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Bien Phu ($1.2 million) i/hich included 8 tanks^ 2k howitzers^ and 15^000. small arms. Defense Letter to Senate Foreign Relations Committee^ ik Deceiiber 195^

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227 Collins is convinced that "Diem does not have the capacity to unify divided factions in Vietnam" and unless decisive action or dramatic leadership gal- .

. vanizes the country into unified action "this

country \rill be lost to communism^ "Apparently^ the only Vietnamese who might be competent — is Bao Eai„" It is recorrmiende6, that the U, S. not assume responsi-■ bility for training on 1 January 1955 j ^^ give direct military aid. Collins 2303 for Dulles, l6 December 195^ ^ ■ - •

228 - Ambassador Heath suggests that General Collins' recom-

mendations ignore the basic factor that withholding aid froisi Diem vrould assist a communist tal^eover. Duties has analyzed our situation in Vietnam as a "tine buying operation" and Heath recommends continued support of Diem in spite of a "Bao Dai solution," The fear that ^300 million plus our national prestige vjould be lost in a gamble" is a legitimate one^ but >rithholding our support vould "have a fa'r worse effect." Heath Memo-- randum to FEj 17 Decennber 195^

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Tripartite discussions on Indochina are summarized. To Secretary Dulles desire to continue strong support of Diem^ Ely indicates-that he and Collins have exerted pressure without result and ."were now convinced that it was hopeless to expect anything of Diem." Ely feels that he and Collins must decide now "vjhether Diem was really the man capable of national union." Four points are agreed upon; (l) support Dlem^ (2) study alternativeSy (3) investigate timing of replacement^ a.td (U) (added by Dulles) how much more U. £, investment should be made in Indochina if it is decided there ^is no good alternative to Diem? Paris 2601 to State, 19 December 195^-

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The President approves ESC 5ll29/^r as emended and " adopted by the Council as NSC 5^29/5* This statement on current U.S. policy in the Far East deals with the primary problem of the thjreat to U.S. security re-suiting from conmimist expansion in China^ Korea, and I^orth Vietnam. NSC 5-^29/5, 22 December 195^^^

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Dulles spells out guidelines for future U.S. actions in Indochina: (l) vre must create such a situation

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that the Viet Miidi can take- over only "by internal violence; (2) investment'in Vietnam is justified even if only to buy time ^ v:e must he flexible and proceed carefully by stages; (3) 'Ve have no^ choice but to continue our aid to Vietnam and support of Diem"; (k) Bao Dai's return vrould not solve the prob lem; (5) reyitalization of National army is hope for an improved security condition; (5) and "something should be done on our side" to exploit land refoxm issue, Dulles 2535 to Collins (Saigon)^ 2k December

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232,* Collins refutes most of the comments of Ely and Mendes made at the tripartite discussion and is disturbed over some of the suggestions and attitudes of Mendes and • Eden. He feels that he should be in Washington in January if the KSC is to re-evaluate U*S* policy to avoid misunderstandings. Collins 2^t55 to Dulles^ 25 December

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233* Secretary Dulles decides that the U.S* should proceed as scheduled and "take the plunge" and begin direct aid to Vietnam on 1 January and move ahead on KAAG negotiations in Cambodia, Dulles feels that the JCS prerequisite on eliminating the French from Cambodia is "too legalistic and unrealistic-" State Memorandum for the Pecord, 29 December I95U , S59

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1955

23^. In light of the unstable situation in South Vietnam and conflicting views "between General Collins and the State DepartmentJ Secretary Vfilson requests the JCS to "reconsider" U*S^ military programs in Southeast Asia, ' Secretary of Defense Kemorandiim for JCS^ 5 January 1955*

235- The JCS provide additional courses of action in Vietnam to the Secretary of Defense. Specifically^ (l) to continue aid; (2) to iinilaterally institute ar^ '^advisory ■ ^ sydtfem"; (3) if (l) and (2) fail, to deploy unilaterally or vith SEATO; (i) or to vithdra^'f all U*S. support from South Vietnam and "concentrate on saving the remainder of Southeast Asia,*' JCS Memorandum for Secretary of Defense J 21 January 1955 • •

239' This memorandum describes the Department of Defense contribution to and participation in the Ban^ok Conference on SSACDT,' DOD M^norandum, foivarded 29 March 1955---*•

860

862

236* General J* Lairton Collins reports on the situation in

South Vietnam* The major factors I'.'hich ^-iill affect the outcome of U.S. efforts are: (i) Viet Minh strength-and intentions; (2) French attitude and'intentions; (3) sects attitudes and intentions; {k) Vietnamese armed forces loyalties; (5) free Vietnam economy^ and (6) Diem^s ]

popular support* There Is no guarantee that Vietnam Vill^remain free ^th U.S. aid -- but without it, "Vietnam vill surely be lost to comuunism." Memorandum for the National Security Council^ 2U January 1955. - ®^^

237. The Planning Board recommends approval of the Collins

Report. KSC 23^t!i Meeting, 27 January 1955* **.•,**.%..-.--*•. ^^3

238. The JCS recommend a concept and plans for the implemen- i tation, if necessaLry, of Article IV«1.^ of the Manila ^ Pact (SEIACDX). ' The primary objective is deterrence of

'^overt aggression by China or other Communist nations." ^ .- The concept relies on development of indigenous forces and readiness to retaliate with U.S. power on the aggressor. JCS NemDrandum for Secretary of Defense, 11 February ^1955 S85

838

2^0. The U, S, proposal on elections is based on Eden*s plan | at Berlin, i.e*. Free Vietnam will insist to the Viet ' ' Minh that no discussions on the type, issues, or other, factors of elections are possible unless the Viet Minh accept the safeguards spelled out, Dulles U361 to Saigon, 6 April 1955 * - ^9^

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General Collins submits a seven step recommendation t/hich centers on getting rid of Diem and reorganizing the govern^ nent structure. Collins kkkd to Dulles^ 9 April 1955

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Diem exists by reason of U.5- support despite French reluctance. If the French view prevails, ^^removal of Diem... may well be interpreted in Vietnam, and Asia as an example of U.S. .pa*ying lip service to nationalist cause^ and then' forsaking a true nationalist leader when 'colonial interests' put enough pressure on us." Dulles*-li^f38 to SalgoUj 9 Apr 55-* 90?

Bao Dai recoinmends that the U.S, agree with the French to -create a "Supreme Council" or "Council of Elders" to govern in pla^e of Diem. The Binh Xuyen could have been used in the connnon effort if "Diem had not bungled matters." Eao Dai cannot rule for Diem by decree and considers Diem's strength" as a "mockery," Paxis U396 to Dulles^ 9 Apr 55'*'-

910

Ely disagrees with the U.S. on maintaining Diem in office. The worsening situation is attributed to Diem by the French and "only by surgery> that is renoval of Diem^ can the country be saved." Ely feels that if Diem is retained, he could not be the responsible French representative or remain in,Saigon. Saigon ^^661 to Dulles (Excerpts) I9 Apr 55 *

912

Diem is seen as a barrier to forming an interim govern-, ment and the gap between him and other elements in the society is becoming wider. The U,S., however, warns . Vietnamese leaders that if Diem is removed as a "sect victory" it would be "difficult to obtain popular support in the U.S. for continuation of U.S. aid." Saigon ^t662 to Dulles, 20 Apr 55 '. *

915

Diem announces to the U.S. his.willingness to accept a coalition in the government but on his terms* This lincompromising attitude leads Collins to remark: "I see no alternative to the early replacement of Diem."* Saigon i*663 to Dulles, 20 Apr 55 *

918

Conclusions and recommendations are offered as a basis for future Department of Defense positions on the subject of South Vietnam. Key recormnendations made are: to determine U.S, military action within the scope of SEACDT to prevent the loss of Southeast Asia as a result of the loss of South Vietnam, and to postpone ^indefinitely the elections proposed by Geneva Accords for Vietnam. ISA Letter to State Department, 22 Apr 55

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In a debriefing, General Collins is firmly convinced that it win be to the detrimeAt of U*S. interests to continue to support Diem. ISA Memorandum^ 25 April 1955 • • «

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The U*S. tentatively proposes to maintain full support to Diem until an alternative supported by Bao Dai is developed. Dulles U757 ;bo SoJ-gon, 27 April 1955; .....>..-..*

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The State Department is being forced to talce a strong stand for Diem* Senator Mansfield is a strong backer of Diem and if Diem is forced out^there will be "real difficulties on the Hill," K,T* Young Memorandum for Hobertsonj 30 April

1955 * ---*

Bao Dai registers strong complaints against U.S. support of Diem, U.S*« inaction vhlch allowed the present civil strife, and against U.S. failure to urge Diem to go to France. Diem^ in Bao Dai's opinion, is a ''psychopath vho wishes tomartyrize himself," Paris U7U6 to Dulles^ 30 April 195 5 - ;

It is predicted that the success of Diem against the Binh Xuyen, Bao Dai^ the French and General Vy has created a potentially revolutionary situation in Vietnam and, given U.S. support and French acquiescence. Diem is expected to stabilise the situation in Saigon. SNIE 63.1-2/1-55^ 2 Kay 1955 -

Tripartite discussions'5,g3An reveal basic disagreement. ' The French conclude: "Diem is a bad choice.,.-without him some solution might be possible but with him there is none.. .Vlhat would you say if we prance/ were to retire entirely from Indochina-,," SECTO 8, 8 May 1955 0..,

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The French are increasingly bitter toward Diem and con-TTinced he must go- Steps are suggested to reconstitute a joint Franco-i^jaerican approach to the situation. Among these are steps to reduce the French garrison in Saigon, r^lace Ely, and fona a courtse of action after the crisis is over which persuades Diem to reorganise his governLient or else get rid of him, Saigon 5071^ to Dulles, 8 Kay 1955^

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The JCS reject both as solutions to the mend that Dulles be promise for achievin U*S. cannot guarante and that U.S* action place FEC presence. Defense, 9 May 1955*

alternatives suggested by Dulles Vietnam problem. The JCS re com-advised that Diem shows the^most g internal stability, that the e security of French nationals, s under SEATO could possibly re-JCS MemoranS^um for Secretary of

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A inov& to deal vith Dieia to protect French civilians in order to get the Frenth to withdraw "would clearly disengage us rram the taint of colonialism,.»" General Bonestecl Meinorandxicij 9 May 1955 ■

The recoinmendatlpns of the report of the Military Staff Planners ^CQnferencGj SEACDT and the recoimnended JCS actions are sursnarized. The "basic report is omitted-See Doctmient 257j P^ge JCS Memorandum for Secretary of Defense^ 2 June 1955* ••^

The use recoimnsnds and President Eis.enhower approves that NSC reco3TiKLendations as to U.S. policy on all Vietnanr elections are not required and that in the event of renewal of Coiiimimist hostilities^ U.S. policy would be-governed by KSC 5^^29/5 > Meniorau^dUHi for the NSC (KSG IU15)^ 13 June 1955

A surimiary of those portions of the Report of the Staff Planners Conference which have political significance are foivarded t^o the Secretary of State, The parts 'Summarised concern terms of reference for military advisors orgajiization to SEACDT^ measures for improving defensive effectiveness through nutual aid and self-helpj si^ial coirjinunications j snd futit^e organizational structure. JCS Memorandum for Secretary of Defensej 1 July 1955

In probable developments- before July 195b^ north Vietnam (DRV) , l^hough confronted by serious economic probletasj will consolidate its control north of the 17th parallel* The DRV amiy has increased in strength but will probaaly not attack Laos before mid-1956-Tactics are lijcely to include activation of guerrilla units in South Vietnam and their reinforcement by ,infiltration from the North* NIE 63.1-55j 19 July 1955

The consequences of selected U.S, courses of action are estima-^ed in the event of Viet Minh aggression against South Vietnajn, While overt aggression is unlikely J U.S. efforts at undertp>-ing other steps to convince the Viet Minh that aggression will be met with intei'vention are expected to render overt aggression even less likely. Failure to intervene however^ could signal an expanded Cominimist Chinese effort in Asia, Sl'IlE 63.1-^-55. 13 September 1955

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The JCS assess the implications of U.S. military operations to repulse and punish overt Viet Minh aggression or to destroy Viet Minh forces and take control of Korth Vietnsjn in the event of renewed hostilities.* Secretary of Defense Memorandum for NSCj 15 Septciriber

195 5 ^ 0.,..,..

The State DepartiJlent relates the political actions necessary under a deterrent strategy and In a situation of overt Viet Minh agression. In either situa*-tioHj the U.S. has to provide substantial economic assistance. State Department Draft Study^ 6 October 1955 •

The Staff Planners conclude that the suGcess]?\il defense of South Vietnam^ Laos and Cambodia is -v/holly dependent on timely deployment of SEATO forces;, an unlikely eventj or on the use of nuclear veai^ons to reduce force reouire ments* Other conclusions and recommendations are made irhich deal vith overt attacks^ combating subversion^ logistics^ and psych-:)logical varfare* SEAGDT Military Staff Planners Conference^ 16 lylovember 1955 ,,*-•«.•

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Asian members of SEATO are press\aring for a peimanent SEATO Council and Military Staff organisation^' Th^ U,S, position to avoid such a coicmiitment is rapidly becoming, untenable. The Asian sigpiatories to SEACDT are losing f&ith in SEATO as a deterrent for coinmunist expansion. ISA MemorandxiH^ for Secretary of I^avy^ 16 December 1955«' .-. .^. • ^ o •. <, *

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ISA proposes a letter be sent to Secretary Dulles requesting additional U.S. personnel be sent to Vietn^^in to protect against vast losses of IDAP eouipsiaent and to a-rrange "with the French for implementing the Collins-Elj agreement* Secretary of Defense Letter 'to" Secretary of- State ^ 31 January 195^

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The position of the government of South Vietnam is appreciably stronger than it vras a year^ or even six months ago. Hev crises are expected in 1956^ in view of the CHICOM request for reconvening Geneva^ the absence of election .prospects, and increased opposition to Diem. Intelligence Brief No, 1876^ 7 February 1956

The President approves the statement on basic national seci^rity policy vhich has as its objective the preservation of U.S. security. The basic threat is posed by hostile policies and povrer of the Soviet-Communist Bloc; and the basic problem is to meet and reduce the threat without undermining the fundamental U.S. institutions or economy. NSC 5602/1, I5 March I956 <

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WHT THE UNITED STATES ISi^JED A OTIILATERAL DECLAMTION INSTEAD OF SIGNING THE 195^ ACCORDS ON INDGCfflNA

Secretary of State Dulles was utterly unwilling to consider signing accords on Indochina of the type concluded at Geneva in 195^' Signing of the Accords^ therefore, was never an alternative in his mindJ to issuing a unilateral declaration. On the contrary, the unilateral declaration was a substitute^ suggested by the desperate French leaders as the most that they could obtain from the United States^ for a partial or complete American withdrawal from the Geneva proceedings and for disassociation from the Indochina settlement.

To understand the Ajuerican position at the time of the Accords^ it is necessary to trace the evolution of our policy from the time^ in 1953? when Dulles reacted negatively to suggestions for negotiations on the Indochina problem. Dulles told the French at that time that negotiations with no other alternative usually ended in capitulation. Then in 195^^ after joining reluctantly in the four-power decision to hold the Geneva talks on Indochina, he pressed hard for action to strengthen the Western hand--above all, for swift establishment of a coalition to meet the Coiamunist threat in Southeast Asia. Furthermore, the United States limited its role in the Indochina talks to that of an ^'interested" nation, as distinct from the role of a belligerent or of a principal in the negotiations^ and it determined to dissociate itself from any disadvantageous solution. The United States battled British inclinations to accept a solution involving the partition of Vietnam and, in the instructions to the American Delegate, Under Secretary Walter Bedell Smithy said that it would approve no armistice or other agreement which would have the effect of "subverting the existing lawful governments . or of permanently impairing their territorial integrity or of placing in Jeopardy the forces of the French Union in Indochina/* Beyond this, when the Geneva conferees turned to the discussion of control m.achiiiery for an Indochina settlement, Dulles rejected the idea of American participation in a guarantee of the settlement because, as he put it^ this would commit the United States to sustaining Communist domination of territory and thus would cut across "our basic principles for dealing with the communist world", (This was presumably a reference to the Republican goal of "liberating*' the captive nations of Eastern Europe-)

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As the Geneva Conference proceeded, however, Secretary Dulles somewhat eased his opposition to a solution involving partition. As early as June 9 he agreed with Smith that t&e deteriorating military situation might lead to de facto partition, though he wanted the United States to try to avoid heing identified with such a result. Later he told Foreign Secretary Eden that it would be difficult for the United States to guarantee a Communist success in north Vietnam or anywhere else hut that it could perhaps acquiesce in a settlement which it disliked hut would not upset by force-Accordingly., the United States and Britain informed France in a I joint message that they would "respect" an armistice agreement meeting

T seven specified criteria^ including the preservation of "at least

the southern half of Vietnam, and if possible an enclave in the Delta".

Fearing that a settlement would be reached which did not meet the seven criteria listed in the Anglo-American message, the United States in July contemplated the alternatives of completely withdrawing from the Conference or of participating in lower key and with a lower level of representation (i,e,, with Ambassador U- Alexis Johnson as the top American Delegate instead of Under Secretary Smith). Explaining the American position^ Dulles told - . Eden and Mendes-France tha't the United States could not be put in

'the position of apparently approving the sale of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia into Communist captivity in a settlement which would be portrayed as a second Yalta. At the same time, he said, the United States did not question France's right to exercise its own Judgment and did not wish to put itself in the position of seeming to pass "moral Judgment upon French action" or of disassociating itself from the settlement "at a moment and under circumstances which might be ijunnecessarily dramatic,"

Mendes-France, however^ fervently urged that Dulles or Smith head the American Delegation even at the risk of having to disavow the settlement* All he asked, he said, was that the United States make a unilateral statement that it would take action if the Communists , ' broke a settlement based on the seven points. Dulles felt that

such a statement would pose no problem. He agreed to a Franco-American Position Paper, in which the British concurred, incorporating the understanding that if a settlement were reached which the United States could respect, then the United States would express its position "unilaterally or in association only with non-Communist states". It was on the basis of the understandings in the Position Paper that the United States issued its unilateral declaration on \ July 21, 195^.

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Attached hereto is an Annex which summarizes the six points in the Franco-American Position Paper-

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Jul 30, 195^

MEMORAiroUM FOR THE SECRETAHY OF THE AHMT

TflE SECRETARY OF THE MVY THE SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: Possible Use of ROK Forces in Indochina

1* At its meeting on 22 July 195^, the National Security Council (NSC Action No, 1178) adopted the recommendation of the Joint Chiefs of Staffs concurred in by the Secretary of Defense^ that the present U, S, policy with respect to the possible use of ROK forces in Indochina (NSC Action No. 105^-b) not be changed at this time J but be kept under reviev^ in the light of future developments,

2. The above action^ as approved by the President^ is trans^ niitted for your general information,

SIGMTURE AUTI-EENTIGATED BY:

LESLIE R. KYLE, 1st Lt, 'AGC Correspondence Control Section Office of the Administrative Secretary cc: ASD (international Security Affairs) (2) Director^ Office of Special Operations

Signed

C. E. WILSON

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Chinese Communist aggression in Indochina. . . :\ . ■ ^ *\:^ ".}

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However, the foregoing statemantSj v/hile they v/ere intended to, and ^ did in fact, deter open military aggression by Communist China in Indochina

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did not fully meet the French pre occupations > as the situation developed in relation to Dien Bien Phu. . . ■' .

^ 1. OnMaixhSS, 1353, General Ely, French Chief-of-Stafi, called upon^^js Secretary of State Dulles to express appreciation for the sympathetic

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I reception which he had had in this country in discussing the military problems ol Indochina. In the course of the conversation, General Ely raised specifically the

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French aircrait which were supplying Dien Bien Phu and which would be helpless , against MIGs. The Secretary of State stated that he could not give, at once a

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definitive ansv/er to so serious a question, Hov/ever^ he pointed out that before the United States intervened as a belligerent^ it would doubtless v/ish to take into account all relevant factors including the fact that such intervention could not be

V

looked upon as an isolated act. Any such armed intervention would commit the ^-prestige of the United States and v;ould require it to follow through to a military

^^success. This in turn involved political as well as military factors and called for

a partnership understanding on the part of those concerned^ v/hich among other

i

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things should insure the patriotic participation of the local population and their

effective military mobilization and training*

General Ely^s request was not pursued and theie v/as notj in factj an y air

^ * ■ ■

intervention from Communist China. — .

21 During the night of April 4, 1354, at Paris, the French Prime Minister

■

and French Minister of Foreign Affairs asked United States Ambassador Dillon

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to meet with them and they expressed to him their opinion that immediate armed intervention at Dien Bien Phu by United States carrier^based aircraft v;ould be

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[liecessary cc S3.ve chat situation.

The United Stato:? Anxbassador at oric^ repOi:tc^cl this opinion to the Depaz^truant

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. cf Stat^! ar'.ci Secretary-DiiU?? imrjediately replied through the United States Aiiica.ss?tiQr subs:ar,tlaUy as foUov/s: ' - . -

- ,. -^^As X personally explained to General Kly at ^ covloreixoe at which^ Admiral Radford was pr^si^nt^. it would r;Ot be possible for tho United States

■I ■I

to bec.^ino a belli;:erent in Indochina without a fxUl political, understandincf wi^h ^ * Frarice and other countries. In addition it Vvould be necessary that Congress, sho-ald act- I have co:ir:rn-;ed this position with the President, The Executive

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is pre pan-ed to consider united action in Indochina^ Ho\vevar> such, action i^

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impossible axcept on a coalition basis which would, include active participant ion of British Cor.nnonwealth countries^ in view of their great slake in .Malaya^

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?. Cn Apri: Co, it^^4., duvi-a the course oi a, NATO Mi!i!sterial Cour.;:il . meetinc! :r. Parli>. a: tended ov Secretarv oi Scate DuHes. the French For elan

triB:t It inichtcc necessary to s^^ek a cease lire unless the:'e were hnniediate and

* ■ ■

^ niasslve air. support by th:^ UiuU'^d Staiies, which, it was thought miaht stlU save Diea 31en Phu. ■ • ■ ■

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• Th? next day, April 24, Secretary DlUIos, aJtex* consulting on military ascact

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I was then in Paris, advised the French Foreign Minister substantially as follov/s:

""We have considered this matter most carefully.

"The situation with regard to our participation is the same as v;hen ; I Spoke with you on April 14, ^ Under the cir cum stance Sj we should first need Congressional authorization for any such v/ar action♦ ^ This cannot be

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obtained in a matter of hours, nor do I think it can be obtained at all unless

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it is v^ithin the framework of a political understanding which would include

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other nations dilrectly and vitally interested in Southeast Asia,

"I may add that I have received military advice which indicates that

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at this stage even a massive air attack v/ill not assiure the lifting of the siege

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.' of Dien Bien Phu, *' * ' " ^ . - ■ , ^ •

The foregoing are the three occasions when French officials suggested United

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states armed intervention in Indochina.

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United States Parallel Efforts for "United Action"

During this March-June 1954 period,- the United States v;as seeking to develop

the possibilities of collective action in the Southeast Asia area^ on a basis v/hich

would fairly reflect the free world interests which were involved.

|Here come quotes from public speeche^ ' ' ' ' \' ^ - ^ -

intensification With the xxis-rtnetiDSissz of the Communist effort follov;ing the Berlin decision

of February 18, 1954, it seemed to the United States more than ever important to

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develop a united front as a counterv/eight to the probability of intensified effort

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of the Communist Vietminh, and increased in ate rial support to them from

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Communist China. . . ^ , '

■ - ■ -. The following'are steps by the United States in pursuance of this policy:

1, On March 23, 1954, Secretary Dulles met with the House Foreign Affairs Committee and discussed the desirability of publicly calling for united action in

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the Southeast Asia area. He invited and received suggestions from the Committee

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m embers in this respect. Thereupon, under the direction of the President^

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he drafted a statement on this subject v/hich he then discussed v/ith various Senators of both Parties. He then showed the proposed draft to the Ambassadors

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of certain;other countries principally involved and learned that their govern-mentSj v/ithout commital, sav; no objection to tiae proposed statement. The statement \vas then incorporated in a speech in Nev/ York on March 29. In that

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speech the Secretar j of State reviev/ed the threatening situation in Indochina and noted the steps which the United States had taken to assist in the situation,

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He sited cited the President's view (April 16, 1953) that the Korean armistice

v/ould be a fraud if it merely released aggressive armies for attack Isewhere

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and recalled his statement (September 2, 1953) "that if Red China sent its ovm

arm^ into Indochina that v;ould result in grave consequences which rjight not

be corained to Indochina. " The Secretary went on to-say that

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"Under the conditions of today the imposition of Southeast'Asia

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of the political system of Communist Russia and its Chinese Communist

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ally^ by whatever means^ would b6 a grave threat to the v/hole of the free community. The United States feels that that possibility should not be passively acceptedj but should be met by united action. This might ■ involve serious risks. But these risks are far less than those v/hich will

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. face us a few years from nowj if v/e dare not be resolute today," '2. Upon his return from New York, the Secretary of State thereupon

conferred further and on a broader basis with Ambassadors of countrie

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3. On April 3, 1954, the Secretary of Stale and Admiral-RadCord met

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■the possible course of United States action with respect to it. It was the sense

01 the meeting that the United States should not intervene alone hut should attempt

to secure the cooperation of othrr free nations concerned in Southeast Asia, and

that if such cooperation could be assured, it was probable that the United States

> Congress would authorise United States participation in such ^'united action."

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4. On April 4, ■1954, the President met diuring tlie evening at the White

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House with a grouo of his advisers, following V7hich communtation v/as made

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to the Governments of tlie United Kingdom and of France inviting their prompt -' cooperation in organizing "united action" in relation to Indochina and Southeast Asia. This led to irivitations from the British and French Governments to

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Secretai-y of State Dulles to come personally to London and Paris respectively to discuss the matter.

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5. Between April 4 to 9, 1954, the Secretary oi State and other high State Department officers consulteyd in Washington with the diplomatic

representatives c: Great Britain, France, Australia, Nev/ Zealand, Philippines,

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Thailcind, Vietnam,^ Laos and Cambodia, OUier Asia governments were kept Informed. ' '. " . -

The Governments of Thailand and of the Philippines promptly indicated ■J tlieir 7;iUingnes3 to join in united action in Indochina and other Amhassadors

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6. On April 10^ 1954, Secretary of State Dulles left for London and Paris for direct personal discussions with the British and French Governments. On April 13, 1954, at London, after conferences v/iVa Mr. Anthony Eden, the

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British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, amd with Prime Minister

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Churchillj Secretary Dulles and Mr, Eden issued a joint statement which saAd:

"Accordingly, we are ready to talcepart, with the other countries principally concerned, in an exa'mination of t?ie possibility of establishing a collective defense within the framework of the Charter of the United Nations, to assure the peace, security and freedom of Southeast Asia and the Western

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* contribute to an honorable peace in Indochina, " ■ ' '

7. On April 13 Secretary Dulles went to Paris and after discussions ^ during that day and the next with' the French President of the Council and ivith

■ ' the French Foreign'Minister, a joint statement was issued v/Mch said among { other things: \ . * . ■ ■

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11- On May 8j 195^> the Geneva Conference held its first plenary session on Indochina.

12. At this points the French Governinent indicated that it would like to discuss comprehensively with the United States Government the political and military conditions which would enable the United States to intervene militarily in Indochina. The French Government was thereupon promptly

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advised through the United States Ambassador in Paris (May 11, 195^) that the President would be disposed to ask Congress for authority to use the armed

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forces of the United States in the area to support friendly and recognized governments against aggression or armed subversion promoted from without, " provided certain conditions were met- The conditions then defined were subsequently summarized by Secretary Dulles in his Jiine 11 j 195^? address

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at Los Angeles as follows:

"(l) an invitation from the present lawful authorities; (2) clear

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assurances of complete independence to Laos^ Cambodia, and Viet-Nam;

* (3) evidence of concern by the United Nationsj (k) a joining in the collective

effort of some of the other nations of the areaj and (5) assurance that Trance will not itself withdi:aw from the battle until it is won/' j

With reference to (5)? the precise United States suggestion was th; ^e French Government should not withdraw its forces during the period of the "united action", so that the forces from the United States — which it

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was then thought would be principally bat not exclusively air and sea forces -

^and forces from other participating countries^ wo aid be supplementary to^ and 'not in sabstituion for^ the existing forces in the area,. ■ -;

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13• On the basis of the foregoing, there occurred discussions at Paris; . as to which other interested governments were kept generally iniormed by the . United States. ' ' ■ - ' ^ ^ ^

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14, The possibility of "united action" in the fighting in Indochina lapsed ^

with the June 20, 1954, decision of the French Government to obHain a cease-

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The folloining intelligencQ OTQanizailons -participated in the ■preparation of this csiiviate: The Central Intelligence Ageiici; and the intelligence orrjanizations of the Bcpartinents of State, the Ariny, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint StaQ,

■ Concurred in hi/ the

on 3 August 1954. Co7icurring W3re the Special Assista7itj Intelligence^ Department of Stats; the Assistant Chief of StaS, 0-2, Departviant of the Army; the Director of Naval Intelligence; the Director of Intelligence, USAP; the Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint StafJy^The Director of Intelligence^ ABC, and the Asdsta7it to the Director, Federal Bureau of InvesUuation, a'bstained, the subject being outside

of their jurisdiction.

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POST-GENEVA OUTLOOK IN INDOCHINA

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■ ^ . ' ' THE PROBLEM ' '

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To assess the probable outlook in Indoohina in the light of the agreements reached the Geneva conference.

CONCLUSIONS

1, The signing of the agreements at Geneva has accorded international recognition to Communist military and political power in Indochina and has given that ,pov/er a defmed geographic base.

^. We believe that the Communists will not give up their objective of securing control of all Indochina but will, without violating the armistice to the extent of launching an armed invasion to the south or west, pursue their objective by political, psychological, and paramilitary means.

3, We believe the Communists will consolidate control over North Vietnam with little diinculty. Present indications are that the Viet Minh will pursue a moderate political program, which together with its strong military posture, will be calculated to make that regime appeal to the nationalist feelings of the Vietnamese population generally- It is possible, hov/ever, that the Viet Minh may find it desirable or necessary to adopt a strongly repressive domestic program which would diminish its- appeal in South Vietnam. In any event, from its new territorial base^ the Viet Minh will intensify Communist activities throughout Indochina,

<^4. Although it is possible that the French j and Vietnamese, even with firm support I from the US and other powers, may be able to establish a strong regime in South Vietnam, v/e believe that the chraices for this development are poor and, moreover, that the situation is more likely to continue to deteriorate progressively over the , next yearA It is even possible that, at some time'^uring the next tv/o years, the South Vietnam Government could be taken over by elements that would ssek unification with the North even at the; ^ expense of Communist domination, li] \ the scheduled national elections are held' |i in July 1956^ and if the Viet Minh does not' I'prejudice its political prospects: the Viet Minh will almost certainly win,

5, The ability of the Laotian Government to retain control in Laos will de^-^end upon developments in South Vietnan. and upon the receipt of French military and other assistance. Even with such assistance, however, Laos will be faced by a growing Communist threat which might result in the overthrow of the present government through subversion or elections^ and in any case would be greatly intensified if all

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Vietnam were to fall under Communist cona'bL • - ' , -

6, We believe that if adequate outside assistance "is made available, the Cambodian Government" will, probably increase its effectiveness and the effective-

ness of its internal security forces and will be able to suppress Communist guerrilla activity and to counter Communist political activity. The situation in Cambodia would probably deterior?vte, however, if a Communist government should emerge in Loa^s or South Vietnam,

DISCUSSION

/

'i, THE CURRENT SITUATION

03„3.> . ■ ■

7 The signing of the agreements at Geneva has ended large-scale warfare in Indochina and has alnrmed the independence of Laos and Cambodia, It has, on the other hand,

" accorded international recognition to Communist military and political power in Indo-

, china and has given that power a defined -geographic base. Finally, the agreements have dealt a blow to the prestige of the Western Powers and particularly of France,

North Vlefnam '

8 The Viet Minh has emerged from Geneva with international recognition 'arid with greatly enlianced power arid prestige in Indo-

T china. The Viet Minh leaders, while ad-

: mitting' that their ultimate objectives may

have been temporarily compromised ''for the

sake of peace/* are acclaiming the agreements

' as denoting"a major victory and ensuring the

■ eventual reunification of all Vietnam under

Communist aegis. Ho Chi-Minh is generally

regarded as the man who liberated Tonkin

from 70 years of French rule, Tlie Viet j\'Iinh

has initialed a program to absorb presently

French-controlled areas in the Tonkin Delta.

South Vietnam

9. In South Vietnam, the agreements and the fact of the imposed partition have engendered aYi atmosphere of frustration and disillusionment, which has been compounded by widespread uncertainty as to French and US intentions. The present political leadership ■. appears to retain the passive support of the

mo're important nationalist organizations and individuals. However, the government's already weak administrative base has been further dislocated, and it has only uncertain assurances of continued outside military and financial support Mutual jealousies and a lack of a single policy continue to divide Vietnamese politicians. Moreover, certain pro-French elements are seeking the overthrow of the Dierr. government v/ith the apparent support of ^French colonial interests anxious .to retain their control.

10. The North Vietnam population is somewhat greater than the South Vietnam population and, in any event, the loss of the Tonkin Delta has deprived South Vietnam of the most energetic and nationalist segment of the population. Although South Vietnam has the capability for agricultural self-sufficiency, the principal industiial establishments and fuel and mineral resources are located in North Vietnam,

11. Provided that the terms of the ceasefire agreement are obs.erved, the combined French-Vietnamese forces :n South Vietnam now have the capability of maintaining internal security, f

Laos

12. The relatively stable internal situation in Laos, which in the past has depended upon French support, remains essentially unchanged. The Laotian Army is poorly armed and trained and, without the suppoi't of French forces and advisers, does not have the capability to maintain internal security. Moreover, "Pathet Lao" Communists continue to have de facto control of two northern

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provinces adjoining the Communist-controlled areas of Nortliern Vietnam. Further-tnore, the Geneva agreements gWe members of the "Pathet Lao" movement freedom of political action throughout Laos<

Cambodia

13, The intci-nal eambodian situation, except for sharp political rivalries among leading Cambodians, is at present relatively stable* Non-Communist dissidcnco appears to have abated and the principal dissident leader, Son ■Ngoc Thanh, no. longer poses any real threat to the government The King retains widespread popular support for having obtained a large df^gree of eiTective independence from the French and for having safeguarded Cambodia's integrity at Geneva. Although the Communis Is are permitted freedom of political action in Cambodia, they have only a minimum appeal. The Cambodian forces, although somewhat weakened by the withdrawal of French forces, have the capability of dealing with current Communist subversive action-

■

!I. OUTLOOK IN INDOCHINA

General Con sfd era lions

14. The Geneva agreements, although precise

and detailed concerning the Ume and place of troop redeployments and related matters, are imprecise about matters pertaining to future military aid and training. Moreover, the agreements are vague with respect to political matters. Details on the implementation of natlOiial elections are left for the interested parties to determine. Except for such influence as may be exerted by the presence of supervisory teams from India, Canada, and Poland, there is no provision for forcing the parties concerned to implement or adhere to the agreements,

15, The course of futux^ developments v;iU be determined less by the Geneva agreements ^ than by the relative capabilities and actions of the Cojnmunist and non-Communist en-; titles in Indochina, and of interested outside powers.

16. Comviiinist •policij, Comnranist willingness to reach agreement for an armistice in

Indochina, at a time when prolongation of the conflict could have produced a steadily deteriorating situation in Indochina, was probably -derived in substantial part from the Comma-^ nist estimate that: (a) an effort to win a total military victory in Indochina might pre-^ cipitate US military intervention, and (b) the ' objective of gaining political control over all Indochina could be achieved as a result of the armistice agreement. The Communists also ^ apparently believed that an attitude of ''reasonableness" and the acceptance of an armistice in Indochina would contribute to the realization of their objective to undermine western efforts to develop an effective military coalition. They probably consider, therefore, that a deliberate resumption of large-scale military operations from their zone in the north would negate the political and psychological advantages the Communists have gained by negotiating a settlement and could involve grave risk of expanded wan

17. In the light of these considerations, v/e believe .that the broad outlines of Communist policy in Indochina will be to: (a) refrain .from deliberately taking major military action to break the armistice agreement while seeking to gain every advantage in the implementation of the agreements; (b) consolidate the Communist political, military^ and economic position in North Vietnam; (c) conduct in-

■ - tensive political warfare against non-Communist Indochinese governments and people; (d) work for the ultimate removal of all Western influence, particularly French and VS, from^ Indochina; and (e) emphasize and exploit issues in Indochina which vnll create and intensify divisions among non-Communist countries. In sum, we believe that the Communists will not give up their objective

^"^■'M>f securing control of al! Indochina but will,

^ without violating the armistice to the extent of launching an armed invasion to the south .or west, pursue their objective by political, psychological, and paramilitary means.

18. French policy. It is impassible at this time to predict even the broad outlines of French policy in Indochina. The followinjr appear to be the main alternatives:

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a. Gnuit or complete political independence lo the Indochina states, accompanied by an atlcinpt to organize strong political regimes in those states. We believe that the French might be persuaded to adopt this policy by strong US-UK pressure, together with economic and militaiy assistance to France and a guarantee of the defense of the free areas of Indochina against further Communist military attache,

b. Continuation of French Union ties with the non-Communist Indochinese states, vath indirect Fi'cnch political controls and French economic domination. We believe that Fi^ench policy may proceed along these lines if the

.French estimate that: (1) the Communists will follow a conciliatory policy in Indochina; (2) the non-Communist leadership will offer veiy little difnculty; and (3) the US and UK wiH not exert pressure toward a gx'ant of full independence to the Indochinese states.

c. Some form of agreement with the Viet Minh providing for expediting elections and achieving a unification of Vietnam, The French might be inclined to follow this line if the Viet Minh held out promises of the maintenance of French economic and cultural interests, and of the continuance of some form of association of the unified Vietnamese state

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d. Withdrawal of all French military, administrative, and economic support from In-, dochioa. We believe that this would occur only in the event of a hopeless deterioration of political, military, and economic conditions in the area_

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19. Intemational policies. The political survival of the Indochinese states is endangered not only hy the threat of external Communist attack and internal Communist subversion, but also by their own inherent inexperience, immaturity, and weakness. We believe that ^without outside support the Indochinese states cannot become strong enough to withstand Communist pressures. The course of developments in Indochina will be largely influenced by the attitudes and policies of other powers. In general, we believe that in the absence of firm support from the US, the non-

Coznmunist states of Indochina cannot long remain non-Communist. If they are given opportunity, guidance, and matei'ial help in building national states^ they may be able to attain viability. We believe that the energy j and resourcefulness necessary for this achieve-1 ment will not arise spontaneously among the '■ non-Communist Indochinese but will have to be sponsored and nurtured from without.

Outlook In Vietnam

20. Outlook in North Yietnam. Communist activities in North Vietnam v/ill be concentrated upon consolidation of Communist control, with their efforts in this respect probably appearing moderate at the outset. The Viet Minh will probably emphasize social and economic reforms and the participation of all politicalj economic, and religious groups in state activity. At the same time, Viet Minh cadres will establish themselves throughout the Delta, will begin the process of neutralizing all efiective opposition groups,\vill undertake the usual Communist program of popular indoctrination, and will prepare for the election scheduled in July 1956. We believe the Communists will be able to achieve the consolidation of North Vietnam with.little difll-

culty,

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21. We believe that the Viet Minh will continue to develop their armed forces. Althou'^h the armistice provisions forbid the Viet Minh from increasing their supply of arms, we believe they will covertly strengthen and possibly expand their armed forces with Chinese Communist aid. Viet Minh forcri will almost certainly continue to receive training in China.

22. Thus established firmly in No'^th Vietnam, the Viet Minh regime will probal j retain and may increase its symbolic attraction as the base of Vietnamese national independence. Its methods of consolidating controlwill probably continue for some time to be moderate, and, its internal program together with its military pov/er, will be calculated to make the regime attractive to the remaining peonies of Indochina. It is possible, however, that the Viet Minh may find it desirable or necessaiT

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to adopt a strongly repressive domestic pro-

■ gram which \tou1c1 prejudice its psychological appeal and political prospects. Barring such

'repressive Viet Minh policies, the unification issue will continue to be exploited to Com-munist advantage- throughout Vietnam. Meanwhile, the Viet Minli regime will con-

-.tinuc to-strengthen the Communist underground apparatus in South Vietnani, Laos,

' and Cambodia, aware that significant Communist gains in any one of these countries will strengthen the Communist movement in the

■ others; It will s6ek to develop strong overt Communist political groups v/here possible and will generally use all available means towards the eventual unification of the country under Communist control,

2d.. Outlook ill South Vietnam. We believe

that the Viet Minh will seek to retain sizeable

military and political assets in South Vietnam.

.Although the agreements provide for the re-

inioval to the north of all Viet Minh forces,^

j many of the regular and irregular Vict Minh

* soldiers now in the south are natives of the

* area, and lai^ge numbers of them will probably I cache their arms and remain in South Viet-Inam. In addition, Viet Minh administrative 'cadres have been in firm control of several Jarge areas in central and soutH,Vietnam for jseveral years. These cadres will probably re-jmain in place. French and Vietnamese efiorts *to deal with "stay-behind" military and administrative units and personnel v/ill be greatly hampered by armistice provisions guaranteeing the security of p re-armistice dissidents from reprisals. ^ ^ -

24. The severe problem of establishing and maintaining securitj'^ in South Vietnam will probably be increased by certain provisions of . the Geneva agreements which prohibit the import of arms and military equipment, except as replacements, and the introduction of additional foreign military personnel, the establishment of new military bases", and military alliances. These provisions limit the development of a Vietnamese national army to such numbers as may be equipped by stocks evacuated from Tonkin, plus stocks nov; held in Saigon. Hov;ever, in the last analysis,

Vietnamese security will be determined by the degree of French protection and assistance in the development of a national army, the energy v/ith which the Vietnamese themselves attack the problem, and by the will of the non-Communist pov;ers to provide South Vietnam with effective guax^antecs.

2d. In addition to the activities of stay-behind military and administrative groups, the Viet Minh will make a m.ajor eflort to discredit any South Vietnam administration, and to exacerbate French-Vietnamese relations, and appeal to the feeling for national unification which will almost certainly continue strong among the South Vietnamese population. The Communist goal v/ill be to cause the collapse of any non*Communist efforts to stabilize the situation in South Vietnam, and thus to leave North Vietnam the only visible foundation on which to re-establish Vietnamese unity. French and anti-Communist Vietnamese efforts to counter the Viet Minh xmity appeal and Communist subversive activities will be complicated at the outset by the strong resentment of Vietnamese nationalists over the partitioning of Vietnam and the abandoning of Tonkin to Communist control. It m?.y be difficult to convince many Vietnamese troops, political leaders, and administrative personnel in Tonkin to go south, let alone to assist actively in the development of an efiective administration in South Vietnam.

26, Developments in South Vietnam v/ill also depend in large part on French courses of action. J'rospects for stability in South Viet-nam would be"considerably enhanced if the French acted swiftly to insure Vietnam full independence and to encourage strong nationalist leadership. If this were done, anti-French nationalist activity might be lessened. With French military, and economic assistance — backed by US aid — the Vietnamese could proceed to develop gradually an effective security force, local government organization, and a long-range program for economic and social reform. Nevertheless, it will be very difficult for the French to furnish the degree of assistance which will be required without at the same time reviving anti-French feeling to the point of endangering the whole efiort.

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27, On the basis of the evidence we have at

this early date, however, we believe that a

'favorable development of the situation in

I South Vietnam is unlikely. Unless Mencles-

* France is able to overcome the force of French

traditional interests and emotions v/hich have

I in the past gw^erned the implementation of \ policy in Indochina, we do not believe there I will be the dramatic transformation in French (policy necessary to win the active loyalty and [support of the local population for a South I Vietnam GovernmentJ At the present time, it appeal's more likely that the situation will deteriorate in Soixth Vietnam and that the

'■ withdrawal from Tonkin will involve recriminations, distrust, and possibly' violence. There v/ill be delays in the development of efTective administration in the south; the French military will probably be forced to retain a large measure of control for reasons

■ of ''security"; and efforts by French colonial interests to develop a puppet Cochin-China state will persist It is even possible that at -some point, during the next two years the South Vietnam Government could be taken over by elements that would seek unlncation with the Viet Minh in the North even at the

' expense of Communist domination. Even-if

i "If the scheduled national elections are

arrangement proved impossible, and the situation deteriorated to the point of hopelessness, would the French withdraw completely from the country,

Ou"fIoo!c in Laos

29. Providing the French maintain the 5,000 troops in.Laos v/hich the Geneva agreements permit them, and continue to develop the Laotian forces, the Royal Laotian Government should be able to improve its security forces and, excluding the two northern provinces, to deal, with isolated, small-scale Communist guerrilla actions. Also, providing the Laotians continue to receive French and US technical and financial assistance, they probably will be able to maintain an adequate government administration. There is notliing in the Geneva agreements to prevent Laos from becoming a member of a defense arrangement so long as no foreign troops other than specified French personnel are based in Lao;

)S.

30. However, if the French for any reason decide not to maintain their troops nor to continue military training in Laos, it v/ill be impossible for the non-Communist pov;ers to orovide efiective aid to the Laotians v/ithout

aching the Geneva agreement. At the j held in July 1956, and if the\Viet llinli le time, Laos will be faced with a growing I does not prejudice its political prospects^

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nmunist threat, and the freedom of politi-vill alnost certainly liin,^' action permitted members of the Pathet

28, In the interim, Viet Minh propaganda will find ample opportunities to influence Vietnamese attitudes- Within a year, Viet Minh stay-behind units will probably be active polit-■ ically, and possibly involved in open guerrilla * fighting. In these circumstances, the French will probably be able to maintain their "pres-'ence" in South Vietnam through mid-195G, but their influence will probably become increasingly restricted to major cities and the perimeters of military installations and bases. The French might be willing to resolve this situation by an arrangement with the Communists v/hich seemed to offer a chance of saving some remnant of the French economic anci cultural position in Vietnam. Such an arrangement might include an agreement to hold early elections, even w^ith the virtual cer-' tainty of Viet Minh victory. Only if such an

Lao movement, strengthened by support from the Viet Minh, may result in the overthrow of the present government through subversion or elections. Finally, further successes for the Viet Minh in Vietnam will have an immediate adverse effect on the situation in Laos.

Ouvlook in Cambodia

31. We believe that the Communists, itf with-dravang organized units from Cambodia, will leave behind organizers, guerrilla leaders', and weapons. Initially, the Communists will probably minimise guerrilla action in order to concentrate on building their political potential in Cambodia.

32. Providing the withdrav/al of the Communists is substantially in accord with the a^ree-

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ment, the development of stability in Cambodia during the next year or so will depend * largely on two interrelated factors: (a) the' ability of the Cambodians to develop efiective government and internal security forces; and (b) the ability of the Cambodians to obtain external technical and financial assistance. There is no proiiibitlon in the Geneva agreements against Cambodia's obtaining outside assistance to develop its defense forces or on joining a defensive alliance, providing the latter is in consonance with the UN Charter and that no foreign troops are based in Cambodia In the absence of a threat to Cambodian se-

curity. If adequate outside assistance is made available, the Cambodians will probably increase the eiTectivcness both of their government and their internal security forces, and v/ill be able to suppress Communist guerrilla activity and to counter Communist political activity. The efiorts of the Cambodians to strengthen their position would probably be more-energetic if their independence were guaranteed by some regional defense arrangement. The situation in Cambodia would deteriorate gi'avely, however, if a Communist government should emerge in Laos or South Vietnam.

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^^- ■ SET.^T DE?AKTl-IEKT-i^Si-;'*lS;PEATEL) IKFDT^MAMotI SAIGOK H^K ' ^-^

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for full and frank discussion regarding his views of Diem V>; governnient.. La Chambre feels future Vietnatriese Governraent must: )^'J

(1) Be fully representative of population'tn Southern Vietnam; p

(2) Be prepared to initiate and carry cut agricultural reform: p (redistributiou of land) very promptly^ and ;, z^ ^

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appropriate during cotntng riionths. He feels that Diem governnioht - ' does not (repeat not) qualify on any of those three points but;^ ..^

also feels that Dieni is valuable for his high moral character ' ^^''-^-

and should definitely be a member of any future Vietnamese .-7 " '^^-

Government if Diem should he successful in making his peace with i

the sects in the south and ^ should obtain their support. La Chanibr-e

--^ said there would be no (repeat no) objection to his staying on •

*-^ as Prime Minister, provided he would also act on points 2 and 3

\ \ above* 1^ Chambre said his information was that Diem wouid not

l^ (ropee-t not) be able to obtain the cooperation and support of

y^ the populace of South Vietnam^ and that^ because of his

-^J^ ^landarin background^ would oppose both agricultural reform and

^^<i,y\^Vae deposition of Bao Dal. ^ Therefore, la Chambre feels, tb^t a

^il >:> ^new government will be required if there is to bo any chance

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^O- of winning the cotntng election- la Chambre said that Jie__favored <\-\xTa.:n as the head of the new government and hoped that Diem would Etav on as Minister of the Interior^ Xo cootrci—the-^joolice or as

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'\&Ilnister of Defense*- La Chambre also hapes that Buu Log will ^^ ^oin the new government as he would be helpful when the time came to depose Bao Dal.

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V Regarding timing, there apparently is nothing Immediate in the 0^ ^^ ■ \ air- la Chambre plans to spend September In Indochina and wants C^l

to look situation over there before any action is taken.- ^ •.; -(}

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,^2" 4 Si J August 4/ noon J from Paris CN 15^6.

upon at that time it vill be effectuated by Bao Dal- La Chambx^e said fj Bciflcally that there could be no (repeat no) action on the deposition of Bao Dal until a broadly based gover^nment supported by all factions had been established in Southern Vietnam.

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THE JOIIJT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Washington 25} D-C.

k August 195^

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: U*S, Assumption of Training

Responsibilities in Indochina

1, It has been recommended by the Chief M.^G Indochina that the United States assume responsibility for the training of the Vietnamese Army, There are indications that both the Vietnamese and the Cambodian governments may request that the United States assume responsibility for training their forces as part of any U-S. effoz^t to check further expansion of Communist influence in Indochina.

*

■ 2, The Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered this question and recommend that before the United States assumes responsibility for training the forces of any of the Associated States certa;-in preconditions which are essential to the success of'-this effort be met. They include the following:

a. Frcsn the military point of,view it is absolutely essential that there be a reasonably strong^ stable civil government in control. It is hopeless to expect a U*S* military training mission to achieve success unless the nation concerned is able effectively to perform those governmental functions essential to the successful raising and maintenance of armed forces^ to include ^he provision of adequate facilities, drafting and processing of personnel, pay of troops, etc. Unless the foregoing conditions prevail, a U,S-training mission woijld lack the authority and governmental support essential to the successful accomplishment of its mission.

.b* The government of each of the Associated States concerned should formally request that the United States assume responsibility for training their forces and providing the military equipment, financial assistance, and political advice necessary to insure internal stability.

c. Arrangements should be made with the French granting full independence to the Associated States and providing for the phased, orderly withdrawal of French o^^'^'^^-m^Wvp

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forces J Fi^ench ^officlals^ and French advisors from Indochina in order to provide ruotivatxon and a oound -basis for the establishnient of national armed forces. The United States frcr.^. the bs^^nning should insist on dealing directly v;ith the gcvemriients of the resp'3Ctive Associated Sta-tes^ corapj-tely independent of French particicatlon or cont.xl. . , *

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a*-'T£io" sise and composition of ^ the forces oi ea.ch of the Associated States sh.ould te dictated hy t'le' local iriilitfjry rGquxreirients and the overfall interests.

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3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recouLuerxl that you approve he fore:;;oins pcsiticnj and Inforn the Departiiient of State of the viev;s of the Deuartruent of r^efense concerning the assiLniption by the United States of trainiri3 responsibilities in Indochina,

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3 prepared study he^scOU^--p'bi'fft' of view US part future tuam includin;:^. estifrate situation aud concept ox^eratiOQ

Have

in sul)stance follovrlng:

Missicn: Ssl-aollsh pDlltlcel psychological, military^ econot-iic courses acttcri for edoptlon ty U3 to insure i^'ree Vietnam^ survival as nation, 0-3velop Vietnarn as effective barrier continued CornLr3uaist expansion as nation,-

Concept operation depends fulftlllns following primary conditions; . " ^ - '

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PUnanciel Enaterial and i^ei^sonnel support by US as required; successful 3>:ecutlon this program and open cooperatic-^. ^. French Govern:rent; Yletna^:T:ase acceptance US agsistanc^e; BtCi sctive supoort U3 r:)rQp,vatj:i within Free Vietnaairtiioans, 3r-^

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With indispensable support defined above j concept e'TiQj'aceS.: US advisors and operation agencies assist Free^yietnarj al£ echelons and in all functio.nal activities, Gshs^^a 11^^every ee Vietnam official and gcverncjent ag6aS:y'^.^'lll'^lon^ r.e or {nor^ U3 speolallstij for steering iti aiscb^r^e,/

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resrjonsrollitiesJ all vlth French concurrence^

K30 es^tablish national policies ^ et cetera^^US Ernbassy-SaiJ;oii . iriplernentlng agency through country tearr^, US Srr^bassy Saigonj GHQ under ccnirriand of Arnbessador for direction activities required under this plan,- Following tssks be accomplished:

A. Political J psychological, US to use its Ov^n interpretation of the French Yietna:!! cease-fire agree^^ent to provide all --possible freedoo: relations vith Vietns::?. US must undertake '-, major political psychological action re France^ SF Asia and Vietnaau By agroer^^ents US assume dcnlnent: role cooperation vith P'ranee and Vletnem to develoo strong viable Vietnarn, Bv ^

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TOP SECEET

SENSITIVE

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US political psychological actions re SE Asia produce strong positive support from nations having primai-y inter-I est SE Asia, Develop strong democratic state oriented toward ' West, By persuading Government Vietnam to announce complete independence J and for French to announce date of withdrawal French forces and date Vietnam becomes entirely free* Detailed implementation above included in plan.

B. Military establish sound realistic modern system national military service- Specialists from US selective service employed this effort. Evaluate and establish sound personal policies* Establish national intelligence agency and other intelligence programs all fields. Study and reorganize Defense Ministry and Armed Forces, Establish for each military service streamlined and highly effective training organization to include staff training and field training agencies J develop division training camps, RTCj et cetera* Logistics development* Signal development- Budget and fiscal development. Develop independent Vietnam army of divisional-sized units*

C- Kaval and air establish sound economic program to provide for realistic development resources including rebuilding railroads J developing highway system^ agrarian reforms^ housing construction^ schools, development sanitation and hygience.

We believe such plan last rpsprt solution on salvaging remaining Vietnam and offer it for consideration in formulation US policy for SE Asia. Ambassador concurs* Ambassador generally concurs with objectives above outline and with my analysis situation. He approves entire report as a timely, useful initial plan^ although he has reservation as to some of methods proposed, as he doubts necessity of US to become q.uite so far involved in operation of this government except on military training side. Comment: I feel this Is war in every sense* Wartime methods, therefore, are in order all fields until emergency passed-

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8/9/5^^ 5:50 p.m: CORRECTED COPiT

FROMrParis

Control O^W-9

Tac'd: Auniusb 9, 1954 . 2:% p.m.

TO:

SocTQiiBry

i;0: 558, August 9, 7 P-m

PRIORITY • - ■ . • ' ,

.... - • ■ . : . ■ • ,

EYES (m2£ SECRETARY

^ .—— ' ^ ' . .

Kev inforn:ation vrhlch baa just corao to my attention makes mo .. feel that it is irape:catlve to obtain coneurronce op acquieric-enco of Schumann and Blci.ault prior to publication of statemont ■ on Indochina. V/hen Jojce nho^/ed proporjod statotnont. to Jfergorie, Margopie commented that tho record Boemod to bo accuj?ate as far af3 it vent but that it otriltted all mention of XQ4?. offer of atomic bombs to Bidault. Ho said you had mjade "this offer to..;. Bidault during a private co'nvernatlon which took place during"^" Jan Inter.nrlBnlon of one of tho fornial talks at the Qual d'Or Bay, v;hich v;ere held during your visit here on route to Croneva,

Joyce asked lyfergorie if this "offer" vas not perhaps merely a ' speculation as to whether atomic homhs could te useful at Dien

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Blen Phua Margerie said "No

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■le further said that Ridault

told him and La Tournelld about your, offer Immediately after_he finished talking vith you and that Bidault had the dlBtlnct impression that you \ieve "suggesting the use, of at amr o ~^m bs which were to be given by the US^t^o the French* AGcbrdlng to Margerie Bidault vas much upset_about this offer and felt that the use of'atomic bombs would have done no good tacticalTy and would have lost all support for the-v/est throughout Asia'"/" Our judgment is that Margerle fears that If Bidault should feel that publication of the statement as drafted pla ce d_him ir unfavorable light and indicated that he favored continuation of the fighting and^was not doing his best to obtain a settlemsnt, he might respond by publicizing his version of the conversation regarding atom bombs and might attempt to take credit for .javlng -.prevented their use after 11: had been' suggested by US. I would^ ^i hope to avoid any such eventuality by prior clearance of. state-'X ment with Schurriana and Bidault, ! " ' . . .

y^ do not belieVG that Bidault would resort to any such irrespon-^ silble tactic which would damage Interests of free world and ''" ■""'"'^^prestige of U3 but we must nevertheless bear in-mind that he 13 ill, nervous hypersensitive and bitter, - - :^

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IMDICkIE: a COLUGF'gTr I .

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offer^ our notes oi co nversa tion do not reflect^mention of subject, and it is

incredible that I should have made offer since the law categorically forbids it/'"*' as was indeed v^ell known not only to me but to Bidault because it had been ^^ ?

discussed at NATO meetings.

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I recall that at the restricted NATO meeting on 23 April 1954 I made a q ^'^

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which among other things I said QTE Such weapons must now be treated as '9 fact having become conventional UNQTE. I am v/ondsring wli^ther what Bidault reported was not in fat^t what I had said at the restricted NATO Council meeting, ' . f

See no objection to your showing statement confidentially to Schumann but we must not get maneuvered into a position where the President an^ I cannot^

respond to a Congressional request unless this is also approved by foreicm ^-'

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governments.

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Margerle e*>ald that he fully agreed th^^t there niuBt have been such a misunderstanding. He added that he remembered April 23 'very uell because on that day Biclault had been 111, jittery^ overwrought, and at his very i7or:it. I'!largerlo added that on that day Bldault had been "incoborent'' to raenfoex\o of his omi top staff. Therefore, he very readlD^y understood hov; such a -tnlaunderstanding could have conie about on that pa3?tlcular day,

Margerle said that he vds very grateful that thi?^ ?iubject h:id been c3.eared up and hoped i.hat Icaowledge of this nilf^iu_ndev*r.t^-:'ndlng vjould be kept strictly liriiited. He said that he i;ould undertake" to see Bidault personally and straighten him out' on this subject.

*I remember Bidault'3 condition on that day very veil myself 5\hd I am sure tl.at It Is the coriiplete explanation for bis otherviso Incouvprehenslble misunderstanding.

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,1 hops to "be able to show statement to Schumann tomorrow. I vill empmsizQ to him that this is helng done merely as a courtesy. . . . ...

In vlev of tense parliamentary situation here^ T thoroiv^ily agree vith Parodl and Margerle that publication of statement should be postponed until after EX debate-.

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF 'YT- ^ r^ — ^ — ^=, Washington 25. B.C. (Of" ,\H 'M^' \

11 August 195^^

MEMORAITOUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Review of U<S. Policy in the

Far East - NSC 5^29

1. The Joint Cbiefs of Staff suhmit herewith their views with respect to a draft statement of policy prepared by the National Security Council Planning Board titled "Review of U.S. Policy in the Far East" (NSC 5^29)^ which is scheduled for consideration by the National Security Council at its meeting on 12 August 195^.

2- In their memorandim for you dated 9 April 195^+j subject "U,S, Strategy for Developing a Position of Military Strength in the Far East (l^SC Action No. 1029-b)"^ the Joint Chiefs of Staff recomniended that- the United States formulate a comprehensive policy in which the Par East Is viewed as a strategic entity and which would provide definitive direction for the development of a position of military strength in the Far East. NSC 5^1-29 lacks a statement of United States objectives with respect to the area as a whole and broad courses of action for the achievement of such objectives^ and hence does not constitute a comprehensive statement of policy as envisaged by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

3. Accordinglyj the Joint Chiefs of Staff recantuend that NSC 5^29 be returned to the Planning Boai^d with appropriate guidance for derivation and exposition of U.S, objectives in the Far East and delineation of broad courses of action directed toward their attainment.

if. Specific cacnments of the Chief of Naval Operations, the Chief of Staffs U, S* Air Force and the CoiiLmandant of the Marine Corps on the material included In NSC 5^29 follow:

"a. We concur in the view of the Defense ^ JCS, and OIM Members of the Planning Board^ contained in the footnote on page 3 of the drafts that U.S. policy with regard to China should be considered and determined firsts and that the policy with regard to the peripheral areas should be established in light of this determination.

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L / We recommend J therefore^ that -when KSC 5^29 is prepared ^ i in final form. Section IV, COMMUNIST CHINA, \>e brought

forward and redesignated Section I. However, for convenient reference, we have addressed our coimnents to the sections of the paper in their present order.

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I "b. The following detailed comments are addressed

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action set forth in the draft statement of policy, as we3JL as to' amendnients and additions which are deemed desirable- (Changes are indicated in the usual manner.)

"(l) Page 3, subparagraph 1 c and page ^1-, para-graph ^* No preference Is expressed with respect to including or omitting the bracketed phraseology,

"(2) Page ^j subparagraph 7 a. Alternative A is favored.

REASON: It is considered that the treaty

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should provide for the prompt and positive application of retaliatory measures against Com-munist China if it is determined that Communist China is a source of armed aggression, either direct or indirect- Any more limited provision would not constitute an adequate response to the aggression,

"( 3) Page 6, paragraph 8, Alternative B is considered preferable.

'*(^) Page 7^ subparagraph 9 ^* Amend to read as follows:

'f- Continue to exploit opportunities to further U.S.long-range objectives toward uniting Vietnam under a democratic form of government.'

*'(5) Page 7, subparagraph 9 g * Delete both alternatives.

R EA SON: In light of subparagraph 9 f;. a further j statement" on this subject is considered unnecessary.

''(6) Page 8, subparagraph 10 d. Stationing of token forces in or around Thailand is not favored* Accordingly it is recommended that Alternative B be rejected. Vhile th-ere is no objection to Alternative A, the necessity for its inclusion in a"statement of policy with respect to Thailand Is not apparent, since the visits of United States forces to friendly countries is a routine and well-established custom.

^^7) Pages 9 through 11, paragraphs 12, 13, 1^, and 13. Among the four statements of alternative courses of action with respect to Communist China adoption of Alternative C (paj'agraph 14), amended to read as follows, is favored:

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^l4, EedtLce the relative power of Communist China in Asia even at the risk of;, but vithout deliberately provokingj ^war:

'a. (l) React vith force^ if necessary and advantageous ^ to expansion and subversion recognizi-able as suchj supported and supplied by Communist China*

'(2) React, with immediate, pasitive, armed force against any belligerent move by Communist China.

'b. Increase efforts to develop the political, economic and military strength of non-Coramunist Asian countries, including the progressive development of the military strength of Japan, to the point where she can provide for her own national defense andJ in time, contribute to the collective defense of the Far East.

'£j d, and ^, Same as 13 £j dj and e^. '

REASONS; (l) Alternatives A and B would provide that the United States resort to armed action only in the event that Communist China itself committed armed aggression. Such a policy would be inadequate to cope with indirect aggression which experience indicates will be the most probable form of Chinese Communist aggression in the general area of Southeast Asia in the near future. It should be the objective of United States policy to block the further expansion of Communist China regardless pf the methods by which such expansion is attempted.

(2) The proposed policy contained in Alternative D is considered to be extreme. It could hardly be expected that such a policy would receive the support of our major Allies. If adopted, it would require that the United States, in common prudence^ now embark upon a major expansion of military forces, and take such other steps as are necessary to place ^he United States in a position to conduct large-scale military actions In the Far East. In short, the proposed policy is considered to be provocative and one which inherently would greatly increase the risk of general war.

(3) The objective set forth in Alternative C, as amended above, is consistent with previously expressed views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff- It states a definite goal and provides for a positive approach to the problem of reducing

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the threat or further Chinese Communist expansion in Asia-It would provide the basis for action against indirect aggression which is lacking in both Alternatives A and B? while avoiding the more extreme measures ^ with their greatly enlianced .risks, contained in Alternative D- Within the content of broader policies with respect to the worldwide threat of Soviet Communisnij the steady and consistent application of the courses of action set forth in this alternative hold promise of achieving results advantageous to the security position of the Free World*"

' 5. The comments of the Chief of Staff, U-S, Arn^ on NSC 5^29 follow:

"a. FSC 5^29 addresses itself specifically to oiily the most fundamental aspects of the problem in the Far East, nam.ely: the off-shore island chainj general political and economic measures in the Far East; negotiation of a Southeast Asia security treaty; action in the event of local subversion; policy with respect to Indochina, Thailand, Indonesia and Communist China, It is not a comprehensive review of the entire problem*

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"b- Moreover, the problem confronting us in the Far East cannot be stated, except in relation to and as an element in a United States foreign policy of global scope.

"c, While I do not suggest just what such global policy should be, it seems axiomatic to me that one principal OBJECTIVE therein should be to split Communist China fi-om the Soviet Bloc* Quite aside from the great moral issue involved in the deliberate precipitation of general war the converse of this thesis is equally applicable* From the purely military point of view we must not, by our own act, deliberately provoke war against the combined power of the Soviet Bloc and Communist China, since to do so

' would be to choose a war against the most potentially powerful enerr^ coalition with a strong probability of losing the active support of some of our present Allies*

. This situation would have the most dangerous possible military consequences. We may well find ourselves in such a war, but it should NOT be our choice without having FIRST, taken every feasible step to increase our readiness to meet an explosion into general war, and SECOND, having mapped out and begun an approach to the OBJECTIVE stated above-

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_» In cIcciGiT;;^ upon a couroo of acti'.oiij^ the first; and basic noccl^, rliich I thinl: i:SC 1G2/2 docs not moot:, is foi? ' a Gi;aucrac:nt^ in a cin^lo cIocu::ii^nt of a U.S« tov^l^^i policy on a sicbal baoiCj \vVc\-i the principal OBJiX-riV^S ll^itad, Acsiinilrir; th^t one of fclicDe v;ould ^o^ the one Etatcd in paragraph £ abw.^e^ it doea not follou that its attaii^r.cnt re- . quires tho dc£itructlon of the nllitai^ pov/ai* of CorjTjnlG'i: China. In fact^ I uould rc:;ard th^ dosGruGtion of Gueh rallitar^^ poT/ot* as inlinical to tho ^ov.z^voxiz"^ ir/ceroi:;t3 of tho U-S, It v:ould ronult in fcho crc^ation of a pov;er vacuu:ii into ?;hich but ono other nation could liiovoj namoli^ Soviet Rue

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rai-^fja conants dcrivo Tron fnlcr.dlincni; vilth America^, not -i?ltn tho LfSoIij irhlch castD Ecqulaitivo eyes cri its t-3Pri-toi-^v and" t^osouroos; thi

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THE JOINT CHftFS OF STAT-'F

^ WAStllNGTON 25, D. C*

12 Auguut iy5''J

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MEMOUAimun FOiv THE SKCUETruTf OF DEFKUSK

Subject: MesGaso to the French Priirie Minister

1, This rjemorandum is in reKponae to the memot^andum from the Assi^^tant Secretar-y of DeTonr-e (ISA)^ dated 11 August 195^J vniich requested the coTTiinentr> and recoinn\endactions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff vrith respect to a Department of State draft of a proponed raessai^e to the Prime Minister of France regarding United States policy to^^ard Indochina.

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2- In their memorandum to you dated 4 August 195^* subject: **U*S, Assumption of Training Responsibilities in Indochina's the Joint Chiefs of* Staff set forth certain conditions vrhich they considered, should be met before the United -Staterj assujiios responsibility for training the forces of the Associated-States. Particularly pertinent to the consideration of the proposed message are tvfo preconditions v/hichj In substance^ prescribed:

a. The existence of a reasonably strong^ stable government capable of performing those functins essential to tlie successful rai^iing and maintenance Its armed forces; and

of:

b. Tiie granting by France of full indepGndence to . the Associated Sl.ateo and arrangements for trie eventual phased v/ithdrat^-al of French forces^ officials and advisers from Indochina^ in order to provide motivation and a sound basis for the establishment of national armed force

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3, The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that neither of the above conditions can be said to exist nov/. The tenure of the present government in Vietnam appears to be in doubt and cvabject to final determination by the French as to the evf^nt-ual composition of that governmer.t Until tills matter has been definitely resolvt^dj tlie strength and stability of the Vietnam Govenment Kill hardly be crueli as to liold promise of providing the firm

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direction required fo'r tlie raiuj-nt; and nialnteiiance of ar^niod rovccn. UnJ/Ji^s a reasonably oUible govcrnnient is eGtabllt^iicd, the United States training laicf^ion i-roiad laclc authority and ^^ovcruinental support essential to tlie succeGGful accoinraiGhmont o£ its miction,

4, v/liile the Fruncli Govoi'nriiei^t hLiij announced its liitenticn to srant ind'-pendeuce to the Ast^ociatod States ^ It has not announced a plan for tfie sciiedulcd relinquisli-inent- or French authority or for the vrithdravral of FrencJi officials from Indochina o.ffairs. The residual responsi-tility and authority^ if any, to be retained by the French Go\ern=uent. particularly with respect to the control to

be exercised over the aimed forces of the Associated States has not yet been made clear. If, in fact, the French v^ere to retctin a degree of authority and direction in tlie or£;anization and training of the indigenous forces^ the United States training mlsoion v;ould be prevented from discharging its responsibilities' "completely independent of French participation and control.

5, The Joint Chiefs of Staff recognize that the proposed message is not an unqualified coirunltment to furnish military aid or to provide training assistance to the

suites. They are in "^accord v;ith tite stated the message J to reassure both the French a: States Govenunents of tiie United States in*^ assist in preventing an eventual Coimiunist

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Associated purpose of Associated tention to

take-over in Indociiina. Uovveverj the Joint Ch-iefs of Staff are of tlie opinion that the proposed message should state in clearer terms-that the final United States decision as to the extent''o'f military aid and the assumption of. responsibility for training vnMl be contingent upon tiie establishment of the prereq^uisite conditions discussed in paragraphs 2. 3^ and h above, As presently Vforded/ the proposed message might convey to the French that U,S* deci£^ioris wlt!^ respect to ti'iese matters have already been taker\. v;itiiout definite French ccnimitments as to their intentions. Fuj/thcrj the Joint Chiefs of Staff feel that the me l^ sage should be more specific v:ith regard to the United States desire th^tt its representative deal directly v/iuh the Govern-ments of the Associated State and that all United States military material aid should eventiially be given directly to the Associated States ■ ^ rather than through the French Governraent,

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rosponnlLilitieG by the Uiutcci Statc^G in Indociiino.j and that the Joint ChioT^ oT Staff be e^vcn an opportiuilfcy to revlevf the aniendecl nicr.Gaj^e. ,

For the Joint

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General, United Slites

Chief of Staff.

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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WASHINGTON

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Dear ViT* Secretary

m:A[} OF

FAR hA,Srf:RN AFFAIRS

Tha Chief of l-IAAG^ Indochina^ has rocoirmiendsd that the jUniied States a^ssiTTie ref^ponsibility xor the training of the Victnanie^'G Anry* As you Imo-r^ representatives of the Goveriiiiionts of ol\ tliree Associated ' States hav3j in their contacts lath United States officials iji Indochina^ aslced for United States assistance iti traioirig the indigenoiis forces of those States©

The" Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered this quetstion ond have recommended that^ before the United States imdertaJkes the training of forces of any of the Associated States^ certain precondit5_ons essential to the success of such ^.n effort b3 not« As stated by the Joint Chiefs . of Staff5 those preconditions includes

>^Prom the nilitaxy point of vieu it is absolutely essential that there be" a reasona^bly strong^ stable civil goveiiment isi controls It' is hopeless to e::p3ct a UeS* milit^^ry training ra-ssion to achieve .

success unless the nation concerned is able effectively to perform those govonimsntal fxmctions essential to the successful raising and . ' Eiaintenance of arined forces^ to include the provision of adequate faci3.itieSj drafting'and procosning of personnel^ pay of troopsj etc<r Unless the foregoing condi-tions prevail^ a UoS^ train±ag nission t7ou!!.d lack the authority and govermriental support essential to the successful accoTTiolishiient of its ri!iss5_ono

*^Thb government of each of the Associated States concerned should fomalDy request that the United States r^svims rosponsibi3-5,ty for . training their forces and pro-^^^Lding the riilitt?ry equipment^ financial ■ assistcxice^ and political advice neccssoj^y to ^jnsiure internal stability<>

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^'Arrangemonta should be riade vjith the Fi^ench granting full independence to the Associated States ajid providing for the phased^ orderly iriLthdravral of French forces^ French officials^ and French adv^-sors from Indoch'^na in order to pro^/id^ notivation rjid a eoi''nd basis for the establishinent of nation.'^l aiv.cd forces o Tho United States from the boginning should insist-"^ on dealing directly tilth the governments of ths respective Associated States^ conipletcly independent, of French participation or control,,

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"The sise oJid copiposition of the forces of each of the Associated States shoiiLd b3 dictated b^ the local rrdlit^JTy requirements end the over-a3JL U*S, interests a"

I £un in general agreement with the vieifs of th3 Joint Chiefs of ^ StaJ'f vliich I'cpresent the current DepartTr.ent of Defense position on this subject*

A point tidditional to those made by tho Joip.t Cl^iefs of Staff is that international interpretation of the ceass-fire. agreement may in any event impose limitations on the extent of military training^ as Vi-sll as end"item assistanco, that could be undertalceii by ths United States in Indochina«

Sincerely yoiirs^

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WASl-IINGTON 25, D. C, .

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<3ated 2? July 193^ and P August 195^ "South-3&i5t Asian Collc^ctive DefensQ

1* In response to your me*n:j rand urn dated 22 July l^'f^*-^* subject as above, the Joint Chiefs of Staff submit hen;V/lth their vi^:v/r>, in tbe licnt of the ney situation created by the- recent developments In Indochina J concerr^inc the proposed nc-go elation of a recional collective security treaty for the Far Kast. In addition to the report of the Joint UK-US Study Group on Southeast Asia and the Draft Treaty submitted by the U.S- member of the Study Group J consideration has been given to the docu!rients fur--nished by memorandums by the Assistant S^^crctary of Defense (ISA)

J both on tlie subject; .._^^« i.^.^^., ^^^^j.^o y^ vp- i^cx'^;ei^c. Organization." -

2. Reference Is nade to the previously expressed views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with respect to the Far East reclonj as set forth in their memorandum for you dated 9 April 195''tj subject: "United States Soratefry for Developing; a Position of Military Stronsth in the Far Kast '(MSG Action Ho, 1029-b).*' In that memorandumJ the Joint Chiefs of Staff stressed the need for a comprehensive policy for the Far Kast v;hich v7ould view that region as a strategic entity rjnd v:hich v/ould provide definitive diT"^ectlon for the develonr;tent of a position of military stren^"^;th in that region, Co<;':nizauce vras taken of the fact thatj in their ajssve?:atej current policies addressed to Individual countries or segments of the j^eneral are^. make It-clear Uhat Uie United States^-from tlie standpoint of its security . interests j attaches major imnortai^ce to th'^^ \^3.v East a.rea and v^ouId be prepared to react v/ith military force a.calnst an at^mcd aj^^^jress ton by the USSK or ■

Communist China in that-rej;5iori.

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3* The Joint Chiefs of StafT expressed the opinion that our Far Kastern no 1 icy should be directed tov;a\'d achiuvltK the follov;inf; objectives:

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of the pui^poGu arid c-'Lpnhll Lty of tho non o i." I f V. ■' j.^' a V ; v''. fi {; uo ?, c t c o 1 J. e c >. i vol:/ an cl

Drrecclvely in or;;a:j;nr; thts- LiireaL oC af^ijrcsslve Coi;^auni;3!n.

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"b. Eventual Oot:ablii?hniiiil: of a compuehcnGivo x^cj^Ional Becu"rit;v ri^n-angemcnt amonjj the non-CanimLnilB S; countries of the Fai- East, vrlth v/hlch the United States^ the United .Klnisdom, and possibly Francn, v:ould be associated.

"c, Keduction oC the pov/er and influence of the USSR in the -. ^ 'Far nasi'^. Initially through the cont?inr,ient and reduction of the relative power position of Con^munlst Chinaj and ultimately the decacliinent of China from the area of Soviet Communist con-brol."

i|. In proposing courses of action foi" the accomplishment of these objectives J the Joint Chiefs of Staff recoiTiraended that the United States (a) be prepared to prevent further territorial expansion by the Chinese Copununists^ (b) retain freedom of action to apply countei^ac tlon, as appropriate j agains t the source of .any ag^t'^essionj and (c) foster a system of treaties v/hich Vfould lead eventually to a comprehensive and cohesive security arrange-mezit in the Far East area/

5. At the time these viov,^3 v:ere expressed, France vras ma.ln-taininc a position of considerable military strength in Indo-chinaJ and the Associated States vrere counted among those coui^.tries v;hich could make'a substPntial contribution to the aggregate of non-Co?:munist military strength in the general area. As the result of the Geneva agreement^ the military position of Fraaice aiid the Associated States is considerably altered,' There jb some evidence that France intends to v/lLh-dravr the bullc of her ground forces from Indochinaj leavingr behind only a token force to conduct training of the armies of the Af^sociatcd States, It is novr \jnlikely that the prt « viously anticipated military potent!a], of the Associated , tates can be realized*^ Additionally, the Com[nun_ists iiave nov^ gained a psychological and military victory of far-reaching effect^ have substantially augmented their manpov/erj have acquire ' important nev; food .resources, arud have expanded the territcy under their militar:; control, ' Tliese altered conditions do" not change the basic objectives v/hich our security interests require that \;o seeV: in the Far L':astj but they do hevo a considerable Influence upon the measuiH^s required for the achievement of tiiose objectives.

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G, The Joint CUi-jfG oT StaTf ar^ ol Ihe opinioTi that uhe rec^^nt dovelormeij!:?; Irj O'-ueva and Indochinaj coiinidered in

V;esl:crn i^IoCj f;erv-r to iircrer'.ES'-^ t;he uri5t;u,cy of tiic nood rov p: coiw'-^vohunslvc Urit.:d 3-:^;:^.^^ polloy v/itlr ronnoot to tlv- l^ar Kas": ro':;iou ns t v:^'OlOj in oi-Ooi* to rive dlr_e'-/L:lonj cohcj^jivo-iiessj and c^rcater efroctivcness to the pollfclcol and pAlitaT7 actions which mr.z[\ movj be taken to prevent tiie loss of tlie re-ma incltir or So lj theas ■:- Asj.^^ to Coiumiinis i: con.tro 1. It is con-siderv?d that until Uic United States fon:iulnfce3 and adopts such an over-all policy* v/e shall be saverel;/ handicapped in / Bi\y ne20tiafcici:s Toi^ the ePtablic>hm-rj:nt of a collective defense .in*'the^gen(£;r?l"ar3a of Soi^thcast Asia and the Southvmsfc pacific. Before tlie prcvisior.s of an acceptable securLt,v treaty can be finall\' Grafted, it v;ould anuear necoszriry that certain basic decisions be made with respect to hov7 far the Uiiited States is v/llllntT; to gOj In concert viith all or certain of the non-ConKuunist natlona having interests ivv the Far East or, if neces--sary, unllateially^ in oppocinp; farther CoiiiiauniDt accretions in the a.rea under cone id oration,

7. Similai^ly. ba^ric decisions v:ould annear to be i^eouisite to the adoption of ini;eri:n courses of action, dt^si^jned to check the momentuni created by recent Cormnunist suoccsscr-j and to provide foi^ coordinated action eendinr; the formalization of a collective ' security ai^rangenient for the Far Ear;.t region.

8. Vievrln^'the iramediate problein of treaty negotiations vrithin this context, th.e Joint Chiefs of Staff recoLa^ize that the Tjuited States ivas publicly coin:ai'tted to the sponsorIny and support of

a collective securi^^; e^rranger^ent for Southeast Asia even before the collapse cf the French effoi-^t in Indochina, but they have serious ml3 3ivinr;s co:\ceinii.n;: the military provlsio'ns of such a pact lest t]>ey Imply comriiit'neiits vrhich the UAiited States v/ould not be able to inee':. Failure to 5^atiofy ti>e expectations cf the

signatories in

the

er of milltai"'y aid could, in turrij result

in the alien _^t ion of friendly ^overnnients rather than the acquisition of nevr allies;

9- S'JbJect to th^; conimente^ set fortii belov;, some of ^'/hlch are made oy v;ay of ernph'?siG of eoints in the reports of the UK-U3 Study Gronpj the Jo-nt Cliiefs of otaff nre in [r.encral agreejueut vfith the position taken by the United 3t:\tes side of tl\e Group. The real evaluation of the product of the Study Group vrill, of course, dep^;nd upon the manner in vjhich t^te differ^aices in the United States and United Klr.jjdom positioiis are resolved.

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10, It is the judgment of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that a Southeast Asia defense treaty should incorporate provisions responsive to the following considerations having military aspects r ' ^

a

a. The clear purpose of the treaty should be to form a collective security arrangement to deter andj if possible^ prevent any further extension of Communist control^ by whatever means^ within the general area of Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific,

'b* The initial membership should be limited to those nations willing to join in the type of organization which can be effective in accomplishing the purpose set forth in a above-

c- The treaty should provide for the future accession of other powers having interests in the Far East which may subsequently desire to join- (it is considered that the pact should ultimately include Japan^ Korea^ and possibly nationalist China.)

d* There sho-old be no built-in power of veto. The treaty provisions should permit concerted action by a lesser number than the total of the signatory nations in the event that the political or territorial integrity of any signatory is threatened by Communist aggression in any foi^-

e* Careful consideration should be given to the practicability and desirability of providing voting machinery in the governing council which would preclude the possibility that^ at some tinie in the future when the membership is expanded^ a bloc of "neutrals" or a British Commonwealth bloc could exercise a controlling voice.

t* The treaty should establish the moral justification and provide the political framework and necessary machinery within which and by which any act of overt Communist aggression could be met by prompt military counteraction^ not excluding military action against the real source of the aggression.

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£., Pnraisraph 2, Article III^ ol" the briift Security Treaty '1-6 addrc::r;cd to indirec*; b/^i^rer^^^louy the racst lilcely aiid insidAorio Tomi^ oj7 Cai;uiiiui.!.:iU a/^firenrlon. Tiie treaty Bhciild GoeciiMcolly nrovldu -tr-ak ai\y Tui^ther c^:ten3icn oT Cc;:v.rvi i i^^t contvo 1 thv-ouj^h it^iM 11x\:itlo11 o?-^ Bubversior.j or through cny obhor indirect moan^j jihould

as in bhe cose of ovt^rb ^;:x2reGsio appropriate cotujteraction,

be

et by prompt and

h. It sliould be ma^dc clear in the prelii:ilnary nei_,o);iabicny and in the provi:;ionr> of the treaty itself that no conimitiiU^nt by the United States to support the raisjngj eoiulprcj'.^;^ eaid tiialntenance o£ lndi£enou.^ forces and/or to deploy IJni-jed States forces in Guch strent^thc as to provide for tai effective defense of all of the national territorj^ of cncli sl£;natory ±3 implied or intended. Military a5.d by the United Stated to the Southeast AGlan countr^ieG v/ho are riieniberG of the pact should be limited to that neceGsary to permit the countx^ies coiicerned to ralsCj equips and mavintain military forces aa necesr^ary to insure internal sta-bility^ to contribute tovmrd o treasonably effective \ oppc.sition to any attempted invaaion, and to in£:tlll national ccnfideiice* '

i^. It yliould be made equally clear that tlie treaty

would net co^runit tlio United States to a larr^e-^scale

procrc-Jii of cconotaic aid to the .sif^natory countries in ^

lieu of military aid'Gijice^ in the final anaJys^s, fimd^

for Gconoiric aid muGt come from the total c*;iiount of money

available for the national Liecurifcy proerajns of the United

Stcitea, '

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11. The Joint Chl.?fs of Staff^ concur in the vievi that^ ' ,having in mind the length of time required j^or a treaty to be negotiated and ra-tiCied^ Mh interim statement of lm:crt to conclude' a treaty estabrij^hint^ a colleGtive security arran-;i;ei:ient in ^tho Kar Jiiaat siiould be Issued jointly by those covjitricG vrhich intend tD .become founder members of such a treaty. The draft statement of Intent fur-nlGhed to the i '^Int Chiefs: ot Staff for coirjivHnt by the raomorandvjn by the Ass..,f5tant Scoreta.ry of DefenGc (ISA) dated 2 AUL;i'.Gt 191>^:j 1-* coiisideredi to be sati^^if ^ otory Cror:i the sallitary point of viev;. It is su;^,^,eGtcdj hov/over^ that it v;ould bo niaidont to wit}ihold any formal doclar'ation of Int-rijt until GubGtant;lal a^rccirerit has been r^^ached vrlth the United ICin^jdoii; as to the px^incipal provisions of a treaty.

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12. The Joint Chiefs of Staff concur in the opinion that the security treaty itself should he drafted by a working group representing all of the probable initial signatories* Subject to the comments contained hereinbefore^ the informal and unofficial first United States draft, furnished by your memorandum for the Joint 'Chiefs of Staff dated 22 July 195^, is considered to be satisfactory as a point of departure- However^ several of the technical points raised by the United K ngdom side of the Study Group appear to merit favorable consideration.

13- It would appear desirable to keep the Japanese Government advised as to the progress of treaty negotiations,

lU. It is recommended that the foregoing views be given due consideration in the fon:iiulation of the Department of Defense position in connection with further negotiations concerning a collective security organization for the general area of Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific.

15. It is requested that the Joint Chiefs of Staff be afforded additional opportunities^ as appropriate h, to submit comments concerning the draft treaty in the course of its development.

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For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

hi

M. B. RIDGVJAY, General, United States Army, Chief of Staff.

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frv-i'l M.i Hi-Mi /

Aug 17 195^

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Dear Mr. Secretary:

I refer to the Draft Southeast Asia Collective Security Treaty^ copies of vhich were made available to the Departiriont of Defense by the Department of State. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have expressed their vieirs on the draft submitted by the United States member of the Joint . US-UK Study Group on Indochina, The conmients of the Department of ^Defense are made in light of the vievs of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and in consideration of a revised version of the draft Treaty contained in SFAP U-2/lj dated 5 August 195^^.

The Department of Defense considers that the revised draft Treaty is generally satisfactory subject to the following comments:

" . a. In order to strengthen provisions of the Treaty vrhich pennit protection to be extended to countries of the area not participating in the Treaty^ the word ''general" before "area of Southeast Asia and the Southirest Pacific" should be added in paragraph fourof the preamble as well as in paragraph one of Article IV*

b. The Department of Defense believes that in further nego-tiationSj both preliminary and at the time of the meeting of the Ministers J it should be made clear that no commitments by the United States to support the raising^ equipping^ and maintenance of indi-^ genous forces and/or to deploy United.States forces in such strengths as to provide for an effective defense of elLI of the national territory of each signatory is Implied or intended. Military aid by the United States to the Southeast Asian countries who are members of the pact would be limited to that necessary to permit the countries . concerned to ralse^ equipj and maintain military forces as necessary to insure internal stability^ to provide a reasonably effective opposition to any attempted invasions^ and to instill national confidence. Tills is consistent vlth the views expressed at our meeting on 2^ July 195^j ^^^ 1^ your message IIo. 5S9 to London dated 29 July 195^•

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c- It^ should equally be made clear that the treaty vould not commit the United States to a large-scale prograrn of economic aid to the signatoiy countries in lieu of militaiy aid sincej in "he final analysis, funds for economic aid must come from the totdl amount of money available for the national security programs of the United States.

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d. It is the vieir of the DepEa^tment ot Defense that if the Treaty is ultimately to result in the development of effective collective strength to halt further Communist control in the general' area of Southeast Asia and the Southvrast Pacific^ those nations in the area V7"liich are potentially capable of making a substantial military contribution, i.e*, Japan, Korea, and possibly Ifational.ist Cliinaj should eventually be penialtted to subscribe to the Treaty if they so desire- Accordingly, this point should be made clear to the other signatories in the negotiations leading to the signing of the Treaty*

The Department of Defense considers that it would be premature and tuadesirable to ..discuss,- either at the meeting of 14inisters or before, the formation of an organization associating the military representatives of ' the participating nations. The Council and the political machinery of the Treaty should be established first* This could be folloi.^d by the creation of military machinery necessary to maJ:e the Treaty effective,. In the viev of this Department such military coordination should be similar to the AIIZUS arrangements.

