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7. Matt! reporl bo R sident Truman of French iesir^ e to -participate in Far East war e JCS view that little military value would accrue 1 the F ch

forces. aorandum by ; thews for Triv i 9 16 May 19^5 • -7

8. Grew rev:' r Hurley the present position of U.S. policy on "trustee lure" and th necessity of "voluntary" action by colonial powers and that 1 t of Pre rtici ion in 1 war in the Facii %s

to be del tine y Sc ~Ar •-. Grew &73 to Hurley (china)

7 June 19^5 • - *» 30

9* 'I U.S. military ly to the French offer of partici-pa1 [l two F eh di Ln th acific war outlines: t] provi bo acceptance in principle. Er tially, the U.S. desires complete command and control of the ch l \ ? ecpj and ma5 .".ivisions with e t fron France based on the units having attained U.S. cor st Memorandum by U.S. Ch.; of Staff to Comb 6 Chiefs of Staff at Potsdam, 16 July 19^5 • • 33

10. 3?he U.S. Chiefs of Staff views that logistics coi lera-ti< prevented I ch and Dutch parti c\ tion in the Pacific war are pres to the C s of Staff for consideration. Memorandum by th U.S. Chiefs

of Staff at R ,,. 36

11. The British Chiefs of Staff suggest tl French divisions be "employed in due course in Fr o-Cbina." Men: 1 nduia by British Chiefs of Staff at

Potsdam, 18 July 191*5 ,,, . , , 37

12. The U.S. Chi of Sts tonsider the British view and compromise earlier U.S. positions to allow for possible use of Freud divJ r British command in areas to "be dett lined later. JT Memorandum

U.S. Chiefs of Staff at I , 19 July 19^5 37

13. Report to the President and Prime Minis :reed s y of conclusions on the str : c concept and

pol I ".es for proses n of th war 3 read the Combined CI f at the terminal confer

cf the ] bdam Lng* B ' ; > the Chiefs 1 j tegy focu Japan with t3 U.S, cont? tJons. The door was left open for French and Dutch participation based on "military cc " and

"shipping" requir nts. JCS files, C /3>

39

TOI' ■ r - Sensil I

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lk. President Erurnan Hurley (China) 1 it was agreed at to divide IndocV' tude 16° a bh for operatic 1 purposes: the s< b going to Soul t Asia Command (SEAC) and the north g g to the China i ter-Hurley is urged to Kai-sl r . zurre

Truman tele tin to Hurley om Berlin, 3 August 19^5* ..*.....« hk

15. William J, Dor- n, Dired of the 01 of Star gic Services (08S), reports on the 1 attitude toward the Indochj 3, Provisional Government to the Secrt y of Sta< . A French commitl e was to negotiate with Annamite leaders on f /orable to Indochina; the Ft h were to act as Lsore to the Indochina Rro-visional G nt with the po* treaties for France. Annaiaite leaders > however, expressed the desire to have sti \ as an A ;an tectorate ? excluding both French and Chinese occupation. Threats of violence over a French reoccupal " ,de. Memorandum by I for Secretary of State, 22 / 19^5* • ■ ^5

l6- Dean Ac! >n, Acting Se< bary of Plate, reasserts U.S. policy :ard 3 control of Indochina to the ChargS in C3 rtson). 'i U*B\ neither opj nor as sis I re-establish of I s eh control in Indo-chlna 3 ]• : ton m told, lue U.S. "willingness" to see French control is based on the e outcome of French claims of popular su rt. son 1622 to Re rtson, 5 October 19^5 • .., ^9

17. Caffery (Paris) inf Secretary of f the Franco-British agreement on Indcchin ch recognizes the French Civil Administration as e authority in Indochina south of the l6th p llel. Caf

6006 to Secretary of State, 12 Octt - 19*15 k$)

18. Caffery repo: bfaat de Gaulle reje jouncing a far-rear " poli designed to give Indochinese thority, repre tation, and res Llity in goverr it under the pretext of the state of ich pre". ' ] De Gaulle felt that "no such policy cc be implemented pend" 1 of Fre Lty." Caf 6857 to Secret State, 28 I ber 5 50

19^6

at ion fr heson on tra* of j : ' fr i 1 to t Fi in 1 sident an ■ - U.S. s ild . e tr- A Mat , 18 r 5 . . . 52

■

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3?a

20. Secretary of te Byri Lnfooc ■ ' ' >n conditions in Indochina and c ei a l l y on the status of French-X' Minh negotl Lons. Byrnes

53 to i , 28 January 1946. 53

21. Gen Gallagher, OSB^ r als 1 . in his view of Indochinaj "one or moc ch ' dona could defeat the Annr ;e n and i af de Gaulle's October pronouncement of colonial policy> the Annamese (Ho Chi Minh) refu. to negotiate with

tfc rench and became 1 Lie. fl Ho himself will

not deal with th d l.. .and will be 1 y

continuing Annamese movement*" The Viet i

administration is young and inexperienced but

"the demand for indepe: ce is widespread and

c in the villages the pe* its refer to the

exBQftple of the Philip ' es,. ,h«- r, the Viet Minh

shov i ot be labeled full-fledge 1 doctrinaire ccni-

Mz b," Mem ndum of Converse ' by R.L. Sharpy

SEA airs> 30 January 191*6 ., 53

22 • la n reports that dV lieu-Ho Chi Minh negotiations have 1 proceed d may be compl I in two or three week8, and that only temporary and local Rranco-Chinese agrei its hav tzed. Landojj (Ss n) O927 t- /rues, 5 February j 58

23. Caf b ids Byr] tl X V present French

government "will try t< m a co cory and mod-: j b policy in Indochina and will be mo; progressive in its outlook than de Gaulle." Caffery 595 1 yrneBy 6 ) ixy l$k6

£U. ] ion states that: "it se cert that Annamese plan perate resistance to F; . Ho Chi M staged that he considering petitioning all U: d Nations to mediate Annam I leper ce and pre t extensive bloodshed," Lai; . l (Han b B; ? 16 J 19^6 , 59

1 25. L& refers to two letters to R 'dent T from

Ho C!hi : h r- *st the USA as UH mi r to

sup: se indep according to .mple

of the Ehili i I* rises

1 Ho Ch 1 ■'■ the I : -eel I s whic

incJ a re " of French conq ts, H r s governmental aecosa lis] and f intervenl

by bl Fc . tandon (l: i) i -.-?y of £ ,

1 a 27 Fc jtary 6l

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

*

CREC - sit

Pa

26. She Chinese Foreign Affairs Minis , Dr. Wang, indi< s that Chinese troops would be wit] awn from Indochina by 15 April and tl he had urged a "blc ' Franco-Viet Minh agree 1th them* Wang su sts joint Chin- -American mediation of French-] ^Chinese problem and fers to the late Pi nt ~>sevelt's interest in depei t peoples. Smyth (Chu ing) 39'*

to Byrnes ? 28 February 19k6 62

27. Keed reports signing of the 6 March a,gr t whereby "Vietnam Ix s a ft state within

Inclochi federation and will have own army, direct own inte? ! affai and finance... Aiinamit.es are frankly pleased...French milj -y occupation proeee g smoothly." Reed (Saigon) 20 to Secretary of State, 7 March 19^6. . ..... 63

28. Saigon informs State that Chinese are ting obstacles in 1 French path and Viet Minh incidents around Saigon are tnereasi) . Eeed 33

State, ih M 19''6 63

29- Viet Minh extremists assassinate a member of the Cochin China Council 7 French seize 01 Treasury 3 and Tc incident? jeopardize peaceful outcome of events. Reed 70 to SI 1 April 19^5 6*t

30. The U.S. informs France thai e Combined ChJ Staff do not object tc lef of Chinese troops by French forces in Indochina, and that on 1 repat: of Ja] tse ? the French milit id c di-nate with G (since the Chinese and

tish were totally relieved of oc

patriation dut in Indochina). Byrnes' e to Bonnet, 12 April 19*16 .. 6k

31. 0 r S a (Hanoi) indicates that most important immediate q; tion in the r "ens or

at 1 at appear be st* § of C m ChJ

0 s Sullivan 2 to Byr P 18 1 1J 65

32. 13 • S. ir i • s that Ho Chi Minh has

3 U, . ; U.K. and c recogni is as a f Lthin French Uh to c«. Officers, 18 April 1$ i

yi TOP - Sens

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33. Ho Chi I : calls for C/ -China to Join Vietnam, Fj to cease entering Cc In-China, and for Fi h to live up to a£, . Frc e pess:i Le over Dalat conferences, ,: ..,c\. 11 picture is not a happy one . . . Ir Reed 122 to Byi , 2? il 19'i6. ... 66

3k* U.S. reviews the situation at Dale.t conference from the

t of French and Vietnam*:- as pes: ' tic (in light of r conflic outb. of fighting <, and conflicting views on C< Ln-China status) and feels that T v - v. ill possibly attempt a coup when Chinese \ hdraw. Acheson to Consular C Leers 9 1 May 19*16 - 67

35. Acheson reports tha Frer are confj nt of success in negot i >ns wit] m 5 but they

feel the Vietnam delegation is controlled by I tter-

organized commun" ; . even tl only half the

delegation is communist, Acheson to Consular

Officers, 13 May 19*16 6?

36. Ho Chi Mihh is reported as belie tisfactory agreement can be r ad with the French. Acheson

to Consular Officers, 1^ May 19^6 63

37. U.S. expresses concern over continued 1

Chinese tro« in Tonkin and that possible should be done to speed evacuation. Ach^ to Gen G rge C. Marshall (Nanking) a 15 Hay l$k6 68

38. French propose federal org Lzation for Viet (under High C ssioner o ex* Lses French Uni f 1 ) ft legislative assembly of ten mesbers each from Tt in 9 Aiinam. Cbehin-Chi Laos 5 Can and ten French w

Byrnes to Nar ,, 20 19^6 69

39. U.S. raises Consulate Saij to Cor G > effective 20 K J : 6. Byi^nes 2^27 to Cafftery.

20 May .191*6 - .. 69

), U.Si rotes three important j _| i -deal par m

Vietnam: V iink (whose t a re r rs

are J t Indocl lis". )>

Dor L (] 1 i V

( )j which £ to si, rt of i

Cathc 1 apj rt no t e p: y a I

1 : .'■ bsen

." O'Sulli 0 to Byr for G 1

,20 69

T0J= ! - ; - : /ve

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hi. Ho Chi Minh has consi y given 3 ton the

,f he would pay great attention to ;gestions' 1

made by the U.S. 0 f £ llivan ( ; 3

5 June 19^6 . . \. . ,..,, 71

42. U.S. Consul to r ' ■ 3 Vie1 - ed strength in Cochin-China as "diminishing.," that Ho wenl to Par' P - is reason^ and at the same time, to seek support from French Left ;. 0'Sullivan to Byrnes, 5 June 3 71

^3* Caffjery ts Franco-Viet 1 conference at Font?, bleau is off to a bad start, as Viet-1 ion proti d assumption of the chairmanship by head of the French d " m, protested creation of Coehin-Chi pendent si 1 ac 3 French of violati] g 6 March greement. Ho Chi Minh held conversations \ Brians on similarity of their problems. C ry 3323 to , 7 July 191*6. -. 73

hk. Vietnam breaks off m iations at Font.: bleau on the g violated March 6 accord by convoking e w Dala onference. Caffrey 38OI nes, 2 August 19^ - lh

45, U.S. views recent moves by the French as designed to regain a large measure of c trol over Indochina in "violation of the sj b of the 6 March convention 11 and that widespread hostilities may r^ Lt from Vietnam sistance to th eneroacl ts. Memorandum by Moffat (SE/l) for Vincent (FEA.), 9 A- t 19^6 . . 75

, U.S. v: s results of Dalat coni nee as a reasc sis for the future ^ but far short of larger degree of indepi 1 by Vie- and it i: fie "to for* i any great 6 suec* o long as Cochin- Shina stays apart im Vietnam... 11 Reed 3^2 i 17 At ... . .., ♦ 78

hf. U.S. expre ricera over n F Lai

U.S. as aggressive end 1 thistle" and in fitting Fr to Cc B&; line.

Clayton (Ac te) 2^0 to SaJ n 9 78

h S

, 13

TOP £:•' r - £

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Pe

kS. U.S. looks at inte 1 orts linking USSR

to Ho Chi I - and requests inform- ton c relative

strength outside contacts of Vietnam coaaminists.

Clayton 2^1 to Saigon. 9 September 19^6 c * 0 *. 79

J49, C y reports on v At of Ho Chi " :3i just prior to signing, modus Vivendi ; Ko deel s he is not a communist. Caffery 6131 to Byrnes. 11 Septe: 19 l i6 ..*....•• ~.> . 79

50. U.S. is info 1 by French of incr< ed coirmrimist activities in French Indocl ,, c " , CMnese Communist entrench at in Saigon and Haipho Agencies outside oi doc3 ' supply!: propaganda. Bee i to Byrnes 3 17 Septemb 19*:6 e .. *., e 80

] . Caff ery report- ' of modus vivendi it Ho Chi ah c lined satisfaction on many points, but French would have liked to e definition of Vietnam relations to Indochi) i oration and K -h Union. Cafi U67I to Byrnes, 17 September

19^6- * • i • • f • 80

52, Saigon view "amicable 11 meeting of Ho CM Minh and

' ^r in I- t of ief that "French C< Lsts desire soft-pedal communist ti Is in Vietnam for politic:! tea " : to elections. Reed )-lll to Byrnes, 19 Oetc IS ...... . 82

53. Ho Chi Minh infc the U.S. that effectiveness of modus vivendi depends on . fighting i:ould not stop unless French applied the 1 nt, t. Cochin-China "; t be unii to Vic ,"

O f Sul"' Ivan 96 to Byrnes, 25 October 19**6 . ....... 82

5k a C< tct betvi. Vietnam and Chinese Communists is app .',, but the presence of Chicoms as in the prdvi is dj to verify. Reports Of Chicc in Haij "th suspicion* 0' Sulli va3 1 >1 to By* .11: . member 191*6 ,.»,.< .. 83

55 , ! y reports Wr .*h c : ov, 1; Ltive proof" of bet Caf ■ 0 B; ■ I9U6 ............. 83

.'.. U.S. Con firth's Lth Prance

as designee 0 facilitate < '

V- ' * when j 1 if, it

is : blish 3 1

OP ; e - i i ve

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r

p sec; ■ " :

1 .-.r/.

*s cc mist cont ai Ls t:i is peculiar hey are forcing < or preparing a puppet government-: t is a pc. Lisle ersion fl rench poll a Ixi O'S n 131 to Bj' : 3 December 19^6 ,

57- Acheson instruct Moffat on Ho Ch' ranrunist record a&d offers guideline?: S, policy in discus Lth Ho, Essentially, the U.S. is conce] d over Tonkin events, t] American people have led Indochinese at ents but \ : rice imperils this syi r> ft U.S. ii i iforming Ft 3 Larly. The U.S. is not ma] formal ir Lon at this time. Acheson 3^5 to Saigon, 5 December 19^6 85

. U.S. feels France would engage in full scale military ■ rati J .' 1 only if forced, since they

e it is no longe 3 to maintain a closed door. Howev -, Cocfain-C a political question must be settled ErencI irmot resolve it withoul

tit, C chin-Chine s prefer Tonkin to I ice. Reed kj2 to I s, 6 pi her 19**6 87

59- Secrel , Byrnes reviews basic ] -Vietnamese difficulties Missions at Londoi Moscow, and Nanlri . ially, the difficul 3 r Ive around deep nationalist s nd opp Ltion to tbe I ch, guided by a few cc d leaders in the government with e rent contacts with Moscow and Yenan. r, "French i ice is iiapor t not only as an an ote to Soviet influence, but to pre Viet and SEA from future Chine: " " Three 1 roubles are fcual ust, Fre solution of the term "free . , !1 ■ Vi intr igence. Byrnes message to certain Mis 17 De 19k6. ...

60. Byrnes r nt Ft li p al crii Ls and infli f Indoch policy as an impc ,nt factor. Outbreak of hostili 3 in Hanoi r serious and no to be r bj bet and d'Argenli ■ es mesi tc w, Hani and S on, 20 Dec r I9J 90

.61. Vincent inf; in rces

ar ded pu~ 2 ox : i re 1

to ac t a str un:*

Bri tain f< I unwii I i . ■ in s]

n gu u ! v." The

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TOP BECSE ~ S m

-r^ »W^

I

■ — ■ ■ ■ . '

French should be informed of U. S, concern, especially si the conflict ma; ne before the OK or other p< y intervene* Memorandum t for Aabeson, 23 December 19-t6....,,. .. 91

62. U.S. adv y the Fietna: s.e attacked the i ch on 19 Dece ■: (a) orders from Moscov; to igpaet Southeast Asia, or to incr e CoiOflranlst Part; Lb Prance as a result of a quick settlement if the CP should take po .nmj and (t.) hope ft- similar J avail«. -Dutch e IrtXenienl resulting from fighting Le negotiating, 0'Sull:- 13k to Byrnes, 23 December 1J&6. • ,.,

*«

63- U.S. impresses concern over Tonkin e fcs on the

French, but expresses no offer to me .te. U.S, is

concerned that the . b become involved*

1 nes i ) to Caffery., 2h December 1$.6 ... < 93

0\. U.S. takes the position to oppose E ese proposals for intervention in Indochina, Acheson 8 to Gallman (tut), 27 Dc ber l$k6. ..... S

65* Reed, in discussing with vi -al, offers creation of new government under Eao Dai -and/or Ts Reed 1|99 to ! nes s 30 December I9I46. 95

66. U#S« approves the Consul in Hanoi to act on humani to save lives, but e: utic not to become involved in any situat which could be interpreted ■ mediating basic political without express authorisation. Byrnes 25 to 0'Sullivan, 31 December 19^6. ».«»•• o *.».. < .

19^7

67. U.S. reasserts the non-involve] licy of approv' sales of milii and g ; to oept in : wh Indochina

h: I ilities. Byr: s 75 to Paxis, 8 Jas uary 19^7»»»»»- S

68. U.S. £ es support • full recognition of

Fr ce's po "-. '• r ; " U.S. cannot overlook d' i' 1 - - ■ t C0I03 ' , On t]

other hr . the U.S. do ^ ' - t b Prance be

Ln eommu 1" y Ho

"nh . Tb ! « ot favor U

1 ":' ;i of

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 2011

!RET - Sens-;

F&

pro! i to sv st." C ge C. Marshall P Se- ry of State, 'j31 to } ,3 r y 19-*7

69. The U.S. is cone lie Wes1 democratic syj is on the defensive l : e: " and ; Asia is in a critic: phase* The key to

U.S. position i ct

to i tion ol stern democratic -ars in

Sou' ia, the United i in the boat as the 3 ch, British and the Dutch. "We cannot conceive setbacks to the If range inter-

of Lch Id not also be s of our own." The U.S. is ready to he hel 1 in any wayj hov: r 3 non-inter\ n is still the U.S. policy. K i 37 to Paris, 13 May 19U7 100

70. The Dej is concerned that a ri ed> dry s 011 1 re ons in a Congress which . be called or extc financial : -d to \ bern Europe in 3J Fr&r r s

••j finane i. td food position. M 3*63 Paris 5 11 Sep: , 19S7. . . , t . 103

71. M. Bollaert^ High Co

delivers publicly * t deel&n

of K l 1 policy since before hosti Lities V out.

33 i a^ Vi se "repre. Lve

go to except 3 and exclude

dealing w 1 t r

and th ly is surrender. Ihe U.S. sees

1 Ls policy resiill d I

(aj a propoi nal 1 in s to make con-

cessii ) as a "retreat" from the -xh 6 accords.

O'SuU : lett to U , 12 S< r 19% 10*J

72. The French deny any v'\- ed dry season milit

offensive. ( 37 1J -> ^ Septt r 19 ] i7. -•

Ill

73, P: eoj rs Bollaert *s policy s :

step -rd po s: formal abandonment

doc n i

t3 of union of th

,■ i . Caffery 3753 to Ka L. ] ' ! ••

tembe * - . 112

7!;. a ■ . ■ as : the : »si-

11. . S - do n- : .

I UCC< " •

TOP ■ J - r : itive

■ ————"*""^—"—

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

)P SEC] - 1 dtj

•

personality I abilit;. re impressiv Ho Chi Mihb

regar a communist, and Ms regime oj

south 1 does not appee.r of critical impor

St t ( 096 to "Marshall, 18 Octc ■■ 19^7 1

19^8

75. 3 La hesitates to submit Indochina question to the UK bee: e France_could veto and the GOI is not c

that Vn / Chi hj e rcises de facto sx rity or repre: "ity viewpoint in Indochina. Mar U telegram to Consular Officers, 29 J ary 19'i 116

76. A Ho CI lieutenant is reported £" : with a petition ; rent ion. J' shall 21 to Saigon,

3 F>: ry 19^8 . . , 117

77. Hanoi Consul summarizes recent events centering on

Bao Dad : ' Bai d'Along co: pence accords, Bao b

withdraws co mm itmc and will stay in France until called

fi r ( r. n R: 1 (Hanoi) 31 to ' 1 7

19 February 19^8 «. * 118

78. French Government authorizes Bolla rt to approve formation of a provisional Vletnt rnment hi 1 by General

Xuan. fery 2567 to 1, 12 May 191*8. 120

79* Xuan governs 1 s very li Le enthu , Bao Dai is war g for favorable si return. Stv 971 to Marshall., 29 May 19*18. - 121

80. French inc te dubious of su 3 for Xuan

Gov: , r 3063 to 11, 9 .j 19^8. . 123

Chi e desire U.S. v on r s coin ■ 1st

conne ons a an indi< U.S. s ulti-

xLicy vis-a-vis th 7iet Minh. St fc (] Lng)

1116 to Marshall, 22 Jr L< 8 r

82. U.S. 3 sition on Bo Chi I 1:: that he is a c

; cl in j but no e vice of a dii . Marshall 97'+ to ! 7 IS • • 127

, U.S. b-: or] Litical ai

e ' iiti

ci

3 ■ * 13

XI 3.1

TC ;

■ *

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ze

&h. C jry that U.S. the French vb

i re fa ; b ciltc j s of approving

inde;nendenc "on of three KYS or los Indoc)d ,

Caff Br 621 to r shall, 9 July 19 [ iS • • 13?!

85- U.S. approves Caf y's suggested action (tel 3621)

and would publicly app re of French acti on C i-

China status as a forward looking step to rd settle-

ment in Indochina, Marshall2637 to Paris, 14 July

19^8 135

86. U.S. feels that France is evading the issue of altering the French Colony status of Cochin-Chi r- hich > 5 effect^ nullifies the Bajed 1 Along agreement. 'shall 2891 to

Paris, 29 July 19I+8 .. 136

87. The French Assembly must face the issue of changing Cochin-China status and approve Baie d 1 Along agreements, if the little pr in Indoch? is not t nullified, is the view of the French Ministry of Overseas

Ter pies. Caffery ^03*1 to Marshall, 5 August 19^8 137

88. U.S. seeks to determine, in the absence of firm commit) : : ; hem France can <3i Letm ;e distrust of } .neh, split off adherents of Ho, or reduce hostilities . Mar: 11 136 to Saigon, 27 August 19WL 138

89. U.S. believes "not" ; should he left undone which will strength truly : alist gr< s" in beadily deteriora g Incl situation. Marshall 3368 to

Saigon, 30 August 19k8 lUo

90. She U.S. licly recognizes major strategem of communists in Southeast Asia is to c ton the ca of local-nationalism. Love it 1^9 to f ;on, 22 Se er

19k8. - Xkl

91. U.S. policy st t bn Indoch? cites four long-term object ; ochina: (l) elindr communist influence, (2) foster ociation of the people with Western powers, ticula: oe, (3) rs the stand? ]l.rin£. ' ) to prevent undue Cfaii g p ion. The ir: is to s 'torily resolve the Fr . leti ;e i . Dei 1 . Lt 0 :

Policy Stat on Indoc i , 2? Septi r 19^8 1^3

92. 3336 U, '. vie* is that for Moscow ,f ] ts are excellent that wil the

1 of the Fr and set u r

B ' I : * ( )

de? 95 to SecSt ,5 r 1< 150

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.19

93. T1k D.S 0 ±n as sing Bao Dai ; annot "iri ly

coir. U.S. to support of i ve £: eh...

night be.i vl: pu I govt../ 1 I ^ing

Sec 5 to January 19^9 .. 152

9J :. The U.S. ce ously i ny prer. r figment of Bao Dai in order to retain tre Dtion i of Frencl pessimism. Acher ( ate) 70 to St 2 May I9 j t9 * • 15

95* Abl. Lg Consul> revl 3 Lna situation (for the ; Delhi Foreign Se 20 Con: Febi- ;,• 19*19) > for tl ( Depar t. "The alternate-- to .0 Dai solution are coi oied costly co ' - withdrawal le; ig a cc. t-eontrolled government in a st . Lc of Sou ast / la." Abbott despatch 93 to . 5 May 19U9 15^

96. The U.S. desires the success of Bao Dai expe and will exte recognition, as there appears no other alten e to the est* 1 co .1st pattern in Vi< ' t success in China*

Ac] on 77 to Saigon, J 1 , 190

97. U.S. fear I ce is of ' >o ] too 3 ■■" and the U.S. should a" ipicuous " i tT

of t kind. Ache, 83 to S > 20 May 191*9 193

98. 33 Feels that the qu Ion Ho Chi Minh's nationalise versus c "irrele it."

"All Stalinists in colonial a sua are nationalists."

Achr Ih 10 Hi i j y I9I49 1;

99. The U.S. submits cominei a the 8 1 Franco-Bao at to • • , i ily, t ff.S., while ] 8 M sucee

is p i c that the requd "te concc oris will

1 le by I s FEA. 1> er 289 to

Br- (J- .3 is) > 6 June 19^9- - - • 200

100, Seer se 1 is 0 son req the

Se> iil to .sian situation to

c ' eu .:.'-. '' ' is

large arc

of in C af secu 1 217

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101* The . r< stablishment of . s only the "first

step 11 in evo: of the Vietnam pr^

Ft anee will hav to cor to accommo: national . Webb ( Lg) 1^5 to R& on, 20 J 219

102, The Singapore Confere, - rnmends that t U.S. join the D . upport of Bao Dai, that the French cla: i y Vietr l s i i , that- de facto recognition be gr :3d on 1 , ;,-ary IS • &o.J hopes that the U*S, would fulfill its ON dirties in event of an at on Indochii . Bliss (London) 563 to SecState, 9 November IS ■ 223

103* The National Security Council suV ■ . L. "The Position of the United States \ Respect to Asia," which, from a j I : iry view, indicates the "current basic cor of strategy - in the 'West 1 and a strategy in the 'East.' The 3 nee of So prlnc lly as an exj ber of strat Lais — tin, fib . • . -rubber." IISC U8/l, 23 December I9H9 225

10^4. The President app the c ions of BSC to/1 as

amended. The basic obj- rbives cit -- development of stable nations and sufficient n Lli1 ay power to prevent coaanunii insion in A; :tio 3 infl ce in Asia, and pr ' on of power latioi rhich -could threat U.S. Specifically, in I> , the U.S- "11 use its i."!:li ce to resolve colo? list-a lonalist conflict. NSC l i8/2, 30 De ber 19^9 265

1950

105. The JCS reviews the curr- 1] j .rise Ass:" ce Ero-gr certain objectives evoli as the basis for future military assi; e pre . A [fie long n tge objective is "develop! 1 suf "eient mil:*, power in selected tations of the Far East 1 ' to pr ■ encroachment by coMitii:'. 1 !. JCD Memor- m for th: ; ary of Defense, 26 Joniv 1950 • 273

106* 2?h* St« Depart] amends i id President Trus roves

reco tion of the three legally constituted gavei nts of Vi nam, Cambodia, end for ' nt, 2 Feb- y] ... *. . . \ • 276

5?Ja V. S, ££ o " " ' on to the

Associated r -eply to stion

c of tic re Ives. Aefa 59 to

Saigon, k j0 278

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Pa

108. At-' ighbors consider Ba DaJ Fj , Hie U.S. should realize tJ EC/ " litar; Id from the U. S.

do not constitute decisive in Indochina*

lems. Theref> Griffiri Mission should not c<

EGA o ry ai ;-h Ind unless France

"gives requisite pub!" undertaking her s"

leading to status simile Indoj sia." Stanton

(Bang ) 160 to Ac] on, 17 Feb i , I 50. ,*.*.< . 280

109. The State Department submi" to the NSC report on "The Position of the United States with Respect to Ind< &/' which an s the proll n to determine mea to protect U.S. security in Indochina and prevent canoironist c Lou

in i a. HSC No. 6U 9 2? F 3 1950 ..,....,.•.., 282

110. I ident Truman a] the c Mr, Ro't -t A. Griffin as Chief of the Economic S on to Sou; 1st Asiaj witfi rank of Minister. Five basic objectives of

I on are outlined: (l) determine nc jecta of po Leal significance; (2) pr Point k programs; (3) ad.vi.8c local officials of inethods and extent of partici-patioi 3 Point h; (h) brief U.S. represents Ives; (5) :i 1 stif al aspe of technical assJJ Departu of State letter to Griffin, 1 h 1950.

111. The State Departs nt maintains to the pepartm of Defense that Indochina is subject to inn liate d r and is the "most strategically important area of Southeast Asia*" Dean Rusk believes that the resources of the U. S t should be deployed to "reserve Indochina from further C« .mist encroachment." j I a Ku;-'k ? Deputy U: stary of State to Genera] James Jl. Burns,, Defense Be e to South-el La Aid Com 3 7 March 1950 ..,.., ■ ,. 288

112. A< "i 13 Saigon, in light of ahti Franco-Viet fr." m c idldj U.S. aid, thai i ^ f Griffin Mis 1' is "clearly u 'stood t findJ " Ac3 on

136 to u^ 9 ©••••••■•••••• * * e . 289

113* Griffin i Lies 1 "l understand 1 ours J an e

ission" and thai I budding co could jeopardize the d pre The Tn ow no enthusiasm f - B If, Gullion {: ) 176 to , 13 1

I95O

it: t< ■«•«*(■>. >«.l«b»C' •e* , *C''*c. •<:••••*■*■• t'ta.eaecotr'. * * 0*0 ^*

29

ll4. Grif sul r £ preliminary

I *na with a of spe ' 1c urj • : 3 s total-

i $23 -=5 million exclusive Llita

r~

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*•*««*« « t,

]

U.S. aid (e, rough Fr ). Obstacle let not per-

mit it ' i< to alloc Ld money or materials: the "crux of the situation lies in prompt decisive action if desired political effect ' to 1 aired, 11 G in file copy of telegram sent to Ac! 9 3.6 March 1950- *♦•......... 292

115. The U.S. assumes that France is c to protect

Indochina from cc mist encroachment 3 that success depends on indigenous support, and that France supports Eao Dai, "but that the. French position and ultimate intentions are not cl to rest of the world. The U.S. requests Fr- to make a public statement of the concessions to Indo alism. Ache con 1363 to Paris, 29 March

1950..*.

301

116. Acheson advises Gri on of t implications for U.S. policy in Vietnam: (l) The prospect of U.S. aid indirectly would Ci it is (induce hyper-confidence in Viets);

(2) Viets bitter at Huu appointment (end the U.S.) may

1 i U.S. role; (3) it is better for the U.S. if a

j 1 union government is set : and (k) the aid program

can more easily "be worked out with Huu Govern . Acheson

2kk to Gv CFIn, 9 April 1950 .. 305

117. Department of State requests an asi sment of the str 'c @ of Indochina from a military point of viev because of t threat of c list domination. The Joint Chiefs of gi 'f ii that the r :1 states of South ia also are at present of critical strategic impoj ce to the United States.," because of the to stockpile strat- materials acquired ; re 3 as veil as the threat to othe on th rf li of cc nt. M JCS Memorandum for the Secretary of , 10 April 1950. ...........* 303

118. The Join' Chic Staff cc hi S D partment on thu 2: ortance of South ;ia to the U.S. Hovever, t urge a more fore*, itive U.S. pot" on than 3 by State — "«...in or to retrieve the losses resulting from previ mi as on the part of the British and French, a. c -11 as to preclude su

the future, the Joint Chi it necessary

that positive oper 1 hip amc V tn

po the United State,? in Sou Asia

it b1 1 >" JCS for I f 3 2 y 1950 ....... 3

119. The JCS rect Uin£ tat I U.S. is pre-pa. to -.'■ ' and t f< ; . JCS

',2 318

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120

President T: ;i ml 13ion for mj ! " 11

to Indochj' Acheson 20*f9 i^ 0 London^ 3 May 1950-

-

321.

121. Griff: ;tructs the Indo on for Seer ry Aci on. C i indicate, bhat t ! . is quo cei i ' ' • "Time is of the essence^ .," Dai starts to slip, "it will V impossj ic to resl hisa." Given t h are aware that a milit ,. Oution is u ' ! . ■ U.S. Ind out vhat French expect of Vietnam.* 1 Griffin Mem> i to S of Ste , } -i 5 1950, .......... . .-, 322

122. The special , R, Al in recommends a iest$6o million economic and technical a&si-sl >e pr<- am for Southeast Asia. State j ss release H85, 11 May 1950 . ... 327

123. The Ministers of the U.S., U.K., and France agree that while Southe- st Asia Is of si tegie importance to the U.S., the ct Llities of U.K. a? France make it of cor. en to them. Extract of Trip&rtj I I Tall 13 May I95O.... . 328

12U. The French sponsibility for Indochina, acknowledge "sup meni .■" U.S. assisl , and assure that 8 March a vrij] he "liberally impli ited." L03 a -8ECT0 256, 1^ May 1950 330

125. U.S. j all; ; t to e£ lish an economic aid mission to the three Associated Sti bes of Indochina. State I ele , 25 lay 1950 332

126. On the basis of the Griffin r atic ;, S publicly announces the 1 shing of a program Ld ecc Lg aid to Southeast Asia. Secretary Dean letter to R. A13 en Gr:• f f in, 3 Jtu ] \ l iO * *... 335

127. North Kor( attacks Sot' ja and President Tri a an] Um"\ as sis not to South

o an 1 i ration in the furnishing of tp.fl 11 / assistance to the forces of Frai c and the Ac so. ' as in Indo the dispatch of a

Lon...." Pr t, 27 June

1 ,.,« , . . . c. ,..

t>«.Ct«CC« t . i. * ft .

336

128. The U*S. p ciples governing U.S. xai

: Indo;-- . Ez ■ ' ce:

U« S. aid * to Assi 1 ; -

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to achieve in Ltyj ass5 bhe French Union against eonmiunj could cause c"J . on of aid from Assocl-j States, on It to Si n, 1 JBly 1950 ■ *.. 338

129. A suited 3 of Ley cu ] oehtn revei U JCS

f 73 th the U.S. Ly Lon to provid-

ing • : • and n . 1 as ' 1 hould ■ Chi? -de

overt support to the VJ Minh. Consultants' 1 ' . .

£,_P U U-J-Jr JL^/^}{-- « • o • • » o a. p.*. •••••«•«•. .9.4.1 p ft ■• • • • b e o*occ«>»« ■ ■ -J

130. The U.S. feels that Frc ste for overall assistance (milit< ee< d politi al) inadegt a to "consum U.S, broad ol ives in Indoehina" and assistant ill have to be increased to resist encroachment of coirimunism* Heath (Saigon) 170 to Aebeson. 7 August 1950* ■•*• 3^3

131. The U.S. v" s gj- inr 1 and military 6

iii Indo una with concern; especia . evident aa "■ Llure

of the governmc to gi. -port, disinclination of

Dai to assume leadership role, aj lications of CB '-

Viet Minh military colli ration. The !. see3<:s to have

Viet- tablish a my and de na1

emergency. Aci -on 238 to Saig 1 Sep' 1950......... 3I4J1

132. The U.S, iforms France 1 b the U.S. was pre; i to in-c-r ase ass nee to Fr could 1 furnish money for local v stica] air suj rt. Extract of Sip tea of Trip&rtH , Ft ' :

Meeting, France., U.K., and U.S., 1*4 September 1950 3**7

133. The Son Asia Aid Policj Committee (£ ) propc statement of U.S, policj on I] ;C for con-si . "The U.S. L not cc ' any of i I for to the defense of Indochina against c -t, foreign 1 Ion.. ••" hut should ' i ! %an of

ti al i ; 1 : 1 of 1 ,; ; . oci a 51 . tf The

U.S. should o "press the French 11 to ear. te

a ients 8 Marc ' 1 3< 19';* SEAC

D-21, 11 October 1950. ... ....•.•*».,-... 3 }

13k* "The d t s1 nt of I in Ir ina is weals: from the p Lde....th ' mt art > for a - 5, I i ittj . > : ■'.-.-. i Lticj ] i ec* • State E r i ly :■ i. ...tc ana ir nner. Co y, the I y, Mi , letter to C ' ■ :> 13 0 ... .

s& ^ r - g

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135, The Stal anno, results of h 3 conversat -h Minister; s jd that 1 I , .

Cor ppropriat one-half billion doj in military istance for the Far East, D rtme of S p : 6,17 c *r 1950.... - *. *. c ... 371

»

136, State and Defense recapitulate te with the French Mi iers s ^igon's views on 1 review bhe proposed NSC po] ' on I> hina; Th nch

not pre nmeci equipment for 13 bail Ions in the 1951 "budget and further had reqv bed < t the U.S. 3 , - and maintain the E tonal ar.." rmed* It appears that the Fren 113 from Tonkin and nsay throw the problem to the U.H< The dj is considered quite adequate. Meau for ' K.T. young), 17 October 1950 ... 373

137. The current situation in ] reveals serious weakness in French mai : . leadership^ and intel3 - The Viet Minh forces are build in trp -scale off* Ives to seize complete control of j dna. The I ch Dnio 1

fo ;s of 35: 0 are oppose 92 5 500 Vj reguli and 130^000 irregulars. U.S. Hav^l Intel 1 adum^

17 Octob 1950* * 38

138. The U.S. infc Emp« J i s Lth empb / ■-. "

ia native I t he giye the Vi ; se people ience 03^

determination to perso.uaLly lead hi, y into 1> iate and ' 1c opposition" to the corwnuni, I The U.S. has .erpreted his ''prolonged holiday" on the 1 as lack of patriotism. It i; tactfully si that further dj of pri ' on jnj it le' bo log of U c n # support for his govern nt. Acheson 38*4 to Sal

18 October 1950. 388

|0 >9. A Def £ viev; is that it is IT :< b important t

do nc ole political \ them. 11

The U.S. should give increased roilit* 1 not intervene

an tress pol ' by t feu Memor urn

St Finlet , 1$ OctoT 1950. *.... ..... . 391

lUO. U.S. desires > " political and ' vantages

it in t' "onal found i ra«

of 2d nativ ont:" bs (00 Dai 5 o > Cathc

etc.) s an ar- j cgkq Dai. A to

; 25 i! . »-* ;

itL U.n. approves ± to ; 05 21311 ho' :i •'

ar '' -155 Jnm hold bo Indochina,

^50 to 7 October 1 >.»«.».,.*... 39^

, • • ■

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lk£. General Brink, Ch Mtadt , 3 at the French coni ch: ^oops from "pacification" dispositions to 3 ;er unit re{ oupment. 3 ich military pi" yed to delays in politic 1 decisions. Saigon 763 to Acheson, k Hover 1950 (see l&ielr A to E anent No, lH6, belo. ) : „ h

1H3. T U.S. does not favor use of the Peace Observation Co: -mission in Indochina mid if the Indoc: a subject is to come into ti United Kations, it is i that the French do it. Acheson 516 to IM, 22 November 1950.-. *. 395

lkk* The U.S. publicly "welcomes the French statement which sures independence of the Associated ! of Indochina within the French Union and that their resources LI be d eted "to the defense of Indoch" 1st communist cole ' _■]." Depart t of State press relea Il87> 27 IJoveinV 0.... y

iV?. "If the Communists are successful in Korea, thin may so weaki r 11 1I1 in Indochina at they will pull out. He /Secret ar; son/ doubted if any one of the President's aclv" .ould urge Man to intervene in that at ion. 11 Ex from Ti ai-Attlee Conversations , k December 1950 * * * ..» . .. * .. *.. 39§

11*6. The Joint C of St position paper on possible f re action in Indochina, 28 November 1950; is circulated for MSC coixside 'i'n, This paper includes the Brink report (k November 1950) as a :- ence. The JCS she term objectives emphasize i at action to deny Indoch:" bo co oiism. ure retention of responsibility by France, and develop I of an over-all military plan for Indochina. The long ten: 1.,...; tiv ; to 3 ..ut cc 1st exi ion, to establish in1 I security conditio] such as the foreign armed forces would be removed, to press the h to carry out c titmentSj and to ei ablish a regional security arranj I L i in Sou 3 . Exeeut" to t" 9 NSC 6tyl ■ 1 December 1950 . ......... 399

1951

jl^7 t p at Tr reasserts 1 , aid o t ] French Union forces * I of the Assoc:' d St-will c inue. ieven C s, 30 Jam 1951. ..*<.* ....... t

■ * *

kl

lH8. The U.S. h wtl to : ^elf to the

budgetar; : -it of ( 5 bi on flrai .-. ) retru;* •

a r - ' ' ^19

6 ..*»>• .

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' ~ Sensj L

:

lii9* Th first pr Ct or s a 1

on 27 > a;- ses the most re thr< o

French Incloc the ' ■ Viet

Minh 3 At in. aid. 0 im±stically 3 the

re< b corclu that "Aiaeric?.- militj , aid fi -shed the State ! s f< my of 1 Unic

have be the decisive or in the of the

area ag " st commmrut Lou11 State 1 tment

.80 . 15 March 1951 . •.. c 421

150. President Truman approves KSC Action h§/_ Lch states U.S. policy on Asia, With respect tc j a a U.S. policy seeks to cc o incr reneb " ' y effc :s > to ' bernal auton

promote int, ional support f ;• Associ I d

States. KSC 48/5; 17 May 1951 , k

151. Dulles discn r;es problems with Parodi of 3: ici] ion of the th Associated States as "save Tr with respect to U hip. V' 1 gov

and positions of In: Buxina^ and In Dulles-

Parodx Conversation > 11 Jui 1951 - - W

152. The U.S. ites Vie . Cambodia, and Laos to participate in signing of Ja , . Sai 132 despatch I ....... 44?

153. The U 6 S. and Vietnam enter into an economic cooperation

a ement. Agreem red intc e 7 Sepi er 195-1 • • - ^9

I5H. The U.S. agrees with Fr hat they will conti" to be primarily hie for ; that U*S. shou 2d3 t first prior it, : >ary aid should to IndochjjvL. u. s. -j -'ranee Lstexs Meeting, 3.1 Septf r 1951 . •.« o *.. * c * k-52

155* I ident Tr . Acl pledge r r

General I attre and vould not t Indochina fall

into enemy banc, ' of Con : on. Acheson,

Schuman, and DeLati tesiber 1951 »«•••»«•••.»••-«»••••« k^h

15&. G attre cc to ate Depari that the

aid j - ' " 1 nt •' rily etc to

don al 11 of c " "jo^x ie it"

1 that the U.S. . ext 3 e. E e

Depari -h Del 17 smber 1953 ^56

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i - , ■ I " /e

157. The I . recounts th doubts and " on the subject of col 1 trial Lssj in Indochi aint' that real 3 te is fc tl Indochinese 11 tje & v l 1 ■'. 3 to exerci " y or be sub^ to communist terror. Dean . • November 1951* * * •« ^59

158. France requests t] conversation 1 place ima

. , U.K. and I te concern! rted rfcion 1 in 1 event of mingly tt Chinese interventic :'

I Indochina. Bn (Paris) 3765 to Acheson, 22 D* 51. ^60

159. ] delivers an ai to I U.S. on a proposal to appeal to tjie U.K. ij R Chi] ' . Paris 3856

to Acheson, 29 Dec 3 \ 1 *f62

1952

160. Ac on revi r rs trij bite military discussions i^ bieh

; be did not participate. G- il Bradley^ vhil: iable

to cojm; ■ " of U.: . lit as;:

ta in the b of CHIC; . ould rec to

the P ident 1 b a dec ion be issued to ] China

that aliation uld follow any aggression. P. i\ son 97^

to Saigon, 15 J^n . . I165

161. 7 Lders the c 0 the United States of corm Lst domination of South sia. Loss of ?ast

t is seen as put J economic and political pressures on Japan > ope g sou of str jnete ' Is to the Sov:" BloG 3 rend ing the U,S, pc the Pacific precarious . ] ing II c

trade rout uth Asia. If Red C " b., the U.S. shoi 0 : e appropriate military action as t of a U.IT. action or in cor., ction but t unilaterally. 0 KSC 12^ 13 February 1952 If68

162. Th CIA esti ■ joint vai against■ 1 intervention in Southeast As I t; . 5 that ini-f of action in /.. probably "bring a

X sir r to t regarding Korea, and CHIC

ance of a joint war ^ invo] ' t

of g U£ . CI/ ; . . ■ Fe . kTf

163. The JCS \ " on KSC 12 fcc MSC l'P ] \ e th t *>. L~ tary operations in dsfe 1 of Indochin ". st Chi se

C " ' 1 3 by a. ;

C< * ' - • 3e of f ch 1 '

result a 1< and and that from

poj of viex-i

c " ' ' • >' '

(fox 1 ' ' )j 3' ch 1952*. 5

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TOP SECRET - Sensitr

Pa

X6k. V NSC r somie i ■ implications of g ' g

to war in China be studied fu .1 to the

Council c the President: that i grt sr to

Southeast Asia is subversion ■ not e> .1 aggression^

and that contingencies for a Fr : ined.

KSC 113th Mc (J 3) • 5 £ch 1952, ., , ..... 502

j

165* The U.S. stresses to the British i rumors of Frei Intel >ns t< ithdraw or negotiate with Ho C>> i Minh are true* The U.S. believes that France will stay in Indoch as long suffice it U.S. aid is forthcanii . Acheson Conversation with itish Ambassador 5 28 March 1952 . 508

166- French stress their problems at tripari eting concerning their EDC eammitmerr 1 . (l) the French effort in v o-china 3 (2) financial da iies and whether the st egic imports] of SEA justify .nued effort I (3) Indochina is part of the European defense problem, France cannot continue to 1 "alone such great share Indochinese burden." Fi ch great importance to U.S. aid. Acheson r ^il5 to State, 28 May 1952 . ■. ■ 511

I67* If the Chinese invade Indochina, "he /Kcl ~J said i

clear that j as futile and a e to defend Indochina

in Indochina. He said we could not have snot 1 fa....

we could not put ground troops in Indochina..■.our only hope

was of chi "mg the Chinese mind." Secrel y of State Hote

(L.D. Battle) , 1? June 1952.... 6 515

168. U.S. informs France that appropriations would be prepared to provide up to 150 million dol] • >; additional Fl 1 I aid in support of ov 11 French effort in Indochina. Acheson ikOh to Paris. 17 June 1952

169. Acheson publicly announces opi.*■■ : m over the conduct of the National a; s in Indocl 1 that communist "aggression has been checked" and that the "tide is now mov in our favor •" State Dep . Re U73, 18 June 1952. 518

170. The President aj ^ves NSC 3 '1/2 (HSC 124/1 as amended) on the U.S. object:! s and cor 101 Lth re to Sout.' t / . V fe to Indoc 3 the U.S. would cont 5 to assur the of the ir 1 inte] t of the Indc Lna effort: ui U.S. ix poli-bical^military, econcenic, and ' oli : i -crea. ] 3 in 1 axon; o Fr. : i ' st Red Ch . , 25 June Ig

x> T0i :

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TOF ' ~ Sensitii

Pa

171. The !. and Bri : - dis s issxd to Red CI:" on j ■ ntic in 1 1. Frr s could trig ■' Chinese in id *t U.S. had "no infant available for op Lna," ~. U.S. think-in is ale lines of a iv ■ 1 "blocks of China's coast* Londoj ' inis I ; al Xalks, June . 5;

172. The French regis that 15-0 Am rican Air Fo? 1 ics be det i ' \ ' ives an opinion for favorable action from Q • 1 Tra LL MAAG Chiefs who also reeom-mends expediting ell. y of jraft promised for 1953.

Saigon 9 to Aeheson^ 5 December 1952.. *, , *,..• e •. 538

173. The U.S. approves participation of 25-30 U | rsonu I in maintt of Fr h aircraft i) , Acheson 1286 to

n , 22 3 ber ] .... * *«.•••».«».»,».<» 5^0

slbii

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3,3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

t

> *

THE STA1 CO( IE

WASHINGTON, D.C,

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" \ extrac 1

1< | F< u 11 I b at ' , sri

3*

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'

BR* "^ e. n to i h

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dquo of b a ;

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as " i I of our

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Bri i

v^ b i B " : sh

: than fcha TJ. 3* \ o? st* al . 'c

I ]/ i no ; b for Indo-Ghi] oper

r, bo felt ' b it is 1 th* bsrszd r Ls to bs

cularl; be r ■ no maj< rations

' ' isential that

It's China ] rec or [R#

til i or. 'JOsit

lod*

t!R. i Lnt b that »e for the Far last

to * the ' our Indo iicy has b

xl for s viefi of a divor-

rien Ln tha ' "• * " " b been

. it /)y id

c; be policy*

" •■ c

Frenc ! finS -'^ P^ r L±rut*

After : bher discussionj ■.:

a« ' 5/7 j ting t

"b, / t th ! nt of St ild

"" i i clarifies of

po] on Inclo r

to the light of the thre

e; 1 b; % lovetW

i

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151 fi From Mai i!l ■ • '' >Pr< Rm he

J *I tv, Di ■ i frtf n ;■>, noftfi for ill ' . . ber i .' »on fl i ml ■ I i • -'

Idinoi ; •;• rtir ■' ■' i \p Tndo

'Kiiilci-^v \vji i ifm ml st< ^ liare boen take fo diwi mfio ,

mil n .. '-'t Urns [r* n ' i •■ .■ ■ ->*r : . Fii'l ii n

thai qp i of Further ■ ' i e ro o1 her :•. . 5s snbjscl of aci : nej ol i [Jlai .]

Stett

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iiicin o1 < iicd Si: i - iu ;ip F

:il . . ii '. in Lou i on ;\ . I 2*>, 1D4-] and i

Jlis ;.

< I h cm ro ive proposal.' The

ITnrU'd States Go m has cowi oiitlv I icved, "tod ac«

irdin/rlv. thai I ho Fur

i lefoai of Japan, > lire i of i :

, ; ... - hi

i • f noli vr 'osto i mili arv i

in i i-iU> : ;,';, mint 1 l. the • the

Governni i ■ i i

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tin- lines •■■ In v si ol

"WArsjiTxc ^. April 20. [0£>.

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

EDITORIAL NOTE; f

With the death of President Roosevelt on 12 April 1945, the indecisive policy toward Indochina took on a new appro: h under the new President, Harry S« Truman© Shortly i being sworn in bo

office,, U 0 So policy was thoroughly revie A 9 On 13 April, the State-War-Wavy Coordinating Committee met and discussed the urgent need for clarification of U 0 S 0 policy toward French-Indochina, document number 3„ Ey 20 April, a Memorandum to the President on Indochina policy had been drafted by the State'Department Division of European Affairs (EUR), documents number 5 and 6 C The Division of Far Eastern Affairs (FE) revised the EUR version to the extent that it was substantially different from the original submitted, document ni r 7* The final compromise between the two versions resulted in a draft action cable for Paris and a Memorandum on / ^ican Policy with Respect to Indochina for the President, both of which app as documents number - 9 and 10 e The record shows that the policy stat nts in the memorandum was neither sent to nor approved by the President and that the cable was not dispatched to Paris* The documentation concerning this evolvement of policy is included here as a revelation of the France-Indochina commitment internal to the Depart t of State and the impetus lent to policy making by the War Depart : In the latter phase of World War II*

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

EpArrr: ■. of Stai

DIVISION OF EU ; /.: : . .;.

Aorll 20

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you : oveci in ft raft fora this : »rni ■ : y\u indicated you would tak up at

the Staff Co: iitt* seating tcao: (Pnti >mingi

As you k:io-'j the : s prepi

f v resale of a airactive from SWSCCi, I

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Mr. :■:■'■*: v; order to r ;aln info: 1

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

I

tSEMGERfiRDOM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Suggested Reexamination of A] riean Policy

with Respect to Indo-China

General Observation

1. The Japanese aggression against the French in Indo-China last month has brought about a marked increase in the numb of proposals advanced by the French for the use of Fre: forces and resource, in the Pacific•

2. The con uenc of these military developments make it clear that our past policy, which held that the disposition of Indo-China v a matter for post-war determination and that th United States should not become involved in military effort for its liberation, is in urgent need of reexamination and clarification* This is particularly so in order that American mill y and naval authorities may have guidance to enable them to take appropriate action with respect to the F proposals referred to above.

3. The United States Government has publicly taken the position that it recognizes the soy on of France ove: French possessions overseas when those possessions are resisting the enemy and has expressed the hope that it will see the reestablish of the im Lty of French territory. In spite of this general assurance, the negative policy so far pursued by this Government with respect to Indochina has aroused French suspicions concerning our intentions with respect to the future of that territory. This hi and continues to have a harmful effect on American relations with the French Government said people-

Ik On April 3* 19~ ; 5; the Secretary of State h the approval of the p. i&ent issued a statr nt of which the following excerpt is pertinent to the present problem:

1! As to territorial trusteeship, it appeared desirable that the Go ^nts represented at Yalta > in consultation with the Chinese Gov lent and the French Provisional Government, should endeavor to formulate proposals for subn" on to the San Francisco Conference for a trusteeship structure as a part of the general O] L: . This trusteeship structure, it felt, should be defined to permit i placing under it of* the territories taken froii the enemy in this \ 9 as might be i upon at a later 6 . also such other territor :'

as it fc voluntarily be placed under trusteeship,"

^ *^^— ■ ■ ^ ■ i ■■ ■ ■ ■ ■ — ■ ■ ■ * ■■■■ mii r" ■■ ■ i i — i —i » — ■ — ■ * ■ ■ ■ ■ ^.i i —■————^—

COPY

•8

Declassified per Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

S4

A

5. General de C He and Ms Government have made it abundantly clear that they c et a proposed Indo-Chinese federation to function within the fra ork of the "Fren u n There is consequently not the slightest possibility at the presi-■ time or in the foreseeable future that Eraa - ill volunteer to place In&o-China w inter-

na* ional tr bip, or will cor it to any program of in i 1 accountability which is not applied to the colonial sions of other paw * If an effort were made to exert pressure on the French Government, such action would have to be taken by the United States alone for France could rely upon the support of other colonial po s 5 notably, Great Britain and the Netherlands. Such action would likewise run counter to the established American policy of aiding France to regain her strength in order that she may be better fitted to share responsibility in maintaining the peace of Europe and the world.

