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Final Draft of the Task Force Report recommends sending U.S. Battle Groups and an Engineer Battalion for training purposes; the assignment of coastal patrol missions to Cli'CPACFLT; and the air surveillance and close-support role to CDICPACAF. It also recommends the Vice-Presidential trip, a letter to Diem from Kennedy, increased MAP and other assistance, and a general U.S. commitment to support of Diem. Final Draft Task Force Report "A Program of Action, " 6 May 1961 . ... ,

OSD requests the JCS to review and study the military advisability of possible commitment of U.S. forces to SVN. Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum for Chairman, JCS, 8 May 196i mmmi

c * • 0 .

President Kennedy provides Vice President Johnson with a personal letter to present to President Diem. Kennedy suggests that, in addition to actions in the Counter-Insurgency Plan, the U.S. is prepared to; (l) augment the personnel of MAAG, (2) expand MAAG's duties, (3) provide MAP support for the Civil Guard, and (h) provide support for the Vietnamese Junk Force. President Kennedy letter to President Diem, 8 May 1961..

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The President makes the following decisions: (l) the U.S. objective is to prevent communist domination of SVTJ and to create in that country a viable and increasingly democratic society, (2) the President directs full examination of the size and composition of forces which would be desirable in the case of a possible commitment of U.S. forces to Vietnam, (3) finally, the President approves continuation of the special Task Force on Vietnam. The decisions of this KSAil are based on the report "A Program of Axtion to Prevent Communist Domination of SVff." NSAM 52, 11 May 1961,

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President Diem asserts that the recent developments in Laos emphasize the grave Vietnamese concern for the security of their country with its long end vulnerable frontiers. President Diem states that "as a small net ion we cannot hope to meet all of our defense needs alone..." and expresses confidence that the Vietnamese needs will be given consideration in Washington. President Diem letter to President Kennedy, 15 May I96L

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Lansdale summarizes information on the possible deployment

of U.S. combat forces in TO. He refers to a conversation between Diem and Vice President Johnson on the subject.

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"Much of the thinking has been on stationing U.S. combat forces in the high plateau...however, General Williams has written a brief memorandum to me recommending such U.S. forces to be stationed on the coast..." Lansdale Memorandum for Deputy Secretary Gilpatric, l8 May I96I.

The Vice President reports on his mission to SEA. Johnson feels, on the basis of his visit, that the situation in Laos has created doubt and concern about U.S. intentions throughout all of SEA. "No amount of success at Geneva can, of itself, erase this." It is Johnson 1 s impression that his mission arrested the decline of confidence in the U.S. "We didn't buy time — we were given it. If these men I saw at your request were bankers, I would know — without bothering to ask — that there would be no further extensions of my note." The fundamental decision required of the U.S. is whether we are to attempt a major effort in support of the forces of freedom in the area or "throw in the towel." Johnson recommends "we proceed with a clear-cut and strong program of action." Vice President Johnson Memorandum to President Kennedy, 23 May 1961.

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President Diem sends the U.S. a study on Vietnamese needs to meet the insurgency situation in the South, Diem suggests that, in light of the current situation, an additional 100,000 men above the new force level of lTO^OOO will be required to counter the threat of communist domination. Diem recommends a considerable expansion of the U.S. Military Advisory Group in SVN as an essential requirement, and, finals, Diem expresses his mistrust of Sihanouk T s communist sympathies and antagonism of SW. President Diem letter to President Kennedy, % June 1961.... x&J

President Kennedy requests that the Secretary of Defense estimate requirements and make recommendations with respect to the anticipated future U.S. needs in the field of unconventional warfare and paramilitary operations. HSAM 56,

28 June 1961 nk

Lansdale relates a conversation between Vice President Tho and Colonel Black. In discussing the Staley Mission, Tho concedes that it is impossible for the U.S. to provide SW with piastres. The GVN feels an increase in piastre return per dollar would cause inflation and, in turn, an inevitable demand for wage increases. Tho further concedes that the basic problem in VH is more political than economic. Tho's impression of the current situation in SVfr is more pessimistic

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than that of the Americans. Lansdale Memorandum for

Deputy Secretary Gilpatric, 12 July 1961 jj5

22. Mr, William P. Bundy' forwards the joint action program proposed by the GVlf-US Special Financial Group to the I Assistant Secretary of Defense. The report prepared by

Dr. Eugene Staley, Chairman of the Group, has been submitted to President Hgo Diem and President John F. Kennedy, and includes the fiscal and economic implications of increasing the Vietnamese armed forces to 200,000 strength. The military portions, in addition to the requirements already planned, would require approximately $1*2 million, during the 18-month period, July 6l-December 62. Bundy Memorandum to Gilpatric, 25 July 1961, (Staley Report attached). .,...,... 177

23. General Lionel C. McGarr, Chief, MAAG-Vietnam, reviews the military situation and offers recommendations for continued improvement of the situation in SVN to President Diem. Among the recommendations made by McGarr are: (l) that a national internal security council be established to prepare and execute the Vietnamese National Counter Insurgency Plan;

(2) that effective border and coastal surveillance capabilities be initiated; (3) that U.S. advisers be more effectively utilized by accompanying ARVN units on combat operations; and (k) finally, that the reorganization of the military command structure and establishment of* a single chain of command be implemented as recommended in the Counter Insurgency Plan. Aide-Memoire for President Diem, received Secretary of Defense, 2 August 1961............... 227

24. The JCS do not believe that an alternate force of 270,000 would be required to enable the HVMAF to conduct counter-insurgency operations and, concurrently, be prepared to meet overt aggression. They recommend that the strategic force objectives for W remain at the 9 division level (200,000) subject to further assessment. JCS Memorandum for Secretary of Defense, JCSM 518-61, 3 August 1961 mmmm 239

25„ The President approves the Staley recommendations and decides that the U.S. will provide equipment and training assistance for an increased RVNAF from 170,000 to 200,000. It is hoped that President Diem will get the maximum mileage in terms of internal political support from this new commitment, and that he will involve more elements of the non-communist political opposition in the civic action program, NSAM 65, 11 August 196l 2^1

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26. The situation in Worth and South VN is analyzed and the scope of the communist threat to SVN is estimated for the following year. The analysis concludes that the DRV is in thorough political control in Worth VN and "when Ho is no longer active, there will probably be a

I struggle for power between the Moscow-oriented and the

I t Peking-oriented elements of the Party." Dissatisfaction

continues in South VN with Diem's leadership. The Array continues to be a major factor in future political developments in the South. The outlook is for a prolonged and difficult struggle between the VC insurgents and the GVN. HIE lU.3/53-61, 15 August 1961 21*5

27. The President approves the following actions: (l) intensification of diplomatic efforts to achieve Souvanna's agreement to the Paris proposals; (2) authorization to undertake conversations with SEATO allies on an enlargement of the concept'of SEATO Plan 5* an ^ (3) an increase in U.S # advisors in Laos. NSAM 80, 29 August 1961......... 2k*J

28. The JCS sends the Secretary of Defense a draft memorandum for the President on military'intervention in Laos. The JCS suggests that if the President decides that U.S. forces should be employed in Laos, that SEATO Plan 5 is the proper basic vehicle for the contemplated action. The political objective of the intervention is to confront the Sino-Soviet Bloc with a military force of Asian and Western powers capable of stopping the communist advance. JCS Memorandum for Secretary of Defense, JCSM 661-61, 20 Septem-

t ber, I96I 2k$

29. The Bureau of Intelligence and Research assesses the crisis in South VN and analyzes the short term prospects. The study recognizes that communist progress toward its objective of overthrowing President Diem has been substantial. Since I960, more than 6,500 civilians, officers, and military personnel have been killed or kidnapped. Recent U.S. support has raised Diem's political stature, but there has been no conclusive, reversal of deteriorating trends. The security situation remains unimproved. However, the Government's comprehensive CIP, supported by U.S 0 aid, is beginning to show favorable results. Over the next year, developments in Laos may have more influence on VN than any improvement in the Diem Government. Department of State Research Memorandum RFE-1, 29 September 1961 258

30. It is estimated that present armed, full-time VC strength is about 16,000, an increase of 12,000 since April of i960,

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and of 1+,000 in the past three months. While only 10-20$ of this strength consists of cadres infiltrated from North' VN, the remaining 80-90$ includes remnants of the approximately 10,000 stay-behind personnel who went underground during the 195^-^1955 regroupment and evacuation of Vietnamese communist army units following the Indo-China War. Though some weapons and equipment have been infiltrated into South W, there has been no positive identification of Communist Bloc-manufactured military equipment in South W. SNIE 53-2-61, 5 October 1961

31. The JCS feel the time is now past when actions short of intervention by outside forces can reverse the rapidly worsening situation in Southeast Asia. They consider the execution of SEATO Plan % or a suitable variation thereof, to be the military minimum commensurate with the situation. JCS Memorandum for Secretary of Defense, JCSM 704-6l, 5 October 1961

32. It is the opinion of the JCS that the use of SEATO forces at the greatest possible number of entry points along the whole South Vitf border, i.e., over several hundred miles, is not feasible. Further, the alternative of using SEATO forces to cover solely the 17th parallel is militarily unsound. "What is needed is not the spreading out of our forces throughout SEA, but rather a consolidated effort in Laos where a firm stand can be taken..." A limited interim course of action is provided herewith in the event SEATO Plan 5 i s considered politically unacceptable. JCS Memorandum for Secretary of Defense, JCSM 716-61, 9 October 1961.

33. "For what one man's feel is worth, mine — based on very-close touch with Indo-China in the 195^ war and civil war afterwards until Diem took hold — is that it i£ really now or never if we are to arrest the gains being made by the Vietcong." Bundy suggests that an early, hard-hitting operation has a 70$ chance of success. "The 30$ is that we would wind up like the'French in 195^; white men can't win this kind of fight. On a 70-30 basis, I would, myself, • favor going in." Bundy memorandum for Secretary McFamara, 10 October 1961

3^-. It is estimated that the Communist Bloc would not commit North Vietnamese or Chinese Communist forces to a large-scale military attack against South VW or Laos in response to an assumed SEATO action to patrol the GVN coast

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and secure the border involving about 25,000 men. Neutralist governments in SEA would be most concerned at the increased tension and danger of general hostilities. Nationalist China would be elated with the SEATO action. SHIE 10-3-6, 10 October 1961 . 313

35•' At a meeting with President Kennedy, the following actions were agreed upon: (l) the Defense Department is authorized to send the Air Force Jungle Jim Squadron to VN; (2) General Maxwell Taylor will leave for SVN on a Presidential mission; and (3) the State Department will pursue specific political.actions, i.e., protest to the ICC on North VN support of the VC; table a White Paper at the UN; and consult with our SEATO allies regarding support in VN. Gil-patric Memorandum for Record, 11 October 1961 322

36. "With respect to training the Vietnamese Array for the 'wrong war 1 , it seems clear that in recent months the insurgency in South Vietnam has developed far beyond the capacity of police control. All of the Vietnamese Army successes this past summer have met Viet Cong opposition in organized battalion strength...This change in the situation has not been fully understood by many U.S. officials. In this regard, there is some concern that the Thompson Mission may try to sell the Malayan concept of police control without making a sufficiently careful evaluation of conditions in South Vietnam." JCS Memorandum for General Taylor, CM-390-61, 12 October

I96I. 32^

37. The President requests that General Taylor proceed to Saigon to appraise the situation in South Vietnam and to report his views on the courses of action which the U.S. might take to avoid further deterioration in the situation and eventually to eliminate the threat to the independence of South Vietnam. President Kennedy letter to General

Taylor, 13 October I96I. <>* 32?

38. The President directs the following actions be taken: (l) make preparations for the publication of the White Paper on North Vietnamese aggression; (2) develop plans for presentation of the VN case In the UN; (3) introduce the Jungle Jim Squadron into SVN for the purpose of training Vietnamese forces - He indicates that General Taylor should undertake

a mission to Saigon. NSAM 10^, 13 October 1961 323

39- It is the conclusion of the HoD General Counseltliat the proposed introduction of U.S. combat and logistic forces into VN would constitute violations of Articles l6 and 17 of the

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Geneva Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in TO of July 20, 195^- Introduction of U.S. troops even for purposes of flood control would still constitute a violation of the Geneva Accords by the Government of TO. If a decision is made to send U.S. troops into TO, the U.S. should justify it on the ground of collective self-defense. "Nothing in the Geneva Accords should be read as abridging the inherent right of Vietnam and the United States to take actions in collective self-defense." DoD General Counsel Memorandum for Mr. Hadyn Williams, 26 October 1961.. 329

kO. General Taylor summarizes the fundamental conclusions of his group and his personal recommendations. Taylor concludes there is a double crisis in confidence: doubt that the U.S. is determined to save SEA, and doubt that . Diem's methods can defeat the Communist purposes and methods. Taylor recommends that the U.S. Government join with the GTO in a massive joint effort as part of a total mobilization of GTO resources to cope with both the VC and the ravages of the flood. Specifically, the U.S. Government will provide individual administrators, conduct a joint survey of conditions in the provinces, assist the GTO in effecting surveillance and control over the coastal waters, and finally, offer to introduce into South TO a military Task Force to operate under U.S. military control* General Taylor telegram (cite BAGI00005) for President Kennedy, 1 November 1961 331

Jfl. Taylor presents his reasons for recommending the introduc-* tion of a U.S. military force into South Vietnam. "I have

reached the conclusion that this is an essential action if we are to reverse the present downward trend of events... there can be no action so convincing of U.S. seriousness of purpose and hence so reassuring to the people and government of STO and to our other friends and allies in SEA as the introduction of U.S. forces into STO. 1 ' Taylor suggests that the stx^ategic reserve of U.S. forces is seriously weak 1 and that U.S. prestige would be more heavily engaged in I I STO by this action. However, the size of the U.S. force J J introduced need not be great to provide the military presence necessary to produce the desired effect. General Taylor telegram (cite BAGI00006) for President Kennedy, 1 November 1961 337

k2 m The JCS and Secretary McNamara do not believe major units of U.S. forces should be introduced in STO unless the U.S. is willing to commit itself to the clear objective of preventing the fall of STO to communism and to support this

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commitment by military action, and preparation for possible later action. They recommend that the U.S commit itself to this objective and support the recommendations of General Taylor toward its fulfillment. Secretary of Defense Memorandum for the President. 8 November 1961 3**3

43. The head of the British Advisory Mission submits to Diem his plan for clearing the VC from the Delta, The central idea is the creation of a network of "strategic hamlets 1 ' akin to those employed successfully by Thompson in defeating the communist guerillas in Malaya, R.G.K. Thompson letter to

Diem, 11 November 1961 , ..., . 3I+5

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k^ Reversing the November 8 Defense recommendation for a commitment of substantial U.S. ground forces to South Vietnam this November 11 Rusk-McNamara memorandum to the President (perhaps prepared at Kennedy's specific direction) escalates the rhetoric regarding U.S, interest in a free South Vietnam, but restricts the military recommendation: (a) employ only support forces now; (b) defer any decision to send "larger organized units with actual or potential direct military missions, 11 Whether Kennedy fully accepted the high-1 blown statements of U.S. interest and commitment to the

GVN is not known. State/Defense Memorandum to the President,

11 November 1961 359

1*5. The Joint Staff submits to the Chairman, JCS, briefs of the military actions contained in the draft National Security Action Memorandum resulting from the Taylor Mission Report, The military actions indexed pertain to the use of significant and/or substantial U.S. forces, provision of increased airlift, provision of additional equipment and U.S. personnel, provision of training and equipment for the Civil Guard and SDC, and finally, overhaul of the GVN military . establishment and command structure. In connection with the draft memorandum, the Joint Staff considersit militarily desirable to pre-position forces and equipment and is currently considering augmentation of U.S. Army Forces Pacific, with one infantry division plus appropriate logistic and combat support units. Joint Staff Memorandum for the Chairman of the JCS, 14 November 1961 368

1+6. Rusk instructs Ambassador Nolting to seek an immediate appointment with President Diem to inform him that President Kennedy has decided that the Government of the U.S. is prepared to join the Government of VN in a sharply increased joint effort to avoid further deterioration in the situation of SVN. The joint effort requires certain undertakings by k

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both governments. On Its part, the U.S. would immediately support the GVN with increased airlift, additional equipment, U.S. personnel, expedited training and equipping of the Civil Guard and increased economic aid. The GVTI, however, would Have to initiate the following actions: (l) begin prompt legislative and administrative action to put the nation on a wartime footing to mobilise its resources; (2) give governmental wartime agencies adequate authority to perform their functions effectively; and (3) overhaul the military establishment and command structure to create an effective military organization. "President Kennedy contemplates an immediate strong affirmative reply to satisfactory letter along indicated lines from President Diem, which will simultaneously be made public." Rusk NIACT 619 to Saigon, 15 November 1961

After three days of talks in Saigon, Ambassador Galbraith feels there Is scarcely "the slightest practical chance that the administrative and political reforms being pressed upon Diem will result in real change." Gailbraith sees a comparatively well equipped army of a quarter million men facing 15 to 18,000 lightly armed men. "...there is no solution that does not involve a change of government,., to say there is no alternative (to Diem) is nonsense." Ambassador Gailbralth Memorandum for the President, 20 November 1961. ... • .. *..

"The key and inescapable point then is the Ineffectual!ty (abetted debatably by the unpopularity) of the Diem Government. This is the strategic factor. Ifor can anyone accept the statement of those who have been either too long or too little in Asia that it is the Inevitable posture of the Asian mandarin. For one thing, it isn't true, but were it so, the only possible conclusion would be that there is no future for mandarins. The communists don't favor them." Gailbraith feels that it is politically naive to expect that Diem will reform either administratively or politically in any effective way. "However, having started on this hopeless game, we have no alternative but to play it out for a minimum time...since there is no chance of success we must do two things to protect our situation. One is to make clear that our commitment is to results and not to promises.,.and we can press hardest in the area of Army reform where the needed changes are most specific and most urgent." It follows from Gailbraith 1 s reasoning that the only solution must be to drop Diem, and we should not be alarmed by the Army as an alternative. Gailbraith New Delhi 99^1 for President Kennedy, 21 Novera-

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Jj-9. The U.S. is prepared to join the VII Government in a sharply-increased joint effort to avoid a further deterioration in the situation in SVN. This joint effort is contingent upon initiation of certain actions on the part of the GVN and consists of increased economic and military support by the U.S., based on recommendations of the Taylor Report. N3AM 111, 22 November 1961 .

50. Bundy comments on the command arrangements for VN and recommends that General McGarr be elevated to the new position or that a replacement be found. He also recommends sending Lansdale back as Diem has requested. Bundy Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, 25 November 1961.... . .♦..

51- General Taylor relates a list of questions proposed by President Kennedy to be used at a meeting of his key advisors. Among the questions are: (l) what is the situation with regard to Diem as reported by Ambassador Holting;

(2) can we delay longer in obtaining an answer from Diem;

(3) what are the views of the JCS on the military organization required to support the new program; (h) what is our plan for flood relief; (5) who should the President regard as personally responsible for the effectiveness of the Washington end of this operation? General Taylor Memorandum for Secretary McNamara, 2J November 1961.

52. The President approves U.S. participation in a selective and carefully controlled joint program of defoliant operations in VN starting with the clearance of key routes and proceeding thereafter to food denial. TISAM 115, 30 November 1961

53- McNamara confirms to Rusk the command arrangements under which the senior U.S. military commander in Vietnam will have the title "Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Forces -Vietnam" and will have equivalent rank to the Ambassador, reporting through CINCPAC to the JCS. Secretary of Defense Memorandum for the Secretary of State, 18 December 1961

54. Diem is apprehensive about giving control authority to

Big Minh as military field commander because of his fear of a coup. While U.S. policy is to support Diem and he has been so informed by the President, we must find a way to reassure him about a coup. "It is the basis for his real reluctance to do what the Americans want him to do and this basic point needs resolving...what realistic assurances can we give Diem that the action he fears won't take place?" Lansdale Memorandum for the CJCS, 27 December 1961

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55. The Chairman of the JCS summarizes the current situation in VN, methods of VC operations, routes of infiltration and supply } relative strengths, and discusses U.S. military units in place or enroute to VN. "The objectives of the Diem Government in SVU include not only survival against the communists, but also improvement of the national economy, enhancement of SVN f s position among Southeast Asian nations, creations of an effective armed force, and preservation of a pro-Western orientation. "Policies directed toward the achievement of these objectives suffer from the concentration of power in the hands of the President, Mgo Dinh Diem, and a small clique headed by his extremely influential and powerful brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu." Chairman JCS Talking Paper for Briefing President Kennedy, 9 January 19&2............. ^28

56. The JCS agree that the basic issue of Diem ! s apprehension about a coup needs to be resolved. "I don T t believe there is any finite answer to the question you pose as to how to convince Diem he must delegate authority to subordinates he doesn't fully trust." JCS Memorandum for General Lansdale, CM-^91-62, l8 January 1962,

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57. The President establishes a Special Group (Counter Insurgency), the functions of which are as follows: (l) to insure proper recognition throughout the U.S. Government that subversive insurgency ("wars of liberation") is a major form of politico-military conflict equal in importance to conventional warfare; (2) to insure that such recognition is reflected in the organization, training, equipment and doctrine of the U.S. armed forces and other U.S. agencies; (3) to continually review the adequacy of U.S. resources to deal with insurgency; and (k) to insure the development of adequate programs aimed at preventing

or defeating insurgency. HSAM 12^, 18 January I962. 1*42

*

58. State Department agrees that an increase in the Vietnamese armed forces to the 200,000 man level should be supported provided the following factors are considered: (l) that U.S. military advisors and the Vietnamese authorities continue to set valid tactical and strategic plans; (2) the

rate of increase should consider the ability of the Army , i

to absorb and train the additional men and the manpower j ;

resources of SVN; (3) that the armed forces should level 1

off at 200,000 and further efforts should be devoted to » !

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strengthening the Civil Guard and Sell 1 -Defense Corps; and (k) that our training programs for ARVM be based on the concept that the Vietnamese Amy will start winning when it has the confidence of the Vietnamese populace. U. Alexis Johnson letter to Mr. Gilpatric, 26 January 1962 \

Secretaiy McNamara forwards a JCS Memorandum to the President with the comment, "I am not prepared to endorse the views of the Chiefs until we have had more experience with our present program in SVN." The JCS Memorandum recommends that if, with Diem's full cooperation and the effective employment of SVN armed forces, the VC is not brought under control, then a decision should be made to deploy suitable U.S. military combat forces to SVN sufficient to achieve desired objectives. Secretary of Defense Memorandum for the President, 27 January 1962 (JCSM-33-62, 13 January 1962, attached).

0.00

The President requests that AID review carefully its role in the support of local police forces for internal security and counter-insurgency purposes^ and recommend to him through the Special Group (Counter Insurgency) what new or renewed emphases are desirable. WSAM 132, 19 Februaiy 1962

The President approves training objectives for personnel who may have a role to play in counter insurgency programs as well as in the entire range of problems involved in the modernization of developing countries. The training objectives include the study of: the historical background of counter Insurgency, departmental tactics and techniques to counter subversive Insurgency, instruction In counter insurgency program planning, specialised preparations for service in underdeveloped areas. Training of foreign nationals will also be Included in the program* The President desires that current counter insurgency training be examined to ascertain if it meets the above training objectives. NSAM 331, 13 March 1962. .»•«.•*•••• •«*••«<

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The President forwards*a memorandum on the subject of VN from Ambassador Galbralth and requests Department cf Defense comments. The Gailbraith Memorandum (h April 62) asserts that the UoSo is backing a weak and Ineffectual government In SVN and that "there Is a consequent danger that we shall replace the French as the colonial force in the area and bleed as the French did." Gailbraith urges that U e 3„ policy keep open the door for political solution, attempt to involve other countries and world opinion in a settlement, and reduce our commitment tr e present leadership of GVN. In

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addition to recommended specific actions, Gailbraith suggests the U.S. should resist aXL steps to coimit American troops to combat action and dissociate itself from programs which are directed at the villagers, such as the resettlement programs . White House Memorandum for Secretary of Defense, 7 April 1962 (Galbraith Memorandum attached)... 460

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63. The JCS comment on Ambassador Galbraith's Memorandum to ., President Kennedy. The JCS cite the Kennedy letter of l4 December 1961 to President Diem as a public affirmation of the intention of the U.S. Government to support President Diem to whatever extent necessary to eliminate the VC threato In sum, it is the JCS opinion that the present U.S. policy toward SV3S" as announced by the President "be pursued vigorously to a successful conclusion. IT JCS Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, JCSM 282-62, 13 April 1962

464

64. ISA discusses the circumstances surrounding the Defense reply to Galbraith*s Memorandum and notes the absence of formal staffing by the State Department. In a penciled note "Secretary of Defense has talked to Ambassador Galbraith and feels no reply needed. Mr. Forrestal informed this date that none would be sent." ISA Memorandum to Secretary of Defense,

65. The President requests contingency planning in the event of a breakdown of the cease-fire in Laos for action in two major areas: (l) the holding by Thai forces with U.S. back-

! * up of that portion of northern Laos west of the Mekong River;

and (2) the holding and recapture of the panhandle of Laos from Thakhek to the southern frontier with Thai, Vietnamese or U„S. forceso Kennedy indicates that he contemplates keeping U.So forces in Thailand during the period of the negotiations by the three Princes and the early days of the government of national union. NSAM 157, 29 May 1962. 0 467

66 9 In an evaluation of the first three months of systematic

counter-insurgency, Hilsman of State's IHR reports some progress and reason for modest optimism although acknowledging the great amount yet to be done. State Department IHR Research Memorandum REE-27j 18 June 1962 . O .«.oao. e9a «. e9 «.» 469

67. The President approves assignments of responsibilities in the development of U.S. and indigenous police ? paramilitaryj and military resources to various agences as recommended by the Special Group on Counter Insurgency. Deficiencies revealed in the study pursuant to NSAM 56 Include: country 1

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internal defense plans, improvement of personnel programs of agencies concerned with unconventional warfare, orientation of personnel, deployment of counter insurgency personnel^ support of covert paramilitary operations, increased use of third-country personnel, exploitation of minorities, improvement of indigenous intelligence organizations, and research and development for counter insurgency* KSAM l62, 19 June 1962 e ... 0 ... 0 D . 0 . ^1

68. The President approves a national counter insurgency doctrine for the use of U.S. departments and agencies concerned with the internal defense of overseas areas threatened by sub- ' versive insurgency. KSAM 182, 2k August 1962 •••••*««** ^5

69* In a year-end summary of the Vietnamese situation and prognosis, Hilsman (State 1KB) concludes that at best the rate of deterioration has been decreased. GVN control of the countryside, the Strategic. Hamlet Program notwithstanding, has increased only slightly. State Department IMR Research Memorandum RFE-59, 3 December 1961.......o................. ^7

I963

70. A national Intelligence Estimate states that "Communist progress has been blunted and that the situation is improving. Strengthened South Vietnamese capabilities and effectiveness, and particularly U.S. involvement, are causing the Viet Cong increased difficulty, although there are as yet no persuasive indications that the Communists have been grievously hurt." The VC will continue to wage a war of attrition and there is no threat of overt attack from the North. On the basis of the last year's progress the VC can be contained but it is impossible "to project"the future course of the war with any confidence. Decisive campaigns have yet to be fought and no quick and easy end to the war is in sight." NIE 53-63, "Prospects in South Vietnam," 17 April 1963 • *. 5^2

71• Ike President approves and directs certain actions outlined in the Department of State Memorandum of 17 June 1*963* relative to Laos planning. The President wishes to obtain suggestions for actions in Laos in light of the deteriorating situation and from the British and the French before initiating any action under the Memorandum. Kennedy asks about additional U.S. actions to be taken in Laos before any action directed against NVN. KSAM 2^9, 25 June 1963... 525

72. The President is briefed on developments in Indonesia, Laos i

and W. Specifically, onSVI^ discussions cover the possibility

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of getting rid of the Nhus (the combined judgment was that it would not be possible), pressure on Diem to take political actions, possible results of a coup, and the replacement of Ambassador Nolting with Ambassador Lodge, Department of State Memorandum of Conversation, 1+ July 1963...

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75* U.S. policy with respect to a coup is defined in more detail for Lodge and Harkins as a result of an NSC meeting with the President. ir The USG will support a coup which has good chance of succeeding but plans no direct involvement of U.S. armed forces e Harkins should state (to the generals) that he is prepared to establish liaison with the coup planners and to review plans, but will not engage directly in joint coup planning." Lodge is authorized to suspend aid if he thinks it will enhance the chances of a successful coup. State Department Message 2J2, State to Lodge and Harkins, 29 August

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76 # Rusk raises with Lodge the possibility of a last approach to Diem about removing Nhu before going ahead with the coup. He notes that General Harkins favors such an attempt. Rusk

526

73- A Special National Intelligence Estimate evaluates the

political crisis in South Vietnam arising from the Buddhist protest. It concludes that if Diem does not seek to conciliate the Buddhists new disorders are likely and there will be better than even chances of coup or assassination attempts. U.S-GVN relations have deteriorated as a function of Diem ! s distrust of U.S. motives in the Buddhist affair and he may seek to reduce the U.S. presence in Vietnam. The Communists have thus far not exploited the Buddhist crisis and they would not necessarily profit from a non-Communist overthrow. A successor regime with continued U.S. support would have good chances of effectively pursuing the war. SNIE 53-2-63, "The Situation in South Vietnam, " 10 July 1963. 529

jh. In a subsequently controversial cable, State informs Lodge that if Diem is unwilling or unable to remove Nhu from the government, that the U.S. will have to prepare for alternatives. Lodge is authorized to inform the Vietnamese generals plotting a coup that if Nhu is not removed we will be prepared to discontinue economic and military aid, to accept a change of government and to offer support in any period of interim breakdown of the central government mechanism. State Department Message to Saigon 2^3> State to Lodge, 2^ August 1963

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feels that if accompanied by the threat of a real sanction --i.e., the withdrawal of U.S. support — such an approach 1 could he timed to coincide with the readiness of the generals

( to make their move and might, therefore, offer some promise

of getting Diem to act. State Department Message 279, State to Lodge, 29 August 1963.•••*«•••., .. 539

77* Vice President Johnson presides over a meeting at the State 1 Department on the subject of ST?E. The generals 1 plot having

1 aborted, Rusk asks what in the situation "lead us to think

; well of a coup," Farther, Rusk feels that it is unrealistic

now "to start off by saying that Nhu has to go." McNamara approves Rusk's remarks. Hilsman presents four basic factors bearing on the current situation: (l) the restive mood of the South Vietnamese population; (2) the effect on U.S. pro-I grams elsewhere in Asia of the current GVH policy against the

I Buddhists; (3) the personality and policies of Hhu; and (h)

U*S. and world opinion. Vice President has great reservations about a coup because he sees no genuine alternative to Diem. General Krulak Memorandum for the Record, 31 August 1963 i-. ...-♦.,• • =

. 780 Lodge is instructed by the White House that since there is no

longer any prospect of a coup,pressure must be applied to Diem to get him to adopt an extensive list of reforms. In particu-| lar Lodge is authorized to hold up any aid program if he thinks

such action will give him useful leverage in dealing with Diem. CAP Message 63516, White House to Lodge, 17 September 1963.

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79. The President explains to Lodge his urgent need for the McNamara-Taylor assessment of the situation.. The visit is not designed to be a reconciliation with Diem, rather he expects McNamara will speak frankly to him about the military consequences of the political crisis. State Department Message ^31, The President to Lodge, 18 September

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80• Lodge's reply to the White House CAP Message 63516^ indicates agreement that a coup is no longer in the offing, but opposes both an approach to Diem on reforms or the use of an aid suspension as a lever. He regards both as likely to be unproductive or worse. Embassy Saigon Message 5^S Lodge to State for President Only, 19 September 19630.......<> - -. 5^9

81. President Kennedy outlines his reasons for sending McNamara and Taylor to VH: "I am asking you to go because of my desire to have the best possible on-the-spot appraisal of

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the military and paramilitary effort to defeat the VC." While the results from programs developed after Taylor's Mission in 1961 were heartening, the serious events in the South since May 1963 have prompted the President to ask Mclfemara to make a fresh, first-hand appraisal of the situation. "In my judgement the question of the progress of the contest in SW is of the first importance. 0 ." President Kennedy Memorandum for Secretary of Defense, 21 September

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82. Pending McWamara's visit and the subsequent review of policy, Lodge is given the following interim guidance: "(l) The United States intends to continue its efforts to assist the Vietnamese people in their struggle against the Viet Cong. (2) Recent events have put in question the possibility of success in these efforts unless there can be important improvements in the government of South Vietnam* (3) It is the policy of the United States to bring about such improvement," State Department Message ^58, Eyes Only for Lodge from Ball, 22 September 1963.. 090 .. «, e 553

83* The McNamara-Taylor Mission Report concludes that the military campaign has made great progress, and, vhile the political crisis in Saigon is serious, "there is no solid evidence of the possibility of a successful coup..," The Report recommends against promoting a coup and, although it is not clear that U.S. pressure will move Diem to the moderations and reforms we desire, nevertheless, as the only course of action with any prospect of producing results, the report recommends the application of selective economic sanctions, including a suspension of funds for the commodity import program. The Mission further recommends a shift of military emphasis to the Delta and a consolidation of the Strategic Hamlet Program. In addition, it is recommended that a training program be established for HVHAF such that the bulk of U.S. personnel may be withdrawn by the end of 1965* In conjunction with this program, the U e S. should announce plans to withdraw 1, 000 U.S. military personnel by the end of 1963.. 55^

8k 9 Lodge is advised that as a result of the policy review just completed, the "President today approved recommendation that no initiative should now be taken to give any active covert encouragement to a coup*" Efforts to build and maintain contacts with "alternative leadership" is authorized, however, CAP Message 63560, to Lodge via CAS channel, 5 October

57^ 1

85, Contact has been renewed by the generals with a CAS agent who has been apprised of the reactivation of plotting. In the

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meeting, General Minh states that he must know the U.S. position on a coup. He stresses that a coup is urgently needed to prevent the loss of the war to the VC. The U.S. contact is noneommital. CAS Saigon Message 14^5, Lodge H to State, 5 October 1963 575

86. Washington reaffirms Lodge's guidance that he is not to promote a coup. Neither, however, is he to thwart one. He should try to obtain as much information as possible from the plotters about their plans on which to base an American judgement about their likelihood of success. CIA Message 7^228, 6 October 1963. • o ..*... *. .... 577

87. The President approves the detailed military recommendations contained in the McNamara-Taylor Report, but directs that no announcement of the implementation of the 1,000-man withdrawal plan be made. NSAM 263, 11 October I963..00 578

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88. A Department of State Research Memorandum contends that the statistical indicators on the war in Vietnam reveal "that the military position of the Vietnam Government may have reverted to the point it had reached six months to a year ago." The analysis angers the JCS and Rusk subsequently apologizes to McNamara. Department of State, 1KB Research Memorandum REE-90, 22 October 1963, 579

89• With the coup plotting now far advanced and the U.S. clearly committed to the generals 1 attempt, Lodge seeks to calm Washington's anxieties about the lack of detailed information on the generals 1 plans. He is at pains to oppose any thought of thwarting the coup because he thinks the military will create a government with better potential for carrying on the war, and because it would constitute undue meddling in Vietnamese affairs. Embassy Saigon Message 196^, Lodge to McGeorge Bundy, 25 October 1963 0*. 590

90. While thanking Lodge for his views, the White House indicates that short of thwarting a coup we should retain the prerogative of reviewing the plans and discouraging any attempt with poor prospects of success. CAP Message 63590* McGeorge Bundy to Lodge, 25 October I963 592

91. The White House instructs Lodge to bring General Harkins completely up to date on the coup plotting, and asks that * Harkins, Lodge and the CIA Station Chief provide a combined assessment of the prospects of the plotters. Individual comments are to be sent if desired. With these assessments, a decision can be made telling the generals:

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(a) we will maintain a hands-off policy, (b) we will posi tively encourage the coup, or (c) we will discourage it. More detailed military plans should be sought from Minh. CAS Message 79109, McGeorge Bundy to Lodge, 30 October 1963 - ».-.,

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95. Taking note of the difference of opinion on the advisability of a coup between Lodge and Harkins, the White House specifically informs Lodge that he is to discourage the generals from any attempt that in his judgement has a poor prospect of success. Lodge is given full authority for country team actions in the event of a coup; if he has left for Washington, Harkins will have charge. In the event of a coup, U.S. policy will be: (a) to reject appeals for direct intervention from either side; (b) if the contest is indecisive, U.S. authorities may perform any actions agreed

593

92. After complaining about Lodge's failure to keep him informed about the coup planning, General Harkins opposes the proposed coup against Diem. He does not see an alternative leadership with Diem's strength of character, especially not among the generals. The war continues to go well. MACV Message 2028, Harkins to Taylor, 30 October 595

1963

93* General Harkins takes detailed exception to the interpretations of a deteriorating war effort that Lodge has been transmitting throughout October 0 He offers an optimistic appraisal of the trend of the war and sees the political crisis as having only a marginal effect on troop morale and military effectiveness 0 MACV Message 2033, Harkins to Taylor, 30 October I963. 0 Q , 0 e . 00000 o 0 0 •....*.. *» 6 . 0 597

$h m Lodge argues forcefully for the coup. "It is theoretically possible for us to turn over the information which has been given to us in confidence to Diem and this would undoubtedly stop the coup and would make traitors out of us 0 Eor practical purposes, therefore, I would say that we have very little influence on what is essentially a Vietnamese affair," In the event the coup fails, he believes we should do what we can to help evacuate the generals 1 dependents. Lodge believes the generals are all taking enormous risks for the sake of their country and their good faith is not to be questioned. "Heartily agree that a miscalculation could jeopardize position in Southeast Asia, We also run tremendous risks by doing nothing." General Harkins did not concur in the cable. CAS Saigon Message 2063, 30 October

1963

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to by "both sides; (c) in the event the coup fails^ asylum

iTiay be offered to anyone to whom ve have an obligation; but

(d) once the coup has started^ it is in our interests to

see that it succeeds. CAS Washington Message 79^07, 30

October 1963.. • ' €Ch

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L ■ As desired by you, 1 visited Vietnam 2-14 January 1961. After

twelve days of intensive looking and listening over some old familiar N ^

r ground, I have come to the following personal convictions: *"*

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

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From; BrigGen Lansdale, OSO/OSD .

"' Subj: Vietnam

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a. 1961 promises to be a fateful year for Vietnam,

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b. The Communist Viet Cong hope to win back Vietnam south of the 17th Parallel this year, if at all possible, and are much further along towards accomplishing this objective than I had realized from reading the reports received in Washington, £3

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c. The free Vietnamese, and their government, probably will be able to do no more than postpone eventual defeat - - unless they find a Vietnamese way of mobilizing their total resources and then

utilizing them with spirit,

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d. The U, S. team in Vietnam will be unable to help the Vietnamese with real effectiveness, unless the U,S. system of their operation is changed sufficiently to free these Americans to do the " * job that needs doing, and unless they do it with sensitive understanding

and wisdom,

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e. If Free Vietnam is won by the Communists, the remainder of Southeast Asia-will be easy pickings for our en^my, because the toughest local force on our side will be gone, A Communist victory also would be a major blow to U. S. prestige and influence., not only

in Asia but throughout the world, since the world believes that Vietnam . has remained free only through U,S„he,lp, . "Such a victory would tell leaders of other governments that it doesivt pay to be a friend of the * U, S. , and would be an even more marked lesson than Laos, . \*

f, Vietnam can be kept free, but it will require a changed U*S. attitude., plenty of hard work and patience, and a new spirit by the Vietnamese, The Viet Cong have been pushing too hard militarily to get their roots down firmly and can be defeated by an inspired and • y

determined effort. ■ . . .

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g, Ngo Dinh Diem is still the only Vietnamese with executive ability and the required determination to be an effective President. I believe there will be another attempt to get rid of him soon, unless the U.S. makes it clear that we are backing him as the elected top man. If the 11 November coup had been successful, I believe that a number of highly selfish and mediocre people would be squabbling among themselves for power while the Communists took over. The Communists will be more alert to exploit the next coup attempt. At present, most Vietnamese oppositionists believe that the U. S. would look favorably upon a successful coup. i

Vietnam has progressed faster in material things than it has spiritually. The people have more possessions but are ,. tarting to lose the will to protect their liberty. ' There is a big lesson here to be learned about the U.S. aid program which needs some most serious study.

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Recommendations

|M .. | m M || Mill «|| Ml ■ -_— _■ -

Before I left Saigon, I discussed my impressions with Ambassador Durbrow who was most gracious towards me during the visit. Included in these impressions was my feeling that many of the Americans in Saigon perhaps subconciously believed in defeat, probably had spent too much time and energy on the politic?.! situation in Saigon Instead of on the very real Viet Cong menace, and were in need of some bolstering up by the Chief of Mission. In this feeling of defeat, I would have to except the Chief of MAAG and the local CIA Chief who believe we can win. Ambassador Durbrow told me of the memo he had issued to all Americans in Saigon after the 11 November coiip attempt. I said this was a good move, but much, more than writing a paper was needed.

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He asked me what suggestions I had. I said that I didn't have . * much immediately, and would have to do a lot of thinking about it. The situation in Vietnam is not black and white, but a most complex one in all shades of gray. Many Americans and Vietnamese expected me to come up with some sort of a miracle, to turn Ngo Dinh Diern into an Americanized modern version of the ancient.Vietnamese leader Jje Loi, However, the task requires more than a gimmick or some simple answer. It will take a lot of hard work and follow-through. In 12 days, all I could do was learn as much as I could and to "plant a seed or two 11 with Ngo Dinh Diem and other Vietnamese leaders who know that I speak out of deep affection for the free Vietnamese.

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Since leaving Vietnam, I have spent many hours thinking about the ituation there* I am far from having a complete proposal to solve the situation. However, I do have some recommendations now for steps which should be taken to start remedying the downhill and dangerous trend in Vietnam. They are: ■ .

«a. The U. S, should recognize that Vietnam is in a critical condition and should treat it as a combat area of the cold'war, as an area requiring emergency treatment.

b. When there is an emergency, the wise thing to do is to pick the best people you have, people who are experienced in dealing with this precise type of emergency, and send them to the spot with orders to remedy the situation. When yout get the people in petition and free them to work, you should then back them up in every practical way you can. The real decisions will be made in little daily actions in Vietnam, not in Washington. That ! s why the best are needed on the spot.

c. Our U.S. team in Vietnam should have a hard core of experienced Americans who know and really like Asia and the Asians, dedicated people who are willing to risk their lives for the ideals of freedom, and who will try to influence and guide the Vietnamese towards U.S. policy objectives with the warm friendships and affection which our close alliance deserves. We should break the rules of personnel assignment, . if necessary, to get such U.S. military and civilians to Vietnam.

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d. Under emergency conditions, our aid to Vietnam should be treated as contingency business and be given expedited priority handling until we can afford to take a breathing spell.

e. Ambassador Durbrow should be transferred in the immediate future. He has been in the "forest of tigers* 1 which is Vietnam for nearly four years now and I doubt that he himself realizes how tired he has become or how close he is to individual trees in this big woods. Correctly or not, the recognized government of Vietnam does not look upon him, as a friend, believing that he sympathized strongly with the

■ -coup leaders"of f% November. , . * . fc - . , , * -.

* " " £. The new Ambassador should arrive as many weeks as possible before the April elections, for which the Communists are now actively

L preparing with their "political struggle" tactics almost unhindered. The

new Ambassador should be a person with marked leadership talents who

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can make the Country Team function harmoniously and spiritually, who

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can influence Asians through understanding them sympathetically, and who is alert to the power of the Mao Tse Tung tactics now being em-ployed to capture Vietnam and who is dedicated to feasible and practical democratic-means to defeat these Communist tactics.

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g. Serious consideration should be given to replacing USOM Chief Gardiner* A number of Vietnamese pointedly answered my questions about .Gardiner by talking about his deputy, Coster, while admitting that "Gardiner seems to be a nice man who has fallen asleep in our r* imate. ri

h. U.S. military men in Vietnam should be freed to work in the combat areas. Our MAAG has a far greater potential than is now being utilized. U.S. military men are hardly in a position to be listened to when they are snug in rear areas and give advice to*Vietnamese officers who have attended the same U.S. military schools and who are now in a combat in which few Americans are experienced. MAAG personnel from General McGarr on down expressed desire to get more into real field work; let's give them what they want as far as U.S. permission is concerned and let them earn their way into positions of greater influence with the Vietnamese military in the field.

i. A mature American, with much the same qualifications as those given above for the selection of the next Ambassador, should be assigned to Vietnam for political operations which will start creating J a Vietnamese-style foundation for more democratic government with-jjout weakening the strong leadership required to bring about the defeat of i the Communists, This must F_ot be a "clever" type who is out to gain a reputation as a "manipulator* 1 or a word-smith who is more concerned about the way his reports will look in Washington than in implementing

U.S. policy in Vietnam.

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j j. We must support Ngo Dinh Diem until another strong execu- -

] tive can replace him legally. President Diem feels that" Ams ricans : have attacked him almost as viciously as the Communists, and he has ! withdrawn into a shell for self-protection. We have to show him by deeds, not words alone, that we are his friend. This will make our

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■influence effective again,

K. We must do much, much more constructive work with the oppositionists, I suspect that the U.S. has taught them to be carping critics and disloyal citizens by our encouragement of these traits. ! They need to put together a constructive program which can save.

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1 Vietnam from the Communists by building something worth a man's

j life to prese-rve, If it's a good program, we should encourage one

; strong political opposition to emerge, without endangering the national

security. Here is where out political skill needs to'be used. This

political work is needed as a m?vtter of grave urgency. Unless a con-. structive outlet'is found quickly, the opposition in Saigon is going to

explode in violence again and the Viet Cong are wide awake to exploit

i f this time*

The Communist Threat

It was a shock to me to look over maps of the estimated situation with U.S. and Vietnamese intelligence personnel, as well as with President Diem who held similar grim views. The Communist Viet Cong now dominate much of the 1st and 5th Military Regions, as well as being active in spots in other regions, according to these estimates, The probable strength of the Communist armed forces in South Vietnam was given to me in various guesses from 3, 000 to 15, 000, My guess is that the strength is now closer to the latter figure and that only Hanoi knows accurately. ■ «

This strength estimate by itself isn't what shocked me. The shocking part was to realize that the thousands of disciplined and trained Communist graduates of "proletarian military science 11 had been able to infiltrate the most productive area of South Vietnam and to gain control of nearly all of it except for narrow corridors protected by military actions and for a few highly-localized spots v/here loyal paramilitary forces (Civil Guards and Self-Defnese Corps) have undertaken inspired counter-guerrilla actions or where villagers work closely with the military.

The Viet Cong have the initiative and most o"f the control over

the region from the jungled foothills of the High Plateau north of Saigon

all the way south down to the Gulf of Siam, excluding the big city area

of Saigon.-Cholon. This is "Vietnam's n brea.d-basket ,r where most of • * • ■ *

its rice and rubber are grown.

Unlike the Philippines or Malaya, the Communists cannot be cordoned off at the country's borders and then dealt with as an internal

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security problem alone. The borders of Vietnam are long and include some of the most difficult terrain in the world to patrol. It is apparent that many of the Viet Cong infiltrate from Cambodia, particularly from Svayrieng Province, Also, southeastern Laos has a reported Communist -

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build-up, with RLG forces committed elsewhere, and increasing infiltration into Vietnam is reported,

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There is an intense psychological attack being waged against Free Vietnam by the Communists. This not only includes an almost constant barrage from powerful Radio Hanoi, which is reportedly relayed from Cambodia and is received as a loud ?,nd clear signal in South Vietnam, but also a heavy campaign by on-the-spot agitprop agents. A part of the psychological attack is directed against Americans, particularly against U.S. MAAGf personnel, along the lines of the Chinese Communist n hate America" campaign. 1 did not have the time or means to assess the effect of this psychological attack which has been going on for years.

The big city area of Saigon-Cholon undoubtedly is a target of Communist operations, although I was able to find out little about either the Communist organization or its operations in this city area. U.S. intelligence personnel believed that Vietnamese counter-intelligence organizations were so actively ri hustling rr so. many suspects that the Communists have been unable to institute much of an organization, president Diem believed that the Communists were concentrating their work elsewhere, following the dictum: n first the mountains, then the countryside, and then the city. 1 ' The attitude of Vietnamese and U.S. officials reminded me of the French and Vietnamese officials in Hanoi in 1953-54, who were so surprised later to discover that a complete, block-by-block clandestine Communist apparatus existed there. Ox, of Filipinos and Afnericans .who believed the Huks were in central Luzon in 195 0 and were so surprised when an, entire Communist politburo was captured in the city of Manila. I believe that the people in Saigon-Cholon have been the target of considerable subversive effort by the Communists and that it takes an in-place organization.tQ.carry this out. ...

Communist strength figures are difficult to determine due in part to the different categories of personnel. I was able to get no estimate ■on the number of.Comnvunist political-psychological operators, although the DRV reportedly have trained many for work in the south. Also, the Communist military personnel include regulars who have infiltrated from the north, plus territorial forces and guerrillas who apparently are recruited locally. Colonel Tranh Thien Khiem, who commands the 5th Military Region, broke his estimate of some 7, 000 Viet Cong military in his region into 3,320 regulars, 1, 170 territorials, and 2,590 guerrDlas. When the Vietminh troops were transferred to the north in 1954-55 under the Geneva Agreemr . ma^y b»ft *=irnUes.

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behind in the south, along with stay-behind organizations and arms, caches. Although the pacification campaigns of 1955-56 cleaned up v/Jiat the Communists had left behind to sornq extent, there were remnants remaining which the Viet Cong have since exploited and augmented** greatly over the past 5 years. -

President Ngo Dinh Diem

President Diem and I are friends". Also, he is a man who put other Vietnamese friends of mine in jail or exiled them. It is hardly a blind friendship.

Prior to my departure from Y/ashmgton, Jeff Pardons asked if I would please size-up President Diem carefully to see if he had changed much from when I had worked with him so closely in 1954-56. In our first meeting, he was a bit cautious with me. I suspected that he was waiting for me to drop Y/ashington's other shoe as a follow-up to the Ambassador's demands that he reform his ways. So, I reminisced on what we had been through together in the past and he joined in, adding the story of the 11 November coup as he saw it. Our meetings" from then on became more like the. old days, with plenty of give and take, .- ," but only after I convinced him that I still had affection for the Viet-

namese people and was trying to understand their problems before

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He seems to have a better grasp of economic matters than formerly. Also, I believe he sincerely wants to pass some of his daily burden of work to others. He said that he had found this extremely hard to do, since too many others were soft in carrying out responsibilities or else were too vain to knuckle-down to hard work. This has forced him to over-burden Nguyen Dinh Thuan, Secretary of State for the Presidency, wlio doesn't hesitate to make tou^h decisions when needed, who has had to act as hatchet-man when others were too soft to get rid of incompe- -tents, and who has been loyal to his boss (although he* speaks right up for his own views). Vice President Tho is so soft-hearted that he

; really never takes corrective action against wrong doers. Vu Van Thai is a n blackmailer rr by threatening to resign after convincing the Americans that he is the most "brilliant Vietnamese in economic matters, although he is a poor executive whose work is in bad shape; if Diem accepted Thai's resignation, the Americans would feel that the Vietnamese Government v/as going to hell. (Unfortunately, there's some truth in these

.feelings of Diem T s about Tho and Thai).

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I believe President Diem Is more screened in by his "palace guard' 1 than he realizes - - but then much the same could be said of other leaders elsewhere. I noted that he still has a personal informant - net and I managed to talk to soitxc of them privately. The largest influence,

rbut not the only one, is wielded by his brother Ngo Dinh Nhu. However, I found President Diem unusually well informed on the situation in Vietnam, • including the bad aspects - - better informed than any ether Vietnamese among the many with whom I talked.

In reflecting on our conversations, I have concluded that most folks

Uv/ho talk to him have little empathy for, or sensitve understanding of, him. They fait to realize that Diem is human and doesn't like the idea of people trying to kill hirn out of hatred; the coup attempt of 11 November, opened at 3 a.m, by bursts of heavy machine gun fire into his bedroom [ in an obvious try at liquidating him in his bed. On top of this, he has

no;. r had nearly 7 years of venomous attack by the Communists who know

Lthat he is a major obstacle which must be destroyed before they can win. This is a daily psychological attack on hirn in his own country, in his' own language, and listened to by his own people. The only way he

f could shut this off today would be to give up what he, and we, believe in.

On top of this, he has criticism heaped on him by many who are simply being destructive, he has administrators who are disloyal or whose vanity is expressed in talking a better job of work than in doing it. And then, to cap the criticisms, he feels that n\any Americans have contempt for him - - that the .IT, S 4 which sould be Vietnam's staunchest

P i frit ad is somehow taking the same psychological line with him as do

the Coinmanists, that somehow our nobly-expressed policies get carried out with much pettiness in actual practice. ■

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If the next American official to talk to President Diem would have the good sense to see him as a human being who has been through a lot of hell for years -- and not as an opponent to be beaten to his knees --we would start regaining our influence with him in a healthy way. .Y/hat-fcvftr else we might think of him, he has been unselfish in devoting his life to his country and has little in personal belongings to show for it. If we don't like the-heavy influence "of Brother Nhu, then "let's move . someone of curs in clone. This someone, however, must be able to look, at problems with understanding, suggest better solutions than does Nhu, earn a position of influence.

The next time we become "holier than thou", we might find it ottering to reflect on the DRV, Do the Soviets and the Chinese Communists give Ho Chi \iinh a similar hard time, or do they aid and *hot hirn?

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U. 5. Political Efforts

The United States has been the main forearm political mentor for • Free Vietnam since it became an independent nation, Of course other nations have had their influence. But we were the ones who have spoken with authority, who have held the purse-strings, who trained and advised the government personnel, and to whom most Vietnamese in political life have looked for guidance. It is only human to want to find someone else to blame for what has gone wrong* But, we won't be able to start '". doing effective political work until we admit that our own actions carry responsibilities with them. There are plenty of Aaron Burr's, a few Alexander Hamilton's and practically no George Yfashir ^ton's, Tom JeffersonJc or Tom Paine's in Saigon today , . , largely as a result of our U.S. political influence, This certainly is not the U.S. policy we had hoped to implement.

Ambassador Durbrow seemed genuinely surprised when I told him that the Can Lao. Party in Vietnam was originally promoted by the U„S, State Department and was largely the brain-child of a highly-respected, senior U.S. Foreign Service professional. Several weeks after this action was undertaken originally, I learned of it and warned that the benefits were extremely short-term and that great lasting harm could result by a favored party forcing older parties to go underground. However, the decision had been made, the Can Lao party had been started, and we had to start working from that reality. We cannot go back to living in the past and must keep moving ahead, but that doesn't mean that we have to pay forever for our mistakes.

However, the real point is that we don't seem to have very long memories or enough solid feeling of responsibility for out acts/ Many U,S, Foreign Service officials leap into attacks on the Can Lao Party. I agree with their reasons. Any thinking American would. But I sure would feel better about it if they could only remember the consequences of their own actions for a few short years - and learn from that memory. I cannot.truly sy rnpa th'i z e v/ith Americans who help promote a fascistic state and then"get angry when it doesn't act like a democracy,

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So, what should we do about it? I have a concrete recommendation, V/e need an American in Saigon who can work, with real skill, with great sensitivity to Vietnamese feelings, and with a fine sense of the dangerous limits of Vietnamese national security in a time of emergency. This upusual American should be given the task of creating

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into one organisation, of helping this new party adopt a platform which

contains sound ideas for building national entities which the Vietnamese

people v/ould find worth defending against the Communists, and of

strongly influencing it to play the role of loyal opposition while President

•• . Diem is in "power and the nation is in such great danger.

r This* work with the opposition is a matter of grave urgency ,

f i Unless the energies of the malcontents, the frustrated, the patriots on the outs are quickly channeled into constructive political works, they are going to explode into de str ue live political"work. This opposition situation in Saigon-Cholon is at the bursting point, and there is no

• safety valve. Y/hen it next blows, and if Diem cannot cope with it,

\ the Siagon political scene has all the makings of turning into anarchy.

j It can happen, and soon.

1 saw a number of opposition people, officials of various' parties, members of the National Assembly, and disgruntled members of President Diem's administration. They eagerly told rne how they were criticizing Diem's actions more and more openly. I asked them what their own program was, other than to seize power for themselves oar to have me pat them on the head for being critics. Few of them had I any sensible ideas. I told them they'd better get busy scratching for

a better program themselves or else I could only assume that they

C l were being disloyal or treasonous in a time of great national danger,

1 trust that other Americans'calking to these oppositionists will do the same or we will be inviting disaster by listening to this and keeping | mum when we should be working like beavers to turn it into constric-

tive channels.

. If we c3.11 get most of the oppositionists meeting with cadi other - to try to put together a platform they can all agree on, and can protect such work so that it can be done fairly openly, we will have an extremely useful political action in motion. It will absorb months !of political energies which otherwise will -go towards the solution of ■ armed overthrow, A major opposition party, once it starts becoming *a reality,, will tend to make the several governmental groupings such jas the Can Lao, MNR, and Nhu's labor organizations start coalescing /into one stronger group. In this way, we can help promote a two-party I system which can afford to be surfaced, end much of the present j clandestine political structures, and give sound encouragement to ; the development of new political leaders. There are many fine younger ^ ^>atr?-*ts who need this sort 0/ a healthy political atmosphere to develop \ ia, ii v/s"evcr expect Vietnam to have a real future.

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Hcrti are some addition?.! thoughts;

' a. President Diem said that if it hadn't been for the dedicated an ti-communism of about a million Catholics, Vietnam could never have kept going this long. Yet his brother, Archbishop Thuc, told me that the refugees from the north (including many Catholics) had been settled into such remunerative new lives in the south that they had gone soft, no longer wanted to fight, and criticised the government for wanting to continue the war. Also, the Saigon-Choi on area is seething with political discontent while the people are f?,r better off in material possessions than ever before, The shops are full of goods for Tet and the people are buying heavily« Somehow, the U, S, has 1 filled their bellies but has neglected their spirit.

b. Many of the Vietnamese in the countryside who v/cjre right xip against the Viet Cong terror were full of patriotic spirit, Those who seemed to be in the hardest circumstances, fighting barefoot and with makeshift weapons, had the highest morale. They still can lick the Viet Cong with a little help. There's a lesson here on our giving aid. Maybe we should learn that our funds cannot buy friends or a patriotic spirit by mere materialistic giving. Perhaps we should help those who help themselves, and not have a lot of strings on that help.

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c. The Viet Cong crowded a lot of action into the year I960, They infiltrated thousands of armed forces into South Vietnam, recruited local levies of military territorials and guerrillas, and undertook large scale guerrilla and terroristic operations, In so doing ..they neglected doing sound political work at the grass roots level and broke one of Mao Tse Tung's cardinal rules. Many people -in the south now under their thumb are unhappy about it, but too terrified to act against these new rulers. The Viet Cong apparently havc'been working hard recently, to-rectify this error, and now have political cadres in the field, Y/e still have a chance of beating them if-wc can give the people some fighting chance of gaining security and some political b?,sis of action, Since both of these actions will have to be carried out by Vietnamese forces in their Defense establishment, it is worthwhile to make U.S. help to the Vietnamese in the contested provinces along these sorely needed lines a priority mission of the U.S. military in Vietnam, The political actions should ,}e ^tve implementing of Vietnamese governmental policy W V5.e*ii>me5e

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rce commanders, aided by Vietnamese psychological warfare units. If the U, S, military doesn't ride herd'on this, it is apt to be neglected and is too vital to keeping Vietnam free to be made a secondary work.

• d, I am passing a copy of this to Admiral Felt at CINCPAC-Suggest that copies be passed also to selected persons in Defense, State, and CIA, '

1G, \/J)ja &LvJU.

Edward G. LANSDALE Brigadier General, U. S. j

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Washington

January 30 s 196l

MEMORiUftDUM FOR: The Secretary of State

The Secretary of Defense

You should understand that as a result of our meeting on Saturday morning, January 28 ? I authorize an increase of expenditure of $28 .k million to expand the Viet-Nam force level by 20,000; and an increase in expenditure of $12.7 million for a program to improve the quality of the Viet-Nam civil guard.

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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SENT TO: AMEMBASSY SAIGON PRIORITY 10 k

RPTD INFO: CINCPAC POLAD AMEMBASSY VIETINNE

AMEMBASSY BANGKOK llh6 AMEMBASSY LONDON AMEMBASSY PHQM PHEN AMEMBASSY PARIS

JOINT STATE-DEFENSE-ISA MESSAGE

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(nvnaf)

i Counterinsurgeney Plan, including 20,000 men increase VN armed forces/and provision training and equipment 32,000 Civil Guard, approved on basis following FY 6l funding: $28.1+ million MAP for expanded NVNAF and $12.7 million MAP for Civil Guard. $660,000 as proposed for psychological operations and com-munications equipment also approved.

Highly command Ambassador, Country Team and staffs. Recognize Plan allows considerable latitude for changes and refinements as implementation worked out

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with GVN and as situation requires. However, U 0 S„ would as Plan provdes expect GVN absorb local currency costs these increases aid does not contemplate farther US dollar grants to generate additional local currency for this purpose.

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preparation abridged version plan suitable for use Ambassador and in presenting plan to Diem. In presenting plan to Diem recommend you emphasize implementation will require extraordinary effort US-GVN cooperation, but that if implemented promptly and vigorously, we believe it will give GVN

1

means turn tide against VC and at same time improve GVN capacity resist evert aggression. Immediate purpose Plan is to enable GVN defeat insurgency, but Plan also envisages that GVN must move on political front towards liberalization

FE;SEA;CTWood;tha;erc 2/3/61 The Secretary

SEA - Mr. Anderson FE - Mr. Parsons BOD - Adm Rainz

ICA - Mr. Sheppard C/MBC - Mr. Ball S/S - Mr. Seip (in substance)

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to retain necessary popular cooperation; that various economic steps be

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takenj and that there be adequate cooperation with KKG on frontier control. It considered US view that success requires implementation entire plan.

Should make clear our present commitment to support Counter insurgency Plan is only for FY 6l part of program. Future funding will require Congressional approval. Views Congress likely be influenced by developments in political as well as security situation. FY 6l component represents large increase in US support Viet-Nam. If GVN willing to accept the obligations involved in its implementation, the US is ready give full and immediate support in carrying it out.

Suggest proposeing to Diem that members US Missions ready confer with GVN opposite numbers work out agreed version Plan within, say, two week time limit. Urge changes be kept minimal to avoid necessity referred CINCPAC. and Washington.

In implementing Plan recommend that Country Team:

a) Conduct annual or more frequent review question balance as between forces committed primarily against VC and those intended primarily resist external aggression.

b) Emphasize importance GVN-KKG border control.

c) Urge GVN improve treatment VC prisoners, as done by Magaaysay, to encourage desertions.

d) Urge GVN increase efforts to infiltrate VC in SVN.

In view Congressional interest monetary reform advise whether GVN should be pressed for early establishment unitary rate or whether additional costs

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imposed on GVTJ by Plan will have same affect <,

If Ambassador considers GVltf does not provide necessary cooperation^ he should inform Washington with recommendations which may include suspension

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US contribution.

RUSK

Pouched by DCT

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Washington

February 3j 196l

TOP SECRET

NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. 2

: The Secretary of Defense

SUBJECT: Development of Counter-guerrilla Forces

At the National Security Council meeting on February 1, 1961, the President requested that the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with other interested agencies> should examine means for placing more emphasis on the development of counter-guerrilla forces.

Accordingly, it is requested that the Department of Defense take action on this request and inform this office promptly of the measures which it proposes to take.

Copy 1 of h

(Signed)

McGeorge Bundy Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WA SHINGTON

. 1961 MAR 10 m r 05

OFFICE OF ?i€ SECRETARY 0" DEFENSE

TOP SECRET

March 9, 1961

NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. 28

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TO:VTHE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

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Subject: Guerr illa Operation s in Viet-Minh Territory

In view of the President's instruction that we make every possible effort to launch guerrilla operations in Viet-Minh territory at the earliest possible time, would you report to the President as soon as feasible your views on what actions might be undertaken in the near future and what steps might be taken to expand operations in the longer future.

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CC: The Secretary of State

McGeorge Bundy

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WASHINGTON 25, D. C,

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11 APR 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY 0? DEFENSE

Subject: Recoiisnendations on South Vietnam (u)

l t On 2o March ISol, .Lieutenant General T. J. H. Trapnell- ■• submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff a report anci ten recommendations on the situation in South Vietnam, These reco:r: ;enda tiohs v/ere:

a c US should support Countering urgency Plan and promote Its acceptance by the Government'of Vietnam.

b. Decide and direct military matters through military rather than Country Team channels*

c # Avoid reduction in MA AG strength*

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d. Provide Defense Support funds on same basis for 170,000 force as for 150'OQO*

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c. Provide MAP support for entire 68,000 Civil Guard, f. Provide MAP POL support for Civil Guard.

^g. Provide MAP support for British-inaka personnel ■ carriers and scout cars. . -

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^—-h. Expedite insnediate shipment by air of 12,000 Ml carbines, • ■ . .

i. Expedite shipment of 625 AN/GRC-9 and 2245 AN/PRC-10 radios; 80■RS-6 radios end 80 GN-43 generators.

j # Expedite shipment of 3000 Claymore anti-personnel

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2, .On 31 March 1961, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the recon^endations listed in subparagraphs la, b and c above and requested the Secretary of Defense.to take action deemed- appropriate. The recc;r/::iendations listed in subnarag:raphs 1 & a e \. f and g above were forwarded to CI__G?AC for ccffifinent and recommendation. The recommendations listed in subparagraphs 1 h- .. and j above were referred to CtllGTkC for action deemed aoor-o-priate, with advice to the Joint Chiefs of Staff of action taken, and of requirements for further assistance on such action

3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have received ana considered the coirrr.ents of C_C_IC?AC. and his reports on action taken. The Joint Chiefs of Staff approve the Trapncll recoi-Mendations below subject to the following considerations:

a. Provide Defense Support funds on same basis for 170,000 force as for 1$0,000, /The Joint Chiefs of Staff have taken clue cognisance of _3ia primary functions and responsibilities assigned to the State Department ana ICA in determining the source and allocation of Defence Support . funds. However 1 j the Government of Vietnam apparently feels it cannot provide the financial support required in the Coimterinsurgsncy Plan* Furthermore, the Joint Chiefs of - Staff feel that prompt acceptance of the Counterin^ursency . Plan by the Goverarasnt of Vietnam is a natter of overriding concern In that country's present critical situation. Therefore^ the Joint Chiefs of Staff request the Secretary of Defense to take action to the end that Defense Sunoort funds are provided for a 170,000 _san force on the sane basis as that nov; provided for 150,000. | ' ' '

b. Provide FAP support for entire 68*000 Civil Guard*

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mately $20 million be adde ceiling*-to support this. .

c, Provide MAP FOL.support for Civil Guard. ' Chiefs of Staff recommend approval for provision to the Civil Guard. ' .

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cU Provide MA? support for British-make personnel carriers and scout cars. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recontend approval for MA? support of British vehicles in Vietnam to the extent only of providing general supply and repair-parts of iteiss

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4. The.Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the increased US contributions to the Government of Vietnacij proposed abovej

be appropriately exploited by US representatives in Vietnam to

i induce that government?s acceptance of the Counterinsurgency

1 Plan

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5. The Joint Chiefs of Staff appropriate action to implement Trapnell:

note that OIKCPAC has taken the recommendations of General

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a. To airlift 12,000 carbines,

b. To expedite shipment of needed radios and generators..

c. To expedite shipment of Claymore mines.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

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19 April 1961

VIETNAM

1. Background

Vietnam today is largely the child of the 1954 Geneva Agreement.

The Geneva Agreement was billed as a "cease-fire 11 between the French and Vietminh armed forces for all of Indo-China, and was forged in the gloom of the French disaster at Dicn-Bien-Phu. The British and Soviets were its sponsors. The U.S. was an observer, not a signatory.

The political portions introduced into the agreement by the Communists should be noted carefully. Among these are the temporary partition of Vietnam with provision for a plebiscite, the establishing of an international inspection commission, and a proviso for keeping a military status quo in weaponry.

Vietnam was partitioned at the 17th Parallel. This gave the Communist North the majority of the population (estimated then at * 14 million) and its most important industries (including coal and cement}. The Free South had an estimated 12 million people and an export potential of rice and rubber.

The plebiscite was to be held in 1956, to determine whether Vietnam was to be Free or Communist. Communist control over the majority of the population seemed to make the outcome plain to predict. However, the vigor of the Ngo Dinh Diem government in making Free Vietnam a viable state, plus the movement of nearly a million refugees from the Communist North to the Free South, changed the political climate strongly by the end of 1955. The Soviet and British sponsors of the agreement then decided that the plebiscite should be postponed indefinitely.' '•*"■•.*

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The International Control Commission was established, with Polish, Indian, and Canadian members. It is still in "being* a monument to the ineffectiveness and dangers of such an international body; the.Free South is observed far more closely than the Communist North, because we play the game legally.

As to the military status quo there were two points: a prohibition on introducing new weapons into Vietnam and a ceiling on foreign military personnel in the country {the number to be no more than were in Vietnam at the time of the "cease-f re"). There were some 400 U.S. military in Vietnam at that time, plus the many thousands of French military. No foreign communists were reported, and the Vietminh had no aircraft at the time.

II. Today

•

In the North is the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. Its Constitution in key provisions makes it into a Communist state in the image of the Soviet Union. In January 1961, its population was estimated at 16, 375, 000. Its armed forces total around 300, 000, with reported heavy fire power capability in new artillery and tanks. Also, aircraft have been reported, not only transports, but jet .fighters. In March I960, it was estimated that there were 6 to 10 / thousand Bloc personnel in the North, most of whom were advisors • to the Vietnamese. About two-thirds were Chinese, the remainder I being mostly Soviets, East Germans, .and Czechs.

In the South is the Republic of Vietnam, with a government somewhat patterned on ours. In January 19&Lj its population was . estimated at 14, 300, 000. Its armed forces total* about 150, 000, not counting 64, 000 in the Civil Guard (similar to a state constabulary) or the 40, 000 in the Self Defense Corps, which is the ill-equipped I and untrained .village militia. Official Americans in Vietnam are: | 98 in "the Embassy, 685 in MAAG, 230 in USOM (ICA), and 30 in i US1S. There are more than a thousand other Americans, dependents of officials, business people, and missionaries. Only a few French and British remain in Vietnam. U.S. aid to the South, in millions of dollars, is indicated as:

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In local piastres (for Defense Support, etc)

n U.S. currency (for technical services, etc.)

FY I960

156

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. Since 80% of the population in the South is employed in

agriculture, much of the U.S. aid to South Vietnam in the years right after 1954, (estimated at over $l-billion), went to rehabilitate the agrarian economy and to settle some 900,000 refugees. The ever-present threat of invasion from the North, and large scale subversive activities has required continued expenditure by the new government to give unusually heavy support to its national security forces. The South now is self-sufficient in basic foodstuffs, but has no heavy industry.

III. Situation Analysis

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The situation map at MAAG in Saigon early this month shows the South's major current problem at a glance; the Communist 'internal security threat. (Map attached)

The Communist f, National Liberation Front 11 claims that the Communists will 'liberate 1 ' the South in 1961. The main reliance : is on Communist armed forces, now estimated at about 10, 000, who ; have been infiltrated into the South from the North (overland through Cambodia ciad L/aos, or by sea in coastal junks), and who fight as

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guerrillas. These are the Viet Cong, *

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As the Free Vietnamese become more effective at countering these Communist guerrillas, (in January and February, the government initiated 529 attacks on the guerrillas, compared to 310. attacks initiated by the Viet Cong), the Communists have been forced to consider further means for winning. Current Communist plans include:

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a. Readiness to exploit any future coup d'etat attempts in the South* (The Communists were caught unprepared

in last November's attempt at a no3i-Comimmist coup in ^ai^on).

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% , ? b. Use the proposed forthcoming 14 nation

conference on Laos as a forvxm to gain political agreement to a j \ew partition of Vietnam at the 13th Parallel.

c. Possibly establish an enclave in the Kuntum area >f South Vietnam, using forces from Attopen in Laos to do this, and start a revolutionary government there*

■ Meanwhile, Free Vietnam has just completed a successful

Presidential election, returning Ngo Dinh Diem to office, with

Nguyen Ngoc Tho as Vice-President, The U.S. Country Team has

taken up with Diem f s government a Counter-Insurgency Vlan, mostly

written by Americans in Vietnam last year* It is hoped that the

implementation of this plan will solve the Viet Cong internal threat.

In addition, MAAG-Vietnam has produced a work, "Tactics and

Techniques of Counter-Insurgent Operations, tr which is being

translated for use in Vietnamese military manuals and texts.

The Counter-Insurgency Plan calls for better-integrated control of the military-economic-political effort against the Viet , Cong, a more effective chain-of-command, improvement of military strength and structure, coordinating and unifying the intelligence effort, gaining more popular support, changing some of the political ' structure, and increasing the Vietnamese contribution to the economic support of the struggle* The Vietnamese have adopted a number of these proposals, have changed some to more acceptable j Vietnamese forms, and balked at part of the political proposals (the ! inclusion of opposition politicians in the Cabinet and elimination of : the Can Lao party which has supported President Diem).

- • ■ -•.**■♦ , ■ •.. * ' .

Diem ! s actions to achieve objectives of the Counter-Insurgency

Plan include: . .

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a. The Civil Guard (constabulary) was transferred from the Department of interior to Department of Defence* 32, 000

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of the Civil Guard are now being trained and equipped by the Army. Since the "Vietnamese are hard put to pay the cost of the increased burden, U.S. Defense officials suggest that we train and equip the remaining 3 6, 000 Civil Guard immediately. They figure that $20-million would cover the initial equipment and first year costs. We could start training and equipping the best of the remaining 36, 000 from FY 61 funds.

b. Control and power of the Joint General Staff has been improved, with U.S. advisors in a more favorable position to assist. The Director of the Civil Guard is now subordinate to the Chief of Staff. Time las between alert and air strike has been shortened considerably. Logistical methods are being improved.

c. The Internal Security Council was founded and now meets weekly. Other structural changes of the government, i (such as having "super-Secretaries n in charge of a group of

related Departments), have been announced but await implementation. • - The Vietnamese agreed to having a national planning system, as recommended in the U.S. Plan, and progress is reported.

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d. The Vietnamese government published a decree $ on the tactical zone organization, although not as complete as in

the U.S. Plan. At the same time, the" Vietnamese have accepted, de facto, closer MAAG help at the tactical level; U.S. military are now actually visiting small tactical units on operations,

e. The Vietnamese have agreed to Chief MAAG's

*) proposed 20,000 additional troops, as in the Plan, Implementation

of tliis increase is tied-up with discussions on the Plan in Saigon. Our Ambassador wants the Vietnamese to accept responsibility for pay and allowances of this increase; U.S. Defense officials propose that the inqrease be supported the same as other MAP forces.

