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- The Elmbassy^s Lack of Political Cont act

The shifts of political loyalties, coups, rehellions, and major changes of public figures often caught the Embassy by surprise. It had no effective system, either through overt or covert contacts, for finding out what was going on. CAS people talked to a few official contacts, vAo told them things the Vietnamese wanted the U.S. to believe; but CAS had and has no mandate or mission to perform systematic intelligence and espionage in friendly countries, and so lacks the resources to gather and eva].uate the large am.oujits of information rectuired on political forces, corruption, connections, and so on. Moreover, there is no sign that the Embassy understood events after the fact, or saw the connection between what we did and what the Vietnam.ese did next. It appears that the U.S. had few people experienced at maneuvering and manipulating among oriental ■ politicians.

In the following cases the Embassy was in the dark. (l) We had no inform.ation on the degree of truth of Khanli^s charges against the four "pro-neutralist" generals plus Minh, and we knew about his coup a day in advance only because he sounded us out on it. (2) During the m_onths of maneuvering between lOianh and Minii after the coup, we had no way to evaluate the coup rujnors that aD.ways went around, and that peaked around mxoments of crisis like the trial of the four genera],s in May. (3) Khanh^s complaints of Vietnam^ese war-weariness starting in late May, in retrospect a transparent tactic to pressure the U.S. to bornh North, took in the USG completely: we ^^ eagerly went ahead and planned to bomb "to improve their unity and resolve. ■^ . (k) lO^anh^s defiant leaks on cross-border operations in July surprised and

perplexed the Embassy; Taylor described them as an attempt to iraprove his own people's morale, not as an attempt to stampede us. ^ (5) When Khanh asked for our public endorsement and then talked about "reorganization," we failed to see the connection. Iften he tried to reorganize Minh out of the govern- _ ment, Taylor made no move to save Minh until after street rioting had broken up the whole plan. (6) The September 13 coup attempt surprised everybody. (7) The HNC decision to make Suu President and Huong Trlm.e Minister surprised and angered us. (8) Taylor's December plan to strengthen GVN by lecturing to it about its failures provoked a completely unexpected reaction; both Buddhists and the military turned against the GVN. Taylor's subsequent stern lecture to the Young Turks likewise produced the opposite of the desired result.

1(9) The generals' January, I965? moves to renege on the agreed crisis settlement and to dismiss Huong surprised us. (lO) The February 19 coup attempt surprised everybody. (ll) We did not know v/hat to think of the alleged coup attempt in May, I965.

In some noteworthy cases we did better. (l) Taylor correctly foresaw that Khanh's August' constitution would cause trouble. (?-) Westm.oreland I ■ detected Ky's budding coup attempt in November and, with Embassy authority,

squelched it. (3) Te^ylor foresaw (and tacitly accepted) the Ky coup.

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

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The ^MCV Role

The MA.CV organization played an important^ mostly hidden, role in US/GVN relations. At every level from Saigon to the districts, the advisory structure was the most pervasive instrument of intergovernmental contact. ARW officers were accustomed to being spoon-fed military advice; so when military dominance of GVN brought these same officers to high positions in governraent, the advisor relationship conferred a latent diplomatic role upon MACV. Advisors were used as chanjiels of communications on political matters and became the most reliable sources of inform.ation on irapending coups. (On occasions such as the Rhade uprising and Ky's first attempt at a coup, senior MCV officers openly became diplomatic emissaries.)

We have less record than we would like of COfflSMACV's influence. He -reported regularly to his military seniors only on strictly military matters: Detailed reports of his routine, daily dealings wj.th counterparts were not required of MACV as they were of the Embassy.

From time to time COi'.:iISKA.CV revealed his own independent objectives. He sought protection of the ARW officer corps from political machinations, and from unfavorable press stories in order to preserve their solidarity and morale; he pressed zealously for early introduction of U.S. ground forces and for their rapid build-up; he opposed encadrement and combined command with ARVN; he resisted exclusion of the military from pacification; he rejected sanctions against ARVN; he objected to the initial constraints on the use,of Am^erican forces and wanted to be free to operate independently of ARVN.

General Westmoreland's strong position usually assured that his view prevailed. Extension of advisors, increased MP resources, and the introduction of U.S. groimd forces enhanced Ms relative position. His freedom _ from detailed reporting of daily contacts was itself an element of strength. When he received unwanted advice and directives, he set up studies (as in the Civic Action Frogra.m) to stall for time; when he lacked authority to operate freely, he planned ahead with the Vietnamese (as in the use of U.S. forces for independent offensive operations) and then presented the matter to Washington as a virtual fait accompli.

Vietnam_ese Non-Perfo rmance and Sensit ivity

Throughout this period the GVN failed to perform in alt'/iost every constructive respect.' Pacification lagged, when not visibly retreating, I ■ even though the .GVN was always willing to issue decrees, set up organiza- . I tions we suggesbed, and so on. Khanh's promise to m^obilize cam.e to nothing.

The VC defeated A,RVN in bigger and bigger battles, until the military ■ assessment of the situation permitted Westmoreland to call for over 200,000 U.S. troops.

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

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Moreover, on issues purportedly relating to sovereignty or "face," the Vietnamese were and are quite sensitive, and the U.S. was consistently afraid to infla,me this sensitivity. Both sides avoided many delicate topics. A prime example is the matter of the lack of a bilateral treaty. The U.S. operated, and still operates, -umder a Pentalateral protocol signed by the French and Bao Dai under the U.S. military assistance program to France before 195^* It gave U.S. advisers and officials virtual diplo-■ matic status, which was reasonable back v/hen there were less than two hundred of them in all Indochina. But it now applies to all U.S. personnel^ and no one has wanted to stir things up. - _

The sensitivity problem cropped up often. ' For a tme early in 1964, the GVN backed off from, an agreement to extend U.S. advisors to district level, and when G-VW did approve, they insisted that the advice be strictly military and that.the advisors be labelled "subsector." In like manner, the III Marine Expeditionary Force becajae the III Marine Amphibious Force, because the French had called their Indochina force "expeditionary." But the GVN, and especially the military, agreed readily to new U.S. troop commitments.

The Vietnamese would often greet a U.S. representative, in moments of tension, vrith false or exaggerated stories of U.S. dealings, such as a complaint in January, 1964, about U.S. training and CIA contacts with the Cao Dai and Hoa Hao. In contrast, on cabinet appointm.ents they often asked I ^^ the Ambassador's opinion, and he customarily leaned over backward to avoid (^ giving specific recommendations. Shared sensitivity, closely related to

the lack of a treaty governing status of U.S. forces, prevented any move toward joint command and U.S. control of all m.i:]ltary operations in Vietnamj both Westmoreland and the Vietnamese preferred to operate separately. The Embassy looked the other way from repressive police measures and political arrests unless these led to embarrassing jjTess stories. "When the Ambassador ■ ' would raise this tj/pe of issue with the GVN, it proved always to be touchy.

■ Vietnamese sensitivity sometmes led to open displays of anti-Americanism. These happened on three main occasions: (l) when Khanh grum_bled about being a puppet after the go-North leaks in July, 1964; (?.) in the open rupture between Khanh and Taylor in December-January; and (3) in the January riots when rioters overran USIS buildings in Saigon and Hue. ^

Vi etnamese Compliance Mo re in F orm Than in Sub stance

The Vietnamese nevertheless showed a ready willingness throughout the period to declare new policies, sign decrees, and engage in joint studies at our request. But as noted above, that did not mean we got the substance of what we wanted on such m.atters. The most mportant case of this kind was iai.anh's ready agreement in March to "m.obilize" South Vietnam. He promjjtly ■ made a token: announcement; and while students and other potential draft-eligibles v.^aited anxiously to learn what he m,eant (as did we), he delayed

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several v^eeks before any f\irther aiinouncement. Starting in May, he began announcing specifics and signing decrees, and kept the idea live for several months. Hov/ever, strength of the RVKAF rose less in 196^ than it did in 1963"^"? and the talk of non-military mobilization came to nothing.

The military and the more militant civilians, on whom the U.S. counted most heavily and regularly supported, turned out to have far more enthusiasm for going North Qjn.d for other external adventures than they did for getting on-with the Job of effective government and pacification. They promised much on this latter score, but could not or would not deliver. Knowing that we had no one else to tvxn to^ they continued their old habits and often openly did what they pleased about important matters. The go-North problem was particularly troublesome because the militants rejected the permanent division of Vietnam at the 17th parallel, upheld in practice by -the U.S.

The following are interesting instances, among many^ of their superficial compliance. They agreed readily to use U.S. advisers at the ministerial level (the brain trust), although there is no sign that the brain-trusters accomplished anything. Indeed, on all ten suggestions that accompanied President Johnson's I96U New Year's Message to Minh, only the one on amnesty foujid them hesitant to express their full agreement. They regularly agreed on budgetary limits to keep inflation from getting out of hand, but never satisfied us on specifics through 1964 or the first half of 1965. They repeatedly agreed to relieve ineffective^ corrupt comjnanders and officials, but delayed endlessly on doing it and generally promoted those whom, they relieved. At VJestmoreland's request, Kiianh created the Hop Tac plan for pacification around Saigon; but it foundered, and eventually the Vietnamese killed it. VJhen Lodge left Vietnam in June, 196^-J, he sealed his tour v/ith a genera..l agreement with Khanh on concept, scope, and organization of the pacification efforts; obtaining such agreements preseiited absolutely no problem. In December, 1964, the JGS issued a directive containing every MA.CV suggestion on how RVMF should help pacif j.cation.

■X- The end-year figures .e.re as follows:

South Vi etnaiTi 1962 I963 1964

Infantry-type Battalions IO7 123 I33

RVNAP Strength ('OOO) 397 514 571

Total Armed Strength ('OOO)

(incliided CIDG, police, etc.) 526 6l2 692

SOURCE: OSD SUA Statistical Summary, Tables 1 and 2

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

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In July 196^, Khanh created a National Security Council similar to ours, and/it met regularly with the top group of Embassy people to talk agreeably about pacification and manpower problems. MACV set up •oint inspection teams and joint studies with JGS people several tames a tear '^ The only thing of this class that had any visible follow-through wal th; joint plan:oing group on bombing North and on other cross-border operations. Q^o battalions specifically declared meffectxve by M/ICV suffered no penalty or improvement.

The m.ilitants' predilection for external adventures began to show in Mav 196)1, after the Embassy started pressing Khanh about hris March apreements with"McNamara. Khanh responded within, a few days by saying he wSted to declare war, bom.b the North with U.S. participation, brxng 10 000 U S Army Special Forces troops into South Vietnam, get rid of the politicians,^ and put Saigon strictly on a war footing. Lodge ;;;-.f f°^-°\^^ him off. but Khanh brought up a less extreme version again with Rusk at tne end of "the month, saying that his government could not win without action outside South Vietnam. When Lodge returned from the Honolulu Conference in early June, Khanh responded to discussions of ARVN strength by trying to dra;fLodge'out on actions against the North. Then, when we ^-^^^l^^l^ fast enough to suit him and Ky, they started a press campaign on ^^^^f .^2'' and pressed Taylor more insistently. Finally, in Deceniber, when laylor told GVN all the many ways they should improve to justi.fy further U.S. I'^jol]^" Tent, their imi>iediate reply included the comment tliat the U.S. program said nothing about Viet Cong use of Cambodia.

The press leaks about going North were the first major instance of their defiantly going ahead as they pleased against our wishes. Khanh s August constitution was a less flagrant case, because Taylor's words of caution • Terf comiSatlvely diffident (Moreover, in the following August-September turbulence, Khanh let himself becom_e clearly dependent on the Embassy when he tak d to the Buddhist leaders.) In the ^-^-^-^'■'^';^^l^^^ defied Taylor at every turn following their dissolution oi the HNC and after a temporary agreement in January double-crossed Taylor, dismissed Huong and took «)ntrol of the formation of a new government. They guessed correctly that we saw no choice but to go along. .

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

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EVEirr OE DOCmiEET

DESCRIPTION

1 Jan 6h

I

10 Jail 6^!-

30 Jan 6^

' 13 Feb 6k

21 Feb 6^1-

21 Feb 6^

8 Mar 6k

20 Mar 6k

k Apr 6k

10 Apr 6^1-

29 Apr 6k

30 Apr 6h-

State to Saigon 1000 30 Pec 63

Lodge to State 1287 10 Jan

Saigon to State 1^33 30 Jan

Memorandxim to Secretary of State

COMUSMACV to CINCPAC 25IOJ-S-Z Feb. 6^

Saigon to AID 233^ 21 Feb

SD PM 16 Mar Sec. Ill;, and

Memorandwn of Conversation. at JGS Hqtrs. 12 Mar

17 Mar 6k NSAIvl 288

White House Press Release

State to Saigon 1602 k Apr

Saigon to State I96U 11 Apr

Saigon to State 2089 30 Apr

Saigon to State 2091 30 Apr

President's Nev/ Year'-'s message to Minb contains reassiirance; advice also rendered-Brain trust approved.

Lodge and Miinh discuss President's advice agree they're doing fine except on anrnesty. GW backs away from previously agreed extension of advisors to districts.

Khanh seizes pov/er^) arrests four top generals of MRCj but lets Minh continue as President at USG urging.

Rostov recommends enforcing NVN complisxice with 1962 Geneva agreenent.

GVN accepts advisors in 13 districts of the Delta»

GVN asks USG for rice standby commitmient^j for the first tim-e.

Secretary McNamara arrives in Saigon for several days of taikSj including talks with GWe Goes away pessimistic^ recommends more AID and larger RWAF^ plus uacru.alified backing for Khanh. Khanh promises mobilization «

President approves Secretary of Defense recommendations5 directs their execution.

Vniite House annoujices Khanl'i's mobilization plan.

Mobilization decree^ dissolution of Council of Notables5 promise of eventual Constituent Assembly and civil goveriiment.

Beginning of AID and related economic negotiations for fiscal I965.

KliaBh renews request for brain trust: Lodge euphoric,

USOM and GVN badger each other on pacif j.ca-tion and economic delays. .

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TOP SECRET ™ Sensitive

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

TOP SECRET " ..Sensij^ive

h May 6^ Saigon to State

2108 k May

13 May 6h Saigon to State

2203 '^-^ May

Saigon to State DTG 271200Z May

Memorandum to President

13-27 May. oh

25 May 6h

Khanli W8Jit>s to bomb NYN^ have 10,000 US troops, and set up all-military government in SVN. Lodge says no^ no, yes,

McNamara sees Kb.anh in Saigon; they reach agreement on desirability of progress.

ForrestaJ. of t^ite House staff "negotiates"

AID -with GVN, gives GYN All) increases.

McGeorge Bundy recoiranends force against ]\n/¥ as the only path to success.

27 May 6h

I

28-^ May 64

30 May 64

2-3 Jvji 6h

29 J VII

64

30 Jvn 64

State to Saigon 1251 18 Feb.

Saigon to State 2332 and 2338

28 May

CINCPAC to State 37 2 Juji

Mem,o for the Record, Special Meeting on SE Asia. CINCPAC 000211 DTG 8 J-un and Memo for Secretary (State) "Highlights of HonoluJ-U Conference" from ¥„ P. Bimdy DTG 3 J-uii

4 Jvxi 64 Saigon to State

2405 4 Jun

COMUSiMCV Command History 1964, p. 69.

COMUSMiACV OIIO57Z JuJ.

8 Jul 64 Saigon to State

56 8 Jul

SuJLlivan distributes proposal for semd-encadrement of GVN as a necessary step for progress.

MRC censLU'es four "neutralist Plot" genereJ.s that had been arrested in Khanh coup. Keeps Mnh, as urged by Lodge. ■

Rusk sees Khanh, leaves nothing to the imagination on possible US aj-l^-the-way commitment, stresses need for GVl^ unity.

Honolu-lu. Conference. Conferees (include Rusk, McNaniara, Lodge, Taylor ajid Westmoreland) agree on increased advisory effort, agree to refine plans for pressures on KVl^I.

Lodge hints to Khanh that USG will prepare US public opinion for actions against W^fN.

AID sets up sector adviser fund, with troika signoff to bypass GVN-Saigon.

US and GW agree to joint plsmning for cross-border operations Jn Laos.

Ambassador Taylor presents his credentials to Khanh.

