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Geneva Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in VN of July 20, 195^ Introduction of U.S. troops even for purposes of flood control would still constitute a violation of the Geneva Accords by the Government of VN. If a decision is made to send U.S. troops into W, the U.S. should justify it on the ground of collective self-defense. "Nothing in the Geneva Accords should be read as abridging the inherent right of Vietnam and the United States to take actions in collective self-defense." DoD General Counsel Memorandum for Mr. Hadyn Williams, 26 October 1961.. 3^9

k0» General Taylor summarizes the fundamental conclusions of his group and his personal recommendations, Taylor concludes there is a double crisis in confidence: doubt that the U.S. is determined to save SEA, and doubt that \ Diem's methods can defeat the Communist purposes and methods. Taylor recommends that the U.S. Government join with the GVH in a massive joint effort as part of a total mobilization of GVN resources to cope with both the VC and the ravages of the flood* Specifically, the U.S. Government will provide individual administrators, conduct a joint-survey of conditions in the provinces, assist the GVN in effecting surveillance and control over the coastal waters, and finally, offer to introduce into South VN a military Task Force to operate under U.S. military control. General Taylor telegram (cite EAGI00005) for President Kennedy, 1 November 1961 331

41. Taylor presents his reasons for recommending the introduction of a U.S. militaiy force into South Vietnam. "I have reached the conclusion that this is an essential action if we are to reverse the present downward trend of events...

* * there can be no action so convincing of U.S. seriousness of purpose and hence so reassuring to the people and govern-. ment of SVN and to our other friends and allies in SEA as the introduction of U.S. forces into SVN." Taylor suggests that the strategic reserve of U.S. forces is seriously weak and that U.S. prestige would be more heavily engaged in SVN by this action. However, the size of the U.S. force introduced need not be great to provide the military presence necessary to produce the desired effect. General Taylor telegram (cite BAGI00O06) for President Kennedy, 1 November 1961 - 337

42. The JCS and Secretary McNamara do not believe major units of U.S. forces should be introduced in SVN unless the U.S. is willing to commit itself to the clear objective of preventing the fall of SVN to communism and to support this

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commitment by military action and preparation for possible later action. They recommend that the U.S commit itself to this objective and support the recommendations of General Taylor toward its fulfillment. Secretary of Defense Memorandum for the President, 8 November 1961...

43. The head of the British Advisory Mission submits to Diem his plan for clearing the VC from the Delta. The central idea is the creation of a network of "strategic hamlets" akin to those employed successfully hy Thompson in defeating the communist guerillas in Malaya. R.G.K. Thompson letter to Diem, 11 November 1961 .

kh m Reversing the November 8 Defense recommendation for a commitment of substantial U.S. ground forces to South Vietnam this November 11 Rusk-McNamara memorandum to the President (perhaps prepared at Kennedy*s specific direction) escalates the rhetoric regarding U.S. interest in a free South Vietnam, but restricts the military recommendation: (a) employ only support forces now; (b) defer any decision to send "larger organized units with actual or potential direct military missions," Whether Kennedy fully accepted the highblown statements of U.S. interest and commitment to the GVN is not known. State/Defense Memorandum to the President, 11 November I96I

45. The Joint Staff submits to the Chairman, JCS, briefs of the military actions contained in the draft National Security Action Memorandum resulting from the Taylor Mission Report. The military actions indexed pertain to the use of significant and/or substantial U.S. forces, provision of increased airlift, provision of additional equipment and U.S. personnel, provision of training and equipment for the Civil Guard and SDC, and finally, overhaul of the GVN militaiy establishment and command structure. In connection with the draft memorandum, the Joint Staff considersit militarily desirable to pre-position forces and equipment and is currently considering augmentation of U.S. Army Forces Pacific, with one infantry division plus appropriate logistic and combat support units. Joint Staff Memorandum for the Chairman of the JCS, lit November 1961

k6 m Rusk instructs Ambassador Nolting to seek an immediate appointment with President Diem to inform him that President Kennedy has decided that the Government of the U.S. is prepared to join the Government of VN in a sharply increased joint effort to avoid further deterioration in the situation of SVN. The joint effort requires certain undertakings by

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both governments. On its part, the U.S. would immediately support the GVN with increased airlift, additional equipment^ U.S. personnel, expedited training and equipping of the Civil Guard and increased economic aid. The GVN, however, would have to initiate the following actions: (l) begin prompt legislative and administrative action to put the nation on a wartime footing to mobilise its resources; (2) give governmental wartime agencies adequate authority to perform their functions effectively; and (3) overhaul the military establishment and command structure to create an effective military organization. "President Kennedy contemplates aft immediate strong affirmative reply to satisfactory letter along indicated lines from President Diem, which will simultaneously be made public." Rusk NIACT 6l9 to Saigon, 15 November 1961.«...**........,... ...*.*..

After three days of talks in Saigon, Ambassador Galbraith feels there is scarcely "the slightest practical chance that the administrative and political reforms being pressed upon Diem will result in real change." Gailbraith sees a comparatively well equipped army of a quarter million men facing 15 to 18,000 lightly armed men. "...there is no solution that does not involve a change of government... to say there is no alternative (to Diem) is nonsense." Ambassador Gailbraith Memorandum for the President, 20 November 1961. ........#

"The key and inescapable point then is the ineffectually (abetted debatably by the unpopularity) of the Diem Government. This is the strategic factor. Nor can anyone accept the statement of those who have been either too long or too little in Asia that it is the inevitable posture of the Asian mandarin. For one tiling, it isn't true, but were it so, the only possible conclusion would be that there is no future for mandarins. The communists don't favor them." Gailbraith feels that it is politically naive to expect that Diem will reform either administratively or politically in any effective way. "However, having started on this hopeless game, we have no alternative but to play it out for a minimum time...since there is no chance of success we must do two things to protect our situation. One is to make clear that our commitment is to results and not to promises.. .and we can press hardest in the area of Army reform where *the needed changes are most specific and most urgent." It follows from Gailbraith's reasoning that the only solution must be to drop Diem, and we should not be alarmed by the Army as an alternative. Gailbraith Hew Delhi 99^-1 for President Kennedy, 21 November 1961.,.

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lj-9* The U.S. is prepared to join the VN Government in a sharply-increased joint effort to avoid a further deterioration in the situation in SVN. This joint effort is contingent upon initiation of certain actions on the part of the GVN and consists of increased economic and military support by the U.S., based on recommendations of the Taylor Report, . NSAM ill, 22 November I961 1*19

50. Bundy comments on the command arrangements for VN and recommends that General McGarr be elevated to the new position or that a replacement be found. He also recommends sending Lansdale back as Diem has requested. Bundy Memorandum for

the Secretary of Defense, 25 November 1961. . 1*22

51. General Taylor relates a list of questions proposed by President Kennedy to be used at a meeting of his key advisors* Among the questions are: (l) what is the situation with regard to Diem as reported by Ambassador Nolting;

(2) can we delay longer in obtaining an answer from Diem;

(3) what are the views of the JCS on the military organisation required to support the new program; (k) what is our plan for flood relief; (5) who should the President regard as personally responsible for the effectiveness of the Washington eud of this operation? General Taylor Memorandum for Secretary McNamara, 27 November 1961. ........... 423

52. The President approves U.S. participation in a selective and carefully controlled Joint program of defoliant operations in VN starting with the clearance of key routes and proceeding thereafter to food denial. NSAM 115, 30 November

1961 ; 425

53. McNarnara confirms to Rusk the command arrangements under which the senior U.S. military commander in Vietnam will have the title "Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Forces -Vietnam 1 ' and will have equivalent rank to the Ambassador, reporting through CINCPAC to the JCS. Secretary of Defense Memorandum for the Secretary of State, l8 December 1961,,,.. k26

54. Diem is apprehensive about giving control authority to

Big Minh as &ilitary field commander because of his fear of a coup. While U.S. policy is to support Diem and he has been so informed by the President, we must find a way to reassure him about a coup, "It is the basis for his real reluctance to do what the Americans want him to do and this basic point needs resolving...what realistic assurances • can we give Diem that the action he fears won't take place?" Lansdale Memorandum for the CJCS, 2J December 1961 * 1|.27

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56.

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1962

The Chairman of the JCS summarizes the current situation in W, methods of VC operations, routes of infiltration and supply, relative strengths, and discusses U.S. military units in place or enroute to VN. "The objectives of the Diem Government in SVN include not only survival against the communists, but also improvement of the national economy, enhancement of SVN's position among Southeast Asian nations, creations of an effective armed force, and preservation of a pro-Western orientation. "Policies directed toward the achievement of these objectives suffer from the concentration*of power in the hands of the President, Ngo Dinh Diem, and a small clique headed by his extremely influential and powerful brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu." Chairman JCS Talking Paper for Briefing President Kennedy, 9 January 1962 •*

The JCS agree that the basic issue of Diem's apprehension about a coup needs to be resolved* fr I don't believe there is any finite answer to the question you pose as to how to convince Diem he must delegate authority to subordinates he doesn't fully trust." JCS Memorandum for General Lansdale, CM-491-62, 18 January 19 62. ....-•.•'.«.

The President establishes a Special Group (Counter Insurgency), the functions of which are as follows: (l) to insure proper recognition throughout the U.S. Government that subversive insurgency ("wars of liberation") is a major form of politico-military conflict equal in importance to conventional warfare; (2) to insure that such recognition is reflected in the organization, training, equipment and doctrine of the U.S, armed forces and other U.S. agencies; (3) to continually review the adequacy of U.S. resources to deal with insurgency; and (4) to insure the development of adequate programs aimed at preventing or defeating insurgency. HSAM 124, l8 January 1962....,.,

State Department agrees that an increase in the Vietnamese armed forces to the 200,000 man level should be supported provided the following factors are considered: (l) that U.S. military advisors and the Vietnamese authorities continue to set valid tactical and strategic plans; (2) the rate of increase should consider the ability of the Army to absorb and train the additional men and the manpower resources of SKI; (3) that the armed forces should level off at 200,000 and further efforts should be devoted to

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strengthening the Civil Guard and Self-Defense Corps;

and (4) that our training programs for ARYN be based on the

concept that the Vietnamese Army will start winning when it

has the confidence of the Vietnamese populace, U. Alexis

Johnson letter to Mr. Gilpatric, 26 January 1962........... 445

59. Secretary McNamara forwards a JCS Memorandum to the President with the comment, 1f I am not prepared to endorse the views of the Chiefs until we have had more experience with our present program in SVN." The JCS Memorandum recommends that if, with DIem f s full cooperation and the effective employment of SVH armed forces, the VC is not brought under control, then a decision should be made* to deploy suitable U.S. military combat forces to SVN sufficient to achieve desired objectives. Secretary of Defense Memorandum for the President, 27 January 1962 (jCSM-33-62, 13 January I962, attached) • . 447

60• The President requests that AID review carefully its role in the support of local police forces for internal security and counter-insurgency purposes, and recommend to him through the Special Group (Counter Insurgency) what new or renewed emphases are desirable, NSAM 132, 19 February 1962... 455

61. The President approves training objectives for personnel who may have a role to play in counter insurgency programs as well as in the entire range of problems involved in the modernization of developing countries. The training objectives include the study of: the historical background of counter insurgency, departmental tactics and techniques to counter subversive insurgency, instruction in counter insurgency program planning, specialized preparations for service in underdeveloped areas. Training of foreign nationals will also be included in the program. The President desires that current counter insurgency training be examined to ascertain if it meets the above training objectives. NSAM 131, 13 March 1962 , „, # 457

62. The President forwards a memorandum on the subject of W from Ambassador Galbraith and requests Department cf Defense comments. The Gailbraith Memorandum (4 April 62) asserts that the U.S. is backing a weal: and ineffectual government In SVN and that ''there Is a consequent danger that we shall replace the French as the colonial force in the area and bleed as the French did." Gailbraith urges that U.S. policy keep open the door for political solution, attempt to involve other countries and world opinion in a settlement, and reduce our commitment tc the present leadership of GVU. In

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66

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67.

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addition to recommended specific actions, Gailbraith suggests the U.S. should resist all steps to commit American troops to combat action and dissociate itself from programs which are directed at the villagers, such as the resettlement programs* "White House Memorandum for Secretary of Defense, 7 April I962 (Galbraith Memorandum attached).,.

The JCS comment on Ambassador Galbraith 1 s Memorandum to President Kennedy, The JCS cite the Kennedy letter of 1^ December 1961 to President Diem as a public affirmation of the intention of the U.S. Government to support President Diem to whatever extent necessary to eliminate the VC threat0 In sum, it is the JCS opinion that the present U.S. policy toward SVR as announced by the President "be pursued vigorously to a successful conclusion." JCS Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, JCSM 282-62, 13 April 1962...,

»OO«OOO0G««

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ISA discusses the circumstances surrounding the Defense reply to Galbraith 1 s Memorandum and notes the absence of formal staffing by the State Department, In- a penciled note "Secretary of Defense has talked to Ambassador Galbraith and feels no reply needed. Mr. Forrestal informed this date that none would be sent." ISA Memorandum to Secretary of Defense, Ik April 1962

0**««*«t«»o*.e#0e*0.»o.«**.**6t>6#

• * * * • o e

The President requests contingency planning in the event of a breakdown of the cease-fire in Laos for action in two major areas: (l) the holding by Thai forces with U.S. backup of that portion of northern Laos west of the Mekong River; and (2) the holding and recapture of the panhandle of Laos from Thakhek to the southern frontier with Thai, Vietnamese or U.S. forces. Kennedy indicates that he contemplates keeping U.S. forces in Thailand during the period of the negotiations by the three Princes and the early days of the government of national union. KSAM 157, 29 May 1962 ...

In an evaluation of the first three months of systematic counter-insurgency, Hilsman of State's IHR reports some progress and reason for modest optimism although acknowledging the great amount yet to be done. State Department IHR Research Memorandum RKE-27, 18 June 1962

The President approves assignments of responsibilities in the development of U.S. and indigenous police,paramilitary and military resources to various agences as recommended by the Special Group on Counter Insurgency. Deficiencies revealed in the study pursuant to NSAM 56 include; country

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internal defense plans, improvement of personnel programs of agencies concerned with unconventional warfare, orientation of personnel, deployment of counter insurgency personnel, support of covert paramilitary operations, increased use of third-country personnel, exploitation of minorities, * improvement of indigenous intelligence organizations, and research and development for counter insurgency. NSAM l62, 19 June 1962 Wl

68. The President approves a national counter insurgency doctrine for the use of U.S. departments and.agencies concerned with the internal defense of overseas areas threatened by subversive insurgency. NSAM l82, 2k August I962 ^85

69* In a year-end summary of the Vietnamese situation and prognosis, Hilsman (State HIE) concludes that at best the rate of deterioration has been decreased. GVN control of the countryside, the Strategic Hamlet Program notwithstanding, has increased only slightly. State Department IMR Research Memorandum RFE-59, 3 December 1961 •.. k8j

. 1963

70. A National Intelligence Estimate states that "Communist progress has been blunted and that the situation is improving. Strengthened South Vietnamese capabilities and effectiveness, and particularly U.S. involvement, are causing the Viet Cong increased difficulty, although there are as yet no persuasive indications that the Communists have been grievously hurt." The VC will continue to wage a war of attrition and there is no threat of overt attack from the Worth. On the basis of the last year's progress the VC can be contained but it is impossible "to project the future course of the war with any confidence. Decisive campaigns have yet to be fought and no quick and easy end

to the war is in sight." FIE 53-63, "Prospects in South

Vietnam," 17 April 1963 ...... 522

71. The President approves and directs certain actions outlined in the Department of State Memorandum of 17 June I963, relative to Laos planning. The President wishes to obtain suggestions for actions in Laos in light of the deteriora-ting situation and from the British and the French before initiating any action under the Memorandum. Kennedy asks about additional U.S. actions to be taken in Laos before*

any action directed against NVN. NSAM 2k$, 25 June I963... " 525

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72. The President is briefed on developments in Indonesia, Laos and W. Specifically, onSVU, discussions cover the possibility

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75. U.S. policy with respect to a coup is defined in more detail for Lodge and Harkins as a result of an NSC meeting with the President. "The USG will support a coup which has good chance of succeeding but plans no direct involvement of U.S. armed forces. Harkins should state (to the generals) that he is prepared to establish liaison with the coup planners and to review plans, but will not engage directly in joint coup planning." Lodge is authorized to suspend aid if he thinks it will enhance the chances of a successful coup. State Department Message 272, State to Lodge and Harkins, 29 August

1963

76. Rusk raises with Lodge the possibility of a last approach to Diem about removing Mhu before going ahead with the coup.

He notes that General Harkins favors such an attempt. Rusk

of getting rid of the Nhus (the combined judgment wa*

that it would not be possible), pressure on Diem to take

political actions, possible results of a coup, and the

replacement of Ambassador Nolting with Ambassador Lodge,

Department of State Memorandum of Conversation, h July

1963 • 526

73* A Special National Intelligence Estimate evaluates the

political crisis in South Vietnam arising from the Buddhist protest. It concludes that if Diem does not seek to conciliate the Buddhists new disorders are likely and there will be better than even chances of coup or assassination attempts. U.S-GW relations have deteriorated as a function of Diem's distrust of U.S. motives in the Buddhist affair and he may seek to reduce the U.S. presence in Vietnam. The Communists have thus far not exploited the Buddhist crisis and they would not necessarily profit from a non-Communist overthrow. A successor regime with con-. tinued U.S. support would have good chances of effectively pursuing the war* SHIE 53-2-63, "The Situation in South Vietnam," 10 July I963 * 529

74. In a subsequently controversial cable, State informs Lodge that if Diem is unwilling or unable to remove Hhu from the government, that the U.S. will have to prepare for alternatives. Lodge is authorized to inform the Vietnamese generals plotting a coup that if Hhu is not removed we will be prepared to discontinue economic and military aid, to accept a change of government and to offer support in any period of ! interim breakdown of the central government mechanism. State \ Department Message to Saigon 2*1-3, State to Lodge, 2^ August

1963

536

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78.

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feels that if accompanied by the threat of a rpal sanction — i.e.j the withdrawal of U.S. support -- such an approach could be timed to coincide with the readiness of the generals to make their move and mighty therefore, offer some promise of getting Diem to act. State Department Message 279, State to Lodge, 29 August 19^3 •

Vice President Johnson presides over a meeting at the State Department on the subject of SVT4, The generals 1 plot having aborted. Rusk asks what in the situation "lead us to think well of a coup." Further, Rusk feels that it is unrealistic now "to start off by saying that Nhu has to go." McNamara approves Rusk's remarks. Hilsman presents four basic factors bearing on the current situation: (l) the restive mood of the South Vietnamese population; (2) the effect on U.S. programs elsewhere in Asia of the current GVN policy against the Buddhists; (3) the personality and policies of Nhu; and (h) U.S. and world opinion. Vice President has great reservations about a coup because he sees no genuine alternative to Diem. General Krulak Memorandum for the Record, 31 August I963

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Lodge is instructed by the White House that since there is no longer any prospect of a coup,pressure must be applied to Diem to get him to adopt an extensive list of reforms. In particular Lodge is authorized to hold up any aid program if he thinks such action will give him useful leverage in dealing with Diem. CAP Message 63516, White House to Lodge, 17 September 1963 •

The President explains to Lodge his urgent need for the McNamara-Taylor assessment of the situation.,. The visit is not designed to be a reconciliation with Diem, rather he expects McNamara will speak frankly to him about the military consequences of the political crisis. State Department Message h31, The President to Lodge, l8 September

1963

Lodge's reply to the White House CAP Message 63516 indicates agreement that a coup is no longer in the offing, but opposes both an approach to Diem on reforms or the use of an aid suspension as a lever. He regards both as likely to be unproductive or worse. Embassy Saigon Message 5^> Lodge to State for President Only, 19 September 1963 9 ,

539

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President Kennedy outlines his reasons for sending McNamara and Taylor to VII: "I am asking you to go because of my desire to have the best possible on-the-spot appraisal of

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the military and paramilitary effort to defeat the VC." While the results from programs developed after Taylor's Mission in 19&L were heartening, the serious events in the South since May 19&3 have prompted the President to ask McNarcara to make a fresh, first-hand appraisal of the situation, "In my judgement the question of the progress of the contest in SVH is of the first importance..." President Kennedy Memorandum for Secretary of Defense, 21 September

1963

551

82, Pending McNamara's visit and the subsequent review of policy, Lodge is given the following interim guidance: "(l) The United States intends to continue its efforts to assist the Vietnamese people in their struggle against the Viet Cong* (2) Recent events have put in question the possibility of success in these efforts unless there can be important improvements in the government of South Vietnam* (3) It is the policy of the United States to bring about such improvement." State Department Message ^58, Eyes Only for Lodge

from Ball, 22 September 1963 553

83, The Mcilamara-Taylor Mission Report concludes that the military campaign has made great progress, and, while the

political crisis in Saigon is serious, "there is no solid ' evidence of the possibility of a successful coup*.." The Report recommends against promoting a coup and, although it is not clear that U.S. pressure will move Diem to the moderations and reforms we desire, nevertheless, as the only course of action with any prospect of producing results, the report \ recommends the application of selective economic sanctions, including a suspension of funds for the commodity import program. The Mission further recommends a shift of military emphasis to the Delta and a consolidation of the Strategic j Hamlet Program. In addition, it is recommended that a training program be established for RVNAF such that the bulk of U.S. personnel may be withdrawn by the end of 19&5. In \ conjunction with this program, the U.S. should announce plans 1 to withdraw 1, 000 U.S. military personnel by the end of I963.. 55^

84. Lodge is advised that as a result of the policy review just completed, the "President today approved recommendation that no initiative should now be taken to give any active covert encouragement to a coup." Efforts to build and maintain contacts with "alternative leadership" is authorised, however. CAP Message 63560, to Lodge via CAS channel, 5 October

1963

85. Contact has been renewed by the generals with a CAS agent who has been apprised of the reactivation of plotting. In. the

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meeting, General Minh states that he must know the U.S. position on a coup* He stresses that a coup is urgently needed to prevent the loss of the war to the VC. The U.S. ! contact is noncommital. CAS Saigon Message 1^5 j Lodge

to State, 5 October I963 575

86. Washington reaffirms Lodge's guidance that he is not to promote a coup. Neither, however, is he to thwart one. He should try to "obtain as much information as possible from the plotters about their plans on which to base an -American judgement about their likelihood of success. CIA Message

Jk228, 6 October 1963 4 577

87. The President approves the detailed military recommendations ; contained in the McNamara-Taylor Report, but directs that no ' announcement of the implementation of the l,000~man withdrawal plan be made. WSAM 263, 11 October 1963 578

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88. A Department of State Research Memorandum contends that the statistical indicators on the war in Vietnam reveal "that the military position of the Vietnam Government may have reverted to the point it had reached six months to a year ago." The analysis angers the JCS and Rusk subsequently apologizes to McNamara. Department of State, IMR Research Memorandum KFE-90, 22 October I963 579

89. With the coup plotting now far advanced and the U.S. clearly committed to the generals' attempt, Lodge seeks to calm Washington's anxieties about the lack of detailed information on the generals' plans. He is at pains to oppose any thought of thwarting the coup because he thinks the military will create a government with better potential for carrying on the war, and because it would constitute undue meddling in Vietnamese affairs. Embassy Saigon Message - . 196^, Lodge to McGeorge Bundy, 25 October I963 590

*

90. While thanking Lodge for his views, the White House indicates that short of thwarting a coup we should retain the prerogative of reviewing the plans and discouraging any attempt with poor prospects of success. CAP Message 63590,

- McGeorge Bundy to Lodge, 25 October I963 592

91. The White House instructs Lodge to bring General Harkins completely up to date on the coup plotting, and asks that' " Harkins, Lodge and the CXA Station Chief provide a combined assessment of the prospects of the plotters. Individual comments are to be sent if desired. With these assessments, a decision can be made telling the generals:

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(a) we vill maintain a hands-off policy, (b) we will posi lively encourage the coup, or (c) we vill discourage it. More detailed military plans should be sought from Minh. CAS Message 79109 > McGeorge Bundy to Lodge, 30 October 1963

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92. After complaining about Lodge's failure to keep him Informed about the coup planning, General Harkins opposes the proposed coup against Diem, He does not see an alternative leadership with Diem f s strength of character, especially not among the generals. The war continues to go

veil. MACV Message 2028, Harkins to Taylor, 30 October 595

1963 . -

93, General Harkins takes detailed exception to the interpretations of a deteriorating war effort that Lodge has been transmitting throughout October, He offers an optimistic appraisal of the trend of the war and sees the political crisis as having only a marginal effect on troop morale and military effectiveness, MACV Message 2033, Harkins

to Taylor, 30 October I963 . 597

$h. Lodge argues forcefully for the coup, "it Is theoretically possible for us to turn over the information which has been given to us in confidence to Diem and this would undoubtedly stop, the coup and would make traitors out of us. For practical purposes, therefore, I would say that we have very little influence on what is essentially a Vietnamese affair." In the event the coup fails, he believes we should do what we can to help evacuate the generals' dependents. Lodge believes the generals are all taking enormous risks for the (/ sake of their country and their good faith is not to be

questioned. "Heartily agree that a miscalculation could ; jeopardize position in Southeast Asia. We also run tremen- ! dous risks by doing nothing." General Harkins did not I

concur in the cable. CAS Saigon Message 2063, 30 October 1963 • ■

feo

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95- Taking note of the difference of opinion on the advisa- |

bility of a coup between Lodge and Harkins, the White House : j

specifically informs Lodge that he is to discourage the ;

generals from any attempt that in his judgement has a poor

prospect of success. Lodgd is given full authority for

country team actions in the event of a coup; if he has left

for Washington, Harkins will have charge. In the event of

a coup, U.S. policy will be: (a) to reject ax/peals for

direct intervention from either side; (b) if the*contest is

indecisive, U,S. authorities may perform any actions agreed

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to by both sides; (c) in the event the coup fails^ asylum may be offered to anyone to whom ve have an obligation; but (d) once the coup has started, it is in our interests to see that it succeeds. CAS Washington Message 79^07, 30 October 1963,

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Talking Paper for the Chairman j JC3, for aectlns v;ith the' President of the United States 9 feauswy 19^2

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B&ekeround - Today Go&sftnist; China end North Vietnam are suffering

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from the effects of failure cf their ©oirniunes to produce actuate amounts' of food to food thair peoples. Recently, lar^e quantitie of wheat were purchased by Hod China from Canada and Australia to

overcome this failure* aouth cist Aaia^ primarily South vietaaat and Thailand., is a food surplus area in normal times. Because

of this and the standard l^arxist-Lonlaist eoncspt of peripheral

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aggression and pressure, the rain ecssiunlst threat in the Western \ "

Facifie appears to he directed at Southeast Asia. Of principle

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cozicern for the purpoco of this brief ins is the situation in i

j South Vietnam, the U3 IIAtional ohjactivao there and the military

actions that have bee-n implemented since October in support of

oar objectives. .'

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- The current; situation In Soixtli Vietnam

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.- country into tv/o major gsogx*aphical areas * Xntersector V sritii

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headquarters in the high plateau region north and west of Kontua* and the flasjbo sector in the south with headquarters northeast of Saigon. Each Ea$or area is sxibdivicled into interprovineial com-.Bands—four in Interseotor V and throe in !Tambo> with a special eons for Saigon. Each inter-provincial area is further organised

j into provinces v;hich are further subdivided into districts*

villages j and hamlets

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I " ' • *~ tl^fetio&s of VC Operation

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•* 5&e aooOO-tn^n Viet Cons Ktlitat*? eaf^Mishmettt is divided

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into ti?o operational groups—regular-and re^loasl-locsl fores:;.

Regular feafcfcaliono sn3 e<^paniea, nisaberlns about 8,500 per-sosmel, constitute the offensive element or the "Mfeerafcion

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Amy* and operate throughout their respective interprovineial

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She Viet Cong have heavily infiltrated^ organized and nov; ef- \

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foctively control the colored areas on this chart* ■ ' : ; *-v To achieve their purposes the Viet Cong have divided the

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The 8,000 regional and local forces., vrhieh correspond functionally to the Self Defense Forces of SV3, arc essentially security troops recruited and organised on district levels fox* limited operations End to provide security for eoimnand heact-

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gra also used to pr-ovlcla seral-trainac! personnel as replacements

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in regular battalions and as fillers far richly activated units.

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Under regional unit control guerrilla platoons made up of day-

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fcims taimsvs sabotage* terror! r,o> ftssa^alnsitdj kidnapj dlss^gslnata propaganda* a&d attoinpt to subvor*fc their neighbors ♦

Availability of yecpons. appears to bs a continuing pro^lesa

-for Viet Con^ forcesj particularly iii regional units in which

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less than half of the E3n are arsied. The prlnary source of arsas ■ for all VC forces app$S?s to be those c&pti&tod from South *

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Vietnamese security forces.

Most officers and key iiC^s, as veil as political and DrQpagazida

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specialists, ere forr.ier South vietn.ai.tise uho v;ent north trifch the Cci^nunists in 19p5.» or ;;ho have since "been recruited and sent to

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Ilorth Vietnam. These southerners are given special training c.^& £3?3 than Infiltrated feack into South Viet&asi tiireush lacs (ox 1 "by

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Training of r^^ional trocoo and th£ activation of noir x»dgulcr ■battalions have been stepped up since the first of the year. In ..

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several ciajoa? Viet Cons training a-Kc&tSj eaia of uhich had barracks cpr-ce Tor noro than a battalion^ £00 d&ssEBT ri;C3c3

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and tons of food.

j.n COi^miiisfcrcontrolloct strea&j tho .Vlefc Cons have oj^dor-ed

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Viet Cons ^2?s coll^efciag r;oney frcn tho peasants arid plantation ovnisrs to finance the yaa? against the gcvovvrasntj and have in:-plesaentetl a rico tax to build up supplies for future epspat&atfsu

Pitched battlas gps

avoided v/aepevsr possible* unless they ore

essential to a ^ivon pla»j oi* the Military advantages ar

least 'four to one, Tho campaign to a~;sa?.>r;in2te all who try to

All inQicatSons point to

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Viet Cons nialntal&ing tha

current higk level of guerrilla action in the south* and in-creasing activity in tbs high plateau area in efforts to build the decided semipermanent bases*

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. . - Prisoner of war Interrogation recently conducted by the -South Vietnamese Intelligence Sorvado has shed additional light

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on the means employed by CosioaaniBt North Vietnaia to assist the

. . "Viet Cons in the latter f s military and psychological campaign

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Korth Vi^tuan ni&intains a training c^np for Special *£reo?) in the? eicinity of Vinhj tihero pro-Yicfc Cong South Vietnamese

receive an 13-nonth Military course interspersed tfith intensive

Cossaunlsfc political indoctrination, SVo 600-nan battalions

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training in May l>*ol. Personnel are asfiirpod to units within tns

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battalion cLccorcUns to their respective regions of origin in South Vie train. .. •

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Upon completion of training* Viet Cons volunteers re-enter South Vietnam by taking a circuitous route through territory "in neighboring laos controlled by Ccrrauniat Pathet

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lii addition to lend infiltration, come Viet Cong guorrillas and cadres are infiltrated by sea using junks and ar.all craft to land at various points on the lon^ South Vietnam coastline. It

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is cstinnted that no r.ore than £0;? of the total infiltrees us

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The current Btttaagtb of the Viet Cons is 16,500 with the possible infiltration of 1,000 per "rionth. The increase in

strength by infiltration is offset hy the estimated Vict Con;

casualttos which avarase cvei* l^CCO a luonth according to South Vietnan official figures• A reeenfc refinement in intelligene-3 reporting indicates that the official estiasate of Viet Cons strength may he raised to about 20^000 in fcha near futttrs. 3?he current actual strength of the South Yietna-nose

forces era as follows;

Array

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* tfavy • -i • Air Fores . Marines

163, 696

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3,135

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. - In addition paramilitary forces Guard and. 45,COO Self Doxcnzo Corps,

total 65,000 in the Civil

The regular Ar:sy forces are organizes and assigned to three corns aroao ulth raj or co:n::ancl fcoadouartors and units located as shotm on tho chart, ' * ' •

* - Currant Xi-5 Military Actions

The President on 22 Rovessfbar 1951 authorised the Ss

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of State* to instruct the US AmosssMor to Yiotnafii to isiforra President Diem that the U3 Government was prepared to Join the *

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C7I; in a sharply increased effort to avoid a farther deterlcrs-

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tisn of tho situation in SVII. On its part tho US would isa&adiatelv

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a# Provide increased airlift to the 6VH in the form, of

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helicopters^ light aviation and transport aircraft*

b. Provide required couip;nent and US pers&insl for aerial veocaxoalsostioOj- instruction In axv$ execution of air-around

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Augaant fchs Vietnamese Havy operationally with d:v^h

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Provide o^peciit^d training and p^oipplng of the Civil

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the rallitsi^-political intelligene© system. . .

f. Provldo suoft Jao;t tti&gia of feoifeps&oej reorganisationj ang additional gt&rsonasl for US sdlltsrsr £ex-ses as are regulfed

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Discussion - As a result of the decision to accelerate US support

or tha CfvII, the following US military units r,v»s in place 62* eni'outs

as ohc:rn c.i th:ir$ chart: (pvei'lsy $o* l)

. * a. tfv;o ksm$ Lijght Helicopter Companies are opera tins in support o.f the StflfAI? l?ron Tan Son Shut and Qui llhon. The third cosspawy is er.routo to Da iizx\z si til an ETA of 3.5 January and an operational readiness date of 1 F$tH*uS3?y* This Kill - provide one cosgjany of 20 K-Sl and tvro 11-13 in support of

each of three 39HK? Corps arass* •

• • b» Tns US Ar-ny has alerted the iSth Flxsci V/ing Aircraft

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Coiaoany equipped v/ith 16 UlA (Ott-:rr) nircraft to be readj*

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for deployment by 15 3araagcey«

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e Ths 3ftStt> US23 IVoop Barrier SgisaarorTwith 16 C-123 .

aircraft has Tour aircraft at Clark end four operating front Tan Son ffiiufc« Efee res&inins ei(£it aircraft are in the Pacific Eaeafcre e.nrouto to Clark with an HS& of 10 January. S&is unit will rotate aircraft into SW front Clark to support; SHU**

operations as rccaiiroa. . : ' •

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. *'._ ' ' d'« Four 1 HP-J01 aircraft and a smll photo processing * . : olemsnt operated by the UOiU? are i« placs at DejV Huang Air-

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'. e. She USA? mm£ JIvl unit at Sien Hon with ei£ht ^-23^

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Vietnamese Ais» Force in cedbafc air support tactics and

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techniques* She Pacific Air Force iu deploying personnel said ceuipraont to SKll to establish a joint iSS/SW Saetical , A±^ Control Sydt€&i'(£A£3}» Tbio sysfc&ia Will par-ait positive control o? nil air* operations ancl rapid respOASo to requests

for slr-grouae suppose*

f ♦ T £ho 3rd Icadio Ksfioimaissaas^ Unit at Ean Son ilhut is

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gg Six C-123 spray equipped aircraft for support of defoliant operations have received diplomatic clearance to enter SW.

h, US Navy Mine Division 73 with a tender and five mine sweepers is operating from Tourane Harbor in conjunction with the Vietnamese Navy conducting maritime surveillance patrols south of the 17th parallel.

i. Air surveillance flights 30 miles seaward from the SVN coast (l7th parallel) to 50 miles beyond the Paracel Islands are conducted every other day by Seventh Fleet patrol aircraft.

In addition to deployment of organized US military units to SVN and increased personnel strength for the MAAG, accelerated

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delivery of MAP equipment has already begun. Nine additional L-20 light observation aircraft are enroute to SVN for use by the Vietnamese Air Force. Also, 15 T-28C aircraft have been delivered to augment the Vietnamese air-ground support capability. These were provided on an interim, loan basis until 30 T-28B (NOMAD) with a greater ordnance delivery capability could complete modification and be delivered to SVN, early in March. Department of the Army is also providing an additional 12 H-3^ helicopters from active Army units to the USAF on a reimbursable basis for accelerated MAP delivery to the RVNAF

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early in March,

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; 0n 1 November 1961 the personnel strength of the military Assistance ■ Advisory Group in Vietnam was 84l, present strength is 120^1 and pro— jected strength as of 30 June I962 is 239^* The total personnel strength of US units and elements, other than the MAAG, was lkh2 as of 2 January 1962 and projected strength as of 30 June 1962 is 3182. The total US personnel in South Vietnam is now 26U6 and projected strength as of 30 June 1962 is 5576,

The MAAG is extending its advisory teams to battalion level within the RVNAF MA Military establishment and beginning to participate more directly in advising Vietnamese unit commanders in the planning and execution of military operations plans. Since delivery of MAP equipment has been accelerated and RVNAF military operations are increasing, the "MAAG training activities have been expanded. This training includes operations, planning, logistics, intelligence, communications and electronics as they apr>ly to each service within the RVNAF. They are also accelerating the training of the Vietnamese Civil Guard and Self-Defense Corps.

Shown on the chart are the approved and funded construction projects in South Vietnam. These include:

a. Improvement of the Pleiku Airfield.

b. Improvements at Tan Son Nhut Airfield which include installations

of:

(1) Pierced steel planking parking apron.

(2) POL hydrant system.

(3) POL pipeline to Nha Be.

(h) Ammunition storage facility (5) Concrete parking apron c. An aircraft control and warning site at Tan Son Nhut and one

at Da Nana:

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d. linpx'ovonsiit or tha Bien Ilea &i#£iel&«

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- Coiirair&Ieafcions and electronics imeroTensonts include the

rollovjlns:

a. An Saiprovsd intelligence co'^iuaicntiono nGt;:or3i* Ifefc

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b* An Improved Gats %fay Station communications f?.c:tlit.Lo

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SSfr&ata?c arc apvxrcvod for CspXo'gtsssit. to 371! as directed by

£ho jFutesre Outlook

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Ths foraaast national objective toa^y of ths Diem govesn-asnt in South Viotn&a is survival &£p££3fc the incursions of

Vietnam, Secondary, but nonetheless extremely important ob- ,' Jeotive-s include: (x) Sjaproveaent of the national economy with

esnphasis on agrarian r-e:Cor;a; (s) enhancement of South Vietnam?

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economic, cultural, and prestige position aaong Southeast Asian

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nations; (3) Che creation of an ei»m&d force capable of defending

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■ftha country frorn potential iiwatldrsj (It) an5 the ppeservatioa

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a pro-v^^-Dorn ovicnvCiuion.

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licloo directed toward .tiio aoMevolasnt

suffer froa the- concentration of pc:-er in the hands of the

President. M^o Slnh. Plea, and a snail clique headed by his e>:-

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trolly influential and powerful brother* Kgo Ein ftfcu Continued receipt of U3 military, economic anet technical aid,

application cf Catholic philosophy^, and the repulsion 01 tee

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Viet Cong gaesrillas are additional c&Jo? policy considerations.

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• Planned courses of action include: (l) the building up of

the armed forces with U3 aid and assistance; (2) defeat cf tixf

Viet Certs forcesj and {3) the implementation cf a series of reforr.v3 aud &3a&\sr£3 to correct imbalances in the po&ox* hior-

• . Certainly sose-of the projects v;e are inplc.;;entin~ are

outright B&3

efforts such as the defoliation project and "or.r-e

all the earmarks of gimrdeks that cannot and will not win the war. In South Vietnam, However, the constltaent of 03 units to

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advice then in conjunction with increased economic and Ddraiiii-

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strative aid., should riaka it obvious to the Vietnamese and the

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Asia.

not bo

or SV1I sixrricien^l7 to raDist Co: : iriunIat pi^ODBure and v/in trio v:a^

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extent en tho futur^o action or lack cf ac&ien o£ one minj Proolc^^nt; B^.o:n, and fchs wall of th3 Vlstsaa^se people to fight

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

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CM-491-62

JAft 1 8 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL LANS DALE

Subject: Vietnamese Command Problem (C)

1. As you point out in your memorandum of 27 December 1961, it is quite clear that Diem l s apprehension about a coup is the basis for his reluctance to authorize his military field commander to implement the task force concept that was an important part of the over-all plan of operations against the Viet Cong, I fully agree that this basic issue needs to be resolved,

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2, You are well aware that Chief MAAG, Vietnam, in accordance

with his assigned mission, has operated principally as an adviser and trainer rather than as a commander. As such he has suggested and counseled, dropping ideas which the Vietnamese could pick up and incorporate in their own plans. This method H saved face" for them, and has been the accepted method of overcoming simultaneously the inexperience and the pride of the Vietnamese officers, Nov/ a strong case can be made for increased direct participation by US personnel in the planning and supervision of Vietnamese counterinsurgency opera** tions. Inherent in such increased direct participation should be some assurance of US support for Diem personally. Convincing Diem of this personal support remains a principal task of the senior US representatives in Vietnam, The increased US military stake in Vietnam should be of great assistance in this task.

