICIAL TO THE VERY IMP

WERE H-AV!NB«

0 miCfi WHY £HN THEY ASKED

-,. .._-

Q YOU USED THEM AS PALL GUYS.

LM THA7*S A CYNICAL PHRASE; W£ HAD NO CHOICE BUT 'TO T IT THE WAY WE DID; IN TERMS OP WHAT I *« . D< WE WSULO BEEN SuAO TO SEE IF HANOI'HAD ANY DIFFERENT CHANNEL ..

h it washed to sat any •hng o:~:'c.Rr-:. we SERa SE< :o< J

HA 7 RESPECT- WE NEVER KNOW THROUGH WHOM THE L.EAi '■

A WE TREA HAVE WHIG IN T

hanoi may wish to comhun?cateo but we had to con! sa:d

TO 0 IN M

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■

IN THE -3AGGS/ASHM0RE CHANNEL WITH AN EYE TO WHAT iEEHEt NLY REALISTIC JUDGMENT — THa'Tj WITH ,-. DIRECT C MEL -G?E OS COW a THAT WAS THE MAIN ONE TO CONCENTRATE C-N«

0 WHY WAS SENA! OR PULBRl'GH" SESSIONS?

A [LUi/C £ i FS A I v_:L

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A NEULj MV UND£RS*ANDXNe !S THA7 ,:'3RS^ B'AScS AND ASHMORE

HAD DISCUSSED WITH HIM THE FACT T AT TJjEY MADS V

AND THAVj ALTHOUGH THEV HAD BEEN ALLOWED -> ■ HO" ..., ; j

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

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PAGE PS STATE 39365

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THEV HAD B::^ ; INVITED BY PREVIOUS ..-..-. ttG* ..:. TO G FijLL AND CCNF ID £ NT I A L A C C CIJN T., ";-. E v . GO" 70.fc*3H QUARTERS- JN FACT* OF COURSE*

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ORDER TO MAKE THIS c^Vg . : : ' . *7 W

FUL6RISHT MIGHT ATTEND A GENERAL D | ■. . . ,-.

K i TH M R - :< A T Z E ,'•<B A C K A M D 0 T KE R3 . .-. ': i • 3 . . ;. . C N "

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C THERE IS SOMETHING WERV CONfUS NQ H£Pf. you RE .":. .Ha" JANUARY S2TH'8AGG3 AND ASHMGRE fOLQ OF W.-iA" HO ', / .. INSIST. UPCW> WHICH WAS BEIN3 ADAMANT -V. ' <QCA! . .. i

RESTRAIN? BV NORTH VSEY-NAMs IN ■' • ■■ o:" THAT* WHY ;._ .. .

OR ANYBODY IN THE DcP^RTMENT; «0P£ ;.. ,' ,>.,' ",: ., - .

E E A pR0MIS I No C J ! A NN Ei.■? ""

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A FRANKLY^ ON THE FaCE OF THi )MSl ('A !, HOPEFUL* NONTHEuESS* WE FELT THV ■ TMR! ASHMORE CHANNEL -- THAT* IN ITS IERHS*"*R£LA1 SEE^ fHE SEQUENCE. OF REMARKS THAT HAD TAKEN .'■ , CONVERATiON WITH HO «« Mi'GHT PROSERIN A :■ . ;

ON WHETHER HANOI was PREPARED TO ;i.§£R <■• R RESTRAINT*.. AND 17 HAS ALWAYS "HE >U8S?0IaR WHETHER* IN FACTj THIS IS A CHANGE THAT

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IRRESPECTIVE OF WHETHER THE SPEC. G AT AN MAY 3rT NEGATIVE,

W A N T VEN

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0 IN PR-ISIDFNT JOHNSON'S REPLY TQ HO* THERE IS ., :„i' IN (THERE "0 HAVING BEEN ASSURED - •• WITHIN r,->£ PaSV." ]■■ | OF THE TIME HE WROTE THE LETTER—" >..'.' H :. . .,/: . " : : ,.-RENAlNEP ~HF SAME AS IT HAD BEEN* Ik ofHER I. : . v :-i .!•;. •; MUST ^E UNCONDITIONAL CESSATION OF B0M8INC . .-WITHDRAWAL OF UoS? FORCES*

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THE BAGG3/A3HKCRE

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THERE'^ 1 IS THIS MOSCOW?

A NO a THE STATEMENT IN THE PRESIDENT*^ LETTcR* IICH ;>, ~ BEFORE M£> REFERS TO PUD . C STAT- "S I v '. 'I PAST ''4Q ,• •.; ; AND 'i^t'., ?N "URN;. REFERS TO THE W£Li . : Nl :. BURCHETTE INTERVIEW;. WHICH PUBLISHED B'l -;-A:/. ■.: ^.

2&> AND THERE IS A STATE! !T IN I" V 7 < ; ,:. ig

RESPONSIBLE PARTIES HAVE ASSURED US I I THAT ',;

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ATEMEf RE ■ STATE 0" '

sousi v nig i: :onc i; . tc ...\ r y,. *?

THE F^C" JS WE 0lDiN«T KNOW ;, :: 3U«

UNTIL HE GOV K0&D THAT HE HAD ANS ": ON '-.. ■- -' .

HIS FIRST STORIES APPEALED ON

W£ £A

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HARDLY BE CHANGED A'GAl'NST US ON THAT 3j-«

AND/ AS FAR A? j"HE

only sat that they

gORAO SU8S ' :e OF "' ;

WERE " i'v-Y C !0'

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3UT ! WOtluD L;KE TQ ' OK Ti

RECORD PEC A USE OF VAFi_, E L! iff! . h

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PAGE 1-0 STATE 32365

F LJi, 3 R l Q HT W a S IN THSSE DIS C US3 r D K 3 s AND » , S 0., I t HI UK V.-.. ASHMQRE B.A/S -- I AM NOT ABSOLUTELY '., \ HERE

SOMEONE THAT ASKED HIM N0*i 0 TESTIFY UP J\ THE HlL_ Q FORTH 1 ". NOT rO APPEAR BEFORE \NY CQMMJ !?7££s 0. . ; ■: ......