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f-iirf.^ —t-***—'-"-'

-.^^wmj.. -fc^TTWi,-. cv-:.?r»^-1w««^--.

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

TOP SECRET " Sensitive

9 Jul 6U

17 Jul 6h

19 Jul 6U

23 Jul 6h

2k Jul 6^

25 Jul 6h

2 A Aug 6^1-

7 Aug 6U

8 Aug 6U

12 Aug 6U

l6 Aug 6'

l8 Aug 6h

21-27 Aug 64

Saigon to State

65 9 Jul-

Saigon to State 124 17 J-ul

Saigon to State 185 23 Jv^

Saigon to State 185 23 J-uJ_

Saigon to State 203 2k Jvl

Saigon to State 232 27 Ju-1

Shaplen^ ]->o^ Revolution ;) p, 269

Shaplen, Lost Re volu tion; p." 270

COMlJSIvlACV to CINCPAC DTG 080715^ Aug

Saigon to State 393 12 Aug

Saigon to State

■6

415 15 Aug

Shaplen^, Lost Revolution;, pp. "270-71

Shaplen^j Lost Revo luti on^ pp." 272-75^.

Arnbassador Taylor hears the complaints of civilian cabinet memhers.

USOM starts periodic meetings with GW^s IMational Secujrity Council.

Khanh and Ky lo"b"by publicly for cross-border operations and air strikes into Laos and

MN.

Khanh presses Taylor for action^ keeps up the lobbying.

Khanh asks Taylor if he (Khanh) shovld resign; Taylor says no. Khanh asks for publicly stated US backing and gets it.

Khanh promises to quit lobbying, reacts favorably to proposed Joint planning for air strikes on NVN^ and says he plans GW reorganization.

GnJ.f of Tonkin incidents^ US retaliation.

Kh.anh proclaims state of emergency, with press c ens or ship.

Westy and Khanh discuss Joint planning, agree not to discuss combined comjnand.

Khanh's "reorganization" is a new constitution with military openly on top, and with Khanh President. Taylor sceptical, counsels caution.

Khanh gets MRC approval of constitution after hurried USOM drafting assistance.

Ambassador Taylor firmly recommends plazis for gradual press'U-res North to start 1 January contingent on improved GVN performance, or not contingent if things get bad enough. Suggests the package include Marines at Danang.

Student dem^onstrations followed by general riotins.

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

TOP SECRET " Sensitive

2.h Aug 6^

25 Aug 6^

29 Aug 6^

.6 Sep 6h

Saigon to State 5^2 2k Aug

Shaplen^ Lost Revolu tion; pp. 27^^-75

27 Aug 6U Shaplen, Lost

Revolution5

•<l»J-p*'-»^i^ -

pp. 275-78

State to Saigon 555 29 Aug

Saigon to State 785 8 Sep

Taylor advises Khanh to move fast on new^ cabinet.

One o'clock A.M. Taylor advises Khanh to make sorae concessions but keep constitution Khanh does 8.nd riots continue. Khanh "resigns." Rjots continue.

MRC revokes constitution, keeps Khanh now as meirlber of temporary triumvirate (including Minh and Khiem.) New PMC to be appointed.

Paratroopers with bayonets restore order in Saigon. ■

Taylor takes off on a trip to Washington. Recomjiiends pressures on FVN to begin 1 December.

10 Sep 6^

13 Sep 6U

20 Sep 6^t-

2k Sep 6k

30 Sep 6k

27 Oct 6^

NSAM 31^ 10 Sep

Shaplen^ Lost Revolution^ pp; 287-290; Saigon to State 836 13 Sep; Saigon to State 878 16 Sep

Shaplen, Lost Revolujfcion, p.290; Saigon to State 923 22 Sep; 936 23 Sep 937. 952, and 95^-2k Sep; 985 29 Sep; and 10^6 7 Oct. COIviaSMCV to CINCPAC DTG O3II37Z Oct

Saigon to State 938 2^1- Sep

NTTimes Article

Says strengthen GW

Abortive coup attempt temporarily captures Saigon. ' Ky and Thieu back Khanh^ defeat coun forces.

Saigon to State 1292 27 Oct; ~ State to Saigon 9!]!^ 29 Oct. Shaplen Lost Revolixtion,

pp. 290-9-

Rhade tribesmen in k CIDG caraps rebel against GYE.

The new HNC begins deliberations to write a constitution.

W. Bvindy predicts publicly that bombing KVN woul-d cut down the threat to G-TO in a matter of months.

hTMC finishes on tim^e, surprises by naming Suu President5 not Minh.

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

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30 Oct 0\

11 Nov 6^

26 Nov 6^

7 Dec Gh

8-20 Dec Gh

(^ 20 Dec Gh

21 Dec Gh

23 Dec

Gh

2I4- Dec Gh

25 Dec o

ck

Shaplerij Lost E^TOlutiori_5^ P • 293; State to Saigon 978 1 Nov; CINCPAC to JCS DTG 020^-1-OOZ Nov; Saigon to State 1382 2 Nov

Saigon to State 1^1-52 and ^hGO 10 Nov

C01^^^SM_ACV to

CINCPAC

DTG 02609^5^ Nov

Embassy to State AirgraiJi A-^68 15 Dec

Shaplen, Lost Revo lution3

pp, 29^r-.95

Saigon to State 1869, 1870, an.d 187U 20 Dec; MACV to CINCPAC

rec'd Nice 2008l6Z

t

J

Dec

Saigon to State 1881 21 Dec

Saigon to State I91U 23 Dec; 1929 and 1930 ?A Dec

Shaplen, Logt Revolution5

ip^ 29^-97.

COjWSMACV Command Kistory 1965, p. 229.

Mortar attack on Bien Hoa airbase. State. rejects Taylor^s recommendation of iiximediate reprisal raid on NYN'.

MRC publishes military reorganization without MACV review; MACV protests and MRC withdraws it for changes.

Westmoreland slaps Ky down just before apparent coup attempt, Taylor is in Washington.

Taylor, just back from Washington with fresh guidance, presents GVN with a candid statement of its failures and couples deman.ds for progress in stated areas to promises of US escalation. ' . .

Student and Buddhist demonstrations against Huong government and growing crisis.

Khanh and Generals disregard Taylor's protests, dissolve HNC and arrest opposition; "Young Turcks" (Ky, Thieu, Thi and Gang) condolidate their dominance by creating a small Armed Forces Council (APC) as the top governing body. Taylor reads them the riot act .

Taylor asks.Klianh to resign and leave the country.

Young Turks attack Taylor publicly, an.d privately seek his recall.

Taylor tells press that Kianh has outstayed his usefulness.

Vietnam.ese JGS issues Directive A-B 139? at mCV request, on how RVNAF should be employed to improve pacification program

XIV

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

TOP SECRET " Sensitive

^^ 7 Jan 65

9 Jail 65

11 Jan 65

12 Jan 65

' \k Jan 65

18 Jan 65

19 Ja.n 65

\

19-2^ Jan 65

27 Jan 65

3„I[. Feb 65

Saigon to State 2081 7 Jan 2089 8 Jan 2102 9 Jan

Shaplen, Lost Revo lutio n, pp. 297-:"

Saigon to State 2112 and 2120 11 Jan

Sb.ap3-en^ Il£?t Revolution, pp. 298-99

Saigon to State 2155 1^ Jan

Saigon to State 2176 18 Jan

COWSMCV to CINCPAG DTG

1912352 Jan

Shaplen, Lost Revol ution, pp. 298-99

25 Jan 65 Saigon to State

2276 and 2283 25 Jan

Shaplen, Lost R^valutdon., pp 7 299-302; Saigon to State 2322 27 Jan; State to Saigon 15^2 27 Jan and 1565 29 Jan

Saigon to State 2399 h Feb

i\FC GenereJ-S decide to give way by restoring civilian government under a nev7 name (i.e. ■without HI^C) leaving Suu-Huong combination in

With Taylor's reluctant concurrence, the AFC announces the 7 January decision.

US and GVN publicly patch up relations. Young Turks will enter cabinet.

Nev/ demonstrations begin, demajiding Huong's resignation.

Khanh shows Taylor a new cabinet list; Taylor tries to slow him down.

Khanh gives Taylor completed cabinet list an,d schedules installation for the next day.

Khanh tries to reasstire Westmoreland on military repercussions of tying up som-e genera3.s in the cabinet; then Khanh suddenly "postpones" cabinet installation.

Buddhist demonstrations build up, including sacking of USIS buildings in Saigon and Hue. Buddhist merchants respond to campaign to boycott Americans. Buddhists demand military taJke-over.

Khanh tells Deputy Ambassador Alex Johnson that Huong and Suu v/ant to resign and let the military talie over. Johnson says no.

AFC topples Suu-Huong government, openly-puts Khanh back in charge. JCS approves' COMUSIMCV request to use US jet aircraft in a strike role in-country in emergencies, subject to i'lrnbassy approval in each instance

McGeorge Bundy visits Saigon, has tea with Klianh and the generals..

XV

TOP SECRET - Sensitive

^

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

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TOP SECRET " Sensitive

(3 7-12 Feb 65

7 Feb 65

Shapleiij Lost Revolutio n, pp. 305-6 State to Saigon 1^38 6 Eeb; Saigon to State 2^1-26 7 Fe"b 2^-95 11 Feb

Memorand-uiri to the l^esident

Flaming Dart boriibings in North Vietnem. All US dependents ordered to leave Vietnam.

McGeorge Bujidy sa.ys the military are the backbone of the country, tha.t the Buddhists should be constructive, and that Vietnaxa needs a social revolution.

16 Feb 65

18 Feb 65

20 Feb 65

2k Feb 65

Saigon to State 2617 16 Feb

Shaplen, l£st Revolut ion, pp. 306-7

19 Feb 65 Sha.plenj Lost

Re voluti on, pp. 307-T2

Shaplen, Ij ost R^voliit i on, pp. 307-12

Saigon to State 2685 20 Feb; 2698 22 Feb; 2720 23 Feb; 2731 2U Feb; and COMaSMiiCV to CINCPAC PTG 2^l600Z Feb

After two false starts, AFC selects Quat to form a new cabinet.

Quat cabinet installed; Buddhists a.cquiesce

New coup groups seizes Saigon^ then bows to superior AFC force.

AFC votes I^anh out.

Khanh goes abroad; Rolling Thujider rolls.

c

27 Feb 65

Saigon to State 2787 27 Feb .

USOM resumes action level meetings with GM; voth sides agreed to prepare proposals for accelerating pacification and to go forward top:ether with effective execution.

c^

28 Feb 65

Saigon to Sta.te 2800 1 Mai'

State issues V^Jhite Paper on Vietnam,

w>

6 Mar 6^

c

8 ViBX 65

COMaSlylACV Command History;, 1965, p. 132

Saigon to State 2991 8 Mar

MACV gives budget guidelines to RVN Ministry of Defense.

Quat discusses sensitive co]i^bined-cornmand isstie with Taylor.

XVI

TOP SEGEET - Sensitive

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8-9 Mar 65

26 Mar 65

1-2 Apr 65

15 Apr 65

17 Apr 65

19-20 Apr 65

5 May 65

20-21 May 65

22 May-12 Jvn 65

27 May 65

12 Jun 65

Saigon to State

2908 1 Mar

2^ ¥i8X 65 Saigon to State

2065 2k Mar

C0I4USMCV Commander 's Estimate of the Situation 26 Mar

NSA14 328 6 Apr

15 Apr 65 Saigon to State

3^a9 17 Apr

DOD 916^4-15 Apr

.^

Saigon to State 3^421, 3^22 and 3U23 17 Apr

ASD McNaughton's Minutes of Hono3.u]_u Meeting 23 Apr

Saigon to State 3097 and 3100

26 Mar; and 21^0 31 Mar

Saigon to State 3878 25 May

Shaplen^ Lost Revoluin^on^

ppT" 3^42-^115

Joint State/ Defense 80^66

27 May

COWSMACV MAC

J"3, 19912 to

CINCPAC DTG

I20828Z Jun

Two "battalions of Marines land at Danang.

Ambassador Taylor formu3.ates a ^-1-point program for stability and pa.cification.

Westmoreland issues Commander *s Estimate of the Situation^ -which treads lightly on combined-command issue.

Taylor (in Washington) talks to President and NSC5 who approve Taylor's Ul-point program and General Johnson's 21 recommendations,

Taylor objects to proposed Peers mission.

The 7"Point message from State/Defense tells Saigon to encadre RWAF/GVN and to expect additional US forces;, with ne"w missions.

Taylor objects to 7-point message, and " Westmoreland objects to eucadrement.

HonoluIl.u Conference meets to resolve disagreements on 7-point message. Conferees agree on force increase and medcap, scuttle encadrement, and agree on studies of

combined command.

AFC dissolves itself.

Abortive coup attempt alleged by QYR^ though not finriy confirmed by US observers.

Suu-Quat disagreement on cabinet changes.

State/Defense message agrees to defer approaching GVN on combined corumand.

Westmoreland presses for commitment of US forces to offensive operations^ has already plaiined it hand-in-hand with our Vietnamese ally.

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12 Jun 65

Shaplen, Lost

Revolution,

pp. 3^-^5"^6.

Saigon to Sta.te

1^065 ^1- Jun, ^119 9 Jun 4156 11 Jun5 I4I9O l^l- Jun, U312 21 Jun.

create

Generals fire Suu and Quat, National Leadership Council of ten Generals chaired by Ihieu, and make Ky 'Prime Minister. Taylor reluctantly acquiesces to Ky*s appointment.

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US-GVN REIATIOES, 19^1:^^^-J^±

Page

I.

AFTERMATH OF THE DIEM COUP, First Half_of_196^

1. 2.

3.

h. 5.

6. 7.

The Inheritance from I963

The First Kinh Government Goes Down

The USG accepts Khanh and opens the

Bidding Against the North

McWamara's March Trip and NS.AM 288

Opening bids on advice, leverage, and

AID, April-May

The political climate and prevailing views

of the wax. May

The Honolulu Conference and Its Follow-iip,

June, 196'4

1 .1

5 8

10

17 19 25

II. AlffiASS^OR TAYLOR' S_J3TvST_SEJENJ05THS^^

For '""Bornb'¥orth"""Araid Turbul ence j^nj^jie_South

1. Taylor's Initiation, July, 196'+

2. The Tonkin Incidents and the policy prognoses, August ■

3. .The Ri.se and Fall of Khanh's Constitution i+, GVN acquires a civilian flavor, and the

USG reviews priorities

5. The KMC goes to work amid further turbulence

6. The HWC installs civilian leadership, Octobcr

7. A quiet November

8. A Lecture and A Program for GW

9. The Government's support vanishes, and Taylor confronts the generals

10. Ongoing programs, Second Half 196U

11. January, I965: Prelude to the Bombing

31 31

39

kl ■5

h^-

kG U8 50

60 63

Til THE US ENrERS_TI^J^ffir_J;"'lamijigJ)8£;^^

" ■■ '■ " " Infiujf of US Forces, June I965

65

fi

1. 2. 3-

5. 6,

"Phase II" "begins and coups continue,

February. 19^5

The cop.tlniurg civilian interregnum and first US ground forces^ Meirch-May First moves on coimnand and control,

March"April

The rise and decline of encadrernentj April The Honoliau Conference^ April 19-20, 19^5; encadrenent and coKibined corni-iiand fade out The Ky coupj June 19^5

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66

68 70

72 75

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AFTERMA-TH OF jj^^ZgJl,COUg First Half of 196k

1. The Inherit ance From I963 - ■

Tli-e top ruling body of the Government of Vietnam at the end of 1963 was a Military Revolutionary Council of twelve generals, mider^^the^^ chairraan,sb.1p of the affs-ble and popular but seak General Du.ong Van "Big" M3nh. The Council governed through an all-civilian cabinet headed by Premier Tho, having forbade all military officers to engage in polj.tics. A Council of Notables served as a pseudo-parliament, with a purely advisory role; it included well-knov/n Vietnamese politicia,ns, but could not claim support of a broad popular base or the main political forces' in Vietnam. While Premier Tho's previous conn.ection with the Diem government was now a political liabj.lity, there was a shortage of national figures who were not tarred with this brush one way or another, l/

^^ ' On the U.S. side, General Harkins, COMUSimCV, who had long been

known to be pro-Diem, was clearly on his way out, although his de-parture was to be delayed until the middle of 196^4. Ambassador Lodge had replaced Kolting just before the Diem coup, and was held in that cautious respect appropriate to the widespread belief among Vietnam^ese that he had engineered

it.