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3« In my view, however, some of the decisions made during the 16 December SecDef meeting at CINCPAC Headquarters offer a greater .hope for progress in Vietnam, It was agreed that, while we should continue to press for acceptance of an over-all plan or concept of operations, we must place immediate emphasis on smaller, more specific, and more readily-accomplished operations. Such a technique is more likely to be acceptable to Diem, At the same time, successful small operations will provide the impetus for larger scale offensive operations, ■ *

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REPRODUCTION OF THIS DOCUMENT IN WHOLE OR IN PART tS PROHIBITED EXCEPT WITH PERMISSION OF THE

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4. I don t t believe there is any finite answer to the question you pose as to how wc convince Diem he must delegate authority to subordinates he docsn t t fully trust* V/e discussed this subject at considerable length at Monday's (15 January 1962) conference in Honolulu, The Ambassador, General McGarr and other top level officers of the Embassy and MAAG recognize the nature of the problem and the importance of reaching a satisfactory solution thereto. If it was not for the heavy responsibilities you are now assigned which would preclude your going to Saigon, 1 believe that one of the best ways to deal with this problem would be to implement the earlier recommendation to send one Brigadier General Lansdale out to Saigon to be personal adviser and conlidant to Diem,

L. L. LEMNITZER /\ Chairman / \

Joint Chiefs of Staff I 1

cc: Secretary McNamara

Deputy Secretary Gilpatric Admiral Heinz

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^PRODUCTlOf. OF THIS DOCUMENT m WHOLE OR IN PART (S PROHIBITED

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SECRET

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

January 18, 1962

NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. 12^

TO:

SUBJECT

The Secretary of State

The Secretary of Defense

The Attorney General

The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

The Administrator, Agency for International Development

The Director ? United States Information Agency

The Military Representative of the President

Director of Central Intelligence

Establisliment of the Special Group (Counter-Insurgency)

To assure unity of effort and the use of all available resources with maximum effectiveness in preventing and resisting subversive insurgency and related forms of indirect aggression in friendly countries, a Special Group (Counter-insurgency) is established consisting of the following members:

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Military Representatives of the President, Chairman

The Attorney General

Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs '

Deputy Secretary of Defense

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

Director of Central Intelligence

Special Assistant to the President for National Security

Affairs ;

Administrator, Agency for International Development { Director, United States Information Agency I

On invitation: i

Other department and agency representatives, as deemed necessary

The functions of the Special Group (C.I.) will be as follows:

a. To insure proper recognition throughout the U, S e Government that subversive insurgency ("wars of liberation") is a major form of politico-military conflict equal in importance to con^ -ntional warfare.

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b. To insure that such recognition is reflected in the organization, training, equipment and doctrine of the U.S„ Armed Forces and other U.S. agencies abroad and in the political, economic, intelligence, military aid and informational programs conducted abroad by State, Defense, AID, USIA and CIA. Particular attention will be paid the special training of personnel prior to assignment to MAAG's and to Embassy staffs in countries where counter-insurgency problems exist or may arise.

c. To keep under review the adequacy of U 0 S 0 resources

to deal with actual or potential situations of insurgency or indirect aggression^ making timely recommendation of measures to apply, increase or adjust these resources to meet anticipated requirements,

d. To insure the development of adequate interdepartmental programs aimed at preventing or defeating subversive insurgency and indirect aggression in countries and regions specifically assigned to the Special Group (C. I.) by the President, and to resolve any interdepartmental problems which might impede their implementation.

In performing the above functions, the members of the Special Group (C.I 0 ) will act on behalf of their respective departments and agencies, and will depend for staff support upon their own staffs, and upon such country or regional interdepartmental task forces (normally chaired by a State Department Assistant Secretary) as may be established. The Group will confine itself to establishing broad lines of counter-insurgency policy, subject to my direction and decision as appropriate, insuring a coordinated and unified approach to regional or country programs, and verifying progress in implementation thereof. It will also undertake promptly to make decisions on interdepartmental issues arising out of such programs.

The critical areas initially assigned to the Special Group (C. I a ) pursuant to paragraph d of this memorandum are set forth in the attached annex.

Attachment

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ANNEX. TO NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. 124

Hereby assign to the cognizance of the Special. Group (Counter-Insurgency) the following countries:

Laos

South Viet-Wam

Thailand

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET January 26, I962

Dear Mr. Gilpatric:

I have received your letter of December 28 to the Secretary on the question of an increase in the Vietnamese armed forces to the 200,000 man level. The matter was discussed with our Task Force while Ambassador Nolting was here on consultation.

In view of the gravity of the situation in Viet-Nam and of the importance of not interrupting the accelerated rate of our assistance to Viet-Nam, we agree that an increase to about 200,000 should be supported provided the following factors are given careful consideration:

1. That the U.S. military advisers and the Vietnamese authorities continue the joint effort to build up a set of valid tactical and strategic plans. We suggest that the locus of this effort should be

in Viet-Nam in order to obtain fall Vietnamese cooperation and to meet the speed requirements of a guerrilla war where a large number of incidents are constantly occurring. We would envisage strategic plans made in Saigon giving priority to areas to be cleared and held and setting forth general methods to be used. We believe these should be accomplished by numerous small tactical actions planned and executed by American and Vietnamese officers on the spot to meet the local situation at the moment.

2. The rate of increase to approximately 200 .,000 men should take into consideration:

a. The ability of the army to absorb and train these men without unduly weakening its fighting ability.

b. Viet-Nam

The Honorable

Roswell \ Gilpatric a

Deputy Secretary of Defense.

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b. Viet-Kam must husband its rnanoover resources carefully. A Eininun number of- trained civilians tnaist be left at their posts in order to at least partially satisfy the rising

expectations of Viet-ITair^s citizens.

3. That the armed forces night best level off at about 200,000 with future emphasis to be devoted to strengthening and enlarging the Civil Guard and Self Defense Corps. Their job would be to hold ground that had been recovered.

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4. That henceforth our training program for AHVIT be based primrily on the concept that the Vietnamese ariry will start winning on the day when it has obtained the confidence of the Vietnamese peasants. As a specific escasiple 1 suggest that we immediately seek Vietnamese implementation of a policy of promptly giving a s:.—11 reward in rice, salt or :.;oney (coiEnooiirf.es in which the Viet Cong short supply} ~:o every person vho gives indorsation to the ar;y, Similarly,villajes which show determination to resist the Viet Con; should receive the promptest possible support.

I would be glad to receive any cos to the foregoing*

seats you ray have with

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27 January 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have asked that the attached memorandum, stating their views concerning the strategic importance may be required if the situation continues to deteriorate, be brought to your attention. The memorandum requires no action by you at this time. I am not prepared to endorse the experience with our present program in South Vietnam.

Robert S. McNamara

cc: Sec. Rusk

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

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MEMORANDUM FORTKE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

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The Strategic Importance of the Southeast Asia Mainland (U)

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j^ 1. The United States has clearly stated and demonstrated that one cf its unalterable objectives is the prevention of South Vietnam

falling to communist aggression and the subsequent loss of the remainder of the Southeast Asian mainland. The military objective, therefore, must be to take expeditiously all actions necessary to defeat communist aggression in South Vietnam, The immediate strategic importance of Southeast Asia lies in the political value that can accrue to the Free World through a success-ful stand in that area. Of equal importance is the psychological impact that a firm position by the United States will have on the countries of the world - both free and communist. On the negative side, a United States political and/or military withdrawal from the Southeast Asian area would have an adverse psychological impact of even greater proportion, and one from which recovery would be both difficult and costly. *

t 2 J It must be recognized that the fall cf South Vietnam to communist control would mean the eventual communist domination of all of the Southeast Asian mainland. There is little doubt that the next maior target would be Thailand- Cadres are now being established in that country and n land reform" or "capitalist dictatorship" ploys may prove fertile exploitation fields for the communists. Thailand is bordered by a "pink" Burma, and a . vacilLatin^ Cambodia, either of which will easily fall under communist pressure. Thailand would almost certainly then seek closer accommodation with the Sine-Soviet Bloc, SEATO would

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probably cease to exist* The only determined opposition to a communist drive would then be Malaya and Singapore. While the people of Malaya have the will to fight arid might have the backing of the United Kingdom, the country- itself would be isolated and hard pressed. The communist element .in Singapore is strong. Short of direct military intervention by .the United States, it is questionable whether Malaya and Si igapore could be prevented from eventually coming under communist domination or control.

i" 3.' Military Considerations, (The Appendix contains a more i d. . .—- \—, * —^

derailed appraisal ot these military considerations.)

a. Early Eventualities - Loss of the Southeast Asian

Mainland would, have an adverse impact on our military strategy-aac! would markedly reduce our ability.in limited war hy denying us air, land and sea bases, by forcing greater intelligence effort with lesser results, by compli-' eating military lines of communication and by the introduction cf more formidable enemy forces in the area. Air access and access to 5300 miles of mainland coastline would be lost to us,* our Allies and neutral India would be outflanked, the last significant United Kingdom military strength in Asia would be eliminated with the loss of Singapore and Malaya 2.r±& US military influence in that area, short of war, would be difficult to exert. *

k* Possible Even t ualities - Of equal importance to the immediate losses are the eventualities which could follow the loss of the Southeast Asian mainland. All of the Indonesian archipelago could come under the domination and control of the USSR and would become a communist base posing a threat again51 Australia and New Zealand, The Sino-Soviet 31oc wov have control of the eastern access to the Indian Ocean. The Philippines and Japan could be pressured to assume at best, a neutralist role, thus eliminating two of our major bases ox defense in the Western Pacific. Cur lines of defense then would be pulled north to Korea, Okinawa and Taiwan resulting in the subsequent overtaxing of our lines of communications in a limited war. India 1 s ability to remain neutral would be jeopardized and, as the Bloc meets success, i$B concurrent stepoed-up activities to move into and control Africa can be expected.

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f 4* Politic?.! Considerations J The Joint Chiefs of Sta.fi wish to

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of South Vietnam to cither communist insurgency or aggression. must prevent the communist control or domination of the Southeast Asia mainland and must extend its influence in that arei in such a manner as to negate the possibility, ox any luture communist encrOachirxsiita It is recognized that the military and political effort of Communist China in South Vietnam and the political and psychological thrust by the USSR ir.io ;he Indonesian archipelago are not brushfire tactics nor merely a campaign for control o£ the mainland area. More important, it is part of a major campaign to extend communist control beyond the periphery of the Sino-Soviet Bloc and overseas to both island and continental areas in the Free World, through a most natural and comparatively soft outlet, the Southeast Asian Peninsula, It is, in fact, a planned phase in the communist timetable for world domination. V/hereas, control of Cuba has opened for the Siivo-Soviet Bloc more ready access to countries of South and Central America, control of Southeast Asia will open access to the remainder of Asia and to Africa and us tr alia.

.

rSmjlrt consideration of the formidable threat to the Free "world which is represented i:r the current actions in South Vietnam, the need for US and GVN success in that area cannot be overemphasized. In this connection, reference is made to the staff level document entitled "Summary, of Suggested Courses of Action" prepared for General Taylor for reference in his mission to South Vietnam. On 21 October 19^1/ this document circulated comments and recommendations on 20 courses of action that could be taken in South Vietnam short of the direct utilization of US combat forces» The Joint Chiefs of Staff note that, in keeping with the President's decision that we must advise and support South Vietnam but not at this time engage unilaterally in combat, all of the courses of action recommended with few exceptions have either been implemented or authorized for implementation. In this connection, it is noted that the Vietnamese Government has specifically requested further assistance from the United States.

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f~7 # |a response to President Diem's -request for assistance and the^agreeiiient between tlie governments, me:., money, materials and advice are beirig provided to South Vietnam, Unfortunately, our co&iributions are not being properly employed by the South Vietnamese Government and major portions of the agreement have either not been carried out or are being delayed by Diem.

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8, For a combined US/Vietnans effort to be successful, there ■ must be convbiaed participation in the decision making process. To date efforts made on both the military and diplomatic level have failed to motivate Diem to agree to act forthrightly on our advice and properly utilize the resources placed at his disposal* He has been slow to accept the plans and proposals of Admiral Felt and General McGarr and he has in many instances disregarded the advice of Ambassador Noliiug* The reason for Dieni's negative reaction to proposals to save South Vietnam while he maintains a positive position that it must be saved may be found in CINCPAC's appraisal of his character - an uncompromising inflexibility and his doubts concerning the judgment, ability and individual loyalty of his military leaders. Recent intelligence reports of coup d'etat plotting involving senior Vietnamese military officers and the possibility that high Vietnamese officers have approached US officials tend to confirm Diem 1 5 doubts concerning the loyalty- of some of his military leaders.

9* £n this regard, should a successful coup overturn Diem, v/e might discover that many of Diem's difficult characteristics are national rather than personal. The Vietnamese are tough, tenacious, agile, proud, and extraordinarily self confident. Their recent political tradition is one of the multiplicity of parties and ?rouns inclining toward conspiratorial and violent methods. The disappearance of a strong leader who can dampen and control these tendencies could v/eil mean reversion to a condition of politic?.! ch?.o-exploitable by the strongly led and well disciplined communists. If Diem goes, we can be sure of losing his strengths but v/e cannot be sure of remedying his weaknesses. Achievement of US objectives could be mere difficult without Diem than with him. Therefore, it must be made clear to Diem that the United States is prepared and

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willing to bolster his regime and discourage internal factious which may seek to overthrow hirn.

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10. In consideration, of the foregoing, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that there is an immediate requirement for making a strong

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approach to Dions on a Government-to-Goverr.ment level. If we are to effectively assist South Vietnam, w-e must convince Diem that

(a) there is no alternative to the establishment of a sound basis upon which both he and the United Stages Goveri^p.e.it can work and

(b) he has an urgent requirement for ad\"ice, as well as assistance, in military, political and economic matter 5. "

11. Accordingly, it is recommended that you propose to the President and to the Secretary cf State that:

a. Upon his return to Saigon, Ambassador Nolting meet with President Diem and advise him. that, since the United States considers it essential and fundamental that South Vietnam not fall to communist forces:

(1) The United States is prepared and willing to bolster his regime and discourage internal factions which may seek to overthrow him.

(2) Suitable military plans have been developed and jointly approved. Diem must permit his military commanders to implement these approved plans to defeat

the Viet Cong

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(3) There must be established an adec^uate basis for the reception and utilization of US advice and assistance •by all appropriate echelons of the GVN.'

{4} There must be no further procrastination,

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(5> Should ii be found impossible to establish s*uch a satisfactory basis for cooperation, the United States foresees failure of our joint efforts to save Vietnam from communist concuest77

CIZ. Vigorous prosecution ol the cameairm vith present and olamiod assets could reverse the current trend. If, with Diem's full cooperation ami tae effective employment of South Vietnam armed

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forces, the Viet Con^ is not brought under control, the Joint Chiefs

of Staff see no alternative to the introduction of US military combat

• forces along with those oi the free Asian*nations that can. be persua.ded

to participate. . .

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13* Three salient factors are of the greatest importance if the eventual introduction of US forces is required,

. a. Any v/ar in the Southeast Asian Mainland will be a peninsula and islav.d-type of campaign - a mode of warfare in which all elements of the Armed Forces of the United States have gained a- wealth of experience and in which we have excelled both in World War II and Korea,

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b. Study of the problem clearly indicates that the communists

are limited in the force? they can sustain in v/ar in that area because of natural logistic and transportation problems, *

c. Our present world military "posture is such that we now have effective forces capable of implementing existing

■ contingency plans for Southeast Asia without affecting to an * unacceptable degree our capability to conduct planned operations in Europe relating to Berlin or otherwise*

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14. The Joint Chiefs of Staff "recommend that in any consideration of further action which may be required Because of possible unacceptable results obtained despite Diem's full cooperation and the effective employment of South Vietnam armed forces, you again consider the recommendation provided you by JCSM- 320-61, dated 10 May 19ol that a decision be made to deploy suitable US forces to South Vietnam sufficient to accomplish the following:

, a. Provide a visible deterrent to potential North ietaarn ana/or Chinese Communist action;

b. Release Vietnamese forces from advanced and static defense, positions to permit their future commitment to

" counterin.3ur^ency actions;

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c. Assist in training the Vietnamese forces;

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* n d. Provide a nucleus for the support o£ any additional -US or SEATO military operations in Southeast Asia; and

e. Indicate the firmness of our intent to all Asian rations.

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V/e are of the opirdon tliat failure to do so under such circumstances

will merely extend the date when such action must be taken and'will

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make our ultimate task proportionately more difficult.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

: Attachment

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L. L. LEMKITZSR

Chairman

Joint Chiefs of Staff

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

i ' February 19, 1962

SECRET

NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. 132

TO: The Honorable Fowler Hamilton

The Administrator Agency for International Development

(SUBJECT: Support of Local Police Forces for Internal Security

and Counter-Insurgency Purposes)

As you knowj I desire the appropriate agencies of this Government to give utmost attention and emphasis to programe designed to counter Communist indirect aggression, which I regard as a grave threat during the 1960s. I have already written the Secretary of Defense tr to move to a new level of increased activity across the hoard" in the counter-insurgency field.

Police assistance programs, including those under the aegis of your agency, are also a crucial element in our response to this challenge. I understand that there has been some tendency toward de-emphasizing them under the new aid criteria developed by your agency. I recognize that such programs may seem marginal in terms of focusing our energies on those key sectors which will contribute most to sustained economic growth. But I regard them as justified on a different though related basis, i.e., that of contributing to internal security and resisting Communist-supported insurgency,

I am further aware that police programs, as a relatively minor facet of the functions of the aid agency, may have tended to receive little emphasis as a result. Therefore, I would like you to consider various ways and means of giving the police program greater autonomy within AID, if this seems necessary in order to protect it from neglect.

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I fully rectrpiize that police programs must be looked at on a case-by-cace basis ma that in some instances they can indeed bo cut back or eliminated, I simply wish to Insure that before dos&jj no we have taken fully into account the importance of the counter-insurgency objective as 1 view it>

In earn, I should like AID to review carefully it3 role in the support of local police forces for hiternal security'and countor-iasurgeacy purposeoj &n& to recommend to me through the Special Group {Counter-Insurgency} what now or renewed emphases are desirable.

(signed) JOHN F. KENNEDY

Information Copy to:

The Secretary of State The Secretary of Defense The Attorney General Director of Central Intelligence Director, Bureau of the Budget Director, Peace Corps General Maxwell D, Taylor

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C 0 THE WHITE HOUSE

P y WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL , March 13, 19^2

NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. 131

TO: The Secretary of State

The Secretary of Defense The Attorney General .. The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff The Director of Central Intelligence

The Administrator, Agency for International Development The Director, United States Information Agency

SUBJECT: Training Objectives for Counter-Insurgency

1. The President has approved the following training objectives for officer grade personnel of the departments and agencies indicated above who may have a role to play in counter-insurgency programs as well as in the entire range of problems involved in the modernization of developing countries,

a. The Historical Background of Counter-Insurgency

Personnel of all grades will be required to study the history of subversive insurgency movements, past and present, in order to familiarize themselves with the nature of the problems and characteristics of Communist tactics and techniques as related to this particular aspect of Communist operations. This kind of background historical study will be offered throughout the school systems of the responsible departments and agencies, beginning at the junior level of instinction and carrying forward to the senior level.

b. Study of Departmental Tactics and Techniques to Counter Subversive Insurgency

Junior and middle grade officers will receive instructions in the tactics and techniques of their particular departments which have an application in combating subversive insurgency. This level of instruction will be found in the schools of the Armed Services at the company/field officer level. In the case of the Central Intelligence Agency, this kind of instruction will be offered at appropriate training installations. The State Department will be responsible for organizing appropriate courses in this instructional area for its own officers and for representatives of the Agency for International Development and the United

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States Information Agency. Schools of this category will make available spaces in agreed numbers for the cross-training of other U.S. agencies with a counter-insurgency responsibility.

c. Instruction in Counter-Insurgency Program Planning

Middle grade and senior officers will be offered special training to prepare them for command 5 staffs country team and departmental positions involved in the planning and conduct of counter-insurgency programs. At this level the students will be made aware of the possible contributions of all departments , and of the need to combine the departmental assets into effective programs. This type of instruction will be given at the Staff College-War College level In the Aimed Services. -The State Department will organize such courses as may be necessary at the Foreign Service Institute for officials of State , Agency for International Development and United States Information Agency. All schools of this category will make available spaces in agreed numbers for the cross-training of other U.S. agencies with a counter- insurgency responsibility.

d. Specialized Preparations for Service in Underdeveloped Areas

There Is an unfulfilled need to offer instruction on the entire range of problems faced by the United States in dealing with developing countries 5 including special area counter-insurgency problems, to middle and senior grade officers (both military and civilian) who are about to occupy important posts in underdeveloped countries. A school will accordingly be developed at the national level to meet this need, to teach general (including counter-insurgency) policy and doctrine with respect to underdeveloped areas, to offer studies on problems of the underdeveloped world keyed to areas to which the students are being sent, and to engage in research projects designed to improve the U.S. capability for guiding underdeveloped countries through the modernization barrier and for countering subversive insurgency. In addition, this school would undertake to assist other more specialized U.S. Government institutions engaged In underdeveloped area problems (i.e.3 those conducted by the Foreign Service Institute, Agency for International Development y the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Services, including the Military Assistance Institute and the Central Intelligence Agency) to develop curricula on the nontechnical aspects of their courses of instruction.

e. Training of Foreign Nationals

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It is in the interest of the United States to provide counter-insurgency training to selected foreign nationals, both in the United States and in their own countries. The emphasis

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choulcl ha placod on those coiuitrios with an actual or potential ccuivb^r-in^ur^oncy problou. This training vill ho given in the following plr.333:

(l) In facilities operated by the Departr.isnt of Defense : and the Central Iniellige&cc Agency v:hich are ayailable to i foreigners •, '

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\ ' (2) In special facilities operated by tho Bopar fcient ox

: Defense end tho Agency for International Development in " Panama for ths benefit of foreign nationals,

(3) U.S. riAAGs/iiission^ a&3 USGIb in countries with

cc^tor-iu^ur^cncy rro^rcis.

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2# It is desired that tho Special Group (Gcimter-Insurgency) explore Vf.yz of cr^rd^lng a school of tho typo described 121 paragraph 1 d above m a natter of urgency aud develop appropriate recc^e^daiioas • Tho Special Group (Count sr-In.rorj-sncy) should olco esfeaiiia the possibility of setting up interim couraea at the Foreign Service Institute end/or at tbo National War College to fill the gap during Consideration of & now school*

3, It is clasired that the addressees egsrafa&e the coaster-insur^ncy training which is currently offered in their dopart::?nt3 and agsncio.3, a&d to report by June 1 # 1962 upon the adequacy with Which it moots tho tratrd:i3 objectives acove*. If any deficiencies are dotor-idi&d to e:dst, tho responsible doportbszit or agency will report its plan for correcting theru N

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RECEIVED

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WA S HIN G T O N

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Dear Mr. Secretary;

The President has asked me to transmit to you for your comments the enclosed memorandum on the subject of Viet-Nam to the President from Ambassador J. K. Galbraith dated

April 4, 1962-

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Michael V. Forrestal

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End: Memo to Pres. from Amb, Galbraith

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The Honorable

Robert S. McNamara

Secretary of Defense

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From J. K. Galbraith

DEPARTMENT OF STATE WASHINGTON

April 4, 1962

KiffilORANDUK FOR THE PRESIDENT

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Subject; Viet-Nam

The following considerations influence our thinking on Viet-Nam: /♦——

1. We have a growing military commitment. This could expand step by step into a major, long-drawn out indecisive military involvement•

#

2# We are backing a weak and, on the record, ineffectual government and a leader who as a politician may be beyond the point of no return.

3. There is consequent danger we shall replace the French as the colonial force in the area and bleed as the French did.

4* The political effects of some of the measures which pacification requires or is believed to require, including the concentration of population, relocation of villages, and the burning of old villages, may be damaging to those and especially to Westerners associated with it. /

5# We fear that at some point in the involvement there will be a major political outburst about the new Korea and the new war into which the Democrats as so often before have precipitated us.

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6. It seems at least possible that the Soviets are not particularly desirous of trouble in this part of the world and that our military reaction with the need to fall back on Chinese protection may be causing concern in Hanoi.

In the

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In the light of the foregoing we urge the following:

1. That it be our policy to keep open the door for political solution. We should welcome as a solution any broadly based non-Communist government that is free from external interference. It should h^ve the requisites for internal law and order. We should not require that it be militarily identified with the United States.

2. We shall find it useful in achieving this result if we seize any good opportunity to involve other countries and world opinion in settlement and its guarantee. This is a useful exposure and pressure on the Communist bloc countries and a useful antidote for the argument that this is a private American military adventure,

3« We should measurably reduce our commitment to the particular present leadership of the government of South Viet-Nam.

* To accomplish the foregoing, \ie recommend the following specific

steps:

1. In the next fortnight or so the ICC will present a report which we are confidentially advised will accuse North Viet-Nam of subversion and the Government of Viet-Nam in conjunction with the United States of not notifying the introduction of men and materiel as prescribed by the Geneva accords. We should respond by asking the co-chairmen to initiate steps to re-establish compliance with the Geneva accords. Pending specific recommendations, which might-at some stage include a conference of signatories, we should demand a suspension of Viet Cong activity and agree to a standstill on an

introduction of men and materiel,

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2. Additionally, Governor Harriman should be instructed to approach the Russians to express our concern about the increasingly dangerous situation that the Viet Cong is forcing in Southeast Asia*. They should be told of our determination not to let the Viet Cong overthrow the present government while at the same time to look . without relish on the dangers that this military build-up is causing in the area. The Soviets should be asked to ascertain whether Hanoi' can and will call off the Viet Cong activity in return for phased^ American withdrawal, liberalisation in the trade relations between the two parts of the country and general and non-specific agreement to talk about reunification after some period of tranquillity.

3» Alternatively,

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3» Alternatively, the Indians should be asked to make such an approach to Hanoi under the same terms of reference.

4, It must be recognized that our long-run position cannot ' involve an unconditional commitment to Diem, Our support is to non-Communist and progressively democratic government not to individual We cannot ourselves replace Diem, But we should be clear in our mind that almost any non-Communist change viould probably be beneficial and this should be the guiding rule for our diplomatic representation in the area.

*

In the meantime policy should continue to be guided by the following:

1, Vfe should resist all steps which commit American troops to combat action and impress upon all concerned the importance of keeping American forces out of actual combat commitment.

2. We should disassociate ourselves from action, however necessary, which seems to be directed at the villagers, such as the new concentration program. If the action is one that is peculiarly identified with Americans, such as- defoliation, it should not be undertaken in % the absence of most compelling reasons. Americans in their various roles should be as invisible as the situation permits♦

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

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OFF SECY OF OFFENSE

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

JCSM-282-62

1 3 APR 18S

Subject: US Policy Toward Vietnam (U)

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1, Reference is made to a memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) dated 10 April 1962, requesting comments on a memorandum to the President by the Honorable J. K* Galbraith, US Ambassador to India, wherein he proposes changes to the present US policy toward Vietnam and the government of President Diem,

2, The burden of Mr, Galbraith 1 s proposals appears to be that present US policy toward Vietnam should be revised in order to seek a political solution to the problem of communist penetration in the area. The effect of these proposals is to put the United States in a position of initiating negotiations with the communists to seek disengagement from what is by now a well-known commitment to take a forthright stand against Communism in Southeast Asia,

3, The President of the United States and the Secretary of Defense both have recently and publicly affirmed the intention of the US Government to support the government of President Diem and the people of South Vietnam to whatever extent may be necessary to eliminate the Viet Cong threat. In his letter of 14 December 1961 to President Diern, President Kennedy said:

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"Your (President Diern's) letter underlines what our own information has convincingly shown «-- that the campaign of force and terror now being waged against your people and your Government is supported and directed from the outside by the authorities at Hanoi. They have thus violated the provisions of the Geneva Accords designed to ensure peace in Vietnam and to which they bound themselves in 1954,

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"At that time, the United States, although not a party to the Accords, declared that it would view any renewal of the aggression in violation of the agreements with grave concern and as seriously threatening international peace and security. We continue to maintain that view, n

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"In accordance with that declaration, and in response to your request, we arc prepared to help the Republic of Vietnam to protect its people and to preserve its independence, "

4, The various measures approved for implementation by the United States in. support of our objectives in South Vietnam have not yet been underway long enough to demonstrate their full effectiveness. Any reversal of US policy could have disastrous effects, not only upon our relationship with South Vietnam, but with the rest of our Asian and other allies as well.

5. The problems raised by Mr. Galbraith with regard to our present policy have been considered in the coordinated development of that policy. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are aware of the-deficiencies of the present government of South Vietnam. However, the President's policy of supporting the Diem regime while applying pressure for reform appears to be the only practicable alternative at this time. In this regard, the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as expressed in JCSM-33-62 are reaffirmed,

6 # It is the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the present US policy toward South Vietnam, as announced by the President, should be pursued vigorously to a successful conclusion. , r

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

L. L. JLEMNITZER

Chairman Joint Chiefs of Statff

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REC$?Sp TANT SECRETARY OF DEFENS:

V/ASH1NGTON 25, D. C.

1962 APR 16 09 14

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

X-l62$kfo2 SHCY CF DEFENSE

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14 APP1962

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COVERING BRIE?

TO:

The Secretary of Defense

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FROM: The Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) I signed) ;Vv Eaydja Willie

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Acting Assistant Secretary

Problem: To respond to the President's request for your

comments concerning Ambassador Galbraith ! s memorandum on Vietnam.

Discussion : The President's request for comments did not specify that only military aspects should be treated. In view of the nature of Ambassador Galbraith's memo, . meaningful comment necessarily ranges beyond the narrow military implications. However, the proposed comments conform with Special Rational Intelligence Estimate Ko. 10-62, dated 21 Feb o2.

Mr/ Cottrell of the Department of State advises that Ambassador Galbraith's memorandum has .*- not been referred to State for formal staffing and comment, Mr. Earrimaa regards it as a private communication to the President from Ambassador Galbraith. However, an initial draft of the attached memorandum to the President was reviewed by Mr. Cottrell and his comments liave been considered.

Recommendation: That you sign the enclosed memorandum.

RlJ

• Concurrences: ITone required.

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May 29, 1962

NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. 157

TO: The Secretary of State

The Secretary of Defense

The Director of Central Intelligence

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Presidential Meeting on Laos, May 2k, 1962

The President has approved the following Record of Actions for the subject meetings;

At the meeting on the situation in Laos held in the Cabinet Room at *f:30 p.m. today, the President requested contingency planning in the event of a breakdown of the cease fire in Laos for action in two major areas:

(a) the investing and holding by Thai forces with U.S. backup of Sayabouri Province (being that portion of northern Laos to the west of the Mekong River); and

(b) the holding and recapture of the panhandle of Laos from Thakhek to the southern frontier with Thai, Vietnamese or U.S. forces.

In connection with the above contingency plans, the President desired an estimate of the military value of the Mekong River in Sayabouri Province as a defensive barrier in relation to the cost of taking and holding it.

The President also asked that the above planning be undertaken unilaterally by the United States without discussion at this time with the Thais or the Lao.

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SecDef Cont. No. 3320

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The President also indicated that he contemplated keeping U.S. forces in Thailand during the period of the 3-Prince negotiations and the early days of the government of national union, i.e. as long as they serve a necessary purpose.

The President observed that a cable would have to go in answer to Bangkok's 1844.

McGeorge Bundy

TOP SECRET

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

BUSEAU Or INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

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Research Memorandum RFE-27, Juno 18, 1962

TO

1 FE - Governor Karriman /\ [,

FROM s IKa - Roger Hilsman \l^

SUBJECTS Progress Report on South Vietnam"

R AS MaSjla. .;.

Please do not remove from Room 6±9» EA-"£

In this report, an expansion of an earlier informal paper, wo summarize tho riajor goals and accomplisliments of the present counter-insurgency of fort against Communist armed and subversive for cos in tho Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam)* A briof assessment of the general situation is also included* It should be emphasized, however, that this report" is not a complete appraisal3 it does not, for example, discuss Communist strength, capabilities, a_nd achievements in recent months nor compare those with those of tho Vietnameso Government 0 It.should also be noted that this report does not follow tha usual format of a Research Memorandum,

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I. W&T ARE WE TRYING TO DO?

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A* Devise an integrated and systematic lailitary-political-econoialc strategic counter insurgency concept and plan to eliminate the Vietnamese Communist anaod**subversivo force, th3 Viet Gong,

B, Orient the Vietnamese Government's military and security forces inerea Ingly toward counter-guerrilla or unconventional warfare tactics,

Co Broaden the effective participation of Vietnamese Government officials kti the formulation and execution of government policy 0

c*--*

D 0 Identify the populace with the Vietnamese Government's struggle a^ainat the Viet Cong* ._ I

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inal analysis of the material contained in this report w^suCpn&ftidod on June 10, 1962. *

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II. PROGRESS: WHERE ARE YE?

e plan is being B&pl eiaen'ted 1» 'Progress

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a .Delta Pacification Tlz\n

(l) President Hgo Binh Diem approved a systematic counter-insurgency plan oa March 19$ 1962, vhich contains the bulk of the British Advisory Kiss ion's (headed by Ifi% R 0 G«K. Thompson) r ©coma en da t Ions and those security coscapta developed by the US. Tha coimterinsurgency plan is to bo implemented in 3,0 provinces around Saigon in the Mekong River delta region (tha so-called ^Delta Pacification Plan 1 *)* Col. Eoang Van Lac, a former proT&noo chief apparently regarded highly by Diem, is responsible for executing the plan, operating under the authority of Nguyen Binh Thuan, Seerefery of State for tha Presidency, and Ngo Dinh Khu, Diora ! s brother and principal political adviser.

(2) ^Operation Sunrise 1 * in Binh Duong province Just north of Saigon, favored by. Diem, for special tactical purposes, constitutes tha initial effort in a systematic, province-hy-provinea pacification campaign. "Operation Sunriss* 3 is headed by Brig. Gen. Van Thanh Cao, the administrator of the Southeastern Provincial Region, Three strategic hamlets have been constructed in Binh Doong province as a resvlt.*of thi3 operation and, as of mid-Hay 1?62, more than 2, 700 persons had been relocated in these hamlets. (Two additional hamlets are in the planning or early construction stage.) They are wall defended and supported by Civic Actionl teams living with the peasantry arid assisting them in a variety of ways. Reports tend to be optinLstic as to the ultimate success of these hamlets.

b. Otte^ Pacification Programs

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On Hay 8, 1?62, the second systematic operation to pacify a specific srea was started in Rni Ten province in central Vietraau It is known as "Operation Sea &rallo*r n and is similar to "Operation Sunrise" in method and objectives.

(1) More than 80 strategic hamlets are to be constructed before the end of 1?62| a large number are already in the process of final construction.

(2) As of May 18, 1?62, there vera more than 600 Civic Action personnel in Phu Ten province formed into more than 70 teams; another 11 teams were to be formed within two weeks/ -As in l! 0peration Sunrise", these teams assist in tha construction of strategic' hamlets, organize government services, and help the peasants in a variety of ways.

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c. StrateglcJfUl.^ges and Hamlets

(1) The strategic village-hamlet concept has taken hold within the Vietnamese Government and is now priority national policy,

(2) President Diem signed a decree on February 3 5 1962 creating a special "Interministerial Committee for Strategic Hamlets" to coordinate the program on a countrywide basis. Tha committee is . officially chaired by its Secretary General, Secretary of State -for Interior Bui Van Luong, but actually operates under Ngo Dinh Nhu.

(3) Estimates on the number of strategic villages and hamlets vary. As of December 1961, the Vietnamese Department of Interior reportedly tabulated almost 800 such villages and'hamlets although in February 1962 the 133 Embassy estimated that possibly there were only l£0~200 such settlements scattered in more than half of Vietnam's 39 provinces, principally north of Saigon. In April 1962, the Secretary of State for Interior informed a IB Mission inter-agency group, the Province Pacification Committee, that there were 1,300 strategic hamlets already in place.

(k) On June 6, 1962, about f>00 officials from all provinces completed a special training course on strategic villages and hamlets• Training reportedly emphasised the Civic Action aspects of the strategic village-hamlet program as well as the responsibilities of the officials involved, ... ■

d. Civic Action

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(1) The Vietnamese Department of Civic Action Fas reorganized in January 1962, creating (I) a central Civic Action Service in Saigon by combining related and heretofore separate services within the Department end (ii) an integrated Civic Action office in each province and district.

(2) As of January 1$&2 3 a Civic Action chief and deputy

chief reportedly had been assigned to every province in Vietnam.

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(3) The Civic Action teams working In strategic villages and hamlets, particularly in support of ^Operation Sunrise" and w Operation

Sea Swallow,* are excellently oriented and are doing a good job..

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(1|) USGM has established a committee to provide on a priority basis direct 133 assistance (and to coordinate such assistance) to Civic Action operations through the relevant Vietnamese Government agencies.

(5) The Vietnamese Department of Defense is also organising its own Civic Action program.

©. Internal Security and Police Services

(1) The importance of the counterlnsurgancy role of the rural internal security services is reflected in the US IJiasion's re common da tion that the Civil Guard be increased to 90,000 by JT 1962 and the SelT Ibfense Corps to 80,000 by FT 1963.

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(2) As of the end of April 19o2 s 89 Civil Guard companies or tfSwttt 12,COO psr^cr^al and 276 Self Dsferisa Corps plateora or about 10,500 personnel had bean trained„ The goal is reportedly to train a total of scsaa k9 5 COO Civil Guard and 60,COO Self Defense Corps personnel by tha end of 1$62,

(3) The 7ietn&rr.££o Government, with the holp of IB Oft, has taken stops to extend the pollea system to rural areas in view of tho gap created by the parwilitsrl'satdLon of tho &eourity services* AID is soaking to hire 20 additional polioa advisers for rural area*. (The present I50M advisory police eoiag&ement in Vietnam is just over 20 personnel moat of yhrm operate principally in urban areas*) 133 aid for tha police program for FT 1962 is 03$3*£ uOltan (of which US$2 0 3 million is for eeaaaoditiea), In addition to about U3$U minion In unused aid.

(It) As of tho end of May 1?62 5 almost 2 C 8 Million of the estimated 7 million parsons of tho age of 18 years or ov*r have baen Issued Identity earda* As a result cf this effort, over 2,000 military deaertera and 52 Viet Cong agents have boen apprehended Sid abottt k,000 irregt&arliies in tha previous ide&tity card program bars been uncover ad.

f. Tillage Radio System

• (1) As of tho end of May 1?62 3 mora than 530 USOM-diatrlbuted eoss&ttniostion radios had boon installed in villages and other p3Ltu»9i in tho provinces of Gia Binh, An X^en, BInh Duong, Dish Thucng 8 Kien Giang, Kien Phong, Tay HSrfh, and Ehuoe Tiy. Sins a the rata of installation 1-3 now about 300 radios par month, USOM expaots to have mere than 1,000 village radios installed by the end of July 1?52. Another 1,000 sets are scheduled to be installed soon thereafter, thus equipping mora than 2,000 villages with radio ooisaKmloatioa facilities. j

(2) The public safety role of village radica ms dorccnatrated on Kirch 20, 1962, whan a joint tBOM^Yiotnamaaa radio installation tasa vas attacked by Viet Cong guerrillas* Tha security eso.ort engaged the Viet Cong while tha teaia proceeded to install the village radio and then nc if io.d district teadqusrtera and noarby villages* Assiatanoa wag despatched and resulted In an as&uah of tha Viet Gong as they vera fleeing toward another village which had been alerted.

g. Utilisation of US A-ssisianoe

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(1) Effective utilisation and integration of US non-military assiafcanoe to Vietnam was strengthened by AID action in March 1962 | establishing first, ssoond, and third priorities en tha basis cf tho *

itt»di&ie bsspact of aid projects on the counter insurgency efforts first priority pre-jscta ara those With iiflpact during tha next 12 feontha, including, for example. Rural Development, Prfblic Safety (especially radio sets) and Health Servicssj second priority projects are those with impact during

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the next 1 to 3 years, including, for example, Agricultural Credit and Cooperatives and Highway; and Bridge Construction) and third priority projects are those Kith long-term economic and social significance.