On top of the problem of the Viet Cong actions, and getting the Counter-Insurgency Plan implemented, there still remains the continuing threat of a coup against President Diem. Much of this is still parlor talk in Saigon and other urban areas, but there reportedly are groups seriously plotting. Some plain, private

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talk with key Vietnamese leaders by a responsible U,S» official would end this plotting, especially if the political oppositionists had another outlet for their energies. A small start on providing another use of political energies has been made by the younger leaders of the Northern Dai Viets, who have started trying to coalesce ^Lll the non-Communist opposition parties in a "Front cor Democratization, ft

In the propaganda field, the Communists are way out in front. They have made this a major effort, while we have done too little, too late. Radio facilities in the South are still inadequate, with Radio Hanoi coming in more powerfully to many areas than do Free Vietnamese broadcasts. The Communists reportedly have ten transmitters in the Hanoi area, all 100 KW medium and short-wave; relay transmitters built by Chinese Communists in Cambodia apparently give Ra,dio Hanoi strong broadcast coverage of the South, The South has 15 transmitters listed, with 9 in the Saigon area; 4 are medium wave (IKY/ to 5KW), 5 short-wave (12 KW and 25 KW); the remainder are l'KW transmitters scattered around the country.

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In this connection, Vietnam is the Asian counterpart of Germany, as far as being a showplace of direct competition between the Free World and the Bloc is concerned, Americans in Vietnam too often forget that they haye Bloc opposite numbers just to the North of them, working like beavers to make the place get ahead of us or at least appear that way,

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One of the customary working groups in Washington is-being called together next week by John Steeves, Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs. It Will be composed of "desk" personnel handling Vietnam's daily problems in State, Defense, ICA and CIA. It will address itself to some of the current questions arising out of the U.S. formulated Counter-Insurgency Plan.

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IV. Action Proposed

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The President should at once determine that conditions-in Vietnam are critical and establish a Washington task force for that country. This will permit the task force to come up with an approved 1 plan of action prior to sending a new U.S. Ambassador to Vietnam, so that he can start moving towards U.S. goals upon arrival.

Initial Actions

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1. A Presidential directive should name a Director and provide for members of a Vietnam Task Force from Defense, State, CIA, ICA, and USIA. The organization providing the Director will support the Task Force administratively.

2. The Task Force will submit a statement of U. S. goals and implementing planning to the President for approval by 21 April.

3. The Task Force will prepare a list of candidates for a special three-man staff for the Ambassador (plans officer, operations officer, fiscal officer), and will have this staff selected and appointed with the Ambassador 1 s approval.

4. The Task Force will brine? the Ambassador a,nd his three-man staff together in Y/ashington, "marry 11 them, and present them to the President for his instructions. *

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5. The Task Force will then supervise and coordinate the activities of every U.S. agency carrying out operations pursuant

to the plan in Vietnam to insure success of the approved plan, until the contingency in Vietnam is determined to have been overcome and that U. S. goals can be'achicved by normal procedures.

Goals

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Present U.S. policy objectives are now stated In general terms. Detailed plans, such as the Counter-Insurgency Plan, only cover part -of the actions needed to reach U.S. goals. A fresh statement of goals and tasks, making use of work now underway, would provide firmer purpose to U.S. efforts. True objectives in Vietnam seem to fall into three inter-related parts: - * - _

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1. Pacification - to end the internal Communist threat in South Vietnam.

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J 2. Stabilization - to promote the growth of hoilthy democracy in South Vietnam.

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3. Unification - to provide a favorable climate for a free choice b, the Vietnamese to unify their country, and then to give thern the opportunity to make that choice.

Tasks

Pacification

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- Assign top priority to the defeat of Viet-Cong forces and the denial of South Vietnam to further entry of Communist para-military and subversive forces.

" Aggressively implement the Counter-Insurgency Plan, while recognizing that it probably requires adjustment to fit both native Vietnamese needs and the newest U.S. military techniques and hardware.

- Give Vietnam stronger U.S. psychological-political support. The Vice President might visit Saigon and announce U.S. determination to support Vietnam's desire to remain free.

^ Concentrate U.S. military research and development to develop better military equipment for use in resolving insurgency problems in Vietnam, The area should be treated as a laboratory and proving ground, as far as this is politically feasible,

- Eliminate artificial restrictions imposed by the strict U.S.

Interpretation Of the Geneva Agreement so to permit as many U. S,

personnel in Vietnam as are needed to help the Vietnamese help them-

selves effectively,

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• - -'"Use the force of world opinion to stop Viet-Cong transit of Cambodia, A task force of journalists should visit Cambodia to report on activities in border provinces such as Svayrieng and on policies being implemented by Sihanouk and other officials.

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Stabilizati o n

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I - Good public administration should % follow the troops, moving immediately into pacified areas. The U. S. Peace Corps can be used dynamically to assist in this, particularly in fields of public health, •education, and agriculture. Community development-in the democratic jt r idition can be undertaken by combined teams of U.S. Peace Corps,

Vietnamese Civic Action, and Filipino Operation Brotherhood.

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~ With the agreement of the Vietnamese government, the U. S. should use its "good offices 11 to bring out all political parties, to help them define party platforms for the national good, to encourage the coalescing into two major political groupings, and to redefine political

crimes in realistic objective, rather than subjective terms.

*

- Communications and transport should be expanded rapidly to knit national unity. Light aircraft capabilities should be improved. Government officials should be induced to get away frequently from their desks in Saigon for more direct actions in the field. The President should be encouraged to hold occasional Cabinet meetings in the provinces, particularly in newly pacified areas.

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- The Washington Task Force should send into Vietnam a practical economic team, which should include representatives of U.S. business, to work out with the Vietnamese effective plans to speed up national development, give Vietnam a better tax structure, and establish a sound basis for foreign investment. The numerous U.S. and other economic plans for Vietnam should be re-examined for sound ideas to be incorporated into a firm new pla„n.

/ • -• Viet-Cong prisoners should be rehabilitated along the lines ! of experiences with Communist prisoners in Greece and in EDCOR

in the Philippines. U.S. teams, headed by U.S. military, should

assist the Vietnamese in this work,

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Unification

- Communist North Vietnam should be subjected immediately to a heavy and sustained psychological campaign; a first step would be to beef up radio broadcast capabilities beamed to the North.

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- Areas just south of the 17th Parallel in Free Vietnam should be developed as show-places, particularly in agricultural improvements. News about n fish-ponds n built in Vietnam by Filipinds of Operation Brotherhood travelled throughout the north rapidly, giving a highly desirable contrast between the methods of free men and

.' those of the "Chinese Communist agricultural advisors.

i - Introduce teams of Free Vietnamese into the North to create

1 the means for the people to liberate themselves from Communist controls and coercion. Related actions could be undertaken by Chinese Nationalists in Southern China. Hope could be awakened by taking initial actions against symbols of Communist power; the rail-

i road, the cement plant, and the large modern printing plan in Hanoi

: (which the Viet-Minh took in 1955).

- Encourage again the movement of refugees into the South by stimulating the desire to do so among the people in the North, by establishing better means of ingress to the South, and by re-establishing the highly successful refugee settlement program. Sustained world opinion should be focused on the plight of the Northern people in order to bring pressure on the International Control Commission

; to assist the "movement of refugees. The goal should be a million J refugees, , -

• - An internal liberation movement "should be created in the

' North, organized along lines of political-revolution,' with the goal I of freeing the North of Communist control and eventually unifying

a Free North with a Free South. The movement should be affiliated

with the government of South Vietnam.

--When a'clear majority can be counted upon*to vote for freedom, and election machinery can be set up to protect a free vote, the sponsors of the Geneva Agreement of 1954 should be induced to hold the plebiscite promised in that document. It was written to ■accommodate the then-known control of "the-electorate by the Communists, but there is no reason why the Free World should not turn the table when it is able to do so.

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V. Immediate Steps

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Fullest use should be made of the existing position of personal 'confidence and understanding which General Lansdale holds with President Diem and other key Vietnamese. In addition to giving a major assist to the new Presidential Task Force for Vietnam in Washington, General Lansdale should accompany the new U.S. Ambassador to Saigon to facilitate good working relations with the Vietnamese Government from \ the earliest moment and to be in command of the initial implementation of President Kennedy's Task Force Plan for Vietnam. • This would speed early actions in the field and assure, upon Lansdale's return to Washington, that the Task Force in Washington applied itself to practical priorities to win this one.

' While in Vietnam, Lansdale also could obtain President

Dierr^s permission and then call non-Communist political opposition leaders together and encourage them to rely on legal means of opposition, to help in the fight against the Communist Viet Cong, and to cease scheming coup d f etats.

Other actions he could take while in Vietnam include; .

a. Confer with President Diem on expediting of . obtaining a popular base through such means as a "Presidential Complaints and Action Commission. n This would fit appropriately into the tasks of the Secretary of State for the Presidency, where President Diem now has one of his ablest executives, Nguyen Dinh Thuan. The Filipino expert on this subject, Frisco Johnny San Juan, who assisted Mags ays ay and who is favorably known to President Diem, could be brought to Saigon to help establish this. It would give the i^eople an immediate feeling of personal connection, with a responsive government", . ' •

b. Visit the Hue area, just south of the demarcation line of the 17th Parallel/ to see what might be done to dramatize the benefits of U.S. -Vietnam friendship. The Communists are highly aware of what goes on in this region. If American youth from the Peace Corps worked side by side with Vietnamese on

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some dramatic agrarian projects, in this area, word of tins would spread among the farmers throughout the Communist North and offer a sharp contrast to the Chinese advisors on the land there. This could be strengthened quickly by adding a team of Filipinos from Ope ration Brotherhood to work side by side with Americans and Vietnamese

c. Radio broadcasts should be surveyed realistically, for facilities and content, to be certain that the word of what free

men are doing in Vietnam is heard loudly and acceptably by Vietnamese who are staking their lives on freedom's cause in the South, by Vietnamese ^vho dream of lost freedom in the Communist North, and by neighbors in Cambodia and Laos. Any mobile radio broadcasting equipment and staffs available to the U.S. should be brought in to action here as a priority matter.

d. A small R&tD section could be established in the Vietnamese Army, to work closely with a small team from U.S. Defense, which could be attached to MAAG. This R&D section would actually produce locally materiel for use in the fight against the Viet Cong, as well as offer a Vietnamese means of introducing improved American techniques and materiel . A similar section in the Philippine Army produced-faulty ammunition and booby-trapped grenades which were sold secretly to the Huks; it was a highly effective operation.

All available Americans who played key action roles in helping the Vietnamese in the 1954-55 birth of their nation should be mustered to assist Lansdale both in South Vietnam and in appropriate North Vietnam operations. This could include members of Lans dale's 1954'-56 team as well as Generals O'Daniel and Williams. Also, other selected personnel with practical experience in the fields of work required could be listed by Lansdale and assigned on a priority basis.-

' * A special economic-trade mission of-highly-regarded American * leaders, to include Dean James Landis if possible, shouJd visit Vietnam. "This mission would step-up existing projects and to demonstrate the

strong, new U.S. initiative in support of the Vietnamese government

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under Diem.

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Dramatic visits by Americans who would capture .world head lines should be scheduled. The proposed visit to Vietnam by Vice President Johnson is a case in point. If other duties prevent this, then consideration should be given to the possibility of Eisenhower or Nixon visiting Vietnam for President Kennedy.

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||jt^^#l||, OFFICE Of 7I|!? FFICE ° F THE SECRETARY Or

;A'i ^ ' : /U ,v "aCRETARY Or DEFENSE Washington 2S,iJ.c.

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25 April 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR DEPUTY SECRETARY GILPATRIC

Frpm: Brig. Gen, Lansdale^<Jl

Subject: Ngo Dinli Diem

-Few people outside Vietnam really know the man who was re-

l elected President of the Republic of Vietnam earlier this month.

With your new responsibilities towards Vietnam for President

Kennedy, you might find it useful to have an insight about this

dedicated man drawn from my close association with him.. Also,

you might like to pass this along to Vice President Johnson prior

to his trip.

It takes a perceptive eye to see Diem's true character when C~ , meeting him. He is short and round and f, mild- spoken. n Many

people miss his "snapping" black eyes by noting, instead, that his

feet seem barely to reach the floor when he is seated. However ] he is not defensive about his short stature and is at ease around tall

. Americans. He has a very positive approach to. Westerners, not the

least bit concerned about differences such as Asian~Cauca.sian back-1 . ground. When the Vice President sees him, he v/ill find him as in-

♦terested in cattle as any Texan and as interested in freedom as Sam

Houston.

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—j First of all, there is his name, Ngo Dinh Diem is pronounced ^

as "No Din Zee'em. " He is properly addressed as "President Ngo," although most Americans, including myself, think of him as "President Diem. " The family name is Ngo. Diem is his given name and

/ it is customary for Vietnamese to be called by their given names.

*

Vice President Nguyen Ngoc Tho is "Vice President Tho, " (pro-\ * nounced as "Tuh"). Secretary of State for the Presidency Nguyen

Dinh Thuan is "Mr. Thuan, " (pronounced as "Twan"). The use of "President Ngo" is a formal mark of respect. Since I think of him as "Diem, " I will call him that to make'the remarks come easier.

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At the* table, he shows that he enjoys eating (and usually has a good appetite). His smile is shy and infrequent. Usually he is serious and becomes passionately so when lie talks about his true lojve, Vietnam. Age lines show around his eyes, particularly on those mornings when he has stayed up most of the night reading, which is often. He reads in English, French, and Vietnamese. While he speaks and understands English rather well, he is emir rrassed over his pronunciation and is reluctant to use it. In his official contacts with Americans, he uses French.

Diem was born in Hue, the ancient capital in central Vietnam, oa 3 January 1901. His 60 years have been full of sharp tests of " his moral courage, of devotion to a highly-principled ideal of patriotism. This is worth understanding, particularly since the truth has been hidden by decades of "character assassination 11 by his bitterest enemies, the Communists and the French colonialists Much false information has stuck, by sheer repetition. The truth is eyen more interesting. i

For example, in the Spring of 1955 the Presidential Palace was under artillery fire from the Binh Xuyen forces, who opened up on his bedroom wing with Sl-mm. mortars at midnight. The French colons in the Saigon bars told a story with great glee of how Diem had hidden under his bed quivering with fear. What he actually did was typically different. He went out in his night-shirt into the Palace grounds where some of the Guard Battalion had abandoned their artillery to take cover, and drove them back to their guns with a tongue-lashing while paddling around the yard in a pair of old slippers.

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.When someone describes him as an aloof mandarin, I recall how he cried on my shoulder when our close friend, Trinh Minh The, v/as killed, his anguish over the loss of Phat Diem province in the North to the Communists, and the agony he went through in his final break .with Chief of State Bao Dai. IJe-simply doesn't parade hi$ feelings for everyone to see, particularly when things are going wrong.

* ■

President Diem has been criticized for his "family," meaning primarily the influence of his younger brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu (pro-c^ nounced as "No Din New"), and Madame Nhu. This younger brother

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handles many of the more sensitive political party and intelligence "special operations" for President Diem, as v/cll as helping him privately, with speeches, planning, and family affairs. Some • Americans have been strongly critical of brother Nhu, seeing in him a continuing influence towards a Diem dictatorial regime, with control of the press, arrests of political dissenters, etc. Actually, brother Nhu-is a whole complex subject in himself, as is Madame Nhu in herself. Both have been defamed maliciously. There is a grain of truth in some of the stories about them. But, the reality is that Diem trusts Nhu for certain activities which he cannot entrust to anyone else, and needs him. We will hardly help Diem be the strong leader we desire by insisting that he get rid of his trusted right-hand man; we would do better to influence that right-hand man more effectively. Incidentally, Madame Nhu is the daughter of Tran Van Chuong, the Vietnamese Ambassador in Washington.

The Ngo family needs mention further. Diem ! s father was Grand Chamberlain of the old Imperial Court at Hue, in central Vietnam. He spent his life striving to maintain some semblance of Vietnamese rule under French control -- and brought up his sons to carry on the fight for eventual Vietnamese independence. In effect, it was a family organized for revolution. The sons are:

Ngo Dinh Khoi - killed by the Communists

Ngo Dinh Thuc - ("Took") - Catholic Archbishop

Ngo Dinh Diem - President .

Ngo Dinh Nhu - Presidential Adviser

Ngo Dinh Luyen - Ambassador in London

Ngo Dinh Canh - At family home, Hue - in local politics there.

In Vietnamese family style, each brother is responsible for his next younger brother. Thus, Archbishop Thuc feels a heavy responsibility for President Diem (and is well-worth talking to about his brother's problems), and President Diem feels a heavy responsibility

for brother-Nhu.

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Diem was educated at Hue, in the Vietnamese equivalent of legal training:. He was the honor graduate of the last Government class

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before the French stopped the training. Diem concentrated on tribal .law, becoming the outstanding expert on the subject through an,exhaustive study of all books and manuscripts in the Imperial library. His real bent was towards engineering, evidenced today in his love . for mechanical gadgets and plans for public works.

At 25, he was appointed as a Province Chief, and served from

* 1926 to 1932 as such, governing Phan Rang and Phan Thiet in central Vietnam. At the time, these provinces had large French plantations which were practically feudal worlds into themselves. Diem, making use of tribal laws, opened lands for Vietnamese settlers. When workers started leaving plantations for land of their own, Diem became a hero among his people -- and earned some French hatred which still has remnants today.

During these same early years, Diem came up against the Com-* munists and started fighting them.. The French brought in Chinese coolies from Singapore to build plantation railroads; the Chinese brought in Communist pamphlets and distributed them to Vietnamese plantation labor. Diem argued forcibly against this dangerous practice, but wasn f t heeded by the plantation owners. He then started working directly with the Vietnamese against Communist influence, (In other words, he has been actively up against all forms of Communist operations for 30 years now. )

In 1933, he had become such an outstanding leader aiiong the Viet- . namese that he v/as made Prime Minister. After 6 months in office, the French proposed government "reforms. 11 It actually meant the final form of Vietnamese abdication of all political rights. Diem defied the French openly on this issue, finally resigned and returned all French honors (including their helpful remuneration), He became a real hero to the Vietnamese.

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* . The family went through some hard times then. Diem , s father

was forced out of his position in 1940 for actions against the Communists, , and for returning tribal lands to .the Vietnamese. They lived for a time " on the family farm, with Diem helping with plowing and chores. However, the family spent every spare moment working for Vietnamese freedom. •Brother Nhu handled the funds. They fought a long, secret war against \ both the French and the Communists.

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t In 1950-53, Diem came to the U.S. , staying at Maryknoll, N.J* He lectured at several U.S. universities, studied, triedto interest Americans in helping Vietnam, and had a book published. The book was about the meaning of democracy in Vietnam, pointing out similarities between U.S. and Vietnamese "checks and balances' 1 in government powers.

Diem then went to Belgium (where he met a number of German industrialists and engineers who impressed him). In 1954, as the Geneva Agreement was bringing a "cease fire 11 to the Franco- Vietminh War after the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu, Chief.of Ftate Bao Dai asked Diem to return to Vietnam to form a government. He arrived as half of his country was given away at Geneva and as French troops pulled back into smaller perimeters, abandoning the countryside to the Communist Vietminh.

I first met him when he came to Saigon in 1954.- The situation for the free Vietnamese was disastrous, so I jotted down some suggestions for vigorous actions by the new Prime Minister to start remedying the situation, had them approved by our Ambassador and MAAG Chief, and then went to the Palace and introduced myself. This started a working relationship which gradually grew into one of trust and respect, despite the fact that such Vietnamese enemies as General Hinh (Chief of Staff of the Vietnamese Army who plotted to overthrow Diem) were friends of mine. Diem and 1 they knew that I, as an American, was honestly trying to help bring unity and stability out of chaos to give the free Vietnamese a chance at life. I came to see him almost daily as we moved refugees from the Communist North, pacified the South as the Communists withdrew regular forces, fought down a rebellion by gangster sects, established government administration throughout the South, went through two serious coup attempts, brought the independent religious sect armies into the regular army, held a plebiscite to choose a Chief of State, elected a Constituent Assembly, and finally wrote a Constitution for the new country. They were 2-1/2 tough years, with plenty of give and take.

■

As the leader of a modern nation which has just been governing itself for 5 years, Diem has worked extremely long hours daily. For a long time, he was really the only competent executive in the government and had to check on infinite details of administration. He has a

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phenomenal memory for details, dates, places, and personal biographies ~- and is short-tempered with Ministers who know less about the current work in their Departments than he does. (U Nu of Burma shocked him once by not knowing the strength of the Burmese Army; Diem not only knows the strength and location of Vietnamese Armed Forces units, but also the names and family background of practically all the officers}. Re now is starting to get a few competent executives. As he gets them, he gives them all the responsibility and authority needed to do the work. Few can stand the burden.

So, here is our toughest ally against Communism in Southeast Asia, A 60-year-old bachelor who gave up romance with his childhood sweetheart {she remains a spinster in Hue) to devote his life to his country. He is a person of immense moral courage and of demonstrated physical courage. He is intensely honest. And, despite seeing hundreds of people daily and visiting frequently all over the country, he is essentially a lonely man. He is hungry for the understanding friendship of responsible Americans.

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

"If O P S E C R E T

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•' TASK FORCE .DRAFT

• 26 April 1961

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Vietnam

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Pursuant to your decision at the Cabinet meeting on April 20, 1961/ I am submitting for consideration by the National Security Council a program of action to prevent Communist domination of South Vietnam,

This program was prepared by an inter-departmental Task Force consisting of representatives from the Departments of State and Defense, CIA, ICA f USIA and the Office of the President, In addition, the Task Force had the benefit of advice from the Joint Staff, CINCPAC and the # Chief f MA AG, Vietnam.

In the short time available to the Task Force, it was not possible to develop the progr?mi in complete detail. However, there has been prepared a plan for mutually supporting actions of a political, military, economicj psychological and covert character which can be refined

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periodically on the basis of further recommendations from the field,

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Toward this end, Brigadier General JE* G«- Liansdale, USAF, who -has bce'n designated Operations Officer for the Task Force, will proceed to Viutn?-rn immediately after the program receives Presidential approval. Following "on-the-spot discussions with U.S. and Vietnamese officials, he will forward to the -Director/-o£<the: Task Force specific recommendations for action in support of the attached program.

* ., ,-Y'OU .v/ill be advised of any changes as this .program proceeds and •

be provided a status,of actions as appropriate.

Roswell L. Gilpatric

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TASK FORCE DRAFT .' 26 April 1961

A Program of Action

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To Prevent Communist Domination of South Vietnam

Appraisal of the Situation: After a meeting in Hanoi on 13 Ivlay 1959, the Central Committee of the North Vietnamese Communist Party publicly

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announced its intention' n to smash 1 ' the government of President Diem*

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Following this decision, the Viet Cong have significantly increased their program of infiltration, subversion, sabotage and assassination designed to achieve this end.

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At the North Vietnamese Communist Party Congress in September, I960, the earlier declaration of underground war by the Party's Control Committee was re-affirmed. This action by the Party Congress took place only a month after Kong Le's coup in Laos. Scarcely two months later there

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was.?. la-rge"seale military uprising in Saigon. The turmoil ^otod throughout

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the area by this rapid succession of events provides an ideal environment for

the Communist "master plan" to take over all of Southeast Asia.

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Since : tli at time, * as cairbe seen from the attached map, the internal

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security situation in South Vietnam has become critical. What amounts to a state of active guerrilla warfare now exists throughout the country. The number of Viet Conn hard-core Communists has increased from 4400 in

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early I960 to an estimated 12, 000 today. The number of violent incidents

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per month now averages 650, Casualties on both sides totaled more than

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4500 during the first three months of this year. 58% of the country is under some degree of Communist control, ranging from harassment and night raids to almost complete administrative jurisdiction in the Communist "secure areas, n

The Viet Cong over the past two years have succeeded in stepping up the pace and intensity of their attacks to the point where South Vietnam is nearing the decisive phase in its battle for survival. If the situation Continues to deteriorate, the Communists will be able to press on to their strategic goal of establishing a rival "National Liberation Front"

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government in one of these "secure areas, " thereby plunging the nation into open civil war. They have publicly announced that they will "take

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over the country before the end of 1961. "

In short, the situation in South Vietnam* has reached the point where,

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at least for the .time being, a solution to the internal security problem

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niv>t take priority over other programs directed towards the political or . .

. ec or-bniic' f i elds ,

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The U.S. Objective: . To prevent Communist domination of South Vietnam.

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Concept of 0p6rations.: To initiate, on an accelerated basis, a series of

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mutually supporting actions of a military, political, economic, psycholog-

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ical and covert character designed to achieve this objective. In so doing/ it is intended to use, and where appropriate extend, expedite or build

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upon the existing U.S. and Government of Viet Nam (G. V. N.) programs already underway in South Vietnam. There is neither the tim.e available

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nor any sound justification for "starting from scratch. M Rather the need

■* is to focus the U.S. effort in South Vietnam on the immediate internal

security problem; to infuse it with a sense of urgency and a dedication

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to the over-all U.S. objective /rather than to the success of individual

agency programs; to achieve! through cooperative inter-departmental'

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support both in the field and in Washington, the operational flexibility r

needed to apply the available U.S. assets in a manner best calculated

to achieve our national goal; and, finally, to impress on our friends, the Vietnamese, and on our foes, the Viet Cong, that come what may',

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the Uaiitcd States intends to win this battle.

Progr am of Action:

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1, G eneral: The most significant step taken to date to counter Com-munist subversion in South Vietnam has been the development of the Counter Insurgency Plan. . This Plan, which has been fully,coordinated within

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the U.S. government, has been fowarded to President Diem. Those

portLons bfthe Plan which- arc agreed to by .the G. V. N. will be implemented ■

as rapidly as possible.

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As part of the over-all program, it is proposed that Vice President Johnson visit Vietnam at an early date.

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2, Political:

fu Assist the G.V.N, to develop within the co\mtry a healthy $ non-

Communist political party structure, guiding this development as

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appropriate toward the ultimate formation of a two-party system. b. Assist the G.V.N, to develop techniques to make it more ■ asponsiue to the needs of the people, including, if agreeable to the

President, a ''Presidential Complaints and Action Commission. n

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• c. Obtain the political agreements needed to permit the prompt

implementation of SEATO contingency plans providing for military

intervention in South Vietnam should this become necessary to

prevent the loss of the country to Communism,,

d. Obtain the cooperation of other free nations in the area in

support of regional measures designed to inhibit the transit or

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safe haven of Communist subversive or guerrilla fo'rees operating

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in South Vietnam* In particular, secure the cooperation of Cambodia

and Laos in the implementation of appropriate military and civil .

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measures to prevent the use of their territory for the infiltration

of Communist personnel or supplies into South Vietnam. y^^^^^.^^^^^^ *

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e. Assist the Vietnamese to become the polarizing spirit against Communism in the Southeast Asia region. Encourage closer working

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liaison with other anti-Communist Asian nations* Step-up the exchange

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of visits of political, cultural, civic, "military, veterans,' youth,

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and labor groups between VrctnaYn and her neighbors. Increase and

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systematize existing exchanges of information on Communist agents, couriers, and terrorists between national governments"throughout

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the region,

f, Vi r here restrictions on U.S. operations exist as a result of the 1954 Geneva Agreement, take such measures as may be necessary to prevent them from interfering with the implementation of this

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pro grain.

3. Military

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a. Increase the MAAG as necessary to insure the effective imple-

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mentation of the military portion of the program. Initial appraisal of new.tasks assigned CHMAAG indicate that approximately 100 additional .'military personnel will be required immediately,

b. Expand MAAG responsibilities to include authority to provide

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support and advice to the Self Defense Corps,

c. Authorize MAP support for the entire Civil Guard force of 68, 000,

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(MAP support is now authorized for 32, 000). • -

d. Install as a matter of priority a radar surveillance capability % which will enable the GVN to obtain warning of Communist overflights

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being conducted for intelligence or clandestine air supply purposes.

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Initially, this capability should be provided from U.S. mobile radar

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capability, with permanent AC&p installations established as* rapidly

as practicable

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

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e. Provide MAP support for.the Vietnamese Junk Force as a means of preventing Vict-Cong clandestine supply and infiltration into- South Vietnam by water, (MAP support, which was not provided in the Counter Insurgency

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Plan, will include training of junk crews in Vietnam or at U.S. bases by US Navy personnel). ?

f. Assist the G.V.N, to establish a Combat Development and Test Center in South Vietnam to develop, with the help of modern technology,

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new techniques for use against the Viet Cong forces. , 4. Economic; ' *

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a. Until further notice, defense support of approved regular and para-

military forces should be given primacy over the important, but less

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urgent need to rectify the growing gold and dollar reserve position of i the G. V.N. and the need to avoid serious inflation.* .(The precise level

of U.S. defense support shall be determined through appropriate negotiations,

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, * State.-* ICA versions: That the United States at present hold firm against

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the provision of additional aid to cover piaster requirements, but at the

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same time-assure, the G. V. N. at the highest level that it need feel no con-

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corn over U.S. willingness to provide resources if they prove necessary

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in the future. Early monetary reform should be strongly urged, §.s

another source of revenue. At the same time the G.V.N, should be assured

that we are prepared to help if the reform produces unsatisfactory results.

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TOP SECRET

but the guiding principle in these negotiations shall be to insure that the

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confidence, of President Diem in the wholehearted U.S. support of the .. . m cpunter-insurgency program is not, prejudiced. V/ithin these guide-lines, the Country Team should study and recommend realistic steps

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to ameliorate the adverse economic effects of more generous defense

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support. } * -

b.* Liberalize current ICA procedures- to pemit USOM to send into

pacified areas complete, /functional field teams composed of public

administrators, public health officials, educators, agricultural experts,

etc. , organized functionally to meet the specific needs of the G. V.N.

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• c, Review the Buy-American Act to determine whether it would be in the mutual interest of both countries for the President to make an

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exception in the case of Vietnam.

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3,3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

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^* Psy chological

a. Encourage the GVN to continue liberalizing its public information

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policies to help develop a broad public understanding of the actions required

to corribat Communist-insurgents and to build public confidence in the GYN's determination and capability to deal with the problem . * " • b. Assist the GVN to develop and improve the USOM-supported

ra<? o network for the country, to include the prompt establishment of

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the presently planned new stations at Soc Trang, Banmethout and Quang Ngai ; .

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and the installation of the more powerful, new transmitters now on USOM

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order for Saigon and Hue*

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c. Assist the GVN to initiate a training program for information and press attaches in the various ministries and directorates.

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d. Assist.the GVN to establish a Press Institute for the training of

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: selected young people for careers in journalism,

e. In cooperation with the MAAG and the Ministry of Defense, make

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use of the troop information and education program of the GVN armed ■ forces as a channel of communication between the Government and the people in the rural areas,

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f. Encourage President Diem'to" continue the effective "fireside

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coverage for such appearances. k ur .

g. Reorient the currentUlSISsprograrn^n South Vietnam by

chat 11 and other getting-to-the-people techniques which were begun during the

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recent election campaign. Provide maximum press, film, and radio

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con; sting the existing hi-national center si into training centers for

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rural information and educational cadres.

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, h. In coordination with the MAAG, CIA, and the GVN Ministry

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of Defense, compile and declassify for vise of rnedir- representatives

in.South Vietnam and throughout the world, documented facts

c mcerning Communist terrorists ^activities and the measures being

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taken by the GVN to counter such attacks.

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i. In coordination with CIA and the appropriate GVN Ministry,

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increase the flow of information to media representatives of the * '

unsatisfactory living conditions in North Vietnam.

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j. Develop agricultural "show-places ff throughout the country, with a view toward exploiting their beneficial psychological effects. This

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project would be accomplished by combined teams of Vietnamese

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(Civic Action personnel), Americans (Peace Corps), Filipinos

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(Operation Brotherhood), and other Free World nationals. "

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k. Exploit as a part of a planned psychological campaign the

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rehabilitation of Communist Viet Cong prisoners now held in South Vietnam. Testimony of rehabilitated prisoners stressing the errors of Communism should be beamed to Communist-held areas, including

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North'Vietnam, to induce defections. This rehabilitation program

would be assisted by a team of U.S. personnel, including U.S. Army.

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(Civil Affairs, Psychological Warfare, and Counter-intelligence), USIS, and USOM experts.*

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^* Cov ert A cti ons: . ' *

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a. Intellig e nce: Expand current positive and* counter-intelligence ■

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operations against Communist forces in South Vietnam and against North

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Vietnam. These include penetration of the Vietnamese Communist

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mechanism, dispatch of agents to North Vietnam and strengthening Vietnamese internal security services. Authorization should be given

for.the use in North Vietnam operations of civilian aircrews of American ■ .and other nationality, as appropriate, in addition to Vietnamese.

b. Communications Intelligence: Expand the "current program of interception and direction finding covering Vietnamese Communist

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- communications activities in South Vietnam, as well as North Vietnam

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targets. Obtain USIB authority! to conduct these operations on a fully

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joint basis, permitting the sharing of results of interception, direction finding, traffic analysis and cryptographic analysis by American

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agencies with the Vietnamese to the extent needed to launch rapid attacks on Vietnamese. Communist communications and command installations.

This program should be supplemented by a program, duly

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; ; . coordinated, of-training additional Vietnamese Army units in intercept

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and direction finding by U.S. Army Security Agency. Also, U.S. Army • Security Agency teams could be sent to Vietnam for direct operations, coordinated in the same manner.

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c. Unconventional Warfare:

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Expand present operations of the First Observation Battalion in guerrilla areas of South Vietnam, under joint MAAG-GIA'sponsorship and direction. This should be in full operational collaboration with the Vietnamesej using Vietnamese civilians recruited with CIA aid. "

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, In Laos, infiltrate teams under light civilian cover to Southeast Laos to locate and attack Vietnamese Communist bases and lines of communications. These teams should be supported by assault units of 100 to 150 men for use on targets beyond capability of teams. Training

of teams could be a combined operation by CIA and US Army Special Forces. These operations should continue despite a possible ceasefire in Laos.

*•

In North Vietnam, vising the foundation established by

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intelligence operations, form networks of resistance, covert bases and teams for sabotage and light harassment. A capability should be created by MAAG in the South Vietnamese Army to conduct Ranger raids and similar military actions in North Vietnam as might prove

*

necessary or appropriate. Such actions should try to avoid"any

..'A

outbreak of extensive resistance or insurrection which could not be supported to the extent necessary to stave off repression.

Conduct over-flights for dropping of leaflets to harass the communists and to maintain morale of North Vietnamese population

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* and increase gray broadcasts to North Vietnam for the same purposes. . ■ ■•*•... ^

# , d.. Internal South Vietnam:

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Effect operations to penetrate political forces, government, armed services and opj>osition elements to measure support of government, provide warning of any coup plans, and identify indi-viduals with potentiality of providing leadership in event of * ;

disappearance of President Diem,

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Build up an increase in the population's participation in and loyalty to free government in Vietnam, through improved communication

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etween the government and the people, and by strengthening independent j

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or quasi-independent organizations of political, syndical, or professional

character. Support covertly the GVN in allied and neutral countries,

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with special emphasis on bringing out GVN accomplishments, to counter-

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■ act tendencies towards a "political solution" while the Communists are attacking GVN. Effect, in support, a psychological program in Vietnam and elsewhere exploiting Communist brutality and aggression

*

..-in North Viqtiiam.: • • .,>.;

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' e ' The expan ded p rog ram outlined above will require an additional

4

40 personnel for the CIA station and an increase in the CIA outlay for Vietnam of approximately $1, 500, 000 for FY 62, partly compensated

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by withdrawal of personnel from other areas. The US Army Security

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. Agency actions to supplement communications intelligence will require

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78 personnel and approximately $1. 2 million in equipment.

7, Funding

Direct that $4? million from the FY 62 Contingency Fund be added

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to the current FY 62 Military Assistance Program for VN to meet this

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mergency. The current military assistance program for VN of

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^$60.8 million in FY 62 provides only minimum funds required to i

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maintain existing GVN armed forces of 170, 000 and 32, 000 of the Civil Guard, In order to provide necessary new equipment, training and other support required for GVN armed forces of 170,000, a Civil Guard of 68, 000, and Self Defense Corps of 40, 000, an additional $49 million for MAP is required in FY 62 for a total of about $110'

.million* Additional fun'ds may be required for Defense Support to

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-meet the local currency for .the GVN .military budget* • • •

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Estimates to cover the use of the Peace Corps and Operations

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Brotherhood are being developed.

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top secret:

8. Follow on Actions

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a. Hold a Counter-Insurgency Conference in Saigon of MAAG Chiefs from Southeast Asia countries for the purpose of developing best methods and procedures for mutual support on a regional basis,

■

b. Authorize U.S. Army engineers to complete construction of a

* highway from the Vietnam Coast through Laos to the Mekong as an international "Peace Highway 11 for the economical betterment of Southeast Asia. Publicly announce plans to eventually extend this "Peace Highway" to Rangoon. ' ■ .

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c. Determine the feasibility of an appeal by Vietnam to the U.N.

to provide ground observers to help control subversion and infiltration

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of South Vietnam by the Communists.

■ . ..

i. d f Study the need for further possible increases in Vietnamese

military strength to meet the growing threat to the security of the

G. V. N. ■ ~ .: •

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e. Encourage other Free World countries to assist the G. V, N. in achieving its goal of preventing Communist domination of Vietnam.

f. Provide adequate funds for an impressive U« SV participation

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an the Saigon Trade Fair of 1962.

g. Sponsor the visit of a practical U.S. economic team, drawing heavily on U, S. private industry, to South Vietnam to work out with the Vietnamese effective plans to speed up national development, to give

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Vietnam a better tax structure, to establish a sound basis for foreign

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investment, and to institute specific programs designed to have an

early impact upon agricultural areas now'vulnerable to Communist

» ■

take-over.

h. Develop a long-range plan for the economic development of

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southeast Asia on a regional basis, allocating priority of funds and

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technical assistance to South Vietnam.

* ^' Or ganizational Ar rangements : "

For purposes of U. S. actions in support of this program, the President hereby declares that Vietnam is a critical area and ap-

ft

proves the organizational concept whereby over-all direction, inter-agency coordination and support of the program will be effected through a Presidential Task Force constituted as follows:

•

Director: Operations

Officer: Executive: Liaison: Defense: JCS: State:

;IGA:. . ■ . ■ . "CIA:

USIA: .

Office of the President

Deputy Secretary of Defense Gilpatric

Brig. Gen. Lansdale

Col. Black *

Mr. Frank Hand

Assistant Secretary (ISA), Mr, Nitze

Gen, Bone steel and Col.. Levy .

Deputy Under Secretary Alexis Johnson

(or Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern

Affairs, Mr, McConaughy) Mr.' V/yiiam Sheppard . , t

Chief, Far East Division, Mr. Fitzgerald Deputy Director, Mr. Sorcnson

Mr. Rostow.

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In carrying out his duties while in the field, the Operations Officer of

the Task Force will cooperate with and will have the full support of the

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Ambassador and the Country Team.

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DEMARCATION

GULF OI-'

T ONK1N

THAILAND

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LAOS

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to CAMBODIA

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<&:£* '.Trang V 1 1- T NV;:^

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SOUTH C h l t< A SEA Ljj Communist dominated

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Communist controlled mostly at night

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

SECRET

SECOND DRAFT Col. E. F. Black

28 A-oril

EFFECT OF A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT IN LAOS ON THE PROPOSED

PROGRAM OF ACTION FOR VIETNAM

If agreement is reached on a cease fire, political negotiations on the future of Laos will begin on May 12 at the Fo-urteen Power Conference , in Geneva* However, the April 26th statement onLaos by the Chinese , Communist indicates that the Communist members of that conference

■

intend to expand the negotiations to include other areas of Southeast Asia, As a result, it can be expected that the Fourteen Power Conference will be prolonged, covering several months or more.

The effect of these negotiations on the Proposed Program of Action for Vietnam are threefold:

First , the very fact that the Fourteen Powers are meeting under essentially the same ground rules as the 195^ Geneva Accords, including the concept of an ICC mechanism in Laos, Vietnam and Cambodia, could have a politically inhibiting effect on any significant measures which the U.S. might undertake to prevent a Communist take-over in South Vietnam.

Second , as has been their practice in the past, the Communists can be expected to use the cover of an international negotiation to expand their subversive activities. In this case, close coordination

SECRET 53

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number; NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 2011

of their efforts In southern Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam can be expected. The 250 mile border between South Vietnam and Laos, while never .

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effectively sealed in the past, will now be deprived of even the semblance of protection which the friendly, pro-western Laos offers.

Third, the three principal passes through the Annamite Mountains (the Nape Pass, Mugia Gap, and Lao Bao Pass) lie in

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Southern Laos. These passes control three key military avenues of

advance from North Vietnam through Laos into the open Mekong valley *

leading to Thailand and South Vietnam. A Lao political settlement that

! would afford the Communists an opportunity to maintain any sort of

control, covertly or otherwise, of these mountain passes would make

them gate keepers to the primary inland invasion route leading to Saigon

and flanking the most Important defensive terrain in the northern area

of South Vietnam.

The first Is of little significance since this government has already

indicated that we will not consider ourselves bound by any limitations

imposed by the 195^ Geneva Agreements.

As to the second, the neutralization or loss of Laos to the Free

World will, of course, compound the problems which the G.V.N, faces

in maintaining the security of their border with Laos. It will also improve

the Communist capabilities to infiltrate personnel and equipment into

Southern Vietnam through Cajr-.bodia. The extremely rugged nature of

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

the terrain along the Laos-G*V.M. boundary makes it almost impossible to establish a "water-tight" border. However, this same rugged terrain limits the smuggling routes to one principal road, (the east-west highway from Savannahhet to Tchopone to Quang Tri) and to some 12-15 reasonably passable trails. With the reinforcement of the G. V. N. Army in. the Konium plateau region; with the establishment of a thoroughly effective intelligence and patrol system using the most modern communications equipment; with regular aerial surveillance of the entire border region; and with the application of new technological area-denial techniques (e.g., GW, BW, ligh plastic, air-droppable landmines, fluorescent materials, etc.); it should be possible to hold the flow of Communist agents and supplies to the current levels. As these measures are applied the efficiency of the border patrol system can be expected to increase

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and it is not unreasonable to expect that the flow of Communist aid to the Viet Cong might even be reduced somewhat.

The third, however, poses a direct and serious military threat to the entire western flank of South Vietnam. It cannot be met within the dimensions of our internal security program alone. It requires the prompt organization of two new G.V.N, divisions and a vastly accelerated U.S. training program for the entire G.V.N, army. This cannot be conceived of in terms of regular MAAG training, as its success depends upon raising the combat effectiveness of the South Vietnamese forces by an entire order

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of magnitude within a matter of 6-8 months. To meet this new situation j it will be necessary to augment the MAAG with two U.S. training commands, each capable of establishing a divisional field training area. One camp would be established in the vicinity of Kontum; the other,

near Ban Me Thuot. Each of these training commands would require I

approximately 1600 U.S- soldiers drawn from Army or Marine Corps sources.

In addition to the regular divisional training program, a major step-up

of special Forces training is indicated to assist the G. V. N. forces counter the increased move level of Viet Cong guerrilla activity which can be expected to follow a cease fire in Laos, This will require a further MAAG augmentation of a Special Forces Group. To meet the urgency of the situation, the 1st Special Forces Group now stationed in Okinawa should be deployed at once to Hha Trang for this purpose.

In summary , the most effect of a political settlement in Laos, while complicating one important aspect of the problem of the defense of South Vietnam, will not make the over-all task impossible or even impracticable.

Specifically, force levels for the G. V, K. Army will have to be increased by two divisions; modern equipment, primarily of the communication and reconnaissance types, will have to be provided to assist t|$e Go V. N. in setting up and operating an effective border control system; and the MAAG will have to be augmented by the addition of two U.S. divisional training commands (l,600 U.S. military personnel each) and one Special Forces Group (kOO U.S. military personnel).

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

DATE: April 29, I96I

SUBJECT: Laos

PARTICIPANTS:

Copies to: S/S

The Secretary Secretary McNamara Attorney General Kennedy The Under Secretary General C.E. Le May General David M. Shoup

Admiral Arleigh Burke Mr. McGeorge Bundy Assistant Secy McConaughy Deputy Asst. Secy Steeves Mr. Charles E. Bohlen Mr. Daniel V. Anderson Ambassador Kenneth Young Mr, G. Edward Reynolds, Lao

C-Mr. Johnson Desk Officer S/P Mr. McGhee EUR-Mr. Kohler DOD-Secy McNamera FE-Mr. McConaughy IO-Mr. Cleveland Wri-Mr. McGeorge Bundy S/B Mr. Rohlen IN/'C-2

The Secretary observed that the principal change on the ground had been that forces had moved from such points as Muong Kassy and Tha Thorn However, there had been no major change that would in itself make the difference between our carrying out Plan 5 today and three weeks ago.

Mr. McNamara said that the real question was whether we could land forces in Vientiane because of the danger of Chinese air retaliation local sabotage and the action by PL guerrillas who could move into Vientiane at any time. The Secretary observed that the presence of these guerrillas had been noted for weeks.

General Le May observed that there had been a large build-up of supplies by the Pathet Lao side.

Admiral Burke said that we were faced with the "folding" of the FAB, which was not fighting.

The Secretary asked to what extent we were influenced by the movement of Chinese Communist fighter bombers and pointed out that this capability certainly existed three weeks ago.

General Le May

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General Le May said that these aircraft could always be moved in to scare us 'off.

The Secretary ne::t sslced to what o::tcnt the Defense Department had been Influenced by tho danger of escalation. K&d thl3 made any considerable difference? Mr. uc^Tamra replied that it would be easy for the PL or Chinese Cc:zr;,unists to prevent successful landings at Vientiane or Scr.o. i '

Admiral Burke said that tho situation had deteriorated quite a bit but he still thought it possible to go in. ( War is dangerous,, he said. If pushed vje could retreat across the river,, reinforce from Jdorn and go back and fight, r, • ' ...»••

When the Secretary asked whether i;o could send in troops to secure the airfield $ Admiral Burke said that would be a first task. Br. McHamara said it would be easy for the enemy to deny us the airfield as we would neod thirty-six sorties a day to get US troops into Vientiane,

Mr. Bundy said that if we took tills action we would be doing something which most countries would not appreciate.

5he Attorney General ask6d where would be the best place to stand and fight in Southeast Asia,, where to draw the line.

Mr. MeUamara said he thought we would take a stand in Thailand raid South Viet-Mam. The Attorney General asked whether we v/ould save any of Laos, but the major question- was whether we would stand up and fip:ht.

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Adrairal Burke said that we could hold /j?ciirane, and General Le May observed that we could use our air lowerback as far as necessary , letting the enemy have all of the countryside but that Ji the PL could be stopped by air power, :

Mr* HclSfamara said that we v/ould have to attack the D3V if

wo gave up Laos. . .

The Secretary suggested that- the part of Laos from the 17th Parallel across" to the Mekong mlkht be easier to hold than tho ent ire c ount ry.

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• General Decker thought that there was no good place to fight I in 'Southeast Asia but we must hold as much as x;e can of Vict-^Ia^ 1 Cambodia and Laos. At this point the Secretary said that we had ; missed having government troops who were veiling to fight.

S?. Steevas

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Mr. Steevea pointed out that we had always argued that we would not give up Laos and that it was on the pleas of our military that we had supported Phoumi; that we had reiterated in the press and to the public what Laos meant to us. If this problem is unsolvable then the problem of Viet-Ham would be unsolvable. If we decided that this was untenable then we were writing the first chapter in the defeat of Southeast Asia. Mr. McNamara said the situation was not as bad five weeks ago as it was now.

Admiral Burke pointed out that each time you giv^ ground it is harder to stand next time. 1 If we give up Laos we would have to put US forces into Viet-Nam and Thailand. We would have to throw enough in to win—perhaps the "works". It would be easier to hold now than later. The thing to do was to land now and hold as much as we can and make clear that we were not going to be pushed out of Southeast Asia. We were fighting for the rest of Asia.

Mr. McNamara wondered whether more VietCong would necessarily enter South Viet-Nam if Laos went down the drain. He mentioned that some 12,000 Viet Cong had entered South Viet-Nam under present conditions and that the Communists held the area south of the 17th Parallel to a depth of twenty-five miles with a supposedly friendly government in South Viet-Nara. (Several of those present questioned the accuracy of the figure of 12,000.)

Turning to the question of the morale of the Southeast Asians, the Secretary recalled that the Thai Foreign Minister had told him during the recent SEATO conference that Thailand was like a "golden bell 11 which had to be protected from outside. The Secretary said he was not sure the Foreign Minister was wrong. He added that he was less worried about escalation than he was about infectious slackness. He said he would not give a cent for what the Persians would think of us if we did not defend Laos.

General Decker thought that we should have stood last August and wondered what would happen if we got "licked". The Secretary suggested that Thai and US troops might be placed together in Vientiene and, if they could not hold, be removed by helicopter. Even if they were defeated they would be defeated together and this would be better than sitting back and doing nothing. General Decker said we cannot win a conventional war in Southeast Asia; if we go in, we should go in to win, and that means bombing Hanoi, China, and maybe even using nuclear bombs. He pointed out that all the advantage we have in he'avy equipment would be lost in the difficult terrain of Laos where we would be at the mercy of the querrillas. The Secretary pointed out that this fact was also true at the time of the Bangkok Resolution but that we had gone ahead with the

resolution anyway and had issued statements indicating that we would

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would back up our words with deeds. Mr. McNamara repeated that the situation is now worse than it was five weeks ago. Mr. Steeves pointed out that the same problems existed in South Viet-Nam, but Admiral Burke thought that South Viet-Nam could be more easily controlled.

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General Becker then suggested that troops be moved into Thailand and South Viet-Nam to see whether such action would not produce a cease-fire. Admiral Burke asked what happens if there is still no cease-fire. General Decker said then we would be ready to go ahead.

Mr. Kennedy said we would look sillier than we do now if we got troops in there and then backed down. He reiterated the question whether we are ready to go the distance.

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The Secretary said that we would want to get the United Nations "mixed up 1 ' in this.

Mr. Behlen said he saw no need for a fixation on the possibility of a reaction by the Chinese Communists. He said we had no evidence that they want to face the brink of nuclear war. He said that he was more concerned about the objectives we would seek if we took military action.

There followed a discussion about the possibility of restoring the kingdom of Champassak where Boun Oum relinquished the throne and where he is popular. It was thought that Sihanouk would support a partition of Laos. General Decker thought that if a cease-fire could be effected now, it would be possible to secure southern Laos.

General Le May did not believe that it would be possible to get a cease-fire without military action. He admitted that he did not know what US policy is in Laos. He knew what the President had said but he also pointed out that the military had been unable to back up the President's statements. He then enumerated a number of possibilities: l) do nothing and lose Laos; 2) ;ase B-26's and slow up the enemy; 3) use more sophisticated bombers and stop supplies and then perhaps Phoumi's forces could be brought up to where they could fight; *i) implement Plan 5> backing up troops with air. General Le May did not think the Chinese would escalate but believed on the contrary that a cease-fire would then be brought about. He added that he believed we should go to work on China itself and let Chiang take Hainan Island. He thought Chiang had a good air force.

General Shoup

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General Shoup suggested that B-26 ! s should be used before troops are landed. He felt that It might then be possible to obtain a cease-fire and get the panhandle of Laos. Mr, Kennedy-asked if any appreciable dent could be made on the guerrillas with B-26 1 s. General Le May said it would be possible to "knock out a big wad of supplies with B~26 f s and 100's. Mr. Kennedy asked what would be the next step. The Secretary said it would be necessary to get the UN in quickly. Mr. Kennedy asked what the others would do then. General Le May said the worst that could happen would be that the Chinese Communists would come in. Mr. Kennedy asked if It could all be done by air. General Le May said it could. Mr. McNamara said you would have to use nuclear weapons. Mr. Kennedy asked if South Viet-Nam and Thailand could be held if Laos were lost. The Secretary and Admiral Burke agreed that It would take a greater effort to hold them after Laos had been lost and Mr. Johnson pointed out that Thailand had to be defended from the other bank.

Mr. Steeves felt that the prize to be focused on was Southeast Asia. The question to be faced, he thought, was whether we could afford to lose Southeast Asia.

The Secretary thought that if a cease-fire is not brought about quicklyj then It would be necessary to get the UN to come in with the SEATO forces committed in a Plan 5 action* He thought that a majority could be found in the UN for such action if the cost is not distributed. Mr, McNamara and Admiral Burke thought that more than two weeks would be required for UN action. Admiral Burke said that only the United States could pull its own chestnuts out of the fire. (There followed a general discussion on the extent to which others would support us. It was agreed that the Pakistani could be relied upon if we paid for them and that a few Malays, New Zealanders and others would help.)

Ambassador Young suggested the possibility of training 50 to 60,000 Vietnamese. He pointed to the ready access to ports in the area of the Lao border and to the fact that the terrain in the area is not too bad.

Mr. Bowles said he thought the main question to be faced was the fact that we were going to have to fight the Chinese anyway in 2, 3? 5 or 10 years and that it was just a question of where, when and how. He thought that a major war would be difficult to avoid. General Le May said that, in that case, we should fight soon since the Chinese would have nuclear weapons within one or two years.

Mr. McNamara said that the situation was worsening by the hour and that if we were going to commit ourselves, then we must do so sooner rather than later.

The Secretary then adjourned the meeting saying he would like

to consider the matter further.

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

THE JOINT STAFF

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WASHINGTON 25. D.C.

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Subject: 5 May 1961 Meeting at State

Secretary of State Rusk posed the question of the'introduction of US forces into Vietnam prior to the beginning of the Geneva Conference., .A discussion (ensued between Secretary Rust-:, Secretary Gilpatric, Mr. Steeves, Ambassadors Johnson, Young and others present. The following points were dominant: * I

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- Should we place combat; troops in South Vietnam - if so, should it be prior to l£ May?

" . - The size of the forces and the mission or objectives.

North Vietnamese violations of the Geneva Accords -and the extent of proof the US can provide.*

UK's expressed caution against any military buildup in Vietnam prior to the Geneva Conference and during its early phase.. i , . .

US privilege to make counter moves at least to the extent of the North Vietnam violations.

Augmentation of the MAAG and to what extent. * «

Secretary Rusk decided that:

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a. We should not place combat forces in South Vietnam at this "time.

b. Vie should proceed to augment the MAAG, in small " increments, with up to 100 additional military personnel.

and not discuss it with- the UK of ICC..,' He recommended * that these personnel be placed In varied locations to avoid attention. ;

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should

c. The 78 military for COMINT purposes proceed to South Vietnam*

It was agreed that the deployment of additional US forces should receive further study and consideration.

a/7/1

ROBERT M. LEVY ) Colonel, USAP y JCS Representative

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Distribution: Mr. Gilpatric ■ Admiral Burke Lt- Gen Wheeler

• Maj Gen Dean

Maj Gen Bonesteel Brig Gen Lansdale

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May 8, 1961

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Program of Action for Vietnam

Transmitted herewith is one copy of M A Program of Action to Prevent Communist Domination of South Vietnam, !l A n final draft form based largely upon the Department of State paper. There are 7 annexes which are now being produced and which will be delivered later today.

Deputy Secretary Gilpatric desires that this paper be com* piled in final form for presentation to the NSC without further formal meetings of the Task Force on Vietnam, if possible. Thus, yovir comments on this final draft and its annexes are requested by 1430 hours to morrow, Tu esda y, May 9 .

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Comments should be given to my office, room 3E-947, the Pentagon, Telephone extensions are: 57742, 57786, and 57792

EDWARD G. LANSDALE Brigadier General, USAF Assistant to the , Secretary of Defense

Attachment

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SENSITIVE

DRAFT 6.May 1961

A Program of Action

To Prevent Communist Domination of South Vietnam

Appraisal of the Situation: The internal security situation in

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South Vietnam has become critical, as can be seen on thr attached map, with an estimated 12, 000 Viet Cong Communists waging guerrilla warfare inside the country. The strongly anti-Communist, pro-American government of South Vietnam, with American aid, is increasing its capabilities to fight its attackers. Should the Communist effort increase, either directly or as a result of a collapse

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of Laos, additional measures beyond those.proposed herein may be necessary, (Details in Annex 1. ) 1 The U.S. Objective: To prevent Communist domination of South

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Vietnam and to create in that country a viable and increasingly

democratic society.

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Concept of Operations: To initiate, on an accelerated basis, a

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series of mutually supporting actions of a military, political, economic,

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psychological and covert character designed to achieve this objective.

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In so doing, it is intended to use, and where appropriate extend, expedite or build upon the existing U.S. and Government of Vietnam

Ibis document contains. P a ^ JO

Cony Bo. of copies- Series

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EXCLUDED PKO'd MffOU&TXC 7fl | REGBADIBG; DOD DIH 5200.10

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(G. V. N. ) programs, including as much of the Counter-Insurgency

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Plan (CIP), as can.be agreed by both governments, already uncler-way-in South .Vietnam, There is neither the time available nor any sound justification for "starting from scratch, " Rather the need is to focus the U, S. effort in South Vietnam on the immediate internal se urity problem; to infuse it with a sense of urgency and a dedica-

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tion to the overall U.S. objective; to achieve, through cooperative inter-departmental support both in the field and in Washington, the operational flexibility needed to apply the available U.S. assets in a'manner best calculated to achieve our objective in Vietnam; to give the U.S. Ambassador and the U.S. team under his leadership

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general authority to undertake a series of accelerated measures as noted below; and finally, to impress on our friends, the Viet-namese, and on our foes, the Communists, that come what may,

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the U.S. intends to win this battle.

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Program of Action: ■ -

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1. General : The situation in South Vietnam has reached

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the point where., 'at least for the time being, "primary emphasis must

be placed on providing a solxition to the internal security problem,

A significant step which has already been taken by the Country Team

to counter Communist subversion in South Vietnam has been the'

development of the Counter-Insurgency Plan (CIP}. Those portions

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of the CIP which are agreed to by the G. V.N. will be implemented as rapidly as possible.

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Communist domination of South Vietnam needs more than rnili-tary measures alone to be stopped. Our military program must be accompanied and supplemented by a strong, positive political-economic program.

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2. Military:

a. The following military actions were approved by the President at the NSC meeting of 29 April 1961:

(1) Increase the MAAG as necessary to insure the effective implementation of the military portion of the program including the training of a 20, 000-man addition to the present G. V. N.

armed forces of 150, 000. Initial appraisal- of new tasks assigned

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CHMAAG indicate that approximately 100 additional military person-

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nel will be required immediately in addition to the present complement

of 685.-

[2)° Expand MAAG responsibilities to include

authority to-provide support and advice to. the Self Defense Corps with a strength of approximately 40, 000.

(3) Authorize MAP support for the entire Civil Guard force of 68, 000. MAP support is now authorized for 32, 000; the remaining 36,000 are not now adequately trained and equipped.

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(4) Install as a matter of priority a radar sur-

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veillance capability which will enable the G. V.N. to obtain warning of Communist over-flights being conducted for intelligence or

clandestine air supply purposes. Initially, this capability should

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be provided from U.S. mobile radar capability.

(5) Provide MAP support for the Vietnamese Junk Force as a means of preventing Viet Cong clandestine supply and infiltration into South Vietnam by water. MAP support, which

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was not provided in the Counter-Insurgency Plan, will include training of junk crews in Vietnam or at U. S. bases by U, S. Navy personnel.

b. The following additional actions are considered neces-sary to assist the G. V. N. in meeting the increased security threat resulting from the new situation along the Laos-G. V.N. frontier:

(1) Assist.the G.V.N, armed forces to increase their border patrol and insurgency suppression capabilities by cstab-

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lishing an effective border intelligence and patrol system, by institut-ing regular aerial surveillance over the entire frontier area, and by

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applying modern technological area-denial techniques to control the

roads and trails along Vietnam's borders. A special staff element

(approximately 6 U.S. personnel), to concentrate upon solutions to

the unique problems of Vietnam's borders, will be activated in MAAG,

Vietnam, to assist a similar special unit in the RVNAF which the

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G, V.N. will be encouraged to establish; these two elements working as an integrated team will help the G, V.N. gain the support of nomadic tribes and other border inhabitants, as well as introduce advanced techniques and equipment to strengthen the security of South Vietnam's

frontiers.

(2) Assist the G. V.N. to establish a Combat Develop-

ment and Test Center in South Vietnam to develop, with the help of modern technology, new techniques for use against the Viet Cong forces. (Approximately 4 U.S. personnel.)

(3) Assist the G. V.N. forces with health, welfare and public work projects by providing U.S. Army civic action mobile training teams, coordinated with the similar civilian effort. (Approximately 14 U. S. personnel. ) * .

(4) Deploy a Special Forces Group (approximately

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400 personnel) to Nha Trang in order to accelerate G. V.N. Special

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Forces training. The first increment, for immediate deployment to Vietnam, should be a Special Forces company (52 personnel).

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(5) Instruct JCS, CINCPAC, and MAAG to undertake

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an assessment of the military utility of a further increase in the G. V.N

forces from 170, 000 to 200, 000 in order to create two new division

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equivalents for deployment to the northwest border region. The parallel political and fiscal implications should be assessed.

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c. / In preparation for possible commitment of U. S. forces to Vietnam^ which might result from an NSC decision following discus-

sions between Vice President Johnson and President Diem, Defense is

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undertaking an immediate study of the size and composition of U.S.

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forces required to:

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- provide maximum psychological impact in deterrence

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of further Communist aggression from North Vietnam, China, or the Soviet Union, while rallying the morale of the Vietnamese and encourag-ing the support of SEATO and neutral nations for Vietnam's defense;

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- release Vietnamese forces from advanced and static defense positions to permit their fuller commitment to counter-insurgency

actions;

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- provide maximum training to approved Vietnamese

forces; and

- provide significant military resistance to potential

North Vietnam Communist and/or Chinese Communist action,

The following.possible actions ptre being considered in.this Defense

study;

(1) Deploy to South Vietnam two U.S. battle groups

(with necessary command and logistics units), plus an engineer (construction-combat) battalion. These units would be located in the

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f, high plateau" region, remote from the major population center of

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Saigon-Cholon, under the command of the Chief, MAAG. To help

accelerate the training of the G. V.N. army, they would establish

two divisional field training areas. The engineer battalion would

undertake construction of roads, air-landing strips, and other'

facilities essential to the logistical support of the U.S. and Viet-

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namese forces there,

(2) Assign thfe Naval component of CINCPAC the responsibility for coastal patrol activities, employing minimal U.S. Naval forces in conjunction v/ith Vietnamese forces, to prevent the seaborne infiltration of Viet Cong personnel and material into South Vietnam.

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(3) Assign the air component of CINCPAC the

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responsibility for border surveillance and close-support of G.V.N.

ground forces in counter-insurgency actions, employing minimal U.S.* Air Force means in conjunction with Vietnamese forces, to help seal the Vietnamese borders and to defeat the Communist • • • guerrillas-within those borders, , . .. -

(An Appraisal of the Military Concept is given in Annex 2. )

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3. Political:

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I I. Objective: . Develop political and economic conditions

which will create a solid and widespread support among the key political group and the general population for a Vietnam which has the will to resist Communist encroachment and which in turn stems from a stake in a fieer and more democratic society. '

i a. Increase the confidence of President Diem and his

government in the United States, by the following actions:

*

(1) A message has been dispatched to President i Diem informing him of your personal support for his courageous leadership in the struggle against communism and of Vice President Johnson's

-

trip, indicating that Vice President Johnson v/ill be carrying a more detailed expression of your thoughts on a broad range of proposals for

joint action between our two countries*

(2) A letter from you to President Diem has been

* -

prepared for Vice President Johnson identifying the key objectives con-

-

tained in this Task Force report which we propose as a joint U.S. -

J

4

Vietnamese address 'to the existing threat to Vietnam's freedom, stability and security, seeking an expression of Diem ! s support for this joint, effort.

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(3) Vice President Johnson's trip to Vietnam should

be focused on obtaining broad agreement on how the U.S. and Vietnam

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J freedom and integrity of that country.

view the problem confronting Vietnam's security including the range of political, economic and military actions required to preserve the *

b. Strengthen President Diem's j^opular support within Vietnam, by the following actions: |

1 i

(1) Instruct Ambassador Nolting to reappraise

[■ ' ■

the political situation and undertake to obtain agreement of the G, V.N.

on an urgent basis for a realistic political program along the lines indicated in the CIP. The objective of the program would be to seek to produce favorable attitudes and active popular cooperation against the VC. While the Ambassador's recommendations might well include actions directed toward fiscal and monetary reform measures, it is presumed that the major recommendations in this area will be developed by the Ambassador in conjunction with the special team of U.S. economic experts which it is proposed be dispatched to Vietnam for this purpose

1 . (in Economic.sectiori following),

(2) As a part of this initial assessment, the . Ambassador should also consider such special arrangements within J the field organization as he may deem required to assure a capability

for rapid Country Team response to evolving problems. This should

*

include an assessment of staff requirements, both with a view to request-

ing such additional personnel as required and to reviewing the employment

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of existing field staff to assure the most efficient application of available

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personnel to major objectives to be accomplished.

II. Objective: Improve Vietnam's relationships with other countries and its status in world opinion.

a. Improve relations with Cambodia leading to full border control cooperation, by the following actions:

" ■ (1) Instruct our Ambassadors in Phnorn Penh and

Saigon to urge host governments to enter promptly into renewed border control negotiations. In order to secure Cambodian cooperation, the Cambodian government should be informed that requests for additional military assistance will be sympathetically considered. It also should be informed immediately of the approval of its recent request for four

T-3 7 aircraft.

;

b. Call for.United Nations observers to observe

externally supported Communist actions of subversion, infiltration and-

i ■

oilier violations of Vietnam's sovereignty, by the following action:

(1) Instruct our Ambassador in Saigon to consider discussing this matter with the G. V.N. Ambassador Stevenson might

■ ■

• * ■*■.• # . ■ ■

later be asked to explore informally the idea with Mr. Hammarskjold

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and friendly foreign representatives in New York.

c. Accept contributions of other free world countries

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toward meeting the Communist guerrilla threat in Vietnam as a means

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of bringing a wider allied support to the effort to assist Vietnam, by the

following action:

(1) Instruct our representatives in Saigon to pre-

pare, in consultation with the Vietnamese, proposals providing for the use of third country contributions, particularly that already offered by the British, to the training of Vietnam's forces and counter-guerrilla

efforts.

/

III, Objective: Undertake military security arrangements which emjDhasize the U.S. intention to stand behind Vietnam's resistance to Communist aggression.

a. Undertake a new bilateral arrangement with Vietnam,

by the following action:

; (1) On the grounds that the Geneva Accords have

placed inhibitions upon free world action while at the same time placing no restrictions upon the Communists, Ambassador Nolting should be.

'instructed to- enter-into preliminary discussions-with Diem regarding the possibility of a defensive security alliance despite the inconsistency of

,such action.with the Geneva Accords,* This.action would be based on the premise that such an undertaking is justified in international law as

> ■ * •

representing a refusal to be bound by the Accords in a degree and manner beyond that which the other party to the Accords has shown a willingness to honor. Communist violations, therefore, justify the establishment

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of the security arrangement herein recommended. Concurrently, Defense

should study the military advisability of committing U.S. 'forces in'Vietnam

(as <noted in Military section above). *

(Political details in Annex 3.)

4. Economic:

I, Objective: Undertake economic programs having both a

short- arm immediate impact as well as ones which contribute to the

longer range economic viability of the country.

i

\ a. Undertake a series of economic projects designed to

accompany the counter-insurgency effort, by the following action:

(1) Grant to ICA the authority and funds to move into a rural development-civic action program. Such a program would include

short-range, simple, impact projects which would be undertaken by teams

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working in cooperation with local communities. This might cost roug?ily

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$3 to $5 million, mostly in local currency- Directors of field teams should be given authority with respect to the expenditure of funds including use of dollar" instruments to purchase local currency oji the spot.

. b. Assist Vietnam to make the best use of all available

■ ■ «

'economic resources', by the following action: .".,•..

(1) Having in mind that our chief objective is obtain-ing a full and enthusiastic support by the G, V.N. in its fight against the Communists, a high level team, preferably headed by Assistant Secretary

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f of the Treasury John Leddy, with State and ICA members, should be

dispatched to Saigon to work out in. conjunction with the Ambassador

a plan whereby combined U.S. and Vietnamese financial resources can best be utilized. This group's terms of reference should cover the broad range of fiscal and economic problems. Authority should be given to make concessions necessary to achieve our objectives and to

i

soften the blow of monetary reform.' Ambassador Nolting and perhaps the Vice President should notify Diem of the proposed visit of this group stressing that their objective is clearly to maximize the joint n^ effort rather than to force the Vietnamese into inequitable and unpalat-

able actions.

{?,) As a part of the foregoing effort, an assess-

ment should be undertaken of the fiscal and other economic implications of a further force increase from 170, 000 to 200, 000 (as noted in the

■

Military section above).

■

c. Undertake the development of a long-range economic development program as a means of demonstrating U. S. confidence in the

>

economic'and. pglitical future of the country by the following action:

(1) Authorize Ambassador Nolting to inform the

■ -

G. V.N, that the U.S. is prepared to discuss a long-range joint five year

development program which would involve contributions and undertakings

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L. by both parties.

. (Economic details in Annex 4.)

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5. Psychological :

a. Assist tlie G. V.N. to accelerate its public information

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program to help develop a broad public understanding of the actions re-

■

quired to combat the Communist insurgents and to build public confidence in the G. V.N. T s determination and ability to deal with the Communist threat. (Details in Annex 5.)

b. The U. S. Country Team, in coordination with the G, V.N. Ministry of Defense, should compile and declassify for use of media representatives in South Vietnam and throughout the world, documented

■

facts concerning Communist infiltration and terrorists' activities and the measures being taken by the G. V.N, to counter such attacks.

c. In coordination with CIA and the appropriate G, V.N. Ministry, USIS v/ill increase the flow of information about unfavorable conditions in North Vietnam to media representatives. '

d. Develop agricultural pilot-projects throughout the

-

country, with a view toward exploiting their beneficial psychological effects. This project would be accomplished by combined teams of Vietnamese Civic Action personnel, Americans in the Peace Corps,

* «

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Filipinos in Operation Brotherhood, and other Free World nationals.

e. Exploit as a part of a planned psychological campaign the rehabilitation of Communist Viet Cong prisoners now held in South Vietnam. Testimony of rehabilitated prisoners, stressing the errors

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of Communism, should be broadcast to Communist-held areas, includ-ing North Vietnam, to induce defections. This rehabilitation program would be assisted by a team of U. S. personnel including U. S. Army (Civil Affairs, Psychological Warfare, and Counter-intelligence), USIS, and USOM experts.

f. Provide adequate funds for an impressive U.S. partici-pation in the Saigon Trade Fair of 1962.

6. Covert Actions:

■ I ■ in I ■*"——^^l^iM I ■ !■■■ i ■ —^f»-^— m

a. Expand present operations in the field of intelligence,

i

unconventional warfare, and political-psychological activities to support the U.S. objective as stated.

b. Initiate the communications intelligence actions, CIA

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and ASA personnel increases, and funding which were approved by the President at the NSC meeting of 29 April 1961.

c. Expand the communications intelligence actions by

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]■ elusion of 15 additional Army Security Agency personnel to train the Vietnamese Army in tactical COMINT operations.

, *

(Details of covert actions are given in Annex 6. )

7. Funding :

a. As spelled out in the funding annex, the funding of the

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counter-insurgency plan and the other actions recommended in this

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program might necessitate increases in U.S. support of the G, V. N.

* a

budget for FY 61 of as much as $58 million, making up to a total of $192 million compared to $155 million for FY 60. The U.S. contribu-lion for the G. V.N. Defense budget in FY 62 as presently estimated would total $161 million plus any deficiency in that Budget which the

J G. V.N. might be unable to finance. The exact amount of U, S. con-

tributions to the G. V.N. Defense budgets for FY 61 and FY 62 are subject to negotiation between the U, S. and the G. V.N.

b. U.S. military assistance to G. V.N. , in order to

provide .the support contemplated by the proposed program would total $140 million, or $71 million more than now programmed for Vietnam in the U.S. current MAP budget for FY 62,

(Details are given in Annex 7. )

8. Organisational Arrangements:

a. Because of the critical nature of the situation in Vietnam, and the need for accelerated action, the direction, coordizia-tion, and support of,the program will be effected through a special Task Force on Vietnam, established in and directed by the Department of State, constituted as follows:

Or

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Director: Sterling J. Cottrell

Executive Officer: Chalmers B* -Wood

Members:

Defense:

Treasury:

BOB:

ICA:

USIA:

CIA:

Office of the President;

b. It shall be the responsibility of the Director and the

Deputy Director of the Task Force:

\

(1) To see that the action program as approved is

carried out;

E{2) To keep under continual review the adequacy of i a

the action program to meet its objectives; and

(3) To bring to the attention of the Secretary and the Under Secretary of State and to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary

of Defense the need for any changes in or additions to the action program

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to meet its objectives.

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VIETNAM j

DEMARCATION

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SENSITIVE

*

. 8 May 19 61

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Annexes to a Program'of Action for South

Vietnam

Transmitted herewith are o Annexes to the final l draft of the "Program of Action to Prevent Communist Domination of South Vietnam 11 delivered to you earlier today. Your comments on these annexes are invited, at the same time as those on the main paper*

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The-annexon "Covert ActionsV has -been withheld-from this distribution,-since there were no "substantive changes from the initial concept-.

Attachments

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This Hocuaent contains/Z^P^g 63 " ^ -£C

Copy Ho. /7 of UO • c opies.. S&ri&8^2£)

EDWARD G. LANSDAEE Brigadier General, USAF Assistant to the Secretary of Defense

Excluded from Automatic Downgrading: DOD DIR 5200.10 Does Not Apply

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ANNEX 1

Appraisal of the Situation

*

After a meeting in Hanoi on 13 May 1959, the Central Committee of the North Vietnamese Communist Party publicly announced its intention "to smash" the government of President Ngo Dinh Diem.

Following this decision, the Viet Cong have significantly increased

■ their program of infiltration, subversion, sabotage and assassination

designed to achieve this end.

i

At the North Vietnamese Communist Party Congress in September, I960, the earlier declaration of underground war by the Party's Control Committee was rc-affirmed. ■ This action by the Party Congress took place only a month after Kong he's coup in Laos. Scarcely two months later there was a military uprising in Saigon. The turmoil created

■

■

throughout the area by this rapid succession of events provides an ideal environment for the Communist "master plan" to take over all of Southeast Asia.

■

Since that time, as can be seen from the attached map, the internal

-*

security situation in South Vietnam has become critical. What amounts ...» ■ ■

• » >.

to a state of active guerrilla warfare now exists throughout the country.