In the last weeks of I963, the U.S. government reassessed the progress of the counterinsurgency effort and the policy options. Plans for pha.sed withdrawal of 1,000 U.S. advisers by end-1963 went through the motions by concentrating rotations hom,e in December and letting strength rebound in the subsequent two months. A realistic appraisal by Secretary McWamara showed that the VC were continuing to gain steadily, especially in the Delta. 2/ U.S..policy continued to be to provide U.S. resources and personnel to the extent necessary. 3/

The tone of USG internal documents and of its dealings with GVN was that of a benevolent big brother anxious to see little brother make good on his own -- but with the benefit of extensive advice. U.S. pressure induced the GVH to break up the palace guard and to move coup-protection Ranger units out into the countryside, though j,t turned out that other units stayed near Saigon for this purpose. A proposal to put all arrmiunition stocks jn Vietnam under U.S. control surfaced in November, only to sink without 8 trace, k/ There was gentle pressare to persuade the GVN to allow USOM e-oiiomics staffs to share the offices of. their counterparts^ and to let r ^hem get involved extensively in qvN budgeting. 5/ The USlS and Ambassador

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LdFe trJed to persuade General Minh to travel aroimd the countryside to build a followJng and convince the people that the government cared about them but with little success. 6/ The overall USG appraisal was that the GW was weak and drifting at the^-top level, fail.ing to set firm national policies and to issue detailed instructions, and that at lower levels it was' in complete taxrmoil because of the turnover of personnel following ' the coup and because of the lack of firm national leadership. 7/

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Vfeether to push the GVN harder was a subject of disagreement between State and Ambassador Lodge. The St,ate view was that the GVN must prove its resolution to adopt economic, social and political measures to suiport the effort against the VC, and must move tox-rard self-support. Moreover, State said:

"We will obscure the actual need for GVN adjustments if we yield too easily at this stage to GVN pressure for . more commercial iHiport aid." 8/

In contrast. Lodge said it was essential

"to provide some increase in overall level of economic aid...Tt is in my view politically unacceptable and psychologically impossible to tell Big Mini that he is going to get less than Diem." 9/

Besides wanting to go easy on the GVN on aid [Leverage, he opposed p.ressure ( ' for early elections. Lodge's position li.s clear from the Honolulu Conference

(November I963) Report, which stated;

"The Ambassador...considers it essential that the U.S. not press the new goverm-nent \induly. He stated that they are in a"most delicate state, and are not ready for a system which repl-aces goA/'ernm.ents by elective process rather than by violence; that this is beyond their horizon at this time and we should not seek to recreate in Vietnam our image of the democratic ideal."

Early in January, 1964, Lodge restated this view in a cable:

*

^'It is obvious that /tlie Vietnamese generals/ are^all we have got and that we must try as hard to make them^inbo successful politicians as we are trying to m^ake them Into successful military men/' 10/

Behind these differences within the UHG a.-nd hetween the USG and the GVN lay a certain nack of confidence in fXiture hehavior. Some in the U S wer-e concerned that the GVN mAght drift towo.rd a "neutralism like that of"Laos, i-l/ At the same time, the GVI feared the U.S. would nego-tjate behind its back or force it to accept an unfavorable settlement. 12/ ■ These concerns made it appropriate for the President to issue his New Yearns greeting tc the GVN:

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"As \7e enter the New Year of 196^[-5 I want to v/ish you, your revolutionary government, 8.nd your people full success in the long and arduous war vrtiich you are waging so tena.ciously and bra.vely against the Viet Cong forces directed and supported "by the Coirniiunist regime in Hanoi,..Qui* aims are. 1 know/ identical v/ith yours: to enable your governiuent to protect its people from the acts of terror perpetrated "by Coiriinunist insurgents from the North. As the forces of your government become increasingly capa.ble of dealing vrlth this aggression, Americs^n military personnel in South "Viet-Nam ce.n be progressively with-dra.vm.

"The United States Goveriiment sha^res the view of your govermnent that * neutralization' of South Viet-Nam is unacceptable. As long as the Corrmiunist regime in North Viet-Nam persists in its aggressive policy, neutralization of South Viet-Nam v^ould only be another na.m.e for a Communist ta.ke-over. Peace will return to your country just as soon a^s the" authorities in Ha.noi cease and desist from, their terrorist Svggression."

In keeping with the a/ctitude of concern but not. alarm about the GVN's conduct of the war, SecSta/te's ca.ble tra.nsmitting the President's j message directed Lodge to offer the following eleven points of confidential advice on behalf of the President: ,

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"1. It is vita.lly Imiporta^nfc to a.ct now to reverse the trend of the war as rapidly as possible.

2. We trust that personnel changes are now virtually complete and that both malitary commanders and province chiefs can now get dowa to the job at hand.

3. We hope that General Mlnh ca.n designate a Chief of the Joint General Staff and a. comjinander of the III Corps who will ha.ve no other responsibilities and can devote them,selves exclusively to these ma^minoth tasks.

k. We assum.e that, a.s Genera.1 Don promised Secreta.ry

McNamara,.the GVN will make available sufficient troops in the six key provinces ixi the III Corpus to give its forces the necessary numerical superiority.

5- We have been glad to learn of the stress which General Minn places on smiall-un.lt auctions, particularly in the Mekong Delta. We hope that eq,ual stress vrlD-l be placed on night actions, both for ambushing Viet Cong a.nd for relieving villa.ges under attack. To win the support of the popule/clon it needs to be emphatically dem-onstra.ted that the Viet Cong are being bea^ten precisely at their own game.

6. We consider it extremely mportant that the necessary civll-m.llitary coordinating machinery for clear-and-hold operation

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followed Iry an effective program to give the villages protection and secujrity tie established in Saigon.

7. It is llkev7ise extremely important that program directives" be issued at an early stage by the central government to lovrer echelons for proper implementation of all aspects of the program for giving villagers protection.

8. We also urge early revitalization of the amnesty program.

9. We are encouraged by the exploratory talks which the Vietnamese Government has held with Cambodian Government officials for improving relations between the two couji- ■ trJes. We hope that both Governroents can proceed to actual negotiations for the settlement of their bilateral problems.

10. We accept with pleasure General Minli's Invitation to set up an American brain-trust to work with his government and we are prepared to furnish any personnel needed for this J purpose. ■ . ■ ■

11. Genera.]. MinJi can also be sure' that he has the complete support of the United States Government as th^ leader of Vnet-Wam. We believe he can magnetically rally the Vietnamese people if he will really try to do so. He should be told leadership is an essential political ingredient of _ victory such as was the case with Magsaysay in the Philipp-ines. i^

In thas overall context the U.S. had already moved discreetly toward greater invo.lvement in Vietnamese adm.inistration at lower levels. Tate in 1963, the USG and GVN agreed on a "Decentra-lization ol Action mcha.-e. Using AID de facto control of AID comiodities to the province level"(even though they"passed to Vietnamese ownership at the doc.^j, U.b advisers could assure that no AID comodities came out to the province with-:'! their consent. Ihey could_and did extend ^Ms control to cover releases of these commodities from province warehouses. U.S. officials controliea the distribution of AID commodities because they controlled all Saigon warehouses set aside for these commodities, even though the warehouses, like the comm.odities, belonged to the Vietnamese. '\}\]

Among the many problems that were to keep recurring was that of freedom of the press. FoLlowing an ini.tial honeymoon period after the coup! trouble broke out between GVN and the U.S. press corps. This reached ^ a cfimax with the temporary barring of the We^. 121^. J line s from Vietnamese aistr^bution channels when it ran a story reporting dissension among the VletSmese Generals. 15/ In general, Lodge sided with GVN on this issue, Isshown m his reported views at the November, 1963, Honolulu Conference:

"The U.S. press should be induced to leave the new government alone. They have exerted great influence on

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events in Vietne^m in the past^ and ca,n be expected to do so again. Extensive press criticism^, at this Juncture^ could be disastrous."

On January 1^ I96U5 there vrere 15591^ U.S. military pers-onnel in South Vietnam. Fever than 2,000 of these were advisors to RVME, but the advisor structure extended down to ARVN line battalions, and advisors accompanied conibat units on operations. YjJ The MA.P budget for South Vietnam in FY I96U v/as $3-75 million, although it was expected that an additional $12.5 million would be required before the end of the year. 18/

In s^ummary, the USG-^s decisions near the end of 1963 started modest changes in our Vietnam programs. Program levels held even, and earlier hopes of immediate phasedown faded. The USG moved toward more involvement in Vietnamese day-to-day administration^ particularly at the province level. The move v;as gentle, and stopped far short of a takeover; nothing of the sort was contemplated at that time. The USG was sceptical of GVN^s leadership and administration at all levels, and continued to offer extensive and detailed advice, but had no drastic policy changes in mind.

2• The First Mirjli GovGrnjnent Go es Down , January,___196'i

The year began with increasing Vietnamese criticism of the Minh government. It had done little to gain popularity in the country, and felt the sting of accusations of discrimination from both Buddhists and Catholics. Buddhists attacked Prme Minister Tho, v/ho was Vice President under Diem. Catholics accused the GVN of hamng gone too far to placate the Buddhists in reaction to repressions under Diem, There were also accusations of secret negotiations with the French to neutralize South Vietnam. I9/

A spate of news stories about U.S. advisor disgust over ARVN^s timid attitude towa^rd combat provoked a cable from State to Saigon asking the Ambassador to prevent such stories in the future. (This standard phrase meant to tell the advisors to stop talking to the press.) Thus the Department aligned itself with Lodgers vievr of bad press stories, which emphasized news silence rather than corrective emotion. 20/

The Lodge idea of making politicians out of the members of the Military Revolutionary Council translated into a. plan for them to send out carefully watched political action teams, (He also suggested ways for the gene};als to improve their speech-making style.) For example, he proposed there should be three tea^ms of eight men each in each district of Long An Province. He pressed the MRC to produce a program along these lines with priority attentioji to security. "The workers would be technically government employees, but most of the work they will do would be what we would call political work/' On the U.S. role, he said, "U.S. personnel should inspect, without ].ooking as though they were doing it, and see to it that a very high standard is set." 21/

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When discussing general objectives^ Lodge and Ms tea.m got on smoothly with GVN. In a meeting with a-11 the top members of General jyfinh's government early in January to discuss the eleven points transmitted with President Johnson's New Year's greeting^ they persudaded Lodge that they were moving effectively on all points except n-omber 8, relating to amnesty. This one evoked little enthusiasm, bnt they said they had it binder study. 22/ The USOM team, that discussed economic policy matters with GVN economists with the objective of limiting the GVN budget deficit and drawing down its dollar balances found them willing to talk frankly and-to exaxaine alternatives freely. GVN was also willing to set up joint . working coimnittees to analyze the budget, the import progra,m, and agri-ciatural policy. However, the U,S. team found that getting jointly agreed bench mark da,ta and a clear line of authority for policy actions "may yet prove difficult/' 23/

Moreover, a snag developed on the previously agreed plan to extend U.S. advisors to district level. In a one hour meeting January 10 between Ambassador Lodge and General Minh and other top Vietnamese officers and officials. General Kim stressed the extreme undesirability of Americans going into districts and villages. It would play into the hands of the VC and make the Vietnamese officia]„s look like lackeys. There would be a colonial flavor to the whole pacificatJ^on effort. Minh added that even in the worst and clumsiest days of the French they never went into the villages or districts. Others present went on to add that they thought the USIS should carry out its work strictly hand™in-hand with the province chief. Wien Lodge pointed out that most of the USIS teams were Vietnamese, Minla said, "Yes, but they are considered the same as Vietnamese -— who worked for the Japanese and the sam.e as the Vietnam^-se who drive for

Americans'and break traffic laws." General Minh went on to comp3-ain about the U.S. hand in the training of Cao Dai and Hoa Hao. This was bad because they then became Aj:iierican t;^T)e soldiers, not Vietna/mese soldiers. Letter in the discussion, General Minh compjlained that the ICA had made direct contacts with the above groups. "We simply cannot govern this country if this kind of conduct coxitinues," he said. 2[[/

In reply to the report of this meeting, the Joint Chiefs of Staff . cabled CINCPAC on January 1^-:

"SecDef seriously concerned regarding...General Don's earlier agreement on district level advisors as well as Minh's assertion that no advisors are desired beyond the regimental level. The Secretary considers, and JOS agree, that this would be an unacceptable rearward step. State is preparing a response...in which SecDef and JCS will have a hand." ?.5y

Tlie State guidance to Lodge on January 17 said:

"...We deem it essential to retain advisors dovai to sector and battalion level as we now have them, and consider establishment of subsector advisors as highly de-r~^ sirable improvem.ent from ou:r viewpoint. Such advisors

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are best assurance that the U.S. material we supply is used _ i to full advantage. Beyond this, we cannot give adequate justi-

fication for our great involvement in Vietnam...if we are to be denied access to the facts."

However, State indicated a willingness to limit subsector advisors to an expermenta] program in a few districts, as suggested by Col. Thang, with a review of the question to follow a few weeks later. State suggested that General Mich's erroneous statement regarding U.S. training of Cao Dax and Hoa Hao"deserved prompt refutation. "It is suggested Harkins accompany you to meetings where military matters may come up. 26/

In contrast to their reticence about extending U.S. advisors to lower levels, Minh's government had vo.lunteered the idea in December of a group of high-level U.S. advisors to work with the top levels of tlie G\ri\T. The State Department replied enthusiastically:

"In elalioration of the brain trust concept suggested by General Minh and accepted by President Johnson (DepTel 1000), our view is that high-level advisors may be essential key to ingredient most sorely lacking in GVN: Efficiency and urgency of action. Minii's invitation to establi.sh brain trust , and readiness to accept U.S. advice and cooperate... should be seir.ed upon. . .We have in mind advisors working directly with VN officials on day-to-day implementation of agreed policy lines. They would of course be completely responsible to you for policy gui.dance and would in no sense supplant . ■ your policy role with top GW offici.als nor would they in-fringe direct and comprehensive military advisory role of I I ■ COMLTSMA,CV. . .We recognize such advisors miist operate behind

the scenes and that their persistent prodding must be done with great tact....

The guidance continued that the department speci.fi.cally had in mind the assignment of three experienced M.l-time advisors (and senior assistants) to work with top levels of GVN. One seni.or FSO would work with Minh and Tho on broad program implem.entation, one ranking AID official would be with GVN counterins-axgency and econom-ic offici.als, one high-ranking min'itary would work with the Minister of Defense and JGS. Both advisors _ and' assi.stants would have off i ce space in a GVN building close to the ofxice they would advise. Authority was given to discuss this with GVN Lodge was told to ask them whom they would li.ke for these positions. 2?/

Meanwhile,"political tension i.ncreased. Then on January 28, General mmrev Mianh told hi.s U.S. advisor and friend, Col. Jasper Wilson, that ■ a eroup of generals, including Minh and Don, were plotting with the French to stagp a pro-neutralist "coup" by January 31- He asked whether the U.S. would support him in stagi.ng a counter-coup which would assure a stepped-UD GVN effort against the Viet Co.ng. There i.s no record of an official US reply before Hianh resolved to act. 2By The evening of January 29, Bianh told Wilson he would take over the GVN at k a.m. the next morning. Lodge inforraed State, which directed him to keep a hands-off attitude and

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to make it clear that the USG had nothing to do vith the coup. 'It also directed Lodge to try to keep "Big Minh" in the government, at least as a figurehead? 29/) The next morning^ right on schedule, Khahli took over.