ARISE* IN KINDS MORE ^CYNICAL THAN \ / .0 -V

ADMINISTRATION MIGHT NOT HAVE BEEN STf ; -YY.

ALONG IH ORDER TO KEEP THEM FROM GOING Up ON i '■•!' Hli-Li ■■ SUPPORTING SALISBURY''8 REPORTSo

A ABSOLUTELY NOT-

s :;: north vZE?„ i c :e

V HAD/ ;n ANY EVENT,

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'EC7S HlCH^ThEY I D NOT

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DESIRE Dp IN ANY SESE* .

ION ■ Ml ' "THEY

j If -HID, 8A6SS D lb fT . .

x :■•..■ HOW. IS Was i r:

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0 -HaY I ASK A QUESTION HERE? A POINT THAT PUZZLES ME .. Y:~

IS WHY -« SINCE THESE TWO GENTI..E:- E- .' '0.-3 IN a 3UAS> DIPLOMATI-C ROLE* WITH AT LEAST ' R CG-OPE flQN TO i

EXTENT -= WHY THERE WAS NO -CONSIDERATION 3] y: TO .YY. „ NO THEM

ABOUT THE'SECRET CHANNEL* WITH THE UNDERSTANDING :.!' -:E'. K£ IT SECRET? ' •

.-.

LET ME °« I AM AGRAID YOU 1! ■ ■ E ME TO CO INTO 3 i". [. S .

ONE IS THE GENERAL CUES'." ■ ON WHETHER PF - TE INDIVID .. V SHO

SHOULD BE ENTRUSTED WITH SECRETS OF■ THE GREATEST' IM I THAT WERE KNOWN ONLY TO A HANDFUL OF P-SOF IN THE •. •

-* -. - -

AND* I REGRET TO SAYj i WILL ALSO CALL ATTENTIO ■— HQUT

—

ATTEMPTING TO GIVE *N VCCCUNT OF ." - TO 1ATTER5 pj a ; ;!;C-: OUOMAN IS BETTER INFORMED T- yE EPJS : THAT l.~ ; up THE UNFORTUNATE DISCLOSURE OF >.E - P MESSAGE :"Y HANOI INCLUDED «R» ASHMORE'S PAST IT i"HA1, I REGRET ' AM I WR0N6« M Rn DUDMALY

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MR--. DUDMANs I DON'T KNOW WHAT YOU .-

256

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A SMRo B'UNOV STILL aNSWE HE WAS IMS '/i : ■. SETTING UP HIS OWN S. CHANNEL TO HJ LA PIR . I SOMEONE ASSOCIATED WlTI .; cEnTE** WHICH j i £ !

1

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ORRECT

MRo-DUDMaN that is not correct*

A WELL:- WAS P SOMEBODY- WHO

'-> i n

HEi R ! FROM MR'- ASi )F ;

HR<> DUDMANs THAT'S POSSIBLE*

A LET Mc WE WERE HATTER:.

SAY THAT WE HERE DEAL NG PRIy., C S

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DcLAING AGAINST A

BACKGROUND 'HAT 0. '. DE ' HIS

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Q GIVEN THE FACT K.AT YOU DION*! ^N*f TO DISC

CHANNEL BY ANY MEANS.* DID V 0U C0N3iDSR*Y-A C-. ■; " ■ " --.v .; ■

F SANCTION

TO THEIR APPROACH TO HANOI, AT E SAME 'TIME '■ ' YC

GOING -0 Ha^E ANOTHER VERY OFF C •] APPRO, M?6'JSK MOSCO ,

MIGHT MAKE HAND J WONDER MO HAS TALKING FOR

G 0 V E R N M EN ~ ?

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LONG A V£R

IN A

DON ■

Y DIRECT AND f«MEDUT£ CHANNEL • i yyn- i ;n.^ n> SOPHISTICAVEO WAYj COULC PC.SSIBIL? HAVE iISU*vDER3'*0i

-i

Q BOTH YOU AMD HR« a SHMORE REFERRED

CHI MINH* AND HIS C0MVERSA" ION '■< ", ASHMORE

257

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PAGE 12 3"aTE 33365

THE NEED "OR -HE U.S. TO AGRE,-" IN THE SOUTH« NOW.' aS FAR AS J ANYWHERE E-..SE PUBLICLY, WAS .. ■

To STOP Re-INFORcIWO ITS ';'•;' NOW, 'THIS _ 0 . ADE ANYWHERE E- 6E j. ;, . .

OH* THAT'S NOT TURE« THIS QUESTION OF C SING US W. H CONTINUING REINFORMCEMENTS GOES BACK* AT THE • .;, V [AST. TO "HE 37 -DAY PAUSE IN EARLY J966«

Q BUT DIRECTLY CONNECTED AS A PRIOR fcpND-JTlQN OF TALKS?

