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57- *£&& Defense member of the NSC Planning Boafd indicates the options available to the U.S. with regard to the Geneva results. General Bonesteel suggests that the increased risks associated with pressuring France to continue the war and possible U.S. intervention to stop the corniaunist advance can "more surely and safely be accepted now than ever again." On the other hand, a compromise at Geneva would lead to communist subversion at a late date and U.S. involvement then might be inhibited by an increased Soviet nuclear capability. "Asia could thus be lost*" General Bonesteel Memorandum for Secretary of Defense, 9 May 195*4.... . , ^ 2

98. The draft instructions for the Geneva Delegation, which have been approved by the President are sent to the Defense Department for comment. According to the in-struct ions , the U.S. is n an interested nation which, however3 Is neither a belligerent nor a principal in the negotiation." State Department Letter to R. B. Anderson, Deputy Secretary of Defense, 10 May 195'^ ^3

99* France is convinced it is facing Communist China at

Dien Bien Phu not Viet Minh rebels. The French request the aid of competent U.S. military advice, i.e., a U.S. Genei-al to confer with Genera]. Ely on regrouping forces in Indochina. Paris U287 to Dulles, 10 May 195^ ^

100. The United States "posture" at Geneva is interpreted as "to cheer the players" rather than "to pitch." The draft instructions to the Geneva delegation imply a "profound point" — will the U.S. admit diplomatic defeat and cease to use the conference toward its ends if the conference appears to go against the U.S.? General Bonesteel Memorandum for Deputy Secretary of

Def ens-', 10 May I95H. M*9

101. The President approves informing the French of his conditions for U.S. intervention in Indochina. Even though premature, the decision to internationalize the war must be made. President Else: :er would ask Congressional authority to commit U.S. forces provided: (l) there was a French request, (2) that other nations would be requested and would accept, (3) that the UK would be notified, {}\) that France gu ? - titers independence in the French Union to the Associated States, including the option to withdraw at any time, (5) that France would not withdraw its forces after the intervention, and

(6) that an agreed on structure for united action is

reached. Dulles k02^ to Paris, 11 May I95U 4 **51

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102. The President approves NSG Action No. 1111 recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff which immediately suspends "shipment of military end-i1 s under U.S. MDAP" to Indochina. HSC Memorandum for Secretary of Defense, 11 May 195 } t • 1{ 5o

103. Secretary Dulles forwards the basic instructions approved by the President for the head of the U.S. Delegation to Geneva. "The United States is not pre I pared, to give its express or implied approval to any cease-fire, armistice, or other settlement.,.." which

would subvert the local governments, impair territorial

integrity, or jeopardize forces of the French Union,

Dulles TOSEC 138 to Geneva, 12 May 195^ • • • • lf 57

iOlf. A proposal tabled at the Planning Board meeting on 13 May 195^; si sts that "the U.S. is endeavoring I to avoid the loss of Indochina and to resolve the

colonialism problem by the creation of a regional grouping." General Bonesteel Memorandum to NSC, 13 May I95I4. • < '160

IO5, Laniel and SgJvpazi appear well pleased with the U.S, position, especially that U.K. participation is no longer a prerequisite to U.S. intervention. The one serious objection to Eisenhower's conditions, however, is that "France publicly accord to the Associated States the right of withdrawal from the French Union , at any time." Unless some way can be found around this, "the French will never ask for outside assistance ." Paris 1*383 to Dulles, I** May 195U **62

:

106« In referring to the French objection to Eisenhower f s conditions for intervention, Dulles indicates the U.S. might be flexible but "there cannot be any equivocation [ on the completeness of independence if we are to get 1 the Philippines and Thailand to associate themselves." Without them the whole arrangement would collapse and ,

■ the U.S. is not prepared to intervene "as part of a

white Western coalition which is slimmed by all Asian

states." Dulles U09H (TEDUL 73) to Paris, 15 May V^k ... H65

107. The "right of withdrawal" from the French Union is

unacceptable to France because it reflects on French

honor and questions the concept of the French Union. 1

It is proposed that existence of a powerful Vietnamese '

National Army would clarify the independence status to

other Asian states and therefore the U.S. should assume

"primary responsibility for the training end equipping

of a Vietnamese national Army.*" Dillon Wfc02 to Dulles,

17 May 195^. - . ..* h <&9

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108. The present acute crisis prevents successful debate on the European Defense Gorasomity (EDC) proposal in the French Parliament, Any attempt to force a vote -would lead to postponement or defeat of EDC. If the Laniel government falls because of Indochina, EDC w:L!l likely get buried for good. Paris WtO to Dulles, 19 May 195^ ^7?

IC9. Secretary Stevens emphasizes the Army's concern over high-level official views that "air and sea forces alone could solve our problems in Indochina" and that the complex nature of these problems vould require a major logistical effort — "it explodes the myth that air and sea forces could solve the Indochina problems," Secretary of the Army Memorandum for Secretary of Defense, 19 May 195U **75

1

4-

110. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that U.S. military participation in Indochina be limited primarily to

naval and air forces, JCS Memorandum for Secretary .

of Defense, 21 May I95I+... . .; *77

111. The JCS recommend against a "Korea-type" defense of Southeast Asia as unsound. Accordingly, the U.S. "should adopt the concept of offensive actions against the 'military power of the aggressor, 1 (in this instance, Communist China) rather than local reaction to the attack. JCS Memorandum for Secretary

of Defense, 21 May l$5k . , . 0 . ». **8<5

112. General Smith cannot understand why the JCS downgraded U.S. military representation on the five i power staff conference because the Russians and

Chinese must, have known Ve really intended serious

business." DULTE 100, 23 May 195 J i J ' S 3

113- The U.S. feels, as a minimum, France and Vietnam should sign draft Treaty of Indepei :ice, France should indicate "equal and sovereign" status of French Union states, and declare withdrawal of French Expeditionary Forces as soon as possible. Dulles to Paris U272, 26 May 195^ • •. -

kQk

Hkn The JCS point out their belief that, from the U.S. point of view with reference to the Far East, "Indochina, is devoid of decisive military objectives and allocation of more than token U.S. armed forces in Indochina would be a serious diversion of limited U.S. capabilities."" JCS Memoranda for Secretary of Defense, 26 May 195U l *37

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115* The White House views the JCS position on intervention In Indochina as not involving any new policy issue relative to 1ISC 5'-Q5* However, a pencilled Secretary of Defense marginal note indicates that the White House "misses the point 11 — the JCS was considering the "regional grouping" and others in the grouping, i.e., U.K. may object to NSC 5^05 policy. Hence the JCS is earning "not to get involved in such a grouping" unless all pai-ties accept direct action. White House Memorandum for Secretary of Defense , 26 May 195*1- • • • • • ^9^

116. Ely emphasizes particular points to Trapnell and Dillon:

(1) Ely was not in accord with 0'Daniel's proposal to reorganize the VietnaiTtese army on a divisional basis,

(2) 0'Daniel's operational war plan was unrealistic,

(3) the increasing frequency of American criticism of French conduct of the ~ - was not appreciated, (k) Ely was regrouping his forces for defense of the Delta, and (5) one or two U.S. Marine divisions could assure

defense of the Delta, Paris k$6 to Dulles, 27 May 195^ **5?5

117- The U.S. Delegation to Geneva clearly sees a forthcoming settlement which the U.S., under NSC, cannot associate itself with. Both the dangers of partition and impossi-I Mlity of armistice supervision in Indochina are recognized. "There is very little that the Defense Department can do to influence the negotiations, since a political decision has been made that the U.S. will continue to participate" even though partition will ultimately result in loss of Indochina to communism. Geneva Delegate Letter to Admiral Davis, 28 May l$3 h r •*. ■ M?3

118. The French suggest that the U.S. take over responsi- ; bility for t^ainl the Vietnamese national Army and provide' assistance toward improving airfields for jet ! aircraft use in Indochina. Paris U58O to Dulles, 28 May 195^ * - ; 500

119* Dillon clarifies apparent misunderstanding in Washington on French understanding of U.S. intervention if Red China attacks Indochina. Peris 1*&7 to Dulles, 30 May I95U 503

120. Schuman, Ely, and Laniel inform Dillon and Trapnell that

France regards the present bilateral negotiations as a j "prelude to U.S. intervention should Geneva fail" or should the communists drag negotiations to uotain a military decision in the . Ita. The French pursue'reassurance of U.S. intervention if Red China launches an all-out air attack. Paris H6l2 to Dulles, 31 May 195*1 506

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121, There is no misunderstanding bet n U.S. and France if U*S, policy on a Chinese intervention would be "judged under the circumstances of the moment* 11 Dillon cites three courses of action open to the U.S a in such an event: (l) President will request Congress to act, (2) President would request authority to use forces, or (3) U.S. would act only as part of a collective action.

• Paris i]625 to Dulles, l"June 195 ! + 503

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122, NSC Action $k21 incloses summaries of studies prepared by various departments and agencies with respect to "possible U.S, action regarding Indochin.a." Sunaaaries included here are of studies prepared by Departments of State, Justice, Defense and CIA, Office of Defense Mobilization, Bureau of the Budget, Foreign Operations Administration and Operations Coordinating Board. NSC 5^21, 1 June 195^ ... 510

123, Disagreement exists that the U.S. and Prance have "now reached accord in principal on the political side" on conditions for U.S. participation in Indochina. The U.S. needs a precise statement of France's commitments to meet the preconditions for intervention. Dulles Vj21 to Paris, k June l$fik 530

12H. Saigon suggests that in order to make a French declaration more palatable, the U fl 3. announce its intention to withdraw technical and military assistance as soon as practicable. In "neutralist Asian eyes > the U.S. Is the principal threat to Eastern Asia....and not decadent France. 11 A review of terms of reference which limit KAAG to a logistical function is now essential* Saigon 2656 to Dulles, k June 195*4 531

125. The U.S. seeks to avoid formal identification with open ' partition or the creation of two states. While U.S. ) military authorities take a "gloomy view" of the military situation, France has failed to decide to "internationalize" the war on the conditions laid down in ; Paris. The French are not treating the U.S. proposal seriously but "toying with it just enough to -use it as

a talking point at Geneva." TEDUL 169, 7 June I95 1 * 533

126. General Valluy evaluates the Tonkin Delta military situation: (l) If Tonkin Is lost, a military line will not be re-established, (2) in this connection,, there are no South Vietnamese who could oppose North Vietnamese, (3) Ho Chi Minn's objective is Tonkin and the political capital Hanoi, to be gained either by

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negotiation or military force as necessary*, (k) if Tonkin .

is lostj France will not fight in the South, (5) nor would

Vietnamese fight ag st other Vietnamese and sooner or

later the vliole of Vietnam will "become communist. TEDUL

171, 7 June 195U 535

533

128. The U. S, .will seek firm views of others once the "French authoritively tell us they want to internationalize the Indochina war." Further, when France decides to request U.S. intervention, the U.S. must have the opportunity to make its own decision "based on prevailing circumstances. "We cannot grant the French an indefinite option on us without regard to intervening deterioration." TEDUL 175*

8 June 195!* ..... 5>*0

129. Because of 3 Hand's strong feeling the scope of appeal should not be limited to Thailand. The Thai government has a negative attitude on limiting the scope and they object to Chechoslovakia or other Soviet satellite membership on the Peace Observation Commission (POC),

United nations 810 to Dulles, 8 June 195 ] i. • 5^2

130. Bidault replies to a conversation reported in DULTE I56 (not printed here) in which "agreement in principle" with the U.S. had been reached. Wo major differences are noted, however, French military believe any JCS war plan would show the necessity of at least one Marine division for the Delta. General Valluy's 'conversationsat the . Pentagon are seen as most crucial. "Thus if we want French military assistance...in. Southeast Asia...it is vital. 'JCS...approve a joint war plan justifying the

use of Marines." Paris U766 to Dulles, 9 June 195^ 5H 1 !-

131- Eden cites three major issues emerging on which "we cannot compromise": (l) separate treatment of Laos and Cambodia problem, (2) status and powers of international supervisory authority and (3) composition of the international supervisory authority. Britain feels negotiations have failed and little can be salvaged in Vietnam. DULTE l6H,

9 June 195U 5U7

132. The French are upset because Admiral Radford had said there was "no question of utilizai i of Marines in Indochina." The U.S. position, according to Dulles,

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had been clear from the start that "we were not willing

to make a cenr.' nt ahead of time which the French could

use for internal political maneuvering or negotiating at

Geneva...." TEDUL 178, 9 June 195U . . 550

« 133* "General Ely has twice in lay presence stated that his

keenest desire is for the United States to enter this

war.* The purpose of General Valluy's statement (war

assessment) is either to bring the U.S. and five other

powers into the conflict or to prepare an "excuse before

history" for an armistice. Saigon 271U to Dulles,

10 June 195'f .., , 552

13*. The French military feel that a Tonkin decision will rest on U.S. intentions. The French are reluctant to request "internationalization" which would result in new talis and provoke new "hopes." The U.S., on the other hand, does not want to consider a U.S. training mission separate from the "overall operational, plan" on the assumption the conditions are fulfilled for U.S. participation in Indochina. Murphy (Acting SecState) ^508 to Paris, 10 June

195^ •

553

13-?. The French impression is that even after all conditions are met, the chances of U.S. participation are "nil." With this attitude it is only a matter of time until the French ccme to terms with the Viet Minh. The result would be disastrous to French public opinion and the "U.S. would be blamed" for having failed in the crisis. Therefore, it is recommended that the French be informed that "the President is no longer prepared to request '

military intervention" even if France fulfills all con- | ditions. France should strive for an armistice and thus avoid a^military disaster• A few months delay in commu- "j nist takeover in Indochina is not commensurate with '

"possible collapse of the defense of Western Europe." Paris li&H to Dulles, ik June 195U 555

136* The French want, ajid "in effect have, an option on our ■ intervention, but they do not want to exercise it and the date of expiry of our option is fast running out." TEDUL 197, Ik June 195^ 558

0-37. Secretary Dulles emphasizes that events have shown that predictions he has made all along on the lack bf any real French desire for U.S. intervention but "as a card to play at Geneva." The U.S. does not see that France's bitterness is justified considering "prolonged French and U.K. indecision." Dulles ^579 to Paris', lU June 195U 559

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138' It is in the best Interests of the U.S. that final adjournment of the Conference take place unless France • -vents to keep it alive. Eden's departure on a recess is seen as evidence of no reason to delay "collective - talks on SEA defense." TEDUL 196, Ik June l$j5»t 561

139* The CIA estimates communist reactions to the participation of U.S. air and naval forces at various levels of intensity and on various targets in conjunction with French Union forces in Indochina. Special Rational Intelligence Estimate, SNIE 10-ls-5 L ^ 15 June 195 1 ^ • • 563

lUo. Dulles cites an alternative that "if and when" a French Government which had the confidence of the Assembly should decide to continue the war, as opposed to an unacceptable armisticej the U.S. would be prepared to I . respond-promptly. 5PEDUL 208, 16 June 195H 570

lUl# Viet Minh demand all of Tonkin area including Hanoi and Haiphong in secret talks vith France. The U.S. informs France that "we did not wish to be... .abruptly confronted with agreement..." as a result of secret ]

negotiations and suggest a U.S. liaison officer. DULTE 187, 16 June 195)4 572

l*t2. China and the Soviet Union are "greatly concerned"

over any break-up of the Indochina conference. Eden t

expresses the view that China wants a settlement but

doubts their degree of control over the Viet Minh, |

DULTE 193, 17 June 195 1 ! * - S"ft

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lh% The " under ground military talks" at Geneva are pointing toward a de facto partition of Indochina. "There can of course? be no repeat no question of U.S. parti-■ cipation in any attempt to 'sell 1 a partition to non i

communist Vietnamese. TEDUL 212, 17 June 195*1 576

ihk. U.S. re-e ines possible de facto partition of *

Vietnam in light of five-power staff report suggest-. . ing Thakhek-Donghoi line. TEDUL 222, 18 June X95^ 577

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1^5. The French feel that partition is the best settlement they could have worked for under the conditions laid down by U.S. for intervention which "no French l

Parliament would approve." Partition should come '

.as no surprise to the Vietnamese since the Viet Minh I * . had made it clear to them -- "coalition government *

or partition." DULTE 195, 18 June 195 J : 578

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lA6« General Smith and Molotov conduct lengthy conversations on "making positions clear." The Soviet tactics were probably to forestall U.S. intervention in the Delta by a compromise formula if intervention appeared imminent, When intervention became improbable, the "ante" in negotiations was raised. DULTE 202, 19 June 195^ 580

lh r [. In conversations with the French, China recognizes that "two goven its" exist in Vietnam and Chou En-lai regards that the final political settlement should be reached by direct negotiations between the two governments . Paris 5035 to Dulles, 2h June 195^. • 589

lh&. Dulles thinks our present role at Geneva should "soon be

restricted to that of observer " TOSEC V?8, Zk June

195^ 592

1^9. A French aide-memoire indicates the French objective to seek a de facto division which leaves a solid territory for the State of Vietnam and further requests that the U.S. do nothing to encourage an anticipated "violent and unreasoning" reaction on the part of Vietnamese patriots who object to an indefinite period of division of the country. Dulles U852 to Paris, 28 June 195*4 593

150. French negotiations with Viet Kinh are stalled and Mendes-France is perplexed by reference to the "Dong Hoi" line since France was holding out for the 18th parallel. Paris

5117 to Dulles, 30 June 195-. - - • - 5S&

151. Dulles warns that Ego Dinh Diem has been "kept in the dark" on French negotiations and fears that if revealed as a fait accompli the reaction French wish to avoid

will result^ Dulles 39 to Paris, 2 July X95 J * 597

m

152. France apologizes for not keeping the U.S. fully informed of French military withdrawals in the Delta, In addition, while France is holding out for an eighteen-month period before elections, Diem, to the contrary, has suggested elections within a year. Paris 32 to Dulles, 2 July 195^ 593

153. The French speak most firmly to the Viet Minh that the proposal for demarcation along the thirteenth parallel is unacceptable. On Soviet interest in the line, the French threaten that the line they propose is acceptable to the rest of the conference and thus averts the "risk of internationalization of the conflict." SECTO 557>

3 July 195*1 ......... 600

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15*i. The U.S. does not vent to be associated with a settlement which falls short of the seven-point memorandum on which Britain agreed and now appear to be less than firm. "if either or both the French and COKanunists are operating on the assumption we will adhere to any settlement they agree to, then we may be healed for serious trouble/ 1 Dulles 52 to Paris, 3 July 195^. ..., 6 °3

155. Dillon recommends that if the U.S. attempts to get the best possible settlement f we should (l) maintain a Geneva delegation, (2) have Dulles return to head the delegation, (3) offer French support to sell a settlement to Vietnam if it is satisfactory, and (k) pressure Britain to stick to the seven points of US-UK agreement. Paris kl

to Dulles, k July 195U • &° 6

156. The French welcome the US-UK 7-point agreement except that clarification was suggested on the conflict between provisions for elections and the position that no political provisions should risk loss of the area

to communism. The French felt that the elections could

"go wrong/ 1 Paris 50 to Dulles, 6 July 195^ - ^08

157- The French indicate they attach no great military im-" portance to retention of Haiphong and that they were "avoiding contact" with the Vietnamese in order not to have to answer their questions. SECTO 5&0, 6 July 195H. 609

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158. Mendes-France will announce to the National Assembly that if a cease-fire is not agreed to prior to 21 July, it will be necessary for the Assembly to apjurove the sending of conscripts to Indochina. Paris 66 to Dulles,

6 July 195H.; , 612

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159. Dulles informs Eden that it is "better if neither Bedell nor I went back" to Geneva since the French will probably settle for worse than the 7-point agreement, hence it would be embarrrassin^ to all concerned. Dulles NIACT

101 to London, 7 July 195- • 6lk

160. The U.S. feels that elections mean eventual unification of Vietnam under Ho Chi Kinh and therefore should be held "as long after a cease-fire agreement as possible and in conditions free from intimidation... fl Farther, the U.S. believes no date should be set now and that no conditions be accepted which would affect international

.supervision of elections. The U.S. would not oppose a settlement based on the 7-points nor would we seek to upset a settlement by force. Dulles 77 to Paris,

7 July I95I1 ;... 616

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P 0*1

161-

162.

163.

16 k.

165.

166.

Billon discovers that the U.S. complaints of not being informed are proved unjustified on the French withdrawal in Tonkin. Both State and Defense were notified via Trapnell's hand-carried plans and diplomatic cables. Public statements thus "can only serve to make our position here vis-a-vis Mendes and his government increasingly difficult and undermine the confidence of both the French Government and people in our candor,. Paris 81 to Dulles, 7 July 195^..., ,

u

618

"I have never harbored any thought of wilful concealment. . -there is a certain lack of intimacy,.." in relations with the present gc nment. The U.S. intends to leave representation at Geneva but notBedell Smith nor Dulles will return. The U.S. should avoid a "position at Geneva..." Dulles 85 to Paris, 8 July

195*k -.- .

The Chinese inform Ambassador Johnson that Chou En-lai had a "very good meeting" with Ho Chi Minh and that "results would be helpful to the French." The French believe that the Sino-Soviet positions have been coordinated with the Chinese views on Asian problems being given major weight. SECTO 578, 9 July 195U

The Defense Department queries the State Department regarding equipping three French light infantry divisions for Indochina in view of (l) the Premier's promise to end the war by 20 July end (2) the considerable impact of equipment removal on NATO. Defense Letter to State, 9 July 195H

President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles indicate firmly to President Mendes-France the rationale behind not sending Dulles or General Smith back to Geneva. Essentially, the rationale is based on failure of the U.S., U.K. and France to agree on a joint position at Geneva and lack of agreement on a "united action" proposal if t2ie position is not accepted by the communists• Dulles sees France and U.K. enhancing a communist "whittling-away" process by readily accepting less than the seven points. Dulles 127 to Paris, 10 July I95U

France views the Dulles decision as (l) mailing the French bargaining position weaker and (2) that* Euro would interpret U.S. absence from Geneva as a step in the "return to a policy of isolationism." Paris I3I4 to Dulles, 11 July I95U

619

J

6?.

tek

c

625

6TL

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l67. France indicates the "necessity for a clear-cut U.S. guarantee that would protect the Associated States" if the communists did not honor a Geneva settlement, Mendes-France will resign if no cease-fire is reached. Paris 133 to Dulles, 11 July 195^ 633

168* Views of the U.K. on collective security of Southeast

Asia are summarized: (l) the British prefer a generalized collective arrangement with as many states involved as possible; (2) the preferred organization would have a general Council, a political/economic council, and a military organization; (3) in the event of no Indochina agreement, the British would move ahead with a military arrangement to meet the threat, admiral Davis Memorandum for Secretary of Defense, 13 July 195^ ... 635

169* Secretary Dulles reports on the Paris meeting: (l) an

agreed French-United States position paper on Indochina which has the United States respecting terms conforming to a 7-point agreement; (2) the 7 points along the lines which were agreed during the Churchill-Eisenhower conversations; (3) a 2-lendes-France to Dulles letter which tellsDulles that his absence from Geneva would produce an effect opposite to his intention; (k) a Dulles to Mendes-France letter which informs him of General Smith's return to Geneva; (5) and a letter from Eden to Mendes* France reassuring him of Britain's support. Paris 179 to Dulles, 111 July 195 J + • • • • ° 38

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l70« Secretary Dulles reports on his trip to Paris at the NSC meeting, Dulles had told Mendes that France's troubles steiaraed from lack of a decision on EDC and the Soviets were successful in splitting France and Germany. If the U.S. cannot guarantee the Geneva Confer nee results or influence France to reject any settlement, the U.S. will he blamed and put a major strain on Franco-United States relations. NSC Minutes, 15 July 195H ..... 6hk

171 • Kendes-Franee is firm in a coclitail conversation with Molotov on Vietnam election dates. The French, how-' ever, conceive the military demarcation line and regroupment of forces to he the major outstanding issues". SECTO 626, l6 July 195U 6h6

172. At a meeting .of Mendes, Eden, and Molotov, the outstanding issues are summarized: (l) demarcation line for Vietnam; (2) elections; (3) control arrangements; (is)

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re groupment time; (5) prevention of arms importation, and

(6) Laotian regrQUpsaent areas. France strongly opposes

Molotov on holding elections in 1955 and placing the

demarcation line at the l6th parallel. SECTO 632,

17 July l$$k 6H8

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173* The Vietnamese delegation to the Geneva Conference secretly passes the U.S. delegate a note of protest which had been handed to the French, The note complains that the "National Government of Vietnam has been left in complete ignorance" of proposals made by the French to other nations on Vietnam's fate. Vietnam rejects the . de facto partition proposal, a cease-fire, and requests that United Nations ec rol be established over all Vietnam territory. SECTO 633, 17 July 195^ • 651

17^. The Chinese Communists inform the U.S. of their position via Seymour Topping, Associated Press. The despatch reflects the views of Chou En~lai and demands that the U,S # guarantee a "partition peace plan." Further, China is hopeful of a cease-fire but did not rule out the chance for one even if the U.S. refuses to accept the armistice. SECTO 639, 13 July 195U 653

175* The U.S. fears Britain will push Prance into an agreement short of the 7 points resulting in a situation which had been previously discussed in Paris* TOSEC 565, 18 July 195 J i - 656

176» At the 23rd Indochina restricted session, Tran Van Do (Vietnam) states that Vietnam cannot associate itself with the final declaration of the Conference which is * to be reviewed. Vietnam does not agree to conditions for cease-fire nor have they as yet advanced proposals for a splution "based on peace, independence, and unity." SECTO 65H, 18 July 195k ! 6 58

177* The Vietnamese delegation requests a plenary session to 1 put forward their position (Document 171, preceding). The U.S. replies that the Vietnamese position is "not practicable" and, in indicating that time is short, suggests that the Vietnamese "speak directlv with the French." SECTO 655, 18 July I95U 662

1 7& Seymour Topping again supplies confidential information from a Chinese Communist contact, Huang Hua. J Vhen Huang Hua spoke of the possibility of American bases in Indochina, or anti-Co 1st pact in Southeast Asia,* he became very agitated, his hands shook, and his usually excellent English broke down... 11 Chinese are convinced that France and the U.S. have i.ade a deal. SECTO 66l,

19 July 195^ • - ...

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179. International control commission is to be compose! of Poland, India, Canada, or Belgium, The U.S. is satisfied that this is better than Korea and is "within the

spirit of Point 7." SECTO 666, 19 July 195*1. . - f ' 6 ' 4

♦ ♦

180, General Smith makes it clear to France that the U*S, could, under no circumstance, associate itself with the conference declaration and recommends authorization to amend the proposed U.S. declaration of position.

SECTO 669, 19* July I95J1 , . 665

-

181* Dulles has no objection on Smith's proposal to amend

the declaration, but is concerned about including part

of paragraph 9 of the Conference declaration, which

seems to Imply a "multilateral engsu; ient with the

Communists" which is inconsistent with the U.S. basic

approach, TOSEC 576 HIACT, 19 July 195^ &&T

182. The Vietnamese delegation proposes: (1) a cease-fire on present positions; (2) regroupment into two small zones; (3) disarmament of irregular troops; (h) disarmament and withdrawal of foreign troops; end (5) control by the United Nations. It is noted that there is no provision for demarcation line or partition*

SECTO 673 ? 19 July 195^ * 66 9

*

183. The United States, not prepared to sign the Accords, makes a unilateral declaration of its position on the Conference conclusions. The United S es declares that it will refrain from the threat or use of force to disturb the agreements and would view any renewal of the aggression with grave concern and as a threat to international peace and security. Unilateral

Declaration of the United States, 21 July 195H. • 6?1

18U« Final Declaration of the Geneva Conference, 21 July"

195^ ... . ..., 6

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

15 January 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Steps Which the United States Might Take

to Assist in Achieving Success of th< Navarre Plan.

o

1. In response to the action taken by the National Security Council (NSC) on 8 January 1954 on MSC 177, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend for your consideration the actions shown hereafter, Appendix "B M of which was prepared in consultation with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), to assist in achieving the success of the Navarre Plan.

2. The actions are considered to be feasible within the framework of existing national policies and will not involve the overt use of U.S. forces in combat. However, in view of the continuing changes in the military situation in Indochina, together with their influence on existing national politico-military policies and commitments in other areas, the actions should be reviewed and re-evaluated on a continuing basis.

3. Appropriate agencies of the government should undertake the to I lowing actions:

a. Place renewed emphasis upon the attainment and maintenance of the full support by the government of France of the Navarre Plan and United States measures in support of it. This full support by France of the Navarre Plan should include the augmentation of the French Air Force, Indochina, with maintenance and air crew personnel from military and/or civilian resources available in metropolitan France or elsewhere. The U.S. supporting measures should include necessary materiel and financial support but should not include military and/or civilian personnel except in certain highly specialized categories.

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Discussion : The French government is uhder strong and increasing domestic pressure to reduce the French military commitment in Indochina, French national sensitivity corr-tlnues— particularly upon points of prestige. Although General Navarre has adopted many of the recommendations of Lieutenant General John W, 0 ! DanIel, USA, other recommendations pertaining to training, tactics, strategy, and logistics have not yet been fully implemented. In some cases the reasons for this lack of cooperation may be political in nature, and therefore beyond General Navarre's control. In summary f . a renewed effort to obtain full support of the Navarre Plan and U.S. measures to support it, including those hereafter recommended, is essential.

bj Approach the French with a proposal to organize a volunteer air group composed of personnel from various anti-communist nations or groups to serve with the French Union forces in Indochina as outlined in Appendix "A."

Discussion : This examination was directed by the President at the NSC meeting of 8 January 1954. While the President emphasized participation by U.S. volunteer personnel he also mentioned the inclusion of other nationals. Since this is a definitive means by which the French can increase the Indochinese air effort as desired by them and thereby increase their over-all air capability this step is militarily desirable. Its feasibility is limited only by the provision of sufficient U.S. funds,

c:. Assign additional technical specialists to MAAG, Indochina, in accordance with the recommendations of the November 0 T Daniel report, so as to maximize technical assistance to the French Union forces.

D iscussion : Additional technical advisory personnel are needed for MAAG, Indochina, to provide guidance and training to the French,

d_. Convince the French military authorities that it is imperative to increase unconventional warfare activities as suggested in Appendix T! B, n the substance of which is a broad general concept, for the use of guerrillas and can be used as the basis for discussions between General 0 ! Danlel and authorities in Indochina in order to appropriately influence the French.

Discussion : .The present French unconventional warfare effort in Indochina is considered to be relatively ineffective.

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e. Re-examine current national strategy with respect to Indochina, taking advantage of any unifying forces existing in Southeast Asia as a whole in opposition to the spread of Soviet Communism, and treating Southeast Asia as a unit with due regard to the long term objectives of the U.S. and France in the area. For further discussion, see Appendix M C. TT

Discussion : The Soviet Communist campaign in Southeast Asia is waged on a regional and coordinated scale, rather than separate attacks on individual countries. By forming new coalitions of Western oriented countries, certain opportunities can be expected to open up which will directly support operations in Indochina.

£. Increase the pace and scope of the U.S. information program, and the U.S. advisory activities in furtherance of the French and Associated States military psychological warfare effort in accordance with the recommendations of the senior U.S. officers on the ground. (See Appendix "D"). Consideration should be given to both unilateral action and action in conjunction with colonial French military and civil authorities, as well as indigenous leaders of Southeast Asia. The objectives should be to increase:

(1) The willingness of the people of France and the U.S. to support the prosecution of the war*

(2) The anti-Communist attitudes and active participation of the native populations.

(3) The morale of the French forces in Indochina.

Discussion: To secure the maximum benefits of our program of assistance to Indochina and, simultaneously, Southeast Asia by the cumulative and cooperative efforts of all propaganda media at the disposal of the Allies.

j*. To render maximum and expeditious assistance in providing materiel and training to the French and Associated States Forces engaged in the Indochina war, the Services should be directed to accomplish (1) and (4) below and authorised to accomplish (2) and (3) below:

(1) Expedite shipment of undelivered items on FY 50-54 Programs in accordance with priority of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for deliveries of MDAP.

(2) Make changes in current programs as requested by Chief, MAAG, Indochina, and make deliveries against such changes and, if deemed necessary, without prior reference to or approval of the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

> *

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(3) Increase monetary value of FY 54 MDA Programs for Indochina, as may be necessary and feasible to provide additional materiel and/or training requested by Chief, MAAG, Indochina.

* ■

(4) Undertake the implementation of these instructions through such organizations and by such procedures as are considered necessary to insure prompt and effective response to valid requests for assistance..

Discussion : To date, restrictive criteria and procedures have seriously handicapped the administration of MDAP assistance in the support of the effort in Indochina. MDAP assistance is normally used to support a training and re-equipment program. In Indochina, however, such equipment is being used to support an active campaign. The purpose of the above is to free the Services of all restrictive criteria other than final legal limitation of available funds in order that prompt and effective response may be achieved in meeting all valid requests received from Chief, MAAG, Indochina,

tu Give consideration to interim revision of French NATO commitments in Europe in order to allow provision of additional French air personnel to Indochina.

Discussion : Shortage of air personnel has been one major factor in prolonging the war, A reappraisal of French NATO commitments should be considered with a view toward releasing additional French air personnel for Indochina.

i. Insure that personnel assigned to MAAG, Indochina, are qualified, to advise the French Union forces on U.S. tactics and techniques.

Discussion : This would provide the benefit of U.S. battle experience for use in Indochina.

jj, Consideration should be given at Governmental level to the proposition of declarations as follows:

(1) By France: A declaration of intention to prosecute the war in Indochina to a successful conclusion and looking toward the more complete independence of the Associated States of Indochina.

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(2) By the United States: A declaration to the effect that positive action will be taken to prevent the conquest of Indochina by aggression originating outside of Indochina.

Discussion: A declaration of intent, as outlined above, would in general raise the morale of all peoples in Southeast Asia and in particular would increase the determination of the Indochinese to fight the war to a successful conclusion.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

r r>< : ~n

F« F. EVEREST Lieut, General, USAF, Director, Joint Staff.

Enclosure

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—

January 16. l$$k

NOTE BY THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

*

to the

■

1 • NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

on

UHITgD STATES OBJECTIVES AND COURSES OF ACTION

WITH RESPECT TO SOUTHEAST ASIA

Heferencesr A, NSC 177

B. NSC Action Nos. 897, .1005 and 1011

C. Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated January 12, 195**

D. NSC 12 k/2

E. NSC 171/1

P. Nls-63/1 and SE-53

\

The National Security Council> the Secretary of the treasury and the Director> Bureau of the Bxidget, at the 180th 'Council meeting on January i*f, 195** adopted the statement of policy contained in NSC 1?7, subject to the deletion of the last sentence of paragraph 1-a thereof and to the deletion of paragraph kS (rJSC Action Ho. 1011-s).

The Council at its meeting on January 8 } 195 ! ;* 5 in connection v/irth its preliminary consideration of NSC 177 also : Action So. 1005-c and d):

a. Agreed that Lieutenant General John Wilson 0'Daniel should be stationed continuously in Indochinaj under appropriate liaison arrangements and with sufficient authority to expedite the flexible provision of U. S. assistance to the French Union forces.

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b e Requested the Department of Defense, in collar "~ boration with the Central Intelligence Agency 5 urgently to stud;/ and report to the Council all feasible further steps 7 sl-iort of the evert use of U» S* forces in cosibat, which the united States might take to assist in achieving the success of the ''Laniel-Havarrd 11 Plan,

The President has this date approved the statement of policy contained in HSC 177$ as amended and adopted by the Council and enclosed herewith as NSC §fe05s directs its implementation by all appropriate executive departments and agencies of the U. S* Government; and designates the Operations Coordinating Board as the coordinating agency. A financial appendix is enclosed for Council information*

JAMES S. LAY } Jr. Executive Secretary

cc: The Secretary of the Treasury

The Director. Bureau of the Budget

The Chairmanj Joint Chiefs of Staff The Director of Central Intelligence

HSC ^m

2

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IMI TEP; STA TES CBJKCT1VES J^D C0URSE3_0F ACTION WITH* RESPi TO SOUTHEAST ASIA

Table of Contents

• - -- .- -fc ~»- - si -w -■ » ----- -

'■j*-'^^* ^-Xfc-^

General Considerations .«.*•• * * * * *

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c>tiC9c«»«a«c««ote* t-c*

Courses of Action,.

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c t < * v ; t t « « c e *

Southeast Asia in General

c tccco«Cert««t«

Irido china, • •.

In the Absence of Chinese Aggression* »,*,»<«*.*«* In the Event of Chinese Coi Intervention.e,.. *

J. li.<s J.J-d i'lv*, *fttttaaotft6tfi**tiftrc

Malaya, ••»«,•,

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ccnmunist

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VI munist

TO

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1.20

Ann®?:, A - Public Statements Regarding Consequences

of Chinese Cojnaiaiist Aggression in South-

Lrmoxji « IISC Record of Action No. 897* "Further

Support for France and the Associated States of Indochina . M ,».«••.«• i *..».••••»», ,23

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«

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STATEMENT OF POLICY by the

NATIONAL security council

on MITSD STATES OBJ^CTms ;i?TD COURSES CP ACTIOS

l/iiri hfjor^i J.U bUU-.:j.;.Khl Aoiil^

I. OEnHRAL CONS] LTIONS

m— ,. , -—i

3.. CoBsaunlst domination 5 by whatever means } of all Southeast Asia would seriously endanger in the short term.

and critically endanger in the longer terra,

United States

security interests*

a. In the conflict in Indochina ? the Couununist and no.n-«Coimauni.st worlds clearly confront one another .on the field of battle* The loss of the struggle in Indochina, in addition to its impact in Southeast Asia and in South Asia, would therefore have the most serious

»

repercussions on U. S« and free world interests in Europe and elsewhere.

•"*■

* Southeast Asia is used herein to mean the area embracing Burma, Thailand. Indochina and Malaya. Indonesia is the subject of a separate paper (NSC 171/1.)

NSC

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b. Such is the interrelation of the countries of the area that effective counteraction would be immediately necessary to prevent the loss of any single country from leading to submission to or an alignment with communism by the remaining countries of Southeast

Asia and Jndonesi

Ot c

Furthermore| in the event all of

Southeast Asia falls under: communism^ an alignment with

communism of India, and in the longer term 5 of v. no

Middle East (with the probable exceptions of at least Pakistan and Turkey) could follow progressively. Such videspread alignment would seriously endanger the stability and security of Europe*

c. Communist control of all of Southeast Asia

and Indonesia would threaten the U. S. position in the Pacific offshore island chain and would seriously Jeopardise fundamental U* S. security interests in the Far East. j

du The loss of Southeast Asia Would have serious economic consequences for ir.any nations of the free wo* Id

*

and conversely would add significant resources to the ! Soviet bloc Southeast Asia, especially Kalaya and Indonesia % is the principal world source of natural

«

rubber and tin^ and a producer of petroleum and ether, strategically important commodities, . Trie rice exports of Burns } Indochina and Thailand are- critically important to Malaya-, Ceylon and Hong Kong and are of

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. . coisside^able significance to Japan and India, all

important areas of ^rse Asia. Furthernore 5 this area • has an Important potential as a raarket for the'Indus-

1

1 tri&lised countries of the free world*

o. The loss of Southeast Asia s especially of Malaya and Indonesia 5 could result in such economic and political pressures in Japan as to rcake it extremely difficult to prevent Japan's eventual accommodation to conmmisnu

2, The Sanger of an overt military attack against Southeast Asia is inherent in the existence of a hostile and

aggressive Cor^unist China. The v.se of U* S. forces to

-oppose such an attack would require diversion of military

strength from other areas* thus reducing our military cap-

•

ability in those areas. } as veil as over-all, with the recognized military risks involved therein ? or an increase in our military forces in being 5 or both* Toward deterring

m

such an attack, the U. St Government has engaged in con- • sultations with France and the United Kingdom on the desirability of issuing to Co^aunist China a joint warning; as to the consequences to Communist China of aggression i: Southeast Asia* Although these consultations have not ! achieved a £rC_l measure of agreement a warning to Communist

■ a

China has in fact been issued i particularly as to Indochina, in a number of public statements* (See Annex A for texts,)

■

The U. S. has also participated" with France, the United

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*

Kingdom, Australia 5 and Hew Zealand in military talks on measures which Bight be taken in the event of overt Chinese

Communist aggression against Inctochi]

-.

3* However s overt Chinese Communist attack on any part

* of Southeast Asia is loss probable than continued communist

efforts to achieve domination through armed rebellion or

subversion* By far the most urgent threat to Southeast

Asia arises from the strong possibility that even without

overt Chinese Communist intervention the situation In

Indochina may deteriorate anew as a result of weakening of

*

the resolve of Franco and the Associated States of Indochina .to continue to oppose the Viet Minh rebellion^ the military strength.of which is increased by virtue of aid furnished by the Chinese Communist and Soviet regimes« Barring overt Chinese Co:::iunist intervention or further serious deterioration in Indochinaj the outlook in Burma 5 Thailand 5 and Malaga offers opportunities for some improvement in internal

stability and in the control of indigenous communist forces*

*

H-« The successful defense of Tonkin is the keystone of the defense of mainland Southeast Asia except possibly Malaya In addition to the profound political and psychological factors involvedj the retention of Tonkin in friendly bands cuts off the most feasible routes for any massive southward advance towards central and Southern Indochina and Thailand* The execution of U« s. courses of action v;ith respect to ■• individual countries of the area may vary depending upon the

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route of communist advance into Southeast Asia*

5. Since I9yl the United States has 'greatly increased

all forms o;C assistance to the French in Indochina, par tic

rn

ularly military aid, and has consulted contiuously with France

v/ith a viol! to assuring effective use of this aid* Partly as

a result of those efforts. French resumption of the initiative

s

under the "Lanlel-ITavarre Plan" has checked at least vempoi arily deterioration of the French v/ill to continue the struggle. Concurrently the French have moved toward per-

*,^

footing the independence of the Associated States v/itnm the French Union, In September 1953 trie united States decided to extend an additional $3&5 million in aici, in return for a number of strong French assurances 5 including a commitment .

that the French would vigorously carry forward the "Laniel-Kavarre Plan"* with the object of eliminating regular ei\e\xy

forces in Indochina * § and on the understanding that if the

-

"Laniol-jlavarre Plan n were not executed 5 the United States

n

would retain the right to terminate this additional

.* »

assistance. (See HSC Action No. 89? } Annex B)

p

6. The French objective in these efforts is to termin-

*

ate the war as soon as possible so as to reduce the drain of the Indochina war on France and permit the maintenance of a position for France in the Far East, By a combination of military victories and political concessions to the Associ-

i.

ated States, France hopes to strengthen these States to the

point where they will be able to nalntain themselves agains

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Communist pressures with greatly reduced French aid* In the absence .of a change in basic French attitudesj the laniel-Havaxre Plan nay be ths last French major offensive effort

. -

in Indochina* There is not in sight any desirable alternative

*

to the success of a Franco**Vietnaaiese effort along the linos

■

of the "Laniel-Mavarre" Plan.

7. Notwithstanding the commitment and intent of the

Laniel Government to seek destruction of Viet Minh regular

forces 5 a successor French Government might well accept an

> improvement in the military position short of this as a

basis for serious negotiation within the next year. Politic

i

pressures in France prevent any French Government from re-Meeting the concept of negotiations. If the Laniel«Navarre Plan fails or appears doomed to failure, the French might

seek to negotiate simply for the best possible terms, irrespective of whether these offered any assurance of preserving a non-Cormrdmist Indochina. With Continued U. S, economic and material assistance 5 the Franco-Vietnamese forces are not in danger of being militarily defeated by the Viet Minh unless there is large-scale Chinese Comatunist in-tervention* In any event % apart from the possibility of bilateral negotiations with the GoimnunistSj the French will

■

almost certainly continue to seek international discussion

of the Indochina issue

3 •

8. The Chinese Co£!?.unists will almost certainly con-tinue their present type of support for Viet Minh, They are

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unlikely to intervene with organized units even if the Viet

Minh are threatened with defeat by the Franco-Vietnamese

■ f forces c ;In the event the United States participates in the

fighting 5 there is a substantial risk that .the Chinese Com-

munists v/ould intervene ~1 The Communists may talk of peace

negotiations for propaganda purposes and to divide the

anti^Gommunisis believing that any political negotiations and any settlement to which they would agree v/ould increase

*

their chances of eventually gaining control of Indochina,

9. Actions designed to achieve our objectives in Southeast Asia require sensitive selection and application, . on the one hand to assure the optimum efficiency through coordination of measures for the general area 5 and on the

+

other, to accommodate to the greatest practicable extent to

«

the individual sensibilities of the several governments^

♦. social classes and minorities of the area*

»

use 5^05

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TO? SECR£i\

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* » #

II, OBJECT IV

i #«-■ „*« rffcfe-».« "^rf-rf- #*-» -f — ■< *: ■*

10. To prevent the countries, of Southeast Asia froa passing Into the cbisniunist orbit; to persuade them that their best! interests .lie in greater cooperation and stronger

affiliations with the rest of the free WorXdj and to assise

■

them to develop toward stable, free governments with the will and ability to resist comrriunisn from within and Without and to contribute to the strengthening of the free world.

-j i- -+\^ii^j.0

III, COURSES OP ACTION

a; southmst asm ih general

11. Demonstrate to the indigenous governments tfiat their best interests lie in greater cooperation and closer affiliation with the nations of the free v/orld.

12. Continue present programs of limited economic and technical assistance designed to strengthen the indigenous

«j»_\_*rV. »>"W w w„ V"* 1 *^

nonvcormnunist governments of the area and expand such programs according to the calculated advantage of such aid to the U. S. world position. *

13 • Encourage the countries of Southeast Asia to co-operate withg and restore and expand their commerce with, each other and the rest of the free world 5 particularly Japan 3 and stimulate the flow of raw material resources of the area

»

m

to the free world.

l l h Continue to make clear, to the extent possible in

< -

agreement with other nations including France, the United

■ *

Kingdom, Australia, and Kew Zealand, -the grave consequence 'VSQ 5*205 ^7 T0P SSSUSfc

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to Gomitiiuilst China of aggression against Southeast Asia and

r

continue current military consultations to determine the

military requirements for countering such Chinese.Goiamtinist

'» Cf p i^Ck c ■' *5 n *i

1^* Strengthen$ as appropriate$ covert operations designed to assist in the achievement of U, S. objectives in Southeast"Asia,

16. Continue activities and operations designed to encourage the overseas Chinese communities in Southeast Asia:

—*.

(a) to organize and activate antl-eoirQuriist groups an

activities within their own communities; (b) to resist the # effects of parallel pro-cofiaauiiist groups and activitiesj (c) generally 3 to Increase their orientation toward the free world| and ? (d) cozisistent with their obligations and pri-Liary allegiance to their local governments* to extend

sympathy and support to the Chinese National Government as a

-

symbol, of Chinese political resistance and as a link in the defense against -comraitnist expansion in Asia,

17. Take measures to promote the coordinated defense of Southeast Asia, recognizing that the initiative in region al defense measures must come from the governments of the

area

18, Encourage and support the spirit of resistance

among che peoples of Southeast Asia to Chinese Communist

aggression, to indigenous CoFJSttnist insurrection, subversion 5

• *

infiltration, political manipulations * and propaganda.

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19« Strengthen propaganda and cultural activities, as

»

appropriate } in relation to the area to foster increased aligrnivjnt of the people with the free v*orlcL

20. Make clear to the American people.the importance of Southeast Asia to the security of the United States so that they may be prepared for any of the courses of action proposed hereinc

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13. IKPOCHBTA

.>

In th e ^faggnce of Chi ngse C ommunist Agr ^ ressio n

21. Without relieving France of its basic resp'onsi-

*

bility for the defense of the Associated States, expedite

the provision of 5 and if necessary increase f aid to the

French Union forces % under the terms of existing commit-mentsj to assist them in; - •

a. An aggressive military, political and psychological program^ including covert operations, to elimiri-ate organized Viet Hinh forces by mid-195 1 ?*

b. Developing indigenous armed forces-s includin independent logistical and administrative servicesj

■

which will eventually be capable of maintaining internal security without assistance from French units.

*

ward this end, exert all feasible influence to improve the military capabilities of the French Union-Associated States forces 5 including improved training of local forces } effectiv cor nd and intelligence arrangements, and the reposing of

increased responsibility on local military leaders.

i

22, Continue to assure France that; (1) the United !

a •

States is aware that the French effort in Indochina is vit 1 to the preservation of the French Union and of great strategic importance to the security of the free world 5 (2) the United

States is fully aware of the sacrifices France is making; and

■

(3) U f S. support will continue so long as France continues to

carry out its prinary responsibility in Indochina, . '

* A, r'

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Declassified per Executive Order L3526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

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23. Enq-Qurage further steps by both France and the

n

Associated States to produce a working relationship based on equal sovereignty within the general framev/ork of the

*

French Union. These steps should take into account France'.a primary responsibility for the defense of Indochina.

a

Support the development of more effective and.

stable governments in the Associated States } thus making possible the reduction of French participation in the affairs of the States,

b, Org'e the French to organize their administra-tion and representation in Indochina v/ith a view to in-creasing the feeling of responsibility on the part of

*

the Associated States,

c, Seek to persuade the Associated States that it is not in their best interest to undermine the French position by mailing untimely demands,

d< Cooperate with the French and the Associated

States in publicizing progress toward achieving the

foregoing policies.

2h % Continue to promote international recognition and support for the Associated States,

2>. Employ every feasible means to influence the French go^ernnient anfi people against any conclusion of the straggle on terms inconsistent with basic U.S. objectives. In doing so, the United States should make clear:

■■

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 I

* •

•.. *

> •

a.

TOP SECRET

The effect on the position of "France itself

in North Africa, in Europe, and as a world power,

*

b. The free world stake In Indochina*

c. The impact of the loss of Indochina upon the over-all strategy of France's free world partners,

*

26. Reiterate to the French:

a. That in the absence of a marked improvement in the military situation there is no basis for negotiation v/ith any prospect for acceptable terms*

b. That a nominally non-Communist coalition

regime would eventually turn the country over to

■

Ho Chi Minh with no opportunity for the replacement of the French by the United States or the United Kingdom.

27« Flatly oppose any idea of a cease-fire as a

*

«

preliminary to negotiations 5 because such a cease-fire would result in an irretrievable deterioration of the Franco-Vietnamese military position in Indochina*

23, If^it appears necessary, insist that the French consult the Vietnamese and obtain their approval of all actions related to any response to Viet Minh offers to negotiate.

29- If the French actually enter into negotiations with the coMnunists, insist that the United States be con-

*

suited and seek to influence the course of the negotiations.

%

TOP SECRET

**\ r\

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

TOP SECRET

-'" * 30c In view of the possibility of large-scale Chinese Communist intervention., and in order that the United States may be prepared to take whatever action may be appropriate* . in such circumstance's 3 continue to" keep current the plans

necessary to carry out the courses of action indicated in

*

paragraphs 31 and 32 below. In addition. } seek UK and French advance agreement in principle that a naval blockade of Communist China should be included in the courses of military

i

action set forth in paragraph 31 below.

*

In the Event of Chinese Communist Intervention

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31. If the United States, France and the Associated States determine that Chinese Cois&unist forces (including

■

volunteers) have overtly, intervened in Indochina,, or are

■

covertly participating so as to jeopardize holding the Tonkin delta area, the United States (following consultation with Francej the Associated States, the UK ? Australia^ and Nov; Zealand) should take the following measures to assist French Union, forces to repel the aggression, to hold Indo-china and to restore its security and peace:

a. Support a request by France or the Associated

■

States that the United Nations take immediate actions, including a resolution that Gomstiinist China had committed

an aggression and a recommendation that member states

• *

take whatever action may be necessary, without geographic

• *

*

limitation } to assist France and the Associated States to r.eet such aggression,

nsc 5*f05

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* »

.

• »•

TOP SECRET

. b. Whether or not the United Rations so acts,

seek the maximum international support for participation in military courses of action required by the situation,

*

c. Carry out the following minimum courses of

1

*.#>*

[military action, either under UK auspices or as pa:

of a joint effort with France, the UK 5 and any other friendly governments.; <-1 uvw^Xvt&A^M \J^A^J^^^ f ^K/

(1) Providej as say be practicablej air and naval assistance for a resolute defense of Indochina

■ *

itself; calling upon France and the Associated States to provide ground forces#

(2) Provide the major forces to interdict Chinese Communist communication lines, including

■m

those in China; calling upon the UK and France to provide token forces and such other assistance as is normal among allies,

(3) Provide logistical support to other participating nations as may be necessary-d f< Take the following additional actions, if

appropriate to the situation: *

- (1) If agreed pursuant to paragraph 30 above, establish jointly with the UK and France a nav&a. blockade of Communist China,

(2) Intensify covert operations to aid I ' ■ guerrilla forces against Communist China and to

4

interfere with and disrupt Chinese Communist lines

of cosraunic at i on.

NSC 5*f05

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3,3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By; NW'D Date: 2011

TOP SECRET

(3) Utilizej as desirable and feasible 5 Chinese National forces in military operations in Southeast Asia, Korea, or China proper,

CO Assist the British in Kong Kong, as do-

. sirable and feasible

*

(5) Evacuate French Union civil and military

i

v

personnel from the Tonkin delta 3 if required. 32t £• £f5 after taking the actions outlined in paragraph 31**£ above 5 the United States, the UK and France determine jointly that expanded military action against

r

Communist China is necessary 3 the United States, in con-

¥

junction with at least France and the UK 3 should take

*

air and naval action against all suitable military tar-gets in China which directly contribute to the war in Indochina, avoiding insofar as practicable targets near the USSR boundaries.

b. If the UK and France do not agree to such e;<~ pandect^military action, the United States should consider taking such action unilaterally, 33- If action is taken under paragraph 32 3 the United

* *

States should recognize that it may become involved in an

*

all-out*war with Communist China 5 and possibly with the USSR and the rest of the Soviet bloc s and should therefore proceed

to take large-scale mobilization measures.

■ -

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TOP SECRET

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FINANCIAL.APPENDIX POLICY ALTERNATIVE: NO CHINESE COMMUNIST AGGRESSION ESTIMATED EXPENDITURES IN CONNECTION V/ITH U. S. COURSES OF ACTION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

~ till — - r | | - | | | I I II II ■ II I ■ I I I 1 I I • ill

illions of Dollars)

I ndochina

FY 1950-53

FY 1950-53

•FY 195V " FY 1955 FY 1956

Total

969.7

102.7

^9.5

53.0

^P 0

3

Financial MDAP and Support

Common- use thro u.?A Programs 1/ France

5V8

cr

375

*+oo- 500 750-800 Woo-500

•88

4-2". 5 4-6.0

^

5

Technical and Economic Assistan ce Grant Loliii

5+6

25 25 25

16

4

13

1

o

Information

Activities

.7 3/

.5

1.5 1.5

.6 3/

.5 .5 .5

.7 3/

.5 1.0

1.0

Other 2/ .

o

H

m

H

ir 1

2: 2;

o a 3 i

ft 8

2 ^

g"

71 £

Pi r -

u> O

— s

I-*

O

CO

~-4

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Si h

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i

Total

Malava '

FY 1950-53

■

FY 195V FY 1955 FY 1956

.7

.5

.5

Total

FY 1950-53 1,092.7

FY 195V FY 1955 FY. 1956

89^.0

1,213.5 766.5

-—

*Less than $500 thousands

MDAP and

Comon-use

% Pror--ra::-is

6

3^6 378

3 Financial

Suopor

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Lf

URAL

thro

"^"*"* n ?**. r* o

375

^00-500 750-800 irGo-500

if

5

Technical

and Economic Assistance

w tmn u 1 ■> ■ 1 ■ ■ ■ ■

7

36 32

32

7

Information Activities

*%&

.7 2/

.5

.5

2.7 2/ 2.0

1/ Represents value of end itera shipments plus expenditures for packing, handling ? . , "

crating and transportation, training and cor.r.:on-use items, 2/ Estimated cost** of covert operations not available. ;v TV 1953 only ■■ -

!£/ Estimated costs to the U. S. of evacuation of Chinese troops fror.i Burma not available,

K/ Additional expenditures o£ appropriately *.2-.0 million in 1$1>$ nnd *\J m 0 million in 1$$& ndofrb be . ** * generated by a proposed rozd prc^ra^: currently wider consideration,,

<

y

!

h

u

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O

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PS

M

a

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PERTINENT ASSUMPTIONS

t

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Indochina

> — *-->■ i n ■■■ .■ ■ ■■■ «

2 - ^in anGi^j^Si^^ort tlrroi^h Franco (Col. 3) expenditures for FY 1950-^3

reflect start estimates of amotaats of aid to France which is attributable to Indochina,

3* ffconom ic Assistance (Col. V) includes no specific estimates, for re

habilitation on. the asstjmption reduced military expenditiires.

uch costs could bo offset againsl

r

J+ « Inforrnational_Actiy;ltios (Col. J) are assumed to continue in FY 1956

at a relatively stable race.

5- pthor (see footnotes Z? and 37 ^° table)

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COMMIT I ill ON ARMED 5£RV!C£S

Jnnuaiy 2?> 195*1

Honorable Charles E* Wilson Secretary of Defense Washington^ Do Co

■

Dear Mr« Secretary:

I have been impressed for some time that we have been steadily saoving closer and closer to participation in the war in Ir/lo-China* I £®t not objecting to any annoimced policy thus far^ butt a decision must soon bo mode as to bow far we shall go$ I fool that you will be highly influential in formvl&ting this Important policy*

It seems to n:e that wo should certainly step short of sending our troops or airman to this area 5 either for participation in the conflict or as instructors© As always* when we send oogroupj

vo shsll have to send another to protect the first and ye shall thus be fully involved In a short time© ' .

*

With consideration of our conf5r.ied promises arc! assumed obligations in Europe., in the Pacific area* in Korea and elsewhere* and with consideration of our homa defensesj I do not think we can at all afford to take chaneos on becoming participants in Xndo-China©

Furtherj I have understood that the Air Force has a special request to send twenty-five to fifty civilian airplane mechanics to In:3o-Chi'n?.* It seems to me that almost the same reasons apply in this instance* France has a great abundance of such mechanics, 7 : a sure* as I saw many French mechanics last September at our military installation at Chat e corpus; engaged in overhauling jot engines*

I appreciate the fine contribution your are making .,o our national welfare as Secretary of Defense and as a member of the Security Council© I shall appreciate your consideration of this important 3 far-

reaching question 0

With best wishes 9 I am

C ord tally j&urs If

hi "of ~ -

jjphn Stennio CUnitcd States Senator

?»

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

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OFFICE or

the: assistant secretary of defense

. WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

30 January 195**

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

MHSdORAlDm FCR TIz3 K2C0HD

BUBJ2CS:

Keating of President's Spools,! EJasaittee on Indoeairaj 29 January 195^

1. The Special Ccmittee i;et In I-Ir. ICyes 1 office at 3:30 p.m. 29 January L95^.,

2, The first matter discussed t*&3 the disposition ol" urgent French requests for additional U.S. assistance. The Under Secretary of Statsj General "v. B. Si^ith, raentionect that there has as yet been no reply to Prime Minister Laniel T s letter to President Disc: hover on this subject. It vas necessary to answer this substantively as soon as possible.

>

3- Afcairal Radford said he had been in touch with General Ely, French Chief of Staffs through Getierfel Yalluy. Ten B-2-S aircraft are on the way to Indochina this veeh. These would contribute to filling the French reouest for aircraft to bring t&to, B-2o squadrons up to o sti'ength of 25 operational aircraft each. However } an additional 12 are reeded to fill the full requirenent because a total cf 22 are reeded (12 to fill the annual attrition plus 10 to fill the additional French request). there vas sciiie discussion on the seen:' ; differences in requests reach Washington via Paris and those.co:air^ through the MAAG. Subsequently in the meeting it vas agreed that the French should be inforjaed that the U.S. Vouid act only on recites ts vhioh had "been approved by General 0'Daniel after Genera.! 0Daniel was set up in Indochina.

h. Admiral Radford indicated that to fill, the entire requirement for 22 3-23 *s on an urgent basis would Eie&n ta&ing Bosie of the:/; frota U.S. operational snuadrons in the Far East; but this could be dene.

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me aircraix vouia noc aii. nave zero mainTenance tizae on tne 1.

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As to the additional French request for 2p B-So's to ecuip a

1 decision to furnish then should return of General O'Banieh* However, the Air Force has been

■

third squadron^ it uns decided that final decision to furnish the*

Etta

alerter

th

to be furnished on short notice.

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6. As to t'ie provision of a snail "ditgible*, it Has decided to in

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7, Rej^&ing the French request for ^00 nsc^ardes trailed in the 1 / v;. --ere of B-2o ard C-^7 aircraft, there was considerable discussion. Admiral Hadford said he hnd informed General Ely. through General Vall^yj that ths O.S, does not celieve the French have exhausted, all efforts to get French civilian Eiainteneiice creirs*

1 -

.'

;u-;££5'C2a x-ie jfreiici* -cry -co

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find thea through * : Air France, Mr* Eyes mentioned the possibility 0:1

obtaining French peraourtel fron their eight aircrafs factories or frc the big Chatsauroux naiiTben&iiee on^e Tfhere the U.S. employed French laechv: ics. general Snith iiicrairod about the possibility of lo*reri:ig French ITATO censnitsaents to enable transfer of French military Esectanics-Ad-iiral Kadford said General Valluy had info; d hid the French Staff "have carefully Gonsideraci the idea "but the French Air Force does not have enough iuilitary mechanics trained in B-2S or C-^7 maintenance to fill the requirement. Therefore, there would he such a delay vhile their military mechanics vere being trained on these aircraft that the urgent rocuireaent could not oe net. He had also said that the eroioyiieut of French c .dliau xseehanics presented a difficult problem in security clearance.

-

8, General Sr.ith recc jaded that the U.S. send 200 U.S. Air Force ^ mechanics to MAIS. Indoehinaj and tell -the J^ench to provide the rest. Admiral Radford said this could be done and that the Air Force is, somewhat reluctantly, ©aiding plans to this end. Jle had let the French know that if American mechanics vere sent they nust he used only on air "bases vhich vere entirely secure from capture. General Smith wondered, in light of additional Fresch recmests, if the Committee should not consider

sending the full 400 neehanics, v -

1

9. Mr. Ryes questioned if sending 200 inllitary neehanics vould rot

so coanit the U.S. to support the French that ve must he prepared eventually for complete intervention, including use of U.S. combat forces. General Smith said he did rot thick this would result - \ie vere sending maintenance forces not ground forces. Ke felt, hovrever, that the irrportan.ee of winning in Indochina vas so great that If worst cane to the vorst ho personally vould favor ^intervention with U.S. air and naval forces - not ground forces. Admiral Radford agreed. Mr. ICyes felt this consideration was so important that it should he put to the highest level. The President hinseli should decide, General Smith agreed, Mr. Allan Dulles vonclered if our preoccupation vith helping to van the battle at Men Bien Fhu yas so great that ve vere not goin^j to bargain vith the French as ve supplied their rest i\z\ at needs. Mr. Eyes 33.16. this was an aspect of the question he was raising* Admiral Hadi i read from a cable just received fro*! General 0 T Daniel \ hich indicated Ge:.eral Navarre had "been most cordial to General 0'Daniel at their meeting and had licated he was pleased vith the concept of U.S. liaison officers "being assigned to his serai headcu^rters and to the

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cram in;- c ;and

*.'

1 1

to vorl; out a mr::h:,rni'of collaboration at the military ^evei,

10* later in the seetingj !Ir.. AllaTi Dulles raised the question as t^ setting the CA? T>i>t- the ?:-; V 1 ov-i: recuetsted. It *r&3 agreed that

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

>■

,

the Vrerch apparently wanted the:! r.o.i. th&t vhey should be sent; and CIA should arrange for the necessary negotiations uith the French in ItidocMna to take care of it,

I 11. Mr, Kyes said that if ve meet the French urgent deraanas they should be tie? to tvo thirds: first 3 the achiev^nert of r.:?;:lr.:ua collaboration with the French in training and strategy^ and secondly^ the strei ytheniuj of General 0 f 3ardel f s hssd in every way possible. General dvith agreed and felt y;a should, reinforce Genera?, O f I)aniel f s position not only with the French in Indochina but also at the highest level in Paris.

12, ^inp^:y_cf Action A-reed ; Ur gent French Request s

%i-

v y&s agreea;

a, To provide a

tot

of 22 B-2:; aircraft as rapidly as

practicable.

b. To provide 200 uniformed U.S. Air Fores neehnnics Mho vculd be assit^ed as an att^eiltatios to VA\G ? Indochina. These rechanics to be provided only on the utidir standing that they would be used at bases vhere they vould be secure fron capture and vould not be c::y:sed to coi^at.

c. To send the CAP pilots ; vith CIA arranging necessary negotiations.

fiU Hot to provide a "Mrigible. ,!

e. To avait General 0 T Daniel f s return to UaGhinyton before making a decision on the other Preach recnasts* Efforts should continue to set the French to contribute a mxiniun number of

,%*

Liecnanics.

It was furcher agreed that General Snith vould clear these reccr; ded

"O

actions vith the President.

13. The next ite:*i discussed vas the status of General 0 Daniel, Mr, }:yes said General Trapuell^ the present Chief of MUG, is bein^ replaced at the normal ercoiration of his tour. General Dabney had been chosen to replace Gereral Tr&taell ard is about to leave for Tndoe'^-r Adrdiral Radford pointed out that General 0 'Daniel could be nade Chief of liAAG without any further clearance vith the ?reuch Government. Gene Smith said this vould be all right but should not preclude further aeti 'to increase the poz^icn o'Z General 0'Daniel. General Ershine pointed out that the IdlAC' in Indochira is not a 'military nission" but only an administrative grouyi concerned vith the provision, of 12)AP esuip:v£ut. E thought the JIAAG status should be raised to that of a nisslon vhich coul

ral

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

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.

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.be first assigned as Chief of MAAO and ihs,tj for this reason* General DaSmey's departure for Indochina should be teisporarily hold up. Ge . " Dnbney should, hovever, go to Indochina to assists Goneral 0'Daniel by heading up the present i-l^AG functions* AOmral Davis tfas req,u&st&& to assure that General D&hriey did not depart until further instructions were given.

1H. Thoro \r<?.s sects discussion ; initiated by Mr. Kyes, about vays "by vhich the French Foreign Legion in Indochina inigbt* oe augmented. }to felt that if the Geman and French Cover.r/ents wuld facilitate it,, considerable numbers of Gernans night bo enlisted to increase the j "on, Mr. Kyes mentioned sav iral other general courses of action he thought should he further considered "by the Special COCTiittee and the:: suggested that General Ersl;lne rend his paper on the subject of Indochina. Mr. Kyes j taa&e it plain he considered this paper only a point cf departure for further vork by the Special Goss'alttee. General Erskine then read the paper ? copies of which vore give:: to the oenbers of the Special Connittec .

15- Adiiral Radford said he thought j in generalj that the paper covered nauy important fields but he had one or two reservations, Jle felt* vith regard to the recommendation on regional coordination ; that CIIICPAC vis. and should be, the nan to head up regional coordination oi the MAAGs. Mr. Kyes reiterated that the paper vac only a point of d rture and said he felt the basic trouble in trying to help in Indoehira Mas the attitude of the French Government. Hr« Allan Dulles said the French do not want us to become too involve:! in the conduct cf operations in Indoehira because they vant to keep one foot on the negotiations stool

lo. Admiral Bedford said he felt the paper iras too restrictive in that it was premised on U.S. action short of the contribution of U.S. coribat forcps. He said that the U.S. could not afford to let the Viet Minh take the Tonkin Delta. If this were lost, Indochina vould op' lost and the rest of Southeast Asia vould foil- Ebe psychological inn zi of such a loss vould be unacceptable to the U.S. Indochina riust have the highest possible priority in U.S. attention. He suggested the paper, vhen redrafted, should have tvo parts, one based on no intervene! n vizh combat forces and a second part indicating what should be doae to prepare against the contingency vhere U.S. coribat forces vould be needed. General Smith vns generally agreeable to this approach.

17. It vas screed not to use the OCB facilities to support the Special Co.vr.ittee^ but instead to set up a voriinj; group of representatives of the principals of "the Special Coviittee to revise General Srshi;e's paper by the piddle of the veelij 31 January - 6 February.

2^3

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.*

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

-I

-

18. Tixe vorkios croup would c: iprise:

Adniral Davis (C3D) \ Mr. Godel (CoD)

Captain An&crs-on (JCS) Hr. Bonsai (Stats) Mr. Aureil (CIA) General 3or.esteal (C-3D)

ereral Snlth reeonnieB&sd that a representative of the Air Force be included in the working group.

-o O'

19* At the felose of the meeting, General Smith inquired as to

done to speed up the delivery of spare parts for 3~£5 f s and C-llS^s. He iras informe3 that necessary actios had beau taken.

what vas being

20. Mr. Allan Dulles inquired if an uncor-venticuml warfare officer, specific&lly Colonel Lansdale, could not "be added to the group of five liaison officers to vliicli General Kav&rre had agreed. Aeniral Bedford thought this might be clone and at any rate Colonel Lans&ale could iioediately be attached to the I-AAG, but he riondered if it vculd r.ot "be best for Colonel Lonsdale to avait General O'ln- iel's return before goi^ to Indochina. In this w&y, Colonel Laus&ale could help the vorkir^ group **n its revision of nor* .:»*■■£» i ■!?v»w'*!"'ir->n tr -ni^av

Allan Dulles.

enera

Srskine's paper. This vas agreeable to Mr.

* •

21, Present at the rieeuin^ vrere;

Department of Defense Davis, General Srskine, Mr

- Mr. Kyesj Acniral Sadford, Adniral Godelj b/g Bonesteelj Colonel Alden

tfepart&ent of State - General Smithy Ilr. Robertson. i

CIA - Mr. Allan Dulles, General Cabell, Mr. Aureil, Colonel Laasdale,

C- H. Bonesteelj HI

Eri£adier General, USA

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number. NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

30 January 1934

roFUORANDUIU FOR: It. General Jea» VaUuy,

French Military i&i&sion tot-he United States

Admiral Radford. Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, has

anlvccl me to convey to yon the following message which he is certain yoxi would be interested in receiving as &o*?n as possible.

Admiral Radford has received approval from higher authority for the transfer to Xndo-Ohina Immediately of 10 additional F>-26 type aircraft to bring the two cssl sting J5-2& squadrons of the French Air Force up to a strength of ES pianos each. This will bring to a total ox 22 the; airplanes of this type now in process of delivery" or to be delivered to Indo-China in the immediate future, Directives for the movement of these aircraft have already been cent to the Commanding General of the U.S. Air Force in the Far East,

The U.S. Air Force in now assembling for immediate transportation to Indo-Ghlna 200 uniformed U.S. Air Force mechanicSj who will augment the United States Military Assistance Group in Indo-China for the purpose of assisting the French Air Force hi the maintenance of C-47 and B~2o aircraft.

The matter of the provision of 25 additional 5i-?.6 aircraft for a third squadron is Mill under consideration. Decision v/ill be made sub-sequent to the receipt of reports from General O'Bsniel upon retttrn to Washington about 7 February from his current mission in Indc-China, and informatic?n which Admiral Radford is c.xp&ctifi i , from Genera] Vallv. ■ an to ability of the French Air Force to obtain from £ ranee additional maintenance personnel, either civilian or military.

cc; Admiral Davis

G, W. A-NDE&3GH, Jr, Captain, USM

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SDilJECT: Report of U*S* Special .Mission to Indochina

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The Joint Chiefs of Staff

(Thru Cofijmander-in-Chief, Pacific)

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1* The attached report of my visit to Indochina covers the results ccoiaplished, action taken, and recousnendations* The outstanding points

are covered herein e

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2o During this visit I talked vdth General llavarre and other senior French officials, as vrell as officials of the Vietnamese government a All conversations \;ere conducted in a spirit of frankness, v/ith a free exchange

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of vievrs and information*

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3* During my stay in Indochina I had tv;o conferences with General Navarre, in which we discussed the purpose of my visit and means and methods

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by v/hich I could be of assistance to him. Relative to establishing myself in Indochina as a liaison officer to him, he emphasized that he did not

* i

desire UoSe overt participation at this level for political reasons but that he would not object to periodic visits by me and my staff. 77c agreed on my visiting Saigon at about six: weeks 1 intervals, Navarre said we could try this out and discuss the matter further at ziy next visit.

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k° In the field of psychological warfare, he was not particular! interested in U<,S<> participation* On the other hand, the Vietnamese are

*

amenable to it*

* ■

5* General Navarre stated that while he felt some concern over the present situation, he scqs no reason for changing his original plans for

*

a fall offensive* The continued development of the Vietnamese forces is

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naming possible the recover;/ of more units that should give him a

• *

vrependerance of forces v/ith which to strike the enemy.

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l6 e ?ha 7rench and Vietnamese Navies arc fully employed to the lisait

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of their capabilities in transporting troops arid supplies^ amphibious operations^ mine sv/eepirigj shipping recbrinaissancOj blockade and patrol, and training* There arc insufficient personnel and small craft to permit

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progressive maintenance, or rotation of crovrs from hazardous and exacting

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11. V/hilo approximately three fourths of all naval operations are

■ ■ * *

currently taking place in the Tonkin Delta area, less than half the

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personnel of the F.U. Navies is assigned there. Eschevdng criticism, it i wy* -< still appears that the staffs and easy billets in the Saigon area are

overmanned

to di

that the staffs and easy billets in the Saigon area are tv*

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Requosts from the Nort h for personnel and a dditional LSlPs ' \y\\

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ischarge missions assigned hayO not bggh jxegded by An no. ra 1 Auboyn ea u, U— ^:<\ CINC, KE. ",'""'-•

12• There is an obvious lack of coordination in joint operations,

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and small craft troop convoys in ambush country have not received either observation or air support, cither of which v;ould normally ensure a J safe journey, barring the ever present threat of mines.

13* Casualties in both ships and personnel continue unabated,

• * * testimony to the efficacy of point blank bazooka fire and ne~.r mine tactics

(See Annex A)♦

The-French Naval Air squadron of Privateers is a first class

* *

aggregation.of pilots and crev; s . They provide the only night bonibing : stential in Indochina, and engage in varied operational tasks suited

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to the P3l|Y.

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lit* ^e French light carrier "Arro:nanche ,: provides close. air supoorfc

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?hogo reconnaissance and armed reconnaissance sorties in ansv;er to requests

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root GATAC.

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15. Naval amphibious assault units (Dinassau) are active in their assigned areas, A review of their small craft requirements is now underway, and will be the subject of another report. Meanwhile, training of new assault units is progressing.

16. Vietnamese personnel are now considered by the French Navy to be capable of handling all small craft and, with some French supervision, larger ones. Accordingly, recuit and NCO training at NHA TRANG has been stepped up, and more Vietnamese officers are being sent to France for technical training.

17. With U.S. programmed support, the F.U. Navy has been fully committed to operations that strain to the utmost their personnel involved. They are employing sound tactics and appear well lead in the field.

18. A requirement for additional maintenance and logistic support exists if the operational capabilities of the FAF in Indochina are to be maintained or increased. The arrival in Indochina on 5 February 1954 of USAF maintenance personnel will largely satisfy the requirement. No recom-mendation as tp additional personnel needs will be made until the work

of this group can be evaluated.

19. The training school for Vietnamese airmen at NHA TRMG is well established, and the program is considered adequte for the contemplated employment of personnel.

20. My current arrangements with General Navarre do not include establishment of myself,* with a small staff, in Saigon. However, he assented to periodic visits and agreed to my liaison personnel. A

*

small permanent Joint Staff is needed to prepare detailed operations

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aid training plans, to develop sound advice, vhich can be furnished in a coordinated ntenner through the liaison officers to all levels of the

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?2"€Tich command* It employs as its fiold agency the five liaison officers recently approved^ and is capable of quick movement* to Indochina in echelons or as a group, on either a temporary or permanent basis* The Intelligence Division is a translation, liaison and security agency only, drawing its intelligence material from facilities available to DXNCPAC* Since KAAG, Indochina, is a logistic staff in being, the logistic division

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of the proposed organisation is limited to joint planning and coordination.

Tho Plans and Training Division contains representatives from all services and will include the diverse planning skills required* Officer requirements

• for the activation of this staff have been furnished CINGPAC

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21 1 General SfciteynOlds, Chief of STEM, reported that the people in r areas liberated fro;n the Viet Jlinh v/ere badly in need of food and other ■ necessities, He believed that additional funds should be allotted STS«-

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or some other U S agency for such use 0 He stated that food and clothing provided- by the U S through local, aathorities' would form a powerful

psychological weapon in allied hands 22, BSOCBfiiEKDATlQHS.,

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, I recommend? a. The organization of the small Joint Staffs set forth in ' paragraph 20 above, be approved*

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b* The two officers for psychological warfare be attached tc * *

*n appropriate U S organization in Saigon to assist trie Vietnamese

;-*vei nrr.cnt in psychological warfare training and development*

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*c. Additional funds bo allotted-ST&.J (or some other U.S., agency) to assist in the rehabilitation of v;ar ravaged areas recovered from the

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The employment of liaison officers, nov;♦being assigned, to

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ug my spokesmen to the French be approved as an interim measure

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JOHN *.V\ Q^MBJM,

Lieutenant General, U.S.A Chief of Mission

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Annexes:

A. Naval Situation

B. Training of Kinh Quan Bn

C. Summary of French Union and Viet Minh Forces Indochina

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14. On February 2 and 3, I went by U.S. aircraft to Hanoi and from there by French C-47, a commercial chartered airlift plane, to Dicn Bien Phu, arriving there at 1400. I was met by Colonel de Castres, CO of troops at Dien Bien Phu and was briefed by him and taken on a tour of battle positions. There are twelve French Union Battalions in the area, supported by what I consider sufficient air, armor, and artillery. The defenses lie in

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a valley and are sitting across the road intersection which joins there. Hills rising as high as 1000 feet or more surround the area at a distance of 3000 to 5000 yards. The defenses are heavily wired-in in with barbed wire, bunkers have been built and a good job of construction of fortifications is being done. Dugouts and bunkers are topped with timber and dirt. « I had the impression that wet weather would cause much trouble through crumbling walls and leaking roofs. The defense area is twelve kilometers long and six kilometers wide. I feel that it can withstand any kind of an attack that the Viet Minh are capable of launching. However, a force with two or three battalions of medium artillery with air observation could make the area untenable. The enemy does not seem to have this capability at

present. The morale of the troops is high; they are confident that they

-can stop any attack. 1 believe, that if 1 were charged with the defence of

the area, I would have been tempted to have utilized the high ground sur-

rounding the area, rather than the low ground, and when I asked abou? this,

the commander said that fields "of fire were bettei~ where they were, I re-

turned to Hanoi arriving there at 1820 after a flight of one hour and

twenty minutes.

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15- I called at General Cogny's Headquarters and had a profitable

* talk with him. He is a fine officer and is sound in his thinking. He

is greatly concerned over having to send so much of his mobile reserve from the Delta area. He stated that the enemy has increased infiltration in the southern part of the Delta and that the 320th Viet Minh Division, as well as other units are involved. At the present time, Cogny reports twenty regular Viet Minh battalions in the Delta area, plus sev-eral individual companies. I feel that this infiltration will no doubt continue until Navarre has more troops to continue the clearing of the Delta or adopts a plan to wire in the Delta with tactical wire, covering it with fire, and then conducts a deliberate campaign to eliminate all enemy. I expressed these ideas to Cogny* He was non-committal but was interested when 1 attempted to show him by a sketch how I thought fencing in could be done.

16. I also talked with Cogny 1 s Deputy. He expressed the idea that the political war had to be won before the military. I told him that I did not agree at all with such a concep.t and that the military had to be won first. I am sure that Cogny is of the same opinion that I am* Cogny is anxious to stay in Indochina until the war is won, although he has been there now for more than thirty months. Navarre has high regard for Cogny and no doubt Cogny will stay. I certainly hope so,

17. The impression I have gained as a result of my visit to Indochina is that the French are anxious to get on with and win the war; that the military definitely want to stay until the war is brought to a successful conclusion. The French are sadly lacking in known-how in many fields,

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tad :t

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including planning and maintenance matters. They are proud and sensitive to criticism. They need help. A step in the right direction has been made in removing obstacles standing in tlie way of furnishing necessary supplies; in establishing closer liaison with Navarre and in supporting the maintenance effort by sending additional U.S. maintenance personnel to Indochina. I believe that with careful handling, \*e can implement many of our ideas as to the conduct of the war strategically and in training matters. The machinery is in motion and my desire is to follow through in every way possible. Navarre stated that he intended to follow his plan in the conduct of the war by continuing the recovery of battalions, forming regiments and divisions, and by launching an all-out offensive in the Fall. The Vietnamese army is making progress mainly the sound action of Secretary Defense Quat,

/s/ JOHN W. 0'DANIEL

Lieutenant General, USA Chief of Mission

Tfr mm \ C* r ~ r * '"■ "•"-*• J

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Visit of Lieutenant General John W. 0'Daniel to Vietnamese Defense Minister* 1 February 1954 at Saigon.