■ (2) The US Mission has established a number of interagency groups, such as the Province Pacification Committee, for the purpose of coordinating and expediting assistance to Vietnamese Government projects in rural areas,

(3) In anticipation of future needs, the US Mission is also taking measures to stockpile commodities (for example, pharmaceuticals, pesticides, barb wire, fence .posts, fertiliser, etc) which would be released on short notice for immediate despatch to the countryside•

2. Critique

a* Although the bulk of the British Advisory Mission f s recommendations have been incorporated into the "Dolta Pacification Plan, H the enabling presidential decree omits the Mission's"proposals on "prompt payment of compensation for damage to property or loss of life,* 3 on "complete coordination of all civil and military action, n on a "clear chain of command," and on "direction and coordination of the information services and psy-war.units," .

i b* US and British officials in Vietnam have voiced serious concern

I over (i) President Diem ! s delay in approving the organizational and

implementing machinery for the "Delta" plan and (ii) a possible subordination of the "Delta" plan to the strategic village-hamlet program. It has been very recently reported, however, that President Diem has approved a merger of the "Delta 1 * and the strategic village-hamlet organizations! machinery and has agreed to give the 10 provinces specified in the "Dolta^ j plan first priority, subject to modification as required by developments

in the security situation,

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-c. Although the Vietnamese Government is giving the strategic village-hamlet program high priority, there is reliable evidence that the program suffers seriously from inadequate direction, coordination, and material assistance by the central government and from misunderstanding among officials at the provincial and local levels. Province chiefs have tended to draw up unrealistically high quotas (generally in order to please the authorities in Saigon), and the lack of sufficient resources provided by the government at the local level has in. certain instances resulted in poorly constructed and poorly defended settlements and in financial levies on the peasant. Moreover, the construction of thase settlements has not followed any particular pattern or plan based on priorities, In his reported recent merger of the "Dalta" plan and the strategic village-hamlet program, however, President Diem has. indicated that priorities would be established,

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eL Although the mission of ths Vietnamese Bepartm&nt of Civic Action is being oriented increasingly toward supporting strategic Villages and, hamlets, it appears that there is still considerable emphasis on informational and intelligence activities. This has reduced the effectiveness of Civic Action operations and has been sor^vhzb detri-mnt&L to the favorable reputation built up in the past by Civic Action parsomiGlo Ttie Civic Action B^partmeiffe also suffers from ^aak leadership and internal power rivalries,

e* The principal problem of the Civil Guard and Self. Dafetisa Corps pertain to tactical utilisation which is discussed be^ov, under B. Ifcwav&r. thsre is also some question as to whether these services are being trained and equipped adequately and as rapidly as necessary.

f 4 Village radios will substantially improve tha defense of the countryside and tha reaction capability of the Vietnamese military and security forces. However, no effort has yet been made to fjspsrove radio communications at the haulst level where the battle with the Viet Gong 1m actually joined,

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g. Two of tha principal weaknesses in the effective utilisation of US aid are insufficient a'tJareness on the part of central authorities in tha Vietnaiaess Governpiftnt of the need to establish project priorities and ths general inability of thase authorities to act quickly to despatch aid i>'t support of projects in tha countryside. Tho distribution of US aid im&h be approved in most c&ses by President Diem per so nail j 3 frequently resulting in delagra and in administrative bottle -necks* Moreover,, Dism continues to exhibit considerable sensitivity to atteiapts by US officials to distribute aid directly to the countryside without clearance frott the central government. Recently, for example, tha Vietnamese Goverrmasnt turned doim a U3QH proposal aimed at increasing the impact of US aid at the local level by establishing a special fund for direct financing of provincial projects. . !

B» The Vietnamese armed and security forces are being oriented toward ccuiLtor-gucrriLIe or Kneonventional Tsariare tactics.

!• .Progress

a. Air Support

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(1) Halicoptsr operations have decreased the reaction tLia and increased the mobility of aanny and security units.

(2) Luring May \6f&% 1^62 5 fl^tnamsa Air Force and US helicopter units flew at least 3u7 sorties -US vers offensive sorties^ 2l6 sorties lit hod X s fXX troops and 2!^0GD pounds of ccgo of which 12,000 pounds vore air-droppsd3 # and 85 sorties v#* far air ©vacation, observation training, and other mie^lon^^ " [^h

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b. Tactical Utilisation of Army and Socuri

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(1) Tho Vietnamese Army is getting cut and fighting more than over before. During March 20-28, 1962, tho armod forces launched

J more thsm 23 operations of at least company sizo throughout ths country. •' Boring April 12-May 3, 1962, more than 11 oporations were launched, each

operation Involving more than a battalionj some of those oporations

continued beyond May 3*

(2) Army units are becoming more conscious of tho necessity of following through daring attacks In order to prevent the Viet" Gong

» * jfrora disengaging 0

(3) Civil Guard and Self Dsfcnao Corps units apparently are being employed Increasingly with army units« During April 12-May 3, 1962, for example, Civil Guard and Self Defense Corps units were combined with vtw units in at least 3 oporations 0 There have also boon reports of Civil Guard units receiving helicopter support*

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(k) There are reports of effective utilisation of artillery bombardment* In early March 1962, for example, a combined Army ranger, Civil Guard, and Self Defense Corps force engaged the Viet Gong in Kien Boa provinceo Artillery was introduced only after tho Viet Cong attempted to withdraw, harassing their escape routes and inflicting substantial casiialtioSo ,..*.}.

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(5) Army ranger units are being deployed in the highlands area, recognising tho equal priority of this area with the Mekong River delta region where**the pacification program has been initiated. As of February 1962, there was a total of 18 ranger companies in tho I and II Amy Corps Areas 0

(6) It is estimated that some 3,000-5,000 Hbntagaard tribes

xsen hive been recruited and are being trained and armed by the Vietnamese Amy against the Viet Cong in the highlands area* In addition, there are s$me irregular Montagnard units,

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a 0 Despite the increasing utilization of Civil Guard and Self Dafonse Corps units jointly with army forces, the former continue to be ' employed excessively on Independent offensive missions. The principal stumbling block to the rectification of this problem is the province chief under whose authority the security services operate *

b* Despite the Increasing deployment of ranger units in the highlands area^ there is no evidence that these units are being U33d to any appreciable degree for patrolling the VietnameseC-Lac frontier.

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c* The principal deficiency in the utilisation of air support is not tactical but rathsr is related to the availability and reliability of intolligonco on the Viot Cong.

BSFoacfanacT" soir^what.

lo Progress

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a. Military commanders in tho field cro playing a greater rolo than in tho past in tho actual formulation and execution of operational plans. For example, Each of tho planning of "Operation Sunrise 1 * and * "Operation Soa Shallow" has been carried out by Vietnamese Array, division commanders and thoir staff?* . .. a

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b. Col, Lac has boon delegated limited but real authority for

executing the c Balta Pacification Han 11 and for his recent and concurrent responsibilities in tha strategic village-hamlet program.

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c.i There has been limited us© of tho National Internal Security Council established in Ita comber 1961,

d. Th© Director of tho Central Intelligence Organization, Colonel Kguyen Van Y s has boan delegated real though limited authority both with regard to his intelligence responsibilities and his concurrent rolo as head of tho regular police services 5 tho National Sureto and tho Municipal Police*

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e. Thsre is evidence that tho authority of certain cabinet msmbors has bacn increased^ notably Secretary of State for tha Presidency

Thuan and Secretary of Stats for Interior luong.

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f* The Vietnamese Government has also taken various measures to improve morale among rank-and-file military and security personnel. Ih^ January 1962, the family allowance rates for Amy and Civil Guard privates, privates first class, and corporals (as wall as the coirbat pay ratas for Army personnel in thaso ranks) were increased, and Arny conscripts be-came eligible to receive a private's pay after completing four months rather than one year in service,

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2. Critioua

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Ineffectiveness In administration at tho nations! lovol, in carrying out tho control fractions of tho government, and in extending services to tho countryside continue to represent tho Tlatanm Government's main weakness. In large measure, this is duo to the limited authority President Diem delegates to his subordinates. Diem continues to make

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virtually all major decision? and even many ralnsr ones, to roly largely on his Inner circle of official and unofficial advisors rather than on his cabinet officers and the formal channels of military and civil coromand In formulating and exocuting policy^ and to interfere personally in purely end of tea miner o^rational matters # Discontent "within the government bureaucracy and the military establishment with these tactics by Diem and his lieutenants does not appear to have decreased substantially during th past yoar. Tho prospects that Diem may change his method of operation are not favorable o . " . •-

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*u President Diem*s frequent travels to tho ccunfeyside muy have Improved somewhat tho popular image of the central government. During July-Docembor 19ol, for example, Diom made 18 known trips outside Saigon and visited 19 different provinces (9 in tho central and northern provinces and 10 in tho Mekong delta provinces) 0

b. There Is evidence that villagers are passing an increasing amount of information on the Viet- Cong to government officials 0 Dae striking example is the Viet Gong attack en an Army pest In An Eoa In Quang Ngai province on April 6, 1962 ? (The Vict Cong used about 300 man, wall armed with rocoilless rifles and machine guns.) As a result of an earlier warning by villagers of a possible attack, the Army unit was on alert and, when the attack came, repulsed the Viet Cong with serious XiHtnar,

c. It appears that defections from the Viot Cong may be increasing It has been estimated that only around l;0O Viet Cong surrendered to government forces during all of 196l 0 Since the first cf 1962, however, BS military sources have been reporting statistics en Viet Cong surrenders #n -a veekly basis, and it is estimated th*t during February 13-April3.'Q, more

-than 20? Viot Cong surrendered. (These and other statistics on the Viet Gong are derived from various official Vietnamese sources and must b; treated with caution since tho Vietnam Government is prone to exaggerate thera.)

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d. President Diem signed a decree en lb-comber 18, lj?6l 5 piovid-lug for the establishment of provincial councils, ultimately to be elected by popular ballot but for the time being to be appointed by the central government. (Youth representatives on village councils have boon elected

v since early I961.)

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e. According to the chiefs cf Kent urn smd H$Iku.province, ec-me 35,000 Kontag nards have been resettled from Viet Ccng*infe£tod to relatively secure areas in these two provinces since January 1962 as a result of coordinated measures by Vietnamese military and civilian officials. These measures have boon aimed at reducing .the. Viet Cong's access to tribal elements for recruits, labor, intelligence, and supplies.

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2. Cri^iaua • ' '";

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a. Dsspits favorable developments, thorns has boen no major break-through In improving tha popular linage of the government^ particularly in the countryside. In the short run 5 tho success of this effort will dopend largely on tha degree of physical security provided the 'peasantry, but in tha long run tha key to success will be tha ability cf the government to walk tha thin lino of meaningful and sustained assistance to the villagers without -£bYious efforts to direct^ regiment 5 or control them,

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bt Thora is growing concern among Vietnamese field personnel in KonUiTj PIsIlaL and other proving that tho Vietnamese Government is not moving fast enough to provide adequate assistance to tho Hontagnard resettlement program and^ as a result, that tho Viet Cong may succeed in subverting tesettlement efforts, According to one report almost 70' 5 O00 of an estimated lOpjOGO Montagnard refugees have not yet boon resettled.

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111 • smi«g_ asses&ieot

A. It Is about three months since the current phase of a major systemati count or insurgency effort began in Vietnam, and too short a tine to expect any substantial wakening of tho Communist position*- Moreover, final victory is 3.1kely to take soms years and to ba brought about mors by a steady erosion of Communist strength than by dramatic military successes.

■ Bo In the military-security sector, US. materiel, training, and advice, supplemented by tactical support by US units, have produced an improvement in armed operations against the Viet Cong* US military operational reports reflect improved tactics, shortened reaction times, and more effective use of communications and intelligence* It is too early to Bay that tho Viet Cong guerrilla-terrorist onslaught is bsing checked, but it can bo said that it is new moating more effective resistance and having to cope Kith increased aggressiveness by the Vietnamese military and security forces. Nonetheless, the Via!.; Cong continue to increase tho J J? armed strength and capability and, on balance, to ero4e government authority in the countrywide* " -

* C. There has not been a ccreasponding improvement in other sectors of tho total countorinsurgency effort. Serious problems remain in the civil and military command structures and in the exercise of command responsibility» Diem continues to prefer personalised rule through a very small group of trusted official and unofficial advisers and traditional methods in matters affecting domestic politics?! opposition* Civil government effective-mss is a3,so impeded by shortages in experienced personnel, payticular3y at louer lovols, and aggravated by confusion and -suspicion at moist levels of tho bureaucracy* More effective direction and coordination and realistic Implementation are needed, for example, for such crucially irTportant program as the "Delta 11 plan, stratogic villages and hamlets* said Civic Action, and greater.authority must be delegated to upper echelon civil and military officials in or dor to make better use of Vietnamese Government resources* * Similarly, while there are encouraging signs cf popular support for %e government, there has been no major break-through in identifying tht people vith the struggle against the Viet Cong

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D* yjo conclude that*

1 9 thora is no evidence to support certain allegations of substantial deterioration in tho political and military situations in Vietnam:

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2* on tho contrary, th«o is evidence of heartening prepress in bolstering the fighting effectiveness cf the military and security forces*

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3, howover* there is still much to bo dona in strengthening tha overall capacity of tha Vietnamese Govornmont to pursua its total counter-Insurgency offortj not only In ths military-security sector but particularly In the politlcal-adininiStratlvo sactorj

it* a judgmont on ultimata success In the campaign against tho Communist °»ar of national liberation" In Vietnam is pr^aturej but

$* 170 do think that tho chances aro good 5 provided thcro is continuing progress by tho Viotnamasa Government along tho linas of its present strategy*

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the; white house

WASHINGTON

SECRET

. June 19, 1962

NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. 162

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TO:

SUBJECT:

The Secretary of State The Secretary of Defease***

The Attorney General

The Director of Central Intelligence

The Director, United States Information Agency

DeveloDment of U.S. a,nd Indigenous Police, Paramilitary and Military Resources

The President has approved the following statement and proposed assignments of responsibilities to various agencies as recommended by the Special Group (Counterinsurgeucy):

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The study of U.S. and indigenous paramilitary resources pursuant to NSAM 56 reflects gratifying progress in the development of an adequate U.S. capability to support both the training and active operations of indigenous paramilitary forces. Certain deficiencies, however, were clearly revealed. Tho deficiencies, to which all efforts and shortcomings to date are related, should be-the^ basis upon which internal defense requirements are established for eaxh country to be assisted.

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1, Country Internal Defense Plans

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With one or two exceptions, there exis- no outline plans to unify and orchestrate U.S. internal defense programs and_3.ctivities in friendly countries facing a threat o: subversive insurgency, or which provide strategic guidance for assisting such countries to maintain internal security. The Department of State has prepared %. list identifying the countries facing a threat of subversive in* surgency and will direct the formulation of outline plans for internal defense (Country Internal Defense Plans) by the Country Team in each such country which encompass the total U.S. -supported internal defense field. Those plans will include the

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military, police, intelligence and psychological measures cemprisin a well rounded internal defense plan 3nd w ill be consi stent with the military, eco nomic, political and social measures constituting the overall country plan. Such plans should be completed and in the hands of the Department of State by September 1, 1962, available for review by the Special Group (Counter ins urgency). From that time on, in accordance v/ith the provisions of NSAM 124, the Special Group will keep these country internal defense plans under periodic review, and insure prompt resolution of interdepartmental problems arising in connection with their implementation.

2, Improvement of Personnel Programs of Agencies Concerned with Unconventional Warfare

A study will be made by the Armed Forces and appropriate civil agencies concerned with unconventional warfare activities of how to improve their personnel programs. Particular attention will

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be directed to the following:

a * * *

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(a) Personnel programming for officers and men, including establishment of career programs which protect the special skills and professional qualifications of personnel assigned to unconventional warfare duties.

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conditions of stress and danger for prolonged periods.

(c) Morale factors such as fa" ill/ housings tours of • duty, hardship allowances, hazardous duty pay, special recognition such as rewards,

3. Orientation of Personnel

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As oart of the current effort to irain more personnel in the problems confronting underdeveloped societies, both civil and military agencies of the Government will assign, where feasible and sub jeer to the availability of funds and personnel, middle-grade and senior officers to temoorary duty for orientation purposes in selected countries ex- * periencing internal security problems.

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4.* Deployment of Counterinsurgency Personnel

In order to Insure a timely deployment of qualified countering urgency specialists to impending crisis areas, CIA and AID will take action to insure that adequate qualifier personnel with paramilitary skills are available. Periodic reports of progress to achieve this objective will be submitted to the Special Group (Counterinsurgency) by CIA and AID.

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5. Support 61 Covert Paramilitary Operations * :

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More Special Forces personnel will be assigned to support CIA-covert paramilitary operations where acute insurgency situations exist. The Department of Defense has taken steps to expedite these assignments. In addition the Department of Defense v/ill increase its capability to fund, support, and conduct wholly or partly covert paramilitary operations under the criteria of NSAM 57 which distinguishes responsibilities of the Department of Defense and CIA: , -

Where such an operation is to b* wholly covert or disavcwable, it may be assigned to CIA, provided that it is within the normal capabilities of the agency. Any large paramilitary operaticn wholly or partly covert which reouires significant numbers of ■militarily trained personnel, amounts of military- —' equipment which exceed normal CIA-controlled stocks and/or military experience of a kind and

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level peculiar to the Armed Se*- /ic^: is properly the primary responsibility of the Department of Defense with the CIA in a supporting role.

This cooperation will be intensified and the President Avill be

given periodic reports on the progress of these efforts.

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6, Increased Use of Third Country Personnel ."

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The Department of Defense, in collaboration with the Department of State and the Central Intelligence Agency, will undertake a study to determine on a selective basis the feasibility of the concept of the increased use of third-country personnel in paramilitary operations. Particular attention will be given to the following:

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(a) The whole range of this concept frorfi the current limited use of Thai and Filipino technicians in Laos to the creation of simply eouipsed regional forces for use

/ in remote jungle, hill and desert country. Such forces would be composed of foreign volunteers supported and controlled by the U.S.

(b) The feasibility of using third-country military or paramilitary forces to operate inder their own or other national auspices in crisis areas.

7. Exploita tion of Minorities

In view of the success which has resulted from CIA/US Army Special Forces efforts with tribal groups in Southeast Asia, continuing efforts v/ill be made to determine the most feasible method of achieving similar results in other critical areas. On a selective basis, CIA and the Department of Defense will make studies of specific groups where there is reason io believe there exists an exploitable minority paramilitary capability.

8# Improvement of Indigenous Intelligence Organizations

Recent experience shows that most underdeveloped countries need more efficient intelligence coordination and dissemination systems to counter subversive insurgency. Therefore, the CIA wilTexpand its present training and support efforts to achieve needed improvements in indigenous intelligence organizations and that other U.S. agencies contribute to this CIA coordinated program.

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9. Research and Development for Cou.iterinsurq ency

The Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency v/ili carry in their research and development programs a special section devoted to the requirements of countering urgency* The Special Group (Counter ins urgency) will follow up on this action and receive reoorts from time to lime with regard to Dro^ress in developing modern eauiDment suitable to meet the reouirements of counterinsurgency.

McGeorge 3undy

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WAS H I NGTON

SECRET

August 24, 196Z

NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. 182

TO:

SUBJECT

The Secretary of State

The Secretary of Defense ^

The Attorney General

The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

The Director of Central Intelligence

The Administrator j Agency for International

Development The Director, U.S. Information Agency The Military Representative of the President

Counterinsurgency Doctrine

The President has approved the document entitled " U.S. Overs eas Internal Defense Policy 11 , which sets forth a national counter-

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insurgency aocfrine for the use of U.S. departments and agencies concerned with the internal defense of overseas areas threatened-by subversive insurgency, and has directed its promulgation, to serve as basic policy guidance to diplomatic missions, consular personnel, and military commands abroad; to government departments and agencies at home; and to the government educational system. The addressees of this NSA.M will take action to insure that the policies set forth in the document are reflected in departmental and agency operations and in such additional instructions and guidance as may be required to assure uniformity of effort* They will also initiate the formulation of the internal doctrine, tactics, and techniques appropriate to their own department or agency, based upon "U.S. Overseas Defense Policy. 1 ' These studies when completed will be reviewed by the Special Group (CI).

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The Department ex State In consultation v/ith'the other addressees of this memorandum is assigned the task of keeping the "U. S.

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Overseas Internal Defense Policy" up to date, making such modification as changes in policy or practical experience may require, and publishing revised editions as necessary.

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McGeorge Bundy

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ggCKOT/ttaptft risass dc cot rs.jva/ic r? DEPARTMENT OF STATE . . 7</n

BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

Research Memorandum

1962

TO : The Secretary

THROUGH: 'S/'S

FROM ; INR - Roger Hilcma

M

A All^O^ClJ. Kill r^iitUJ.UllUUIU

r\l$&* f *'^ RFE " 5 ^ J December 3. 196: K'

SUBJECT: The Situation and Short-Term Prospects In South Vietnam*

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This appraisal covers the Communist insurgency and the internal political situation in South Vietnam during the past year and focusses particularly on the direction und effectiveness of the Vietnamese-US counterinsurgency effort. It was prepared as a contribution to the forthcoming KIE 53-62, Prospects in South Vietnam.

ABSTRACT '

President Ugo Dinh Diem and other leading Vietnamese qs veil as many U3 officials in South.Vietnam apparently believe that the tide is now turning in the struggle against Vietnamese Communist (Viet Cong) insurgency and subveroion ( This degree of optimism is premature. At oest, it appears that the rate'of deterioration has decelerated with improvement, principally in the security sector, reflecting substantially increased US assistance and GVN implementation of a broad counterinsurgency program,

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r The GVN han givert priority'to Implementing a basic

strategic concept featuring the strategic hamlet and systematic pacification program:;.. It has paid more attention to poHtieal, economic, and nocial counterinsiurgency measures and their coordination with purely military measures. Vietnamese military and security forces -- now enlarged and of higher quality -- are significantly more offensive-minded and their counterguerrilla tactical co-onbilitier, are greatly improved. 1 Effective GVN control of the countryside has:been extended

slightly. In some areas where security has improved peasant attitudes toward the government appear alsp to have improved.

*This report is based on information available through November 12, 1<?62.

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As a result, the Viet Cong has had to modify its tactics and perhaps set back its timetable. But the "national liberation .war" has not abated nor has the Viet Cong been weakened. On the contrary, the Viet Cong has expanded the size and enhanced the capability and organization of its guerrilla force — now estimated at about 23/000 in elite fighting personnel, plus some* 100,000 irregulars and sympathizers* It still controls about 20 percent of the villages and about 9 percent of the rural population, and has varying degrees of influence among on additional 1*7 percent of the villages- Vict Cong control and communication lines to the peasant have not been seriously ve?kened and the guerrillas have thus been able to maintain good intelligence and a high" degree of initiative, mobility, and striking power- Viet Cong'influence has almost certainly improved in urban areas not only through subversion and terrorism but also because of its propaganda appeal to the increasingly frustrated non-Communist anti-Diem elements.

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The internal political situation is considerably more difficult to assess. Diem has strengthened his control of the bureaucracy and the military establishment. He has delegated a little more authority than in the past, and has become increasingly aware of the importance of the peasantry to the counter!nsurgency effort. Nevertheless, although there are fewer reports of discontent with Diem's leadership within official circles and the civilian elite, there are still many indications of continuing serious concern, particularly with Diem's direction of the counterinsurgency effort* There are also reports that important military and civil officials continue to participate in coup plots. Oppositionists, critics, and dissenters outside the govern-went appear to be increasingly susceptible to neutralist, pro-Communist, and possibly anti-US sentiments. They are apparently placing increased reliance on clandestine activities.

The Viet Cong is obviously prepared for a long struggle and can be expected to maintain the present pace and diversity of its insurgent-subversive effort. During the next month or so, it may step up its military effort in reaction to the growing GVM-US response. Hanoi can also be expected to increase its efforts to legitimatize its "National Front for the Liberation ■ " of South Vietnam" (NFLCV) and to prepare further groundwork for

a "liberation government" in South Vietnam- On present evidence, the Communists are not actively moving toward neutralization of South Vietnam in the Laos pattern, although they could seek to do so later. Elimination, even significant reduction, of the Communist insurgency will almost certainly require several years. [

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In either case, a considerably greater effort by the GVN, as veil as continuing US assistance, is crucial. If there m is continuing Improvement in security conditions. Diem should be able to alleviate concern and boost morale within the 1 bureaucracy and the military establishment• But the GVN will

not be able to consolidate its military successes into permanent political gains and to evoke the positive support of the peasantry unless it gives more emphasis to non-military aspects of the counterinsurgency program, integrates the strategic hamlet program with an expanded systematic pacification program, and appreciably modifies military tactics (particularly those relating to large-unit actions and tactical use of airpover and artillery). Failure to do so might increase militant opposition among the peasants and their positive identifi cation with the Viet Cong.

A coup could occur at any *irr.e, but would be mere likely if the fight against the Communists goes badly, if the Viet Cong launches a series of successful and dramatic military operations, or if Vietnamese arrr.y casualties increase appreciably over a protracted period. The coup most likely to succeed would be one with non-Communist leadership and support, involving middle and top echelon military and civilian officials. For a time at least, the serious disruption of government leadership resulting from a coup would probably halt and possibly reverse the momentum of the government's counterinsurgency effort. The role of the ' US can be extremely important in restoring this momentum and in * averting widespread fighting and a serious internal power struggle. :

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SECRET/IDFOHN

TABLE OF CONTENT

Page

I # The Nature of the Communist Threat to South Vietnam

JU Strategy and Objectives

B. Viet Cong Organisation and Capabilities

2. Military Strength and Effectiveness

3, Viet Cong Logistic Support

a. Local Support

b. External Support

lw Political Capabilities

b. The Urban Sector

A. Background2 Gradual Response .

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a. The Communist Position in the Countryside

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H« The Vietnam Government's Counter insurgency Effort ,♦♦■.♦

««•»••••*#*•#•*

2

3

1. General 3

6 6

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10

10

B. Formulation and Implementation of Basic Strategic Concept. . 10

1, Strategic Hamlet Program ........ U

2. Systematic Military-Political Pacification Operations. , 12

C, Military Operations and Effectiveness. • • ♦ ♦ 13

HI« The Political Situation •.••#*##'••-.,.-• ♦»♦♦• lf>

A. Backgrounds Rapid Deterioration

B. The Current Situation

17 18

1* Political Attitudes of Diem and His Family \ %

2. Diem and the Bureaucracy • •**,♦ m m # # « jo

3. Diem's Position in the Countryside , 20

ii, Iftem's Position in Urban Centers

21

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TABL3 OF COinEMT (Continued)

Pago

IV. Economic Trends • ♦ . ♦ ♦

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V # Outlook

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A. Communist Actions

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B. GVil Count or Insurgency Effort

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C. Tho IB Role

23

D. Political Situation

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I, THE laTPHE OF THS CCfrfMJHIST THREAT TO SOUTH VIETNAM

The Communist threat to the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam) consists of three interrelated elements. Within South Vietnam, but under the direction cf tha Democratic Republic of Vietnam (IKV), zn expanding campaign of guerrilla warfare and terrorism and an intensive political psychological subversion effort are carried out by an apparatus commonly known as the Viet Cong,* left behind by the IHV after it withdrew most of Its military forces to the north in 1$£U and since reinforced by local recruitment and infiltration from the EtV* Externally, the IRV holds over South Vietnam the tacit threat of invasion by the numerically superior North Vietnamese military forces 0

In part because the Government of the Republic of Vietnam (GVN) focussed its defense efforts too much upon the Implicit external threat and too little upon the internal threat, not only was it unable to counter effectively the developLng Communist movement but also its authority and internal stability In the period from late 19$9 until early 1962 ?re increasingly weakened by Viet Cong insurgent end subversive activities* Since the early part of 1962 however $ the rate of deterioration appears to have decelerated as a result of substantially increased US assistance to South Vietnam and expanding GVN implementation of its broad military-political counterinsurgency program* The apparent inrprovement is principally in the security sector, but with some resultant effects on the political situation. Many US advisers in South Vietnam, as vrell as President Ngo Dinh Diem and other top GVN officials, are more optimistic and believe that the deteriorating trends in effect have been checked and that the tide is new being turned in favor of the GVN 0 Whether this optimism is justified may well be determined by developments during the next few months 0

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"Viet Gong is the popular term used by the South Vietnamese to refer to Vietnamese Communists, singularly or collectively* For all practical purposes, the Viet Cong apparatus is an extension of the North Vietnamese Communist Party, tijMjg *££ Iton* Viet Kam or merely Lao Itong) which also operates in Laos, Gain£odia, and other countries witFT^ortant Vietname&a minority groups*

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-2-A. Strategy and Objectives

In South Vietnam, the Communists are clearly embarked on a "national liberation war" of insurgency and subversion from within rather on overt aggression. It is probably the Communist view that this strategy greatly reduces the risk of direct US military intervention and, at the same time, provides good prospects of success at relatively little cost. In addition, it permits the Communist Bloc to claim continued adherence to the 195^ Geneva Agreements, This strategy was most recently reaffirmed by the Third National Congress of the North Vietnamese Communist Party in Hanoi in September i960 and the Moscow conference of all Communist parties held the following November and December,

The immediate Communist objectives are to demoralize the South Vietnamese public and the military and security forces, weaken and eventually supplant government authority in the countryside, and discredit and ultimately precipitate the overthrow of President Diem's government. Simultaneously, the Communists are attempting to gain broad popular support for their effort, including the creation of a "united front" with non-Communist elements, and gradually to strengthen and transform their guerrilla forces into regular forces capable of undertaking a general offensive.

The DRV is the implementing agency for Communist activity in South Vietnam, It exercises close control over the Viet Cong guerrillas and over the"National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam" (NFLSV), the political instrument of the Viet Cong. However, while Hanoi is probably allowed considerable freedom .of action, Moscow and Peiping probably would have overriding influence over any major decision critically affecting the situation in South Vietnam, as for example, international negotiations on South Vietnam, cessation of Communist guerrilla operations, and escalation to conventional warfare or overt introduction of North Vietnamese army units. In any event, important Communist policies for South Vietnam are probably coordinated with Moscow and Peiping and the latter scrutinize developments in South Vietnam carefully with an eye to their own interests. Both Moscow and Peiping also furnish strong propaganda support for the Communist effort in South Vietnam and, in addition, the USSR carries on supporting diplomacy, largely in its capacity as a Geneva Conference Co-chairman« There is little evidence of material support of the Viet Cong guerrillas by Moscow or Peiping.

There are no apparent major policy differences between Hanoi, Moscow, and Peiping regarding South Vietnam. During the first six months of 1962, it appeared that Moscow differed somewhat with Peiping f s and Hanoi's propaganda for an international conference to settle the South Vietnam situation; t ^s difference presumably continues to-exist although little has been said by the Bloc on a conference since mid-1962, There also may be underlying intra-Bloc differences on the subject of neutralization of South Vietnam or reunification. In any event, even though Moscow might prefer neutralization, all would work to communize a neutral South Vietnam if one were established. Moscow has also generally exerted a restraining influence over Communist willingness to take risks.

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The sharp increase of the US military presence in South Vietnam and the events of recent months in Laos apparently have not weakened Communist resolve to take over South Vietnam, However, these events have clearly caused some modification of Viet Cong guerrilla tactics and may have caused the Communists to revise their timetable. Nevertheless, the Communists probably continue to look primarily to the long run in South Vietnam and to remain confident of. eventual victory.

B « Viet Cong Orggniz^

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!• Gsnoral* Available intelligence indicates that two parallel structures, military and political, exist at all organisational levels of the Vict Cong apparatus in South Vietnam* At the top of tho organization ©ro two bodies, tho Nairibo Regional Committee (KtC) and the Interzone V Regional Cansaitteo (IVHC)j equal in status and each apparently responsible directly to Emoi« The NRC directs and is responsible for all operations in the southern provinces, or roughly tho former Cochinchina region, while the IVRG directs and is responsible for all operations in the centra! and northern provinces 0 These committees consist of sevoral staffs responsible for military and political activities 0 The organization of the too regional committees appears to bo duplicated among intermediate and lower level committees responsible for operations at tho interprovineial (i«e., area covering more than one province), provincial., district, and village levels* Information is not available on the size of the political component of the Viet Cong apparatus, but it must be assumed that the regular and irregular guerrilla forces also serve as penotration, espionage, sabotage, propaganda, and terrorist agents 0

Viet Cong capabilities have increased considerably during the past three years* In 195>9 a relatively small but effective military-political apparatus operating largely in the Mekong River delta provinces, the Viet Cong has since grown into a formidable force operating throughout the countrysida and even in many urban centers, including Saigon, the capital e In addition to increasing its numerical strength, the Viet Cong has significantly improved its military and political organization and its tactical, weapons, and subversive capabilities*

4

2 « ^i^fy...^^^fi,.^, Effectiveness. Communist assets for guerrilla action in South Vietnam are considerable. In spite of an apparently increasing casualty rate, Viet Cong hard-core personnel has grown from ^n estimated It,000 in April I960 to about 23,000 in October 1962, These forces are distributed principally in the southern provinces, the former Cochinchina region which includes the Mekong River delta area and where most of the fighting occurs, Thoy are well-trained and well-armed (utilizing such weapons as light machine-guns and icortars and even £7 isu,rocoilloss rifles), Tho units into which these forces are organised range up to battalion and include ths key personnel infiltrated from Ebrth Vietnam These units in

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effect constitute the elite fighting elects of the Viet Cong force and operate at tho interprovincial, provincial, and district ****• ^^ e h?s Deen no hard evidence that the Viet Cong has yet formed regtoental-siL units or that thsy have an antiaircraft capability, other than the small arms which they are using vith increasing effectiveness agaxnst helicopters.

In addition to this elite force, the Viet Cong has an auxiliary ' emed force roughly eatinated at 100, COO and distributed throughout the country. This force operates essentially at the village and hamlet levels and consists largely of part-time or full-time armed cadres and sympathizers. Its functions are probably varied, but there is considerable evidence that it serves as a local defense force, provides logistic support (food ana intelligence, for example), and constitutes the reserve from which personnel are drawn as replacements for tha elite force or to help activate new units. The auxiliaries appear to be partially trained and partially armed, frequently utilizing nothing mere than spears, scimitars, and a variety of small weapons manufactured In home workshops or "arms factories. n However, these limited capabilities apparently are partly offset by the ability of the auxiliaries, many of whom cannot easily be identified by tho GV1I, to pass themselves off as innocent peasants.

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I3jr relying on small-unit actions and tactics of surprise, constant movement^ concentration for attack^ and dispersal upon withdrawal, tho Viet Cong guerrillas have achieved considerable effectiveness. They ambush, carry out company-size attacks against army and security units, and have tho capability to strike in battalion force against several targets simultaneously* According to official GVN statistics, the Viet Cong sine© I960 has killed more than 9?£00 and wounded at least 13*300 military and security personnel* In addition, the GVN estimates that at least 8,700 w local officials and civilians have been assassinated or kidnapped since i960*

The Viet Cong appears to be well-informed particularly on the plans end movements of government forces sent on large counter guerrilla operations c Itorale is probably also good and desertions or defections to the GVN forces, although reportedly increasing, axe relatively few. In recent months, however, shortages .of food and the increased aggressiveness of GVN forces

#The statistics on Viet Cong and GVN casualties are incomplete and not entirely reliable partly because -fee GVN probably understates its 01m casualties and overstates those of the Viet Ccng* Since the latter part of 1961* casualty estimates have improved largely because of tha increased US presences in South Vietnam. Despite reservations regarding their accuracy, these figures are helpful as one indicator of the magnitude of the fighting in South Vietnam*

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are believed to have adversely effected the moi-.ule and capability of some Viet Cong forces In the central provinces.

3« Viet Cong Logictic Support

a « L2£i^Support. The Viet Cong roi.ios principally on local resources to sustain its operations. Both tho character of this support and the mop.ns by which it is acquired vary considerably. It is obtained voluntarily, by propaganda and promises of mater Lai or political benefit, by threats and intimidation, and finally by outrjght force. It includes, among other things, personnel, arms, food, fund,-;, ^d intelligence.

Host of the Viet Cong guerrillas and agoi its are recruited locally, vith a large percentage coming from the youth. Host of their weapons are either captured or stolon from GVN military and oocurity forces are manufactured in home workshops or "arm factories" 1,, Viet Cong concentration areas, or are activatod from stocks cached silica the end of the Indochina war. A considerable portion of Viot Cong funds apparently comes from fees levied on buses and other means of transportation from taxes on the wealthy and on business enterprises (such as ruU,er plantations), and from ransoms paid for persons kidnapped. The Viet Co U g is entirely dependent upon the local populace and the countryside for food which is obtained through purchase, pilferage, capture of stocks, taxation (in the form of rice), and oven actual cultivation of crops by Sympathizers and part-time guerrillas. Finally, the ability of Viet Cong < :U errillas and agents to disperse, regroup, and indeed retain their pre^nce intact, even after .GVN military clearing operations have been competed, is considerably-enhanced by the concealment afforded them, voluntarily or otherwise by the local population, '

■ •

In addition, tho Viet Cong guerrillas and subversive agents rely : heavily on the villagers for information and suppled ;r <-. n .,• intelligence gained from espionage and from penetration of GVn military and civilian services. Intelligence supplied by the villager.-; t s lar K elv of a tactic natureand deals, for example, with the location and ^^Vl^TiS military and security forces and the defenses of individual army and security posts, villages, and hamlets. v

b. External Sutyoort, The Viet Con^ ir^,™~ *,+ v in South TletaaSnrifii^edTTispired ^ orl^l t ^T it ^T^ »w«nent support from North Vietnam, howevi, appeals TuTfJS^ ^ * ?«?**** evidence indicates that there is no large^ca£ JlfSS*!?' "J ^^^S equipment. On the other hand, infilSLn 5l l ££*"?* m "* . • sporadic if not continuing basis and aSS^^S^f SZ T e\ ' as was probably the case during Kay and June 156.:, '

Infiltrators are believed to consist larr^w ~r -»i 4. . Military personnel, key political and S^fLSt^tS^f 5 -

courts) ratter than units. Ho,evar, ta recent ShlSfSSbSn" 4

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two reliable reports confirming the infiltration of two Viet Cong groups (203 and ^00 men respectively) from southern Laos, There is considerable evidence that infiltrators in general are largely South Vietnamese (Cochin-chinese and Aimamites^ regrouped md retrained in Itorth Vietnam since the end of the Indochina war and familiar with the people and terrain of South Vietnam, They carry in then" own weapons and > in some instances, a limited amount of additional small and even large vreapons, technical equipment, medical supplies, and funds* The infiltrators apparently are distributed among existing Viet Cong units, thus increasing the number of hard-core personnel and thereby the capability of these units, or become the nuclei of new units.