» ■ * *

Despite greatly stepped up efforts by South Vietnamese, the number of

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Viet Cong hard-core Communists has increased from 4400 in early

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I960 to an estimated 12, 000 today. The number of violent incidents per

•month now averages 650; casualties on both sides totaled more than

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4500 during the first three months of this year. These figures, while

*

alarming, are also a reflection 01 increased efforts by South Vietnamese forces. 58% of the country is under some degree of Communist control, ranging from harrassment and night raids to almost complete administrative jurisdiction in the Communist "secure areas." - -

* a

The Viet Cong over the past two years have succeeded in stepping up the pace and intensity of their attacks to the point where South Vietnam is nearing the decisive phase in its battle for survival. If the situation continues to deteriorate, the Communists will be able to press on to their strategic goal of establishing a rival "National Liberation Front" government in one of these "secure areas, " thereby plunging the nation into open civil war. They have publicly announced that they will "take

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over the country before the end of 1961. "

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If agreement is reached on a cease fire in Laos, political negotia-

• ■ . * ♦ , -

ti'ons on the future of that country will begin on May 12 at the Fourteen

-* Power Conference in Geneva., However, the April 26 statement on Laos

by the Peiping government indicates that the Communist members of that

■ ■ ■

conference intend to expand the negotiations to include other areas of Southeast Asia, As a result, it can be expected that the Fourteen Power

meeting will

be prolonged, covering several months or more.

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The effect of these negotiations on the situation in Vietnam will be

threefold:

First, the very fact that the Fourteen Powers are meeting under essentially the same ground rules as the 1954 Geneva Accords, including the concept of an ICC mechanism in Laos, Vietnam and Cambodia, could have a politically inhibiting effect on any significant measures which the U.S. might undertake to prevent a Communist take-over in South Vietnam.

t

Second, as has been their practice in the past, the Communists can be expected to use the cover of an international negotiation to expand their subversive activities* In this case, close coordination of their

;

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t efforts in Southern Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam can be expected. The

250 mile border between South Vietnam and Laos, while never effectively

sealed in the past, will now be deprived of even the semblance of pro-

*

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tection which the friendly, pro-we stern Laos offers.

Third, the three principal passes through the Annamite Mountains -

»

the Nape Pass, Mugia Gap, and the pass that controls the road from

Quang Tri to Savanakhet - lie in Southern Laos. These passes control

*

[ three key military avenues of advance from North Vietnam through Laos

■■

into the opening Mekong valley leading to Thailand and South Vietnam. A Lao political settlement that would afford the Communists an opportunity to maintain any sort of control, covertly or otherwise, of these mountain passes would make them gate keepers to the primary inland invasion

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route leading to Saigon and flanking the most important defensive

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terrain in the northern area of South Vietnam.

■ * » "

Thus, the situation is critical but not hopeless. The South Vietnamese Government, with American aid, . is increasing its capa-

■

bilities to fight its attackers. It provides a strong anti-Communist government and generally pro-American population as a base upon which the necessary additional effort can be founded to defeat the Communist attack. Should the Communist effort increase, either directly or as a result of a collapse of Laos, additional measures may be necessary.

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ANNEX 2

Military Concept

1. The military considerations involved in a national program of actio i designed to prevent Communist domination of South Vietnam and to

■

create in that country a viable, increasingly democratic society are com-

plica .ed by:

* . *

a. The Post Cease-fire Situation in Laos:

—, ■.- -—

Indications are that the Communists are attempting to use the post cease-fire period to consolidate their control over the areas in which the Pathet Lao forces have been operating. If they are successful, this will

■

(1) Greatly increase the problem of guarding the G.V.N, -Laos border against the infiltration of Communist terrorists and supplies, and

(2) Allow the Communists to gain control over the three princi-

/ ■

pal passes through the Annamite Mountains, which lie along the frontier

- / *

between Vietnam and Laos. These passes (The Nape Pass, Mugia Gap, and

[ £"*.: pa*ss that controls the road from Quang Tri to Savannakhet) are located •

in Southern Laos and control the three key military avenues of advance

• - •

i from North Vietnam through Laos into the open Mekong Valley leading to

" Thailand and South Vietnam. Ability to use these internal lines of advance

Would enable an attacker from the North to avoid the coastal road which is

■

vulnerable to interdiction by naval gunfire or demolitions and to flank the most defensive terrain in the northern area of South Vietnam.

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b. The Forthcoming Fourteen-Power Conference:

The very fact thai the Fourteen Powers are meeting under essentially the same ground rules as the 1954 Geneva Agreements,

i

including the concept of an ICC mechanism in Laos, Vietnam and Cambodia* could have a politically inhibiting effect on any significant measures which

the "U.S. might undertake to prevent a Communist take-over in South Vietnam

■ i

c. SEATO Responsibilities under the Manila Pact:

Responsibility for the defense of South Vietnam, both against

external aggression and internal subversion, was assumed by the SEATO powers under the protocol to the Manila Pact. The unanimity principle

governing SEATO action has prevented that organization from taking any

-measures to resist Communist advances to date. Yet the very existence

of SEATO makes it politically desirable that any military operations in

Southeast Asia be conducted under its aegis. This in turn inhibits, to a

certain degree, U*S. unilateral military actions.

d. The Morale Problem within South Vietnam:

fc , , —T-, ., ... I ■ — ^ . ■ 1^1 ■! ~ M , M,^^ !■ ||. M "I IM^^^i^M I I JI I 'I ~ I ■»■■ ■ ~ 1

The failure of SEATO to take any action to .halt the Communist actions in Laos has in large measure impaired the credibility of that organization insofar, as, providing collective assistance in the. defense of any nation in the area. Similarly, the U.S. reluctance to play a more

■

active leadership role in SEATO has also contributed to a general lowering of morale among the G.V.N. governmental officials and intelligentsia.

Meanwhile the Communist terrorist-campaign has been stepped up

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increasing the sense of uncertainty and fear throughout the official government of South Vietnam,

2. Taking these military considerations into accounts the problem of preventing Communist domination of South Vietnam can be broken down into:

■

a. Internal Security Measures:

— ■ ■ ■ ■ - - * —_

l These have been carefully worked out and coordinated within

the U.S. Government in the form of a counter-insurgency pi'n {CIP} for

Vietnam. This plan has been presented to President Diem and is to be

implemented as rapidly as possible as he approves the various specific

elements of the plan. In support of the CIP, the President at the NSC

Meeting of 29 April 1961 approved the actions listed under Part I of the

■ ■

Military Section of the proposed Program,

b. Protection of the Land Border of South Vietnam:

" i» ■ ■ 11 ■ .— ... -i . . I i n I, -— H i i —i——>——— — ■ — ■—-——■

Communist capabilities to infiltrate personnel and equipment into South Vietnam across either the Lao or the Cambodia border will

be facilitated by the cover provided by the cease-fire and the forthcoming

> . * ■■ • ■ • -•

Fourteen-Power Conference. Along the Laos-G.V.N. boundary, the

extremely rugged nature of the terrain makes it almost impossible to

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establish a "water-tight" border. However, this same rugged terrain

4

limits the smuggling routes to one principal road 5 (the east-west highway . from Savannakhet to Tchepone to Quang Tri) and to some 12-15 reasonably

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Barring a significant increase in the present level of guerrilla infiltration and military aggression, the G.V.N, armed forces (170,000) and the Civil Guard (68, 000) bolstered by the establishment of an effective intelligence and patrol system, regular aerial border surveillance and the application of technological a,rea-denial techniques (e.g., CW, BW, light plastic, air-droppable landmines, fluorescent materials, etc.), have the

I' 4. «

capability of continuing the suppression of the insurgency and even making considerable headway against it. This capability will, of course, depend on a major acceleration of the present retraining program. Given the aug-

1

mentation and strengthening of the G.V.N, armed forces now being proposed, it is considered an acceptable military risk that South Vietnam can cope successfully with the Laos border problem.

i

Similar considerations apply to the frontier between South

■

Vietnam and Cambodia. It is hoped, however, that a realization of the increased threat to their own security posed by Communist advances into

l

Laos would persuade the G.V.N, and Cambodia Governments to cooperate more effectively in the maintenance of adequate border security between

■ ■

the two countries. , ■ -

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In furtherance of these efforts, a special staff element (approxi-

* ■

mately 6 U.S. personnel), to concentrate upon solutions to the unique prob-lems of Vietnam's broders, will be activated in MAAG, Vietnam, to assist

a similar special unit in the RVNAF which the G. V

.N. will be encouraged

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to establish; these two elements working as an integrated team will help * ■

the G.V.N, gain, the support of nomadic tribes and other border inhabitants,

*

as well as introduce advanced techniques and equipment to strengthen the

security of South Vietnam's frontiers.

Additionally, there will be established a combined U.S. -Viet-namese Combat Development and Test Center in South Vietnam which will assis the G.V.N, to develop, with the help of modern technology, new

techniques for use against Communist terrorists and subversive activijfes throughout the country. The Center will seek to devise practical appli-cations of the latest scientific techniques to the conditions of the sub-limited warfare now being waged throughout Southeast Asia, taking into account particularly the local terrain, the level of training of the Vietnamese population, and the possibilities of local production of any new weapons *or equipment which may be developed.

c. Protec t ion Against Infiltrati on b y Sea :

* •

The provision of MAP support for the Vietnamese Junk Force ! (/rflrea'dy approved by the President) will greatly improve that Force's capabilities in preventing clandestine supply and infiltration from the

sea

Additionally, "however, it will be necessary for CINCPAC's naval .

component to assume an active responsibility jointly with the Vietnamese

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navy for coastal patrol activities from the Cambodian border to the mouth of the Mekong River. In conjunction with the Junk Force, these naval

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forces can be expected to substantially reduce the quantity of Communist

supplies and personnel currently reaching the southern delta area of Vietnam.

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d. Training the G. V.N. Armed Forces for Combat:

■ *■ ■■ ■ ■ T I ■ ^^ I - I I ■ , -■■_. | | | ■ ~t III I ■-. I . , MB »

The chamged military situation in South Vietnam resulting from the Communist successes in Laos poses a direct and serious military threat to the entire western fla.nk of South Vietnam which cannot be met within the dimensions of our internal security program alone. This uw threat requires

■

the prompt organization of two new G.V.N, divisions and a vastly accelerated

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U.S. training program for the entire G.V.N, army. Because of the shortage of trained officers and non-commissioned officers cadres, the success of such a program depends upon raising the combat effectiveness of the South Vietnamese forces by an entire order of magnitude within a matter of 6-8 months. To meet this new situation, it will be necessary to process the entire G.V.N, army through a greatly intensified divisional training program as rapidly as possible. A task of this magnitude is well beyond the capabilities of the existing MAAG and will require the augmentation of the

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U.S. Advisory Group with as much as two U.S. training commands, each capable of establishing a divisional field training area in the "high plateau"

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area of South Vietnam. These training areas, established in remote locations •away from population centers and organized on a completely austere basis, simulating to the maximum extent combat conditions in the country, would ! each be able to process an entire G.V.N, division every ten weeks.

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U.S. personnel required to establish these training commands won *

be introduced into South Vietnam in phased increments through northern ports, such as- Tourane and Nha Trang in a manner calculated to minimize, as much as possible, public attention to these MAAG augmentations. Preliminary estimates indicate that in order to process the existing 7 Viet-

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namese divisions through this intensified combat training program in the

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short time available, each of these U.S. training commands would require approximately 1600 U.S. instructors from Army or Marine Corps sources. In addition to the regular divisional training program, an acceleration

of Special Forces training is indicated to assist the G # V.N. forces counter the increased level of Viet Cong guerrilla activity which can be expected to

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follow a cease-fire in Laog. This will require a further MAAG augmentation * of a Special Forces Group. To meet the urgency of the situation, a Special

Forces Group (approximately 400 military personnel) should be deployed at ** phased increments to Nha Trang for this purpose. Initially a Special Forces

j • * Company (52 personnel) would be sent at once to prepare for the arrival of

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the remainder of the Group.

.e* Possible• Introduction of U.S. Flag Forces into Vietnam:

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Should the situation in South-Vietnam deteriorate to the point •

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where the measures outlined above are not adequate to.prevent the Com-

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munist domination of the country, it may be necessary to introduce U.S.

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' flag forces either as a part of a bi-laterg.1 U.S. -G.V.N, defense agreement or as a fulfillment of U.S. -SEATO obligation^. In this event, .it is con-

sidered desirable to deploy to either Tourane or Nha Trang a tailored, com-

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posite joint task force specially designed for carrying out a counter guerrilla-civic action-limited war mission in South Vietnam, In the absence of intelligence indications of an overt attack on the G.V.N. , it is contemplated that

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* this composite force would be deployed throughout the country in small

"task force" units on specific mission assignments of a counter-guerrilla or civic action nature. For example, combat engineer troops would undertake priority road and airfield construction in preparation for their possible military use by U.S. or other allied forces, but which would also be of long term benefit to the Vietnamese economy. Similarly, mobile medical teams , would travel throughout the area providing help and assistance to rural

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G.V.N, villages and to the mountain tribes. As needed, truck-borne water purification units will assist in areas where water pollution presents a serious health problem. These small specialized "task forces" working jointly with similar units in the Vietnam armed forces would not only give concrete evidence of U, S.; willingness to commit its military strength in a combined effort with the G.V.N, to defend South Vietnam against Communist domination,

but would also demonstrate that while in the country, they will make a positive

t contribution to the civil and economic needs of the local population."

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ANNEX 3 . Political

General Objectives

1.

In order to develop the political and economic-conditions for

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solid and widespread support of the GVN by key political groups and the general population which will enable it to continue to resist

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Communist enchroachment, we must continue to work through and support the present Vietnamese government despite its acknowledged weaknesses. No other even remotely feasible alternative exists at this point in time which does not involve an unacceptable degree of risk. At the same time, we do not underestimate the difficulties inherent in attempting to effect a major alteration in the present governmental structure or in its objectives*. To accomplish this will require very astute dealing between US government personnel and

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the Vietnamese, However, we believe that we have the combination of

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positive inducements plus points at which discreet pressure can be

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exercised which will permit accomplishment of this objective.

. • *

US Support for Diem

2. President Diem is not now fully confident of United States support.

This confidence has been undermined partly by our vigorous efforts to

get him to mend his ways politically, and partly by the equivocal attitude

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he is convinced we took at the time of the November 11, I960, attempted coup. It is essential that President Diem f s full confidence in and communication with the United States be restored promptly. 3. Increasing the confidence of President Diem and his government

in the United States must be the starting point of our new approach to Vietnam. Fortunately a number of circumstances are favorable; a new

administration in the United States, a new ambassador going to Vietnam,

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and the fact that President Diem has received a new mandate. Nevertheless, the going will not be easy. Given Diem's personality and character and the abrasive nature of our recent relationships, success or failure in thds regard will depend very heavily on Ambassador Nolting's ability to get on

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the same wave-length with Diem.

4.

A series of Presidential Communications have been recommended and

several have been sent. The President sent President Diem a short oral

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message on his election, aid a warm public message on the occasion of

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his inauguration on April 29. A classified brief personal message has been

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sent saying that Ambassador Nolting is on his,wey with new proposals for

•. *

joint actions to defeat the Communist insurgents. Messages relating to

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the Vice President's visit have also been sent, Amother message from the President is in preparation laying out the broad outline of the Task Force program seeking Diem's cooperation and endorsement and proposing, in

effect, that this become a Joint Presidential Plan,

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5, The Vice Presidents visit will provide the "added incentive needed

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r , . Communist encroachment in S.E. Asia. . These meetings will also serve

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to get across to President Diem our confidence in him as man of great I stature and as one of the strong figures in S.E. Asia on whom we are

tm placing our reliance, / At the same time, these conferences should impress

-Diem with the degree of importance we attach to certain political and

economic reforms in Vietnam which are an essential element in f rus -

to give the GVN the motivation and confidence it needs to carry on the

struggle. We believe that meetings between the Vice President and

President Diem will act as a catalytic agent to produce broad agreement i

on he need for accelerated joint Vietnamese-US actions to resist

trating Communist encroachments. Recognizing the difficulties we have had

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in the past in persuading Diem to take effective action on such reforms, as specific an understanding as possible should be solicited from Diem on this point. A Finally it might be possible for the Vice President to return to Washington with a letter from Diem to the President replying to the

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t . letter referred to in Paragraph c4 above.

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Internal Sup port

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■ 6, Despite his recent success at the polls, President Diem lacks adequate

support of a large proportion of opinion-making elezments in Vietnam. He also needs more understanding and support of the mass of people. His

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autocratic methods and his lack of communication with the Vietnamese

people are a continuing cause of concern,

7» The chief threat to the viability of President Diem's administration

is, -without a doubt, the fact of Communist insurgency and the government':

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inal lity to protect its own people- Thus military measures must have the

highest priority. There is , nevertheless, strong discontent with the* government among not only the elite but among peasants, labor and

business. Criticism focuses on the dynastic aspects of the Diem rule, on

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its clandestine political apparatus and on the methods through which the President exercises his leadership. This is aggravated by Communist subversive attempts to discredit the President and weaken his government's authority. All this is made the easier because of a communication void existing between the government and the people. For many months United States efforts have been directed toward persuading Diem to adopt c ( -olitical, social, and economic changes designed to correct this serious defect. Many of these changes are included in the Counter-Insurgency

-Plan. Our success, has been only partial. There are those who consider

that Diem will not succeed in the battle to win men's minds in Vietnam.

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Thus in giving priority emphasis to the need for internal security, we must not relax in our efforts to persuade Diem of the need for political, social and economic, progress. If his efforts are inadequate in this

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field, our overall objective could be seriously endangered and \vc might

• • •

once more find ourselves in the position of shoring up a leader who had

lost the support of his people.

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8. Next to specifying the means, the cost and the resources for inter-

dicting Viet-Cong access to South Vietnam and reducing Viet-Cong operations tQazxdfiimun?, the tasks q£ rallying the peopl'e to the government and improving the government's relations with the people are the most urgent. A new type of political development is long overdue in Vietnama. to spark a new spirit. This should be something much broader and more relevant than the so-called "liberalization 11 program. The government's rapport and acceptability must be strengthened with the following key elements of

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the population:

(a) The young professional intelligentsia in the civil service, private organizations, and the faculties,

(b) The provincial, district and village administrators who must

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be replaced or reoriented for democratic, humane, modern style handling of the little people.

(c) Village youth leaders, village councilors, farm family heads,

and teachers. . ....'■

These key groups could reach the general population in rural and urban areas on a personal! basis; new means of mass media can reach

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the population on a quantitative basis.

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9. A realistic political program would seek to produce favorable

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attitudes, active popular cooperation against the Viet-Cong, and cadres

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to execute the government's programs intelligently* For example, the program could include establishment of:

(a) A professional and young Community Development Corps for the whole country,

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(b) Political training schools,

(c) A trained administrative corps,

(d) A mas.s radio and television system for political communication, (c) Training for teams of young Vietnamese professionals for

important longer-range projects in the economic electric power, and educational fields.

It may prove desirable to provide the*Ambassador with the assistance of one of more experts in Asian political development to assist him in developing and explaining a political communications program. External Relations

10, While it is vital that Vietnam's internal political situation be

• • • * . . . •

improved it is also important that its external political relations with

its neighbors and with the world community similarly be improved.

Vietnam's relationships with its neighbor Cambodia are generally bad,

nevertheless, defeat of the Communist insurgents requires close

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cooperation with Cambodia on border control. This .will- require a

major effort of reconciliation. Other free world countries should be asked to assist or at least support Vietnam in its struggle, Vietnam is a Free World problem, not just a United States problem.

11 Cooperation between Cambodia and Vietnam on hoarder (control

is an essential means of combating the Communists. Vietnam and

Cambodia have always had difficulty in negotiation on any issue, i

especially a complex and politically-charged problem like border-control. In 19^0, Cambodia made a major request for military as sis-tance to which we made only a token response. We should endeavor to obtain better Cambodian cooperation* using a step up of military

assistance as "quid pro quo, M To maximize the benefit to be derived

• » ' ■ * *

from provision of additional military assistance we should specifically

agree" to provide 4 jet trainers requested by the Cambodians thereby

precluding provision of these aircraft by Czechoslovakia which has

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already offered to make the aircraft available to the Cambodians. This

would forestall further Communist penetration in this area.

12, Because of the failure of the ICC to control subversion and

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infiltration it has been suggested that Vietnam appeal to the United Nations Security Council for ground observers in both North and Sou

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Vietnam. The Soviets would probably veto any such action, and action in the General Assembly would be required. Not only does the provision of United Nations Observers have intrinsic merit but in any event, United Nations consideration would have the value of focusing world opinion on Communist actions in Vietnam. '

13. An appeal by Vietnam to the United Nations for the dispatch of

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ground observers to supplement the work of the ICC in patrolling against the infiltration of arms and armed personnel into Vietnam would normally be dealth with first in the Security Council and, if a veto by a permanent member prevented the Security Council from acting the appeal could then be taken up by the General Assembly. There are various reasons for concluding that such an appeal ought to be dealth with first in the Security Council rather than in the General Assembly:

(a) The Security Council, under Article 24, has primary respon-

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ibility under the Charter for the maintenance of international peace and

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security. ' *

(b) A similar call for assistance by Lebanon during the summer of

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1958-was handled by the SecurityCouncil, - - ■ ..

(c) An attempt to deal with such an appeal in the General Assembly

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in the first instance, without having gone to the Security Council, might

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meet resistance in the General Assembly, perhaps led by such permanent members of the Security Council as France and the Soviet Union.

(d) Proceedings in the Council are more manageable, and it would

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be relatively easier to secure majority agreement on a satisfactory text. If the USSR should veto, thi$ sam- text could then be introduced in the Assembly, with probable avoidance of a difficult many-powered negotiation. 14_. A resolution providing for the dispatch of a United Nations observer group would be likely to receive the support of seven or more members of the Security Council. Nevertheless, its passage could be prevented by the negative vote of one of the permanent members of the Council. The Soviet Union would be likely to veto such a resolution. Then the processes of the General Assembly could be invoked to deal with the question, pursuant to the Uniting for Peace Resolution. Action in the Assembly would presum-ably be undertaken on the basis of the draft resblution which failed of adoption in the Security Council. Under Article 18 (2) of the Charter, -questions involving recommendations with respect to the maintenance of peace and security are important questions requiring a two-thirds majority of the members present and voting in the General Assembly. In the case

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of a request by Vietnam for United Nations observers, such a majority

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could probably be secured in support of a^resolution providing for the dispatch of a United Nations Observer Group.

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15. The presence of United Nations observers would stimulate the

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(...„■ Indian and Canadian members of the ICC to step up their surveillances,

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Infiltration would be exposed to a much greater extent than is now the

case and hence might be deterred; South Vietnam would be strengthened

by the presence of United Nations observers. The prestige and political

influence of the General Assembly and of its members would be brought

into play in support of a position designed to prevent the infiltration of

arms and men.into Vietnam.

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16. The United Kingdom has already expressed a strong interest in cooperating to help the Vietnamese stop the Communists. It has offered 1 to provide training personnel with years of experience in Malay, It has also offered financial support. Other like-minded countries,

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notably, the Philippines, and Australia have a capability and a possible

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interest in this regard. While the use of third'country personnel may

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create some administrative problems for us and the GVN. it is of overriding importance that others share with us the responsibility for helping Vietnam win its struggle. Particularly as we can obtain a

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British participation we will maximize the political benefits to be

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obtained within the western alliance by sharing responsibility for this difficult problem.

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• *

Civic Action

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17_. The anti-guerrilla effort should be accompanied and followed up

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♦ by economic and political consolidation. Abroad range of community development activities both in the politic alaid economic field should be pressed forward. Not only should roads, wells, schools, etc., be pushed forward, but village political councils should be created and an imaginative communications system should be established, geared to bring the rural people of Vietnam into the body politic.

Improved Security Arrangements

18. It is doubtful whether the Vietnamese government could weather

the pressure which would be generated if Laos were lost, without

; prompt and dramatic support for its security from the U.S. Similarly,-the extent to which the remainder of the S.E. Asian countries would be prepared to go "in resisting Bloc pressures or in withstanding local t c > Communist threats would depend on whether they still assessed that

the U.S. could stem further Communist expansion in the area. Although

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-'< .they would bo disillusioned regarding U.S. resolution after the loss or

division of Laos, they would nonetheless welcome demonstrations of U.S,

firmness, aid might, in response, modify their appraisal of their own

future in due course. ,r (NIE of March 28, Outlook in Mainland S.E. Asia)

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Thus to futher strengthen and* improve the internal and external political

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.position of Vietnam described above, and as a complementary action to the economic undertakings described above, the U.S. should endeavor to develop various strengthened security arrangements,

19* The Geneva Accords have beeen totally inadequate in protecting South Vietnam against Communist infiltration and insurgency. Moreover, with increased Communist success in Laos dramatic U.S.. actions in stiffening up its physical support of Vietnam and the remainder of Southeast Asia may be needed to bolster the will to continue to resist the Cominunists, The inhibitions imposed on such action by certain parts of the Geneva Accords, which have be en violated with impunity by the Communists, should not prevent our action. We should consider joining with the Vietnamese in a clear cut defensive alliance which might include stationing of U.S. forces on Vietnamese soil. As* a variant of this arrangement certain SEATO troops might also be employed.

■ *

20, Bilateral military assistance by the United States pursuant to a

* *

request by South Vietnam along the lines of that undertaken during 1958

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in response to the request by Lebanon for military assistance, would be in keeping with international law and treaty provisions. The provisions of the Geneva Accords of 1954, which prohibited the introduction of additional military arms and personnel into Vietnam, would not be a

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bar to the measures contemplated. The obvious, large-scale and

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continuous vi'QlQtio» of these provisions of the Geneva Accords by North Vietnam in introducing large numbers of armed guerrillas

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into South Vietnam would justify the corresponding non-observance ol hese provisions by South Vietnam, Indeed, authorization for_\ changing PEO Laosanto an ordinary MAAG was justified on this

legal theory. It should be recognized that the foregoing proposals

j require careful and detailed consideration and preparation particularly

■ with regard to the .precise mission of U.S. forces used,

[ 21. In addition to the previously cited advantages such an action might

i have at least two other important political and military advantages:

(a) It could release a portion of the ARVN from relatively static military functions to pursue the war against the insurgents and

(b) It would place the Sirio-Soviet Bloc in the position of risking direct intervention in a situation where U.S. forces were already in place, accepting the consequense- of such action. This is in direct

■ *

contrast to the current situation in Laos. -

22. Alternatively, there are several potential political and military

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disadvantages to such an action, principal among these being:

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(a) Some of the neutrals, notably India might well be opposed -

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the .attitudes of the U.K. and France is uncertain.

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(b) This would provide the Communists with a major propaganda

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(c) The danger that a troop contribution would provoke a DRV-•CHICOM reaction with the risk of involving a significant commitment of U.S. force in the Pacific to the Asian mainland. The French tied up some 200, 000 troops during the unsuccessful Indo-China effort.

This might significantly weaken the Diem regime in the long

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run, having in mind the parallel of Rhee in Korea*

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ANNEX 4 ■ Economic

Best Use of Resources

1. Our capability to assist Vietnam is hampered by its own inability to make the best use of its available resources. Abroad range of agreement between our governments on fiscal and monetary measures to correct this situation is urgently needed.

2. In spite of the increased insurgency, Vietnam has been making good economic progress. It has increased production and its exports have been increasing rapidly. Despite a steady decrease in economic aid, its foreign exchange reserves have been going up and are now in excess of its normal needs. On the other hand, GVN revenues are now inadequate, in GVN opinion, to meet the increased local currency costs

^ * of further anti-insurgency measures. This presents the US with a

L difficult delimma. On the one hand, the enthusiastic .cooperation of

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the GVN in moving forward against the Communists is essential, but

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on the other hand, if we give in to their request for more aid in support of the military budget, this might not only fail to produce additional

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local currency, but could provide a serious disincentive to GVN efforts to find more resources. More importantly, coming after a protracted

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US effort to obtain an increased Vietnamese financial contribution

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which has recently gained a limited Vietnamese agreement (the

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Vietnamese have agreed to meet the FY 61 local currency costs of

the CIP) a relaxation in our previous position might well be inter-

■ preted as an acceptance by the US that the problem is of greater

concern to it than to Vietnam. Such an attitude could be highly

disruptive to an effective joint US-Vietnamese effort. They have

*

the means to raise more revenue, including increased taxation and

monetary reform, but both of these solutions, particularly the latter,

are unpalatable in the extreme-to President Diem. However, one

*

thing is certain, payment of Vietnamese troops will receive first

■

priority in the Vietnamese budget and US failure to provide additional defense support aid will not affect the ability or willingness of Vietnam

to carry out necessary military actions,

3, Vietnam is essentially a "have 11 rather than a M have not" country.

\ It has Xand, resources, and an able and. energetic people." If it were

■* . * *' • . ■ -.

not for the Communists, Vietnam would probably be, like Thailand, economically viable today. We should help it move ahead with a long range development program against the day when the Communist menace has been brought under control and it can press ahead into an era of

self-sustaining economic growth.

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4. • Perhaps the most effective means of establishing Vietnaimese confidence in the political and economic future of their country would be for the US to commit itself to a long range economic development program. Under peaceful circumstances, Vietnam would unquestionably

-* * ■

be one of the most rapidly developing countries in the area, having J;hej resources, both human and natural, to bring this about. Substantial amounts of additional US development grant assistance for long range

projects can be effectively employed in Vietnam. The additional amounts

would supplement current programs as well as those contemplated for

•

FY 1962. They should in their aggregate serve to significantly accelerate

the overall development of the Vietnamese economy and provide some

* *

additional social and physical infrastructure support,

- ■ 5v While the following does not pretend to be a comprehensive long

J * range development program, it unquestionably includes priority components of any sound long range program. Contingent upon the Vietnamese - * .cooperation,' assistance could, be directed into the following areas: ■ ' ■ (a) Agriculture - A 20 per cent increase of agricultural output is

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a feasible 5~year goal. Expanded extension service, additional agrisul-

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tural credit facilities and greater use of fertilizer are called to meet

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this objective,

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(b) Health Services - Present deficient facilities should be expanded through training of additional physicians, nurses, and technicians

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to i ovide for staffing of hospitals and local health centers.

i (c) Education - Priority should be accorded to accelerated

teacher-training programs with an augmented technical-vocational edu-

i cation program,

(d) Fishing - The deficient protein content of the Vietnamese diet

can be inexpensively augmented by the provision of additional larger and

specially equipped fishing boats to provide for greater range and more efficient processing of cath.

(e) Roads - There exists an urgent need for further development of secondary road systems in the rural areas to permit imor.e efficient marketing of agriculture products as well as to assist in exploitation of presently untapped forestry resources*

(f) Public Administration - To obtain effective government direction of essential public services, public administration training

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should be augmented at the national, provincial,* and local levels;

(g) Industrial Development - The present Industrial Development Center could be used to expand light industry, through the provision of additional resources and the improvement of managerial, entre-preneurial

and technical skills.

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6. In order to help strengthen the will of the people to resist the

incursions of the Viet Cong, the United States chould begin immediately to assist'the GVN undertake concentrated work in those rural areas

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currently subject to intensive Viet Cong activites. A number of Task

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Force teams should be organized which would undertake, in cooperation

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with local communities, a series of short-range, simple, inexpensive projects, the benefits of which can be readily recognized. Examples of projects to be undertaken are:

(a) well digging

(b) construction of inexpensive schools using local materiel

(c) construction of markets

(d) iiit reduction of medical dispensaries

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(e) construction of simple irrigation ditches .

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(f) agricultural extension services

(g) veterinary services

(h) strengthening of rural agricultural cooperatives

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(i) construction of local roads, etc.

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The above and related actions--which would incorporate a

maximum of eelf-help operations--could be initiated on a crash basis. They should be addressed to meeting the*n.eeds of the village communities.

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It is proposed that the "Task Force 11 pattern of operations of USOM/

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Laos be adopted. This program was designed to accommodate to the disorganized conditions after the Battle of Vientiane. The objective of the Task Force concept was to provide relief to non-infiltrated ind liberated areas and to accelerate self-help in rural development

* ■ ■

'activities. This program, despite numerous difficulties, has

achieved satisfactory results to date and presents itself as a most convenient and realistic mechanism for the Presidential Task Force

program for Vietnam.

In carrying out the foregoing, the cooperation of existing Vietnamese organizations should be utilized to the maximum. In particular the full cooperation of the military would be required.

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TOP SECRET

ANNEX 5

Ps ychological

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The following are the types of actions envisioned to help the GV. accelerate its public information program with the objectives

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of gaining broad public understanding of the actions required to

combat the Communist insurgents and to build public confidence in i

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the GVN's determination and ability to deal with the Communist

i threat:

a. Assist the GVN to develop and improve the USOM-supported

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radio network for the country, to include the prompt establishment of the presently planned new stations at Soc Tra,ng, Banmethout and Quang Ngai and the installation of the more powerful, new transmitters now on USOM order for Saigon and Hue. - *

b, Assist the GVN to initiate a training program for information

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and press attaches in the various ministries and directorates.

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c. Assist the GVN to establish a Press Institute for the training of selected young people for careers in journalism.

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d. In cooperation with the MAAG and the Ministry of Defense, make use of the troop information and education program of the GVN

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armed forces as a channel of communication between the Government and the people in the rural areas,

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e. Encourage President Diem to continue the effective "fireside

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chat 11 and other getting-to-the-people techniques which were begun during the recent election campaign. Provide maximum*press , film, and adio coverage for such appearances.

f. Reorient the programming of the existing USIS bi-national centers so that they can serve as training, centers for rural informa-

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i tion and educational cadres.

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ANNEX 6

Covert Actions

a. Intelligence : Expand current positive and counter-intelligence operations against Communist forces in South Vietnam and against North Vietnam. These include penetration of the Vietnamese Communist mechanism, dispatch of agents to North Vietnam and strengthening Vietnamese internal security services. Authorization should be given t

subject to existing procedures, for the use in North Vietnam operations

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of civilian air crews of American and other nationality, as appropriate, in addition to Vietnamese, Consideration should be given for over-flights of North Vietnam for photographic intelligence coverage, using American or Chinese Nationalists crews and equipment as necessary. ^b. Co mm u.uca t io»s mteU^nce: Expands current program of . interception and direction finding covering Vietnamese Communist

communications activities in South Vietnam, as well as North Vietnam

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targets. Obtain further USIB authority to conduct these operations on Q£2^L~

a fully joint basis, permitting the sharing of results of interception,

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direction finding, traffic analysis and cryptographic analysis by American

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agencies with the Vietnamese to the extent needed to launch rapid -

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attacks on Vietnamese Communist communications and command installations.

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This program should be supplemented by a program, duly coordinated, of training additional Vietnamese Arrny..units in inter-cept and direction finding by the US Army Security Agency. Also, US rmy Security Agency teams could be sent to Vietnam for direct operations, coordinated in the same manner -- Approved by the

President at the NSC meeting of 29 April 1961.

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i c, Unconventional Warfare : Expand present operations of the

First Observation Battalion in guerrilla areas of South Vietnam,

under joint MAAG-CIA sponsorship and direction. This should be

i in full operational collaboration with the Vietnamese, using Viet-

namese civilians recruited with CIA aid.

. In Laos, infiltrate teams under light civilian cover to

Southeast Laos to locate and attack Vietnamese Communist bases

and lines of communications. These teams should be supported by

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assault units of 100 to 150 Vietnamese for use on targets beyond

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capability of teams . Training of teams could be a combined operation by CIA and US Army Special Forces.

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In North* Vietnam, using the foundation established by -.

intelligence operations, form networks of resistance, covert bases

and teams for sabotage and light harassment, A caxDability should

■ be created by MAAG in the South Vietnamese Army to conduct

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TOP SECRET

Ranger raids and similar military actions in North Vietnam a's ■

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might prove necessary or appropriate* Such actions should try

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to avcd any outbreak of extensive resistance or insurrection which could not be supported to the extent necessary to stave off repression.

Conduct over-flights for dropping of leaflets to harass the Communists and to maintain morale of North Vietnamese population, and increase gray broadcasts to North Vietnam for e same purposes,

d- Internal South Vietnam: Effect operations to penetrate

/

political forces, government, armed services and opposition

> elements to measure support of. government, provide warning of

» any coup plans, and identify individuals with potentiality of provid-

ing leadership in event of disappearance of President Diem.

* Build up an increase in the population's participation in

and loyalty to free government in Vietnam, through improved

communication'between the government and the people, and by

strengthening independent or quasi-independent organizations of

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political, syndical, or professional character. Support covertly the GVN in allied and neutral countries, with special emphasis on bringing out GVN accomplishments, to counteract tendencies

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towards a "political solution 11 while-the Communists are attacking GVN. Effect, in support, a psychological program in Vietnam and

elsewhere exploiting Communist brutality and aggression in North

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Vietnam,

3. The expanded prog ram outlined above was estimated to require an additional 40 personnel for the CIA station and an increase in the CIA outlay for Vietnam of approximately $1. 5 million for FY 62, partly compensated by withdrawal of personnel from other areas. The US Army Security Agency actions to supplement communications

intelligence will require 78 personnel and approximately $1.2 million

s

in equipment. The personnel and fund augmentations in this paragraph were approved by the President at the NSC meeting of 29 April 1961. 1 £• In order adequately to train the Vietnamese Army in tactical COMIT operations, the Army Security Agency estimates that an additional 15 personnel are required. This action has been approved

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by the US Intelligence Board.

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TOP SECRET

ANNEX 7

Funding

This funding program is discussed under two headings: (a) GVN

Defense Budget (local currency) and (b) MAP. It is understood that

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these are estimated figures and that the Task Force will attempt

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more detailed estimates as programs are approved.

a. Defens e Budget: (Local currency GVN defense budget re-

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quirements in millions of dollars. }

1 # To provide for defense against increased Communist insurgency, the GVN defense budget has had to be increased materially over the past two years. The GVN defense budget is mutually agreed upon by the GVN and MAAG/ The budget for FY 60 and our present estimate for FY 61 and for FY 62 GVN defense budget are in dollars

(Vietnamese FY is also CY):

FY 60

■ •

168.0

FY 61

212.0

FY 62

247.0

The figures for FY 62 include the increased costs for the already

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approved (but not funded) actions as well as the additional actions

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.recommended in this program. ■ . .

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2. Funding of budget: Funding of its defense budget is accom-

plished by GVN, with the US providing imported commodities which are

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sold for local currency. The agreed budget and financing for FY 60

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was as follows:

US Contribution

GVN Contribution

TOL GVN Defense Budget

FY 60

155.5

12.5

168.0

Prior to the initiation of the CIP, the GVN proposed a defense budget of $177 for FY 61, No agreement has been reached between the

USG and GVN as to provisions of funds for this budget. Prior to the development of the Program of Action for Vietnam anticipated expenses associated with the implementation of the Counter-Insurgency Plan, and other requirements, made it necessary to increase the earlier estimate of GVN Defense Budget for FY 61 to $212. 0, The status of funding of

m

this amount is as follows: ICA has agreed to provide $134. 0 and GVN has agreed to provide $20. 0 leaving a short-fall of $58. 0. The Country

*

Team has. recommended that US contribute an additional $19. 0. If «

this were approved, it would raise the total FY 61 US contribution to -$153, 0 million, but would still leave a short-fall of $39* 0 million. Mr. Thuan (GVN Secretary of State for the Presidency and Minister of Defense) stated on 24 March 1961 that the GVN would like to receive

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more American aid, but if this were not possible the GVN will have to choose between the Communist danger and the danger of inflation. The

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QVN in this case,, of course, would choose to risk the danger of inflation and could meet the financial burden of the Counter-Insurgency Plan in 1961. Secretary Thuan, however, expressed

considerable concern regarding the prospects for 1962**

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While recognizing that the final levels of both US and Viet-namese contributions to the FY 61 defense budget are still under

I

negotiation, it must be kept in mind that in order to be certain that the 20, 000 additional soldiers now authorized for the GVN Army are brought into the troop basis promptly, it may be necessary for the US to increase FY 61 contribution by the amount of the short-fall of $58 million to insure the success of the Counter-Insurgency Plan*

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In order to implement'items in the Counter-Insurgency Plan

*

which are agreed to by the GVN and to carry out the additional

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measures recommended herein, the GVN defense budget for FY 62

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might be in the order of $247. This budget would include, if mutually agreed upon, a US contribution of $161. 0 million and a Vietnamese contribution of $86.0 million. This would provide the

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.local currency needed to carry out this program of action for Vietnam.

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The Task Force points out that this level requires a four-fold increase

* See Foreign Service Dispatch 456.

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over the FY 61 GVN contribution. If the Vietnamese are unable to

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provide this level of funds, there will again be a substantial short-fall

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which the US might have to meet if the program as outlined is to be

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mounted. »

b, MAP: In order to provide the necessary equipment, training

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and other support required for a GVN armed force of 200, 000, a Civil Guard of 68, 000, Self Defense Corps of 40, 000 and those portions of para. 2 above properly chargeable to military assistance, a total of $140 million is required for Military Assistance in FY 62 for Vietnam. This amount is $71 million more than is currently programmed for Vietnam within the current World Wide FY 62 MAP of $1. 6 billion, which is a holding program pending results of an Executive Branch study of the Military Assistance Program now underway,

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■ It is necessary, therefore, that this additional $71 million required

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t efor .the Vietnam Military Assistance Program be provided by supplemental appropriations over and above the presently contemplated World , '- Wide FY 62 .$1,6 billion progr.am., " -. . ■ .

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May 8, 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, JCS SUBJECT: U. S. Forces for South Vietnam

In preparation for the possible commitment of U. S. forces to Vietnam, it is desired that you give further review and study of the military advisability of such an action, as well as to the size and composition of such U. S. forces. Your views, which I hope could include some expression from GINCPAC, would be valuable for consideration prior to the NSC meeting this week (currently scheduled for Friday, May 12.)

The missions for such U.S. forces, and preliminary concepts of size and composition, are given in section 2c of the May 6 draft of ir A Program of Action to Prevent Communist Domination of South Vietnam, 11 JCS members of the Presidential Task Force participated in formulating the thinking on these. With this guidance, and with the other studies which I appreciate you have undertaken already on this area, it is my hope that you will be able to provide me with a recommendation which will assist the NSC discussion of this subject.

s/Roswell Gilpatric Deputy

BGen. E. G. Lansdale 577^2 3^-9^7 8 May6l

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Dear Mr. President:

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I have asked Vice President Johnson to go to Viet-Nam on my behalf to visit you personally, to give you my warmest greetings, to witness the valiant struggle of your people against Communist aggression, and to assure you that my message of April 27 was more than an expression of moral support.

Since I took office my colleagues and I have watched developments in Viet-Nam with attention and concern. We have been urgently considering ways in which our help could be made more effective. I can now tell you that, for our part, we are ready to join v/ith you in an intensified endeavor to win the struggle against Communism and to further the social and economic advancement of Viet-Nam. Because of the great importance we attach to this matter, I have asked Vice President Johnson and Ambassador Nolting to discuss it fully with you.

. ■

If such an expanded joint effort meets with your approval, we are prepared to initiate in collaboration v/ith your government a series of joint, mutually supporting actions in the military, political, economic and other fields; We would.propose to extend and build on our existing programs including the Counterinsurgency Plan and infuse into our actions a high sense of urgency and dedication.

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It is my understanding that certain of the proposals in the c Counterinsurgency Plan may not entirely reflect your own judgment. However, I hope you would feel free to discuss any issues frankly with Ambassador Nolting so that we may find a common viewpoint. I am happy to tell you, however, that the steps already taken to implement'the Plan have niade*it possible for us to have approved Military Assistance Program support of the 20, 000 increase of your regular forces. * ' -

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I spciak first of military measures. But I fully share your view that Pommunism cannot be stopped by such measures alone. Parallel political and economic action is of equal importance. I • believe we are in agreement that the military actions proposed in the Counterinsurgency Plan for controlling and defeating the Viet Cong are soundly conceived and should be taken. However, in light of current conditions, these measures may no longer be sufficient. Therefore, in addition to actions in the Counter-insurgency Plan, we would be prepared to:

■

1, Augment the personnel of the MAAG to enable it to carry out increased duties.

2. Expand the MAAG's duties to include supporting and advising the Self Defense Corps.

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I 3, Provide Military Assistance Program support for

the entire Civil Guard force of 68, 000.

4. Provide material support for the Vietnamese Junk

Force to help it prevent clandestine supply and infiltration of the Viet Cong. m ,

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We would also be prepared to consider carefully with you, if developments should warrant, the case for a further increase in . the strength of your forces beyond the 170, 000 limit now contemplated, -

f T'also believe that the problem of Viet~Nam ! s borders requires our further urgent joint study to develop techniques whereby crossing of these borders by unfriendly elements can be more effectively controlled.

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I believe we should consider the establishment in Southeast Asia of a facility to develop and test, using the tools of modern technology, new techniques to help us in our joint campaign against the Communists. " * ""_--•'

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We would be prepared to collaborate with your Government in the use of certain military specialists to assist and work with your jarmed forces in health, welfare and public v/orks activities in the villages. We can also offer additional Special Forces training to assist your government in accelerating the training of its Special Forces.

•

In the political field, in addition to the steps contemplated in I the Counterinsurgency Plan, I feel you will agree that the strengthening of border control arrangements, particularly with Cambodia, is perhaps the most important element. Whil_ I fully recognize the difficulty and delicacy of this problem, I urge you to authorize the renewal of negotiations on this subject with the Royal Khmer Government. If you concur, we will use our best efforts with the Cambodians to facilitate these discussions.

Other governments have shown an interest in assisting Viet-Nam in its actions against the guerrillas and have indicated that certain expert personnel with long experience, e. g. , in Malaya, might be made available to help. "We would be glad to cooperate with your government in planning the most effective use of this welcome assistance.

Turning to the economic aspects, I am aware of the increased burden that an increase in your military forces will place-on your internal budget. However, budgetary problems must not be permitted to interfere with the successful prosecution of our joint effort against the Communists. It seems to us that the. chief problem is how to make the best possible use of all available e es-ources*. This is a complex problem which taxes the ability of the best experts and we feel must be attaxked by the best talent we both can muster. If you concur, I will send to Viet-Nam a group of highly qualified economic and fiscal experts who would meet with your experts and v/ork out a financial plan on which our joint efforts can be based.

. I wish to assure you of our continued interest in the social advance ment and economic betterment of your people. Various joint programs are under way and much has been accomplished. These will be continued and improved.

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In addition, Ambassador Nolting will be prepared to discuss new economic and social measures in rural areas to accompany the anti-guerrilla effort in which the U. S. can provide direct assist-_ ance, if desired. Such programs, we feel, can be organized, in close cooperation with military operations and with maximum mobility, speed and flexibility. Funds for expanded efforts along these lines can be allocated. \

We have great confidence in the long-range political and economic future of Viet-Nam. Therefore, I am certain you will ag :ee that, despite our present focus on the immediate Viet Cong problem, it would be good for us to work together toward a longer range economic development program, including increased assistance on our part in the fields of agriculture, health, education, fisheries, highways, public administration and industrial development. I have authorized Ambassador Nolting to enter into preliminary discussions with members of your government concerning the best ways of moving forward with a program whose eventual goal would be a Viet-Nam capable of self-sustaining economic growth.

This, Mr. President, is the broad outline of our thinking on how we can help you and your brave countrymen to help themselves in their determined struggle to defeat the Communists and find a better way of life. I am confident of your success. I look forward with great interest to Vice President Johnson T s report on his talks with you, and I would be especially happy to hear from you „ personally.

i • • * . . • • .

Please accept again, Mr. President, the expression of my warmest friendship and respect.

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Sincerely;

His Excellency Ngo Dinh Diem President of the Republic of Viet-Nanl

TOP SECRET

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19*1 WOf II 18 01

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OFF SECY CF DEFENSE

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May 11, 1961

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NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. 52

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The Secretary bf State

next meeting of the National Security Council, now scheduled lor May 19, the President has made the following decisions on the basis of this report:

1. The U. S. objective and cone cot 01 operations sis tec in the

report are approved: to prevent Communist domination c: South Vietnam; to create in that country a viable and increasingly democratic gocietv* and to initiate, on an accelerated basis, a series of mutually supporting auctions of a military, political, economic, psychological and covert character designee to achieve this objective. •

t% : ' sV 2. The approval given for specific military actions by the

^v President at the National Security Counci; meeting on April 2 9, 1961, * is confirmed. * *

3. Additional actions listed at pages 4 and 5 of the Task Force Report are authorized, with the objective of meeting the increased security threat resulting from the new situation along the frontier between Laos, and Vietnam, In particular, the President directs an assessment of the . military utility of a further increase in G. V. N, forces from 170,000 to 200, 000, together with an assessment of the parallel political and fi^c^l irhpii'CatiQns.

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4, The President directs full examination by the Defense Department, under the guidance of the Director of the continuing Task Force on Vietnam, of the size and composition of forces which would be desirable in the case of a possible commitment of U- S. forces to Vietnam. The diplomatic setting within which this action might be taker! should also be examined.

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5, The U. S. will seek to increase the confidence of President Diem and his government in the United States by a scries of actions and messages relating to the trip of Vice President Johnson/ The U. S* will attempt to strengthen President Diem l s popular support within Vietnam by reappraisal and negotiation, under the direction of Ambassador Nolting. Ambassador Molting is also requested to recommend any necessary reorganization of the Country Team for these purposes,

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6. The U. S. will negotiate in appropriate ways to improve Vietnam's relationship with other countries, especially Cambodia, and

its standing in world opinion.

■

7* The Ambassador is authorised to begin negotiations looking toward a new bilateral arrangement with Vietnam, but no firm . commitment will be made to such an arrangement without further review by the President.

S. The U, S. will undertake economic brograms in Vietnam with a view to both short term immediate impact and a contribution to

the longer range economic viability of the country, and the specific actions oroooscd on pages 12 and 13 of the Task Force Reoert are authorized.

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9. The U. S. will strengthen its efforts in the psychological

field as recommended on pages 14 and 15 of the Task Force Report.

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10 4 The urogram for covert actions outlined on pa<*e 15 of the Task Force Report is aporoved.

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11, These decisions will be supported by appropriate budgetary action, but the President reserves judgment on the levels of funding pro-, posed on pages 15 and 16 of the Task Force Report and in the funding aruie>:*

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12\ Finally, the President approves the continuation of a sp^c'I^l

T.ask Force on Vietnam, established in and directed by the Department oC

State under Sterling J. Cotirell as Director, and Chalmers E. Wood as

Executive Officer. * ..

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SENSITIVE

DRAFT 6 May 1961

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A Program of Action

To Prevent Communist Domination of South Vietnam

Ap praisal of the Situatio n: The internal security situation in South Vietnam has become critical, as can be seen on the attache map, with an estimated 12, 000 Viet Cong Communists waging

■ *

guerrilla warfare inside the country. The strongly anti-Communist, pro-American government of South Vietnam, with American aid, is

-

increasing its capabilities to fight its attackers. Should the Communist effort increase, cither directly or as a result of a collapse of Laos, additional measures beyond those proposed herein may be necessary. (Details in Annex 1.), .

The U.S. Objective: To prevent Communist domination of South

Vietnam and to create in that country a viable and increasingly

■

democratic society. .,

Conce pt of O perations: To initiate, on an accelerated basis, a

• * ■

* « • * *

series of mutually supporting actions of a military, political, economic, psychological and covert character designed to achieve this objective.

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In so doing, it is intended to use, and where appropriate extend, expedite or build upon the existing U. S. and Government of Vietnam

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(G. V.N.) programs, including as much of the Counter-Insurgency

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Plan (CIP), as can be agreed by both governments, already under

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way in South Vietnam. There is neither the time available nor any '

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sound justification for IT starting from scratch. n Rather the need is to focus the U.S. effort in South Vietnam on the immediate internal security problem; to infuse it with a sense of urgency and a dedica-

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tion.to the overall U.S. objective; to achieve, through cooperative inter-departmental support both in the field and in Y/ashingtcrij the operational flexibility needed to apply the available U.S. assets in a manner best calculated to achieve our objective in Vietnam; to give the U.S. Ambassador and the U.S. team under his leadership general authority to undertake a series of accelerated measures

as noted below; and finally, to impress on our friends, the Viet-

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namese, and en our foes, the Communists, that come what may,

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the U.S. intends to win this battle.

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- Pro gram of Action:

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1. General: The situation in South Vietnam has reached the point where, at least for the time being, primary emphasis must

•

be placed on providing a solution to the internal security problem.

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A significant step which has already been taken by the Country Team to counter Communist subversion in. South Vietnam has been the development of the Counter-Insurgency Plan (CIP). Those portions

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number; NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

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• ■ of the -CIP which are agreed to by the G. V.N. will be implemented

as rapidly as possible.

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Communist domination of South Vietnam needs more than mili-

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tary measures alone to be stopped. Our military program must be

■ accompanied and supplemented by a strong, positive political-

er -momic program

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2, Military:

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a. The following military actions were approved by

the President at the NSC meeting of 29 April 1961:

••— ,.»»••.

i (1) Increase the MAAG as necessary to insure the

effective implementation of the military portion of the program in-eluding the training of a 20, 000-man addition to the present G. V. N.

■

armed forces of 150, 000. Initial appraisal-of new tasks assigned

• *

CHMAAG indicate that approximately 100 additional military personnel will be required immediately in addition to the present complement

of 6S5,

(2) Expand MAAG responsibilities to include

. authority to provide support and advice to the Self Defense Corps . '*•»■■ ', m ' • • « • . - »•

with a strength of approximately 40, 000,

* •

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(3) Authorize MAP support for the entire Civil

-

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Guard force of 68, 000. MAP support is now authorized for 32, 000; the remaining 36,000 are not now adequately trained and equipped.

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(4) Install as a, matter of priority a radar sur-veillance capability which will enable the G. V.N. to obtain warning of Communist over-flights being conducted for intelligence or clandestine air supply purposes. Initially, this capability should b provided from U.S. mobile radar capability.

i (5) Provide MAP support for the Vietnamese

Junk Force as a means of preventing Viet Cong clandestine supply

and infiltration into South Vietnam by water. MAP support, which

i was not provided in the Counter-Insurgency Plan, will include training of junk crews in Vietnam or at U.S. bases by U. S. Navy personnel.

b. The following additional actions are considered neces-sary to assist the G. V.N. in meeting the increased security threat

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resulting from the new situation along the L-aos-G. V.N. frontier:

- (1) Assist the G.V.N, armed forces to,increase

■

their border patrol and insurgency suppression capabilities by estab-

-

lishing an effective border intelligence and patrol system, by institute

ing regular aerial surveillance over the entire frontier area, and by applying modern technological area-denial techniques to control the

... *

roads and trails along Vietnam T s borders. A special staff element

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(approximately 6 U.S. personnel), to concentrate upon solutions to

the unique problems of Vietnam's borders, will be activated in.MAAG, Vietnam, to assist a similar special unit in the RVNAF which the

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G. V.N, will be encouraged to establish; these two elements working as an integrated team will help the G. V.N/ gain the support of nomadic

tribes and other border inhabitants, as well as introduce advanced techniques and equipment to strengthen the security of South Vietnam's

frontiers.

(Z). Assist the G.V.N, to establish a Combat Develop-

ment and Test Center in South,Vietnam to develop, with the help of

i

modern technology, new techniques for use against the Viet Cong

**-

forces. (Approximately 4 U. S. personnel.)

-»*-•«».'

1 (3) Assist the G.V.N, forces with health, welfare

and public work projects by providing U.S. Army civic action mobile Li training teams, coordinated with the similar civilian effort. (Approxi-

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mately 14 U.S. personnel.) ' #* / /,; : - *•-'- '' C(.< *

(4) Deploy a Special Forces Group (approximately 7/ 0> .

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400 personnel) to Nha Trang in order to accelerate G. V.N. S]Decial -" ' ' •■ '&M

, \ m Forces training. The first increment, for immediate deployment to

Vietnam, should be a Special Forces company (52 personnel).

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(5) Instruct JCS, CINCPAC, and MAAG to undertake

, an assessment of the military utility of a further increase in the G. V,N ■

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p forces from 170, 000 to 200,000 in order to create two new division

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equivalents for deployment to the northwest border region. The

parallel political and fiscal implications should be assessed.

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c. In preparation for possible commitment of U, S, forces

■* * ■ ■ "-*" -•—-**— .«....,.

to Vietnam, which might result from an NSC decision following discus-

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sions between Vice President Johnson and President Diem, Defense is

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undertaking an immediate study of the size and composition of U, S.

—. *. »* *..'.. _

*■»•■» *

forces required to:

- provide maximum psychological impact in deterrence of further Communist aggression from North Vietnam, China, or the

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Soviet Union, while rallying the morale of the Vietnamese and encourag-

■ ing the support of SEATO and neutral nations for Vietnam 1 s defense;

-

- release Vietnamese forces from advanced and static

»

defense positions to permit their fuller commitment to counter-insurgency

actions;

- provide maximum training to approved Vietnamese

.forces; and

- provide significant military resistance to potential

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North Vietnam Communist and/or Chinese Communist action.

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The following possible actions are being considered in this Defense

■ •

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study:

(1) Deploy to South Vietnam two U,S. battle groups

(with necessary command and logistics units), plus an engineer (con-struction-combat ^ battalion. These units would be located in the

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high plateau" region, remote from the major population center of

Saigon-Cholon, under the command of the Chief, MAAG. To help accelerate the training of the G, V.N. army, they would establish two divisional field training areas. The engineer battalion would undertake construction of roads, air-landing strips, and other facilities essential to the logistical supx^ort of the U.S. and Viet-

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namese forces there. * - ■

(2) Assign the Naval component of CINCPAC the responsibility for coastal patrol activities, employing minimal U.S Naval forces in conjunction with Vietnamese forces, to prevent the

s

eaborne infiltration of Viet Cong personnel and material into South

Vietnam.

(3) Assign the air component of CINCPAC the

■

responsibility for border surveillance and close-support of G.V.N.

* ■

(An Appraisal of the Military Concept is given in Annex 2. )

ground forces in counter-insurgency actions, emj^loying minimal.^-% i^C^vJ^{ 1 UvS~-Ai-r^l*loJLce. means in conjunction with Vietnamese forces, to , * help seal the Vietnamese borders and to defeat the Communist

guerrillas within those borders.

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3. Political:

A

I, Objective: Develop political and economic conditions

which will create a solid and widespread support among the key political

groqps and the general population for a Vietnam which has the will to

resist Communist encroachment and which in turn stems from a stake

in a freer and more democratic society-

a. Increase the confidence of President Diem and his * *

»

government in the United States, by the following actions:

(1) A message has been dispatched to President Diem informing him of your personal support for his courageous leader-

ship in the struggle against communism and of Vice President Johnson's

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trip, indicating that Vice President Johnson will be carrying a more

detailed expression of your thoughts on a broad range of proposals for

*

joint action between our two countries,

(2) A letter from you to President Diem has been prepared for Vice President Johnson identifying the key objectives con-

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taincd in this Task Force report which we propose as a joint U. S. -

Vietnamese address to the existing threat to Vietnam's freedom, stability

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and security, seeking an expression of Diem's support for this joint effort,

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. (3) Vice President Johnson's trip to Vietnam should

be focused on obtaining broad agreement on how the U. S. and Vietnam

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view the problem confronting Vietnam's security including the range of

political, economic and military actions required to preserve the

• *

"I freedom and integrity of that country.

1

I . b. Strengthen President Diem's popular support

within Vietnam, by the following actions:

(1) Instruct Ambassador Nolting to reappraise

the political situation and undertake to obtain agreement of the G. V. N.

_ ■

• ■

on an urgent basis for a realistic political program along the lines indicated in the CIP. The objective of the program would be to seek to produce favorable attitudes and active popular cooperation against

the VC. While,the Ambassador's recommendations might well include

actions directed toward fiscal and monetary reform measures, it is

presumed that the major recommendations in this area will be developed

by the Ambassador in conjunction with the special team of U.S. economic

*

experts which it is proposed be dispatched to Vietnam for this purpose

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(in Economic section following)".

■

. • " ■ . * (2) As a part of this initial assessment, the

Ambassador should also consider such special arrangements within * the field organization as he may deem required to assure a capability

■

for rapid Country Team response to evolving problems. This should

i include an assessment of staff requirements, both with a view to requesting such additional personnel as required and to reviewing the employment

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of existing field staff to assure the most efficient application of available • personnel to major objectives to be accomplished,

.II. Objective: Improve Vietrfam f s relationships with other

I countries and its status in world opinion.

a. Improve relations'with Cambodia leading to full border control cooperation, by the following actions:

(1) Instruct our Ambassadors in Phnom Penh and

i ■ . • ■ - •

Saigon to urge host governments to enter promptly into renewed border control negotiations. In order to secure Cambodian cooperation, the Cambodian government should be informed that requests for additional

■

military assistance will be sympathetically considered. It also should *

m

be informed immediately of the approval of its recent request for four

T-37 aircraft

-

i * b. Call for .United Nations observers to observe

' . . .

externally supported Communist actions of subversion, infiltration and

other violations of Vietnam's sovereignty, by the following action:

. (1) Instruct our Ambassador in Saigon to consider

*

-

discussing this matter with the G. V.N. Ambassador Stevenson might .later be*asked to explore informally the idea with.'Mr. Hammarskjord and friendly foreign representatives in New York.

*

c. Accept contributions of other free world countries toward meeting the Communist guerrilla threat in Vietnam as a means

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of bringing a wider allied support to the effort to assist Vietnam, by the

following action:

(1) Instruct our representatives in Saigon to pre-

pare, in consultation with the Vietnamese, proposals providing for the use of third country contributions, particularly that already offered by

the British, to the training of Vietnam's forces and counter-guerrilla

efforts,

III. Objective: Undertake military security arrangements

.which emphasize the U.S. intention to stand behind Vietnam's resistance to Communist aggression.

a

♦ a. Undertake a new bilateral arrangement with Vietnam,

by the following action:

(1) Qn the grounds that the Geneva Accords have placed inhibitions upon free world action while at the same time placing no restrictions upon the Communists, Ambassador Nolting should be instructed to enter into preliminary discussions with Diem regarding the

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possibility of a defensive security alliance despite the inconsistency of

such action with the Geneva Accords. This action would be based on the

■ *

premise that such an undertaking is justified in international law as representing a refusal to be bound by the Accords in a degree and manner beyond that which the other party to the Accords has shown a willingness

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to honor. Communist violations, therefore, justify the establishment

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of the security arrangement herein recommended. Concurrently, Defense

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should study the military advisability of committing U.S. forces in Vietnam

■ a ■ a

'(as noted in Military section above).

(Political details in Annex 3. )

4, Econo mic:

■

I* Objective; Undertake economic programs having both a short-term immediate impact as well as ones which contribute to the # longer range economic viability of the country.

• * ■

a. Undertake a series of economic projects designed to accompany the counter-insurgency effort, by the following action:

■

(1) Grant to ICA the authority and funds to move into

■

a rural development-civic action program. Such a program would include

short-range, simple, impact projects which would be undertaken by teams

■

working in cooperation with local communities. This might cost roughly

1 $3 to $5 million, mostly in local currency. Directors of field teams

should be given authority with respect to the expenditure of funds including

i i *

use of dollar instruments to purchase local currency on the "spot. « * • • ■* b. Assist Vietnam to make the best use of all available

economic resources, by the following action: :

■ , a ■

. * -. ■ •' -/ ' (1) Halving in mind that our chief objective is obtain-

ing a' full and enthusiastic support by the G. V.N. in its fight against the

a

Communists, a high level team, preferably headed by Assistant Secretary

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of the Treasury John Leddy, with State and ICA members, should be dispatched to Saigon to work out in conjunction with the Ambassador

■" \ • : " • • ■ •

a plan whereby combined U.S. and Vietnamese financial resources can.

. i

best be utilized. This group's terms of reference should cover the

■

br ad range of fiscal and economic problems. Authority should be given to make concessions necessary to achieve our objectives and to so.ten the blow of monetary reform. Ambassador Nolting and perhaps the Vice President should notify Diem of the proposed visit of this group stressing that their objective is clearly to maximize the joint effort rather than to force the Vietnamese into inequitable and unpalat-

able actions.

(2) As a part of the foregoing effort, an assess

ment should be undertaken of the fiscal and other economic implications of a further force increase from 170, 000 ^to 200,. 000 (as noted in the.

Military section above).

* •

c. Undertake the development of a long-range economic

• . ■ • ■■

development program as a means of demonstrating U. S. confiden.ee in the

economic and political future of the country by the following action:

," * (1) Authorize Ambassador Nolting to inform the G.V.N, that the U.S. is prepared to discuss a long-range joint five year

■

development program which would involve contributions and undertakings

by both parties.

(Economic details in Annex 4.)

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5, Psychological:

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a. Assist the G. V.N. to accelerate its.public information program to help develop a broad public understanding of the actions re-quired to combat the Communist insurgents and to build public confidence in the G. V.N. ' s determination and ability to deal with the Communist threat. (Details in .Annex 5.)

-

b. The U. S. Country Team, in coordination with the G f V. N. Ministry of Defense, should compile and declassify for use of media representatives in South Vietnam and throughout the world, documented facts concerning Communist infiltration and terrorists 1 activities and

* *

tlie measures being taken by the G, V.N. to counter such attacks.

■

c. In coordination with CIA and the appropriate G.V.N.

*

Ministry, USIS will increase the flow of information about unfavorable

conditions in North Vietnam to media representatives.

» ■

d. Develop agricultural pilot-projects throughout the

• +

country, with a-view toward exploiting their beneficial psychological

-

effects. This project would be accomplished by combined teams of

*

-Vietnamese "Civic. Action personnel, Americans in the Peace Corps,

Filipinos in Operation Brotherhood, and other Free World nationals.

■ ■ e„ Exploit as a part of a planned psychological campaign

the rehabilitation of Communist Viet Cong prisoners now held in South

#

Vietnam. Testimony of rehabilitated prisoners, stressing the errors

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of Communism, should be broadcast to Communist-held areas, includ

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ing North Vietnam, to induce defections. This rehabilitation program

\ .. ■ ■ ■ • ■ .. ■••

would be assisted by a team of U. S. personnel including U. S. Army . (Civil Affairs, Psychological Warfare, and Counter-intelligence), USIS,

■

aid USOM experts.

• -f. Provide adequate funds for an impressive U.S. participation in the Saigon Trade Fair of 1962. ' . . ;

. ! • .

6. Covert Actions:

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• a. Expand present operations in the field of intelligence,

unconventional warfare, and political-psychological activities to support

*

the U.S. objective as stated. . •.

b. Initiate the communications intelligence actions, CIA

and ASA personnel increases, and funding which were approved by the President at the NSC meeting of 29 April 1961. . ' «

c # Expand the communications intelligence actions by inclusion of 15 additional Army Security Agency personnel to train the

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Vietnamese Army in tactical COMINT operations.

•

(Details of covert actions are given in Annex 6. )

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7. Funding: ■ *

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a. As spelled out in the funding annex, the funding of the

counter-^insurgency plan and the other actions recommended in this

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program might necessitate increases in U, S. support of the G, V.N. budget for FY 61 of as much as $58 ipillion, making up to a total of $192 million compared to $155 million for FY 60. The.U.S. contribu-

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tion for the G, V.N. Defense budget in FY 62 as presently estimated would total $161 million plus any deficiency in that Budget which the G. V.N. might be unable to finance. The exact amount of U. S. contributions to the G. V.N. Defense budgets for FY 61 and FY 62 are subject to negotiation between the U. S. and the G. V. N,

b. U.S. military assistance to G. V. N. , in order to

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provide the support contemplated by the proposed program would total $140 million, or $71 million more than now programmed for Vietnam in the U. S. current. MAP budget for FY 62.

(Details are given in Annex 7.)

8. Organizational Arrangements:

a. Because of the critical nature of the situation in

»

Vietnam, and the need for,accelerated action, the direction, coordina-tion, and support of the program will be effected through a special

** ■>

Task Force on Vietnam, established in and directed by the Department

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of State, constituted as follows:

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Director

Sterling J. Cottrell

Executive Officer: Chalmers B. Y/ood

Members:

Defense:

Treasury:

BOB:

ICA:

USIA:

CIA:

Office of the President:

b. It shall be the responsibility of the Director and the

Deputy Director of the Ta&k Force:

(1) To See that the action program as approved is

carried out;

(2) To keep under continual review the adequacy of

*

the action program to meet its objectives; and

" (3) To bring to the attention of the Secretary and ■ # . . . *

the Under Secretary of State and to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary

of Defense the need for any changes in or additions to the action program ■

to meet its objectives.

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May 15 , 1961

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Dear Mr, President :

The gracious visit of Vice -President of the United States and Mrs. Johnson to Vietnam has brought to us an even wanner feeling of friendship for the American people and strengthened the bends of friendship which had existed between our two countries since thie birth of the Republic of Vietnam, The presence of your brother-in-law and your charming caster , Mr, and Mrs. Stephen Smith,brought to the Vietnamese people a warm feeling of your own personal interest in Vietnam, an interest which you may be sure vail be long remembered,

Your thoughtful and understanding letter of May 8th, 1961,which was handed to me by Vice-President Johnson,contains wise and far-sighted proposals ,many of which I myself have advocated for four years or more, I was accordingly glad to tell Vice-President Johnson without hesitation that the Government of Vietnam accepts the proposals in your letter to initiate, in collaboration with the Government of the United States t the series cf joint, mutually supporting actions to win the stru^le against communism in Vietnam and further the advancement o: our country* Cur agreement to these proposals was made public in the joint communique which was released to the press on Saturday morning 13th f just before Vice-President Johnson's departure from Saigon*

In the course of our frank and fruitful conversations, Vice-President

* ■

Johnson graciously asked for my own suggestions as to the most urgent needs as we see them to save our country-from the vicious communist aggression being waged against us, both within our borders and from every side today. I was most deeply gratified by this gracious gesture by your distinguished Vice-President, particularly as we have not become accustomed to being asked for our own views as to our needs. The recent developments in Laos have emphasized our grave concern for the security of our country with its long and vulnerable frontiers.

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With the very real possibility that we may find, ourselves faced with communist military forcer, pressing our borders not only from the north of the 17th parallel but from a possibly coilirhuaist dominated Laos and a communist or neutral Cambodia on the west as well, we have undertaken urgent plans to determine the needs to save our country. These studies will be completed in preliminary form in about a week.

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\7e now know that as a small nation we cannot hope to meet all of our defense needs alone and from cur own resources. We are prepared to make the sacrifices in blood and manpower to save our country and I know that we can count on the material support from your great country which will be so essential to achieving final victory.

I was deeply gratified at Vice-President Johnson f s assurances that our needs will be given careful consideration in Washington, An estimate of these needs as we see them will accordingly be furnished to you in a second letter which I shall write in about a week. The "Government and peopled Vietnam have been greatly heartened by the encouraging visit of your distinguished Vice-President and the members of his official party * I now feel confident that in the mutual interest of our two countries tha-sacrifices the Vietnamese people are prepared to make will, find full support from the United States in our joint effort to save Vietnam and consequently Southeast Asia from being overwhelmed by communist aggression.

■ Please accept, Mr, President, this expression of my deep respect and friendship.

Sincerely,

KrAjt KJ^

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His Excellency

JOHN F. KENNEDY

President of the United States of America

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V SECY OF CEFEDKfiCE of the secretary of defense

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MEMORANDUM FOR DEPUTY SECRETARY G1DPATR1C From: Brig. Gen. Lansdale r ":"rl

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Subject: U.S. Combat Forces for Vietnam

The following sums up the information made available to me

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on the possible deployment of U.S. combat forces in Vietnam,

On 10 May, the JCS recommended that President Diem be

encouraged to request that the U.S. fulfill its SEATO obligation, ?X "*

in view of the new threat imposed by the Laotian situation, by the '.* % \ x

immediate deployment of appropriate U.S. forces to South Vietnam. '■ ' *l

Details of size and composition of suitable forces were awaiting ; ^\ |

the views of C1NCPAC and CHMAAG. . i ' :\

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Oil 12 May, this subject v/as discussed" by President Diem and * V

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Vice President Johr r g<yft in Saigon. Ambassador Nolting reported v

this discussion, noting that President Diem would desire U.S. ^

(or SEATO) combat forces only in case of overt aggression. The introduction of foreign combat forces would contravene and signify the end of the Geneva accord. (General Williams, former MAAG Chief, agrees that this is in line with previous thinking by President Diem. )

Ambassador Nolting added that President Diem would welcome * as many U.S. military personnel as needed for training and advising Vietnamese forcqs. General McGarr, Chief of MAAG who was pre \J

'Sent at this ''discussion also, rep6rted that while President Diem would not want U.S. combat forces for the purpose of fighting Communists in South Vietnam, he would accept deployment of U.S. combat forces as trainers for the Vietnamese forces at any time.

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Size and c omposition:

There has been considerable study of the size and composition of U.S. combat forces for possible deployment to Vietnam. The latest I have seen were CINCPAC's tentative views, after refinement. A U% S, Army infantry division to the High Plateau region, reinforced with Army Aviation, Engineers, Artillery, etc. The Seventh Fleet would relieve the Vietnamese need for readiness tore sist large scale invasion by sea. A minimum number of U. S. Navy patrol craft to help develop and train the Vietnamese Junk Forces, while initially supplementing the efforts. The air effort would be based near Saigon, with eight B57's (later relieved by F100 squadron) for border surveillance, four F102 r s for possible air defense, two or three TAG recce aircraft, and provisional C47 squadron.

Location:

Much of the thinking has been on stationing U.S. combat forces in the High Plateau, where they would be well located in relation to borders vulnerable to overt Communist aggression. However, General Williams has written a brief memo for me, recommending such U.S. forces be stationed on the coast, at Da Nang (Tourane), Nha Trang, and Phan Thiet, where sea, road, rail, and air facilities would permit further deployment as necessary in a contingency.

* Any of the above locations would permit the relief of Vietnamese

forces for training or operations against the Viet Cong. Also, any

of the above locations have good areas for training of Vietnamese

forces, if this were to be a mission of the U.S. forces.

Recommendation s:

* Since the deployment of U.S. combat forces in Vietnam is predicated on-the request for them by the Government of Vietnam, since this request hasn't been made yet, and since President Diem is sending,Nguyen Dinli Thuan (Secretary of Security, Defense, Interior, etc. ) to Washington next week to bring us Vietnam's ,f definitive military needs, n it is recommended that you explore this subject with Secretary Thuan towards getting a precise definition of the use of U. S. forces in • Vietnam. With concrete information, you v/ill then have a firm position for further decisions.

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May 23, 196l

MEMORANDUM

TO: The President

FROM: The Vice President

SUBJECT:Mission to Southeast Asia, India and Pakistan

The mission undertaken May 9 ? 196l 5 at your request, was informative and illuminating far beyond my expectations. Unusual candor — as well as unusual length — marked exchanges in each country. Each leader "bisited selcorned and sought to take full ad* vantage of my presence as a means of transmitting to uou their strongly held personal views on many matters.

The purpose of this memorandum is to convey such of my own impressions and evaluations as seem most pertinent to decisions now under your consideration. It would he unrealistic to assume that such limited visits afford a basis for detailed substantive policy judgments. It would be equally unrealistic not to recognize that the circumstances and timing of this mission elicited a depth and substance of expression not normally present in exchanges through casual channels. My purpose is to offer perspective -- not, I wish to emphasize, to propose details of policy.

The Impact of Laos

There is no mistaking the deep - and long lasting — impact of recent developments in Laos.