I called on the Minister of National Defense of Vietnam, Dr. Pham Huy Quat, accompanied by the Deputy Chief of Mission who served as interpreter.

Dr. Quat told me that the plan for augmentation of the Vietnamese

»

national forces had been approved by the High Military Committee at its meeting on January 18. This called for an increase of 66 battalions in 1954j plus 16 specialized companies. However, Dr. Quat had proposed a new system of accelerating the increase of the Vietnamese National Army. This consisted in drawing on the local militia as the initial base for recruitment to the light battalions, and the light battalions, in turn, would serve as the base for filling out the regular battalions. Dr. Quat felt that, by the adoption of his system, it would be possible to decrease the present training cycle of four months to only two months. He said

that if his system were adopted (and stated that it had already received

i the approval of Bao Dai) he could raise 130,000 additional troops in the

current calendar year.

The Minister of National Defense said that one of his great pre" lems

was that of cadres. There simply were not enought officers of field

grade to go round. He had an absolute ceiling limitation of 800 Frt ^h

■ officers for the Vietnamese National Army, and a large proportion of these

were employed in training activities. If, by chance, he could secui

American officers as instructors, this would liberate an equivalent num-

ber of French officers for combat service.

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However, Dr. Quat added in strictest confidence that when last in Paris he had discussed this problem with Marshal Juin. The Marshal asked why the Vietnamese had not found it possible to find officers "elsev/here." Quat at that time had made a request of Defense Minister Pleven for French reserve officers, promising the pay and accoutrement of active officers in the line plus an insurance policy. However, the French replied that their reserves were very scarce in number and that most of the ex-officer personnel were now in civil life.

I inquired whether, if it met with general agreement, it would be possible to pay American reserve officers, should they seek employmeat in the Vietnamese National forces, at the rate of salary they had received when serving in American uniform. I likewise inquired if retired American

*

colonels who were qualified to serve as Generals of Division could be given division command, rank and pay. The Defense Minister thought that, if the principle were accepted, means of payment and rank could be worked out. Dr. Quat said, again in terms of strictest confidence, that he had received permission from Bao Dai to elaborate plans for development of a national militia. -He said the matter was a delicate one, as it had not

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met with complete French acquiescence, and he requested that the matter be discussed with the French, However, his studies of how to improve the militia were almost completed, and he thought that soon His Majesty would authorize him to approach the Chief of MAAG, the American Ambassador, or the reporting officer with the request for American aid to arm, train, and equip a Vietnamese National Militia.

I queried the Minister as to what progress had been made in psychological warfare, stressing his belief that competence in this field was

"half the battle" in such a war as that which prevails in Indochina,

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Dr. Quat described in detail the present psychological warfare activities undertaken in "Operation Atlanta" in the three provinces extending between Nhatrang and Hue, He said that not only were GAMO teams close behind the expeditionary force, but that a new technique was being tried for the first time in Vietnam. Hitherto the French Union and Vietnamese forces

had been content to overwhelm an area and then leave it relatively empty,

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with the result that the Viet Minh returned to territories officially listed as "pacified," Nov;, however, two new systems were being tried.

The first was in the treatment of villages in the line of allied advance.

—•

Instead of following the old system of obliteration, three categories of villages were recognized, The first was the village which offered all-out resistance. This was subject to all-out attack and was wiped out, either by aerial bombardment or land assault. The second class of village was one which showed sporadic resistance, and this was encircled by Vietnamese troops and called upon to surrender. Following capitulation, the inhabitants were divided into three sub-categories: those who were clearly

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Viet Minh and who were used for battle intelligence before being made prisoners; those who were merely suspect and who were placed in concentration camps where, by means of psychological warfare, they might be induced to come over to the Vietnamese side; and those who were clearly the mass of the people - peasants who were promptly given work, paid in good Vietnamese piasters, and set free, although still kept under surveillance. The third type of village was that which offered no resistance whatever, but on the contrary, welcomed liberation from the advancing French and Vietnamese forces. These people were given immediate assistance and an opportunity to work with prompt payment. The Minisjter felt that the outcome of this

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experiment in the three provinces which had been entrusted largely to Vietnamese hands would be of utmost importance in developing future guidance in the realm of psychological warfare.

In response to my question, Dr. Ouat likewise indicated that his Ministry was preparing plans for training in guerrilla warfare. He was interested in the suggestion, although it did not apply specifically to Vietnam, that in the present conflict in middle Laos prompt action in bringing Laotian guerrillas, backed up by regular battalions, to confront the Viet Minh who had invaded that area might be successful in preventing the Viet Minh from settling down in these remote jungles and mountains and so establishing themselves that their eradication would prove a time-consuming and difficult problem.

The over-all impression given by Minister Quat was one of quiet self-confidence in his ability to get on with the war and to succeed in his program, provided that, he had sufficient backing from the French High Command and if an increased amount of American aid, both in officer training instructors and in arms for his proposed militia, were forthcoming.

Acknowledgment for this detailed report of my meeting is made to Mr, McClintock, Deputy Chief of Mission, American Embassy, Saigon.

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON 25, D. D.

1 March 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Consideration of the ROK Offer to

Send a Division to Indochina

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1. In two messages, C-66980 dated 2 February 1954 (DA IN 36799) and KCG 2-4 dated 5 February 1954 (DA IN 37583), CINCFE has reported President Rhee's proposal, subject to United States concurrence, to offer a Republic of Korea Army (110KA) division to assist the Government of Laos in resisting the Viet Mitih invasion of that country. In discussing this matter with General Hull on 5 February 1954, President Rhee stated that he did not' wish to make any move which would be embarrassing to the United States Government and that he would do whatever the United States Government desired him to do in this case. He felt that early action should be taken if any reinforcements are to be sent to Indochina, as the situation there appeared to him to be quite critical. He stated that, in his opinion, whatever decision is taken should be taken quickly.

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered the implications of this problem, and submit herewith their views in the premises.

3. Provided the withdrawal of a ROKA division from the United Nations forces in Korea for transfer to Indochina did not bring about a general movement on the part of our United Nations Allies to reduce their contingents in Korea, such a withdrawal would be acceptable from the standpoint of the military situation in Korea.

4. The augmentation of the French Union forces in Indochina by one ROKA division would not, of itself, increase their military capability vis-a-vis the Viet Minh to a degree likely to be decisive.

5. In addition to the purely military considerations, there are involved a number of important political and psychological factors having military implications which should be carefully weighed in evaluating the over-all

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effects which the introduction of a ROKA division into Indochina might have. Since the substance of President Rhee's offer has now been publicized, certain psychological benefits have probably already been realized. The political factors involved cannot be finally evaluated unless and until the reactions of our Allies in Korea are determined.

6. President Rhee does not have at his command the resources required to initiate and subsequently to support his proposed project. The French Government has repeatedly indicated that

it is unable to increase above the present level its contribution to the Indochina conflict. Therefore, the material support of the project would inevitably devolve upon the United States. It follows that no matter how President Rhee's offer is presented, and no matter what the proclaimed attitude of the United States Government might be, the sponsorship of the project would be generally ascribed to the United States in the eyes of the world.

7. It is not possible to predict with any degree of dependability what the reaction of Communist China would be to the introduction of a ROKA division into Indochina. While a decision on the part of Communist China to intervene overtly in Indochina is more likely to be governed by other considerations, the entry of ROK forces into the Indochinese conflict might precipitate overt intervention by the Chinese Communists. In view of publicly announced United States policy, i.e., that open Red Chinese aggression in Indochina would have lf . • . grave consequences which might not be confined to Indochina. 11 (See paragraph 4, Annex "A 11 to NSC 5405), implementation of President Rhee's offer could have grave military implications involving United States armed forces,

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8. A direct and exclusive offer of a ROKA division to Laos would probably be regarded by the governments of the other Assoc? ited States and of France as an affront, and could cause serious embarrassment in the matter of command relationships. Furthermore, should the forces invading Laos be withdrawn by the Communists as was done in the previous instance, the employment of a ROKA division solely in Laos could develop into unprofitable garrison duty even though it freed other forces for active operations elsewhere in Indochina. Therefore, if President Rhee's offer is to be formally made, it should be addressed individually and simultaneously to the governments

of France, Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam with the stipulation that the ROKA division would be made available to the Commander of the French Union forces in Indochina for employment subject only to the condition that the integrity of the division be maintained.

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9. In addition to the foregoing, it is considered that the transfer of a ROKA division to Indochina would be attended by the following advantages and disadvantages having military implications:

Advantages

a^ It would augment the present "foreign forces" of 192,000 French metropolitan and colonial troops by about 15,000 men. This would enhance the capability of the French to implement the Navarre Plan for offensive operations designed eventually to achieve a military victory, and could furnish to the French Union forces the new impetus required to accomplish this objective;

b^. It could create a situation that would make it more difficult for the French to withdraw from Indochina or to negotiate a settlement with the Viet Minh of a nature prejudicial to the future freedom of the Associated States. A rejection of the offer by the French would tend to place increased onus on them to bring the Indochinese conflict to a successful military conclusion with the forces now available or planned;

c_. It would represent a concrete step in fostering unity of action by anti-Communist Asiatic forces in countering Communist aggression in Asia, with immense psychological gain to the Free World;

ji. It would open the way for a well-trained, battle-experienced ROKA division, by exhibiting a high standard of performance in combat, to inspire and stimulate the Vietnamese forces to greater efforts;

£*.. If a ROKA division performed well in Indochina, it would serve as a demonstration of the effectiveness of United States training methods in Korea, and might speed the adoption of comparable training methods in Indochina;

Pi s advan tages

f, It would provide President Rhee with an opportunity to exploit the situation to his own ulterior purposes. It might be his hope that the transfer of a ROKA division to Indochina would lead to a renewal of hostilities in Korea;

£. The burden of moving and providing logistic support for the ROKA division would most certainly devolve, directly or indirectly, on the United.S es. This would impose additional responsibilities, commitments,' and costs on the United States Government and on the United States military

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departments. The arrangements for furnishing logistic support to the ROKA division would undoubtedly involve numerous difficulties;

h_. It would add to the complications and difficulties of French command relations in Indochina.

jL. It would be difficult to explain and justify to the American public the transfer of a ROICA division to Indochina while still requiring the retention of United States ground forces in Korea. In all probability, serious criticism by the American public.would ensue;

j. The governments allied with us in Korea would experience similar difficulties, and this would impose additional strains upon our relations with our Allies in Korea;

k. The situation would, in all likelihood, be widely exploited by Soviet bloc propaganda as a case of United States employment of hapless oriental puppets for the benefit of the white imperialists;

_1. A ROKA division committed in Indochina would be fighting a type of warfare entirely new to it, under conditions of climate and terrain completely foreign to its previous experience, and without the accustomed United States advisors at hand. It would lack the incentive of fighting in the defense of its homeland. If under these conditions the performance of the division were poor or indifferent, the reputation of United States training methods would suffer accordingly;

■

m. The language barrier would be a considerable obstacle,

10. In the light of all of the foregoing, the Joint Chiefs of SteLjff conclude that, from a military point of view and hav^ ing due regard for the principal political and psychological factors having military implications, the transfer of a ROICA division to Indochina at this time would not be in the best interests of the United States. Therefore the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that while President Rhee should be commended by our Government for his determination to combat communist aggression in Asia even outside the borders of Korea, he shou be told that we do not consider that the transfer of a ROKA division to Indochina at this time would be in the best interests of the Free World and therefore that we request he not make a formal offer to the Laotian Government.

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11. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that, subject to your concurrence, the foregoing views be presented by the Department of Defense for consideration in the formulation of the United States position on this subject and in the preparation of a formal reply to President Rhee.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff;

/s/ Arthur Radford

ARTHUR RADFORD, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

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4

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

5 March 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Reappraisal of General 0'Daniel's

Status with Respect to Indochina

1. Subsequent to decisions made at levels above the Department of Defense concerning enlargement of Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG), Indochina, and appointment of a new chief thereof, information has been received which points to the need for a reappraisal of the matters involved.

2. A recent message from the United States Ambassador to Indochina, states that General Navarre informed the Ambassador that Navarre's "very willing acceptance of General 0'Daniel [USA] was predicated on the understand- • ing that the latter's functions were limited to military assistance," that "any good ideas the General or any [U.S.] officers might produce would be put into effect wherever practicable [but that] it should be clearly understood that neither 0'Daniel nor MAAG was to have any powers, advisory or otherwise, in the conduct and planning of operations, or in the training of national armies and cadres*"

3. Information available to the Joint Chiefs of Staff relative to plans of the United States Government indicates that a very considerable increase in MAAG, Indochina, personnel and in the scope of its training responsibilities is contemplated. Recent messages from the U.S. Ambassador to Indochina and the U.S. Embassy, Paris, make it apparent that General Navarre would be strongly opposed to granting increased training responsibility and authority. From this it appears that the Chief, MAAG, Indochina, will not have authority, primarily the authority of command supervision, to accompany the proposed greatly increased responsibility of the MAAG, Without this capabiity to exercise command supervision* no training program can be assured of success. In the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, this places a completely different complexion on the entire matter of General 0*Daniel's appointment as Chief, MAAG, Indochina,

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Therefore, the Joint Chiefs of Staff feel that it is more essential than ever, in the. interests of the United States, that this basic issue of authority commensurate with responsibility be satisfactorily resolved in advance on a governmental level and in a manner acceptable to the United States.

5. Inasmuch as this basic matter requires reconsiderci-tion, we believe that the question of the rank proposed for Lieutenant Genera] 0'Daniel, USA, as Chief, MAAG, Indochina, should be reconsidered. The Joint Chiefs of Staff hold it to be distinctly detrimental to the prestige of the United States Military Services in general,.and to the United States Army in particular to demote a distinguished senior United States Army officer already well and widely known in that region. The repercussions of such action in the Orient are well known.

6. In light of the above, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that:

_a< The basic issue of increased responsibility of MAAG, Indochina, with respect to training be satisfactorily resolved on a governmental level, and in a manner acceptable to the United States.

Ik The despatch of General 0'Daniel to Indochina, and his demotion both be held in abeyance until the training issue is satisfactorily settled.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

D

ARTHUR RADFORD,

Chairman,

Joint Chiefs of Staff

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

12 March 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Preparation of Department of Defense

Views Regarding Negotiations on Indochina for the # Forthcoming Geneva Conference

1. This memorandum is in response to your memorandum dated 5 March 1954, subject as above.

2. In their consideration of this problem, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed UNITED STATES OBJECTIVES AND COURSES OF ACTION WITH RESPECT TO SOUTHEAST ASIA (NSC 5405), in the light of developments since that policy was approved on 16 January 1954, and they are of the opinion that, from the military point of view, the statement of policy set forth therein remains entirely valid. The Joint Chiefs of Staff reaffirm their views concerning the strategic importance of Indochina to the security interests of the United States and the Free World in general, as reflected in NSC 5405. They are firmly of the belief that the loss of Indochina to the Communists would constitute a political and military setback of the most serious consequences.

' 3. With respect to the possible course of action enumerated in paragraph 2 of your memorandum, the Joint Chiefs of Staff submit the following views:

ju Maintenance of the status quo . In the absence of a very substantial improvement in the French Union military situation, which could best be accomplished by the aggressive prosecution of military operations, it is highly improbable that Communist agreement could be obtained to a negotiated settlement which would be consistent with basic United States objectives in Southeast Asia. Therefore, continuation of the fighting with the objective of seeking a military victory appears as the only alternative to acceptance of a

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compromise settlement based upon one or more of the possible other courses of action upon which the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have been specifically requested in your memorandum.

b^. Imposition of a cease-fire . The acceptance of a cease-fire in advance of a satisfactory settlement would, in all probability, lead to a political stalemate attended by a concurrent and irretrievable deterioration of the Franco-Vietnamese military position. (See paragraph 27 of NSC 5405,)

£. Establishment of a coalition government . The acceptance of a settlement based upon the establishment of a coalition government in one or more of the Associated States would open the way for the ultimate seizure of control by the Communists under conditions which might preclude timely and effective external assistance in the prevention of such seizure. (See subparagraph 26b of NSC 5405.)

fL* Partition of the country . The acceptance of a partitioning of one or more of the Associated States would represent at least a partial victory for the Viet Minh, and would constitute recognition of a Communist territorial expansion achieved through force of arms. Any partition acceptable to the Communists would in all likelihood include the Tonkin Delta area which is acknowledged to be the keystone of the defense of mainland Southeast Asia, since in friendly hands it cuts off the most favorable routes for any massive southward advance towards central and southern Indochina and Thailand. (See paragraph 4 of NSC 5405.) A partitioning involving Vietnam and Laos in the vicinity of the 16th Parallel, as has been suggested (See State cable from London, No. 3802, dated 4 March 1954), would cede to Communist control approximately half of Indochina, its people and its resources, for exploitation in the interests of further Communist aggression; specifically, it would extend the Communist dominated area to the borders of Thailand, thereby enhancing the opportunities for Communist infiltration and eventual subversion of that country. Any cession of Indochinese territory to the Communists would constirute a retrogressive step in the Containment Policy, and would invite similar Communist tactics against other countries of Southeast Asia*

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e * Self-determination through free election s. Such factors as the prevalence of illiteracy, the lack of suitable educational media > and the absence of adequate communications in the outlying areas would render the holding of a truly representative plebiscite of doubtful feasibility. The Communists, by virtue of their superior capability in the field of propaganda, could readily pervert the issue as being a choice between national independence and French Colonial rule. Furthermore, it would be militarily infeasible to prevent widespread intimidation of voters by Communist partisans. While it is obviously impossible to make a dependable forecast as to the outcome of a free election, current intelligence leads the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the belief that a settlement based upon free elections would be attended by almost certain loss of the Associated States to Communist control.

4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion that any negotiated settlement which would involve substantial concessions to the Communists on the part of the Governments of France and the Associated States, such as in c^ and d_ above, would be generally regarded by Asian peoples as a Communist victory, and would cast widespread doubt on the ability of anti-Communist forces ultimately to stem the tide of Communist control in the Far East. Any such settlement would, in all probability, lead to the loss of Indochina to the Communists and deal a damaging blow to the national will of other countries of the Far East to oppose Communism.

5. Should Indochina be lost to the Communists, and in the absence of immediate and effective counteraction on the part of the Western Powers which would of necessity be on a much-greater scale than that which could be decisive in* Indochina, the conquest of the remainder of Southeast Asia would inevitably follow. Thereafter, longer term results involving the gravest threats to fundamental United States security interests in the Far East and even to the stability and security of Europe could be expected to ensue. (See paragraph 1 of NSC 5405.)

6. Orientation of Japan toward the West is the keystone of United States policy in the Far East. In the judgment of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the loss of Southeast Asia

to Communism would, through economic and political pressures, drive Japan into an accommodation with the Communist Bloc. The communication of Japan would be the probable ultimate result.

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7. The rice, tin, rubber, and oil of Southeast Asia and the industrial capacity of Japan are the essential elements v/hich Red China needs to build a monolithic military structure far more formidable than that of Japan prior to World War II. If this complex of military power is permitted to develop to its full potential, it would ultimately control the entire Western and Southwestern Pacific region and would threaten South Asia and the Kiddle East*

8* Both the United States and France have invested heavily of their resources toward the winning of the struggle in Indochina, Since 1950 the United States has contributed in excess of 1.6 billion dollars in providing logistic support. France is reported to have expanded, during the period 1946-1953, the equivalent of some 4.2 billion dollars. This investment, in addition to the heavy casualties sustained by the French and Vietnamese, will have been fruitless for the anti-Coramunist cause, and indeed may redound in part to the immediate benefit of the enemy, if control of a portion of Indochina should now be ceded to the Communists. While the additional commitment of resources required to achieve decisive results in Indochina might be considerable, nevertheless this additional effort would be far less than that which would be required to stem the tide of Communist advance once it had gained momentum in its progress into Southeast Asia.

9- If, despite all United States efforts to the contrary, the French Government elects to accept a negotiated settlement which, In the opinion of the United States, would fail to provide reasonably adequate assurance of the future political and territorial integrity of Indochina, it is considered that the United States should decline to associate itself with such a settlement, thereby preserving freedom of action to pursue directly with the governments of the Associated States and with other allies (notably the United Kingdom) ways and means of continuing the struggle against the Viet Minh in Indochina without participation of the French. The advantages of so doing would, from the military point of view, outweigh the advantage of maintaining political unity of action with the French in regard to Indochina*

10, It is recommended that the foregoing views be conveyed to the Department of State for consideration in connection with the formulation of a United States position on the Indo-chine problem for the. forthcoming Conference and for any

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conversation with the governments of the United Kingdom, France, and, if deemed advisable, with the governments of the Associated States preliminary to the conference. In this connection, attention is particularly requested to paragraphs 25 and 26 of NSC 5405; it is considered to be of the utmost importance that the French Government be urged not to abandon the aggressive prosecution of military operations until a satisfactory settlement has been achieved.

11. It is further recommended that, in order to be prepared for possible contingencies which might arise incident to the Geneva Conference, the National Security Council considers now the extent to which the United States would be willing to commit its resources in support of the Associated States In the effort to prevent the loss of Indochina to the Communists either:

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-a. In concert with the French; or

Ik In the event the French elect to withdraw, in concert with other allies or, if necessary, unilaterally.

12, In order to assure ample opportunity for the Joint Chiefs of Staff to present their views on these matters, it is requested that the Military Services be represented on the Department of Defense working team which, in coordination with the Department of State, will consider all U.S. position papers pertaining to the Geneva discussions on Indochina.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff

s:;

< ARTHUR RADIOUD 3

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

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Farch 1'7, 195 1 '-

MEK0RAEDEE FOB TEE SPECIAL COMMITTEE

1; OU

SUBJECT: Military implications of the U. 3. Position on

Indochina in Geneva:

1, The attached analysis and recoinniendations concerning the U. S. position in Geneva have been developed by a Subcommittee consisting of representatives of the Department

of Defense5 JCS 5 State, and CIA.

2. This paper reflects the conclusions of tine Department of Defense and the JCS and has been collaborated with the State Department representatives who have reserved their position thereon.

3. In brief } this paper concludes that from the point of view of the U. S. strategic position in Asia-*, and indeed throughout the world, no solution to the Xndociilha problem short of victory is acceptable. It recommends that this be -the basis for the U. S. negotiating position prior to and at the Geneva Conference, ' .

h 9 It also notes that, aside from the improvement of the present military situation in Indochina^ none of the courses of action considered provide a satisfactory solution to * the Indochina war.

5. The paper notes that the implications of this position are sue}] as to merit consideration hy the KSC and the President.

0

6. I recommend that the Special Committee note and approve this report and forward it with the official Department of State views to the NSC.

/s/ G.B. ERSKI?m

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G.B. Ersklne General, USi'C (Ret) Chairman, Sub-eoDimittee President 1 s Special Committee

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I. PR03LEF

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To develop a U. 3. position with reference to the Geneva Conference as it relates to Indochina, encompassing the military implications of certain alternatives which might arise in connection with that conference,

II. ! r AJ0R S08SIB3 ■ 101:3

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A, The Department of Defense and the JCS have reviewed NSC 5^05 in the light of developments since that policy was approved frosa a military point of view and in the light of certain possible courses of action as they affect the Geneva Conference* These are:

i;

i. 5.

Maintenance of the status quo in Indochina. Imposition of a cease-fire in Indochina. Establishment of. a coalition government . Partition of the country. Self-determination through free elections*

B. The Department of Defense and the JCS have also considered the impact of the possible future status of Indochina . on the remainder of Southeast Asia and Japan and have considered the effect which any substantial con™ j cessions to the C nunists on the part of France and the Associated States would have with respect to Asian peoples a^j a whole and U. S. objectives in Europe*

C Indochina is the area in which the Communist and non~Communist worlds confront one another actively on the I field of battle. -The loss of this battle by whatever means would have the most serious repercussions on U. 3, and fre~ world interests, not only in Asia but in Europe and elsewhere. - . • • ;

D. French withdrawal or defeat In Indochina would have most serious consequences on the French position in the world;; the f ree world position in Asia; and in the II. on the domestic attitude vis-a-vis the French. It would 5 furthermorej constitute a de facto failure on the part of France to abide by its commitment in U. K, to repel aggression. . .'

E. Unless the free world maintains its position in Xr&ochlz&j the Cc::.:r.uni3ts will be in a position to exploit

S.

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■ vhat will be widely regarded in Asia as a Communist victory. Should Indochina be lost to the Co; unists, and in the absence of.i: diate and effective countsraction by the free world fahich would of necessity be on a much greater spale than that required to be decisive in Indochina) ? the

" conquest of the remainder of Southeast Asia would inevitably follow. Thereafter, longer term results, probably forcing Japan into an accommodation with the Communist bloc, and threatening the stability and security of Fur.Q-pa» could bo expected to ensue.

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F. As a measure of U, S. participation in the Indo-Chinese war it is noted that the U. S. has since 19?Q programmed in excess of $2 A billion dollars in support of the French- Associated States operations in Indochina* France is estimated to have expended during the period 19^6--1953 the equivalent of some S5.H billion. This investment 5 in addition to the heavy casualties sustained by the French and Vietnamese v to say nothing of the great moral and political involvement of the U. S. and French> will have been fruitless for the anti-Communist cause if control of all or a portion of Indochina should now be ceded to the . Communists.

III. FACTS BEARIRG OK THE PROBLEM

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A. IISC 5*+05j approved January 16, 195^* states U. S. licy with respect to Indochina*

pol

B. The French desire

at any cost represents our Geneva talks.

for peace in Indochina almost greatest vulnerability in the

IV, DISCUSSION

9

For the : views of the JCS see Tab A.

V. CONCLUSIONS

A, Loss of Indochina to the Communists would constitute a political and military setback of the most serious consequences and would almost certainly lead to the ultimate Communist domination of all of Southeast Asia.

B. The U. S. policy and objectives with respect to Southeast Asia as reflected in NSC 5 1 '0? remain entirely valid in the light of developments since that policy was approved.

C f With respect to possible alternative courses of action enumerated in paragraph-IIA above, the Department Defense has raachsd the following .conclusions;

of

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is highly improbable that a Co mist agreement could be obtained*to any negotiated settlement; which would be consistent v/ith basic U. S. objectives in Southeast Asia in the absence of a very substantial improvement in the French Union military situation. This could best be accomplished by the aggressive prosecution of military operations.

r-o

2. Imnqstipi' of a cease-fire in advance of

&J&&2§$*z£$££l&, Tk G acceptance a satisfactory settlement would • in all probability lead to a political stalemate attended by a concurrent and irretrievable deterioration of the Francos-Vietnamese military position.

3 • - Jgsta^ljlsh^eait;,. Q,j*..a; ponlition, government. The acceptance of a settlement based upon this course of action would open the way for the ultimate seizure of control by the Communists under conditions which would almost certainly preclude timely and effective external assistance designed to prevent such seizure,

h. Partition of the country. The acceptance of this course of action would represent at the least a partial victory for the Viet Minh and would constitute a retrogressive step in the attainment of U. 3, policy and would com-- promise the achievement of that policy in Southeast Asia*

5• Self-J etermination through free elections *

Vany factors render the holding of a truly representative plebiscite infeasible and such a course of action would5 in any ease, lead to the loss of the Associated States to C oiaamn 1st control.

IV. RECOMMENDATIONS

ft* That the U. S. and U. K. and France reach a ment with respect to Indochina which rejects all of courses enumerated above (except No, 1 on the assume that the status quo can be altered to result in a mi victory) prior to the initiation of discussions on I

China at Geneva. Failing thiSj the U. S. should act oppose each of these solutions } should not entertain eussion of Indochina at Geneva 3 or having entertain should ensure that no agreements are reached.

n agree

the tion litary ndo-ively

di s « ed it.

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If, despite all U. 3. efforts,to the contrary 5 the French Government elects to accept a negotiated settlement which fails to provide reasonably adequate assurance of the future political and territorial integrity of Indochina 5 the U* S« should decline to associate itself with such a

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settlement and should pursue, directly with the govern^en : of the Associated States and with other Allies (notably the Ui KJ 5 ways and means of continuing the struggle against the Viet Hinh in Indochina without participation of the French.

c

\ C; The Special Committee has reviewed the findings i'ad^recommendations of the Department of Defense and considers that the implications of this position are such as warrant their review at the highest levels and by the National Security Council 7 after which they should become the basis of the U, S. position with respect, to Indochina at Geneva, The Special Committee recognizes moreover that certain supplementary and alternative courses of action designed to ensure a favorable resolution of the situation in Indochina merit consideration by the NSC These* and the Special Committee recommendations with respect thereto^ are:

to

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1 • The^nol j tical jstep s _ m , to. be taken to ensure „an agreed U* S.»U, K.-French uosltion concer n in s Indochina _ at Geneva. That the NSC review the propose political action designed to achieve this objective with particular attention to possible pressure against the French position in North Africa j and in KAT0-, and to the fact that discussions concerning implementation of course 2 and 3 hereunder will be contingent upon the success or failure of this course of action,

2« Overt U»,_ S« involvement in Indccfaina^ That the MSC determine the extent of" U, S, willi ,ss, over and above the contingencies listed in NSC 5*f0§, to commit U. S. air, naval and ultimately ground forces to the direct re~ : solution of the war in Indochina with or without French support and in the event of failure in course 1 above. That in this connection the NSC take cognizance of present-domestic and international climate of opinion with respect to U. S, involvement and consider the initiation of such steps as may be necessary to ensure world-wide recognition of the significance of such steps in Indochina as a part of the struggle against communist aggression.

3• The dexelotjmgnt_of 3, JPJjfe ?% i tute base , o f pperations« That the H3G consider whether this course of action is acceptable as a substitute for 1 and 2 above and recognizing that the hope of implementation thereof would be one of major expenditure and long-term potential only.

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THE SECRETARY 0? DEFENSE Washington

Dear Mr. Secretary:

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March 23, 195^

Pursuant to a recommendation of the Under Secretary of State 5 the Department of Defense has considered the military implications of a negotiated settlement to terminate the hostilities in Indochina. The views and recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on this matter were submitted to me in a memorandum dated Karch 12 9 195^- These views, together with the views of General G e B. Erskine. USKC (llet) 5 Chairman of the Subcommittee of the Presidents Special Committee s were submitted to the Special Committee in a memorandum dated March 173 195**« It is understood that the Department of State is presently considering General Erskine f s report.

■ I am fully in accord with General Erskine r s recommendations and the views and recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in this matter. Accordingly, there is forwarded herewith for your information a copy of the aforementioned documents which represent the views of the Department of Defense, It is recommended that these views , be carefully considered in preparation of the United States position on Indochina for the forthcoming conference at Geneva.

Sincerely yours, . /s/ C.E. WILSON

C* E, V/ilson

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

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29 March 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT'S SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON

INDO-CHlNA;

SUBJECT: Discussions with General Paul Ely.

1. During the period 20-24 March I conducted a scries of discussions with General Ely, Chairman of the French Chiefs of Staff, on the situation in Indo-China, I am setting forth herein a summary report of these discussions with particular relation to those items which were included in Phase A report submitted by the Special Committee* ,

2. General Ely requested urgent action for the United States to effect

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■ early delivery of various items of material that had previously been re-

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quested through the MAAG-lndo-*China, These requests were all met to

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the satisfaction of General Ely with exception of: f

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a a 14 C-47 aircraft which arc in critical supply and were

not in the urgent category,

b. 20 helicopters and 80 additional U.S. maintenance per-

i sonneU An alternative solution is now being worked put through

routine channels*

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3, In connection with the foregoing is the solution that was evolved

to meet the French request for 25 additional B-26 aircraft for a third

* squadron. There is no doubt that French capabilities for maintenance

and aircraft utilization fall far short of acceptable standards and that the

supply of additional aircraft alone is not the remedy to inadequate air power

in Indo-China t However, in view of the importance of the morale factor

at the present time in relation to the struggle for Dion Bien Phu t it was

agreed, and the President has approved; to lend the French these aircraft*

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Certain conditions were imposed which General Ely accepted;

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a, A special inspection team headed by an Air Force General Officer would proceed to Indo—China immediately to examine French maintenance, supply problems, and utilization of U.S. aircraft furnished the French. A report will be made to the Secretary of Defense with a copy being given to General Navarre.

. b f The aircraft will be returned to the U.S. Air Force at the end of the current fighting season about the end of May, or earlier if required for service in Korea, Decision as to permanent ac~ J ccptancc and support of the third }?»-2& squadron will be made after the report of the special examination (para 3 a above) has been analyzed,

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.4. General Ely Informed rne that steps had been taken by the French

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Air,Force to supply additional aviation mechanics to Indo-China and to replace our 200 U # S f Air Force mechanics along the following lines:

a. The tour of duty of ZOO French mechanics due for early

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return to France is being extended two months. This .will permit

i

the operation of the 25 additional 3-26s without need for more U.S. personnel, 15 Air crews now in training in France and North Africa are being sent by air to Indo-China.

b ft Fifty mechanics are being sent from France within the next month and beginning 1 June, one hundred additional per

month will be sent to a total of 450 f

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c. The 200 U.5, Air Force mechanics can be released "within 8 days of 15 June*'*

5 t General Ely raised the question of obtaining authorization to use the C-119 transports to drop napalm at Dicn Bicn Fhu, Although the U»S« dobn not expect spectacular results, tins was approved on condition:

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b. The French high command requested the diversion of this

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air lift capability to meet-the emergency situation at Dien ftien Phu.

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6« 1 presented to General Ely our views in regard to expanding the

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MA AG to assist the French in training the Vietnamese, indicating to him

the importance which we attach to this action, first, to obtain better r

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suits, secondly to release French officers for combat service. General

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Ely was most unsympathetic to any encroachment on French rcspOn-sibiU—

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ties or significant expansion of the MAAG, The reasons given related to French "prestige 11 , possible lack of confidence in French leadership by the Vietnamese, M the political situation in France 11 etc, The only commitments

1 was able to get from General Ely were; " •

* a. He would urge General Navarre to be most sympathetic

to the advice given by the officers recently assigned to MAAG

(such as Colonel Rosson).

b» He would request General Navarre to discuss the utili&a-

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tion of U»S f staff officers with General O'Danicl ll on the spot in a

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broad, understanding and comprehensive manner 11 . 1 would make a similar request, of General O'Danicl.

c, He would make some informal soundings in Paris on the subject of increased U.S. participation in training and would communicate further with me - informally - through General Valluy.

1 conclude that the French are disposed firmly to resist any delegation

of trainifig responsibilities to the U # S, MAAG.

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7. Much the same attitude was manifested by General Ely in regard to U.S. operations in the fields of psychological, clandestine and guerrilla

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warfare. Mo commitment was obtained except that General Ely would

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discuss the matter.with Mr» Allen Dulles (which he did),

8. General Ely submitted fi request iii writing, copy attached as

Enclosure ll A ll l as to what action the U.S. would take if aircraft based in

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China intervened in Indo-China. I exchanged the following agreed minute -

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with him on this matter;

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,f In respect to General Ely's memorandum of 23 March 1954, it was decided that it was advisable that military authorities push their planning work as far as possible so that there would be no time wasted when and if our governments decided to oppose enemy air intervention over Indo-China if it took place; and to check all planning arrangements already made under previous «?greemcnts between GINCPAC and the C1NC Indo-China and r-end instructions to those authorities to this effect. 1 '

9. The particular situation at Dicn oien Phu was discussed in detail.

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! General Ely indicated that the chance for success was, in his estimate,

"50-50 11 . He discounted any possibility of sending forces overland to re-

I lieve the French Garrison. He recognized the great political and psycho-

logical importance of the outcome both in Indo-China and in France but considered that Dicn Bien Phu, even if lost, would be a military victory

%

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3,3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By; NW'D Date: 2011

*

: • • 1 v ■ ■ - a o

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for the French because of the cost to the Vict Iviinh and the relatively greater loss to the Viet Minh combat forces. Politically and psychologically the loss of Dien B-ien Phu would be a very serious setback to the French

,■■

Union cause, and might cause unpredictable repercussions both in France and Indo-Ghlna,

10. In regard to the general situation in Indo-China General Fly 1

s

*

views were essentially a3 follows. The Joss of Indo-China would open up all of South East Asia to ultimate Communist domination. Victory in Indo

China is as much a political as a military matter. The French hope to

■ get agreement with the yict Nam in current discussions in Paris which

will implement the July 3rd declaration and lead to more enthusiastic eor

m

operation and participation in the war by the Vietnamese, They hope also

to get more positive leadership from Bao Dai who, at this time, is the only potential native leader* From the more optimistic point of view, assuming that Dien Bien Phu was held and native support assured, he expected that

■

military successes but not total military victory would be achieved in

<

1954-1955, following the broad concept of the Navarre Plan and within presently programmed resources. Ultimate victory will require the crea-tion of a strong indigenous army, extending operations to trie north and west, manning and defending the Chinese frontier and the commitment of resources greatly in excess of those which France alone can supply* He

*

envisages some sort of a coalition or regional security arrangement by the

nations of South Fast Asia.

ft W J v& »*• w SI - ■ ' 3

282

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

■ ■ ■ !R

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11,1 raised with General Ely the question of promoting General Navarre in order that General O'Oanicl might retain his rank of I>t, General

■

without embarrassment to Navarre. General Ely made no commitment,

t

<

pointing out that rank in the French Army resulted from a Cabinet action depending upon seniority. He indicated that the Cabinet might possibly consider a promotion for General Navarre if Dicn Bien Fhu was held,

12, General Ely made quite a point of explaining in "great frankness 11

i

actions on the part of the United States which were causes of friction. Those mentioned specifically were:

a. Americans acted as if the United States sought to control

* and operate everything of importance; that this was particularly true

at lower levels and in connection with FCA operations,

b. The United States 'appears to have an invading nature as they undertake everything in such great numbers of people.

■

c. French think that McCarthyism is prevalent in the U.S.

and actually is akin to Hitlerism.

*

d. Americans do not appreciate the difficulties under whic? the French must operate as a result of two devastating wars.

-

c. Many Americans appear to favor Germany over France.

I

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By; NW'D Date: 2011

*.

■ * *

f, U,S. administrative procedures arc enormously wasteful,

irritating and paper heavy,

*

g. In Germany'the U.S. forces have the "benefit of better

——

»

weapons and most modern techniques, whereas the French forces

»

do not,

h. In connection with offshore procurement, the U.S. appeared

% ;

i

to lack confidence in the French in the manufacture of most modern

weapons and equipment, I endeavored to set the record straight on each of these particulars, and stressed the fact that /.mericans were growing very impatient with France over its lack of action on the EUC and German rearmament and French tendencies to overemphasize their prestige and sensitivities.

13, General Ely indicated that the leaders of the present French Government were fully aware of the importance of denying Indo-China to

the Communists and the prevention of Communist domination of South

* East Asia, He stated that they would take a strong position at the Geneva

Conference but, inasmuch as France could make no concessions to Com-

munist China, they looked to the United States for assistance as the United

States could contribute action that the Communist Chinese sought, i#c,,

*

recognition and relaxation of trade controls.

»

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Dale: 2011

_.X t

14, During the course of the discussions General Ely stressed that,

from the military standpoint, one of the major deficiencies in Indo-China

*

was offensive air power* I took'this opportunity to pose the proposition of incorporating an air component within the framework of the Foreign Legion or alternatively forming an International Volunteer Air Croup for operations in Indo-China, General Ely manifested casual interest but made no commitment to do more than consider the matter further on his

>

'-7

return to Paris,

15, As I stated in a brief memorandum to the President, copy at-

*

tached as Enclosure ,r B M , 1 am gravely fearful that the measures being

*

undertaken by the French will prove to be inadequate and initiated too late

to prevent a progressive deterioration of the situation in Indo~Ghina f If

Dicn l"ion Phu is lost, this deterioration may occur very rapidly due to

the loss of morale among the mass of the native population. In such a

situation only prompt and forceful intervention by the United States could

avert the loss of all of South East Asia to Communist domination* I am

I

convinced that the United States must be prepared to take such action

/s/ ARTHUR RADFORD

ARTHUR RADFORD

Admiral, U.S«. Navy

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

■?*.

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

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ENCLOSURE "A"

■

Washington, 23 March 1954

*%

MEMORANDUM FOR: ADMIRAL ARTHUR W, RADFORD

• Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

FROM: GENERAL PAUL ELY

The absence of enemy air has been n characteristic of the military situation in Indochina since the beginning of operations. Therefore, an enemy air intervention would carry grave consequences.

On the other hand, the lack of jcttable airfields in Viclrninh con-

<

trolled areas leads to the conclusion that any intervention by modern air-

i

ft

crafts would start from Chinese territory.

Without prejudging decisions of a general nature which our govern-ments could take in the event of an air aggression starting from China,

oo

it seems to me it will be of some use to study the best way of limiting

-the effects that such an attack might have on the French Air Force units

and on the Corps Expcditionnaire even if it were carried out by aircra c of a doubtful nationality; tills last assumption has not been made so far,

*\ o n i /.UQ

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number; NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

-„ - T "*

>

■

Can direct intervention by -U.S. aircraft be envisaged and, if such is the case, how would it take place?

Contacts have already been made in the past by CINCPAC and the

■

French CinC Indochina on this problem, I feci they ought to be renewed

m

and pave the way for more precise studies and more detailed staff agrge-

* *

ments with a view to limiting the air risk which characterizes the present

situation.

/s/ P. ELY

Enclosure "A u

4 ' 4 > ; * - - . -I

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

TOP SECRET

ENCLOSURE ««£"

■.

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

.

Washington, D ( C.

•

24 March 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Discussions with General Ely relative to the situation in

Indo-China.

1, During the period 20-24 Ivlarch I conducted a scries of discussions with General Ely, Chairman of the French Chiefs of Staff, on the situation in Indo-China. In addition, General Ely conferred with the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Director of CIA

■

and the U.S. Military Representative to NATO*

2, General Ely requested urgent action to make early delivery of various items of material that had previously been requested through the MAAG Indu~China. These were all arranged to the satisfaction of General Ely except for 14 C-47 transport aircraft which are in critical supply and did.not come in the urgent category. Noteworthy is the supply of 25 additional b-2 6s for a third squadron which will \\o. furnished immediately on

-* i

a temporary loan basis. A recent request for 20 helicopters and 80 addi-tional U.S. maintenance personnel was discussed and he was informed that

it was not possible to grant the request at this time.

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 i

■

3, Genera! Ely made no significant concessions in response to sug-

*

gestions which would improve the situation in Indo-China. He explained

*

French difficulties involving domestic problems and maintenance of prestige

*

as basic reasons for his non-concurrence* He agreed to explore informally

*

the possibility of accepting limited U.S. assistance in training the Vietnam-esc, but is generally.in opposition,

i.'l '

4, General Ely submitted a request in writing as to what action the U.S. would take if aircraft based in China intervened in Indo-China. No

■»

commitment was made. The matter is being referred to the Secretary of

*

State*

5. General Ely affirmed the gravity of the situation at Dion liicn Phu

stating the outcome as 50-5Q f and emphasized the great importance of that

« *

battle from the political and psychological standpoint. In this I arn in full

■

accord but share the doubts of other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

-

as to the adequacy of the measures being taken by General Navarre, He

* was given .approval to use C-119 transport aircraft to drop Napalm provided no U.S«. crews were involved.

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6. General Ely expressed the view that military successes but not

*

total .military victory were to be expected in 1954-1955, with the presently programmed resources In pursuance of the Navarre P 4 lan, He considers the problem in Indo-China to be political as well as military. Ultimate

■

victory will require the independence of the Associated States, develop- '

fa ment of a strong indigenous army, manning and defending the Chinese

frontier and commitment of resources greatly in excess of those which

France can supply. He envisages some sort of coalition by the nations

of S. E, Asia,

1

7, As a result of the foregoing conferences I am gravely fearful that the measures being taken by the French will prove to be inadequate and initiated too late to prevent a progressive deterioration of the situation,

*

The consequences can well lead to the loss of all of S* E f Asia to Com-

munist domination, .If this is to be avoided, I consider that the U.K. must

i

m

-

be prepared to act promptly and in force possibly to a frantic and belated request by the French for U.S., intervention*

/s/ARTHUR RADFORD

Enclosure "B"

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

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FTI We were disturbed at Berlin by Eden's position on Indochina which waa in effect that this was problem between US and Franco, with CDs UK standing on C^ sidelines as an uninterested party, situation which actually encouraged French sock negotiated settlement. This was not only unhelpful « but unrealistic; since if Indochina goo3, Malaya, Australia, and New Zealand will be directly threatened (areas whore UK has definite responsibilities ),*•*•

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as will be Burma, Thailand, r.;j Philippines, Indonesia, and over period of time Japan and whole off-shore island chain.

It scoins to us one of best ways keep French from taking any step:, which jfiight prove disastrous re Indochina is for US and UK have solid alignment

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and let French know we will not only not be party to but will actively oppose any solution of any kind vrhich directly or indirectly in near future

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or over period of time could lead to loss Indochina to Conmiunists. To bring

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With above in mind and following Secretary* 6 talk with Mokins which

■ will be reported to you, you should see Eden and reiterate to him our position

i

along following linos;

1, Ife clearly understood from Biclcai.lt at Berlin that our agreement to discuss Indochina at Geneva i*/as on condition France would not agree to any

arrangement which would directly or indirectly result turnover area to Communists, We presume British because of vital security interests in area

as well as their role in free world would solidly support this position

&

2, Our views on any specxal position for Communist China at Geneva have

-»

already been made clear (DEPTEL 4932"repeated Paris as 3340).

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3» Our basic position on Conununiet China: in contained in Secretary's March 29 speech of which you should give copy to Eden if you have not already^ particularly emphasizing e' th paragraph from end in which is contained following sentence: "V/e shall not however be disposed to give Co-rrnunist China what it wants from us-merely to buy its promises of future good behavior,"

4. Insofar as development US position is concerned > our preliminary views on substance and procedure contained numbered paragraphs 1 and 2 DEPTKL 3401

■ *

to Paris (repeated London 506?, Saigon lfil4) and tho^e views should also be

conveyfed Eden

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5, We believe it essential at this time have understanding above basic

points on which we would hope for strong British support with French

6, Ro foregoing JDEPTEL 3353 to Paris repeated London as ,._gQ7?

also

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1} We soo no prospect of negotiated settlement at Gonova which does not boil down to one of following al tem at i ve s : (a) Face - saving To vrawl a to cov or surr and er oi' French Union forces, or (b) Pace-saving formula to cover surrender of Viet 2iinh*

2) Division of Indochina impractical. QU0T3 Mix^d IJNQuOTS government would be beginning of disaster. Both

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3) In addition to consequences in Southeast Asia

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Southeast Asia v/111 not bo permitted without danger of/

extending war they nay desist and accept (b) 0

5) This requires strong coalition of nation

(U.S., Prance, Associated States., U.K*, Australia, Hew Zealand, Thailand, Philippines) who will recognize threat

*

to their vital interests in area* and will he prepared to

continuation fight if necessary. This pre suppose s/zorih* " i of

French military effort in Indochina*

6) If coalition established U.S. would'play its

full part.

■

7) Establishment and announcement of coalition should precede Geneva in order permit us to go there with position of strength«

8) Although UN action not excluded and U!T would in any event need to be notified in soma formal way, we probably could not count on it.' (Soviet veto in SC and long drav/Q debate in Assembly*) '

9) Formal approach to other governments will depend on French desires• . .

10) Bonnet said he would report immediately to his

Government and seek their viev/s

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5175 to London)« v ..

considerably more advanced than British which had apparently

not yet gone beyond examination of possible political solutions

Indochina under existing conditions.

Partition seemed to London least undesirable settlement

*

according Matins but it was clear UK had not yet developed thoughts Tor dealing positively and constructively v;ith situation which woulc confront us if French determined to cell out. ' -

Secretary emphasized to Making essentiality of UK and US befoi and at-Geneva maintaining solid front to stiffeft French attitude. ^afcins agreed latter point and promised report entire talk fully ^

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URGENT. I was called at 11 o'clock Sunday night and asked .to oome immediately to i-latignon where a restricted Cabinet mooting was in progress. '

On arrival Bidault received me in Laniel's office-and was joined in a few minutes by Laniel. They said that immediate armed intervention of US carrier aircraft at Dieri Bien Phu is now necessary to save the situation.

Navarre reports situation there now in state, of precarious ■ equilibrium and that both sides are doing best to reinfor.ee— Viet Hinh are bringing up last available reinforcements which v will way outnumber any reinforcing French can do by parachute drops. "Renewal of assualt by reinforced Viet Hinh probable' by middle or end of week. Without help by then fate of "Dion Bien Phu will probably be sealed. * * "

Ely brot t back report from Washington that Radford gave him his personal (repeat personal) assurance that'if situation at Dien Bien Phu required US naval air support he would do his best to obtain such help from US Government., Because, of this information from Radford as reported by Ely, French Government .now,,^gklngr for US carrier aircraft support at Dien Bien Phu. Navarre feels that a relatively minor US effort could tur. the tide but naturally hopes for as much help as possibl

,r I i

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report Chinese intervention in Indochina already f• lly

established as follows:

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First. Fourteen technical advisors at Giap headquarters plus numerous others at division level* .All under command of

i/Chinese CotsffiOnlst General* Ly Ghen-houfvho is stationed at Giao

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Second.

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-2- 3710, April 5, 1 a.m., from Paris. ' ' ■'

■ ■

*

» *

Second, Special telephone lines installed maintained and operated by Chinese personnel.'

Third. Forty 37 bhh* anti-aircraft guns radar-controlled at Dien Bien Phu. These guns operated by Chinese and evidently are from Korea* These AA guns are now shooting through clouds., *to bring down French aircraft.

Fourth., One thousand supply trucks of which 500 have arrived since 1 March,, all driven by Chinese army personnel.

Fifth, Substantial material help in guns, shells, etc., as is well known.

a

Bidault said that French Chief of Air Staff wished US be' informed that US air intervention at Dien Bien Phu could lead to Chinese Communist air attack on delta airfields. Nevertheless, government was making'request for aid, "' I

*

Bidault closed by saying that for good or evil the fate of Southeast Asia now rested on Dien Bien Phu. He said that Geneva would be won or lost depending on outcome at Dien Bien Phu. this was_It#^son^o^^^ch_reguest for_.this, yery serious action on our part, " ~~ ■ ""

m

He then emphasized necessity for speed in view of renewed attack which is expected before -end of week. He thanked US for prompt action on airlift for French paratroops. He then said that he had received Dulles 1 proposal for Southeast Asian coalition, and that he would answer as soon as possible later in week as restricted Cabinet session not competent to make this decision.

■ » *

New Subject, I passed on Worsted's concern that news of airlift (JEFEEL 3^70, April 5) might leak as planes assembled, .Pleven was called into room. He expressed extreme concerp as any leak would lead to earlier Viet Minh attack. He sale at all costs operation must be camouflaged as training exercise an til troops have arrived, Ke is preparing them as rapidly as possible and they will be ready to leave in a week. Bidault and Laniel pressed his to hurry up departure date cf troops £ d he said he would do his utmost.

* *

DILLON ■

AB:MRS/l2

NOTE: This message was read by Mr, MacArthu-r (C) at 10:15 p.m. end he informed the Secretary, Undersecretary Smith/ Mr, Merchant (FJJR) and Admiral Radford at -10: J>0 p.m. V'V^ CW0/FED

• *

TOP SECRET

• 297

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number; NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

--%

TOP SECRET

SPECIAL SECURITY I CAUTIOES

COPY ICO. W April 5^ 195^

(Revision of Report distributed ftpril 3)

*

Pro bier, i

1, To analyze the extent to which, and the circumstances and conditions under which, the United States would be willing to commit its resources in support of the effort to prevent the loss of Indochina to the Communists, in concert with the French or in concert with others or,.if necessary, unilaterally. Issues_Involved

2« The answer to this problem involves four issues:

a. Will Indochina be lost to the Communists unless

■

the United States commits combat resources in some for::?

*

■

b. What are the risks, requirements and cense-quenees of alternative forms of U. S* military inter--

-1 nn 1 ?

vencionv

a

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c. Should the United States adopt one of these forms of intervention rather than allow Indochina to be lost to the Communists and if so which alternative should it choose?

*

d. When and under what circumstances should this decision be taken and carried into effect?

**

29°

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Prospect of Loss rf; Indochijia

'*

3* i;Iio first issue turns on whether the French Union can and will prevent the. loss of Indochina and what further actions 5 if anyj the United States can tahe to bolster or assist the

■

French effort* Some of these cuestions were covered by the

* * *

Report 6i the Special Committee of March I7 5 19>V. Others are

matters of continuous intelligence estimates <> At the present time there is clearly a possibility that a trend in the direc-tion of the -loss of Indochina to Communist control may become irreversible over the next year in the absence of greater 0*8,

»

participation 5 There is not 5 hoirever 3 any certainty that the French have as yet reached the point of being willing to

accept a settlement which is unacceptable to U.»S. interests

« * *

or to cease their military efforts. Moreover, regardless of the outcome of the fight at Dienbienphu ? there is no indiea— tion that a military decision in Indochina is imminent * It is

-

clear that the United States should undertake a maximum diplo-matic effort' to cause the French and Associated States to con-tinue the fight to a successful conclusion-*

h* The attached Annex-addresses itself to the second issues The risks ? requirements and consequences of certain

■ ■

alternative for&s of U.S. military intervention. In order to permit analysis of military recuireraents and allied and hostile .

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reactions., this annex assumes that there will be either;

M

(1) a French and Associated States invitation to the United States to participate militarily; or (2) an Associated States invitation to the United States after"a French decision to withdrawj and French willingness to cooperate in phasing out French forces as U. S t forces are phased in, If neither of

these assumptions proved valid the feasibility of U, S. inter

*

vention would be vitiated t If the French 5 having decided on

■

withdrawal and a negotiated settlement, should oppose U, S.

intervention and should carry the" Associated States with the

\ in such opposition 5 U. S. intervention in Indochina would in

effect be precluded. If % after a French decision to withdraw

+

the Associated States should appeal for U. S. military assist

ance but the French decided not to cooperate in the phasing

* in of U. S. forces s a successful U. S, intervention would be

very difficult.

Desirability and Form cf U, S. Intervention

-.** ——>•■

5. The third issue is whether the United States should

■w

intervene with combat forces rather than allow Indochina to be .lost to the Communists, and which alternative it should

select?

a.« U. S. commitment of combat forces would involve

strain on the basic western coalition, increased risk of war with China and of general War, high, costs in U, S,

300

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manpower and money s and possible adverse domestic political repercussions* Moreover 3 the United States would be ndertaking a commitment which it woul£ have to carry

through to victory * In whatever form it mi&h-t intervene, the U.Si would have to take steps at the outset to guard against the risks inherent in intervention« On the other • hand, under the principles laid down in NSC.5^0?*- it is essential to UoS* security that Indochina should not fall

*

under Communist control.

-

b. Of the alternative courses of action described in the Annex. Course A or D has these advantages over

\

Course C» ITeither Course A or B depends on the initial use of UrS« ground forces* For this reason alone, they obviously would bo much more acceptable to the American public c For the same reason 7 they would initially create

■

a less serious drain on existing U*S C military forces. But either Course A or B may turn out to be ineffective without the eventual commitment of U,S fl ground force^.

e

A politic?! obstacle to Course A or Course 3

lies in the fact that, the 'oresent French effort is con-

m *

sidered by many in Southeast Asia and other parts of the

i

world as essentially colonial or imperialist in character If the United States joined its combat forces in the

:

.ndochl

iria conflict

3

it woul be most. imTiortant-

to attempt

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to counteract or modify the present view of tills struggle*

This would also be essential in order to mobilize maximum

support for the war within Indochina

B

i ■

d. An advantage of Course B over*Course A lies in

fci*

the association of the Asian States in the enterprise which would help to counteract the tendency to view Xndo~ china as a colonial action* There would be advantages in Course B also in that U C S C opinion would be more

favorable if the other free nations and the Asian nations

■

I were also taking, part and bearing their fair share of the burden*

e c As between UtI and regional support it appears

that regional grouping would be preferable to UK action 3 on the ground that UI! support would be far more difficult to get and less likely to remain solid until the desired

objective was reached

*

6« In order to make feasible any regional grouping 3 it .will be essential for the United States to define more clearly its own objectives with respect to any such action• In p«r-ticular, it would be important to make perfectly clear that

r

this action is not intended as a first step of action to destroy or over thro 1 ./ Communist China« If the other members of a potential regional grouping thought that we had such a broad objectivej they would doubtless be hesitant to join in it* The 1/0stern powers would not'waftt to increase the risks of

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general war which would, in their opinion, flow from any such broad purpose. The Asian countries would be equally reluctant to engage in any such broad activity. Both groups would doubtless want to make very clear that we object essentially to the expansionist tendencies of Communist China and that, if those ceased, we would not go further in attempting to carry on military activities in the Far East. Furthermore, to attract the participation of Asian States in a regional grouping, the United States would undoubtedly have to undertake lasting corn-

-

mitments for their defense.

Timing and Circumstances of Decision to Intervene with U.S. Combat Forces

'7. The timing of the disclosure or implementation of any U.S. decision to intervene in Indochina would be of particular i mporta nee.

a_. In the absence of serious military deterioration in Indochina, it is unlikely that France will agree to

■

the arrangements envisaged in Alternatives A, B, or C in light of the hopes widely held in France and elsewhere than an acceptable settlement can be achieved.

fe. On the other hand, inaction until after exhaustive discussions at Geneva, without any indication of U.S. intentions, would tend to increase the chance of the French government and people settling, or accepting the

303

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*

inevitability of settling, on unacceptable terms. Hints of possible U.S. participation would tend to fortify French firmness, but might also tend to induce the Communists to put forward more acceptable terms.

£. On balance, it appears that the United States should now reach a decision whether or not to intervene wHh combat forces, if that is necessary to save Indochina from Communist control, and, tentatively, the form and conditions of any such intervention. The timing for communication to the French of such decision, or for its implementation, should be decided in the light of future developments.

8. If the United States should now decide to intervene at some stage, the United States should now take these steps:

a_. Obtain Congressional approval of intervention. Jb. Initiate planning of the military and mobiliza-

tion measures to enable intervention.

* a. Make publicized U.S. military moves designed

to make the necessary U.S. air and naval forces readily available for use on short notice.

d. Make maximum diplomatic efforts to make it clear, as rapidly as possible, that no acceptable settlement can be reached in the absence of far greater Communist concessions than are now envisaged.

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e, e Explore with major U»S. allies —- notably the U::-Australia* and !Tew Zealand, and with as many Asian

nations as possible, such as Thailand and the Philippines^

i

and possibly Nationalist China.) the Republic of Kbreaj

■

and Burma ■**• the formation of a regional grouping *

fa Exert aaxiiaxaa Siplomatic efforts with France and

#

the Associated States designed to (1) brln-g about full agreement between tlieia, if possible prior to Geneva 3 on the future status of the Associated States; (2) prepare them to invite U*S 0 and if possible group participation in Indochina, if necessary.,

s o r <

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Mill

-»».—...-

I, GENERAL

Scona of This Annex

1. This Annex seeks to assess the risks., requirements, and consequences of alternative forms of U. S t military intervention in Indochina, • -

Objective of U« S. Intervention in Indochina

2. The immediate objective of U. S, military intervention in any form would be the destruction of organized Viet-m.inh forces by military action limited to the area of Indo-china 5 in the absence of overt Chinese Co: lixnist interven-tion. However, whether or not the- action can-be limited to Indochina once U. S« forces and prestige have been committed y disengagement will not be possible short of victory* » Risk of F-xnandin?' the War

^'r>«rtf^^4n • —

3* The increased risk of such Chinese Communist inter ■ ■

vention is assessed under each alternative form of U. S. military intervention. . U» S, action in the event that the Chinese Communists overtly intervene in Indochina is covered by existing policy (ITSC 5 l *-05).

k. The implications of U. 3, intervention go far beyond

- *

the cornmitnent and support of the military requirements , identified below under the several alternative courses. To

4

meet the increased risk of Chinese Coinmunist intervention and possibly of general war, measures must be taken inside ■

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the United States and in areas other than Indochina to im-

■

prove the defense posture of the United States, Military measures would include the Increased readiness of the existing forces and the re-positioning of U* S* forces outside the United States. Domestic measures would include those out-

-

lined below under "Mobilization Implications." A re-examination and possibly complete revision of U. S, budgetary

and fiscal policies would be required

U- *

ailabilitv of Military Forces

5* The military forces required to implement the various courses of action described in this paper are presently as-.signed missions in support of other U. S. objectives. A de«

■

cision to implement any of these courses would necessitate a diversion of forces from present missions. It would also require the mobilization of additional forces to assume the functions of the diverted forces and to meet the increased risk of•general war. The foregoing is particularly true with respect to U. S. -ground forces. . • -

Mobilization Implications

+ V ^^- -> at --m » *j- v »•» *w.^ »•

6, All the domestic consequences of U. S. intervention

■

cannot be forecast, being dependent on such factors as the degree of opposition encountered 5 the duration of the conflict

*

-

and the extent to which other countries may participate, but in varying dogrcQ sc?'ie or all of the following steps may be-

* ■

come necessary:

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a. Increase in force levels and draft quotas,

b. Increase and acceleration of military procluc

•

*

tion.

c, Acceleration of stockpile programs.-

■

d. Rciraposxtion of materials and stabilization controls. ■ *

e* Speed-up of readiness measures for all con-

a

tinontal defense programs. Whether or not general mobilization should be initiated, either at the outset or in the course of U. S„ intervention, is a major question for determination, .Use of Nuclear Weapons

^ * i».*i Ta » ■ » ■■■— »-—■ f- "■****■**'» p <-*-«V'—-^ - » ■

7. Nuclear weapons will be available for use as re-

*

quired by the tactical situation and as approved by the Presi-

*

a

dent. The estimated forces initially to be supplied by the

m

United States under the alternatives in this paper are based on the assumption of availability. If such weapons are not available, the force requirements may have to be modified. The political factors involved in the use of nuclear weapons are assessed under the various alternatives-. Political Conditions

,^ r- *- -■**• .—•-*>— - . i

. 8. U. S* military intervention in concert with the French should be conditioned upon satisfactory political

* State considers the military effect of use or non-use of ■ nuclear weapons should be made clear in the estimates cf military requirements to assist in making a decision.

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i*

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cooperation from the French and French agreement to grant in-dependence to the Associated States in a form that will con-

tribute to their maximum participation in the war. The . \

Associated States undoubtedly would not invite U. S, or allied

!

intervention without lasting guarantees of territorial in-tegrity, U. S. contribution to a full-scale reconstruction

-

and development program in Indochina must also be anticipated.

(No paragraphs 9 and 10)

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. »

II. ALTERNATIVE F0: i OF COl-iMITKENT OF U, S. CO; T FORCES FOR OPES X CHINA

-. *-^^."- - — -* ,i«.»»

*._-.',.•-.,«,,,.. j-.-,. ..._^-»*-,-.,^.

. » - ... _ w-~- . .

Ac In Concert with the French

Assumptions

ti

11. The Associated States and France invite the military participation of the United States,

12 # It is impracticable to organise a UN or regional

military effort

«

% '

13. The military situation in Indochina is approximately as "at present i i s e M stalemate with element's of deterioration. Ih. France and the Associated States will carry forward

*

the scale of military effort envisaged in the Laniel-Navarre

= ■

-

Plan,

*

-

■ »

Military., jtaoalZfiBfi^

15, Estimated forces to be supplied by U* S, initially,

&* Ground Xorces •?■ (None, provided French Union

forces afford adequate security for local defense of

* U f S, forces in Indochina,)

*

b. ' Kaval for ces ~ (Total personnel strength of

35,000)

(1) 1 carrier task group plus additional ur^ts

3 *

consiscmg ox :

Amphibious lift for 1 HCT

Minecraft

Underway replenishment group

VEROK» s

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£• Air Force forces - (Total personnel

strength of

8,600)

\

*

(1) 1 fighter wing

defense capability)

(3 sqcii-s with integral air

(2) 1 light bomber wing

&

(3) 1 troop carrier v/ing (**) 1 tactical control* sqdn, (5) 1 tactical recon* sqdn« 16, P^^^^^^^^^r^tv^r 1 ^ 1 ^z^Jl&r^Cojirnan^

/

a* This should be U, St, since this command must

be a combined as v;eil as a joint coatsaand and U, S

/

, coriander s have had considerably more experience in commanding combined and joint co::iuiand3* Further, should

/

it become necessary to introduce U, S< ground forces 3 it

/ .

would be much better to have a U, S* commander already

/

operating as theater commander rather than effect a

\ /

change at the time U, S ( ground'forces become involved.

All services-of the United States, France, and the

/ \

Associated States will have representatives at the

\

combined headquarters. Similar representation will be necessary at the Joint Operations Center (JOC) to be

established,

• b. Political considerations and the preponderance

\

of French Union forces may dictate the assignment of

■

*

theater convene! to the French, at least during the- early

o 11

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"phase of-UV S c participation,

# !?• ]^E^^9..^9J^y:l:R^^K:^:Il' This course of action can be

- log^stically supported with the following effects:

a. No delay to NATO deliveries, f

b, No drain on Array logistic reserves } negligible

■

drain on Air Force logistic reserves^ a partial drain on certain logistic reserves of the Navy, particularly

aircraft and ammunition s

c« Borne Navy production schedule increases in aircraft and ammunition (depending on extent of opera--

*

tions)^ seme increases in Air Force production schedule • with emphasis on ammunition } no effect on Army produc-■ tlon schedules*

d. No additional facilities at bases in Indochina required t

.18, The training of indigenous forces is crucial to the success of the operation. The United States should therefore insist on ah understanding -with the French which-will

i

insure the effective training of the necessary indigenous forces required including coiBma&ders and staff personnel at all levels, The United States must be prepared to make contributions cf funds 7 materialsj instructors and training

devices as agreed with the French, A United States progran »

for the development of indigenous forces would stress the

organization of divisional size units. The battalion organisation does not particularly well fit the approved

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■ I

concept for operations formulated by General Navarre, nor

doss it represent the bast return in striking power for the

manpower investment made.

A reasonable } attainable goal in

o

Associated States forces which the United States might develop and train is on the order of 330 s 000 (an increase of 100,000 over the present forces.) This would be accomplished by a re-orgarii^ation of the presently formed battalions into divisions followed by further training stressing regimental and divisional exercises. New units would be developed as necessary to complete the program* Political Aspects

*-tv»* -«-».■• >r>-_w »•■ V— »^-. Hi; tT ■"» * <v<l>«t>r<'*> *■

19c French Reaction: The French would expect U. S

military participation in Indochina;

a, To relieve them from the prospect of defeat or failure in Indochina and to this extent they would welcome U* S. intervention.

b, To highlight the inability of the French to handle the situation alone, with resultant weakening of

the general international position of France.

■

e. To lead to a strengthening of the position of the Associated States as against the French, and a

■

weakening of the French Union concept,

do To tend to result in channeling u. S. support

*

for the Indochina war directly to the theater of opera-tions, thus reducing the financial benefits to metropoli tan France.

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_e, To increase the risk of Chinese 'Coimnimist in-

4

tervention and, through a series of actions and counter

f

actions, to increase the risk of general war with the

USSR,

On balance, the French would prefer to find a solution of the Indochina problem which did not involve U, 8, military participation, although such solution might in our opinion risk the ultimate loss of Indochina* In the event of U. S, military participation the French could he expected to attempt progressively to shift the military burden of the war to the United States, either by withdrawing their forces or failing to make good attrition, •

20. Associated States Reaction: The Associated States

-P» * ™ ■ r- *

would not be interested in U c S, intervention unless they were satisfied (1) such intervention would be on a scale which seemed adequate to assure defeat of the Vietminh organized military forces and to deter Chinese Communist aggression, and (2) the United States would assume lasting responsibility for their political independence and territorial integrity. On these terms non~Communist IndoChinese leaders

+

would welcome U, S. intervention s and would be unlikely to succumb to Communist peace proposals,. The war-weary Indo-

Chinese people, however, might be less favorable, particularly

* if U. S* intervention came at a time when an end to the

■■ i

fighting seemed othorv;ise in sight, The Associated States

would expect to profit fro:; U, S, intervention in terms of

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" increased independence from the French, and would constantly

■

seek to enlist U, S* influence in bolstering their position

«

* vis-a-vis France f The Indochinese, however, would be worried!

-

over the possibility that U, S* intervention might invite

■

Chinese Cosiiattftlst reaction and make Indochina a battleground of destruction on the Korean scale. Accordingly 3 they would be expected to oppose the use of nuclear weapons in Indochina, 21i Fre e World^g&P.jjion:; The U.K., apprehensive of the . possibility of war with Communist China } would approve a U, S. intervention in Indochina only if convinced that it " was necessary for the prevention of further expansion of - Communist power in Asia. Australia and New Zealand would fully support such a U. S e action, and f&nacta to a lesser extent. Nationalist China and the Republic of Korea would welcome U* 8, intervention in Indochina, since both would

■

hope that this would lead to general war between the United

«

States'and Communist China. President Rhee, in particular, might be tempted to believe that his chances of involving the United States in a renewal of Korean hostilities were

■

greatly enhanced. Thailand, if assured of U. S. guarantees of adequate permanence would probably permit the use of Thai. territory and facilities. The Philippines would support U. S, intervention. Japan would lend unenthusiastic diplo~ natic support. India and Indonesia strongly 5 and Ceylon end Burma to a lesser extent, would disapprove U. S. intervention. Other members of the Arab-Asian bloc would be unsympathetic

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'

-especially because of seeming U. S. support for French colonic

-

alism, The NATO countries, other than those mentioned above,

*

%

would generally support U, S« military action, but their support would be tempered by fear of expansion of t3?3 hostilities and the effect oa the NATO build-up. The attitude of most of

the Latin American countries would tend to be non-committal.

>

22. Free World Reaction in the Event of U, S. gaotical Use of Nuclear Weapons: U, S« allies would almost certainly consider that use by the U, S« of nuclear weapons in Indochina (a) would remove the last hope that these weapons would not be used again in war, and (b) would substantially increase the risk of general war, Our allies would, therefore, doubt the wisdom of the use of nuclear weapons in Indochina and this doubt would develop into strong disapproval if nuclear weapons were used without their being consulted or against their wishes. On the other hand, France and, if consulted, the UK, Australia,

■

Hew Zealand* and possibly the Netherlands, might support such action but only If convinced by the U. S, that such action

was essential to keep Southeast Asia from falling under C' i\-munist control and to preserve the principle of collective' security* Other KATO governments, if similarly consulted

*

would probably not publicly disapprove of such U. S t action, if they were persuaded during consultation that such action was essential to prevent collapse of the collective security

system. Nationalist China and the .Republic of Korea voul*

■

probably approve such action in the hope that this would

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•result in general war between the U.' S. and Communist China, -. Japan would almost certainly publicly disapprove, Most

*

Asian states and those of the Arab Bloc would probably object

■

strongly to such U. S. action. Certain of these nations led

•o * -**«

by Indiaj would almost certainly seek to have the OH censure

the U. 5.

23. Soviet Bloc Reaction;

■

jw The Communist Bloc would almost certainly seek to create differences between the United States and the French> and for -this purpose would probably put forward "plausible" peace offers to the greatest extent possible in the light of the Geneva Conference, It is Unlikely 3 in the first instance, that the USSR would take any direct military action in response to U* S, participation in the Indochina war. The Soviet Union would, however, continue to furnish to the Chinese Communists military assistance for Viet-rainli utilisation in Indochina,

* *

b. The Chinese Co-nmunists probably would not im-mediately intervene openly, either with regular or "volunteer 11 forces, but would substantially increase all other kinds of support. However, if confronted by im~

■

pending Vietininh defeat. Communist China would tend to-

ward intervention because of the prospect that Communist

prestige throughout the world would suffer a severe blow

and that the area of IT. S 3 military influence would be

«

brought to the southern border of China. On the other '

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hand, Communist China's desire to concentrate on domestic problems, plus fear of what must appear to Peiping as the

■

virtual certainty of U, S. counteraction against CoRaaunist

>

China itself, would tend to deter over.t intervention. The

chances are about even that in this situation Communist China would decide upon overt intervention rather than accept the defeat of the Vletmlnh#*

£■ Soviet B loc Reaction In the,E vent of p.. S. Tactical Use o.f Nuclear W eapons , Initial Communist military reactions would probably be substantially the same as in tne case of -no nuclear weapons. Politically y the Communists would intensify their world-wide campaign to brand the U, S, as an aggressor, with the expectation that considerable political capital could be realized out of the adverse world reactions to U, S. use of nu~ clear weapons. If U. S, use of nuclear weapons should lead to impending Vietminh defeat, there is a split of opinion within the Intelligence Advisory Committee as to whether the Chinese Communists would accept the risk in-

volved and intervene overtly to save the Communist posi-

i

tion in Indo China: three members believe the chances they would not openly intervene are greater than assessed

* For fuller discussion of the split of opinion within the IAC on this question, see SE-53^ n Probable Communist Reactions to Certain Fossible U. S, Courses of Action in Indochina through 195^ n (published December 13, 1953)

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in par. 23 «b above; throe members believe the chances are better than even they would openly intervene. 2H, Foreign Aid Considerations: Military assistance to finance the French and Associated States military effort and

to supply military hardware would continue at approximately current rates (Fl 195 1 *- - £800 million; FY 1955 z £1130 mil-lion)* Expenditures for economic assistance in Indochina would be substantially increased ever the present rate of expenditure ($25 million). These figures do not take into account the cost of U. S* military participation or the pos~ sible cost of post-war rehabilitation in Indochina.

315

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B. Tn Concert tfith ths French and Others

Assumptions

25. The, Associated States and France invite the military

participation of the United states and other nations

*

26. It is practicable to organize a UI! or regional mill

■

tary effort*

27. Th<f military situation in Indochina is approximately as at present. i,e M stalemate with elements of deterioration*

28, France and the Associated States will carry forward the scale of military effort envisaged in the Laniel-llavarre

Plan

Military Requirements

■-i..-j ,*a-+f*. --*■<„•. * .. —..i>»-»i.*. t4-«t

■ •r.Oj *•-

29- Same as II-A (pars* 15-18 above). Ground forces contributed by other nations will, supplement French Union ground forces., air or naval forces contributed by other nations might substitute for U* S* air and naval forces.

Po 1 i t i ca 1 A s p e c z s

30. a. Uil* Action* An appaal to the UN for assistance

against Communist aggression 5 in order to secure the

-

requisite two-thirds majority in the General Assembly^ would necessarily have to come from the Associated States acting as independent states 3 and be supported by the French. A request for assistance by France alone would probably fail of passage as being merely a request for assistance in a colonial war, Even with an appeal from

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the Associated States* it is probable that, though a two-thirds majority might be secured } there would be not more than 3^ affirmative votes, and many abstentions e During the course of the debate. the£"e* would bo major efforts to incorporate in the resolution a call for a cease-fire and negotiated settlement s or provisions for limiting the conflict to Indochina * U> S*. control of the

■

character of the resolution would be extremely difficult, although not necessarily Impossible■ In stua s it might be possible to secure DH action for armed assistance to the Associated States'-* but the difficulties in staving off UN pressure for a negotiated settlement or UII mediation would be considerable* The majority for a satisfactory UII resolution would, at best, be slim and

}

conceivably might take more time to aera eve than is available» Failure to obtain UII action^ if attempted 5

#

would seriously prejudice the prospects of any effective intervention* " '

b. Regional Groutline. Any regional grouping should enlist maximum Mian participation. It would be possible to develop a regional grouping which would lend moral and some military.support to a U. S* intervention, in Indochina if it were clear that the United states

had decided (1) to undertake the coramitinsnt of U* S

■■i

forces to the Indochina area, and (2) to assume cdmrai stents of a lasting character for the defense of the

O c X

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number. NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

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Associates States^ -Thailand and Malaya. Australia and

Hew Zealand j while concerned about the effect on the *

AHZftJS organisation, would probably be willing to par-

ticipate in a broader organization fo» the defense ox mainland Southeast Asia, Xhe U. Kc, already disturbed at its exclusion from Ai-IZUSj and in general ready to

p

support Hi S* intervention in Indochina 5 would be prepared to enter a South East Asian regional grouping which carried with it u« g, guarantees for Malaya. Thailandj if given lasting U* S, defense commitments %

would also participate in such an organization and would probably provide bases and facilities for support of

I

* m

military operations in Indochina and possibly modest

*

military forces* The Philippines would also support a

■

regional organization and might provide modest military

*

forces. The Nationalist Government of China end the BOX would seek inclusion in any regional organization which sponsored military action in Indochina 5 in the hope of an extension of hostilities to Communist China, Foi

■ +

this reason5 their inclusion would probably be opposed by at least the UK and French governments. Such a regional grouping v;ould almost certainly be less inclined than the UM to respond to plausible Ccroirrunist peace offers 5 and more likely to persevere to an acceptable

solution in Indochina.

*

322

•v r\ "n o "?p w- ~p**i

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

31* French Reaction; The Preach-would prefer a regional grouping to UN sponsored assistance* They might consider sUch a grouping as less desirable than U* S« intervention

*

alone. The French would probably £eel, however 3 that they would have to go along with the formation of such a regional grouping if they could sec no other way out of their difficulties in Indochina, After active multilateral armed intervention in Indochina, France would probably seek progressively to reduce its share of the military burden*

32* Associate States Reaction; The Associated States

***.>**---'-'v-;^-* ft •-* -ta «* w * ?U^>^w-% i 'Mi'«iiin i *i h -*»'*<e>-w* -—* j« _-%r

would probably prefer US sponsored military assistance to any other form of outside intervention. They would, however,

■

be more than vailing to accept such assistance from a regional

£

grouping• and would be eager to participate in such a grouping

if it included effective U* So military participation, 3*-U Free World Reactions

a

a f In gei ral f The reaction to U* S# military inter

» *

vention<in Indochina under the aegis of a regional group-

■

ing would be somewhat more favorable than the reaction to U. S. 'military intervention alone, UN sponsorship

i

of U« S. military participation would materially decrease the hostility of the Arab-Asian bloc to U, S. intervention , and night also strengthen somewhat the support for such action in Latin America and Western Europe,

rr.

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

TOP SECEE2

b

To U

.J. .. - ,.— ,» <.— -■»

Tactical Use of Nuclear Vfea'oonR* T.c -

actions of

.»-1,

j, .*

caner nacions

including the participating

nations % would be substantially the sams as in par, 22

above *

3Vf Soviet B'ioc Reaction?

rrv

I'ne

fact that the United States

was initially only one of a group would probably not appreciably reduce Peiping*s apprehension at the presence of U. S* power on the southern borders of China* Peiping might well believe that in the.,end % as in the case of Korea s the situation would evolve into a continuing and largely U. S. unilateral com-

-r a-

mitffient. Thus, the chances of overt Chinese Communist in*-tervention would remain substantial,

3f?« Soviet Bloc Reaction in the Event of IL 8\ Tactical

Use of Nuclear Weapons: Whether or not the other participating powers concurred in U« S* use of nuclear weapons 3 the chances of Chinese Columnist overt intervention would be the same as stated in paragraph 23~c above.

36, Foreign Aid Considerationss In addition to the in-creased program under A above (par. 2h) the United States, would probably have to provide additional expenditures for

provision of military equipment and supplies to the force

-

of some of the participating states.

s

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By; NWD Date: 2011

rn

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C.