Since the latter part of i960, the principal infiltration routes have been through the corridor of southern Laos controlled by Laotian and Jforth Vietnamese Coramnlst forces. However^ infiltration continues through eastern Cambodia, across the Demilitarized Zone at the 17th parallel, and by junk landings along South Vietnam's long coastline. In addition, Viet Cong guerrillas are believed to use the border areas of both southern Laos and eastern Canibodia to a limited extent for safo haven purposes during their hit-and-run attacks or when pursued by GVN forces

if t,

k* Political Capabilities

-

a * .^°_.0?j°f , "?y s * fesjftjggJP the Countryside There have long been major gaps in our knowledge of rural conditions in South Vietnam. In view of the overriding importance that the Viet Cong attaches to the country side in its strategy, thase gaps have now assumed critical prooortion3. Although our knowledge of rural conditions is improving, principally because of the substantially increased US presence in South Vietnam, any assessment of Communist political strength outside urban areas remains'questionable and at best tentative.

-

The Viet Cong appears to have had considerable success in reducing or supplanting government authority in the countryside. By the latter part of 1961, US officials estimated that probably more than one half of the

^ f! ^ r °?v 0n fT* *** soattaraa * °* Saigon, as well as several areas just to tas north and in the central and northern provinces, were under effective Viet Cong control by night, with the government generally capable of maintaining its authority only by day. Hany other area? were uLr varying degrees of Viet Cong influence. y

of n r 1 ir° r f-n %^ ? m °H f e 5 ent 5nd «PParontly more refined study, US • £f,£ \ • tuBated ,^^.1962 that of South Vietnam's some 2^00villages ^ich .contain around 85 percent of the total population, 20 percent wore ' effectively controlled by the Viet Cong. Although the Viet LlconLoned villages were inhabited by an estimated 9 per.enl of the xurS^SS*

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the t~t<L vez represented by these villages eaooagpassad a much larger proportion of the countryside. In contrast, the GVH effectively controlled about 1*7 percent of the village population, and 33 percent of the vUlagos, largely located, howaver, in the environs of majcr totms and provincial eaaitals and in the more heavily populated areas along m,un lines of earananlcatton. In the remaining hi percent of the villages and UU percent of the villare population, neither tho GVN nor tho Tie* Cong exorcised effective control,, even though GV*I influence ssespd greater Sn moat of these villages-,

5he accelerated GVH counterinsnrgency effort, principally the strategic 'bsalet program and the increasing aggressiveness of the military and security forces, reportedly has enlarged goimrfeat the number of villages and peasants under effective GV1J control, Efewrcs?, this improve-ment has presmaably oocrsrrsd principally In areas formerly eosite-sted by taq GVN and the Viet Gong since the rural area and popa&ase estimated as ifiaJer effective Viet Oeng control has been reduced by only 17 villages Pith a population of 15*0,000. .

Partly by tho eheer strength of its presence and partly be c of the prolonged absence of strong jfovernmont military and security forces, ths Viet Cong has boon able to t: jform sous r aral areas =■» ~suoh as portions of the Ca 1-Iau peninsula, the siranray Elaine dsa Jones, and the highlands In the north °° into ^na.jcr concentration or bi areas which arct dangerou3ly close to b?zoning ^liberated* areas, Eere, the ¥let Cong has virtually a free hand In levy5.ng and collecting, taxes, directing the

cultivation of rice and other farm products, and controlling their distrl-butioJij propagandising the populace, conscript!Jig cadres, and even setting ig> overt political organizations and provisional local gqverisrtent \mite.

The political capability and strength of tins Viet Cong in the countryside is inextricably associated with and strcstgly dependent rpon its military presence and power. The threat ©a? the use of £&$&e $ as demonstrated by tho high rate of assassinations and kld&applngs of local officials and oven ordinary peasants^ is a continual reminder of the penalty of nonoeoporatlon with the local Viet Ge&g* Hsreover^ by successful military operations against the GVN, tho Flat Cong is able to demonstrate its superiority and it3 determination and Ability to mala* Is tiara, the political apathy of the peasant — .i.e., his traditicraal and overriding sensitivity and attachment to local, village, and ladM family matters and his minimal awareness of natlor^l or men regional Iwaaa and develop-rents « has mada him prcae to seek an accciracdaticai with whatever force seeing for ths laorant capable of exorcising authority,

The Viet Cong.also usss non-violent, positive, mwm to ^^ea3 to the peasantry. Although thair tactics vary and dsfead partly en prevailing

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local conditions, they have, for example, purchased rather thm seised rice and food ©tuffs in many cases, have taxed the wealthy with effective publicity * and reportedly even distributed land to landless peasants* Even their terrorist acts from tine to tims faaire bsen agalnat harsh, disliked, or corrupt officials* Tfrese acts are held cut as proof of the Viet Congas ability to improve' the peasant 3 a economic and political lot* Sheir appeal is enhanced by fee peasants basic distrust of government officials engendered partly by their excessive and harsh i&plomontation of government programs and by the average Tiataassasa bureaucrats belief that he does ncrfs serve but ir; to be served by the p&u$L%*

Viet Osng propaganda to the peasant, therefore^ is both j/ositive and negativeo It extols Viet Cong achievements andpesssr,* credits the Dosssmmist forces under Ho chi Minh ifith expelling $7ih French from Vietnam and3fi9fijpiag the north free of f *£ore5.gn control, 11 holds cut Moncnlo and political, indasejaents, derides? OT2J aqpsfcilltiMj and points to tha exsossivo, -oppressive^ and corr\Tpt character of GVH demanda and practice;, s as for ©scaiaple, military conscription and forced labor in the creation of strategic hamlets*. Viet Gong propaganda also exploits the Vietnamese peaaant 8 a credulity and eniralstic beliefs, spreading bisarre stories intended to lir*dt popular

participation In goverrcaont prcgraroSo

■

Viot Cong penetration efforts have been "dire*ted largely against local govespESeat services sad &my. Civil Guard, and Self Bsfease Corps field nnlta. lihilo the extant cf this penetration Is difficult to determine accurately, there have bean increasing reports in recent acnths of succeas-ful Viet Cong penetration of Self Uefenae Oarps units and strategic hefflleta Moreover, the apparent advance knowledge of some GVB all liary onoratlona end tha generally high rate of te w desertions is probably pariSy due to Viot Gong penetration cf Aragr field posts and training csntera.

if«rf+~4 i b % S^^aa Sectc*. Qmnmlst activities la urban areas are limited largelylo propaganda, penetration, and terrorisa. She S^ediSo cbjectavo of these activities Is to encourage dissent and cpSaVtSn to Resident Bis* and the BS presence in Sout?Vletaam IrtUto^llrtZ**** aentnuents among intellectuale, professionals, SJSuS pohSc^S^ government officials, and labor and youth eroina %7+£?. PWlMotaaa and Cong h s to created cc^n gronnVSS SS'J^^T?!!* 2" Viot opposition elements, legitime it, WgeS5uo^^S^"fT anUt egimately precipitate Kern's overthrow. £,i2 aS^^SS"* • effort elnce 1961, particularly with the crettXnefU.% J?*"!*,? this the Liberation of South 1Utatt« to T * L *f W^"* Front for

national support for the GoSlst^eTtiS; ""* "** *» g3i * fet «*- "

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As reflected by Radio Hanoi which ilso relays KPLSV statements, the paramount Viet Cong propaganda theme is the dictatorial family rule imposed by the Diem government and its subservience to *JS "foreign imperialist intervention" which are combining to "oppress" and "murder" the South Vietnamese people and block reunification. This Viet Cong propaganda campaign,coupled with recent political developments in Laos (which some Communist propaganda has implied provides an acceptable model for "settlement" of the South Vietnamese conflict) and with Diam's persistent reluctance to tolerate any appreciable non-Communist opposition, has already contributed to an increase in neutralist sentiment among urban circles* Moreover, some oppositionists, including a few leaders- of the once-powerful Cap Dai and Hoa Hao religious sects, are reportedly cooperating with the Vict Cong to the point of being committed to participating in an eventual Communist-led anti-Diem coup attempt.

Viet Cong capabilities for leading a successful coup are limited, however. Its own forces, even if combined with any remnant armed bands of the Cao Dai and Hoa Kao religious sects, do not appear strong enough to overthrow the government by military means. Nor is there any evidence that the Viet Cong has any support in the. middle or top levels of the GVIJ bureaucracy or its military and security establishments. Although the Viet Cong might well be able to exploit the confusion and instability resulting from Diem's overthrow, it does not yet have the ties with the non-Communist opposition to Diem that would enable it to lead a successful coup.

There is no reliable evidence of Viet Cong penetration of the middle or top echelons of the GVN bureaucracy and defense establishment. There is believed to be penetration of the lower echelons, and it is clear that the GVK security and intelligence services do not now have the capability to prevent such penetration, A GVN police interrogation report in early 1962 revealed that there was a large Viet Cong subversive network in the Saigon post office and that an employee of the post office was possibly using the telegraphic system for clandestine communication with North Vietnam* ■ :

The Viet Cong has also progressively improved its terrorist capability in Saigon and other urban centers. There have been increasing reports that the Viet Cong has enlarged its terrorist corps in Saigon and that the principal targets of these attacks are to be Americans, Evidence of this capability is the increasing number of grenade bombings in Saigon* For example, there were three bombing incidents against Americans in May 1962 and three bombing incidents in connection with Independence Day celebrations on October 26, 1962-

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tt THE VJSTJIAH GOWRK-ffiMT'S C QggSBgtSTEtGBRCr E flftStT

A* Backgrounds Gradual^eogonsa

«MH

In contrast to the ra^ld acceleration of the CoKsmnist insurgent and subversive effort, the GVN response antil this year vas gradual and relatively uncoordinated and generally did not reflect the sense of

peneral kolementation began. Moreover, the GVH leadership continued *o view the situation as one created and supported largely by external forces with Uttlo popular appeal arid saw their problem as essentially a military one requiring overriding emphasis on purely military measures.

■

' Even these military J3eama?e8j however, rare weakened principally by the GTO leadership^ reluctance .to .abandon static defonso concepts and permit mare offensive actions, for which it had suffioiont forces -« a reluctance that reflected both fear of overt ElV aggression and interna! political considerations. In addition, the GVN military and security ■forces themselves, despite their experience in combatting guerrillas during the Indochina l*ar and thereafter, wore inadequately trained, equipped, and organized to wage a sustained and large-scale counter guerrilla effort.

"The turning period in the GVN response occurred in late 1961 mid early 1962 and resulted largely from substantially Increased US aid,

persistent up reconaisiaa3i&j.uja»,

missions to South Vietnam* Accordingly the GVN has diversified its response by giving increasing emphasis to political counterinsurgency measures . It has improved the coordination of these raeasures with purely militsiy operations, given priority to implementing a basic strategic concept for eliminating the insurgents, significantly increased the counter-guerrilla tactical capability of its military and security services, ar'3 departed appreciably frcia static defense concepts, thereby greatly aid: jg the development of increasingly offensive-minded and aggressive military and security forces. By the early part of 1962, the GVN had begun to act upon the recognition that the crisis situation in South Vietnam was an internal and political problem, requiring largely political measures tu eliminate Consmaist appeal, support, and control among the peasants.

**• Foraulation and Implementation of Basic Strategic Concept

JJ5 a result of persistent DS reporEtendations, the GVN has developed a basic strategic concept for the inplomentation of its diverse canhter-insurgoncy measures. The teo principal features of this concept are' the ■ strategic harslet program and a closely Integrated and coordinated military-political approach directed toward isolating £he Viet Cong and regaining control of the countryside on a systematic, area-by-area ffaSis*

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1, Strategic Hamlet Program , The strategic hamlet program embodies principally the recommendations of the British Advisory Mission, headed by R.G.K. Thompson, a key figure in the campaign against Communist insurgency in Malaya. It also reflects US innovations and the experience and concepts developed by the GVN in similar earlier projects. Briefly, the program involves regrouping hamlets into fortified and more readily defendable settlements and undertaking in these settlements political, social, and economic measures designed to weed out Viet Cong agents and sympathizers, reestablish and improve local government administration, improve the general popular image of the GVN, and increase the peasantry's identification with the government's fight against the Viet Cong. The program is initiated in relatively secure areas and is then expanded into less secure areas. The majority of the hamlets provide most of their ovm resources, although the US is supplying some of the equipment and necessary construction materials and it is expected that this aid will increase substantially.

The strategic hamlet program is now priority national policy. President Diem has created a special interministerial committee to implement and coordinate the program on a countrywide basis. The committee is headed by Diem's brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu, and delegates its responsibilities to regional committees under each of the army division commanders. Increasing efforts have been made to regularize the procedure for implementing the program, educate the responsible local officials and the peasants on procedures and objectives, speed up the distribution of US material assistance, and train the necessary specialized personnel. The GVN has reported that, as of mid-October 1962, more than 3*000 strategic hamlets had been completed and more than another 2,000 were under construction; more than one-half of these are in the southern provinces, including the Mekong River delta area.

The completed strategic hamlets vary widely in the quality of their physical defenses, the effectiveness of the defense, internal security,, and administrative systems, and the degree to which necessary political, social, and economic measures have been implemented. Among the most effectively organized hamlets are those in areas where integrated and systematic military-political pacification operations have been undertaken, such as "Operation Sunrise 11 in Binh Duong province and "Operation Sea Swallow" in Phu Yen province. In these and other hamlets, fortifications and the defense forces are adequate for repulsing guerrilla attacks, radio communication has been provided, hamlet administrative officials have been elected or selected by the inhabitants rather than appointed by the village or di ;rict chiefs, and Civic Action teams have been active in improving the healtn, educational, and general living standards of the people. In many other hamlets, however, fortifications are extremely inadequate or virtually nonexistent, defense forces axe greatly under-strength and Inadequately armed, there are no radio comraunicatIons or Civic Action teams, and hamlet officials continue to be appointed. Moreover, despite improving peasant morale in many hamlets, particularly as the benefits of security against Viet .Cong intimidation and

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taxation becone evidoi^ thorc are continuing reports that GV1J Officials have exactod too heavily from local resources and havo not coitpsnsated tho peasants for tho mterial end labor required to build tho haialots, that tho peasant's ability to earn a living has declined because of tho time ha is required to spend on construction, and tliat tho government has boon rcora concerned irlth controlling tho h^ilet population than with providing services &nd improving living conditions*

#

It is still too csrly for accurate ovaluation of tho strategic hamlet program. On balance, the program appears successful and probably has contributed to tho reported slight increase in tho number of persons and villages that havo coma tinder effective government control. The fact that tho strategic htoalsts have become a major targot for Viet Cong armed attacks is in itself an indicator of the importance of tho program to the GVJJ's counterinsurgoncy effort, if not a measure of its success. Most of the.deficiencies of the strategic harlot program appear to be the result of implementation and, to some extent, are to bo expected during th3 early stages. J&ny province! and district chiofs continue to be rolatively unln-formed or confused as to procedure and objectives or are overzoalous in

their attempt to impress their superior

1*3 and thus havo established unrealistfe ' eluding President Diem and E*o Dinh

goals, Moreover, soma GVK leaders, including President Diem and Ego Dinh Kin, tend to place exaggerated importance on tho program, Viewing it almost

a*

continuing defense of tho strategic hamlets doe3 not exist in many of the areas *fcej?a they havo boon established.

ter Ion and

considerable delay:

VS oxficials, the GVN has developed the general outlines of an Integra sd military-political approach for pacifying tho country on a systematic, gradual aid province-by-proviiice basis. The approach involves large-scale and con-truing Military operations to dear and hold a given province. As thV EJi"? * ST 4 fra^Sio hamlets are established with Civic 40U1 j teams

for the pacification of 11 pSfSSi*«5STwSf 25 £ 5? i if^S 6 «.♦• area and embodying most o/the *JLE2££?S fi kJMS&S'" ^

cation. 7 Priority areas for purposes of pacific

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Implementation of the integrated pacification approach boge>n in March 1$>62, and since then four operations have boon initiateds "Operation Sunrise" in Binh Duong provinca (and portions of surround iiig provinces) 9 ^Operation Saa Swallovr 3 in Phu Yen provixoo^ R 0pGraticn Let's Go*3 in Binh DLnh .province i and IJ Operation Royal Phoenix 1 * in Qusng Ngai province * HLans for another operation in Vixih Long province <, "Operation West VJind'^ 11 ! are being cbfactai up* In addition to continuing military operation^ over

160 strategic hamlets^ the great majority in Phu Yen province^ have already-been constructed and more than an additional 1 5 000 hamlets are plumed for completion by mid-1963 or shortly thereafter*

The results of tho systematic^ integrated SiSlltsa?y=pt5lttleal pacification approach are encouraging* However^ its limited apx^lication to relatively feir provinces has not yet appreciably altered the balance bet-rasa the govern-asnt and the Viet Cong in the countryside 0 Moreover $ thare is evidence that the GTO has some doubt as to tho feasibility of this apprc&oh as the princip:!. basis of its counter insurgency offer to For ©xaiq>lo, in addition to th s 1 v.:n-y reliance on tho strategic hamlet program, thero are reports that President Dica fools that his military forces now have sufficient strength and capability to make quick, large-scale military strikes si taneouiOy in and behind various areas of Viet Cong concentration with tho hope of dispersing an3 ultimately isolating tho guorrilla forces into small and easily eliminated packets.

C* MJlttavy Operations and Effectivoness

*— — — - fe^ha - . ■!■ ^mm i ' _— m tma -» — a -a I i i ■—■ ■ — i —»■ ■ ■ — — — _ ■ — _ - _. .

■^■f i~tt~itm «~it^«— ^p *mm*t\ ■ mm i^.nni

Tho GTO military and security forces have significantly stepped up thoir offensive operations against the Viet Cong insurgents, particularly since the early part of 1962, In large measure, this has been the direct rosult of US agreement to support a substantial increase in the s*ze of ■ ( the GV» military and security establishments. Since the latter part of

1961, tee GVN has increased its military forces from about 160,000 to around 200,000 and its security forces, tec Civil Guard and Self Bjfense .Corps from just over 90,000 to almost 155,000, This has enabled th* W to satisiy its requirements for defending transportation facilities and what . it considers key areas, including tee l?th parallel, vhils it attempts to seek out and eliminate the Viet Gong. During the period October %£t for example the GVii military and security forces Lunchea 19 lar-^llfenslve operations, involving units vith equivalent strengths ranging from 4o battalions to several regiments, in addition to Sail-unit offeSiw actions and defensive engagements. ^ 1W aoraons

strategy end plans. In close eooieratlcn wits iR^i-fr ""J 1 ™* «*• division colanders and th.li subo^ es^ro U £%£%«'> 0W ingly m formating and executing offensive mLSo^gS^ *

uig mcreas-igairat the Viet Co

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However* it appears that Diem«s willingness to delegate this respens ibility is due partly to his appointment of division commanders whom he believes to be loyal to him snd his family. This reliance essentially en colonels to direct the fighting reinforces continuing reports that Diem and Ngo Dinh Ehu still mistrust most of the generals and even have doubts as to their military competence. In any event, Diem axid Ilhu continue to plsy ' dominant roles in the development of general military strategy and must approve pleas for major operations end frequently Mill initiate or modify

them.

As a result o? the substantial increase in U3 military assistance and accelerated training programs by US military personnel in South VietaKcn, uho now number almost 11,000, the GVIf military and security forces have

covmter guerrilla vrar-faroc They are now alibushing and patrolling mors than over before arc engaging tho Viet Cong Increasingly in small unit a^tion'j^ and are following through tfoeia? attacks in order to keep the Vict Cong from diseiigaging * Probably of greater iiaportance^ hotiavor^ is the considerably * improved 1 ical mobility of the GVII forces* - These forces are now able "to strike more quickly and in greater strength than ever before during defensive^ relief $ or offensive operations * The single most important reason for this accelerated tactical mobility is tho increasing utilisation cf air p&mr $ principally US helicopter support* Although better intelligence and coTraunications, particularly the installation of radios in moat villages, and improvements in the tactical organization of the GVN military establishing have also contributed significantly*

*

The Improvement in GTO tactical intelligence is due partly to admin-inisirative and organisational reforms but principally to the success of US officials in impressing theSo.Uth Vietnamese with the necessity for more effective Interrogation of Vist Cong prisoners and to the apparent inorsssa in the willingness of the peasants $ at least In aroa-s >;here security- has insxroved^ to Inform on the Viet Cong, On balance^ however, G¥K intelligence

^or^el,

„ _ . 'risibilities aaong several agenciea and Interagency rivalries, and the continuing reluctance of the peasantry to inform on the Viet Cong for fear of reprisal particularly in insecure areas or where the GVN wmmv** *«= ***»*<«*«>* J

terapor ary."

here the GVH presence is regarded as

Doapite this improvement in counter guerrilla tactics, GVH mUitafrv forces continue to rely more on large operations or clearing s^e^ than or MlHttit action*, employ CiviT.Gasrd and Self Ifefenae Corps unS ex£ a ! eiveiy xn ^dependent offensive missions, and, during large operation* deploy combat units, particularly artillery and airforco, accord^to' convention! Ustieal ssthoda. As a result, the Civil Guard and ifilf Jftfense Ce*ps are incurring heavy casualties and Viet Cong guerrillas

*

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

A* Bscl:<p?ound* Rapid Baterioratien

During I960 and 1961 j -the Inter rial political situation in South Vietnam deteriorated rapidly, breaking the 'relative stability and general surface calm that had prevailed since President Diem consolidated his authority in 195>!>-5>6e Criticlea of Diem increased substantially throughout I aH sectors of Vietnamese society but was more urgently articulated within ; the government and bureaucracy, including the armed forces, A wide range of civilian and military officials, including Vice President Nguyen Ngoc • Tho and other members of the cabinet, privately questioned Diem ! s handling / of the internal security problem and his ability to rally and lead the

people against the Viet Cong during what they regarded as the most critical period since tho end of the Indochina war. Their concern with tho Commurlst threat, however, was almost inseparably entwined with an accumulation of grievances principally ever DIem*s failure to delegate responsibility, the excessive power exercised by Blem* s family, and the use of secret security services and semicovert political.organisations to scrutinise the attltu s of the bureaucracy,,

since 1956, and to a lesser extent among labor and business elements. They repeatedly and, on occasion, vociferously demanded that Diem liberalize and reform his govcrnmant, lift restrictions on civil liberties, eliminate corruption in government, and permit an opposition to operate. These demands

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generally have advance knowledge of major GVN operations, especially then artillery or air power is used to "soften up" tho enemy, and are able to disperse or avoid engagement,

Tne increased US seaport and presence, the greater role played by GVN military officials In formulating and directing military operations and more accesses, against the Viet Cong.than ever before have -PP^ntly taoved morale among members of the middle and upper echelons of the GVN military establishment. The state of morale at the lower level, hoover, is more difficult to determine. Desertions,particularly among recruits and recalled reservists, appear to be running very high for a vide variety of reasons, and some GVN officials continue to claim serious difficulty m meetln* conscriotion quotas, During the first seven months of 1962, for example, a total of 17,28? personnel were dropped from the rosoers of the Army, Navy, Airforce, Civil Guard, and Self Defense Corps as deserters or as personnel absent without official leave. On the other hand, some GVN officials have recontly claimed that voluntary candidates have for the first time oversubscribed tho quota at the army officer's training school at Thu Due,

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were supported, as in the past, by a disparate group of anti-Diem Vietnamese expatriates in Paris v?ho have long advocated Diem 1 s removal.

Unrest also increased among the peasantry principally because of the government's inability to assure adequate protection from the Viet Cong but partly because of the cumulative react ion to the excessively arbitrary and severe behavior of local security and administrative officials. Possibly underlying this unrest also was the character of the GVH 1 s economic development activities which, however limited, were oriented mora toward de% r eloping an urban industrial base than toward improving the economic lot of the ppasantt

Vietnamese confidence in the Diem government was obviously seriously shaken and morale within the bureaucracy, particularly the military establishment, declined greatly* In Ibvember i960 a small group of middle level paratroop officers staged a near-sxiccessful coup in Saigon, Although the abortive coup obviously made Diem take serious stock of the prospects for political survival, it also strengthened his confidence in the correctness of his political views and increased his suspicion of many of his subordinates and the oppositionists outside tha government.

During this period also, Diem's view of US policies toward Sowbh Vietnam underwent considerable change• For the first tine since he consolidated his position, Diem appeared to question seriously US political support of his leadership and US commitments to defond South Vietnam from Communist encroachment, His apparent concern, although partly reflecting his disagreement with US actions in Laos, was duo largely to earlier persistent US representations on"internal issues which he regarded as pressing him unduly ! to reform and liberalise his regime. This concern was further aggravated by his belief, partly instilled by members of his family, that the US was in some way involved in the abortive coup,

*

During tha Immediate post-coup period, Diom took a number of measures to strengthen his controls over tha bureaucracy. Ho and Wgo Dinh Nhu made it publicly and privately clear that future coup attempts or even public I ' criticism of the government would be dealt with severely. The Can Lao the government's semicovert political control organization, and"~tao~Secr e t police were ordered to maintain close surveillance over critics within the bureaucracy and the military establishment and over the oppositionists outside the government, and officials were apparently instructed tint passing information to or even having social relations with Americans would ftl\ f J iou V° ns ^nces. As a result, there was a sharp decline in the heretofore large number of reports on coup plotting and criticism of

couo S^l Un * 7 ° S thS 7?**"* m ™ ^te^organSed a^Ser,

T* P t£ S'-.fr* ""J 5 ^ St l0ySl memb0rs of th9 V™ l^.the bureaucracy

^nd tte military and security services. Ostensibly tol^ss the IS Sth

tJ.i'n ^ mSnQ3S ^ r6l ° rra thS *"•"■«*. he later reorganized'his £b£t

• * *

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During the last half of 196l 5 'the political situation became somewhat less disturbed despite the continuing rapid deterioration of security conditionso The predominant factor in this development vas external: : . \ .strong US public manifestations of support for Dieia, including the visits of. Vice President Johnson and General Maxwell Taylor, and the substantial Increase in US assistance to South Vietnam* Other contributing factors wero the slightly greater participation that Diem now appeared to permit his military advisers in the conduct of the fighting, the favorable psychological effect on the middle and lower military echelons of a few large offensive operations^ and Diem f s initiation of some modest political reforms, However, there vras no conclusive reversal of deteriorating trends as was made clearly evident when Diem ? s palace was bombed by two GVd air force pilots in February 1962,

( B« The Current Situation

r

• ■ .. • The political situation in South Vietnam is now probably more complex

and more difficult to analyze than at any time since 19$h. On tho one hand, ■ the sense that political reform is urgently needed appears to have subsided* significantly, at least onr the surface, and indeed a relative calm seems again to have descended over the biu'eaucracy,- There has b3en a significant decline in reports of serious discontent, and of criticism by GVN officials of Diem's leadership and his family. Reports of the concern of officials with inefficiency, corruption, and morale in the government have likewise declined significantly since the early part of 1?62, as have reports on ■ °°? P lot ^ S*™ us officials believe that morale within the bureaucracy and the military services has improved appreciably, largely because of tho improved capabilities of the armed forces and several large successful operations against the Viet Ccngj that some heretofore strong oppositionists - are now seeking to identify themselves with the government a^d con?ribu?e positively zo the war effort} and that peasant loyalty is shifting toward ^he.government, particularly in areas where the government is making its presence increasingly felt, Finally, Diem and his principal lieutenant* have very recently shorn considerable confidence and optSism tS the ,' tide has been turned against the Viet Cong and have evrn «,t«L?*h T general offensive is about to be launched! ^ at a I

in,t,M?? t tbe ° tJ ? er Jr*' ^ lndicatoi ' s of serious internal political instability remain, however diminished in apparent ln*.™ 0 «+£ * JOX ^ iCaJ -

varied as the indicators of political stabSitv Vw ^ ""l" 6 * S

officials from various level's of the aaminlsWinn •" f!*»£*■ £r ™ Tho and Generals Daong Van Kinh and Le Van kZ III ™ clu6m Z Vice Resident toe war- himself or Sough htf Lnner cJcL i? fSfT Contimiss to run Within the government ceS^ 8 ^4S%1^^£ that CCr ^ion lottery scandal that there is no politic^! lortlt*- T^ mi<m ^ jesses against the Viet Cong in the ctun^r>T ll f*5 ° f "*■***? *& in the countryside is forc^nTo^To^ttU ^criminate bombing

Cong, and that coup plottingV^tfaS onlTS SZTZSf ~

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exploitation and the belief that the US would not tolerate a coup keep it from materializing. As recently as late October 1?62, Gen, Ton That Dinh, commander of Army Corps II and generally considered one of the most loyal although opportunistic of Diem's generals, stated that he was highly dissatisfied with the regime, that Diem and Nhu tolerate corruption in high places, and that he was planning to precipitate a coup in early February 1$>63«

1, Political Attitudes^ of Dlgff L JH?*1 .J^JLJ^^Xl Dlcm and h3 s £ ?jn} -ly remain firstly convinced of the wisdom of tholr political outlook and of their method of governing their country, They are basically impatient tath democratic processes• They consider democracy a useful goal but its methods thsy regard as wasteful and as dangerous to political stability and public safety in a country such as South Vietnam* They contend therefore that the Vietnamese people, with their national survival at stake, must submit to a collective discipline until they develop a greater national consciousness and a batter sense of civic responsibility. While willing to rule within the framework of constitutional and representative government, they are firm In their- convictions that government is effective and dynamic only when its power is closely held and exercised by a small, highly dedicated, and uncompromising element at the very top through a machinery founded more on persona], relationships and loyalty than on formal or institutional chains of command. Where representative government and civil liberties come in conflict with the highly centralized authority, the latter generally prevails, Finally, Diem and his family continue to believe strongly, almost fanatically, that their leadership is crucial if not indispensable to the survival of their country in the present crisis.

Some slight modifications have slowly appeared in these attitudes during the past year, partly because Diem and his family are increasingly aware that the Communist threat to South Vietnam is largely internal ° and partly because of the magnitude and complexity of the US assistance

) program and its increasing orientation toward the needs of the countryside.

>bre than ever before, they have been made aware that government nust not only be .served but must also serve, that the peasant and his active particip?-

J tion rather than his passive obedience may well be crucial for final

victory over the Viet Cong, and that a little more sharing of pover at the top would probably improve administrative efficiency rather than lead to their ouster.

At the same time, however, Diem and especially Nhu have gone to great lengths to convince U3 officials that this ha/al^ys been ?he£

peasant, Km has repeatedly stated that the strategic hamlet pro-i-m for ex^nple, will create a social, economic, and poUtlc^reTOl^^

*L l«el, and raise the peasant to a new social status. There is no evidence,

., , secret/koforn

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*

however, either in recent developments or Id the records of past performance, particularly Ilhu's, that such are "their real objectives and expo otatIonso -

Probably the most significant change is in Diera's attitude toward the US* Kb has apparently become substantially persuaded that IS defense cosniltments to South Vietnam are firm, despite his continued disagreement vrith the IB on the Laotian problem. His earlier suspicions that the OS was looking for a successor in South Vietnam and that tho IS was implicated in the abortive I960 coup have been considerably relieved. On the other hand, Diem has remained firm against any US pressure on matters that ho interprets as vital to his oirn raid his government's best interests and is . convinced that in the final analysis he can have absolute confidence only in himself and in his family.

2. 2^9^ n ^^t^S^2^^i:SC a ^ cra r ro ^^ly has somewhat strengthened

his control" of the adiiijustoatfon. For example, ho has reorganised a number of his agoncios, has removed a number of critical and potentiality disloyal officials and by various means neutralised tho influence of coma others, such as V5.ce President Tho and Gen, Duong Van Minh, and has improved his means of surveillance of tho bureaucracy through such techniques as the creation in the military establishment of a,system of "political commissars" known as the Political Welfare Division* He has attempted to roinforco further his control of the military establishment by the appointment of personally loyal colonels as division commanders, some of whom have Vernon-strated from time to time that thoy regard their responsibility as principally to Diem rather than to their corps compandors.

On balance, however, it appears that tho general efficiency of the administration has improved slightly, partly because of tha appointment of ©ore competent officials to several key positions, partly because of soma increase in the authority delegated by Diem, and partly because of the enlarged IS presence in South Vietnam* For exaa£Le, Secretary of State for the Presidency Kguyon Dinh Tfauan appears to be oxcrcio*n* greater authority than before, as is Secretary of State for Interior°Bui van Luon* wio, like xhe head of th* now Central Intelligence Organization, Col. Nguyen Van Y, and Secretary of State for Riblic Health Iran Dinh Do is among trie nov/ly-appointod and more competent members of Diem's entoira^e in Saigon, At Dlem's initiative, the National Assembly recently p*s-ed

3i22*! , *w J^^-*"***-*"^ W to call v£on **&.*£%*..

cabinet to give testimony on pending legislation,

i

■are selective in hi? appointment 3 ^^^'SaSirSi^SL " •t this level of the goverr^nt, some of these officials havo^so SoT^a

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so^Hhat greater vHltngP.3. to ^-JJ^LTta'SSl'SStaS'->att»r

rtta* to throve orr f^Uof Bd ^ i"d™ i.ntciais.nco, and planning *d ^^?**J2fS^«n g3.4-.tor consultation and coordinaS^a^JSiTSS^™ tne rotation and implantation of

policies. ■ ■*

iwarfhnless participation by the cental elements of the adminis-Nevertheless g^JJJJJ^^/,^ direction of policies, as well as tration In Satgen in the ff^JJJ*' d fr0IP lts mid dlo and lower

initiativo *»d construe ?^^^ y *~£ ^ his fanU y continue

echelons •J* l ™ttTSSS^ ^SmSS of personal relationships to operate ^ 6^^"* J^g-^ foma channels of comand, They havo rather than through th r ^ ! l to teoadw govornmont participation

^nSlor^^^^aferfSd htg£y sensftive to the possibly Satthe rolfofU3 advisers in the field or at the middle and lower echelons S^radXistration may weaken their authority outside Saigon.

3

iottc-

Dlem's Position in the Countrywide. Diem has never had widespread noouiar S "aSH poFt, even during "his period of greatest achievement. ?2tt-53 An austere and disciplined introvert, he is incapable of demagog, uerv ana has never made a great effort — to the extent that Erix§e Sihanouk of Cambodia and Ho Chi Hlnh of North Vietnam, for example, ha™ done so — to inspire among the South Vietnamese people a national con noss centered and moulded around him personally. While he has enacted measures that have helped the peasants, he has not attempted to identify himself intimately with the peasants. Relatively few peasants havo ever seen Diem or heard hm speak, and there are probably many others who are not aware that he is head of the government. For the great majority of naasants the district chief is probably the highest government official thero has been any notable degree of contact.

ty of peasants, with whom

Diem undoubtedly has become increasingly < re of the serio\JS need to improve the public inage of himself, his family, and his government* He now travels extensively in the countryside, and his manner of talking with the peasant has become more relaxed and sympathetic than beforej during the last half of 1961, for example, Diem made 18 knowntrips outside Saigon and visited 19 provinces, 9 in the central and northern parts of the country and 10 in the south. Both Diem and Nhu have from time to time attended the inauguration of rolativoly small rural projects. Vlith US assistance, the GVN is expanding its information and Civic Action programs at the village level and has become more conscious of the need to conduct these activities along lines understood and appreciated by the peasant. Finally, there are reports that a number of the villages and hamlets ■which have been given arms have resisted the Viet Cong, instead of surrendering their weapons as some GVN officials had expected they would do.

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There soonis to ha some fooling among GVH and US officials operating at tho local level that the popular appeal of and support for Blew and his govermsent in the coi jsldc is li^prcrring, partictOsrly In areas where security haw improved snd the govsrraanVa poorer is imreasing* Ifcwever, thoy i7arn against any n&fitie optimism, particularly since they believe social and economic advances &re still no 4 ", keeping pace vith military successes^ and that the positive identification of tho peasantry with the goveranent is stSl3 a long war ofx* While over a 100.000 Montapnard or mountain trifcespeople have fled Wet Cong-cont3?o31ed areas aac! are being temporarily housed and fed by the G7K, their flight apparently was due principally to Viet Cong excesses and tha general intensification of the fighting in the highlands rather i&aa to any positive snaasnres taken by the GVB to appeal to the trlbespeople. She extensive use' of artillery and aerial bombard™ itisnt and other apparently excessive and Indiscriminate ffie&snros by GVN military and gscurltgr Itoees in attenuating to eliminate tita Vict Cong have tmdaubtedly killed man;/ innaeezat peasants and made many others teore irilling than before to cooperate with tho Viet Cong, pgBpticrilaarly in areas vhere the gowacment has conducted extensive military operations* but has failed to follow up by providing the means .for poriaanent socueilgr* ;

*

lj. ffl affig. Pfr affiioa tn Tffban t Centere« "Bitem's legitiraa^r ae South Vietnam's S^SS^L leader may be, at best, a vagus and tap arson xl concept . in the countryside. It is seriously questioned, hotzever, ^:ong r^j:y elements of the urban society, principally gmong professionals, intellectuals and formsr politicians in Saigon. \fis in the resent past, this questioning largely continues to t tho form of dissent and private criticise rather than openly organised exposition* Within this educated s$d politically sensitive sector of the Vietnamese society, there in a wi'ds Yarieiy of political sentiaents. Including varying degrees of -Vietnar^o nationalise, neutralism, coaswnism, pro-IB and anti-US, and^pro«Ffceineh and anti-Ereneh 0 5he coition thamea among: these critics and active opponents of Diem continue to be related to his sv m and manner of rule.

Repeats of opes critieisa and opposition to fiiesi among th3 Salgin civilian slits, already on ths decline by early 1961, havo decreased further during this year, littla has been heard, for exsB§jflLe, of Er. Bisu Quang IXmfs Republican Party of Vietnam (Dan himself has been in prisaa since the 1<?50 eonp skteaapt), of GVtf-ereated or OT-eontrolled s cpp^s'"^c-a» groups, or of the once TOciferous critics of Diem, such ?.a ths 18 int Llee-tuals and ex-politicians vho signed a public pretest petition to Bisa in ' I960. Tm probable causes for this decline in reports are varieds GV-V

SECHET/NOFCTiJI

ET1 O

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i<

SECRET/EOF®*!

22

*-■*

r .

.rded as an ihaica-

Pai

a

oithor In cooper< It also

This relative surface silence might be rejja tor ©* tarmmt In Biem's position with the urban public if it were not for the increasing wafcer of reports of clandestine activities by his non-Co^utnist critics and opponents. Factional leaders of such olo. and once teportaat political groups as the Bai Viets and the Nationalist Party of Vietnam (V1-3JDD) reportedly are seeking nays to geo their nepers secretly installed in the government. (There is ovidonce of some collxxsion between elements of one of these groups and the two pilots who borahad Diem's palace in February 1?62 0 ) Other opposition elements, including^ factions of the Cao Bai roligious sect and the tea teo Social Democratic

arty, are reporEeoly^eparlng plans for a future coup, oit v ~ * _tion with other non-Coasmunist groups or with tho Viet Cong, appears that expatriate groups in France, such as the Democratic Party of Vietnam, exe attempting to expand their covert activities in Saigon.

j

Khile it appears that Diem has not improved hie standing among urban groups there is no evidence that tho g&tl-Blein IntelioctuaX-olite elements in Saigon have boon able to overcome thoir chronic disunity and sectarian* isra or°to inorvB.se their very small follo^ings* On the other hand, DIera*s persisting disdain of most of these oppositionists and his refusal to bring into the govsr nt even some of their least reprehensible members have 'contributed to a gro>i3 g neutralist sentiment among then and, by forcing many of them under cover, have made it extremely difficult to estimate tholr real strength and disruptive potential, In addition to tho growing appeal of neutralism araong Hiera, thoir pro-US orientation nay also be rapidly declining.

IV. EC0K0HIC TR3HBS

!

\

There has been little inflationary pressure in Soutie Vietnam as yet. Prices have been stable and tho money sitpply has been nearly constant for over a year. For example, in August 1962, "total raoney supply, made up of demand deposits in the banks and currency in circulation, vzs only fractionally above vihat it had boon in March 1961* Further, prices havo been generally stabl^ and tho cost of living in tho cities has risen only very slowly.