Recommendat:' - 3

In the light of the above considerations, the following recomme tions, which have been communicated to the War and Navy Departments, are ted for your approval.

1. The Government of the United States should neither oppose the restorai i of Judo-China to France, with or without a program of international accountability, nor take any a i toward French overseas possessions which it is not prepared to take or suggest with regard to th colonial possessions of our other Allies.

2. The Government of United States should continue to exert its influence with the French in the direction of having them effect a liberalization of their past po]i j of limited opportunities for native participate on in gov exit and administration, as well as a lil ligation of restrictive French economic policies formerly pursued in Indo-Chi .

3. The French Provisional Cove snt shotild be infomed confidentially thatj owing to the need of concentrating all our resources in the Pacific on operations already planned, large-scale military operations aimed directly at the liberation of Indo-China cannot be contemplated at this time.

k* Fr offers of i y arid naval assistance in the Pacific should be considered n th rits as b : upon the objective of defeating Ja na, as in the case of British and Dutch proposals. The fact accepta: of a s; ific propc L might serve to strengthen French claims for the restoration of Indo-China to ee should not be regarded as grounds for rejection. On the c< ry > accepta of En h pro Is for : y assistance in the defeat of J should be regarded as desirabl ' P ie > s Always to military requirement in the theater of c ' .

COPY

■*

t'

Declassified per Executive Order L3526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 I

7

5, V tile avoiding specific commitments with regard to the amount or character of any assistance which the United B y give to the

French resistance forces in Indo-China, this Government should continue to afford all possible assistance provided it does not interfere with the requirements of other planned operations.

6- In addition to aid which we are able to bring from the China theater of operations to the French forces resis he Japanese in Indo-dhina^ the United States should c, se no obstacle to the implementation of proposals looking drd the despatch of assistance to those forces from the southeast Asia theater of operations, provided such assistance does not constitut a div of resour i which the Combined Chiefs of Staff consider are needed elsewhere.

C 0 P Y

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Declassified per Executive Order L3526. Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

■ -i

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I CBS G

• ■ • .71 ; ■ I-

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to : a-D - Mr, Dunn \ A " ,%i j datei Ar>r.U 21, 1<

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FRO] : j ... V[ ;0<t gt OH

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subject* Memory i for thi 10 Infl

■4

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;

With reference to the memorai ' ; for '' 3 Preei< m-t t »gai d 1 nation of American Policy vrith F t

. | A. to : china' 1 j F3 n js the folio tg c .ts and

I a \ stsgj ted g] ges: J j ■ f ';' ; >h 1* F3 concurs* !

Para? U FS belie 1 this par- ^ ' ould

be si to o:k • i only tho neeti ' adi -X ■

tion of policy* j '" f " -

Pair fh 3* FS oonoi K^th tl \ first; r.*cn i ?!

but b i that, in t '■ , >- : : ■'.. J !>

bo made to the fact ti Ij loci Lna Su b tu ;1^

co!3 " '" ' ' ' b i \y 9 It bs3 : ti at th 3

balance o the para© . ! shou! ' ..; onlttecl in view i>f

,ph 2, "-j

; /: / ■ " 5« FE full;; concurs, but sui .,:

tj ft . . £ 5 i •• v ■ ' ■ ton to c 1 ■ uq the r*

si tld include Presids tt Boos 9 it ; £ viei "■■-■■ould suffice It a >ve.fl t&at the last i ■ of parasraph 5

is ii . ■ ;■'-.-V;- enough to •.:.■:■;.-. nt c to a tat snt i*ri !

a c ' rcc ling ; teric ir »ata in J ist

ABia«

In addit \ to the general obs ttions inelud^d j.n th > i ? 2 beli :s that to press tt a c

iotu i the raeffloran&um should include:

M*

A* A statement of the joint State^vrar-Navy dee3 Bio "'verioy sacle regarding Indochina*

B, Refer 3 to the coll tionist h o^y 61* \% e !/:■- Lnistj i in Indochina in cli

to the rsccrd of th^ colonj 3 of oux^ othei ftllic ■ «

! l

C, St; as to tne increasingly

r/: in f futi of s

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

^

\ D. A statement as to the independence tt

In Indochi

» E« Reference to the frrc b teffienia on Indochina

indici o concessions to ' ? i o:r r : y for

the French ac " nation of ; : i, but whiah do not

ii cate an intention to pailt g tains Indoc] In *e s government; a to the app : na for ti

concc " S©

F* Referei to tho effect on China of past I ecc FTiic po3 ! in Indoch a CJ th

safety of its t ^ flank*

Go Re to tho clangor inherent in the Thailand Indochina boundary questions

v>

Rg22£S^ yior 1 , Reco "ion 1 9 as

cir; , r< IN to ; e 1 Indochina - anc! would In J . i\

for inats », - in lived in the Go \ Lnitta

Government of the* S -; H ' " . s« Fe cor rs in ti _ 1 lo

policy that tho Uni' should t • bc a trusteeship for Indochina or ij ."' " account "•" ,; \ ■•••"■ \ similar ac' ' is to ha i / ' from '' \ B 'J ' and the DutcJ It "believes, ho- ■. that f of / interests it is or atial th policies in Indochin/. follow a patl snore liberal t; any : ' " - - enounced* ! I ! also that u i , olrcunistai 3s a policy of n - exerting infli ie to achieve such a .roi It will not ; ac!

■

Several ti ; during the ? 6 f* ? the French authorities ft de announce r ths of Indochina which, though still ii uate to r sur< peace end a' bility in a, indicates an intention to nh their pre~v ill tic tow is Indochina, It is t;

belief*of FK that this cJ in aititu; has boon due, first, to i XXzB ion of tho anti-F: , i a

sentj i »? Infix Lio must t ooea if h ' "on is to be si ssful and, second, to unco; ! aty : the - e of I ted

a ; . a feeling 1 i* Unj ! 3 for ;.. on

G f s . ■ : pel i

, -;-• • tj ti t tj t ' • 1 61 I

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

-Because the liberation of Indochina isj in fact, r lent on African defeat of Jar a; "bo-- - w® are sacrificing blood and treasure to assure peace and s.t illty in the Far East, *>ost-vrar maintenance of which villi bo largely our responsibility; b shout recognition of the dynamic trends towards If-government among the peoples of Asia there can be no peace and stability in the Far East and the peoples of Southeast . a may embrace Ideol-Qf o contrary l;o our ovrn or develop a p Asiatic niovcraent against all western p ; rsj FS feels r&s that it -rould not bo unreasonable for the United Sir s to insist that the French give ade assurances as to the implements ; of policies in Indochina vjhicb we consider r ential to assure peace t stability in the

Vfe ux^ge, thereto } that t" polio;/ of the Unite States slv Id 1 not to or - 3 reator -ion of jnc to '. ace, n; ;.-;. & the 1 adequate

assure ceo as to the ^bilowingj

a* Development of a national or federal f nt to he run for and Increasingly by the Indochine , t] selves with no special privileges for Fro- ht or p .) :■;" not ; bltants and citizens of Indochina so that within the foreseeable future Indocl bo fully self-governing r autonomous alone denoc? lines, exc in matters of i r rial cc orn in which Indoo ; Lna should bo a p.: - r in the Pre < I aion«

b. Maintenance of a policy of non-discriminatory treat) it and of c lete economic and commercial equality

c» Establishment of Ha: a free port Kith ax-free ti ' faclll " ig ant! Ghli l«

d» ptanoo of a frontier betr c 2

Ti ~ ' , '• "■- " •- :. ro - h< 1

CO

11

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

e« Acceptance of such inter tional security - -r<\p '\ inclti ':..: Americ inter; uional h- 9

an . - y be d t to be necegs y fo: Into: felonal security, lnoludi protee m of GhiJ i's sou:',-: >rn fla

Recon elation 3« FE believes'that the last part of the j ho old be 3 • \ified in accor 3 with military plans already adopted so that the Fren will

not vainly hove for* either American military 0; 'lone

or American supplies for the liberation of IndoehinUa

Recomsienc .tion 4* FS3 bi ;este that t first

sente . ■ be c] to specify : ■ it Fro b ofi . 3 of

assists ; vrill be consic od B solely en their military merj n o It believes that with this cl a 1 ice

of the pa: ,; \ I nnecesoary and s! « omit* 1*

Recj 5c F£ belies 3 that this v ph

should be If assist" can be given the : h

which viil] aifl in the defeat of t ; at in sring

with A-aeri* m strategic cor ion& § the mil'

authc Lea c " political ions involved

at t) tl r :^= ) ' Lie, FS be ■■ ! : tro&ld bo

desir litioallj the United B Ses not to lend

military id to or be a \ writh fc] seatabli r t

of Fr 1 control o 3

V

r % a : sre b now less th a a ',.'. I

FroaoV Y forces in Indochina (the rest h •

cr , lev to China) and 1 ' \ould

a: in a stats t of policy 2 tion

Attached is a suggested draft of the r " to t3 president, embody^ g above modifications 1 C h : , 5 voloh F3 e^; :\ b .svsb are of great irnoort* for the establishment 1 1 1 main' 1 aance of osace and stability in the Far Sast,

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Declassified per Executive Order L3526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 I

SAI FOR : 325 IT

,vi ,5 Aneric Policy .. 3Ct to Indochj

ral (Xbse I xs

■r 1 **-.

1c '. 3 Japanese t ggrei ■ ■ • . i ; . \ in

Xndochj last nsonth has brongj i :' ?ase s-

;he r iber of propo ; .g ac by t' toh for 1

use of Prei h Tore resources :ln the Pa c 6

2o 5?hese proposals and re< :';. mil:Vi . . sesvta

lnako it e. ' that the United S fces :■■ Si a c

' in rega ling % ; •'■ '■ -. ' : ' 3 ' ' :c

a : for j, ' ' cU:tc '

5* The Unit States Gc ' £ - 3 ' ' ' GLy 1

the Dositlon :" ■ it re< s the so-- . ' ;;-.-

of 'prance over .'. 'h po; : ■ v/hen

p 0S ■ re ' king th ; . > : 5 has eanpresseci

jjop-s LH s ie the re it of the ;'

60 Until the last : ' 5 the I ich 1 inisiration

0 £ j ' '■' - co?--' oral " : . v/ith t] Japi in narked

c y '■■ ' a tO V' ' i-OnS Of C i 8 &Xo

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Declassified per Executive Order L3526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 I

He realized that dyn :lc fo ;s lr " : to./' :0'.

gc t are growing in Asia5 that the 1 lited Sta

as a great C oeracy—cans t and must tot try to :•.-. a

this clove' '; but ra" ■ :' h; -.-■:" it; 1

that social s o ic or polii inst ity in ;

may threaten the p -o and stability of t3 Par Sast "i

indeed the world*

8» As his solution of this Q.ea s it relates

to '.■ >china9 Resident Boc lo f.i ;

Indochina v a ustc ' ; - ■ s on April 3, 1945,

the ' of State with t) ap 2. of the S .vb

issued a r ' &ient relative to the ; ; :'; at .

which \ Id :lncU ;e th ', : old • • the

trusti p : only by " . ao\ ■ ■' the

grencho It is a" itly c? : ti at f . ; : i no ]

at the pz "; t" ■ or in the . seal v. ; ' tl t

■ranee v 1 voluni to •'■ Indochina under '■ ■ ' . ;

or •■ i '' ■ e :<> '■ of •' '■•' ■ ■ ' f.ity

whi< • is not a= i: •"■ to the co3 ssess;i o.1

power io -££ ■• effo . to e :■ v

U 1 : ich ( ' r n f; would * e to r *' ^

the Uni' es a could : • I3 . the

support of a- 3? co3 Lai 3 s 9 not

;: Y the '

9* '.Che prewar, Fi • , .■ ' "•'.-■ : :' \ 7i\

was the le b colo; lal a Lstri in in &sia$

both a • "-" ; the develoj it and :•■ ' " of bo nati 3

peoples and as ; kc reli is with ot <r c v-

ftrnor : -' rites -re is inc: 1

to : ' : IPhe Chi :e are giving actit tpport to

the a ice nto France will pro' y enec

ser3 -•'". ■ ! ' re:Vi?.po tg French control in ' 1 Lna

10c :-:c y liberal .:'.c:' . toi >china

KO t ad ' the . ' -policies v;h. jco, : .se the

pari at : ; • of t : ; ' ■ P- ' "• giv

wit] the foreseeable future a _ genuine "o;; y for

tr bl

1/

;•

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

b '; - ?■■•' ' st be; t of March PA Is v 3 and 3

v," 1 Ined . Ltli care s indicates little int< &ion of

p ' g ; lf~mle ; ths Irvdo ' ' u 2ho

c" 1 French attitude t ■ Indochina is bsliev

to have bsen occasioned by ciV real:'.;/. 'the ■.

French r ':• : the . id a belief t: tt

A* -ican a; 1 of Fr< ;h : it ion can he \-

bv a liberalization of its policies tr trds Indochi ./

1;U It is stat ' ' policy - cession of

territory by InJi. hina to 'jChaiXand in 1941 :l not 1 , Used and that th: ritos tst be returned to'X sia» Enis

territory, ho.; . .. had in earlier yea: bo irrs 3d by t,he Fri sh f: Tiiaili 1 and its :' litants are cnli 7

akin to tl ' Similarly, 3 cs of Ls j v^ai :"■-

chaw g i - ! ' the 1 bao' - be 9 e

; border :. ': hina and £haj 111

be a sov. of ial conflict v * a a fair ■■

priate fro: '' ? is det ' ir.ip< : 1 Internat; : 1

co! :tssioho Th3 : ii (k s&nt t/ill accept any fa? ntier so deter; Lnedo v

14* It will be .' . victory over £apan vrhicii trill

.Ice poss.' " of j china* Vie • 3 f:< tog

to and stability in the and v/ill ?

Xn , ,, V jo: , Lty for its : : 5

a f ,- t a Encourage* rfe of and sistance to tl

t^e ' ' that s s but v/ould i bs ths c ; prac-

tic ' rhich v; a a p and stability in the

Far"East* If this policy is ot followed, *:' millions who

X: v.- -;■ I • " i&eo3 co ' ry to

q^j. lop a pan-./ it aj ' t

... tiorldt. It is not &, the for

f:■..-. ■ •'*" t). . ' give ac

assn ^ ' ■" : " '-' ' - P°«

15

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

Re< to

» ■ . i—■ i.

I In the ^ight of the abc considerations s the follovr~ ins : iatio 9 Yfhich h been ec ' 1 to the

War c 7y Depart bs for their c ' ; « " Bitted

Tor v approvals

lo The Gove:.. it of the United States should not seels v. 1 bees-hip 9 int .tio: 1 or French 9 o - Indocj '■ v (©s it ; sks s liar trusl \ :h as

Di -h ovo.7 Burma and the Netherlands ': Iies« ; t: ' ct States see?; international acx ly uhich

is not sought tor the a ' •■ \ a Its3 la

not ppos : toration of Xndoe< to Fra P p ovided

the h give adequate a • that t' y will meet

the folio ' , tdlti so

an Develop sent of a dm ratio ' 1 or fee 1 t '; srn sat to "bo run for and ireas-in y by " Indochin 3 *;:"v selves with no special privileges : : h or other persons

who are , >t inhabit i,ts £ ci s of Irri>

china so .t v;:lt" ' •. t able futiiro

Xndocl '■ i be fully self«g srnin i 1 a m«

j e'.v pt in matters of :' ; 1 In

V:- Ich Indochina should be a pa: fcnec in ths French 0:

o

be Maintenance of a policy of non-diserjb. ; i : ;iory treai; - nt and of eo] ipl< ' 3 e ic and cge dal equality©

Co Establishment or Haiphong as a free port with tax-free transit facilities between Haiphong and China*

a

d* Acceptance of a frontier he -en Indoc ia and Ehaili l s to he determined by an imp; rtial inter national ■ dssion.

e D Accept of such int al

secu Lty arrange fcs, :""•■'•' American or

inters onal bas 3 as nay be ds"l d to

cess*' :<■ for int : ?urity 9

Of (a ' !

i

2n For '■•■■ t] he United

bl it7i .' 31 ." " ""■

' :. . £ French (

is

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 633 L6. By: NWD Date: 2011

J

* . *

3o The French Provisional C70 it >uld bs

in# isclj confidential ■-, tl P c ;j to ■'. ed o? eon-

*.; : ig all onr res: . : the Pacific on 0;

a! ly pla ted ? / . : . ' ary operations aimed direct' at b se lil ation of Indoc3 eg lot be contemplated v "L

c

after the d fc of »■ an ? . nor will it be pos . ; '. ' 11

any coaajiitments 1 the i ' i g o.C rnilii y eon' &

ov snppl to resistance groups :1m Xj 3 thina or to l. leh military forces in the Asiatic the; es of war*

4o French offers or . : . ,- and naval as! 3 in t cifle should ba ace bed or rejected by :

'■:.10 ties solely on tl Lr : ' y merits as beari upon it of Jaj v as in the c of 3 and fcch proposal

17

Declassified per Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

f " •

r*f

Department of ssta.

THE UND! SECRETAri

\j

umoB on :

$1

April 24. 1945

Mt*. Punn left the following message to be delivered

to Mr. & ' on the f of I: a:

Mr* Dunn Btal -\ thai: ha t] It was ):■ y d<

able So cl:. ';* c position on Indochina and * " at ""

\ ■ lcI boon dravm up by EUB and ;

Mr. D'j 1-8 definitely c; accept *q revi-

sion-* Re it It would b r ju3t to

the ma' • n* dr. vat* nan 1 our policy on She FiS

■ sraion ■ ■ tiria p: i - Hov/o* p ho i >ulcl

grftPvtly prefer to have us c' ■ up ::*■ Xnc s) -

Krs sooi •• pos3 e e

■

Mr, ' J«fl th . he b^lle* that Just no^ especially we : i; C ~ T te ^° ' : ' ^: 'V and I ■ 5 the stri " Su: t c (and :.-j hope t will ba Bt sr and at >lp her)*

1 ? ana the and g! Id try to

all-.> her appr< ' ^l r - ■' aro ( prsp ■-■■ tl

fcerritorj be : - "• away £ro her* 70 i : " .

ftic^a is • - > e : ' '^ r;i •' ' ■ . ' ' - 7* •-can on*. ' " -; £

so. for* exa *pl9, to br 3 F; to iispro' 2 ths Gove: -

: nd conditio Shore ) i I ■ 1' not

m

Mr. Dunn emphasized his no?. tl no-; in the time

for ■ to co : v/hole Cedly with , In this

connection he re- red to Lb recent co ttion ~;;l';h

Bid; It; in v: -■ the latter [&ed : :\3 for w rn

eivlli^atic ) as a result o? the donii 0 of ;

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MEMORY OB THE PRESIDENT Subject: American Policy with Respect to Indochina

Ger 1 Observations

1. The Japanese aggression a< st the French in Indochina has "brought about a marked increase in the number of proposals need by the French for the use of French forces and resources in the Pacific.

2. These proposals and recent military developments make it essential that the United States reach a definitive determination regarding its policy toward Indochina,

3. It is established American policy to aid France to regain her strer bfa in order that she may be bettei _. «.tted to share responsibility in maintaining the peace of Europe and of the world. It seems par-ticul iy important that at this time the United States should draw close to France and Great Brit he stro st Western Powers, and attempt to remove the sourc of friction between the United States and France, whici ftch apprel ions that we are going to propose that French territc 1 _■-: 1 ray. However, in pur sir this policy,

he United States must not jeop; e its increasingly important interests in Southeast Asia and must take into account the dynamic forces leading towards self government in that ■ social, economic or political instability may threaten the peace of the Far East and the world.

If, The United St cites Government has publicly taken the position that it recogs i ' so i jv iction of France over French possessions oversea n i e possessions are resisting the e and has expressed the hope that it will see the re~establishment of tl integrity of French territc , The surrender of Indochina to Japan, however, not only opt i the way to Japanese conquest of southeastern Asia and the Inc tit exposed China's southwestern fl; Ln the midst of its war with Japan. Ifert 11 recently there coll tion

on the part of Indo Lna with the d nese, but Japanese aggression in Indochina has now given rise to resistance on the y of local French and native elements*

5 fl Altho " Roosevelt had in the pact expressed his preference v should be placed under trustee Lp, he

neve] apprc sta at is; the Secretary of State on April 3, 19^-5 *&X* " to the plans approved at Yalta which can " I tiie c on that Indochin ould only come under a prop-

trustee r re J voli ction by t rich. The

U n: ; States position that trusteeship should apply only to ated and c territory and territories voluntarily ced under the sysl

COPY

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number; NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

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by states respo Lble for their administration has been re-affir I during the current discuss!' at San Franc o. It is abundantly clear that there is no possibility at the present t' or in the foreseeable future that France will volunteer to place Indochina under trusteeship 9 or consent to anj program of international accountability which is not applied to the colonial possessions of other powers*

6. French policies in Indochina before the war were unsatisfactory both as regards the Indo T jsc and as regards economic and commercial relations with other countries. There is increasing independence si Leiii among the Indochinese and this movement appears to It re at least the tacit support of China. ! re aj indications, however, that the present French Government is emba "ng i a new policy which is taking the factors into account. On several occasions in recent years 3 French authorities have iss; policy statements on the future of Indochina. These fellow a general trend toward greater autonomy for the French administration of Indochina but the most recent statement, that of March 2k 9 19^5* 3s still vague and Indicates little progress toward the establishment of genuine self rule for the Indochinese or of an open door economic policy in Indochina.

7* The economic policies pursued before the war by the French admin istr at ion in respect to foreign trade with China thr< Haiphong, and over the Yunaan railway affected adversely the economic develop-

of southwest China and foreign coe rce with that region. Unless the situation is changed, this 1 be an increasingly important source of po, ar friction.

8. The frontier between In hina and Thailand is also a potent! source of future trouble in southeastern Asia because it does not conform to ethnic and cultural oupings and involves conflicting historic clams.

Recommendations

In the light the abov tons, the following ni-

dations are submitted for your approval.

1. The Government of the United States should we J o the French Provisional Government its concern for the future peace end stability of the Far East and its views as to how French action with respect to Indochina can c ribute toward 1 maintenance of peace and" stability. To that 2 Co. - of a proposed telegraphic uc-tion to the Trie ador at Paris is enclosed ewith. In this instruction t Ambi to s the \ of the Trench.

Government on five specific t propo. Is which agpee r to be of chief import a for the future pje and sta Lity of this area.

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2. Pending the outcome of the proposed discussions in Paris the followinj rocedl 3 which is in line with 1 m views of the Joint Ch : of I will be followed:

(a) While avoiding so fai- as practicable unnecessary or long- & commitm*: th regard to the amount or cha r of any assistance which the United States / give to the French resistance forces in Indochina, this Government should con to afford such assistance as does not interfere with the requirements of other p] jed operations. The French Pro-vis io Government should be informed cor i J ly that owing to the need for concentrating all our resoir s in the Pacific on operations i ly planned, large-scale military operations aimed directly at the liDeration of Indo na cannot "be contemplated at this time. American troops should not be use J in Indochina except in American military operations against the Japanese•

(b) Free i offers of military and naval ast ice in the Pacific shott] be considered on their military merits as bearing on the objective of defeating J; - in the case of British and Dutch proposals. There would be no objection to furnishing of assistance to any French military or naval forces so approved regardless of the theatre of operations from which the assistance may be sent provided such assistance does not involve a diversion of ources which the O or Joint Chiefs of Staff consider are needed elsewhere.

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THE STAT MJAVY COORD 3 CC UTT

WA. ON, D. C.

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The Acting ■>"■ . ctavy of SUi o tht -I ntbaswador h, Frame [.& y)

"Washingtox, M; -1100 .

1943, Follow jrauj dated Mav 3 received from tin: Secretary

at Sat) E I ft ' j our inform; i.

m n-i

The r«It< i n lul tal <k£an3 I San

Frsuu'iwii i',- .. Xi*rU 2r» lo Jnn> £tt, is ."

"The subject of In . (Jhina cai up in n reeen! converse i T In with Bi !. The'latter Remarked that although the

:i Cm ■> I*icl:mlt, French 5J aim

French fcmme.nl interprets Mr: \\ ' sintei >f tS '■ c l*

cerniug the re of French sovereignty over the French Em*

-For text ti ,> rt«t*Hl April 13, I from .\ $ei i rrtftr.v of State $ni

tut Wnls i.iAiJ «ulm* < I »i3f<f»it n<*in i & nY/« Motions, .10-1 , ol.it,

p.5Gl f nr npiiHjhiwnl 'i' Stsilo HtfUvtbi, April is. 19-1:2, p.:;::"..

piiv its including Indo-Ohiua, flic [>i ■ — co ties to imply th speci situs will be reserved for ilii colonial area. It wa, nin qui clear to Hidault thai the m is entirely : irenl of any olliCial statement of this govt&rmi stionhu;, even.by implica-

tion, French sovereignty over I -('liinu. ( .-in bten ^ American public opinion, however, condemned French governmental policies and practices in 1 China. Ridanlt seemed relive and has ao doubi cabled Paris that In *ed assuranc

:/ .-. iiition of Fi ■ ■. fi rere y ov «i. s:

GtiEW

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C* ■ - ■ * Memonm hij lh< At S of Sltdt f<& President Ti

Wahjiixotox, May 16, 1945

With res] f to General deGraulle-sm igeofMaj 1.5 s i nun

'-■ Anncs to thl tu.

bi me desire to hav< Freud trtieipate in ' ; of

Am an fo in i Jap*tn, # fl i

ivhi ticlo Follow i ■ ideral ions i »d for | • ibl ■

us© i3i your conversation with the French Foi sign 'Mini I Gen-

oral Jtitn u ivow scheduled tor ton tow, May I , for Mr, Ridault,

* Gen. AIj ■ Trc Juta f? Staff,

and May I s for Oe i tuI J inn,

Tlir F tl»Sr i 3) military an*.] naval

,,, , i.ii rhe Far East wai Erencjj Naval

Mi.-- ' I • : > . on M*i rch 20, AY i Join] I

tr A,l:,,.. I fl,

of Sl«! ! ref' t for an csp i of

*vij I g >i State repli Aj>ri 5 that

p] ... Is in prii •• i • ■. cl ■ '. the poin

of view of reiaui i . i tit, rjeel

• . ry vs | in the thealu ions. It

i . . : . French

. rliei . iii Un il fuil

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

rhnent of State should I; be up the qui ion of prompt elur -Ri-ji of our policy on Indochina* In us much as (lie final di mi-iintton of policy wiili re . to Indochina will probably involve and depend upon discus ion« wii h . Veneh Government, ai.ul in as much as (he Secretary of State has t*xpiv.sscd Hie wish thai these discussion should nol be initiated al least e the present conference in San

Frond ■• ; - hi session, consideration of the matter has been restricted to the immediate implications of ;Gencra1 de Gaulh e to the

e] Unit Fran* e wished t<. pari icip i tively a1 ihe side of American foriN ihe dgii against Jap.-ui. This j age was discussed with the French Foreign Minister by the Pn tut and by the Aciin": Secretary of State and referred io in the President's public statemeul = * regarding his talks wit h M. Hidault. in the Inner "the

a to the ]-iv>s May IS, L) mrlinenl i £ State Bulletin May 20, If] p. 027/

President emphasized thai we arc faced with ;; still strong and deadly enemy in tin* Far F a whose defeat thr total resoun ' coun^

try, both in manpower and material, are pledged. IK* indicated thai such assistance a- France and our other Allies may bring t< lI Strug-gle and which may l)e sj i iromged with ope : '. ■ [y phim

or underway, will be we] rued/'

In the conversation which took pi in thcWhfr ay t^,

1945, Hie lv ti i '''/reel to General de ftaulle*s ii age ai i c-pn pel his appreciation of Fj i ' off* istance. The Presi-

dent then said "that he had a me row (Jen til de

G*udl< i the ■ ' France would be glad b p the

was i insi -Japan alongsi Pnited e Pre ident

express hisappr* iion of Fram istauc T

sklent said thai ii is his , I y to leave to (hi C i^fuvder-in^hief in the tU'lA mat) re dialing to th.e p< ndu f the war and that in tlits case also he,w - to the rnmandcr-in-< ;",

U.S. Army F< > Pacific, ' | the i dilation of whether it would

pi•;;•■ helpful to have Fronch f-* -v join with ns in th

Opera ioi pan. He indicated that such assi France

and oi • i her Allies niighi bring to (he : i< the Pacific, which

would svn with operutio adv uned or under w, ..

wi !. The Prei thought that the question wo

depend in large n are on tin problem of fcrcra ... tul, as H 3fi i' no doubt was it >•. this was an important problem involving [hive tin c the i innate rha'i had been used in I war

in the Atki ' k cl was i | id".'-

On the followh day the samp was again n rred to i

the follov ii in a co i'i ;. . ■, \ cen the Acting i sir;

of State and the French iign XJ i : ■ I i

the pom which had been touched nj the V.. s tlui

pf French milhi y assi v in tl>e Fi i si in the wa'r Japan. I remii I SI . - nil rlntt while the President I IMf, i 'j ion will

ii: Iteater, he i ie prob

;«-.■• judged on its merits the ry aul . i • i it v a i p io

.

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 NND Project Number; NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

G. LOX rt X*i.lll 11 ^ L'uTo h and where I idi

mHitarv contrilm! ion *-<>:ili1 be h atilizecl. The Minister that there v,v;v-two French divisions n-iuiy for im iate transport tion to the Fur L In reply to my turpi Try as lo whether tin are Senegalese t among them, he admitted thai this was j< l>]y so,

although there were nl ant Jul imWrs of white French, lie

made il clear thai the F ]j divisi could he utilized anywh in the Far East, and rlu r< ^ i of Itniiti

tribution to attacking the imemy in Indochina, 1 reiterated that this matter wglild be pi Hilary at t»s imme-

diately,

]n as much i (he Acting Secretary of State agreed that the in; \ t>uld be placed I ire military authorises immediately^ it is recommended thai tike foregoing I brought to the attention of the Joini of 5 taft at the earliest i uont. In 11 i I Ion,

the fol wing tions which are believed to be in bar, ^ y with

tin I i icy i f ih ;n: ( St:i: are pui forward:

(//) While avoiding so far able unnt wry or lo

. iminitinents with repird to the aiiiount or character of! . : tance

which the-1 tcsmnj* give to French resistance fo do-

china, this ( should continue ta afford such assistance as

does not interfere with the requirements of < .planned op Owing to the need for con >t tn rating all our ■ « in I In Pa ific

on operations already phi . lares military operations ai i

reclly al the lil a tion of Indochina cannot, h I con

pin 'ai tins time* American tro | should be used in Ind

i;i A inertcan military the Ja]

(/,) Frei OjI milii ary ai al as i e in the T?m

should be con klered on their military merit; taring on llt&obji five of defeating Japan as in tl Iritishand Dutch prop*

XI.■ n io furnishing of ■ e to any Fr

military or naval force approved, re of the the; of <

ns from • at, provided : - ist-

ai>C'C doei ti ■ h diversion of re -h th 'ombiue

jo i Stafl' consider are nee ed t-e.

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FOR to &MBASS >B PROM THE ACTIB8 SEGSBTAKT*

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The President thanks you for- your cons icier 3d tele-gram in re 0 ard to the problems presented by the reestablish :nt of French control in Indoehliis a:xl the Fritish desire to re occupy Hongkong and fully appreciates the difficulties in which you and Genera] one-yor may be

' placed on account of the lack of specific directives in respect to both of these problems fcihich have bean m careful study both here and in connection v&th the discuss ions at &eii Franc 1 sco *

I h:*ve also received your Liessa 0 e Ko« l^l\B of June 6 end regret thct frl e has been delay in teplyinj to your earlier one owln^ to the study which has been required of these matters in connection with present developments at the Conference. The President h^s s-sUed me to si y that there has been no basic change in the policy in respect to these two questions anc that the present position is as follows-:

The ^resident assumes thi.t you '\re familiar with the ateteoent i-de by the Secret ry of LU-te on April J, I9I4.5 with the approval of /resident ftoosevelt in which-tip, Stettlnius aeclrrod that as a result of the Yalta discussions the "trusteeship structure., it v:rs felt, should be defined to permit the placing under it of such of - territories taken from the enemy in this w&Sj as might be agreed upon at a later date, end al^o such other i territories &s rai-^ht voluntarily be placed nr r trusts ■ / ship". The position thus publicly announced has been con-fir ' by the eonversati ts which are now taking place

in San Francasco

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

s

S (; ri 3 T

in San FyancisGO in regard to trusteeships* Throughout these discussions[the American delegation has Insisted upon the necessity of providing for a progressive measure of self-government for all dependent peoples looking toward their eventual inf nee or incorporation in

sorae" form of federation according to circumstances and the ability of the peoples to assume these responsibilities. Such decisions would preclude the establishment of a trusteeship in In ^china except with the conront of the French Gove pent. The latter seems- unlikely. Nevertheless it is the President's intention at sane appropriate time to ask that the French Government give some posit :; indication of its intentions in regard to the establishment of civil liberties and increasing measures of self-government in Indochina before formula ting further declarations of policy in this respect//

In. the meantime the President has explained to the French Forei 0 n Minister that v^rer s we welcome French > participation in the war against Japan the determination

of the extent that it would be practical end helpful to have French forces join with us in such operations must be left to the Commander in Chief x United States Army Forces, Pacific* The Joint Chiefs of Staff are at present

engage^ "*" n a s ^ u ^3 r °- ^ ie possibilities of French help alons the lines of the following su^estionsj

(a) While avoiding so far as practicable unnecessary or ions-term commitments with regard to the amount or character of any assistance which the United States iftay give to French resistance forces in Indochinaj this Government should continue to afford such assistance as does not interfere with the requirements of other planned operations 1 . Owing to the need for concentrating all our resources in the Pacific on operatic already planned, large-scale military op-er- ions aimed directly at the liberation of Indochina cannot, hot/ever, be contemplated at this t' . American troops should not be used in Indochina except in American military operations against the Japatieset

(b) French offers of military and naval assistance in the Pacific should be considered on tJ Iv military merits as becrin^: on the objective of defeating J en as in the case of

British ■

S L C H E T

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number; NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 i

S E G H

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British ©nd Dutch proposals, Tnerc ./ould be xio objection to furnishing of assistance to \ any French military or naval forces so approved.,, 1 regardless of the theatre of operations from I wh ;i c 1} the a ssis fc&ne e may. be sent 9 prov I d ed ruc h iassistance does not involve a diversion of resources which the Combined or Joint Chiefs of Staff consider are needed elsevheret

/s/ Gfsv;

Acting

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an organisation si tilar to thai of cost i srica

Par E-

It is therefore requested, In regard ' as v to sup-

porting array corps -.5 and services, thai the t; pes of units to 1 organized, be exactly gfined,

XL is finally suggested, in order to facilitate fui I "ncgotiai i i s t ;. Supreme Headquai s, Allied E;q>Gditionary Force, be a : deal directly with eneh command iu what concerns details of

mutters herewith referred to.

A* XI. Bkossix de Saixt Bdk

1

[Enc o B] lop ssgsbt

Draft Mbmoeanbsdi foe the Chief or a Frkxcii Militah's: ^ rssiox

TO TKK UxiTKD St.

1. With reference to your men urn of 30 _ Es y 5 3 addr

io the Chief of Staff, U. S. Array, the XJni - " !

;, in ; Lple that portion of your proposal v.. iby the Fn Govs ait puts i ha -entire dis] I be A (oani i

French army corps of two h *y di s, with co,

. Ld service units on the U. R. . • E r op

Japan, This acceptance in £ ; that

the agrei -it on this E .er with the French Government w2 ' acta the following provisions:—

. TL a<:■;. corps a, bom i

and in the pa readju t period

United States, subje United £ 2s coj id in tlic firmer i . "J. S, ars ; . i-ps.

J, i lent . loo-ti , .".

Fx i - of United Stat ■

com" tiencybs J on United States sta - $.

c. Assi 1 bo provided

ie F] '• So 1 emu us n ■

rf. Mi -urn use will be le of e . ent pro 1 North African ai ;n Hear: it Pro is.,

e. The imp] ion of tis a'«pn ■ i tcb as

accompi yingsup] 3,provisi ; [pmei

and the ' I iming t e - - n e ! employ:

corps wi [ be mi scbrdaa ffith plans i aro . gements to be determined by the Unitel States rnih ury i u i nities ■ d v.-":. d -..': directly with the French military authorities.

s Enclosure A, supra.

[No. 12S3]

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cox srrs and sopplemektart papers

[Enclosure] TOP SECRET

Dli.MT

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Mr.MOR.v • ran the Cktef of the Frbkch Military Mi

in Tin: United States 4

The Combined Chi of S accept in principle your offer of a French corps of two infantry divisions to tvi in the Pacific war oi; the lie I ^standing that:—■

a. Whether the corp [Unserve under V. S. or British ep ;

and the area in which if w'M open will be cl trained later.

6. Final ac re of th ps wilt involve an agreement with tl

government concerned on basic matters inciudiug command, con:! efficiency^ n . \ and In ] support.

c. Maximum use will bo made of equipment provided under v. ■ North African and Metropoli i B racial ■ ■' Pro]

d. The ti of poveinent will be in accord&J with the priority of the opcratioi in which it is to be 1. Prcssinj ipping i other requirements for operations in the Pacific make e in that the corp.- cai t he moveil from J 1 .- for at least several months, Whel • used in the main efforl or in the South Chi] a area, it will not be possible to commit i! to o a•• pri »r to the sp

19 J 6.

* This text was corumtml i lie f of the French Mill y MI

a mcmor«v ! y the Co ined Secret I of the C ct Chiefs

of Staff in Washington on July 19.

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CONFERENCE DOCUMENTS AX1) SUPPLEMENTARY PAP

d. In cooper: : " q with other Allies cc ttions, if ■

to lil 1 ■ eneinj ar ar

is.

IV. Till; 1VAU AGAINST JAVA

Strategic Direction qf ilr. War

8. Wo bare discussed the strategic direction of the v* ar again Japan and have agr< id as follows:—

& Tli'3 control of operational strategy in the Pacific Theater remain in ike Lauds of the 1 " >! St ■ I iefs of Sti

&/Thc United States Chi Staff w ill j ridethoBri

of Stall with full and timely h as to their f plan

mtei is.

c. The United os Chiefs of Staff will consult the ) h CI

of Staff on matters of general strategy on the und nding tl \ , the event of disaj . Em : : ' i n the n ' m to be i !

win lie with the United State fi\

d. In the event the British Chiefs of ! I ;T should d " that tl tdt commit British troops in support of n d ion made by

I States Ci of Staff as indicated in c. above, the Bi Chiefs of Staff will give to the Ui 'ofs of Staff su

advance notice of their decision a ill permit them to make time!;; ■merits.

e. In fcho event the V. B. S. R. enters the v.-ar agai an, tl strategy to be pv ' i hotild be discussed b i the parties c*

i rricd.

Opera lions in fiifl J\u:ifio

9. We hare taken note of the plans and operations proposed bv the United States Chiefs of Stal i App !ix "A."

10. We have eon suit rod the scope and nature of British partici] tion in opera in the Pacific area. Our conclusions are as follows:-

a. The British Pacific Fleet \r3\ participate as at present |)lan

b. A British very long range bomber f i of 10 squadrons, inert ing to 20 i Ire ii'fields becom ble, will p ticlpate. There is li prospect that airfield sj for more tl 10 squadrons of this force will become available before 1 Decern* 1945 at the earliest,

c. We ] I in principle that a Commonwealth land fo and, if possible, a small helical air force, should take part, in t" final phase of the war t Japan, subject to the s Lorr resolution of operational and other probl *ras. In addition, soil units of the British 8 East Inril t mi bo t-nh p .

#

1L In con n with paragraph 10 c* above, we have jk,

that the appropri British command and staff should visit Admiml Nimitz and ( ! "■•'. cArtl i and d up with lb

a plan for submission to the Com Chiefs of Stafi".

a 1 j ; \) " h f1 does not •• . Q ' point in C. C. & £00/2.

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 2011

REPORT J>V COMIUXED CHIEFS OF STAFF

• '" ' Southeast Asia (

-

12. We 5 discussed tlie instructions iliould be 1 Dd to

Supreme Allied Coram- \r f So;: - , and have agr*

on. the terms of the directive in Appendix '15."

\;!bcation qf Areas and Command in &e Swift . ■ 1 ' \ft \ and Sou east A Areas

13. We have agreed in principle that that pa Southwi oific Area lying south of the boundary described in Append! '(

should pass from Unl States to British command as soon as possible. The British Chiefs of Staff have undertaken to obtain the agreement of tlie Australian, New Zealand] and Dutch Governments jo these proposals and to investigate and report thi tpn -able

late on which the transfer can be effected.

14. We con ider it desirable that initially Admiral Mountbatfc control 0] ls und taken in southern Indo-China since i 1

more closely relate 1 to those of Southeast Asia Command thi to those of the China The We are agreed that the best arrange-

ment would be to include that portion of Indo-China lying south of latitude 10° north in Southeast. Asia Command. This nt

xould continue General "\\\ a oyer's control of tlmi pari of Indo-China which covers the flunk of projected Chinese operations in China, and would enable Admiral Mountbatten to prepare the ground m the sou.0 I If of Indo-China where any initial operations by him would develop.

We recommend that an approach to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek 4 be made by our two governments to secure his agreement to ti arrangement.

At a later date it may prove to be desirable to place all o j ti of the remainder of Indo-China within the sphere of operations of the .Southeast Asia Command,

nch and Dutch Participation in the War

15. We have considered the r which can be made for Frr I Dutch participation in the war against Japan and o conclusions are as follows:—

a. While it is at p: im ble due chiefly to 1

Officii! French or Netb armed forces to take a major

i in tlie immediate oper lis in the Far East, the provisi uofsu !

istance which may be sync' ' 1 with o] >ns will be taken

Into ace 6, The use of such forces will di id solely on mi considerations. French or > lands forces so accepted must

.rate under the coin] ol of the <:■• aander in chief

nnceraed.

* C. C. S. 000/2 reads: "an aj teb io the Ger ao M *

av»iaoi]

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;E OF STRATEGIC

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Hone ole Ja sC. Bur Assists Secretary of SI &< D tit it of * .te

Dear Jimmy:

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tative in Kunming. Will you kindly see that : : rear s his desk? Thank you.

Sincerely yours

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OFFICE OF STi -G1C VICE

WASHINGTON 23, D. C.

22 August 1945

'

3BMD0M FOE THE SECRETARY OF S! E:

he S'rej ' ive in Ku> ' tranr Ltted the foil g infc lion concerning the F< toi h the Inc" -Chi-

nese Provisional Government. The 1 Government was e subject, of our two i anda of 21 Augi.v '

The French Gove? it has decided to i ?t a passive diplomatic attit ; t< reoccv tion of In do-China be so c. their inability to make an entry ith a powerful s" ar; k committee of three has been appoi eel by the F it in Paris, co & of the chief c the Kv 7,' ich intelligence Service?, the Mini-- ar of Colonies, and nistra-tor al of' Coloi ies. Its issio; Is to cc b h lead s and n otiate with t- . t- \able to the Indo-Chinese, acco to Major £ ho will r sent 1 commi • Hi i. The French pc ;y will be one of liberal a : istr : on in the capac.' of ors to the Indo-Chinese Prov. Govern it, to v : by the Kuoi Intang An-nami d the Vietminh, which ler form a c a-tional liberat . (The Vi< ' 3 a . > Cc ' t party, a r bership of lately 2( the active political n ele it. The Kuo s six minora ar sc 3 of independent ones.) The*French C ls been ed with 1 ' ta ng - I Oh? ^e ers anc : en 1 oper U. It has J 1 cowers o treaties in the name ^ce. The committee 111 in turn report to I" bains the pre e of akiw minor ^° the gen ;re ant. Anns -e lead-res \ of the C< Lbei Ion Com-m j ee j f >i, .have exp: 2d a c" ' s to brj

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

"

-•

Hell-informed French and Am ?. sources state - the ; ral C< ittee has been negol Lth 3 1 Japar ' u-thorities for the pra se. of g id ai sinita , wit}-tent of using them, should « er the French or Chi se to reoccupy their areas. '. Inclc ie fear a Chinese r c-cupation because they feel the Chin ill become squa ?s living c bl land, : looting. The I aeh

concu: . thj opinion only in so far as to wish exclusive ad-

•ative rights for t. el' . The leader of g k ite Kuo i itang rty in China and a d representative of the Cen il Liberation C ittee in Hanoi, made t following st i -ment on 15 August:

"Should the Frencl to ret i to Indo-China le intention of governing the c d to act once more as oppr Se Indo-Chinese people are prep? :1 to i to" id against any s h reoc pation. On the other , if they c 3 as fri Is to establish commerce, industry and withoi spirations to j sven , t" y will be the $ as any other foreign pc The Central ( ashes to nu ! . m to the Ui 1 St Government .t 1 i Indo-Chinei le est of all desire the independence of Indo hina, and are hopa that the Unit-- ' s a champion of scracy, will assist her in seen in/? this ind in the foil ' manner:

ploit the resources of the land; and (.•') developing thoj

\ tes hat Indo-China is ca; ble i supporti .

"In c- asi< Indo-Chinese woi 1: to be placed on ti sta 3 as the .es for an undet* i period. •

■

ip Fj eh repr in ' jor ' '» is re ~

il aid i . ->A ML.

) C [ for the : ' • K

jrec .o "! W ; '• '» 0il aI

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Declassified per Executive Order L3526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 I

at air , t ;re cor ' Chinese a erican

xiic abo the j -•, prohibiting t i fj

1< ; - the airfield. In convert ion 1 r that Ltb j •

j : .nt ', he ssed the ht ' French h.

trayed by 1 ri< s. He further that the Americ

in C ia have right along been p'J linese ga ie, all igh

u Ltt <;:hen. qr t eonceri s int from :

on, lie i iictantly stated there \ not the French to do

but await instruct: from C The Jft ich DG$ X r a~

mir had infiltrat- .earns of men into fiaj r the l€

ershin of a ''■ ' ' Blanc He has h Li. ( L.

—

Kamiya, f< r li; o c icer : aen the J; qi ters in Hanoi and Admi: al Decoux 1 Luis ation. X '. detained t team in Haiphong, ' to '

ssages cone ' x-ende: ad meteoro? ;ieal dat

to ioli I larters in

Reports from ' " t Col. Roos, C of the . c In

Calcutl is now en route to £ ,o 1 part i: the J ■■

ese surrender on tt 'f of t" a r sentat:* ith

Col. JR( is Col. Fay, for. 1; Fi ;h ' ' ,

-de' ined, but lo is ber of !

Mountbatten'

^VW"'-

illiam J. Pono*.

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 NND Project Number; NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

S5lO.ftl/10-r»4S5 : Trfrtfram

Tht At ' tart/of i, tJu ClutrgP h China {Roberttion)

TV \xnTi,s. ( »ber 5, 19-45—(5 p, i

1622* Folio ; Ttinent extracts from Dcpl R57 August 30, to

Kcw Delhi M for Bishops are repeated for your iiifonnation,

l *,Ma\' W. Bi#hc!i>, - rt'tnry of U ' uiprfrftH Oman* Iks Jmi ;h Xcw Delhi*

"ITS has no thought ol opp » tJie i of French con-

trol in Indochina and no o fteial sfai . by US Gov! has q fcioned

even by implication French sovereignity over Indochina. Howcvi

is not the policy of this Qovj I the French to ree ablh

iheir control ov< r h by Force and ilie willingness of the US

to see French control ablished a: rones that French claim t

have the sup] ■ of the population of Indochina is borne ou< by future events.

AOHESOX

8510.1 10 1245. v mm

Ti . Lm&tf r ?' in Fi ' (C • _ ) ft? //■•■ $

Pakis. October 12, tl -7p,m [Re . i I < ■ l 1 13—1:30 a* m.]

600fi. My 5964, Octol I0* ae ] V s l/oneb

gives Further details re Franco-British agreement on Indochina. Lc Mondi •' k nt will . be ] ted at tins time bill til

principal provi. . ■ known*

Ju the French Civil Adminisfratil i i ed as

sale authority in i ha1 pan of] utli of 16th parallel* On

exception 1.1 From presenci British troops in this pail i

Indochi cither e lo no* ret principles of xi rcment.

L> lilo'i i I is i' nniho reh I

French Civil Admhmtratio i\d Bri military authorities an

ihnt HniLsh Ooi ■ ' will not ii in civil affair*

except Ihronjrh French tvi tb rentier in Turkey agree to fulfill

any veq\ ;. arising from pre* we? of British troops, Ag provides Ihiiisli tra will only be rhere tei rfly Forpurp of

enforcing tei i of Jap surrender i A llu

priso civilian in en

II is again em] *d thai dial atmosphere of n .

wa lication • f ity of Franco Briti latio bi |

i he v. orld-

Senl Dep ii as 6i I , . ■ p« I London as 748*

C ! ■ 'KRY

Declassified per Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

The Atnl>, (for In-France {Caffcry) to the -" *Jary of State

m

P*uqs, November 2 . L915. [Received November 28—J: 03 p. m.]

6857, Speaking of [n hina Chaiivel" stud that when trouble?

** Jean Cfcattvel, Secretary-Gemini to rli \\ Minister for Foreign Affairs'.

with the Annamites broke out clc Gaulle had In-, n ii'gedby the French Mi on in India to snake som< ficy statement annotmcing

Fran ionfoudopl n far-reaching progr ivepolic

to give the native population much greater authority, i atsibili and representation in govt. Do I He considered the idea but rejected il because m the state of cti order prevailing in I china lie believed thai no such policy could be implemented pending n torati< French authority and would therefore i be eons' I by everyone as "merely more-fine \rords". Furthermore d< Gaulli and the F\ . Minister believe thai the present situation h still so c used and they have so little in format inn really reliable on tl i revall Indochina pic* ture thai - uch plans and thoi ghts as they held heretofore may have to be wry thoroughly revised in the light of ; dcvclopm mts.

Despite the that the French do not feel that they can as

make any general statements outlining specific future plans for I ml

inn, Chauvcl says thai they hope "very \iv- to pu1 into op ton in certain areas proghum including local elections which will be designed to granl much greater authi y and great w void m aft to the natives, This he said would bo n much better indication of the sincerity pf FY< h intentions than any policy statement,

In this connection In aid thai Admiral ciMrseiifieu M is in touch

: ■ .\m.i. Thierry ti*A risen Ik* tverum* General «f French [ml Inn. with tho King of Cambodia and the latter has iwlii rl thai lie has

[ilitytoth! \ch (I on the contrary apparently tears bo

Aunamvl Aiyh pirations). The Flinch hop ■ i to neg

tinte an agreement with him which will result in the pouring of mu

ter i-espi ibility and authority to the Cambodians, lie mentioned specifically that rheri would be many more natives hue ted into the local aclmiuii i ive servi nd il was also hoped that local I ctionj could i ho held. The iMvneh lie said intend to follow the procedure in Laos when the situate permits and ituall; in Ai Tonkin, When ■ i* is n red throughout Indo-

china and agt have been I with the individual sfctii

NFID FTIAL •

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 NND Pro]©:! Number; NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

Oliaiiwl said I lie Kivm-h inj tin body the result* of these sepa-

rate? tijrix^cmctits info a jreneral \> mm for all of (ndorhina.

Insofar its (lie Chinese ixyb concerned Chauvel said thai lie does not believe lb03 arc eiicourn#tn*rthe Annamites who have a hearty dislike of the Chinese nor docs he believe flicy Iinve any Jerrilorlal n&piirafi in Indochina, On the other Im-ud be ihinks the Chinese are definitely trying (o {ret (lie maximum w ;»e* from Hie French in the form of

upational fosts for their uriiiy, el cetera (my (5815, Xoveiubei - ')

An! prlllfC

He also mentioned I he ero 11c nej with (lie Chines 1

lathijrto Indochina and said that th Pr I etty agreeable to

tablishinj poils for the Chinese wtHicci ' 1 transit riglil

and use of railways, ei cetera in Tonkhi \v] they would be of real use but ibe Chinese are demanding free port and transit rights for (be whole Indochina, Furthermore, the Chinese are di i of obtaining title to the northern section of 1 lie lucl ¥11 an Kail way. Chauvel was not inclined tophi any great import; of [of£\ these di H'erena • I'opii andthoujd &nt w-Hl be reached.

Qa

'COr >EN',

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 NND Project Number; NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3,3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Dale: 20! 1

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DEFARTH3NT OF STATE OFFICE OF EUROPEAN AFFAIRS DIVISION OF WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

January 18 % l$k6

w. Acheson

As you know we have teen following a policy by which we will not permit the French to buy armai nt and. military maintenance supplies for use in Indochina* The British military authorities in Indochina have now asked pep sic to turn over to the French some 800 jeeps and trucks which had been given to the British under Lend-Lease, and which are now in Indochina * The British state that the French must have this equipment so that they can maintain order in Indochina when they have taken over from the British* Our own military authorities have recomme ed approval of the British request. The French, and no doubt the British also s will be very much upset if we refuse to permit this transfer© However s in the light of our recently adopted policy wd may be subjecting ourselves to criticism if v/e permit this transfer for the purposes stated s i#e M maintenance of order. '

I would appreciate having your direction as"to the response which we should make to the military.

II. Freeman Matthews

WE:PTC

^/Handwritten note by Acheson7

EUR Mr. Matthews«

I dincus ' ; this with the President who thought that we should agreo to the transfer. He pointed out that this does not bring any new equipment into the area and that to remove the trucks and jeeps would be impracticable*

.DA,

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NMD 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

FRENCH INDOCHINA

THE INTEREST OF THE UMTBD STATES EN NATIONALIST OPPOSI TJON TO RESTORATION OF FRENCH RITLE IX INDOCHINA "

1 For previmis (TorntuetttatlaM on thv fur arc of XttctnciiliMj s?i e Fwcltfu RefutiOH$ a 1045, vol. vi, i\>. — ff.

SSlC.Ofl i -Mi; :TM

-

Th' Se&vtiUty of Stitf. tu tin A**i*htnt Chief of the Dirfaion of South* east Asian Affiun (Lttnrl i, Then at Saigon

sechkt TTasuixctox, rTamiarj 2S, 194B- -noon.

Please proc I Hanoi, renin iningsueli tune as you consider necei sary, and report to Dept as fully as possible on conditions northern Ind* china and especially on any French-Tie* Minh negotiations* D'Argenlicu - understood to have stared privately that Fivik-U negotia-

* Acini. Thierry d'Argealieu, Hlgli Comniia^ioiier of Fn:. li [ndodiiiia.

tions with Ho Chi Miiih 3 hare been proceeding since late Xov and

Xi Tre$ident of flie Fruvistoual Govefmneiit t>£ Vietnam DeuwomtiL- Republic*', satisfactory agreemenf anticipated by end of Jan. Other reports deny existence negotiations. D'Argentieu also reported to have cxp d personal willingness accepi Philippine mode] for Aiitnatn with in/ pendente at end 30 years. Crtel from Saigon i tved Jtin 2± 4 ap-

*Xot prints.], bul see tttragntiih 2 of telegmiu 1S2, January 30, G i», nu, to

Chungking, V- —.

predated. Please try to secure maximum information 1 tail French or Annaniese ceo; lie agreements with Chinese and status of such agreements,

SSI exploring possibility for SSU representative pro 1 Hanoi. Reed B expected Saigon end of Feb.

s Charles 8 Reed* 2d, Causal assigned l«» Stiigoa.