A ! AM NOT SURE WHETHER WE HAD EVER HEARD IT BE TO :. HAD -CERTAINLY HEARD ENOUGH' R1 ARKS IN THIS SENERAi. TO BE AWARE OVER A LONG.- LONG PERIOD THAT~THJ3 '.;.•. A PCS^: ISL'E ADDITIONAL ELEMENT* IF WE COULD WORK OUT A BALANCED ?RC( OF MUTUAL DE-ESCALATION°

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ON PAGE THREE -- GETTING BACK TO -'HE QUESTION R, 0 IS WRITTEN HERE AS THOUGH HO IS INSISTING ON TWO V : . BEFORE AGREEElNG TO TAlKSs BOTH A STOP TO THE BOM ■ .. AN STOP TO REINFORCEMENTS* NOW THAT -

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QUESTION* THAT THAT IS :.-' HO SAl : ON'THIS" 0CCa3:«

IT IS ENTIRELY POSSIBLE TO 5££ IN THE

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PRESIDENT* AND IK 0T " NORTH VIEJN •' 'ZMENTSj •

ABSENCE OF MENTION G? PHIS IS: E*

NOW* I W|LL LEAVE IT AT ■ • IN OTHER *DSj

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AMY BE. I REGRET "0 SAY r CAN! T

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Qo IN OTHER WORDS* YOt DID NOT REPLY SPEC:IF! TALLY TG THIS f OF REINFORCEMENT BECAUSE YOU SOT IT ' OUG.u BAS6S ANC : 1"

A. NO- AG I HAVE SAID THIS A3 POS : T E.. "".

TO"AL PICTURE OF MUTUAL DEES, . ' IAD LONG BEEN PRESE.N

OUR KSKOs* AND HAD BEEN RAISED BV HANOI :.. ITS PCs

IF YOU WILL* °N "HE JANUARY

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SO IT HAS SOMETHING THAT WE HAD GIV-N A LOT Of THOU 1 LONG PERIOD OF Tl-HE,

Co WHAT Z [JON'T UNDERSTAND !S CONS >: Tt ASKHOBE BROUGHT BACK 3RD 7 P.O HAS ADAMAN"] . RECIPROCAL ACTION - - WHY* ON PHE FACE OF Hi FROM VvEw* IT Was AM aSSuRD HD HOuLOtv P£AC? EFFORT*

mean anytk:"ns* HO N US "0 STOP BCf<5 SO :

YOl; JUST 7£._L THIM^ "LOOK. ,. S HOT GO} TO DC -

IT'S HOPELESS* FOR T 1

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Department oj State

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UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE H STATE 39365

Aj WELL, IF YOU ACCEPT G THE DOOR TO ANY POSSi EXPLORATION/ WE WOULD P 600N PROBING* AND YOU

FATEMENT BY HANOI AS C I 'THINK YOU HAVE TO

Q

IT WON'T DO ANYTHING?

Ao LET ME FINISH, YOU WITH INDIVIDUALS* TO Wh

he would take in secret or with general suggest

but you can't take a ne foreclosing the desirab the way you negotiate i point of negotiating i

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t'ajement to an individual ag

PROBING ON tr* IT IS aUST TUAYlONB OR TRY TO GET "TO A HAD BETTER ;SAYe .

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Q 0 DO YOU PLAN TO HAVE SCHR0EN3RUN WRITE A LETTER WHEN HE GET? BACK?

A» WE HaVE HAD NO CONTACT FOR THAT PURPOSEo ' ' .

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EY EVER TELL YOU ANYTHING THAT HO SAID THAT MADE EL FOR A MINUTE THAT MAYBE HO WANTED TO HAKE PEACE?

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DID SAY THAT THE TONE Op "HE CONVERSATION*- AND THI ORE SAYS IN THE ARTICLE* WAS X'ONC I1 IATORY• ON TH S, THEIR DICTATED ACCOUNT DID NOT APPEAR TO IttD'XCA

NONETHELESS* THE FaC~ THAT HE Was PREPARED- 70 RECEIVE

XPRESS HIS VIEWS--IT' WAS CERTAIN OMISSIONS IN THE ION. IT WaS THE KIND OF CONVERSATION WE HAVE HAD

to us over a long peri-od of time from many sources very hard ever to give a capsuled summary that q£ flavoro they thought it was conciliatory — merel that they were received and 'talked to in this way. the tone was conciliatory 3 an6j of course '$ they we

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Q. I BELIEVE THE ASHMORE ARTICLE SaYS THAT HO MADE A lATEGGR.C

COMMITMENT* OR— IT IS INCORRECT -- IT REFERS TO HQ«S

CATEGORICAL COMMITMENT TO TALK IF THE BOMBING WERE STOPPED.

DO YOU REMEMBER THIS — SOME SUCH PHRASE AS THIS?

260

UNCLASSIFIED

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NMD 63316, By: NWD Date: 2011

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PAGE 15 STATE 39365

As I DON'T RECALL IT IN THE LETTER,

Qo - IT WaSN'T-'THAT/ but very close.

Qo ' IT IS NOT IN THE LETTERS IT IS IN THE ARTICLE*

a« now* .wait a second* do rr again.o i»m sgrry°

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G. HAS HO CHI MINH EVER"- EITHER PUBLICLY OR IN SECRET EXCHANGES ««■ MADE A FIRM COMM I :TM£NT s A*VIRM ;SYAT£t<ENT "HA IF V;

bombing or north viet-nam was stopped he would .enter peace .'-.. .

A a TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE/ THE ANSWER TO THAT GUEST J ,S-■ "NOo" I KNOW OF NOTHING -« XERTAlNLY* WTHING T^AT !IA3 BEEN ■■-. CONVEYED AUTHORITATIVELY TO US THAT SAYS THAT FLATLY*

Qo DO YOU HAVE ANY INFORMATION • -

Q 0 THROUGH THESE THIRD PARTIES* THEY ALWAYS !USE THE COMDfTIONAL COULD* OR -SOMETHING LIKE THAT.-

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A o THAT HAS BEEN THE NORMAL FORMULATION. THERE HAVE BEEN '

.' THIRD COUNTRY REPORTS THAT INDICATE IT IS MORE POSITIVE, BUT

NOTHING THAT HAS BEEN CONVEYED OR INTENDED TO SE CONVEYED 70 US; THAT i AM AWARE OF• " . .