Tho stability in rconay supply and prices that has boon such a marked feature of tho Vietnamese economy has baen the diroct result of vary conservative .15711 policies with respect to prices, wages, and fiscal management, So long as the immediate problem In,South Vietnam was reconstruction, lee., tho restoration of production to pro-World $&r II lovels, it was possible to obtain substantial ineroases in output at relatively small cost, and conservative price-Sage and fiscal policies Mere not only useful but also to some extent necessary• * Although GVH policies have been more conservative in nature than was really required (for example, budget swpluses from l&k to 1959 amounted to a total of 2.7 billion i>i^sto^s) they have kept the spseter of inflation from adding yet another element of

Instability to the scene..

*

•. , SECAST/1X)?GRN

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 201 1

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Shice the rscesistruction phase ended In about 1959* Cf7N economic * policy hay preserved tha status quo In the eotmtaysida$ including the* traditional- disparl% osteon rttP&I sad xnrban living standard^ and has pot stiEvulatad oec Lc dtfrdopsuHit, Thero g3?e soma indications, in fact^ feat ihore has recently been not disinvestpat hi agriculture, ' Given tha security situation in tfc* CQ®£facysIdc and tho current depressed state of tr&da there-j rovised policies directed tttrsrd increasing rural income and production would'be an essential element in p^suadtqg tha peasants to cast th$fip lot with tho govor- nt alld &ot with tha Viet Cong.

Two GSicowagiBg dw&lop kts have occurred in the economic field in South Vicing In the last BOTaral JMnthSq Flrstp tha Second Five-Year Plan >ras endorsed by- tho Kkticnal /.: :£rn.bly SLa Jbsm Wi approved by Resident Diem* Tm Plan calls Tor t&e te ^ 'of U5 billion piasters over the period 1962-1966 &ed ©ssphssisas tho d©ysloj5ma»$ of agrienlturo, public im I ^.&nd J* ista^Ta On 3 30 ihs Jfeilc 1 Am&ably appropriated an irdiiai 1*2 blllloea p tutors to finaiic-a the piaster costs of several proJ[dct0$ii3&fi0 of thca in the"hgriociltural sector

Second^ IVoildcnt Siem, Nations b

uiao p. „ —„ „ „„ ^^vwMgsu *-iam i-'iv(u;-j« w*« *'<n*MMiiJLU) x or

deficit financing by pointing cat that a developing nation normally experiences a budgetaary deficit,, tiUm referred to the necessity of raisin* the living standards of the rural population] and said that tho present, guaranteed minimus wage would be re-examined because of tho rise la tho cost of living. £Lti»ugh measures to implement now economic policies may not* be 'presented to tho National Assembly until its next regular session in April 1?63, Biem'a statements indicate a now awareness that-the trend of declining income among tha lowest income groups must he reversed This asrareness is enema-aging but, unless the addition*} Lneom* *ererated" by deficit financing in largely directed to the countryside end to tha lower income urban gwmps, the price rises resulting from deficit financing yill marely widen tha income gap which already exists and further alit late : tna peasants from the OK. ■ Moreover, the additional Income must be' " directed lo taa rural areas in such a way as to encourage agricultural 1 production. Stable and attractiva prices for farm products are the b< t and perhaps only means to accomplish this.

1 Wet Cong activities in South Vietnam can b 3 expected to h-vi a depressing effect on agricultural production, alt« t 3 r ' determinants will continue to be orioe tha 4»*+w \T ■ L

8H £ ClUdlllS % ™ f teffl=J ' -" -dleeSf ^rS^" factors however, are less Important with respect to rubber prod'eiton which provide,- south TLotaa'a largest single a™,rt p- £T«? £f' Eonth.3 enough August 196? rubber erodu«*?™ J,- •' v J .*? 8 olght b/ sorr.o 2 Sco r^+-\c\Z-\ Production on m 0 or plantations dsciined

7 d,500 metric tons as compared to 196l a a fungus disease effecting

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SECRET/mFORN - 2k -

" tha rubber trees *** partially *££»* g^* SttofcSfoSi and

impertant additional cause f% cl ^!XaS^e tawing on tho estates ' general *^+**££S%Z? S£/£^J58?£«* ^^ and extension ^Jfjj^^^^^ivonted it si*co 19&> from making needs arising from 2LT25SL to 5»»t of its rubber replanting 2g2 ^J^SSSSSSSi 5 Restates, there is little prospect gr^r^ov^oat in the rubber situation until security improves goner ally.

It can also-ho ejected that Viet Cong harassment will continue to totJtor?^ to* transport system, especially tho railroads. Eha

r,:!"* irrhfc oassengcr operations between Saigon and Hue on SS2^#«2£55JUi on any improvement to security but Sept^sDer i> vas ^ ^ "sabotage trains carrying passengers.

on toe ^f.^.f.t.ie also been due to the fact that additional revenues art SS£^^JTcFS. 10 Billion P iastor aontaly deficit on railway operations.

If President Diem's statements on October 1 are followed by the necessary measures to stimulate development of the agricunural sector in South Vietnam, which accounts for the employment of 80* of tto population, important steps will have boon taken not only to provide the peasantry ' with the motivation to side with the government but also to diroco economic

, ' development along tha lines most promising for tho economic tuturo of

Soxxth Vietnam, This will be particularly tho case if the GVN's economic devel opmonfc program also emphasizes industries utilizing domestically

, produced raw materiels, particularly agricultural ones, as well as those

that provide import substitutes but are based solely on imported raw mater iris.

■ *

In short, the G7N is showing a new arcarenass of tho necessity of direcii&g its attention to programs which will directly benefit tho rural population. It has not as yet put into effect any concrete measures to carry out its prcgrau Its actions in tha next six months to a year will indicate how deep its new-found conviction iff.

V* OUTLOOK

At foromunist Actions

■ There sean^ littlo prospect that tha Viet Cong will be able to achieve a take-over of South Vietnam by armed force during tho next year* The Communists ara obviously prepared for a long struggle. Even though the strengthened GVH response and increased US assistance have apparently necessitated sorao modification of plans, it is not likely that the Cormnmists will diminish their diversified campaign of guerrilla warfare,

f terrorism, and subversion* They can be expected to make every effort to

maintain, consolidate, and expand .their control of tha coitvtrvaidoj increase their overall armed strength, the number of organised fighting

i . units,* and tha percentage of hard-coro personnel in these units; improve

their weapons capability particularly against helicopters;'and increase

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

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their attaofcs against strategic har.ilsts. Acts of terroris% particularly against '&r.orleans, and sabotage* par ticuZUrly of trains and li^ortant installations, may veil increase to unprecedented proper t ions in an effort to tie doim more GWmilitary and seciarity forces and thus relieve the pressia:e against the Viet Con;

C

Hanoi can also be expected to continue to infiltrate personnel and raterial into South Vietnam r.nd has the capability to stop up infiltration, as the situation warrants^ vith relatively little danger of detection and no great difficulty. The W8*S capability is further enha&cad by the nature of the border terrain and the limited border-control capabilities of the South Vietnamese, Lao, and Cambodian gG\'ernmenta 4 H^we^er^ because of tactics! and strategic military end political considerations s Hanoi Kill probably continue to infiltrate elements primarily from the pool of regrouped South Vietnamese rather than from the Vietnamese Communist forces in Laos aoffi Of vjhom are believed to be North Viettta&3£3 or ToDkinese,

■

It is entirely possible that the Viet Cong v?DJ. step up its armed operations daring the next month or so with the advent of the dry season, in the belief that further military escalation is necessary in order to counter the growing response and effectiveness of the GV3J forces and U3 support. There are a number of indicators that support this ej^asctationj noserous earlier intelligence reports of Viet Gong"ragro^jpisant £ consolidation of forces; a slight increase in the ntnaber of armed incidents during roughly the last week of October; and two Viet Gong battalion-size attacks in the Mekong River delta area in late October and early Hbvemher 1962, the first since July 1962. Farther military escalation daring the next several months night involve the formation of regimental-siae units, including the transformation of some guerrilla units into conventional units with heavier weapons^ selected and simultaneous large attacks aeainst oneor more targets, including military installations and towns; establishment of "liberated areas" in South Vietnam) the ersailoa of ress-va baZZT in Communist-held areas in southern Laos; end UwrtS* l3l5£^ particularly if Coamunist forces in southern tS S pl^StdeqSte protection along infiltration routes. (It does not ajWlLelvSSt inspection by the International Control Commission in ilos JSlLSSLlt

Politica^aStSindl 5£52**5JK '&*&*?«* ^ ■

*VI1 make incr easod^ff or ts to ££*«£ tie St ^^ ?* Vlet *>«* ^d security units, recoup its psyXJogicS S^FS***? "? *** ' «* m general suhvert the GVtfs effort^ l^£^J&*&;

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* *

In urban areas, the Viet Cong wiH rely on terrorism, to Serialize the Xtilenry^ on increased propaganda end subversion to Umpire anti-SeW SnSrations and coup plots, encourage neutralist sentiment end

oppositionists and youth and labor grougS«

Outside South Vietnam, Hanoi will probably increr.se its diplomatic and propaganda effort, to gain support particularly among neutr^ nations for S «|ational Front for the Liberation of South Jftetnaja* (SFXS7). It aa7havt sons success in establishing "unofficial" relations between the Wm and Laotian and Cambodian leaders, in gaining support for the KPLSV amon* Vietnamese minorities in Lacs, Csmbodia, 1 and Thailand, and in persuadin" prominent Vietnamese eapatrtatea in France to suppor & a change of government in South Vietnam. In addition to advocating the reunification of Vietr i sooi and the WLSV can be expected to continue nronagaada support for the neutralisation of South Vietnam, Knraver, tne extent to which neutralisation is emphasised will depend on the course of the war in South Vietnam and the degree to which the concept is found to . appeal to the elements in and cuts ids South Vietnam, as well as on develoj • Bents in the Bloc itself*

The pattern of events relating to the creation end devalopmairt of * the Wi&V? as wall as tho pattern of CosmBunist political tactiea pad strategy in similar situations in other comtrtes in tho par>t^^indicates that Hanoi and tho Viet Cons are preparing the groundwork for tra imtox nation of the HB1S7 into a shadow or t? libc-u?ation govocmonV 3 In South Vietnam* However, it is exfeeemely difficult to predict when, tihatfcer.j or uadsr ^aat conditions this Kill occur* Hanoi might find it politically r.dv^ntjgGous to create c shadow government •under any one of the following circi vtr^ieoss during a period of internal political crisis in South Vietnam following a successful or near-successful, coup atteraptj during a period when there has been a series of i:ujor and drastic Viet COMg military scccegsesj during r> period of serious military cr diplomatic' reverses for the US in the Par Bsstj or at r- t^une >:hen several neutralist countries had given assistances of diplomatic recognition of a new "government* 3 in South TTietsam* Oader any clrcuisstancss, however, the decision voiud be considerably influenced by Moscow sad Fsiping raid their estimate of the general international situation*

B* QV1I Counter insurgency Effort

The elimination and even ths significant reduction of the ©sasaialst insurgency in South Vietnam will almost certainly require several years, Bswever, in addition to continuing IS assistance, a considerably greater effort by tha G¥B is crucial. Jxi effective strategic militaryapolitical concept for impleaentlng tho GTO counter insurgency plan has been developed and is now boing acted upon, and the armed and security forces have been enlarged and inprored. GY1J success will in large aeaswe depend on t^a manner and speed with which it continues to irroler^at this concept.

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- 27 ~

Ultimately, ho ^jr 5 t&e effectiveness o? Its iraplcir . it&tion will depend on the idllingnees of III era and his family to utilise fully the basic resources available to the G7N. Ihe GVN military leaders are anong the bpst in Sbs&east JUia sad the rank and file have the spirit &nd villiog^ ness to fight; ths 'civilian bureaucratic leadaarsjiip is strongly anti-(bnasainistj e^eia though its effectiveness continues to ba iiapeded by Inadequate delegation of autfcrltyj there are as yet no serious trends toward neutaLi3m or toward a political accomodation vith Hanoij sr-d finally, the ITletnaaiese pess&ntSj however politically apathetic and discontented tdth tke government, are by no means re^dy to surrender thesiselves to the Viet Ocmg, given greater effort by the govarn^nt to protect then £rom C nratst Intimidation said ircprovo their economic end political status*

Daring the mx& yo:r5 the OW probably mil not be able to halt completely the deteriorating security trends, let alone reverse the tide against the Viot Cong, unless Saigon significantly accelerates and improve its response to the inirorgency. itaong other things, the govern nfc leadership !•;. give much greater e-uphasis to political, social, end economic measures in i, orb of its:military op pitions, make a substantially greater offo

1

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end capabilities, including increased reliance on r... .Il~un5.t actions read

restriction of 1 t ^tical use of airpcrfer and artillery,, Rjilure to do

this will seriously-1 ' : n the -strategic hamlet program* partioularly

since the Viet Cong eon bo expected to stop up it* effori against the

program during the next year. Such failure will also greatly restrict th

particularly sssoisg the peasfchts a the needed greater sense of stake Jn &e gpvermmt's fortunes. Indeed, the continuation of such taction ae&sures as extensive use of airpo»er and crop destruction, however carefully controlled Kay veil contribute to ike development of militant opposition a , tfce ' peasants end positive identification with the Viet Co:

o -l2.

Progress egiinst the insurgents will probably remain diffievi t to evaluate accurately. There are many indicators on the br.sis of Weh Peeress can be jud^d} the more meaningful would aopear to be t^re"^i-

Jftrt Gong attacks, and Viet Cbng mapons leasee, shortages of food and J»f"ine, and defections. In this respect, a national program by X '

CTH to encourage Viet Cong defections, with the promise of fSrLeaLent of the defectors is long overdue and could be eaSreaslv °?f~^v?Z

SrafeJ? 1 2!£*~! -* •-«* Viet c^^i;; 10 ^ t S

on casualties, while helpful a3 an toSite afSi^^inl^de of"firfflSi should continue to be treated with extreme eauti^ JSES v ^f I1ST: ' oiil g*

undoubtedly iijclude masv c-nl ,> ^^V • p U/ boc ^° *^ .. supportor/of the Viet Cong': " ^^ P 8 ^^* 8 W ««««««

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- 28 -

C, The U3 Role

Ths cotffse of US-GYN relations Kill bo an Important element in the

a-

end assistance is th-3 controlling factor in Gf?H relations and attitudes toward tho U3» Daspit© considerable improvement in relations between the IB and the GVH during the past year or so 5 disagreements end frnstr tiono can bo expected to continue over a number of issues, including the Im*leB»niation of tho counterinsurgency plan and GVH relations with Laps and Car&odia,

Blein trill elrcosfc certainly continue to press for increased aid and remain adamant against a^y OS pressures upon him to delogato appreciably mora authority to his cabinet and military advisors or to expand tho political base of his government to any signIficc.nt c oefcent. Ebroovor, Khlle ho has Kalcoroad tho increased VS presence in South Vietnam and generally approved of tho activities of IB advisers in tho countryside, MLcra and hi* fciaily Kill continue to maintain & close Kateh over those activities in tho interests of protecting their anthoriiy. at tho local level. Diem and. particularly Ehu may also reiaain oxtrcrnaly rpluctant to accept possible " U3 proposers directed i d further intonation of tho strategic haraiot and systematic pacification programs or directed toicvrd substantially altering tho present balance between esaphasis on puroly miliary measure; to defeat tho Viot Cong and emphasis on political, social, and economic measures •

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Dion probably still has soma lingering suspicion of the extent of confidence in and support of his leadership. In -the event of another coup atterapt, Dion rould o^pect qnipk and strong manifestations of U3 support and Kould regard tho absence of SttcJi manifestations as demonstrating lack of VS confidence.

lie

SChere is considerable evidence that tho substantia increase in u5 presence in South fietnam has improved morale at all lords of tho G administration. Eolations between individual US advisers and tbeir ffis coimtcrp^ts especially at the local level have generally boon good and ctoGpi.o Vxot Cong propaganda efforts, have not resulted in any neticeab j

^ong th 8 probable m$ox considerations are tho fact that IS pdotmJ? «aite the French Ln tho past, are acting as advisors rather lm a7 ' afrr^* P&MU&W of an policy, and tho apparent wUlli-ness

tomt^parts, assisting i-oro hy example rathw than by persuasion

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29

a

D« Politic*! Situation

The fit-ability of the go' nmsttt during tka next year will continue to dapand principally on Diem* is fa&i&lfig of the internal security fiituatioru If Diem can demonstrate a continuing Inprcvamont -In security conditions^ ha should ba able to ^Deviate concern and boost rcor^le idthiii bis bureaucracy and military es&^lsbss&t, Bomvw, if tba figtyt against tho Viet Cong goes badly* if tha Viet Cong launches a scries of successful and'dramatic military operational or if South Viobnaaoso ansy casualties imr«ssa appreciably over a promoted period^ tha cfcsacas of & coup attempt against Biain could ineraasa atfestantially« Moreover, tha possibility of a conp attempt at a^y tfoaa cannot bo ©xctwlsda Ifesy "officials and oppositionists fool that^ despite tho govern -> & e military victor iss and improved military cay Abilities aad ihitiattvaj tha GVIT ia not winning tha ttar principally basalt a of Dlom-3 virtiml cir-.: i rula and his failure to follow through with tho political and.jsS&aomio m nacosssry to gain tha support of tho peasant?

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It is moro difficult now than at zmj tint* sinco tho crisis in South Vietnam bagaii in lata X9>9 "to eattaata raXiably tho dopants that wraOLd bo Btost likely to praoipitata a co^p atteeot 5 tha prospects for tho auocesa of a coup attempt, or tho effects of such an attempt on intomal stability and on tha coimtarkisixrgoney effort itself 9 frying tha past year 02 so* tho Viet Gong presumably has improved its ability to initiate a ootzp and ■kigfat attarapt to do so, Bbi*aver s the Viet Goi2g probably i;ould not ba abl3 to oarsy out £ successful Gotsp 3 £>n& tho odds that it could gain co&teoi of a soccassftil coup, although somanfaat bettor than last y©ar s appear to ba less than ovon.

Hid coup most likely to succeed vould be ©na vith non-Ccauiaualet

tha govaassmaat* 32ha aborfciva coup attempt in Kbveaab&r i960 &v>d tho

f uuw " "» »«^«aaitv 1 y x«i- oowap praxmmian and broader poa?tieixstloa ' tha Silltsry. Any furburo iKja-CesBEniai^t ec-ap grot® probably would Sot b» as deficient to this reqpet and its laadara, uallfca tha leaders o?19&

coup

aaans certain,' a major polarization of tha G71J military loadvriifn * M +.

coup gad anti-coup groups doos not appear likely **"™M» into

?*?f Dl; T, ol °?* *° ^""a 1 ? weeraiited at tela outsat

m giv.3 their tacit or active

coup od anti-coup groups doos not appear likely. Most of ««» ^ald apparently did in fcn** lc£o, J vouWtS"* ** "^ "^ ^ ***

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Dlora's removal — i&&thar by a military coup^ assassination, or death tram ^ecidsntal or natural esusos -- vould probably considerably strengthen tho potto? of tho military* Tho odds apponr about evan bctueon a govcrrjn&nt loci by a military jEata or by Vico President Tho, with tho erffijr^ in tho latter cassij playing a major If not tho predominant rolo behind tho scenzs* On tho o:io hand, tfaa military might conciiido that a milita3*3r-l©d government vonld bo bettor abla to laalntaln national unity and iatfearaal political cohesion &n& s more importantly, to conduct a doterminod and effective campaign against the Viot Cong* On tho other hand^ they night eoncl\ui? thnt 23io, i^ho apparently has boon on good terms with soma of ths present top military loaders, K>nld not disagree with their vio^s on tho maimer of conducting tho fight against tho CoTfLr^nists and that his constitutional succssaioaa iroDld legalize the change in goveriBaant and possibly avert a sorious povror struggle, (Although Biota 1 s brothors^ Em and Can 5 viould probably also bo removed by a coup > If Blsm loft tho scone for other reasons his brothers Bight attempt to retain roal politic?! power*) In any ovont, a govornmsnt led by tha military, by Tho, or by any* other civilian approved by tho military ■•Jould probably maintain South Viotna^s pro-CS orientation*

■

If there is a sorious disruption of govor;: iaant leadership as a result of a military coup or as a result of Dicm's death, aiy ncaiantiOB

fail

IXndsr most of tho foreseeable circumstances involving a coup tho rolo of tho 05 would bo extremely torpor t ant. Although this"is by no means certain, US military raid intelligence officials might well have advance notice of an kapeading coup and might bo able to restrain tha eovo plotters from precipitous action. Evon if unable to restrain .such action hoover, tB officials night have greater success in averting widespread

*rt£S 21!, * i0 2 ET* f^TS* l hiCh wuld lo * d to ^ccssivo blood-shea and weaken the front, against tho Viet Cong. She US could -l^n h*

helpful to achieving agreement aaong the coup loader's as to ^olLu^d h^d

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CONTROLLED DISSEM

N1E 53-63 17 April 1963

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1964 FEB 15 11 07

CFf SECY OF DEFENSE

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

NUMBER 53-63 ■ • • (Supersedes NIE 14.3/53-61)

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Submitted by the

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

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UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

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17 APRIL 1963

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PROSPECTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM

THE PROBLEM ' ' * * '

To assess the situation and prospects in South Vietnam, with special emphasis upon the military and political factors most likely to affect the counterinsurgency effort.

CONCLUSIONS ' " '

A. We believe that Communist progress has been blunted and that the situation is improving. Strengthened South Vietnamese capabilities axid effectiveness, and particularly US involvement, are causing the Viet Cong increased difficulty, although there are as yet no persuasive indications that the Communists have been grievously hurt. (Paras. 27-28)

B. We believe the Communists will continue to wage a war of attrition, hoping for some break in the situation which will lead to victory. They evidently hope that a combination of military pressure and political deterioration will in time create favorable circumstances either* for delivering a coup de grace or for a political settlement which will enable them to continue the struggle on more favorable terms. We believe it unlikely, especially in view of the open US commitment, that the North Vietnamese regime will either resort to overt military attack or introduce acknowledged North Vietnamese military units into the south in an effort to win a quick victory. (Paras. 29-31)

C. Assuming no great increase in external support to the Viet Cong, changes and improvements which have occurred during the past year now indicate that the Viet Cong can be contained militarily and that further progress can be made in expanding the area of government control and in creating greater security in the countryside. However, we do not believe that it is pos-

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sible at this time to project the future course of the war with any confidence. Decisive campaigns have yet to be fought and no quick and easy end to the war is in sight. Despite South Vietnamese progress, the situation remains fragile. (Para. 32)

D. Developments during the last year or two also show some promise of resolving the political weaknesses, particularly_that i of insecurity hi the. countryside, upon which tlie^iiisurgency has_fed. However, the government's capacity to embark upon the broader measures required to translate military success into lasting political stability is questionable. (Paras. 33-35)

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•

TO?

THE.WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SECRET •' ' June 25, 1963

NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO." 249

j- :. -\ f . '

•TO:! " The Secretary of State M . • ".'*-;* ■' ■ '

. The Secretary of Defense*^ • / •' •

y "• " The Director, Central Intelligence Agency " . . ". ■. ^>

\* . The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff # ^

SUBJECT: Laos Planning ' • ' « V ' -fV.

• i

1. At a meeting on June 19, 1963 the President considered the Memorandum addressed to him from the Department of State dated June 17, 1963 ("Memorandum"). ' •-.-:•-,

2. The President approved Phase 1 of the plan outlined in the Memo-randurn and authorized that the steps outlined therein might be taken at such time and in such manner as the appropriate officials concerned might direct.

*

l \^ J ■ 3- The President directed the Department of State to consult with the L/ . 4 French and British before initiating any action under the Memorandum.

- He wished to obtain their suggestions for action in Laos in light of the deteriorating situation there.

■ *

, 4. The President approved Phase 2 of the Memorandum for planning purposes, but directed that none of the steps outlined in Phase 2 be ",\ ' put into final execution until after further consultation with him.

* •

■5. The President directed that the steps described in Phase 3 of the Memorandum be further refined and reviewed; and he asked that the question be explored whether additional U. S. actions should be taken in Laos before any actior^be directed against North Vietnam",

.

,*

Carl Kays en

; Copies furnished: Governor Karriman

' General McKee . *•' " Mr. Colby

General Clay-

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*: .*;Hilsman:mk

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/Aemorcsnd'jm of Conversation FOR THE RECORD

Q

Situation in South Viet-Nam

3

. July 4, IS}/ TIME: 11: uO to 11: 50 a. ra, . PLACE: The White House

PARTICIPANTS:

COPIES TO:

The President

Mr, BaU

Mr. Earriman

Mr. MeGeorge Bandy

Mr. Hilsmaa .

Mr, Forres tal

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— • - ■ —

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The President was briefed on developments in Indonesia, Laos and ^

Viet-Nam. The portion en Viet-Nam follows:

■

A joint agreement was signed on June 18 in which the Government nut the Buddhists 4 five demands. The Buddhists and the Government then worked together on the funeral arrangements for the bonze who burned himself to death so that incidents could be avoided. The funeral came off without trouble.

>

Since then there have been rumors circulating in Saigon that the Government does not intend to live uj to the agreement. These rumors were given credence by an article appearing in the English language "Times' 1 of Viet-K&m, which is dominated by the JEflxoa. The article contained a veiled attack on the US and on the Buddhists. There v/as a suggestion that file Monk who burned himself, to death was dragged and a provocative challenge to the Buddhists that, if no further demonstrations occurred on July 2, this would amount to an admission oj the Buddhists that they were satisfied with the Governments -action, {The President injected questions on the possibility of drugging, to which ^H Mr. Hilsman replied that religious fervor v/as an adequate explanation.)

At this point there was a discussion of the possibility of retting rid of ^ the Nhus in which the combined judgment v/as that it would not be possible, A /A* ■

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Continuing the briefing, Mr. Hilsman said that the Buddhists contained an activist element which undoubtedly favored increasing demands as v/oll as charging the Government with dragging its feet. There was thus an element of truth In Diera's view that the Buddhists might push their demands so far as to make his fall inevitable.

During these events the US had put extremely heavy pressure on Diem to take political actions. Most recently we had'urged Diem to make a speech which w-^uld include announcements that he intended to meet with Buddhist leaders, permit Buddhist chaplains In the army and so on. If Diem did not make such a speech and there were further demonstrations, the US could be compelled publicly to disassociate itself from the GVIVs Buddhist policy. Mr. Hilsman reported that Diem had received this approach with what seemed to be excessive politeness but had said he would consider maldno such a speech.

■ *

Dor estimate was that no matter what Diem did there will be coup attempts over the next four months. Whether or not any of these attempts will be successful Is impossible to say.

*

Mr. Hilsman said that everyone agreed that the chances of chaos in the wake of a coup are considerably less than they were a year ago. An encouraging sign, relative to this point is that the war between the Vietnamese forces and the Viet Cong has been pursued throughout the Buddhist crisis without noticeable let-up.

At this point lar, Forrestal reported on General Krulak's views that, -even if there were chaos in Saigon, the military units in the field would continue-to confront the Communists,

Mr. Hilsman went on to say that Ambassador Inciting believes that foe most likely result of a coup attempt that succeeded in killing Diem was civil war. Mr. Hilsman disagreed with tills view slightly in that he thought civil war wag not the most likely result but that it was certainly a possible result.

The timing of Ambassador Kolting's return and Ambassador Lodge's assumption of duty was then discussed. The Presidents initial view was that.. Ambassador Bolting should return immediately and that Ambassador Lccre should assume his duties as soon thereafter as possible. The President volunteered that Ambassador Molting had done an outstanding job, that it was almost miraculous the way he had succeeded in turning the war around from the

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disastrously lovr point la relations between Diem and ourselves that existed v/hen Ambassador Kolting took: over, Mr, Hilsmaii pointed out the personal sacrifices that Ambassador Halting had been forced to make during this period, and the President said that he hoped a way could be found to commend Ambassador Halting publicly so as to snake clear the fine job he had done and that he hoped an appropriate position could be found for him in Washington so that he could gStre his children a suitable home in the years immediately ahead. ~

:•

The President's decision was to delegate the authority to decide on the timing of Ambassador Koltin-j's return to the Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs; that Ambassador Ledge should report to Washington no later , than July 15 so that he could take the Coimterinsurgency Course simultaneously with the normal briefings for an ambassador; and that Ambassador Lcclce should arrive in Saigon as soon as possible following completion of the CI Course on August 14. Arrangements v/ere made for Ambassador Holting to see the President at 4:00 p.m. on I.loaday, July 8. • ' ••'

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CONTROLLED DISSEM

CASE FILE'COPY

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RETURN TO DIAbC-l

SNIE 53-2-63 10 July 1963

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SPECIAL

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

NUMBER 53-2-63

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10 JULY 1963

CONTROLLED DISSEM

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THE SITUATION

IN, SOUTH VIETNAM

.-

SCOPE NOTE

NIE 53-63, "Prospects in South Vietnam," dated 17 April 1933 was particularly concerned with the progress of the counterin-surgency effort, and with the military and political factors most likely to affect that effort. The primary purpose of the present SNIE is to examine the implications of recent developments in South Vietnam for the stability of the country, the viability of the Diem regime, and its relationship with the US.

CONCLUSIONS

A. The Buddhist crisis in South Vietnam has highlighted and intensified a widespread and longstanding dissatisfaction with the Diem regime and its style of government. If—as is likely— Diem fails to carry out truly and promptly the commitments he has made to the Buddhists, disorders will probably flare again and the chances of a coup or assassination attempts against him will become better than even. (Pci7*as. 4, 14)

B. The Diem regime's underlying uneasiness about the extent of the US involvement in South Vietnam has been sharpened by the Buddhist affair and the firm line taken by the US. This attitude will almost certainly persist and further pressure to reduce the US presence in the country is likely. (Paras. 10-12).

* C, Thus far, the Buddhist issue has not been effectively exploited by the Communists, nor does it appear to have had any appreciable effect on the counterinsurgency effort. We do not think Diem is likely to be overthrown by a Communist coup. Nor do we think the Communists would necessarily profit if he were overthrown by some combination of his non-Communist opponents. A non-Communist successor regime might be initially less effective against the Viet Cong, but, given continued support from the US, could provide reasonably effective leadership for the government and the war effort. (Paras. 7, 15-17)

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DISCUSSION

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I. INTRODUCTION

• -* " * *

- 1. The two chief problems which have faced the Government of South Vietnam (GVN) since its birth in 1954 have been: (a) to forge the institutions and loyalties necessary to Vietnam's survival as an independent nation, and (b) to counter the menace of Hanoi's subversive Grid aggressive designs—pursued since 1960 by & campaign of widespread guerrilla warfare. In attempting to cope with these problems, the GVN has been hampered by its lack of confidence in and its inability to engage the understanding and support of a considerable portion of the Vietnamese people—including large segments of the educated classes and the peasantry. In recent weeks these inadequacies and tensions in the South Vietnamese body politic have been further revealed and intensified. . ..;

II. THE BUDDHIST AFFAIR

2. President Diem, his family, and a large proportion of the top

leaders of the regime are Roman Catholics, in a population that is 70

■to 80 percent Buddhist. The regime has clearly accorded preferential

treatment to Catholics in its employment practices and has favored the Catholic Church. But there have been no legal restrictions on religious freedom and, until recently, most Buddhists appeared passive in their response to the privileged institutional position occupied by the Catholic Church. There have, however, been various administrative discriminations against the Buddhists, though these may have resulted as much from thoughtlessness or misplaced zeal on the part of minor officials as from conscious GVN policy. These have obviously created an undercurrent of resentment, as is evidenced by the extent and intensity of the recent outbreaks.

3. In April 1963, the GVN ordered its provincial officials to enforce a longstanding but generally ignored edict regulating the public display of religious flags. As it happened, this order was issued just prior to Buddha's birthday (8 May), a major Buddhist festival, and just after Papal flags had been prominently flown during a series of officially encouraged celebrations commemorating the 25th anniversary of the ordination of Ngo dinh Thuc, Diem's brother, the Archbishop of Hue. A protest demonstration developed in Hue on 3 May, which was dispersed by fire from a Civil Guard unit. In the ensuing melee several persons were killed, including some children. The GVN has blamed the deaths on Viet Cong terrorists despite evidence to the contrary, and its subsequent stiff-necked handling of this incident and its aftermath has sparked a national crisis. The Buddhists, hith-

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erto disorganized and nonprotesting, have shown considerable cohesion and force—enough to elicit a set of "compromise" agreements from President Diem on 16 June. Moreover, the fact that' the Buddhist leaders have been able to challenge the government openly without evoking serious government retaliation has presumably given them considerable" confidence. • i

- 4* For the moment, the Buddhist movement remains under the effective control of moderate bonzes who have refused to accept support from or countenance cooperation with any of Diem's political opponents, Communist or non-Communist, and appear to be trying to insure that the Buddhists live up to their part of the bargain. This leadership gave the GVN a period of grace (which expired about the end of June) in which to show that it was moving in good faith to carry out its undertakings, failing which protests would resume. So far. there have been no further demonstrations, but the Buddhist leadership is clearly restive.

5. Despite Buddhist restraint in the political exploitation of the affair, it has obvious political overtones. It has apparently aroused widespread popular indignation and could well become a focal point of general disaffection with the Diem government. It provides an issue" on which most of Diem's non-Communist opponents (even including

- some Catholics) can .find common ground of agreement. There is considerable evidence that the issue itself and, even more, the Diem family's handling of it to date has occasioned restiveness at virtually all levels of the GVN's military and civil establishments, both of whose lower and middle echelons are largely staffed by Buddhists. In some cases, civil servants seem to have ignored or tempered GVN instructions, superiors have on occasion evade'd their assigned task "of propounding the official GVN line to their subordinates, and information on impending government actions has obviously leaked to Buddhist leaders. In any case, recent developments are causing many GVN oificials to reexamine their relations with and the limits of their loyalty to the Diem

. regime; there is accumulating evidence of serious disaffection and coup plotting in high military and civilian circles.

6. The Buddhist affair appears to have given considerable heart to the various non-Communist political opposition splinter groups in and

'out of South Vietnam. There also appears to be a growing feeling amono- former supporters of the regime that Diem's position may have been permanently and dangerously impaired. Thus far, however, we have no evidence that the diverse opposition groups have been able to form hew or effective alliances with one another. • . .

7.. The Buddhist issue would appear to be an obvious windfall for the Communists, but so far there is no evidence that they have been

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able to exploit it effectively. They" may have penetrated the Buddhist clergy to some extent, but are not presently exerting any discernible influence, despite the suggestions to the contrary in GVN pronouncements. To date the Buddhist crisis docs not appear to have had any appreciable effect on the continuing counterinsurgency effort, though the morale and efficiency of the GVN's military and civil forces are likely to be impaired if the issue is prolonged,

- 8, The Buddhist crisis has also hurt the GVN internationally, with potentially important effects upon the future success of US policy towards southeast Asia. Protests are growing in other predominantly Buddhist countries, with the implication that US action could help resolve the crisis. Cambodia and Ceylon have made representations to the UN and more may "be forthcoming. In other countries, including the US, the crisis has given new stimulus to criticism of US policy on the grounds that the US is supporting an oppressive and unrepresentative regime.

9. The future course of the Buddhist affair will be largely determined by the GVN's actions in the near term. It is likely that the issues recently raised can be resolved if the GVN executes its portion of the negotiated bargain. However, politically .sophisticated segments of South Vietnamese society, Buddhists included, are mindful of Diem's past practice of often using negotiations as a stall for time and of making promises in order to weather an immediate crisis. The real danger in the present situation is that Diem may be tempted to employ such tactics which have served him well in the past but could prove disastrous if essayed this time. If demonstrations should be resumed, they would probably assume an increasingly political cast, and less-moderate Buddhist leadership would be likely to come to the fore. Public order would be threatened. In particular, we cannot be sure how various army or police units would react if ordered to fire on demonstrations headed by Buddhist bonzes.

III. THE EFFECT OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS ON US-GVN RELATIONS

10. The GVN has always shown some concern over the implications of US involvement in South Vietnamese affairs and from time to. time has felt moved to restrict US activities and presence in South Vietnam. This attitude springs partly from legitimate, if hypersensitive, concern for the appearance as well as the fact of Vietnam's recently acquired sovereignty. To a considerable degree, however, it springs from the Diem government's suspicion of US intentions toward it, and from its belief that the extensive US presence is setting in motion political forces which could eventually threaten Dicm's political primacy.

11. The Buddhist affairs erupted at one of these periods of GVN sensi-tivity, and the strain lias been aggravated by subsequent events. The

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GVJNTs initial handling of the issue gave the US ground for serious embarrassment and concern which, in turn, produced a succession of forceful US demarches. The Diem family has bitterly resented these US actions and may well feel that the Buddhist protests were at least indirectly due to the US presence. Under the circumstances, further pressure to reduce that presence is likely.

I

12. A key role in this regard will be played by Diem's brother, Ngo

dinli Nhu. He has always been Diem's chief political lieutenant, but the years since 1954 have witnessed a steady accretion of Nhu's personal power and authority—an accretion due partly to circumstance and primarily to deliberate effort on Nhu's part. Nhu has political ambitions of his own and almost certainly envisages himself as his brother's successor. For a variety of reasons, Nhu has long privately viewed the -US with some hostility and suspicion. American criticism of the GVN has especially irritated Nhu, for he is aware that he and his wife are often its primary targets. Above all, Nhu almost certainly doubts whether the support which the US has given to his brother would be transferred to him.

13. In the negotiations with the Buddhists, Nhu urged his brother to take a firm line and is, by his own statement, wholly out of sympathy with the concessions made. On the basis of past performance, \vc think it unlikely that he will help to implement the settlement; his influence on- Diem will be rather in the direction of delaying and hedging on commitments, a tendency to which Diem himself is already disposed. This will be the more likely since not only the Nhus and Diem, but also his brothers Archbishop Thuc and Ngo dinh Can, the political boss of the central provinces, obviously continue to doubt the legitimacy of Buddhist complaints and to underestimate the intensity of the crisis.

IV. THE OUTLOOK

14. If the Diem government moves effectively to fulfil its 16 June commitments, much of the resentment aroused by the Buddhist controversy could be allayed. However, even if relations between the GVN and the Buddhists are smoothed over, the general discontent with the Diem regime which the crisis has exacerbated and brought to the fore is likely to persist. Further, if—as is probable—the regime is dilatory, inept, and insincere in handling Buddhist matters, there will probably be renewed demonstrations, and South Vietnam will probably remain in a state of domestic political tension. Under these circumstances, the chances of a non-Communist assassination or coup attempt against Diem will be better than even. We cannot exclude the possibility of an attempted Communist coup, but a Communist attempt will have appreciably less likelihood of success so long as the majority of the

'government's opponents and critics remain—as they are now—alert to the Communist peril.

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15. The chances of a non-Communist coup—and of its success—would become greater in the event renewed GVN/Buddhist confrontation should lead to large-scale demonstrations in Saigon. More or less prolonged riot and general disorder would probably result—-v.ith the security forces confused over which side to support. Under such circumstances, a small group, particularly one with prior contingency plans for such an eventuality, might prove able to topple the government. Conversely, a continued or resumed truce between the GVN and the Buddhists would serve to reduce the likelihood of such an overthrow.

•

16. Any attempt to remove Diem will almost certainly be directed against Nhu as well, but should Nhu survive Diem, we are virtually certain that he would attempt to gain power—in the first instance probably by manipulating the constitutional machinery. We do not believe that Nhu's bid would succeed, despite the personal political base he has sought to build through the Republican Youth (of which he is the. overt, uniformed head), the strategic hamlet program (whose directing Inter-ministerial Committee he chairs), and in the army. He and his wife have become too much the living symbols of all that is disliked in the present regime for Nhu's personal political power to long outlive his brother. There might be a struggle with no little violence, but enough of the army would almost certainly move to take charge of the situation, either rallying behind the constitutional successor to install Vice President Tho or backing another non-Communist civil leader or a military junta.

17. A non-Communist successor regime might prove no more effective than Diem in fighting the Viet Cong; indeed at least initially it might well prove considerably less effective, and the counterinsurgency effort would probably be temporarily disrupted. However, there is a reasonably large pool of under-utilized but experienced and trained manpower not only within the military and civilian sectors of the present government but also, to some extent, outside. These elements, given continued support from the US, could provide reasonably effective leadership for the government and the war effort.