B 111 X lis

831G.1 #M0

Jfenioi'fntdttm of Conn rtfon* by Mi, Richard L. Sharp, of the

Dhmhn of Smith A*hm Ajffrin

restricted [Wash ix«. rt»N.] January SO, 1940.

Participants: Brigadier General Philip E, Galluj r a War Department; Colonel VUtrup,TTsir I mem Liaison;

MrXkftita&It«d,F30; Sir. Woodruff Wallner, AVE;

HnAUbot Low: Fat," SEA;

Mr. Jl. L. Sharp, SKA.

"Cliiff. I '■'• i rt«H "f Smith*?!*! Asian Affairs,

COK DENTIAL

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

Asked whetij in his opinion, the Chin e-.would get out of Indochina 3 General Gallagher said that General Lu Y^n i/had told hirn the

7/ Commanding General of Chines: forces in Indochina.

Chinese would move out when the job given th the Allies was completed, General Gallagher said he thought they really intend to do this although the whole matter depend;; i 1 the removal of the panes . To date, shipping for this purpose has not been available but r it is understood that United States bottoms will be used, The question is, therefore, wl will such ships be allocated. General Gallagher said he had recommended to Gem demeyer 2/that high priority should be gi such allocation.

8/ It. Gen, Albert C. Wcdemeyer, Commanding General, U.S. F; s, China Theater, and concur] tly Chief of Staff, China Theater.

There are some 20 to 30 thousand Japanese in Haiphong and the Do Son Pe aula.

>lit 1 sett ;nt can be reached in Indochina L! the C e m out and they cannot do that until the Japanese are repatriated. General Gall; added that he thought US army teams would have to be put into :oehina to concentrate and prepare the Japanese for evacuation.

General Gallagher was asked whether he knew of any arrange t whereby French forces moving into the north would overlap departing Chin: ees. He replied fcta in December Sainteny 2/said tl 0 Fre ould enter until

w

Jean Sainteny, French Commissioner of Tonkin and North Amiam,

the Chinese left. General Gallagher thought the French were probably not get-ti far in negotiating with the Chi: on probler connected with their removal. Unless in the meantime something has been arranged between the French and the C aese, the French would probably infiltrate overland from the &ox rather than land in force in nor oris.

General Galla sr pointed 6u1 that little love v lost betw e Chinese and the French; that the presence of the American group in Hanoi restrained anti-French Chinese action; and that he himself had influenced General Lu Han to bring aintenj 1 Ho Chi Mirib together 3 confront both with a strong directive that order mast be maintained. The existence of a vacuum in the north with neither French nor Chinese troops present would be extremely igerous, as tl e would react strongly a t all French in the a , w3 ffould be helpless in protect ; themselves. To take over successfully, the French would need a sufficient force to co\ r whole. north. One or two modern Fre] divisions could, in Gen 1 Gallagher's opinion, de innai

In response to the 13 ion wl her the French could do more than ke key cities, he ad: 3 that the Annamese would to the hills and continue guerrilla e. Even in Saigon, he point* at, tin an m peaceful cJ ttish and French claims to the c rary. Establishment of Fi :h control could I eded up if they were able to drops thr< e north. The Ar , er, £ w§ll organized s so far as 1 ar go, ar ait- I armed, although they ha\^e no r , , shore bat le artill*

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 NND Project Number; NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

The <|tu 4'um was raised whether the French n ion in Hanoi w; it t fad negotiating vrith Ho Chi Minh. ( ; ral Galls v repli that the Vict Mitib Provisional Government was at firsl willing tu negotiate-; then in October, alter de GaulleV pronoun-■ - on

10 Gen. ChnHW rtt« GawltiN PnvhU»»t of the Pnrt'Mtmal 0 rtutieui of n Republic of Krauze tint II *T;imwu*y -'».

colonial policy, the Amuiinese refused to negotiate with the French and reacted vigorously against all French nationals in Hanoi, Tl Chinese mav succeed in putting in a less ai French Annanicse gov-ernment *<> that n m might go for- \ AH French efforts

to stimulate a palace revolution agaius* Tin were of no avail. Tin himself will not deal with *lie French. The Viet Minh »s strong and, regardless of 11 ssil le 'facial chaises in the Provisional Govern-menf, l;lo \rill be hehhul any continuing Annamese movement. Genral Gal burlier said ►hat Pain*env had told him he expected peaceful agreement between the French and the Annamese would, be reached l>v > i eflfo f h*tion.

General Gall* 1 was a*ked how effective f he Viet Minh admin-

istraHor would be wtth neither French nor Chun forces present He replied that on the whole he was impressed by the remarkably effective Annainepe administration. There was an personnel;

they were all enthr?iastic an 1 vonn«\bn* there were too few nf them. Whatever thi *r [eel-mica 1 skill, thev perhaps lack executive abili and experience sfnee *he technical services in Hanoi"were at first very well run bnl fraduajlv deteriorated T rainecl people for the government and at the municipal level are hn*k"m 7n (I pal Gallagher's opinion (lie Annamese are nol yet readv for self-government and in full-fledged con*petition with other nati thev would "1"$c their shir' ". Hoy v. the demand far independence is widespread and even in (lie villages Hie peasants refer to the example of the Philippine

Hi I willing*o cooperate with G'v-m Britain. FSSR.or frheTni*ed States and would perhaps even a ttle for French tutelage if that wen subordinated to control bv the o*ber nations. French control alone, however, will be strongly resisted* The deep~seatcd hatred for the French has been Fanned by e>rc< lutly clever Viel Minh piwia«*»n la-General Gallagher was asked whether the Aiinamese were realistic regarding their ability to stand tu> against French military force. Wliile thev are too en*hnsi«stie and too naive. \v> said, thev probably know th:H thev w'll he 1 etl They are strong on pan and reiterate their willing! "io figlri tn the las' man", bu Kev would be

*

slaughtered and they have been told thai and probably know it. The Annami would be no match for forci with modern ai ren if they tin nselves have some, which they may ha Chinese

found no Japanese roll ins artillerv and numerous Jaminese antiaircraft gnus in to have completely disappeared, Vnited States Armv 'vi nl i i ? ne**er did learn the extent of arms controlled bv the Yief Minh. Certainly the Chinese are not turning Japai over in them. Before V« J Day the Janai ■ tmdonhi-edly had armed : ml framed manv An A Japanese & n 1 claimed thev had

m

taken over on Uarcl ' imply been us thfrFn ronldno-h _ n n-troltheAnnai Jnittltissta 1 : f f; rnl Gallagher c!mm as a lie. He h: rd thai mi d r the pretexi of arming Amwmese

gendanne« for police duty iii F-Tanouthe.l '. icselmda I i 1

three dfettuH coutii . fisini.^ group when i med and

CONFID PIAL

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

1 ringing in a new one to be armed and trained. Furthermore, tlic Annan had acquired Japanese anus frmn arcrrods which !. been opened. G fterol GaMairher-did not know whether or not r !

Li n \, ' sarins to the Viet Jlinh.

* : JVpntj DSrrrtnr. 1 i-i Invalidation awl > tfclics Chitted National

Omr Military .\u\iirs.

General Gallagher was asked whether the presence of French hos-

lai'i - in the north would restrain Fi h forces when thev enter the region. Tie pointed out tha* onlv a fc^ French civilians had been removed by air. All the res*, 1 five thousand disarm

French troops, were still to be renu L The Chinese cannot take i hern out nor would Lit Han even permit their evacuation to the T)o Son Peninsula* Their presence had been a constant restraining influence on Saintenv. A?ked whether the Anna would lei the

■

French be evacuated, General Gallagher replied that they would have i if the Chinese were still there, but that these French natioi aid

be a real problem if f he Chinese were moved out. The American Army group had to I considerate pressure on the Chinesi to gi I them to,give any freed* in a? all to French civilians in Hatpin Hue and other centers besid Hanoi, However, the Chinese and French alone had arranged for shipments of food from the south. Tl American group, incid lly, had to intervene to prevent the moi tj by the French of & :h food or of food distributed bv the U.S. Army. The French nationals could be evacuated from Hongai and Tourane by (he United State when the Japanese were removed if the CI. would concentrate them at those ports Howi i*er, General Gallaghi noted, that would plac us in a position of working against tlie Annam

Originally, General Gallagher explained, tlie F ch exp -d the United States to ythi role in the north thai the British were

playing in tl In "JVhen fliey found us neutral they became moi

and more nntag I ic and did everything \ sible to persuade Unit States personnel to favor the French position. They hud no appreciation of the actual help which the American group gave to the prisoneriTof war and s< civilian French in the form of food s

medical aid, ai : \ on. Tlie Annamese, too s ex] Anieri in help

o: lly, having been thoroughly indoctrin I with the Atlantic

Charter and other ideological pronouncements. In our neutral role we were thus a disst] uitmenl to

In response to a question, Get 1 Gallagher gave his opinion that Lu Han would bi faithful to Cluuigki although as govern* of Yunnan he would also be influenced to maintain as fully as possible relations lei ween Yunnan and north Indochina which would 1 profitable to hitu, *

General Galhu at the half dozen or so top Freimh mil

tary officers held by the Ja| ?ehad »rtly

after Saiuteuy reu 1 Hanoi, lie did not know what had happeni to 1 )ecoux

**Ylci? Aflro. -Twin . ''"ViTLur t)i Frcueti fricfe bet-aiue ;i j>n*>

0| ■: ;.: itf J tpnll ill "Slit? 'h V'z">.

Asked how^o r" the Viet Xflnh wnerei General Oullagh

il rbsit the; were snunl tind sihve^fully gave the im] hot bet] communist. Rather, they cnipha* ; I their ii est in i

CONFIDENTIAL

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

dependence and their Annamcse na*Ti^ti?m. Tl^ir excellent onrani-f /;vi ii pucI nmpa^anda rechninnpfs. Gener?*! Gnllairher pointed our, vomII ceeni to have flip r nf some 1 influence, fieneral

GsiIU»*y]ipr <*rntpc1 flin! the minority Oao Da-j /rronn \n w rl itely Communist. In life rminfno. however. Hie YiiM'Minh should not 1 labeWI t'ull-fif.lovj rlftrh'tnairp A Binnisi.

Af fba nre<*pnJ rime rite Hanoi radio is controlled by the Chine 5 j=o/lvo Him ■ roninniniojtiinnl>p*>vwnTTf»noi ttncl Ruiwn, A British noli hi rv smd civilian Hafcon team wn- a^nl In H^noi and a Chh connfprnjn'i toSaiowi, ThoBrU^ *» i Ha^oi at fir a > made liule progress vt*]\ Hie Chimin i>nt General'Gal her tin land? they hai sine* m«u1* fn< iv headwa

The Phtnpse fift*li Armv in rt»p Fonfh of fhr f^mese scone and the WJrd ^mv si^otmd H«"f»i, both toi-n^ino- pomp SH tlioiwjuul nv*Bi have been tphl to concpn*rctfp for pcinovfll *o M*«rhiiria, hit! whether they have pc*im"nv ynovpfl ont pi < GptumiT Ga^hi/dw dcv»s jyoJ know. By Doi'i«i"l>or, however the fltnip«o 53rd Armv h;\d bpjjnn 'o come in front ^ii^an and would probably provide replacements for the other two A nnii .

Gp»er*l Gtiilp/rhfr nofed thai n c'Jc mine? bavp not been ci iii,iv ^earpd ;«t Vp&I from Hie northern ports mid r h:» T iln threat prorhWI bv Mip^p moii''> In*? In^ned and wouhl ron.tinnr* to hpln keep the Fn'Hi Hpi »nder^ki n F hir«e-Frt$b» binding oneraHons in that area.- Ti> Feb tba* fwdnr mil communications betwe< Saigon and Hanoi mi n # another year.

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3,3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Dale: 2011

1 he Awistant Chief of ta< OifMop of Xottffu A rh s (Lfih-

don) to ih* Secretary of State

SECnETAEY S.VKM >W February 5. 19 I

[Received February 5—3:05 p. m.}

TTar Series Saig 27, Refereu' e Wash ; T. We - ■■ all y in position !« ;ile li-lif on question* asked.

1, D*Argenlieu-Ho Chi Jlinh nego have in fact been going

on ssince November. There negol tat tons looking toward Fi 'h reeng-nit ion of independence for Aiuuimite to be worked out what along

Philippine lines. 1 have no knowledge of | eriod time content plated. Negotiations would j mbahly have been ronipleted by now but for Lec^erc raising nn objection. TFe told the A.dmiraFs Counril '1ml if these negotiations succeeded the French might as well leave Indochina altogether. He recoil 1 military reeonquesi and statefd]

HQ*S A rni v was all r tdvforit. Xeveil untiafions were later

resum A and are con* inning between Tin Chi Minh und Saint em who is French Commissioner for Tonkin. 1 rope they will be cam; d in

2 or 3 weeks. 13

a This imra^ratrih was reported by Hi I in its telegram 630, Feb-

ruary T. Lft-lfl l p. i«m i" Paris*, n-t m-hitad.

2. There tire no Chin economic agret with the Aiimunites.

3. Reference Franco-Chine; agreeme nothing formal yi Temporary and local agreements are -■. follows :

$l In north French pay in pin for maintenance of Chines

troops. These payments eon iidered as advanci on amounts French are s losed to receive as war damage from Japanese.

h. Small part of lhe. 3 e pias're advan» eupp d to be used for

withdrawal of some Chinese gold units ai official rate,

c, Chinese Government advances gold units which are freely convertible into CIiph' r- national dollars for exnenses of French repre sentntives in Chungking, Kunming und Shanghai. Such advances are only frai i or ainouul reach are paying for Chinese troops.

•A There is an agreemenl for exchange of Hanoi coal for Cochin China rice* Due to tack of shippi and troubles of various sorl the volume of exchange under tin *nt has been disappoint-

ingly low,

4 Chirac now in Chungking laying groundwork for important agreements. Among other thing- following are contenipl < 1:

a. Yunnan-Haiphong Railway will be operated jointly by Chin u &. Haiphong will becoiw free port.

c. Frenchwill exchange all live (#*V) hundred | rre notes held by Chinese military. This will be wry profitable to Chinese who h been buying fhcni up all oyer country al depreciated prices.

d, Chungking with as h ance of*Chinese Consul Saigon is now preparing lis! o tg French lawn and practici whir!, teud I discrimini Ch'u Inline u in Indo-Chma. Principal complaints are poll tux, other discrimn rx u . rti ton in amounts of money allowed to be exported* tin rl 3k*ul allegedly u tli fril of rationed : Is. French indicate willing*.] ■ ■> ilj ring tl

[TiA&l IN

CO ITIAL

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

2*A« Jiwia**ad&r hi /*/ Wtf£ (Cuffa)/) to flu Secretary of Stale

socket Paris, February fi. 194G —0 p. m.

[Tieceived Filii 7 — \J.: M a, m.]

595. Depths r>fi-|, February I. While T have nol ai= yel detailed information on the differences of op : « : ons I tween DWrgenlien and Lederc oh French policy ; ird Indo-Chinn nil indications in Paris point to rite Fad thai the French Govt at this tune favors n eoneilL-atorv and moderate policy, The Foreign Office ha? been stressing to Hip Govt the fact *"hal in the light of the evolution of event? in the Far Ens* an • ••' heast Asia. French interest can best be ?afe*marded by a liberal aiid progressive.colonial policy in Iiulo-Chimi. The So* cialist Partv, which al present h in a position to exercise much influence on French govenunen f al policy, i: also in favor of «uch a policy as is •! • present Socialist lfii : r Colonies. Marins Montei

This? does not mean, however, that they are thinking in 1 of in-

dependence for Tiulo-Ohina for no Frenchmen appear to be thinking in puch terms.

TTIiile it i& of course* impossible al this limp to #azG too far into the future, presen' evidence would seem to indicate that Hie or. Govt will try ro follow a coneiliatorvand moderate policy in Tndo-Chino and will be more progressive in it outlook than the de Ganllo Govt. 11 * As the Pept is aware, in the latter Govt the influence of

11 ■

Am u as*i*rlwr Cn^fw rP|vrrh*ii in iH'-Tim fc*fl. * t *eHrnflr.v 21. 1!M0 3 i>. m, a

that tii" T, i""K'li Ci**tOTmu*»iit 1 * si rl fTfK'f'Ipct r*t jfj^f A^til^al tVAt^^tlU'Hl. thioi n

a vNit f'» Par** *"^ nutln-rftv r« emlpn v or h» iwicli a ' 'Ha« wttti the

native element* meetiiij iimcli more ivny" fsrjffKnn-21 ir,)

certain old-luie mil'taw leaders sometimes had an unfortunate in-fluence on French col >licy.

Caffe&t

B31 G.Oa 2 H". I G : IVlncrn til

7*/i e *4*#wft-'*' t ( Sft?/ «/ //'i /?//■ />/,', of i C; t■'>■'th• ■ •■ nf d 1 &hn A . f*t h *$ (L» i

don) to th Se l nry of Ktate

_ *

secret Hanoi. February 16, lruo.

pkioj :11 [ J teceired Febrnc vy 2t f—10: 34 a. m. |

2. From Laudon for ^ToHar and Culbertson:" Chin< ' infdnnally

,T P;uil T, CttlHpvtsfja, Ciitef. DivMou uf Western Enroittftn Affairs.

state that Fi*e»irfi are negotiating two instriuuentfs?] at Chungking:

1. An aivri-c;i»ont in regard to Chinese troops in Indochina.

2. A treatv of commerce: Thai the agt*eemeni ton ' ion:

a. The an il to he [iaid the Chinese by the French to cover troop ex;pen?p.s in Indochina.

7>. 11 tp to ] iven French troops by Chinr e to reestat lish : I j-selve? in Tonkin*

r. Time and method of v .'■■ wnl of Chinese tin ops. Ti i^ be-lieved that French Chinese to withdraw h> tofn at once and I

coordinate their withdrawal \'i |T French entry wltile C «e want to withdraw i-ii ■ ■•' over an expended neriod. In iliJ : ponrvection 05rd Army he«3in wM, iran-ino 1 no i:. Febn ' i IP'h Division

started maivhin« to 1 fai Idnc: thai about i ry 10 il r nother

tmion will I gin imirch until allot 03rd Ai iy exits. Ho'Chilfinh

CONFIDE]

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

^ ....... » , \t\r lion »*;«•> \ i t I 11V ."** (UC

bc^tr.itiiiir oxif and abou* 5.000 Fr*»nrh trains from China now w Lnirji ii near Laolcay rn ilrorul to Hanoi, He siuu-d thai although French troops suppose*! 1 ^ for L^o* no^hin^r t* •""*••*»■•' rtw* on _ traininir any dav f^r- Hanoi For rw//* < 'A Tin ("hi Minh did not spom fn fpfr French froons nl Lsnchau Oilier Anname • pxnre-ss'belief Annates? papaWe of disarming Chines tro in Tonkin. Ii peemp certain Hi«* Annai plan depneptte tf to French.

Hoclumr"h atod rl'nt he foundering petWonin£ all rni*ed Xarinns

to pwliate Annam* p independence nnd prevent *Xten$ive blood-lied, In tlii- ponnj ■' ; ( ,n C*Jvti sh'te »h-M h^ayv lc^ of lives peem* inevitable and that rti^v would Hire h> refer Indochina pi+natinn 'oTTO hut caunol i 1 i po Ihi'.Mi-f of Chinese nopftiw in r^ard '<> ^Fanrlturia, The alWed Sino-Freiieh treaty of commerce paid bv Chi; to be stalled over mt^t'on of Wup " r ( Ipn hi T ndor-Vn -> Oh hies rerun re p»*«i f-i\-niMl wr*ion tteatuienl for Ohv v es o n*Hoi on

ChinePe h*m& of eitixen.*liin namely ms-tomnyfoh. This h'< of commerce supposed to include ei ions bj 1'Y h to Chinese of:

[ 1,1 .Free access to nori of Hanoi '

5, Join* control of Ralpho^-Yunnan railroad.

3, Join! •"hare of profits-on China end oil in*.

!. Dutyl transit of good? consigned to China.

These con bnfed on Chines i phihn of heavy lodges due to

Fivnrli r 'i • ion to Annai ■-** to upp Tonkin as ba^e attack China. French ?r*Hor Sjiiptenv op^imis^ or#»r oipck n pnien^ with Oliiiu although pi.-M'i'V return de'aved mde^ni^pH*, Snintpnv inthnated thai although no( formally seated [fiftttw??] tlio treaty of com men v.ill be contingent on Chinese tro ; tauce and e< dimition.

[L.wi'.x]

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

CONFIDENTIAL

The A$mtt(ni ffltlef of fhe D/rw&i) of South* <i«t A*fat\ A]f<ur«

[Landcm) to the Si en fttry of Stofe

■ *

secret TTaxw, undated.

[Received February 2T—11: 45 a. in-J

FromLandon forMottat and Culhertson,

1. Saintenv Stated thai in conversation! with Ho Chi Minh lie? offered Annnmese complete independence within French community: That this meant thai Annantese would have benefit of French advi

in every department of Govern™ : it : That for instance Annnmese Foreign Office would express its policies through French channels: Thai Annamesc Armv and T»Var Ministry would he coordinated with

■ ■

French Army j?nd War Ministrr: And thai Annnmese if"{"/«?] Finance and Commerce Ministries would heed French advisers as Ann$mes were inexnei i in i\ matters and might jeopardize [i\ - garble]

French investment. Sauitenv saul that Annnmese in Cochin China would p 'My prefer to remain French Colony rather come under northern MtP i unp?r Government* In this connection TTo ('hi Sfinh said thai French official? had conferred with him hut that they wei'e vapue in their comments and had avoided the real issu >f Annames independence so that he had askcxl them to pet specific terms from Paris which would make clear whether the French really offered Ajitt&iries* independence or wen relv using new language to describe usual Fr It control Annnmese affairs.

2. ITo Chi Minh liandod me iwo letters addressed to President of USA, China, Russia, arid Britain, identical copies of which we, stated *o have Ixen for -led *o other prorernments named- In two letters TTo Chi .M~iph requests USA as one of United Nation-: tosimport idea of Annamese independi according to Philippines example, I e> incthecasenf the Annainese»and tptakesfeps \ a-ryto maintenance of world peace whir], is being endangered by French efforts to reconquer Tndochhia. Tie asserts that Am amese will fight until United Nations interfere in support of Annnmese independence. The petit ion addressed to major United Nations contains:

a, Beriew of Frem-h relations with Japanese where French Indochina allegedly aided .Taps:

J, Statement of establishment on 2 Rentend^v lft+o of [Provisional Government of?] DemocraticliePublicofT J e1 Mhih:

r. Summary of French conquest of Cochin China begun 23 Sept 1945 and still incomplete:

d\ Outline of accomplishments op Annamese Government in Tonkin includinf!: popular elections, abolition of undesirable taxes* expanstoi of education and resumption as far as possible of normal economic activities:

e. Red I i<> four powers: M) To intervene and Mop ihe war in Indoch*na in order to i fair settlement and f2) to bring the

Ihdnchii is-ue he United Nation Organisation. The pe-

tition oiifls w : i!i tit that Annamese ask for full independence in

fact and rhaf in interim while awaiting 1 UNO de. >n ih- An name; will co timie to fight the ^establishment of French imperialism. Letter;-: and p tfition will be tra : ted toDepamnei

[Laxdox]

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

The Counselor of Emtmsy In China ( \/fh) to the Rca i tar.y of 8ta U

gnscRKT * CnuxcstNO, February 28, IMfl—5 p. m.

rs ckgext * [Received 11: 1*2 p. m.]

SB4. Embassy's 280, February VI:1 Tins afternoon Br. "Wang

21 Xr4 priirtecl, buJ run "i Felu'Uiu? 10 tn Saigon, p.—.

Shih-ohieh, MiuirVi for Foreign Affairs, called me to Foreign Ofiice and said thai Sino-Frcnch treaty on Indochina would be signed at 4 p. m. today. lie paid main points in treaty were as given to me by Vice Minister Liu Chieh on February 1*2.

Dr. Wang said that Chinese forces would hand over control of their area in Indochina at end of March* Chinese troops would withdraw from Indochina at end of March, Chinese troops would withdraw from Indochina during? March, by sea and land, 1ml due io diificnltie. of pipping and of withdrawal by land, Chinese forces would probably not be able t,o complete withdrawal until a short time after end < March,rio f later, he felt sure, than April 15.

Tie said thai Chinese Government had informally bn( emphatically urged French nuthorities to roach a "bloodle agr< nt with the Indoehinese: he expressed opinion that present French Governntent fis less intransigent than that of de Gaulle, He said that Chi in Indochina had also urged the Indoclunesc to reach a bloodless" agreement wi!h French-

Dr. Wang -said that the Chinese Government would be willing to mediate between French and Tndoehinese, if requested by both He then ashed me to ascertain the views of the Secretary of State regarding '' ie possibility of joint Cliinese-A an mediation* if re-

quested b\ Both French and fmloel}ine3&. He referred (o the great interest which flij hue President Roosevelt had shown in dependent peoples, remar g that due to opposition from certain countries, the President had been unable to establish trusteeship principle for colonies of European ]" He indicated that, if US G ent

should agree to Joint mediation, the matter of r 2 such media-

tion could be u mg§ 1"' to the French and Indo'chmese. Dr. Wang commented that, as result of Chinese actions during rt lis, he

felt (lint French were convinced of Chinesegood faith.

Dr. Wanp expressed opinion that, if joint Chin -A >;m mediation is agreed upon, it shoul undertaken during the coming month. He said that he would appreciate very much receiving the vu f the Secretary of State 9 oon as possible.

SI

C2

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

The Consul at Saigon (Heed) toflv Sec'rettrrjf of'State

stricter Saigox. iTaivh 7, 1040—7 p, m.

[Ree< 1 March 7—1 : 33 p. m.]

20. Spokesman for the Oovei anient in Tndocbina announced signing .of agreement vcftferdav af Hanoi whereby Vietnam I =•■•-.-mes a free state within rhc Indochina federation mid will have own army, direct own internal affair?and finance. Further negotiations on other points such as foreign affa»r?« French economic interests, fci ee*era. to be held shortly. Referendum to be held in Tonkin, Annani and Cochin China to determine Form of government desired and they may be separate or may unite. Full texi of agreement will be forwarded.* 5

^Telewraiii 21, "Starch &. W4d. noi tiriufeft. ne«nnfrli -«U4. Mmvii S. from Paris. enelnsecl rnpy f<f text :j translated from the Paris Flwro. of the prelim* inary eonifrutinti si-sud at llauoi, March ft. ;it H ]». ni. : neither |»riate.tL

Spokesman concluded thai many concessions on both sides, AnnamUes aw frankly pleased and French military occupation now proceeding smooth!?,

T { i:ed

bechet Saioox. March 14, 1010 — 5 p, m.

[Keceived March 16—9: 24 a. nu] 33, In formal ion from north indicates Chinese putting many obstacles in way of French, and Saigon press queries Chh intentions. Chirac reviewed wor^ning situation in detail, mentioning imex] lasf minute n al Chine?? General Staff to sign ngreemenl for reli Chinese by French (to begin before March 15, to end before March SI) because needed approval Combined Chiefs of Staff. This has been [apparent garble] but Chirac not dear if they have ae*ed, also adding MacArtluir-' had said it was not his business which Chirac found

*■ General of tin* Army Dougla&c MacArtliur, Stqweme Commander for the Allied Forces. ,1;\\r,u\.

astonishing in view of Moimtbattens 2 * approval of relief British by

M Adai. L'»rt1 Route Mou»tt*at tea, Siipreu e Altfed Cainii ler, Southeasl Asia. French f-on*h of Tfith I para 1 Id], ITe i e worried as Chinese digging trenches Haiphong and encircling citadel, Hanoi fear.- serious chi but hopes*jLn Hair?! arrival yesterday may ease tension* also Lu may have authority to implement n i (: agreement. 8 * Clarac^s information

**Tele£»*«iai 8**« MVijvh t."T, 11' in. in y K m M from Saigon, reported that the Sin* French milti ,■ ft'weai was jdaniert :*f Chii I tag on Mardi 14, thereby bu[ile-ii^ntini! the earlier ugreeineul tor relief of Chinese by French B>r< (731,-

from China shows growing Chinese sentiment again*! Vietiniuh-French s*<rrpempni probably I ■ ■ • ! on Chine?* 1 ffear of?1 Commn state south of China and al*o Ft7 :| i<> fa Pure Chinese snona partv to have Id #ef ro^e in Yie'nimb. Increasim? number i. its

Saio-ou and el cwhere bul on whoV Annai li^es willing to work our agreement as nhii • cl and £e ten ; I etief if Chines ' : not eh id attifude things onldhavegi .veil.

Ifr.rj>

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

S31G 00, t-1 «>«; TMmtkmi

Thc( ij/vn (Rfied) fo t?te $erret**r\

cuxiinr:xn.\L " Siicox. April K I04fi I a. in.

[Received April 2—10:80 p. m.]'

70. A sat filiation Dr. Phut, ineinl 'V Cochin China Council, on March 2*> by known Viettntnh extremists? and threats to kill members opi ''.1 in Cochin China joining Vietnam has not helped Vietnam cause, Ifucr ing extremist activities Saigon and Cochin China also bad effect and modi rate Cochin Chi not particularly pro-French comment Vielminh trying to force joining Vietnam whether Cochin Chinese desires or not. On other hand French seizure of Treasury Hanoi precipitating general strike and inckl in Tonkin have not helped French cause and inspires little confidence that they will ke faith. One might hope that both sides take no ; during period oi negotiation which might jeopardize Run] peaceable outcoi ie bu1 every liL'clihi' d >torniy period ahead, particularly so far as concerns mature status Cochin China.

Reed

£5iC.0fi<-l 54(1

The $ ■ twff of Sinti to the Ereneh Amimmdw [Bonnet)**

*TliiK note wa« rermlert by tbe Dcpnrttnenl in telegram 1'ftW, AinH 12. VMQ. 5 j>. iil, t* Paris nnil repeated tn Chungking fiwl Saigon.

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to His Excellency the French Ambassador and lias the honor to refer to the Ambassador^ note no. 167 of March 7, KMiV' 1 enclosing a copy of the Franco-

30 x>t i%rihttfL Chinese Agreement with regard to the relief *of Chinese force- in northern Lido-China hy French forces and requesting the approval of tin Combined Chiefs of Staff thereto.

The Secretary of S f aN? is pleaded to inform the Ambassador that the Combined Chief? of Staff bare no objection to the relief of Clun< troons in northern French Lido-China bv French forces, since tlu-v consider that such arrangement? are a matter for determination bv the Governments of France and China,

Smce the Franco-Chinese agreement eomnte*e? the reversion of all Indo-China to French control the Comhi ! C! -consider

that tht* French military commander in Xndo-Chimi should aH as a medium for the French Government for coordination with the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers on inarfers rehi*m** ro tins repatrhi »n of Japan from Tndo-China, and thi Chii Sn

premc Commander ' rl and Admiral Monntbatten should i i " : : >ved of

m Geui r ilfcsiiun C!rittn£ KnM

their duties and ibilities for disarmaw and evacuation at

Japanese i 'hunt.

Declassified per Executive Order L3526. Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

Current repatriate envls&ge the completion of the evac-

uation of the Japant from nothern [ndo-Chimi by April 13. The Combined Chiefs of Staff consider that it is most desirabl to Inn the French commander in Tndo-China conform to pn-out schedules*

Accordingly, Admiral MVuuuh n has been directed to make tl nere>arv arrangements wnh thi French military commander In Tiulo-China reirardrn*: t lie transfer of his share of the above ; ed re-

sponsib*)it a* at the earliest possible date.

Tin" Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers ami 'he appropriate Chinese authorities have been informed of the Combined Chiefs* of Staff action on this matte

It. is niuler-' ood t lint a memorandum has been addn d directly to the French ifilitary Attache to the Vniled States informing him of the above and requesting thai appropi I t+e in ^ructions be issued to the French military connnander in Indp China.

WASirixGTOXj April 10, HUG,

The Via Conml nt Tlanoi (0*$u?llrtw) to the Secretary of State**

32*

"This tel m wi^^uimmr m n Departs circular telegram ut April 10, VM\\ aoon, to Baugknk, Elatarfa^ Cinmgl iwg. Mauila. ami Parte;

■

CONFIDENTIAL HiVXOT, April IS, W4G I a. in.

priority - [Received April IS- 8 a. itl]

2. Despite many questions which are tPl in Buid state, condition in Hanoi are surprising v quiet. French Annamite and CI e 'mop? are in city in varying force I ml with iparatively little friction.

French troops under Ge rcri Va 1] nv, com nosed of elements of Second Armoured and Ninth Colonial Infantry Divisions, are making streimo ffnvt* to avoid tuit witting Chinese.

Fifty-*hird Army with sea'. : | rvi & are only Chinese tro which n in in vicinity of Hanoi, of their withdrawal i

unknown here.

Repatriation of Japanese soldier,- and civiHans not*h of ififh parallel has been taknigr place during pa=1 '2 weeks. Approximately ?A of 85,000 have h n shipped. Remainder ai luled to leave in near

future.

French appear to be « xereisiug no civilian fund ions here. Vietnam ; P $t fecto government of Hanoi, running po%e and adminis^rati service?. There are indications thai no effective een'ral authority exists outside of city areas a 1 though natives are said r bitterly anti-French. Passage of receu 1 French convoy from Haiphong *o Hanoi, for exmnpV, was n ! I by barricades (bur apparently not by rii fire) in vilb»ges aloiu* route,

Xei. ; \fu us now opening between French and Wtiuim ai Dal at (Da hit *$ hill Ftation in Cochin China) to implement preliminary

reem to M-nvli (H* \\qs\ important immediate qi to be ft ;i* ii CoHiin China.

Food s ; tua**ion generally bet f er than hi-f year. Reports indicn there should be no famine in northern FIC in near futnri -

O'SULLTTAX

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3,3 NND Project Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 2011

851G.01 r 4-l?4*;: Circular lt'fr?mai

The s - ■ n tary of State to Certain DiploumtU a i < - ■ v///;- Officei

53 At B;n»g:fe»k, Batarfa, Chungking. London. Maniln, Paris, and The Hague, secki r . " W.\sinxtno\-. April 18, liMfi—] p, m.

Vlenain Republics President TI<^C1 i Minh requested I~S, UK and other recognitions approximating French recoitnifton as free state within French Union, UK iiiform*»Py replied unable recognize because negotiations re Vietnam nctnal status continuing,

Bybxes

8510.00/4-274** :T>l©£ttim

The Consul at Sutgon (Seed) to the Secretary of $fafe

confidently. Saigox, April '27, 104fi—1 1 '. m.

[Received April 23—2 : U a. m.]

1*2:2. Mytel 121, April 27,10 il mf* Returned yesterday front Hanoi

^Not.pHnntl: for suamuuT, *ep rimilar, teto&ratii »f April 30. 11 a. uu Fw/m. where situation tense. Called on all high French. Chinese, Vietnam officials. Hi» [J?*?] dwel; largely on Cochin China issue, first, musl join Vietnam, second, French must ces ring Cochin China; he

also mentioned need for complete financial independence, own bank and own bank note \< Ife was highly indignant action of French

in arresting find dispj lling [ettpt llh from Dal at Dr. Thaeh, Cochin Chinese delegate to Dalat confereiv He exp 1 hope for future if Freheh lived up to their a; mentis which lie rather d i'ed bill added \\vxt outside help, chiefly capital and teclmica! aid, must be

supplied.

Pessimistic views held by all French regarding success of Dalai conference which is now uspended for a few days while Vietnam demandsre/rardh'gCochin (cease hostiHil . - p»disical interne Armistice Commission and political freedom) and French count offer regarding all Indochina (establish special committee to tnvesti-*mte Vietnam-French incident | are being studied and thai French have now* adopted thesis conference merely preliminary and Pail approval mi-.r be obtained which is contrary previous understanding. French defend ^t, expelling Dr, Thaeh on grounds that he is notorious anti-French Cochin Chinese and that Cochin China not \ pari of Vietnam.

French insi ice withdrawal Clpnese froip north and all-over pro-t mat'on r <» Dalai may have ulterior motives as it \< not imp ible French military coup may be brought oil' as soon its Clih goi Some French eh ili; have • | ken of this "as putting V in

their place*\ In any event over-all picture \> noj happy one and i ticli compromise, \ ifh and tolerance needed to efl | eac* ful

settlement.

Em

pc

Declassified per Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

Kil&fth 5-t4i»: Circular tnteifrcnu

The Acting Secrefrai/ of Sfttfe *o f ' tin Diplomatic and Consul

3!»

39 At Bangkok. Batavia, London. StoukJnj: P*trl*e. $1nsap"re. aiul Tiie Elaine. confidential Washington, May 1,104(3 7 p, m.

French Vietnam conference Dalat temporarily suspended for study conflicting views re Corhinchinu. Vietnam officials hope for future li<l by doubts French will abide by their agreements. Freud pessimistic re outc< Vietnam demand? cessation hostilities Co-

ehinchina, release political internees* establishment armistice commission aftd political freedom Cochinchina. French counter-offer special committee studv French-Viotuan incidents throufdioul Indochina. French now bold Dala* conference rneivlv preliminary and results must have Paris apnroval.

Consul Saigon observes 4 " French maneuvers propaganda to fi

'"Trl.-nr- ISO AuHl -<X 1040. 3 n itt„ not nrlntrf. In It, Poium] Recfl men-tionpil M»at Ho Phi Mmli lunl stressed o> hi.m at Hon^l ■unjust necessity of toterrettog Aui^Wcan capital ami employing An ui tcelmtdans in Vietnam." (8TilG.OO/4 30

withdrawal Chinese troops Tonkin and delaying tactics T)alat con ference compatible with possibility French planning military coup when Chinese withdraw.

Acuksox

g5lG.O0/5-l54fi: Circular tefogrj

3TAff 'Acting Utry of State to Certain Diplomatic ami C< lav

Officers '-

42 Ai Sacking mul Saigon, BECrei TTAStTCXOTON. May 18, 1046—1 p. m,

French FouOff official confidenl ultiin; c «no Dtiarions with

-

Vietnam which may be prol !, 4r - Vietnam deU^ Fhmrc impressed

^Tdejrrani 2243. M 1040. 2 p. n*„ from Pari* not prlnMI,

him favoraWv bnr be regarded recent devc'opinents Indochina China disturb:] fnee b«>Ueved CMn&sw* rvmunandRsTndtf china openly initundennininF Chiang Tvsii V incere efforts evacuate Indochina, Chinesecfficial Pari- stated M tbat Vietnam d from] 1 five Com-

* Tfctwsrinri 227JK STay 10, v.ur;. t p, m„ froia Parte, not priiif*(L *,iuni*t^ four uon-CcnunnPists, one K »ntang, but Communists

Vietnam better owapwd than non-Cornmu«fe f s and ?itni> r 1 by French Cnntinunists»rhat Chinese troops would er^cnpte. that Chn wj>i h) • neutral, would not !,«:• intermediary for A ekirg l"S sppport. Consul Hanoi observes 43 Chinese appear try-

*T«* \l(K Mn*jr a IMG, s a, m.. not printed iiiU undermine Vie*" Minli party and leadej ive Chine

dominated 1 iJ inh Hoy party in power.

Achhsox-

mm

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 KND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

•-.-,t':,"- T> ]-\ I-• :Cln nhir tt^mm

The Acting Secretary of State to Certain Diploma • C&mii!m l

Of

in

i

**At Bangkok, l.omlon. Moscow, Xriiikiirr. Moscow, Park, and Raigon, C(vxnni;xTiAL YT.-isni.wrox. May 14. 194(5—11 a. m.

Vietnam Republic's President believe factory agreement can

be readied with French, expressed confidence their ^1 faith in Hanoi Paris bid disturbed by French actions Ss '..

ACHESO^

851G 00 k 5 -1*415-: Tetaffrttig

Thi Acting Seen • of S l ot, to (renew? of the Army ft* C.

Mar$hftll 3 nt Sanhr,

secret Washixgtox. May 15, 1016—G p. m,

133. For General M-u•■!lali Dopt concerned by re] from both French and CS sources indicating serious effects of continued presence 53rd Chinese Army and independent uirts northern Indochina despite, agreement to withdraw all troops by Mar %\ or Apr 15 at latest.

Consul Hanoi (Reinfotel May 1-!) rcj danger thai actions local Chinese military 1 an will embitter Franco-Chinese reli u i (Si Paris Enibtel 6 to Chungking May 9 4T ) as well as obstruct recent

-

c TelPjjr«ni 2243 tn Department, Xfny 0, 104ft, 2 p< ia„ from Paris, not printeti, hul seerimitnr telejrram rvf >jay 13,1 p. in., p, —.

progress Franro-Yiel Xain relations. Also that Viet Sam President hinted his tasks easier when Chinese leave. Hanoi believes thai few problems facing French and Annamese can be handled until Chines eracuated.

French Emb W;i *h May 8 verbally empha» : zed importance Fn h Govt attaches to prompt Chinese evacua f ion to avoid further incidents, and n I possibility evacuation 53rd Army by ship,

Dept believes everything possible should be done urgently speed evacuation Chinese h --. Request your views as to what a< '• n. if any, might be I pn US Govt t h »lation this problem, and

your recommendati thereon.

ACHESOX

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3,3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

SolG.rtfi/O-SO I-: Ctrvtrtor r- :■ -ram

Thr Seen tary of State io & " Diplomatic Offi IS

* At X:m L in* r aiul The Ib>-:m*. This teV i was based '' n ' trains 100. aiay 14, 1040. 3 p. in., and 163, May 15, from Saipm. is printed.

CONFIDENTIAL WaSJIIXGTDX, MftV 20 5 10t6—$ a. m.

D*Aij*eiiliei] to meel President Vietnam soon prior departure French, Y>etn:-.m delegs Paris for final negotiations " ■ governmental structure Indochina and Vietnam's status therein. French propose federa 1 organ : zfltic*h tuuler High Commissioner who exo; 7 neh Union's powers and with Assembly initiate federal legislation. Assembly comp 10 French members, 10 member? each from Tonkin, Annam, Cochinchina, Laos, Cambodia. Each state form own govtj elcci Parliament, vole own constitution recruit defence armv, fix budget, orgar*ze adminHra^oUjenaci iutprnal Jaws. Vietnam counter-proposal would limit federal powers to cu^oms policy currency and supplies coordhia^ion, would place relations beh Vit and federation on sta f u$ international re 1 at toils with Higb Commissi r as ambassador to federation's member states.

Byrnes

12$.7* •" ''» 2<>4 fl : T* 1 1 v srnm

The Secretory of State to the Amhmwdor m France {Caffery)

-Titien :i> Wa sin xr;'!ox, Slay 2(1, 194ft—5 p. pi.

2-127. Consulate ftrgon ra : sed to Consulate General effective im-

jm y. Inform French (xoveriuneut.

IJyrnks

77*£ F7<?* Comul at llano! (0 n) to tl> v - ■'"■ - v of Su

Hanoi, May 20, 1946—fip.m. [Received "May 23—11 rSOp.m |

20. Please pass to General Marshall fur information.

6°

^

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

—

There ate .three important political parties in Viet Xam.

They are Viet itinli League, composed of former Indo-Chinese Communist Parly (PCI dissolved itself November 30* 1045) anil Democratic Party, son (**/>] Vietnam Caeh Menli Dons* Mini) Hoi, generally referred to as Dong Minh Iloi or I) J III; and Vietnam Quoc Dan Dans:.

There are in addition several splinter parties which seem to serve chief] v as vehicles for oruantxed banditry.

Both Dong Jiittli Hoi and Ouoe Dan Dang seem have support of Chinese. Most a< live part of Viet Minh is factor composed of for PCI members.

Vief Jlinh strength seems to be spread throughout northern Indo-China. Dong Minh Hoi and Quoc Dan Dang control territory in Moncay, Langson, Vinb Yen area. 40

«\-i

Vice Consul O'Salliran. In termini m. July 20. 184fl, 4 p. ill..'from TTrinui, reported the steady elimination <>f all orsitniftWI bi«iio^slt1«n m tlie Viet Miuij Lea ■. Tlie Hon* Minh Hoi niul Qiiw nan Dans toad Inst influent* with | departure of the .12ud Cnmese Ann.v from Tonkin. (R11Q.OO/7-24HG)

As yei no Catholic party has appeared nor do Catholics appear to lie committed to support of any one part v. Viet Minh League bus I n making tentative moves to capture Cathode support but is said to be too radical to obtain full cooperation from church, Tn view of fact church claims million members in Tonlving and Annain (large percentage believed to be u r?ee Christians**), i( seems probable that Catholics as group will fnof ?! remain Ion.<£ absent from politics.

Sent Department, repeated Nanking: Saigon informed airmail.

O'Sn-mvAx

Declassified per Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

have 1 h vi' -d (o evacuate bv land and to reach Chin territory

before 10 Ji tie or, weather permitting, liefore the end of May. Remaining division is now at Haiphong awaiting transportation to •Japan. At request of Foreign Office SOAP has been informed of

foregoing.

S^tyt

n

The Vict Consul at Hanoi (O'SuWcan) to the Secretary of State '

CUXFIDKXTIAL Haxoi, June 5,1946—5 p. m.

[Received June fi—7: 5-2 a. m.] 86. Hi Chi Minh probably will call at AmEmbs shortly. He has constantly given me impression he would pay great attention to any suggest i CiS m a '.1 e by 1 )e p t.

O'Sullivax

851G.OO/I3 i'J: Tel^nim

The Vice Consul at Hanoi (O'S-uJlitmn) to the Secretary of State

Hanoi, Juno B, 11)4-6—8 p. m. ; [Received June ft—10 : -ir» a. m.]

37. There is growing conviction in Viet Xam circles that principal point involved in Paris negotiations will be future states of Cochin China nndhowit will be determined.

Viet Xame-e generally agree that without Cochin China any hide-pendente will be largely theoretical

Vicl Xam nasi/ion regarding referendum anpears to have undergone extensive changes. Ho Chi Miuli when lie <: 1 convention of March I'm was convinced thai in any "fair*' referendum Cochin China would not \i?ofe?~\ to attach itse 1 f to Viet Xam,

However, Dahit Conference delegation appaientlv returned to Hanoi with realization that Viet Xam strength in Cnrliin China was diminishing. This they attribute to French propaganda and absence of freedom for their own agents.

Realization of diminishing Vie' Xam strength in Cochin China is

probably principal n w why Ho accompanied delegation to Paris.

hopes to reach satisfactory solution on this alMinpi nt question

on basis of tturaerau friend Lips which he has with Left Wi French

circle

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3,3 NND Project Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 2011

CONFIDENTIAL

French here give impression they would not object to i*ef iduni in Cochin Chuia. However, lliev indicate ihcv would not cue to allow* complete freedom for Viet Nam agents there. Their objection is thai such agents would resort to tei -in (n influence vote, (There sei to be certain amount of Justification for French contention. Viet Xnm police have been treating pro-French Viet Xamese and Metis with French nationality rather s y in Tonkin.)

Outcome of any referendum would probably l>e lamely determined by conditions under which it would be held. French feel Cochin China would vote > for autonomy. Viet Nam claim Cochin China would vufe 80/f for* incorporation witli Viet Num. Both claim[s]

ve an unspoken promise [y y l thai claimant could establish

conditions of referendum, Xeulral observers 1 Feel vote in referendum free of undue influence from cither side would be close.

Sent Dept as 37, June 5,8 p. m.; rep d Xanking, Saigon in formed*

airmail.

O'Scijjvan.

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3,3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

* The Amhmsrtdor in 1 ce {Caffery) to the Seen ■ >j of State

RESTRICTED Paims, July 7, l! -1 p. HI.

[Received July 7—12 : 39 p. in.]

8323, Opening of Franeo-Viet Xam conference at Fojitamebleau yesterday brought to an apparent end pre-con fere nee honeymoon period during which Fi h and Indocbinese officials had rivaled with each other in displays of Franco-Viet Xam friendship.

After long wait for Admiral Thierry d'Argenlieu supposed to preside over conference, unexpected*anuotineeinent that "Admiral was indisposed" created uneasiness and rumors* to effect Vie! Xtiiu.delegat had vetoed presidency of Tltierry d'Argenlieu who, in their eye "typified French imperial ism 5 *.

Max Andre, heal of French delegation, assuming Presidency at last momentj delivered innocuous speech of welcome and decl&n conference open. Mr. Phan Van Dong, head of Viet Xam delegation, immediately protested against this unilateral assumption of the chair of the direction of the proceedings. In a fighting sell which contrasted sharply with platitudes of Andre's address, he went immediately to the core of (he worst difficulties which the conference will have to face. In sharp words, he protested against "the mutilation of the Viet "Xam Motherland" through the creation of an independent state, of Cochin China outside of (he Viet Xam. lie vrmi on to accuse the.-French authorities in Indochina of having violated the accords of Dalai of March 6, 1946 and of having used these accords to penetrate peacefully in the north while military op rations were being carried on in the south and in the in fr.

This unexpected offensive of Hie Viet Xam delegation on the fi clay has created a sensation. Independent and impartial Comba£ : genuinely interested in colonial problems, headline.-' Met Xam accusation across the entire first page and recognizes French mistakes made in Indochina. Communist Uvmnrnte frankly sides with Viet Xam. Socialists PopuhfJn gives fair and impartial account in a vein sympathetic to Viet Xauu MTVP, Attbc regrets "that French goodwill did not find a corresponding echo". In the conservative and Nationalist papers there is literally an expl ion of wrath against Viet Kara delegation. Inert ingly Leftist but always itTtra-Xationaltst Ordre terms Phan Van Dongas statements "shocking" and already blames Viet Xam for any future breakdown in negotiations. All : these papers play up violations of Dalai agreement by the Viet Xam and underline assa inal! . kidnapping and rape of Enr< :ts as Justification of continui 1 mil itary operations by French expeditionary

corps.

On the who] conference had gotten oft" to had start, Viet Xam leaders also esq I I thai conference "of such considerable

importance** si aid he'heltt outsidi Pari

Interesting.to note thai yesterday afternoon onversa i held be-tween TTo Chi iljuh", Vie! Xam Pn ident, and A ian deputies of friends of manifest j | hy Fcirhal Abbas (my despatch

5571 of July 3 -*') on similarity between problems facing Algeria and

"Not printed; it r<n»orfe<l an interview ivJtli the Alcrei'lrto antottmuM leader, FerluiKU'bils, A drfesati &\\ Alsedmj rlfimfW. ei

[nflei t*iui. *NlPuiofrflti ton In favor < 'Algerian I '\ was In

ris, (8TilIL00/7-:J4G)

Viet Xam.

Sent Depl 323, repeated London as509.

73

( WFVMY

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3,3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

Th\ Ambam [t ^ffcry) to the Secretary of Stafi

coxiiuEXTUL Paris, Angus! 2, in G p. in.

[Received S : 16 p. m/J

3801. Viet Xiiiii delegation at Fontainebleau conference y relay broke off negotiations on ground thai French have violated March 0 accord by convoking new conference at Dalat* Head of delegation alleged Hial French intend to use new Dal at conference (to which Viet Xam was not invited) to engineer their own statute for Indo-Chinese federation and to fix future of Cochin China and other areas claimed by Viet Xam. He added thai Fontainebleau conference is not terminated bu! only siu tided until French clear ii]> this w equiv< eaP situation* Delegation will remain at Fontainebleau for time" being and is prepared to maintain contact with French delegates on unofficial basis.

This decision has been received by press as a kind of bomb shell although reports had been current that eoirlY e was entering a critical stage and that lie [Zfo], Chi M~inh, would depart soon for Indo China. Press reaction 1ms followed ex] ted linei with left-wing onrans justifying decision while right-wing and radical papers acci Viei Nam of blackmail and insist thai Freucehas perfect right to consult other peoples of Indochina in parallel Dal at conference.

Radical Aurorc demands thai France shall not "abdicate* 1 in Indochina and adopts Epotato line in charging that "other imperialism are utifiz'iu? Viet Xam for own purposes*

Montlr insists thai France is playing role of impartial arbiter and must not ret real before ultimatum. Sf&nd* ulso takes off gloves with respect to TIo Chi *\Iinh. recalling that lie was friend of Doric J thai in 1943 he publicly expressed determination to "break oft all n ]alions with French peopled

CONFTDftNTTAT.

Am Fenders of Viet Xam Cwmmimist EfwwmiM is most out-

spoken. Independent's Combat ttinues to stress "the flagrant dissonance' 4 between French statemei in Paris and Fi ; n Indochina which has b Fitly amounted to a "provocation n . ( // expects ions repcrcv in Indochina.

Caught in the middle, both Socialists and MTIP are eml sed

and worried* Popvfaw blames Admiral d'Argenlieu for imp liable polity which must "be repudiated by French Government £'Aube, on other hand, takes ed [stand?] and ij Dal

conference is entirely proper under Man accord.

Baudet, one of Foreign Office delegates r( Fontainebleau* admit situation is serious but believes conference will resume in a \ el* or 10 days. He in new Dalat conference is piily exploratory and consultative. Baudei once again indicated French officials are not particularly anxious to * i p work of Fontainebleau con fere

and are quite willing (ny relations with Viel Xam to continue under present agreement until the pacifica! ion of Indochina and i irularly Cochin China is compl tl Tk i tdeel that security situation hi Cochin China is more serii : n French public is aware.

Sent 1 nsSSOl; Dept pi i f re] it to Saij .1 London

as 578,

C EOT

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 2011

8516.00 'S 040

Memorandum by the Chief of tlie ftirhion of Southeast Asiftn Affairs (3/offtft) to the D % .or of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (1'weenf) t

[Was ox.] August 0, 1946.

Receni developments indicate that the French are moving to regain a large measure of their control of Indochina in violation of the spirit of the March 0 convention. The ev'ul », as set forth below, suggests thai the French are attempting Im stain tlietr objective by manoeuvres designed to confine and weaken Viet Xam. In the event that Viel Xam decides to Est tl encroachments, which is l>y no means unlikely, widespread hostilil i mnv result.