^. The USG Accepts Khanli and Oioensthe__ Bidding A^aAnst the Iforth,

Keeping Minh i/as to prove difficult. Idrianh wanted to try four arrested generals for conspiring with the French to neutralise SVN; and not only were these officers Mirf'i's close friends, but Khanh said Minh was a party to the plot also. 30/ The affair was to drag on into September, adding to the"political uncertainties and thus to the paralysis of govern- .

ment. _3l/

To improve goveriiment stability, Khanh broadened his governjiient to make the cabinet more representative of all the political and religious groups, and expanded the ^/KC to include 1? generals and 3^ other officers. (By the end of March the MRC had 53 members.) Partly at USOM urging, General Minh travelled around the country and reportedly gained popularity. The . Council of Notables continued in its advisory role. 32/

Following the coup, the USG reopened the c[uestion of extending U.S. advisors into the districts. On February 7. 1964, the State Department told Saigon: . '

"inasmuch as recently displaced government evidently took no definitive position on e^xte/asion U.S. advisory structure to subsector level. . .we believe /the/ Ambasseidor and General Plarkins should raise this subject at early date with General K^ianh. It might be useful to point out to Khanh that in addition reasons cited in our IO72, proposed extension U.S, advisory structure would represent expansion U.S. commitment to support GW in war against VC."

■ State anticipated that Kliani might object but believed the possible harm would be m.ore than conxt-terbalanced by improved effectiveness of GVN operations in countryside:

". . .if ■Kh.anh will not accept subsector advisors on scale originally envisaged he should be urged to agree at least to their establisliment on experimental basis in few districts in order to lay basis for determining whether there is any substantial ill effect in politica,l sense from their presence." 33/

Tv.ro weeks later COMUSRACV reported Vietnamese acceptance of district ad-' visors in 13 districts of central Delta provinces. MACV J-3 tiad casually arranged it wJ.th General Khiem, apparently without any new top-level U.S,/ GVW discussion. 3V

Klianh's government vms as receptive B.t first to top-le-vel. U.S. advice as it was to advisors at lower levels, although the "brain trust"

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?omte specific reco-.enaa,ti«is for particular positiMis. 35/

HoweTcr there was still no sign of effective GVl action, witli -t„„„tTr avice. in BrLd-February JCS recomenaed a concentrated or Without U.S. advice. X province to restore GVN control

"'^^"if SS'Xt I mSri: oSei^c?itlcll provinces. 36/ Deputy Ambassa-"r-fes in Mge's absence, objected stroogly; for he said such a proposal was based on the false assujnptions that:

"(l) Indigenous Communist insurgency with fu.ll external ■ support could he defeated hy an -offensive' of finite dura-tion.

(2) GVN had adequate political cohesion, leadership, etc., to launch an offensive.

(3) The U.S. Mission had sufficient influence and con- _ trol over GVW to persuade it to do so." 37/ f'

nn .,. r>-.+ f-K^nm POMITSMACV te] Is of Continuing delay on pacification A ^-'^"^'Tl^ll^l^lJ^Tj'Zit^^^^ to be revalidatea by the new govern-Sr^A^nL^pSnTs'pr^^ente^ to General ,a,anh on the 17th and was to be

called Chien Thang ("struggle for victory }. 30/

On February.21, 1961,-,'Aiahassador'Lodge, Aa:mirval Felt and General ■Harkins saw Khanh wit^n a proposal for creating a corps °f. J-^f. .^^f ":^^^^';^t Srs to take over the villages and ha.n.lets as soon as P^^^^J^^f-°\^^^ ,^.^^°'^ Sete. lOiani replied that he was just about to put xnoo f^f^jj' \^ ^^f -S the seven key provinces around Saigon wh3.ch would provxde the hel.p doctors, teachers, and goverment advisors from Saigon. 39/

„, hecausf :oSiSr?^S"S S ^ILS ^^--^Sniionftrtr J?;;.d.et Wa...n.ton request.

rs.T.:nt°w!;in:\?Bhl..unaesirable^UB«^^

th- situation and develop Domt U.S./GVW act .on to_mee^ i^i budeet fttion ^40/ Saigon replied that their analysis mdicatea (1) the budget ^^'nts i^^ld probably be smaller than originally expected, ana (2) the_ ' nomic constoSences'were extremely difficult to predict. Economic Minis-f o"nh sSunned any ^iPmediate "complex study" of the economic outlook ter Oanh shunnea o.iy n y series of important planning exer-

''^Sr fof t^e^o™? : S: : d'o^'fit'tS potential'cost of the pay raise (700 million pfalters in'l9610 could be absorbed within the present expendr-

ture levels, kl/ • " '

Ihe Sobassy reported being informed on February 21 by the Minister of mtionS ESnomy'of a threatened Baigon rice shortage. He reauested that

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the U S. stand ready to provide ^0,000 tons under title II PL i+80 for distribution to the Armed Forces. Wo U.S. coiiunitments were made. Talks were exploratory. ^42/

Although the USG recognized the weaknesses of GVN, as noted at the end of Section 2, these merely aroused concern at the highest levels, not. alarm An extreme example of the enrphasis of this period is found in ¥.W. Rostow's xaemorandum to the Secretary of State dated February 13, 1964._ In a context emphasizing the importance of success in Vietnam to U.S. interests every-^/here, Rostow wrote only about the role of Rortn Vietnam m the insurgency, relegating South Vietnam's governmental problems (ana those of Laos) to a vague clause in one sentence:

"South Vietnam is in danger. The internal position in South Vietnam created by the system.atic operations conducted from North Vietnsja is precarious...although difficult tasks would still be faced in South Vietnam and Laos if iJorth Vietnamese compliance with the 1962 agreement was enforced, we see no possibility of achieving short-run or ]..ong-run stability in the area until it is enforced.

In a cable to the President, Lodge expressed the same view. In addition, ■ he compared the sanctions used against Diem with the sanctions being considered against the North, and thus by mplication treated the fall of Diem as the end of the problem of good government in the South, flo/ Rig-holy or wrongly, the USG viewed North Vietnamese support and direction of Ghe insurgency as the overriding problem, not merely in its public posture (as represented by R-esident Johnson's new year's greeting to General feinh, quoted on page 3, above, and by the State Vtoite Paper, Aggression From the North," issued February 2?), but also in its internal policy discus-sions. Rostow's statement says that there is no way to achieve short-run or lonP-run stability in Southeast Asia without putting a stop to tins support and direction, and gives short shrift to GVN reform. To the extent that this view was accepted, it tended to set the face of U.S. policy looking outward across South Vietnam's borders, putting South Vietnamese weaknesses in the background, m.alnly to be dealt with art.er the 1962 Agree-ment is enforced. , ■

\-Jhen the issue cam.e up of the GVN's internal military and political failures, all agreed that these were serious, but there was seldom _ any action. Occasional references (e.g., Honolulu, I.96)-!.), and conversations with some'of the principals, m.ake it clear that the explanation f?^ this lapk of action was the fear that the GVI^ was a house of cards, which would rollaT,se if we pushed too hard. This fear of GVN weakness proved to be a consistent source of strength to GVN in its negotiations with the Fmbassy and with the USG. ^ ■ ■

k. McNajnara's March Trip and NSAJ-l 288

For several days beginning on March 8, 196^1-, Secretary McNamara conferred with GVN leaders and with U.S. officials j.n Saigon. The trip

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reinforced his pessimistic views of the previous December. In his trip report to the President^ he said:

"C. The situation has unquestionably been growing worse, at least since September:

1. In terms of governm_ent control of the countryside^ about ^lO^ of the territory is under Viet Cong control or predominant influence....

2. Large groups of the population are now showing signs of apathy and indifference;, and there are some signs of frustration within the U.S. contingent:

a. The ARVN and paramilitary desertion ra^tes^ and particularly the latter, are high and increasing.

b. Draft dodging is high vT'hile the Viet Cong e.re recruiting energetically and effectively.

c. The morale of the hamJ-et militia and of the Self Defense Corps; on which the security of the hamlets depends, is poor and falling.

3- In the last 90 days the weakening of the government's position h8.s been particularly noticeable. . . .

) k. The political control structure extending from

Saigon down into the ham3..ets disappeared following the November coup. Of the ^1- incumbent province chiefs on November 1, 35 have been replaced (nine provinces had three province chiefs in three months; one province had four')* Scores of lesser officials were replaced. Almost all major mdlitary commands have changed hands twice since the November coup. The fa^ith of the peasants has been shaken by the disruptions in experienced leadership and the loss of physical security. In many areas, power vacuums have developed causing confXision among the people, and b. rising rs.te of rural disorders.^'

^'D. The greatest v/eakness in the present situation is the uncertain viability of the Khanh government.. .After two coups, as was mentioned above, there has been a sharp drop ■ in morale and organization, and Khanh has not yet been ehle' to build these up satisfactorily. There is a constant threat of assassination or of another coup, which would drop morale and organization nearly to zero. Whether or not French nationals are actively encouraging such a coup, de Gaulle's position and the continuing pessimism and anti-Amiericanism of the French coiranunity in South Vietnam, provide constant fu.el to neutralist sentiment and the coup possibility. If a coup is set underway, the odds of our detecting and preventing it in the tactical sense are not high.

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"E. On the positive side, we have found many reasons ' : for encouragement in the performance of the IQianh government

"^ to date. Although its top layer is thin, J.t is highly re-

sponsive to U.S. advice, and with a good grasp of the basic elements of rooting out the Viet Cong. Opposition groups are fragmentary, and IQaanh has brought in at least token representation from m.any key groups hitherto left out. He is keenly aware of the danger of assassination or coup and is taking resourceful steps to minimize these risks. All told, these evidences of energy, comprehension, and decision add up to a sufficiently strong chance of Khanh's really taking hold in the next few months for us to devote all possible energy and resources to his support." kk/

A memorandum of the conversation held at Joint General Staff (JGS) headauarters between Secretary McWamara and General Klianh, the Rrime Minister, ■ on Merch 1?, shows that the U.S. pressed for a national service act. General Khsnh agreeably assured the Secretary that the GVN was prepared to embark on a prograja of national mobilization. The principal question raised by the Vietncmese was the desirability of raising the Civil Guard to the same re-lative status as ARVN on such matter as salary, pensions, and survivor benefits at a total additional cost of 1 billion piasters. Mr. McWamara s reply that he thought this highly desirable was obviously interpreted by the Vietnamese as an agreement to underwrite much of the bill. h3/

After considering various options in his reports, McNamara recom- . r~^. mended the following basic U.S. posture:

"1. The U.S. at all levels must continue to make it em-■ ' ' phatically clear that we are prepared to furnish assistance

and support for as long as it takes to bring the insurgency " . ^ under control.

"2. The U.S. at all levels should continue to make it c].ear that we fully support the IQianh government and are totally opposed to any further coups. The ambassador should instruct all elements, includi.ng the military advisors, to report intelligence information of possible coups promptly, with the decision to be made by the ambassador whether to report such information to Klianh. ... • ^

"3. We should support fu-lly the Pacification Plan now • announced by Khanli. . .This so-called "oil spot" theory is excellent, and its acceptance is a major step forward. However, it is necessary to push hard to get specific instructions out to the provinces, so that taere is real unity of effort at all levels....

Many of the actions described in succeeding paragraphs frfc right into the framework of the Plan as announced by Khanh. vmerever possible, we should tie our urging of such -—N actions to IQianh's own formulation of them, so that he will

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be carrying out a Vietnamese plan and not one imposed by the U.S.

"^. To put the whole nation on a -we/r footing. . .a new National Mobi-lization Plan (to include a National Service Law) should be urgently developed by the Co^mtry Team in collaboration with the Khanh Government,...

"5. The strength of the Armed Forces (regular plus paramilitary) must be increased by at least 50^000 men

"6. A Civil Administrative Corps is urgently rea^uired to work in the provincial capAtals^ the district towns5 the villages; and the hamlets .. .The U,S. should work with the ' 1 GVN urgently to devise the necessary recruiting plans, training facilities5 financing methods 5 and organizatione^l arrangements 5 and should furnish training personnel at once, under the auspices of the AID Mission....

"7. The paramilita>ry forces are now ujiderstrength and lacking in effectiveness. They must be improved and reorgan-i?.ed.

d. Additional U.S. personnel should be assigned.to the training of all these paramilitary forces.

"A e. The National Police reciuire special consideration.

Their strength in the provinces should be substantially increased and consideration should be given to including them as part of an overall * Popular Defense Force*....

"8. An offensive guerrilla force should.be created to operate along the border and in areas where VC control is dominant. . .. '^ ^6.

He 'recoifflnended more military equipment for ARVN^ which along with the expansion recomm.ende(.tions above^ added up to a total cost to the U.S. of somie $50-60 million in the first year and $30-^0 million thereafter. He reasoned:

"There were a,nd are sound reasons for the Imits imposed by present policy -- the South Vietnamese must win their own fight; U.S. intervention on a larger scale, and/or GVN actions against the North, would disturb key allies and other nations; etc. In any case, it is vital that we continue to take every reasonable moasure to assure success in South Vietnam. The policy choice is not an 'either/or' between this course of action and possible pressures against the North; I the form^er is essential without regard to our decision with

respect to the latter. The latter can, at best, only reinforce the former.

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"The foiaowing are the actions we believe can he taken in ord-r to imrjrove the situation both in the immediate future and over a longer term period. To emphasize that a new phase has begun, the measures to be taken by the Khanh government should be described by some term such as 'South Vietnam s Program for National Mobilization.'" V//

Tvro courses of action that Secretary McHamara considered and re-iected were destined to come up time and again. With respect to the suggestion that the U.S. furnish an American combat unit to secure Siagon, thrsecretary reported "it is the universal opinion of our senior people in Saigon, with which we concur, that this action would now have^^serious adverse psychological consequences and should not be undertaken.

On U.S. assumption of command, he said:

"...the judgments of all senior people in Saigon, with which we concuT, is that the possible military advantages of such action would be far outweighted by i.ts adverse psychological i-mpact. It would cut across the whole basic pic- . tui'e of the \m running thei.r own war and lay us wide open to hostile propaganda both within SVN and outside. _Moreover the present responsiveness of the GVN to our advice -■ although it has not yet reduced military reaction time -- makes it less urgent. At the sa.me time MkCY is steadily taking actio5is to bring U.S. and GVN operating staff closer together at all ^ levels, includn.ng joint operating rooms at key comiaand levels.

The Pi-esident met with the National Secm-ity Council on_March 1? and approved McWam.ara's recoirimendations; NSft.M 288 of that date directed all a-encies to execute the parts applying to them. To underline one point°further, State cabled USOM Saigon on March l8 to make sure oo report all "rumors of coups heard by any U.S. personnel to th,e Aarl^assador at once, and it gave the Ambassador full reaction authority. 49/ Then the w-esi-dent simmarized his view of the main tiirust of the new policy, m a cable to Lodge on March 20:

"As we agreed in our previous messages to each other, judgment is reserved for the present on overt military action in view of the consensus from Saigon conversations oi McNamara . mission"with General Khanh and you on judgment that movement against the North at the present would be premiatuxe. We here share General IQianli's judgment that the immediate and essential task is to strengthen the southern base. For this reason our plan-rring for action against the North is. on a contingency basis at present, and iiraaediate problem in this area is to develop the strongest possible military and political base for possible later action." 50/

U8,

Anticipating great things, the \m.te House announced Khanh's "mobilization plan" on March I7, and implied USG support for him: ^

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"To meet the situation, General Khanh and his government are acting vigorously and effectively. They have produced a sound cexatral plan. , .To carry out this plan. . .General laianj.! has informed us that he proposes in the near fu.ture to put into effect a National Mobilization Plan

"The policy should continue of withdrawing United States personnel where^ their roles can be assumed by South Vietnam-ese and of sending additional men if they are needed. It will remain the policy of the United States to furnish assistance and support to South Vietnam for as long as it is required

"Secretary McWamara and Genera]. Taylor reported their overall conclusion that with continued vigorous leadership from General Khanh and his government, and the carrying out of these steps, the situation can be significantly improved in the coming months." 5i/

In a speech in Washington on March 26, Secretary McNamara more explicitly supported the Khanh government, and gave the accepted prioriiiies of U.S. policy:

"...In early I963, President Kennedy v/as able to report to the nation that 'the spearpoint of aggression has been . blunted in South Vietnam.' It was evident that the Government had seized the initiative in most areas from the insurgents. But this progress was interrupted in I963 hy the political crises arising from troubles between the Government and the Buddhists, students, and other non-Comaunist oppositionists. .President Diem lost the confidence and loyalty of his people; there were accusations of maladministration and injustice. There were two changes of goverrmient within three m-onths. The fabric of government was torn. The political control structure extending from Saigon down into the haroH-ets virtually disappeared. Of the kl incumbent province chiefs on November 1 of last year, 35 were replaced. Nine provinces had three chiefs in three m.onths; one province had four. Scores of lesser officials were replaced. Alm.ost all ma.ior military coroinands changed hands twice. The confidence of the peasants was inevitably shaken by the disruptions m leadership and the loss of physical seciurity..-Much therefore depends , - on the new govermnent under General Khanh, for which we have ■ high hopes. ■ -

" "To'd8,y the government of General Khanh is vigorously rebuilding the machinery of administration and reshaping plans to carry the war to the Viet Cong. He is an able and energetic leader. He has demonstrated his grasp of the basic elements — political , economic and psychological, as well as military --reauired to defeat the Viet. Cong. He is plan^aing a program of"econom-ic and social advances for the welfare of his people.