It is recognized that it is not feasible to include in the Treaty itself details relating to implementation of the provisions by the Parties, Hovever, the Department of Defense strongly urges that in the formulation of implementing procedures by the Council, the United States take a posi-tion in support of permitting concerted action by a lesser number tha^a the total of the signatory nations in the event that the political or territorial integrity of any signatory is threatened by Communist aggression in £iny form. In addition, careful consideration should be given to -the practicability and desirability of providing voting machineiy in the Council vMch vould preclude-the possibility that^ at some time in the future when the membership is expanded, a bloc of "neutrals" or a British Commomreslth bloc could exercise a controlling voice.

The Joint CMefs of Staff have expressed the opinion, ^ri.th vliich I fully concur, that the recent developments in Geneva and Indochina, considered in conjunction \*Tlth the general retrograde trend within the Western Bloc, serve to increase the urgency of the need for a compro-hensive United States policy -^fith respect to the Far East region as a vhole. This is necessary in order to give direction, cohesiveness, and greater effectiveness to the political and military actions which must now be tal^en to prevent the loss of the remainder of Southeast Asia to Comjiiunist control- It is considered that until the United States formulates and adopts such an over-all policy we shall be severely handicapped in any negotiations for the establishment of a collective ■

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defense in the general area of Southeast Asia and the Southv/est Pacific« It vould aj^pear necessary that certaia basic decisions be made \Tlth respect to hoT^ far the United States is VTilling to go in concert with all or certain of the non-Coim3iunist nations having interests in the Far East or^ if necessaryj unilaterallyj in opposing further Conmiunist accretions in the area under consideration,

; _ ' .^ Sincerely yours ^

Signed/C.E, Wilson

The Honorable

The Secretary of State

cc; Sec/state JCS

0M4 (l/Co1 Alden)

Anny CS (l/Co1 Queenin)

Mr. Sullivan

Cys 1&2

Advance cys; ^-

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JCS

Mr. Sullivan

DMA (LColAlden)

Amy GS LColQuecnin

OSD files

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SECRET

Dear Mr. Secretary: :

I have received your letter of August 12^ 195^? setting forth the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on requests from the Govern-* ments of the Associated States of Indochina for United States assistance in training the indigenous forces of these states- The Joint Chiefs of Staff established four preconditions for United States participation in such a training program and you add the further consideration that an international interpretation of the cease-fire agreement may in any event impose limitations on the extent of military training^ as well as end item assistance, that could be undertaken by the United States in Indochina.

The first precondition of the Joint Chiefs is that there be a reasonably strong, stable civil government in control of the Indo-Chinese states requesting United States assistance. This condition applies to the Governjnent of Cambodia which is strong, stable and enjoys the whole-hearted loyalty of the population. A similar situation likewise exists in Laos but there, because of the restrictive terms of the cease-fire agreement and likewise because the Laotian Government has never made a request for U.S. training assistanceJ the problem does not arise- In the case of Free Viet Nam^ the civil government, which has been under the presidency of Mr, Ngo Dinh Diem for only slightly more than a month, is far from strong or stable* However^ we are currently perfecting measures which may assist that Government rapidly to increase the effectiveness of its administration* I should like to point out that one of the most efficient means of enabling the Vietnamese Government to become strong is to assist it in reorganizing the National Army and in training that army* Hhis iSj of course, the familar hen^and-egg argum^ent as to which comes first but I would respectfully submit that the U.S. Gf uld profitably undertake two courses of action in Free

Viet Nam:

The Honorable

Charles E- Wilson,

Secretary of Defense.

SECRET

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Viet Nam: one> to strengthen the government by means of a political I and economic nature and the others to bolster that government by

' strengthening the army which supports it*

i

I The second precondition established "by the Joint Chiefs is that

I the Governments of the Associated States should formally retjuest that

' the U*S- assume responsibility for training their forces and providing

military equipment. As indicated above the Government of Laos has

made no such request and does not contemplate one. However, the

Government of Viet Nam^ in a letter from Prime Minister Prince Buu Loo

to the American Charge d'Affaires dated June 28, 195^5 did request

that MAAq Saigon participate in troop training and requested U^S-

assistance in providing adequate armament and in financing a proposed

expanded troup base- In the case of Cambodiaj the Cambodian Minister

of National Defense, General ffiiek Tioulong in a letter dated May 20,

195^> addressed to General John W* O'Donnel, Chief of MAAG Saigon,

stated that the Royal Khmer Government was anxious to complete plans

to set up in the minimum of time three divisions according to the

methods of accelerated instruction used in Korea^ on condition that

the U*S, Government assured the Cambodian Government of indispensable

financial and materiel support*

The third precondition of the Joint Chiefs calls for arrangements with the French guaranteeing full independence to the Associated States and providing for the' phased withdrawal of French forces, French officials,, and French advisors from Indochina in order to provide motivation and a sound basis for the establishment of National armed forces.

t

The case of Laos may he ^set aside since Laos has not requested U.S* assistance and imder the terms of its military agreement with France is required to look to France for aid in training and other purposes. Furthermore^ under the terms of the cease-fire agreement ' Laos is estopped from introducing foreign military personnel other than "a specified numiber of French military personnel required for the training of the Laotian National Army-"

In the case of Cambodia, de facto full independence already exists. Likewise during 1953 and early 195^ command of the Royal : Khmer Army was^'handed over to th4 King of Casihodia and French forces have been entirely withdrawn from Cambodian soil. There is a minir^im of French advisors still attached to the Royal Khmer Army*

In the case of Viet Naia, practically the entire French Expenditionary Corps still remains in that country- It would be militarily disastrous to demand the withdrawal of French forces from Free Viet Nam before the

creation

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' creation of a new K"ational Array• Howeverj as seen from this Department^ there would seem to be no insuperable objection to the U.S* undertaking a training program for the Vietnamese National Army while at the same time the French forces commence a gradual phasing out from that theater.

{ As for the point you raised regarding the limitations of the

f Geneva settlement^ in the view of this Department there is a limitation on the degree to which the Vietnamese armed forces can be increased-HoweverJ in my opinionj there is no provision of the cease-fire agreement regarding Viet Nam which would prevent the existing MAAG Saigon from undertaking a training mission or which would impede MAAG Saigon from rotating existing personnel to bring in number for number new personnel especially versed in military training.

In the case of Cambodia there is no obstacle whatever to the setting up of a U.S- training mission- The cease-fire agreement affecting Cambodia provides in Chapter III Article 7 that the Royal Government of Cambodia will not solicit foreign aid in war materiel^ personnel or instructors except f or the purpose of effective defense of the terri tory. This latter clause makes it entirely possible for the Cambodian Government to request a foreign training mission and for the U,S*, if it so desires^ to provide such a mission. In the opinion of this Department J it would be most helpful to the furtherance of our national policy in Indochina if the U.S, should reply affirmatively to the letter of the Defense Minister cited abovej and it is recommended that the Joint Chiefs give their consent to the establishment of a MAAG/Phnom Penh which would provide both training and logistical -^ assistance to the Royal Kbm_er Army. The Department of State likevrise feels that sympathetic consideration should be given to the establishment of a training mission'irr MAAG Saigon to assist in the development of an effective Vietnamese National Army*

Sincerely yours^ John Foster Dulles

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STATE-IENT OF POLICY by the KATTOHAL SECURITY OOWJZTL

on

REVIEVJ OF U.S. POLICY Hi THE FAR

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PHgFACE CorLsecuencGS of the Gens^'a Conference

Coinmun5,st successes in Indochina, cuLnlnating in the

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agreement reached at the Geneva Conference, have produced the follov;i-^g significant consequences vfhich jeopardize the security interests of the Ui^S, in the Far East and increase Conimimist strength there:

a. Regardless of the fate of South Vietn^jiij Laos and Caral:5odiaj the Corni'iunists have secured possession of an advance salient in Vietnara froni v;hich military an.d : non-military pressures can be r^ounted against adjacent and Fiore remote non-ComrrJunist areas* '

c. By adopting an appearance of moderation at Geneva and taking credit for the cessation of hostilities in li^dochina, the Communists vill be in a better position to exploit their political strategy of imputing to the United Sgrates motives of extremismj belligerency^ and opposition to co-existence seeking thereby to alienate the U,S* from its allies. The Comraunists thus have a basis for sharply accentuating their /^peace Propaganda'' and '^peaco progra^m'^ in Asia in an attempt to allay fears of ConLm^Jnist expansionist policy and to establish closer relations v/ith the nations of free Asia,

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d* The Coimuunists have incx^eased their military and

political prestige In Asia and their capacity for expanding

Coni::mnist iiiiluence by exploiting political and econoriiic

weakness and instability in the coiuitries of free. Asia \^athout

rdsort to ariiied attack, - .,

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\ e^ The loss of Southeast Asia would imperil retention of' Japan as-a key element in the off-shore island ch^dn.

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COimSES OF ACTION

I. COivil'RJNIST CHINA*

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' 1« I\educe the pov/er of ConiLumist China in Asia even at th^ risk of. but without deliberately provoliingj v/ar;

a. (1) Ileact with force/if necessary and ad^^anta-geousj to expansion and subversion recog^iizable as

. suchJ supported and supplied by Communist China.

* ■

. (2) React v;ith imraediatej positj.ve, armed force against any belligerent move by Conimvmist China,

b. Increase efforts to. develop th^e political^ economic and military strength of non-Communist Asian countriesJ inc3.uding the progressive development of the military strength of Japaj'i to the point vhere she can provide for her ov/n national defense a^nd^ in tii.rie^

' ^ contribute to,the collective defense of the Far East.

'" - c^. Maintain political and economic pressures

against Conimunist China, including the existing embargo and support for Chinese Nationalist harassing actions,

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d. Support the Chinese Ilational Government on Form.osa as the Gqvernr.^ent of China and the representative of China in all lil'I agencies,

e^. Create internal division in the Chinese ComrfiUivist regime and impair Sino-Soxaet relations by all feasible overt and covert means.

*.'

ft

^ Section I is to be considered as a basis for'Turther consideration in the light of a review by the Secretary of State and report to the Council within approximately

one month.

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II. THE OFF-SHORE ISI.^.ITD CHAIN

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2, The United States must maintain the security and increase the strength oT the Pacific off-shore island chain (Japan^ Ryiikyus, Fornio sa j Phili ppine s ^ - Austra?.ia and Nov: Zealand) as cin ele:?.ent essential to U^ S, security. To this end:

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. a^ Initiate and support appropriate measures vrhich will contribute to strengthening the economy of Japan^ its internal political stability and its ties v-ith the free world.

* •. - II

• a.

¥ a ■ PHI

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' t. Increase the military strength of Japan and the Philippines= improve the effectiveness of existing military strength of the Republic of Korea and of Formosa J and continue participation in MZUS,

c. Provide rela.ted economic assistance to the local governments in those cases vhcre the agreed lovel of indigenous military strength is beyond the capacity of the local econciny to support,

d. Encourage the conditions which will make possible the formation of ^ and be prepared to partici--pate in J a V/e stern Pacific collective defense arrange---mentj including the Philippines, Japan^ the Republic of China5 ajid the Republic of Koreaj eventually linked v/ith tlie Southeast Asia security structure arid Ai\'ZIjS.

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_e Intensify covert and strengthen the orientation of the free world. ' ■

psychological actions to these countries toward

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III.

GBLE|yi^POLITJ(^LL_ANp ECQUOl-^IC kEASufiE

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THE FAR EAST*

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3* Encourage the prompt organization of bjx economic ^grouping by the raay.ir^.ura number of free-Asian statesj including \Japan and as nia^ny of the Coloribo Povj-ers as possible, based bn self-help and mutual a.idj and the participation and support '.(including substantial financial assist?Jice3 of the U* 5, and other appropriate V/estern countries through vaiich^ by united actionJ these free Asian states will be enabled more effectj-Vely to achieve the economic and social strength needed to iiiaintain their independence*

* ■ ■ * • . ., , , . .- ,

H, Take all feasible raeasures to increase the opportunities of free Asian countries for trade vdth each other and v/ith other free world countries*

*.

5. Provide teclmical assistajice to help develop political stability and eccnoniic health, ' -

6, Develop and make more effective information^ cultural education and exchai^ge programs for the countries concerned. '

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* See also Iirdiex B to- NSC 5'-r29

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IV. SQUTHEAsy ASIA

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7* CT0nera_l, The U. S- must protect its position and restore its prestige in the Far East by a nev initiative in So'iVchoast Asia^ vhere the situation must be stabilized as socin as possible to prevent further losses to Commurdsm thi^ough Cl) creeping expansion and subversicnj or (2) evert agression.

.a. Coimnit each member to treat an arraed attack on the agreed area (including Laos^ Cambodia and South Vietnaiii) as dangerous to its ovn peace^ safety and vital interests 3 and to act prorr.ptly to meet the coriiRon danger in accordance with its ovrn constitutional processes,

b. Provide so far as possible a legal basis to the " ' e

the Mv.^^-^^ States.

event 5 other nations

c. Ensure that^ in such vould be obligated' in accci^dance with the treaty to supijort such U- S* action.

d, Kot limit U. S, freedom to use nuclear weapons, involve a U, S- commitment for local defense or for

or

stationing U* S- forces in Southeast Asia*

The U. S- would continue to pro'/ide limited military assistance and training missions^ vrherever possible, to the states of Southeast Asia in order £o bolster their will to fight^

to stabilize legal governmentsp and to assist them in controlling subversion.

9.

requeste

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Action, in the^ E vent _ of L oca l Sub v e rsion * d by a legitir:iate local government vrhich

If requires

covert and overt support within Executive Pr^nch authority, the President should at once consider requesting Congressional ' authority to take e.ppropriate action, which might if necessary

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and feasib3.e include the use of XJ, S- military forces either locally or against the external soiurce of such subversion or rebellion (including Coniinunist China if determined to be the source).

10. Indochina ; Political and - Covert Ac tion.

a^ Make'every possible effort ^ not openly incon--■ sistent v;ith the U, S. position as to the armistice agreeraonts, to defeat Corrjuunist subversion and influence j to maintain and support friendly non-Coroir.unist govern- ^ ments in Cambodia and Laos 5 to maintain a friendly non-Cciranuiiist Soutli Vietnamj and to prevent a Com2nunist victory through alD.-'Viotnam elections.

' b. Urge \^ deal \/ith Cambodia sovereign nations*

the French pror:ptly recognize and Laos and free Vietnam as independent

*,*

c. Strengthen U, S. representation and deal direc^tlyj vherever a.dva.nta<soous to the U. S-5 vdth the goverraiients of Carabodia- Laos and free Vietnairu

d. V/orking through the French only insofar as necessary^ assist Carnbodia^-Laos and free Yietr^im to iriaintain (1) military forces necessary for internal security and (2) economic conditions conducive to the ' maintenance and strength of noii-Conununist regiiiies and comparing favorably with those in adjacent ConuaiUiist areas, ^ / ■ . ^

g^. Aid emigration from North Vietnam and resettlement of peoples imvjilling to remain under CorrL^iiuiist rule«

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f. Ex:ploit available means to make more difficuH control by the Viet Minh of North Vietnam.

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£. EKiploit available means to prevent North Vietnam Xrom becoming periiiaiiently incorporated in the Soviet bloc.^ using as feasible and desirable consular relations and non-strategic trade,

h. Conduct covert operations on a large and effective scale in support of the foregoing policies*

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11. Thai},ando

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'a. Provide rdlitary assistanoe sufficient to in--crea^e the strength of indigenous forcosj thereby helping to control local subversion^ and' to make easier clear identification of instances of overV agresGion*

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1 b._ Pj:ovide economic assistance conducive to the ■ maintenance and strength of a non-Con^mu^iist roginia,

c. Concentrate efforts on deveD.cping Thailand as a support of U, S« objectives in the area and as the ^ , " '\ focal^point of U, S. covert and psychological operations in Southeast Asia*

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12* IndonG^gJ^. Reaffiriii existing policy in NSC I7I/I3 subject to: ' "

a. In lieu of Daragra-Dh 19 substitute "Continue

- efforts to influence Indonesian govornmont officials to oppose. CoiniTiujiist infiltration and siiovorsion. ^^

' ' b. In lieu of paragraph 21 substitute '^Take ' appropriate actions to strengthen friendly relations betueen Indonesia and the United States."

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COUNTRY

Associated States

Burma

Forrao.na

Tr;donesia

■Japan

I/-

Koroa

Malaya

Al^_i

Phil ,1:1 pplnos

Thailand

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TOTALS

viT^

.X A

FAJLJAST Proposed Assistance Pro;r:raramocl for F Y 19 5^-' - - FY 195?

aii 11 ions or Doll ars)

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M 'J: L3:TAH Y. : EC OK UMIC sOThliJi bj: TOTAL

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C)

1,093-0

If

^26.0

: 77.6,

J)

5_.3.

.7_. 7.

31^^

Ll^i^.

a) 25.0

82.0

ao.o)

320.1

IJ 15.0

jiH-=

V'-i-2.1

r*

.^

2.7

*6

r:

1.5

Q q

1.118.5

3.0

^(•08.1

80^

3'26„.0

I m I m^- -MM!

1^

pU J.

51.6 :

23.7 ; 2,017.1

■ FY 19 55

HILITAilM : £G 0NO>:iG : OTHbTTT

1.108.5

108.0

102.1

17

7

^■.i^

ikl- ^ } '' V I .^..k

21,0:

3,-.^-

..5

6^.ot

^.0

4

5.1

252.0;

1.3

12.^-

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i..2

•

6,1+

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TOT./iL

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5.1

105.^

T 5

2.6.0

2^4-. 1

lJz,'-Z28^

17^.0 ;

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258.7 ;

FY 195^+ and FY 1955 TOTAL - S3^!^3

SPHCIA L K^OTEG : a) Progranimed amoi^ints arc frorr. FY 1955 Congri^'sional Prosentations of the Forei; Oporatlons Administration, U. S, IriTorriiation Agency, and the Educational Exchrjnge Division of th^ Do par tin en t of State ^ made prior to the conclusion of the Geneva Conference.

b) -Funds vhich might hecoae available from tlie sale of U, S. surplus ayriculturi cbrrimoditie^ are not' 5ncludr»d.

c) ^jLrect utS. Department of Defense expenditures in the area, v/hich have an imDortcjit effect on tlic eoonomy of eacli country are in addition to the above prograjitrned amounts.

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a) "Economic*' includes Economic Assistance and Mutual Dofense Support,

b) "Other" includes Teclinical Assistance, Information Services and Educational Exchange.

c)

d)

.0)

f)

g)

h)

1)

j).

This amount incli^des: Mutual Defense Assistance - ?p3^S million and Direct Forces Support - S7*+? million. _ , • ;

m

This a:no^uit was prosranu-ied prior to the Indochina Arinistlce as: Mutual Defense Assistance - :ii'308 million and Direct Forces Support - $800 million. A similar amount has been requested of the Congress for support of IJ. S. policy in the general area.

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The Technical Assistance for Burriia ^^^as terminated on June 30? 195^+ '^hen the deliver!e made from contracts placed in prior years were completed. The termination v/as made at the roG'uest of the B'urr.:iese Governi.ient,

This amount Includes: Mutual Defense Assistance - $296 million and Direct Forces Support - :i*^30 million.

This amount includes: Mutual Defense Assist.ance - S83 million and Direct Forces Support - $2!? million. . . ' ■

This does not include material already transferred or to be transferred from the Department of Defense FECOM Reserve, As of March 31? 195^^-, materiel vath a replacement value of ;i^^!'00 million was earmarked for transfer.

This aiTiount is to be finojaced by sales proceeds under Section 5?0 of the Mutual Security Act of 1953? ^s amended.

This figure represents only the costs for training Koreans in the U, S. The bulk, of U, S. assistance to Korea is provided directly by the Department of Defense through Defease appropriations* Such direct military assistance, not included in the figures above, vere approximately '^p500 million in FY 195^ ^nd should be approximately S'+OO million in FY 195!;^

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k), This amount represents all funds expended under the Korean Relief and Rehabilitation Program,

1), This amount includes both Economic and Technical Assistance for this,year,

m) A $25 million U. S* commitment to Thailand is in addition to these figures Dnd. v;ill have to be financed by a transfer frora other programs in the area.

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DEPARTMENT or STATE WASHffsiGTCN

All£Ust 26, 1S54

Dear I/Ir. Secretary;

As you ^re av/^re, tho President h=is aoproTcd a colicy r^^ss^ne to the Prime Hinistsr of Prp.nce indic^^.tine th^t her-oeforth '^he United States v^ould providt; such aid as it deems necessary for the thrcf! str^tcs cf Inclcchinc clircctlyj rct\\^r tl^an through the ne-diura of the I^rench Govori^jneat.

Th^ Cantbodian Gov&rninr^ntj on Uay 20j 19?4j, office?J.ly the assi^^'Uiice of the United States in trajjrin<7 the Ro-^^al C=;nbodian ia^ay ^.c cor ding to the accelerated j-v^thcds of instruction used in Korea \:2:m the objtxtive cf foir^Lxag three divisions la tha shortost possible tLrnc* 'To date no response has b;;en r-iado b/ this Cro^'crnn^:nt to the Ga^-ornr.'i^nt of CrrAcGi/f.,

Ih6 iiiprir GL^nt of Stat^ feels in tlie national interest thjit th5_s Gpvernnient should respond affii^ir^^ivr^ly to the Canibodian request and rocorpri-rirds that a bilatoral agreement be negotit'.ted vrith '

CaMbodia for the establishiri^nt of a Military Assistance Mvisory Group vihica \Tould like\dLse have a training function*

It 5.S understood that th'3 present Chir-f of l-'AAG^ Saigon has undertaken prelii:dnc-j?y study of the requirerionts "for a l'AA.Q/?hnom Penh. If you concui' in the rccoi7ur.t:ndati02'i of this Dc^p^rtrient^ it Troiild bo our intsntion to authorise the nevr An-j-rican j'jjrfoassador to Cairibodia officially to irjCorin riis Iiajestyj the King of Cambodiaj of our intention to accede to the Car-bodian request and proi^iptly to negofciato a iIAAG biJ.£ jcral agreement. If the Eepartnent of Defense agrees in this proposed line of policy and has special considerations nhich it/' desires should be incorporat^^d in the proposed bilateral agi^cemont^ *' I shall te grateful for your coui^tcsy in indicating the main heads of agrcer.ent v.hich v/ould be desired oy the Eopart!?_ent of Defense.

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Sincerely yours,

Acting Secretary

The Honorable

Charles E. VrilsoUj

Secretary of Defense*

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MESSAGE ■ DEPARTMENT OF THE AmCf

STAFF COMf'IlMI CAT IONS OFFICE

STATE SECRET

PRIORITY PARAPmASE NOT EEQUIRED

CONSULT CRyPTOCENTER BEFORE DECLASSIFYING KO UJICLAS REPLY OR REF IP DTG IS QUOTED

FROM: SECRETARY OF STATE FROM (FE) MR WADDELL "

TO: OSD WASH DC FOR ADMIRAL DAVIS OR MR SULLIVAH

NR: UMIUMHERED 3II805Z AUG 5^

Sent Manila 819 rpted info London 120^ Paris 7^19 Canberra 170.

Manila-Following for your information text Aide Memoire delivered Department August 31 by Australian Embassy:

Verbatim text.

**1. The Australian Government has welcomed the establishment of SEATO on the assumption that it would provide a firm basis for military planning in the area and a means whereby preparations could he made to cope with direct or indirect Communist aggression- The Australian Government has given public assurances that if such an organization is established it is prepared to mate an increased military contribution to the defence of the area,

*'2, This policy, w^s laid down at a time when the United States Government was calling for the urgent establishment of a defence organization in Southeast Asia and appeared to be willing to participate fully in it. The Australian Government is therefore considerably disturbed at recent reports which appear to indicate that the United States does not rpt not now contemplate that any concrete military functions should be carried out by the organization set up under the treaty. If this should turn out to be the case^ then the value of the propos'ed treaty to Australia would be drastically diminished- The diffic Ities with which the United States Government would be faced at the . present time ^n making precise commitments under SEATO are fully • understood. At the same time the Australian Government feels there is a real danger that the present United States attitude m jht lead to a treaty without 'teeth' of any kind^ or to a treaty into which it would be very difficult to put any 'teeth* subseq.uently.

"3- I't would also appear that, at a time when United States policy regarding the military functions of the DA IN 81950

(1 Sep 5^)

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Deciassified per Executive Order 13526, Sectit^n 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

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MESSAGE

DEPASTMEKT OF THE ARMY ' STAFF COMMUHICATIONS OFFICE

NR: UfflUMBERED PAGE 2

organization has undergone a changej the United States view .also seems to have hardened that the treaty should be aimed specifically at Communism. In these circumstances it seems that Australia might get the worst of both worlds. On the one hand Australia would be criticized in Asia for Joining an organization which v/ould be dominated by great non-Asian powers and which would.be criticised as constituting a provocation to the Chinese^ while on the other hand Australia would obtain no rpt no assurance that additional military protection would be given to an area which is strategically vital to Australia. It will be appreciated moreover that such a treaty would involve the Australian Government in considerable embarrassment domestically. The Australian Government would be attacked for subscribing to a treaty which seemed valueless^ and there would be a danger that present public support for an expanded Australian defence effort would-be dissipated. The Prime Minister recently impressed on Parlament that the present situation in Southeast Asia called for an international arrangement in the region under which all parties would be ready to undertake commitment. Australia's willingness to undertake such commitments in peacetime represents a real innovation in Australian policy,

"k. In some respects the effect of present American thinking about SEATO is to provide little more than a commitment to act in the event of Communist aggression^ without any effective understandings among the Allies as to what that action should be.

"5- It is the Australian Government's earnest hope that the United States Government will agree to the establishment of effective military machinery under the proposed organiz;:.bion and will themselves participate in planning for the defence of the area- To this end Australia viill press for inclusion in the text of the treaty of a specific undertaking that parties'^would 'concert their military planning*. The Australian Government hopes that the United States Government will be able to accept this.

"6, The Australian Government fully appreciates the difficulties involved (partly for security reasons) in detailed military planning among seven or eight nations. But the Australian Government considers that close contacts among^ and joint military planning by^ The United States^ United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand are essential. The latest American position^ as presently understood^ could give Australia less than the already existing Five Power Staff Agency; and the future even of this organization seems in

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SENSITIVE

MESSAGE DEPARTMENT OF THE ARM?

STAFF COMI^OT^ICATIONS OFFICE

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doubt in view of Its virtual suspension at the request of the United States,

"7, Like the United States, the Australian Government also contenrplates economic activity being conducted outside SEATO. But a SEATO ^hich is coirrpetent to discuss all these things should exercise this function at any rate to some extent, even though effective work in some directions may be done by smaller groups and possibly outside SEATO, Consequently in the Australian Government's opinion^ regular and fairly frequent meetings of SEATO representatives are needed^ and would be expected by Australian public opinion/^

End verbatim te^. Departments comments follow*

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DA IN 81950 (1 SEP 3h)

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r^FICE OF T}\k ASSIST.y-T SECRETARY OF DEFEilSE Ifiternations;! Security Affui.'^s

Washington 25. D. C.

.14 Scptcubcr 1"54

lIEt^ORA?IB[IlI FOR THE SECRISTARY OF DEFEilSE

SUBJiiiCT; Report oil -the Kenila Confercnco

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As Dapartment of Dafensc r£^prGsentativa on the U.S» Delegation to the Manila Conference (6-9 S3pto:ribor 1?54) I submit for your Information tha ' attached te?;t of a Southeast Asia Collective &3fcnsG Trosity (Tub A) as

approved by the Conference, together vdth coiTLT.ents rslatiiig to aspects ■ of tho Trtjaty of specit.1 concern to the Dep^rtinont of Doftinsc,

■

General Gonnont

As you knov;^ the Ifcnila Conference conv-^nod follov/ing Comr:Vjnist militeay achiGver::ents in Indochina- and political cind psychological sucl . cossos at Geneva- Against this background the effort of tho Manila Conference to construct a oolleotivo defense arranrerrrent for Southeast Asia" and the Soutriv/est pacific v;as directed in largs trie:;,sure to recovering ■ ^ fron the psychologics.1 blov; thus administered to tiio Free Vforld, Huch " ■ of vih*:it v/as said at the ConfertBnce bora-vjitness to tho pree^Trinenco of

psychological objectives in the thinking of the particix^-ting States, In & real sense, tho: Treaty th<it emerged at Manila is a response to the Geneva Agreeraents.

Tho participating; delegations placed great e^iphasis on the effect the v/ording of the Treaty vjould hav^Oj not only on the Oojimunists j but also on their dom^st^lc popul^^cti'ons. Thus the Treaty is a document that speaks to many audiencc^s: it supports self-determination of peoples, solf^ goycrnment rnd independence in deference to Asian nationalismj it provides

I, for econo::ac and technical cooperation as an indu:errLent to present Asian

"neutralists^ countries to associate thetnselves with the Treaty; it pennits the accession of other States^ thus avoiding the charge that the Treaty members forn an exclusive club v/ith aggressive designs ^^^gai^nst' other States; it .describes tho Treaty area so as to exclude for zivs present Poi-mosaj Japan J and Plorea, St-tes to'-vard v;hich the Trcvty membors hold differing policies- Thcao el£;:ac:;ts of the Treaty attest to the isnport-

I ance the menib.:r States place on the effect of the docunier.t upon their

respective puDlics, At the same time these eleniants give the Treaty , " ' the character of d. collective d-^fenso arrangement in cnore than a purely

j ' military sense. The success that the Trei^ty n;ay have in enlianoing the

defense of the arej. vrill therefore h:ive to be judged in light of the fact thvt it has ps/chological and econorrao as well as military objoc^^

\ tivos.

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mth respect to tha inilltary aspects of Vv^ Treaty, v\ozt of tho parti cip^^ ting Stc.to^, notably the Philippines and Thailand^ ur^ed provisions that\vo^.ild explicitly com,.:it tho Trtjaty Parties to tako militr.ry miction in event of GggrGssicn in tho Treaty area. "Hhe comrnitnient of the United States to such act! on J of course, v/as the purpose of those ur^^ings* Much v;as srdd about tho desirability of tho IJATO as opposed to tho allegedly viecikor AtCZUS for-iula. Host of the parti^cipatins Stut^s argued that explicit corLbitn^ents to take action v/-3ro nocsssr.ry if the Treaty was

to have the dosircd deterrent of foot on tho Oomtriunists-

+ ■ . *

The United St^t^s v;as faced in this issue, I believe, v;ith tho dil-onma of attempting to attain ti7o objectives thr^t v;ere not coripletely coni" pp-tiblo: on the on^ hand th::2'e v/as a dcsiro to place t}io Cornniuviists on notice uz clearly as possible th^.t further aggression in tho area vould meet T;ith effective collective counter-action. Such unequivocal notifi-cation v/ould tend to enhance the psychological effect of the.Treaty on tho Free Tx^rld and tho doterrvjnt effect on tho Communists« Yet on tho other hand, in spite of tho greater psychological effect ^h:.t a strongly worded Treaty raight have, tho attainr.iont of this object-ve v/as necessarily limited by the extent to. which the United States, in it:? ovm interest, could undortr^kc advance military commitments under th'-'Treaty in restriction of its froedorr; of action. A further li:Tiitation v/as tho fact that the United States can corinit itself to take- rulitary action only in accord' anco vdth its Constitutional processes^ Thus, opposed to the objective of maximum .psychological effect v;as tho necessity that the United States retain essential freedom of action^ and r-void treaty con^rnitrr.snts that m^^to inconsis-cent v^ith Constitutional requiromonts and thorofore prejudicial to support for ratification of tho Treaty by the Senate,

Iho Treaty as it stands agreed is in effect a reconciliation of these conflicting objective's. At the moment it servos tr:oro a psychological than a military purpose. The aroa is no better prepared than before to cope v/itfi Communist aggression. As time goes on, ho;vevcrj tho Treaty can provide a nucleus for coordinated defense, and may rally presently unconniitted States to the non-Comrr:unist" side.

Military Aspects cf the Treaty

' Yr»u day>ecall that follov/in;^ tho v;ork of the Joint U,S.-U*K. Study Group v:hich r.ot from 7 to 17 July 1954 in Tfcshington to lay tho groundv;ork for the Treaty, "Sho Department of State prepared a draft v;hich served as the basis for discussions among the United St:tos and other interested. Govcrr^T.c-ntst This draft v/as referred to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, for . comrrrent on 22 July 1954, The viev;s of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, sub- ' mittod to y^'U on 13 August 1954, fonned the basis of yrur letter of 17 August 1954 to the Secretary of State. Trvis letter, together v/ith a letter of 13 /.ugust 1954 from Acting Secret'j^ry Anderson to Mr, Robert ilurphy on the subject of rulitary machinery under the Ti'eaty, contained

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the basic positions of this Department with respect to the Treaty^ and guided Department of Defense representatives on the U*S* Delegation to the Manila Conference in discussions in the Eight Power Working Group and in the Conference itself.

The following provisions of the Treaty are- of special concern to the Department of Defense:

1. Article IV is the heart of the Treaty^ and generally follows the wording previously used in the Philippine^ Korean, and AN?,US Treaties. It provides that "Each Party recognizes that aggression by means of armed attack in the treaty area against any of the Parties or against any State or territory which the Parties by unanimous agreement may hereafter designate, would endanger its own peace and safety, and agrees that it will in that event act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes," Secretary Dulles pointed out during the Conference that the wording of the North Atlantic Treaty, which speaks of an attack on one as an attack on all, nevertheless provides that the Parties will act in accordance with their constitutional processes. He persuaded the Conference that the final agreed wording of Article IV would be better received by the Senate^ would tend to minimize debate, and would facilitate ratification by the United States.

The Article further provides that the Parties shall consult immediately on measures of common defense if, in the opinion of any of the Parties, any Party in the treaty area is threatened by other than armed attack. This brings Communist aggression in the form of subversion and coup d'etat within the purview of the Treaty. '

,2. Article V establishes a Council to consider matters concerning the implementation of the Treaty- During the sessions of the Working Group it became evident that some countries would propose wording calling for the establishment of military machinery, possibly along MTO lines-

; Recalling the position of this Department that military participation

should be consultative along lines of the ANZUS arrangement rather than pexmanent and formal as in MTO, the Defense Representative in the Working Group, Mr, C. A* Sullivan, in a message to Defense (SEATO No, 1, 2 September 195^) proposed that consideration be given to the inclusion qf the following v?ording after the first sentence of Article IV: "To this and the Parties to the Treaty will consult with regard to military plar^^dng as req.uired by the situation in the area-^' Shortly thereafter the Aus-

I tralian delegation proposed the following addition to Article V: "The

Council shall set up such subsidiary machinery as may be necessary 1 achieve the military and other objectives of the Treaty-" Since the Australian proposal involved an open ended commitment, this Department and the Joint Chiefs of Staff opposed it and accepted the wording suggested by the Defense representative.. The Department of State agreed, and instructed the U.S. Delegation to support incorporation of this wording in Article IV (TOSEC 25, 3 September 195^)-

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In the course of negotiation on this point the U*S* Delegation persuaded the Australian Delegation to accept a modification of its language removing reference to "machinery" and injecting the concept of consultation as the situation may require, as favored by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and this Department* The UiS* Delegation on its partj accepted the placing of the amendment in Article Y^ and secured agreement of the Conference to wording which in substance reflected the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Defense views* Secretary Dulles^ with my advice^ succeeded in causing deletion of reference to ^'periodic" or "regular*' consultation as several delegations at one stage proposed* The amendment in Article V as finally approved reads: "The Council shall provide for consultation with regard to military and any other planning as the situation obtaining in the treaty area may from time to time require-**

3- Article VII provides that other States may be invited to acceed to the Treaty by unanimous agreement of the Parties- Although the agreement of all the Parties to the Inclusion of I^ationalist China^ Japan, or Korea is presently unlikely^ such a possibility is not precluded*

k, Similarlyj Article VHIj in defining the "treaty area", provides that the Parties hy unanimous agreement can include other States in the treaty area or otherwise change the treaty area* The "treaty area" is defined as "the general area of Southeast Asia^ including also the entire territories of the Asian Parties^ and the general area of the Southwest Pacific not including the Pacific area north of 21 degrees 30 minutes north latitude." This wording brings West Pakistan under protection of the Treaty even though it is not in Southeast Asia. The word "general" permits an eventual broadening of the treaty area.

5* All participating States except the United States supported, exclusion of the word "Coiiiraunist" from the Treaty. The U.S. draft originally referred to "Communist aggression" in the preamble and in Article IV. The chief reason advanced by the other signatories for the deletion was the desire of most of the Parties that the Treaty cover any kind of aggression in the area- Pakistan, for example, wished that the Treaty would apply to possible aggression by India. The Unites States position was that the United States could not properly say that any aggression in Southeast Asia would endanger its own peace and safety, and that iti could accept the obligations of Article lY only in respect to Communist - rgres-sion. For this reason the United States attached an "understanding'^ to the Treaty in this sense. All other participants accepted the Treaty with the U*S* "understanding"-

6, At French suggestion specific reference to Cambodia, Laos, and Viet-Nam was removed from the text of the Treaty, but these States are covered by the provisions of the Treaty in a separate Protocol (Tab B).

■ The French felt that this method of extending the application of the Treaty to the Associated States v;as less likely to^be construed as a

. violation of the spirit of the Geneva Agreements.

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7- I also attach for your perusal copies of the opening and concluding addresses of Secretary Dulles at the Conference (Tabs C and D) *

I Implementation of the Treaty

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It can be expected that several of the participating States will shortly urge that an interim Council meet pending the time the Treaty is ratified and goes into effect, [Hiere is a general desire to keep up the momentuin established at Manila. In such an event the subject of consultations with regard to military planning as referred to in Article V will undoubtedly arise. This is a subject to vj^hich we are giving additional thought with a view to developing further details of a U*S» position.

Conclusion

I believe the Manila Conference accomplished the objective expected of it from the Unites States point of vie\^. In my Judgment our Defense representation in the U,S, Delegation succeeded in its efforts to insiire that the Treaty.is consistent in its military implications with the posi^ tions taken by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and by this Department*

I should like to pay tribute to the brilliant work of Secretary Dulles 5 Herman Phleger^ and -Douglas MacArthur II, These men carried the . principal burdens of the negotiations with forcefulness and intelligence, and advanced the interests of the United States by their efforts*

A- C- DAVIS Vice Admiral, U- S- ITavy Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA)

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on 15 Scpteviber 1954. Co?icurri7ig locre the Special Assistant Intelligence, JDevartmcnt of Siat^; the Assistant Chief of Staff, C-2^ DeparLvient of the Army; the Director of Naval Intelligence; the Director of Inlclligenco, USAF; the Deputy Director for Intelligence^ The Joint Staff. The Atomic Energy Com.missiop^ Ilcprescntative to the I AC and the Assistant to the Director, federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained, the subject oeing outside of their jn'risdictioji.

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CURRENT TREMDS iN SOUTH VIETNAM

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1, Since assuming office Premier Diem has been confronted v/ith the usual problems of inefficiency, disunity, and corruption in Vietnamese politics and with the extraordinary problems of a mass evacuation of the Northern population and the hostiUty of many French officials. Despite his qualities of honesty and zeal, he has not yet demonstrated the necessary ability to deal with practical problems of politics and administration. Lacking an organized political machine and finding control of the Army in the hands of an uncooperative chief of staff, Diem's freedom of action has been severely circumscribed.

2< The French Government appears to have no definite policy tov/ard South Vietnam. While the Fi-ench Government has not openly opposed the Diem Government, France has failed to support Diem and there is' no evidence that the French are prepared to cari7 out a policy based on unreserved support for Vietnamese independence and nationalism. Accordingly, close cooperation betv/een the French and Vietnamese governments, essential for the survival of South Vietnam, has been lacking and French motives have become more suspect.

3. Although little real progress has been made under Diem's administration m dealing with pressing* political, military, and social problems, he still retauis considerable unorganised popul?a^ support, particularly among Catholic elements of South Vietnam, He has also made some progress in reaching agreement with the pov/erful Cochin China sects.

4, At the moment the Dlcm Government is threatened by the insubordination of General Hinh, the politically ambitious Chief of Staff

whom Diem has discharged. It does not now appear, that the present struggle between Diem and Hinh v/ill degenerate into civil strife. In fact Diem now appears to be making some headway in his eiiorts to control or exile Hinh, either of which would enhance his prestige and remove an obstacle to the strengthening of his government

5. Bao Dai has remained in France and apparently is refraining from direct participation in political aftairs in South Vietnam, His prestige among Vietnamese nationalists has been considerably lessened by his apathy tov/ard the fate of his country. We believe that if Eao Dai were nov/ to return to Vietnam, he w^ould almost certainly become a center of political intrigue and would further complicate an already complex and confused situation and weaken rather than strengthen the ability of South Vietnam to achieve political stability.

6. Trends in South Vietnam since the end of the Geneva Conference have enhanced the prospects of an eventual extension of Communist control over the area by means short of large-scale military attacks. A.lthou<^h Diem's government will probably survive the present crisis of Hinh's insubordination, and may achieve greater strength and popular sui^port, it will continue to be threatened by Vietminh activity, and hampered by French indecision. Diem appears to be the only fi^^*-ure now on the pohtical scene behind whom genuine nationalist support can be mobilized. However, his ability to create a government that could reverse the current trend in South Vietnam depends at a minimum on an early and convincing demonstration by the French of their wholehearted support.

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'ADDRESS OFrlCrAt, COMMUHECftTlO^ia TO

American Embassy

Sctigon, Septerjiher 1$^ l95'h

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1 "believe that it is necessary to niake a/uiatter of regord a TiOre detailed account o± the recent impeti^oun action of general C Daniel repoj?tcd in Pimbassy telegrams. 9ol and 9^7 of; September 13^ 195''4- This is a matus^LJ^rhich 1 do not v/ish t^-broached vrith Defense, no matter how informally. I am convi.' vinced that I can handle the situation here, . * 'i'%

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In this current political crisis involving the strurglK'V bett^ecn President Ditm and General Hinh, General O'Daniei has quite understandably been deeply, concerned* He has taken tlie position that, v;hile he re cornizes th e faults and shoxtcominp;G of General rlinh, he still believes him to be the best "soldier available to the Vietnamese to head up their National Army* This is not the vievr of General Ely or liis most experienced' and objective observer's Vfho see General Vy as preferable be-

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experience, althour;h lacking in

cause of his cliaracter and

Hinh's vivacity of intelligence. At the same time, being a man of action himself j Gc*neral O'Oaniel is impatient v/ith the hesitancy and weakness of the Dien Government, It is not my purpose to comment upon these viev/s, imich are held in some measure by the Embassy as v/ell* The problem arises in the General^s"tendency to believe that all matters can be portrayed in sharp* black and v;hite and can be solved by forthright and direct act:" on. General 0'Daniel is handicapped by his o^in strai^r:htforv;ardness £uid hc^nesty of character, v/hich make him an easy target for those who v/isb to take him in, and by an unfortunate impression that he is a master of tact and jraile. rv-

The sit'aation in nuestion developed folloy:ing an_informar'^ * meeting held" in the I=mba33y on Sunday m6rnin°:i September 12,

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■O^Janiel* The General v/as impatient to take action ar(ri', coh-'^-■-^^ vinced as he was by General Hinh^s disingenuous prote^stations

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that he had no personal political ambitions, believed that Diem, and Hinh could he brought together very easily- I agreed that, while ideally the solution might be for Diem and Hinh to bury their differences^ the matter was a little more difficult and I believed that at this moment neither I nor others should get in touch with Hinh* Before undertaking anirtMng of "this sort, it would he necessary for me to see Diem^ which I did not plan to do until the following day. It had been clear for some time that General 0*Daniel was eager to take a hand in the problem and he had previously offered "to be anybody's messenger" should the need arise- This knowledge was one of the reasons that I stated definitely that no one should see Hinh at this time.

Unfortunately, despite my admonition. General O'Banlelj accompanied by his aide, went that afternoon to call on General Hinh at General Hinh^s house and had a two-hour conversation with him concerning the political crisis- This conversation was reported in summary in my telegram 98I. In essence^ it appears that General 0'Daniel inquired as to Hinh's attitude toward the President and as to his personal political ambitions and received the usual story from Hinh depicting himself a loyal, patriotic soldier without political ambitions and only too ready to cooperate with the President, It would appear clear, as has been indicated by 0'Daniel himself, that 0'Daniel then suggested that, since Hinh felt that way, he should convey such a message to Diem in the hope that the matter could be set right by a clear understanding and differences between the two men thus be settled* Hinh made a phone call immediately in 0*Daniel's pre-sence to the Secretary of State for Defense Chan, who promised to convey Hinh's message to the President, It is probable also that 0'Daniel discussed^ at least in general terms, his own solution for the Hinh-Diem conflictj which included the promotion of Hinh avray from direct command of the army and placing him in the presidential palace as the supreme military adviser to the President-

O'Daniel's intentions in this action which he took were certainly good. The fact remains, however, that he took this action in direct contravention of my instructions, indulging his tendency to take matters into his own hands and to mix into political situa"£ions without proper clearance from the Chief of Mission•

This is not the first time that 0'Daniel has taken hasty direct action himself with regard to a political problem, VJhen difficulties began to shape up between Diem and Hinh and I had received a request from Diem ^to look into the possibility of having General Hinh invited to the United States in order to re^ move him from the scene while the President established his

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ciuth'jritv over the-fetional irniy, I diacu^sed the matter vrith C''Jau-'?.l". General 0*=J''AniLl v;as very nuch opposed to the idea of reolacinr; Hinh an:l 'Lo t-iis maimer of doln,^ it. He expressed '^■^"^anr if aa preforrinft Kdnh to Diem, should he- have to make a choice betv;ecn the 'tv;o r:i0n*

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Follov:inr our convc: cn '. -i o :i s to ne ^ Qc ^c. ral it, ''sounded him ouf on or not hc: would consider General O'Dsniel rcturnc sincerity and *patrioti3i operate "loS'^ally v/ith the would not consider \asit incident was reoorted ,in

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Follov.'inf; his most recf^nt ■ two-ho'ur conversation with Hinh, 0'Daniel immediately tried to get in tpuch with mo to report. As I was absent at a special church service, he ^^ave an account of his conversation v/ith Hinh J:ax Counselor Kidder, The following' day, oeptember 13, I shov/ed to 0^Daniel the draft of a telegram which I had prepared reporting; this matter in detail to the Department. O'Dauiel insisted that hc bad not heard my instructions and upon this assurance I destroyed the telegram- It is possible that 0'Daniel actoaally did not hear my instructions, as at the tine he may vrell hcivo been immersed in his ovm single-minded thoughts. ' General Trapnell, v;ho preceded General 0'Daniel as Ghief of -MAAG, remarked to me at one time that the latter seldom listened when .he was told sbmethin^o;, particularly if he had any. scheme or idea of his ovrn in mind,

>iy relations v;ith 0'Daniel have been excellent an^. I expect them to continvi- to be so.- OOaniel normally works'in friendly and respectful cooperation/ /I believe that he will not again in the immediate future indul£:e in political free-wheeling, but in the long ran his impetuous temperament, which drives him to take action even in situations where action is inadvisable, vrill pro-, bably reassert itself. It is for this reason that I wish to be on record in this matter, * , ^ " . '

Sincerely yours,

Donald R. Heath

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF Washingtonj D. C. 20301

22 September I954

MEl^ORAIIDia-I FOR TtlE SECRETAEY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Retention and Developmeat of

Forces in Indochina

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1

!• In response to a memorandum by the Deputy Secretary of Defense J dated 10 September 195^> subject as above, the Joint Chiefs of Staff submit the following vievs and recommendations.

2, The Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered the provisions of the Geneva Aimlstice Agreement and the latest National Security Council policies for the Southeast Asia area,

3» The restrictions imposed by the Geneva Armistice Agreement on Cambodia are minor and can be overcome to a degree sufficient to carry out generally the U.S. national policies in that Eirea, The restrictions on Laos are major and permit training^ assistance and supervision bj French instructors only. In Vietnam the cease fire agreement constitutes a major obstacle to the introduction of adequate US MAAG personnel and of additional arms and equipment*

k. Although the French have not submitted for U,S. study any plans they nay have for mthdrawal of French forces from Indochina^ some informal and general information has been obtained as to their present intentions. Based upon this Information and taking into account the estimated capabilities of the three nations of the Associated States^ the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that those forces listed in the Appendix hereto sho>0_d be retained or developed in Viet Kam and Cauibodia. The estimated costs thereof^ listed in the Appendix hereto must be reexamined in view of the lack of data related to condition and quantities of equipment and clothing^ quantities of ICC, ammunition and arms to be reissued by the French*

5» Under the terms of the Geneva Armistice Agreement the training of Laotian armed forces may be conducted by French personnel only. However military equipment can be furnished in specified quantities for the defense of Laos through the French-

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6. The development of the proposed forces for Viet ITam and Cambodia -will require extensive and detailed training which , will extend over a period of 3 to 5 years. The French should ; relinquish over-all coitimand of the Armed Forces of Viet Nam ; as rapidly as possible with complete removal of forces vhen f the Vietnamese are capable of exercising command of an effective force.' The Vietnamese capability along these lines should be developed by intensive training and by progressive promotion of Vietnamese officers to posts in command of larger units and to positions of increased responsibility*

7* The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that prior to the assmrrption of support of the forces of the state of South Viet Nam^ a definite agreement should be obtained from the French Government with respect to the timing of their programmed phased withdrawal. The phasing out by the French should be correlated with the ability of the Vietnamese to take over this responsibility from the French, and at the same time assume command.

8. Although introduction of military equipment into Vict Nam above the levels existing at the time of signing the Geneva Armistice Agreement is prohibited, it is estimated that sufficient materiel is available in Viet Nam from that which ^ms previously delivered to Indochina for the French Union Forces • The primary problem pertaining to m-aterlel would be to insure that the French^ while executing their phased mth-drawal from Indochina^ leave in Indochina the materiel and equipment required^ insofar'as availabloj for the use of the Viet Nam Armed Forces. It should also be eir5)hasized that this materiel and equipment should be left in good operating condition,

9. The supply of items such as pay^ food^ uniforms ^ and POL J should be fui^nished by the Associated States to the maximum extent of their capabilities. However^ it is fully recognized that^ due to economic conditions in the associated states J they would require extensive support concerning these items. Such sux)port as may be supplied by the United States should be furnished out of ly&itual Security funds administered by Foreign Operations Administration.

100 Indochina is an important part of Southeast Asia and merits limited U.S. support in in^lementation of national PQHey in that area. The United States Is supporting military programs in this area, which possess a capability of producing effective military forces* In view of the uncertain capabilities of the French and Vietnamese to retrieve^ retain^ and

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reorganise the dispersed forces of Vietnam^ it may be several years before an effective military force \rlil exist. Therefore, U.Sc Ttiilitary support to that area, including the training and equipping of forces^ should be accoirrplished at low priority and not at the expense of other U.S, military programs and should riot be permitted to impair the development through MDA programs of effective and reliable allied forces elsewhere,

11» In additionJ the Joint Chiefs of Staff note with concern the unstable political situation presently existing \rilthin the state of South Yiet Nam, and^ accordingly, consider that this is not a propitious time to further indicate United States intentions vith respect to the support and training of Vietnamese forces.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff

(signed)

ARTflUK RADFORD,

ChairmanJ

Joint Chiefs of Staff

Enclosure: Appendix

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Washington 25^ D. C-

22 September 195^

>IEMOMNDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEKINSE

Subject: U.S. AsstuEption of Training Responsibilities

in Indochina*

1- This raemorandiim is in response to the memorandum by the j

Acting Secretary of Defense^ dated 31 August 195^? which requested the comments and recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the State Department yiews on establishing a MAAG in Cambodia and a training mission in MAA.G5 Saigon, It also responds to the memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) dated I5 September 195^ which transmitted additional State Department views on Cambodia to be considered in connection with the memorandum of 3I "August 195^^ ^^^ to the memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA)^ subject: "Training for the National Police Force of [ Vietnam/' dated 21 September, 195^,

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2* In their memorandum for you dated k August 195^> subject as above^ the Joint Chiefs of Staff set forth certain conditions which they considered should be met before the United States assumes responsibility^ for training of the Armed B'orce of the Associated States. In their memorandum for you^ dated 12 August 195^j subject: "Message to the French Prime Minister" the Joint Chiefs of Staff reiterated two of these preconditions in their recommendations concerning the proposed message to the Prime Minister of France. From a military point of view^ the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that all of the previously expressed preconditions are still valid and desire to point out that conditions in South Vietnam fall short of meeting these preconditions - In the light of Presidential approval of the message to the Prime Minister of France and in light of Presidential approval of Sections II, III, and IV of NSC 5^29/2, the Joint Chiefs of Staff offer no further objection in the establishment of a l^IAAG in Cambodia* Howeverj the Joint Chiefs of Staff note with concern the unstable political situation presently existing within the state of South Vietnam, and

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accordingly consider that this is not a propitious time to further indicate United States intentions with respect to the support and training of either the Vietnamese regular or J police forces* Accordingly, the Joint Chiefs df'Staff recom^ mend against the assignment of a training mission to 'MAACj^ Saigon.

3, The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that special provisions of the bilateral agreement between the United States and Cambodia provide that all French advisors xiltiinately be withdrawn in order that the United States may deal directly with the Government of CambodiaJ completely independent of French participation or control. The Joint Chiefs of Staff further recommend that no commitment be made at this time as to the size or composition of armed forces to be trained and supported^ nor to the size and composition of the proposed MAAG in Cambodia, until further study can be given to these matters.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

A/

ARTHUR RADFORD,

Chairman

3

Joint Chiefs of Staff

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Follo^.'G text of ir/jssage which approved by US and French dalegstions

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for-trft-n.^miUal to rospeotiva liussions SAIGOM. ; ^^SC:'£e2f:=rc;£'rrprq^s:'Zt^OSni^^.K¥;< "

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QUaXS; In French-'US discussions hero, ve and French b^v- reached conclusion 5^"'

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ve should cUp_:jort Diem in establish-nGnt and iz:aintemaice ofxi strong, ariti-Cor^^iTjanist ^^c nationalist government. To thi^^ end France and >ty:o US will both iirge-all anti-Ooiri:.unist slerientc^ in Viet-rlam ±J5 coo^>:}rate full^'^ with

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Ttos govorrjiiont of Ngo Dinh Diem

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nationalist govarniTLcnt under Diern^s lead-':irehip v/ith chance of success:

Via recognize fiva key eleir,^nts yhich. can urovido a stable anti-Gr!r::^:ani^ t ^^i

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Eao Dai J HinJi ^nd national *arrny and three eccts.

As :c re:3ult x:C our discuesions t/o ^ire giving consideration to action along ±x:.:> follcv/ing lines and dsi^ira yoijr coTiimsnt?:

The ni'oble.T.s relating to >-bcicChief of State ^'ill rccuire further

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^consideration when ::t:ce "CoverrJbent of Viet-Nan: x^ consolidated. Under present

circuinstanciis. further deir^rches should bs r^ade jointly or separat^jly to

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Eao Dai emphasising ±x:o conseGuenc-ss in tcrins of US and French support of ^. v^

failure on his part ±0 act in such ^ \is.y y^iii to strengthen ^'j?^ Dies

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Pagt

2 of tclc^r^ni rr. SAIGON, PARIS, PHI^OM P SNTi, ^ ISirtlkll^, ^^^^

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Governir^ent. French and Uni-led Statos reprossntatlves :±^ Saigon, \jhD f^hould

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1 be glv^ri X bread d^jlegation r-^ povex^s for ^his pvLrposo, should encourage-

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Diem ±o support our actions re 5?.o Dai with appropriate noasuros vathin

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^:r4 corjp^it^ince ii£v±;:^ Vietn8.me53 .Gov<irri!;:eiit#

. '' '" it Gfi^ontial th^t Chief* Sttiff obey orcU^rs given by

^ V/ith rezpscjt to Gensral yAi'^^j/:Vc^<X'^^::^^'T'^]irit^^^ civil axithority, Ilovcvir^ at sairie tirr.Cj it nost difficult JTr; findir.^:^ replaceinent for hin, CoiioCGUcntly, doiiarch'^s should b£; nistdo to

Ganeral Kinh and t-iS President Dietn towards K rcGonoillatlon, It would bs

e:nphasizsd t?iat Franc™ and :S>ri United States ars fir^-iily supporting Prssldi^nt

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Dxerh aiid tl-iat once his position ;t?> consolidated and only than ?'4 ext^^nsive prograin designed to develop i^C'S national ar.tiy undi^r General HirJi could be^ undertaken.

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here reraains '^-^s problem of v:ho would be Ninipter of Defcrxso over Kinh.

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[^ the futurCj relations with Kinh as Chief ^x Staff, sho'Jtld be limited i:a, purely

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t military nitters in ^^i effort ^:.^ discourage hiin froin entering into political

afiairSfl ^ I S&H sects play an essential j^ole in their respective tex^ritories but

have limited iT-iportance on tc national scale, ^^:as sects have ir^aint-^iined flexible positions viith regard tn Dicni, ti^ Viet MirAj Eao Dai^ Franco and

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the United States* It yx of vital ir^oortance that France and the United

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States naintain'x carefully coordinated strategy to-^'ards i6cic'sects, x3ii.^

I scots should be inforiP.ed of tcvri intent of iizx United States and France vith regard fcc support for Diezii. Diera n:i£ht be aivised izx attenipt t:^ influence

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yzixx s-cts through his handling of integration of taeir forces inL-o to^

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national amy and through l6:-:s. ability tix grant thera adirdnistrative control

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Dccliissified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 NND Project Number: NND 6?316. By: NWD Date: 2011

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over ar^as being evacuated by Vict l-Iinh* The representatives in. Victiuua Ox Franca and t^>rx United States should bo given i;l'c^ broadest possible dole-gation o± powers to determine coordinated positions fcx these i?.&tters*

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^ VJith specific regard to tJcs 3inh Xuvc>n Idco^*^ recognig&d that wl:atover

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I their tmsatisraclory and iindGisirablo qualities r^ay be^ tboir position of povr^r should not be underastiiriatod particularly as they control fexpolicaj

are closely tied in v/ith Bao Dai> and in iix:c p-ast hava beon resp:>n5=iible for

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e>:tensivo t^^^rroristic acti^vity xn Saigon*

Therefore^ cur course of action should bo to sesk to i.*^olate the Einh Xuyen partidularly from Bao Bai and to ninin-iisc their power and

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influence through stren^th^nin^ tfex .national, army as E^: counter, ihis can -only bi achieved proppressively* At tco: present time it seorrL^ necessary to as£:ooiate them with the governnentj which uii^^'nt in :^^:3: loii^ riin be t'lir-t best m-3thod to bii In a: position i-:^ control then, UKQUCrTS*

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As noted third ra^ragraph abovej Saigon coiTLT.entii reqaested regarding

* specific TT.eans by which we could carry out coutsos action included above text* French Delegation requests te:<t above included within quotes be given

r Daridau vith explanation this sent by US channels their request for his

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By; NWD Dale: 20J1

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' fe-^cdlaj I believe thc:t'united'Sties^policy- i^liculcl T:;e b-c:Gd cii KSO 5^>29/&, ""~

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irnzc.i criv:„ca;:;c3 vno r:::anteii::::ee an ±iiD.Q'zi:r.ZL ci lorcos r.oc^Gcrz^y "co cc^^rs ^nc intarn-JL Gociirity o^ the crca^ crji uponuis arror^^z^-^nt:^ ccxi-^Lv5.nd at ll^^ixXo,

^- n f\ ^>-^^*y* r" 'ViT'i-*??! ^ o-I >^-^^ •? Ti i^oT rJ**^0'^'r'-f* £^ '^ '^ n 1'h 'v j^h —^^^ *-.^-i-'<*r I'-jn^^-"?^! i:"J *»rp ^ii^* Pi^Vpt'"'"*■^^.*■-

Ar-'f o n^,"] "i''"^nt',?i"'p *\-%^\'%p'^!^ ^i^L-'tT*''v ^'"■'--htT r" "TT^V-^ vC'^^ v-^'+t'"!'.'^""^""^?^!^ r"^ v^r T r^tivp^ V "* p*.^"-.-^

cocuj:ity ^2"i^-'^'^ c:;tcrnD,l c^^Gi'csslcn, It cj;C-r3 to re th";b,tlio^r;ir;o5,cn,Oi, the__ yio%\r:z"^zc: i!atic:2til /trr^^d forces. c'r*c^ 5.ntGrnaL GcciTi'^lty. Eie

ri:rzipc::er a:cd ccr^t c:;ti:r.atcG in the JC3 r/ctachrcrnt vould b^^^^ to "be cxceooive in tr*e accve ccnte:rb. . ,

Fi^on: the politicei vic^ijcnt co::e r^^ried i! or ceo 2x<i ncceGcax'/# pr cdccuatQly trained or/d ecuiT;r:cd tboy wou,ld give the people oT free Vict-l-CLm scire o^ciu'cncb cf internnl ceeurity and pi'ovide the Gevcx^nr:2r.t or Tree Vict-I"crA vritli r.n inercr„oed senze of stability* ^^113 vrould produce definite politicrd ai^i pcy-cholo^ic^l ad%'ents£eG end vorLd help fulfill the cbJcctiY03 cf K3C 5-i29/2, >: v;evld cpprceiate havir<; yoiir viei;3 ns to the forccG v;e chnuld conl.^ei:plc:-te to cc:cTj out this policy as \iolX as the axoi:jat of fund^ \:o znav3A devote to this Tjurfiose* , ■ ■ . .

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forcer; "blicra ars ti;o political cspecoc; pro-pccic czA -'ciTXriz- Sr'^ective cmccU" . tica c- rZQ. policy on"U.S. ciAppo;-^ Tor eu^n forces can tic;ve a Dic^iii:iccn,t hzc-^'hizr I on -l^ho poP-i'l^ic:'-! dbjcctiva OjT c^.'ctitins a zi'table^ cc-ipablc Witi-Ccii;.imlr.-b covcrn-!-,-:;■:■:; irTv^-Ot-Z'Tc^, ^vl en r.sriictir^^ it in cz-JC^yraz out ii vi^oro^^3 internal pro:;rciJ -rith Cc:i:j-'C;3c;icnaX cpr^rovrJ.^ C"0 crrcctivc v::^.y to L;trc-n:;Gn^n th-D Viet-n"::;:;so Govorrreiit io to ccoicit in t:i3 rodrG^^JiiEins ci-ii trr4n-ii:::i cf ita drz-d i-oir-ccr^j zr. T noted in r:y letter to ycu cr AuiiV^t l3j :.9>!-. I^is point u:io c.Z^-'^ referred to in the> j^ctin:: £eGi-,Dt;:Liv' c letter cf Ecptcrcbor 7j 195-ij to tlio Sorjuby CecrotoiT cf Defence. lii cadiitica to "btid-stcry c^-.pport, a direct necns of*h:;lpln2 to crecite Ci:::;i:2intcin political ot:^bilit7 vill do Ijy c^prcpriato "■•^articirjetion of the U.S. liUG in the ple;iL:d::s> developing cj'zX training cf

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1 j?GC'l <;liera nro i.:any roccjonp -to ccii*:35/lex' a vic^oron^j ir/ji;^lr.:i^;:iiva and c:Crccv5.va pro3ra:^a i'or plaimln:;;^ clovolcr}±i:z ^--i tr^'nin:;; Vict;nrrr:cc; cccuvj/ty rorcca bcih in . V;lct";in^ ar.5- porhcpa ovon in iic^rcy ccctj'ucIqo or iii -cho IL^tcd State:; l-tccl?. Wo could DifooL^^iiicJ-ly iiiflucnc:^ ^clio <lGYolc;?"::iri Ca pDliticaL^ c^ voU cr^ ;:ilit?,ry ctability in j?rce ViCv-ira:i if vo lao/i ci^.ca a training; projocu 'irit!! Vicv>il:^::'^oo Torc^ ?na provirixcn of dii-cc*i budsooary cxtpporv vO tlicco ;Corccc vrciicL have far Iozq

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' Shen tiibx^o ic tbo qi:c3ticn cf tir.iin^ roc^-^^n^;; 'the: (/.o^roc; of poli*^:lcei ota-"o±lity vhich tho Jcint G^icfc of S-^aff rcif-cd In their x:->uora::duri of Sc:po:::::bor £2^ 19!;' ' X believe -that itjotcintial x>oiitlcal c.ovolop:r,^nt3 iicv v;arrciTt ycva* con^idcra* tion oJ' the noco^^caiy pr5lirjir*ary st^ps fci* v;orI;iri2 out nn apprcp:rxr.t^ U.3< . training function for Vietfc:::ccG cccvirity forces* •* ' - ' •

With respect to th^se conDiderationG re5aA}.in:2 ^otc3 gocla ai^ training ia ' Vict-rajj vre need to tcOze fsc::^ decinicns prc:".r>uly to enable v.z to rcDiXCid to the Ca:-bodiaaj Victna^aeo^ crA French GcvonizentG conGcrnii^s finaccii?! ai:d othor . '

cupport Tor their forces in Inclochia?.*

J,

^ U^i3 Provident bes Ginned a letter to 'the Erl::j;a I^inist^r of Viet"!Tc^„^ airvhor* iziii^ the /^.oricen i^:basGadcr to Vieb-I^en to exanune vith hiia an intellii^ent pro-QTc:i of direct Av^^rican aid to acsiot Viot-^IJois, A oiijilar letter has already been delivered to the Xln^ of Ca^-rocdia* Xn tlie neantiire the Vietnenre^^e Govem-::ent has nid:D:ltted >a note to thio Covern:-eat stacin^ that it ia con^idorins increa::inr; the Vietna^ece oxf:^/ to a total force of £:30^CC0 :.:en in order to ''s^-'^^-rcntee the interr^al

. cr:l e::tornal cecurity of the coiuatry"' and req\;e3tins United Gtaies aG3lnt:?.iiee in this crJ-oavor. Ehe French Finr^nce I-i^nieter in hiG recent talks in vreshin:j's;on. c:;preGScd a deoire for U.S^ fir^inciel i^upport for the Forench Ih.^peditionary Corps in In.uoe>J:i?,j v.^hich the French contei::p3.ats retaining ab an cWerai^o Gtx^en^th of about 150J COO nen during 1955* ^-- united States reprejerit?.tives indicated thr.t vo vrould otriVG to give co:::e indicai^ion to the ITrench Govcrir::;nt of onr thirliinj on theco F;atterG by Deceirr^^er 1^ 195^i-» Eie plc:ii3 of the 7reneh z-.vA the Vietiia^:^-.^ both C3crn to L:e to be beyoi:d vhat the UmVted States sho'c^ld consider feasible to

*'^;jii2">port for i.iaintainins the cecurity o:f free rCndcehinjL at thiH ti^ie*

In vie:r of the political consideratlor^o CTrX the reouirei.ictts of tinin^;^ it is imperative that t:ie Un?.ted States G-overr^^^ent prep.ire a fii*73 position on th.e ci'-::e of the forces ve cor::::ider a pinirj-in level to a^;sure the internal seeiu^ity of Indcehina. ?his position 'jIIX also liave to iiielude the ai:oui-ts of noney ^;e \:1.11 be prepexod to r.aiie available for this pui^csOp otA the steps ^re irill bo irillin:;; to t^ize to assist in the training a-:d fonraticn of these forces* i:l

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cIdo appreciate yoiir vievrs on hcv? l^cst ve ohovld proceed in r^nddn^ this

deternination* '

t;ee;:s. to i::e that'irc carmpt realistically enter into di-cussions v;ith the other roVcrrer^ents concer^^ed until .\:e have nade tiiis doterr;dnatlon* I vould therefore

I esi sending G copy of this letter to Governor Sta::sen,

*

Sincerely yoaraj

M

John Foster EullG3

. 763 -■ ■

Declassirit'd per Executive Order 13526, Section 3,3 NND Piojeci Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

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In Reply Refer to 1-1550^'

Oct 1^ 195^+

MBiORKromi FOR THE JOHIT CIIIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT; Development and Training of Indigenous Forces in Indochina

1* There is attached a letter from the Secretary of State which refers to tvo memoranda from the Joint Chiefs of Staff^ dated 22 September 195^^ on the subjects: "Retention end Develbpment of Forces in Indochina" and^tJ.S. Assiimption of Training Responsibilities in Indochina." These memoranda ^-rere made available to the Department of State by a letter from the Secretary of Defense^ dated 28 September 195^*

2., In the attached letter Secretary I^Liiaes raises t\<7o related aspects of the military situation in Indochina; force levels of indigenous forces^ and U.S. training responsibilities for Vietnamese forces. He points out certain political considerations which he feels affect both these subjects. ^ ,^

3, In the light of the views expressed in this latest letter from the Secretary of State^, it is requested that the Joint Cliiefs of Staff submit their coi^iments and rccoimr.endations vath respect to the levels of forces that should be developed in Viet-IIam^ Laos and Gam-bodia^ including their concept of the objectives of such forces fron the U.S. militpay point of view and an estimate of the annual operat- • ing cost of training and maintaining such forces.

4. It is further requested that the Joint Chiefs of Staff submit their comments and reconmiendations concerning, a U.S. conunitment to train Vietnamese forces^ in the light of the considerations pointed out by the Secretary of State in IrLs letter. In view of the special emphasis placed on an urgent determination of a U.S, course of action, toi'/ard the tx^aining question at a m.eeting of the Operations Coordina^t-irig Eoai^d on 13 October^ the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on this subject are requested as a ma^tter of high priority.

Signed -

H. Stinive Hensel .

JCS

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Prqjeci Number: NND 63316, By: NWD DiXi^: 2011

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"TO; Secretary of Stato -CT2 -19b4 NO: DJLTS 5j Octooer 21^ 5 p.m,. /

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SENT DEPARTT.EKT DIILTE 5, REPEATED INFORMATION SAIGON 209

EYES OI^ILY ACTING SECRETARY PROM SECBETARY.

SAIGON EYES ONLY AMBASSADOR. ' ' " ■ . .

^ During and after dinner tonight -^-Jith Mendes-Francsj v/e * discussed Indochina. I said our recent reports indicated disturbing internal situation South Vietnam. Mendes-France agreed situation serious^ but said understandable ve should nov7 be at psychological low point follov/lng armistice. Ho was also firoi regarding importance giving Diem ever^ chance. He vent on^ however^ to say that plans should be laid for ^'another structure of governviiont'^ v/hich/could be produced lu^verrLD^®^^ failure^. In response my question^ he vas unclear as to Gleaning ffis phrase and indicated ^he had no other local political figure in mind as possible replacea:ent Diem. He stressed^ hov/ever^ importance of utilizing thread legitimacy deriving from 3ao Dai^ although he was firaulc in discussing latter^s failures and spoke of necessity keeping him off front of stage.

At conclusion conversation/ Moides-France indicated desire before my departure to discuss situation South Vietnam and vhat we might do about It at greater length. In anticipation such further talk^ I would appreciate receiving urgently ^Department's*'latest estimate ciolftical developments.

DULLES

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Note: Mr- Gleysteen (SS) notified 10-20-5^ 10:^5 P-m, EH

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* EU;U!-CT: Action In Indochina - . . ^

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I# !To one is nove avare. than you that tlio neutralist '^rrorldj nov* voi£:hiing

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1^ thtcource of the fut^ire^ vill eventually make, a choice befeiGcn Corrimuni^ra cLud

^-, frccdoia* The ultinat© Xate of the free portion of IndocMna uill bQcon:e a *

■ ■ ■ ■

^ critical element in that choice for the vast rillions" living; in the uncorrjnitted

f^ ■ regions of Ksia and the Iliddle East, Tho loss of the rest of Indociilna in con-*

■ ' sequence of the 1556 elections or othertiice, i-rotLld inevitably 5v;ay nony of

[^ theoe millions to '';^^:jr.^iUnicm* Aeide from itD political aspects, this trend could

p., be iiilitarily dicastrouc to the U.Sp strategic position 3ji the Far Iiast, If another frca uorld debacle in Indocliina natcriali^eSj as every intelligence

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e5tir,atc jjredicts^ the U«S* r^iilitary position in the l-Jestern Pacific could b

jeopardised. _" ' ■ r -' -"

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^ 2.. .You are J of course^ riirarc of the ^nany current proposals for political, econor^iic^ and military programa dcsi^nod to chcch the spread of Coirj^iinist influence to South.Viotnan* Tho Chief of liUG, Indochina has advcd repeatedly ^, -^ foi" a govcrnncntal decision to enable tlie U,S, to begin the training'of native

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arnics in Couth Yietnan and Cai^bod5,a* The Joint Chiefs of Staff have hesitated

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L • to concur in General 0'Daniel^a recorriT:iendation ^ust as they hesitated ^oo

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rccQ" '.::nd participation In the Indocliina \;or \rhile it vao in pro^reDs because the po?J.tical situation has so dctcx^ioratod that the indigenous support, re-.^:: ouired to r.:al:e aiiy Military efforts successful, i^eeriied doubtful of attainriont*'-

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r/. ■ ;:';■ *. 3» Xn any aGGoncrdent of tho situation in Indochina, it ccqv.z obviouo that ■. - ' \ - ■ ■ - . , ■ '

^ tho superiority of Corumnict poDLitical leadership in'that area ha^ not been. ^- '

f- ■ ■'■''.

- ■ accidental, 't'lia Copjrranists havo altJnys recognised tho necessity for preparing ^

. and trainiiif^ leadorshin cadreo in the areao. they have narked out for subveroivo oocrationa. In Indochinaj the French opf^oaition to the Ic^itinato nationalist aspi: tions of the Victnaxaeso has aided ckillcdj indoct^^inatcd CorrrnirJ-ct persorLnel in carrying out their plans* On the other hai^d, the lack of a basis

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for X idcrstandins between th,e indigenous people in Indochina and the rrcnch'hao

been one of the prinary reacons for tho free T>^orld'3 failure in Indochina, VJq

' . . * * ■ ' ' - "

have hesitated to face up to rrahinn decisions regarding proposals for Indochina,

4

tecaucG ire are not confident that vq can defeat the CorJiiunist at their o'iin gar^-a,

I'he r;stl:ods u6 have tried to reach the minds'of the actual and potential* pro-

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freedoi:: leaders in Indochina have not been cuccessful. \io have not tJucceedcd _

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in i.:al-d.n£j oui^ objectives in Indochina appear desirable to the x:!Coplc there in ' '

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terns of th:::ir ovm interests^ problcraa and anibitions* A nc;/ approach to le.adcr-ship training and cross fertilisation bet\?ccn V/cstern and Asiatic ideas in the

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Indochina area is necessai-y* Bcca\ise the 19$& elections set cun absolute deadline

■ * " ' ' ' . '

to ox3r efforts we nust seek forpsycholoclcal pro^raros tliat see their results

in nonths rather than years

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II, 'In thi^ corincction^ a osychological operat:.ons concept entitled

■ '^Militant Liberty xv;hlch h^s recently corro to ry personal attention seems to

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possess the ingredients ve are gropin;^ for, "Hilitaiit Liberty'' is a concept

vhich T:as successfully ttsted in Philippine battles a^^ainot the "Huks".

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^^rillitont liberty""notivatcs indigenous people to work tovrard a co-^jTion ^or.l of individual freedom by presenting to them the principles of frcedoinsj clearly stated J in a nahnor-uhtch can bo vigorously propa^^ated and faitluMlly supported*

d. "

ihc concept of ^'Militant I-iborty*' provides a clear ctatencnt of frcedora e^qpresG^^

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Ln Iv^TiZ^ir.z?. 1>hat r.en anytihora can undsratoiid in a short period of tir,o»

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^'ililitnnt Libcr'^y" ctinalateo tho peoples of coiintric3 thi^esitencd b/ Corjt^imisia to net to achieve the pbject5.VGS of freedom t/irough cclf--c::^Tc3sionj proper

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orc^ni^^ation and prof^rcncsivc action;

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.;T-'"^:v',?,p'^:.'il'iny'conf^^^ people qualified to render judnrxnt have been irr?r£ . vith.tho ir.erlt and value of the **!Iilitant liberty" awroach* As I sec it* the

potential" succciJG "rdlitant Xiberty" could achieve In Xndcchina is so great that .- ', ' ■ - - ' . . "^' ■ - .'

our joint efforts should bo doYoted to getting it undenray ;rf,th least possible

■m

dol::y, I should like to sucgeot tli:it Mr. Br^^lr^ t;ho is a consultant to the Joint

Subsidiary Plans Ei^/ision of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, be mado- available to

■.-■■■■• " • • .

bi'ief you and Mc-nbers of yovur Innediate etaff in the neai' futta'e. There is ' . ' •

attached hcre^rlth (Tab A) a co::!prchcnG5,vc paper cettinrj forth the concept*

6, The heart of sny plan to Inplencnt ^^liilitant Liberty" is tho p:r:df;recG5,ve

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training of groups of indigenous personnel in an understanding of the jr.eaning

of a free, society to the ind5-Vidua3. azid the' individual's responsibilities in ^,.-

creating and ruiintainj^g such a society. If the concept of '^Militant Liberty''

■ ■ • ' ■ . * t

■v:ero tested in Indochina^ indi{';cnous personnel irould hax'^e to be trained fron among tho rdlitai-^as KeU. as the civilian clenicnts of Vietnanosa society- ^If a slcnificcJit nilitary training pro^ran ^;cre instituted, the induction*-traiiiln£;-dlscharge cycle pro^^-des ready access to indigenous perso:u^el uho could play an important role,in a revitalir.ation of Victnara both during theit' period

of Military sorvico and subsequently ^ftor they had retui^^ncd to civilian li

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For tills reason^ as veil as to insure unity of effortj the inplerxcntation of

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"J^ilitcJit Liberty"'on a toot basis In Indochina should^ I believe, be accomplished on a joint loilitary-^IA baDis, I an inclosins an outline foru (TAB 3) the draft of a plan vhich can "be fuVthor dGVcloped for joint oxcciition "by yo-jr a£;ency and'

CIi:C?AC.

' 778

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7, Tho arrae'-' forces ai'e in a position to support tha pui-olj- nlli-tary ac^pects of this progra^t^. As the draft.plan c;u£;£;cGts^ hovevcrj the necer^i^it^

exists for consictorablo parallel action in the civilian con;Tiimity in South Tictn.i!:i. It Is n/ hope that onco you have ,had an opportunity to understand the concL^jt hchlnd "^^'ilttant Liberty^ you idll bo in a'position to assist in ;dndei"'-irritinc substantially the x^emaininc elcr^cnts of an integrated operational plan<>^ ■ ,d* It is* my fii^i^ conviction that *^h'llitant Liberty^ of xers ug the r.eans

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for \:;'iLch vro have bacn ccarchinrj to galvanize the Victnar.eae into ta^3.n{J the action they nust ta^^e if they are to rc^i.-dn free* I truGt^ once you have had tho

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opportunity to becone acquainted \;ith ^^rlilitant Liborty'^j that you also ;:ill sco

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Amsmb-assy Hrts tEQUL // KIAGT Am-nibaEsy SAIGON '/^%3 . ■

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For your ready reference vs quote paragrach 4 <^f "the September 29 i^imiteO* of Understandinn: *^''

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QUOTE Vith ro'^poct to Viet-Nan ^ the representatives of France and the

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United States a^ree that thair resoective'governnents support Ngo Dinli Dierd jr/^"j ,r

tho establishnent and jnainton?,nce of a strong^ aati-Gorriir-uniEt and nationalitrt 0' '^-

gov':;riLiient« To this end France and tha United Stat^? vill urge all anti-Corjrrcrilst

- "^^^^^ *

eloTr.ants in Viet-^Nam cooperate fully i;ith Governr.ient of Ngo Din}i Diem in order counter vigorously the Viet l-inh and build a strong free Viet-Na^^ UNQUOTE,-Brief cstiuiate political situation South Vict-Nam follows:

1> Vfnile General HinJi's threat to execute militaiy coup £.^ er:}5 to hav e bean avertedj Hinh and his associates Xuan and Bay Vien continued hold virtual veto HI

power over Diein and his governip.ent, Prolongation of crisis leads to inevitable deterioration of govez^riTicnt's position and prospects-j even if it is no longer

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menaced by violent overthrow*

Vc do not rooeat not feel that sufficient effort has yet been riLade tc /^n " .

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honestly carry cut this agresiii^nt, fact that u^rrj French elements have never accepted

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Diem solution jnus t hav e vsakoni:! Ely's efforts and encouraged Hinh carrarilla in its

recalcitrance, PAPvEN In this connection ssc Pai^ls 1665 UM3.RlQIc* Ve reinain o?

^ ■ . ** . ^

opinion that railitary porsonalities now oppor.ing Diem are more susceptible to Frot.ch pressure: and influence than any other sinillarly po'.vnrful eler,>:ints in Viet-Najn..

' Broad govern^n^nt of national union around Dlcn has not been achieved. Until

the c'Lirrent civil-nilitai^^-^sect conflict is resolved any successor Pi^iir.s Minister

would be faced vith substantially sirdlar proJblf^:n \;ith which he mght ba even less

* pi'^ejudicial able to cops th^n Dic^m, except on conditions pr-o-jud^kra to estsbltshr=isnt of governs-at

of'integrity, .

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Current joohoying for pow-:::r and struggle for cabinet positions is resulting aly2;ing inpases^ Positive moves are necessary by Franco and the U»S, if this inipasse is to be broken, Ve rt^T^aln convinced that if anything is to be saved In Viet^lfam we cannot sacrifice indispsn^ablo qualities of honesty^ incorniptibility . and nationalisin represented nore conspicuously at this moment by Diem than by

I anyone else

a

3, Mendes-Fi^ance's use of tera QUOTE another stinacture of government UNCJOTS suggests French han>:ering to reestablish political system similar to that of 194° Cochinehinese B.apublic, founded on police and military power-to be exercised by such

figures as Taiii and Hinh/ In addition to such pro-French figiu^es, system raght. involv:: direct eolonial-tyce contro ls by Fre nch, Such a forrr.nla in French eyes would have advantage of facilitating elii^ination of Bao T^ai and non-Coohinchinese elements

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nt of this sort in or^ view vovild create conditions in

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ligon to be undertaken soonsst with^ personnel and other rsso'ir±'ces now fivdilable

thorc. NacCEsaiy iiistnictions to M-VAG and Enibiissy now in process. Ua hops this

Y South Vlet-^NaTa analogous to those vhich ended by delivering to Vist Kinh northern j

half of Viet"Nam, even though it might in the short run restore internal order. ^7^^5-;;^VJg agree with Ksndcs-France^s f^'oling that perpetuation of 3ao Eai in present role pret^erves tliread of legality, Ve believe hov;evcr that whsn eoiu^ legislative body can take over from hiia his present appointive pov.^ers the time vrLll have coi^e to rerciove hjjn froT^i the seene* ^ ,^'6r" OCB on Oetobsr 20 approved initiation nllltary training program by llkkG

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step> together with delivery of President's letter to Dj-emj v?ill strengthen Diei^i \il

I I in.his relations both with French and other Vietnarnose^ l'!

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C? ^7^ In EiLTimary, unless Diein receives ur^eserved U.S, and French support, his

chances

cl^25s^zc of success appear slight, V'ith such support^ his chances are probably better

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U.S. TRAlUINr- or. VIT^TITBTSr: FORcrs

Iir^Tieciiatel;/ f ollouinp* this note Is a draTt jcint State-Defense cable on the ahove subject* Tliis cable carries out the fist'of the GC3 decision of 20 Cctober* It is beinp acted en this evening by tiie Joint Chiefs of Staff* General Erskine vail imde^take to j^et '

LKr. b'ilson's a^pproval of the JCS action first thinj: Friday morning and to cori'-ranlcate Kr. Wilson ^s reaction to Adr:i. Radford prioi-' to . the liSC ;neetinf# Mr. Hooverj ':ho has aj^rced not to s^nd the . Tfiessagc until final Defense clearance is obtained^ ^'^ill probably . ■ . ■ sgoa Defense .concurrence in' the cahle at the KSC riceting in connection* vdth his report on Indochina*

j * ■■ Unless the JCS or Kr. Wilson have some objection which it -

^ is not new expe^'/sed (Adu. Hadford will knc¥ in the riorning), it i

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s-if^gested thrt yoa concur in the dispatch of the cable as v/ritten.

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TO: itmaiibassy SAIGON

JOUv'T STATE-DEFEiSS I>ESS/:GB TO US Al-mASSi'iTiOR SAIGON Ai© CHIS? OF US

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MUG SAIGON

. Tha f olloifing message coiitaiii3 the policy of ^ the tJS'GoverruTient and yotir

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instri:ctxons necessary to carry out paragraphs 10-a cud. 10-d^ Part IV of

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PiU^T I US Governmental Policy

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(1) It is US Govt* policy to support the GovernriOnt of Free Vietnam under the Preiiziership of Ngo Dinh Diem and to assist that Government iioitiaAly

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(a) ,to promote 5 Jit em al secui^ity and political stability in Free Vietnam^

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(b) to establish a:nd maintain control by tliat Government thi^oughout the

territory of Free Vietnam^ and (o) effectiveD^ to counteract Viet Minh

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» . ■ * ■

infiltration and parajnilitary activities south of the 17th Pai*all-el^>

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(2) For these ptirposes and uti3.i^zlng existing VietnaiTteso arsied forces.

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it is the policy of the US Govto tliat al3- appropriate agencies and ViAAG Saigon

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should irancdiately develop and initiate Kith the Vletnairicse Government a

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Dro^'rain for training that niuTiber of. Viotnanose Bxraed forces necessary to carry

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out the aboTe rilssions* US agencies' novr sgx^ee no efforts siioiid be spared in

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finding \isr/s to begta and carry out such a program in the shortest possible

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s outside of Vietnam and various means of increasing

' US training personnel should ba exploited to the fxtllest^

(3) , The initial target vdll be the reorganisation and tra^Jiing of those

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\ • .Goyornment of Freo Vietn^i:!, Tlie \iltimato obJect.lvo and the co.Tpositionof. US^ support of Victna^T^Qso forces required to achive these or other longer

armed forces reo^uired for the internal security and support of "the legal"

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range ob^Jectives is presently.under study by the appropriate US Go^rbe agencies, .

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(ij) It is fully recognised that, to be offoctiva, US MAj^Ja Saigon must

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have adequate authority^ responsiblJLity^ au^ij'-onted strength^ and full support

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[^ '' ' fron Vietnaiaeso and Fj^ench authorities. Tho activities and functions of

■\\ ViASiG Saigon laust'be carried out idthout intorferonco by^ but vdth appropriate

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INSTRUCTIOMS FOR mJ.Q Sl'iIGCJT

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(l) In dji:ple:rientation of this policy^ US IWiG Saigon Imnediateli'' idUi

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(a) Assist in the rcorgaaisaticn of ths Victnajiieso aitaed forces

and provida such training and support as tdJj, contributo to tho

r*aintensrice of the legal goveniniant of Vietnam on a broad national

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basis and tQ:ider the IVemiership of Ngo CinJa Dic^in,

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';(b) Seek initiaUjr tho roorgardaution and training of those

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VietnauiesG ariaed forces required for interjial security and the support

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.-:';. .- of- the legal goveraiueat*

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:,.; ■; ' (c) Develop ir;medi.ately and taJce initial'steps to iinplenent

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vrith the Government of Freo V5.etnan a progx^am for the training of those Vie-tnamese forces necessax^ to counteract ¥iet ilinh infiltratioa and paraEiilitary activities• ;- '

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■- >^-'^.^-."^' ^gj Corrtlrmo .-to. coorcliJiato closely r/lth tho US^ Ambassador to

.\ . ensura that thooo activitloa aro consistont with the .pol5-oie3 of tho

\ * '. ' '**'Unitod States regardiiig the legal govoriBioirt of Frca Viotn-sjn,

■ . .■ . ^ ■ ^ • - * ■ ^ . /

• - ■ ■ . ■ . . . .

* : ■, (2) .-In viow of tho critical international iriiplicatio'ns of this program,

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(. tho major decisions to ho taken in Vfeshiagtonj and the continiulng rovisM of

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tho longer rango 5j:iplications, it is requoatod "that US UAhQ roiX)rt regularly

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and uako recommendationa concerning all significant dcvolopoients offocting

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this progx^am.

I " PAKT IX I XnSTTUJGTIQNS FOR THE Ar^ASS ADOR, SAIGQiT

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(1) Yon are requo3tod.to undertake tho nscopsary dlG^cupsiona and negotiations with the Govornijient of Froe Viotnaia and local. Frsnch authoritiea

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to ohtain agreoinonta (a) onsuping US UkhSk Saigon vrill -have tho necessary -

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authoi-ity, responslbniby and freedom of actioa to cai'ry out the abovo prosi'aa; ■ * . -X

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and (b) ass\n7ing tho coc^ rjration, coordination and asoistanca froai Viotnameso

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and French authorities .and personnel at all levola in Free Viotnijxii*

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(2) You will imiaediatoly consult with Chiof MAG to foririiaatD tha

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detailed af^i*eeBont3'and assurances nhich UAAG roqxiixoa.