In the R.-oviv of a ProTJoseei 3 ntch Vftthdraval, tha Units

States Acting in Cone t v;ith*0thers .or Aloxi

Assignations

37* France refuses to continue participation in the war

in Indochina

*

38* The Associated States invito the military partici-

pation of the. United States with others or alone*

39• There has been no serious deterioration in the French

Union military situation prior to U ( S» take-over,

ho* The French will so phase their withdrawal as to

permit orderly replacement of their forces.

e

l H. The Associated States will cooperate.fully with th United States in developing indigenous forces.

h2. It may be practicable to.organise a UN or regional military effort, / • •

Military Re-quirments

**3« a. Ground forces. (Total personnel strength of

605,000)

(1) Indigenous forces of 330 5 000. >v (2) U. S. or allied forces of six infantry and one airborne division (each the equivalent of a U. S. division in strength and composition) plus necessary support personnel totaling 275 } 000« b. Air Force forces. (Total personnel strength of

12,000)

3

1 air defense fighter wins

1 light boiib

mi n

*~ t *■"' r*

^ t-_ %,>

TO? SECRET

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 1-3 NND Project Number: NND 63316- By; NWD Date: 2011

-

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•

i "

1 troop carrier wing

2 tactical recoil* sqdns

■■

1 fighter bomber wing

1 tactical control sqdru

* e, Naval farces. (Total personnel strength of

35>' 5 ooo)

1 Carrier Task Group plus additional units con-

-

sisting of: . ' , Mineeraft ' -VPROHS

m

Amphibious lift for 1 RCT

#

Underway replenishment group cl. Train: ns forces. (included in above)

■

e. Logistic implications* This course of action can be logistically -supported with the following effects;

(1) Effect on NATO deliveries,:

Army and Navv - JIo adverse impact,

Air Force

*.'

No effect until second

i

quarter of FY 1955* vtien

*

certain units schecUiled for vath&r&wai from CTHCFB are retained in that area, due to the Indochina, com-

mitment and are not available to fulfill the NATO commitment,

on n

m

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

*...-

TO? SSCRET

(2) Drain an logistic reserves;

Army

Navy

•--*

Negligible on all items that are in production, assuming

necessary adjustments in

«

production schedules

■

(par, L J-3-&C3) below). Partial drain on certain

_»

Air Force

logistic reserves 1 , prin

cipally aircraft.

Negligible in all instances

0

(3.) Effect on production schedules:

Ar ray

*• Require revision of assMiini"

tion schedules for 105 and Xffimm howitzers and for k*2 60mm and 8lrora mortars which are currently being cut back,

Navy

*.-«.-

Increased production schedules for aircraft and ammunition may be required depending upon the extent

• •

Air Force

*a ) -»8.vv^

01 operations •

~ Some increases in certain *

produe c ion is c 11 s d ul e s wi th emphasis on ammunition depending on the extent of

operations t

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r~

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 1-3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

*■- >

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(h) Additional facilities required at bases

in Indochina

Air

TlTiV

l<.

A logistic support base

similar to but 021 a smaller

scale to that established

Wavy

at Pusanj Korea*

*- Base requirements can be met with existing mobile

logistic support units now in FECOil and by expansion o:f bases in the Philippines

Air Force

Light and fighter bomber and interceptor wings will

operate from existing facilities in Indochina. This operation may require tv;o wings to operate from one airbase. POL can be supplied

The majority of FS<lF<s airlift capability must be made available to insure

effective operation if units are required to move in on

short notice.

0 0 : '

in

Declassified per Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

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'

■

f. Materiel Reouirements: The major share "of the burden for provision of replacement equipment, ammunition and over-all logistic support for all forces involved will

have to bo undertaken by the United states. Ihe equip-ment and materials relinquished by the'French forces should assist in meeting the initial materiel requirements*

£* Impact on U, S* Military P] crams; This course would undoubtedly have the following effects: an increased calculated risk of war with Co-umunist China or of general ..war ^ adversely affecting war plans.; alterations in fiscal and budgetary policies and programs dependent on the scale and duration of operationsi and a reversal of policy planning to reduce the .size of the U. St armed forceSo Political Aspects

><■<,» ■•*.».» i»-*»«—r~*«v t*"* ^*r-^;-*w ■* % •».*■*■— »> -«» -. \ v*

hh* U W. Actions French disassoeiation would largely remove Asian suspicions that the actions of the United States and the West were directed toward perpetuating French colonic alism in the area and thereby enhance support for UIT action. However, there might be increased pressure for a negotiated

D

settlement and UN mediation 3 and equally strong pressure for limiting any hostilities to Indochina*

h$* Regional Action: It would be feasible to secure support of a regional grouping for U# S. replacement of French forces in Indochina, In the contingency of French withdrawal

Thailand^ in particular 5 and the other states in general

5

0£$

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

■ ■ _

top SEC:;:

would wish to assure thesaelves that the United States was really committed to fully replacing French strength in the

are?.. If'they were convinced this was the case } and if the nature of French witiidrav/al nade replacement by U, So troops

■

practicable 5 they would support a; tu S« effort*

■

l J-6* Effect on Frances A French decision actually to

* • , - '-,--' C * J - ■ " _■>■ * ^i^A- «.*

withdraw would signal a aa^or change in the French position in the world* France might be expected to lose interest in the Far East 5 to resign itself to a diminution of U, S. assis tance and support 5 and to an abrupt loss of its role as a major power* The French political position in North Africa -would be seriously prejudiced* The effect on French policy toward NATO and EDO or in Europe has not been est:!mated*

*i-7. Associated States Reaction; The Associated States

r

would be concerned by a French withdrawal largely by reason of the practical obstacles which they would believe would have to be overcome in any replacement of Trench forces* If

■

convinced 5 however 5 that these obstacles could be overcome s

# they would, continue to fight in stoppert of U. S. s regional,.

<jk

or DH military efforts in Indochinaj but the war-weary Xn&o

*.*

Chinese people would be less willing to fight, particularly if

#

intervention comes at a time when the end of the fighting is

4* V -

oxnerwise m ^rosneci,.

l ;-S. Free World Reactions

0- "*.'- fc.- W-

— -••;--*— *»-t^-« —4 »«j--«*-*■•'«—■*.*

a

>. Jn eeneralo Free world reaction would vary*

If

the French withdraw the rest of the free world would prob«

-

ably orefer ffi, action to u. S- intervention alone. But,

*"S *"* if*

3oU

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By; NW'D Date: 2011

■

TOP SECRET

i.

convinced that the only altern tive to Co:.ramiist

domination was unilateral U« So action, most of the free

world would support such action. The NATO conn "cries would be concerned with U* S,- diversion of resources to

the Par East and the increased risk of general war

B

b« To U, S, Us a of Hixelear ITeaoons* Reactions of

«■ — 1 ■ •■ , l# l >J ■ H l U ~ **C»i < »' ■« » S — J W »I> Jlf J l * »t" C ■ J- *". C-.V-t-r * ■•■«»■._ • •_ *-r^ «■- ■" I . -»^ W *— -•

other nations^ including; any participating nations } would

be substantially the same as in par, 22*

*f9« Soviet Bloc Reactions (Same as In paragraph 23 above,!

t

50• Soviet Bloc Reaction in tha FJvant of IU S. Use of Tactical Nuclear Werroons. (Saae as in paragraph 23~c above.) Foreign Aid Considerations

*

51. In addition to the increased economic aid set forth in previous contingencies (pars. 2h and 36 above) 5 the United

+

States would be required to replace key French advisors to governments of the Associated States with U. S* personnel and greatly increase expenditures for relief and rehabilitation.

In addition, the requirement for military aid for indigenous

« forces "would be at least as great as under present plans.

» #

-

The savings in the U. S. contribution for the support of French forces in Indochina would partly serve to offset the

gi*eatly increased

costs of Uo S.

forces

taking their place

1

«3 O .'.

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

COPI

. ■

i

I--. ■* ■

&mZ POSITION ON NSC'ACTIOS NO. lOJ^-A

■ » ■ ■ -i-i —- ■ ■ -— » -— i ■— • ' ■ ■ .

1. There are important military disadvantages to intervention in Indochina under the assumptions set forth in NSC Action No, lO^i-a.

2, A military victory in Indochina cannot be assured by U.S. intervention with air and naval forces alone:.

3- The use o f atomic weapons in Indochina*would not reduce the number of ground forces required to achieve a military victory in Indochina*

-

k. It is estimated that seven U.S. divisions or their equivalent, with appropriate naval and air support, would be required to win a victory in Indochina if the French withdraw and the Chinese Communists do not intervene. However, U.S. military intervention must take into consideration the capability of the Chinese Communists to intervene.

% It is estimated that the equival ent of 12 U.S. divisions would be required to win a victory in Indochina, if the French withdraw and the Chinese Communist intervene,

6. The equivalent of 7 U.S. divisions would be required to win a victory in Indochina if the French remain and the Chinese Communists intervene.

■

7- Requirements for air and naval support for ground force .operations are:

i

a. Five hundred fighter-bomber sorties per day exclusive

of interdiction and counter-air operations. I

b. An airlift capability of a one division drop. \

-

c. A division amphibious lift.

8. One U.S. airborne regimental combat team can be placed in! Indochina in 5 days, on e additional division in 2^ days, and the remaining divisions in the following 120 days. This could be accomplished partially be reducing U.S. ground strenght in the Far East with the remaining units coming from the general reserve in the United States. Consequently, the U.S. ability to meet its NATO ccssm&tment would be seriously effected for a considerable period. The time required to place a total of 12 divisions in Indochina would depend upon the industrial and personnel mobilization measures taken by the government.

ill &M w--; '->3 * - '

(0-1)

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

'• ■ * * ouced >.-uhout psriPiissxon o;

the originating office

PAR? 1

■ «

IKDO-CHIKA

I - THF, FROBL!

-

m t B— -** *~**,» *«-"l-—»

To set forth a program of action without resort to overt combat operations by U,S C forces* designed to: (a) secure the military defoat of Coramuntst forces

■

in Indo-Ghina; ana (b) establish a western oriented complex in Southeast Asia incorporating ln:lo-Chir<a ; Thailand; Burma; Malaya; Indonesia* and the Phil-

ippine s o

II

*.»

MAJCR COi'iSj ATI CMS

i fc ^ MM ■ n > »m ■ %.»-<

(A) Indo-China is considered the keystone of the arch of Southeast Asia;

arid the Indo-Chinese peninsula must not be permitted to fall under Corr^unist

u *

■

domination* This requires the defeat in Indo-China of military and quasi-military GoHsnunist forces and the development of conditions conducive to successful resistance to any Communist actions to dominate the area* Neasures takeii in Indo-Chiiia; however; must be in consonance T-;ith U.S. and allied action taken in the Far East and Southeast Asia to defeat Communist efforts to extend their control of the area*

.(b) Feasible actions to provide for the immediate TJ.S* assistance

■

requested by the French for operations in the Dien Bien Fhu--Central Laos sector have been takers The measures recoiraendcd herein vill hardly affect the immediate tactical situation in these areas (which? while serious; is not as critical as public pronouncements suggest)* They are designed to effect a general improve^ Fiont in the over-all situation in ln:lc-0hin^ which is such that all actions

This doev.-int contains 13 pages*

1

KJ

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By; NW'D Date: 2011

AJU'Jf. &W^lS*i&Fi ft

nust be considered a matter of urgency to be implemented without delay

#J1> ^ - r

are also designed to achieve the desired results in indo-China without overt

involvement by U«S* co-ibat forces

vJ fc

(c) The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Central Intelligence* Agency have

* ■ -

developed a program of support for tfha Kavarre Plan in Xndc^Chinao This plan considers certain basic iiasiediate requirements for continued U«S e support for Franeo^Vie&namese operations and sorie of these recommendations have been imple~ mented-. The remaining actions have been incorporated hereunder in paragraph III (A) * Hoy over j there is implicit in many of these proposals a requirement for a stronger French political and military effort as -well as more ef foe live support for Vietnamese participation* The alternative to more precise and extensive action by the French and Vietnamese,, as proposed by the ILS.^ appears to be a continued stalemate or debacle in 3"ndo-China»

■ * •

(D) It vould appear that France cannot idt&b*av her forces 'from Indo~ China without serious deterioration of her position as a vrorld power,

■ *

(S) The key to the success of military operations continues to be the generation of well-trainedj properly led indigenous forces effectively employed

ft

in cornbat operations against the Gonsvonist forces in Viet Kinhu The eventual

* 4

goal must be the development of homogeneous indigenous units vath a native officer corps a In this ihe French have had; for whatever reason ; insufficient

■ *

-

successj Such success id 11 ultimately be dependent upon the inspiration of the local population to fight for their own freedom from Corrrttnist doirination and tile willingness of tbe French both to take the measures to stimulate that inspiration

a

nd to more fully utilize the native potential, At the s?:v;. time, French sensi.

tivities id-th respect to their sacrifices^ responsibilities^ and capabilities *ust be respected^ as m persuade and assist them to correct existing deficiencies,

*

*". r

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

*

'I u ) i ■*•> f J - '' ,u IA i 1

• -.

i

(F) The U*S* objective in indo~China should be centralized U W S* control

-

■

and coordination of all U t S* military ; military aid; and "unconvcri bional varfarc (uhieh includes'Psychological warfare^ guerrilla raarfarej and certain aspects of pacification operations) inechanisras in Indo-China 5

(G) There is in Indo-China, or programmed for Iridc-China (and anticipating continued U„S* assistance) a sufficient snounb of equipment and supplies and

a potential manpower., pool sufficient eventually to defeat the Communists

■

i ■

decisively if properly utilised and maintained and if the situation C-Ont&nu to

+

permit this manpower to be converted into military effectiveness c In their o:;n report the French have acknowledged that U 0 S e aid in many areas has exceeded French capacity to absorb it*

(H) Measures advocated by tb3, U ? 3» must be so characterised by determina--tion* strength; confidence; and justice that they serve to enhance the support

m

of all Asians viho seek freedom, both fix>m Coi^unist domination and western

colonizationa Asians must be convinced that they vill have a far better future

Kith the Free *T orld than under Communism and th/it there is not to be reinstitu-

^*

tion of colonialism©

r * »

(l) The Corar.ujiists in Indo-China^ Southeast Asia ; China, and Moscow must

*

be jpade aware that "the United Statesj France; and the free governments of the Far Bast are united, steadfastj and capable of accomplishing their ainso

(j) The U*S. must take the initiative in persuading the French and Viet-namese to overcoiae these deficiencies« Such initiative must; however j avoid

*

French exploitation in its unilateral interest and must avoid actions -which till

S

*»

lead to, in voluntary UrSc corfoat participation

5

.»..VW«'. . fin -;Wl_vJ'i j;

^ O O

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

* y~>

Ji.sJJ*v - w « :! J -^ s& t * »

III « ACTI0E3 REQll ^:D

—■_• f — w^ m mm *

(A) The Joint Chiefs of Staff, in coordination vith the Central Intolligenc

t

Agency* have recoroendod certain courses of action which aro suscoptdbj.e of

immediate implementation* Of those not already undertaken^ the following should be completed as a matter of urgency:

1* The French air forces in Ind--China should bo augmented; particularly vdth respect to air and ground-crovr personnel from military and/W civilian resources within the framework of the French-Vietna&ese arred forces* Steps should be taken through existing contacts vdth the French Government to satisfy those

v <•-

requir assents j to explore the possibilities of establishing

a

.^:

^*

*v<

V

%r\ volunteer air group; and to make the necessary arrangements to j

—

replace the uniformed U«S e military personnel being temporarily"^ assigned to assist the French in maintenance functions, ** Action; Defense

2c The present arrangements fcr the assignment of U*3. officials to Indo-China should bo altered to include the assign-Tient

of an-'additional representative* of the Central Intelligence Agency

*

to an appropriate U.S. activity in the area*

i

Action: Defense. CIA

> ■ — *-^~——*_« *

—^—^*». «*^»

3? A source of funds in the amount of $12ii millions to meet

' -. : :-

additional urgent requirements for Indo^China for all services ;• ; must be determined* Currently for FY !£?!* there hzs been provided ■* - to the French effort in Indo-China a total of $1 ; 115 millions in

••>

t

t-

military assistance, defease support; and r/alitary support projects* Unless a source of fun:1s other than IDA? is made available to neet

mi?, sucaHTr

d 0 b

Declassified per Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 I

l j\ ^iiT

c^Vi* i^iHj Jt

-

! ■

1.

(

these additional requirements^ the materiel action and training support for Inde^China will have to cc*:e at the expense of the

>jor3.d-*v:ide Fi 1?5U HS* progr:

t

Action: Defense

-

(B) The present situation In Indo^CMnaj howeverj indicates that in addition to the jbjtm&dl&te actions outlined above, the following steps must b

■

taken as a matter of priority;

1* . As a result of events which have occurred during recent neelcsj and particularly in the light of the forthcoming Geneva conventionj

certain actions which might have been susceptible,of direct negotiation with the French Government now require more pircunspect negotiation,

■

Nora the less i it should remain the U & 5* objective to obtain French ccym'?.

">

acceptance formally or Informally of the following:

a* Modification of the Mission of the U*S, MAAQj Indo-China- •

H ,

. to provide for expanded strengthj including a planning stai

X

(composed initially of up to 10 highly selected officer personnel): •authority to conduct liaison vdth senior training and planning staff sectionsj and authority to fljakq reconpendations concerning

■ k

the conduct of operations * This relationship may be justified entirely within the framework of the present agreement with the French Government that "the French Government will continue to

-

facilitate exchanges of information and TJLevfi on a continuing basis between French and U S S* mllitaiy authorities and "111 take into account ths vievs expressed by the latter with respect'to tfoa development and carrying out of the French

<** ^, -»,

441

*

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

T.W. &&&&&& «

strategic plans without In any wajTj of coursej detracting

from exclusive Frenob responsibility Tor adoption arid exocutic

*

thereof 4 " It should be presented that the 0*3« has complete

-

confidence that France can win the struggle against the Cor?, a-nists in Indo-China and that expanded U*S 0 Representation at

*

the French Headquarters is designed to provide the maxinum and most effective assistance In aiding the French to achieve common free world objectives in Indo-China

bo Gradual assignment of additional U C S* personnel up to a - level of $0 specially qualified personnel in Indo-China as such assignments become feasible P These individuals should

■

have the mission of acting as instructors,, principally with the Vietnamese forces and in non-*conbnt areas as recommended

by the Chief, MAAGj and concurred in by the local Coriander*

m

Co Expanded utilization of U*S» covert assets* particu-

■

larly in the unconventional warfare field and particularly in bilateral US-Associated States unconventional warfare

operations t

■

Actio n-; State ^ Defense } CIA ' -*

2 t It should also be a U 3 S» objective to seek (both with the a.rfiV-G-French and other appropriate governments as well as with the necessary U.S* authorities) the methods of attaining the folioving:

o t

m

a. 0 Modification of present Foreign Legion enlistment

*

requirements with reduced enlistment period for service in Indo-China and expansion of the Foreign Legion to

include the formation of air units*

-TV ^.

Declassified per Executive Order ^Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

flF/f^ PS © v*> if* pa m *;*

b c Recruitment in certain foreign countries 5 especially GermaiVj Xtaljj and possibly Asia/of non-French personnel with appropriate technical qualifications for

*%

\

service in Inco-China. with the Foreign Legion

j

Co Provision of certain U e S & personnel- on a voluntary

* •.* ■*

basis ; for service in the French forces without sacrifice

of their UcS, citizenship*

Actio n; Defensej State •

3* In addition to the urgent actions outlined above^ the following

additional actions are suggested as contributing to the advancement

-of U.S. interests vjith respect to Indo-China:

a* The U*Sd should continue to stress and emphasize

in every way our purpose in helping the peoples of Vietnamj f\ Cambodia^ - and Laos through the French is to maintain their

\

^v

independence^ and should reiterate our position regarding that independence 9 _ .

Action: Operations Coordinating Board

■

b© A vigorous U*S» effort might be made to restore Bao Dai f s health and to persuade him and possibly the King

■

of Csiabodia to take a more active part in 1 the struggle against the Viet Kinh c This effort should include action*

designed to encourage Bao Dai to vithdravr from his semi-

■

isolation to visit his troops^ to reside in his capital and otherwise to comport himself like a dynanic Chief of , "State t This effort Plight be correlated with measures designed to have some U.S 0 inilitary assistance delivered

A

V- o o

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

t@t WMH&

* -- *

*

•

directly to the Associated States instead of through the

French* Such action might appropriately be taken upon the

--

conclusion of or during the latter phases of the Geneva conferencs ft

Action: Operations Coordinating Board

Militarily

■ " — -* ■! —~m ■■ » . ■ ■■ i —

lo A general officer of two-star r-ank, as designated by ths Department of Defense, should be appointed Chiefs KAASj Jndo-China, upon relief of the present Chief in February 19$k* He v/ill be subject to the coordination of the U f S 0 Ambassador to Indo-China-but idll be under the military coismand of U*S* Cor^iander-in-Chicf, Pacific * He vill command all U«S t military personnel and covert assets in Indo-China relative to his mission and will be personally responsible for presenting the involvement of uniformed U*S« personnel in combat*

2 G Subsequent to the receipt of French-goveramental approval (and desirably at their invitation), but at the earliest possible

• •**.

time j the Chief } HAAG, mdo-China, should be provided vith necessary : staff sections, and assigned additional duties involving expanded liaison with the French and Vietnam forces* He should be directed and authorized to advise and assist the Franco-Vietnamose cqma&d in training and planning, and to make recommendations concerning the conduct of operations. In this connection he should urgently seek the following:

. a* Development and implementation of a sound concept and operational plan for the conduct of operations

in Indo-Ghina*

mi?. SiiCi

'■-.■■

iR.ii

1

Declassified per Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

•

r

1 y^JJ o WJI --i sv* tSV* M 1>

b e Intensive and aggressive operations with a view to idnning a victory of consequence at ths earliest tlme-j

• *

and exploitation of this success politically and psycho-" logically* '

£c Effective pacification of Fronch-Viotn^.iosc hold aroa&j emphasising security of individuals and property

s

through proper utilisation of defense groups and guard and institution of adequate lecal civil administration,

4-

d* Training and properly equipping Vietnam units" / uith arinhasis upon the institution of adequate officer^ NCJO, and technical training courses«

£■• Improvement in intelligence and security agencies

T

-

j f* Expansion of unco: itional warfare operations*

Action: Defense. CIA

3o Concurrently with the tasks assigned atove^ arrangements

* v

should he made to develop an over-all concept designed to achieve " H

Q> 1' the subjugation of Corrnunist forces in Indo-China and the pacific "\ - "

cation of the area B This concept should be provided the Chiefs

MAAGj Indo-Chinaj as guidance in seeking the accomplishment of

»

the task assigned in paragraph 2 above*

■

Action: Defense^ CIA '

Information ar.d Psychological

_»..—.....

1 ? Concurrently with the political, and military actions outlined above,, and under the coordination of the Operations Coordi

>

nating Boardj a specific domestic and foreign information campaign

+

should be developed and fcatrtfcsiriedj particularly for the period

■f& r?i\ n ci -. •'' ff > -~> v? r tr

V *

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

rift jfV fr^ fc* \:' /^-C*^ H 1 c " -**

leading up to the Geneva conference- to de~c sise "hysteria 11

publicity snd to bring about siidespread recognition of and

*

appropriate attention to the foHo.id.33g thermos:

& 0 France, in supporting the fight of the "Associated

States of Indo-China against CoramUnist domination., is the principal nation nov shedding its blood for the freedom

■a

of others*

b« The French Government has made major sacrifices in terms of its young military mgnpororj its economic resources^ and its political position in order to def end the cause of liberty and freedom from Communism in Indo-

China*

* Op The French Government has accepted the principle

of self govern.i:nt and sovereignty for the Associated States of Indo-China and has in fact more than satisfied tho initial demands of Ho Chi Minhj thus providing •evidence that the Viet Hinh are fighting not for freedom but for the "Communist cause* .

d* The cause of the Associated States of Indo-China

is the cause of all countries in South Asia who desire freedom from Communist domination and self determination with respect to their political and economic objectives*) j2 0 The cause of Viet Minn as Kith all Communists is

the cause of colonization and subservience to Kremlin

•p

rule as was the cause in China^ in North Korea and in tho European satellites*

x

Action: St&t'Qj Defense; CIA, U3IA

-,r- ^t

f^4 /*\ r\ c* \ : /ps -^ r '' : '-*-

\

I

Declassified per Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 I

< -

2* A specific U*S* psychological warfare program for Indo-

i

China should be developed ii-tviediately, including overt and covert projects*" wider Operations Coordinating Board coordination^ with

t a

paramount emphasis on the establishment of a climate of opinion which associates all outside support wd.th the achievement of Indo-Chinese national aspirations* Benefit vail accrue from UrSc

■

courses of action in direct proportion to the degree they arc implemented through indigenous peoples rather than through direct support of the French;,* The U*S< psychological warfare program should therefore provide for the following;

u

*

■*

8® The establishncnt under the U C S^ Ambassador to Indo-China of an operations advisory group ; including '. • . representatives of the U«S* Military Mission in Indc-

China^ the Department of State } and the Central Intelligence

■

Agency as appropriate to coordinate the non-salitary aspects of U^So psychological operations within IndcMGhina* The

■

Chi of> KAAGj Indo-Chinaj should be responsible for coordinating all psychological warfare activities directly relative to his expanded mission with this group*

Action: State, Defense, CIAj FOA, U3IA

hj Appropriate psychological warfare equipment and t .„

" t, v

supplies should bo assigned to the French and Vietnam

* v

«

forces, and Vey technical personnel should be assigned to the HAAG for such use as the Chief. KAAOj rcay desire * A cti on: Defense } CIAj FOA .

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number. NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

;/;:s r> El*

./I ii> ii nS £-1 &* LA IA il

c 9 A specific mechanism should be established within *—

the U*S* to provide for the orientation of all official ■

%

UftS* personnel assigned to duty or visiting Xndo-China so that maximum favorable psychological effect is derived

frcrn all their activities and contacts

t

Action; Operations Coordinating Board

dc Development of indigenous leadership which mil be truly representative and symbolic of Indo-Chinese national aspirations and v;ln the loyalty and support of the people*

■

Action: State. Defense, CIA

Hi " -■■■■■ ■■ * *

c c Subsidization of indigenous newspapers and public

-

information media^ including provision of equipment and supplies as vreH as air transport to remote population

.!.

centers* „

Action; CIA, USIA

jf 0 Upon establishnont of nece ry agreements vith the French Government as prescribed above, augmentation of the US-Vietnam guerrilla warfare potential In Indo-China,

Action: Defense, CIA

-1

IV - CONCLUSIONS AND RECOKGNDATICKS

(A) If the above actions can be completed at an early date x-dth lull French support (and on the assumption that the Chinese Communists do not intervene overtly in Indo-Chin^) ; it is considered that this program v;ill have the effect of reversing the present situation and give promise of leading to a

n

Itimate victory in Indo-China viihout evert use of U,S 3 military forees

e

r-1 P.-i

•

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Dale: 2011

- - fi 1 "tt\i F$ <5l r? (t * ••3 f? V

(b) Ho\*joverj should the iiraediate situation in Indo~China deteriorate drastically or should French intransigence make the substantial aceoinplishinsnt of the program outlined herein impossible^ the U & S P ray id-sh to consider direct military action in Southeast Asia to ensure the Maintenance of our vital interests in the area* Under such circumstances^ an area concept inolitding Malaya, Thailand^ Burma, Indoisosiaj and the Philippines^ as well as Indo-China* would appear essentiale These ramifications are to be considered in Part II of this

%

stud/ as assigned to the Special Committee

<

(C) It is recoriraended that this program be approved by the Operations Coordinating Board and submitted to the President for immediate implementation

(D) It i_s al so repomnended that the Department of ' Defense develop;

for the iiamodiato attention of the Special Cornrdttoe^ a concept of operation v jBprid considerations involved in the use of U,S* armed forces in Indo-Chlnaj should such involvement be determined upon*

s

JC RAFT $ April 193^

I

THE PRC' : 'i : DM

.()■■- - «*% -w—*

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3 3 NhJD Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 20JI

This doer it must not be repro

ta.J»K fe&L]&fe3£ clucad wit.- at permission of the.

1 origi nati r.% ox fie e

Sp Lai Cc : ttse Revert On SOUTHEAST ASIA —~ P/j;V tj

To set forth rscoinmandations concerning longer range policy and

courses of action for possible future contingencies in Southeast, Asia net covered by NSC £ttG*J«

II ~ MAJOR CONSIDER ATI CiIS

-.-*—-•■—

A* The Special Conmittee has reviewed NSC $\\Q%$ "lUS* Objectives and Courses of Action with Respect to Southeast Asia% dated 16 January 19$l\ >

and considers that this statement of policy remains valid and should be

.

continued in effect insofar as it concerns the specific contingencies enumer-

* ated thereini

Be NSC $hfi> covers the contingency of possible Chin Corantoist inter-

vention in Indo-China and along vith Part I oH the Special Corrjnittee Report

*

establishes UeS* courses of action designed to secure the military defeat

V A V

. /

i \ .* -•

. % v * * *

of Communist forces in Indc-China in the absence of Chinese Communist # # *y ^ %i ,*

t T

intervention!

Ct There are ; hovever^ at least tv.o additional factors not cove-red by NSC $h0$ Which BBrit additional policy consideration of the U.S. Govern-raont;. These are:

(1) The fact that the Communist threat to Southeast Asia will

■ *

continue to be a major obstacle to IUS* policy and objectives in

*/-

Southeast Asia even though a solution to the Indo-Chinese war

which is satisfactory to the UVS« say be obtained

B

Phis doc irs n£ cor.t si ns XO par;es a

9TOP BE? >^t Copy 7 of J

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* fir V VI & ^S M t l " J :> \'£ W"

JLk'!/ h .; i-Ji2* kW iy& & .B.

(2) The fact that the threat of Co&fflurdst destination in Southeast

T, .>.-.?- - # .

Asia v;ill be infinitely increased in the event that Indc-China should

■

fall.under Corniunist domination despite the pres&nt efforts of the S-> to the contrary*

III - FACTS BEARING ON TrS PROBLEM

_^TrS_ _.

Aa Southeast Asia comprises some 170 Trillion people in an area just eiaerging from the colonial era$ Standards of living and of literacy are very low* With the exception of Viet Ua:.\ ; military forces are inconsiderable* The number and quality of leaders^ adniini stoat or s^ and technicians is far below minimum requirements* The prospects of political or econor.de stability during this . generation are diin ; except in the Philippines and perhaps in Thailand*

Bo The peoples of Southeast Asia are accustomed to the rule of the many . by the very feu at the level of their central governments Their principal national political vitality expresses itself as "anti-colonialisrri" and the

termination of all foreign (Semination rather than in a desire for political

V

democracy or- for the political liberties upon which the Western concept of the world ideological struggle is based 0

Co Southeast Asia is a part of and ethnically associated with the

* Asian continent; principally China* China today is the base of international

Corrar-unisn in the Far East 0 Kith the exception of Australia; to which Southeast

» »

*

Asian states are not ideologically oriented; anti-^Communist bases are very distant* Certain of them are associated s&th colonialism in the minds of the .

*

a

people of Southeast Asia 3 Western influence; both in Southeast Asia and in Xbreaj has not been effective in preventing the spread of Commimism« This results in increased vulnerability of scree Southeast Asian countries to Corinunist influencesc

Si if '

I

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By; NWD Date: 2011

Ds Nationalism that expresses itself in Asia as anti-colonialism^ if properly guided^ is also a potential ks )n against Qoirnnunlst imperalisis* At the present tim-3j however ; some Asians tend to regard "Western coloniali^" as mare evil and pressing than the possible future threat of Co^vunist iiape-ilraXism*

Eo Economically,, the countries of Southeast Asia vary in their products

* ■

and rcarkots* Many major export products o.f the are?, (rubber^ tin ; copra ; etc*)

• * »

are absorbed by the West 8 However$ rice production is a natter of pan-Asian

■

concern as is o5.1 production* -

Fc Southeast• Asia as a region is less homogeneous than the Atlantic

Community or the American Republics in the factors making for real regional consistency and strengths There arc major ethnic and religious differences as well as traditional emnities,? There is no sense of a common danger as regards

Coiumnist iinpexlrOLissu

*

G© Current developments^ including military operations in the Associated

1 States and the forthcoming Geneva Conference^ will have a major influence on

-

"future U»S* policy throughout Southeast Asia*,

Ho UcS* position and policy in the area are nost effectively represents"

* «,

in the Philippines and in Thailand^ from which countries - outside of Indo-China - any expanded program of Western influence may best be launched^

IV *> CONCLUSIONS

Ac The Special Committee considers that these factors reinforce the necessity of assuring that Ir.do-Ch5.na renain in the non-Conp;unist bloc^ and believes that defeat of the Viet Kinh in Indo--China is essential if the spread of Communist influence in Southeast Asia is to be halted^

B$ Regardless of the outcome of military operations in Inda-China and without cc:-prcrds: _ in any way the overvheSLTiiiig strategic importance of the Associated States to the Western position in the area, the U*S* should take

3^8

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

*

r:?^' /T^v v^i (- V- o -o rr^ r ; *■*"»

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all affirmative and practical, ",'s tops* vrith .<;■:. &i'fcnoit& its Evvopezn. allies^ to

■ l-U,

provide tangible evidence of Western strength and determination to defeat Coramunl'^aj to demonstrate that ultimate victory will be won by tfe free isorldj and to secure the affirmative association of Southeast Asian states vith the*

purposes*

C$. That for these purposes the Western position in Indo^Chiiia must be

*

maintained and improved by a military victory*

•~ *

Do That without coEiproiaiso to C* above > the U c Sc should in all prudence reinforce the remainder of Southeast AsdLaj including the land areas of Malaya,,

Burma j Thailand; Indonesia, and the Philippines

V *4 REG0MEND3D COURSES CP ACTIO!

a &

A* The Special Committee wishes to reaffirm the following recommendations .which are made in KSC $l\Gu 9 the Special Committee'Report concerning military

operations in Indc-Chinaj and the position paper of the Special Committee^ con-

* curred in by the Department of Defense^ concerning U C S 0 courses of action and

policies with respect to the Geneva Conference:

(l) It be U*So .policy to accept nothing short of a military

victory in Indo~China* . -

(2) It be the U e S« position to obtain French support of thi

*

position; and that failing this,, the tUS* actively oppose any

s

negotiated settlement in I-dc-China at Geneva©

flfthe Department or State representative rcccv^ends the deletion of paragraphs A and B hereunder as being redundant and included in other documents*

Hl:Q

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number. NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

8C0I2 SK&Ui&H

- '■ (3) It/be the U t S* position in event of failure of (2) above to initiate irii'.iediate steps with tho governments of the Associated States aimed toward the continuation of the war in *I neb-Chip a; to include active U 6 So participation and vithout French support should that

be necessary p

(10 Regardless of whether or not the U d S* is successful in obtaining "French support for the active IKS* participation called for in (3) above-; every effort should be made to undertake this active participation'in concert with other interested nations;»

*

B* The Special Coirauittee also considers that all possible political and economic pressure on France must be exerted as the obvious initial course of action to reinforce the French vill to continue operatings in Indo*-China 3 The

■i

Special Corr^dttee recognizes that this course of action v/ill jeopardise th

■ e

existing French Cabinet; may be unpopular among the French public; and may be

considered as endangering present U*S<j policy *ath respect to EBC* The Committee

t nevertheless considers that the free world strategic position; not only in

Southeast Asia but in Europe and the Middle East as well; is such as to require

■

the most extraordinary efforts to prevent Gosnnmnist domination of Southeast

• • •

Asia 0 The Committee considers that firm and resolute action now in this regard

9 *

may well be the key to a solution of the entire problem posed by France n the free world coirciunity of nations,

r

C* In order to make the maximum contribution to free world strong>n in

Southeast Asia; and regardless of the outcome of military operations current!;

iy

in progress in Indochina; the U«S» should; in all prudence; take the following courses of action in addition to those set forth in IISC $\&$ and in Part I of

■

the Sp2ci?i C0y-.7i.ttee report:

0

rT 1 ~(T'\ D' <sjV ^ J p k r 1 ?

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number. NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

r JTW>I<? rm^MiO

. *

Political and Military; . \ . ...

(1) Ensure that there bo initiated no cease-fire in Xncb-China

■

prior to victory whether that be by successful military action or clear concession of defeat by the Coriirivnists* Action: State, CIA

(2) Extraordinary and unilateral; as veil as jru?lti~ national^ efforts should bo undertaken to give vitality in Southeast Asia to the concept that Communist imperialism*is a transcending threat to each of the Southeast Asian states* These efforts should be so

*

Undertaken as to appear through Xccal initiative rather than as a

> *

result of U*S-> or UK, or French instigation^

*

Action; USIA, State, CIA

(3) It should be U*S* policy to develop vithin the U1I charter a Far Eastern regional arrangement subscribed and underwritten by the

major European povers with interests in the Pacific^

* *

a* Full accomplishmonfc of such an arrangement can only be developed in the long term and should therefore be preceded by the development^ through indigenous sources, of regional economic and cultural agreements between the'several Southeast Asian countries and later tilth Japan» Such agreements right take a form similar to that of the OEEC in Europe t Action:■ State, CIA, FOA

b* Upon the basis of such agreementsj the U«S* should actively but unobtrusively seek thsdr expansion into imitual

* ■

defense agreements and should for this purpose be prepared to underwrite such agreements with ralitary and econonic aid and should

i

*V* m*J — •_

hSJj a . f-J) l*?* 5>W Li kk Jl

t

j

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

?r?n\r3 co ^ t\ - i^ R 1 c fr

be filing to become a signatory to such agreements upon invitation, as

in Korea; Japan, the Philippines, and For,v.osa 3

Action: State, Defense^ CIA ■ ■ ■'

i

t««a^|ra*"r^

working t

Co As an immediate move in this direction* the U C S« -* hrough indigenous channels *» should sponsor the negotiation

of a

mutual defense treaty directed against Co;:vmnist aggression

between the several states of Indo-China and Thailand, and particu-larly between Cambodia and Thailand 0

m *

Action: CIA, Defense, State

(k) The tUS* should undertake the immediate organization vithin

the several states of Southeast Asia of an increased number of military

■

units, including guerrilla and paramilitary organisations, as well as anti-subversion police forces© In.particular? this should be accomplished in Thailand and if possible in Indonesia and Burma* This should include the establishment of U»S.« military missions through the assignment of U.S« officers who might, where necessary, serve on a contract basis vdth local military forces v In addition, the U*S B

should stand ready to offer such assistance in Malaya as the UK

*

may require/

Action: State, Defense, CIA

■

($) The U 0 S. should take the initiative in establishing an International Volunteer Air Group to be used in Indo-China and elsewhere as required-) In addition, the U*S* should consider the advisability of establishing an International Volunteer Corp of ground forces for use in Southeast Asia? So long as the French retain the major responsibility for rrilitary operations, such

^

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By; NW'D Date: 2011

■n

tOP. SKOKEl

forces should only be utilized with French eoitsen

Actipm Defense^ CIA

(6), The U 0 Sc should support when appropriate any Asian-inspi rod

development of regional or area organisations; bonferencesj and

« agreements and should seek unobtrusively to promote such inter"Asian

rapport»

Action: State, U3IA, CIA. FGAj Defense

(7) Kith respect to Malayaj Burmaj and Thailand ; the U«S* should

seek UK agreement to measures designed to ensure the retention of

these areas in the free vorlcU A statement that any change in the

present security status of these areas would be considered a

fundamental threat to US^UK interests in the area might be appropriate

Action ; Defense, State-; CIAj USIA

(8) The U e S e should^ largely/ through covert means., take steps)

s

a 0 To promote and support energetic^ able and honest indigenous anti-Coirauni st leaders in Southeast Asia in order to provide more effective government in the area*

b© To exploit opportunities to strengthen v;ostern-oriented anti^Communist political parties and other influential indigenous groups in Southeast Asia* Action: CIA

t

Economic

(l) The Uj,S<s should be prepared^ as in Koreaj to underv.Tito the

i

economic potential of the Associated States in the event of a satisfactory

solution in that area? A statement to this effect at the present tirr.e Blight have a favorable effect en the Geneva Conference*

Action; State, FOA

— — - —

)C

CO

3

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

XWT.Sft.^*^ n

.* *

(2) The U a S# should affirmatively attack the economic problems

■ *

that grow out of the instability of demand for primary products (such

as

rice j tin, oil; ete«) in ths area^ and should give najor attention

*to the development of mutually desirable economic programs and assistance as befofeszi the Up§ 9 and Southeast Asia** Action; FOA* State* Dpisimeroe

•—•— -»—i—* *

(3) Technical programs^ particularly those designed to achieve

improvement in agricultural skilled and serni.-skilled labor ^ should

be stopped up 0 Leadership progransj however useful; cannot alone overcome; the deficiencies in these areas©

a

Action: Stats, FOA

(h) Capital investment associated v.dth indigenous interests in the area should be encouraged© This includes the establishment of:

■r

a c A climate of opinion in the countries concerned favorable

• I r

to foreign investment«

b 6 The establishment by treaty of the rights and obligations

*—»

of UcSo investors in the countries*

Cg The creation in the U ft S c through a system of guarantees

of adequate .and attractive investment opportunities*

Action ; State;. Consaeroe. F0A- Treasury^

-. -

(5) The ExporUXnport Bank and the Inter national Bank should be

encouraged to extend loans to Southeast Asia for economic development

* Action: State> FOA

(6) The UcSo should discreetly pror.ote reasonable reparations settlements betvraen Japan and Southeast Asian countries.

Action

Stat*

.-_-♦.

KJ D *f

' it 3 }f*\ n> c< s ■?' \< v p> r? •>

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number. NND 63316. By; NWD Date: 2011

%0& ^^i^^

_«; * -

h

* 0

The courses of action outlined above arc considered as mandatory

regardless of the outcosne of military operations in Indo--Chinao

(l) If Indo-China is held they are needed to build up strength ami resistance to Communism in the entire area©

(?) If Tndo: .Cbana is lost they are essential as partial steps:

■

a's To delay as long as possible the extcntion of Communist

u

domination throughout the Far East; or

he In conjunction with offensive operations to retake Indo-* *~*

China from the Coi.rcunistso

(3) Should Indo-China be lost; it is clear to the Special Cosmttc

■

that the involvement of U v Sv resources cither in an attempt to stop the further spread of Coimrainisra in the Far East; (which is bound, except in terras of the most extensive military and political effort, to be futile) or to initiate offensive operations to retake and reorient Indo-China; (which would involve a major military eanpaign), will greatly exceed those needed to hold Indo-China before it falls© * I

(h) Furthermore,, either of these undertakings (in the light of the major setback to V C S 0 national policy involved in the loss of Indo-China) would entail as an urgent prerequisite the restoration of Asian morale and confidence in U©S© policy which vail have reached an ,

unpreced.ented.ly low level in the area©

(S>) Eaeh of these courses.of action would involve greater r5.sk of war with CoKSHunist China,, and possibly the Soviet Union, than timely preventive act5.on taken under more favorable circumstances before Indo-China is lesta

^ U K"

ODD

tm swcr]

• -

• -

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By; NWD Date: 2011

ttftP. umUU'i;

5 April 1954

•

Proposecl Implementing Procedures for the Establish £ of a Southeast Asian Regional Concept

. 1, In considering various laethods by which a pro loot to develop

re jJoj-^L fi V-1 :• v. ^ ,-j fJ; 5 rt y

a reasonable undors*&nd£ng in Southeast Asia Might be undertekrr^, it

*

appears th&tj in any case, considerable time may elapse before an effective organization nay be developed* However j it does appear that a preliminary survey should be made by the individual appointed by the President for the development of this project, For initiation of this preliminary phase it is believed that the procedure outlined in the following paragraphs should be undertaken e

2. The President should appoint an individual of international standing as a special and personal representative of the President, Such an appointment > during the preliminary phase, should not be limited to

■

any specific assignment. This individual should not be 'classified

m

■ *

as a "roving Ambassador 11 but he should have anbassadoral rank.

3# Having appointed this individual, the President should immediately

■

and, publicly request this special representative to undertake a survey

of Southeast Asia for the purpose of making a detailed report on con- j

* ditions and problems directly to the President, This report to form t.G

basis for further development of the regional arrangement among Southeast

Asian States.

■ *

4t The special representative should have no other official assign-

i -inent and should be relieved of any duties vhich would tend to restrict

■

his interests to any one country or particular area.

5. The President's special reorcsfentative should be emoovered to *

enter

■into discussions with all U.S. military .and civilian of^icir.lsjln

O-JO r-zy I'o. .?— CVLJu

copies* Series

■

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

■

I the area and with the chiefs of state of the several Southeast Asian • countries. Ho should go to Formosa, the Failippinesj Thailand, the

Associated Sfiotesj lalaya, and Indonesia* Thereafter 7 he should probably

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also pa to Korea and Japan, It is not thought that the* special represen-tative should £o to Basse except upon receipt of a specific invitation fron the Burmese government.*

6, The special representative should enter into any discussions with the governments of Southeast Asia through the respective Ambassadors and any arrangements made with those governments should be consulted

by the Ambassadors or by the government itself,

*

7« It should be the publicly announced mission of the special representative to undertake a fact-finding mission. He should not himself

■ publicly .interfere or intercede in the continuing relations by the U # S,

and the Southeast Asian countries or among the several Southeast Asian states themselves. ?

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8, On the contrary, the special representative should act only as a catalytic agent and should offer to assist in the solution of problem areas by appropriate intercession in the U.S. For this purpose, the special representative should initially be based in the U.S. although for his initial survev he may v/isb to establish an advance headquarters irith a small staff in some appropriate Southeast Asian country,

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9* It should also be the mission of the special representative to

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seek an expansion of bilateral and multilateral agreements between the several Southeast Asian states such as those already established between

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Cambodia and Laos and between Thailand and Viet Earn*

10. Initial agreements nay probably best be obtained in the field*

of economic or cultural agreements j crStjusc arrai lents should initially

be secondary.

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' 11, The special representative should, of course, report throu-h he Department of St.^te but should specifically have access to all departments of government for the purpose of expediting the solution of any probieuis in vhich the 0,S, may contribute to the achievenent of

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better regional understanding and association among the Southeast Asian countries, •

12. Upon the completion of his initial survey, the special repre-

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sentative should return to the U.S. for the purpose of-making record sneta-

tions to the President and to secure the implementation of recommendations developed during the survey.

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As I personally explained to Ely in presence of Radford, it is not (rpt not) possible for US to commit belligerent acts in

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Indochina without full political under shading with France ana tit other q countries/ In addition, Congressional action would be required,

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After conference at highest level, 127111s': confirm this position. '" wt

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US is doing everything possible as indicated my 517o to prepare public/ 4 * *"■

Congressional and Constitutional basis for united action in Indochina,

However, such action is. impossible except on coalition basis with

active British Commonwealth participation. Meanwhile US prepared,

as has been demonstrated, to do mc everything short of belligerency.

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British Commonwealth interests in Malaya, Australia and New Zealand.

This matter now under discussion with UK at highest level.

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I!0: 5729* April 5, 8 p.m.

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.1 delivered message DBPTEL 3^82 to Bi&ault Monday evening. • He asked me to tell Secretary that he personally could well understand position US Government and would pass on your answer to laniel.

He asked me to say once more that unfortunately the time for formulating coalitions has passed as the fate of Indochina will be "decided in the next ten days at Dien-Bien-Fhu, As I lef" he said that even though French must fight alone they would continue fighting and he prayed God they would be successful.

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6 April 1954

TAD Q

ITEM 1 (For Consideration)

POSSIBLE U» S. INTERVENTION IN INDO-CKINA

(NSC Action 1074-a)

*

PROBLE M

1. To consider and make recommendations to the President on appropriate action regarding Indo-China and on the need for U.S. military intervention.

SUMMARY

2. The paper consists of a brief report from the Planning Board and an annex which analyzes alternative forms of U.S. intervention. The annex is summarised in TAB A:*

3. The report stales there are four issues to be decided by the Council These are:

a. Will Indo-China be lost unless the U.S. commits combat forces?

This involves several specific questions:

(1) Is the military situation critical? (The report says not yet but that it is deteriorating.)

(2) Are the French likely to negotiate an unsatisfactory settlement at Geneva unless the U.S. is prepared to intervene? (The report says this is uncertain.)

(3) Have we exhausted all practicable political and diplomatic measures to encourage the French to live up to their commitments?

(The report says the U.S. should make a maximum diplomatic effort to cause the French and Associated States to continue to fight to a successful conclusion.)

b. What are the risks, requirements, and consequen ces of alternative forms of U.S. military intervention? ■

(See the annex or TAB A - The alternatives, to be valid, involve assumptions: either the French and Associated States both will invite U.S. military intervention or the Associated States will issue the invitation alone if the French intend to withdraw. The annex also discusses the question of use of nuclear weapons.)

£. Should the U.S. intervene rather than lose Indo-China and if so on which alternative?

(The risks of intervention are high, but the loss of Indo-China would result probably in, at least, the loss of South East Asia. A regional grouping (Altern. B) would bring Asian allies to help fight and thus be good, although it would require time and a need to give defense commitments and assurances that intervention is not intended to overthrow

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Communist China. A UN action is not desirable. Unilateral intervention (Alterns. A or C) might be politically difficult at home and abroad.)

d. When and under what circumstances should the decision to inter-

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vene be taken and carried into effect?

(The report says - par, 7-_c, page 7 - "on balance, it appears that the U.S. should now reach a decision whether or not to intervene with combat forces, if that is necessary to save Indo-China from Communist control and, tentatively, the form and condition of such intervention." The real issue , however, in light of the French request for urgent help at Dien Bien Phu, is that the Council must decide whether it is essential to intervene now with little or no time to (1) work out arrangements with the French (including acceptance of conditions, command arrangements, etc.), (2) condition public and Congressional opinion - intervention may involve our drafting men for Indo-China where the French have never yet sent a conscript - and (3) try to prepare a regional type arrangement. Decision to act later may take care of these difficulties but might come too late to save Dien Bien Phu.)

COMMENTS

A. In reaching any decision the Council should affirmatively decide that regardless of the numbers or types of U.S. military forces initially involved once the U.S. physically intervenes we mus t be prepared to expend whatever resources are necessary to secure vict ory. Involved are increased risks of Chinese Communist intervention or general war, steps to prepare the U.S. to meet these increased risks, and reversal of plans to reduce the size of U.S. armed forces.

5. The views of the Service Secretaries and the Joint Chiefs of Staff should be available at the Armed Forces Policy Council meeting at 11:30 a.m., 6 April. |

6. [An associated problem is that the U.S. has accepted an invitation

to meet with the French on 12 April 1954 to exchange views on Indo-China, preparatory to the Geneva Conference, It is important that the U,S. representation at this meeting be at a high level (at least Mr, Robertson), with Department of Defense representation,]

RECOMMENDATIONS

7. It is recommended that you: ' i

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a^ Agree that the U.S. must intervene if necessary to avoid th*s loss of Indo-China, but advocate that no steps be left untaken to get tl French to achieve a successful conclusion of the war on their own*

b. Support Alternative B (regional grouping with maximum Asian participation) as the best of the alternatives for intervention, subject to

discussion in the AFPC.

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c. Base your decision as to whether immediate intervention at Dien Bien'thu should be approved on the results of discussion in the AFPC,

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TOP. SEC I

SUMMARY OF PLANNING BOARD ANNEX TO ITS REPORT ENTITLED, "NSC ACTION NO. 1074-a"

1, Problem : To assess risks, requirements, and consequences of alternate forms of US military intervention in Indochina, The objective of intervention is, in the absence of overt Chinese Communist intervention, destruction of or-ganized Vict Minh forces by military action.

2. Nuclear x^eapons : Nuclear weapons will be available for use as require by the tactical situation and as approved by the President. Estimated force requirements contained in this paper are based on assumption of such availability.

3- Alternative A : Commitment of US forces in concert with the Frenc h.

a - Mil itary re quir ements : Assuming military situation is approximately as at present, US military requirements would be:

(1) Ground Force s: None, provided that French Union forces afford adequate security for the forces in Indochina,

(2) - Naval Forces : 1 Carrier Task Group, plus additional support-

ing units.

(3) Air Forces : 1 fighter wing, 1 light bomber-wing, 1 troop carrier, 1 tactical control squadron, 1 tactical reconnaissance squadron.

b. Logistic requirements : Case I can be logistically supported without particular difficulty. As the training of Indigenous forces is crucial to the success of this operation, the US must be prepared to support a training program for 330,000 Indigenous troops, an increase of 100,000 over present forces.

c. Political aspects : The French would prefer a solution which did not involve US military participation, but would not seriously oppose same. The Associated States would welcome US intervention if given appropriate security guarantees. The Free World would generally support this action.

d. Free World reaction to US tactical use of nuclear weapons: Our Allies would probably disapprove if nuclear weapons were used without their being consulted, but if consulted would generally approve their use tactically ,

e. Soviet_b>lo c reaction : Generally Soviet reaction would be the same as though the US were assuming unilateral responsibility. The chances < e about even that in this situation Communist China would decide upon overt intervention rather than accept the defeat of Viet Minh, If US use of nuclear weapons should lead to impending Viet Minh defeat, chances are better than even that th^ Chinese Communist would not openly intervene,

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f. Foreign aid considerations : Military assistance would continue at approximately current rates: i.e., FY-54, $800 million; FY-55, §1130 million. Economic assistance would be substantially Increased ovei" present rate of $25 million per year-

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4. Alternative B : In concert: with the French and others ,

a. Mili t a ry re quirement s : Same as In Case 1, although allied air or naval forces might substitute for US forces.

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b. Political aspects : While it might be possible to secure UN action for armed assistance to the Associated States, It would be difficult to stave off pressure for a negotiated settlement or UN mediation. It would be possible to develop a regional grouping with maximum Asian participation if it were clear that the US had decided to commit forces to the area. Franc would prefer a regional grouping to UN sponsored assistance. The Associated States would prefer UN sponsored assistance. The Frre World reaction would be somewhat more favorable to action as a part of a regional grouping than to US unilateral action,

c. Reaction to US use of nuclear weapons: Same as Case I,

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d. Soviet bloc reaction : Even though the US was participating as one of a regional group, the chances of overt Chinesr Communist aggression would remain substantial.

e. Foreign aid considerations : Expenditure would probably be greater than in Case I because the US would be called upon to support the forces of the additional participating states.

5. Alternativ e C: US acting in concert with others or alone.

a. Military requirements : Assuming no serious deterioration in the military situation prior to US take-over from the French of responsibility for military operations:

(1) Ground Forces : Indigenous forces of 330,000; 6 Infantry

and 1 Airborne Division of US or Allied troops, plus 275,000 support personnel.

(2) Air Forces : 1 Fighter Wing, 1 Light; Bomber Wing, 1 Troop Carrier (Wing), 2 Tactical Reconnaissance Squadrons, 1 Fighter Bomber Wing and 1 Tactical Control Squadron*

(3) Naval Forces: 1 Carrier Task Group, p l us additional mining and support units.

b. Logistic'implications : Case III can be supported without major logistical implications provided production schedules are maintained at approximately Korean War levels.

c * I mpact on US military programs : As this course would involve accepting an increased calculated risk of war with Communist China or c c general war, it would require a reversal of present policy planning to _e~ duce the size of the US armed forces.

d. Political aspects : French disassociatiou would enhance support for UN action or for a regional grouping. It would also end France's role as a major power. Most, of the Free World would support US intervention.

e. Soviet bloc reaction : Same as in Case II,

f. Foreign aid considerations : Same as in Case II, although savings in the US contribution Tor the support of French forces in Indochina would partially offset the greatly increased cost of US forces taking their place.

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SOUTHEAST ASIA - ALTERNATE POLICIES

1. General, The basic decision confronting the United States in Southeast Asia is whether to cut our losses in that area and to gradually withdraw our commitments with the least possible loss of prestige or to implement fully the provisions of a policy calculated to guarantee the retention of the area in the free world provided the U.S. is willing to take the full range of measures which are necessary to make its stated policy effective. If the U.S. is not willing to do the latter it may consider two possible alternatives to Communist control.

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2. Japanese Alternative . Recognizing the lack of decisive U.S. military objectives in Southeast Asia, the apathy of the indigenous people toward Communist encroachment, the improbability of any realistic Indian reaction to responsibility for Southeast Asia, to this end:

a. assure the Japanese Government of U.S. willingness to acquiesce in a Japanese sphere of influence in Southeast Asia provided they will cooperate in preventing Communist control of the remainder

of Southeast Asia by accelerating their rearmament program sufficiently to assume responsibilities there;

b. divert a considerable proportion of MDAP funds programmed for Indochina to an offshore procurement program for Japan for the production of ground force weapons for Japanese and other free Asian forces;

c. encourage maximum Japanese participation in organizations and programs designed to stimulate the economic growth of Southeast Asia.

3. I ndian Alternativ e. Recognizing the proximity of the Colombo powers in this region, stimulate, with U.S. support, Indian interest in and responsibility toward Southeast Asia, to this end:

a. ^assure the Indian Government of U.S. willingness to support an Indian area of moral influence in Southeast Asia, provided they will act to prevent Communist control of the remainder of Indochina;

b. utilize the Colombo economic development organization to stimulate the economic growth of Southeast Asia;

c. utilize to the maximum Indian officials in assisting and advising the indigenous governments.

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110: *K582 April 6, Jip-s.

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EYES OMLY FOR SECRETARY.

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C&a*i»US512 RtKS'dJ April 6, 1954 '11:04 a.m.

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In compliance with DEPTEL 5090^ I saw Eden this morning and made points referred to therein and embodied those in an Informal memorandum which I left with him* a copy of which is going forward to you by. do uch. ,-,-t

Eden had already seen President's letter to Prime Minister (HEPHBL 5179)- Eden stated questions covered would be \ m considered at highest .level as soon as possible and that in r ■ meantime he wished to say that he felt seriousness of military ' situation in Indochina hod boon exaggerated saying,, "French

cannot lose the war between now and the corning of the rainy * seasoq however badly they may conduct it/ 1 He will consult with Prism Minister, Cabinet and Joint Chiefs of Staff and -will let as know soonest'whether it is thought that you or ■ Bedell Smith might profitably come here prior to meeting in Pariso

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if£E&« Following are main points made by Secretary in conversation with Ambassadors Spender and Munro April (1) Situation in Franco is deteriorating and

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there is very real possibility that unless new clement

interjected into Indo-China situation French will seek

settlement at Geneva which will amount to a sell-out.

I (2) We see no prospect of negotiated settlement at

Geneva which does not boil down to one of following

alternatives: (a) a disguised surrender of the French or

Sfefebcs ">; retreat (b) a disguised/ :rwi:r; of the Communists* V/e have

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carefully studied other possibilities including division of Indo-Chlna and consider them impracticable* f

(3) In our view required new element in situation should

be creation before Geneva of an ad hoc coalition of

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effort Proposal presupposes continuation of Stench military/in

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Indo-China. US is prepared to contribute and play its

xP^th part in such a comvion effort*

(4) Secretary stressed attitude of UK, Australia,

and Hew Zealand, particularly former$ was ) * to problem

and V/ith passage of time danger would increase i uiS/bz capacity

for united action would be induced. It v/oulfi be difficul

if to hold unity of free world rr.i'r we waited until danger

was at our very doorstep* If danger not recognised by

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United Kingdom and Qoaaaon&ealthj whioil £& much closer to

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it than we are, we cannot move*

f';(5)Matter would at. some time be laid before UN with view to broadening support as much as possible. Howev

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coalition we had in mind was indispensable and we could not count on UN for effective action. :

^(6) (3") We believe action by coalition would not lead to Chinese intervention* However, if this happened we would

all consult*

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Spender referred to Austrlian election Way 29 and

obviously' feared interjection of issue in campaign

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However, he personally felt action should be taken if we.

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Munro referred to New JSeeiaiici commitments in Middle

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East which would need to bo changed and said attitude of United Kingdom v/ould be of greatest significance to his government *

In reply to Inquiry concerning expected Australian and Nov/ Z@EL.axid contribution Admiral Radford indicated Australian carrier and Hew Zealand naval effort comparable to what it had contributed in Korea, would be satisfactory*

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Ambassadors indicated they v/ould consult their g ove rame nt s inanedi at ely o

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For Peasleo: As Spender raised Australian election as possible difficulty*Merchant at Secretary T s direction today had supplemental talk with Spender suggesting matter might be manageable politically if Australians took Initiative and thereby gained credit as they had on creation of Anzus-i You may have opportunity plant same seed with Menaiejs or'Casey«

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For Peaslee and Scotten: Please folic?/ up urgently with Australian and New -Zealand governments at highest levels witl* vlev/ to early favorable response«

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It in sat po-ffjsiibla Siithis t!o p:-c t logistic e>1 &2& oporatUrol ■ e^ssgepast in Ssdooliina to rariva ftt a^ rer-xos^iblo ostiaato of ct-t to t&a fcit&fi Stntec of n-t.Tv.oj. re^irsismts for tho tear ia Sxid^Ghina* With c&33*s$*91 feroo gools^ crash rot^ir^snts for currcrt oil&tsrjr oporutior;^ Xao!: of Srsi/lQ&ga of French epsr&iiQSsi plastaj rad so:?ioii3 gaps in l^gistiosl, data^ th:t corrts. for FY 3i;£v: c^o i« ^ constcat at^bo of llta 0 T xr.i Air Forco SDi? gro£ : ^ for o^aal^ tAii<tb vaa origi: n.jy O0tir^tDd vd co:it Gpproxinat3i7 5S5 nillion dd'U^fl In ^ iQ5-i io 3-";:/ ovd? $!t00 7iii.l?.o: tI-Si hd 0224 in sigit cu ta fis^l oo^fc for tliio ficorC yo:r* Kio Av.:^ 1:^2* progrrzT ir. la tJao csco position xriih n pro^riTi of ^251 EiilliOB iTitU :i^t/ roc^xoDt3 $?o^&£d$s for eicoLiblo i^oro^oo^c Fo2* K ^.9Co^ r<? JiSjp ccot cstfesatoa ha^ b:=oxi d^valopsct cr ct& bo daroloppd until forco (fivln Ca?a fir::or P rac^ircsiaiats tad aswfes of nilitary o:.d it;;^B ■ ost:'.blir>oup r^ad ba^io por^^ivTi>l cost data Sstoraizsdo 5:ho2Q b^aio ?^64»3 nitst t3 ol»t:d": 5cl tron tho ft •-;..,.-;. , i to hzoo^s a b^nio for tlao -LMG tD porfo^a ito :.;Tj^r fi^iotlora of roTicTi;_g and &or©^sir:s r&$&l#9£!ga&a t3 fisv^lcp a fira pr^^rcn Ji^conc^ry for d^temini^ ^^> iogistiosl and fundtii^ r; %J.rcr3nt:u

Aft^r ro*^s:T of i&© i!\foiTi^tio:i Brs&Isbie to tho Corrtr^ 2o^:i In SMgaas it i*j rvcom^^^floci that th-> oost study p^apared by tha Deputy ^fci>^3 ^CTptT^llor I2rv-*opj ho ztzozp+^S. "/1th s^ioh iiodiiiQv.^io:-:; z.3 or-^i bo dstsH^ii^d as n result of \iio EMgoa visit by tfeo cost sta^- to:o Bteoo tlio cost Efculj v/o.g prcyvj.'^<3^ doyjlou/^^ts haT5 occurred ^h£eH v.-ill effect t5i3 eost 8t\icy e Spcolficolly thaco c.DTo3.o^::or 4 to era* (l) tlo p^B0:».r.2 5CD liillior. piaot;r Q8«5 nillion) iv>roa50 in tb.o cost of tri Cr^b^d5.rL i-Jllit^ry progjsa^ (2) tho ptoftidg ^iet of t:io Vict Secst t:^? ec!.T^r.oo (or ^robr-.blo ctlio;* pny ir^roass) ©Ovr.tatod i:^ bost £00 to 6CO ■nillicii pi^tsarn {'}2*5 « 05? nillion)j (q) t!i£ aoas» rao^d aoti*7?*tIo:i *;f cort^5.ii y^aoticd a:^d Tiefer^oss m-:d forego by th3 Fronch High Qzzzzz&4 m (rough ©strata fi?Q4-iO sUlioa)^ (&) tb.3 po^ible ij^lusioa of /porsonnsl cost CI54 CI55

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

costs of certain regional call tic; units in Associated States military budgets -of which the first installment is estimated at S6 million and (5) the additional costs of pacification of areas liberated by operation "Atlante" estiiB&t$.d at 200 million plasters ($5*1 million). Those developments plus adjusti its such as changes in force goals and con-sumption Rnd initial provisioning requirements where known should bo incorporated*in. the cost study* Kowe -, it should bri made clear that in revising the cost study eased on the known factors those areas more or less, tend to increase the estimate* It is estimated that there &ra many unkupwn areas that wouldj if kno^iij in all probability reduce the estimate considerably, With these revisions, the report of DC/E should bo accepted as the bsst possible estimate of cost of the Indochina military operations until such finis as the French and 2JAAG Saigon can provide improved experience factors and costs* Prom an overall standpoint* it should be noted that &AAG Saigon has no basis for do tor mining tho costs of the FY IS 54 and FY 19^5 HDA Program at**this time. The MAAG feels that until su<?h time as tho French inform thorn of future plans it is impossible to develop a costing of the FY 1954 and FY 1955 Indochina operations. Thus, any estimates contained in the FY 1955 Budget and Congressional presentations are illustrative only and in no way reflect what the costs for FY 1955 Y/ill bo,

BSHERAL RBGO fKMTLQBS A11D C :,1IT3: The MAAG must b3 given authority to review requisitions along the lino indicated in this report in order that they nay no longer merely act as a transmission agency for French requisitions•

*

' Y/hen and if the French provide the required logistical data ; the UAAG must make some* fundamental changes internally, designed to establish a system of supply control which will be geared toward the screening of requirements. This will necessitate a proper integration of the present record system with the needs of the screening and review process.

There is no question that requirements of the French and Associated States Bust be met, but the problem is one of providing sufficient equipment of the right type needed to support the military mission. Otherwisej both funds and effort will be dissipated and the military mission weakened by providing equipment in excess of requirements or not of a type that can be utilized* For ever.iple, 2094 rocket launchers 3*5" have been delivered along with 66,000 rounds of asHaunifion* and an additional 190,000 rounds programmed, which the French do not want or use. Without close liaison v/ith the French in the planning and logistical phases, which will enable the IiIAAG to have an understanding of future operations, assets, and requirements, there will be continuous problems of an unbalanced supply situation and inadequate data for U3 logistical and funding planning*

An improved system of inspection of end use of SjQtfJP equipment must be developed. At present the L1A.AG is permitted 30 inspections of units a month* The MAAG must give 60 days notice of proposed units to be inspected which necessitates assuming that specific units will be non—operational and at a given location 60 days in advance. Even when the schedule is approved by-the French, units to be inspected are mad© operational without notifications to the &AAG* who, upon arriving at the site find thgt inspections cannot bs accomplished because the unit was made operational* Hore freedom^" of choice of units to be inspected

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

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must be worked out with the Frendi* Because the £335 million dollar program includes pay sad subsistence of forces of the Associated States• this problem of inspection becomes an even more acute area^ since it is proposed that those units will to visited by the ISAAC at least once . a year to follow up on its imple©i3ntlition*

The major reasons for the lack of program information and logistical back up material within the I IMG are more or less a direct result of the following: ." . « '

The 1-ItA.G members have,, in the past., been expected to be experts in relation to rc^&remsnts for supplies sad equipment to logistieaHy support a war for which they have no part 5j\ the planning or execution* Hot only do they have no part in the planning but the plansj if any> which are prepared by the French are not made known to the II-iAG for the most part until after execution or on a crash basis. It is believed that the KAAG has made a valiant attest based on the limited information provided then to screen aid evaluate the requests for supplies and materiel in order to provide the necessary requirements to support the war* Due to the very limited justification presented with requisitioned it has in the past been incumbent upon the MMG to ask the French for additional information prior to recommending approval to Washington* An example of a reply from the French is shown in (Tabs A and Al)« The Commander-<Ln™ Chief of the French Forces^ General Navarre,, forwarded a letter (Tab B) to General Trapnell, Chief of the M&AG* wiiich resulted in a cable being forwarded from OSD Nash to the HAAG (Tab c)* As a result of the above correspondence and General Ravarre f s discussion of the situation here with visiting US officials who have given him the impression that all his requests will be granted, this attitude has filtered down tlirough General Kavarre's staff to the point that they feel that an official request for equipment or assistance from the French High Cosamand is sufficient justification^ and that their needs should not be put to question. The KiAG 5 as a net result^ has become to a great extent a transmission agency for requisitions for supplies and equipment except in those limited areas where MAG personnel are able to extract reasonable justification from the French* In many cases the KAAG has recommended disapproval of requests and the French have gone to higher authority and gained approval, A recent dispatch from* the #&AG to Headquarters U3AJF in connection with French requests for aircraft support is attached (Tab D) as an illustration of the difficulties under which MMG action is taken*

•

The following is a brief analysis of the problem areas and recommendations* It is believed that the following recommendations are

essentials if the US is to furnish logistically support for the ware in Indochina in a reasonably efficient and economical manner*

.JL

TORCB BASIS: Since the completion of the 6 February 19$k DCS cos study there have been a number of changes in Force Plan objectives of the Army* Navy aid Air Force* Some of the changes were under advisement at the tins of the 6 February report and in those cases where considered

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number. NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

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firm were included in the study. There are indications thao further changes ?re being considered by the French aasd/or Vietn §e Which have not yat bean officially cramJ&icated to the I&AG* For the most part obliges as of this date vill increase the cost estimates over those included in the original study al though th*y are relatively minor ifhon % cohered to ths- overall force levels..

The logistical irp^cations of thoae freqetent changes are in^ortant* For 62aqple 3 since it&d-^amiary 195H the Country Tessn has becooa arsaate of throe different plans for the build-up of Standard liifasstry Battalions and Light (Ehin Qocm) Battalions in the Vietnamese Army* These plana ?re siu: -■■■■; iscd as follower:

Tims Periods

Infantry Battalion (Stan* dard) (T/G PersbimaL s829)

Plan A Plan B Plan C

Ligjit Battalion (K.Q.) (T/0 Personnel: 6I.1O)

Plan A Plan B Plan G

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In being Doc'£3 86 Planned Dse'5>l> .86 Plawiad D3e>£5 66

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108

120

Flan As Officially sifedtted to KUG on ?S January 1?5U as basis for "logisTiefl planning* M&AG has subattted to JCS for approval. Probably in costing study bass..

Plan B z Unofficially subr,jittsd to M'iAG in sutraort of request for change in equipment programing on 2 March 19xu MAAG has requested official submission; request as yet uSaosveredt

Plan C; Learned of throurh inforiaal .sources on 2 April 19Sk

•

The equipment required by a light battalion is significantly different from that required by a standard infantry battalion. Shifts in planning of this magnitude over such short periods of time could , easily result in US finishing equipment of the vrong type for the missions of forces that Kill actually bo activated.

Attached is table P v:hich illustrates the utilization of assigned | aircraft. As you will note in the table of the total F-8-F aircraft assigned^ only 6$% are operational or projected to be operational at aay one tir.ie. Like ; ,<rise ; for the B-2o 5 only $$% of the total assigned aircraft are operational or projected to be operational at any one time*

RECOMMKKD.A.TIO-I: While it is recognised that a fluid situation requires

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changes in planning^ the necessity of keeping H&AG fully and promptly informed of chenges in thinking should be stressed to the French. Further^ force plans and T/Q's should be stabilized to the rasedEsaa extent permitted by the military situation as soon as possible in order to parrtiit orderly and effective logistical support, • .

REQUIPJS-S;?fS; The KAAG has available for the most part* tables of organisation and equipment for major 4rjny tactical units but they gr$

not available for most sector or static units* Where T/0:-3s are'

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

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" " P availab3Le initial requirements have oeen computed by the cost sway teaau The Air Force- and the Bavy have T/Ci-^s for a limited number, of units, but the H&AO does not accept t as firm en i to be a basis for rstfoireme&ts coaptations* The t/g^s available represent a small scg tt of the total materiel requirements. Sherefore,, the Army, Havy, and Air Force have been accepting retirements a© stated by the French except in those cases *;here sufficient information is available to modify the requests*

■

Table (l) attached is a cor.pprison of requirements and assets indicat-* ing the incomplets nature of the requirements data available to the EV&G* For some items such as rif3.esj heavy machine gun, 57r^i recoilless rifle, CO.vjn mortar*, all trucks*, armored cars M~3, personnel carriers half tracks and most si&nal equipment, the requirements are less than assets, as much as $0% is some cases* So data is available as to the basis for the requirements for the difference between the T/0&3s and the stated assets* Sirsilarly, it is impossible to determine whether there ere additional requirements for those end itmes inhere requirements exceed assets* t r ould all the require-beats be met if the apparent deficiency were funded? The HAAG is in no position to answer that question or to provide an answer as to the definitive requirements irhich Must still be met*

logistic and plsnning signed to General Nararre's staff in an advisoxy capacity in order to determine logistic requirements for projected prograsiiTiBd operations* If it is not possible to assign US personnel to the French Staff then it is imperative that the US logistic officers be kept inforstiad of the planned operations in order to effectively ar.i efficiently support those operations* Furthermore, the French and the MJL&G should meet and agree on approved T/Q&Es for ell units including tactical, sector and static unitsj and the H&AG must be advised immediately of changes or revisions to the approved T/0&3

'4. C

INVENTORIES: No firm information is available on actual inventory position

4, —» -• ,» _*

as ox any given date and actual deliveries from I3DAP are not knoun in m*ny areas• The Air Force, for example, does not have actual delivery informa*-tion on ISA? ai.LT.unition. This is due to such things as; (l) Ho manifest being forwarded pith shipments; (2) shipmate arriving and unloading ■without knowledge of M&&G., etc. Ho information is available as to Ereneh contributions of end itens or deliveries from off-shore procurement. The inventories ap submitted by the French for the-cost study Vary as much as $0$ plus or minus from the inventories contained in the KAAG records. *

As illustrated in Table 1, the status of inventories is not firm. The table corcpareD asset data as of 31 December 1953 available at the ' M8AG rath that presented by the French in their Paris report to DCS* There is no consistent pattern or explanation as to the variation existing at^een the tvio ssts of stated assets,, -since for sor^e items such as the carbine and 8linm mortar the KiAG assets are "double those stated by the French, vhile for the rifle and light machine gun 5 for exsraple, the French indicate assets double those stated by the KAAG* It should be recognised that the IfflAG do not provide for combat losses or for OSP snd indigenous financed shipments of evA itsus to Indochina* This table indicates that vithout the collets knowledge

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3,3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By; NWD Date: 2011

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**

ox assatsj tho H&itG nay apprpvs end item requests to$ag& on their liiiitod asset date ^^o?i in roality they nay to in long supply, or vice versa,

A further complication to the end item inventory prohlea is CM>»iainod in tho Ke^orsaadraa of Understanding "tas-tveon the US .end tie Franc*! raith relation to the §5&5 million aid progsua to the Associated SJA^es* S'ho I&i&oran&Tn posits esg^nditqros for axscaeKurij notosiaod egmWontj O'acssufiieatitfas o<£Uipia§nt : and ©nginsering equipment for the A soeiated States out of tie 038? nillion. It is Wdjs&tod that o?0 million v£ll>? lor uateriolj vhieh vdll not bo controlled oj the M-/.Go thus, if tho I'AiG rejects a request for 2IDAP end item &id$ there is nothing to prevent tho ASS0CXAS&& States froa procuring that it on out of tho S32f> million program, FlBTHernoroj tho K\&G trouXd bavs* if tho present r.tato of logistical ooBjfusioa continues* no information as to the natericl on order from the 038;} udllion or that which is stocked as a result of tho 6385 Billion.

KBCCgSi?gfMfI03*Sj Fho 1L1AG imaadiaiely bxiag their racoreds un -fco data in relation to r&&& equipment and supplies havo actually been shipped to Indochina under all programs and vhat is planned to ho shipped by data* this isill necessitate complete cooperation of all Department of 3)e£enso agencies in the US and Fre.no e T/ith I1AAG Saigdn, . „

A request he nade to tho French to furnish to the HAAQ all biov;n assets^ including nateriel from Francs ; off-shore procurement and materiel to ho procured from tho ?385 Million Associated States aid progress * ffihoso stated assets^ in turn- must be reconciled with the 1£AA0 records in order to proYido a firm basis for computing future requirements.

QOnsmSWIGBs The latest information evailablc to the 21AAG on actual Ariay consumption la contained in a French report elated April 1933 for the calendar year 1952 ¥/hich does not take account of the major increased effort since that period 0 7/hen consumption information is furnished to the IIAAG it is usually on a crash basis for tho purpose of justifying air lift of additional supplies. Jfeperieneo has 0hown that the French are requesting Material on a crash "basis v/hon they actually have sufficient Quantities in their ovm depots hut say it is nuch easier to have tho US air lift additional quantities than to redistribute the nateriol withjfn Indochina. S&ia io particularly true in the case of ammunition, Sossstiins during the month of April! the French Bill vx :ait another list of consumption factors^ hut these v/ill he based on CY 1953 and ^.rill not refloct the full impact of the ITavarro Plr;n or the present fighting at Dion Bien P!hu.

* RSC0;.i'x;r.av?I0:f: Tha'o -the French "b 5 rea.uss-tcd to provide crcoari encricl conru;.iption retss on all typos of ©quipnent and eitpi^lics on a monthly recurring hoieia, or- v/hatevor hasis is reasonahle iTithin their capahility.

STOCK J^v73LS « 0?3?A^XonAL F3S^SV^; Inasmuch as the assets, consv- .tion and r^coiptu a:oe tiore or less urJcnov^nj it is not possible for tha 3IAAG to determine Y/hat ute^S: levels; or opei^.tie:ial irznovyvz vrra being maintained in depots, r.er the s*ao«nt of r.erviceablo and reparable equipment in depot z^ or th'j arioimt of equipment in the hands of troops, There are

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

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a'fov,' escoptions to thiSj euoh as army r.v ■ nuiition, r&aro monthly reports ■ a:ee Eu&aittod by the French on stoolc lowla and consumption* Eo*£*3lrer$ tho stack lovolr- for tho "bull: of tho sjttpplioa and eqtdpfltont cannot bo dotossainsd jcr reconciled to any opsoifio levels £hc SXL4G in their ccnt&ont on ths corjt study stated that tho Pronoh Dust have/art least a aix-^o&ih atooS: l©YOl of cvLpplieru in the thsator« However, the }?MQ was unable to state in ^pacific tortus v/hat actually constituted a Bi: &&nth Icrol o?? tthkt constitutes any militarily satisfactory lorol fore- Indochina* % .

lij tho stray asnsunition area; as noted in fable II; if tho current high consumption rates continue a a ohortaga of 60 et-i raortar shells and 105 ^a howitzer shells aill occur, while prscont IDl'JP progregsssing mil result ±-& an oYorsupply of 30 calibaS carbina cartridges^ 57 bkm rifle sheila, and 15; hovTitaar shells* ITith available consu option data 5 rough ro^nlre&antg can bo developed to s-oarco as & has is for logi&tioal planning to provent tho orach approach that has bson nocossary recently. Yrhile soise oon&idoration laust bo given to tho UkLG position that lacking data on the opor&tional plana of tho X^conch, it io impossible to stats what constitutor a definitive operational lov:l 5 estimates for planning purposes ara ncoossary and can be &ado has 3d on tho ava5,lablo consumption date

%

Stj 1 1

aOOCasaK^paSi Sho French should bo requested to furnish the HUG tho qiiantity and location of stock levels v&A operational icosorvoa currently iiaintainod by typo of ooiuprioiit and supply and v/hat is projected*

5?ho levels of supply required in Xndoohina arodopohdont on the extont of logistical back-up outsido tho theater, the capabilities of tha l©gia-« fical organisation in Indochina end such othor factors a# transportation rvnd ooi3iunioation faoilitios \?ithin tho thsator* It is rocor.^-ondid that ^u^lifiod losistical porsonaol bo aspignod to nako ?, study of tho logistical mipport situation in Indochina in o3?dor to determine v/liat IotoIo a:ca reciui^od in tho thoator to support tho operation*

MPagABT P^S0MI?4 COSggs fho^ is ineufficiont information cvailcOao from Asio-ric&n eotircso'"in Sivigon to ralidato oitlior tho Pr^xich or DC/s ostimston of pay end allot^tneosj 3io:e in thoro a rovisod porsonnol plcn available to f;hov; tho of foot of rooont changes in foroo gooilo on the pareonnol buildup* Kabaosy^and S5EHCI &oun»ds c&nsidor a pay incroarjo for ABsooiatsd States military porsojmol r, diotinot probability cost likoly taking tho form of non**3Eop&y&ont of tho anniusi STou Toar'o (i7/i) adYaaco of ono nonth'o tj?,v* Avoraga pay data inibgni-ttdd to rf 3>C/E in faris indicatos IPronoh 032?3otaMon of a 20^ pay inoroano £02? those Associatod States porsonnol as \70ll an indig^ous porooinol v^lth S*ronoh £V>£ooa by c^i of caiord^r 1955$ although * tMfj van not inoludod in tho bud^ot* S^.ch information as is available 021 food and oXothing poltita to cono i\p;;^rd rwioion of tho DO/S ©stiH^to* ^

i Kiat the Pronoh b^ roquo.etod to fitsniBh rOTiood p3afooir::ol plans chowlnj: tbo pliaood build—i@ co it rolatos to latest foroa objootivoa,

2* Shat in ordor to validate ostiisatos of food costs, tho French bo •

rociioctcd to ^r/ovic'.os

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 NND Project Number; NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

(a) Host recent data on aToragia coal; of food p$y men for both Sroaoh and Associated" States Forces, by norvico*

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. (b) Lists of tho-'£uc^titiG3 and kinds of food in th authorised nation fotf (l) Fronob Steocoa (2) A»8 Fo:?c?3 and (3) any iiajor ?oedjL&£ group's (such an supplotiTos) v.Mch era furnishoft a'sapasato ration* the Itsts should indicate those iteos procured locally ami thoso in nvrtropolitan Frazioaj and the current psdeos boi&s paid for each*

(c) Latent available inventory position rnA explanation "of basis for ©took levels iaaintair.odo

(d) ]3ata on unit cost, consumption abates and inTcntory status of any special or operational rations usod*

3* Por ootimates of clothing costa, th© French should bo yeqtuestc to provicLoi " -

(a.) A general eirplanation of the nyrton or systems used "by each service in providing olothing to (l) P^oaoh Porcos and (?.) Assooiatod States ForoftBj including the sigalfloanod| if any, of doploynont on clothing requirements*

*

(h) A list of the items and quantities of clothing

furnished iadiTiduals upon entry into the stjrTico, and the value'of this initial outfit ("by service)*

(c) Latest available data as to annual clothing 3*aplaoo« wont costs per &an, (i#o* consumption factors).