The chief opposition to the ree^tab^ishmenl of French rule in Indo-china has all along come from the Aimamese, who inhabit the three east coastal province of Tonkin, Annum, and Cochinchina, which once comprised the Kingdom of A imam. The populations of the other two countries of Indochina—Cambodia and Laos—are no! in n high stale of political development or in any condition seriously to resist French control. A modus rirewdi between the French and the Annamese was achieved in the preliminary convention of March G, 1946, by which theAnnamese "Republic of Viel Xanv 1 was recognized as a free state within the Xndochinese Federation and the Viet Xam Government declared its readiness to receive the French Army. The convention left for future settlement two crucial problems: ih status of Viet Xam in its external relafio and the geographical extent of Viel Xam. On the former point, the provisional agn ent stated that "each contracting party will take all n v m ures

• • *

" 'Omission indicated in tie origin

to create the favorable atmosphere ueci for an immediate open-

in^ o f a mi cable a n d free 11 em > t i at i o i, Tl iese 1i es'< >t in t ions will I tea r particularly upon diplomatic relations hi iveen the Viel Xam and foreigtl stale-, the future status of Indochina, French economic and cultural intei in Viel Xanv 1 On the latter point the agreement stated thai "with re U the bringing together of he three (prov-

inces), the Fraieh Government pledges itself to ratify the decisions taken by the populatioi -■ consulted by referendum/* The crus of (he present situation lies in the apparent intention of the French to settle both matters to their own advantage and without reference to Viet

aim

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

The hostility of the Annan toward the French bej ;m to mount to its present intensify wjiw th* ^*'^nch en Juno 1 announced the inauguration of the Provisional Government of the Republic of Cochinchina. Aniui incste Idlers ha*] 1 >ng emph; d their view thai the inclusion of Crichinrhiua in Vie1 Nam was a matter of life an(3 death to their country, Cochinchina, it may he mentioned, a tains the important mercantile • i Saigon and Cholon, includes tl

months of th? M u, and is the riches! province in Tiulftcliin; Called the Southern Province by the Vie! Xaniese, it is racially indistinct from Tonkin and Annum. Statements by the French thai til referendum in Cochinchina fas pledged in the March C convention) would still be held failed to reassure Viet Xam 1 ?rs, who pointed out that such a referendum could nol possibly be fair owing to the suppression by flie French of pro-Viet Sam political parties and of all anti-French opinion, SEA's information tends to substantiate this point of view.

Tension between the French and tlte Annaiuese readied its present pitch when the French on August 1 convened a conf at Dalai

(in southern Annam) to which the Royal Governments of Cambodia and Laos, the Government of the autonomous Republic of Cochin-china, and the native peoples of southern Annam and high plateau of Indochina (but not Vict Xam, recognized by the French as part of the. Indochina Federation and French I'liiou) io send delegates t< "study the fiameworfc of the French Union''. Sub ently puh-lislied agenda of the conference indicated thai the .-nlicnt aspi of the Indochina Federation would also be, deliberated. As an immediate result of this conference, the Viet Nam delegation which had been discussing I lie future relation between France and Viet Nam with the representatives of the French al Fouulahieblean since duly 0 announced tlini they were suspending negotiations until the French should have clesi up tlte "equivocal" situation which had been created. The head of the Viet Xam delegation, who had opened the conference with a violent bias) against French polieii , charged that the French were now frying to engineer their own statute for the Ind< tese Federation and their own settlement of the status of Cocllinchina and other are; claimed by Viet Nam. The view of Consul Saigon is not very different. He gave as his opini thai a front againsi Viet Nam was in the maki . that the states participating in the Dalat Conference were at least \\ ly recognized a-. free states by the French, and that Fran nnd these free states ai now determining the status of the Indocliinese federation without refer to Viet Xam. In his view it indicated double-dealing on the pari of the French, and lie reported thai the French Commissioner for Cochinchina had forced the issue by threatening to resign unless his p i.n carried ou*". Nothing ha- been said at the conference

about a referendum. Finally, Consul Saigon added that he had learned thai representatives of tin us of the Province

of Annam fwhich has always b« ;t claimed by Viet Nam) will petition for inclusion of their tentorial in Corluneliina, In view of the completi the agenda of the Dalat Con hich covei

the . nfial framework of 'lie Ind deration, and in view

of the delil te e i of Vief Xam from f lie co iferenee, tlie

conclusion is htescapi ■ e thai the French are endeavoring to w3 te down Vi i ? and to tie th ire form of organization of Indo-

china with t! ' expected to be an ble to J k nch

infhieti

CONFIDi TJAL

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

Annamese reaction to French moves lias been sharp, unci Follow n the suspension of the Fontainpblcau negotiation^ there were pro-Yi Nam manifestations In Saigon* The ambush oF a French supply column near Hanoi by Annamese soldiers, during which the French suffered 52 casimlties (one of the worst of many incidents during the* past several months), may have been related to the opening of tl Dal at Conference*

"While it is lo be doubted that the French will allow the Fontaine-blean Conference to break down ly, Embassy Paris quotes

Eaudet as having stated that French officials i>re in no hurry to speed up negotiations until the pacificatjoi T Indochina, and particularly i Cochinehina, has been completed. 3n this connection, Consul Saigon reports that more troops are arriving in Indochina and thai the French military position has rown much stronger. Meanwhile, tire Saigon press has horn parrying vitriolic attacks against Yiel Mini, Since fliis pi is completely controlled by the French, there would appear to he noofficial objection to thisliue.

In his latest report, Consul Hanoi states thai there now exists an imminent danger of an open brealk between the French ancTYfei Nam. He adds thai a rupture of relations would probably be followed by a period of anarchy and that, although the French could qtiicfdy overrun the country, they could not—as they themselves admit—pacify it except through a long and bitter military operation*

In conclusion, it is SEAs view that the Annamese are faced with the cli of a costly submission to the French or of open resistance, and that the French may he preparing to resort to force in order to secure their position throughout Indochina, Ti may i be advisable for this Government to take official notice of till nation during I he-Peace Conf' " hut the Department should be prepared, V

" For document t<l between -July 2D and October 15

see rot —. pi>; — ff.

\li n , to express to the French, in view* of our interest in peace and orderly develops of depeudcnl peoples, our hope thai they will abide by tli i-rit of the March 6 convention,

A,£bbot] L[ow] M[offat]

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

B51G.0O/& 1740: TV1«*srain

TJu Cotrnil at Saiffon {Reed) to the Secivtctry. of State

coxFinKXiLVL Saksox, August 17, W46—1(1 a. m.

[Beceived Angus! 18— 2:53 a. m.]

3-£2. At Daltif conference, which closed on 1-lth, delegations wei reasonably unanimous as to desired structure and scope of federation and relationship of meniher states with federation and each cither. Cochin-Chinese delegations vowed {delegation $ko move hide-

pendente oT thought than other del itions and followed less slavishly French pattern for Indochina of future. This is part to impress Cochin-Chinese and to help lessen belief presets Cochin-Chinese Govt only a puppet, hut as previously reported members of this govt sincerely want more fret of action and less domination

by French. "While findings and recommendations of conference i binding they appear to be reasonable basis for future, but ir is certain Viet Xnm will find nmHi fault therewith, as they frill short of the larger degree of independ desired by that state. Growing bi High Connnii er and Commissioner for CochhvCliina : mny go as

ir policy subjected increasing criticism here and re] dly in FmiUT, particularly in calling 1 Palar conference knowing Viet Nam could object and in creating Cochin-China Oovl withonl referei to referendum. However, thev argue no reason whv FreneltVie! Xn negotiations should decide future without reference to of her state? and thai necessary atmosphere for n euidmu is In 1 tug (hitter probably tmeasanv referendum under existing conditions mi r Mt well increase partisan activities). 1'nn mably both officials are less 1 d in views re na'nv neoples than when first came to French Indochina. Nexl more will be submission Dalai nronosals to French Gov! and attemnf to reconcile proposals with Fonhiiuphlpiin a/renda. However,

fardle^s soundness manv these prono^ata difficult fore • • anv great degree success in above so lorn* as ( bin China stars apart from Viet Nam, whieh is one point of French policy in F !i Indochina.

BEEP

8330*Oa/S- 2QTO: TWrkim

The Acting 5 ry of State to the Comal o (R> ed)

ijr Wariiixotox, September 1,1946—5 p, m,

240. Action ur I Aug 2(5 commended,* 8 Lose no opporti.

m Not printed.

counteract with i r>ns responsible pn orientation, and in maim you deem most effective, 1 i ncli colonial tendency picture FS as s gv< - i e and imperialistic. This brings ct in French cotoi ials, unwittingly for rnosl part, very-clos inmtvist Party line.

Wuh his knowledge FS Clarac (renrtel 357 An i should know I tter M encourage anii*American suspi ' thisjuncture Franco-Am n relations, and Pen! believes lie can lie j traded take and fosti f attii n rents.

Clayton-

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 NND Project Number; NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

The Acting Secretory of State to the Coft&ul nt Shigon (Bee$)

secret * WASitTXCTOX", September 9, IWB —2 p. m.

241. Intel 1 hrence renorts of uncertain reliabilihr starve VSSR (ft) anxious see Ho Chi Mlnh succeed unite l^hree Kys under Viet Nam for possible eventual weapon against National Govt Chhia and fo) has instructed French Communi manoeuvre reliable French Officers to Indochina for training: cadres future Viet Xam army. ICeep T)epf infn 1 indications sul vienrr to Party line hv Ilo and other-leaders, relative strength Conunmusl and non-Communist elements Viet Nam, and contracts with Communists other countries. Inform CTSullivuu. Sent Saigon. Repented Paris for info.

As telegram -HJS0-

GUATTGQff

S5H; n to

The Awhtxxadar In France (Cttffery) io tTie fiecrettwy of State

•

ooxftoextlvl ^ * Paris. September 11, IfMfi.

No. (5131 [Received September 17.]

Snt: I have the honor to report thai al Jus request T received a visit this morning from SL Ho Chi Miuh, ''President of llie Republic of Viet-Xam", who confirmee! the news published in the local press that the FontaineWeaii negotiations between the Tle^Nam representatives and Hie "French representatives 1. etically broken down and the

Yiet-Xam delegation will be returning to Indochina within the next few days.

The principal point on which they failed to reach agreement concerns Cochin China: (lie French representatives insipl that Cochin China he an "independent*' entity in an Indochinese federation, while the \. j .i Xanj represenfafim: ii thai one centra] srovernineiit ii Indochina irin ' itc the whole country. He said that he and

his o-uiv a-]vred to Yie«-Xam u ind( idence* 1 in an K T*nlon Fran* gaise"- He said thai they would like to receive some "help" from us, but did not epe what he meant by that ITe took occasion io sav thai he was not a communi

From the srenera* 1 ftizzine f his remarks, I gathered that he would like us U) ovf inn* the gai rid he woukl he verv pleaded if h*» could use Pit* »n f orne way or i in hi futmv negotiate tl French

authorities.

1 eypi s*cl our in*ere$1 in Indoclumi and Trie people of Indochina bu f made »o wrctmitments.

Respectfully yours, Jefferson Caffeet

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NMD 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

• The Consul at Sn*gon {Ret *1) fa the IFecretmy of State

*

secket Satook, September 17,1040—11 a. m,

[Received September IS— 1: o:i a, m.J

S74. Both Chirac and Chief of Surety have informed me increasefd] Communistic activities in French Indochina are disquieting. Infer-eepfed letfera indicate Chinese Communist are entrenched in Chinese centers Saigon and Haiphong and tlui t Annamites chiefly in Tonkin and Ainnm), bill also to certain extent in Cochin China 1 are receiving much Coiniwmist propaganda- They feel Viet Xam leaders not entirely responsible for this apparent trend but point out those leadei have Communist training and leanings. Chirac added that one difficulty in handling Communist problem is imp ibility using word c *Cowmunist" hi regard to this movement as strength of Communis! party in France precludes any unfavorable mention. Both believed continuance uncertainty Freneh-Viet Xam relation? despite signing proris*onal agreement fA will contribute to such activities hut stress

m See felegr&ui 4(171, tnfvu*

Connnuni- ire already in French Indochina (no Russians) and close watch over developments must be maintained as agencies outside French Indochina are undoubtedly supplying propaganda.

This telegram $74 to Department, repeated as 2 Nanking. Department pie repeat Paris.

Eeed>-

SSl&Dft/!) 174fl:THr-r.nn

The Ambaxmdor In Frnnch (C ry) to the && nj of State

COXTTOEntial Pakis. September 17* 1940—5 p. m.

[Received ptentber IT—8:24 p. nu]

4G71. A1 final conference with French September II. Tin Chi Miuh signed ioini declaration and nwtfm nirefidi and denarfed few horn's later for TWon to sail for Saigon. Agreement will he submitted to French Cabinet tomorrow 01 and after expected approval, given to

a *Tiit* French Oimtfl of Ministers approved the agreement on Seji i ~}%:

the text was transmitted to rteisiirtiiicKt in despatch 6203, Septemb 20* 1 f> ?i : P

frn.: ['.'iris; neither prhi i rl

press on September W. Following are essential pointsof agri ent summarised From text obtained from Foreign Office,

Joint declaration emphasizes a.*Erecm of March fi, 194fi, still in eftVH hut wodit* rirewdi providing provisional solutions of urgent problems was necessary until permanent and definitive agreement conhl be re: • !. Date and procedure for referendum in Cochin C),ii! i is to he fixed later* Ii is expected Fontalnebleau conference will be resumed in January in 17.

Summaries of numbered j raplis of M&rlw ■■'■■..-. fi Follow:

1. Reciprocal u demo ic* ! rights for citizens of one country m territorv of other*

2. Recommit inn of reehirocal i». / rights. French pro v ini?itionedor*e'xedin*VietXaintoi d,

i. French Fchoo's to operate freely in Viet Nam; Pasteur instirutt to be restored in French.

4- Viet Xam to : ' France priontj win king advi , tech-

nicians or t lu-Ms.

• "». Pi tied in French t'> to bi single currency for Indochin whli I iiu'i'"] • lerindochii temporary bank of b

BO

Declassified per Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

0. Establishes customs union and free trade within Indochii federation,

7* Provides for coord inn Hon of transport and communications of all tvws within federation and T'nton Fwp£ah .

& Pemhng agi Jiiont on Viet Xani diplomatic relations, Mixed Commission will arrange consular re] rotation with neighboring States.

0. Re Cochin China: (if) all fhduhur to case: (h) Mixed Commission of general staffs to control this: (c) nil political and military prisoners to be released except those accused of common cri : ((f) democratic l'hertri reciprocally guaranteed? (e) unfriendly propaganda mutually lo cease; (0 collaboration in control of ex-enemy citizens'J iff) representative oi Yiet Nam accredited to High Commissioner will control execution of above provisions.

Signed by I To Chi Minh and MannsMontet.

It will be seen that llo Chi M'lili obtained safi tion on majority of point d in mytel 1591, September 12,

Bo : ii of Foreign Office etates French g iilly satisfied with agreement biH would Pmvel liked to include paragraphs defining more nrerisely relations of Viet Nam to Indochinese federation and French Pnioit. They were also unsucc fid in having written in(o agreement provisions for disarmamenl of resistance elenyents in Cochin China but Bo'ssezon claims it \ orally understood with ITo Chi Minh fhaf h elen would hare chance of either retiring I

Tonkin with arms and baggage or giving up arms if remaining in Cochin China-

Sent Dept as 4671,, repeated I Ion ns 69&, Dept pic relay to

Saigon as 2,

Caffj]

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

B5lO,00 ln-lflhi.TH.^rum

The ( n7 ttl Srigon (Reed) to the > en tary of State

coxfihlxtial Saioox, October 10, 1946—6 p. m..

[Received Octolier H2 —2:03 p. m.|

411. Meeting High Commissioner and Ho took place yi relay a? reported Mytel 109, Ocl IS." 2 Few details known bul understand

■*Nft1 printed. In desjuih'li H, OefrpTier 22, l!Hfi« fttuji Hntuif, Vice GmMil CPfttiUiran renorhtl the return there MirOctahW" 21 of Iln fill Mfnli frwn France by way of Oamninh Ray. where Ui* hail euaferred with Admiral d'Awnilen on October is. ami added: "Geuerims gesture* on the pari of l««ih iht* French and Vietnamese ereotefl an *mpa ratified rinitre-'itli . i t nubile tiuilty n eortttaUty between fh^hrwgnmns." fSSl&oQt, ID 2240)

meeting most amicable with I In unusually pro-French and even denouncing Vietnam terrorist activities. So much so one recalls earlier

rumors Ho has sold out to French. 1 i above true. que$1 ion po.*es itself whether I To can keep unqualified support in north, particularly in view of further reports of Communist character of that state. I still believe French Communists desire sofl pedal Communist trends Vietnam for political reasons and will adopt passive attitude until after elections. FIC vote against ion mum ion (mylel -104") is be-

43 Not printed* it reported thai preliminary H. showed ao ove; -whelming ,

majority"voted no*' (.s:w:s tr. iron (Snajftl/lft-l&lG).

tiered to be vote again?! left and is possible Fascist reaction against theory independence For native peoples.

£510,00/10 35JG: Telegram

The Vice Consul at Hanoi {O'SulVium) to the S tary of State

secret Hanoi* October 25,1046—11 a. m,

[Received 0: 20 p. m/]

PH. In private conversation, Ho Clii ilinh told me iha» effectiveness of modus vh*endi l would depend upon French actions in Cochin-China,

"If they allow spread of democratic liberties, release political prisoners, and stop attacking my people, things will go well for them in Tonkin. Otherwise the commissions (provided IVu' in modus ri-vendi) will not accomplish much*-, he said.

He added fighting in south \ ild nol stop unless French applied agreement locally.

He stated Vietnamese polity remained unchanged: i.e., Xanibo 54

"Southern district, meaning Coefcln-Cbina, mnrf he united to Vietnam. He thought thai French had reached conclusion that referendum in Cochm-China would favor unification and t hey ' herefore seemed to b ing ro avoid it.

Mv said he had been promised oi oniie aid hut thought French

would provide what ihey could if and when definite agreenienl s reached.

In concluding Ho said that if there was any information T required he would see that T obtained it.

OrScixrr.\sr

The Vtrt Ct t.J *>f lift no* {0 % $ulJ*r$n to th\ ^ fary of St

s; r • ILvxor. November I, 194 fl S a*

[Received November 2—12:30 »

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

101. ReBepfel 2+i^ September 0. : 2 »>, m M to S : <>on. There apparently is confute! between Vietnam and Chinese Comniunfefs.

Reports difficult to verify indicate presence in Vietnam of Chinese Communists who are said to be listed as advi rs in provinces. Xum-ber? ore not known bni estimates run to hundreds. Traffic apparently is directed by sea from Shanghai to Hong tiring, thence to Haiphong,

However- any reports concerning pi j ce of Cliinese Communists in Haiphong itself shouM he regarded with suspicion. Pirates from Son*h Chinp have combined with Chinese Army deserters to black* mail Clvnese congregating there. While calling themselves Com-miii : , thev are actually outlaw's.

CTSl'ujvan

S51Q.0A/11 29 EA: TefoffTOm

The Ambasm in Fi {^afjfery) to the Secretary of Statt

•? Repeated l»y the Depart] : \o Hanoi as 2?«v 17% nml to Saigon as No. 200,

secret Paws, November : [016 3 p. fin.

[Received Xovember 29—12: 53 p. m/|

5857. Tlie French are verj concerned over developments in Tmh china. A high Foreign Minis*rv official sa'd thev are particularly worried because they have "positive proof thai Ho Chi Minh is in direct con*acl with Moscow and is receiving advice and instruct! from the Soviets." ■**

••Consul Reert. In \eh pain 4153. !■ I*W>, 3 p. m.. from Saferoi. U\

spans? rp'wrtefl ")!!i''nn:v tnv pnutacfa rfiutlriii generally ilevtli »] -niprif of Com-!sl >| <i'Uxv in FIC. Himfly [n Tonkin. Nonli Annum". it? prevlmi*}? ttrfegrapft

(.^niOjMt/l^-iMt;!. ITafml had - a nn . : - nt return p»s juu! Ae^patehes In

i . ;\r>] in iViuinu: nt Haiphong between Freneh and Vietnam forget* >[.

Vi-vii::' 1 -!' 23, fttihiwiiig vifiutts incidents earUei French ultimatum to

Viet an ai to evaluate certain areas.

Repeated London as 7S0> Moscow as E1.6.

Caffert

B3

Declassified per Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

(

831G.0U I ■' MUrTrfcgnuii

The Vice Consul at lLnu/t (O'SuIUemi) to the Secretary of State**

-T J;<.'i'f".-iirti hy the D tnumf to Parts In telegram] 6332, Dec* 5, ItW

T p, m.

secret Haniu, December 3,1JM (i —noon,

[Received December -l—I a. hi,]

131. ReDeptel 15, November ».■ Possibility ITo Chi Minh in

& %>

■■ fniitn<' . J>, -

— — — * 4

contact Moscow suggested my telegram 00, October .29® bat have no

"Not printed;

further information available.

Am beginning believe Flo following line which v ill keep liim in contact with French and will assure pertain amount Freiu-h influenc here after three ICys united as sugj led Deplel 241, September 0 to Saigon. Then, if :md when, Convmimist Govt establ 1 in Fnmec, Vietnam Govt will progressively apply Marx principles.

However, thnt French should only now become concerned with tl velopineni is peculiar. Un Govt '" sow seeds more nationalist than

** Governmpul tvf the fal-on <>f rntiocbTnese elates, year ago* French to mv certain I knowledge?] have known since 18

that (?) is Ko (hi Minh ( ?) [apparent garble] stands very high in Third International. They further have strongly s j ected for at It that if fro was not receiving instructions from Moscow it

was only ! use of technical difficulties in transmission. Tt is further very peculiar that Fi onceni Id be brought to Dep attention at very moment when French apparently ,\r? heginnii to [apparent omi i n] program in Tonkin and when French i preparing to force Vietnam Govt to collaborate on French tei ms or to establish puppet govt in its place,

French t oneem over Communist may well becfevised to divert Depths attention from French policy in Indochina.

0\Sri.uv.\N

Declassified per Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

SECRET

851G«00/12~3 y ]6s Confidential File

OUTGOING TELEGRAM

i

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington

December J? 9 19 ] i6

,US URGE! I

AJMIICAK CONSUL

" SAIGON, (INDOCHINA) 305

FOR MOFFAT;

Assume you will sec Ho in Hanoi and offer following summary our present thanking as guide *

Keep in mind Ho ! s clear record as agent International communism* absence evidence recantation Moscow affilia

/

tionsj confused political situation Fra- ce and support Ho receiving French Communist Party. Least desirable eventuality would be establishment Comrmnist-doininated, Moscow-oriented state Indochina in view DEPT, which most interested IKFO strength non-communist elements Vietnam. Report fully, repeating or requesting DEPT repeat Paris.

Recent occurrences fonkin cause deep concern* Consider March 6 accord and modus vivendi as result peaceful negotiation provide basis settlement outstanding questions between France and Vietnam and impose responsibility both sides not prejudice future, particularly forthcoming Fontainobleau Conference, by resort force, Unsettled situation such as pertains certain to offer provocations both sides 5 but for this reason conciliators patient attitude especially necessary. Intransigence either side and disposition exploit incidents can only retard economic rehabilitation Indochina and cause indefinite postponement conditions cooperation France and Vietnam which both agree essential.

If Ho takes stand non-implementation promise by i of Cochinch: i relieves Vietnam respon:

bility compliance with agreements, you might if you

SEC T 85

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 NND Project Number; NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

SECRET

8510.00/12-3^6

consider advisable raise question \ ther he believes referendum after such long disorder could produce worthwhile result and whether he considers compromise on status Cochinchina could possibly be reached through negotiation

May say American people have welcomed attainments Jndochinese in efforts realise praiseworthy aspirations greater autonomy in framework democratic institutions and it wo be regrettable should this interest and sympathy be imperilled by any tendency Vietnam administration force issues by intransigence and violence*

May inform Ho Caffcry discussing situation Pre] h similar frankness. For your IKF0, ? Baudet in DEC 3 conversation stated 1) no question reconcilest Indochina as such would be counter French public opinion ^nd probably beyond French military resources, 2) French will continue base policy March 6 accord and modus Vivendi and make every e 'fort i ly then through negotiation Viet;: . 3) French would resort forceful measures only on restricted scale in case flagrant violation agreements Vietnamj k) d'Argenlieu^ usefulness impaired by outspoken dislike Vietnam officials and replacement perhaps desirablej 5) French Communists embarrassed in pose as* guardian French, inter-national interests by barrage telegraphic appeals from Vietnam, Caffery will express gratification this statement French policy with observation implementation such policy should go far obviate any

danger that 1) Vietnamese irreconcilables and extremists

might be in position make capital of situation 2) Vietnamese might be turned irrevocably against West and toward ideologies and affiliations hostile democracies which could result perpetual foment Indochina with consequences all Southeast Asia.

* Avoid impression US Govt making formal intervention this juncture* Publicity any kind would be unfortunate.

Paris be guided foregoing*

m

Achesrvn

Ac tins SEA:COgburn WS;VMallner

SECRET 8G

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

The. CoMttJ at Srttgon (/?< ed) to thi St tary of Sfrrte

coxfu>i:xtial Sausox. Decemtar (I k l M>— l j> .m.

[Received Dceenilier 7 — IL: 12 p. uk]

472, During risirs Mortal to high French ofiic*iu.1s latter almost invariaWv si it'll desire arrive at peaceable settlement with

Vietnam, comment tug difficulty dealing with Vietnam and that Tatter almost always tried put poljttcal aspect toevensimpl - economic negotiations, and hinting France could and would go only so far in I lie desired settlement. C > j i interesting remark by Commissioner for Finance was to eft eel France nol working for political federation in French Tndo-China but rather build up economic federation in which all iih ] r~ would be represented ami projected—he pointed out inability Vietnam unci and purely economic miestions and piv.-^m indifference to such nr'mfrrv matters as affec* the national economy. He and another high official Fitvssed willingness even desire for foreign capital Inves'ments in FJC if they were for constructive purpose? and not (mentioning Chinese specifically) speculative. Commissioner for Fii t. however, recommending foreign capital si Id be united with French knowledge conditions. In above connection question is raided whether Fivueh would insist upon lar<*er share capital and ortwjorHv boai*d d tors. Commissioner for Econnuiii Affair was optimistic for n year's fir* crop. estunaMn" at least 250.00H tons exportable sumhis and if noHtical conations iinnrove as much ps ftOfllOOO; Prospect for rubber n.ot sob^gh'l (perhaps 30,< 35.000 tons^ unh-s labor Question solved and i^n+io^cd plan under study imi 1 > Chines coolies tmt said V*C native? v n■ ;iM in

sibly not reaH kindly to this. Mentioned aho allocations of FTC rice evpor*s Khis year have not been taken up conmVMv. Among other points Commissioner for Political Affairs stated personnel all mixed commissions envisaged by wpdiw rifepd* have b*en nanwtbut still disci ioji where thev are to niee* —und^vsNnd Mixed Military Commission has fein|Kn*ar^vsuspei work in Hanoi until rft'tu

tion is clarified. Almost a 1 ! officials remarked in one form or another Commnnis' cltaracter of regime in north and one stated specifically Soviet mission her (inytel 131, November 21 ;t ) lias already violated

"Not printed

its undertaking not to ens e in political activities in FIC.

In coinmen' above and i ions telegrams feel French wouhl . eepF solution protecting intet hut will only go so far (witne present stifferat f ihtde) but hesitate believe French wonhl en#*w* uuon full ?cale unwary operations ui;l. iHtfcH" forced. French linear

to realize ho h frer tio ib'emain'ain closed door here and non-French interests will have chance to parti ■ In in can. H o Iri li economic

fusibilities. Pefore this ran happen political situation must he , hd and «n doing tins Cochin China question will be turnhur point— still believe French "ill find it cftftHilt to Fsvve Cochin Clnna ui prepaid to fight, for n iefnam and French ti

Cochin Chin will join former de pite dislike of Tonkinc? and fear of lonomi l political exploitation by them.

Hfjd

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

$510,00/12 174G: Circular Mmntm

The Srjufury of Sfttte fo Certain JIfesiom Abr I :T tT .\t London, M< .-nu'. and Xnntcing.

WASTfixoTox, December 17, 1946—1:03 p. m,

SECRET FOB CHfi;!' or M i>;-WX

Basic Fincxcii-VirrxAMi.sK Difj iculitcs

-After conversations with French and Vietnamese and

British, .Chinese and US Consuls Hanoi Mr. Abbot ilotlnU who is at present in SEA, has developed views in which Consul Saigon concurs alouj* th 'Mowing lines; 7

"Telesraw 47& D< r 1*J. 1040, 5 p. m., from Rateoii f£31G.0ti/l2 i

tr.'ifr-ti'iri! il Mr. >i iffat's report in whlcll lit 1 si • I ft? llclcl left LlaiMU. mi D« smt-i r i> lirfun reeetviitj Mie t>&]KirtuiCMit"« to mi 5M1TJ # December ■">, 3 p..m., p. —•.

The Vietnam Government is in control of n *inall Communis* Egroiip possibly in indirect touch with Mas i o\v and direct touch with Ycnan. A nationalist group is utilizing Communist party techniques and discipline with wh"n*h they are familiar* The people are conserve fcive Inndowne is and at tempts to -comnutnize tb« condary

and would await sim fit! operation of a j malis'l e. Apparently some leaders, like* Ho Chi ifiuh, e< Ii r collaboration with the French essential: those like Giap : would avoid collaboration fearing

French domination Imi iitight not reject French influence and aid. Jvationalisl sentiment runs deep among the \lel iwse and does op-position to tlu i French, hi liey mi| I >rn against all whites.

French infl e is impor*itui not only as an Antidote to Soviet i flirenre bin (<• project Vietnam and SEA from future Chinese imperialism. Delay in achii ir a settlement v. ill ] sively diminish i he possibility of ultimate French infiuen<

The in y of both French and Viet™ " iaJs i : questional >le

in connection with recent incidents, O'SulIivan k 1 -'- rt>* Vwt

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3,3 NND Project Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 2011

clear that with a drfferenl French commander af Tr:11^.T l .•■ 111^- than Colonel Debes, who is notorious for graft and brutality and who has admitted thai he cannot control U\< own troops, the trouble might have been confined to the original incident!.

According to the French, lite Viefi iinu enlarge their clai each agreement and an 1 so impractical ami doctrinaire th;n all e< versa t tons are ineffectual. The Vietnamese Feel that the French renege on each agreement and aiv trying to reestablish control. How-ever, both say they have approximately the same obj ires, although Giap says Vietnam opposes a political Indoehincs ration but

favors n federation, dealing with common economic probl . StoiEat has mentioned to the French tin nt basic troubles: [ft) co

plete mutual distrust, (i) failure of tlie French lo resolve their own views on "freestate within French Tnion", (r) almost childish Viettra-me ' attitude and knowledge i I ik questions and vagne grop-

ing for "independence* 1 * Agreement cannol 1> reached by trying to reach accords on incidental problem Basic Vietnam powers and relations with France must first I i iblishe.t. JCot only new f are needed but neutral good offices even mediation nun be e iial.

Declassified per Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

83lC.0ft/13-2f>4G : Circular tr[.t ;im

The Secrettwy of Shift to Ci vtuhx Diplomatic and Con&ulitr 0 r$* 1 ** At Moscow, Nanking, and Salami.

( >xfiiu:xi ial Washixgtox, December 20, If) !(> —10 n. m.

Ami) Paris states Motttet, Minister Ovci^eas* will leave soon visit all part* Tticloclunn confer with Tin ('hi Minh after which he will go Xa^ki ,wv (Vsh 1 ^ Chinese n*hi*ions with Indochina. TVAr/reiltieu will arrive Indochina same time as Jfontct Caffery says5 * question

French hoticv Indochina wa> important i >r dnrtnjr receni political crisis^ omiMbti betw* ^hnrn'v meraaringiy divided on subject* Loft-irirfs purees defemh Ml policy inward Vietnam* acenstn*

cV.\ r<>vidj ( >u, French mililat'v. civilian anthori'ips T ndochina of sabo-tu^-Infv >t ;i r i: n-eiiifNU and m, rirentft. Radical Socialists ."MRP and o*her center and H«rh*wi?vff nhrties hcrnwl JEontel* nf giving away Fiwcels mpsf valuable colony, demanded firmer atlihide toward Ho :»»»' I Y 'm. In speech to Assembly, Communis Duc^os spoke of peed ,,ir no'icv nrotpctinsr inter* ! 1 i h ui'inn, maintaining in-tero-rs France everywhere in world. TTe warned France rauri not make Tndocbina same mistakes tha* cofI her pnsiHon Levant. Thb-modi i <>te bu' crvptic statement i cts recent Communist caution re Indochmo which nmeraPv interpreted as designed avoid onnoaiiig pnhlip oi>into« which fa ipct »nsflv nnvio its over i >-il>"dit\ losing In do ••Vi>i-'». C1 " ItWv remark? TVHun Govt's d^ri-ar.n -pud both Moiltet, d'Arjreid'ii-ii Indochina ,-oem> W compromise which avoids any decision J.^t\Tp rt, *'I nni m ;M<r advocates of finn and cnnciltatorv policy. He doubts wjiefj'ors.'idi can hope solve sue* fully seriot crisis

which arisen Indochina*.

Btexks

Declassified per Executive Order L3526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 I

831G.flfl 12 2:1441

Mcmomndmn hy flu Director of the Office of Far E'Ufern Affffirs (I'//ifv/i/) ft) th» VndcTS 1 } tmy of Sftrfe [Ai >)

nYA<ntxr,TON\] D ceml S3, 1946-

The serious implications of the fighring between the French and tin? Vietnamese which tools place in the T »se towns of Haiphoivg

and Lnn hi during the week of November 20—27 w noted in a memorandum to von of Xorember 2G. W It was feared at that time

** Not priiifWL

iat a sii down l>y force was in tlie making This now appears to have eventuated; V**r the past six days* open war lias been raging in Tonkin and a1 several points in Annam. The Vietnamese Government has (led Hanoi and t lie French are savoring to clear the city of remaining Vietnamese guerillas with plain . and tanks. Vietname casualties dnring the pasf month an probably now well over 2,000, Although French casualties have been far lighter, Sainteny (Oommi sioner for Tonkin and northern Animm) was himself seriously wounded four days ago.

Yon may w*$h to make the following points when vou see Ambits* sador Bonnei this aftt moon :

1. AVe are deeplv concerned bv the oi eak of war in kin and Ainniin and by the apparent severance of mosl of the ntacts between the French and the Vietnamese and am fully awar the unhappy position in which the French have been placed ;

% AVe are gratified by tlie news that M. Moutet Ofinister for Overseas France 1 is proceeding hunieditfteiv by air to Indochina to obtai first-hand information on the situation;

& AVe are aware fhftt such unsettled condemns a? now prevail in northern Indochina offer provocation to outside interference and are disturbed lest:

a. The co I I e brought up before the Security Council . i\ threat

to peace;

h. Oil'^r powers attemrct pnr»e form of intervention, in wh?ch connection *f mav he noted that the Chinese press ha? reported that the dispatch of inese *roops f « the :r\ ; lv»*nfij coi sidererl owing to the* heavy los sustained by the local Chinese in the November fighting;

/>./ / information:

*

Although r hc French in Indochina hare made fa aching papered ions to the A'u'namee desire for antou< tiy, French actions on the ■•■. havebei n directed f owatd whittlim »wn the powers and the territorial extent of tlie Vie , "free state". This, n the Vietnamese have conttrnned io L At the same t»n the French themselves adi n( thi they lack the military stremtfh to re juer the country. In brief, wKh inadequate forces, with public opinion sbamlv at i ' . with n povemm nf tendered largely i tFective throt^h internal division, the French have fried to accompli in Indn hina wh;*t a ' f united RrHain has found it i rise to at; • in Burma. Riven the pi element in tht -' t-i u

m v \u • tntiinie incl Finite!v.

*

COX AL

■

Declassified per Executive Order L3526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 I

In connexion with the possibility of Chinese intervention in Titdo-china, tlit* Chinese Emba? j in London lias approached tin* Foreign Ofii'-e to oronosc ioim Chinese British intervention in Indochina and the Chinese Embassy in Paris has approached our Emh •-,- in Parts to prono?e Chinese British-American intervention, It is believed that the Chinese Embassy here may approach us to tin* same purpose. If so, i( h considered (hat vre-should reply as the British replied, to i]*e effec' that Mnutet is en route to Iudiv! i to review the situaf ion, that the French line in Indochina will probablv ho clarified as.French internal pontics emerpe from their pi m confusion, and that an offer of mediation at this time would probably be resented and

a-

rejected by ihe French.

J[onx] C[-vwer] V[ix»t.\t]

85lO»flfl 1" 2;M0 : Tt'fojrrnin

The Vice ('■■■ id at Hanoi (0*SuUicttn) to fh< s< - retary of State

Secret Haxoi, December 23, 1948—fl p. m.

[Keci 1 De tber 24— l: 85 p. m.] 154. Reasons why Vietnamese attacked French I 19

Unclear.

However, theories here are: (1) Resnli ordefs from Sfoseoiv ('<) possibly ^ieodv to nn 11 Rnutlieasi Asia, (h) possibly to *?ive French Commnnisi Party, should H fa! ower when t i' Blom Rovern-menf <r<>"- opivwtfimil v to irrak? rniirk favorable . i lenvnii with Vuf-tium ' Urns en^Wln^ French Coiin v ninfc*s to pose as "protectors of French inter thereby inemi^injrc CP strwpjth hi Fr^nee; (2) Result >>' -Javanese obtained «n Holland bv fi<*htin«: while Tie 1 ' a('n*c -<\- Vietnamese apparently l I all hope satisfactory settle* men! irh^n r**unid*Ai^ lieu announced. Kepeat to Paris.

O'Sru.ivAx

Declassified per Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

851G.00/12-2W

OUTGOING TSU .AM DEPART!: ' OF STATE

Washington

Confidential

„ Decemb i ■ . P 19 ! i6 I\IY::: 7 ASSY

PARIS. 6586 ■

The Under Secretary asked Bonnet to call yesterday afternoon to discuss the situation in Indochina. Mr, Acheson said that we are deeply concerned by the outbreak of hostilities in Tonkin and A m and are fully aware of the unhappy situation in which the French find themselves. We had anticipated such a .situation developing in November and events have confirmed our fears. While we have no wish to offer to mediate under present conditions we do want the French GOVT to kr that we are ready and willing to do anything which it might consider helpful in the circumstances. We have been gratified to learn of Moutet's mission and have confidence in his mode bion and broad viewpoint. \!e believe however that the situation is highly li-iflaii tory and if present unsettled conditions continue 3 there is a possibility that other powers might attempt to bring the matter up before the Security Council. If this happens, as in the case of Indonesia } the question will arise whether the matter is one of purely French internal concern or a situation likely to disturb the peace. Other powers might likewise attempt some form of intervention as has been sn^ested in the Chinese pres^. We would be opposed to such steps , but from every point of view it f *s important that the question be settled as soon as possible. Mr. Acheson added that he v dered whether the French would attempt to reconquer the country through mil ita force which was a step that the British had found unwise to attempt in Bur .

COITFIT

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3,3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

CO IAL

Bonnet said that he had little direct info with regard to the present situation in Indochina but referred to Loon Blum 1 8 speech in the-Assembly this morning. He summarised important points of the speech which he said clearly indicated that Blum's policy is to settle the question as far as .-possible by conciliatory means and that this was the purpose of Mount's visit. He said that Blum had reiterated that French policy is to assure the independence (within the French empire) of Viet Nam and complete self GOVT* It was unfortunate that it had been impossible up to the present to implement the far reaching concessions embodied in the French agreement with Viet Nam,

Ho said that personally he would be surprised if the Chinese brought the question up before the Security Council at this time for he felt that the Nanking GOVT was sympathetic to the French position in Indochina, He concluded by saying that he would inform his GOVT of our friendly interest and of our deep concern over the situation and let us know the reaction from Paris.

BYRNES

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number; NND 63316. By; NWD Date; 2011

Tit*- Acting Si cretary of Flute to th Charge //< tfu United Kingd&i

{G-nlJ-man)

secret WlvsinxOTOX, I k seemlier 27. 19iti—7 p. in.

SS17. Uriels 10216, Dec 21 and 10245, Dec 24.** Xo Chinese pro-

p See ftiotunte. Pi —.

sal received hew for intervention Indochina. Event such approach Depi reaction v ill be negative with reply bused same considerations einpha.-ized bv l>rit FonOff in reiVtv such sas&estton hv Chinese^ namely (1) possibility insults from MfoittH trip, (2) likely clarification French Hue Indochina as I h internal politics em< from confusion, and (3) ainty offer of mediation would be resentfully rejected by French.*

"Telegram 1027!), Ivnuier 30, in in, i p. nt.. from Lmiclcm« reported that 11 British Furufgn Office wra«* gratified ;;t the Delia rhttentVf similar position ntid stated r'';!f flu iTiIiiese Eiuluissy w:i> b^ing* Informed ot Biirlsb rejection «>f tl»e proposed intervention hi 13 hlna fsriin.00/12-: ->.

Sen 1 to London as S317- Related to Paris as BOOS; Saigon as 31! and Nanking as 1*214.

ACJTESOX

-

TTus Conml at Saigon {Reed) to the Secretary of St

coxfidkxtial * Saicon, December 30, 1.946— 1 p. m.

[Received 10: 21 p. m.]

409. I^eclerc arrived Saturday n - p. m, with many his original Staff

03 December 2&

faitd] is proceeding Hanoi Tuesday. After conference with Leclei Moutel lefl for Cambodia, Laos and Argenlieu for Hanoi Sunday a. m. French making progre in north and west and proposal from Vicftnam military 1 r fro] withdraw his troops from city is being favorably consi id. Big question now with whom Moutet can deal, pro-Vietnam elements iiieistmg still can treat with Oobue, most ob-seri think lias unlikely. Solution as 1 hare previously reported mar be creation new Vietnam ("Ion ay under Rao Dai

18 BBiperor of Amtain who alidlcfttecl In Aniai^t VM't,

and/or Tarn (now in Nanking) with which )'. nch can treat wit-haul losing face and which will have influence with native population. Mnnt natives definitely tired tin* seemhi^lv endless insecurity and want chance resrnie peaceful life. XT-illi d'uloinatic handling, solution can he obtained bin extremtef element will continue make trouble iblv lonq; time in come, Xot impossible Vietnam Government thus created will clahn only Tonkin. Anuam as overheard remark ^IVmtet 'ft Tv (Vi lent Cochin China Government) indical

French kirlc'iis independent Cochin China. FnoneMionnbly attack and atrocities (Tom hro to five hundred French civilian killed) have routed French feeling— even Mbutei surprisingly mil en—and untd all other n its exha French will 1 disinclined accc

+

mediation. Department please repeal Paris,.L ,X ag.

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

* Thr S,-. try of State to the Vice Consul at Hanoi {O'SutVerm)**

Wr n*e riri»;«rtirn'iif also sent Information telegrams. gCiwg Hir gfst of tbis telegram t^> Paris. London, Xanfcing. mid Saigon,

secret Waswixgtoj., December SI, 11)46—7 p. m.

23. Xo objection your acting humanitarian grounds as described

crtel i fO Dee 28 n< " or, w irli Fi eiuli agreeing, in any other strictly local,

w In tWs h'ii •ram Vice Consul (VSuUh-ati reji >rted Mint lu» bad informed tin* Chinese Consul General at Hanoi thai he ir»tilcl lit* wilfiiijr m aid in an.\ eai«idJ^ fen whirl; Frown auUmritn-s ,f ajHirfivu] and reifiiestwl the Dpjui'fhiienfs i»-strs:»-r Ifnis "ii this point. The n*imw hrttl *hkj: I that the Victual up^ might wish unofficial nresewe of nrUish and Am* all 'an nmsmtur officers in any meeting wiiu rlie French, i -Hi.oti/u-^M

military, non-political hit nation in order save lives. Ton should not, however, withoul express Depl authorization become involved any situation any way which could be interpreted as mediation basic political issues between opposing rmiftcs; For your secret info. Acting Secy in Dee 28 conversation with French Amb here expressed our concern outbreak hostilities an 1 our read! do anything which img] be con^ulered helpful bul stated we have no wish offer mediate present conditions Further- on receinl info that Chinese liutl aj 1

Brit FonOff and AinKinb Paris with proposal join) mediation, Depl decision vastfdy< i this unieture in new certainty ni fid ejection by French- V*y'\t reaction also negative. Chinese desire extend in fluf'iK'f* Indochina wins seems clear and French Communist? ready make infant capital any appi Lde intervention Indochina

u foreign imperialism.' 3

Btbxes

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 NND Project Number; NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

o

o

CD

O

Declassified per Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

SECKET

85?.2Vl-3^7s Secret File

iAMEMBASSX

PARIS

75

i

OUTGOING TELSGHAIi

January 8, 19'+7 7 p

>rn

DEPT's present policy on arms and armaments approves QUOTE sales to France by the FLO of reasonable quantities of military supplies except in cases which app v to relate to Indochina I c French requests for purchase surplus military supplies in Buraaa and Philip; ?s for use Indochina have been consistently refused on basis thj "policy which consequently should be well knowxi to F P and ' >G Pariso Since French have apparently stated their proposed purchase ammunition subject UK TEL 33 is related to Indochina hostilities, DEPT could not approve its resale to them by Belgians* You may wish ii Imate as much to FONQFF before receipt note you anticipate.

BYRK3S

WEtWWallner

Jitnil

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

BT

OUTGOING TELEGKAM URGENT

AME3SBASSY February 3, I9V7.

8 pm PARIS

' There is reason for increasing concern over situation as it is developing in Indochina and for that reason I feel you might well take early occasion to have frank talk with Ramadier or Bidault or both so: .;hat along lines conversations you have already had with Blum, but at this time going in fact beyond position you took in those talks. We have only very friendliest feelings toward France and we are anxious in every way we can to support France in her fight to regain her economic, political and military strength and to restore herself as in fact one of major po rs of world. In spite any wisunderstanding which might have arisen in minds French in regard to our posit 3 concerning Indochina they must appreciate that we have fully recognized France 1 s sovereign position in that area and we do not wish to have it appear that we are in any way endeavoring undermine that position) and French should know it is our desire to be helpful and we stand ready assist any appropriate way we can to find solution for Indochinose problem* At same time we cannot shut ouv eyes to fact that there are two sides this problem and that our reports indicate both a lack French understanding of other side (more in Saigon than in Paris) and contin 3 existence dangerously outmoded colonial outlook and methods in area. Furthermore, there is no escape from fact that trend of times is to effect that colonial e: es in XIX Century sense t rapidly becoming thing of past. Action Brit in India a: Burma and Dutch in Indc sia are outstanding examples this trend, and French themselves took cognizance of it both in new Constitution and in their agreements with Vietnam, On other hand we do not lose sight fact that Ho Chi Mirih has direct Cc unist connections

id it s ild be obvious that we are not interested in seeing colonial € ire administrations supplanted by philosophy and political o: ni; is r ting iron and

*

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3,3 NND Project Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 2011

SECRET

controlled by Kremlin, Fact does remain 5 however, that a situation does exist in Indochina which can no longer he consider* I 3 if it ever was considered, to be of a local characterc If that situation continues deteriorate some country in direct interest is very likely to bring matter I before Security Council under Chapter 11 of Charter c We i have no intention talcing such action ourselves at this

time, but French will surely appreciate that we do have a vital interest in political and economic well being this area* If some country should bring matter before Securit; Council we wojild find it difficult to oppose an Investigation Indochinese problem unless negotiations between parties were going on. It might be added that it would not in our est on be in France's Ion: range interest to use her veto position to keep matter from coming before Council* Fi Iy_v. r e_h ; ' cl solution, qf^pr suggest # It Is 1: 11 y matter for two v s"to"work out . themselves and from your reports and those from Indochina we are led to feel that both parties have endeavored to ke door open to some sort of set *nt« We appreciate fact that Viet i started present fighting in Indochina on December 3.9 and that this action has made it more difficult for French to adopt a position of generosity and ■ conciliation* Nevertheless we hope that French will find it possible to be more than generous in trying to find a solution*

MARSHALL

-rTCulbertson

SI SET

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number; NND 63316. By; NWD Date; 2011

SECRET

&5lG»00/5f-13^7s Secret File

OUTGOING TELEGRAM

AMEMBASSY, PARIS.

Hay 13, 19^7.

8 pin

1737

We becoming increasingly concerned by slow progress tbtfard settlement Indochina dispute. We fully appreciate French are making effort roach satisfactory settlement and hope visit Co; sioner Boll&ert to Indochina will produce concrete results* The following considerations, however, are submitted for your use any conversations you may have with French authorities at appropriate time this subject* We recognize it night not be desirable make such approach . to newly constituted government in first days its reorganization, but nevertheless feel early appropriate opportunity might be found inform Trench Gov of our concern in this matter*

Key our position is our awareness that in respect developments affecting position Western democratic powers in southern Asia, we essentially in same boat as French,

also as British and Dutch,

cannot conceit setbacks

close as so-

to long-range interests France which would not also be setbacks our own, ' Conversely we should regard elation France and members French Union as not only to advantage peoples concerned, but indirectly our own-

In our view, south' Asia in critical phase its history with seven new nations in process achieving or struggling independence or autonomy* r iese nations include quarter inhabit is world and their future course, ow; : sheer weight populations, resources they command, and strategic location* will be momentous factor world stability. Follow' \g relaxation European controls, internal racial, religious, and national differences could plunge new nations bo violent discord, or airead; apparent anti tern Pan-Asiatic tendencies could become dominant political force, or C anists could c controls V eonsic as best safeguard against these ev alitie-s a

SRE2

10 0

Declassified per Executive Order L3526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 I

f

SECRET

8?1G.00/5»13 1 '7

continued close association between newly-autonomous peoples and powers \i) ch have long been responsible their welfare . In particular we recognize Viet: : ; will for indefinite period require French material and technical assistance and enlightened political guidance which can bo provided only by nation steeped like Fra j in democratic tradition and confirmed in respect human liberties and \i or tb ind iv idua 1»

We equally convinced, however, such association must be voluntary to be lasting and achieve results, and that protraction present situation Indochina can only destroy basis voluntary cooperation, leave legacy permanent bitterness 5 and irrevocably alienate Vietnamese from France and those values represented by France and other Western democracies *

While fully appreciating difficulties French position this conflict, we feel there is danger in any arrangement which might pro e Vietnamese oppc Ity compare unfavorably their own position and that of other peoples southern Asia who have made tremendous strides toward autonomy since war*

While we are still ready and willing do anything we can which might be considered helpful, French will understand we not attempting come forward with any solution our own or intervene in situation* However, they will also understand wo inescapably concerned with situation Far East generally, upon which developments Indochina likely have profound effect*

Plain fact is that Western democratic syst is on defensive in almost all emergent nations sou rh Asia and, because identified by peoples these nations with what they have considered fori r denial their ri ts, is ticularly vulnerable to attacks by de; Ic leaders political moveno of either ultrf ationalist or Communist nature which promise redress and revenge past so-called wrongs and in : allties, ' Signs development anti-Western Asiatic consciousness all ay multiplying, of which Inter-Asian CGEF an ple« Unanimity support for Vietnai se among othor Asiatic countries very striking, even lead ; to moves Burma, I] a, and Malaya send volunteer forces their

32

T>

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3,3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

SECRET

851G.00/5-13-7

assistance* Vietnam cause proving rallying-cry for all anti-Western forces and playing in hands Communists all areas. We fear continuation conflict may jeopardize position all Western democratic powers in southern Asia and lead to very eventualities of which we most apprehens." *

We confident French fully aware dangers inherent in situation and therefore venture express renewed hope they will be most generous attempt find early solution which, by recognizing legitimate desires Vietnamese 3 will restore peace and deprive anti-democratic forces of powerful weapon.

For your INFO, evidence that French Communists arc being directed accelerate their agitation French colonies even extent lose much popular support France (URTEL 1719 Apr 25) raay be indication Kremlin prepared sacrifice temporary gains with ^0 million French to long range colonial strategy with 600 million dependent people, which lends great urgency foregoing views * French position Indochina dispute since DSC 19 5 which based on Vietnam initiative attackj seems DEPT dangerously one-sided in ignorii g Debes attack Haiphong NOV 23 and understandable Vietnam contention that stand had be made some point view steady French encroachments after B 6 on authority and territory Vietnam (e.g., establishment Cochinchinese REP, occupation southern Annam and Moi Plateau, and Dalat plan French-dominated Federation to which Vietnam would be subservient,) DEPT much concerned lest French efforts find QUOTE true representatives Vietnam UNQUOTE with whom negotiate result creation impotent puppet GOVT along lines Cochinchina regime, or that restoration Baodai may be attempted, implying democracies reduced resort monarchy as weapon against Communism. You may refer these further views if nature your conversations French appears warrant.

Saigon and Hanoi should be guided by this TEL in any conversations Bollaert.

MARSHALL -SEA ;C0k burn

SEC:

Declassified per Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

851G.00/9-11^7: Secret Pile

SECRET

OUTGOING TELEGRAM

US Urgent

DEPART, ;JJT OF STATE

Sep 11 19^7

AMEMBAS3Y

PARIS 3>33 For the Ambassador

We have read with concern recent telegrams from OU7iO£fleers in Indochina (repeated to you) to the effect that local French military are seriously con-■fcemplating an offensive against Vietnamese in dry season beginning at end this month. It is difficult for' us give credence these reports in light French econ LCj financial and food position. It is obvious that such an offensive,, if it took place under these conditions > would have serious effect on public opinion here which would be reflected in a Congress which will be called upon to consider extensive .financial aid for western European nations, Including France.

Please make appropriate Informal Inquiries and report urgently. For your Info Dept considering approach French on apparently rapidly deterioratin prospects for Franco-Vietnam settlement end is" awaiting your reply this point.

Or o

a

MARSHALL

ECRET )3

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

Consul noi, French Indochina September 12, 19^7

Reed COKFIDERTIAL Oct 7 ? 19'+7

ACTION SUBJECT: Speech of Emile Bollaert on September 10 on French Policy PE-ene in Indochina .

IMFO OCD-enc

DCS

EUR-ene THE HONORABLE

SPA

OIE THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WAR

man: Washington d.c.

GIG

POL SIR:

I havJ the honor to refer to my telegram number 286 of September 11 9 8 a.m. and to report further on the speech delivered by EMI IE BOLLAERT y High Commissioner of France for Indo China. There are enclosed five copies of the speech as published by ,f L'Entente" in a supplement to its regular daily edition.

The site selected by Mr. Bollaert was HADGKG, a provincial capital which lies 10 miles southeast of Hanoi, and which was, for a time 5 head-qi bers of the Viet Ham Government after its flight from Hanoi in December, 19^6. Hadong apj ntly was ch n as the place for the speech that M. Bolleart might make reference to "tW razed city of Tonkin, in ruins still haunted by memories of terror' 1 . Robert Sherrod of "Time" had previously described it as "probably the most thoroughly -war-wrecked city in the world."

The speech itself was delivered at about 5 p.m. in a publi re* Around M. Bollaert, when he spoke, were gathered the ver&l hundred civilians (white and Vietnamese) and the many military officers who had been invited. Some 1,500 V ame.se* largely peasant women children, were kept behind ropes set up to form a square in the center of which was the ro am that the Vietnamese guerrillas had tried to burn the ev previous.