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.t'RT XV FOR rrs A^SASS/JDOR, PAT tIS

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■. (l) Xoii aro requested to infona French Govornmont of theso in3tructioa3 and to SQok Its agraeraont Jramodlatoly to authoriso General Ely to concltida th3 necesaai*/ asreGmonto'vith tho US Anbassadop Saigon and Chief MAAG to

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; FXT tlio Department of Stata ia ijiraGdla-tQ]y radertalciBg td obtajJi ■ 'appropriate midoratandin--and inoano of au-r^cn'dxg- tho IbUG ctrenstH.

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'Statc.-:;^. Yordisj Dofonse-I.^r; Godol; £Tr, Sxtllivanj OCB-1^.Staats, Mi% IlacDonald.

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KSG 2l8th Meeting 22 October 195?^

ITES-I J^ (For Infonnation)

BTOOCHIIJA ■ ■ '. . -.

1» This vill be an oral report on the subject "by the Chainnan of the OCB^ • . Herbert Toover^ Jr-j or sor^ieone designated by him. It vill probably incl-ude a £iiiivr:ary of the recent U.S.-French discuasions on Indochina as veil as of the current situation there. * . -

2, The XBj at its 6 October meetingj requested its special l-lorking Group on

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Indpchina to prepare a program of economic and military aid to the three Associated States to include both direct aid and aid to be granted in coordination with the French J these aid programs to be based on the tentative force ^oals developed by the JCS, This program is nov being developed. The JCS recoinmeflded force goals are attached as TAB A; State coininents thereon as TAB B,

3. At its meeting of I3 October, the OCB agreed that State a.nd Defensej as a inatter of urgency^ should develop guidance on U.S. training of Free Vietnamese forces for approval by the Eoard at its meeting on £0 October, Mr, Cutler has expressed

'considerable concern at OCB meetings over the failure on the part of the U.S. to get a military training prograia under^-;ay in Vietnam. The JCSj howeverj have been dubious regarding this sort of U.S. inilit^.ry i.nvolvement in Indochina because of the unstable political situation and the limitations on the. size of the I-IAAG imposed by the Geneva Agreement and recoirjnended- against such training unless political considerations vex^e overriding (see 'JhXBS C and D). At the COB meeting of 20 October; State said political

: considerations are, in',fact^ overriding and. the OCB is, ve understandj directing in-*aediate commencement of U*S. military training in Vietnam. The OCB's draft recciimenda' >io'ns are at T^\3 K. ' ■ ' " < \ - • - , *

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'^ ' h. \ This OCB action inay have broken the log-jam of inactivity regarding :

r' '^ Vietnam vhich has gripped the U, S. Government since Geneva. Hoveverj there are many, other possible psychological and political action programs vhich may deserve

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■ a try in a real effort to keep free Indochina from being assjjnilated by the Comi^iunists. Tlierefore, continued, streamlined efforts by the Departments and Agencies concerned^ given highest priority, seem necessary.

I

RECC:-2-ru:ifDATI0HS - ' • . ' -

5. It is recommended that you suggest tliat the Council;

'. ■ *

a. Discuss vhether the cui^rent U. S, approach to the problems of Indochina is yet fully adequate to achieve our objectives there.

■ ■ " . ' " - " •■ . - . -

. b,' Reaffirm its belief tint the development and implementation of: ■ effective programs with, regard to Indochina be given highest priority attention vithin the,Departments and Agencies concerned and that the present action machineiy be streamlined to the extent possible. .:

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Tho CC3 tocloy toe": tho follo\;ins poriitloii on tMs natter in order to coriy c'-it paragraphs lo-^a G.nd lO-d oi" Pro^t IV of Iv3G 5/^^9/2:

■ ■ ^ ■■

■ . 1) It'is ncccGsnr/'for us MUC/Saiscn to bo cutiioidacd irr.cdiatoly to unclertaTiG tho funotldnn of i^ro-rf-din^ nilita^y aclvico and trainiiis as

■ " ■ - " *

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appropriate, to Yictncix:o:jo forcoa at oillovolo for tho development and I ' nc4^^icnanco of intornal accTirity* tJitliin its capabilit5.03^ 1-3 i-IiUG/Sai^on

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. shoiild Qsaist in tho roor^^:lDi/Ja.tio-l of tho Viotnoj^eso arr<ed forces and £;ive

then such traiiun^ and support as recjuirod to cuGtaiii the l-^^al EovcrTinont - of'Viotnajn, . -■ ^ \ ' ' - ■ . ^ . - --

■ ,•' ■ ', 2) Tho trainintj anh advisory activities or U3 M:".AG/Saic;on should to '

. ' ■ ' * * » , . '

■■ ■■

"clo^ioly coor:linatod \-ath tho Ar.bac£:ador to aosuro that rllitory cd%dco and \^

\ training GXipport tho policies of tho United StatoG x*o^ardin:;'! tho malnte:3aueo '

' of a lo^al VlctnanoGo Govonracut having*a "broad baao of national union and

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' under tho jjrciAiorohip of lli% llgo Dinh Dicn# - ' ' ^ • ' ^

3) Utilising Cvd^jtin^ Viotn^ooo Ax^ri^isa-.'ForcoG the appropriato

' a^cnclca of tho T33 GoYornTr.ont and ciclDtin^ U3 liULG/Saiccn should develop

irr^odiatoly^ and ta!:o Initial atepc; to c::ocute vlth tho Viotnar:c20 Govern- *

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nont a plan for trainin^f Jainir.un Viotnanoso cociu-it/ forcoc nccossaiy to

' counteract Viet Kinh infiltration cjid pra^anilitar/ activitios. Tho rds:5iori

of Guoh forces chould bo to onablo tho Govorrjnont of froo Viot Han to

* cstahlish and isaintaln Its oontrol throughout that torritory* Ho efforts

^. fihculd^^o aparod in finding va;>'n to besiu and':cai*ry out cuch ti^ainin^ in ^

■ * !■

tho rihortoat posniblo tine^. Tho uco of crcas oiitaido of Viot l\t^ ejid -YVX'ionn noans of ineroafjin^ VS training pcrsonnol should be o:):i5lolted:,

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h) This traininc should bo curried out vithout Interference ' ■ " ' • -^ , • . ■

jTroi;! but \ath ^^ppropriaoo coordination and arc;ictanca Xrom French

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Kilitaiy nnthoritief>. .. ^ ' ,

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5) ■ 'i-'f'iQ initial tarcot iDJ,lbo tho reorganisation 'imd training of tho nirdjv/a^ ar;ncd forces required Tor intcmallsccuri-ty in support of. a Ic^al i:ovcraraont^ Tho o^uestion of ult.i:?atG total oi^o and Ij\S,

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su port of YiotunmeGo forces \rillbG left for lator^ dctei^iT^iuationo

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6) Tho state repart:;:cnt ^rlll uiac-ortake to obtain frori the Vict-nanoGG and French Govomnontfj tho necGsa-r/ a^reG^nenta a:; to adequate authority; ^*osponDibility| and aiigr-ionbGd Gtroni^'th of the \0 JiUvG/Saigon,

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Ao yoti laiou, tho Precldont liao onkod no ^o GUmnarino ao 'briefly ctnd aa ol)Jca-tivoly a^ I can tho ^u^olicy and General

Foi' i^;t?^ ucoia l^rlofJus tho Scorotax'7, or^olooo ny 6j?af^ oa ouch' a lijuijihar/.

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RlilPORT OF THE YM FLEET MISSION TO THE FAR EA.ST

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SUM-aRY OF GENERAL AI^JP POLICY OBSERVAHONS Chapter 5 - United States Position in the Far East; An Appreciation

1

1,- The Problem : ' The problem before us is the failure of U-S. leadership in the Far East* In the light of enormous coimBunist gains in Korea and Indophina^ and the generally deteriorating situation throughout the area, the national security policies vje have been following are pointing towards ultimate defeat. We must exercise necessary leadership and develop ppropriate policies for that role*

'2. The EnejHj^s Design : So long as the Chinese CoiP-iijunist regime exists^ it will not abandon its goal of conquest^ or dominance of East and South-

ast Asia. For the nezt several years, Comrminist China is a greater jmenace to the Free World than the Soviet Union itself.

Implementation of the Design : Since the end of World War 11^ the Chinese Communist regime has waged a relentless v/ar against the free w^orld^ specifically the United States* The conquest of China^ Korea and Indochina have been stages. Geneva is but a first installment. It appears certain that Communist China vill press on towards the objective of controlling all of Southeast Asia. Her further aggressive aims have been publicly announced ("liberation" of Formosa — Ho Chi Minh's intention to take over all Vietnam) * Comi^iunist China regards the Korean armistice only

as

a deferral of the ultimate aim of control of all Korea.

1+, The Coimnon Enemy : The common enemy in the Far East is Corrtmunist China^ aided and abetted by Soviet Russia. Communist China has pursued a middle course -- pushing forward her progra^n' of conquest ^ but never to the point of precipitating unliroited war mth the U.S. We^ by our actions and inactions^ have transformed a once weak coiiimunist regime itito a woi-ld power. Peace vith freedom cannot be restored to Asia as long as the Chinese Communist regime continues to exist. Unless we stop her noWy the results will be catostrophic and we will be forced to intervene eventually anyi^ray to restore . the balance.

5. Implications of Free Worjjl Defeat : Further defeats could lead to a chain reaction and loss of the whole area^ including India^ to the Communist orbit — or its neutralization. Communist control of Asia would be an important step towards control of Europe,

II

\fe must reco,^nize that the defeat we

have suffered in

Indochina is merely a part of the price we ai^e paying for weakness in Korea -- for the Red Chinese victories in Korea that our self-imposed limitations forced on o\w commanders ^ for an armistice that relieved Red China of the strains of wajr , . . The future will reveal other prices wa must pay for the free world defeat in Indochina."

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"Toward the last stages of the var in Indochina^ those who opposed interventioa . . . expounded the principle that t^-fo conditions ^ere necessary to Justify o\ir intervention: Firsts that the local governrrLent must exercise effective control; and second^ that the local population must be friendly to the United States, In reality^ this principle is largely a pai-apbrase of the position developed in the State Department's * China VJIiite Paper' . , , to explain our failure to prevent the loss of the mainland of China to the Conmiumsts* Moreover^ it must be pointed out" that it is a very dangerous doctrine that invites explanations for future failures and defeats. Its greatest danger is that it overlooks a prime res'ponsibility of leadership^ i,e.^ to strive to create conditions favor d?le for positive action/*

6, Defeat Unnecessary : —Our defeat is unncessary. There are large indigenous material and human resources in the are^ vjhich can be developed and harnessed in the event of hostilities with Red China* Twice we let slip the '^decisive strategic opportunity'* of subtracting Communist China from the Soviet orbit^ and thus beginning the rollback of Coipjfiunist power in Korea and Indochina. V/hen Chinese communist aggression starts again, as it undoubtedly will, we must be prepared to strike back and seise strategic opportunity.

that

7- Free World Assets : Considered separately^ the problems of Korea, Formosa, Japan and the Philippines ajypear insoluble except through ultimate defeat; for these countries are in the line of mai^ch for communist conquest On the other hand, considered as a regional area, linked to U»St influence and power, they have assets of great present value, and even greater potential value, /General Van Fleet then analyzes the actual and potential strengths of these countries^ emphasizing the role they might play in a united offensive with the U,S. against Goi>miunist China/,

8, Failure of Leadership : Despite the real and potential free world strength in Asia, we have continued to suffer one defeat after another. Oar failure in the Far East is one of 3.eadership; it is a failure to consolidate Free V/orld resources of the Far East and make of those consolidated resources an instrument of Free World power and influence. We have failed to create conditions for the development of a strong, friendly role by Japan. We have failed to solve the Janahese-Korean problem. V7e have failed to solve the Japan-Fhilippines reparations problem. Our technical assistance and economic aid programs have been inadequate. Our educational and exchange programs have been weak and inadequate. Above all, we have failed to develop for ourselves a finn policy for the Far EastJ to decide what sort of a position we wish to build there. Under our present national security policies in the Far East, vre are in no position to solve the dilemna, save by compromise built on compromise. Equally, we cannot redress the balance in Asia if we give Britain and France a veto over our policies in the area.

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9* Halting the Shrinlcage in the Free World : V/e are doomed to ultimate defeat in the Fax East if we continue to "be pi-ecluded from talcing strong action. If the shrinkage of the'free ^rorld is to be halted^ ve nmst "begin the rollback of communist poller* We must exert constant pressui^e against China to undermine her position. In the event of Communist assault on Formosa^ we should take the offensive against China proper. Communist afttack on the offshore islands would present us the opportunity of destroying a large part of the Cninese ConMunist air strength^ and furnish the occasion for the start of the rollback V7hich might profitably begin with the recapture of Hainan. Merican opinion mil support such a strong rolicy in Asia.

Chapter 6. Observations of the Cliief of Mission

""O, This policy would have two aspects to be concurrently followed: ^l) defensively^ the development of increasing strength and stability in ■East Asia;, (2) the maintenance of continuous pressures against the Communist apparatus. A regional^ multi-national organization^ integrating the assets of the nations in question^ mil insure the phased development of military^ political and economic strengths* In particular^

"Under the conditions extant today, Formosa represents an asset which transcends considerations of pure defense. It constitutes the most im.portant springboard for the projection of all manner of opera^ tions against the Chinese Communist mainland. It is the potential rallying point for the totality of non-coFJUunist Cliinese in Asia^ under a liberal political platfoin which could have a profound appeal to the Chinese masses. It houses a vehemently anti-communist government which could contribute significantly to a regional organisation designed to solidify the free nations of Asia as a pre-requisite to action calculated to undermine and weaken the Communist bloc.**

Chax^ter 7 - Explanation of Approach to Survey

11. "Cursory examination revealed that there were no positive and consistent United States policy statements . , . -^-^.th respect to East Asia and its component countries. Similarly lacking were clear and unmistakable prime military missions for the forces of the several countries * . , Consequently;, certain hypothetical policies were established in order to secure a quantitative measxo'e of the forces required for the support thereof.'* The first envisages an intemiediate policy designed to develop increasing strength among the free nations of Asia while maintaining pressures to undermine and weaken Asian communist regimes and being prepared to exploit by offensive action the situations created by such pressures. This policy^ he states^ is geared to the announced intentions of the Administration J although not adequately reflected in ctu^rent national security policies. The second policy considers preventive war* The third policy considers a distinctly defensive posture.

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General Van Fleet* s analysis and recoimnendations as to the mission^ size and composition of military forces for East Asian countries are apparently based primarily upon the first assuined policy, as illustrated by General Van Fleet's statement of the general mission of the expanded and improved East Asia indigenous forces stated in his "Sijurji^ary of Recommendations on the Area as a Whole";

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(1) Maintenance of internal security;

(2) Defense against external aggression;

(3) Exertion of constant pressure- against the CoEimunist enemy;

(h) Exploitation of oprjortunities arising from, the cumulative effects

of constant pressure against the enemy^ and (5) Development of an adequate "base for maximum mobilization in the ^ event of war with Communist China or a general war,

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Ambassador Eonnab called on the Secretary at his ovfn recusst. Ke said that r^ he had not been Instructed to rr^akc a donarche but had coine on his ov.ti initiative- 0) to express his p.dsgi\dngs and deep an^dety v;ith regr?.ixl to the com*so of events in Indochina. He said that the iniorn^aticn he had received officially^ and in 'personal cor/jnunxcations frcm General Ely^ led hint to feel that the chances of Dieni succeeding in forming a govomnent of national iinity aiid of acquiring authority v;er3 very slight.

He said that General Sly^ in V/iioni he had unbounded confidence^ had done everything he could to bring about a settlenent of the Diem-fiinh quarrel. He had succeeded in obtaining from Kinh the undertaking that he vrould liieit hiifts^lf entirely to nuLlitary affairs and v;ould stay avray from politics. He had brought H5jnh to the uo5-nt where he had agreed that he vrould take oilers fro:r. Dieni, Hov/ever Dion- had on hi^^^j^tjbeen^acl^^ Hinh. iTtTs" deadlocirhas created a dan.^erous situation in >.^iich sorr.e of the

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■ ■ The Ambassador co^-i^ented in a rueful tone that "Prance nov had ever yone against her in Indochina." Ke said that the Presiderit^s letter to-Diej:: had ^-cre^tted a 3s:isation in Saigon and vras being interpreted as superseding the

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Vfesliington a^reejientsj by T-/hich ATubassador Heath need no longer consider hinsolf bourid. It v.^.5 felt that the President's letter had given Diem full rein i^athout requiring of him as a preliiidnary condition that he shoiild first succeed in fanning a strong a.nd stable goven:in-entj even though yii3._prelininai;:>;;_cot^ition had been_p?.rt -Of .-the.basis_of the Vfashington agreeuients, ' ^ ^ ■

/ further aspect of the President's letter vhich is gi^-ing the French concei-* is the use v.^iich the Viet Viinh could make of this step in relation to the Armistice agreerxient. Xhe Embassador said that the Viet Kinh ''.-.'OTiLd doubtless v-ash to e^q^loit this possibility^ especially if the situation \%ere to deteriorate furthe . In addition to the French It^peditionary Force no^^' located in Southez^n Vict Kam^ there v::-ts the natter of the troops in Kaiphong, v^hich v;ere not to be evacuated until Kay 1955- AH this added up to a very delicate situation, . potentially darigerous and of uncertain prospects. The /jr^bassador said that in all good faith J and despite the best vdll in the ^forld to inake the Diem cxnqriraent v;orkj the out3.ook seemed to be deteriorating rap5-dly. He vas also concerned bv what seemed to hin to be a lack of Franco -Ails ri can cooi^lination >rith roi=^ard to the course of action to be taken in Indochina and said he hoped it vrould be possible for us to consult each other again-more closely, and bring oixr positions together, . . '

The Secretary said that he vras gi^dng the situation in Indochina the gVeatest attention, and he agreed that it >ras a difficult and delicate problem. He pointed out that Diem needed all the support that he cou3-d get froa every quarter and that it was not enough to say that one vas going to support Diem but that he hadn't nuch chance. The support r.ust be positive and continuous' in orcier to be effective. The Secretary said that he had ha^d a talk vdth Preniier l-Iendes^-Frjance in Paris on Indochina and that he vould shortly be sending him a r^essar^e about the situation there.

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November 17, 1953

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MElvlORATJDUI^l FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: General Collins^ RecommendatlorLS Regarding

Military Force Levels in Viet-Nain

General Collins has submitted a report and his recommendations regarding force levels in Viet-I^ram* A breakdown of the proposed forces as recommended is attached as Tab A.

In simimaryj the main points of his report esxe as follows:

1. It would be disastrous if the French Expeditionary Corps •were v;ithdrawn prematurely since otherwise Viet-Nam could be overrun by an enemy attack before tfie 'Manila Pact Powers could act*

2. The United States should continue to subsidize the French Expeditionary Corps during calendar year 1955^ a-t least to the degree of one hundred million dollai*s, to encourage the French to retain sufficient forces* (The current rate of U,S. subsidy is four hundred million annually). I

3. The Vietnamese National Army^ now totaling 170^000

should be reduced by July 1955 to 77,000, It should be placed ^ i

under Vietnamese coEimand and control by that date. It

would be organized into six divisionsj three of which would - (

be field elements designed to reinforce the balance of the

Army which would be stationed in reginaental and battalion

garrisons tliroughout the provinces* A smaH Air Force and

Navy is provided for. The cost to the U.S. would be tv7o

hundred million dollars annually. (This is less than current

costs).

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k» The United States should assuiiie training responi^ibility for the Viet-Natu rlational Army by January 1^ 1956 with French cooperation and utilizing French trainers*

5. General Ely, the French Comnander^ is agi^eeable to a slow build'-up of our MAAG for training purposes.

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John Foster Dulles

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Enclosure:

Tab A - Reconmiended Force Levels - Viet^-Nam

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ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

, WASHINGTON 73, D. C, ' i »

Novcnibor 24^ 195^

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At a meeting held today at* 3:00 P-IU^ FOA Administrator

Is en told French Ambassador- Bonnet that thtJ United States i;ould contemplate^ subject to an agreement being reached be-tv/een Generals Collins and Ely^ and subject to, discussions i^^ith certain Congressional leaders^ the following future aid

ranee with respect to Indochina: " , '

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(a) The sum of 100 million dollars for "support of the ch Expeditionary Corps during the calendar year 1955, counterpart French francs accruing after January 1^ 1955

zn^^ U^ S^ aid with respect t o^ Indochina, would be applied ischargo of this commitment if sucji commitment is actiTally ^ Likev/ise^, any savings effected as. indicated in Sub-si on (b) bolov; in expenditures of the 1954 budget programs d be applied against this commitment if andv/hen made not be an addition to xto ' '

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(b) The programmed 1954 budget expenditures in respect-to the French Expeditionary Corps would bo continued but would only cover supplies^ equipment^ etc, actually* sent to Indocliina* on or prior to December 31^ 1955<i As stated abovc^ if this arrangement resulted in any savings below the original 785 million dollars programmed for this French budget support^ such savings would be first applied against the foregoiag 100 million dollar comraitmenl and not be made available to the French in .addition thereto* . . ... / " " 'S"- -^ . ..

I had had no notice of. this meeting prior to 2:00 P»M, today v/hen I arrived at the airport on return from Ncv; York City where I, attended the Navy Le^ague Dinner last night. The time of .py return was dictated by the fact that I v/as traveling-by commercial transport and no scats v/ere available until the 12:?-0 Pa^'s* plane from New York City^ The notice of the meeting to tiie Defense Department as distinguished from me personally

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s not received until 1:00 P« M^ todayc* Both Stasscn's office ard the State Department disclaim responsibility for the lack of notice^ but i\olting of State indicated to mo over tlie p^^ono that the mec^ting vjas knov/n to'the State Department last Saturday* . . '

t e 1 e -since

Orally at the incetingj I stated that the Department of Defense had not had any opportunity to chock the details of the ICO million dollars mentioned for FEC support during the

year 1955o Tjirough pencilled notcs^ I informed v/h 11 e he v/as talking that the Departnicnt of Defense Jiad never agreed to the original position paper in that respect' Trhich"v;as based on a recommendation from General Collins v/ith--

showing tJie basis of his calculations* Ii^ . notes made clear to Stassen that I had called

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Tierchant on Monday^ November 22^ and asked him

v;hcther and v/hcn any meeting would be held v;it]i the Trench on the subj cct of financial aid to tlie FEC and othcrv/ise in Indochina^ stating that Defense had some ideas it would like to prosonto * I told Mr* Merchant . that I did not feel it v{as Defensors job to get in touch vfith the French^ that I assumed State v/ould take the lead in that respect and that State v^ould get in touch v/ith Defense so that v.^c might compare notes before , any meeting* Mro Merchant agreed vzith that position but did not at that time mention.tlie fact that any meeting \it\s scheduled, vjith the French for U^cdnesday^. NoVer.iber 24,^

'Ambassador Bonnet at the meeting indicated that the ICO million dollar support for the FEC during calendar yenr 1955 v;as far below, the amounts v/hich the French had expected to receive from the United States in that respect and that if the United States remained firm at that figure^ General Ely v/ould probably have to make a substantial revision in his estimates as to the nurabers of .men in tl^e FEC to be retained in Indochina^ Ambassador Bonne-t stated that he would com-tnunicate Stassen*s statements to the French Government and that v;ould probably take some days before any reply could be made* n endeavored rather briefly to argue with Bonnet. that 100, million dollars v/ould be sufficient in the absence of any war act ivity^ ^pointing out that only 256 million dollars had been utilized by the FEC (based on bills received to date) under the Laniel-Navarre Plan which required much greater activity on the part of the FEC* Bonnet replied that all of the bills are' not yet in and that while he could not make any

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After the meet ing^ I complained to Stassen about our

lack of notice of, the 3:00 P*M« meeting todays He replied that he personally had not received any longer notice than I had and that the entire commitment as phrased vtas based on the Dulles desire to communicate as promptly as possible to the French that their expectations of receiving budgcti support in the amount of $300 million for calendar year 1955 uere without foundation and that the 100 million dollar comaitment as made v;as based on the rocommcndation from General Collins^ I replied that I v/as fully aware that Secretary Dulles did not v/ant to give the French a valid excuse for pulling out of Indochina completely and leaving the problem in our hands v;ithout the French available to bear any responsibility^ but that Defense had not agreed^ insofar as I knev;^ to the original position paper on' this subject and had accepted the Collius recommendation of $100 million subject to an opportunity to check the basis of his calcula-H, tionso I further explained tli'at I had told the State Department (I believe it v^as Livingston Mercliant^ but it might have been Nolting) during the Mendes-France and Dulles talks that I believed we should express any statements made about' 100 million dollars for the FEC as a maximum and give the iirioression that it mig};t be reduced^ Stassen and apparently my expression been co.'^irjiunicated to himo.

Such v;as not done by of' opinion had never

I further made the point that Defense had a substantial interest in these matters^ that Defense approval should be sought in advance of any discussions v:ith tlie French or at least Defense be given an opportunity to express its opinion ar.d that any meeting scheduled should only be'after adequate

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D/VfE: DecQTuber ?/ 19!^;

;UD JECT:

Vietnam and Southeast Asia '

PARTICIPANTS: Senator Ilike Kansfield

Assistant"Secretary Walter S* Robertson Assistant Secretary Thraston 3* Horton Hr* KeiVAGth'T. Young^ Jr.

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At th3 Ssoretaiy^s request Yx, Rcb^jrtson^ Hr* Morton and I'll% Y<yo.r% went to see Senator Maii^field this morning vith respect to General Collins* analysis of the situation in Vietnaiii (Sai£;on:3 21Q3 of Eecex-iber 6). Ml', Robertson eiq^lained to &5nator Konsfield. that the Secretary had a suTiT-iary oJE^ this telagran early th5-3 morning and had asked that it bo - ' brought to Senator KansfieldTc attention so that the State Leparteient night ha^/e the benefit of his reaction and advice. . ^

After reading the telesram and di.scussing various points Senator^ Mansfield stated his conclusions as follc^fs:

1. The prospects for he3,ping Ciem strengthen and uphold South Vietn?j;i look veiy diiii given the best-cf circurp.stanccs. Any elections in 19^6 Hill probably f^-Vor the Co^Tjiranists.

■ ^ 2# Nevertheless, the United States should continue to exert its efforts and use its resourcesj even if it will cost a lot, to hold Vietnani as long as possible e Arx^^- other course vould have a disastrous effect on Car:ibodia^ Laos and Southeast Asia, The Senator strongly cpoosed the idea of abandoning our eifoi^t in Vietnan, That coursi^ of ;■

action i;ould lead to-the absorption of Canibodia and Laos by the ComTiunlsts,

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3. Therefore^ he felt vfe should cor.tijiua to do whatever was possible to suppoi'b the goV'Srixr^ant of Dien. Senator Ilansri^lcl sees no alternative Srir.e llinistex-^, Khils recoj^nising Dien's^ ^icakiiesses as an. adiriijniEtrator and manager J Senator Mansfield feels \^b ought to continue to p?.ok Diem, strongly encourage hiia to make Dr. Quat Mini.ster of Defense iniT-ediatel/j and ui'ge Diem to delegate as rmoh as possible of the day-to-day operations of the govornjr^ent to others* Senator Mansfield 7ias cf the opinion that Genexv^l Collins' time limit of t;;o to thi'ee v:eeks \:b3 plying Trith "political ^.amite'^ because it vas giving Diem such an ar.ffully short time iii vrfiioh to shcnv results or be replaced. . , * ■ - "

It. Kith respect to lir. Robertson's point that the French vjould subject the Secretary to great press'ars on iiriinediately fij^ding a replacement for DisHj Senator Kansfield took the strong position that this line of action utJuld only confound the already great difficulties in Vietnam* It vould adi niich confusion^ take tiitie^ and probably increase the dD.visions v:5.thln Vietnam beyond vrhat they are to^lay. Senator Kansfield vas certain the refugees and many of the Catholic bishops and church officials vould oppose the replacement of Diem. The Senator felt, that Dieia represented ;rhat snail hope there Tnay be in building soniething jxi Vietnanfie He was against relinquishing oven tlie small chance vie have >rlth Diem for some unlcnorn and iiQoried combination*

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5, Senator K^nsfield agreed with General Collins' reco-nmendation that Embassy Paris urge Eao Dai to cease the long distance wirepulling from the Riviera and to give Diotn complete backing and initiative to run the government i;ithout interference froii b^-*^ Dai* Senator Hansfield strongly urged that it vras so inport-snt to get this idea across to Bao Dai that A,mbassador Dillon hi-Tiself shou3-d make the approach as suiting the publicity of such a meeting could be kept to a min:b?rum. The Senator also felt veiy strotigly that Bao Dai should not return to Vietnaiji.

6. In addition to the abovcj Senator Hansfield said that Dr. Quat in h-is opinion ;jas an able man trho. could do m.uch to help bring the arr.-vy-under control Sind into loyal support of the gov'em>:3nt. He hoped D5,em woitld appoint Qaat right avay.- The Senator said that the remai*kabla aspect of Diem vas unlike most of the Vietnamese^ he really ivas honesty 5,ncorrupti ble and a devoutly dedi cated nationalist as veil * Hovrevex'^ the Senator expressed the periohal view^that in politics one often has to maka some compromises in order to get results* He thought that Diem should be encouraged not only to delegate responsibilities to trusted and capable ministers^ but should also give in to a certain amount of comproirLise, The ^' Senator suggested that Di'* Fishel would probably be the best person to vork ' out with Diem the problem of delegation and political adjustments. It v/as clear that the Senator had great con:fidence in D^. Fishel. He hoped that the Department and the Ihibassy uoiad give the latter full leeway and since he appears to have the coiTTplete confidence of Diem. On Kr. Robertson's point

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that the French and the British irould continue to push very hard for Tairij iSenator I'lansfield was iir:nly oppoaed to our accepting Tam or exerting any pressure at all on Diem to include Tarn in his cabinet* Senator i-'ansfield agreed nith Mr, Robert son that to do eo rro^Jild comproirdss ' the carbinefc and provide the Corrjn^mists with a ready jcade argirr^ent for ■ charging the Diem go\"ernnient viith being a puppet of the old colonial regirae.

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BELIEVE EMBTELS 2^133 AMD. 2^13^4, DECEMBER'S ANSl-JER IN GENERAL TERMS REFERENCE TELEGRA^5, OUR VIEl'S NUMBERED QUESTIONS REFERENCE TELEGRAM FOLLOvJl -' '• '

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QUESTION OF BUDGET PRESENTAT IOMj BY WKICK WE UNDERSTAND YOU HEAN THE MATTER OF TIHXNG, OF COURSE INTENSIFIED PRESS-' URE REACH DECISIONS BY JANUARY 15j BUfIS NOT AT ROOT OF BASIC PROBLEM. AS INDICATED PARAGRAPH OE^E EMBTEL 2A33j FRENCH GOVERNMENT ALREADY CONSIDERING DECISIOM ACCELERATE WITHDRAWAL EXPEDITIONARY CORPS AND PROBLEMS RELATED THERETO, INCLUDING CIVILIAN EVACUATlCNj.AS DIRECT RESULT UNITED STATES DECISION PROVIDE ONLY ONE-THIRD AMOUNT REQUESTED FOR MAINTENANCE F.E.C. IN 1955.

k, VE BELIEVE FRENCH FOR MOST PART SINCERELY CONVINCED THAT UNLESS-EITHER DIEM GOVERNMENT PROFOUNDLY MODIFIED AND STRENGTHENED OR ALTERNATIVE STRONG GOVERNMENT ESTABLiSHED_^.Y_SOME-' TIME DURING JANUARY AT LATESTj VIETMINK EROSION IN SOUTH VIETNAM WILL HAVE PROCEEDED TO POINT WHERE VIETMINH CAN REASONABLY EXPECT TO BECOME PRINCIPAL FORCE PRESENT IN SOUTH BY TIME JULY 1S56 ELECTIONS, ' HOWEVERj WE WISH REFER THIS CONTEXT OUR COMMENTS EMBTEL 2QE3 REGARDING FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES INVOLVED VIETNAMESE SITUATION WHICH WE FEEL TRANSCEND AND TEND AGGRA--

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~2~ 2kkSj DECEMBER 9j 5 P*r!, , FROM PARIS

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5. IJE DO HOT BELIEVE FRENCH DECISIOM ACCELERATE WITHDHAHAL EXPEDITIONARY CORPS VIETKAH AND TO EVACUATE THOSE FRENCH CIVILIANS AND VIETNAI-:ESE WHO WISH LEAVE AS RESULT THEREOF, WILL AFFECT APPRECIAELY FRENCH ACTIVITIES LAOS AND CAMBODIA, OR FRENCH DESIRE TO HAIMTAIM ITS ir-IFLUENCE rlAXInUrl LEV-ELS THOSE TUO COUNTRIES, PARTICULARLY'ECOMO^ilCAL AND CULTURAL FIELDS, SO LONG AS IT APPEARS REASOMABLY CERTAIN CAH30D1AK AND LAO BORDERS ARE TO BE HELD. BY FORCE IF NECESSARY-AGAIKST POSSIBLE FUTURE INTESIFICATION VIETMIMH PENETRATION.

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Recent developments current situation follow: 1. Relations vith French:

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{a) Earlier this weak Ely was en verge of signing minute of understanding on organization and training of Vietnsiiiese armed forces. Mo^-J French have come up with ne'^ amendments requiring US respect Ely's responsroilities ^'under Geneva .accprd s"'^ a nd.

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Including long new protocol with several reierences to Geneva. V/hether these new proposals come from Ely's legal staff or Paris I do not (repeat not) know^ but inclined believe latter since .Ely agreed to resolve few remaining minor points directly with me and since he has said several times that Paris political circles would have to be satisfied. I intend refuse accept any reference to Geneva accord or make any further-concessions refer ence OT^yrile'l'sfull responsibility for training .under Ely^s broad ^^ direction. » '"^^ ^^

(B) Interview with .Salnjteny^ to which Ely and his officers con- ^^V= tlnue to refer with Caligrinj appears reinforce view that our' ^"^ ^ relations with French" in Indochina may remain less clear-^ciit thgn:] --Ely wishes and has^given me to believe they are q

2. Latest developments re Quat: ' ^ li,

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'Since Lujen^s return froii! Paris, his open opposition to Quat has undermined Dietn's decision to appoint Quat Minister of Defense. On 11 December Diei^n Infortijed Flsh8l.e,a,follows: -six of seven cabinet members consulted by Diem have voiced strong opposition to Quat, Generals Phuong (Cao Dal) and Soai (Ploa Hao) have declared they vill withdraw frotn gOf/ernment and threa-t-en-opsii rebellion if Quat appointed. Secause of location Hoa Hao terrl-tor* , Diem purportf^ to fear GeneraLSoal might cut off rice supply of Ljaigon-*Cholonj block road and waterway traffic through cop.stal areas and to Saigon^ tnalce v/ar in Hoa Hao area^ against na.tional army which in present condition could not (repeat not) handle slti 3.tion. Diem fears also comparable action might be taken by Cao: Dai forces, including possible moves against government in Saigon and vicinity,.

(b) Diem told Flshel that he had ,informed Phuong and Soai that Americans wanted Quat as Defense Minister- The Generals replied, "a responsible American should speak for the Americans^'. Hence Diem asked Fishel to transmit these "facts" to me, sa^ying if I or "soiTiS other person" can convince' Phuong and Soai not (repeat not) oppose actively the appointment. Diem vrlll appoint Quat at ^ once, (A neat passing of the buck, we must admit). If sect leaders persist in their opposition. Diem says he v;ould be inclined raise present Deputy Minh to Defense Minister and give him full authority and responsibility over armed forces-

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(C) I am quite convinced that Diem and brothers Luyen and Khu are afraid to turn over control of armed forces to Quat or any other strong man. They may also fear Quat as .potential successor to ;" Diem and hence are doing everything they can to keep him out of any post in government- With General Hinh fired and General Vy replaced as Chief of Staff by spineless General Ty, Diem has fairly effectively seized control of army, I doubt Diem would delegate real authority to Minh, but would retain ineddltng hand on details to detriment O^Daniel^s training mission and effective development of armed forces. - ^- ^

(d) Through Colonel I^nsdale's group and GAS, I am canvassing attitude of 3ect la^iders and genulness of their alleged threats. Depending on lensdale^s findings, I will consider (l) proposing to Ely a direct US-French approach to General Soai, who Quat has said will bow to French pressure; (2) having Lonsdale suggest to Soai tb^t with Quat in defense all rice for arxed forces would be pur^ chased froui Hoa Kao (this was hint dropped some time ago by Quat as means of buying t)ff Hoa Hao); (3) sending emissaries to Seal, Huong and Cao Dai Fops (Pham Cong Tan) making clear that a ny rebellion wou ld lea d to withdrawal alTll m erlcan aia ana inevLtable victory for Ho Oi:ii Minh who would certainly not (repeTt noc) tolerate private empires of Hoa Hao or Cao Dai.

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(E) I realize dts'aavantages of forcing Diem to accept "American-

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choice" Ox Quat. Hov;ever acceptance of status Quo^ vith Mlnh elevated to Defense Ministry and sects reinforced in veto po^er over government^ Is simply postponing evil day of reckoning as to vhenj if ever^ Diem 'will assert type of leadership that can . uniTy this country and give it chance of competing vith hard^ effectiveJ unified control of Ho Chi Mlnh. Such a delaying action vould appear to be justified only If ve are preparing vay for alternatives^ as indicated in part II, * ^■

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Rec'd: Deceinber I5, 195^^ ^' ll:05,-p-*W.j.

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At midnight 12-15 De-ce;Tib3r Generals Vy a.nd Ty took office as Inspector Genaral and Chief of staff Vletnan] ai^rriad forces, respGctively* Details of Vy's autlss net yet knowTi-.

^5- Diem'3 declaration of confidenca In Amiy: -

December 13 Diem published decla.ration expz^esslng conftdenco in - Army and calling on all ranks to join v;lth people in building free, indepOjadent Vietnaiu.

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Postscript.

6. Re paragraph 1 (a) above; Ely and I this morning signed minute of understa.nding on developrnent and training of aufccnomous Vietnatn armed forces and agreed to vording of separate axplana-

: ' toryjtnemoranduti] for record to accompany it. Final text of minute is based on our draft and I consider it wholly satisfactory. Texts follov by separate inessage. , . ■ .

7. Re para.graph 2 above: Ely and I agree this morning to take further steps to secure Quat's appointment. Ely discounts possl^ blllty sects will revolt if such appo^lntn^ent made. Sly said he vould at once see Generals Phuong a,ad Soai and inform them both "French and Amerlce.ns support Quart's appointment, Ely said he has little influence over Cao Dal Pope and racotnmended X see

■ him, Ely will also Intervene ^#lth Deputy Defense Minister Mlnh and ask him to remain three to six months as Quat's deputv.

i^ ' PART II ^ ^ TOP SECRET REPi:ooycTiOM Fr;oM nns

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Possible alternative3 to Diem Government:

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1, As I see Itj ve have 5 possible courses of action.^ia-3;:ie-tnet5:

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(a) Continue support of Diem Govei^nnrient.

(B) Support establishment of another government v^nien-^ay-'b^e"'* • able to save situation, . k V'/^'rc. 1 X

(C) Gradually withdraw support froin Vietnam,

2. (a) Difficulties and risk of support Diem have been covered In EI^IBTEL 21C8 and FART I this message and other cables- Recent accomplishments have been minor considering-magnitude of task ahead. Favorable developments Include: ^ , ^

(1) Diem made first anti-Comtnunist appeal to people 16 November.

(2) Dlem-Klnh feud has been resolved^ for present at least.

(3) Diem made trip to South Cochin China to observe work by-Army In its rehabilitai:ion program,

(4) Phan Rang-Pban Thiet affair has been compromised,

(5) V y and Ty have taken their new offices.

-v(.6) 15 December Diem issued proclamation expressing confidence in the Army and calling on it to unite with people in the fight against Communtstn.

(B) Realize abandonment of Diem would embarrass US in view our public.support present government. Howeverj if it proves neces--sary, believe such embarrassment would prove insignificant compared to blow to anti-Communism In Asia and throughout world if US-supported free Vietnam were lost to Communism. I believe It ■ would"be better to take slight loss of prestige In near future vblle time to attempt other solution remains^^ rather than con- .. tlnue support Diem should failure appear relatively certain. V/e have not reached this pointj though I have grave misgivings re Diem'3 chances of success.

5. In view of possibility that Diem will fail to rally unified support of army in fight a gainst Communism^ believe we sncuTd ' GonFider other solutions. IVo alternatives (neither of which is too promising, but each of which should be considered in event of Diem's failure) are suggested: . , ^

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CORRSri'ED PAGE 5 12/21/5^^ 2 a.m.

CN 53gi

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(a) Have Bao Dal'name Quat to replace Diem as President of Council, Quat Is able, forceful and resourceful and though ohstacles to his success exist, if given chance_ he ailght succeed where Diem failed. T^iTiether the various" selfish grpi^ps In the country vould give him that chance la question-He 3 northerner, has only slight political following and, as indicated in PART I, faces considerable opposition. With complete confidence and support of Eao Dal, hgwover, he might sue eed; i^ithout it he would surely fall.

(b) ,(1) Second alternative is to have Bao Dai return to Vietnam under "state of emergency" conditions, assume Presidency of Council and rally entire nation to unified action, trnat is needed hero more than anything else is leader vjho' can fire ImGglnatlon and patriotism of pooplo ond instill in them dcterinlnatlon to flj^^ht for froodorn of Vietnam. Una Dol

may bo the Inst posslhlo candidate for this tank.

(2) I have been Irripx^essed with influence lino DU still exercises 'over leaders Vietnam. All leaders continue to refer to him ns *^His Majesty" and most regard him as the real source of authority Vietnam*

(3) To ovez''come obstacles, dramatize return and establish self as leader of Vietnam, Bao Dal could take steps such as:

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(a) Turning over some of his holdings to government for distribution to peasant's as step toward agrarian reform;

■ (b) Form an "emergency" Cabinet including best available' Vietnamese — Quat, Diem, ..others;

(C) Announcing withdrawal jftench military forces by some

specific date; - ^ . ■ - ^ '

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*(d) Issuing temporary democratic charter to guide government during emergency;

(G) Convening a representative assecjbly; •(H) Calling for a constituent assembly.

Act:,**:

6- Though course.

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Dedassitied per Executive Order 13526, Secdon 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 2011

iv^-iiEm immm 'Department'of State /"^iliilFrV

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Control: 5883

Rec'd: December 13, 1954 FROM: Saigon 8:05 p.ra.

TO: -Secretary of State . "" -v^ Enrc-auof

f fAR EASTESlRAf FAIRS ' NO; 2250, DecsEber I3 (SECTION THREE OF rHEES.) ' .pr.-n 1 /M3b4

KIACT\

SENT DEPARTME^IT 2250^ REPEATED IM^ORIv^ATIOK PARIS 70&, PHflOM PKI^IHj

1"G (grodml vithdrairal form VJ.etnain) is Ica^t desirablCj In all honesty end in view of \iast I hove ohaerved here to date It Is possible this aay he only sound solution. Should this he neaer.saryj it r.-sy he'ulse to concentrate effort on saving Laos-Canihcdi3--Th3tland'-Bui*'ir.a'*India^ line — if possible ulth latter's active support. Realize Departrnsnt has probably given . consideration to Gonia such alternative. I v/ill not presume to advise steps to be taken 'at this tlroe^ other than suggest that ve attempt persuade India recognize Governa

ients Laos and

Cambodia soonest.

7. Surrmation: (a) At present I arn highly dubious of Diem*3" ability to succeed but prefer to reserve final judgnjent till e3P3-y\part of January; \h) alternatives to support of Dtetg should be thoroughly explored vithin US Governrrien

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8, RecoLfliuendattons: (a) US continue to support Diera at Paris j ' (h) not consider alternatives paragraph 1-3 ^^rlth French until after I have communicated tcy final judgment to Department.

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3,3 NND Piojeci Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

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SECRET

Refer to: I-l6,521 C-R 1-8270 (Unci)'

Deaj? I^. Chairman;

Dec ll; I95U

The Secretary of Defense has requested that I reply to your letter 01 17 Hovember 195^^ to the Director of the Foreign Operations Administration requesting a report on the military aid situation in Indochina. ' 1 ' - .

The facts of the military aid situation in Indochina insofar as the Department of Defense is involved follow:

■ a. The value of MDAP shipments to Indochina (in millions of dollars)J including value of equipment furnished from excess U, S, stocks J as of 31 October 195^1;, is:

Regular MDAP

Special Military Support

Common Use

Total

■ 9^.0

123-7

Army

Navy

$76H .-£ $15^.3

Air Force

$167.0

13.8

633.1

3.17.3

13.8

151.7 2.6

163.2 . 3.8

0

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TTo official reports of losses of ai^mament and equipment have been released by the Trench. Hoveverj it is estimated by U.S, officials that the following items of equipa^ent^ valued at approxinately $1.2 million^ fell into Viet Kinh hands at Dien Bien Phu*

In addition to the equipment lost at Dien Bien Pliu, snaH quantities of small axmsy machine gunsj ammunition and personal troop equipment have been captm^ed by the Viet Minh during the prolonged military operations in Indochina.

COPY

SECRET 813

Dedassiflied per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 20 i 1

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c. The Departoent of Dt^fense has not supplied any fixed assets north of the 17th parallel*

d* Since the signing of the Geneva Agreeir^ent^ all shipments of materiel to Indochina have ceased except those items required to avlle-Yiate suffering, prevent disease^ and assist in the evacuation from North Vietnam.

e. The Department of Defense plans to initiate direct aid to Vx^tnan and Camhodia on 1 January 1955* The details of the military plans and MDA prograins to implement such plans are under active study and de-velopment by appropriate agencies of the U.S. Coverraifent. There are no p2 ns to give military aid to Laos at this time "because under the terms 01 the Geneva Agreement, no U,S, military advisors are admitted in the country* The fozui of the aid for the tvo Associated States is to be concentrated on training a force capable of maintaining internal security and to eventually develop an anay capable of figliting a delaying action in case of invasion from the North* It is hoped that the French Expeditionary . Corps vill remain in the area until native troops can be trained to replace them.

i * f. Negotiations with the French are being conducted at this time vlth the vlev of returning to U, S. custody all materiel no longer required in Indochina*

g. When the Genevi^Agrcement vas signed, there vere 211,000 long tons of h'lDAF materiel in French depots north of the lyth parallel. As of 20 November 195^^ over 50^ of this equipment had been evacuated- Fifteen-hundred long tons per day is the target for evacuating the above materiel. The daily averages of evacuation to date indicate that the French are more than meeting this target and it is estimated that all depot stocks irill be evacuated from the North by 1 March 1956 and retitrned to depots in the South, Equipment issued to the various military units is evacuated with the miits. The materiel in the South is being inventoried and upon completion, a deter-, mination xill be made as to the equipment that is no longer required for operations in Indochina. Materiel that is not required vrill be returned to the custody of the U*S. for distribution to other areas. As an indication of the thoroughmess of the French evacuation of military equipment^ all pierced-steel planking used on airfield runvays and taxiT-,^ays have been dismantled and shipped to the South*

Sincerely yours.

Signed: E. STKUVE HHISEL

Honorable Alexander Vfiley

Chairman

CoiiDiiittee on Foreign Relations

United States Senate

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FROM: Saigon ■ .' '

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TO: Secretary of State

NO; 2303, DeGe::nber 16, 7 p.

vlt>out prior consent Control: 7230 °^ I^ii--ctor S/s Rec'd: JDocsmfcer I6, 19^^ 10:02 p.ra.

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T KIACT PAP.IS 7?_n; FRIGRITx DEPARTI>'IE1?X 23O5

DEFARTMET^'T PASS DE?E?iSE EZES Omj£ HETISEL^ J1\Y1S AND JCS DEPAETMEI^JT EIES OrvT:rr ACTIKG SEGRSTARX AI^ID ROBERTSOn

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PARIS PilES au:i SEGPJSIARZ STATE^ SECRETARX DEFENSE AlID RADECHD

FROM COLLINS

Re WiBTELs IS30. 2108, 2250 Dspartment 2285 (paragraph 8) .repeated Paris $02^ 665, 706, 717.

1. Decision of Diem not to appoint Quat Defense Minister la . final develop-TenL that convince8_me that■ Diern ^oes^aQJuIiavgJ:he

capac 1 ty jto_un 1 fX..^J-X^ ^ ^'^ tha t un 1 es a

stJrfr0~suGh action ia taken as indicated'in paragraph 7 helov, this country will be lost to cor^jraunlsm. Reasons for Diems decision procabl^' compounded cf (l) unv;illingnes3 to' delegate control of Vietnan arrrod force3 to any strong man; (2) x'ear of ■ Quat as potential successor; (3) opposition of sects; (^) in- . fluence of brothers Luyem and Nhu; tS) desire to retain Mlnh in government.

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2. Whatever the reasons^ the failure to utiltiae Quat epitomizes lack of unity anong Vietnarrese and lack of decisive leadership on part of Die;:3* Mlnh refused to submerge his personal am-

bit ions J even for a fev ircnt-hs transition period under Quat or, anyone else. Luyen again demonstrated his ability to cause ^'^' Diem to reverse a dec is ion already taken (Diera had told tne prior to Luyen^s return from Paris that he would^ appoint Quat). The veto pcver cf the sects over any changes in the government that are likely to result in a veakenlng of their private dor:jalns has been confiru:ed." Another strong positive trjan^ Quat^ has been blocked fror.^ having a hand in reorganizing and controlling th.:

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d forces. And all of these negative results have re-

—quired a month of lengthy discussions^ evasions of basic Issues^

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-2-#2505/Decsstep 16, 7'p.a., fr-oa Saigon and wasted opportu^iities.

Vithcu<;prior conso 02 Director S/S

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3. Mlnh Is a good v:^an, though young and inexperienced. 0'Daniel feels that if Dleru delegates full authority to Mlnhj the latter may be able to heal vounds of Dieic-Hinhj T^-yy^ Ph^^ Rang-Phan Thtet affairs and bring stability end sanity" to governirjent^arniy relationships.,rr,3ut It is highly doubtful to me that Minh^ or/ anyone- else under present conditions^ can create a single^ cohesive national army from the five separate forces novr existing^*-the Geo Daist^ Iioa Hao, Binh Xuyen^, national guar-d, and the. present national aro^y. With anticipated opposition from the sects and scgs frotn DierG hiuiself^ vho is lostha to disband his o\in private force (national guard)^ it will take stronger leadership from DioiL' and Minh than either has shovn to date to reduce and a'i}alga;::ate these forces*

h, Ifhat is true of the armed forces is likely to be true In the resettlej^ent of refugees ,snd land reform, ^^.on 1 told Die^i] recently that our FOA people vere having difficulty in getting dov/n to business v;lth the Vietnam agricultuj?a officials^ Diem reminded mo that the Minister of agriculture is a Hca Hao and the Eoa Hao are fearful of the effect bf land reforn] on their extensive control of rice lands. Government officials hesitate to place refugees on French-ovned rice lands or in the French-Gvned rubber plantations. And so on^ one excuse for inaction after another* ^ ' ^ .

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5- Fact is that of the fine program of refornis announced by " -Dietn in September^ no definite progress has been achieved in converting'words into deeds in any field. - ' '

6. I had hoped Diem would broaden and strengthen his cabinet by addition of Quat and perhaps even Bay Vien, Latter^ despite his liu'id past, has demonstrated organising ability and his recently indicated desire to become ■'honorable" and to assist . government. With Quat in government^ Quat might have done much gradually to get sects In line and thj^oagh his practical political ability have Injected sc:re flexibility and drive^ both of which are now woefully lacking. At same time Quat might have acquired greater stat^ore in public eye which might later have rendered him more' eligible for higher post if later fcund necessary replace Diem. 'Unfortunately^ this was probably deduced by brother Luyeh and Die:u also. I feel sure that fear of Quat'a ability is at root of sects and Dlem's opposition.

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7. After weighing all available evidence^ I am now convinced that in face of the positive threat of Ho Ghi Minh's rerirre '^^ will take decisive action and dramatic leadership frco: ^te '^He-^ namese themselves to save free Vietnam. Neither French nor A-erl^ cans can substitute for such"action and leadership. Apparently "

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Bet to bo r5lop-,^(j' Without prior con^eat Qt Director S/s

Dccliissified per Execiilive Order 13526, Section 33 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

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the only Vletn^r^BEe Vho night be oczretent to galvanize the couritpy Inl-o unified action ts Bee Dal. T:io-^h I" do net kncv^ the tran^ snd reallr.e his manj disabilities^ it Is pcssible he might furnip-h the uecesnei^^ isipect if he vere to ret-Jirn and.t^ke active dir-ectlcn of the gcverc-rent, vhether he retsiaed Cie:^ or eppolQted Q:;Ht or someone else as Premier, or essuLied the orftoe hlt!]self. Merest all Yi6tn3n:68e with 7rhc:::i I heve talked^ In-i^iuding Die,:::, look Instinotivel-v to. Eao Dai as the ultirate ■ soiiroo of authority* Of ocursa^ if ve and the Fi^ench vera to

'support'his i^et;urnj specific conditions w'ould have to stipulated in^advance^ g6ner?.lly a^ indioeted in Fart 11 ^ pap-jgraBh 53, Eli^^rEL 2250. I realize slso th^t Beo Dai^s rectum vould fiju-^^

^nish excellent"propTiganda xateri^^l for the CororQunists^ but If they don-t have such ti^aterial in hand they vill tr-anufacture it anvvray. So vre should not per-:it this aspect to deterLilne our coui'-se^ after w-eighing all other

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8* I recognize that vre nust continue to support t^ie Diem Govern msnt for sor.s tlrre at least. But I r-eco^Tond th at yre not nov consummate an agreement with the Vietnamese to 3ss'c;r:e "on ^T^Jan uaiy responsibility for training their^ forces or for giving direct rnllltary aid, V/e should continue to place Arr^erlcan officers vlth staff of Vletnatn errrj and aid tn developing tral ing pla ns' a nd p a o If i c a t io n pla o s „ V/e s hould c o n 11 rL:xQ to t a Ik vlth Vietoair.ss with a viev to reaching corjixon accord, on siz^e ^ " "and cornioosltion of forces. But we should not coocl-;d9 forr^al

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should noh coni:.nit ourselves to any given volurt^e of aid until US has adopted definitive pollcj vlth respect to Vietnav;. Meanwhile I vould stroncrl;/ urge consIderstion of bringing 3ac Dal

back-under ozie or other of the variants indicated In paragraph above and paragri^ph^P EMoTEH* 2250* (See also paragraph 5j

228o, repeated Paris 717, for Ely^s vie;^^s). ^'herefcre

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■oy present reoominard^tions are:

A. Continue -to Svipport Dleo: along preser.t lines for short vhlle longer but vithout cot::u3ittir:g US to specific aid prograi^sj

B, . Consider urgentlyj as possible alternative,-the early re-vcrn of Bao Dai; ' '

C. If after short period of further test Die^r Government f-^tls to achieve sub^.tantlal progressive ac-tioUj end if retur-n of :3a: Dai is acceptable to TS Govern:i:entj to support his prorcpt return;

4

D, If ret^jLi'D of Bao Dal is not acceptable to US Governnent^ assuuiirg Diec Governnent contirues to d^-onatrete inability zz • unite free Vietna?_i behind an aggressive prcigran]^ I reoovneod

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Declus!>jncd per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

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reev3lua"ti6n of our plans for SHSlSoing Southeast Asia with SDe^tal attention to pi^opcsal contained in par-agpaph 6^ Fart II

9. I ara sorry to h3ve to make such a discouraging report^ b*:it in all honesty I have tc present to ycu ny present convict-ions "because of their possible effec^ on U3.19i'6 budget about to "be presented.to Congress. Should it be determined that in ■vie'w of the unsound situation in Vietnsc the US should gredually Vithdrav its support from this ccuntryj then it vould be necessary, in my opinion^ to Increase the aid to the French expeditiohei-y corps so that it vould remain strong enough during, the next

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year to per-nit the US to vithdrav assenti^l eqtilpuienfc vhich might other^rise fall into Cornmonist hands. It appears to me^ therefore J that ve should retain as ti^uch flexibility as possible . vith reference to financial aid for the FEC. /

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10. Conclusion; It is possible that by a tuonth frcn: no^^*^ soir^ radical Iriiproverrent will have come about but I'strongly doubt ^ -.

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t-lnue to^ carry on along same lines x hBve been "follcv:lngj but will avait Instructions vhilo tea^por^rily dragging feet^ if necessary J vith respect to definite corr:raitnient3, as indicated in paragraph 8, ■

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« , UNITED STATES GOVEHNMENT

DATE: Dec-Tri)ex' 17* V)$\>

HtOM

PS.\ « Ambassador Heath

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SUBJECT: Co:^ivaGnts on Saigon TalegraiTi 2303

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1* Tho'situation in Viet-Nam at ths time of Qcnevzl Collins * arrival on Novernber 7 night bodosoribed as foll.ori3r

. At The Fronch had lost a disastrous battle at Dien Bien Phu ani ^: that ConiTiunist military victory had boon coiTipouiidcd by a h^jiiTtiliating d5,ploinatio defeat £ov the Froe Vbrld at Gonovac^ Tho GomJnuirl-sts had achieved a level of intfsrnatloiiol recognition and po.^ition tlirough these devFjlopnento far exceedliis any pro^dO'iiJ status*

Bt Neo Dinh Diem took office on Jii3y 7o He T^jas tho first '^Nationalist^^ to assume the Frir.o Miixlstershipg He inis and i^> antl-» French J anti-Gonminist and personally honest a Ho is politically inept ^ stubbo3rn and suspicious» In his four raonths of i^sponsJhility hs had b3ca faced iriuh nassivo opposition^ inclucLijig a r-abolliou^ Ai'iV Chief Nho allegedly vras an unvritbing too?, of the Covriunlsts^ active Frohch opposition and xi^.d.'oy other dirjcoijiraging factccs*

C*, There is ovcry ovidonce that the French did not ij^t Dle^i to succeed* Reli^otant acoeptanco by Jjx Cba"i>ro (Septer^^bnr) and liendes^ Finance (^Jov3Id:)er) of the U^S^ thesis' of suppox**b of Dien^^ principally because of the lack of a better qualified candidate^ nay have eased French pressures against ^hin but did not resul-i in full Fi^onoh support^^

2'a Sinco General Collins* ari^lvalj the latter has att?ir,pted to achieve a rapid solution^ at least pax^bially based on the concept that Collius* missicn is tennorary and a settlenent appeared called for by the time of his originally schedujl.ed departures in nid-Januaryo (Sines extended) 0 General Collins* recoji^iondatiojis are no:f based on the clr« cu'.nstances of a satisfactory setblement prior to January 1. If no BOl\itionis founds he recoiT^nendsu

a* Continued suooort of Dien for a shoru period but

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without comi!Littiag specific U*S* aid prograi^is^

h^ Recalling Bao Dai, if aeceptri)!? to Uc3«

* 0^ Revaluation of ovj^ plcns fox^ assistiriig Southeast As5a^

dft' rf the situation continues i-rithout substantial progressive action to withhol3 sx^port to the Viet«;ia^ Army and to increese < support of \hB Fi^ench S:<:peditionai5^ Corps i-hile evacuating our JIDAP inaterielj>

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3» In our vi.e>Tj Genc^ral Co3.1in3* reco^ri^TiSudations igiioro tho basic factoi" that vje Kould assist a Goirimiiisb talcoover by a Tiithholding^ of o\xc ald^ even if it must necossarU^ bo |;iYen to a governnent v^aich is less th?,n perfect,^

^T^i^^ Secretary has analysed the situation as cno in vhich U3 are conducting a tlm^ buying op3 ration & Xf vie >rLtbho?«d our support to Viov-*Nair:j it will bo taken over soonor than if x-js extend smaller aid^ at a figure of about a thJrd of la^t year^ In the mo^n tine^ ue irilX prooood to do T-7bat -^ja can to strengthGn Q9rL-yQ65.D.^ Lao3 and Thailand^ This is my understanding of the Seoretaxy^s policy^ * • ■

1|, r recoimend we inform the Secretary and General Coll"ln3 that WB reco£ni:?a the dangers posed by tho above policyj bi\t that in thfi lack of more usaful alternatives that v?3 vdll continue to support Dionij because tihere is no one to take his place irho uould serve UoSo obj! ctivas enj bottero This includes the Bao Dai solution vMch is opposed by the facts of Bao Dai^s lack of support in Viot-*:Ian and his past demonstrations of inability to govern> The fear that a fiscal coTiimitiaent of over 03OO million plus our national prestitja vovild be lost in a gamble on the retention of Froo Vict-'Nari is a logltin^p.t^a ono^ but the iri.-thhold5,n5 of our support at this ji\nctura uould almost ir;evitvibly have a far vorse effect o

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PLeoonmendation;

That th3 attached tolegram bo approved and sent;.

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Dccliissified per Execulive Order 13526, Section 33 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

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■.miW& TELEGRAM Departm.e?7i\of State f im.W

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FROM; PARIS

TO; Secretary^ 0/ State

NO: 2601J DECEMBER 19.

Control: S573' Rec'd: DECBIBER 19 3J27 P.M.

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^ P.M. CSECTION O^JE OF TWO)

NIACT „ . ■ ' .

SENT DEPARTMENT 2601, REPEATED LONDON €5^i. ■

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LIMIT DISTRIBUTION - SAIGON FOR COLLINS

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TRIPARTITE SISCUSSIONS ON IKDOCHIhfA .TOOK PLACE THIS AFTER^!00^4 AT MATICKOM. ■ • ~~

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DULI,ES OPENED CONVERSATIONS BV GREETING ELY AND CITING AFPRE- ' CI AT I ON OF COOPERATION^ HE HAD SKOlvN U:S. AUTHORITIES IN ViETNA^'. ELY GAVE REPORT CURRENT SITUATION AT MENDES' SUGGESTION, HE SAID FIRST POINT TO BE CLEARED UP'AFTER COLLINS ARRIVED WAS - ' SETTLEMENT GOVERNMENT-NATIONAL ARMY CONFLICT^ ACCOMPLISHEU BY". MEANS BAG DArs RECALL HINH» SECOND WAS TO TRY PREPARE PROGRAM FOR DIEM GOVERNMENT. THIS DONE BUT QUESTION NOV/ HOW TO GET DIEM ACCEPT FORMULA. THEIRS WAS HOU STRENGTHEN DIEM. ELY AND COLLINS TRIED INTRODUCE QUAT WHO IS BETTER POLITICI;.N AND ADMINISTRATOR THAN DIEM INTO GOVERNENT BUT SECTS AND DIEM BALKED* HE SAID ONLY SUGGESTION EVER ACCEPTED 3Y DIEM WAS APPOINTMENT MINH A3 MINISTER DEFENSE*

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r . MENDES INTERRUPTED TO MAKE TWO POINTS, FIRST THAT COLLINS AND

i-- ,- ELY-THOU Gl-n THAT MINISTRIES OF INTERIOR AND. NATIONAL DEFENSE SHOGId .

"BE COMBINED. BOTH OFFICES ARE CONCERNED liflTH INTERNAL AFFAIRS ' ^C ;.^ f -^ AJ^iD IT IS UNNECESSARY-SEPARATE THEM AT THIS TIME,'DIEM HAD ^^

^ (3 REFUSED THIS SUGGESTION TOO, SECOND POINT ^AS THAT yORKING GROUPS .*""'

HAD BEEN ESTA3LIS.HED IN SAIGON TO SUGGEST EEFCRNS TO GOVERNMENT - ;-.-r ■ -BOTH ADMINISTRATIVE At<d AGRARIAN, bWT A SIl'iGLK REFORM SUGGtSTEn

ACCEPTED BY DIEM. MENDES DESCRIBED DIEM^3 APPROACH AS WHOLLY .

NEGATIVE. FRENCH GOVERNMENT NOy CONSIDERED THAT AS A RESULT Op-'-

- TODAY-3 TALKS STRONG APPROACH UOULD HAVE '^'^ BE MADE TO DIEM.

: „^^ :UGGESTIONS

^>O^Fw. TO? SECRET

Kto/UHJliNl REPRODUCTION-FKO'i 7hr

v>vr'r^■oT^ onnv o T>ii<: r-nnv mr?;f h,-^ rptnrnGd to CC/R centrrd files \vith notitior.Oor,:ifcC!<:rfSl^;-;?,■.!>. '•

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Secdon 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Dale: 2011

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-2- FROM PARIS, , 2501, DECEMBER 19, 4PM SECTION ONE OF T13

SUGGESTIONS SHOULD BE PRECISE AND ENEPGETIC^ THERE WAS NO TIME LEFT TOO ALLOVJ FOS' ANYTHING LESS. MENDES UISHED REAFFIRM HIS . . PAST AGREEMENT UITK SECRETARY'S THESIS THAT WE MUST DO OUR MAXIMUM TO PERMIT DIEM GOVERNMENT TO SUCCEED. NOVJ KE WISHED. ADD THAT HE UAS NO LONGER SURE THAT EVEN MAXIMUM IJOULD HELP. KE SAID WE MUST NOW HAVE ALTERNATE FORMULA IN MIND. WITHOUT VARYING FROM OUR STATED PURPOSE OF SUPPORTING DIEM GOVERNMENT AS LONG AS IT EXISTS WE MUST NOW PREPARE IN OUR lUNDS FOR ALTERNATIVE.

SECRETARY CONTINUED TO SAY THAT HE HAD NO RPT NO PERSONAL JUDG-. MENT OF PERSONALITIES INVOLVED, BUT OUR INDICATIONS WERE THAT ' DIEM UAS BEST MAN AVAILABLE IN SPITE OF FAILINGS. WE VISUALIZED CABINET WITH BROAD APPEAL AND AUTHORITY. THIS VISION HAS NOT RPT NOT BEEN' REALIZED, DIEM APPEARS TO BE NAN CONSTITUTIONALLY INCAPABLE OF MAKING DECISIONS. US NOT P-PT NOT COMMITTED TO " DIEM IN ANY IRREVOCABLE SENSE. WE HAVE ACCEPTED HIM BECAUSE WE KNEW OF NO ONE BETTER. DEVELOPMENTS HAVE CONFIRMED OUR FEARS AS'TO HIS LIMITATIONS BUT HO SUBSTITUTE FOR HIM HAS YET ■ BEEN PROPOSED, THOSE SUGGESTED IN PAST VARIED FROM MONTH TO NONTHt NOW IT IS CLAIMED THAT ONLY BAG DAI CAN SAVE SITUATION. IF THAT IS CASE, THEN WE MUST INDEED BE DESPERATE. SECRETARY'S VIEW WE SHOULD CONTINUE BACK DIEM BUT EXERT M'ORE PRESSURE OH • ■ ■ . ' ■ HIM TO

44BS3' TOP SECRET

827

SECRETARY REPLIED THAT HE RECOGNIZED TASK IN SOUTH VIETNAM WAS ■" -DIFFICULT ONE. DIFFICULT BECAUSE IT REQUIRED THAT GOVERNMENT 3E ■'BUILT OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES WITH LITTLE OR NOT EXPERIENCE. i_ MOREOVER, THEY HAD TO BUILD IN TIME OF GREAT STRESS FOLLOWING

MILITARY.DEFEAT, TEMPORARY PARTITION AND WHILE THERE WAS GREAT Y^ INFLUX OF REFUGEES FROM NORTH, SECRETARY REGARDED BASIC FACTORS t- AS FAVORABLE, PEOPLE WERE OPPOSED TO COMMUNISM AND HAD GREAT

NATURAL RESOURCES, THEY HAD EXPORTABLE SUPRLUS* THEY RECEIVED f~ GREATER AID FROM ABROAD THAN NORTH. BEGINNING OF JOINT FRANCO-*-- U*S. TASK DIFFICULT J BUT SITUATION , WAS MUCH IMPROVED NOW THAT ._ THERE WAS FULL COOPERATION BETWEEN FRXNCH AND AMERICAN AUTHORITIES,

PROBLEM MUST NOT BE APPROACHED BETWEEN FRENCH AND AMERICAN t

■AUTHORITIES. PROBLEM MUST NOT BE APPROACHED IN SPIRT OF DEFEATISM, ONLY SERIOUS PROBLEM WE HAVE NOT YET SOLVED IS THAT OF [ INDIGENOUS LEADERSHIP. WE CANNOT EXPECT IT TO BE SOLVED IDEALLY BECAUSE THERE IS NO TRADITION AMONG INDIGENOUS PEOPLE FOR SELF-GOVERNMENT. WE MUST GET ALONG WITH SOMETHING LESS GOOD THAN BEST,

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Declassified per Execulive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number; NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 20li

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•^

, TOP SECRET "3- FROM PARIS, 2601 DECEMBER 19, 4 PM SECTION ONE OF TWO

HIM^ TO MAKE CKAKGES WE COMSIDER NECESSARY^ SECRETARY FINISHED BY ASKING WHETHER ELY HAD, WITH COLLINS, ALREADY APPLIED MAXiiMUM PRESSURES TO DIEM. ■ ■ - ■ .

EL REPLIED TKEY HAD AND THAT BOTH WERE NOW VIRTUALLY CONVINCED THAT IT WAS HOPELESS TO EXPECT ANYTHING OF DIEM. NEVERTHELESS THEY "CONTINUED PRESSURES, SECRETARY ASKED WliETHER DIEM HAD YE BEEN CONFRONTED UIT)[ ULTIKATUtI THAT UNLESS SUCH AND SUCH WERE DONE BY CERTAIN DATE OUR SUPPORT WOULD BE WITHDRAWN," ELY SAID HE"HAD NOT RPT NOT.' HE CHARACTERISED DIEM AS EXTREMELY PIG-HEADED MAN WHO BECAME MORE SO UNDER PRESSURE, SECRETARY ASKED IF THIS MEANT THAT ULTIMATUM WOULD HAKE HIM MORE STUBBORN AND ELY REPLIED IT WOULD,

MENDES THEN PURSUED SUBJECT WITH ELY WHO STATED THAT HE FELT THAT TO EXERT TOO MUCH PRESSURE ON DIEM WAS NOT RPT NOT IN KEEPING WITH THE NEW INDEPENDENT 'STATUS OF VirfNAM AMD THAT IN ANY.CASE SUCH PRESSURE SHOULD NOT KPT'NOT BE EXERTED JOINTLY BUT SEPARATELY BY HIMSELF AND COLLINS. MOREOVERj HE DESCRIBED DIEM AS HAVING TENDENCY PLAY ONE MAN AGAINST OTHER IN'TYPICAL ASIATIC STYLE AND THAT THIS WAS TO BE AVOIDED* HE COMMENTED ON DIEH'S OWN DlFnCULTIES,_ESPECIALLY JTHOSE HE HAD HAD IN RECONCILING SECTS. _P"R(NCIFAL QUESTION WAS T O DEC IDE NOX^JHETKER

^S-J'iA^^-^-^^ ^'^^ AN_j:AP_AELE_0_LN'ATiONAL_UNION. HE AND"' Ct)LLINS^ MUST DECIDE THAT O.UESTION. ~~ ^-

SECRETARY STATED THAT HE WAS OPPOSED TO ISSUANCE ULTIMATUM UUTIL WE Kt'lEW WHAT WE WOULD DO IF IT WERE REJECTED, AT THE . ■ MOMENT WE HAVE NOTHING ELSE TO OFFER, HE COMMENTED. MENDES RECOMMENDED THAT WE APPROACH BAO DAI BECAUSE OF HIS LEGAL POWERS AfTD USEFULNESS AND FACT THAT PRESUMABLY WOULD HAVE TO /IPPOINT ANY SUCCESSOR TO DIEM, HE HAD PROVEN IN HINH CASE ■ THAT HE COULD BE USEFUL AND MENDES FELT THAT BAO DAI COULD AGAIN SERVE PURPOSE, HE COULD BE USED TO ?UT' ALTERNATE PLAN INTO EFFECT IF ULTIMATUM TO DIEM FAILED. SECRhH-ARY COMMENTED THAT HE REALIZED'THAT WE MUST BE PREPARED TO USE BAO DAI BUT FELT THAT WE MUST GO'TO Um PREPARED 'JITH OUR OWN IDEAS AND NOT RPT NOT SIMPLY TO ACCEPT HIS. MENDES AGREED BUT. COMMENTED THAT EAO'DAI'S PERSONAL POSITION HAD WEAKENED RECENTLY.

,,^„IN SPITE

. 44694

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Pn^ject Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 i

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-^i- FP.O:i PARIS, WYPG DECEMBER 19,,-tiPi-3 SECTICM^tJMK OF TWO '

IN SPITE OF THIS FACT, KE STILL REPRESENTED LEGALITY Ar!D COULD SERVE IN FUTURE IF ''LEGALITY^^ HAD TO BE PROVIDED TO ANY STEP UE WOULD ['JISH TO TAKE.

KEMDES THEN SPOKE OF A PLAN FRENCH HAVE BEEN CONSIDERING,'.

FIRST PHASE WAS TO ASK BAO DAI TO PLACE ON SPOT IN VIETNAM ■

A REPRESENTATIVE WHO WOULD EXERCISE BAO DAIS'S AUTHORITY.

HE WOULD BE "DELEGATE" OR VICEROY. HE WOULD HAVE FULL AUTHORITY

TO USE BAO DAI-S POWERS. USEFULNESS WOULD PERSIST EVEN IF

DIEM SHOULD SUCCEED FOR HE COULD ACT AS SUPREME ARBITRATOR

TO SETTLE SQUABBLES.

MENDES SAID THAT FRENCH UERE NOW PREPARED TALK TO BAO DAI ALONG THESE LINES AND URGE HIM ESTABLISH VICEROY WITHOUT DELAY,

FRENCH ALSO PROPOSED APPROACH BAO DAI WITH VIEW REINFORCING PRESENT GOVT AND PREPARING LEGAL GROUNDS FOR NEW ONE IF IT SHOULD BE FOUND NECESSARY. ^ , -

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EDEN INTERVENED TO STATE-THAT IN HIS OPINION IT WOULD BE MISTAi:E FOR BAO DAI TO GO BACK NOW BUT BRITISH RECOGNIZED ADVANTAGE OF VIETNAMESE ROYAL TRADITION AND AGREED THAT "ROYAL COMMISSION'* OF SOME SORT SHOULD BE SET UP AND MIGHT PROVE BE BEST WAY OUT. .

HE INQUIRED ABOUT PERSONALITY AND USEFULNESS OF EMPRESS AND KENDES REPLIED THAT SHE WAS EXEMPLARY PERSON WHO COULD PROVE VERY USEFUL IN VIETNAM,

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■ ■•' Note:' Mr.' 'Allen

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notified 2:^5 P^ 12/l9/5^^ {F¥{R)

TOP SECRET

829

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Di^classified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By; NWD Dale: 2011

^GGMli^G TcLLGKAM Uepartment or biate / ^mw\ /

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FROM! PARIS 1S34 i:^^

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Control :S5 75' Rsc'd: DECEMBER 19 1J39 P.M.

1954

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TOj Secretary of State

tjOs ?-eiil, DECEM3HH. 19,;'^ P.i-I^

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SECTION TWO OF TWO

SENT DEPARTMENT 2601, REPEATED IHFORMATIOW SAIGON 3SS, LONDON 654,■ ■ . * "

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SECRETARY STATED THAT IN CONSIDERING VICEROY I'JE WERE ADVANCING INTO TO SECOND PR03LEL1 I'^ITKOUT HAVING SOLVED FIRST, HE DID NOT RPT NOT EXPECT'VICEROY BE ABLE DECIDE ON ALTERNATE TO DISI'^i Ai\D TO SET UP MACI^INERY TO IMPLEMENT OUR IDEAS* HE STATED THAT OUR JOB I'JAS TO CREATE'THIS MACHINERY, AT ' PRESENT TIME UE MUST CONCERN OURSELVES WITH PRESENT PROBLEM, NOT WITH NEW INTRIGL^ES. KE ASKED -MENDES TJKAT HIS ADVISERS HAD SUGGESTED AS ALTERNATIVE* MENDES REPLIED NO RPT NO ONE SPECIFICALLY AS YET BUT THAT HE PREFERRED ALLOW ELY SPEAK ON THIS SUBJECT. . . . ■ • .

ELY REPLIED THAT HE WAS MORE CONCERNED WITH CURRENT PROBLEMS-OF DIEM. GOVT THAN WITH aUHSTION. OF POSSIBLE NE'.J GOVT, ONLY . CERTAINTY. IS THAT NO RPT NO MORE TIME CAN EE-l.'ASTED, ELY MENTIONED HUU, TAM AND QUAT AS AMOMG MANY PERSONALITIES WHO MIGHT BE USED. MENDES ASKED IF THERE WAS NO RPT NO PREFERENCE, ELY SAID NOT RPT NOT YET» SECRETARY ASKED WHAT' WAS WRONG BETWEEN GUAT AND SECTS AND ELY REPLIED THAT IT WAS RESULT OF AN OLD FUED DATING FROM TIME QUAT WAS MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENSE AND HAD TRIED ABOLISH SECTS PRIVATE ARMIES. MEMDES ASKED IF THERE WAS NO RPT NO GOOD 'PROVINCIAL GOVT AND ELY REPLIED WOT RPT NOT SUFFICIENTLY GOOD TAKE ON RATIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES.

*

^ SECRETARY WENT ON TO SAY THAT WE MUST EXHAUST ALL OUR PRESSURES

ON DIEM

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p!^CGrJJ COPY » This copy must be rbuu-ncdHo^GC/R central files with notatio7:c-:;^^n;etl-tf;SS£r;e;-,!3 I

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By; NWD Dale: 2011

TOP SECRET , ' .: ' -2- FROM PARIS, 2601 DECEMBER. 19, h?!-] SECTION TvJO OF TWO

• - ' , '

T

- • - • . ■> ■

ON DIEM TO GET THINGS DONE. BEFORE CONSIDEPJNG ALTERNATE SOLUTIONS, RADFORD UILL SE IN SAIGON DEC 22 TO REPORT RESULT OUR CONVERSATIONS TO COLLINS^ SECRETARY AGREED WE MUST EXPLORE ALL POSSIBILITIES BUT WARNED THAT MERE FACT UE WERE DOING SO v'JAS SUFFICIENT TO UNDERMINE PRESENT GOVT. HE ASKED MENDES NOT TO THINK WE HAD OBSTINATELY'CLOSED OUR MINDS TO POSSIBLE ALTERNATE SOLUTIONe WE HAD NOT PJ=T NOT BUT OUR INVESTIGATION OF ALTERNATE MUST BE DONE OM CAREFUL BASIS AND WE MUST FOR . RESENT SUPPORT DIEM. ,' . • ;

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. • . - ^5E^^DES AGREED, TO SUMMARIZE HE HAD THREE MAIN POINTS: FIRST,

r (J ' 0 SUPPORT DIEM; SECOND, TO STUDY ALTERNATIVES, COLLINS AND

L . "y ELY SHOULD BE INSTRUCTED TO EXPLORE FURTHER POSSIBILITIES -

^ .\ INCLUDING 3A0 DAI WITH GREATEST DISCRETION* SECRETARY THEN

■p RETURNED TO VICEROY QUESTION ASKING IF*PROPOSED MAN VJOULD BE

L .INDEPENDENT OR DEPENDENT ON BAO DAI* MENDES STATED HE WOULD

BE INDEPENDENT BUT WOULD DERIVE LEGALITY FROM BAO DAI.

F GUESTiON WOULD BE STUDIED FURTHER AND FRENCH PROPOSAL PASSED

^ ON TO COLLINS AND ELY FOR STUDY, *■ ' .

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MENDES- THIRD POINT WAS THAT ELY AND COLLINS SHOULD 3E REQUESTED 'INVESTIGATE MATTER'OF TIMING, HOW HUGH FURTHER DELAY CAN BE TOLERA MENDES ASKED? WE MUST SET DEADLINE, THE GENERALS MUST ' COME TO CONCLUSION ON TWO AND THREE AND MAKE PRECISE RECOMMENDATIONS TO US SO THAT WE CAN TAKE NECESSARY DECISIONS.

■SECRETARY AGREED BUT STATED THAT FOURTH POINT'MUST BE ADDED. ' IT IS THAT IF US SHOULD DECIDE THAT THERE IS NO RPT NO GOOD D ALTERNATIVE TO DIEM WE WILL HAVE TO CONSIDER HOW MUCH MORE ' ■ INVESTMENT WE WILL BE PREPARED TO MAKE IN INDOCHINA. OUR POLICY ' WOULD HAVE TO BE REAPPRAISED. CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES, ' ' PARTICULARLY THE TWO FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEES, LED BY MANSFIELD AND RICHARDS, WERE INTENSELY INTERESTED IN PROBLEM AND WOULD HAVE TO BE CONSULTED. THEY BOTH HAD STRONG FEELINGS* MANS.-FIELD BELIEVES IN DI£M_. SECRETARY WAS NOT RPT NOT FULLY COGNIZANT WITH RICHARDS' OPINIONS BUT THOUGHT HE DID TOO,' " SECRETARY BELIEVED THAT .EVEN SLIGHT CHANCE OF SUCCESS IN VIETNAM WAS worth' CONSIDERABLE INVESTMENT, US HAD ALSO TO THINK OF WHAT HAPPENED IN ADJACENT COUNTRIES — IN CAMBODIA, LAOS, THAILAND AND MALAYA^ US SITUATION WAS DIFFERENT FROM THAT

OF FRENCH*

. . ' TOP SECRET ■ • •

44697 -■" ■ ■

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Declassified per Execiitive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number; NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

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"5- FROM PARIS J 26^51 DECEMBER i'9, h?Vi SECTICiN TWO OF Tl'JO .

or FRENCH. FRENCH HAD AN INiVESTIiENT IN LIVES AMD PROPERTY IN VIETNAM VJHILE OURS INVOLVED EFFECT THAT FATE OF„yiETNAi^ .

SECRETARY CLOSED'

POINTS WITH ADSITICH

WOULD HAVE ON REST OF SOUTH EAST ASIA.

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BY STATING THAT HE ACCEPTED KENDES' THR OF HIS OWN FOURTH*

- MENDES REPLIED THAT HE SYMPATHIZED WITH US PROBLEM BUT TRUSTED THAT WE WOULD NOT RPT NOT ARRIVE AT NEGATIVE CONCLUSION. HE URGED THAT US AND FRANCE KEEP IN TOUCH AT ALL TXHES.; - -EVEN IF US SHOULD ARRIVE AT NEGATIVE POSITION, FRANCE V;OULB ■NOT HPT NOT RENOUNCE KO?E, " . - _ ..

EDEN STATED HE AGREED AND FELT THAT EVEN ADDITONAL SINGLE YEAR 07 SUSTAINED EFFORT WOULD HELP EVERYUHEHS AND THAT WE MUST TRY AND KEEP U? THE FIGHT IN ORDER TO GIVE CONFIDENCE TO OTHERS IN AREA* THIS ENDED MAIN PART OF INDOCHINA DISCUSSIONS*

.KENDES THEN SAID THAT HE WISHED TO RAISE QUESTITNOF LETTER SENT BY VIET MINH TO EDEN AND MOLOTOV AS C0-CHAIRllEN OF GENEVA CONFERENCE, IT COMPLAINED ABOUT ViCLATIOMS OF GENEVA AGREF.-NENT BY FRENCH AND VIETNAMESE GOVT. HE SAID THAT SONE OF VIET MINH COMPLAINTS ^WERE NOT RPT NOT UNFOUNDED*'* yHOLE MATTER CONSTITUTED DELICATE QUESTION FOR ICC WOULD 3E SEIZED OF IT AND IT WOULD PROVE DIFFICULT, PARTICULARLY IN VIEW SENSITIVITY OF INDIANS ON ICC» MENDES BELIEVED WE MUST EXERT ALL OUR EFFORTS TO CONVINCE SOUTH NOT RPT NOT TO VIOLATE GENEVA AGREEMENTS* --VIETNAMESE POSITION HAD BEEN THAT THEY WERE NOT RPT NOT SIG->JA'' TORIES^ THIS MIGHT PROVE USEFUL TO US LATER AS LEGAL POSITION BUT FOR PRESENT BELIEVED SOUTH MUST BE PERSUADED TO ABIDE BY GENEVA TERMS. ■■ • ' . . • "

EDEN STATED HE HAD REJECTED LETTER EXPLAINING THAT ATTEi-lPT ' ' TO DELIVER IT KaD BEEN. MADE IN MOSCOUc MENDES CORRECTED . EDEN'S I'^EMORY 3Y STATING THAT LETTER HAD BEEN REPORTED BY BRITISH CONSUL IN HANOI. HE DESCRIBED LETTER AS NOT RPT NOT BEING IMPORTANT IN ITSELF — A PROPAGANDA INSTRUMENT — ■ -BUT THAT IT INDICATED START OF POLITICAL OFFENSIVE BY VIET MINH« ■ ■ • . ' - ■ .

RELATED'PROBLEM -WAS SAFEGUARDING OF

PUBLIC UTILITY SERVICES IN KAIPHONG.

44GQB

TOP SECRET

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Declassiried per Executive Order 13526, Section 3,3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

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. . "h- FROM. PARIS, 2S3i DECEMBER 19, k?Vi SECTION TWO OF TWO

* . . ' * ■

- IN HAIPHONG. VIETNAMESE GOVT HAD BEEK- BREAKING GEND/A AGREE-\^ MENTS ON THIS SCORE AS UELL, VIET MIMH HAD COMPLAINED 'aND ■ JUSTIFIABLY, " - . ■ .

'J

MENDES THEN PROCEEDED TO QUESTION ABOUT CAMBODIA STATING THAT ! . FRENCHHAD 500 OFFICERS IN CAMBODIA AS TRAINING MISSION AMD

INTENDED TO KEEP. THEM THERE, HE ASKED SECRETARY TO LOOK INTO r4ATTER AND TO GIVE FRENCH US VIEVJS Of': SUBJECT. MENDES ADDED L THAT FRENCH CONSIDERED PRESENCE OF THEIR MILITARY MISSION THERE / . • ■ • ' ■ AS CONSISTENT

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- ANOTHER DIFFICULT PROBLEM WITH REGARD TO GENEVA

^^J UAS TRAINING OF VIETNAMESE OFFICERS^" HE UOULD BE PLEA^SED TO

' KNOW US POSITION ON INTRODUCING NEW MILITARY ADVISERS INTO !

. ..INDOCHINA AND POSSIBLE CONFLICT UITH GENEV-A AGREEMENT. .. \

■

SECRETARY STATED THAT ALTHOUGH WE ¥ERE ROTATIi>'G MA AG PERSONNEL ¥£ WERE NOT RPT NOT INCREASING IT. RADFORD CONFIRMED, ELY STATED THAT COLLINS-ELY AGREEMENT ON TRAINING REMAINED WITHIN FRAMEWORK GENEVA ACCORDS, MENDES STATED THAT QUESTION WAS -u/^ LEGAL ONE.; ROTATION_PERMITTED UNDER TERMS GENEVA BUT CAN TRAIN-r .. ING-OFFICERS BE SUBSTITUTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE PERSONNEL? . ' L ^AS IT VIOLATION OF ACCORDS TO SUBSTITUTE OFFICERS FOR NON-

CONSj ETC.? MENDES SAID THAT FRENCH GOVT WOULD HAVE TO STUDY-1- . . TEXT OF COLLINS-ELY AGREEt'lENT CAREFULLY FROM LEGAL POINT OF

VIE'i TO ENSURE THAT IT FULLY ACCORDED UITH ARNISTICE_AND REQUESTED US DO SAME, HE SAID THIS PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT •■ . [■ ■ ;:AS VM HAD ALREADY OFFICIALLY PROTESTED TO ICC RE US ASSUMPTION ^ ■ toF TRAINING RESPONSIBILITY* SECRETARY EXPRESSED GENERAL

■;AGREEMENT UITH PRINCIPLE THAT GENEVA ACCORDS SHOULD NOT RPT NOT BE BROKEN BUT STATED THAT OUR INTERPRETATION OF THEM MUST HOT RPT NOT BE SO REFINED THAT WE REFUSE TO SUBSTITUTE r- • ' ■ - X FOR Y IF Y IS ILL OR LESS COMPETENT THAN X= MENDES AGREED . L AND SAID THAT IN LAST ANALYSIS PEOPLE WHO MUST BE PLEASED ; ARE ICC. HE ASKED THAT BRITISH MAINTAIN THEIR CONTACTS WITH

INDIANS AND CANADIANS, WHICH EDEN AGREED TO DO. GENERAL DISCUSSION ENSUED ON QUESTION VIET MINH PROTESTS ON VIOLATION OF GENEVA ACCORDS AND SECRETARY CONCLUDED BV SAYING THAT IT WOULD BE UNFORTUNATE IF WE WERE TO 7l:'lD OURSELVES ON DEFENSIVE '..■ IN'THIS MATTER IN LIGHT' OF SMUGGLING OF MILITARY MATERIAL INTO = . NORTH VIETNAM FROM CHINA AND PERSECUTION OF CATHOLICS_BY VfET

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-5" FROM PARIS, 20;-31 DICB'IBER' 15, ^JPM SECTION TWO OF TUO

AS CONSISTENT WITH FRENCH DEFENSE POLICY.