Country to country, the degree differs but Laos- has created doubt and concern about intentions of the United States throughout Southeast Asia. No amount of success at Geneva can, of itself, erase this. The independent Asians do not wish to have their own status resolved in like manner in Geneva.

Leaders

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j Leaders such as Diem, Chiang, Sarit and Ayub more or less'

' accept that we are making ll thc best of a bad bargain" at Geneva.

Their charity extends no farther. ;

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» The Impact of the Mission

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Beyond question, your judgment about the timing of our mission was correct. Each leader -- except Nehru -- publicly congratulated you on the "timing" of this mission. Chiang said -- and all others privately concurred — that the mission had the effect of "stabilizing 11 the situation in the Southeast Asian nations.

What happened, I believe, was this: the leaders visited want -* as long as they can — to remain as friends or allies of the United States. The public, or, more precisely, the political, reaction to Laos had drastically weakened the ability to maintain any strongly-pro-US orientation. Neutralism, in Thailand, collapse in Vietnam, anti-American election demagoguery in the Philippines were all -developing prior to our visit. The show of strength and sincerity «-partly because you had sent the Vice President and partly, to a greater extent than you may believe, because you had sent your sister -- gave the friendly leaders something to "hang their hats on" for a while longer, «

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Our mission arrested the decline of confidence in the United States, It did not -- in my judgment -- restore any confidence already lost. The leaders were as explicit, as courteous and cour-tly as men could be in making it clear that deeds must follow words -- soon.

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The Purpose of Joint Communiques

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j Starting with President Diem at Saigon, it was my conclusion

fha-f the interests of the United States would be served -- and protected --by the issuan.ee of joint communiques. My purpose was this: to attach the signature and the name of each of the leaders to a joint public statement e. bodying their acceptance of an agreement with the details of your letters which I delivered in your behalf. Without such statements in writing, it was clear that the United States would be victimized later"by self-serving st tements that you ~- and the Administration -- bad offered "nothing" or "too little, ,T etc.

As you recognized, the joint communiques followed item by item the statements in your letters. In most instances, where substantive pledges and policies were involved, the communiques were cleared through Washington before issuance. The extensive, important and almost unprecedented communique with Nehru largely reflects the high regard the Indian Government holds for Ambassador Galbraith.

I should make these two points clear: assurances I gave were those, you sent me to convey, and no commitments were asked and none were given beyond those authorized in your letters. In some instances, for various reasons, I did not, express all the commitments or proposals authorized in the State position papers.

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The Importance of Follow-Through

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I cannot stress too strongly the extreme importance of following up i this mission with other measures, other actions, and other efforts. At the moment — because of Laos -•- these nations are hypersensitive to the possibility of American hypocrisy toward Asia, Considering the Vienna talks with Khrushchev -- which, to the Asian mind, emphasize : Western rather than Asian concerns — and considering the negative line

of varjous domestic-American editorials about this mission, I strongly j believe it is of first importance that this trip bear fruit immediately.

y Personal Conclusions

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Personal Conclusions from the Mission

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I look to Southeast Asia some basic convictions about the problems faced there. I have come away from the mission there -- and to India and Pakistan ~- with many of those convictions sharpened and deepened by what I saw and learned, I have also reached certain other conclusions which I believe may be of value as guidance for those responsible in formulating policies.

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rhese conclusions are as follows:

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The'battle against'Communism-imisfc be'joiriedfin Southeast Asial3 • /with strength and determination to achieve success there --or *j tthe United State s t . inevitably, must'surrender the Pacific"and take aid our dcicnsc's on our. own shorc^ Asian Communism is compromised

and contained by the maintenance of free nations on the subcontinent.

Without this inhibitory influence, the island outposts -- Philippines,

Japan, Taiwan -- have no security and the vast Pacific becomes a

Red Sea. " *

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C rhe"strugg 1 e is"faf~lroirTl6's \"in' Southea"st""Asia"and"i"t*is oy\ no_ Ji itffean's inevitable that it niust.be lost. In each country it is possible to build a sound structure capable of withstanding and turning the Communist surge. The will to resist -- while now the target^of subversive attack --is there. The key to what is done by Asians in defense of Southeast Asia>; freedom is confidence in the United States.

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;r>.creTs^nrj.,a Iter native to United States le'ader^s hi p"in "Southeast" A;sia-^ Leadership in individual countries --or the regional leadership and cooperation so appealing to Asians -- rests on the knowledge and faith in United States power, will and understanding.

^ST; A* T O Ts~ n o r ri o w ~a7rf British.and French unwillingness to^support decisive action* Asian distrust of the" British and'French is outspoken. Success at Geneva would prolong SEATO's role. Failure at Geneva would terminate

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SEATO's meaningfulness, In the latter event, we must be ready with a new approach to collective security in the area. -^

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We s'hould

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V£3. .? h py Id consiSeiFaBralHance'of a~l 1"th" <T~fre & "nS;ti "dns"o£ thtflZZ P^qila^anffT£sia. y/h o.are. wiHing .to join forc'cs"InTdefensV~of.Jt5iei25* freedom* Such an organization should:

a) have^a^crcar-cut^.coii-irnand authority

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b) also devoteattcntipyfCtoTmeasures-and programs-of-^j Is o cial- jus Lice!- housing; -land rcf or rn,"e$c.

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AsaarL leaders'^--at.this time — do not" wantf""American troops 'j iiivoly ed Tn "Southea s t A sia other" than' on "training ~m. s si on s. > American combat troop involvement is not only not required, it is not desirable. Possibly Americans -- fail to appreciate fully the subtlety that recently-colonial peoples would not look with favor upon governments which invited or accepted the return this soon of Western troops. To the extent that fear of ground troop involvement dominates our political responses to Asia in Congress or elsewhere, it seems most desirable to me to allay those paralyzing fears in confidence, on the strength of the individual statements made by leaders consulted on this trip, ^Thi^jf ^cTcsTnot jmiYumiz p ■ ~or~dis'rc"ga~rdTthejpi?obability■ that"open"aTtack~ would j fbKhg""calls"*for'U.' S. 'combat troops, i But the present probability of ■ open attack seems scant, and we might gain much needed flexibility in our policies if the spectre of combat troop commitment could be lessened domestically, " -

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A~ny~He"Ip --^cconomic as well as military ^-3VS^ivCT1^7?^^^^§2 natiojis3ol.sec_ure and maintain their ^freedom^m_ust_be'a""part of'a"7j jTmuSial 'effortA These nations cannot be saved by United States help alone. To the extent the Southeast Asian nations are prepared to take the necessary measures to make our aid effective, we can be --and must be -- unstinting in our assistance. It would be useful to enunciate more clearly than we have — for the guidance of these young and unsophisticated nations -- wha.t we expect or require of

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In large measure, tTie ereatest'TlaTigeVIS'outheast-A.cia- offers to nations like the United States is not the momentary threat of Communism itself, rather that dari£er~s'tcrrfs~irorii Hunger, igno'fance^ ^6V.e'i 1 Ly'and"dis'Ccrs'eTl3^ r ^ must «•- whatever strategies we evolve --keep these enemies the point of our attack, and make imaginative use of our scientific and technological capability in such enterprises.

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8. Vietnam and Thailand are the immediate-and most important -tr*able.spots, critical -to the U.S. These areas require*the"attention of our very best talents -- under the very closest Washington direction on matters economic, military and political.

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T 1 cT"ba sic~dccis ion'in ~ So uthcast~ A'sTa i s /he r erT We"musTTdec idc" *Clv;*^her to help these countries to the best of our ability "or throw~iii'~~3 "vJTcT.towel in-the area and pull back our defenses to San Francisco andj?j S.- ■■ Tor'-.-css Amcrica ,r conceoL*\ More important, we would say to the ^•/orld ,n this case that v/e don't live up to treaties and don't standby

jut friends. This is not my concept* 1 recommend that-we move forward promptly with a major effort to help these countries defend

hemsclves. I consider the key here is to get our best MAAG people

o control, plan, direct and exact results from our military aid program.

n Vietnam and Thailand, we must move forward together.

' a. In Vietnam, Diem is a complex figure beset by many problems, e has admirable qualities, but he is remote from the people, is surrounded by persons, less admirable and capable than he. The country can

e saved --if we move quickly and wisely. We must decide whether to [support Diem --or let Vietnam fall. We must have coordination of purpose in our country team, diplomatic and military. The Saigon Embassy, USIS, MAAG and related operations leave much to be desired. They should be brought up to maximum efficiency. The most important thing is imaginative, creative, American management of our military aid program. The Vietnamese and our MAAG estimate that $50 million of U. S. military and economic assistance will be needed if we decide to support Vietnam. This is the best information available to us at the present time and if it is confirmed by the best Washington military . judgment it should be supported. Since you proposed and Diem agreed to a joint economic mission, it should be appointed and proceed forthwith, %

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b. In Thailand, the Thais and our own MAAG estimate probably &£ much is needed as in Vietnam — about $50 million of military and ■ - economic assistance. Again, should our best military judgment concur, I believe we should support such a program. Sarit is more strongly and staunchly pro-Western than many of his people. He is and must be deeply concerned at the consequence to his country of a communist-controlled £ Laos. If Sarit is to stand firm against neutralism, he must have -- soon --concrete evidence to show his people of United States military and economic support. He believes that his armed forces should "be increased to 150,000. His Defense Minister is coming to Washington to discuss aid matters.

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9. The Republic of • China on Taiwan was a pleasant surprise to ms. . I had been long aware of the criticisms against Chiang Kai-shek and his governmen£\and cognizant of the deep emotional American feelings in some quarters against him. I know these feelings influence our US policy,

r hatever the causeAa progressive attitude is emerging there* Our conversations with Chiang and Mme. Chiang were dominated by *

discussions of measures of social progress, to my unexpected but grati ied surprise. As with the Republic of Germany in Western

Europe, so I believe we might profitably and wisely encourage the t . ♦

Republic of China in.Asia to export talents, skills, and resources to •

other Asian lands to assist in programs of progress*

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* 10, I was assured that there were no problems for the U.S. in

| the Philippines. There is a greatvreservoir of good feeling toward «

America among Filipinos, with many of the usual Latin qualifications. • But a widespread belief that corruption exists is sapping the effectiveness of the government. Remoteness^of the leadership from the people seems a problem.

11, India could well be the subject of an entire report. Nehru, dur ing'our visit, was clearly M neut,ral H imfavor of the West, This

* Administration is highly regarded and welfr received in India. Only part of this flows out of hope or expectation of aid. Mainly, there is an intellectual affinity, or^an affinity of spirit. \J\ : his J cin v my-judgment,' -^.oYiVd'VtT"exploited not with the. hope of drawing India into our sphere--"^"\

/vvV;v_h might be as^unne'ees'sary as it would be improbable —' but,-"chiefly'\

\\vT:*h;the hope'ofcementirigunder NehrlFlmTn'dia-U. S..friendship. which _-i

r\vc-cVd T ensure beyond any. transition "of Dower irTlndia*

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12. President Ayub in Pakistan is the singularly most impressive and, in his way, responsible head of state encountered on the trip. He is seasoned as a'.leader where.others are mot; confident, straightforward and I would judge, dependable. He is frank about his t belief, offensive as it is tq us, that the for ins of representative government would only open" his country to "Communist take-over at this time. Nonetheless, Ayub understands -- and is in agreement with — the aims of'eradicating poverty, ignorance and disease. We can have great influence and — because of his administrative organization -- achieve dramatic success by supporting Pakistan's needs. Our military should sec how to improve the effectiveness and achieve modernization of Pakistan's army. Ayub is wisely aware of Pakistan 1 s strategic position, wants to ma^e his forces more modern, and wants to resolve the Kashmir dispute to

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Release Indian and Pakistani troops to deter the Chinese rather than each other. He spells out the fact that U.S. leadership rests on our own self-confidence and confidence we permit Asians to have in us.

To recapitulate ? these are the main impressions I have brought back from my trip.

The fundamental decision required of the United States -- and time of the greatest importance -- is whether we are to attempt to meet the challenge of Communist expansion now in Southeast Asia by a major effort in support of the forces of freedom in the area or throw in the towel. This decision must be made In a full realization of the very heavy and continuing costs involved in terms of money, of effort and of United States prestige. It must be made with the knowledge that at some point we may be faced with the further decision of whether we commit major * United States forces to the area or cut our losses and withdraw should our other efforts fail. We must remain master in this decision. What we do in Southeast Asia should be part of a rational program to meet the threat we face in the region as a whole. It should include a clear-cut pattern of specific contributions to be expected by each partner according to his ability and resources. I recommend we proceed with a clear-cut and strong program of action.

I believe that the mission « as you conceived it -- was a success. I am grateful to the many who labored to make it so.

Lyndon B. Johnson

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Jr. reference to my letter dated 15 May 1961 and in reply to the, invitation ta^t was mads io mc in ycur name by Vice President John acta* I h&ve t)*e honor to send you a study on our needs to meet ' \

the new situation . C

ro As I expressed verbally to your eminent reprcoentative, it pertains XiL

to a situation which has become very much more perilous following \ !

the events 5.ji Laos, the more and more equivocal attitude of \

Cambodia and the intensification of the activities of agjgreeaioa of - [

international communism which wants to take the maximum advantage {

erx to accelerate the conquest of Southeast Asia. It is apparent that one f

t of the nvijor obstacles to the communist expansion on t}ii3 area of *f

the globe i f s Free Vietnam because with your firm support, we arc \

V\ . resolved to oppose it with all our energies •Consequently! now and

\^j .henceforth,we constitute the first target for the communists to

overthrow at any cost* The enornous accumulation cf Russian war

C'- material in North Vietnam is aimed, in the judgement of foreign' observers, more at South Victo-arn than at X*aos a V/c clearly realize this dangerous situation but I want to reiterate to you here,in rny [" personal name and in the name of the entire Vietnamese people, our

*~ ' indomitable will to win s * - . p

j * * On the second of Hay, my council of generals met to evaluate the

current situation and to determine the needs of the Republic of

C Vietnam to meet this situation. Their, objective evaluation shows

that the military situation at present is to the advantage cf the . : ; . corrirjnu^URts and that moit.of the Vietnamese Armed Forces are r already committed to internal security and the protection of oar

j • 12 million inhabitants. For many months the corruruLnist-m^pired,

fratricidal war has takon nearly one thousand casualties a month en r both sides. Documents obtained in a recent operation, along' route

[^ No, 9 which runs from Laos to Vietnam j contain definite proof that

2,860 armed agents have infiltrated amcn£ U6 in tb<3 course of the last four months. It-is certain that this number rises each &zy . -■-.->; . v-^?*^ th'/Uctname^e people arc showing the world th<ii they 4> -- \ V

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are willing to fight and die for their freedom, not withstanding the temptations to neutralism and its false promises of peace being drummed into their ears daily by the communists.

In the light of this situation, the council of generals concluded.that additional forces numbering slightly over 100,000 more than our new'force level of 170,000 will be required to counter the ominous threat of communist domination. The 100,000 reservists to be called up according to the plan of my council of generals were to meet the requirement for an augmentation of the Vietnamese Army by nine infantry divisions plus modest naval and air force increases. First priority called for one division to reinforce each of the three Army Corps in Vietnam plus a two divisional general reserve for a total of five divisions. In second priority, an additional division for each of the three Army Corps plus one in general reserve brought the total to nine new divisions. With the seven existing aivisions, fragmented in anti-guerilla operations, the Army of Vietnam would thus have a strength of 16 divisions of slightly less than 10,000 men each plus appropriate combat and logistic support units.

We have now had an opportunity to review this initial force requirement with General McGarr and the MAAG staff who have recommended certain modifications which are basically in consonance with our

plan and with which we agree.

After considering the recommendations of our generals and consulting with our American military advisors, we now conclude that to provide even minimum initial resistance to the threat, two new divisions of approximately 10,000 strength each are required to be activated at the earliest possible date. Our lightly held defensive positions along the demilitarized zone at our Northern border is even today being outflanked by communist forces which have defeated the Royal Laotian Army garrisons in Tchepone and other cities in Southern Laos. Our ARVN forces are so throughly committed to internal anti-guerilla operations that we have no effective forces with which to counter this threat from Southern Laos. Thus, we need immediately one division for the First Army Corps and one for the Second Army Corps to provide at least some token resistance to the sizeable forces the communists are capable of bringing to bear against our Laotian frontier. Failing this, we would have no recourse but to withdraw our forces southward from the demilitarized zone and sacrifice progressively greater areas of our country to the communists. These divisions should be mobilized and equipped, together with initial logistic support units immediately after

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 2011

completion of activation of the presently contemplated increase of 20,000 which you have offered to support,

• Following the activation of these units, which should "begin in about five months, we must carry on the program of activation of additional units until over a period of two years we will have achieved a force of Ik infantry divisions, an expanded airborne "brigade of approximately division strength and accompanying supporting elements of logistical, naval and air units. In other words, our present needs as worked out with General McGarr's advice and assistance call for a total force of 15 divisional equivalents plus combat and logistic support units instead of our original plan for a 16 division force. The strategic concept and mission of this total 270,000 man force remains the sajTie, najnely, to overcome the insurgency which has risen to the scale of a bloody, communist-inspired civil war within our borders and to provide initial resistance to overt, external aggression until free world forces under the SEAT0 agreement can come to our aid. The question naturally arises as to how long we shall have to carry the burden of so sizeable a military force. Unfortunately, I can see no early prospects for the reduction of such a force once it has been established, for even though we may be successful in liquidating the insurgency within our borders, communist pressure in Southeast Asia and the external military threat to our country must be expected to increase, I fear, before it diminishes. This means that we must be prepared to maintain a strong defensive military posture for at least the foreseeable future in order that we may not become one of the so-called "soft spots" which traditionally have attracted communist aggression. We shall therefore continue to need material support to maintain this force whose requirements far exceed the capacity of our economy to support.

To accomplish this 100,000 man expansion of our military forces which is perfectly feasible from a manpower viewpoint will require a great intensification of our training programs in order to produce, in the minimum of time, those qualified combat leaders and technical specialists needed to fill the new units and to provide to them the technical and logistic support required to insure their complete effectiveness. For this purpose a considerable expansion of the United States Military Advisory Group is an essential requirement. Such an expansion, in the form of selected elements of the American Armed Forces to establish training centers for the Vietnamese Armed Forces, would serve the dual purpose of providing an expression of the United States 1 determination to halt the tide of communist aggression and of preparing our forces in the

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minimum of time.

While the Government and people of Vietnam are prepared to carry the heavy manpower burden required to save our country, we must know that we cannot affort to pay, equip, train and maintain such forces as I have described. To make this effort possible, we would need to have assurances that this needed material support would be provided. I have drawn on our past experience of United States support we have received to make some extremely rough estimates of the costs of these proposals.

The costs of providing essential initial equipment to the added forces under the Military Assistance Program would probably be in the neighborhood of $175*000,000 with deliveries to be distributed over the next two and one-half years as units can be activated. If the United States assumes the task of providing this initial equipment for the additional forces, I understand that the annual Military Assistance Program for force maintenance will increase by about $20 million above the level of MAP support for the presently authorized 170,000 force.

The Vietnamese Military Budget, which includes piaster requirements,

must also be supplemented. As you know, Vietnam contributes to

this budget to its fullest .capability now with respect to existing forces.

Despite our best efforts, your Government has largely supported

this budget through Defense Support Assistance. Although we have made •

significant progress in developing our economy in the last four years.

the support of even the inadequate armed forces we have has far

exceeded the modest capabilities of the economy of our small

country. In order to carry out the expansion of forces, the piaster

military budget now averaging nearly 7-0 billion piasters a year

will have to be supplemented. As I see it, the annual maintenance

cost will increase gradually during the force implementation and

will ultimately level off at approximately 10.60 billion piasters.

This program, I realize, will be expensive in money, equipment

and personnel. The benefits to be gained, however, in preventing

the subjugation of our free people and in establishing a solid obstacle

to the advance of communism, I know you will agree, "far outweigh

the cost. With your support, we stnad determined to survive in

independence and freedom.

It goes ^without saying that in the face of the extremely serious situation created by the communist aggressor, we must temporarily

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accord priority to the military problems, However, my Government ^ doa* net attach less importance to economic,political and social problems / At this point the doctrinal position which pertains to South VtetiAsn is clear ?.nr clean. It was expressed in a free and sincere m«nn«r in my message to the Ai^er.icaa Congress j n April 1957. It has not varied since. Neither did it vary durin^'thc recent preeldatJtia! campaign when I was elected by a very large majority.

Presently, it is necessary not to be maneuvered by the communists, who exploit our tendency to consider military efforts as reactionary and fruitlefts, to divert our effective action, which is necessitated

by the raortAl communist attacks, toward a long range project of economic and social improvement, and which, of course, supposes that we ai*c still alive, Y/e sec for the army £n econom'c and social 'UTiiiiion along with military role, a conception which rationally responds to the double challenge which the newly independent countries of Africa and Asia have had to face : underdevelopment and communist subversive war.* It is aloilg this line that, since my taking office in July l?5i, I have undertaken to create an economic infrastructure throughout the country, including the least inhabited regions ; to develop the lines of communication with the double purpose of facilitating intercourse and facilitating the mobility of our troops ; to increase and diversify the agricultural production ; to give each family a tract of land which will belong to them ; to create each day more employment by industrializing the country ; in brief to open new horizons to the rural masses, the determining factor in the struggle against communism. It is sufficient to consider the product of our exportation these last two years, the reduction of our importation program, to count the factory chimneys which -make their appearance to realize the progress already made # On the other hand, in spite of its lack of resources, the Government increases the social investments to respond to the diversified needs of a population which increases at the rate of 3°/o per year : hospitals in the towns, dispensaries in the villages, primary schools in each commune, secondary schools in each city of whatever importance # Education is developing at the annual rate of ZOo/o while in the doma.in'of'publi c health, we haye a hospital bed available for each thousand inhabitants. We want to progress more rapidly but," in addition to the budgetary Limitations which constitute a primary obstacle, the lack of trained personnel has made itself felt deaoite our accelerated training programs , The agrovilles, which I have built in the last year, are another proof of the Government's efforts : These are agricultural communities located between two urban centers to give the rural population the benefits of the commodities of modern life and to correct the extreme dispersion of the

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population. All foreign observers who travel in the country are struck by the standard of living enjoyed by the mass of peasants: sewing machine, bicycle, transistor radio for each family in more or less comfortable circumstances, theater, movies in the most backward areas, motor boats on the inumerable canals, tricycle busses on all passable roads. And it is precisely in order not to interrupt this development program that we ask for supplementary aid to finance our war effortj otherwise we will be forced to make the tragic decision to abruptly cease all our social and economic programs.

i

Concerning Cambodia, our diplomatic efforts would have results only if we recognize our adversary.

The idea of Cambodia being afraid of Vietnam is a myth. For 7 years, Sihanouk has not missed one chance to provoke South Vietnam, of which he has militarily occupied six islands. Having no reason to fear a Vietnam, divided and weakened by the subversive communist war, Sihanouk has nothing to fear at all. However, this idea would be pleasing to those who would seek to arbitrate between Cambodia and South Vietnam. It would also be pleasing to certain Vietnamese because this idea is flattering to their vanity and to their infantilism which consists of minimizing the difficulties and proposing any solutions. It would also be pleasing to Sihanouk vho has a need to give substance to another myth that of encirclement which he needs to excuse his internal failures in order to justify his presence * in power, to accuse the Americans and to court the communists. In reality, Sihanouk is committed intellectually and morally to communism, which he considers the stronger party and the inevitable victor in the future. In spite of the aid which he receives from America, has Sihanouk ever aided the US in the battle with the communists? He always takes positions favorable to the communists against the USA. His conduct in the Laotian affair is clear. Not only does he serve the communists, but he is proud to serve a stronger master. On the other hand, Cambodia, like Laos, is unable to ensure the security of her territory from the communist guerillas because he will not or does not wish to make the appropriate efforts. It is for this reason that he takes refuge in communist servitude under the guise of a neutralist. It is also for that reason that he has always refused to accept any arrangement for the effective control of the Cambodian-Vietnamese border under the fallacious pretext of neutrality.

From the political point of view, the reforms that I have anticipated,

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thxii fro to say the elective system tfstablinhcd at the village: level, fha crcafitoa cS tho provincial councils f the institution of a High 32co*no;:nIc Council,, of a National ?.nd Social CcuhcU - all these msajfmrea.arcj ten&ihg to assure more ;~n£ mors active participation-by the population in public affairs, in the dramatic situation of an underdeveloped country, divided and mortally menaced by cemmumsm.

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Sn i is the direction of my efforts and such in our regime op?n to progress and not a closed system* I am convinced that v/Ath your support and go generously aided by your great, friendly x.i£l'rci, I Trill manage to reestablish lav/ and order in o-ir provinces, in cur villages, to accelerata progress in all ether areas for the edification of a society of free men, happy and prosperous* Vietnam thus constitutes a pole of attraction for the countries of Southeast Asiaj for those who fight communism a: v/all as for those v/ho still doubt the future of the free world .

I wish to assure you, Mr, President, of the sincerity of my sentiments and most cordial wishes ,

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^.KI^Excsllency JOHN FrKENNEDY

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OFF SECY CF DEFENSE

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NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. 56

TO:

SUBJECT:

The Secretary of Defense

Evaluation of Paramilitary Requirements

The President has approved the following paragraph:

"It is important that we anticipate now our possible future requirements in the field of unconventional warfare and paramilitary operations. A first step would be to inventory the paramilitary assets we have in the United States Armed Forces, consider various areas in the world where the implementation of our policy may require indigenous paramilitary forces, and thus arrive at a determination of the goals which we should set in this field* Having determined the assets and the possible requirements, it would then become a matter of developing a plan to meet the deficit*1 /

The President requests that the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Department of State and the CIA, .make such an estimate of requirements and recommend ways and means to meet these requirements.

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MEMORANDUM FOR DEPUTY SECRETARY GILPATRIC

From:

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Brig Gen Lansdale*S>V^

Subject: .Comments by Vietnamese Officials

The following information has been received from Colonel Ed Black:

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Following is memo of my conversation with Vice President Tho on 10 July prepared for the Ambassador at his request. Mr. Tho invited me to his office as a result of a note of introduction from General Lansdale.

Taking advantage of the opportunity I reviewed briefly the presentation which Staley-Thuc were preparing to make to President. Diem stressing the "breakthrough concept, rr the need to mobilise Vietnam's full effort to meet the current crisis, and the principle of a complete joint approach on the part of both VN and US Governments to the emergency. Mr. Tho appeared to be already briefed on this ; subject. He freely "conceded that it was impossible for the US to '. provide Vietnam with piasters. Fie acknowledged that the main source of piaster revenues was for the GVN to provide for-a higher piaster return per dollar of US economic aid imports. The problem which troubled the GVN was their fear that such an increase in piaster return per dollar of US economic aid would cause a rise in prices and thus, in turn, would create an irresistible demand for broad-based wage increases. Thus the GVN might find itself involved in a wage-price spiral which it would be unable to control. He conceded, however, that 1 the'basic problem was -more political than economic-

* * ' Turning to more general subjects, Tho pressed me for my opinion of the current situation in VN. I replied that based on my observations made during my last visit in 1956, the country had achieved tremendous progress. Tho agreed, but still left me with the;impression t that he held a more pessimistic view of the situation. r

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CONFIDENTIAL

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' |Tho then said he wished to speak frankly concerning" the underlying corxern throughout VN, at all levels, that if the GVN were invaded by communist forces, the US might not repeat not respond. In this regard, he cited the developments in Laos, which he said were uppermost

in the minds of people throughout SE Asia, and which had added fuel to these fears. He noted that if the communists did attack it would probably be in conjunction with a well-planned, general Viet Cong uprising throughout South Vietnam. He indicated there were two ways in which the US might provide tangible reassurances, but that both of those presented political obstacles. The first was the stationing of token US combat units in the country. This was impracticable at this time as it left the GVN open to the highly-exploitable communist charge that the government was merely substituting the US for France as a colonial, occupying power. The second was a mutual defense treaty with the US. This also appeared to be impractical since it would constitute an open repudiation of the Geneva Agreements of 1954, \

*

Concerning the internal security situation, Tho stressed the importance of providing the self defense forces with modern weapons. Today 30 percent of their weapons and ammunition are unusable. He pled for early distribution of up-to-date individual weapons to the self defense forces as one of the most effective means of getting on top of the Viet Cong terrorist campaign. He strongly recommended that the weapon needed by these forces was the light weight carbine, not the I larger, heavy M~l. ■ - I

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Referring to the emergency program, recommended in the Staley-Thuc economic report, I asked Tho if he thought the GVN had the administrative and managerial resources to complete 100 new l ngrovilles-in 18 mpnths. He said he believed it could be done provi ed it were handled in a manner which did not antagonize the pejo-ole. I , told him the cost estimates in the report included funds to paythe villagers reasonable wages for their labor in constructing the new agrovilies. .Tho-was greatly relieved to hear this and indicated tha. this being the case he was reasonably confident the agroville program' could be completed on schedule. »

New subject. President briefed on joint economic program of action from 4:30 to 8:00 PM 11 July. Staley-Thuc made joint presentation.

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Problem of more realistic realization of piasters from US commercial aid was outlined in detail. President and senior .members GVN who were present now have full picture of this key element of economic equation. President allowed Thuan to state current GVN position. For

1 their part in 18 month crash program, GVN will institute tax reforms, float victory bond issue, take measures to insure realization of 60 piasters per dollar US commercial aid, and borrow from Central Bank up to legal limit * These measures v/ill provide about half estimated 6* 5

■ billion piasters needed to finance crash program of action) recommended in Staley-Thuc report. They hope that in addition to increased MAP of 42 million US for its part v/ill provide commercial imports 0^169 million in FY62 and 190 million in FY63, exclusive of PL 480. Will -report further in subsequent message.

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Secretary McNamara

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Colonel Levy, JCS

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1961 JUL 26 16 34

OFF SECY OF DE^§§ TANT secretary of defense

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

SECRET

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INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

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1-15565/61

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. GTJLPATRIC

SUBJECT: Joint Action Program Proposed by the Vietnam -

United States Special Financial Groups

1. In the report, subject as above, submitted by Dr. Eugene . . Staley, Chairman of the U.S. Special Financial Group, to Presidents Ngo Dinh Diem and John F. Kennedy, the fiscal and economic implications of increasing the Vietnamese Armed Forces to 200, 000 have been described* A rough, order-of-magnitude estimate of the dollar costs of this force level was made by the Special Financial Group, The report indicates that approximately $42,000,000 in addition to requirements already planned would be required for the military portions (including the increase to 200,000 force level) of the overall program of joint action proposed during the 18-month period 1 July 6l 31 December 62. (/e.^ty f*+. l^&tjw ^ fVht)

.2. V/ith favorable action by the Congress on the FY-62 MAP submission, and necessary decisions to adjust priorities of other requirements, funds can be made available to meet these additional

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requirements.

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■* William V. Bunay

Acting Assistant Secretary

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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

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25 July 1961

MSMORAIIKJM FOR MR. GILPATRIC

SUBJECT: The Steley Report.

Attached is the Joint Action Program Proposed by the Vietnara-U.S. Special Financial Groups" which has been submitted to both President Kennedy end President Diem, The latter read, the report very carefully before ve left Saigon end ve understand has approved it insofar as his country is concerned* I recorsnend you reodj as a rainim^ the covering letter^ paragraph 6 and sections III and IV (these are marked with paperclips)- .

In Vietnam^ as in nany other areas of the vorld where the fight with the Communists is joined; the difference between success.or failure vill be determined not so much by the amount of the money ve spends but by the speed with vhich t r e r.ct. The critical factor is time . " '

The amount of additional U.S. funds recommended by the Staley group over end. above the current level of U.S. effort in Vietnam comes to the modest sun of $85-5 ntillion^ for the next eighteen Months^ of vhich §1*2 Billion is MAP.

You vill note that virile the U.S* is making this contribution, the Vietnamese vill also "be contributing $6-5 billion piasters (approximately $103 million at 60 piasters per/dollar)•• - In other wbrdsj the attached program is tru^ly, as its title indicates,, a joint action program by, both the Vietnamese and the U.S. Government!

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Prom the standpoint of maintaining impetus behind the current counter-insurgency progran vxfchin Vietnam, and to insure that the U«S. Government takes prompt action on the Staley report, it* is retforanended that yo :

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a. Invite Dr. Staley to brief the JCS on his report at your next

meeting with the JCS. Mr. Nitze should be invited to atter»dj

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b. Approve the report in-principle and so notify the Secretary of

State (draft letter attached;

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c. Have the report considered at an early NSC meeting to obtain formal Presidential approval of the "Joint-Action Program" and the general order of magnitude of the additional U.S. assistance to Vietnam viiieh is recommended;

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d. Have President Diem informed; through appropriate channels j that the proposed force level of 200^000 men by the end of CY '62 is approved^ subject only to the Vietnamese ability to build its ; forces up to this level vithin that time.

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SOvlQ, F. Black Colonel^ U.S.Arrr.y

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PO M PI 7*. *""a !*7"S 1 I '

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Dear Dean:

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The Department of Defense has reviewed the "Joint Action Program

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Proposed by .the Vietneia-U.S. Special Financial Groups" (The Staley Report) said considers it a well-conceived, realistic program for meeting

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the stepped-up level of Communist activities in south Vietnam. The

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Department of Defense concurs in the recommendations contained in the

"Joint Action Program", including the proposed force level of 200,000 men for the regular forces by the end of CY 19&2•

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I suggest that the report he forwarded to the Rational Security Council for approval, with the understanding that the cost figures end details of the broad programs outlined therein are subject to

refinement and adjustment by the appropriate U.S. Government agencies

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in Vietnam, acting jointly with their Vietnamese counterparts under the

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guidance of the U.S. Ambassador. * ; .

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Honorable Dean Rusk Secretary of State

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SBCISa

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JDIHT ACTIC2I PEOGSJiM PROPOSED Yi EE3 VWj? NAM - TJHXTKD STATES SPBCI&Ii KBttHCIit EBCgPS

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President Hgo Dinh Dices

• President John Fo Kennedy

Ths Viot Nam and United States Spooial ^Baneial feaups cllapsed vith

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considering the raeana of ftethes* oooposatlon tettreen thaib? two counties foi*

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niutually shaded pa^posoo have the hOnos? to propose to theirc ^ospeotivo

-govornnients the attachod Joint program of eoticno

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Vict Nam £a to-day trader attack in a tdttei^ total atmiggle which $xm>Jvos its survival as a £1*00 nation0 Its oneisyj, the Viot Cpngp 5,8 ruthless p resourceful ^ and oluGivo* 'Biis ensspty is supplied 0 poinforeod^ and centrally directed fcy tho intor^iivtio^al Communist apparatus operating thorough Hanoio To defeat it ratmlses. tho raboiK^ation of tho ©ntSbya economic* military

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■ psychological ^ and social xesot&ttes of tho coijntay and vigorou.a , support from

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Tho lons^torvYa economic SvUtusa of Viet Nam is" bvighto Sh fact* tho • f jro^loing ©tart already ©ado toward improvement in tho living conditions of

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its people appaa^ v a to b crsj of tho factors which precipitated tho £OC£nt intensification of Coijnsaiiist presstprQo $ba contrast hotvroen tho achievements of recent years in South Viot Ham a^d the baajdBhipa and fading in Coaumaiist

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.North Vict Sum was brewing too glaring* Given tho mesns to throw hack tho

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Cormmmict attack and to $®&wm ita insy©h of economic^ social^ end political

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prosrooSft Vict Ham can bo an crural© in Sesxthdast Asia for tho p^cs^flD^vo ■ potentialities of men vho asa flatassnisaod to smaln feOo V/o Btroaa^iy tfi*Ep3 that car tvro govsnosients mak® this tho purpose of their contiiT.iGd cooperation*

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At the mcmontg hovavo:^ the.prisiaiy psToblcra Is tha restoration of

feteEaaal oeci^ity in tha face of tou^h^ \rfMBpg&g& 9 ozfezrally cidcd C:

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crams t ga©3Krilla wa&faro and oxibvu^aieao Co moot this problem TOc^feoa ■'ctoppad^p military and policing etttdcn*. Tat th@ j^c/blcra is no^e $tea a military probleau Its soltttioa also demands stopped-ap economic -cad CGoin-l action? especially to sa^al axesD^ closely intonated idLth tha nil&tcay

aot5-OUo Fes? o;:ample 5 one of tha eiol*o promising comxtoi^uo^rilla rzothodo "

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j teiod up to this fefca© IbvoI^tos s^groupS^ Beatteved pural popalatio&a into

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^ more readily defensible cOBEauaitioB do designed and as sin tod aa also'to offe^ improved opportunities fes? livelihood

fecognizing this oloso interdependence of the military and tho cconcaio*

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eocial problenop wo have baaed cur TOcoaaaendations on tha follc-rlng thrao contra! considerations: .

lo Eis military-internal security retirements must for the tii^a boin^ have first call on Viot Nan's manpower and economic resources and or U 0 S 0

assistance c Eiia is a ehort«torai but easential requirement© • ♦. 2# At the- same tissa 0 the-degree to which the militaiy-intemal security

operations achieve lasting success vill$ in large measttre e depend en tha •epeed and effectiveness vith vhich the recoirjnendad emergency economic and

social program are applied 0

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3» The ultimate objeotiVB of those economic and social programs and of

* tho lorj^or-ranse dovoloi^ont planning vhich wo alco recor-nnend is to hasten

tho day v/hon Viot Xani will bo a e3lf-Gustainins cconciy and a poaceful 9 fz^ao

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eooioty* 35his is.desired by the YietnaKssog who want to be jjidopsBdorA In the fullest sonsa p and Isy th3 /tfiericans? who conceive their aid as helping

people "So help thsraselvos toward a condition where tfasy can continue to pro-

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%2?®O0 by their own efforts*

The recommendations which cor two groups$ wording Jointly together;, have

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thus prepared call,for major increases in tfas level of effort of both

Yiot Kaai and the United State

These increases reflect our sincere conviction that tha subversive D

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intensive ^xrfar© being waged today in South Viot Kara can be brought to a

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successful conclusion enly by tha prompt application of effective military

powerp coupled with large-scale economic and social action reaching every

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part of the Coventry ^ especially the rural areas* From, the financial stand-

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point 9 wo beliovo it far less costly to provide fully adequate resources

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today than to attempt to match Ccamuiis'i initiatives with Jnot enough strength to moot each new threat o Tho first course off era a real posal-

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bility of early victory and thus ezi end to the tragic waste of human life

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and of the material assets so oorely needed for the economic development of ; the country* . Tim second ? 'while less costly in terms of current budgets P

will not provide sufficient resources to achieve a decisive defeat of tna "Viet Cong organisation and therefore will p in the long run ? prove more ' '..

• expensive as the war drags on with increased Intensity year after year,

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Accordingly9 tho intensified ijrogram which we recommend "our two

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countries adopt as a basis for mutual actions over the next several years

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is deDigned not ^xxst to hold th3 line tut to achieve a* real b reak through*

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Oar ;Joiiit efforts mast eitrpass the critical threshold of the enemy f s

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resistance 9 thereby pattittj an one! to his destructive attackst'anft at tha

eama time we nru8t mako a doeioiva topact on the economic^ social* and

ideological £ront«

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Respectfully 5

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Vu Quoo Thucp Chaiman

Duong Tan Tai

Diiih Quasig Chiou

Euynh Van Diem

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tUS* Special Rinp.Tifi r'.al G^mri

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William V/c Diehi

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

SECKE3? • "'.

I. " 3n.n?nop pcQ?iQtT'

.Conscious of the serious problems created throughout Southeast Asia by the, accelerated Ctor&tuiiist campaign of subversion and creeping aggression in

* ■

Lsos and in Viet Nam* President John Po Kennedy* in response to an invitation of the Government of Viet llam$ sent Vico President lyn&on Bo Johnson to Saigon

■ *■

to discus a with President Ngo Dinh Diem varioua mea^uroa which might be under-*

'taken by both their govemsients to proaerve the freedom and security of

*

Viet Kamo One of the consequences of these tallis was an agreement to send a

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. Special Financial Group composed of UoS* experts to Saigon to explore vrith

t

their Vietnamese counterparts the economic mid financial implications of a

4 4

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plan of action in which* tha two governmento could cooperato in mooting tho

-

emergency situations . ■

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President NgoDinh Diem appointed a similar group of experte to represent the Government of Viet Ham* At their first meeting* the Vietnamese arid \J C S

cwo

chaiimon decided that any report or recoirtinon&ations which thay would submit should be prepared cm a joint basis,, emphasising thereby the close partnership .

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in which tho two governments desire to approach the problem* Accordingly ?

* ■ they jaarged their two groups into one and ;x>nducted all their business as a

completely integrated committee* The following is the special action program

.--.......•■ "- f. •

which they recommend to the Presidents of Viet Earn'and the United S-fcateo f ■

- • " •■" ; - " . . ....*. , ' ■

'This program is 'raised on tho concept that the two governments rust together

"- . do what is "necessary to achieve a "breakthrough" simultaneously on the

■

..milits>:,-y-into^pial security front and on the economic-social front- At tho same time* the economic-social action should bo so planned as to help Viet Mam move toward its objective of a free society witif a growing and self-sustaining economy* The spirit of po^tnorship which animated the wor^c of the"joint rrouos is considered as a guiding principle, in the implementation of the special action progranu

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 i

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II„ SPECIAL ACTION 3PR0GBAM

A. MILI2Airy„jlJ!K3RKAL SEGffilOT AGPICGT

1. Sis S4toa*&S&

25io Cc^unist«in£pired insurgency in Viet Kem p v&Jch io aisied at the Sg< struotion of the authority &$id prestige of the establiohod government p is

aeaoned to be a prelude to fuyttes? att©apted lusfoafis designed ultimately to *

■ «

absorb tho es*tl29 country into ths Colonist Bloo* Hprth of tho 17th parallel* Ihe Coimniinist-ledDemocratic Republic of Viet Nan (DOT) vdth fcba help of inter-national Cararaailom hao tks capability of overtly defeating the present military

»

forces of Laos & Cs-nbodiap ami Viet Nam ? either singly or in combination* It ia the primary source of support" and caftans' £tt? the Viot Cor\g of foists to gain

( • t i ■

control of Viot Ham. Current intelligence estimates indicate that, rather than y?& sorting to overt attaofcp ths Co^uromiot Bloo probably will continuep

- * : • » .

through the DHVp to exploit tho uoc of insurgent forces &a long as it appears

■

to them that such action might ^icco'eft in bringing about the downfall of tho

. . ... GVff. ' '■•-.;•. • ■■ ;"_•-*-• ■■ - , . . .

Although tho throat of overt attack by DE7 foree3 presently exists (and,. *

Mill py ofc afely 5*i c^eas e^ j;^J3g w ffiffl,jgstp.b?A r J^^fit : ^^X^. -Cftftfoy* \ wfoft^3 ^gj^.y^n) p tfcs most pressing problem from a military viewpointp is the destruction and elimination of the apps?esSmat03y 12 5 0C0 DRV supported and inspired VJet Cong

V

gaorrillao presently conducting insturgeiisy operations vzithin the borders o:

Viet Bern* The increase in Viot Cong strength and aot;lvitioD sin

] p

JLctt

1959

h$s resulted in. tho conuaitsient of approximately $0 per cent of the combat *

* * • *

i forces of ths RYKAF to cQunte:<>>inFAirgenoy operations* This heavy commitment has onabled the RYEAP to bogin to take the offensive 5 but moro military forces are

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

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needed to hring ths Viot Cong undoi' effective control«

,

Ei3. tu^rn ,of events in tsos has oraated ifurthe? Berloii3. problems with regard to th* malntcnanoo of the GTtf as a fx'eo and sovoroign non«-Communis t nation*

■

In partldulaa?^ the imoovoring of tho 3^aoti8»*Viot Haa to3c$MP to DRV or DRV-supported fQa^&'ore&tQS a Der&©na throat of Ssuxsaaded. GOT&rt infiltration of

-

I personnel 0 Buppl£©s f and equipment to tho Viet Co$g© With &v.ch Increased l

support c tho Viet Gong tajdoufctedly hops to seize firm military control of a geo<> graphic area and ansooxmce■ tha ©Bt&lJlielfaent therein of a ,r roho!' f government for South Viet Han which would thon bo 2{®G©g3a&8©& by end raoeivo &HitaEy Bttp« pert from the BRITj Cbraamief Ghina p and Soviet Rtadete-* (Example: The present situation in Laos*)

- ■ ■ . * ■ ' .: .

Confronted with this combination of an intensified Communis t~d ire ctcd

insurgonoy campaign within the oountry aftd an evar^2nor@asine danger frora overt military aggression by superior forces from tho North? the EVK&F has taken tho calculated risk of deploying almost its entire regular forces -against the

■ ■ ■ •

Viet Cong guerrillas<> The present conditions of internal subversion require

■*

* B

* the* massive and widespread application of military power by highly-trained>

t » i

disciplined forces* %" thus providing fully adequate strength to do th$ job

B

it is intended to reduce the current insurgency situation rapidly to manageable

i • .

proportions, whore it can then be maintained by the normaj internal security.

.*

fOTC03 o

2 0 GVH

' &« Iho major clo-BQnts of ARVM under ths 150^000 force structure wore the

■ • ■ •

Joint Genoral Staff? a Field Command Headquarters; thrao Corps Headquarters;

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

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seven'reduced strength ftifontry Divisions; fTvo coparat© Infantry Battalions;

•' one Airborne Brigade (five Battalions); £ our Armored Rogiiaents; eight ncn-

:■-■.•-..

divisional Artillery Battalions; si>r!;y~five Banger Companies; and subminimal

■ -* . logiotio support units* \ "..- ' ;

b© The VH Navy and Marines consisted"of a small Navy HaaAqua^$ro end Shore

i Eatsbltehmentft a email Sea Force of about 27 vosselq* a ©mall River Itorc-o* £n&

-three .Marine Battalions* She major units of the email VK Air Force were cno

Transport Croup (P~47)» one Eight or Squadron (AD-45) ? one Special Air Kis&lca

■ *

Squadron p two Li&ison Squadrons (1^*19)* Qfce Koliccptor Squadron (S*X$/B»34) BBS eosontial base and rtiaintenanee support elements*

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Co Under tho 20*000 force increase srocoiamendoa and subsequontly approved . . undor tho couxiter-insiLrgenci/ plan 8 the RVNAJ? gained tho following additional major elements* three separate £n£antsy Kcgimontaj twenty-one Kangor Companiesj

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one Military Intelligence Battalion; one'Engineer Coaicat Battalion; ono-Eavy

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Shallow Draft Boat Groupj one Kcrine Battalion; one Airforce Helicopter Squadron; and selected logistic support units imd augmentations to help -correct tho orlti-

• m

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cal imbalance previcunly existing in'the S7NAP 0 . . - • '

i , if . - ■- • • :..*>• f

do Tho throe- Infantzy Regiments were activated on 10 May 196lo Acti-

• ., ■

vation of the tvonty-one Hanger Coniprinios bogan on 1 Hay IJolo A recant RYHAF

* ■ . * ■-. .■ *■ . . * ■ ♦

estimate indicates that the 170o0C0 force* level should be reattheft prior "to the

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end of' CT ISS'J.

.1'

Om r fhe developing situation in Izov ha£J f houaver, indicated an urgent roq.uirer.iont for a further increase in the ETOAJ? force structure/ 3?hera exists a requirement fox- an additional forse increase of approximately 103^000 over a

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Dale: 2011

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period of tha next 5~l/2 years, v/ith an immediate rcquireiaent for tv/o additional

Infantry Divisions and Bpaeatial supporting forces*. SBbe two additicmal Infanticy

• #>

Divisions are considered essential to bolstox* present forces in Northern and Central Viet ifeffl due to tho continuing deterioration of tha situation in l-aos*

Current authorized strength for the Civil Guard is 6S P 000« It io organised into companies and battalions» Each province'has a battalion composed of four

m

or five companies* Its primary mission is to complete training and to a££ra&8

the bulk of the scsii-staticr security missions in Viet Nani 9 thus freeing tha ma-

■ ■. *

;Jority of Rangers and regulaa? A3tl?H units for offensive operations end training*

In vievr of the critical throat posed by the insurgency 5 control of the Civil

.

Guard was transferred on J December \$$0 from tho Department of the Interior to the Department of Defense » draining of Civil Guard is now conducted by AKWI 0

a ' * il

''■,.■'■' -•

Civil Guard units have been equipped or eare in the process of being e^iaipped with vehicles s weapons* radios P and other essential items.

*

A short supply situation has necessitated suspension of equipment issue to all units except those separate oompanies ©ntering unit training at tho Song Mao Civil Guard Training Center* This suspension v:Lll be lifted v/hen moror material

■ ■

arrives in Viet Ham*. A significant quantity and variety of equipment should be

«

on hand before the end of CY 1961 to complete the equipping of the first ;52 p OOQ

■

civil guardsmen u. e It is estimated t'cat all of.the 70*000 Civil Guard force will be completely equipped by the end oi* CY 1$£2« . *

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4* The Self ^"Defense Corps - - ■ ; . ' ' ..

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?ho Self Defence Corps (SDC) is a para-military 'Village militia"

type

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By; NWD Date: 2011

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SSCRBT

orgo2ii%ation which io responsible to the Department of the Interior* The SDC has oil authorized strength of 58 „000 during CY 1961 o

*

r tfho missions of the SDC are: To protect the village committee; to maintain

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order and security In the village; to oppose subversion and terrorist activities $

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* to protect public buildin£3 and public worksj and to assist the public during disasters*

*

At present 7 the SDC is a relatively imtrained$ poorly equipped 9 arid poorly paid foreso The SDC has no trained officer or NCQ's but depend b on tha Civil i ' Guard or AKVH for leadership* The general level of individual training is* low* Equipment consists primarily of individual weapons and ammunition* Thero is

* ■ * * ■ *

no communications equipment* Available weapons consist of a collection of

f

■ ■ ■

French^ British 8 German* Indochinose and American r5.fles 9 pistole 9 and some

i • *

automatic weapons* Ammunition is old$ unreliable$ and in short supply*

At present the SDC ie purely, a defensive organization* To date "because of

■ - ■ •

* f ■

training deficiencies SDC operations are not veil conducted,, The SDC h?,ve been

. i

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e chief target of Viet Cong attacks and almost invariably suffer dispro-

portionately heavy losses 9 often losing weapons and ammunition to the Viot Congo

s ■

! * During the past year the GTO baa angled in a ncijor effort to mobilise the. ycafch of the country for tlia purpose of supporting the government and combatting * Co^mnism* It is an indirect way to commit the population in the struggle

f. *

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against the Coi^immists* Tjne most important youth group in Viet Nan today is the.Republican Youth Movement (K3I) which has approximately 1*7 million members

, •

and is olcsely identified with .the present regime*,

■ The IQQ-1 has fcaeome the Ria^oy.GVK effort to organize tho yountfor elements

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

SE GEES

of ths Viotn-sisnoBa population and to nso tho organization to inci a oa£G fcfea c»v/aro-

■ i

nesG of people* of tfas true nature of Vict 2fera*e> fight for Girarf-val aoainat

r * |

■ - • Co:nmim&ot £a3ux 4 goncy and torroriot taolaiiqjBSa*

6 * Financial femlAcal&OBffi 5!he joint V1MJS group doer* not consider itsolf coripotont to ztu&o apscifia

* m

reeoimitendationc aa to desired forca levels for tho defense of Viet Ham© Thay

■ •*•■

havo^ howEcrasPf &£tor consultation with their r-esp3Ct:l% r e military authorities fi

> .. . • . . „

adopted for economic pl&airSjag proposes certain estimated strength figures for tho CT1I amed for ceo under trad altom&tiva fcStfUBrpti<ms„ /J^ ^g ^irity^ ,A osswaett

« * ■

that tho Cc:imiimist-led insurgency pffort robins at apjsroadinately its pro cent

levol of intensity and that the Qovarxsraont of laos maintains sufficient inde«

.penfts&oa &can the ftxosEaaiet Bloc to dony authority for the transit of DVH or

* ■ - ■. *

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\ *Oo!nnamiGt Chinese. troops acroos its borders* ^Itejtti jvfcfoQ l B assumes that tho

* * ■

Viet Cong aro &blo to significantly Increase their insurgency campai{pa v/ithra

Viet Kom and that tlia situation in laoa contimoa to deteriorate to the point

."":'''-"--"■ v/hore tho CorninunistG gain ^ ffi yjft? control of that country*

• Unrler those alternative assumptions? the following force levels and costs

,.,*'■ -• ' -

havft been assumed iii the preparation of thin report and its to commendations;

, . 'FOPXS ZEVSIS i

+.m-*-+r- 3**%t~*i *•—». irf* ik«n ■••«

A, d

2$£<£

IMS,

■

(l) Alternative A

170 P C00

(2) AjtoaM^suJ 170,000 ■

Ci^i;duqkt' > '• ' '" 6'/* 500'

Meal Mm^ Itosa 50, 000 .

XaaJSlLiSt'CKi.

?oo,coo

200,000

'70VO0O

60,000

103,000

200,000 230,000

70 , 0O0

60,000

100,000

200,000

200,000

260,000 278.000.*

70,000 60,000

70,o;>J Co ,000

103,000 108,.000

1

* ?o be. r^V.chWi taring tl^ first ninths of 19^3,

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

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VXETN&KESE COSTS # (in millions of piasters;

■

1961

1962

i!>63

Regular Forces:

(1) Alternative A

*

(2) 'Alternative 3

,-*

*«*j«ssT=»fc-^» ■-*»

Civil Guard . *':.'■ Local Itefenso Forces

.

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Youlh Corps

• 1*8

$9$

600

# Do not include military equip-nont,.. transport, or PbO.L,

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% .- - - .

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:r : U.S.. COSTS *

(in millions of dollars) 1961 1962 l:?63

■ -■-.

Regular Forcosj

*

(l) Alternative A

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n ■' ■

r

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• .

• •■ ' *

(2) Al

Civil Guard

tornative B

62 ■ 62

11

120

120'.

20

71

u*

1961*

196^

8,300 8 f l*oo

11-200

10 4 200

1,600 1,600

■68U'

6$o

681* 600

j . .

-

-

1961*

1965

66

136

66 83

12

* Do not include- coots to U.S 0 of MAA0 operations" (salaries, subsistences adrninistrativo costs) estimated at $12 million a yoar«

To Civic Action .

rJV w w n wn »tf*%m •»»

Ona of tho proquisitDS of successful military action as&ins'c Insisrg^ncy ox*

■ ■ gUQjcrtlls ftttaok ic-for the soldier to convince tho population that ha is a

■ r

brother of tho pooplo* &o veil ao their protector* Tha Coiarnunistg clelra an

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3 3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

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B« .EiffiRGENCY ECONOMIC AliD S0C11L ACT10K

The major problem now confronting Viet Nam is that of internal security*

Bat the joint groups were in emphatic agreement that this problem cannot be

* eolvp-d by military means alone* Th&y therefore considered the nature and the

costs of economic and social measures which can be undertaken or escpanded in

-,« ,

order to give direct and early support to tho solution of the internal security problem* _ .-.

Tho following activity areas are those which deserve highest priority*

Hough cost estimates are shown whs^a majjor additional piaster and dollar outlays

* are required• • ■

• 1* JOcfoi^stion and cgpmnicaticms

T * .

Ka&suros now underway to establish communication facilities arc well do-

* ■ * "

signed and oriented* All possible steps should be taken to speed up tho jmpls~

1 . • ■

mentation of those programs* The joint Groups believe $ however, that at tho

■

eatae time a re-semination of thie program is novr in order with special vedfexK ence to (l) increasing the broadcast power and coverage of radio stations *

■

and (2) possible initiation of a television syotem 0 The latter would be a

■ -

• * **

dramatic and unprecedented attack on the* problem of national unification* It would undoubtedly require phasing as to area and programndflg*.

Of particular interest are the programs to increase the number of tran-•sistor receivers £n the rural areas 9 and to expani the inter-village com-* * .

• 1 %

•munications system*

...•'■»*

Ehe importance is underscored of adequate programing to achieve the

desired results from the physical cc^uii cations facilities now being estab-

■ • •

liohedt, "This programming should give attention to making available useful

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■ information to rural listeners 5n ouch fields as agricultural and health oducati

*

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3,3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

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ideological ox 1 dogmatic kinship to the people so as to gain their support and to be able to hide among thenu Kie soldier must tea^oraxlJy hatfe to provide train-ins to the villagers, to help them gat stewed in their piemeering resettlement efforts 6 .Araiy personnel may find it necessary to show the pooplo how to build a coeounity house, a sohoolj, a market* a simple first aid station. Ehay may be needed to give on-the-dob training to volunteers in teaching, village adminio*-

*

tration, sanitation, elementary public woxfcs and simple agricultural tochniqnos o 5?he joint groups uooimend the GYM* aasaed forces for their outotandintf

■ *

« ■ * ■ *

achievements* in civio erstion in the past and for tho work thoy are doing through-

■

out tho country todcy 0 The U<,S« is making a, special effort to help, "by sending, to Viet ITem several email tesms of civil affairs technicians who will be avail"

■ • - _ _

- ,

able to wozfe with the G-71T militasy authorities in the furtherance of an expanded

''•'-•...■ -• '.": . .. ■' ■■ .\ ■ '■" •

civic action campaign on a national ocale.

. . - - ■• * .* •

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Such a campaign will enable the GVK Army to contribute materially to the

-

« ' .

success of tho closely related "crash" program of economic and coeial develop-ment outlined "below* 'Similarly* the rapid implementation of the economic and

- r *■ . T • '

social program will strengthen popular support and help to instill a sense of confidence in ultimata victory which cannot but be sefleoted in the morale and fighting sp.irit of tho Vietnamese armed forces . " . -

.•

COS? Sltt-tt-IARY

, * Tho following ie a rough,,, order-of-^agi iitu.de estimate of additional costs

■ • .

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for the military program P from July 19&1 though December 1S62, Bering this

• , * »> ■ • . »•

. ■ • i ■ •

period the coots are '';he seme for either alternative force level.

Piaeter costs,..**..*.*** 3«7CO million

dollar costs,.

«u<b#.t«eev

42 million

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

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Without awaiting tho ro^oxojaination oufigested above 9 measures already

■ * ■ ■

underlay to increase tho output of tho Saigon lisosftcastiag station should bo

■ i

intens if ie&o

'*

Piaster cost • » + <>«»••

f> !-■ n • O

10 trillion

Dollar? cost

© O « O C C o »

< ? *>»o©«6o5 million

a a ™ v

Agrovillos and land development projects contribute materially to the cc~ lution Ox security problem* in the rural oasaaeu All possible of fort should b3

■ i-

f made to speed up these programs 0 . An important element of those progrsng

■ . ■-• . • . • :

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I should ba the conn tract i<ti of villas© roade with heavy use of local laburp-and

of self-help housing « with aid « maaclmiss&ng use of local materials and Jacor*

* « -

It is difficult to foredas'i with preoicion the coats for the proposed VK target

of 100 additional asrovil5oo ovor tho next eighteen months* Tho following*

estimate represents a roujh orders of magnitude* 25ie real figures will depend

on (a) actual mobilisation of skilled nanpowar to organize and manage tho

program* and (b) rafir/.-d costing on an austere 9 Emergency basiso lis piaster estimate covers local cost3 while tho dollav estfoi&te covers the equipment and supplies not domestiuil3.y available*

■ i,

4 •

, , •

• "

Piaster oogi###»««»*fo**0l$fK& million

* * ■

■. ■-

Dollar C03tfi*#o 09*0 r*# mop Jo5 million

•

•3* '-Rrcal Ked foal.gaaaasgaa

3

:

■ Adequate care of the wounded, both civilian and military^ is essential for

* •' . ■ :

psychological as vnll &3 for oWicuVfcjzaaiia treasons* Civilian and military

authorities* mast confer on an urgent bavis to determine how beat to make use of

»

the available radically trained manpower in Viet Bern* To maximize the use of .

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T' > •'" ' * "gem " •*■" ,

» •

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the limited trained medical manpower la V&>t FaH 0 p rogram fl should ha initiated

to develop an effective evacuation system for ths seriously iajured* Specific

programs that should fca further considered to assure the best use of available ■

medical personnel in caring- for casu&lities "would be the creation of ciobile medical teams mid the provision of needed equipment and mGdical supplies in

*

existing hospital end. medical facilities* A rough estimate of the coots of

■

. • >«

- this typa of program xoi

* >

Piaster co3t»«»«»«»**«**«*»o 8 million . " Dollar CO€t»».**« Q +*••*•*• 3*5 million

u. *

4* SreJJnirfir. of c:lv 5 J._. edn it>igtrato r3 In _tb^ lover and middle .3.o vo3n« ■ Good relations /between civil administrators and tho pooplo are of paramount

importance t as is the making known of the needs and wants of tho population tcV

4.

tho Govommonto Further consideration should, therefore, he given to tho esteTc-

i lishment of a system of reporting of complaints and surest ions by oitisona

* • s ■ * . . ■

to the highest government authorities for appropriate study and investigation

"t

Urgent attention should ba given to the acceleration and intensification

• • •

of the training of civil administrators in tho lower and middle levele ; serving

* .■ . ■ * * •

- •

in the rural areas«

• -- • -

5 * J graJ ni ng of. tha. You th Ca roa

?

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* mm

As the Vietnamese Government proceeds with the expansion of the Youth •■ "Corps 9 the contribution of Youth Corps members to the national effort can be

greatly enhanced by txsing their services in economic "and social fields,

- . ■ *

* • _ h

s Planning should p therefore 9 be initiated for training Youth Corps members in

- "" ' ■ "; '■ ■ •' ' "• •

. appropriate health^ agricultural > medical ? small public works 9 and communication

' • -. - . • :*. • '

" * ' ■-- • .'

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

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(radio) activities „ Eho last activity -would eorva the neoded Intosvvillsga

.

couiamnication requirement 0

■.. • •

COST SUMKMST

ffiae following is a rough^ estimate of cost a for tho emergency oconciailG social program from July 1961 through Itecorahor 1952 s , ;

- • *

- _ a ' •

■

■ . ...

15&5 Billion

. ;.■

-

i

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-

1 .

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4 -'

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number. NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

■ i

- 14 -

SBCHE3

•

C. IXJHGER RfiHGE rnmJOSfiEffS SOIifAIH) S3LP.SIJSTAXHIRG ECGNG-nC . . .

■ m p »

■ ■ ■ *

i. .terras, xspm^ft

The earliest possible consideration of the emergency pro^eots mentioned \ above io essential? in connection with military-security efforts 3 but the car» rent succassffcil programs in the econcmio and oocial areas saxat.be continued*

• a© Tr^proy^i^T\t of Bflpgt cs dtwcsaj t, Tflgo&MraxvaHfaE „

The Vietnamese econoay is based on its agxicblture* Wiis heavy roll-anco will undoubtedly continue* 5?o improve the productivity of Viet Nam's egrlcultural resources f ftothsr efforts should ba encouraged in training of .

agricraltural personnels research^ diversification of orops, more intensive use of fertilizersi end the provision of adequate a^Tici&tural credit facilities.

Particularly premising are the possibilities in the development of livestock

«• .

*

and fisheries and complementary processing activities« . ; ..

* * *

* b* Eeonomle and social servic es to rura l, /popula tion

-

• -

While the asroville-lanrl development program merits special action on a more immediate baeie & the build-up of economic and social services to the great mass of the rural population not encompassed by the agroville-lana C | ;elQpmont program uiust be continued* Such Jir.prdved services e# exte' 3 ion education* agrarian reform^ past control 9 and foreiers 1 cooperatives and production credit can yield considerable economic and social benefits in ; turn for relatively limited investment*

o* Creation of a stronge r indastrial base

~ tirJ -rf l il 1t« ii ~ ' f~ | 1 - -. x i Q II H'- ■ ' >-| liil r— -i r - -n p— ^- |i(->i-i i r i -■ - -t

* • • ■

* ■

Caking into account the anticipated population increases, the future

■■ . y

of Viet Nan vill$ however 0 demand a reorientation of its economy toward one

» ,..

with stronger reliance on a fSxat* viable industrial base* To achieve this

19

■

■

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

SB (SEE

mmtm

development with tiinisrun loss and bast uc3 of resources, additional efforts aro rocor.smonded» (l) in the planning aroa & including manpower 9 and (2) to

• ■

encGUTaf^>- tha usa of domestic cavities for local investment and to attract

"0 V W-*" «wrw «^-_ **V^-- ^ V—, V *rffc*« *-U U >

foreign capitalg toy iEsjEJOViEg tha local climate and procedurec for invoatmemto

■

r * B

In addition to tho current econoruic and social program of longer are#®3

■ ■

development p including those siligled cut abovoy there vxo gonsral considerations

• -» *«

* ,

underlying acceleration toward a ■GQlf~3untaining economy that the joint Groups

•.•

tooliove warrant special attention*

»" ■ . Hul l ^«*«i» f» .Mt*»I-»l^ iw ^. I MUMJH fcm.^Mfc

Iho joint Groups re contend a str&n^haaiaag of the planntog.inQehanisino

. .. m

'This would make possible tho preparation of an integrated plan? on tha basis of

tho statement by national loaders of tho country *a goals covering a pariod of

. • . ■ , -

l . "

four or fivo or eight yaarn* The plan woxild also indicate tho #Dverument pro-

f ■

grams that v/ill be necessary^ tho expansion of private activity that is antici-

pated 0 mid the results that will bo obtained* Such a plan is a useful fpzz.z work for year-to-year budgeting of specific government programs f but it may

*^»

also solve a toreador purpose© Eie nation f B IcoAoxz csn 9 through tho vehicle

■

of tho'plan» combine these ooctor QQalB into a concrete statement of tho nation ! o

■ *

r

! . f ;as^3 and philosophy ained at capturing tho public 1 a imagination*

i

b© Private inw» fitment

•»lr-»l» » ^ *» ■A.'"-** ».--

■ "

* 4

• L \ In marshalling its resources to meet immediate and longer-tern

•. •. * ■• * • , . «

■ *

economic problems* the VietnaJiieoo Government recognises the importance of tho

m

* ■

potential contribution by 'She private sector of the oconOuiy* This contribution

can bo maximized by governmental meaeuroG to assure tho potential domestic and

i

■

.

■ ■ •

i • ■-.■'■• ;. /

se c:-et

"00

1

I

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3,3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

-16 -

foreign investor thai his capital and? semetiaes even more important, hirj .technical and mo;a't£orial laxow-how are baing eoiigjit© to active and dete^inod carapaigrip well publicized., would help to dsnOQO-teato to the whole world that 'Viet !Tam fucas the future with resolution end confidence o

*

Ox conrae s a w&$ov obstacle in the stimulation of private invest-.

j.

>

a ■

mont ic the security situation© However,* despite its seriousness there have ^ been now investments both local iflad foreign© 3?hio impetus Dhould continuo and

accelerate© Sana measures in thin direction that should ba considered BS8I

■

(l) Ifc^Mtmeftt Ipifo Enactment of an investment law to provide :

1 guidance and policy to public officials and to investors would help establish

*

*o

a legal framax/ork of rights p privileges 9 and obligations of the Investor

' (2) Iwfagfacial DeveX oTOient Canter reor&arination: Establishment of

en effective agency to provJ.de leadership* direction^ coordination^ and oper

ational personnel to formulate and effect a program for encouraging private

,. - - . - . . investment is recoisriiended* Ete TnduBtrial Development .Cantor ece&n a logical

r - * • V .«

institution to serve thio need© It iiltt&t to re~or£anisod to hecomo an invest-Rent promotion center rather tlien a financial support agency. Ito ootiyity

.

should be devoted m principally to: '. ' V - .* . . '.

■ * l

•r • -* 1

■ 1 ^

+ '■;■""■*■ Btimulating' creation of new indue trice

■ •

- encouraging expansion of existing industries

- craatiAS a jroductlvity *v>onoy ' : : '

• • •

-

Eie Industrial Development Gbjerfrr ehould be able to give to investors all infor-

mation they need on the fionoral economy of the country? procedureo for e-stab

■

lislvnent of their industries fiocal advantages 5 labor $ cto©

(?) J&B^A^SS^i^S&f Improved facilities with novo adequate

■ ■ * a

* ■ . . .

•rlU.L

SECSjfrl'

• -

>

1

• • »

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

^ •

*

-17 -

SKCRET

■ I

resources to provide ate&itsa &nft lons-terri credit to neet needs for industrial

f ' • .

development is considered desir^b'J.Co

■

■

(4) M.VJj££$dy Initiation of an effective rosoarch'program applying

■

Ijrofessionil techniques and practices to identify and promote investment opportunities ie rIejo suggest ecu .-. • /

If" private inventors nasi h& attracted to tho priority industries, "

■

the groat bulk of pxofSts can Tx-codg government revenue or private savings o

a 1

^ comparison^ lazega public eec*.or investments that do not produce comparable

Burpitisca clearly do not provide the saras kind of help for sustained development 0

• ■ r * >

■ rt ,

■ • ■

1

Public Boetor iirvcsimfcnt m&y bo undertaken for a variety of reasons» For example private capital naj' b? imwillins to invest its limited savings lii projects that require cwroral years to complete said that sometimes offer uncertain business proapscto ther.opJFter* It hafi been found that public sector

*

investment often stiinulates private investment., V/ithin limits., the one complex

' ■ •■ *

1 ■■■ 1

ments iha other« Bat public investments in product5,ve enterprises will servo Uaa coHioioy'less satisfactorily than privato enterprise unless prices ore set

,».

to cover full costa and produce conrparable mirplusoSo

■

Where public investment is necessary to initiate or px*omote produce tiv©'enterprise* such investment chould as public policy bo on cox interim basis

At tho earliest practical t5zno, public investment shoujd bo converted to

p ■ 1 ■ -

private" i:\TODfeiento

I r

«.

rv n r\

iU

. 1

■

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

- 18

«

8ECHE2

CCS? SffiSH&Kg

The following estimate is offered for additional development pro^act£J p

B t

bayond those already progic^-^e-dj during tha eighteen month povicd July X9ol through Dee37ator 1952 s "V

'.

(

■

Piaster oosi&*«

■ > La

Dollar coots

- - r- ' - T"

yoi-tocotc C(je« BOO

■.

4

,-'■.-•- •' ' .• ".. .

■,■■■'■■•..---■

1*000 million

JO Million

■ ■

-

■ - ■■• ... -

••• -.":-.-■■■.

•

. - * -

■ » »

.»,

• . ' -

7 -

■

- , • -

-

*

'

t .

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- ' *

. -

•

■■

*

■ ■

.-.

' - .-

- - ■

-

•

.

•

'

• ' •■

•

■»- -

■ n

■ m *

■■

-

■'

t

I

"*1 *

■

"

.

«

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-

1 ■ ,

•

■

.

•a % — -

' 1 v. .

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■ •

....

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1

• •

• *

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-

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. '

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

-19-1SCRST

III. FIUAIICIAX. nft n S3 &JZEQ2X THIS SOCIAL ACTIOI! FE0(ffifiH

■. n i i i i

. i ■ i ■ i

Once the ceeurity problem to in hand end the nation's renourcco can b3 do-voted to peaceful purcuitflf Viot Haa v/ili novo rapidly toward"a viable t prenparcuo econoay uitti a progressively highor ctandard of living. In order to attain thio dacirod citu&tion, the present emergency requirements - oilitary, econo-mic, cocial and financial - must bo net by rabilizing and cosibiriing domestic and external resources norc effectively.

i

The following table, based on the action program set forth in Section ll t

*

indicates the financial magnitudes involved,

Sumstary of Additional Coots for Pro f ^raxia^

(July 1961 - December 1962)

Military-Security Emergency Economic-Social

(millions ) 42.

13*5

VII Plactera (billions)

3.7 1.8

Longer-range Eevelopisent

30.

1.0

Total

85.5

6.5

^Thece ectiiaatfcG ate cubject to further ctudy to dctcroine technical feasibility end prccice crcountc.

•

..

A. EXTERNAL REQUIREMENTS * '

The domestic resources which are immediately available are in themselves inadequate to neet and overcome the Communist threat, Supplementary external support directly keyed to the phased utilisation of local resources rr.uot therefore be provided to enhance the effectiveness of the Joint action. Funding of

thio input bar. a tsajor impact on the problem of generating piasters t

or n

ma^r

■-*-*•- «-■ --

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

m 2J - -

SECRET

Ag the requirement for import of goods, material, equipment, and technical . :

training rises. It will be met largely in the form of direct grant aid Li physical cerniSi

* * * 4

will go directly Into the government sector, and therefore will not generate piasters.

* . " « *

* a *

Extraordinary aid in (fee form of imports to be sold for economic and social objectives in the program will servo to etireagthea the economy siig will also generate piasters

-.•

for uee by the government. • '-"."■ • *■• •

The Import program; as a matter of policy, should be governed by the following

criteria:

■

, -

•

1. The program should be viewed as a whole, and the portion 'supplied by American

•" . * ■ ■

. aid integrated with the total import program. Tills requires jointly keeping the eligibility

list under review. It Is also desirable to increase the emphasis on capital goods

■ ■

2. Tine long term goal in a self * sustaining economy with a rising level of Jivuj;;;

• *,*

.

but in the present emergency the objective is to prevent a rise In per capita consumption

£nd mobilizexeeources for urgent purposes. * . •

• ■ i

3, The foreign exchange reserves of Vist Nam should be held in the region cf £200

million.

. i

■

*

4. * Aid should, over the next several years, be equal roughly to the- estimated

difference between the foreign exchange receipts snd the foreign exchange payments of

VN economy. :

• •

■ r

.*

-

J 5. Imports should b3 regulated with a view to protecting sound infant"induetties

, • > •>•'.•. ■*•*•■

• " ■*.-.*.

• . . '....■/

and encouraging private investment on the pao hand while on the other protecting rJie

*■ *

Vietnamese consumer against undesirable clses id prices.

. . -

j

• *

-. -,

■■'....■. •. ' .■ SECRET

• i ■ -

Declassified per Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

* * '

!- ii -

■ SECRET

•

*

6. Import of luxury goods to s& extent that v/ould widen, the gap between the rich

r

snd tine other economic ^roupc should not be allowed, and the means of controlling audi luxury imports should J>o taxation,' . " . " ;

7» To the extent consistent with other criteria, imports should be employed to

promote genera] orderliness of markets gn£ to avoid disruptive speculation

: '.*

The Vietnamese experts estimate the appropriate level of commercial aid imports to

bo go follows:

<US> FY 1962 - annual rate of $169 million (excluding P. L, 480) (US) FY 1963 - annual rate of $193 mijlioa (excluding P.. L. 4SG)

.