(d) Current inventory position and explanation of basic for stock levels aaiiitaiiiodt

4« Inaomuoh ts the US combined Group Saigon vdll have definite responsibilities in tho adainlstratioil of the S3S5 nillion aid program for the support of nilitary personnel of the Associated States, procedure!; should be set up to keep currently adTised of (a) changes in personnel plans as cha&gea are made in force plans, (b) progress made tov/ard meeting goals (or slippages) in force plans and personnel plans, (c) cj-rperience data on food and clothing consumption, prices^ and stock levels &s v/ell as (&) experienced ezependituro rates for pay and allowances,

IiOSSSS 55E0P&H CIU gggB US TOH BOJiIARS TO mSEBBSt The official rata of evchaiije is 35 piasters to the dollar, v/hilo the present purchasing poirov parity in Indochina is about 72 piasters to the dollar. It is apparent that for those items purchased locally, there is a.n average 50/o less of dollars as a result of the differences batvresn the exchange rate and the dollar piaster purchasing pcrcrar parity

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3,3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

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4. Should the Communists operate an air force from South China in sufficient strength to jeopardize French retention of the Tonkin delta, the resulting situation would warrant active consideration of implementation of appropriate actions as outlined in paragraph 31 of NSC 5405- If and when the introduction of Communist aircraft into the Indochina War appears imminent, the U.S. should initiate talks at a political level as set forth in NSC 5405 to provide for the implementation of the military actions outlined in paragraph 31 of NSC 5405.

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5. Although there is no reliable evidence to indicate that

Communist combat air units, POL, or other aviation supplies have been moved in strength to South China, this could be accomplished without too much difficulty. However, until there is some indication of such an enemy development, the Joint Chiefs of _Staff are of the opinion that any commitment which restricts or limits freedom of action by the United States would be premature and unwarranted. Accordingly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the reply to Mr. Pleven indicate that United States action in such a development would depend upon the circumstances.

6. The Joint Chiefs of Staff will acquaint Department of State Representatives with the substance of their views as expressed in this memorandum when the subject of Indochina is again discussed at a State-JCS meeting.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Signed

ARTHUR RADFORl), Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

TOPSEGIfci •

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

i

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

8 April 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject; U.S. Reaction to Chinese Communist

Introduction of Air Power in Indochina

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed a memorandum by Department of State Representatives, dated 12 March 1954, subject as above, tabled at the 12 March 1954 State-JCS meeting. In substance, this memorandum requested the Joint Chiefs of Staff to present their views on the military significance and implications of the following:

a. The appearance of, and Communist capability of maintaining and supplying, an air force using only airfields in Viet Nam or Laos in the face of French opposition.

b_. The appearance of, and Communist capability of mounting, an air force based principally on airfields in Communist China, and how large a force would be required to counter French defense capabilities*

In regard to subparagraph 1 ji, above, there are no indications that the Viet Minh currently possess an air force. Thereforej the appearance of combat aircraft in Minh would warrant the assumption that they were supplied by and operated from Communist China. It is estimated that the Communists, in the facje of current French capabilities, could not maintain and supply an air force operating exclusively from airfields in Viet Nam or Laos.

3. In regard to subparagraph 1 h_, above, the Communists have the capability of mounting a ersious air threat to the French with an airforce based principally in South Cina. The French air defense of the Indochina area is inadequate. Consequently, a Communist air force of from 100-200 aircraft (including jet bombers) could readily overcome French air strength in the Tonkin delta and severely affect other French strengths in Indochina.

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4. Should the Communists operate an air foxce from South China in sufficient strength to jeopardize French retention of the Tonkin delta, the resulting situation would warrant active consideration of implementation of appropriate action as outlined iri paragraph 31 of NSC 5405* If and when the introduction of Communist aircraft into the Indochina War appears imminent s the U.S. should initiate talks at a political level as set forth in NSC 5405 to provide for the implementation of the military actions outlined in paragraph 31 of NSC 5405.

5, Although there is no reliable evidence to indicate that Communist combat air units, POL, or other aviation supplies have been moved in strength to South China, this could be accomplished without too much difficulty. However, until there is some indication of such an enemy development, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion that any commitment which restricts or limits freedom of action by the United States would be premature and unwarranted. Accordingly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the reply to Mr. Pleven indicate that United States action in such a development would depend upon the circumstances,

6. The Joint Chiefs of Staff will acquaint Department of State Representatives with the substance of their views as expressed in this memorandum when the subject of Indochina is again discussed at a State-JCS meeting.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Signed

ARTHUR RADFORD, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

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In reply refer to I 11594

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT CUTLER

SUBJECT: The Aircraft Carrier ,r Belleau Wood"

1. On the 23rd of May, 1953, France requested the loan of an additional aircraft carrier for use in the Indochina theatre. They asked that the ship be turned over to them on 1 Octobrt. Accordingly, the President on 26 August, 1953, under the terras of P.L.188, 83d Congress, approved the loan of the "Belleau Wood" to France effective on or about 5 September, 1953,

2. The US Navy actually transferred the ship to the French on 5 September, 1953, but, owing to France's delay in supplying a full crew, she did not arrive in France until about 24 December, approximately two and one-half months later

than originally scheduled-

*

3* Latest reports indicate that the "Belleau Wood" was scheduled to sail from Toulon on 7 April, 1954, to begin her first tour in the Indochina theatre. Enroute she will deliver 32 French-built "Ouragon" jet aircraft to the Indian Air Force at Bombay. It is estimated that it will take her approximately one month to make the voyage from France to Indochina with a stop at Bombay to unload the jets. Furthermore, when she arrives in the Gulf of Tonkin she will relieve the carrier "Arromanche" which will return to France. MAAG Paris points out that if the Ouragon 1 s were unloaded and replaced by one and possibly two available Corsair squadrons it would be possible to keep both the "Belleau Wood" and the "Arromanche" in the Indochina combat. There is no indication, however, that the French Navy is considering such action.

4. The French government's sale of French-built jets to India is particularly interesting. At the same time these jets were being built, we have been delivering, as a part of our military assistance program for France which at the end of FY 1953 had exceeded a total of 3.8 billion dollars, US jets to France in order to help them meet their NATO force goals. (We have already given them more than 700 jets.)

5* In view of the current crisis in Indochina, the repeated frantic French requests for additional US aircraft, and the recent proposal by Pleven

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that the US provide a large carrier and aircraft of types familiar to French pilots for French air strikes in support of the Dien Bien Phu battle (see attached cable) it would appear that:

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a_. The French will have had the "Belleau Wood 11 a whole year without making use of her in the fight for Indochina,

b^. She is currently being used as a delivery wagon rather than as a combat vessel.

c^. Despite France's urgent need for additional fighter aircraft in NATO and in Indochina the French will manage to find time to build, sell and deliver 32 jets to India.

.Enclosures

1. Cable D/State to Paris, 3541 dtd 8Apr54,sgnd Dulles,Secret

2. Naval Mes 7048 dtd 061330s,Secret

3. Cable DA IN 49168 frm Paris dtd 3 Apr 54,Top Secret

4. Cpy Memo to Sec/Navy frm ASNA dtd 16Mar54, Secret

5. Cpy Memo to Sec/Navy frra AS0Air dtd 3Sept53,Restr. w/inel. cpy memo for Sec/Navy frm Sen•Buffner, dtd !Sept53, Conf.

C. H. Bonesteel, III Brigadier General,USA Defense Member NSC Planning Board

Prep:Col Black/isc/10Apr54/OASD(ISA) NSC/2E853/79349

Cpy #1-Mr. Cutler 2-R&C Files 3 & 4-0SD Files

5-SW0 Lewis, Comeback, 2B853

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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D«C. 20301

April 15, 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY THE SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: NSC Action No. 1086-a, b and _c

REFERENCE: Planning Board Report on NSC Action No. 1074~a,

dated 5 April 1954

1. At its meeting on 6 April 1954, the National Security Council agreed on the following, which has been subsequently approved by the President (NSC Action No. 1086-a, b and c):

a. Noted and discussed the reference report and postponed decision on tbe recommendation in paragraph 7-c_ thereof, but agreed that military and mobilization planning to be prepared for this contingency should be promptly initiated.

Agreed that the United States should direct its efforts prior to tbe Geneva Conference toward:

(1) Organizing a regional grouping, including initially the U.S., the U.K., France, the Associated States, Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, and the Philippines, for the defense of Southeast Asia against Communist efforts by any means to gain control of the countries in this area.

(2) Gaining British support for U.S. objectives in the Far East, in order to strengthen U.S. policies in the area.

(3) Pressing the French to accelerate the program for the independence of tbe Associated States,

c_. Noted the President's view that, if agreement for the organization of the above-mentioned regional grouping could be achieved Congressional authorization for U.S. participation therein should then be requested.

ihis document must not be reproduced without permission

of the originating office.

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2. The action set forth in paragraph 1-a above has been referred to the Secretary of Defense and the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization for appropriate implementation and was discussed at the Armed Forces Policy Council on 15 April 1954. The action in paragraph 1-b^ was referred to the Secretary of State,

3. It is requested that the Joint Chiefs of Staff promptly prepare the military plans involved under paragraph 1-a^ above. It is further requested that the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in close collaboration, under existing arrangements, with the Secretaries of the Military Departments and the Assistant Secretaries of Defense (Supply and Logistics), (Manpower and Personnel) and (Cpmptroller), promptly develop the supply, man-power and other requirements arising from these military plans which might affect production, manpower and budgetary planning by the Department of Defense and the Office of Defense Mobilization. This military planning and the development of requirements should cover not only specific intervention in Indochina, but also any augmentations in forces

or supplies required to permit the United States to maintain at present levels its present defense commitments and to be prudently prepared to face possible increased risks of (1) Chinese Communist intervention and (2) general war.

4. It is further requested that the Joint Chiefs of Staff report to my office on the above by 10 May 1954. If it has not been possible to complete the planning by that date, a progress report on 10 May 1954 is requested.

5. The Assistant Secretaries of Defense (Supply and Logistics) and (Manpower and Personnel) will collaborate with the Office of Defense Mobilization, as appropriate, in the preparation of production and manpower plans based upon and required to implement thp. military plans.

i 5. • Because of the security sensitivity of this planning, appropriate security precautions will be taken by all concerned.

/s/

C. E. WILSON

cc: ASD (Comptroller)

ASD (Manpower & Personnel). ASD (Supply & Logistics) ASD (ISA) Office of Special Operations

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Dear Alex:

April 15, 1954

This Department is becoming increasingly concerned regarding the lack of a U.S. position In preparation for the Indochina phase of the Conference to be held at Geneva. I fully appreciate the difficulties whichj up until this time, have made it very difficult to draft a position on Indochina. However, in- view of the short time remaining until the Conference convenes at Geneva, it is essential that consideration be given to the U.S. position.

It appears to me that ample guidance is available to provide the basis for an initial draft of a U.S. Government position on Indochina for Geneva. NSC 5405 as well as reports of the Special Committee set forth, in positive terms, U.S. policy with respect to Indochina and Southeast Asia. At the meetings of the Indochina Working Group the need for a U.S. position on Indochina has been discussed at considerable length, but to date no progress has been made. In order to initiate action on a draft position, the Defense representatives at the working level submitted an outline of views to the State members of the Indochina Working Group, A copy of this paper is attached for your information.

In view of the foregoing I strongly recommend that immediate action be taken to draft a U.S. position paper on Indochina for the Conference at Geneva, I would be glad to discuss this matter further at your convenience or at a meeting of the Assistant Secretaries.

Sincerely yours,

For the..Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) :

SIGNED

1 Attachment

Draft U.S. Position

on Indochina for Geneva

A. C. DAVIS Vice Admiral, USN Director, Office of Foreign Military Affairs

The Honorable U, Alexis Johnson

Coordinator, U.S. Delegation to Geneva Conference

Department of State

CASullivan/jg/14 Apr 54 OASD(ISA) 2E832 79271 1-11,691

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le ESC £IsO£j approved l6 SstLVtaxy 19>h $ continues to bo the policy of the United States Kith resssot to Southeast Asia*

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2. It is highly improbable that Ceraninlst Sgrosnent could bo obtained a negotiated cattle iont uhich ::onld to consistent v:ith bacie United States objectives in Eoutlioast Asia* (JCS :..;norcr.dv-v^ 12 '"arch l?5'-0 •

3« At Geneve.; the French Cover, at under continued ex ic pressure Kill favor a negotiated scttl^iont of the figxiting in Indochina at al-ost any price* .* - .

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Discussion

The French Covorrr:ont has "be-on \mdar considerable do^oetie prepare to tcr.rdr:at3 the hostilities in Indochina* in order to forestall a 3ho:;do;-;i3 prior to Genevaj M. Laniel^ in a public stateneixt^ proposed six points ac .conditions for a ceaae-fire in Indochina. Thooe c5zi points uoiild usqtf&s-ticii " ~y bo unacceptable to the Co:v:niists^ particularly if reinforced by addition:-! conditions to assure enforcement of tho arustica terra. I:o;;avar^ d: eatic pressure on ths French Oovornncnt to *c iato hostilities ic ex-

pected to increase dnrins tho cenroe of tho Geneva Coherence:,, rather then decrease* In viev: of this., it uould be c:ctro~oly difficult for the French Govarsrrant not to accept an agr&ensnt uhich ironld be lece than the conditions of tho la.nicl proposal* It should bo noted that although tho above f ac bora ssake it almost certain that tho Franch Government vill cod: a^ree^ent at Geneva at practically any price > there *hac boon no indication that this Vprice" has been considered realistically Vj tho Franch Govern::jnt or public.

Co::::mi^t tacticc at Geneva are likely to follow closely thoae tactics

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employed by CcrrlTrilat negotiators at Panama j on. Corvceniet intransigence rnd other tactics,, chert of actually brcaliin;- off negotiation:^ led tc pro-longed diecueeions t;hieh ^orhed to tha disadvantage of our side. As a result, the Korean A^ree-ant in its final for" produced an nrruetica bring' in ^ about a coaee-firo but idth uhich. it haa bean irroooaible to aasure Co'aianiat compliance* On tha other hand^ in Korea tha United Nations .en-rand if required to live up faithfully to tha tcr^a of tho amietice. It should be noted that this prohlen ;;onld bo considerably r>ore co:;plc;: and

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The Tapart^ant of Eafenae hec considered tho r^ilitar^' iiplication^ of taridnatin^ tne fi^htin^ i>i Indochina under conditions loac than a nilitary d;:fcat of oxs^nissd Viet ::inh forces.* It tfas tha conclusion of

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United States objectives in Southeast Asia, a continuation of fighting with the objective of seeking a military victory appears as the only alternative in Indochina. (JCS memorandum, TAB A).

Conclusions

If the Communists follow the same tactics they employed at Panmunjom, they will be prepared for a long and difficult negotiation. The French will find it almost impossible to withstand presures for a weakening of their position (the Laniel proposal) and will most likely give way under these pressures. Further, the French, once engaged in a negotiation, will of necessity be required to seek every possible means of settlement.

The United States should not join with the French in any Indochina negotiations at Geneva unless there is prior French commitment not to accept terms leading directly or indirectly to the loss of Indochina. This commitment should be positive and definite, for it would be difficult, if not impossible, for the United States to disassociate itself from the negotiations once they bad begun. Thus, if the negotiations result in a settlement leading to the ultimate loss of Indochina, the United States would have participated in this loss.

Recommendations

It is recommended that:

a. The United States adopt the position that it is highly improbable that the Communist agreement could be obtained to a negotiated settlement at Geneva which would be consistent with basic United States objectives in Southeast Asia;

b. The United States position for Geneva be positive and definite that we will agree to no settlement which would in any way compromise our objectives with respect to Southeast Asia;

c. The French Government be informed of the United States position (a and b above) at 'the earliest possible date;

d. Concurrently with informing the French of the United States position, consideration should also be given to the following pressures to be brought on the French if circumstances dictate:

(1) If France through one means or another countenances a Communist takeover in Indochina, it will mean far more than the end of France's position in the Far East. Rather it will be a public ex- . hibition of France's inability to carry on any longer as an equal member with the United States and the United Kingdom of the Big Three;

(2) The effect of abandonment would be so severe in North Africa as to have serious repercussions not only on the French position there, but also on the nature of the relationship between France and the United States in that area;

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(3) I££ the Indochina :;ar ends on tcr;:3 considered i^atisf<~3£ory by tbo United States^ cur dollar aid to France would^ or ccur;::^ automatically cease*

();) Beyond these pojL.ritj^_conei:si.<:<:i of negotiations P7 Pr^ni resulting in Con ittniet domination of Indochina^ an area of ektre-te strategic interest to the free worlds Kotild roeult in c: sqesnaes in Europe as veil as elsc&here v;hose ceriGU.5iio:;3 viould h£ft£ no pparent limitation.

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Cc If the French Government refuses to agree to the United States pc:ii< tic:^ the United States Government should not participate in the Indochina discussions at Cenova;

f* 5-he United States immediately detcrsnine whether in the event of (c) above^ ve should approach the Cbvernrpnts of the Associated States and ou^ allies tfith a vic;r to continuing the strusslo in Indochina either jo5^it3y

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FROM: Geneva *

TO: Secretary o:? Stats

HO: DU1.TS 5, April 25, midnight

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1 met with Eden this evening at 10:15 p.m., following his arrival -from London, He had consulted Churchill, the Cabinet and British chiefs. He said that the United Kingdom is strongly opposed to *%4 any intervention at Dien Bien Phu because it does not think it 01 ■ vrill have decisive effect and will not be understood by United ~-* Kingdom or free world opinion. He indicated that the views of ^.Q ' the British chiefs differ with ours and that British chiefs looks forward to a discussion and estimate with Radford in London, ln(j\ summary the British position is as follows: (l) The United Kingdom is prepared now to join with the United States in a cret study of measures which might be taken to defend Thailand and the rest of Southeast Asia if the French capitulate.

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Eden saw Bidault at Orly tonight on bis way through Paris (where Q] he stopped to pick up Mrs. Eden) and outlined, to him the British «> position as follows: (1) The United Kingdom will give the French all possible diplomatic support in Geneva to reach a satisfactory settlement on Indochina. (2) If such a settlement is reached the United Kingdom will be willing to join with United States and others in guaranteeing that settlement. (5) If fails the United Kingdom will be prepared to join the to examine the situation urgently" to see what should be

Geneva others done.

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I said to Eden that while I hacL reservations myself about air * intervention at Dien Bien Phu at this moment without an adequate political basis for such action, his r.eply was most discouraging in that it seemed to leave the French nothing to fall back on. If French are to stand loss of Dien Bien Phu they must be strengthened and a declaration of common intent would do this. In essence " the United Kingdom was asking the French to negotiate and at the

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same time telling them that if the negotiation failed that they -would be glad to examine what could be done. Given the present t/ Ereoch situation with which Eden is fully familiar, I said to * -Eden that I doubted that there would be French will to stand *\m

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intervention at Dien Bien Pbu and also opposed to becoming directly involved in any way with the Indocbinese war.

■

Referring to the rest of Southeast Asia, he said the British were confident that they had the situation in Malaya in hand and mentioned that they had 22 "battalions there and 100,000 native police. He said that there was no parallel between Indochina and Malaya. ~ ; # ■ , •]■

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Eden also showed me a map of Indochina prepared by Alexander and the British chiefs. The map indicates that virtually all of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia is under or subject to imminent control by the Viet Minh. The British believe that the only way to cope with the situation is to commit a strong force to the Hanoi delta and generally work outward concentrically consolidating their position as they go with loyal natives. This they believe is a "tremendous project involving lots of time and considerable forces." . •

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I said to Eden I felt the position which his Government had taken would have so little in it in way of comfort to the-French that the prospect of the latter standing firm here was very slight. It would be a tragedy not to take steps now which would prevent Indochina from being written off. "'-*-. -

Eden said that there was obviously a difference In the United States and the United Kingdom estimates and thinking but the United Kingdom proposals which he had outlined above vere as far as the British Government could go.

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DEPARTMENT EYES ONLY ACTING SECRETARY-PROP 1 SECRETARY 0

PARIS AND LONDON EYES 0NI.Y AMBASSADOR

at

met for about an hoar this afternoon with Eden and Bidault latter 1 s villa. Meeting was called at latter T s request . with no (repeat no) indication its purpose.

After some discussion procedural problems Indochina conference (reported separately) discussion turned to Bao Dai's declaration in Paris and current attitude, Bidault told us that he understands Bao Dai named as his personal representative and • observer a former member Ho Chi Minh f s cabinet but that Bidault has not (repeat not) been able to confirm observer's arrival at his station in Evian.

Bidault then launched into rather confused discussion of problem his government faces with regard to establishing position for Indochina negotiation which he said was extremely difficult during nrogress of Dion*BIen Phu battle. He touched

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lightly on'whole range of possibilities Including collective defensej cease-fire and partition. He mentioned further deterioration in political situation in Associated States.

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Eden picked up the question of cease-fire and encouraged fur ther discussion by Bidault this subject with cryptic remark that a month ago'British had felt cease-fire due to general |infiltration was dangerous but that now without having any '(clear view they were not (repeat not) so sure, I pointed i 1 that cease-fire at Dion Blen Phu locally would be in fact ! surrender and that cease-fire generally would Involve serious risk of native peoples l rising with resultant massacre-of

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-2- DULTK 9, April 26, 9 P-^o-, frdtn G: va.

general cease-fire lacking any-control or safeguards would make it impossible for French Union forces to resume fighting once cease-fire established, Bi ult Said that the French Government bad queried French High Command in Indochina and bad received; a reply that there would either have to be a final cease-fire or further reenforcetnents would have to be sent to Indochina during the conference.

^

As indicative of Bidault's continuing courage 9 he said that . when he saw Molotov tomorrow he intended to stand on L&niel's statement of March 5 and attempt to draw Molotov out without ■ ceding ground himself and without getting involved in detailed" discussions of substance on an Indochina settlement.

In my Judgment, Eden has arrived with instructions actively to encourage French into almost any settlement which will result in cessation hostilities in Indochina. My guess is that behind "this lies British fear that if fighting continues^ we will in one way or another become involvedj thereby enhancing rlslc Chinese intervention and.possibility further expansion of war. This estimate of mine is confirmed by facVth^t Ghauvel told MacArtbur that French believe Eden's instructions are to pre&s actively for a cease-fire.

I made clear to Bidault privately that we would have- no (repeat no) part in settlement at Geneva of Indochina war which constituted surrender of Indochina to Communists,, and that France has better chance by fighting on rather than by attempted withdrawal which would be under most difficult conditions*, i intend to see Eden alone tomorrow morning to talk with extreme bluntness to him expressing my dismay that British are apparently encouraging French in direction surrender which is in conflict not (repeat not) only with our interest but what i conceive theirs to be.

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LlUi OLuhL.1

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

27 April 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: French Request for Additional Aid

References: a. NIACT 4085

b. SECTO 14

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff lack verified logistical information, including the comments of the Chief, MAAG, Indochina in regard to feasibility of the aid requested by the French. This information has been requested as soon as possible.

2, Pending receipt of such data and comments from Chief, MAAG, Indochina, which may materially alter the observations on feasibility which follow, the comments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the French request are indicated below:

a^. From the viewpoint of military effectiveness the proposal offers little insofar as relief of Dien Bien Phu is concerned.

b_. It would appear that the psychological aspect could be satisfied by confining the operation to one field only— that at Seno.

£. The Seno airfield appears also to be the only one in which rehabilitation and preparation are feasible within anything like the timing proposed. Preparation of the two other fields included in the French request would require from 2 to 4 weeks and greatly increased supply, logistic and construction effort.

d_. It should be pointed out that the proposal is by no means a "one shot 11 affair but represents a continuing logistic supply requirement of no small proportions with a corresponding reduction of the airlift capabilities of CINCFE,

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e. The matter of local defense of the fields, when operational, adds to the continuing logistic supply effort.

f. The project, even reduced to consideration of the one field at Seno, unquestionably involves continuing participation of U.S. military forces in active operations. The prospects of disengaging them appear remote if the fields are to remain in active operation, as the capabilities of the French to take on the continuing supply effort are questionable. In fact, the probability of continuing and expanded participation by U.S. military personnel is high. Increased risk of U.S. personnel casualties is also involved.

£. The question resolves itself really to whether or not we are, under the guise of a last minute effort to relieve Dien Bien Phu to commence active participation by U.S. forces in the Indochina war,

h. With regard to the furnishing of privateer aircraft this request can be handled through regular MDAP channels, but expedited. The first ten airplanes.are now being assembled and prepared, and air delivery to Saigon will be expedited. The additional ten can be provided at a later date.

3. In summary:

a_. Employment of U.S. planes and crews, and GOA and supervisory construction personnel, on missions stated, would have the following major military consequences:

(1) Involve U.S. Armed Forces in direct participation in military operations in Indochina.

■

(2) Mounting scale of U.S. Armed Forces participation due to requirements for local security, and increasing demands for combat and service support for both U.S. and French forces.

(3) Greatly increased risk of U.S. personnel casualties due to enemy action, including capture.

(4) Some increased risk of armed intervention by Communist Chinese forces.

Jd. Within the approximate time limits suggested, the rehabilitation and extension of the field at Seno appears to be feasible.

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£. From the military viewpoint, insofar as relief of Dien Bien Phu is concerned, the project is of little value.

<i. Psychological aspects might well be satisfied by confining projects to the field at Seno only.

e t Maintaining Seno field operational would require a continuing supply effort of considerable proportions.

f_. Local defense of field and any ground line of communications would have to be increased to counter Viet Minh guerrilla operations which would increase with the added importance of the airfield.

4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider* that:

au From a military viewpoint, the propoi- of the French, except for supply of naval aircraft, should be rejected.

b^ If, for other than military reasons, the proposal is approved, the U.S. commitment should be limited to rehabilitation and extension of the Seno airfield.

* The Chief of Staff, U.S. Army invites attention to his additional views expressed at the 6 April 1954 meeting of the Armed Forces Policy Council and submitted through the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense for his information by a covering memorandum, dated 22 April 1954, subject: "Indochina."

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff

s

for ARTHUR KADFOKD,

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

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SEN? DEPARTMENT DOLTS 13 REPEATED INFORMATION LONDON 77 PARIS 127.

EYES ONLY ACTING SECRETARY. EYES ONLY AMBASSADORS.

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I saw Eden and his immediate,!! advisors for a few minutes befors ^ N his luncheon April 27. I opened by saying that I wanted to speeds frankly concerning our own immediate affairs. I said I con- y t sidered it great mistake to push French in direction cease-fire^ whisb I believed would bo a disaster. I said I considered it *£ of utmost Importance that we both keep French in mood to fight on in Indochina. If that mq'od is lost surely disaster would follow with little chance of limiting its scope and indeed little chance of French extricating themselves.

Eden replied with some heat that ho was not advocating a cease-fire though he admitted that he had told Bidault that he was less sure today than a,month ago that a cease-fire was out of the question. He insisted that all he had been thinking of had been a cease-fire with adequate safeguards and controls. His purpose he said-had been to concentrate French thinking on latter points, '< w ,

I interjected that I did not think three of us were presenting a very irrpressive or cohesive position. I reminded him that I wanted immediate ad hoc plans covering Southeast Asia including Indochina if Geneva failed but that British were against this. French I said had in effect no government and were atr a loss as to'what to do. They were drifting toward disaster. I was concerned that we were not doing all possible between us to shore up French resolution. I said there was a basic difference between us in that British seemed to think that plans for a "joint defense were more apt to spread .conflict tha^i absence of a ij : + plans. ;.''"'"

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where- They just did nob believe that It was a realizable Liitapy exercise considering the military means available. yioi^aovov Eden said it would be* most unpopular in Asia let alone

v ■ British home opinion,

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den -hen asked if our tripartite position was really as bad as 3 bad pointed it. He said he felt that other side was properly vorrLed , «

t agreed but said in all frankness they were more worried about United States than British,

Eder did not deny tbis J and said that we must see how things go here In next few days and do what we can to buck French up particularly if Dien Bien Phu falls,

1 laid I was deeply worried over French situation not alone in its relation with Indochina. NATO was directly affected, The fall of Laniel might result in a left-of-center government corning to power which would exist by Communist sufferance., thereby increasing*' Communist influence domestically in France and by contagion in Italy which country was also a source of serious con-eern, 1 said EDO would be affected 3 and our entire defense structure In Europe, At this point Bidault arrived and we broke off our col • : -tion*

DULLES

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TO: Secretary Ox State

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EYES ONLY ACTING SECRETARY FOR PRESIDENT FROiM SECRETARY. .

Developments..have been so rapid and almost every hour so filled with high-level talks that evaluation has been difficult. My present estimates follow:

(l) Indochina- Delay in fall of Dion Bien Phu has resulted in some French discounting of this development. Nevertheless, it must be assumed the French will not continue in any long-range operation unless it will defeinitely relieve the strain on French manpower in Indochina. Present French Government holding on because their Parliament in recess and probably no one eager to take over at this juncture. Bidault given considerable discretion because present Cabinet cannot make up its mind on any course. Therefore, we do not have anyone on French side with whom we can make any dependable agreements. After deputies return and Dion Bien Phu falls, there -may veil be a change of government, probably to the left, committed to liquidate Indochina. However, this is more easily said than done and it is possible that as this fact develops a French Government might 'be prepared to sit down with us seriously and consider some joint program which is something that so far they have evaded-

I do not know whether from military standpoint it would be deemed feasible"to end the scattering ahd exposure of military forcYs for local political reasons and withdraw present forces to defensible enclaves in deltas where they would have US sea and air protection meanwhile retail^ enough territory and enough prestige to develop really effective indigenous army along lines suggested by 0 ! Daniel. This might, I suppose, take .two years and would require in large part taking over training responsibility by US. Also full Independence and * increased economic aid would probably be required to help maintain friendly governments in areas chosen for recruitment.

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DULTE 21, April 29, 10 a.m. from Geneva.

from political standpoint this type of program appears oo offer best hope of France staying In war. If France and US agree on such" a plan, there vould. be fair chance of Australia and New Zealand coming along. However, this estimate can be improved in next day or two.after I have conferred further with Foreign Minister Casey and Prime Minister Vfebb. It is unlikely that tVie UK would initially participate and vould probably use its influence to prevent participation by Australia and New Zealand. The UK situation would be difficult internally and externally, and there would probably be undesirable repercussions upon other NATO partners. Thailand could be expected to cooperate if we act promptly. Foreign Minister Wan gave further assurance today and urges quick military conversations.

The attitude here of Molotov and Chou En-lai's statement yesterday lead me to rate more highly than heretofore the

(2) UK attitude Is one of Increasing weakness. British see to feel that ve are disposed to accept present risks of a * Chinese war and this, coupled also with their fear that ve vould start using atomic weapons.-has badly frightened them. I have just received a note from Eden referring to my paper

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. read bef< ^M^o restricted courie {J^^ave^W^eh again urges necessl't:y bT consultation before\any use. He says. "You know our strongly-held views on twe need for consultation

before any decision Is taken-n

(5) General; The decline of France^ the great weakness of Italy , and the considerable weakness\in England create a situation where J think that if ve ourselves are clear as to what should be done, ve must be prow red to take the leadership in what ve think is the righk course } having regard to long-range US interest which Includes importance of Allies. I believe that our Allies will be inclined to follow, if not immediately, then ultimate%, strong and sound leadership. In saying this, 1 do not underestimate the irnrnese difficulty of our finding the right course in this troubled situation. Nor do I mean to imply that I think that this Is the moment for a bold or war-like course. I lack here the US political and NSG judgments needed for overall evaluation.

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

30 April 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Suspension of U.S. Military Aid to

Indochina in Event of a Cease Fire*

1. The possibility exists that a cease fire in Indochina may be agreed upon either at Geneva or unilaterally between the French and the Viet Minh. In that event, the Viet Minh would likely covertly extend their control over large areas currently held by French Union Forces and cause major defections of these forces. This would result in a quick deteriora* tion of the entire French Union position and enable the Viet Minh to seize large amounts of U.S. Mutual Defense Assistance Program (MDAP) materiel and supplies,

2. In light of the foregoing, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider it necessary that the United States adopt the following position reference future MDAP assistance to Indochina:

In the event of a cease fire in Indochina, the shipment of military end itesas under U.S. MDAP provided under the "Agreement for Mutual Defense Assistance in Indochina between the United States of America and Cambodia, France, Laos, and Vietnam," will immediately be suspended, except forfor such spares and associated maintenance items necessary to the maintenance of equipment in operations. The entire question of U.S. aid to Indochina will be re-examined in the light of circumstances then existing.

3. It is the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the "Agreement for Mutual Defense Assistance in Indochina between the United States of America and Cambodia, France, Laos, and Vietnam," of 23 December 1950, provides adequate legal basis for subject suspension.

*

4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that you secure governmental acceptance of the position proposed in paragraph 2 above.

Declassified per Executive Order L3526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

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HIE 63-54 Approved 28 April 1954 Published 30 April 1954

The Intelligence Advisory Committee concurred in this

estimate on 28 April 19SL The ABC and FBI abstained,

the subject Icing outside of their jurisdiction.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

AGENCY

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CONSEQUENCES WITHIN INDOCHINA OF THE FALL . • ' OF DIEN BiEN PHU'

THE PROBLEM

To estimate the probable consequences within Indochina, during the next two or three months of the fall of Dien Bien Phu within the near future.

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SCOPE

The consequences of the fall of Dien Bien Phu on the political situation in France,, and the repercussions of major decisions in France or Geneva on the situation in Indochina, are excluded from the scope of this estimate.

CONCLUSIONS

1. The fall of Dien Bien Phu would have far-reaching and adverse repercussions, but it would not signal the immediate collapse of the French Union political and military situation in Indochina. As a consequence of the fall of Dien Bien Phu, the morale of French Union forces would receive a severe blow, A crucial' factor in the military situation thereafter would be the reliability of native units, particularly the Vietnamese. There would almost certainly be increased desertions, and the possibility cannot be excluded that the native components of French Union forces might disintegrate. However, we believe that such disintegration would be unlikely during the ensuing two or three months, and that for at least this period the major part of the native troops would probably remain loyal.

2. Assuming no such disintegration, the fall of Dien Bien Phu would not in itself substantially alter the relative military capabilities of French Union and Viet Minh forces in Indochina during the ne two or three months. The French stand at Dien Bien Phu has produced certain compensatory military results. It has prevented an overrunning of Laos and has resulted in the inflicting of casualties upon the Viet Minh comparable in number to the total French force committed at Dien Bien Phu. The bulk of Viet Minh forces released by the fall of Dien Bien Phu would probably not be able to move, regroup, and re-equip in time to be employed in new major operations during the next two or three months, although some lightly equipped infantry battalions might be made available more rapidly,for operations in the Delta region, ■

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3. Although the Viet Minh have a substantial capability to organize demonstrations and carry out sabotage and terrorist activities in the major cities of Indochina, we believe that French Union forces could maintain control in those cities.

4. The political consequences in Indochina of the fall of Dien Bien Phu would be considerably more adverse than the strictly military consequences and would increase the tempo of deterioration in the over-all French Union position in Indo-

l china, particularly in Vietnam, There r would probably, be a serious decline in the Vietnamese will to continue the war and to support the Vietnamese military [ programs. However, we believe that general collapse of French and native governmental authority during the next two

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or three months would be prevented by the continued existence of organized French Union forces and the hope among Indoehinese that the US might intervene in Indochina.

5. We believe that although the fall of Dien Bien Phu would'not immediately lead to collapse of the French Union position in Indochina, it would accelerate the deterioration already evident in the French Union military and political position there. If this trend were not checked, it could bring afaou' a collapse of the French Union position during the latter half of 1954. It should be emphasized that this estimate does not consider the repercussion of major decisions in France or Geneva and elsewhere, which could* have a decisive effect on the situation in Indochina.

DISCUSSION

6. We believe that the fall of Dien Bien Phu, if it occurred as assumed in the problem, would result from: (a) French capitulation; or (b) an overwhelming of the French either by assault or ay gradual constriction of the French position.

.*

7. If the French were to capitulate without further heavy fighting, the adverse military and political consequences would be essentially similar in kind, though possibly of greater intensity, to those accompanying the fall of the fortress through heavy fighting. Viet Minh losses in the event of capitulation would be less than those which would be incurred during further heavy fighting.

8. In any event, the Viet Minh would have suffered heavy losses in the prolonged fighting at Dien Bien Phu. Estimated Viet Minh casualties in the fighting there to date are approximately 13,000; roughly 50 percent of this number have been killed or rendered perma-

nently ineffective. Although a few experienced units have been sent as reinforcements, individual replacements for the most part have consisted of partially trained personnel. As a result of the Dien Bien Phu operation, the effectiveness of the Viet Minh offensive striking force will be greatly reduced dining the next two or three months. \

9. French Union casualties at D n Bien Phu to date have been approximately 5,500. The defeat of the force now at Dien Bien Phu would add another 11,000, thus ringing the total French Union losses to roughly 17,000. At least two-thirds of these troops are experienced, professional units from Algerian colonial and foreign legion forces. Moreover, six of the thirteen parachute battalions in 1 French Union forces in Indochina are at Dien Bien Phu. The lo'ss of these elite French Union troops would reduce the French Union offensive striking force by approximated one-

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quarter, thus markedly reducing over-all French Union capabilities for offensive operations in Indochina.

10. As a consequence of the fall of Dien Bien phu, the morale of the French Union forces would receive a severe blow. Their will to win would be diminished, largely because of a widespread belief that military victory was no .longer possible. The loss of morale would probably not be sufficient to reduce the effectiveness of the professional soldiers""of the French Expeditionary force. However, a crucial factor in the military situation thereafter would be the reliability of native units, particularly the Vietnamese. There would almost certainly be an increase in Vietnam desertions, and the possibility cannot be excluded that the native components of French Union forces might disintegrate. However, we believe that such disintegration would be unlikely during the ensuing two or three months, and that for at least this period the major part of the native troops would probably remain loyal. Therefore, we estimate that the impact upon the morale of the French Union forces would be severe, but not of such severity as to preclude their employment as an effective military force during the next two or three months.

11. The fall of Dien Bien Phu would not in itself substantially alter the relative military capabilities of French Union and Viet Minh forces in Indochina during the next two or three months unless there were large-scale desertions from the French Union forces. The victorious Viet Minh troops at Dien Bien Phu would have suffered heavy casualties and their efficiency would be reduced. In order to bring these forces up to full strength, the Viet Minh would probably move them from Dien Bien Phu to their main supply and training areas adjacent to the Red River delta. Prior to the rainy season, this redeployment would require at least three to four weeks. After the full onset of the rainy season, which is unlikely before mid-May, the movement would take between two and three months to complete. We therefore estimate that the bulk of the Viet Minh troops at Dien Bien Phu would not be available for major operations elsewhere in

Indochina during the next two or three months, although seme lightly-equipped infantry battalions "might be made available more rapidly for operations in the Delta re-

i

gion.

12, Although the over-all capabilities of the Viet Minh \v9uld be reduced as a consequence of the losses inflicted upon their main striking force, Viet Minh forces elsewhere in Indochina would have the capability during the rainy season to maintain and in some instances increase military pressure against French Union forces. In the Red River delta, they could intensify efforts to sever land communications between Hanoi and Haiphong, ambush French detachments, attack villages, air bases, and other installations, and lay siege to isolated French delta strong points. The scale of Viet Minh operations in the Delta, however, would be restricted by the adverse effects of heavy rains on maneuverability. The Viet Minh could use their force concentrated in the Pleiku region in southern Annam to launch fairly large-scale attacks against French forces engaged in the "Atlante" operation. They could also use units from this force for raiding operations in the Mekong River area or to reinforce the Viet Minh battalions now in Cambodia. Combat operations in southern Annam, the Mekong valley, and in Cambodia would be restricted by the tenuous nature of resupply of ammunition and other military equipment for these units. The Viet Minh could at the same time organize demonstrations and carry out sabotage and terrorist activities in the major cities of Indochina. The Viet Minh capability in this regard is probably substantial.

13. French Union forces, assuming no major Vietnamese defections, would have the capability to maintain their present major fortified positions in the Delta, and elsewhere maintain control in the major cities, prevent the permanent severing of land communications between Hanoi and Haiphong, repulse Viet Minh attacks in southern Annam* and the Mekong River area, and retain the area liberated In the "Atlante" operation. If the Viet Minh were to undertake a major military

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. .

TROOP STRENGTHS AND DISPOSITIONS

FRENCH UNION

Regular and Light Bns 274 . . . 402,000

Semi-Military . . .... . . . 203,500

Total , 605,500

VIET MINH Regular and Regional Ens 155 Semi-Military

Total . .*

185,000 106,000

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291,000

MAJOR CONCENTRATIONS I

65 Regular Bns (35 Fr. Ex. Force) 19 Light Bus 83,000 semi-military

DELTA

DIEN BIEN PHU

16 Regular Bns (15 Fr. Ex. Force)

NORTHERN TONKIN (Less DB Phu Area)

NORTHERN LAOS

14 Regular Bns (10 Fr. Ex. Force)

2 Light Bns

THAKHEK-SAVANNAKHET

17 Regular Bns (13 Fr. Ex. Force)

3 Light Bns

CENTRAL VIETNAM

35 Regular Bns (10 Fr. Ex. Force)

16 Light:

COCHIN CHINA

17 Regular Bns (3 Fr. Ex. Force)

20 Light Bns

SOUTHERN LAOS and NORTHEASTERN CAMBODIA

8 Regular Bns (3 Fr. Ex. Force)

WESTERN CAMBODIA

11 Regular Bns (0 Fr. Ex. Force)

3 Light Bns

22 Regular Bns 10 Regional Bns 35,000 semi-military

28 Regular Bns 2 Regional Bns

13 Regional Bns

3 Regular Bns 2 Regional Bns

8 Regular Bns 4 Regional Bns

14 Regular Bns 7 Regional Bns

10 Regular Bns 2 Regional Bns

4 Regular Bns

Elements

1 These dispositions cover only infantry units. The regional breakdown does not include the total nurrvber of Viet Minh and French bns.

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operation against Cambodia, the defense of Cambodia would require troops from other areas. French Union forces would retain the capability to launch limited offensive operations before the full onset of the rainy season, either in the Reel River delta region or on the coast of Annam.

14. The political consequences in Indochina of the fall of Dien Bien Phu would be considerably more adverse than the strictly military consequences, although the two are interrelated. The defeat would increase the tempo of deterioration in the over-all French Union position in Indochina, particularly in Vietnam. The principal political consequences would be: (a) a major blow to French prestige

- among the Indochinese, and an increased •conviction oh their part that the French were

. unable to protect them against the Vict Minh; (b) a serious' decline in French and Indo-Chinese will to continue the war, and in particular a further decline in popular support

m fa Vietnam for Vietnamese military programs; (c) exacerbation of French-Indo-chinese relations, partly as a result of increased Indochinese suspicions that the French will "sell out" to the Viet Minh; (cl) a sharp increase of "flense sitting*' among politically conscious groups previously disposed to support the Vietnam Government;

" and (c) a sharp increase, particularly among Vietnamese, of covert support of the Viet Minh. However, we believe that a general collapse of French and native governmental authority during the next two or three months would be prevented by the continued existence of organized French Union foi'ces and

the hope that the US might intervene in Indochina.

15. The political effect in Laos would probably be similar to that of Vietnam. However, the Laotians would probably display a greater disposition than the Vietnamese to stand by the French and tQ continue the war effort.

16. The political effect on Cambodia would be extremely uncertain. The internal security of Cambodia and a certain minimum stability might be maintained, but Cambodia's vulnerability to future Viet Minh pressure would increase.

17. The Viet Minh would make every effort to make political capital of their victory at Dien Bien Phu. They would concentrate on in* creasing the sense of hopelessness in the Associated States, and would seek to convince the Indochinese that the triumph at Dien Bien Phu signalled their imminent "deliverance"* from colonial rule by fellow countrymen. They would intensify current efforts to en-hance the status of the so-called "People's Governments" of Laos and Cambodia.

18. We believe that although the fall of Dien Bien Phu would not immediately lead to collapse of the French Union position in* Indochina, it would accelerate the deterioration already evident in the French Union military and political position there. If this trend were not checked, it could bring about a collapse of the French Union position during the latter half of 1954. It should be emphasized that this estimate does not consider the repercussion of major decisions in France or Geneva and elsewhere which are likely to have a decisive effect on the situation ir Indochina.

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I OO C H I N A

The following are comments made by Major General Thomas J. H* Trapnall, Junior, former Chief of the Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAC-) Indochina, at his debriefing, 3 May 195^.

GENERAL

The battle of Indochina is an armed revolution which is now in its eighth year. It is a savage conflict fought in a fantastic country in which the battle may be waged one day in waist-deep muddy rice paddies or later in an impenetrable mountainous jungle. The sun saps the vitality of friend and foe alike, but particularly the European soldier. Torrential monsoon rains turn the delta battleground into a vast swamp which no conventional vehicle can successfully negotiate. It is a war of many paradoxes -

Where there is no popular will to win on the part of the Vietnamese.

Where the leader of the Rebels is more popular than the Vietnamese Chief of State.

Where a sizeable French army is composed of relatively few Frenchmen.

Where the partners of the Associated States regard each other as more dangerous than the enemy.

Where a large segment of the population seeks to expel the French at any price, possibly at the cost of extinction as a new nation.

This is a war which has no easy and immediate solution, a politico-military chess game in which the players sit thousands of miles distant -- in Paris, Washington, Peiping, and Moscow.

STRATEGIC "POSITION OF INDOCHINA

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i

The autonompus Associated States of Indochina consist of Viet Nam, Laos, and Cambodia. They occupy a blocking position against the expansion of Chinese Communist influence along the principal routes of communication in Southeast Asia. If this area, approximately the size of the state of Texas, defects or is neutralized the frontiers of Burma, Thailand and Malaya would immediately be exposed and eventually the positions of Austi-alia, New Zealand, India, Ceylon, Pakistan, Indonesia and the Philippines would be weakened. A state of Civil War presently exists in Indochina, which pits the Communist Viet Minh against French Union forces essentially deveoted to the ideals of freedom. Other issues, such as varieties of Nationalism, are involved as well. Moreover, a state of transition is concurrently ruiderway in which a formerly strong Colonial power is crumbling. France is giving way to a self-determination movement by the indigenous peoples, who, while numbering more than 30 million, lack stability and security. The population of the three states is not completely compatible in matters of economics.

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culture, religion, ethnic origins, philosophy or political goals. Therefore, a compromise position has "been reached in which the principal state of Viet Nam, eonibirdng the former protectorates of Annam and Tonkin with the ex-colony of Cochin China, has entered into a loose state of alliance with the lesser states of Laos and Cambodia, and with France. This federation is called the French Union. The exact relationship of each autonomous state to France has as yet not been completely determined. This indecision is, moreover, complicated by natural rivalries existing among the states, even extending to political tribal groups within the states.

The topography of Indochina is varied and consists of extensive mountains, jungles, rivers, canals assd major deltas* A remarkable compartmentation results. Military operations in a given area may be conducted with almost complete disregard of the situation in the adjacent compartment. While essentially the ground war presently is the dominant military activity, great potentials in amphibious, naval and air warfare by French Union Forces exist which should be exploited increasingly. Poor internal communications and 1,599 miles of coastline are factors dictating the advisability of utilizing more effectively the combat power of the combined arms.

The political situation in France and Indochina requires a complicated system of military administration. Four national armies comprise the French Union Ground Forces. The French Far East Territorial Force, numbering roughly ^ million troops, equals the combined totals of the three indigenous armies, of which only that of Viet Nam may be considered as significant. Military responsibility is being delegated to the Associated States to the degree that their state of military development and capabilities so warrant. The pentalateral agreement of 23 December 1950 is the authority for existing relationships. The United States Is a signatory to this document which extends MDAP Into Indochina, Significantly, the conflict in Indochina has not been "internationalized" such as in Korea. Of the French Union partners, only France is a member of the United Nations., France has specifically opposed UN intervention on the presumption that its control of the Union would eventually be weakened by UN participation. On the enemy-side, the rebel army of 300,000 troops could not be supported without the substantial aid presently provided by Red China. '

GOVERNMENT OF INDOCHINA

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The prosecution of the war against the Viet Minh in Indochina is a joint responsibility of the sovereign governments of Viet Nam, Cambodia, Laos and France, under the leadership and direction of the latter. The local representative of the French Government Is the Commissioner General, M. De Jean. He represents M. Marc Jacquet, French Minister of State, in charge of relations with ^he Associated States. The Ministers of the Associated States, the French commissioner General and the military- Commander in Chief, Lt General Henri Navarre, prescribe the conduct of the war. Existing protocols define the degree of military control enjoyed by the Commander in Chief over the armed forces of the individual. Associated States. Essentially, the French exercise operational control over all forces in strategy and tactics. Each of the Associated States maintains a Chief of Staff and a General Staff who are primarily concerned with recruit!no-training, personnel actions and limited logistical activities. The long range program envisages a progressive turnover of responsibilities to the Associated States, although a requirement exists that adequate coordinating powers be vested in the hands of the French for many years to come.

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Political decisions affecting military operations are reached in sessions of the high committee by representatives of .the States, France 9 and the Commander in Chief. Essentially military problems are resolved in a permanent military committee in which the military chiefs of the Associated States together with the Commanding General of Headquarters, Joint and Ground Forces, Far East, participate.

Although a quadruplication of facilities exist in the form of several national general staffs and territorial organizations, actually a reasonably efficient channel of command is maintained by the French, Diplomatic liaison with the States counterpart organizations is exercised wherever coordination is required. This highly < plex arrangement of joint and combined staffs and pooling of national forces may be likened to a miniature NATO at war, except that by necessity, the senior and more professionally qualified partner, France, exercises the dominant role. The governmental structure of each state is more or less oriented toward support of the war against Communism and the principal portion of each State's budget is devoted to defense expenditures. Viet Nam is the most vigorous state in this regard, Laos is cooperative to the French, but without sizeable^resources of men or money. Cambodia views the entire struggle as secondary to what it considers more important, the determination of future relationships among the States themselves. In consideration of the fact that hostilities are more or less normal in the life of the Indochinese, the States may be considered as mobilized for war, although with less dislocation to private enterprise and fewer restrictions and austerity measures than would be

expected by Western nations in a counterpart situation.

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Both Laos and Cambodia are constitutional monarchies, while the Vietnamese respond with less solidarity to the government indirectly controlled by the Chief of State, Bao Dai, nominal descendant of the Emperors of Annam. He is potentially a capable leader but unfortunately out of favor with many extreme Nationalists and non-Communist dissidents.

The overall attitude of the population borders on indifference. The failure of friendly propaganda toward both,development of a National attitude and the fostering of patriotism is an important deficiency. The uneducated native is inclined toward himself, his family and his tribe, or stock, in that order. The Japanese-inoculated spirity of Asia for the Asiatics has been adopted by Nationalist! leaders and the intelligentsia. The peasant, whose way of life has not been changed for centuries, is mostly apathetic.

The principal targets for Communism are among the educated classes, whose immediate resentment is the domination of the French through force of arms and political and economic controls. These people, when converted to Communism, muster more effective support from the peasantry and city workers than do the French and the educated Loyalists. Communist influence is strong and its organization very complete, particularly within the large cities. The contending leaders compete with each other for recruits ~ the Communists holding forth idealistic rewards reinforced by threats, and the Loyalists stressing fear of the enemy as well as other inducements, some of which approach impressment.

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The effect of the Ho Chi Minh bid for a negotiated peace and the French inclination to seek a settlement has had strong repercussions among the people, particularly those who pay double taxes, and whose villages are invaded, fought over and destroyed periodically by the opposing forces.

It is natural that the Communists will support the line of negotiation since implementation of any such peace will set the stage for Communist absorption of the entire area, without fail and immediately. The Ho Demarche, and the proven ability of his field forces to threaten seriously the French Union Forces, has had a profound affect on metropolitan France as well, where a considerable portion of the population is in favor of terminating an expensive and seemingly futile war,

PERFORMANCE OF MDAP — SUPPORTED FORCES

French and Associated States Forces have received MDAP equipment in increasing amounts since 1950» French Union Forces conduct modern joint military operations according to professionally accepted tactics and techniques, and in accordance with doctrines approved by the U*S. Armed Services, Applications vary in consonance with difficulties imposed by terrain and the climatic environment. It has been noted that this is a war which pits a modern mechanized army against a large and well-led guerrilla force. However, the character of the Viet Minh forces has "been changing during the past year. Therefore, may inefficiencies must be charged against the mechanized army since it lacks complete opportunity to utilize its capabilities fully. Since it is neither practicable nor completely desirable to meet the enemy on the basis of guerrilla versus guerrilla, the ultimate solution will require the isolation of the Viet Minh from his base of supply in Red China and then overwhelming him by materiel superiority. In any instance, a requirement for provision of quantities of MDAP equipment exists and will continue to exist for an indeterminate period. Generally, maintenance standards of MDAP equipment are below those of the U e S* Armed Services, although within well-trained units employing equipment in the intended manner, favorable comparisons may be reached. Since many of the personnel of the French Union Army begin their careers as illiterate peasants, completely unskilled, the training and indoctrination task toward better maintenance is evident. MAAG visiting teams proffer such guidance as is feasible. Specific notification of superior, as well as unsatisfactory units, are made officially to the French military authorities. Under the existing terms of reference, MAAG has no authorized direct contact with armed forces of the Associated States, A significant weakness on the part of the French is their failure to project the r system of field operations and staff planning beyond their experience in Indochina. Imagination is frequently lacking . Also evident is the fact that their limited experience in World War II has stunted their overall development in mod ern warfare. This is basically the reason underlying their poor staff work, logistic and "" operational plans. In addition, the French are sensitive and touchy and loath to accept advice. We frequently encounter outdated techniques dating back to Colonial campaigns and World War I.

Another weakness of the French Union Force is the diversity of troops employed. The French Expeditionary Corps is composed of Foreign Legion, Moroccans Algerians, Tunisians, Songaless and a small percentage of metropolitan French

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volunteers. These units are diluted nearly 59 percent by native Indochinese. The Associated States Forces are composed of varieties of native Vietnamese, Laotians and Cambodians. The whole effect is that of a heterogeneous force among whom even basic communication is difficult. Troops require a variety of clothe sizes and diets. They have different religious customs, folkways and mores. They vary in their capacity for different tasks and terrain. Logistically, a great problem exists in the support of such troops.

On the other hand., the Rebels are mostly Vietnamese recruited largely from the hardy stocks of Tonkin and Annarru They are a truly homogenous army whose capabilities and requirements remain more or less consistent.

The MDAP equipment furnished the French Air Force of Indochina has converted it into a modern air arm capable of performing its combat mission in a highly satisfactory manner. It is an effective offensive or defensive combat weapon, the full potential of which has not been realized.

NATIONAL MILITARY SERVICE

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a. French Forces: All French Army personnel in Indochina are serving in the Regular Army. The draftee in France is not required by law to serve in Indochina, However, he may volunteer for such duty. The period of service in Indochina was formerly 2*+ months, but due to a shortage of replacements, the period currently is extended to 27 months. French personnel receive substantial increases in pay for service in Indochina.

b« Vietnamese Forces: The original law which drafted man for military service required all physically fit males to undergo a period of service for 60 days. Until April 1953 > this law was not strictly enforced. In April, it became, with minor changes, the basis for the ordinance drafting ^0,000 men for duty with Kinh Quan t alions. Personnel are inducted into the army for the duration. They are selected on the basis of their family situation. Single men are taken first, A man enlisting for the Regular Army is taken on a trial • basis for one year. A t the end of one year, and if his service has proyen satisfactory, he can reenlist for a period of one, two, three or four ye\rs. Recently, the draft laws have been more vigorously enforced to eliminate draft dodging, . |

INTER-SERVICE BALANCE OF FORCES IN INDOCHINA

While the majority of resources are devoted to ground operations, the

following factors must be considered:

a. The enemy has no air forces or naval forces other than junks and sampans,

b. Friendly ground forces maintain a large proportion of river squadrons and 1 aviation units

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c. Opportunities for employment of large tactical air forces and seagoing naval and amphibious forces are limited.

d. Strategic targets are limited. Terrain and enemy skill in camouflage reduce number of tactical targets.

e. A shortage of trained air personnel exists, with limited prospects for augmentation from metropolitan France resources,

f. Commercial resources satisfy a considerable portion of naval and air logistical requirements.

g. Airfield construction limits composition of air traffic to light and medium transports and propeller-driven fighters and bombers. The balance of forces is considered adequate , although recently the French Air Force, motivated by unanticipated operational requirements in Laos and Dien Bien Phu, has requested additional B-26 light bombers, an additional C~V? transport squadron, and the loan of U,S* C-119 heavy transports and maintenance personnel. Civilian CAT pilots are presently on contract to the French Air Force for logistical missions. The Army likewise has requested increased air strength in the form of helicopter companies

and liaison aircraft.

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OBJECTIVES

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The missions of the opposing forces may be considered as follow

VTET MIffi - To achieve, by attritive military and political action, a

negotiated settlement of the war in Indochina upon such terms as will permit either,

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a. Absolute control of a portion of Viet Ham arid Laos - generally considered

to be north of the l8th Parallel, or '

b. Eventual control of the majority portion, or the complete entity, of Indochina as a result of a favorable political position achieved at the peace table.

FRENCH UNION - To achieve, by overwhelming military pressure and political action, a cessation of hostilities upon terras favorable to the French uAon which wil

a. Restrict the influence or "cne League of Independent Viet Nam Party-Viet Minh, to that of a controllable minority.

b. Permit the establishment of sound, stable, solvent and harmoni as governments within the Associated*States,

c. Enable France to maintain its position as the dominant member of the French Union - of the Far East - with extra territorial privileges and commercial-benefits.

Naturally, the results of the Geneva Conference may be expected to have a strong influence on future political and military objectives in Indochina for both sides.

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ORGANIZATION OF THE FRENCH UNION GROUND FORCES

By the end of 195*f 3 French Union ground forces Kill consist of four French and one Vietnamese infantry division and one French airborne division. The ground divisions will he formed from 13 French ECTs and 9 Vietnamese RCTs. The airborne division will be formed from 2 French ARCTs and one Vietnamese ARCT. This force, known as the Battle Corps, will be supported by 5 armored battalions , 5 reconnaissance battalions, 5 amphibious battalions and 3 medium and 1 heavy artillery battalion. This represents the striking force of the French Union Forces, not much larger than a single U.S 0 type Army Corps. To free this force for independent action against the Rebel strongholds, the French consider that a force of twice that size is necessary for static defense and pacification purposes. By the end of 1955j this surface defense force will reach a total of 86 standard infantry battalions, 132 light infantry battalions, 1100 suppletive companies, the equivalent of 70 artillery batteries and 36 armoi , ed car companies. All units of the Fr :h Union Army are equipped with a percentage of MDAP material. Amounts vary accordin. to date of activation, depot stocks, mission and replacement factors. A certain percentage of hard items, estimated at 30 percent of gross requirements, is provided by French procurement agencies and may consist of identical items to those of MDAP, having been acquired during World War II, or through other channels by which UoS. surplus stocks were distributed after 19^6. Indigenous production is practically negligible, since local industry is not developed and barely sufficient to provide maintenance for civilian requirements. A certain number of paramilitary agencies exist in this theater of operations which are not MDAP supported. These include militia, national police, plantation guards*and others. Obviously, MDAP items, mostly small arms and ammunition will find their way by devious channels into unauthorized hands.

Due to the stress of constant warfare, circumstances are such that strict conteol is impossible. For example, an MDAP rifle, abandoned in battle may be acquired by a Viet Minh soldier y who vrill forfeit the same weapon upon his death or capture by paramilitary forces.

LOGISTICS 'OF THE GROOHD FORCBS

In general terms the organization and operation of the technical services which furnish logistical support to the combat arms is similar to that in the United States Army. The French Forces are handicapped by a insufficient number of units and trained specialists and consequently are unable to furnish the amount and quality of support given by comparable US units. For all technical services MDA Programs have furnished the spare parts and small items necessary to carry out adequate maintenance and repair programs.

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French Forces: French Forces are, for/the most part, trained prior to shipment to Indochina, Training of individual replacements is done in the units to which they are assigned. French Far East ground forces operate schools for artillery, armor, engineer and transportation for their own forces and additionally provide generous quotas for Associated States personnel. Recently, four tactical training centers have "been activated for use as maneuver areas for large tactical formations and battalions rotated out of static positions.

Vietnamese Forces: There are eight training centers for recruits of the Vietnamese Array. Four are for recruits for the Regular Army and four are for personnel to be activated into Kinh Quan (light infantry) battalions and companies. On-the-job training is conducted in technical fields for selected individuals upon assignment to a unit. In addition to this training, a limited number of specialists, technical, non-cormnissioned and officer schools exist. A considerable number of indigenous officers and men attend French schools both in France and Indochina. Training is not up to American standards.

The Associated States training plan has an annual capacity of about 65,000. It is considered adequate to meet phased build-up requirements. By American criteria, certain training deficiencies are conspicuous, particularly in such areas as standardization of training aids, programs of instruction, troop training programs and training literature. Utilization of plant facilities with greater efficiency is a further requirement. It is apparent that the Associated States forces are developing with more stress on quantity than quality. It is hoped that American guidance will prove acceptable and valuable to the French. The use of MDAP equipment has not generated any critical training problems, however a need exists for management training to encompass stock control; organization of depots and other procedural-type activities.

ORGANIZATION OF THS F RENCH NAVAL FO RCES, FAR EAST

French naval strength is approximately 10,000. The only Associated States navy is a 1,000 man Vietnamese force. Naval forces are light units composed I of approximately 250 light vessels and 100 small craft. These are supported ' by an aircraft carrier on loan from NATO and a squadron of privateer aircraft. ' Command of river,, operations as well as overall logistic support is the responsibility of the C.irimander, French Naval Forces ashore. Direct coordination of naval river forces with the respective Army area commands is executed at the Naval area level. Commander, French Naval Forces, afloat, controls coastal operations including surveillance, blockade, and amphibious operations. Naval Aviation, Indochina, supports the Naval mission as directed. The aircraft carrier force is under Naval administrative command although embarked aircraft operate as directed by the French Air Force area tactical commands.

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SUMMARY OF THE NAVAL SI fflQN

The French Union naval forces in Indochina are reasonably effective on rivers and inshore areas. They have had much experience in river landings, combating a river ambushes and intercepting junk and small boat traffic on both, the ocean and inland waterways. Also, logistic support by water to all services is a constant and heavy undertaking. For guerrilla warfare along the waterways in the Red River and Mekong River deltas, they are uniquely qualified and equipped. In other more orthodox forms of naval warfare such as large amphibious operations, anti-submarine and anti-aircraft warfare, they are neither trained nor equipped. With the establishment of the Joint Amphibious Staff and the formation of an Amphibious Corps, part of this deficiency should be eliminated. Although enemy submarines and aircraft have not been a factor in this war, the possibility does exist. There is little in Indochina to combat the potential me nance. Limitations and restrictions for the conduct of the war at present are basically caused by a shortage of personnel rather than a lack of equipment. In addition, concrete and positive steps have been taken in the establishing of a Vietnamese National Navy. This will perform a two-fold purpose - that of easing the serious shortage of personnel and engendering a spirit of pride in the Vietnamese people through increased responsibility and participation in the conduct of the war in their homeland.

ORGANIZATION OF THE FRENCH AIR FORCE

As of 10 April 195** , the French Air Force consisted of 98 Bearcats, organized into k squadrons, 16 Bearcat Photo Recon Aircraft organized as a flight, 8U B-26 light bombers, expanding to 3 squadrons, a light tactical reconnaissance flight of modified B-26 bombers, h transport squadrons of 11*1 C-Vfs — 65 MDAP — and liaison aircraft squadrons consisting of 8 C-:^5s, 12 L-20 Beavers and 8 H-X9 helicopters. Additionally, 85 Army liaison aircraft • L-19s - will be delivered by 31 August. 22 C-119 packets with supporting (200) mechanics are on loan during the present emergency.

SUMMARY O F THE AIR FORCE SITUAT ION

The general, MAAG* opinion is that the individual flight and ground crews are very well qualified in operating and maintaining their equipment. However, there is not enough"- of them. Shortages of MDAP supplied equipment of he major categories has not restricted or hampered the operational ability of the FAF combat squadrons and support agencies. Some of the changes in methods and procedures which MAAG believed should be placed in effect are actually beyond the capability of the FAF due primarily to the shortage of personnel and o\ rail restrictions imposed on the FAF by the political and economic situation both in Indochina and in Metropolitan France.

The French are highly operationally minded, however, they do not put proper emphasis on their logistics support requirements to support their operations. In spite of the MDAP equipment and machinery received, the development of this country's self-sufficiency has been abnormally slow.

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ORGANIZA TION AND TACTICS OF THE REBEL ARMY

The Viet Minh is a well-led, veteran guerrilla army of approximately 300,000 troops organized into 6 infantry divisions, a heavy division of artillery and engineers and numerous regiments, battalions and companies. It has a regional militia component as well as its regular troops. Its equipment and tactics are those of light infantry with a tremendous capability of cross country mobility and endurance, A high command is reputed to contain Red Chinese advisors. Until the pitched battle at Dien Bion Phu, the rebels followed the strategy of hit and run with much of its maneuver dictated by political objectives. The manner in which this force deployed its battle corps into assault infantry, and, with effective artillery support, captured several highly organized and well-defended strong points, indicates a versatility not fully appreciated prior to this campaign season. Additionally, the Viet Minh are skilled in psychological and political indoctrination and have been able to establish bases of operations behind French fortified lines, particularly in the delta. The recent capability of the Viet Minh to seize territory throughout Indochina, albeit temporarily, will have a profound effect upon the conferences at Geneva,

CONDUCT OF THE WAR — MILITARY ASPECTS

In June 1953s General Navarre formulated a set of principles for the conduct of the war in Indochina. This was described in the 0'Daniel report as the Navarre concept for successful conclusion of the war in Indochina, but it is less a formula for successfully concluding the war than a statement of short term aims, to wit:

a 0 To retake the initiative immediately through the carrying out, beginning this summer, of local offensives and by pushing to the utmost commando and guerrilla actions, j

b. To take the offensive in the north beginning September 15, in order to forestall the enemy attack. To conduct the battle which will take place during the fall and winter of 1953-5^ in &n offensive manner by attacking the flanks and rear of the enemy, •

c. To recoVer from areas not directly involved in the battle a maximum number of units. To pacify these regions progressively.

d. To build up progressively a battle corps by grouping battalions into regiments and regiments into divisions and by giving to the units thus created

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the necessary support - artillery, engineers, armor, communications - taking into account the very special character of the war in Indochina, the terrain— the enemy. To bring about a maximum of cooperation with the Air Force and the Navy.

e. To maintain a reserve of special type units — armor, commando, light battalion, etc., for attachment to groups and divisions in accordance with terrain and mission.

f. To continue the effort of instructing and organizing the army of the Associated States so as to give them more and more participation as well as more and more autonomy in the conduct of operations,

Note: The above was given to General 0 1 Daniel in writing by General Navarre on 29 June 1953 and was thereafter referred to as the Navarre concept for the successful conclusion of war in Indochina.

Few of these aims are progressing satisfactorily. The training of the National armies is woefully inefficient and the series of tactical offensive operations engaged in during 1953-5^ fighting season, instead of retaking the initiative has lost it to the Viet Minh. After a rather encouraging beginning with the Lang Son operation, Navarre's later operations reveal that he is following the same conservative defensive tactics as his predecessor, General Salan. Although Mouette was highly publicized as a successful offensive, it in fact was nothing but a reconnaissance in force with the objective of occupying a strong position and awaiting attack by the enemy in the hope of dealing him a crippling blow* The enemy refused to be taken in. The current campaign season has been dominated by the Viet Minh, and the present position of the French Union Forces is no improvement over that of last year. Pi en Bien Phu is not only another Na San but a grave tactical and strategic erro r. The only hope for gain from the battle novr raging is that the French can survive. The French have consistently postponed seizure of the initiative through failure to select and pursue vital military objectives such as the obvious enemy troop concentration depot and communications area in the foothills north of the Tonkin delta. Viet Minh leadership, on the other hand, has capitalized on this vacated opportunity by seizing and holding the initiative. The French battle corps, which was built up hopefully by energetic withdrawal of implanted units, has now been dissipated into four sizeable components: (l) Dien Bien Phu — 12 battalions — an expensive-supplied airhead, is encircled and under heavy attack. (2) Seno-Savannakhet-Thakhek-Pakse area — 15 battalions — partially stipported by air with its overland communications threatened. (3) Operation Atlanta --25 battalions — a coastline sweep north from Nha Trang, which has uncovered no appreciable enemy > and (h) the Tonkin delta — 18 battalions — where the enemy is increasing his attacks on rear installations and lines of communications. The lack of initiative which the French have is emphasized by the day-to-day reaction of the French to enemy moves and activity as expressed in recent requests for emergency assistance in the way of U.S. equipment and maintenance personnel.

French tactics are based primarily on defense, even though French Union Forces outnumber Viet Minh forces "by almost 2 to 1, have overwhelming fire power, and upopposed air force, a balanced naval force and strategic transport capability. The barbed wire concept is exemplified by the fact that the French have established a requirement of UOOO tons of this item per month over and above that furnished by France. The bulk of the G-119 airlift for Dien Eien Phu supply was utilized in dropping barbed wire.

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French Union forces do not as a general rule attempt to gain and maintain contact with the enemy, but rather, they wait for the Viet Minh to attack. Patrolling is the exception rather than the rule. Viet Minh regular tattle corps troops have been avoided unless the French troops are well dug in behind barbed wire or have astronomical odds in their favor.

Wight operations are never employed by Fx^ench Union forces although the Viet Minh use such operations most successfully, French forces retire to their fortified and secured areas at nightfall, and control only the areas of their fields of fire. Night operations training should be instituted and emphasised in their training programs , and French Union forces should be as adopt and successful in such operations as the enemy.

At present there is no evidence that the French staff is working off-detailed plans for the final offensive which General Navarre has indicated to me as Chief MAAG will occur during the next dry season, 195 J l-55.

Although Navarre demands that his requirement for U.S 0 equipment should not be challenged by this MAAG, the fact is that the small inadequate French., staff handling this function is not capable of accurately presenting requirements for Indochina. Were it not for the screening which these requests undergo by MAAG, material would be wastefully supplied, and many critical and sudden shortages would occur. Many examples of this lack of planning foresight can be found in the files of this MAAG, such as requests for specialized equipment requiring specially trained operators with no companion plan to provide such operators -- request for a specific amount of ammunition in January is constitute a year, supply only to double the request in April - not because of an oversight or error but because of poor planning for the operations to occur during the intervening months.

This lack of French staff capability and to a great extent the conservative and defensive attitude of the entire theater of operations, is due in large measure to the fact that many of the officers on duty in this theater are over age in grade according to U.S. standards, and are lacking in drive and imagination. Lack of'command supervision is obvious in all echelons, the best evidence of which is the absence of command inspections and maintenance inspections of equipment of commanders. End-use inspections by members of this MAAG frequently reveal that higher commanders have never made an inspection of equipment in their subordinate units. Shortage of personnel is anothei^ contributing factor which-cannot be overcome except through more extensive support from metropolitan France.

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POLITICAL ASPECTS

A strictly military solution to the wai 1 in Indochina is not possible. Military operations are too closely bound to concurrent political problems, and most of the military decisions concerning tactics and strategy have their origin in the politics of the situation here- The governments of the three Associated States are comparatively weak, and are almost as insistent upon complete autonomy from France as they are on liberation from the Communists. It is doubtful if the ordinary people understand the issues at stake between the rebel and Associated States objectives. It probably appears to them that they are being ground between the two political groups, one of which seeks to achieve autonomy by Communist methods. The other by political evolution. They are not aware of the dangers of domination by Communism nor of the'difference between democracy and the Communist People's Government as we understand it.

The French have a tremendous investment in Indochina and have made great strides in bringing the advantages of Western civilisation to the people, yet the French are not wanted. Colonialism is still the chief argument against the French and with some substance. The natives are still considered as second-rate people and the French have only made concessions reluctantly and when forced to do so. There is a lack of comaraderis between the native soldier and officer and the French. Separate messes are maintained, due in some measure to the difference in dietary preference, but also due to this lack of friendly association in a common cause.

The Viet Minh, on the other hand, are fighting a clever war of attrition, without chance of a major military victory, but apparently feeling that time is working in their favor and that French and U.S. public opinion will force eventual favorable negotiation.

PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS

In 19^+9 the French, in a search for Nationalist support against Ho Chi Minh, recognized Bao Dai, playboy scion of the ancient Annamite emperors as Chief of State of Viet Warn which was given its independence within the framework of the French Union, Bao Dai is popularly believed to be very pro-French, and most of the people have a luke-warm feeling toward the Government which they feel is not earnestly working for their complete independence from France. The French promise independence, but only reluctantly give concessions.

The key to this problem is a strong and effective Rationalist army with the support of the Populist behind it. When the people have confidence in their government and in its ability, through the Nationalist army, to give them the protection from Communist terrorism which is necessary for business and commerce, then complete victory will be in sight*

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The key to this problem is a strong and effective Nationalist army with the support of the Populist "behind it. When the people have confidence in their government and in its ability, through the Nationalist army, to give them the protection from Communist terrorism which is necessary for business and commerce, then complete victory will be in sight.

THE U.S 0 COWTBIBDTION TO THE W AR IN INDOCHINA

The U.S. has greatly contributed to the success of the French in holding Indochina from the beginning. In January 1951, material was rushed from the docks of Haiphong to the battlefield of Vinh Yen, then being fought under the personal direction of Marshall De Lattre himself. Since then, delivery of aid has kept pace with changing French needs, often on a crash basis, down to the present heroic defense of Dien Bien Phu. U.S. aid has consisted of budgetary support, furnishing of end items, military hardware, and of technical training teams. The magnitude and range of this contribution is shown by the following very few examples. All of these figures are as of 31 March this year.

a. 785 million dollars has been allocated for the budgetary support of the French Expeditionary Force and the Vietnamese Army. This will assist in meeting budgetary requirements for pay, food, and allowances for these troops.

b. Under MDA Programs, a total of more than 78^ millions of dollars has been programmed for the years 1950-51*. Of this, more than hhO million dollars worth of military end items have been received.

c. To date, 31 March 195^ 5 Mil ships have delivered a total of U78 thousands of long tons of MDA equipment to Indochina.

SOLUTION

As in Korea, Iran, Malaya, and Burma, the war in Indochina is not a separate entity. It is another tentacle of the octopus, another brush fire on the periphery of the iron and bamboo curtains. The problem can only be solved completely if the masters of the Kremlin decide that Indochina should be abandoned in favor of more profitable enterprises elsewhere. However, ways and means exist to achieve a degree of success with respect to Indochina, beginning at the political level -- specifically at the level of Chiefs of State. What is then necessary '-s as follows:

a. An agreement must be reached with the French to deliver their strongest possible assault upon the Viet Minh as soon as possible to reduce the efficiency of that force to its lowest potential.

b. Concurrently, the Associated States armies must be put through a training cycle designed to produce leaders and units and to develop confidence through skill and achievement. Such forces must be developed to the level of the ROK

or Greek armies under American tutelage and material support for these forces must be in being and capable of replacing the French when they retire.

c. A defensive alliance of democratic nations of the Orient must be developed to provide future stability for the Associated States. The U.S. must establish leadership in this area by relieving the French in a similar manner as was followed in relieving the British fc?r the responsibility of Greece.

d. The sovereignty and territorial borders of the Associated States must be guaranteed - under no circumstances should the country be allowed to divide on an arbitrary parallel such as in Korea.

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C0NCLUSI 0 N

i

I recommend that the Department of Defense urge that negotiations for agreements to be initiated at the earliest time to achieve the foregoing objectives and that upon reaching an understanding with France and the Associated States, a full-scale U.S. training mission be established with the Associated States forces to achieve an effective training base by Spring of 1956. That the French overwhelm the enemy in the interim is a vital concurrent requirement, and, again, this objective must be achieved by governmental agreement, with the U.S. insisting that the French Government establish military victory as a primary objective and so instruct the field commander, who may then be relieved of his anxieties regarding casualties and indifferent political and moral support from France.

In conclusion, I reaffirm my opinion that victory in Indochina is an international rather than a local matter, and essentially political as well as military.

*

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WASHINGTON 25, B.C. JOINT SUBSIDIARY PLANS DIVISION

SPDM-173-5 1 * 5 May 195^

MEMORANDUM FOR LT. COL, J. D„ SITTERSON, USA, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE MEMBER, OCB WORKING GROITP ON NSC 5^05 (SOUTHEAST ASIA):

Subject: U.S 0 Objectives and Courses of Action

with Respect to Southeast Asia (NSC 5^05)

Reference: Secretary of Defense memorandum,

h March 19 5*+> subject as above

In accordance with the above request from the Secretary of Defense, the following informal comments are submitted:

a. Reference paragraph 21.

(1) On Ik December 1953, the Secretary of Defense informed the Chief, MAAG, Indochina, that Indochina has the highest MDAP priority. It is the only nation with this priority classification and, as such, has precedence over every other allied nation and the UoS. armed forces for the allocation of equipment in short supply. Generally, military assistance equip-

. ment is being delivered at the scheduled rates, which are up to the capability of Indochinese forces to utilize effectively, Thailand is being furnished MDA equipment under a limited program. This material is generally being delivered at the rate at which the Thailand forces can most effectively utilize it, Burma is not a recipient nation for MDAP grant aid. Initial arrangements have been made to provide Burma on a reimbursable basis, but no actual deliveries under this program have yet been made*

(2) Major General 0 1 Daniel has been appointed Chief, MAAG, Indochina. This was as a result of an NSC action designed to increase the influence of the United States in the prosecution of the war in Indochina, particularly training of local forces, effective command and intelligence arrangements, and operational planning.

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b. Reference paragraph 31.

(1) A military plan for U 0 S e intervention in Indochina has been completed and approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This plan has been forwarded to appropriate commanders of airfield commands for the preparation of detailed plans,

(2) The Joint Chiefs of Staff currently have under preparation an outline plan based upon concurrent renewal of hostilities in Korea and intervention in Indochina by the Chinese Communists.

(3) CINCPAC has been directed to prepare plans as foilows:

(a) Blockade of China coast.