Qo DO YOU GET .'•»' IN WHAT IS CONVEYED TO YOU •»• THE USE OF t£ CONDITIONAL? '•

A. THAT s S THE NORMAL FORMULATION',

Q a DID THE STATE DEPARTMENT AT ANY TIME EVER FEEL THa" 7;":E3E ' TWO MEN WO'JLD~HAVE ANY BENEFICIAL AFFECT ON TALKS* OR WERE :*HEY JUST BEING PAMPERED'/

■

A. NO* AS i SAID BEFORE* THEY HAD ACTED REASONABLY AND RESPONSIBLY. THEY HAD CAREFULLY GONE OVER THE POs's 'ION BEFORE ' THEY WENT" THEIR ACCOUNTS OF THE CONVERSATIONS INDICATED THAT IN SO FAR AS THEY PURPORTED TO DESCRIBE THE VIEWS 07 THE 3CV . . THEY HAD DONE'SO HONESTLY AND FAlRLYo THEY HAD AGREED TO REPORT

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

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UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 16 STATE 39365

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CONFIDENTIALLY WHEN THEY GOT BACK 3 A ND THEY HAD DONE.SQ*

THEY REPORTED THAT THEY MAD A WAY Or COMMUNlCATiNG WITH HANOI. WE- ARE PREPARED TO TRY ANY WAY -OF COMMUNICATING WITH HANQJ* IT DID NOT SEEM -J TO BE PERFECTLY HO ST --.LIKELY THAT ,'CU WOULD OPEN UP A NEW INDIRECT,, AND VE*V" — I WON'T SA* ' v ' «»"WELL* I WOULD SAY TENUOUS -* BUT* RUNNING THROUGH THE -: TO PHNOM PENH* AND SO ON.- DIDN'T GIVE ONE THE VAST FEE tNG

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THAT THIS WAS GOING TO OPEN UP'o BUT* NONETHELESS, We.

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PREPARED TO GIVE IT A CHANCE*. IF THEY HaDj IN SOME FASHION* STRUCK HO "AS PARTICULARLY REASONABLE MEN THROUGH WHOM HE WOULD LIKE TO DEAL* THIS WAS CERTAINLY WORTH WHATEVER SMALL CHAN E THERE MIGHT BE THAT THIS WOULD COME OFF*

;,

Qo A RELATED QUESTION,, BILLc IN THE .LAST SENTENCE .OF STATEMENT YOU SAY " *«o THAT THE PRESENT DISCLOSURE '.. REASSURE HANOI "HAT SUCH' PRIVATE CONTACTS WILL BE KEPT ARE 'YOU SAYING THIS MIGHT HAVE A SERfQUS AFFECT ON ANY CONTACTS OR NEGOTIATIONS' THAT ARE UNDERWAY NOW?

Ao I. THINK 1 WILL LE i THE STATEMENT "SPEAK FOR ITSE I THINK IT IS A SELF-EVIDENT STATEMENT*

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Q 0 RELATED TO THE LAST GUEST ION OVER HERE* ON THE PAMPERING* DOES THE FACT THAT THIS HAD SENATOR FUtBRlGHT : S IMPRIMATUR CAUSE YOU'TO GIVE IT MORE CREDENCE?

-

Ao WELL, IT WAS AN ELEMENT OF FACT,. PHIL." BUT I WOULDN'T ATTEMPT TO GIVE ANY WEIGHT TO IT* THE REAL QUESTION WAS [ETHER IT WAS A CHANNEL WORTH SEEKING A PROBE TO SEE JF~17 OPENED UP„ AND TO SAY NOTHING IN IT INCONSISTENT* ■ A GENERAL M ; CONSISTENT WITH WHAT We WERE SAYING IN THE DIRECT ,CH. SELo

Q. WOULD YOU EXPLAIN WHAT YOU MEANT BY USJNG'THE WORD "MISLEADING" EARLIER .ABOUT THE ASHM0Re"aR7 \Z'„Z -« IN WHAT SENSE?

Ao MISLEADING IN THE VERY BASIC SENSE -« THAT IT TAKES MO ACCOUNT Or MATTERS THAT ARE MATTERS GF PUBLIC RECORD- I AM SIMPLY ASTOUNDED* To BE PERFECTLY BLUNT ABOUT IT "HAT MRo ASHMORE -= WHO SEEMS TO HAVE STUDIED T.Ht PRESIDENT-*S LET »=> DOESNvT TAKE NOTE OF THE FACT THaT THE PRESIDENT'S LETTS

262

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THE FACT THAT MRo ASHMORE COlK-D ATTEMPT TO DESCRIBE OUR CON ' i " KITH HIM/ EXTENDING QUITE SELF-EV-DENtCy OVER THE SAME ?'Ek . 0d* WITHOUT ANY REFERENCE TO THE POSSIBILITY "HAT THERE >■'' > A PROBLEM IN OUR MINOS OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE fWG* SEEMS' TO ME TO DESERVE THE WORD MISLEADING,/

G« WE ARE ALWAYS IN A POSITION OF DISCUSSING WITH t'QU ISSUE*; LIKE THIS EIGHT OR NINE MONTHS AFTER THE FACT* AND* IN ORDER 'TO AVOID THIS EIGHT MONTHS FROM NOW* a"E YOU INVOLVED *N GREAT EFFORT WITH HANOI AT THIS "TIME?