This speech n its the most important declaration of French

policy t has been made in the last year. M. Bollaert, it will be recalled, was originally named H Commissioner for Indo China, replacing Admiral 33C DVABGEH 1TI in He tvec in Indo China ei r in April, and subsequently returned to Paris in Ji .

He was in Saigon again in late July and s) ly thereafter revealed to the p ss that he intended to deliver a major policy declaration in

i COPY

.

104

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

- - *

Tonkin in the course of the next month. He came to Hanoi on August 7 ? I9V7. The Rainadier Gove erit* at that time, faced the dii ult qu- -tions of the Statute of Algeria and the Municipal Election law and was under attack from within its own party. Bollaert* instead of delivering his speech* when the government.... .Ho less than four "conseils restrients des 1 stres" a one full "Conseil", plus a series of private in> s between Bollaert* the Generals &e Pellet and Valluy* and Raanadier were needed to settle the final form of the speech* which I em i] 'armed, was much changed from the original version.

The speech* then, was word by ;1 and sentence by sentence laboriously ass* '.ed by the Raniadier Government* and is the lOj 1 conclusion of France policy as pursue 6 in S03 bhern Indo China for the past two yc For as the Frenc Hi y position in 5 has improved militarily, so in : lost exact ratio has declined their willingness to make concessions. M. Bollaert f s speech represents a definite retreat from the French position taken in the March 6 > 19^6* Accords* and indeed its terms on their face are no more liberal than the 188*4 Treaty of tl Protectorate.

Stripped of its verbiage* the speech constituted an oblique offer to the Vietnamese people to bring forth a "representative government rT b would accept the terms offered by M.-Bollaert on wl there was to be no ""bargaining" as this "would be in truth unworthy of such a nob" cause."

■ lis seems to be designed ■ an escape clause for the French government and is directed against Ho Chi Minh with whom the French apparently v I deal only in a last extremity. At thepresent time* the French have no intention of dealing with Ho and should he accept the terms as offered* the French would unquestionably demand the immediate surrender of his arms and an" 1 t "the weapons must grow silent."

Bollaert first defined the goal toward 1 h "the Vietnamese people aspire freedom within the French Union and unity of the three Kys". He said this freedom is in no way restricted othc han "by the limits forced on it by 1 t that these territories belt the French Union". But France* he maintained "does not take any position with regard to the problem" of unity of the Kys save that "she requires that the Union should not be made under pressure and according to totalit an fc iver-sally condemned 11 . Then should the Union be derived from the popular wish duly e: d ? local particularisms should be preserved* and the cohesion of the Annamii - countries should "be founded not on the interest of only one but on the confidence and friendi Lp of all",, fa stated.

As : the si s. separated or unified as they wish* M. Bollaert said "we are ready to hand over to the fully qualified governmerr manage-me of public affi " whic eans the org: on wit! ench i erence of "its repr ". " stitutions* judicial pre dings* it own fii ie* education, social legislation, end hospitals".

jhe states of the p : la* M. Boll- x fc i,- the facts of geo ( *hy e cert ■ 11 rt tire common

He 1 ed out t "all rj L people" will cc de that among oth

..

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 NND Project Number; NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

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things., a "common customs sy. m, coramon currency, and common policy of immigration" is necessary. (This 1 vras added because of the problems posed by the oximity of China,) These states, M. Bollaert continued , will also plan toge r the reconstruction of indo China in which "of coursej we (the French) have our own point of view".

"This collaboration is, after all. unavoidable and all those concerned (the French Republic to Lug one of them) will have to decide-together how, under the supe: ion of the K Ccmnriissioner,........

also be "commissioners of the republic" to defend eh

economic and cultural int n .

"The High Commissioner, or his deli c (whose funciio or position is not specified), will take good care that our countrymen are enabled to enjoy all the democratic freedom enjoyed by the ci1 Lzens of the states belonging to the Union and will see to it that our concerns do i fare worse than local ones; the citizens and concerns of Indochina being, in return, certain of finding the same adv; jes in Frar The Hi -mission:r or his deleg: will therefore 1st on asc aiming \ the

personal and material status of French subjects is never one-sidedly cl &•"

And finally, M. Bollaert said, the High Commissioner will have a special status drawn up for the "soul and northern minorities of Indo China whose right: considered by the French as having a sacred character."

All the Indochinese states will be, H- Bollaert said, in the French Union which "must frame in the autonomy of the Indo Chinese people...it does not restrain private immunities...the F ± Union is resilient and dynamic enough to allow a nation to develop fr :Jy in framewoa ...it is an aggregate of forces, ever on the move, each through a never ceasing interplay of exchange, giving and taking at one and the same time...it is

the French Union that men will find their raison d'etre".

-

But, he added, the French Union can have only one i and one diplo-

y, "The police forces of the associated states of Indo China will assure in time of peace internal order on their own territory: in case of foreign aggression, they will be integrated in the i med forces of ti Frei Union for the defense of their countries and of the Union,"

M. Bollaert also promised that the French "would not take re; sals and that all political and military prisoners would be liberated reciprocally. He j th> at the "originr -s of the December 1 aggression" who h: . lost "■ h of their credit with the French r le". He extolled the French Unio:> I its act icnt and possibi? b some h and conel i:

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

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"This peace depends upon you (the Vietnamese people) to obtain it."

ANALYSIS

Individual States

The speech left th way open for u ication of the three Kys which the French feel as a foregone conclusion. The French cleverly do not propose any solution "but leave the burden of preparing a plan acceptable to all Kys in the hands of the Vietnamese.

The status of the states, either unified or separate, is one of "liberty arid freedom" within the French Union. There is no recof don of Vietnam as an "etat Libre", such as was done in the March 6 agreement. There is nowhere any mention of "independence" save in the t-t dent by . Bollaert in Vietnamese; "BOC LAP TRONG KHOI LAM KEEP THAT" (independence within the framework of the French Union.) Nor will France hand over anything to the States which resembles "sovereignty". Rather she will give only "public administration".

Tiiis omission is commented upon by the AFP in a September 12 despatch from Hanoi as follows:

"On the other hand, French circles expressed ap; elation for the liberalism of the French oent, a liberalism which may reduce the tension. It is only regretted that the word 'independence•, as being capable of producing a (favorable) psyschological shock, was not pronounced."

Each state or states will organ' its representative institul as, its justice, its finances, its education, its social legislation mid its hospitals.

The exact judicial formula has not yet been settled, 1 er. Didier MACHEL, Political Counsellor to the High Commissioner, whom I saw aft the speech was deliv 1. pointed out it was uncertain her the courts of the states would have jurisdiction over French and foreigners wit its territory. He did not specify whet] "i and Cambodians would be cc ed fc ,ers with a special status- He sug d, as his personal opinion, that perhr there might be a so ion in the establish rfc of "mixed tribunals" or possibly mixed or wholly French appelate courts over Vietnamese courts of first instance.

The . :ate governments will have the help, if they so desire of "our functiormaires and our te icians", snot: eat from the previous position as only French "coir llors, technici b, and experts" were m oned in A Lcle *! of the Modus V: : li of Septead>er lU. Finally, France solemnly renounced all ace ct and indi t. France

sol renounced r, c ct" adm5nist> ion in the June 6^ >- 3 y

^icl -ticle 7: Efae (French) resit, bs (in Tc In) will avoid

treating det< interic ' on in the provinces.

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 2011

Grouping of States

Bollaert did not abolish the "Federation 11 . He diluted ■ watered it down and his staff maintain that it is dead. However, at least three "common services" (a euphonistic n for federal services)will exist: finance, immigration, and customs.. It is probably an economic fact that if there were no fed on in Indo C3 " it would probably be necessary to invent one. Bollaert indicated in his speech that there might be more "common services" than those he specifically mentioned. Didier

EL maintained vehemently there would not be: that the concept of the Fede.v Ion> as proposed by D'Argeniieu, had been com etely abandoned. However , the history of'French administration in Indo China is not one to inspire confid a in such limitations as the French voir rily place on the activity of their services.

Mo wlu is there any mention of the "Surete", that ubiquitous French combination of an FBI (for Europeans) and a Gestapo (for Vietnamese). MICHEL maintained the ete of the state or st s which « ould be in the hands of the local government. He said that in Laos and Cambodia there was not a single French member of the Surete which entirely in the: hands of the indigenous peoples. He considered that during the early stages of development in Vietnam, there would be two Suretes which would then be merged as gradually French personnel would be eliminated. "You will understand, I believe, that the situation in Tonkin is not such that we can eliminate , at the present time, the French Surete completely without danger to French lives 11 , he said.

There is no good explanation of why Bollaert did not mention the eventual disappearance of the Surete in his speech. Eor ir re any good r by it was left to Pr er RAXJADIER rather than Bollaert to state in a Paris Press Conference tha-t the goveriMent "undertook to eliminate th network of the administrative corps which control or direct the administrative service 1 '.

Special Status

Special status will be prepared by the J h Commissioner for the minorities of the Korth a South whose rights have, r e th: war, assured an overwhelming "sacredness" to the French. It might be mentioned that th Dutch in Indo: and, for a time 5 the British in Burma developed similar sentiments at about, the same tme.

The Mo Is of the south - the lauig, Xho, Meo, ITari^ Lolo, tluong, Black and White Thai, among others in the -rth - \ L become more or less special war eh- Didier MICHEL did not care to elabo

what kind of a status the I :h propoj sd for these people. 1 is the logical develop ' French policy vis-a-vis minorities set as early as April 9, 19-6, as reveale by doc b&cfa the Vietnam government

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

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obtained from the French Headquarters by ways more or less devious. It is also interesting to note that throughout last year 5 French officials -stridently denied that they intended to enclose Vietnam in a framework: of directly admi ed French territories.

External Relations

Vietnam or the individual three Kys are flatly denied foreign representation as such. It or they -..ill have the right to ipate in the representation of the French Union particularly in the surrounding countries where it or they have economic and cultural interests to defend. But Vietnamese diplomats will represent^ re Hess of their grade ? only the interests of the French Union.

Army

The States will have only armed forces which will be integrated into the single army of the French Union. The army of the r at libre 11 of March 6 has thus d ppeared although in time of peace the police forces of the associated states of Indo China will assure "internal order 11 .

Commissioners

The Commissioners of the Republic will be attached to the local government. According to MICHEL* he or they will have only a very small staff: a political, economic * and possibly a culture J adviser or counsellor. His or their task will be to protect Fr h intea :-s # His position as d ned is very nebulous but it will develop great strength as the defender of French interests. It offers such possibilities that i attempt can yet be made to evaluate its workings.

CONCLUSION

The position taken in the speech is the logical develo nt of French policy Is ido China. As France's military strength improved with willingness to make concessions diminished. Before French troops were in place in To: n ; France wa,s willing to concede recognition of Vietnam as an "etat libre". having its c government ? parliament > arisiy and finances. By the Modus Vi" idi of September 1^ Frt s demanding much strengthened Federation ~. i control of customs of primary importance. It on the willingness of the French to enforce tl customs control that the Haiphong incident of Hovember 21 developed. It was from the desi of the French to reduce the Vietname Government to impotence that the French counter-posit, of Ilovember 23 with its famous ultimatum was taken.

At the present time, tl e are only two reasons for France to e any concessions whatsoever; world opinion (to - Lch the Indoch >se Ft h j been more or less immune - note the pre-', u i ; monopoly)

and the fact ; hat they arc 3d wit) wsied resisi :e.

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

Bui should this resi be broken in Torn;in during the cooing fall campaign, there is no doubt whatsoever that the final settlement 111 in practice be even less liberal than its present form.

As it now stands, the French posa n as expressed by M- Boliacrt is an elastic instrument which wil] I .■• -ame a vise if the Vietnam Government is crushed but which, if this task proves beyond French military strength, can be stretched even to cover negotiations with Ho,

Respectfully yours,

James L. 0 1 Sullivan American Vice Consul

Enclosures: Five Copies of M- Bollaert's speech on S er 10

800

JLC 1 Sullivan:jcf

cc: Consulate General Saigon

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

851G.00/9-12Vf: Secret File

DEPARTMENT OF STAT Incoming Telegram

SECRE1

m

Rec'd September 12,19^7 2:^0 p.m.

PROM: Paris

TO: Secretary of State

i'

NO; 5715# September: 12j 4 p.m.

I talked informally to Bidault along the lines ox" Dept ! s 3K33 September 11* He said he understood our point of viev; and as far as he knevr there are no plans for a military offensive a; nst Vietnamese in dry season b Inning at end this month,

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SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Control 5638

n

Ree'd October l8, 19)47

7:17 a.m.

FROM: Nanking

TO: Sec iary of State

NO: 2096, October l8, 2 p.in,

In conversation with Embassy officer on subject of Indochina, Vice I IK George Yeh and Director of Europ Dept F0IJ0FF {pressed following vi :

It is difficult to foresee a settlement of Indochina question under current French policy, which is iraing position of other powers, particularly China and US, extremely dif ult. It is unlikely that a govt can successfully be formed without participation of Ho Chi Minh, as Ho and his group are the only ones having a genuinely popular following. Attempts to alienate Ho f s adherents under present circumstar-unlikely of success. Persistence of French in present military cou carries danger of forcing entire freedom movement into hands of Extreme, Communist elements.

Ho is regarded as Coi anist but many Vietminh leaders are not. Vice Minister is impressed with Ho's personality and commented that Ho was an abler individual for example thai] Sjahrir of Indonesian Govt, both men being personally known to hinu Tbe question of possible danger to China from a Communist-Influenced regime adjac to her southern border did not appear to be of critical importance.

Tlit tional Union F3 does not have a solid popular base. It cons: in th n of a group of prominent fig s and If these lead s were removed from the picture (the recent

-sassinations in Saigon and Hanoi e recalled) the movement would probably h: v ble force left. As rega Is Bao-

Dai IL :

SECRET

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 NND Project Number; NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

SECRM 1

#2096, October 18, 2 p.m., from Nanking

Dai "the Chinese people would not regard favorably the reestablisbment of a monarchy in Indochina* Bao-Dai has not recently been in Hanking (RED] L 1205 5 September 29) and POKOPF officials made oblique reference to a "French story" to that effect*

Embassy comment: while no direct statement was vouchsafed by F0N0FF officials as to Chinese attitude toward National Union or Nguyen Hai I ■ , foregoing would appear to indicate P0N0PF does not contemplate support of Beo-Dai who would seem to be an indispensable element in present Frenc plans and that a dubious view, at best, is taken of National Union move) b. As Dept is aware there are diverse Chinese elements interested in the Indochina situation and views given above do not purport to represent crystallised Chinese attitude. No allusion w made during interview to possible mediation by third power or powers.

STUART

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

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fcJUrJLGT: INDIA'S-POSITION RBGnKDJEG. IflDCCiUNA

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Certain American Diplomatic and Consular Officers.

0 . , \ Afr assy, I'gv." Delhi, has reported following regarding the Government of India's attitude toward Indoel a as furnished by offic&ial- External .Affairs Depts

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"As frequently expressed by Kehru>y India has deep sympathy for efforts southeast Asian countries fulfill national •■' aspirations' mid improve their peoples living standards, notwithstanding this India will hesitate submit question Indochina Uh because (onn) Franco as permanent,member 00 nJ2*j could veto any action contrary French interests and (tv/o) ^ GDI not convinced Vietnam exorcises de facte authority

Indochina or, in contrast-Indonesia s it* represents viet? joint majority Indochinese. For. time being India*s sympathy "-. Indochinese aspirations viill take negative forms such as refusing permit India be used as base French operations in ; Indochj t andGOI crill not take positive steps toward inter-vention. Lastly India v/oiuM not like submit In' Lncbe question UH as long as GOI GO? dispute regarding Kashmir under cons -ion by DJjN ,< .

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frcouent emotional approach such problems. . Extremely un-.likelv India V/ill take any action regarding Indochina until

decision re dispute 7/1th.Pakistan handed d by in. 1 '

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NM) Project Number: NND 63310. By: NWI.) Dale: 201 I

SECRET

DEPARTMEKT OF STATE

Washington

AMCGHSUL

SAIGON 21

Control k r [0

February 3 5 19I18 7 p.m.

Mil Attache Bangkok reports Pham Ngoc Thach one of Ho Chi Miiih's chief lieutenants in cours recent visit (l) said he departing for India 29 Jan with petition signed by Ho Chi Mirih requesting US intervention (2) confirmed suspicion previously voiced by AjjER correspondent of imminent offensive which certain involve fighting in city Saigon,

Sent Saigon as 21 ; rptd New Delhi as Saigon repeat Hanoi.

79

KAR^ ij,

Colonel Reginald F. C, Vance

"President of the Brovisional Government of Vietnam Democratic Republic."

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 2011

COPY

depart: c of sta {

IHCQMIHS TELEGRAM

T ntrol 588U Rec'd February 19, 19^8 12:03 p.m.

FROM: Hanoi

TO:

NO:

Secretary State 31 , February 19 > No

Re APF story February 17 Cannes that Bao Dai had postponed departure

Kong for indefinite period, \ ;lly reliable Vietnamese source gives following summary recent events.

At 1 ong conference December with Bollaert, Bao Dai signed accord of two articles: (l) France recognizes independence and unity Vietnam; (2)once independent, Vietnam will freely adhere to French union. When General Xuan, Tran Van Ly, and Diem ( according this source continu

as

n

eminence grise" E&tionalist) met Bao Dai Hong Kong after Bai dalong conference. Diem persuaded Bao Dai signature of above accord was ti-cal error, that Vietnam should only bind itself to France by alliance, not French union. (To \: tent this position taken for bargaining

purposes not clear). Finally decided best method of allowing Bao Dai

'thdraw gracefully from cc dtment was to take position he s: 1 d only as individual, sot for hi 3 then have "assei Ly of notables" call for his return Indochina as emperor of state freely allic i<th France.

This strategy now being applied. Bar Dai, who anta d failure Ge a conversations, fop p ent to remain ] where he can deal directly Bidault, Sclsuman in preference Bollaert, Meanwhile opening gun in prep bion public opinion for calling "as Ly

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

-2- #31 j February 19> Noon, from Hanoi

of notables" by General Xuan was article by Ifzuyen Fhan Long in Saigi journal ECHO DU VTETH&M of February 1?% demand ' representation all groups including resistants." Hanoi ! s THODISU, which in Mbveinber sabotaged Xuan f s proposals for aasei Ly of "hommes distingues," will beat drums here an ran Van Ly f s paper in Hue*

At vs Bao Dai aware of fact recent French promt; ] 1 population re his early return, combined with lack of French success in military operations, have strengthened his bargaining position-

Repeat to Paris: sent Saigon

RENMLL

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US

Declassified per Executive Order 13326, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 I

COPY

DEPARTMENT OP STA r i

LEGRA

b'iO'': Paris

confidential

Control 3885 Kec'd May 12, 191*8' 9-1^ p-r..

TO;

WO:

Secretary of State 256?' 3 May 12, 6 p.m.

Baeyens has .info fed me that French Governs has auti oilaert to approve formation provisional Vietnam government headed hy Xuan but to insist that seat of g it be located at eit ■ Hanoi or Hue and not at Saigon* Boilaert-Xuan negotiations will be conducted on basis Bay of Along protocol which Xuan will countersign. Bao Dai will conntersi; agreement reached with Xuan.

Baeyens si d Foreign Office was not optimistic as to extent popular support provisional go orient could achieve and expressed hope that representatives from Ann and Tonkin would be of sufficient stature to offset at least in part government's being chart rized as French pupp*

He had information other than pi report of early Bao Dai-Bollaert meeting and Bao Dai's visit to Euro >gn Office endeavoring to bio latter which they consider could only lend support to charges of puppet

government.

Department pass Saigon a o. 18

CAFFERY

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Control 9859

{ Rec'd May 29 , 19U8

8:22 a.m.

FROM: Nanking

TO: Secretary of State

0: 971, May 2$ 3 10 a.m.

Responsible Foreign Office officials states that according to Chinese information very little enthusiasm had been aroused among Indochina natives by news of formation of government by General Nguyen Van Xu . , Pie expressed doubt that imich more result would be obtained by d oup than was attained by local administr- ve canmdl , unless Bao Dai came back. He believed Bao Dai was adopting wait-and-see attitude and that his decision whether to return would wait upon signs of favorable reaction to government by native elements. Upon being questioned, officials said latter point would in his view be more important with Bao Dai than question of independence; that Bao Dai would himself in the end accept about what Bollaert has already c red (given appearance of popular support) despite couns el of most Ms advisers to hold firm for independence, and this even though he incurred risk of playing role of Henry Pu Yi for French* He said Bao Dai ! s supporters are insisting more strongly on foreign policy independence, being less intractable on question of military control, probably in realization that native levies would be incapable for some time of putting d- any continuing int .1 revo.1t.

While all Chin elements are not one on line of action to be followed in Indochina, Foreign Office itself seems to distrust Bao Dai, viewing him as possible vehicle for restore Lon French prewar s us. At same time many officials plainly give evidence Chir wish to keep on freiendly terms with Ho Chi llinh. As indicated i; EI 251, February 12, 19^7* Chinese problem is to el 1 and in time capt or at least hold veto over power

elements in

SECRI

Declassified per Executive Order L3526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 I

tjj!iCRii/r

•2- #971, May 29, 10 a.m.

elea in Indochina. Thus nationalism suits them^ as does Ho CM Minh with his galvanizing political force. Their expectation is that Indo se political groups P with their rivalries and easy realignments 5 "will provide their own equipoise > if the French do not have the final word. Chinese have no illusions as to Communist 1 b of many of Ho's followers and possibly Ho himself * They woir expect to be in a position to intervene 9 with the Communist menace as a pretext^ if a decisive Red coup took place; moreover P they would probably attest to take some steps toward intervention immediately (especially in Tonkin) if a Communist coup took place in Prance (this threat has> of course 3 diminished recently). Finally .> if the Chinese Government itself is further weakened or possibly driven southward ■> the Chinese may not impossibly feel that the US will not in its own interests allow such a strategic ea to fall to Communism and mil necessarily come to the rescue.

Department repeat Paris y Saigon and Hanoi^ pouched Hong Kong.

STUART

NOTE: Relayed to Paris ^ Saigon and Hanoi at 11 a.m. May 29. F,M.K«

122

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 NND Project Number; NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

COPT

DEPAP NT OF STATE

INCOMING TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL Control 3213 Rec'd June 9, 19V? 2:1*7 p.m.

FROM: Paris

TO:

NO:

Secretary of State 3063, June 9> 5 p.m.

US UflGKI;

Baeyens has Informed Embassy that prevailing opinion in French Government circles is that Xuan Govern t has only dubious chance of success and that best iication its viability will be extent d se in guerrilla activities during next month. States both Foreign Office and Overseas France would welcome cl es in Provisional Government giving it a more representative character, as for example-, replacement of Xuan by Diem. He added that Bao Dai who dislikes Xuan has repeatedly stated Provisional Government would r -in in power only long enough to "secher les raurs."

Commenting on Bay of Ale ■ eernent, which had r Lous a,} >val of reach Government (Saigon 1 s 130, June 7> to Department, 3^ to Paris). Baeyens sta referendum in Cochin China was prerequisite to Ass iy approval of change in statu which would undoubtedly be vigorously oppo. by Gaullists (iiy 3006^ June 7)- (Baeyens spent three hours with D'Ar'g lieu yesterday in discussion devoted primarily to means of pre ting French intere; Cochin China.) In addition to put 3: I text there is secret annex • "h Baeyens describes as "neither more nor less" than Bay of Along protocol of last December. Implement aa called for in para-

graph 3 of -nt (text In immediately following cable) must be "negotiated from scratch/ 5 a- to yens who envis? s conference i Lar Dal at or Fontainebleau.

Bolla-ert returns to Paris about June 20 in order confe] it] Coste-Flc

latter 1 s dep are for I r June 23. R s does not believe

1

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

COPY

-2- #3063, June 9, 5 p.»-j from Paris

he will return Indeed a- B: yens gives as principal reason other than personal for Bao Dai's forth: i g European visit his desire to remove himself from Far East dur difficult period of establishment of Provisional Government and negotiations wit Prance,

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OUTGOING I ELKUKAM

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Dept Cvi-o Iderlns ways of implementing .recommendations eon*

twined In final para 3aIgoft f 8 tel 150 Jun 30 to Dept/i'ptd Paris

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as 40, antl.lt appenro desirable that with fifobj you consult

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informally vlth French officials, particularly Bollr.ert, ee to £f (

points 3. and 2 belo;;, Plec.oe comment on these as veil c.s re- £)

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l) I^riilanv4?ar> informally stated to Dent officer that-in

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Along agreement. He pointed out ? however, that definite agree- q

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meat covering points mentioned in para 3 that document would CO

ssuiaaaly have to be" so ratified. Dent inclined believe French

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Boll^ert's signature of agreement. ,Pie report current French S^

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thinking this question/ * / ■ /

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proval Assembly would be question of change of status Cochineft] to allow 'iuote union three kya Unquote to be* achieved by Viets as stated Jun 5 agreement, Yfould such t -

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such r.ove by Schu: it/Govt precipitate crisis? Is there any

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possibility that Communists might support such a measure or

' at least abstain from voting against it ? as their line -has

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consistently'favored Quote Union of 3 kys Unquote?

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3) How can approach to French best be made? In respect Baeyens 1 views (Einbstel 3^5*3 Jm /30) and v rptd"statements of Daridan that he does not believe Schuman covt v;oulc] risk its

■

political life to brine question before assembly 3 Dept believes that" If desired n Its to be obtained, it must ' be done at hig'l t levelj i#e» JSghumanj Bidault and Coste-'

Floret in spite latter *s recent statement to Assembly

* \ A * c

(Kmbsiel 3155 Jun l^yparalleled of course by high'level

■;•••• V / * •

approach to Bonnetyin Washington. • * * •

4)..'Should approach, if made* be confined for present only to change in status .Cochinchina? In this connection, What is best timing? . J . ■ * .

■ *

J>) V/hat concessions are judged neeessai. to give, plan

* ■ *

fair start? . .•..".'• ! ' " -

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Dept cognizant of fact that fighting in Indochina 1,

nov/ coni' 5 fur al st three years; that v;e believe given.

« 1

N/Robert Schiosan, ifegggfedB ^

uouncii 01 j .mif (pre irj.

\/ Not printed.

\/ Henri: I b, French i or .

Resident of the French

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

*****

INDICATE

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-LEARANCE

present world political arid economic conditions % ,French

$Imply do not have and have no prospect of amassing suf-

ficient strength Indochina reach mil solution; that

*

instead of being element strength to "France, Indochina

since war, at present, and for foreseeable future, unless

situation'changes radically, will remain grievously costly

enterprise weakening France.economically and all west

generally in its relation:' with Oriental peoples♦

In our view, continuation of parade puppets such as

• ■ ■

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■ French have produced over past two years will strong then

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land Ho Chi Minh find'may well insure'eventual en rgnnce of

state prolmbly .dominated' by communists and almost certainly

■ . * *

oriented toward Moscow • .It "is to avoid such eventuality

that we consider it of highest importance that present

. ■ * «

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so-cdlied central government, or in'fact any non~coriii.:unist

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government* be given every chance to succeed by.the-granting

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to it of such concessions as will attract greatest possible

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No action contemplated pending your return jfashington.

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TOP SECRET 8510.01/7-9^8: Top Secret File

' DEPART!- T OF STATE . INCOMING TELEGRAM

FROM: Paris 'Rec'd July 10, 19^8

6:26 a.nu TO: Secretary of State

NO: 3621, July 9, 7 p»i. FROM V/ALLIJER

1 .

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Dept may wish instruct Embassy inform Schuman Govt from top level clown of US conviction that Prance is faced with alternatives of unequivocally and promptly approving principle Viet independence within French union and union three KYS or losing Indochina, While immedia Assembly debate seems only solution Embassy should be given discretion in applying pressure to avoid charge giving tad cal advice on political maneuvers or becc ig identified

with maneuvers that may ril govt*

-

Ambassador concurs.

CAFFERY

MJPsM

TOP SECRET

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Declassified per Executive Order J3526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

m

TOP SECRET

85lG.01/7-9}i-8: Top Secret File

DEPARTMENT OP STATE OUTGOING TELEGRAM

AMEMBASSY, ' July 1^, 19^8

PARIS.

2637

Dept approves line of action recommended last para EIBBL 3^21 and wishes you proceed immediately to ascertain

Imposition Sehuman Govt toward dealing with Indochina situation before Assembly adjournment* On basis your findings you should apply such persuasion and/or pressure as is best calculated produce desired result * In applying such persuasion and/or pressure you may in your discretion convey to Schv Govt that once Baie d f Along agreement together with change in status Cochinchina approved, Dept would be disposed consider lending its support to extent publicly approving French Govt's action as forward looltia step toward settlement of troubled situation Indochina and to d realization of aspirations vietnr se people« It appears to Dept that above stated US approval -would materially assist in strengthening hands of nationalists as opposed to communists in Indochina* Keep Dept closely informed.

MARSHAL

iltWV/allner SEAsCSRoed

T

TOP SECHE

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3,3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

♦'. '/ PltEPAftlHG OFFICE

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WILL INDICATE WtlCTl.

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CLEARLY THE OF THE

JUL 29 1945

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;;. :'• AMEJ5BAQSY, ■ ^ PARIS.

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Please ascertain Eollaert's reaction/to points ^wade, by Maria and CosteKFloret-( 3934). They

* m m •

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"^ appear to be evading central issue of CochiuOhina

! :

whose- stetus ao French Colony cermet be altered-

except by lav/ of .Assembly• Unless this status is ,

*

definitively altered Bale d*Along agreement is in effect

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nullified, Saigon 1 c 42 July 6 to Paris^peptains«

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MAHSHAIX

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July 2£, not printed.

See telegr; 155, ante « p, .

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SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF STA r i

INCOMING TEEEGRA

Control 1771

Rec'd August 6, 19U8 1 12:1*3 a.m.

FROM: Paris

TO: Secretary of State

NO: ^03^, August 5> 8 p.m.

Bollaert is of opinion (DEFTEL 2891, July 29) that President French Union may legally ratify Bale d'Along agreements b that change in si Cochinehina requires Assembly action. He maintains t he will not return to Saigon unless there is an Assembly debate on government's policy in Indocl ' bd approval of Bale d 'Along agreements and change in status Cochinehina.

Baeyens> DeLavignette and Moutet sbax-e Eoll t f s views. All consider that regardless of legal considerations, failure by Assembly to meet issue squarely will e practical effect of ar< tsing such mistrust in Indochina as to nullify completely such progress as has been made,

In last sight's ;sion of Assembly 9 Frederic DuPong (PRL) introduced motion cal discussion Indochina prior to adjournment for su , Despite request by

anadier that motion be withdrawn tr as it deals with subject too delicate for gover: to undertake without prudence and without a full review of all aspects of he sii tion. 11 Motion was carried by narrow vote 288 to 286. Date of c ie vri.ll be set by conference of presidents.

Sent Department '-103^ repeated Saigon 36,

CAFFERY

G: -nor-General Re lv" was head of the political section of the French Ministry of Overseas T itories.

" Moutet ifas French I i ber of Overseas Tr Ltories from January 26, I9U6 to ITcv. *r Zh 9 19*47,

Paul R- was President of the French Council c sters in

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

SECRET

OUTGOIi'IS TELEGRAM

DEP P OF STATE Washington

Control 6MS9

AMCOHSUl " August 27 > I9U8

SAIGOff, FRENCH KDOCKOIft 136

Bollaert's position as expressed in Paris tel h^Qk Aug 2k to Dept (rpt Saigon as hS) unclear. Dept notes (pgh 7) Bollaert believes as QUOTE IEKERQUOTE it bec< ent that Bao Dai has been 1 to achieve more

by negotiations than Ho has or will be able to achieve by force of arms EHD BIIffiRQUOTE there Kill be increasing tendency in ranks of non-Communist elements of Viet Minh to switch

1% UHQUOTE It not clear how Bao Dai < show he has gained more from France by negotiation than Ho has or will gain by force arias 1 nch no prepared to maky any QUOTE irrevocable commit] its UNQUOTE (j 6) to Bao Dai or any provisional govt of he may form part as High Commissioner states (pgh 5) that such govt will remain provisional until peace restored sufficiently to permit popular referendum on permanent form govt.

Abbot 1 ight see Bollaert (who reportedly left Ifcris Aug 26 for Saigon) ; atte; clarify ambiguities his state-jnent to Embassy. At t) time ? y^ ; i point out that it difficult see how course action he 3 s will in

absence ST T

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 NND Project Number; NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

1NDICA1 i.

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distrust of Prenchj split off adherents o't Ho, or materially reduce hostilities. ' : "._"•■ ..."

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3,3 NND Project Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 2011

Department of Stale

'• OUTGOING TELEGR/

SECRET

AMEMBASSY, PARIS >

AUG 20 1948

3268

Dept concurs views Saigon's 188 Aug 28 similar those Deptel 136 Aug 2J to Saigon (rpt Paris as agamj. Dept appreciates difficulties facing any French Govt taking decisive action vis-a-vis Indochina but can only see steadily deteriorating situation unless more positive approval Bale d'Along Agree ntj enactment ' legislation or action permitting change Cochlnchlna statusj and immediate commencement formal negotiations envisaged that Agreement, Dept believes nothing should be left undone which will strengthen truly nationalist groups Indochina and induce present supporters Viet II;inh come to side that group. Mo such inducement possible unless that group can show concrete evidence French prepared implement promptly creation Vietnam as free state associated French Union and with all attributes free state. When you deem appropriate please point out to French Govt Dept 1 a views regarding Indochina and repeat Dept' 1 a readiness publicly approve French Govt action along above lines which will assist bringing about solution of Indochina problem* In foregoing connection you might refer substance second para Deptel 3231 AUG 26.

MARSHALL

secr:

Declassified per Executive Order L3526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 I

Ct>*TQ* 0 ?pzrir.\cnk

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»Eoi--ts -"text statement ISLBept spokesman Sept 16

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—response pertinent questionsAQTE Dept has watched clbsel rapid increase- of Communist activity whicfr has taken place In southeast Asia since e ly this'year and "has naturally

taken this development into consideration in determining

-. ■

Its course of action. Results of these activities in

■

Burma, Malaya, Indochina and Indonesia have been, reported by press as they occurred from time to time and need not be reviewed* However, little attention has been directed

* ■

toward ©ne major strategem employed by Comj.vunislss in do-pendent areas of southeast Asia. To win support and allies

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east Asia, originally deceived t this device, have now y& av/al to fact that, in Commn: t controlled states

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in their drive for power, Communist leaders have consistent!,

pretended to champion cause of local nationalists and have C

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attempted to identify communism with nationalism in minds

*

of'^ people of area. This scheme worked well, at lesst until

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Cominform*s denunciation of Yugoslav Communist leaders as being, among other things, guilty of nationalism. There Is some evidence that sincere nationalist leaders in south-

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outside Soviet Union, nationalism to which they sfspire is regarded as a high crime and grounds for ruthless interference in internal affairs of such states by international Communist organization a UKQTE Sent SaigoiVrptd Hanoi SINGAPORE

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DEPARTMENT OJ STATE Septembsr 27, 1?

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

Executive Secretariat Files, Lot 57 D-6£9 — tr\*i *r

Department of State Policy Statement on Indochina, September 27, 194.8

SH3RET

A. OBJECTIVES

The immediate objective of US policy in Indochina is to assist in a solution of the present impasse which will be mutually satisfactory to the French and the Vietnamese peoples, which will result in the termination of the present hostilities, and which will be within the framework of US security.

Our long-term objectives are: (1) to eliminate so far as possible Communist influence in Indochina and to see installed a self-governing nationalist state which will be friendly to the US and which, commensurate with the capacity of the peoples invoLed, will be patterned upon our conception of a democratic state as opposed to the totalitarian state which woxild evolve inevitably from Communist domination; (2) to foster the association of the peoples of Indochina with the western powers, particularly with France with whose customs, language and laws they are familiar, to the end that those peoples will prefer freely to cooperate with the western powers culturally, economically and politically; (3) to raise the standard of living so that the pi of Indochina will be less receptive to totalitarian influences and will have an incentive to work productively and thus contribute to a better balanced world economy; and (4) to prevent undue Chinese penetration and subsequent influence in Indochina so that the peoples of Indochina will not be hampered in Haeir natural developments by the pressure of an alien people and alien interests,

B. POLICY ISSUES

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To attain our immediate objective, we should continue to press the French to accommodate the basic aspirations of the Vietnamese: (1) unity of Cochin-china, Annam, and To; i, (2) complete internal autonomy, and (3) the right to choose freely regarding participation in the French Union. We have recognized French sovereignty over Indochina but have maintained that such recognition does not imply any commitment on our part to s t France to exert its authority over the Indochinesc pe> Since V-J day, the majority people of

the area, the Vietnamese, have .stubbornly resisted the reestablish in ent of French authority, a struggle, in which we have tried to maintain insofar as possible a position of non-support of either party.

While the nationalist movement in Vietnam (Cochin , Annam, and Ton-

kin) is strong, and tho great majority of the Vietnamese are not funda-

mentally Communist, the .most active element in the r nee of the L

peoples to the French has been a Communist group headed by Ho Chi Minn.

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This group has successfully extended its influence tolnclude practically all armed forces now fighting the French, thus in efiect captu/mg control of the nationalist movement.

The French on two occasions during 1946 attempted to resolve the problem by negotiation with the government established and dominated by Ho Chi Minh. The general agreements reached were not, however, successfully implemented and widescalc fighting subsequently broke out. Since early in 1947, the French have employed about il^OOO troops in Indochina, with little result, nnce the countryside except in Laos and Cambodia remains under the firm control of the Ho Chi Minh • rnment. A series of French-established puppet governments have tended to enhance the prestige of Ho's government and to call into question, on the part of the Vietnamese, the sincerity of French intentions to accord an independent status to Vietnam. .

1. Political

We have regarded these hostilities in a colonial area as detrimental not only to our own long-term interests which require as a minimum a stable Southeast Asia but also detrimental to the interests of France, since the hatred engendered by continuing hostilities may render impossible peaceful collaboration and cooperation of the French and the Vietnamese peoples. This hatred of the Vietnamese people toward the French is keeping alive anti-western feeling among oriental peoples, to the advantage of the USSR and the detriment of

the US.

We have not urged the French to negotiate with Ho Chi Minh, even though

he probably is now supported by a considerable majority of the Vietnamese

people, because of his record as a Communist and the Comi list background

of many of the influential figures in and about his government.

postwar French governments have never understood, or have chosen to underestimate, the strength of tionalist movement with which they must

deal in Indochina. It remains possible that the nationalist movement can be subverted, from Communist control but this will require granting to a non-Communist group of nationalists at least the same concessions demanded by Ho Chi Minh. The failure of French governments to deal successfully with the Indochinese question has been due, iti large measure, to the overwhelming internal issues facing France and the Frezich Union, and to foreign policy considerations in Europe. TJ factors have combined with the slim parliamentary majorities of postwar governments in France to militate against the bold moves iv sary to divert al iance of the Vietnamese nationalists to non- f Communist leadership.

In accord with our policy of regarding with favor the efforts of dependent peoples to attain theh* legitimate political as rations, we have been anxious to see French accord to the Vietnamese the largest possible degree of political and economic in endence cons" with legitimate French interests. We

have therefore declined to permit the export to the French in Indochina of arms and munitions for the pros of the war against the Vietnamese. This

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policy has been limited in its effect as we have allowed the free export of arms to France, such-exports thereby being available for re-shipment to Indochina or for releasing stocks from reserves to be forwarded to Indochina.

2. Economic

Indochina's trade with the United States before the war was relatively small as the greater part of its commerce was carried on with France and the French * Empire duty free. Indochina now enjoys a limited customs autonomy, and the US should be able to compete more successfully with France.

American investment hi Indochina has also been of minor importance in part at least because there has been no treaty basis for the protection of American interests there as activities in certain business lines are prohibited or can be conducted only with the consent of the French authorities.

Should a political solution satisfactory to the French and the Vietnamese be reached leading to the establishment of peaceful conditions within the area, the US should endeavor to have the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade made effective in Indochina and to make an arrangement which would afford protection for American enterprise there. The increased trade and investment in Indochina which might result from these measures would tend to raise the level of economic activity and standard of living.

We do not wish to press for these matters, nor to develop a long-term financial or economic policy in the area, until such time as a political solution, such as may terminate in large measure the present hostilities, has been achieve: 1

With respect to the important question of whether EGA assistance should be extended to the area, we have informed the French that because reconstruction and dc opment of Indochina is impossible under the present conditions of warfare which pertain there,, no direct EGA financing for Indochina will be forthcomingsat present although French requirements will be readjusted accordingly. We have indicated informally our willingness to reconsider the question should conditions change.

As regards French claims for Japanese reparations on behalf of Indochina, we have taken the position in the Far Eastern Commission (FEC) that France should receive two percent of the total amount of reparations which may be determined to be available. While most 3 countries feel that the proposed share is too large, in view of the French wartime performance in Indochina, v/e have indicated a willingness to allow the French an additional one half of one percent. Fiance presumably would also be eligible for a.prorata share (or a portion to be determined by negotiation) of the 18 of our 28 percent of tot reparations which we have proposed to make available to h FEC countries as accept our schedule for reparations distribution. This question remains unsettled. We have not allowed the French a* portion of the advance transfers within the interim reparations program.

We have under consideration a French cl i to gold v; 1 at 37.5 million dollars earmarked for Japan in Indochina, 1 gold r bs the settlement

of certain trade balances 1 een Ind 1 Japan and of Japanese local

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C. RELATIONS WITH OTHER STATES

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currency requirements dining the period AngusV : l940 to March 9, 1945. Since

the earmarking oC the gold transferred title to In'dochina and since there are j "||

no general considerations of equity or public policy of a sufficiently compelling ! -

nature to justify withholding recognition of title thus transferred, the tentative r

position of the Dcp/ritment is that SCAP deliver the gold to Indochina unless

an early FEC policy decision precludes such action.

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The French, whose policy since the Japanese surrender has been a failure with regard to the Vietnamese, have made some progress in normalizing,! relations with Cambodia and Laos. Both these Indochinesc protectorates have now been formally admitted as "associated" states to the French Union. The peoples of both these protectorates have been allowed some degree of autonomy, which apparently satisfies them for the present. Unquestionably, however, the current modi vivendi will be altered by any French settlement with the Vietnamese which gives the latter more autonomy than now possessed by the Laotians ' and Cambodians.

The most recent French attempt to resolve the question resulted in the June 5 Baic d'Along Agreement between the French High Commissioner of Indochina and General Nguyen Van Xuan, head of the Provisional Central Government of Vietnam, and countersigned by the former Emperor of Annam, \ \

Bao Dai In this agreement, France recognizes the independence of Vietnam, i

whose responsibility it will be to unite the three Vietnamese provinces of Indochina with only such limits as are imposed by its membership in the French Union to which it freely declares its adherence. Further negotiations to fix relationships of France and Vietnam are provided by the agreement which must now be ratified by the French Assembly, particularly as it relates to a change in the status of Cochinchina, now a French colony, to permit its union with f

Annam and Tonkin.

As regards international conferences, the US, as it recognizes French sovereignty over Indochina, has upheld the right of France as a metropolitan power to^submit the applications for associate membership in ECAFE of its dependent

areas in Indochina.

French relations v Siamese Government have improved since the

November coup d'etat of Field Marshal Phibun. Phibun apparently has given *&&* assurances to the French that he has accepted the solution of the recent Siamese-Indochinesc border c He has furthermore taken limited measures de-

signed to reduce the activity of Indochinesc elements in Siam hostile to the'

French.

Chinese relations with Indochina, based upon a 1948 treat} tiich confers

substantial benefits upon the Chinese in the p "^sula, are largely determined

by the needs and interests of the co ereially and economically powerful

Chinese overseas community in Indochina, numbering almost one million.

On the surface, Chinese official relations with the French officials have been

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

correct although signs of tension develop from time to time. The Chinese have pressed the French to indemnify Chinese who have suffered property loss in Indochina's fighting. The Kuomintau- has striven to maintain a tight control over the Chinese community through consular representation, while the French have endeavored to reestablish the situation ofpre-war years wherein the French authorities successfully maintained a degree of control over Chinese within Indochina.

The Chinese, however, have also tried to protect the several hundred thousands of their fellowmen who live in territory not under French control There have been contacts between Ho's agents and Chinese government officials which apparently resulted in Chinese tolerance of a munitions traffic from China to the benefit of the Ko government. French efforts to enlist Chinese support in Kwangsi and Kwangtung to suppress Chinese bandit and Communist bands which cross the Indochinese border have not been successful despite an agreement in principle.

An increasing Soviet interest in Indochina, as demonstrated by a step-up in radio broadcasts, was evidenced in the first half of 1948. The line taken by these broadcasts has been constantly to discredit the United States by attempting to identity it with "imperialistic France." There continues to be no known communication between the USSR and Vietnam, although evidence is accumulating that a radio liaison may have been established through the Tass agency in Shanghai.

D. POLICY EVALUATION

The objectives of US policy towards Indochina have not been realized. Three years after the termination of war a friendly ally, France, is fighting a desperate and apparently losing struggle in Indochina. The economic drain of this warfare on French recovery, while difficult to estimate, is unquestionably large. The Communist control in the nationalist movement has been increased during this period US influence in Indochina and Southeast'; has suffered as a result.

The objectives of US policy can only be attained by such French action as will satisfy the nationalist aspirations of the peoples of Indochina. We h repeated], ted out to the French the desirability of their giving such sat 5

faction and thus termi; rig the present open conflict. Our greatest etifficul in talking with the French and in stressing what should and what should not be done has been our inability to suggest any practicable solution ol the Indo-china problem, as we are all too well aware of the unpleasant fact that Communist Ho Chi Minh is the strongest and perhaps the ablest figure in Indochina and thai any suggested solution which excludes him is an expedient of uncertain outcome. We are naturally hesitant to press the French too strongly or to become deeply in eel so long as we are not in a position to suggc. solution or until \ye are prepared to accept the onus of intervention. The above cons! lions are further complicated by the fact that we have an inv

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mediate into rest in maintaining in power a friendly French government, to assist in the furtherance of our aims in Europe*'This irfimediate and vital interest has in consequence taken precedence over active step:' Looking toward the realisation of our objectives in Indochina, *

We are prepared, however, to support the French in every way possible in the establishment of a truly nationalist government in Indochina which, by giving satisfaction to the aspirations of the peoples of Indochina, will serve as a rallying point for the nationalists and will weaken the Communist elements. i

By such support and by active participation in a peaceful and constructive \\

solution in Indochina we stand to regain influence and prestige, T

Some solution must be found which will strike a balance between the aspirations of the peoples of Indochina and the interests of the French, Solution by j French military reconquest of Indochina is not desirable. Neither would the complete withdrawal of the French from Indochina effect a solution. The first alternative would delay indefn ly the attainment of our objectives, as we would share inevitably in the hatred engendered by an attempted military re-conquest and the denial of aspirations for self-government. The second solution would be equally unfortunate as in all likelihood Indochina would then be taken over by the militant Comn 1st group. At best, there might follow a transition period, marked by chaos and terrot c activities, creating a political l vacuum into which the Chinese inevitably would be drawn or would push. The absence of stabilization in China will continue to have an important influence upon the objective of a permanent and peaceable solution in Ind ta.

We have not been particularly successful in our information and education program in orienting the Vietnamese toward the western democracies and the US. The program has been hampered by the failure of the French to under ^

stand that such inform aal activities as wc conduct in Indochina are not I

inimical to their own long-term interests and by administrative and fin; lal j

considerations which have prevented the development to the maximum extent of contacts with the Vietnamese. An increased effort should bo made to explain democratic institutions, especially American institutions and American policy, to the Indochinese by direct personal contact, by the distribution of information about the US, and the encouraging of educational exchange.

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Air 2:ail

OF HIE _ , UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

AI^KxCAH C ULAIS G21ERAL

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Soviet Policy in Southeast Asia*

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I have the honor to refer to the Department *s secret circular ^instruction of October 13, 19*i-8, Y entitled "Pattern of Soviet Policy in Far East and Southeast Asia 11 and to submit certain comments, as requested by the Department.

Soviet policy in Indochina appears to follow in general tho lines described in tho final section of the instruction under ac-knowledge] • but with certain minor variation* In general 11 to paid*that Indochina presents an ideal picture fro© the point of vie?/ of I'oscov;* A s:;a11 group of Moscow and Chinese trained Communists has firm control of the strong and deep seated native Ratio: lisai. A native government under Con t direction controls considerable areas of the country and intains an amy sufficiently strong to pin dovm large French forces. The country has been kept in turMoil sis o the end of the vrar, : ing it a serious drain on the military and economic resources of France instead of a source \of wealth* From the point of view of Iioscov/, prospects are excel-.lent that Ho Chi^fBfE will c tfcually force the withdrawal of th French and set up the first "flew Democratic Republic*' in Southeast Asia. At the s time CoEtaunist control has been cc alod and " identified with Nationalism so successfully as to confuse and delude public opinion in France and the United States and thus gain the sunoort of large Socialist and liberal groups in those ecu ie$.

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f,f In recent inonths particular emphasis has been placed'on eeo- W ■feomic sabotage. This has included burning of rice mills and rubber vrare] ses in Saigon* and attacks on eovr aicati of all types, inclu g railroads, road convoys and barge transport* This has been so successful t ■ the :i:o of paddy and rica to Saigon*-Choi on has pr illy ceased in recent weeks* Curiously eno-\^h

there have " i no serious ; stacks on " particularly vulnerable petroleum £ >pots in Sa" i aftrl ?ng nor have the larger riibbex plantation! b .• :ly list bed*

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The Co. list led Vict:niiih has not yet adopted the violent anti-Araerican lino follov/ed by mo t Sorraunist parties th jh&ut the world., although thers are rnany in ions that this is oal;

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on the surface cliici that the standard anti-Anerican line is being distributed.in directives to party loaders* IIo evidence has yet turned up that Ho Chi Ilnh is receiving current directives either

: from Koscov/, China, o Soviet

ty

\B& that Moscow fools that Ko and his lieutenants have had sufficient training and experience and are sufficiently loyal to j be trusted to determine their day-to-day policy vrithout supervision

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Another factor peculiar to Indochina is the apparent quiescence of CoiP-'tiunist elements among the resident Chinese colony. Not only are these believed by the Surete to be relatively few in number, but anv plans they *aay have had to emulate their comrades in l/alava have undoubtedly been hampered by the Surete which has been quietly rounding up and deporting their leaders for several months. It may also be that Eoscow feels that anti-Chinese feeling is so strong in the Vietnam that active cooperation of Chinese Communists with the Vietainh would furnish too valuable a propaganda weapon to the French i

Kespectfully yours,

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ancUeg^l^ii L^e?a£tra&nt to American Embassy, Bangkok t^itmo^ican assy, London* to Amerl^aji Smbas sy, Moscow

Hanking

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Department of State OUTGOING TELEGRAM

SECRET

January 17/ 19^9 6 p.m.

AMEMBASSY

PARIS

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Daridan haj expressed to Dept same view contained penultimate para urtel 10? Jan 10 qualifying his remarks however with statement that he uninformed developments past ten days which might explain optimism Overseas Prance officials in urtel IQo Jan 10 re negotiations with Boo Dai.

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While De de ?oub F; tch coming to term* with Dal or an: ~_n a 1st group \ ch

"chance winning over prepoi ance of Viet cannot ""at "" E bly* [sic] com-

mit to ct of natj jjovt which by foiling cievc i^ 81 ^ 1 }? Vietname se might become I

iy j >vt ; sep arat e from people and r iting orila / pre nee rench military forces-Accordinglyj Emb should make noadditinal[slp.Krepresentations to French until and unless further instructed by Dept which does not believe it desirable go beyond position outlined Deptel 26p7 July 1^ its reftel >621 July 9 from Paris and Embtel 5129 Sept 30.

Dept will inform Emb re possibility any common anti-Communist action Indochina (third para Embtel 107) after it has reed Brit views as Emb London reports Brit Fonoff instructed Brit Emb Wash discuss matter with Dept.

LOVETT Acti?

SECRET

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In forthcomi* difficult period Dept desires you

FOR DC/T USE ONLY

guard carefully ; alnst any action which might b~ seiz upon as prem.: re endorse t or de facto recognition by

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evidence pessim: viability Bap Dai solution and D t desires retain as much freedom of action re IC as possible thout : : any manner i ins im; * :i v:e oppose or wish

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i i ropriate _ H R officials issuing to consular coi'ps ii ta~ tions to attend all ceremonies involving Bao Dai (fifth para artel 9? 29).

Dept Irishes you and Gibson con tin porting situatlo

closely a * veil as you have in p it.

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politics^ c:^v;lop: in IndochJ in February and I&troh > '

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As the DaparttaotfC i^ arare tho T ,1 A bly dis^s:

in this ?*5>p3 "•"'- *»c duly n o] ©d? and voted cm April 28* 1' p a x*i3rtolu-\on fATcring i ty of tho 7i^t; ? E :,' t ;bho m-

ton by ^: ?youdi ^.rlv b to iT.\pl :it thio roc hus bo-n •- i&>eci : 1y C- ':-:y d by t3 &S of tho Rydii

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Whilo th^ t.' will not ba ^atireljr na^tact« it in novortholoos felt tb ' tbc delay is oxtronoly i -tut. % :9 Hot only 3 ,s fe3 *^ poy*» cholc \l -offcert of to I^^i'o arr" 1 in Saigon bringing unity end ibdop$&<2 ■ io b.o^a largely di^ipated, but tto r ' cl progyosa of'tJ Chiso^c Obraaxtaista cn-^l-n ;.\ ler^hisnins ^Irviov; oTjr Isido^hin^, r/:^ ovory c/.y cC delny inc k c©3 tho difficulty of Eao Dati achi ' ; hia c -■ >

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American Consulate General, ■ ■ Saigon, Xndcehi]eta., -"arch SI, 1949«

IAHWjK OS KIDOCinXA TOR : DELHI FOREIGN SSRVICS CO] FC3

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SCTXOK I* POLITICj i SSCTI01I

Annex I 1

Dovelo; :s? In Pol .ry and S&rch 1949

Feverish negotiations vrent on in Paris during ths th of Fobruary and the early days of -:a*ch- Thoy v/oro all broken off v.hon Priisa

Minister ^1 -.J that for internal political reasons ho could

not live up to his enrlicr proviso to* present tho proposed agro mt ■ to Parli ut for rati* fore rao DAI f s roturno Ho f that

tho only ch&n-cc to obtain a faTorahlc vote would to aftor.tho I sro? "

d retu: i d axtd established £ si ble goyerrauant which appeared to }^ L v!; a fair chanco of v/inning tho sup b of a majority of his people : and restoring ?c-lcoa 3ao Dai finally accepted this but vias ad<: th b] joi&ing of Cochinehisa to tho ViotnaD niust bo an accomplished 7 faeb before ho arrived in Indocl

Kc.. r difficulties arpse otot hov; this was to bo accomplished*' Tho quick and ol#ar-eut way ve&s to act under the paragraph of the French. Constitution govs; ting aliem&bioa or acquisition of French territory

and p^ss i law trains i colony of Cochincl ia to tho of

fictnana Hc^erer, it v/:l ^ argued, first that this v/ould ronuiro a* refcrend of ths people affected* ' , ibis to hold under proscni conditions*-** td second^ the proper : 'hod was to act under paragj ?? permitting a ch ig*> in status of parts of tho Frxich ^nlon*o .Shi requires ft vote by tho French Assembly after a request fron tho territorial Assembly* r Chc constitutional experts argued that no DiroDcr assembly had ever been established in Coehinchina sinco tho existing Asso:iVbIy do Sud Vieta ^ boon appointed and not elected?