MEETING THEN PROCEEDED TO OTHER SUBJECTS COVERED IN SEPARATE IMMEDIATELY FOLLOyiNG TELS. AT END THERE WAS A PROLONGED DISCUSSION ABOUT COMMUNIQUE AMD IT WAS FINALLY DECIDED NOT RPT NOT TO ISSUE ANY. . • ,

■^^MENDES ASKED AT END vJHAT SHOULD BE DONE ABCTUT INFORI^ING ASSOCIATED STATES GOUTS OF OUR DISCUSSIONS IN KEEFKJG tJITH OUR USUAL PRACTICE. IT UAS DECIDED THAT THE HIGH COMMISSIONERS IN PARIS IvOULD BE INFORMED BY THREE-MAN GROUP REPRESENTING THREE DELE-GATIONSa (SEE SEPARATE TELEGRAM.)

DILLON

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Note: Mr. Allen (EUR) notified 3:?0 pni 12/19/3^^

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Declassiried per Executive Order 13526, Section 3,3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

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DGccmber 22, 195^»- •

TOP SECRET

NOTE BY TliE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

to the

NAT ION /lL security C0U>ICIL

CURRENT U.S. References:.

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POL ICY TOWARD THE J\AR^.AST ■A. ' KSC 1^-1-2972, NSC 5^2^/3) i-B, . NSC 166/1 0. HSC 152/3

D, NSC 1^^6/2

E, NSC Action No. 2?6

F, NvSC 125/2 and NSC 125/6

G, NSC 170/1

H, NSC 171/1 • ■ ' I.. NSC 5^05 J. ■ NSC 5^-^09

K. NSC 5^1-13/r.

L. NSC Action No. 1250

M. NSC Action No. 11^8

N. Memos for NSC from Exocut

■ subject, "U.S. Objectives

of Action v^ath Respect to

the Chinese Nationalist G

dated Septenber 28 and Oc

•and 1>!6C'Action No, -1235 0, NSC Action Nos. 122^+ and P. NSC Action Nos. 1258 and Q. NSC Action No. 1233 R. NSC Action No. 1275 S. Memos for NSC froa Execut

same subjectj dated Noven

December 20, 195^ T. NSC Action No. 1292

SC 5^^29/^

ive Secretary and Courses" Fornosa and ■ overnment"-, tober 5, 195V

123'^-1259

ive Secretary ber 29 and

The National Security -Council, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Connerce, the Director, Bureau of the Budget, at the 229th meeting of the Council on December 21, 195*^^ discussed the subject in the light of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff transmitted by the. reference memorandu.^ of December 20. ' The Council adopted the changes in the statement of policy contained in NSC 5^29/lf, which are set forth in "SC Action No. 1292-b. and:. '*.*'•• ■-

NSC 5^f29/5

TOP 37XRET

Declassiried per Execuiive Order 13526, Sectit>n 3,3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By; NWD Dale: 2011

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Doferred action on paragraph 5^^^ pending further ,consideration by the Secretary of State, in consultation v;ith the Secretary of Defense, and ■ ' renort at the meeting of the Council to be held . " January 5, 1955. (KSC Action Ko. 1292-c)

! Deferred action on paragraj)h 7-^, other than the , ,. ;- MMajorlfcy Proposal'^ in 7"C.(2) , pending further

consideration by the Secretary of State, In consultation with the Secretary of Conferee, and report at the meeting of the Council to be held January 5, 1955. CM3C /Action Ko, 1292-d)

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Requested the Covmcil on Foreign Economic Policy to undertake the study outlined in the ''majority proposal" in paragraph 7-C-C2) of I^iSC 5^1-29/^. (NSC Action I\o. 1292-e)

>' The President has this date-approved the stateinent of ^ policy in NSC 5^29A, as amended and adopted by the Council (except paragraphs 5-^.S and 7'S.) and, enclosed herev/ith as KSC 5''-^29/5J directs its implementation by all appropriate executive departments and agencies of the U*S. Govsrnnent, subject to review in' the light of final decisions as to basic national security policy; and designates the Operations Coordinating Board as the coordinating agency.

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Accordingly J the enclosed nolic/ suoersedes NSC 5^\-29/2i NSC Action No. ll^i-S-^bj K3C Action No'. 1224'-b and NvSC Action No, 123^-b; 1^13C Action No* 1258-0 and NSC Action 1^6, l?59-c; itemo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject, '^U,S* Objectives and Courses of Action with Respect to Formosa and the Chinese Kationalist Government*', dated September 23, 195^r« The enclosed statement of policy is to guide the impleiP-entation of all other existing Far Eastern policies (reference S-L) modifying them where inconsistentj pending Planning Board and Council reviev; and revision of these more particular policies,

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A Financial Appendix covering the Far East v/ill be prepared for the information of the- Coujicil at a later meeting.

JA14ES S. LAY, Jr* Executive Secretary

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The Secretary of the Treasury The Secretary of Commerce The Director, Bureau of the Budget The ChairmanJ Joint Chiefs of Staff le Director of Central Intelligence

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Decl^ffsiHed per Executive Order 13526, Section 3 J NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

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STATEI-iENT OF POLICY by the NATIONAL SECURITY COUrJCIL

on

CURRENT U, S. POLICY IM THE FAR EAST

GENEMT^^^CONSI^DERATJOfS 1^ The primary problem of U. S. policy ia the Far East is to cope v;ith the serious threat to U, S. security interests which has resulted from the spread of hostile CoTDmunist power on the continent of Asia over all of' Kainland China, IJorth Korea and^. more recently, over the northern part of Viet !Tam,

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2, In its five years of pov/er, the regime in .

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Comiuunist China has established and consolidated effective control over the mainland and has maintained and developed close v;orlcing relations v;ith the Soviet Union, Miile there is novr no reason to anticipate an early collapse of the regime nor any means of seeing when one might occur J inherently such regimes have elements of

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rigidity and Instability v/hlch sometimes produce crises. We should be ready to exploit any opportunities v;hich ' might occur as a result of inherent internal weaknesses.

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. . ■ ■ - . ■ . . TOP SECRET 3. The task of the United States in coping with this

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situation is further coniplicated by;

"a. The vulnerability of the"non-Cosnimist countries

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in the'area ^nilitarllyj and in varying degrees^ politic ';callyj economicallyj and psycholcgically, to further ' CoDiraunist expansionist efforts*

b. The deep-seated national antagonisms and differ-■' ing assessments of national Interest v^ach divide those

countries from each other and severely hanper efforts to combine their collective resources for their ov/n defense and velfare^ ' . , ,

c, . -The intense nationalistic feelingsj fed by re-

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sidual resentments against European colonialism coupled

with a vddespread feeling of wea^Lness and inadequacy in

the face of the worldv.ade pov/er struggle^ v/hich inhibit

many of these countries from cooperating closely with ,

the United States, ' ' ' '

d. The divergencies on Par Eastern policy with our

European alliesj principally with respect to our posture

toward China, which limit the extent of political and' ■

economic pressures which can be maintainfed against the

Asian Comjriunist regimes without divisive effects on t>ie

basic United States-le'd coalition,

^NOTE: In addition to the fore.golng "general considerations, attention is .• directed to r:iE 13-5^, "eorrjnunist ' ..

China's Povrar Potential Through 1957," • published June 3, 195V, and KIE lO--?-?^, "Conraunist Courses of Action in Asia Through 1957)" published Kovenber 23, ■- ■ 195^-.

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OBJECTIVES

} h^ Pursuant to a policy of being clear and strong in its

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1 resolve to 'defend its vital interests, if necessary at the

[i^ risk of but witliout being provocative of vjar. the principal

^T' objectives of.the United States in the Far East should be;

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^, ■ ^ a. Preservation of the territorial and political

^ ' integrity of the non^Corrjnunist countries in the area

.jff^ against further Coriununist expansion or subversion,

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^ ' b. Progressive improvement of the relative political.

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economic and military position of the non-Communist countries vis-a^-vis that of the Asian Communist regimes.

c^ Reduction of Chinese'Cbmniunist power and prestige, or' securing by reorientation a Government on the mainland of China v;hose objectives do not co.nflict with the vital interests of the United States, * ."

d. Disruption of the Sino-Soviet alliance through

actions designed to intensify existing and potential areas

of conflict or divergence of interest betv;een the USSR • ■

and Communist China.

e. Creation in Asia of political ajid social forces which will zealously spread the greater values of the Free V/orld and simultaneously expose the falsity of the Communist ideological offensive.

- . COURSES O F ACTIO H

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J. In order to preserve the territorial and political

f" integrity of the areaj the United States should:

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ci- Maintain the security of the Pacific off-shore island chain (J^^pan, Ryukyus, Formosa and the Pescadores, ' the Philippines J Australia, and New Zealand) as an ele-

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' ment essential to U.S. security; assisting in developing

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such military strength in each area as is required by

U.S. security and is consistent v;ith each area's capa-^

bility and maintenance of domestic stability.

b. In the event of unprovoked attack on the Republic

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of Korea, employ, in accordance vith Constitutional processes, U,S. armed forces against the aggressor, VJhile supporting the unification of Korea by all peaceful

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means and maintaining appropriate safeguards against ROK offensive action, continue military and economic assistance programs consistent v.ath U.S. security interests ^ •

and subject to continued ROK cooperation,

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c. Ratify the Mutual Defense Treaty with the Republic ' of China covering Formosa and the Pescadores, and jointly . agree upon appropriate safeguards against Chinese r^ational-ist offensive action. Pending the ratification of such* a Treaty, continue the existing unilateral arrangement to

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defend Formosa and the Pescadores (excluding the ifetiOxnaL-1st held off-shore islands). For the present, seek to pre-

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serve, through United Nations action, the status quo of ! the Nationalist-held off^-shore islands; ' and, without com--

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mittin'g U.S. forces except as militarily desirable in the

event of Chinese Communist attack ox\ Formosa and the

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PescadoresJ provide to the Chinese Nationalist forces military' cquipmenl; and traininj^; to assist tneni to defend such off-shore islands^ using Forraosa as a base* Eoiiovorj do not a^ree to Chinese Nationalist offensive actions against rnainland Gopinun-1st ChinaJ o:ccept under circumstances approved by the President* Agree to Chinese Nationalist actions ajainst Coi?jnunist China ^ vrtiich are prorapt and clear retaliation against a Chinese Cora-munist attack; provided such retaliation is" ai;ainst targets of' vdilitari' sioHificance v;hich meet U, S. criterlc as to feasibility and chance of success and vrhich are selected V7ith due consideration for the undesirability .of, provoking further Chinese " Comiaunist reaction ar;ainst FormCisa and the- Pescadores.

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d,. Should overt CoriL^-iunisf aggression occur in the South-■■I"

east Asian treaty area^ Invoke the W\ Charter or the SEATO

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treatyj or both^ and subject to local request for assistance take necessary military and any other action to assist any . state or dependent territory in the SEATO area willing to re-sist Coniinunist resort to force: Provided^ that the taking of military action shall be subject to prior submission to and approval by the Congress unless the evaersency is deemed by the President to bo so ::;reat that iinniedlate action is necessary to

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save a vital interest of the United States,

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e. Employ all feasible covert uieans^ and all feasible overt meanSj includin^j in accordance v;ith ponstitutional pro-cesses J tlie use of arned force if necessary ^nd appropriate ^ to prevent Indonesia or vital parts thereof from fallin^^ under

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Comniunist control by overt arned attackj subvorsioHj econoniG domination^ or other meansj concerting overt actions with other ANZUS-nations,

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f * In the 'event of Confaunist overt armed attack or im-minen'b threat of such attack against any other country in the

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area (not covered by a security treaty to which the United States is a party), this evidence of a renewal of Communist agpressive purposes would constitute such a grave menace to the United States as to justify the President in requesting authority from Congress to take necessary action to deal with the situationi including the. .use of U»S, armed forces, if

appropriate and feasible*

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g, (l) Issue a directive to its armed forces that in the event oT unprovoked Comniunist ariTied attack

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against U. S, military or non-military personnelj

■* aircraftj or vessels outside Communist territory^

XI, S, forces in the area v;ill take asainst the Com-

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niunist attacking force during the course of the attack aggressive protective measures^ including if necessary and feasible inimediate pursuit of the Communist ■ '

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attacking force into hostile airspace or waters,

(2) In addition to the action directed in (l)

abovej and as constitutionally authorized and.speci--

fically approved by the President^ take such additional

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punitive action as may be necessary and appropriate.

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h. Encourage the conditions necessary to form as

* soon as possible and then participate in, a Western

Pacific collective defense arrangement Including the

I FnilippineSj Japan, the Republic of China and the

Republic of Korea, eventually linked with the Manila x^ct and AKZUS. ■ • '

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? '^ i^. If requested by a legitimate local government Vhich requires assistance to defeat local Communist subversion or rebellion not constituting armed attackj the

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United States should vlex/ such a situation so gravely that^ in addition to giving all uossible covert ,and overt

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support v,dthin the Executive Branch authority, the President should at once consider requesting Congressional authority to take appropriate action, which might if

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necessary and feasible include the use of U.S. military forces either locally or against the external source of such subversion or rebellion (including Communist China if determined to be *t:he source)*

X* Assist where necessary and feasible non'-Communist ^Goverrunent and other elements in the Far East to counter

^

Communist subversion and economic domination*

K, Maintain sufficient U.S. forces in the Far East as clear evidence of U.S. intention to contribute its full share, of efi'ective collective aid to the nations of the area against the Communist threat, and to provide.

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assurance to the people of the Far East of U.S

*

intent and deterriiination to support them in^the event of Conmunist aggression.

-:'■ ■ ' i ■ ■ s., -Increase efforts to develop tKe basic

M " '. stability and strength of non-Comniunist comttries,

. 6p In order to enhance the individual and collective strength of the non-^Communist countries, the .11 ted States should;

especially Japan and India^ and their capacity and will.to resist Communist expansion,

b. Continue (1) to recognize the Government of.

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i J the Republic of China as the only government of China and its right to represent China in the

j-- ^ United Nations, and (2) to furnish direct support

to its defense establishraent and its econoray.

c^ Encourage the pronpt organization of an

' econouiic grouping by the maxi^uin number of free * ' ■"

Asian states, including Japan and as many of the Colombo Powers as possible based on self-^help and mutual aid, and the participation and support (including substantial financial assistance) of ^ the United States and other appropriate V^stern

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countries,, through which, by united action, those free Asian states will be enabled, more jsffectively to achieve the economic and social strength needed NSC 5^:-29/? , TOP SECHET -

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to maintain thear Independence,

^ * ■ ' '^* Take all feasible measures to increase the

opportunities of such countries for trade v;ith each other and with other Free World coimtries.

■ e» Provide in South and Southeast Asia, through the economic grouping referred to in c above or otherwise^ such economic and technical aid over an extended period as can be us^d effectively to accelerate the present slow rates of economic grov;th, and to give to the peoples in these areas a sense of present progress and future hope.

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v/hich is currently lacking. '

f. Develop and make more effective information^

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culturalJ education and exchange progrems; and

ii expand the program for training of free Asian

leaders. •

^, Encourage the countries of the area to use

qualified Ainericans as ad\'isers and develop a

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program for training such persons.

h. Seek, by intensifying covert and

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C psychological activities, and hy utilizing indigenous

■ ■. persons to the greatest extent feasible, to (1)

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increase :the understanding and orientation of Asian

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peoples toVard the Free V/orld and (2) exDOse the

menace of Chinese inoeriallsm and world Communlsni,

nSC 5k29/5 - p!:^ ■ TOP SECRET •

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.!_• Encourage and support, more vigorously and

effectively, the application of private capital to

the development needs of free Asian countries under I ; a^^rangements avoiding ^^exploitation" yet acceptable

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■ to private interestSt

' 7* In order to weaken or retard the grov/th of the

. . ..power and influence of the Asian Communist regimes, especially Cominunist China, the United States .'should:

a^ Continue to refuse recognition of the , Chinese Communist regime and other AsianXonimunist i regimes, but deal v;ith each on a local basis and

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with regard to specific subjects wheye the regime is a party at interest. ' : ' * .

b. Continue to oppose seating Cominunist

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China in the Sacurity Co-uncil, the Genera Assembly,

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and other organs of the United Nations/

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(1) Maintain the current level of United States export,

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importJ and^financlal controls on trade with Comnujiist China,

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r Witriout derogaMng froD the basic principles of these pontrolSj

administer them iii such a manner so as to endeavor noi: to lessen

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\ ^ the active cooperation in the multilateral control program of

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oVt r Free V/orld^ couJli^^ies.

.(2) Urge otherYree World countries*"to'^maintain the

cur ent level of export corVtrols on trade v/itly Communist China,

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In aid of this effort^ the Urtited States shouldj without frustrating the multilateral embargo^ program j ^ndeavor to handle questions of routine exceptions iVj such ji>&nner as to preserve

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and foster the willingness of other^^countries to retain the ■ ^ present level of controls* . *

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(3) V/iienever it may be determined by the Secretary of State that further-effort to maintain the\ current multilaterally agreed level of export controls would be seriously divisive

among our allies or lead nations needing trade with Cominunist

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China toward an accommodation/with the Soviet ^bloc, the Secretary should report such determination promptly to the Council

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for consideration of appra|)riate action,

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•T ' iS) In the meanwhilej the Council on Foreign Economic

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Policy should studyj on an urgent basisj all asnects of U.S.

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r bloc (including Communist China), akingjinto account in^.such

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study, among other/things, the matters set forth in Annex\Bj and should submit to the National Security Council at the

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Dedassifkd per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 20il

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earlioat practicable date comprehensive and detailed* recoirmGn-

ijiQh policy as may be required by

dations for such revisi

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national secm^i-ty intex'^ests^ both long^'nd shoi^t range,

dt Utilize all feasible overt and covert neans, consls--

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■ tent with a policy of not being provocative of vrar, to create

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discontent and internal divisions within each of the Commun-ist-doninated areas of the Far East, and to inpair their re-lations with the Soviet Union and vjith each other, particular ly by stimulating Sino-Soviet estrangement. However^ do not agree to Chinese Nationalist offensive actions against mainland Comnujiist China, except under circunstances approved by the President,' Agree to Chinese Nationalist actions against Communist China which are prompt and clear retaliation against

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' a Chinese Communist attackj provided such retaliation is against targets of military significance yhich meet U.S. criteria as to feasibility and chance of success and which are selected with due consideration for the undesirability of provoking further Chinese Coinnunist reaction against Formosa

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and the Pescadores,

O4 Continue the policy towards Indochina and Thailand' ■

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■ Stated in Annex A,

■ S,' a. The United States should attempt to convince the other Free V/orld countries of the soundness of U.St policies toward

Comi^iunist China and toward the Republic of China and of the

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advisability of their adopting similar'policies, without,

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however, imposing such pressures as would be seriously

divisive. ■

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b. In its Pacific role, the United States should be less ) .-. . influenced by its European allies than in respect to Atlantic affairs* 9* The United States should keep an open nind en the possi-

r blllty of negotiating with the USSR and Connimist China acceptable

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nd er orceable agreenents^ v/hether limited to individual issues

now outstanding

or involving a general settloDGnt of najor issues.

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■ (Paras. 10 and 11 of rJSC 5^29/2 • vith the addition of a nev; para. 10-h)

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Indochin a: P oli tic al a nd Co ver t Action.

a\ Make every possible effort, not openly incon-

sistent \ilth the U. S, position as to the armistice agree-^ mentsj to defeat Communist subversion and influencej to maintain and slu3poi't friendly non-Corimunist governments in Cambodia and Laos\ to maintain a friendly^ non-Communist \

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South Vietnarrij and to prevent a Commionist victory through

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all-Vietnam elections^

b. Urge that the i^i^ench promptly recognize and deal

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with Cambodia, Laos and fr^e Viejsnam as independent ,

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sovereign nations.

c. Strengthen U* S. representation and deal directlyj vherever advantageous to the U, &• , with the governr:ents -of Cambodia5 Laos and free Vietnam,^

d» V/orking tlirongh the French only insofar as neces^

sary^ assist Cambodiaj Laos and free Vi^^tnam to maintain

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(1) military forces necessary for internaX security and

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(2) economic conaitlons conducive to the maintenance and .strength of non-Comniunist regimes and comparing favorably with those in adjacent Communist areas.

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e. Aid emigration from North Vietnam and rese-ttle-ment of pdoples unwilling to remaiil undei:^' communist rule,

f. /Exploit available means to make more difficult the control by the Viet Minh of North Vietnam*

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£.. Exploit available means to prevent North Vietnam

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from .becoming permanently'incorporated in the Soviet bloc Using as feasible and desirable consular relations and

^ non^strategic trade, v ' .

'! ll. 'Expose Comm-unist violations of the Armistice in

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Indoclilnai

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i» Conduct covert operations on the maximum feasible and productive scale in support of the foregoing policies. 11. Thailand

a» Frovida military assistance sufficient to increase the strength of indigenous forcesj thereby

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helping to control local subversion, and to make

easier clear identification of instances of overt aggression.

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b. Provide econoniic assistance conducive to the maintenanc.e and strength of a non-Comrn^onist regime.

c^. 'Concentrate efforts on developing Thailand as a support of IT. 3. objectives in the area and as the focal point of U. S. covert and psychological opera-

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tions in Southeast -Asia*

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AmsKibassy PARIS ^3^^ -BTTD Ih'FO; Ar:2P.b?.s^y PiCIOI'f PEIlTi ^ 5.-^

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pursuant r.iy talks concerri.n^ Viet-Na-n vrith Mendes-Fr^nce aad Eden

Paris (Pai^is 2601 repaat-d Saii^on 338) I feel it good occasion for us all review basic factors Vist-'ram r>roble:r;S and spell out sonie ^idde

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linos cur actions"in nsar future

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1, Although there .TiP.ny complex and, difficult factors confronting %

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Free Viet-IIani^ th.era no reason ad^dt defeat. During past five Pionths sincG Gsnava, situation has not disint2|{ratsdo reools fundainsnt^ll;:^ anti-Goru'^.unistt They have major resources in south. Hinh or obi am solved

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and resettlement proceeding reasonably uello In aorne is^ysj developments better than vre predicted* Collins and Ely have contributsd ^r^atlv this situation and their coop3ration is najor asset. Direct aidj reduction rSC and pro\'i_3ion3 Manila pact aLl positive factors vrhich i;ilX

affect develop.^.entSo pace may not please us but r^ajor changes such sta^^e of transition as Viet-:I?jn going through oorrias more slowly than in tJest. vFe must not overlook fact CorrjrLunists also face fonrAd^ble proole*T

and if v:3 creata situation such that they c ?j:i only take over by internal

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. effect such action on Asian countries !U>e India^ Their recent increase anti-Diem, and anti-Jtmerican nrxj^n^^jz^^cxi^a: prbpaga^nda may veil be resiili rpa-li^atlon in^-gnitude >:hat they face and chances ultimate Free "iizo^k ^vorld success,

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2, Withdrawal our support would h?.sten Comrtanist takeoi'-er Viet-^Tan and

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have adve se repercussions all Southeast Asia^ Consecruen.irl.i'^j investnent Viet-i^laia

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justifiea even if only to buy tima build up strength else^fliare in area. VJe are

going irj have uiaintain fci flexible policy and proceed cai^efully by stages . Viet-Najn. Simultaneously \ie are tninlan^ of'nays and raeans strengthen Cambodia^ Laos and Thailand against contingencies. But i-re 'basically and irninediately faced

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vrLth pz^obl^iTi strengthening Free Viet-Nai:! and must devote best efforts that task

3* Under present circurr,stances and unless situatioa iai Free Viet-iTaiH clearly appears hopeless and rapidly disintegratingj we have no choice but

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continue our aid Viet-Mani and support of DieM, There no other suitable leader

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known to us a Can any successor raake uq for Dien's deficiencies vritnout also lacking Diem's virtues? Could we KrdAsjipi anticipate stable process of succession and not vrorse conJ^usion and weakness than now e:dLsts* These tou^h questions

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and would appreciate your views:* _ . - ,

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li# I agreed vjxth llendes-France at Paris four itenis concerning problcTi of

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Diem* (reference telegrani) VJhile study of alternate leaaers ?jr.on^ these points

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1 did not agree j=x Generals Collins and Zly should establish deadline for replace-

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i;:ent Diem by anotlier man. It agreed that Collins and Ely would report late

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January on overall situationo

$, I do not consider Sao Dai^s return Viet-lla.^ would really solve our

basic

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basic probl^ns thsrSg Neither do ilenaes-^France cr Eden^ Nor do I se^ merit in French suggestion of viceroy, which j-lh:! Ilendes-France did not press after suggestion Kas analysed. I see little point takin^^/^iiccos create such ■ niachinery when no successor in sight and v:hich v;ould only add to intriguesn

6, Early approval of France and then Viet-llani of Collins-Ely nemorand-on understandip-i; regarding training is basic need. \Ie should make every effort*

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ensure discussions with Viet-TIam proceed rapidly and effectively* Only when

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we have taken steps reorganize ar^ revitalise Ifetional Arr^iy can we hope for -

iir.Droved secuzdty condition and lesserin^- Cor^TLunist infLusnoe Free Vlat-Han,

r This 'tvlll also require very best native l3adership available and I hcpa either General Ty or Vy is up to that task^

7# There also extraiielv delicate problem our influencing Dietti along

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riKht lines* I know how fnastratin^ Collins' exoerience now and Heath's in

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past have been, land refom has powerful propagarxla valuej which Coi^i'Ti'inists already not fail-:d e:oloit, So.iiething should be done on our side, vrith our T3:y^ help J put this a^.otional and basic element to work for us,

8o Al-Uiough there mar^' other factors consider I am sure if we concentrate on solving problenis listed above we ;ri.ll make headway* I would appreciate yoiir com^ientSa

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, ., , ^ ^CORRSCTiD COPY Action ^.33i£^c:;trvbr:f:x?5^-5^5

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Secretary of State 2^55, December 25^

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SENT DEPAR-EvTEI^JT 2453/HEPEA'r^D INEOPu^LA,TION sP^RIS 7^2 561, J^"" ^- ■ -J±2±lL

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repeated Saigon 588.

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Folloving commenta sutrnittsd for Inforcnation State and rtefense;n:; ^ ell paragraph r eferences are to refe rence tele gram unle ss \ g

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otherwise Indicated;

1* First parag ra xS a statement that "on l y su g gestion vhlc h lias been ac ce pLed^lpy Dierri was ap po intrigant i^l nh as Minis tap or~Defense^ is not correco. See TDarap^raiDh '^A, ir^rt 11.

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my telegram 22z)Q. Most 01 acLJona listen

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upon my recouirnendations 01 vhich Ely had bsen inior:::ed>

2, Kendes stateTent in iDaras;raph two lik^vise naints unduiy

^BXaclc picture, f^'aci: is that when Ely derj^rted Sai£?:on ou

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n details oi sii^ programs outlined

my telegram 2004. Ely -ana i nad reached g eneral agreen-:ent on e ac n oi t h ese progranis out: unLlx deualTs vere TurLher aevelopeaj ve vere not p re pared to preseni^ them to Dieoi g overnnient. , Subse q aenL ro Ely^s de p arture ve have discussed

vlth D iem aetailed'^aggestions for lla uionai Assemoly ■

L-an erally Lhese vere received lavoracly gj Diem. Ud staf f

01 fleers nov actively stuaylng proposals viih small cc:r.:nT^tee

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axjnoinuea oy iJiem.

While nou conclusive^ 1 airly 3ai;isi acuory prepress is celn^made. Sii^ilarly, statecien:^ auLributea lo

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ji-iy in paragrapn b tnat ^ooza were nov virtually convincea tnat It was hopeless to expect anything ox Diem' 5,3 an' overstate^.ent. I made no such staterient to Sly though he might '*T have deduced this from our discussions, reported -in paragraphs H h and 5 ^y telegram 2285- Reference para?y7aphs 6 andJ?^ \ce have-^ '' not submitted any ultimatum'to Diem although'l have t:^ed to :^ 1 make clear to him. that no decisj^on has been reached bJrtr-i Uht tf^1 I

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-2- 2^55, Dece[riber 25/ 8 p.m., fro^i SaiEon, CORRECTED COPY

States vith respect to assumption of training responsibiltty or direct military aid and have indicated that my final recommenda^ tions vill he dependent upon the progress actually achieved by his. government during the'remainder? of my. stay here, I am in full accord with position taken by Secretary outlined in paragraph 8, . , ' .

3-. I thoroughly disagree with the suggestion made by Mendes in paragraph 9 and.^t)y.Eden in paragraph 11* As I view situation there are only fou]? acceptable solutions with respect to Bao Dai: either (a) he should return to Saigon and u§e his full authority and Influence to force sects and all other elements of country to support progressive program of Dlemj or some ot>^er Premier if Diem Is replaced; or (bj he, should personally assume active direction of the governvment as Chief of State and Premier; or (c) he should cease pulling any strings from France or asserting any influence, excSpt as specifically requested by French and Americans pending' establishrnent of constitutional monarchy; or (d) he should renounce his authority as Chief of State. I assume that these and perhaps other alternatives vlll be examined thoroughly in'Washington as indicated In Embassy telegram 2^77 and Departmient telegram 2599, repeated Saigon 3S5.

4. Quite frankly I was disturbed-over the attitude assumed by . Mendes as Indicated in paragraphs 21 through 2H. Inference In-paragraph 25 that Vietnamese Government had been breaking Geneva agreements vith respect to public utility services in' Haiphong Is not factual to our best information. I told Ely that I had Issued positive instructions to our WAG and USOM representatives in Haiphong to cooperate fully with French in preventing violations of the Geneva Accord in Haiphong enclave. No single report of violations has been made to date. I wonder whether Mendes' reference is possibly a removal of US financed mining equlpuient which French commercial firms and Sainteny-Mission may be concerned with. Ely has promised to have more valuable and better conditioned equipm.ent of this character ^ -removed* However, Darldan only yesterday said there may be ' . some question as to whether this equipment could be interpreted under the Geneva Accord as pertaining to public utilities.

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5- statement in paragraph 2^ by Mendes that Collins-Ely agree ment reference military training would have to be studied carefully from legal point of view again raises question authority delegated Ely and extent to which be will be supported by Mendes government In agreements made as Indicated by Mendes in last Washington conference. If our conduct of training is to be hedged about with legal interpretations of the character in paragraph 24, then I would recommend that we not assume this responsibility. As indicated in an earlier message, Ely had agreed with rne that if necessary, strength of

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our KAAG training personnel could be Increased teyond the 5^2 figureJ If it vere done quietly and over a period of months, IThile I am not a lavyer^ I have carefully studied Article l6 of the Geneva agreerrent vith respect to Vietnam and oaxi find ■ noxi^here In this Article any hasis for interpretations vhich Mendes appears to place on Introductions of US training personnel- Fact is the y\2 US total comprised Air Force technicians and MAA.G Logistical personnel. These must be converted largely to personnel competent to train the Vietnamese Ajr-my. . *■.''. . .;

6. After discussing vlth Radford above details and other factors concerning situation here^ ye vere in accord that if NSC is to re-evaluate our policies in late January^ to be iollov;ed perhaps by USj British^French consultations^ it would be desirable for me to be present Washington during these discussions, ©/en the best modern communications lack the ■ . personal touch and give-and-take exchange of Ideas vhlcH 1 vould thirJc would be essential If we are to make sound e-evafuatlon of our policies with respect to Vietnam,

LT'iS: JAK^6

KIDDER

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Declas^^jficd per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

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"I'Ei'iOil«MDUI^ FOR THE RECORD

December 29, 195U 0,

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P/iRTICI?AlJTS: The Secretary-, -.-.'-.t'^nt 5Ei.;iF.T;'xY y

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Hr. Robertson Mr, Yoiaig

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SUBJECT: Indochina

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Mr. Robertson and I -went to see the Secretary thi-s jnornlng about beginning direct aid to Viet-llam in January and moving ahead >rith H\AG negc jiations in Cambodia,

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1# The Secretary decided we should proceed as scheduled and "take the plunge" on January 1, Mr* Robertson and I stated the pros and cons* Kr- Robertson pointed out our prestige would be considerably more corakiltted in the three Associated States and our ability to disengage made more difficult by this step. On the other hand, I pointed~out~^it vjould give us m.ore leverage, put o\ir missions on a direct footing and carry out the ■ understanding reached with the French and the three Associated States last : Sept.e!T:ber and October. I explained to th3 Secret^iY tha.t Governor Stassen / had set up an operational mechanism v/hich would keep our dii^ect aid fluid . ,' and fle>:ible so that it could be tapered up or dovm quickly depending on '..7 _;^ developing circumstances* Nr. Robertson stressed that no amount of aid / would be announced at this tiJ^e or conveyed to the governments concerned. ^ . The Socretaiy xhdics-ted his approval of this general line or approach,-i^iiX' ^ thjat the progratn would be subject to discontinuance at any time, as a-^ ^^''5?3j;nt,C;5 .

2# VJith respect to the JC'S prerequisite on elimination of the French --f^" in Cambodia J the Secret arj"^ stated that it was much too legalistic and mirealistic. It is the kind of thing that could get us into a great deal of complication without sufficient compensating advantages. He felt that this was the sort of problem which could be orJLy handled in time and by various methods* To attack it so directly would only create rmich more of a problem, * - .

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Kenneth T. Toungj Jr

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Appi-oved Disapproved

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Jan 5 1955

l^dORAT^lDUI^ POH TlIE JOUIT CHIEFS OF STA^

SUBJECT: Reconsideration of U. S. Military Progreins in Southeast Asia

I ■ 1. In a recent cable (DA IN IO5690) General J. Lairton Collins

*' Indicated that Premier JIgo Dinh Diem of Soutli Vietnam does not have the

aapacity to unity the divided factions in Vietnam and that imless action is tai:en to achieve 5ueh unity the country -win be lost to ConMunisni, .. I He further stated that if measures to strengthen tfie governriient vere un*-acceptable to" the U, S.^ or \/ere unsuccessful^ the U, S. should re-p , evaluate its plans for assisting Southeast Asia* ' In addition^ it is

[^ ' apparent that if the I956 Vietnam e3,ectiGns are held^ the CojTnnunists mil

' probably emerge victorious. The political decision ijlth resijcct to Genez'al Collins' recoimJiendation has not yet "been made.

2, In message Ho, 2585 darted 2^ December 195!!- to tlie Aiaerican Embassies in Paris and Saigon^ the Secretai^ of State vas more optlJEiistic and expressed the vievr that progress had been made in South Vletnaju during the past- five iiionths.

1^^' 3- Referenced commmications indicate a delicate and unstable

4^ ^ situation ^rithin South Vietnam, Under these clrcui<istanceSj It is necessary i: that the Department of Defense be pi^epared for any eventuality; hence it

is prudent that all the iirip.lications of possible courses of action be ■ examined. Accordingly^ It is requested that- the Joint Chiefs of Staff submit their vievs and I'^ecornmendations on the folloTring points as veil as any other vhlch they deem apxi^ropriate, ' :

a. Assuming aid is cut offj the effect of tliis action upon the ability of the armed forces and the Government of Vietnau to jnaintain internal security in South Vietnam.

b. Assuming minimal aid is to be given^ the nature and extent of the military aid required^ and the period for vhlch it should be granted.

e. Force levels for the FEC vhich vould enable them^ in conjunction iTlth available Vietnamese forces^ to safeguard the evacuation from Vietnam of U. S. equipment,

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^ d. I^es rmd levels of equlpnent to be retained by the TEC end the Vietnamese anned forces.

e* Procedures for the rapid evacuation and disposition of excess U. S, equipment, . "_

f. The military iinplications of the possible loss of South Vietnam to the Communists.

The type and level of assistance to be given to other countries in the area (Cambodia^ Laos^ Thailandj Bu]ana) in the light of the above.

h. The extent to trhich these changed circumstances and revised prograias iTill effect the discharge of U, S. obligations under' the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty.

k. It is further requested that this information be for\7arded to me not later than 20 January 1955*

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Signed -

C. E. Wilson

Distx: 1, 2, 3 - JCS

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5 - OYiAk Plans Comeback

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Prepd. by JICoffey/2E845

Ee>iTitten by: IISHensel/ocp/30 Bsc ^h

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h-^r^r^ ri^fi^^F'n^

•IHE JOIIW,CHIEFS OF STAFF Washington 25^ D.C.

21 January 1955

MEMORArom FOE THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Reconsideration of U.S. Mlitary Programs !

in Southeast Asia. ^

1. In response to your memorandum^ dated 5 January ^955^ subject as above^ the Joint Chiefs of Staff submit the fol-lo^^ing views and recommendations.

2. In answer to the eight specific points raised in the above memorandum^ the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider it appropriate^ in viev of the complexity of the problem and the difficulty of considering any of the questions in isolation, to fon-rard a discussion of the points raised. This discussion is attached as the Appendix hereto.

3* The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the eight points mentioned involve only a portion of the over-all problem in an examination of the implications of possible courses of action. AccordinglyJ in response to your request to submit views and recommendations on any other points considered appropriate^ the following courses of action are considered available to the United States in the light of the current situation in South Vietnam.

a. To continue aid to South Vietnam as currently being developed with the cooperation of the French and Vietnamese.

b. To institute a unilateral program of direct guidance to the Vietnamese government through an "advisory" system. Under this course of action^ the amount of U.S. aid should be dependent upon Vietnamese adherence to U.S. direction.

£* In the event the courses of action in subparagraphs a and b above ^ are not sufficient to insure retention of South Vietnam to the Free World, to deploy self-sustaining U.S. forces to South Vietnam^ either unilaterally, or as a part of a Jfenila Pact force*

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d. To withdraw all U.S. support from Soutli Vietnam and concentrate on saTing the remainder of Southeast Asia.

Included in the discussion attached hereto are some of the advantages and disadvantages of each course.

h. Although national policy prescribes making every possible effort to prevent South Vietnam falling to the CommunistSj the degree to which the United States is x-rilling to support this policy in men, monej^ materials^ and acceptance of additional war risks is not readily apparent« Prior to consideration of military courses of action \fith respect to this area^ a firm decision at national level as to implementation of IT.S. policy in Southeast Asia is mandatory. In this connection, the Joiat Chiefs of Staff have recommended previously against a "static" defense for this area and therefore reiterate the previously recoiTjnended adoption of a concept of offensive actions against the "military power of the aggressor''.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

ARTHUR RADFORD, ChairmanJ Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Enclosure

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EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF TrlE PRFSIDENT

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

V^ASl-llHGTOW

January 2h. 195^'

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>13>;0a^l>!»Uii FOH T?K MATIO:^AL S-XL^.ITY COUXIL

SUBJECT;

R3FJ2l3^!C)i;S;

Boport on Viotman for the ?Iational Security

Council

I

A. Annex A to NSC 5^v29/5

B, mc Action :>Io, 1259-e

The enclosed report on the subject, prepared

by General J. Lav/ton CoXllnsj iSpecial Representative, in Vietnam, is transmitted herewith for discussion by the

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National Sacuvity Council at its meeting on Thursday,

January 27, 19^'?

In_the liF:ht of the nature of the reuort

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distr Ihutioj] Is. bein^ ka d t to j^g absoluta ^i^^^ an d _ i t. i s

be on a 'Uioed to k>iovj^^ basis* . -

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JAMiS S. LAY, J^, Executive S'ecretary

cc: The Secretary of the .Treasury

The Director, Bureau of the Budget The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of ^/taff The Director of Central Intelligence

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January 20, 1955

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, To: ' .jL'he Secrctar/ of -^tate

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Froiii: J. Lav:fcGn Collins, Special Kepresentative in Vietnam

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Subject: Report on Vietnain Tor the National Security Council

1, Tlic situation in Vietnam is riost conple,^. and clirricult to j.atho>Ti. Ky judgments arc conditioned by the fact that I have been in Vietnam only tv:o months. However^ duBing this period I have studied intensively the raajor Tactors vrhich vjill aTfect the out J.7ie of our effort g to save rVoe Vietnain from CorrL'fiunlsra, iheae najor factors are:

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r Vietnain car^not match the r:iilitary poiver of the Viet Kinh who

L. have, and v:ill retain^ the capability to overrun free Vietnai^

if they >ri sh* Free Vietna:*^' s^ ultirnat o securi ty lies in the

C military, and luoral support it may receive under the Manila fact*

Strong affirnation by the sisnatorics. to the Kanila Pact of theix' determnation to react if hostilities were renevjed in '^

Indochina nay be an essential factor in deten^ing the Viet Kinh %J-

; fron launching an open attack* Moreover such a declai^ation "^

^" 'would (s^eatly strengthen the Diera Goverr^icnt's position* The ^^^*

Viet Hiiih have left elenents throu^'hout South Vietnaju >jhich constitute a c^ontinuing throat to the nation's security* On -. thiS other hand** the Viet liinh have serious -ccononic problems in th e Ko V t h J vih or c s ova -- c o nf i ti c a t cry t ax a t io n a nd o t h or acts of

L repress!on have erected much dissatisfaction, Knovledse of

these adverse conditions of life in tbe J^orth, as it reaches Free Vietnam, is bo^innin^^ to have a salutary effect on the

C attitudes of people in the Soiith and nay have considerable

bearing on the eiection^i if they are held in 195^*

^) /ho__At t rcj^ud Int e nt i o ns of ?r anc e: Th ere is

considerable doubt in vx^ mind as to the real intentions and ob^ jectivos of France in Indochina* There is strong evidence that the French favor a nevj Vietnamese G-overnsient vhich will offer no serious resistance to the Viet Hlnh .or to French direction. V/ithout French support, and that support is far from assured^ the survival of Free Viotn^i-i is problematical*

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c) Attitude and Intentions of the Sects: The nolitlco- T'^'^-/jpL reli£;ious ai^med groups called the Gao Dai, Hoa iiao, and 3inh Xuycn

L%t/ ^^^ anti-Comrriunist Ih orientation, but fc\i.dalistic and regressive in all other respects^ At present they have an

i

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feiieC:t3-ve veto povrtr over £overninent action. This pov:ur tiiey use to block reforms v;l:ich irdfht thryafjan their preferred !rdlit£!ry, economic ^md political status'^ They v;ill retain their power to thrt:atyn and harass the governnient until the National Army is strofi^; enough to-noutrVjlise their forceE;.

f^J li^i^^!!:iX-HlO:iLt?L£tiZPil§^S_or_the Vietnarr-ese Arrji Forcec: Wnen 1 arrivee in Vietnam the Government was terro:

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p ^ by" a: "rebellious Chief of Staff, General Hinh. Hinh' [_^ ■ and dismissal shortly thereafter cleared the v;ay for

render the Army subordinate to the Government. Dien,

ra fair measure of control over the armed forces. The Army is bein^; deployed throughout the country to carry out a so-callec "^'ationol Security Action" program designed" to conibat Viet Kir

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rised s departure steps to reridor the jlrrny ji-ubordinatu to the Government. ^ Diem noi/has a fsir measure oT control over the armed Torces, The Army is

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infiltration'and restore civil government throughout the coun^ try. The Amy's degree of effectiveness in executing this pro-£rap- v;ill have a decisive hearing en the success or failure of ^ the Diem Government* It is too soon to predict v/hether or not the Nationa.1 Secairity Action pro£;raH v^ill succeed but a£;reement by the United States to assume training responsibility and to £;rcnit financial aid to a rcox"£f?ni3cd and revitalized national ari^iy should have significant stabilizing effects.

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e) Econornic As!>ects of Fi'^ee_ ?ietnani: Free Vietnam is capable of maintaining, a viable econoiiiy, at modest levels-The territory is novi self-sufficient in food and formerly produced a substanticil rice export surplus. Rice and rubber are tx'^aditionally the principal sources of Vietnamese foreign ex-chi^inge. As security improves^ export availability of these, products sliould increase, thus contrib^iting; tov/ard''stabilisa-ion of t3ie economy, , . -

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f) Ability of "^icn to Secure Broad Popular Suonort: There is still a serious question in my laind as to v/hetber Diem v/ill be able to estal^lish broad popular confidence in^ and support for J his Government. Hov/everj he has enjoyed sor.^e recent successes in his dealinge v;ith the sects. This and his reten--tion of active U.S, support have tended to enhance his prestige, Kov;ever^ Diea has iriuch yet to learn about practical politics ^. and public relations. 'VJhile at times he conveys the impression of being well over his depth, recently he has evidenced greater flexibility in handling* people s.nd increased self-confidence in dealing: v;ith his ministers and-public issues. On balance I bolieve'that Dieia^s integrity^ strong nationalism, tenacity^ snd^ spiritual qualities render him the best available Prime ^ Mnister to lead Vietnam in its struggle against GQ::iriunism,

2r In orde'i'"'to assist the Diein Government to capitalise'

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Declaitsified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number; NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

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on its advantaf^es and to overcome the obstacles to its success, I have directed the principal errorts of the United States in, Vietnc-i:n^ in cooperation wit?i the Prcnch^^* toward aiding the Vietnapiuse, to develop and execute a series ox eniergenoy programs covt^ring the military estabiishpieht, agrarian voUovm^ refu.gee resettleiiientJ fiscal mana:;^^-^-*^^^^ ^^^d the establishnent of a national assembly, dorao progress^ of increasing monentum is bciing inade in all these fields, with corresponding increase in the stability of the G-overixnent • The leo.st successful aspect of my mission has been my failure thus far to induce Dium to -^ b"^oaden his Governrtient by including other able^ experienced leaders, such as Or. ilian Huy ,;^atj former Defense Minister. :

r ■ 3» Considering all factors, although the sitviation^ in V'etna:n is not bright, I believe that if -L^iem has firm U,3* support and guidance and active ?reneh cooperation, or at Least -acquiescence, his G-overra'aent. has a reasonable p;rcspect of success, Vihiie the atr;:Dsphere in Saigon has improved demonstrably since I\ovumbi.-r^ owing to the departure of vJ'eneral Hinh and the backing >jhich the "United states G-bvernment has given to Diem^ I have been unab 1 e to determine the oxtent of inprovemont in tha coiintryside and villages of free Vietnam, There the Viet Mlnli vill maintain a siguificant degreo of control xintil the National Security Action prograM is well advanced* Moreover^ the sects, although dlsplayin;^ some un^jasiness that thtir days of political and financial ind^epcndence iriay be numbered^ remain devoid of any sens^e of national eonscicn.ce and still have the capacity to do great harm, I/ilceijise the prospect of national elections in 1956 hangs as a threat, over free Vietnam* This threat may reach the stage of crisis by July 1955^ the period when under the Geneva Accord th's3 tv:o sides are to begin discuscions leading to elections, iveverthtjl.ess, in my Judgment, there is at least an civen chsnce that ViotnJ^^m can be saved from^ Commvinism if the present vrogram:^ of its Government are fully Implemented,

k. a^c. Best available estimate of the cost^s for 0'£ 55 financing programs of military and non-military aid that I recommend are:

vl

of

G^l 55

Xst Half

Military Jjon-military

Total Costs Less Viotnnmese Contribution Remaining Requirement for

;jj) 152 o 3

§ 206.^

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b. In practice, beca.usc of delays in leaking nevr

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U.S. appropriations ?.vsalable in Vietnan, . Vietna^nese calendar yesr expenses have norvoaliy been paid £ro^ funds appropriated for the. U.3, Tiscal year. ' -. , ^ *

_c. However, if it is necessary to reduce Vietnam's share o.f tlie 8700,000,000 currently appropriated for Southeast Asia, it would be possible to limit the o.iiiount made available to Vietnari to ;:a72,300,000 (reaulred for 1st half of CI 195i^) if ve could be aysurod of 01^^5,000,000 (renui-red for 2nd half of GY 1955) frcm new ?T 195^ appropriations.

d^. jistiraated costs for GY 1956 are:

CY_JL9i6

t'ilitary Icon-Kilitary

1st Half

91 .IT

V

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Total Costs

Less Vietnamese Contribution

ilem a i ni ng Re qu 1 r ein c nt Tor l)

Funds

t)l3l.7 ^^103.^

2nd Half

-33 a

U 21, 9 -28^5

^^ 93.li:

e. The requiremevit for U.3, funds for the second half of 01 1955', ::?l55o0 million, added to'* the requirement for U.S. funds for the first half of CY" 1956, «103^2 million, or a total of :ji25o.2 million, would be the to'tal requireiient for U.S. py 1956 appropriations, A contingency fund of -^2.0 riiilllon may be required for F'l 1956 as Indicated in Enclosure "3".

5* In view of the importance o.f Vietnam to all of -Southeast Asia> I a:a co'ivinccd that tho United States should expend the. fui:ds, materiel^ and effor*t, required to strengthen the coimtry and help it retain its inde':?endenceo I can^aot guarantee that Vietnam vdll reniain free, even vrith our aid^ But I knovr th?.t uithout our aid Victna-^a will surely be lost to Cora^^unisn, If the chances of si^.ccess are difficult to calculate, the results of a vjithdrawal of Aiericar; aid are only too certain, not only in VietnaiTi but turou^hout Southeast Asia* Such a v/ithdrawal v:ould hasten the rate of Con-iunist advances in the ?ar ii^ast as a vhole and could result in the loss of Southeast Asia to Communism. in my opinion, the chance of success is not only Kprth the gainble; we cannot afford to l^it free Vietnari go by default*

^y^.

Jp Laivton Collins Special .Representative ^ of the United States in Vietnam

Declassined per Executive Order 13526, Section 3 J NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

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SUPPLEMLK? ■0 SHL RlilrOilT OH VIETrJAM

.by • -■•

GEIi. J. LAVTOiC COLLINS-

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P03T-GEN7:VA CllISTS III VIZTHAM/ a, Ori^unjoTjy^ The "immediate 'cc-use" of the crisis* in Vietni^m vrhich -"a ocute phrase in the fc^Il of. 1954 v^^'i3 the Geneva This a{;retir3ent ended seven years of v/ar by dividing

reacnca c>.i Accord,

t^ e country at the l?th parallel and av;arded administration o^' Ton!<:in and northern .'mnam to a victorious Communist ^rmy and re,^;iTP.£i. Under French leadership Vietna?^! had oarticipated in the V';ar under conditionG which tended to perpetuc^te the e sentiol features of colonial rule. These conditions dis-coura^ed the grovrth of institutions v;hich mi£;ht have consti'--tuted a lulv/ark a^:Ginct the Viet Minh in the South even after the enemy hcd prevailed Liilitarily in the North. Vietnairi eiaerg^rj froni the v/ar v:ith nominal independence, but this e'xertcd less popular appeal than the anti-colonial slogans

of the Viet Kinh. Its so-called i^ational Ax^my at the raoment of defeat \^jas neither national nor.^an ariny. Its civil administration V'-'as denoraliEed, Its government lacked effective control and v/as faced v;ith the pi^ospoct of national elections in 1956 which could reunite the country under Communist control* iIov:everj this £Overn:.ient, headed by Mgo Dinh Dien-since June 1934, v;as the first nationalist government of Vietnam and vdth its moral force resolutely opposed the Viet I^Iinh»

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k- I}i5Jil_5.lllJ}i.^.^Ul2.^^ (-^) Bec ause of its anti-A^ict Minh'and'nationalist character, the Diem Governm.ent ^vas unpopular vdth nearly the entire range of French official--dorn, Sor:=e Frevich elements hoped for an accoir^modation betv/een North and South v.liich vrould permit the French to continue to do bvisinoBS v;ith the entire country. Others nourished the illusion that ^ quasi-colonial regime could be established and perpetuated in Cochinchina. Under pressure from bath 'ides, the French Government through its representatives in Vr'ashin^ton -^ind Saigon^ made repeated representations U.S. Government^ v^hich had publicly stated its support Diem Government, to the effect that Diem had had his chance, had failed, and should be replaced. The negative reply to these overtures v/as based on the U*S. contention that Diem, ov/ing to circuinstances beyond his control, had not had a real chance^td prove himself j that to replace him v;ithout removing the impodiments to his success v/ould only lead to another failure; a.nd that the men suggested by the- French to

Paris, to the

of the

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replace Di^ni vjere unacceptable ,10r being eithor French puppots

or cryptO"Vi*;.-tt i'linb.

(2) The opposition to Diepi^.'in addition to the CoiiHiiunists f..n.c\ a Ic-ri^o element of the French, included the Ciiicr of tl c VietnriiTiC-se General Staff end the sectarian reli-glous groups. These S(i;cts have long teen more concerned, vdth mciintaining their private armies and domains than v;ith wording for the common national ^;ood. The sects finally joined the Diem Government, to protect their cvm interests. Kov/ever, General Hinh, the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces^ vjith some tacit support froi:! the sects, precipitated a prolonged crisis by threatening; for about tv:o months Xo overthrov; the Government by force > AlthQU£;;h this officer vras a French citizen and a lieutenant colonel in the French Air Force, no effective French pressure v^rxs brought to bear on him to desist froin threatenin,-^ the Gcvernment. On the contrary, it appeared

that a Vietnamese Keguib {or Nasser) would not have heen un-vjelcome to the French if he had been able to estcliiBh a military dict^otorsi-ip responsive to French direction*

£' Situation as o f Hovepibgr 1954* (1) As of the date my mi'ssioir alrrivcd in Saigon, "Cenera'l Hinh^ the Chief of Staff J continued to threaten'the Government, even thour?i he had been ordered by the Chief of State to proceed to France* The sects, although represented in the Government, were openly working tovjard their owi objectives, vnthout thought of the consequences of their action upon the nation, Thie Viet Ilinh v-ere in offoictivc control of ino;5t of the rural areas and villages under apminaX authority of the French representatives v.cre pressing Hi em and hie rep la corn en t by one of t

National Government. for the early removal of eir ov^n stoo.ees or else

bv a Vict ;'';inh syi,ipathizer v/ho might reach some kind of under

en

nego'f^i^V'ing in rtanoi \w\zn ztie uiei: ::Linn zo me eiiu ufi^J^b n-ench businesses might continue to operate under '^normal*^ conditions in Viet r'inh territory. At the same time .the Government v.^as faced v.'ith the cru^^rdng problem of moving, caring for end relocating anti-Communist refugees iror^ the North \=ho now number nearly one-half million and may in the end total one million- This undertaking, which could ne^er have succeeded without the devott^d service of the French Army and the American' Navy and the financial support of the U.S. GoveririTsnt, v.dll ^ long tax the resources of the nation, involving as it does one of the mo.:-t' significant population movements of moderrr ' times* ^^ '

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tElyj I pro'ceeded thereafter to draw up a sovdn-point pro^:r or action to vx^uch l proposed to devote the limited period of my n^ission in Vietn-r^n, I had consulted "Ely in detail as this pro/;rai;i wag bein*: drav^n up, '7:ad had obtained his con-r ctirrence' and the cooperation of his staff nerifoers v.'ho v;orked

Accordingly, my initial efforts were directed tovs"ara preparing' recor.^'iUidations on tlse flational Ax-^my which had to be dealt with before &ny of the ot'ner urgent problems of Vietnam could be solved• Fortunately^ shortly after my arrival. General' Ilinh obeyed the orders B?o Dai had been prevailed upon to issue J and left Vietna.ni for France, as I had urged him to. do. Kinh's departure rer^^jved some of the aspects-of crisis from the National Army pro^^ram but did not rob it oi its importance as t]ie nation's inost urgent problem.

b. In accord vrlth the French Commissioner General

t pro-;;r;^um

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(2) From nearly every point of viev.-, ^'free" Vietnam apneai'ed headed tov)ai-l absorption by the Vie^t Minh, vdicther through a French-managed accommodation vith the Communists or through the restoration of a^ scarcely-^veiled ^ colonial syi'te):i in South Vietnam v;hich could have hecn sustained against the Viet I-Iinh only by the ^jeight of arms \v)iich^ paradoxically J the French had m.ade clear they had no

intention of vising.

to'

2' PUKP03K O F C0LLI ^i3 ^JISSIOH, In his letter of Novem^ ' \ ber Ij 19i^^4> instructing me to undertake a special mission ; to Vietnam J the President said he \ras ordering me to Saigon ' for a limited period to coordinate and direct U.S. activities^ in Vietnam, in support of U.S. policy objectives. To that ^nd.^ he gave me broad authority to direct, utilize and control all agencies of the U.3, Governm.ent in that country. My imm.ediate task vjas to attem.pt to check a rapidly deteriorating situation in Vietnam and to help Biem^s Governnent establish internal security and political stability tlu^ough-cut its territories. The eniergency, rather than the'long- - • range, aspects of U.S. policy in Vietnam v/ere designated the principal task of my mission, . >

3' SiiYr^iLlJ^^^^^^^ B,* ^ ^"^-s ^<^^^ impressed vdth

the fact that'the r^ational Army"was the key to success or led.lure in Vietnam, The kvmj v/as under the command of- an avoved enemy of the Diem Government. So long as the Govern- " -ment could not rely on the Army, it v;as povjerless not only . aralust th& General Staff but also a.r-ninst the scents, each

Declassirit'd per Executive Order 13526, Section 3,3 NND Pioject Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

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closely with mine. Cur fclose collaboration v;ns confiri.ir;d in Decern: er by thm 3ccret;;ry of State and.'the French Premier ^.fte^■ tiieii- ineetini^ in T'Jashington.

G. The seven-point program \je evolved v/as as follows: (1) Vietnamese Arir.ed Forces

(a) A=;:roeaent to be" reached with French and Vietncauese on .tiie siae, composition and mission of the forces.

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(b) As-airaption by MAAG of full rosoonsibility for training Vietnamo^se Armed Forces* ^

/a'TiJed Forces.

(c} Full autonomy to be rrrontod to Vietnamese

(d) National Arrny support, and subordination to J Vietnairjese Government to be assured.

{e) Euployrricnt of National Array in National Security Action (pacification an/l .anti-subversion program).

(2) 3trenrtlicnin<£ and broadening of Ijien Governncnt.

(3) Helocation of refugees and their absorption into the national economy, ^ . ^ .

^ [l-r) Agrarian reform, particularly tho.<;e phases' designed to get refugees onto the land and restore all \mtxlled lands to cultivation*

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(5) I^stablishment of a National Assembly.

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(6) Financial and economic measures designed to strengthen the econor':yj iiVr:et U.S. requirements for receiving direct American aid and to support other points of the prorram,

{7) Education and training^ pfirticularly in the field of public administration.

d. It ivas agreed that as progress ";\^as achieved in each field a calculated effort vjould be made to give major^ credit to Px'esident Diein for such progress. Diem ,v;ould meke the public announcements through an im.proved and expanded^ Vietnaniese Public Information Service, I charged the chief of our USI3 udth-the irriplementation of this most irr^portant -aspect of our program. . ■

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Decl^ffsiHed per Executive Order 13526, Section 3 J NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

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Vie tnamG ^0 Anne d r orct*s. {1 j Un Ue ce;-'■']>er 13 Gene ra 1 Ely and 1 agreed on ^ lorce structure Tor ths Vietn/iiiiosG Arned Forces and on t)\e assu^rntion hy ^^AAG of full responsibility for ^ training thei-'^ forces under the overell authority of the Con- . mender-in-Chief in Indochina. Delay by the French Covora:rtent in approving our agreencnt on this subject has held up irnple-m cntati on of t ■ ] i ^ a d pe ct of tli e pi"ogram,

(2) The same agreement referred to above provides that the Vietna^nese Armed Forces v.dll be fully autonor^ous, that is staffed and coinmanded solely by Vietnamesse officers^ .by July 1 V^^^ *

iiient vJith Pre

(3) Additionally, on January 19, i reached agree-;sident Dieui and the Vietnamese J^Iinister of i^at-

ioaal Defense on a slightly modified force structure and on a program for reorganization of the Vietnamese A.rmed Forces, in v;hich General Ely concurred. This agreement is contained in rn exchange of letter? betv^^een the Vietnamese Government c'nd me*

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(4) The sti'^ucture of the Vietnamese Armed Forces n (shovm in Enclosure A) is designed to accomplish a t^vo-fold . - mission; the establis'irnxnt and maintenance of internal secu-'^ rity; and the capability of providing sufficient initial re- ^

' slstance to external attack to prevent the country from being [ rapidly overi^un before outside assistance can be brought to' ^ bear, ?o ^^ccomplish these laissions the .Arrny is to ""be organised

into six divisions: three territorial divisions^ essentially existing regional co:mr.ands; and three field divisions to constitute a mobile brittle corps to reinforce provincial units and provide a delaying shield in event of aggression*

(5) Tills structure is based on the concept that a relatively small force, properly trained, equipped and led^ can perform the above missions more effectively and at less cost t='.p.n a. larger force which would be disproportionate to the economic and manpo;;er capacities of the country. In any

exceeding Vv'hatever number of divisions free Vietnam could put into the field*

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case J the Vict riiah enemy^ backed hy its Comriunist Chinese

CcllVj could alv.-ays maintain the capability of matching anA rf^r'clir^.y whatever numhf:r of divislonr^ free Vietnam could du

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,\6) Thus the Vietnamese Jirmecl Forces dascribxid ^hQV&, fiiid the concept upon v.'hich their structure is br.sed,. do not in themselves insure the security of free Vietnam in the event of external attach. Such security nust depend ultimately on the Manila P.ect Powers and tlie action they ^-:ould

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"be prepared to take, bo ijhich VietnaTnesd forces thci^Gelvo vculdnake a vlt?J_ contribution. .

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(7J Significant progress has been maCio in attaining i^ational Arruy support of, and subordln^ition to^ the Viet-n^nose uovern:^,ent f or:iov:in:7; the depoxturo of General Kinli. VJhilc it may be too early to say that the Jlational Army is novj in alL GonGGs the riiilltar^y am of the. govGprjTientj I believe that thlG aspect of the orograri is on the ri^ht path and v;ith p tlont application will be fully realised.

(8) ^he dcployTnent of the territorial force- of

already begun, The c nectlves and methods o? thp- ilntlon.^l Security Action ?ro3ra>^

tne ivational Army to the i:.roYinccG has already begun, The P c^ jectives and methods of the ila^tlonal Security Action Pro^r

h.a^e been explained to mlltary and civil authorities having

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r^espon^iibilitles tVLrcug:iout .the country. This prograrri too 1 of long range character and v:ill tal^e some months to execute. A good start has boon made.

b» Strengthening^, and Broadeninq_ of Diem n-overn^Tient, Little pi'ogress has been vaade tovjard strengthening and broadc2iing the i^ler.i Goverinent. This failure, is attributable to the fact ^that more than half of the present 'cabinet ministers represent the sects ai:d are opposed to accepting into the cabinet any laan i;ho i^iight threaten their position there or the place of their respective sect in the societyc Frii-ae Minister Diem contends that he v/ishcs to broaden his Goverix-nent but dares not do so U2itll the iiatilonal Army has been rendered capable of neutraliz^ing tho private^military forces of the sects. The fail^ire of Diem ^ to accept Dr# Fhan Huy -^lat in the Government v?as a riajor p set-badv. 'J-hcro is still an urgent need for an effective

[^ Minister of the Interior^ and the I'^Iinistries of Inl*ormation

and \griculture particularly need strengthening. Considerable

L improvement has resulted from the appointment of Ho Tliong ifinh

as Defense Minister and Diom^s reliri--LuishTrient to him of authorrlty to direct and control the Defense Ministry, The new Comvdissloner of hefugees, rha>n Van iiuyen, also represents an improvement,

LI fear that no further progress on this front, hoivever, villi be made for. some time to come.

^* j.^.f 1 o.c^^tio n _ o f ,3.oi^V-fiPPA* Kiis is likewise a long range and complex proV^.em*"" It has been under urgent study by members of uSCM and the appropriate ministries of the Government* Some progress has been made in developing plans to ; absorb the hundreds of thousands of refugees into the productive life of the nation, particularly in the field of agriculture.

V .^

^» Ar^J'ari an He f orm^. President Dien intends to announce In his he\<f Year's message 1 January 2l;.) an agrarian reform prorr-ain

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cc\'erin2 landlord-tenant relationships, conditions of land tenure, and an eriergency pi'Or;ra"M vhcrcb^y refugees and nllitary personnel doriobiii:ied as a result o.f the i-eduotion in thfe Arriod Poncos can be placed, npcn land abandoned by its ovrners or not nov: in x^ne, Tlie pro£^Pan will provide that ^af ter tj'iree years, ir certain conditions ez*o net, the rernj^ees can obtain poi^nanent posscGsion of the land on vhich they are placed.

e^, ilM^abl i shr-icnt of ive arai'tcc th e liTib a s sy a t aff,

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a 1 ;ati onal As 3 e:;ibly, Yi g tnaracso

Htul v;lth tne "close cooperation of r;ieTabops reyised a decree establishing a national a£ser:b,^y. This assembly >:ill be provifi onal, viill have some elective character, and v.dll have only liiYiitod pov7ers. This cinbly v^ill prepare for the later establiSnitient of a conriti-

nt a?;serab?Ly but >:ill itself have no constituent pov;ers.

s point is iranortant since to establish the poi*2nanant foi"^ii

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of the r^oveminent necessarily involves dcfinin,':?: the role of the

pro

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the national ^^overrcaent is unable to cone with the sects and

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Chief of '^tato 3ao Dai* The inclination o± the present ernvMcnt is to throi%^ over Bao Dai, but I feci that as ior^s

as

o

other splinter f^rouo'^ vrithou.t his aid- it i^^oxO^d be both^prc^iiature end de/ngarous to rc:nove Bao Dai from lii,s position as Qilef of State,

£* Financi al and r.;co non: l_c^ Meas ure s to_ S trengthen the Kconop y, 11) yi o t nam no\^ iias its ovjn national barilc and i s independent of the nrevlons quadripartite system* Am^rrican" e:^ports of the U^OM and 'iinbassy staffs arc ^vor-':in^ Hith Viet^ naxi-ese Governnent officials to establish procedures acceptable to the United States i:ith' regard to foreign exchange, import, controls, and related matters, Ivuch time has hoen cTonsarTied in explai/iin^i Ai-nerican requlre:iients but the Vietnai^iese offi*- ■ cials have displayed good %jill and I believe that they \/ill meet our objectives in this regard*

(2) Daring GY 1955> tax receipts of tiae national government of Vietna?^ will be appro::ipjately ^39 liiillion, of wliich ■■pll6 rnillion will have to'be used for ordinary civilian experjditures of the governnent. This surplus on the civilian side of th.e bud;^et, plus borrovring and other extraordinary recelp t s of the national governinent, x^-ll 1 p emit ''" ^"^ ^^.• ^4-« Gcveri-iraent to contribute approximately i}oQ milli extraordinary exp-^jnditures of the G-overri!aent, including niilitary, rerugees, and econoiTiic aid. The balance of necessary expenditures of arjnroxiiniately $32? tnlllion vrill have to be Tiiet by United States aid/'For FY 19i>6'it is estimated that receipts v:ill increase and expenditures decline, so that aid needed \-Jill decline to approximately i^2$^Q million.

V, i^he Vietnaj:nese ion to the

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Sectiun 3,3 NMD Project Number: NND 63316. Bv: NWD Dute: 2011

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(3) ^^eqiiirenents for Uiiited States econoi^ilc aid are exoected to xncre?.£je rrcm aorsroxinafclv i-3lL rilT lion in FY 1955 to :-^50 million in Cr 19^5> cr.d to^ 1^66 nillion in L^J 1956, or au ^.pproxiiuatG doubling Trom I^'Y 1955 uo PY 1956, T}ie inajor increase is in transportation raid coinraunications, wit?i snsllcr increa.^es in agricr.lt up e, education and public adninititration, and rublic health.

aid tbe the

[h^) As shovm by the above fi^^uresj during 1955 ai\6. 1956j economic aid rc^uiren^nts v;lll incraaso and ndlitary roquireraents v;ill decrease* Knclosuro ^'B^' shovis graphically ma^^nitudo of Vietnaraose Oovernrncnt extraordinary expenses, expected Vietnariiese contribution^ and the anounc of^ United States aid reconL=]ended for military and. non-nilitary aid prograras during 1955 -nd 1956 J

iS.• jiLducatio n and TraJ.nin .^ in Fi:i bli c Ad-^iini_st ration » The Vietnanese Goverr^-rient is aliout to sign a contract with Kichi^jan State Gollese, under the sponsorship of FOA, vaiich

Hill provide a niuch-neodcd school of public administration and specialized training in police methods.

5

Ili!2!3LJ;;^_g?_T}I^ The normal probleiia of a divided

e

es sta-

Bach or t::ese groups is rendered dangerous by its possession of arncd forces and its control of a considerable portion of the national territory* The sects and the 3inh Auyen, althoush they have afe various oirios olayed an anti-Fi-^ench role, are vestirt of the colonial policy of divide and rule. VAiile no rcliabl-e ti sties are avail ablej thpse groups claim to embrace about oni;-tenth of the population of free Vietnava and to h.ave forces variously sri^.od tot oiling I|.0/50jOOO* The Frciich have incorporated sone thousands of these ar-ned forces into their iS:*:peditionary Corps and have provided ti^e financial means for the perpetuation of tl:o sects as serni-indcpendent principalities* "French subsidies^ to tho sects, hov/over, which have steadily dirjinished over recent months, \-jill, according to General Ivly, be entirely sus-penO,ed as of ^^anuary 31. This development, vjhile dangerous in the i2v>2aediate future, is of lon^ range advanta^ge to the Vietnamese Government in that it o*ffers tho opportunity, if properly exploited to end once and for all the a.cute threat of the sects to an orderl v central cover*iiin':-mt• Lachlng French support the sects will be obliged to turn to the national governments If the governiTient handles then skillfully, they can be brought into line and shorn of their power to create serious trouble* }Iov/ever, if the govern^ ment does not proceed cautiously in this natter, there is a possibility that thp sects, or fragtn^^-nts of them, nay resort to ' open banditry at "a" ti^ne when the iiational governjai^nt not tvrenared to meet this noi-j nenace.

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 NND Prciject Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

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U.S. RJJjA TIQjMa :-agH '^Ji^AC'd III VXi^i^AIU One of the

in Viotnori

6.

ci^uclrxl Toquiromvjnts o:." U,ci, policy ana dperationr. Is to cleter^iiiiie precisely v;hat Frencli Intentions toward the country arc. It is cle^.r that tho/rcnch-in Vietnam do not £p'i^alv with a single voice, I have entire confidence in the integrity ox Genoral i^ly and have no doubt that he believes i-jhat he has said to rac curing the ^course of our association in Saigon* Kovcvor^ the presence in Hanoi of the Saintt^ny mission^ tha conv-cjrsation 1 had v:ith 3j3.inteny in KLy^s presence, and e:-: cell en t analyses made by our i:i>:ba£sy in Paris, lead pio to believe t/iafc ^^'^eneral li-ly is not t>ie sole representative in Vietnam o± th^ Fre2ich GoV'^rn='-erit• 'Ihis vlev? is rein'/orced by a continuing and undiSi;s'L;ised i^'rench desire to renove Prime

Kiiiistor Dicni ^in ravor of one of the 1 r own candidatcs, I believe that the i-'rc :-,ch are prenarin^^ t^jo possible courses oi actiozi:

a. If Tree VlotnaTi. should be taken over by the Coniiriunis13J the -^"'renc;\ m1 sh 't o bo prepared to rialco a deal T-ri th lio Chi Hi^-ili in order to conti'nue trade and cultural relations with ho under sor«ie fora of- '*co-existence''.

It

throunh lUS,

If, on the othf^jr hand, free Vietnamj largely aid and support of the-. Manila Pactj can bo saved as an ir_do. endcnt state, the French still msh to retain their S;oecial economic and cultural status, claim a large measure of credit for such success, and thus, perhaps, held free Vietnara in the l^Vench Union, Ihe rrench Government^ however, is still undecided as to tho outccrae, and so testers back and forth

our .^overnnient should

0uc:;een

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two policies. I feel

Ju _ _ * J_^^ J_T_ _ "tt__ _'

th at

have Lhi£; raatter out with the I^rench Goverrjaient one o and for-all, Wltn full and faithful support from the French;^ Diem has a fair chance of success. V/ithout such support, particularly if instead there should be covert obstructionism fro:n the_French in the foroi of support of rival lea^ders, perhaps with 3ao Dai's con::ivence, Dieri'V chances v/ill be materially lessenedc

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a. Die>n*s virtues lie in hla and nationalism. His disadvanta.^es

widely acVnovjled^jed proTxIt^^ as a head of governricnt are his lack of executive experience, his conspiratorial past vjhich tends to raahe him suspicious of t'^ose who do not openly su^oport him, his naive trust in those willlnrj to flatter" his eco', his lack of *'ki:;ow how" in selling himself to his peo2:»le, his n^.rrovrncss of view, his tendency to exaggerate his insight into the proble.as of Vietnam, and his great stubbornness* Moreover J^iem has surrounded himself vjith members of his family whose defects tend to intensify rather than offset his own.

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Deelassifi^ per Executive Order 13526, Section 3 J NND Project Number: NND 6331C. By: NWD Date: 2011

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b* Hcvjevsr, since 1.1^ arrival in;S£-dgon I have observed some i!aprove:-icnt In I>ic-Ti'G conouct of public eSxpSrs^ and I believe Jbhat .with continued staunch Algeria an support he may be able to succeed* It should be noted that the problems he faces vjould daunt the iTiost oxpcrienqed statesviian, Ko on^i else is in sight at the present timo w/io could usefully replace Diemc However, as a last resort, it nay become necessary to call upon the personal presence and support of -5ao Dai to enable Diem to^ solve the coiaplex pr obi era of his'relations with the sects and.the ultimate position of these grouvs in the national society* This would have to be done;^ however, unde certain ^^larantees, firmly .agreed to in advance by 3ao Dai, * as indicated in pertin^^nt telegrams I have sent the Denartment,

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PROPOSED FOnCS BASIS I'OR FRKE VIKT-IIAJ/ TOR CT 19^6

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Alined Forces Ileadqiiari.ers TerratorialDivisions (3) Per Div:

Div Hq ^ 5p Trps ct 800 Split among 3 Div:

13 Security Regt Hq at 200 39 Security Bns at 500 Field Divisions (3 at 8^1^50) Airborne RCT (1) Army Troops Com2 Troops Schools and Caijips Pipeline RediicGid Tciy Trainees

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IR FORCE

Iiq a]id S\x Elornants Operatinf^ Units (!')

2 Ln Sqn

1 Trans Sqn

TOTAL AIR FORCE .. ^ .;

NAVY

Ho Staffs and Services Training: Scljool Ships Crev;s

TOTAL riAVY

«V Oo^e^OQvaaAe^O^

T0TA7. AT?:-!ED FORCES

(1) During' so c end ysar add

1 Ftr Sqnj 1 Trans Son, 1^000 ir.3n*

STRSMOIH

MILITARY

2,1^00 2h,^C0

3,700 Ji^OOO

5 J 000 5>ooo

lOj 000

9}hOOO

,000 2^000

3,000

700

Uoo

;.900

3,000

I J ' ^ tfc l > » I I rt l ■ ■■ ■ HuJ

100,000

CI7ILUN

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ll,000

150

• 150

2$0

250

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SECRET ^,^:? JL.^ ^-

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^ MMM Mil ■ !■ I ■!! I ^» 1

In Millions of U.S. Dollarr;

' FY 55 • .

Second Half First. }[nlf

j-,ijij.t.uf..iii-cr "fc v-'-" J i'^i/Ju;.! /

ti- I t, <l « l ■ T lt-^^-»

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193(1-

1^33

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19 b-J 19^^

3ncond !.':ilf jTr;z

;ra ord j. n ?.i"y 2xn 3 !"i E G ?- '

lalitary Eiq>ensGS

19U.2

152.3

130.9

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Rdfuree Settle

':Zcor;Orrac Ai^d Total o£ ''rhich:

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'' .Trr-Xisr^ortation,

f Industry '"- i;ird.ns

' C crorairn. ty Dex^elopme nt

^ t'' Public iioalth

' Sducation h Public

Acbiird sti^ation

>jLscoll^n';;oiio

2.1

2,2

18 oO 17.2

al 2xtL-r.or:linp.ry E^ t pv^nf^^^? (Half Yrs Q ' 229 al^ ?y Oasis

2.1

li.7 2o2

10.0

27.0 17.2

206.5

^ '

6.7 12.1

3.3

7.1 )i.l

10$ ^9

■y/:y-l

10.0 15.0

1-P9-5

6.7 12.1

7.1

lul

320,9

f.l Vi-i.nar,'i3o CcntribiitionfHalf Yrs.)

35.7

3h.?

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Vi ijaa.ls ;^Y Basis

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69.9

6ti,).

62.7

7.0

33.3

131.7

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P

6.7 12.1

■3.3

7.1

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233.6

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fi-

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121.9

■3.5

37.0

. Gon-lribiiUon (residual)(Half Yrs.)

193.7

172.3

155.0

103.2

93. U

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366,0

V>7 ">

256.2

196.6

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' Civilian Budget Surplus

S^icond Hair

■ 19?II '

OCT 7

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/ Fi>Dres shoim are on "budget ratlior than exponditiixe basis*

/ In vlev; of tho iiriGxpected inTlvJC of refugeesj the %\'S million precently pro^ranT^ed for ?Y ^5^ i^-^/ f^H short by %\$ mllion of anticipatod needs ♦

/ Ho prorran has been dravni up for July-Decenber '56; figures hare ai^e continuation of FY '56 prqiirajrio

/ Corr.prised of $U5*6 million tp be reimbursed b^ the French for expenditures already made by the Vietnaraeso Troasuryp if ErAassy and French recoirjnendations for settlcnient of 195U irilitary expanditm^os are accepte'd,-Tills money will be available to be spent in CI '55 ^^^ CI *56* ^ •

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Certain additional costs not reriected in the above

vjill "orobably require larger Vietnaracse X":enditure3 th^.n 't)rGsentlY estiriiated, Th

coat estiinace GoverrxieI'ital ex;: g Klditional costs will be:

ese

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; (1) The financial support given hj the Vietnamese

Go V ^s r^'iiu o n t to the s e c t ts ^ ' :lii ch' v; ill i nor ease wh en the 1^ r o n ch c ^se t^ieir Tinancial support of the sects on 31 January 1S?55-Die:n will probably have to continue the subsidies he now gives the sects and' assume at least part of the support i:iow provided bv the l^rcr-ch for the time bein^, and until he is in a iTfOsi-t* :»n politically and militarily to cut off their subsidies. It is oifficult to estimate the anount of support the VIet-" nariese Crove.rnj^.ent v;ill feel required to furnish* However, based on oresent Vietnamese and French payment figures a total of a:proxi:nately j^jOOO^OOO nay be required in FI 19>o. fecpondi t\ re^ of this sum \vouid reduce the Vietnamese contribu« tion to its own "iiilitary e.nd economic aid px^o^rams and increase the require:T»ent for U*S. funds accordinrdv for P'l 19^6»

j-^ „'

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' (2) Another incalculable cost will arise If the

refugee ev-'.^cuation tovjard the end of the 300--day period (Kay, 1955) exceeds expectatloris. There raay be a reqiaii'^enent for an additional Ol5^000,OGO in this fields I therefore rocoTinend t b

to porrilt flexlbilit.f in copin^. with the above contingencies, if hecessG^ry.

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3J NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

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27 JsQiiiiry 1955

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ESFORTo;.! v;ci;^y>fAypoii ?ns i!'L',eTO":^T. s-'n)RH:x cop^jiT, m cmmf^ coLhr.iH

J,o General Collinr^ vSJ.l bo V';:'c:;Cji'?; "to flii;o"a"s3 his •E.THtcXi rcp:>i"k oj? 20 ^ JaiiUav-y 19:'5p (rico TA3 A)^ 'I'ho pr:lno5,i?j.l points in tbio vcporb f.i'o:

be Thr-^^o ic a voal doubt as to j?VGi:':ola into?itionD a;ia objccitivea in li-^.orjViiuao Alt:iocrj;h Goncrcil }':lly iy coop::catiY£; in IVco Vic/L.i:?;i:j t}ic Sainton; vAe^i^on iri j^orth Victi^?A'.i rj7;:£^?jeD cc^^^-^"* '^^^ ^-eooylGo-* vritli tho Coi:-3Voii^tn<x Tn^ U* Sc. Govcjr-i\^:orit pIiouI/I }:avo t}iin n?;tb::^L^ out ^ath tliD FrGTiob GovG'i"iiJ.::::jt onoo curd for t01«

to

jDc Diom i[5 tlia best t->vailab:io Priuo. Iliiiiator

e

clc '/"lie p^rir.oipcil crfo:et5 of th^i Uc »^<. t.t X-^*o:^ont oro to o4 tho yioti::0u;}3:j to dGTolop cxd e::;..^ait& a cerlo3 ox ctirrgenay progri'J^s co^^ering t;iG lalit^c^;/ eritabli£:br.c^iit:, r2i\ii'5xi-a TzHovn^ rcfu^c^a i-ezattXczori's^ fircal iii;ii$=.sc:r,ontj e-ixl tbo or-teljli£ib:i^:^^t of a r>:vtion:a as^c::b]^<. ^£i*eoT:$;:il: by tho TJ^ B, to ar?r)UJ^3 ti^ainiiig re-^i:o3p5Jjility £u:^^ to £ViV:it firo.^i^oirtl aid to a ro^rg;Via;:cJ aricl r^vitali^ivL-cl ' ixationcil arj:-7 L'bou?.cl hrv'D a rtabili^jing effect *

c* !iJ!io pi'onp^r-t of natiorial clcotioLin ±n 19^^^ bat^gs aa u tba^cat ovei' ^ R;co Viet-jon.

^ f^o Tno U* S* f:b.oul.'l cc^cZiol t;V3 fu^nlG^ intox'iol; r.r:d cffci-t rcqira^cd to Lstvcnj^^hon tbo ooiv:.to'y ar,J holp it i-'ct^.ii-i itr3 irclcpendciccoc Without oi'ci* aid^ Viotnaii vdll f;ui^-0-y ba lo^t to Co:r.:^xviic':u If Dic:^ b:\fi f ix^n U. S, ^^uppo'^'t arid [iiulda^^30^ r;^a Kccnoli cooperation^ ho hz-.s a :cc?.GoncbXo x^o:yy^z:yi fo:c gv.cog^is* Tbis cb^^:coa of cucooe-f? is trcll vortb the ca::blo, . ^ -

007:C-2nS3 i ' ■ . -

a. It cor^xoh in tbo dosiv^bility of a ?Aroy:z rt:rfi:crr3tion ct Bzu-^^bo!i of allioil dctovi'UJi^ition to^ :Lv.iplor:oiit tho ibrJla Factj chouVa t}i3 need £;ri:JO^» »

bo Tno tStato DDpartsr.cint corito".:^:^ tb%t ;:cv b^.vo bsci '-thia j;r?/;toi' exit irith tho ri"tn::li" tit v^reJxm^ hij^h^-lovcl coru^c^erfosa eX:^ tta* tbo Fre::vh bavo f:;roecl in x-r-i-aoivOx to o-jr position ii:i ^ritir^* Tae ?lc^^rA3.r:^ roai-a bolievo:; i:c cboald

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Declassined per Executive Order 13526, Section 3 J NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

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p^ir-^ijploj ^ah all rc;crp>oJ><36 For c:"^:r;>loj uo L^ould injii^t that *t!icy re;::DV3 th taq>^d^5ivo POA--?inDi:oc:l jf„vjhi5^.0A^y <Vo;t5 tho cool Jaino;^ riox'th o:? I'::no:lo Txp^a vSn

r,rd c/g t:.-^c5cix1i as bcln^ i^cc^^;-;:! by 'c}io Ccc,7.T0.nifjtf5 fca* 'bhoir b:::uc€:lu(, Torjpioo

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in clot ail by tho dsp^v:'orient b gjjI £:ie^oica coi^xjcanic-^Ao

Co It coivy-scr^ th-at cirLup/o^o ^*Cjr?:cdi:o2 tho 19p6 clestio^iG is 3i^oeEi!3:iry ai^d tliat thicj rjhniilu ba clovclopzc\ i^rrl neat to G:::/iex*al Collins irltUip, tlia nzcco i:r:pi2th or six iraDlzc^

f:^. It co-ici'rG in tlrj orcl-:;^" c^ rLagrdtivlG o:? tho cor;t to t\id Uo S* of the i^Jlit^^;y riiXi 3aon-iiil5;b:vi?y tc-oc:^^>^ fo-? CY i55 (O^^^c^ ijlliion) cr^ OX 56 ■ (03^9^^06 loiUio'Oo ^Ph^rc c^ppc^-i^o to ]yj no i£iL.iiri:;ortri:'3r;Dlo o'i:>::;tr,olei3 to tlic fij:'Ci.ri-:;iii2 of tbcCvO pvo^rcji^o Kv3 foi^ce ^^oalrj ^o^r th:) ViotiiaT^^fio ai?:^:^ fo:?cer5 have pn-TC'r/3y bean apr^roTcd by tho Joi:at Ghiu?3 of Staff*

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fio You EPiM^ovG tiio :r;c;;:>rt o:? Gonce^ril CoLliiis aria c:;,pper:3 tlio appxccia

tion of tlio DOD to^i las vo:d: in Inlcchin^

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bo Xou svvo7>DV't tho PliCii'oir::' Eor/rd positions rc3arcliz>g tho abovo i-:ajci^ jvjinta in tho event tlio Council is c.plccd to act on thcL^.i>

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Tl-iE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

' WASHINGTON £5, D,C,

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11 February I955

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Concept; and Plans Tor the Iniplementation, if Hecennary^ of Article IV, Ij of the Manila Fact.

1, Thifi is in rcnponrjo to. a nieriioi^anclum by th'" Deputy SeoL"^e-tary of BefenGC;, dated 6 January 1935, nubjccb a^ above, in v;h 1 ch ±t VI an rcquer;ted 111at the Jo 1 nt 0h 1 efG of St: v f.f vo ooir.:ncnd a conocpt and broad outline plant: for fcUa application of U.3* milita'ry poucr under the na^iila Pact vrith a'priiaary objootive bain^ the clatorrence of ", ^ , overt asgroGGion by China or other Coiiuiiunlat nation

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2* There are three basic fovna in v:hich agGreGGion in Southeast Aaia can occur

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a„ Overt arviied attack from outnide of the area^

b^. Overt armed attack froii v;ithJn the area of each of . the novere^tS^ states.

9^^ AgsrenGlon other than aiViied, or "^ubyeroion*

i o G., pelitical v;arf are ,

3^ The Joint Chiefs of Staff ccnoider that their vic-vrn pre--viouoly exprer.rjcd in a, ncn^ornnduni foi'' the fiearotary of Dofenrje, dated B October 193^!^ rnbject: 'Tiilltary Conr:ult^:t lea Under th Southoar/c Ania Colilectivn Defanoe Treatyj" in vjhich the Joint

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Cbiefr; of Staff ntated that U*S. ccr-piitr-Kntr> to rov;-:-ona-j Japan and Korea, vjhieh nations have boon CAcluded fr^oin the treatyj make it i)v:p.erative that the United States not be rea trie ted by force coi;ir:iitrp.Gnfca In tlic subject treaty area*' rei-ialn valid«

h^ 7n orr3er to retain thifj freedoin of action it in coneldo'ced. that the United States aliould not enter into oonbincd i;ilii;ai^ planjiinfi for the; defcnne of the trc-'^ty area vrith t]\e other'-Manila Trat p-i'/err; nor Ghoul'-l iictailn of United fjl'ilcB unilatoral plann fov nilifcary 'action in the event of Cor":iLinia{; n^sv-eoalon in Sou the ant Ar-ia be dincloued to the other pov;c'ri>*

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5, Bor;ed on .the above ocui^lcloratlonGj the Joint; Chiefs? of Staff raconrnenf^ the follovjlpg as a corxicpt; nnd broacl outline plim for the ?.ppXlcati03i of U^3, mililari' pov:Gr undoi"^ the Ilanlla Tact: ' . ■ . ' ,

0 , C on I; Inu ed C e v e lo pnicn t o f r.ChX oa t off oc t i ve 1 n a i(5.cnou r> To re e c J \i i t h t h e i i^* g t vv c v. u 'ce r nd. t rrj. n In r^ n n l: n al 1 y coo 'rd in a ted to develop local leaOeri^hip anti prcabl^o^ and vrith improvoci capabilltlc!Lj to ccaate a coheGive tishting force throu[^h integi^atlon of their operatioiiB v:ith ndjacenl; iiidigGnOL^G forces a-nd v;ith support by operation's of forces of othct> Manila Fact irierabei'So

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d^i, DiccuGfjlcn^ in general terms^ of unilateral milit?,ry

Cplanr; by tJio Ililitary Heprcit^cntativerj to the Council to the extent neceruOXi' to inaure maxir.mm participatio2i and cocpo\^a tion by other member natlonB but'not to the eictent that U.S. c ^ ntratosic piano or the availability of U.S, forces for iiiiple

mentins cuch piano niitjlit be revealed^

b. Read^.r^ecrj to retaliate propiptly v-itli a^ttaclra by the most effective combination of U,S* armed forces a^alnct the niilitai^y povrev of the BQ^^reoGov^

c_» Encourofjement of other Ilonila Pact countrie-u to irialn-tain forcea in readinefiD to counter af;KreGnion,

e. Periodic vinitr; by U.S. forces into the area ao de-non-trations of Intejit^ and for Joint and coiiibined trainlii^ , exercises.

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f;, Availahilit:/ of appi"opriate rjcchanihm for the employment of U,3. foixeG in support of friendly indiccnouG forces in the genci^al area.