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^ He has iDrought into support of the government representatives

of key groups previously excluded. He and his colleagues have developed plans for systematic liberation of areas^now siA-missive to Viet Cong duress and for mobilization oi all available' Vietnaraese resources in the defense of the homeland. •

"At the san^e time, Genera]. Khanh has understood the need to improve South Vietnam's relations ^zith its neighbors... In short, he has demonstrated the energy, comprehension, and decision required by the difficult circumstances that he i9.ces»«»»

"The third option before the B:esident /Ifter withdrawal and neutralization, both rejectee^ was initiation of military actions outside South Vietnam, particularly against North . , Vietnam, in order to suppleraent the counterinsurgency program in South Vietnam.

, "This course of action -- its impl-ications and wa;ys of carrying it out -- has been carefully studied. , ^.■

"mat ever ultimate course of action may be forced upon _ us by the other side, it is clear that actions under this option ■ ■ would be only a supplement to, not a substitute for, progress within South Vietnam's own borders.

^ ■ ■ "The fourth course of action was to concentrate on help-

ing the South Vietn8,mese win the battle in their own country. This, all agree, is essential no matter what else is done....

"We have reaffirmed U.S. support for South Vietnam's _ Governm^ent and pledged economic assistance and military training and logistical support for as long as it takes to bring the insurgency under control.

"We will support the Government of South Vietnam in carrying out its"Anti-Insurgency Plan " ^

The next day McNamara formally ended the hope of phased withdrawal, ■H .+n-,Toinr the lower-echelon joint planning activities that had aimed at ^ - SptacfS U.S eie nt^- in Vietnam by Vietna,B.ese. Although the Vietnamese

^,S that the "withdra;.al" of 1000 men in December 1963 had been - P-^ten e Ss action now removed any remaining doubt about our intentions. The message was brief:

II

'Model Plan projection for phasedown of U.S. forces and GVi^ forces is superseded. Policy is as announced by mn-te House on 1? March 64." ^3/

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5. Opening Bids onAdvice^.j;£verM.^^^

Armed with our declaration of support and with the promised further materml assistance, General Khanh signed a mobilization decree on April 4; at the time the decree satisfied the USG as meeting Mclfemara's recomxaenda- , tion on the subject. 5^ However, Khanh delayed signing implementing flpcrees for the mobilization decree indefinitely; and it has never become clear what it would have meant, if implemented. In May, Khan]i purportedly broadened the draft to include older and younger men, and announced fo™a-tion of a new "Civil Defense Corps"; but neither came to anything. On April k, Khanh also abolished the Council of Notables. This latter step_he did on his own. without prior discussion with Lodge.- As noted in section 1, Lodge, who aWs believed in the need and importance of constitutional government in SVW felt no urgency for creating a democratic form of govermaent, al-thouFh'many in State may have wanted to object to Khanh's actions. 5|/ ' , Such ections without prior consultation were to become a sore point later on with both State and the Erabassy. Thus, what the USG actually got for the recognition and material support it gave Khanh in March was the dissolution of the Council of Notables. 56/

^—'

During April, Lodge and State continued to debate how hard to •Dush GVN using AID leverage. Lodge agreed with the general principle that the Con-miercial Import Program (CIP) should not be increased until increased GVN expenditures quickened the economy and drove imports up. However, he noted that GVN had been given to understand that they could expect at least the $95 million CIP in 196^- that Diem had in I963, and that McNamara had said in Saj.gon an-d Washington that U.S. assistance to Vietnam would increase by about $50 million. These assurances had spui'red Oanh, Minnster of National Economy, to ask for specific increases m CIP. Lodge thouP-ht the time unpropitious for detailed joint planning and for austerity measures as conditions for the last increment of 196I1 CIP. Oanh receivea .. credit for being too busy with pacification planning and other matters to discuss such matters. Therefore, Lodge proposed to use the planning of the CY 1965 program as the right place to apply leverage. 57/

State reacted sharply,' questioning whether the USG should let rvN off the hook on its March commitments that easily. Nevertheless, _ State acknowledged that "formal negotiations may not be desirable at this time" and settled instead for "constant dialogue to keep GVN aware of ns adherence to the new approach and of firm desire to see it implemented. T^he"desired GVN actions' included drawdown of foreign exchange reserves, promotion of exports, iirrport austerity, and an anti-inflationary domestic policy. 58/

USOM th°n talked to Oanh about the conimitments on the two sides. TTqOM fe3t that Oanh understood that GVN was to m-ove first and be backed _ ^^bv the USG as needed, but thought that some seg^nents of GVN were dragging lleir heels to avoid living up to their commitments. USOM estimated a I15..3O mi-llion drawdown of GVN foreign exchange reserves m 196^+. 59/

In the last week of April, General IQianh asked Lodge for one ABierican expert each in the fields of Finance-Economics, Foreign Affairs,

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-x ^ •^v.o +0 -ho pq^iP-ned to him'personally and to have offices '^^'Z::^£r:^^^^^^^--^ ^^e Americans to be responsi-^■?e eiHr^^fnlt merely as advisors." TMs -.uest revived the bra.n ^ , J\j^ r-oncent discussed with the Minh governrflent around the first ol tne "f ■ CommeniiS Lodge noted that he had opposed pushing Americans into rWbecavTrof C?lon?a!.ist overtones; they world cause resentment and ^m because ot Lo placing the blaiue on the U.S. There-

foir he hid avoided raising the'idea with Khanh. However «-t ICbanh hiSkf nofproposed it removed that objection, and_Lodge felt that the u'.S. should respond because it was an urgent necessity.

Late in the same meeting,- Lodge told Khanh of a State Department proposal for civil administrators on a crash basis in partially pacified areas. His auick reply, "Yes... if you will accept losses. , ,

■nnssiblv Forrestal, to come out for a conference. 60/ Ordinarily, it: ■ ^ f,ld be suiirfsing that Lodge would make such a big issue of Khanh's re-^iva? of In fdea that GYN hat already advanced through Lodge and_that the SSident himself had approved. However, his effusive reaction in t is Zse merely underlines his oft-repeated reluctance to push GVN. Lodge presented the first three advisors to Hmnh on May 6. oiy

■ On April 30, Lodge, Westmoreland, and USOM Director Brent met ' with several top members of'oVN to discuss QVN's failure to disburse operating fu-nds to the provinces, sectors and divisions and to correct the man poSer shortage in ARVN and the paramilitary units. Lodge ^^^f^^f^'J^l^ . . Samara program was failing, not because U.S. support lagged, ^^^J^^^^^' the necessary piaster support was missing. Moreover, he saia there was !n shortaee of piasters available to GVN. In reply, Oanh of the GVN said Se? had fniwi^ed a bad system from the French and that ^e was now trying

to Implement new procedures. Kb.anh replied on ^^^^^-JJf^^^^.J^^,^'"^, fn ra^se the strength would require an ultimate to the Corps Coramanaers, ^ t ;hS he also slid that remedial moves were underway ^^^^^ Sicv. Kh.anh cou:atered the budgetary argument by sayixig ^^J^^^^, f ^ "^_ "' not -received money from the U.S. to support increased pa^/ for the para mflitl- "Lodge riplied that if he went ahead with the ---- "/^^ ''" T q would m4t the bill. Overall, the meeting was one of thrust and ";r;;'rather than of consultation. 62/ This meeting followed prodding -from McNamara and JCS in a cable sent April 29- 637

Cn M8.y h, KhanJi told Lodge he wanted to declare war, bomb Koi'th Vietnam with uls. bombers, put the country on a war footing, mcluamg "iSrin^ rid of ke so-called politicians and having...a government of .^t ^Han' " and bring in 10,000 U.S. Army special forces to "cover the '^SrS^dian-LaoSan frontier." Lodge was non-co.mnittal on U. S. forces, T,hole ^'^^■^^^^ . ^ ^ ^l,^t democra,tic forms could wait. 6hj^

^^' S^iytubircircal ed for an election by October of a Constitutional 5:::iS;.^^iJ^ Roister his public support; he had his share of rumors and political infighting. 65/ " . • ■ ■

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On May IS, during a trip to Saigon to review progress on the u .h dec?sioS McNa.rr...a\et with Khanh to express his concern over GVN niotion McSamra ■ t main complaints were that RVMF was failing to reach J^ oi?td strength leveJs a.d that budget delays were holding up pacifxca-J on He felt i"S? GW should announce that failure to disburse funds tion. He ^^^•:hj^'t.n PXT,resspd concern about the replacement of incompe-Zl ™;rs" su'ra S:c:m.^^ins General, of the AWN Fifth Division, ihe meeting w^nt agreeably, and produced the following consensus:

(1) All present exi^ressed satisfaction at Khanh's having accepted the importance of speeding up disbursements.

(2) The case of the comander of the Fifth Division "pre-sented something of an internal problem, but it would be"arra-np-ed." (This was the second time around for the Fifth Division case. As the result of a personal request from General Harkins, lOianh had agreed on ^_ April 25 to change this same officer "inmiediately. 66/)

(3) Khanh hoped to spend m.ore time on military and pacifi-

■ ^^^ cation matters i? only "this political stomach trouble . _ that took so m-uch of his time could be quieced. 6//

MA.CV presented McWamara with a proposal to give '^^'^^ "^ ^ „ i-n-h^l of *978 000 in petty cash and "seed money, to be used soiexy :r?b S sidv or;' discretion. ^This initial x.-opoBal suggested putting tie money under control of the psychological °P--^f-/-°-™^^^J;i,,^"^,,.. ■ idea received mixed reactions, and went on the agenda of x.ne Honolulu Con

f erence in June. 68/

«. Forrestal of the Vtoite House Staff eame «th HcNa^arP, a;j^^ 1«^

about its"own budget; the talks ended with an agreement to aisagree. 69/ r ^.,^ ^„-,.+..oi mnr.,.vl-.P and Prevailing Views of the WarsJ^aj^,^^

Kbanh's "-DoDit-Jcal stomach trouble" was merely a fresh case of a . • ^nS^rLe^eCobiem. His troubles with General Minh over the four • chronic ^^^^^^f ^-^^Jt^^^^''-,,^^ ,,,,,, ^miors abounded. On May 21, Lodge told ?'':' ^ST^fur f?: s Tsu^h^umors, and suggested he talQ. tough with ^•'' "^h^net Sen their conversation turned to General Minh, H.anh insisted S^t M rc;.ld be proied to have conspired with the others and with the f:' b S maS Vietnam neutral. la.anh and the MO planned to try the fovir

CSt.": ":S: % Sif position to.Khanh on May 28, asserting tbe

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s-oecial need for miity in yior of possible cross-border problems with Laos, ^ ^anh accepted the point and agreed to soften the blow on the generals._

' S fleSiSediately to Dalat, and the next day announced to Lodge an amica-Mp setti ement of the problem, with lenient treatment of the generals and new-foirid complete uni^y among the m.embers of the ruling MRC. State and Lodge were gratified, and agreed that the thing to do was to press for unSy in support of getting on with the war. 70/ However, it was soon comonknowSdge that the "settlement," a,mounting to censure of the accused officers, satisfied no one; and the problem festered on. Jl-J

In May the first sign appeared of varying emphasis at the highest levels on particular necessary steps for success against the VC. In a DPM dated May 25, 196U, McGeorge Bundy restated the theme of the Rostow memorandum to SecState of February 13: "

"It is recomraended that you make a Presidential decision that the U.S. will use selected and carefully graduated military force against North Vietnam...on these premises:

(1) That the U.S. cannot tolerate the loss of Southeast Asia to Comraimism; . .

(2) That without a decision to resort to military action if necessary, the present prospect is not hopeful, m South Vietnam or in Laos."

'^ Of course, Bundy knew of the'GVl's weaknesses and on other occasions asserted

the need to reform GVK; but here he focussed exclusively on using force against WN.

In contrast. Chairman Sullivan of the newly-created inter-agency ■ Vietnam Committee 1?./ said in a proposed memorandum for the President _ (M8.y; 196'4, undated):

"The Vietnamese Government is not operating efficiently - enough to reverse the adverse trend in the war with the Viet

Cong. The Klianh Governji^.ent has good intentions; it has announced ■ good general plans and broad programs; but these plans are not_ V • Ijeing trans]8t.ed into effective action against the Viet Cong

. on either the military or the civil side. It has, therefore, become ujrgently necessary to find a means to infuse the elli-ciency into the governmental system that it now lacks.

To remedy the GVWs lack of efficiency, Sullivan proposed that Americans a.ssume de facto command of GVN's machinery.

1 "American person-nel, who have hitherto served only as

' advisors, should be integrated into the Vietnamese chain of

command."both military and civil. They should become direct operational components of the Vietnamese Governmental structure. For cosmetic purposes American personnel would not ■; "^ assume titles which would sliow conmand functions, but would

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rather "be listed as ^assistants' to the Vietnamese principals at the various levels of government...

"Americans should he integrated to all levels of the Vietnamese G-overnjiient. . .Ajnericans would be integrated into the Central Government to insure that decj.sions are taken^ orders are issued and funds, supplies and personnel are made avai3-.able for their implementation, and execution actually takes place. At the regional level Americans, both military and civilian; v/ould also be introduced. . .Americans would likewise be brought into the government machinery at province and district level to insure that the counterinsurgency programs are actuallLy executed at the level at which the people live. ■ - ■

"Aside from the command aspect which Americans would assume, the principal other new element in this concept would be the introduction of American civilians a,t the district level. Their pujt^pose would be to insure that programs are put into effect at the village and ha.mlet level to gain the support of the people.».■ ■ •

"Personnel at the district level would' confront a maximu:m risk and casualties are virtu.ally certain. Since the U.S. should take any feasible measure to assure their security, it is i.mpoi'tant that Vietnamese units of the Civil Guard and Self"Defense Corps, which operate at this level, be en-cadred with an adequate number of i^jiierican military personnel to insure that they will operate effectively."

This DPM a].so proposed extensive reshuffling of the lines of authority in the GVN itself, including the elimination of divisions from the Vietnamese military structure a,nd placing all authority for pacification, malitary and civilian, in the hp.nds of the province chiefs under the corps comBian-ders. T3j

The Vietnam Comjiiittee watered down this proposal imiriediately, however. On May 2?, it went to four high-level addressees as a talking paper, with the second sentence of the above recommendation altered to say, "They should becom.e m.ore than advisors, but should not become an integral part of the chain of comm.and." (Eraphasi s added.) Recognizing Vietnamese sensitivities and the GVN^s political vulnerability, the revised pamper ■ ; recommended a gradual, phased approach. But even the watered-down version . was termed "radical" in the cable putting it on the agenda for the upcoming , Honolulu Conference, jh/

In the new advisory program already underway, MACV reported a bJ^- Lmpr-ovement by late May in the experimental districts with U.S. advisors. People rather than messages moved back and forth. Economic and social bonds were'rex;orted improved. Further extension of advisors to districts was put

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on the agenda. 75/ In pre]-iminary communications. General Taylor, Chairman of the JCS, assumed that their mission would be to supervise unit training/ operational performance, and operational planning of para-military units in the districts; hut he also suggested discussion of other v/ays in vrhich military personnel could he used to advantage in forwarding the pacifj.ca-tion program, 76/ . '

The month ended with a Rusk-Khanh mieeting that re-emphasi%ed the accepted priorities of U.S. policy, and unciuestionah3,y confirmed to the Vietnam_ese how far we were thinhj.ng of going. First, Rusk emphasized to Khanh the effect of Vietnam.ese quarreling on the U.S. and on other potential allies in the struggle. Second, they discussed immediate extensions of the vrar, such as attacking the Laotian corridor, and the various further extensions that might follow. Third, Khanh pushed hard on the idea, which as noted above had already been discussed in VJashington, that he could not win without extending the war. Finally, Khanh pledged to keep all these .matters secret until the U.S. agreed to overt statement or action. . ,

revealing

The language of the cable reporting this meeting is candid and

"1. Solidarity Within South Vietnam

s

". . .Secretary /Rusk/ stated one of m.ain problem President faces in justi.fying to American people whatever course of action may be necessary or indicated as m.atter of j.nternal solidarity of SVN. Secretary noted that if struggle escalates, only U.S. will have the forces to cope with it.