Ac I THINK YOU KNOW MY ANSWER TO ".'HAT-, tj IS THE STOCK ANSWER THAT WE ALWAYS GIVE TO QUESTIONS OF THIS SORT-. ;T IS. NOT TO BE READ ONE WAY OR ANOTHER- AND THAT IS "NO CQMMENTc"

Qo IT WAS WORTH A TRYo

Qo is this using the press media to carry on secret

NEGOTIATIONS?

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A* 'JS^Ng WHAT? ■ Qo THE PRESS MEDIA o

■ .

' 0 . WELL; I .WOULDN'T DESCRIBE IT IN "KA~ SENSE BECAUSE IN

respect to the views that Phey got trom us a and [heir imparting of those views j and their imparting back To us what was said to them/ it was quite clearly understood wjfh messrs ggs

AND ASHMqRE THAT THY WERE ACTING AS AMERICAN "CITIZENS AND NOT AS PRESS MENc THE*UNDERTAKINGS EXCHANGED BETWEEN USj . \ EFFECT.;

UNCLASSIFIED

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

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Department of State

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UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 18 STATE 39365 • "

*

WERE UNDERTAKINGS THAT THEY WOULD NOT PUBLISH THIS

El

Go ■ DO YOU FEEL THEY HaVE' BROKEN THAT UNDERTAKING BY POBLlS* WHAT THEY .HAVE PUBLISHED?

Ac I WILL LEAVE THAT FOR YOU TO JU06E* AND I WILL LEAVE . THE LAST SENTEN~E OF THE RELEASE.

r! .

Qc JUST TO CLARIFY ONE POINT 'HERE., AND TO GET THE MAIN i'Hn-JS'i OF ONE OF THE POINTS '"HAT YOU ARE MAKINGS IS IT'.ACCURATE ?G SAY THE EXISTENCE OF THE SECRET MOSCOW CHANNEL WAS <:: D. _0S£O TO THESE TWO GENTLEMEN* BECAUSE IT WAS FEARED "HAY I \.Ci NG IT IN SECRET TO THEM MIGHT 'SOMEHOW IN SOME WAY DESPITE '': r BEST EFFORTS LEaD To EXPOSING iAJ YCU"*BEL IEVED 'TO RE A P,T.^ : L . -CHANNEL OF CONTINUING DIRECT NEGOTIATION?

A= -THAT'S TRUE* THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE 'MOSCOW XHANNEL EXTREMELY CLOSELY HELDo NOW* FOR ~ObV?OUS. REASONSs "/OU C/.Y ' CONDUCT SECRET DIPLOMACY WITHOUT THAT* TO SUGGEST THAT TWO PRIVATE CITIZENS* HOWEVER WELL"MEANING* SHOULD BE INFORM;

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SEEMS TO ME/ ON k'TS FACE* AN UNWISE SUGGESTION*

Qo WAS THERE ANYTHING EXCHANGED IN THE MOSCOW CHANNEL PRICR \'0 THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER TO HO THAT GaVE"YOU ANY ENCOURAGEMENT^

i

Ao I HAVE SAID IN THE STATEMENT THE ONLY ANSWER I WlL THAT* WHICH IS THAT WE NEVER HAD ANY USEFU* RESPONSE TO THE PROPOSALS" BUT, TO REPEAT.* V 0U KEEP TRYING"

G I '■! E 7 0 ANY OF

Q„ ON PAGE SEVEN OF YOUR STATEMENT YOU SAY THAT YOU " »c, NOTE WITH REGRET THAT MR a ASHMCRE IS APPARENTLY IGNORANT OF THE SUBSEQUENTLY PUBLISHED REPORTS OF THE MOSCOW CON-TACTS, AND OF. THEIR CONFIRMATION BY DEPARTMENT REPRESENTATIVES* WE N< WITH STILL GREATER REGRET THAT AT NO TIME SINCE HAS HE CONSULTED WITH THE DEPARTMENT IN ORDER TO ATTEMPT TO UNDERSTAND AND SO ON* AND SO 0N«

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f!

ARE YOU SAYING THERE THAT YOU HAD NO CONTACT WITH PUBLISHED THE LETTERS? AND WOULDN'T 1*7 HAVE BEEN. WISE TO HAVE CALLED HIM AND SAID; "NOW'YO'J SEE •■■■'-',

CAREEUL" AND SO ON?

264

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PAGE j9 STATE 39365

Ao 1 SAY THAT WE HAVE CERTAINLY HAD NOi; CO NT-ACTS Of THE K . ! iC THAT IS DESCRIBED IN THE SENTENCE* I AM NOT AWARE 0' ANY CF ANY SORT. WE HAVE KEPT IN TOUCH WITH REPRESENTATIVES DF ,mE CENTERS AND WE HAY HAVE TALKED TO MR. AXflRE ON MATTERS RE_A 'ED TO THE GENEVA CONFERENCE; IN MAYo J 'SUPPOSE WE "CQtJLD HAVE TRIED TO CLARIFY JT fl BUT WE COUL0N»T HAVE GONE FURTHER WHAT WOULD HAVE SEEMED TO ■ MOST CF US A FAIRLY SECF-t . DE CONCLUSION FROM THE PUBLISHED R'EPORYS,

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PU

DID THE DEPARTMENT .LEARN IN ADVANCE ISH THIS PIECE 1 ?

THAT HE WAS GOING 70

Ao NO* WE HAD NO KNOWLEDGE WHATSOEVER"

t* ' (

..,, Qc WHY DIDN'T YOU INCLUDE IN MR* ASHMpRE 9 S .LETTER A SPEC:" .. ■. CONDITION .LIKE THE PRESIDENT MADE?