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STATE TO LODGE

BEF: CAS 265 - TAB E

State 316, 320 & 329 TAB B

It is now clear that whether military proposed martial law or whether Nhu tricked them into it, Nhu took advantage of its imposition to smash pagodas with police and Tung's Special Forces loyal to him, thus placing onus on military in eyes of world and Vietnamese people. Also clear that Nhu has maneuvered himself into commanding position.

US Government cannot tolerate situation in "which power lies in Nhu T s hands. Diem must be given chance to rid himself of Nhu and his coterie and replace them with best military and political personalities available*

If, in spite of all of your efforts, Diem remains obdurate and refuses, then we must face the possibility that Diem himself cannot be preserved.

We now believe immediate action must be taken to prevent Nhu from consolidating his position further. Therefore, unless you in consultation with Harkins perceive overriding objections you are authorized to proceed along following lines:

(1) First, we must press on appropriate levels of GVN following line:

(a) USG cannot accept actions against Buddhists taken by Nhu and his collaborators under cover martial law.

(b) Prompt dramatic actions redress situation must be taken, including repeal of decree 10, release of arrested monks, nuns, etc.

(2) We must at same time also tell key military leaders that US would find it impossible to continue support GVN militarily and economically unless above steps are taken immediately which we recognize requires removal of Nhus from the scene. We wish give Diem reasonable opportunity to remove Nhus, but if he remains obdurate, then we are prepared to accept the obvious implication that we can no longer support Diem. You may also tell appropriate military commanders we will give them direct support in any interim period of breakdown central government mechanism.

(3) We recognize the necessity of removing taint on military for pagoda raids and placing blame squarely on _Nhu. You are authorized to have such statements made in Saigon as you consider desirable to achieve this objective. We are prepared to take same line here and to have Voice of America make statement along lines contained in next numbered telegram whenever you give the word, preferably as soon as possible.

Concurrentlyj with above, Ambassador and country team should urgently examine all possible alternative leadership and make detailed plans as to how we might bring about Diem's replacement if this should become necessary.

■

Assume you will consult with General Harkins re any precautions necessary protect American personnel during crisis period.

You will understand that we cannot from Washington give you detailed instructions as to how this operation should proceed, but you will also know we will back you to the hilt on actions you take to achieve our objectives.

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Needless to say we have held knowledge of this telegram to minimum essential people and assume you will take similar precautions to prevent premature leaks.

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STATE 272 (EEF: Saigon 375 - TAB B) STATE TO LODGE AND HARKINS

1. Highest level meeting noon today reviewed your 375 and reaffirmed basic course. Specific decisions follow:

2. In response to your recommendation. General Harkins is hereby authorized to repeat to such Generals as you indicate the messages previously transmitted by CAS officers. He should stress that the USG supports the movement to eliminate the Nhus from the government, but that before arriving at specific understandings with the Generals, General Harkins must know who are involved, resources available to them and overall plan for coup. The USG will support a coup which has good chance of succeeding but plans no direct involvement of U.S. armed forces. Harkins should state that he is prepared to establish liaison with the coup planners and to review plans, but will not engage directly in joint coup planning.

3. Question of last approach to Diem remains undecided and separate personal message from Secretary to you develops our concern and asks your comment.

k. On movement of U.S. forces, we do not expect to make any announcement or leak at present and believe that any later decision to publicize such movements should be closely connected to developing events on your side. We cannot of course prevent unauthorized disclosures or speculation, but we will in any event knock down any reports of evacuation.

5. You are hereby authorized to announce suspension of aid through Diem government at a time and under conditions of your choice. In deciding upon the use of this authority, you should consider importance of timing and managing announcement so as to minimize appearance of collusion with Generals and also to minimize danger of unpredictable and disruptive reaction by existing government. We also assume that you will not in fact use this authority unless you think it essential, and we see it as possible that Harkins' approach and increasing process of cooperation may provide assurance Generals desire. Our own view is that it will be best to hold this authority for use in close conjunction with coup, and not for present encouragement of Generals, but decision is yours.

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I J v (EEF: Saigon 375 - TAB B)

29 Aug I963

Xt

Deeply appreciate your 375 which was a most helpful clarification. We fully understand enormous stakes at issue and the heavy responsibilities which you and Harkins will be carrying in the days ahead and we want to do everything possible from our end to help*

Purpose of this message is to explore further question of possible attempt to separate Diem and the Nhus. In your telegram you appear to treat Diem and the Nhus as a single package whereas we had indicated earlier to the Generals that if the Nhus were removed the question of retaining Diem would be up to them. My own personal assessment is (and this is not an instruction) that the Nhus are by all odds the greater part of the problem in Vietnam, internally, internationally and for American public opinion. Perhaps it is inconceivable that the Nhus could be removed without taking Diem with them or without Diem's abandoning his post. In any event, I would appreciate your comment on whether any distinction can or should be drawn as between Diem and Counsellor and Madame Nhu.

The only point on which you and General Harkins have different views is whether an attempt should be made with Diem to eliminate the Nhus and presumably take other steps to consolidate the country behind a winning effort against the Viet Cong. My own hunch, based in part on the report of Kattenburg ! s conversations with Diem is that such an approach could not succeed if it were cast purely in terms of persuasion. Unless such a talk included a real sanction, such as a threatened withdrawal of our support, it is unlikely that it would be taken completely seriously by a man who may feel that we are inescapably committed to an anti-Communist Vietnam. But if a sanction were used in such a conversation, there would be a high risk that this would be taken by Diem as a sign that action against him and the Nhus was imminent and he might as a minimum move against the Generals or even take some quite fantastic action such as calling on North Vietnam for assistance in expelling the Americans.

It occurs to me, therefore, that if such an approach were to be made it might properly await the time when others were ready to move immediately to constitute a new government. If this be so, the question then arises as to whether an approach to insist upon the expulsion of the Nhus should come from Americans rather than from the Generals themselves. This might be the means by which the Generals could indicate that they were prepared to dist: iguish between Diem and the Nhus. In any event, were the Generals to take tnis action it would tend to protect succeeding Vietnam administrations from the charge of being wholly American puppets subjected to whatever anti-American sentiment is inherent in so complex a situation.

I would be glad to have your further thoughts on these points as well as your views on whether further talks with Diem are contemplated to continue your opening discussions with him. You will have received formal instructions on other matters through other messages. Good luck.

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Present:

The Vice President Secretary £t»i$k Secretary McNamara Mr. Gilpatric Mr. Bundy General Taylor M*r. Marrow

G^riorkl Carter Mr« Holm 3 Mr, Colby -Ambassador HoUin.j Mr. Hilomar* Mr. KaUcnhur^ General ECrul&k

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1. Secretary Husk stated that, in his judgement, \to were back to whore we? were about ^'edn&sdMy of luttt \v«ck| and this c;*uccu him to go back to the original problem and ask what in th© situation t«td %is to think well of a coup. Ruling out h&tred ci" the Nhus, he c&id # thgr* would appear to be three things:

ct. The things thSsx the Nhus hr.cl done or supported f which tended to upset the GYM intarnslly,

. b. The things th^t thoy had dono which h:id an sdverco ex*

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, Lodge* g suggestion In hie mess^e of today (Saigon 391) r.nd ccter-cnine what uhepM are required to r«-gtrd solidarity in Sot^lh Vic^tc^cn - £uch aw linprov^Dient In condition a concerning otudento aad liud-dhitit* and ihc possible departure ^f Madame Nhu. Vu? cr.id that wo should determine whtit additional tne?iRuros are needed to improve

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the international situation - such as problems affecting Cambodia -and to improve the Vietnamese position wherein U.S. public opinion is concerned. He then said that he is reluctant to start off by saying now that Khu has to go; that it is unrealistic.

•

3* Mr. McNamara stated that he favored the above proposals of , the Secretary of State, with one additional step - that is to establish quickly and firmly our line of communication between Lodge, Harkins and the GVU. He pointed out that at the moment our channels of communication are essentially broken and that they should be reinsti-tuted at all costs.

k. Mr. Rusk added that we must do our best not to permit Diem to decapitate his military command in light of its obviously adverse effect on the prosecution of the war. At this point he asked if anyone present had any doubt in his mind but that the coup was off.

5. Mr. Kattehburg said that he had some remaining doubt; that we have not yet sent the generals a strong enough message; that the BOA statement regarding the withdrawal of aid was most important,

but that we repudiated it too soon. He stated further that the group should take note of the fact that General Harkins did not carry out his instructions with respect to communication with the generals. Mr. Rusk interrupted Kattenburg to state that, to the contrary, he believed Harkins' conduct was exactly correct in light of the initial response which he received from General Kheim (they were referring to Harkins 1 report in MACV 1583).

6. Mr. Hilsman commented that, in his view, the generals are not now going to move unless they are pressed by a revolt from below. In this connection Ambassador Wolting warned that in the uncoordinated Vietnamese structure anything can happen, and that while an organized successful coup is out, there might be small flurries by irresponsible dissidents at any time.

?• Mr. Hilsman undertook to present four basic factors which bear directly on the problem confronting the U.S. now. They are, in his view:

a. The mood of the people, particularly the middle level officers, non-commissioned officers and middle level bureaucrats, who are most restive. Mr. McNamara interrupted to

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state that he had seen no evidence of this and General Taylor commented that he had seen none either, but would like to see such evidence as Hilsman could produce, Mr, Kattehburg commented that the middle level officers and bureaucrats are uniformly critical of the government, to which Mr. McNaraara commented that if this is indeed the fact we should know about it,

b. The second basic factor, as outlined by Hilsman, was what effect will be felt on our programs elsewhere in Asia if we acquiesce to a strong Nhu-dominated government. In this connection, he reported that there is a Korean study now underway on just how much repression the United States will tolerate before pulling out her aid. Mr. McNamara stated that he had not seen this study and would be anxious to have it.

c« The third basic factor is Mr. Nhu, his personality and his policy. Hilsman recalled that Nhu has once already launched an effort aimed at withdrawal of our province advisors and stated that he is sure he is in conversation with the French, He gave, as supporting evidence, the content of an intercepted message, which Mr. Bundy asked to see. Ambassador Nolting expressed the opinion that Nhu will not make a deal with Ho Chi Minh on Ho r s terms.

d. The fourth point is the matter of U«S. and world opinion, Hilsman stated that this problem was moving to a political and diplomatic plane. Part of the problem, he said, is the press, which concludes incorrectly that we have the ability to change the things in Vietnam of which they are critical. To this Mr. Murrow added that this problem of press condemnation

is now worldwide. !

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8. Mr. Kattenburg stated that as recently as last Thursday it I was the belief of Ambassador Lodge that, if we undertake to live with this repressive regime, with its bayonets at every street corner: and its transparent negotiations with puppet bonzes, we are going to be thrown out of the country in six months. He stated that at this juncture it would be better for us to make the decision to get out honorably. He went on to say that, having been acquainted with Diem for ten years, he was deeply disappointed in him, saying that he will not separate from his brother. It was Kattenburg f s view that Diem will get very little support from the military and, as time goes on, he will get less and less support and the country will go steadily down hill.

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9. General Taylor asked what Kattenburg meant when he said that we would be forced out of Vietnam within six months. Kattenburg replied that in from six months to a year, as the people see we are losing the war, they will gradually go to the other side and we will be obliged to leave. Ambassador Nolting expressed general disagreement with

Mr. Kattenburg* He said that the unfavorable activity which motivated Kattenburg r s remarks was confined to the city and, while city support of Diem is doubtless less now, it is not greatly so. He said that it is improper to overlook the fact that we have done a tremendous job toward winning the Vietnam war, working with this same imperfect, annoying government.

10. Mr. Kattenburg added that there is one new factor - the population, which was in high hopes of expelling the Nhus after the VOA announcement regarding cessation of aid; now, under the heel of Nhu's military repression, they would quickly lose heart.

11. Secretary Rusk commented that Kattenburg 1 s recital was largely speculative; that it would be far better for us to start on the firm basis of two things - that we will not pull out of Vietnam until the war is won, and that we will not run a coup. Mr. McHamara expressed agreement

with this view.

12; Mr. Rusk then said that we should present questions to Lodge which fall within these parameters. He added that he believes we have good proof that we have been winning the war, particularly the contrast between the first six months of 1962 and the first six months of 1963. He then asked the Vice President if he had any contribution to make.

13. The Vice President stated that he agreed with Secretary Rusk's conclusions completely; that he had great reservations himself with respect to a coup, particularly so because he had never really seen a* genuine alternative to Diem. He stated that from both a practical and a political viewpoint, it would be a disaster to pull out; that we should stop playing cops and robbers and get back to talking straight to the GVN, and that we should once again go about winning the war. He I stated that after our communications with them are genuinely reestab lished, it may be necessary for someone to talk rough to them -perhaps General Taylor. He said further that he had been greatly • impressed with Ambassador Nolting's views and agreed with Mr. McNamara's conclusions.

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14. General Taylor raised the question of whether we should change the disposition of the forces which had been set in motion as a result of the crisis. It was agreed that there should be no change in the existing disposition for the time being.

V. H. KRULAK

Major General, USMC

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CAP 63516 (EEF: Saigon 523 - TAB B)

•

• MUTE HOUSE TO LODGE 17 September 1963

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1. Highest level meeting today has approved broad outline of an action proposals program designed to obtain from GVN, if possible, reforms and changes in personnel necessary to maintain support of Vietnamese and US opinion in war

1 against Viet Cong. This cable reports this program and our thinking for I your comment before a final decision. Your comment requested soonest,

2. We see no good opportunity for action to remove present government in immediate future; therefore fl as your most recent messages suggest, we must

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for the present apply such pressures as are available to secure whatever modest improvements on the scene may be possible. We think it likely that such improvements can make a difference, at least in the short run. Such a course* moreover, is consistent with more drastic effort as and when means become available, and we will be in touch on other channels on this problem.

3* We share view in your 5^3 that best available reinforcement to your bargaining position in this interim period is clear evidence that all U.S. assistance is granted only on your say-so. Separate telegram discusses details of this problem, but in this message we specifically authorize you to apply any controls you think helpful for this purpose. You are authorized to delay any delivery of supplies or transfer of funds by any agency until you are satisfied that delivery is in U.S. interest, bearing in mind that it is not our current policy to cut off aid, entirely. In other words, we share your view that it will be helpful for GVN to understand that your personal approval is a necessary part of ail U.S. assistance. We think it may be particularly desirable for you to use this authority in limiting or rerouting any and all forms of assistance and support which now go to or through Whu or individuals like Tung who are associated with him. This authorization specifically includes aid actions currently held in abeyance and you are authorized to set those in train or hold them up further in your discretion. We leave entirely in your hands decisions on the degree of privacy or publicity you wish to give to this process.

k. Subject to your comment and amendment our own list of possible helpful action by government runs as follows in approximate order of importance:

A. Clear the air — Diem should get everyone back to work and get them

to focus on winning the war. He should be broadminded and compassionate in his attitude toward those who have, for understandable reasons, found it difficult under recent circumstances fully to support him. A real spirit of reconciliation could work wonders on the people he leads; a punitive, harsh or autocratic attitude could only lead to further resistance.

B. Buddhists and students — Let them out and leave them unmolested. This more than anything else would demonstrate the return of a better day and the refocusing on the main job at hand, the war.

C. Press; The press should be allowed full latitude of expression. Diem will be criticized, but leniency and cooperation with the

i domestic and foreign press at this time would bring praise for his

leadership in due course- While tendentious reporting is irritating, suppression of news leads to much more serious trouble.

D. Secret and combat police — Confine its role to operations against the VC and abandon operations against non-Communist opposition groups thereby indicating clearly that a period of reconciliation and political stability has returned.

E. Cabinet changes to inject new untainted blood, remove targets of popular discontent.

F. Elections — These should be held, should be free, and should be widely observed.

G. Assembly — Assembly should be convoked soon after the elections. The government should submit its policies to it and should receive its confidence. An assembly resolution would be most useful for external image purposes.

H. Party — Can Lao party should not be covert or semi- covert but a broad association of supporters engaged in a common, winning cause.

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This could perhaps be best accomplished by disbanding the party and

starting afresh.

Repeal or suitable amendment Decree 10.

Rehabilitation by ARVN of pagodas.

Establishment of Ministry of Religious Affairs.

Liberation of passport issuances and currency restrictions enabling

all to leave who wish to.

Acceptance of Buddhist Inquiry Mission from World Federation to report

true facts of situation to world. You may wish to add or subtract from the above list, but need to set , psychological tone and image is paramount. Diem has taken positive actions in past of greater or less scope than those listed, but they have had little practical political effect since they were carried out in such a way as to make them hollow or, even if real, unbelievable (e.g., martial law already nominally lifted, Assembly elections scheduled, and puppet bonzes established).

6. Specific "reforms" are apt to have little impact without dramatic, symbolic move which convinces Vietnamese that reforms are real. As practical matter we share your view that this can best be achieved by some visible reduction in influence of Nhus, who are symbol to disaffected of all that they dislike in GVN. This we think would require Nhus departure from Saigon and preferably Vietnam at least for extended vacation. We recognize the strong possibility that these and other pressures may not produce this result, but we are convinced that it is necessary to try.

7» In Washington, in this phase, we would plan to maintain a posture of disapproval of recent GTO actions, but we would not expect to make public our specific requests of Diem. Your comment on public aspects of this phase is particularly needed,

8.. We note your reluctance to continue dialogue with Diem until you have more to say, but we continue to believe that discussions with him are at a minimum an important source of intelligence and may conceivably be a means of exerting some persuasive effect even in his present state of mind. If you believe that full control of U.S. assistance provides you with means of resuming dialogue, we hope you will do so. We ourselves can see much virtue in effort to reason even with an unreasonable man when he is on a collision course. We repeat, however, that this is a matter for your judgment.

9. Meanwhile, there is increasing concern here with strictly military aspects of the problem, both in terms of actual progress of operations and of need to make effective case with Congress for continued prosecution of the effort. To meet these needs, President has decided to send Secretary of Defense and General Taylor to Vietnam, arriving early next week. It will be emphasized here that it is a military mission and that all political decisions are being handled through you as President's Senior Representative.

10. We repeat that political program outlined above awaits your continent before final decision. President particularly emphasizes that it is fully open to your criticism and amendment. It is obviously an interim plan and further decisions may become necessary very soon.

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STATE U31

18 September I963

FROM THE PRESIDENT TO LODGE

I appreciate your prompt comment and I quite understand the problem you see in visit of McNamara and Taylor. At the same time my need for this visit is very great indeed, and I believe we can work out an arrangement which takes care of your basic concerns. Will you let me have your comment on the following as soon as possible:

1. We can make it clear here, and McNamara and Taylor can make it clear in Saigon to the GVN, that this visit is not designed to bring comfort to Diem.

My own thought is "that in any visit McNamara makes to Diem he will want to speak some home truths on the military consequences of the current difficulties, and also to make it clear that the United States Government is not open to oriental divisive tactics.

2. We can readily set up this visit as one which you and I have decided on together, or even one which is sent in response to your own concern about winning the war in the current situation. For example , we could announce

that the purpose of the mission is to consider with you the practical ways and means of carrying out my announced policy that we will support activities which will further the war effort in South Vietnam and avoid supporting activities which do not. The whole cast of the visit will be that of military consultation with you on the execution of the policy which you and I have determined.

3. As our last message said, my own central concern in sending this mission is to make sure that my senior military advisors are equipped with a solid on-the-spot understanding of the situation, as a basis both for their participation in our councils here, and for the Administrations accounting to the Congress

on this critically important contest with the Communists. Having grown up in an Ambassador's house, I am well trained in the importance of protecting the effectiveness of the man on-the-spot, and I want to handle this particular visit in a way which contributes to and does not detract from your own responsibilities. But in the tough weeks which I see ahead, I just do not see any substitute for the ammunition I will- get from an on-the-spot and authoritative military appraisal.

k m I do not think I can delay announcement of the McNamara mission beyond Saturday, and I will be grateful for a further prompt comment on this message so that we can be firmly together on the best possible handling of the announcement and of the mission itself.

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(Ref White House Msg CAP 63516 atchd at Wash Guidance TAB)

FROM LODGE TO STATl FOH PRESIDENT 0'!LY

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1. Agre«2 that no good opportunity for' action to remove present government in irurediate future is apparent and that we should, therefore,

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do whatever we can aj an interim measure pending, such an eventuality.

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, Virtually all the topics under paragraph 4, letters A to M t have T " * •" ken up with Diem and' Nhu at one time or another, most of them by me *\V^ lly. They think that most of them would either involve destroying

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the political structure on which they rest or loss of face or both. We,

therefore, could not realistically hope for more than lip service, Frankly,

I see no opportunity at all for substantive changes. Detailed comments on

items A to M are contained in separate telegram*

3, There are signs that Diem-Hhu are somewhat bothered by my silence. According to one well placed source, they are guessing and off-balance and ''desperately anxious" to know what U*5, posture is to be* They may be preparing seme kind of a public relations package, possibly to be opened after the elections. I believe that for me to press Diem onthings which are not in the cards and to repeat what we have said several times already would be a little shrill and would make us look weak, particularly in view of my talk with Mhu last night at a dinner where I had a golden opportunity to make the main points of your CAP 63bl6 as reported in 541 t

4, Also, I doubt that a public relations package will meet needs of situation which seems particularly grave to me, notably in the light of General Dig Minh's opinion expressed very privately yesterday that the Viet Cong are steadily gaining in strength; have more of the population on their side than has the GVU; that arrests are continuing and that the prisons are full; that more and more students are going over to the Viet Cong; that there is great graft and corruption in the Vietnamese administration of our aid; and that the "Heart of the Amy is not in the war". All this by Vietnamese Wo, 1 General is now echoed by Secretary of Defense Thuan (See my 542), who wants to leave the country.

5, As regards your paragraph 3 on withholding of aid, I still hope that I may be informed of methods, as requested in my 478, September 11, which will enable vis to apply sanctions in a way which will really affect Diem and IJhu without precipitating an economic collapse and without impeding the war effort, VJe are studying this here and have not yet found a solution, If a way to do this were to be found, it would be one of the greatest discoveries since the enactment of the Marshall Plan in 1947 because, so far as I know, the C T ,S. hod never yet been able to control any of the very unsatisfactory governments through which we have had to work in our many very successful attempts to make these countries strong enough to stand alone,

6, I also believe that whatever sanctions we may discover should be directly tied to a promising coup d'etat and should not be applied without such a coup being in prospect, In this connection, I believe that we should pursue contact with Big Hinh and ur^e him along if he looks like acting,

I particularly think thdt the idea of supporting a Vietnamese Army independent of the government should be energetically studied.

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7, I will, of ccur-jo, give instructions that programs which one can be effectively held up should be held up and not released without ny approval provided that this can be done without serious harmful effect to the people and to the war effort. Technical assistance and (omission) support to communications support programs nay be one way* This would be a fly-speck in the present situation rind would have no immediate effect, but I hope that U.S. (omission) may get Vietnamese officials into the habit of asking me to release items which are held up and that, over a long period of time, it might create opportunities for us to get little things done,

" 8, But it is not even within the realm of possibility that such a technique could lead then to do anything which causes loss of face or weakening of their political organization. In fact, to threaten them with suppression of aid might well defeat our purposes and might make a bad situation very much wcrse.

9. There should in any event be no publicity whatever about this procedure, If it is possible (omission) a prcsjram, I intend to (omission).

10. As regards your paragraph 6 and "dramatic symbolic moves", I really do not think they could understand this even if Thao wanted to f although I have talked about it to Diem f and to Nhu last night (See my 541), They have scant comprehension of what it is to appeal to public opinion

as they have really no Interest in any other opinion than their own. I have repeatedly brought up the question of Nhu's" departure and have stressed that if he would just stay away until after Christmas! it mi^ht help get the Appropriation Bill through. This seems like a small thing to us but to them it seems tremendous as they are quite sure that the Army would take over if he even stepped out of the countryi

11. Your paragraph 8, ' I have, of course, no objection to seeing Diem at any time that it would be helpful. But I would rather let him sweat for awhile and not go to see him unless I have something really new to bring up, I would much prefer to wait until I find some part of the AID program to hold up in which he is interested and then have him ask me to come and see him. For example, last night's dinner which I suspect Nhu of stimulating is infinitely better than for me to take the Initiative for an appointment

and to call at the office. Perhaps ny silence had something to do with it,

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON'

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'MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

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It may be useful to put on paper our under standing of the purpose of your visit to South Vietnam, I am asking you to go. because of my desire to have the best -oossible en-the-spot appraisal of the military and paramilitary effort to defeat the Vie.t Cong. The program developed alter General Taylor's mission and carried forward under your close supervision has brought heartening re suits a at least until recently. The events in South Vietnam since May have now raised serious questions both about the present r>rostreets for success against the Viet Cone; jLnd still jnore about the future effectiveness of this si£QX%

todiesS thsre can be iAvpo^ilaht 'policial improvement in the country. It is in this context £ha* I now need your atroraisal of the situation. If the oro^nosis in your judgment is not hopeful, I would like your views on what action must be taken by the South Vietnamese Government and what stet>s our Government should take to lead the Vietnamese*to that action.

Ambassador Lod^e has joined heartily in sua^wrting this mission and I will rely on you both for the closest exchange * of views. It is obvious that the overall political situation

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an«i me military ana paramilitary enor: are ciosery interconnected in all sorts cf ways, and in executing your responsibility £03? appraisal of the military and paramilitary problem I expect"that you will consult fully with Ambassador Lod^e en related political and social Questions* I will also expect you to examine with Ambassador Lodge ways and means of fashioning all forms of our assistance to South Vietnam so that it will support our foreign policy objectives more precisely. *

I am providing you separately with a letter from me to President Diem which Ambassador Lodge and you should discuss and which the Ambassador should deliver on the occasion of a call on President Diem if after discussion and reference to me I conclude that such a letter is desi'rabie.

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THE WMITlv IlOUSii

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In my judgment the question of the progress of the contest in South Vietnam is of the first importance and in executing 1 this mission you should take as much time as is necessary for a thorough examination both in Saigon and in the field.

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STATE fcjS, 22 September I963

2Y23 OKLY FC3 AM;I\G3AD0R D3D02 *7£M BALL

Understand dec ire for caudancc expressed your 577- Pending further

ituation by President ;:hich ir5.ll follor your consultation

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vlth KcSemara and TayJLor vc vioh to 31 vc you following interim guidance:

1. The United States intends to continue its efforts to assist the

Vietnamese people in their struggle against the Viet Cone*

2. Recent events have put in question the possibility of success in these efforts unless there en be important improvements in the government of South Vietnam.

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3- It is the policy of the United States to bring about such improvements - Further specific Guidance on your meeting frith Diem being dcvclped here and will be subject further consultation with you. In any event the President believes object of this meeting should be to increase your authority and leverage with Diem goverjiment. In meantime CAP 63516 still represents Washington's current thinking on specifics- A possible Presidential letter to Diem is in preparation and will be forwarded for your comments before a decision on delivery.

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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WASHINGTON

2 October I963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Report of McNamara-Taylor Mission to South Vietnam

Your memorandum of 21 September 19&3 directed that General Taylor and Secretary McNamara proceed to South Vietnam to appraise the military and para-military effort to defeat the Viet Cong and to consider, in consultation with Ambassador Lodge, related political and social questions. You further directed that, if the prognosis in our judgment was not hopeful , we should present our views of what action must be taken by the South Vietnam Government and what steps our Government should take to lead the Vietnamese to that action,,

Accompanied by representatives of the State Department, CIA, and your Staff, we have conducted an intensive program of visits to key operational areas, supplemented by discussions with U.S. officials in all major U.S. Agencies as well as officials of the GVN and third countries.

We have also discussed our findings in detail with Ambassador Lodge, and with General Harkins and Admiral Felt.

The following report is concurred in by the Staff Members of the mission as individuals, subject to the exceptions noted.

I. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. Conclusions.

1. The military campaign has made great progress and continues to progress.

2. There are serious political tensions in Saigon(and perhaps elsewhere in South Vietnam) where the Diem-Nhu government is becoming increasingly unpopular.

3» There is no solid evidence of the possibility of a successful coup, although assassination of Diem or Nhu is always a possibility.

U. Although some, and perhaps an increasing number, of GVN military officers are becoming hostile to the government, they are more hostile to the Viet Cong than to the government and at least for the near future they will continue to perform their military duties.

5. Further repressive actions by Diem and Nhu could change the present favorable military trends. On the other hand, a return to more moderate methods of control and administration, unlikely though it may be, would substantially mitigate the political crisis.

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6- It is 'not clear that pressures exerted by the U.S. will move Diem and Nhu toward moderation. Indeed, pressures may increase their obduracy. But unless such pressures are exerted, they are almost certain to continue past patterns of behavior.

B. Recommendations.

We recommend that:

1. General Harkins review with Diem the military changes necessary to complete the military campaign in the Northern and Central areas (I, II, and III Corps) by the end of 195^ and in the Delta (IV Corps) by the end of 1965. This review would consider the need for such changes as;

a. A further shift of military emphasis and strength to the Delta (IV Corps).

b. An increase in the military tempo in all corps areas, so that all combat troops are in the Field an average of 20 days out of 3Q an -d static missions are ended.

c. Emphasis on "clear and hold operations" instead of terrain sweeps which have little permanent value*

d* The expansion of personnel in combat units to full authorized strength.

e. The training and arming of hamlet militia at an accelerated rate, especially in the Delta.

f. A consolidation of the strategic hamlet program, especially in the Delta, and action to insure that future strategic hamlets are not built until they can be protected, and until civic action programs can be introduced.

2. A program be established to train Vietnamese so that Essential functions now performed by U.S. military personnel can be carried out by Vietnamese by the end of 1965- It should be possible to withdraw the bulk of U.S. personnel by that time.

3- In accordance with the program to train progressively Vietnamese to take over military functions, the Defense Department should announce in the very near future presently prepared plans to withdraw 1000 U.S. military personnel by the end of 1Q63- This action should be explained in low key as an initial step in a long-term program to replace U.S. personnel with trained Vietnamese without impairment of the war effort

h. The following actions be taken to impress upon Diem our disapproval of his political program.

a. Continue to withhold commitment of funds in the commoc .cy import program, but avoid a formal announcement. The potential significance of the withholding of commitments for the 1964 military budget should be brought home to the top military officers in working level contacts between US0M and MACV and the Joint General Staff j up to now we have stated $95 million may *be used by the Vietnamese as a planning level for the commodity import program for 1964. Henceforth we could make clear that this is uncertain both because of lack of final appropriation action by the Congress

and because of executive policy.

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b. Suspend approval of the pending AID loans for the Saigon-Cholon Waterworks and Saigon Electric Power Project. We should state clearly that we are doing so as a matter of policy.

c. Advise Diem that MAP and CIA support for designated units, now under Colonel Tung's control (mostly held in or near the Saigon area for political reasons) will be cut off unless these units are promptly assigned to the full authority of the Joint General Staff and transferred to the field,

d- Maintain the present purely "correct" relations with the top GVN, and specifically between the Ambassador and Diem. Contact between General Harkins and Diem and Defense Secretary Thuan on military matters should not, however, be suspended, as this remains an important channel of advice. USOM and USIA should also seek to maintain contacts where these are needed to push forward programs in support of the effort in the field, while taking care not to cut across the basic picture of U.S* disapproval and uncertainty of U.S. aid intentions. We should work with the Diem government but not support it.*

As we pursue these courses of action, the situation must be closely watched to see what steps Diem is taking to reduce repressive practices and to improve the effectiveness of the military effort. We should set no fixed criteria, but recognize that we would have to decide in 2 - k months whether to move to more drastic action or try to carry on with Diem even if he had not taken significant steps.

5. At this time, no initiative should be taken to encourage actively a change in government. Our policy should be to seek urgently to identify

and build contacts with an alternative leadership if and when it appears.

6. The following statement be approved as current U.S. policy toward South Vietnam and constitute the substance of the government position to

be presented both in Congressional testimony and in public statements.

a. The security of South Vietnam remains vital to United States security. For this reason, we adhere to the overriding objective

of denying this country to Communism and of suppressing the Viet Cong insurgency as promptly as possible. (By suppressing the insurgency we mean reducing it to proportions manageable by the national security forces of the GVN, unassisted by the presence of U.S. military forces.) We believe the U.S. part of the task ! can be completed by the end of 1965* ^ he terminal date which we are taking as the time objective of our counterinsurgency programs,

b. The military program in Vietnam has made progress and is sound in principle.

c. The political situation in Vietnam remains deeply seri .-us. It has not yet significantly affected the military effort, but could do so at some time in the future. If the result is a GVN ineffective in the conduct of the war, the U.S. will review its attitude toward

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*Mr. Colby believes that the official 'correct" relationship should be supplemented by selected and restricted unofficial and personal relationships with individuals in the GVN, approved by the Ambassador, where persuasion could be fruitful without derogation of the official U.S, posture.

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support for the government. Although we are deeply concerned by repressive practices, effective performance in the conduct of the war should be the determining factor in our relations with the GVN.

d. The U.S. has expressed its disapproval of certain actions of the Diem-Nhu regime and will do so again if required. Our policy is to seek to bring about the abandonment of repression because of its effect on the popular will to resist. Our means consist of expressions of disapproval and the withholding of support from GVN activities that are not clearly contributing to the war effort. We will use these means as required to assure an effective military program.

II. MILITARY SITUATION AND TRENDS

A. The Standards of Measure.

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The test of the military situation is whether the GVN is succeeding in widening its area of effective control of the population and the countryside. This is difficult to measure, and cannot be stated simply in terms of the number of stragetic hamlets built or the number of roads that can now be travelled without escort. Nor can the overall situation be gauged solely In terms of the extent of GVN offensive action, relative weapon losses and defections, VC strength figures, or other measures of military performance. All of these factors are important and must be taken into account; however, a great deal of judgment is required in their interpretation.

We have looked at these factors carefully, but we have also given great weight to the evidence of the men on the spot — the U.S. military advisors and the USOM field representatives — as to whether government control is in fact extending and becoming more accepted and solid in the various areas. We have been greatly impressed with the variation of the situation from area to area and from province to province; there is a different war in each area and province, and an example can be found somewhere to support any attitude toward the state of the counterinsurgency campaign. Our task has "been to observe the situation as broadly as possible to avoid giving exaggerated importance to any single angle of observation.

B. Overall Progress.

With allowance for all uncertainties, it is our firm conclusion that the GVN military program has made great progress In the last year and a half, and that this progress has continued at a fairly steady rate in the past six months even through the period of greatest political unrest in Saigon. The tactics and techniques employed by the Vietnamese under U.S. monitor ship are sound and give promise of ultimate victory.

Specifically, progress is most clear in the northern areas (l and II Corps); especially noteworthy work has been done in key coastal provinces where VC strength once threatened to cut the country in half but has now been substantially reduced. In the central area and the highlands (ill Corps), progress has been steady though slower, and the situation remains difficult in the provinces to the west and north of Saigon itself.

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Throughout the northern two-thirds of the country the strategic hamlet program has matured effectively and freedom of rural movement has grown steadily.

The Delta remains the toughest area of all, and now requires top priority in both GVN and U.S. efforts* Approximately hO'fo of the people live there; the area is rich and has traditionally resisted central authority; it is the center of Viet Cong strength — over one-third of the "hard core" are found there; and the maritime nature of the terrain renders it much the most difficult region to pacify.

A first step has just been taken by the move of a third division to the Delta, but further major actions are needed. They include priority decisions by the GVN in the use of its resources, the consolidation rather than further spread of strategic hamlets in many areas, the elimination of many fixed outposts, better hamlet defenses and more trained hamlet militia. Regular army units should be reserved for use in mobile actions and for clear and hold operations in support of the strategic hamlet program. Though there are unresolved problems in several key provinces close to Saigon, as well as in the southernmost parts where the VC are strongly established, it is clear that the Delta situation has generally improved over the past year, even*with the limited resources allocated to it. Despite recent evidences of greater VC effort and better weapons, the Delta campaign can continue to go forward if the essential priority is assigned to Delta requirements, <

C. Military Indicators.

From a more strictly military standpoint, it should be noted that this overall progress is being achieved against a Viet Cong effort that has not yet been seriously reduced in the aggregate, and that is putting up a formidable fight notably in the Delta and key provinces near Saigon. The military indicators are mixed, reflecting greater and more effective GVN effort but also the continued toughness of the fight.

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No. of government Initiated:

June July August

September Mo. Ave. (estimated) Year ago

Small operations Large operations Viet Cong Killed

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GVN Weapons Lost

VC Weapons Captured

Viet Cong Military Defectors

420

Viet Cong Initiated

Incidents of all Typesl310

Viet Cong Attacks

Estimated Viet Cong Strength

Hard Core

Irregular

410

310

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1375 385

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1660 410

22000

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Recent days have been characterized by reports of greater Viet Cong activity, countrywide, coupled with evidence of improved weaponry in their hands. Some U.S. advisors, as well as some Vietnamese, view this increased activity as a logical reaction to the steadily growing strategic hamlet ' program, which they believe is progressively separating the Viet Cong from the rural population and from their sources of food and reinforcements. Others view it as a delayed effort to capitalize upon the political trouble All agree that it reflects a continuing capability for offensive actio".

D. The Strategic Hamlet Program.

I

In this generally favorable military picture ? two main factors h~ve been the strategic hamlet program and the effectiveness of the U.S. advisory and support effort.

We found unanimous agreement that the strategic hamlet program is sound in concept, and generally effective in execution although it has been overextended in some areas of the Delta. The.teamwork of U.S. military men and civilians is generally excellent , and on the GVN side a number of the province chiefs who handled the program poorly in its initial phases have been replaced by men who appear t9 have a better grasp of the central

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purpose of the program — to bring people under clear GVN control, in a way that really solidifies their support of their government and opposition to the VC. The economic and civic action element of the program (schools medicine, fertilizer, etc.) has been carried forward on the U.S. side with considerable effectiveness, but has necessarily lagged behind the physical completion of hamlets and in insecure areas has made little progress. Without this element, coupled with effective hamlet defense measures, what are called "strategic hamlets" may be only nominally under GVN control. We were particularly struck by some evidence that a hamlet's readiness to defend itself often bears a direct relation to whether the Province Chief, with U.S. help, has managed to make a convincing start in civic action,

E. The U.S. Military Advisory and Support Effort.

We may all be proud of the effectiveness of the U.S. military advisory and support effort• With few exceptions, U.S. advisors report excellent relations with their Vietnamese counterparts, whom they characterize as proud and willing soldiers. The stiffening and exemplary effect of U.S. behavior and attitudes has had an impact which is not confined to the war effort, but which extends deeply into the whole Vietnamese way of doing things.

The U.S. advisory effort, however, cannot assure ultimate success. This is a Vietnamese war and the country and the war must, in the end, be run solely by the Vietnamese. It will impair their independence and the development of their initiative if we leave our advisors in place beyond the time they are really needed. In some areas reductions in the U.S. effort and transfer of U.S. responsibilities to the Vietnamese can now be carried out without material impairment of the total war effort. As a start, we believe that a reduction of about 1000 U.S. personnel (for which plans have been In preparation since the spring) can be carried out before the end of 1963- No further reductions should be made until the requirements of the 196*+ campaign become firm.

■

F. Conclusion.

Acknowledging the progress achieved to date, there still remains the question of when the final military victory can be attained. If, by victory, we mean the reduction of the insurgency to something little more than sporadic banditry In outlying districts, it is the view of the vast majority of military commanders consulted that success may be achieved in the I, II and III Corps area by the end of CY 196^. Victory in the IV Corps will take longer — at least well into 1965- These estimates necessarily assume that the political situation does not significantly impede the effort.

III. EC0N0MCC SITUATION AND TRENDS

The current economic situation in South Vietnam is, in the main

i

satisfactory. The internal price level is reasonably stable. Commercial inventories are high and national bank reserves of foreign exchange stand at approximately $160 million which equals approximately U to 12 months. Imports at current rate ($2^0 million imports .less $75 to $80 million exports). The effective rate of exchange*of the piastre to the dollar is within the range of reasonable economic value.