"This basic reality means President has heavy responsibility of making vita]., decisions and leading /unerican public opinion to accept them. Difficu-lt to do this if SVN appears hopelessly divided and rent by internal quarrels.

- ' "...Secretary said he was not thinking in terms of

displaying solidarity so as to convince Paris that struggle could be won, but rather was thinking in terms of sustaining the faith in the possibilities of ultimate success of our VietnaiP-ese effort among those nations we hoped S^rould be in the foxholes with us' if escalation became necessary and if enemy forces reacted in strength. For example, UK,' Australia, New Zealand. Solidarity and unit of purpose in j|, SVN was keystone of whole effort. Was General Khanh doing

11 all he could to bring about such national unity?

, ■ ^ "Khanh replied affirmatively, saying he fully aware of

importance of unity. His recent handling of the case of the H arrested Generals showed this. His clem,ency showed he v/as

ij primarily interested in protecting unity of A"rmy. But there

* ■ ^.-^ were many problem-S. Underlying structuxe and heritage of coun-

try was such that only Army could lead Nation in unity. Only

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Army had the req.uisite organization;, cadres, discipline, and sense of pm^pose. The intellectuals vould never "be ahle to adopt a cornraon point of vie\v unless it was imposed by a dictatorship -- hy a party as the Coramimists did, or a * family dictatorship* such as Diem's. This situation was made worse because of"disproportion between measure of political, and civil liberties granted in wartime situation on one hand and lack of background and sense of responsibility of recipients on /the/ other...He was aware he had perhaps given more freedom than really prudent handling of situation would have dictated, but he had to be mindful oft-proclaimed democratic goals of the Vietnamese revolution. All in all, this disunity would not be fatal because Arrn^' itself was united, and no potentially disruptive force could hope to oppose Army and overthrow GVN. (N.B. No reference to religious problem.s, sects, or labor ujider this heading.)

"2. Need for Action Outside South "Vietnam,

"...Khanh dwelt at length on this, laying out some fairly precise ideas about the kind of action that might

be taken.

» "Basically, he said that despite the pacification plan and some individual successes he and his govermnent were 'on the defensive' against the Viet Cong. He said pretty flatly that they could not win unless action was taken outside South Vietnam, and that this needed a firm U.S. decision for such action.

"...He /Khanh/ then said that the 'imm.ediate' response should be to clean out the Conmrnists in Eastern Laos, who were the same kind of threat to him, and that we should not get bogged down in negotiations but act.

"...Secretary t?ien noted we could never predict enemy reaction with certainty. How would SVN people react if IWN and China responded by attacking SVN? Khanh replied this would have even more favorable effect on SVN national unity and faith in victory, a.nd would mobilize usual patriotic reactions in face of more clearcut external threat.

"3. Timing of Action Against the North and Necessary Erior Action Within South Vietnam.

"Khanh asked if Secretary azid i^jubassador believed ■ ■ he should proclaim, state of vmr existed dvxlng next few days and now that Generals' case was settled. Both advised him to vrait at least until after Honolulu Conference and in no case ever to take action on such matter vrithout consulting. He agreed, and remarked that if he proclaimed state

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1

Q

of war, wm would know this was preparatory to some form of escalation and he would never act unilaterally and thereby run risk of tipping America's hand. Although the matter was not specifically mentioned, Khanh appeared to accept as entirely natural that he would not necessari3-y know in advance if U.S. decided to strike outside W.

"...Some question as to how enemy c8,mp will react. At var-ious points in conversation Khanh was obviously seeking some more definite stateraent of specific American intentions in immediate future. Secretary told him he could say nothing on this because he simply did not know. The Honolulu meeting would produce some firm recormnendations to the President and some plans, but ultimately only B:esident could decide. His decision would be influenced by consideration of all implications of escalation: On our forces, on our allies, and perhaps even on mankind itself if nuclear warfare should result. Only U.S. had the means to cope'with problems escalation would pose, and only President could make the ultimate decisions.

"Nevertheless, Secretary said he wished to emphasize the following:

A. Since 19^5 U.S. had taken 165,000 casualties in defense of free world against Communist encroachments, and most of these casualties were in Asia.

B. US. would never again get involved in a land W8.r in Asia limited to conventional forces. Our population was 190,000,000. Mainland China had at least 700,000,UUU. We would not allow ourselves to be bled white fighting them with conventional weapons . ■ / / .<•

^.^*«*

.^'/»

/..^

C. Tlris meant that if escalation brought about major Chinese attack, it would also involve use of nuclear arms. Many free world leaders would oppose this. Chiang Kai-Shek had told him fervently he did, and so did U Thant. Many Asians seemed to see an element of racial discrimination in use of nuclear arms; something we would do to Asians but not to Westerners. Khanlj replied he certain.iy had no_ _ quarreJ with American use of nuclear anas, noted that decisive use of Atomic bombs on Japan had in ending war saved not only American but also Japanese lives. One must use the force oDe had; if Chinese used masses of Humanity, we would use superior fire power.

D. Eegardless wJriat decisions were reached at Honolulu, their implementation would require positioning of our forces. This would take time. Khanh maist remember we had other responsibilities in Asia and must be able react anj'where we had forces or comnitments. Not by chance

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was tviis' Conference "being held at Honolulu; the combined headauarters of all Ajnerican forces in I^.ciflc was there.

■ ", . . 6, Cormnent

"As can be seen, the Secretary let Khanh develop his ideas fairly fully and do most of the talking.* ■ Khanh talked firmly and effectively, and responded well to the -^—-Secretary's several points. He showed clearly that he was ! aware of the gravity of the decisions (tho he did seem a touch cavalier about the political problem.s of hitting eastern Laos at once), and did not seem to want a firm U.S. answer the day after tomorrow. But it seemed clear that he did want it pretty soon, and was now convinced he could not wrn in South Vietnam without hitting other areas including the North. He was careful to point out that the pacification cam-paign was making gains and would continue do so. Still, it was essentially defensive.

"On the timing; the Secretary said that any action wouJ.d be preceded in'any event by some period of time for force deployments. (He did not refer to diplomatic steps re Laos, the UF side, the U.S. Congressional problem, or other types of factors). lOianh understood this, and also accepted the Secretary's point that we would need to consult very closely with Khanh himself, try to bring the British and Australians aboard (the Secretary referred only to these two possible active pa.rticipants), and generally synchronize and work out the whole plan with great care, lij

Thus although the USG had pressed GVH on many details of economic •nolicy, administration, and pacification, contacts at the highest level told GVN that if the Vietnamiese leaders would only stick"together to prosecute the war, and if we compelled the North Vietne.mese to cease and Resist, everything would be ali right. Provided the GVN didn't embarrass the USG ■ too much, there was no limit to how far we would go to support them; and amrt from "unity" and a reasonable show of effort, there was no onus on them to deliver the goods. lOianh's claim that he could not win without extending the war, and that the Vietnamese were tired of the long dreary ■ grind of pacification, met no U.S. objection.

7• The Honolu lu Conf erence and Its Fol low2UEj_iuriB^,_196Ji

The Honolulu Conference met on short notice with an air of urgency; ^rincvnals included McNamara, Rusk, Lodge, Taylor, and Westmoreland. Sesentations of the current situation preceded consideration of additional' SasLes to be taken. Lodge briefed those, present on the political status. Hesaid the situation could "jog along," but he thought that some external abflou would be a big lift to South Vietnam.ese morale. Lodge s prediction was'more optimistic than lator events, in August, proved justified; he said •■tf we bombed Tchepone or attacked the [mi\ torpedo/ boats and the Vietnam^ese ^PO-Dle knew about it, this would. . .unify their efforts and reduce /their/ quarreling." In reply to a question by Rusk, he opposed the idea of a more

1^SiiS^rrnre';?irt^^ ^e seen; the Secretary spoke freely.

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•pnvm-il ioiPt USG/GVN organization at the top; McNamara hoped that a more for^i orgfn:l^:ation wo.ld evolve. Lodge felt that the USG/gVN relationshxp washarmonious, and that GVN was responsive to advice. He like the present Methods of dealing -with them. Westmoreland called the_military picture "tenuous but not hopeless" and added that a few victories were^haaly needed. Both were more optimistic than was the prevailing Washington view. 7»/

All present agreed that the emergence of a hostile government or anarchy would be a major threat to the U.S position. J9/ The fear of this threat undoubtedly helps explain the USG's persisteno hesitancy to apply leverage to GVN.

Westmoreland circulated a working paper calling for moderate_increases in U.S. personnel, both civilian and military, for eight critical ■nrovJnces. He reported that the GVN had recentlLy responded to massive advisory pressu.re by increasing the tempo of their military operations. He felt they would similarly respond to a continuing advisory program . oriented toward pacification. Both Lodge and Westmoreland rejected, as both unwise and unacceptable to GVN, any major plan for inter-la,rding or "encadrement" which would move U.S. personnel directly into deca.sion-making roles. Their opposition ended conference consideration ox the proposals advanced by the Sullivan memorandum. • ,. •

In a long draft m.emorand™,, dated June 13, 196^1-, Sullivan added some further insight into US/gVN relations and into the views of \o,\z^^^^_ Westmoreland about national priorities, beyond wnat is shown m the CiNCPAC record of the Conference.

"In attempting to accomplish many of these progreans, we have encountered resistance both from the Vietnamese and from our own U.S. Mission. Ambassador Lodge...fears that the increased introduction of Americans would give a colonial coloration to our presence there and would cause the Vietncmese to depend more and more on our execution of their programs. The Vietnamese...have some fear of appearing to be Ajnerican puppets...Finally, there is some indication that they are _ reluctant to associate themselves too closely with the Americans until they feel more confident of ultimate Axaerican intentions.

"At the cuj-rent moment, there is great doubt and confusion in Vietnam about U.S. determination...As a leading Saigon newspaper said on June 12: 'We must be vigilant and we must •. be ready to meet any eventuality so as to avoid the possible ■ , shameful sacrifice and dishonor to our country as m the

p3.St.'

"Given this sort of atmosphere in South Vi.etnam, it is very d-^'fficult to persuade the Vietnam.ese to coimriit themselves to sharp military confrontations with the communists if they suspect that something i.n the way of a negotiated deal is being

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concocted behind their backs. Conseq.uently, many of the actions which we are pressing on the South Vietnamese are flagging because of this uncertainty...

"Both Ajfibassador Lodge and General Westmoreland, at^ the Honolulu Conference expressed the opinion that the situation in South Vietnam would 'jog along' at the current stalemated pace unless som.e dramatic 'victory' could be introduced to put new steel and confidence into the Vietnamese leadership. General Westmoreland defined 'victory' as a determination to take some new vigorous military commitment, such as air strikes against Viet Cong installations in the Laos corridor. Ambassador Lodge defined 'victory' as a willingness to make punitive air strikes against North Vietnam. The significant fact about both...suggestions was that they looked toward some American decision to undertake a commitment which the Vietnamese wou-ld interpret as a willingness to raise the^ military ante and eschew negotiations beguii from a position of weakness.

"Wliile it is aMost impossible to establish measurements of Vietnamese morale, we are able to say that there is not at the current moment a single galvanized national purpose, expressed in the government leadership and energizing all ^_ elements of the country with a sim.ple sense of confidence. bO/

^ ' The selective Westm.oreland p^.an offered hope and was sufficiently

\ ■ . general to avoj.d specific opposition. The conference agreed that Saigon

should complete the plan and work urgently on its implementation.

Several more minor decisions were made on unilateral matters. 'Czar' powers for infonrntion were put in the hands of Zorthian. It was agreed that the DCM should be strengthened with a "truly executive _man, and there was to be a clearing-of-decks on the military side in Saigon ■ through reductions in social activities and cut-downs in dependents. None of these measures was expected to affect the dubious prognosis for the next 3-6 months. The best that could be hoped for was a slight gam by the end of the year.

There was serious discussion of military plans and intelligence estimates regarding wider actions outside South Vietnam. Subjects included, the conduct of military operations in Laos, a major build-up of forces,

■ and- planning of possible air strikes against North Vietnam. The conclusion reached was that the som,ewhat less pessimistic estimate of the pres- " , ent situation afforded the opportunity to f\;.rther refine these plans.

i The conference concluded that the crucial actions for the DJiimedi-

? ' ' ate future were (l) to prosecute an urgent j.nformation effort in the United

States toward dispelling the basic doubts of the value of Southeast Asia which were besetting key meml)erB of Congress and the public in the budding

■ "preat debate," and (2) to start diplomatic efforts wi.th the Thais, Australians, New Zealanders, Philippines, and the French on matters within

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their cognizance vbicli inipinged on our effort in South Vietnam.

Upon his return to Washington, the Secretary of State cabled Saigon a specific listing of the Washington understanding of the ten actions that were to be taken to expand U.S. and Vietnamese activities in the super-critical provinces. The gist of the actions is as follows: .

(l) Move in additional VN troops to ass-ore numerical superiority over VC.

■ (2) Assign control of all troops in province to province chief.

(3) Develop and execute detailed h3,mlet by haml.et ''oil I spot" and "clear and hold" operations plans for each of the

approximate ^0 districts.

(k) Introduce a system of population coxitrol (curfews, ID papers, intelligence network).

(5) Increase the province police force. .

(6) Expand the information program. j'- -

(7) Develop a special economic aid prograjn for each province.

(8) Add additional U.S. personnel (initially from within SVN).

320 military province azid district advisors "- ■ • ■ UO USOM province and district advisors

7U battalion advisors (2 from each of 37 battalions)

(9) Transfer military personnel to fill existi.ng and ftiture USOM shortages.

(10) Establish joint US/gVN tea.ms to monitor the program at both national and provincial level. J •

The message concluded by asking Saigon.to forward specific proposals to effect these decisions and a time schedule, earliest. 81/ The plan , £%;-3ve province advisors a petty cash fund (above, p.19^ received bo little support that there is no m.ention of it in either the CINCPAC or the State Co;aference Record.

Upon his return to Saigon on June k, Ambassador Lodge went straight ■Prom'the airport to call on General Khai)h. Vfliile Lodge raentlons in h3.s _ report that the subject of low ARYN strength was raised as a matter to be

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improved upon^ the main thrust of his talk vfith Khanh vj-as to hint that the USG would in the immediate future be preparing U.S. public opinion for actions against North Vietnam. Khanh v?as reported to be eager to learn.more about the details.

On June 13, Saigon replied to the State request for specific proposals. A MAGV study had been completed on point 1 and the RVMF would be approached. On point 2^ it was noted that RP and ¥F were already ujider the province chiefs j ARVN wouH.d be approached on province command of regulars, A wordy description of "concept" spoke to the remainder of State's ten points. 83/ It provoked a long series of specific questions from Washington about the 8 provinces, asking in shorty "Plow soon can action be initiated?" 8^

On June 2^^ COI^SMACV sent his request to JCS for an increase of UjSOO U.S. personnel to implement this expanded advisory effort. He viewed these as efforts to "influence the successful planning axid execution of the National Pacification Plan." Subsector advisors were to be "a general reinforcement of the pacification effort at district level." 85/ Consequently ^ the mCV terms of reference for subsector advisors were developed to provide that teams would extend the capabilities of USOM and USIS. Guidance was intentionally not specific.

The sdMe day General Westm^oreland reported that5 with the Ambassador's concurrence;, he had called on Genercal Khanh to discuss three military matters: (l) Augmentation of advisors a,t battalion level and extension of larger advisory teaans to most districts; (2) The urgent need to coordi--nate pa.cification efforts in the provinces surroun..ding Saigon; and (3) The necessity of moving a regiment to Long An (the pacification show-case) as soon as possible. General Khanh's reply was very receptive and agreeable on all matters.