Ao WELL, LET: ME PUT YOURSELF IN OUR !SHQES« WE HAD A'VERV C;.; DIRECT CHANNELS WE HAD IN THE BAGGS/ASJ RE THING ONLY THE

ST

■'CONCEIVABLE MAKINGS Of- A CHANNEL c YO START.' CM THE FI R '• COMMUNICATION* THROUGH A NEW. AND UNTRIED CHANNEL W! E ... v3 • SPECIFIC IS NOT* ■PERHAPS* ALWAYS THE WISEST STRATEGY., ?,.;, ,;j_',V.

WHEN YOU HAVE GOT A DIRECT CHANNEL THROUGH WhICH"Y0U CAN SAY ' ANYTHING YoU WANT*

Q 0 MR* BUNDY* ARE THERE ANY MORE CF THESE FREE-LANCE .EFFORTS GOING ON/'SiNCE THEN? "

■

. Ac WELL.- LET ME SAY THERE HAVE BEEN A GREAT MANYt AND I WON'T COMMENT ON WHETHER THERE ARE ANY UNDER WAY AT THE PRESENT "TIME* FOR THE SAME REASONS THAT I GAVE THE RESPONSE I DI D TO MR- KAi_8o

1

THIS HAS BEEN RECURRENT* AND* A3 WE MAKE CLEAR IN THIS STATEMENT* REASONABLE AND DISCREET ACTION BY PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS IS SOMETHING WE ARE PREPARED TO COOPERATE WITH* i'V ;HAS TO BE WEIGHED AGAINST THE TOTAL PICTURE OF CONTACTS THAT "EXIST AT ANY ONE TIME*

Q«' SHALL WE MEET AGAIN. IN EIGHT MONTHS?

(LAUGHTER J

265

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

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PAGE 20 STATE 39365

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ORDING TO THE LETTER J "HEY GAY --HAT THEY SENT TO MO.XHl MINH (IT S.OFFICIALS) -« "HEY SAY* QUOTE* 'THE T IN YOUR SUGGEST JON TO US THAT ?R. . DING THE U« Ss STOP BOMBING r : C : ADDITIONAL U« S^> TROOPS JNTO V2g 'NAM * ION THAT SOME RECIPROCAL RESTRAINTS BE HER SIDE GETS TH1 ,DVANTAGE* WHjfCH WOU[ « VlDENCE OF THE GOOD FAITH OF A! .. PAR"' A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT ••»

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I RETURN AGAIN TO MY QUESTIONS WHAT MAKES YOU SO .SURE THAT •HANOI WASN'T READING'THI ; S AS :S0METHlN6~:C0NTRA0;cTORY TO Mi ' THEY RECEIVED LATER FROM PRESIDENT JOHNSON?

A. WELL* BECAUSE I THINK .HANOI IS SOPHISTICATED ENOUGH T REALIZE THAT A DIRECT CHANNEL AND A DIRECT COMMUNICATION; SIGNED BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED ?TA"ES.. IS THE H IAT v/O r CEs AND I THINK THEY WOULD I E SEEN CLEARLY WHAT WE '■ E Du T NG* THEY KNEW MESSRS- BASGS AND ASKMORE, AND THEY :UsV HAV

SEEN CLtARLYj.

WHAT THE DISTINCTION WAS,

HA < D-io-h

EXCLUDE THE POSSIBILITY OF SOME KIND Of. A RESPONSE* HAD THEY BEEN LESS NEGATIVE ON THE BAGGS/'aSHMORE CHANNEL; i'F THEY WISHED TO DEVELOP IT»

I REALLY D0N'<T THINK SOPHISTICATED RECIPIENTS WOULD HAVE HAD ANY TROUBLE SORTING THAT ONE OUTo

Q. DID YOU •-, IN SPEAKING WITH BAGGS AND THE VIEW THAT WE SH0ULDN»T SEEK TO'TIE AMY BOMBING TO THE TRUCE: IN OTHER WORDS* TAKE APPARENTLY WAS CONTRADICTED' BY THE OFFICIA PRESIDENT MADE ONLY A FEW DAYS .LATER?

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SUSPENSION GF A PO'SITION WHICH PROPOSAL THAT 7H

A* LET ME SAY WHAT WE WERE DEALING WITH THERE -* WE WERE DEALING

WITH; AMONG OTHEI iHINGSj* TIMING fACiORS«

i He

PtR-OD OF THE

TET TRUCE' THE AGREED PERIOD* RAN FROM THE STH TO THE ISTHi WE WERE DEALING WITH A LETTER TH a T WAS GOING TG BE* AIR MAILED ON THE 5TH TO PHNOM PENH, TO SUPPOSE THAT ?T COULD REACH HANOI IN TIME TO REELECT IN ANY WAY* BEFORE "HE EXPIRATION 0^ THE TRUCE

UNCLASSIFIED

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

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, PAGE 21 STATE 39365 • ■ '

*

PERIOD* R A N AGAINST ANY REASONABLE CALCULATION OF TIME AND* AL$0»' THiS HAPPENS TO FIT WITH THE ?,' ■.'7.'.' REVEALED BY "US

-- TO MR„ AXMRE >- DELIVERY DATE* WHICH WAS THE !3"H N PMOM PENH" THERE WAS NO POINT IN ST« WE WANTED ' TO GET A:. FROM THAT- AND, INCIDENTALLY* THE REFERENCE-:N THE PRESlC " S LETTER SpEAKS FOR ITSELF ON THAT SUBJECT, AND I WILL LET . " SPEAK FOR ITSELFi bUT I THINK* IF YOU REREAD $T* ,L :

THAT IT DOESN'T HAVE THE IMPLICATION THAT SOME OF •<* . tSH S WORDS APPLY TO ITo

Q 3 WAS THE SPECIFIC DEMAND FOR ADVANCE ASSURANCE OF THE HALT IN NORTH VIETNAMESE INFILTRATION INTO THE SOUTH FORM uATED ' '- BEFORE* OR AFTER* THE ASHMORE LETTER WAS DRAFTED?