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number; NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

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Trends are difficult to discuss but the business community was ; optimistic before the present crises. Rice exports for the current

calendar year are projected at approximately $80 million against $8.75 j million last year. Total exports are anticipated at $70 million as against $55 million last year. Banking circles point to one bearish factor in the export picture. Rubber, which represents more than half in value of all exports, faces a situation of declining world market prices and some plantations may curtail operations in the next year.

On the domestic side South Vietnam is almost self-sufficient in cotton testiles and is on its way to satisfying its own fertilizer and cement requirements by 1966. At the beginning of the current year banking circles noted a healthy increase in local investments in small enterprises which reflects, in their judgment an increase of confidence in the future that is unusual for recent years. The prospects for next year, under normal circumstances, appear reasonably good. If the Government encourages diversification in agriculture, exports of such products together with the increasing availability of rice should offset the decline in foreign exchange earnings from rubber.

The projected GVN budget for CY 196^ totals B27 billion: tax revenues are estimated at Pll billion, leaving an internal budget deficit of Pl6 billion. External resources (resulting from U.S. operations but requiring also use of foreign exchange reserves) are estimated to generate an additional P9-5 billion, leaving a P6.5 billion estimated deficit. This deficit might be somewhat reduced by additional tax revenues. To meet the remaining deficit, borrowings from the National Bank would still be required with a resulting increase in the money supply.

The money supply has been increasing rather sharply in the last nine months, although the inflationary effect has been dampened by the recent arrival of large shipments under US0M f s commodity import program. This has been accompanied by an increase in import licensing brought about principally by the GVN f s adoption at the beginning of this year of an open general licensing system for certain manufactured goods such as trucks, automobiles, fabricated steel and some industrial raw materials. The banks estimate that the open general licensing system will result in a $10 million increase in GVN-finance& imports in CY 1963.

In shortj while the general economic situation is good, the prospects for holding the line on inflation and the balance of payments do not appear bright for CY l$6k unless the GVN can be persuaded to impose severe restraints.

Effect of the Political Crisis on the Economic Situation.

• At the present time the current political problems have not had a significant effect on the internal economic situation, French banking sources report a slight increase in the rate of withdrawals from private Vietnamese bank deposits over the last two months; but this increase has only been on the order of 1 to 2 percent.

Commercial inventory stocks seem to be increasing, but this can be explained by the recent increase in arrivals of foreign goods. In any case prices have remained stable with exception of a slight increase in the cost of cement, automobiles and certain industrial equipment.

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i The value of the piastre fias fallen 10$ on the Hong Kong market

in the last month. Virtually no abnormal flight of capital has yet "been j observed In banking circles.

The most apparent effect of the crisis of the past several weeks is a slowdown in investment decisions, both in industry and In the limited capital market. Inventors and industrialists are worried about a reduction in U.S. aid. They are aware of the suspension in the issuances of procurement authorizations and are therefore concerned about the availability of imported raw materials and spare parts.

Since the Saigon business community has lived through some violent times before this, they have not reacted to events with as much panic as might have been expected. If the U.S. should long suspend import commitments, however, it should be apparent that the private sector of the economy will react in an Inflationary manner*

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number; NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

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IV. POLITICAL SITUATION AND TRENDS

Although our observations of the political situation were necessarily less extensive than of the military picture, they were ample to confirm that tiie existing situation is one of high tension. We reviewed the situation carefully with the relevant U.S. officials and were also impressed by frank Interviews with GVN officials and with third country representatives.

In essence, discontent with the Diem/Nhu regime, which had been widespread just below tfre surface during recent years, has now become a seething problem. The Buddhist and student crises have precipitated these discontents and given them specific issues. But the problem goes deeply into the personalties, objectives, and methods of operation of Diem and Nhu over a long period.

The evidence appears overwhelming that Diem and Nhu operate in close collaboration, and that each needs the other. They undoubtedly regard themselves as carrying out a social and political revolution for the good of their country, using all means — including the strategic hamlet program — to build up a secure base of political strength In the rural areas.

At the same time, the positive and educative sides of their . actions, aimed primarily at the countryside, but with extensive countrywide educational efforts as well, have been increasingly matched by negative and repressive measures of control against the urban population. The urban elite or "Establishment" — which includes intellectuals, civilian officials at all levels, and a high proportion of military officers — has never been trusted by Diem and Nhu. Always sensitive to signs of opposition — with some justification from events in 195^-55 and the attempted coups of I960 and 1962 -- the regime has turned in- j creasingly to police methods, particularly secret arrests, that have almost all the bad effects of outright totalitarianism even though a

good deal of freedom to criticize still remains. J

I

Concurrently, the palace has always manipulated and controlled the

government structure to ensure its own control. The degree to which centralized control and intervention have been carried, and the often quixotic nature of its use, have had a steadily growing adverse effect on efficiency and morale*

Both of these adverse characteristics of the regime, and the resentment of them, focus more and more on Nhu. Not merely is he the hatchet man, but hts statements on "personal!sm" and his building up with Madame Nhu of a wide personal apparatus have smacked more and more of outright totalitarianism. A further distrubing feature of Nhu is his flirtation with the idea of negotiating with North Vietnam,

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

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* whothcr or not" he 13 serious -in this at present, ■ Th*is deeply disturbs responsible Vietnamese and f more basically, suggests a possible basic incompatibility with y,S. objectives.,

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Khu's role and scope of action have increased > and he ray well * \ have the designs imputed to him of succeeding his brother in due course. Diem is still quite a long way from being*a figurehead > and * 'his personal prestige in the country has survived remarkably well.

* But Diem does depend heavily on Nhu, their central ideas are very i close if not identical^ and it would be remarkable, if Diem dropped, I Khu from a commanding position.

Until the Buddhist and studgat crises> it was probably true that the alienation -between Diem and the elite Was more a matter of basically divergent views of the right social structure and of Diem and Hhu v s handling of individuals in the government than it was a matter of reac-f tion to repressions. However* the crises have now brought the repressions "jso directly into the lives of -many of the elite that more orderly methods, ] . [which might previously have kept the loyalty of the needed amount of

'il3.XCRt g now probably cannot do no without a convincing degree of restoration of personal security, Yet both.more orderly methods and a . . restoration of personal*security cut diametrically across the grain

of Diem's and especially Nhu's view of what is necessary to maintain their power and move toward -their idea of social revolution,

* . •

Thus, the discontent of the elite'— reflected chiefly in the

I progressive loss of responsible men —• has now reached the point where-

--•>■ jit is uncertain that Diem can keep or enlist enough talent to run the

[ . * - ;war. The loss of such men as Kau and Tuycn', and the deeply disturbed

'attitude of such-S-^c^ucial-f-igureas Thuan. are the strongest evidences

* of the seriousness of the situation.

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This is not to discount groups other than the elite. However, the Buddhists and students cannot in themselves cither threaten the -regime or do more than focus issues — although of course they seriously "damage the regime's standing in the U.S. and elsewhere* with uninhibited ,ipress reactions that contribute further to the persecution complex "that drives Diem and Nhu into repression. .The business community is a passive factor only. Urban labor is simply trying to hold its position, being anti-regime but not to the point of being an independent" ■ source of trouble. The rural peasantry appear little affected even by the Buddhist issue, If these groups can be kept'even in an acquiescent state the war could go forward, .. .;■•

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>

As matters stand, political tension in the,urban centers is so high that it could boil over at any time into another cycle of riots*■ ., repressionsj and resignations. This tension would disappear in a very short time if Khu wqre removed. Whether it could be reduced to accept-

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

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but it is clear that such measures would havo to include both more moderate control methods and a better government climate particularly for civilian officials. ■ . \

effect or political tension •

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tA. On Military Operations..

So far this has not significantly affected countryside operations in any area* U.S» personnel in the field testified that a few officer r or civilian counterparts showed concern over the Buddhist and student -issues, but not tQ the extent, as yet, of materially affecting their doing their jobs. The rural population has.been almost untouched, .The pace of GVK operations v/ss sharply cut for a short period at the end of August by transfers of units and general uncertainty, but has now largely renewed.its previous intensity. The Delta particularly has been so Concerned with the war that it has been virtually unaffected.

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Basically,■the unifying factors embodied in the hatred of the military for Communism remain very sharp. -This hatred is real and pervasive. It transcends domestic policies in the minds of most officers.

However, there, are disturbing elements that could change this picture greatly unless the political tension can be reduced. Certain high officers have been heavily preoccupied with coup possibilities* Those who have had relatives directly involved in the regime's repressions . are deeply disturbed though not necessarily ready to act against Diem."**'

Presentment of Hhu exists in top military circles and probably to some --extent at middle levels. The fact that the great bulk of military 'officers — and" Province Chiefs — come from*- urban areas (simply be-up

- ■

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'cause of educational requirements in'many cases) clearly does open u

.-the possibility of, progressive loss of morale and effectiveness, as

well as*, coup participation, if'the regime does not cease its oppression

^against 3uddhists, students, and real or supposed opposition individual

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On the civilian 6fficial side, which.is also relevant to,the war 1 effort t the reaction to .the regime's actions has been sharper,. The

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~A specific example of this is the Commandant of, the Marine Corps in Saigon. His brother, along with many other relatives of military officers and cabinet'members, was picked up in the student roundups of early September. Some were tortured, and — as in the case of the ". Commandant's brother—released enly after intercession. However, the Commandant shows no inclination to take action against the Diem.govern-

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

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Embassy and USOM report unanimously that their normal counterparts have become afraid of associating too closely with Americans, and that there is a general atmosphere of watch-and-wait, just going through the motions of the job but failing to exert what limited initiative and imagination they had previously been ready to exert ■ in face of the constant and power-directed interventions of Su, The decline in the contribution of these officials is less serious than any similar decline among the military- and province chiefs, but is nonetheless a potentially significant and growing factor if tension persists because these officials play a substantial role in the strategic hamlet program* ';■'•/

In summary>*the political tension has not yet significantly affected progress in the field^ nor does it seer* likely to have major effects in the near future. Beyond that, however t the prognosis- must -be considered uncertain if political tension persists or mounts,

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VI, OVERALL EVALUATION

■ *

From the above analysis it is clear that the situation requires a constant effort by the U.S. ~o obtain a reduction, of.political tensions and improved performance by the Vietnamese Government, We cannot say with assurance whether the effort against the Viet Cong will ultimately fail in the absence of major political improvements. However 9 it does seem clear that after another period of repressive action progress may, be reduced and indeed reversed. Although the present momentum /.light . ; conceivably continue to carry the effort forward even if Diem remains in power and political tensions continue t any significant ©lowing in .

J.the rate of progress would surely have a serious effect on U.S. popu-.

[lar support for the U.S. effort,/

VII. U.S. LEVERAGES TO 03TAIN DESIRED CHANGES IN THE DIEM REGIME...

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A, Conduct of U.S, Representatives, - *, f

-U.S. personnel, in Saigon might adopt an attitude of coolness toward

their Vietnamese counterparts, maintaining only those contacts ann

communications which are necessary for the actual conduct of ope; :tions

in the field. To some extent this is the attitude already adopted by the

Ambassador himself 9 but it could be extended to the civilian and mili-

"*" tary agencies located in Saigon, The effect of such action would be

largely psychological. , * .,;

*%

3. Economic Leverage.

Together, USOM's Commodity Import Program (CI?) and" the PL K&Q

program account for between 60 and 70 percent of imports into Vietnam.

.The commitment of funds under "the CI? has already been.suspended, CI?

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deliveries -result £h the generation of piastres, most of which f,o 'to the support of the defense budget. It is-estimated that'CI?' '

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';:"•'*.**• forced ;o craw down its.foreign- exchange r^sorvos or curtail its mill- *"\ *1

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Within the domestic economy the existing large pipelines would wear, .what there would be no material reason for "inflation to berin 4 ?f - "'in the short terra period , However 9 " .the psychological effect of growing, fu . jrealization that the* CI?, program has been suspended migjvt: be substantial , - 'f .; : _in 2-^ siotiths. Saigon has a large number.of speculative traders, and '-. ♦*'.""- although there is considerable police effort to control prices, this ; : ;■; might"not be able to contain a general trend of speculation and hoard-*'./. ■ ing. Once inflation did develop., it could have a 'serious effect on the . :>'.'■'/] GVtf budget and the conduce of the war. . . |■• . .

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■ : . ;V. Apart item CI? fc two rr.ajor AID projects are up for final approval -.' ". ' the Saigon-Choi on Waterworks (09 Tni.ll ion) and the Saigon Electric Power, Project C$ l t million) • Suspension of these projects would be a : r possible A-,means of demonstrating to Congress and the v;orld that we disapprove of. "; ■'■;. GVN policies and are not providing additional" aid not directly essential • 1 '7 " ; to the war effort, . ' • • • .- - i J

' ;-C. Paramilitary and Other Assistance:

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i\ ■ "* (1) USOM assistance to the Combat Police and 0SOK and USIS *-;. : ; "assistance to the- Director General of Information and the ARV:; Psyttar.j . I :_-.: -Program could be suspended.- These projects involve a relatively sralt ; - . amount of local currency but their 1 suspension a particularly in the case .- of .USIS ;* might adversely affect programs which' the^U.S.^isnes to see. 1 . / .V : progress. '' .. *

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(2) However> there would be merit in a gesture aimed at Colonely the Special Forces Corrm'ar.cer s < whose forces in or near 'Saigon ; played a conspicuous"part in the pagoda affair and are a continuing '' support for Diem- Colonel Tung commands a-mixed complex of forces, **' sOftT.e of which are "sunDorted by KA? and others presently through CIA,:

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>:'■ could'inform Diem thafwe would cut off MA? and CIA support unless tney • # • r were placed directly under Joint General Staff and were ccrnrutted to «■-.'■" . . >J£field, operations. - '-■' -* . »'• * J :.; \

s - , V '• "/. ! ' "The practical effect of the'cut-off: would probably bo srall,

/.\ The ecuiprrint cannot be .taken our of the hands of the units, and the ; "

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

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of the U.S.', and would..probably also be welcomed'by the high military . ofricers t£a,Victnaa > _atidLjecrtainly--by the disaffected groups in Sairon,"

*

At the same tiwOj support should continue, but through General.

Karkins rather than CIA, for border surveillance and other similar •field operations that are contributing io the war effort.

• •.

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We have weighed this cut-off action carefully. It runs a risk that Colonel Tung would refuse to carry out external operations* .- ♦- •'

"■* against the Lao corridor and North Vietnam, Ix night also limit CIA's' .' <* access to the military• "However^ U.S, liaison with high military 'officers could probably be fully maintained through the U.S. military advisors. On balance,, we conclude that these possible disadvantages * ".* .. ■

■ /".are outweighed by the gains imollcit in this action.,- i • *

• * *•

(3) Consideration has been given both by USCK and the military * w

(principally the JCS.in hashington) to the possibility of redirecting • ■ *. ; economic and military assistance in such a fashion as to bypass the

central government in Saigon.. Military studies have shewn the technical ** „■_ feasibility v though with'great difficulty and cost a of supplying the war effort in the countryside over lines of ccrrnunications which do not involve Saigon > and it is assumed that the.same conclusions would £pply to USOM deliveries to the field under the rural strategic hamlet propraa 1 --' y However a there'is a consensus among U.S. agencies in S^gen that such an effort Is not Dractical In the fc.ee of determined ODoosition by the

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GVK unless a of course a a situation hac developed where the central

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government was no longer in control of some areas of the country. Kor

Is It at all clear that "such diversion would operate to build up the position of-the military or to cut down Nhu's position** *

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D. Propaganda.

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Although-the capability of USIS to support the United States campaign of pressure against the regir.>e would be sntalXj the Ambassador believes consideration must.ie given to the content and timing of the United States pronouncements outside the country. Ke has already -suggested the'use of the Voice of America In stimulating^ in its broadcasts.to Vietnamese % discussions of democratic political philosophies. '.This mediura could,be used to exploit a wide range of ascending politica pressure. In addition., a phased program of United-States official' _:.-pronouncements could*be developed for use in conjunction'with ^he other leverages as they are.applied. We must recognize .the possibility that '

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r.e Leverage.of Conditioning Our Military Aid on Satisfactory

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: - or toe insurgency,. •

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axresGy cs.usxno concern to ..•7 Diem. Howe.ves* t the effect of pressures *hat can be carried cut ever ; i,an extended period without detriment to the war effort is Probably ( - ■ ^limited with respect/.to the possibility of Diem mqkinc necessary

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. We have r.ot analyzed with care what the effect night be of -* more intensive level of pressure such as cessation, of MA?- deliveries f J ,% or long continued suspension of the commodity import 'program,-' If the *'\ Diem government should* fail to make major improvements % serious ccr.~ ' sideration would have zc be given to this possible course of/action. but we believe its effect on the war effort would Se so serious - in . .;osycholo2ical if not in immediate material-terms - that it should not " -. be undertaken at the present time.

>*•'

' VIII / "'COU? POSSIBILITIES

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.;,A, Prospects-of a Spontaneous Coup.

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'-,../ The prospects of ' an early, spontaneous replacement of the Diem " ■'• Ke?ime are not high* The.two Drinciaal sources of such an attempt.

' L.»*C b»l.-U. Mil J . tCl V C-- -L XvLi O C..*~ v...«w i ww^i-,-. Li> . ..CvO JUl..j JLt.i xCUL* QIXmCU

/■by a combination of their*own inability and the regime's effective

countenneasures of.control,' The student organizations have been emas-./ '♦ -\ . culatec,-_ The students themselves have displayed" more emotion than .-."■ • determination and they are apparently being handled with sufficient . police sophistication to avoid an explosion< • ■ . . .. ..■•■

*

The cenerals aooear to have little -stomach for the difficult job of secretly arranging the necessary coalescence of force to upset the Regime, '. f .

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Diem/}**hu are keenly aware of the capability of the generals to .take over the country, .utilising the tremendous 1 power now vested in

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t.*a niilitary forces. They

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j concentrate their manipulative

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:ithe unity of the Array and the Establishment itself.

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Despite these unfavorable prospects for action in the short tons' jnevj factors could quickly arise, such as the death of Diem or en unpredictable and even irrational attack launched by a junior officer

j " -whom arrangements could be developed for 'a more permanent replacement

after a transitional ocricd.

• *

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Prospects for improvement uncer an Aj.tema.tive Government.

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The prospects that a reolaeen&nt regime would be an improvement : appear to be about 50-50.* .Initially 7 only a strongly authoritarian ' regime would be able to pull the gqverns&n? together and maintain order. In-view of the pre-eminent role c:" the military in Vietnam today, it * > is probable that this role would be filled by a military officer s perhaps taking power after the selective process of a junta dispute• Such -• . an authoritarian military regime., perhaps after an initial perici of

euphoria at the departure of Eiem/Nhu, would be aot to entail a resump-: :;tion of the regression at' least of Diem, the' corruDtion of the Vietnamese

% Establishment before Diem 3 and an emphasis on'conventional military ^"".rather than social> economic ar£ political, considerations> with at u * '

* 'least an ecuivaient degree'of xenophobic nationalism.

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These'features must be weighed,- however s against- the possible \ results of growing dominance or succession by Khu a which" would continue and even magnify "the present dissension^ unhappiness and_jjnrest.

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C, Possible U.S. Actions.

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Obviously., clear and explicit U*S« support could make a gre. \ ' difference to the chances Cf a coup;- However, at the present time we lack a clear picture of what acceptable individuals might be brought to

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e point of action, or what kind of government mirint emerne. We- there-

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fore need an intensive clandestine effort, under the Ambassador's

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*KTi Sullivan (State) believes that a replacement regime which does not suffer from the.overriding 'danger' of tfnu T s-ambition .to establish a totalitarian state -(the control of which he might easily lose to the Ccmmunistsfin the course of his* flirtations) would.be inevitably better;., than the current regime even if the former did have the.,deficiencies : described« • •

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direction, to establish, necessary contacts to allow U.S. to continuously appraise coup pi-ospects.

If and when we have a better picture, the choice will still remain difficult whether we would prefer to take our chances on a spontaneous coup (assuming some action by Diem and Nhu would trigger it) or to risk U.S. prestige and having the U.S. hand show with a coup group which appeared likely to be a better alternative government. Any regime that was identified from the outset as a U.S. "puppet" would have disadvantages both within South Vietnam and in significant areas of the world, including other underdeveloped nations where the U.S. has a major role.

In any case, whether or not it proves to be wise to promote a coup at a later time, we maist be ready for the possibility of a spontaneous coup, and this too requires clandestine contacts on an intensive basis.

IX. ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVE POLICIES

Broadly speaking, we believe there are three alternative policies the U.S. could pursue to achieve its political and military objectives:

1. Return to avowed support of the Diem regime and attempt to obtain the necessary improvements through persuasion from a posture of "reconciliation." This would not mean any expression of approval of the repressive actions of the regime, but simply that we would go back in practice to business as usual.

2. Follow a policy of selective pressures: "purely correct" relationships at the top official level, continuing to withhold further ! actions in the commodity import program, and making clear our disapproval of the regime. A further element in this policy is letting the present impression stand that the U.S. would not be averse to a change of Government -- although we would not take any immediate actions to initiate a ■ coup,

3„ Start immediately to promote a coup by high ranking military officers. This policy mig^rt involve more extended suspensions of aid and sharp denouncxations of the regime's actions so timed as to fit with coup prospects and planning-

Our analysis of these alternatives is as follows: 1. Reconciliation.

We believe that this course of action would be ineffective from the standpoint of events in South Vietnam alone, and would also greatly increase our difficulties in justifying the present U.S. support effort both to the Congress and generally to significant third nations. We are most unlikely, after recent events, to get Diem to make the necessary changes; on the contrary, he would almost certainly regard

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our reconciliation as an evidence that the U.S. would sit still for just about anything he did- The result would probably be not only a continuation of the destructive elements in the Regime's policies but a return to larger scale repressions as and when Diem and Nhu thought they were necessary. The result would probably be sharp deterioration in the military situation in a fairly short period.

2. Selective Pressures.

We have examined numerous possibilities of applying pressures to Diem in order to incline him to the direction of our policies. The most powerful instrument at our disposal is the control of military and economic aid but any consideration of its use reveals the double-edged nature of its effects. Any long term reduction of aid cannot but have an eventual adverse effect on the military campaign since both the military and the economic programs have been consciously designed and justified in terms of their contribution to the war effort. Hence, immediate reductions must be selected carefully and be left in effect only for short periods.

We believe that the present level of pressures is causing, and will cause, Diem some concern, while at the same time not significantly impairing the military effort. We are not hopeful that this level (or indeed any level) of pressure will actually induce Diem to remove Nhu from the picture completely. However, there is a better chance that Diem will at least be deterred from resuming large scale

oppressions,

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At the same time, there are various factors that set a time limit to pursuing this course of action in its present form. Within 2-h months we have to make critical decisions with the GW about its 196^4 budget and our economic support level. In addition, there is a significant and growing possibility that even the present limited actions in the economic field -- more for psychological than for economic reasons -- would start a wave of speculation and inflation that would be difficult to control or bring back into proper shape. As to when we would reverse our present course, the resumption of the full program of ecoi jmic and military aid should be tied to the actions of the Diem government.

, As a foundation for the development of our long-term economic and military aid programs, we believe it may be possible to develop specific military objectives to be achieved on an agreed schedule. The extent to which such objectives are met, in conjunction with an evaluation of the regime's political performance, would determine the level of aid for the following period.

.3- Organizing a Coup.

For the reasons stated earlier, we believe this course

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In conjunction Trith decisions and rocc ^eii&atiorj* in separate E333SL. President today approved reaa&aienda&lG!! that no initiative should ttSOT be taker* to give any active covert eiiccaxresest&nt to a coup, Euspo should,, towareEj be -ardent covert effort with closest sec^ity.ml&er broad guidance of MbassaSor to identify c.i i "build extracts vith possible alternative leadership as anc 3 . -*rhen it appears* Sssantial th?„t this effdTfc be totally secure and fully deniable and sefoars&ed entirely fr&* nciu.al political analysis and reporting and other activities of pcurti^ ?SS3U We repeat that this effort is not repeat not to be a&ied at active promotion of coup but only at survei"l^uce and readiness. In order to provide plausibility to denial surest you end no one else in Sribassy issue these instructions orally to Acting Station Chief and held Mas responsible to you alone for making appropriate contacts and reporting to you alone

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All report;s to WasMngfcQaj on this stibject should be on this channel*

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SAIGON (CAS JM5), 5 October 1963 TO STATE FROM LODGE

1. lit. Col. Conein met with Gen Duong Van Minh at Gen. Minh's Headquarters on Le Van Duyet for one hour and ten minutes morning of 5 Oct 63• This meeting was at the initiative of Gen Minh and has been specifically cleared in advance by Ambassador Lodge. No other persons were present. The conversation was conducted in French.

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2. Gen* Minh stated that he must know American Government's position with respect to a change in the Government of Vietnam within the very near future. Gen. Minh added the Generals were aware of the situation is deteriorating rapidly and that action to change the Government must be taken or the war will be lost to the Viet Cong because the Government no longer has the support of the people. Gen. Minh identified among the other Generals participating with him in this plan:

Maj. Gen . Tran Van Don Brig. Gen. Tran Thien Khiem Maj. Gen. Tran Van Kim

3. Gen. Minh made it clear that he did not expect any specific American support for an effort on the part of himself and his colleagues to change the Government but he stated he does need American assurances that the USG will not rpt not attempt to thwart this plan.

h* Gen. Minh also stated that he himself has no political ambitions nor do any of the other General Officers except perhaps, he said laughingly, Gen. Ton That Dinh. Gen. Minh insisted that his only purpose is to win the war. He added emphatically that to do this continuation of American Military and Economic Aid at the present level (He said one and one half million dollars per day) is necessary.

5. Gen. Minh outlined three possible plans for the accomplishment of the change of Government:

a. Assassination of Ngo Dinh Nhu and Ngo Dinh Can keeping President Diem in Office Gen. Minh said this was the easiest plan to accomplish.

b. The encirclement of Saigon by various military units particularly

the unit at Ben Cat. (Comment: Fifth Division elements commanded by Gen. Dinh).

c. Direct confrontation between military units involved in the coup and loyalist military units in Saigon. In effect 5 dividing the city of Saigon into sectors and cleaning it out pocket by pocket. Gen. Minh claims under the circumstances Diem and Nhu could count on the loyalty of 5,500 troops within the city of Saigon.

6- Conein replied to Gen. Minh that he could not answer specific questions as to USG non-interference nor could he give any advice with respect to tactical planning. He added that he could not advise concerning the best of the three plans.

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ves formerly a Comaunist end still has Co.v~unist sympathies, f&ss Col.

iad considered Col. Sun. ? ^s cr.^ of the r^ore dangerous

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Thien Khien since Xhlez: ray have played, a double role in August, Gen. Mi: rested that copies of the documents previously passed to G<hi. Khieis (plan of Ccrp Ior-2 Thanh and munitions inventory at that camp) he passed to G^n. Minh personally for comparison raith papers passed by Xhieia to Kj,ah purportedly frcn

9. Minh further stated that one of the reasons they are having to act euiekiy vas the fact that rmy re^ir.ental, battalion and corpany cosassiSsrs are working on coup plans of their ovn i/hich could be abortive and a "catastrophe". * . _ .- -

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10. Kinh appeared to understand Conein's position of hein^ unable to ccrar.snt at the present rrtsxnant but aslced that Conein a^ain neet \rith Gen- Minh to discuss the specific plan of operations Tmich Gen, Minh hopes to put into action. IIo specific date vs& given for this next neetin^. Conein ;ras asain-

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ani stated that he. ^ro\:ld arranae to contact Conein in the near future end hoped that Conein vould be able to sset ifith hisa and giva the assurance outlined above * ■' .

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Reference Bis Minh-Conein neetins (Cas Saigon l-r-^5). -riiile neither General Esx&ins nor I have great faith J.n Bis Minh^ ve need instructions on his approach. Ky recoxmendation^ in which General Harhins concurs^, is that Conain vhen next approached by Icinh should: - -

1- Assure hin that US will not attempt to. thwart his plans.

. -2. Offer to review his plans } other than assassination plans.

3. Assure Minh that U3 aid^.riil be continued to Vietnesa under Goverra:-3nt vhich gives promise of -ainins suppor-o of'people and winning ths war against

the Corziunists. Point cut that tz is ova: vie:r that this is nest lihely %o ce

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&ne case if Government includes ^ood proportion of *, r ell. cualified civilian leaders in hey positions. (Conein should press Minh for "details hi He composition future Government). 1 surest the above be discussed vith Seorettiry Keicmnra and General Saylor ::ho contacted Minh in recent visit.

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FROM: TO : 7^228 Re CAS IUU5

CIA Lodge

1. Believe CAP 63560 gives general guidance requested REFILL.

We have following additional general thoughts which have been discussed with President. While we do not wish to stimulate coup, we also do not wish to leave impression that U.S. would thwart a change of government or deny economic and military assistance to a new regime if it appeared capable of increasing effectiveness of military effort, ensuring popular support to win war and improving working relations with U.S. We would like to be informed on what is being contemplated but we should avoid being drawn into reviewing or advising on operational plans or any other act which might tend to identify U.S. too closely with change in government. We would, however, welcome information which would help us assess character of any alternate leadership.

2. With reference to specific problem of General Minh you should seriously consider having contact take position that in present state his knowledge he is unable present Minh T s case to responsible policy officials with any degree of seriousness. In order to get responsible officials even to consider Minh f s problem, contact would have to have detailed information clearly indicating that Minh ! s plans offer a high prospect of success. At present contact sees no such prospect in the information so far provided.

3. You should also consider with Acting Station Chief whether it would be desirable in order to preserve security and deniability in this as well as similar approaches to others whether appropriate arrangements could be made for follow-up contacts by individuals brought in especially from outside Vietnam. As we indicated in CAP 6356O we are most concerned about security problem and we are confining knowledge these sensitive matters in Washington to extremely limited group, high officials in White House, State, Defense and CIA with whom this message cleared.

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7HZ WHITE KOUSS

WASHINGTON

TO? S2C3

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.October 11, 19=3

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NATIONAL S2CURITY ACTION 2/2MORAXDUM NO. 253

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Secretary cf Stat.,

Secretary cf Defense «/ -

Chairman of zhe Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: South. Vietnam

meeting or. October 5, 19o3, zhe President considered th© "•recommendations contained in the report of Secretary McNamara and General Taylor on their mission to South Vietnam.

T'n^ President approved the military recommendations contained-

*

in Section I S (X~3) of the report, ■ but directed that no formal announcement be made of the implementation of nlans to with- ■■;*• draw 1, 000 U,S. milzitary personnel by the end of 1963.

After discussion of the remaining recommendations of the report, the President approved an instruction to Ambassador Lodge which ~is set forth, in State Deoartment telegram. No. 534 to Saigon.

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SECRET/KG F0PJ5I0K DiSSE'M

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Research l&sorand^! SPE-90, October 22- l^c3

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SIBJ3SCT: Statist ic;s on tb» Uar IKTort in Sou!:: Vietr^i: Show C^-Yocteb-I-?

Trends

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This*report"reviews the more significant statistics on the Communist insurgency in South Vietnam as indicators of trends in the military

situation since July 19o3-

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ABSTRACT

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Statistics on the insurgency in South Vietnsr^ although neither thoroughly trustworthy nor entirely satisfactory as criteria., indicate sn unf&iror&ble shift in the military "balance. Since July 19^3; the trend in Viet Cong casualties } weapons losses / and defections fess been downward while the nur-iber of "Viet Cong arsed attacks and other incidents has been upward. Cornparison with earlier periods suggests that the military position of the government of Vietna-rt may have been set back to the point it occupied six sionths to a year ago. These trends coincide in time with the shttrp deterioration of the political situation. At the saiae time, even without the Buddhist issue and the attending government crisis., it is.possible tftat -the Di^vr. regime would have been unable to rjiintain the favorable trends of previous periods in the face of the accelerated Viet Cong effort. * .'***-

■ Statis tics as Indicators .

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Statisticsj in general, are only partial and not entirely satisfactory ir.&icators of progress in the total counter ins urgency effort in South Vietnas.* Fir itj some statistics are incomplete 3 as for example ; those relating to Viet Cong attacks against strategic harvilets and desertions within the South Vietnamese military and security services. Second, all statistics are ■ acquired largely if not entirely from official South Vietnamese sources. &s such, their validity castj to sozss degree at leastj rerrain questionable^ even though the efforts of the United States military and civilise advisers * have improved the quality of this data during the past year or . *

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Third, there are several other important indicators which are extremely difficult, if not impossible, to handle statistically. These include: morale and efficiency within the bureaucracy and the armed services, the degree of locally acquired or volunteered intelligence, popular attitudes toward the Viet Cong and the government, and the status and impact of the government's political, social, and economic activities in support of the strategic hamlet program. Nonetheless, statistics touch on some significant aspects of the military situation and provide a guide at least to trends in the fighting.

Viet Cong Incidents

Statistics show that the Viet Cong have accelerated their military and subversive effort since July 1963- From January 1962 until July 1963, the total number of Viet Cong armed attacks, as well as all other incidents (sabotage, terrorism, and propaganda), dropped consistently. However, since July of this year, total incidents and armed attacks have increased appreciably. If the present trend continues through the end of this year, total incidents will exceed by more than 10$ the level for the period July-December 1962. Large Viet Cong attacks (company-size or larger) have also increased appreciably since July of this year, and, if the trend continues, could exceed by almost 30$ the level for July-December 1962.

In addition, the Viet Cong during the last half of I963 have shown increased daring, planning, and coordination in their attacks. This has been evidenced by an attack against a United States helicopter base, and by simultaneous actions against two or more strategic hamlets and even against two district capitals* Until this period, towns had not been attached since September 1961, when the capital of Phuoc Thanh province was raided by a large Viet Cong force.

Casualties

Although the Viet Cong have incurred relatively heavy losses during some of their more daring recent attacks, their overall casualties since July of this year have not been correspondingly high. If the accelerated Viet Cong effort and losses suffered are maintained at present levels during the rest of this year, casualties will remain about 10$ below the level in July-December 1962, the peak period in Viet Cong casualties last year.

In contrast, casualties among the South Vietnamese military and security forces since July of this year are increasing and, at the present rate, could exceed by about 20$ the level for the preceding six-month period. This would raise the total casualties for 1963 by some 30$ above the

1961 and 1962 levels. Indeed, the ratio of Viet Cong to South Vietnamese forces killed and captured dropped from five-to-one for the last half of

1962 to three-to-one for the period July-September 18, 1963. This ratio would be still less favorable to the government if casualties among such

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paramilitary groups as the Tillage militia and Montagnard scouts were taken into account- Casualty statistics on these groups are not complete and are not shown in this report* During the period August-September 18, 1963, however, their casualties exceeded 500 as compared with the combined total of more than 2,300 casualties among the Army, Civil Guard, and Self Defense Corps for the same period.

Weapons Losses

During 1962, weapons losses among both the Viet Cong and government forces increased progressively, although government losses were somewhat greater than those of the Viet Cong- The increase continued during January-April 1963? but losses on both sides were about even- However, during May-August, Viet Cong weapons losses dropped by more than 10%, while losses among government forces increased by about 15%. If the trend noted during the last three weeks of September should continue throughout the year, the Viet Cong will lose almost 70% fewer weapons than the government- Moreover, a large number of the Viet Cong weapons lost are of the home-made variety while the great bulk of government weapons losses are of

standard or modern-type pieces.

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Defections and Desertions

Viet Cong military defections increased progressively during 1963 until June, dropping from a high of 4l^ in May to a low of 107 for about the first I three weeks of September. (These Viet Cong are usually members of the

insurgent armed forces, although only a small percentage are believed to be hard-core cadres. They generally defect to South Vietnamese military forces who interrogate and screen them and determine their disposition.)

In addition to the military defectors, some 13,700 persons "rallied" to the government from April through August 1963 under a national surrender and amnesty campaign. This campaign, known as "Chieu Hoi," was officially inaugurated on April 19* The South Vietnamese government regards the bulk of these as Viet Cong. United States officials, who do not screen these statistics, believe the vast majority to be refugees and persons who, for one reason or another, have left areas controlled or formerly controll i by the Viet Cong- Many of them, however, may well have assisted the V^et Cong in some way voluntarily or under duress- The number of "Chieu Hoi" returnees increased progressively from April 19 to June 1963, when a high of about 3,200 was reached. By August, returnees dropped to a low of >out 1,600- Complete statistics are not yet available for September-

Until June 1963, statistics on South Vietnamese desertions included all military and security personnel who had been absent from duty without official leave for any reason or for any length of time. Moreover, there was apparently no attempt to adjust these all-inclusive statistics to account for persons who had returned to duty. Including "awols," the I962 monthly average of deserters was .7% of the combined strength of the military

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and security services. On this, oasis } there vas no charge in the ir.or:t?iIy average during the first five month.- of 19o3* 3e£innin£ in June, hovraver^ statistics on deserters excluded ^rcls" altttdugh thsy vera, still not adjusted to cover returnees. Even so ; on the rev basis 3 the monthly average of*deserters increased from .c-i in June ISoS to .8$ in August I963. Comolete statistics are not yet available £or September.

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Conclusion

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On the basis of available statistical treads, there appear to have been a number of significant and unfavorable changes in the military situation in South Vietnam since July of this year. Indeed, virtually all of the indicators noted in this report suggest that the military position of the Vietnam Government E£y have reverted to the point it had reached

s to a year ago. While it is difficult to relate precisely cause

six iuGiv<;n

and effect for adverse changes in the military situation in SouVn Vietnam their occurrence at a tirne when the political situation has deteriorated must be considered as r.jre than coincidental.- At the sar_e tlT.e^ even vithcv.t the Buddhist crisis and the more serious political difficulties following in its vakej it is possible that the Diem government \rould have been unable to maintain the favorable trends of preceding periods in the face of the accelerated Viet Cong effort since July I9S3.

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I. STATISTICAL TRENDS, 1962-1963

Jan. 1-June 30, 1962

1. Viet Cong Incidents

(total) 10,481

July 1-Dec. 30, 1962 (and % of change)

8,595 (-18*)

Jan. 1-June 30, 1963, (and $ of change)

6,81+7 (-20*)

3,777

55$

2. Viet Cong armed

Attacks (total)

3,024 2,44l (-19$)

l,94l (-20$)

1,067

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Company-size and larger Viet Cong Casualties (total)

GVW Casualties (total)

Viet Cong Weapons Losses

156

Jan,-April 1962

1,202

GVK Weapons Losses 1,777

63 (-U0*)

13,755 17,338 (+26%)

6,036 6,846 (+13$)

May

Aug.

1962

Sept Dec. 1962

72 (+11$) 13,9^ (-20*)

8,056 (+18$)

Jan.-April

1963

3^ 6,425

4,220

May -Aug^ 1963 (and $ of change)

*+7$

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52$

Thru Sept. 18, 1963 (and $ of previous period)

1,526 1,806

1,88U 1^53)1

6. Viet Cong Defections** 1962 Total: 1,956

1,917 1,97^ 1,178

1,703 (-11$) 335 (20$) 2,260 (+15$) 644 (28$) 1,307 (+10$) 107 (8$)

*A1though only 42$ of this period has elapsed, the statistics in this column are already 46$-55$ of the total figures for the previous six-month period, as shown in the last column. ** This exclude-s lf Chieu Hoi 11 returnees which have totalled 13,664 through August 1963 but which have declined sharply since July 1963-

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II. CONDENSED FIGURES Oil MILITARY ACTIVITY FROM JAHUAKY 1, 19&2

1. Viet Cong-Initiated Incidents

i

Large-Scale Attacks

Total'" 5,465

219

... _ 8,875

2,0o0

2,676

19,076

*These figures closely parallel year-end figures furnished by C0MI3SMACV.

1963

10 14

11 12

13 12

9

12 13

447 433 653

688 608 652 695 569 613

49

69

131 105

93

107

80

93 115

Total ' 3,003

10S

5,36"!