*

It is recommended chat the parallel committees proposed In Section IV, working

-*

«

•

I

togetiier, examine at an early d<-itc the apfilcatioa of the alcove criteria hi order to arrive'"'

• , * ■ - ■ ■ -.*+*-

f tu. ea agreed estimate for the next'six mouths and then for the rest uf PV 1962 and

r

-- •" .' •*'

"■ ■ ,

^ibsequesct periods h and that they jointly keep under review cue uend of imports, exports, commodity stocks, foreign exchange reserves, and markets. It is also desirable that they jointly consider possible Improvements to procedures.

a a .a

1 . Looking to the future in terms of medium arid longer tejm economic development,

-

*xs v v.-1 financing does not appear to be a limiting factor for programs ano pro] act i

."'■.' ' I *

„ which are tested and approved vn the oasis of mutually accepted criteria. Private capital,

■ " ■

fi&i fropi other friendly governments, The International Development Association a ,d

'

The Development Loan Fund afford Varied end substantial funds for capital project a.

•■ ' ■ ' ; • '...-■ • ' •' ■ ■ . I ' .

The vaticzy of terras currently available will be broadened still further If the recommendations

* • ■ • «

made by the Executive to The United Stares Congress on foreign eld are Accepted, • *

*

■» 4

-- ■ •

. *

♦ •

•

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number. NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

SECRET

Such financing could Involve grace periods in which no Interest is paid, interest ra'^cs

ac low as cac per cent annually; arid amortization periods as long as fifty years.

"'■•• . • •■

Evea though the security problem la not yat completely solved, capital Js flowing

izZq Viet Kara, end this Hoy; may be substantially increased, The jomt group, ericforadai

thz view that Viet Nam has tremendouo potential for economic progress and development

* ■* . '. . • •

Plans already underway or iti a .preliminary'stage for agriculture, voter works-.

*

■ ■

v*.

( sibling, fich&ry, forestxy, small ladustrise, steeJi textiles, and augur reflniog could

utilise $60 to $70 million aiinualiy - a total of ?300 to $350 million' a*er ?t five yenr period,

. '■-•:"■ -. ' v. • ;■ ■, ■ ■•■" . • ■*' ' '- '. :

B. B^ERNAL RB0UI&EMENT3 ...

- * ■ .» ■

i t ■ '

To cover the resource requirements of the special action program, domestic * espurees

• i * ■ -

must ba fully utilised so as to effectively transfer and compensate manpower while increasing domestic production and avoiding disruptive effects on the civilian s^ctoc of the tc'conotny." _The physical resources available, supplemented by external support, are sufficl^u.' tc sustain the action program. Hitsre remains the rsGulrcmear for tn &ddition&l supply of local currency to cover the increase in piaster expend it ares. " *

*

i.

- ,

* This Increase should ba met by; 1) t>x reform, designed to icstrilb any iacreme&r

- -

. . ..

la consumption per capita* to encourage production* sjio to more equitably recIhftrUxilc

the sacrifice imposed by military efforts; 2) exchange refoxin, which ttUna at ubscrbmg

cay vnndj&ll profit created by some present unrealistic rates o? exchange; 3) by & savings

-r- - -■• *

* % * • ', .

-

rxd victory bond campaign to provide additional revenues for the governors* and to

provide opportunity to &H cit&eas to participate with tlif: government in Its security effort;

. i ■ a

■ '0 : .: :' ; ■ ■ .*■ ~ .;• .;

SECRET

. ► ■

.:; .! • ■ .' . .

■

r • *

fcUi

■ ■ - :■ -

'• I-

i

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number; NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

*■

• 23 -SECRET

4) by oalco of goods dorivad £rc3 additional ostornnl roccurc£0, to tha account compatible

... with a cound policy on tha bclarxo of paymnts; 5) by borrowing as. necessary from the

National Bank, limited only by tha danger of ricaa in prico which should be Itont within

nanagcab'io limits, fined temporarily at 5 per cant par year, ,

* •

■

With respect to the realisation of additional piasters from cale of CAP imnortc, tho following observations arts made:

t« There is complete agreement in the joint groups on the desirability of simplifying end unifying the Vietnamese cyotem of exchange. In other terms, the principle of a single and realiotic exchange rate instead of the present multiple rate cyotem is recommended.

2, The Vietnamese experts eoteera that an open exchange reform cannot take niece in present circumstances, but that tha same results may be obtained through a revised

i F~rra of taxation, especially taxation of imports.

3. The .American experts, agreeing with their Vietnamese colleagues on the objectives, are of the opinion that it would be more desirable to have a clcarcut operation that vould

tot a defensible rate of exchange, produce immediately a larger cuoply of oiastcrs, avoid

■

! the necessity of a complicated system of subsidies on exports and taxes on imports.

jncoiirage new investment,and remove incentives to capital flight or speculation agninot

he piaster by removing the fear that still further adjustments in.the value * E the piaster would be forced in the future. However, they recognize that political and psychological

, actors which they are not in a position to evaluate must influence any decis *n of the

* ■ •

■ *

, Government of Viet Nam, and they agree with their Vietnamese colleagues in urging a i

» m. *

s uick step as far as seems possible in the direction above indicated. [

' ' . :

SECRET

20

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3,3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

- i

SECRET

IV. IMPROVED QRGAHEiAIICSAL PROCEDURES FOR MORE EFFECTIVE ACTION

'■ m *» i i a **v»* —»**->•-*

ll rp ■«»!■■ *■< *

• '

The ;Jaint Groups a?@0oa®@att that for the implementation of the spsoJal .action program It is deoirahlQ to adopt a form of parallel committees? irhlch vill meat together from time tn tinus* as shown on tho following chart*

•

■ ._. i

..

SUGGESTED OliGANIZATION FOR .PARALLEL PLARHING AM) ACTION

•fit* mi *-j— ^— m-jK<*» »i*r»^—» v» > »i ■**•-»***■'

•.

u.s

. U.S. COMMITTEE FOR SPECIAL ACTION PROGRAM

GVN

■ m^ ii

V,N» COMMITTEE FOR SPECIAL ACTION PROGRAM

(l) toBOOHtOSESQE FOR

MILITARY ACTION

(2) SQB&WOWEBB FOR

ez* *i

ii,.JW»»3lO,

(l) STCBGEMMlXttEB FOR

. . . .

;

• ■

MILITARY ACTIOS

ECONOMIC & SOCIAL ACTION

#*w

A (?) 'subggkotee pdr

^r ECONOMIC & SOCIAL ACSfftH

M*V-'*

k<

L

LIAISON 0FFIC3R

*<%*jji'> i '■ «*.> »*>

LIAISON OFFICES

•

:

All U oS „ SERVIG3S

-■ ■ • ■

>. ■

s4^

■ a |

ALL'VoN. 3S3pAR3MEiraS

r-

• '

• l

■ • "

-, • • ■-•;••

*' Within the constitution and legal procedures of their rrespootlve govern-

- ■ ■ . •

* ments each of tho tvro eeta of oonnaittoes ehovm above should T>o dele gat X luasiiiitJLEi

■ •■ , • • •■ ■

% potior to" take rapid and flexible action in tho following rcopeovat

•

• •

■ a

!• Co initiate follow-up .action for tho implementation orc\ the* GpooSal'

action pro-am

• ■*

2* To approve necessary modifications in tho iv>icial action pro^ttsi•

i

5* To recorcmend fipGAfittXea "^o improve and adapt the special action program.

as tho oituatiora chan^aau

.-.

r

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

x-- *.-i . , ii I . 11 ■ I

» « 4 .,

I.

*m€Y

im

h JOINT VM-yS-lMEK

SRAM Mm ITS Fi^AMCli^

D

\h

SI

U

THE RECQFATMNPEP APPROACH.

o

THE'RECOMMENDED PROGRAM AIID ESTIMATES OF ADDITIONAL RESOURCES NEE&E0.

y?. MILITARY-INTERNAL SECURITY ACTLQPJ.

. EMERGENCY ("CRASH") ECONOMIC AfJP SOCIAL ACTION.

ft

£Z LONGER RANGE DEVELOPMENT TOWARD SELF-SUSTAINING ECONOMY.

o

/<?#?/ APDITIONAL FINANCIAL REQUIREMENTS

J. DOLLAR FINANCING. . .

J3. PLASTER* FINANCING

• ■

RECOMMENDATIONS ON ORGANIZATION

EOj? MORE EFFECTIVE JOINT PLANNING Am ACTION

, «•*

FT"-—— "* ? *■ ' ■■ I ■ » ■ — j

— — T*~'»*

SeoDaf cent. JJo.$ A ?? >'

ar

-? .. ■■■■ »n ; ■. i -

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

i -■"•. <*

.f

/

'

lJ\\b

liHiN

ra fits

F?'/rv

0p»

CT£,-*

W ECONOMIC-SOCIAL PBQMEM.

J Pa a

nV

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Mf,

/i^

/0 M#

KtdOiUCClb fUK " mt

Dill I UhlLi/

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fit

mm**.- v-^mrJiZ>9

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/

AIK I FOR PRESIDENT DIEM

RV . ; OF m) : ID

RECOlfE©?. EI FOR COi &

J&u Gilpairic, ;

2 is,

Mr. .President, as your American military advisor, I feel this is, again, an apprs Late time to review the Military situation. I know you also feel that v: are at a decisive iod in the military history of Vietnam, which is today in the v tgu&rd of the Free tibrld's : against

Co: inism. Events are moving so fast that it "behooves us from time to time to j view the events of the recent past so that we nay give letter direction to our pre: fc and future activities.

Largely "because of your keen understanding end assistance, we can point t/ith mutual pride to the aecoaiplishrnents of the past few months-Although the urgency is g fc and there is still much to do, 1 am particular? \ heari d by the following actions.

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Your a] 1 of the Ar Forces reo; ' Ltion portion of the Counter-Insurgency /Ian has established a single" chain of conscand i; m JGS through Field Commend to the c aiing units. The most inpo nt imple... Lation phase of this reo: ' .n, which I shall later discuss

at greater length, is now i r way.

As you know, the actual build up of the 20,000 man increase in the RVHAF force structure is now in process with the ati at budgetary problems apparently on the way to resolution. At your direction^ certain .of these units are now being activated and equipment is beginning to arrive

for them in significant quantities;

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Also, 1 feel we can both be well pie d with the progress made in the overall Civil Guard Program since transfer was effected to the DOD.

Your establishment of the Central Intelligence Organisation is a- . nother improvement which, when it becoi b fully operational,- will, together with Military Intelligence improve* , contribute -: atly to the counter-insurgency campaign by ensurii g improved Operational Intelligence to the Armed Foixes.

Ihe Combat Development t Test Center, discussed with you by Mr, Godel and myself, and which you. have authori: also holds great •promise of assisting in trie overall Counter-Insurgency effort.

S E C R E T

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SECRET

Ihese organisational type improvements have been accompanied by what I feel is equally ha rtening progress in the long delayed tral id g of "RVIIAF forces and the Civil G a.. All fcrai •; programs, ^ both .in-country and off-shore,, have "been re~e; \ lined and revised to place addition"! St: 3s on anti7gaerrilla tactics and techniques, Many training courses are nov . being conducted under the revised programs and results are beginning to be felt.

Immediately folio- " g the transfer of the Civil 0 d to the Department of 3)efcnse ; ve developed a concept of envolo, it for Civil Guard units,, \-hich aow serves as the "basic for all Civil Guard training. This progr 3u dudes special leadership training as veil as individual unit training all oriented to.vrd anti-guerrilla combat. 3^500 of the Civil Guard have been trained to date, 6,000 are now undergoing 'dividual and unit training at Quang Trung and Song Mao. In additionj 65O are novr undergoing DCS and KCO training*

She linger training program has continued to receive high priority and einphasis. As you knovz, a series of U.S. Special Forces teams were "brought to Vietnam,, one of lahich is still here, and J1AAG developed a prog: :• of instruction vhich was adopted "by KVHAF for Ranger Cadre Training, In this res; t^ your E Training Center at Hha 5?ra is outstanding. Additionally 3 an on-site unit training program has "been developed to further train K lies in the vicinity of their actual operational areas using APOTI-US Mobile gaining Teams.

Closely tied to improver in training is the work now being done "by the joint RV:TA*'-i:\AG study group on the MAAG paper/ "luetics and Technif of Counter-Insurgent? Operations. 11 This is an important project "because it vill establish ;■ ■ tactical doctrine in the Vietnamese Ian,; ge which vill be videly distributed to the Aimed Forces. Once refined and distributed^ 1 believe ,;:: can expect another significant increar in training improvement subsequently in operations. As you l:nov, however1 certain of the concepts proposed in this study^ because of their far reaching and comprehensive nature,, vill require, policy decisions at a very high governmental level before the full effect can be gained in the field. Hie timing and t diness of these decisions is most essential for . anti -guerrilla cor. fc to be successful.

1

"in the field of { :tical operations^ yon have authorized MAAC a&-\ visors to accc ny h b lion and company-si^e units i ,ed in

erations^ with the understanding that they vill obs 5 and advise

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vill not actually participate in hot var activities, liAhG has arranged for the same authorisation from U.S. military authorities* In addition* HVHAF officers have been eneour< .1 to i . ' closely with U.S. advisors in the all important oper fcional p. 1 ning se vhich needs additional * emphasis.

Lso in the field of op ationSj I am particularly pie 1 at the improvements realized in Air-Ground operations. She reaction time on requests for air support and for ome forces has been signifii bly reduced as a result of impr ■; operational procedures worked out; with MAAQ advicej between your Army and Air Force. In this r rd,, a concept has been developed empl g a specially trained force of company-size,, on constant airfield alerts with another company-sisse force equally trail d in K~3 J ':- helicopter operations^ on camp alert. This ready force, coupled with the airborne capability vill materially increase the ability of the KVHAF to counter widely dispersed guerrilla attacks, fhisj of course; requires that the primary use of these H~3^\s ^ operational and not administrative.

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Ihe foregoing^ Mr. President } are only sone of the achiev rts we have realised in the past fev; . ^nny result from close cooperation between the KffiffAF and MkkG, It is this type of cooperation which ve both must re-emp] isiae in order to continue our progress toward victory over the Viet Cong guerrillas.

As you >Wj I am convinced> and I have repeatedly given assurances to my superiors that the GVJI'has the vill and determination as well as the ability to achieve victory if provided with."required U.S. support and if GVS accepted and imp.") mtecl t" ■: militi y b A other supporting reeom-ndations contained in the Counter-Insurgency Plan, I am sure you will

from recent events that the United States vill render the requi 1 support. We both know that there is general acceptance of the Counter-Insurgency recommendations In principle on the part of the GVH« However, te are certain specifics re ling their military inzple] ttion vhich * would now like to take up with you^ together with sone other closely r lated MAAG recommendations*

t\rn

One of the major recommendi tions of the proposed Counter-Insurgency .Plan waa that a, national Internal Security Council be established to proatul-Cate the policy for and to coordinate the preparation and execution of a Vie' nasiese Hi 1 Gounter-Insur ncy Plan^ incor; : ; the political; economic; psychological, e military aspects or that plan. I realize the

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E C R E T

co2nple>:ity of this task at the national level and am & e that although c bain existing agencies are capable of working in this fields it will take BQme time to ±m nt fully this co: rehensivo* but vitally ±m \nt

toco: 'Mon. I r:erely wish to invito your attention to the u ( mt -need for expediting the full active tion and operation of such a Rational Agency,

Another ssatter of urgency at the present tiuna is that of effective border and coastal surveillance capabilities for Vietnam. As pointed out in the Cou r-Insurgency Plan^ both of these ca; abilities require high level coordination arid vUl not be fully imple i A until a national agency such as the Internal Security Council is in operation, Ihore &ve } howeverj certain portions of the border and coastal surveillance concepts vhieh "can be initiated piecemeal. I know you will agrc : that any action uhidh can reduce the ability of the Viet Cong to make full use of the laud or sea frontier?! should be ta&en as soon as possible. Naturallyj IIAAG fcands ready to work "with appropriate agencies of the ] to this end*

s

As you know; a portion of the 20j000 man force increase vas devoted to the activation of three separate Infantry Regiments, In recommending these three units ; MAAG intended the creation of a badly ne 1 rot bional training 1 se so that regiments from those Infantry Divisions vhich have,, of necessity,* boon coj.aoitted to hot \?ar operations for ex-tended periods of t" could be rotated for badly needed rest; rehabilitation and retraining in anti-guerrilla tactics» As you know, my superiors approved U.S. support of these Regiments^ primrily on my strong personal conviction and consc. at recti Station that a rotational capability by Regimental size units vas absolutely essential to the adequate and timely training of the K \F, SOhere vas ; 'and still ressainsj a critical need for such a rotational training plan, especially in the three divisions in the III Corps area* Biese three nev regtments have, in fact been activated and are training toward operational readiness, However, I am informed that it is now* proposed to use them in security roles, one per Corps area. If so, 1 feel this should be rec< sidereft, Mr. Pre; : rfc,

\n light of the most urge:

need to i: >ve the combat effectiveness of

the e at division:;, now cc Ltted to fighting the Viet Cong and especially as the approval of the increai to 170,000 "was made continent on this use of the forces,

7 mentioned earlier v t U.S. advisors are-now authorized to ac~ . company / , units on operations &C to \ ttalion and separate company level. This is a sir ificant i; ; : ; ;er the fo r arrange snt, l advisors v : i at author! to accompany units into operational

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S K C R 3^ T

areas except in exceptional circumstances* While I feel that this is a major step fo: rd in the wore effective utilisation of I-1AA0 advisors^ I an concerned that this forward looXing i ization is not being fully

implemented. The ii . iting directive (HVHAF Keiaor* "' > number 5^3/ . SA^ elated 5 May 1961) r. ds the decision as to vhether or not MAAG advisors are t raitted to aeco- ; u its, largely ■to ARVI'I field 'command - "based on their est be of "security limits imposed by battlefield conditions." While I recognise and concur in t] concern of the GVil at all levels regard! \ the securit of U.S. ralitary 'personnel; 1 feel that :e are often over zealous in their

desire to insure the one hundred percent security of AG advisors in f operational i as - a condition which cannot be att '' .d ui " " % current : circumstances. Of course; I do not wish advisors to en; \ in actual combat except in self defense. However, 1 feel that lads of absolute security measures should not prec] them from, performing their mission. In tlie future ; 1 am hopeful that / commanders will avail them* " b more frequently of the professional competence available to them through MftAG advisory assistance in both the planning and. conduct of tactical operations.

1 am convinced that the most fur; sfttal military recommendations contained in the Co\ r-Insu/gency Plan ; those pertaining to reorganisation of the co: structure and a single c] "n of command* As you, know; in my military assessment of the situation .last September; one of my basic conclusions was the absolute necessity for a single, inviolate chain of cc an&j which could imp] ment an integrated national plan for counter-insurgency. You will recall our numerous dir ns and conferences on this subject prior to your decree 9o/QP and the directives which were derived therefrom. In c nee, this import* decree resulted in elimination of Military Regions ! '1 placed the three '( ps -under an operational Field Co ,n&, charged with the conduct of military operations. Province Chiefs retained certain Eoilitary responsibilities; however; the DOD directive specifically placed them within the military ' chain of coam-and for miliv . rs. As you know, M AG was apprehensive about the retention of Province Chiefs in the military chain of conniand/ I rex, we felt t : ; your decree represented a v :able solution : : I \jzre enthusiastic a"; t the opportunity for improves in this vital area. In recent weeks, he -er, during the detailed i?:rolementa-tion of these directives s< tendencies have developed which; if not checked, -.will ne?g ' .0 are both trying, to accomplish. I refer specifically to sore ; s of violation of the officially establish 1 chain of co: 3 and to difficulties in isolating and defining \ : : of the Province Chief; as pertains to nil ry affairs.

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X am sure you agree that the military chain of c 1 ; to be effective; wist be r acted by all - both subordinates and superiors alike. Confidence in the cc and va.is fundaitiental to military operations arid X am convinced that a al plan for counter-insurgency cannot successfully be administered v it* Naturally* if cc ters are byp: . sd or tl -ir o; i rs counterman : ij they are unable to make effective plans 1 it is most difficult to execute a essful operations vith in their ass3 ad areas of responsibility.

Of coursej unfor circumstanc vill often develop requiring the iiranediate cc • of security forces in a particular area. 3?ro« vided such a requirement is levied i&rough the no:... 1 chain of military cc andj the jaission can normally be accomplished with minimum disruption of training^ security and operations against the Vict Cong* In th respect; I have received reports recently indicating that major c rid ^elements have b bypassed; both up and dovn the chain of command.

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In this regard; I must also report that in establishing the of military cc and^ in certain cases problems have bean encountered ±n 'defining the role of the Province Chief within that chain* The directives are clear that the Provii e Chief; in his role of a military co: der^ is vithin the milii y chain of cc : i aid. However; above and beyond the nor/rial Civil Guard Force iSiich en t igned to each province ; the Province Chief should not automatically assume c and of all military units physically pi snt in his province but should do: 1 only those forces allocated to bin by his next h.igb military superior j no: ally the Division Taci lL gone Colander, This arrange it 1.d p of course,, parallel to the system at the Corps level; vhich seems to be understood ^oy all. For (- plo; the Corps Cc r does not cc .end units of the General R serve me: ly becc ;> they are physically present in his Corps Tactical Zone. Rather; such units must be allocated by Field Cc tnd or JOS before the Corps Co; ncler e>:ercis co: or control. I feel it essential t the same principle p: /ail at Province level. While I fully unde and the dual capacity of Province Chiefs as military and civil leaders; I feel that tfaii dual position must be brought into harmony with the need for clear-cut c sis and unit

assigj •■'■■■. ■ on the military side. Other,." ■;?; piecemeal ass/ . tent* as ■already r.ted, of ARVU battalions .to-Province.Chiefs could veil result, xn the conduct of 37 miniature canpaigns ~ each one proceeding at its o\m .pace i 1 intensity; rather than a nati' al ca: : ,. against V Viet Cong ►in accordance vith a cohesive; coordinated p3 ■■..

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S B C R E T

Anothere area to vhich I must invite your attention has to do h the Utilisation of the H-3'.- helicopter squadron* This aire ift is not a si&gple item of equx ni, and I am fully aware of the complex problems involved ■■ having to do with maintenance and specialised pe: sonnel* However, it : potentially one of the most effective items of equip it in the hands of KVHAF for defeating the Viet Cong. The helicopter provides superior mobility over all types of terrainj and as you know guerrilla warfare is essentially mobile warfare- Increased effort is necessary to expedite the training of troop units in helicopter "borne operations* To accomplish this, priority utilization of these aircraft must he given to this training^ and to the subsequent use of helicop rs on their primary mission of combat operations. Daring ny inspection of the 21st Division Operation in Vinh Birih Province; 27 June, there were only tvo of the six operational H-3^ r s ,de available for operations. As you kndwj these H»3^ ls vere delivered ahead of schedule by my government only upon wy insistance that they were urgently required for actual hot var military operations. Although these aircraft are being used in important combat support missions, increased operational use of H-S'^'s is required to justify this earlier delivery.

Also, during my inspection of the 21st Bivii. \ Operation mentiora d above, I noted an a rent lack of adequate prior planning and coordination between the civil i "nistrative functions of the Province and the military operation. On this seve: lay of the military operation, the Con&canding General, Field Command^ Cor .ding General, III Corps, the National , Delegate and the Province Chief were folding a meeting to coordinate and resolve problems of a combined politico-military nature. Ihese included the problems such as the mov it of villagers and civil control after completion of the military phase, As you recall^ the concept of prog save coordinated, phased clearing of the country, spelled out in the Counter-Insurgency Plan and the Tactics and Techniques paper, requires a high degree of civic-military coorci tion in all ar , and particularly in areas where actual fighting is taking place, ©lis is especially important not only prior to and during the operation, but following it. Active and positive cooperation between the Province administrative authorities and the military coi 3 is essential to ensure a coordinated..pacification of the area plus the all important follow-up and lake over by the Province authorities. Only in this vay can permanent results he obtained - by denying the Co ists re-entry into the area after the operation has been cample Trie overall concept of the Province Chief vlsIi the Civil Guard and Self Defense Corps to perform this mission is Gcur.d but requires close supervision and coordination in each major clearance operation by KVHAF* ,

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S E C R E T

Another element of RVHAF which hac a greater capability for effective operations against the Viet Cong tHan v at. .present is the River Forces of the V3SH. Tvo {general pro! i an are currently preventing * more effective employment '

Ifae first is the problem of joint planning. 1'ne operational commander of the River Perce is Coniraai ; General^ III Corps,, As an Arsay Coriander; he cannot he expected to know the many details of how test to employ the potential combat and s port capabilities of these forces. I feel the solution lies in est hlishment of a joint planning section vith Naval representation on the Corps staff. Given proper tec" aical advice, the Corps Colander could then realize much more effectives from the River Forces, ■ ■

r ihe second problem area is sup i for the River Forces^ to include additional draft; "better priority for maintenance^ increased com-i-and recc Lion and assistance vith some acute personnel problems to include officer shor ges and an equitable promotion policy within the VHN Military missions should also he coc :;ed vith civilian requirements for these craft.

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In addition^ as i?ifl.icated in the Virih Binh operation; hotter coordination with respect to the Sea Forces in Joint Operations appears races-,sary. Ihis coordination should he accomplished at Joint General Si ff level. AH igfa s< p: ^planning was accc lished at Joint Staff levels difficulty was experienced in coordination vith the ground operation.

.Another important progressive step was the establishment of three logistic commands; or^ in each of the three Corps areas- This is resulting in the coordination of the six technical services in the field and is producing mate Lally improved logistic sui rt for the combat forces assigned to the Army Co , A3 >; I am pleased to note that the KVHAF Deputy for Logistics; General To ; has "been given a degree of increased coordinating authority. However,, t": ire still remain i-r ray complicated delaying procedures vhieh : Lr the effectiveness of 1c : tic support to c at units, It at rs particularly desirable that some of the ABA fiscal functions he decentralized to permit prompter response to the needs of co hat units*"

Another matter which I consider of sufficient irrpor' . to hrin^ to your p s onal att i is the 3 mediate i juirem-ent for additional civilian personnel in the technical service depots and other logistic installations.

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S E C R E T

As of * 31 May 19ol, tkere ^ ; -s a cumulative she gs of 568 civilian personnel from the 1^821 authorized for the 1$0>000 RVKAF force level. Ko new c bhori^ations have been i le to provide the inc] ved capability re- , quired for .the 20*000 man incn i e and the MAP support of t 68,000 Civil Guard force* Additional pe; pent as .11 as t : ry civilian personnel are most urgently needed so that the technical services will be able to properly receive^ account for* store^ issuej and maintain the significant tonnages of supplies and equipment scheduled to arrive on an accelerated basis begin: tag in mid-July. Although an interdepartmental commission Has been or' blished to solve this problem* little pro* - 3 has been made in augmenting the e n technican force. The inability of your technical services to process these supplies could veil retard the entire training and supply program. As KMG has made the urgency of this program its main reason for b ry re commendations ^ this must not happen.

I know that you share riy concern that the officers and n of Vietnam's military and para-military forces shall be veil uniformed and equipped as individuals, Tne transfer of the military clothing factory from its present inade ate quarters on Dai Lo 9?ran Hung Eao to a more spacious facility in the Quartier Pasteur is a matter of the greatest urgency* 5Ehe capacity of the existing uniform factory* 35;000 cc at uniforms per month^ is entirely inadequate to meet the demand - particularly since the supported forces basis has 1 tly increased - and the short: will become most critical by mid-July. Hew power sewing machines have T 1 procured from the U.S. but the moc tion to the new facility will not be completed until seme time af,ter the arrival of these machines in Saigon. In addition to action already in processj I feel that we must take additional urgent action to solve this problem, as soon as possible.

One final rcajor r or J would like to iaention has to do with the all important continv improvement of ARVIT tactical operations, As a result of its responsibility for continuing a ysis of operations against f VC* my £ ff has developed a synthesis of what apj to be recurring £ hne.sses .in the preparation for* and the conduct of } tactical operations

y GVil forces. 1 have disci d these f: time to tine with appropriate RVSFAF general officers and shall* of course, continue these discussions in the future. 1 have also furnish* neral Ty and General Minh with full . details of the MAAG analysis. There are seven general areaswhich re-' quire the continued attention of all concc-■ -d in'order to achieve the desired iinprovesent. Briefly stated; they ar« :

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S E C R E T

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'There appears to "be too icuch delegation of responsibility. and too little centralized control of tactical operations. Of course, decentralization in tactical operations is go 3 pr* Ice, if sufficient centralized .control is maintained to ensure active supervision by higher cc re-, Such is not alv ; the case, however, "because of a somewhat natural \ tendency for higher cc anders to stay fixed in offices and C?'s instead ;of gett out with subor&in* bes to vhom control has been delegated, to inspectj supervise, and give guidance needed to take advant of the developing tactical situation. In this regard., an essential adjunct to strengthening the chain of command is the establishment in the RVKAF of an effective inspection system-

3IWBBQUATS 1 LXGEHCE ABD IffiCOIIITAXSSAHCE

large forces, up to battalion size, are at times committed viihout sufficient knowledge of enemy locations- Consequently, these operations often produce negative results and are vast 1 of tine, energy and resources! Equally important, as they are non-productive, they are harmful to the morale and esprit of the officers i a. Better intelligence coordination bet. x civil and military intelligence agencies are indicated,

IHCOMPISTE PL' IIHG:

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In maoy ARVIF operations, the planning enphasis appears to be primarily 021 a scheme of usaneuver, with inadequate attention to sue!) other important aspects as sound coord:' tion, tea-;jorh ; task organic zation, fire support, air support, communications, supply and resupply, and administration. Each phase must he thought through and planned for in detail, from the initial recoana:u ance to locate the enemy, to his final destruction. Appropriate pL Lng, units and resources must be allocated to each of these phases if ve are to be successful,

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Operations are too often conducted by makeshift, "provisoire, " task forces urder a provisional co: tider, v':. j there are available regular unite of appropri* t* size and cosiDOsition, A- co. .;;der vho finds a issaeclikte opportunity to gain a victory, "p erly c its everything at his disposal into battle - often with provisional organizations* Bais, however, should be the exception, not the rule, Bie reason for units such as

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divisions* regiments and battalions is to provide a coordinated* smooth functioning testis c ; -ble of applying the oper degree of eosibat power to fit the specific situation. The colanders of such units,, %krc la" prior training exercises* have developed a 1 -i* they l-now their subordinates per: lly « they understand the unit's capabilities and limiti tions. Such is not normally true with "provisoire" organisations,

OVE- ! . 3XS OH EBRRAIH OBJECTIVES:

Junior leaders tend to become "fixed 1 * upon a particular terrain objective and there have been instances vhere opportunities to destroy VC have been Iqst in order to occupy a terrain objective on schedule*

I The solution lies in increased eiirphasis on the job of Jailing Viet Cong.

\ Subordinate cc Landers must be constantly ^reminded that their primary"

; mission is to destroy the Viet Cong who nonzBlly hit and then run to avoid

! casualties.

IMPROPER AHD INSUFFICIENT USB OF AIR AM) AETXIEEKE:

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Air and Artillery support are weap the VC do not possess and cannot effectively counter, Their advani must be exploited to aaxl urn. In many instances cos anders do not adequately plan in advance for this support. Air sup] art of operations,, properly planned* coordinated with the ground force's* and timely executed* provides the I ground comma] '. r extremely effective support, Too often* ground ! artillery support of operatipns lias been unobserved fire by i. is of nap •coordinates. This is the moat ineffective type of fire support and should ^rarely be used. Artillery support* for isaxiraum effectiveness; i be . observed and adjusted by observers on the ground with the forces being supported or in the air and in consro dLcation with the ground forces, Artillery end air support* \:hc:re applicable* must be preplanned vnd integrated into the overall plan for all major operations,

; 53SD FOE JW OFFENSIVE SPIBIT: . ,

Despite improves nt in this area* there is still too much reliance on defensive operations and reaction to Viet Cc initiative rather than taking the actual initiative ourselves. The ultr : solution does not lie in 'defending against the guerilla* but in boldly and energetically attacking him. Anti-guerrilla filters imist gal nd maintain the initiative and truly-becc le the hunter rather than the hunted. The Viet Cong often retains the initiative* even t h we take the offensive This is because he

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E E C R E T

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strikes unknown out of the jun. " s, swamps or mountains and then fades ] amy again* To prevent this, the KVHAF must penetrate and control ! these Viet Cong safe areas. Although the key to success is the spirit of the offensivej to permit the guerrilla to retain the initiative is to court ultimate defeat, 5he Viet-.■:■: : a Forces, to an ever increasing degree, must continue to c rry the fight to the enenjy, rather than permit him to select the time and place for battle. Larger guerrilla \ must "be hit

in their assembly areas and smaller groups must "be hunted down and destroyed le;' they are able to accomplish their mission, This, of t course ; requires proved patrolling and training; a clii 'e of assistance "by trie population to ensure accurate, timely intelligence* the ultimate in offensive spirit together with tactical in ation at all levels, and the highest order of t 11 unit 1 rship. Our current training programs are oriented in this direction but much remains to "be done to c tre uaaximum results,

Tiiis concludes jay discussion, Mr- President, Although we have previously tour i on many of these matters in our many discussions, I felt I should review the considerable accomplish! its we have made as a cooperative team, and highlight those ar< as in which I feel further corrections and improv leUts are reouired*

I am co dent that, by continuing to work together we can build an efficient fightd force, led by colanders duly invested with adequate com-

nd authority, and the fighting capabilities of the Armed Forces of Vietnam will continue to improve.

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF D ■: F

Subject: Increase of GVN Armed Forces to 270, 10 (C)

1, Reference is made to the moraoranclum by the Acting Assistai Secretary of Defense (ISA) dated.10 July 19&Ij subject as abovo a ro-QuestiTiP.*thc Joint Chiefs of Stafi to submit rc-coniner ;jons on in*-creasi g the Republic of VJ An Forces (RVNAF) to 270, 000.

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2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff do not belie-ve that an ultimate for(

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of 270, 000 would be required to enable the RVNAF to conduct counU*r-insurgency operation ; and concurrc tlly be prepared to meet overt

aggression

3,- The Joint Chief:; of Staff are of the opinion that for the for; able future the fores objectives for Vietnam of a nine division equivalent force (200,000) is adequate, Ti\e Joint Chiefs of 11 con i u to

assess the Gov, rrunont of Vietnam (GVN) and'RVNAF capabilities a no will b"7 prepared to recommend increases in the force objectives* for Vietnam should circumstances indicate there is a requirement.

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"4. The Joint C F of Staff recommend tl :

a,. ,The str< tegic force objectives for Vietnam rr:nhin at the nine division ecuivalenl force level (200, GOO), subject to future

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b. Priority efforts be continued to enhance the capabilities of the already authorizccl 20, 000 RVNAF augmentation, 1^8, 000 Civil Guard (CG), 48, 000-52, 000 Self Defense Corps CSDC).anr] the rotation and retraining of existing forces,

For the Joint; C ? ii Ts of Staff:

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THE WHITE HOUSE Washington

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August 11, IS

NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION i : .13UM NO. 65

(Supplement to National Security Action Memorandum K . [?2, dated May 11 1961)

TO: The Secretary of State

SUBJECT: Joint Program of Action with the Government of Viet-Nam

Following his review of the "joint Act Program Proposed by the Viet-Nam-United States Spec:! 1 Financial Groups to President Ngo Dinh Diem and President John F. Kennedy," the President on August *4 made the folio " g decisions:

1. The President agrees with the three basic tenets on which the recommendations contained in the Joint Action Program are based, namely:

a. Security requirements must, for the present, be given first priority.

b. Military operations will not achieve lasting results unless economic and social programs are continued and accelerai

c. It is in our joint interest to accelerate measures to achieve a self-; Lng economy and a free and peaceful society in Viet-Nam,

2* The United States will provide equipment and at- iistance in training for an increase in the armed forces of Viet-Nam from 170,000 to 200,000 men. In order to make this increase as effective as possible, the United States and Viet-Ham should sati . themselves, before the time when th< level of 170,000 is reached, on the following points:

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

a. That there then exists a mutually agreed upon geographically phased strategic plan for bringing Viet-Cor., subversion in the Republic of Viet-Narn under control.

b. That on the basis of such a plan there exists an understanding on the training and use of those 30,000 additional men, \

c. That the rate of increase from 170,000 to 200,000 will be regulated to per t the most efficient absorption and utilization of additional personnel and material in the Vietnamese armed forces h due regard to

Viet-Nairt's resources.

3. In view of the fact that the force level of 200,000 will probably not be reached until in 1963* a decision regarding the further increase above 200,000 will be postponed until next year when the question can be re-examined on the basis of the situation at that a. Meanwhile, the build-up in equipment and training of the Civil Guard and Self-Defense Corps within already agreed, levels should*be expedited.

k* Within the limits of available funds, the United States will provide the external resources required to implement the Joint Action Program, including commodity imports which can be justified and absorbed under the seven criteria of the J t Action Program (pp. 20-21). The parallel Committees of the United States and Viet-Nara will immediately cooperate in working out target estimates for an port program that will give the United States Government a basis for planning,

5. In order to direct the resourc of Viet-Nam to the highest priority requirements, Viet-Ram shoitLd be strongly urged

to undertake to generate piasters through the several means spelled out on pp. 22-23 of the Joint Action Program.

6. Strongly u ■ ;e early implementation by the Vietn sse of the recommendation reg Lng tax rei m and the princr s of

a single and realistic rate of exchange.

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number; NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

7. 'ie Ambassador should make c~ r to President Diem

that if this is to be a truly Joint effective effort, action. „ by each country must be related to that by the other. In particu , the U.S. attaches g t importance to the reasonable implementation of the agj criteria governing imports; we also consider the gaining of the effective piaster rate applicable to U.S. commodity aid, to which it is understood President Diem has already agreed, to be an indispensable part of our effort. Action by Viet-Nam on both of these matters will be very closely related to the U.S. contribution to the over-all effort. The Ambassador is authorized to assure President Diem that increased piaster realization per dollars worth of imports Till not be used as a reason for reducing the U.S. share of our joint efforts.

8. The President directs the Director of International Cooperation Administration to conduct through USQM Viet-Nam and in cooperation with app priate Vietnamese experts, a through

and expeditious review of the new proposals for em eney social action outlined in Section B of the Joint Program and of p ady ui rway which these proposals are

intended to suppler t.

9. In order to derive long-r benefits from our joint efforts to win in the present emergency, Viet-Kam needs long-range planning. Accordingly, urge 1 Vietnamese to create more

e< ctive planning m r inery to develop a lo ge plan and urge them to expedite the training of staff to carry on plar.ziing activities.* The Parallel C ittees should develop specific development projects in line with the general rec lations in the Joint Action Program.

10. Make clear, to Diem that we hope that one consequence of our

new joint efforts will be an effective projection to the nation, its friends and its enemies, of our confidence in a long-ran^

* Such planning activities should, inter alin , cover such particu] Ei as the use of medical manpower and teachers, for which Viet-Nana has cc Lag .civilian-military requi? bs<

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

future for an Independent Viet-Nam. In this connection the Ambassador should seek discreetly to impress upon President Diem that he should use the total U.S. program for the greatest political effect in his achievement of maximum appreciation of his government "by the people of Viet-Ham and the people of the world. (it is hoped that the Ambassador will continue his efforts to persuade President Diem to er ore folly in his civic action program non-Communist elements now in political opposition.)

11, The Parallel Committee should be given a maximum delegation of authority to assure follow-up action, approve modifications of the program and rr reo aend measures to improve and adapt the Special Action Program as the situation changes." In this connection, the President has emphasized that the chief responsibility for the planning and execution of the U.S. share of the program will, more than 'ever, rest with the Ambassador and, under his direction, with MAAG and USOM.

12 .The President shall be informed of matters arising in the

implementation of this Joint Pr i requiring his attention so that they may receive his im Hate consideration.

McGeorge Bundy

Information Copies to:

The Secretary of Defense

The Director, Inter al Cooperation Administration

The Director, United States Information Age .

The S etary of the Treasury

The Director, Bureau of the I ct

The Director of Central Intelligence

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

S E C U E X

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PROSPECTS FOR NORTH AND SOUTH VIETNAM

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THE PROBIEM

To assess the situations in North and South Vietnam, to analyze the nature and scope of the Communist threat to South Vietnam, and to estimate the prospects for the next year or so.

CONCLUSIONS

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1. The Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) has thoroughly consolic d its political control in North Vietnam and, with extensive Bloc assistance, will probably continue to make rapid economic progress. Regimental] on and food shortages have increased public unrest and dissatisfaction and resulted in sonic slackening of discipline among local officials. However, there is no significant organized opposition. The moderating influence of the aged Ho Chi Minh has v vented policy differences among top

'" / leaders from erupting into serious v iraparty strife. When Ho is no longer

tive there will probably be a struggle for power between the Moscow-oriented and-the Pelping-oriertted elements of the party. (Paras. 13, 15, 21, 23-25)

2. There is some dis tisf action in South Vietnam with Diem's leadership amo3 members of the cabinet, the bureaucracy, and the military, arising out of the serious internal security situation and irritatioj

.i Die lem of family rule -Diem

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has initiated a number of political reform measures, but probably will not relinquish his highly centralized method of government control. The degree of dissatisfaction will probably be directly related to the success or failure of the Government of Vietnam (GVK) efforts against Communist guerrilla and subversive activity. (Paras. 31, 34, 39)

3. The army will continue to be a major factor in future political developments in South Vietnam, We helix that the chances of a military coup have been reduced by recent manifestations of US support of the Diem government and by the substantial increase in US aid to help South Vietnam meet its internal security problems. Although there has been a d -crease in indications of coup-plotting within the military in recent months, cer-tain basic dissatisfactions with the national leadership persist. If the fight the Viet Cong s poorly during the next year or the South Vietname Army suffers heavy casualties, -tl

SECRET

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

SECRKT

i chances of a military coup would substan-) lially increase. (Para. 37)

4. A major Hanoi-directed Communist offensive against the Diem go it

and directed toward reunification of Vietnam under Communist control is uncle way. The Communist apparatus in South Vietnam, the Viet Cong, now probably has more thi 12,000 hard-core members and s ral thousand supporters engaged in guerrilla warfare, terrorist operations, political and propaganda activity, sabotage arid intelligence ac 1 ivities. This campaign is intended to assert Communist authority over increasingly large parts of the countryside in anticipation of setting up fully "li!_3ral areas" in which GVN authority is effectively denied, or of so weakening the Diem government as to precipitate: its overthrow, or both. At present, more than half of the rural area in the productive and highly pop lated region south and southwest of Saigon, as well as several areas to the northwest of Saigon, are under extensive control of the Communists. (Paras. 50-51)

l K

5. We believe that the Hanoi regime will increase the pace and scope of its paramilitary activity during the next ft months. South Vietnam's urban centers

ill probably be subjected to mere Lng f-ct Coiig terrorism. • Further Vict Cong

'/tempts to assassinate Diem are likely. However, we believe that with continued .high levels of US aid and a strenuous and effective GVN effort, the problem of Viet

Cong control of large areas of the countryside can in time be re 1. (Paras. 58-60)

6. Even if the GVN does reduce Viet Cong strength, it will require continued m -mum effort—military, political, and economic—to maintain its authority. South Vietnam will not be able to seal completely its borders with th Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia to the infiltration of material and personnel from North Vietnam. (Paras. 60 61)

7. Thus, the outlook in South Vietnam is for a prolonged and difficult struggle with the Viet Cong insurgents. At the same time that the government is prosecuting the military campaign in the war against the Communists, it will have to act to pre-vent internal weaknesses and strains from causing its collapse. Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese forces already control most of southern Laos except for towns along the Mekong, and if a Communist or leftist government comes to power in Laos the GVN struggle against the Viet Cong will take on new, more perilous dimensions. If there is a serious disruption of GVN leadership as a result of Diem\s death or as the result of a military coup any momentum GVN's coimterin-surgency efforts had achieved will be halted or reversed, at least for a time. The confusion and suspicion attending a coup effort could provide the Commu-nist an opportunity to se\ control of the government. (Paras. 61-62) ■

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; - \ 1961 /IS' 29 19 03 : TMB vvhitb i iousc

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NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMOR ANDUM NO, 80

August 297 1961

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SECRET

Dccisi.onB approved by the President at the Meeting on Southeast Asia j August 29, 19 61

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Participants: . ■

The Secretary of Defense • Mr. Alexis Johnson ^"

The Secretary of State Mr, John Sleeves - K \

The Attorney General Mr. Robert Johnson - »

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Ambassador Harriman ' General Taylor * Z.:

Mr. Allen Dulles Mr. Bundy' . v 2

General Lemnitzer . ' < " : ' :

Mr, Edward MurrOvv •'. ::

The President approved the following actions; . V

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1. An intensification of the diplomatic effort to achieve agreement to the Paris proposals on the part of Souvanna, especially by direct conversations between Ambassador Harriman and . I - Al

Sow/anna* with an emphasis not only upon the interlocking ■ >■ importance of the Paris proposals* but also upon U* S. support —.

of Souvarma in the event that lie accepts the Paris plan*

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2, Authorisation to undertake conversations with SEATO allies both bilaterally and with the SEATO Council, exploring the possibility of an enlargement of the concept of SEATO Plan 5, It must be understood that this exploration was in the nature of con t-ingency planning and did not represent a flat commitment of the ;••/"' . United Stateq lo participate in such an enlarged enterprise,

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3. An immediate increase in mobile training teams in Laos 'to include advisers down to the level of the company j to a total U„, S.. strength in this, area of 500, "together with an. attempt to get Thai agreement to supply an equal amount of Thais for the same purpose* . ■ .

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4, An immediate increaee of Z t 000 in the number of Mcos being supported to bring the total to a leva! of 11, 000.

5. Authorization for photo-reconnaissance by Thai or sanitized aircraft over all of Laos.

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It re assumed that these actions will be carried out under the general direction of the Southeast Asia Task Force under the direction of Deputy Under Secretary Johnson.

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/Signed/ McGeorge Bundy

CORRECTED page to National Security Action Memorandum No. 80, August 29.

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAF

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17 . 29

CFF SECY OF DEFENSE

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MEMORANDUM )R THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Plan for Military Intervention in Lao? (C)

1* Enclosed herewith is a proposed draft for a State-Dei se memorandum to the President concerning a plan for military intervention in Laos*

2, The Joint Chiefs of Staff concur in the presentation of the memo-randutn to the President at an early date.

Attachment

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff;

L. L. LEMNITZEB

Chairman Joint Chiefs' of Std

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EHCL0SU1

DRAFT

MEhSORAHjDUM FOR THE PRESIDE]

Subject: Plan for Military Intervention-in Laos (c.)

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The Secretaries of State and Defense have reviewed again the circumstances under which military Intervention in Laos might be undertakenj and the form of such action.

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Their conclusions are set forth below.

The Intervention Plan

It is the judgment of the two Secretaries that If the

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President decides that US forces should be employed in Laos^ SEATO Plan Five, augmented with South Viet Mam and additional Thai forces ; i3 the proper basic vehicle for the contemplated action. Along with the initial deployments coordinated action with South Vietnamese^ Thai, and Lao forces wonld be taken to expand Royal Laos Government control over additional areas

of Laos *

Circumstances of Initiation

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1, The plan would be initiated upon resumption of obvious and determined Contuuriist offensive actions -above the scale of violation of the current cease fire,

2. Initiation of the plan should be considered if large

scale enemy military strength and logistic build-up clearly

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Indicates imminent resumption of hostilities.

3. The Royal Laotian Government would have appealed to

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SEATO for assistance under the ]■:■ 11a Pact of 195 ; L

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

4, An urgent .meeting of the .UN Security Council would have been requested, to apply pressure on the USSR to establish an effective cease-fire, A resolution would be introduced into the Security Council which would contain the following elements!

a. Security Council endorsement of Lao neutrality and territorial integrity, ' °

b. A call to establish an effective cease-fire,

c. The sending of small UN teams to Laos to be positioned at strategic points throughout Laos.

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5. If such a resolution were vetoed by the USSR in the Security Council, a move into the UNGA would promptly be made,

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6. Simultaneously with the initiation of United Nations action. SEATO would proceed with the necessary measures for

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intervention. Thus, it would mean treating the United Nations action on the same basis as that at the time of the Lebanon

crisis. It would not exclude public statements that SEATO

'■ . . . *

forces would be withdrawn if the United Rations reached agreement on appropriate measures.

Political Objective To confront the Sino-Soviet Bloc with a military force of Free Asians and Western Powers capable of stopping the

Co^ronunist 'advance through Laos into South Viet Nam,, Thailand id "Cambodia by: * . .

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OP SECRET

a„ Expanding Royal Lao Government control in the strategic "panhandle" of Laos, particularly along its border with South Viet Nam, to prevent the outflanking of the 17th para] 1 el <,

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b c Preventing Communist advances to the border of Thailand where they could easily supply and step up their insurgency effort among the Vietnamese ethnic minority in Northern Thai 1 and.

o. Bringing about a de fact o cessation of further Communist thrusts into the territory of the Royal Lao Government*

It would be made clear publicly that the political objective of this military intervention is to stop Communist expansion in Southeast Asia, (t would also be made clear that the forces involved would be authorized to take the required action to successfully accomplish this mission. Enemy military actions would not alter the political objective, but such actions could compel military responses not necessarily confined to Laos.

MILITARY OBJECTIVES

K To minimize United States military involvement by obtaining increased participation and coordination among the military forces Laos, Thailand and South Viet Nam,

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2. To protect the borders of South Viet Nam, Thailand and Cambodi a.

OP SEC T

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

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3# To restore Southern Laos to the complete control of the ..Royal Laotian Government.

4. To prevent further territorial loss In laps, 5f To preserve and maintain, to the extent feasible the home-lands of the MEO tribesmen.

Force Involvement

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1, The combat forces In laos would number approximately 2^^100k men^ on a SEAT0~< ented basis, US forces In laos would be • , ' 5,500 4 The remainder of the SEATO forces of approxi tely 22,700, including 11*000 US air and logistics forces ; would be based in

Thailand. This does not include US Naval forces which may be committed to support the operation and a SSATO General Re rve

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of c.,000 personnel; none of which is USj regained in the parent country,

2 # The augmentation Indicated above consists of one Thai

a. a

division (11,'i-OO) less the units previously committed, (3,300) to

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SBATO under Plan 5 and a minimum of one South Viet Mam regimental

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combat team of 2/J 00. ■ 3* See the Appendix for total forces involved

Areas of Action and Military Time Phasing

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1. Execute the current SEAT0 .Plan 5, augmented, * "2. The initial lift of SEATO' forces (other than Thai)'would be directly into laos from areas out.) Thailand, .

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3. The areas to be occupied would initially Include key

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 NND Project Number; NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

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this wpuld. mean as many as possible or the following; Vientiane*

Paksane, Thakhek* Seno* Savannakhe'tj and Pakse. It is not con-

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tempi at cd that tlie forces would occupy any area held by

opposition forces such as Xieng Khouang or the w Plaine des

Jarres.

4* Upon the completion of the initial deployments of SEATO

*

Plan 5 military actions will be expanded as fallows:

a. Thai augmentation forces Will operate in the Sayabouri Province area to include the town of Luang Prabang,

b. South Vietnamese Forces of a minimum of a Regimental Combat Teem will operate in Laos along the common border between the two countries,

c. SEATO forces occupying Mekong River areas will support

and £0 3"st the Royal Lao Forces in cleaning Communist forces

from the areas of Northern Laos bordering Thailand and from »

al 1 of S ou fcb e r n Lao s (p ai) h an die)*

Initial Rules of Engagement

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1, Short of expanded Viet Minh or Chinese Communist inter-vention or a broad Pathet-Lao offensive, the forces employed in Laos would oceuoy and secure the selected areas together

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With airfields and Mekong Riv'_ -r* crossing's in the vicinity,

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Tney would take counter-guerrilla action as necessary to protect lines of communication,, would prevent harassing action against their position* and would resist any force attacking their

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

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2. The SEATO force would furnish material and logistic

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support to Royal Laos Forces. ' ' •' 3 . The SEATO Force would participate in offensive operations against the-insurgents by providing Hbyal Lao and-South Vietnamese Forces.assistance with air support, including combat air support, co^unication, psychological warfare and with other special

operations•

Enemv Forces

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1. I nsurgents now in Laos

The insurgents now operating in Laos.,

consisting of

about 31,100 (Kharo Guano/Kong Le forces - 12,000; Pathet Lao forces 15>900; Viet Minh technicians and troops ~ 3y200)

would be capable of harassing, guerrilla-type operations

^

against SEATO forces in Laos. These operations[would most likely be directed by Worth Vietnamese cadres ^wi* til ".North

Vietnamese" technical and logistic support and Bloc airlift, Coirominist insurgent forces employed coiild vary from platoon-si:^e to several battalions, including medium artillery support, 2 * Nor^h Viet Nam and Conmiunlst China

a. Although the Con nist have iH North Vietn< bo; and". 21 Chinese Divisions which could be employed in Southeast Asiaj the geographic and logistic limitations of the

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terrain in Laos prevent the effective support of more th ■

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eight divisions. Communist ground force capability in*

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

Laos are limited by tonnage capacity* of road routes and air heads. The eight division capability, is based on a

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120 short ton per day divisional requirement (12,500 men per division). This represents the maximum capability during the dry season. During the rainy season the Communist capability would be reduced to introducing approxi mately five light regimental units. Communist logistic air

support would be limited by airfield capacities. - : b. The question of open counterintervention by Communist *

Bloc forces is in large part dependent upon ..the manner and

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the circumstances under which S3 0 forces are introduced in

Laos, The communists might well react simply with a politic;:! and diplomatic c paign to force withdrawal of SEATO forces. If counterintervention did occur, the Communists would be unlikelyj at least initially, to seek direct engagement of

SEATO forces witn regular North Vietnamese or -Chinese

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Communist forces > although there probably would be guerrilla

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harassment using lt volunteers" or unacknowledged forces to

sutoDleinent the in ;ents nov; in Laos,

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

TOP SECRET

APPENDIX

TOTAL FORCES JKV'O 5D SEATO AUGMENTED

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United States

Thailand

C o turn b n \>i e a 11 h

Australia

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Nevr Zealand Pakistan Philippine 3

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South Vietnam

TOTAL

In Laos

5,500 11,1*00

Moo

United Kingdom (l/lOO)

1,600)

(1,>!00) 1, '100

2,700

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25,700

Support and Reserves

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11,000

3,300

3,5

If, 700

200

22,700

To ta 1

16,500

l J l-,700

7,900

6,100

200

2,700'

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^{8,100

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ROYAL LAOS PORC}'

Regular Army

. MSO Forces

*

38,500 11,000

Other Defense Forces 29,800

TOTAL Laos

79,300

GRAND ',

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,

127,^00

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 633 16. By: NWD Date: 2011

. . secret/;: Copy No

r-«-JV. X^::■■ . DEPARTMENT OP STATE

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BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

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4 . ;j RFJS-1, Sept r 2% 1961

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south vi :: crisis mb skg rqspects 1 NjlV*

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ABSTRACT . \'

Since late 1959 the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam) has bean faced with greatly accelerated, diversified, and unremitting Cc tunist guerrilla and terrorist w are and subversion directed and supported by the: North Vietn . r.. regime. During this.] lod the ar 3 component of ths Coiamunist apparatus has grown from 3>C00 cadres to a well-organised, ade-" quately arieed, and inc singly aggressive gUerrilUa-terrorist force o£ about 17,000 as a result of ste] t-up infiltration and recruitment locally Although Conanuuist in ed operations arc concentrated in the rural areas of* the Mekong River delta, they have, spread to the once relatively quiescent central and northern provinces and have occurred increasinj closer to urban areas. The im Late Cowniunlst objectives arc to demoralize the peasantry, weaken and supplant government authority in the countryside,, , and discredit President Hgo Itinh Diem ! s leadership to the point of precipitating his overthrow,

Ccirtmimist progress toward these objectives has been substantial* Kore than one-half of the entire countryside in the highly productive Mekong River delta, as well as some areas north of Sa5-gon and in the central provinces, have coma under varying e s of Cosmunist control* In many ox these and other areas f the GoimnuxiistSj have restricted the flow of rice to- the marketing centers > forced the curtailment of government agrarian and ot3 r rural programs, and gained control of xaany inland Waterways, thereby ar sely effect" the economy. Since the beginning of I960, Communist guerrillas and terrorists have killed or kidnapped more than 6,500-civilians, local officials, and sec ity and military personnel, thus increasing the shortage of trained local ad dnistrators '. ' . and weakening morale partie axlj? a ag the security servicesand the local civil bureaucracy. Moreover, in the of the government's inability to provide adequate protection to the populi i in many r ■ 1 areas, Cc unist reprisals and propaganda haw. a|gravated ] . sant diss ' iti<jn,.and have n:ade the peasantry relx" it to participate in

local gov ' projects nd to assi! the security forces with vitally needed m intsllig . on the C ' sts.

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1* This j •;-:• is based on mat* Lai prepared as a contribution to

NB 14.3/53/61 £ sts for ] 1_South Vj r u At tst 15; 1961. It has been Lially : ' ' for j " tion at the present time.

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SECBSa7MQ?0HK

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The domestic political repercussions of the Coi aunist insurgency lave also t j severo^ Numerous officials at all levels of the govern-* roent and the military and security establish) its have criticised Dieiri J s handling of the security siti 'Ion and have serious!? questioned his m ability to lead the people during what 1 y rag : the most critics!

period since the end of the Ina " L] a war* Their concern with tl 3 Cc .i~ nist threat;, ho-. ' &t s is almost inseparably entvined with an a ecu. ration of gric^.eaes principally over Dieat's failure to delegate responsibility*, the power exercised by members of Piem*s family, and Dien's methods of policing the attitudes and loyalty of the government bur) *aey« O3 n deprecation of Diesa's leadership on these and other g: und3 has also increased sharply among intellee-b_;al-*Glite circles and disgruntled ex** politicians in Saigon, largely a politically impotent however vocal lot, and to a lesser orient, among labor and business elements.*

Recent de% r elopriients*—including Dion's outstanding success at the preaic ial polls !ast April and some mi st political reforms to date but, more importantly; strong US public manifestations of support and a substan^ tial increase in US military and economic aid—haw given Diem so:. ng of a political reprieve. However« th political situation regains fluid and^ as yet, there has teen no conclusive reversal of de" ;orating tie ;, Although reports of coup-plotting and of criticism of Dicra have dec sad in recent months, their persistence is indicative of the continuing and potentially explosive political situation in * Vietnam* Moreover, below tie surface of open c -tent, there i$ probably a growing and increar ly

desperate element of dissenters who are silent either because of being suppressed or because of the realis Ion that there is lit can do legally to improve conditions.

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Neither has there been any conclusive 5 c e ant in the security situation although the governments comprehensive counterirsurgeje•;, j gra supported by substantial US aid, is beginning to show favc le results♦ Th Qomimnists can I .cted to maintain a pressing and diversified campaign of guerrilla-terrorist and subversive fare, and there are strong ie v "u ns they will atl t a greater ar Tort after the end of the rainy season later this year; hour .. e, they may continue 'to avoid any large-scale ere gent with the increasingly ressivo Viet: e a: , except in placee at til of their own choosing. In the short run, the Cc 1st a; - us does not apj r to have the capacity to foment a large-scale insurrection or to .sei^e control of the governreen-t without considerable assis ' f o:g Ik Vice a, which would necessarily 1 \ c " such 1 gnituda that it wou3 be ' ita-mount to overt r y aggression, Barring-such a development ' no given effective impl* trfcation of the couni . : e. e jy p! 1 TggcvES&iA should be able to ra t the level of G surds t 3 - gen . during ihe'n^::^

year or so and co h bly even re.. the trend a: ' -t the Communist* ; In

the le - xLij Go: " ' inse: :. tially re :ed but the

govee; nt r ■. t, within the fc .Me future^ elii ' it entirely,

^rincixally b of 1 nt T s 11 ' ility to real c Sou c

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1

Security prospects over the next year, 1 :ver 5 may well be influenced more by developments in neighboring Laos than by extent to which the

Lem gover can Im] rove the effectiveness of its military and security forces* If Laos comes under predominantly 0 mist control, C* 1st capabilities in South Vietnam would almost certainly be strengtl to a degree unprecdented since 195^. * Southern Laos could becca the most important base for 0 amist ns Inst South Viet ■ In this event, the level of Communist insurger . ;ht assume the proportions of widespread guerrilla warfare and some areas would probably c ier complete C mist control, within which Hanoi raj ht attempt to establish a Communist but ostensibly independent government with both military and political support from the Bio Vietnam's agricultural economy would suffer further and urban centers prob? wo\ild be increasingly subjected to mist guerrilla and terrorist attacks designed to heighten anxiety in the centers of government power and spark a non-Communist coup effort.

In the face of a Consmmist offensive of such proporti \ 9 South Viet: would be required to make a maximum military effort in order to survive. There juld be no imme ate collapse. In the long run, to «, the maintenance of South Vietnam's independence would rest principally on the nature and amount of US support and on a maxi; effort by the South Vietnamese Government to develop the political, psychology . and ee Lc programs required to gain and r ' ' in popular su] ) t-

The stability of the gover- nt during the i jar or so, will depend principally on Diem's handling of the secur situation. If Diem can de strata a continuing improvement in security eonditii s, he should be able to strengthen his position, alle Late concern boost morale within his bureaucracy and military establii snt, and lessen the urgency m h which many of tl members view the current situation. However, If the figh gainst the Comra goer, poorly or the South Viet ;e Army suffers heavy casualties, the chance of a coup would substantially inere . ] *over, a coup may be atterag i at any time. The odds favor a c if security declines appreciably further,

ticularly if accompanied by a virtual Communist takeover of Laos,

Any coup attempt during the next year or so is likely to be non-Co- L in leadership, involving army elements and civilian officials and perhaps some di oppositionists outside the goverr. ant* The -ticipating elements

probably would be broader t the involved in the i960 attempt, would have greater popular pport* and would be better prepared to execute their plan guic r and successfully- Moreover, a maji lit . in the military le-ship does not appear likel,/: most of the generals probably Id elect to remain uric dtted i t the outset of the coup, as they ap] tly did in November 1 their tacit c active support to whatever side they

judged 1" ly tc win, Ui e circumstances, a military coup ati pt . uld have better than an even chai ■ to succeed,

Diem's removal—wl . - militi \ p, assassinate 1

from accidental or natural causes- Ld consic st the p x

of the military , The c I s appear a' b ov b amove led by

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

secret/uofoj

military junta or by Vice President Tho, with ' u ., playing a r if not the predominant role behind the scenes* On the one hand, the military might conclude that a military-lc vernment would be better able 1 maintain national unity and i trt al political cohesion and, more import* Ly, to conduct a determined and effective c aign Inst the 0 mraunists. On the other hand, they might conclude that T . who has been on good terms with some of the present military leaders, would not disagree with their views on the manner of conducting the fight against the C mists and 1 his constitutional succession would legalize the change in government a avert a serious power struggle. / er important far ich would almost certainly enter into the calculations of the military would be the fortunes of the coup group in South Kc and the cc of US-ROK relations. In any event, a government led by the milit .-, by Tho, or by any ( sr civilian apprc 1 by the military would probably maintain Vietnam's pro-US orientation.

If a military coup or Diem's death ser" "Ly disrupted government leadership, any momentum the gov : j nt T s countering! ;eney efforts had achieved probably would be halted and possibly reversed, at .1 east for a time. Moreover, the confusion and suspicion attending the -niption would provide the Communists an opportui to stren en ; Lr position in the countryside, and they might even be embol tied to attempt to s Lze control of the government. Since a serious split within tb ilitary leadership does not appear likely, C Lst attempts to take oifer the government in Saigor Id probabJ fail.

press

In the ntiine, the Diem it will almost certainly eontJ i to for increased, aid, further expansion of the armed fore. . and a clear priority ( ilitary over political and ecc ic efforts to undercut the Coram.' ' rfc ii :y, 1' • will be adamant in his views as to how the anti-Corn; dst camp* should be waged and will tend to regard US differences with such views or criticism of his inner cir le as indications of Log U3 confidence in him. In the event of another coup effort against him, he would probably € and s ; US public support- Diem will also continue

to press the US for a strc i-cor 1st j rfcure in the Far East. If he ncludes that this posture is weaken!: ;. he will almost certainly e str protests and bee increasii ve and stubborn in his relations with

the US. I ver, in the absence of any accej able alternative to US supp and assistance to S Vie is likely to avoid jeopardjzing seriousl;

Lc US-South Vieti ties. In d probably sc to establis

closer t with the US by sue 1 ns as a 1 defense treaty and poss y the st' of US forces in Couth Vietnam if, for e pie, the C .unists ta over Laos or* Communist China ach] s a nuclear car.' 'lity. Failure of current int Lonal effo to establish a neutral Laos or a resumption of all-out rebel military operations in Laos would great];; tempt Diem to in-e substantially fc forces i s in order to pr

plete C ol of a; Diem would pr US-Thai

participation as well as as: s that the US d^f .. nth Vieti i ' case such act" i aggress i by North Viet. .. pie \ id s

be 1 t in another plot t ro dr

ban the event the latter 1 too accc dat Coi 1st pressure in the area,

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1

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The past year and a half has witnessed a marked d ion in

-the E&eurlty and political situations in the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam) j overshadowing all other internal deyel aits and breaking the reli ive stability and general surface calm that had prevailed since president Ngo BInh Diem consolidated his authority in 19$$*$6* She Communist clar bir apparatus • <-« maintained atxi directed by the Communist ;'■ regime to the north, the Democratic Republic of Vieti; (ERV) »** has stepped" up £ts gi.ertfilla^* • terrorist, and other subversive activities to levels ynprcccdonced since fee end of -the Indochina hostilities (19l*6~5&)« She gravity of the security situation in turn has generated serious critic i of Dieffl*e leadership both in and outside tha government bureaucracy^ in-" eluding the military establish] tent, and has aj ravated disco: t at among the traditionally politically apathetic peasantry! Eiesa trends were climaxed In an abortive anti-Diem coup in £ Lgon in November i960 by a small group of middle level and junior a: ratroop officers and civilian :-

opp osition i s t s c

■ • »

As in the p ^ Dieri and his alc&e advisors te:xl to viciv virtually every problem besetting their country as caused directly or indirectly by thedual Cornnunlst threat of internal subversion ar.d r::U : 1 a c ion<

In their pla< tl : cfore. they continue to give the absolute highest

priority to military and secu y measures direc I toward x-tfiat they consider to ho their most urgent taskss 1) to defend against Communist encroachment essentially by maintaining a larger and stronger military establish nt (with substantial 1)8 aid); z ^ ?\ to-maintain firm control over the bureaucs .cy and c- • the military and security establishments in order to prevent their use to dislodge Diem and his advisors fron pcifer and in order to organise the population to s^rxo t 'r programs* ' At the same tim§j the Vietnamese leadership is no less anxious"to keep the people Ted "and supplied at a level sufficient to i -i' serious unrest., -' - ;

'.."

- . In J)iem*s scale of values, democracy * in the sense of individual '*

freedom, although it rcr s an ulV be goal, under present circv noes frequently ranksbelctf (and lias sometimes been inimical) to those urgent tasks* While eschewing tha systematic xc- ' mtatlon.end repression of the population cha;- pter'i : c of North Vietnam, Diem a?:d other governs lit-■lei Jers are Peeking to st:* late a I tf cfo) art by the * *

people of South Vietnam than yet obtainse' Although attempting to do so viihin the i-v: :;. ■: of cc titutlonal [ ramentj arv conflict bet a the t;o is gel ally in favor of 1 tral authority*

Accordingly Di 5 has been willing to r lutein the forms of repres l tive insti ions aiid the p: s of civil rights instituted whsa the

Rcpi: c of Vietnam :, first est^ 'i at the coiutXy continues to

be g rnsd in an ai " Dritari t&sq ] by Diem's patern? '• : -' Lc

outlooka It is not c rtain t th - institutii 1 trgfamovk of g< rarn- ' -weni would survive the death or n - , d of Tr' ■/ : , its croc '. \ • ' \

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6.

. ShB deterioration of the security and political situations has contributed to sense deceleration in the pace of economic gro?rth, E: snsion in both the agricultural ai:d Industrial sectors has .continuedj hefterop, and the South Vtetr people re&ainj if not prosperous at least relatively

. il-off in tern- of Southeast Asian living standards, Nonetheless^ the economy Is stUl heavily dependent on US aid, and there is the grating fear that ! h of "the economic progress achieved *to date ray be undona by th;

g

jts whose efforts in this direction give testimo^.of a major obj^o

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In foreign affairs, the South Vietnamese cover:/:, has sought to maintain its close ties with the US but. until recently, Biera and some of his top advisors have teen critic?.! and resentful of many urgent US recoi endations and oven doubtful of US political support for their regime.

m

During the past fe>i months, a clear and public reaffirmation of US supporl and increased US assistance, on the one hand, and on the other * Diem's willingness to push ahead more vigorously with expanded rr.e; ires to fight the Coaanunists have provided a basis for a continuing close relationship bet. i the US and South Vietnam, The South Vietnamese^ Government is most urgent concern, however, has bean with the crisis in neighboring Laos, Ct mist insurgent fore and capabilities in South Vietnam have been ■appreciably strengthened by infiltration across the Lao frontier, and fee South Vietnamese Government is £■ sly alarmed at the prospects

of a Communist takeover of Laos, In the South Vietnamese Government's view, CcHsmnist activities in Laos are part of a broader and coordinated

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encroachment.

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4

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.II. THE C 1ST T} v r .< H ' ;

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Since the cessation of the Indochina hostilities and the partition v of Vietnam at the l?th parallel in 1954 by the Geneva Conference, the DM while holding ever the Republic of Tj > an implied threat of eventual invasion by-its numerically superior military forces, has used armed guerrilla and t 1st warfare, penetration; Sabotage," bluster, and pro-pagandaVin an effort to weaken and disrupt its rival and eventually extend Coiomunist control over all of Vietnaia, These activit s have been carried out by a covert Ooimmmist subversive apparatus of aimed cadres and political agents, c ..or^ h n as ifaft Viet Cong, left behind by the. DRV after it withdrew/ most of its military forces" to l: in 1954 and reinforced since then by infiltration from North Vietnam and by recruit: b locally*^ In the meantime ? the DRV has assiduously attempted to give the impression that it abides in every C bail "with the Geneva Accords and has urged the holding of Vietnam-wide elections (as provided for by the Geneva Accords) ' and the unification of the country* . .

A, ^actios and Objectives * ■*' '-*"„' ''

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1. First Post-Ge va Phase: 195A-57 From 1954 to about 1957, Communist subversive activities in South Vietnam were largely non-viol* ^ in lino with the DRV l s new tactics of saaxiraizing the Apolitical" stm le and minimizing the "armed* 1 struggle- as* the means to brin^ about the .d i-fall of the p cariottsly weak Triors governments The Communist le lersbip in Hanoi probably viewed the future with c ?idence in view of the polit- \ ical chaos and economic dislocation prevailing in the South, Howeverj ; the success of Ciem and his lieutenants in forgi; ;: a stable goveri at and . an effective armed force to withstand both-Columnist and non~C cruras t :• ■6ub\ sivo pressures and in moving rapidly against critical economic problems (with considerable US assistance) and Diem's persistent refusal to enter into any political negotiations with the DRV (much less permit area-vide elections under conditions which would assure a Goi must Majority), contributed to a readjustment in Co&munist tactics. Other probable contributing factors were the concern of the TBV leadership over South Vietnam's .inc sin close alij nt with the 15 } consid p; is'bytho ©on st regime in consolidating its control in North Vietnam, and ths poor rrale of the hard-pressed Cos • Lst apparatus in South Vietnami

Viet Cc is the ) 3d by the South Viet . \se to refer

to Viol. se Coaenunists, singularly or collecti &y. For all practical pur is, the Viet C ' is is an e>: I nsion of the

th V:i re Oobcbi list P y; t! D ; Lao J~: ' r Viet y ; or i ely Ia.o ] . y ■ Lob also o] £ bes in Laosj.C; 3 other c :.". ies , \ with imj nt V;.ei ity i ivBi - — - -s ^"T '

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

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howeverj a planned ■

2 °' §SKSSLE2i ! 1^.57-59, Communist armed activities

01* all types began increasing in mid-1957* 'I gely of a terrorist type^ involving as: Laations, kidnappingsj I binr-s, eto C j thess actions were . concenter >$ in remote parts of the sout] srn and southwestern provinces* or the former Coehinehina are&j were "carried out by a few or several armed cadres, and were aimed principally at local administrative officials } police and security personnel, and village leaders* Within a year, it was clear that the Qommunist 3 iership in Hanoi was conducting and increasingly diversified; although still low-level, armed c i^n in South Vietnam^ coordinated with stepped-up proper:: ' :1 wad other non-violent ■ . subversive activities and designed to weaken security and government authority in rural areas and da: IQ'ga 3;■.; ■■■> thg peasantry1 In addition to the continuing rise in terrorist incidents s the number of guerrilla raids against'small security and army units and remote villages increased^ reflecting greater Communist armed c bilities and aggressiveness, Vic' -/■ c i diligence sources, however > est3 j the armed component of the Communist apparatus at Just over 2,000 which included dome remnant armed bands of the once--; Dwerful One ?ai and : Sao religious sects and of the Binh Xuvon bandit organis ' ion. By the end ox 1959; estimated ( 1st armed strength reached 3*000, with a proportionate

incj in the size of attacking guerrilla bands* Dicing this period, Communist terrorists are believed to have assassinated or kidn ed a total of at least 1,100 persons, in addition to the number of military and security sonnel killed during armed or a tions t 2 * ,

Present Phase, Since the latter part of 19595 the Communist

apparatus has waged an intensive and consid cably expanded terrorist-guerrilla offensive in South Vietnam j supported by increasingly eff ive proj »nda and intelligence operations* Terrorist acts against local officials and civilians and guerrilla raids against army and security units have in ed to levels unprecedented since the end 01 the Indochina war* The n \ of persons ass inated and kidnapped Sarins i960 alone is more than double the total for 1957-59;. Cc nist armed strength has more than quintripled, substantial parts of the countryside have come under varying > of Cc nist control.and poli al influence! travel thourfiout most of the countryside has becoras extremely hazardous, ai orist acts in Saigon itself have increase

2 t * These and other statistics on casualties inflicted by Go 1st' or goX'e'rnT.ient forces are rased on 'official Vietnamese sources/ are not fcomp'letslyReliable 3 and should h conside: 3 essentially as .indicative of the order of magnitude of the fight: in South Vietnam,

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Because of geographic, logistical^ and other considerations* Coosai-nist .activities arc concentrated, as in the past, in the highly populai and productive forme? Coefainchink region. .The terrain, most of \?Moh is sv/ampj as in the Mekong River delta, or vi: Xly jungly as- along the -Cambodian frontier, has favored hit-and-run tactics and infiltration from (and regrou] sat in) Caaboctta., Since'the latter part of I960, however, the Xfer mists have steppaa up substantially their i tied, operations in tlio once rolatj ly quiescent central and northern provinces, While this I iy he partly a tactical Lianuever to relieve incrcasing government pr ure on Gonamuiist forces in the southern provinces, ths Communist leadership may be in the process of rang a second major IJ front M in an area where the prospects of infiltrating c es from neighboring southern Laos have bece more favor, than ever before, In any event, the size of Co&rauhist forces in the central and nortl .has increased

eatly, and Communist capabilities there are likely to :" ovc still further. Other infiltration routes are across the Demilitarized Zone along the 17th parallel and by junk landings along South Vietnam's long '*

astline, ■ , *

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Judging from their actions and f£o*n alleged secret directives from K ' : , the C LUnists appear to* be aiming at isolating as Much of the countryside as po sib] from urban centers (as they were able to do to a considerable extent during the Indochina' hostilities)) h 'ng to weaJ; the goveriEnent and utlimately precipitate its overthrow * The plan apparently has teen to build \rp sufficient armed strjspgth in relatively : inaccessible areas (including areas under Cc: rinist influence since 1954) . where,cadres, could rest, train; a: -roup and fr ch operations could bo launchedc The Communists presumably hope that ths number and size of these-areas could be progressively increased and'that they .could eventually become completely Cc unist-controlled and strong enough to resist attack hy E r t forces, By Columnist definition, they would then constitute "liberated' 1 areas, Sinae al it the aidcELe part of this year, however, Communist guerrilla and terror' t attacks have occurred closer to urban -areas than ever before, and provincial capitals have boon'attached and .-- held -i rily- - ■ ■ '■" -• - " ■ . . • , .. ;

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..,-..:....:. The Cc mists, have also stepped up their propaganda and other non-violent subversive activities, particu rly during the past six months

, In urban areas, they have ; Kt to exploit diss tisfaction with Diet's leaxlership v among'iion-*Coii^unist opposition and lal and youth groups and have urged cooperation in a popular f at against Diem, 1 y have announced the creation of a ^national liberation Front", reportedly c : d of various youth; viomens', labor, and < I r groups ai 3 equi; ; r with its n . news ag : ...y and mobile radio tr n . Lti , ostensibly to give the Cerrirrist conspiracy the facade of political 3 " . • y and broad political sir _ *t„ Efforts to p trate 1 gov snt serv: s and the military and security

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e^tablisJMsnts have also incro & e In rural arcasj the CoiflsraniB-ts have attempted to subvert local government projects and insp' anti-govarams

ttonstrations and have undertaken major c: is to gain control c r th;

tribal minorities and to aggravate economic,conditions* ' *

B« Gojnasunist Acer in] itr

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Ceramist successes since the hggi] rung of I960 have been high* Probably the most significant gain has been the spread of Gonmiaiist control and influence over Increasing sectors of the countrywide largely through organized coercion and terrorism* The number of Oo^iunist cadres and co ts is pro: Qy small in most villa; ^ but in tho absence of government forces sufficient to protect the-village against reprisals ; those inclined to sup; ri tho government and turn agai&st the OoMituhists are effectively contained. The high rate of assassinations of local officials and retaliatory i^x^oxs^ moreover $ is a continual reminder of the penalty ox noncooj:eration v;ith the local Cotnraunist forces t

-

Although the Coiamunist armed*-political apparatus does not appear to have succeeded in coraplel . supplanting the government over any ^X hie area, it Is believed that more than one-half of the entire rural region south and soul st of Saigon, as vxell as several areas just to the north and in the central p: inces, ma.y be under substantial C i;iist control by night^ v/ith the government generally capable of maintaining its authority only by di x y t However, in r ?. of these areas (for ex pie, portions of the Ca Kau peninsula and of the swampy PI " e des Jones), the Ccswaun&sts have benefitted froin the extended al ace of sufficient goverj nt military and security forces and reportedly exercise considerable control by day as veil as by night. Moreover, these areas are believed, to be dangerously close to 1 ming "liberate ; areas, the Communists frequently being reported levying and collecting taxes, directing the harvesting and controlling the distribution of rice and other farm products, conducting indoctrination pro- s on the populace, conscripting cadres, and setting up overt party c Lions and provisional local government units similar

to those established during the Indochina fighting t • , .....