Tho Cabinet hurriedly d« r nd submitted to tho French Parli aeiris

a bill to sot up o Territorial Assembly* This bill wa« j :kV through th -*i A ibly of the French Union, tho French Assembly and ■ the Council of tho Republic in & v h of all night dot is* Tho Socialist ?arty*5 v ilaiess for Ho Chi I itrioa to 3ac

Dai b <ko in th* first debits and gpTcmncnt received heavy

majorities frc: fchffi on, only tho Co^jranists tenaciously oopo ;

the bill.

•

it of

Tho n stops are the "election 1 ' of tho no?/ assspbly, :, vote ■, petition lo el Cool china frora a colony to a:\

";, Latcd Stato tf and to join tho V'iot ':... : and tb i nev; scr;

of vot:?-i in tho '. Parlias at to iaple7ft«jnt thiso This must nil

bo ftcco j sh^d by April 35^ th Lat« ; b for tho : ; " return

to Indoc* ' -u It i?; dii icult to s h it can h:> dotie and £i postpone it of i Uai 1 l^ral in Saig« : 1 tici

It shou?

S

rr t

st: a-

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xi shouM

bo :. Loaod that ♦tha necessity for this eonpli< fcod (if it. exist*, j) has b^cn little v * -ood in IndooM - by cither French or Yistn&ri^sq &iid. laueb additional j&is trust ^nd suspicion of

:r.otiv^s h^3 b*ssn c -. Tn-jro : also 1 „ eriti-

cisn of th$ r^n-up of fc-era Ltorial assenihly*—tho French claiming

they vrill not fee adequately repress ?d (13 out of 64 : " 0> awl trv; Vietnamese protest!: H st any Troncli representation at all* ".

■

When (and if) the above described process is eoiaploted, Bao Dai e.rrivos in Saigon and tho Auriol-B&o Dai agroenc sij 2 in Paris y rch 8, 1949, goo^ into' effects subject to future ratification. Tho text has :iot yet boon published but :-. ros, was givoa to the press after.th xchan^o of letters' and.soma additional details were revealed by the gov.;r; at during the doc .to in tho Assembly and by h Coxarjis r PIG1TOE in a speech is Saisroa o:i Hareh 2y«

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It confirms tho provisions of tho Exi d 1 Along Agrt at of Jjupto S, 1946—unity and i icb vd.thi:i tho French tf::io:i, pro** toction of French cultural and eeo l: do positic - and prcforor.co for French advisors and technicians-*--Tart apoai v goes a . - • considerable tray in settling tho :.'c\y points loft for future negotiation by that agi nit* The Vict: .ill hav-3 its o\n arsy under its ov#n coj uid except in v i of mr« Franco vrill r: iyo nilitary and naval bases with carefully dej sd righlta of c nunication* Tha Vietnam will have It's o?ra diplomatic and eonsular oorvioD, but Viotnan missions will bs restricted to throe—^ i, f '.-■: and Ch 0 France v 1 sponsor a do; . -1 for adsd&sion to u^Q* French citim will r i:i joct to It la~f« There Trill bo

l: -?■:* custon f s union i*nd a Joint eurro: y tied to fr to* 3< ::ic and c r catters affecting all of Indochina, including the thorny and important question of control of tho Federal sorvices--cuatoruSj railroads, postal service, aviati ; highways, oto—are to bo discussed at a conferoncq or CaiAbodi&j Laos and Vietnan in May or Juno of this year© " • *

■ ■

• It io usderatood that tho agroun::v^ ©ontaino naay p-roviolc distinctly favorable to tho ?ict:m& triiieh tho French gov< aent preferred not to reveal prior to the Assenbly dotnn and the c

tonal cloctio:n* 0 ' ; v

»•

It is p: .turo to ciscusn the prospects for sue " of prosoas p^ caferb tho text of the agrw : 3 boon oarefully '

;,:;udiod and until tho arj . ats for cKaagias the statufi of

Cc china ! 1 nn suceos y conp: :todr« (t aru n rn

circuici^iiig that the diehard colonialists in Saigon vrill at'' to rig tho oleotioiis •schoduled for April 10 -. ':" a hopo to block tho veto for ai , or, noro likely^ the veto fo:\unv ■ 1th the

rest of the Vietnan in the ! ?pe of achievi: g thoir niiiisivsi objective of :. ..' 3 an to^ Ceehiachiiu under Fron ' atroltj d * .

Oai ■ " ■' also foru a go^ j ent en hia return ^ith n h r rro p: stige dl -.n'shoriny. i;;v i tho pro at XUAS r< ' u

He pj i: r thd full text! ' u of h. h S .;

suppl -',-• "^3 for it ;./" r : r to C ;ai:

11 r }

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•

:i<jo jabia b^r.is for satisfying the nirair^u:^ dona: of tho, Viet: so nationalists^ jsi&d if the other i tioacd c iitiosxs ard ::tj it

in V^l;: ■ 1 Eao Dai v;il! } ft fair c" .;.;-, to sucooed in his plan to

sop i tho ^on^Cc 1st; ol i of the resi3taaee frora the V

Miaiu A loyal and liberal attitude "by both sidos dur : critical

period of ehasxgo over froa French to V . adtiinistratip^ vriLll to-,

a vied factor i:i determining tho civ ; of succdcc*

.This raises tho q cion # of the altitude of the Waited States

■ goveriiuent tovstrds the p.lsuu It has 1 ir. ated to the French that \tho:\ an a| it v,ias reached in Indochina vrhich appeared to iaeei ts&g niniviuri demands .of tho Vi i nationalists and to havo ?. reaso " go of sue.ee adj g> we would b? prepared to : officially our approval reid support* and to, cc sidor direct alloca- : ticn of ISareh&ll Plan funds to I:idoc a aud perhaps other cconor.iio ."

+ , • ■ ■ ■*

aid© . . : •■ •" ,

■ * ■

It is believed that this policy should bo ir.ipl ftted at .the earliest; possible apriont after, the ess lal eo:i^"" ' : ationod .

in the previous paragraphs ha^ Loo:i ^to Naturally if Eao Dai faile after our support has been eamou 3d, the proavige. p£'the United Stages suffers j\ serious blo;To . On the other ] l $ the laclc of our-support vreuld.be a heavy } dicap -.vhieJi saight troll elisdsiato any .■ . chaueo of suceosso Tho alternatives to tho Bao Dai .solution ar ■ either conta d costly epic il v/arfarc or French v/ithdr 1 lo&vir a Coaai&l at -oont rolled govern in asv ^gio area of Southeast ■ *•

Aaia« Seither of those would appear'to bo to our i;rb 3t«

X

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f

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■

» ■

157

•- ' -

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To* 54

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LUKtl.

Saigon, Indochina, February 12, 3 •«

.

Subject: Transrn.ttilig S«igon f'craorauda for Hew Delhi C . nao

Tiir; -:■::c : : le

THE S?CR2TaJcY 0? STATS,

WASHireiOS.

.. r~

• r*

SIR:

■

•; ■

I have the honor to refer to ' pirfement's circular telograia of January 12, 192 9, 5;00 • , f and to transit herewith five c of the insmorandum prepared by this office for the How Delhi I ? Foreign Service C Perence. Copies have been forv Led to other interested pests as instru* bed*

Respectfully yours.

Geo | T. Abbott American Consul Gone

Enclosure:

tfenorandun on Indochina for Hew Delhi Foreign Service Conference, dtcf Feb. 12, 1049

Original and ozalid to Department

Copies to: Auionibassy, Rangoon

Amenib:;s£y f Cairo AiaDiabassy, Hew Delhi Asnenibassy, Tehran Air: \ y, Karachi A / cissy, Hanila A to: sy, Bangkok American C ulato General, Colombo 1-c ic:m Consulate General, 3oabay American Consulate General, Calcutta (2) Aisoric £ ulata Go al, JSvclras American Consulate General. Batai" American Consulate Go, l 3 Lai 3 African Consulate General, Sing&j American Consulate < -. "., Canton U3i D, Tokyo

1 -

310

G;Abbott:P.AColc* rook:HFCunnir ' ! teors/

SECRET

0

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

SECRET America** Consulate Genera?,

Saigon, Indochina, February 12, 1949 UEHOKAHDOS! OH TSDOGSXSJk FOH ;:t;, r DELHI FOREIGN S3ERVIC3 C0HFS CE

■

SECTION I* POLITICAL SITUAVJOlf

&« Internal Political Situation in the Vietnam

/*•

1# General Situation - Postwar developments In the Annaiaito provinces of IndochTaa, fcrTov;n as the Viet] tia, are fund&tngnt&lly similar to those in other parts of Asia in that tJ • ;,- stern fro:: s powerful upsurge of Nationalism. Tho Viotnan st is cub from other regions in that ConniunisR has gained control of the Nationalist may mt and created a situation which is a clt sic cy. ie of the successful application Gf Cossitiu 1st strategy in a col ial area- A small Koseot; ai Chine so trained gr has soiled leadership and control of tho strong and aliitost universally supported indc : ace laovom nt« ^ho country has be?n !copt in a state of strife a: -confusion for throe years* One hundred thousand French troops are pinned dcrcm in Indochina and not available in 3ui . ■, The area is a serious drain on Prance's resources ins id o? a source of v/oaltb end rav; materials for Franco and tho world. Finally thero is a fair chance that French may bo driver, out and tho first Co: i.lst outpost in Southeast Asia established*

Tho French hare belatedly co^e to a partial understanding of the situation with which they are facer! and arc endeavoring to Croat a non-Communist autonomous gevernaent under the leadership of former Esaperor Bao DAI. They hope to rct_.ii: tho Vietnam vlthin the nebulous French Onion and maintain French military and economic positions*

2. Background - To understand how tho present situation arose e, brief review of the history of the colony is necessary. Indochina oamo under'European domination considerably later than Indonesia, India, or the Philippines, the French first occupying part of Cochinchina in 1864* The area of this colony was expanded v;hile protectorates r;ere established over tho remaining parts of tho peninsula during subsequent years* Tho administration tendsd to becoTO more centralized and eventually evolved into a tightly knit political and ceo ic fee ition in which the rights and Dowers of the 1 sror of As im, King of Ca:;.bocia, and Princes of Laos had practically disappeared* Th was little utc y or self government eve;i at the local level and little pi oo for natives in the i tetinis-tration exs pt in or cb ntially honorary posts.

The Fr aro justly proud of bho taste which t/oy ace ?lis3 *& in bui 1 is and r^ilroa-5s, dc sloping ports, convert: j tho i ps of tho Cochinchinose deltas into rice lands, and dcvcloj fc] mineral resources of T kin. They also nade considers! Lo p . uss in intplsnting the French la: .go and cult through schools and the church, (?h arc aby.it tv;o million i in ths Vietnam, nearly 10$ of f 3

p iletirlj : 1] educated km so speak sc~ie French.

?ho occur ,- t of th couni ; was not ac i

plished vdLth ■ ►Its Lei vrorc.put 1 great sc . y.

Tho nationalist ?;.■■. ', however s v ~ never tely s* '

SB J

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developed particularly rapidly in the period between the two world wars. The Communists early became influential therein although never numerous. The Trotzkyist faction was strong and at one time controlled the Indo-Chinese Communist party.

The shattering defeat of France by Germany and the immediately f ollov, ■; Japanese occupation of Indochina dealt a severe blow to French prestige with the natives, while the early Japanese victories in the Pacific extended this loss of face to all whites. Even though the Annainese hated the Japs, five years of anti-western propaganda left permanent icts on the minds of the people.

In the final months of the war when defeat was inevitable, Japanese leaders in Indochina deliber ly created a situation ch would mal the return of the French difficult by setting up a native government and allowing arms to get into native hands. The allies had contributed to this situation by parachuting arms and supplies to the native underground fighting the Japa , As in most occupied countries both in Asia and Europe, the Communists were one of the most active and best organized elements in this underground. Some months before the Japanese surrender Ho Chi MIMH returned secretly to Indochina. He has had a long and promi b history as an Annamite revolutionary and a Comintern agent under a variety of aliases. For the Communists there was no question of his leadership; to others he was known as a lift long fighter for independence who had returned from exile to lead his people. He had around him a small group of able Communists trained as he was in Moscow, or veterans of the Chinese Communist movement. Following the then current popular front tactics-, Ho organized a coalition of political parties known as the Viet Mirih J and set up a government in which Communist control v at first concealed.

Thus when after some delay the Chinese arrived in Tonkin and the British in Saigon to disarm the Japanese troops, they found a native government established and in control #

A more detailed account of events from this point on will be found in the annex to this memorandem.

3, French Colonial Policy, Past and Present - While not always clear or consistent, French colonial policy before the war s generally one of assimilation. In its h:l :t and simplest form, this was based on a complete absence of color or race prejudice and a belief that the mission of France was not to prepare her subject peoples for independence, but to convert them to French civilization, culture, and religion and prepare tl to become French citizens and their homelands to become i gral parts of France. (Martinique and Guadaloupe were pies of the complete application of this policy.)

This policy had I i questioned even before the war and in ] ; General de Gaulle held a conference of colonial experts at Brazzaville to consider postwar colonial problems. At this erence was born the idea of the French Uni which was to be a centralized colonial federation with varying degrees of local autonomy but with essential cc ol remaS i In Paris.

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

When France was liberated and the drafting of a new constitution

■was taken up, colonial policy played an important "but confusing parte

Few of the deputies to the two constituent assemblies knew much about

colonial matters while the few "experts" were s] ply divided. It must

be remembered that the average Frenchman believes what he was taught in

school - that Prance is the only color" :r that really uric! bands

the natives> that the latter are universally grateful for the benefits

of French civilization and t any disce nt is the work of a small

minority of professional agitators. *

t Those who realized that the era of colonialism was past and that

France must make fundamental changes in her policy if she were not to

lost her empire could make little j ession on the general apathy and

ignorance. Even the Communists were hesitant about going too far against

public opinion by advocating independence for the colonics, and were

probably also doubtful about the wisdom of b g up an empire which

they expected shortly to control.

The result of all these factors was a constitution which was extremely vague, confused, and conflicting on colonial matters. It provides for three classes of o\ \ territories - (a) the overseas departments which arc an integral part of France, (b) the overseas territories which have limited local autonomy, and (c) the Associated States. The latter category was created to take care of Morocco, Tunis, and the states of Indochina, Ho details were given as to their position in the Union except that it should be determined an "Act" or agreement with each Associated State.

The overseas territories (and, of course, the overseas departments) are represented in the Assembly and even more heavily in the Consei] de la Republique, the upper branch of the French Parliament. In addition, there is an Assembly of the French Union composed of half colonial and half metropolitan members which, however, ) only consultative powers. Finally there is to be a Council- of the French Union composed of a representative of each Associated State, the Pi 'dent of France, and certain cabinet members.

It was expected that the Vietnam would be the first Associated State and that the agreement with it would establir precedents for the entry of Morocco and Tunis. Unfortunately by the time the constitution was adopted and in operation, the situation had already gotten out of hand in Indochina. Ho Chi Jlinh was not willing to accept the e: jmeiy limited a ority which the French insistence on control of defeme. Lgn affairs, and economic policy would leave him, and incited by the inept policy of Admiral d f ARGEHLIEU and his subordinates, he made a s rise attack on December 19, 19^6, which almost succeeded in overrunning the Fre rces in Tonkin and mam and resulted in the der of many innocent French civilians.

This attack strengthened the influence of the conservative and reactio; circles i France and Indochina and was followed by a desperate ati t to pacify the country by military i is. While the control of most of the cities was regained, the countryside re ined in the hands of Ho f s forces and open fighti- ally sir! o

bitt'

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

bitter and destructive guerrilla war.rar©-» In this the French superiority in arms and equips nl ites balanced by the size of the country, the difficulty of ' terrain, and the h llity of the great bulk of the population*

Tho reali£Stion that paM£i<^tion of the country by force, oven if possible, would be a long and'costly process, and fear that world public opinion might force U.TO or ^icrican 5 bervention caused the Kronen Government fco shift policy in the spring of 1946 and replace Admiral d'Argenlieu by a civilian, Lie Enile 3C12, - IT, as High Commissioner* II ■ wail sent to Saigon *'/ith no precise instructions but with the hope that he could roach agrcc&pnt with someone and step the fighting.

In judging tho situation on April 1, 1947, wh a ho arrived in Indochina, dev&lppnonts in tho French* and interxiati 1 political situation since 1945 must be kept in mind* The most iraportant was undoubtedly tho growing split between the Western powers raid lioscdw* tiihon tho French first accepted to negotiate with Ho Chi Hinh, his Coisnunist background was pf minor importance« France was an. ally of Russia/ and the French CoEicunists were an important element jn tho coalition government in Paris* In tho y<y:\i- that passed before Bollaert arrived on tho scene, tho international crisis had becoiae clear, the Gosmniists Were no longer in tho French 3overnTitent, and tho fact that the Vict h was Cccficunist controlled bcoarao o.n important political factor* Thus Bollaert soon decided that tho rorurcption of negotiations with Ko was iiff>ossible«

Kis decision t'» droatoa new political force around tho ex-Emperor Dei rnd the lengthy an2 confused nogobiatic: -vhich folic is arc described in coma detail in the annex to this nemo-randuKu As it finally took fom, what is coHsaonly called the Bollaert-Bao Dai solution pay bo sufesarized as follows--: ■

a. It v necessary to recapture from the Communists control cf the Victtfrua n&tioxxalist movements.

b* To do this it was necessary to group together anti-Co!rjTiunir,t forces around some political figure with national

prestige and influence* Bao*Dai was selected - with consider-able reluctance - since it Was felt that traditional nennrchism was still a forco among tho people, (and because it was felt that his F-rc:i-:h education and the fact that his wife is a d . ut Catholic would mako bin o : ro rca sonabls per go:, to deal with}.*

■

c% An agreerent would bo negotiated with Bao Bai granting the r. Nationalist c^ : -.-,nds.

do Sac Dsti would return to Fuc and set up a govern which Jfculd be a polo of atfcro i to those cl : ;r*ts su oorf-

i.ng I;o Chi llinh whiah voire not SeirMnists or sympathizers .

(pr« b] ;:

*~Thi" rTlr . -'- '■"■ - act nly on the French side* Bao Dai has : or . 1 ' ''■ , Lhe p] of th Hiviera for :, difficu]

and daa reus position in Hue.

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number; NND 63316. By; NWD Date; 2011

(pre ly 80$ of the total) and which were becoming increasingly fed up with the totalitarian methods and discipline of the Communist leaders of the Viet Kinh and discouraged by months of hardship in the jungle.

e* Gradually Bae Dai's strength would increase and Ho's decline until the latter would either have to surrender, flee the country, or become a minor guerrilla leader.

It is obvious that the success o£ such a plan required grant i-sufficient authority and concessions to Bao Dai to ible him to establish a stable government in at least a restricted area and to convince native leaders that their essential demands had been met and that there was no longer any reason for continuing to fig] ; , In this Bollaert failed, .largely because of the political situation in France. The various "Third Force r governments were not only weak but sharply divided on colonial policy. They were particularly anxious not to give ammunition to the growing strength of de Gaulle's forces, always ready to exploit the average Frenchman's out-of-date views on colonial matters. Thus Bollaert was not eve able to persuade the Government to request Assembly ratification of the extremely vague Eaie d'Along Protocol of June 5? 19'+8 ♦ This fact was largely response for Bao Dai's decision not to return to Indochina which made further stops in the 5 ntation of the plan impossible, even though a Provisional Central Government had been set up under General XUAN, former President of the Coehinchina Provisional Government.

Bollaert gave up in disgust and was replaced by M. Leon riGl. a young career colonial officer with much expe i in Indochina.

If. Present Situation - M. Pignon, being a civil servant rather than a politician brought a fresh viewpoint to the situation, and appears to have made considerable progress towards a solution in his short period of office.

He has adopted the policy of his predecessor but has been successful in having it aecepl as that of the French Government rather than as a personal policy of the High Commissioi . In this he was aided by a number of factors, the most important, of course, being recent developments in China, Even the most die-hard French political leader can realize that with the arrival of Chinese Communist forces on 1 Tonkin frontie which would assist or perhaps even join with Bo Chi 2-linli, the precarious French military position would become impossible. Moreov , a growing number of pre French- n in and out of the G ent has in recent months advocated liberal concessions to Vietnam nationalism. Even the Indochina resolution of the HPF (Gaullist) Congress last fall was surprisingly mod ? (although Gene de Gaulle himself has been ] liberal).

Pignon reopened negotiations with Bao Dai in November and continued them in Jan ry after his return from a brief turn in Indochina. Little lite is known as to the exact status of these negotiations, but arently cgti ions have been made on both sides. Bao Dai has agreed to return to Indor a if the ] ly

ratifies the B; d'AJ resraent and c *es the si is o

16-

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

Cochinchina from a French colony to a part of the Associated St of Vietnam. A debate on these points is expected early in March. Bao Dai also wishes the prompt signing and ratification of a treaty covering the subjects reserved under the Baie d'Along Protocol* but it seems doubtful if tliis can be accomplished In the time available before his return. Disagr* still continues on certain Dints, the most important apparently being over separate diplomatic representation for the new stat • The French are believed to have offered consulates in neighboring countries and Vietnam officers in certain French missions*

Opinions differ considerably as to the chances of the French Government to obtain the necessary parliamentary action. Undoubtedly opposition will be violent from both t: extreme right and left wings while the Socialist Party will be seriously split. However, speculation at this i j is pointless since the matter vail presumably be settled by the time the conference opens at New Delhi*

A more pertinent question is - assuming Bao Dai returns - what chances has he to establish a stable government, split away the non-Cor. followers of Ho Chi Minh, and eventually pacify the country? It is believed that the most important factor will be the nature of the French agreement with Bao Dai and the meaning which it gives to "independence within the French Union." If this independence is a sham with most real authority remaining in French hands, then Communist propaganda proclaiming him a puppet and a traitor will be vindicated.

A second factor is the manner in which the return is staged and the agreement is implemented. Because of the delay, inaction, and disunity on the part of the French in recent months, the Vietnam leaders and people have become cynical and distrustful. The popular enthusiasm which might have been aroused by the return of Bao Dai last June can no longer be expected. Furthermore, the French civilian population in Indochina will be sullenly hostile o any new regime while few officials can be counted on to offer real cooperation in the difficult transition perido. The result of the French local elections in March mil also be a factor since if they fo: ast a return of cle Gaulle, doubt will be cast on the permanence of the agreement with Bao Dai.

Finally much will depend on Bao Dai's ability to resolve the rivalry and intrigue 1 c. en Vietnam leaders and the r Zonal jealousy and suspicion between the three provinces which are to form the Vietnam state. The Tonkinese are poor but energetic, intelligent and aggressive, the Annamese poor but cultured and proud, while the Cochinchinese feel that the other provinces are interested mainly in sharing the wealth of their region. Opposition to the Fr h and Chinese is about the only thing that the leaders of the three provinces see eye to eye on. CocMn~ Chinese s: atism has been encouraged and supported by French business interests and less openly by many French c ' icials.

B. Internal Situation in Cambodia and laos .

The J la of Cambodia and Laos differ in race, reli :i, and tt rament from the , and the pr< blem of their relation with

France is less difficult and acute. Cambodia has good reason to fear

the aggressif

m

Declassified per Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

SECRE1

the rcssion cf both £icin and "ho ETctnara, and tho French Pre borate has a literal meaning* Folio 1 the BtirrrtaJier i ' ho Japo-iese a Modus Vivendi vjas sigi I in 1946 vi\,h the Fr.c:o;i grs 5 local ai ;_:• Lost year C? and Laos became tho first Is so elated Spates in tho French Union, end recently tho ■ l independence" of Cambodia in the French Union v;as proclaimed* Tho nc fciotts for ar* agreement or tre by to determine tho waning of those terms has been delayed until tho Vietnam problem is settled, with tho French promising t Cambodia v:ould receive at least the same concessions*

Cambodia has a now liberal constitution and has made soma pro- -gross in adopting the forms of dcuKJOxa^y* French officials are now called advisors to their Cambodian counterparts and exert tftoir authority largely behind tho scenes.

There has been increasing evidence of Cambodian impatience over the delay in fixing their final status, and a determination to win v/idcr auto; 7 and sovereignty- LU Pignon as farmer Governor of Cambodia can be expected to bo sympathetic to these demnds*

Laos ?/ith a population of only cne million, thinly scattered along tho upper Jfekong, is oven less a political problem* After the war tho French set up the Prince of Luong Prabang as Sing of Laos under a t parary agreement siniilar to that nith Cambodia. The French adnsinistration in Laos is, hovrerer, much raoro direct and open* The region has been generally peaceful, but there have recently boon, rumors of concent rat ion of "Free Laotians" in the Siamese provinces along the l\ :n; which nay forecast raids into Indochincso territory. "The objective of the Frco Laotians is apparently an independent greater Laos including both the French province end territories inhabited by Laotians in Siam*

C. International Relations,

1. United Stat e? - Pest war relations between the United States and Indochina got off to a bad starts!th President Roosevelt 1 s views on international trusteeship for strategic areas in the hands of powers unable to defend them, followed by the overenthusiastic activities of certain CSS agents in the period just before and after tho Japanese surrender* The belief that the policy of tho United States is to throw the French out of Indochina still persists in any circles both in j china • in Fr r \^co* Ue are also bla; i y cT permitting the Chinese and English to occupy the northern and southern halves of the country to disarm J panose troops. Our pens: bent refusal to supply equipment and arms for French military operations in 1: I shina is a sore subject v;ith most 1 nch any officers s Another source of irritation has boon the almost universal / of A:n rican correal idonts visiting Indoch' ■ to write articles axtrczaely critical of the French.

As c litions hav; deteriorated in J lochiiia (and in Europe) there has been 1 3 understand] o£ our policy 5 nors desire to ol al ■• ' assistance in irp] 1 Lng 1 1 I plans, and

at higher levels Lons are relatively c lial*

SECRET

In recent

165

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In recent vrocks the French navo acti^-siy sunvoited proposals for four povrer co rat' in Southeast reve I of

C 'T-v-inisn, and bhere has "boon grjeh talk .about the strategic importance of Indochina as a bastion against 1 eouthratrd spread of Chinese

Cc.:r:.y.;; : LstS-

As fnr as the Ar.nani are concerned., they were encouraged to believe that after the defeat of Japan vro v/ould assist th - in obtaining independence- As it became apx>arent that our syxnpath] v/cre tempered by strategic considerations in Europe > the p ul&rity of tho United States has diminished* Nevertheless, tho prestige of tho United States is still high, and even Ho Chi Minh has boon careful to prevent any public anti-Aiuorican propagandas

2. China - Tho civil?. ton of the Vietnam is essentially Chinese^ and Political and cultural ties have boon close throughout t -turios- JTcverthelosSj there is little sympathy or natural liking bciv.-een the tv/o races largely because of the fear of future Chinese expansion aiid jealousy oP tho large Chinese minority which controls most of the bush and trade of the country* The Chinese occupying forces in Tonkin and northern Annam loft behind a bitter noiacry*

In the French-Chined Treaty of 194C, Prance granted important concessions in China- These included the return of the French concessit in S} gfeai end bhe leased territory of Xv/an^chov;. the sale of the Chinese portions of the Yunnan Railroad, a froo port in Haiphong, and the continuation of free Chinese immigration into sc hern Indochina- The latter two provisions angered Violnan leaders, and there have been repeated warnings that since they xroro not consulted in drafting the treaty, they did not cc ier the:aseives bound to honor it when thoy regained their independence- Attacks on Chinese 5 d-gration are frequent in tho native press* Tho French authorities^ have boon far rn>:.i reluctant to heed the voice of public opinion, and are endeavor:! to chock iimnigration by strict enforcement of quarantine and other regulations.

The orobleB of Chinese CoirjiiujiictG v/ill be treated in a subsequent section ' *

-

3, Philippines - Political and economic rclatio: between Indo-ch and the ] ilippine Republic are of surprisingly minor iingiorto There is not even a Philippine Consulate in S-aigon- V: :i polity sal loaders arc much interested in Philippine inc 1 and the nature of tl political, military, and economic agreements ivith the United States,

4* Siaia - The cession of Cambodian, and Laotian territory to Siara under Japan are in 1041 left FronSh-Sianu : relations in a ^ngoreus St the r ended. After prolonged negotiations :J Si I tho J : evinces but has never officially accepted the

decision of tho co: illation cor^nission*

-

With ths ' of povrar of J&rshnl I I : :I the French V .v.

ft&de :t; us r : ■ i-'-p' "■" ; relations v/ith $iam s

r; concluded last year for coo; in preventing s

inovcmonl

16

p O

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SECRET moments of partisans across the frontier, ard tho present Siamese

govern sti'C as much less &~&3pat?v*tic tc tho large group of Vict

Lnh refugees residing in Sis:?,

5* EStlaya - ffith tho outbreak of tiisordnrs in fcSalaya last year the French 1 oit that they could expect greater sympathy and coop ion from the British authorities in Sir- rc> Thc.ro have boon a number of visits back and forth of military and civilian officials* Tho general impression is that tho French are such zsore eager than the British*

i 6. Indonesia - Tho French have naturally sympathized and supported

the Dutch in their difficui Log in Indonesia* The recent police "action

has boon enthusiastically approved, I the attitude of the Unit States

an! Australia bitterly attacked* There is undoubtedly an undercurrent

of envy and jealously over tho contrast between Dutch Liilitary successes

and French failures*

The Vietnam people naturally sympathize wholeheartedly with their Indonesian fcllov/ sufferers, and tho recent developments have been given as nuch pr .'nenco in tho native press as censorship would permit* The do vole sits in tho Security Council have generally been greeted with disilluLionniont and a frequent reaction has boon that the mi-si ; of tho Indonesians was to place too rt&dh trust in the United Nations and in the United States as tho leading : P that organization* The Hew Delhi Conference cr little eiccitoriont cr enthusiasm, and the effect of Coxr^unist pro; . - clearly visible in certain articles denounci hru as a number of the imperialist clan* Di e*-or the fact that Vietnam representatives wore not

invited tt Indochina wis not discussed was undoubtedly a factor in the poor press received by the conference*

7* India - Tho considerable Indian minority, most of whom are shop keepers and money lenders, is the most important factor in relations between Indochina and India* Tho presence of a number of minor officials, oh ly police, fro:?* Pondiehcry, also tends to harm relations between the Vietnamese and Indians. Difficulties over tho future of tho French territories" in India naturally gets nuch attention in the French pr

C S E »

It is not believed that an independent Vietnam will bo enthusiastic about accepting the leadership cf India in Southeast Asia* An effort to play oif^ the Indian .against tho Chinese can be crrpoctedo

I), Co? tnisft i:i Indochina

A brief description of the C- mism in Indochina before an 1 durin tho war - lined control cf the nationalist nov at is included ir. otion A, Part 2*

SEC

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SECRET

ho one knovs hov; many Corossunists there . j in Indochina, but the mibbor of real party irieiabprs 3 s certainly pjjeuI* TV; highest estimate in 20$ of the troop:' fig] ting rcith Ho Chi EBUih and this includes sympathisers* 3Io:v ^, the nu? r is undoubi Ly grot Lng, and at tho s tine nou-Conniunist ciilitary u s arc being si . ily infiltrated with secret agents* Ofelts under C anist co;v: 1 are generally r ariaed-

Thus the problem for tho lor.dcr cento fcing changing sides is not an

easy onCt

-

Another point on which definite infor: ion is lacking is tho channel of coiununie ations with !!os-c and tho canter of regional control. [It is probable that all of the available channels are used -overland ?r^- China, Buripa, and Siamj and "by spa from China, Hans Kongj and Singapore- It is also vory possible that Uoscovr din .: ves arrive; via France »J Certainly satis ft. ry ccr-ir.u.nications exist since Moscow Duplications of fairly recent date arc frequently seised hy the FrenchJ^Corununist headquarters in South Asia are variously reported to be in Hong Kong, Bangkok* Sinj ora 3 Rangoon, and Calcutta* Hong Kong seems to bo the most likely!

■

One peculiar thing about Vietnam Co irAsn is that there has boon very little anti-American propaganda* It is obvious this is not due to ignorance of the current party line* It apparently rep-rose s a hope en the part of ho Chi !linh that he nay still obtain American support for or at least acceptance of a Vict Minh govern at under his lr .dership- Evidence that this hope is dinj tshing is furnished in a regional party directive dated in Hbvcinber 1948 v/htch st d that active anti-American propaganda should be conducted in party circles and by vrord of nouth &:$ong the people but should not yot appear on the riidio, in the press, or in public speeches•T/ThC main there of this propaganda was to be that the United States is an imperialist power which aims to extend it:: damnation over Indochina "in a n nnor even no re cruel and ruthless than the Fron I 1 - An inter sting iton v/as thet pro-American Annamites v.*ore to be denounced in anonymous letters to French officials vrhich indicates that the Comraunists are av/nro of the similarity between their propaganda and the belief of e«: tain French circleso ;

Tho problem of Goznmunism anong the C}_" ;sc minority is one v;hich has been given ranch attention by the French authorities, especially since tho situation becano critical in China* Up until now there has boon surprising little direct cooperation bot~.vocn local Chi :-. Zy .-■ mists and the Vict *finh* There are vory fev/ Chinese aniens; the insui t troops,*.nd the Chief of Surete stc tes that no Chin had over been caught taking ; in ^r- : raring or other terrorist

activities. Howe- , the Chin play an important part in cos^iuni-cations an?3 in smuggliJ I supplies* For seme • F nov: the French have been quUF:dy rip iding ^ ' y ' _: snail batches of

iGiovm Con.:. 1st leaders and the rote Is thej h^ire 3 sit' ion

j in hand* In a recent convor i "on with the head of the Surote ho, nevertheless^ expros ~] co^o disquiet over the tendency of ' te local Chi*i33G coi - Lty to climb on the has 3 .. (;on as Communist victor ■ ?s in China r« Hod up,

GHA/jr

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

;

Back - InJCbr-satior:

It is believed thvt a brief discursion of the bac ;rouad.„ 3 essential to the understs ] :i~ of the present situation in Indochina. The following paragraphs accordingly pre at a soj tfhat over-simplified version of events since 1345*

C:i ixeh 9, 1945, the Japanese took over direct control of the a- Lnistration of Indochina, disarmed ?n sh troops and interned ir.ost French officials and Civilians* Enporor Bao DAI was retained in pov/er and promised independence* When Ji^an surrendered, Japanese officials in Indochina permitted control to be seized ly Anaamese nationalists. Emperor Bao P&i abdicated on August 25, 1945, and Ho Chi I' IK, i\ prominent Ccni rn ]. ier, proclaimed the Viotnarn Republic on Septenbor £* The British, v;^o laoved into the s uthern region to disarm Japanese trocps, refused to recognize the new republic and promptly turned over the administration to the French-There was spiae fighting in Saigon and continued guerrilla ivarfaro throughout Cochinchina*

-

In the north the Chinese occupation forces recognised Eo 1 s government and supported pro-Chinese elements in the doMnairt Viet Minh party coalition* After prolonged negotiations and considerable concessions on the part of the French (Shanghai, Yunnan Railroad, et cetera) the Chinese agreed to vrithdravr* On I-arch 6, 1946, just before tho Chinese ^rithdrev/al, a representative of the French High Coirgaissioner signed a brief protocol with Ko Chi Minh, recognising the Vietnam as a free cor y v/ithin the French Union and tho Jndoohincse Federation vrith its ovm array, finances, and government* Tho status of Coch china v/as to be determined by a plebiscite* Details Were to be-worked out at a subsequent conference*

■

After unsuccessful negotiations txt Balat, Ko and a largo delegation cane to France early in June* Tho so-called Fontaineblcau Conference lasted from July 5 to September 11. It broke down over tho issues of tho unity of Coehinchina v.ith the rest cf Annam, military relations, and Vietnam depends for a separate dip" 1 : tic service and control of customs, finance and economc scatters• Just before leaving France, Eo signed a nodus vivondi vfith {Sinister of Overseas Franco KOUTBS v;hich provided for stopping errilla fighting in southern Indochina, release of prisoners and hostages, and for the re: tion of negotiations in January 1947.'

Vihen

1* It s-2 ild bo recalled that 4 Fontainebleau Conference took pier

trier tho n^riocl of tha second Constituent Assembly in v;hich colonial policy *.;as a crucial and 1 i r issud Thus the Fro ncgotic s

v/crc • ferung by ; of fa of v;hat the ne^; constitution v:-:u"

do a! tho Fj eh Union, ;vhile the V bnara dolcgj :n v?as b h doul

ful of the p '-'' sri fcy e ! s3 ! 3 - iticn ai ' c:

int.j ' " •; "•' speeches in the Ass ly by colonial and Cc::~

nunist o$» The C< Foresee ws 1 is foi 1 to failure.

SECRET

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 NND Project Number; NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

SECRET

When :io returned to Hanoi, in October, hs found -: sts in his gover 3-, led by Coanuiiisi Minister of war SIAP, had itu sed their influence cmtI::- his nearly five isonths : ab oe. The Erasures for stopping the fighting in Cochinehina v;erc never implemented and relations vriLth the French deteriorates rapidly, A dispute over cus~ toins control in Heiph:. in Uovaxtor resulted in localized fighting, and on DeeorJb^r 19, 1^ a carefully pr rod surprise attaci almost succeeded i:: overrunning ?r^rr:h forces in, Tonkin and Jtaaasu

Fighting has boon continuous since then-* After a for/ v/oeks of real warfare in V a and vicinity it deteriorated into bitter end costly guerrilla operations* Kith great difficulty Franco concentrated about 100,000 troops in Indochii ari^od chiefly v/it British and American lend lease equipment* This force, ;*h31e sufficient to garrison the chief cities and maintain pro communications be I n then, v/as not large enough to p^oii*v the country* Civil end military officials in both France and Indochina have for sane time admitted that this cannot be done without freatlv increased forces which arc not available.

Hhcn it bccar.o apparent \hat a nilitary solution v;as not practicable the French returned to the idea "of negotiations• Adrdfal d : ; : was repl d as High Co^Tdssioner hy *!- BCL1 a 1 , a resistance leader a::! former career prefect. Partly because of the proju-

d-? ■-».-» r* ^ "* f 4-,"^T cr^ r % ' t''"h ".''i FStfV" <*1^?*TT V I^ "Mir 1 *i J J ftf»l- nf* L/** ■ ^ ^.-- ] Q <\ *? fs

...... yi , .„;il j iiv« , .v u v * y ^ *•.»'■_' V'k, r _. w. t j, y.^^, i '^-* rt v.'. ;•.' . > v .<■-. * vA. O/, MvvvmJ - - X*? *.*%j • H

personal affront to hie., and also because'of grovdrig anti-Coi:::-enis:n in France, the French v:ere reluctant to resume negotiations -rath Ho Chi Minh- In the absence cf any other loader with n national following, the French turned to the ex-Emperor eao Dai ^rhe was living in exile in Hong Kong- During the surr.er of 1947 fevered and confused negotiations succeeded in collecting a laoticy group of parties, nov bs and individuals billing to support Bao Dai. The nucleus was traditional monarchists fro::. Annan and Tonkin. To this tras joined certain native Catholic elements in Tonkin, the Caodadst and iioa Eao religious sects in Cochinehina,. certain anti-Conraunist nationalists, and various other minor groups v;ith nixed snotives.

Jy September 1947, the French felt prepared to epen a combined diplomatic and nilitary offensive, Bollaert v;as to : ke an : bant policy speech outlining the conditio for a settle ttt, rchile a limited military offc ive in To:'!:in would e. n Ho Chi Minh and one aire rors tc rally to Bao £ai. Unfortus xly. the text of Bollaoi : 3 spec -: v? : 3 a political foot! til in France and as delivered 7;as s: * Lt< r< ? devm that it nade a peer i: . ssion in rative circles. Tho only nev: 'concession affero. .s union of the three Annandto provinces*

Bno Dai, after considerable urging, : &dth Sollaert on a French

t-'i 'JIj. QVa —.. -• i - -- — ■*■ " ■-» -* **• *-• *-i_ i •'wy»<«ww« U t*i fcV! i t .'■ -- - • , . -,. i .. t J.S** -■ '-^ a

Si" "' Tiv f*c '"" ' •'■ **t1 t>f J- i 7 *i/H *l ^ fiC'T\r* v ^ t***\f*€* r- tsA ,.-^.' t J-,. r\t" > -*-V i-i

V :: th ion, p " for the pre Ion of Pronc^i

pcpi ic ini s, ( ! riority ! h in choosing advisers

*-; l

170

n ■

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

and technicians, but loft to later negotiations tho detailed solution of diplomatic, military, economic, financial, and technical : :rs# (This agrc' Lt was, except for two u > exactly t

same as tho ono signed on June 5, 1948, by Bollaert, Xttan, and Bao Dai.) Bollaert is understood to have arr^eed he should not deal with Ho* It v/as arranged that o vould beet again in February to rrake final arrange inonts for the return of B&o Dai to- Indoehi2ia«

t Bollaert returned to France to explain his plans to his govsrmient and obtain its an sal. Bao Dai un etodly follovred Bollaert, going to S\vitseriate *:!i3ra ho had a meeting v.dth M« Bollaert in Jo try* Tho High Cordissi oner returned to Indochina on January 26 to prepare for the meeting with Bap IXii scheduled for February. Tho latter, hovnvor, went to Prance and vj&s received by a number cf high government officials This infuriated Bollaert, v.ho t reatenod to resign and was only placated by an official statement that negotiations vvith 3ao Dai YTould bo exclusively through hin.

Events fro:r\ this point on were confused- ObViously Bao Dai had roconsiderQd hi^ reluctant ugrqorient to return to Annam and felt : fc additional concessions and guarantees ess 1 if he v;cre to gain the support of sufficient Nationalist elc s to insure stability for his nev; governments In addition, his i y in Franc:: had opened his "eyes to the unstable position of the Prench government and the possibility of a return to power of do GAULLE*

too Dai did not return to Hong Kong until l?arch 14, 1948. The following vxeks v.-ere .marked by much oc Lng and going between Saigon and Hon" Kong of French and Vietnam representatives, and continually changing rumors of the status of the negotiations* Apparently do** spairing of persuading; Bao Dai to return in the near future, Bollaert agreed to set up a Provisional Central Vietnam Government Which v:ould prepare the v/ay for the Emperor, v/ho agreed to give his moral backin to tho nev/ regime*

•■-■

o

The w*i govornnent v;as headed by General Xu&n, then President of the Cochinehinese Government. Xuan, while an Ani Ite by birth, is a general in the French Array, a French citizen, and married to a French woman- Ho v/as, of course, promptly hi ;ed as a French puppet (which

not believed to be true)* Xuan h:A great difficulty in persu persons of ability influ : to join hi! government, even v;ith fchi backing of Bao Dai, and the toara ho collected vis very weak, particularly as regards rcprosentatj . ;- from Tonkin*

On Juno 5, 1948, Boil vert ; with Xuan and Bao Bai, again on a cruiser in tho Baio dv ng, and a r-r. m agrc at v/as signed which v/as ul b exactly ths sa as the first one. The text v;as promptly made public in cor sh to first protocol. Jhs : • ±ror left for

dtEcrlaftd the sans il K« Bolli stun o Prince shortly aft* c Preside '&xki * i his : ra gov< i fc in Hanoi*

SE(

The Hij

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SECRET

The High Coran&ssioner jarantly believed t ho vrould obtain proinpt ratification of his -reement by t! French Cabinet anc sibly, following which. Bad Dai would urn to Indochina, raid the negotiations for'the supplementary agrc^ its could then begin* Unfortunately, ho returned to Paris at p. particularly difficult i b» The Sehuirann Government was faco4 ^itb grovring internal dissension and opposition within the Assembly- The Socialist Party Confer, o hac revealed a sv;ing to tho left and voted a resolution favoring negotiations with }Io Chi Itinh. Colonialist and cor 'vative groups in Indochina and Franco began an active? campaign against the Bale d 1 Along agreoiastnt as . tho first step in throwing mmy the csipire« In the circi fences, tho government was naturally reluctant to take up a problesi which might

jll res It in its overthrow by the Assembly c Lch appeared less urgent than other serious internal and iirtea Lonal problems* After tho Schuraann Cabinet finally fell, the shortlived Mario Cabinet tras even less eager to face a debate on Indo china *

When the long scheduled interpolation o Indochina finally cro up on the a t, the Priias • rter as"; *d tbat the debate bo postponed indefinitely, but Indi tbe gove: saontJs appr 1 of M» Bollaert 1 s policy and the Bale d'Alcng protocol and a: need that a vote in favor of adjournment v/ould be. consider* 1 as approving this policy* A substa] bjtal majority was obtaii 1 after a brief < jo on tho adjournment motion Tflhieh indicated sral approval of the Bi d'Along protocol by all parties except tho Co&munists, but consid able differences of opinion as to its into rotation and methods of application* The Socialists In particular ware embarrassed by the parby directive mentioned abov

or-

/*

ir C»

■ !!• Bollaert returned to Indochina breathing optimism and professing to be co:pletoly satisfied vith the Assoisbly's action and convinced that Bao Dai would return, and the iiaplosientation of tho Bade d 1 Along protocol could proceed irmedlately* This optimistic facade crumbled quickly* Eao Dai lest no time in shaking it clear that he v-as not returning until a formal agreement had been signed and ratified by the French Government, not only covering the principles of the Bale d ! Along protocols but the reserved subjects left for future negotiation* Private and public stat -nts of X i and his ministers and articles In the native press shelved that they v:ere In no way satis I with the oblique handling of the the French Govern: : The local colonialist press proclaimed a defeat for Bollaert and too 1 : pains to po:' out that th .hole situation in Indo-cK i s illegal and unconstitutional and that, in particular, no change c Id take place in the political status of Coehinchina without formal Assenbly action., since C< hinchina, in c .st to Tonkin a AnnoBi. is a French colony and French soil*

M« Bollaert noon lot it be krs a t- ho would m * re st a fur' r tr ' tff his tern of of , which expired Sey :r SO.

io reason sivo: .s his need to i to Franca to Feb litie ! cos for tho c tic for tl - C seil ia la I -bl-kc Ly, it vv.r, cle r isons 1 ' \ nd his c ol,

!o

172

hi

s

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 KM) Pmjeei Number: NND 63310. By: NWD Date: 201 I

his plans for a prompt solution of the IndoclrLnese problem had failed and that much time and effort still remained to be expended.

The appointment of M e PIGNOK as successor to M. Boliaert came as a great sur se since his name had not even been mentioned among the numerous candidates for the position- (The two most talked of were General MST > former Governor of Tunis y and General CATKOUX^ a former Governor of Indochina and recently French Ambassador to Moscow). Pignon is a career colonial official just over kO years of age who has spent most of his service in Indochina. In 19U8 he had been Coimnissaire de la Republique (provincial governor) for Cambodia when he was called to Paris for a responsible job in the Ministry of Overseas France. His appointment is generally considered as indicating the intention of the Cabinet to keep closer control over developments in Indochina.

The new High Commissioner spent the first weeks after his appointment in Paris, arrived in Saigon on November 21 5 and returned to Paris on December 11, 19^8. His brief stay in Indochina was chiefly occupied in bolstering up the tettering Xuan Government. A more detailed account of his activities since assuming office will be found in the main section of this paper,

«/j

'*

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 NND Project Number; NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

American Consulate General, Saigon, Indochina, February 12, 19^9

MEMORANDUM OK BIDOCHINA FOR HEW DELHI FOREIGN SERVICE CONFERENCE

SECTION II. UNITED STATES ITIFORI-lATl SERVIC E

A, Need for USIS in Indochina

No American news service reaches Indochina* UP service to Indochina ceased in December 19^8 because it could not meet expenses, AP is negotiating with the Bureau of Press and Information of the French high Commissariat for Indochina, but even if AP succeeds in selling its service to the Bureau, that organization will translate, select and edit whatever AP Serial it sees fit to pass on to the public through press and radio.

Agence France Presse service is distributed in Indochina under the Bureau's supervision. The Bureau naturally concentrates on presenting the French point of view and on excluding all news which might disturb the population or be inimical to French policy. News of the United States and of the United Nations reaches the public here badly truncated or not at all.

Against this background, USIS Saigon should be disseminating the full facts on United States policy. Here is an illustration of this mission. The French In Indochina have admired the Butch "police action" of last December in Indonesia. The Indochinese press, lacking adequate news sources, at first misinterpreted beyond recognition the United States' attitude toward that action. If the Department's wireless bulletin were being received here, it would have been possible to provide the papers and Radio Saigon promptly with the full texts of the Department's January releases on Indonesia and of Mr. JESSUP's statements of United States policy. Though delayed, this material did reach here by pouch from Bangkok and has been brought to the attention of friendly journalists. As will be explained below, efforts are being made to begin copying the wireless bulletin in Saigon, The British Consulate Genera] distributes a small daily wireless bulletin mimeographed in English on both sides of a single legal size

sheet.

American and other English language books are not on sale in Indochina, There has been very little English taught here. Nevertheless, the public, whether Vietnamese, French, or Chinese, is acquiring some English and is eager to learn about the United States and its culture and achievements. The large, steady attendance at the Reading Room is evidence that USIS' stock of books and publications fills a need and at the same time contributes to American prestige

B. Current Activities

Since USIS Saigon first opened a temporary Reading Room on August 26, 19**6, there have been ] iods ox inactivity irpos^d by

obj 3 of space and per lei. The present Ree g Room opened its doors on August 13 > 19^7* It has a popular corner location on the

dn

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By; NWD Date: 2011

inaIn business stre&t of Saigon- Tha chairs are cc;t ble, the shelves attractive, 1 the Vietnamese attendants are efficient and courl us. The stock of books is modest (just over 1,000), but interesting ner acquisitions are flowing ln« I-aiiy attendance of readers and visitors exceeds 200 (average 5,000 par gonth) and is in the ratio of more than 3 Asiatics to 1 European• There is also a British Reading Rooe in Sairon. but it suffers from a verv inCon >nt location and lacks staff* Attendance at the British Reading Soon is only a small fraction of that enjoyed by USIS.

Frcis 'larch 7/ 1 , when i!rs. Jeanne S; :*, a public affairs assistant temporarily in charge of USIS, Saigon, was ambushed and killed, until the arrival of the present Information Officer en Kovo:;bor 12 there was no American y -1 attached to USIS Saigon* Hov/cvor, the Consul General instructed a vice consul, Mr* Dallas M* G00HS l to give such attention to the conduct of a "holding operation 11 at USIS as v/ould be consistent with the performance of his other duties*

■fa

The previous American director cf USIS Saigon resigned on January 15, 1948. The present director arrived one year later, en January 13, 1949*

Thanks to the effective r;crk of Mr* Coors and cf the sisall and devoted Vietn*::ie?c staff, the fcsrp American officers hew at USIS have taken over a going concern v/hich provides, in addition to the Rending Room, v/eekly film sliovrings in a hall leaned by the Bureau of Press and Information, a system for lording filths and projectors to schools and organizations, the distribution of Arvorican periodicals to a carefully selected list, t; gift distribution of mrtime stocks of paper-bound CVfl books and Amy textbooks, and a little cultural exc] tgc work. The periodicals and v/a rtioo : ks arc mailed or shipped to persons and institutions in rnany parts of Indochina. USIS has reason to believe that sorno of this natorial filters into areas under Viet Liinh (rebel) control. , ■

Plans to monitor and distribute the wireless bulletin have gone on for & long tine and are nov: bei&g pushed. The present stunbling block is the lack c^ office space po aceoi&sbdato the wireless equipment and operator and the employees and r.achines to take care of * duplication, distribution, and eventual translation of the bulletin.

Office space is extremely scarce in Saigon, but USIS is leaving no stone unturned in search of it.

Sinai! bulk subscriptions to Tine,, Kev.-svreek, and Life (25, 27 and 19 copies respectively) are ro, d here (Pacific editions) r distributed by USIS to a selected list including; friendly journalists* The Information Officer distributes nevrs itenis and photos received by air fron the De^&rtnstnt : .vor: to place then wl" :• they will he appreciated and published. As this ziro^c progr - has just been revived (lack of personnel has caused its suspension), it is 1 early to rxasurq its effectiveness* Sot 1 local papers, Vietnamese, Frei h and Chinese 1 kge, arc printing uZlG material, chiefly photos plastic cuts. 7! pirate so:;o ratorial f: £ and {Tor;

C. Particular

17

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 NND Project Number; NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

Particular Problems Encountered in Indochina

The civil war in Indochina and tho" fast fc Saigon for all its harm is a besieged city have a direct bearing or. the day to di\y activities of USIS. Asiong Fronchnon in Indochina the belief persists that tho United States wishes for economic reasons to supplant French power and influence hero. Those factors feavo in tho past lad to official French protests against one or another activity of USIS,and still condition its functioning Two plain clothes men habitually loiter near tho entrance to the Reading Room*. Aside fron the question of whether anyone is actually molested for attending tho American Reading Roo::i, tho presence of these dotictives inay cause some interested persons to stay away.

The showing and lending of films is or:cumbered with controls and red tape. To be shown at all a £i%m raust have been granted a "visa 11 by the Bureau of Press and Infcrmtiori. Anyone wishing tc borrow films for showings must have the specific approval of the Bureau* For instancej an owner of rubber plantations requests U3IS in writing to place his plantations on the list for regular film loans* Ko states that the audiences will consist of Vietnamese enployoes, French supervisors, local guards, and French soldiers s US 13 writes to tho Bureau, encloses a copy of tho loiter fron the plantation owner, and asks approval* This is granted promptly, and USIS is then free to circulate films, each of which must have been "visaed" to tho plantations in question. Although the precise effect cannot bo estimated, these formalities must act as a brake on applications to borrow USIS films*

The Director of the Bureau of Press and Information has stated infomally that application for permission to issue the wireless bulletin must be Trade to him in writing* He added that he would iiriTiiodiatoly grant approval. Nevertheless, this required procedure illustrates tho close control exercised over printed ratter. The French authorities will certainly protest against and endeavor to stop any USIS activities to which they take objection. Expansion of the progran here or additions to the American staff of USIS must be carried out with circumspection in order to avoid suspicion and obsbruction*

t

The shortage of office space is accompanied by a scarcity of living ace: aoctations. The unsolved and haru^sing housing problems of the two American couples are evidence that sgifks time nust elapse before even a third African is assigned to USIS Saigon. On the other handj additional local personnel will be employed as soon as additional office space is obtained- This prospective increase in local staff will., in addition to producing the wireless bulletin, enable V?>15 to o::p the distribution of photo exhibits and to set up a lending library of recorded rsusio.