(b) Assistance to the British in HongKong, as desirable and feasible,

(c) Evacuation of French Union forces from the Tonkin Delta,

(d) Participation defensively or offensively of Chinese National forces.

(U) CIHCPAC Operation Plan No. Wi-53 is a plan approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff for a naval blockade of Communist China.

(5) Other CINCPAC Operation Plans have been prepared to cover the contingencies in paragraph (3) above, but have not yet been approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff,

c. Although not directly part of the implementation of NSC 5^05 7 the Joint Chiefs of Staff have under preparation the military plans directed in NSC Action No. 1086 a. These plans cover not only U.S. intervention in Indochina but also augmentations in forces and supplies required to permit the United States to maintain at present levels its present defense commitments and to be prudently prepared to face possible increased risks of (l) Chinese Communist intervention j and (2) general war.

*

(Signed)

M. 0. D0N0HDO

Colonel, USMC '

Deputy Chief.

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

INCOMING TELEGRAM

DEFAE3MENT OF STAIE

ACTION COPY

SECRET

FROM: Geneva

TO: Secretary of State

NO: SECTO 106, May 5, 2 p.m.

Control: 175& Rec'd: May 5, 195 1 !

1:09 ?•*&.

NIACT

SENT DEPARTMENT SECTO 106, REPREATED INFORMATION PRIORITY PARIS 201, PRIORITY LONDON 121, SAIGON 33.

Re SECTO 89, repreated Paris 186.

Following is outline given this morning by Chauvel to Dennis5 Allen and Achilles of proposal which Bidault last night sent to French Cabinet for authorization to make when substantive discussion of Indochina starts:

1. Vietnam problem Is purely Vietnamese with no question of partition, only military struggle for control of government,

2. Situation different in Laos and Cambodia which are victims of external aggressioia.

3* Under Berlin agreement 5 purpose of Geneva conference is to establish peace in all three countries. To this end there should be a cease-fire guaranteed by adequate military and administrative controls under supervision. Cease-fire would take effect only when such guarantees had been embodied in armistic conventions, which might be different for each three states, and when control machinery had been established and was in place. Controls would be based upon Laniel's March 5 conditions. When cease-fire occurred, regular troops would be regrouped into delimited areas and all other forces disarmed. The control machinery would be "international" and would require considerable body of personnel.

h. After peace had been re-established by the cease-fire, political and economic problems could be examined.

In discussing this draft proposal Chauvel said French assumed Russians would propose immediate cease-fire followed by political settlement based on coalition and immediate elections, which would force West into position of opposing

cease-fire

K

3536

PERMANENT RECORD COPY

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 I

SECRET -2- SECTO 106j May 5, 2 p.m., from Geneva

cease-fire* French public desire for cease-fire was emotional and French Government could defend its proposal, even though it ^ould in effect delay any cease-fire for long time if not indefinitely, on grounds that conditions demanded were essential for safety of troops themselves. The continued resistance at Bien Bien Phu long after public opinion had discounted its fall had conditioned French opinion to believe its loss would not mean loss of war. He did not exclude possibility of conference calling on opposing forces not to undertake new military operations during negotiations. He assumed very lengthy negotiations would be necessary to reach any armistice agreement and felt that during this period Communist uncertainty as to united action of US intervention might be increased.

Allen inquired whether at some stage in proceedings working out of armistice details might be left to combattants themselves as suggested in Colombo communique. Chauvel did not like this idea but said it might be considered. In response to question as to whether he envisaged conference turning into indefinite Fanimmjom Chauvel said it might turn

■ armistice negotiations over to working group and adjourn to

- reconvene when warranted.

In response to Achilles inquiry as to whether "international" meant "UK" supervision, Chauvel stated French had no firm position on this but subsequent discussion indicated French continue to oppose use of UN machinery as establishing precendent which would be used against them in North Africa and elsewhere and that British definitely share their point of view* Allen suggested something like peace observation commission would be preferable to UN auspices. Achilles stressed importance of insisting on UN auspices.

Chauvel said studies by French military had confirmed their impression that withdrawal of French Union Forces from Cambodia and itaos except for two bases in latter would be of definite military advantage rather than disadvantage*

; SMITH

JAK:MEj/lU

NOTE: Mr. Hoey f s office (PSA) informed 3:15 p.m. 5~5~5^ JDP

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SECRET

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iv: *?**&$%** i

1I3C I95th Meeting

ITEM 1 (Fur Discussion)

* -

- REPORT BT MB, DULLES On G^ISVA AIlD 1I!DQ-CH1I!A

«

1, Secretary Dulles, who was rather pessimistic,in reporting to the president yesterday morning on the Geneva Conference, made the followirg points': (a) there Is no responsible "French Govern i::.t with which to deal; . (b) the British have declined to take a position regarding a Southeast Asia' regional grouping until after the Geneva Conference; (c) the British however are trilling to proceed with sec ret talks with us regarding the political and military scope of our plans for SFA; (d) the expected Cotmiunist proposal re Indo-China vfill call for evacuation of all foreign troops and elections to be supervised by a joint Vietiainh-Vietnam Co^nission; (e) French have no particular form of settlement in wind; UK is still thinking in ter^s of partition.

• 2. It Is not clear how the ITSC discussion will develop, but it seems desirable that certain questions be clarified at the meeting. They are along this line:

a* Should the U.S. resign itself to being unable to influence any •further the French and O.K. positions at Geneva? (i.e., is it still not possible to stiffen their spines by any conceivable means - Presidential talks, threats, sending Mr. Dulles back with a new mandate, etc, - so as "assure they will not accept a dangerous compromise.)

to

b. Is or is not the U.S. prepared to commit its combat forces in tl near futuz^e, in some form of regional effort if possible, to save the partition or loss of Indo-China? '""(A decision In principle seems necessary now . As the situation is at present we are saying we will consider this if the parliaments of Australia, Nev Zealand, etc. agree, but it is not clear whether we mean before or after Indo-Chlna is lost.)

£ # is the U.S. prepared to acouiesce in the clearly engineered Communist aggression in and taking over of Indo-Chlna - with Red Chinese support - even though we evaluate this loss as very serious to the free world and even though we have the military means to redeem the situation? " (The A-bomb)

3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff sent you a memorandum several days ago

(see TAB A) recommending that you "secure governmental acceptance" of the

following position:

■

"In the event of a cease fire in Indochina, the shipment of militarv

end items under U.S. IDA? .... will ipmediately be suspended, except

for such scares and associated maintenance items necessary to the main-

■ tenance of equipment In operations. The entire Question of U.S. aid to

Indochina will be re-e:o3mined in the light of circumstances then existing."

The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA.) has suggested you forward the memo to the E3C saying yo*i concur, but you hav^ not yet acted on

4-i

the ratter.

You m&y wish-to rs.ise it dirrirrr the discussion.

k25

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— -j-

INDICATES D collect D CHARGE 70

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C 1 a s s i j i \c a t ii o n

SENS TO: AmGonsul GENEVA

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Socrotary held hour and half briefing of 25 loading members Congress yesterday 0 Generally friendly, constructive atmosphere, no direct criticism, although consjd arable discussion on future plans and weakness of British and French. ' ,/ £

Secretary described set-up of Conference and briefly' went over Korean developments* Explained difficulty v/Ith

D

^Allies on a 11-Korean elections and trouble finding someone 1 {?&**

w-^u' to spegk up in defense of US against Communist^ vilification

men "■ •

Congress/showed interest in this and asked about positions

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(Office) On!yJ

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our various Allies 0

Turning to Indochina, Socrotary traced developments in our thinking and plans-since inception massive aid program last fall* Three prerequisites demanded from French had then seemed to be met* understanding A*S* become Independent, effective program for rapid training \^ of natives, aggressive military plan. Prerequisites woul>l ~~\

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age*_2 of wtog&m co. amao^iaul jQ£ SH& ^.

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Clusfificdtion

lead to ouv desired objectives, Navarre Plan still sound; but French will for* offensive action and 6van

ability govern felumaalvaa disintegrated* Following development unit ad action concept and as French

■

military situation deteriorated,* wa began think of* US military int savant ion* In April 5 ma a ting with

i

Congressman agreed objectives of earlier prerequisites

mi£9.t ba mat to incveeasrui degree and other interested

I

nations must join in In^fovs such intervention could be

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i

', authoriaedi Secretary described London*Paris trip

and Eden's reneging on communique« Soma adverse Congressional comment on latter and Secretary said thought HahtHi had pressured British*

Sa era t a r y do s cr ib a d fcvo in formal French requests for US air intervention on April 4 and 22 and his

■

replies thereto. Described French mood of extreme urgency and British Cabinet confirmation of reversal of agreement in communique of April 13. British terr fied by H-bomb $ pressured by Hehru, contrasted their giving up India v/ith French call for help to keep Indochina, and gavo higher rating to risk of Chinese intervention

and global wnv if V/est intervened. Secretary read from

■■

memo of conversation in which he had chastised Eden for British standc Huaob.er adverse Congressional cosBuents on

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C I a s s i I i c it t i o n

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

Pasef-LS—of telegram w teS^SUXSlXLJ^SSSA _;..

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British position, especially JndcU

Secretary said had reached three conelunlonn

<

'

US should not intervene militarily until and unless prerequisites agreed on at April 4 meowing were

-

fulfilled. Conditions must exist for succo sfiful

■

conclusion of oa'p and such v/as not nov/ case© Particletion other allies academic sinco French had not fulfilled prerequisites« Considerable opposition to internstionaiization of war in France anyway. This was Administration position on intervention. No Congressional comments on this,

i

Secondly, US must push rapidly for development of

SEA community, probably without Vietnam but hopefully

* . might

with Laos and Cambodia* British ;.::r.A come in are! they

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might want Burma and India too 0 We wore agreeable to

■

Burma* This community might offer fair chance

quote insulate unquote rest SEA against possible loss of

*

Vietnam*

Third conclusion ir/as v;o should not v/rite off British

#*

and French in spit© of their weakness in Asia* Lack of 100 per cent GcopB^Stloai one of welcome dl^&d^antages of

democratic sy/rtenu

DULTE 51 then received and Secretary read partition

V

parts* Considerable discussion ensued on Eden 1 a idea .of

428

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Q\tist\\\<ci\un

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Paw* V4 of t«fegram to. £$lQQ.nS-U l GEKSV .flu.

TOP SECRE3?

Classification

quo to f XV 0

white

powers

unquote

cona ult at ion and

conclusions 2 and S above. Judd strongly against Edon quote plan unquote, wanted Asians in oven without UK and France* Knovrland agreed on importance of Asians

i

as did several others. Knov/land said we should have-

■r

commitments from UK, Australia, Nov/ Zealand and others to help us if needed in Korea or Japan, et cetera, if we

m

v/ere to have collective security pact with thorn for SEA, which he personally favoroo\ Secretary said Burma, Thailand, Philippines plus A.S« would holp and that he told Eden he wanted Formosa in if British brought in Indiao McCormack and Smith supported Secretary on conclusion three and several othera did too* *.

Secretary described dffect of Indochina developments on PSench government and 3D0. Russell paid fine tribute to' Secretary for briefings and cooperation v;ith Congress and others expressed appreciation.

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'JSC .

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TQPSECBHE

Clcssij'tcetion

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r *»

- .--

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON ?.5. D. C.

-^* - - i.

J. Uj, o r.iV'i

7 May 195H

MEMORiUJlWa FOB TII3 SECRETARY 0? DBFJ5HSE

Subject:

Negotiations vith Respect to Indochina.

e

1. Attached for your consideration (Enclosure) ar the' vievs of the joint Chiefs of Staff in regard to Department of State inessases SECTO 105 and SECTO 110, both dated 5 May 195 2 *, and message DA HI 5929-5, dated 6 I-cy 195 J J.

■

2. 5?he" Joint Chiefs of Staff reco&sond that their views be transmitted to the Department of State for incorporation in the reply to S2CT0 105 and SECiO 110.

3. Copies Ho. 2 and I-Io. 3 of the Enclosure vere delivered in advance to the Deputy Secretary of Pefeas

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For the Joint Chiefs of Staffs

f

ARTHUR RADS0RD,

Ohairisasij

Joint Chiefs of Staff

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TO? SSCKl

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cqk .'-::^;ts to bs furnished to the secretary of dtspkksjs

RE R ADIOS SS0T0 106 AND SECT0 110," DA TED 5 MA Y 19.5^ /

D DA IN 59*96, DATED 6 MAY 19 :. J i

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1. Having due regard Tor Interim developmentSj the Joint Chiefs of Staff adhere to their views regarding negotiations

■

on Indochina, as expressed in their memorandum to the Secre-

■

tary of Defense dated'12 March 195^ ; The Secretary of Defense

i

iorwarded that memorandum to the Department of State with his full concurrence on 23 March. Understand Defense Member of US DEL holds a copy- . - •

2- Outline of French armistice proposal furnished in S2CT0 106 has been examined by JCS in light of their views

+

referred to above. They consider that French proposal would be regarded by Asian peoples as a Communist victory, particularly in the light of the current military situation in Indochina,

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An armistice under the proposed conditions would, in the

ir'

opinion, lead to a political stclemate attended by a-progressive deterioration oi the Franco-Vietnamese military position ultimately resulting in the loss of Indochina to the Communists •

3- Even were the Communists to agree

to undertake armistice

negotiations pursuant to the French proposal, such negotiations

■

would be expected to result either in a rapid capitulation of

-

the French to obtain an early cease-fire or in a protracted

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

/

■wrangle characterized by steadfast Communist adherence to an

*

inflexible position on important issues and "by repeated sub-stantive concessions by the French- Moreover,, experience in Korea indicates that regardless of the military and adtninis- , trative controls which might be embodied in the armistice conventions ^ it is certain that the Communists would flagrantly ■-

evade,'circumvent, and violate the agreements to suit their

ultimate purpose of subjugating all of Indochina. Even though , the Communists should agtfee to' international control machinery,

i

Communist practices would render it impotent, as in the case of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission in Korea.

■ #

H . Based on past performance, it is doubtful that the Com-

i

ffiunists would enter into a preliminary agreement to refrain from new military operations during the course of armistice negotiations. On the contrary, it is more likely that they would intensify military operations during negotiations 1 in order

-

to enhance' their negotiating position, whereas the French would

-

be under strong compulsion to avoid casualties during the negotiating period. •-••«-.

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■

5. The Joint Chiefs of Sts.it share the view of the US DEL that once armistice proposals are made the French would"rapidly move toward acceptance of the probable Communist counterproposal

of an immediate cease-fire- Should-the United States associate

■

itself with the French initial proposal, the United States would in all likelihood be confronted subsequently with the painful

■*' i.

alternatives of continuing to support the French through retrogressive positions* or of extricating itself at some point along

the way. •

■

m

*

6. The Joint Chiefs of Staff agree that it is no longer realistic to insist that the French continue aggressively to prosecute the Navarre Plan. At the same time, they adhere to their view that no satisfactory settlement is possible without

■

a substantial improvement in the French Union military situa-tion, and that, in the absence of a settlement which would reasonably assure the political and territorial integrity of the Associated States, any armistice entered into would inevitably lead to the eventual loss of that area to Communist

control.

?

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

•

* ■

7. In the light of the current situation, the Joint Chiefs I

of Staff consider that the United States should now adopt the K 1 \f^ following as It's milrimum'position, The United'States will not £u4

associate itself with any French proposal directed toward a *' .^t^

cease-fire in advance of a satisfactory political settlement, Jj ^v The United States urge3 the French Government to propose that &A*^ negotiations for a political settlement ho initiated at once* During the course of such negotiations, the French Union Forces should continue to oppose the forces of the Viet Minh with all the rieans at their disposal in order to reinforce the French negotiating/position, In the meantime, as a means >pf strengthen- ,

ov^<

£Cv.vv( *jc<f ^U-\r:\-^* vA C A &i*\ M K 'X tv**V .

■lng thtr French hand, the United States will, intensify Its efforts ' to organise and promptly activate a Southeast"Asian coalition for the purpose of preventing further expansion of Communist power in Southeast Asia. / If the French Government persists

in its intension to enter armistice negotiations or accedes to Immediate cease-fire negotiations 9 the United States will

V

*

disassociate itself from such negotiations in order to maintain

■

maximum freedom of action in taking whatever measures may be feasible for opposing the extension of Communist control into So uthea st Ad ia;/ * *

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+.

, — z%,

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASH IN GTON

* ■

rr!.

May 1, 1954

1":

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MBX08ASDOU FOR:

GHAXRMAS. JOIIiT CHIEFS 0? STAFF

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At & meeting in the President's office with the President } J. F. Dulles and Cutler, the President approved Paragraph lb of the tentative Record of Actions of 5/S/yk Meeting of the Notional security Council, but wished that the advice to Smith relative to Eden's proposal should also make clear the following points

1, Five Pover Staff Agency, elcne or vith other nations } is not to the United States a satisfactory substitute for a broad political coalition vhich vill include the South East Asian countries vhich are to be defended.

2. Five Pover Staff Agency examination is acceptable to see hov these nations cen give military aid to the Southeast Asian countries in their cooperative defense effort.

3. The United States vill not agree to a 'Vhite man f B party 11 to determine the problems of the Southeast Asian nations.

*•

P d

R035KT CUTIHR Special Assistant

to the President

N

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By; NWD Date: 2011

TOP SECRET

May 7, 195^

At a meeting in the President's office this morning with Dulles 3 three topics were discussed:

1. Whether the President should approve paragraph lb of the tentative Record of Action of the 5/6/5*+ NSC Meeting, which covers the proposed answer to the Eden proposal. The Secretary of State thought the text was correct- Wilson and Radford preferred the draft message to Smith for

Eden prepared yesterday MacArthur and Captain Anderson, and cleared by the JG3, which included in the Five Power Staff Agency Thailand and the Philippines. Radford thinks that the Agency (which has hitherto been not disclosed in SEA) has really completed its military planning; that if it is enlarged by top level personnel, its actions will be necessarily open to the world; that therefore some Southeast Asian countries should be included in it, and he Tears Eden f s proposal as an intended delaying action.

The Presient approved the text of paragraph lb, but suggested that Smith's reply to Eden's proposal should make clear the following:

_

1. Five Power Staff Agency, alone or with other nations, is not to the United States a satisfactory substitute for a broad political coalition which will include the Southeast Asian countries which are to be defended.

2. Five Power Staff Agency examination is acceptable to see how these nations can give military* aid to the Southeast Asian countries in their cooperative defense effort.

3. The United States will not agree to a "white man's party" to determine the problems of the Southeast Asian nations. j

I was instructed to advise Wilson and Radford of the above, and have done so,

2. . The President went over the draft of the speech which Dulles Is going to make tonight, making quite a few suggestions and changes in text. He though additionally the speech should include some easy to understand slogans, such as "The HS will never start a war," "The US will not go t to war without Congressional authority," "The US, as always, is trying V organize cooperative efforts to sustain the peace."

3. With reference to the cease-fire proposal transmitted by Bidault

to the French Cabinet, I read the following, as views principally of * Llitary members of the Planning Board, expressed in their yeaterday afternoon meeting

1. US should not support the Bidault proposal.

2. Reasons for this position: /

a. The mere proposal of the cease-fire at the Geneva Conference would destroy "the will to fight of French forces and make fence-* sitters jump to Vietmirih side.

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b. the Communists would evade covertly cease-fire controls.

3. The US should (as a last act to save Indo'China) propose to France that if the following 5 conditions are met, the US will go to . Congress for authority to intervene with combat forces:

>

a. grant of genuine freedom for Associated States

b. US take major responsibility for training indigenous forces

c. US share responsibility for military planning

d. - French forces to stay in the fight and no requirement of replacement by US forces.

(e. Action under JM auspices?)

This offer to be made known simultaneously to the other members of the proposed regional grouping (UK, Australia, N2, Thailand, Associated States, Philippines) in order to enlist their participation,

I then summarized possible objections to making the above proposal to the French:

a. No French Government is now competent to act in a lasting way,

b. There is no indication France wants to "internationalize" the conflict.

£. The US proposal would be made without the prior assurance of a regional grouping of SEA States, a precondition of Congress; although this point might be added as another condition to the proposal.

. d. US would be "baling out colonial France" in the eyes of the world,

£, US cannot undertake alone to save every situation of trouble.

—

I concluded that some PB members felt that it had never been made clear to the French that the US was willing to ask for Congressional authority, if certain fundamental preconditions were met; that these matters had only been hinted at, and that the record of history should be clear as to the US position. Dulles was interested to know the President's views, because he is talking with Ambassador Bonnet this afternoon. He indicated that he would mention these matters to Bonnet, perhaps making a more broad hint than heretofore. He would not circulate any formal paper to Bonnet, or to anyone else.

The President referred to the proposition advanced by Governor Stassen at the April 29 Council Meeting as not having been thoroughly thought out.

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He said that he had been trying to get France to "internationalize" matters for a long time, and they are not willing to do so. If it were though advisable at this time to point out to the French the essential preconditions to the US asking for Congressional authority to intervene, then it should also be made clear to the French as an additional precondition that the US would never intervene alone, that there must be an invitation by the indigenous people, and that there must be some kind of regional and collective action,

I understand that Dulles will decide the extent to which he cares to follow this line with Ambassador Bonnet. This discussion may afford Dulles guidance in replying to Smith's request about a US alternative to support the Bidault proposal, but there really was no decision as to the US attitude toward the cease-fire proposal itself.

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Excerpts fi'om the First Plenary Session

The Geneva Conference

Indochina Phase

May 8, 195^

The French Proposals

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The French Government is thus confident that it has done everything in its power to put an end to the conflict. Hot only has it removed all reason for this conflict to exist by recognizing fully and unreservedly the independence of Viet-Nam, Laos and Cambodia but, further-more, the French Government has manifested for a long time its readiness and its desire of obtaining a reasonable settlement which would allow for the hostilities to be brought to an end. This is the main and primary task assigned to this Conference....

"We propose that the Conference should, first of all, declare that it adopt the principle of a general cessation of hostilities in Indochina based upon the necessary guarantees of security.

...

"....in agreeing upon the withdrawal of the invading forces and the restoration of the territorial integrity of those states....

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...For France there is a Viet-Jism state of which the unity, terri torial integrity and independence must be respected....

"...•the most Just solution of the political problem can be found and finally assured only when the population is in a position to express in complete freedom its sovereign will by means of free elections. For the present moment I repeat the problem is that of bringing about a cessation of hostilities and the guaranteeing of that cessation. These guarantees, in our opinion, must be of two kinds.

"....the regular forces of the two parties would be brought together in clearly demarcated regrouping zones....the implementation of th agreement should be placed under the supervision of international commissions. ...

"....the agreement.... should be guaranteed in appropriate conditions by the states participating in the present Conference...,

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..The French proposal is as follows:

"I. Vietnam

1. All regular units to be assembled in assembly areas to be defined by the Conference on the basis of proposals by the Commanders-in-Chief.

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2. All elements not "belonging either to the amy or to the police forces to he disarmed.

3. All prisoners of war and civil internees to be released immediately.

H, Execution of the above provisions to be supervised by international commissions.

5- Hostilities to cease as soon as the agreement is signed. The assembly of troops and disarmament of forces as above provided to begin not later than x days (the number to be fixed by the Conference) after the signature of the agreement.

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"II. Cambodia end Laos

1. All regular and irregular Vietminh forces which have _ entered the country to be evacuated.

2. All elements which do not belong either to the army or to the police forces to be disarmed.

3. All prisoners of war and civil internees to be released

immediately,

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k* Execution of the above provisions to be supervised by international commissions.

M IH* These agreements shall be guaranteed by the States participating in the Geneva Conference. In the event of any violation thereof there shall be an immediate consultation between the guarantor States for the purpose of taking appropriate measures either individually or collectively.

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"This 5 Mr. President, is the proposal submitted to the Conference on the responsibility of the French Delegation and by that Delegation. Thank you, sir....

The Viet Hinh Proposals

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"....In the same spirit, expressing the sentiment of the three peoples of Vietnam, Khmer, and Pathet Lao, the delegation of the Democratic Republic of Viet Han proposes to the conference that it invite the official representatives of the governments of resistance of Khmer and of the government of resistance of Pathet Lao to take part in its work. We submit this proposal having in mind the following:

"....the peoples of Khmer and Pathet Lao have liberated vast areas of their national territory....

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"•-..These governments represent the great majority of the people of Khmer and Lao, the aspirations of 'whom they symbolize....

"....Alas, the delegation of the Democratic Republic of Viet Ham "proposes to the conference that it adopt the following resolution:

1,1 In view of the present situation of the countries of Indochina and in the interests of the thorough and objective examination of the question of the cessation of hostilities and the reestablishment of peace in Indochina, the conference recognises the necessity to invite the representatives of the governments of resistance of Khmer and Pathet Lao to take part in the work of the conference in regard to the question of the reestablishment of peace in Indochina. '

"Having submitted this proposal to the conference, I would ask the President of this meeting to authorize me to continue my statement when the conference has discussed the proposal that I have submitted

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The United States Proposal

fl Tbe United States proposes that any idea of inviting these nonexistent, so-called governments be rejected....

The Red China Position

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"....The delegation of the Peoples Republic of China fully supports the views of Mr.Pham van Dong....

The Soviet Union Position

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"in view of the aforesaid, the Soviet Delegation supports the proposal of the delegation of the Democratic Republic of Viet Rem to invite the delegates of the Democratic Governments of Pathet Lao and Khmer to take part in our Conference...."

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OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON 23, D. C,

9 Kay 195

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INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

KSMCRAiiDUM FOR 5323 SECB3TSBY OF nSESISE

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SUBJECT: Future U- S- Action Eegarding In&o-Chitia *

1. In light of the French having tabled an armistice uroposal at Geneva; the United States rn.uat now decide whether:

a. To intervene actively in the Indo-China war to redeem the situation.

b. To exercise all feasible pressure to require the French Government to avoid all compromise at Geneva and to take increased effective military and political action against the Viet Minh in Indo-China. This appears realistically possible only if the decision to implement a above is also made. t

* -

£. To adopt a passive policy toward the negotiations at Geneva while endeavoring to organize hastily a regional grouping, with U.S. participation^

to hold what remains of Southeast Asia. I

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2. Decisions a plus b offer the only sure way to stop the Conriirdst advene. They involve substantial risk of var with Red China and increased risk of general war. Howeverj recognizing the steadily increasing Soviet capabilities in nuclear warfare and the consequent steady diminution of the present military advantage-of the U.S. over the USSR^ these increased risks can more surely and safely be accepted now than ever again. " I

3. Decision £ would be a co,-promise involving clear possibilities for piecemeal advancement of Communist control over the balance of free Asia despite the best efforts of the U.S. to the contrary. The likelihood of further such advancement would be* somewhat diminished if the U.S. made publicly clear that the further support by Moscow and Peiping of Corronunist aggression or subversion

:tion by the U.S against

as Judged o-j- the U.S., would entail direct military the source or sources of this support. However } it

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t might be raotiths or years before further subversion would enable such a U.S. judgment. By then the increased Soviet nuclear capability might well inhibit the U.S. Government from implementing its announced, intention. Asia could thus be lost.

■ km Thereforej it would appear that the U.S. Government must decide whether to take the steps necessary to certain Ccrsmunisra in Asia within Red China bv " intervention in Indo-China or accept the probable loss of Asia to Comu&isia.

113 ftocaa^at cc::tai^s _L~ passs. Cow Ug. JL- of -X copies. Series

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Secretary Dulles has asked r^e to send you the attached draft instructions to our Delegation in GoaGYSo

Kc vould appreciate roc Giving the urgent comments or the Department ox" D&fensG 0:1 tlie^c instructions s

ana if possible it vould uo very helpful if I could have at least your initial reaction by toncercv

morning.

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I ?l\ also sending a copy of this letter with enclosure to AcV;dral HadforcV

Kiiclocaire;

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Dinooroiy yours 5

Bobort B. K-arplM

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Draft .instructions

She Honorable

Robert B # AncIor^on 5

Deputy Secretary of Defensej The Pentagonj

Washington*

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The following basic instructions., which have bean approved by the President, will guide you, as head of the United States Delegation, in your participation in the Indochina phase of the Geneva Conference.

J1- The presence of-a United States representative during the discussion at the Geneva Conference of "the problem of restoring peace in Indochina' 5 rests on the Berlin Agreement of February 13, 195^- Under that agreement the US, UK, France and USSR agreed that the four of them plus other interested states should be invited to a conference at Geneva on April 26 "for the vvrposo of reaching a peaceful settlement of the Korean question" and agreed further, that "the problem of restoring peace in Indochina" would also be discussed e,t Geneva by the four powers represented at Berlin, and Communist China arid other interested sfetes.

*

2* "You will not deal with the delegates o± the Chinese Communist regime, or any other regime not now diplomatically recognized by the United States, on any terms which imply politic?,! recognition or which concede to that regime any status other than that of a regime with which it is necessary to deal on a de f acto basis in order to end aggression, or the threat of aggression, and to obtain peace. * "•*- jp

3- The position of the United States in the Indochina phase of the Geneva Conference is that of an^interested nation which, however, is ^neither a belli gernt nor a principal in the negotiation.

K* The United States is participating ip the Indochina phase of the Conference in order thereby to a^slsN? in arriving*at decisions which will help the nations of that area peacefully to enjoy territorial integrity and political independence under stable and free governments with the opportunity to expand their economies, to realize ther legitimate national aspirations, and to develop security through

;ainst aggression, frora withir or people should not be ar;ialgar.iatt,d into the Coirjmmist bloc of imperialistic dictatorship, ;

5- The United States is not prepared to give its express o: implied approval to any cease fire, armistice or other settlement which would have the effect of subverting the existing lawful governments of the three aforementioned states or of permanently impairing their territorial integrity or of placing in jeopardy the forces of the French Union in Indochina, or which otherwise contravened the principles stated in (k) above.

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6. You shouldj in so far as is cr ,tible with these instructions, cooperate vith^the Delegation of France an:l vith the Delegations of other friendly participants in this phase of«the Conference.

■

7. If in your Judgment continued participation in the Indochina * phase of the Conference appears likely to involve the United States

in a result inconsistent with its policy, as stated above, you should ime&iately so inform your Government, receiveriding either withdrawal or the limitation of the U.S* role to that of an observer. If the situation develops such that, in*your opinion, either of such actions is essential under the circumstances and time is lacking for consultation vltfa Washington^ you may act in your discretion.

8. You are authorized to inform other Delegations at Ceneav of these instructions.

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INCOMING TELEGRAM

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ACTION COPY

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Control Rec'd:

3907

May 10, 195^

10:52 a.m.

PROM: Pari s

TO:

NO:

Secretary of State *}28?, May 10, 1 p.m.

NIACT

SENT DEPARTMENT bzQj; REPEATED INFORMATION SAIGON 509, NIACT GENEVA 20U.

DEPARTMENT AND GENEVA LIMIT DISTRIBUTION

SAIGON EYES ONLY AMBASSADOR

Laniel asked ine to come to see him at 10 Sunday night. I found him in a strong and courageous mood reminiscent of the conversations I had last summer at the beginning of the negotiations over the Navarre plan and quite in contrast with his mood of the past few weeks. He stated that he plans to take a very firm position in the National Assembly on Tuesday when Indochina problem comes up again. He plans to say that there are decisions of vital military importance to be taken daily at Geneva. If the National Assembly has someone else in mind whom they can put into office promptly to handle these decisions in a better fashion than he can, they should do so, but that if they are not (repeat not) prepared for the immediate reconstitution of a new government (which they are not) they should stop talking about Indochina and let the government get on with its difficult task,

■

Laniel then expressed considerable concern regarding (l) the prospects at Geneva; and (2) and more important, the military situation in Indochina. He felt that Indochina phase of Geneva conference hud got off to a bad start and considered it very likely that in view of the division and weakness among the Western powers, the Communists will not (repeat not) accept the French proposal for a cease-fire with guarantees, but will press for what in effect would be total surrender.

He said it had been made clear to the French delegation by the Communists that they could not (repeat not) have any conversations direct with the Viet Mirih at Geneva but must in all cases proceed through the Chinese. This, plus the fact of large scale Chinese intervention at Dien-Bien-Phu, made it clear that the enemy France

is facing

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' -2- 1*287, May 10, 1 p.m., from Paris.,

is facing is not (repeat not) the Viet Minh rebels, but Communist China- Laniel observed that Communist China had fought the whole UN to a standstill in Korea. Obviously France alone was • no (repeat no) match for China. The strength with which the French could oppose Chinese propositions at Geneva would have a direct connection with the amount of support they received from the other Western powers, particularly the US. In the final analysis, the only such support, which he felt would have any real effect on the Chinese, would be the direct threat of US military intervention. He very much feared that the Communist side would attempt so drag out the negotiations by interminable procedural debates on such subjects as the admission to the conference of non-existent Communist Governments of Laos and Cambodia until such time as they could gain a military decision in the field.

Laniel then turned to the immediate military problem. He said that the Viet Minh had^_announced that they would not (repeat not) cease operations this year during the monsoon. Their next objective, after Dlen-Bien-Pbu, would in all probability be Hanoi. Under ordinary circumstances it should take the * Viet Minh approximately a month to move their troops from Dien-Bien-Phu to the Hanoi area. However, it might be possible to reduce this period to two or three weeks If the Viet Minh made

p

an all-out effort. He also feared that in view of the success which the Chinese have had with their military Intervention at Dlen-Bien-Phu, they would not (repeat not) now hesitate to intervene further with supplies and even with additional personnel , to the extent necessary to gain a knockout victory at Hanoi.

therefore was vitally important, as a first order of business, the French to decide how to regroup their forces In Indochina

It for

so as best to protect the expeditionary corps. Laniel said that he would much prefer to* take these military decisions with the aid of competent US military advice, rather than to'take them by himself. He also said that he would have to ki dw. In connection with making _his decisions, what, if any, military action the US might be prepared to take in Indochina and under what, if any, circumstances. If there was no (repeat r-> bility of US military help at any point, the regroupmei, c forces would have to be much more*drastic, and the first to be done would be the complete evacuation and abandonment to the Viet Minh of the entire territories of Laos and Cambodia. He stated that there were 15 French Union battalions presently in laos which vould have to be redeployed 'to the Delta or to some area near the sea. In addition, the French-held lines ity the Delta would have to be greatly shortened.

possi-of

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ActlQfrf^ -3- 4287, May 10, 1 p.m., from Paris, Control 3907

: ■ As a specific request, Laniel asked that a US General officer, fully familiar with the terrain and conditions In Indochina be sent to Paris Immediately to confer witft General Ely, Pleven and himself. He said that at least In the first instance,<it P would be imperative to preserve the utmost secrecy concerning C this mission and that the only people who would be Informed of "UR it, in addition to the three previously mentio ned, w ould be

Bidault and Ma urice S chumann. He s aid tTia't^ It was imp o ssTole to spa re G eneral El y at t h is time; f or a t rip to W ash it xm, whic h was THe"reason for hi s r equest" that a US o ffic er com e to Paris. He emphas ized the importanc e^ ofT he US officertaing fully u p to date" andTnfQ rmed regarding' the T e rra in "and po s sTb 1 1 ~ ties in Indo china, In a ddition to"the help which tbis oT_fiogr ~ could g ive, La niel said that he would also require definite inf orma ti on Trom me asTo what the ^B~GovernmerTtr might "5e ^ prepared to do in t he w ay of military effort. He empEasized the great need for speecT and hoped tnat he could have an answer in principle very shortly to his request for advice from a US General. If the answer were favorable, the US General should arrive before the end of .the week in order to be fully effective.

DU:VH/ll

DILLON 7 :\

Mr. Sturm's office (FE) notified 5/10/2:12 p.m. Mr. Fisher's office (WE) notified 5/10/2:12 p.m

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10 May 195^

In reply refer to 1-11999

MEI'lOR/uTDUM FOR DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: United States "Posture 11 at Geneva Conference *

Captain Grant and I vent over vith Mr. Hensel the State Department "Draft Instructions to the U.S. Delegation at Geneva." We all agreed that as presently drafted they imply that the U.S. is at Geneva to "cheer the players" rather than to "pitch/ 1 The following specific comments are to raise the basic question vith State, which is: are we in Geneva to try to the limit of our capacities to influence the outcome along the lines we want - or are we content to take a passive role? We think that to accept the latter is to accept defeat in advance.

1; Regarding para, 3, the United States, while not a "belligerent," is certainly vitally interested in the successful handling of the Indochina phase at Geneva. Again, while not technically a "principal" in the negotiation it would seem the U.S. should act from its position as the strongest nation in the free world and endeavor consistently to influence the progress of negotiations towards our objectives. Consequently it is recommended that this paragraph be amended by the insertion of the word "vitally" before the words "interested nations" and the insertion of the word "technically" before the words "a belligerent or a principal."

2. Regarding para. h 9 this could be strengthened somewhat to give proper guidance as to "posture," by changing the words "to assist in arriving at decisions" to "to promote decisions." It is further suggested that, in the last sentence, the word "implies" be changed to "means

II

3- With regard to para, 6, the U.S. Delegation should manifest more positive efforts than merely those of "cooperation" with other Allied Delegations, ' To this end, this paragraph should be changed to read:

."You should, insofar as is compatible with these instructions, cooperate with and endeavor to influence the Delegation of France and with the Delegations of other friendly participants in this phase of the Conference in order to further the attainment of U.S. objectives ."

U» With regard to para. 7> there appears to be a profoundly important point involved. This point is, in effect, will the United States admit diplomatic defeat and cease to use all means to influence the Conference towards its ends, if the Conference appears to be going against us. It has been argued that this should be done so as to relieve the U.S. of responsibility and permit the U.S. to pursue, with complete freedom of action, such

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steps as it then felt were necessary. Consideration must be given to what steps could be taken if we withdraw from a conference which we helped initiate and of which we were an inviting Power. If such steps to be contemplated include any direct militaxy action in the area, the U.S. vould be risking being called an "aggressor" if it tried to take action of this sort while the Conference was still in session. Para* 29 of , NSC 5^05> "the approved policy on Southeast Asia, states "If the French actually enter into negotiations with the Communists, insist that the United States be consulted and seek to influence the course of the negotiations." You presumably will want to discuss this coinment of paragraph 7 with Admiral Radford.

In case you want to send a written reply to Mr. Murphy we attach a draft. Note that it says you have discussed it with Admiral Radford who agrees. We have not shown it to Admiral Radford so you should do so before sending it (his office has been given a copy) # Also note it questions the need for sending any such instructions on "posture" at this late date.

SIGNED

C. H. Bonesteel, III Brig. General, USA Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for National Security Affairs

Attachment - 1 Draft Memo

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'Orig - DepSecDef Cy 2 - Acta Radford

3 - Capt Grant, OFMA k - ISA(R&C) Files . 5 - Stayback

CHBonesteel/* WlO May 5U OASD(ISA) 21 840 78IOI

COPY

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

TOP SECEET

03630 195^ MAY 11 B* ^:09

SENT TO: Amembassy Paris NIACT ^023

EYES ONLY AMBASSADOR FROM SECRETARY

RPT Araconsul GENEVA TEDUL 5^

EYES ONLY UNDER SECRETARY FROM SECRETARY

REUKTEL U287 and our ^017

1. We fully realize need for prompt decisions regarding international-izing the "war. Various factors combine to suggest that it may be premature to pose issue of internationalizing for decision at this moment.

(a) If raised before French realize fully that choice is between internationalizing and virtual surrender, proposal to internationalize might well be rejected, leaving no alternative but capitulation.

(b) British are more likely to support or acquiesce in intervention if Geneva has been shown to offer no prospect of solution,

(c) Australian government would almost certainly not take a position until after elections at end of May,

Even so it seems desirable for Laniel to know in general terms conditions Me would require for intervention because of influence on current French decisions in military field in Indo-China and in political field in Geneva.

^6185

2. President

Drafted by:

JED/ma 5-11-5^ SS/S: JCK/

Approved by President Eisenhower

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(a) Tb*t uS military participation had been formally requested by Franco and three Assoc:^ ted States: • '.-'■'

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•(b) That Thailar.cl, Philippines, Australia,

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similar invitations and that v;e v;ore satisfied that first two would also accopt at enco; that next two

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(c) That s©2*e aspect .of matter rrould be oresent e

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to VZx promptly* such as n oy request f?on laos, Canbodia

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cr Thailand for peace observation comiissionj

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(d) That France guarantees to Associated States complete independencej including unqualified option to

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(o) France would undertake -not to withdraw

its forces from Indochlra ditriijLg period of united

- principally air and ssa -

action'so that forces, fron U. So/and others would bo

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supplementary and not in substitution;

(f) That agreement was reaeked on training of

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native troops and on command structure for united

action4 •

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So U*S» would require all these conditions to bo accepted by French Cabinet and authorized or endorsed by French National Assembly* Tals would bo especially important in view of uncertain tenure of cay French governments U.S* would have fully ccasaittod itself once it agreed to. intervene and would have to be ert>le to rely on adherence to conditions by any successor French government

4

You will realize that intervention nipht involve

consequences of utmost gravity. Reactions of Cornrramist * bloc could not bs predicted. Also, if it bocano necessary to proceed without active U,L participation, the

'*

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page 4_o£ telegram to AmQESbS S3^— PAR-IS—*-r-

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I • implications would be extremely serious and Tap-

*

reaching., Removal any taint colonialism would be

essential to success of operation in Indochina, to

♦ ■ -

attraction of potential Asian support, and to fore-

stalling opposition by other Asian and Middle Eastern

countries* In view of those factors, you will

appreciate that conditions indicated would be absolutely indispensable as basis for our action*

-

5 0 The U.S. would continue its efforts to broaden united action operation by seeking to bring in other countries whose interests are affectod and to formalize * : the coalition as, for example 3 by negotiation of regional defense pact*

./-. 6. Unless you consider timing unwise in light

of factors stated in para 1, you may outline foregoing -

as . ■

orally to Laniel/your estimate of indispensable condi-

■ tions in light of your knowledge of current high-level

thinking in Washington in advance receipt by you of

official reaction to your report of his proposal» Tou

should leave nothing in writing with hinw You should

make clear to him, however ; that we would not wish to

proceed with any of this program unless National Assembly

supports position of his government , as outlined first

paragraph your cable Q If that occurs and X&niel wishes

« TOP SEC S2 . - ■

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to pursue matter on basis outlinod above, he should formally roquost opening of disousoions with us on procedure for fulfilling essential conditions* At that stage U.S« Would expect to consult with U»K 0

7. If you docifie unv/iso to ftsJC tall: with Lcniol now on above basis ; please cablo*

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• rm Q\ i

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDE]IT " . %

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL Washington

May 11, 195^

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

THE DIRECTOR, FOREIGN OPERATIONS ADMINISTRATION

SUBJECT: Position of the United States Regarding the Provision

of Military Aid to Indochina in the Event of a Cease-Fire

REFERENCE: NSC Action No. 1111

The National Security Council and Mr. Tuttle for the Secretary of the Treasury at the 196th Council meeting on May 8, 195*4, ■ ■ discussed the recommendation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the subject, and adopted the following statement of policy with respect thereto (NSC Action No. 1111):

■

In the event of a cease-fire in Indochina in advance of an acceptable armistice agreement, including international controls, the shipment of military end-items under US MDAP provided under the "Agreement for Mutual Defense Assistance in Indochina between the United States of America and Cambodia, France, Laos, and Vietnam 11 will immediately be suspended. In such event, the entire question of US aid to Indochina "will be re-examined in the light of circumstances then existing. The US also assumes that, in such event, military end-items previously delivered in Indochina by the US will be recovered or destroyed to the maximum practicable extent.

< Accordingly, the above statement of policy, as approved by the President, is transmitted herewith to the Secretary of Defense for guidance and appropriate action, and to the Secretary of State and the Director, Foreign Operations Administration for information.

It is requested that special security precautions be observed in the handling of the above statement on policy and that acce ss to it be very strictly limited on an absolute need-to-know basis.

Signed: JAMES S. MY, Jr.

Executive Secretary

COPY

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

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The following basic instructions, which have been approved by the

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President, and which are in confirmation of those already givan you orally, will guide you, as head of the United States Delegation, in your

participation in the Indochina phase of the Geneva Conference, " |Y)

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1. The presence of a United States representative during the discussion^

4

at the Geneva Conference of "the problem of restoring peace in Indochina"

rests on the Berlin Agreement of February 18, 1954* Under that agreement

the USj UK, France, and USSR agreed that the four of them plus other

» •

interested states should be invited to a conference at Geneva on April 28 "for the purpose of reaching a peaceful settlement of the Korean question"

I • ^

and agreed further, that "the problem of restoring peace in Indochina" would also be discussed at Geneva by the four powers represented at Berlin

and Communist China and other interested states,

*

2. You will not deal with the delegates of the Chinese Communist regime, or any other regime not now diplomatically recognized

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3. The position of the United States in the Indochina phase of the Geneva. Conference is that of an interested nation which, however, Is neither a belligerent nor a principal in the negotiation.

4. The United States is participating in the Indochina phase of the Conference in order thereby to assist In arriving at decisions which will help the nations cf that area peacefully to enjoy territorial integrity arid political independence under stable and free governments with the opportunity

*

to expand their economies, to realize their legitimate ;£T,national aspirations, and to develop security through Individual and collective defense against aggression, from within or without. This implies that these people should

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not be amalgamated into the Communist bloc of Imperialistic dictatorship).

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5. The United States is not prepared to give its express or ii plied

approval to any cease-fire, armistice, or other settlement which SE^<lkx would have the effect of subverting the existing lawful governments of the three

■

aforementioned states or of permanently impairing their territorial Integrity

or of placing in jeopardy the forces of the French Union in Indochina, or which otherwise contravened the principles s&Hsix stated in (4) above.

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You should, insofar as is compatible with those Instructions,

cooperate with the Delegation of France and with the Delegations of other friendly participants in this phase oi the Conference..

*7

If in your judgment continued participation in the Indochina phas

se

of the Conference appears likely to involve the United States in a result inconsistent with its policy, as stated above, you should immediately so inform your Government, reconimehdina either s withdrawal or the limitation of the US role to that of an observer. It the situation develops such that, in your opinion, either of such actions is essential under the circumstances

-

, and time is lacking for consultation with Uh v :^^ ; ^ix Washington, you may

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act in your discretion. .

S. You are authorised to infom other delegations at Geneva oi those

ek instructions. END VERBATIM TEXT

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A COHCi'Ff FOR AC r CICir WITH RKGARD TO

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1. To find a way to resolve the numerous conflicting factors of the Indochina problem in a way which will preserve Indochina to the free world.

FACTS EFARJRG 011 THE PRO^nilM

*

2. The loss of Indochina to Coiamunist control, cither by negotiation at Geneva or by force of Vietminh arms,, would have grave consequences to the free world.

3. The United States might he willing, to intervene in Indochina if the following problems could be resolved:

a. The U.S. must not be supporting "colonialism" in such intervention.

b. The U.S. must intervene in some sort of allied action.

c.. Th^ United IGtigdom and the Asian nations related to her, particularly India, appear to be opposing U.S. intervention. This opposition is presently being Manifested by "Asia for Asians" proposals based on the Colombo nations supervising and guaranteeing an Indochina settlement.

k* There arc two further factors bearing on U.S. intervention:

a* The need for Congresstonal agreement. This is at least partially contingent upon a clear resolution of the "colonialism" factor.

b. The possibility of Red Chinese intervention, separate issue presently allowed for in I5GC 5^5-

This is a somewhat

5. The U.S. is ei:deavoring to avoid the loss of Indochina and to resolve the colonialism problem by the creation of a regional grouping. It is not clear that a grouping -adequate to resolve the colonialism problem could be used for intervention'in Indochina.

DISCUSS IQU ■; ..

6. To d.atc there has been some lack of understanding amongst our Allies, "in Europe and Asia" as to firm U.S. intentions with regard to Indochina. This may arise because of a lack of an overall concept which will guide the U.S. as to its objectives and actions,

7. The following is an admittedly imperfect attempt to set forth a possible concept.

a. The U.S. is unwilling to permit the loss of Indochina to Communist control by whatever raeans.

Ihls document must not be reproduced wHjicjt permission of the originating office.

160

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The U.S. is prcj^arccl to join actively in tuo regional groupings

The first such grouping will include nations ready immediately to intervene in Indochiia provide:! ccrta: conditions arc.met. The second such grouping should be defined, with wider participation j to guarantee agaiust Communist aggression or subversion, all of Southeast Asia with the exception of Iixic China go long as active figjitlng continues.

j-

c. The smaller regional grouping, for active intervention, should % consist of at least the U.S., France, the Associated States, Thailand and the Philippines, A precondition of its formation is the absolute declaration by France of the independence of the Associated State:

5.

d. The second regional grouping should be open to all countries vho wisrf~to join, including the Colombo countries } Korea and; perhaps, the Chinese nationalists. The Asian members 3 definitely including the Colombo countries; would be invited to maintain the peace and security of the area of Indochina progressively liberated according to the procedures set forth

below*

■

e. Intervention in the Indochina conflict by the first regional grouping would be on Invitation by the Associated States. Operations would be conducted from as Eiany Vietnam held areas as possible to destroy organized Vietminh resistance therein and to develop a "front" which would delimit

the areas of independent Vietnam. These areas would be expanded as rapidly as was consistent with the destruction of organized Vietminh forces therein. As soon as a substantial area was "liberated", the "active" regional grouping; i.e,, the U.S. and France, would turn over the maintenance .of order, anti-guerrilla operations and anti-subversion to the Vietnam Government assisted by the Asian members of the second and "peaceful" regional grouping. Military installations necessary to support active combat could be kept as "enclaves" within the liberated area.

-

8. The above concept; complicated though it may be, would seem to resolve to a considerable degree the problem of U.S. intervention being construed

as "colonialism. 11 It would further be an offer to the Colombo nations to guarantee the progressive settlement of Iildochina by force of arms in which they are not askel to participate. It would clarify to the world that the U.S. means what is has frequently said, that the U.S. is determined that Communist expansion by aggressive force of arms shall not be permitted.

i

9. The concept, to be effective in halting the deterioration of the free

world position in Indochina and at Geneva, would, need to be publicly presented to the world, after the decision to do so was reached by the Executive Branch and Congress. It would have to be presented in its entirety to obtain the psychological as well as facttial resolution of the "colonial" problem.

EECa-E-EHDATJOfJ ' '

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10, It is recommended that this concept be given appropriate study and further definition by the interested Departments and Agencies.

481

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 633 J 6. By: NWD Date: 2011

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THSSpRp JltfclMTJ " -UJ Wi rm uj- mm**.

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Info

FROM: PARIS

Control: 6CC8 L/d: MAY I'l, 1954 6S39 P M

TO: Secretary o:? Btato

HO: 4 383, MAY Hi } 10 PM

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SENT DEPARTMENT 4 383, REPEATED INFORMATION NIACT GENEVA 237, ' i LIMIT DISTRIBUTION

EYES ONLY UNDER SECRETARY

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I SAW LANIEL AND SCHUMANN THIS EVENING REGARDING DEPTEL /i023o BEFORE DISCUSSION STARTED ON REFTEL, LANIEL MADE A NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS AND ASKED TWO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS, HE SAID THAT HE WAS SENDING GENERAL ELY TO INDOCHINA IMMEDIATELY. HE WILL LEAVE ON SATURDAY OR SUNDAY AND WILL STAY IN INDOCHINA ONLY TWO TO FOUR DAYS. PURPOSE OF HIS VISIT IS TO CHECK UP ON MILITARY SITUATION ON THE SPOT AMD ON PHYSICAL AND MENTAL CONDITION OF GENERAL NAVARRE. BECAUSE OF ELY'S PROSPECTIVE ABSENCE FROM PARIS, LANIEL SUGGESTED THAT GENERAL TRAPNELL, OR WHOEVER ELSE WE PLAN TO SEND TO PARIS IN ANSWER TO LANIEL'S REQUEST FOR AMERICAN MILITARY ADVICE, ARRIVE APPROXIMATELY THURSDAY OF NEXT WEEK. GENERAL ELY WILL UNDERTAKE SUCH RE-GROUPING OF FRENCH FORCES AND SHORTENING OF LINES AS MAY BE NECESSARY. THIS WILL PROBABLY INCLUDE WITHDRAWAL OF PORTION. AND MAYBE LARGE PORTION, OF THE FRENCH FORCES NOW IN LAOS, FINAL DECISIONS, HOWEVER, WILL ONLY BE TAKEN UPON RETURN OF GENERAL ELY TO PARIS,

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LANIEL THEN POSED FOLLOWING TWO GUEST IONS J ONE, COULD THE UNITED STATES FIND A WAY TO GUARANTEE THE BORDERS AND THE INDEPENDENCE OF LAOS AND CAMBODIA. IF SUCH A GUARANTEE COULD BE MADE, HE FELT IT WOULD BE OF GREAT HELP AFTER THE FRENCH FORCES HAD BEEN WITHDRAWN. LANIEL'S SECOND QUESTION DEALT WITH ACTION UNITED STATES WILL TAKE IN THE CASE OF INTERVENTION BY MIG 15'S AIRCRAFT. HE SAID THAT FOR HIS OWN PROTECTION .. HERE HE WOULD LIKE DEFINITE ASSURANCE, WRITTEN IF POSSIBLE, «W* THAT U * S * AVIATION WOULD COME INSTANTLY TO THE HELP OF FRENCH u L~ FORCES IN DELTA IF THEY WERE ATTACKED BY MIG'S. HE SAID THAT

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 NND Project Number; NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 2011

*■

TOP SECRET

*

-2~ 4 383, MAY 1A, 10 PM, FROM PARIS

FINALLY, MAURICE SCHUMANN TRANSMITTED A REQUEST OF BIDAL'LT'S THAT U.S. DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE"IH THE NEXT DAYS TO ACCELERATE DELIVERY OF PLANES AMD EQUIPMENT IN THE EVENT THAT A CEASE FIRE SHOULD BE NEGOTIATED AT GENEVA WHICH WOULD NATURALLY BRING .TO A HALT SUCH DELIVERIES.

I THEN REFERRED TO QUESTION OF LOCATION OF NEGOTIATIONS AND EXPRESSED DEPT'S VIEWS IN FAVOR OF PARIS. SCHUMANN AND LANIEL ' AGREED THAT PARIS WOULD BE PREFERABLE TO WASHINGTON AND ACCORDINGLY IT CAN BE ACCEPTED AS AGREED THAT NEGOTIATIONS ALONG LINES OF REFTEL WILL CONTINUE TO TAKE PLACE IN PARIS.

I THEN OUTLINED REQUIREMENTS LISTED IN PARAGRAPHS 2 AND 3 OF REFTEL. LANIEL AND SCHUMANN LISTENED VERY QUIETLY AND SERIOUSLY AND ON THE WHOLE APPEARED WELL PLEASED WITH THIS CLARIFICATION OF U.S. POSITION, THEY SAID THAT NATURALLY .. THEY DID NOT HAVE ANY INFO REGARDING THE VIEWS OF OTHER COUNTRIES IN THE AREA AND THEY WOULD APPRECIATE BEING KEPT INFORMED BY U.S. OF PROGRESS TOWARD FULFILLING CONDITION INDICATED IN PARAGRAPH 2(B) WHICH WAS BEYOND THEIR CONTROL. THEY WERE PARTICULARLY IMPRESSED AND PLEASED BY INDICATION IN THAT PARAGRAPH THAT ACTUAL PARTICIPATION BY U.K. WAS NO LONGER A PREREQUISITE TO U.S. ACTION.

• LANIEL AND SCHUMANN HAD ONE SERIOUS OBJECTION TO U.S. CONDITIONS. THIS, AS EXPECTED, MAS TO THE CONDITION THAT FRANCE PJJ?iLICLY_ACCO RD TO A SSOCIATED STATES M-MT^OFJllliiDRAWJL

• FROM FRENCH UNIO N AT _&MY_ TIEE « WHEN I EXPLAINED U.S. REASOTfS FOR THIS POSITION AS OUTLINED IN DEPTEL k&Sk , THEY SAID THEY COULD SEE HOW SUCH A STATEMENT MIGHT BE OF SOME HELP WITH NEHRU BUT THAT FRENCH PUBLIC OPINION WOULD NEVER UNDERSTAND WHY IT WAS NECESSARY TO MAKE SUCH A STATEMENT WHEN IT HAD NEVER BEEN REQUESTED BY ANY OF THE THREE ASSOCIATED STATES. THEY THEN POINTED OUT THE FACT THAT THE VIET MINH ARMISTICE PROPOSALS, DISHONEST THOUGH THEY WERE, NEVERTHELESS LOOKED TOWARD THE POSSIBILITY OF THE VIETMINH JOINING THE FRENCH UNION. (COMMENT; I AM CERTAIN THAT UNLESS VIE CAN FIND SOME WAY TO GET AROUND THIS REQUIREMENT,

FRENCH WILL NEVER ASK FOR OUTSIDE ASSISTANCE.) AFTER HEARING STRONG STATEMENT ON THE SUBJECT BY BOTH LANIEL AND SCHUMANN, I SAID THAT I HOPED WE COULD CONTINUE CONVERSATIONS ON THIS SUBJECT IN ORDER TO FIND A FORMULA THAT WOULD SATISFY' U.S. REQUIREMENTS AND AT THE SAME TIME COULD BE ACCEPTED BY THE FRENCH PARLIAMENT. LANIEL AND SCHUMANN AGREED THAT WE SHOULD TALK FURTHER ON THIS SUBJECT. "' --■■•■

■

LANIEL AND SCHUMANN HAD ONE OTHER QUESTION REFERRING TO SUBPARAGRAPH 2(E) WHICH STATES THAT FORCES FROM U.S. WOULD BE

PRINCIPALLY AIR

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 633 J 6. By: NWD Date: 2011

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PRINCIPALLY AIR AND SEA "AND OTHERS*, THEY ASKED ME TO FIND OUT WHAT WAS MEANT BY OTHER FORCES, LANIEL INDICATED THAT IT WOULD BE VERY IMPORTANT TO HAVE ARTILLERY FORCES AS WELL AS SOME GROUND FORCES, IN THIS CONNECTION, THEY MENTIONED THE POSSIBILITY OF THE USE OF MARINES. COMMENT: I FEEL THAT WHILE FRENCH GOVT WOULD NOT LOOK FORWARD IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES TO THE NECESSITY OF ANY SUBSTANTIAL INVOLVEMENT BY U.S. GROUND FORCES, THEY NEVERTHELESS FEEL THAT IT IS VERY IMPORTANT THAT WE PROVIDE AT LEAST SOME TOKEN GROUND FORCES SO THAT OUR PARTICIPATION IS NOT LIMITED STRICTLY TO NAVAL AND AIR FORCES.)

BOTH LANIEL AND SCHUMANN ACCEPTED WITHOUT QUESTION AS BEING WHOLLY JUSTIFIED U.S. REQUIREMENT THAT CONDITIONS BE ACCEPTED BY FRENCH CABINET AND ENDORSED BY NATIONAL ASSEMBLY. THEY THEN SAID THAT THEY WOULD PROBABLY WANT TO SPEAK TO ME OVER THE WEEKEND AFTER THEY HAD HAD TIME TO THINK FURTHER REGARDING U.S. CONDITIONS. I MADE IT CLEAR THAT CONDITIONS AS OUTLINED REPRESENTED PRESENT HIGH LEVEL THINKING IN WASHINGTON AND DID NOT REPRESENT AS YET ANY COMMITMENT ON THE PART OF U.S. GOVT. SCHUMANN THEN SAID THAT NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD BE PURSUED IN THE GREATEST SECRECY UNTIL SUCH TIME AS FULL AGREEMENT HAD BEEN REACHED. HE SAID THAT PREMATURE PRESS LEAKS COULD MAKE THINGS MOST DIFFICULT AND HE REFERRED TO AN AP PRESS STORY TODAY FROM WASHINGTON, LANIEL AND SCHUMANN THEN SAID THAT THEY HOPED THAT NEGOTIATIONS .COULD CONTINUE RAPIDLY AND THAT WHEN AND IF FULL AGREEMENT HAD BEEN REACHED, WE WOULD BE IN A POSITION TO MAKE PUBLIC DECLARATION OF A SORT WHICH WOULD INFLUENCE COMMUNIST NEGOTIATORS AT GENEVA,

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inclined to question desirability of sending hira next week in light of ESy's

trip. Request your recommendation.

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2. We know no (rpt no) way to guarantee borders and independent pi V * Laos and Cambodia. From military standpoint such guarantee would be ^

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impractical, From legal standpoint the processes requiring Senate

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action would be too complicated to affect present situation. Believe best course regarding Laos and Cambodia is to have them join with Thailand in seeking UN Peace Observation Commission, This would carry at least certain moral implications if the move was strongly backed by US and other

powers

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3, If collective defense arranged as contemplated, this would of course

embrace situation resulting from intervention by MEGS. If such intervention.

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Page 2 of telisgram to Amembassy PARIS

TOP SECRET

should occur prior to conclusion of collective defense arrangements,

then the US reaction would have to be judged under circumstances of the

moment, but in any case President would expect to make his action

dependent upon Congressional author!zation, assuming US interests not

(rpt not) directly attacked. However, Defense advises that their

intelligence does not (rpt not) indicate that Chinese airfield situation is such

as to make such intervention seem likely,

km Our normal processes of delivery of planes and equipment are proceeding and do not (rpt not) plan any interruption. We must be vigilant to prevent what in effect would be turning over equipmwnt to the enemy* It is of course absolutely indispensable that any French cease fire or armistice negotiations should protect the right of the US to repossess itself of the planes and equipment which it has delivered for purposes of fighting Communists under agreements which give us the right to recapture ! if this use no longer contemplated. '

5, Note acceptance Paris as place of negotiations.

-

6. Respecting, conditions named our h023> would like your suggestion regarding condition 2(d). We believe there might be some flexibility on our side regarding formulation but there cannot be any equivocation on

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completeness of independence if we are to get Philippines and Thail?-»d to associate themselves. Without* them, whole arrangement would collapse

1*66

TOP SECRET

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

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(rpt not) because we are not/prepared to intervene purely as part of a white

Western coalition which is shunned by all Asian states,

7. The phrase "and others 1 ' v;ss designed to refer to other forces

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than those of US and France, The formula ^principally air and sea. n was not (rpt not) designed to exclude anti-aircraft artillery, and limited

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US ground forces for protection of bases which might be used by U3 fces naval and air forces. ..

8. Will do best respecting secrecy. The press report referred to N Suggest Laniel that Fr Srnb Wash Tie instructed to exercise utmost discredit almost certainly came from French Embassy./;re these negotiations.

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9, FYI, we believe as suggested yens: last sentence principal French

. motivation is to use US position to get better terms at Geneva. We have

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no (rpt no) objection to this, provided action is consistent with the principles which we think necessary and have reported to Under Secretary

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at Geneva as essential to avoid thinly disguised capituation. We would

expect if the French and our selves are working together to create collective

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defense of the area, we should also work closely at Geneva and the French

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Delegation soMa&x would -not fcDiiic (rpt net) agree at Geneva to terms which we felt involved virtual abandonment of area to Communist forces, Certainly we should have full opportunity to know what was going on and have timely opportunity to express our views^ and if they are ignored, pcclx publicly to disassociate cur selves, ,

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10. Re final sentence para. 6, TEDUL 54, we consider Laniel ! s comments

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in Paris 4383 as preliminary observations and not (rpt not) as constituting formal request for opening discussions. Therefore we will not (rpt not) consult with UK and possibly others until we hear results of your further

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talk with Laniel over weekend. We assume that French will talk to no one

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11. We are also not (rpt not) clear how Laniel proposes to handle this question procedurally with Cabinet and Parliament and would appreciate your own comment on this. We ourselves would have to have consultations

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FROM: Paris

Pco'dJ May 17, 1954 10:30 a.m.

TO: Secretary o" BtatQ HO: W02, May 17, 2 p.m.

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SENT DEPARTMENT 4402, REPEATED INFORMATION GENEVA 243-

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Re DEPTEL 4023, paragraph 2D.

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I would like to propose for consideration a radically different approach to the clarification of the full independence of the Associated States, and in particular of Vietnam. The establishment of the right of withdrawal from the French Union seems to me to be a purely juridical approach, which does not go to the roots of the problem. It is also unacceptable to French opinion for a large number of reasons, among which are (l) that it throws into question the entire concept of the French Union as a union of free and Independent peoples, and (2) It casts doubt on the veracity and honor of France in her recent statements that Vietnam has now been granted full Independence and, subsequent to the granting of that independence, has chosen to retain membership in the French Union.

The real problem to me seems to be how to establish in US and Asian opinion the fact that the Associated States have, or will have, a similar degree of independeee to that possessed by Indonesia, India, and Pakistan. * I consider that the two basic treaties rejently negotiated between France and Vietnam (A) granting full independence, and (3) establishing Vietnam 1 s membership in French Union do establish this type of independence for Vietnam. However,, the situation is obscured and complicated by the following factors:

1, The presence on Vietnamese soil of a large French expedi tionary corps.

2. The existence of a state of war requiring a French commander as supreme military commander in Vietnam. . jS

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* TOP SECRET. -2-#4402, May 17, 2 p.m., from Paris

The present situation Is Indochina is in some ways comparab! to that: during the darkest early hours o*f the Korean war, when there was treachery and disaffection on all sides in South Korea, when the lines were being held primarily by American troops, and when a large part of world opinion regarded the South Korean Government as a US puppet, 1-he real independence of the South Korean Government only became fully apparent when South Xor-ea came into possession of an army of its own capable of independent action, I feel that independence of Vietnam will become perfectly clear after a strong national army has been created^and after the bulk, if not all, of the French Sxceditionary Corns has been withdrawn.

I would assume that the agreement which we will require regarding "raining of troops would give uhe US primary responsibility for the training and equipping of a Vietnamese national &rs*y'. There has in the past been doubt as to the ability and good faith of the French military command in this direction* An agreement giving this responsibility to the US should remove these doubts and do more than anything else to make clear the independence of Vietnam. In addition, I would think it pass Lble for the French to make some sort of state-men": saying that after peace had been established, and a Vietnamese national army had been established, it was their intention to withdraw the Expeditionary Corps. In' this onneotioa, the base rights which the French have in Laos by of the recently negotiated Franco-Laotian treaty, and *hich ":ie;~ expect to acquire in Vietnam by virtue of

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If this picture can be presented in clear terms, which pr> sentation will in considerable measure be a US responsibility, I should think that the independence of the Associated States would be fully, clarified in US opinion and in the opinion of friendly Asian states. I would appreciate receiving Department T s comments on this type of approach prior to discussing it with the French.

DILLON

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43918

TOP SECRET

mi

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

INCOMING TELEGRAM

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ACTION COPY

TOP SECRET

Control: Rec'd:

FROM: Paris

TO: Secretary of State

NO: kkkO, May 19, *4 p.m.

PRIORITY

SENT DEPARTMENT 4MK), REPEATED INFORMATION GENEVA 257

EYES ONLY UNDERSECRETARY

DEPARTMENT LJfflT DISTRIBUTION

Re DEPTEL Ul30

I have "been much concerned abo\it EDC situation for some time. Two things are perfectly clear*

1. That as long as present state of acute crisis exists regarding Indochina there is no hope of a successful debate on EDC. The singleminded effort for a period of at least two weeks of all pro-EDC elements in government will be necessary in order to have chance of ratification of EDC by French Parliament.

877U

May 19, 1954

3:11 p.m.

2. Any attempt to force EDC to a vote before Indochina crisis has been further clarified would lead to indefinite postponement or defeat of EDC.

While pro-ECD members of French Government originally saw no connection between EDC and Geneva, the fall of Dien Bien Phu and present military crisis in Indochina has drastically changed situation, EDC is'for the moment Inextricably intertwined with both Geneva and Franco-US negotiations regarding united action in Indochina. While there is no direct logical connection between the two, the way in which we handle present Indochina negotiations with French is bound to have great effect on our friends in Fi^ench Government who are supporting EDC. The two key elements in this situation are (l) the finding of a solution to the clarification of- the independence of Associated States that will not require France to publicly proclaim right of withdrawal from French union and (2) the question of Marines for Indochina as raised by Schumann In EMBTEL hhl6. Unless we can satisfy this request for Marines, I am very much afraid that the emotional reaction here will be such that there will be no hope of EDC ratification at least for months to come.

PERMANENT RECORD COPY

U72

Indeed, if we

TOP SECRET

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 2011

TOP SECRET -2- W+0, Hay 19, h p.m., from Paris

Indeed, if we fail to reach agreement with. French for joint, effective and hopeful action in Indochina, the Laniel government which is living on borrowed time granted by National Assembly in the hope that, thanks to United States support, an honorable solution can be reached at Geneva, will probably fall, A government pledged to peace in Indochina at any price is then likely and such'a government is also likely to bury EDC for good. As regards Geneva, I am sure that Soviets must be well aware of the reaction of Indochina crisis on EDO situation here. Therefore, I would assume that they would, while endeavoring to appear reasonable in public and before world opinion, take action to prevent any agreement in Geneva other than ignominious surrender at least until July when there would no longer be time to debate EDC here prior to summer recess. Therefore, the only way that I can see to push EDC to a vote here with a reasonable chance of success is to bring present United States-French negotiations on Indochina to a successful conclusion in next two or three weeks. Such a result would enable us to give solid support to French at Geneva and would recreate the spirit of alliance between our two countries which has been lacking since Dien Bien Phu.

Meanwhile, technical progress on EDC has continued. I do not consider that French have failed to live up to agreement regarding setting date for debate as Saar precondition has not yet been met. Delay on this is clearly a joint Franco-German responsibility and connot by any stretch of the imagination be imputed solely to French. There has been real progress in these negotiations which as reported are now concerned almost entirely with the two words ft corresponding relations" in Article 12 of Naters T report, Schumann told me that if Teitgen and Adenauer could not reach complete agreement at Strasbourg he expected another meeting with Hallstein. He also told me that if no new points were brought up by Hallstein, it should be possible to reach complete agreement at this next meeting. There has also been real progress on protocol signature problem as has recently been reported by Bruce mission. If Socialist Party Congress should live up to Mollet's expectations, Laniel ! s position regarding EDC will he greatly strengthened, not only in Parliament, but also in committees and, in particular, in Steering Committee where first test of strength will take place. MRP Congress due May 27 and 28 also expected take strong pro-EDC position.

In view of above, I feel that present is not quite the time for letter such as described in reference telegram. I feel we should concentrate our immediate efforts on conclusion of Indochina negotiations with France and on bringing about a Saar settlement and agreement on signature of the protocols, all prior to June 1.

Delivery

^73

TOP SECRET

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

TOP SECRET

-3~ kkk0 9 May 19, k p.m., from Paris

Delivery of letter of type indicated in reference telegram at this time, in the midst of crucial France-US negotiations on Indochina, -would in my opinion not have effect of exerting pressure on French, but would simply ensure defeat or indefinite postponement of EDC and would greatly strengthen group in French Government favoring peace at any price in Indochina.

By June 1 situation should be much clearer and then if, after further conversations with Laniel, there still should be no progress on EDC I feel that the time would be ripe to consider seriously the delivery of a formal letter regarding intentions to the French. Status of Indochina crisis -will, however, still have to be taken into consideration in reaching our final decision. Meanwhile I suggest that our action be .limited to oral communications by me regarding importance of EDC to Schumann or Laniel or both the next time I see them regarding Indochina.

DILLON

MEJ/9

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TOP SECRET

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

DEPARTMENT Or THE AKmi

V/ASHINGTCN, D. C.

19 May 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR; THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE SUBJECT: Indo-China

1 # I am becoming increasingly concerned over tlie frequency of state r .ments by Individuals of influence within and without the government that • I United States air and sea forces alone could solve our problems in Indo-

I China, and equally so over the very evident lack of appreciation of the

logistics factors affecting operations in that area*

2. Indo-China is almost totally devoid of local resources which would be of use to our Armed Forces. It has a tropical, monsoon climate with pronounced wet and dry seasons and the disease and morale hazard's are hioh for Caucasian trooos, The population, when act hostile, is uutrnst-worthy. However, the principal deficiency of Indo-China as a base for the support of large military operations lies in the inadequacy of its facilities for the movement of supplies.

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3. The two principal ports are Saigon and Haiphong, with a comoined I daily capacity of 15, 100 short tons. Both are inland river ports requiring "

1 * considerable dredging before maximum potential can be obtained. There

are nine secondary ports whose tonnage capacities vary from 100 to 1,400

tons,

] 4, Because of the inadequacies of the road, railroad, and waterway

j . systems north from Saigon, this port would be of very little use for the sup-

I port of operations in the Tonkin Delta. Haiphong could not be used without

augmentation of its capacity including full use of secondary ports and all beaches. The tonnage capacity of the road and railroad system from Haiphong to Hanoi is even now less than the port capacity of Haiphong.

■i

5. It would be necessary to make full use of the air for supply and evacuation as well as for tactical support. Much construction, to include lengthening and reinforcing of runways, of extreme difficulty during the rainy season, would be necessary. Only three airfields in lad o-China, Haiphong/Cat Bi, Tourane and Tan Son Nhut (near Saigon), have runways * over 7, 500 feet long and have reported pavement strengths which could support B-45 bomber operations. Fight fields can handle transport planes as large as a C-119; an additional seven fields can accommodate C-46's. Sustained operations could not be undertaken on most of these fields in the rainy season. Within the Delta itself/' there are ten airfields of all types of , which only one, Cat Bi, is currently being used by C-119 ! s or C-54 ! s.

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* 6. Even were it decided to limit the employment o£ United States forces to naval and air, which in itself would be a basically faulty military decision, it v/ould devolve upon the Army to perform 'the bulk of the logistical services and it" is essential that the magnitude of the effort required be clearlv understood.

7. The adverse conditions prevalent in this area combine all those which confronted united Stales forces in previous campaigns in the South and Southwest Pacific and Eastern A si?,, with the additional g.«£vs complication of a large native population, in thousands of villages, most of which are about evenly divided between friendly and hostile.

8. The complex nsfcur^ of these oroblerns would reouire a major United States logistical effort. It explodes the myth that air and sea forces could solve the ludo-China problems. If United States land-based forces are projected any appreciable distance inlan'd, p.s would be essential, they would require constant local security at their every location, and for their every activity. The Arrny would have to provide these forces, their total would be very large, and the time to provide them v/ould be extensive.

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

PA i

20 Way 195*t

«

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: U.S. Military Participation in Indochina.

*-

1. In recent discussions between the French and the Depart menfc of State relating to U.S. military intervention in Indo-chl-naj the U.S. Government specified certain conditions wh.lch would have to obtain If U.S. military intervention uere to be undertaken. Among these conditions v/ere

•

a. That France v-ould under take not to withdraw its forces from Indochina during period of united action do that forces from U.S. principally air and sea and others would be supplementary and not in substitution;

b. That agreement would have to be reached on training

. of native troops and on command structure fox* united action

2. On the assumption that United States armed fore on inter vene in the conflict in Indochina^ the Joint Chiefs of Staff have agreed that a Department of Etefenae position should be formulated as to the size and composition of U.S. force contributions to b<s made and the command structure to be established. In formulating these views the Joint chiefs of Staff have been guided by several factors^ among which are:

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a. The limited availability of U.S. forces for military action 5n Indochina.

b. The current numerical advantage of the French Union forces over the enemy 3 i.e. 3 approximately 5 to 3*

£. Tiie undeslrabllity of basing lai'ge numbers of U.S. forces In Indochina.

d. The primary need of en expanded and Intensified train ing program as being the current greatest need.

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e. The lack of required facilities for siiperimpooln U.S. Air Force forcer; on existing facilities in Indochina.

f # The implications of a reaction by the Chinese Commu-• nlsts in the event of U.S. participation.

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&. Atomic weapons will be usee! whenever it is to our mi1i t ary advan t ase.

3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the basic prin-' cinle underlying any command structure for operations in Indochina which Is acceptable to the United States must enable the U.S. to influence future strategy in Indochina. In addition* they believe that some nov; means to furnish the military Guidance which heretofore ha3 come from Paris must be found, A possible solution for over-all strategic guidance is a Military Representatives Committee v/ith membership from those nations contributing the principal forces of the. coalition with a steering or*standing group along the lines of NATO.. Thin grx>up would be sei n ved by a staff organized along the lines of the U.S. Joint Staff composed primarily of U.S. and French officers.

4. Although the Allied Commander in Chief in Indochina should be French, there must be a U.S. Deputy with sufficient staff assistance to provide liaison with the French arid coordinate U.S. activities with the over-all operations. CIHCPAC would exercise command over all U.S. forces based in Indochina and other forces assigned to him for operations In Indochina. In addition, a U.S. Air Advisor would be provided the French Goinmander In Chief for the purpose of advising him concerning the air effort.

*

5. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the best military course for eventual victory In Indochina is the development of effective native*armed forces. Thus far the French have been unsuccessful in their efforts to develop such forces. A firm coipaiitment by the French and firm requests from the respective governments of the Associated States for the training and development of native forces by the United States should be a prerequisite of U.S. participation. It Is estimated that an augmentation of IIAAG Indochina on the order of 2250, with an appropriate logistic support force, would be required to initiate this program* The size of thin force and secui^lty arrangements therefor will be determined in light of recommendations requested from CINCFAC and Chief, MAAG Indochina.

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6. The Joint Chiefo of Staff recommend that U.S tlon be limited primarily to Naval and Air Forces, position of these forces should be on the order of

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a. Naval Fore on. A fast carrier Task Force and supportlnj forces* as necessaiy In accordance with developments in the situation,

Jb. Air Forces . U.S., Air Force unity operating from present bases outside Indochina as may be required. The order of magnitude of this effort cannot nov; be estimated since It will depend on developments in the situation.

7. The Joint Chiefs of Staff note that the principal sources of Viet Minh military supply lie outside Indochina,. The destruction or neutralization of those outside sources supporting the Viet Minh would materially reduce the French military problems

in Indochina.

■

-

8. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that committing to the Indochina conflict Naval forces in excess of the above or basing substantial air forces therein will involve malcleployment of forces and reduced readiness to meet probable Chinese Communist reaction elsewhere in the Far East, From the point of view of the United States, with reference to the Far East as a whole. Indochina is devoid of decisive military objectives and the allocation of more than token U.S. aimed forces to that area would be a serious diversion of limited U.S. capabilities.

Foi 1 the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Aj<XA

ARTHUR RADFORD,

Chairman,

Joint Chiefs of Staff

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TOP SECRET

THE JOIHT CHIEFS OF STAFF WASHINGTON 25, D 0 C.

21 May 195^

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Defense of Southeast Asia in the Event

of Loss of Indochina to the Communists

1. As a result of recent military and political developments , including certain public statements by high-level officials of the United States, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that it is incumbent upon them to determine what military forces and resources would be required to hold Southeast Asia against farther Communist aggression in the event Indochina is lost to the Communists.

2. Currently approved United States Government objectives regarding Southeast Asia are based on the considerations that:

,

a. The passing of the countries, of Southeast Asia into the Communist orbit would "be inimical to the security interests of the United States, and

b. The loss of Indochina to the Communist orbit could lead to the eventual loss of the other countries of Southeast Asia to the Communist orbit.

■

3- In the event that Indochina is lost to the Communists, the United States must take as an objective the prevention of the loss of the rest of Southeast Asia (Thailand, Burma, and Malay) to the Communists.

U. There are two basic military concepts for the defense of Southeast Asia:

a. Static type defense (Korea type).

■

b. An offensive to attack the source of Communist military power being applied in Southeast Asia.

h80

TOP SECRET

SecPef Cont. No, 3195

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

TOP SECRET

5. The force requirements and inherent logistic implications for a "static" defense of the remaining countries of Southeast Asia-Burma, Thailand, and Malaya are of' the order of magnitude as shown in Appendices "A" and f, B" hereto. So long as Burma and Thailand are not under Communist control, the geography of the area and the lack of a Chinese Communist capability for a major overseas attack renders Malaya secure from external attack. Therefore, the force requirements are limited to those necessary to defend Burma and Thailand and to provide internal security against infiltration and subversion in Malaya, Should Burma and Thailand be lost, to the Communists prior to an Allied decision to hold a line

in Southeast Asia, the defensive position would have to be established in Malaya.