6, The concept of prorrpt retaliatory attaclcr^ doerj not envi^ ria^e attnclcn on tar^;et8 vrlthin the p^.f^rcGOor country other than on military. tarsetr> i^ivolved in the direct rupport of the "^'ZS'^'^ GC'o X' action. If au ther 1 z ed ^ atom 1 c v^eaponn v:ou 1 d be uned ^ . even In a looaL Gituation^ if such ur^e v:ill bring the asG^-^S3lon to a svfift ond ponitjvo ceBfjationj aj^d if^ on a balance of politi cal CJid military consideration^ Duoh use will ber/c advance U.S. security Intereot?. Under the alternative aor^umption that anther 11 y to use a t o r'. i c \i e apo n n c an not be ass u x- ed ^ t li e abo v e c on c e p t vrould not req^rire chanije, but thlG af;sut.^.ptloji would not perjnifc t the moot effective errployii^ent of IJ.3^ armed foi^cen^ pakI con:3e^ cjuenf:ly mi^ht Tequlre greater forcers than the U.S* v;ould be ; juatificd in pi^ovicing from the over-^all point of viev7.

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7. In the event general vfai"* sliould clevclopj U.S. forcoc v^'ill bo deployed rrj Indic^^ted in emorGCJioy v:av plans^ c^iid V7lth the principa^l effort ?^jvoLocI to 'ofci^ateElc areao conuidei^ed nore vital than Southf-not Ar^ln* Kov/evcrj r^horld <n a;_:5rc?3iorj result In a prolonged local!;r.ec] coiU'lict of limited objcctivcGj additional U.S. f oreea cou 1 cl "be dcpleyed to the ^ area if rcqu 1 red. The applioation of lh:lr; additional U.S. rrO itary povjerj in conjunction \iXlh the tnllitp.ry pov/er of othor^Fcnbor natiOiiD of the Manila Pact^ vould involve the movenent^ doploynent;^ rnd nurporb o f U, S . f o re o 0 no t v:i t h 1 n p re sen, 11 y appro vocl f o re c 1 e vc 1 g ^ and V'.^ ri^oblllr.ation of the dofenoe effori/of the Manila Fact nationn* 1j. order for the Unj.tcd States to oupport this additional effort^ the military brdget and pcrrjonnel ceilinrgy v;ould rcciulre conoid er able increaoeo.

I 8. The above ccnnidevationo are ba^ed on currently planned U.S^ military capabilltloG and on the a-^ouiiiption that the United Statec t;j.ii not enter into r>peoific agreementrj v;ith other IlDjviia Pact CPUntries in vt^gai^d to coramitmont or eariaarlcins of U.S. forceo for emnlojnfTGnt in the Southeast Ania area or VFeGteini FacifiCc Sucli a poration v:ill per);nit the United States^ in the event of further Commiiniofc aggi^eBOion in Southeanb Asia^ freerlon of action in deter:linrln^ We type of U.S. forceo to be er-iployed and the method of their eiViploynient,, and can be eo iripleniented a a to retain the oupport of neinber nation a of the Manila Fact and other friendly or neutral cnuntrler. In the gonei-^al at^oa. It must be fully understood that the United Staterj cannot guarantee the territoi^ial integi^ity of any nienbor riation^. but at meet can help ace u re the inde pond once of tboie counti'^ieo v.^hof e peopleo dqpire it and vrho are v;illlns to undertake the reij"ponriibilitier:J of Gelf--£overii3nent.„

g. The Joint Chiefs of Staff conGidex-- that aucceoa in imple-ill en ting the above concept v;ill be dependent on the resolution ulth v/hich future U,3, deci^*ionf? concerning the Manila Fact are. made aJid carried out, Kovrevcr^ frequent pronounoeRont>?. by liigh Eovo'cniiKnt official g to inoure bettor public underotanding of our objeotiven and nececsary courses of action vjlll materially anoiGt in obtaining guccugc

Por the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

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AUD PAia'ICAPA'rVOlf IW 'xWri. HAi:G!(GK CC!;Ki;jihMCS

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Dcparteent of Defense conti^lbutton to end participation in the Ean^lvOk Conference conslcted of tv^o pho^Gs of activity.- the prellmi-ary phnoe end the conference phGGe, - ^

DLirin^i the preJ.liBljiary phase the D^partuisnt of Defense provided E-ev:berchip on the International World ns Group vrhich liiet in V/aGhin^ton during the period 30 iyoven:lDcr 195!^ - 7 February 1955 • ^n addition to repi^Gsentatives of the U.S, DGparti;;^nts of D3fence and "State, the n-eir-berchip of the International V/orlting Group consist'jd of the /giibaG-eedors of the seven other cisnatory countrieB vho, in turn^ vrere Burjported by their political and luilitary advisers.

T*he prlrijary function of the International V/orking Group ^-^as to develop and give consideration to' the problems vhich would be discus-i^cd at the Eans^iok Coriferencej and to agree upcrn an agenda to be sub-tiltted for the approval of the Council- ll:ie report of th3 l-Jorlcing Group in the form of a proponed agenda vfa^ ccnpleted on 7 February and Gubmltted to the Council for consideratidn at the first cloced fiCGGion of the Council Conference^ at Bangkok^ on 23 February 1955-(T.'^U A) ■ .

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During this period^ the Departi^'^ent of Defense ^drofted, and obtained agrecL^ent of the I}rternational V/orking Group to the 1^03 it ion paper on the orcanl^^ation of the Ullitary Advisers to the Council K:>ii]bers which \/M adopted by the Council at Bang!to!:- (TAB B)

Further;, durin,^ this preliminary phase, the D3parti3:ent of Dcrfenae prepared nine position paperri for the U»S. Delegation on matters concidercd of x>rii;iary DepartT^jcnt of D^^fcnso interest. (TPJ^S C-K). Tnese vere as follows;

Security iiieasures for th:^ Manila Pact Military

Advisor

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Further Status of the AT3ZU3 lilitary RcpresentativcG

Possible diccUGGion \/ith the British and/or Australians on the defense of the Kra Isthr^ius

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U.S. Position on ths EstcibHalir^'-nt of a Ccziblnia

InitiGl KoD'Gino o:r th^ SiilACro? jiilitary Adv3.scrs XaVoJXigonco Agrcc';T:ents in DEACBT

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U.S* po:;ltion on the Vac of J military Forces to Suppress Gubveraive Activities

Cc::^bi^ed Corcjnoxids for Forces of the SEAC.DT Countrieo

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Military Mvisern to the Council cf the Jt.nila Pact

(rno positions oi:itlined in the al:ove papers with the excoption of th:xt pertainin,^ to the initial irectin.^ of the SEAGDX Council Military Advisers (TAT^ O), provided adn(iu?.te guidance to the TJ.S- D3lcG-i'^^C)n. As a QUCGtion oi tacticsj and in order to offset pressures by the A^ian sienntorlcG for a lJPSO-ty;(}C orc^mizaticnj the Defense Representative proposed to the Secretary of State^ prior to the first closed Ee^sion^ that the U,S. ta!;e the initiative and reccriOicHnd a lectins of the Militarry Advisers durni^ the Ban^iok Conference- l^iG proposal v:as accepted by the Secretary of State.

IXn^ing the second or conference phar^n, it bcccnie obvious that the Asian nations r>ie:natory to the Treaty would strive for a U-S. coounit-ment of forces for the defense of the Treaty area, A^ain es a question of tactics, and in or^J.er to provide the assurance that tltese countries vere scouring ^/ith respect to U-S intentions rcoardin^ the defense of the Treaty area against Coin:iunist ^[i^rc^^rAon^ the D^^fenue Representative proposed to the Secretaiy of State that he c3.early outline such U-S.* intentions and j^rcvide inforniation as to U.S-, foices currently stationed

in the Far East as a deterrent to Cor.uiuniols ar/^i'cssion. Toe Secretary

of State accepted this proposal and In his rcranrlts ot the firot closed ,seG6ion of the Conference on 23 February, stated the U.S. intentions GO specifically that thG anticipated forcing tactics on the part of the Asioai nations in rel;ition to this matter did not develop.

All of the Council ]r;cmber3, vith the exception of Mr. Bonnet of France accepted the Military Adviser*s papt^r vith minor revisions. Hovevcr, the French Delegation took exccptjon to certain tcnTjinolo{:.y used in outlining; the functions and responsibilities of the Military Advisers on the basis tliat this terminology ^'^^ not easily translatable into French. It subsequently becair,e obvious that the question of cCFjantics ^ms not the primary cause for concern on the part of the French but that they were disturbed over vhat :iilght be construed by the

French Govcrmiient as a French delegation aerccrent to fovce cc:^::niti:::^nts v/ithin the scope of the pD.annin:^ responsibilities of the Ililitary Advisers. IXirins the period between the Doming and afternoon session^ the French and U-S* Delegations^ on an ad hoc basis cjiA v/ith D:fense representatives of both countries participvatingj revif:cd the language of the I-ilitary Advisers paper in order to overcoine Frcncli apprehension. ^0rio revised paper vas 3.atcr accepted by all ii3r:inbers of the Council and the unitary Advisers iir^nediately convened in a separate closed session.

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The Military Aflviser to the h03t country^ General Jira VichitsoncG^oiD ^prcGldcd but .rJ'tcr opening the njcetins propor>ccl tl^at he vac cite the chair In'favor cf the IJilitrLry Advicer of the United Kincdc:n Oclccationj FicXd Marshall Sir John Hardin,^; the ccnior offi.cer present. With the coneur-, rence of the otlicr Military AdvicerSj Field liarshall n:^rdin2 accepted- *

/3 a i;iatter of tactics it had bean agreed v;itliln the U.S< D2lcgatiDn th^t Adii]iral StUTO) uou]dj in his opening reF^arlrG, daB^onstratG U.S. sincerity in aiding in the deteiT^ination of :j:3thcd3 for the iiLplGr.:2ntaticn of the SEACDX by taking th.e initiative in arrongins for an early conference of the liJlitary Adviner's Staff Planners to be followed by an early msetfnc of the Military Advisers, A copy of Adiijiral Styjrip's oponin^ i^einarlcs is attached as T/iB L.

During thiG Initial jr.ceting of the Military Advicersj iijreen:ont vcis reached en the following natters: /'

Dates cud locations of the first ir^eetings of the llilitary Advisers a:id Staff PXamiers

Agenda for first nectings of Staff Planners and Military Advisers " \

Responsibility for preparation of position papers

Procedural arrangenients

CorCTuiiique

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T!ic Philippine Militciry Adviser during this initial rreeting proposed that a nilitary organisation similar to that of IJATO be established for coordination of military action vdthin tlie Treaty Area. Hcr.-;evorj the PlUlippine Military Adviser acceded to the unanimous request of the otlier Military Advisers that this nnttcr be included on the agenda as a matter appropriate for consideration by the Staff Planners at their first meeting.

Tnc second an'X final ir.eeting of the Military Advisers was held on 25 February ai:! vas notable for the sorae degree of ujianiciity which CAisted at the first irocting. A record of dociDions reached at this Kseting is attached as TAB M.

In conclusion, it is considered that U*S. military objectives vere attained during the conference- Hr^vever^ it is further considered \ that there v;ili be two major factors, V7ith nilitary ir'plicationo> to contend with in fiv^ure^n^ectings of the laiitary Advisers or Staff Planners* il:ioy are;

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^nQ obvious dcGire *of the AGlcrn nations to cotciblifsh a KATO-tyi^c SSACLTT org^jiization uith. everything that it iinplies in the * nature of force co!i:i]3itr:t?nts/

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llie obvious cnxioty on the part of the French pertaining to cc;::niitir.-;nts of any type in support of the SEACDT yet their desire to participate in all policy ana planaing o.ctivities.

Tlie J Military BtaTf Flann-^rG ere Gcbeduled to cect on 25 April 1955 in Manila; and the I'lllitQry Advioero will meet in the latter part of Itay in Bangkok,

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DEPARTI-m'T 0? STATE

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SMT TO: Ainembassy S/iIGOH fRIOEITY U361 EPT HOK): Menhassy PARIS 35^6

Apr S, 1955

LB!!'! DTSTEIBUTIOK

FYI. We have been -^vorXing on pro"bl^^ of elections in Viet-Namj in great

detail over last several weeks • KSC has asked Dejjartiient suhmlt policy

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for consideration iDy tnid-April and ve siire that elections vill be discussed during proposed U.S.-French talks VJashington April SO. The British have offered give us their views on elections prior these talks*

We feel best solution is for us be in position inform French British our views prior talks and believe it best v^e can put such forv:ard"as support of policy of Free Viet-Nairi rather than as imilateral U. S^ recGi:TirLendations*

Our proposal is based on Eden's plan put forward at Berlin-Conference for all German elections and has already been approved by France for use

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Gei7iiany and rejected by the Communists, The basic principle is that Free . '

Viet-Nam will insist to the Viet Minh that unless agreement is first reached

by the latter's accept£mce of the safeguards spelled out^ that no repeat no further

discussions are possible regarding the type of elections^ the issues to be

voted on or any other factors.

After ve have Diem's general acceptance we can proceed inform UK and

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Fremce of this plan vliich we thini onl^'- formula which ensui^es both satisfactory response to Geneva Agreement and at smne time plan which is unassailable

in intent but probably unacceptable to ComQnunists because of provisions for strict coripllanc^ to ensiire genuinely free elections, EKD FYI,

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You shou3.d spesli to Diem privately regarding elections^ without sho'vring hiJn Torjimla outlined next telegram. We axe not nov: atteLipting secure his approval as such to ovx position but to assure he understands

o:ur vie\rpolnt £ind acceptc it to degree ve can proceed vith French British on broad assutnption Free Viet-Iiani's position similar our ov:n,

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Be 11 ere best vay accomplish this is to remind him of his and foreign in?nisters conversations vith Secretary on this subject aiid to continue that ib specific cases of elections in Korea and Germany Free V.^orld has stood

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firm on issue of guarantees of genuine free elections^ supervised by body

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having authority guarantee eleinents free elections PAElEi^T outlined last paragraph following telegrriin UITPAIffiJ:!. In each case CoiiMunists have re:rused

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accept these safeguards vhich ve think basic and fundamental, We believe unless such guarantees previously agreed upon i-:ould he dangerous for Free Viet "Nam be dra-\vn into further discussions of other issues of election.

Ask Diem if ve can assume our thinking is alilie en this point.

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Since time exceedingly importantj hope ve can have affirmative answer soonest.

DULLES

COPY

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3,3 NND Piojeci Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

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IKfCOl-ENG TELEGRAI-l

DEPARTMEHT.OF STATE

TOP SECRET

SITiVE

Control: Kec'd:

FR014: SAIGON

TO:

Secretary of State

EC: kkk8^ APRIL 9> 10 P.M. (SECTION ONE OF FIVE)

NIACT

ACTION COPY

1+99)4

APRIL 9, 1955

1:25 P.M.

POP SECRETABY FROM COLLINS.

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T^EPARTKEITT TELEGRAI4S khll and ^^412,

kmS MESSAGE IN WO PABTS. PAET I POLLOWS. I

PART I, SUCCESSIVE STETS RECOMMEtlDED AS FOLLOWS:

.1

1. TRMSJ^R NATIONAL POLICE AJ^ID SUEETE FROM BINH XUYEN, TWO POSSIBLE 14ETH0BS OF DOING THIS DEPEICDING ON WHETHER OBJECTIVE IS TO SAVE FACE FOR DIEM OR BINH XUYEN^, POIW ABOU"! LATTER BEIJ^G TO SECURE THEIR PEACEFUL COOPERATIOH

'WITH MIW GOVERNMENT*

A. TO MAKE IT EASIER FOR DIEM TO RESIGM" AHD PEEVEIW BINH XUYEN FROM CLAIMING VICTORY IK PRESENT CRISIS, VJE WOULD INSIST AS H?IOR CONDITION ON TaU'SFER OF POLICE TO GOVEHKMENT BY ORDINAIRE ISSUED BY DIEM, BUT OPENTjY SUPPORTED BY BAO DAI

AND POSSIBLY FRENCH AND U.S. PUBLIC SUPPORT BY BAO DAI PROBABLY ESSENTIAL TO AVOID -FURTHER BLOODSHED. IN THES CASE BINH XUYEN MIGHT BE FORCED TO BOW BUT MIGHT TRY TO SABOTAGE NEl^ GOVERNl^ENT IN VARIETY OF WAYS, (l SHOULD NOTE TliAT FRENCH V/ILL OPPOSE THIS STEP. ALTHOUGH HE ONCE FAVORED IT, ELY HAS NOW SAID HE COULD NOT AGREE TO IT. FRENCH FEAR BLOODSHED IF BINH XUYEN LOSE COBTROL OF POLICE UNDER DIEM AND BELIEVE NEW PRIME MINISTER SHOULD HAVE POLITICAL ADVANTAGE OF REGAINING CONTROL OF POLICE FOR GOVERTfl.ffiNT).

B, IN ORDER INDUCE COOPERATION OF BINH XUYEN WITH NEW GOVERNMENT, IT MIGHT BE ADVISABLE TO OFFER BAY VIEN A CHANCE TO SAVE FACE BY HES "VOLUIWARILY" PROPOSING THAT CONTROL

OF POLICE BE TRANSFERRED TO NEW GOVERMMEHT. I liAVE JUST HAD

CONVERSATION V/ITH FOREIGN MNISTER DO, WITHOUT ItlDIGATING

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TOP SEGEET QirMQU l^'t--2- kkk8 APRIL 9, 10 P.M.(SECTION OKE OF FIVE), FROM SAIGON

OUB POSSIBLE THIMKING, I ASKED DO IF IIE THOUGHT BAY VIEIT 14IGHT RELINQUISH POLICE CONTROLS TO ANY NEW GOVERKIffiMT. DO SAID , HE FELT THAT Wim PROPER APPROACH, THIS ICTGHI WELL BE POSSIBLE. HE INSISTS IT WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE FOR DIEI4 TO ACHIEVE THIS. DO FULLY AGREES THAT ANT fM-J GOVSRNIvffiNT WOULD HAVE TO TAKE OVER POLICE CONTROLS, BUT FEELS STRONGLY THAT EVERYTHING POSSIBLE SHOULD BE DONE TO SECURE COOPERATION OF BINH XUYEN WITH NEW GOVERNl'.ffiNT. I BELIEVE THAT IF BAY VIEN VffiRE CONVINCED AHEAD OF TBffi THAT U.S., FRANCE, BAG DAI AJ^ID ANY NEl^ PREMIER , WOULD INSIST ON GOVERNMENT TAKING OVER POLICE, Iffi IG^HT VJELL AGREE TO MAKE THIS OFFER HIMSELF. I BELIEVE THIS METHOD PREFERABLE TO lA ABOVE UNLESS V7ASHINGT0N FEELS DIEM'S PRESTIGE AND PERHAI^ OUR am MUST BE PROTECTED BY FOLLOV^NG METHOD lA.

2. PERSUADE DIEM TO RESIGN, OR IF HE REFUSES, HAVE BAO DAI RELIEVE HIM.

A. BETTER SOLUTION WOULD BE RESIGNATION BY DIEM. IF ^ffiTHOD lA ABOVE IS FOLLOWED, DIEM COULD BOW OUT S01>IEWHAT GRACEFULLY "IN ORDER TO HEAL THE WOUNDS" CAUSED BY RECENT EVENTS, Tffi COULD POSSIBLY DRAi'T A STATEMENT FOR HIM.

B. DISTASTEFUL AS. IT WOULD BE TO USE BAO DAI IP DIEM ^LL NOT RESIGN, I SEE NO OTHER LEGAL I4ETH0D OF REPLACING HIM.

C. FOR TIMING AS TO NOTIFICATION OF DIEM, SEE•PARAGRAPH 3F BELOW.

3. CHOOSE SUCCESSOR TO DIEM AS PRESIDENT OF COUNCIL.

A. I BELIEVE IT IS MCBT IMPORTAJTT TO PLACE ON FRENCH THE ONUS AND RESPONSIBILITY OF DESIGNATING DIEM'S SUCCESSOR. FRENCH AJtE ALL TO READY TO PLACE ONUS DIEM'S LACK OF SUCCESS ON U.S. IT WOULD BE PREFERABLE THEREFORE FOR THE HEAD OF NEl^ GOVERNMENT TO BE PROPOSED B¥ FRENCH AND CONCURRED IN BY THE U.S. ELY INDICATED THAT RE WOULD FAVOR QUAT, DO OR PERHAPS EVEN EX-DEFENSE MINISTER MINH. HE STIPULATED AS PRIMARY REQUISITE THAT ANY NEW GOVERNMENT IfiJST AVOID TAINT OF COLONIALISM. HENCE I BELIEVE THAT IF ELY'S ADVICE V/ERE

I

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khhB APKI.L 9, 10 P,M. (section OME of five), from SAIGON

FOLLOi*?ED FRENCH G-OVEEia.ffilJT WOULD WOT PROPOSE BUU HOI, TM OR HOU. OUR OPPCBITION TO THESE MEN HAS BEEN MADE CLEAR TO FRENCH.

B. SEE m TELEGRAI4 ^^263 FOR DISCUSSIOH OF POSSIBLE SUCCESSORS. OF COURSE, ¥E WOULD HAVE TO COI^ TO AGREEffiNT WITH THE FRENCH ON A SUCCESSOR AND I WOULD NOW HECOtfEIffi EITHER DO OR QUAT.

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INCOMING TELEGRAM

ACTION COPY

BEPAETtffiNT OF STATE

Control

TOP SECRET Qrr\iciTi'-/r^^''^"

5011

APRIL 9, 1955

2:06 M.

FROM: SAIGON

TO:

Secretary of State

NO: UUl^S, APRIL 9, 10 P.M. (SECTION TWO OF FIVE)

NIACT

FOR SECRETARY FROM COLLINS.

DEPAETl-ffiNT TELEGRAMS Ui+11 MID kkl2

C. AFTER FRANCE AND U.S. HAVE AGREED ON A MAN, BAO DAI'S CONSENT MUST TiiEN BE OBTAINED, IKES WOULD HAVE TO BE DONE THROUGH PARIS,

D. BAO DAI WOULD THEN SWMON THE N0:4INEE TO PARIS FOR CONSULTATION, IF POSSIBLE, THIS SHOULD BE DONE SECRETLY.

IF QUAT VffiEE THE CHOICE, IT MIGtJT BE DOIffi ICTHOUT A LEAJC SINCE HE HAS MADE A COUPLE OF TRIPS TO PARIS WTHIN THE PAST YEAR.

E. ASSUMING NOMINEE WOULD ACCEPT TPSK OF FORMING GOVERf&IEWT, HE WOULD HAVE TO RETURN AT ONCE TO SAIGON FOR CONSULTATIONS. THESE CONSULTATIONS SHOULD COMMENCE WTH DISCUSSIONS VflTH ELY AJH) ME, WHO WOULD INFORM 'HIM AS TO [^^TURE OF PROGRAMS WlirCH U.S. Al'lD FRANCE WOULD SUPPORT. ARMED WITH THIS KI'IOI'/LEDGE, HE COULD THEN PROCEED WITH CONVERSATIONS WITH PROSPECTIVE MINISTERS, REPRESENTATIVES OF VARIOUS POLITICAL PARTIES, AND LEADERS OF THE SECTS.

F. I FEEL THAT AS SOON AS NOMIflEE HAS ACCEPTED, DIEM SHOULD BE INVITED BY BAO DAI TO RESIGN OR ELSE BE RELIEVED. UNDER NO CIRCUI'ISTANCES SHOULD DIEM BE TOLD OF PLAN BEFORE FRENCH AND U.S. IiA\'E APPROACHED BAO DAI AND GAINED IHS ABSENT: ■ TO INFOPJ^ HIM COULD GIVE HIM DAMAGING MATERIAL FOR HIS "WHITE PAPER". EFFORT SHOULD BE MADE BY BAO DAI TO liAVE DIEM RSI-iAIN IN OFFICE UNTIL HIS SUCCESSOR IS PREPARED TO TAKE OVER. IF HE SHOULD REFUSE TO DO THIS, IfflDCCH IS WHOLLY POSSIBLE, BAO DAI WOULD THEN HAVE TO DESIGNATE, PREFERABLY FROM PRESENT CABINET, SOIffiONE TO ACT AS IlfCERIM PRESIDEira

OF THE COUNCIL. UNQUESTIONABLY, A3 SOON AS DIEI^ RECEIVES

SUCH NOTIFICATION,

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TOP SECIffiT.^f [\i3iTlVL

KEPRESElslTATIVES

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-2-I4U8, APRIL 9, 10 PM. (section TOO OF FIVE), FROM SMGOl

SUCH NOTIFICATION, HE VfILL CALL ON ME TO Fllffi OUT WHAT INFOffl.IATION I HAVE MtD PERU'VPS TO ASK FOR ADVICE. I WOULD PROPOSE REPLYING THAT I liAD BEEN NOTIFIED BY I^TY GOVEENMENT OF DECISION OF BAO DAI, PM) WOULD SEEK TO PERSUADE DIEI4 TO . REM/ilN IN OFFICE UIWIL HIS SUCCESSOR COULD TAKE OVER. WE SHOULD BE WILLING TO ASSIST HIM IN PREPARING A STATEMENT WHICH HE MIGHT ISSUE AS ITOIGATED IH PAilAGRAPH 2A ABOVE.

h. REACH AGREEMENT BEWFEEN U.S., FRA3ICE, AND NEl'J PRESIDEIW

ON PKOGRAl'I FOR SOLUTION OF SECT POLITICAL MD MILITARY

PROBLEMS. IT IS BELIEVED THAT AW AGEEEI'.ffiNT WOUID HAVE TO ;

BE REACHED BETl'JEEN ELY, THE NM-f PRESIDENT, AM3 MYSEM", ON

A PROGRAM FOR SOLUTION OF THE POLITICAL AITO MILITARY PROBLEI^

OF THE SECTS. TIlES WOULD REQUIRE A PRIOR AGREEl-ffiNT BET.'.fEEN

FRENCH AMD U.S. GOVERNl^ffiNTS ALONG THE LIHES OF OUR PROPOSALS

COIWAINED IN EMBASSY TELEGRAM '+373. THESE PROPOSALS ARE

BEING ACTIVELY STUDIED NOW BY GEiffiRAL ELY'S STAEF. Vffl

EXPECT TO COME TO AGREEMENT HERE V7ITHIN 48 HOURS, APPROVAL

WILL STILL BE REQUIRED PROM WASHIHGTON, PARTICULARLY AS TO

ADDED COSTS WHICH ARE INVOLVED IN THE INDUCTION OF MORE SECT

PERSONTffiL THAN ORIGINALLY COUNTEMPLATED, SE\rERAIICE PAY FOR

SECT PEESONIffiL TO BE DEMOBILIZED, AND LAR'GER AVERAGE STRENGTH

OF ARI'ffiD FORCES FOR FY 1955, CAUSED BY SLOW-DOVJIT IN DISCHARGE ' ^

OF VIETNAMESE ARMY PER30MEL AS A RESULT OF PRESENT SECT

CRISIS.

5. OBTAIN AGREEMENT OF SECTS TO PROPCSED SOLUTION OF THEIR

PEOBLEI^IS.

A. KEXT STEP WOULD PROBABLY BE FOE UM PRESIDENT TO MEET WITH LEADERS OF SECTS AITO OBTAIN THEIR AGREEl^NT TO SOLUTION ARRIVED AT UNDER PARAGRAPH h ABOVE. HE WOULD HAVE TO MAKE CLEAR TO SECTS THAT THIS WAS BEST PROGRAM THEY COULD POSSIBLY OBTAIN AI5D THAT IT WAS ONLY WAY TO CONTINUE AMERICAN AND FRENCH FINANCIAL Alffi MORAL SUPPORT, WITHOUT I-ffllCH THE COOTTRY COULD NOT POSSIBLY BE SAVED FROM VIET MINH AI-TO COMMUNISM WHICH SECTS PROFESS TO DETEST,

B. IT IS OUR THOUGHT THAJ? SECTS WOULD NOT BE INVITED .TO PARTICIPATE IN CABINET, EXCEPT FOR POSSIBLY ONE OR -WTO MEN, WHO MGHT BE CHOSEN BECAUSE OF THEIR ABILITY RATHER THAN AS

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

TOP SE CEET " C p ^f 31T i y E

_3_ I+I4.I+8, APRIL 9, 10 P.M. (SECTION TV/0 OF FIVE), FROM SAIGON

REPRESENTATIVES OF SECTS. IH LIEU OF CABII3ET PARTICTPATIOIT, SECTS WOULD BE OFFERED POSITIONS OF HONOR IN THE HIGH COUNCIL, WHICH WOULD BE ADVISORY TO THE PRESIDENT. SEE PARAGRAPH 7B BELOW.

C. SOME QUID PRO QUO WILL PROBABLY HAVE TO BE OFFERED

SECT LEADERS, PARTICULARLY BAY VIEN, IF LATTER IS TO AGREE

"WILLINGLY" TO SURRENDER POLICE POWERS. I UlffiERSTAND THAT

IN TliE PAST BAY VIEN HAS IMIGATED THAT HE WOULD LIKE TO BE ' I

MINISTER OF INTERIOR OR HAVE Olffi OF HIS HENCffiffiN IN THIS . j

POSITION. SUCH AN APPOINTl^NT WOULD BE FATAL AlTD IT "MUST

BE MADE CLEAR TO NEW PRESIDENT THAT UNDER NO CIRCUl-lSTANCES

WOULD WE AGREE TO THIS. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT BINH XUYEN WOULD

SETTLE FOR SOLIE ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE FROM THE GOVEEIt-SIfr IN

THEIR COMiffiRCIAL VENTURES. BAY VIEN AND PERHAPS GENERAL

SOAI MIGHT CONSENT TO LEAVE TliE COUNTRY ON SOME OFFICIAL

MISSION IF THEY WERE PERIGTTED TO Tj\KE OUT BULK OF FORTUITIES

THEY HAVE ACQUIRED.

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^ J

INGOMNG TELEGRAM

ACTIOIT COPY

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

TOP SECRET Qr^V\

IVE

FROM: SAIGON

TO:

Secretary of State

Control EecU:

NO: khhB, APRIL 9, 10 P.M. (SECTION THF.EE OF FIVE)

NIACT

FOR SECKETAEY FROM COLLINS,

DEPARIMENT TELEGRAMS i^Ull and )4)+12.

6. FORM imJ CABINET. DURING TfHE PERIOD, THE NEW PRESIDEI-TT WILL HAVE BEEN CONSULTING WITH POSSIBLE f!EW CABINCT" JlEI-fflERS, AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE, HE SHOULD FORM HIS NEW GOVERNMENT

AND ANNOrjNCE IT.

5012

APRIL 9, 1955

2:10 P.M.

7. REORGANIZE GOVERNMENT STHJCTURE.

A. OUR TEMTATCTE TIIINJCLNG ON THIS POINT IiA5 BEEN COVERED IN SOME DETAIL IN RECENT TELEGRAMS. ' '-

B. WE FEEL IT WOUtD BE ADVISABLE UNDER CURRENT CtMDITIONS FOR PRESIDENT, AFTER CONSULTATION WITH HIS CABINET AND SEPARATELY WITH ELY AND ME, TO APPOINT A "HIGH COOMCIL",. CONSISTING OF REPRESENTATIVES OF VARIOUS INTELLECnJAL GROUPS, LABOR, SECTS AND OTHER RELIGIOUS GROUPS, REFUGEES, AND DISTINGUISHED PERSONALTIES SUCH A5 FORMER ERESIDEIi"! LONG,

MY PERSONAL JUDGI^ilMT IS THAT THIS COUNCIL SHOULD NOT INCLUDE PEOPLE LIKE GENERAL IffNH, BUT HOI, TAN OR ICfU, THCOGH FRENCH MIGHT INSIST UPON INCLUSION OF SOME SUCH PEOPLE.

C. DIEM liAS INDICATED THAT HE WOULD FAVOR APP0INB4ENT OP

AN ECONOMC ADVISORY COUl\rciL, INCLUDING SOME FOREIGN EXPERTS, CERTAINLY TECHNICALLY COMPETENT PEOPLE WILL BE NEEDED IN ECONOMIC FIELD, THOUGH THEY COULD BE SUPPLIED TO G0VERNMET3T THROUGH FRENCH AND AI-ffiPICAN ECONOMC AID PROGPAMS. HOVJEVER, IT MIGHT BE WELL TO HAVE THE14 CARRIED OFFICIALLY TE AN ADVISORY COUNCIL.

D. BASED ON QUE EXPERIENCE HERE, I FEEL THAT THE^ SHOULD

PEP^MANENT RECORD COPY

BE A VICE

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TOP SECRET SENShiVE

-2- khkQ, APRIL 9, 10 P.M. (section TIIEEE OF FIVE), FROM SAIGON

BE A VICE HffiSIDESIT tffiO CA1>1 BE USED BY TliE PlffiSIDEHT AS A GENERAL EXECUTIVE AND TROUBLE SHOOTER TO HAirotE SPEC3:FIC PROBLET-IS AS 'THEY ARISE. IT MGHT BE ADVISABLE TO HAVE A SECOND VICE PRESIDENT BT CHAEGE OF rvJO MINISTRIES OF DEFENSE Airo INTERIOR, SINCE FOR THE COMNG YEAR THESE MNISTRIES WILL HAVE TO WORK VERY CLOSELY TOGETHER IN PACIFICATION OF COUNTRY AND FERRETING OUT OF VIET MINH AGENTS AND INFLUENCE.

8, ANNOUNCE COMPLETE PROGRAM OP NEW GOVERNMENT. THIS JNOUNCEIffiNT SHOULD INCLUDE:

A. THE PLAN OF REORGANTZATION OF GOVERNMENT.

■**

] . THE BROAD PROGRAM OF SOCIAL, ECONOMIC AID MILITARY REFORMS EMBODIED IN THE ELY/COLLINS SEVEN-POINT PROGRAM. SEE ElffiASSY TELEGRAl^ 200^+.

n i

C. THE DETAILED FLAN FOR TIffi POLITICAL AND MILITARY INTEGRATION OF THE SECTS IN TliE NATIONAL LIFE. SEE EI^EASSY TELEGRAM

9. ELECT AND CONVOKE PROVISIONAL HATIONAX A.SSEMBLY.

A. THE NECESSARY ORDINANCES TO ESTABLISH THE PROVISIONAL

NATIONAL ASSEIiBLY HAVE ALREADY BEEN PUBLISHED AJD MAY 15 HAS BEEN AM0U13CED AS DATE FOR ELECTION OP THOSE MEI4BERS WliO ARE TO BE ELECTED BY VILLAGE AND OTHER COUNCILS.

B. THE ASSEMBLY SHOULD MEET AS HIOMPTLY THEREAFTER AS POSSIBLE. ITS TWO MOST IMPORTANT TASKS SHOULD BE REVIEW OF NATIONAL BUDGET AND DESIGNATION OF A SPECIAL COtMTTEE TO DRAFT PLANS FOR A CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY.

PART II. ' •

PARAGRAPHS ARE NUMBERED AS IN DEPARTMENT TELEGRAM 41+12

1. I BELIEVE FRENCH WOULD DO ALL POSSIBLE REMAIN ALOOF FROM ANY IvIILITARY ACTION DIEM MIGHT UNDERTAKE AGAINST BINH XUYEN

BUT WOULD

9

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BUT WOULD OFFER GOOD OFFICES TO EICD OR MIWIMIZE ANY CONFLICT FREJICH WOULD CERTAIMLY DO ALL POSSIBLE' IN SAIGON TO PROTECT . 0>JN NATIONALS AND FOREIGNERS AlID PROPERTY OF BOTH FROM MEM, INCLUDING PUBLIC UTILITIES. :

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INCOffiKG TELEGRAM

ACTION COPY

i.

DEPAETMEHT OF STATE

TOP SECRET ^ r jM QI I {' / P

Control Kedd:

FROM: SAIGON

5013

APRir. 9, 1955

2:19 PM

TO:

Seci-etary of State

NO: kkk8, APRIL 9, 10 PM (SECTION FOUR OF FIVE)

NIACT

FOR SECRETARY-FROM COLLINS. -^

DEPAETI4EM' TELEGRAMS U^ll and ^^12»

2. OWING HIS SPECIAL SENSE OF MISSION^ DIEM WILL EROBABLY PUT UP IfflATEVER RESISTANCE BE CM TO BEING REMOVED, BUT I DOUBT liE WILL FIND SUBSTANTIAL SUPPORT IN ANY QUAHTER, IN END HE WILL PROBABLY RETIRE IN OUTRAGE FROM SCENE AND VOICE ILTS PROTESTS AGAINST BAO DAI^ FRADICE AITO U.S. IN SaiE KIND OF 'VHTTE PAPER". , ^, ^^

A. CERTAIN VIETNAMESE NATIOJ^IALISTS WOULD SEIZE ON DIEM'S REMOVAL TO FAN ANTI-FRENCH SENTIMENT^ BUT I DO NOT BELIEVE DIEM'S REMOVAL WOULD PJESULT IN POPULAR VIOLENCE AGAINST

FRENCH EXCEPT POSSIBLY SPOIUDIC INDIVIDUAL INCIDEIiTS.

■

B. I BELIEVE DIEM WOULD ULTIMATELY ACCEPT REMOVAL AS STATED PARAGRAPH 2 ABOVE, I THIM HE IS TRUE PATRIOT AND WOULD NOT TRY SABOTAGE CONSTRUCTIVE PROGRAM OF NEW GOVERNMENT, I DO NOT AGREE THAT HE STILL IIAS "CONSIDERABLE POWER" EXCEPT SUPPORT OF FRANCE AND U.S. I HAVE TRIED TO CONVEY TO DEPARTMENT HOW SLENDER BASIS OF DIEM'S PRESENT SUPPORT NOW IS IF FRENCH AND U.S. SUPPORT IS WITHDRAWN, DIEM OTLL BE HARD PRESSED TO MUSTER ANY ALLIES, AND FE'^ IF AI^ OF THESE ARE LIKELY TO RESORT TO VIOLENCE IN HIS SUPPORT.

3. NATIONAL ARMY LOYALTY, WHICH DIEM DOES NOT FULLY COI#IAND, IS NOT COMPLETELY' TRANSFERRABLE TO ANY INDIVIDUAL. I BELIEVE, HOl'ffiVER, ARMY LOYALTY COULD BE SECURED BY NEW GOVERI^vEKT MORE BROADLY BASED, NOT RIVEN BY POLITICAL JEALOUSIES AND CRISES LIKE DIEM REGIME, AND FULLY BACKED BY FRANCE AND U.S. HOWEVER, THERE MAY BE INDIVIDUAL BATTALION COIMALIDERS IN CENTER VIET NAI^ WHO MGHT LEAD GROUPS OF'MEN

TO DEFECT,

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, I' " ^op SECRET SENSITIVE

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_2- kkh8, APRIL 9, 10 PaM. (SECTION if OF 5) FHOM S/IIGON

TO DEFECT. SUCH IKCIDEWTS. WOULD }IAVE VERY LII.IETED EFFECT ON BULK OF ARMY, IT SHOULD BE a^ID HERE THAT Uffl)ER NO CIRCWlSTAITCEg SHOULD GETffiRAL MKH BE ALLOVJED RETUH7 TO VIET NAM NOW, HE RETAINS CONSIDERABLE INFLUENCE IN ARMY AND COULD ■ BECOME ONCE AGAIN MAJOR DISRUPTIVE rNELUENCE.

k. COMPILATION OF ASSETS OF STRENGTH DIEM MAY HAVE IS • DIFFICULT TO MAKE. WITH RESPECT TO POLITICAL FOLLOWING IH CEItCER VIET HAM, THIS liAS BEEN FALLING OFF PARTLY AS RESULT OF POLITICAL ACTIVITIES OF DIEM'S BROTHER NGO DINH CAN, AHD OPPOSITION HAS TAKEN FORM FOR EXAMPLE OF RECENT INCIDENTS AT EA LANG. THERE IS NO PROPER GRASS ROOTS SUPPORT OF ANY LEADER IN VIET NAM, LEAVING ASIDE HO CHI ICENH. DIEM'S VIRTUES AS AMTI-FRENCH LEADER HJiVE BEEN TARNISHED BY HIS DEPEICENCE ON HIS BROTHERS WHICH ]iAS LED TO QUITE GENERAL FEELING THAT A NGO FAICELY DICTATORSHIP IS IN EFFECT BEING I ESTABLISHED, FEW NATIOMLISTS OUTSIDE HIS FAMILY AND BftlEDIATE

; _ ENTOURAGE WOULD LIF A FINGER IN DIEM'S DEFENSE. HOT GREAT !*'" HIS EOLLCWIKG IS IN CATHOLIC COMMUNITY IS liARD TO SAY, DIEM HIMSELF CLAIt© HIS SUPPORT IN CENTER, FOR EXAIJOPLE, COMES LARGELY FROM NON-CATHOLICS „ IN ANY EVENT CATHOLIC COMMUNITY IS NOT POLITICALLY ORGANIZED AND REPRESENIS LESS THAN 10 PERCENT OF POPULATION, CERTAINLY MANY REFUGEES FROM NORTH VJERE ATTRACTED BY FACT CATHOLIC HE/'J>S GOVERNI^NT OF SOUTH, BUT POLITICAL AND PHYSICAL STRENGTH OF REFUGEES IS ONLY A POTENTIAL FOR EXPLOITATION AT A LATER DATE. IN NATIONAL ARMY, SCARCELY ANY LEADERS ARE ENTIRELY PRO-DIEM, EVEN CHIEF OF STAFF TY; SOME ARE HOSTILE, AND TliE MAJORITY ARE HIOBABLY NO MORE THAN LUKE-WARM. I BELIEVE THERE IS NO REASON TO ANTICIPATE SERIOUS ADVERSE REACTION IN ARMY AT LARGE. IF DIEM IS REMOVED TimOUGH ORDERLY PROCESSES.

5. VIET MINH REACTION TO DIElvl'S REMOVAL WOULD UHDOUBTEDLY BE TO EFFECT THAT FREE WORLD HAD SUFFERED DAMAGING SETBACK. APART FROM STEPPED-UP PROPAGANDA CAlvIPAIGN AND PUBLIC GLOATING OVER DEFEAT OF AN ENEMY, I DO NOT BELIEVE VIET MINH REACTION WOULD BE DA1>JGER0US. IN OTHER WORDS, I DO NOT ANTICIPATE VIET MINH WOULD ATTEMPT TAKE MILITARY ADVANTAGE OF DIEM'S REMOVAL. HOfrffiVER, VIET MINH, PLAYING MANY ANGLES AS USUAL, MIGHT ATTEMPT BUILD UP ANTI-FRENCH AND AHTI-tr,S. SENTIMENT, CHARGING OVERTHROSf OF NATIONALIST GOVERNTffiNT TO FRENCH AND U.S. "IMPERIALISTS."

KIDDER

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Dedassiiied per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

IHCOMING TELEGRAM

FROM: SAIGON

DEPARTMEHT OF STATE .TOP SECRET

^ ^ * • v t ' I b'

\Ji^i iKJi i I ''

ACTIOIf COPY

Control: 501U Rec'd: April 9, 1955 2:27 P=M<.

WO:

Secretary of State

^U)4 8, APRIL 9> 10 P.M. (SECTION FIVE OF FIVE)

HIACT

FOR SECRETARY FROM COLLINS.

I

DEPARTI'EBT TELEGRAMS kklX and ^^^^12. "^

6. IT WOULD BE PREFERABLE TO MAKE CHANGE AFTER BANDUNG JTJ ORDER AVOID GIVING VIET MIM PROPAGANDA ADVANTAGE FOR EXPLOITATION AT CONFERENCE. HOWEVER, SINCE DIEM IS STILL THREATENING TO TAKE INDEPENDENT ACTION TO REi>40VE SAJ^G AFTER EA.STER WEEKEND J OVER STRONG FRENCH OBJECTIONS, IT 14AY BE DESIRABLE EFFECT CHANGE AS SOON AS U.S. AND FRENCH HAVE REACtlED AGREEMENT ON CASE TO BE PRESENTED TO BAO DAI, WHILE I RECOGNIZE DIFFICULTIES THIS CRISIS CREATES FOR U.S. IN VIEW OF OUR >JELL-KNOVJN ASSOCIATION WITH DIEM, I FEAR CONTINUED DELAY VTILL LEAD TO EVEN GRAVER PROBLEMS OF DETERIORATING FP-ENCH-U.S. COOPERATION IN VIET NAM, INTENSIFICATION OF CIVIL DISORDERS CULMINATING, POSSIBLY, IN CIVIL WAR, AND NOT IMPROBABLE ULTIMATE LOSS OF AIL VIETNAM TO VIET MNH. THIS EVENTUALITY WOULD BE DAMAGIITG NOT ONLY TO U.S. PRESTIGE BUT, MORE IMPORTANTLY I AM CONVINCED, TO U.S. SECURITY. MECHANICS OF POSSIBLE CHANGE OF GOVER]a.ffiNT ARE DISCUSSED IN PART I ABOVE, .

7. OUR AGREEIiENT TO PJUPLACEMENT OF DIEM ADMITTEDLY WILL

BE DIFFICULT TO EXPLAIN TO AMERICAN AITO WORLD PRESS, I WCULD SUGGEST SOMETHING ALONG FOLLOOTNG LINES:

A. DIEIvI HAD MADE A GREAT CONTRIBUTION TO HIS .COUNTRY AT A TIME WHEN HIS PARTICULAR QUALITIES WERE MOST VALUABLE. HE MAINTAINED CALM AFTER GENEVA, CONTRIBUTED TO EXODUS OF REFUGEES FROM NORTH WITH ITS GREAT PSYCHOLOGICAL Il^AGT, SUCCESSFULLY MUSTERED WORLD OPINION IN SUPPORT OF AID TO THESE REFUGEES AND WITH SUPPORT OF FRAI^jCE AND U.S. DEVELOPED SOUND AND PROGRESSIVE SOCIAL, POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND MLITARY

905

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•'

TOPSECHET ^r'iViOiUVt

-2- ifl|i|8, APRIL 9> lOP.M, (SECTIOII FIVE OF FIVE), FROM SMGOU REFOFJ-IS FOR HIS COJHTRY.

B. PERHAPS IT WAS INEVITABLE TliAT IMPLEMENTATION OF THESE PROGRAMS WOULD DEVELOP DEVISIVE IWLUESCE3 AJ'IONG THE PEOPLE OF VIETNAM, WHO HAVE OMLY RECENTLY GAIMD THEIR INDEPENDENCE. THEY HAVE HAD LITTLE EXPERIENCE IN IffiETING THE COMPLEX PROBLEMS WHICH THEY FACE, SUCH AS RECONCILING DIFFEREIW INTERESTS OF SECTS AND VARIOUS REGIONS OF THE COUNTRY. THIS HAS RESULTED IM CLASHES OF PERSONALITY, WHICH HAD MUCH TO DO VJITiT THE CURRENT CRISIS, INVOLVING THE "UNIFIED FRONT" ORGANIZATION. RESULTANT BLOODSHED, EVEN THOUGH NOT EXTENSIVE, HAS CREATED DEEP WOUNDS WHICH WILL BE DIFFICULT FOR PRESENT GOVERNMENT

TO HEAL.

C. DIEM WAS UNABLE OR UTJWILLING TO TAKE INTO HIS GOVERNI-ffiNT MEtBERS OF VARIOUS OPPOSITION PARTIES. ON"LY WITH BROAD SUPPORT CAN" THE PROGRESSIVE PROGEAT© DEVELOPED BY DIEM BE MADE EFFECTIVE. THE NEW GOVEfflMENT IS.HEADED BY A MAN WHO liAS HAD EXPERIENCE IN GOVERNl^ffiKT AND WHOSE PERSONALITY IS SUCH THAT HE SHOULD BE ABLE TO GET OTIiER STRONG MN TO WORK WITH HTM. HE HAS ADOPTED THE SAlffi BASIC PROGRAI-iS WHICH DIEM INITIATED AITD WHICH HAVE THE FULL SUPPORT OF BOTH

U.S. AND PRANCE. DECISION AS TO WHO SHOULD HEAD GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM IS, OF COURSE, ONE TO BE MADE BY THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE UNDER THEIR OWN SYSTEM. WHILE CliANGE IN PRESIDENCY INVOLVES TEMPORARY LOSS TO VIETNAI^I OF A GREAT NATIONALIST LEADER, IT DOES NOT IN ANY SENSE MEAN A CHANGE IN THE POLICIES OF HIS GOVERNl/ffiNT WHICH HAVE DRAlffl U.S. SUPPORT. WITH THIS SUPPORT AND THE COOPERATION OF ALL ELEMENTS OF VIETNAM, THE COUOTRY CAN BE SAVED FROM C01«JNISM.

KIDDER

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Note: Read by Mr. Yound (psa) 2:30 p.m. k/9/^5 FMH

906

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DEPARTI-m^T OF STATL

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SENT TO: Amembassy SAIGON HIACT U'138

EYES OELY iU^IBASSADOR FROM SECRETARY

Apr 9 1955

I Have this laornlng discussed situation vith highest authority. We are disposed to back whatever your final decision is "but before you 3'txially finalize Vg >rant to "be s'^jre you have weighed all of the factors

vhich concern us here.

■s

We feel that "what has happened does not reveal anything new about

i Diem but rather a basic and dangerous misunderstanding as "bet^ieen France

and the U.S.

/

have always known the qualities which Diem possesses and those

)^hich he lacks. Nevertheless our two coutitries agreed to support him in

i

default of anyone possessing better qualifications. The only alternatives

now suggested are the same persons who were regarded as unacceptable sub-

m

-stitutes scxne nonths ago.

Wliat has happened is that whereas the United States has been pro-ceeding on the assumption that Diem would be backed as against any who might challenge him assitroing that he had the capability^ apparently the Erench have given their support only on the assusnption that the Binh Xuyen w^ould al^o be supported on an a^utonomous authority and that when they challenged Diem he would not be allowed to use force to assert his authority over it» . '

Vie can appreciate the reluctance of the French to see force used but If it cannot bemused then what is the point of our supporting at great cost the national arniy w^hich I thought it had been agreed was primarily to be

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an ariny for domestic security rather than an anny to fight external aggression

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U,S» recognises that Cao ,Dai and even the Hoa Hao are genuine sects with cuJ.t\iral religious and political roots which caiinot 'be forcihly torn

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up -without grave consequences \rluch should "be avoided but ve do not believe that any central government can exist as more than a figurehead if it does not have control over the national police and if this control is fariaed out to a gang which exploits its privileges to protect vice on a vastly profitable scale and which exists by virtue of the backing of the self-exiled Bao Dai and the French.

We ca2:inot see that replaceraent of Diem by ap^ persons you mentioned will of itself correct this situation and indeed we have hB.d. the iiapression that Quat w^as less acceptable to the sects than is Diem,

There are two other factors to be-borne in mind.

One is that it is widely known that Diem has so far existed by reason of U*S. support despite French reluctance. If^ how^ver^ when the showdown cones the French view prevails then that will gravely weaime oui^ influence for the future both in Vietnain and elsewhere. Eemoval of Diem under these circumstances may well "be interpreted in Yietnam and Asia as exsuiple of U,S, paying lip service to nationalist cause and then forsaking true nationalist leader when QUOTE colonial interests Ui^rQUOTE put enougli pressure on us. The French constantly assert that the U.S. has a primary responsibility in this pai^t of the world but it is difficult to have responsibility without authority. In essence, v/ill not the ouster of Diem on the present conditions mean that from now on we will be merely paying the bill and the ]?>ench will be calling-the t\ine- My successor of Diem >rill clearly know \vhere the real authority lies.

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The second factor is that there vill be rery strong opposition in the Congress to supporting the situation in Indochina generally and Vietnam . in particular if Diem is replaced imder existing circusistances. We do not say that this opposition may not in the last ^instance te overcome^ pax- i

ticularly if you personally can maJve a case before the Congressional can-

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loittees ^)ut Mansfield \jhQ is looked upon with gi^eat respect by his colleagues vith reference to this matterj is adsxaantly opposed to ahandoninent of Diem under present conditions, I wonder w^hether there is not sone intermediate

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solution between the present extremes now discussed and that Diem can be allowed to regain his daiiiaged prestige by an assertion of authority OYer the Binh Xuyen and at the same tlmq other .^elements be brought into the

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government under conditions which "will assure a real delegation of authority;

I feel that as with most Orientals Di<^n must "be highly suspicious of what is going on about hiiu and that this suspicion exaggerates his natural disT50sition to be secretive and untrustful. If he ever really felt that the French and ourselves were solidly beh:lnd him might he not really broaden his govern^nent? We must I thinl^: have soiae sympathy for his predicament as he is constantly called QUOTE the Diem experiment IMQUOTE,

In conclusion I want to reaffirm the very great confidence which we ;. all have in you and in your judgment. You have done and are doing a w^onder-:ful job in the face of treraendous difficulties*

Your UkkQ has just arrived in Department but is not yet decoded, V7e will comment on it: in subsequent telegi^am. * j

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 i

INCOMING TELEGRAM

DEPARTIffiNT OF STATE

ACTION COPY

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FROM: PARTS

Control: 5026 Eec'd: , . APRIL .9', 1955

3:52 m

TO:

Secretary of State

WO; ^396, APRIL 9, 3 VA (SECTION ITGffiE OF FOUR)

PRIORITY

DIEM'S FAULTY HANDLING OF THE PROBLEM HAS NOW RESULTED IN THE Blim rJYEN BECOMING A MAJOR FORCE, THE HANDLING OF WIi^CH IS OUT OF HAND, RATHER THAN A MINOR ONE WHICH COULD HAVE BEEN USED IN THE COMMON EFFORT IF DIEM HAD NOT BOTIGLED MATTERS. BAO DAI NOT BELIEVES THAT THE BINH XUYEN IvRJST GO EVENTUALLY BUT THAT TliERE IS NO POSSIBLE MEANS OF REMOVING THEM FROM THE SCEME UNDER THE STRESS OF THE PRESENT CRISIS BY SIMPLY ISSUING A DECREE TO IHAT EFFECT. THE DECREE WOULD BE IGNORED AI-ID EAO DAI'S AUTHORITY LOST. DIEM HAD BEGGED J'OR. FULL POWERS AMD HAD TOLD BAO DAI THAT IT WAS WHAT THE UNITED STATES I'JANTED HIM TO HAVE. BAO DAI HAD GRA3ITED THEM AGAINST HIS ADVISORS. NOW DIEM IS INCAPABLE OF GOVERNING EVEN WITH THESE POWERS AND WISHES BAO DAI TO DO SO FOR ICM BY DECREE. IF BAO DAI WERE -. TO DO SO, HE WOULD BE EXPENDING HIS AUTHORITY FOR A CAUSE WHICH IS ALREADY LOST, WHICH HE IS UWILLIIJ-G TO DO. DIEM HAS HOT THE MILITARY OR POLITICAL STPvENGTH TO CARRY OUT HIS ORDERS BY FORCE, AHD IF HE ATTEMPTS TO SUPPRESS THE BINH XUYEN IN THAT MANNER, IT WILL LEAD TO CIVIL WAR WHICH WOULD IN BAO DAI'S OPINION RESULT IN FREE VIETNAM PASSING UNDER VIET MINH CONTROL IN SHORT ORDER. EVEN IF IT VffiRE POSSIBLE TO BACK TliE GOVERNMENT TO THE EXTENT OF FORCING THE BINH XUYEN OUT OF TliE SAIGON POLICE (PRESUMABLY WITH OUTSIDE AID FROM THE FREireH OR THE UNITED STATES), IT WOULD RESULT IN DIEM BECOMING "EMPEROR OF SAIGON" AND WITH THE REST OF THE COUNTRY UNDER CONTROL OF LOCAL SECT TROOPS AND, EVENTUALLY, OF THE VIET MINH. DE QUOTED BAO DAI'S SOURCES IN SAIGON AS REPORTING DIEM'S STRENGTH AS A "MOCKERY".

AFTER THIS PROLONGED EXPOSE, VfE ASKED DE WliAT BAO DAI THOUGHT SHOULD BE DONE. HE REPLIED THAT THE UNITH) STATES GOVERNMENT SHOULD ARRIVE AT AN IMt^DIATE AGREEMENT WITH THE FRENCH TO CREATE SOI^ffi F0RI4 OF GOVERNING BODY WHICH COULD TAKE OVER

PERMAHENT RECORD COPY

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THE EXECUTIVE

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Declassilicd per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

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TOP SECRET SENSIlJVE -2- i+396, APRIL 9) 5 BI (SECTION THREE OF FOUE), FROM PARIS

TliE EXEOJTITO ROLE OF GOVERNING THE COUNTRY BEFORE IT IS TOO LATE. WE ASKED lOM TO BE MORE PRECISE AND HE STATED THAT HE HAD IN MIND A FORM OF "SUPRElffi COUNCIL" OR "COUNCIL OF ELDERS" V7HICH WOULD SERVE AS A GOVERNING BODY. IT WOULD FUNCTION UIIDER BAO DAI'S OVERALL DIRECTION AS CHIEF OF STATE, BUT WOULD ENJOY THE SAME POVJE^ NOW ENJOYED BY DIEM. BAO DAI'S CHIEF F'lWCTION WOULD BE THAT OF "SUPRElvffi ARBITRATOR". THE COJNCIL , XJLD HAVE TO INCLUDE, IF IT WERE TO BE EFFECTIVE, REI^E-SENTATION OF ALL (ALL) FACTIONS IN VIETNAI4 INCLUDING THE

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'ATHOLICS WHO MGIIT DECIDE THAT DIH4 IS THE BEST QUALIFIED MAl^ TO REPRE3EOT THEM* WE ASKED WHETHER IT WAS THOUGHT THAT THE \ OimcIL WOULD REPLACE THE GOVERP^IENT OR SIMPLY ACT IN CONVICTION WITH IT AND DE SAID THAT FOR THE MOffiM HE THOUGHT THAT BAO DAI'S THOUGHTS WERE ALONG THE LATTER LINES BUT THAT WOULD HAVE TO BE WORKED OUT. THE ONE RESTRICTION OF MEMBERSHIP IN THE COUHCIL SHOUIxD BE THAT ALL ITS MEMBERS BE ANTI-COMMUNIST.

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■WE ASKED WHETHER EAO DAI HAD ANY VIEWS ON RETOEIRNG TO VIETNAM .AND VJERE TOLD THAT HE HAD NONE FOR THE MOMNT BUT WAS 'prepared TO DO ANYTHING THAT WE AND THE FRENCH FELT WOULD HELP TOWARD A SOLUTION TO THE CRISIS. DE STATED THAT BAO DAI HAD WANTED TO RETURN ivIANY TIMES DURING RECENT MONTHS WHEN IT BECAME MORE AND MORE CLEAR THAT DIEM WAS INCAPABLE OF GOVERNING BUT THAT HE HAD BEEN PREVENTED FROM DOING SO BY DiEM Ilffl-SELF WHO ARGUED THAT THE UNITED STATES WA^ OPPOSED TO BAO DAI'S RETURN AND THAT IT WOULD BE INADVISABLE FOR HIM TO COME BACK FOR THERE WAS GREAT OPPOSIHON TO HEM IN VIETNAM AND THAT HE, DIEM, WAS "PRESERVING BAO DAI'S INTEREST". BAO DAI WA^ ]<fOT IMPRESSED BY ANY OF THESE Al^GUMENTS EXCEPT THAT THE UIHTED STATES DID NOT WISH HIM TO RETURN, >fflICH WAS CONFIRMED TO HIM BY LA CHAMBRE. HE HAD NOT PRESSED THE ISSUE BECAUSE HE FELT THAT, AS IN THE HINH CASE, HE MIGHT ACTUALLY WIELD MORE INFLUENCE PROM AFAR TfflERE HE WAS REMOVED FROM PETTY LOCAL SQUABBLES AND COULD EXERCISE HIS AUTHORITY FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE NATIONAL GOVERNl-IENT AS HE HAD IN THE HENH CASE.

DILLON AB/32 it5093 911

Note; Read by Mr^ Young (i^a) 7:^5 V^-^^ V9/55 CWO-JRL

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Pn^ject Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 i

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INCOMING TELEGRAM DEPAEMENT OF STATE ACTION COPY

TOP SECEET QFhlQjTiVr

Kt L HOI ■ control: 10^92

Rec'd; APRIL ±9, 1955 FROM: SAIGOIJ 10:57 H-I

TO: Secretary of State

NO: h66l^ APRIL 19, 11 EM (SECTION TWO OF THREE)

PRIORITY I

SENT DEPARTMENT U66l, REPEATED IJjFORHAIION PRIOKLTY PARIS 120? FOE SECRETARY FROM COLLINS PAEIS FOE AMBASSADOR

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LIMIT DISTRIBUTION.

6. ELY REPEATED HIS BELIEF THAT PAST SUPPORT FOR DIEM HAD NOT BEEN AN ERROR. HS SAID T]'iAT WE 2-lUST NOV? ENVISAGE CHANGING PRIME MINISTER BUT NOT REPEAT NOT POLICY. THIS, HE SAID, CORRESPONDS TO WISHES OF VIETNAMESE PEOPLE. I ASKED ELY

HOW HE COULD PROVE SUCH IS WILL OF VIETNAI/ESE PEOPLE IN ABSENCE OF AlIY ASSEMBLY. STATEMENT CAN ONLY REPRESENT ELY'S ESTIMATE. HE REPLIED IT IS OBVIOUS THAT PEOPLE WISH TO BE RID OF DIEM. I REPLIED DIEM COULD CHALLENGE STATEMENT AND, IN ANY CASE, NO ONE WAS IN POSITION TO PROVE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE WISHED TO BE RID OF DIEM. ELY SAID PRESENT CEISIS ITSELF WAS EVIDENCE, I REPLIED THAT CRISIS HAD BEEN CAUSED BY SECT MINORITY LOOKING AFTER OWN SELFISH INTERESTS. SAME GOVEEIMENTAL PR0GRA14 UNDER ANOTHER PRIME MNISTER WOULD IWE\T:TABLY HAVE LED TO OPPOSITION FROM SECTS, ELY SAID THAT IF SUCH OTHER PRIME MINISTER HAD BEEN SIMILAR TO DIEM HE WCULD AGREE, BUT DIEM HAD HANDLED SITUATION VERY BADLY, AND EVEN HIS OWN RELATIVES, DO AND THOAI, NO LONGER BELIEVED IN HEM.

7. I TOLD ELY HE AND I I-JERE FOREIGNERS HERE AND EVEN BAO DAI WA^ TO SOM EXTENT FOREIGN. NONE OF US COULD SAY WHETHER VIETNAMESE PEOPLE WERE UNITED AS TO CHOICE OF ANY SUCCESSOR TO DIEI^. WITHOUT PARLIAMENT, IT CANNOT BE PROVED TO U.S. PUBLIC AND PRESS OPINION THAT DIEM IS NO LONGER WANTED._

IF Dim WAS REMOVED IN ABSENCE OF SOtffi REPRESENTATIVE BODY, I COULD NOT PREDICT U.S. CONGRESSIONAL REACTION. THEREFORE,

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-2- l(66l,APRIL 19, 11 H-I (SECTIOir WO OF THREE) FRCM. SAIGON.

I URGED ELY NOT DISCOUNT S0LU110N UIMISS VIETNA!#;SE THEMSELVES REJECT IT, ELY REPEATED THAT DIEM EEI.IAIHS IN POVJER ONLY BY OUR INTERVENTION. I SAID IF HIS A1>IALYSIS WAS CORRECT, AN ASSEMBLY WOULD VOTE DIEI*^ OUT, AND IF AN ASSEIffiLY DID SO, I BELIEVED U.S. WOULD ACCEPT DECISION. ELY SAID HE KItEW HE COULD WOT PROVE HIS STATEMENT, BUT HE BELIEVED THAT TO MAINTAIN DIEM AGAINST POPULAR VfILL WOUTjD BE TO DIMINISH VALIDITjf OF EXPRESSION OF POPULAR WILL WHEN ELECTIONS BECOJIE POSSIBLE. I SAID THAT, ON CONTRARY, MODIFIED THOAI PROPOSAL WOULS WORK OI>ILY IF ACCEPTED BY CONSIDERABLE BODY OF VIETNAMESE OPINION. (#) BAO DAI IS FRAireO-U.S. CHOICEo I SAID I DID WOT KNOW WHETHER PROPOSAL WOULD WORK, THAT I INTENDED TO HAVE FURTHER COWSULTATIOEB TODAY AMD ONLY ASKED ELY WOT TO PREJUDGE OUTCOME. ELY SAID THAT, IN HIS VIEV'J, NO SOLUTION COULD APPEAR TO BE MORE 14ARKED AS FEANCO-U,S. SOLUTION THAU MAIWTENAWCE OF DIEM. I SAID I COULD NOT AGREE WITH TJCS SINCE FLAW WOULD NOT WORK UWLESS GOOD I-LWY VIETNAI-5ESE AGREED TO IT.

8. ELY SAID THAT HE I€JST MARK THIS AS A POINT OF DISAGREEMENT-BETWEEN US SINCE IF PLAN DID WORK IT WOULD BE BECAUSE OF MY PUTTING PRESSURE ON VIETNAMESE. I AGREED THAT THOAI PROPOSAL, AS MODIFIED, WOULD WORK ONLY IF U.S. AND FRANCE BACKED IT, AND IF THE BASIC ELEMENTS WERE AGREED TO BY DIEI4, DO, QU^^ ET AL AITO BY BINH XUYEN. I REffiNDED HIM WASIIEHGTON HAD NOT YET AGREED TO WITHDRAW SUPPORT FROM DIEM, AND THAT IF IT DID AGREE TO WITHDRAW SUPPORT, SUCH WITHDRAWAL WOULD BE VERY HARD FOR SECRETARY AND ME TO EXPLAIN TO AlffiRICAN PEOPLE, ELY SAID HE WAS UNABLE TO SEE HOW AWYOWE WAS JUSTIFIED IN MAINTAINING DIEM IN OFFICE AGAINST BEST JUDGMENT OF PEOPLE ON THE SPOT. WTH RESPECT TO POSSIBLE WORKING OUT OF PROPOSAL, I TOLD ELY MY GUESS WOULD BE THAT PROVISIONAL ASSEI^ffiLY WOULD VOTE DIEM OUT OF OFFICE UNLESS HE HAD BEEN BROUGHT TO CHANGE HIS IvETHODS OF OPERATION. ELY SAID THIS WAS A DIFFSRMCE OF POINT OF VIEl'7 BETlffiEN US, EXPLAINED BY FACT THAT HS HAS SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITIES WITH RESPECT TO CRISIS WHICH RE FEELS CANWOT BE SOLVED AS LONG AS DIEM IS IN OFFICE. HE SAID SITUATION IS GETTING WORSE DAILY, MD HE ATTRIBUTES TMS WHOLLY TO DIEM'S INFLUENCE. SITUATION IS WORSENING IN Tlffi CENTER, A3ID UWDERGROUND IS GROWING. ONLY BY SURGERY, 1HAT IS REMOVAL OF DIEM, CAI-J COUNTRY BE SAVED. I SAID I DIQ NOT

BELIEVE

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-2- ^i66Js /^"'^IL l?j 11 P-?•'!« < SECT I ON THRIVE OF THREE) FI10;V SAICOU

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HAD MO CONNECTION WITH OUR PHODLEM HERE, -I -SAID' THAT, ON . C ON I R A R V 5 IN KA S H J. MGT 0 U VIK '.•/ T HE RE 'IS I NT I U AT i: C 0 m KCT 10M , •

VAN LAETHAI'J SAID FRENCH UNDERSTAND OUR PROBLEN WITH RESPECT "

TO PUBLIC OPINION, BUT THEY HAVE THEIR OWN PUBLIC OPINION' . PROBLEM; AMD FRENCH GOVERNMENT HAD TO ATTENPT TO PRESERVE

SOrSETHiNG IN NORTH» THAT DID MOT MEAN, HOUEVER, THAT '" "^^ GOVERNMENT WAS PLAYING DOUBLE, GAKE. I AGAIN SUGGESTED THAT

SHOUJ^D BE HADE CLEAR TO IMSHIMGTOM

12n ; ELY SAID.THAT IF DIEM MUST BE RETAINED^AS PRIME HINISTER3 HE FELT HE COULD MOT CONTINUE TO BE RESPONSIBLE FRENCH REPRESENTATIVE IN VIETNAM* ,. ■- •

5,5. TO SUMMARIZE ELY^S POSITIONj I'SAID' WITH RESPECT TO MODIFIED THOAI PROPOSAL HE MADE THREE MAJOR POINTS3 -

(A) ELY SAID HE THOUGHT if WOULD KOT WORK AND WOULD BE ■ ' INTERPRETED AS A SOLUTION IMPOSED'FROM WITHOUT,

')■ . ■ CB) ELY DOES NOT BELIEVE SITUATION COULD BE HELD IN BALANCE ■ - ■ FOR SIX WEEKS«

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CO) IT APPEARED'ELY FEJ.T THAT IF CONDITIONS PR^IREQUISITE .* TO IMPLEMENTING MODIFIED TKfJAI PROPOSAL WERE MET;-' HE WOULD. STIL.L FEEL HE COULD N0T REPEAT NOT RENAIM ]^ERE OR, CONTINUE " TO ACCEPT RESPO;.;SIBILITY DURING NEXT SIX WEEKS. 'I HAD " ■ UMDEnSTOOD ELY TO SAY }{E COULD NOT REMAIN IF DIEM REMAINED PERMANENTLY IN POWER, I WISHED TO KNCI^ WHETHER THAT STRICTURE APPLIED ALSO TO PROVISIONAL SOLUTIOH,, ' J • "

• ■ • J.A, ELY SAID. HE DID NOT BELIEVE IN SOLUTION, THAT l{)i DID MOT THINK IT VALIDj THAT'HE FELT THAT MEW CRISIS WOULD BE , UPOM US IN THREE WEEKSj AMD THAT WE WOULD LOSE OUR LAST ■. -CHANCE TO SAVE VIETNAM. I SAID IT APPEARED CLEAR ELY WOULD NOT ACCEPT SOLUTION. IN TH.^T' CASE, IT COULD OBVIOUSLY NOT WORKj ESPECIALLY SINCE THERE' COULD' BE NO QUESTION OF REPLACING ELY AT THIS POINT, ' ' . ■

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.'t5o I SUGGESTED THAT I RliPOnT LATER APRIL J.9 MY CONSULTATIONS WITH DO3 QUAT,, ET AL, AMD WITH DIEN, . I SAID TO ELY I DID MOT KNOW WHAT WOULD BE OUTCOME OF MY TRIP TO WASHINGTON* . '

Declassified per Execuiive Order 13526. Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 2011

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Control: X^')3C>1

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^SjCNT DEPARTIIICNT A^GS^ REPEATZD INFORMATION PRiORirY PARlS"^ i25)S . "

Kanio or Ciri'i^^'...

PAIUS FOP. AMBASSADOR

FOR IKE SECRETARY FROtI COLLINS

LIl'ilT DISTRIBUTION

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I MET WITH DO J QUAT, MINH AND. TRAN VAN VAN 3.500 APRIL-1.9 TO REVIEW l.aTJI T}[Eri THEIR REACTIONS. TO MODIFIED THOAI PROPOSAL.. ■ I WENT OVER EACH STEP CAREFULLYj SO THAT THERE WOULD BE NO MIS UNDERSTAND It If: AS TO HY MEANING „ ,'.

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NiNir^'S REACTION VJAS T}[AT SITUATION V.'AS MOT MUCH WORSE THAN IN PERIOD BEFORE HIS' RICSIGNATIOM AMD CRISIS WOULD 3E iiUCH flORE EAS[LY RESOLVED WITHOUT DIEM THAN-WITH lUM, MIN-I SAID HE TENDED TO FAVOR EARLY GENERAL ELECTIONS TO SET U? A CONSTITUTIONAL ASSEMBLY IN TOR A MONTHS^ MEANWHILE, ■A COALITION GOVERNMENT WOUD) BE NECESSARYj SUT IT WOULD 3E DIFFICULT TO FORM WITH DIEM AS PRIi^E MINISTER. •' ■ '

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3^ OUAT SAID HE HAD NG SPECIFIC COMMENTARY TO MAKE ON THE PROPOSAL BUT WISHED TO CONTRIBUTE AN ANALYSIS OF CRISIS.

iW'Z y\^o MAIN elements/ ]{e SAiDy are'dieM'S. covernnent and ■ ..

SECT^S POSITION0 A THIRD AND LESS CRUCIAL FACTOR IS POLITICAI OP I WI ON OF OP P 0 S i T TON OTHER T H AM S E C T S, *' DIE N' ' S 0 B V10 U S ' ERRORS AND FAULTY i5ETH0DS"HAVE CREATED' MOAT BETWEEN HIM AND ALL OTHER ELEMENTS IN THE SOCIETY WHICH IS BECOMING BROADER AND DEEPERj AND CONTACTS BETWEEN DIEM AND OTHERS ARE BECOMIf^c' .' HO RE REMOTE. WITH REGARD TO SECTS; THESE GROUPS KNOW THE '/'' ■' PROBLEM THEY CREATE MUST BE RESOLVED.. HE FEELS ONLY WAY TO :: ■ : RESOLVE.J?i?OBLEM IS PROGRESSIVELY THROUGH MOBILIZING PUDLIC ; •■

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-2- ^662, APRIL 19, 11 pIm., prom SAIGON

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OPIKION Afro CREATING M ATMOSPHERE IN I'ffllCH SECTS CM BE iroUCED ACCEPT PEACEFUL SOLUTION. PR0BLEI4 COULD HAVE BEEN RESOLVED MORE EASILY AT AN EARLIER TIME, QUAT SAID HE DID • NOT THINK DIEM Alffi ANY TEAil HE MIGHT GATHER COULD EESUlffi EFFECTIVE COOTACT VriTH SECTS.

h, QUAT DISCUSSED IN A GENERALLY UNFAVORABLE SENSE DO'S IDEA OF HAVING BAD DAI CONVOKE A CONGRESS, HE SAID THE CONGRESS WOULD BE MORE QUICKLY SET UP THM^ A PROVISIONAL ASSEl-BLY AND WOULD BE MORE MANAGEABLE. HOV?EVER, OVHNG TO BAO DAI'S ABSENCE IN FRANCE, PRESENT POLITICAL ROLES" OF SECTS AND ATTITUDE OF OTHER POLITICAL GROUPS, HE BELIEVED CONGRESS NOT PRACTICABLE. QUAT SAID HE THOUGH THE BEST SOLUTION WOULD BE PROVIDED BY A.PROVISIONAL ASSEI^EBLY, BUT POLITICAL GROUPS ARE FEAHFUL OF ANY ASSEMBLY CONSTITUTED UNDER Dini AS PRIME 14INISTER.

5. DO SAID THAT IN HIS VIEW MEANS SHOULD BE FOUND TO ALLOW VIETNAMESE PUBLIC OPINION TO BE HEARD. HE HAD SUGGESTED CONGRESS AS A I^IEANS TO THAT EbJD. IF THEKE ^ffiRE AN ASSEMBLY PRESENT, CRISIS COULD BE MORE EASILY RESOLVED. A CONGRESS, OPERATING UNDER BINH XUYEN MENACE, MIGHT REMOVE DIEM AND THIS COULD BE INTERPRETED AS VICOTRY FOR SECTS WITH UICFORTUNATE EFFECTS IN U.S. DO SUGGESTED AS POSSIBILITY THAT CONGRESS BE REPRESENTATIVE ONLY OF POLITICAL GROUPS AND NOT REPEAT NOT OF SECTS, IF PROVISIONAL ASSEMBLY SOLUTION WERE ADOPTED, IT WOULD BE NECESSARY FIND INTERIM GOVERNMENT TO FUNCTION FOR PERIOD OF PERHAPS SIX VffiEKS AND THUS PROBLEM REMAINS OF CREATING A NEW GOVERiMENT. DIEM IS A BARRIER TO SOLUTION OF Tins PROBLEM. DO REFERRED TO FACT THAT DURING NINE YEARS OF WAR NO GOVERNMENT COULD OBTAIN POPULAR SUPPORT FOR STRUGGLE AGAINST C0MI€JNI3M BECAUSE THEY WERE ALL FRENCH PUPPET GOVERNMENTS. PROBLEM NOW IS TO GAIN POPULAR SUPPORT TO CONTINUE RESISTANCE TO VIET MINH. DIEM'S GOVERNMENT HAS NOT SUCCEEDED IN CONVINCING PEOPLE OR POLITICAL GROUPS OF NTICESSITY TO CARRY ON AITII-VIET MINH STRUGGLE. ONLY A GOVERNMENT FULLY SUPPORTED BY PEOPLE CAN DO THAT, AITO SUCH A GOVERNMENT MUST COM FROM SOME KENT OF POPULAR BODY," EITHER AN ASSEMBLY OR A CONGRESS. AS A PRACTICAL TEST OF WHETHER PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT FOLLOWED BY PROVISIONAL ASSEIfflLY WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION, DO SUGGESTED ASKING SPECIFIC INDIVIDUALS, SUCH AS QUAT AND MINH, l-ffiETHER THEY

WOULD

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WOULD AGRE:]C to enter SlJCl^ PROVISIONAL GOVirRHHENT. ' MIHII SAIJ) THAT ]{E ,'vOUL)} AGREL TO EMTER A ?ROVISIO^;AL GOVKRiii'lZHT it POLITICAL GROUPS REPRESENTED BY QUAt AMD OTHKRS ACCEPTED/ BUT UK F7CLT THIS SOLUTION HAD DEEM OVKRTAXEH'BY EVENTS, aUAT SAID THAT IF AN IMMEDIATE A;;SvIER' FROM \\l\\ WAS RE^i^UIREPj IT ITOIJLD -HAVE TO PE NEGATIVE. .HE A'ODED TlIATj IN HIS OPIMIONj

Yil Eiv ^ CANNOT MOW 0 R G AM I Z E AM I NT.ER IN - G 0 V ERMILENT c . ■ ' • - ■

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6/ VAN SAID THAT 'HE FELT DIEM MIGHT ACCEPJ THE PROPOSAL BUT ,THAr PROPOSED NEMi3)i;RS OF NiCVI TEAM, T?!IKI(IMG JlXEt-i INCAPABLh! . OF CHANGE, WOULD NOT AGREE TO PARTICIPATE^ HE SAID THAT . DIEM DOES NOT HAVE SUPPORT IN TISE COUNTRYo AMI)' WHILE HIS GROUP WOULD RISiC AL Vi 0ST ANYT1 [I [^G • FO R' A. GOOD SOLUT10N 5 THEY ■ WOULD NOT TAKE THE 'OIANCE OF PARTIC'lPATXNG j.N INTERIJ-I DIEM CABINET, .-■ * . •

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7. I SAID THAT IF VIETNAHESE LEADEp,S..WEREJjnABLE. TO. Fjr_ND '' SOLUTION J AND DIEN WAS REMOVED ■ UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES WHICii" ' ' POINTED TO SECT VICTORY3 IT WOULD'BE VERY DIFFICULT TO OBTAIN VPOPULAR SUPPORT IN U,S, FOR CONTINUATION OF U.S^ AID. I . " THEREFORE! URGED PARTICIPANTS TO CONSIDER E^ATT^R F^iRTH^R AN:3 •

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iu FIND 30NE OTIiER SOLUTION IF THAT WHICH WE DISCUSSI^D SEENED

. IMPRACTICABLE TO THEN

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FROM: SAIGON

ACTION COPY

1053^

APRIL 20, 1955

1:57 A.M.

TO:

Secretary of State

«0: ^4663, APRIL 19, 11 P.M. (SECTION O.NE OF TWO)

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SENT DEPMTMEOT h663, REPEATED INFORMATION PRIORITY PARIS 120?

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•FOR SECRETARY FROM COLLINS. PARIS FOR AMBASSADOR.

LIMT DISTRIBUTION.

1. I CALLED ON DIEM I8OO APRIL I9 AND-A^KED WHETHER HE HAD CONSIDERED FURTIiER MODIFIED THOAI PROPOSAL. DIEM HANDED ME FOLLOWING NOTE (iN ENGLISH):

BEGIN VERBATIM TEST.

1) I AGREE WITH IDEA OF COALITION IF IT IS TRULY TO OBTAIN REPRESENTATION FOR THE GREAT MAJORITY OF THE PEOPLE:

2) THIS IS IN ACCORD WITH MY BELIEF IN G0VERN1^IEI^"T WHCH REPRESENTS THE PEOPLE — AMD TOWARD mCCH I HAVE BEEN TRYING KHARD TO BRING VIETNAM AGAINST SO MANY DIFFICULTIES;

3) I DO NOT TEEIj TliAT THE NAMES GIVEN TO ffl AS SUGGESTIONS

FOR MEMBERS OF MY CABINET -- MEN FROM SMALL OPPOSITION PARTIES WHO ACTUALLY REPRESENT ONLY A HAITOFUL OF PEOPLE -- ARE IN ACCORD WITH THE PRINCIPLE OF HAVING THE GREAT MAJORITY OF THE PEOPLE REPRESENTED IN THE GOVERNMENT ~- WHICH I UNDERSTAND IS OUR I4UTUAL DESIRE. CERTAINLY TIIES IS TIffi POLITICAL PRINCIPLE OF THE UNITED STATES IN ITS OWN GOVERNMENT:

h) I AGREE THAT NO Ol^ffi liM SHOULD MANIPULATE THE ELECTION OF A NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SO THAT HE DOMINATES IT FALSELY. THIS IS THE VERY REASON ^ffiY I HAVE PROPOSED THAT WE HOLD A GENERAL ELECTION — IN A MANNER WHICH WILL BE MOST FAMILIAR TO MY PEOPLE — TO^ELECT A NATIONAL ASSEMBLY;

PERMANENT RECORD COPY

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, 5) WITH/ GENERAL ELECTION J THERE IS EVKKY REASON TO "EXPECT THAT TJ;E'people WILL BE REPRESENTED BY PEOPLE OF THEIR r OWN CHOOSING — ANH NOT P^Y SELF-APPOINTED SPOKESt'lEN FOR THE

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rr S) ON THE BASIS OF THESE PRINCIPLES' DEAR TO NEj AND TO FREE . ^

; ,MEN TilROllGHOUT THE UORLDj I AM WILLING TO ACCEPT COALITION,.- '

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APRIL ^9, ^955

•END VERBATIM TEaTo

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2^ WITH REFERENCE TO LAST PARAGRAP}( OF NOTE, I ASKED WHOM ' DXEN WOULD TAKE INTO A "COALITION''^ HE SAID'I'HAT HIS CABINET MINISTERS SHOULD BE "CAPABLE5 'nEUTRAL"" MEN. HI MADE A POINT" WHICH THE NOTE DOES NOT REPEAT NOT MAKE CLEAR TK^T TH5 COALXTIon W ENVISAGES WOULD 'BE FORMED AFTER .(REPEAT ■AFTER)_ GENERAL.' ' " ELECTIONS TO BE HELD IN_.3. OR ^ jlONTHS. DIEM SAID THAT 'AlZ

^GOVERNMENT MUST FIGHT" CONMU^flSN/'FEUDALI^H-AND COLOMMLISM.

.IF IT HAD 5 OR U) YEARS If"COULD USE VARIOUS PEACEFUL MEASURES.. HOWEVER, OWING TO EXIGENCIES OF SITUATION, MILITARY PRESSURE MUST 3E USEDo HE SAID HE BELIEVED THE'PEOPLE WERE IN ACCORD WITH THAT PRINCIPLE; ' _ .

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7) I WOULD PREFER TO LET AN ASSEMBLY CHOSEN BY ALL TilZ PEOPLE IN A GENERAL ELECTION BE THE.DECIDING FACTOR IN THE CONTINUE]) LIFE OF THIS GOVERMMEtJT -^ THAN TO. HAVE A COMPLEX . ;. SYSTEM OF CONTRIVED REPRESENTATION DO SO, NO MATTER HOW WISELY THIS. SYSTEM WAS DEVISED BY A GROUP. OF MEtU THE PEOPLE' ARK ' ' THE ONES WHOSE LIVES ARE AT STAKE^ THEY SHOULD BE GIVEN .A ." . '• VOICE IN *HL*IR OWN FUTURE5 ' • - ■■ ■ ■■■'...

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5o I REMINDED DIEM T)MT THERE IS NO KLECTIOM LA^J AND MO ELECTION! MACHINERY, t SAID ALL THOSE I HAD COiiSULTED AGREED - • TilAT GE^!ERAL ELECTIONS WERE NOT NOU PRACTICABLE, .1 ADDED THAT IN MY VIEW HIS- GOVERNMENT COULD NOT CONTINUE FOR T}tREE MONTHS AS IT IS NOU„ DIEM REPLIED THAT HE DELIEVED WHEN PEOPLE KfJEy ELECTIONS lyOiXD TAKE PLACjC-TM THREE 'HONTHS THEY WOULD CHANCEvTHEIR ATTITUDEo I ASKED WHAT HE PHOPOS.ED TO DO ., IN THE MEANTIME, HE SAID' KE WOULD CARRY OUT REFORMS AMD ■ • 1 rnOGRAMS ;^ITK which I WAS- 'FAMILIAR3 AMD TO DO THIS HE PROPOSED' ■ TO C^IOCSE ONLY ADDITIONAL CABINET MENoERS HAVING SANE POLITICAL' CONCEPTS AS HIMSELF. 'WZ SAID THE-STRUGGLE IS VERY HARD AND THERE CAN 3E NO COMPROMISE, "" ' •" ' ■-' i

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• FKUDM,ISM AND COMMUNISM ^'??ETHODS,

I ASKED IF HE THOUGHT QUAT-WAS IM FAVOR OF COLONIALISM,

-, HE SAID I^AT flUAT -FAVORS CCMPRCMISE I ASKED T'HE SAME ABOUT DO. DIEM.SA'ID DO AVOIDS DIFFICULTIES AND HAS NO-PLAN. .'l ASKED SAME ABOUT THOAI. ' ' DIEM SAID THAT THOAI IS ANXIOUS ONLY TO RETURN TO. HIS CHEMICAL LADCRATORYo ■ ' . ; - ^ ■ -.

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■5o I TOLD DIEM :THAT I .DID NOT KNOW WHAT WOULD HAPPEN TO HIS GOVERNMENT AND COUNTRY IF )\7, CONTINUED 0\\ ??:t.S7J^\i: COURSE SINCE I BELIEVED HIS SOLUTION TFUST LEAD TO■CtVUVWAR, DIEM R E? LI ED ■ T H AT ]-;E ?s E A L 12 ED RIS K S V; ERE I ;-rv 0 L V ED, AND T H AT HE. NEVER CEASED TO REFLECT ON NATION'S PROBLEMS., HE SAID COMPROMISE .HAD LOST.-Ti;! WAR AGAINST VIET MINH^ I SAID THAT IN NY OPINION VIETNAMESE PEOPLE DID NOT" WANT CIVIL WARa ■•

r^Ej^ir.'TAiiSirT -' '■ 920 • diem replied ^^^S ' •

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-2- h663, APRIL 19, 11 P.M., FBOM SAIGON (SET KTO OF WTO).

DIEM REPLIED THAT IffilTHER DID liE WISH CIVIL WAR, BUT ADDED THAT "FSUDALISTS" ARE UNSCRUHJLOUS. l'SAID THAT I trJST REPORT

TO hff GOVERHlffiNT TliAT I BELIEVED DIEM^'S COUESE OF ACTION MJST LEAD TO CIVIL WAR.

6. I TOLD DIEM THAT ALL VIETNAMESE WTH WHOM I HAD TALKED WERE LIKEWISE OPPOSED TO COLOIWALISM^ FEUDAilSM AITO COMMUMSH. HOWEVER, THEY DIFFER AS TO METHODS OF TACKLING- THESE PROBLEMS AID DO NOT APPROVE OF DIEM"S WAY OF WORKING. DIE1>J SAID THAT ON THE CONTRARY THEY DID NOT OPPOSE ES MTHODS, BUT' HIS POLITICAL CONCEPTS. HE ADDED THAT EVERY Tll-ffi A COMPROMISE

IS MADE THE PROBLEM REITJRI^ Ilf MORE ACUTE FORM, TIE PEOPLE DO NOT LIKE THIS.

7. I ASKED WHAT DIEM WOULD DO IF EAO DAI DECIDED TO 14AKE A CHMGE OF PRIME ICLHISTER. DIEM SAID BAO DAI HAS POVffiR TO DO SO AND OTLL DECIDE. HOVJEVER, EXPERIEITCE IN VIETNAM DURING THE WAR HAD PROVED COMl^ROMISE TO BE INEFFECTUAL.

IT WILL BE UNFORTUNATE IP BAO DAI DOES.NOT ACCEPT HIS COURSE OF ACTION. I TOLD DIEM THAT I BELIEVED THAT IF NO COALITION WERE EFFECTED PRIOR TO ELECTIONS, BAO DAI WOULD l-iAKE A CliANGE. I HAD TRIED TO ASSIST VIETNAMESE TO AVOID DRASTIC SOLUTION OF THIS SORT, BUT UTn:£3S GOVERNI#;N"r IS EFFECTIVELY BROADEJffiD, I BELIEVE THERE WILL BE A CHANGE. DIEM SAID HE WAS CONTINUING HIS POLITICAL CONVERSATIONS TO TEST ACCEPTABILITY OF HIS IDEAS. I SAID I HOPED HE WOULD DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO AVOID OPEN CONFLICT DURING BY ABSENCE. DIEM SAID THAT IF HE HAD REI^IOVED SANG AS CHIEF OF POLICE IN BEGINNING, HE WOJLD NOW HAVE SAIGON WELL IN HAffl).