The present possibilities of exchange of per t-s working here arc s rely United. A few students h applied for scholarships* at Ar rican universities, and USIS has forwarded th Lr replications. Cc: In advsrso factors exist independently af the civil rear and of

tho inposi ility

176

CONFIDENTIAL .

iBm * r-

Declassified per Executive Order L3526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 I

n

cc :: : "L

the impossibility of obtaining dollar ' ;: .^ Very few \ arc sufficiently wealthy un*Ier any circumstances to send their children half v.'L\y around the world to colle£e. The iiaple; tation cf tho Ful-bright agreement with Franee is being'worked out in Paris. It seems probable that thl^ iapl bion vail place Tndochinese applicants in direct competition vrith those in'Franca, In that case there is not likely to bo any political disorifnination against Vietnamese or other Indochinese applicants* They will, hovJdver, constitute but a small fraction of those applying in French territory and will rarely possess acco:nplisl sits permitting them to r^eet the competition of students fro::i Franco itself, It will be recalled that the Fuibright program is designed for graduate students,

Hanoi is under more in' ic siege than Saigon, and has experienced raorc destruction. A very modest USIS program, limited primarily to Eiagajsines and some fills distribution, is about to be launched by tho Consulate there* The possibility of expanding this program will be subject to periodic review* Present plans are f'or the Consul and Vice Consul to delete sor.e of their time to USIS activities, assisted by one or tv;o Vietnamese ployed at USIS cxpen The possibility of opening a small reading room at Phnoni Penh, the capital of Cambodia, is being considered.

Despite the accelerated tempo of events in China. Indonesia, Kalaya, and Burim, the situation in the French-held areas of Indochina ha3 boon relatively static for some time past* This report has been v/ritten in tho light of this static situation. Current French negotiations v. r ith ox-Emperor Bao Dai of Annara nay lead to his early return to Vietnam v;ith a trend toward sore peaceful conditions in Indochina wh-ieh would permit expanded USIS activities, Tho single factor of improved transportation facilities vrould bo an immense advantage. If, however, conditions become more unsettled, USIS v/ill soon be adversely affected. ■

HFC/jr

177

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 I

Lt. "fin. Y* nunter ; raerican E:Y^sy Bangkok

.amrican Consulate General, Saigon, Indochina, February 1£, 1949

\«t , v ( '-. ,, *;ri-;;; A3.; 7 A "V.r*" 1'■ ^ PHP STT#7 TV?' CTT W^7r "fr" T ^"V^TPv PnT'^FP-T??:f

Si'CTXC:; :I

ilLI?i3?l'

101

[ED EIMA

Sussrarv

The v:ir in Indoclaina* nor* in Its third ye?/r, has continued its indecisive course during the nut $±a month*:«

3 hs usual full and

;vintor c^:p-ips, more la in ccepe than I& : st year, resulted in the reoccup&tion of abandoned tern:: av.-d the usual capture of stocks of ar, and explosives, "fithptit Dny r«?oii " result* The truism that "there is no military solution" r$r Indochina is ::oro pertinent now than ever. with 100,000 French troops, over 80;^ Indophincse^ Senegalese, Foreign Legion or c i r ntereenariea, hardly snore than adequate to hold the present very limited areas of control* In this stale^ate^ large sortie Chinese Ccr;:»uni."t intervention or the complete tireakdovm of present political negotiations 1c ling to self-government v/ould have a serious, if not disastrous, effect on the ^resent French ni3itary position.

TEE ASS*

Kis

Since early in 1946 a succession of French generals (including Lo Clerc and valluy, fcvo of the ablest) have tried their hand at pacifying Indochina* A high point in the scries of campaigns v/as reached in ?Iov siber 1947, vrith a Successful fall car.paign in Tonkin that dealt a severe and unexpected blow to the- Viet Hinh* The French v/ero unable to consolidate their advantage, he vor, and by Dec I r 1947 vrere being counter-attacked all along the line, finally being forced to vdthdravj virtually to their original positions-*

In spite of subsequent raids or epmhined operations into Vie-2'lnh held territory, the initiative has regained with the no Govern-rsent, together v/ith control of most of the country*

C

urre nt S i tu rt . t i on

*•;"»

n

The past f "" - tth-s h^ive seen two operations in Tonkin. The first, "Operation d-d 1 , was designed to cut off the :'.v:*unr- incus ''northern" redoubt" from the rich rice producing delta. It involved a five battalion, cordbi: ! aratroop, land and river operation to seize Sen Tay, Vietri and the line Sen lay - -venoi. no rei " ce was net in the-initial stages and no Vict clones ?/erc found* Harassing co attacks along the perimeter of this 20 :d g&ke it air y

ai ar doubtful if it can ba held during the rainy season.

The . i<3 tonkin operation 1 sran on S Decernor end red the line : :: ; h - ?hu Ly -fed tig as its objective, r vrith a "clean i ■" of the : r bar of f -iid &r:r*s supnlv in the Del

Paratroops, infantry and Lkrii u:ed, heavy resist e r.ot, and

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3,3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

considerable stocks of munition: and i .lies v:orc seised* Sine:; th< Kam Eir.h - Phtt Ly - Hedoftg line is entirely surrounded by Vict Hinh hold arc?, and hr.d to bo supplied by air or river-boat, Fronch trithdrc from the area when objectives had been reached, operation ending 21 January*

Central and South Annam

This relatively tranquil sector erupted on 16 January 1949 with a largo scale Viet h :h attack on the Tour no - Bhe railroad resulting in destruction of the train and capture of tho manager*of the railroad. Previously only routine French clean-up operations have been noted during the past six months in the narrow, hundre:d-nilo-long coastal strip hold by Fre::~h for cos in central Annam* As in South Annam, an attenuated chain of srnll forts and blockhouses, manned by second-line troops, is subject to intermittent and admittedly nerve -v. racking attacks* This attrition, plus miserable living and sanitary conditions has reduced morale and initiative in both Central and South Annan sharply<

Coehinchina

■ i i j i n i ii i

Three fairly able generals, LS CLE3C, KYO. and Boyer DE LA IGOR DU MOULIN, have tried their v hand at pacifying Cc hina, but in almost throe years thy situation has renain&d virtually unchanged. The French hold all the large tovrns and a small network of roads radiating from Saigon to the north, wast and northwest quite firmly, although attacks even within this limited frar.vxTork are frequent and sometimes severe* Beyond it, in spite of mssive sweeps and encirclements, para-troop and amphibious operations, the countryside remains in Viet Minh control* The w Plaii3 ies Jones 1 ' area west a: south of Saigon &-*" the v/hole rich, rice-gror/ing Ga Ehu peninsula remin particularly strong centers of Viet resistance. The latest reported French plan for the Ca Lfeu y insula is to permit no rice to be exported from it, in spite cf world rice shortages, so solidly is its economy controlled by the Viet Minh.

Cambodia and Laos

These large, sparsely-inhabited, deficit areas use up large numbers of French and Indochinese garrison troops to protect towns and communications from an insignificant Independence mov Snt which draws most of it's strength from Slam and the Viet Minh* Important operations on the part of either adversary r^rc very rare, although large scale

",

^.in

rroo

Lcvos operations are reported planned for late February*

Troops

Current estimates give a total of ICO,COD Fronch troops for all of Indochina* Of these, almost 50% are believed to be Indochinese natives, under French officers and non-coms* Total vrhitc French .trooos, includj ' ' j cire not believed to e:-:c 1 20;'; of the total or about 20,000* 12,C00 Foreign Legion rind a mixture of Sen. esc, ?-!orrocans, Algeria] ~, Tunisians, to i v/ith a few 3 iich ; Indiai s, : dee up the balance* A re^:: " of French U rines also serve as infa y cc bat troop-: v/3 ! the Fronch gr 1 forces.

179

Nat ii

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 2011

Native anti-Viet Mirita movements such as Cao Dai, Koa Hao, Partisans, etc. have been virtually written off as an asset, and in the case of the latter two groups have become an admitted liability.

Morale and discipline in all combat units visited during past months showed a sharp decline over the past year, particularly among paratroop units. Widespread atrocities have been reported by American and British sources in the North; health and sanitary conditions in the field were observed to be very bad; and th is a widespread lack of confidence in both the French government at home and French generalship in Indochina among officers and superior non-coms. Feeling the general hopelessness of the military sit ion, many of the albest young officers are seeking staff rather than combat duty, and only the most recently arrived French troops show much combat enthusiasm or smartness of discipline. In this connection, Viet propaganda makes much of an alleged recent proclamation by Andre MARIE, French Minister of Justice, offering French convicts a chance to "redeem" themselves by joining the Colonial Army to fight in Indochina.

The pay of officers and superior non-coms, however, is good to excellent, particularly in comparison with metropolitan France; professional advancement and decorations frequent; and these factors have inhibited widespread resignations or desertions.

Generalship

The present two top generals in Indochina (BLAIZOT and ALLESAi 3) are thought by French officers to be decidedly second rate, although served by a first rate General Staff. Area commands (KOCH in Tonkin, LE BRIS in Annam, DE LA TOUR in Cochinchina) are little more than autoj io sector commands. All large scale plans and decisions are made in Saigon by Allesandri and staff, with some interference by the High Commissariat, particularly on the political impH cat ions of litary moves.

The Navy

With a single carrier, a cruiser, a dozen colonial sloops 3 three LST's, l6 minesweeps, and a variety of small landing craft at its dispostion, the Naval Command in Indochina is a minor military factor. Its functions are: river and coastal patrol (anti-arms and rice s ;-gling); transport and support of troops in amphibious operations, and protection of river convoys, A regiment of Marines (Fusiliers -

rins) while officered by the Navy is under Array operational command. They are recognized as the best combat infantry in Indochina at present.

The Air Force

Some 36 out-dated German Junker transports (JU^S's) used for para-troop operations, are the backbone of the French Air Force in Indochina. Additional planes arc old Spitfires and C-117's, plus light observation and perse 1 pl^ ^ such as Piper Cubs. Bes3 s transport of para-. the mission of the Air Force is the bombing and strafing of villages not in French control, support of ground troops and personnel trail >rt.

In

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 2011

As in the Navy, promotions and decorations are slow, and i ,le and maintenance have both fallen off sharply in the past months. Pilots particularly resent lack of ground facilities, and various safety devices which those trained in the U.S. (over 50$) there learned to regard as indispensables *

The Viet Minli

—»

Opposed to the French forces are about 75,000 Viet ese troops of various political complexions, largely under Communist dominated leadership. There is considerable French-furnished evidence of Communist political commissars and indoctrination ext ling do™ to company strength levelso It is certain that the disciplined Communist element has been the largest factor in maintaining the vigor and cohesiveness of the resistance. In this, they have been greatly helped by French indecision and bad faith, and the terrorism of French troops.

In spite of arms captures and occasional defections, there is no sign of large scale weakening of Vietnamese resi nee abilities or morale. The large areas under Vietnamese control lack luxuries and medicines, but are wholly self-sufficient in the basic necessities and tolerably well rdministered, according to what few reports are available. They continue to form a source of supplies and of fresh troops that are only limited in numbers by the arms available.

Although there are rumors of a Chinese Communist treaty with Ho Chi Minh, and of a Chinese Commi; t general and his staff in Northern Tonkin, there is little evidence, as yet, that the Chinese are of any considerable help in the resistance. French sources feel that there is little danger of a Chinese Communist 5th column in Cochinchina, or of an invitation on the part of Ho Chi Minh to the troops of the age-old national enemy to enter Indochina in force, in spite of the Communist link. All French military sources consulted, however, feel that a large scale Chinese Communist invasion would make most, if not all, of Tonkin, militarily untenable•

For many months past, observers feel that the resistance has not put forth its maximum effort, perhaps because the leaders are waiting for the outcome of political negotiations going on between the High Commissariat, the French Government and the Xuan-Bao Dai el< nts. If these should break down, the resistance will be greatly strengthened by the adhesion of many now neutral or pro-French elements. If the negotiations are successful, the resistance army is sure to be a dominant factor in any form of V 3se self-government.

Comment

Having long since explored, and exhausted, the possibilities of a final military victory in I) ? there is little incentive for the French mill Lgh cc A to plan beyond small scale operations of limited scope, while waiting for the politicians in Paris and Mao Tze TUNG in China to make the really decisive .moves.

BH/jr

181

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

American Consulate General, Saigon* Indochina, February 12, 1949* LEIG!L\NDUK Oil 113 JHE& ?0S BE7I LHI FOkEIGIJ SERVICE C0SPER3SC5

SECTION IV, DffiOCElKESE' ECONOtllC SITUATION

A* General

again

Indochina has an ares, of 235,000 cqur.ro miles - half/aa largo ::s Prance - and a population of about" 26,000*000* The population is largely concentrated in the deltas of the Rod and Mekong Rivers and a narrow strip p.long ths coast- Largo parts of the interior are practically uninhabited* Tr economy of the country is pr~ irily agri~ cultural and largely based on the growing, processing, and export of rico. Rubber output -.v,s inci ling rapidly before the war, and some progress had been niado in del■■ loping the country's Hiineral resources.

Eecoirery since the war has been slow because of the practically continuous guerrilla warfare. Even with the return of peace it will probably take two years for production in most fields to reach prewar levels, f\nd largo capital investments would be necessary*

Be Resources

1. Agric ulture

-—"■ ' --

Rico is the rcainstay oT the native diet and by far the most important crop* Tonkin is only self support ; in exceptional years; Annan aiid Cambodia usually break even; while Cochinchina can produce a large surplus for export and seldom suffers a crop failure» Agricultural methods are primiti ~:-. and yields per acre arc Ib&fi Other iiaportant crops are corn, grovai chiefly for export, sugar cane, beans 9 cotton, tobacco, and vegetables* Copra and oil reeds are of minor iiHportance as arc coffee;, tea, and kapok*

»

Rubber planting began late in Indochina and reached its greatest development in the period 1925 - 19£4. Present acreage is about 134,000 hectares a perhaps 20$ of which his boon more or loss sariously d&imged by the guerrillas* Potential production is estimated at 100,000 tons, but mny plantations have boon abandoned because of insecurity, and the balance lack labor* Productiq n 1948 was only about 45,000 tons* Rubber is almost entirely in French hands and th great bulk in largo plantats is - the 33 largest contain BO?* of the total acreage* Frenzl^ planters ha?e boon pro; bo develop and adopt modern methods, and error 40JS of the trees zkto fro::: grafted and s cted seedlings. It is understood

that cost- of pre tot ion is low coiriparod with other grov/ing regions*

2, Antral Husl . . Pishing, and Timber

In the Vietnam, cattle and buffalo are raised chiefly for draf animalsj and their >rs arc still bolew pr - r totals* Cambodia raises 6 fair number of beef cattle* H _ - xre the moat Imj • food

aj ' " : -. t -t in c- ain /■ "lite j . h cos are an " i i it source of in o* Gr its sheep are of ninor importance* Fish for an

182

itaportar

RE

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

1- *

important part of tho native dipt., and lcx§o quantities are caught in tho coastal voters, tho rivers and particularly in the Tonic Sap Lake In Cm bodia« Largo quantities of dried fash wore formerly exported* V/hilo Indochina has groat areas of forest anj inany valuable woods, their exploitation 5s difficult and timber li&i never V a an important exportc Tho cutting of.construction timber and firewood is, r ; an iisportant local industry* -

5, Minerals

The provinces of Tonkin and Laos are rich in ninerals, tho latter largely uncxploitod. High quality anthracite coal deposits arc found north of Haiphong and bofoie th@ war production reached over 2,000,000 tons a year nostly by open cut mining* Production in 1940 v/CvS only 540,000 tons dus to lack of machinery and labor and guerrilla activities* Coking coal is found only in insignificant quantities* . "

There are valuable tin deposits in North Tonkin and Central laos* Production reached 1800 tons in 1938* Considerable crude tin v/as also brought dovm from Yunnan, China, for siaelting at Haiphong* Production is at present at a standstill due to the guerrilla -warfare* A fev; tons v/orc flovm out of Yunnan in 1943, but plans for developing 'this have been postponed because of the pros* high price,of Chinese tin. Tonkinose tin ores contain tungsten, and production in 1338 reached 555 tons of concentrate•

There arc valuable zinc ores in Tonkin* Production reached 25,000 tons in 192G, but dropped to about 5.000 before the war as v/orld prices declined* Those mines aro also closed* Gold deposits v;cro worked at various points before the war but verc of minor importance*

There are important deposits of phosphate rock in northwest Tonkin near the Chinese frontier, the develop it of which v:as begun by the Japanese during the mr- Exploitation of these rich mines will require not only tho pacification of the area but large investments of capital*

I'sxziy other minerals, including iron orc^ bauxite, lead, antinomy, and grap: ibc, arc known to exist, and Laos particularly lias only boon partially prospected*

,— —^-~—. ■

1

Indust2 % y is of little iiaportance in Indochina and is chiefly concorj h the processing of agricultural and forest p: iucts*

The most i:&H>rt&nt : ifacturing industry is the cc . at v'orks near Eaip! g* is produced 260,000 tons V the war an:

100,0;0 in 1 » Other : industries produce alcohol 3 textiles,

: r . and cif,are> bed-

• 0 w,- J

103

C. Foreign

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

C* Foreign Trades

1« Experts

~~"

Before the waif rice, rubber, and corn represented 75> of the total value of exports. Of other items, only coal, dried fish, tin and cement wore over 1% of the total*

Today rubber is the leading export by value* Shipments totaled about £2,000 tons in 1948* This cotaparps favorably with prev/ar but is loss than half of present capacity* Pice exports at 220,000 tons improved ov-jY 1917 but vrere only a fraction of the prc-.var average of over 1,500,000 tons* In 1933 over 500,000 tons of corn were exported, almost nil to France. During the war production practically ceased and has siado little recovery since * With the decline in the export of rice and corn, certain other products such as hides and skins, soya and other beans, pepper, and kapok have assumed relative importance*

The recovery of Indocninoso exports to prewar levels depends primarily on political factors and the return of security. However, such recovery v;euld net occur i diatoly on the return of peace since much destruction and deterioration has occurred which would take tine to repair. Thus rice exports will bo hindered for sol tir= by failure to keep up dittos an:! drainage or irrigation canals, lack of junlcs to move the pad iy, and destruction and deterioration of rice mills* Rubber could recover more quickly but isany trees have boon slashed or burned and factories and houses destroyed* Annual now or replanting schedules have been largely abandoned since 1945* All export industries are affected by the 2*e iK)r ^ deterioration of 7/atcr, road, and rail transport*

Over 60J&, by value, of Indochina's exports go to Franco and the Srr,oiro f about the san.o as before the -war* Most of the balance goeb to Singapor;.-, Hong Kong, and China* Exports to the United States amountci to only about Z% of the total value in the first ten : bhs of 1948* The percentage v;as rorr.ov.hat higher before the war bub has never been large and probably never frill be unless the economy of the country cl ;es sharply* Vfe do not import rice, corn, coal, or c :it, while Indoehincso rubber vrill normally go to France.

2, Imports

Imports are : ; up of the u 1 selection of manufactured products vrhich are ded by a non-industrial eduntry of low per capita purchasing pov.-er. Due to the great need for both cons :; and eaoital goods follcvdng six years of bio do, imports since the

.r }. been relatively high c trod with exports and have recently excee 1 ■ •r volume*

Under tl prevrar syst or empire pr rence, Franco naturally supplied the 3 ! sh of inports, 57jS 5 . In spite of a

cl. e to n co as C-::r as i: port duties are concerned, ?rauco

ha i h r po'sH 'en an:: supplic 1 ' 1947* Ir trts

fr 3 States have ) t relatively larger since the war and

: to r, ! : U This dropped to 14$ in the First ten months of 3 LB. Most of the balance ;o from C " t, He Ron*, Slam,, and India*

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3,3 NND Project Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 2011

3» Balance of Tra

From 1906 until the war Indochina had a favorable balance of trade except in 1923, 1931, and 1932. The balance has now sharply-changed and from January to October 19^8 imports were valued at 1,76^ million piastres and exports only 926 ^ a deficit of 838 million. The foreign exchange problem is thus acute, particularly as concerns dollars* The deficit has been made up by France under the plan for the French Union. The failure to include Indochina for direct allotments under the Marshall Plan resulted in considerable delay in the I9H8 Plan, and it is only in recent weeks that certain dollar allotments have been approved, st imports from the United States in 19^8 were delayed shipments under the 19^7 Plan.

The ambitious ten yea}' plan for the reconstruction and equipment of Indochina foresees large investments of capita]* The present administrators of the plan expect most of this capital to come from government sources, and there is little place for private capital, either French or foreign. It is probable that present plEtns will have to be considerably modified to fit the new political conditions now developing.

h . Finance and Currency

Internal finances are in relatively good shape in spite of the critical fore :change problem* The central government has derived its chief income from customs fees.> excise taxes and monopolies 5 of which the opium monopoly is the most lucrative. Subsidies were granted to provincial governments from the central budget.

During the past year a number of changes have taken place in preparation for the new political organization. The bank note monopoly has been taken from the pa\-rerfulBanque de l f Indochine and is being transferred to a new Emission Institute. A separate Indochinese Treasury has been authorized, while the revenues from the excise taxes and monopolies were technically transferred to the Associated States on January 1, 19^9• AH these measures contejr. te a closely knit economic federation for Indochina in which French participation and influence will be prominent. The individual states, particularly the Vietnam, are strongly opposed to this, and lengthy and bitter disputes with the 1 ach on economic and financial matters can be anticipated.

The Indochinese piastre was worth 10 francs from 193^ until 19*16 when the rate was changed to 17. The rate of 6.95 piastres per dollar became 12«55 as a result of the French devaluation of January 19^8. In October 19^8 the system of a double exchange rate was extended to Indochina, the official rate remaining at 12.55 per dollar and the "free" rate fluctuating with the free franc. Current quotations are about 19 per dollar. Foreign trade transactions take place at the average of the two rates or about 15»70* The black 3 eat rate rose during 19^8 from around J+0 to about 55 per dollar. Even better rates are occasionally reported from Hong Kong and Bangkok*

5. Cost

* It is difficult to convert these figures to dollar ue to two

devaluations during the period* Foreign trade is conducted at about 15.7 piastres per dollar, the average between the official rate of 12.55 and the free rate of about 19«

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Dale: 2011

5* Cost of Living

The cost of liiring has mounted rapidly since the ivar, and t index for Europeans in December 1948 was 2646 (first half 1939 ~ 100) conpared vath 1G58 g year earlier* Ccr.prrativc figures for native working classes v.cro 3966 and 2802* For Asnoricans attempting to oper ate at the n froo fl exch &: o r&te^ prices are outrageous*

-

Salaries tend to lag behind prices with resulting unrest among the working population and the large class of civil servants*

6. Conclusion

The "basic problems of the economy of Indochina arc similar to those- of other iLsi&tic countries, with ^ny increase in the standard of living tending to be checked by the rapid rise in th population* (Cambodia is an exception in that the population is static.) The dOTelo] fc or the mineral resources and the industrialization o2 the country will reoui: enormous amounts of capital and much time.

—

The immediate problem of restoring peace and order is primarily a political on

Gil&sMC/jr

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number; NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 i

American Consulate General,

Saigon, Indochina, February IE, 19*9.

*\

MEMORANDUM OH INC0C1 . tJB EST DELHI FOHEIG2I SERVICE GOiSFSRETCE

section v. consular akd AioniSTRATivH problems

V

■

Administration

A problen which confronts all ssei.11 officer,, no doubt, is the unusually heavy load of administrative work in proportion to the ainount of crea t i ve work, turnod o v t* Tho r e qu irosiests of tho Dopart-mont for administrative reports, and tho quantity of administrative detail involved in tho daily operation of a small office 5s roughly the same as for a large office* The administrative instructions and the forms prescribed are naturally drafted vdth large offices in nind, and their use in a Email office is difficult end results in a dis-proporl* to amount of time spent on administrative workt

It is urged that the Department investigate this matter with a vie 1 /; to giving additional authority to the field to inc.ke decisions and also to transferring to tho Department ranch of the "control 11 records and roperting that is new demanded of the field*

-

Alien Staff ' • ' •

■ i ■ i

Saigon has boon experiencing cc Uticr&ble trouble in finding and keeping alien personnel, particularly French employees* Business houses are in a position to offer better salaries and a shorter work week j and the Consulate has been unable to coinpctOi Re consolidations have recently boon sent to Washington which, it is he i, v/ill sone-what ameliorate this situation. A single wage including basic wage end temporary increase has been suggested, which will be semi-annually adjusted according to changes in the cost of living index* At the same tir.c r position classification system has been established v/Mch 1 allows in-*gradc prorations for merit and service*

To encourage tho alien staff to continue its work with the Government; end to isake thorn more valuable to the office, it is hoped that some way can bo found vithiu budget* limitations to provide language and stenographic lessons for those members of tho staff who appear to bo qualified* Stenographers arc almost impossible to find in Saigon, and it is, therefore, necessary for officers to consume much valuable time in drafting correspondence for typists. Tho cost of such train-in* is Doiuinr,!, the tirse allowed during working hours for the study would bo negligible, and tho results undoubtedly satisfying

^*

Supply s j^LifilHP?

Saigon formerly e:xpericnc< serious losses in shipments of of-fici&l supplies and personal e^feeb- through short sh."plants, theft, 1 br ;* It was found that clearing agents usually took little interest in c alar shipments since as r, rule they are smll a the r for the ti 3 effort s: fc en clear" ; does not v/arrai making the extra off % to supervise c fully our shi; . ;-• -The ulatc still sj ading r csh tirso en each shipment in ar ing

187

for

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 NND Project Number; NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

for tho free entry of tho goods and assisting the clearing agent*

It has been found that a considerable sum of money can be sa I by training an alien cr.nloyco to handle tho entire clearance lie has sufficient official s din^ to povndt hisa to ezr lite papers and clearance procedures that would otherwise take days, and by devoting his full tisse to trio clearing of the ship rib and noving the j;aods quickly losses have boon cut to a large extent*

Kail and Courier Service

I

Saicon has boon experiencing considerable delay in the trans-* mission of pouch rnail, both courier and unace anied air pouch . It is necessary to allow up to throe v/eeks for the transmission of mail to the Department. It is possible that other offices in this area have been experiencing the same difficulty^ and it is suggested that a concerted effort be mdo to encoui'a^e the Dopar' :it to v;ork out a more expeditious v/ay to handle mil to and from Southeast Asia- Sea pouches take a miniiraam of six v;eeks to reach Saigon «

It is not safe to send personal correspondence of any iinportanee through the open rail in Indochina. In spite of firm denials there is adequate procf that a form of censorship exists. This delays mail, and encourages the loss of enclosures and sinall p ckages.

Visitors to In dochina

It is a&ain dosircd to point out to neighboring offices that Saigon is not able to guarantee accomodations to visiting business men, and only with great difficulty and v:ith anple notice can accomodations be arranged for official visitors* A critical housing situation is not peculiar to Saigon. Kovrevcr, consular residences here are small and with the exception of the consul general's residence do not possess gu^st rooms. !2ven a confirmed rerr rvation usually means a bed in a dormitory with from three to ten people.

Kany unofficial travelers have been giving the Consulate General as a reference when applying for an entry visa. The French officials call at the Consulate General anticipating that v*e will give a guarantee of lodging* This, of course, is not possible, and it is, therefore, again urged that business.: :n and tourists be vrarned that there may not be any accomodation available in Saigon and that they should mho no attenpb to co:vj to Indochina unless they are assured in advance of lodging.

Consular

General

Saigon cencuro v;ith Eatavia that s---'j cfforl should be made to provide an operate ' for each consular office. Nov officers coning to tfc i ti tld for the first bino, c or a training p riod 5?. iv■:.:' ton, find it most difficult to f rise fchi soivi vril their vto: Often they arc replac: ; so::.:: . tthc has all ly loft

188 J ?os

:!CTSD

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

the post or who leaves shortly after his arrivals It is impossible to assimilate all th details of procedure in a short time, and for this reason detailed operating instructions should be made av&il&b]

Iho precedent file gives rnuch valuable information about conditions peculiar to 0210 particular post* irov/cvor, for instructions regarding shipping, seamen, visas, and passports or notarials,, a detailed guide is essential* In a small post an officer nay neve!', during his tenure, have occasion to issue certain typos of visas or experience unusual shipping and seamen problems* But occasionally those situations do arise, and an unexperienced officer has no recourse but to refer to soino guide foi^ assistance*

The Foreign Service Regulations are, of course, the basic manual* Experience lias proven, however, that the sections e:i visas, passports, shipping and seamen, immigration and not&ric.ls are noticeably inadequate vfhen detailed instructions are required. In the interest of efficient office routine and the proper execution of consular duties within the bounds of cur present budget limitations, Which makes it essential to operate with a s^sall staff and a maximum of productive effort, it is urged that these portions of the regulations be re-examined with a viev; to iinproving their content so that they n&y servo as a helpful guide*

TcJc^ra n Rate s

This post also agrees iTith Batavia tliat a concerted effort should be n^dc to obtain reductions in telegraph rates between posts in'this region. It is desired to point, out to neighboring posts that there is considerable delay in transmission of telegrams betvreen countries since radio circuits are open only once or at most trace a day, usually at night* Thus persons traveling by air to Saigon often reach here before the telegram announcing their arrival*

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Assumption Urtel 141 Dept desires success Baodai experiment entirely correct. Since appears be no other alternative to estab Commie pattern Vietnam, Dept cdnsiders no effort ehld be spared by FR, other We£ rn powers, and non-Commie Asl^n nations to assure experiment best c; toe succeeding.

At proper time and under proper circumstances Dept will

be prewared do its part by extending recognition Baodai Govt ,\

"Viand by exploring possibility of complying yrlth any request

by such Govt for US arms and econ assistance. Must be under-

■

stood however aid program this nature v/ld require Congressional^

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approval. Since.US eld however scarcely afford-backing govt <^

y> which v;ld have color and be li Ly suffer fate of puppet regime,

it must first be clear PR will offer all necessary concessions ■ *

to make Baodai r solution attractive to nationalists. This is stpo of which FH themselves must see urgent necessity view v ■nosciblv short"time remaining before Connie s uccesses Chi a

It ti do c hina. Moreover, Baodai ( t must throug h n effi s demonef 0:i nize.and conduct affairs wisely so

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Ctarg*3 LVf.-ulment

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Indochina analagous Kuomintang wld be foredoomed failure.

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Assuming essential FR concessions are forthcoming, best chance success Baodai wld appear lie in persuading Vietnamese nationalists (l) their patriotic aims may be realized prompt] through FR-Baodai agreement (2) Baodai govt will be truly representative even to extent including outstanding non-Commie leaders now supporting Ho t (3) Baodai solution probably only means safeguarding Vietnam from aggressive designs Commie

i.

While attainment these objectives depends initially upon

attitude FR and Baodai circle, Dept believes more will ultimately be required. Beet hope might lie in active demonstration of interest in and support of Baodai solution by other non-Commie Asian govts. Appeal such so3.ution to Vietnam nationalists wld

prer tably be far greater if it api ared sponsored by free

-

Aelan nations animated by interest self-determination Asian

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*

peoples and their own self-preservation in face Inimed Commie menade rather ti^an if it had appearance gambit engineered by FR, US and UK as part strategy of West-Bast; conflict,

Dept giving closest consideration to means whereby US might assist attainment these ends #

From above, you will see Dept thinking closely par lels

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Charg* P*p>irtmmt

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your own. Dept agrees when time comes Baodai must certainly be fully warned of danger yielding to any temptation include Commies his govt and this connection again believes other Asian govts eld serve most useful purpose since India, Slam, Philippines, and Indonesians (both Repubs and Federalists) are fully alive growing Commie threat Asia.

Re last para Urtel 141 QTE reliability Baodai solution UK^TE was error, Deptel 70 shld have read QTE viability UNQTE cleaning able live.

While Dept continues believe it wld be premature and unwise for you make special point (such as trip Dalat) see Baodai, there no objection your talking informally with polit personalities

close to hira with whom you have doubtless already made contact

*

in normal course carrying out your functions. In such talks

vou might well as suggested Urtel 14-1 take occasion cite examples

futility collaboration Cdmraie's and grave danger

such

course.

"<.:!3UrrON DESIRED

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Urtel 147:

Dept believes extent to v/hich FR concessions embodied

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Mar 8 agreements will satisfy nationalists can be determined 01

only by reaction nationalists themselves* Meanwhile via

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appreciate your view.

■

While not fully informed provisions Mar 8 agreements plus associated documents, Dept fears national. opinion will i

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follow line Duoc Viet editorial Apr 9 which, states QJPE althoug. Vietnamese reassured on score their country's unification, they* remain uneasy-about question foreign relations and,.army, Vietnam sovereignty villi not permit Vietnamese army be com i by FR

general nor villi requirement of ooverelgntvbe satisfied by

■ ■ diplomatic representation only in-China, Slam and Vatican", UHQTE

: ' ; As practical matter, Dept believes that uhen independence

movement in colony too strong to be defeated, metropolitan power

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if it wishes preserve influence In area has no real choice but attempt establish special relationship with former colony br free acceptance terras by latter, and that asooc between metre

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-,-dc baft po% -rtd former colony is more 11) y prove fruitful

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id. dv ble if 0 3d free consent of latter than if trans:

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of autonomous powers to latter la made conditional upon its

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acceptance of such important qualifications upon its Independence

as continued metropolitan control its fon relations and command

armed forces.

persuaded

However, Dept/snaosfl FR unlikely make further concession

s

this time and that any US efforts press them do so w^d probably

(Paris to indie; if this not correct.) miscarry,/ Hope is, the refore, th at F R w ill carry out thei r

obligations urn Mar 8 agree its with such generosity and

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expedition that impressively constructive I tmosphere will be

created and that at same time Viet nationalists wlLl rapidly

appreciate true character menace approaching from Chi and will prefer cooperate Baodal solution rather than accept alternative continued resistance and risk loss all real autonomy to Ghl Commies. Presumably such outcome not impossible particularly If FR eld let it be understood Baodai agreement does not permanently define status Vietnam but provides basis for further early evo3j

TfilBUTIOM I CEO 0WLY)

tion.;

At same time, ehld it appear as Dept fears that FR are offering too little too late, Dept will not be inclined make up for FR deficiencies by rushing into breach to support Baodai

■ ■

agreements at cost its own re '.nirig prestige Asia. «S

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Dept considers US this st a shld avoid conspicuous position any

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kind and try reach common attitude with other interested rjovtt, particularly UK, India and Philippines.

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probably even leas favorable nat3 lists than now. It must of ecu:, be conceded theoretical possibility exists estab National Communist state on patt Jugoslavia in any r beyond reach Soviet array. He sr, 03 attit* old t acot such possibility only if every oti r possible avenue closed to pr -rvation area from Kremlin ol. Moreo , while Vietnam out of reach Soviet .army it will do btless b^ by no means out of r* h Ghl Commie h n a irmed forces.

Fol is for urinfo and such reference as you dosm judicious;

Dept naturally consider only FH c through concessions to nationalist movement lay ! is for so: Ion Indochina problem. As suggested Deptel Sua to Saigon, if nationalists find concessions Mar 8 agreements inads ., much / d

urxm willingness FH put agreements in most favo ble possj le

- ■

context by t hasiaing e:^ id evolution " i

beyond a envisaged tfc ante. Provided F.?. d >lay

realistic and generous attitude, most i rtant part r inder in program—viz, port nation fcs

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propaganda support Baodai solution night nore than anyone else bo able deprive Ho of talking-points in event ho continues demand armed resistance Baodai regardless circumstances (which appears certain in light vitriolic tone, current Vietminh broadcasts on Baodai which give no recognition any FR concessions to nationalist

-

demands.) Even with conditions for US support Baodai realized, it futile expect US be able assist effectively this initial task beyond (stressing requirements situation in talks South Asian

»

govts and providing materials evidencing realities of Communism through USIS for distribution a3 you and Condon Saigon consider

desirable in conjunction with Baodai efforts arouse compatriots to Commie menace. Experience Chi has shown no aat US nil and* econ aid can save govt, even if recogn" d by all other powera and possessed full opportunity achieve natl ainis, unless it can rally si port people against Commies by affording representation all important natl groups, anifeating devotion to natl a3 oppose person or party interests, and demonstrating real leadership. Re Viet opinion reported Saigon 1 s 145 that OS abandonment Nationalist China presents unfavorable augury for non-Co: Le regit

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above qualities and lack will to fight, not because US Q!?S wrote It off UNQTE.

Re Xuan query whether US wld propose Vietnam for membership UN ehid FR renlg, you ehld avoid discussion this matter , at most if pressed state circumstances at moment will of course determine US action. For urinfo only it unlikely US old even vote for Vietnam membership UN if as it appears now FR wld remain in control Vietnam fon relations«,

Telegraph Branch;

Send to: AM00HSUL,

HANOI

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Repeat to:

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v

0

SE CRET

*• ■ " '■ " ■**

The Honorable

David K. E. Bruce,

American Am sndor # Paris*

Sir:

There in transmitted he fith a memorandum sefctl forth the Department f s views on the ogre it signed en

reh 8 bv the President o> nice and the for. a«

peror of Annam defining the ful o r tun of tlio State of Vietnam* You are raqu d to p: ent this memoran*

dum to the ilstry of Foreign A ra of the ' rach

Government*

It 15 bi jested that fcJ " jy f s no to trancnittir

the memoranda bo composed ig the folio lln

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B The Vrabassy of the United States of America pre~ sents its t pll t try of Fore 1

Affairs and f on in taction its govt mt $

has • honor to tran It h< artaix^ c< ents

of the Department of Stat© on the agreement con** eluded on eh 0* 1949* b n the Freai it of

tho eh Republic and the former Emperor of

Annam, which the Ministry of Foreign Affaire was kind enc i to r available to tho Sever it

of tho United States* 11

As vn alternativej the i sent n of tho noto hy Hr* Charles B* Bohlen may apt preferable• Tho prob-

1 3 dealt with in the memor* ium were die cues od in a conversation ,v;ith the Secretary of State shortly before his departure from 1 hiiigfcon at p« Bdhler

pros ent • ::

.

Vojwr truly you-

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Srigloal ' o copj a,

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For Acting Secrel - of State5

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■llton ,Butterv:orth Director for astern Affairs

o:. .loranaum

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

She Govern nt of the United States is most appre-

ciative of the actio/), of the French Govern it in m 3

available to it tho text" of the agreement con clue

March 8 betYJcen the President of France and tho fo: r

Emperor of nam defining the future status of the State

of Vietnam* The agreement 3 b'eon studied frith-tho

greatest interest by the Depart nfc of State*

A.S the French Gove: is *e, the United.Stat-.

Government has followed with s 3 concern the cov e of

events in French Indochina since the end of* tho war "in

*

tho Pacific* Ttils concern, it is cc 0 to.. , haa

been prompted by p. reali tho forces which

• " ;]•;: con .bated predominantly to tho ol .:.» o:C tho

*

Vietnamese »fttl< \liat move it are mi no of

■

the 3aaio forces whl ' orked pre Ac a in

sc end it the e 3 0:

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

a or cob can bo oi* considerable consoquonce Tor tho world

in none 1#

O

ion at tho end of. the war it frecamo ovic- b that

in most of fche pendent countries of southern Asia the indigenous peoples were doteratinad to control t) dr oraxi destinies in the JFuture, tho Unit Statoa Government ventured to hope that the trcstv nations would copra-

*

*

ciato tho strength o;C this peso* n and ttlllli gly grant

the essentia! dea " of the nationalist ram .onto* It x?bb ho? red that in so doing* fclio metre litan powors would be yielding rchat in any i »se thoy co 1 oocj at to bold only by military Torco at at cost* la unci e fc It sftoms'd probable t" at tho costs to otropolitan

Goverr «t r;ould be unrecoverable and tho value of V

V

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-

. colony and its p >iblo contribution to world staMli i

would too reduced by the em at hostilities* Ca i other ] d it was b d * by p: effe: the neces-

r y i ttleal c ~ to ' itl< I til©

elo1 • ost 1- ly

202 •

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 NND Project Number; NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

to result in a continued close rind mutually fruitful i

-'i

latloi ip with the former colony, in the preserv ' Lon < patterns of trade and economy lcn Intexraesl d, arid in b readiness on the part of the colonial people to \*ol<*

the continued technical and admin Srativo assistance c

the metropolitan power* It appears iat only on such a

"basis would there be any real hope that tho V/ootora po^e^

could retain their legitimate 1 bs in the countric

go closely associated wlfch-r m over such lor^ p©riocto #

and that e ng the 13 notions of southera Asia conditions

of political stability and of freedom of political and

econoxalc development could bo achieved c tiling thou to

realise t lv potentialities and make their full contrl

but ion to the worlds

* Convereply* it se od that an intention on tho part

f tho bropolifcan pt r to r a authority xrhlc

19 flop oplo was • ad to o^erci itself

v could * suit on^y in turning tl natle list movi int

.to deatru chnn- -. In 3 circ ja :

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

could bo expected that wide ond 3 OS till ties :ld result

nnd that the consequent destruction c the faci bio a <

production in the de; ident area would cause economic setbacks seriously Injurious to to peoples* Furthr ore

it could bo anticipated " it atlonalist forces uould

turn iijc ;ly to an uncorneromlelng It >rshlp Tshich

would react Inst cooperation i?;lt!i the West id against those free institution: wixicfe Europe civilization I: cx T olvod through long experience In celT*-govominc^t#

Events fm southern Asia 'in tho past jfcur y< : have

i

caused no revision of those vie ; and It is In tho 1:1 of this estimate that the Unit iteSi'G ft Y

examined tho agreement o£ 3 rch 6 and offers Its x."

Because of Its conviction that c no by Pa:' ice

i • tq the Nat' aalist movement cossae: ,?.to with fcrength

--

of that moir fe can alone provide tho basis for a r "lu-tion of the Ind.c Lnei sii ties t ie err of a

st ' - ' : V: Go 1 , tho Unit

•I

i

t ■■" th • I I ?3

0.

20 1 * #

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

al v'^cre' , the fcerriti -al unit; *£ Vietnam* coisprl

Tonkin* Annnia, ana Go chinchilla, -y be realised and i

Vietnamese State enjoy far-s powers of i

autonomy* It c '. bated a I: once i*. b 31a the opj a

of the United S1 <;es Government the Viet o people

would bo guilty of a mist ! e disastrous to t&eir futui

should fch reject this solution and givo their suppo*;.

not to the Viotnasiosc Government formed v. tor the :*£■• r>

agfc nt cut to the so-oall vie Republic (

Vietnam* Fop those in cozamaad of I ds fi bile are cj

trained in the r&othe :-3?5jio of Inl tiona! c:

roonlsmj Bad regardless of t&eir pr .t e al of t

noti st cause, it cannot he Ignored 1 they !r

a ever Misa vended tlieir Kremlin ct toctii & op repudiated

tlio techniques find oh; tives of cc :a p rhit-h are ti

cause of so suffering in the v:orld to * It t

p t' ore, r idr : at j

% c its ji the r he act

one io ■' ■ of a ;'

205

G

Declassified per Exeemive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

total! tarJ nlsm will bo.elmng a u i Vietnam under* *hich all lilbertie , national and personal* will be lost* Such i outcome would not only be fatal to the welfare and

hopes cf the" Vietnamese Kit would bo neat defer!] 1 to

tho Interests pf ell free peoples, particularly those ojf

southern Asia who stand h oat immediate ( %ev of fur-

ther GoffiBxaniet a$ ossic

Hov/ever, tho United Stat Gov ; doea not Tool

confldont that tho Viet o p pie in gexw 1 will aco

tho choice confronting th in these, teams, eaj/o daily

in viev; of the isolating factors in thoir aituatlon dur-

ing moot of the pr decade* Th& Vietnamese nationalist

who for" the most part have boon supporting tho ao*»call3d

Democratic Bepublic of Vietnam as tho one a; :cy

appeared to promise independenci ay not* it is feared,

■ find i provisions of tho rch 8 agreese entirely

op; * In this connection, It \ Id be pointed ov

it I States Gofers is cor I ly

this c. at oo it ia not f itex

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

or anj associated doc ieh i y bear upon ths matter

and does not Ira era whether tho 2 >ch Q a; mt Is intended

to define tho status of Vietnam permanently or to provide

a

basis for f further early evolution of the Tietnsinese

2tato#

The United States Government is Inclined to believe

th orio of tho strongest motivating fore ©a behl .io»<

alist mov&a^nts among dopenc it peoples i?> resentment of

the iiapnt of Inferior.' -licit to a bordln&t

status. When s. people has fought for I > goal of ind

I &m

pendenae with such tenacity as tfc displayed by the

Vietnamese resistance forces* It appears tmll&elj that It

*

will he content with a position of anything loss fchr.n

equality with other peoples* It In t ir©4 I t tho cc

'cessiona granted by the French Gave ien ybe obecu cl

In tho eyes or the Vietnamese by t* o I a of tho t

>

» cient which a incomp hie with Vi< o national prJ/'

f " feelings determine t otlon of t

■y of ' o to e ov< £v

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3,3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

March 8 agreement 3 then it must be supposed that the Com-

munist-dominated "Democratic Republic of Vietnam" -will

continue to receive the support of these Vietnamese.

Certainly as long as the Vietnamese are persuaded that the

< two-and-a-half-year-old war with France must be prosecuted

to a conclusion if the goals for which they have fought

are to be won, they will continue to regard the dominant

Communist element of the Vietminh League in the light of its effective leadership of the nationalist movement and

■

not of its inevitable intention to subvert the nationalist cause in the end to the requi onts of international Communism, with which they have had little acquaintance

as yet.

The United States Government would be lacking in

-

frankness if it did not state that in its considered

estimation the paramount question in Indochina now is

whether the country is to be saved from Communist control.

Under the circumstances, all other iscues must be regarded

as irrelevant. Much time has already been lost. The

years since the end of the Pacific War have seen the Com-

munist threat to Indochina intensified rather than other-

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

lS6«

The southward progress of Chinese Cor: list era;

tc rd the northern frontier of In." hina Introduces a

nev element that transforms an already serious oltuition

into an emergency*

As it has made clear in ,tha part, the United States

Government is of the opinion that- It most prove cliff i

cult to save this situation tm< o preserve Indochina frr

a foreign tyranny unless the French Government offers

the Vietn&cwae the attain nt of those nationalist goals

which tho; Mould continue to fight for a "aer than forego

id unless the Vietnamese r be convinced t t they c

a

in factj, fully realise their patriotic alms throurti co

operation with the Government envisaged in the

agreement* In its view, develops ba have reduced tl

• '. choice in Indochina to simple altoraattvea: will Viet

achieve independence through an agree it with Frsn<

ant the assistance of Prance ancS raaintai* ■■ thi3 in'

C denes fortified by colla' v>at moo, c

113 i cc e inde; ice fro?

t:

t t ' .liv

209

*

-

i

Declassified per Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

:v rovei *t balleves t' b tho Vic

oameso 11 vrillinc;ly ace b a partnership 7 r Ith Francs

cnlv if the e Hty of Vietnam Is re cog :ed and if* r

a nrior condition to the deterrr nation of the cha cter

. r

of this relatier.ship, the sovereignty of Vietnam is

■

aefaaoifrled&fccL Observation of developments in southern

Asia since tho end of the war -Id seam to leave little

doubt that a Bnicaa "betv/eon Prance sne! Yiotne.n would be

far mors likely of attainment and \ Id prove mo: fruit*

ftil snfi < LdurSag If attained wore tho Union conceived not

V3 on instrument fop tho control of ono ">or by ti

other but os t noy of coo, itlon in flold3 of connion

Sntoroet^ diplomatic, military* economic, and cultural

voluntarily espoused on both i s«

An approach to the future on tb le lines would ep.

* *

>

.*

ear to offer; the greatest hope tliafc French Influence in

ndochlna may be proaervsd, whtcifa Jt be r 3 v

qi fclcnably to the best sis, of .^

milli ; and naval .ha » VI. a r.ay '

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number; NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

tainod by Fru cam c rights "be a

• ; this course the aietr olitaxi coi try d

',*

?©ar to havo little bo lose and nuch to gain* Mo] p f

-

froa s strictly practical ; rjfc of vi P the United States

Soirermaetib has "been 1 ?esse<3 to the difficulties likely

arias if in transferri ; au.fc 10120 pcerers to the

goven mt of a depend it territory t metropolitan

or i feSj as a condition to »&eh tram # for, to ettb&ivic

sovereignty in the a: % h.v retail g c alu tranectnd-.

xfehts to Itself* For in this case fc! question of t<

precise dlvinlon of ant .y i^ prone to present it el:C

in conse na with every field of genre t as* the process

of transfer is planned* In coj nce^ 9 greatly

and good will vrhich should accrue to the met olitaa

* P from its a auce of a r r io likely to bo

dissipated In fin at npharo of < cord and u* nfcrua1, &3

suspicion • aaoag tho nations Hie metropolis

. taa 01 rr Is in fact sec . fco pers o its existing

f •

eo • Itt c \co tho pi defialtli

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NMD 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

1

indefinitely protracted, rrlth results uhltih, may C &at

the enterprise*

*

I A cllfjpasslonate appraioal 1 is the United States

Government to boll eve, in abort, that the preservation o

Indochina 1 a Integrity depends, in the first placo, upon

the willingness of the metropol:- n country to give ao

Durances that Vietnam la feo exorcise control or Ito do»

tinios; that its participation in the French Union \"ill be upon ter^s freely accepted by representatives on^oyir the confidence of the Vieti: one p lo v?hon these shall

h^vo boon assembledj that the p( > of t inlstratic

:e3*clsed by Franco in Vletr. uill ha transferred to

the Vietnamese ©o soon go condition pexmlt tho institu*

tic::\ and functioning of tho non re .03 and tfc t t

* . «

\£&smsnt of French* forces in Vietnam outside thoir I

is to be accounted for in terms of the c^fcuno of Viet

i against the profe 'a-national t U-

t o rrould nrxr:. * V: i to alien controie*

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

In the second \>lnc0 $ tm ffoi Id n. p to depend u]

the read an of tb icdn or the Vietm so Govcr

formed un March 8 t to invite the p cl*

patios this Dover: 3nt of henr ruly nati( Xiofc

Icad^^y of Vlefeianij including, those ■she have heretofore

supported the ' foocratlc Republic of Vietn; r # tc tfco

end that this Govorr it a c 5 leadership

and obtain the couri of the nationalist cleric

cov ismc the major rt of the r tance forces*

Such an ; rc«cb bo prot rouid Tseafc 1 .r

to lay the basl3 for the e3 reparation of nationalist

from 0i : ; elements in Vietnauj for those nho per-

1 ;.sted in resists ic Government t

all 3 bioi tst is could he : iHsod In favor of cc

dher^nce to the "Eeiaocratle Bepv >lle of Vietnam**

a iii effect be * ] it tUoir seals w

o

not yiationa." hufc C mist* Ehe 1 ' it cf th

C tine Mild 1 the sine £ a solu

.

U

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number; NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

- r

avlJ strata! its ipac . fco rally 1

list sajc ity of Vie.tno to its support,, : rn-

■

*

ment formed under- the pch 8 a^r nt would -«* it would e.ee.v to the Ijnited Stauea &over enfc — have grounds £<a?

■

appealing for tVic support or all fro© nat". »« The United

States Government would hope that this ap il v/oultl I

lly hooded, or oially by the other Governments oi*

southern &sia if " ch, tta ea having 6 py r man to

regsrcl tno further iraslon of £ ; controls la fcho

region with ala: f could fill a yi ly Important polo by clarifying £03? the V£etn<u le pooplo the Issues c fronts

jfcng tl on the t>asis of r c orienco and un-*

ted fidelity to t ado or solf-dete: Lnatlon 1

tho A£lsn peoples*

14 33ie United nt 1b # ; her :?, convinced

that if the requisite c ions toy the Pre a £ov<

to tib natl alisfc c

a, or' * the tasl

1

vii igreei it must

fc diffic It of ■ fl• : • 3

to Indochina will ' a t fc

2:U; "

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

tho prospect of the *rmtoo or f >le Cc 1st**

controlled forces on their frontiers*

It goes without saying that file earnest hopo of the

Waited States Government is that tho Government fcracd

under the March 8 agreement will auec 4 in Its crucial

task* At the same time It would appear aadL< tie tl

Insofar ae the probabilities of Its success aro rel fi

to tho extent or International aupport it obtains, t]

decision of a third party in"reapcefc of t feasibility

of its ©attending support or a tsneo \ t ho or;

by the extent to Ich tho French Cove nt h Itself

provlc" that Povernment vrlth t! political ac&rant

upon which ita appeal to tho Vietnamese mua

Clearly the* success of this Gov at is the

f: fc instance r upon thooo means of ace shtng lfco pu:

pooe -which only the Fr verr it t provide*

III talcing "vantage of f elation a of cordial;

and i anderstan g 11

ta< ; "by c Is fronli a ?ir ail

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 NND Project Number; NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

n] no direction o£ Ita "/ I lug a

dculjt ana fcbnt a*3 crc o of vlevs a it "bo adv;

tfcgeoua

considering all t* ; la Involved la the oufcee

of situation

i Xndochl

^

*

■*w e

216

FJ EA : 0 Ogbura, Jr: mp

r\

FE

Clear-ed witk EUR end \

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 NND Project Number; NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

-.

TOP SECRET

J

NOTE BY THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

to the -NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

i

U. S, POLICY TO' D ASIA

The enclosed memorandum by the Secretary of Defense on the subject is circulated herewith for the information of the National Security Council and referred to the NSC Staff, as requested in the second paragraph thereof, for the preparation of a report for consideration by the Council,

SIDNEY W. SOUBRS Executive Secretary

DISTRIBUTION: The President The Secretary of State The Secretary of Defense The Secretary of the Army The Secretary of the Navy The Secretary of the Air Force The Chairmanj National Security Resources Board

P1 7

j KS cx TOP SECRET

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number; NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

&

o

TOP SECRET

F

THE SECRETARY OP DEFENSE

Washington

i

■

.

June 10, 194-9

HBI ANDUM FOR THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

t.