Another highly nifleant gain by the Communist network has been the sharp increase in . m& in the armed Capability of its guerrilla-ierrorisl force* . Total armed str th is nw esii ed at about 17,000 and the n of po* ical agents, all h* still unknown, probably has also increased. The bulk of the Coi list araied force is still distributed in the sout! n ; :;ion, ( ' the substantial increase of forces in the rest of the country* Trie total r rical increase in strength, .vrMch is due both to steppsd-up infilv; tion al I recruitment locally, enabled the Corn : i ts duri! . st of I960 to op te frequ ttly in large /bands and 'on s6va": -1 occasions of sev al hundred armed personnel, e,g., during the . tack on an army r " al }.■ _■ rters in Tay Nia h In Ja; ry I960

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

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and the series of attacks against army and other £ t outpost; in

the Koxrt Pleiku area in C ■ >or l?3£a Since the beginning of this year, GGrjaufiist guerrillas have generally oper in smaller bands,

..king it more difficult for governs it forces to find s andj I® theft* Bov?ever, a series of attacks principally against aeeadty for this month has report; Ily involved about 1,000 C: 1st personnel* . • - --

. —: . She" capture of weapons and equij t has signifies y improved Cc .mist armed capability. Communist bands a] t to be acbqi ! ly arayga yith a variety of small weapons, frequently utilise light machine-guns and

nor s and occasionally rocket la rs and reeoiH rifles, and are

hecoamg increasingly adept in the r. otnre and use of land mx&& and

other explo3J *•, During some engagements, Comt&inist.. guerrillas have toon reported veariag South Vista Uitary unifozaiSj Complete i/ith

steel helmet^ utilising night flares, land vehicles, and motor-boats, and being aided by radio cc unications,

•

The casualties, inflicted by Col tUnist terrorists and guerrillas have been heavy. According to incomplete officii X Vietnamese statistics, Cc ianist terrorists a .ssifiated about 3,000 local, officials and civilians and kidnapped almost another 1,&00 iron January I960 through June 1961, while.Goiiimunist guerrillas killed about 2 ; 700 military and security personnel during ax 3 cngag saents from ifey I960 t] rough June 1961. In ; comparison, the goverment clai that about 19,000-20,000 Communists have been killed or t iptured dicing i960 and the first half of this y* c 9 but this-estimate appears exaggerated. In any event, the ca Ities inflicted by the OoBnnunists have b: sufficient to aggravate the existing shortage of exp* ' \ ed local government officialsj weaken mor particularly among the local bureaucracy and the security sei " 3, and " ' foment peasant discontent 0 '• • . • • *

The effects of the Co 1st guerrilla-terrorist campaign in t3 countryside has been severe in .other Respects* Government operations in many areas have 1 m constantly" hara i and in some instances h boon indefinitely z Hided, Per example, approximately 2C0 elerr iry schools in the south and southwest; affecting about &5j0C0 students and •800" teachers^ had closed down last year } and it is nay believeo that the IB yr of schools inoperative because-of the insurgency is about 300 c \ Cert- rid development operations in the central pr< pinces have been re&uq ' fcy*'almost"fiftj t, and Gomunisi '■ :>is to,disrupt the ceo ] to c i a shortage in the amount of rice available for export and have: c id to a rise in rj.ee prices*. Sabc ge has increased sub: ;'llyj by the first quarter of 1961, for c le, about 250 bridj s had bean jarti&lly or v I lly .(3 v 3 by ths Co; nists. Finally-, an increasing number of inlc i uaterways in-the J&kong delta area, particul&rl; minor canals Is = ling to raj or waterways have come under Dm 1st control^

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1 . ■: ' • Increased Gorsiunist activities have required the government to " adopt extraordinary int< al security measures vihich cons close to constituting a national emergency* V'he g at bull: of its militj /, security, and police forces las been employed directly or indirectly in counterinsurgeney operations since the beginning of I960, and these forces are being increased substantially J the 15^,OCX)-ran defense e b~ lishmest (with an army of about .140, DJ is being increased to 170,000 and eventually to 200,000; the Civil Guard, in effect a paramilitary security and police force, has been ir ased iron /^,000 to about 6$, and eventually to about 70,000; and the Self-defense Corps, a village constabulary force, has been increased from about 40,000 to 51*000, regular police services, the Kunicii 1 Police and the National Su steV

000

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have remained at (lout their previous levels of 10,500 and 7,500 respectively, Assisting the military establishment and the security and polio services are a number of other croups each as the small Gendarmerie the Self-Defense Corps Youth, and the Republican Youth, the latter being essentially a political organization but recently armed for defensive purposes,

With the help of US advisors and with increased IB aid, the South Vietn so Government has proceeded to Implement a broad and compre] ve countering ney plan designed to strengthen its military and seewity capabilities as well as improve related political, eoono tic, and social conditions. Among the many military-security i asurea already enacted (some of which had been implemented prior to the foririulatlon of the oounterin&urgency plan), the government has accelerai 3 signific ' ly a training program in attti-gu rrllla warfare for its military and security services, increased substantially the number ox army "ranger" units to be formed by the personnel trained under this program, reorg " 3 the army's tactical coi \ structure in order to increase the efj LVeness of field operations, improved military cosamunication and transportation -Ilities, centralized the intelligence functions of most If not all ncies, and creste'd a high-level advisory council for security affairs*

5Phese measure have increased the effectiveness of the gover; [> ] s Llitary and security forces to the point that they have lean able since the first* part -of this year to v \ ere offensive action against Corsnunist

JL

guerrillas than ever before, rbreover, several unprecedented!/ large operations, involving elements of the three military t .leer', have been launched since last June principally : : southern a F considerable Coj mist ■ armed stre bh- . While these operations have nificantly improved the ability of the military services to car y out c ?d±xi " 3 offensive: 1 , In only throe operations have the govern nt's ns sric&lly superior force-been able to i Let heavy casua] . * c -"'' 3 Co: 1st guerrillae.

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South Vietnam 1 s military capabilities and other resources for fighting the Gosuadrdsts are considerable. The .military leadership i among the best in Southeast Asia and the xt arid file troops have the spirit and willingness to fight. The civilian bureaucratic leadership* is also strongly anti-Co " t^ bat its effective! ss is impeded by inadequate delegation of authority e There are no serious trends toward neutralism or toward a political accomodation with Hanoi, Finally^ th Vieti teso p. ants, however politically apathetic and discontented, with the government* are by no means ready to surrenti ■' tt . elves to the Comiaujiists 5 given a greater effort by the government to protect] them from Communist intimidation* ... " ". •

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President Piem»s leadership and the stability of his government have besA more seriously questioned during the past year or so than at any tijae since he consolidated his authority in 1955-56/ Sinfee the beginning of 1/50, criticism of Kiem has increased substantially in \ rious sectors of the Vietnamese society bat has been laore urgently artiovla d within

have privately questioned Biem's handling of the internal security problem and his ability to rally and lead the people against the Co ists during v: ' tbey regard as the most critical period since the end of the Indochina war #> Their concern with the Caaaunist threat, he zv % is almost in arebl v entwined with an accumulation of grievances principally over piem*s failure to delegate responsibility^ the power .exercised by*so:^e of Diem ! s close advisors, particularly his brother Kgo Binh VBm 9 erid. the use of the Can lao t the government's semicovert political apparatu , to police the attitudes and loyalty of the government bureaucracy * This disc: cujMneted in a near-■ successful Military coup effort in Saigon in fcove. r I960,

Open deprecation of pi-can's leadership has increased sharply among iutelleetual-e]ite circles and disgruntled ex-politicians in Saigon^ the focal point of non-CoinmunistApolitical opposition to Diem since 195&> and to a lesser extent ; arrong labor and business elements. They have consistently and; on occasion; vociferously 6 led that Plea liberalize and reform the regime 5 lift restrictions on civil liberties 3 and permit an opposition to c be. These demands have been supported by a disparate Croup of anti-Die^ Vietnamese expatriates in Paris who have 1c advocated 3 i ! s removal* There is little likelihood^ howeverj that the activities the Saigon opposition will contril 9 appreciably to any immediate tlitical crisis in*South Vietnam* Their leaders are largely opportunists end political idealists with political views covering a wide &j ^ . including neutralist. They are not I ' ved to have support within the upper echelon of the gover b^ have little i lar &pj 1 outside Saigon -arjtd expatriate Viotnfeese eonkenxt Lties*j and have beien consistently unable to maintain unity within their own ranks or to agree on a principal leader or spoke: a, A number of tl . vrere involved in coup att pt last y } but there is no reliable evidence that they had entered into g / close plann' or u tderstanding with the military coup 3 " .; f

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Until this period, fev high or middle level officials dared to .criticise Di-en or any member of the ruling family or to at v. £ thV*"Cg.ij feS ev ^ n privately ? while fton-Coiraunist anti-Die,, elem its outside the government had limited themselves almost entirely to guarded «x] ma . . of diss :t s Illca had heretofore not hesitated to remove any critical offici&l, including cabinet members■and loiliiary leaders, or to use the governi it's varied resources to pressure and otherwise -silence grumblers outside the government. Fear of unfavorable reaction from the IS and of

Unrest has.also increased among the peasantry principally because " of the governments inability to assure adequate protection frees tfepreda-tidns and t on by the Coimmist guerrillas and terrorists but partly because of the cimlative effort of excessive and roughshod iriethcds by * local security and ad istrativo officials* Although ais&atisfaei 'on in the countryside is difficult to measure because of ths peasantry's traditional political c tthy a sus^pdeion of gov ;nt ? it does not appear to be widespread. It is probably limited to areas where the level of t Camuraat insurgency and the excesses of government control are highest, and would probably Id alleviated by a general improvement in the s pity situation arid by less gov^r nt coercion. Some recent reports indicate that a trend in this direction is already noticeable due to the increased effective a of military and security forces, suspension of forced labor practices^ and greater government effort to discipline and remove corruptj harsh, and unpopular local officials. If these problem are not dealt \/ith effectively* rural discontent may in the long run develop as th

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principal source of political instability, In the short run, neither the government nor the Coiaauriists seem capable of building up a ground-swell of positive popular support among the r \ry or .using it extensively as a.militant force.

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The i ct of these developments on the Vietnamese i.dlit^ry establishment ? however/ appears to be much more serious*. From senior down through junior officer ranksj there has been a growing concern * over the course of the fighting against the Communists. Ibrale particularly among junior and middle grade officers and no n farads si oned pa el has suffered further ".'froi.v c:-ttensive c .• ' it* without sufficient rotation in 'the Ya.caiingly endless pursuit of the Cc mritsts under the most advert ;• conditions of g rilla "ere, A fairly rec unconfirmed v rt has alleged growing neutralist sonir :nt a rg the jnaior a: . officers, The concern of a significant s nt of the top military 3 a ship is f r aggravated by Diet's reluct i to permit them a greater rola in the planning of operations against the Co riLatSj by his fr it da a rd of the regular ch els of c \ 3 l^ the activities of ths Can Igo

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within*tke military establisl a% 9 Kost of the top military leaders are considered by IB military observers to bo excellent professional officers, id { iter utilization of their talents would increase the effectiveness of 'the gov ant's couiiterins^jrgency proj t \

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B, Diem's Attitud

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President Diem ! s reaction toward the current crisis reflects both general optimise and serious concern. Dion's attitude a; ntly continues to be shaped by the basic premise that the overriding problem is the Communist threat which ho believes can be net virtually by military measure* alone.^ Ke is inclined to view criticism of his system of rule, whether emanating from the bureaucracy or from the political opposition on the outside) as being substantially less important presumably because he feels that such criticism is either Goiaraunist-inspired or, to the decree that "IV is legitimate, is stimulated by cone n over the CoaUuunist da r which he seeras c dent he can counter with increased US aid. In addition, he probably feels conf: of his ability to forestall or suppress any ;ed coup attempt against him,

Equally important, however 3 is ir r s basic impatience with democratic processes which he considers useful as ultimate goals but liable in a co try such as South V: -am to bo wasteful and dangerous to political stability and public safety. Diem appears to hold, therefore, that Vic amese, with their national survival at stake, must learn to submit to a collective : discipline until they develop a better g tse of civic responsibility. For those and other n iBy' Diem «bas not only given low priority to expanding

democratic processes but he has also I inful and even suspicious of

most Vietna who have agitated for political reforms* fiiep's convictions of the correctness of his political views and of his approach to th current situation probably have been strengthened by a series of recent developments, including his e session of last year's revolt, his easy victory du: " the elections last April, and the strong IB public reaffirmations of support.

■ e ♦ Below the surface of apparent optiraism, Diem and his lieute: ts

v. Mbit considerable apprehension over the stability of their positions.

During their actions against the co p plotters, t made it clear that

f ture attempts of this type or of even strong public criticism of the

iverns-ent leadership will be severely dealt with, ..Rhu has indicated to —' 'Do, yers that'many of the ofi^icials criticising the government are eelf-ee." " ". 'that the ; : ; critics are r making more from a "lack of un&ersta " ! of ths political situation than fron political conviction* In the meantime, Die:.: has attempted to tighten his controls over the

anient and the raiXJ 1 ; t gh the Can Lao and such ] : as incres • police surviellance and removal and reassign Lent of

wso: n 1, .He has, for oe i pie, c • " tl; used t] s t .binet reorganisation

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of last !fey to remove some of its critical (but admittedly weak) mentors; he has increased -the authority of officials helpful to hi:* during tho I960 coup attempt, as in the case of Brig, 'Gen/: xyen Khanh; and ho hap established a "political ccnrndssar 11 system in ths ar&ed services ostensibly to conduct political indoctrination programs but probably also to sttfsngtheft Di&n's informant and control mechanism. According to re tit reports^ Pica has created a "Hilitary fes?v Force 1 ' of trusted military leaders and units which Mould, be prepared to move quickly agains b any attempted coup,

. -

At the same ti&e 5 Diero appears to"'have realised that so:-liberalization of his prevasive personal role in running the government is necessary* To date. Diet's political reforms have bean modest arc! appear to be motivated more by practical considerations # i,c f . persistent IB urging and increased IB aid; than by any change in his political convictions, A);:ong othdr things, ho has permitted the "election 11 of youth represent! Lives to village councils in a number of southern provinces } though the representatives cone from the governments Republican Youth Qrganination, He has sought to improve the quality of local government officials and has disciplined and removed (with adequate publicity) an increasing nunfoer of those guilty of graft 5 excessive harshnessj and ineffectiveness in office* He has allowed (probably ordered) the Rational Assembly to indulge in slightly more open del: te of government-sponsored legislation and occasionally to question publicly cabinet members m on the operation of their departments* Restrictions over the press have been rel d somewhat and., with the exception of those involved in last year's coup attempt, the opposition had not been active t harassed, Finally, he has made a number of administrative' changes.vithin the military e iablish-meni designed to improve its effectiveness and 'ostensibly to delegate greater authority to'its hierarchy* ' : ■:.♦.■*■ ... •. -■; •._'.-. - •;

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C. Mem's System of RuJ

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* ** '*' Diejii r s system of rule regains essentially unchanged. As before, his personal impress is upon almost every aspect of the government and he continues to>make all important decisions as veil as many less important ones* What limited authority his" subordinates possessj from the secretaries of state heading cabinet dej tents down to middle-level operational personnel, is largely det^ by their personal standing with hini rather than hy .formal legal ri nts. Even his close advisers } including members of bis ov/n family, "are balanced a;;- i: t ekeh other and operate in relative " * obscurity 3 never bei&g permitted to shire the public spotlight focussd ,'on Mgo binh Diesii Thus, while r intains the forxa of constitutional gov^rntaentj he dire the fcu; iiicraey largely on a perse sis arid with" the help oi ft i; inner circle" of advisors, bound to bin by fa: ' y ties and personal loyalty^ operating largely outside the fo: I govers&ent structure, and* extend* g their controls thro'- ' the natioi^al and local bureaucracy»

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Changes in the composition of the inner circle have not 'been frequent,/ Its principal and consistent : c& have been.Diem f s own fairly: Ego Dinh Khu, who is officially political advisor to'Diem) Kgo Dinb Can, who has no official status but is the political boss of the central and northern * provinces; Kgo Dinh Thuc, who is one .of three Roman Catholic archbishops in South Vietnam but holds no official position in the governments and probably Madame Kgo Dinh Hhu, Bier's sister-in-law and a meiabsr of the National Assembly, whose influence is now difficult to judge in view of Diera ! s recent efforts to impress the government and the public with her absence from the inner circle in order to counter sharp criticism of her activities P Outside the Diem family, membership in the inner circle has changed from time to time and currently includes Nguyen Dinh Ihuan, Secre y of State for the Presidencyj and Brig* Gen, Nguyen Khanh, Chief of Staff of the Army. Vice President Mguyen Kgoo Tho 1 s position within the inner circle is no longer clear in view of his known criticise of -Diem and the mutual dislike between hira and Hbu*

Control over the implementation of policies' outside the inner circle ay_ rs to be maintained by the Cen Lso and by the largo bureaue-racy of local officials. Headed by Dion's brothers, hhu and Can ; the Can lap also serves as a surveillance mechanism both within and outside the government. Its trustee! and carefully selected members are placed at every echelon of government; including the military establishment and the police and security services, and frequently exercise greater authe than their non-party superiors* The power of the Can lao outside th government bureaucracy is further enhanced by its direction of the governments mass political party, the National Revolutionary Movement, by its influence over other pro-^govdrnment political organizations and labor > social, and cultural m groups, and by its illegal control of certain economic activities. The importance of the local government bureaucracy for controlling policy implementation is derived from the fact that practically all officials at all levels, from the region &o\m to the villagej are appointed and removed directly or' indirectly by the central rovenlment and frequently by Diem personally* These officials tend to operate essentially as Diem ! s personal agents, particularly the province' chiefs who continue to exere virtually unlimited powers over the people, despite efforts to inculcate in them a greater degree of public responsibility* - \ - *

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D. ■ 1 . ttiona and Cabinet Reorganisation ....."■

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.-.- President Mem and Vice President Tho \<;ere returned to office fo? another five years by an outsi aiding majority (S9 percelit) of the vote "-bast in the presidential and vice presic itial elections of April 9* 196l 5 the first v.tw3 ar Vict; i f s constitution*! However^ rather than constituting an accurate baroa&tes? of support for the national leadership^ Dieui's easy Victory at the polls wan duo largely to the ovari/lvO au advantag \ accruing from his utiliaati* of the vast government bureaucracy j includ- \ ing the military and security establishments ? the virtual political nullity of the opposition candidates^ and the failure or inability of the CpHBttunists network to exercise its maximum ani and other subversive Capabilities during the brief electoral period* . t . - w

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There is no reliable evidence of extensive government interference in the actual voting or k lipulatiofl of the ballotsj and Diem made considerable effort to give impression that the elections were free* Among other 'things $ he permitted extensive coverage and observation of the campaign and of the voting by foreign and Viet: aese correspondents^ ca] led extensively even in province^ where ConBEuniet activities.were fairly in' avo (partly in order to show that he was actively seeldng the office) ? . and reportedly instructed his officials and agents to concentrate their efforts on an effective cs dgn and on providing.adequate internal security during the voting rather than on intimidating the opposition candidates,, This nay have been due to Diem's expectation of an easy victory and to his desire to counter Western criticism of his author** itarian rule, Neverthelessj the elections were obviously closely controlled by the government* The national and local bureaucracy, including the airiest 300^000 military, police^ and security personnel^ the equally large political party apparatus 9 and the prof anda media ? including the govern iVcontrollc radio and pressj were monopolized by the government in waging its c: Lgn, instructing the voters how and apparently for whom to vote and seeing to it that the voters actually voted t

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Diem became president by deposing Eao Dai 5 the Chief of State^ in a referendum en October 23> 1955j which simply called upon the people to vote against Eao Dai and recognize Diesij then prime Ministerj in his Stead* The vote for Diem was overwhelming oyer 9o percent of the vote cast,*a: on-October 2& 9 1955* Diem proclaimed a republic; with hh If as its first President, A little more than a year la > he appoii ted if goc The as Vice Pr< . 3 : rrfc, in accor ce with

special provisions in the constitution promulgated on October 2o ; 19:

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The four opposition candidates (there were two opposition ticketsj with two candidates, on each ticket) would have had little chance of winning even if the elections had been completely' free» They had no notable popular appeal of their own in or outside official circles and were not among the most vocal* articulatej or we" known critics of the governs A nur : r of the latter were probably fearful of running or are still under arrest as a result "of their ailef involv t in the I960 abort:'ve. coup. Even in the Saigon area 5 where^the opposition* - * * : " candidates concentrated'their efforts and wh$r« they e&peqted to do W3llj ; the'"] m-Tho ticket got more than 70j5 of the vote cast* *■••**,.'" ■

The following month Diem raorg d his cabinet^ ostensibly to increase efficiency and liberalize the regime, The reorganisation created three new departments with "coordinating" but still vague responsibilities over all other departments } established another new department for agriculture by merging the fuiv tons of two for: do] nents as vol! as other executive agencies concerned with agrarian aff Lrs^ and p&s&ced '"* *." under the existing depart ran of the functions formerly within the Office, of the Resident. 'While the"hew cabinet Members for the most ' part eeeio technically more competent'than their predecessors ; their." *"^ ?*•> effectiveness vail depend largely on the authority delegated to them by Diem — something which Diem has been reluctant to do and which has generated discontent within his official family,

E. Political Retrieve for Dio:a

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Recent developments appear to have given--President Diem something of a political reprieve, Diem's outstanding success at the polls last Aprilj however questionable^ probably deflated some of his critics, while the modest political reforms implemented to date ra&y have given others some hope of further liberalisation of the regime* Howeverj what lessening c r the sense of urgency over the crisis in South Viet has taken placej there airiest certainly has been some, can be attributed principally

■ strong US' public manifistations of sup. art for'the Diem gover, :it ;

olud.: : Vice President Johnson ! s visit* and to the substantial increase 5n IB aid to help South Vietnam defeat the Coi.i-ramist insurgents, iMoreover^ the reorganisations within the iiiilit establishment a: 1 the deg e of : ctical -planning permitted the ©ilitstry leadership &pp to have all:-viated dissatisfaction somewhat within the upper echelon of the armed forces, while the recent large offensive operations against the C< 1st? have presumably improved morale among : : 1 Lc lie and lower echelon

At best, however, the poli' ' stl situation remains highly fluid and, as yet, there has 1 no conclusive reversal of deteriorating trends t Although reports of coup-plotting and of dissatisfact with Piem' l s leadership have deer* • ■ in ree* H 3, their persists] 3 is

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disconcerting and indicative of the continuing and potentially explosive political situation in South Vietnam*' For example- soma military leaders fire still critical of Dieses handling of the internal security situation and of his reluctance to delegate responsibility and give sufficient attention to political; econozaicj and social pro grains as a necessary adjunct to miljitary operations against tha Concc^aist ins 'gents* Morale * in the security and police services and in the army.reportedly has been weakened further by the suspension or delay in the payment of pensions to widows of personnel killed by the Corenunists« Kgo Dirih Luyen, Diem's youngest brother currently in Saigon cazd Ambassador to the 0Kj has boon critical of some of Diem's policies,* and a number of other officials continue to be c satisfied with Dicing organisational changes within both the national and local government, structures and have little hope for meaningful political reforms. Moreover$ below the surface of open discontent $ there is probably a growing and increasingly dssp^ate clement of dissenters who are silent either,because of fear of being suppressed or because of the realisation that there is little they can do legally to improve conditions

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Having passed riod when e; y action was required to meet critical economic problems, the* South Vietnsaese government has since about 1959 given greater attention to future economic development* Frogrej this direction has been ta bio despite the continuing priority given to defense and security i is 3 tba effects of Ccr^unist insurgency in the countryside, and the precarious political situation. Th

economyj vith about 80% of the people employed in agriculture, is self-sufficient in food, the population-land ratio is still relatively favorable, and cultivable lands are still av Liable, Approximately 7 million acres (about 6 million acres in rice), 1755 of the natiopal area, are under pexroanegt cultivation, j i as much as an additional 20$ of the country is potentially productive, and the average peasant land-holding is about five acres, .

Although the gov* nt'e outlook is influenced by a felt need to compete in economic an well as political terms with North Vietnam,, it has not been disposed to grant priority to lr. ■ ge prog: s of modernization, industrializationj and economic growth• Instead, it continues to regard economic improvements as feasible and desirable only to the exv t that they contribute to or at least do not detract from current defa 9 strength* The maintenance of the military and security establishment continues therefore to be accord I overriding imports; - in current eeo: tc programming followed] by what is rej irded as a political essential ~ the maintenance of the con-sumption standi rds of the people at 1; ge t All!, other programs requiring the expenditure of funds tend to be ranged in order of their pertinence to immediate defense and security needs. " - «•' - . ' '

• - The economy of South Vietnam was severely weakened by the years of recurrent warfare after 1940, particularly during the Indochina hostilities, and by the subsequent loss through partition of the mines and manufacturing industry of Korth Vietnam, Sources of s- ly and ; kets vera disrupted and. the economic balance of the region destroyed, In the countryside, vital water control works were damaged or neglected, Jarge areas of rice land were abandoned, and the livestock population was seriou pleted as farmers moved to urban areas in search of security* The influx of about 900*000 refugees "from Korih Vietnam in 1954-55 further-burdened the economy*

*• . ■

Supported by heavy US assistance after 1955, South Vietnam'was able by 1959 to • ike s 1 notable economic achiev ■ nts. building up a modern military force and at rbing the refugees from the North (activities which thenaelves accounted for about 85 percent of the aid furnisl . 3 by the US), South Vietnam j >de progress in re] tiring its heavily damaged ti tal Ion network^ in restoring the productivity of its grieulture, in providing 1 nd to its 3- i iless pe< \ -ts (including the

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refugees) and in carrying out other agricultural refers , and in establishing sanebasis for induj "1 g ;[.}., For example, the recorisiiti .on of the principal railroad^ r; ting Tor aJinoat 760 miles along the coast • from Seigcn to just north of Hue, was co&pletedj the production of rico^ which supports most of the population* reached the estiical 3 prewar annual average of 3.5 million metric tons of paddy? about 340^000 1- -'." laps p ons were resettled in sparsely populated areas in the hi| Is and Kekoiig delta as ar. ter rn to counter.Gc mist infiltration as vol], as to relieve^ population pressures in the crowded coastal region; and construction or planning had 1 m on several raedii a-si&e a»nufacturing plants, principally in the textile industry*

Despite the serious security and political situations during the past.year and a half, agricultural and indusi 1 output has increased antb ■ the main reconstruction .projs jts have been eo:;ipl- cL Patfry rice production in I960 (the 1959-60 crop) rose to over 5 million metric tonsj e:;c ding the prewar .level for the" first time^ and the i960-6l crop, which began to cc on the market toward the end of I960, was slightly higher, By the end of I960, as a result of the governments agrarian reform and land distril on jarograsQj the n ': of landless peasants resettled in villages in the highlands and delta areas increased to more than 170 3 COOj F,n additional 123*000 tenant farmers were able to pure]:: land bold s they formerly . worked or to establish bomest* s on : I • J nod lands, and some 44*000 other •''"peasants were resettled in 22 %gravilles ts j the highly controversial govorr . built villages in the delta area. Significant progress has been i e in the reconstruction and expansion of the road $y& 1 by completion of three princ:!--pal projeotSj National Rout; 19 and 21 in the central part of the country an" the Saigon^Bien Ilea highway, and the appr< i*hing completion of work on other important"routes. Industrial expans 1 since the end of 1959 has teen ,gr- or . than at any tine since 1955. There has teen a sharp increase in the nu ber . of nu n ::U ; and small plants c £$ l); construction, or planned : for South Vj tnajn's light industry (which includes textiles^ fertilisers sugar ; glass, paper, etc*); coal production has risen appreciably and is sooii"expected to'Supply all of South Vie; : U~ requirements; and construction

is fcegun on a la3 1 orceloctrie plant at the .Da Jihiim river (financed through the Japanese re; .. ations program) which, when finally completed in 19o5j is expected to more than double the pre? nt electric power capacity*

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.Since the latter part of 19-0 > how ^ the effects on the economy ■ of 0: i'st-ifcaur-g 3 of • '• . ble political conditions have become

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increased substantially^ a?5 the domestic pr5.ee of rico has risen* Since the .end of last year Saigon merchants have reported increasing difficulty in deliver:!ng thoir merchandise to the village3j and c tic co: e-has declined in part because of the .uncertainties of the political situa~. tier), Gaaa&unist sabotage of roads fend bri,dj ?s and Communist control of " certain areas'have set back the government*s reconstraction and agrarian reform and land distribution programs* Fi] ally, although thare has been an increase in the production of rubber s the leading source of foreign esechaj } rubl :■•:.■ plantations have coiae under increasing harassment by Communist terrorists o

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South Vietnam's reliance on US grant aid has not lessened over th< past several years, Daring fiscal years 1955-60 total-economic aid amounted to about $1,4 billion, including several loans totalling about &S3 million. The continued high degree of dependence derives prircarily from the burden imposed on the economy by the ds: : se establish mt« KLli-tary and security costs alone were budgeted at about 5^B billion pias s (or eSxnit 0221 i Lior at the official rate of 35 to the dollar) in I960,, an amount which exceeds the total revenue which the government is currently extracting from the underdeveloped economy*

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" Dependence on foreign assistance is also clearly reflected in the external tr< of South Vietnam. I ts in the period 1955-60 have covered only about 2B% of imports, aver, *ng £68 million per year co-pared with average annual imports of $244 million, In I960, rubber and rice furnished i of the export:; fey value, with rabbi ■ alone account for 5?& Consumer goods make up a Significant portion of the■Imports „ reflecting the nee ity for increased * development of South Vietnam's domestic manufacturing capacity. About 11$ of all imports are financed by the US commodity import program whereby goods pure 1 cl with aid dollars are sold for Vietnamese piast and the proceeds used to r port the national budget and pay the piaster costs of economic assistance projects t France has remained South Vietnam's principal buyer and supplier, although its importance as a'su] Ler of im arts has de ad considerably since 1955, The GS is the' second leading buyer ana supplier while Japan is becoming increasingly important as ?. s' lier.

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FC ■,;■: AFFAIRS

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. "In its overall foreign policy orientation^ the South Vietnamese Cover.- nt remains rigidly uncorrpremisin^ in its anti-Ccmunist stand

:d is generally cento?}-, to follow US leadership on .v: or Id iss 5 re- ' mining consciously d&pendeht on the DS as itg r.ajor source' of assistance and protection and principal .international sponsor*, Governroojt leaders continue to play largely an ambivalent attitude toward France, which they admire as a cultural fount but still suspect of politic;! intrigue in South Viet/o o as well as in Laos and Canbcdia e Other current features of South Vietno:o?s for, in relations ares a) the -rent redaction of confidence in the Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation (rh/y ) to provide limited collective security; b) increased dissatisfaction with the failure of "the International Control Comission (ICC) to take effective action on r* ted strong South Viet-names© complaints of increased Cc t subversion and external inter*

vent ion; and c) the expansion of relations with non-Corununlst countries in the Far East in order actively to ] icte anti-Corununifoi in the area and with countries in Africa, the Hiddlo it, and latin America in order to counter EHV diplomatic efforts and provide a tional support for the Diem govern t ! s international position as the legitimate government of Vietnam* -h --

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'•'■ Until recently, Diem and his close advisors have been exto sly neitive to urgent US recommendations, particularly those pertaining to Vietnam's relations Kith C: iia and to such domestic issues as corruption and nepotism in government and-political reforms* Diem, Nhu, and some other leaders freqn t&y expressed (usually privately) resentment at what they considered US atteihots' to dictata to them and to restrict then-'

they evidence

freedom of action at home ana* abroad K At the same time '. apprehension c the extent of US political support of their ".regime, particularly in viei T of growing criticism of their leadership in and outside official circles, unfavorable puSliciiy of their r- m in the Western press, and their apparent suspicion that "the US suirpathized with the abortive coup in November i960* Moreover, their evaluation of US actions in Laos during the past year had led thorn to : ! ion the strategic objectives of the US in South Vietnam In r rit months, however, the leadership l s apprehension over the extent of US support of the regime arxi over US offense coiooitiaents in South Vietnam has been allayed considerably by strong public US statements of support, Vice President Johnson's, visit, and increased. US aid* . * ■ ■- 4

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The governments most immediate source of anxiety is that the C .urdst inroads in neighbouring Lacs and C sella may result in a Co: mist encirclement of South Vietn^is, South Viet oh : ' tiens with Laos have generally been friendly, with South Vietnam coming to assume an a' t avuncular air and undertaking to influence Lao policies in geo 1 and

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particularly those .policies that misfrt have dangerous Sjriplications for South Vietns ; tfecu'eitjr* South ¥iet22am*s concern has become acute since the Kong I:; coup in August.1950 and "the ensuing rapid deterioration in the Laotian security and political situations* South .VistEara reputedly advocated stronger: political support by the US for the Bonn * Oum-^ourai Nosj l governmsnt ( inst the Souvanna Phou:.: ■ Kong Le group and has favored armed intervention by S 0 or the West sgainst the: Pathet L?,o-Koftg Le insurgancy which from the ontsst of the pres ' ) ao crisis the j m government has labelled as being clearly directed and assisted by the DS? e Concern over the security of its frontier with Laos has led the government to place its anned forces in the border-area under a continuing alert status^ to dispatch a small contingent of covert military personnel into southern Lacs ostensibly to carry out intelligence and reec Siissance operations^ and to c mi v into secret negotiations ffith the Lao Government for joint planning to defend southern Laos and the border area, Regarding the current international efforts to resolve the Laos situation, the Diem government has held that the ^neutralisation 1 * of Laos world inevit ' "y result in a Corfi.umist takeover enJ thereby aggravate greatly the already serious Conrnuiist threat to South ietnarru

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The strained relations with Cambodia since I9$h have been high-lighted by several serious arises and protracted exchanges of highly infla: iimatory propaganda* The persisting problems include border incideijtsj

. territorial aiid financial claims^ and covert political conspiracies* She most serious crisis^ for c:: p].e^ occurred in the early part of 19^9 and centered around probable involvement by the Diem government in an abortive conspiracy against Chief of State (then prime minister) Prince Sihanouk* During the first half of l?6lj tensions were exacerbated by the capture of two Vietnamese fishing boats in Cambodian Haters and by the flight of some IjfTOQ Cambodian residents hi South Vietnam into Ganiftcdi&$ probably in eider to escape internecine fighting between Vietnam: ariay and

■ security forces and Communist guerrillas* However, the basic factor in

South Vietnamese-Carbcdian relations has been Diets's and Sihanouk 7 s in tense dislike and distrust of each oihor, aj -avated by their essentially diverge

international political orientations * For his part^ Diem seems convinced that Sihanouk is unstable and vieak, syi mthi^es with and possibly supports anti-Diem activities by Vietnamese Communist and non-C unists ; and c iot be relied upon to keep Cambodia out of Communist hands*

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Relations with Jhailandj strained someifhat in 19?9 oeo^m XbailandUe decision to repatriate its Vietnamese refugee minority to North Vietnam^ have improved largely because*of coiranon and overriding concern with increased Cbnsi&nist encroachment in Southeast Asia during the past year. South Viete&ia, nonetheless^ probably still continues to feel that the repatriation (already more than 20,000 of the estimated YOj000**S0,000 refugee Vietnamese have boon sent to Horth Vietnam) would strengthen DRV propaganda and diplomatic efforts for international recognition as the legitimate government of Vietnam c

*.

Since the latter part of 1959* DRV propaganda against South Vietnam^ in line with the step^up in Goruaunist subversive activitiesj has been laore aggressive p.iici provocative than at any tiros since the end of the Indochina hostilities, The persists is of bids to ^regularise 1 ' relations with the Diem government^ an earlier important featiire of KV propaganda^ hay all but been replaced by blatant calls for intensification of the B people*s struggle 11 and for Dieiftts overthrow* Fo:^ its partj the Diem government has since 19J>9 ir sased its efforts to counter DRV propaganda and diplomatic activities and has taken the initiative within the ICG to cite the IE? with subversive activities in the south and with violations ' of the 19>'i Geneva Accords«

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VI. 0UTL0C

A, Interaal Security

The Vietnamese Communist apparatus can be expected to maintain a pressing arid diversified campaign of guerrilla-terrorist and subversive -warfare in South Vietnam, The principal immediate Cc t objectives will continue to be the demoralization of the public, wealtenii and supplants ng of government authority in countryside, and precipitation of a non-Communist coup effort. There arc strong indications that Communists will attempt a greater armed effort after the rainy season later this year although they may continue to avoid any large-scale engagement with the increasingly effective Vietnamese amy., except in places and at times of their own choosing. Statistics indicate that the total number of casualties among military-security personnel and local officials during I96I is likely to exceed the total for i960. In the meantime, the Communists will conti to place considerable importance on political, propaganda . and economic activities, in order to strengthen their controls in the countryside, enc urage a popular front opposition, and disrupt farther the economy.

In the short run, the Communist apparatus in South Vietnam doc3 not appear to have the capacity to foment a large-scale insurrection or to seize control of the government without considerable assistance from North Vietnam, which would necessarily be of such magnitude that it would be tantamount to overt military aggression. Barring such a development and given effective implementation of the government's counterinsurgency plans, reinforced by substantia! US aid, the government should be able to reduce somewhat the level of Communist insurgency during the next year or so and conceivably even reverse the trend against the Communists. In the longer run, Communist insurgency can be substantially reduced but the government probably cannot, within the foreseeable future, eliminate it entirely, principally because of the government's inability to seal cornpl- Ly South Vietnam's frontiers with North Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia.

Hov r 3 security prospects over the next year may well be influenced by developments in neighboring Laos than by the extent to which the Diem government can improve the effectiveness of its military and security forces. If Laos tes under predominantly Communist control, Communist capabilities in South Vietnam would almost certainly be strengthened to a degree unprecedented sir the end of the Indochina hostilities. Sou rtx Laos could be expected to become a major, if not the most important, base for directing, supplying, and expanding Communist operatic ns in South Vietnam In this event, the level of C t insurgency might assume the proportion of widespread srrilla 3 some 1 as (including portions of the

central ] his . ] . old ~* bably come under plete Co; mist control within which Hi : might s fctempt to establish a Communist but ostensibly independent 3verra nt with both military and political support from the W , South Vie : urban cent pre . would be increasingly subjected to ist guerrilla 'ist acts insJ >fc

anxiety i f . je centers of ent power and 1 Communist coup

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effort. The possibility of Co mnist attempt6 to assassinate Diem would increase, and Americans would probably be singled out: cc special targets for terrorist attacks.

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In the f< i ce of a Coiasiunist .offensive of such proportions* South Vietnam, would be required to makejEt maximum military effort in order to survive. SThere would be no in^ediate collapse". In the. long run, however, the maintenance of South Vietnam's independence would res?: principally on the nature and a at of US support end on a maxfarOTi effort oy the South Vietnamese government to develop the political, psychological, and economic programs required to gain and retain popular support*

B. Domestic Political

__,_ *.*«_■.•

;.. : The stability of the government during the next year or so will depend principally on Biera's handling of the internal security situation. If Diera can demonstrate a continuing improvement in security conditions, he should be able to strengthen his position, alleviate concern and boost morale within his bureaucracy and military establishment, and lessen the urgency with which many of their members view the current', situation. Hot-fever* if the fight against the Communists goes poorly or the South Vietns Army suffers heavy casualties, the chances of a coup would substantially increase* Moreover, the possibility of a coup attejupi: at any time cannot be discounted, The odds favor a coup if security declines appreciably further, particularly if accompanied by what amounts to a Cotnmuniet takeover of Laos. : ... . .......

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* •. The Coipjcaunists vjould like to initiate and control a coup against Diem, and.their armed and subversive operations, including "united front*' propaganda among disaffected groups In South Vietnam, are directed toward this purpose* It is more likely , however, that any coup at tempi: which occurs during the next year or so would be ncm-Coirniunist in leadership, involving army .elements and civilian officials and perhaps soi::e disgruntled oppositionists outside the government. In any event, the participating eletstents probably would be broader than those involved, in the 1960 .attempt, vould have greater'pbpular support particularly among*'the..youth and labor groups;-and could-be expected to be.bette? prepared to execute their plan quickly and successfully. * Moreover,: while the role of the military leadership is by no means certain, a major -split .among the generals doer; not appear likely; Most of thani probably woul.d elect to _ regain .unco; mi .tiled at the outset of the coup, as they apparently did.in Hoveaber I960, adding •'their tacit or active support to whatever side appeared to have the best 'chance of winning. Under these circumstances, a military coup attenpt

would have better than an even chance of succeeding* *

■ •■ --.

Diera f s removal —* whether by a military coup, assassination, or death from accidental or natural cau ■■ , — would considerably strengthen the power of the railitar.y. The odds appear about i ^ between a govs nt

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led by a military junta or by Vice President Tho, with the army playing i major if not the prede : : ::nt role behind the scenes. <fOn the one hand, ths military might conclude that a military-led-government would be bell able to maintain national unity and internal political cohesion and, more importantly, to conduct a determined .and effective campaign against the Coixiriuni-sts. On the other hand, they might: conclude that Kho, who apparently hr been on good terms with some of the present military leaders, would not disagree with their views on the aianner of conducting the fight against the Conuminists and that his constitutional succession would legalize the change in government end avert a serious power struggle. (Although Diera's brothers, Hhu and Can, would probably also be removed by a coup, they might attempt to retain reel political power in the event s Diem left the scene by weans other than a coup. ; However, the army would , probably act quickly to neutralise their efforts*)J Another-important factor which would almost certainly enter into the calculations of the military would be the fortunes of the coup group in South Korea and the course of US-ROK relations- {in any event, a government led by the military, by Tho, or by any other civilian approved by the military would probably maintain Vietnam's pro-US orientation/ -

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< If there is a serious disruption of government leadership as a

result of a military coup or as a result of Diem's death, any momentum the

government's counterinsurgsney efforts had achieved would probably be

halted and possibly reversed, at least for a time.^ Mor ;er^ the confusion

and suspicion attending the disruption would provide the Communists an

opportunity to strengthen their position in the countryside, and they might

even be emboldened to attempt to sei&e control of the government* Since

a serious split within the military leadership does not appear likely,

Communist attempts to take over the government in Saigon would pre ly fail. . ■ ,

C. Economic

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Because of the greatly increased internal and external Communist threat,, improvement in South Vietnam s economic position during the next few years v?il1 depend largely on developments in the security and defense fields, iloreover, if larger and more effective military and security forces are to bo maintained, South Vietnam is likely to remain increasingly dependent on- US .aid during this period, lite security situation also will continue' to 'ciff-ec t adversely the wil- ess of the govern t to undertake" fiscal reforms, urged by the US, ain* 3 at increasing tax revenues,

i Agrarian reform and land distribution programs, as well as h ;ay

and'canal reconstruction, will continue to suffer as long as the government's control of much of the countryside, particularly in the Mekong delta ar~ea, remains as tenuous as it is at present, Prolonged, unrelieved insecurity in the countryside would nit in a decline of agricultural outputj e further decline in domestic c erce, and a lo " of business

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Confidence in South Vietnam, The cumulative efface of all the developments could be inflation, particularly if the government ware to undertake large-scale deficit financing of 1 its budget. One of the encouraging factors in South Vietnam has..beep the fact that the price level has not risen cr acurately with the money supply, reflecting increased .private holdings of piasters- Impairment of this confidence could bring out of hoarding 3 to 4 billion piasters which would create •serious inflation, *

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. , Unless the security and defei situations deteriorate appreciably further, development of South Vietnam's light industry, concentrated in the Saigon-Cholon area, probably will continue at about the present pace. Most of the effort, however, may be directed K trd the completion of plants currently under construction or in the planning stage, She £VN can also be expected to give high priority to the Da Nhiia hydroelectric project and to increasing coal production* *-.

The security situation has thus far not prevented an increase in the export of rubber which, along with rice, is the mainstay of South Vietnam 1 s foreign trade, The trade gap, although atill substantial, has been progressively narrowed in recent; years and can he further decreased in the short run only by maintaining the availability of rubber and rice for export. The short-run outlook js not bright, however, in view of the adverse effects of Ceramist insurgency on rice exports and increased /Communist harrass&ant of rubber plantations. In the long run South Vietnam will probably have to rely increasingly on agricultural diversification which, as in the car.es of pork and kenaf, leads to new exports and on increased consumer goods production which, as in the cases of coal and textiles, replace imports or substitute the importation of raw materials for finished goods respectively,, In any event, South Vietnam will continue for the foreseeable future to require extensive US aid to finance its large balance of payments deficit,

-

**• Foreign Af Fairs

■ «^-. ,#-— F*- *

JReeerit increases in US assistance, a jointly agreed plan to combat Communist insurgency, and manifestations to Diem of 'US sympathy and backing, have provided a basis for a continuing close relationship between the US and South Vietnam. To a considerable extent, however. Diem and his advisors appear to regard recent US decisions toward South Vietnam as a vindication of the wisdom "of their basic approach to political and economic problems, as a recognition of their long-standing efforts to get special US consideration of their appraisal of the seriousne of the CoflEiutiist threat, and as a reward for South Vietnam 1 s steadfast support and anti~Ccnr«rauniat orientation■ 'Che Vietnamese leaders, therefore, will

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almost certainly continue to press for increased aid, further expansion of i i arrnad forces, and a clear priority of military over political a.

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Moreover, Diem will be

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adamant in his vIghs as! to'how the campaign against Gciaaiunist insurgency should beVagedj and he will tend i;o regard US differences with such vieus or criticism of his inner circle as indications of weakening DS Confidence in hivt. ■ , •

'Diem probably still has sc:-:e -lingering suspicion of the extent of US confidence .in and support of bis leadership* resulting froa the abort !h coup attempt of November 1950 and urgent aruTpersisteat rep; fentations wade during that year for liberal political reforms* In the event of another coup effort against Diem, tin WQuld probably expect quick and strong 1)3 public support* and would feel that ho did not have US confidence if such support v;::rc not forthcoming* * "

iem will alsocontinue to press the US for a strong nuti-C ( .unist" posture in the far.East, particularly as it pertains to US policy Coward Laos, Nationalist China, and the issue of Chinese Communist representation in the UN. T.f he concludes that the US i^ weakening its aitti-Communist posture in the Far East, he will almost certainly^make strong protests and become increasingly assertive and stubborn in his relations v h the US. However, in the absence of any acceptable alternative to US support and assistance to Vietnam, he is likely to avoid jeopardizing seriously basic US-South Vietnamese ties. Indeed, he v;ould probably seek to establish closer ties with the US by such means as a mutual defense treaty and possibly the stationing of US forces in South Vietnam if the Ce:<; 1st threat to the area increased substantially, as would be manifested;, for examplej in a Communist takeover of Laos or in the achievement of nuclear-capability by Communist China.

In the event of the failure of the international conference at Geneva to reach an effective and' satisfactory settle: t on Laos or a resumption of all-out military operations by the rebel forces in Laos, Diem would be greatly tempted to inert e substantially his covert forces in southern Laos and, in cooperation frith Lao government forces, ati ;t to prevent complete Communist control, of that area. Diem would probably seek US and Thai participation in a concerted armed effort in southern Laos as well as -assurances that the US would defend South Vietnam in case such action precipitated open DRV aggression.

In South Vietnamese-& dian relations, the best that probably can be er.poeted from what no;? appears to be a temporary and ephemeral situation of mutual restraint by Diem r nd Sihanouk is the resolution of one or isore outstanding problem, Although this could probably lessen the chances of recurring crises and possibly strengthen the current political : 'c ase-fire," there is little prospect that cordial relations will develop so long as the present leaders of the two countries remain in pov/ar* i . r, if Sihanouk were to heccfi too accc associating to Communist pressure, particularly in the event the CciDtiunists gained a predominant position in Laos, 1 .. ciay be unable to r< . ist trie temptatlA ,-

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to involve his govermssnt again in a plot to overthrew Sihanouk (end Consequently,, at least in the tainds o£ the Cambodians; involve the US

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The Diem government will continue its'efforts to get* the ICC to m

consider its charges'that the DRV is engaged in subversive activities south of.the 17th parallel. Hhile the government probably will not so as far as to renounce its policy of not blocking the implementation of the 1954 Geneva accordsj it mey t?ell announce that it temporarily refuses to be bound by specific articles of the accords which restrict its; ability to defend itself against DllV subversion and armed intervention. In any event, the DRV v?ill maintain an increasingly threatening propaganda campaign against the Diem government and may zin\ov,nc<:i that its "national Liberation Front"* (probably under some other name) constitutes the legitimate "government 11 in South Vietnam ?- an net which would likely be followed by an intensive propaganda and diplomatic effort to achieve local and international recognition for its satellite.

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SNIK 53-2-61

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N A T! O N A L I N T E L L i G E N C If E S T! M A T E

NUMBER 53-2-61

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SiibwHtcd by the

STfte following int 'genet orgai 'ions participated in ir preparation of this estimate: The Central inicUigence Agency and the intcUigei > wganimfions of the De t nts of

State, the Army, the Navy t the Airl-'orcc, and The Joint Staff.

Concurred in ou the

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on 5 October J::/. C-o?ic^r/'2;^ K?erc 2*/ic TMrector of Intelligence and Research, Department of State; the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Armyj, the Assist-'ani Chief of Naval Operations {Intelligence A Depart: ;l of thejlavij; the / it Chief of Staff, Inicll g nee, USAP;

the Director for Intelligence, Joint Si* ff; the A- ' ". nt to ift Secretary of Defense^ Special Operations; end the Director of ■ the National Security Ag< ... The /' me Energy Commis* >:$ibn Represent U o to th* . l, and the /■ ■ ' lant Direcior t Federal Bureau of Investigation (>":>?■'■ '. -, the subject bei ..

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SEC K ): T

BLOC SUPPORT OF THE COMMUNIST EF-FORT AGAINS"

THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM

■

■..,'• THE PROBLEM

To estimate the extent and nature of Bloc support of the Communist effort against South Vietnam, 1 ,

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THE ESTIMATE

1, The Communist subversive and guerrilla apparatus in South Vietnam, known as the Viet Corig, is an integral part of the North Vietnamese Communist Parly and it looks to Hanoi for political and military guidance and various forms of support, Hanoi is the implementing agency for Bloc activity in South Vietnam, and the Hanoi aulhoriti-are allowed considerable local freedom in conducting Viet Cong guerrilla and subversive activity. 'The Communist Bloc probably views the guerrilla and subversive campaigns in Laos and South Vietnam as two parts of a single broad political-military strategy,' and of the two, considers South "Vietnam as the more significant prize. ' * " -

2. The Viet Cong are using Maoist tactics. A • large.part of the North Vietnam Army was

trained in Communist China during the Indo-. china war ending, in 1954, and some of these 'troops are*leading op fcions in South Vietnam now. Each Bloc country lias supported the "struggle" in the South with propaganda, notably during Pham Van Dong's trip to other Bloc areas in Jim August, 19G1.

'For a broader treatment of the situation and prospects in South XI am, see :;<••, 14,3/53-Bl, "Prospects for North and South Vietnam;" dated 15 August 1W

3. Since early 1980 a general Hanoi-directed political and paramilitary Communist offensive against President Diem and his government of Vietnam (GYN) has been underway, and during the past year this campaign ha taken on increased tempo and scale. The V: Cong apparatus has undergone rapid expansion, and the scope and area of operations of its guerrilla units have increase d significantly. More recently, the Viet Cong lias begun to op-crate in larger sized units (500-1,000 men) and they have extended large-scale attacks to include, for the first time, the plateau area jri the northern part of South Vietnam.

4. Apparently in response to this direction from Hanoi, cadre personnel and many special items, such as' communications equipment, chemicals, medical supplies, and other items needed for guerrilla warfare not available in the countryside, are being infiltrated to-td South Vietnam via long established land and sea routes. Thousands of Junks which ply the coastal routes of the Indochina peninsula provide s means of infiltration extremely diffl*. cult to control. Mountain trails in southern Laos have been used freely by the Communists for years for movement of men and supplies between North and South Vietnam. Othei infiltration routes pass through ( ' Ncverth ss, the Vict Cong effort is still

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largely a self-supporting operation in res] I to recruitment and supplies. The Viet Gong Ifve upon locally 'produced food which ,thcy cither grow themselves or levy upon villi 3. They meet most of their currency needs by taxing areas under' their control, by n 3ry, or by blackmail. Most of their arms and much of their ammunition have been locally' acquired or captured from GVN Army and security forces.

5. We estimate present armed, full-time Viet Cong strength at about 10,000, an increase, despite substantial combat losses, of 12,000 since April of I960 and of 4,000 in the past three months. About 10-20 percent of total Viet Cong Strength consists of cadres infiltrated from Nor Hi Vietnam mostly via mountain trails through southern Laos, Mo I of the remaining 80-80 percent of the Viet Cong-are local recruits, but they also include remnants of the approximately 10,000 stay-behind personnel who went underground during th 1954-1955 n-groupment and evacuation of Vietnamese Communist Army units following the ) idochina War, Approximately 90,000 Vietnamese Communist troops were evacuate'd io North Vietnam during this period, most of whom were from south and central Vietnam, It is from tins pool of experienced fighters that most of the guerrilla cadres bow operating far South Vietnam are drawn, These hard-core guerrillas are augmented by several thousand supporters who, under the cover of normal civilian pursuits, join the organized insurgent bands to assist in intelligence, sabotage, prop mda, and terrorist operations. In addition, local ifth ants in many areas provide the Vict Con- with recruits, food, refuge, and c J ionai support, in some cases voluntarily and in ethers as the result Of intimidation ore Srcion,

6. As part of the buildup for their current campaign, the Viet Cong have i Wished an extensive co iimitations m I work. Much of the communications equipment in use is probably quite primitive and some of it i assembled in the field. Tin is e\v nee, hov/evcr, that in addition there arc subst; > tiaJ quantities of sophistic d cc . .iimlea-

tions equipment and well-trained technicians serving the Viet Cong, Such equipment and the ncv :ry maintenance a operating personnel were infiltrated into South Vietnam;

7. There lias been no positive identification of Bloc manufactured military equip] ml in South Vietnam, Most of the arms and equipment now in use by the Viet Cpng is of US or French origin. Although weapons have been infiltrated from North Vietnam, most Viet Cong equipment is probably from caches established at the end of the Indochina War or is equipment captured from GVN armed forces or security forces. During 1960, over 3,000 small arms were lost by GVN armed forces during combat. Some items, such as grenades, land mines, booby traps, and £ 11 arms ammunition are locally manufactured by villi level Viet Cong "arsenals," from materials procured locally or imported from North Vietnam and Cambodia. Moreover, in view of the physical problems of infiltrating large amounts of arms and ammunition into South Vietnam, many Viet Cong operations are primarily for the purpose .of capturing arms, ammunition, medical supplies, and oilier equipment, A major buildup of Bloc equipment in South Vietnam is likely to await the improvement of lines of communication into and within.South Vietnam.

8, Outlook. Viet Cong control of the Ca Man peninsula at the southern tip of South Vietnam has been virtually complete for several years. During the dry season beginning in November* the Viet Cong will probably intensify the exploital ion of GVN weaknesses in the plateau areas of the north and central parts of the country, seeking io establish another "liberated area" as a loj Ics base from which larger scale operations could be mounted. The creation of a second "lib \ area" in the plateau r djaccnt to southern Lao;; would enable the Viet Cong to. keep GVN for- :• split and j rent the concent-

effort hi A either. Moreover, a strong Vi ' Cong ] . jiti w in the plateau area woul > ously threaten tin ' rDiem'strooj i

along the di rnillii i h d ;

SECKE'

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

- •

SECRET

3

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9. To a considerable extent the ability of the Viet Cong to maintain this expanded effort will depend upon improved logistical support from the outside. It is probable that the Bloc intends to build up the eastern part of south Laos, Improving the roads, mountain trails, and airfields, as a major supply channel to

*.

support a stepped up Viet Cong campaign In north and central Vietnam, There lias already been a considerable increase in Communist troop strength in south Laos, a substantial supply buildup,- particularly east of Thakhckj and an increase in the Communist airlift into the are;

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S E C R E T

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

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THE JO!N'T CHIEFS CT- STAFF WASHINGTON 25, D.C,

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MEMORANDUM FOR'THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

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5 OCT 1961 •'J ■

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Subject: Planning for Southeast / a (U) '

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1, Reference is made to the r norandum by the? Deputy Secretary of Defense, dated 3 October 19&lj subject as above.

2, Over a period of time, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have exa ined various alternatives fo the solution of the problems of Laos and Southeast Asia, They have 'recommended certain military actions short of US intervention which might have had the desired effect and conld have altered trie situation to our adyaniaie. Hov ever, the* time is now past when actions shorl of intervention by outside forces could mvi:r:?c the rapidly worsening situation* They co : the execution of SKA TO

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Plan 5. or a suitable variation tl eof, to be the military mi lijrmim .

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commensurate with the situation,, It is the view o£ the Joint Chiefs of Staff that, lacking aa acceptable political settlement prior to [be re p~

tion of overt hostilities, there is no feasible military alter tive of lesser

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magnitude which will prevent the loss of Laos, South Vietnam and ultimately

Soudan st A sia.

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.3, If this intervention causes escalation, additional mobilisation would be required in order .to maintain our str. ic reserve. The Joint Chiefs of Staff reaffirm their opinion that we cannot afford to be preoccupied with Berlin to tbe ca :t that we close oar eyes to the situation in Southeast Asia, which is now critical from a military view; ' it.

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Plamaiii --'by the Joint Chiefs of Staff has contemplated sirnu] ncous

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coVxin's;: :cie' L\iM3crlin and South e« •' ."'. i: . "In sUch planning tbe Joint Chiefs of Staff have agreed t: t imp tion of SEATO Plan 5 would

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provide a US initiated cc er to I . denial of access to Berlin.

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aaproductiorj of this fioci^et-.t It rhol(J or in pa-/c i^ prohiMtsd «:;-^r*t "^■- •

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current build-up o( 'force-* will improve our military pohfriri to support action in'Southcast Asia in : Ition to that in Berlin* It is not a cru< of the desirability of having two Halted war situations going at lh<: same time. The fact of the matter is that wc may bc'f; ed with such a con-tingency.

5, In re!) 1 y to y° u " j * two 1 cs ser onestioas;

a* Naval forces in support of SFATO Plan 5 operations would consist of one or two attack carrier strike groups with supporting forces. The employment of these units would not unacceptable reduce Scv< tth Fleet capabilities in other areas of the Western

Pacific, In the event that overt Chinese Conirounist intervention

* *

required the deployment of additional Seventh Fleet forces to Southr Cc Asiaj First Fleet forces and elements of a Marine Division/ wing"team from the Eastern Pacific could be deployed to maintain the required level of naval capabilities in the ^Western Pacific, These actions are in consonance with currently approved military plans.

b, The "massive del nt US air power 11 referred to in the

paper was designed to provide the North Vietnamese with evidence of the bS i fcentj determination and capability. This "show of force 11 exercise could be conducted by Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps aircraft deployed to Southeast Asia under SEATO Planj 5, USAF aircraft based at Clark AB* Philippines* other PACOM aircraft using air-to-air refueling, or by SAC training flights. This type of exercise would not dilute other deploymei ts and would serve the dual purpose of providing useful reconnaissance, both photo and

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Visual/ The basic posture for nuclear strikes would not be affec sin.ee alert aircraft would not be used for the purpose of con g

a show of force operation.

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For the Joint Chiefs o[ Staff;

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number; NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

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34

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

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9 OCT 196

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

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Concept of Use of SEATO Forces in South Vi i a'am (C)

1. Reference is macle to the memorandum by the Deputy Secretary of Defcviisej dated 5 October 1961 j subject as above. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered the proposed concept for the use of SEATO forces in South Vietnam anJ. the suggested, two principal military possibilities for its implementation.

2, It is their opinion that the use of S3 !ATO forces at the greatest possible number of entry points along th: whole South Vietnam hord-v, but excluding that part of the 17th parallel now held by the South Vietnamese Army itself, is not feasible for the following r ons:

a. SEATO forces will be deployed over a border of several •hundred miles arse will be attacked piecemeal or by-passed at the Viet Cong's owe. choice.

b. It may reduce but can personnel and material.

lot stop infiltration c Viet Cong

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. .c. It deploys SEATO forces in the we: st 6j se points .... * •-. •* * . • ■

should DRV or CKICOM forces intervene.

ch It .compounds the probl is of co aunications and logistical

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support.

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 2011

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3. Further^ the alternative possibility of using SJdATO forces to

cover solely the 17th parallel, although considered feasible to a limited

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extent, is militarily unsound in view of the following considerations:

a, The 17th parallel is not a main avenue Of approach being used by the Viet: Cong.

b. North Vietnam may interpret seen SEATO action as preparation for aggression against them, thus promoting the possibility of communist harassment and destruction oi friendly combat and logistic: forces concentrated near the parallel, if not escalation.

4. € As stated in your memorandum* the proposed concept set for must be analyzed in the total context of the defense of Southeast Asia, Any concept which deals wit}-: the Ccfznze of Southeast Asia that does not includ 11 or a substantial portion of Laos is, from a military standpoint, unsound. To concede the majority of northern a:*id centra] L^os would leave three quarters of the border of Thailand exposed and thus invite

an expansion of communist military action. To concede southern Laos would open the flanks of bot-i Th; nd and Scuth Vietnam as well as expose Cambodia, Any attempt to cornbat insurgency in South Vietnam, while holding areas in Laos essential to the defense of Thailand and South Vietnam and, at the same time* putting troops in Thailand, would require an effort on the part of the United States alone on the order of magnitude of at least three divisions plus supporting units. This would quire an additional two divisions from the United States,

5, What is ne< oc6 is not the spreading out of our forces throughout Southeast Asia but rather a eor:e -ted effort in Laos where a firm stand can be taken saving all or substantially all of Laos which would*

c i the same time, protect Thailand .-and protect the borders of South Vietnam*

6, The over-all objective could best b% : the implementation

of SEATO Plan 5/61, or a variation thereof, now. This would accomplis the objective of assisting to secure the Border of South Vietn< against the infiltration of pars'''.. : .. Laterial in support of the Viet Cong thus

£re*eii , Vic i :se for< to conduct mors effective olfs ive operations

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

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in South Vietnam, In addition, this action would stem further communist

gains in Laos and, at the.same time, give concrete evidence of US deter-mination to stand firm against further communist-advances world-wide*

t, 7, If implementation of SEATO -Plan 5, or a variation thereof, is

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considered a politically unacceptable"course of action at this time, there is provided herewith a possible limited inl rim course of action. This course of action, covered in the Appendices hereto, could provide a degrc of assistance to the Government of South Vietnam to regain control of its own territory, and could free certain South Vietnamese forces for offensive actions against the Viet Cong, While the Joint Chiefs of Staff agree that implementation of this limited course of action would not provide for the defence of Thailand or Laos, nor contribute substantially or permanently to solution of the over-all problem of defense of Southeast Asia, they consider the Plan preferable to either of the two military possiblities described in referenced memorandunfiu

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff;

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Chairman $ Joint Chiefs of t(

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POLITICO L OBJECT IVES

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1. To enable the Government of Soith Vietnam to regain full control of its own territory and to eliminate the Viet Cong threat fr * .

2* To defend Thailand and South Vietnam, holding Laos or areas thereof to the extent required as being essential to the

■

defense of Thailand and South Vietnam.

MILITARY OBJECTIVES

■ #■ ^,^1 1^ , a^—m* —.-*-.. t - r* a«V* w'aa^^k^aB -*■»

l f v?o assist by the use of SE/iTO forces in securing the borders of South Vietnam to the maximum extent possible against the in-

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filtration of personnel and material in support of the Viet Cong* 2, To assist the Governs b of South Vietnam to regain full

control of its own territory and to eliminate the Viet Cong threat by freeing South Vietnam forces for offensive action against the Viet Cons,

3, To defend Thailand and South Vietnam, holding Laos or

areas thereof essential to such defense. . . ASSUMPTIONS

i *

■

1. Forces available will be the British Commonwealth Brigade 3 Pakistan, Philippine, and US forces and a limited amount of Thai

fore*

■

'" 2. The United States uill'provide for stationing in Thailar. one US Brigade Task Force Team.as suggested to Foreign Minister

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Thanat by Deputy Undersecretary of State Johnson *

3* South Viet? forces released by SKATO forces will

conduct effective

offensive

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operations against the

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viet Congo

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526. Section 33 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

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*. ttxtau. possible use of SE)Vx . 0 forcos ¥lu fce ^ ^

. .•rtWU. an effective co^unications network i„ as ffide an

area as possible and to Derve a ' ' .

a ] ' A ' uno J-or introducing new

techniques : into fchp o rn /. K 1r .«./ * .

1 UbC tnu ^caun Vietnamese Array* **'

CONCEPT OP OPERATIONS

1. SEATO ground and air forces will deploy to South

Vietnam to assist in protecting the South Vietnam-Laos border*

■

exclusive of that part of the 17th parallel now held in force by I Corps of the South Vietnamese Army (I Corps Tactical W Area)j southward to the Cambodian border. -

2. SEATO ground forces of approximately one division strength (11,000) initially will deploy to the high plateau region of the Pleiku area* Securing this region with SEATO forces will free South Vietnamese forces to conduct effective

offensive operations elsewhere- Further deployments to assist

■

in interrupting the flow of personnel and material in support of the Viet Cong into South Vietnam will be at the discretion of the- SBATO Field Force Commander in light of the existing

. * i

tactical situation. Tne SEATO force will further assist South Vietnamese forces by the provision of air, communications and

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logistic support,

3- The additional command and control communications -electronics requirements for the support of this concept are

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set forth in Appendix B to Enclosure B.

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

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' - C01 mp ARRANGEMENTS ^ . Command arrangement? .for this concept would* be as now provided for in SEATO Plan 5/61 except that the United States would have the responsibilities of the Appointed

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Nation- In addition* coordination between the SEATO forces and the Government of South Vietnam \*;ould be required. *

FORCE INVOLVEMENT

1. The forces involved in support of this concept would include those forces now committed to support. SEATO Plan 5/6l

■

less both the Thai commitment and the US commitment to the Central Reserve. This force would be composed of approximately 9600 combat forces, of which about 5000 would be US. Headquarters units, air component, logistic and other support units would total about 13*200. This would provide a total force of about 22,800.

2. SEATO forces in South Vietnam would be approximately

as follows:

»

a. Headquarters * 700

b. Ground Component

• Philippines • . - 20p

Commonwe alth 4^00

.. United States " . 5000

9600

c. Air Component

Commonwealth 200

United .States 85O

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3.030

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 2011

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d. Reserve Component Pakistan \l\00

e. Base Area Command

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(Hq & Hq Det) ' 100

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' Psy War Units * 150 ' •

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Common Service Log.

Support Units ! 38OO

Log. Units In Support

of -j-tional Forces 6000

10,050

Grand Total "22,800 1

3. There are no US Navy forces assigned to the SEATO force, SEVENTH FLEET forces consisting of one or two attack carrier strike groups with supporting forces would operate in direct support of SEATO operations as required. Other units of the SEVENTH FLEET including patrol aircraft are available to'

assist the South Vietnamese Navy Coastal Patrol Force 9 as

• ... ♦

requestedj in operations against Viet Cong sea infiltration. ■ k: The source of US forces to support this concept would be from those forces now assigned to the Pacific Command. Our military posture is such that the employment of the SEATO forces would not adversely affect our capability to conduct planned operations in Europe relating to Berlin*

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

RULES OP ENGAGEMENT

1. SEATO forces may take whatever action is, in the opinion of the commander, necessary to insure the security of the

force itself, ' . . .

*

2. Offensive actions by SEATO forces against the Viet Cong will be limited normally to those necessary to destroy such Viet Cong forces as pose a threat to either:

a. The borders of South Vietnam* or

b. The security of the SEATO force Itself, Such

. ■

offensive action envisages the possibility of reasonably limited projection of SEATO air and/or ground forces beyond the borders of South Vietnam into Laos.

3. Aerial reconnaissance by the SEATO Air Component will normally be confined to Laos and South Vietnam.

4. SEATO forces villi be permitted to retaliate immediately against North Vietnam overt military intervention by launching air strikes against military targets in that country.

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

l/UMMUXN XO J, i iJinvy J. j-V/is

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Bloc overt aggression to counter the movement of SEATO forces into South Vietnam is considered unlikely. The most / provable course of action by the communists would be continued

- j."

use of insurgents and infiltration. However^ if the Bloc

did decide to act overtly to counter the introduction of SEATO

forces into the area,, this action Would probably follow* in * general, the pattern set forth below:

a. jbasically an infantry invasion of South Vietnam and L%os and deployed in strength and direction as follows;

(l) Five divisions on the North/South Vietnam border to Saigon along the coastal route via Dong Ha - Tourano ~

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Binh Dinh.

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(2) One division (light) to Vientiane via Xieng -Khouang - Paksane.

(3) One division (light) to Thakhek and Savannekhet via Mugia Pass apd Keo Keua Pass.

(4) A follow-up force of up to six divisions moving as follows:

(a) Tito divisions to Saigon or Bangkok via Lao . Bao Pass - down the lower Mekong Valley along Route.

■ # . ■

13 to Saigon or across the Mekong River to Bangkok. ; * (b) Two divisions to Bangkok via Routes 7j 8 and

• ■ - ■ . ♦

13 through Laos into Thailand and on to Bangkok.

(c) Two divisions to be held in reserve along the North/South Vietnam border to be available to put additional mo: ntum along the coastal route , or to

*

effect a subsidiary effort in the Kontum-Pleiku

Plateau,

:

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

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; % b; A secondary effort, or threat thereof, by about nine Chinese Communists divisions into Burma and Northern Thailand, which could be supported as follows:

(l) Three- divisions , one lightly equipped, to northern Thailand via northvjes*; Burma.

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(2) Six divisions toward Rangoon along the Burma Road and' via-Myitkyina to -Kandalay,, then south in the internal transpor*t system of Burma,

-

e* There would probably be a build-up in North Vietnam and possibly a build-up along the China-Burma border before any' invasion was initiated. The invasion would probably be on the

j broadest possible front employing lightly equipped troops to

infiltrate between defending forces and thereby minimizing

: the effects of nuclear weapons against deployed ground troops.

j These infiltrating forces would be supported by columns advancing quickly down main routes. Battalion-size or smaller airborne units might be used, chiefly to seize and hold key features .

!

such as bridges, airfields, critical road junctions. The communists would exploit to the fullest their ability to

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t { 4 filtrate, through the most difficult country and would not \ cessarily be tied to the highways and roads. Large numbers

■

of porters and pack animals would be available and jungle

•* * • ■ .' . » ,

trails would be used to a great extent, though this would restrict the -speed of attack and the weight of equipment that could be used.

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Deelassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number; NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

Am ACTIONS

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a. The Chinese Communists maintain,, on a routine basis,, appro;:.* tely 250 jet fighters in South China. These and other aircraft^ including jet light bombers,, could be rapidly deployed to. bases in Nort.b Vietnam and South China to conduct air opera-tions in support of the Communist objective. In the event of a ground invasion of the magnitude suggested above^ it is well Within the CHICOM's capability to neutralize the air bases and port facilities in Thailand and South Vietnam in an attempt to

deny their use by SEATO forces. Such an operation could precede

-or accompany the invasion of ground forces. * ■

*

REACTION TO CONTINGENCIES

' 1. If North Vietnamese forces overtly intervened,, the SEATO force would have to he inc.: seel from the equivalent of

rapproximately one division at the initiation of the' SEATO Plan

f .