6. A study of the above requirements and implications reveals the following extensive and damaging weaknesses inherent in this concept:

a. It is estimated that it would take a minimum of 12 months to build up the necessary base complex and facilities required to support the forces indicated.

b» These forces would have to remain for an extended period,

c. The eoimnitment in manpower and material incident to maintaining these forces in Southeast Asia for such

a period would be unacceptable from the overall viewpoint.

d. The presence of large numbers of United States Commonwealth, and French troops in this area would provide a basis for Communist propaganda to develop and intensify anti-Western sentiment.

e. The dissipation of allied strength through the commitment of forces of this magnitude to a "static" defense of Southeast Asia would contribute to the Realization of the politico-military objectives of the USSR vis-a-vis

the free world.

f. Execution of static defense plan would result in maldeployment and seriously reduce the flexibility of employment of United States forces. This could seriously jeopardize the United States capability of supporting logistically our present war plans.

7. It* view of the foregoing, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that from the military viewpoint the concept of a static-type defense is unsound.

481 -

TO? SECRET

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

TOP SECRET

8. In stating certain iraplementirig actions to the current military posture of the United States > the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated inter alia :

"Certain other countries such as Indochina, to which the United States has no specific commitment, are of such importance to the United States that an attack on them probably would compel the United States to react with military force either locally at the point of attack or generally against the military power of the aggressor."

It is considered that the rest of the Southeast Asian countries are included in the above category.

9* In view of the above, the United States should adopt the concept of offensive actions against the "military power of the aggressor/ 1 in this instance Communist China, rather than the concept of "reaction locally at the point of attack/ 1 which is the thesis of the action outlined in paragraphs 5 and 6 above.

10. The force requirements and the logistic support for the operations envisaged in paragraph 9 above are being considered but have not been fully developed. However, it is felt that adoption of this concept would provide a more acceptable return for the manpower and resources expended than would be the case in the concept of a static defense.

11• Upon the decision to implement either one or the other of these courses of action, it would be necessary to insure the degree of mobilization required to take care of the increased possibility of a general war.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

ARTHUR RADFORD, Chairman } Joint Chiefs of Staff

Enclosure

^82

TOP SECRET

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3,3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

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Your TEDOL 107.

I will advise Eden in accordance with your instructions and provide him with a confirming memorandum. Will omit paragraph four, since Australia and New Zealand have been informed and are participating and our relationship to ANZUS is well understood . *'

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With regard to final paragraph of TEDOL 107, it is completely impossible for me to understand the reasoning which prompts the decision by our Joint Chiefs of Staff that they should downgrade the rank of our representation on these five power staff conferences. Regardless of the actual outcome, the simple fact that very senior military officers of the five powers were meeting in Washington would convince the Russians and Chinese, who inevitably would know about it, that, regardless of protestations or statements to the contrary, we really in tender! serious business. I really regret this decision more than r can 3ay.

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We have given consideration (Ssibtel 4514* repeated Geneva 267 3 Saigon 542)**

C to question of further clarification of independence of Associated States and M

Ci following views should guide your discussions with French: *

1, While fully aware of importance of juridical and constitutional factors

in establishment of permanent and complete independence of Vietnam, it sesnis to'

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convincing impact on world opinion and above all on Vietnamese themselves. We

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cannot wait for abolition of all deep-rooted abuses end extra-territorial

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privileges in times like these. We can, however, attempt have it made unmistakably clear that the Treaty of Independence between France and Vietnam represents full .and unqualified conuidtraent on part of France which vrill be carried out in practice* \

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2, Our present thinking is that in order achieve this, certain declaration and measures''are required in immediate future, both by France and by other

countries associated in regional grouping for collective defense. United States

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in addition to such atmropriate statements as might be made by President at 'time of his goin^ to Congress for authority to intervene, right join with other .-. v^ .countries concerned in a foxtt&L pledge of fulfillment of full independence arid Ci

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sovereignty provided by Article I of Treaty of Independence. This statement, couched I in form of a common declaration of purpose, would have to be simple and explicit so there would be no room for doubt as to validity of pledge or as to intentions of countries participating in it, ;

3. Following represents certain minimum measures which we believe French should take now, and which we feel will not (repeat not) place government in more difficult position than it is already:

a. France and Vietnam should sign draft treaties promptly,

b. At moment of signature, President of Republic, in his capacity as > President of French Union, should make statement to effect that Union is

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'composed of equal and sovereign states,

c # A declaration that French will withdraw their expeditionary force from

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Indochinese states at earliest practicable date after end of hostilities, consistent with France's obligations to Associated States, unless invited by respective governments of Associated States to maintain their forces, (Comment i

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We consider this to be at heart of any action French could take to convince world opinion they are in earnest, V?e feel such declaration should be made at actual

tine of signing or at least immediately after. Would appreciate your viewer a

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how and by whom this could be most effectively made,) This provision would not (repeat not) prejudice any base agreements which might be reached with Associated

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States. If United States or any other forces have been ccsanitted, v;e and any other countries v.ould join in or make similar declaration. /j. Unless above are followed promptly by concrete actions which bear out professed intentions of f,ood faith, hoped-for favorable reaction vrill not (repeat" not)

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take placej and disappointment will set in correspondingly quickly. Vie suggest therefore that following measures be taken simultaneously, or as soon as practical;

a. Participation of Associated States in programming all aid snd direct receipt of military materiel aid. (This night require eventual renegotiation of pentapartite military agreementj but should not (repeat not) delay 2a

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implement a t ion .)

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b. French should promptly find specific ways of giving Associated States ;

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and particularly Vietnam/ Ministry of Defense and Vietnam national army greater

sense of participation in Measures required for defense of their territory. Ke

* conceive such participation as being progressive in character.

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5# Fundamental to problem is establishment at earliest date possible of

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representative and authentic nationalist governments, We would hope insofar as Vietnam concerned that French would join vrith us in impressing Bao Dai with necessity

* ' adopting prorapt and effective measures to this end. ■ I

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6. Furthermore, we believe series of measures could be taken locally, even in

advance of full implementation Treaties, which should have favorable public effect in

Associated States. These could take form of liberalization existing Franco-Associated

of States accorcls in such manner as to attain sone/objectives toward which we are vrorkin/%

Ov/ing to rapid military and political developments in Associated States, we are

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unable specify at this time exactly what these measures ir.ay'be, but believe Smbassv Saigon and Corjoissariat General in consultation may be able make appropriate

recommendations to Department and Paris*

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

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THE JOIMT CHIEFS OF STAIT

WASHINGTON 25, D,C.

26 May 195 J i

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Studies with Respect to Possible U.S*

Action Regarding Indochina

1. Reference is made to the memorandum "by the Acting Secretary of Defense, dated l8 May 195^> subject as above, wherein the Joint Chiefs of Staff were requested to prepare certain studies, and agreed outline answers to certain questions relating thereto, for discussion with the Acting Secretary of Defense on or before 2k May, and for subsequent submission to the National Security Council (NSC).

2. a. The studies requested by the Acting Secretary of Defense were developed within the parameters prescribed in the memorandum by the Executive Secretary, NSC, dated 18 May 195*** subject as above. This memorandum is interpreted as assuming no concurrent involvement in Korea. This assumption may be quite unrealistic and lead to mal-employment of available forces. The Joint Chiefs of Staff desire to point out their belief that, from the point of view of the United States, with reference to the Far East as a whole, Indochina is oid of decisive mulitary objec-tives and the allocation of more than token U.S. armed forces in Indochina would be a serious diversion of limited U*S. capabilities. The principal sources of Viet Minh military supply lie outside Indochina, The destruction or neutralization of these sources in China proper would materially reduce the French military problems in Indochina,

b. In connection with the above, it may be readily anticipated that, upon Chinese Communist intervention in Indochina, the French would promptly request the immediate deployment of U.S # ground and air forces, additional naval forces, and a considerable increase in MDAF armament and equipment. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have stated their

SecDef Cont. No. 321?

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belief that committing to the Indochina conflict naval forces in excess of a Fast Carrier Task Force and supporting forces, as necessary in accordance with the developments in the situation, of basing substantial air forces in Indochina, will involve maldeployment of forces and reduce readiness to meet probable Chinese Communist reaction elsewhere in the Far East, Simultaneously, it is necessary to keep in mind the considerable Allied military potential available in the Korea-Japan-Okinawa area.

£. In light of the above, it is clear that the denial of these forces to Indochina could result in a schism between the United States and France unless they were employed elsewhere. However, it should be noted that the Joint Chiefs of Staff have plans, both approved and under consideration, which provide for the employment of these forces in combat operations outside Indochina. Nevertheless, it is desired to repeat that this pax-ticular report is responsive to the question of U.S. intervention in Indochina only.

. .' ASSU MING THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS INTERVENE

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3. Strategi c Concept and Plan of Operation

Seek to create conditions through the destruction of effective Communist forces and their means for support in the Indochina action and by reducing Chinese Communist capability for further aggression, under which Associated States forces could assume responsibility for the defense of Indochina, In the light of this concept the major courses of action would be \ as follows; J

a. Employing atomic weapons, whenever advantageous, as well as other weapons, conduct offensive air operations against selected military targets in Indochina and against those military targets in China , Hainan, and other Communist-held -offshore islands which are being used by the Communists, in direct support of their operations, or which threaten the security of U.S. and allied forces in the area.

b. Simultaneously, French Union Forces, augmented by UoS, naval and air forces, would exploit by coordinated ground, naval, and air action such successes as may be gained as a result of 'the aforementioned air operations in order to destroy enemy forces in Indochina.

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c. Conduct coordinated ground, naval, and air action to destroy enemy forces in Indochina,

d. In the light of circumstances prevailing at the time, and subject to an evaluation of the results of operations

j conducted under subparagraphs a and b above, be prepared

I to take further action against Communist China to reduce

its war-making capability, such as:

(1) Destruction of additional selected military targets. In connection with these additional targets, such action requires an enlarged but highly selective atomic offensive in addition to attacks employing other weapons systems.

(2) Blockade of the China coast. This might be instituted progressively from the outset.

(3) Seizure or neutralization of Hainan Island.

(h) Operations against the Chinese mainland by Chinese Nationalist forces,

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km Forces Required of Each Nation Participating

The forces which would be employed under current plans during the initial phases of the above operations are those indicated in the Appendix hereto. The duration of the commitment of these forces would depend on the succes of French Union forces operations supported by U.S. naval and air operations in defeating communist forces in Indochina.

5. Normal Service logistic arrangement for United States Forces would prevail. CINCPAC would be responsible for providing logistic support. CINCFE would assist by providing material and logistic support as mutually agreed with CINCPAC, or as directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The facilities of MATS and K3TS would be made available to CINCPAC as directed. Existing U.S. bases in Western Pacific are available. Bases with limited facilities in Indochina and the Philippines (other than U.S.) \v T ould be available. Effort would be made to obtain or utilize bases on Formosa^ if required. The French would provide their own logistic support within capabilities. United States logistical support of French Union Forces and Associated States would be provided as required. The Military Assistance Advisory Group, Indochina, would coordinate and arrange for utilization of facilities and services and would provide logistic support to the United States Liaison Groups and Training Missions. In the event operations should involve the use

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

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of NORC Forces, United States logistic support above the current NORC MDA Program would be provided,

6. Plan for Command Structure

. — —i— -.. — ,. ...

In accordance with the Unified Command Plan, CINCPAC would exercise unified command of assigned forces. He would insure the coordination of all operations in Southeast Asia and provide for the necessary ground-air coordination between French Union Forces and U.S # Navy and Air Force forces which operate in support of the land battle. In addition, CINCPAC would select targets and conduct air operations with assigned forces against military targets in Indochina and those in China which directly support Chinese Communist aggression, COMSAC would support CINCPAC in these operations, and in addition would conduct air operations to further reduce the Chinese Communists war-making capability, as directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. CINCFE will continue to provide for the security of Japan and the Ryukyus in accordance with his priority mission elnd in addition would support CINCPAC and COMSAC in their operations as agreed mutually.

7. Plan for Training Native Troops

For the United States to initiate training of Associated States Forces, it is estimated that approximately 2,270 U B S. personnel would be required, as an augmentation of the existing Military Assistance Advisory Group, to carry out this program. In additio, U*S. personnel would be required to provide appropriate logistic support. The exact si&e and composition of the training mission, the logistic support requirements, and the security requirements and arrangements till be determined in light of recommendations which have .been requested from CINCPAC and the Chief, MAAG, Indochina. The training of Associated States Forces would be patterned after the training program conducted £ov RCK forces in Korea.*

8. Plan for World-Wide Military Aid

The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that action should be taken to insure appropriate degree of mobilization to provide for the greater risk of a general war and be prudently prepared under this alternate assumption. In view of the increased risk of general war involving the Soviet Bloc, immediate action would

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

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have to be taken to strengthen our allies. However., due to the overriding mobilization requirements for U.S 0 forces, such aid would be limited to those allies who could directly support the U.S. strategic concept for general war. Tills aid would further be limited to combat essential material, essential replacements, and spare parts which are beyond the capabilities of the individual countries to provide from their own or other allied resources.

ASSUMING THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS DO NOT INTERVENE

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9« Strategic Concept and Plan of Action

Seek to create conditions by destroying effective Communist forces in Indochina, under which the Associated States Forces could assume responsibility for the defense of Indochina. In the light of this concept, the major courses of action which would be undertaken are as follows:

a. Conduct air operations in support of allied forces in Indochina . The employment of atomic weapons is contemplated in the event that such course appears militarily advantageous.

b. Simultaneously, French Union Forces augmented by such armed forces of the Philippines and Thailand as may be committed would, in coordination with U*S. naval and Air Force forces, conduct coordinated ground, naval and air action to destroy enemy forces in Indochina.

I

10. Forces Required of Each Nation Participating

The forces which would be employed under current plans , during the initial phases of the above operation would include:

a. French Union Forces currently operating in IndochinaI

b. A U.S* Fast Carrier Task Force and supporting forcer as necessary in accordance with developments in the situation.

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c. U.S. Air Force units operating from present bases outside Indochina as required.

*

d. Forces as may be contributed by other friendly nations.

The duration of coimaitment of these forces cannot be determined at this time.

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11. Plan for Logistic Support

The plan for logistic support would be the same under this assumption as under the assumption that Chinese Communists intervene (see paragraph 5 above) — except for the last sentence of paragraph 5.

12. Plan for Command Structure

Although the Allied Commander in Chief in Indochina should be French, there must be a United States Deputy with sufficient staff assistance to provide liaison with the French and coordinate U.S. activities with the over-all operation. CINCPAC would exercise command over all U.S. forces based in Indochina and other forces assigned to him for operations in Indochina. In addition, a U.S. Air Advisor would be provided the French Commander in Chief for the purpose of advising him concerning the air effort. This officer would have no command responsibilities

but would.be under the direction of the U.S 0 Deputy.

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13- Plan for Training Hative Troops

The plan for training native troops would be the same under this assumption as under the assumption that Chinese Communists intervene (see paragraph 7 above).

lk. Plan for World-Wide Military Aid

a. Initially, there would be no requirement for additional material and equipment over and above current IDAP for the French and other allied forces in Indochina. MDA programs, however, would require augmentation within approximately 6 months to provide equipment and support necessary to equip initially and maintain a total of 3 new ROK-equivalent Associated States' divisions. Thereafter, increased MDA programs would be required to support additional Associated States 1 divisions as developed. The maximum number of such divisions probably would not exceed 20.

b. All other military assistance should proceed as currently programmed.

_c. Current programs for equipping and modernizing U.S. forces must not be curtailed as a result of any of the foregoing.

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METHOD OF FINANCING COMBAT OPERATIONS

15. Whether or not the U.S» intervenes in Indochina, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that it is vital that the war in Indochina be financed by a method separate and distinct from the world-wide MDAP. It is imperative that the commander be provided with the necessary equipment to wage war effectively without the financial and legal restrictions imposed by MDAP procedures. The current practice of diverting MDA funds from approved programs to support emergency requirements such as those resulting from combat operations in Indochina has already had the effect of hindering the attainment of our worldwide strategic objectives. Only by divorcing the fluid requirements which exist in local combat situations from the normal MDA programming methods and procedures can the orderly achievement of our objectives in other world areas be achieved.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

(Signed)

ARTHUR RADFORD y

Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff

Enclosure

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

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THE WHITE HOUSE:'

V/ASH IN GTON

May 2 °> l?? 1 *

TO? SSCRSi

M5ilORAITDu]I FOR SHE SECB&CAIS 05 1 IBF31I3E

1. I wish to ae!mo*rlo&gs the receipt of your rie::.orandu~u Bay 2> ; 195^, subject: ,f Dsfense of Southeast Asia in the Event of IjOss of Inioohiua to the Corrciunists", vith an attached iaer.orar.duia to you frost the Joint Chiefs of Staff, dated May 21, 195 ! o s^^ subject.

2. Your neKioranduin indicates that the paper or the Joiuo Chiefs of Staff deals with the military defense of the rest of Southeast Asia, if Indochina is lost, "against an overt Chinese. Ccrasttunist attack* 1 (although these specific vor&s arc not used in the paper) • Given this clearification, the paper takes the position, in the event of overt Chinese* Cos&EMfiist attack, that a static- • type defense is militarily unsound and that*the proper concept is an offensive against Cc mint China. . j

3* l*t is cleea? in the current policy of the United States toimrds Southeast Asia that, in the event of "overt Chinese Columnist attach 11 against Bunaa, Shailaiid, or Ilalaya, the United States vill "take appropriate military action sgainst Consaunistj China" (paragraphs 1:2, K6 } and IfS, H3C 5**05) rather than employ a static-type defense. . . I

k* In viev of this existing policy, the Joint Chiefs' paper does not appear to involve a nev policy issue necessarily requiring its circulation to the members of the national Security Council at the present tine * On the other hand, if you feel that it vould he desirable to circulate the paper on a limited basis, vith an appropriate e:cplanatory note as above, I shall be very glad t* do so.

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SENT DEPARTMENT 4566, REPEATED INFORMATION GENEVA 505, SAIGON 550.

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EYES ONLY SECRETARY; GENEVA EYES ONLY WIDER SECRETARY; SAIGON EYE ONLY CHARGE

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PASS DEFENSE FOR DEPARTMENT ARMY FOR RID3EWAY

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THIS IS J0.ii:T EMBASSY-TRAPNELL MESSAGE

After arriving Paris, Trapnell called first on Ambassador for general background discussion and subsequently on General Gruentber for same purpose. He vas originally scheduled to call on Laniel May 28 before seeing Ely but because of Prime ;. Minister's preoccupation with Cabinet meetings and other urgent

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t\ business meeting was postponed. Trapnell accompanied by Ambassadors /$■ seeing Laniel at latter's home tomorrow morning. Meanwhile Laniel C5 V suggested that Trapnell make direct contact with Ely.

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I done this morning when Trapnell, accompanied by Embassy Officer, LV«C ^ a d hour and half interview with Ely, accompanied by Colonel *7 Br oha n.

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As conversation opened, it became apparent that Ely vas not fully aware of reason behind Trapnell ! s presence in Parish After this was explained Ely launched into a general review of the Indochina situation giving particular emphasis to following points: < • ' .

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1. He recounted content of talks he had had in Indochina with 0'Daniel. He vas agreeable to principle of American instruction Vietnamese forces but not entirely in accord with 0'Daniel f s proposal that national army be reorganized on divisional asis. He believed that divisional units were perhaps too weighty and ■that" lighter units of perhaps 6, 7 or 8 battalions per division ! were more practicable. Yet, he did not wish to press this point as he regarded it as a detail which could be*worked out sub-

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/ and US instructor-advisers remained with units upon completion of

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.training, they would have to accompany units into battle and, therefore, major question of whether US prepared to participate

in combst operations would arise. Only alternate to this would be replacement of US instructor-advisers by French as units'were

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

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2- 4566, May 27, 6 p.m., from Pari

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prepared to enter combat. This*would be unsatisfactory because training and advising methods of French and Americans were dissimilar.

2\ Ely stated that 0'Daniel had presented^an operational plan for continuing the war but that he found it unrealistic on basis that It gave priority to operations in the south while the principal and immediate threat is in the north.

j5. Ely referred to Increasing frequency of American criticism of French conduct of var. He explained that it was easy to criticize post facto and when things went wrong. As Trapnell knew, the war in Indochina was "of a very special nature and it was unfair for people who perhaps didn't understand this fact as well as he and Trapnell to criticize. It was useless to compare the wars in Korea and Indochina; they were entirely different. He hoped that Trapnell could use his influence to reduce the degree of present US criticism of past and present French performance In Indochina in the Interests of good Franco-"* American working relations in the important joint tasks at hand.

4. At about this stage of the conversation, Ely remarked that it was virtually Impossible to discuss specific military questions in Indochina without getting into the major political questions including the possibility of US Intervention, the prospects for a Pacific pact and the whole question of where the defense of Southeast Asia was to take place and by whom. Trapnell referred to his* terms of reference which prevented him from discussing other than specific military questions, particularly that of the regrouping of existing forces In Indochina for the defense of the Delta.

5- When Trapnell asked Ely what the immediate military prospects were in the Delta , he replied that the five Viet Minh divisions' released from Dien Bien Phu were moving rapidly forward and should be at the Delta perimeter between the 10th and 15th of Jrne. Normally at that season they would return to their regrouping areas for rest, "self-criticism" and general revision. Whether they will do so this year or not is still uncertain, although there are Indications at the moment that some Viet Minh ; >rees are .moving to regrouping areas. - r ... .

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6. When Trapnell asked what Ely was doing to regroup his forces for the defense of the Delta he replied two basic things: First, removing units from pacification and other "static missions to the Delta to become part o± mobile defense groups; secondly, he was recovering units from inactive posts in Laos, Central Annam and other areas for transfer to the Delta to become part of these same mobile forces.

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7. Ely's plan

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-2- ^566, Ifey 27, 6 p.m., from Paris

7. Ely's plan for the defense of the Delta con tors around the defense of what he termed the Hanoi-Haiphong axis. No specific detail was given as to the number of units* whore they were to

be retained, or the exact orea to be clef ended. He was particularly and /no doubt, designedly pessimistic on the aspects for the defense of this axis, stating that if Hanoi had to be surrendered French Union Forces would move to Haiphong, and if Haiphong wei'o lost they would at least be able to move out from there to "possibly another stand in the south". This, too, depended entirely, according to Ely, on what was decided about US intervention and other pending high-level political decisions.

8. Trapnell pointed out that French superiority in aviation and armor could be extremely effective against a Viet Minh coordinated attack in the Delta because of the terrain- Ely not only admitted this fact but stated that it "is our trump card .

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9- When Trapnell pressed Ely for an opinion as to what was > required between the period of the immediate threat and the period when, it was hoped, the Vietnamese army would be on an effective footing, Ely replied that the General was obviously thinking of how many US Marines would be required to assure the defense of the Delta. He went on to say that in his opinion, if one or two US Marine divisions intervened "there would be no

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ement regarding Frencn intentions concerning despatch cf reinforcements from metropolitan Prance

and JTorth Africa to Indochina, were unsuccessful. Nor didiEly appear particularly interested in Trapnell f s recommendations concerning the redeployment of forces. We attribute this to

yls still busily engaged in consultations with

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Defense .j and was probably being very careful not to make ? ly commitments which had not yet been cleared by the government.

seeing Lb nlei tomorrow morning time more specific matters my be

that Trapnell continue

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TOP SECRET

DELEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

28 May 195*+

Dear Admiral Davis:

Developments over the past few days very clearly indicate that we are approaching a stage in the conference where it is evident that the French are going to settle on terms which the U 0 S. could not, under present NSC directivesj associate itself with. The British have long favored an Indochina settlement on the basis of partition. The Viet Minh in their proposals submitted at the restricted session on May 25 (TOSEC 302) made a proposal which would in effect be partition. The Russians and Chinese have, of course, supported the Viet Minh proposal. In the face of this, the French have no firm position, nor has there been an indication that they have a minimum position. As a result, I feel that we are moving toward the probability that there will be a settlement which will, directly or indirectly, result in the partition of Indochina.

I have discussed the foregoing points at considerable length with Herman Phleger and Alex Johnson. They both recognize the dangers of partition and the impossibility of supervising an armistice in Indochina. There appears to be a feeling of hopelessness inasmuch as the U.S. is not in a position to control the situation. The U.S. position is not at all clear. Someone indicated before the conference we should be flexible - I would say we are now fluid. At the morning staff conferences, during the past two days, there have been discussions of U.S. tactics, and General Smith has indicated that the U.S. should remain firm. He has indicated, however, that we should be realistic, and face the probability that there will be some soi^t of a negotiated settlement which will result in a loss of at least part of Indochina, and will result in some type of partition. There has been no mention of the point at which the U.S* will disassociate itself from the negotiations. On the contrary, there have been indications that the U.So will probably have to go along with a settlement even though it is unsatisfactory to the U.S.

Yesterday I attended a meeting with General Smith, Alex Johnson and Ambassador Heath in which we met with Eden and Bidault. The subject of discussion was Eden's proposal which he put forth at the sixth restricted session. Bidault had thoughts of his own on the subject taking a slight3_y different approach as you will note from the enclosed copy of his proposal. The thing I noted most in the discussion was the all-out effort that the various conferees are making to develop a position to which they feel the Communists will agree. Both Eden and Bidault referred to international supervision of the cessation of hostilities. However, it was quite clear from the discussion that neither are aware of the many difficult problems which will be involved in enforcing an armistice in Indochina. The question

U98

TOP SECRET

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

TOP SECRET

was raised by one of Eden's staff regarding the number of troops required to enforce the cessation of hostilities in Indochina. Various estimates were discussed. However, it was generally agreed that the number of troops required would be in excess of two divisions.

Since it is obvious that the conference is headed toward partition, I feel it significant to bring the foregoing information to your attention. There is very little that the Defense Department can do to influence the negotiations, since a political decision has been made that the U*S. will continue to participate even though we know that partition of Indochina, whatever form it may take, will ultimately result in its loss to the Communists. The view seems to prevail in the U.S. Delegation that there is very little "the U.S. can do to influence the French and no useful purpose would be served in disassociating ourselves from the negotiations. I have little to offer in the way of recommendations. I have continued to point out the views of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of staff that from a military viewpoint a settlement in Indochina which results in leaving the Communist military forces intact will ultimately result in the loss of the area to Communist ;control. Also, there should be little doubt that there is no form of international supervision that will effectively stop further Communist infiltration and their eventual control of Indochina. Although there seems to be general agreement with the U.S. Delegation on these points there is a feeling that we cannot disassociate ourselves from the negotiations.

In outlining this gloomy situation I would like to mention one bright spot. As a result of your recommendations to General Smith I have been given every consideration and there has been complete cooperation. Due to the small number of U.S 0 representatives who can attend the restricted sessions on Indochina, I have not been to all of them. However, I have been included in all important discussions. Though there is obviously a difference in view between the Defense and State Department representatives here on Indochina, it is a frank, honest and friendly difference. I fully appreciate the State Department's difficulties, and though they share our view on what will ultimately result from partition, they feel compelled not to bi*eak with our Allies.

I shall keep you informed of further developments.

Respectfully,

(Signed)

-

CHARLES A SULLIVAN

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I saw Schumann this afternoon and'gave him information contained in DEPTEL k2S$\ He made careful note of points 1 and 2, and said he felt personally that they were entirely satisfactory. He did not get into any discussion of details so subject matter in FY1 portion of DEPTEL 1*286 never came up. Schumann also. told me that he had been informed by Parod! regarding my discussion with him yesterday and that Schumann again personally "was very pleased with the" information in DEI TEL J 427<5.

While we do not as yet have formal French answer on either of these two DEFTHLa, Schumann said that only things that now remained unsettled were military conversations to arrange details of training, command structure, and war plans. Ke said that French were roost anxious to get at these conversations immediately He then read ire portion of telegram from BIdau.lt in which BIdault said that an Increased show of Franco-Airier lean solidarity in Indochina was now vitally necessary in order to have any hope of sound progress at Geneva. As possible concrete steps Fddault

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-2- # ! o03, May 23, 8 p.m., from Par-is

undertake these Franco-US military negotiations in Washington at the same time or parallel with 5-power raili-tsry talks. If so, he said be felt it was most important that Ely attend and he would so inform Pleven, who, he was sure, would agree. He requested a prompt answer so French could take necessary decision as to whether or not to send Ely. He said French had been anxious for some time to initiate these military discussions and he hoped that US was now ready and willing for them to begin. «

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During course of my visit he had a telephone conversation with Massigli in London regarding a telegram which Massigli had sent reporting en British attitude regarding Southeast Asia Schumann showed ft© the telegram, key portion of which indicated British reluctance, as expressed by Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick to undertake any sort of military operations in any portion of Indochina, as they thought that all Indochina, including Cambodia, was Infested with Communists and so it was not practical for military operations. Schumann was quite upset by this telegram which he made clear to Massigli on the telephone^ saying It was now clear that British were only interested in defending Southeast Asia when question became an immediate problem of the Defense of Malaya. Schumann then brought up another question which he said was giving great concern to Pleven. 'This was possibility of Chinese air attack on the delta. He said that French Air Force has Informed Pleven that Chinese Communist planes operating from present bases had capability of remaining over Hanoi* for 15 minutes. This would be enough time to cause great destruction and Pleven felt that It such an attack were not opposed immediately by US jets, Communists in 3 to 5 days could cause enough damage to make the delta effectively indefensible. Schumann wondered whether something along following lines might be possible. Provided French decided to strongly reinforce the delta and use conscripts in Indochina, could the President go to-Congress and ask for discretionary authority to use US air power to defend the delta if it should be attacked by Chinese Communist planes. A request to Congress comine

after the eve^t would necessarily cause a few days delay which, in Pleven's view, would be fatal. Schumann thought present United Action Program might not be ready In time as he did not know what If any progress US was snaking with other powers in order to satisfy point 2B of conditions posed in DEPTEL ^023.

I told Schumann naturally I could venture no opinion as to whether the President would be able to make such a limited request for discretionary authority but that from my personal knowledge of Washington thinking I felt that it would be absolutely necessary in any event that French take action along lines of paragraph 3 of DEPTEL 4272 regarding clarification of independence of Associated States.

As I left

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As I left Schumann again emphasized his hope that a prompt reply would be forthcoming from Washington regarding possibility of holding Franco-UK military talks in Washington next week.

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FROM: Par-Is " 12:41 p.m.

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SENT DEPARTMENT 4607, REPEATED INFORMATION PRIORITY GENEVA 321.

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Reference: Department telegram 2 rjS25.

Second paragraph of reference telegram may Indicate extremely { serious misunderstanding between US and French. French draw sharp distinction between (1) US intervention In present circumstances with Viet Minh bolstered by Chinese Communist . I materiel, technicians and possibly scattered troops and * ( .(2) US reaction against full-scale air attack mounted from ( Communist Chinese bases. Regarding point (1) French fully * ( understand that conditions outlined Department telegram 4023 \ apply to any possible US intervention. As regards point (2), j however, the French fully count on US military reaction against such an open Chinese Communist attack. The only limitation on such US reaction which French recognize Is the time required for Congressional action which they would hope to be a matter of not more than a day or two. In second case, they feel that US statements to the effect that full-scale Chinese Communist Intervention could not; be permitted are still binding whether or not there 'is time to create collective action. The Secre- q tary's radio speech of May 7, Indicating that while Chinese had S given very considerable support at Dien~31en Phu they had £

avoided full-scale Intervention, was taken to mean by French that if there had been full-scale Chinese Intervention US would have responded differently to their request for military assistance- . *

Schumann reverted last night to this question of protection fl against a possible air attack and gave me more accurate Information than that contained In Embassy telegram hjQQ regarding French apprehensions. He said that what French General Staf? fear is an attack from bases on Hainan Island against Haiphong.^ Best French estimate is that Chinese jets coming from Hainan

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could remain over Haiphong for 20 minutes on each mission* A massive Chinese air attack (Schumann mentioned figure of 100 planes) could completely knock out French air capabilities in .the delta and could so seriously damage the port of Haiphong that it would be impossible to conduct a successful withdrawal of French forces through the port. The loss of French air potential would drastically tip the scales In favor of the Viet Minh and make total defeat of French forces in the delta inevitable. It is against this eventuality that the French wish to have protection. Paragraph 9 of, Embassy telegram 4605 indicates Ely's belief that he already has commitment from Admiral Radford on this type of attack. What French feel they are asking for now is not, in fact, a new commitment from US but assurances that OS reaction will come within a matter of hours and even, if possible, in time to meet attacking Chinese planes. Schumann said he felt that only circumstances in which Chinese would make such an attack would be if they felt that US, for one reason or another, was not in a position to respond promptly and effectively. Therefore, Schumann suggested that if it should be impracticable to obtain preliminary approval of such military action from US Congress, it might be equally useful to have a clear warning from either the Secretary or the President that a massive Chinese air attack would meet with US opposition. Schumann said he felt certain that .if Chinese realized that an air attack would cause US intervention they would never take the risk of mounting such an attack.

I have -previously stated to Department that if we allowed delta to fall to the Viet Minh without a successful evacuation of the French expeditionary Corps, the effect here would be disastrous. If such a disaster should come about because of open Chinese Communist air attack to which we had not responded by US military action, the result here would be nothing short of catastrophic. Vfe would have to count on a strong movement in France that could well be successful in favor of making peace at any price with the Soviets rather than continuing to count on US support through NATO- The effect of such action by France on the North Atlantic Alliance is obvious^ In addition, I do not feel that we could exclude possibility, if the Soviets play their cards right, of a popular front government » arising to carry out such a new policy. This naturally would incur the danger of an eventual Communist take-over in France. I do not have any means of evaluating effect in Asia of a unilateral US response to a Chinese attack, but Department should be constantly aware that lack of US response to a full-scale Chinese Communist air attack on the delta would place in jeopardy the North Atlantic Alliance and our whole position in Western Europe.

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

TOP SECRET '

-5- H607, May'50, 5 p.m. from Paris

Schumann has never asked me whether US response to a Chinese attack would be subject to same conditions posed in Department telegram i|023 and I have never, In any way, indicated to him what the US requirements would be for reaction in such an emergency except to point out that full clarification of the independence of Vietnam would be most Important. See Embassy telegram 4580.

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

INCOMING TELEGRAM DEPARTMENT OF STATE ACTION COPY

TOP SECRET

Control: IU09I

Rec'd: May 31, I95U

FROM: PARIS 9:32 A.M.

TO: Secretary of State

NO: k6l2, MAY 31, 1PM

PRIORITY

SENT DEPARTMENT 1*512, REPEATED INFORMATION GENEVA 327

LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

WHEN TRAPNELL AND I ARRIVED AT LANIEL*S HOUSE FOR MEETING

TRTS MORNING, WE FOUND MAURICE SCHUMANN AND ELY ALSO PRESENT.

THE MEETING WAS SHORT AND IT WAS CONFIRMED THAT ELY WOULD GO

TO WASHINGTON FOR BILATERAL MILITARY TALKS. HIS MISSIONS WILL

OSTENSIBLY BE TO ATTEND FIVE-POWER MILITARY TALKS, AND IT. IS

FULLY UNDERSTOOD THAT BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS WILL REMAIN SECRET.

ELY IS UNABLE TO ARRIVE WASHINGTON THIS WEEK AND VALLHY HAS BEEN

AUTHORIZED TO REPRESENT HIM BOTH AT FIVE-POWER TALKS AND AT

COMMENCEMENT OF BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS WHICH ELY STATED

HE UNDERSTOOD WERE TO COVER TRAINING OF LOCAL TROOPS, COMMAND

STRUCTURE AND WAR PLANS. VALLUY WILL ALSO ARRANGE DATE FOR

ELY'S ARRIVAL WITH JCS. ELY SAID HE WAS GOING LONDON TOMORROW

FOR ONE DAY VISIT WITH HARDINE WHOM HE DOES NOT RPT NOT MOW

WELL, FOR PURPOSE OF MAKING FRIENDLY CONTACT PRIOR TO OPENING !

OF FIVE-POWER TALKS. j

LANIEL ONCE MORE MENTIONED FRENCH FEAR OF CHINESE COMMUNIST AIR

ATTACK, HE MADE IT CLEAR THAT FRENCH REGARD PRESENT BILATERAL '

NEGOTIATIONS AS A PRECLUDE TO U.S. INTERVENTION SHOULD GENEVA

FAIL OR SHOULD COMMUNISTS DRAG NEGOTIATIONS AT GENEVA

WKLLE ATTEMPTING TO OBTAIN A MILITARY DECISION IN THE DELTA. ,

ON THE OTHER HAND, LANIER CLEARLY CONSIDERS THAT AN !

ALL-OUT AIR ATTACK ON THE DELTA BY THE CHINESE, WHILE NOT RPT

NOT LIKELY, IS A POSSIBILITY AND SHOULD BE PLANNED FOR. ;

HE FEELS THAT SUCH AN ATTACK WOULD COMPLETELY CHANGE THE PRESENT :

SITUATION AND WANTS THE BEST ASSURANCES POSSIBLE OF PROMPT

U.S.HELP IN THE EVENT OF SUCH A CHINESE ATTACK. ELY

CONFIRMED THAT HIS UNDERSTANDING WITH RADFORD ON THIS SUBJECT

WAS PURELY A TECHNICAL ONE BETWEEN CHIEFS OF STAFF AND WAS SUBJECT

TO POLITICAL DECISION BY U.S. HE SAID THAT RADFORD HAD PLANS

READY SO THAT U.S. ASSISTANCE COULD COME VERY RAPIDLY ONCE |

THE POLITICAL DECISION HAD BEEN MADE, I INFORMED LANIEL THAT

AFTER MY MEETING WITH SCHUMANN SATURDAY NIGHT AT WHICH

SCHUMANN ffAD RAISED THE SUBJECT, I HAD SENT AN INQUIRY ON'

SUNDAY TO WASHINGTON EXPLAINING IN FULL FRENCH VIEW THAT

(l) U.S. INTERVENTION BECAUSE OF CONTINUATION AND AGGREVATION

OF PRESENT MILITARY SITUATION IN INDOCHINA, AND (2) U.S.

506

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:

Declassified per Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

TOP SECRET

-2- k6l2, MAY 31, 1 P.M., FROM PARIS

REACTION TO AN ALL-OUT CHINESE AIR ATTACK WERE OHO VERY SEPARATE PROBLEMS, AND THAT SOME ARRANGEMENT SHOULD BE MADE TO HANDLE A CHINESE AIR ATTACK IF IT SHOULD OCCUR PRIOR TO CREATION OF A SEATO ALLIANCE.

IF WE SHOULD INFORM THE FRENCH THAT WE WILL NOT RPT NOT REACT TO A CHINESE AIR ATTACK EXCEPT AFTER MAKING THE NECESSARY ARRANGEMENTS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION, I AM AFRAID THAT THIS WOULD HAVE A PROFOUND AND IMMEDIATE EFFECT BOTH ON FRENCH ATTITUDE IN GENEVA AND ON PRESENT FRENCH PLANS FOR BOLSTERING THE DEFENSE OF INDOCHINA. WE GAVE LANIEL GENERAL TRAPNELL'S OPINION THAT ELY'S OVERALL PLAN SEEMED GOOD AND THAT FRENCH SHOULD BE ABLE TO HOLD AREAS WHICH ELY PLANS TO DEFENS. ELY THEN ARRANGED FOR FURTHER TECHNICAL DISCUSSION WITH TRAPNELL LATER IN MORNING. SEE FOLLOWING TELEGRAM.

DILLON

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SENT DEPARTMENT 4625, REPEATED INFORMATION GENEVA 354 LIMIT DISTRIBUTION " ., &

EYES ONLY 0M3ER SECRETARY Re ^DEPTEL 4352 ^ } ' 'to/ ^

Information contained in paragraph 3 of DEPTEUjK)94- was con-. ". & j veyed by me to Schumann Immediately upon receipt and he^fully understands it. My concern as evidenced InEMBTEL 4607""stemmed ( from fact that last sentence of DEPTEL 4325 clearly goes much J further than paragraph 3 of DEPTEL 4094, which reference tele , gram now confirms to be Department's policy. Last sentence of { DEPTEL 4325 carries clear implication that U.S. would not parti v cipate under any circumstances, except as part of a broader collective effort, while paragraph 3 of DEPTEL 4094 states that U.S. v reaction to Chinese air attack would be "judged under the circumstances of the moment", but that, in any event, the; ;. " President would require congressional authorization. If in J \ fact last sentence of DEPTEL 4325 was not intended to indicate ;? * : any change in this policy, there is no misunderstanding be-

tween our governments.

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However, we must bear in mind that French for practical purposes draw the Inference from instructions in paragraph 3 of DEPTEL .4094 that the President would request Congress for authority to - act in the event of a sudden and unprovoked mass attack \ y Chinese ^ aircraft. They realize, however, that this is only an Inference % on their part and that U.-5. position, as expressed in paragraph 3 of DEPTEL 4094, makes no commitment one way or another regarding what action the President might take. From theii point -of view this is an unsatisfactory situation. All trie recent French requests from Schumann, Lanlel, Ely, et cetera, regarding ^guarantees against a possible Chinese attack were brought about° ^4028^ the vagueness of U.S. policy as expressed In paragraph 3 of " DEPTEL 4094. ' ■ ,

French are now attempting to clarify what .U.S. position actually J will be in the event of a Chinese air attack on the Delta .prior to the conclusion of collective defense arrangements. AsJI see'

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1. Maintain position outlined in paragraph 3 of DEPTEL 409H. In this event"French will continue to believe in their hearts that President will in fact request Congress to act if there should be an all-out Chinese air attack.

•2. Tell French that if there should be such unprovoked attack, President would expect to request Congress for authority to use U.S. forces.

3. Tell French that U.S. would not come to French assistance even in the event of a Chinese air attack except as a part' of a collective action. . .

If in fact -intention is to give assistance to French in event of a Chinese air attack, it would seem immaterial whether we follow courses No. 1 or No. 2 and I can see many reasons in favor of sticking to course No. 1. However, if we stick to course No. 1, and then do not come to assistance of French in the event of a Chinese air attack, I feel that the results here in France will be as outlined in ©©TEL 4607 •

refore, tf we do not intend to react to Chinese air attack except In the framework of collective action } I feel that It would be better to adopt course No. 3 so as to avoid the risks described In EM3TEL 46uf • If we adopt course No. 3, however, we must realize that it will corr-e as* a shock to the F -ench and would probably have a prompt and serious effect on French attitude in Geneva and on present French plans for reinforcing Indochina. If it became public knowledge that course No- J was our policy, it would probably hasten fall of Laniel and generally militate against our European policy, though nowhere nearly to the extent indicated In EMETEL ^60?.

When Ely arrives Washington next week, he will be under specific instructions to attempt to clarify U.S. policy on this point if answer has not previously been given. Therefore, if our de- ■ cision is,to stick to policy outlined in par eaph 3 of DEPTEL 409<; with no further explanations, all personnel who will be talking with Ely should be carefully briefed regarding the subject. .

DILLON

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NOTE BY THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

to the NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL *

on

STUDIES WITH RESPECT TO POSSIBLE

U. S. ACTION REGA r IMQSSM& References: A. NSC WOy

B. NSC Action Nos-. 1086~b and c, 110 l hb, 1106, 1110 and 1112

Tho enclosed studies with respect to possible U. S. action regarding Indochina have been prepared by various departments and agencies in response to requests authorized by the President. In the event that conditions established by the President as prerequisites for United States intervention in the conflict in Indochina are net, these studies will provide the basis for further consideration by the Council of the question of such intervention.

These studies were prepared on the assumption that United States armed forces intervene in the conflict in Indochinaj and on the alternate assumptions that the Chinese Communists: (a) intervene with armed forces in Indochina 5 or (h) do not intervene with armed forces in Indochina.

A draft of a Presidential message is being prepared by the Department of State and will be circulated later for insertion in Part I of this report. Additions and amendments to the enclosed reports may be circulated from time to J irae,

Pursuant to Presidential directive, distribution of this report is being limited to one copy to each Council participant, which is being transmitted through the Pie- ling Board members.

NSC 5lf21

510

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vxtihout fefeo oormission of this office i

*

JAMES S. LAY 5 Jr« Executive Socretary

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DISTRIBUTED II

The Tho The

The

The

The The

The President

The Vice President

Secretary of State

Secretary of the Treasury

Secretary of Defense #5

Attorney General

Director, Foreign Operations Administration

Director, Office of Defense Mobilization

Director, Bureau of the Budget The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

Director of Central Intelligence

Secretary of the Army

Secretary of the Navy

Secretary of the Air Force

Chief of Staff, Army

Chief of Naval Operations

Chief of Staff, Air Force

Commandant of the K?.rine Corps

The The Tats The The The The

The The

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

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STUDIES WITH RESPECT TO POSSIBLE

G~ S. ACTION REGARDIN G INDOCHINA

Table of Contents

■

- ►

•

I. By the Department of State

I

Economic Warfare Against Communist China

United Nations Action in the Event of United States

Armed Intervention in Indochina Juridical Relations in the French Union; Giving

' Effect to the Independence of the Associated States

of Indochina Draft of President's Message (to he circulated)

II* By. the Department of Justice

Constitutional and Legal Aspects^ Including Appropriate .Form for Joint Resolution,of President's Request for Authorization fl to Intervene in Indochina"

III, By the C entral Intelligence Agency

Communist Capabilities in Indochina

IV. By the Dertart&en.t of Defense '

Under Alternate Assumptions that Chinese Coiainunists Intervene or Do Not Intervenes

S

trategic Concept and Plan of Operation brces Required of Each Nation Participating

.

Foi

Plan for Logistic Support

Plan for Command Structure

Plan for Training Native Troops .

Plan for V/orld-V/ide Military Aid

V• By the Office of Defense Mobilization

Industrial Mobilization Manpower Mobilization

Economic Stabilization Mobilization

KSC 5^21

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VI. By the Foreign O parations

Plan for U. S. Economic of Intervention

Actmini str at ion and Technical Aid in Event

VII. Bff^ jjfejjL Qgg x : a t ipng^ gp or dina t ing^, Bo ar £ r

Plan for Gaining Maximum Support for U, S. Intervention

in the Associated Stater, from the Indigenous Peoples Plan of Political Warfare (Including Guerilla and

Paramilitary) Action Against the Vietminh Plan for Gaining Maximum Support of Other Free World

Countries Plan for Political Warfare Organization as Integral

Part of Intervention Plan for Keeping China out of War or Reducing Its

Effectiveness

VIII. B%;, the Bureau of. the Budget *

Preparation of Any Necessary Request for Supplemental

Appropriations Preparation of Any Necessary Requests for Additional

Statutory Authority Required for Appropriation, Revision of FY 55, 56" Budget Plan

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Section 1 t

SUMMARY OF STUDIES BY THE DEPAPvTMENT OF STATE

'i 1. There are three parts to the State study:

a. Economic warfare against Communist China.

b. U.N. action in the event of U.S. armed intervention in Indochina.

c. Juridical relations to the French Union: Giving effect to the independence of the Associated States.

2. Economic warfare against Communist China .- The paper seeks to determine whether, in the event of U.S. intervention in Indochina, intensified and broadened economic warfare measures would deter Communist China from openly intervening or hinder its military effort if it did intervene. The study concludes that the divisive risks of seeking an international program of broadened and intensified economic warfare measures against Communist China would be too great to be undertaken if the full support of the United Kingdom were absent. Even such a program as could be obtained with United Kingdom support would nevertheless not constitute a serious deterrent or countermeasure to open Communist Chinese intervention in Indochina in terms of economic impact. It might be possible, however, to achieve some deterrent psychological impact through the device of an advance multilateral declaration of the economic consequences of massive Chinese Communist intervention.

The paper does not deal with the question of a naval blockade, which State considers to be a military measure.

3. U.N, action in the event of U.S. armed intervention in Indochina With the exception of action under Article 51 (individual or collective defense against "armed attack") the U.S. as a U.N. member is obligated not to use armed force except in response to orders or recommendations of the U.Nc . Therefore, "united action" without prior U.N. authorization would have to be t&ken under Article 51•

There are three possible types of U.N. action related to "united action":

a. U.N. action prior to U.S. intervention, designed to lay the foundation for "united action."

b. U.N. action following and supplementing the "united action."

c. Possible U.N. action in the event the Chinese Communists resumed hostilities in Korea as a result of "united action" in Indochina.

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k m Jurdical relations in the French Union: Giving effect to the independence of the Associated States - Our goal Jiere must be to have France make it unmistakably clear to world opinion, and above all, the Vietnamese that the Treaty of Independence between France and Vietnam represents a full and unqualified commitment on the part of France which will be carried out in practice. Since the peoples of the Associated States are still mistrustful of French promises* French actions must be underwritten by the U.S.

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ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

"WASHINGTON ?.5. D. C.

8 June 195h

rrtRMATlO.VAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

1 '

HEMOa&HHn-I FOR ElIGADIHi ffiSKSUL KtfSSTiiza

S0BJSO2s Ccrjr.snts on Study of Poss5.blo U-,Sc Antion Eegai'dins Indochina.

pursuant to your memorandum dived l;. Juoe IS'pKj are submitted

tfaa following ccc&ents

r

&, Economic Warfare Against Coasaunlst China

-**-~»^*.

"g» «*-«*— ' ■»■——

3.c It is noted that this pr.psr d~>33 not cb&l Kith tho ■ question of a naval blocfctda* This office h&s r;o eosg&s&t o:: the iiOB«rilitary economic fffflffeate r^asure.s discuiocd in' thic

2o Dssplts the ir .probability of ebts&nirg eg^eais^nt of ©11 ths ispcrUnt allies of ths United States to a full economic eslbaFgo of goods and ssrvicas to Co; rctaist CMnaj • it is racon?r!3ndsd that t&s tfoited States s&wld att$j£&t to ofetsda such a^es&sat in th3 event of further involvement in Inciocbii":^

;&* o

3o U3 should maintain that a totsQL naval bloolrads rovld ba the only effective economic warfare fciaasiare against Corsmanist

Chin:;*

b 0 United JTations Actiovi in the Event of United States Armed

• *—«v-*-'

by

In terven tion in Indcohina

l c No consent except that p^Egraph 3 has been overtrJ^n events*.

c

Juridi cal Eolations in tKs fiei3Qh r T UaiotVf plying BiTfeot

thsInd3oand^Rco of th^ Associated St?,t gs* o£ Ir.d.ccjSrA

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t to

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^!lJl^?ZJl£^^yJI^^ psct to P ossible Unitad States Action R |g r^d i n g IndocMr^

lo Concur ^holoher^todly in the entire paper*

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d. (Continued)

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V

2. A firm stand should be taken to support particularly paragraph lk 9 "Plan for Worldwide Military Aid."

e. FOA paper "Studies with Respect to Possible United States Action Regarding Indochina"

1. Concur on the condition that the paragraph iH of the JCS paper is made applicable.

Attachments:

1. State Study dtd 25 May 5**

2. State Study dtd 26 May 5^

3. State Study dtd 25 May 5^ k. DOB Study dtd-2? May 5^ 5. FOA Study dtd 2k May 5^

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ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

8 June 195 1 *

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

MEMORANDUM FOR BRIGADIER GENERAL BOiffiSTEEL

SUBJECT: Comments on Study of Possible U.S. Action Regarding Indochina.

Pursuant to your memorandum dated k June 195^ > the following comments are submitted:

a. Economic Warfare Against Communist China.

1. It is noted that this paper does not deal with the question of a naval blockade* This office has no comment on the non-military economic warfare measures discussed in this paper.

2. Despite the improbability of obtaining agreement of all the important allies of the United States to a full economic embarge of goods and services to Communist China, it is recommended that the United States should attempt to obtain such agreement in the event of further involvement in Indochina.

3. We should maintain that a total naval blockade would t be the only effective economic warfare measure against Communist China. I

b. United Nations Action in the Event of United States Armed Intervention in Indochina

1. t T o comment except that paragraph 3 has been overtaken by events.

£. Juridical Relations in the French Union: Giving Effect to the Independence of the Associated States of Indochina

1. Concur.

■

JCS paper "Studies With Respect to Possible United States Action Regarding Indochina"

1. Concur wholeheartedly in the entire paper.

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d.

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

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'I sir

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The interest of"the Department of Defense in the legal conclusions summarized above would appear to be far less than that of the'

* i.

Stale and Justice Departments, So lonj; as the action tslcen is broad enough in scops to permit the Department of Defense to carry out the responsibilities which vd 11 be assigned to it, there would appear to be no grounds for objecting to the Conclusions offered* This study cor.cludes that the v&rticie power of the President ray be exercised in a state of emergency and that the proposed Resolution provides a political solution of the constitutional question v/hich is broad enough to cover a possible extension of hostilities. These arc the principal points of concern to the Defense Department and since I agree* with these conclusions and also with the practical conclusion regarding- the Red Cress, Prisoner-of-Y."ar, and related conventions, it seams to *ne that there is no reason for this Department to challenge the conclusions of the ELe-ftorandttru

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Eotwithstanding the foregoing, I venture to offer two oovs&ents on

the general problor. presented. First, it sesns to sie that the term "intervention" might just as vrell be avoided altogether. It nov; appears prominently throughout the Department of Justice study, but not in the draft resolution. The political connotations of the vorci are, as you knov.*, the subject of much anti-American.coni?ient in Central and South America, Iforeovor, apart frow this, as a matter of technical international lav* the word implies a dictatorial 1/ interference in tho affairs o? another state, I understand there is no thought of going into Indochina except on the basis of an invitation on the part cf the lav.'ful recognized government. Our action would not, therefore, be

"intervention" in the strict sense of the term as used in International lav.%

I-recognise that tho vnord "intervention" does not now appear in tho text of the draft Joint Resolution" and it se-zzis to ine, for the reasons set forth above, that it should not appear, either there or in the public declarations of Administration spokesmen.

m j/ Thus professor Opper.heirc states; "But it nust be emphasised that intervention proper is always dictato rial interference, not inter-"' fcrones pure and siuple. Therefore intervention must neither be confused TS&th good offices, nor with mediation, nor vrith intercession, nor with co-operation, because none of these imply a dictatorial interference. Thus, for example, in 1826, at the request of the Portuguese Government, Great Britain sent troops to Portugal in order to assist that Government against a threatening revolution on the part of the followers of .Don JCiguelj and in 1849, at the request of Austria, Russia sent troops into Hungary to assist Austria in suppressing the Hungarian revolt. Law* (1943} £75.

I. Oppsbheim, Int -itional

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Second, I think it preferable that* the word "justified" be used in place of the word "authorized" in both paragraphs 3 and k of the draft Joint Resolution. The Joint Resolution of Congress approving "President Wilson's action at the time of the Tampico incident designedly employed the word "justified" in order to avoid the implication that Congress was exercising the power which it alone has to declare war. 2/ Moreover, I have taken the position internally within the Department of Defense that, as a matter of constitutional law, the President has authority to use the armed forces to repel aggression abroad without specific approval from the Congress where the circumstances of the situation require it. If this draft'"Joint Resolution is passed in its present form it will be a precedent for the proposition that the President must under the Constitution have an authorization from the Congress before he can use the armed forces to repel aggression abroad in cases of this sort in the future where the time element may be even more critical than in the present case.

I think the first of these two points is worth mentioning. I think the second is worth pressing for.

(Signed)

Wilber M. Brucker General Counsel

2/ See 6 Hackworth, Digest of International Law 19^0 (1952).

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:

*

SUKIARY-OF III. STUDY BY THE CENT! :L BTELLIGEHCS AGENCY 0? 001:115": CAPABILITIES I!" BllXXJHINA

1* Corimunist capabilities to oppose U.S. ar^^ intervention in Indochina are estimated on two assumptionss (a) Viet Kinh alone j receiving indirect Chinese Comunisl aid; and (b) Chinese Cc nist and Het Minh forces receiving Soviet support, H ovrever 3 th^fe T . gttedy doe s not consid er.the effect on enegiy c^PacDlti^s of _U 4 S, c »t er~actlon^or of ene?y action not directed against indoch£na ( This assumption is very misleading 1 especially in view of the fact that national policy toward Southeast Asia (I;SC 5U05) in the event of Chinese Conmimist intervention calls for U.S. military reaction not liiaited to the area of Indochina.

oi:

2, Under assumption (a) (Viet ^inh a3.one), the Viet Minh will be capable

m

a* Maintaining guerrilla warfare throughout Indochina and mounting attacks in northern Indochina vith a force of up to six divisions - almost complete logistic dependence on Chinese ConLnunists.

b. Expanding the present combat forces of 2 £0^000 by an additional 1^000,

c* Making air fields available j although the Viet Minh do not possrrs an air force.

d, Negligible naval activity*

e, Regarding political warfare, aopealSxg to nationalism and denounc-ing U.S. intervention as colonialism: subverting and itttinldating the Ifidochxnese people. In spite of Allied victories, a hard core of Cor.-munists would regain.

3- Under assunption (b) (Chinese intervention)* the Chinese Communists will be capable of;

a. Comnitting five of their thirteen armies (36,000 men each) within ■ 10-20 days,

b. Supporting Communist combat forces^ over present lines of communications ^ of 600^,000 men. This capability exists in the dry or rainy season, * *

c. Intervening immediately with an air force of 120 aircraft (fighter and bomber).

«

d. Limited naval activity.

var

e. Regarding political Warfare,, infiltrating and conducting guerrilla fare in suooort of Viet Minh activities,"

to -

2 *

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SUMMARY OF SECTIOH IV

STUDY BY THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

This study Is based on the assumption that there will be no concurrent U.S. involvement in Korea. It points out that from the point of view of the U.S.j Indochina is devoid of decisive military objectives and that, consequently, the committing to the Indochina conflict of naval forces in excess of a Fast Carrier Task Force and supporting forces, as necessary in accordance with the developments in the situation, or basing substantial air forces in Indochina, will involve mal-deployment of forces and reduced readiness to meet probable Chinese Communist reaction elsewhere in the Far East.

Assuming the Chinese Communists intervene, we should, inter alia , employ atomic weapons, whenever advantageous, conduct air operations against military targets in Indochina, China, and Communist-held offshore islands, blockade the China coast, seize or neutralize Hainan, and have Chinese Nationalist forces undertake operations against the mainland. In accordance with the Unified Coimnand Plan, CINCPAC would exercise unified command of assigned forces. To train Associated States Forces, approximately 2,250 U.S. personnel would be required to augment the existing MAAG. Meanwhile, action should be taken to insure an appropriate degree of U.S. mobilization to provide for the greater risk of a general war, and we should undertake to strengthen those allies who could directly support the U.S. strategic concept for a general war.

In the event the Chinese Communists do not intervene, we should, inter alia, conduct air operations in support of allied forces in Indochina, employing atomic weapons if such a course appears militarily advantageous. Although the Allied Commander-in-Chief should be French, there should be a U.S. Deputy and a U.S. Air Adviser. CIKCPAC would exercise command over all U.S. forces based in Indochina and other forces assigned to him for operations in Indochina* The plan for training native ttoops would be the same as under the assumption of Chinese Communist intervention. )

Whether or not the U.S. intervenes in Indochina, the UCS consider that it is vital that the war in Indochina be financed by a method separate and distinct from the world-wide MDAP 0

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summary of odm studies re mobilization elans in the event of u.s. arm™ intervention in indochdia without Chinese intervention (situation a) or with chinese interve^jtion (situation b)

GENERAL

The need for mobilization actions depends far more on the induced effects of public interpretation of events than on the direct impact of military outlays. The expectations and interpretations of the public mil lead to serious economic consequences unless offset by appropriate government action. The Increased direct effects of the military programs would be moderate for either Situation A or B in FY 55 and FY 56. The induced effects of either situation could have a very serious result particularly on price level and less seriously on the supply and distribution of materials. They would have only a slight effect on overall manpower availability. The measures which ODM proposes are most comprehensive in the field of stabilization and least so in manpower,

INDUSTRIAL MOBILIZATION

1. The Defense Materials System will continue to be a key element in industrial mobilization.

2. The rate of stockpile accumulation for a selected few critical materials will be protected.

■

3. Inventory controls will be imposed In both Situations A and B,

J+, Funds will be requested to erect plants and acquire equipment to overcome deficiencies in the mobilization base.

5, Preparatory work for more serious military conditions will go forward.

MANPOWER MOBILIZATION

, m 1 ii i^g». ^^^^■ ■ 1 ■ 1

a

1. The potential supply of military manpower available in the selective service pool and military reserves is sufficient to meet anticipated requirements under Situation A or B. However, certain policies and actions would be required to meet the demands of Situation B. Briefly they are:

a. Statutory authority for involuntary recall or reservists.

b. Statutory authority for extension of terms of service.

c. Elimination of fatherhood as a basis for deferment.

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i f* r" s " " " ■ 1

gC^pmC STABILI2MS0S

Ksasures to fca t&&3i2 in thia area £i^e:

1* Frio^ s rant n:^l wags eositroXsa ', 2, Dlrcot cor^uxor Eationi;?gi

3* Credit control* ! / >0 An oflequato to:-: j^ogvam to offset tho isflatio&sry effect3 of direct onlays*

03M v!3J. regroup its activities to fera four r:ajor divisions:

1-faterials cjd prediction 2* Kanpover, 3* Stabilisation*

/;i Tel ecov Altaic at ions*

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- VI

SlkJMARY 01? STUDY BY F 0A

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FCB U.S. ECONOMIC A 7 ^) T^C?U:ICA T , AID liT T:B 5T?S£TT OF I:^;R\^;:?I0TT

1. The objectives of the plan for economic and technical aid to the cour.tries of Southeast Asia in the event of IKS. action in Indochina would be (a) to gain the support and cooperation of the indigenous peoples 3 (b) to strengthen fcSeir ability to support the military effort , and (c) to strengthen allied appeal to neutral or hostile i'ndigencus peoples.

2, The nagnitude of the aid is dependent on the size of the area o"oen to operations, the speed vita which developments take place and the outcome of the military activity. The type of program would be cieteirr.ined largely by the c^e^rc:^ of stability in the area involved.

3- a. Activities necessary whether conditions are stable or unst? £z those vhich supplement the.var effort or contribute directly to the needs of the people: activities involving economic control•

b. Additional activities as re^r ar^as prc^ressi-ely stabilize: projects vhich contribute torrard building the basic strer^th of a country and its peoples: projects vliich assist indigenous ^rover^^ts to ooerate efficiently and gain popular support- i.e., agriculture and public vorhs, health and educational standards.

k. Outlines for the specific countries of Viet Has^ Caiiibcdiaj Laos ; Thailand and the Philippines are presented (p graph 21).

525

Shis docn::;>enl rust not be rcprciiiG'-d vrithoul psrinission of th« ori£i:^tI:;:- office.

This dorcntnl cental::' Copy Bo. —L- of J—

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SO&9HX OF S2CTI0I: 7 S5S3DIES BY r ri3 0PSRA2ICS-TS COQSDX2a$3$G 30SRD .

1. The 0C3 studies present five plans designed to facilitate U.S. ob.jectr after ve have intervened in the Associated States as a sentjer of a regional grouping. These plans or a:

. -,. s

a. Plan for sain: indigenous peoples.

,ng jrjaxirius! support for U.S

.«?.

lu'cervercion rrc

b. Plan of political warfare campaign against Viet Minh

c. Plan for gaining xaaRitioai support of other free world countries.

&. Plan for political Warfare organisation as integral part of interventj

e. Plan for keeping China out of var or reducing its effectiveness in var "by Political warfare means.

V *-

2. Highlights of the various plans are e«s follows:

* a. Maximm support for U.S. intervention fro© the indigenous peoples should "be achieved by clarifying for then the issues involved.

rv

c« A Korean-tvpe training prosram should he established fo" nanese AnSjfj and training programs for Laos and Casibodia should established.

w. .».. , _ .. ij —

also he

d. As fast"as practicable; the people of Viet Sam should

voice in **~ne Koverrsnatrt.

^xven a

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e. Political "nrfare against the Viet Minh should include continued support for the 10,000 French-controlled -juerrill&s in Viet Hart and Laos and sabotage tea&s should he developed and trained to operate in Southeast China^ I'orth Viet I;am and Hbrth Laos. Escape and evasion safe areas and "rat lines" should he established to the coast or to Thailand, CAT has been alerted for any necessary logistic or operational air support requirement'- ~~ unable to he net by military air support. In order to increase Allied sunno--in the absence of Chinese Co/.v:u::ist intervention , -;e should continue our er?f

If order to increase Allied support in the event of Chinee:- c-'—-i—*-

intexnrention, \te should rsafce every effort to restrict

a s

tne conflict to e>-v:I the Associated States and se^> a favorable hasis for a ---- .^

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g. Political varfare measures designed to prevent the er of Chinese forces into the var should include:

(1) Tlireats to retaliate^ ineludir.3 a show of air and raval strength i" the area.*

\ '

(2) Assurance that hostilities "rill be United to fee Associates States if China dees rot intervene.

h. In the event of Chinese Cor. mist intervention^ we should try to minimize the effectiveness "by;

(1) Indicating that South Korea and Nationalist China will "be encouraged to attackj thus confronting the Chinese ylth a %-£ro&t var.

(2) CocEsenelug rapid rearming of Ger&any in order to put pressure

on the USSR and to increase Soviet logistical support of China.

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SECTION VIII

STUDIES OF THE BUREAU OK TIES BUDGET

SUMMARY

J. A sugary of the studies prepared by the Bureau of the Budget is

attached as Tab A.

*

COMMENTS . ■

1

2* The Acting A5D (Comptroller), whose cotn&ents are attached as Tab B 3 feels that the sums for economic aid appear excessive in relation to the mutual military assistance program. He further notes an increase in additional new obligational authority for "economic stabilisation l selective service* stockpiling. etc**" while the amount of additional funds for stockpiling is not known* He makes the point that there is serious doubt vhether the U.S. should accelerate its stockpiling program in the event of U.S. action in Indochina,, or "whether the stockpile should be insnedi&tely utilized, Ke questions whether the several agencies contributing studies have based their programs and program estimates on the sane policy guidance.

528

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SUKKAIft OP' SECTION VIII

STUDIES OF TKS BUREAU OF THE BUDGET

1. The Bureau of the Budget was asked to prepare studies to cover:

a. Revisions of FY % $$ and l $S budget plans.

: b. Preparation of any necessary requests for supplemental appropriations,

-

-

c. Preparation of any necessary requests for additional statutory authorityj these studies to be made under the alternate assumption re Chinese Cocnmunist intervention.

2. The key to the upward revision in budget plans centers around Defense programs (60 per cent) ; plus mutual military aid and foreign economic assist-ance. The submissions by agencies indicate that without Chinese Cc mist interventionj additions to current budget plans villi be of the following order:

19$$ 1956

(in billions)

s. Nc-vr obligations! authority

•A

S2.1

b« ixoenoicures »•*«»**. •>» «*«.*#« •*«•*•*• jl • J.

3. Under the assumption of Chinese Corun.unist intervention, additions to current budget plans of the folio g order have been indicated:

195$ 19^6

(In billions)'

a* New obligational authority . •., $5*7

b. Exc end i tur as

2.5

8.9

l«. Regarding necessary requests for supplemental appropriations, 503 says merely that supplemental appropriations vrould be necessary.

5. Regarding necessary requests for additional statutory authority, BOB

says that at this stage, they have not prepared any legislation.

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

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military participation Indochina seem to U3 serious overstatement this stance and potentially dangerous for reasons given Dsptel b3£6 (repeated to Geneva TEDUL ll$)« ...... •

Irihile one major obstacle to agreement removed noix that fomula proposed r

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Deptel 4272 for clarification independence Associated States acceptable

(subject to discussion in. th Bitiaultj ceo XULT. 7 ; 135 repeated Paris 3^7) ^

ve need from French soonest possible? prsd&d Gtat: .';:at he;-; tlioy propo

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handling their action or cosTaittasn to to meet our conditions listed Dsptel

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1»023 paragraph 2 as modified by Deptel l|£72<> Until to have obtained such statement from Lanxel v;o cannot (repsat not) be (rare b&sis for any firm agreement does in fact exist* Once such statement received and judged by us fulXi.1.1 conditions \;e would then be in position proceed accordance with

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other necessary steps vhich vould have to bs taken, assuming situation

warranted it

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TO: Secretary o2 State /bJJ" .J

fJO; 2656, June 4, 5 p.oi«

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SENT DSPARTiXENT 2656; REPEATED INFORMATION PARIS 9^2, GENEVA 192...

Department telegram■4272\sent Paris repeated Geneva T03SC 2695 § Saigon 2^418 was delayed In receipt due to extensive servicing* » This accounts for our tardy comment,

I am in full agreement with general tenor of reference telegram -ana have only minor observations to make. Those are: 0

Re numbered paragraph 3-C s ±t might make French declaration more palatable both* in France and in Asia generally were we likewise to announce Intention to withdraw US technical and :

I military assistance as soon as practicable. It must not be ;.

'"forgotten that In Communist and" neutralist Asian es US is principal threat in Eastern iHTia ane[ riot "what" IV generally re-regarded to be a decadent France. Since Communist propaganda has already overstressed alleged unduly large role of FOA Mission here and Peking radio daily proclaims that US is send-' ing military equipment to slaughter*Asiatics J such a declaration might be useful from psychological'warfare point of view.

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I Reference paragraph 4~A, it is essential that we commence forthwith to review terms of reference which now limit MAAG to purely logistical function/ Under present set of rules^ General Q'Daniel is being asked to train Vietnam e troops > with ever present French veto hanging over his head. In my I opinion, we should approach French Government on terms of September 29 j 1953 agreement , point out that Navarre plan no longer exists 3 that conditions have changed, and that new terms of reference for MAAG should be drafted forthwith.

Implicit in paragraph J-A but not specifically touched upon is problem of ancillary agreements which will spell out turn-ovei by France to Vietnam of sovereignty in specific fields as, foi example, control of currency, Custom Union, Civil Aviation, and Mixed Courts* French, whether through incapacity of government to move in present Parliamentary crisis or by deliberate design, have not moved at all in completing these*agreements" ^ although telegrams from Embassy Paris have Indicated that so o far as experts were concerned, these accords were almost, ready0

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-2- 26565 June k, 5 p.m., from Saigon.

for signature. Likewise Vietnamese experts, feeding at the flesh potSj have shown no alacrity in pressing for final action. It is not enought to broadcast a fine-sounding treaty of independence without knowing exactly where Vietnamese will find themselves in respect of control of their finances, their courts, and their right to request technical assistance from any quarter, and not exclusively from France.

As for question of elections to which Department quite rightly attaches importance, it is now of less significance in Vietnam than before owing to general feeling of panic and anxiety lest entire country be lost through unfortunate armistice terms. Press has announced that decrees will presently be signed by Bao Dai providing foi^ municipal elections and, with exception of Saigon-Cholon, for direct election of mayors. This should to some extent meet Department*s requirement in this regard although it is far less than national elections or preparations for National Constituent Assembly.

Upon DeJean's return from north today, I plan to discuss with him measures which should be taken locally as suggested number paragraph 6. I intend to suggest to DeJean necessity of providing Vietnamese administrators and technical experts with know-how derived from actual participation in the affairs of government. Likewise, Department heads and Ministers should be given greater opportunity to participate in forward planning as this will result in sense of responsibility to the nation which has heretofore been lacking. Another suggestion which has frequently been advanced is that French, by turning over Norodom Palace to Vietnamese, would give graphic evidence of their intention to retire from this country and to confirm Vietnamese independence. Main question, however, would be whether Chief of State would return to occupy Palace*

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French acted the situation had deteriorated beyond salvage. Th

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latter seems,to be happening.

I have long felt and still,feql that the French are not treating our proposal serious ly hu t r- ,' ' v.-ith it just enoug h to u se_it_a;

a talking point at Geneva-

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plenary cession of June *h, under chairmanship General Valluy P aiaen<Io

and approved Conference Study ITo. Is "Intelligence Survey of llilitr Situation in SUA Area."

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^-. Ho Chi Klnti'-s objective is 3?oiil:in« to bo attained either by

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negotiation at Geneva or by assault on Hanoi.

5. lio Chi ianh wishes to entangle us in rio^otiationji by adtuifctinj now| for fir:;I tiiao 7 that there is a Co&BifuniSt northern state and a non

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Co.iunuaist southern- state and saying that both wi^Ut bo incorporated in

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6. What Ho Chi Hiuh seeks la Tonkin and its political capital Han from which he was driven in 1?H6. He wishes obtain 'Tonkin cither by negotiation (Valluy admitted "among military won" that ho Chi Hlnh i'lads

teross negotiating table receptive French oar:;) or by military action,

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To prepare for such action, ho in drawing out negotiations to gain tiuio

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Tor his battle corps to bo in positlohand ready, IS action is called fo

7. In course of negotiating toward a ceasefire (which is demanded

by French public opinion) concept of partition appears 9 as Ho CM Kinh

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off he will strive to obtain Xonkin by force. In siicli a aJ&ddteuQEjc lalliL;

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o. It has been caicl at this Conference that if Tonkin Iz ^nx lonfc we will fi^ht in couth* However French will nob rpt not fight nor will

YietnartUi To &&n lino in south 9 conferees will have to provide own imn*

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9- Decisive point in military conference is this; if other

■ conferees do not rpt not underwrite today's, battle for Tonkin 5

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tomorrow they will fight without French In Saigon and Bangkok** Vail-

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said he could af firm that i f Tonkin were lost 3 no Vietnamese would i

fight against -other Vietnamese a and sooner or later (probr .^sooner

whole of Vietnam will become Communis!

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10, Valluy said he did not rpt not mean to dramatize hut only t« be realistic among soldiers. Truth cannot be disguised* 13ach of allies has share of responsibility and if battle for Tonkin is lost,

allies will have to fight alone on actual main line of resistance

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much Itsti&ssr. farther away. y •

Admiral Carney remarked that Gen Valluy f s appraisal was

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and appended to intelligence survey as representing unilateral views of one representative. Bad Defense Dept sususary. " .

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Foregoing for your own info only. Valluy was speaking in confidence

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and as an Individual* Your comments requested*

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

DEPARTMENT OF 'STATE

SECRET

SENT TO: Amconsul GENEVA TOSEC 368

RPTD INFO: USUN, New York 626

Aiueiribassy LOMDON 6632

PARIS kh5k

Bangkok 2^38

Secretary believes it is of overrriding importance to push on with action on Thailand appeal, and to avoid getting bogged down in argumentation about geographical scope of sub-commission activities. Nevertheless, it seems clear UK and French will not agree to move along in SC jntil we have reached understanding on this question, SECTO 366 and SECTO 371 indicate language included TOSEC 229 and in Thai speech to SC June 3 should meet Eden's desire that resolution not specifically (repeat specifically) extend scope of POC . beyond Thailand, while allowing actual observation to be extended later without further SC or GA action. However, French delegation in NY has firmly contended

■

sub-commission must be restricted to Thailand alone while British were most

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concerned that there be no immediate request by Laos and Cambodia for observation.

Since we now desire quick action, suggest you meet with Eden, Prince Wan and Bidault to work out agreement wMch will permit delegations in NY to press matter in SC. Hope we could get their agreement next meeting of SC should be held preferably Friday and certainly not later than Monday or Tuesday, Juno Xk or 15- Possibly they would agree on text contained TOSEC 229.

UFA: UITP: DHPopp er: r s 6/7/5*1

UNA - Mr. K

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constructive suggestion they have* -i^^oon as agreement on resolution reached >re would want to have it Introduced in 3C 5 although m would hops no::b meeting

could bo scheduled even if text of resolution not yot firm, In this event

-■

next meeting would he limited to sceech-caaking*

Foregoir.^ dismissed with Thai Ambassador hara today, He rcoct eager avoid delay in SC and feels strongly v;c should not give up our bargaining position by ridding on scooe of US observation at least it this fcjjfts* H G j,a notifying

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t • j'! Numbered paragraph 1 Reftel. We would bo interested any specific ideas ''

Bidault teight propose with view simplifying request to other nations, so long

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wo have full agreement, at least in principle, with French on conditions U3 military participation there would be no actual negotiations with other •»

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would rr.osfc likely coma along.

Numbered paragraph 3» Sfe agree undesirable President should make fornal

pledge unilaterally and refer you paragraph 2 Deptel 4272 ^ repeateu Geneva

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IfOSSG 269j 'which stressed joint character any such uledgc, President would

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I Numbered paragraph 4. Ifnile we ;would agree substitution words Quote after " re-establishment peace Unquote for Quote after end of hostilities Unquote vrc feel our phrasing for rest sentence definitely preferable to that proposed by Bidaulw

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His text carries overtone Franc© retaining right decide timing first and then getting

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Vietnamese Government to agree after, /whi ch pr ecisely type 3.rnplicat ion we cons ider

— , — ■ — ■ ■ - ■ ■ ■. ■

it necessary avoid if independence of Viet Nan to be cryabal clear.

Numbered paragraph 5* We feel Bidault's proposed text for paragraph 2 of Deptel 42o6 > repeated Geneva TEOUL 133, conflicts with assurance sought by our text. VJhile Bidault's language might be helpful for 3DG debate it provides loopholes for

■ ■

abusive interpretation justifying later claims right withdrawal on one or other of counts listed. When occasion offers suggest you point out to Bidault that we could not (repeat not) commit forc es &n dJJ3_prg3tlg e in situ ation when there would be any question concerning premature French withdrawal their forces.

N\u;ibered paragraph 6. After full agreement reached on all conditions and French

Government has reached decision it wishes requeot U3 intervention, US must have

opportunity, at that time make its own We^can not gran CTrer.ch- nn Sile?irtl

implementation of formal stej

. decisions taken would we expect Laniel submit agreement and request for interoation-alization to Parliament for endorsement and ratification;-also he nust not (repeat not) prejudice our liberty of decision by approaching-Parliament in such way that we would I

aDpear be morally coirznittcd intervene prior to our decis5.cn.

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understanding of the I told him I understood

Dixon (UK) asked me this morning our present status of Thai appeal in SC.

Smith had been instructed to urge on Eden and Bidault importance we attach to very early meeting. I also indicated our understanding Thais strong feeling scop e sh ould,_not_be___tQ,a^strictly limited. Dixon said his instructions remained (A) timing should tie dependent entirely on developments at Geneva; (B) scope should be limited to Thailand. He said if Russians veto resolution in SC"limiting the scope to Thailand, consideration could then be ^j given to broadening scope in GA resolution. We pointed out ft* broadening the scope in GA after Russian veto of limited scope ,resolution in SC would be likely to alienate votes; it was our j impression there is more give in' UK position on scope than vindicated by Dixon but that there is probably very little give ■on the question of timing. - ■

Lucet (France), who was present, indicated to us in an aside that he personally thought a reference to "the general area of Thailand 1 ' was too "broad and that perhaps language could be worked out which permitted POC group to go into "neighboring states at the request of those state

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Hoppenot is in-hospital and will be out of circulation for at least week" or two/ We agreed to get in touch this evening or tomorrow morning if any of us have any word from Geneva.

.Khoman (Thailand) came in this afternoon for general discussion.

He very strongly em-

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Knew about Sarasin's talk with Key.

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phasized Thai Government's negative attitude towards limiting scope to Thailand. He also recorded strongest opposition-^to^ I have Czechoslovakia or any other satellite as member of PQC > \ group. He asked if we thought it would be useful for fritirrx). talk with other delegations in order to build up support for--: GA action in event of Soviet veto in SO. We advised him it ^ would be desirable to begin laying strong foundations now (Kf k in favor of convening GA promptly, and (B) in support of de—J sirable objective when GA convenes. He would like to know US? thinking at present on resumed GA or special session. He wo'bld

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-2- 810, June 8, 7 p.m. from New York.

? also like to know our thinking on composition of FOG group 'in the event India cannot be persuaded to serve. He mentioned Iraq as one possibility.

Khoman also asked us to ascertain the Departments latest thinking on sponsorship of SG_.re.s.olutlQn^' He indicated Thailand would be quite willing to introduce resolution itself on understanding, of course, that United States and others . ., would ask it be put to vote in accordance with rules as useful / debating material. Khoman mentioned recent story in PRAVDA / or some other Russian paper on active fighting in Cambodia -/ close to border of Thailand,

At lunch today Johnson (Canada), although noncommittal, seemed generally more sympathetic to our ideas of timing and scope than Perry (New Zealand) who tended to argue current UK line in New York re limiting scope to Thailand.

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FROM:-Paris

TO: Secretary of State HO: ^766, June 9, noon

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SENT DEPARTMENT 4766 REPEATED IITEORMATION GENEVA 570.

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GENEVA EYES ONLY UNDER SECRETARY

Reference: CEPTEL 4421 and DULTE 156.