8. I ASKED IF HE HAD HAD ANY REPORTS FROM LUYEN. DIEM REPLIED THAT BAO DAI WAS ABSENT WHEN LUYEN ARRIVED. HE SAID THAT LUYEN HAD REPORTED THAT PEOPLE IN PARIS HAD NO UTTOERSTAHDING OF I'/HAT WAS GOING ON IN VIETNAM.

9. ON TAKING MY DEPARTURE I SAID THAT IN MY OPINION BAO DAI WOULD REMOVE DIEM IF HE CONTINUED AS AT PRESENT. I HAD DONE MY BEST TO HELP, I ADMIRED HIS ACCOMPLISmiENTS AN"D HIS CHARACTER, BUT NOT HIS METHOD OF WORKING Alffi ONLY REGRETTED THAT I HAD NOT BEEN ABLE TO DO MORE FOR HIM AMD HIS COUTiTRY.

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22 April 1955

Dear Walter;

I refer to the c-orrent situation in South Vietnam and the probable necessity for review of the basic policy in that area.

An analysis of the problems has been made by my staff in the attached staff study, I think it is an excellent study and I highly reeommead you and your staff read it.

While I realize these problems have no easy solution^ to me the-basic issues are quite clear* I believe there are three major areas of weakness in South Vietnam as follows:

a. The need for a solution of the problem of how we can achieve our ends in South Vietnam and yet live with the French,

b. The need for a solution of how we can achieve internal order with particular reference to the sects^ the lack of internal comniuaicationSj and the lack of stren^h in the central government, (During my recept trip I conferred with Diem at which time he stated that if his government could become strong he felt the people would rally to it^ and that at present Ho Chi Minh offered the only strong rallying point to the people of South Vietnam.)

c. The need for a solution of how we can achieve

a suitable government of South Vietnam^ with particular reference to its relationship to Bao Dai^ the broadening of its base^ and the participation of capable people within the government,

(l feel that in the past we have made a mistake in building the government upon one man,)

In view of the probable nature of the problems to be discussed with General Collins during his visit^ I consider that this inform.ation may Be of value to you*

Sincerely yours.

(siGDffiD)

H* Struve Hensel

Mr. Walter S. RobeHson Assistant Secretary for

Far Eastern Affairs Department of State

Prepd, by Col. Queenin Re^v-rtn by Col. Silver

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ProrrLLT:3 for the In:nlc:::'!itation of U-S. Policy-To'rarJs So*Jth Vict-IIam

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?ro>j.cn: To rc-c;-:c;.::in3 current ii;:^')lcr,onuQtion of TJ<S policy pertaining '•■ \o South Vict-ICa:a ia lii;>/c of curront events rc3.atcd to thut area.

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CGncl ^ :.i:ic ".L:: 1. Interim or delcyin:; actiona in South Viet-JIojp should be -£cco::.pr;.;Uu:d by dcv'elo;;r:^-::nt of a ffivorcble situation in the rcr-cxinder . of tne Var SriCt in o-^rkCral t'.u:\ in Sc^utheast /vsia in particular as per-" taCn;> to CuiL^oiici^ I-co^j <.rA i'hiiilani*

2> S'l::: GUcceGGful c.t^coiipliuVir.ont of U,S- prOL?:'cr:i3 for South Viet l':^:^ capjiot 1-e assured throu^^h r:'e;ich iirplc:r:ontaticn of ouch pro^o^rains as the rrench vill only :icccpt the concerit of tliet^e prosrc^r^s incofar * C.3 they further French policy in the oxaa.

3- ?i^*e influence of '-^^o D?.l in hio ■po.-^ition as Chief of State is a constaiit r.annce to tl:c ;3ucces3ful ir.plcr.iontation of U-S. j/rograris in South Viet-llaa* . ■ . ^

-K AltornatiYcs to the Dle:a Govcrnuent diould he gi%^en t^.dcquate consideration in the event the" U.S. camiot loncor reasonably support DiOui. ' . . ,

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5. A Gtronc; ctaolo^ viahlc Goverrxient cannot'be developed ia. Gouth Viet-Kan unti,! a i^eaconable Golution to the T;rohleni of the S^^cts has been dote rained. ^ ." .-.. '

6. The Viet--';inh are capable^ even vithout resorting to overt vi/j^rei^sicnj of preventing the toi^al acco:i:plish?ncnt of U*^S- objectives in South Vict-Iferj* ^" ■. ■ ■. '

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7, The JiTiJ.itary defense of Vict^rrarj vould be extremely difficu],t if not i-LT^ocL-^ible should; V^iV- VilC ^,:ithdrav fro,:i South Vict-'Nar: a:id no other forecG b.? ir.'r:odiat:?ly available to fill the vacuu^i; the Viet-Ivinh then overtly intervene; and no IhS- eround forces be included in ^ ''other'* forces ultimately used to fill the vacuum*

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*3* '2':?.o loss of Vict-I'a-j and rivAvscquent political developn:ents would render the railitary dofc2-ise of tl;e rer^ainder of Southeast Asia :trer:ely difficult, if.not ir^possible. .;./ .

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9, :Ct is <iue.^tienable that South Viet-ITara could at this tiino v;in an election pertaining to the unification of Viet-Iiam. , ■/-

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• ^ 'n-^allai:d ani C:u;;l^odia» /u:y U,f3i r^ilitary nid j)^'oc;-;"an in the la-'^ter_ '" *. _ o:*o*L)id CO cor.t'in::cnt upon U*G- control of the'orranliriitioa end traln^ ■

. 2t Obtain a xiro ot::<,:>:r.ont of Fi^cnch polic/ rclatinfi to Vlct-U^^i^ ^ irjvoni tV.c French tact tho U*3 yill expect'cc:.:pletG yrench DTjr;port in

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3* Obtain fron the Dop:i:ctr.::^at of [^t^tO; r.a iriiXrCdlate ciiu practical Golution to the prohdcr, cf Eao D^l. ("rom a Defense point of vicU/ be ehoiild ie CI fiCAirohead only^ v;ith a Lanltnun arrtOimt of.,control, over the* -^ Vict«!"^ni Covcr:izn2nt) ;

^. Accept Cr::::eri:l Celling* i\tcorMQpAc.tiQn(; on alternatives to tha . current Vlctna::<:je Gov:;ri-:r.x\nt l^ut i-^ahe certain tncit the prohlcn of the S3ct3 is also considered concurroatly-

5- Kv;c-i'^lf'-33 of %'liothor Dicrn'or alternative ^ovcrrrjcnt is in -poverj it ^h.C'ijil cs ucderctood that the, B+nh Xijycn vill ii:rDediate?Ly t^ Litrippcd cf all po^^er and uuhjiir^/ited to the naticna.1 CovernTrx^nt; that the covor:ii:eiit \;.il3, i::clnd3 rcprooentatioa frou the other Sects; £iad that these other Sects •;iLl cventual?^y he cor^iplctcly subjugated to 'the ICcwional Governrcent* , ■ * i ' '

7. Deten^ine U,3, military action ^-ithin the Gco^'^.e of the ESACa? in order to prevent t'ao lo:;a of the rct.i-iinior of ^outheat^t /'^ia as a rc;5U],t of the Iodg of Goirth Vict-I^'oiK* ' ^ ,.^' \

G. n^jLl'.e every effort to aloli.^h or postpone indefinitely the cleetioriG proposed for Viet-IJt^jr/j under the Geneva. AccoixIdj for July ^ '

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6. In rO"evaluating curi\'-nt or cGtabli:;hinij ne'J U.S. ohjectives , ^-:. - , P . in Soiith Viet-Ivaa inGiu^e adcqi:ato conGideratioa of Viet-I'Ilidi capabilities " ; :'

rather than pc^Goiblc intentions. * ,. ."'**'

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DISCUSSION:

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1* The difficulties inherent in developing^ iEiplementing and sustaining a program designed to produce a stable^ viable, government in South Viet-Nanij under the limitations imposed by current U.Sa national policy^ are recognized. EowevBTy recent recorranendations from the field for revision of such programs must be considered in the nature of delaying or interim actions which can be justified only if they are undertaken with a positive objective^ i»e*, to gain time for consolidation or development of a favorable situation in the same area of elsewhere. Although proposed interim notions in Vlet-Nam may be justifiable from the point of view of minimizing the psychological impact of the eventual loss of the remainder pf Viet~I?sm to the Communist

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Bloc^ it is considered that ultimate failure of U.S. policy in Viet-Nam^ -even though limited by the extent of the U.S. commitmentj would have the effect of furthering the loss of IT,S. prestige in Asia. -SXIBCONCLUSION : Interim or delaying actions in South Viet-Nam should be

■I

accompanied by development of a favorable situation in the remainder of the Fax East in general and in Southeast Asia in particular as pertains to CambodiaJ Laos, and Thailand,

2. The implementation of current U.S. policy and programs in South Viet-Nam and to a great extent'in Cambodia and Laos is effected by the ability of the French to negate within these countries the accomplishment

of U,S, objectives. The complex and flexible policies currently being fol-

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lowed by the French will not insure the continued cooperation and support |-necessary for the successful accomplislmient of U<,S, programs. France is i pledged to and is supporting a policy of internal sovereignty for the

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Dedassificd per Executive Order 13526, Sectiun 3,3 NMD Project Number: NND 63316. Bv: NWD Diite: 2011

Associated States, with full independence vithin the French Union. The Prench Union is an ultra-national^ coirtmonwealth-type arrangement ^ as yet loosely defined and suhject to further legal development. The statements of French leaders to the effect that ^'France intends to maintain its presence in the Far East" allude to the concept of the French Union, Further, the French are capable of negating U.S. programs by: (a) working to bring about the downfall of the Diem Government through an internal coup or through influencing Bao Dai to dismiss Diem; (b) refusing to cooperate in the training of the Vietnaiaese Army; (c) withdrawing completely from Indochina^ thus forcing the UoS„ to increase substantially its political^ financial and military commitments in the area; (d) unilaterally reaching a rapproachement with the Viet-Minh; and (e) insisting on executing their obligations under the Geneva Agreement by working towards holding the elections now scheduled for July, 1956*

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The basic factors on French J^olicy with regard to Indochina are as follows:

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(a) The French desire to maintain a maximum of influence in Indochina,

(b) The French believe, because of their financial investment and their historical position in Indochina, that their interests should be the determining factor in political developments in Indochina and they are Jealous of what they regard as'U„S* intervention.

(c) French acceptance of the Geneva Accords recognized their military inability to defeat the Viet-Minh, and the consequent need for a political settlement of the Indochina problem on a basis which would minimize French political, commercial^ ^arid prestige losses resulting from such a settlement, ;

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,G?SE53 SENSiTiV

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Sectit^n 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 2011

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(d) .'r^iO French deslro to avoid a rcGuiGp-tlon of-ho3tlHt5.c:; at all

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cczc^ clnce past dcvclcpr-i^ntG hcvo led the^a to believe that their f^round '

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:?cvccs v;gu1c1 \;QOii^ the Innuit of renewed ri^jhtlas*^ , . ,../ - ^ '

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(o) ^^:jcd^^zo or their dcjoendcnoo oa U*G* firianc5.Dl Gupx^ort to i;:.'iiritaia ■

tiioii* pre^enpe in Idochina^ they are inclined to go olon^ vitli tl:e U*S. - -. ■ • ' . ' ' ^ - ' - . ' . ■■

^o?-icy in Eoutb Viet-I'ar: as one rjsarts of izaintalnins cojie influence in the i\rer.j altliOvCh eertaiu groups (eolonialists) are cctively uoders^inlns the -u,3. 'oro^^c-j locally in South Vict-irazi. -^ . " ^' •-

^ (<r) S1:e French do^fot that t1:e U^S* pro^rara irill Guecced^ and c^ added

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in5ur^^.1ee arc endctv/erdxis to establish an underctanv,iri2 vitlxthe Viet-Mlrfi

vhlc-; i:>ic;>^t 'oe expa:;dcd to inclvde a politlgal Gettlei^ent for oil o? Viet-*

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ICar: in the cve:ifc thr.t U.,S* tn'osrcitio f^X, thus rctaiiiliis GO'X-e decree of -

influence.

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(^) TVi^-j are heco^'ins apprehonoivo let^t U.S* policy should coinnletely >\ :railj aud loot their attcr.-T/tG to c^ln a scttlei::cnt vith the Viot-Xirih vill

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Also fail .caia are thuG hoclnnins to conterrj^latc the poocihle necec^fjlty of a

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co::T/leto vl'^hdrairal frcra Viet-lxain Vcfore the clcctior:;: are heM* . "

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(h) Tr.cy uculd bo"\/ildin:j to Gtay as' lon^ as U*o- financial support

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csiiuir.ucG and the U.S. £;iveD then a riojor voice in detaiTrinins x^olicy.

(i) Z:cir -ori?r>ary ::otivatior;S arc (a) xinaxxoivXj bvA (h) pre^ti^e.

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^'hey are reluctant to vithdrav Tro::! I::dochlna hecauc;a they vould then " - /

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\^vr^hon their poGitio;i as a *'vcx*ld pjvcr'j as a iriCLX-er of the "Bis Fo-ur'!'

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or "Eic ^i"''^"/ ^-"^ ^'C'T.^'rA 1-^-^ '■/''-!> prcstls'i tlioy hold tui a- 'Tar Eag-tern"

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Dedassificd per Executive Order 13526, Section 3,3 NMD Project Number: NND 63310. Bv: NWD Date: 2011

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(j) In the final analysis^ they -will retain a position of flexil^ility in order to follow isrhichever course of action appears most likely to assure them the most advantageous position^ vhether that should he to continue to support U.S. policy J to seek a rapprochement >ri. th the Viet-Minh^ or to with.-draw completely from Viet-Nam,

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SUBC f^ 7CLUSI0N :_ The successful accomplishment of U.So programs for South Viet-Kam cannot be assured through French implementation of such programs as tl ^ French will only accept the concept of these programs insofar as they farther French policy in the area,

;3- Bao Daij in his position as Chief of State^ has the authority to appoint or dismiss the Cabinet in Viet-Nam at any time. His attitude has

recently been favorable to the U.S. but his^ yiilnerability to the influcence

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and intrigue of the French and anti-Diem Vietnamese could sway him at 'any time to dismiss Diem and eliminate tbe Government on whose existence the U,S» predicates its policies. This factor tends to weaken the'basis on which current U.So programs are established.

SUB CONCLUSION : The influence of Bao Dai in his position of Chief of State is a constant menace to the successful implementation of U.S. programs in South Viet"Nam.

!|. Diem has proven to be an individual who^ in addition to being guilty of nepotism in his government and of being reluctant to utilize the capabilities of some of the more dynamic Vietnamese personalities available to him, has demonstrated, a marked inability to understand the politicalj economic and

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military problems associated with Viet-Nam. The concept of making Ut,S„ support dependent exclusively on Diem's continuance in power is not valid

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NKD 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

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txnl vc-nd,; to portrety liiu g^ bcin^ inuicDCnca'blCj 1/hich nhovld not bo tli5 caoo.

SltCJld lUo::: j?cJ.1, U.3. prcovi^'is ci^iit coiicolvaclc uc ccr.-tinucd mirier a . .

DUJcerc-OV* ^oveiVjv^ntj parcict:Iarly if a noro d/nci^ic^ ccv):role leader (aj,beit.

\riV.i Iczo initielppi^cGviG^) vcre placed in ccritrol* Forcer Foreign MinlG^er ! ' ■ '' ■ . .■'

Zd cr Di-^- i^aatj cs rcco;.':r*audf]:d by Gcncrcl ColliT;Gj ohould te ^ivea adcc^uatc '"

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E:C' ciVi:cr::aoivo oi vitV:d.ro7in£; U Si. ctipport should not be stated as a

Ci c.i*-cut nGi^^ativc cour^o o.C action- If the X>lc:i cxjcrir;:cnt failo^ ani - \.-

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t^.o U,o- dooG uot con^iuer continued j^upport to South Vict-ITGi!3 r.D bcin^

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varrant'jdj Wiero is a vide ycalc of courses ofactio-a vhich vouJ.d "bo adopted l>y the U^iited States to :};lni]c5.-e the cfjCcctG or a Coc^^uiUGt taI;o over ia South Vict-I'a::]* These ir.clude: (a) su-.'^port of i^rencli efforts to crec^te a Gouth VicBt^^t'r.e^e Govornr:L^:\t ^fhicu 'i:ould vork out a sott'ler:ent'trith the ^

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Yiot-^;lrut; (b) clandcotine orcrationG to ,hinder the consolidation ojT Cos- -" '"

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rjursilri^t control; (c) aur^ri^ntation q£ pro^jra^^^s to dcveloj? a.nti-Co3:niTniDt ^_. positioas cx streu^oh in CirahQiiaj T^ios ciid xhailcnd; mid (d) other X'^Htical^

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.*.coiv::;uic £^ad i^o/cholociceJ, n-ifj^va'e*^ deGljyved to £aiii the Gjiirjjath-/ c?, and- ■

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bo d-;^vc'lo2 cupv-,ort from the "ne^itrol" nations of Scutheaat Ivsio.* Tx^ese

r.:oa3uvej nl^l'it include contir.uation of U*S- * nut::auitarian" proGiro^s or . -^ -

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eeor.c::-.ic and ^oeiel at3si:^tr:ace in South" Vict-ifen p^adina the aGiu:in>tlon of'

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ccsr?j.eb=j control, or tlils area hy u Co:^.-.;u:ilst i;av£rr^vent. • ".r ' " •■ '■' Slir:gG;:OTAv.UC^I: ./vlternativc3 to the Sieri Gorer/iTnoJit shoidd be ci^'cn adeciuate - ■

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cc.-:;;i>.Vjx'i^tion in the event tho U.;3. cannot lonj^cx- rerjs'oncu^ly suppo'i't Dien.

5, dliy prcl'lep.pf thi Gncta luis been ccrzrcnted .on In recent coi-rosrsondcnce

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Cvon the field t-nd'in nv.clyv.hi^s "^^^ cowrsc:} of action available in ''....

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rcl^uicii.lo^ttiecc dics^ldent facllonu it Ig l>oviou3 that their only consideration in rcit/Lio:! to the Mut^oniO, GGver::r:cr.t is a retention of poorer runi iraintcn^nce o?

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a ''£^:'!':ero of irLfluciicL^'* in thoir cvn orcnrj- The Cao Dai and Hrx> ITor: vxq Gu^noDOdly rc'licio'^^^ croups vita ethnic ties to cpccirCic arena of South Viet-KcLn*

if » Hcvrcvcr^^ tt:^jir rclici^'^^^ l:ac.^.^;rolu:dG arc in reality ucccl no abasio xor tho '"

ctovclop:;,2:it of their v:olit:leal anci ncvor nc^iratlcns, %\^ Linh Xi^yen Sect -h.:t:s :::> 3:->::cific ctVinxc tico Vvit is conGidored to have oricinfitM in the area Gcut'* ot S i^on ond to hcvc neon r^^rincipally ent^:;:^^ ^^ the past in, river piracy r.ctivities. Ecccntly^ they have controlled t"..G gou^olins and- -oth.er vice aotlvitics in Svlron ct:d nearhy Caolcn^ and have ceen Bao Tol^s chief soru'ce of inoo'j;o. . " , ' / ' : --^

It is considered tViat the prohleni o|* the Gocta ia one of tn^ Liajoi-

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i'actora retr.rcJing th.e C3tablir>httent of a stablej viable coveroir^ent in'

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Viot"ITc-:i ara tiny plan for tha ranlaccin^^nt of the Dii^ui Government nust ■ '* sIgo aIyc. adccaate consideration to t3iio isrchlorft Action to reduce the pov;er of th:; ^'1^1^ Xuyon should ho iu^jicdiute and i/cvld prol36"b3y result in

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5oot £oinr: vJKle,0£:roi;nd o:3d livitictinc; c'^^erriLla activities* Ho'r.'ever,

paratoilitary k\^:6. GXihversive activities are go x^xcvclent in South Vict-Keii ' / at present th':it it io not'holieved this ^roald seriously GiSr^ravate the cituationV

A :^xjor effort shculd he i-ado concurrently to strerj^^then the i*attonal / A.":x:y and; €13 good as po^oihl'j^ the other i^ccto sIiGi^ld tv> Gubju£;atei to the

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Mill. Cv the Ivational Gcverrtrj^nt. - ^ ^ ^. , * ^

flI; BCv:rC:>U3T0N : A strong^ Gtahlo^ viable {^ovcrri^r.ent cannot 1-e developed in foi^tli Viet-Ifeii until 0; ro;^igon,ahlC' solution to the-proh:L3.xa of the Sect;

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6* 5^1-iC :ioco:rnl±CuiT.::nt ot U*S. objectives in So*atli Vict-Kaa \dXl depend " .^ l.rxxoly u;^orL "the acblv^^itico o^ tUo Vict-Minh* The Dien Coverni3or-[t ic r.ot;-, ^ '

ii::;l oi'i^lclout Cc:^^Ui2inb poliiic^jl crur'nizGvion couth of the 17th i^^i\illQlp Glr?V"drtv^ locally by a covc-rt pjLi.Mri:ilitary or^arLl;::ition cCiX^able of vide-.

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colo G'L^c^rrxHa action^ cxvl cvcrtlj^ cbovG the 17th porrilel hy: a iiur.crlccilly

!?-( r, 'rclixtlvoly letter ecuix^pi^^d reexilar crc^^ of 250^000 trocs:>s- llic Vict** ' Kinh ecu be c>.^octcd to oi'-po^^o ofi^orts ly't!ic Diea Covcvnvr^cnt to i^ticify ancl ■^*.

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£ra^CC; X7,I;:;:lO:7: i-J^o Vicb-I-ilnli ni^i ccji^blc^' in the ^I-oence of a r,trc:;£; pcpiaorly

o\vj:}6-^'t-z± ciovernr^ant iu Go^uth Vict-rTai:^^ eren withciit r^sorfcin^ to overt - '. C3i''*'>-'3-^^^-i> of T;revont:lna tao totol accoi^:pli3h:n'2nt of V*G. cIciJectivesHn South

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;air control over all territory Gouth of the 17tli parallel^ particularly vhc;r. and if Guch ei'fortG pr^c-^ a Girrjific^nt t ro3.t to the Viet^Mlnh activities

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i:i that area. Such cppoGxtioa could ta^.o the for^; of: (a) x^GycholosicaJ.

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^rar-f^re iz^d subvort^ivc penotrfit^.cnj (b) Gabota^c r/al IocdI terrorist actions; ■ (c} initiation of vide-cockle £\;.c-z'rilla ci:cre^tion3; (d) Taiixtovc(iZ]:^nt'pi} this ._ '

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Guerrilla action by infiltration of liijited niJinber:^ of x^gulai* troops fi^om ^thc north; ci^ finally (c) orert full-scale invnsioii of South Viot-Kaiis, Tne '

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Vietnan:3se Goveriri:oat currently ic^ incapable vXoiia of succei?ffiLlly counterin^i . - i

any of thc:,^ courcc-s of action; Cijti:i5iQt:lc^lly; if the current U.S. jirosrcii .

shcuj.u be £ucc33sfr<l l:i ;^-JLI fieldsj tho Dj.e:;i Govcrni^^^nt probably covild countci? * '

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ccuroG (a).' ^^'^-'^ ix>dr>ibly could keep courc;e(b) xindcr control, Taa force level- ' '■ pro3i'*r:Ln^.:;d for tb^e Yietn'/j'-oae Arny vould preclude co^jiiteriiia succoosfuJ,ly' • ccur^c-G (c), (d), and (c), , ■ : * '. ' " • ' \ ■ ..•.■■.•

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7* Xu the cvcnv of a ex^lit tct".^"cen the U-.S- i^rid'French rcGultin^In .

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th.c vithir^Lv.'al or cJ.l Trench political £ivid tjilitary*support to South Vict-'

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;Cnr3; thi? vp.cuun creritc^d by t)*c \^it}}dri:^'nl of tli<? Frcncli Kxi^editionary Coi-p ;:culd have to T;o filled hy other external forces i>endiii2 the dcvelo?:;::rr.t of ccrrarative strcncth in tlic V5.ctnar/:c3e /Xr^%'v/ithout i-cplaeiJi^ the F>2C l»y, cciz-o

pc:rahle _force3^ South Vict-i'ojj vxuld he nt 15.tartly iri.'potentj and a den:orcll'j;a!i,iQa

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of the Yiotru'^:rc:?e Aru^/- nnd people could rcniJ.t*. . • -

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Ivi connection ^rith the above, any thought of U S- intervention under the Zk^Tf2 should he considered in th,e li^ht of possible Jltidtatious of the " ' ^

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Geneve. Accordcj vith respect to intorvontion hy U'-*S*'Ground forccG." A Ic^i'all^tic -i:;torprct:;tion of the accord:s 7-y the Vict-MInh aiid the ICC would cbnaider cuch TJ*S» interv'ontion 03 a in^Jor violation* Trie U-S», vailo not a sienatory to the Genevii v^-ceords^ h:^ pxillicly declared it Vould not contravene its

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. Aooistance for intei*^/ention i}i South Viet^Ka.ii pr oh ably camiot he e:<pec'S^d

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frozi /i:3tra3,iaj Hevr Ifealondj the U.K. or P^^kiotr-n, Tliailand or the Pnilippiiies

CLinr^ot provide suffieient troops to reinfox^ce adcqriately the VietnaniCGc' force

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to the ext02it recLUircd. ~if^ under thcGe circunstuncesj Viet-MirJi re.^'ular £t3»rces i vero to he corr.rj?Vtted a;;,ain3t GiZACDl' forces, ^^\X no U»3- ground forces -^^ ;l

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vei\::''employed; the Vici:-:%^iriii v;ould be ccr)ahlc of defGatinG SBkCiJli forces

suhGecucnt to the withdrrrw-al of t.ie ?!^C. U.S." air; and naval force 13 vould

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hinder thiO Vict-JIirili advance hut it is unlihely that they v:ould Gigoificaiit^v'*

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reduce the Yict^riinh capi:'h:Llity to overran Viet-IJ^xu ' -'

a:'he parrtr.iilitary oporatieno of the Viot-rnnh in Go\Jth Viet-iraij.cannofe

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he cU'r:r^;:;scd ty those r^eo^urer. auplicahlc in other countries^ i.e. tW

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Phildppino oUViprcGuion of the lUJICS. Tlie HU:C3 never had the decree of -" :

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popular oyrjpathy and cupport 'rmich the Vict-IIlnh currently enjoy. / ^ '

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r,- IC tiiQ ?ii;c chou}.d vithdrav from South Vict-Jton^ other forces

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vc;:n.a \o y.ccCzd. to fill t!:a vacuuia*. . - ' '"•' . / •'

V. ir ether forces are uc'cd to riU the vaciiun^ the Vict-1^5inh v^Il '

c* If U-3 c^^^^^^i forccG arc not included in these "other'' forces.

ho Viot-Minh '^"111 ener^e victorious

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d. Vict";>iii]i pai^auiilitai^ cctivitiea in South Viet-I'ai3 cannot bo ovor-cg:;.o uy usin^ those r:c;tho5.G vhlch have proven succcGcful in other area^, i,c the Phili'^^elnGo* ■ -/

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8. In considering the accoptacillty of the Iosg of Vict-Kam from the U,S* vic'^^point, U.S. policv ohjectives related to the entire Frr Si^stj GoutheCi^t and South Asia vould have to ho revlc:fed. The-nilitary iirj^llcationi;

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cf tho lo3G of South Viet-Kaiu have to tahc into ticcouat the prohahly

eri.vuin;-; political developneatsj i,e, a CoLriiunist tai:eover in Laos aud Ctuubodia

vrithaa resrJltant vrcahenlz;^^ of Tliailand's vill to rcaiGt Coinnixmii;^ and £,t a

nirii::uLi the strcn^cticnins of the neutralist tazidenciCG in the other countries* — . . ■ . • * ■ ■ '■.'■'

of the area. - ' . ^ ■„ . ' ^■

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£li3C0CvCLU3-CC'r; The Iogs cf Viet-lTati and suhGcnucnt xioliticai develoni:;ent3 vould rc;nd;vr the irllitary defense of the rciriaindcr cf So\;theaGt Asia ejxrcniely diffi-cult^ if not iirinoGsihl-;^. " ■ • *, '

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9- ., '^^- cor;:;iderln2 the oueaticn of electionsj the aGGV-iiotion that

th*o Viet-MirJ:! vould not a;;reQ to froo electlonG could veil he erroneous

* * . de:3i:ite the ccnGir^tent Coi-'r;i;rjiGt rcjcctioQ of election pro^iJOGalG for the

un'^"'f''''cat'o;i of Cknvrrny, Austria or/i Xorca* In cthor coiurtriesj the ConzLuniot

conti^ol only a minority of tlie 7pox}ulationj ^/hore^G in Vict-Kaia they control

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the majority. In cd'ditionj thoy have rcGidm^-l i>opular i^upiport in aroas cutGlda-'

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Dale: 2011

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t5;wdr coivtrol and tliey iz.^.y i^ccX that I'^^ir at:^'oci:.ovX to oloctioi^ij held under co::ait.ioi:3 vhich nJc'^t le tciirod "free" vcula ijicvltaToly rcuound to their ,r-lvinta:;o'. Fur the more ^ natioiin-list D^i^ciL la VioAi-r-'^r, ic- go clozcl^j iCcrj^AUct i.'lt:i Ho Chl Minh and the Viot-Ilin!! novcL^snt 'chat, oven in aree.c outsiee of '.' '-■ Cco:nuiiist control^ candidate3 c:-jd iG:>uc3 connected vith *'nationallcn p.nA ■

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£\;ppDrtc'd hy the Vict-Minji voiild probably to supported by the majority of t:;o people. ThiJGj the Co::rA:niDtG mii^t be so conTident of ^GUccei33 that they vould be vlU.inc; to perudt ""free" elections under international GupcrvSsica ;

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wlccdt cor.tinuins to -utilize ell the standard C0L-:ri:uni5t proccsGCs and tac;tics

* iii £Ln atten:pt to ascura the outcc:::^ thoy vould deaire. Should tlvey do bo^

there is no reasoa to doubt at this tir^e that they vrould via easily iu ^he" 1555 elections / - ' ' / ' , "•

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Zn ccnr.ection vith the above, the icsue of uxiiflegation vould be a popular one in Viet-raa^ despite the x^J^^'obable conse«iuence3 of Coi^nnmlGt domination. It vould be da:i;£;erous to aGsun^e that South Viet^K-aia vould reject i:::irication vith the ICorth. The Gouth Vietnau:e30 Governnient vill not be cperatinj in a propas^mda vacuur^i in the Gouth; Viot-Klnh propaganda is , . : .

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still r,cro intent?.ve and succecGful than that of the Dieo Governiiicnt, i'-urthei^j there is 1:0 guarantee that the people of the Sent a Trill reject unification, particularly if the rcforendu:n is relatively fi^eo and super^/ised by an :lr:te:;nationel cc;3ii3Gicn. On the other hand, there Is no doubt that the '■:cc ;le or the north vould apox^ove unification undex' any cxreur.Dtaj:ces vhich

vill provide th:cu yith the opportvjiity to tt;I'tc over the territory of the

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:^^*_^..rj :t^J^^^ ba^is of QxE a sincle nation^ a single state^ a single ^^yj and a'sin£;le ""\j acnrinii^tration ljr'QTI5* Such decree by Pao Dai must be in process before Dion "^vv'^

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If^avcs .ond Jiov: priiiie Xiiii.'^'^.c.r instollodj to prevent clear Binh Xi^^yc^n QTS victory UMf^T«'J ovor pien: vMch iro-ald t^i:^3 to ploj^u^'j fiucoe^scr* ' . .

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\^) Genex-al Collins and Ely should info:™ Dlcr;^ that as a. result of his

inability to create a broadly based coalition noYorroieiitj and because ox ■ " .. ' ■ ^ ^ ■ ' . ^. ' -

atteiTiot to prevent his rei-ioval from bfficQ* Piciii^s patr5-otic qualitioG arx; p:-

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groat potcr.tial valine to Viet^ari and it ±0 hr;p.:jd lie >nJJ,l'^nd bis soTvic*^^ to

any ns;v £;ove:rr;.n:ent Khich ndeUt be appointed. ' , ' . - /

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6) CoIiJLinG ar.d Kly toc'^ther^ speaking* for their govei^ir.ientg rr^ay be able

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to aVi::''t ^-':"-';* for:nula/rre^n Viet;:^r.'=ir:*^ political leaders behind the scene?^.

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jia na-iC for }}ao Dai to doGignato to foarm a nevr covernir.erit under .the nn prope;

terms and conditions*

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prcciciont rmd vice prer>ic;entj respectivolyj composed o^^ si'^^nll nuclcuG or r.o:itj

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ablo nauioj'iali.'jt leac^Grs* it vrould be hipMy do.'^irablc IC the cabinet i^^fjelf

covJci incltd':^ con^o frot^i ])iepi'/j cab5.not and ?:oir.o 'ncv; faces- lit vrould op:5rate as -

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an interfjjTi corilition goveriiracnt until a fully elected National AasoTnbly io constitutod* The ir^modiate t-:iGks or the n-?>? cabinot iTould' ba (a) x'osolution o? fject problem^ (b) corr.plotion of reroriii of the ari"ied rorco3 and^polico> (c) natis-'

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and (f) con.^ultaticn v;ith the Viet MinJi on Geneva elections in 19?6 and -> .

preparations for elections and a. constituent asnevtibly in 7rco Viet-lJam at ccm'^ i\^-CA

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and fv^ov.n rr;prcr:'entativ^2rj;. includinfj the .sacts* Bien should ce pGrsixaoT^d if

vrou?.d V-e to renera'iO coir it of unity ai}d ccoperatiGu ij:'.tT/d the. peo;:le a:'-:l rrcu^:; throupheut Free Vlctn^'ji. /^^ tha request of the presifienv or. the cabinetj it " ..

v;ould advise the president and cabin-?t on n:aJor natters-of fstat-c* It should have no executrive or a-ininistrativo fmictions. It should continu3 until the

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con^titutior, of a. poi^\anf:'.nt r;triicturo of oov,3rnfrent by a constituent aG:3:?.^bI'tr^ - .

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and appointed* candidates .:ilread/ erivisaied and sch^diiled to b3 set up ' •

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FROM:

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PSA " Kenneth T. Yoiaigj Jr

EATE; April 30, 1955

SUBJECT: Report on Collins Visit and Viet-Uam Situation

Collins arrived Tliursdayj April £1^ and left ea:t'ly Friday moiTiingj April 29. He had limch i-zith the President-April 22^ sav the Secretary for the first time at a long luncheon meeting April 25. \-Je also met mth the -Secretary Tuesday, Wednesday and Thursday. V/e spent all day Fridayj April 22, meeting lath Collins 'trith Defense and CIA represented. He reiterated even more vigorously and firiTily his vieVj strongly backed by Sturm, that Diem must be replaced and that a plan of action should go into effect immediately. They both favored Quat, 1^1 one of the questions 01? alternate considerations expi-essed by any of us at that or any subseqiient ineetir^s changed Collins' vie-tr. MondE^ norning, April 25/ \tq had a uoriiing jneeting mtli him at vhich I proposed basic question, do we or do ve not support so:rte political change in Saigbn, said (b) a specific plan of change • The reports at that time frojn Saigon shoved Biein iras steadily slipping. In the fe-ce of the adaiuant viev of Collins and Sturm most of us reluctantly accepted the need for" a change^ but we ttU insisted that ve stsy mth Diem at least for the first innings, Collins and particularly Sturm, rejected our proposition in arQf shape or foi^n. The basic shift in our approach vas tal:en at' a long luncheon meeting mth the Secretaiy, Unfortunately neither Bob Hoey nor I were invited to attend. Bill Sebald can fill you in .on this. The Secretary took the position iie vould support Diem until and unless genuinely Vietnamese elements turned up with another acceptable solution. Collins and. Stunu later told the vorking group this vas an ijiipossible condition.

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2, 'The rest of Monday, Tuesday and 17ednesday ve spent \70rking up tvo long and complicated telegrajas to Paris and Saigon; At a full meeting \ri.th the Secretary, Mr, Hoover and Allen Dulles late Tuesday afternoon they vere ' api>roved. Collins fully endorsed these telegrams after he and Sturm had elin^lnated our proposal to try again to keep Die-m as head of a coalition "' -government, Tliese telegrajns envisaged a gradual and rather caiiplicated shift of our position in carefully vorked out stages. As \re suspected at the time- they vere imaiiediately overtaiien by events, TTone of us really

believed in them but ve -^jere faced \ath Collins' strong recommendations and the fact that he liad been to the V/hite House the first dpy after Ms arrival- In aTiy event, this shift has never been carried out. Although the telegrams vere sent to Paris and Saigon, \/e have put out a. stop order holdincr up action on theiu indefinitely, " ,

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3, Wednesday, Apxul 27, Diem changed the police^ chiefs and Tliursday the Binh Xuyen began military action against the government. Ely and the French have been putting the full bla^me for this situation on Diem, ks they tried to do for the Ma^'cli 29-30 incident. Events have moved very

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rapidly' since then, Tlie national a'riiiy has seenied to be mnning^ groups are rallying to Diem^ Bao Dai is getting set to fire Diemj and the French have in effect mthdra"\'7n their support frcin Diem. AID. reports from Saigon indicate there is a revolutionaxy feeling developing against Bao Eai and the Ij^ench, Scene of this is instigated by the Diem group but some ^of it ; may be spontaneous. As of this i^nriting ve may be faced vrith a choice between Diem and Bao Dai. In vievr of the fighting^ \ie liave felt in State it was best to continue support for the goYermaent under Diean and see irhat happens. But as tliis crisis develops ire are being forced to take a more and more unequivocal and strong stand for Diem, "

4- Senator Mansfield issued a long statement in sujjport of Diem on : April 29, If Diem is forced out^ Mansfield would have us stop all aid , to Viet-Ham except of a humanataxiaji nature. Senators Kno^/land and Humplxrey have also backed Diem. A la,rge number of members of the House Porelgn Affairs Committee after hearing Collins have infoi^ned the Department through Congressvoman ICelly that they would not- favor the State Departijaent withdra^ring support from Diem, Collins met \vith tlae Far Rast Subcar-mittoe of the Senate Foreign Relations CcatMittee^ separately \n.±h. Senator Mansfield and TTlth about a dozen of the House Conmittee. \Jliile he and Stuim felt these legislators "vrouJLd give no trouble^ Stuim infomiing us after seeing Senator Mansfield tliat there was nothing to it^ Bob Hoey and the rest of us here were much less sanguine about legislative feeling. In fact there is going to be real difficulties on the Hi,ll if Diem is forced out by what appears . to be Fx^ench-Bao Dai action*

5- During the past ten days the French have been giiiet lath us^ but-irorking behind the scene, Kidder reports Ely as almost liysterical, * Bao Dai has been active, as he has submitted one plan to us and has also

't- ■ taken another action pubUcly. Both of these are almost identical iTltH

plans or ideas \rhich French officials had submitted to us several -^Teeks ago. If there 'were aaiy notion that Bao Dai acts independently of the French and Ely J that shoT-ild now be dispelled. Hovever, Fi'ime Minister Faure has indicated to Dillon that he does have no stanaeh for going off independently

Cof the US in Free Viet-Nam. They \rlll follow our ].Gad even though they don't like the idea, providing the situation is not so, bad in Ssiigon that they have to move out French military and civilian personnel. We liave asked for pretty fundamental reassurances on basic French intentions In Viet-l^aL^j \je got them orally for whatever they may be irorth.

6, We are in a bemldering, fluid situation, I believe more strongly than ever that we should stick ^riLth Diem now, Collins says he is a terrib].e administrator a:ad it mil vrreck Free Viet-I^Iani if we leave him in. That majr be true but that is not the issue at present. If Diem can lead the nationalist forces to a conclusive settlementj even to the point .of rendering Ba.o Dai ineffective or annulled, we should continue to support him. The key questions are:, „ *

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a) Ifill the Vietnaniese Kational Amy as a group sticX mth Diem?

b) Will the Binh Xuyen be broken up into isolated remnants?

c) I'iill enough nationalist groups including sect leaders rally to the goveriicnent even against Eao Dai?

d) Will Bao Dai fire Diem^ even if the answers to the above three questions are clearly enough in the affiniiative.

■■

4

T-That I ajn airraid of is that the combination of continuing forces coalesced around Diem on the one hand and Eao Dai on the othSr may not enjoy preponderaxit strength,

7. Eliere are possibly serioiis anti-French overtones in the Tietnamese political situation. Ihese a3-So Include aiiti-Bao Dai feelings. Vfe must not tal-^e any action vrhich vroiild tar us trith the saiiie accusations. General. O'Danielj om: tlxree Attaches^ and Lansdale infornied us on April 30th that "any change in leadership or command at this tiifie could result in chaos",

8< There are sone personal aspects that I would like to ta]^e up -vdth you privately*

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FOLLOWING IS SECOND MESSAGE DRAFTED IN NICE APRIL 29 AFTER SECOMD INTERVIEW IMTH NGUYEN DE AND BAO DAIj RESUME OF WHICH TELEPHONED TO YOUi^G EVENING APRIL 29o ' . . " .■ ,

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1. AFTEH RXCKIPT ])EPTEL 27' TO NICJi: At^JD-lJOnD RECEIVED BY TKLKPHON^ FROM PARIS THAT AMB DILLON HAD CALLED ON FAUHE PURSUANT TO DIPTEL jS^ 9 (R ESULTS RJCPO RT ED' Li-^ BTEL h Ih 0 j S AIG ON r>S 7 ) j GIB SON C ALLKD

p'^! Fir .T ^:i'^UYEN DE and then IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING ON BAO DAI.. ■ ' ■■

2. V'E AN FORMED--DE THAT AMBASSADOR HAD SEE-N FAURE AMD'Rp/J El; ED UITH KIM IMPORTANT ASPECTS FRANCE-U.S. POLICY V.IETNAM, VJE REFERRED TO NECESSITY THAT EAO DAI.' /\S V/ELL AS FRENCH, GIVE FULL SUPPORT TO LEGALLY CONSTITUTED GOVT, VIETNAM. ' ' . ■: ■■.■:.'■

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3. ^'E THEN HAD GENEP-AL REVIEU WITH DE IN COURSE OF .yHICH Iv'E HADE POINTS TO HIM GIVEN TO US OVER TELEPHONE FROM WASHINCTONo"; VE EMPHASIZED THAT ANY FURTHER STEPS TOvJA'RD -SOLUTION VIETNAM ■

cmsis ;;usT be hade on initiative vietma:^:ese nationalists

THEMSELVES^ VE EMPHASISED U.S. VIEW THAT PRESENT "GOVT. AS LEGALLY CONSTITUTED GOVT. l-^'ST BE SUPPORTED AS LONG AS IT REMAINS SUCi{ AND THAT URGENT PROBLEM IS TO DEAL WITH PRESENT CIVIL _ '-IJAR AND NOT QUESTION OF FORM.OF ANY NEU GOVT. . • ■ '- ■

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ii, DE AGREED FULLY VITH OUR REMARKS POINTING OUT THAT BAO^-DAI-S DECISIONS OF PREVIOUS DAY UERE IN KEEPING LLITH TiiZSE PJilNCIPLES, KE HAD MADE CLEAR TO DIEM' IN SUMMONING HIM TO CANNES BEFORE OTHER VIETNAMESE AND IN SENDING PERSONAL PLANE

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-2- 4 7^J.6y APRIL :50j S PrJj FROi-: PARIS C SECT ION i OF 2> ' -■

TQ FETCH KIl''i THAT'hIS. STATUS AS PRIME MINISTER REMAINED UNaLTERI;:!}. B/iO DAI REGARDED PRESEi^iT . CRISIS AS YiZmQ IH TWO PHASESS. • '■

FIPSTj' TO BRING ABOUT END OF PTcKSirNT. CIVIL WAR AND SECOi-IDj TO" "DEAL J'JITH QUESTION OF GOVERNMENTAL REFORM. FIRST UOULD }!AVE T^ BE SmLK]) NOW, SECOND COULD BE DEALT WITR LATER.

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5. TRENCETORTKj AND IN CONVERSATION IMMEDI/TTELY FOLLOViING U'^Til BAO DAI INTERVIEW CONCERNED WITH BAO .DAI *S" OBSERVATIONS • Oj* HOW TO PUT END CIVIL WAR RATHER THAN ANY QUESTIONS ALTERNATE GOVT« OR OTHER ASPECTS BAO DAI "PLAN",- - /

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6;. BAO DAI STATED IN STRONG TERMS -HE WISHED U.Sc TO'TAKE . IMI^EDIATE STEPS PERSUADE DIEM TO COME TO FRANCE TO RECEIVE" VIETNAMESE LEADERS WITH HIM AND DI-SCUSS MEANS ENDING PRESENT C RISIS 0 ^H E S TAT ED THAT C 0 R R E C T J. Y' OR IN CORP. ECTL Y T) I EM HA S ' CLAIMED.THAT HE HAS HAD U.S. SUPPORT IN STFPS HE HAS TAKEN DURING LAST FEW WEEKS" WHICH HAVE LED TO PRESENT BLOODSHED. HE VIOLATED TRUCE AND AT LEAST HIS BROTHERS IF NOT HE HIMSELF CLAIMED-'THAT HE DID SO WITH AT LEAST PASSIVE U,S« SUPPORT = IT WAS ALREADY BEING SAID^ BAO DAI CLAIMED;, T}:aT IKS, HAD • ■' "BY ITS REFUSAL TO COUNTENANCE ANY ACTION BUT BLIND" SUPPORT . FOR DIEi'^' ALL0WED PRESENT -ABCE£S TO FESTER U'NTIL IT HAD BURST IN FORM PRESENT CIVIL WAR AND THAT U.So HAD.PURPOSELY DONE THIS IN HOPE.DIEM WOULD TAKE ARMED ACTION. THIS ACTION HAD' '■ RESULTED IN DEATHS OF HUNDREDS OF INNOCENT PEOPLE AND WASTE OF NATIONAL FORCE NEEDED TO FIGHT COMMUNISM. UoS, IN ACTION .. COULD NO LONGER BE ADMITTED". .. ' •■ ■ ' ''■

7o ALL OF Tins WE DENIEDj POINTING OUT AGAIN THAT GENERAL COLLINS . . AND EMBASSY SAIGON HAS CONSISTENTLY URGED RESTRAINT ON GOVT,

"BAO D AI CON I' 11.' U ED J ST AT IN G T HA T U.S. RE S? Oi\' SIBILIT Y IN P 'R E S ENT .' ■ .

SITUATION WAS HEAVY, HE HAD PUT OFF TAKING ACTION HE HAD

WISHED TO TAKE WHICH MIGHT .HAVE SERVED TO AVOID PRESENT l^ BLOODSHED AT U,So REGUESTo ON TWO SUCCESSIVE DAYS U.S. HAD

^ ASKED HIM TO REFRAIN FROM TAKING DECISIVE ACTION ON EXCUSE r WASHINGTON WAS STUDYING Pl^OBLEM WIl'H GENERAL COLLINS T][ERE' L ; AND WOULD HAVE SOMETHING TO SAY SHORTLY, ON APRIL 26 AND 27 •

BAO DAI HAD AGREED 'TO OUR KECWESTS AMD HAD NOT TAK^^: ^CT10>:

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9, IN EAO DAI'S OPIKIOU DIEM HAS NOU BECOME A PSYCHOPATH irKO

v/iSliES TO MARTYRISE Xli^SELF EVIM AT PRICE OP THOUSA^vDS 07 LIVES.

AND NATIONAL TREASURY. HE ENJOYS THOUG}iT THAT }[IS LIFE IS-

IN DAMGEH AND WOULD VjELCOIJE 11ARTYRD0M ;JHICH IS INDEED UKAT ■ K?: •

yILL GET. SAID EAO DAI; FOR FEELIJ^'G -is SO I^■TE^!SE AGAIKST

HIM THAT'sOi'jEONE IS BOUND TO ASSASSINATE HIH IK NEAR FUTURE ' •

IF HE PERSISTS IN TRYING TO ESTABLISH jriS RULE BY FORCE •' '

"HITH THE SUPPORT OF NO ONE BUT- HIS OWN FAMILY. AND THE U.S,",- ■

3A0 DAI SAID, " ■ : •" ' -. :■■

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• g- BAD DAI ALLEGED THAT RESISTANCE TO DIEiL IS SO UNIVER-r ' SAL IN VIETNAM THAT SUPPORT OF 5IEM VJAS SERVING DISCREDIT '-• - ' U.So IN EYES OF VIETNAMESE PEOPLE. DIEM WILL UNDOUBTEDLY

* S U C C EEE IN D RIVIN G S EC T S 0 U T ■ 0 F S A ICON OR "A T LEAST iU S U PFH E,

SING NXLITARY FORCES. THERE BUT TIIEY v^ILL SXHPLY GO JO PROVINCES .,

V;HERE diem has NO CONTROL

, ~5~ A7A6j APRIL 30 J 8 PNj FROM PARIS (SECTION 1 OF 2)

L ' \'yd\c\\ HIS JUDGNENT INDICATED .WAS NECESSARY. ON APRIL 2S HE . .' .".

• . - WAS FORCED TAKE MATTERS INTO HIS" O^^N HANDS DESPITE THIRD . ■■ . ■ : r . ■ SUCCESSIVE REO.UEST DELIVERED. IN CANi>;ES ON APRIL 2S AFTER ,. - *'

L . SHOOTING }{AD ALREADY STARTEDc IN HIS OPINION IF HE HAD ACTED : .■ i

■ . '■ LAST WEEK HUNDREDS OF LIVES WOULD }[AVE DEEN SAVED* IF U«So . ' f WAS, REALLY NEUTRAL IN MATTER IT MUST TA:<E STEPS TO AVOID ' •'. ^ ^ GIVING OPPOSITE InPRESSION }IE ADDED. MDREOl^ERj IF U.S.. Dip NOT .'■ ^ • . WISH TO STAND BY AND WATCH STATE OF CIVIL-WAR ESTABLISHED IN •' [ ■ VIETNAM J WHICH WOULD LAST UNTIL VIETMINH WON CuFiPLETE CONTROL j

.WE MUST HELP IN BRINGING AN END TO THAT CIVIL WARo WAY TO DO ' "

V 'this is TO INFLUENCE DIEM TO LAY DOWN ARMS AND COME TO FRANCE ' L. TO CONSULT WITH OTHER VIETNAMESE -ANTI-COMMUNIST NATIONALISTS. ■ :

•. \, " I'iOMENT HE DOES J OPPOSITE SIDE WILL LAY DOWN THEIR ARMS 5 HE '.

'■ . CLAIMED, . •••■.•:■.■■-./ . ■ . ■ .

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XQ> BAO DAI SPOKE OF DIEM'S ROLE AS A CATHOLICj. STATING THAT "' ' LATTER REGARDED :HIS TASK AS LEADING A HOLY WAR., INSiJ-.AD OF . . D 01N G T 'HAT, H E H AD. T U RNED VIETN AI-5ESE A G AIN ST CAT HDL I Ci SM. '. F,AO DAI SAID HIS WIFE'S OWN FAMILY HAD BEEN CATHOLIC FOR GENERA- ' TICNS AND MOW REPORTED IT WAS UNSAFE TO GO OUTSIDE SAIG.ON - •

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TOP SECRET ' '^^ ■ ■ '■. ;

Declassified per Executive Order J3526, Section 3,3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date; 2011

rop SECRET SENSlTiVt

-k" ll7^6, APBIL 30, 8 m, FROM PARIS (SECTIOI^ 1 of £■)

IF YOU ™re Yimm to be a catholic because of the Ei'Saa^Y

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DILLOH

PAF/32

NOTE: MR. HOEY (ISA) INFORMED 8:30 M, 14./30/55- CVJO/f^lD"

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iU UE REFERRED TO DI EM'S REFUSAL TO OBEY BAO DAI'S SUin^o:]S. BAG DAI STATED T?[AT IT DID NOT SURPRISE HIMo 'HE HAD EXPECTED IT ANDp IN A SENSE5 UELCOUE IT AS'IT MIGHT SERVE TO CLEAR THE AIR AND PROVE TO PEOPLE THAT DIEM IS NOT ACTING AS SERVANT OF STATE AS HE CLAIi^ED BUT RATHER AS A SELF-SEEKIKG WAR LORD WHO . WISHED TO ERADICATE ALL OPPQSJTJON AND HOLD TOTAL POWER vJITHIK ,HIS OWN HANDS AND THAT OF HIS FAKiiLY. ■ BAO DAI UOULD STAKE HI.S INFLUENCE UITH PEOPLE AND VIETNAMESE NATIONALISTS AGAINST DIEM^S

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X2. 1:E ASKED UHAT BAO DAI INTENDED TO DO IF DIEM CONTINUES TO

Disou::^' HIS orders* , bag dai stated he would tahi: legal stzps ■

TO HAVE Hi:v declared A REBEL AND IvOULD TilEN PROCEED TO UNIJE T}iE COUNTRY AGAINST HIi4 UNTIL HE WAS REMOVED FROM POSITION ?IE l/AS USURPING, UE ASKED *BAQ DAI I? HZ INTENDED TO DO THIs'": IN PERSON :\ND IF SOj IvOULD IT MEAN A PROMPT RETURN TO SAISON;. •■ HE AN5v;ERED-THAT IT .MEANT' THAT }IZ MIGHT RETURN'TO" SAIGON IN THH

£ . N£AR FUTURE TO LEAD THE FIGHT BUT THAT WOULD BE DEPENDENT ON -

! ■ ' TH£- ALLEGIAN'CE OF .THE NATIONAL ARMY, MOREOVER HE WOULD TAiO: '

NO SUCH SIF.P WITHOUT CONSULTING VIETNAMESE LEADERSj VHOM 'ilZ

■ • mu SUMMONED TO FRANCE NEXT KEEK IN ADVANCE, ' :■ '

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Xc>. WE ASKeD WHAT EFFECT DIEM'S REFUSAL TO^'OBEY HIS ORDERS WOULD HAVE ON ARRIVAL IN FRANCE OF OTHER VIETNAMESE PERSONALITIES, . " ■ BAO DAI SAID HE HOPED THAT THEY WOULD ALL COME AS IT WAS MOW HORE ESSENTIAL THAN EVER THAT THEY BE CONSULTED IN ORDER THAT COUNTRY ■ COULD NOW ACHIEVE THE UNITY DIEM HAD FAILED TO ACHIEVE. 'WE ASKED FOR A LIST OF THOSE INVITED AND IT WAS SUPPLIED (BEING CABLED SEPARATELY), IT IS NOTED THAT CONTRARY TO B^O DAI'S FIRST STATEMENT APRIL 2S SECTS HAVE NOW BEEN INVITED AND ALL FORMER ■ PRIME MINISTERS EXCEPT TAM ArRE INCLUDED, OUAT AND DO AS WELL. 31 SHOP LE'HUU TUU HAS BEEN liCviTED BUT IT IS NOT CERTAIN HE CAN COME, ■ IKE LIST INCLUDES DUDDHISTSj CATHOLICS/AR?^Y RFFS,

fiECOHD COPY o Thio copy must be returnsd to

urnsd to CC/n* central iiles vnxh noi..rL:c:/'^tv4^.'^;,WV--Fnr.v;

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TO? SECRET OC!rUniVL

_2- lvjh6y APRIL 30, 8 BA, FROM PARIS (SECTION 2 OF 2)

TRADE UI'aOIttSTS, FEASAWTS, ETC, BAO DAI SAID IT WAS KTS IIWEHTION TO JSiAKE REPEESEaTATION BROAD AS POSSIBLE,

ikL BAO DAI STATED THAT HE IIAD DECIDED ON HINH AS S FECI AX EIGSSARY to' SECTS. WE PORTED OUT THAT THIS DECISION WOULD CG^ AS GREAT SHOCK TO AlffiRICAW PUBLIC OPINION WO LOOKED UPON HtNH .AS REBEL AGAINST GOVERMIffiKT. HE HAD HAD TO BE REMOVED FROM SAIGON FO^. THAT REASON. IT WOULD BE IIWERPRETE'd AS A SIGN THAT BAO DAI W. J SENDING HINH AS l^IEANS UPSETTLING NATIONAL ARMY'S LOYALTY TO GOVERNMENT. BAO DAI SAID THESE >JERE IHTERPRETiCTIONS HE COULD NOT HELP AND THAT CIRCUt^STANCES NO LONGER PERI^JTTED KH^ TO BE II^LUEKCED BY THEM. FACT WAS, HE SAID, THAT IHNH ENJOYED MOST SI PPORT IN VIETNAfi MILITARY CIRCLES OF ANY VIETNAMESE GENERAL. Ht; HAD BEEN RET-IOVED FROM VIETNAM BY BAO DAI AT OUR REQUEST IN ORDER GIVE DIEM FREE HAND IN ESTABLISIilNG HIS AUTHORITY OVER THE ARMY AND IN REESTABLXSHIHG LAW AND ORDER AI^ A GOVERNMENT OF NATL UNION. BAO DAI REMOVAi OF KM VJAS BEST EXAJ-IFLE OF EXTENT OF EFFORT TO GIVE DIEM EVERY CHANCE. DIEM HAD CONSISTENTLY FAILED,-NOW IT WAS BAO DAI'S PURPOSE TO Em PRESENT BLOODSHED BY P£i»IOVING DIEM FROM SCENE AND THUS PREVENTING NATIONAL Ara.IY ¥RCM TAKING FURTHER ARMED ACTION. AT SAlffi Tllffi, HE MUS-T MAKE CERTAIN THAT SECTS WOULD DESIST FROM SIMILAR ARMED ACTION. HE HAD ALREADY TAKE STEPS TO ACCOMPLISH FOK^ER BY DECREE. ONLY WAY HE COULD ASSURE LATTER WAS BY FORCE HIS OWN AUTHORITY BACKED UP BY HiAT OF MAN WHO HAD GREATEST INFLUENCE. MAN WAS HTNH. HINH WILL CARRY BAO DAI'S ORDERS FOR INTEGRATION OF SECT FORCES INTO NATIONAL AH4Y ' AND BAO DAI GUARANTEES SECTS WILL OBEY iOM AND MESSAGE HINH CARRIES IF DIEM IS REl^IOVED FROM SCENE.

15. AT THES STAGE OF INTERVIEW, BAO DAI BECAJ^ SO EXCIETED THAT AT TIMES HE COULD BARELY TALK. HE SAJD THAT NO MAN HAD EVER ENJOYED THE POIffiES WHICH DIEM HAD HAD FROM VERY BEGIfCTING, MO DAI liAD TRANSFERRED AI.L HIS POVffiRS TO HIM. HE WAS FULLY ■ BACKED BY BOTH FRANCE AND U.S. HE WAS GIVEN LARGE SUMS OF MONEY AND HIS MLITARY FORCES >ffiRE CLOTHED, FED AND EQUIPPED BY FOREIGNERS. HE WAS CONSTANTLY HELPED BY FOREIGNERS TO DO THINGS HE WAS INCAPABLE OF DOING HIIvKELF. GENEPAL COLLINGS AND ELY AND BAO DAI HAD ALL BEEN IN HIS SERVICE, EVEN CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE VIETNAM ARMY WAS REMOVED FROM SCENE BECAUSE DIEM

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DIDN'T LIKE KIM„ NOW THIHGS IIAD GOIJE TOO FAE AND CONSIDERATION HAD TO BE T^XEN OF WHAT WAS BEST FOR VIETKMIESE PEOPLE AND NOT WHAT WAS BEST FOR DIEM AND HIS FAMILY, VIETNAM VJAS SUPPOSEDLY AN INDEEEtlDEiW COUIWEY: SHE MUST TliEREFORE MAKE HER OWN DECISIONS. BAO DAI WAS CHIEF OF STATE, AND INTENDED TO CAEEY OUT HIS RESPONSI BILITIES AS SUCH.

16. WE ASKED WHAT BROTHER LUYEN WAS STILL DOING IN CANNES AND ilHETHER HE WAS SERVING A3 INTERMEDIARY BETVJEEN BAO DAI AND DIEM. AT THIS POINT BAO DAJ REALLY EXPLODED AND STATED THAT BROTHER LUYEN HAD COl^IE TO CANNES NOT FOE ANY PATRIOTIC PURPOSE AS "DIEM UNDOUBTEDLY HAD TOLD AMERICAMS IN SAIGON," BUT EATHER ON SECRET fflSSION FROM DIEM TO ATTEMPT TO BUY BAO DAIo SOME DAYS AGO BEFORE ANY ACTION HAD BEEN TAKEN TO SUMMON DIEM TO FEANCE OR OTHERWISE BAO DAI SAID LUYEN ARRIVED UNINVITED IN CANNES, BAO DAI KEPT HIM WAITING AND WHEN HE FII1ALLY RECEIVED lilM, LUYEN OFFERED BAO DAI THE SUM OF THREE liUNDRED MILLION FRANCS IF HE WOULD AGREE NOT TO TAKE ANY ACTION WHICH WOULD AFFECT STATUS OF DIEM OR PREVENT HIM FROM ESTABLISHING ICS AUTHORITY BY FORCE. BAO DAI COMMENTED WITH INDIGNATION THAT, OF COURSE HE HAD REFUSED AND "TIfflOTN LUYEN OUT OF THE HOUSE" BUT HE WAS STILL "GROVELLING" AROUND. HE STATED TliAT LUYEN HAD MADE VARIOUS ALLEGATIONS OF HIS CLOSE RELATIONS WITH "AMERICANS" IN SAIGON.

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17, AT END OF INTERVIEW BAO DKL ASKED IF TO COULD GIVE HTM ANY FURTHER WORD ON WASHINGTON'S REACTION TO PLAN SUBMITTED WEEK AGO, Vffi EXPLAINED ONCE MORE TliAT GElffiKAL COLLINS WAS. LEAVING WASHINGTON THAT DAY FOR SAIGON WHICH WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE

OP V7ASHINGT0N'S RECOGNITION OF EMERGENCY NATURE OF SITUATION THERE IT WAS OBVIOUS THAT NO DECISIONS WOULD NOW BE REACHED UNTIL GENERAL COLLINS HAD ARRIVED IN SAIGON AND COULD COrlFEE THERE WITH EMBASSY AMD ELY. IN ^ffiANWHILE WE INFORMED BAO DAI TliAT HIS OBSERVATIONS WOULD EE Pi^SED TO DEFT IN THEIR ENTIRETY.

18. BAO DAI SAID HE WOULD SEND DE BACK TO PARIS MONDAY IN ORDER TO REMAIN IN TOUCH WITH US AICD TO RECEIVE ANY OBSERVATIONS WASHINGTON CARED TO MAKE TO HTM. AT SAJvIE TIME HE WOULD INSTRUCT

DE TO KEEP US AU COURAHTE,

DILLON

PAF/32 ^ ,

NOTE: MR, HOEY (P3A) INFOEI^ED 6:30 IM V30/55 *-- O'fO/FED

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To assess the iJiipHcatioas of recent develoimients hi Saigon and to estimate the probable actions of interested parties in the current crisis.

THE ESTIMATE

[AMPLICATIONS OF CU.^RENT DcVELO?/Ac;s!TS IN SAIGON

1. The success of Premier Diem m operations against the Binh Xuyen, and in his stand against Eao Dai, the French, and General Vy, has created a new and potentially revohition-?ay situation in Vietnam- While the situation in Vietnam is extremely fluid, Diem appears to hold the initiative in the phase that is about to begin. In this phase, the interested parties — particularly the French and Eao Dai — v/ill have to adapt themselves to a radicaUy new political situation dominated by Diem or by more extreme nationalist elements. If they do not adapt and if there are any substantial eiYorts by Bao Dai or the

► French to frustrate Diem's governmentj the chances of anti-French violence and the de-posal of Bao Dai would be greatly increased.

2. Dicm's relations, with the Revolutionaiy Council which has been actively ijijecting it-

. self into this situation have not yet been clari-lied. This council, designated by a self-appointed assembly, takes a more extreme position than Diem, particularly in regard to the v/ithdrawal of French forces and the immediate deposal of Bao Dai. It is dominr^ted by Cao Dai generals Trinh Mhih Tlie and Nguyen Thanh Pjiuong and by Hoa Hao General Ngo and includes a number of extreme nationalist politicians, • General Ely nov7 charges that the Council is Communist infiltrated but so far has not produced evidence to substantiate this charge. V/e have no significant evidence to indicate that any of the

inernbers of the Council arc Communist, In a proclamation the Council announced a broad program couched in social revolutionary terms but including a denunciation of "red colonialism" in IS'orth Vietnam. Its ?x-tlvitics have been denounced by the Commu-nist radio in Hanoi as have those of Premier Diem,

PROBABLE COURSES Or ACTION OF INTERESTED PARTIES

3. Preinier Diem, The virtual expulsion of the Binh Xuyen from Saigon-Cholon has increased Diem*s prestige throughout Vietnam. The confidence of Diem, and his supporters in their ov/n strength, judgment, and popular appeal has h^en considerably enhanced. In this situation, Diem will almost certainly continue to resist any efforts to remove him frora-office,

4. Plis actions and those of his followers have taken on an-increasingly nationalistic, anti-French tone over the past fev; days and Diern may now be convinced that a continuation of this anti-French policy is essential to the rallying of popular support Nevertheless he has exercised a moderating ii^fluence on the anti-French and a,nti-Bao Dai position of the Revolutionary Council. However, if he believed the Fi^cnch v/ere continuing their efiorts to depose him, he would almost certainly permit intensified anti-FrcriCh manifestations. Such a course would carry "-rave dangers of anti-French violence, particularlv in Saigon.

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5. So far, Diem and his j^rincipal Vietnamese National Army (VNA) leaders have appeared desirous of maintaining good xx^lalions '■Auth the French. Diem's attitude toward Bao Dai has been less clear and there have been indications that he has been considering the suggestions of tlic Council that Bao Dai be deposed. He may be using ultranationalism to bring prcssm^e against Bao Dai and the French. If he is thwarted in his objectives by the French or by Bao Dai, he wjll become more susceptible to pressures toward extreme action.

6. Diem has rallied additional support during the current military phase, and from this position of strength, Diem v/ill almost certainly continue to gain adherents, including defections from among the Binh Xuyen and the sects.

7. The Vietnamese National Army, Aside from the Frencli Army, only the VNA presently has the capabi]ity to enforce Bao Dai's authority in Saigon or to back Diem in He-fiance of Bao Dai. There are some VNA officers who dislike Diem and who are concerned by the developing rift betv/een Diem and Bao Dai. On the other hand, there is considerable pro-Diem, nationalist sentiment in the army; Diem has gained additional support as a result of clearing the Binh Xuyen from Saigon; and most importantly, the VNA units in the Saigon area appear to be loyal to Diem,

8. If Diem should move precipitously to depose Bao Dai, or if Bao Dai attempted to oust Diem, some elements of the army might remain loyal to Bao Dai and attempt to overthrow Diem. Vv^e believe such efLorts would be unsuccessful, however, even if General Hinh had entered the country to rally support for Bao Dai.

9. Bao Dat As a result of Diem's stand against Bao Dai and because of the latter's involvement in v;hat many Vietnamess nationalists consider^ to be a French-inspired political maneuver, Bao -Dai's prestifje has been greatly reduced, w-hatever the outcome oi the present crisis. Bao Dai's authority can only be enforced at this jhncture by the force of French arms and any such action would

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Imost comx^Ietely discredit him in Vietnam,

10. There appears to be considerable senti-TPJtnt for the dcposal of Bao Dai, and if Diem

, gives his consent such action may be taken at any time. For the present, Bao Dai apparently feels that the tide is running w^ith Diein^ and is attempting to preserve the institution of the 3iionarchy by accepting the contintaa-tion of Sie Diem government, ■ \ '

11. The French Govermncnt. The French v/ill find it difficult to accept Diem's success which caznc despite theu* strong and v/ell-publicized opv;osltion. We believe tha,t fear, of large-scale violence and of adverse domestic and v;orld reactions will cause the French, to refrain from overi. action in Saigon to restrain the VNA or to remove Diem, unless the situation should threaten serious loss of French lives. Kov/cver, the extent to \vhicli the French permit the VNA freedom of action and the nature of their dealings v/ith the

. Binh Xuyen and Bao Dai can still have an influence on the outcome of the immediate situation. Furthermore, v/e believe that the French wiD continue pressures for Diem's removal; some French elements in Vietnam are likely to continue their covert assistance to Diem's enemies. If the French believe that Diem will succeed in corisolidating his position, they rnay decide that they have no choice except 'to repair theh' position with Diem as best they can v/hile making plans for accelei^ated withdrawal of their forces.^

12. The Binh Xuyen. Tiae military potential' of the Binli Xuyen will depend on the extent of support they receive, directly or indirectly, from the French and the Koa Kao. It appears that the morale of the Binh Xuyen troops is low, a number liave already defected, and that many of the troops may be susceptible to peace

'The Special Assistant, InteHigencei Department of St:ite, believes that the last sentence of th!3 paragraph understates the diHiciaUy the French would i^ave in accommodathi*^ to a strong, r^nti-French goveinnient in South Vietnam, and therefore believes the 5i?ntence shoii]d reed: "it these elTorts are i:nsiicccssJul zviO. I>ic:n appeared to be consolicip-ting his position, the Trench in the <^n^. may decide that they have no choice except to step up the v.ithciiav^'al of their forces from Vietnam/*

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offers from the governnient We believe that a considerable Bumber of the Binh Xuyen may attempt to resume their life of piracy and extortion, The.VNA should be able to reduce the Binh Xuyen to the level of a local nuisance.

13. ■■The Sects, We believe that for the immediate future the Cao Dai military forces under Generals The and Pliuong v/ill continue actively to support Diem against the Binh X- en and Bao Dai. The Koa Hao are unlikely to play an important role in the immediate situation, although the Ba Cut forces nw continue their terrorist operations,

14^ The Viet Mmh. The Viet Minli probably fear that Diem's continuation in office would limit the prospects of a peaceful unification of Vietnam under terms favorable to the Communists. They will probably continue covert efforts in South Vietnam to keep the situation agitated. The Communists almost certainly will not invade South Vietnam in the near future. ,

GENERAL OUTLOOK

15, In present circumstances, we do not believe that Diem could be persuaded voluntarily

to resign. If he were forced from ofnce, many of Diem*s follov;ers would probably undertalce revolutionary opposition, includuig maquis resistance, to the successor regime. Some VNA elements in Saigon and in centiial.Vietnam would probably join these elements in resisting the nev/ government.

16. Assuming that the US continues to support Diem, and that the French acquiesce, we believe the situation will stabilize in Saigon uiider Dlem's control. Diem's talents as an administrator are unlikely to improve. His success, achievt'd lai^gely on his ov;n initiative and v/ith his own resources, is likely to make him more independent^and less amenable to policy guidance. Diern's government will still be confronted with manifold internal problems— c.g,, integration of the sects, resettlement of refugees, land reform, extension of government authority in the provinces, and training of the army. Although Diem has iitiproved his position, w^e believe that it v/ill still be extremely dinicultj at best, for Diem or any Vietnamese government to build sufn-cient strength to meet the long-range challenge of the Communists,

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INCCMTNG TELEGRAM

DEPARTIffiNT OF STATE

ACTI01\F COPY

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FROM: PARIS

TO: Secretary of State

'control: i|06l Eec'd: MAY 8, 1955

5:37 m

NO: SECTO 8, MAY 8, 5 M (SECTION Olffi OF THEEE)

PRIOBITY

SENT DEPAHTMEIW SECTO 8, REPEATED INFOEMATION PRIORITY SAIGON 716.

FOLLOWING IS SUMMARY CONVERSATIONS ON INDOCHINA HELD WITH

BRITISH AND FRENCH THIS AFTERNOON. FRENCH DELEGATION Iffi.ADED BY PRIME MINISTER FAURE, BRITISH BY FONNIN MACMILLAN AND US BY SECRETARY„ DURING FIRST PART OF CONVERSATIONS BRITISH TORE ABSENT, JOINING LATER AS NOTED.

FAURE OPENED CONVERSATIONS BY REFERRING TO RATIFICATION PARIS AGREEi'ffiNTS AND DIFFICULTIES FFFINCH GOVT HAD SNCOUfJl'ERED IN PROCESS. HE OBSERVED TliAT PUBLIC OPIICCON ICFST NOl'J BE SATISFIED WITH EARLY FOUR-POWER TALKS. HE AGREED THAT Vffi WOULD NOW BE TALKING FROM STRENGTH AND THAT PROSPECTS FOR SUCCESS TORE THEREBY INCREASED. HE REFERRED TO CHINA AND TO. FACT THAT FRANCE WAS NOW IGNORING GOVT WHICH HAD IN HANDS FATE OF lUIfflREDS OF MILLION OF PEOPLE BECAUSE OF IffiR RECOGNITION OF FACT THAT US VIEtJS MUST BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT. HE REMARKED THERE ARE NOW TITO AREAS OF PARTICULAR INTEREST TO FRANCE. THEY ARE NORTH AFRICA AND VIETNAM. HE WOULD CALL UPON LAFOREST, MINISTER OF ASSOCIATED STATES, TO GIVE OUTLINE FRENCH POSITION ON LATTER.

SECRETARY REPLIED BY STATING THAT US RECOGNIZED COURAGEOUS STEP FRANCE HAD TAKEN IN RATIFYING PARIS AGRKEI-ENTS, BOTH HE AND PRESIDENT APPRECIATED MAGNITUDE OF POLITICAL TASK. THEY FELT STEP, HOI'ffiVER, WAS IN FRANCE'S OWN INTEREST AS WELL. SECRETARY EXPRESSED OPINION THAT IN RATIFYING FRANCE HAD REAFFIRMED HER POSITION AS "ONE OF GREAT NATIONS OF WORLD'*.

LAFOREST THEN OPENED INDOCHINA DISCUSSION, HE STATED THAT GENEVA ACCORDS HAD POSED SEVERAL qpESTIONS INCLUDING THAT OF

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-2- SECTO 8, MAY 8, 5 K-l (SECTION 1 OF 3) FBOM PARIS

HOW TO DEAL WITH FORTHCQMIIIG ELECTIONS. DIVISIOM OF COUIJTRY HAD GIVEN SOUTH VIETNAI'^ DISADVANTAGE IN COMPETING WITH NORTH BUT WHAT SOUTH LACKED IN AREA AITO POPULATION WAS COUIWER-BALANGED BY HER ECONOMIC SUPERIORITY. " FRAITCE BELIEVED THAT SOUTH COULD WIN OVER NORTH IN ELECTIONS IF SHE COULD PRESEIW MORE ATTRACTIVE REGIME TO PEOPLE. THIS COULD BE DONE ONLY WITH NATIONALIST, STABLE AND BROADLY BASED GOVT. Tll-ffi WAS OF ESSENCE FOR DISCUSSIONS PRIOR TO ELECTIONS WEHCH WOULD OPEN NEXT JULY AND ELECTIONS THELiSELVES IN JULY 1956. THERE ¥A^ NO AMBIGUITY IN FRENCH POLICY BETVffiEN NORTH AND SOUTH VIETNAM. PRESENCE OF FRANCE IN NORTH COULD NOT BE ERASED BY STROKE OF PEN. IT IS FRMCH DUTY TO PROTECT HER CULTURAL AND ECONOMIC PRESENCE THERE. SAJNTENY MISSION IS DESIGNED FOR ONLY THAT PURPOSE. FFvANCE HAD GIVEN UP THOUGHTS OF MIXED COMPANIES AS RESULT OUR OBJECTIONS AND HAD NOW SURRENDERED COAL IGNES. SAINTENY MISSION WOULD BE MAINTAINED ON ITS PRESENT TERMS. IT WOULD BE NEITHER ENLARGED NOR CHAITGED,

LAFOREST CONTIlfUED TO SAY THAT FRANCE ^HAD LOYALLY SUPPORTED GOVT OF DIEM FROM BEGINNING. ANY ALLEGATION TO CONT'RARY IS UNTRUE. FRENCH CONSTAIJTLY TRIED TO REENFORCE DIEM GOVT. FRANCE REACHED AGREEMENT WITH US L^T DECEMBER TO PERSUADE "OR COMPEL" DIEM TO ENLARGE GOVT. IT WAS AGREED TO GIVE HtM UNTTIL JAIftJARY AT VffllCH TIME, IF HE HAD FAILED, WE WOULD LOOK INTO MATTER OF ALTERNATE DISCREETLY. THIS WAS NOT DONE. LAST MARCH PRESENT GOVT BROKE IWYO OPEN CONFLICT WITH SECTS. UNITED FRONT OF SECTS WAS FORI^IED AGAINST DIEM. BOTH DECEMBER AGREEMENT AND COIMON SENSE TOLD US AT THAT TIME THAT SOMETHING TO BE DONE TO AVOID CIVIL WAR. FRANCE WARNED THAT ARMED CONFLICT - FIRST CIVIL V7AR, THEN GUERRILLA WARFARE, THEN TERRORISM - WOULD RESULT IF WE FAILED TO TAKE ACTION. FRANCE UfiS ALWAYS DESIRED PEACEFUL SOLUTION. FOR THIS REASON JOINT ELY-CODLINGS APPROACH WAS TRIED. IT WAS HOPED THEY WOULD ARRIVE AT JOINT PLAN FOR SOLUTION. WASHINGTON APPEARED FIRST TO VJELCOME THIS CONCEPT THEN CliANGED ITS MIND. COLLINS LEFT SAIGON WHEN CIVIL WAR WAS ABOUT TO BREAK OUT. UNTENABLE TRUCES WERE DECLARED. WHEN THEY'WERE ABOUT TO EXPIRE BAG DAI SUBMITTED HIS Om PLAN ON APRIL 19 IN ORDER TO TRY TO RECONCILE US

AND FRENCH

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SECTO 8, MAY 8, 3 H4 (SECTION OHE OF THREE), FROM PARIS

AKD FRENCH FAILURE TO ACT. US FAILED TO REPLY TO BAO DAI

IK ABSENCE OF COLLINS FROM SAIGON BAG DAI ACTED.

LAFOEEST CONTINUED TO SAY THAT WM REVOLUTIONARY COM^ilTTEE APPEARED TO HAVE CONTROL. COMtCTTEE IS STRONGLY UNDER VIET MINH INFLUENCE. A I4AN NAlfflD HOM PAN SON, STAFF OFFICER IN VIETNAMESE ARI^, EDUCATED IN CHINA WAS VICE-PRESIDENT OF REVOLU-IIONARY COMClTTEE. NHI LANG WAS ONE OF VICE-PRESIDENTS OF VIET MINH GOVT, DOAK TRUNG CON IS NOTORIOUS VIET Mllffl AGENT. VIET MINH INFLUENCE OF "REVOLUTIONARY" GROUPS IS RBCOGICLZABLE THROUGHOUT AND THEIR INFLUENCE IS SPREADING TO COUI^'TRY. BAO DAI'S DEPOSITION IS DEI4AHDED. THERE IS VIOLENT CAMPAIGN AGAINST FRENCH AND FRENCH EXPEDITIONARY CORK. VIET MINH AGENTS MAKE GOOD USE OF IT AND CERTAIN AI^IERI CAJIS DO HOT SEEM SUFFICIENTLY AWARE OF THIS. FRENCH GOVT DOES NOT WISH TO HAVE ITS ARI^IY ACT AS PLATFORM FOR VIET MINH PROPAGAiroA. ARl^ff WILL NOT BE MAIIWAIHED IN VIETNAM AT ANY COST. LAFOFJEST CLOSED BY REFERRING TO GOVT CENSORSHIP AND SHOWED COPY OF SAIGON NEl'/S-PAPER, HALF OF WHICH HAD BEEN CENSORED,.AS EXA>DPLE OF EXTENT OF GOVT CENSORSI-EP. ' '-

SECRETARY REPLIED REFERRING TO SERIOUSNESS OF SITUATION AND NECESSITY THAT FREl^CH AND US AS GOOD FRIENDS VfOEK CLOSELY TOGETHER. IT WOULD NOT BE PROFITABLE TO GO INTO DETAILED CHARGES MADE AGAINST EACH OTHER IN TWO COUNTRIES. QUESTION IS MIAT TO

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DEFARTMKi^iT OF ST^SE

YROU: Paris •

TO

Secretary of State

KG. SECTO 8j May 8, 5 p-m. (SECTION Y\^0 OF THHEE)

PRIORITY

SLl-^T DEP.^RTliEI^T SECTO 8; REPRITED IIIFORI>iATXON ERIOKIIT SAIGON 7l6.

vhat to do in face of present situation. He s^iMnarized present situation a£ follows:

(1) There is a revolutionary movemGnt under way in Vietnam,

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(2) We Relieve that Dien has the best chance of anyone of staying on top of revolution and keeping it vithin "tolerable'" liraits. Diem is only means US sees to save South Vietnam and counteract revolution- US sees no one else who can. VJhatever US view has "been in pa^tj today US must support Diem ■Kholeheartedly. US must not peiT:ait Dienl to bee02^ another Kaxensky,

Regarding Bao Dai^ Secretary said in his vie¥ he had irretrievably lost capacity to be anything but titular head of government if even that position could be saved for hiiji and that this vas solution Secretary preferred until election (of national Assembly), Bao Dai should support Diem and not tal;e away his power. Cao Dai and Hoa Hao could be used but no Binh Xuyen. Secretary expressed opinion that with support two governments Diem could sit on top of revolution. Dien is only force of moderation.^ FIDO a certain stabilising influence- US was giving funds to support Vietnamese Army and could not see anyone else to give funds to but Dicra for that p^arpose. Concluded by stating that support of Diem was only way he ccuJLd see to deal with common problem pointing out that time was running against us and no successftal results could be achieved unless two countries worked together.

Meeting was then joined by British for whom Secretary resumed US position as summarized above adding that in US view present revolution is not yet dominated or influenced by Coirununists to any appreciable degree. He remarked that prior association with Coi.^nunists was not in iteelf sufficient reason to believe that man vras a CoiTimujalst ncw^ citing that Bao Dai himself could be considered a Cor-omunist on this reasoning. Support of Diem did not indicate US non-recognition of his wealinesses. US had not taken part in his original selection and liad been and remained ready to support any other man who might be presented by orderly process of law. He remarked that just before outbreak of fighting US was prepared to consider altei-natives but he was not sure no\i that it would" have been practical. Secretary remarked h^ was told last March by Collins that we had already reached point of no return on Diem,

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Faure continued tliat ranch of Fra^ice-US difficulty grows out of fact that \:e have never admitted our true thoughts from hegirming. Last Septeriber \;e-inight have had an agreed solution if \ie had expressed our douhts bx;t -v^e did not- Eao Dai is a ^^bad card" hut hy means of him something is possible hut vith Diem failtore is certain, VJe might have been able to save situation on -eve- of coup de force if ve had had tlxree-sided agz^eerient (USj France^ Bao Dai) but again ve failed. Eao Dai has faults but he can serve a useful purpose and should be used for that. He cannot be excluded as a possibility for bringing about a riore productive solution but as long as Diem is there the view is obstructed and no situation is possible. To resuinej Faure said^ Diem is impossible and there is no chance for hliii to succeed or to improve the situation. Another man might not be able to improve the situation'either and^ in fact^ there is^ no one specifically in mind but at least ^^ith another man there is a chance* ^ .

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(l) It vould bring on a Viet Minh victory^ , ' ■ . t|

t_ ' (2) It irould focus the hostility of everyone on French^ and

(3) It will begin on a France-US breach ^ Everyone believes that the US , i is baclcing Diem and encouraging hm in his anti-French sentiments even if - I the French Goverinaent knews US is not.

There vas no practical i:ay of getting rid of him. Secretary vdshed to do everything to get Diem to enlarge goverzmient. It might be possible to change government at the time of forthconing elections but Question remains ''vho is better thsn Diem," If there is a better man US is ready to consider him but re-submits no one has been suggested. Although Collins had reached agreement vith Ely in early April to change Diem he now believes we must support hijn.

Faure replied that he thouglit it best that he speak himself. He wished to state that France is not in agreement with US views. In the past ^^e have concealed this fact from each other but now it is time to speak frankly. Diem is not a good solution. Joint efforts to prove lie is have resulted - ^ in failure. France is convinced that Diem is leading to catastrophe. Diem took advantage of Collins' a^bsence to effect a "coup de force" which v;on primary vlctox-y but which has not contributed to any lasting solution. His anti-French sentiments are extreme. France does not object to his being anti-French if he is capa^ble but being anti-French is not a s'ufficient quality in itself, Faure will not continue with him for^ one way or another J he will bring on a Viet Minh victory. He is surrounded by Vietnam elements and there is not time to lose. Diem is not only incapable but mad (fou). He ruined our chances for a possible solution just when it was in the offing• France can no longer take risks with him. He could yield to the revolutionary groups. Continuing with Diem would have three disastrous results;

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IMCOMm TELEGRAM

DEPARH^IENT OF STATE

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'~'*^ Control: Eec'd:

FROM: PARIS

ACTIOH COPY

'4065

MAY 8, 1955

9:12 PM

TO:

Secretary of State

NO: SECTO 8^ MY 8, 5 PM CSECTIOH THREE OF THEES)

ERIORITY

SEHT DEPARTMENT SECTO 8, REPEATED INFORMATION PRIORITY SAIGON 716

IS A CHANCE BUT V7ITH DIEM THERE IS NONE.

FAURE THEN CONCLUDED WITH THE FOLLOWING SIGNIFICANT STATEMENT: "DIEM IS A BAD CHOICE^ IMPOSSIBLE SOLUTION, WITH NO CHANCE TO SUCCEED AND NO CHANCE TO IMPROVE TliE SITUATION, WITHOUT IHM SOME SOLUTION MIGHT BE POSSIBLE, BUT WITH HTM THERE IS NONE. flOVffiVER, I CANNOT GUARANTEE ANY OTIiER'SOLUTION WOULD WORK NOR IS IT POSSIBLE TO CLARIFY THE SITUATION. THERE SEEMS TO BE FIMDAMENTAL DISAGREEMENT BEBCEEN US . I COULD HAVE CLAIMED THAT SINCE FRENCH POSITION IS PREDOMINANT IN VIETNAM, YOU SHOULD ACC0M>10DATE YOU'R VIB'/S MORE TO OURS, BUT I HAVE REJECTED THIS, IfflAT SHOULD BE DONE UNDER THE CIRCUiiSTAATCES? WHAT WOULD YOU SAY IF WE WERE TO RETIRE EIfi!IRELY FROM INDOCHIKA MD CALL BACK THE EEC AS SOON AS PCKSIBLE. I FULLY REALIZE THIS WOULD BE A GRAVE SOLUTION, AS IT WOULD LEAVE FRENCH CIVILIANS AND FRENCE INTERESTS IN A DIFFICULT POSITION. THERE IS ALSO THE QUESTION OF THE RilFJGEES' FATE. IF YOU THINK THIS MIGHT BE A POSSIBLE SOLUTION, I THIM I MIGHT BE ABLE TO ORIENT MYSELF TOTARDS IT IF YOU SAY SO. IT WOULD HAVE ADVANTAGE OF AVOIDING ALL FURTHER REPROACH TO FRAITCE OF "COLONIALISM" WHILE AT Ti-IE S.AME TllvflS GIVING RESPONSE TO DIEM'S REQUEST THAT FRANCE SHOULD GO. SINCE IT CONTIMPLATES THE LIQUIDATION OF THE SITUATION AND THE REPATRIATION OF THE EEC, WOULD THE UNITED STATES BE DISPOSED TO HELP PROTECT FRENCH CIVILIANS AND THE REFUGEES? IF YOU DO NOT AGREE TO THIS SOLUTION AND BELIEVE IT WOULD HAMPER YOU, THEN WE CAN HAVE FURTHER DISCUSSIONS ON THE VIETNAMESE SITUATION.

SECRETARY

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SECRETARY REPLIED TliAT ICE APPRECIATED FRA1K1>!ESS, IT IS ONLY WAY FRIEiroS SHOULD SPEAK TO EACH OTHER. THERE IS A -FUKDAl"ffiIWAL DIFFERENCE BET^JEEN FRAKCE AND US. US HA^ lilGHER REGARD OF DIEM'S CAPABILITIES THAN FRAIICE. US INFORMED "COUP DE FORCE" WAS ENGINEERED BY BINH XUYEN WilLE FRENCH SAY OTHEEt'lISE. SECRETARY HIMSELF HAD HAD DOUBTS TR^^T DIEr4 COULD SURVIVE. IT WAS QUESTIONABLE WHETHER ARMY WAjS LOYAL TO HIM AND HE DID NOT CONTROL THE NATIONAL POLICE. LOYALTY OF FRENCH GOVT ITSEU IN SUPPORT OF DIEM m3 NOT QUESTIOI-JED BUT THERE WERE DIFFICULTIES FROM OTHER SOURCES SUCH AS RADIO FRAHCAISE-ASIE. US DOES NOT AGREE WITH FRENCH OPINION OF DIEM, IF HE HAD BEEN A NON-ENTITY HE WOJLD liAVE COLLAISED BUT HE DID NOT. HF SliOvIED SO MUCH ABILITY THAT US FAILS TO SEE HOW HE CAJT BE GOT HID OF NOW. IT IS ASSUMED THAT FRANCE WOULD NOT V/ISH TO DO SO BY FORCE.