' Ao THAT'S MOT A QUESTION I .CAN REASONABLY OR PROFITABLY D^SCUSi THIS IS A L'xNE OF THOUGHT THAT HAD GONE ON FOR A U3NG .-■ LOi WHILE*

0 CAN YOU SAY WHAT IT IS *= NOT FOR MR» SCALI *.S BEN H

FOR THE BENEFIT OF MR- SCALI'8 HEARERS »- WHAT IMPLICATION "YOU

ARE TALKING ABOUT WHEN YOU REFER TO THE PRESIDENT'S .f' l:-

MR« ASHMORE*S STATEMENTS?

Ac WELL, THE TREATMENT IN THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER Of ANY EXTENSION OF THE TET TRUCE* I THINK, . I § NOT REALLY OPEN TO THE KINDS OF FEARS THAT ARE .ASCRIBED BY MR* ASHMQRE *?0 US IN OUR DISCUSSIONS OF THE SAME TOPIC IN RELATION TO THEIR CONVERSATION,, IS THAT C-EAR?

Q* NOo TRY AGAIN,

.

A, ALL RIGHT' IF YOU GET OUT THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER, YOU

WILL SEE THAT ITS TREATMENT OF THIS IS NOT MADE A CONDITION OR

ANYTHING Op THIS SORT= IT MERELY SAID IT WILL BE HELPFUL \ F

YOU LOOK AT THIS PROBLEM.- WHICH HAD B£?N THE SUBJECT OF STATEMENTS

FROM SAIGON, BY THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE GOV 1£NT, OF OURSELVES -

IF YOU COU^D LOOK iO SEE IF WE COULD EXTEND THIS* THIS WOULD BE

HELPFUL s BUT I T 3 S IN No SENSE '•' i ME • L I Mj TED OR CONO I T I ONED 5 ■' THAT -.

q. DO YOU AGREE; BILL, WITH PRESIDENT'S LETTER CONST I TUT CONDITIONS?

rHE WIDELY STATED VIEW Tj D A HARDENING OF THE AMERJ

* *

UNCLASSIFIED 267

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number; NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 I

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unclassified

.PAGE! 22 STATE 39365

A, NO* I DO N0T« IT ADDED A VERY MAJOR ACTION 0?g OUR SIDE, THE CESSATION Or REINFORCEMENTS IMMEDIATELY. IT FF-GPO^ED A VERY MAJOR ACTION ON ".'HE OTHER SIDE IN RESPONSE* THERE IS A LONG SERIES OF PROPOSALS 0" A GENERAL SORT ,N TH-S • ,'.T BEEN MADE PUBLICLY AND PRIVATELY,"" I DO NOT CON TO HAVE BEEN A HARDENING* ON THE CONTRARY* »7 ADDED ■

HAVE

THIS

VERY MAJOR NEW ACTION ON OUR PARTo

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THAT'S THE SOFTEN INGo

A i 1 HAVE

CONSIDER n CONSISTENT WITH THE BASIC WAV IN PPROACHED THIS WHOLE QUESTION OF .CESSAT I ON -

WHICH WE

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THE IMPLICATION OF

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SAYS

I THINK HE ALMO GOOD THl'NG GOING WHXCr SOME KIND OF AGREEMENT A VERY To"JGH LETTER TO

ASHMORE'S STATEMENT IN HIS ART! '-.:-:, <',■ IT IN SO MANY WORDS* IS THAT HE 3 A WOULD HAVE VERY* VERY PROBABLE .-J I'D TO STOP THE WAR;' AND THE PRESIDENT SENT HO ^KICV KNOCKED IT ALL IN

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NOW, IN VERY SIMPLE PEASANT LANGUAGE* THIS IS WHAT A LOT OF

THIS WHOLE CONTROVERSY IS ABOUT* WILL. YOU COMMENT ON /KJ3 POiNVl

A, YES* I WILL COMMENT TO SAY THAT IT'S .AGAIN OBVIOUS TO ANY STUDENT OF THE RELATIVE"WEIGHT TO BE ATTACHED TO THE CHANNELS AS OF THAT TIME THAT THE DIRECT CHANNEL IN MOSCOW WAS BY FA?? THE MOST IMPORTANT* I THINK MR, aSHMORe 'YIELDS TO AM UNDERSTANDABLE

PERSONAL FEELING THAT HIS OWN WAS THE CENTER OF "HE STAGE.

I THINK THE ACCOUNT I HAVE GIVEN MAKES'CLEAR THAT IT WAS NOT*

AND IN THE NATURE OF THINGS COULD NOT BE -

IS

N

THE QUESTION IS WHAT THE SUM TOTAL OF WE EXCHANGE

MOSCOW -« WHICH I HaVE CHARACTERIZED A§ TAR AS ITS IN THE

NATIONAL INTEREST TO DO « AND OF ThE PRESIDENT'S LETTER; AN

WHAT HO c S REPLY IS. AND I THINK IT' : S CLEARp IF YOU TAKE

ALL, TOGETHER* THAT THE READING WAS TKA"f HANOI HAD NO DESIRE I

MOVE AT THAT TIME*

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o» to what extent did :he

CONVERSATION WITH HO ■• - T'0 THE END PRODUCT/ NAMELY TH

6AC.3S-ASHM0RE REPORT HAVE THE WHAT E >' T E N T "• DIP 7 H A T C 0 N 7 R \ 5 U'. E '." 0 LETTER OF FEBRUARY 8?H BY'T PRESlD-i

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page 23 state 39355

A« I THINK I HAVE ALREADY ANSWERED THAT QUESTION-Q„ I AM NOT CLEAR.