I sew Schumann yesterday afternoon and endeavored to explain to him oar need for a French statement as to how they proposed to ^ handle their actions as described In second paragraph of reference Department telegram* Schumann had difficulty understanding just what It v/as we wanted at this time as he considers that the basis for an agreement in principle has" been reached and that it was impossible^to go further until the Geneva conference had definitely failed.*" He pointed out that since the basic US requirement was that any French request for military assistance must be approved by the French Parliament, such a request could not (repeat not) be made while there was any hope for progress at Geneva because of the s trong feeling'In the Parliame nt that everything possible should^be done~to reach an agreement at Geneva. * - .

He then told me that Under Secreaty apparently agreed that agreement hat* been reached in principle and he read me a telegram^from i Bidault reporting same conversation as that reported in D'JLTE 156 # J Bidault reported that Under Secretary had expressed pleasure that* agreement in principle had now been reached. Regarding numbered a paragraphs of" DULTE*156 .3idault's report had following Items"of ^ interest: Tj^TT .

Paragraph 1, Bidault reported that Under Secretary agreed with him that this problem was over-complicated and should be simplified . •

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Paragraph 2. Bidault stated that he felt that the Thai resolution took care of this problem and he stated that the Under. Secretary agreed with him that this problem had now been solved

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Paragraph 5. NO difference.

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

TOP SECRET

_2- U766, June 9j noon from Paris

Paragraph k* No difference. Schumann however pointed out the great importance of this change of wording as "the end of hostilities" could well he interpreted to mean a state of armistice, whereas what was really meant was that troops should only be withdrawn after peace had been established. The whole Viet Minh effort has been to reach some sort of armistice that would force the withdrawal of the French troops and leave the country to them.

Paragraph 5- No difference. However , Schumann stated that he had told Bidault prior to his interview with Under Secretary that he felt that new language suggested by French was too broad and that US would require more specific pledge. Bidault reported that Schumann had guessed wrong as Under Secretary had seen no (repeat no) difficulties in proposed language pointing out that conditions named in new draft were inherent in sovereignty of any great power. Bidault also reported Under Secretary had said

he would refer this language to Department for final decision.

■

Paragraph 6, No difference.

Schumann then stated that in view of meeting of minds between Bidault and Under Secretary he was sure that with the possible exception of new wording suggested in paragraph 5 of DULTE 156, there were no (repeat no) political differences between us. He then said that he had just received a very disturbing cable from Bonnet. Before he could read it to me a call came through on the telephone from Bonnet in which they talked further about the same subject.

*-' a

Subject is Valluy r s negotiations regarding use of US Marine Valluy has reported to Pieven and Bonnet that it is very doubtful if US would agree in any circumstances to sending a Marine division to Indochina. I pointed out to Schumann that US response on this subject had never been blanket pledge to use Marines but had only stated that their use would not (repeat not) be excluded provided an agreed upon war plan required their presence. I further said that it would depend upon the war plan which Valluy submitted as to whether or not our JCS would be convinced that Marines should be committed. Schumann said he fully understood this and would explain it further to Pleven, but no emphasized crucial impoi*tance this matter.

Comment: As I pointed out in EI4BTEL U503 French military have assumed that any war plan which was satisfactory to our JCS would show necessity for the use of at least one Marine division. While from our point of view this problem quite pz^operly should be judged on its military merits, we must realize that it also has strong political aspects here and that French Parliament in my opinion will not (repeat not) in any circumstances vote to ask

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TOP SECRET

for US

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

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TOP SECRET

■

-3- H766 y June 9, noon from Parts

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for US assistance in Indochina unless government can at least make strong inference that Marines will "be sent to Indochina.

-

»

Thus; most crucial part of present Franco-US negotiations from both military and political point of view would seem to "be

conversations Valluy is carrying on at Pentagon.

*—. __ ,

If our JCS takes position that US has not (repeat not) the military power to be able to afford the commitment of even one Marine division to Tonkin delta, French will draw the obvious conclusion that arguments which force JCS to such a conclusion apply with approximately five-fold effect to France. This will push them irresistibly toward .abandonment of Indochina, Thus if we want French military assistance in showdown with Communists in Southeast Asia it is in my opinion vital that JCS find it possible to approve a joint war plan justifying the use of Marines. . . ^ \

TT/11 ■ -"'.''■ ■ i

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 633 J 6. By: NWD Date: 2011

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TOP SECRET'

Action

Inf.

FROM: Geneva

Control: 4526

fcse'*: Jane 9, 3-95** l'A r o p.m.

2

TO: Secretary of Sto/co

K0: BOLTS l6*L June 9, 10 p.m

KIACT

EYES OKLY SECRETARY

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I had a long talk with(Eded' this morning- He said that we are clearly ji' ominp to end here e _n_ _Indop hlna . Three major issues # have emerged on which we cannot compromise and on which Comaun-ls-tQ svhow no intention of receding. These are (1) separate treat nt p of iaos and Cambodia, which are clearly victims of Viet Minh

^

L aggression; (2) status and powers of impartial international supervisory authority; and (3) composition of international s aperv; ory a ithority.

He is convinced that we can get no further on these issues and Should b reak within next f ew d ^ys« While he feels no useful negotiating purpose would be served,, he is inclined to think that for public opinion it would be desirable that he privately see Molotov once more before a break in order to make clear to .Molotov firs -33 our -position and obtain Communist position. He is hopeful of forcing Molotov i nto p ublic rejection Colombo power^ f or s uoervi sorv^orga: ' Tion. TfTis~¥tll~hav very^bene-STal effects in soutS and southeast Asia- I pointed out,

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an:! he• s.r:'55:. that French situation is such that we would prababivj have to leave the French and Viet Minh military officers here

v .o:^s In Vietnam.-

lr.in^:d":a^ ely foilowirig^b reak bS feels Cambodia and Laos should

cases to L^e~T 7 7~errci ty divoTg^-~frDsr1g li^llaii d-s^

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"I gathered that- he was Lamping oz sometTTI^TgnTTC»Ttri7han jar.:, a POO. J He thinks it highly important that they move rapid r? trie conference is wound up, but equally important until v *

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be no hints or press leaks whatever that such ted. He feels that if properly handled and appeals are spontaneous on their part, with no implication of US-UK initiative or prodding, they will receive general Asian

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Thailand an; 1 to Laos and Cambodia. He rightly points ;iut

,_iacaaemlo, si it wlii in any event be vetoed, Resoluti ian ' :i •

way that appears desirable at the time matter ioi ; L -

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

TOP SECRET

u

-2-#DULTS 164, June 9, 10 p.m., from Geneva '

" before General Assembly. He said he would send Instructions to Dixon to try to work out with. Lodge some .language that would meet his point, while not necessarily precluding POO operations outside Thailand. I am sending separate telegram repeated*tb"

• USUK replying to your T03EC 378 giving only latter part this paragraph.

■

«

Eden said he had not yet put to cabinet bis Ideas with regard to UN appeal by Cambodia and Laos, and therefore asked that the matter be treated with strictest secrecy.

Eden also said he was considering recommendation reduce strength of Commonwealth division in Korea by about half or one brigade in order to reinforce Malaya, If things eased up in Egypt, he was also hopeful that forces could be spared from there for Malaya, I told him that in view of more critical situation in southeast Asia and our ability within the armistice to train and equip ROK forces as replacements, I thought we would have no objection. ...

* ■

Clear that Eden now considers negotiations here have failed.

r

FTeve he -IT prepared to move ahead quickly in southeast Asia coalition which would guarantee Cambodia and most of Laos under umbrella of some UN action with respect to those two countries. He expects active cooperation from Burma, and hopes for benevolent neutrality from India. Efe Apparentl y dn^s not feel much can be

salvage d . In Vietna m.

*

As you know, Bida ult is n ot here and we will not know where French 4 stand urrElT Assembly debate completed, if then. If French continue negotiations, point will probably arrive shortly when deteriorating military situation will force them accept simple cease-fire in attempt temporarily, salvage something. Therefore ^ne^ gu^stlon we ma y shortly f a ce is what we and UK do if Fran ce Insists en ccntl - ny n egotiatio ns som ewhat lon ger. It -is one thing to withdraw if France negotiates an agreemSTrt with which we cannot publicly associate ourselves, and another to withdraw prior to that time.

Aden's tactics recommend-themselves very stronsly to me.

>ha\£ve^spoke to me after the above was dictated. In Bidault ! s absence he and others have been considering recommending to Bidault that France and three Associated States together make appeal to UK. He had reports from Valluy, part pf which he read to me. He is obviously convinced that things will go badly in Delta.- I made no comment except to suggest that Laos and Cambodia commanded a certain sympathy in Asia and Middle East which France plus Vietnam did not. I asked hi® categorically if rranoe want ed to internationalize on conditions we had v led some time ago, saying neither you noi; I knew where France stood..

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number; NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

JL Ui fcJJJjWJ. ID _L

-3-//DULTE l6h 9 June 9, 10 p.m., from Geneva

■

He replied that he did not know: '— that "Bidault st i ll ho ped to get someth^g^lieTe^^

I would appreciate your thoughts and guidance.

With respect Korea* Eden indicated he would probably speak next plenary (which we plan for Friday or Saturday). He would not be adverse to making this last session-on Korea. However , not all of sixteen are yet prepared to do this. I do not knew whether we will be able get them lined up. If not, ono more * plenary may be necessary.

SMITH

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OUTGOING TELEGR/

Declassified per Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

TOP SECRET

PRIORITY

SENT TO: Amconsul GENEVA TEDUL 178

Rpt to Amcmbassy, PARIS 1+^76 Amembassy, SAIGON 2551

Amembassy, LONDON FOR MERCHANT AND DILLON EYES ONLY FOR AMBASSADORS

6684

Ambassador bonnet came to see Secretary Dulles Wednesday afternoon and raised question of participation of US Marines Indochina. He said lie had received telegram from Maurice Schumann expressing excitement and dismay at information from Valluy that Radford had said there was no rpt no question of utilization Marines Indochina* Ambassador said this conflicted with what French Govt had hitherto understood to be intentions US Govt this respect. He further stated suggestion made by Radford to Valluy that three Korean divisions might be used in Indochina was unacceptable.

Secretary said US position had been clear from start and that we were not rpt not willing to make commitraent ahead of time which French could use for internal political maneuvering or negotiating at Geneva and which would represent a kind of permanent option on US intervention if it suited their purpose, A month ago^ French had been explicitly informed conditions which must pe met and fulfilled by them before President took decision whether to go to Congress and ask for authority use American armed forces in relation Indochina. Among these conditions was need for French and Associated States to request US and certain other interested countries to come in. We were still in dark as to what French intentions really were.

EUR: WE: WRTyler: e j f

FE - Mr. Drumright EUR - Mr, Barbour

k62k0

(signed

Douglas MacArthur

Cleared with: Secretary

550

TOP SECRET

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1

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; . TSDOL AnisEb'aia'dy PAEIS, A: b&osy SAIGON- f --, /

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TO? SECRET

CldssificGtion

Secretary said hs felt French desire obtain firm coi-nitsisnt from u^ on / - " vhich they could draw ma understandable* but equally imderatandablo in I

circumstances is our determination not rpt not to give them such blank chock* Seeretaxy confined US position as stated by Dillon (H766 from Paries) that use

—»«_

of Marines would not rpt not &6 excluded provided an agreed operational '■

plan required their presence* He said it was useless and illusozy to attempt to obtain from us at this time a ecEHflitas&nt more specific on this point than that which we had already given*

m

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With regard to what we would do in event act of open aggression by

(last four paragraphs of section 2Z Roy,::m four) Chinesej Secretary read relevant extractG/frcn his Los Angoleo speech

which is being separately transmitted©

Bonnet expressed surprise that W3 considered that French Govt had not

*

rpt not made up its mind with regard to internationalization of Indochina war .and said ho considered request, had already been made by French, Secretary pointed out that our offer on basio certain fjpecifie conditions had been made a month ago in context of situation at that time* irhich confirmed and nade precipe much earlier representations* , SincD then things had changed rapidly and would doubtless continue to change* For this reason delay was regrettablej and further delay would not rpt not improve situation With regard to any role rcs might consider playing* ■ - .

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TO: Secretary oJ State

}10: 2714, June 10, 2 p.m.

SENT DEPARTMENT 271^, REPEATED INFORMATION PARIS 967, GENEVA 21^1.

PARIS FOR AMBASSADOR. " • ~

GENBftA FOR IKDER SECRETARY,

General Valluy's appreciation of the situation"as set out Department telegram 2527, sent Geneva TBDllL 171, repeated Paris WlS is exceedingly good--in fact almost too good, . * Although there are one or two points to which we might take exception from purely military aspect, I desire to confine my comment to political connotations of Valluy ! s statement, I have impression that under instructions he made this very concise evaluation less with military considerations in mind than with political objectives in view. I think that Valluy was looking as much at the French Parliament as he was at the "Tonkin delta when he made his speech. General Ely has twlc_e in my^resmice—stated ." .

St ates to enter t his war . Only yesterday his Chief of Staff, Colonel Brohan, repeated this comment. My belief is that purp ose of Va lluyL-i^taterrient was either to bring us and, if possible, other five powers into .conflict here or, failing that, to prepare excuse before history'for*an impending armistice which French would then request of Viet Minh,

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NKD 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

OUTGOING * DEPARTMENT OF STATE

TELEGRAM TOP SECRET

SENT TO; Amembassy PARIS ^508

Undersecretary, Geneva TOSEC 392 EYES ONLY AMBASSADOR

Following translation text message from Ely to Radford received evening

June 9 :

QUOTE: I have not yet made a survey of the military situation, especially in Tonkin. However, it seems to me that the decision I will have to take regarding the operations will rest on the US intentions, in the present situation^ as well as those they anticipate in the future.

QUOTE: Therefore, I would very much like to have, either in Paris, where I expect to be possibly on the 19th June, or here in Saigon, as soon as possib.1 an exchange of views with a qualified representative of Admiral Radford, in order to know what I can expect on the part of the U*S.A. UNQUOTE*

Prior to French decision to request internationalization, we consider undesirable to start yet another series conversations which would inevitably provoke on French side all kinds hopes and interpretations with regard basic

issue US intervention which would only cause further confusion. In other words,

i it is our feeling that we should not be eased into a series of

piecemeal commitments resulting from collateral military conversations in the

EUR: V?E:WRTyler: vh 6/10/5*4 Robert Murphy

C - Mr. Mac Arthur

TOP SECRET

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absence of cm urder steeling with the French G-vorr^ut bas§3 on our general proposal clescrilod in T3DUL y., Bedford has accorolb-ly inferred Gsssral

Valli^ orally that US position vas given to Jbth&ssador Boanot l;y Secretary*

*

ffsns 9 asd that he is not (repeat not) :ln position at this tins to respond to Ely's request for conversations on subject r-ai~?'i hie massage^

With regard to US trailing VietB^aeea troops, va fool that situation

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Viet Ram has degenerated to point v:;?ora any oosmitrbnt at thin tims to &encl

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ever VS ingtruotere in near future' riirht expose 1*0 to fesd&g faoecJ with

situation in which it would be contrary to otir interests to bava to fulfill

eueh cor^itr.^r;t ( Our posit! otj accordingly 1b that ve do ftot (rojoat ££&£

not) wish to consider 13 training s&ssion or progrsoa eepkrat&ly from oyc'2*-*&il

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war Iriioc^iir.s.,

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Control: 6854 fbc'cJ? June 14, 1954 7: 26 p. m.

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TO: Secretory ©£ Btoto DO; 4841, June 14, 5 P-"'-

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SENT DEPARTMENT 2 i84l; REPEATED INFORMATION GENEVA 393. ^ /v,J^>f<^

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DEPARTMENT EYES ONLY SECRETARY GENEVA EYES ONLY UNDER SECRETARY

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1. In all probability one of first acts of any new French Government v/ill be request precise statement Immediate and future US Intentions regarding military intervention Indochina.

2. During past week, I have gathered the very definite impression that because of (A) our reluctance to send ground

'forces to Indochina; (B) deterioration of military and political situation in Indochina during last month; (C) extru me reluctance, If not refusal, of ANZUS partners-to consider joining US in any military intervention in Delta area, the chances of US responding favorably to French request for military assistance even after they have met all conditions are approximately nil. "~ .

3. Hardening of Communist position in Geneva as indicated by Molotov and Chou En-lai last week .would seem to Indicate that Communis ts no longer fea r pos slbility of US m j ] itar y Inber ^ v entIon In Indochina providecTThere is no overt Chinese attack. X1Twould seem, therefore, that Viet Minh and Chinese will not accept any armistice which does not clearly pave the way for Communist takeover In Indochina,

4. Lacking the possibility of US military support, it would s eem to be onl y a quea.tlQn_^Qf.-J;lme-,^Keeks or a fev/_jponths_at very most, be -e French are forced to accept Vlet JKl nh teri ttiPttie meantime, there is the constant risk of an all-out

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erse, If not total annihilation of expeditionary corps in

Inai--—■ 'Tonkin.

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have continually pointed out that such a reverse might have"-:! A disastrous effect on French public opinion. Today I am morej

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

TOP SECRET

»

-2- ^841 June 14, 5 p.m., from Paris.

■

wronglyj US would be blamed by French public opinion for having built up French hopes of intervention and then for having failed in the crisis. The result could well be a .neutralist-

government in France that wo aid reduce French military eorrmitraents to NATO and would, at the same time, be completely intransi-geant on question of German rearmament« Such a government , would also, in all probability, make a strong effort t to strengthen relations with the Soviet Union and to recreate the wartime Franco-USSR alliance in order to prevent German rearmament.

■

■ From this distance, I cannot judge what the effect of such French actions would be on American public opinion and particularly on our Congress, but I suspect that it might lead to an irresistible demand for the recall of some, if not all, of our troops from Europe, which, in effect, would mean the end of the North Atlantic Alliance followed eventually by the isolation of the Western hemisphere.

p- 1^ view of these very serious *and grave dangers which we will run if we allow the French to be defeated militarily "in the Delta, and if my assumption in paragraph 2 above is correct, I recommend that you give serious conalteration to pg ptly Infdrming -tSS French~^£i atn D ecause^ f e ither (Aj~the deteriora-€ Ion^or^th e~m 1 ] it ary~s Tt tiat ion in Indochina or (B) the reluc-■ timcF "^*^^ the""" Preax-

j from the Congress eveTT~Tf~ Zfie French should" now fully meet our

; cpn^l :^C^~V( r tt"l:e^^uch"'a"ctron'"on~^oiir^part would^hastefTl^hau

now appears to be the inevitable loss of Vietnam and might cause a certain additional temporary loss of face for the US, it w ould put the Fr ench _on_nojblcj)__th at t he y should promptly g^cepuI The^Vl e t Mlnh s 1sti ce t erms and thu s would save the Fren c h Expedit ionar y Corns_£mm.possible mil itary dl sas^er"7~ •I n the event of a wit hd hbX frotn I ndochin a under sacSTir ^um-stences 2 __^/oul d not f o^see_anv_^eri^o us or long term re jer~ cuss ions on France's po sition in the No rth Atlan tic^ ATliance. If we allow the French to continue to fight in the false hope that in the event of a crisis in the Delta, they may get T JS military assistance, the best we can hope for is to delay th Communist conquest of Vietnam by a few months, while we J?isk ' the very existence of the Korth Atlant ic Alliance,

ra

Prom my viewpoint hore in Paris, the possibility of a few! months delay in the Communist takeover of Indochina does not seem at all commensurate with tho risk of the possible collapse of the defense of Western Europe. . .

6. Vhile

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&4101 T0P SECRET

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3 3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

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•TOP SECRET -5- 4841, June 14, 5 p.m., from Paris.

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6. While I have several times made it clear, both to Laniel and Maurice Schumann, that, as indicated in paragraph 8 of your TEDUL 185 from San Francisco, our decision would have to be made in the light of "conditions at the # time 11 ; this is not at all clear to French public opinion and # is not even very clear to Schumann, himself 3 as he has no means of knowing how , we will judge "the conditions at the tits© 11 * Therefore, what * I am in effect recommending is that we adopt your suggestion contained in paragraph. 8 of TEDUL 185 of pu tting a time li mit— on our lnteryen t iorj^ offer with the additional proviso that I woulcPauggernrtibat the tima limit he now,.

DILLON

JEF

44102

TOP SECKET 557

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 i

INDICATE: D COLLECT Q CHAKGiTO

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Department is giving this thorough consideration with Defense, My

personal opinion is that we should try to carry situation along with •

» . * avoidance of either formal refusal now train Vietnamese and also

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strong political overtones and might raise Congressional complications. • --*

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With reference to your last paragraoh suggestion on QTE/sxpEglisi ' -•; 0

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conclusion of final agreement with French UNQTE this is quite impossible | so long as French have >txxto£x not made up their mind whether or not they want to internationalize war and now are further from internationalizing it than ever before. They v;ant t and in effect have, an option onjyir

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inte rventionx-'ec^ but they do not want to >x exercise it and the date of

*

expiry of our_optjon is fast runn ing out.

DULLES

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It is true that there is less disposition now than two months or one mont>i . f !

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ago to intervene in Indochina militarily. This is the inevitable result of the

steady deterioration in Indochina which makes the problem of intervention and pacification more and more difficult. When united defense was first

broached, the strengt h and morale of French and Vietnam forces were such

■ that it seemed that the situation couldbe held without..anyjjreat pouring -in of

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are forced to contemplate a fall-back which would leave virtually the entire

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that the departure of Eden v/ould bo evidence that there was no

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INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY C&aajTSSSE

on IB Juris 1954, Concurring were the Special Assistant, In-ielligence, Department of State; the Assistant Chief of Staff, G~2, Department of the Anny; the Director of Naval IrzielH-gence; the Director of Intelligence, USAF; the Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff; the Director of Intelligence, ABC* The Assistant to the Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained, the subject being outside of the

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TOP SECRET

LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

COMMUNIST REACTIONS TO CERTAIN US COURSES OF ACTION WITH RESPECT TO INDOCHINA

■

* .-' - THE PROBLEM

To estimate Chinese Communist and Soviet reactions to the courses of action and consequent situations indicated below. 1

THE ESTIMATE

PART I

• • ■ ASSUMPTIONS

*

A. The treaties of independence between France and the Associated States will have been signed, . *

• ' B. A regional security grouping including at least the Associated States, Thailand, the Philippines, Australia, France, and the United States, and possibly including also New Zealand and the United Kingdom, will have been formed,

C. The Associated States will have publicly requested the direct military participation of members of the regional grouping in the war in Indochina,

+

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D. The French will have undertaken to continue at least the present level of their military commitment in Indochina.

REQUIREMENT 1

* To estimate the initial Chinese Communist and Soviet reactions to the 'participation of US air and naval forces loith French Union

■

forces and token Thai and Philippine forces in coordinated ground, naval, and air operations designed to destroy the Communist viili-

*The assumptions and estimative requirements stated herein were furnished to the intelligence community for the purposes of this estimate. We interpret the hypothetical action as occurring within the next twelve to eighteen months.

tary forces in Indochina. Air operations would be limited to targets in Indochina. Nuclear weapons would be employed if their use were deemed militarily advantageous but nuclear attacks on the Indochinese civil population as a target system would be avoided

Chinese Communist Reaction

1. The intervention of US and'allied forces in Indochina probably would cause the Chinese Communists to believe that sooner or later they would have to decide whether to

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3 3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By; NWD Date: 2011

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"

accept the defeat of, the Viet Minh or to intervene In force in order to try to prevent such defeat. Their decision would probably rest mainly, though not exclusively, upon their weighing of the risks and disadvantages arising from the Viet Minh defeat against the likelihood of involvement in major war with the US and the probable consequences of such a war for Communist China. Available evidence gives no unmistakeable indication of what the Chinese Communist decision would be. On balance, however, we believe that the chances are somewhat better than even that the Chinese Communist would decide to take whatever military action they thought required to prevent destruction of the Viet Minh, including when and if necessary, open use of Chinese Communist forces in Indochina. 23

2. The nature of the assumed US action is such that ample warning would almost certainly be given in advance of actual operations. The Chinese Communists have the capability now to intervene quickly and in such force as to drive French Union forces out of the Delta. The Chinese Communists might choose to exercise this capability before US intervention could be effected. *

3. We believe it somewhat more likely, however, that even if the Chinese Communists had determined not to accept the defeat of the Viet Minh they would not intervene openly immediately following the assumed US intervention. They might estimate that US air

■The Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff, recommends deletion of the last sentence of this paragraph and would substitute the following:

"However, their decision would be largely determined by the Chinese estimate of the probable extent and eflect of US initial action."

3 The Director of Intelligence, USAF, believes that the last sentence of this paragraph should read as follov/s:

"Communist China will probably not choose knowingly any course of action likely to expose its fundamental national strengths in war with a major pov.-ei\ However, we believe that Communist China's strength for conducting various kinds of warfare is such, and the motives and judgment of its leaders are such as to make Communist China's courses of action dangerously unpredictable under outside pressure of any appreciable magnitude."

and naval forces could not, in the absence of US ground forces, decisively alter the course of the war. They might therefore consider their intervention unnecessary at this point and might postpone final decision as to their course of action until they had observed the initial scale and success of the allied military operations and had estimated the probable nature and extent of US aims in the conflict.

•

4. In this connection, US use of nuclear weapons in Indochina would tend to hasten the ultimate Chinese Communist decision whether or not to intervene. It would probably convince the Chinese Communists of US determination to obtain a decisive military victory in Indochina at whatever risk and by whatever means, and of the consequent danger of nuclear attack on Communist China. Whether this conviction would precipitate or deter Chinese Communist intervention would depend on the military situation in Indochina at the time, the observed military effect of the use of nuclear weapons, and the observed political and psychological effect of such use, particularly its eflect on the coherence of the regional security grouping and the Atlantic

' alliance.

5. In any case, the Chinese Communists would almost certainly greatly increase their logistic support, delivery of arms and equipment, and technical assistance to the Viet Minh. The Chinese Communists would probably increase their deliveries of A A weapons and might send in Chinese AA gun crews. Moreover, the Chinese Communists would probably deploy ground and air units near the Indochina border in order: (a) to warn

* the US and its allies, and (b) to have forces ready either to intervene on behalf of the Viet Minh or to defend the southern border of China.

6. While maintaining a posture of military readiness, the Chinese Communists would intensify political and propaganda activities designed to exploit anti-Western and anticolo-nial feelings of the indigenous population of Indochina and the war-fears of neutralist Asian nations and of certain US allies. They would also seek to label the US as an aggressor. In the meantime and throughout' th

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

TOP SECRET

3

period of military operations, the Communists would almost certainly agitate and propagandize for a "cease-fire" and political settlement, which would preserve the Communist position and prospects,

■ Soviet Reacfion

7. In the assumed situation, the USSR probably would estimate that the US action, though limited to air and naval forces, would considerably increase the risks of unlimited war between the US and Communist China. The USSR would probably prefer that such a war not develop out of the Indochina situation. Nevertheless, the USSR would assure Communist China of continuing military assistance. The USSR would also give complete diplomatic and propaganda support to Communist China and the Viet Minh regime.

REQUIREMENT 2 "

■

To estimate Chinese Communist and Soviet reactions to the success of the operations envisaged in the assumptions above (i.e., to the impending effective destruction of the Communist forces in Indochina).*

Chinese Communist Reaction

8. As stated -in Paragraph 1, we believe that the chances are somewhat better than even that the Chinese Communist, in the assumed situation, would intervene militarily to prevent the destruction of the Viet Minh. If they decided # to do so, we believe that the exact timing and nature of their action would depend on various factoids, but principally on the scope and character of the US/allied operations they were seeking to counter. 5 6

Soviet Reaction

9. In this assumed situation, the USSR would probably continue to support the Chinese Communists. If the Chinese Communists intervened openly in support of the Viet Minh, the USSR would rapidly Increase military assistance to Communist China. The Soviet diplomatic and propaganda campaigns against"* the US would continue full-scale, and the USSR might ask the UN to condemn the US as an aggressor. Thinly veiled threats of Soviet involvement in the fighting and references to the Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1950 would multiply.

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•The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 r Department of the Army, believes that the results in this requirement could not be achieved by the unbalanced and insufficient forces envisaged.

3 The Director of Intelligence, TJSAF, believes that this paragraph should read as follows:

"Communist China will probably not choose knowingly any course of action likely to expose its fundamental national strengths in war with a major power. However, we believe that Communist China's strength for conducting various kinds of warfare is such, and the motives and judgment of Its leaders are such as to make Communist China's courses of action danger-

ously unpredictable under outside pressure of any appreciable magnitude."

•The Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff, believes that paragraph 8 should read a* follows: a as

"Communist China would conclude from thn assumed impending destruction of Communis* forces in Indochina, by limited forces employing nuclear and conventional weapons, that its o military intervention would invite an exten^* 1 of similr-.r. action to Communist China ^°d would, therefore, probably not Intervene* nttii taTily." ™ n ~

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 NND Project Number: NKD 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

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PART II

. . ... • ' ASSUMPTIONS

■

A. The treaties .of independence between France atlfl the Associated States will have been signed. • ,

B. A regional security grouping including at least the Associated States, Thailand, the Philippines, Australia, France, and the United States, and possibly including also New Zealand and the United Kingdom, will have been formed.

' C. The Associated States will have publicly requested the direct military participation of members of the regional grouping in the war in Indochina.

D. The French will have undertaken to continue at least the present level of their military commitment in Indochina,

E. The Chinese Communists will have openly intervened with military forces in Indochina in order to counter US direct participation as defined in Requirement 1,

REQUIREMENT 3 ■ .

To estimate Chinese Communist and Soviet reactions to an extension of allied offensive air operations to incln.de military targets in Communist China directly supporting Com-vntnist military operations in Indochina or directly threatening the security of Allied forces in the area. 1 Nuclear loeapons would be employed in these operations if it were deemed militarily advantageous to do so, but nuclear attacks on the Chinese civil population as a target system would be avoided.

Chinese Communist Reaction

10. We consider it probable that before intervening in Indochina the Chinese Communists would have accepted the likelihood of US air attacks against military targets in China. Consequently, they would not feel compelled to withdraw their forces from Indochina solely as a result of the initiation of the air operations assumed above. At the same time, we

f In this requirement we interpret targets "directly supporting" Communist military operations to be generally south of the Yangtze River and to consist primarily of transport lines, troop concentrations, and air fields in the area.

. believe that the Chinese Communists, in order to prevent further destruction to this area of China and particularly to avoid the spread of unlimited US attacks to the whole of China would intensify efforts to induce the US to enter negotiations for a settlement which would preserve the Communist position and prospects in Indochina.

11. Meanwhile the Chinese Communists, to the full extent of their capabilities, would prosecute the war on the ground in Indochina and attack allied air bases, aircraft carriers and other installations directly supporting allied operations in the area. They would* however, probably try to keep the war centered in Indochina and, as a consequence, probably would confine their attacks to such directly supporting bases and installations.

12. The use of nuclear weapons under the restrictions given above would greatly increase Chinese Communist concern about US intentions but probably would not by itself cause them to adopt new courses of military action at this time. However, they would threaten nuclear retaliation. They would also exploit to the fullest result ant psychological opportunities and in particular would

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

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charge that the US was using weapons of mass destruction on the civilian population. 8

13. The Chinese Communists would attempt by all means possible to convince other Asian nations that the US had undertaken to destroy the Chinese Communist regime in order to thwart its efforts on behalf of an indigenous independence movement. If the Chinese had not previously done so, they would probably appeal to the UN to brand US action

as a threat to the peace.

■

Soviet Reaction

14. In this assumed situation, the USSR would greatly increase its military assistance to Communist China, especially supplying modern aircraft and small naval vessels, possibly including submarines, with Soviet personnel to train and advise the Chinese and probably to participate in air defense operations. The USSR would probably not openly commit combat units of the Soviet armed forces and probably would not release nuclear weapons for Chinese Communist us«

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15. The Kremlin would also continue its diplomatic and propaganda campaigns against the

•The Deputy Director far Intelligence, The Joint Staff, believes this paragraph should read:

"Nuclear weapon attacks on Communist China would undoubtedly result in a much greater Chinese Communist reaction than nuclear attacks on the Indochlnese battleground. In addition, such attacks would probably indicate to the Chinese Communists a US willingness to exploit its superiority in nuclear weapons and delivery capability to force them out of Indochina. Since the nuclear attack coutempfiaied in this requirement is of a limited nature, the Chinese Communist rulers would retain control of the government 'and country and, with the initial attacks, they would probably make urgent appeals to the USSR for nuclear weapons and additional military assistance. They might also increase the tempo of their military operations and would undoubt-. edly endeavor to induce the United States to enter negotiations in the hope of forestalling further attacks. A Chinese Communist decision to withdraw or not would be dependent primarily * upon continued or increased US nuclear attacks and other US action as well as upon Soviet reaction. It is believed, however, that the Chinese Communists would be willing to withdraw from Indochina rather than be subjected to further destruction of their homeland."

US, undertaking in the UN to brand the US as an aggressor if this had not previously been attempted. The USSR would support Chinese charges concerning the use of nuclear weapons against civilian populations. At the same time, the USSR would probably advise the Chinese Communists to negotiate for a cessation of hostilities on the basis of the status quo at the time and would try, to establish a position as peacemaker.

-

REQUIREMENT 4

To estimate Chinese Communist and Soviet reactions to the following additional allied, courses of action, undertaken subsequently to those above:

a. Extension of allied offensive air operations to additional selected military targets in Communist China, including the use of atomic weapons under the same conditions as above.

b. Naval blockade of the China coast

c. Seizure or neutralization of Hainan.

d. Chinese Nationalist operations against the Chinese mainland.

■

Chinese Communist Reaction

16. As a consequence of this allied broadening of the war, the Chinese Communists would probably conclude that the US was prepared to wage unlimited war against them. They would continue to defend themselves to the limit of their capabilities and would probably make vigorous efforts to secure the full participation of the USSR, At the same time, they would intensify their efforts to end the war by negotiations, and might eventually indicate in some way their willingness to withdraw from Indochina in order to obtain a cease-fire 0 If unable to obtain a^cease-fire agreement, the Chinese Communists would accept the fact of unlimited war with the US and would wage such war to the full extent of their remaining capabilities.

•The Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint StaiT, and the Director of Intelligence, USAF, suggest that the words "might eventually" in this sentence should be replaced with "would probably/ 1

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•

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

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6

Soviet Reaction

17. In this assumed situation, the USSR would continue to provide military assistance to* Communist China as indicated above, but would probably refuse Chinese Communist demand for full Soviet participation in the " war. The Kremlin would strongly urge the Chinese Communists to negotiate for a cessation of hostilities on the basis of withdrawing from Indochina. 10 If the Chinese Communists could not obtain a cease-fire agreement, the USSR v/ould provide Communist China with military assistance in every way short of openly committing combat units of the Soviet armed forces in operations against US and allied forces outside Communist-held territory. The USSR would provide military resources and equipment for Chinese Communist attacks on US bases or US forces anywhere in the Far East. At this stage of the conflict, the USSR might provide Communist China with nuclear weapons and the technical personnel required for their use. 11 12

18. The USSR would continue its diplomatic and propaganda campaigns against the US, insisting that the Soviet aim was purely the defense of China against outright aggression. The USSR would also begin at least partial mobilization of its own military forces on a war basis., It would issue thinly veiled threats of general war, suggesting attacks on

Western Europe and on the continental US, but would probably confine its operations to the defense of China so long as the US did not attack Soviet territory.

REQUIREMENT 5

To estimate Chinese Communist and Soviet reactions to the success of the foregoing operations (te* t to the impending effective destruction of the Chinese Communist capability to conduct military operations outside the borders of Conuminist China).™

Chinese Communist Reaction

19, Unless the USSR was willing to make an unlimited commitment of Soviet forces to prevent the success of the assumed US and allied operations, we believe that the Communist Chinese, under the assumed circumstances, would accept any US terms for a settlement which preserved the integrity of China under the Chinese Communist regime.

Soviet Reaction

20. In this assumed situation, we believe the USSR would urge the Chinese Communists to accept any US terms for a settlement which preserved the integrity of China under the Chinese Communist regime. 14 So long as the fighting continued, however, the USSR would continue its aid to China.

"The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Department of the Army, recommends the deletion of "on the basis of withdrawing from Indochina," believing that at this state of the conflict the Kremlin would not willingly acquiesce in the surrender of any Communist-held territory in Indochina or elsewhere.

■ ■

11 The Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff, and Director of Intelligence, USAF, believe that this sentence should read:

"We do not believe that the USSR would release nuclear weapons for Chinese Communist

use.

"

*

"The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2;Department of the Army, substitute for the last :tence:

"Itjs also believed that the US^R would give serious consideration to making a substantially greater military contribution including nuclear weapons and the technical personnel required for their use." j

"The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Department of the Army/believes that the results assumed in this requirement could not be achieved by the unbalanced and insufficient force envisaged.

u The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Department of the Army, would add "and retained a Communist foothold in Indochina."

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 i

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\ * I Chauvel Informed rr.e this morning that in Franco-Viet Minh - X

"underground military talks" ( conducted by Colonel de Brebisslon ' \^ y on French^side) Viet"Minh ha d d emanded all of Tonkin and entire^ j

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Ar^y) and Haiphong be turned over to Viet Minh. French without |

agree 1 ng_had_jjr: pl"iea that if any,thing_lik e tHrs^eTTul ejngnt^ere ^aae"7~Freno h "could demand fre e hand in^ south, indicating area s qZZVTcT~. n ne starting approximately IS "paralle l on Laotian border and running southeast approximately to iJadon ( this line marked sc:;:evhat indefinitelj^ oh map in Chauvel 1 3 office)/ French had also indicated necess it y for enclave and port in delta a f-ea,-implying temporary tenure for troop withdrawal. Chauvel indicated Ely felt he could not defend delta area and better have French 5w~-forces therein by negotiations than lose them in battle. ; French raised Question evacuation their troops. French citizens, and \ Vietnam Catholics frorn Tonkin area but had received no reply ; froni Viet Minh. Chauvel also stated French had made clear that Laos and Cambodia were not involved in this proposed settlement. No mention was rnade rg£TL0Hp^ n g Viet Minh forces_southjbhj s line. Last conversation three days ago and nothing has developed since. Chauvel continued that Vietnamese had no knowl edge this proposal and if acceptable to French it .would be most difficult t sell N, It to them, which might be necessary within next few days. He ) implied that Ambassador Heath might be of real service this /

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I informed Chauvel of Zhukov-Kingsbury Smith conversation (SECTQ * 423 repeated Paris klB) emphasizing advisability French retaining foothold in north preferably Haiphong-Hanoi area, but at least Haiphong - This, with possibly, sni all co mpensati ng encl ave for Viet Minh south of line, would-avoid appearance of outright partition. Chauvel was somewhat dubious whether this would be* possible but thought that maybe foothold on delta coast at Hon Gay, ^ whore there are important French coal interests, might be retained.

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-2- From Geneva DULTE 187

I told Chauvel that we did not wish be suddenly placed in position where these secret negotiations might have result of our being abruptly confronted with agreement or proposed settlement which we would not feel able accept" and from which we might have to disassociate ourselves , and stressed need our being, informed on continuing basis of converstations. Suggested-Colonel Dwan be liaison officer this respect. Chauvel agreed entirely.

SMITH

PEP

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Note: Advance Copy to Mr Draper SS 6/16/54 4:15 P-m. PEP

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573

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TOP SECRET ■ . , 1 / / ,

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Dennis Allen (UK) gave Johnson this morning additional details " (ry

on conversation with Chou-En-lai, Chou stated that in cess

Cambodia^resistance forces vers small and all that was needs- *

sary wa&* a political settlement by the present royal government

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V , -the resistance" forces were larger,.and it would be necessary £5

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;In reply to Eden T s query as to whether it would not (repeat not) (jj

be. difficult obtain Viet MInh admission Viet Minh forces were 4^ In "Laos and Carfoodia, Chou stated it would "not (repeat not) be

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difficult" to get Viet Minh to agree to withdrawal their for-fro;n those two states in context with withdrawal all foreig" forces. Chou made no (repeat no) direct reply to Eden's reference to French-Laotian treatypn French bases in laor-. • Eden expressed personal view that ifhbu wants settlement, hut has so~;e doubt with regard to degree of control he exercises ever Viet O MLnh.

In long talk with Bidault this morning (first direct contact be-. ••' - tween Chinese and French Chou substantially repeated what he told

Eden yesterday (in conversation with Bidault, Chou referred tc Viet Minh forces in Laos and Cambodia as "volunteers"). Bidault had also seen Molotov this morning and reported that loth Molotov ■ /and Chou are obviously greatly concerned over any brealc-up

//Indochina conference in pattern of Korean conference as well as ■ •/of lowering level conference below level of Foreign Ministers. ' "Bidault said the*/ clearly want to keep the conference goir^. _ • Bidault and I agree (Eden did not (repeat not) cowr.eut) tr.at -~z. . ; was .important we do nothing dispel Chou's worries over US bases

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2- BULTE 193, June 17 5 p.m., from Geneva.

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I also expressed personal opinion that important" Laos and Cambodia move ahead as quickly and as vigorously as possible with appeal to UK. Eden and Bidault agreed, Eden adding that Important Vietnam not (repeat not) get mixed up with Laos and'Cambodia cases UN.

Chauvel showed me handwritten note from Ely, in his political /capacity, urging against attempting hold any enclave In delta /and recommending straight partition formula, I could not i (repeat not) resist expressing contempt for such an easy rr sell's out f! of lastL remaining foothold in north and said we could J under*no (repeat no) circumstances publicly associate ourselves

with such a solution.

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM

DEPARTMENT OF STATE TOP SECRET

SEWT TO: Ameonsul GENEVA TEDUL 212 PRIORITY

Prom your DULTE 187 it is evident that QUOTE underground military talks UNQUOTE., even more than conference proceedings , are pointing toward de facto partition under conditions such that Communist take-over of all Vietnam looms ahead clearly,

Chauvel's mention of difficulty of QUOTE selling UHQUOTE Vietminh proposal to Vietnamese and his doubt that Hanoi-Haiphong area can he held indicate to us that French may end by accepting any Vietminh proposition which offers hope of extricating Expeditionary Corps. In this connection we note failure of Vietminh thus far to react to French question regarding evacuation French troops and citizens and Vietnamese Catholics.

There can of course be no repeat no question of US participation in any attempt to QUOTE sell UNQUOTE a partition to non-Communist Vietnamese.

'*■

(Signed)

Dulles

FE:PSA:PJSturm: tas 6/17 /5h

J. F. Dulles

C - Mr. Mac Arthur

EUR - Mr. Merchant

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SENT DEPARTMENT DULTE 195, REPEATED INFORMATION PARIS 4 SAIGON 177-

FARIS EYES ONLY AMBASSADOR; SAIGON EXES ONLY AMBASSADOR

Johnson saw Chauvel this morning and discussed with him conference situation in light TJ3DUL 211. Johnson stated seemed-:*to us that such fundamental questions as composition, » voting procedures and authority or interna/clonal control com-" mission should be dealt with in conference rather than by \ committee. If conference reached decision on fundamental ; principlesj working out of details could be done by committee *■ of exports of principally interested parties in same pattern as present Franco-Viet Minh military conversations.

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C ha live 1 said thi-s -would "be agreeaoie except that question of authority, which he termed "relationship between international commission and joint committees" could be dealt with by technical committee, thus implying France not (repeat not) prepared to maintain principle ''of subordination joint committees to international commission. As French have already circulated proposal contained SECTO 460 through secretariat, it was agreed we would make suggestion along foregoing lines at today's re T striated ueeting. Chauvel said they did not (repeat not) yet have any further indication as to what attitude Chinese would take on French proposal entirely clear from conversation with Chauvel that his main interest is in keeping some conference activity or nine going and that if regardless of level representation we prepared continue some conference meetings would probably meet French point of view. Appears French proposal -^ ma&e on assumption that there would be complete recess of conii ference with departure of Smith and Eden. ' r^v

Chauvel made reference to his conversation with Smith yesterday (DULTE 195--iast paragraph), making inquiry as to exactlv what;

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we had in mind. Johnson in reply read to him paragraphs 5, 6 and 7 basic instructions (TOSEC 138) stating that French willir^- I ness surrender even minimum enclave, in north of Haiphong* would so clearly contravene the principles which the US considered essential as to require our public dissociation with such a solution -•"-

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

5-DULTE 195, c/Line 18, 5 p, m. from. Geneva

In reply -to Chauvei T s questions, Johnson made It clear we were .speaking only of public disassociatlon from such a settlement. The US had in the past and of course would continue working with and supporting Prance In every possible way and who rover we could. Chauvei Indicated full understanding our position. He said they had come to conclusion that what he termed any "leopard spot' 1 solution was entirely impracticable and unenforceable. From standpoint of future It would be much better to retain a reasonably defensible line in Vietnam behind which there would be no (repeat no) enclaves of Viet Minh and do all possible behind that line to t build up effective Vietnamese Government and defense. They had no (repeat no) intention of "any Immediate surrender of Haiphong 11 which in any event must remain under their control for a considerable period for* purely military reasons to effect evacuation of French Union Forces from the north. However, If, as appeared likely, choice was giving Viet Minh an enclave In south in exchange for French enclave in Haiphong, they thought it preferable to give up Haiphong. He said no (repeat no) French parliament would approve conditions which the US had laid down for its Intervention, and_ French had no (repeat no) choice but made the best deal they could, obtaining as strong position as possible in soilh. Chauvei understood fully we would probably not (repeat not) be able to publicly associate ourselves with such a solution, but he hoped that when It came time to put it to the Vietnamese the US would consider It possible very discreetly to let the Vietnamese "know that we considered it best that could be obtained under the circumstances and our public disassociation would not (repeat not) operate so as to encourage Vietnamese opposition, Johnson replied he did not (repeat not) see how it would be possible for us to do this, and In any event he would of course have to see what the solution was „ Cj2gjivgj 1 _saj 1 d that_j3uch a sol ution as p artition should come as no (repeat no) surprise to tEe~Tletnamese_asH3utrTjTTc~"~had

anawoiilcTlirofrabljr prove to be "dlff iculte 1

\ Chauvei said the line French had In mind had been made available'

to US defense representatives at some five-power talks, tit was vague about" tisse and place. He referred to It as "line of the chalk cliffs", which he said was defensible position running from the sea across Vietnam and Laos- to the Mekong. Undersatn' this is g line roughly 19 parallel running from vicinity of Dong Hoi to Th&kbek. Replying to query, Chauvei said French Union Forces removed from the north would be deployed along that line.

Chauvei said all indications were Mendes-France would succeed in forming government next day or two and would probably himself as-suae Foreign Minister post. Said he had been in .touch with Mendes-

I France and had sent emissary to Paris this morning to brief him on

! f situation in Geneva. Chauvei said was anxious to show complete" con-

II iw-4 3§tinulty °£ French effort here In Geneva arid hoped there could be

: ^ "*' another restricted meeting tomorrow, Chauvei said, "Under-ground ^ military talks 11 last night Ivicl been completely unproductive, Viet f T Minh c Lously taking strong line in view of French Government sltua

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

June 19, 195'i

Sent to: SECSIAITE DULTE 202

RPTD INFO: Amerabassy Moscow 138 EYES 0Itt.Y FOR AMBASSM30R

I saw Molotov at his villa yesterday evening at my request to inform him of my departure, and because I felt time had come to sound a note of warning. Talk lasted more than hour and a half, Molotov asked what I thought would be best thing to do with Conference, to adjourn it teniporarily or to keep it going. I replied as far as we concerned should be kept going while there was hope of reaching reasonable settlement, but that thez*e was no use referring to "committees" matters of major policy which must be decided by the Conference as a whole. Before my departure I felt It would be desirable to exchange views, in order that mistakes of the past should not be repeated as the result of nisunderstanding of our respective positions. With regard to Korean phase, I had only to say that in

*

TOP SECRET OUTGOING TELEGRAM 1^26

3^073 580

TOP SECRET

reserving our position re final Chinese proposal had not implied to exclude Communist China from future discussions on Korean question. As matter of fact, China was belligerent there against UF and for practical reasons would have to be party to settlement.

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

TOP SECRET

DULTE -2-

Regarding Indochinese phase Molotov said he had impression US avoided reaching solution and cited in this regard Robertson objection in yesterday ? s restricted session to acceptance ChouVs proposal on Laos and Cambodia, I said that while proposal might be satisfactory in some respects it made no mention of Vietminh withdrawal or of adequate supervision. So long as regular Vietminh forces remained in Laos and Cambodia we could not help but view situation in very serious light. Molotov cited Pham Van Dong's remarks regarding withdrawal Vietminh "volunteers" and emphasized importance of beginning direct negotiations regarding Laos and Cambodia of type now taking place regarding Vietnam. I regretted that I was not at all convinced that Eham Van Dong really meant what he said. His statements sounded well enough, but his written proposals did not bear them out.

I said I wanted to make our position on Laos and Cambodia entirely clear. In addition to regular Vietminh forces in these countries, which I enumerated, there were some dissident elements in Laos and a much smaller number in Cambodia. If regular Vietminh forces were withdrawn, elections could be held, with guarantees that individuals would be discriminated against as regards their electoral rights for having supported either side. Dissidents would

581

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 i

TOP SECRET

DULTE - 3 -

be able to vote for any candidates they chose, Communists included.

However, while Vietminh forces remained in these countries, there could

■

be no peace nor could free elections be held.

In private conversations with Mr. Eden and others, Communist delegates, in particular Chou En-lai, had taken an apparently reasonable view on Laos and Cambodia, but that here again, when we came to the point of trying to get open agreement on specific points we were unable to do so, I specifically mentioned Chou En-lai's statements to Eden in which he said that China would have no objections to recognizing the kingdoms of Laos and Cambodia or to these States having forces and arms sufficient to maintain security, or their remaining in French Union so long as they were not used as military bases by the United States, We could not disagree with any of this, although if we kept out the Chinese would have to keep out, and these small states would have to be allowed to join with their neighbors in whatever regional security arrangements would best protect their integrity without constituting a threat to any one else, Chou En-lai might be anxious about possibility of US bases in Laos and Cambodia. We wanted on our part to be sure that these countries were not handed over to the Chinese. Molotov said that while he did not know about what attitude Chinese might have on other questions in

TOP SECRET

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

TOP SECRET DELUTE - k -

future, he could asuure me that Chinese attitude on this particular questions was not at all unreasonable, and that there was nothing in it which would give rise to conflicts. He added, however, that if we continued to take a one-sided view and insist on one-sided solutions, he must u in all frankness say that this would not succeed/ 1 There were, he said, some differences of view "between us on Laos and Cambodia, especially in regard to our refusal to recognize resistance movementsj point he wanted to make, however, was that basis for reach-

-

ing agreement was present and that agreement could be reached so long as neither side "adopted one-sided views or put forward extreme pretensions." This, he said, could only lead to other side's doing same.

Resistance movements existed, in Laos and Cambodia, Moletov asserted. About 50/S of the territory of Laos was not under the control of official government. It was true that much smaller resistance move-ment existed in Cambodia. He said that in fact conditions in all

three Indochinese countries were different—--large resistance move-

i

ment controlling three-quarters of territory in Viet Nam, substantial

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movement in Laos controlling, as he had indicated, about half territory,

and much smaller movement in Cambodia. I said, with regard to two 1 rtter country

TOP SECRET

DULTE

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

TOP SECRET

5 -

solution was simple. Withdraw invading Vietminh forces and let dissident elements elect communist representatives to general assemblies if they wished. But the elections must be actually "free"* Regarding Viet Nam, I said we recognized relative strength of the Vietminh but theywere demanding too much. It seems Vietminh demanded all Delta, including both Hanoi and Haiphong. The French were our allies, and we took grave view of this extreme pressure. Molotov said that if French were to have something in Sought and

something in North, and probably in center as well, this would add up to three-quarters of country or better, which was •-'holly unreason-able. He said there was old Russian proverb that if you try to chase two rabbits at once you are apt to miss both of them, and added that in this case wanting something in Worth and in Sough was like chasing two rabbits. If French were to give way to Vietnimh in North, they would gain territory probably greater in extent in Sought in recompense. I said appearance of "partition" was repugnant to US, and that as

~f

far as proverb about rabbits went I felt that Vietminh were chasing two rabbits in wanting both Hanoi and Haiphong. Vietminh demands for all the Delta, or efforts take it all by force prior to reaching political solution through elections, was serious

TOP SECRET

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

DULTE

TOP SECRET - 6 -

matter in view of my Government* Molotov disagreed, stating that present French position in area was due only to Vietminh restraint, and that two cities did not even have normal communications between each other. In regard to US aversion to partition, he said that this problem could easily be solved by holding elections at once, which would decide "one way or the other." He repeated that important thing in reaching agreement on any of these questions relating Indochina was to be realistic about actual facts, and to avoid putting out one-sided views or extreme pretensions. If French were encouraged to disregard actual situation and to ask for too much, he said, one could only expect conflict to continue, (He made it clear that he considered US as party likely to do the encouraging.) I replied that US was not one of principals to Indochinese dispute and did not cast deciding vot, to which Molotov remarked "maybe so, but you have veto, that word I hear you use so often." and went on to say that among other delegations present at Conference there seemed to be real willingness to reach agreement. Agreement had in fact, he added, very nearly been reached, althgugh he hoped I would realize this was not informlation for publication. (This remark, obviously, referred to private French-Vietminh military conversations which I have mentioned.) I said I must emphasize my Government held serious views on issues involved in Indochina situation,

TOP SECRET

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

DULTE

-7-

more serious, perhaps, than did some of other govei^nments represented at Conference. I hope he would give consideration to this ? and assist in overcoming some of the deep-rooted

i

suspicions of Asiatic participants, which became apparent every time we tried to reconcile formal proposals„ eOl'MENT:

Throughout conversation Molotov maintained friendly and mild tone evident in all informal conversations. He is completely sure of himself and of his position. What

>

he had to say regarding Delta, Laos and Cambodia confirms Communist intentions to play all the cards they hold. His avoidance of endorsing Chou*s remarks to Eden concerning Laos and Cambodia indicated that simple withdrawal of Vietminh forces from these countries was not acceptable and that some form of de facto partition was intended in Laos, at least* His remarks seemed to indicate that Communists have eye on as much as half of country. This conversatiqn, together with the inflexible position which Kolotov took during his last conversation with me regarding

the composition of a Neutral Nations Supervisory Commis for Indochina, as well as Ms speech on Tuesday, June 8

and all subsequent speeches on the Communist side, which took firm positions on points the Communists know to be

sion

3^079

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TOP SECRET

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

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TOP SECRET DULTE -8-

unacceptable to Eden, Bidault and me, are highly significant. The recent emphasis by all three Communist spokesmen that France should carry on direct political as well as direct military negotiations with Vietminh show their interest in having a convenient way of holding out for greater gains in their direct negotiations with the

■m

French as well as within the framework of the Conference.

Molotov in effect told France in his June 8 speech that her position and that of the Government she was supporting in Indochina were hopeless and that she had best face up to facts and capitulate in direct negotiations with the Vietminh, His speech, of course, was in large part intended to assist in the destruction of the French Government for the implications that that would have on the European as well as the Asiatic scene. Nevertheless, his harsh and even insulting language seemed to reflect the confident, nearly triumphant mood in which he has been lately. It would be misleading to ascribe the harder -line which Molotov brought back with him from Moscow entirely to Soviet tactical considerations in regard to the French Government crisis. While the Soviets may think that the blocking of EDC through the destruction of the French Government would reduce future threats to them

+

in Europe, the fact remains that the Indochina conflict potentially involves a much more immediate threat

. 587

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TOP SECRET

DULTE -9-

of general war.

It is probable that initial Soviet tactics were to forestall US intervention in the Delta by some kind of a compromise formula involving Hanoi and Haiphong if it appeared that such intervention were imminent. The recent raising of the ante in the negotiations here by the Communist side probably reflects an estimate on their part that our intervention is improbable and that they are safe to go ahead there, keeping, of course, a sharp eye out for indications of change in our attitude.

While the Communist position on Laos and Cambodia remains more flexible than their position in regard to the Delta, they will get all they can in Laos now. In the whole are the determing factor for the Communists will continue to be their estimate of the likelihood of US or joint intervention and nothing short of a conviction on their part that this intervention will take place will stop them from going ahead with their plans for taking all of it eventually, through military conquest, French capitulation 5 or infiltration.

Realize much of above is repetitious, but it will serve as final summary. 3^081 SMITH

USDEL: JKeppel/ph 588

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19 June 195U TOP SECRET

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1

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SinceQfend.es was tied up in National Assembly today, he asked.; me to B6o "Parodi and Chauvel regarding his t alk wit h Chou. Chauvel did all the talking and described the meeting as^ follows:

^1

He said «bhat Mendes opened the meeting telling Chou that he . had been glad to agree to Chou ! s idea of a meeting and that he was interested to hear anything Chou had to say. Chou then spoke very fully and most of the time at the meeting, which lasted a little over two hours, was taken up by Chou ! s statements and the necessary translations,

Chou in general followed the same line as he previously had taken with Eden and Bidault, with certain important exceptions, which Chauvel considered to represent a considerable advance over Chou ! s previous position. \

Chou started by talking about Laos and Cambodia- He said that the immediate problem was to obtain the withdrawal of all for-/eign forces"including Viet Minh from the entire territory of both countries- He said that then the governments of tin two countries should arrange political settlements within their own'countries based on the will of the majority of the people, Chou said that while there should be no persecution of minorities, he had no objection to the two countries retaining their monarchical form of .government if they so desired. The one thing upon which he insisted was that there should be no (repeat no) US bases in either Laos and Cambodia, He stated that he saw no objection to Laos and Cambodia remaining within the French Union, provided they so desired. *

The talk then turned to Vietnam where Chauvel considered important advances in Chou's position were -revealed. ^Ch^i^said^ that he recognised that ther a were now ± wo ^n vprnm^^fFT^T ^c^^

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TOP SECRET

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-2- 5035, June 24, 10 p.m., from Paris.

territory of Vietnam, the Viet Minh Government and the Vietnamese Government. According to Chauvel, this was the first time that Chou had recognized the valid existence of the Vietnamese Government, * *

Chou then said that the settlement in Vietnam should be reached in two stages. First, an armistice which should be reached as soon as possible, and second, peace, which would obviously take longer to achieve. Chauvel said that Chou clearly accepted, and for th e first^time, the French thes ls_ ^ab~ucie re_s_flD D "iii l.^ i ,vv u~ph"Sses; rirst military and second political to the eventual settlement of Vietnam. Regarding military settlement, Chou said that there should be regroup^ ment of troops in large zones in order to stop the fightingT Chou said that he was ready to discuss the division of zones if Mendes so desired. Me rides answered that he was not yet prepared for such a detailed discussion and said he preferred that It be handled by the delegations at Geneva. Therefore, there y&B no discussion in detail regarding th© make-up of I the eventual zones.

•

,

Regarding the final political settlement , Chou said this should be reached by _ Street; negotiations between the two povernme nts in Vietnam, t.'e., the Vietnamese Government and the Viet MihTT~ Government. Chou further said that France might be able to help in these negotiations. He added that he saw no reason

\/why the eventually united state of Vietnam should not remain

' within the French Union.

Mendes at this point said that since the war had been going on for 8 years and passions were high, it would take a long time before elections could be held as the people must be given a full onpoz^unity to cool off and calm down. Chou made

ivno objectlop^o^m^ statement by Mendes and did not press

i.for early/elections/

Mendes then told Chou that negotiations with the Viet Minh for reasons not very clear to the French had been at a practical standstill for the past week or ten days and he suggested, that a word from Chou to the leader of the Viet Minh. delegation might be helpful in speeding things up which I seemed to be Chou's desire as well as Mendes 1 . Chou agreed j to Intervene with the Viet Minh and ask them to speed up negotiations.

The conversation never touched on any subject other than Indochina. According to Chauvel, no other item of Far Eastern policy was touched upon, nor was Europe nor the UN or possible

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-3- 50J5, June 2H, 10 p.m.., from Paris.

recognition of China by France ever mentioned.

Chauvel is returning to Geneva tonight and will see the head of the Viet Minh delegation tomorrow in an attempt to get the military talks under way again.

ER3/12

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why the French Govermisnt will insist on* maintaining Haiphong as long as possible and on obtaining the neutralization of. the bishoprics of Bui Chu and phat Die:u„ "It is difficult to predict the result of this negotiation in which the^ French authorities must face two sorts of difficulties; on the one hand it> <N

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is concludedj dangerous reactions by the Vietnamese Government whose citizens

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are serving at the present time under the orders of the French command^ comprising a major proportion thereof a

"The French Prime Minister feols that the allied American and British governments should be as veil informed as possible of these possibilities* Km Hendss-France wishes especially to call the attention of these two Governments to the following aspects of the situations

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"(1) If the Viet Ilinh appears disposed to negotiate, it is for a series of

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reasons among which figure without doubt the fear of a spreading of the conflict, a spreading which nothing at the present time would lead us to expect, but which the general world situation does not permit us to exclude. Although the fear of such an extension of the conflict may have a determining influence on the

■

i decisions of our adversaries > the French Government realises that precise

declarations on this subject are not possible at this time. But it considers

it would be very useful if the final communique of the Anglo-American talks in

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Washington could state in some fashion or other that, if it is not possible to

■ reach a reasonable settlement at the Geneva Conference, a serious aggra* .tion

of international relations would result* r

,r (2) The problem which is posed with regard to Vietnam is diff ercri « It

is to be feared that any solution providing for an indefinite period a division

of the country will cause a violent and unreasoning reaction on the part of the

Vietnamese patriots, While this reaction may be in a large measure inevitable

every effort should nevertheless be made to canalise this reaction in a directi6n

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in conformity v/ith the interests of Vietnam, France and their allies c

"To this end it appears highly desirable to the Prime Minister of France to obtain the assurance of the United States Goverxunent that nothing will be done

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by the latter which might even implicitly encourage such a reaction. Under

present circumstances such action could lead to no result but to ruin any hope

of seeing Vietnam consolidate herself in such a fashion as to create in the

face of the Viet Kinh an authentically national- and independent force. It is

for this reason that the French Government strongly hopes it can count on the -

United States at the proper moment to intervene v/ith the Vietnamese to counsel

upon them wisdom and self-control and to dissuade them from refusing an agreement

* which, if it is reached, is dictated not by the spirit of abandoning them, but

on the coritraiy by the desire to save in Indochina all that can "possibly be

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saved, and to give the Vietnamese state, under peaceful conditions, opportunities which have not always been possible heretofore because of the war,"

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Jebb came to see me this morning after his interview with -**j Mendes-Prance in the course of which he delivered reply to French" 1 Oi aide-memoire of June 26 (DEPTEL 4853) in the form of aide-memoire, -^. followed by verbal comments along lines outlined 0 in paragraph 2 0 reference* telegram, . -

Jebb reported that Mendes was pleased with text reply and stated

that Parodi would give us definite French position in day or so,

Mendes also confirmed that ne gotiation s ^wit h Viet-Mi nh at Geneva

were_siail-ed (Geneva SECTO Sm, repeatedTParis as 51*57^ "

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(~0n question of (elections^ Jebb quoted Mendes as stating that the

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Viet Minh wan tea thguTTo be held in six months but that the French were taking the position that they should be delayed for e year after final settlement and withdrawal of troops bad been thieved* This, as presently envisaged, would mean a year and half to two years from now. M i - c*

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REDEPTEL 4852, June fee; Saigon 2746; Geneva 489 It seems to me that new Vietnamese Prime Minister Ngo Dinh Diem, who has reputation of uncompromising

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SENT DEPARTS T 32, REPUTED INFORMATION GENEVA 2, SAIGON *k

Re DEPTELs 5 and 8.

I took up reference telegrams with Mendes this afternoon. Regarding present withdrawals in the delta Mendes said that these had been planned in Ma^ by the Laniel government and he had made no change in toe"original plan- The withdrawals represent a definite shortening of the French lines to protect "* Hanoi, Haiphong and the connecting road.

He said he had been much surprised to read in the papers that a State Department spokesman had said that the US had not had prior information regarding these withdrawals. He had assumed , he said, that Ely had fully informed O'Daniel of his plans. He then accordingly asked Ely this morning if that was not the case and Ely had told him that he had not informed 0 f Daniel. Mendes accordingly offered his apologies and said that he had instructed Ely in thg^^turejbo keep 0 ! Daniel_fully^informed on the spot. " * ~" "

Regarding withdrawals themselves he said they were necessary to ensure the safety of the French Expeditionary Coras. He

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said that the French had offered to take with them those me *rs of the loca-1 population who desired protection and that the French forces had provided transportation for such people. He said he had not seen the latent figures but a fairly substantial number of people had availed themselves of this opportunity. On the other hand,, there had been many who preferred* to stay where they were.

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In this connection he said that since Dien Eien Phu the Viet M*rihJ had not conducted reprisals when they occupied new territory J -';

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was worth, It was the fact. He then said that the withdrawals were not yet completed and showed me on a rough map where .furtter withdrawals were scheduled. These include the Phu r,- ' i^XBOarea £"nd a portion of the area to the west of Hanoi.

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- . \ TOP SECRET;. ■ ' , ■ -2- 22, July 2, 8 p.m., from Paris

Repa^dipo- the right of population transfer as contained in . paragraph 6 of DEPTEL ^853, Mendes said that he was thoroughly in accord that this would be a good thing * :>m the French point of view. He said that it had been mentioned to the Viet Minh in Geneva and that they had made no answer either favorable or u'nfavorable ♦ When 1 reiterated the importance that we attach to thi ; subject, Mendes made a note of it and said that he was wr-iting Chauvel tonight and would include , in his letter of instruction a reference to this subject. I think it would be useful if Johnson would stress this subject in his next talk with Chauvel.

Mendes then said negotiations in Geneva had been at a standstill and that he had instructed Chauvel to go to Berne for two days to show that the French were in no greater hurry than the Viet Minh. He said that the Soviet representative at Geneva had told Chauvel not to worry about the slow pace of the negotiations as at conferences such as these everything was always settled in last few hours. ■

j Regarding DEPTEL 8, use of word "withdrawal 11 vras intended only to <vean deployment into agreed regrguEra^t^area^ , "Mendes said~that "the''Frenchmen timing*"Pf "election are~~ftolQInfr out for l8jiian±ha^a£ie^ which, he said,

would mean 22 or 25 months after cease-fire. Viet Minh are asking for elections six months after cease-fire. Mendes expects the f lnal_ re sult_wlll be a^compx^oiiiise^ somewhere in between. *

He then commented that Die m had made an u nhelpful spp.anh ot her da y _in_Saigo n wb glQi e was q uoted as haying said_JJiax_ he~~was in I'avor of the elections within a year. Mendes thinks

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€Rat this is too soon and not in -the interests of Vietn

and It runs counter to what the French were trying to obtain

at Geneva.

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In Johnson's absence, Chauvel this afternoon, informed Bonsai regarding his talk wiurTlIuZnSTBov last night and with Dong this morning, * ————-

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Chauvel raised with Kuzne.tsov pending questions orvc_o^tro^. : He found Kuznetsov adamant on necessity of inclusion Coraffilialst pov/er and rejection thesis Communists can not (repeat not) be neutral. Kuznetsov added that Colombo po wers are afterall sworn to Influence or London which in turn is inimonc^S—ax

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UpstnTC oi talk on this point was that matter of composition might be set aside for present and left for Ministers to settle when they return. Concerning acceptance by parties of decisions or recommendations of internatiqnal commission, Chauvel stressed importance of establishing "rule of lew 11 accepted beforehand by both sides. Chauvel had impression Kuznetsov not (repeat not) unmoved by his arguments this point, although he gave no (repeat no) indication of change in Soviet position.

On QllitaixQH^^ 2 ^^ Chauvel made clear to Kuznetsov'that theseare held up because Viet Minh have made unacceptable proposal of demareal-1on„line along; thirteen th par alle l (about Tuy Hoa). On other hand, Chauvel stated Fren crThave -proposed line acceptable not (repeat not) only to French, out, one which Fre nch have reason to believe would be acceptable to con ferenc e as _a~"~

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whoTe 7~and thus would avert risk of I nternational izat ion of conflict. Kuznetsov replied that difficulty arises from fa fhet three provinces south of Faifo have been held for many . 1 -years by Viet Minh (area in question would appear to run frcr, just south of Faifo and include provinces ox" Quang Mgai, Qui Nhon and perhaps all or part of Sons Can; Department will recall in this connection, recent violent Viet Minh attack against

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French forces withdrawing from Ankhe which"is in this general area). Kuznetsov suggested French and Viet Minh might examine area between fourteenth and eighteenth parallel and exchange views as to specific areas of particular interest to each party. Chauvel stated this could not (repeat not).be considered and repeated position regarding line French have already offered.

Chauvel r s talk with Dong took place this morning at residence of Chinese Communist delegation. There was an exchange of views about control and particularly regarding prior agreement to accept decisions or recommendations of international commission. Dong stated that he would consider this further. He is aware that French, British and Soviet delegations are working on specific proposals (SECTO 553)* * "

Chauvel reports that he spoke most firmly to Dong regarding military discussions. He Said French have accepted Viet Minh proposal that Viet Minh receive Tonkin area, including Capital, -but that further Viet Minh proposal for demarcation line is I unacceptable. Chauvel reiterated in strongest terms fact that French proposal for demarcation line just north°of Dong Hoi wduld be acceptable to conference and would thus eliminate danger of extension of war. (Chauvel stated to Bonsai that of course French would have to hold Haiphong and adjacent zones for considerable period.)

Dong raised question of Viet Minh troops and sympathizers in area sputh of Faifo. Chauvel stated he assumed regular troops would be evacuated and others would return to their villages. He said that presumably there would be no (repeat no) objection to any persons desiring to do so removing to Viet Minh controlled territory. (Bonsai expressed interest and emphasized United States view this subject as set forth paragraphs of aide memoire contained Department telegram ^853-J

Dong endeavored to raise question of eventual political s ,-ttlement but^Chauvel stated that in present discussions must be limited ' to military matters and reaching of armistice. He stressed purpose of present conversation is to make arrangements f p removal from Tonkin of 300,000 Franco-Vietnamese troops. He said that French have no (repeat no) aggressive military intentions, although obviously it is essential for French to reinforce their position both by regrouping their forces in delta and by measures agreed on in Paris in order to insure so far as possible, security of their troops. (He told Bonsai he did not "(repeat not) believe either French or Viet Minh would take aggressive military action under present circumstances.)

Alluding to political matters, Chauvel took occasion to point |! out to Dong that elections have not (repeat not) yet been held in Communist China and that Dong would probably agree on need for considerable period of pacification and reconstruction before

bul elections

TOP SECRET

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

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■ TOP SECRET

-J>- #SECT0 557, July 5, 8 p.m., from Geneva.

-

elections would be held. Bong made no (repeat no) comment.

Chauvel read Bonsai passages from letter fie had received from Mend- 3-Prance Indicating that French negotiators should avoid appearance of overeagerness to reach settlement. Deadline date of July 20 which Mendes-Prance has set himself Is not (repeat not) so pressing as to induce French to accept Viet Minh proposal of thirteenth parallel,

In view Department telegram 9* Bonsai drew Chauvel*s attention to presence here of new Vietnamese representative Tran Van Do end"to latter 1 s Interest in seeing Chauvel. (Chauvel apparently not (repeat not) fully Informed by his subordinates on this score.) •

JOHNSON

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We are considering here what position we should take as regards.* ';, the French negotiations in Indochina. These negotiations appear to O

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is really in the minds of the French Government or what is likely X U - . O \ \1

to emerge. We have ourselves agreed with the British on the(7 points) ®

previously communicated to you. However, we have the distinct impressic

that the British look upon this merely as an optimum solution and that

they would not encourage the French to hold out for a solution as good ^

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as this. Indeed, during the talks here the British wanted to express these 7 points merely as a "hope" without any indication of firmness on our part.

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The word rrespect was agreed on as a compromise. The fact is however

that the US would not want to be assoc iated in any way with a set tle merit which fell mat erially shor t_gf the 7 point memorandum.

We fear the French may in fact without prior consultation with us of more than perfunctory character agree to a settlement which though ■ V]

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superficially resembling the 7 points will in fact contain such political clauses and

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restrictions that Laos, Cambodia, and Southern Vietnam will almost surely fall in a few months under Communist control. No doubt such a solution would be accepted with satisfaction by the French people-and parliament who would rejoice in the ending of the fighting and close their eyes to the possible future implications of the settlement, At this point the US may be asked as one of the powers which

convoked and participated in the Indochina phase of the Geneva Conference to sign-*

4&M&& Also or otherwise adhere to the settlement* ^SE^^^^^^^sss^s^^^^^^^^& the

Communists may insist upon this and take the position that if we did not do so that

would be a violation of the understanding upon which the armistice was negotiated

and they might even threaten to withdraw mid their armistice terms if the US did not

adhere to them. This Communist tactic v/ould well serve their purpos e of creatine]

animosity between France and the US at a time when the defeat of EDC is a major

Soviet objecta/e.

-

We are giving consideration to various possibilities such as the withdrawal of I

were public and if it were public it might be looked upon as a threat which would

create the French em gsssfero antagonistic reaction which we want to avoid.

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Possibly you could find out ihs: whether or not there is the danger which we .apprehend and whether or not the French are negotiating on the assumption that we

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may not be a party to the settlement. If the French are operating on this basis

« and if they know that the Communists also accept this premise, the situation

is not dangerous. If either or both French and Communists are operating

on assumption we will adhere to any settlement they agree to, then we may

be headed for serious trouble. I would like your personal thoughts on this

matter.

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I can veil understand difficulties we face as described In reference.telegram. I feel that French position is fairly clear as of bow but difficulty may well arise In. last days

I or hours of conference after Ministers have returned to

[Geneva.

In that cqnnection we face following problem. If., we wit ha delegation from Geneva we lose all possibility of inf luetic French to stand firm, and we also throw away whatever resting influence we may still have on Communist delegations. French would feel abandoned and, with only Eden to advise } would undoubtedly accept a result more favorable to the Communists than If we stayed at Geneva. The same effect but to a lesser extent would result if neither Under Secre nor you return to Geneva for closing negotiations.

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I)n_the_oib£iLJiarid even if we do maintain a full delegation at Geneva headed by you or Under Secretary there Is always the possibility and maybe even probability that French will accept a settlement that does not fully accord with 7 points in US-UK agreement. This will be particularly apt to happen l! .Eden does not stand firm in final negotiations.

I do not feel that public statement of our position would be helpful as It would create the antagonism mentioned in next to last paragraph of reference telegram.

Even if we do not consider final settlement satisfactory to X feel that unless we asree not to use force to u^set it we

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■ -2- Hi, July 4, 3 p-m., from Paris

We have <Q ne str ongjgajjg 3 which so far we have apparently not cared to use. "TEaTE^Ts we can tra de will in gness to give full d .ip'lomatic suppo£ t_Jio_Frei^^ t

t o Viet n am in retur n f or a settlement that we car: support. The indication whicfiT~Frencii now have tnaz no raat:ter"Wim"tn:he settlement may be, we cannot be counted upon for support with , Vietnam obviously greatly weakens our influence with French,

In conclusion if we base our actions solely on the attempt to get the best possible settlement I feel that we should (l) maintain our delegation at Geneva, (2) have you or the Under Secretary return to head the delegation when the other Foreign Ministers return, (3) tell the French at once that we will support them in selling settlement to Vietnam provided that settlement is satisfactory to us, (4) maintain close contact with and pressure on Eden so he sticks to 7 points US-UK agreement,

I fully realize that domestic political considerations must also be ta]<en into account, but I am not in a position to evaluate them so I have confined these thoughts to a description of the best method available to US to influence the final settlement at Geneva in the direction we desire.

•

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Paroai this morning gave me Trench reaction to US-UK terms for I^ochina-settlamen_t._ f He~~said the terms generally p arallel p resent F renc h jagsItIon and are welcomed by French Government? -However, they have one important rese rvation in that they consider that paragraphs 4 and 5 may be mutually contradictory.

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French feel that^evguiua^l agreement will have to contain provisions for (Qlectiojs which would comply with paragraph 5 of US-UK agreement. However, if elections should go wrong way, this would seem to contradict paragraph 4 of US-UK agreement, which says there should be no (repeat no) political provisions which would risk loss of the retained area. Accordingly, they request clarification from us as to US an d UK po a lt-ion rega rdin g elec t ions. ~ - . .

In addition Parodi said that French do not (repeat not) fully understand what we mean when we' say we would be wii-M-ng^o "respect" agreement. Parodi said that the word 'u^ gspec^' s^eeroecLweak a nd unclear a nd French would like clarliTcation if "*" -all possible. _

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■ This morning Chauvel expressed to me serious concern re reports he hsd had from Bonnet of two statements "by Secretary and one by Under Secretary to effect US not (repeat not) being adequately informed. He asserted with much emphasis that he had and would continue keep me fully and frankly informed. My own belief is that Chauvel has not (repeat not) deliberately with-

[ held information.

Chauvel had seen^ong* this morning. On question of demarc ation, lines, Dong again referred to status of populations sympathizing with Viet Mltih who would be left south of demarcation line proposed by French. He said this question would be easier for*him if he could get some general political assurances regarding eventual status these people. Chauvel said Dong indicated' that with such assurances he might be able to accept Dong Hoi

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In reply to Dong Chauvel stated that such assurances would have to be very general. They might refer to such matters as eventual unity, territorial integrity, democratic conditions, et

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Chauvel told Dong that, any attempt to go further into detail on political matters would result in prolonged discussion end delay in achieving the armistice which all desire,

Chauvel suggested to Dong that it might be advantageous to have the agreement on the armistice purely one be tween * th e ?.o?si*rJisL of each side and not (repeat not) between governments, This -"

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'then be*submitted to the conference. Perhaps conference might then make a general statement of political principles which would be included in a final declaration by conference. Dong ag reed with this general approach. He referred to his own - -statement of May 12 in which he had advocated that agreements regarding cessation of hostilities should be bilateral, • -

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(Jtasuvel stated that In his talk with Dong he referred to fact, * military conversations not £repeat not) moving well. He wondered whether it might not (repeat not) be possible to supplement - them with some conversations between civilians on certain subjects \ net (repeat not) purely military. Deng agreed and Chauvel ) designated Offrcy while Dong indicated that Tran Cong v.uong } (Vice Minister of Justice in Viet Minh Cabinet and member Viet I Minh delegation here -•- he was also in Fountsinebleau Conference in 19^6} would be his representative.

Chauvel told me French delegation is working on draft of paper on control system which will be submitted to British and Russian -delegations and of which he will give us a copy as soon as completed. Although his position, remains that parties should . agree accept decisions or recommendations of international commission, he is somewhat skeptical on how system will work in practice on major questions. He stater] that decisions could be by majority or unanimous vote, but that in case of majority decisions on major questions implementation would obviously be difficult. He pointed out that eventual recourse to guaranteeing powers, i.e., conference powers will obviously not (rej)eat not) work in event serious disagreement., He stated that it will be necessary in this case "for us to work out something among ourselves".

/

Chauvel told us that he is leaving for Paris tomorrow t Mendes-France in order to get his instructions. He ind that Mendes-France .has been in touch with London regard future plans for conference. He has impression from Ma that Reading or Caccia will be returning here shortly a Eden is expected about 12th, (lamb subsequently told me no (repeat no) information on Eden's plans and knows no 8bout Reading or Caccia returning in advance of Eden),

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Mendes-France himself may come here between 10th and 12 th, probably not (repeat not; before Eden, The Chinese Communist representative apparently indicated to Chauvel that Chou En-lai f s return is expected, but gave no (repeat no) details, Kolotov is apparently still due about 8th, although Soviets ha not (repeat not) dLrectly said anything on this.

I again raised matter Haiphong enclave by asking Chauvel if

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any recent Viet Minh reaction on this. Chauvel said that Dong had given no (repeat no) definite indication regarding maintenance French enclave there. Chauvel said French would in any event obviously have to remain there for some time to come. In reply \ rny further question, he said that French military do not (repeat J not) attach great importance to r gtent job— e£-j fc ii phon g from [military point of vie*/.

I also again raised with Chauvel question of anti-Communist civilian population in zones evacuated by French under any agreement. Chauvel said he expected Offroy to take this up with Dong's representative. Such matters as amnesty for alleged political offenses could also be discussed* Chauvel stated that problem of forcible repatriation of prisoners had not (repeat riot) risen and that he did not (repeat not) expect that it would.