DIEM IS STRONGER NOW THAN WHEN BAO DAI FIRST WITHDREW HIS POWERS. WOIST ASPECT IS THAT PROBLEM INVOLVES DIFFERENCE OP • OPINION BEWJEEN FRANCE AND US, VIETNAM IS NOT WORTH QUARREL WITH FRANCE, COMMON INTERESTS ARE TOQ GREAT TO BE JEOPARDIZED BY DIFFERENCE OF OPINION ON VIETNAM. SECRETARY AGREED WITH FRENCH STATEMEM THAT IT MUST NOT AFFECT FPAl-JCO-US RELATIONS IN OTHER AREAS. IF IT WOULD SOLVE PROBLEM, US WOULD WITHDRAW AND DROP ITS SUPPORT OF VIETNAM. FRANCO-US DIFFERENCES MUST BE RESOLVED NOW FOR SECRETARY DID NOT BELIEVE TILAT US CONGRESS ■ WOULD CONTINUE WITH ITS PRESEIW AID PROGRAl'l OTHERWISE. SUB- ^ STANTIAL SUMS OF i^ TO 5 HUiroRED MILLION DOLLARS ARE INVOLVED.

CHOICE OPEN TO US IS TO HAVE DIEM SUPPORTED OR TO WITHDRAW, IT IS GRAVE PROBLEM WHICH THE SECRETARY WOULD LIKE TO THINK ABOUT OVEEICLGHT. FRENCH SUGGESTIONS ARE SERIOUS AND MUST BE WEIGHED CAREFULLY. ADVICE AND COUNSEL ARE NEEDED. US INTEREST IN VIETltAM IS SUffLY TO WITHHOLD AREA FROM COMMUNIS TS. US WILL GIVE CONSIDERATION TO ANY SUGGESTION FRENCH I-IAKE BUT MUST WARN THAT US FINANCIAL SUPPORT 14AY NOT BE HPECTED TO ANY SOLUTION IffllCH SECRETARY CAN THINK OF AS ALTERNATIVE TO DIEM. QUESTION MUST BE TAKEN UP AGAIN TOMORROW.

MACMILLAN STATED THAT BRITISH INTERESTS IN VIETNAM WERE MORE INDIRECT BUT NONETHELESS VITAL BECAUSE (l) INTEREST IN AREA ITSELF AND (2) INTEREST IN COMMUNIST THREAT FROM ANY AREA IN WORLD, IT WOULD BE GRAVE ERROR TO REACH DECISION THAT EVENING. FOREIGN MINISTERS ARE TO BE IN PARIS SEVERAL DAYS AND SHOULD LOOK INTO MATTER AGAIN. EVENTS MIGHT OVERTAKE OUR DECISIONS, ACCURATE REVIEW OF

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topseci^t3[:|\j3|JjVF secto 8, may 8, 5 b.i, (section three of three), from paris

WHAT HAS BEEN SAID SHOULD BE UlffiERTAKEN AND EFFORT TO ASCERTAIN .FACTS SHOULD BE tlADE BY ALL SIDES. IT IS IMPORTAIW THAT NOTHING 'he RELEASED OF ^fflAT HAD BEEN DISCUSSED DURING MKETING AS LEAK WOULD BE CALAMITOUS. BELIEVE EFFORTS SHOULD BE MADE BY ALL TO THINK SERIOUSLY OF WHAT HAS BEEN SAID AND KEEP CONTEfjTS ABSOLUTELY SECRET.

FAUEE AGREED WITH MACMILLAN, STATING THAT HE HAD tIEVER EXPECTED ; DECISION TH.AT EVENING. EXPERTS SHOULD GET DOWN TO ^'JORK IM-IEDIATELY ajSD PREPARE FOR DECISIONS AS EVENTS ARE CHANGING HOURLY.

i MEETING CLOSED WITH GEflERAL DISCUSSION CONCERIffNG SCHEDULE FOR ■ FURTHER TALKS ON INDOCHTNA AND FORTHCQf.n:NG VISIT OF FOREIGN MINISTERS TO VIENNA,

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A DISCUSSION ENSUED CONCERNING TEXT OF COMMnQUE, SECRETARY • REJECTED PROPOSAL OF MEETING OF EXPERTS BEFORE NEXT DISCUSSIONS ON INDOCHIM BY FOREIGN MINISTERS NOW SCHEDULED FOR MY 10.

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DEPAETMEHT OF STATE

moa: Sainon

TO:

Secretary of State

Kay 8, 1955 '

ISOi: 507^J May 5, 9 p.m. (SECTION TJfflEE OF FOUR) HIACT

S" T DEPART^^2^T 507^4, REPEATED INiOK^IATION im^CT PAEIS 1305-7v French position, -^

A* French position determined by t>jo factors;

(1) Ely's responsibility for safety EEC and for Erench lives and property; and as signatory of Geneva Accordsj

(2) French desire retain cultural and economic presence and to retain Vietnam as part French Union,

B* Friction between French and Vietnemese'has reached serious proportions. It springs fran U<o major sources:

(1) Ely J to meet his responf?ibi!llty for the safety of French lives and property, has established a French controlled secui^ity zoikb vhich includes large portion residential and business zone of Saigon proper* He has introduced new French battalions to protect this zone. Presence these forces^-reported refusals to permit WA tmits to move through French Zoncj and sanctuary provided to three Binh Zuyen posts located ivithin secxB:ity zone are constant irritants to Vietnaanese nationalists.

{2) Ant i "Diem propaganda such as broadcast by Badio France-Asia and aDJega-tions of French support of sects^ particularly Binh Xuyen, vhich widely credited by Vietnamese^ have added oil to fire.

Ely and French authorities here have finally concluded Biera must go* Increasing French bitterness toward Diem and their sensitivity to "anti-colonialist^* propaganda has to some extent been extended to US whom they blame for not joining with them in pressing Dien to seek cease-fire. French liltevjjse tend blatne US for recent bloodshed because we did not agree with tliem in finding political solution to governmental crisis some three weeks ago, ' ' ^ ^

D. Strong anti-French aspect of Revolutionary Committee has great appeal to large seg?nents of population which beneath surface has long nourished hatred and contempt "for French.

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E. Quite regardless of future developmentsj episodes of last week, featured liy increasing strain in French-Vi^^tnainese relations, cannot help but severely jeopardise Fraaice's long range interests in Vietnen- Of late one hears less and less mention of maintenance cultural and economic interests and >" influence and more and more of threats that France will drop responsibilities and withdraw FEC. " \ie believe this to be passing phase^ however.

F- Keference the activities of Revolutionary^ Coirjuittee and States General local French.have same fears that we do. French are convinced that Revolutionary Committee is penetrated by Viet^Minh agents, but have so far been V ^ble to give us any conclusive proof- They are also skeptical about the States General being able to modify radical resolutions of the Revolutionary CcQimiittee, ^ -^

G I think it is fair to say that French are convinced that Diein desires overthrow Eao Dai and will continue efforts to do so irrespective of current activities of Revolutionary Coimnittee.

H. As indicated in recent telegrams^ General Ely and the Coiiinissariat General in Saigon have becoine so enotional in their bitter opposition to Diera and his entourage, that I fear they have lost some of their objectivity as to popular reaction to Diem's recent moves, his hold on the Army^ and his ability to deal with the Binh Xuyen, They are q^ii'te convinced that serious \7arfare will be initiated by the Binh Xuyen, and that anti-French sentiment fomented by Diem and perhaps Viet Minh may still cause serious outbreaks in foreign sections of Saigon,

KIDDER

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DEPAET^a;RT OF STATE

FROM: Saigon

TO:

Secretary of State

KO: 507U, Kay 5, 9 p.m. (SSCTIOE ?OUR OF FOUR)

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SEiW DEPARTl.IEIJT 50?^, KUKSATED BIFOHI.mTIOH KIACT PARIS 1305

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A. It -^'/ould appear to me that the essential steps in rec^^nstitution of Joint Anerican-French approach to situation in Vietnejn should be as rollovrs:

(l) Dien governir.cnt should "be fully supported In bringing to a final and guiok solution its conflict vith the Binh Xuyen*

(a) This mil requ.ire on part of French^ not only in Paris but more importantly in SaigonJ that genuine aesistance rather than passive self-obstruction be offered to yietna2iLese Governijaent and armed forces.

(b) Specifically^ General Ely should be directed take active steps, to persuade Binh Xuyen to withdraw their forces froin three police posts ■ -remaining i\^ithin French security zone in Saigon^ or if Binh Xuj'-en refuse^ then to perroit Vietnam aircned forces to reduce these posts \-rXth minimum ot casualties,

(C) All echelons of French bureaucracy, including arned forces^ should be instructed to desist fz^om agitating against Diem government,

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(d) Official pressure^ both in Paris and Saigon^ shoxild be brouglit upon Radio France"Asia^ a seiai-governmental institution^ to cease its attacks on Diem government.

(e) Such steps as may be possible should be talien to persuade French pressmen to cease their attacks^ particularly in Saigoril

(F) French garrison in Saigon-Cholon should be reduced without delay,

(g) There sho^old be a public announceiaent by appropriate French authorities of their full support of Diem government in present coirTlict with Binh^Xnyen, possible to assist organisation and training of essential logistical servicer of Vietna2!]'ese ^rined forces so as to Jnake them as independent as possible of FECp This is under vay in accordance vith r<y^ instructions to J-^lAG, .

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(2) As soon as ciirrent crisis is over^ decisive effort must "be made to persuade or other'v;ise" force Diem to reorganize his goverijirLGnt artd to establish a cabinet competent to Implement broad programs of refozm covered by the Gollins-Ely seven-point progra:^^ plus a program, for integration of sects into normal life of Vietnam.

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(3} If^ after res.sorable further period of trial^ Diem is nnable to constitute a government capable of linplementing these ^jrograms^ US should Join vith France and Bao Dai in assisting liberal Vietnajmese nationalists to establish a competent goverriinent.

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B. I recognize that General Ely may irrevocably be opposed to supporting any Dien governtnent. If this should prove to be true*, I vould sugr^est v:e UT'^e Faure government to replace hm^ preferably vith roan of caliber of D' finat^ or perhaps Georges-lfiact. At same time^ it vould probably be nt^cessary to replace General Jacquat (vho has inciorred violent anijuosity of Vietnamese during Binh Xuyen affairs) vith man liJce General Cogny*

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C. Reference step (3) abovej I recognize also that it may be politically difficult to withdraw US support from Diem even if trial proves is capable of establishing an effective government. I still feel that even if Dien manages suppress Binh Xuyen^ this vill not change his o^'n basic incapacity to manage the affairs of government. His present successes may even msike it harder for us to persuade Diem to take competent men into goverronent^ to decentralise authority to his ministers, and to establish sound procedures for the implementation of reform programs, I am still convinced Dit^i does not have knack of handling men nor the executive capacity truly to unify the country and establish an effective government. If this should become evident> ve should either withdraw from Vietnam because our money-vill be wasted, or \'Jq should take such steps as can legitimately be taken to secure an effective nevr Premier,

D- T/iroughout all this I feel we must keep our eyes clearly on our main objective in Vietnam^ i-e,j to assist in saving this country from Cornnunism. Ho matter who heads the government here^ free Vietnsm will not be saved unless sound political, economic and military programs are promptly and effectively put into action. This will require wholehearted agreement and coordination between Vietnamese^ Americans and Krench. Difficult as this may be to achieve, it is possible^ in my judgment. If this tripartite approach is not secure, we should withdraw from Vietnam, ^

KIDDER

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THE JOINT Cf-IIEPS nF STAFF

V/ASHItsJGTON 25, D. C,

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9 May 1955

lAEMOUAiroUM .FOR THE Sj^CRETARY OF DlilFEHSE

Subject: Indochina (Vietnam)

1, The Joint Chiefs of Staff sutmlt herGv?l\h their vlevjs rei :rciins the military aspects of the p,roblein presented in the attaclicd excerpt from a telegram from Ilr. Dulles to the , Department of State,

2. The situation as depicted in the telGgran from Mr. Dulles appears to present the United States v;lth a choice between:

: a. Continuing to support the- Diem Governnient in Vietnam ^ hliich v/ould result In the withdrawal of French forces from that cou-ntrj?; or

b* V/ithdrawlng United States supjport from Vietnam --. al3cwln2 the French to deal with the situation as thoy deem fit.

military implications.

^. It is considered doubtful that the Viptnam National Army (VjfA)j in its present state of development and unassisted by other forcesJ can continue to maintain internal security ujvler ti}e conditions of near-^civil war nov; prevailing in Vietnam, TJ'jere is even less likelihood that the VITA could offer more than a token resistance to external aggreiE^slon. Further, it is open to question whether the VMA v;ou.ld be loyal to tlie Dlcm Government under all circui^stances. The presentee and cooperation of an outside milltar^^ force is therefore essential at-this tJme if Victnan^-se security and integrity are to bo assure 'fho United States ^Is debarred by the jjrovicicns of the Oenova Tlgi^eement from providing tiuch forces^ and could tJiorofoi^e give ho assurances rcjiarding t)\e protection of lives and property of French or any other foreign nationals, VHiile the vflthdravml

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of I'Jie French JJxpcd 1.tionary CorpG is ultimately to bo desirGdj -it Is considered that a precipitate v/itiidrav;al ncjv: v/ould be l.lkely to result in an Incroa^ringly unctabic and precariouo Eituation, This situation v;oald undoubtedly be exploited to ConimuniGt aclvantat^Cj v/lth the probable eventuality that South Vietnam v/ould be lost to conununisnr. ^ ' '

5, Tn the face of the strong anti^French sentiment v/hich has developed In Vietnam^ tliere novf seems little prospect tjiat France alone can provide either the leadership or tae resources required to establish a stable Vietnamese government. V/ithout United States moral and materiel supn^ort it cannot be expected tha.t the Yil^ vjould develop into a cohesive military force or maintain even its present limited effectiveness, Vlithout effective indigenous forces and vilthout a Vietnam goveriiment VJhich caji conunand tlis loyalty and support of its people^ the French lixpeditionary Corps (FEC)j judt;ed by past performances J vfould be incapable of pre serving the secxirity and integrity of Vietnam. It can therefore be expected tliatj folloKing the pattern v;hich led to the loss in the Worthy South Vietnam v;ould^ in due course, fall to the Communists,

6. For the forecoing reasons, the'Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that neither of Uie altei'^nativcs suggested represent acceptable solutions to the problem of Vietnaui at this time. They feel it to be in the best interest of France as v.^ell as

of the United States that every reasonable effort be exerted to preserve South Vietnam from communism. It is their opinion -that the present situation, involving armed resistance against the established govei^nmcntal authority and the dangers inlierent in the role assumed by the Revolutionary Committee, requires the utmost in coopex^ation and energetic action by the Vietnamese, United States, and French Crovernments tov/ard tlie restoration of internal order and governmental control in Vietnam. It is considered tliat this should constitute the im^s^tediate joint objective. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that Mr. Dulles be advised that from the military point of view;

a. The government of Prime Minister Hgo Dinli D:i em shov/s the"~greatest promise of aciiieving the internal stability essential for the future security of Vietnam,

b* The United States could not guarantee the security of the French nationals should the French Fxpcditionary Corps be ^_

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c_. FoL^^iible Unlt3cl Stateii actioi-^G under the Southeast Aisla- Collective Dcrense Treaty could ultlinntsly afford -security to Sout)^ Vict nam equal to that provided by the continued presence of the French Expeditionary Corps*

7. The above coir:!T:3ntn ovc submitted v/lthout benefit of the peel fie viev;s of Ambassador Colllnri, v/hlch have been requested by the Gecretary of State, They L>hculdj therefore, be con-sideref] an tentative and subject to poasible revision in the light of his reply.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

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Chaix^inan, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Knclosure

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.TO? SECRET

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EX03RPT FKOli ^JELEaRAM FROM SSCiiST/iRY DULL33:

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\Je n;et alone vlth the Fi^enohj- teing joined after a time by the British for discussion of Indochina. Faure proposed that in vleu of the sharp differences of opinion"vhich exl*sted betv:een our tvo Governments vith reference to policy in Vietnain and in viev of his ^overnr^ent's total inability to support Die in, vho had now become violently ant i-French, he proposed that the French should withdraw their, forces irorj Vietnam. Ke

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raised the question as to whether in this event v^e vould be

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^ able to give any assurances rd^^arding protection of lives and property of remaining nationals•

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I replied that this was too serious a matter to

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ettle vithout deliberation^ and that \ agreed that Vietnans

vms not worth a quarrel betveen France and the United States, If ve could not agree, then one or the other should withdraw

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ivoxTi the scene, as \:e could not afford to oppose each other In this area end adopt rival and conipetitive policies, I aaid that the United States vould be vllling to vithdrav, and indeed I could not have 'any good hope that Congress vould appropriate the necessary funds for us to support the situation if ve with-drev support fron Dien] and saaght an alternative vhich Faure hiiiiself said he could not now define- My guess is that the

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French are not bluffing and that his proposal may be the

agreed solution.

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If "tlie U, S. can aiid vili nake a cleal ultn Dicnj in i?liich he pledges to protect French civilians rei^ainin^'axter French troops leave ^ in retui'^n for our r-ssurances oJT increr,sea £iid and the rapid and effective training of his army^ v& shouJLd he happy to see the , Trench leave.

A novc^ of this sorb ^7ould clearly disengage ud fro?^. the taint Ox' Colonip-li3'm derivijjd f roin our support of the French and Eao I)?*i i^hich has plrigiied us throu;^ho;it AGia. It vou-ld i:>ut us clep.rly in oi:r traditional role of su.25portin3 the "independence and legitipiate national aspirations'* of peoples. The rcpercuGcions of this throu^-h-out Asia and the I^oslan iForla i:ill he great and he:;eficial. A cD.ear stand against French colonialicn^ may greatly Tree our hands at sous later d.ate vith reg^-rd to French Ilorth Africa \?here a.n explo:>ion like Indo Cliina seo-ns inevitable.

Fi^ench \;ith'lrai;al i7ill also effectively stop the potential douhle-dealing \;e have suspected of th.e Saintenay mission in Viet Minhj vhex^e it appears the French have hcen insuring against the loss of Free Vietna'^ to the Vict llinh hy corprorxising -with the Corrimunists so a,s to retain conunercial and other advantages after a takeover. At one tnne it vb.s ruiiiored the French nilght even accept a Co:3L-niinist Indo China in the French Union,

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A. tacit ass>a:7iption hy the U* S, of the support of Free Viet ITaia night J of coarse, eventually involve us in e. suhstantial ccn-.-nitTT.ent. Eovever^ this is "by no Fxans certain^ and there is a real likelihood training; technical r^ssistance and noderate aid v;ill "be all that is recuired. lie should not forget that ve are already coiunitted under SFATO to defend Viet ITam against overt attack* The nd/ situation vou3,d permit J in psychological tennsj the all-out use of "Militant Lioerty'' to help "build Free Viet H^ca resolve,

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As a final point to reneziocTj the French declared at Geneva that they -wouid vithdraw th.eir forces at a-ny tina if re^iue^ted by tjie Free Viet llain Governi^^ent.

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THE JOINT CMIEF3 OF STAFF

WASHINGTON 25, D. C,

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2 June 1955

IIEMOIL'VI.'DUn FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ■

Subject:

Repoi-t of Military' Staff Planners Conferonce, Southeast Asia Collective Defenoc Treatj', Ba^^ulo, Philippines, April-May 1955.

1. The Staff FlaruierG to the Mllifcrii-y AdviGcra of the SoutheP.f:^t Ania Collnotlve Dcfonoe Treaty (3EACPT) Council held their first conference in Basuio, rhlllpplnes clu't^ng the period 25 April to 5 nay 1955. The report of that conference, attached ari Appendix "C" hei^etO;, vrlll ho conolderecl by the Military Advipern at their next rAeetins in Banglrolc.

A cuin.-nai.'-y of the i-ecorumcndatlouG nadc in that report, the propocod actlona of CIFGi'AC and the rccoipjasnded actlonc of the Joiiit Chieft5 of Staff thereon are outlined in Appendix "A." hereto.

2. The Joint Chiefc of Staff have reviewod the report of the Staff FlannerG, and, cnbjcofc to the corr^nent and/or in-ntr-uctiono outlined in pax^ograph 2 of Appendi:< ''B" hereto, con cider the report gone anally Gatitsfo.ctory as- a baclo for further plonning actlvitlca of the military machinery under the SEACDT orgnniKation.

3. The Joint Chj.cfc of Staff recoripond that the Secretary of Defence concur in the content of the proponed ncfjnase to the Gor-:iander in Chief, Pacific, in Appendix "B" hereto, and authorise its tranemicolon by-the Joint Chiefo of Staff,

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

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[i^efeVcnce: Reoort of Military Staff Planners Conference^ '• ^ SLACm^ Dasuio^ rivilipplnes^ Aprll-Moy 195!3)^

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1, EncloGures 1, 2, and A - No action required by the Joint

"^ Cnlefs of btaff*

[ '2, Enclosure 3 -^ (Military pcrticioation in ccnibattin:< Coininunlst

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subversion)

^', Staf f r 1 r.nncrs recomnv^nda 11 on: Hone ,

b. CTircP/C*s '^rooosed action;^* Subject to the results of

the Subversion Subcoiiiinlttee meeting held In Bangkok 3 H^y^

r and guidance of higher authoi-'ity, to participate fully in

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military and non-militrxry aspects,"

S.' ^iL^i^"J}£l£J:^'^-Q^-^''''A!^^^ ■ °^" 31afx'" acti0n : Concur in the action pz^oposed by CIWCP.AC, ' '

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3. Enclosure 5 - {Terns of Reference arid Rules of Proced ure)

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a. Staff rinnners reconjncndation: ;Voorove. ■ b* CIJ TO J" A C ^ fj or o o o s e d _ ^ c 11 on _: ^- To approve or concur. N c. Becorninend.^d Joint C'liefs of Staff notion: Concur v;itli

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the addition that CIHCPAC v/ill not make any coranitnent of U.S. fprces and vjill support or furnish to the Council t;:iose recoirunendations v;hich have received approval of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

k. Enclosure 6 - (Measure:^ to IncroaGe Securltv of Classified

Infor mation) .

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a. Staff Planners reco™ionf3ation: Approve*

I I . ^ ■■ I ■ r i I I 11 till !■! II I ■• 1 ■ I ' l — -- - - r --• '. .. . -. k JL

■■ -/b* CINCPAC_\s_ proposed^ action: ^^ Approve or concur,

M

c. ncconiniendGd Joint Chiefrj of Staff Action: Concur "but

F

inforn CINCPAC that subparagraph 3 d should be changed to read: 1* ' . * ''All placesj buildings^ industrial and military instal-^ la t ions J chips and aircraft^ v;here classified matter of any

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sort is located, shouldj through appropriate procedures be inade secure against access by unauthorized persons."

5. Enclosure 7 - (Intelligence Survey of Selected Areas),

- _ — . ■ * ■ I- m • • m-^ —■*- 11 I . r m— ' ijJit^ 11 il M ■ I > ^ 1 I I I I I] '-J

a^ Staff Plannei"*B reconiniend^tion: Aoprove as a basis for further planning.

*

b. CINCFAC '5 pronon ed action ; Approve or concur.

^ • n ecoi urn ended Joint Chiefs of Sta ff action ; Concur, except

4

Inform CII.'CPAC that t^e last sentence of subparagraph 3 a should be deleted.

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C1MCP;^.G W3G to Clio, DTG 150OOIZ May 1955,

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6, Enclosure 8 - (Prlox"^ity Listing; of Courses of Action or

» ■ ■ ^ I " —.-^ ;^-t- i> 1 M J . ■ m |-- -. . .. ^ - ^ . . ^ 1^ ■ I I ■ Mil , ! 1 — I r - - L ■—-

, ' r Measur es)*

L * " ' *

* a^ Staff Planners recomrnendntlon: Approve as a nuide to the

- -■ J ^ J^ailJ ^ 1 t i l l U ^" !■ I '^l ll ■ ■ ! — ■ ■ IJ -I .1 > I M * ^ ^-

jjf order in vjhlch further coordinated planning studies should be

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prepared , .' ■ \

b* CINCPAC's prO!"^^osed action:'^ j^pnrove or concur, "-- c. ■^ecominendod Joint Chiefs of Staff action: Concur, but

■ ' ^' ■■ ■ ■ ■ ' ■ -■ ^ '^ -■i II p I II b ■ » ■ ■ > ■ ■ I - h ■ fcJ l | J _fc ■! l . fcB l 1 H I ^,^1 <• ^ ■ II I ■ ""^

inf oriji CinCPAC tliat it vjould be more acceptable \o delete the excepl ion stated in subparagraph 9 b In the case of West Pakistan

7. Enclosure 9 ^ (Methods for imnrovinn; defensive effectivenevS

' I ^ II ■■" ■ ■ 1 ^ 1 II I til ' I II ♦^s^i I " II ^1 ■ ■ . r-T* ._-n i ' 11 ■ — in ' n .■ ■ r i ■ i i ■ ■ i- » ■ m ■ ■ ■ i w l i

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in the treaty area)*

a* Staff Planners recommendations:

■*" ■ ■ ^ff. — ^- m I m ^^s rf^.-^M ^ - 1 1. 1 I |.» i « r w, i n ■ ■- ^i i

' (l) Adopt the recoiiHTiendationG concerning the approach to the Coimcil,

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i-t ^ "'- (2) Approve as a banis for further planning studieti and

pr e p a r a t cry ine a s ur e s *

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b. CIIICFAC^s' or^oposcd^ ac tion :^^ To approve or concur.

1

c, Rs£0n^mend£^„.Io1.nt_C^ Concur, tut inform CIMCPAC that in cubpar'-si'f'plT 2^1 6, the word "common"

" ' a.

...should be substituted for "combined"'.

8 Hnc Ids lire 10 - (Study of 3l p;nnl com nTunlcaJ^lon_G ;>-'S terns v .'ithin

t jie treaty area) , ^

a. Staff PI:''nr^ ers reco rii nendati on : Approve az a'basis for ^ further planning studies and preparatory measures.

I

L b CINCF.AC's ri^O!20J^^d Pc_tian:* To approve or coneur.

r c. Recomi-ended JointJy:^J,eUl^cni^sXfjiJ^ctlon^ Concur.

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9* **Enclor?v\re 11 - (Exanlnation into methodn of creatlnn; a

^ . - L I • ' ' I 11 111 1 — - - . . ■■_ r^

5Sible future org^^nizational structure), " [

a, staff Planners recorrrmenciaticn: itpprove the findings as, - an interim meaaure pending further experience,

' b. C INCPAG 's pr o pos e d a ction:- To approve or ccncur. However J CINCPAC has coirjiiented thatj "An item of major interest lies In. the proposed creation of a small permanent sccx^etariat, From the U,.S, delegation vievjpoiht, as v:ell as that of certain other delegations^ thiG was recogni:sed as not lra'!iediately a valid requirement and it wao further realized that the necessary coordination and continuity of

I-

effort could be maintained by correspondence and through che military liaison group In Bangkolc, It becarne apparent however, that it wa3 vitally nececsary to lend substance to the Fuilitary /advisers endeavours try (by) a form of some type permanent I f" group. VJithout this recognition it was evident.from the *' start that a serious split v;ould have developed^ thereby f militating agciinct the desired development of the military aspects of oEACDT. This step^ i^e.j the recognition of the ^|,V, ' requirement for' a small pcr:manont secretariat has definitely r forestalled for the forsecable future any determined insistence

,1 "■' for either a permanent Staff Planners organizationj a standing '-"'■ group J or a combined staff,"

■ ■ ■ <^ cBcPACT'I^i^'TB'CJ^iorDVG 1500013 May 19!35 ' TOP SECRET

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c. Recomriended Joint Chiefs of Staff action: To inform.'

^^^ ^■-^^^i—i^^^^r^^^—^^^™^»^—^ ■!.■>• h-^ ■ I . IM m ■ ^ ■ J. ^^»-^»^^ B_a -j -

CINCrAC that, subject to the results of the study indiccted In Dubpnracraph 11 b^ the Joint Chlnfs of Stcff hove nonobjection to the establishment of a am 11 porit^anent secretariat, which would be an instrument of the Military AdvicOrs and subordinate plnnning connnittees. However, the Joint Chiefs of -

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Staff would not aerec to the' possible evolution of such a secretariat into an organisation of o otanding nature as indicated in Gubparaf^raph 11 c_.

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10, Enclosure 12 - (Future anenda). 9.- Staff Planners ru cc r:;r:rend n ti ons:

(1) Appro^^e Port II - Agenda for Hilltary Advlsera

nieetlng (6 June 1955} i '

(2) Approve part III -- Prograrrinie of studios to te coiT^plcted at the next Tncetins of the Staff Planners,

(3) Approve Part IV -- Preparation of position papers. * {^) Approve Part V - TlmcG and places' of meetings,

(5) Approve Part VI ^ Initiation of additional studies,

b. CI NCPAC'g pr o posed acti on:-^ To approve Staff Planners RecoiT/mendations*

c, necornr.iondcd- Joint Chiefs of Staff action: Concur in

^~"»"^-^

action proposed by CI?ICrAC^

•>

ClFcTlUTlIiFirt^^ DTG 15OOOIZ May 1955

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APPEWDIX "B

TOP SECRET 0!rf\10ET!\/L" DRAFT

'■ SENSITIVE

MESSAGE FOR COMWmER IN CHIEF, PACIFIC

Ic The Report of the Military Staff Planners Conference^

t I

SEAGDTj April-May 1955? has been reviewed* 'JCS consider the report generally satisfactory as a basis for further planning acti\ ties of the military machinery under SEACDT*

;2, The actions on that report proposed in Part III \}f CIDICPAC i

1500C^Z May are concurred in subject to the following cojnment

and/or instructions in reference to the Staff Planners report:

a. Enclosure 5 " Conciu* in terms of references and activities of the Military Advisers Group vith the addition

> '*

' that CINCPAC will not make any commitment'of U.S. forces and will support or furnish to the Council those recommendations which have received approval of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. ' b. Enclosure 6 - Subparagraph 3 ^ should be changed to read:

"All places J buildings^ industrial and military installationsJ ships and aircrafty where classified matter

b-

of any sort is located^ should through appropriate procedures be made secure against access by unauthorized persons,"

£. Enclosure 7 - In subparagraph 3 ^ the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the last sentence should be deleted.

4

d. Enclosure 8 - The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider this

if\ . _

Enclosure suitable as a guide for the preparation of further planning studies. However^ it would be more acceptable to delete the exception in subparagraph 9 h in the case

of West Pakistan.

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e_. Enclosure 9 - In subparagraph 2'\ d^ Gubstltute *'conitiion"

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for "comblnuHl^', ^ " . .

f, Encloourc 1] - Subject to tliu rccults of the Dtudy incl.lCDtcd in subparai^rnph 11 b^^ the Joint Chiefs of Staff have no objection to the CfCtablishnont of a sinall por:nan*int scc^^?t^^''iat vjhlch v:oulri be r.n li^strument of tlj^; Military Advisers and subordinate planning conimifctecs% Hovvovor^ the?

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Joint Ch:l'-:?fn of Staff v:ould not apree to thu possible ovolutioi; of Guch a oecroitavint into an organi^^ation of a standinc naturo as Indicp-tod in cubporograph XI c^.

3 . Dof onrjc CDncurs *

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EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDE

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON

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COPY NO.

June 13 J 1955

M5M0RA?IDUf-i FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SUBJECT: REFEREMCS3;

U.S. Policy on All-Vietnam Elections

A. B. C. D,

NSC 51-J-29/?

NSC 5519

NSC Actions T.ios. 13l6-d and lM-15

Henio for NSC froir. Executive Secretary,

s?.ffie subject5 dated June 2, 1955

The National Security Councilj the Secretary of the Treasiiryj and the Director, Bureau of the Budget^ at tho 25lst Council

mee

ting on June 9, 1955 (^^'SC Action No. 1^-15)

a.

Noted the draft statement of policy contain-ed. in the reference report (NSC 5519) and the views of the Joint Chisfs of Staff trans- . ! jnitted by the referenc3 memorandum of June 2,.

b. Agreed that Council racommanclations as to : U*S, policy on all-Vi^tnam slections ara not :' required at this,time.

4

■

c, Notad that U,^S* policy in tha event of a

^ renewal of hostilities by the CorfLT;iinists in Vietnam would be g over nod by the provisions -• of paragraph 5-d of T'lSC 5^f29/5j pending a :

review of thrit paragraph by the MSC Planning Board,

Accordingly the actions in b and c above^ as approved this date by the President^^ are transmitted herev.ath for infor^ jnation.

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'i>C-iXi./2^C

JAliES S.^LAY^ JR. Executive Secretayy

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cc:

The The The

Secretary of the Treasury Director J Bux-iau of the Budget Chairman5 Joint Chiefs of Staff The Director of Central Intelligence

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Decl^ffsined per Executive Order 13526, Section 3 J NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

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THE JOINT CHIF-:FS OF STAFF

VVASinrJGTOH 25,D.C,

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CM-171-55 1 July 1955

MEMORAl^mUlA FOR TilE SECHETAP.Y OF DEFEIiSE

Subject:

Sun-iray of T^eport of Military Staff Planners ConferencCj Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, BaguiOj Philippines^ April - Hay 1955i for Infoniiation of Secretary of State.

i

1. Reference is niade to a FiOmarendum by the,Joint Chiefs of Staffs deted 2 June 1955; subject: ''Report of Military Staff Plnnn2rG Coriferencej Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treatyj Baj^io, PhilippinoGj April - Hay 1955•"

2. Attached hereto is a- GUnimo.i-'y of those portions of the Report of t}:iG BtoSf Planners Conference vhicb may have political eigJiificance. I reconi'ieiid thot you inform the SccretRry of State of this conference^ ciyl i^rovide him irith copies of the attached summary.

3. It is further rccoiranencled that the Secretary of State

"be informed that the studies prcpoa-ed by the Staff Planners are . not final until approved by the Military Advisers.

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ASTHOR MDFORD ChiairrTLan • Joint Chiefs of Staff

ISA i-[S'l^'^/S'^^/i.C. Df^iK^

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TOP SECRET

BU:j^mRY_ OF THOSE^rORT J or 3 _0£;j^ J-i'lORT^O? J'-2J.tT/'>RY

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^^^^---* - ^-—Jfc'-«*^±*—•^»*.-^I*»fc^*<J-

PART^I

*

Terms of Bofercnce and Rules of Frocndijire of tbe Military

M^ T'T-^^ iW I I' ri- ^r^

■ Hi f — f - ■ -"-Mi-^i I -r i I

Advisers Grf^nnlzr\tlon to the So^jthenct AGin Colloctive DefcnGc

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Trenty Cov.acll,

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■ Tentis of RcfGrcn'ce

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1. Military Advisers Gi^oup, In the furtherance of peace

ill J. l-M I * w

and collective security vltbin the Treaty area^ it Ic the reGponjjil:»ility of the Militfiry Advisors Group to provide general policy f^uidonce to such subordinate groups cs nny be established under the aegis of the Council and to nake appropriate nilitary rccoirtnendations to the council for its decision*

2. Actlvitien of the Military Advisors Group,

n. The Military Advisers Group should:

(1) Conctantly revlev' the r^llitary necsurcs by vbich CoDj^unlst subversion airl aggression directly affecting the Treaty area cau best be countered*

(2) Meet as required after consultation air.ong then-

■it

selves or as-directed by the Council. In addition^ they

•a

vill be prepared to attend iieetlngs of the Council.

(3) Designate such planning assistants as night bq

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required.

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{h) Ensure that railitary planning actlvitios tal^e into

* .Gceount vf.rioT:n contingencloG that r^ight arlce In connection

with the tr:ipleiicntation of the Treaty throush close

coordination of planning and appropriate GXchcLngt? of

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InfoiTiation bctvcen the Military Advicers, their plcnaing

i

QDGlGtnnts and other reproseatativcG which !.:ay r:cet under the aegis of the Council*

{5} "DeslGn^te ullltrkry liaison officerG in Dangkok vhose functions arc as stated in paragraph 6^ beljir* b. The activities of thu Military Adviscrf^ Group sliould Include aiionG other thinsc:" ',

(l) Consideration of nensurec to be taken in each

J *

country to increase the security of classifled inforriation with n viev to au£?r.ientlng the effectiveness of nn exchange of intelligence data.

(2) Initiation of and naintenance of an Intelligence

■

sui"^ey of Southeast Asia.

(3) Continued exchange of planning infor:.iation.

■

(U) Detei::::ination of posGible courses of action to meet the current CoiX";unist threat in Southeast Asia and

F ■

in the event of further CoriDunist aggression directly

a

ffecting the Treaty nrea,

(5) Prciparation of planninf^ studies on likely Allied courses cf action developed in subparagraph {h)^ above, to be used as a basis for further planning.

(6) Maintenance of a strategic estinate for Southeast

5>'~-,r^'T

Asia,

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(7) Consideration of ways and Dcans for incroaGing tha effectiveness in the Trenty area of the collective defense' effort of the uenher nations*

3. Military Liaison Group.

a. A >5ilitGry Liaison Group conslGtinfj of one officer

fron each of the rienbcr countries will te eotcililiGhed in

BnnG'^.ok, These officers nay he neuhers of the staffs of

Council Pcpreseiitatives in Bangkok. I b\ The JUlitary Liaison Officers viH provide nor:.;Ql

points of contact hetveon Military Advisersj nc veil as ■ vlth other interested individunlG nnd ac^nciGs as approx^rlate*

I c. Forr-ial neetings of the MllitrTrry-Liaison Group vill be convened^ vhen so requested by any of itn ncnberSj by nn officer to be nonlnatcd by the Chief of the Defense General Staff of Thailand.

■

h. Frequency of Meetings*

t '» ^ ^ i i j jj

The Military Advisers Group will neet not less than

twice a year.

5* Flace of Mcetinj^r^. Meetings will usually be held in the Treaty area at places to be agreed upon by the Military Advisers Konially the place of neeting for both the Military Advisers Group and the Staff Planners will be r.stated a:nong the neriber nations. The sites' for ::icetinf:5 of the Staff Flanners will be

recoixiended by tlien.

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6. participants at Meetings of tho Military Adviser g Grcup.

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The accredited Military Adviocrs or properly designated alternat gc

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* will attend neetings of the Military Advisers Group* Staff Officers and technical advisers iiiay attend v.iGctings of the

Military Advisers as tho latter nay individually require* These

t. '

officers nay fon-.i working corinlttc:cs as required by the Military

Advisers Group.

7, Observers. Frovirled a record is kept of their nojT^es and ^^appropriate security ueasures are taken, properly accredited

-I

Military observers nay be allowed to attend i:;aetii:i2;s of thtj Staff Planners. As a r^eneral rule tho nuuber of observers will

be kept to a ninlrjun

6. C 01 ".riu n i c at i i:}n s,

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a. Cor.iTiuni cat ions between Military Advisers w^ill be prefixed by the work '^SEAMXL".

b. W^cn a Mi].itary Liaison Officer is on lnfon::ation addressee of a coT.ijtunication exchanged botwocn any two (2) or n;orc Military A'lviGtrs, he v:ill provirle copies to tlic

m

Military Liaison Officers of the countries t;hose Military Advisers are inf orient ion or action addressees of tl^e basic

*

comunication.

9* Cor T'^unique . Cor.r.iunlques should be prepared under the direction of the Chain.ian and issued upon the ngrecLient of all the Chiefs of DeleGations, normally one at the be^^inning and

end of each ueetin^.

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vrn^ II

Sup.fsGstGd Mencures for Ii::provinf^ Deli^nsivt EffcctivEnGGS in

■ Mill «. ^ ^ - ■ ■ L I ■ J . I -.F I I B ■ J l ■ 1 ^ « - f -^ i ' . l - _ . M I I !■

II

Treaty Area throu^?^ So].r-Help nnd Mutual- Aid,

1* Each nation individually should noy strive to inprove its

■a

defensive effectiveness by the following nGa"ns:

a. Inprovlng its intelligence organization,

h. Improving tho quality and training of its anifed forces

■^ f

c. Maintaining and developing the logistic facilities to

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support Its ar:.icd forces.

2. Mcnbcr nations should act collectively to augr-:cnt their individual effort3, by tho following cooperative iieasuros:

■f *

a. The initiation and maintenance of intelligence nnd operational appreciations.

b. The exchange of obGorvers, students^ advisers^ training experts and training facilities,

4

c. standardization of techniques and equipnent, as nececscxy and practicahla.

d. Provision for the coi:ibined use of military facilities and cervices >

e. The planning and dovtlopi'^ent cf logistic facilities in

the area*

f, The holding of conblned naval and air exercises.

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^. The holding of exercises vithout forces nt a later

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3* In addition the Staff FlnnnGrs^^/in-this Gtudy^ recofx.icndud thrit the SEiiCDT Cc-uncil take note- of tlie ntlit^^ry neud to n^-ke ir:.icdlately availa'ble^ for cpc-ratioTiQl uGt^ in cace of ci.iL-ryoncy; tho combined use of tli-:^ :::llitr,ry faciliticG and cervices of the nenbar nations.

ft

NOTE: The position of the Joint Chiefs of Stcff is that ^^cori^on" should be substituted for ''co::bin-jd" Ip paragl^aph 3 above.-*

RART III Study of S J^n-l Go:;; iinications SyGt-r:s V'ithln the Treaty Area,

The Military Staff Planners concluded that the present international systems of co:in\inl cation such as Port^ Ship-Shore ^ Ground-Air J Radio aids to navigationj and Gyster.is of seoi-ch and rescue operations are available and adequate'for uce by pai^ticl-

^ i

patlng nations* They notQ<i^ howeverj that sorjte r^cthod should be established by which area G£ree:.ient can be readied for tlie conbined use of frc'iucncies.

P/lRT IV

[Ml I ■ —■■■^rk

Conclusions and RccoTTX-ndations of the Staff Planners in their

^-11^ ■ . !• I h J - I ■ -I [» I 111 1| [W ■ I 1 i >■ » Ml ■ ^ T II' I u -. I ■ I ■ ■

study on the sub.ioct; ^'Exr^::ination into Methods of Creatin,^ a Possible Future Orr^anIrrational Structure".

■^ 1 II I ^

1, It vos concluded that:

a. To carry out the requirenents of tl:e i:3.*ediate tasks to be undertahvcn by the military nacliinery of SEACDT, .staff

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/ planners nnd tl^eir Gub-con:.iittccs.^x;ecting on an ad lice Tp^sIg

j and supTJortcd by n criall'x^cn.anent^Gucrctcri^t is the be&t

Dcano of cnouring ii~Lnediote action;

* b. A Gtudy should be; uario of the conposltloUj functionj

r* , nnd location of the pcir/ianent Secretr.riat; ^

c* The er^tabliGlii.ient of cuch an r4 hoc c-rrangeuent Ghould

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not prejudice the cventuril creation or evolution of a stonding group, or certrLin sections of a etandin^; nature to au(5"ient the cd hoc systcnij should the need bo cone necessary because of inat.\cnuacics revenXed by cxpt^rricnce.

2, It was recoij.icnded tliat the Militcry Advisers Group

*

approve the conclusions of this paper and nake arrangcricnts accordj.nEly.

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3- The French delegation did not accept the recor.r-endatlon

- Dade in this report. It questioned the usefulness at the

prcesont tine of tlie creation of a peiTian^i^nt secretariat and

held the view that coor:Unatian of studies can be G:itiofactorily

carried out by the Staff Planners at their r.eetings. If it

vas agreed in the future that closeir epprdination vas required

it could best be achieved through the nilit?.ry liaison GX^oup

without setting up a nev; body hovrever snail. It also su^^r^^osted

that as a rule ad hoc cor.i:iittces r.:eet in a fev places, centrally

located in the-Treaty Area.

HOTE; The Joint ChAefs of Staff have no objection to the

establiskient :of a s^iall pornanent secretariatj which would be an^ inst.rur,cnt of tl-je Military Advisers and suJ)ordinatv plarniing corj.jittces. Hcvever^ the Joint . Chiefs of Staff would not a[i:ree to tho possible evolution of sucli a secretariat into an orn;r;nlzatlon of a standin;^ / ' _nc^ture as indicated in subparar^raph 1 c above.*

J.CS, 1992/h6h

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on 19 Jul'j toss. Co:ic%trrinj wsr^ tii3 S:^^a;al Assiss^.ni, fyitsl-Unenc^, mpttrtnLCrA oJ SirJo; ihz Assistant CrJaf Oj Staff, C-2, Dcparl-^naytt oj t/iB ^trrav: Ih-^ Director of Ilci^al Intelli-neiic^; the Director of l7iteUi:,'aiice, UiSAF; a^id t7ie Deputy Director for l7it^lli^c:iDe, The Joint Staff, The Ato^rJo Er.troy ComTiiis'^ion }lepi-evjiita.iixa to the JAC^ ar:d the /.isistant to thQ Director, Federal Bureau of Inv3$ti:^at:oii, c-hstcdnad, the subject bcir^j o:tlsiCc of their j^rr:sdict:on.

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PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN NO:<T>^ VIETNAM

• ' TO JULY-1956-

(Supersedes Porfions of Nlir 63-7-54 on K^rih Vieinam)

THE PROBLEM

To analyze the present strengths and weaknesses of North Vietnam and to estL mate probable future developments and trends to July 1956,

CONCLUSIONS

1. The immediate concern of the "Demo--cratic Ropublic of Vietnam" (DRV) is to consolidate its control in the area north of the 17th Parallel and to gain control of South Vietnam. (Para. 14)

2. We believe that the DRV will experience no great difficulty in maintaining eiicctive control of North Vietnam during the period of this estimate and will probably retain a considerable measure of prestige and general acceptance. Hov^^-ever, passive resistance and discontent resultinfi- from harsh control measures and poor economic conditions may increase toward the end of the peilod. If the situa^tion in the Soutli does not deteriorate, the na^tionalist appeal of Ho Chi Minh and the DRV wii: probably be reduced throughout Vietnam. (Para. 23)

3. The DRV is confronted by serious economic problems of which the current rice shortage i.s the most criticaL Its present export potential falls far short of providing sufiicient funds to pay for neces-

sary, imports. Hov/ever, the Sino-Soviet Bloc ^will almost certainly provide sufin-cient economic and technica.1 assistance-to meet minirriiun requirements for stability and control With such assistance the DRV v/il3 probably make gradual progress in g-aining control of the econ--orny and in rehabilitating transportation, irrigation/ and industrial facilities, (Paras. 24-30) :

4. Since the Geneva Conierence, the strength of the DRV regular army has been increased substantiaJly by drawing on regional forces to form nev/ units and by the receipt of new and heavier military equlprneiit from Communist China, -DRV forces are capable of defeating all -military forces, including the French, j nov/ located in South Vietnam, Laos, and I Cambodia, (Paras- 31-35)

5. The present DRV tactic with respect to South Vietnam is to pose as the cliampion of Vietnamese hidependence and unification, and as the defender- of

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^ -the provisions of the Geneva Agreenjent,^ The DRV probably still believes that it

* could emerge from Iree nationwide elections v/ith control of rJl Vietnam. It v/ill attempt to appear reasoiiable in any ne-gotip^tions concerning procedures for elections. While the Communists almost certainly v/ould not agree to complex and , elaborate safeguards a.nd gua^rantees, they probably would agree to some form

- of ''neutral" (but not UN) supervision. They would probably estimate that such election controls would work to their advantage in the Soui^h and, as manipulated, would not adversely a:^sct their position in the North. (Paras. 4^45)

6. In the meantime, the DRV will con-tiinie its efforts^ through subversion, intimidation, and propaganda, to weaken the Diem government, and to bring to pov/er in the South men prepared to ac-

" cci:>t a coalition v/ith the DRV, (Para, 46)

7. The Communists in their propaganda have revepJcd sensitivity to the implication of the Manila Paxt v/hich incorporated Vietnam, Cambodia, and Lacs :n its area of protection. We believe that concern for Vv^estern, and particularly US re-actions, together v/ith general considera- j

tions arising from over-a,ll Bloc policy,! will prevent the DRV from openly in-} vading the South during the period of this estimate- Similarly;'the resumption of v/idespread guerriJIa activities appears , unlikely prior to the election deadline, unless the DRV should come to the con- \ elusion that South Vietnam can be wen ]

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only' by force- Such a conclusion v/ould become more likely should the Diem government persist in refusing to enter tiie^ election discussions, should election dis- ,

I

cussions not proceed favorably -for the . DRV, or should the Diem government succeed,- with US assistance, in consolidating its strength to the point of becoming' a nationalist altc-rnatlve to the ^ lio regime. Moreover, if during the / period of this estimate little progress is ' made tov^ards l^elaxing tensions, Peiping a.nd Moscow might pemiit the DRV greater freedom of action. Should the: TypC^ decide to uss fores short of open : invasion, it v/ou!d probably attempt to ^' undermine the Saigon government by,' initiating a. campaign of sabotage a,nd' terror, seeking to formation of a new gov-' ernnient more amenable to demands for a national coalition. These tactics are likely to include the activat ion of DRV ' gi:errilla units now in South Vietnam and ! their reinforcement by the infiltration in 1 sm^Jl units of regulars from the North, (Para, 47) , - - ■ ' ^_

3, The DRV v/iil probably refrain from launching an attack with its ov;n forces to seize Laos during the period of this ' estimate," It v/iIl probably continue efforts to convince the Royal Laotian government of the propriety of the DRV attitude toward" Laos, while covertly strengthening the rebel Pathet Lao movement. The DRV Vvould probaljly infiltrate armed units mto Laos to assist the Pathet L?.o ii Royal goverirment-military a,ction should seriously threaten the

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-For an estimate of probr^bl^ ^?ve]opir*enrs in Laos, see XIK 63^^55, ''I^obr.b!5 Dovelopinents in L:i03 Through Jul^ 1S5G/' to be pubJishecl* in July 1D55,

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Patliet Lao position in the northern provinces. (Paras. 4S-49)

9. The Communists now have fev/ assets

m

in Cambodia and will probably be unable to develop a significant-interna-l threat in that country until their position is greatly strengthened in La.os or South Viet-nana,'* In the meantime, the DRV will prob. Ay continue its efxorts to i:}romote

friendly relations and to secure Cambodia^; neutrality. (Para. 50)

10. We beheve the DRV v/ill be v^illing to continue political and economic contacts v/ith the French. Ilov/ever, it almost certainly will be umwilling to make ?*ny agreement v/hicli in fact v/ould permit the French to retain an economic and cultural position in North Vietnam. (Paras. 51-56) . ^ ^ .

DISCUSSION

I. INTRODUCTION

Ih Under the terms of the Geneva Accords, and with tlie Hnal v/ithdrawal of French forces from.the Haiphong area on IS May 1955, a Communist regime known as the "Demo-ci'atic Republic of Vietnam*' (DRV)"has assumed full respoiisibility for the administration of the territory of Vietnam north cf the 17th Parallel, pending a political settlement and the unification of the country.

12. The DRV, known also as the Viet Minh, .vas established at the end of the Second World War when a coalition of Vietnamese of ail political leanings drew together under the leadership of the veteran Communist, Ho Chi Minhj and proclaimed Vietnamese independence. The DRV openly and frequently professed its solidarity v/ith the Sino-Soviet Bloc after 1949. Since then any loss by the DRV of its Vietnamese support has been offset by a considerable increase in organizational and material sti^ength and by the prestige of victories over French forces.

13, Although the recent assumption of responsibility over 13 million people and several large cities has confronted the DRV with major problems, these problems a.re not entirely new or unrelated to previous DRV experience. During its years of resistance, ivhich was conducted until 1950 with little or ■ - ^■ - -. ^ ^...,

*For an csUmate of probable devclopnients in Cambodia, see NIE G3.2-55, "Probable DQvclop-nients in Cambodia Through July 1956/' to be published in August 1955.

no external assistance and under conditions of severe physical hardship and austerity, the DRV leadership was able to weed out the v/eak and timid, build an effective arrny, train a substantial number of experienced cadres and local administators, and" obtain considerable experience in the techniques of political control. \Thus, when the DRV assumed''control of all North Vietnam in 1954, it possessed considerable advantages over the Diem government jn terms of military strength and experience, organization and sense of unity and purpose, .

14- While the immediate concern of the DRV is to consolidate its control in the North and to gain control of South Vietnam, its longer run objectives almost certainly are to build a strong Communist state in all Vietnam and to. assist in the extension of Communist control throughout Southeast Asia/

II- INTERNAL SiTUATlOM AMD TRENDS'

.j: fX

D-

Svabiiliy and Euec;']vene35 oT me Kegime

15, The DRV is organized on the normal pattern of all Communist ^'peoples democracies," Although the government of the DRV ostensibly represents all elements in a *'united front" grouping (the Lien Viet), actual power resides in the Com^munist party (the Lao Dong or V/orkers Party), Out of a total population in North Vietnam of some 13 million, the Lien Viet is estimated to have approximately 3 million members, including the Lao Dong, which

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NUMBER 63.r~4~55

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on 13 Sc2Jt^yribcr 13oS* Conciirrlii-j loere the Specicl Assistant, InielUo^'noa, Department of Slate; the Assistant Chief of Staffs C-2, Department of tJis A.rmy; the Director of Naval Intellvjenoe; the Director oj Jnlelliuenee, USAF; and the Deputy Direetor for Irdelligeiice, The Joint Stajj\ The A^tomic KnertjV Co7nrnissi07i Representative to t7ie J AC, and the Assistant Direclo", Federal Bureau of Investigation, a'bstazned, the stfoject oeing outside of their jiirisdiciion.

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CONSEQUENCES OF POSSIBLE US COUl^SES OF ACTION .. ' ■ . WITH RESPECT TO V1ETNAA4' -

•: ■ . ■ TF;E Pi^iOBLEM

To estimate the deterrent ef/ect on the Viet Minh of certain US courses of action; to assess the consequences of a US failure to counter overt Viet Minh aggression' and to assess the political repercussions of US armeh intervention against Viet Mizih aggression. ■ ' -

* <

I INTRODUCTOP.Y NOTE

1. We continue to regard as valid the estimate made in NIE 63.1-55, namely that during the period of the estimate (to July 1953) "concern for Western and particularly US reactions, together with general considerations arising from over-all Bloc policy, v/iU prevent the DRV

' from openly invading the South/' We also believe that the px^esent Communist policy of reducing international tension malces nnlikely the resort to overt aggression.

11, DETI^RRENT EFFECTS OM TME VIET MINH OF TH5 US UKDErrrAXING SUFFICIENT MILITARY, POLiTlCAl, AND ECONOMIC STEPS TO CLEARLY CONVINCE THE COM/'AU-NiSTS THAT OVERT AGGRESSION 3Y TnE VIET M!NH AGAINST SOUTH ViETNA/A WiLL BE MET BY SWIFT AND DETERMINED US ARMED INTERVENTION

2. This assumed US course of action vmuld render even less lil^ely than at present any overt aggression by the Viet Minh against South Vietnam, The Communists v^/ould prob*

^The possible US coiirses ot action considered herein v.'cre furnLshcd the intclliscnce commum-ty for the purpo.TOS of this estimate, '"Aggression" in this paper'is ceSncd as a Viet Minh attack by overt amcd forces across the anni,^tice line, of such a character that it can clearly be labeled as a^grc^ssion and is generally regarded as such by free v/orld opinidn.

ably estimate that: (a) Viet Minh forces alone would not be able to capture South Vietnam in the face of swift and determined US armed intervention; (b) Chinese Communist assistance v/ould have to be on such a Scale as to seriously risk spreading the war beyond Vietnam; and (c) acquisition of South Vietnam would not be v.^orth such a risk. These considerations v;ould ler^d the Communists to refrain from overt aggression even if they could. see iio prospect of winning South Vietnam by other means and believed they enjoyed a marked superiority in forces locally available,

3. The assumed US course of action would not' in itself preclude either a Communist decision to initiate large-scale guerrilla action in South Vietnam or the clandestine support oi such actions by the Viet Minh.

4- The dcten^ent ellect on the Communists of the assumed coiuse of action v/ould be in-increased if the US made it clear that nucles^r weapons w^ould be used. If the US made it clear th?vt nuclear v;eapons would not be used the deten^ent ellect would be reduced. However, the Commmiists ^vould probably esti-mPvte thp.t the US w^ould not maintain such a position if faced vnth a deteriorating militaiT situation- In the absence of any clear indication, the Communists w^ould ahnost certainly base their plans on the possibility that nuclear weapons V'ould be used.

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in. CONSEQUENCES Or A US FAILURS TO INTEi^VENE AGAINST AN OPEN VIET MINH ATTACIC AFTER HAVING TAKEN THE p;^ERARATORY STEPS ASSUAGED IN II ABOVE ,

5. The Communists v/oulci vigorously exploit the opportunities in Asia created by the failure of the US to intervene in Vietnam. Although Coinmunist China and the Viet Minh would probably not launch early overt aggression agahist other countries, Chinese Commu-aiist diplomacy would probably become openly threatening, possibly supplemented by intim-Jdatory troop movements near the Chinese Commimist border with Burma and Laos or v;ithin Communist-held Vietnam. Communist policy would also be furthered by greatly increased support from overseas Chinese communities.

6

The Chinese Communists would probably apply strong pressui^e against those countries whose determination to resist Communist inroads had been most weakened. They v/ould demand an accommodation to the Bloc going beyond the benevolent neutralism that is the current goal of Communist strategy .in much of the area. V/here more forceful action appeared necessary, Pciping would almost certainly encourage local Communist groups to resume and enlarge guerrilla operations and vrould support those operations more directly than in the recent past. In some cases units of Chinese Communist troops^ possibly of minority origin, might be assigned to reinforce local guerrilla units. Communist operations against the ofTshore islands might be stepped up, but a full-scale attack against Taiwan v;ould probably not be initiated.

7- The consequences of a US failure to Intervene to save South Vietnam v/ould be most serious in Asia. US prestige and iniiuence would be drastically lowered, and the Manila Pact as an effective instrument against Communist aggression Vr'ould ahi:tost certainly be destroyed. Even immediate and forceful subsequent US action elsewhere in Southeast Asia might not persuade any state in the ax^ea that further Communist pressure could be resisted. These countries would be reluctant to accept

US offers of assistance from fear that closer alignment with the US v/ould merely invite the Communists to further acts of aggression ^nd that in such an event US assistance v/ould not be forthcoming. They v/ould become increasingly Inclined to attempt to maintain .their independence through negotiated understandings with Peiping.

8. Both Lacs and Cambodia v/ould probably initially proclaim a neutralist position but v/ould shortly enter into cultural and economic agreements with Communist China as the first steps T:oward political accommodation. Thai apprehensions for their own security would greatly increase. Succcijsive govcrninent changes might bring to power a leadership amenable to an accommodation with Communist China. Burma would probably not consider such Comnnmlst action as a direct threat and v;ould seek to rear.atn neutral. Should the Thai government reach an -accommodation v;ith the Communists, Burma would become concerned and v/oufd probably seek a closer alignment with India, The British would be gravely concerned over the security of Malaya and would almost certainly press for the conimitment of US forces to the defense of Malaya. Although the Philippines, South Korea, and Nationalist China ^ w-ould rem.ain allied v/ith the US» tliey v/ould have grave doubts concerning the lutm-e. They V\^ould almost certainly press the US for a more concrete demonstration of its determination to defend them. In Japan, neutralist sentiment would increase. Indonesia would attempt to maintain a neutral orientatloii but would be drawn toward an accommodation v/ith the Communist Bloc as Communist influence spread thi'ough mainland Southeast Asia.

9. The reactions of the Western Euroi:)ean allies of the US v/ould be mixed. Oa the one hand, they v;ould be concerned about the implications of US withdrav/al in the face of an open Communist attack, and there would probably be an increase in defeatist and neutralist sentiment. On the other hand, we believe that these concerns would tend to be offset by their relief that a crisis in the Frr East had not led to a renewal of ai^med con-

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flict which might embroil them in general war. In any event, the Europeans would not necessarily conclude that the US would fail toresist Coinniunist aggression in Western Europe, Middle East defense arrangements might become more difncult because of a loss of confidence hi US commitments,

IV. CONSEQUENCES OP A FAILURE OF THE US

TO INTERVENE AGAINST AN OPEN ViET

MINH ATTACK V/lThOUT HAVING PRE-

' " VIOUSLY MADE INTENTIONS CLEARER

THAN THEY ARE AT PRESENT

10, The local reactions to the US failure to intervene under these conditions would be virtually the same in Southeast j\sia as they would be under the conditions discussed in Section III above* It is widely believed In Southeast Asia that the US is already committed through the Manila Pact to the defense of South Vietnam and that it has strong moral obligations to the Diem government. However, if the US had made its intentions no clearer than at present, the Communists would be less inclined to believe that the US failure to intervene indicated that the US would not resist Communist aggression elsewhere. The Communists might therefore proceed more cautiously in their eflorts to exploit the situation created by the fall of South Vietnam, Outside Southeast Asia, the damage to US prestige and the decline in the will to resist Communist pressure would be less than under the conditions discussed in Section III above.

v..

V. CONSEQUENCES OF US ARA-VED INTERVENTION IF THE US (q) STATED ITS OBJEC-

TIVE V/AS LIMITED TO RESTORING THE STATUS^QUO AT THE 17fh PARALLEL, OR (b) STATED ITS OSJECTiVE V/AS TO DESTROY THE ViET MINH REGIME AND EX-, TEND iNON-COM^AUNIST CONTROL TO ALL VIETNAM

11, Asian and European approval of US armed intervention against clearly recognls^able Communist aggression v/ould be tempered in varying degrees by the fear that the fighting could not be limited to Vietnam. Our NATO allies and Japan Vvould exert pressure on the US to limit its objective to restoring the status-quo and to Iceep its military actions clearly consonant with that objective. They w^ouldf be deeply concerned if the US declared its ob-( jective to be the destruction of the Viet MinhX regime, or carried the fighting beyond Vietnam. India and other neutrals v/ould exert

>every Cilort to bring the figliting to an end.

12, The other nations of mainland Southeast Asia would be encouraged in their efforts to resist Communist pressure by US intervention. They too, however, would fear that the fighting could not be limited to Vietnam, and that they would become embroiled in general war in the Far East, Only Nationalist Ciiina, the ROK, and possibly Thailand and the Philippines, v;ould give unqualified support to a US declaration that its objective was to destroy the Viet Minh regime and extend non-Comrnunist control to all Vietnam,

13, The Communist reactioiis to US intervention would probably depend on the course of US military actions rather than on any statement of US objectives.

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U*S« Policy in ths Svant-cf a Henev;al

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Beoa'ase of the- sensitivity of the docTanents

attached it is rociuested that they.be distributed on a strictly liifiited^ neod-tc-kno^; biisis* Extra copiej of the cables are firmished so that tliey rr^ay be appended to the . papers you distribute -r.cithout the need for wox.-2 office to re'Lij-oduce theiiic. . ■

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and recu:l:c5:T.Gnts cf L%S^ n'diitary c3:j£::-ations^ with e.;vi V7ithGut ator/iio voapons^ (1) tc rapnlsc and punish ove:::* V:-etr:lnh as gross! on., or (2) to d^istir^oy Vistmirh: forces and taho control ot l^orth Vietnc^::!. - *' .

2. The Jo5.ni;Chiaf5 of Staz":: consxcc- "i'-atfor near luc-are^ \i;iass:'.s'C3:i Soccn V:=:3'';:^av^cse icij^jo;^; ^:i,i,-L oa ca*Dab?_e of only il:::ltGd ras:Lstan:::e against d&t:^^^!ii:Lnod^

poi-tion cf South Vlafean would pi^-o^ably be o7£::?*?\i2-, the in-05gi-i-cy of clerisnts of tl^i cofevidin^ foi-ces "ould

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fj_::^st tasl-: Cusratlons to i^e'julse and "vonlsh gvg

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^ a. xniniedlate U'.S. naval and ai:^ at^ao!: a^a^^i^s X 0 t.v.lnh f or a e 3,

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to oppose the- aggression

c, ^Early r.ovGrnsnt fo:r,vard o:C mobile tuS^ Tore for the i^JirposG of cond-aotin^ jolnt^operations loj tasks beyond the capabilitiGs oi". South VletnciTiase

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taskj to dei^troy Viletinir^i. forces -r,! vcjca\ control oC

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o2" creating cona^tions wider ^rhicli vlie I'orcas oi" Soiith

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nlargad :nlssion. Such a campaign ^ould ba :Lnlti.avCd by

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supply lines from CoriiHirjiist Chr.-;.a\.

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to seize bases a:cd othe:? i::i^Oj:':;cnt ^./j^^^--v^^:. c^.^u

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sv/ijit and docisive action is believed d-2j/GridGx.f en th3 military ener-gy and £o.\idai\ity o:t thG Vlrtnanase. ths

extent of^ warning and pr*3palpations r:adG boiTor^ :?.n a th e r ^ s t r i 01 i on impo sea. on U.S. ni li t a i^;^ c;>3 r a t i on s ^.' and tha season of th3 yar^r* It is cstiniated that opa::--:.-' tions to carry out the fi::^£t tas": corld be l:frhinatc-d in

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une vi^Gtniinh

a I'GW inonvhs 'co ona year zo on-3:;;: ar^res^iLon.

tins night bG rGCfuirefi to cj.oar oir: all the Vi

back to thG 17th parallel. The ti:-:3 nGeded for carrying.

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out the second tash cannot be accYirataly estinat^d* Shoui Gmplcyrient of atonic '^.csapcns not be authoi/ii^cd a longer ■

employment of U.S. arned forces and conseo;:ently rriight require .^^reatar forces than the u"*S, y'^OLild bo jiistified

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naf^nitude. of tvo ^o :?cur U.S. divisions rhould be

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ba r(^cuir'3d. BGOiirV^Gnients -or u.S* z'^ovuic. forc-35 i;OLild ba subject to 'sec-\\oti.ori to thG extent thrat offectix'^c- forces ^;£^s provi'.ded by otl'ler Mciiila ?^c': countries or* by other AlIiGS,

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7. The Gffects upoii other U.S. i::ilitar-y ooi::n:it^Gnt5 as a result of thc;se'cpGTcitions by U*S, arnicd forces in South2ast j^sia v:o\;ld bo significant aiiu in proportion to tho amount of diversion of forces to this area and the spsed vith V;hich these diverted forcess arc ret-arned or replaced, Kov/ever^ the ^leet Karina Forces and certain Avny forces in the Pacific could ba cepioyed to the area te^iporarily without serious. effects en other x-iilitary corn^itnents and without necessitating partial i::obili^;ation

or substantial"increases in fores levels support^

*■* ^ ^ '^ *^"

S. The strongest ^deterrent to Yietmirili aggression.

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and.^ at the sane tinej the nost effective pre^^Lir^^vUi^ military step vould be the stationing of u'.S, forces in South VietnaiTi. Hov;ever^ this course of action is pro-

the Geneva aj^reerrients

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r>rGsently deployed in the ?ar East by deploying inobilo

^ro^md'forces oH approxi^nately corps strength toge'cher

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v/ith naval and air forces into ^zriZ Sout:icast .-^^sia ci^^^ prepared for rap5.d corj^vitnent to South Vietnan,- I^evertha-

at th 1 s tir^e the na j 0r "chr eat to South Vie tnara con 1 inue s * to be that o^ subversion^ and vaitil there are :;,ore conclusive indications of overt co!;res5ion, it is not .ccn:^id4: GO that additional force ^^ should be do ployed to\tha , Southeasi: Asia ar-^a^

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Declassified per Execmive Order 13526. Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 I

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is riiado to merriorrir^clvin for tr-e Saoretar;^ of j^cXgiisg

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.b* CcntinuGd inprovGD^rit of basas in Thailnni ■ and Car.bodia for use in support of Vlc^.aiTiGsa forces

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c, Speci?.l training for y^ilcct^d Vletii^n^s^ persorjiGl, exits ids of Vietn^rr: if necessary ^ in U.S, rasthods of exploiting air and n:ival su^'':'Or.t in grovind

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the special tactics and tschr>.icues of cnploying atc^^i:; weapons su^^ort, - ' -- ^ " .

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of the KrLiiila Fact incXudinj co:::binod ti^aining/ Exorcises could b^ tinned to at'tain optiriuni psycho--logical and political irripacitj J^or arcaiapla-. ."joint and combined nancuvar' type G:x:arc{sGs in tha Hlillppines Oi* Thailand co^^ld "dg schednlui^d iiriinediatoly pi-ior .to thG Vietnain elections to indicatG pro2^ess.i::ade hy ncn-GpLii^r:nist nations toyard collective s^curity^

e_, .^side from the fo::'Ggoin^*. prepar^atior.s can

DG r4^cC3 ior Tsne rapia novcniozrG p partiGs and sc^e g:i::o\:nd liaison^ logistic and coi:;-mimications pcz-sonnol to "Viatnau.^ in advance of rja;Jo: U.S* fox'inaticnsj-^cq insiire an 'eax'lj^' C'lpability for U ,S , supporting operations ^ Siuilar7,y^ prcpai-^ations can be nade for early daployrnGnt of special U,S, forces to provide a capability for grotind delivery of atonic wea'oons.

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10. In the early' stages^ Vic^tminh aggression would ■ probably be characterised ^by a f luid- sitvta'^icn v,"it> dispars-ed clashes between opposing- forces.

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During later stages^ however^ suitable tar^exs could be, expccxed to dGVG?L0p as a res^ilt of friendly efforts to

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vjcapons should result-in'a ccr::>?.dL^rchl<= reduction in fri^Xi<ily casuaitf!Gs and in niorc-^rapid ccss?::t:'.ors of ho;-ti\:".--

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the v.s^ of atomic weapons^ or on ot-i-3r r.:.lir:irv^orj3r£:--

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Staxx consiaer cnc^u xx- ar^crac ■.:::'ji^:on.v \:c^irs not 'ds^c.

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■ 11» The Joint ChiGfs of Stafz" rvitcrctc the vlcv/ exp-jTcssed in their ricinoraridurii,^ cat-ad 11 7^bv*u.:iry If5?: • suhjecu: ^'Gonc£pt and Plr^ns for the IinploL;r3nta'^iori,^ if

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the United States cannot ^^usi^antea tho terr5-tov'ir.l integrity of any merroer nation (of the Manila Pac^t), but at most can help secure the inc-=p'indenca of those coun'cri^s ^,vhose pGoplt?s desii'3 it and'vrhc are v;illiiig to undertalca ■ th^ responsibilities of self £o\-ern::;ient, - This appears'to be particularly applicable tc protGCted^ 'non-r;;£nbei

x<rz,, j,iJo J.oj/ti^o,,ii^ _^s ci ±o.s^ij. e::; L^-L^i-ia^vS O- i^.i^ xx^l^u.v* lament s » A rr,or e dof initive ansver cannot be n:a cg I'tnti 1 the Commander in Chief, Pacific, orovides a olan vhich he is presently developing„ . ,

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par*cic.\pa'ce iin the ac^iiion oi outlined in this ::ier:orandun.

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Dccliissincd per ENecutive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND G3316. By: NWD Date: 2011

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APHiI;?;DIX "A- '

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nnex '*A"*

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Annex *'3''^ - Naval Fo.'r-ces Annex ^^C^' - Air ?crce Forces

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1 Co-^"03 I-Isadcucirters V ^/ i Abn'Div 2/^6/ 1 Inf Div 2/ 6/ 1 'Abn Div 1/ "6/ 1 Tnf Div 3/

1 Inf Div 'V. ' ■

1 Inf Div ^y

1 Abii RCT 3/ 6/

1 AriKCi Cav Hegt 3/ 6/

1 Arrr;d Cav Kegt '^'/ 0/

1 Inf Div V

1 Abn BG? V/ *■ ; .

1 Inf Div 2/ V

D~Day

D-Oay D-Dsiy

DA 30 D/210 ^ D>^2^^0 "

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,1/ General riasorve . ^_ . . . . . ,

V/ Located in Ai'ea o? CISCFE "* ^, .:

5/ Located in Area,of CiaCPAC ' . " -

6/ Designated ?.s A-dg3ontation Forces for Contingency Planning of CII^C?:: and CINCPAC — ■ '^

Col'urJi 1 is based on readiness oi^ avciilability of units--Coluinn 2 indicated't;}>e tins unii^^ ooliIc bs t^vailable in the area based on surface shipping-Colu,7;n 3 incticatc-s the tirie the assault schelcns of specifiod units could ba available in the araa based on air raovernent,^ and provided cc^ibat and service suoport can be i^roviced by the force ccrrL^andar until' the non*-air transportable portion cf the iinits have arrived by surface shippings

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The above schedule does not talca into consiccrawion the availability of lift^ nor. other requireinents for lift J ineluding possible deployr-ients of other Services ^

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ANNEX ''3" -TO A???^"DT>: ''A"

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Attach: Carriers

ASVf Support Carriers . Escort Carriers

Battleships ■ Cruisers

Destroyers . Submarinos

Am'ohibious ^-^

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, Pa-cro.L Scrat-.di'-ons (V?) Airship Sqitad^'ons (Z?)

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Air V/ings FOOTNOTES:

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2-2/ 1-2/3 2/

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a/ C^EC?AC?Lr Hi^intains unaer a flest corr-^ncor in t^e

VJo s t aril Pacific^ us in g b^, s e s i n oEjo^Tx ^ Kcr o c.., the Hyi;^:y us Philippines and Marianas a fleet cciTi^jCsed ci'

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riors wi'cn supporting ooiiibat ships* ^Ciu?rantjLy appro:'rir::at8ly 3-%- attach carriers j 1 ASV/ support 'carrier^ 2 cruisers. 32 destroyers.) ^ ^

/mti^-subraarine v/ar^are units inducing escorts

oatrol aircraft

Appropriate subraarine and mine warfare 'onitst

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Requisite nurnbar of auxiliaries including an under-way replenisnnieni^ group c TIiis fxeeu is m acc.iticn to thos^ forces sho-jn locatod under *^?ar Sast*^ Additional ?AC?L? forces :v:ay be considered available f or operat'ions short of ganera 1 var ^ s'abJect to specific determination in the licht of conditions

prevailing at the tir;e^ as follcv;3

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1 Attacl^ Carrier and 1 Sscc::t Carrier \rit^i ' supportin2 co■'ibat ships 'and 3 Patrol Sqi:ad2"'ons ^■1-1/3 KarDivs. 1 MarAlrV/lng. a::id Ari:-:^hibiGUS

Troop HdGtrs^cnd-2/3 ^-phibious Lift (Div),

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Both CIrlCPAC (and CIHCFi;) should plan for' use oi* the forces available in the F?.r East-V/cstern Paoif area plus the augmentation shovrn above for contih^ planning, * \ ' ' -

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2/3 Marine Divisions and 2/3 Karine ii3 under forces loc^atod in the ^ Pacific are East and tonporarily assigned CliiCFS^

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assigned to the operational ocntrol of C0>2;1y?2 in cor^-nection vith the current situation in the Far Saat Con-mand ^

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Declas^incd per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

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SAC snppoiH and such' sup^^ort fi^oin CIMC/S as is directed by the Joint Chiefs of Stafv*, ■ ^ ''

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Col-urnn 1 abova indicates the d^y on rhich v^nits ^vi":. be ready fo:^ deployment firc-rr: their cvjn baas^ * Co?janin 2 indicatas ths t:c.:a tha units ccald ba av^.:ll-able in the theatar basse; i^pcri surface shippings Col'arrzH 3 indicates tha tir.e" the luiits v;ould ba

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Ox the units i^erG^ airlifted.

The above Dchaduls does not ta'ce 5-nto cor^^icaration tha availability of lift; nor pther r3C:uir3::icnta for lixtj including possible d'3ployi::an'ts of othar Sarvica

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additional S^^^ tons/^^onth

fi;. Unless Jet aii'* bases ar-o mad3 available in " Vic;tnam prior to tho Gutbi*3a:i of hos:tiliti38j an aviation anginas:^ sffcr-t of up to 25 aviation angin^^ev^ battalion jnonths pa^ air fiajld may ba- raqviirad to provida air basas for- tho^^ j'ot air unit^ to ba daplcyad to Vietnam, :

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divisions are deployed. Of the reouirad I^ar^ina Cor;p^ logistic support' forces J an adequata r.uoleus is available to support up to tv:o M?.i*ine Al'^:* Gr-ovn^i Ci?ask Porces, Prolon^cea incobaiidoiit o'j^^?ations

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to sustccin 5ueh op5r'ation,5.

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forces ar-o availabl3 in the activa fleet-in the' event of a pz-'olon^acl cr.ar'gency^ additional logistic suppoz't units vjould ba reqviirad to suppor-t sustained ooerations.

(

c. VJater trans'oort for uo to four division;

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equipj:::ent and supplies v/i'c^hin a period of cO days^ and for up to four additional divisions during the

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In connection v;ith the abova"; the follOTCin^ shipping

capability is estir^atei to be available: , -

Notional 0>ren3^o:?t Ca^ab-.I5.ty - ?5.cif?.c

MSTS (active & ROS} C Gi'/r-ia rc i fel (a c t i ve.; Reserve fby D/^O days} Reserve (by Jj/%0 days)

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3-5

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by D/lyO

^^

bo.O

N otional Car;;o CcLoability - Facific

F

MSTS (active) ■ ■ .

kS?S Active Heavy lift C^s Coirincr-cial (activa) Rese3?v£ (VC2 = a} (byEK^J^O days)

. . 'Total by 3/^0

17 2

13:

0

224

The reserve ves.^;els can be activated as indicated on an erriersency basis if highsst priority is givea for men, r-iaterials^ and facilities, -In vie?; of the . above capability existing shipping capacity can i-eet a recuirei^ient of appro:^inately three divisions and supporting enuip:?.ent after positioning of shi^/pin^ is effected (approxiriately 15/20 days). By S/SO days

• ■ 1013

TO?'SEc?ae

Declassified per Executive Order 13526. Section 3-3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

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a iovj?'oa. cavxsicn can ce cr£nspo:rGca 03^ reserve

3 ac^^ivated. Capacity noeis the voIu:-:3

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divJvSlon caraiot bo 'tra-n£3:'crtoo- to be £iva:L\able v7itri:ln the ?-raa by D;-^55 '^"^-t can rGc^oh the axe a by J^^^oO C?^ys.

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H,>:?- G V1- n^ . ccirr^ 0 s n:-, 'cs can J:ie e 'o car;<o re a vii'-reni^ nx; s.

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V f, Thero ^-:?e 7 aviation engineor battalions in the *!?ar Saat and li in the United. States.

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a^; 'Js3 of existing fcrces and natoi-^iels for this operat^lcn vrould ganercally 00 at 'the direct expense of ctho:? cq:-:i\iit:-ri^nts and v;ould constitute a serious iv:ald:;pIoyi-ent of logictic forcef> and ;;:aterieX if a

!^C^e"^*a - ''.*P'-^^ FlhoV*^ ^. fyri^^^-i-r* pi^r*<^ort""sj^"i pn'^ fn^tp^T ^T.

■'-"j^nV"•'! r^pr/io^'i-> p- *!-<^ ;^i t .,'%*^^^•^''- ^-T--*o nr^^ r'p h'* r^n l*o n'^ ''I npr-^sR'i "b^ "'t'^

ryp'■■*!--* -^ "i v^i^^il^*: 1 -: *;'o ^'*- r^-n

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■£- Suppo/.-^t of^ this Operation v;ould probabiy cv^rtaii MDA? deliveries to the 'Title- X. IX and IV countries.

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rersonnel ceilin^^s for Services raust be raised .t 100 per cent iTianning of ships^ units and installations racuired in support of both t?,^^;:s.

X

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b^, Hcitensive construction t:ill-be required in ^/ietne^Vi^, to include, bvit not lir.iited t;o; ^.ir bas<

** .* ,*.

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AcvCTvJ.i*;ieSj S';orC'/v3 rac:;.j-iticSj roads and port facili-'i^ietr-.

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TO? S3CKET

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND Cj3316. By: NWD Diite: 2011

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production j?acilities expr-nclad ir, crcl^'j* to 'oorrilt increased production.

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unuil production is e:ypnnd£:dj mo"bilis?:tion

roserve stocks rau^it 'be utilised. £oi:^ itaivis of rasarve stook=s require a lead tine of on:^ to tv;o year-, Even soj shorta^Ds i?iil e::ist bocauss of nonavailability of critical itei;i3.

■° - * '

£. Navy and Air Force stocks in Philippines nuet

be built up*- ■ ' ' ' ^ '

J- **

In ligbt of the Khorta^a of adequate port raciiioies^ extensive ovor-the-beech cffloadins of personnel and materiel vrill b3 required* Such offloadinp; v/ill be ^li^iited durin-. th:; first year

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terrain and due to shorte^;5 of ovsr-^the-bsaQb equiprt^ent and ships capable of offloading heavy eouipinent.

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until current facilitie;H

constructed*

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restricted by lack of adequate inland.transportation^ and by the difficult terrain,

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■ g^, Losiijtic support for up to IpOjOCO Vietnar.iese troobs will be reouired*

. Action Covered by ir'arac^raoh o c:V 2:";ncloc-,ure

h''

The employp-ant of ground forces as a deterrent v/ill have con si de rable lo v;i sties iinpli cati ens ^ the de t err-iina t ion of vjhion is largely dependent upon'the ezctent and nature of tha' deployniants reouired,' -', "

1015 .

TO? SBCHSO;

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Declus^jficd per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

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STATr; B3AFT STUI5Y

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TO? SSCRS!!:

Octbusr 6, 1955

OF A Ri^SlE'ilL K-^ jG-C^:Cii

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Tha follcving study is suiiaittad in response to the Planning Boar-d Mer/.orendvjn of August l6 which celled for a State Depai^t::ient '-study of political and s^oncrfiic measures, which would be required in support of ths opsrations" vjhich are described in thf^ JC3 !'lenorendum for the Secretary of Defense dated 9 oeDtG-'no^i'^"' ^^including nre'^aratory steps

.1^ J

^'j-nich inisht have a deterrent eiTect,

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A. POLITICAL:

Deterri=nt

1^ *

1

nost irri^ortant 'political c.ction which the

US could take to deter overt Viet Hinh aggression would be' a clear reafflrr::[ation in official public state^.ents of US intention to tahe vigorous action under the protocol zo the >uanila Pact in the event of such aggression.

2^ Similar stater.ents frc-n other nieriibers of the Kanila Pact vrould also provide a useful dete,;:rent^

3^ Possioiliiiies of securing such statements would

be affected by the ?:ani could nake. it

de^^ree to vrhich the Go

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v^.^^ ^■^►^nrs^ to "^erno for KSC^

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iCAUbure ou ; i^^iriu ^or :.o^^ "Uv^S., ?o.licy in the Event' cf Renewal of Aggression^ in Vietna^^'j Septenber 16.^ 1955*

lOIG

Dccbssined per Executive Order ]3526» Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

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uo-uld lie with ths Viet 'Cinh

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"by the OoverniLent of Viat Ivan of its 6.5ter:nination c.r-d

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country v/111 as sis

it

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and will s^rvt; as a detor-rent *5o Viet Kinh aK^xesslon,

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Accordingly^ the US should continiia to prevail upon tne Govern^Tient * of Free Viet jf?ar:'i to follow courses of i:ction'

i v;hicii ^rill

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should £tter;:pt to p^^rsuade tha Govormcant of l^rca Viat I\an ^ to establish a National Assembly as soon as ^^0£;siblG which V;Ould be aiidov/ed with authority i^o draw up a constitution to detsr;iiine the relationsni-D of Viet Kan i;ith FTan:^3 anc

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other countrreSp and decxare the officis^l position oi Free Viet Nam v/ith respect to the pre-^election consultations v/ith the Viet Minh and the eD^ections called for rmder the

*

Geneva agreement.*

'-V

US could also undertal:e political action to

assist in establishing military deterrents to aggression such as arran^in^ facilities for introduction of US mobile ground

forces into the Southeast Asian area should such co:;jr.i

(^;.;en it

of forces be decided upon. US political action T::ould also

be he

lT)ful if irnnroverrent of bases in Thailand cr other

m i^uuonec",s L ^--ii-^a v/eie j^icj^ulj-iv^cl^

*

?. In the evsnt of Viet Minh ove-^t asg^assicnj the US should sti::^\xlc/Qe an officisl Viet-Hanesa r^cuast to tha

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sx^n^ H^o^ xt

for assistance vnider tne pro\.oco±

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Dale: 2011

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Article IV or tho tii^eaty* ^he Ud shoi^ic!

strongly support the Viet 2;an;c3e r

pi^rl vo^ ^u^

fluence to secu^L^a action cy'tha r::onib3i"s cx the Pact iinc^i'*

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^iet Kciia

• • .*.

initiative to briri^ the issue to the Security Council of

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u.ne uni'coa .\abions m an eiioro xo seoui^5 coi'iaaniia'cion oi the Viot Minh and a U^I reservation calling to^: ^ cessation

OI ^■''

agression, ihe US should ccnqicsr in 'cno -^ign^ oz one

■

circumstcncGs at the tine vJh^thar or net it should sael: designation as United Nations CQi:':ia£:nG3r' in an organized UN

action.

7^

US uould undoubtedly have 1:0 insist tha

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supra;:::ie conii^ianc o:: any I'ci^ces contributoc aithor under tha Manila Pact ci' -u^ider ths United ?Tations should be vested

in the US, ine Jd uouj^d

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Viet Name. It should a^aphasize that r'raa Viet Na^ h^o. foriTierly called upon its ^^lanila Pact pi"otecto:^s to deploy troops within its ter^^^itoi^y to i^epal Viet.I-Tinh -^ggr^sslon

It should eru'ohasize \"ne fact that US exarclse of

co^iiv^and and tb^ u^essnce of fo-^ai^m ^foi^ces in Viet ^la:^ vone that the US intended to establish a colonial ]:^a^ii:;o*

1018

Declassilicd per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

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5, Viet Hiziii aggi^essio:! and consacuont introoL^ction of iO'i?eign troops into Fres Viet Ksrrr avoixlo s&riously npsst

tha Viot I^rarnese economic pEtt5:?n.^ "The proouotion of p^xxV and rubber v;onld be fvirthei" reduced, Sivo^oo:;?t of forcGs V. uld nscGssariXy cor.a froi^: abrcr.d. Viot 2van voulci bsccv.'ie

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even more fiepandent upon foreign aid.o lHXlt€.Ty necessity v.uuXcl reouire Viet ICain to accent increasea foreign, control

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nnd internationcil trade would hava to be dolas^tsd to "cho

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9uprei;-e Military Goini^iand. Tiie US vould have to oa t^reparea to extend subsT^antial econonuo assistance to Viet I^Iani and to exorcise a considerable cegroa of econordc authoritj'^*

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(K!~95)

To:

Ths Staff Plannoro '

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ubj': Ref:

(a) l;anii:£o!c RcpDi-t of (>-S July 195i> (TO? SrORliT)

0

I^ GI^TFRWj; In accordance v/ith tho provl^DfLon^i of refdronco (ei), tho Staff P'La^ins^r^i held thoir second co'^ercnco £iv ?craO- Hrortor, T.H* durlr.^ the period .VI6 novc::^.ber 1955* I^^ ndditilon to e:;a\niii5ji^ their figcridaj, thcj attcndad to other jaatto^^a raicod at the jiicatlBg and alf-o pr67:):^ccd a cQriprchGu:3ivo pz'0^;iVsao of future vrork of the Military Advir^era 0.vi:aDl£:ation. , ' I

?-. ■ JtoM^Ar^cafllJjJ:'!.^: ^iio Ad Hoc GotEiittGG on TnUOJA'jc^oe re^-vicij:^:! tJr:, a-i2nc!.:::1. t/is intcIHgcace ansG^^s-seats i.-j.ds in July 1955» Thosa Kiie.n:l-.:cnt:J h^vo been circulated- by the- vScorotrxiat and have been incoi*" I

poratocl .ill tho inLolllgoncc report '..Oiloh th-3 Militaj^y .'dvisGrs cro ., • ix-co:=-^3Kdcd to e^provo lu-der Asend?. Item I. •. -. . ' ' )

B. A'^:^:\J^7]XZ-^Jl.:^I^±]li OiOTS;' Theirs Agenda'itoo vore conrjoli-dntod foi* tno pm-poaoa of thlo riayzu^g Study)

.V

3- feq/ll-.^.lJ To dotcr/oiue tho e:ctotit of id-lixDj-y cupport for tho dofcncjo of EDut'a ViGtnrn^ l-zos^ and Cambodia in tho event of ovoi*t Co^;DiT.mi£;t r.^gi'ossion,

■ - * w

I^* ' i^ir^G]^^;^?^;:^^: Tho concept of oporatioiia requiroa that tho ijidi^onoup forcc3 of t'lree ctatoz; resist Co:^ami;3t r,:i^^-ro3idon to tho fiOJ. crctco.t of their capzibllitlon prior to and aftor tho Liti-o duct ion of SEATO forcoDs Tho initial op:^r.Ttion3 vDJ. ba to deliiiy tho advauo:* of the ConvJiilijt jU-nioD into fi^icndly ra'c:,D. S£:VrO forces i^vut be dm3.oyc:d to the tho?*tor of opDr^ntiona a3 G^^i^.y TvH pr^/jtic^rolo nf tc^r tli-^ Dt^^t of ;.

n:',rp:r-jioii end not later th.r:a 90 (i:\j3 Jja* order to cr-.^iire holdlr;;;^ a^- cxi ' ab::Dlu^3 ]iinJr:io^ the.SzJ..:io.^i rj^oa^ A.t a Ir.t^r r/i^-^-S^^ ^ coiurtor offc^iisive ■ \rill fc5 Liouutcd to clvivo the enc^iy froi^i the three ^tr-tep.