2. Casualties**

842

1, 413

10,624

Jan. 19o2

KK"

GVN

T?M Cap/Miss

Total

KET

Viet Cong

Tor - Cap. Total

ARVK - Army of

Vietnam ll6 CG - Civil Guard 76 SDC - Self-Defense

Corps. 107

299

221 103

146 V?5

8 43

65 116

890

1,294 212 390

1^9o"

*«C0M0SMCV has reported the following statistics for 1962 on Viet C casualties: Killed - 20,919; wounded - 4,235; captured - 5,518;' total 30,673. ' * ' '

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2. Casualties (continued)

— - ■ -

February 1962

GVN

Viet Cong

KIA

ARVN"- Army of Vietnam 72 CG - Civil Guard -68 'SDC - Self-Defense

Corps 1<*

Totals

Totals

May 1962

* ii ■■ 1 ■■■> ■ ■ ■

■

ARVN

CG

SDC

Totals

June 1962

ARVN CG. ' SDC

■ • ..

t • *

m

Totals

July 1962 ARVN

CG

SDC

v m

Totals

V/IA

118 76

106

■■^

b2 131

197

1^0

215

3'90 509

Cap/Miss. Total KIA WIA -'Cap.

7

k2

75

2hh 300 12^

- -

2

2*1

68

9 1 "

36k 686 212

SECRHT/lIO FOREIGN DISS3M

Tota

668 ; 1,205 316 353 1,87^

W m

:.i,i»oo 1^56 551 523 '2,530

'3B7 532 151 :1,070 1,596* 292 U15 i?,303

993 1,756* 352 52^ 2,632

lH3 4Ui • 2,520

■\

1,282 1,5^ I12U 542 2,510

Declassified per Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1

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Total

Oct. 1962

if*

Nov. 19&2

Total

Dec. 1962

SECRET/HO FOREIGN DISSEM

• *

- 8 -

2, Ca sualt ies (continued) GVN

Viet Cong

KIA

w in

Cap/Miss. Total

218

KIA WIA Cap.

288

560

1(19

6h6

59

1*10

831*

92

Total

29^

6l8

78

Totals,^19o2 4,1(17 7,195 ' '1,270

Jan. 1963

ARVN . CG

SDC

+

Total

153

83

217

1*53

lt32 152

324

1

9Q3

10 12 80

595

21(7

621

102

* • *

SECRET/NO FOREIGN.DISS3M

v»OC

*

Total

1,066 2,271 367 669 3,307

. 358 150 6l6

l,l2l( . 2,218 365 hh6 . 3,029

373 2,626

1,336 1,982 368 561 2,913

990 2,203 289 1(63 " 2,95! 12,882 21,158 U,235 5,700 ' 31,C9."

1,^63 . 1,754 318 379 2,45

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

/$7

Feb. JL9b3

KXA

82

87 210

379

*

75 161

Ilk

4J.U

*

192

91 223

Tor

-■ 9 -

Casualties (continued) GVn'

225

139

293 oT6~

* .

306

259 286

851

•352 136 390

WXAi Cap/M iss. Total KIA

6

10

66 "62"

11

51 "55

15 13

68 9*6*

312 236

_569 l,llf

385

U31

511

l,32f

559

25 0 681

l,58o

Total

55:

viet Cong

WJA

Cap.

Total

.

l708)| 303 ' 292 l7oT9

1,553 3o8 205 2,016

1,6*60 25B" ' 388 2,30't

iT^TS"

ii§95 2~9T *6~95 *2, 85$ .

'£,

June 19&3

* n VH

SDC

Total

July 1963

ARVN

CG

SDC

Total

August 1963

ARVN • CG

: SDC ..

Total

Sept. 18, 1963

ARVN

CG

SDC

Total

;als. 1963*

99

89 201

389

m. r .

178 103

258

92

6Q 150 310

83

101 3,756

256 158 358 772

1*76 198 397

529 1,071

313

105

218

65

2

6 82 •90"

23

51 232

3C5

1U

151 179

. 357

■ 253 _65l

1,251

677 352

877

•1,906

* *». -

■186

__519 1,125"

251 2 336

221 8fc 5 Co

211 JS6_ _U8_

T83 172 1,190

EEI CT57 12 ; 27o»

57862 310 537 .2,609

* B.

1,918 372 3"87 2,6Tf

,

275$7 *"2Co' 5T6~" 2,069

I72F9 101 329

2,529'3,523"

iii^a

2C.3fe9

*These figures do not induce GVI'l casit&lties for other paramilitary forces,--.'hich • are Incomplete but which in August and September 19o3 totalled 571.

SECRKT/NO EORKIQN MESSEM

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Total

Vict Cone;

2,753 '

3,955

secrht/no foreign dissem

- 10 -

3-. WEAPOK LOSSES*

GVN

5,982

■ »

It, 878

■

*Kany VC weapons lost are of the homerra&e variety.

.1

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1*. VXBT CONG DEFECTIONS**

-i

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1

-

.

Total

2,592

"

It

II

**This do-^s not include "defectors coming* in under the "Chieu Hoi" or amnesty progr&ni* .. , *

■ • *

SECR5t/':0 FOPETQI-: pispem

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 i

SECIST/iTO FOREIGN DISSEM

- 11 -

III* DSSERTIOKS IK TIE SOUTH VIESEM-ESE MILITARY AED SECURITY SERVICES*

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19o2

January February Karch April

tear

June

July

August

September

October

Koveiober

December

Total

1963* ■ ■ ■ ■

.January February terch April Kay June July Augus

4.

J'otal

RVfiAF**

933 If83

.1,168

1,273

1,3^ 1,160

855 867 629

767

8^7

§77

11,203

865

723 656

853

999

877 686

830

Civil Guard and Sc-lf Defense Corp

•

6,^89

1,553 1,032

2,110

1,057 1,638

1,997 2,105

1,269 1,505

1,7H 1,270

1 ^ ■ 1 ■■■■ - i\ \ m

*

18,721

l,8lU

1,389 2,260

2,018 2,165

2,289 2,501

m hi ■* ■ - *

15,877

- Total

■. 2,If86

1,565 3,278

2,697

2, If 01

2,793 2,852

2,972 1,898 2,272.

2,558

29,92^

2,679

2,122

2,916 2,871

3,l6H 2,318

2,975 3,331

22,376

Percent of Combined ' Strength of KVflAF, Civil Guard , Self

Defense Corps*-**

.8 •

.5

1.0

.8

.7 " .8

.8 • .8 .

:I

.7

. .6

Average: . 7

.7

.5

■ .7

.7 .8

.6

.7

.8 j

Average:. ,7

I

:

* *From January 19^2 through lay 19o3> the above statistics include, in addition, - : - to. deserters all other persons vho have been absent without official *ave * ( ,: avol") for any length of tirre or for any reason. The statistics have not been adjusted to take into account those persons vho returned to duty. From June through August 19o3> the statistics consist entirely of dosorters 'and exclude tr avols, n but still have not been adjusted to account for returnees 1 **Army, Kavy, R&xdtaes* and Airforce. , [

**-*Fro;a January through December 19o2, the combined strength of these services increased front 315,^ to 390,220. From January through Au-ust 19S3, the increase was from 392^60 to kCh, r (§9. * , ' ^ - ,

SECFST/KO FOSEIGSf DISSEM • • ■

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SAIGON 196U, 25 Oct. 63

FROM LODGE TO McG. BUKDY

1, I appreciate the concern expressed by you in ref. a relative to the Gen. Don/Conein relationship , and also the present lack of firm intelligence on the details of the general's plot. I hope that ref. b will assist in clearing up some of the doubts relative to general's plans,

and I am hopeful that the detailed plans promised for two days before the coup attempt will clear up any remaining doubts.

2. CAS has been punctilious in carrying out my instructions. I have personally approved each meeting between Gen. Don and Conein

v/ho has carried out my orders in each instance explicitly. While I share your concern about the continued involvement of Conein in this matter, a suitable substitute for Conein as the principal contact is not presently available. Conein, as you know, is a friend of some eighteen years' standing with Gen. Don, and General Don has expressed extreme reluctance to deal with anyone else. I do not believe the involvement of another American in close contact with the generals would be productive. We are, however, considering the feasibility of a plan for the introduction of an additional officer as a cut-out between Conein and a designee of Gen. Don for communication ptirposes only. This officer is completely unwitting of any details of past or present coup activities and will remain so,

3» With reference to Gen. Harkins' comment to Gen. Don which Don reports to have referred to a presidential directive and the proposal for a meeting with me, this may have served the useful purpose of allaying the General's fears as to our interest. If this were a provocation the GVN could have assumed and manufactured any variations of the same theme. As a precautionary measure, however, I of course refused to see Gen. Don. As to the lack of information as to General Don's real backing, and the lack of evidence that any real capabilities for action have been developed, ref. b provides only part of the answer. I feel sure that the reluctance of the generals to provide the U.S. with full details of their plans at this time, is a reflection of their own sense of security and a lack of confidence that in the large American community present in Saijon their plans will not be prematurely revealed.

if. The best evidence available to the Embassy, which I grant you is not as complete as we would like it, is that Gen. Don and the other generals involved with him are seriously attempting to effect a change in the government. I do not believe that this is a provocation by Ngo Dinh Hhu, although we shall continue to assess the planning as well as possible. In the event that the coup aborts, or in the event that Khu has mastermined a provocation, I believe that our involvement to date through Conein is still within the realm of plausible denial. CAS is

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SAIGON 1964 (Coii't) Page 2

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oerfectly prepared to have me disavow Conein at any time it may servo the national interest.

5. I welcome your reaffirming instructions contained in CAS Washington 7422S. It is viral thzt we neither thwart a co-oo nor that \yq are even in a position where we do not know what is going on.

6. "We should not thwart a coup for two reasons. First, it s&cms at least an even bet that the next government would not bangle and stumble as much as the present one has. Secondly, it is extremely unwise in th<^ long range tor us to pour cold water on attempts at a coup, particularly when they are just in their beginning stages.

\V\ .should remember that this is the only way in which the people in Vietne.m can possibly get a change of government. Whenever we thv. ur: attempts at a coup, as we have done in the past, we are incurring very Ion** lasting resentments, we are assuming an undue responsibility for keeping the incumbents in office, and in general are setting ourselves in judgment over the affairs of Vietnam, Merely to keep in touch with this situation, and a policy merely limited to "not thwarting" are courses both of which entail some risZcs but these are lesser risks than either thwarting ail coups while they are stillborn or our not being informed cl what is happening. All the above is totally distinct from not wanting , U.S. military advisors to be distracted by matters which are not in their domain, with which! heartily a.gree'. But obviously this does net conflict with a policy of not thwarting. In judging propose:, coups, we must consider the'effect on the war effort* Certainly a succession of fights for control of the Government of Vietnam, .would interfere with the war effort. It must also be said that the war effort ha.s been interfered with already by the incompetence of the present government and the uproar which this has caused. . ;-,

7. Gen. Don's intention to have no religious discrimination in a

■

future government is commendable and I applaud his desire not to be "a vassal" of the U.S. Hut I do not think his promise of a democratic election is realistic. This country simply is not ready for that procedure. I would ^.dd two other requirements. First, that there be no wholesale curves of personnel in the government. Individuals who were particularly reprehensible could be dealt with later by the regular legal process. Then I would be impractical, but I am. thinking of a government which might include Tri Quang and which certainly should include-men of the stature * of Mr. 3uu, the labor leader.. , ■ '

• Copy to Gen. Harkins. / * . •

.

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KcGeorge Buftdy to Lou&

25 Oct 63

£"~.

A? 63590

Your 1964 mcrri helpful.

*

* -

We vill continue to "be grateful for all additions! Information Sivins Increaaed clarity to 1 prospects of action "by Bon or others, and ve look forward to discussing T .rith 3^ou the irhole question of control ex& cut out on your return 3 always assuirdns that one of thece D-Days doe.?> not turn out to be Veal- we are particularly concerned about hazard that &*&. unsuccessful coup, however carefully we avoid direct en^ajerr.e-nt/ v.dll he laid at our door by public opinion almost everywhere. 'therefore, while sharing your view that ve should not be In position of thwartir.g coup, v vould like to have option of judging and warning on any. plan, with poor pre ;pocts of success. He recognize that this is a large order ; but President wants you to knew of our concern.

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

i

s ( 30 Oct 1963

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PROM: JfdSSGRGS HJNDY TO : L03GS CAS 79109

"\

* *

S

"l. Your 2023, 2C&0, 20^1 and 20*13 examined with care at highest levels here. You should promptly discuss this reply and associated messages with Berlins whose responsibilities toward any coup arc very heavy especially after you leave (see para* 7 below). They give much clearer picture group's alleged plans and also indicate chances of action with or without our approval new so significant that we should urgently consider our attitude and contingency plans. We note particularly Don's curiosity your departure and his Insistence Conein he available from Wednesday night on, which suggests -date might he as early

as Thursday. "

2. Believe our attitude to coup group" can still have decisive effect on its decisions, We believe that 'what we say to coup group car! produce delay of coup and that betrayal of coup plans to Diem is not repeat not our only way of stopping coup. We therefore need urgently your combined assessment with Harkins and CAS (including their separate coznents if they desire). We concerned that our line-up of forces in Saigon (being cabled in ne:cb message) indicates appro:-:Ii:ately equal balance of forces, with substantial possibility serious and prolonged fighting or even defeat. Either of these "could be serious or even disastrous-for u.S« interests, so that we nust have assurance balance of forces clearly .favorable. 1

3. With your assessment in hand/we nighty feel that we should convey message to Bon # whether or not he gives k or k& hours notice that woul (A) continue escplicit hands-eff policy, (3) positively entourage coup, or

(c) discourage. - ■•

lv. In any case, believe Conein should find earliest opportunity express to Son that we do not find presently revealed plans give clear prospect of cuick results. This conversation should call-attention iiraortant Saigon units sti 11.apparently Idyal to Diem and raise serious issue as to what neans coup group has to deal with then. .

5, From operational standpoint, we also deeply, concerned Don only s"ookesr;.an for group and possibility cannot be discounted he Stay not be in good faith. We badly need some corroborative evidence whether Mifeh and others directly and completely Involved. In view Don's claim he doesn't handle ''military planning" could not. Conein tell Don that we need better military picture &rA that Big Minh cculd boT^unicate this most naturally and easily to Srillwell? ^We -recognize desirability involving ¥ACV to minimum, but believe Stillwell far hiore.desirable this purpose than using Conein both ways. • . ' :""*■**

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V .

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6. Complexity above actions raises question "hither you should ire to present Thursday schedule- Colour you c.:~d other U.S. elements should take no action that could indicate 11*3. awareness coup possibility, Eo T /rever ; DOD is sending berth-equipped military aircraft th&t will arrive Saigon Thursday and could tskd you out thereafter az l&tcj _ Saturday afternoon in time to ir.eet your presently proposed arrival Washington Sunday.. You could explain this being done as convenience and that your Washington arrival is se/.ie. A further advantage such aircraft is that it would permit your prcirvpt return.from any poinu en" rouvc it necessary* To reduce time in transit; you sho\u.d use this plane, out we recognize delaying your departure may involve greater risk that you XJersonally would appear involved if any action-tool: place. Kowevar, advantages vour having extra two days in Saigon may outweigh this and we

leave timing of flight to your juagnieni:, . • x

7, Whether you leave Thursday or later, believe it essential that prior your departure there "be fullest consultation Harkins and CAS and thsrc there "be clear arrangements for handling (A), normal activity, (3) continued coup contacts, (c) action 'in event a coup starts. ¥e assusie you will vish •I'ruehart as charge to be head of country tean in nor.r.al situation, "but highest authority desires it clearly understood thau after your departure Earkins should participate in supervision- of all coup contacts and that in event a coup begins^ he. become head of country team and direct representative, of President, with Truehart in effect acting as PGLAD. On coup contacts we will maintain continuous guidance and will expect equally continuous reporting with prcr:rot account of any important divergences in assessments of Barkins and Snith. ' . .. .

8- If coup should start, question of protecting U*S* nationals at once arises* We can move Marine Battalion into Saigon hy air from

Okinawa within 2^ hours if available. We are sending

instructions to C1KCPAC to arrange orderly novenenu of seaborne Marine Battalion to waters adjacent to South Vietnasie in position .to close Saigcn Within a-o-oro:-: irately 2k hours, \ . \ ■

9* 5?3 are now examining post-coup contingencies here^and request your imnediate recc^rieridations on position to be 'adopted after coup begins, especially with respect to requests for assistance of.different sorts fron one side or the other also request you forward contingency recommendations for action if coup (A) succeeds, (3) fails, (c) is

indecisive.

10. We reiterate burden of proof must be on coup group to show a substantial possibility of quick success; otherwise, we should discourage them, from proceeding since a miscalculation could result in jeopardizing U„S„ position in Southeast Asia*

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NMD 63316, By: NWD Date: 2011

Hb

TOP SZCRET

30 OctOC :* 1953

FROM: KarkinSj Saigon

To: " Taylor, Washington, D.

NR 202S

C

Your JCS 4183-63 arrived as I was in the process of drafting one for you a:or.3

the same lines. I share your concern, I have not as yet seen SAIGON* 768, I s. .

to the Embassy for a copy at 0S30 this morning - as of now 1100 - the Embassy has

not released it. Also CINCPAC 0-300040Z infor JCS came: as a surprise to me as I

am unaware of any .change in local situation which indicates necessity for ac.lo.as

directed. v Perhaps I f ll find the answer in SAIGON 76S. Or perhaps actions directed

£n CINCPAC 300040Z are precautionary in light of Gen. Don's statement report cl in

CAS 1925 that a coup .would take place in any case.net later than 2 November. It rnigi

be noted Don also is supposed to have said CAS SAIGON-1956 - that though, the cc,

committee would not release the details, the Ambassador would receive the complete

plan for study two days prior to the scheduled times for the coup.

I have not been informed by the Ambassador that; he has received any such plait**,

I talked to hirn yesterday on my return from 3angkok and he offered no additional infc

mation. Ke has agreed to keep me completely informed-.if anything new turns up. .

Incidentally he leaves for Washington tomorrow (31st) afternoon. If the coup is to happen before the second he's hardly going to get two days notice.

One thine I have found out, Don is eithe_r'Tyi^g -or playing both ends againsi the middle. What he told me is diametrically opposed to what he told Col. Coneim Hi :.-■ Conein the couo will be before November 2nd. He told me he \vas not planning a :c . p., I sat with Don and Big'Minh for 2 hours during the parade last Saturday. No one rr.er.-

.tioned coups. To go on: * ' " _- . * ■ .

Both CAS SAIGON 1896 and "1925 were sent first and "delivered to me after cfispa^ Mv 1991 was discussed with the Ambassador prior to disp&tciu My 1993 was not, basically because I had not seem CAS SAIGON 1925 before dispacch and I just wante-r ze'C the record straight from my side'and where my name was involved. * \

The Ambassador and I are certainly in to'ueh.with each other but whether the gc: . tications between us are effective is something else.' I will say Cabot T s methods cf operations are entirely different from Amb Noltings as 'far as reporting in the military

is concerned. ,* ■

' Fritz would always clear messages concerning the military with me or my star: prior to dispatch* So would John Richardson if MACV was concerned. This is not tix today. Cite CAS 1896 and 1925 for examples. Also you will recall I was not the 1

recipient of several messages you held when you were here. 1

CINCPAC brought this matter up again when I saw him in Bangkok* this past wee end. He is going to make a check, when he returns to see if he holds messages I have not received. Have just received SAI.GON 7oS* I will have to report you are correct

w»

in believing that she Ambassador is forwarding military reports and evaluations wiihou consulting me. For his weekly, report to the President, at his request, I furnish hint a short military statement. For preparation of 7oS I made no mention of the Delta* I will answer 76S separately today.*

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There is a basic difference apparently between the Ambassadors

*

thinking and mine on the interpretation of the guidance contained in CAP 63560 dated 6 October and the additional thoughts, I repeat, thoughts expressed in CAS Washington 74228 dated J) October. I interpret CAP 63560 as our basic guidance and that CAS 74228 being additional thoughts did not change the,basic'guidance in that no initiative should now be taken to give any active covert encouragement "to a coup. The Ambassador feels that 74228 does change 63560 and that a change of government is desired and feels as stated in CAS SAIGON 1964 that the only way to bring about such a change is by a coup.

I'm not opposed to a change in government, no indeed, but I'm inclined to feel that at this time the change should be in methods of governing rather than complete change of personnel. I ha,ve seen no battin^ order proposed by any ox the coup groups, I think We should take a hard look at any proposed list before we make any decisions. In my contacts here I have seen no one with the-strength of character of Diem 3 at least in fighting communists. Certainly there are no Generals qualifi* to take over in my opinion,

I am not a Diem man per se. I certainly see the faults in his character. I am here to back 14$ million SVN people in their fight again, communism and it just happens that Diem is their leader at this time.-Most of the Generals I have talked to agree they can go along with Diem, all say its the Nhu family they are opposed to.

Perhaps the pressures we have begun to apply will cause Die in and Nhu to change their ways- This is apparently not"evident as yet. I'm sure the pressures we have begun to apply if continued will affect the 1 war effort. To'date they have not. I am watching this closely and will report

when I think they have. •■/...■ l' m '

I do not a^ree with the Ambassadors assessment in 768 thai: we are just holding our own. The GVN is a way ahead in the I, II and parts of the III corns -and making progress in the Delta. Nothing has happened in October to change the assessment you and Secretary McNamara made after your visit here. ' ^ . —^ ~ -;\.

I would suggest we hot try to change horses too quickly. Tha we continue to take persuasive actions that will make the horses change their course and methods of action. That we win the military effort as quickly as possible, then let them make any and all the changes they want.

After all, rightly or wrongly, we have backed Diem for eight -lon<* hard years. To me it'seems incongruous now to get him down, kick him around and <*et rid of him. - The US has been his mother superior and father confessor since he's been in office and he has leaned on us heavily.

Leaders of other under-developed countries will take a dim view of our assistance "if "they too were led to believe the same, fate lies in store

for them.. .: _ -

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. • ■ 3G1030Z October 1962

FROM: General. Harkins, Saigon ",'

TO: General Taylor, Washington ■ ..-NR: MAC 2033

1. Admiral Felt not addee this message but will be provided copy upon his arrival Saigon tomorrow. ' ',

'-V 2. I now hold copy of SAIGON 763 and this amplifies my MAC 2 ; which initially responded to your JCS 4183-63.

3. SAIGON" 76S was Ambassador Lodge personal report to President in response to DEPTEL 576 which is possible explanation why I had not sesn.

76S until one week after dispatch and only then when I requested a copy I might intelligently respond to your JCS 4188-63 which referred to 768.

4. Upon receipt of DEPTEL 576 Ambassador Lodge requested that I / provide him brief suggested inputs for responses to questions 1 and 2 (a) I

of DEPTEL 576 in that they were principally military in nature. I have done this on weekly basis but have had no knowledge as to whether my suggested / brief inputs were utilized in his persona,! report since as indicated afeot these

were not opened to me. .' ■

5. My suggested brief inputs for para 1 which were provided Hie Ambassador for use as he saw fit in drafting his personal evaluations for

\ . the past three weeks follow: ' . , •

'16 OCT: On balance we are gaining in the contest with the VC. There will continue to be minor ups and downs but the general trend has been and t continues upward. ' .: j

23 OCT: V/hile significant changes are, and will be, difficult to identify on a day to day or even weekly comparative basis as regards the contest with the Viet Cong, the general trend continues to be favorable. The tempo of RVN - initiated operations is increasing and recently £13 tempo of VC - initiated activity has fallen off,

30 OCT: No change from that previously reported. National day z:":VLrs this past week tended to bring about a slight reduction in the tempo p£ RVN initiated actions, however VC initiated actions also waned and on b lance the trend continues to be "favorable, . •- . .,

6. My suggested brief inputs for paragraph. 2(a) which were provided the Ambassador for use as he saw fit in drafting his personal evaluations for the oast three weeks follow: ....

16 OCT: The government has responded at many points when we have cited need for improvement in the campaign against the VC (shift of boundaries; placement of VNSF activities in corps areas under OPCON ci corps comdr; reallocation of forces). Additionally .Gen Don a*td Gen' Stilwell ray G-3 have spent the last week in the conduct of a Corps by Corps assessment of the present situation with a view to s further desirable reallocation of forces. Based on their recommendations I will make further recommendations to Pres. Diem, (for inclusion in ANS to para 2(a) Ambassador was advised that US/GVN military relations remain good).

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23 OCT: Resoonse received from the government iiv reaction to military areas where we have cited needed improvement has been favorabl/e in some areas, while in other areas no indication^! response has been received to date. In no case have they flatly resisted recommended improvements. Favorable indications are the commitment of nearly half of the general reserve to operations, plans for possible further redistribution of forces, and a recognition of the requirement to effect consolidation in the strategic hamlet program. t ,., v j ;

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30 OCT: No specific responses have been received from the government this past week in reaction to military areas where we have cited need for improvement. This is believed due in great part to their pre-occupation"with National*day affairs. '.;:.'

7 # Comparison of my 23 October suggested brief inputs quoted above with SAIGON 768 indicates Ambassador Lodge did not see fit to utilise my suggestions to any significant degree. It also apparent that upon further reflection Ambassador determined that more detailed response was required than he initially felt necessary when he requested brief inputs on principally military items. :

8. I believe certain portions SAIGON 7^8 require specific comment.

These follow: .. - — - '" ■" "

Para F of answer to question 1 - View of Vice Pres The that there are onlv 15 to 20 all-around hamlets in the area south of Saigon which are really good is ridiculous and indicates need for him to gat cut of Saigon and visit countryside so as to really^know of-progress which Lj bein<* made In past two weeks I have visited nine Delta provinces, { Ninh, Binh Duong, Hau.Nghia, Long An, Kien Phong, Kien Hoa, An C

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Phon^ Dinh, Chuong Thien) eight .ofjvvhich are south of Saigon, and I do not find the zrrovince chiefs or sector advisorsJ;o hold the same views as Vice

Pres Tho. ". . > J

Para H of answer to question 1 - I am unable to concur in statement

that quote one cannot drive "as much around the country as one could two

years a^o end of quote. I believe it will be some time before, if we ever

do, experience mass surrenders of the VC." I am unable to concur in

statement that VC is quote in fact, reckoned at a higher figure than iz v.-£,s

two years ago end quote. I havfc not observed the signs thai hatred of the

Government has tended to diminish the Army's vigor, enthusiasm and

enterprise. I find it difficult to believe the few rumors one hears regarding

Generals bein^ paid off with money and flashy cars". Most cars I see in

use by Generals are same they have been using for past two years and few

if any Qualify as flashy to my mind. I do not concur with the evaluation*.

at the 14 October report of the Delta Subcommittee of the Committee >n

Province Rehabilitation which states that the VC are gaining. Moreover I

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take exception to the implication that the report represents official country team agency views and is consequently authoritative in the views it presents. Agency representatives on this sub-committee served as individuals in reporting to the COPROR Committee, incidentally there were wide divergencies even among sub-committee members. COPROR Committee received but did not place its stamp of approval or concurrence on report of its Sub-Committee. CO PRO R "Committee returned the report to its Sub-Committee for rework. Consequently this report has not as yet been submitted to country team nor has it been referred to individual country team agencies for review and/or comment. Any views quoted from this Sub-Committee report therefore have no rpt no validity as expressions of country team or individual agency views, ." . \

Para J of answer to question 1 - With regard *to the quote existing political control over troop movements, which prevents optimum use of • the Army ^nd quote, I do not deny that political influences enter into this picture however I feel we have made and ai*e making significant strides in this area and do not concur that time is not working for us - so long as political controls remain as at present. ^ y '

Para J of anser to question- 1 - As indicated in paras 5 and 6 above and in other reports I have filed my evaluation is that from the military point of view the tread is definitely in RVN favor consequently I cannot concur that quote we at present are not doing much more than holding our own end quote. \

Answer under (a) to question 2-1 am correctly quoted here bui para 6 above gives fall context of my suggested input.

Answer under (c) to question 2 - As indicated para 6 above Ambassador was advised that US'/GVN* military relations remain good.

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

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FROM: Iodge TO ': State CAS- 20o3

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not"think we have the power to delay or discourage a coup. Dor; has made it clear many times that this is a Vietnamese affair. It is theoretically possible for us to turn ever the information which has been given to us in confidence to Dien and this would undoubtedly stop the coup and would asafte traitors out of us. For practical purposes therefore I would say that we have very little influence on what is essentially a Vietnamese affair. In addition, this would place the heads of the Generals, their civilian supporters, and lower military officers on the spot, thereby sacrificing .a significant portion of the civilian and military leadership needed to carry the war against the VC to its successful conclusion After our efforts not to discouraga a coup and this change of heart, we would, foreclose any possibility of change of the C-VIJ for the better. Dieaa/Khu have displayed no intentions to date of a desire to change the traditional Methods of control through police action or take any repeat any actions which would uK&0?:v"-iTte the power position or solidarity of the Kjgo family, This, despite our heavy "pressures directed DEPIEL 53^ ■ If our &tte:.vot to thwart this c ._> were successful, which we doubt, it is our fir^i estimate "that ycunger officers 3 small groups of military, would then engage in* an abortive action creating chaos ideally suited to VC objectives. , !

2. While we will attempt a combined assessment in a following message,-time has not yet perasitted substantive examination of this matter with General Earkins. 2fy general view is that the U.S, is trying to bring this medieval country into the 20th Century and that we have made considerable progress in military and economic ways but to gain victory we must also bring then into the 20th Centu?.y politically and that can only be done oy either a thoroughgoing change in the behavior of the present government

or by another government. The Viet Cong-problem is partly military :uu it is also partly psychological and political.

3. .With respect to paragraph 3 Hef., I believe'that we should continue our present position of keeping hands off but continue to monitor and press for more detailed information. CAS has seen analyzing po .r.tlal couo forces for some time and it is their estimate that the Generals have probably figured their chances pretty closely and probably also expect that once they begin to-move, not only planned units, but other units will

join them. We believe that Vietnam's best Generals are involved in

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directing this effort. If they can't pull it off- it is doubtful other military leadership could do so successfully* It is understandable that the Generals would "be reticent to reveal full details of th plan for fear of leaks to the GVDI. ^ ■ •

km ' Be para- k, Ref*, we expect thst-Conein will meet Don on the night of 30 Oct or early morning 31 Oct- We "agree *rith Para. k } Kef., that we snould continue to press for details and question Don as to hi, estimate of the relative strengths of opposing forces. We do not believe, however, that we\should show zrrr si^nc of attempting to direct this affair our selves or of giving the impression of second, thoughts on this Vietnamese initiation. In the meantime, we will respond specifically to CAS Washington 79126. Please note that CAS Sr-igon 2059 corrects CAS Saigon 2023 and tab regiments of the 7th Division are included in the coup forces.

• 5. Apparently Para. 5, Hef., overlooks CAS 1^5* 5 Oct 1903 which gave an account of the face to face meeting of General rr B: and Conein at Minh's instigation and through the specific arrangerfient of Gen Don. Xinh specifically identified Gen Don as participating in a plan to change the government. Please note that Minh : s rem* trks parallel in every way the later statements of Gen. Don. ffes believe that the limitation of contact to Don and Cein is an appropriate security measure consonant with our urging that the smallest number of persons be aware of these details, .

6. tfe do not believe it vise to ark that "Big Mir.h" pass his pi 2 to Gen. Stilvell* The Vietnamese believe that there are naaabeJPS of th3 U*S. military who leak to the Government of Vietnam. I do not doubt thav this'is an unjust suspicion but it is a fact that this suspicion exists and there is no use in pretending that it does not.

J. I much appreciate your furnishing the berth-equipped military

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aircraft which I trust is a jet. I intend to tell Pan American tha jet has been diverted for my use and therefore I "will no longer need their services, this will undoubtedly leak to the newspapers and the GVN may study this move with some suspicion. I will answer any inquiries on this score to the effect that I -am most pleased by this attention end that this is obviously done as a*measure to insure my comfort and save my time. .Do allay suspicions further 7 I will offer space on the aircraft to MACV for emergency leave cases, etcV, and handle this in as routine fashion as possible. I wish to reserve comment as to my actual time of departure until I have some additional information, hopefully tomorrow.

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8, Your para, 7- scsaettfrai pcrpj 3 ne* It does not s-em sensibi to have the military in charge of a m 2r which Is so profoundly r>; tical as a change of government. In fact, I would say to do this "/.: probably be the end of any hope for a change of government here. Thi..-. is said impersonally as a general proposition, since Con* Earkins i. u splendid General and ari o],d friend of mine to who&"2 would gladly entrust anything I have. I assume that the Embassy and KACV are tijio -handle normal activities under A, that CAS can continue coup con:,a:-ts under 3, and as regards C, we nust simply do the very best ve can xn the light of events after the coup has started. j

9- We appreciate the steps taken as outlined in para. 8. "cv;evjr ; we should remember that the CPTK is not totally inept in its foreign soundings and that these moves should be as discreet and security conscious as possible. I would, of course, call for these forces only in case of extreme necessity since my hope coincides "frith the Generals that this will be an all-Vietnamese affair* " --

10. We anticipate that at the. out set of the coup, unless it ncv::; with lightning shriftness, the GYN will request me or Gfen. Karkins to use our influence to call it off. I believe our responsibilities should be

■ that our influence certainly could not be superior to that of the President who is Commander-in-Chief and that if he is unable to call it off, we would certainly be unable to do so and would merely be risking American lives attempting to interfere in this Vietnamese problem, She Government might request aircraft. Helicopters., :Tor the evacuation of key personalities that would have to be studied closely,, but we would certainly not commit our planes and pilots between the battle lines of the opposing forces. We should, rather, state that we would "be willing to act in this fashion during a truce in which both sides agree to t!*b removal of key personalities. 1 believe that th-re would be tomsdij political problems in attempting to take these personalities to snot;: _-.■ neighboring country and probably we would be best served in deposit:,v.; them in Saip-an where the absence of press, cossm^ications, etc., wovi..

• allow us some leeway to make a further decision as to their ultimate! disposition. If senior Vietnamese personalities and their families sre-guested asylum in the Embassy or other American installations, ve ve ; "

■ probably have to grant it in light of our previous action with resp -\ to Tri Quang. This will undoubtedly present latei; problems but hop^fvlly the new government might feel disposed to help us solve this problem". Naturally, asylum would be granted on the same basis as the Buddhists, i.e., ph.ysi.cal presence at the Embassy or other location.

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11- As to requests from the Cenersls, they raay well have need ' . of funds at the last moment with which to ovy off potential opposition. To the extent that these funds can be passed discreetly, I "believe We should furnish thesij provided we*are convinced that the rjroposed coup is sufficiently Well organised to have a good chance of success* If 'they are successful, they will undoubtedly ask for prompt recognition and some assurance that military and economic aid wil l continue at cor&ai level- We should be prepared to make these statements if the issue is clear-cut predicating our position on the President's stated desi continue the War against the VC to final victory, VOA might be an

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important means of disseminating this message. Should th we will have to pick up the pieces as best we can at that t2ae» We have a ccesmitment to the Generals from the August* episode to attempt to help ■in the evacuation of their dependents- We should try to live up to this if conditions will permit. American complicity wiH undoubtedly be charged and there might be some acts taken against specific personalities which we should anticipate and siake provision against as best we can. Should the coup prove indecisive and "a protracted struggle is in progress, we should probably offer our good offices to help resolve the issue in -;ke interest of the war against the VC* This might hold some benefit in terms of concessions by Stflf* We will naturally incur some opprobrium from both sides in our role as mediator- - However } this opprobrium WG&1& ■probably be less distasteful than a deadlock which would open the door, to the VC. We consider such a deadlock as the least likely possibility

of the three , *

12. As regards your para- 10, I do net know what acre proof can be

offered than the fact these men are obviously prepared to risk their lives and that they want nothing for themselves* If I am any Judge of human nature, Don's face expressed of sincerity and determination ori *;k: rn.orr.ino" that I spoke to him. Heartily agree that a miscalculation could jewirdize position in Southeast Asia* We also run tremendous riks 'h'j

doing nothing.

If we were convinced that the coup was going to fail, we would, cf course, do everything we could to stop it.

13. Gen. Harkins has read this and does not concur.

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CAS 79^07, 30 Oct '63

FROM BUNBY TO LODGE

1. Our reading your thoughtful 2063 leads us to believe a significant difference of shading may exist on one crucial point (see next para.) and on one or two lesser matters easily clarified.

2. We do not accept as a basis for U.S. policy that we have no power to delay or discourage a coup. In your paragraph 12 you say that if you were convinced that the coup was going to fail you would of course do everything you could to stop it. We believe that on this same basis you should take action to persuade coup leaders to stop or delay any operation which, in your best judgment , does not clearly give high prospect of success. We have not considered any betrayal of generals to Diem, and our 79109 explicitly reject that course. We recognize the danger of appearing hostile to generals, but we believe that our own position should be on as firm ground as possible, hence we cannot limit ourselves to proposition implied in your message that only conviction of certain failure justifies intervention. We believe that your standard for intervention should be that stated above.

3. Therefore, if you should conclude that there is not clearly a high propsect of success, you should communicate this doubt to generals in a way calculated to persuade them to desist at least until chances are better. In such a communication you should use the weight of U.S. best advice and explicity reject any implication that we oppose the effort of the generals because of preference for present regime. We recognize need to bear in mind general's interpretation of U.S. role in i960 coup attempt, and your agent should maintain clear distinction between strong and honest advice given as a friend and any opposition to their objectives. t

k. We continue to be deeply interested in up-to-the-minute assesment of prospects and are sending this before reply to our CAS 79126. We want continuous exchange latest assessments on this topic.

5. To clarify our intent, paragraph 7 of our 79109 is rescinded and we restate our desires as follows:

a. While you are in Saigon you will be Chief of Country Team in all. circumstances and our only instruction is that we are sure it will help to have Harkins fully informed at all stages and to use advice from both him and Smith in framing guidance for coup contacts and assessment. We contir: s to

be concerned that neither Conein nor any other reporting source is getting the clarity we would like with respect to alienment of forces and level of determination among generals.

b. When you leave Saigon and before there is a coup, Trueha j will be Chief of the Country Team. Our only modification of existing procedures

is that in this circumstance we wish all instruction to Conein to be conducted in immediate consultation with Harkins and Smith so that all three kndw what is sold in Conein. Any disagreement among the three on such instruction should be reported to Washington and held for our resolution, * when time permits.

c. If you have left and a coup occurs, we believe that emergency situation requires, pending your return, that direction of country team be vested in most senior officer with experience of military decisions, and the officer in our view is Harkins- We do'not intend that this switch in final responsibility should be publicized in any way, and Harkins will of course be guided in basic posture by our instructions, which follow in paragraph 6.

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we do not believe that this switch will have the effect suggested in your

paragraph 8. *

6- This paragraph contains our present standing instructions for U.S.

posture in the event of a coup.

a. U.S. authorities will reject appeals foi^ direct intervention from either side, and U.S.-controlled aircraft and other resources will not be committed between the battle lines or in support of either side, without authorization from Washington.

b. In event of indecisive contest, U.S. authorities may in their discretion agree to perform any acts agreeable to both sides, such as removal of key personalties or relay of information. In such actions, however, U.S. authorities will strenuously avoid appearance of pressure on either side. It is not in the interest of USG to be or appear to be either instrument of existing government or instrument of coup.

c. In the event of imminent or actual failure of coup, U.S. authorities may afford asylum in their discretion to those to whom there is any express or implied obligation of this sort. We believe however that in such

a case it would be in our interest and probably in interest of those seeking asylum that they seek protection of other Embassies in addition to our own. This point should be made strongly if need arises.

d. But once a coup under responsible leadership has begun, and within these restrictions, it is in the interest of the U.S. Government that

it should succeed.

7. We have your message about return to Washington and we suggest that all public comment be kept as low-key and quiet as possible, and we also urge that if possible you keep open the exact time of your departure. We are strongly sensitive to great disadvantage of having you out of Saigon if this should turn out to be a week of decision, and if it can be avoided we would prefer not to see you pinned to a fixed hour of departure now.

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