I asked Chauvel regarding liaison with Vietnamese. He replied he was handling this through members of his staff and was avoiding direct cootact with Vietnamese in order not (repeat not) to have to answer their questions,

JOHNSON

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After finishing discussion of Kerr article, Mendes said that^-.f the second major thine which he wished to discuss with me was ::_r

the question of the resump tion of the Ge neya L _talks_,g ? t the MinisteriaTTevol. He saiar^Ti_rf'iT~was ""now''clear that the Ministers would have to make the decisions as the technical committees had been unsuccessful; Therefore, and in view of his July 20, deadline, he personally hoped that Ministerial discussions could commence as soon as possible.

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1 In this connection he mentioned a report that Molotov might

return to Geneva on July 8. He said that Chauvel had tried to confirm this with the Russians at Geneva but they replied

I " that they were without information, Mendes said he very much

did not (repeat not) want to be in a position of talking at Geneva with only Molotov and Chou En-lai. Therefore, he would like very much to find out what US intentions and plans were asr^' to when the Secretary or Under Secretary would return to GenevaT"" He said that Masslgli was making similar inquiries of Eden on his arrival today.

I said that I was unfamiliar as to US plans and asked Mendes what his understanding was as to when the conference would r sutne. He replied that it was his definite understanding that all five Foreign Ministers had agreed to return to Geneva not (repeat !^ not) later than July 12, to recommence their discussion-. Referring to US, he indicated that he expected that eit _er C: the Secretary or the Under Secretary would return at that time. I told him that I was not informed but^ that I would inquire " < and let him know as soon as possible.

Mendes then informed me that he will announce tomorrow to the %\ Rational Assembly that if a c ease-f ire is not (repeat not) agreed*'

l^^rjjQJ?—tCL.July:.2.L,—i tTwiIT~b e_ n ece ss^J^ Tov^X^' AssemET^Fp >

approve the sendiiag Picons c rip ts to IadOctxipa ana thaL tne~la&t act 5f"Tiis goverGBfant before resigning wiTl be to introduce a° £*42!1 las to authorize the sending of conscripts to Indochina. This

lav would be introduced on July 21, and the Assembly would be required to vote on It tbB^pame day as they will have had two

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weeks from the date of his announcement to consider the matter. He said that his government would definitely, not (repeat not) resign until such a law had been passed. Mendes also said that the shipping to move the first group of conscripts to Indochina: would be ready on July 25, so that his schedule for parliamentary action would cause no (repeat no) delay in the movement of troops. :

I then mentioned DEPTEL 39* and Mende3 said that he recognized that this posed a real problem. He said that Ely had been instructed to keep Dier:* as fully informed as possible and that he had stressed the matter again in a telegram to Ely. Mendes said, however, that no (repeat no) matter what occurs or what action is taken, he exp ects there would be difficulties w ith Dien, and he said^tTTaif he wanted again to ask for our assistance alTThat time. He said he r ealized that the US would, prob ably be unable to under write any sertinreTireTrt^ Geneva. lie salcTKe also realized that it would not (repeat not)

be easy for us to-tell Dien, to accept everything. Mendes sala he did not (repeat not) want to ask us to do anything we could' not (repeat not) do, but that he hope d we j gou ld by unoffi c' 1 means di scourage_Dlen_^ ~a soiutlori~along general lines of US-UK formula had beej3_reached *

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Please deliver following personal message to Eden:

QTE Dear Anthony: We have an inquiry from Mendes-France as to

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whether or not Bedell or I will return to Geneva and if so when. He apparent^ contemplates a reunion at the ministerial level July 12. I understand he is \

making a similar inquiry of you.

• • 4

It is my present feeling that it v/ould be better if neither Bedell nor I went*-*

back. As you know, it would not be feasible for us to be parties to a settle- •

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ment which fell below the seven point paper which we drew up together in 0|

Washington and gave the French through our Ambassadors, Our position in that respect is perhaps a little different from your own. In any event, I fear fvl that the French, whether or not Bedell or I are there, will take a solution considerably worse than this and in that event our high-lavel presence at Geneva might prove an embarrassment to all concerned. In view, however ^\ of our joint efforts for this area, I wanted to let you know of our present !-^-i

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[ thinking and I would welcome quickly knowing how you yourself visualize this

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matter working out. Sincerely yours, Foster. UNQTE

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realize of course that even agreement which appears to meet all seven O

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this shall not happen. This v/ill require observance of criteria not merely £>.

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in the letter but in the spirit. Thus since undoubtedly true that elections might eventually mean unification Vietnam under Ho Chi Minn this makes

it all more important they should be only held as long after cease-fi-re agreement as possible and in conditions free from intimidation]to give

democratic elements best chance. We believe important that r

' V /■ <r should besetnow and especially that no conditions! should be accepted

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as well as military guarantees. Also note paragraph 3 of President

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ci««^«. ~C - Mr. MacAr tnur FE- Mr. Storm EUR IMr. Merchant in draft)

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I and Prime Minister j oint declaration of June 29, regarding GTE unity through

* free elections supervised by the UN UNQTE. *

• Our interpretation of willingness QTE r_espect UNQTE agreement which might

-

be reached is that we would not (repeat not) oppose a settlement which conformed

to seven points contained Deptel 4853. It does not (repeat not) of course mean

~ _ — .

we would guarantee such settlement or that we would necessarily support it publicly. We consider QTE respect UNQTE as strong a word as we can possibly employ in the circumstances to indicate our position with respect to such

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arrangements as French may evolve along lines points contained £)EPTEL 4853.

* *

QTE respect UNQTE would also mean that we would not seek directly or indirectly

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to upset settlement by force.

You may convey substance above to French,

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In going over file since drafting EMBTEL Tt> we have determined that Department as well as Defense were informed of French plans to withdraw to inner perimeter of Tonkin delta on May 30. At that time Generaly Ely handed General Trapnell, former chief. MAAG Saigonj who had been sent to Paris by General Ridgway to take part in Indochina talks $ copy of new Defense plan and permitted Trapnell to make notes on it. EMBTJEL 4-605, repeated Saigon as 318, Geneva as 56O for Chiefs of Mission and passed to Defense for Ridgway informed Department of new plan In numbered^' paragraphs 4, 5 and 6. Details of plan were carried to Washington^ few days later by Trapnell himself..

It therefore cannot be alleged that French did not (repeat not) inform us in advance through both military and diplomatic channels of their plans to withdraw to Inner perimeter of Tonkin delta. We cannot (repeat not) help but feel that Kerr Article pi us^ what Department's own spokesman has been quoted as saying can only serve to make our position here vis-a-vis Mendes and his government Increasingly ..difficult and undermine the confidence of both the French Government and people In our own candor in these rao'st difficult times.

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true I think it is probably tarns that if we had put together all of the bits of

at information given at various times and/Various political and military levels : d

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at Paris, Geneva, Washington, Saigon and Hanoi, the result would have beeri'Q-

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a reasonably clear picture of French military intentions as now revealed, ■* : —

I have never harbored any tho ught of any wilful con cealment. Also I have al- &}

■ ways conceded that the French were clearly within their rights in making *

their own plans. I have repeatedly said at press conferences that we recog- (

nize that the French had the primary position in Indochina and that our role 4^

was that of a friendly observer who wanted to help if and when our help was

wanted.

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I do fee] that there is a certain lack of any intimacy which is perhaps due to the fact that we have not in the past worked closely with the personali-

ties of the present Government who have been plunged into an immense and

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engrossing task. In this respect they have our sympathy and I hope that vV X

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you will try to remove any impression of carping criticism on our part. JIIZ&-C& We' are quite prepared to agree that France has been overextended in relation to Indochina and v/e are not quarelling with present French policy designed to limit its commitments more nearly within the bounds of its strength.

Our present intentions to leave representation at Geneva at the present level

i

of Ambassador Johnson is primarily because we do not want to be the cause of any avoidable embarrassment by what might be a spectacular disassociation of the United States from France. Whatever France may be determined to do, we accept as v/ithin its prerogatives. We only regret that we cannot agree to associate

w ourselves in advance with an end result which* we cannot foresee. Equally, we do

not want to be in a position of seeming to obstruct an end result which from the French national standpoint seems imperative to its parliament and people.

Since starting to dictate this ; I have received through Bonnet a message from

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Mendes-France strongly urging that either Bedell Smith or I should come back __ . ^_— —-'

This apparently based on my today's press conference statement that neither of

us had any present plans for returning, • . : ■

*

I told Bonnet the substance of the preceding paragraphs to the effect that while v/e would be only too happy to contribute to a united front, we could not do so .

■ • 4

without knowing on what position that front was based. If there were a position which France was able to define and state that she would not accept anything else ' then we would be able to judge whether or not that afforded the foundation for a

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| united-front. At the moment, it seems t o me that there is less danger of doing

Unless you perceive objection, I would like you to explain orally my position * / to Mendes-FrancS, making clear that we are motivated by our estimate that in the end our presence at Geneva, even though initially it seemed an asset, might subsequently prove a liability to Franco-American relations.

Code Room: - Pleise note

FOR LONDON ONLY

Please show Eden portion of this cable which follows first two paragraphs. Portion beams QTE We are quite prepared, etc UNQTE

irreparable injury to F ranco-American relations if we avo icl.getting, i nto a

position at Geneva which might require a disassociation under spectacular conditions

*— -

which v/ould be deeply resented by the French as an effort on our part to block

*

at the last minute a peace which they ardently desire,

» *

* We have not yet taken any irrevocable decision and even if no one from here

| comes over for the 12th, we would be standing by here under circumstances such

*

. . that if developments at Geneva seem to indicate that our preserxte there would serve i a really constructive purpose one or the other of us could get to Geneva overnight.

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Fvoc'dJ ...July .9,.. 195^

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PARIS EYES ONLY AMBASSADOR

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SAIGON EYES OKLY AMBASSADOR * ■ *

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yp I called on Gha-ivel following restricted meeting today. He has just returned from Paris• His impression is that Mendes-Prance position unchanged and that he does not intend make further concessions to secure agreement v/ith Communists. Mendes-France anticipates active week of discussions followed possibly by last minute agreement on evening July 19- Mendes-Prance arrives here tomorrow afternoon. He will see Molotov tomorrow evening*.

Chauvel dined last night with Communist Chinese. LI Konurig and Chano; Wen-tien . Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs and Ambassador to USSR who has just returned here, were present. .Atmosphere was "very cordial 11 . Chauvel informed Chinese that military discussions with Viet Minh not going well and tb t latter had made both for Vietnam and for Laos unacceptable proposals wholly cu*; of harmony v/ith what Chauvel had understood Chou En-lai f s position to be. Chinese expressed surp rise but did not go into details of situation. He told Chauvel tb t . Chou En-iai would probably,return here early next week saying it takes three to four days to fly here from Peking depending on weather. ^ice^ Minister stated Chou En-lai had had "ver^ __^ good meefrlDRlL. with Ho Chi Mi nh and results M would be he lp?ul~ to Fr_ench n , Vice Minister has spent last- -:wp weeks in Moscow^

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and Chauvel b eliev es Comm uni st Chinese and ioviet positions regaraing prob lem have been coord tnated JL ^jiI^ o?i Ksl an problems oelns: Riven major weight .

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- There was an "u nderground 11 meeting between French Colonel

Brebisson and "Viex; ftiina mixicary representative yesterday. At this- meeting Viet Minh made two proposals (I) A demarcation

mmn c« ? i *'/// J+vft***/* L • ~* 822 line reproouctioh from ms

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

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TOP SECRET -2- SECTO 578, July 9, 9 p.m M from Geneva

line about 40 kilometera ga rth^of 'Stiff faoa line and (2) "neutra->ization !l of delta In orde^Vo'permit total evacuation of French Expeditionary Corps in three months period. French representative stated both these proposals wholly unacceptable ■ and not even worthy of discussion. He refused to set date for next meeting,

Chauvel sai^ Molotov this morning. Molotov expressed Interest In being Informed of progress of conference, Chauvel gave him general review touching particularly on question of demarcation line, attitude cf extreme intransigence being adopted by Viet Minh in military talks and problem cf international controls. Molotov expressed Interest but claimed unfamiliarity with details, Chauvel suggested desirability of contact between French military representatives and members cf Soviet delegation In order that Soviet delegation might be fully informed of difficulties being encountered and of attitudes adopted by Viet Minh. Later in day Soviet delegation got in touch with French delegation and these contacts will be set up, Molotov stated that he had seen Chauvel T s working paper (SECTO 575) and that while there were points requiring clarification and further study he thought it was a i aeful contribution,

Chauv el has impression both Russians and Ch inese g ive Viet Min h fairly iree hand t o see how far th e y can go' but that when the y f ^id~VIeT"Mintrdemanas nave gore beyond limit which French can 7 b e expected to" accep t, the y interven e. Chauvel made point to Molotov that any agreement reached must be acceptable not only to Franco-Vietnamese side and to Viet Minh but also to other conference members, He is hopeful that, as he says occurred previously, Chinese-Russ ian moderating influence will now be brought to bear on Viet Mlntio Chauve 1 expr essed confidence that If he were'negotiating oaly with Russians and Chinese,

ihe could almost certainly achieve a settlement in line with

\provIsions of US-UK aide-memoire,

Chauvel told me that he is having his staff prepare drafts of" an armistice agreement and related documents so as to be ready in case ministers reach agreements on major matters. Ke stated' that information we had furnished regarding Korean armistice was most useful to them and was much appreciated.

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

TOP SECRET

THE SECRETARY OP DEFENSE

WASHINGTON

JUL 9 195^

Dear Mr. Murphy:

I refer to iny letter of June 19th regarding U. S. assistance to the French in the formation and equipping of three light infantry divisions for use in Indo-China. The evaluation referred to in that letter has been prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as set forth in the attached memorandum, with which I concur.

Since no additional indication of French intentions has been received in the Department of Defense and the new Premier has promised to end the war in Indo-China by 20 July or resign, I shall leave to you the timing of any additional U. S, actions which may be desired. I desire to point out, however, that in the event a formal request is received there is., in addition to the points contained in the Joint Chiefs of Staff memorandum, the additional problem raised by Section 10oa(l) of the Mutual Security Act of 195^ (Richards Amendment), as approved by the Committee on Foreign Affairs, which could bar the United States from replacing this equipment.

In the event that you determine that this French plan is worthy of farther action, I suggest that the above point be included in those requiring resolution since the impact on NATO of the removal of equipment, if permanent, would be considei^able.

Sincerely yours

(Signed)

■

R. B. AHDERSON Acting

Incl, - 1

Copy 3 of JCS Memo, 2k June 195^

The Honorable Robert Murphy Deputy Under Secretary of State Department of State

cc: General Bonesteel

62U

TOP SECRET

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1

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INFO. LOlIDO^AnD GENEVA ^U f

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FOR AMBASSADOR FROM SECRETARY

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Following is personal message from Secretary Dulles

to Mondes-France which is to be delivered by Aiabassado

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Dillon to Kendes-France in person" as promptly as possible as instructed by separate cable.

BEGIN TEXT: " My dear Btr. Presidentj

President Eisenhower (who has been kept closely

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informed) and I have been greatly moved by your earnest request that 1 or General Bedell Smith should return next week to Geneva for what may be the conclusion of the Indo-

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china phase of the Conference. I can assui^e you that 01

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attitude'in this resoect is dictated by a desire to find the course which will best preserve the traditional friend-ship and cooperation of our countries and which will promote^

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the r^;oals of justice and human welfare and dignity to which

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our two nations have been traditionally dedicated* V;e also

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'■ P^geU. 2_of telegram .to iSBI£B_EiifiIS.

TO? SWJT^-P

Classification

attach great value to preserving the united front of France, Great Britain and the United Statea which has during this

~i

postwar period so Importantly served all three of us in our , dealings with the C ornraunfeb s.

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What no-7 concerns us is fch-£<£?:ais: that we ajtS v&ry

:. a. In relation to- Indochina,

doubtful as to whether there is 53^&39& a united front/

and we do not believe that the mere fact that the hijrh

representatives of the three nat ions physi call y reappe ar together at Geneva will serve as a substitute for a clear

agreement on a joint position which includes fl-gw*ttwftr»fc a<^

to what will happen If that position is not accepted by thj,

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Coiranunists. \7e fear that unless there is the reality of/a

united front, the events at. Geneva will expose differences

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under conditions which will only .s erve to accentuate them

•-with consequent strain upon the relations between our two

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countries greater than if the U3 does not reappear at Geneva.

■ at

in the person of General Smith or myself.

Beginning early last April the US worked intensi\ sly with the French Government and with that of Great Britain

in an effort to create a common position of strength.

xhixs

This did not prove possible. and derived from fundamental

The reasons were understandable causes &XSX&&& »Mch still subsis t

and influence the possibility oi' achieving at the present time a genuine "united front".

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During the talks of Prime Minister Churchill and Foreign Secretary Eden with President Eisenhower and me, an effort was made to find a common position which might x be acceptable to the two of us and, we hoped, to the French Government. This was expressed in the seven-point memorandum

~\

.of which you are aware. I believe that this represented a constructive contribution. However, I do not yeb feel that

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there Is a united position in the sense that the three of

us would be prepared to stand firmly on this as a minimum

. acceptable solution and to 3 ee the ne gotlatipns break ofx

—■ .— — *■■—- ~~

and the warfare resume if this position was not accepted

; by the Communist side. We doubt very much that the Co: m-

■ nlsts will in fact accept this seven-point position unless

they realize that the alternative is some common action upon

which we have all agreed* So far, there is no such alternative.

Under these circumstances, we greatly fear that the

seven points which constitute a minimum as far as the US is

concerned will constitute merely an optimum solution so fa

<r.r

as your Government and perhaps the UK are concerned, and that an armistice might be concluded on terms substantially

less favorable than those we could respect.

■* «

V/e gather that there is already considerable French thinking in terms of the acceptability of departures from

certain of the seven points. For example:

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TO? S'.llST

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Allowing Communist forces tg remain Jja Northern Laos;

military aeniar ea t ion * •"" accenting a* Vietnam line Q^/yiv::d^^^i considerably south of Donghoi ^ " ' *\

^Mfes&gQ&'i neutralizing and demilitarizing Laos, Cambodia anti^

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Vietnam so as to impair their capacity to maintain stable, non-Communist regimes; accepting elections so early and so ill-prepared and ill-supervised as to risk the loss of t he

*

entire area to Communism; accepting international super-vision by a body v/hich cannot be effective because it in-eludes a Communist state which has veto power,

% These are but illustrations of a whittl r lng-away proces s, each stroke of which may in itself seem unessential, but which cumulatively could produce a result quite different

m

from that envisaged by the seven points. Also* of course, there is the danger that the same unacceptable result

might come about through the Communist habit of using

words in a double sense and destroying the significance

principles * . go od- ^vC^^cfex^x^^^^: 1 v/i th s tui t i i ying implemen tati ons,

of

We do not for a moment question the right of the French Government to exercise its ovm judgment in all of these

respects. Indeed, v/e recognize that the issues for Fran,

are so vital that the French Government has a duty to exercise its own judgment. I have from the beginning recognized

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the preponderant interest of your Government as representing

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the nation which has borne for so many years the burden of

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.AMSLia_EARia

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a cruel and costly war. However, my Government equally

• ■ *

has the duty not to endorse a solution which would seem to

us to impair seriously certain principles v/hich the US

*,

believes must, as far as it is concerned, be kept unimpaired, If our ov/n struggle against Communism is to be successfully pursued- At the same time, we do not wish to put ourselves

■

in the position where we would seem to be passing moral judgment upon French action or disassociating ourselves from the settlement at a moment and under circumstances

v/hich might be unnecessarily dramatic• *

-xkxiiK^xuf. It is also to be, considered that if our

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conduct creates a certain uncertainty in the minds of the

Communists, this might strengthen vour hand more than ou r

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presence at Geneva in a form which would expose probably to the world, and certainly to the Communists themselves, differences which the Communists v/ould exploit to the dis-comfiturC of all three of us-

Under all these circumstances, It seems to us that tho

*

interests of both of our countries are best served by con-type fcinuing for the time being the present izvi/i^n^Kv'rairinri of

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US representation at Geneva, This consists of able and responsible persons who are in close contact with tho Presi-

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If circumstances should alter so that it appeared that

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our coiTii'fion Interests would be better served If higher ranking officials became our representatives , then we would

be alert to act accordingly. -, - . *

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It is because I am fully aware of the serious and

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solemn nature of the moment that i have gone Into the mat-tor at this considerable length* It is possible that by the first of the week, the Co^iunxst position will be Buffi-ciently disclosed so that sonie of the answers to the fore-

going queries can be foreseen. This might clarify in one

-sense? or another the thinking of us all- *

In this connect!on } let hi© emphasize that It ic our

ardent hooe that circumstances mi/rht become such that con-

slstently with the foregoing either General Bedell Smith

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or I can personally come to Geneva and stand beside you ESSD TEXT

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SENT DEPARTMENT 134, REPEATED INFORMATION GENEVA 21, LONDON 35.

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FOR SECRETARY PROM AMBASSADOR

I delivered Secretary's message Department telegram 127 to Mendes *in Geneva after lunch Sunday. At same time,, I gave ■: him personal message contained in first paragraph Department, telegram 128. In view Eden's absence (SECTO 585). I did not (repeat not) see him. Johnson will deliver message to Eden ;. tomorrow, if Aldrich has not (repeat not) already done so. * V; "

Mendes' was very touched by personal message in Department telegx^am 128 and twice asked me to be sure and thank Secretary on his behalf for this thought.

Regarding Department telegram 127, Mendes expressed extreme disappointment and gave concern at United States decision not (repeat not) to be represented at Ministerial level. He divided his remarks into two categories, first, the effect of • our decision on Conference itself, and second, the overall effect of our decision on world affairs. !

Regarding first category, Mendes stated that our absence made-French bargaining position far weaker. He stated that if Secretary was present, France would not (repeat not) ac "spt anything at Conference that was unacceptable to United states. As he put it in his own words, presence of Secretary would give United States in effect a veto power on decisions of Conference. He felt it particularly important that we have someone at Geneva, who could take strong personal position with; Molotov, if and when necessary, and without having to refer to : " Washington for instructions. Mendes also feels that United States absence at Ministerial level will lead Communists to increase their pressure and be more demanding in order to deepen the obvious rift between the Western powers. He said France had not (repeat not) as yet departed from the Seven

,- 331 ■ Point

-TOP SECRET , . t'"*' fcF/ ( if iisift

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Point United States-United Kingdom position and he did not (repeat not) make any commitment to hold to these points during coming week, except for statement regarding United States veto power if Secretary present,

*

On the overall effect of our decision, Mendes pointed out that this will be first time since the war that United States not.(repeat not) represented at equal level with other powers in an important conference. He said he felt certain that Europe would interpret United States absence as first step in return to a policy of isolationism. This he felt, would have catastrophic effects not (repeat not) only in Far East, but also in Europe and would be great cold war victory for Communism. According to Mendes, we would in effect be saying "do your best, you have our sympathy, but result is no (repeat no) real concern to us."

I tried hard to dissuade Mendes from this viewpoint, but without much success* His statement regarding United States veto power if Secretary present, led me to point out "that there must also be an agreed alternative if Conference failed. Mendes promptly replied that only alternative to cease-fire at Geneva would be internationalization of war with United States military forces coming promptly to assistance of French. This aspect of our talk being covered more fully in separate telegram, being repeated to Saigon.

Finally, Mendes asked if there was anything he could do specifically to create a situation that would nake it possible for Secretary to come to Geneva. He asked me to pass this question on to Washington. In this connection, he specifically questioned sixth paragraph of Secretary's letter, and said he knew of no (repeat no) French thinking along such lines, except possibly on subject of international supervision. He

wondered where United States had got the ideas expressed in this paragraph.

•

While I was talking with Mendes, Johnson talked with Chauvel and showed him a copy of Secretary T s letter. Chauvel showed Johnson a cable from Bonnet which indicated that Bonnet may have given Secretary the impression that French were considering retrating from Seven Point program.

Chauvel and Johnson joined us at end of our talk, and Johnson and I suggested that if Mendes developed any concrete ideas which would help meet United States fears, it vould be helpful if he put them into a reply to Secretary's letter. While Mendes was non-commital as to a formal reply I rather expect he will make one. In closing, Mendes said he would keep in. close touch with Johnson, During talk, Mendes made it clear that while presence of Under Secretary at Geneva would be most helpful, he very much hoped that Secretary himself could come.

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During conversation with Mendel at Geneva s I informed him of .contents*of DEP1BL 8<t~and of our feeling that Vietnam Govern-" ment should be kept more fully Informed^by French , I told him* that we felt time had now come for * Vietnam to be i nfor med of ge7^ r aX~Tixres^ tfendes aaia, ne would [ il

(TOTisttter^Tniorraitlg Vietnamese after discussing matter with his f advisors during afternoon: He Bald he had originally felt it referable not to inform them until he could assure them that ^^ was prepared to guarantee "chem against further aggression I or subversion.

He then spoke at length of jrieeessity for a _c leer -cut US guar an-tee thalLJfciauld—^ Sp ates irf the event that the

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He then discussed in seme detail the situation which would arise if no settlement was reached*at Geneva He said the sending* of conscripts to Indochina would then.be debated on July 22^and 2j5* If the National Assembly approved , the first division would H leave on July 25 and the second division about 10 days later,.. '-: It would take a month to reach Indochina and three more weeks^to '■-"' get troops ready for action Therefore the first division of 1 •■ 4 conscripts would not be ready in Indochina until about September V^

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Mendes said he doubted if French.alone could successfully resist such an assault. He said that Fretrch .-Government would / officially inform U5 of these facts at end of July if no ceasefire reached.

I reminded him of US requirements for action on our part, and he said he could not foretell how French Parliament might react They might react strongly and request US help to continue the war or they might have wtrat he termed a "nervous breakdown" and push for capitulation at any price to save expeditionary corps.

If no cease-fire , Mendes will resign ,. but in view of the above, I fedl it.is possible that if* no cease-fire is reached the French Government which will succeed Mendes raa^ appeal for US armed help, and may meet all US terms. Not possible to estimate tirnihg or such an appeal but it could "occur'during August .when US Congress no longer in session.

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ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

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SUBJECT: l T .S./u\K. Discussions on Southeast Asia

Three meetings of the Joint U.S./u,K. Study Group on Southeast Asia, established as a follow-up to the Eisenhower/Chttrohill discussions, have been held. In addition, there have been several meetings of the U.S. Side. Under Secretary of State Walter Sedoll Smith is the Senior U.S. Representative* The U.K. is represented by 'Sir Robert II. Scott.

* The views of the U»K. with respect to collective security in the

Southeast Asia area may be summarized as follows:

a. It is the British view that a collective security arrangement for Southeast Asia should be considered in two contexts, (l) on the basis of a settlement in Indochina, and (2) on the basis of no settle-nnnt. In the event of a settlement which does not nose an immediate military proble.n, the British would prefer a generalized collective security arrangement designed to bring in as many states as possible. This approach would include such states as India, Indonesia, and Bursa. On the other hand, if there is no Indochina settlement at Geneva the British would agree to immediately establish en organization to meet the military throat. Such an organization v/ould presumably be limited to those countries who would make military .commitments to halt the Communist aggression*

b. Under the arrangement which the British prefer be established in the" evon't of a settlement, there would be three principal elements to the organization: a council which would include oil participants in the organization, an economic end political council which would include as ncny of tho statas as possible and v/ould deal with the economic and social problems of the area, and a military organization which v/ould have fewer members, since states such as India v/ould unquestionably not wish to participate in the military aspects of the organisation.

c. In the event that tnere is no agreement in Indochina, the British would immediately move ahead with an effective military arrange* rn-jiit designed to obtain as much support as possible x'or an organisation to resist further Communist aggression in Southeast Asia.

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In addition to the for-cgoingj there arc? several points whicn hnv*€ come out in discussions with tho British v;hich are worthy of mention:

a. Tho British ::<>" e no in tent. ion of "pressing forward* with a Southeast Asia Collective SocurLty Ur^rnizatio:\ until the Indochina phase of tho Geneva Conference has been terminated.

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b. Tho British representative has referred on a number of occa-eions~"to use of military force to repel overt Communist aggression.

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However, the British attitude v/ith respect to infiltration and is vague.

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c. The British consider that the principal problem in dealing with Southeast Asia after an Indochina settlement would be a large-scale economic assistance program. Although there has been no discussion as to support of the economic assistance program for Southeast Asia, there is little doubt which state would be the principal contributor.

During the course of the meetings. General Smith has maintained that regardless ox whether there is a settlement in Indochina it ia necessary that an effective collective security organization be established. Further, it is necessary that the organization be established immediately in order that we will be in a position to deal with the probable adverse political and military repercussions in the Associated States that will result from an unsatisfactory settlement of the Indochina conflict. It has also been pointed out to the British that inas-nuch as the principal danger of further Communist aggression in Southeast Asia will probably*take the form of infiltration and subversion, the organization taust be in a position to deal effectively v/ith thi situation*

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Sinco approval of a collective security organization would probably require considerable tifca for action by the various governments concerned, the United States representatives have proposed that consideration be given to the establishment of an interim organization to deal v/ith the situation. The British have indicated tentative agreement v/ith this idea. A further point has been made by tho V. S. representatives that no geographical limitation should be put on the treaty covering the collective security area. I re commended., and Secretary Dulles agreed, that the area covered by tho treaty should not be restricted to Southeast Asia but rather should be open to permit inclusion of non-Communist states of the en tiro Far East area. Although Sir Robert Scott did not object to this view, it is possible that when the formal British position becomes clear they might not agree to leave open the area to bo covered by the • Treaty. . -

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. An additional point which has been discussed with the British has been the question of a declaration to be made in the evont of a settlement at Geneva on Indochina. Secretary Smith informed the British that tho U.S. is planning to make a unilateral declaration and hopes that

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declarations which the British and other, allies make would not vniy substantir>lly froni the {.VS. declaration. Sir Robert Scott indicated that blio Britislt prefer a nuxltilatoral declar• tion to include at least Australiaj Sew Zealand,, and possibly India and other nations having an interest in tlio area. The British do not exclude the possibility of a multilateral declare tion. including CoEtinunlst parti/jipotioa. £he British were informed th ? .*.t it would bo impossible for the United States to participate in a multilateral declaration v/hich includes Communist China.

Several documents have been exchanged by the U.S. and U.K. delegations. At a meeting on 10 July a U.S. draft treaty v/as submitted to the British for their consideration, British comments are expected at a meeting on 13 July. Following receipt of the British comments, it is planned that the draft treaty will be submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for consideration. If the views of the U.S. and U.K. on a draft treaty can be resolved, the Department of State plans to establish, a working group consisting of the U.S., U.K., and other countries which are likely to participate in a collective security organization, with a view to developing an agreed draft of a treaty, I shall koop you informed of further developments in this matter.

FOR THE ASS1SIASI SBCESlARY OF DEFENSE (ISA}:

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In addition to the following agreed texts of Paris meeting, the Secretary's party will bring full memoranda of conversa-tions: (The following documents are classified and not (re- vJ|| peat not) for release.) . • \ "T *''

A, Agreed French-United States position paper on Indochina, *

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1. Prance and the Associated States of Vietnam, Laos and ■ "^ Cambodia are recognized to be those which, on the non ' Communist side, are primarily interested in the Indochina *°* phase of the Geneva Conference. 4^

The United States Is Interested primarily as a friendly na- 4^ tlon which desires to assist, where desired, in arriving at a just settlement , but who will* not (repeat not) seeic, or be expected, to Impose Its views in any way upon those prl-" mariiy interested. -

2. The attached 7 points constitute a result which France believes to be obtainable by negotiation at Geneva and which would be acceptable to France and, France believes, to the Associated States. The United States, while recognizing the right of those primarily interested to accept different terras will itself be prepared to respect terms conforming to. the attached. The United States will not (repeat not) be -asked. or expected by France to respect terms"which in its opinion . -differ materially from the attached, and It may publicly c: disassociate itself from such differing terms. j - ^ .?' ;v|

3. If the settlement is one which the United States, is prepared to "respect 11 its position will be expressed unilaterally or in association only with non-Communist states in terms

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which apply to the situation the prlnci forces which are embodied in Article 2 Charter of the United Nations.-

ties of non-use of 4) and (6) of the

4. The United States is prepared to seek, with other in- - / terested nations, a collective defense association designed to preserve, against direct and indirect aggression, the integrity of the non-Communist areas of Southeast Asia following any settlement. .

5. If there is no (repeat no) settlement, the United States and French Governments will consult together on the measures to be taken. This will not (repeat not) preclude the United States, if it so desires, bringing the matter before the United Nations as involving a threat to peace as dealt with by Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

6. France reaffirms the principle of independence for the Associated States In equal and voluntary association as members of the French Union,

UNQUOTE

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B. Annex to above document consisting of the 7 points regarding a settlement which could be respected as agreed during Churchill-Eisenhower conversations. (Please note following phrase which has been added with the full consent of Eden and Mendes-France at the beginning of paragraph 2 of the 7 points.) "In connection with the line of military demarcation, preserves

"Memorandum of points referred to in paragraph 2 of the France-United States position paper.

An agreement which: .

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"1. Preserves the-Integrity and independence of Laos and Cambodia and assures the withdrawal of Viet Minh forces therefrom;

"2, In connection with the line of military demarcation preserves at least the southern half of Vietnam and if possible an enclave in the deltas; in this connection, we would be unwilling to see the line of division of responsibility drawn further south than a line running generally west from Dong Hoi;

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"3- Does not (repeat not) Impose on Lacs, Cambodia or retained Vietnam any restrictions materially impairing their capacity to maintain stable non-Communist regimes; and especially restrictions impairing their right to maintain adequate forces

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for Internal security, to Import arms and to employ foreign advisers;

n 4. Does not (repeat not) contain political provisions which would risk loss of the retained area to Communist control; *

"5. Does not (repeat not) exclude the possibility of the ultimate unification of the Vietnam by peaceful means;

"6. Provides for the peaceful and humane transfer, under international supervision, of those people desiring to be moved from one zone to another of Vietnam; and

"7. Provides effective machinery for international supervision of the agreement."

C. Letter from Mendes-France to Secretary (unofficial translation of French text).

.QUOTE ;

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Dear Mr, Secretary:

"Following our frank and friendly conversation of last evening, I believe I understand fully the position of the United States with regard to the negotiations at Geneva concerning Indochina.

If I Interpret your views correctly, you recognize fully the primary right of France," the Associated States of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, to decide the conditions for the settlement of a war in which they are the only belligerents on the non-Communist side. You wish to aid us through you good offices in obtaining a just and honorable settlement which will take into account the needs of the Interested people?'. However, you are not (repeat not) prepared to participate ,/ith the Communist countries In any settlement which might appear to retain for them the benefits of aggression or the domination of non-willing peoples. In any case, if a settlement should be arrived at between the parties holding the prim: ry responsibility, you would agree to indicate that you would fj] comply with the principles which are contained In Articles 2 f~-(h) and (6) of the United Nations Charter and you would con- •"-sider any violation of the settlement by the Communist regimes ;\ as being of grave concern. I ,.\

. DULLES MRS/1 • • .

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It being your belief that the continuation of the war would involve a serious risk of an"extension of the conflict, both as concerns the combat areas and the belligerent countries, the .tfUestlon of the participation of the United States -would n be guided by the terms defined in the fourth paragraph Sbf the letter addressed on Ju>,£ 16, 195*1* by President Eisenhower to President Coty. *

You have indicated to me that you would fear, in the present state of negotiations, that the sending by the United States to Geneva of representatives chosen at a high levfel and bearing instructions from President Elsenhower to adhere to the principles noted above, could cause a situation capable of giving rise in France, under the most regrettable circumstances, to a feeling that our two countries are divided and that it might risk affecting seriously th£ir good relations which are so important to the whole free world,

I have noted your hesitation to come to Geneva in the fear of having eventually to disassociate yourself from ah agreement, or certain of Its terms, which you might not (repeat' not) be able to respect. This appears to me to be understandable, but In my opinion it does not (repeat not) respond to the : situation. In effect, I have every reason to think that your absence would be precisely interpreted as demonstrating, before the fact, that you disapproved of the conference and of everything which might be accomplished. Not (repeat .not) only would those who are against us find therein the confirmation of the 111 will which they attribute to your governmentJconcerning. '-the re-er.r.^blishment of peace in Indochina; but many others ^ " would r@£-l in it a sure sign of s division of the western powers; Finally, the negotiations would thus be deprived of the element: of balance indispensable to the seeking of a solutionfas recom-' mended Iw the memorandum of June 30. I

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I consider thus that such an absence would produce an : effect

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_2-#179, July 14, 9 p.m. (SECTION TWO OP WO) from Paris

diametrically opposed to the intentions which you have expressed and which I have cited above„ In a situation as difficult as this only the unity of the western democratic front, supported by the immense potential which we have in common, can bring about the very military and strategic unity which we should seek eventually to establish in that part of the world a

It is in this spirit that the French Government envisages, aside from the assurances which the conference itself could furnish, the establishment of a^collecJaj/ ^ guarantee by virtue of which the signatories would declare themselves prepared to intervene if, In Indochina, one of the three states was a victim or aggression,

I am fully conscious of the position of the government of the United States and I have noted with care the consequences which it might Imply; but for the reasons which I have just enumerated^ I have the profound conviction that the common > . interests of cur two countries and of the three- Associated States would be effectively defended only if you, yourself, or the Undersecretary should represent In person your govern-ent at Geneva. . ;

If the situation should nevertheless evolve In a manner which would confirm your fears, I engage myself, on behalf of France, to make known publicly the conditions under which you have acceded to my request. ' ,

UNQUOTE j

D. Letter from Secretary to Mendes-France. \

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I have received your letter of July lh with reference to participation by the United States in the final stages of the . Indochina phase of the Geneva conference.

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In th e lig ht of what y xn a say and after c onsultation with Presldent Eisenhowe r, 1 aoTgladl to oe able tro^irfurnr^^Lt jRa T^Ene ^residen t ancT l are askiTig~trhe" Under s e^reirarj "erf—state Geheral~~t ; raTter~" Bedeii Smith, t;q prepare z o reuurir"aTTtris r earliest convenience to Geneva to s re in -the work of the conference on the basis of the understanding which we have arrived at. •

I greatly appreciate the opportunity which we have had to'

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confer together and I believe that it has added a new chapter to the honorable and precious tradition of Franco-American cooperation.

UNQUOTE

E. Letter to Mendes-France from Eden.

QUOTE

My Dear Mr* President:

Thank you for providing me with copies of correspondence exchanged today between yourself and Mr. John Foster Dulles on the present phase of the Indochina conference at Geneva.

I have noted their contents and wish to assure you that, as a friend and ally, I shall do my best to help you to achieve a settlement on the basis set out in this correspondence,

I am sending a copy of this letter to Mr. Dulles.

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UNQUOTE

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Note: Mr. Drumright (FE) notified 10 p.m., 7/l4, NPL.

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SECRETARY DULLES' SEF02T Oil HIS RECETriT TRIP TO PARIS

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At the NSC nee ting of 1$ July,, Secretary Dulles reported on hi recent trip to Paris as follows:

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j 1. He had been iri practicality continuous meetings with Kendes-I France and !lr, Eden from the time of his arrival to his departure^ :• : sometimes with one oz* the other individually and sometimes with tjie two together. He had told Kendes thaij in his opinion, most of • Prance ! s troubles stem iron a lack of French decision on ZDC* Be-, cause of this, the Soviets were b§ing successful in splitting France and Gernariy. Therefore, he put the greatest urgency on French action"on EBC. Ilendes said that it might not be possible now to get a constitutional najority of 321*, votes in the Assemble without some face-saving formula• He hoped this could be aov.e through minor amendments which, would not reouire renegotiationi but in any event j Hend.es had promised Secretary Dulles action by the /assembly by early August. Mr, Dalles had pointed out that the U.S. public was getting a trifle short-tempered on the EDC topic and that if Kendes was not careful^ the U.S. Congress might terninate aid to NATO which would be detrimental to trie military effort of all Europe, cspec5.ally France. " ..

2. a. Regarding the dilemma of U.S. participation in the Geneva Conference j Secretary Dulles had pointed out that if the U.S* participates in the Conference and then finds itself \mable to guarantee the results > a violent French public reaction against the U.S. would ensue. Similarlyj if the U.S. participates and so stiffens French will that France does not accept the Co:nnunist best offer 3 then again, the U.S. would be blamed and a major strain placed upon U.S.-French relations. • Thereforej the U.S. was seeking to play an inconspicuous role.

b. The original. 7K proposal had been for a partition line along the liflh parallel: their second proposal; along the 16th " parallel. Both had ocen rejected and the French position was to hold out for the l6th parallelj along with the guaranteed independence of lacs and Cambodia.

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c. The Secretary had worked up with the French a Joint U.S.-French paper along the lines of the seven points of the U.S.-U.K. paper which had resulted from the Churchill-Eden ■ talks. Er.« Guiles had said there would be no U.S. guarantee of the settlenent, but rather a unilateral declaration that the U.S. would not attempt to change it by force. Hendes had provided Mr, Dulles with a letter of reply and acceptance of the U#S.-French position paper. Accordingly, Gen. Smith was returning to Geneva with his instructions contained in these two oaners.

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3. Kr. Dulles said that the liendes Government put isiors emphasis on the granting of independence to the Associated States than had the Xaniel Government. Ifenaes even agreed that French ft?nctionHircs t and eventually aiiaf-d forces vroyld have to leave the area. It was current French planning to hold Haiphong until French forces and their equipment could be evacuated but not to attempt to maintain \ Kaiphong as a peMianent enclave.

Um V3ien asked if the VH would agree to the seven ooints, the Secretary said he was not sure but he could count on support from Laos and Cambodia. Mr. Allen Eulles felt the possibility of VH uprising against the French was a real one.

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J># Kendes had assured Secretary Dulles that if the Geneva Conference was a failure s he would send two additional French divisions to Indochinaj although they could not arrive before Septemberj 195k •

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HO; SECTC 626, July 16, 7 P-ffi.

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Roc'd: July 16, 1954

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REPEATED INFORMATION PARIS 72,

S3W Cliauvel this afternoon., He told me that Mendes-France and Molotov had dinner last night, and Soviets had launched into substantive discission even before cocktails were served and continued throughout dinner, and Mendes-France icd Molotov had discussion following dinner with only interpreters present which lasted more than J :*ours until almost 1:00 a.m. * Discussion eov-ered whole range of outstanding questions at least once; according to Chauvel some of them "twenty times". Chauvel said Mendes had stuck firmly to French positions an d_w1th very minor excep r _ tions of elections mentioned below, Molotov H£ r d7~v. r hite^beTrig vef7 T>lee sarrg... not"("repeat ~ho u)"*budged s n inch. Q n ele ctions

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at his firmness, aid are still testing bim.

There have been no (repeat no) other major developments. I called Chauvel 1 s particular attention to paragraph 3 of position paper on Indochina agreed at Paris and noted that I-'rench were still using term "guaranteeing powei^" in draft armistice, and asked how he"' perceived the situation in this regard. He said that he conceived guarantee to be more than that embodied in French draft of conference declaration (SECTO 597) • I pointed out that position paper imade it clear that US will express its position unilaterally or in | association only with non-Communist states, and was not quite sure y Yio\: French concept of conference declaration fitted therewith. I said I had particularly instructed Bonsai reserve our position on last paragraph of French draft providing for consultation among w conference powers on reports of violations by supervisory commission, Although I had no (repeat no) instructions on subject, I C did not (repeat not) believe US would be willing assume continuing! obligation consult with all conference powers' including Communis t°" China and Viet Kinh* Chauvel said that in light of paragraph 3* of position paper, French draft provided only for conference "noLi

ar-aiis tice agreement.

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"S REPRODUCTION frc: THIS

o this copy must ba returned to DC/RrCerifat,glas,wUh notation of action taken Q C0?V, IF CLASSIFIES 15

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 2011

TOP SECRET -2- SECTO 6265 July 16, 7 p.m., from Geneva

Chauvel said French were concerned over reports continued contacts between Fran Van Do and Dong, They did not know exactly what was happening, they know very little about Do, but they had impression he was unsophisticated and might be "taken into camp" by Dong, They felt after zones between defined and two governments each clearly responsible for own territories, such contacts would probably be desirable and necessary, but in present situation might be dangerous and could even result in surprise more bringing about something in nature of coalition government. Chauvel said De Jean was going to see Bao Dai to determine what Bao Dai knew about the matter and whether he had approved.

In reply to my question on what French conceived to be major outstanding issue, Chauvel listed: (l) military demarcation line in Vietnam, (2) regrouping in Vietnam, particularly in delta area, where Chauvel said Viet Minh would be required to move out two divisions from areas that they now occupied so as permit separation from French-Vietnamese forces. In Laos he said major question retention small number French troops there (consideration was being given to "changing their flag" from French to Laos), and also political questions in Laos. He said there were no major issues on Cambodia.

*

Chauvel also mentioned international control and asked whether I had any new instructions on subject. I said I had not and subject had not been discussed at Paris in any detail.

UK informed me today that meeting was proposed this afternoon between Mendes, Eden and Molotov to go over present stage of work of conference and make catalogue of work to be done. They asked whether I wished to be present, pointing out if US were present Soviets would probably insist on "presence of Chinese, thus turning meeting into "five power affair". I replied that I had no objection to their goind.ahead on three-power basis.

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TOP SECRET

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SENT DEPARTMENT SECTO 6^2; REPEATED INFORMATION PARIS' 79,^rJLc SAIGON 50. • ,,^.io*> to Dfi/9 ^~~~ ' '

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Following account of Mendes-Franee-Eden-Molotov meeting last night is based on report of this meeting to Foreign Office made available to Johnson by Caccia. This telegram expands upon and supersedes preliminary account transmitted in first ■ three paragraphs SECTO 6^0 (repeated information Paris 76, Saigon 48).

At Eden's, suggestion, French enumerated"document^ before conference: ,

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(A) Armistice agreements to be signed by local commanders-in-chief. French have prepared drafts for Vietnam and Laos and Cambodians draft for Cambodia. Viet Minh delegation preparing counter draft for Vietnam.

(B) Control arrangements, French have circulated papers for Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia.

(C) Political arrangements. After having seen military documents, certain delegations might make unilateral statements. For example, Laos and Cambodia are preparing statements on their willingness to limit their'armed forces. Conference

as whole would then agree upon common statement taking note of military agreements and unilateral declarations. French have circulated draft of such statement. Soviets have prepared counter draft and French second redraft.

French explained that if conference did not (repeat not) have time to agree on all details of armistice, it might approve only parts providing for cessation of hostilities and first stage of regroupment. Remaining aspects, of agreements could; be covered by statement of general principles for guidance z"~ < of experts who would work out details after conference had ^

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It was agreed that British, French, and Soviet experts would meet July 17 to consider various drafts,

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' " • • SECRET

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1 -2- SEGSO 652, July 17, Tp.m., f*om Geneva.

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At Eden ! s suggestion, Mendes-Franee summarized main outstanding problems as (A) demarcation line for Vietnam; (B) elections, and (C) control arrangements. QonoernijQg-iiernar-cation 1 in e, he said French had p rc gesed line near l8th oar aXlgl vlg^a^J^le^y. lnh -proposed ibtft parallel^ On elections in Vietnam, he said question was whsther to fix firm date now . (rapest now)( Soviets h ad pro posed J'-jne 1Q 55) or whether, as French proposed, to- settle now (repeat now) only manner in which date would be set* Elections in Laos and _Jlamb-Odla-already provided for in eoos t Itatj jcgis for August and September 1955 y respectively were: Whether there s

Cn/c onrrclj , he said m ain q ^g ^jops hoiild^oe one commission cirxhree,

composition, voting, execution of commissions 1 recommendations, and freedom of movement for inspection teams;

ftIoloto2_ adcie d. to cut standing; issues : (d) time required for regrouping (French have proposed JSC days end Soviets 6 months};"' and (E; prevention of importation of new arms and military personnel subject to certain exceptions for Laos and Cambodia, prohibition of foreign military bases, and prohibition of military alliances by three states,

Fden_sd£gjcLj£ , 5 question of regroupment areas for resistance forces in Laos»

Discussion then turned to substantive issues: •

(A) Election s in Vie tnam. date" I or eYections»

said conference should fix

i-fe conceded more flexible formula might be found than firm date of June 1955 previously proposed by •j Soviets and suggested a greement mere ly that elections be held during 19^5 Wtth precise oate to be fixed by Vietna

tnamese ana

\ Viet Minh authorities.

;

Mendes -Franee argued that it would be imprudent to fix d..ite_ as early as tue end of 1955 * He suggested two ways of providing necessary flexibility in arrangements: Date for elections might be fixed after completion of regrouping; or tact date might be fixed now (repeat now; end international control commission te given authority to advance date if necessary,

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Eden_ supoorted Men des-France cnn eed for fiexlbllley a nd suggested that two parts~ci*^Tietnam ilx. date after-completion of regrouping. Ken&es-France agreed to consider, this suggestion, but Kolotov continued tc urge elections during 1955.

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1

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-3- SECTO 6j52, July 17, 7 p.m., from Geneva.

(B) Demarcation line, Molotov argued that in moving from 13th^Ec"T6t"H parallel, Viet Mtnh had made substantial concession which called for proper response from French* Mendes-France disagreed, arguing that Viet Mlnh would be giving up mu c h les s in Annam thsn_JA£^jw

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He said tEa^ThamTan" Dong had admitted that line

on l6th parallel would require special arrangements for Tourane, Hue, on route No, 9 leading Into Lacs. Mendes-France stated that necessity for such special arrangements showed how unnatu ral- demarcation line at i6th parallel would be; -Ke said that thsre was no (repeat no) chance of pei 1 -su^ding French Government to accept line which excluded either Hue or route No* 9. Eden supported Mendes-France.

Molotov suggested that discussion move to question of control arrangements. Mendes-Franc e- replied might be better to postpone such discussion. He observed that questions of el ections a nd demsrcation line had bee rud.lac.us^ecL-XQgeth^ 1 and migqt bi~Tinked in sense that conceivably one party might yield en one question and another party on ether.

SMITH

MRS/8

NOTE: Read by Mr. Sturm (FE) 5:30 p.m. 7/17/5^ LQ3.

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Nguyen Huu Chau cf Vietnamese delegation handed USDEL copy ol/

note watch was given to French delegation today. He'" said

French requested contents be kept secret for moment > andjthat

French not aware copy given to this delegation. Following is

unofficial translation:

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Just as the French High Command In Indochina evacuated, without fighting and in spite of the strongest protests by President Ngo Dinh DIe~, zones vital for the defense and the existence of a free Vietnam, the delegation of the Vietnamese National Government learned only by the papers and by the messages viilch vere sent to It yesterday, July 16, that the French delegation appears already to have accepted abandoning to the Viet Minh all of that pert situated north of the eighte enth parallel and the delegation of the'Viet Minh might claim an even ciBre

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The National Scwemrsefit of Vietnam has also been left in complete ignorance of the oreoosais on the fate of Vietnam made bv

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me .-rencn government to the American and British Governments s particularly at the meeting in Paris,

The delegation of the State of Vietnam must express its surprise This delegation finds it hard to understand that peace in Viet-

nam is Lag negotiated without previously consulting with its

Qualified representatives.

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The de facto partition which seems to have been adopted from the outlet by the delegations of France and of the Viet Minh-X. at discussions bearing only on the materialization of tpe partition—does not take any account of the unanimous will tional unity of the Vietnamese people.

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SECRET -2- SECTO 633, July 17> 8 p.m. from Geneva

On the other hand the regroupment of non-national armed forces in the zones resulting from the partition implies their consolidation outside of any danger of combat and thus reinforces t the threat that they constitute to the free expression of the will of the people.

Therefore not only does such a cease-fire not lead to a durable peace, since, ignoring the will for national unity 3 it provokes the people to "unify" the country, but, by the consolidation of the armed forces now facing each other, it violates in advance the liberty of the future elections.

The delegation of the State of Vietnam, which more that any other wishes the return of peace, is pleased with the efforts put forth by the other delegations in favor of this object. However, it greatly fears that the cease-fire, such as it seems to be accepted by certain delegations, far from leading to peace, makes peace improbable and precarious.

Aware of these very grave dangers and certain that it is expressing the profound aspirations of all true Vietnamese, including most of the Viet Minh fighters themselves 5 and in full accord with the Chief and the Government of the State of Vietnam, the Vietnamese delegation asks not only a cease-fire but the disarmament of all the belligerent forces in Vietnam.

The Vietnamese delegation asks that the entire territory of Vietnam be placed provisionally under the control of the United Nations pending the complete re-establishment of security, of order and of peace in their minds and in their hearts which will permit the Vietnamese people to decide their destiny by free elections.

His Majesty Bao Dai, Chief of State of Vietnam, thus shows once more that he places the independence and the unity of his country above any other consideration, and the National Government of Vietnam would prefer this provisional control by the United Nations over a truly unified and independent Vietnam to its maintenance in power in a country dismembered and condemned to slavery.

The Vietnamese delegation reserves its right to develop its proposal at a later time.

bsd quote

smith

AB:PAF/3 652

Note: Read by Kir. Sturm (FE) 5:30 p.m. 7/17/5 1 *. 1Q3

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

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Following despatch given us in advance by po pping ; of Associated r Press apparently represents official Chinese Communist position " and was given Topping in order that we would become aware of it. It begins:

QUOTE •

The Communist bloc has demanded that the United States guarantee CS

the partition peace plan for Indochina and join in an agreement 0';

to neutralize the whole country, a responsible Chinese Communist •

informant said today. . -*

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The informant, who reflects the views of Red China Premier Chou ff)

En-lai, said the Communists are hopeful of a cease-fire agree hi

ment by next Tuesday 1 s deadline if the Western powers agree to ^

'bar ail foreign military bases from Indochina and keep the ^

three member states out of any military bloc* 1 , i I

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The informant said the Communists are pressing for the stamp of . J3 American approval on the armistice agreement—already okayed in Ol principle by Britain and France---which would divide Vietnam be- -^ tween Communist leader Ho Chi Minh f s Viet Minh and Bao Da f s pro-Western regime. >

*\Ie believe that the US as a member of the conference she-Id and • is obligated to subscribe to and_guaranie^_anjL_seitlenient Morally there is no reasbrr-for-tfrerrUS to avoid this obliaationT' *~

.

| Bat the informant did not (repeat not) rule out the chance of an Indochina cease-fire even if the US refuses to okay the armistice 1 I agreement. • r „ q

The Eisenhower administration has told France and" Britain that*" they can go ahead with their plan for an Indochina settlement "*"•: ^. ■. based en partition of Vietnam. 'But Washington has made it clear-~ ' that it is not (repeat not) ready to associate itself forraally""" •-. J ^272 w ith the plan which would sanction putting millions of Vietnamese ' i ^-- under Red rule. • • • ;•■ -

mm ^%t4^t 0 9 c l 4f S.^-* <*fc *-. 653 The Communist REPfKHWCTJoa rsqi t ^ s

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The Communist Informant said the 'crucial Issue 1 now in the Geneva peace negotiations revolves around whether the Western powers will agree effectively to neutralize Indochina.

Refusal to join in such a guarantee, 1 the*informant said, ( 'could seriously deter a final settlement. On other important points in the negotiations we are in agreement or close to It, We are hopeful and we believe that there is time to reach a settlement by July 20.'

J/\ French Premier Pierre Mendes-France has promised to resign with \ his Cabinet if he fails to end the bloody eight-year-old war by next Tuesday. Fall of the French Government probably would doom the Geneva negotiations. The informant declared that American efforts to organize a Southeast Asia Treaty organization (SEATO) is 'a threat to any possible Indochina agreement. 1

'Success or failure of the Geneva Conference may depend on^the attitude of the American delegation In this regard, 1 he adcied.

V

END QUOTE

The above seems to me extremely significant, particularly in view of the fact that in my discussion with Eden last night he expressed pessimism, which he said was now shared for the first time by Krishna Menon. latter had begun to. feel, as I do, that Molotov wishes to force Mendes-France's resignation.

Eden remarked th at Mol ntniL-harLnnw hpnnms t.hft wnat. rtlffMppI f;

a nd intra nsigent m ember of Comm unist dele_g£Ltion. You will note obvious intention to place on shoulders of US responsibility for failure of Geneva Conference and fall of French "Government if this occurs.

•

Molotov is -insisting on a meeting this afternoon which French and British are trying to make highly restricted as they are apprehensive of what may occur. If such a meeting is held and if-demands are made for US association in any agreement, I win simply say that in the event a reasonable settlement is arrived at which US could "respect", US will probably issue a unilateral statement of its own position. If question of particiDation Laos, CamDodia and Vietnam in security oact is raised,*I will reply that this depends on outcome of conference.

Eden has already told Molotov that securitv pact is inevitable that he himself favored It some time ago and that he wouTa~noT' (repeat not) withdraw from that position, bu£_he made the mi*-

take of paying that_ no. consideration had" been £iveFToTn"clusT^n of-Laos and Cambodia. """ -~ "™^* - ' •W-J£%#i22£m

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-3- SECTO 6^9, July 18, 1 p.m., .from Geneva /

This final gambit is going to "be extremely .difficult to , play and I do not (repeat not) now see the moves clearly. However, my opinion as expressed to you "before leaving, i.e., that Mol otov will g ain more bgiJ brlnging down Men ded Govo:onraent^ft5rTT)y a settlement, has grown stronger.

SMITH

DU:MEJ/^

Note: Mr- Halla (SS) notified 10:^0 a.m., 7/18/5^, CWO/FED

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Your SECTO 639 received.

It may be useful for you ^ to bear In mind that Executive has no Constitutional

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its general undertakings expressed in US. Charter.

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:,"endes~Prance Paris and I must count on him to strive to protect both our countries against consequences o.f this Communist maneuver which Eden might unwittingly

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Twenty-third Indochina restricted session Sunday > July Xo^ Molotov presiding. This session-called at urgent request

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Soviets: French ana British had requested that paruxexpands "be confined to chiefs of del plus one adviser- Thi3 latter-relaxed to permit two advisers. * '

Molotov spoke first, noting that last meeting.ox F:or-eig2 Ministers held on Jane 19,. just one month ago,- He believed that today's session presented good opportunity to gue^s ■ importance of period which had passed since last meeting and work performed by deputies. He believed that results achieved through private meetings and discussions MS been

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not (repeat notj inconsiderable. Gf course^ not (repeal QGujl ail of the questions had been resolved nor everytbing done which bad to be done, but one should recognize the value of what had cean achieved. '"' :.-. V

Molotov said first of all he wished to note that as far as ;' ,. the most ccnplicated problem was concerned^, that of peaoe iiSi'V 1 Indochina^ a basis for reestablisl^rient of peace had been k ae~ 7 hieved as a result private negotiations which baa opened" 1 possi bility of agreernent on that c^es'tion. Ee believed ail ps3?ti- ' clpants would attach appropriate significance to this accoui« plishzneat. He felt it was also important to recognise the work done with reference to estahlislimsnt of peace iti Lacs and Cambodia. m : this connections it is perhaps true that __ everything had not (repeat not) been done that could be. done'^ but it appeared conference was on way to agreement concerning^ Laos and Cambodia. • .

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Tv^"t»lbt T i*r oifcu&tion as it appeared to him, Molotov noted thai drafts for agreements on cessation of hostilities in Vietnam and La^s bad beerj presented to conference. Two drafts would

soday* The same Fas also true "for Cassbodia* He

honed parties concerned would display goodwill necessary to a*p&3 on unresolved points in these drafts.

Molotov noted also were two drafts of Geneva conference felon dealing with Important political matters.

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Tvo drafts have also been presented concerning the question of International control pertaining to implementation of the agree Bents* Question of control commission has long been discussed and Molotov felt .that final agreement on this subject would not (repeat not) require great deal o'f titrse.

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Molotov concluded by saying that he had made these observations in order to give general picture of the conference at present and that his remarks were naturally not (repeat not) complete. He believed that today : s meeting could make progress re the Questions under discussion and would contribute to solution of problems facing conference. . |

After long pause Tran Van Do (Vietnam) spoke next, saying he . had learned this morning that; today r a meeting was to. review .\ final declaration of Geneva conference. In order to avoid any misunderstanding^ he wished to state firmly that Vietnam eel could not (repeat, not) associate Itself with any .discussion of this declaration. Vietnam position based on following noints

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1. Vietnam does hot agree to conditions advanced for cessation

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2. Vietnam delegation has not' (repeat not) as yet advanced proposals on behalf of Vietnam Government for solution of problem based on principles of peace*; independence and unity.

With regard point number one, Do referred to French draft,of July 16 of conference declaration (SEG20 628 repeated Paris 7^ • Saigon KS)• This'draft spoke of division of Vietnanf Into zones For example, article 6 said settlement must permit Vietnamese people en^cy fundesie&vaX liberties guaranteed' by democrat!*

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supervised by international commission. ^ectian3\¥Cu ( M t-ake place* when it) opinion of competent representative authorities In each zone restoration of peace.in country has made sufficient progress et cetera. Article 7 speaks of a settlement which would give Vietnamese people right decide freely as. to zone where residence desired -

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Vietnamese representative next referred to Soviet draft of July 15 (SECTO 6l5, Repeated Paris 6p,'Saigon 35)* Article 8 of Soviet draft speaks of "consultation between competent representative authorities of northern and southern zones of Vietnam 11 . _Article 10 states that representative authorities in northern and southern zones of Vietnam, as well as authorities of Laos and Cambodia, will not permit persecution of persons who have collaborated with othe^ side.

-

In view Vietnamese delegation, this indicates that Vietnam will be divided into north and south zones. Everyone is talking of the cff.. vision of Vietnam and mention Is even made of parallels at which"" division will be accomplished- Delegation of Vietnam:,can s>nlf protest the idea of partition/ Bas"ed on point number one cited eeri**U

in statement of Vietnamese representative, Vietnamese delegation flatly rejects both drafts submitted to conference. *~ _

express owe vievs. It reserves its" right to submit a draft d§ci*

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NNl) Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

CONFIDENTIAL -2- SECTO 65k, July l8, 11 p.m. (SECTION TWO OF TWO), from Geneva.

Do noted further that there was no mention of State of Vietnam in either French or Soviet drafts. Vietnamese delegation cannot accept declaration or agreement where Vietnam, which invited to conference as existing state, not even mentioned.

*

After pause following Molotov f s request for other speakers, General made following statement:

"If no one else desires to speak, I think it would be helpful if I made clear position of US in these last critical days of conference. I do this because I have recently seen the advance drafts submitted to the conference and have had a chance to review them.

"One position of the United States with respect to this conference has consistently been that it is willing to assist, where desired, in arriving at a just and honorable settlement which will contribute to the establishment and maintenance of peace in the area. The United States is not a belligerent in this conflict and it has not and will not seek to impose its views in any way upon the belligerents, who are the parties primarily interested.

"If the agreements arrived at here are of a character which my government is able to respect, the United States is prepared to declare unilaterally that, in accordance with its obligations under the United Nations Charter, and particularly Article Il(^), it will refrain from the threat or the use of force to disturb them, and would view any renewal of the aggression in violation of the agreements with grave concern.

Since no other representatives requested floor following General Smith's statement, Molotov suggested intermission. After intermission had lasted for U-5 minutes, it was informally agreed that meeting should be adjourned without returning to conference room. No communique issued.

Comment : Today's restricted session strangest performance to date. Apparent Molotov had not set stage even with Communist colleagues for any particularly important announcement despite his insistence that meeting be called. Molotov had said to Mendes-France just before meeting that he thought would be well underline progress made and to show how close conference was to reaching agreement.

During recess, Chou En-lai said he had no desire make any statement. He seemed as much in dark as everyone else as to why Soviets had called meeting.

SMITH

SMD:JG/ll

661

Note: Passed Army, Navy, Air, OSD 7/l8/5^> 11 p.m. <IEF

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At recess after today's meeting/ Tran Vhn ir? }r ind'"Tr^>j Van Ohuong

immediately approached Johnson stating- they wished, F3 rclearly qj

understand reasons they felt court; "Tod fna!ie---'Uiei>'statement at ^q

today's meeting (SECTO 6^4) and why they were asking for a x plenary qj

session. They said they desired at such a plenary s-ea^ipn put for-,

ward position contained their note to French (<$ JJCT0 § 5#) and asked,^

.Johnson's opinion on position. C':) nson replied that, did not feel * ,

Lb was practicable proposal, to which they responded they fully q

realized that it w as not pr^hTr^vir.- nnr] wou]d be ^rejected by : r«

other s Lde^ JJyl[_they Prill; t hey mu st make mora J. p os Axon tneir ^jyei' niii(;inr'clear to world and to Vietna mese peopl e n ccrter sloe ^J rejected lx>, position of [.riexr"j7UTurhTnelTt would have been improved. j Upon ro;icctlo n_by other side th ey w ould be prepared accept sett : - ,. iMcnt a Jong lines now beinr: discussed". = — — - r«

KK'.on pointed out that time was short and it v/as late for each proposal to which they replied that Meudes could of course ask for and obtain additional time from French Assembly. " hnson expressed strong doubt and urged they speak directly with French. After- repeated strong urglngs tboy ^finally a p proached Mendes, who listen ed sympathetically and at length . He suggested and they promised to consider formulation their proposal in writing and circulation to other delegations. He ont^nrip.nlly wl-.Ml-.ori hnVmiM not even If he so jjcslrod astc Assembly for any extension time he has givon's oTj'."

Johnson told Meudes he wan concerned over reaction to Vietnamese sta tome tit and reminded Mendes of IK'-, position o>i' VI ot,f.-irru><--.,-; cen-i? a.irret,ice with any agreement. [ vjun des stated be was very ^orsciou o ol • anu was asking Do Jc.ui immediately ro to uannes • t o see Ban

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Topping has supplied in'confidence following bac* .round infer-; mation concerning his story on views of Chinese ,onmunist delegation.

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He stated his informant was Huang Kua, whom he has known for many years. Interview was at Huang's initiative, was called on short notice, and was conducted In extremely serious manner without propaganda harangues.

Topping said he had reported Huang's statement fully in his story but had obtained number of visual impressions" during interview. Vhen Huang spoke of possibility American bases in Indochina or anti-Communist pact in Southeast Asia, he became very agitated, his hands shook, and his usually excellent English broke down, forcing him to work through interpreter. Huang also spoke seriously and with apparent sincerity concerning his belief that I have returned to Geneva to prevent settlement* / Topping believes Chinese Communists convinced Americans made deal with French during Paris talks on basis of which Mendes-France has raised price of settlement.

SMITH

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HO: SECTO 666, July 19, 7 p.m.

NIACT

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FOR THE SECRETARY PROM THE UNDERSECRETARY. ' \

The outlines of l<rfbern ational contr oIJ)now clearly emerge, N Composition -will proUafaly be Poland, India, and Canada or Belgium The French prefer Belgium and so do I, Both Poland and Canada or Belgium will have veto on important questions. Commission will have full freedom of movement in demilitarized zones which * will separate forces at each stage of regrouping and in all frontier- and seacoast areas.

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—fi Taking everything into consideration,.! strongly feel this i I satisfactory and much better than we were able to obtain in ||Korea, French feel, and Eden and I agree, that with such composition built-in veto will work to v -our advantage. This setup is best French or anybody else could get, and I feel it is within spirit of point 7.

SMITH

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July 19, 8 p

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NIACT

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FOR THE SECRE2AHZ FROM THE UNDER SECRETARY

. I had long talk with Mendea-France this afternoon, as I told you. He urgently asked that we expand our proposed unilateral declaration so as take note not (repeat not) only of agreements between military commands, but also take note of para-graphs one to nine proposed conference declaration. (See 6rSECT0s 628 aod 647), 1 made It clear that we could under_no k j "girouffl3tances_a3 3 0ci ate_ ourselves, with conference decl aration evenjthough it is anfficijiate^T^

do^ut^ t e~~or other-

wise imply any acquiescence in or approval of paragraph 10 which provides for consultation among conference members on questions transmitted to them by international control commissions, ' "

Text of declaration not yet agreed between French and Communis ',s, but I am transmitting immediately by following telegram French estimate probable final text. I am also transmitting texts of unilateral statements to which Laos and Cambodia have agreed which are referred to in paragraph h draft declaration and draft French trilateral declaration referred to in paragraph 8.

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EJ^gnc^jgosi^J^ is this conference declaration is integral part of agreements reached at conference and they will be sorely disappointed if we simply disassociate ourselves from declaration without even taking note in same manner as with respect to cease-fire agreements» I recommend that I be authorized to amend our proposed declaration (Annex B my instructions) by inserting a brief addition taking note of ^arajgraphs one to nine cf conference declaration if its final conten1rnctoe3--tie4r

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too greatly differ from that which French have indicated they] : .

prepared to accept a I would like some latitude on this, and am sure I knotf what would be acceptable to you, I will, of course, have to state in conference bhot the US is unable to join in a arultilatersl declaration (since.the one planned would include the Ccrj^iunists) but it is making a declaration of its/ own position j et cetera n This may/cease to a head tomorrow -ill] p afternoon or evenings and while it -would be possible to make 7

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our declaration later It is infinitely preferable to do It at th'e time of settlement. Otherwise we will have to disassociate ourselves with a lengthy and detailed conference declaration without anything of our own to offer except the very brief declaration we already have prepared.

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Your SECTOS 666^667, 668, 669/

As requ est ed 669 yo umay expand proposed unilateral Eetesx

. declaration so as to take note of paragraphs 1 to 8 of the proposed

Conference declaration with understanding that US obligations w$M

QTE with regard to aforesaid agreements and paragraphs of

• Declaration UNQTE are limited to those expressed Subparagraphs 1 and-$

of Annex B of your instructions. * Ol

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• The ek foregoing is on the assumption that the Declaration in its

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final form does not materially differ from SECTO 667. As to non-materiality of differences, -would like you to obtain Phleger's legal

judgment.

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Amconsul GENEVA 1H5DUL

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I governments became parties.

1 While we don't want to take responsibility of imposing our views on the French,

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I feel particularly concerned about provisions of paragraph 6 which gives the Control

Commission constituted as per SECTO 666 authority also to control the general

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elections. The ink is hardly dry on the Declaration of President Eisenhower and

Prime Minister Churchill ofuune 29 to the effect that "In the case of nations now

I divided against their will, we shall continue to seek to achieve unity through free

■ elections supervised by the UN to insure that they are conducted fairly. M It is

( ■ [ rather humiliating to see that Declaration now so quickly go ^&wxk down the drain

j with our apparent acquiescence,

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. * With reference to 668 believe something like this is acceptable if obtainable.

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I Believe that this would not necessitate these states dealing only with or through

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France as suggested your 650 and 652. V/e hope that this possibility of direct *

assistance for genuinely defensive and internal security purposes and not involving 1 • ' . very

any US bases can be preserved as it may x\orx well be that as a result of surrender

in Tonkin Delta French will become so highly unpopular that their effort to maintain

*

authority in other areas would in fact lead to these other areas surely fallina under

Communist domination.

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Vietnamese DEL handed us late this afternoon their new proposal.^ It is elabor ation of Idea in note to French (SECT O 633 Land con-^ ference^was advised of its preparation in yesterday ! s restricted"^ session. Unofficial translation follows: * ' X

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QUOTE

French, Soviet, and Viet Minh drafts all admit the principles ofj a partition of Vietnam in two zones, all of North Vietnam being ^ abandoned to the Viet Minh. ^

Although this partition is only provisional in theory, it would V not (repeat not) fail to produce In Vietnam the same effects as ** in Germany, Austria, and Korea * _ ■

It would not (repeat not) bring the peace which is sought for, deeply wounding the national sentiment of the Vietnamese people, it would provoke trouble throughout the country, trouble which would not (repeat not) fail to threaten a peace so dearly acquired. s ...

Before discussing the conditions of a de facto partition with disastrous consequences for the people of Vietnam and,for the peace of the world, th e DEL of the state of Vietnam renews i t3 proposal for a_ ge s.se-fire without a demarcation line , w I thou t partition, even pro visionally , "

The Vietnamese DEL therefore proposes;

1. A cease-fire on present positions

2. Regroupment of troops in two zones which would be as possible.

3. Disarmament of Irregular troops

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5. Control by the United Nations:

A. Of the cease-fire

B. Of the regroupment

C. Of the disarmament and the withdrawal ;

D. Of the administration of the entire country

E. Of the general elections, when the United Nations be.lieves that order and security will have been everywhere truly-restored.

This proposal made on the formal Instructions of His Majesty Bao Dai, and of the President Ngo Dinh Diem, shows that the chief of state of Vietnam once more places the independence and the unity of his country above any other consideration, and that the national government of Vietnam would prefer this provisional UN control over a truly Independent and United Vietnam to Its main-*" tenance in power in a country dismembered and condemned to slavery.* *

\

■ Vietnamese DSL renews its request that a conference session be devoted to the study of its proposal for a cease-fire without partition-.

In adding this proposal to those of other members of the conference, the DEL of the state of Vietnam means to bring a positive contribution to the'*search for a real and durable peace which conforms to the aspirations of the Vietnamese people.

Geneva, July 19, 1954. . {

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END QUOTE ' .

Comments follow.

SMITH

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(7M& wnilaicraZ declaration hy the United States Government sets forth its position with regard to the Geneva Accords % which it did not sign.)

STATEMENT BY THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE' 1 AT THE CONCLUDING PLENARY SESSION OF THE GENEVA CONFERENCE, JULY 21, 1951 2

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As I stated on July 18, my Government is not prepared to join in a declaration by the Conference such as is submitted. However, the United States makes this unilateral declaration of its position in these matters:

Declaration

The Government of the United States being resolved to devote its ■ efforts to the strengthening of peace in accordance with the principles and purposes of the United Nations takes note of the agreements concluded a& Geneva on July 20 and 21, 1954 between (a) the Franco-Laotian Command and tho Command of the Peoples Army of Viet-Nam; (b) the Royal Khmer Array Command and tho Command of .the Peoples Army of Viet-Nam; (c) Franco-Vietnamese Command and the Command of the Peoples Army of Viet-Nam and of paragraphs 1 to 12 inclusive of tho declaration presented to the Geneva Conference on July 21, 1954 declares with regard to the aforesaid agreements and paragraphs that (i) it will refrain from the threat or tho use of force to disturb them, in accordance with Article 2(4) of the Charter of the United Nations dealing with the obligation of members to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force; and (ii) it would viow any renewal of the aggression in violation of the aforesaid agreements with grave concern end as seriously threatening international peace and security.

In connection with tho statement in the declaration concerning free elections i:i Viet-Nam my Government wishes to make clear its position .which it has expressed in a declaration made in Washington on June 29, IS*54, as follows:

In tlie ease of nations now divided against their will, we shall continue to eee?c to achieve nelty through free elections supervised by tho United Nations to insure that they are conducted fairly.

With respect to the statement made by the representative of tho State of Yiet-Nam, the United States reiterates its traditional position that peoples are entitled to determine their own future and that it will not join in an arrangement which would hinder this. Nothing in its declaration just made is intended to or does indicate any departure from this traditional position.

. We share the hope that the agreements will permit Cambodia, Laos and Viet-Nam to play their part, in full independence and sovereignty. ■ in the peaceful community of nations, and will enable the peoples ox that area to determine their own future. .- . ♦

* Walter BftfcU Smith.

1 Department of SUto Bulletin, Aujj. 1 t 1954, pp. 162-1G3.

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IC/43/Rev, 2 21 July 1954 Original: FRENCH m

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GENEVA

CONFERENCE

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INDO-CHINA

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FINAL DECLARATION, dated the 21st July, 1954,■of" the'Geneva Conference on the problem of restoring peace in Indo-China, in which , the representatives of Cambodia, the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, France, Laos, the People's Republic of China, the State of Viet-Nam,-the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America took part, " . "«

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■IC/43/Rev. 2 • .

page 2

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1. The Conference takes note of the agreements ending hostilities in Cambodia, Laos and Viet-Nam and organizing international control and the supervision of the execution of the provisions of these agreements.

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2. The Conference expresses satisfaction at the ending of hostilities in Cambodia, Laos and Viet-Nam; the Conference expresses its conviction that the* execution of the provisions set out in the present declaration and in the agreements on the cessation of hostilities will permit Cambodia, Laos, and Viet-Nam henceforth to play their part, in full independence and sovereignty, in the peaceful community pf nations* '

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3. The Conference takes note of the declarations'made'by the Governments .of Cambodia and of Laos of their intention to adopt measures permitting all 'citizens to take their place in the national community, in particular by participating in the next general elections, which, in conformity with the consti-'

'tution'of each of these countries, shall take place in the course of the year 1955, by secret ballot and in conditions of respect for fundamental freedoms.

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/♦: ■■*' 4."■■"vThe Conference takes note of the clauses in the agreement on the "cessation.of hostilities in Viet-Nam prohibiting the introduction into Viet-Nam of.foreign troops and military personnel as well as of all kinds of arms and munitions.' The Conference also takes note of the declarations made by the Governments of Cambodia and Laos of their resolution not to request foreign aid, whether in war material, in personnel or in instructors except for the purpose of the effective defence of their territory and, in the case of Laos, to the extent defined by the agreements on the cessation of hostilities in Laos. i-

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5. The Conference takes note of the clauses in the agreement on the cessation of hostilities in Viet-Nam to the effect that no military base under the control of a foreign State may be established in the regrouping zones of the two parties, the latter having the obligation to see that the zones allotted to them shall not constitute part of any military alliance and shall not be utilized for the resumption of hostilities or in the service of an aggressive policy. The Conference also takes note of the declarations of the Governments of Cambodia and Laos to

the effect that they will not join in any agreement with other States if this agreement includes the obligation to participate in a military alliance not in conformity with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations or, in the case of Laos, with the principles of the agreement on the cessation of hostilities' in Laos or, so long as their security is not threatened, the obligation to • '• •' establish bases on Cambodian or Laotian territory for the military forces of -foreign Powers. * -■*...'.

6. The Conference recognizes that the essential purpose of the agreement relating to Viet-Nam is to settle military questions with a view,to ending hostilities and that the military demarcation line is provisional and should not in any way be interpreted as constituting a political or territorial boundary.

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IC/43/Rev. 2 page 3

The Conference expresses Its conviction that the execution of the provisions set out in the present declaration and in the agreement on the cessation of hostilities creates the necessary basis for the achievement in the near future of a political settlement in Viet-Nam. ■•' . . *.

7. The Conference declares that, so far as Viet-Nam is concerned, the settlement of political problems, effected on the basis of respect for the principles of independence, unity and territorial integrity, shall permit the Viet-Namese people to enjoy the fundamental freedoms, "guaranteed by democratic institutions established as a result of free general elections by secret ballot. In order to ensure that sufficient progress in the restoration of peace has been made, and that all the necessary conditions obtain for free expression of the national will, general elections shall be held in July 1956, under the supervision of an-International commission composed of representatives of the Member States of the International Supervisory Commission, referred to In the agreement on the cessation of hostilities. Consultations will be held on this subject between the competent representative authorities of the two zones from 20 July 1955 onwards. ->

> The provisions of the agreements on the cessation of hostilities intended to, ensure the protection of individuals and of property must be most strictly applied and must, in particular, allow everyone in Viet-Nam to decide freely in .which zone he wishes to live. .• :

9. - The competent representative authorities of the Northern and Southern zones of Viet-Nam, as well as the authorities of Laos and Cambodia, must not permit any individual or collective reprisals against persons who have collaborated in any way with one of the parties during, the war, or against members of

such persons' families.

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10. The Conference takes note of the declaration of the Government of the

French Republic to the effect that it is ready to withdraw its troops from the territory of Cambodia, Laos, and Viet-Nam, at the requests of the Governments concerned and within periods which shall be fixed by agreement between the parties except iu the cases where, by agreement between the two parties, a certain number of French troops shall remain at specified points and for a specified time. .

11. The Conference takes note of the declaration of the French Government to the effect that for the settlement of all the problems connected with the re-establishment and consolidation of peace in Cambodia, Laos and Viet-Nam, the French Government will proceed from the principle of respect for the independence * and sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity of Cambodia, Laos and Viet-Nam.

12; In their relations with Cambodia, Laos and Viet-Nam, each member of the • Geneva Conference undertakes to respect the sovereignty, the Independence, the-unity and the territorial infcegrtfcy of the above-mentioned states, and to refrain from any interference In their internal affairs.

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•■IC/43/Rev.2 page 4 ;

' 13. The members of the Conference agree to consult one another on any question which may be referred to them by the International Supervisory Commission, in order to study such measures as may prove necessary *to ensure that the agreements on the cessation of hostilities in Cambodia, Laos and Viet-Nam are respected.

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