A-- WHAT i SAID WAS THAT THAT IT WAS OBVIOUSLY PART OF OUR TOTAL INFORMATlONo I DON'^T THINK IT PLAYED A •SIC-::'."..: V PART* BUT !-;T WAS A PART OF OUR TOTAL STOCK OF INFORMATION?

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Q 0 COULD I ASK THE QUESTION ANOTHER WAY? ARE YOU PREPARED SAY THAT THE PRESI DENTf S .LETTER WAS IN NO WAY IHASINA8 Ej CONCEIVABLE* RELATED TO THE BA-GG8-A-SHM.QRE

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A a NOr I DIDN'T SAY ANY SUCH THING I SAID IT WAS BASED ON TOTAL ANALYSIS OF ALL INFORMATION OVER A L.QNG PERIOD OF TIME AND* IN PARTICULAR ON THE I NFGRNATI OH , NEGATIVE THOUGH IT WAS; OF RESPONSE TO THE VARIOUS PROPOSALS MADE IN MOSCOW TO 0TH1 INFORMATION THAT HAD REACHED US FROM OTHER QUARTERS VERY CENT: AND REFERRED TO IN THE RRES IDENT* S -.LETTER AND'TO'tKE TOTALITY 0," ALL WE HAD* .

NOWj OF COURSE.-) IN THAT TOTAL tSENSE* 'WHAT BAGG3 AND ASHM0RE HAD

s'rVEN us w A s a part OF I7«' so to say t hat it had MO IMPACT HA3J

i would say; ny own summation •»« no significant impact «- but it was a part of the 'totality*

qo but you will not say that the cay that you drafted the letts with ashmore that you were in the process of drafting 7k£

PRESIDENT'S LETTER?

Ac NO* SIR. I WILL NOT COMMENT ON THE DRAFTING OF LETTER WRITTEN BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED~STATES.y

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WELL,- THIS IS THE CENTRAL POINT OF HIS ARGUMENT..

k, NOT AT ALL* IN THE ACCOUNT I HAVE OlVENo THE EXACT DAY AT WHICH YOU COME TO A DECISION TO HANDLE A THING,; 17* SEEHS TO ME-* IS A MATTER THAT A GOVERNMENT IS ENTITLED TO .LET STAND UN "THE RECORDo

Q« BUT VOU ARE TRYING TO ANSWER HIS ACCUSaT ;C-N* ■ AND HIS

UNCLASSIFI

Reclassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

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ACCUSA-IQN IS THAT ONE-HALF Of THE OTHER HALF WAS D0:NG-

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GOVERNMENT D. V KNOW . ■ :, :

A* I HAVE ANSWERED THA WHO FRAMEO THE RESPONSE FULLY AWa^E OF ALL THAT OTHER CHANNEL*

QUESTION TOO, I THAT WAS GIVEN TO WAS UNDER WAY AND

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HAVE SAID THAT

MR* AS'-!,:ORE WERI CONTEMPLATED I" THE

Q* WAS THE LETTER UNDER WAY AND CONTEMPLATED AT '.'HAT TH1E7

Ao THAT'S ,4 QUESTION THAT I REGARD AS A MATTER OF EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE. AND NOT A MATTER IN WHICH ANY SPOKESMAN FOR THE ADMINISTRATION SHOULD COMMENT; r^>E LETTER SPEAKS FOR H'SELF*

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', Co BUT YOU STAND BY WHAT YOU SAID BEFORE* THAT THE LETTER Was

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A* WE WILL NEVER COMMENT ON DATE? LETTERS ARE WRITTEN*

0- YOU DID SAY BEFOR

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YOU ORIGINALLY TOLD US IT WAS WRITTEN ON- THE SND& ''OU DID.

A« N0» I MERELY CORRECTED THE RECORD ON THATvCfiAL*

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AFTER IT BECOMES --

A= IF IT WAS SAID AT ANY TIME BY ANY ADMINISTRATION SPOKESMEN THAT IT WAS FEBRUARY 2ND .« AND THIS ISAM THAT DOUBTLESS BOB MCCLGSKEY HAS GOV SOMEBODY LOOKING THIS MOMENT--" THAT WAS IN ERROR* THAT LETTER WAS \

(TTER

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FORM DATED FEBRUARY 8?H>

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HAVE TOLD YOU TriE FACTS o

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I THINK WHEN WE WERE GIVEN THE LETTER THERE WaS NO DATE ON

Ap THAT QUITE OFTEN "HAPPENS WITH CORRESPONDENCEo

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• NORMALLY GIVEN A DATE CORRESPONDING TO THE DATE

" TRANSMISSION* WHICH IN THIS CASE WAS VERY EARLY ON THE 3TH*

MR» MCCLOSKEY! I HAVE 'THE RECORD OF TH£ TRANSCRIPT ON TH <~ DAY- THERE'S NO REFERENCE TO FEBRUARY'S IN THE RECORD 0,N THaT«

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UNCLASSIFIED 270

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

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Department of State

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UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 25 STATE 39365

AND

REALLY DON'T KNOW HOW WILL HAVE TO LEAVE IT

HE FEBRUARY 0 ONE SIDE.

2 STOR'/ GOT S ;AR 'Eds

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HIGHER OFFICIALS IN THE DEPARTMENT OF StX.TE TOLD US 'THA-T DATE a

Ac WELL* IN THA RUSK

EVENT WE WERE WRONG. UNQUOTE*

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UNCLASSIFIED