' to twelve division^ seven Regimental Combat Teams and five

battalions. In addition, the SEATO force would have air and

■

naval superiority. Such a force is considered adequa te to defeat tfte North Vietnames.e_forces. .

2. US force contribution to the enlarged SEATO force required to combat such DRV action would include two Army divisions, one Marine division/wing team and. five USAF tactical squadrons d.e-ployed in Thailand and South Vietnam. The US forces would be increased from 14,000 to a total of approximately 129,(X)0, not

■ - ■ *

including Navy forces. One division for this force must

come from the continental United States. This could require the call up of one division plus other appropriate fore to

■7' ■•, '

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maintain the US strategic reserve-

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 633 16. By: NWD Date: 2011

3. The mission of the enlarged SEATO.force would be to defend Laos and South Vietnam against attack by forces of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) and to inflict a quick and decisive defeat on the military forces of the DRV, The general concept

m

is to hold the enemy as far forward as possible, destroy his

* •

forces/ his lines of communication^ and those installations directly supporting his war making capability. When a] ropriate, SEATO forces would .mount a general offensive against the enemy. They would have a capability of conducting amphibious assault operations in North Vietnam in case the military

■

situation so dictated 1

h. If the Chinese Communists intervene , whether by regular

or volunteer forces, political authorization for essential military actions must be anticipated since prompt counteractions-would be required. The ould be issues whether to attack

selected targets in South China with conventional weapons and whether to initiate use of nuclear weapons against targets in

■ *

*

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direct support of Chinese operations in Laos.

• 5, In this event the SEATO force would be increased to

■ »■

fifteen,divisions and eight RCTs (278,000) deployed in the defense of Southeast Asia.

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3,3 NND Project Number: NND 633 16. By: NWD Date: 2011

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6. The US contribution to this force would be three ground divisions deployed in Thailand and South Vietnam and one Marine

.-♦Division/Ving Team* prepared for amphibious assault operation

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against North Vietnam as the military situation dictated. Two divisions "and additional air forces would have to coine from the continental United States. This could require the call up of two additional divisions plus other appropriate forces to

maintain the US strategic reserve.

m

7. The mission of the SKATO force would be expanded to defend Southeast Asia against attack by Chinese C'or.imunist forces and

■

these of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. The general con-

.*

cept of operation would be to launch air and naval attacks, to delay the enemy's advance with local forces and interdict his lines of com unications with air and naval forces* while conducting an unremitting air and naval offensive to destroy the

■

enemy's war-making capacity.

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

TOP SECRET

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APPJSMDIX D

COMMUNICATIGNS-EEECTRGNICS REQU! :TS FOR SUPPORT OF SEATO

FORCE Itt SOUTH'VIETNAM (C

1. Long Haul Gateway Communications

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a. Long haul gateway communications now supporting the Southeast Asia area will require expansion and augmentation

as follows:

(1) Establish Saigon-Okinawa voice and record communi-cations system.

(2) Establish Saigon-SEATO Force Headquarters voice and record c om nuni c ati on s.

(3) Expand Saigon-Bangkok system to provide voice and record channels.

b. Provision or the above communications will involve the following actions:

r

(l) Saigon-Okinawa Sideband System - Expedite

completion of the sideband equipment now in the process

-

of installation at Saigon, Okinawa installation has been completed. To fulfill this requirement pending completion of the present installation now in progress at Saigon,

■*

■ « a

'* it would be necessary 'to move by" air one mobile AN/TSC-16 radio equipment (contingency package) with operating personnel from Clark Air Base to Saigon. Operating personnel would be furnished initially from CCS STARCOM Station Clark AB.

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

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(2) Saigon-SEATO Force Headquarters - Move by a;ir two complete mobile radio relay equipments (h terminals > k relays with associated carrier , channel derivation switching-and terminal equipments) with operating personnel

from-the US to Saigon. Mission will be to establish

■■

voice and record communications between DCS station Saigon and SEATO Force Headquarters.

(3) Saigon-Bangkok Expansion - Move by air two mobile

AW/TSC-20 radio equipments (contingency packages) with

I

4 ■

operating teams from the US., one to Saigon and one to

Bangkok.

-

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2. SEATO Force Communications-Electronics to component Forces Headquarters, Subordinate Field Forces and National Forces Headquarters will be provided by CINCPAC, and National Forces initially^ utilizing resources currently available augmented by three mobile AN/TSC-20 equipments with operating teams air lifted from the US to locations designated by CIHCPAC.

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Washington, B.C.

10 October 1961

International Security Affairs Refer to: 1 19126/61

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY

SUBJECT: Viet-Nam

Even if the decision at tomorrow's meeting it only prelininary— to explore with Diem and the British, Australians., and New Zealanders would be my guess — it is clearly of the greatest possible importance. Above all, action must proceed fast.

For what one man's feel is worth, mine — based on very close touch with Indochina in the 195^ war and civil war afterwards till Diem took hold --is that is i£ really now or never if we are to arrest the gains being made by the Viet Cong, Walt Rostovj made the point yesterday that the Viet Cong are about to move, by every indication, from the small unit basis to a moderate battalion-size basis. Intelligence also suggests that they may try to set up a "provisional government" like Xieng Khuang (though less legitimate appearing) in the very Kontum area into which the present initial plan would move SEATO forces. If the Viet Cong movement "blooms" in this way, it will almost certainly attract all the back-the-vinner sentiment that understandably prevails in such cases and that beat the French in early 195*+ and came within an ace of beating Diem in early 1955.

An early and hard-hitting operation has a good chance (?0$ would be my guess) of arresting t hings and giving Diem a chance to do better and clean up. Even if we follow up hard, on the lines the JCS are working out after yesterday's meeting, however, the chances are not much better that we will in fact be able to clean up the situation. It all depends on Dien's effectiveness, which is very problematical. The 30$ chance is that we would wind up like the French in 195*1; white men can't win this kind of fight.

On a 70-30 basis, I would myself favor going in. But if we let, say, a month go by before we move, the odds will slide (both short-term shock effect and long-term chance) down to 60-H0, 50-50, and so on. Leos under a Sc anna Phoi deal is more likely than not to go sour, and will moi^e and more make things difficult in South Viet-Nam, which again underscores the el it of time.

lliam P. Bundy

Acting

Cy furnished:

Deputy Secretary

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CENTRAL. I N T E L L I C- E N C E |*A GENX Y -j

10 October I96I

SUBJECT: SNIE 10-3-61: PROBABLE CC^aJNlST REACTIONS TO

CERTAIN SEATO UNDERTAKINGS IN SOUTH VIETNAM

THE PROBLEM

To estimate probable Communist reactions to the use of SEATO forces in South Vietnam to prevent Communist incursions or infiltration from North Vietnam .-i

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1/ Other National Estimates pertinent to this problem are SNIE 10-2-61, "Likelihood of Major Communist Military Intervention in Mainland Southeast Asia," dated 27 June • 1961; SNIE 58-2-61* "Probable;Reactions to Certain Courses of Action Concerning Laos, 11 dated 5 July 1961; HIE 14.3/53-61, "Prospects for North and South Vietnam, 11 dated 15 August 196lj and SNIE 53-2-761, "Bloc Support of the bommuhist Effort Against the Government of Vietnam/ 1

dated 5 October 1961.

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THE ASSUMPTION

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For the purpose of this estimate it is assumed that in response to an appeal from the Government of Vietnam (GVW)^ SEATO ground, naval P and air forces numbering about 25*000 are committed to patrol the GVN coast and to secure the GVN~ ^Laotian border against incursions' or infiltration from the

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Communist Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) in North Vietnam, The SEATO objective, -vhieh will be publicly an-nouncedj is to stop external Communist assistance to the Viet Cong Cc aunist guerrillas^ while avoiding direct engagement by these troops in the conflict within South Vietnam,

THE ESTIMATE '

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. 1. We believe that the Communist Bloc would not commit North Vietnamese or Chinese Communist forces to a large-scale military attack against South Vietnam or Laos in response to

the assumed-*SEATO action. The DRV would probably seek to

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avoid having its regular units enter into a direct military

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engagement with SEATO, and in particular US, forces. Hanoi,

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Peiplngj and Moscow^ would almost certainly be concerned over the increased risks for- each of them of broadened hostilities ■ involving US Forces. Moreover, they are generally confident that their current low risk tactics of local subversion and

supporting "national liberation" struggles will

continue

to be

successful in Southeast Asia.

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- 2, Nevertheless, Peiping and'Hanoi in particular vrould be highly concerned as to the intentions of the SEATO forces., particularly during the initial deployment- The presence of SEATO forces so near its border would be a source of constan unease to the DKV- Moreover, both Hanoi and Peiping would consider it a particularly urgent matter to prevent any in-

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vigoration or strengthening of S 0 which could result from

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The Gossnunist guerrilla organizations In both Laos and South Vietnam (the Pathet Lao and the Viet Cong) are under the control of the Conmuniat Party of North Viet-nan and look to Hanoi for guidance arid support. We believe that Hanoi e; cises considerable local tactical latitude, in conducting the Oomsiu.nist s.tr. ;le in both countries. \fa.en the struggle is elevated to the international level * as is now the case with Laos, the major Bloc partners play an increasingly important leadership role. It is also likely that the USSR exercises con- ' sidefable restraint on 'DRV or Chinese Communist decisions v/hich Would risk the broadening of hostilities and raise the issue of USSR or US participation. . " .

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a successful SEATO operation* Both would seek by political means and by military means short of major overt attack, to frustrate the SEATO effort.

3. In the situation assumed> we believe that the DRV would seek at first to test the seriousness and effectiveness

of the SEATO effort by subjecting the SEATO forces and their land lines of communication to harassment* ambushj and guerrilla attack. The Cc unists could not be expected to "recognize the announced intention of the SEATO forces to avoid J involvement in the internal struggle in South Vietnam* They would probably estimate that by using their Viet Cong appara-

j tus in South Vietnam, by committing additional experienced

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tory long familiar to them, and by exploiting the opportunities

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offered by the sizable junk traffic in coastal waters, they

3/ 'Approximately 90 > 000 Vietnamese Communist troops, most of them from south and central Vietnam,, were evacuated to North Vietnam in the regroupment of forces following the Indochina War, ?ho DTOJ has maintained relatively • intact a'large part of this*pool "of manpower bxpcrlenced in guerrilla operations in South Vietnam j drawing upon" it for cadres to reinforce the Viet Cong,

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could harass the SEATO land forces and Infiltrate the SEATO

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blockade. The Communists would expect .worthwhile political

and psychological rewards if their harassment and guerrilla

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operations against SEATO forces \:ere successful-, including lowered GYN morale and increased tensions among some of the

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SEATO members, Whilte seeking to test the SEATO forces^ the DRV would not relax Its Viet Cong campaign against the GW,

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4. It is expected that the SEATO action would cause the DRV to try to gain "compensation 11 in "some*,manner > such as possibly declaring the 1954 Geneva Agreements, or pertain articles of the Agreements, abrogated. It might also begin to receive increasing military assistance from the Soviet

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Union and Communist China openly and in unconcealed violation of the Agreementsj and to buildup an air force which would Include jets. The Bloc would attempt to encourage and insti-gate Laos and Cambodia to protest to the UN If any SEATO forces crossed the South Vietnam border.

5. If no agreement on Laos had been reached at Geneva

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prior to the assumed SEATO action, we believe that the Com-

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raunists wotiTd *take steps to haetcn their takeover- of Laos.

F •They would into ify their'efforts to achieve political con

troli and they would step up military pressures against

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. Laotian Army, Communist strength in south Laos would prob-

ably be increased by forces from North Vietnam to guard

against an effort to partition Laos or an attack against the Pathet Lao forces. The Soviet airlift would probably be increased with a heavier flow of military supply into south Laos, and the Communists would probably intensify their efforts to establish a secure route for motor traffic into the south* On,the other hand, if the SEATO action took place after the

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establishment of a coalition government in Laos under Souvanna Phouma and the conclusion of an agreement at Geneva, the Communists would probably emphasize political rather than

military measures to win control of the country. In either

case, the scale of Communist infiltration of men and equipment from North to South Vietnam through Laos would probably not be

significantly affected.

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6. If the SEATO action appeared to be proving effective

in reducing the present scale of infiltration the Communists

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probably. wo\ild increas.e their use of the mountain trail system

I through Cambodia, This is a longer and more difficult route

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but its use could keep at least minimum support flowing to. the

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Viet Cong, At the same time, in order to reduce the apparent

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success of the SEATO action, they could intensify small unit

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attacksj assassinations^ and local terrorism in South Vietnam; they could also commit more DRV irregular personnel for the harassment erf the SEATO forces. It' would probably be part of Communist tactics to play upon possible SEATO weariness over maintaining substantial forces and accepting losses in South

Vietnam over a long period of time.

7. With the introduction of SEATO troops into South

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Vietnam,, Communist China might increase its ground and air forces in South China and strengthen its military posture opposite Taiwan* It might also announce various types of

military assistance to the DRV to meet the imperialist threat

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from South Vietnam, possibly including the stationing of Chinese Communist air units in North Vietnam. Nevertheless,

we do not believe Peiping would consider assignment of SEATO forces to South Vietnam as an immediate and direct threat to its own national security/

8. At the same time,

the

Communist powers would im-

mediately launch a major propaganda and political camp Lgn % designed to label the SEATO action as aggression, as a" threat to the peace in the Far East, and as a disguised US

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effort to re-establish colonial rule over Indochina. To in

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crease the fears of war in the Far Eastj Hanoi and Peipir

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would

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the US, through SEATO, was preparing to

attack the DRV and Communist China* The USSR would probably

remind the world of its defense" commitments to both Peiping

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and Hanoi.

9. The reaction to the assumed SEATO action among con-

cerned non~Communist governments would vary widely. The Asifm members of SEATO would find renewed confidence in the organization and the US,, if the plan were to go well. If, - on the other hand* the SEATO action were tojbecome costly,

prolonged, or to involve heavy casualties, the Asian members I would soon become disenchanted and look to the US to do some-» thing to lessen the burden and to solve the problem. Ate: alia would probably go along with this action; New Zealand might also join in. The UK would be likely to oppose the assumed

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SEATO action* and British reluctance to participate could be overcome only with great difficulty. Prance would also oppose

the action and almost certainly would refuse to participate.

10. The neutralist governm ts in the area would be most concerned at. the increased tension and da r of g^; ral

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hostilities. They would denounce the SEATO action and call for a peaceful solution. None of them 5 however, vrould be

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without some secret sympathy for the SEATO action for they all

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have fears of Communist subversion and expansion. For example, Sihanouk has become increasingly•fearful of and disillusioned v/ith the DRV's subversive and guerrilla organizations in Laos and South Vietnam, both of whom have violated Cambodia f s borders. He has no desire to see Laos or South Vietnam under Communist domination. Despite his genuine &nd justifiable' fear of Communist China and North Vietnam, Sihanouk might co-

operate, covertly, with the SEATO

action.

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11. Moscow" and Feiping would bring strong pressures against Jasan. Although the Jaoanese Government would be

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under strong leftist internal pressure, it would probably

tolerate US logistic activities and would not officially op-

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pose the SEATO effort. Nationalist China would be elated with

the SEATO action.

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i THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Washington, D.C.

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October 11, 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJFCT: South Vietnam

At this morning's meeting with the President the following course of action was agreed upon with relation to South Vietnam:

1. The Defense Department is authorized to send the Air Force T s Jungle Jim Squadron into Vietnam to serve under the MAAG as a training mission and not for combat at the present time.

2. General Maxwell Taylor accompanied by Dr. Rostov from the White House, General Lansdale, a representative of JCS, Mr. Cottrell from State and probably someone from ISA will leave for Vietnam over the weekend on a Presidential mission (to be announced by the President at this afternoon T s press conference as an economic survey) to look into the feasibility from both political and military standpoints of the following:

(a) the plan for military intervention discussed at this morning's meeting on the basis of the Vietnam task force paper entitled "Concept for Intervention in Vietnam".

(b) an alternative plan for stationing in Vietnam fewer U.S. combat forces than those called for under the plan referred to in (a) above and with a more limited objective than dealing with the Viet Cong; in other words, such a small force would probably go in at Tourane and possibly another southern port principally for the purpose of establishing a U.S. "presence" in Vietnam;

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(c) other alternatives in lieu of putting any U.S. combat forces in Vietnam, i.e. stepping up U.S. assist-ance and training of Vietnam units, furnishing of more U.S. equipment, particularly helicopters and other light aircraft, trucks and other ground transport, etc.

3. During the two or three weeks that will be required for the completion of General Taylor's mission, State will push ahead with the following political actions:

(a) protest to the ICC on the step-up in North Vietnamese support of Viet Cong activities,

(b) tabling at the UN a white paper based on Mr. William Jordan's report concerning Communist violations of the Geneva Accords, and

(c) consultation with our SEATO allies> principally the British arid Australians, regarding SEATO actions.,in support of the deteriorating situation in Victna

Rosvell Kilpatric

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF Washington 25, D.C.

CM-390-61

18 October 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL TAYLOR

SUBJECT: Counter 1nsurgency Operations in South Vietnam

1. You will recall that I recently had occasion to look into allegations that the United States is overtraining the Vietnamese Army for a Korea- type war with little or nothing being done to meet the terrorist problem in Vietnam. My inquiries have highlighted the following main points:

a, The success of the counter-terrorist police organization in Malaya has had considerable impact*

b. The concept of using local police force to combat local insurgency is politically and diplomatically attractive.

2. I fully agree that we should make maximum use of these aspects of the British counter!nsurgency experience in Malaya which are pertinent to the situation in Vietnam. You will recognize, however, that there are major differences between the situations in Malaya and South Vietnam:

a. Malayan borders were far more controllable in that Thailand cooperated in refusing the Communists an operational safe haven,

b. The racial characteristics of the Chinese insurgents in Malaya made identification and segregation a relatively simple matter as compared to the situation in Vietnam where the Viet Cong cannot be distinguished from the loyal citizen.

c. The scarcity of food in Malaya versus the relative plenty in South Vietnam made the "denial of food to the Communist guerrillas a far more important and readily usable weapon in Malaya.

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d. Most importantly, in Malaya the British were in actual command^ with all of the obvious advantages this entails, and used highly trained Commonwealth troops.

c. Finallyj it took the British nearly 12 years to defeat, an

insurgency which was less strong than the one in South Vietnam.

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3. Furthermore, as you well know, the success of the counter-insurgency operations in Malaya is not unique. Major terrorist activities have been defeated in both the Philippines and Burma, and in neither place was the police organization used as the framework for coordination and control. In the Philippine s 9 for example, the military framework used was highly successful.

k. Closely associated with the allegation that the MAAG is "overtraining" the Vietnamese Army is the concern frequently expressed over the length of time required to train military officers and NCO's. No one knows better than you do that well-trained officers and NCO's are not produced in brief training programs, I am sure you will want to discuss this in detail with General McCarr when you visit Saigon, It is most important to note that the heaviest casualties in the Vietna insurgency have been suffered by the Civil Guard previously trained as police. Almost without exception, the Viet Cong have attacked the untrained Civil Guard rather than the better trained Array units. This has resulted in a heavy loss of weapons and equip t to the Viet Cong. Untrained Civil Guard units have, in fact, been an important source of weapons and supplies for the Viet Cong, and their known vulnerability has been an invitation for the Viet Con to attack. General McCarr believes that reversion of the Civil Guard to police control would set back the counterinsurgency operation in South Vietnam by at least a year.

5. With respect to training the Vietnamese Army for the "wrong war 1 ", it seems clear that in recent months the insurgency in South Vietnam has developed far beyond the capacity of police control. All of the Vietnamese Array successes this past summer have met Viet Cong opposition in organized battalion strength. Even larger Communist units were involved in the recent Viet Cong successes north of Kontum. This change in the situation has not been fully understood by many U.S. officials.

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6. In this regard 5 there is some concern that the Thompson Mission may try to sell the Malayan concept of police control without making a sufficiently careful evaluation of conditions in South Vietnam Additionaly \> there are some indications that the British, for political reasons, wish to increase their influence in this area and are using the Thompson mission as a vehicle. Consequently, your forthcoming trip to South Vietnam is most timely. Despite repeated urging, the Government of South Vietnam has not yet written an over-all national plan for counterinsurgency. The question of police or military organization for combatting Viet Cong insurgency should "be laid to rest in that plan. Your evaluation of this matter could have an important effect on the Governments of both South Vietnam and the United States.

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(Sgd) L.L. LEMNITZEB

L.L. LEMNITZER Chairman

Joint Chiefs of Staff

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL.

Dear General Taylor: ^ '

I should like you to proceed to Saigon for thz purpose of appraising tho situation in South VIat^Ham* particularly an it concerno the threat to the internal oecurlty and defense of that country and adjacent areas, Aft©r you have conferred with ths approp?i&fra United States and South Viet~Naxn-3£e authorltieo, in« eluding th$ Comtnander-in-Chief, Pacific^ I would like your viov/o on th3 courses of action which our Government roijjht take at this juncture to avoid a further deterioration in ths situation in South Viot-N&m and eventually to contain and eliminate iho thro&t to itcj IndopcaiiSiicc.

In your assoaamtrot you should boar in mind that ths Initial responsibility for th o effective maintenance of tho i&&apenclojn<cui ci South Vi&t-Nara roots with the people &id govornraan* of th&t ccuatry* Our efforts must h$ evaluated* and your recomme'o dationa forinulatodj with fcis fact in mind.

Y/hile ths military part of thti prohl&rn io of groat import&ftto U, South Viet-Ham, its political* social, luid ecoaosrdc clon^; e equally Bignific&nt* and I

oh&ll ir:^oct your appraisal and your recommondationa

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to taks full account of them*

Gdn&ral 3 / rv?oH D. Taylor Th* White Ho t&ae

Washington, 3X C*

Sincerelyj

CONFJ ' " NTW1

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Washington

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KATIOltfj; SECURITY ACTIO?! MSKORAIIDUM NO. 10k

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October 3.3, 1963

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SUBJECT:

THE S" : 'ARY OF STATE

THE SECRETARY 0? DEFENSE

THE DIRECTOR OF CEiiTRAL IHTELLIG:3HCE

Southeast Asia

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The President on October 11, 1$/Slj directed that the following actions be taken:

2.

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Make preparations for the publication of the white paper on North Vietnamese agression against South. Viet Hem which is now being drafted in the Department of State.

Develop plans for possible action in the Viet Ham ICC based upon the white paper, preliminary to possible action i jt

paragraph 3 below, - ' ?

Develop plans for presentation of the Viet Mam case in the United Rations.

h* Subject to agreement with the Government of Viet Ham which is now being sought, introduce the Air Force Jungle Jim Squadron into Viet Kam for the initial purpose of training Vietnamese forces.

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5- Initiate guerrilla ground action, including use of U.S. advisers if necessary, against Co: .unist aeri resupply missions in the Tchepone area,

6. General Taylor should undertake a mission to Saigon to explore • . ways in which assistance of all types might be more effective.

( , The President also agreed that certain other, actions developed by the

:; Force and concurred in by the agencies concerned, but which do not require soecific Presidential approval, should be imdertaken on an urgent basis.

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• .. - • •*"••• • /s/ McGec Bundy

Infernation copies to:

The Director } U.S. Information Agency

The Military Representative of the President

The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

The Administrator; Agency for International Development

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

OFFICE OF Gi RAL COUNSEL

WASHINGTON 2b, D. C.

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26 October I96I

MBMOKA^HBH FOR MR, HADYN WILLIAMS j

iJECTs The Geneva Accords of 195*1- and the Introduction of * IT«S* Combat and Logistic Forces into Viet Nam

*

You have requested that I submit an opinion on the legal Question of the compatibility with the Geneva Accords of the actions proposed in Saigon's telegram 537 to the apartment of Statec The pressure of time forces this opinion to be a preliminary ens. A full statement of my reasoning will follow as soon as it can be prepared*

Yssf conclusion is that the* actions proposed in the above mentioned telegram would constitute violations of Articles 16 and 17 of the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Viet Nam of July 20 9 195 1 '* That conclusion is not affected by the reasons* ostensible or real, for the actions *

of

Article 16 prohibits "the introduction into Viet Nam my troop reinforcements and additional military personnel", The article does permit however* under strict conditions,, "the rotation of units and groups of personnel 11 , .Since there were 170*000 foreign troops in Viet Nam at the time of the ■ 1954 Agreement* it can be argued that the United States could introduce up to 170*000 combat troops without causing a violation of that Agreement, That argument would of necessity be based upon the supposed rationale of a decision of the International Commission for Supervision and Control In'View jftaffl* dated April 19*1960*. in which an increase in the MAAG was approved* The Commission gave no reasons for its ruling., and it is far from clear that it would extend its scope to cover combat troops/ It is difficult to contend that where *troc are introduced to replace other troops,.which departed five to seven years previously there is a ^'rotation 11

"rotation 11 defense in the present risks of an adverse ICC decision,

of units. Reliance upon the circumstances would run grave

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Even if there were a IJGjOOQ troop "credit 11 which v T e could legally draw upon^ I doubt that the actions proposed in S&±gon ! s telegram 537 are compatible with the further limitations contained in Article 16, For examplej no unit introduced could be larger than a battalion, and rotation Would have to be (l) on a man-for^sscn basis* (£; notified to the ICC two days in* advance^ (3) carried on through certain listed entry point and (h) supervised and inspected by the ICC*

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The provisions of Article 17 might prove even more burden-Entry of military equipment must take place at listed

entry points under the supervision of the ICC and may only consist of replacement of "war material 3 arms and munitions which have been destroyed., damaged* worn out or used up after the cessation of hostilities * « , on the basis of piece-for-piece, of the same type and with similar characteristics*"

It should be noted that the United States was not a party to the Geneva Accords^ but it did declare at the Conference in 195^ that ft , * * it will refrain from the-threat or the use of force to disturbc . •" the Accords, Viet Nam, although it was not a signatory of the cease-fire Agreement in question, is^ on the other hand* bound by its terms* The Agreement was signed by the Commander in Chief of the French Union Forces (Viet Nam being part of the French Union)^ and this signature was within

• --.,

- the authority of the Commander in Chief, Thus* on the strictly legal plane we need be concerned only about a possible violation by the Government of Viet Nam of its obligations*

As a final comment 'J would point out that the purpose of the introduction has no legal relevance; introduction of U«S. troops for purposes of flood control would still constitute a violation of the Geneva Accords by the Government of Viet Nam, I suggest that^ if a decision is made to send U.So troops into Viet Nam,, we should justify their introduction on the ground of collective self-defense* Nothing in the Geneva Accords hould be read as abridging the interent right of Viet Nam X the United States to take actions in collective self-defen: If you wishj I shall prepare a memorandum on this point.

i&tn**

cc: Mr, VJm.McCormick

Office

GEORGE H t AL1.0:CH of the Assistant General Counsel In t e rn a t ion 21 A ffa irs

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EYES ONLY FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM GENERAL TAYLOR, 1* Transmitted herewith are a summary of the fundamental

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conclusions of my group and my personal recommendations a?r

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response to the letter of the President tome dated 13 October -.1961 . 1 At our meeting next Friday I hops to be allowed to

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explain the thinking which lies behind them, At that time I shall

transmit our entire report which will provide detailed support

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for the recommendations and will serve as a working paper for the interested departments and agencies.

\£i It is concluded that; .

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Cbxxfmunist- strategy aims to gain control of Southeast

Asia'by methods of subversion and guerrilla war which by-p convent] aI tl."S«-;and indigenous strength on the ground,

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The interim Communist goal -- en route to total take-over --

appears to be a neutral Southeast Asia, detached from U.S. pro-

* tecticn. This strategy is well on the way to success in Vietnam.

b, In Vietnam (and Southeast Asia) there is a double crisis in confidence: doubt that U.S. is determined to save Southeast Asia; doubt that Diem's methods can frustrate and defeat Communist purposes and methods. The Vietnamese (and Southeast Asians) will undoubtedly draw rightly or wrongly -- definitive conclusions in coming weeks and months concerning the probable outcome and will adjust their behaviour accordingly. What the U.S. does or fails to do will be decisive to the end result,

c. Aside from the morale factor, the Vietnamese Government is caught in interlocking circles of bad tactics and bad administrative arrangements which pin their forces on the defensive in ways which permit a relatively small Viet-Cong force (about one tenth the size of the GVW regulars) to create conditions of frustration and terror certain to lead to a political crisis, if a positive turning point is not soon achieved. The following recommendations are designed to achieve that favorable turn, to avoid further deterioration in the situation in South Vietnam, and eventually to contain and eliminate the threat to its independence.

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a. That upon request from the Government of-V ; **t"\~ fr,VX\ to come to its aid in resisting the increasing a"?rt? <.**.*-*• &* ••-*

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Viet-Cong ?,nd in repairing the ravages of the Drlts rinrd .,-.'.-• combination, threaten the lives of its citizens arc! the security of the country, the U.S. Government offer to join the GVN in a massive joint effort as a part of a total mobilization of GVN resources to cope with both the Viet-Cong (VC) and the ravages of

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e flood. The U* S. representatives will participate actively in

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-[his effort, particularly in the fields of government administration, military plans and operations, intelligence, and flood relief, going beyond the advisory role which they have observed in the past

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b. That in support of the foregoing broad commitment-to a joint effort with Diem, the following specific measures be under-

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(1) The U.S. Government v/ill be "prepared to provide

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individual administrators for insertion into the governmental

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machinery of South Vietnam in types and numbers to be worked out

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with President Diem.

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(2) A joint effort will be made to improve the military

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political intelligence system beginning at the provincial level and extending upward through the government and am 1 forces to the Central Intelligence Organization,

(3) The U.S. Government will engage in a joint survey of the conditions in the provinces to assess the social^ political^ intelligence ? and military factors bearing on the prosecution of the counter-insurgency in order to reach a common estimate of these factors and a common determination of how to deal with them. As this survey will consume tirne^ it should not hold back the immediate actions which are clearly needed regardless of its outcome-

('0 A joint effort will be made to free the Army for mobile 5 offensive operations. This effort will be based upon improving the training and equipping of the Civil Guard and the Self-Defense Corps ? relieving the regular Army of static missions, raising the level of the mobility of Army forces by the provision of considerably more helicopters and light aviation, and organizing a Border Ranger Force for a long-term campaign on the Laotian border against the Viet-Cong infiltrators. The U.S. Government will support this effort with equipment and with military units and personnel to do those tasks which the Armed Forces of Vietnam cannot perform in time. Such tasks include air reconnaissance and

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photography, airlift (beyond the present capacity of SVN force*?)

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special intelligence, and air-ground support techniques,

(5) The U.S, Government will assist lh£ uVN in of incline

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surveillance arid control over the coastal waters and inland water-ways, furnishing such advisors, operating personnel and small craft as may be necessary for quick and effective operations.

(6) The MAAG, Vietnam, will be reorganized and

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increased in size as may be necessary by the implementation of these recommendations*

(7) The U.S. Government will offer to introduce into

/ fiouth .Vietnam a military Task Force to operate-under U.S. control for the following purposes:

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(a) Provide a U.S. military presence capable of raisins national morale and of showing to Southeast Asia the

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seriousness of the U. S. intent to resist a Communist take-over. . - • (b) Conduct logistical operations in support of mili

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(c) Conduct such combat operations as are

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(d) Provide an emergency reserve to back"'Up tl , Armed Forces of the GVN in the case of a heightened military

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CLASSIFICATION OF REFERENCE

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1 ins mes3age is ior tfce purpose ol prese:itsn g my rensons for

.recommending t)\e introduction of a U, S. military force into

South Vietnam (SYN)« I have reached the conclusion that this is

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an essential action if we are to reverse the present downward trend of events in spite of a full recognition of the following dis-advantages:

a* The strategic reserve of U.S* forces is presently so

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weak that we can-ill afford any detachment of forces to ar peripheral area of the Communist bloc where they will be pinned down* for *a"h uncertain "duration. " ' -•

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CPECtAL INSTRUCTIONS

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b. Although U.S. prestLgg is already engaged in SVN, it will

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become more so by the Ending of troops.

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c. If the first'contingent ts not enough to accomplish the [necessary results, it will be difficult to resist the pressure to reinforce. If the ultimate result sought is the closing of the

{frontiers and the. clean-up of the insurgents within SVN, there is no

jlimit to our possible commitment (unless v/e attach the source in

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Hanoi)

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d. The introduction ofU.S. forces v/Hl/increase tensions and risk escalation into a major war in Asia, •

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i On the other side of the argument, there can be no action so

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(convincing of U»S» seriousness of purpose and hence so reassuring to the people and Government of SVN and to our other

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friends and allies in SEA as the introduction of U. S. forces into SVN

The views of indigenous and U, S. officials consulted on our trip

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were unanimous on this point. I have just seen Saigon 5X5 to State

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3.n& sueeest that it be read in connection with this message.

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2 '*The size.of the UVS.- force introduced need not be great to pro vide the military presence necessary to produce the desired effect

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on national morale in SVN and on international opinion. A bare

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however, will not suffice; it must have a si Ificant value,

1 she kinds of tasks which it mi^ht under' s which would have a

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(a) Provide j/tJS military presence capable of ra:*:n*

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national morale gptS of showing to Southeast; Asia the" seriousness of

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the US intent-to resist a Communist take-over.

(b) Conduct logistical operations in

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and flood relief operations, ^

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(c) Conduct such combat operations as are necessary for

self-defense and for the security of the area in which they

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stationed.

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(d) Provide an emergency reserve to back up the Armed ^Forces of the GVN in the case of a heightened military crisis.

(e) Act as an advance party of such additional forces as may be introduced if CINCPAC or SEATO contingency plans are

invoked.

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It is noteworthy that this force is not proposed to clear the jungles and forestffof Viet Cong guerrillas. That should be the

primary task .of the.Armed Forces of Vietnam for which* they should be specifically organized, trained, and stiffened with ample U.S.

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advisors down-tp combat battalion levels. However, the U. S,

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troops may be called upon to engage in combat to protect them-

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selves, their working parties, and the area in which they live. As a general reserve, they might be thrown into action (with U.S,

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/ agreement) against large, formed guerrilla bands which have

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abandoned the.forests for attacks on major targets. But in general, our forces should not engage in small-scale,guerrilla

operations in the jungle,

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As an area for the operations of U. S. troops 3 SVN is not an

1 excessively difficult or unpleasant place to operate. While the border areas are rugged and heavily forested, Vno terrain is

j comparable to parts of Korea where U.S. troops learned to live

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I and work without too much effort. However, these border areas,

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for reasons stated above, are not the places to engage our force::. 1 r Tn the High Plateau and in the coastal plain where U. S. troops would probably be stationed, these jungle-for est conditions do not

exist to any great extent* The most unpleasant feature in the coastal areas would be the heat and, in the Delta, the mud left

behind by the flood. The High Plateau offers no particular obstacle to the stationing of U« S. troops. .. -

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relief activities in the Delta will depend upon further study of the

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j problem there. As reported in Saigon 537, I see considerable

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advantages in playing up this aspect of the Task Force mission* i am. presently inclined to favor a dual mission, initially help to

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fats resources can be used effectively to give tangible support in the

truggle against the Viet Cong 4 However, the possibility of

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emphasizing the humanitarian mission will wane if we wait long in *

moving in ou«r forces or in linking our stated purpose with the

' emergency conditions created by the flood,

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The risks of baching into a major Asian war by way of SVN are

[(present but are not impressive, NVN is extremely vulnerable t

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conventional bombing, a weakness which should be exploited diplo-rnatically in' convincing Hanoi to lay off SVKo Both the D/?3f and the Chicoms would face severe logistical difficulties in trying to maintain strong forces in the field in SEA, difficulties which we

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share but by no means to the same degree. There is no case for fearing a mass onslaught of Communist manpower into SVN and its

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Ineighboring.states, particularly if our airoower is allowed a free

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hand against logistical targets. Finally, the starvation condition in China should discourage Communist leaders there from being

militarily venturesome for some time to come*

By the foregoing line of reasoning, I have reached the con-

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elusion that the introduction of a U.S. military Task Force without

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delay offers definitely more advantage than it creates risks and difficulties. Xh fact, I do not believe that our program to 'save SVN

will succeed without it* If the concept is approved, the exact size

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and CINCPAC. , My own feeling is that the initial size should not

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exceed about 8000, of which a preponderant number would be in logistical-type units. After acquiring experience in operating in

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SVM S this initial force will require reorganization and adjustment

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As CINCPAC will point out, any forces "committed to SVN will

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strategic reserve in the U.S. Also, any troops to SVN are in

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Edition to those which may be required to execute SEATC Plan 5

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in I*ao.5. Both facts should he taken into account in current considerations of the FY 1963 budget which bear upon the permanent

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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Washington, B.C. 20301

8 November 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT \ SUBJECT: South Vietnam

The "basic issue framed by the Taylor Report is whether the U.S. shall:

a. Commit itself to the clear objective of preventing the fall of South Vietnam to Communism, and

b, Support this commitment by necessary immediate military actions &ad preparations for possible later actions.

The Joint Chiefs, Mr. Gilpatric, and I have reached the following conclusions:

1. The fall of South Vietnam to Communism would lead to the fairly raped extension of Communist control, or complete accommodation to Communism, in the rest of mainland Southeast Asia and in Indonesia. The strategic implications worldwide, particularly in the Orient, would be extremely serious.

2. The chances are against, probably sharply against, preventing that fall by any measures short of the introduction of U.S. forces on a substantial scale. We accept General Taylor's judgment that the various measures proposed by him short of this are useful but will not in themselves do the job of restoring confidence and setting Diem on the way to winning his fight.

3. The introduction of a U.S. force of the magnitude: of an initial 8,000 men in a flood relief context will be of great help to Diem. However, it will not convince the other side (whether the shots are called from Moscow, Peiking, or Hanoi) that we mean business. Moreover, it probably will not tip the scales decisively. We would be almost certain to get increasingly mired down in an inconclusive struggle.

k* The other side can be convinced we mean business only if we accompany the initial force introduction by a clear commitment to the fu>l objective stated above, accompanied by a warning through some cl lei to Hanoi that continued support of the Viet Com 111 lead to

punitive retaliation against North Vietnam.

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5- }S- v;i ^et- lru_lhis_vay ^JUU£LJLill*iiR8xte*posciJbla--cxtont.^f our nuJUj^iry c^rajutment must be_ fncru. The stru(>;le piay.be.prolonged and ■ Han^jLnd.J^eiDirJy "may intervene .overtly , _- In view of trie logistic

difficulties faced bv' the other aide, I believe ve can assume that the " • maximum U.S. forcedrequired on the ground in Southeast Asia will not * exceed" 6~ division, or. about..205,U00 men, (etBCPAC Vlmr'i'^y), -Phase: .1 V,) . Our'military posture is, or, with the addition of morn Rationed. Guard or regular Army divisions, can bo nade, adequate to furnish these forces vithout serious interference with our present Berlin plan:;.

^ 6, To accept the stated objective is of course a most serious decision. Military force is not the only element of what must be a most carefully coordinated set oi actions. . Success will depend on factors many of which are not within our control -- notably the conduct of Diem himself and other leaders in the area- Laos will remain a major problem. The domestic political implications of accepting the objective are also grave, although it is our feeling that the country will respond better to a firm initial position than to courses of action that load us in only gradually, and that in the meantime are sure to involve casualties* The over-all effect on Moscow and Peiping will need careful weighing and

Lmay well be mixed; however t permitting.South Vietnam to fall can only strengthen and encourage them greatly.

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7* In sum:

a. We do not believe major units of IKS. forces should be introduced in South Vietnam unless we are willing to make an affirmative decision on the issue stated at the start of this

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memorandum.

Ve arc inclined to recommend that we do commit the U.S. to the clear objective of preventing the fall of South Vietnam to Coimnunisin and that we support this commitment by the necessary nilitary actions.

c. If such a commitment is agreed upon, we pupport the recofficicrt&atioris of General Taylor as the first steps toward its ■fulfillment*

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Enclosure No. 1

Despauch No, 205 From Saigon

BRITISH ADVISORY MISSION, 196, Cong Ly, Saigon

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November 11, 1961

Your Excellency,

As promised at my interview with Your Excellency last Wednesday, I now enclose a memorandum briefly outlining plan and the measures required for the clearance of the communists from the Delta area.

As I explained to Your Excellency it will be much easier to make a start on these lines in one area and for this purpose the whole Delta area, south and west of Saigon, comprising the present 32nd and 33rd tactical zones, would appear to be the most promising starting point as compared with the area north of Saigon and the Highlands which require, at the present time, more specifically military measures. Arrangements have now just been made for my mission to visit the Highlands area and Central Vietnam and we are leaving on Monday morning (November 13) and returning on Friday evening (November 17). This will enable us to get a clearer picture of the problems throughout the country as a whole,

I also attach a short note by Mr, Palmer on intelligence, which is related to the organization mentioned in paragraphs 27 and 28 of the memorandum, Mr. Palmer has attempted to provide Your Excellency with a number of examples showing how life can be breathed into the organization. He would, of course, be ready to discuss this further at any time convenient to Your Excellency.

Your Excellency will also understnad from the outline plan in the attached memorandum that it should lend by stages to a reorganisation of the Government machine for directing and co-ordinating all action against the communists and to the production of an overall strategic operational plan for the country as a whole defining responsibilities5 tasks and priorities. At the same time it will lead to the establishment of a static security frame. ; which can

His Excellency - The President of the Republic of Vietr:

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

Enclosure No.l Despatch No. 205 From Saigon

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be developed eventually into a National Police force into which can be incorporated a single security intelligence organization for the direction and co-ordination of all intelligence activities against the communists. I agree with Your Excellency that it would be too disruptive at the present time to try to achieve these immediately and that they should be developed gradually. Using a medical analogy, the remedy should be clinical rather than surgical.

I look forward to seeing Your Excellency again on my return.

I have the honour to be^ with the highest consideration^

Your Excellency's obedient Servant y

(R.G.K. Thompson)

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

Enclosure No, 2 Despatch No. 205 From Saigon

MEMORANDUM

The aim of this memorandum is to outline a plan and the measures required for the clearance of the communists from the Delta area.

Overall aim

The overall aim of any counter insurgency plan must be to win the people. The killing of communist terrorists will follow automatically from that. If the main emphasis is placed merely on killii terrorists there is a grave risk that more communists will be cre&bed than are killed. Winning the people must, therefore, be kept in the forefront of the minds of every single pwrson, whether military or civilian, who is engaged in anti-terrorist operations.

Combined Headquarters

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3. There is a Very similar terrain throughout the whole area of rice fields and swamp, with mangrove on the coast. The area is at present divided into 12 provinces with two tactical zones (the seven southern provinces and five northern provinces) in each of which a military division is stationed. At the present time there is inadequate direction and co-ordii ion of the campaign with the result that the 12 provinces are tending to fight separate battles and the communists are able to take advantage of the boundaries between the respective spheres of responsibility.

k* We should therefore establish a Combined Headquarters for the area to direct and co-ordinate:

(a) all anti-terrorist operations;

(b) all civilian emergency measures:

(c) all security intelligence;

(d) information and propaganda; ;and

(e) as a follow up, social improvement

It is logical that these Headquarters should be the present 3rd Corps reinforced by Administrative, Civil Guard, Self-Defence Corps

d Propaganda elements. There is great advantage in the fact that the Corps Headquarters itself is based in the Saigon area where the best facilities for control are available,

5. This would make it desirable to relieve this headquarters of any responsibility for the 31st tactical zone and for the special zone of Saigon, and it is for consideration whether these two zones could best be handled by Field Ay Headquarters as a separate command

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 2011

Enclosure No. 2 Despatch No. 205

From Saigon

command or, perhaps, Incorporated into 2nd Corps. The Combined Headquarters at 3rd Corps should cease to be responsible to Field Army Headquarters (which can then concentrate on the area north of Saigon and the Highlands), and should be directly responsible to the National Security Council presided over by His Excellency the President, The Corps and all i;ts military units would, however, continue to draw logistical support from the H.Q. A.R.V.N.

The Tactical Zones

6, Given this one Combined Headquarters for the whole area, the 32nd and 33rd Tactical Zones as such are no longer necessary. Instead there would only be an operational dividing line between the two divisions but this would be changeable, depending both on the situation and on the operations planned. This will allow such greater flexibility with regard to the movement of military forces throu ut the whole area.

Provinces

7 • It follows from this that the chefs de Province will be directly responsible to the Combined Headquarters on all emergency matters (though they will continue to work to the Ministries concerned in respect of normal routine administration). The Chef de Province should remain responsible for the direction and co-ordination of all emergency measures in his Province and the District chefs should similarly remain responsible to their respective Chefs de Province, Bearing in mind that most of them are military officers this Is likely to be more satisfactory in the present circumstances than the Malayan District or Executive Committee system. This system should only be developed gradually as military Cfyefs de Province can be replaced by civil administrators.

Command'Channels

8. (a) The military chain of command will operate In the normal way, from the Military Corps staff at the Combined Headquarters to the two Divisional Headquarters and thence to regiments and battalions. It may be desirable for Ranger Companies., specifically attached to a particular Province, to come under the operational command of the Chef de Province, but the latter should not command any army battalion or regiment operating In his province■ He should, however, be responsible for co-ordinating operations with the col Ler of that battalion or regiment, as the case may be.

/00

The

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 i

Enclosure No. 2 Despatch Wo. 205 From Saigon

(b) The Chef de Province will, however, be responsible for all civil emergency measures and their direction and, in that respect, will exercise command over the civil departments concerned.

(c) Civil Guard and Self-Defence command channels are discussed in paragraphs 17 and ik below.

Civil Measures

9. The basic units of population are the village and Hamlet, Although the sizes vary, there are normally about k to 5 Hamlets of 200-300 houses to each village. The main civil emergency measures required at this level are:

(a) regrouping of hamlets round the perimeter i.e. along the Cambodian frontier and on the fringes of the mangrove swamp areas, particularly those which have become long established communist bases. These hamlets should be known as "defended Hamlets 11 ; and

(b) the establishment of "strategic hamlets" in the remainder of the area.

10. The establishment of a "Cordon Sanitaire" along this part of the frontier (or elsewhe on the perimeter) is not desirable, except possibly at special points, because:

(a) it gives up ground;

(b) it eliminates intelligence coverage;

(c) it establishes a more or less permanent patrol commitment for either Civil Guard or Military forces; and

(d) it still does not solve the problem of the populated areas wherever they may start.

Regrouping of hamlets is likely to prove a better solution provided that they are of a convenient size for defence and control and the inhabitants are not moved too far from their normal work. Regrouped villages might be too big and unwieldy and cause too drastic a move of the population. The ideal size for a defended hamlet is about 300 houses (8-10 to an acre).

Control measures

11. (a) Prohibited areas from which the population is totally

excluded until further notice should be declared and all Government forces should have complete freedom to shoot on sight in such areas;

/(b) Curfews,

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

Enclosure Ho. 2 Despatch No. 205 From Saigon

(b) Curfews 5 particularly at nighty should be introduced on certain roads and waterways, in areas surrounding defended hamlets and in such other areas as may be required. Anyone breaking the curfew should be liable to be shot on sight,

(c) Identity cards should be issued to the whole population and the Delta area should be given priority for the new plastic cards. The inhabitants of each house should be recorded (as is being done in most strategic hamlets) and a photograph of the complete household should be pinned inside the house with duplicates available at district and province level (as in Vinh Binh province),

(d) Check points should be established on all roads and waterways. There should also be surprise checks at other points. This will help to prevent the present freedom of movement enjoyed by communist agents and couriers.

*

(e) It may be possible to introduce a limited degree of food ' control (and of other supplies) particularly in the areas where defended hamlets are established.

Self-Defence Corps

12. I was very impressed with the good progress being made with the establishment of the self-Defence Corps jand Self-Defence Corps■ posts (particularly in Kien Hoa, Vinh Binh and Vinh Long Provinces) based

on strategic hamlets with a larger post at village level. The potentiality of this policy is tremendous and the Self-Defence Corps could be made the key to the whole situation. Although the pay is low and the equipment is still poor, the necessary spirit seems to be there and should be easily encouraged. If this is done successfully, the great advantage will lie in the fact that the people are defending themselves. Their local intelligence is good and provided that'they are given sufficient confidence not to fear reprisals, they wil j_ pick off communist agents and supporters and small guerrilla units, (in one of the Provinces visited they have the highest score of kills over the last few months).

■

13. The pay problem might be solved by making the permanent members more part-time on a roster basis so that they can still attend to some of their normal work. With regard to equipment I hope that carbines can soon be issued. Every post should, however, also have a grenade discharger. Other minor equipment and "better uniform would greatly improve morale• Each post should also have a Very pistol or at least a rocket. The drum seems to be very adequate for raising the alarm within the hamlet its.elf.

-

lU. Being essentially a force which operates only at the village and hamlet level no elaborate chain of command is required above that level. A very small staff is required at District level to

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

Enclosure No, 2 Despatch No. 205 From Saigon

ensure co-ordination between the villages and to the intelligence aspect and similarly at the Province level. Above that there should only be an inspectorate, the main purpose of which should be to visit posts as frequently as possible to find out their needs, stay with them and help them to understnad the importance of their mission. The Civil Guard at Province and District level shoiild be responsible for logistic and administrative support.

15. A prerecuisit e for the establishment of Self-Defence Corps units, including their posts in strategic and defended hamlets, is that they can be adequately and rapidly supported by Civil Guard units in the event of an attack developing and, in turn, the Army should be responsible for dealing with any large concentration which may develop against such hamlets. It would be fatal to establish such units and posts before this support can be provided. Training is not a major problem

as only a minimum is required and in many places there are a number of former soldiers. All peasants have a natural instinct for small scale guerrilla and anti-guerrilla operations.

Civil Guard

16. The Civil Guard should be organised to provide the permanent static framework of the Government's security forces within each Province. Their present organisation on a battalion and company basis is desirable only for the purpose of equipment and retraining. Their subsequent deployment requires that battalion Headquarters should be the provincial headquarters with company headquarters becoming the district headquarters. Provinces should then be reinforced by additional companies as may be required particularly for mobile operations. As the security situation improves companies may be transferred elsewhere, except that a company headquarters must remain at district level even though the number of men in that particular cc ny may be reduced. This means that the total strength of the Civil Guard in a Province can vary considerably but that the headquarters framework at the Province and District level must always remain,

17. The operational direction of the Civil Guard in a Province should rest with the Chef de Province through the battalion commander and at district level with the District Chief through the company coir_ der (when the Chef de Province and the Chef de District are military officers). In all other respects the command and administrative channel should .go direct from the battalion commander to the Civil Guard element at i Combined Headquarters, and thence to the main Civil Guard Headquarters in Saigon. As and when provinces are declared "white" and civil admicd rators are appointed as Chefs de Province, then the whole command chain will run direct from Civil Guard headquarters in Saigon through Combined Headquarters to the Battalion Headquarters at Province level and thence to its companies

/it is

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

Enclosure Kb. 2 Despatch No. 205 From Saigon

It is this organisation which should then gradually be developed into a national police force with the amalgamation of other suitable forces.

•lilitary Units (including Rangers)

■

18. The initial aim of military units should be to keep the main communist forces off balance while the whole framework of defended and strategic hamlets is being developed and consolidated and their main tasks will therefore be:

(a) active patrolling and engagement of communist terrorists outside the populated areas;

(b) prevention by planned operations of communist terrorist concentrationj

(c) support of defended hamlets in bad areas and rescue of them if attacked;

(d) enforcement of control measures especially curfews and prohibited areas.

19, As the framework is established, military units should gradually be relieved of all static duties, except in defence of their own establishments and, where any static duties remain, a mobile reserve should always be available. This will be the time when the communists will either have to concentrate to attack the framework or else will withdraw to their bases in the swamp. Planned military operations will be necessary to deal with both these eventualities,

20, In so far as the Delta area is concerned it would be desirable gradually to withdraw Ranger Companies as they can be replaced by retrained Civil Guard companies in order that the E ■ Companies themselves can be retrained for their proper task in the jungle areas north of Saigon and in the Highlands. But, as already stated, where they must initially remain allocated to a Province they should be under the operational command of the Chef de Province (when a military officer) and used in much the same role as mobile Civil Guard companies.

Air Force

21. The main role of the Air Force should be to increase the mobility of the security forces in areas where other communications are lacking, It wil3 also have the normal tasks of reconnaissance and cc aications and, where a suitable tdrget presents irself, of ground attack. The priority task for helicopers should be the evacuation of wounded, including t; e from the Self-Defence Corps who should receive equally good treatment as the / ; and Civil Guard.

/Navy

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

Enclosure No. 2 Despatch No. 205 From Saigon

Navy

22. The main task of the Navy must be to prevent the entry of supplies 5 reinforcements^ agents and weapons "by sea into the area. Simultaneously the Navy should prevent all communist movement by water along the coasts. At the present time large communist units are able to move rapidly from island to island across the mouth of the Delta with impunity. Not only should these be stopped completely but ? if suitable craft are obtained and fitted with radar, there should be considerable slaughter on the first few occasions. The type of vessel required is a seaward defence motor launch, inshore mine sweeper^ or sea-going customs launch (like the police P-craft as used in Malaya). They are all quite small with crews of between 10 and 15 men but they must be fitted with radar, wireless, search light, at least one 20 mm. and machine guns. They should carry sufficient fuel and stores to stay at sea for about 7 days.

Inland Waterways

23- With regard to the Mekong itself and other inland waterways this should not be a naval task (although the Navy may be required to help for a specific period or operation). River patrol units are required in the Civil Guard (as in Kien Hoa Province). It is understood that small landing craft suitable for troop movement and patrolling of the Mekong are being provided. These should be very adequate bu, in addition, there will also be a requirement for smaller and faster boats, possibly fibre glass with outboard motor, capable of carrying about 6 men. In the initial stages these should be used, if based on static control points, to check traffic up and down the rivers and, in the later stages when security has improved, for patrolling and quick communications.

Roads

2H. Some Civil Guard battalions now have a road partol platoon at Provincial Headquarters using mainly former Malayan G.M.C.'s and Lynx scout cars. These are all very old and problems are arising with regard to spare parts and tyres. For the future it is considered that a light armoured car to take the place of these vehicles is essential. As far as I know the only one being produced is the United Kingdom Ferret scout car and this is due to go out of production in I962. It may be possible to make a final order. Its cost is about h 15,000 excluding spares. If this cannot be done then the best solution is to devise a fairly simple system of armour plating jeeps and light trucks (as was in fact done in Malaya).

Wirele ss Communi cati on

———1——■— -— —— . _ i- _—.—. ,— .— ,—_—_~

25. These will need to be gone into in some dei ail to see that they all tie in correctly. At the lowest level strategic hamlets may have to communicate with the village by courier, flare or rocket but at village level the Self-Defence Corps certainly needs a simple

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

*-.»

*-

-0

I'ilClGSUl 1 !

trarisniit tor/re eel* and feitio ::iuy al&o be repaired in t?ie defended

iiai;uei

XiQl'H

co a control not at *)z strict

*%adou&rters next door uo tha Civil rftard Coii-xtfiy sat t;j:io.i would thea be responsible far ralayin,; ukv ueasucos; ta required to civil Gaard -^admaarterfc til; n.-ic *VovivicG lovely Jiie Civil i*uard Coauarr/ Headquarters at .Dis'sriOu level ^voult 1 also aroviue kae i&u;&oxi?u:

Ixtik va 6l, ulVil

tbe district.

parrels rind aay other lUvil Uttf;rd poets within

^tglli,;ence

27* SeariMij in r^ind she VMcle fra-ev^ric vac- first roqai-e: A?at here vis to establish a joint; eoi:£:5i*tee in one 1*00*3 at distidot level with Irepresenoatiyse oi" Curate, caic uhe£ de i/iiyoricis Cxse ^eli^iJefenoo

l Corps$ the Civil c-aard Bod* if raiiiiary miivo type op i_; in. the

District, the ArMy uO } 'reiser*, ^:^ ::ost suzwiOAe »raon ctaon : these

1 V

"

should be yl^ooS i*i charge Co direct 9 under the Chef do Jis1 Iet 3 the intoIlx^eHoe effort in the *ii3triat* Afc fciis lavolp t'Ua elooesls contact :ii:3t be keps v;ich the *elf^**ejtence ^orpj* villa^oo szrA ii^i>-lets ciiich v/ill be urio aain &cures of i&relljbjeuco* #*t 1 v s -T-oviiioial level chc : &t-oul£ be a rinilur out larger Jain^ intelligence staff filr&CEinj and eC^jrdinaisia:; itikolli_;ehOis for t:tq ifipovinae && a tvkoie and undertaking iai-alliya^cu jcpojeeco v/iich &r*s beyoud tl~e ea^oMli-sy of t:ie i)iQtii a ic^* At uiia Conbiuad -oadcum^ory core EMpuld bo a siFdlar iu4ielli v ;oucG Bttiff diraotvr^-; iuoolli^o^as Tor sau aren as a v;;io3.e* as t tii; isyaco:i :b d^voloood i\: iill jittdualiy ^Uftj i-xo a security inteilijerioa or^'aaisafiiotj a«;d yvoatuall/^ if i:..o civil

of *o!:e i^ibicnal Police .oroo. J;:cro can tilv*u t va jo c^^aqhed 10 it at any level an amy iiitalli^onea officer cu provide *^:ie ijjr:.y liiiko

2S« Anoth3r inport;.?,:it ocurce of intelligence^ J;l:ou;;:i not always of isaediube tacyicnl inportauea 9 vlll oe J^^ J a (Jiere rider enai^y V&tsc b1) and cauttarsd d0ou?.ie?i&3» oftcta c;.onlu alleys be i/ite:/io ;atci at tie nearest IHswrxet **esaqimi a ters xn oa^e tliey Slave any tactical

j^it^lliy' -s vaioh can to irr;£Glately exoloi^etU Jh©y should then

i::ulc:i snoulo aaira a interrosated on eosj*»

and oBher :>ari;iculara„ to j6 broLiTrlit buck fo;

\)G seet'sriisc c-o iVovinoe -^aadnuarters each of sr^all interrogation o&n^ra tshsra Jlj?s can fos nuni&t or of battlo s scursaa of supplies

If of sufficient inporear.co the oaf may need

fu?rtjier interrogation at t in Co^Jiined Corps ^eadnuaruers* iiyervtisir*-po ilble o T 'Oald be dona fco c:\{; .:ra^a Bi^rcaders a-:d all Lit a. in-dueling any eaptiires* siioiild bo yjeXl ci*aatsd as t*:oy uay bscc raat imporfe i for n'rops.jm-.da g»tirpoDO©o

*

c*

/luforr-atj c

. «■«. »^^-^

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number; NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

Enclosure No* 2 Despatch No, 205

From Saigon

Information and Propaganda

29. A strong section must be established at the Corps Headquarters covering all fields of information and propaganda from the radio A downwards. It is essential that a common line should be taken throughout the whole area on every subject. In the field at provincial level 5 however 5 mobile units are required (both boats and jeeps) in order that every hamlet can be visited as frequently as possible. In addition each hamlet should have a receiving set (as already-supplied by Australia under the Colombo Plan). Greater use also needs to be made of leaflets to be dropped either by patrols or by aircraft and for this purpose the Combined Corps Headquarters should either have under its control, or should be able to call on, adequate printing resources. Voice aircraft would also be a tremendous asset particularly for exploiting successful action and any surrenders.

Social improvements

30. It may not be possible to introduce the necessary social improvements simutaneously with the emergency measures already enumerated but they should follow as soon as possible particularly when an area becomes 'white 1 with emphasis on improved schools and medical facilities. Much good work to the effect Mas already being done in the provinces visited. Such measures should, however^ be undertaken in defended hamlets simultaneously with regrouping in order to demonstrate the advantages of such a measure. In defended hamlets it may also be desirable to install small generating sets capable of providing in the first instance perimeter and street lighting. The inhabitants should be informed that as soon as the Communists have been elimated these generating sets may then be used to provide house lighting in the hamlet.

Civic Action

■

31. There is great scope for Civic Action and Youth Corps cadres

particularly in relation to the activities covered in the last two paragraphs. All this requires careful co-ordination so that the timing of all activities are properly related to the establisi nt of strategic and defended hamlets and to military operations.

Compensation^ Rewards and Subsidies

32. Funds should be provided by the central Government at provincial level to pay immediate compensation to the libers or families of the Self-Defence Corps and any other innocent person who is wounded or killed by the communists. The present system tends to be too slow

and the amounts may often be inadequate. Funds should also be available

/for

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

Enclosure-Ho. 2 Despatch No. 205 From Saigon

for the payment of rewards to members of the Self-Defence Corps and any other person (not a member of the security forces) for information leading to the killing of communists and the capture of weapons. It is desirable to produce a set "scale which should be uniform throughout the country. Subsidies may also be'necessary in cases where houses are regrouped into defended hamlets. A sum of about Piastres 2,500 for each house which has to be moved would not be unreasonable particularly if roofing material was also supplied free*

Summary of Material and Equipment Requirements

33* (a) Coastal and river patrol craft;

(b) Wireless communications;

(c) Better equipment for the self-Defence Corps including carbines, grenade dischargers, uniforms, flare pistols (or rockets);

(d) Helicopters;

(e) Large quantities of barbed wire; (it is understood that Chefs de Province are having to buy barbed wire for this purpose from provincial funds in the open market. This should be a central Government commitment).

(f) Mobile information units and small receiving sets;

(g) Suitably packed medical supplies for defended and strategic 1 lets;

(h) Roofing material - either corrugated iron, aluminum or asbestos (if regrouping is carried out on any scale this is bound to be a bottle neck and even supplies of nipah palm may not be available in the right places in sufficient quantity); (i) lyres for present Civil Guard scout cars and their

eventual replacement either by ferrets or armour plated jeeps or land revers;and (-j) Small generating sets and perimeter lighting for defended- hamlets.

Results

3^. The main results of establishing a framework as proposed should be:

(a) protection for the population;

(b) increased mobility for the security forces particularly the Army;

(c) greater flexibility in the use of forces where required at any given time in the whole area;

(d) with mobility and flexibility and ii red communications there should also be greater ecc ;.y of force;

(e) all this will instill greater confidence both in the population and in the security forces;

/(f) this 356

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 NND Project Number; NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

•

Enclosure No, 2 Despatch 205 From Saigon

(f) this, in turnj will lead to better intelligence; and

(g) better intelligence will result in more kills.

Protection., confidence, intelligence and "kills should become a sonstantly expanding circuit. \

Communist reaction

35* The Communists will not be slow to react and will make a determined effort to prevent the framework being established particularly at the village and hamlet level- This requires that there should be careful judgement and timing in its establishment. As it grows, so break it. That is the time for the security forces, and particularly the Army, to get them. Once the communist rank and file starts to break the leaders will attempt to withdraw, preferably over the frontier where they will be safe, but, if that is denied to them, then into the more inaccessible mangrove swamps in the coastal area where they can be steadily starved out and eliminated.

Priority Areas

36. Even within the Delta itself these measures cannot all be carried out simultaneously in every Province or District. First priority should be given to the Provinces along the Mekong with the intention of clearing a corridor through the middle of the whole area along its easiest axis. In fact regrouping should start there as soon as possible in order to take advantage of the damage caused by the floods. The luain intention in this area, however, would be initially to prevent further infiltration and subsequently to deny the frontier as a safe refuge. The final aim should be to push the communists back into the Mangrove swamps along the coast where they can do little harm and where they can then be starved out and eliminated.

Summary of Expected Achievements

37. (a)

00

(c)

(a)

The first achievement should be a cleared corridor along the line of the Mekong followed by

the declaration of 'white* areas ir the provinces concerned which will raise the morale of the whole country; the safeguarding of the rice crop;

the release of troops from the Delta area for the more specific military operations North of Saigon and in the Highlands;

/(e) the

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

Enclosure No, 2 Despatch No. 205 From Saigon

(e) the establishment of a solid security framework which It will be comparatively easy to maintain, and

(f) a model for operations in the remaining parts of the country, particularly in the area immediately North and East of Saigon and along the coastal plain.

British Advisory Mission, Saigon.

November 13, 19&L •

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number; NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

TOP SECRET

November 11, 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: South Viet-Nam

lo United States National Interests in South Viet-Nam .

The deteriorating situation in South Viet-Nam requires attention to the nature and scope of United States national interests in that country. The loss of South Viet-Nam to Communism would involve the transfer of a nation of 20 million people from the free world to the Communist bloc. The loss of South Viet-Nam would make pointless any further discussion about the importance of Southeast Asia to the free world; we would have to face the near certainty that the remainder of Southeast Asia and Indonesia would move to a complete accommodation with Communism, if not formal incorporation within the Communist bloc. The United States, as a member of SEATO, has commitments with respect to South Viet-Nam under the Protocol to the SEATO Treaty. Additionally, in a formal statement at the conclusion session of the 195*+ Geneva Conference^ the United States representative stated that the United States "would view any renewal of the aggression . • , with grave concern and as seriously threatening international peace and security."

The loss of South Viet-Nam to Communism would not only destroy SEATO but would undermine the credibility of American commitments elsewhere. Further, loss of South Viet-Nam would stimulate bitter domestic controbersies in the United States and would be seized upon by extreme elements to divide the country and harass the Administration.

2o The Problem of Saving South Viet-Nam

It seems, on the face of it, absurd to think that a nation of 20 million people can be subverted by 15-20 thousand active guerrillas

if

TOP SECRET

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

-2-

if the Government and people of "that country do not "wish to he subverted. South Viet-Nam is not, however, a highly organized society with an effective governing apparatus and a population accustomed to carrying civic responsibility. Public apathy is encouraged by the inability of most citizens to act directly as well as by the tactics of terror employed by the guerrillas throughout the countryside. Inept administration and the absence of a strong non-Communist political coalition have made it difficult to bring available resources to bear upon the guerrilla problem and to make the most effective use of available external aid. Under the best of conditions the threat posed by the presence of 15-20 thousand guerrillas, well disciplined under well-trained cadres, would be difficult to meet.

3. The United States' Objective in South Viet-Warn

The United States should commit itself to the clear objective of preventing the fall of South Viet-Nam to Communism . The basic means for accomplishing this objective must be to put the Government of South Viet- Nam into a position to win its own war against the guerrillas. We must insist that that Government itself take the measures necessary for that purpose in exchange for large-scale United States assistance in the military, economic and political fields. At the same time we must recognize that it will probably not be possible for the GVN to win this war as long as the flow of men and supplies from North Viet-Nam continues uncher i and the guerrillas enjoy a safe sanctuary in neighboring territory.

We should be prepared to introduce United States combat forces if that should become necessary for success. Dependent upon the circumstances, it may also be necessary for United States forces to strike at the source of the aggression in North Viet-Nam.

k. The Us e of United St ates Forces in Sout h Vie t-Nam,

The commitment of United States forces to South Viet-Nam involves two different categories: (A) Units of modest size required for the direct support of South Vie: - :ainese military effort, such as communications, helicopter and other forms of airlift, reconnaissance aircraft, naval patrols, intelligence units, etc., and (B) larger organized units with actual or potential direct rnilitai^y missions. Category (A) should be introduced a seedily as possible . Category (B) units pose a more serious problem in that they are much more significant from the point of view of domestic and international political factors and greatly increase the probabilities of Communist bloc escalation. Further, the employment of United States c forces

(in

TOP SECRET

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

-3-

(in the absence of Coimnunist bloc escalation) involves a certain dilemma: if there is a strong South Viet-Hamese effort 3 they may not be needed; if there is not such an effort y United States forces could not accomplish their mission in the midst of an apathetic or hostile population. Under present circumstances 5 therefore 3 the question of injecting United States and SEATO combat forces should in large part be considered as a, contribution to the morale of the South Viet-Namese in their own effort to do the principal job themselves.

5. Probable Extent of the Commitment of United States Forces,

— ... _ - _

If we commit Category (b) forces to South Viet-Nam 5 the ultimate possible extent of our military commitment in Southeast Asia must be faced. The struggle may be prolonged^ and Hanoi and Peiping nay overtly intervene. It is the view of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff that> in the light of the logistic difficulties faced by the other side> we can assume that the maximum United States forces required on the ground in Southeast Asia would not exceed six divisions y or about 205^000 men (CINCPAC Plan 32/59 Phase IV), This would be in addition to local forces and such SEATO forces as may be engaged. It is also the view of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff that our military posture is> or,, with the addition of more National Guard or regular Army divisions^ can be made, adequate to furnish these forces and support them in action without serious interference with our p sent Berlin plans.

6. Relation to Laos .

It must be understood that the introduction of American combat forces into Viet-Nam prior to a Laotian settlement would run a considerable risk of stimulating a Communist breach of the cease fire and a resumption of hostilities in Laos, This could present us with a choice between the use of combat forces in Laos or an abandonment of that country to full Communist control. At the present time, there is at least a chance that a settlement can be reached in Laos on the basis of a weak and unsatisfactory Souvanna Fhouma Government. The prospective agreement on Laos includes a provision that Laos will not be used as a transit area or as a base for interfering in the affairs of other countries such as South Viet-Nam. After a Laotian settlement the introduction of United States forces into Viet-Eam could serve to stabilize the position both in Viet-Nam and in Laos by registering our determination to see to it that the Laotian settlement was as far as the United States would be willing to see Communist influence in Southeast Asia develop.

7. The

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7. The Need for Multilateral Action .

From the political point of view, both domestic and international, it would seem important to involve forces from other nations alongside of United States Category (B) forces in Viet-Nam. It would be difficult to explain to our own people why no effort had been made tp invoke SEATO or why the United States undertook to carry this burden unilaterally. Our position would be greatly strengthened if the introduction of forces could be taken as a SEATO action, accompanied by units of other SEATO countries, with a full SEATO report to the United Nations of the purposes of the action itself.

Apart from the armed forces, there would be political advantage in enlisting the interest of other nations, including neutrals, in the security and well-being of South Viet-Nam. This might be done by seeking such assistance as Malayan police officials (recently offered Diem by the Tumka) and by technical assistance personnel in other fields, either bilaterally or through international organizations

8, Initial Diplomatic Action by the United States ,

If the recommendations, below/ are approved, the United States should consult intensively with other SEATO governments to obtain their full support of the course of action contemplated. At the appropriate stage, a direct approach should be made by the United States to Moscow, through normal or special channels, pointing out that we cannot accept the movement of cadres, arms and other supplies into South Viet-Kam in support of the guerrillas. We should also discuss the problem with neutral governments in the general area and get them to face up to their own interests in the security of South Viet-Kam; these governments will be concerned about (a) the introduction of United States combat forces and (b) the withdrawal of United States support from Southeast Asia; their concern, therefore, might be usefully expressed either to Communist bloc countries or in politicaD. support for what may prove necessary in South Viet-Nam itself.

RECOMMENDATIONS

In the light of the foregoing, the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense recommend that:

1. We now take the decision to commit ourselves to the objective of preventing the fall of South Viet-Nam to Communism and that, in doing so, we recognize that the introduction of United States and other

SEATO

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SEATO forces may be necessary to achieve this objective. (However, if it is necessary to commit outside forces to achieve the foregoing objective, our decision to introduce United States forces should not be contingent upon unanimous SEATO agreement thereto.)

2. The Department of Defense be prepared -with plans for the use of United States forces in South Viet-lTam under one or more of

the following purposes:

the

(a) Use of a significant number of United States forces to signify United States determination to defend South Viet-Nam and to boost South Viet-Nam morale*

(b) Use of substantial United States forces to assist in suppressing Viet Cong insurgency short of engaging in detailed counter-guerrilla operations but including relevant operations in North Viet-Nam.

(c) Use of United States forces to deal with the situation if there is organized Communist military-intervention.

3. GVH:

We immediately undertake,the following actions in support of

(a) Provide increased air lift to the GVN forces, including helicopters, light aviation, and transport aircraft, manned to the extent necessary by United States uniformed personnel and under United States operational control.

(b) Provide such additional equipment and United States uniformed personnel as may be necessary for air reconnaissance, photography, instruction in and execution of air-ground support techniques, and for special intelligence.

(c) Provide the GVN with small craft, including such United States uniformed advisers and operating personnel as may be necessary for quick and effective operations in effecting surveillance and control over coastal waters and inland waterways.

(d) Provide expedited training and equipping of the civil guard and the self-defense corps with the objective of relieving the regular Arrny of static missions and freeing it for mobile offensive operations.

(e) Provide such personnel and equipment as may be necessary to improve the military-political intelligence system beginning

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at the provincial level and extending upward through the Government and the armed forces to the Central Intelligence Organization.

(f) Provide such new terms of reference, reorganization and additional personnel for United States military forces as are required for increased United States participation in the direction and control of GVN military operations and to carry out the other increased responsibilities which accrue to MAAG under these recommendations.

(g) Provide such increased economic aid as may he required

to permit the GVN to pursue a vigorous flood relief and rehabilitation program, to supply material in support of the security effortj and to give priority to projects in support of this expanded counter-insurgency program. (This could include increases in military pay, a full supply of a wide range of materials such as food, medical supplies, transportation equipment, communications equipment, and any other items where material help could assist the GYM in winning the war against the Viet Cong.)

(h) Encourage and support (including financial support) a request by the GVN to the FAO or any other appropriate international organization for multilateral assistance in the relief and rehabilitation of the flood area,

(i) Provide individual administrators and advisers for insertion into the Governmental machinery of South Viet-Nam in types and numbers to be agreed upon by the two Governments.

(j) Provide personnel for a joint survey with the GVN of conditions in each of the provinces to assess the social, political, intelligence, and military factors bearing on the prosecution of the counter-insurgency program in order to reach a common estimate of these factors and a common determination of how to deal with them,

k* Ambassador Molting be instructed to make an immediate approach to President Diem to the effect that the Government of the United States is prepared to join the Government of Viet-Nam in a sharply increased joint effort to cope with the Viet Cong threat and the ravages of the flood as set forth under 3-9 above, if, on its part, the Government of Viet-Nam is prepared to carry out an effective and total mobilization of its own resources, both material and human for the same end. Before setting in motion the United States proposals

listed

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listed above, the United States Government -would appreciate confirmation of their acceptability to the GVN, and an expression from the GVN of the undertakings it is prepared to make to insure the success of this joint effort. On the part of the United States, it would be expected that these GVN undertakings would include, in accordance with the detailed recommendations of the Taylor Mission and the Country Team:

(a) Prompt and appropriate legislation and administrative action to put the nation on a wartime footing to mobilize its entire resources. (This would include a decentralization and broadening of the Government so as to realize the full potential of all non-Communist elements in the country willing to contribute to the common struggle*)

(b) The establishment of appropriate Governmental wartime agencies with adequate authority to perform their functions effectively.

(c) Overhaul of the military establishment and command structure n as to create an effective military organization for the prosecution of the war.

5. Very shortly before the arrival in South Viet-Nam of the first increments of United States military personnel and equipment proposed under 3-j above, that would exceed the Geneva Accord ceilings, publish the "Jorden report" as a United States "white paper," transmitting it as simultaneously as possible to the Governments of all countries with which we have diplomatic relations, including the Communist states.