Sub j: United states Policy Toward Asia

1. I am becoming Increasingly concerned at the course of events in Asia, The advance of commun:i .&m in large areas of the world and particularly the successes of communism in China seriously affect the .future security of the United States, I am aware that this critical situation is being watched closely in the several departments of the government, and I appreciate that the. current problems are being handled as realistically

as circumstances permit, it occurs to me, however, that this day-to-day, country-by-country approach may not develop a broad program in our best long-range Interests,

*

2. A major objective of United States policy, as I under* stand it, is to contain communism in order to reduce its threat to our security, Our actions in Asia should be part of a carefully considered and comprehensive plan to further that objective. I therefore request that the staff of the National Security Council undertake as soon as practicable a study of the current situation in Asia to re-examine and correlate current policies and to appraise the commitments and risks involved in the various courses of action—political, economic and military--which might be undertaken in support of the broad objective and recommend for the consideration of the National Security Council an appropriate plan of action outlining specific objectives to be achieved.

/s/ LOUIS JOJffiSON

-

USC 48

218

TOP SECR3

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3

NND Project Number: NND 63310. By: NW1.) Dale: 201 I

I RM P 7-18-40

INDtCATF.

/ Collect

Char^o Djpartrnont

Charge to

OUTGOING I ELEGRAM

zputtmtni ni i tnt$

'Washino&SCRET

7

CLf. 31F1CA1

:

n-f

Ua

*ri • ^

3

**

iT/<?

DISTRIBUTION DESIRED

(OFFICES ONLY)

-

JUN 20 1949

AMEMBASSX,

1 ' RANGOON.

■

On JOH 14 new Vietnam Stat© El B under Bao Dal ae» associated state of PR Union with wide attributes internal and external sovereignty but with FR retaining measure of control over external relatione and defense,

I

FJR troopn regaining In Viet* i t Eofer Fortnightly axm~ aries for additional background especially Bao Dai

statement JUN 14

DEFT will ma! tlally same DEPOIELTEfr. JUN 14

d3io statement to press ^FUM S]

1 sv."bstaii'

■

FXI DEPT Recently ecu'. ?io.for delivery F0N0FF memo commenting MAR-Q agreement (basis new Vietnam State), expressing view success Bao Dal solution depends first

.*s

instance upon readiness FR provide him with means satis

* j

* fying alms nationalist majority Vietnam?, that If requisite

C

o

O

i

N

O

FR concessions forthcoming and VI GOVT evidences qapacity rally support substantial percentage Vic ouch GOVT v;ld ;

*

>ve grounds for appealing for support froe nations, which

US Hopes wld be generally he L, Id GOVT and V

m ■—i ^

1MAR 8 at i :ceens thin venture,.

Cn CLEARANCE

Ki

/

Qm....

21

:

-ft Y

^u^s. tpvE*K«ufiT Minims errict t i#*i mom»

i C/)

-r

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

US with expectation coordination BRIT wld bqqIz obtain backl' other South Aslai} GOVTS and itself lend support including recognition new regime and extenolon such assistance aa possible .in circumstances,' Other hand, shld PR and Vlot -GOVTS fall short what enev ont upon then, US wld regain from oupporting Bao Dai eolation and it Kid bo clear, aa

■

to why US unable prevent COMMIE control Vietnam,

Memo will he delivered only orally and in part as EMB Paris reports its delivery btthis time wld impede rather than encourage PR to move along lines DEPI desires.

If Bao Dai regime suocoeds and wo are able get Indian approval Bao Dai GOV?, possibility may eventually develop get GOB approval 0 However understand Burmese have friendly attitude Ho Chi I-Iin faction which believed

■

propagandising-in BURM against Bao Dai.

For your consideration end action your discretion wo

s.v. 3G estio:-.i

/M? advance/:' "that you explain GOB importance to Asia of success Bao Dai regime which mlg thereby create bulwark against COMMIE control Vietnam^ If COMMIES gain- control IC THAI and rest SEA will be imperiled. You 1 also express hope GOB will refrain from publlo statements which

■

SECRET

• *

v i w-y.-

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 2011

WLD prejudice chances his success

In explaining our position GOB you may PT out that failure Bao Dal experiment may troll result ehortly in COMMIE control IC; that in view Internal POLS'? practicabilities FR, MAR 8. agreeme represents lor r ent maximum concessions which PR GOTO could ir?,koj that; Bao Dal is only-person visible at present about whom Vietnamese nationalist may group.. You may also PT out that Ho Chi Min has long record as agent of thlwaiMTERKATL Including i vice SOV

CONS to Canton 1925 under Boro&ine. was organiser 10

■ V

■

Z Party and that his re it actions have not changed

DBPT's "belief that he remains COMMIE.

Youma y stated t hat UB y 8TAS Bao. Dal GOV? as

only first -step in evolution Vietnam problem and that we

. — i

Relieve in time FH will have to move far beyond oonoecsnior

thus far made In order accommodate nationalist aspirations

i. 11

i— i ■ ■

Vietnamese people»

■ ■

Even iif iuipraoticable for you approach GOB along these lines now, foregoing explanation our position may be

S£CR T

-#. O

221

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 NND Project Number; NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

useful replying any questions this matter trow GOB officials*

PYI PBP1 planning approach THAI and PHIL GOVTS

with view obtain oome public expression encouragement

for Bao Dai solution

*

•

U/eU

I

SEGRK?

-^**

NEA:SOAJHEUs ';rk

C: '.•'•--:',"!

0

I

ir u. t. covcprriMtnT mum no cinct i ttia ?toci>

Cleared in

aft vriLth SEA

Mr* O f btip.ivaii afl Mr. Read

Declassified per Executive Order L3526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

INCOMING AIRGRAM Department of State

2027

PROM: Amembassyj London

DATE: NOV 9, 19^9

RECD: Nov. 15, 19^9 2:12 pm

Mailed: Unknown

SECRET

Secretary of State, Washington,

A-2063

Following in substance are the recommendations made at the Singapore Conference in regard to Indo-China:

1. A failure of the Bao Dai experiment would inavitably result In a complete French withdrawal from Indo-China; therefore U.S. and Commonwealth Governments should join the UK in assisting the French in support of Bao Dai.

2. In view of the urgency of the situation Western nations cannot afford to await prior sponsorship of Bao Dai by the Asiatic nations. It is therefore recommended that after the transfer of sovereignty to Vietnam on January 1 the UK support the new regime.

-

■

3. Following action is recommended:

a. The French should be asked to clarify the legal status of the Vietnam.

b * P^ j3*£e recognition is not possible

until March 8th Agreement is ratified. It is therefore recommended that d_e facto recognition of Vietnam be granted on the

SECRET

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number; NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

SEC

Dated: NOV 9, IS

Proms Am :>assy, London..

transfer of sovereignty* It would be desirable to inform Boo Dai of the British Qovera Tit's intention before the British Government recognizes the neu Chinese government.

c. The French should be encouraged to

expedite the ratification of the March 8th Agreement and the transfer of the control of Indo-Chinese affairs from the Ministry of Overseas France to the Foreign Office,

h. It is hoped that See bary of State Achesoft will issue a public si nt with regard to Indochina similar to that made with regard to Hong Kong on May l8th wl n fas stated th in the event of an attack on Eong Kong the United States will fulfil its duties unc the Charter of the United Nations.

$. The IV ould c nsult closely with the French in Indo-China v;; : regard to a -Communist propaganda.

6. Neutrality from India is the.most that can be expected.

BLISS

. ..

• 22^

*

»

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 2011

NSC kQ/1

December 23, 19^9

NOTE BY THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

to the

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

on ,

THE POSITION OP TIE UNITED STATES WITH RESPECT TO ASIA

TOP SECRET

— • • ■ »

Reference: NSC 48 and related papers.

The enclosed report on the subject has been prepared by the NSC staff pursuant to NSC 48 and related papers, with the advice and assistance of representatives of the Secretaries of State and Defense and of the Acting Chairman, National Security Resources Board and the Director of Central Intelligence.

The enclosure is submitted herewith for discussion at the special meeting of the National Security Council scheduled for December 29, 1949, &nd for whatever action the Council may decid-to take with respect thereto.

t

SIDNEY tf t SCfOSRS Executive Secretary

cc: The Secretary of the Treasury

NSC Wl TOP SECRET

/.

Declassified per Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 NND Project Number. NND 63316. By: NWD Dale: 2011

NSC hQ/l

- December 23, 19^9

r DRAFT

TO? SSCR1

REPORT Et r THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

on

THE POSITION OF THE UNITED STATES WITH RESPECT.TO ASIA

THE PROBLEM 1. To assess and appraise the position of the United States with respect to Asia* on the basis of our national security inter

ests.

ANALYSIS

General Considerations

•^^*»

-

2. The peoples and countries of Asia have in common a heavy pressure of population on scanty or underdeveloped natural re-sources and a consequent meager standard of living: disruption experienced in the war: the vigorous nationalistic spirit which characterizes newly independent states or restive colonies: and active discontent with their prevailing social, economic and

■

political institutions. In other words the Asians share poverty, nationalism, and revolution. The United States position with respect to Asia is therefore that of a rich and powerful country dealing with a have-not and sensitively nationalistic area, and o: competition together with friendly countries against the USSR for influence on the form and direction of the Asiatic revolutions.

I

*For' the" purposes of this report "Asia" is defined as that part o the continent of Asia south of the USSR and east of Iran together with the major off-shore islands—J< n, Formosa, the Philippines, Indonesia and Ceylon.

NSC 48/1 226 TOP SECRET

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3

NNI) Project Number; NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 2011

TOP SECRET

v" - - 3. Asia is an area of significant potential power—political, economic and military. The development in this region of stable and independent countries friendly to the United States and seeking to direct their potential power, into constructive channels would enhance the security of Asia and strengthen the world position of the United States. Conversely, the domination of Asia by a nation or coalition of nations capable of exploiting the region for pur-poses of self-aggrandizement would threaten the security of Asia and of the United States, Recognition of these principles has been implicit in our traditional policies toward Asia; We have consistently favored a system of independent states and opposed aggran-dlzement of any powers which threatened eventual domination of the

region.

k. Our over-all objective with respect to Asia must be to assist in the development of truly independent, friendly, stable and self-sustaining states in # conformity with the purposes and

s

principles of the United Nations Charter. In order to achieve this, we must concurrently oppose the domination of Asia by any single country or coalition. It is conceivable that in the course of time a threat of domination may come from such nations as Japan, China, or India, or from an Asiatic bloc. But now and for the foreseeable future it is the USSR which threatens to dominate Asia through the complementary instruments of 'communist conspiracy and diplomatic pressure supported by military strength. For the foreseeable future, therefore, our immediate objective must be to contain and where feasible to reduce the power and influence of the USSR in

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

TOP SECRET

Asia to such a degree that the Soviet Union is not capable of threatening the security of the United States from that area and that the Soviet Union would encounter serious obstacles should it

attempt to threaten the peace, national independence or stability

« of the Asiatic nations.

political Considerations * • *

5. Asia is in the throes of political upheaval. Communist attempts to capture leadership of this revolution, nationalism and the revolt against colonial rule, the emergence of new nations, the decline of western influence, the absence of a stabilizing balance of power, the prevalence of terrorism, economic distress ana social unrest, and the repercussions of the struggle between the Soviet world and the free world are currently disruptive forces. The conditions now prevailing in Asia render the realization of United States objectives there difficult and facilitate expansion of the area of both communist control and Soviet influence,

6. The USSR is now an Asiatic power of the first magnitude with expanding influence and interests extending throughout continental Asia and into the Pacific, Since the defeat of Japan, which ended a balance of power that had previously restrained Russian pressures in China and the pacific, the Soviet Union has been able to consolidate its strategic position until the base of Soviet power

-

in Asia now comprises not only the Soviet Par East, but also Chin: north of the Great Wall, Northern Korea, Sakhalin, and the Kuriles. ! The islands of Japan and the subcontinent shared by India and Pakistan are the major Asian power centers remaining outfide the

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Soviet orbit, If^ Japan, the principal component of a Far Eastern war-making complex, were added to the Stalinist bloc, the Soviet Asian base could become a source of strength capable of shifting

the balance of world power to the disadvantage of the United States.

t Should India and Pakistan fall to coffimunism, the United States and"

its friends might find themselves denied any foothold on the Asian

mainland.

7. While the military advantages of this position to the USSR are great, the general par Eastern situation also gives the USSR significant political advantages, in estimating the degree of political pressure that the USSR may exert from its present posi-

■

tion in Asia, it should be remembered that its proteges deal with Asiatic peoples who are traditionally"submissive to power when effectively applied and habituated to authoritarian government and the suppression of the individual. Moreover, the USSR In Asia as elsewhere with relatively little oyert interference In other states, at relatively small cost, and at limited risk, is able to give assistance and impetus to native communist movements. The political offensive of the Kremlin or its"proteges also tends to gather additional momentum as each new success Increases the vulnerability of the next target. *

8. Japan has ceased to bo a world power, but retains the capability of becoming once more 3 significant Asiatic power.

Whether its potential is developed and the way in which it is used will strongly influence the future patterns of politics in Asia. As a result of the occupation, Japan*o political structure has been

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basically altered? and notable steps have been taken toward the development of democratic institutions and practices. Despite these advances, however, traditional social patterns, antithetical to democracy, remain strong. The" demonstrated susceptibility of these patterns to totalitarian exploitation is enhanced by economic maladjustment which may grow more serious as a result of population increases and of obstacles to the expansion of trade .

9. Although, in terms of the Japanese context, an extreme right-wing movement might be more effective in exploiting tradi-tional patterns and current dislocations than one of the extreme left, a number of factors combine to make the threat of Communism a serious one. These factors include the close proximity to a

weak and disarmed Japan of Communist areas with the attendant

. opportunities for infiltration, clandestine support of Japanese

Communist efforts, and diplomatic pressure backed by a powerful threat; the potential of Communist.China as a source of raw materials vital to Japan and a market for its goods; and the existence in Japan of an ably-led, aggressive, if still relatively weak, Communist movement which may be able to utilize Japanese tendencies toward passive acceptance of leadership to further its drive for power while at the same time exploiting economic hardship to under-mine the acceptability to the Japanese of other social patterns that are antithetical to Communist doctrines.

■ •

10. Even if totalitarian patterns in Japan were to reassert themselves in the form of extreme right-wing rather than Communist domination, the prospect would remain that Japan would find more

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1 compelling the political and economic factors moving it toward accommodation to the Soviet orbit internationally, however anti-Communist its internal policies, than those that move it toward military alliance with the United States, Extreme right-wing domination of Japan, moreover, although loss immediately menacing to the United States than Communist control would represent a failure, particularly marked In the eyes of other non-Communist Asiatic countries, of a major United States political effort.

11. A middle of the road regime in Japan retaining the spirit

-

of the reform program, even if not necessarily the letter, would

in the long-run prove more reliable as an ally of the United States

than would an extreme right-wing totalitarian government. Under

such a regime the channels would be open.for those elements in

japan that have gained most from the occupation to exercise their

influence over government policy and to mold public opinion. Such

a regime would undoubtedly wish to maintain normal political and

#

economic relations with the communist bloc and, in the absence of

open hostilities, would probably resist complete identification either with the interests of the United States or the Soviet Union. The existence of such a regime, however, will make possible the most effective exercise of United States political and economic influence in the direction of ensuring Japan's friendship, its ability to withstand external and internal Communist pressure, and its further development in a democratic direction.

12. Tlie basic United States non-military objectives in Japan, therefore, remain the promotion of democratic forces and economic stability before and after the peace settlement, To further this

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objective the United States must seek to reduce to a minimum occupa-tlon op post-occupation interference in the processes of Japanese Government V7hile at the same time providing protection for the basic achievements of the occupation and the advice and assistance that will enable the Japanese themselves to perpetuate these achievements; provide further economic assistance to Japan and, in concert with its allies, facilitate the development of mutually beneficial economic relations between Japan and all other countries of the world; make it clear to Japan that the United States will support it against external aggression while at the same time avoiding the • appearance that its policies in Japan are dictated solely by con-r siderations of strategic self-interest and guarding against Japan*s *■ ^ exploitation of its strategic value to the United States for ends

n

contrary to United States policy interests; and promote the accept-

i ance of Japan as a peaceful, sovereign member of the community of

nations t •

13. The United States has taken the lead in assisting the

efforts of the Korean people to regain that independence promised them at Cairo. In'NSC 8/2, approved by the President on March 23,

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19*1-9, it was agreed that "if the significant gains made thus far, in terms both of the welfare and aspirations of the Korean people and of the national interest of the United States are to be consolic ed, the United States must continue to give political support and economic, technical, military and other assistance to the Republic of Korea." The principal objective of this policy is to strengthen that Government to the point where it can (1) succes;

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fully contain the threat of expanding Communist influence and control arising out of the existence in north Korea of an aggressive Soviet-dominated regime, and (2) serve as a nucleus for the eventual

peaceful unification of the entire country on a democratic basis,

i

14. It can be assumed that under present circumstances the

communists have the capability of dominating China* Communist domination of China is significant to the USSR primarily because it enhances USSR capabilities for obtaining Soviet objectives in Asia, Soviet ability to capitalize on the situation in China will depend on the degree of control that the Kremlin can exert over Chinese communist leaders, and on the control that the Chinese communists can exert over all elements of Chinese society. Development of these two varieties of control will not necessarily proceed in parallel. The formidable problems of overpopulation, limited and undeveloped natural resources, technical backwardness, and social and political lag which confront.the Chinese communists have contributed to the downfall of every Chinese regime in recent history. Chinese communist success in surmounting their internal difficulties might well be accompanied by a lessening rather than an intensification of their subservience to the Kremlin, Similarly Chinese communist failure to achieve an effective solution of China T s problems might drive the Chinese communists to depend more rather than less on the USSR* For the very immediate future it may be assumed that both Kremlin influence on the Chinese communists and Chinese communist control over China will grow more firm and that China will represent a political asset to the USSR in accomp-

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lishmcnt of its global objectives. But longer range development of

Kremlin influence over the Chinese communists will be subject to

the interplay of such presently unpredictable factors as Chinese

communist effectiveness, USSR policy toward the Chinese communists,

t

and the relations between the Chinese communists and the non-communist world. If the Kremlin should attempt to extend to China the pattern of political and economic control and exploitation that has characterized its relations with its European satellites, it is quite possible that serious frictions would develop between the Chinese communist regime and Moscow, Moreover, an attempt by the USSR to mobilize directly all Chinese resources in pursuance of its strategic objectives might well result in China's becoming more of a liability than an asset to the Soviet Union. The actions of the United States or of other Western powers cannot be expected greatly to weaken Chinese communist control of China in the foreseeable future, but may have infiuence on*the relations between the Chinese communists and the USSR, In fact, any attempt on the part of the United States openly to deny Chinese territory, such as Formosa to the communists would probably react to the benefit of the communists by rallying all the anti-foreign sentiment in China to their side, 15, Furthermore, action by the u. S. to occupy Formosa would inevitably expose the U. S. to charges of "imperialism" and seriously affect the moral position of tne U. 5, before the bar of world opinion, particularly in the Far East, at a time when the u. S. is seeking to expose Soviet imperialist designs on other nations. Such action would provide the Chinese communists with an irredentist

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1 issue for their propaganda against the U. S. and a cause which

would rally almost unanimous public sentiment behind them in China, / 16. It is not believed that denial of Formosa to the Chinese

.conanunists can be achieved by any method short of actual u. S..

< military occupation. As a CIA intelligence estimate of October 19,

19^9 (ORE 76-^9, concurred in by the intelligence organizations of

the Departments of State, Army, Navy and Air Force) states:

"Without major armed intervention, U. S* political, economic, and logistic support of the present Nationalist island regime cannot insure its indefinite survival as a non-communist base. Communist capabilities are such that only extended u. S. military occupation and control of Taiwan can prevent its eventual capture and subjugation by Chinese communist forces. Failing U. S. military occupation and control, a non-communist regime on Taiwan probably will succumb to the Chinese communists by the end of 1950."

17. In the light of the foregoing, and in view of the estimate of the JCS, reaffirmed in MSC 37/7 of August 22, 19^9, that "the strategic importance of Formosa does not justify overt military action. • •", it is believed that ,u. S. military occupation of Formosa, which would require concurrent responsibility for the administration of the Island, would not be in the U. S« national

-

interest,

18. On December 23, 19^9, the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated

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that events which have taken place in China have not changed their

i

above views (NSC 37/7/ dated August 22, 19^9). However, within these limitations, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that a modest,

w

ell-directed and closely supervised program of military advice and

assistance to the anti-Communist government in Formosa would be in the security interest of the United States, and should "be integrated with a stepped~up political, economic and psychological program

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pursued energetically in extension of present United States programs there.

19. In south Asia we are favored by the fact that communist groups and leaders played a minor part in the nationalist movements of the area, which attained independence through a peaceful transfer of power by the British. The present south Asian governments are non-communist and, except in Burma, are maintaining law and order and have good prospects of remaining in power for the next few years, Soviet and Chinese communist hostility and internal communist opposition, on the one hand, and friendliness and circumspection on the part of the United States, the" United Kingdom and the other Western powers, on the other, have during the past two years strengthened the Western orientation

of the south Asian government f

20, India and Pakistan, the pivotal nations of the area, inherited from the British well trained armies, a corps of experienced civil administrators, transport and communications facilities well developed by Asian standards, important agricul-

*

tural .and extractive industries, and a few large-scale processing

and manufacturing industries. They, and Ceylon, remain within

the Commonwealth and have significant military, economic and

cultural ties with the United Kingdom--as does Burma which chose

i to leave the Commonwealth.

21. There are, unfortunately, adverse factors which threaten the continued relative stability of south Asia. Active disputes between India and Pakistan and between Pakistan and Af, mistan,

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and suspicion of*India in varying degree among its smaller neighbors at the minimum impede essential regional cooperation, At the unlikely maximum, they could embroil the area in war* Internally, all the governments of south Asia are faced with the necessity of bringing to their peoples within the next few years at least some hope of improved economic and social conditions. Failing this, they may lose control to extreme groups of the right or the left.

22. Consideration of the foregoing unfavorable aspects of the south Asian situation together with the current reluctance of the area to align itself overtly with any "power bloc" leads to the conclusion that it would be unwise for us to regard south Asia, more particularly India, as the sole bulwark against the extension of communist control in Asia. We should, however, recognize that the non-communist governments of the area already constitute a

/ bulwark against communist expansion. We should accordingly exploit

every opportunity to increase the'present Western orientation of

> «

*

south Ar'a and to assist, within our capabilities, its non-communist governments in their efforts to meet the minimum aspirations of their people and to maintain (in the case of Burma to restore) • internal security,

23. The current conflict between colonialism and native independence is the most Important political factor in southeast Asia. This conflict results not only from the decay of European imperial power in the area but also from a widening political consciousness and the rise of militant nationalism among the subject peoples. With the exception of Thailand and the Philippines,

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he exercise of responsible power. The question of whether a

colonial country is fit to govern itself, however, is not always relevant in practical politics. * The real issue would seem to be whether the colonial country is able and determined to make continued foreign rule an overall losing proposition for the metropolitan power. If it is, independence for the colonial country is the only practical solution,, even though misgovernment eventuates, A solution of the consequent problem of instability, if it arises, must be sought on a non-imperialist plane• In any event, colonial-nationalist conflict provides a fertile field for subversive communist activities, and it is now clear that southeast Aisa is the -*- target of a coordinated offensive directed by the Kremlin, In

seeking to gain control of southeast Asia, the Kremlin is motivated

in part by a desire to acquire southeast Asla ? s resources and communication lines, and to deny ,then to us. But the political gains which would accrue to the USSR from communist capture of southeast Asia are equally significant. The extension of communist authority in China" represents a grievous political defeat for us; If southeast Asia also is swept by communism we shall have suffered a major political rout the repercussions of which will be felt throughout the rest of the world, especially in the Middle East and in a then critically exposed Australia. The United States should continue to use its influence looking toward resolving the colonial nationalist conflict in such a way as to satisfy the fundamental demands of the nationalist-colonial conflict, lay the basis for

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political stability and resistance to communism, and avoid weakening the colonial powers who are our western allies. However, it must "be remembered that the long colonial tradition in Asia has left the peoples of that area suspicious of Western influence* Ve must

• *

approach the problem from the Asiatic point of view in so far a possible and should refrain from talcing the lead in movements which must of necessity be of Asian origin. It will therefore be to our interest wherever possible to encourage the peoples of India, Pakistan, the Philippines and other Asian states to take the leadership in meeting the common problems of the area.

24. Although European influence has certainly declined

■

throughout Asia and European powers are no longer able fully to * shape the course of events in that part of the world, nevertheless the influence of such powers is by no means negligible. This is particularly true of the United Kingdom because of the advanced policies followed in Asia by that > nation since the end of the war. With the successful conclusion of the Round Table talks at the

■

Hague (for which this Government can claim preeminent credit) the Dutch will undoubtedly regain much of their lost popularity. It would be to the interest of the United States to make use of the skills, knowledge and long experience of our European friends and, to whatever extent may be possible, enlist their cooperation in measures designed to check the spread of USSR influence in Asia. If members of the British Commonwealth, particularly India, Pakistan, Australia and New Zealand, can be persuaded to join with the United

Kingdom and the United States in carrying out constructive measures

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of economic, political and cultural cooperation, the results will certainly be in our interest. Not only will the United States be able thus to relieve itself of part of the burden, but the cooperation of the white nations of the Commonwealth will arrest any potential dangers of the growth of a white-colored polarization.

25. With the rise of new nations and the decline of colonialism, a consciousness of common interests and a demand for regional

■

collaboration is beginning to take form among the countries of Asia. However, the wide diversity of political organization and development, the lack of a tradition of cooperation and a sound economic basis for large-scale mutual trade, and the suspicions with which

*

the weaker nations of Asia view the stronger } have all operated to

delay the formation of any regional organization up to the present. But efforts continue and will probably increase in tempo as the advance of Soviet influence becomes more and more a direct threat. As stated above the peoples of Asia are suspicious of the Vest and in any cooperation the United States may extend to a developing

*

regionalism it .will be necessary to do nothing which would excite further suspicion of our motives, Asian leaders have already taken the Initiative in this natter and it should continue to rest in their hands. There are many indications for example that India aspires to draw Ceylon, Burma and southeast Asia into a regional association. These aspirations are aided by the considerable moral influence which India enjoys throughout this area, derived from the great prestige of its revolutionary leaders and its position as the largest of the Asian dependencies to become independent of colonial

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rule. India has -'gained additional goodwill by its strong support of

I-

he Indonesian independence movement. Prime Minister Nehru is,

however, aware of the difficulties of creating an effective regional organization in south and southeast Asia, and is moving slowly and cautiously* Ke and other Indian leaders prefer that such an association develop from indigenous desires and would not look with favor upon attempts by outside powers to impose, or even too actively to foster, a regional organization of the area* United States interests would appear to demand that our sympathetic support be given to Asiatic leaders to the end that any regional association which may develop be one with which we could cooperate on equ&l terms and which would be in harmony with the UK Charter.

26. Asia is only one of several fronts on which tho United States directly or indirectly confronts the USSR. Pressures, or lack of them* on any front affect all the others. The fortunate circumstance of occupying a favorable geographic position both in Europe and in Asia allows the USSR great flexibility in the pressures it may apply. Operating from the center of the Eurasian continent it may advance or retreat in the east or in the west as the occasion demands. Because there is no longer a force either in Europe or Asia which can withstand without full United States assistance the power of the USSR if it shouid be unleashed, determination of the effective use of United States power, in its total sense, on any or all of its fronts with the USSR-European, Kear Eastern, or ' Asiatic--requires decisions based upon a constant and skillful re-evaluation of the costs involved and the probable results to be

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obtained in each-oase, both in the event of war and its probable afterjaath, and in the event of continued peace. The United States for its part must be able to apply pressure on fronts at tines of = its own choosing rather than spreading itself thin in reacting to

every threat posed by the Soviets if it is not to lose the advantages of the initiative In the struggle between the Soviet world and the free world. Mobilization of our cold war potential and implementation by effective techniques is essential.

■

27. United States ability to exert counter influence against the Kremlin in Asia rests on U. S. ability to provide economic assistance and cooperation to Asiatic countries; on preservation

and development of the u. S. traditional reputation as a non-imperialistic champion of freedom and Independence for all nations;

■ •

on the frictions which will arise between Asiatic nationalisms and USSR Imperialism; on U. S. cxiltural and philanthropic contacts in Asia; on U. S, ability to exert constructive influence on the European Far Eastern colonial powers and to gain assistance from these powers in the Far East; on U. S« military power, and on the U, S. strategic position in the Pacific, Appropriate development and utilization of these U. S. assets in Asia through effective diplomacy and propaganda will naturally increass the influence which the United States can now bring to bear to check the USSR in that

area,

28 # It must be remembered, however, that helping Asiatic countries to resist USSR pressure is not something we can do by our own policy alone. We will depend for success on interaction between

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'•'J

our

our

/policy and what already exists in the way of will and ability to resist on the part of the Asiatic countries themselves. It must

+

also be borne in mind that the sweeping changes which have been

taking place in Asia since the war ha\se been stimulated in very

i considerable part by the determination of the peoples of Asia to

control their own destinies and to redress the grievances of the

past which they associate with foreign rule and foreign influence.

Intervention in their affairs, particularly by the Western powers,

however well-intentioned, will of itself be suspect and be likely

to result in the undoing of the very interests which prompted the

intervention. In the conflict between the u. S. and the USSR, the

advantage in the long run in Asia is likely to rest with the side

V , which succeeds in identifying its own cause with that of the Asian ■

peoples and which succeeds in working in harmony with the dominant motivating forces in Asia today and in influencing these forces rather than attempting by direct 03? impatient methods to control them.

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Strategic Considerations

29. The potential pover of Asia is strategically significant

a

both to the United States and to the USSR because of its capacity in

■

the long run to affect the relative military strength of these tvo countries and hence the character of military operations in the event of var between them. Translation of the Asian'pover potential into military strength vould require development of each of its elements--organization and training of manpower, exploitation of natural resources, development of sea transportation, improvement of communications and further industrialization--as veil as their integration to-vard coordinated objectives. Even given the most favorable atmosphere for development, including the pover to consolidate as neces-

- sary, the authority to divert channels of trade, and the military

force required to protect long sea routes and other lines of communication—the full development of Asia's potential pover is a long-term affair. In the pover potential of f Asia, Japan plays the most import-ant part by reason of its industrious, aggressive population, providing a large pool of trained manpower, its integrated internal communications system with a demonstrated potential for an efficient merchant marine, its already developed industrial base and its strategic

■

position. Because of Japan 1 s economic importance in Asia, of the extreme vulnerability of Japan to blockade, of the long period required under the best of circumstances for the development of significant strategic potential in Asia, and of the hazards involved in attempts to harness Chinese potential to Soviet ends, there exists no serious dancer that the USSR vlll in the near future be able to undertake mil-

itary aggression based on Asia's strategic potential.

* .

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*

30. The location of Asia, contiguous to the USSR and separated from the United States, presents different strategic implications, both offensive and defensive, to the United States and to the USSR. The Asian power potential is more■valuable to Russia than to the United States, since American industrial power is so much greater than Russian, The industrial plant of Japan vould be the richest strategic prize in the Far East for the USSR, For Japan and major Asian raw-material producing areas, together with the necessary transportation lines, to be controlled by the Soviet Union would add measurably to the war-making potential of the USSR, Russia could

not, however, quickly build up a powerful self-sufficient war-making

*

complex in Asia without access to and control over Japan and could

not effectively mobilize Japan in war without a larger merchant

fleet in the Pacific than the USSR and Japan are likely to have for

/ years to come. Other Asiatic assets of potential value to Russia i

include soybeans, tin, rubber, and*South China 1 s tungsten. Petro-

leum coring from Indonesia including Borneo, while not essential to

meet Russian domestic requirements, is one of the most important

■

'strategic materials 4 in the region.

31. The strategic value of Asia to the United States rests on three considerations: In the first place denial of USSR control over Asia might prevent the acquisition by the Soviets of elements of power which might in time add significantly to the Russian war-making potential. Secondly, to the degree that Asian indigenous forces develop opposition to the expansion of USSR influence, they would assist the U. S, in containing Soviet control and influence in the area,

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possibly reducing- the drain on the United States economy. The indigenous forces of Asia, including manpower reserves, would also be a valuable asset, if. available for the support of the United States

■

in the event of war. Thirdly, Asia is a source of numerous raw ma-terials, principally tin and natural rubber, which are of strategic importance to the United States, although the United States could, as in World War II, rely on other sources if necessary.

32. Since, from the military point of view, the primary stra-

■

tegic interests and war objectives of the United States consistent with the aim of destruction of the enemy's means to wage war are not now in Asia, the current basic concept of strategy in the event of war with the USSR is to conduct a strategic offense in the "West" and a strategic defense in the "East 11 • In keeping with this basic concept and in light of the strategic interests of the United States and the USSR as developed above, certain principles may be stated. As a primary matter in the event of war, it is essential that a successful strategic defense in the "East" be assured with a minimum expenditure of military manpower and material in order that the major effort may be expended in the "West". In order to gain freedom of access to the Asian continent within these limitations, the United States must now concentrate its efforts on bringing to bear such power as can be made available, short of the commitment of United States military forces, in'those areas which will show the most results in return for the United States effort expended. In addition the United States must maintain a strategic position which

will facilitate control of coastal and overseas lines of communica-

tion in Asia.

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•

33. From the military point of view, the United States must maintain a minimum position in Asia if a successful defense is to be achieved against future Soviet aggression. This minimum position is

considered to consist of at least-our present military position in

the Asian.offshore island chain, and in the event of war its denial

to the Communists. The chain represents our first line of defense

and in addition, our first line of offense from which we may seek to

reduce the area of Communist control, using whatever means we can

develop, without, however, using sizeable United States armed forces.

The first line of strategic defense should include Japan, the

Ryukyus, and the Philippines. This minimum position will permit con-

trol of the main lines of communication necessary to United States

strategic development of the important sections of the Asian area, i

Economic Considerations

I l - i-lii ■ ■■!-■■ i" " ' ta * I I ■■—■■■ ■ 1" ^

I

3^ t Except for industrialization in Japan and to a lesser extent in India, Asia is basically an agricultural region. Pressure of population on the land has depressed living standards to the margin of subsistence. Communications and transportation facilities are poor and productivity is low. However, Asia is the source of important raw -and semi-processed materials, many of them of strategic value. Moreover in the past, Asia has been a market for the processed goods of industrialized states, and has also been for the western colonial powers a rich source of revenue from investments and other invisible ,

earnings.

35. The United States has an interest in the attainment by the

free peoples of Asia of that degree of economic recovery and develop-

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merit needed as a foundation for social and political stability. This

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interest stems from the principle that a viable economy is essential to the survival of independent states. In the two major non-Communist countries of this area, India'and Japan, U. S, aid (direct in the case of Japan, and via convertible sterling releases in the case of India) Is averting a deterioration in economic conditions that vould otherwise threaten political stability. While scrupulously avoiding assumption of responsibility for raising Asiatic living standards, It Is to the U. S, interest to promote the ability of these countries to maintain, on a self-supporting basis, the economic conditions prerequisite to political stability. Japan can only maintain its pres-

ent living standard on a self-supporting basis if it is able to se-

needed cure a greater proportion of Its/food and raw material (principally

cotton) imports from the Asiatic area, in which its natural markets lie rather than from the U. S., in which its export market is small. In view of the desirability of avoiding preponderant dependence on Chinese sources, and the limited availability of supplies from prewar sources in Korea and Formosa, this will require a considerable increase in Southern Asiatic food and raw material exports.

36. The Indian problem is somewhat analogous: The sizeable post-war Indian dollar deficit may be traced largely to this country's unprecedented dollar food imports. These imports have been necessitated by the failure of Indian food production to keep pace with population growth and to the reduced post-war availability of food exports from India's soft currency suppliers in Southern Asia.

Even with these significant dollar food imports, Indian food con-

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-sumption has fallen belov pre-war levels* - A further decline vould almost certainly produce serious political instability in the major cities of India. A serious problem vould thus result if the U. K. were no longer able to bear the burden of the convertible sterling

/

releases that have so far met the Indian dollar deficit.

37. It is thus difficult to foresee a time at vhich Japan and India will be self-supporting in the absence of greatly increased food production and some increased cotton production in Southern and South- " east Asia. One major prerequisite to such an increase is the restora-

tion of political stability in the food exporting countries of Burm and Indo China. Given such a restoration, perhaps as much as 2,5 million more tons of rice exports could be secured from these coun-

a

'""xtries vith only minimal loans for rehabilitation of damaged facilities, e.g., transportation. Another major prerequisite is expanded agricultural development in the stable Southern Asiatic countries in -vhich such development vould be economic: India, Pakistan -- vhich exports vheat and cotton, Thailand — vhich exports rice, and Ceylon -- vhose sizeable rice imports reduce the availability of Asiatic foodstuffs to India and Japan. Japanese and Indian food requirements, and Japanese cotton requirements, could be met if certain projected irrigation reclamation, and transportation projects vere executed in the above countries,

38. These projects vill probably require: (i) a more effective mobilization of local resources by the governments concerned, (ii) some external technical aid, (iii) some limited external financial aid. Most of the countries in question are nov taking steps to

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.mobilize local resources more effectively in the agricultural field, and they should be encouraged along these lines. External technical aid should "be made available under the Point IV program. The external financial aid required is of such a limited character that it can

i

probably be adequately provided by the International Bank and the

Export-Import Bank, Ve should, therefore, continue to urge these institutions to give serious consideration to requests for loans to finance sould development projects that vould increase agricultural production in India, Thailand, Pakistan and Ceylon, This encourage-ment should, of course, be vithout prejudice to other additional loans . these institutions may vish to make for non-agricultural purposes to

*

these countries. • " / -^ 39, Expanded agricultural development in Southern and Southeast Asia vould make a contribution to the political stability and the welfare of the exporting, as veil as the importing countries. Through increased sales of rice, vheat, anjl cotton, Thailand and Pakistan could most economically secure the imports of capital and consumer goods to develop and diversify their economies. A comparable effect vould be felt in India and Ceylon, if increased food production en-

i

abled these countries to reduce the disproportionate amount of foreign exchange that they presently devote to the purchase of food

imports,

i|0. Our interest in a viablb economy in the non-Communist countries of Asia vould be advanced by increased trade among such countries. Japanese and Indian industrial revival and development can : ^contribute to enlarged intra-regional trade relations vhlch suffered

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; -a set-back because of the economic vacuum resulting from the defeat of Japan, the devastation caused by the war in other areas and the interference and restrictions arising from extensive governmental

*

i controls. Given a favorable and secure atmosphere--plus adequate freedom to individual traders, readily available working capital, suitable commercial agreements establishing conditions favorable to commerce and navigation and general assistance in the promotion of trade—it Is expected that a substantial Increase in intra-Asia trade can occur* The patterns of such trade, however, may differ from those existing before the war. In any event, a strong trading area • among the free countries of Asia would add to general economic devel-

opmant and strengthen social and political stability. Some kind of /^regional association, facilitating interchange of information, among the non-Communist countries of Asia might become an important means of developing a favorable atmosphere for such trade among themselves and with other parts of the world.,

^1 # Asia, particularly South and Southeast Asia, are among the

■

1 principal sources of United States imports of several basic commodities which could contribute greatly to United States security for stockpiling purposes and would be of great assistance in time of war if they remained available to us. Exports to Asia from the United States are of less importance than are imports, but are not now in-significant and could.grow in importance to the stability of our own domestic economy. In brief, the economic advantage derived by the United States from our trade with non-Communist Asia is considerable x and there is little doubt of the wisdom of its development.

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I 42, One effective means available to the United States for as-

sisting in economic development, particularly in Southeast Asia, is I " to enlarge, consistent with security considerations, and despite pos-sible objections of U. S. competitors, the orderly and sustained pro-curement, both by private and public agencies, of strategic and other basic commodities, such as tin, hard fibers and particularly natural rubber. United States purchases of strategic materials on current account would represent an important source of dollars for use by Asian countries in and outside the sterling area in meeting their current and capital needs,

43. The USSR is the primary target of those U. S. economic pol-icies designed to contain or turn back Soviet-Communist imperialism,

-a

"'' and not China or any of the Soviet satellites considered as individual countries. It would, therefore, be Inappropriate to apply to the willing or unwilling partners of the USSR punitive or restrictive economic measures which are not being applied to the USSR itself. This guiding principle should be the point of departure in applica-tion of procedures for conduct of our economic relations with Communist China. It should be our objective to take steps to prevent the

Soviets and their satellites from obtaining, via trans-shipment in

* the Par East, strategic goods now denied them through direct channels.

It should also be our objective to prevent Chinese Communists from

obtaining supplies of goods of direct military utility which might be

/

used to threaten directly the security interests of the western powers in Asia, It is not, however, either necessary or advisable to re-

strict trade with China in goods which are destined for normal civil-

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Ian uses within China provided safeguards are established to accomp-

lish the two objectives mentioned above. Three reasons exist for this position: (l) Japan's economy cannot possibly be restored to a self-sustaining basis vithout a considerable volume of trade with China, the burden of Japan on the United States economy cannot be re~ 1 moved unless Japan's economy is restored to a self-sustaining basis and U. S. interference with natural Japanese trade relations with

■

China wou_d produce profound Japanese hostility; (2) permitting trade with Communist China in goods destined for normal civilian end uses within China, will enable us to obtain quantities of important commod-■'ities needed by the U. S. (e.g,, tung oil, bristles, tungsten, anti-mony etc.) and might contribute to internal economic and political

Vvtensions between the urban and rural sectors of the Chinese economy, and permit China to choose between a Soviet and a Western orientation in their foreign economic relations; and (3) restriction of trade for any purpose other than those indicated by the objectives outlined above would be ineffective and impractical in view of the existence of alternative sources of supply in other countries which will not cooperate in export controls affecting normal trade with China, The U. S, should seek the cooperation of friendly countries in exercising export controls to achieve the objectives indicated, and request SCAP

*

to conform to our general policy in this respect, While SCAP should be requested to avoid preponderant? dependence on Chinese markets and sources of suDply he should not be expected to apply controls upon Japan's trade with China more restrictive than those applied by Vest— - / rn European countries in their trade with China. At the same time,

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. SCAP should encourage development of alternative Japanese markets elsewhere in the world, including Southern and Southeast Asia, on an economic basis. Notwithstanding the advantages of the permissive trade policy outlined above, there would be no advantage for the United States to extend governmental economic assistance to or en-courage private investment in Cor^munist China.

•

CONCLUSIONS 2}4 # Our basic security objectives with respect to Asia are:

a. Development of the nations and peoples of Asia on a stable and self-sustaining basis in conformity with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter,

b. Gradual reduction and eventual elimination of the pre-ponderant power and influence of the USSR in Asia to such a de~ gree that the Soviet Union will not be capable of threatening from that area the security of the United States or its friends and that the Soviet Union would encounter serious obstacles should it attempt to threaten the peace, national independence and stability of the Asiatic nations.

c. Prevention of power relations;. Ivjs in Asia which would e.nable any other nation or alliance to threaten the security of the United States from that area, or the peace, national independence and stability of the Asiatic nations,

i-5. In pursuit of these objectives, the United States must en-courage n on-Communist forces to take the initiative in Asia, must exert an influence to advance its own national interests and must take

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NOTE BY THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

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on

THE POSIT ION OF T HE D ili TED- STATES WITH R ESPECT TO ASI A

Reference:' NSC W/l

I )

At its 50th Meetingj vith the President presiding, the Rational Security Council, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Acting Secretary of Commerce, and the Acting Economic Cooperation Administrator, discussed a report on "The Position of the United States vith Respect to Asia" (NSC 40/l), and adopted the Conclusions contained therein subject to amendments at the meeting and to further amendments subsequently agreed upon by the Departments of State and Defense. The

Conclusions as revised are enclosed herewith.

<

The National Security Council, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Acting Secretary of Commerce, and the Acting Economic Cooperation Administrator, recommend that the President approve the Conclusions contained herein and direct their implementation by all appropriate Executive Departments and Agencies of the U. S. Government under the coordination of the Secretary of State,

SIDNEY V. S0UER3 Executive Secretary

cc: The Secretary of the Treasury The Secretary of Commerce The Economic Cooperation Administrator

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REPORT BY THE. NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

on THE POSITION 0? THE UNITED STATES WITH RESPECT TO ASIA

i CONCLUSIONS

1. Our "basic security objectives vith respect to Asia* are:

a. Development of the nations and peoples of Asia on a stable and self-sustaining basis in conformity vith the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter,

b. Development of sufficient military pover in selected non-Communist nations of Asia to maintain internal security and to prevent further encroachment by communism. .

c. Gradual reduction and eventual elimination of the pre ponderant power and influence of the USSR in Asia to such, a degree that the Soviet Union vill not be capable of threatening from that area the security of the United States or its friends and that the Soviet Union would encounter serious ob-

3 stacles should it attempt to threaten the peace, national independence ' and stability of the Asiatic nations,

+

d. Prevention of power relationships in Asia which vould enable any other nation or alliance to threaten the security of the United States from that area, or the peace, national independence and stability of the Asiatic nations,

2. In pursuit of these objectives, the United States should ct to: • ■ , ■

a. Support non-Communist forces in taking the initiative in A"siaj

b. Exert an influence to advance its own national interests; and

c. Initiate action in .such a manner as vill appeal to the Asiatic nations as being compatible vith their national interests and worthy of their support.

For the purposes of this report "Asia" is defined as that part of the continent of Asia south of the USSR and east of Iran together *fith the major off-shore islands —Japan, Formosa, the Philippines, I Indonesia and Ceylon.

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* As the basis for realization of its objectives, the United ' ci 4«-. "should pursue a policy toward Asia containing the following

a. The United States should make known its sympathy with the efforts of Asian leaders to form regional associations of non-Communist states of the various Asian areas, and if in due course associations eventuate, the United States should be prepared, if invited, to assist such associations to fulfill their purposes under conditions which would be to our interest. The following principles should guide our actions in this respect:

(1) Any association formed must be the result of a genuine desire on the part of the participating nations to cooperate for mutual benefit in solving the political, economic, social and cultural problems of the area.

(2) The United States must not take such an active part in the early stages of the formation of such an associa tion that it will be subject to the charge of using the Asiatic nations to further United States ambitions.

(3) The association, if it is to be a constructive force, must operate on the basis of mutual aid and self-help in all fields so that a true partnership may exist based on equal rights and equal obligations.

(4) United States participation in any stage of the development of such an association should be with a view to accomplishing our basic objectives in Asia and to as-; suring that any association formed will be in accord with

\ Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations dealing

with regional arrangements.

[ b. The United States should act to develop'and strengthen

i the "security of the area from Communist external aggression or

internal subversion. These steps should take into account any ] benefits to the. security of Asia which may flow from the de-

velopment of one or more regional groupings. The United States on its own initiative should now:

(1) Improve the United States position with respect to Japan, the Ryukyus and the Philippines.

(2) Scrutinize closely the development of threats from Communist aggression, direct or indirect, and be prepared to. help within our means to meet such threats by providing political, economic, and military assistance and advice where clearly needed to supplement the resistance, of the other governments in and out of the area which are more directly concerned.

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t (3) Develop cooperative measures through multilateral

or bilateral arrangements to combat Communist internal subversion.

(*0 Appraise the desirability a,nd the means of developing in Asia some form of collective security arrangements, be&ring in mind the following considerations:

(a) The reluctance of India at this time to join in any anti-Communist security pact and the influence this vill have among the other nations of Asia,

(b) The necessity of assuming that any collective security- arrangements vhich might be developed be based on the principle of mutual aid and on a demonstrated de-

■ sire and ability to share in the burden by all the participating states,

(c) The necessity of assuring that any such security arrangements would be consonant with the purposes of any regional association vhich may be formed in accordance with paragraph 3-& above.

(d) The necessity of assuring that any such security arrangement would be in conformity with the provi-) sions of Article 51 of the Charter relating to individ-

ual and collective self-defense.

I c. The United States should encourage the creation of an

• atmosphere favorable to economic recovery and development in

} non-Communist Asia, and to the revival of trade along multilat-

'* eral, non-discriminatory lines. The economic policies of the

United States should be adapted to promote, where possible,

j economic cpnditions that will contribute to political stability

L in friendly countries of Asia, but the United States should

j carefully avoid assuming responsibility for the economic welfare

I and development of that continent. Such policies might be pro-

: jected along the following lines:

5 ^8/2

(1) Vigorous prosecution of the Point IV program in friendly countries of Asia, in an endeavor to assist them, by providing technical assistance, to make a start toward the solution of some of their long-range economic problems.

-

(2) Maintenance of a liberal United States trade policy with Asia and stimulation of imports from Asia. The special problems concerning trade with China are treated in paragraph 3-f-(^) below.

(3) Execution of a stockpiling program for strategic materials, based upon United States needs for strategic

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reserves and upon Immediate and long-range economic effects in the supplying countries.

(k) Negotiation of treaties of friendship, commerce and navigation vith non-Communist countries of Asia to define and establish conditions facilitating capital movements, trade and other economic relations between them and the United States. {

(5) Encouragement of private United States investment In non-Communist countries and support of the early extension of credits by the International Bank and the Export-Import Bank for specific key economic projects of a self-liquidating nature, especially those directed towards increasing production of food in this area.

(6) Efforts t tries to the prlnc trade as embodied Trade, as a means the International an economic basis, efforts to secure ment for Japan.

o obtain the adherence of Asiatic coun-iples of multilateral, non-discriminatory in the General Agreements on Tariffs and of reducing trade barriers and expanding and intra-regional trade of the region on

This would include, for example, further the benefits of most-favored-nation treat-

d.

_ The question of a peace settlement with Japan, nov receiving separate consideration, will be presented for the consideration of the National Security Council at a later date and policies vith respect to Japan vill be re-evaluated after the decision regarding a peace treaty has been made.

e. (l) The United States should continue to provide for "the extension of political support and economic, technical, military and other assistance to the democratically-elected Government of the Republic of Korea

*

(2) The United States should therefore press forward with the implementation of the EGA, MDAP, USIE and related programs for Korea, and should continue to accord political support to the Republic of Korea, both within and without the'framework of the United Nations.

f ( (l) The United States should continue to recognize the National Government of China until the situation is further clarified.** The United States should avoid recognizing the Chinese Communist regime until it Is clearly in the United States interest to do so. The United States should, continue

.

* KSC _ B/2, approved March 23, 19^9• '\ *'* HSG 3V2.

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to express to friendly governments its own views concerning the dangers of hasty recognition of the Chinese Communist regime but should not take a,stand which vould engage the prestige of the United States in an attempt to prevent such recognition. In general, however, it should he realized that it vould he inappropriate for the United State? to adopt a posture more hostile or policies more harsh towards a Communist China than towards the USSR itself. It should also be realised that the according of recognition by other friendly countries vould affect the bargaining position of the United States in the absence of United States recognition and i^ould affect United States private and national interests in China. In the event that recognition of the Chinese Communists is anticipated, appropriate steps should be taken to make it clear that recognition should not be construed as approval of the Chinese Communist regime, or abatement of our hostility to Soviet efforts to exercise control in China.

(2) The United States should continue the policies of avoiding military and political support of any non-Communist elements in China unless such elements are willing actively to resist Communism with or without United States aid and

* unless such support vould mean reasonable resistance to the

Communists and contribute to the over-all national interests a of the United States.* In determining whether or in what

manner any such assistance or encouragement should be given, consideration vould have to be given to the protection vhich Chinese Communist authorities, as they become generally recognized by other governments, vould be able to claim under

; international lav and the Charter of the United Nations,

The United States should maintain so far as feasible active contact with all elements in China and maintain our cultural and informational program at the most active feasible level.

(3)

The United States should exploit, through appropriate political, psychological and economic means, any rifts between the Chinese Communists and the USSR and between the Stalinists and other elements in China, while scrupulously avoiding the appearance of intervention. Where appropriate, covert as veil as overt means should be utilized to achieve I - these objectives.*

(4) The United States should, as a security measure, ! seek to prevent the USSR, its European satellites, and North

i Korea from obtaining from abroad through China supplies of

1 strategic materials and equipment vhich are currently denied

them by the United States and its European allies through

* NSC y^/27

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direct channels. The United States should also use every effort to prevent the Chinese Communists from obtaining from non-Soviet sources supplies of materials and equipment of direct military utility U-4 items). The United States should, on the other hand, permit exports to China of IB items within quantitative limits of normal civilian use and \ under controls which can be applied restrietively if it be-1 comes necessary to do so in the national interest, and 'should place no obstacle in the way of trade with China in "non-strategic commodities. The United States should seek the support and concurrence of its principal European allies in these policies. The United States should not extend governmental economic assistance to Communist China or encourage private investment in Communist China.

g, (l) The United States should continue the policy set forth in NSC 37/2 and 37/5 of attempting to deny Formosa end the Pescadores to the Chinese Communists through diplomatic and economic means within the limitations imposed by the fact that successful achievement of this objective will primarily depend on prompt initiation and faithful implementation of essential measures of self-help by the non-Communist administration of the islands, and by the fact that

freedom of U, S. diplomatic and economic action vill be influenced,, necessarily, by action taken-by other countries

(2)

Since the United States may not be able to achiev

its objectives through political and economic means, and in

view of the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (reaffirmed in NSC 37/7 of August 22, 19 J 19) that, while Formosa is strategically important to the United States, "the strategic importance of Formosa does not justify overt military action

• • •

so long as the present disparity between our military

strength and cur global obligations exists", the United States should make every effort to strengthen the over-all U* S. position with respect to the Philippines, the Ryukyus, and Japan. The United States should, for example, proceed apace with implementation of the policy set forth in regard

to the Ryukyus in paragraph 5 of

SC

13/3.

h, The United States should continue to use its influence in .Asia toward resolving the colonial-nationalist conflict in . such a way as to satisfy the fundamental demands of the nationalist movement while at the same time minimizing the strain on the colonial powers who are our Western allies. Particular attention should be given to the problem of French Indo-China and action should be taken to bring home to the French the urgency of removing the barriers to the obtaining by Bao Dai or other non-Communist nationalist leaders of the support of a substantial proportion of the Vietnamese. With the successful conclusion of the Round Table Conference at The Hague the United

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States should give immediate consideration to the probl tns confronting the ne\i Republic of United Indonesia and how best it can be aided in maintaining its freedom in the face of internal and external Communist pressures,

jU Active consideration should "be given to means by which all members of the British Coinmonwealth may be induced to play a more active role in collaboration with the United States in Asia. Similar collaboration should be obtained to the extent possible from other non-Communist nations having interests in sia.

j[* Recognising that the non-Communist governments of South Asia already constitute a bulwark against Communist expansion in Asia, the United States should exploit every opportunity to increase the present Western orientation of the area and to assist, within our capabilities, its governments in their efforts to meet the minimum aspirations of their people and to maintain internal security,

k. The United States should undertake an information program, both foreign and domestic, and publish United States policies and programs vis-a-vis Asia designed to gain maximum support both at home and abroad,

1, Nothing in this paper shall be construed as amending approved NSC papers unless a specific statement to that effect has been made on each point.

ar-

m. The sum of $75,000,000 for assistance to the general ecL of China, which was made available under Section 303 of

the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 19^9, should be programmed as

a matter ox urgency.

.

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