■ a

"3*. Forcn P.'^.nvir-^Krntf^: ^

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cu Tho forci rcq^aircasntr; for thxa action i7iil ba on tli- crd-v JO? SSHST . . ' ■ =7- • * ' ^ ■

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Declassined per Executive Order 13526, Section 3 J NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Dute: 2011

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(},} UavcJ, •" Cax*ripi' Striking Torco^ including it;; ^upporV ing tnA Lo£-5_str5-C clcF.eiits, /^SiJ llun tor-Kill or Crovip^ Hiiaesw.^spiiig force end. necescp.vy /u^iphibioup lif tp

(2) Gi^ovjid - Up to S Divisions plus £iupporting Tores J

(3) Aiv^ " 2 to 3 Tactical VJingfJ, 1 Tr.cticEl Eeconnr.iGseJioo VinSy ^ S'roop CcLrrier V/i:!i:^p Eci^boi' forco or long-r^j^gc Tightsr l>Dn^.bers as Gvaiiab^le fronvbasos outsido the thsat^:^^ of operation.

, % -

bo It chou.lci he noted that thscc forces are those required v/hcn tho d0fcnr:3 of tho t^u^oa stats2 is conzddered collectively and on the as£ra:rption th-j/t nnclcar uaapons vdLl not be usad^

* ♦

Co Tho forces depictsd aboYO, o:ro in addition to Incigcnous forces evailablGc *

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The aiooossfiOL defenno of South Vietnanip Laos and Gariibodia

3

±n vholly dopend::r.t on the tinaly deplo^^T'ient of SBiTO forces into th Theater^ in addition to operations by the indigenous forces,

bs On tho a:;5U!T>ption that nucj^eav veapons are not tised^ the forces roquired for the r.ueccpsfiLl cljfGn:^^ of Pcuth Victnci^^ L?.as txiA Ca^abodia are ujilrU^oly to b:i f.vailablej,- for the time beinf^^, iii ths muabers indicated and \;ith:in tho tib^^a hy \:hich they must bs deployed*

5o ]RonoT:>TiCncT'^.ticnn5 Jt io recoiis:aended that the ILllit^i^ Aclvlesrs a a lloto tho conclusions in i^ava^^raph 4 above, bp 'Approve thlp Dtudy*

.1/ Prqblens^ To cletcj-n^i'io the crtent of tho Hilitary ^Support nceoBssLvy for t}io"d3fenae of Th^llond In the event of overt Co.-iuiHiist

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c^grep^j-on^

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2 0 J5 i '^-H 3 T^lon ; ^ The 0 on c en t. 0 f op or at! on 3 for the d of en £: e of

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3« X'orcio r.rcilr-.t.r'.-iri.'iiss

(?.) Air ™ 650 culre:L-aft " *

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i[_ , tr^oup lo^dDtic iia\p2Do:.^t Sdi^ooz^ s^vcor'naiG^anoo n:^cl pah'ol forces raid irln:*

M . . ; . . bo - )-t fjhould ba not':;d. th-?/% t]ism Sqtoo at:sosrv:o:itn rcps:'C^»-

4

lirA^o to to n^ao up f?.xd outside couvcor-]^ cj/O thQ=:<"oforOp lar^o, _ * 1 '

' -5* C£::3/j^:li:^iSlQ- 3;t io cono;2;C:d3d.th:tts * . ' - ■ •

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. ' A* Choiild tho fo:.^oDG c^aoi^szd in tii5.G otiidy tD pro^/idod V/f

be !Ph^ ^orcoa d^filcicncion ro:-; tho tlccrca^D of Tho:5J-€nd^

' — ' c* ThacD *cVj:?:Volcna:loG cvo likoly to br-Doro i:.ovd r.'^asoae.bXo -. ^: ' \:hzn tho dofonco of Thri3.ond X3 conc^idj^cd 3ji 5,-^o?.at:loa to ot'jiji' i:oz;:?i'i)la " -eovs^cisp of r,c^t:lc:a p^r/to-'j^in^ to Soi^-thoaat ADila,. . , ■ . .' . < ^ -

j '■' tliQ dol'cnn^ of Si^o-lirivd to stiu^lcd 311 corro.\citic':i vi%\i tl^D jK-^ovicic:! of

- '/' / uUit:v;-y :A\ppo:/i <rcv* ±ho CoSC:.zzo'cyx h?.oz^ Qzr*:zC\5-':i cridf^^iitb Viotii::^ tv::^i

I \/it-h othor ia\p7:o:;'t5/i:^.:; coi\vi^:id 0:? action 5.i^clud5^i:j c/ttc.'ri!; ca G^loofed,

I*- . tx'SotD on tin C:vlivo:]:i iiia:]xlr:nd u::d^::3 bo't-a nMOlojr't:?.d <:^^^c:a1vicn:x>.

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Declas^jficd per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

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^0? S3CRET

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that ?t^JcL^sti:^;ii jToxc-33, au£'ir.3nti:cl hy falcVLtio.^:!-! C3.\T0 j?o:;c5s/ r^3:ler>* r.i

studies f^o fr-Tc' consid!jr3cl by Vne S'ccfx plrAin^i-zs, t/^is sU^uy br-o b-i^a ir.:\cJo in tb3 ccTt-3xt of Globnl Urjt^. Providod ti:^t t-h^ Dc^senW,al r^adfi-tlo^ica

d-dstroy^d by liolclini; either of tbs fo-llo:;5„ng thr^-G -lin:;S:

a, Th^ hir.dvlaish line: (Pcdgha t.ikT SM.bar Passes I?orth of. Kelral " Herat - Kschecl.)

b, !Ili3 Kabul - F^rJiiUav - ^-oMd-nn lin?,

c, 'The Khj^bor Pass - JO^ojak Pass -- Zaiiidan lira.

3* Fpi^l££. Kp^?sll^?jl^x'|^^ ^ii addition to t-hs Tore33 ^^Jr^^ccTy avail-Gblo in P^lcLstruij tba foiloirin^ iiilitfj,iy Gupjx>:vt ijill b5 reqiiirad:

, Alrcvaft cariTi^lor

Crii-isDr (CL) IDDstroyGr:^ (DD) Aa/A&"i:3Co:.:t Ve£:^Dl8 Sulm^irinpn (S3) Ocoi^:*i ,lLai9STrDap3X"*3 (All) Coastal ImiasirespDrs (AviS) Insliors Min3Si/a8per3 MTi5 and II?.:t-bor D^fenso Boa't lVa3j;er

Iforitir^a shoi*^ basod ^^i^crci^b Easo cjid rcpcdr ship

Fonr Si>: ■

.i/kj

(SDSs)

Tvslva 'Aralva

Oni! sqiicxTron

C-^) N':S^y}^* O-"^^ Arnioiircd cliv^-fjion oxtd ona AK^^urod

iv>conn?Lissarx3 re 2^'

(S) j2:f£ll^XXi K-ve iioro iii^DxAry di\"inions c-tid non^-di\dsional supporting uioits for elovon di%dsions*

* (3) Aix-bo?7r>.o: 0n3 Pi.ira/Bi"^is-da Group

c. Air S^^ADport:

■Fig'nt-ijr Eoii-cr cquEOccons (jots)

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TO? SECHai'

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND Cj3316. By: NWD Diite: 2011

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Light, bo:::b:tr SquccVroni: (jct^X *(inolvxUDS one Squadron for ■ Photo Rccco)

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squnrJron#

^^ \t^Kl'.^J&S3.- I^ogictic fr,ollitioG Gi;ch r^s cc:Tuunicatio?ip n^cli-cal^ trraisportatiOH; dccky^rd riid cix* bases \:onld hovo to ba ccnejidiirably 5.r:prov;jd cori^Qnsvu'iito \:itb Oj-y iTiCroas^ that \_z?j bo effected in SJi:7fO forcen in Pt^^iij^troi.

I

, a* On th3 r.s3uri;ition such ni\ att^^clc uould b-D jointly undcrt^^Uou \;:rth /^FGH-^IIISTLN r.nd Cor^-amist Chino.^ opf-rr.tii^^ fi*on bazioo in Cav^tx-ol /cia Olid SIiuQ/ii;G^ nnd thr^t in 5uc}i £^rj ovcntu^lity IKDIA night .roaain n3iVbr*?J- or ccii:idt cci ret of f^.gsres?)ion F.gaiiist P/KI3T^'i:3^ in the carXy .^ita^^^tn of c<\obol ^^-^x KUSSIIjI moxClA attao]c Pi':CTai/:i-t:6p?rriteiy or £jlHiO-tr-'i30u.'3l;f"a'3 pTo;t of thTiix* objcotivo of EOctLvins tho Middlo Ea£;t mad godiilrig fiecoso to v;?^*F.3r v;atoA*s.

Tno in-iti.-l Riuislrjii attrnk r.grdi?.st P/^jaST/:-l v:av.ld bo of oiQlrt divicions inoludin.'j ona - t\ro rrnoiu^t'd/j:::^chaxals:Kl divisiojan^ ono rlr-boi'nj di--vlDiOHj ritli tr.otiaca r.nd ti-o^^cport rdr cxi-pport„ Tliis Ruscio-i] offon.^ivD ^.:oa^d dovoico in thyoo GDp:^/i'ato colri:n3 e^lcng tho hii;toric:^l koH l:no:^^i.-i ro;vt:j3 lor.d-* ins ^i^'^:^ Control /.^ia r.orooa /^?GH/iI;ISM:J r^id K:^..'stoi'n IK/:'! into P.^XISV£I. A ra^b^idirxy offonslvo of ono division sti-'onsth voiiXd t:^ Ir.ijnohod by Go::2iuM.jt Chino::o q:i Pi^CISVAII'a llorthorn i-a-oao* '/fchr^ Mtion r.^rLinat \SST P/JvIST/t^i voiild tt-ko tliD f orn of r.ttrjokg on po^tsp cutting of linoo of coi:Z2r»vticr-:tionj

yould bo proparntory to th:) nain Cox'irojiist invasions

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Co With tho Gxcoption of ra-^om*- S:horc3 noc:^* p^i^'ity Liay bo clair:3d in tho cponing phr^nos of tho cr::paign^ tho CoLratnisto havo rn 0'7ar;;h'jl:in2 supoidority in tho ^A."}^ i^xA on Inndo I'ho procDnt ctron^th r^id logititic b"C;:in<7 of'tho P/:XIST/:i Arr-:^d Torccs it; inrdcq\\r\to for tho dofcnno of P/aX&m a-o.;ai:;t tho Coirjimiot thro at *

d. nrxlo ^[r^ailnblo doBtroyod by h

K/3UL ^ Hsa.wr

Providing thrd tho es^ont.lrA- cddltional j3ilit"i^'y t^UDiyo^t Jq' tho Coznuaiii-^t invasion of WEST ?j':iIST/:i couj-d bo ehcc^^od crid /dng oithoL^ of tho fo^Jlo-jing throo 3,iD0p.

(1) Tho HIliDUKUSH li)i.i- (P.^lGIt\ o^ivJ SEID/:a Par,so3 >lo:^Lh of '■ . ISSHED).

.(2) Tho KABUL « K/UiDiUR -^ ZtCSUiU \±\Yi,

■I

(3) Th3 KHVBjH pass ^ KIIOj/a PJ^S - ZAHID^^ liv::!. .*

Declassincd per Executive Order 1352&, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

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th3 Tore;; roq^irc^::::'nt3 s^^t ou'b ;'>■■ iM 3.p^^i::,r^ rd^/i'b b?-VD T3.-::n oV;:,V"C;;tiv:i'!;ci, Thry propose "to a":r-J:d.r^,o tIi^^i iy\ }^i*3 dotail bjioi^'-o tla-:) urt;:/ca?.^5^ /^7:Ig:"1"3 . .

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1^ ^Jl^W,;:3s To co^luot a plojordvig :jtr5j^ 0-5 tho aca-lal a'ttr.c-: o:v ca?.-Gelcd tavgG'bs o:^ 'ti:o Gbi-cs^o ii'ainlond am l]o'^-±yi Victnan as th3 rajci-liiiifeiV ooi:G7ca of GCX-ion Ij^ i^-^pport of xilifer-y opM';it:lo:as iln tho CYCji't

1

a, E:^scd upon r.cc^pt-d SEMO x-^-t^liJ-sa-cca ttr^X'j^'B^ 'tlio S3/:.T-0 jir-.tiC'ixs oro faced \r.lth a potaa-tdal cnoa^r of conaidoi'eblo raJ-ita-oy

r.c;.Q:rcoa proT.UIon tho ti;o rcos't potaat Jcv-aes cona-tci-iiru-li^^g a t.h:.-c:i-b -co tho ibS-'uiO ii-ationSe , . , , ■-.-..-.■-.■ -• • • ■ - • - '-

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roduoo th:; 5j:jn:xliatD tiirciit -^ -^lo S3V[0 nation (s) mdor attack ard to provide th3 opportunity qC oiffcctivcly cL;i:>loyins S!1\T0 fox^cos. Control of thcj nil- PA\3t ba lield or £rdncd by tho SK\TO nation's if they aro to suTvlYO f.fl crfcctivo fightin,^ vjiitso In addition, friondJy air yiUL-.t ba cap-bio or noutralizins or reducing th3 taxoat pos^d by c-iaijy ground rcroas It hTis b^on forad that in vicu of tho Ei-i^nitudc of tho. tas\ and the iii-ocnfiy of reducing thcs thi'tatj atonic an v;oll as non-atoi^^Jx lavnitions vill ba required. If non--ato::dc vroapons oi\].y' arc employ ad j ths fo:oco re qu iron ant 3 to inpl.2zu:;nt this coujss of action v;ill ba prohibitive,

c, Bocausc of tho iii^portancG of targst solcct5-on. in ^tho^ adopted concept of opi^rationsp a tai'goting atax^y hnn h^cn cari*-icd out. U.^ing tMs inforjiation as a bacisj an estiiiato of force i-cquiroKanta has bean made and included in this papir. . ■'

3* i>^;9jl?.?.^'^^^?3i It i^ concluded that in tho ovcnt of overt aggro3Dion by CorinuiLlst China*

■. " a, Tho course of action vhich i/iU ^^odI cffcctivaly, aJid vith the IsaPt Aoli^, in tini=, rcduco tho thr.3at to tho Tra^ty Ai'v^j; ic att..c:c by the SEL'TO air forcos upon aclootcd targets on ;.n. Cnxi ..a M^iDlrnd and North \xoU^. Ihia reduction voiad probably be sm.icicn. . to ensure that the dofcn«o of tho Treaty Area veuld bo practicable. ^

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Declassincd per Executive Order 1352&, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 20il

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b'. Kio SMTO liations s}2otuld ^^dopt a co;ic^pt of air or^rafJono

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a. The l^ii^-itary k&yls^T3 approve the* ecnclu^jions in p^'^j^'^a-

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b. Th3 Stsff Plr^miars conduct r stiiiy ^±or tho Militaiv AdvJ.fjars to ' ^itQi^lno the exiict dim^-nsionv^^ of the reduced threat.

^ F- Ar<cp.da Iton H

^-o ^?£piL^£i'U To develop n^asm'Gs for of coiiibatting ruibvortjlon»

2, Dir^ciission:

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inT^rovaBS XJio

ziilitsr'/ cspacts

^ Q. I'ho reports of thj Conbii-^ad K-^otin^ h2:vo boon CGiicldorod

uador Asenda Itcn I (f) (End (f) to App 9). 'i>.a Coabif^ed K:^utin2 agi'OGd;; as to th'j Militaiy Staff ?lm>r.'jrB^ that a tnifiod Civil rjid". 'irllitary effort against Co:^^unist fmbvarsio:i is csssntinlj ai:id_thcLt_ .. ^ , the. Catui.it'ittCO.'to Ccqzbat: Coi^iniiiiiist Subverrslcir shoiO-d be the" agehcy to na!:o tho \m5Sxcd effort* Tliorefora^ the paper prepared by Thailend ,ehoiild bo T^ado available to' th-e Corijittee to Cojabat Coi^TiiUAiist Snbvar^iicn, for their ixifona^ition. , '

i

' h^ Tiier-o ^;ill bo a coiitinulDf];- ro(j;ilrGr:ezit for tha Milita^.^

Staff Planjaere to con:^ilder ewtinatoa and etudies pic^pi^rcd by tha Co)::^ iilttoo to CoTfoat Coim^unist Sv.bver:^lon as tliose estiriatcs vs^A stv.d5.oo havo a bearing on lailitarj'^ plana aiid pro^i'^aii^s. i'iierefore, the p.attor ^of ii.ip::ovj_n2 rAlitaiy effectivena^s in co::ibattiD2 subTeroion should bo hopt continuoii.nly before the l'Ii3,ita^;^ Advisers*

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3. Recovrei-^d^.tio^mj It la rcconitnended that: Th-e Military Advi^era noto the 'x'halland paper on '^L^arsures of Inproving Mlitary Aspecto of Coribattin^ Coi-'i^mnist Subversion" and cor:iiend it to the Cori'id.ttao to Co'nbat Goii::2\u:i3-::t SiibvorBion that it E^hocLld Ve hcpt rcr.tiriX"ousIy before thxr

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G. Agenda Iton Is

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1* Probloru 'i'o roviei; the Ad Iloo SuVGcnmtteo reports lij^tod

b::lov;;

Q. Intolliscnoo -- Singapore - Jtdy 1955 b^ lo.^lrjticri " Helboiirne - Au:5U3t 1955

c. Co::.v^iuni cations - Aixclcland - Septe;

!ber 1955

i-G? SEGKliT

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Declassined per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

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o^ Un convent ion-JL \!c^'£vro - McniJ.a - GopoO-ibor 1955

f.

Trainins - KpjrcLchi - S-r^ptembsr 1955 Standardization - Briigko!: - Octobsr 1955

2. Pi sown <:; ion

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Qc The St^Xf PlEtnners hav3 rDviclJ:^.d^ and iji sor.^D oas3& ej'T.cnclGCi, tl:e reports of those Ad Hoc Suc^^Coi^^iiiittoos* Thosa rovlov/s, v/hich are cnclosGd at /.ppcndix (9) j, t^b-0\j that tho reports foil iirto

throo catOi^orioGs

( ' (1) VJorklnr docimonts for tbo i\£!3 of Staff Plrnnors.

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.^ .. . (2) IntDllirjeno^ as£;eGE]^Qnts wM.ch form tho basiti for

th.6 dovelopmc^nt of pn^anuin^ utudiDs, * ,..-.. .. -.^-rv^--

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(3) Reports on 3.i,ilit.^j:y activities iMch require coordlna-tion \rith civil aotivitiGs undortc'cen \uidor fcho iior:U> of the Coi^zioilo

I

Thosa reports \rK:;.ch fa.Tl under ths category in (l) abovo haVG bccm appro%-c!cl by tho StvSf P3.annerSj ^;ho have directed tha Conforcnco Socrotsxy to refer tha ri-r.^snfc-.-nty to tho Cha3.r?iou of tha Mil.ltai'y SGcrataj;lat for diptribution to dl holders of tli3 opproprJ.ats roports. (Vo?AiiurD2) _ ■ •

#

(lX0;7^iS Tho Au-sti^alirai r^eprocontativo pointed out that h3 had not Ir^on doic;;;atad tho authority by tho AustraD.ian H5.1it!?j:y Advisor to approve ray dociu<\ent for futi.tro actiono H-^ advisad^ hov;overp ho \:ouJ-d o-vrrn^o for . such en approval to be signalled from AuBtra.lia as soon as posaiblo* The lion 7iOol€Jid Roprocintativo oiproos^d a slrxiiar vicupoint;,)

3* Action bv H:mtary .Vdvif^ors^ As a result of their roviov/s the Staff Plarmors invite tha Hilitai-y Adviser a to ti'ko note? of the points^ and vjhero appropriate approve the reo::i.;ni3ndation3 arioins out of each raport as set out in tho fo3-lo\jin2 Dubp^ra^raphss,

a^. Intollinenco;

r

(1) Tho'^Intolliseaco Ad Hoc Sub-0oitmitt-3e diwi up t^*o

docujii3ntD;

■ ' (a) A reportjj dated July 1955^ contpdninj an as^est^LBnt of the threat to Laos, Gciabodia^ South Viotnai, Thoilcjid and \Jout ?>rJ':iuton,

TO? SliiGHET

(b) A paT)or entitled Sifourity Policy r^nd Procedures

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number NND Cj3310. By: NWD Diite: 2011

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Ad Hoc- SxCi>-Oo:zjl-bloo iiDotii)^ iii KoVerr.bor 195^ corrtrA-a ^Dn^c^ctilvoly:

viDxcnoOly approved by tha klH-tcry /idvAiJDi'G„

(3) Th'j Sto-ff pi.ann:a'a cciarjiclai' tlrr/bp in crd:i' to pro\':;.do fc c.d:;q-(.utD coordlaat.lcn in t'5,0 l'.:plp:.L.!intc.tJ^n of tho r-?r.7'J?po pi-CT^oj-a in tli3 f;ocii^it7 Policy D;::d Prcec^J'Vay dcjvirjatj, n £3cvrjx^" Ccd: y'a-irAc:c is A'cqi'.lj^citU Px'CiJC3od tc'i=i.io of rofcrcnco fci" tljio co:i2'vlii:.?.tc:f £LVO:at ApjjciuVb: (9) i;uc?.o.To?a'(a) Tab (^). • . . -

\Ath to'^'12'3 of rofo::*orico a^ cot out at^A-^jponcU:: (9) ,&^^ (a) 'rr.b (1)*

I (b) As-t'oo tb:vt t'np pcot .s'iwH l;*vf:Ul':.ulv r^^i.of-Tiqor^

(o) /^r-'provo tiici SDGi-rlt/ Policy r,ri Preocc^.m-^^^ i:r.;:oi'

V

cbovo;, in:jt:rr.3t tho C.-^orot?rlat to iiic6:'=porato into i^oSo cioon-z-jiri 'ch-o toiT2D oa roforonoo of tho S30"n:<^5/cy Coc-^O^rbn-Lrtc^ra

(cl) An-pi^oTO t>.3 oxondocl ropc-:.-^t c? tbo Jv^^ 191^5 Acl IIcG Siib-Co:"J;ctoa en IntollLl^.TiiicD cp a b.'^.nils fcr tho cbvolopi^^nt of

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(1) Tiio ropoort of tho Lc^iuticj J/I Uoo CuVCcir.'dttcj li?.a boon approved b/ tiio Staff V3j::xaiOTi^ t\3 a i:orl:iT:3 docvr-iont fci^ uco fit DtrJT Io-'TdIc It conta:lrj3 a U'Oad r-ovloi; of c:c:lctiD2 ^-OjrLotilc far;:UJ/G:lc3 of ?r?nt:r ratlona In tho Ti^oaty .^ava ^ir^d prcv:U!':)P fcr tho G::ch:in:;o of i3C^"G clotrdlQcl lo^iyjyllc data n3 rar cd rcqirlrcd fo:.^ tho friT'th^i' d^volc^?" i-::oBt of cpori^.tlcnrul pIci:j2lD2 Gtuciiop, ,, ' ,

(2) Tho i^^pcrt oAoo dj.^'U'^.r^ attontilco to tho fact that in. v:bo;:r of tho financla),:ar:i:T occnc3-G ij:>c3.cat:lcno it vXH^ at oo:io fut;r.'o datOjj nr'0b.ib7.y t:i r:';co::i:-:aT-7 fCj.^ iXTX^o::.:^ntativo3 cf th:j l^J^lt.-,^/ iclv:lcci-3 to r::ot HltJi tho Bocnd^o GcrriLttop cf tho 5S.W0 CGi:no5i mth a v:lc:f to i?c:iv.:'al:vi:b:*2 "^'^ ovo:^:ul ixlou fcj^ tho .do%"olcp:::orj; cf icjzlotdco faei.VLtloa 'ui tho T^^caty ;\voa, ' " . , '

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND Cj3310. By: NWD Diite: 2011

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(1) Tho ropor-'o o£ the Con:au::iicitions Acl }Ioo Sui>-Co::C^i5,ttoQ has b.-^GB an^^i^tacd and approved by th3 Staff PlGm^ors ar> a bnois foi' future cI:^Sj: ^ octfi.on. ^

(2) Tiio report Qirp)iD.?Ay,rs t}^:it V,bu:;nca of a clofinxto cc:r:^aiid stru-oturc s}ii3. oporatio:aal pi on 3 Ii:\s pr^ocliidod cloTolopr^^nt oS a coroiUiiion-ixons plan. This x'-opor'tj as ojii^nclcdj pro"/id3& a b^r^n foi- cstablishii^s t:\Ldc cor-amlcr/caons tc;cloi:lquoa^ anl proccdiUL^oy foi* RXVTO naticQ:^. It fiirthoi^ provides for cr^tublishins rdD:lm\B e6r;a?i^icatioii0 facUitlon in aroa3 i-*hora doflcicaaiCD no:; cxist^^ cXitX establi^bin^' banic actions and or^ofconso oi^ data n^ioozs^xy to future prapar^ition of a coriroiii or/lions pi cm. It e-hould b3 notcd^ th:vt even \1h2n nil rolevant action? requArod in tbo report )y:kV3 baon tfiVcn^ tho cor-V.nuiications; proooduros end tcciniiqxias i:a

tlio E}1.\'':0 crca vjill b;-fVO only reached a prinary ntago and that prosrci^'* fiivo dc=vclop::ont ijill bo n3ceG?>rLry,

^~^-^M JJ 1 II—- —- - ■- • ■ —■ — ■ ^ ^ , — , T in fm ir^-L^^^M

A.

-••'* ' ^'^ ' ■ ""' ■" (1) TKo raport'of tho rsycliolosical b'arf^ro Ad Koc Sub-Cc>:r;:-dttCO has b3c;'i aiii2ndcd and approved by tha Staff PlasiDortS. as a ' v;or!ciu2 doouiiont for ud3 at staff level. (Eo^jjvcrj tho Aujtralia:i dcD.os-'ticB uifjhcs it to bo recordf:d that^ iJi thx^-* viau^ thD authenticity of tho doou'^^nt^;. att3.chad to tho Ad Hoc Sul>GoiJiiittGo rcpor^t a?? Arnc.^ 1 oxid /i^i^ic:-: 2 hiiB not' yet bion c;'jt:;bli£;h:d aud nhoiO^d na^^oly b3 ivsod as an ox^aplc of th::j typ;; of policy vhich tho Ru^isian vx\A Chin'j33 Co?inux^ist3 rdght ,b3 c:<p3Ctcd to adopt.)

at

(2) It provides the iV2C03^ax-y teras of reforoB03 for futura plcojuins studios to support idlit:'!^' coiiroos of rction a3 iray b3 dovolopsd und3r tho no£;is of tho Mllj.tary Advisors. Consideration has b:c.:a [^Ivoa in tho ropo-'o to pro'vddin^ nooofjsai^' o^:chxmgo of training G:^3ricnc-3* . ;

(3) Tho Continuij\3 action by tho nilltrvry AdviDsrs orc^rol^.a-tio;a in providiBg basic data ancl oxchtiDs^ of training c:;i::rric3^C3 in Jj/sportrait to ovontiul fori'ail a ti on of P^ych.olocical VJarfara cupportlD^ plana to tho ra].ita.'/y coursi^sj of action, ' ' ■

* (a) In order to clarify tha reoponsibilitor of tho l-alit?;:fy Adviporn in tho fiold of Pi:ycholo£;icar Unrfa:i-'0; the rei^ori ooto out tho . follo^.dns dofinitions: .

" (s) X^>y.^PlS'2'i-SCl-^-?-PM^' '^'^i^ i^ *^- planned uso in co:^;diticn3 chort c^ var, "of'pT/ohliioG'lc'^orui'asurJ3 .vo.clviiin^ propaaor.aa, - inror^-ation e-ad cthor ralntsd ticUons oiroctccl at -i-ii*i'icndayj neutral ■ and nrri-ndly £roup3 for .th^ p^r?P:;30 of £i>ppcrt5.n:j tho ccco-raHDhncnt of nat;l.cn,al r..ir:G fLiyJ objectives.

TOP. SSCRilV

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Decl^ffsiHed per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Dute: 2011

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(b) ,P?X*Z^?l-5,?^'J^>!c^.Jji^^^^^^^ TMg 5.3 the plerjisd use

in time of vrar or declei^ecl eyrL^rgcrjcj-^ of p^'yuholo^^-cr-J, incaBVxez iuc3-uc>-ing propa^a^-^-?-, 5.nfori*nation^ aucl other relatccl r.eoions clirir-otod F,t oiic-nyj neutral^ friendll_y foreign ^ronp3 for t}>o pvitjco^iso of 3iipp-:>roin3 the^ acco3::plisl:iiiienl of national aij^is'and objcicti-^jc^y* ! 1 . ^ .

I (5) Activities unclor tha aogib of t>i3 Kilitsr-y Acivisei-

should b8 confined to the field of P&yoholo^'ical lJa.vfr-VG as dsfjU^^d aboYOo Pnli^.^xy responsibility in the field of PDycholo;sic?'-l Action ig O' ^cido thG £iphcre of the llilitary AdviserSi, In order to cr?.3iirG continuity of x^l^^i^'i-^^S ^'-nd coordination of effort there shoiO.d b3 co-T:)rdlnation b^stueen the co:':i::itteoD cet \vp \-r the Kilitary Advinorj^ rnd thor;e eet np by: the Coiincil Rcprosontatives„ ThJ.s f>hould.i3iclado tba ec .hange of obnerYers on an j.nvitationsl basiSo

a

(6) Renan-r.en4at.ion5; It is rceoi^endcd that the Military Advisors:

i

^ (a) Aj;ree that act5.vities UTider their aegis ' nho;0.d

bo'confined to psychological vjarfai^e as defined xn paragraph f^^h, above

^ (b) Insirdct the Secretai'iat to adviee tho Coimcil Rbpre£>entative3 of the field in i/nich the 'Military* Advifields '£>tS eon- '■' fiji)ir«g their activities \rith respect to Pr.ychological V!ai"^farOj and to invite their attextiou to the need for coordination botveen the Military Advisers or2^ni£:at5.on and the Council Representativos 0T^c-'-)3.zt'-' ion to cni^ure cont^Vnuity of plannln,^ aucl effort in this field*

tio;

.y oi" pi .Oe Unconvent5_on^l Vr^rfare;

(1) The report has been approved by the St?ff Pleroisra as a ^JorVlns dobr-nsnt for ugo at stcuff levels,

(2) It essentially provides baf;i3 for development of S7i^iT0 UnconveJrtaoral Vfarfare planf3 to support planning studies of the MiDJLtary Advisers oi^rianisation in th'it: .

stated;

Wsrf^o^oj

cnsi'ired; and

(a) Pertinent arpectc of Uli conventional ir^vfaro aro

(b) There is an a^a-eed definition of Unconventional

(c) Keans of coraoilin^ b:\?iic teebnAeiUOs ar.d data aro

(d) Ecchr-Dg^ of troam-T^;; c-:rpca\ienoe is provid:rd foi\

-'a

(3) Tha Gharccterirrtxcr. of tho SE^TO crc-^i h±i^tili.zs^ -the iinportauce o£ U;-:convt;n-tior,.rJ. V!oi-rr..r,o-pl'Lti.ii and tha iujt.>r'o.^ncc of h-;?cpJj:!^ th3 nattci- of 'Jictv v-t' Unoonventlon^J, Ucxfare ctti^lies co.Titiau0U3ly bcfoi-o

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TO? SECRET

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND C)3316. By: NWD Diite: 2011

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^* Pi2}S}i-SK'::§B)S'.'!S'''-lflism

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■ . (a) Tho vr^ort of tho Kilitc-ry 7inti^-SiO?v^rc;ion Ad F:o3

Coir^mttoe^ toge^thor vlth the rc:v:ort c^f th^ CoLirattoa to Cccibat C'jLU^:\*rz5.?jt ■ Svh'r^Tzlon^ is n pDllc/ dociv.'ionu i;M.ch e3tr.W.j.£ih3^ ths b--'.cin Tor fivbiivo ^:orlc in the field of coivater^oubTorsion vitbin SSATO^ ^

(2) Thcae c1ocrjnc:aoj: reflect.tho results of the Goi\bin-d Civil oxxd Military Meeting on Coimter-S'ab^^orziion, Both reyjrts f^gi'^^^ as cb the Kilitaiy Staff Plan-norc^ tlixt a unified civil md nilit?.ry effort against Ccrrjumi^t tiubveri^iion is essential., an3. tiiat the Ccrjiiittes to Co-nbnt CoHisunict EifovGrsionj d.s sot iip by the Council, f^hould b3 tho cgency to Kio^^g ,th.3 unified efforts, ^ .

(3) Proper covorage of ?J1 ti^pGcts of coimt^r^-Giibversion, ip to bs achieved by each ]nember coiratry scndSj^g its approprie^/to ^pcieialz-ists, whether civil^ luilitexy or both, to n-33tii3g3 of tho CoLTilttco to Cohibat Ccc^mimitSt Subversion*

C^) BsSQ^!H3£i^f;?:ift9.s: It is recoirnsnded that:

*. * . . (a) l*]ie VSJ.yA?j.-y Mvisers accept th^ report^ of th^' -

liiijLtr_ry A'ati^-Subversion Ad Hoc Co^iiioittoe'and appro yo. tho,.x?=ooxntac^ndn.tion3 tne:i*oxno

(b) Tho Military AdviBsra note the i-oport of tho Co:3itt'::3 to Goi^tat CoriiiuMat. Subversion cud cndoras tho Co::LMittoo^a recoiiu^sedation re^-'^rdlv;.;^ rosponsibilitiOD dtA coox-^dination of civilian, and id-litary authorities in coiuiter Lni.bvorsion motI: in tha r.oT)so t}ioro ehould bo one unified copjiiitteD to eouitor Coinraurd.bt rAibyor^-^ion roporti?:3 to the Council Reprerj^ntativeSj and in tho sonfjc con^dstsnt i;ith th3 intent of the rnilit^iry report p.b it rolateo to tha recoixncndatio;::; coi:-cerimi^ racrgcr of tha t::o con^Aittee^, that tho or£;*?;aic^.tion of such a uriified oon^aittee Yl^jj tlao effoot of leaving to e:idh i^c-::ab:r nation tho rifdit to deterraine its civilian end/or Liilit?ry roproacntLVGion,

0

(c) Estimates related to tho do vtoz^ iihrro rA^bvorDlva aotivitic3 m^.j directly affect 3?.ilit;?j:y plaunit^g should be prepared by tho Goriuitteo to Coribat Cor^vurist Subversion cud the KiLitavy AdviDora s}iDuld instruct the Sscretrn'^iat. to invito tho Couacil Eepro:?entativo3

to initiate t^uch studios as soon as poosiblo,

(d) Tno r.iUtt-xy AdvlnorD instruct the Scorotavir/c to laaUo kno^.rn to the Council Roprcrente-tives the re::u.lts of the:i.r considor- , aticn of tho reports of tho Co:.foined i^oet^T-g a:-: indicated in p?j\^.<^r;-;r>h3 ,-^a^ b^ a-nd c above*

■*t, w

(e) Th?.t t}i3 MJJ.3.t?x-y A{3v:ls£r3 note tbo ros^x-Y-i-bioa ■ nvJo by tha French DDictation in rci^ccJ.i\±n2 -fro-.T B'ateittiii:! f;pool:C.io c-it^j^iatos on-tiv3 5ubver£^.vo thri?a-b in IA03, VXBnij:-! and C^itODXA.

TO? SECRET

1031

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 I

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(X) TbiG report has bcs^n approved by the StoXf PlLVJTier.^ . as a iror1:i»:s dociruiont for use at staff lovol,

' . ' (2) Th3 report noteD £ons action alro?,cly in pro^fraos on ' ■

SJiI/lTO trairdns ^^^^ rcsr.lt of thils report. It pointu out the t::cistixi3 deficiencios iii this fiold cg pertain to the req"uire;aent for the ciil>* liission of traiy±n-s reports, ti-alnin^ sc3:c3uld^ ancl need for lonj ran^o: forecast of bilateral or niu?-tilatc-:ral exerci^jOSc Th^ report utre3G0G the UGGcl^ on a priority baf^is^ for sts^nciordisation of doctrinas, proeecl-v±o-^y techniques and pub?cLcatioii3 which are con::;idercd in the re;:art of the Staiida.vdiZ':;-tion Ad Hoc oub-Co7-:^tteo<, 5?h3 report providG3 fc^r t:^C:3l>-' ins th3 cinficicncife3 noted tlirough pro^-r^ri of fiitiirc vrorf: and cccohango of schedulo of training facilities a\^ailablc \dthin tho SJtL^.TO £irea.

(1) This rcpprt has besn aL-ie-iiclecl and approved by the Staff Pa^ainers r.s a v;orkin3 docur^icnt for usg at ctaff lovol. , ' •

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(2) The report points out major eate^jories and areas V7here Bsr.s'J^i-es to effect practicable ancl. tiecensary staiidai-di sation procedUTCfs shovJA be ivadertaVen ap goon as p^Ksible. It providas for Taa-ftbnr nrLtioiis to undertaj.:e .puch practicable and nscessary ota'adi?vdi-,atlcn of tech;.^iqu£s ojid cquipnent to enable S&\TO forcer. \;hich may particroato " in conbiiv:.d trajuiii-' or operations to operate collectively in an efficient and crfect?,ve nanner. The report cstab.Ushs^ methods and procedurerj for collective and caohr.nge of data.

(3) ArrtOigGrac-ntG are provided for the U:iitcd States to asrAHie responsibiUty fc-r initiating actions relative to coordinat5-n;^

traiains, and logistics have been a^si^n^d to the Ph;lii;yo:iJ2cs^ United States, and United Kinsdom respsotivcly. ■ ■"

III*' OTHER. BUSWgS: (AlCISC^ E) ' ... ' . - '

^* ^J^^^jMSiP' of DofensivG and Suo-o^i:J:in^_C<^^^315^o^|LAc^^^

1.

Str;tjrnsnt_or_Prqblc:at To correlate tlie provision of nilitr-a-y support fcr th^li^.^foilsVoT^he-TVca^^^^ A.rea la-Lti other - OTpportir. of action including attrxk on selected ens-xy tr^rgetD v.cin^ totb t5.oria3. and nuclear. Areapons.

^v.^ couroes :h conven-

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2ft ConnliKiionn

«

Of Th in th acccp'

TOP SDIRET .

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Declassifi^ per Executive Order 13526, Section 3 J NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

TO? SECRET

(Pr:-95

* ' btf That the proviniuon of military support for repollijQS Coii"^iii^^^i5/jt c^r^reiision ^i^aiast the Tra^.t;r Ai-en through &.ii'b?. "bo £cco;i:'tcd an a bsu coui-^^e of action and plerc-iing stucVios propi^Tcd,

: (1) The net capability of the Chinese Cox^artiiritG end

Viet MirJl follo-j:Uig attao!-: on fjoleetsd targets of the Chinese nia3.:>-

' ■ ^ - (2) The net cp.pability of the Yiet l-Ji^ih follc^dn^ c.ttiic?:

on £if.locte:l targets of JTorth Vietn^in, and , ^

(3) That the pro"vrifjion of xiilitai-y fii^^pport for the defence of 3?rf:it:tr;a h^ Au'ther developed to include the rittac^c of Bolccted encijytargjts us^ing both conventionrJ. and imclerj^ x.^eapens.

J ■ c* That other supporting coi*^:^^sc3 of act5_onj Inoludins

jblxjolcftde of Coi^-mniet consts, deffenne of essential cca Jlnes of coii-^m-

Cication tjid defense of essential air linos of coTumuiication, b3 doyelop::;d lu cor:oelation u^th tha provi::ion of lailit^^iy support for tho defends ' ' of Thailar.a, Ic,03^ CaTEihodiaj" Sov.th Vietn.^jQ end Pakitit.^^! and ;rf-th attack

'. * - ■' on selected tai'g^tt^ of the Chinese. 3nDJ.nD-and and elDe::her0 as rccuir^d,-

r' ; ■ ' ^ -

V. . 3* Rcco^^-ri^ndationJ That the IIilita^*y Advinera r/tyorove the

coneluf:jion3 ateve and direct the Kilitfay Staff Plavmor.r? to trfcc the fj ■ * n^Q033c:cy action*

1, DicGiv'^^nion!

i*

a, /^euda.o for Mllitai^^ /.dvisers and Sts^ff Planners Meotli}^^ h^ivo b::au fir;ily JjoA-oii^ have bsen cl-^^rr-cut and have.bijen follo".;cd in ^ ConoraJle llo auch fiia-i .^/stc^ pi-evailcd for the Ad Uoo Si'b-Ceirioltt cd,

b- Th9 foLlo-'.Jing additioDpJL slgnificrat x:ointD c.re l?roii;:;ht. t-o the attention of the i:ilit::.ry Advisers.

9

(1) Agendas frequently do not darjioiiatop irhen thou^-h appropriate^ rcinon^ibility for t}ie prcp:a*ation of po^jition p>;per,

e.

-? n ^ -% ^ .

.

Ec ForM.^rdl^:!'^' Co?rrcr;nondonne B'-^tiraen Militai^y Advi^jGrs; ' .

!• Ji4r'£?A§J^i;Sn - 3x1 the case of signals addressed to tho French Military Advif^cr^ there has been certain difficulties of routin^^^ due to tho use of various cliaunels, ...

2* E.^^'l^i^i^^^i^-®• I't is recoHLisndcd that t}ic MiDAtary A.clvlaoro ^|

ta.ke note of the irich of the French Delc'^ato to ha\'-o the corre:>pondGnoG , '

adtlre33ed to the French iiiDAt^A'y Advitiarn routed as faa' as poni":jiblo. throv-Sb the Military Liaison Group in Banghok ' ■ ,■ ' ';

G* Thn ProcVidures for Develouino' A^endan for Co?™'}lttc3 and Snb-* ' .

Ceii^a5_ttee Knat^jif^.i: ^ ■

frv. ^^"^v^ ^--

Declassified per Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 ^fND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

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, (2) Position papers ortc^a ai^e r.ot circiilD/ocd in .surn-cicnt tiuo to p^^r^pJlt"study bsforo tho com'^enj^ig of neet^aigs,

■ ■ ^ ' ' *

a* IJhsn the Stnff Ple;::!nars rccoia-uCJid or ^the l^'ilitrx^^ Advisers axrprovo or i:ichedulo Ad Hoc Sub-CcrivJ-ttBO ir-eotan^^ that 5.n acVln.tion to spsoifyiiis t^-Q 'iV/nnD of RororGn;;;^ tvnd t^j^ie rncl place of i-isi^tir^ga that os^-^3^cl?.s bo ciGvaLopcd cxid irhero rppropriate rc3ponsib:llity for the prepnra-^ tion of pO'^itilon pap3x-B bo da^igiiiVLritle • , • ^

i

b. Once r/^^ei^claa exo r.pproved by tho Mi.lAtary AC\Y5,seT0 they ' ' irlll not b3 icodiricd except r.G tho flvst itc^.i or bihvxnc^Ds at a prrtioiilsr ■ laG&tii:^, , . "... '

' ' ' * '' " ^ ■ ' . ■

Ct irneii x^^^^^"'^-^-^^'P^'P-^^ ^-'-^ bc^ilri^ propavcd tho coi^ntry *

respDnsiblo should in3u::c th:it rATch pcpsrs reach other lacrab^r countx-ie^

in rsi^ffioient tiiao for study prior to a liieotinso -

CJ

3.

R^j^-Qr':^gj:^^':^ici3:Tq: It is reco:i:ieroded that the Milit:?2^y Advisors ^ tpxxcore tho abo\-o proocdiire for dcYGlopi^i3 future agendas for SE/iTO Ad

Hoc Sub-Gorjimttees, ■ ^ . , . ' , ^

* ■ '' . ■'' '

■ iSKATO Coiv;\oll. ProTfrens Ro-.-^nrt: ■ -^ ■. . ^

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■ * • •

»■■*

a* The Sta,ff Plejancrs consfdorsd the x^'03t^5.Mlity that thc^ro iLi;jlit bo required a co::;prehensive SSATO Council Prosross Roport v;hich \rjj.l contain a ni3.itary chapter» Such report sight bo required for US3 by tho SEATO Council at tlieir 33:p8ncy,U2 raeetiii-; to bs held in late ^'obruary or early Maixh, ■ '-. ,,

■"o

bfl Althoi'gh it>v:a3 goner ally agi*eod that tho Military SocrotaricVt \;ould be the proper'organ for coaipilixig such a report for ar^>roval by tho llilitary Advisers at their ncKct noetir.g in Melbouvao dxxrln^ Jaauaiv^ i"*^ vao rccogniiied that the shortnef^s of time ajid present embryo statuD of tho. Secretariat XDlght not perz-rittho coiipil5.ng of th^ coi::OTchcn3ivo aad accurate report de^jired.

G

in the Sli/iIO Go\moil reportc The United States a^freed to prepare dxai^t reports aud 'to diascjiinate scjae to tho other llilitar-y Advisers during .early Bccoiiber, ^

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d, Th3 rc3p-:?otive Military Advlpcrrj^ co~aieiits vxul roco-iierLi ation.s on thoDO rc^pcrts i:ould thoa bo for:^-ai'ded to tho Mi3.it?ry S'^^^cretariat \:hich vouAd^thcu h'ajv^ "the tojss: of coneolidatir-^ theDO c.o:^:i?ntG and rcconiaendationa r.rid coiopili:a3 those reports for subrdeLvVo::i - to the Hil3/to:cy Advisers at their ne::b neetin^.

TO? SEGRET

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Declassified per Execulive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number; NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

TO? SI^RST

(p;%95}

2, Rrr^^o^^vr-DOTl/i.on; It in rcoo:-TaoJi?.cd 1;lia"t the lliIli.t::'Xy Scnx'ot print: ' ^ ' ' .

•t ■<

1* Dif^ovr.^ijion:

' Gc " On 30 Sc-ptc.^'oGr 1955, the PrrccutiYo ScorootDi^ o.f tlK

SKiiITO Coiixicil Roprcserttav-ivo'j Sc^rotrriat lulviscS tho CI:a:U'ncm of tii3 SEATO M5-litary £ra>?OwCJ'5:at th:it tlio Ccin^Gil Rc;pi-e:^ont:^o:tvcQ kci'G pro-rrciai^ to o^Tfm^o for eoplotj of all a^rirovcd roorcls of tholr p:-;oo:>itlar'iii ,j ba Hado available for the una of tho Hilit^a^y jicTviGoi^s aa \/ol3. as 'copicp of othor docvTov^^rtD l:lk3?.y to b^ of. iiit^^rcijt^to thc::!^ It \:-^.:3 rJlcQ iiirorr^ially conveyed th:it tbo Co-ancil nc;jro3i;ntativc3 Socrotr/i*iat \ aild like to he in porr^cri^slon of n copy of omfiioJ. records of pAI , ; " LjSAffO r^ootinga to ijicluclG the fin^jaisM^rt^^ of a eapy of all riilit:?.!'/ r0;Tort3 for ro tent ion oy tho Couiicil PtcproDe^t:Lti\'03 SDcratsi^iat,.

; b* TIdrs Hatter vic.o c-ifx-ucaod b^ the Et:Lff Flr.nncrs at t>io

inj^tisiation of tlio 11=8, dolG^^ation aud it t-ao gonoi'alAy a^roccl" that a^i ^cccchcj^so of aporopx-iat3 tlocAv:iont:3 v^oiilcl bo cTcoirablOa 3't vwz rc£^oj^.vU;cc%

^ far

Sscrotariiit*

^o:;ovv?r, that thcro i^ay ba j-iilitr^a^y qccm^lty and- other rv?:rtrictionD o.2:d\::3t ^urxiliDhijiz ^^^^ iii-'i-itojrj rGoordri ciid ropoiyos to tbo Ccr^ricil Rcpros&ntativc3

2 r Rccot^-nendnt.ion:

a« It is rccori^:iio:adcd that tho MJjA-trx-y ;:d^lr;erD a0.opt tho folioi.-in^ &tate--2C2at of poriition a:} £uid:i:2oo for tho Chajx-f^:ai of tho miltary Sccrotarc-lat:

"Ad a f;onDr;:il. nilo^ thoro i^ no objection to lial-cin^ coplc3 of i^eportD of pa3t rrtooti:i:?;;n avaalablo to tho Gou>iDil Sacrotarlatj ho7> ■ 'ovGr/thJ.n choi^ld not noan tho automatic diatribatioii of cU official . \ ' records of tho I-Jilita^vy Advincrj o:?2a.i>i^':-atiori lol^pas the CoTiiioil nopreacntativon t3^ci-^ot:ij:-iat is cpaoifica.Uy dosiijnatcd in distribution."

b.. It la fiurthor rccor^aonded that the Milit^j.*}'^ Advicciro . 5.ndicatu their acceptance of thla position by ei^jaal to tbo lliHtaiy "

Sccrotaxiat as c:?^'ly as practicablo ap intorliv gtiif^Taco psndi?::^ cJiy furthc-i^ oicaTniiiation of thin cubjec^t as nay bo n^^GGP2ary.r

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F* Rnl ^tioP^wulrja B^tu^on ryj^ct-iTcv Advinor-i rvs\ Cminriil Rc■'^rn'l:'r^t.'xt.^val• lo Dirjcvvinioii; , ' '

a» In con::idcy:bJ3 a proposed a2-^-^- ^or tho M3.1it:?xy Advicora at thoir forthcoiiin^^'n-^iotiiij in Molcwv-no^ the nattm* of tho corporate Dtatii.T rolatioi:i:;bip3 botira::!! Kilitr^v Ad'^i^jJcrs r.^d tho Council Roprcsenta-* tiva3 vraD raiccd* Thin !:attor had bcr^a dicout^r*::^ bilofly at tha la3t Kllit:?.ry AdYiD3rB' :T.oot5^:13 in Bai^.^IioV:^ bi:t raD dsi'e^^rc-d at that tii^a D.Q eJl i;ilit.?j:'V Advi.T:or3 uoi^a ^oo then in reooipt of natiorsal £;uidarice.

TO? SUGRS-r

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be. It \V2.3 i^enor^"'Jy rcco^';:i.'>:cd that the ^jo.fdvicluil I'clc/cio::;-thipti "bstuecn tb?j roDpoDtivo KiJatar/ kCcn.^^'iTu^ Cdv^jjaoII RepresentrttivCii^ Connc.il J^ibriber3 a'ad oira dsren?i;& c3t£i"b3J.£bxioiit:i d:*.?x'*ca' xa the \i\riD'i'^.r*-^ eoi\ntr:le3 c/acl uro a patter for nation^il dirtcriTor^roicn, it ij2;;i r.*;;r-::z5, hoiroverj th^vt there sIiQUlld bs a dster-aination r.3 to th=3 cc:?.ot iV3A:it:lo;>'' cM.T);j b;^tvb3it liilrltra-i^ Adviccrs r,ncl ths'Coi^oil R-:yz*osont::itiv:;3* Tli3 U*S. Dele{^ation ^ub^rlttc:! a di-?.;3r^S':r'!r,tio chart r-3f.lcatii"^^ the;.-if roletlo:!'* slxlp^j fro::^ tho vilei^pDi'at of the U.S* Ml^ltai^^ Advi.^^r, I'his ir* av:;;Glided h^vo'to as App3ii5i:^ 10 t.:> AnBex A,, , :

K

2p Reco^Tnende.tion; It is therefore rcoor:r;]enclcvl thattho ' liilltary AclviDerc; co-asidsr this rolatio^iDbii:' at tiiD^r foj/licorjij:-!

Go

Pnnnrlhle Thrp::it to Tro-itv Avt?a by Ovoi't 3^i=:-y'V ,*.'v^^*Gn':^:lr3n TV^rcir^h

1.

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a. Tho PcOdDtL^n Dclc;:at^.Q3i ra;l:5e:l tlio }:}attcr of tlio H^rioi^.a

i H —

throat to the cutiro Treaty arc?! of overt Coi=cz>ani£st a2gx*G=js:lon ti'i:oo\?:;;h ■

2# Rnoo'^7ij!v.lr'.t:^.n:a: It is recoii-iiondsd th?-t the MlLttc^ry A0.v:l:jcr3 t-?]ce ijoto of t}iE3 forego:'.n^ propoaod i\\\\C^:j 5.n ito relittloiaDlrlp T^dth oth-:!^ clofcnL^ivc .nnd eupportAr^j coin^as^ of actions

H* SPTin-TAT Rer^ort on Go:-nuii:Uiiu^:^ md }^ifolic Rr^lr^.tion^: '

■

1^ St'^-tf-rjnt of Frol?T.::-n: To r/a^r.'ciariivO t}i2 leacons learned ;'_:=a tri3 public rali-vt3.01)3 field diirir.^ tho second confersnco of tho Et^^f:^ F,lr.';ino:Ci'^j end to rcccc;:aavid tho i[ian:aer in \;hlch !i;r:eh rolatio:ii3 phoiuld fimcticn r.t fiitaro SEATO nllrltsu-y confcrcviices,

"p. Tn.tmduotir-n: Tiic e0a£:rtial p^^rpriz^o of this rc'.:?ort in to cer/e ao a b?.6'io for di'jcuasion by r.^Tprcbriate rAithoidtie^ in orich ;.v:3ber niition prior to tho Jicrit HiJat^:.-^^ Advir^er^i mE^otin^ v^ rath-ir 'the-n thrt it choiild bo regardod co "A cc:iclu;iivo cc:prDJn^.o:;a of runtr-J^T- q:>:a-don cii/chiD

3

TO? SiCH;:^r

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b* The Staff Plariners n2"recd that a detrdltd atudy of tho pb:^;Diblo thrc:it of Coi:ii^unir;t A£_^2^c:7sion t'l^jairist th'i Treuty ai-ca gcnora^J.y^ . Olid Tha^.lcr-d and Earjt Pahi^tr^i in pai^ticiLlar, tlii^or^'h }h^rjr.a nhoirld ba prcpniccdj tos^thsr ulth a dotsrvxlaatior. of tha military support i:ocjo.^,3a^y ^ to reool i>rch a thrcr,t imdcr co2:dit5,on3 of 2iucle2r v,zzQZi}:ca^ ' ■ >

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.J^' JiecpH^]ena?^XDiji3: The St?-fr Plpj]r.ers recoi^-enfl;

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a. That, at futm-e SEATO laHtai*^ Aciviscrs and Staff Plaim conferences, a Public Relations CoL-:Laittee ba eritabliehc-d A.dth tho cole responsibility of supplying material for al.1 nass cojc^im^lcations lacctia.

b, Tliat the Military Advisors in5:truct their reprcsontativeD on the Pi^bllc RelrAions CoiraitteCj prior to the meotiiig-p on the theriGS ■ cnct'policies uhich thoy consiclGr should h3 emphasised in wblic rolatior EiaterieJ.*

piv

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c^ That the Public Relation^ Cori^^ittee chouJ-d convene prior to SEATO Kilita.ry Advif;er£; aiid Staff Pla:mers conferonc^a to analyse past pcrfoMDUices vjnd foririulate a public relations poller for guidance during tho confercno3, (Note: The effectiveness of SE.'.TO*public rclcations cannot be i/ieasured until post-conference reports concerning public relatione are available in all countries«)■

4'

i

* ^ d* , That the members of the Public Relations Corumltteo r.hould h^^o no other duties. " \ '\ - '

Go That the ropresentativ.e of the ho^st nation on tho Public Relation:? should be the channel t}rrou:ih \:'hioh all puW.icity pertninin^ to the conferanoe is reloaded locally, -^ ■ .. ^

f. That aJJl l^ilitary Advisers should^ as soon as poaDibley individua-lly notify the Secretariat of their agreeTnent that the Public-Relations CoiLjnittfiC should laeat in Melbourne on 11 January^ I956 to agree to a comiunique for issue pilor to th3 Military Advisors* r^otins on 16th JaiiUaiY/ ^-956* '

IV. R?:/^U3:RFM£I?rSJ'0R_FU-''IIHE VJORK: ' " i

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A, Vi^ litarv Advil a em' Group:

1. Tlio Military Advisers^ Group is due to laeet 5ji KolbouA^no on 16 Januai^y 195^* The Staff Plauiacra suggest that they should conaider th foU.oi7.iD2 agenda: ■■ '

ao AgcndaXtc^- A: Approval of tho Dv:^jnejx-y report of tho ysiitsry Staff Plannors Coufercnce at Pc?j:*1 Ka^rbor in Noverober 1955 •

b* A!:^anda Itf::^^! B; Con£dd:^ration of the-United States paT^er on tho rolationship bstveen the Military Advisors' Group and tlia Council Representatives*. ■ . ,

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c, A^^erda Itcn C;/ AgTeemeat t-o tho rillitary prc^rea, reports, to be sircniitted by the S.3creta.viatj for subcaisiiion to the SS/.YO Coiacil Rooresentatives*

dfr A'cpnda Itc-^ D: Other businoi^s*

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y ^ Hilita'f^ Advxcora shonin^ as soon e,3 poj^^iblo, jj^.^ulvic>acJ^l7 r.oliSy tbs

J , ■ *. Secretr.rir;!: of thsiir r"rcc:'ient to Viio d'cove Q2cr4^#

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;. 1. TiiD St?.ff Plimiiors prof:3D3 th^t orii Ad Hoc S;^l>-Gffi::Mitt ehoii^-d n^cit to consider tha c.i^cncl^ as i^tat so b^loi? vJ2^i that pacitic^a pH^:?a\^£i rhoiild bo pr-cp.rrccl C3 iixUcatsd:

* ~-' - ■' -' — - -' —■..-. — -^ ^ ^

,. ' ^ . ■ (1) X^^"'i: /m crvrJiiation of tho not Conmui^^rrt tL'j'Cj:-: to

Cf ,nithcarrt Anir;> ir>-dueling S'.a-t Ptilcif:t?.n^ in conr^icloration of <ho i'oxvat ,th:cou:th BiUTi?C^ aftf^r-t:C.:ir!g Into conciidci^ition ths offc^ct of /-Xlicd aerioA attack, ^7ith c, ccrro:lnration of convent.ior.al ciii nnclz3:c voyoo^D^ on KoiitOa Chiuct TAicl !!ort5i Vlotniixi. (The ccopo of tho ailica r.ttao!^ to b3 ta'ccn int-o con^^icloration ir. arj detailed in the t/onOy 6t Anne^: A^ /^ppcadiUc 7 of tlvio

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/■*^ \ ' / C^) P^nit ion.. r)nr>r;r; To bo ixccpDi^cd by tiio U::iitc:l Stcto:^^

(1) 7,^^325: ^^>^ ova^lnation of tho not Viot V^:^::k thrcnt to tho G0untrf.e:3 of fi'^vvtli^a^t Asia af't^or tp]:!!-'^ into a^coimt tho effect of A^^licd aciripl *"ttr.ckj' v^ith a coi3M.nation of conventio;aal and nnolcrj* .ue^iponsj on 7brth Viotnr].^t . ' "

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r ' ' ^ " ■ ' . (l) Ta5";,:: An ov^Jv.ation of tho i\^% Ccr„*:;iird8t tjr^^c?,t to

C[^ '' IJoDt P<?;iiotan aftor tr-Vin^ into ficootint tho effect of AJ:i:v::d nuolcr^r

i - ■ motion (!::irJji^3t the Co^7aroist v,zz^oz:ilon^

b. Tt>; tho n3e:yi:v'prcpDoi;d abovo^^ • ' ■ '

Q.. Tn^X poaition 7:?n^>or3 ohor^d bo r^c'r^:}:^^ og pro'::opcd o;:ovc,

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if . -■ ■ 3,, Th3 StAff ?aa"::c:r.:3 iTro::oro that nt thnix* ri:^:t. nootli'is thoj

^ - EhoiLld coxi::idc^ the fo2J/:^::i:i5 0.3---^^ ^--^ "^--^ po:jition p;\p:T should bo

]; ^, - produo^::d tip. indicated:

1.

70? SEGHIff

- C^) Vj^J^JijSlV^JOjni^i To b3 prcpoTcd by tho Unrltcd Statese '

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2^ Rocor=^o::r'i!.-^tion; Tho St?S£ ri^nncrn recCwierad th:it tho *\ I

'"'** ^ ''/ '' ,.\ G. To tho irjotin3 of tho Ad Hog C:fc-Gc::::od.ttco jjroprjrod abovoi*'^

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a. Apxincla Itsyi A:

b, Ar<.enc!a Iter^i B;

. aw^^ v'fc- .rfi,-^.^^*^ •m Ln--^ _ ■•

(l) X^i^'i* A stiicly of thD Wocl:ade of the South Ghinii and North Vietnrjn cor.,sts in support of the rdlxtniy o^jorations in dofcnr.o of

So- theanit Asia,.agrdnst aii attacic by ClL^aeso Coii^u^xst vxid Vict Mitili forcoco

/

C^) r£/^i^3UJiSSJSI! To b'^ prepcjj^ed by the UrdtccT Stater^

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(2) Position iD-pj^er; To bo preuDred by thG Urrltcd KingdQrn*

(7^ Por.iti^n prroex^: To be produced \rr Paidst^Ji,

I (l) 7(1^^}:: To C::coi::ino e:^d,r>ti^2 iiov.-mxc^z saA to d8te:c:ai?:^,3

^SHL^TO rcquirClients for th3 all.oc?.tior*, coiitvol riud protection of -QHed

L ■ :fo? sECRRr

. " I

(-1-) .^^-.S's: A revievr of the report bj tho Ad-Ibc Sub-. ' CoinaittoG on Tiireat EVrJ.uatlon end tho ch^a'.-dri'? iro of f•.•o^jropriat2 cl■>scA^-•

vations and r&cor:3nezLdations to the Kilitc^a^" Adviccre concornins it, - ' ;

M ^. ' ^ , ■ ' 1 (2) Position iy".^or; Ken3 renuired.

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(i) X?,5l?5 The dDve.lop:aent of the SEATO f^ti^ategic concept ^ for tlic dofen£.^G of Southeast Ania, including the defeui^c of Fact PiO:ir/J",£'Ji I

\ ~ ^ and of essential sea and air lino:] *of coiT.V^uziicatioB, against eXi attack - ^ P

by Chin83G Coirj.maint a^id Viet "Kinh forces on tl33 aanUT:ption that tho SEATO nations uoiLld uso nuclcax frc^t\pony us required^. (To bs bapcd on the ^ findingcj under Agenda Iteia A of tlio A.d Hoc Sub-Coiuiaittes on Tiircat

' Eval'.uatlon,)

)

d* i.^Mo-^lfe'iJl.: ' ' \

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(2) Pofsition BrvDor: To bo prcb:a^ed by Prince.

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c. ^ Agenda Itrri E: * , - J

I (1) Ta:^-l5' The dsvolopment of a SEATO ctrategic concept ^ I

for the dofcn-^b of V/est Pakistan against an att!ic!< by CorrfiTiuiiDt forcr.o ) on tho ai53n^i:ption that SEATO nations i;juld u^a i.^uclear v;canons as required^

L{To b3 bailed on the findings under Agenda Itc3 C of tho Ad Hoc Sub '

' Commttee on Thj^eat'Eva^luationo) ; » ' ^ /

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jaerccjiant tihilppiL^g 3Ji the South cud £outhe'iirt'i:ii'5.a r-ra23 in tlis OTCii'i ox overt CD:-amiviifit r.sijL'esjsilonc

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(1) lJ^^:iS* ^^^<^ coazJicioratioM of iiatci-iDJ r>tand^i'ai^i;aio:d ' by properly o\\v^S£xz^O, t3ohn:lc^2 ropr;DDontat5.YOD* i!l3e.^lc■a to b6 dralm up ■ tiUvf circiilatcd by the U:2itod States*

• ■' ' (2).2i>5^,mJ?:v:s;: Yo ba prcpc^Tcd l:>y t!io Unxtca St:itc:3.

hft Af;e"o.a .Ctc':a 11:

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JLtig the preparation of agicidad for:

2.

(a) Too third laa^tli:^ of the ra3ifcm*Y Advlssra.

(b) Ad Hoc Sub-Coni:ii,tte3 as rcciu:brcdfl

(c) Ths foLirth nc'itit)^ of tho St^IT Planners.

Rf^£J2fr2S:::i3ni:£n: TI13 St-rr Planners recoroiGnd that "tho lliHtiri'

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Pl!?jiue:cs.

a. Approve the above rgenda for tho thli^a Kcotin" of the Staff

b. Asi-es th-t po3;ltlou papers £;bmad bo prepared as indlca"

tecle

i>» TiB03„enrl_Pn ;-iNj3_j)_f^r)_^^^^^^ . •

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Ad lloQ Suc"Con:nittcG on !rhrD.-i &/aluatio;i

t VoDxJ, HarraT 5 Fcbruory 1956

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23 15^7 195S 16 July 195S

1

, ^" ^^iS^^rESE^Jvy^on: The Staff Plamerc rcoo:3jsnd- that tlio*

^j.xxw:l-/ Auva.oerD f>pprovi the n'cove echedulG of future Ksctin^^D, "

,,,. -'- .5fiQ.'':n32:'S-i?;PI!: The Stsiff Pl^riiora rccor-se-r'.S that tho

i'^-.-ttarj Arlv;lscra g^-gs th?.t nations reD-conail^Xo for t-lio prcpr.ratioa 01 pOEXxicn p^psrs should circu3.atc tho so thr-oti-th the Szcr ctxcxo^t at

lea;

'^^i' o:i-3 nonth before tha r.ppropriato nooti-^s*

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'^cc~:

.z-.nCi that tho i-'ilitar-y /idvijsora

ro;:t>rt.

1. Tekc Koto of cXL tho ixjint:; rained la tho ebovo cui^iaary

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Declassiried per Executive Order 13526, Section 3,3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

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In reply refer to 1-16501/5

MEMOIWniM TOR TEE SECRETAEY OF THE WAVY

l6 December 1955

SUBJECT: Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty (SEATO) Staff

Organization

Reference is made to the forthcoming meeting of the SEATO Council to be held at Kai'achij Pakistanj coiimiencing 6 Marcli 195^-

The Department of State has informed this office that pressure is increasingJ particularly from the Asian members of SEATO^ for a permanent I SEATO Council and Mlitary Staff, organiza-tion. At a recent meeting of 'the Military Staff Planners held at Pearl Harborj TH (1-15 November)^ it was the conclusion of the U.S. representatives that the position of the U.S. relative to avoiding a commitment to the concept of a permanent SEATO militaiy staff organization vas fast becoming untenable. CIIICFAC reported this in his message to CNG^ 230211Z Novemberj vhen he stated *'It has been U.S. policy to oppose formation of a permanent SEATO staff orgeuiisation. In this connection^ foimatioa of some sort of perrnanent SEATO staff organi?,ation may be Inevitable and U.S< eventually may find it necessaxy to yield on this point or find itself in no position to refute 'paper tiger' charges. It may be more realistic to take the initiative in this matter so as to be in a better posJ_tion to influence the size and shape of the end product." * ' ,

She attitude of the Asian countries signatoz^j" to the Treaty indicates that they are losing faith in SEATO as a means for deterring Com-mm:tist expansion in Southeast Asia. In this connection^ the Asian States consider that the U.S. is not leading sufficient support to SEATO. FurtherJ the recent Russian visits to Southeast Asia and continuing CMnese Coimnunist activities in the area could result in the Asian members of the Treaty leaning more to a neutralist position.

The Department of State is currently re-exaiaining the U.S. position as pertains to a permanent staff organization for the SEA.TO Comicil and has indicated that^ due to the need for adding "substance** to SEATO^ consideration is being given to the desirability of a U.S. proposal at the 6 March Council meeting^ for the establishment of a pemianent SKA.TO Council staff.

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SecDef Cont. l^Io. S-578

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It is requested that the Department of the Ilavy obtain CIKCPAC's detailed vlevs on tliis matter. Upon receipt of CIKCPAC's views they vill be presented to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for consideration in conjunction vith other policy factors as a basis for the development of a Department of Defense position regarding a permanent military staff orgai:iization. ^

2 cys SeclMavy 1 cy SecAirmy 1 cy SecAF 1 cy CH, JCS 1 cy OSD 1 cy E&C

1 cy Reading file

2 cys SKB'E

(Signed)

E. Perkins McGuire Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA)

Lit^Col.Queenin/j/s/oiiia safe 2E83r T9258 15 Dec 55 1^16501/5

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Declassiried per Executive Order 13526, Section 3,3 NND Pmject Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Dute: 2011

Dedassitied per Executive Order 13526, Secdon 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Dale: 2011

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To: The Scoretaty of DefenoG ■ ':

^'rpm: Tho Assictant Secretary of Defense. (ISA)

* ' . * '. '* . ♦ / '

P roMciii : /oa Intcjragency Military Coatine Team recently returned frora a five vccks iDiGsion'to Free Viet-Nam, The proposed letter to the Secretary of State Gimimarizes tlie Team's findings and re^iuesta hio aGsiotance in cor-rectln^^the eerlouo logistic situation. "./ ' ;

.■ ■> ■ < M ' ii ^* ' < • : _ . ^ .

DiscuGGlon: 1* Financ ei Partially as a^ resiO^t of the Coating Teajn^s efforts^ < estlrfiates Oj? aiinuaD. Defense Svipx"?ox*t and Direct Forces Suj^port do3Jar require* mentG have been reduced by $70 million to $90 ni3.1ion a year. ' _;■'

' ■^" ■ . ^r ■ ■ ■ ' ■ ■ "• 1-

2. . Lo:';istics; Tens of'mllliorjs'of dollax's of U.S, cqulp:.ient'e.nd cumly" are no'./ being loat* Only proiriT^t State-D-^fense action can correct the i^

deficiencies* Tlie TeaiQ'reported; (a) "Tuo \;arehoueeG vere recently ' '>^/ j found to contain' 120 tons of Diedico,! oupplies of vjhich no_ one had prior knowledge*"- (b) 1^000 vehicles and l^jOOO njajor assemblies are sittings ;^ in the rain and mud deteriorating rapidly* (c) ***.*the capabl3.ity of ;'

fjupply of foixeo in the field in the event hostilities BhoiO,d be recUL^ed -,; in mld-1955 vrould be virtua3_ly non-existent*" (d) "#i*the HAAG personne]/*"

I

have done tlieir utiiiost to protect II*S. Interests; there are juet not enough lndi\idua],c to go around*", > ' ,*'■'. -

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' ■ ] 3* Person nel Recul remen ts: ' I50 to 200 Air.erlca.no ckillcd in nd.litax'y " .supply and logistics are iirgent.ly needed in Vict-Ilatii. Authority, to add th.lo ' nuraber requires State D^parti^e^t concurrence* • ." -

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; ^* Co p lins-Kly Agreeiiient ; Tlie Collins Ely Agreement of 1 I>3c X^^h, '

/■/ provides that U*S# equipment in the hands *of the French in Free Vlot-lT.:;i3 "■ /\ is to be returned to U*S. or Vietnaii^cGO control vrhcn dctcnoin'i^d by joint ■ U*S.-French revicif to be no longer needed for the purposes for which ': ; \ originally tiade available* 'This Ag^recrient is not'being lr.jplei):3ntcd by the ' French, with loss pf assets to U*S. end loss'of Vietnaujco'e ■logistic capablli-

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.' Im plcTiiGntation : If Mr* I>alles can (a) mol^e it possible to bring in the adOltiona' T Aniericans .(as. you requested in your letter to Mni dated 13 I)oc 3.955 -* cec ta* A) iincl (h) arrange with the Froncli for lFrplei^:-ntation of the CoHlns-E?^- /^fjT^^

Tucntj VqD C€1\ proceed 'ifith Its plans to rolve the-px^oblcLi*" ; ^^y Recoijui^nO^^c-ion: ^^^'^ '^^'^ ^^^ ^^^^ attached letter4 *']; -'"f-'.'//^'"-'^-v ^^

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Di^classified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By; NWD Dale: 2011

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SENSITIVE

Ltr SecDef to SecState

JM 31. 1956

Dear ltr. Secretary:

Since my letter to you of the 13th of December regarding the Viet-JN'am situationj the Interagency Costing Team^ sent to Saigon to study military finance and related matters^ has returned and submitted its report. The recommendations of the Team vill lead to substantial improvements in budgeting, including savings of millions of dollars during tlie calendar year 1956. Steps have already been initiated to realize these savings.

The Team also studied the logistic situation in Free Viet-Nam and has reported deficiencies which are of greatest concern to me* Only by prompt action at highest departmental levels vill it be possible.ito correct the problems.

Since the recent heavy phasedowr^ ±]i French forces^ or adequate logistic capability in Free Viet-Uam no longer exists- The Team reported that "..,the capability of supply of forces in the field in the event hostilities should be resumed in mid«1956 vould be virtually non-existent." From the standpoint of preservation of U,S.^ assets^ the situation is also most unsatisfactory. Adequate control of MOAP spares and supplies has^ in large part, been lost.

We have concluded that not less than ^lOO^OO&jOOO worth of MOAP materiel can be saved if prompt corrective act,ion can be taken. Such action includes the availability in Viet-Nam in the immediate future of I50 to 200 Americans skilled in supply management and logistics.

A further essential factor in achieving effective supply control is the implementation of the Collins-Ely Minute of Understanding of 1 December 195^. This Agreement provides for the return by the French of U.S. equipment no longer required for the purposes for i^hich originally made available. The Agreement further states that decisions on >rhat is to be returned should be made Jointly by French and U,S, representatives. Nevertheless^ the French are making these decisions unilaterally; it appears that they are carefully sorting out the useful^ serviceable items for their own use, and returning the excess and salvage. We know of no valid reason why U.S. personnel shoiild not be allowed to enter French military storage areas to participate in these determinations.

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SecDef Cont. No. S-O86 '

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Declas^jficd per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

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Your assistance in (a) making it somehow possible to bring in additional personnel^ and (b) arranging T^ith the French for effective implementation of the Collins-Ely Minute of Understanding is requested-on an urgent basis* I recognize that in reaching your conclusions, you must also weight other factors not discussed in this letter* To enable the Department of Defense to carry out its responsibilities in Free Viet-Wamj however^ a solution along the lines discussed above is essential, j

Sincerely yours,

SIGHED

C.E. WILSOIT

The Honorable

The Secretary of State

2 cys State 1 cy OSD 1 cy RC

1 reading file cy 1 yellow — office cy (Westdott)

Prepared by JEWestcott/^s/2E837

5U175 - 12377/6 Re^^itten by Gordon Gray/jcp

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Di^cl^ssined per Executive Order 13526» Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

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■ 'THE GENERAL SITUATION] If J SOUTH VIEEMAl'I

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. ' Tho position of the government of South Vletnsm ' is appreciably stronger than it vas a yoar^ or 0. en six jnonths^, ago^ VJithin- the past several ueeks, hOi-;'- :, ^{^^*^S ,"; ■ -. J ever J si;;jn3 of new political stresses have appeared^ /^^j'''■^-^^^'Xl:V^''^* ^ --

LHd the Coiumimists are, apparently steppiiig up their campaign against the South Vietnamese Goverimont^ -

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pect that the nation-vrldo election^ stiptilated 5^1

Final Declaration of the 195U Geneva Conference, tail -^^^'Sr:^'^:^^l ^'/' be held by July; aaid 3) the reported rmcrease in op^ \i)^^'^^^i-^^^' ■.. /^ position to President Ngo Dinh Diem er^d the Corrijnunist .'^^;v:t/:-'*-\--J'v'*V'/. .:-<-attack on programs strengthening the Diem governmentj-V' --,?'/ ./;^f:^'.r.'.'>.! -'■ spec^i'ioally,'the March U/election for a national-con**'^; ;'■ *V '*:;/'■-": -\y; stituent asseiTiblyo ..*..■■ * ^ i':'-:u ---.,>/,<':■='-."■

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Since the vii'bua], Gl5jriination of the Bliih Xuyen as a 7ni3-5.tary foroo " ■ iiiki the neutralisation of .a major portion of the Cao Dai vjiitCj the principal tlTToats to internal seciirity in South Vietnam come from the claiidestino ■

Co:r;:TiUnist apparatus and from the remnants of the HoaKao'sectg The CorLTiunists^ have ^.n'est^jnated 10^000 guei-rillas in South Vietnam^ scattered in small g'^-^Q^-^-QS ±^1 rural areas but presumably still responsive-to control from Haiioio ?ae principal infested areas ai^^e the plateau region of northern Soxith Vietnam the southern peninsula (Camau), ajid the canal-i-oyen area southuest ^ of s'aicron where the Vietnainese National Army (VNA) io cm^rently engaged in ' operations a^^a^nst the Hoa Kaoo COir.munist agents reporl^edJ-y have boen ' .

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successful In infiltrating remaining Hoa Hao groups chiefly Ba Cut's

organization. The latter's increasingly effective defensive tactics have made recent TOA operations relatively costly.

I

In addition to the continuing presence of these guerrilla elements^ the Communists have presumably tried to penetrate all branches of the goverjunent. The most frequent reports suggest heavy penetration of the Inf rmation Ministry. The absence of reliable information does not disprove somt; probable penetration of police and military services ^ particularly at lover levels. The Communists have a surviving capability to disrupt governmental operations J and perhaps to immobilize the regime^ through a coord nated campaign of terror and assassination -- a capability they have

thus far chosen not to exercise,

I

Political Problems

The March ^4 election vill^ in all probability^ produce a national assembly that will overwhelmingly support Diem and approve the constitution that a pro-Diem commission has prepared. The constitution will establish a presidential system vith separation of povers. Balloting vill not indicate accurately the extent of anti-Diem sentiment^ for a nimtber of nationalist leaders, particularly refugees from the norths appear disinclined to risk censure or repression by contesting the election as opposition candidates.

It will be essential J in the iromediate future^ that Diem have effective control over the administration and the national assembly- He has the support of the National Revolutionary Movement (MM) ^ which has become^ in effect his political party. There is some question^ nevertheless^ whether at present Diem is unnecessarily antagonizing elements which might add strength to the future government. He remains almost pathologically sensitive to criticism and potential opposition^ with the result that the regime is becoming increasingly autocratic despite his democratic principles. In view of Diem*s skill in dealing with dissident elements over the past year J it will, perhaps be wise to give him the benefit of the doubt during the pre-election period.

Economic Conditions

There has been little recent change in the economic picture in South Vietnam. Rice prices^ which rose precipitously during the summer and fall due largely to poor distribution, have now returned to normal. A major program for resettlement in southwest Vietnam of up to 100^000 of the refugees from the north is now developing^ with US and other foreign support. If successful, it would simultaneously reduce the problems of 1} the refugeesJ 2) increased agricultural production, and 3) internal security in rural areas *

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Deciassified per Executive Order 13526, Sectit^n 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

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Xr.ternr,tioncl Asoecfcs

The Chines© CojYanunist request for a reconvcnajig of the Geneva* Conference broadened to ii^iclude'the International Control CormrtiGv'jion rfierrbers^ probably indicates that tho CorrjTAmisto vdll continuo to drive for "ro\:nlflcation^* of • Vietnsn by political and diplonatic Tno^is rather than by a x'^esort to large** • E;cal3 \dLolence z-*^ at least until their proposal is definitively rojectedo ' ''" ;q Indians, as i:ell as the Coinjiiunist countries^ uUA probably approve tlia call for a new conference^ . They apparently lash-to see"the ICC continue ia operation^ ivhich T:ould require the Vietnamese to assuirio some of the functions GElsignod to the French by the 1?5U agreements (, ^ '■■-..

The French are likely to continue the Trlthdraw?^.! of their forces (now reduced to about l^^OOO) in South Vietnam^ to avoid formal terinlnation of its informal mission to the DRV headed by \U Saintenyj and — despite current opposition — nay come to favor a neu conference as a means of relief from their obligations undor the 195U agreementso The British have become increasingly reconcHGd to aji extended partition of Vietnam^ novr have greater confidence in Hiem*s strength, and TXfuD.d prefer to avoid or at least postpone a ncvj Geneva Conference 9 'Jho Bi^itinh;, hotrever;^ still hope that Diom can be -brought to accept some form of nort-h^-eouth consultation^ ovon without proc^'» poet of success0 ■/■ ^-^ ' 1., "

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NSC 5602/1 March 15, 1956

TOP SECRET

Referencess

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ITOTE BY THiS EXECliTIVE SECRSTARY

to the

HATIONAL SECURITY CCUNCIL

on

BASIC NATIOj:IAL_ST';GyRITY_FgLTCY_„ _

A. Ka; 5501'""■""" '"'"' "

B. NIE ii-a-55; MIS 11-7-55; -NIE li--i3-55i NIE'11-13/1-55

NIE 100-7-55;' SNIE .TOO-8.-55 NSC 5602

Memos for NSC from Acting Executive Secrotarv, sane sulfject, elated February 13 and 2^, 1956

E, Memo for NSC frorij Executive Secretary, subject: -"U. S. Policy in the Event of a Reneval of Aggression in Vietnain". dated September l6-

1955

F. NSC Action No, 1522

The National Secuirty Council; the Secretary of the

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Administrator J and the Director, -Bureau of the Budgetj at . the 277th and 27Sth rafeotings of the Council on February 27 and March 1, 1956, discussed the subject on the basis of the reference report (N£C 5602) in the light of the recorjiiiien dations of. the NSC Planning Board, transmitted by the reference memorandum of Pbbruary 13, and the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff^ tranismitted by the reference m.er.10-randma of February 2U; 1956. The Council -adopted the statement of policy contained in McG 5602, subj^^ct to the changes set forth in NEC Action No. 1522~b. ■ .

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The President has this date approved the stateraent of policy in NSC 5602^ as amended and adopted hy the Council and enclosed hez^'ev/ith as IvSC 5602/15 and directs its implementation by all appropriate executive departments and agencies of the U. S. Governir.ent^ vrith the understanding that final determination on hud^^t reqvxests hased thereon v;ill be made by the Presid-^^nt aft^^r normal budgetary revien-j,

'nSC 5602/1 is a Eubstitut'd for ^82 5501 and is the basic guide in I'ho implementation of all other naticjial security policies J supc^rsfding ziny provisions in such other policies as may be in, conflict v/ith it, Progress rt^ports to the National Secuirty Council on other policies should include specific reference, to policies which have been modified by NSC 5602/1.

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3,3 NND Pmjeci Niiniber: NND 63316. Bv: NWD Diite: 2011

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■At the time that th^ Council adopted the enclosed policy it a] so took the follo-iv'ing actions (KvX Actions 1522-c thi^ough -h): " . • "

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Requesjted the Dt^parteen.t of Defense to make a presentation on the capabilities^ vith or v;ithout nuclear vjeaponSj of the U, 5. military forces 37eferred to in paragraph 32 and ether appropriate

ocal aggres-i late the study transmitte^d by the reference, memorandum of September l6 1955.

J. V'J. ^-v J. vr^_t vv^ -Lij ya^x d£^*c CLjJii _j£L CIiJ-VJ- ^^M-:l^-J. n

paragraphs of ?ISC 5501 j to deal v:ith lo sion in Vietnam^ utilizing as appropria

Agreed that the Councilj after submission to the President of the report on the subject noi/ In preparation by the Chairr^anj Council on Foreign Economic Policy, should give further consideration to basic U. S. policies v;ith respect to the less developed and uncommitted areas*

Requested that a presentation to "the Council on the problem of technological superiority be raade by the Department of Defense, the Office of Defense Mobilizationj and the Ifetional Science Foundation; v;ith the collaboration of the Department of Health, Education and V/elfare on those aspects of the presentation respecting the educational objectivtjs in the United States, ■ :

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Agreed that intensive? efforts should be continued on all aspects of the probleiri of devising a safe-guard^jrd systeir^ of disarmament*

Requested the Operations Coordinating Board^ vdth the participation of the Department of Justice, to , prepare a study of the factors involved in implementing' paragraph 35 of NSC 5602, dealing with free Vcrld-Comjnjinist bloc contacts; and directed the KX Planning Board to review pertinent policies (particularly NSC 5508/l and NS'J 5^2?) based upon such an OCB study.

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Noted tUe President's request th-nt the Department of Defense and the Office cf Defense Mobilization, in consultation vith the-Bureau of the Budget prepare for Counci:. consideration a definition of " the terra "mobiliaation base".

JAITSS S. LAY, JR. Executive Secretary

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The Secretary of the Treasury

The Attorney General

The Special .Assistant to the Prosidont for

Disarm^nent The Director J Bureau of the Budget' The Chairnan^ AtcLiic Energy CoiruTAssion The Federal Civil Defense Adninistrator

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The Chairniahj- Council of Sccnoniic Advisers The Ch^iirivianj Council on ForejgiiL Econorac Policy The Chairmanj Joint Chiej?s of Staff The Director of Central intelligence

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Decliis!>jncd per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

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BASIC NATIONAL SECURITY POIJCY

Mr—w'^r^-'VV^ * ■

PREAMBLE

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li, 0?he spiritual J nioral and material postiu'^e of the United States of America rents upon establishsd principles which have been asserted and defended throughout the history of the Republic« The genius^ strength caid promise of America are fourided^in the dedication of its people and government to the dignity5 equality and freedom of the human being under Godt ThGse concepts and our instituti021s v/hich nourish and maintain them v.ath o^stice? are the bulv/ark of our free society and are the basis of the respect and leadership v/hich have ] been accorded cur nation by the peoples of the world,. When they are challenged j cur^ response rr-ust be resolirte and worthy of oui' heritagep From this premise raust derive our national-v;ill and the policies which express it. The continuing full exercise of our individual and collective responsibilities is required to realize the t-asic objective of our national security policies: i2>aintaining the secuirty of the United States and the vitality of its fundamental values and institutions*

NEC 5602/1

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SECTIOi-: A-0UTLI1\H. (F. U. S . h^ATIOK^L STRATEGY

2- Ih^^^^^iil_p]?.iactive of Ut S, national security policy^ is to preserve the seoufity of the United States^ and its fundamsntal values and institutions, -^ ^ ■

an^ernatlonal apparatus.

^^ .The basic problein confronting the United States is how, v;lthout undsrinining fujidaKiental U, S^ values and in-- * stitutions or seriously v/eakening the U, S, economyj to meet and ultimately to reduce to acceptable proportions this threat to U,. S* security. ► - , -

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\ 5. The United States and its allies have no foreseeable

^-prospect of stopping the growth of Soviet nuclear capabilities-

and of reducing Soviet armed strength—the core of CoiniJiunist "

'pov;er—or of significantly reducing other basic Cojomunist

military strength^ except by riiutually acceptable agreements

v;ith thG Soviets or by large--scale military action* The . t

initiation by the United States oX such military action for

this purpose is not an acceptable course either to the United

States or its major allies,

6, Hence J U. S, policies must be designed (1) to affect the conduct and policies of the Comrriunist regimes5 especially i those of the USSR, in v;ays that further U, S. security . ; interests (including safeguarded disarriament) j and (2) to foster tendencies that lead thein to abandon expansionist > policies. In pursuing this general strategy, our effort should be directed to: *

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s used in this paper, the term ^'nuclear'^ refers to any military device of any sise or purpose which utilizes energy released in the course of nuclear fission or fusion.

KSC 5^02/1

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a. Deterring further Cor-irnvmist aggressiorij and -prevsnting the ocourrerioG of tj;^al_j:/ar so far as

compatible with U, S, security, . ^

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b. Madntaining and developing in the free vorld the mutuality of intGrcst and coiiiiBon purpose, the confidence in the United States, and the will, strength and stability5 necessary to face the Soviet-^Cczimiunist threat and to provide constructive and attractive alternatives to CoirmunisM, v/hich sustain the hope and confidence of the free peoples* * .'.... ^

c. 'In addition to a and b above, talcing other GLCtions designed to foster changes in the character and policies of the Soviet-Coiiirrranist bloc regimes:

(1) By influencing thera a2id their peoplfis to- , \;ard the choice of those alternative lines of action vhich^ while in their national interssts^ do not : conflict vjith the security interests of the United Gtates, ...

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(2) By exploiting differences betv;een such regimas to disrupt the structure of the Soviet-Corjirnunist bloc.

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(3) Sy exploiting vulnerabilities \7ithin the bloc countries in v/ays consistent vath this general I strategy, ■ ^ , '

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d. Destroying or neutralizing the international Communist apparatus in the free vi^orld,

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7. To carry out effectively this general strategy v;ill reouire a flexible combination of military, political, economic, psychological, and covert actions i;hich enables the full exercise of U* S. initiative. These* actions must be so coordinated as to reinforce one another* Programs for carrying out this general strategy should be developed and conducted as a natter of urgencyj vith special enphasls in the period before the Soviets achieve nuclear parity*

8, Provided that it is resolutely pursued, this general strategy offers the "oeht hope of bringing about at least a prolonged period of arraed truce, and ultimately a peaceful resolution of the -Soviet bloc-free v;orld conflict and a peaceful and orderly v;orld environment. Failiu'e rcso3-Utcly to pursue this general strategy couldj v;ithin a relatively short span of years, place the United States in great jeopardy.

LSC 5502/1

1056

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