6. Simultaneous with the publication of the "Jorden report," release an exchange of letters between Diem and the President,

(a) Diem's letter would include; reference to the DRV violations of Geneva Accords as set forth in the October 2k GVN letter to the ICC and other documents; pertinent references to GVN statements with respect to its intent to observe the Geneva Accords; reference to its need for flood relief and rehabilitation; reference to previous United States aid and the compliance hitherto by both countries with the Geneva Accords; reference to the USG statement at the time the Geneva Accords were signed; the necessity now of exceeding some provisions of the Accords in view of the DRV violations thereof; the lack of aggressive intent with respect to the DRV: GVN intent to return to strict compliance with the Geneva Accords

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as soon as the DRV violations ceased; and request for additional United States assistance in framework foregoing policy. The letter should also set forth in appropriate genera], terms steps Diem has taken and is taking to reform Governmental structure.

(b) The President's reply would he responsive to Diem's request for additional assistance and acknowledge and agree to Diem's statements on the intent promptly to return to strict compliance with the Geneva Accords as soon as DRV violations have ceased.

7. Simultaneous with steps 5- and 6., above, make a private approach to the Soviet Union that would include: our determination to prevent the fall of South Viet-Nam to Communism by whatever means is necessary; our concern over dangers to peace presented by the aggressive DRV policy with respect to South Viet-Nam; our intent

to return to full compliance with the Geneva Accords as soon as the DRV does so, the distinction we draw between Laos and South Viet-Ham; and our expectation that the Soviet Union will exercise its influence on the Chi corns and the DRV.

8. A special diplomatic approach made to the United Kingdom in its role as co-Chairman of the Geneva Conference requesting that the United Kingdom seek the support of the Soviet co-Chairman for

a cessation of DRV aggression against South Viet-Nam.

9. A special diplomatic approach also to be made to India, both in its role as Chairman of the ICC and as a power having relations with Peiping and Hanoi. This approach should be made immediately prior to public release of the "Jorden report" and the exchange of letters between Diem and the President.

10. Immediately prior to the release of the "Jorden report" and the exchange of letters between Diem and the President, special diplomatic approaches also to be made to Canada, as well as Burma, Indonesia, Cambodia, Ceylon, the UAR, and Yugoslavia. SEATO, NATO, and OAS members should be informed through these organizations, with selected members also informed individually. The possibility of some special approach to Poland as a member of the ICC should also be considered.

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OP STAFF Washington 25, D. C.

THE JOINT STAFF

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.DJSM-1383-61

14 November 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN t JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF Subject: South Vietnam (u)

1. Reference is made to the memorandum for the National Security Council, subject as above, dated 13 November 1961.

2. Briefs of the military actions contained in the draft National Security Action Memorandum attached to the above referenced memorandum are enclosed. These briefs are indexed to relate directly to appropriate paragraphs of the draft memorandum, Because of the security classification involved ;with the provision of additional equipment and United States uniformed personnel for special intelligence in South Vietnam, the brief for this item has been provided separately.

3. In connection with paragraph 1 of the draft memorandum, the Joint Staff considers it militarily desirable to preposition forces and equipment and is currently considering augmentation of US Army forces Pacific with one infantry division plus appropriate logistic and combat support units, CINCPAC has recommended that; in consideration of the requirement to locate army forces in close proximity to Southeast Asia, this division be prepositioned in the Philippines. The Army has established a Pacific Forward Depot on Okinawa for prestocking essential non-air-transportable items of materiel required for a one division force. In addition, there are ammunition stocks in Japan. There are also limited prestocks of aviation fuel and ammunition in Thailand for use by the USAF. Prestocks have not been established in South Vietnam. CINCPAC has recommended and the Joint Chiefs of Staff have concurred in the additional prestocking of railroad rolling .

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stocky POL.,, ammunition^ heavy engineer equipment and other materiel in Southeast Asia for use.by US Forces in contingency actions. These recommendations are currently under consideration by the Department of Defense* If these recommendations are approved necessary country-to-country bilateral agreements with Thailand and South Vietnam will be required.

EARLE G. WHEELER Director, Joint Staff Lieutenant General,, USA

Enclosure

Indes and Briefing Items on South Vietnam

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PARAGRAPH

INDEX

SUBJECT

2. (a)

2. (b)

(3)

2. (e) 2. (f)

3. (c)

•

Use of Significant US Forces Use of Substantial US Forces Use of US Forces in the Event of Organized

Communist Military Intervention Provide Increased Air Lift to the GVN

Forces by:

Helicopters

Light Aviation (L-20/L~23/T~28)

Transport Aircraft Provide Additional Equipment and US

Personnel for:

Air Reconnaissance and Photography

Instruction In and Execution of Air Ground Support Techniques

Special Intelligence (Under separate cover) Provide the GVN with Small Craft Provide Expedited Training and Equipping

of the Civil Guard and Self-Defense

Corps Provide Personnel and Equipment to Improve

Military Intelligence System Provide New Terras of Reference,, Reorganization and Additional Personnel to , Support US Participation in Direction

and Control of GVN Military Operations

and Expanded HAAQ Functions Overhaul of GVN Military Establishment

and Command Structure

NOTE;

The above paragraph designations are directly related to the subparagraphs under paragraphs 1, 2 and 3., of the draft National Security Action Memorandum.

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Paragraph la, USE OF SIGNIFICANT US FORCES

A Brigade Task Force of three battle groups from the

Pacific area., and approximately 3*500 combat and logistic

support units from CONUSj has been earmarked by the Army as

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a force that could be deployed to South Vietnam. The deploy-

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stent of this Task Force could meet the requirements set forth in .the related paragraph. If so deployed,, it would not only serve to signify United States determination to defend South Vietnam and to boost South Vietnam morale but would also serve to preposition forces which would be required in implementation of further plans.

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Paragraph 1 b.

USE 0? SUBSTANTIAL US FORCES

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CINCPAC Operation Plan 32-59 Phase II, Counter-Insurgency

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Vietnam (approximately 1§ US divisions),, provides the basis for US military action to meet purposes of Paragraph lb. A SEATO

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Plan to provide for Counter-Insurgency Operations in Vietnam is being developed.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff are not cognizant of relevant operations in North Vietnamj however, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have requested that the Central Intelligence Agency prepare plans for covert sabotage operations against Pathet

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Lao and Viet-Cong in North Vietnam

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Paragraph 1c. USE OF US FORCES IN THE EVENT OF

ORGANIZED COI-H'IUNIST MILITARY INTERVENTION

CINCPAC Operation Plan 32-59 Phase lit North Viet-Nam Aggression (3 US divisions in Southeast Asia, 1 US division in support),, and Phase IV, Chinese Communist Intervention (4 US divisions in Southeast Asia* 2 US divisions in support) 3 provide

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for US military action to, meet purposes stated in paragraph 1c,

SEATO Plan 6 and SEATO Plan 4 will provide for SEATO action against North Viet-Nam Aggression or Chinese Communist Intervention respectively. US force requirements for SEATO plans will parallel those for corresponding phases of CINCPAC Operation Plan 32-59-

It is estimated that the maximum US forces on the ground in Southeast Asia will not exceed six divisions or about 205,000 men in implementing Phase IV CINCPAC Operation Plan 32-59.

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Paragraph 2. a. (l) HELICOPTER SUPPORT

PRESENT STATUS

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a. Two H-21 helicopter packages will load and depart the est Coast on 20-22 November. The destination will

be announced enroute.

The USNS CORE and two com-

mercial freighters will be used for lift. As of 14 November all equipment and baggage of both company packages (except H-21s from Fort Bragg) was at the West Coast port; the H-21s from .Fort Bragg are enroute to the West Coast; ETA 16 November Personnel, less air crev/s, to arrive port for loading on 20 November. * .

b. A third H-21 Helicopter package., located at Fort

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Deven, has been alerted for possible deployment overseas. This unit is a low priority unit and* villi require an estimated three weeks before readiness date is reached. Earliest

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availability date of ocean shipping for Fort Deven package is 15 December.

FORCES AND EQUIPMENT

^—. — _ _ | 11

I138 personnel

hO H-21 helicopters 4 H-I3 helicopters

COST INVOLVED

CONARC has been allocated $400^000 to cover packing,

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crating^ and movement of first two packages within GON7LS.

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Unit cost of airerait i- as follows:

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H-13 l H-21

A/C

| 38,500

$250,000 (FY 56)

S pare Parts and S pt

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24£ of A/C cost 24j& of A/C cost

SCHEDULE OP EXECUTION

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20-22 November Last increment to arrive West Coast

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20-22 November USNS CORE and two freighters depart

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11-13 December USNS CORE arrive Saigon. Freighters will probably arrive Saigon from 3 to 10 days after the CORE,

Note: Departure of the CORE was delayed from 15 to 20-22 November awaiting the arrival of other military cargo.

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Paragraph 2. a. (2) LIGHT AVIATION (L-20/L-28/T-28)

PRESENT STATUS

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craft with armor plate and self-sealing tanks.

L-20 CTNCPAC has requested 9 additional L-20 light aircraft

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be provided for expansion of KVNAF light observation capability.

L-28

L-28 aircraft are now being produced at the rate of a per

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month. CIA is taking the current production through December 19ol. Beginning January 19o2j the US Air Force is planning to procure an additional 14 L-28. They"are presently conducting an evaluation of this aircraft for support of SAC missile operations. The evaluation report will be available about 30 January I9S2. FORCES AMD EQUIPMENT

15 T-28C aircraft (on loan basis from US Navy)

30 T-28B aircraft (to replace the above)

9 L-20 aircraft

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lk L-23 aircraft

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COST (ESTIMATED)

15 T-23 on loan

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Spares and misc. equip, $989.,000

Transportation

Total

105.000

$1,094,000

30 T-28B

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Spares Transportation

Total

9 L-20 Aircraft 14 L-28 Aircraft

$1,470,000 617,000

210^000

$2,297,000

$540,000

$840,000

SCHEDULE OP EXECUTION

T-28 (on loan) depart San.Francisco, Calif. 20--22 Nov 1961. ETA Saigon about 10 Dec. I96I. "

T-28B replacement aircraft readiness as follows,

29 December 1951 -2 5 January 1962 -5

12 January 19 January 31 January

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Depending upon urgency, planes can be shipped as they are made available. Add 30 days to above dates for ETA Saigon if shipping immediately available.

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L-20. OSA/ISA is now staffing an affirmative answer.

Delivery will commence 3^d quarter FY 62 if this action is

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L~28 Production could be increased to a rate of 1^ per

month providing an order of sufficient magnitude were placed.

Air.Force procurement of 14 will provide a lesser number for

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operation in South Vietnam as a part of the Jungle Jim project. Air Force has requested DOD approval of a program to deploy

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3 Lr-28s to Vietnam in December 19S1 provided approval is received by 14 November I9S1*

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Paragraph 2 (a) (3) Transport Aircraft

STATUS: USAF has requested RTJJrnPAO^viewo relative to augmenta-

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ti.on nf p^nA-n transport capability with C-123 aircraft based on current situation in Vietnam.

FORCE: The composition and number of personnel cannot be determined until specific requirements have been ascertained. EQUIPMENT : USAF tentative consideration of augmenting airlift

capability for Vietnam is based on the use of C-123 aircraft.

*

USAF presently has five C-123 squadrons assigned to Tactical

Air Command, CONUS.

COST: Unknown. •

SCHEDULE OF EXECUTION : Augmentation of airlift capability up to

twelve aircraft could be in place in Vietnam within 25 days after

deployment order is issued. These aircraft can be flown from

CONUS to their overseas destination.

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Paragraph 2. (b) (l) Air Reconnaisance and Photography

STATUS: There are 2 USAF Reconnaissance Task Forces (RTF) units presently established in Southeast Asia, Project "PIPE-STEM" consists of four RF-101 aircraft which were established at Tan Son Nhut Air Base, South Vietnam on 20 October 19S1 for aerial reconnaissance within the borders of South Vietnam. In addition, project ABLE MABLE, composed of four RF-101 aircraft was established at Don Huang Air Base, Thailand, on 6 November 1961. Project ABLE MABLE was to replace project PIPESTEM and provide US aerial reconnaissance of Laos, as well as South

Vietnam, Project PIPEoT&M was scheduled for termination on 10 November 1961 but has been extended for a h week period, on request of CHMAAG, South Vietnam.

FORCE: Each RTF consists of four RF-101 aircraft with necessarv * operations, maintenance, support, personnel and equipment and photo processing/interpretation capability*

EQUIPM ENT: Eight RF-101 aircraft with associated camera, ground support equipment and two photo processing/interpretation vans . COST : Not available at this time. SCHEDULE OP EXECUTION: Currently operating.

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Paragraph 2. (b) (2) -

INSTRUCTION IN AND EXECUTION 0? AIR GROUND SUPPORT TECHNIQUES

STATUS: PACAF, in coordination with, CIMCPAC and USAF, is presently studying the feasibility of establishing a limited Tactical Air Control System (TACS) in South Vietnam, TAGS has three objectives; (l) Teach and train Vietnamese;

(2) Provide a structure to apply Vietnamese air capability; and

(3) Establish framework for control of US air effort. Plan presently envisions that TACS would be under US command and control. It would provide a Joint Opperations Center (JOC),

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a Control and Reporting Center (CRC) at Tan Son Nhut, a Control and Reporting Point (CRP) at Tourane,, two Air Support Operations Centers (ASOC)^ and Forward Air Controllers, The two ASOCs would be co-located with the two northernmost Army corps. The southernmost corp would be directly supported by the JOC. A suitably modified course of instruction from the air/ground operations school would be deployed to furnish comprehensive

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training for Vietnamese Army and Air Force Personnel. Vietnamese personnel would participate directly in system operation. The Jungle-Jim detachment could handle training of Vietnamese T-28 pilots and indoctrination of these pilots in the air to ground support role. AD-6 pilot indoctrination is within the capability of the MAAG advisors now assigned to the AD squadron. FORCE : Personnel requirement for the TACS are estimated at 314

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in addition to the 67 nov; in.place at Tan Son Nhut. The Z&OOth

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and four RB-2o's with approximately 230 personnel would also

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be under TACS control. . In addition,.,U3AP tactical fighter

squadrons could be deployed to operate with and under control

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of TACS. ' *

EQ UIFMS MT: Radar and communications equipment necessary to

establish a TACvS. U^OOth Detachment has necessary maintenance

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and ground support equipment for its aircraft.

COST: Not available at this time.

SCHEDULE OF EXECUTION : TACS could be operational within 30 day3

after receipt of implementation decision.

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Paragraph 2. (c)

PROPOSED CONCEPT FOR COORDINATED VIETNAMESE NAVY OPERATIONS

!• An effective naval command and control organization v/ould as

•

a minimum consist of:

a. A naval planning group , closely associated with MAAG and with the JGS planning section.

b. An operations con trol cent er at Naval Headquarters, with integral or adjacent naval in tel l igence center , and adequate

communications to: '

*

(1) Naval Coastal Di stri ct Opcon/Intel Centers

(2) River Fo rce OpCon/Int el Center (includes Delta operations)

(3) Civil Guard Ri ver Control Center (incorporated with, or in close liaison withj River Force Control)

(4) RVNAF Headquarters (OpCon center when established)

(5) Joint Intellig ence Croup (when established)

(6) Oper ations Evaluation Center, Saigon. 2* O perating Forces consisting of:

a. Sailing Junks, motor junks, patrol and amphibious craft

f J *

for offshore operations.

*b. Shallow draft small boats for river and Delta patrol, including offensive action against VC elements located.

e. Troop transport craft (LCVP or equivalent) for patrol and ; counter VC troop operations, river and Delta area.

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d. Coast watchers ("shore posts 11 ) - may be Army, Navy, or civil, preferably under Naval control, but at least tied in directly to naval communications reporting net,

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3* Coord1na ti ng (s upper ting) for

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a. Aircraft of RVj\ t AF available for reconnaissance and attack missions, coordinated at primary Opcon/Intel center.

b, RVNAF or civil security forces to conduct investigations/ interrogations and to take action against VC suspects on craft brought to port. (important that intelligence gained be promptly fed into the Joint Intelligence Group)

. c. Mobile RTOAF or civil security forces ashore to apprehend landing parties from craft sighted but not captured in time;

*

and responsive to intelligence of landings reported by coast

■

vratehers, ; '

cL Civil control, inspection, and clearance (under procedures coordinated with Navy) of all maritime traffic at all ports, k 9 Operations concep t

■ a. A barrier patrol of junks and patrol craft to identify and interdict VC traffic near 17th parallel and off the Delta,

b. Sailing and motor junks to operate offshore for as complete coverage as possible along coast, and in concentrations of fishing junks for intelligence of traffic and interdiction as practicable.

c. River and Delta operations not primarily .against infu-

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tration but in support of mobile offensive Army operations.

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d. Any craft not following normal routes , or landing at other than controlled ports, to be considered suspect and reported/ investigated/destroyed,

e. Land operations on coasts, rivers, and in Delta MUST include Naval planning and be jointly conducted to insure maximum results. -

5* Problem areas recognized:

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a. Reluctance of Vietnamese Wavy to accept US Navy advice

b. Gaining acceptance of USN personnel as working and

* _

advisory members in OpCon/lntel centers and aboard ship,

c. Getting the Vietnamese Navy really accepted and written into RVKAF operations and intelligence plans in the Counter-Insurgency effort.

d. Increasing rate at which the Vietnamese Navy can man and operate the craft and equipment which is now available and that can be made available. Problems are recruitment, training and increased personnel ceiling,

e. Establishing effective command and control organization, with necessary coordination between the Vietnamese agencies necessary to make the concept work, (The ships, craft, and boats are only one element in the overall surveillance/interdiction operation c )

NOTE : Rear Admiral H. S. Persons, USN, and officers of CINCPAC Staff including a Coast Guard Officer, are now in Vietnam to assist in planning for the integration of the Vietnamese Navy

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number; NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

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into the over-all plans for counter-insurgency. Detailed

. - *

*

recommendations may be expected in the.near future. Appended ' are briefing sheets for current and projected programs related to integrated Vietnamese naval operations in support of a

GVN national effort.

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number; NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

llj- Kover.ter 1961

SECRET

.

Paragraph 2(c). Appendix 1 ..-•.•■ Provide the GVT; with small craft, m . . .

Status: PCE (patrol fcraft Escort) and PGM (Patrol Gunboat) for

Coastal patrol.

Forces: PGM (100 ! ) - llonr.al complement 3 offleersj 2k enlisted-

PCS (l80 f ) - Itonsal complement 9 officers; 90 enlisted. Vietnamese Navy now operating seven (7) patrol craft in coastal operations.

Equ ipmen t: PCE and PGM tailored to requirement for coastal patrol.

Advantages are cheaper operating costs, smaller personnel requirements and simplified training programs in eomparisc to larger patrol ships. They will add increased firepower, mobi3_ity and communications to the overall patrol effort.

Costs:

PCE - $325 ; 000 plus ^5 ; CC0 for concurrent spare parts to

activate and convert fron MS? (removing minesweep gear and installing guns on steel-hulled fleet minesweepers).

PGM - $1*00,000 plus $20,000 for concurrent spare parts. Mev "construction only - delivery lead time 12 months. Hone in U.S. active or reserve fleets.

Schedule of execution:

FCE - Three (3) now scheduled for delivery with first of these on 29 November 1961 and another in April 1962. Last delivery date scheduled for January 1963« Cnly two (2) MSP are currently uncommitted out of kl MSF in the U.S. Reserve Fleet, These possibly could be made available to SVH and converted to FCEs. .

PGM

- 10 now funded with delivery dates of 3 in October I962, • 3 in November, 3 in December and 1 in January 1963. Delivery tines for both PCE and PGM could be expedited about two months at a cost premium of approximately 2C^*

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

Ik November 1961

SECRET

Paragraph 2(c) . Appendix 2

Froviae the GVH vlth Saall Cr&ft. " '"'

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Status: Swimmer-Support Craft for river and ranger operations.

i

Forces: Up to 250 boats eventually to be required for mobility

in delta end inland waterway operations, £s veil as for - i covert (ranger) operations. Plastic swimner-support craft . ! carry 6-8 troops each*

Equipment; 50 plastic unsinkable svir.::.;er-support craft to be initially

provided, each vith ^C H.P. commercial outboard motor fitted with a bronze weedless propeller. 125 French manufactured 3 rubber inflatable "Zodiac" boats vith outboard motors also have been procured*

Costs:

4

50 Swimmer-support craft - approximately $50,000 for boats, motors and fuel tanks (about $1700 each complete beat), "Zodiac" boat contract was approximately $80,852 (about $1500 each complete boat).

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Schedul e of Execu tion : "20 plastic boats to be delivered in Vietnam

early in January I962. Materials and equipment to fabricate 30 boats in Vietnam plus a U.S. instructor to teach the Vietnamese have been funded by AREA and are to be delivered via the highest MATS priority.

125 "Zodiac" boats have been procured. 90 have been delivered to Vietnam. 35 &^ e in the pipeline*

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SECRET

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

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Baragraph 2(c) . Appendix

Frovicle the C-Vir with snail craft. . .

Status: Provide LCVP (landing Craft } personnel) to Civil Guard

boat platoons.

Forces: HAAG has proposed formation of 17 Civil Guard boat platoons

to free Vietnamese naval forces for direct support of Army operations.

Equipment: 8 LCVP for each boat platoon,, total of 13o required.

Cost: Approximately $7,000 each - total of"$952,000 for 136 LCVP.

Schedule of Execution : LCVP available in Norfolk and San Diego. ~~~ First one could be available in 5 days, thereafter 20 per

month fron Norfolk. 30 per month fron San Diego.

NOTE: LCVP deliveries can be effected faster than the Vietnamese reportedly can be trained to use and maintain them.

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SECHET

Para graph 2 (c). Aopendix **

Provide the GVH with Snail Craft.

.1

Forces

Statusr Expedite GVH Junk Petrol .Force Program.

^____ 1|20 sailing junks; 63 motor junks are planned.

80 sailing junks now operational in Teurane area. 1 motor junk undergoing design modifications* Sailing junks have crew of 5, motor junks crew of 7. 300 personnel now in training.

Equipment: 60 H.P. Japanese diesels in motor junks; eventually

10 H.Pi diesles in the sailing junks. Sailing junks are procured from indigenous commercial sources. Motor junks prototype being built and modified at Saigon Ilaval Shipyard.

Navy is dependent on Vietnamese Amy sources for communications equipment, small arms and certain other required equipage- Considerable difficulty experienced in filling these requirements.

Costs: $800 for each sailing junk..

Cost data not yet available for motor junk.

Commander, Vietnamese ITavy, has stated that he has been

promised or provided sufficient funds from the GVH piastre

budget for the entire junk force. • . Approximately $l8,0C0 per junk division (20 sailing,

3 motor junks) for the communications gear, small arms^

etc. mentioned above in "Costs.".

Schedule of Exec ution: 60 more sailing junks due to be operational

by end of I96I- Motor junk prototype due for second sea trials in November 1961.

Entire program scheduled for completion in 19£>3 • Program is to be expedited but to what degree is currently unknown.

Accelerated procurement has a direct relationship to recruitment and training of the junk force personnel. The training cycle is approximately three (3) months and is conducted orally in South Vietnamese due to the illiteracy problem.

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1^ November 1961

SECRET

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ferctgraph g(c) . Appendix 5

-1

Provide the GVN with U.S. uniformed advisers arid operating personnel

as may be necessary for .surveillance and control operations in coastal and inland waterways.

■

Status: Provide U.S. uniformed advisors and operating personnel.

Forces: The only advisors currently assigned are attached to HAAGj

Vietnam. No U.S. operating personnel are assigned now to the Vietnamese Kavy.

*

The Seventh Fleet does conduct cn-bcard training of Vietnamese Navy personnel in U.S. ships of the sane or similar types as are in the Vietnamese IJavy inventory.

Additional AdviSQrs_e,nd Operating personnel.

A realistic estimate of the numbers and employment of U.S. Eavy or Coast Guard Personnel, and tine phasing of their integration into the overall Vietnamese Kaval effort, must necessarily await the acceptance of an integrated concept of operations; including command and control.

It is considered that U.S. personnel will be required in the Operations Control Centers, the Kaval intelligence effort and the operational communications network. Additionally, the U.S. personnel could be assigned as advisors to the afloat forces. The augmentation of KAAG instructors will be dependent upon the success of efforts to increase the personnel strength of the Vietnamese Navy,

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 2011

TOP SECRET

Paragraph ?. (d) PROVIDE EXPEDITED DRAINING AMD EQUIPPING

OP THE CIVIL GUARD AMD SELF DEFENSE CORPS

STATUS " • ■ :

a. Civil Guard: Increased effort in this basic task has been progressing since January IgoO when the Civil Guard v/as transferred to the GVN Department of Defense, Enlargement of

■

this program is being actively pursued; acceleration time-wise

to obtain tx^ained units is difficult., particularly in view of a shortage of trained leaders and priority requirements t or the

AKVN.

Additional training sites and input have been recently

approved. Additional US advisors are enroute to assist in this training. Officer and NCO training has been stepped-up but

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prospects for a short term leadership solution are not encouraging. Chief MAAG is currently working on providing additional inter-

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preters to permit greater use of more US advisors,

b. Self Defense Corps (SDC): Subject to the individual

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desires of Province Chiefs, the SDC has achieved no real uniformity of organization or training. However, these locally available citizens are being equippedj and additional US advisors are being made available during the next three months to take over training duties at the SDC training sites through-, out the country.

/POP SECRET

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US carbines., ammunition, and communications equipment have been programmed for the entire SDC # 25^000 carbines are

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now enroute to Vietnam. US HAAG advisors to the Civil Guard

also have responsibilities for the SDC. Expansion of this

program is developing as local resources allow*

PORCSS

a. Civil Guard:

Authorized 68,000 Actual 64,000

Has only 37 per cent of officers and 55 V^ v cent of authorised NC0 strength. Consists of 303 separate companies (15 have completed current training program; 2h are in training cycle). Approximately 1500 officers and enlisted personnel are in school. .'

b. Self Defense Corps: Authorized 59,000

Actual 53*000

■ ■

Reportedly have only 76 officers/ Consists of locally recruited and organized citizens to defend their community. Administered by. Civil Guard personnel who are detailed to such duties. *

c. US Advisors: Of the 72^ personnel augmentation approved for MAAG in October i 207 are specifically for super-

-

vision of training at nine Civil Guard Training Sites.

■

EQUIPMENT

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a. Civil Guard: Equipment being processed by US Army includes carbines , ammunition, vehicles, communications, F0L, medical, and clothing. Deliveries have commenced in S^ignvi ,.

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

TOP SECRET

Pending arrival of equipment,, units are equipped with ARVN

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stocks to extent possible*

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b. Self Defense Corps: Present equipment is a collection

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of unreliable French small arms and ammunition, US carbines and communications equipment have been programmed. AN/PRC-10 radios and sound power phones are now expected to be delivered in 1962.

COSg : Approximately $8.8 million has been funded in FY 6l and 111.2 million in FY 62.

SCHEDULE OF EXECUTION:

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a. Training: A continuing project that may take up to two years for completion,

b, Equipment: Some basic equipment can be made available faster than individuals and units can be trained to use and maintain it. Based on overall programming and priorities with ARVN, total equipping will probably extend over 18 months.

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number; NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

TOP SECRET

Paragraph 2. e. PROVIDE PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT

TO IMPROVE MILITARY-POLITICAL INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM.

PRESENT STATUS

The CIA representative on the Taylor Mission was responsible

3

for recommendations in the political intelligence field. The

-

status of those recommendations is not known.

In the military intelligence field the Military Committee made the following three "basic recommendations:

a. Establish a Joint US-GVN Military Intelligence Group, under the control of Chief KAAG, to direct the South Vietnamese national intelligence effort. This recommendation was also submitted by CINCPAC on Ik November 19S1 with a request for approximately 150 additional manpower spaces. This request is now being staffed by the Joint Staff. .-

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b. Enlarge in size and scope the US Evaluations Center in Saigon to enable that agency to properly evaluate and disseminate all available intelligence bearing on the security of South Vietnam. This recommendation was, approved by the JCS and OSD on

*

9 November 196l.

c. Increase the number of Intelligence Advisors in MAAG and provide intelligence advisors at the province level. This

*

recommendation was also submitted by CINCPAC on 14 November and is now being staffed by the Joint Staff.

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SCHEDULE 0? EXECUTION

J-2 CINCPAC, G2 U3ARPAC, and J2 MAAG Saigon have been

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informally briefed on the recommendations but the Taylor Military Committee is not aware that they have been directed to implement dad- recommendations.

It is not believed that the formulation of the necessary

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plans by CINCPAC are far enough advanced to include firm

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requisitions of specific personnel- The accomplishment of the

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recommendations is limited only by the availability of qualified

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personnel.

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3,3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

Paragraph 2f

PROVIDE MEW TERMS OF REFERENCE, REORGANIZATION AND ADDITIONAL US PERSONNEL TO SUPPORT US PARTICIPATION IN DIRECTION AND CONTROL OF GVN MILITARY OPERATIONS AND EXPENDED KAAC FUNCTIONS

STATUS : Under its present terms of reference, MAAG Vietnam is not directed to participate actively in operations, operational planning and intelligence activities. There are, currently, no MAAG advisors at any level of combat command solely responsible for intelligence. In addition, there is a requirement to provide unit advisor-5 at battalion and selected company level throughout the RVNAF, the Civil Guard, and the Self Defense Corps, Under current directives, US advisors do not fully participate in planning for and conduct of operations. In order to be successful against the Viet Cong, operations must be careful3_y planned, coordinated, and energetically implemented, Vietnamese officers are not as well qualified in this area as available US military advisors who, by their e:xperience, schooling, and higher professional standings, could supply the much needed know-how, techniques, knowledge of joint and combined operations and the vigor required. If US personnel were working continuously in the various operations centers, CHMAAG would know the true situation at all times and keep abreast of new requirements as they arose. PERSONNEL : In order to provide for essential MAAG assistance

to RVNAF in the operations, operational planning, unit advisor,

< and intelligence fields, it is estimated that the authorized

strength of MAAG Vietnam should be raised from the present

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

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figure of 1,573 to approximately 2,500, CIMCPAC has this date requested an increase of 320 in MAAG Vietnam strength which j when approved, would raise the authorised strength to 1,893. COST: Unknown• SCHEDULE OF EX ECUTION: Actions which must be taken as a matter

of urgency: .

-

1. Amend the terms of reference to direct MAAG Vietnam

to engage in operations, operational planning, and intelligence activities # , '*

2. Expedite the request for and selection of personnel necessary to bring the MAAG Vietnam strength to approximately

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2,500, to accomplish the actions referred to in the above paragraph, and to provide advisors at battalion and selected

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company level throughout the KVNAF, the Civil Guard, and the Self Defense Corps.

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Paragraoh 3.(c) OVERHAUL OF GVN MILITARY

•ESTABLISHMENT AND COMMAND STRUCTURE

PRESENT STATUS . » .

This Item is a proposal in which no implementing action has been taken. The proposal entai-ls five^actions as follows:

•a. Designate one Intelligence Agency as a central control,

b. Establish a single Inviolate chain of command and compel Diem to adhere to it« (Remove province chiefs from chain of command.) *

c. Rework Vietnamese Joint General Staff Organization

■

to provide for proportionate Service representation and member-

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ship of all Service Chiefs.

d. Release 50^ of the ARVN troops from static duties ~-

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place on comba.t duties*

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e. Organize to provide for participation of MAAG personnel

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at all planning levels in operations centers and as team members on a 2^1-hour basis during operations*

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You are instructed to seek en irradiate appointment with President Die::

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and inform bin that/President Kans^cyi^&rter conferring with Gsr^ral Taylor and carefully considering his report, has decided that the Government of the United States is prepared to join the Government of Viet-Ha^ in a sharoly increased joint effort to avoid a further detericiratioti in the situation in' South Viet-Nan and eventually to contain and eliminate the "threat to its

independence

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joint effort we have in nind would require certain undertakings by

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. Provide increased ain'ixxt to.the GVTf forces, includii helicooterSj light aviation > . and""transport aircraft, manned to the extent necessary by United States uniformed personnel and other United States

operational control

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TOP SECRET

Clcssifie alio

personnel as m.ay be necessary for air reconnaissance, photography, instruction

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in and execution of air-ground support techniques, and for special intelligence.

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c„ Provide the GTO With some small craft, including such United States uniformed advisers and operating personnel as may be necessary for operations in effecting surveillance and control over coastal waters and inland waterways*

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d a Provide expedited training and equipping of the civil guard and

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the self-defense corps with the objective of relieving the regular array of static missions and freeing it for mobile offensive operations* . ,

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e« Provide such personnel and equipment as nay be necessary to improve the military-political intelligence system beginning at the provincial level and

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extending upward through the Government and the armed forces to the Central

Intelligence Organization

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f« Provide such new terms of reference, reorganization and additional

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personnel for United States military forces as are required for increased United'

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States military assistance in the operational collaboration with the GVN and

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operational direction of U»S. forces, and to carry out the other increased respon-

sibilities which accrue to the U e S« military authorities under these recommendations.,

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g 0 Provide such increased economic aid as may be required to permit the GVN to pursue a vigorous flood relief and rehabilitation program, to supply material in support of the'security efforts, and to give priority to projects in support of this expanded counter-insurgency program. (FYI # This could include

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increases in military pay, a full supply of a wide range of materials such as

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food, medical supplies, transportation equipment, communications equipment, and

any

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Classification -.

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any other items where material help could assist the GVH in winning the v;ar against

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the Viet Cong. END FYI)

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* • * * h» Encourage and support (including financial support) a request by the GVN to the FAQ or any other appropriate international organization for multi«

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lateral assistance in the relief and rehabilitation of the flood area. (One ob-

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jective here would be political objective of engaging widest possible multinational interest in and concern with GVN.) . *"-:• ' "■:-:* -, -/• . -^ . • .J ,

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: . io Provide individual administrators and advisers for the Governmental

machinery of South Viet-Nam in types and numbers to be agreed upon by the two

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Governments.

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factors bearing on the prosecution of the counter-insurgency program in order to

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* 2. On its part^ the GVN would initiate the following actions:

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/ a. Prompt and appropriate legislative and administrative action to put

the nation on a wartime.footing to mobilize its entire resources. (This would

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include a decentralization and broadening of the Government so as to realize the ' full potential cf all non-Coramunist elements in the country willing to contribute to

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adequate authority to perform their functions effectively.

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TOP SECRET

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c e Overhaul of the military establishment and command structure so j

as to create en effective military organization for the prosecution of the war

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and assure a mobile offensive capability for the Army

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3* Before setting in motion the joint effort outlined above, the United States

Government would need confirmation of its acceptability by the GVil, and an express

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sion from the GVN of the measures it is prepared to take"under the broad headings

listed in para 2 above in order to ensure the success of" this joint efforts The

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foregoing subheadings under para 2 are purposely broadly phrased so as to permit

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you to spell out specifics in manner you feel will be most effective. We realise

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that the U.S. cannot successfully dictate from here precisely what measures the GVN

should take since they might be unworkable in the circumstances peculiar to South

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Viet-Kam and necessarily must leave these details and manner of their negotiation

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with Diem to your judgment* However, it is most important that Diem come forth

with changes which will be recognized as having real substance and meaning. Rightl

or wrongly his regime is widely criticized abroad'and in the U.S., and if we are

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to give our substantial support we must,be able to point to real administrative

political and social reforms and a real effort to widen its base that will give

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upon his response to this pint

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maximum confidence to the American people, as 'well as to world opinion that our efforts are not directed towards the support of an unpopular or ineffective regime

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but rather towards supporting the combined efforts of all the non-Communist peoole

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of the GVN against a Communist take-over. You should make this quite clear, and indicate that the U.S. contribution to the proposed joint effort depends heavily '

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4. It is anticipated that one of the first questions President Diem will raise

with you a£ter your presentation of the above joint proposals will be that of

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introducing U C S, combat troops. You are authorized to remind him that the actions

we already have in mind involve a substantial number of U,S,. military personnel for

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operational duties in Viet-Mam and that we believe that these forces performing

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crucial missions can greatly increase the capacity of GVtl forces to win their war

against the Viet Cong. You can also tell bin that we believe that the mission:

being undertaken by our forces > under present circumstances y are more suitable for

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white foreign troops than garrison duty or missions involving the seeking out of

Viet Cong personnel submerged in the Vietnam population. You can assure him that

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the USG at highest levels will be in daily -contact with the situation in Viet-Nam

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.5m You should inform Diem that s in our minds> the concept of the joint under

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in/the political^ economic and military fields as they affected the security

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6, You may inform Diem that concurrently with the commencement of the joint effort > we intend to make additional strong approaches to the Soviet Bloc designed

to impress them with our determination to see that South Viet-Nam is not overrun

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7o FYI, If Diem responds well to above demarche^ and outlines measures he

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should then inform him that we wish to provide our aid in respo

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and timing of release of the Jorden Report and the letter from Diem. President

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

To Director, CIA, From Bangkok, 20 November 1961 For The President From Ambassador Galbraith

I have just completed three intensive days in Saigon which, with CINCPAC talks, gives me a roach better feeling for this tangled situation. Tomorrow night I am sending you a full and, I trust rather close analysis which 1 pray you read at average speed. That concerns our longer course but meanwhile I must register conclusions on two

■ -

or three matters on which action niay be pending and I add a general thought or two,

(l) There is scarcely the slightest practical chance that the administrative and political reforms now being pressed upon Diem will result in real change. They reckon without deeper political realities and insecurities of his position and the nature of politicians of this age. He will promise but he will not perform because it"is most unlikely that he can perform. Accordingly, it is important that in exchange of letters which I suppose now to be inevitable that our proposed aid be geared to demonstrated action not promises. This may slightly increase the effect. But mostly it will keep us from what otherwise will be a purely one-sided commitment to Diem. In the absence of fundamental reform, the help we are now proposing will not save the situation.

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

(2) In my judgement, in the immediate situation there should be no> repeat no, change in either political or KAAG leadership. Political leadership is using accumulated capital to get whatever slight administrative and political improvement may result from this initiative, MAAG change would, in my judgement, set back whatever slight chance there is for military reforms and sensible counter-

-

insurgency action.

(3) While situation is indubitablybad, military aspects seem to me out of perspective, A comparatively well-equipped army with para-military formations numbering a quarter million men is facing

a maximum of fifteen to eighteen thousand lightly armed men. If this were equality, the United States would hardly be safe against the Sioux, I know the theories about this kind of warfare,

(•+) The foregoing, among other things, leads me to believe that your decision against troop commitment was wholly sound and with full discount for rt^y high threshold on this matter. Decisive military factor is not manpower or even confidence but bad organization, incompetent use and deployment of forces, inability to protect territory once cleared, and probably poor political base. American forces would not correct this. Their inability to do so would create a worse crisis of confidence as this became evident.

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

(5) I note that problem of confidence is partly our making.

■

There is a fashionable tendency^ though not by most senior military and diplomatic figures, to depict your decision of last spring on Laos as a disaster without any reference to alternatives available. This flows over to local community. Word should be passed down that when we make the best of bad alternatives second guessing of this sort does no service.

(6) As I will argue, there is no solution that does not involve

- -

a change of government. To say there is no alternative is nonsence for there never has seemed to be where one man has dominated the scene. So while we must play out the ineffective and hopeless course on which we are launched for a little while, we must look ahead very soon to a new government. On this more later. Given an even moderately effective government and putting the relative military power into perspective, I can't help thinking that the insurgency might very soon be settled.

(7) As I shall argue more fully in my letter, the diplomatic initiative should of course go forward. But I am convinced that the insurrection has more internal material base and less to meet it than

I had previously imagined. Accordingly> the calling off of or stopping

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

of outside materiel support as distinct from encouragement and guidance might not make too much difference.

Ambassador Galbraith requested CIA Chief of Station 5 Bangkok forward this message via this channel as it is "faster and

more secure.

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For CIA Chief of Station,, New Delhi; Please hand carry to Ambassador utjoh his return.

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

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•J$? r SECRET [HP V; j ;, *:■■■' , ,

DATE: .21 NOV .61 ... ^ VltVi!is (i RECD:.N0V21 21372 d1

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^91// ■ .OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

■ ' ' • IN 25879 :

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FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM AMBASSADOR GALBRAITH . . -

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POLICY IN VIETNAM '• • • . . \ . " '-".*.-.-.

FROM JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH " *• " . ■ •"'.'•.

• • *

1. HERE IS MY FULL ANALYSIS OF OUR PROBLEM AND COURSE IN SOUTH VIETNAM. FROM MY STAY THERE, TALKS AT CINCPAC AND BANGKOK, PREVIOUS READING OF THE

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TRAFFIC AND EXPERIENCE OF THE REGION I FEEL REASONABLY SURE OF MY.GROUND.

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YOU WILL BE AWARE OF THE INTENSE THEOLOGICAL DISPUTES WHICH RAGE OVER SUCH ISSUES AS THE POLITICAL POSITION OF DIEM, THE SCOPE OF EXTERNAL SUPPORT TO THE' INSURRECTION AND OTHERS. WHERE A SOLUTION OF THESE .IS NOT RELEVANT. TO

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A PRACTICAL COURSE OF ACTION I .HAVE NOT ENTERED THE DEBATE. I HAVE ALSO ENDEAVORED TO WORK FROM THE CIRCUMSTANCES TO THE ACTION RATHER THAN THE MORE

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CUSTOMARY PROCEDURE WHICH IS TO MOVE FROM THE PREFERRED COURSE OF ACTION BACK TO THE CIRCUMSTANCES. WHERE MY BIAS INTRUDES, AS IN THE CASE OF TROOP COMMITMENT,. I HAVE MADE IT CLEAR. ' .*•.'.' . •

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"2. .THE VIET CONG INSURRECTION IS STILL GROWING IN EFFECT. THE OUTBREAK " ON THE NORTHERN HIGHLANDS IS MATCHED BY A POTENTIALLY EVEN MORE DAMAGING

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IMPACT ON THE ECONOMY AND ESPECIALLY ON THE MOVEMENT OF RICE TO SAIGON.. . 3. IN THE .ABSENCE OF KNOWLEDGE OF THE ADMIXTURE OF TERROR AND ECONOMIC '

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AND SOCIAL EVANGELISM WE HAD BEST ASSUME THAT IT IS EMPLOYING BOTH. WE MUST

-

NOT FOREVER BE GUIDED BY THOSE WHO MISUNDERSTAND THE DYNAMICS OF REVOLUTION' AND IMAGINE THAT BECAUSE THE COMMUNISTS DO NOT APPEAL TO US THEY ARE ABHORRENT TO EVERYONE. ,' •'

% k.. IN OUR ENTHUSIASM TQ PROVE OUTSIDE INTERVENTION BEFORE WORLD OPINION '

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3,3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

PAGE 2 OF 9

•■" NEW DELHI 99Ul

■ .

- IN 25879

. .*

IN THE MAIN AREA OF INSURRECTION IN THE FAR SOUTH. THAT LEADERS AND RADIO *.

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""'. GUIDANCE COME IN V.'E KNOW. BUT THE AMOUNT OF AMMUNITION AND WEAPONRY THAT A

• MAN CAN CARRY ON HIS BACK FOR SEVERAL HUNDRED KILOMETERS OYER JUNGLE TRAILS

' V/AS NOT .INCREASED APPRECIABLY BY MARX. ' NO MAJOR CONFLICT CAN DEPEND ON

SUCH LOGISTIC SUPPORT, \ \ ' ' ' -

5. A MAXIMUM OF 18,000 LIGHTLY ARMED MEM ARE INVOLVED IN THE INSURRECTION. -

■-. THESE ARE GVN ESTIMATES AND THE FACTOR" OF EXAGGERATION IS UNQUESTIONABLY CONS ID-' ERA3LE. TEN THOUSAND IS MORE PROBABLE. V/HAT VE HAVE IN OPPOSITION INVOLVES A

HEAVY THEOLOGICAL DISPUTE. DIEM IT IS SAID IS A GREAT BUT DEFAMED LEADER. IT ■ . •" '

IS ALSO SAID HE HAS LOST TOUCH WITH THE MASSES, IS IN POLITICAL DISREPUTE AND .

' •• • • - . : " .

OTHERWISE NO GOOD. THIS DEBATE CAN BE BYPASSED BY AGREED POINTS. IT IS

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AGREED THAT ADMINISTRATIVELY DIEM IS EXCEEDINGLY BAD. HE HOLDS FAR TOO MUCH

* * * " .

POWER IN HIS OWN HANDS, EMPLOYS HIS ARMY BADLY, HAS NO INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION V/ORTHY OF THE NAME, HAS ARBITRARY OR INCOMPETENT SUBORDINATES IN THE PROVINCES AND SOME ACHIEVEMENTS NOTWITHSTANDING, HAS A"POOR ECONOMIC POLICY. HE HAS ALSO

. EFFECTIVELY RESISTED IMPROVEMENT FOR A LONG WHILE .IN FACE OF HEAVY DETERIORATION.

.THIS IS ENOUGH. WHETHER HIS POLITICAL POSTURE IS NEPOTIC, DESPOTIC OUT OF "

. . . -

TOUCH WITH THE VILLAGERS AND HENCE DAMAGING OR WHETHER THIS DAMAGE IS THE

*

FTGMENT OF SAIGON INTELLECTUALS DOES NOT SEAR ON OUR IMMEDIATE POLICY AND MAY

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BE BY-PASSED AT LEAST IN PART. * . '' ■ * * * ."

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6. THE-SVN ARMY NUMBERS 170,000 AND WITH PARAMILITARY UNITS OF THE CIVIL

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GUARD AND HOME DEFENSE FORCES A QUARTER OF A MILLION. WERE THIS WELL DEPLOYED

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PAGE 3 Of' 9 •'

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NEW DELHI. 9$5;i IN 2p379

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f ON BEHALF OF AN EFFECTIVE GOVERNMENT IT SHOULD BE OBVIOUS THAT THE VIET CONG WOULD

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HAVE NO CHANCE OF SUCCESS OR TAKEOVER. WASHINGTON IS CURRENTLY HAVING AN • •'

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INTELLECTUAL ORGASM ON THE UNSEATA3IL ITY OF GUERRILLA WAR. WERE GUERRILLAS

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EFFECTIVE IN A RATIO OF ONE TO FIFTEEN OR TWENTY-FIVE .IT IS 03VI0U3 THAT NO • \

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GOVERNMENT WOULD BE SAFE. THE VIET CONG, IT SHOULD BE NOTED, IS STRONGEST

IN THE SOUTHERN DELTA WHICH IS NOT JUNGLE BUT OPEN RICE PADDY. • ' - •-

7* THE FUNDAE'£NTAL DIFFICULTIES IN COUNTERING THE INSURGENCY, APART ' .

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FROM ABSENCE OF I NTELLIvENCE, ARE TWO-FOLD. FIRST IS THE POOR COMMAND,

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DEPLOYMENT, TRAINING, MORALE AND OTHER WEAKNESSES OF THE ARMY AND PARAMILITARY

• * . " • . . •

FORCES.' AND SECOND WHILE THEY CAN OPERATE - - SWEEP - - THROUGH ANY PART OF*

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'THE COUNTRY AND CLEAR OUT ANY VISIBLE INSURGENTS, THEY CANNOT GUARANTEE *• • . SECURITY AFTERWARDS. THE VIET CONG COMES BACK AND PUTS THE ARM ON ALL WHO ' " : HAVE. COLLABORATED. THIS FACT IS VERY IMPORTANT IN RELATION TO REQUESTS FROM

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AMERICAN MANPOWER. OUR FORCES V/OULD CONDUCT THE ROUND-UP OPERATIONS WHICH THE RVN ARMY CAN ALREADY DO. WE COULDN'T CONCEIVABLY SEND ENOUGH MEN TO

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PROVIDE SAFETY FOR THE VILLAGES AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR AN EFFECTIVELY TRAINED •

* * . *

CIVIL GUARD AND'HOME DEFENSE FORCE AND, PERHAPS, A POLITICALLY COOPERATIVE

COMMUNITY. . . • " . ;

*

8. THE KEY AND INESCAPABLE POINT, THEN, IS THE INEFFECTUAL ITY (ABETTED DEBATA3LY BY THE UNPOPULARITY) OF THE DIEM GOVERNMENT. THIS IS THE STRATEGIC FACTOR. NOR CAN ANYONE ACCEPT THE STATEMENT OF THOSE WHO HAVE.BEEN EITHER

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TOO LONG OR TOO LITTLE IN ASIA THAT HIS IS THE INEVITABLE POSTURE OF THE

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PAGE i* or 9

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NEW DELHI 99'-;i

IN 2p079'

ASIAN MANDARIN. FOR ONE THING IT ISN'T TRUE, BUT WERE IT SO THE ONLY

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POSSIBLE CONCLUSION 1 WOULD BE THAT THERE IS NO FUTURE FOR MANDARINS. THE COMMUNISTS DON'T FAVOR THEM. ,,* ' "' . . /•

■■$. I COME NO.-/ TO A LESSER MISCALCULATION, THE ALLEGED WEAKENING

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EMPHASIS OF THE MEKONG FLOOD. FLOODS IN THIS PART OF"THE WORLD ARE AN

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OLD TRAP FOR WESTERN NON-AGRICULTURISTS. THEY ARE JUDGED BY WHAT THE HIO DOES TO ITS TOWNS. NOW AS THE FLOOD WATERS RECEDE IT IS ALREADY

EVIDENT THAT THIS FLOOD CONFORMS TO THE ASIAN PATTERN, ONE REPEATED . . " EVERY YEAR IN INDIA.. THE MUD VILLAGES WILL SOON GROW AGAIN. SOME UPLAND ' ' ' RICE WAS DROWNED BECAUSE THE WATER ROSE TOO RAPIDLY. NEARER THE COAST THE

*

PRESSURE "ON THE BRACKISH WATER WILL PROBABLY BRING AN OFFSETTING IMPROVENENT. • NEXT YEAR'S CROP WILL BE MUCH BETTER FOR THE SILT. . '

-

10. I COME NO.-/ TO POLICY, FIRST THE BOX WE ARE IN PARTLY AS THE RESULT OF RECENT MOVES AND SECOND HOW WE GET OUT WITHOUT A TAKEOVER. WE HAVE JUST PROPOSED TO HELP DIEM IN VARIOUS WAYS IN RETURN FOR A PROMISE

* i •

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■*

OF ADMINISTRATIVE AND POLITICAL REFORMS. SINCE THE ADMINISTRATIVE (AND POSSIBLY .POLlTiCAL)l INEFFECTUAL ITY ARE THE STRATEGIC FACTORS FOR SUCCESS. THE ABILITY TO GET REFORMS IS DECISIVE. WITH THEM THE NEW AID AND GADGETRY*

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WILL BE USEFUL. WITHOUT THEM THE HELICOPTERS, PLANES AND ADVISER'S V/ON'T MAKE APPRECIABLE DIFFERENCE.

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.' 11. IN MY COMPLETELY CONSIDERED VIEW, AS STATED YESTERDAY, DIEM ■ ;

■ -

WILL NOT REFORM EITHER ADMINISTRATIVELY OR POLITICALLY IN ANY EFFECTIVE

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■ •

NEW DELHI 99'-H

WAY." THAT IS BECAUSE HE CANNOT. IT IS POLITICALLY NAIVE TO EXPECT IT.

■ »■ ■ 41

HE SENSES THAT HE CANNOT LET'POWER GO BECAUSE HE V/OULD BE THROWN OUT.

HE MAY DISGUISE THIS EVEN FROM HIMSELF WITH THE STATEMENT THAT HE LACKS

■.'..

EFFECTIVE SUBORDINATES BUT THE CIRCUMSTANCE REMAINS UNCHANGED. HE PROBABLY SENSES THAT HIS GREATEST DANGER IS FROM THE ARMY. • HENCE THE

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REFORM THAT WILL BRING EFFECTIVE USE OF HIS MANPOWER, THOUGH THE MOST

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URGENT MAY BE THE MOST IMPROBABLE.

*

12. THE POLITICAL REFORMS ARE EVEN MORE UNLIKELY BUT THE ISSUE IS ACADEMIC. ONCE THE IMAGE OF A POLITICIAN IS FIXED, WHETHER AMONG OPPOSITION INTELLECTUALS OR PEASANTS, IT IS NOT CHANGED. NOR DO I

POLITICIANS CHANGE THEMSELVES. DI EM'S IMAGE WOULD NOT BE CHANGED BY HIS TAKING rN OTHER NON-COMMUNISTS, INITIATING SOME SOCIAL REFORMS OR

» ■

OTHERWISE MEETING THE REQUIREMENTS'OF OUR DEMARCHE.

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13.. HOWEVER HAVING STARTED ON THIS HOPELESS GAME WE HAVE NO ALTERNATIVE, BUT TO PLAY IT OUT FOR A MINIMUM TIME. THOSE WHO THINK

" -

"THERE IS HOPE OF REFORM WILL HAVE TO BE PERSUADED. SINCE THERE IS NO ' CHANCE OF SUCCESS WE MUST DO TWO THINGS TO PROTECT OUR SITUATION. ONE'

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IS.TO MAKE CLEAR, AS I SUGGESTED PREVIOUSLY, THAT OUR COMMITTMENT IS TO RESULTS AND NOT TO PROMISES SINCE DIEM IS EXPERIENCED IN BOTH

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PROMISING WITHOUT PERFORMING OR IN PROVIDING THE SHADOW WITHOUT THE

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SUBSTANCE OF PERFORMANCE. AND WE CAM PRESS HARDEST IN THE AREA OF

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ARMY REFORM WHERE THE NEEDED CHANGES ARE MOST SPECIFIC AND MOST URGENT.

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• THE -LIKELIHOOD OF FUNDAMENTAL PROGRESS GIVEN DI EM'S SUSPICION OF THE

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page G or 9

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NEW DELHI 9Ql*1

. :.. .'•.in 25S79

• til. 'AMBASSADOR " NOLTI NG AMD GENERAL MCGARR, BOTH HEAVILY IDENTIFIED

* - I : ' * *

WITH THIS PRESSURE FOR REFORM SHOULD REMAIN TO PRESS THEIR CASE. THOUGH ACTING LOYALLY, NOLTING IS NOT HAPPY ABOUT" THE EFFECT OF PRESSURE ON

* * . "

DIEMi • HE BELIEVES RATHER-THAT V/E SHOULD LEND HIM OUR PRESTIGE AND POWER

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. -.

IL'E WORKING MORE GRADUALLY FOR REFORM. THIS POLICY BY MY ANALYSIS

WOULD MERELY CONFIRM DIEM IN HIS INADEQUACY A RISK WHICH MOLTING CONCEDES. IF OUR PRESTIGE WOULD HAVE'PROVIDED THE SECURITY FOR REFORM WE WOULD HAVE

•

HAD RESULTS' LONG BEFORE MOW. •. , .".,-

-

: 15. IT FOLLOWS FROM MY REASONING THAT THE ONLY SOLUTION MUST BE • TO DROP DIEM. KOREA REPRESENTS THE ONLY MODEL THAT HOLDS OUT ANY PROMISE

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* ■

WHATEVER FOR US. WITHOUT D0U3T DIEMWAS A SIGNIFICANT FIGURE IN HIS DAY.

*

BUT HE HAS RUN HIS COURSE. HE CANNOT BE REHABILITATED. INCIDENTALLY THIS VIEW IS HELD INDEPENDENTLY BY THE SENIOR POLITICAL COUNSELLOR OF OUR EMBASSY, THE MAN WHO HAS BEEN LONGEST IN VIETNAM. ' ' ".'•."■

l6. IN MY VIEW," AND THIS IS NECESSARILY SPECULATIVE, DROPPING DIEM WILL*NEITHER BE DIFFICULT NCR UNDULY DANGEROUS. THE VIET CONG ARE' IN

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POSITION TO CAUSE TROUBLE WIDELY OVER THE COUNTRY. THAT IS FAR FROM

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MEANING THAT THEY ARE ABLE WITH THEIR SMALL NUMBER TO"TAKE OVER AND •

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CONTROL THE COUNTRY. ' THE ARMY IF INEFFECTIVE .IS THOUGHT TO BE NON-COMMUNIST.

THE RUMORS OF COUPS ARE ENDEMIC. NOLTING WHILE NOT IN FAVOR HAS SAID THAT

. •

A-NOD FROM THE UNITED STATES WOULD BE INFLUENTIAL. AT THE EARLIEST MOMENT

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THAT |T BECOMES EVIDENT THAT DIEM WILL NOT AND CANNOT IMPLEMENT IN ANY REAL

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page 7 or 9

•/' NEW DELHI S)2 ! H

- WAY THE REFORMS WASHINGTON HAS REQUESTED WE SHOULD MAKE IT QUIETLY CLEAR

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. THAT WE ARE WITHDRAWING OUR SUPPORT FROM HIM AS AM INDIVIDUAL. HIS DAY

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WOULD THEN I BELIEVE BE OVER'. WHILE NO 0.\'E CAN PROMISE''A SAFE TRANSITION

."■WE" ARE NO.-/ MARRIED TO FAILURE. '• ' "•: • • -

17.- IT IS A CLICHE THAT THERE IS NO ALTERNATIVE TO DIEM'S REGIME. THIS

* a. ■

IS POLITICALLY NAIVE. WHERE ONE MAN HAS DOMINATED THE SCENE FOR GOOD OR |LL 'THERE NEVER SEEMS TO BE. NO ONE CONSIDERED TRUMAN AN ALTERNATIVE TO ROOSEVELT. ' THERE .IS NONE FOR NEHRU. THERE WAS NONE I I MAG INE FOR.RHEE. THIS IS AN OPTICAL

ILLUSION ARISING FROM THE FACT THAT THE EYE IS FIXED ON THE VISIBLE FIGURES. IT IS A BETTER RULE THAT NOTHING SUCCEEDS LIKE SUCCESSORS,

* ■

18. WE SHOULD NOT BE ALARMED BY THE ARMY AS AN ALTERNATIVE. IT WOULD ■BUY TIME AND GET A FRESH DYNAMIC. IT IS NOT IDEAL; CIVILIAN RULE IS ORDINARILY MORE DURABLE AND MORE SALEABLE TO THE WORLD. BUT A CHANGE AND A NEW START IS OF THE

* ■ - * .

ESSENCE AND IN CONSIDERING OPINION WE MAY NOTE THAT DIEM : S FLAVCR IS NOT

MARKEDLY GOOD IN ASIA.

»■

19: A TIME OF CRISIS IN OUR POLICY ON SOUTH VIETNAM WILL COME WHEN IT

* . .

BECOMES EVIDENT THAT THE REFORMS WE HAVE A*SKED HAVE NOT COME OFF AND THAT

■

. *

OUR PRESENTLY PROFERRED AID IS NOT ACCOMPLISHING ANYTHING. TROOPS WILL BE

*

URGED'TO BACK UP DIEM. IT WILL BE SUFFICIENTLY CLEAR THAT I THINK THIS MUST

BE'RESISTED. , ' ' ' .

would not deal with the vital weakness.

OUR SOLDI UiSf^^S^^^^^^^SsB^^l^J^^ C0ULD PERPETUATE IT. THEY WOULD ENABLE DIEM TO CONTINUE TO CONCENTRATE ON PROTECTING HIS OWN POSITION •

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. •• '.:■■■ • page 8 0fr 9 , ' .../;._ new delhi 99^

,'•'.'..'- . - • ■• : in 25879

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AT THE EXPENSE OF COUNTERING THE INSURGENCY. LAST SPftJNSj FOLLOWING THE VICE-* PRESIDENT'S PROMISE OF MORE AID, PROPOSALS FOR INCREASED AND REFORM TAXt;s ^ICM

V/ERE WELL-ADVANCED WERE PROMPTLY DROPPED. ". THE PARALLEL ON ADMINISTRATIVE AND*

POLITICAL REFORM COULD BE CLOSE. . • ■ • •'

20. IT WILL EE SAID THAT WE NEED TROOPS FOR A SHOW OF STRENGTH AND '' DETERMINATION IN THE AREA. SINCE THE TROOPS WILL NOT DEAL WITH FUNDAMENTAL FAULTS •- - SINCE THERE CAN'T BE ENOUGH OF THEM TO GIVE SECURITY TO THE COUNTRY

**

ACHESO.M KNEW HE COULD NOT INVEST MEN IN CHIANG.

• 21. WE SHOULD PRESS FORWARD OM THE DIPLOMATIC FRONT TO GET ALL POSSIBLE

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INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT fOR OUR POSITION AND TO RAISE THE BARRIER TO MORE

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OVERT HANOI INTERVENTION AS HIGH AS POSSIBLE. THIS WAS ALWAYS A LONG SHOT..

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AS THE RESULT OF MY TRIP I THINK IT A LONGER ONE. THAT IS BECAUSE THE ACTUAL

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.MATERIAL SUPPORT IS SMALLER THAN OUR PROPAGANDA HAS' PERSUADED US TO BELIEVE.

* ' *

AND I DON'T SUPPOSE V/E CAN STOP THE MORAL SUPPORT AND LEADERSHIP WHICH THE INSURRECTION RECEIVES. HC-UVZR WE SHOULD MAKE ALL EFFORT.

-

22. IN THIS CONNECTION, IN ADDITION TO THE OTHER MOVES AT GENEVA, ON

• • ■

•THE ICC AND THROUGH THE INDIANS TO HANOI AS DISCUSSED WE*SHOULD ASK OUR

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NATO ALLY THE CANADIANS AND OUR SEATO ALLY THE AUSTRALIANS TO MAKE CLEAR TO

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SIDE « ~ THEIR FAILURE'TO PROVIDE SECURITY COULD CREATE A WORSE CRISIS OF CO"tiF(D"-?"

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ENCE. YQU WILL BE AWARE OF MY GENERAL RELUCTANCE TO MOVE IN TROOPS. ON THE

••■•■• . ■ .

' OTHER HAND I WOULD NOTE THAT IT IS THOSE .OF US WHO HAVE WORKED IN THE POLITICAL

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- VINEYARD AND WHO HAVE COMMITTED.OUR HEARTS MOST STRONGLY TO THE POLITICAL

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..FORTUNES OF THE NEW FRONTIER WHO WORRY MOST ABOUT ITS BRIGHT PROMISE BEING

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SUNK UNDER THE RICE FIELDS. DULLES IN 195't SAW THE DANGERS IN THIS AREA. DEAN * .

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PAGE 9 0F 9

■NEW DELHI 99^

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IN 25079

THE CHINESE THE IMPORTANCE WE ATTACH TO PcACE IN TH1.S AREA. THERE CAM NO

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•LONGER BE ANY QUESTION THAT THE FOOD THESE".TV/0 ARE SUPPLYING IS OF NEARLY

■ ■ 1 • ' • • ■ ■ . , • v-. ■ ' - ,

DESPERATE. IMPORTANCE TO THE CHINESE. I VERIFIED THE POINT FURTHER IN LONG TALKS

! . * •■

IN HONG KONG. PROPERLY APPROACHED THE CANADIANS AND AUSTRALIANS WOULD SURELY ■MAKE THE POINT FORCEFULLY, . - " " ■ *

23 AS I HAVE SAID THE PRESENT GAME MUST BE PLAYED MOST WITH THE PRESENT

• * * * ■

DIPLOMATIC AND MILITARY LEADERSHIP. UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES SHOULD THERE BE

• . *

. ANY IMPAIRMENT OF THE CIVILIAN LEADERSHIP BY INTERPOSITION OF A NEW HIGH-RANKIN

* * *.

* . •

.GENERAL. WHEN POLICY CHANGES ON DIEM IT WILL BE TIME TO CKANGEf.THE LEADERSHIP. IN THE NEXT FEW WEEKS ECONOMIC FACTORS WILL BECOME INCREASINGLY CRITICAL AND

* ■

".THERE. IS NOW.?* ONE IN THE COUNTRY WITH AM ADEQUATE GRASP OF THESE' ISSUES OR '

■ ■

THE POWER TO DEAL FIRMLY WITH WASHINGTON. 'SOMEONE OF UNDOUBTED ABILITY IN THIS FIELD - - EUGENE STALEY IF HE CAN BE DRAFTED OR JACK BELL-IF GUATEMALA CAM WAIT - -SHOULD BE SENT FORTHWITH. IN THE MILITARY FIELD WE WILL HAVE AN UP-TO-DATE PROGRAM OF REFORMS FOR PUTTING IN THE DAY DIEM GOES. WE ARE NOT AS WELL SITUATED ON THE ECONOMIC'AND SOCIAL SIDE AND THE, SITUATION HERE IS CHANGING RAPIDLY

. * m

' Zk. MY OVERALL FEELING IS THAT DESPITE THE ERROR IMPLICIT IN THIS LAST

-

MOVE AND THE SUPPOSITION THAT DIEM CAM BE REFORMED, THE SITUATION IS NOT • HOPELESS. IT IS ONLY HOPELESS IF WE MARRY OUR COURSE TO THAT OF A MAN WHO

*

MUST SPcND MORE TIME PROTECTING HIS OWN POSITION AND EXCLUDING THOSE WHO THREATEN

■ » *

IT THAW IN FIGHTING THE INSURGENCY. DIEM'S CALCULATION INSTINCTIVE OR DELIBERATE

• *

IS EVIDENT* HE HAS ALREADY BEEN DEPOSED ONCE AND NOT BY THE COMMUNISTS. HE

■ ■ *

CAN SEE HIS CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER AS WELL AS ANYONE.

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END OF MESSAGE

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Washington

TOP SECRET November 22, 196I

RATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORAKDUM NO, 111 TO: The Secretary of State

SUBJECT: First Phase of Viet-Nam Program

The President has authorized the Secretary of State to instruct our Ambassador to Viet-Nam to inform President Diem as follows:

1. The U.S. Government is prepared to join the Viet-Nam Government in a sharply increased joint effort to avoid a further deterioration in the situation in South Viet-Nam.

A

2. This joint effort requires undertakings by both Governments as outlined below:

a. On its part the U.S. would immediately undertake the fol~ actions in support of the GVN:

(1) Provide increased air lift to the GVN forces, including helicopters, light aviation, and transport aircraft, manned to the extent necessary by United States uniformed personnel and under United States operational control.

(2) Provide such additional equipment and United States uniformed personnel as may be necessary for air reconnaissance,

• photography, instruction in and execution of air-ground support techniques, and for special Intelligence.

(3) Provide the GVN with small craft, including such United States uniformed advisers and operating personnel as may be necessary for operations in effecting surveillance and control over coastal waters and inland waterways.

(k) Provide expedited training and equipping of the civil guard and the self-defense corps with the objective of relieving the regular Army of static missions and freeing it for mobile offensive operations.

TOP SECRET

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(5) Provide each personnel and equip&ient an rcv.y be necessary to improve the miHtary^poIiiicgl iriSslIIjonce Gystern beginning at the provincial level and oRSsadia* upward through the Government and the armed forces to the Central Intelligence Organisation*

{6} Provide each now terms of reference* reorganisation

arid additional personnel for United Si?,tot military forces as are required for increased United States military assistance in, tho operational collaboration with the GVN and operational direction of U 0 S« forces and to carry out the other increased -responsibilities v/aich accrue to tho U & S G military authorities under the&e recoi?imendation3*

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(7) Provide ouch increased economic aid as may be required to permit the OV'Fi to pursue a vigorous flood relief and rehabilitation prc^ramj to supply material in support of the securi ty efforts* and to gr.ve priority to projects in support o£ this e::panded counter-insurgency program,, (Thic could include increases in military pay* a full evipply of a v/He range of material d such aa focdj medical supplier transportation equipment* communications equipment* end any other items where material help could assist tho GVN in vvinning the war against the Viet Congo)

(8) Kncoura^e and support (includra^ financial support) a request by the GVN to the FAO or any other appropriate info national organisation for aniiltilatoral assistance in the relief and rehabilitation.of the flood area*

2* V

(9) Provide individual administrators and advisers for the Governmental machinery of South Vict~Naxn in typos and numbers to be agreed upon by tho two Governments

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On its parti the GYN v/oald initiate tlio following actions;

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(I) Prompt and appropriate legislative and administrative action to put the nation on a wartime footing to mobilise its entire resources* (This would include a decentralization and broadening of the Government so as to realise the full potential of all non-Communist elements in the country walling to contribute to the common strustle*)

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(2) The yiialization of appropriate Governmental wartime . agencies with adequate authority to perform their functions effectively*

■ *

(3) Overhaul of the military establishment and command structure co as to create an effective military organisation for

the prosecution of the war raid assure a mobile offensive capability for the Army* .

McGoorge Bandy

information Copies to:

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The Secretary of Defense V Director of Central intelligence General Maxwell £>* Taylor

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ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

JC WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

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INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

25 November 1361

Refer to: 1-19366/61

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY

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SUBJECT: Command Arrangements for Vietnam

* Mr. Nitze and I have examined the JCS paper, and believe that it represents the best possible current solution. The following points may be noted;

-

a« The fact that we have parallel command arrangements in Korea, Taiwan, and Japan should remove most of the possible political disadvantage of having a US "commander 11 in a situation where Geneya calls for our having only an advisory role.

i

b. Under the President's letter of May 29, a US "commander 11 becomes coequal with the Ambassador. (See page 6 of the JCS views for text distinguishing this from the MAAG.)

I recommend that we either elevate General McGarr promptly to the new position, or find a v replacement soonest.

I Re General Lansdale, General McGarr has sent two messages ■by special channels reporting disappointment by Diem that no de-icision has been made on Ed's coming back, (From these and other (indications, it is clear that McGarr himself would favor this.) tin spite of the importance of Ed's current assignment, I think

! he belongs in Vietnam, where he is of unique value.

■ i

■ The importance of both these points is underscored by Nol ting's I negative talks with both Diem and Thuan* V/e badly need something ito sweeten the mixture. You may have seen the report in today's •Post (page opposite the editorial page) that the Saigon controlled

press has sharply criticized the US, a most novel and disturbing symptom.

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William P. Acting

Bundy

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. WAS H IN GTON

27 Kovesibsr 1961

lEl;0!tMJ3U:i FOX: SL-CT-'TA-Tif }>u^:;

SSCFS TAllY KCstfMAlU "^ MS. U. ALEXIS JOH-^SOiJ GEISBM. I£I£TIT2E?v

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abject:

Meeting on Southeast Asia, 5:3D p«:ju, *bve^bor 27, 1961

The President uirhes to use this meeting as a round-up of actions to date and of Slew decisions required zio'J or shortly. He vould lite the zollouias qcsstioas to serve as a framework for

discussion.

a* 8t*te

*■ « 111' - ■ > —•

(

(1) lihut is the.situation with regard to Diea as reported by Ambassador lloltlnj? . • •

(2) Can we delay longer in obtaining an answer fron Dierj?

■ (3) Should ibltinj be called to Washington in order to ci-ipose him to our thinkisiS on the situation? • »

>

(4) What is the present plan for the use of the Jordan Report?

>

y (5) Are ue in danger of losing the psychological lnpact of"

our new pro^rair t through its delayed and .piecez&al implement aticn?

b. Defines

(1) Khat in the stats of Defence actions in itipleaeatios tha ttev* projraci?

(2) lihat is bein^ done to expedite delivery of river and coastal craft? .

*

(3) What'about increasing the training and readiness of the Civil Guard and the Self Defense Corps?

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(4) Khat are the vie^s of the Joint Chiefc of Staff with regard to ths military organisation in Silicon required to support .the nz'j prQ3r^i? ".

£,• A^"cy for Inter na. t i p'aal pavalorTaa nt

(1) Ibvo tli 2 revis-sd requirements for. economic aid been forth' ccnins frcci Sni^on? Khat in our plan for flood roller?

(2) f*h£t is bains done to meet these requirements?

d. Or ^anisntlori in J?« shin;* fcofl

(1) Save State-Befensa agreed upon the division of responsibilities for the ippleseatation of the new prosrem?

for tl

(2) libera should, the President resard cs personally responsible

;or the effectiveness of the & ? ashin3ton end of this operation? (i;DK: "She President vishee a proposal to rsaaet this point, having in raind an individual to be identified with this presr^a as Kr* Kohler has be£n for Berlin.)

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jp q4 the white HOUSE

WAS HINGTON

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November 30, 1961

TOP SECRET

NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. 115

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TO:

The Secretary of State The Secretary of Defense V

SUBJECT: Defoliant Operations in Viet Nam "" *

The President has approved the recommendation of the Secretary of State and the Deputy Secretary of Defense to participate in a selective and carefully controlled joint program of defoliant operations in Viet Nam starting with the clearance of key routes and proceeding thereafter to food denial only if the most careful basis of resettlement and alternative food supply has been created. Operations in Zone D and the border areas shall not be undertaken until there are realistic possibilities of immediate military exploitation.

The President further agreed that there should be careful prior consideration and authorization by \Yashmgton of any plans developed by CINCPAC and the country team under this authority fore such olans are executed.

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McGeorge Eundy

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Information Copies to:

The Director of Central Intelligence

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The Director, U. S. Information Agency ■ The Director, Bureau of the Budget The Administrator, Agency for

International Development The Military Representative of the President

TO? SECRET

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l8 December 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE

This will confirm our discussion of this morning in which we agreed that:

1. The Senior U, S. Military Commander in South Vietnam will have the direct responsibility for all U. S. military operations in that country y and the authority to discuss both the U. S. and Vietnamese operations directly with Diem and the leaders of his

government.

ti

2. The Senior U.S. Military Commander will have the title Commander. U. S. Military Assistance Forces - Vietnam, 11

3. The Senior U.S. Military Commander will have direct access to CINCPAC and through him to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense on all military matters.

k„ The U.S. Ambassador in Vietnam will be responsible for political and basic policy matters.

5. The two U.S. representatives will keep each other informed of the operations within their respective spheres.

SIGNED

cc: Mr. Wm. P. Bundy Mr. Nitze DepSecDef

Robert S. McNamara

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I UK StUKt

M

27 December 19ol

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, JCS

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SUBJECT: Vietnamese Command Problem

CINCPAC's message to you, 232137Z December 1961, outlines the problem of President Diem giving control authority to Big Minh as his military field commander, when Diem is apprehensive of a coup. CINCPAC then solicited your help to get State to direct Ambassador Nolting to make a concerted approach to Diem with General McGarr,

In CINCPAC's proposal, as in other comments on this problem, I have yet to note anyone come up with an answer to Diem 1 s apprehension. It is the basis for his real reluctance to do what the Americans want him to do, and this basic point needs resolving. How are Nolting and McGarr to reassure him on this point?

V„ Sc policy is to support Diem and he has been so informed by the President, We know that Big Minh has been outspoken about a coup. Diem certainly knows about the way Big Minh has been talking, also. Now we ask Diem to give practical control of his military force to a man who has talked about a coup. What realistic assurances can we give Diem that the action he fears won't take place?

It would seem that the increased U D S 0 military stake in Vietnam should afford some means for stabilizing the political relationships within the Vietnamese Armed Forces long enough for all concerned to get on with the war. Armed with facts about such a political stability, Nolting and McGarr should have little trouble in getting Diem to play ball.

SIGHS)

EDWARD C. LANSDALE

Brigadier General, USAF

Assistant to the Secretary of Defense

(Special Operations)

427

TOR SECRET.