On June 26^ Lodge sent his last message as Ambassador reporting ■that he and General Westmoreland had that day met with General Hianh and had reached "general agreement" on the concept, scope^ and organization set "forth in the Saigon reply of June I3 (referred to a,bove), 87/

Meanv/hile the proposal for a province advisors' fmid reappeared in a new foz-m^ and won quick approval. USOM agreed that AID should spend $200^000 from its contingency fimds for direct piurchase of piasters, to allocate to sector advisors for small expenditures (usua^lly less than $25 at a trlme). The funds vrere to buy local ma-teria].s and services for projects using AID commiodities; and their use was to be coordinated with the Vietnamese Province Chief. 88/ ■ By subsequent US/gVN agreement, all uses of these funds and commodities, and requisitions of the commodities from. Saigon warehouses, required unanimious approval of a three-m^an ("troika") Provincial Coordinating Committee consisting of the Province Chief, the U.S. AID Provincial Representative and the MACV Sector AdvJsor. The troika sign-off had already applied to the commodities, as the means to the U.S. veto ■ on their ijse mentioned above in Section 1. Except for a high-level agree-.<--x m.ent each year on the size and overall allocation of these reso-orces,

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Saigon allowed the Provinces full freedom of action in their use. The intent of this arrangement was to permit prompt action on urgent projects, unaffected, by the delays in the GVN administration that plagued regular GVN operations. It also interfered with corrupt misuse of the AID commiodi ties and of purchase piasters.

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II

AMT^ASSADOR TAYLOR 'S FIRST S E VEW MOimiS : Planning; for " Bomb Nort h" Am id Turbulence in the South

1. Amb assador Tayl or's Initiatj,on^Juj^y^_Ij£!:

Ambassador Taylor arrived in Saigon ejuid the start of planning to extend the war outside the borders of South Vietnam. Rusk had discussed the options with Khanh on June 1, and the participants of the Honolulu Conference had mulled them over further. Although there was no formal decision to recommend new operations in Laos or North Vietnam, there was an atmosphere of expectation. A joint State-Defense message on June 2? authorized joint planning with the Vietn8,m.ese Joint General Staff for cross border operations in Laos; on June 30, Westmoreland discussed it with General Khiem, who a,greed to initiate joint planning. 1/

Taylor came with a letter of support from the President .that cleared up any previous doubt about the Ambassador's control over MACV:

"I want you to have this formal expression not only of my confidence but of my desire that you have and exercise full responsibility for the effort of the United States in South Vietnaja...1 wish it clearly understood that this overall responsibility includes the whole military effort in South Vietnam and authorizes the degree of command and control that you' consider 8.ppropriate •" 2/

Either the letter was intended to prevent confusion of authority such as ' existed among Lodge, Felt, and Harkins, or the expectation of greater ^ ■ militarization of the war made it appropriate to appoint Taylor Ambassaaor and to give him unchallenged authority.

Taylor met lOianh and presented his credentia]:s on July 8. I<hanh promised hjm "the frank cooperation of a soldier." He said the U.S. should not merely advise, but should participate in making and implementing •nlans- in this he still held the view he had expressed to Taylor when he, Hianh, was still a Corps Coirma.nder. (By referring to Zorthian's contacts with the Minister of InformatJ-on, Haanh made it clear he had the brain trust idea in mind.) However, he noted that this degree of involvement should be kept secret, because of the criticism it would attract if known. Tiiev discussed Minh's trips around the country, and agreed these were useful and constructive. Finally, Taylor stressed the importance of Vietnamese unity and resolve. 3/

The next day Taylor called on the three Vice Premiers, Hoan, DO Kau, and Oanh, and received the civilian point of view. Hoan did most

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of the talking, saying that civilian politicians like hmself wanted *\ ^ ' the Amy to be supported by the people, but that Khanh and the MRC

were difficult to work with: The ruling generals control everything. He saJd the II Corps Commander lived like a playboy, and that the people were outraged; "ever since we carae to power we have been telling population we are soon going to have change, but it never comes. The people are becoming impatient." Moreover, he said, something must be done to raise the standard of behavior of the armed forces toward the population. Taylor received these views diplomatically. _4_/

For a while there was a serious effort to go through with close meshing of USOM and GVN planning. On July 17 USOM met with Khanh, Hoan, Oanh and others as a group, which Khanh designated the National Security Council. They discussed joint planning and further meshing of US/gVN organizations, putting the stamp of approval on the arrangement in the Ministry of Information. On July 23 Taylor met Khanh and discussed a second meeting of the NSC Khanh said the Vietnamese had-some difficulty in adjusting their ministerial organization to the requirements of rneshing with the U.S. mission subdivisions. Taylor responded that reciprocal adjustments were possible. _5_/ Planning ^ ' y and discussion of cross-border operations continued actively. Offensive " guerrilla operations in laos were a major idea; small operations had already begun into North Vietnam, under OPLAN 3^A. In the meeting on July 23, Khanh told Taylor he wanted to Intensify the operations under 3)4A and to start air strikes against North Vietnam. 'He said again, ^^ . as he had to Rusk on June 1, that he didn't like to look forward to

the long; indecisive puJ.l of the in-country pacification program, and doubted that the Array and the people would carry on indefinitely. _6/

■ The events of July 19-23 made it clear that GVK was straining at the leash; it started public lobbying for cross-border operations. On July 19 Air Marshal Ky spilled the beans to reporters on plans for operations into Laos. Khanh coiBmitted a similar indiscretion at a "Unification Rally" on the 19th, and these were followed by GVM press releases and editorials in the Saigon press urging a "march to the North." All these leaks directly violated Khanh"s promises to Rusk on June 1 (above, p. 2^). Taylor spoke to Khanh sharply about theiii, and pointed out that they could be Interpreted as a campaign to force the USG's hand. Khanh insisted that such a campaign was tne furthest thinr- from his wind; and then confirmed that it vras exactly what he had m mindT Following a long, eloquent repetition of his remarks of other occasions on Vietnamese war-weariness, he asked: Why does not the USG

" recognize that the appearance of North Vietnamese draftees among the ■ prisoners taken in the I Corps meant that the war had entered a new phase ■ and the USG and GVN must respond with new measures? He said Vietnaraese spirits had been raised by President Johnson's firm statements earlier

'in the year (specifically, Los Angeles, January 2l), but that following them nothing had happened.' The effect was wearing off, and the communists would conclude they were only words. Then Khanh took the offensive and complained to Taylor that U.S. officials were contradicting him

"^

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in public statements. For example, RACV had denied that there was an invasion of I Corps by DRV units, as Khanh had claimed in a speech -at Danang. Zorthian soothed him by saying that MACV merely corrected ■ a miscLuotation of one of MACV's own officials; Taylor said no U.S. _ ■ official would knowingly contradict Khanh. J7_/

Tayl_or took all this patiently; as he did an intelligence report that said Khanh was trying to incite the USG to action against North Vietnam. (The report also said that Ky was saying privately that the GVN should go it alone, because the USG was stalling on account of the U.S. election.) USOM conjectured that Goldwater's nomination had precipitated the "go North" movement. Moreover, within two hours after Khanh's long meeting with Taylor, the Ministry of Defense let fly another press release in the teeth of USOM disapproval, when Khanh ordered the Ministry to reject Zorthian's suggested changes. The only explanation offered was that GVN was extremely sensitive about appearing to be a U.S. puppet. _8_/ ^

In an analysis of these events, Taylor argued for tolerance and patience with GVN, and showed no hint of a desire to get tough. He noted that political sniping and maneuvering pressed Khanh to do something J dramatic to bolster his support. Taylor feared the GVN mdght get tired and want to negotiate if they could not get the" U.S. more involved. He ■ proposed joint contingency planning for bombing North Vietnam as a means to cool GVN off and to reopen comraimications with them. _9j

In a long conversation on July 2.k Khanh discussed his po].itical problems with Taylor and asked him point blank if he should resign, Taylor flatly said no, that the USG still supported him and definitely wanted no further change in GVN. Khanh then asked for a declaration of support and for pressure on the generals to continue to support him; Tay]or agreed. (Coxrment: Much of Khanh^s political problem still revolved around Minh, who had long had good relations with Taylor. This relationship may have worried Khanh, and led him to approach Taylor in this^way. ■ _ However, it may have merely been a way to keep up the pressure on USG on the matter of bombing North. A couple of days later Khanh was again grumbling publicly about being a U.S. puppet.) !£/

In response to Taylor^s discussion of GVN motives and of ways to make them happy, State authorized him to tell Khanh the USG had considered attacks on North Vietnam that might begin, for example, if the pressure from dissident South Vietnamese factions became too great. He must keep -■ ■ this confidential. It said to tell him that the "USG position had not changed, and that it never excluded the possibility of wider action. When Taylor brought this matter to Khanh for discussion, they first agreed^on a OW announcem.ent of an increase in U.S. personnel and discussed the^ press .leaks on going North. Khanh then took the offensive, complaining to ' I'aylor about press stories, suggesting the USG was negotiating with the -Chinese through the Pakistani Government, behind the back of GVN. Taylor soothed him by saying that the USG was merely letting China know how firm our policy was. When Taylor asked Khanh his views of U.S. policy, Khanh

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-^^ said he wa/nted pressuxe on the North, meaning a bombing ca^mpaign. Taylor 'w replied with the position that State had authorized on joint planning._ ^

Khanh acted pleased and surprised, promised to think it over, and prornisea „ to ho]d it tightly. He also said he wanted to reorganize GVN to strengthen his own position; Taylor asked for specifics, and urged him not to do anything drastic that would stir up trouble. 11/

2• The Tonkin l ncidepts_andJAe_Poljx^

Within a week, North Vietnamese PT boats attacked the U.S. destroyer Maddox. in admitted retaliation for an attack by South Vietnamese boats on two^North Vietnamese islands. Then a disputed further attack of Norch Vietnamese ¥Y boats on the Maddox and the Turner Joy on August h provoked a U S retaliatory raid on the main North Vietnamese PT boat base and its support facilities. The raids lifted GVN's spirits, as expected, and encouraged Hianh to clamp down internally. On August 7, he proclaimed a -tate of emergency, the idea he had been discussing for some time with both Lodr^e and Taylor. He reimposed censorship and restricted movement; ^ but he left politicians and potential coup-p]-otters alone. 12/ Also on August 7, the U.S. Congress in joint session passed the Giilf of Tonkin ■ Resolution. . . ' ■ '

On August 8, Westmoreland discussed overall joint planning with Khanh; the question of combined command came up, and Westmoreland mentioned the example of Korea. Both agreed to postpone this issue. 13/ , '

'^ ' On August Ih, State directed Saigon to avoid actions that could

be called provocative, like the DESOTO patrols (which the Maddox and the^ Turner Jov'had been doing when attacked) and 3^A operations. State noted that the U.S. retaliatory raid's effect on GVN's morale would be temporary, and took a pessimistic view of the USOM reports:

"Mission's montly report (Saigon 377) expresses hope^ of significant gains by end of year. But also says Khanh^s chances of staying in power are only 50-50, that leadership... ^ has symptoms defeatism and hates prospect of slugging it out within country, that there will be mounting pressures for wider action 'which, if resisted, will create frictions and irritations which could lead local politicians to serious consideration negotiated solution or local soldiers to mili-tarv adventur-e without U.S. consent'.. .Our actions of last week lifted...morale temporarily, but also aroused expectations, and morale could easily sag back again if VC have successes and we do nothing fu.rther." ' •

The cable went on to state that an essential element of U.S. policy was, in devise the best possible means of action - minimum risks for maximnm ^Lults in terms of SVN morale and pressure on DRV. In the context of a possible new Geneva conference on laos, its prognosis was that pressure on the'North vrould be the m.ain vehicle for success:

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"Basically soli:itio:a in "both South Vietnam and Laos will reCLuire combination military pressure and some form of communication under which Hanoi (and Peiping) eventually accept idea -of getting out. Negotiation without continued military action will not achieve our objectives in foreseeable future.. .After, but only after, we have established clear pattern pressure _ - ■ hurtine DRV and leaving no doubts in South Vietnam of our resolve, we coiad even accept conference broadened to include Vietnam issue." (Underlining in original.)

On the touchy aspect of US/GVN relations, it simply said: ' -

"Joint US/aVN planning, already covers possible actions against DRV and the Panhandle. It can be used in Itself to maintain morale of GVN leadership, as^well as to control and inhibit any unilateral GVN moves." lA/

The Taylor reply to the above message differed only in emphasis.

"...Underlying our analysis is the apparent assum.ption of DepTel ^1-39 (which we believe is correct) that the present in-country pacification plan is not enough in itself to maintain National m„orale or to offer reasonable hope of eventual -^ success. Something must be added in the coming months.

"Statement of the problem - A. The course which U.S. policy in South Vietnam should take during the coming m^onths : can be expressed in terms of fovir objectives. The first and - most iraportant objective is to gain time for the Rianh^govern-■ ment to develop a certain stability and to give some firm evidence of viability. SJ.nce any of the courses, of action^ considered in this cable carry a considerable m^easure of risk to the U.S., we should be slow to get too deeply involved in them u:atil we have a better feel of the quality of our ally. In particular, if we can avoid it, we should not get involved militarily with North Vietnam and possibly with Red China if our base in South Vietnam is insecure and Kbianh's Army is tied down every^-rhere by the VC insurgency. Hence, it is to our interest to gain sufficient time not only^to allow Khanh to prove that he can govern, but also to free Saigon from the VC threat which presently rings it and- assure that sufficient GVN ground forces will be available to provide a reasonable measure of defense against any DRV ground reaction which may develop in the execution of our program and thus ■ . avoid tha possible req,uirement for a major U.S. ground force ^ '■ ■ commitment. . ^

■ "A second objective in this period is the maintenance of morale in South Vietnam, particularly within the Khanh government. This should not be difficult in the case of the government if we can give Khanh assurance of our readiness to bring added pressure on Hanoi if he provides evidence of a.bility

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to do his part. Thirdly, while gaining time for_Khanh, we ' _

must he ahle to hold the DRV in check and restrain a further

buildup of Viet Cong strength byway of infiltration from

the North. Finally, throughout this period, we should be ■ _

developing a posture of maximum readiness for a deliberate

escalate-on of press-ore against North Vietnam, using January 1, .

1965, as a target D-Day. We must always recognize,_however,

that events, may^force us to advance D-Day to a considerably

earlier date..." ■ ■

"In approaching the Khanh Government, we should express our willingness to Khanh to engage in planning and eventually to exert intense pressure on North Vietnam, providing certain conditions are met in advance. In the first place before we would agree to go all out against the DRV, he must stabilize his Government and make some progress in cleaning up his operational backyard^ Specifically, he must execute the initial phases of the Hop Tac Plan successfully to^the extent of pushing the Viet Cong from the doors of Saigon. The overall pacification prograan, including Hop Tac should progress sufficiently to allow earm.arking at least three ■ division equivalents for the Defense in I Corps if the DRV . ^ step up military operations in that area.

"Final]y, we should reach some fundamental understandings with Khanh and his Government concerning war aims. We must make clear that we will engage in action against Noroh_Viet-nam only for the puirpose of assuring the security and inae-pendence of South Vietnam within the territory assigned by the 195^ aweements; that we will not repeat not join m a crusade to unify the North and South; that we_will not re- . . peat not even seek to overthrow the Hanoi Regime Wovx&ed , , the latter will cease its efforts to take over the South by subversive vrarfare.

"With these understandings reached, we would be ready to set in m-otion the following:

(1) Resume at once 3^A (with emphasis on Marine opera-^tions) and Desoto patrols. These could start without awaiting outcome of discussions with Khanh.

(2) Resume U-2 overflights over all WN.

(■^) Initiate air and ground strikes in Laos against . ^ infiltration targets as soon as joint plans now being worked-out with the Khanh Government are ready...

"Before proceeding beyond this point, we should raise the aevel of precautionary military readiness (if_not already done) by taking such visible measures as introducing U.S. hawk units to Danang and Saigon, landing a Marine force ■

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at Danang for defense of the airfield and beefing up MCV's support base. By this time (assumed to be late fall) we . should have some reading on Khanh's performance.

"Assuming that his performance has been satisfactory and that Hanoi has failed to respond favorably^ it will be tme to embark on the final phase of couj:se of action A^ a carefully orchestrated bombing attack on IWM, directed priniarily at infiltration and other military, targets, . .

"Eros and cons of course of action --A. If successful^ course of action A will accomplish the objectives set forth at the outset as essential to the support of U.S. policy in South Vietnam. I will press the Khanh Government into doing its homev^ork in pacj.fication and will limit the diversion of interest to the out-of-country ventures... It gives adeq.uate time for careful preparation estimated at several months, while doing sufficient at once to maintain internal morale. It also provides ample warning to . Hanoi and Peking to allow them to adjust their conduct ") before becoming over-committed,

"On the other hand, couj?se' of action A relies heavily upon the durability of the Fvhanh Government. It assumes that there is little danger of j.ts collapse without notice or of its possible replacement by a weaker or more unreliable successor ...Also, because of the drawn-out nature of the program, it is exposed to the danger of international political pressure to enter into negotiations befoi'e NVN is really hurting from the pressure directed against it.

"Statement of the Problem -- B. It may well be that the problem of U.S. policy in SVN is more urgent than that depicted in the foregoing statement. It is far from clear at the present moment that the Klrj.a,nh Government can last until January 1, I965, although the application of course of action A should have the effect of strengthening the Government internally and of silencing domestic squabbling. If we assume, however, that we do not have the time available which is implicit in course of action A (several months), we would have to restate the problem in the following terms. Our objective avoid the possible conseq.nences of a collapse of National morale. To accomplish these purposes, we would have to open the campaign against the DRV without delay, seeking to force Hanoi as rapidly as possible to desist from aiding the VC and to convince the DRV that it must cooperate in calling off the VC insurgency.

"Coarse of action -~ B- To meet this statement of the problem, we need an accelerated course of action, seeking to

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obtain results faster than under course of action A. Such an accelerated program would inc3-ude the following actions:

"Again we must inform Khanh of our intentj.ons, this time expressing a willingness to begin military pressures against Hanoi at once providing that he will undertake to perform as in coujrse of action A. HoweA^-er, U.S. action would not await evidence of performance.

"Again we ma^r wish to communicate directly on this subject with Hanoi or awaiting effect of our military actions. Tlrie scenario of the ensuing events would be essentially the same as under Course A but the execution would await only the readiness of plans to expedite, relying almost exclusively on U.S. military means.

"Pros and cons of Course of Action B. This covirse of -action asks virtually nothing from the Kh.a:ah Government, primarily because it is assumed that little can be expected from it. It avoids the consequence of the sudden collapse of the Khanh Governmient and gets" underway with mini.mum delay the punitive actions against Hanoi. Thus, it lessens the chance of an interruption of the program by an international demand for negotiations by presenting a fait accompli to international critics. However, it increases the likelihood of U.S. involvement in ground action, since Khanh will have almost no available ground forces which can be released from pacification emplo'yment to mobile resistance of DRV a.ttacks.

"Conclusion: It is concluded that Course of Action A offers the greater promised achievement of U.S. policy objectives in SVN during the coming months. However, we shovLld ■ always bear in mind the fragility of the Khanh Government and be prepared to shift q.uickly to Course of Action B if the situation requires. In either case, we must be militarily ready for any response which may be initiated by WN or by CHICOMS,

"Miscellaneous: As indicated above, we believe that^ 3l^A operations should resvane at once at maximum tem.po, still • 'on a covert basis^ sijiiilarily, Desoto patrols should begin advance operating outside 12-mile limit. We concur that a nujnber of VE^F pilots should be trained on B-57's between now and first of year. There shou].d be no change now with regard to policy on evacuation of U.S. dependents.

"Recommendations: It is recommended that USG adopt Course of Action A while m.aintaining readiness to shift to Course of Action B." 15.

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3, The Eise and Fall of,Hian3T/£ Constitution

In a state of euphoria after the U.S. reprisals, Khanh broached , the subject of a new constitution with Taylor on August 12; presumably this was what he had in mind on July 2? when he mentioned reorganization (above p 3'+ )• He proposed three branches of government beneath the MEC The Assernbly wouid have 90 appointed members and 60 elected; Hianh would be the Pr-esident (and Minh' wouldn't). Taylor urged Kh.anh to go slowly, and to handle the matter gently. Taylor feared renewed political insta- ■ bilitv if sweep-ing government chan.ges were announced; but IQianh said that the country could not progress under the existing government. TayD.or expressed his scepticism, but objected no further than to caution Khanh on the need to explain these changes adequately in advance. 16/

On August li+, after an KSC joint planning session, Khanh showed Taylor a rough English translation of his proposed new constitution. Taylor expressed reservations:

"We found it brusque in language and suggested to Khanh that in present form it could raise criticism in U.S. and world press. We stressed to him that internal problems of acceptance in Vietnam were his ovm affair, and we could only"offer observations on the objective issue of international reactions."

Khanh allowed Sullivan and Manful to work briefly with his drafting comittee, ( ■ the same day, but they worked in such haste that they had little influence.

Taylor comjnented:

'* '■ "We conclude that IQianh and his military colleagues ,have

decided that this sort of change is indispensable. It is of course still not determined what General Minh's view will be. We have considered possibility of seeking legal aid from Washington to review this charter, but feel this would not repeat not be useful because this document departs so ' •■ widely from U.S. experience and because time is so short, we have decided that our best efforts would be devoted to (]) making wording of docviment less bruS'q.ue and r.iore pa3.at-abTe both'in YN and sJbroad, and (2) assisting in proclamation and other sources of public relations nature explaining necessity for this sort of change. Wiether we like it or not, this is the constitutional form which the MRC repeat MRC _ -' fully intends to impose, and we see no repeat no alternative

but to m^ake the best of it." YjJ

Wlien lOianh secured MC approval of the final draft on August I6, they also elected him President, displacing Minh. Khanh had earlier complained to ' _ Tavlor that he had kept Minh, a big source of trouble to him, only at Lodge's urFin- as indeed he had. 18/ Inasmuch as Kianh had seized power using ■' charges aP-ainst four generals and using unproved allegations against Minh,

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and raasmuch as Minh was still a popular figure Kha-nh was bomcl to regard' Minli as a threat to his personal prospects. -U/ .

For severe! days following the announcement of the new constitution, a heaI°of^:Sa.a-hu^t up a^ong students and Buddhists J^-e .s^o s ga^

that the J]r.lmssy did anything to ^f ^^^Pf ^/^^^^;^.,°JJ,f ^^X df sregarded. other than the previously mentioned words °J^ f ^^^^'^^^^^^^ ™ J^ i/the On August 21, student demonstrations broke ouo. Violence^DU3J^ up x s?rteS, organized and orchestrated by the Buddhxsts and the VC. 20/

Taylor called o^ Khanh on August 2U in his Dalat retreat to tell him how seriously the Embassy viewed the demonstrations. The discussion revolved around "public info-cmation" and completion of arrangexaents for the new

complaints and to try to enlist tneir ui.j.jj. ^. .^^, "^^^ . ,^, pnfoT-op the student demands, to crack down on the demonstrations, and to enfoice tne

old m.obilization decrees plus new ones.

State responded to these events with a public announcement of support for lOianh in more direct language than any previously used. - . .

"The IJpited States governm.ent fully recognizes the need fo. national unity in South Vietnam and is, therefore support-ir^ the Khanh governm.ent as the best means of building such uSty at Sfslme time that the war effort is being prosecuted, Obviously anything of a divisive nature is neither in^_the interest of the Vietnamese goverment nor its people. 21/

Th^ evening^anh^et three^op Bud^^^^ ■.

r iSS:?e':bSg::irS-t^S.S.'l6 charter and the holding of ^ee , elections by Woveir^er 1, 1965- I*-anh made the m.istake of telling ttiem _ he would have to consult the Ajnericans.

Taylor and others met Khanh at 1:00 a.m. August 25. ^^rSfereSed . • \^...v.n ni-.r Tnvlor sa-id his tentative personal views as an mterestea ?Sra Sri; S; tSf KhaS; .Suld not toucke under to a Mnority group on ,°chtn imoirtant i.sue as the August l6 daarter, ^^P^^^'^^g,"^^""^,;.

concerns of the Buddhists and students. 22/ • .

ICV.onh's -nroclamation promised to revise the constitution, diminish censoSS, -ct5^^"l-al Ibuses of government and permit ^^^J^ ^tr-^tions The Buddhists and students were not satisfied, they formed stictions. ine ^ briefly without further con- .

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withdrawn^ and that the MEC wonJ.d meet the next day to choose a new Chief of State and v/ould then dissolve itself. 23/

Taylor had made it clear to Minh^ IQiiem, Lam and Khanh that the U,S. favored retaining Khanh as head of the GVN. Both Tri Quang and Tarn Chau^ fearing a Dai Viet takeover^ supported Khanh. Aligned against Khanh v/ere elements of the military angered hy Kh.anh's "down with military dictatorship" statem_ent made from a truck top and the Dai Viet (including Khiem.;, Hoan and Minh) angered "by his appeasemjant of the Buddhists, 2|4/

On August 26 and 27, the MRC met, while violence erupted in the streets of Saigon. The evening of the 27th they announced that a triuia-virate consisting of Generals Klianh, Minh, and Khiem would ru].e as an interim, government vrhile they tried to form a new one- Hrianh withdrew to Dalat, and Vice-Premier Oanh became acting Prme Minister. Violence continued, and coup rumors becam.e especially active. 2^5/

On August 29, a State Departmient official briefed the press, interpreting events. He said Buddhists and students interpreted the August 16 charter as a return to Diemismi and repression; in meeting their demands the MRC had worried some Catholics, but balanced things out by creating . the tri\mvirate with all views represented. He said the charter had not been the USG^s idea, but that we had been consulted and had urged delay.. The demonstrations did not contain appreciable anti-Americanism, he said,. nor did they arise from, differences between the "go North" feelings of the military and refugee Catholics, on the one hand, and neutralist senti-ments of students and Buddhists, on the other. However, the cable reporting the press conference to the Erabassy showed concern on both these latter points. 26/ >'

\ . GVN Acquire s a Civilian Flavor ,__and__the^_US^^

On August 29th, Vietnamese paratroopers armed with bayonets restored order in Saigon. Khanli rested in Dalat; Taylor called on hira on the 31st-to try to persuade him to return to Saigon quickly to prove he was in charge. Westmoreland went to see Khanh the next day to urge him to keep ARVH on the offensive and to press on with Hop Tac and other pacification; in exchange for reassurances, Westmoreland revised a previous position 27/ and promised that U.S. advisors through MiACV would alert Khanh to unusual, troop movements. Westmoreland also obtained reassurances from General Khiem, Rusk suggested a letter from I^esident Johnson in?ging Khanh to return td Saigon, and then cabled the text of such a letter. A Dai Viet coup attempt was blocked by the junior members of the l^C, who had now become powerful. Several Generals went to Dalat to persuade Khanh to return as Prrime Minister, which he promised to do in a few days. Khanh did return to Saj.gon on September h, 28/ Minh was to be chairman of the trium^virate, and would ajDpoint a, new High Nationa]. Council to represent all elements in the population. The Council was to prepare a, new constitution and return the government to civilian leadership within a month or so. Klianh was taking the line that he wanted to get the Army out of politics. Vfiaen Taylor cautioned Khanh, just before the latter* s return to Saigon, that an a].l-civilia.n government

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-,^1. +-00 -TPPlc snd would tend toward neutralism, Khanh replied that '' IZIZ ZAte ^i :lIaS! Ta.lor again advised Khanh to la. the ground-^-!/hPtter before any more changes in governjnent structure. VJhen the T°iLv iate an .ouSced'^the creation of the WiC, they also ended the state of mIrSncy and press censorship, which they had declared on September 6. 29,

On the morning of September 6, as he was leaving for Washington, TBvlor sent Rusk a f^ill review of the crisis and of its effects on the Sbassv-State military and political appraisal of mid-August. He san.d that ?he SsG now had to give up on the idea of using a plan for press.^es on the North L leverage to get the GVN to press.on with pacxfxcatxon and should go ahead with these presstxres in the hope that they would raxse Vietnamese morale enough to keep up their war effort:

"...miile we must be disappointed by the political turmoil of recent days, we cannot consider it totally unexpected. The very nature of the social, political and ethnic confu-Sion in this country makes goverimental turbulence of this type a factor which we will always have with us. •■

"What has emerged from these recent events is a defini-I I . tion within fairly broad limits of the degree to which per-

fectability in goverxim.ent can be pushed. It should be remembered that the recent fracas started when KhanJri sought to make his broad and cumbersome government m.ore tractable and more effective. His motives were of the best even though his methods • "^ ■ were clumsy. But now, after this recent experience at govern-

ment improvement we must accept the fact that an effective government, much beyond the capacity of that which has existed over the past several months, is unlikely to survive. We now have a better feel for the quality of our ally and for what we can ex^iect from hm in terms of ability to_govern. Only the emergence of an exceptional leader could mprove the situation and no George Washington is in sight.

"Conseq.uently, we can and mii.st anticipate for the fiiture an instrument of government which will have definite limits of ■nerform.ance. At the very worst, it will continue to seek a broadened consensus involving and attem_pting to encompass _all. or most of tlie minority of popular front. This amalgam, if it takes form, m_ay be expected in due course to become sus-ce-Dtible to an accommodation with the liberation front, which ' might eventually lead to a collapse of all political energy , behind the pacification effort.

"At best, the emerging governmental structure m.ight be ca-oable of maintaining a holding operation against the Viet Cong.' This level of effort could, with good luck ana strenuous American efforts, be expanded to produce certain limited pacification successes, for example, in the territory covered C the Hop Tac plan. But the willingness and ability of such ^ a goverrLment to exert itself or to attem.pt to execute an all-out

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r National pacification plan would be marginal. It would

probably be incaps^le of galvanizing the people to the heightened level of unity and sacrifice necessary to carry . forward the counter-insurgency program to final success. Instead, U would look increasingly to the United States to take the major responsibility for prying the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese off the backs of the South Vietnamese population. Kie politicians in Saigon, and Hue feel today that the po].3.tical hassle is their appropriate arena: The conflict with the VC belongs to the Americans.

"We may, therefore, expect to find ourselves faced with a choice of (a) passively watching the development of a popular front, knowing that this may in due course rectuire the U.S. to leave Vietnam in failure; or (b) actively assuming increased responsibility for the outcome following a tme-schedule consistent with our estimate of the limited viability of any South Vietnamese government.

"An examination of our total world responsibilities and ' the significance of Vietnam in relationship to them clearly rules out the option of accepting course (a). If we leave ■ Vietnam with our tail between our legs, the consequences of this defeat in the rest of Asia, Africa and Latin America would be disastrous. We therefore would seem to have little choice left except to accept course (b).

"Our previous views on the right couj-se of action to follow in South Vietnam are set forth in EMBTEL )465. The discussion-in this present cable amounts to a recognition that course of action A repeat A of EMBTEL U65 no longer corresponds with the realities of the situation. Recent events have revealed the weakjiess of our ally and have convinced us of the improbability of attaining the level of governm.ental perform.ance desired under course A before embarking on a campaign of pressure against the DRV. VJe are forced back on course of action B with certain revised views on timing."

He went on to recommend that escalating pressures on the DRV begin around^ December 1. 30/ . . -- . '

Taylor brought with him General Westmoreland's assessment of the ■ military situatiqn; it included a look at the political situation from a completely different viewpoint from Taylor's:

"...1. In preparation for your trip to Washington, I thought it might 'be useful to give you my assessment of the. military situation. In subsequent paragraphs I outline in some detail the rather substantial progress which we have

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already made andj more importantly, the great potential for __ additional progress. 1 also describe military problem, areas.

These, as you know, are m.any; but all are susceptible to solution assuming that political stability can be achieved, and that armed forces, particularly the Army, remiains intact and unified in its purpose. Under the present circumstances, however, the continued solidarity of the arm.ed forces is in doubt. As all else depends on holding the armed forces together, I e.ddress this matter first.

" The Key Military Issue .

"2. It seems to m^e there are certsAn conditions which must be met in order to preserve the structui-e and effectiveness of the RVKAF:

A. The officers of the RVME must be protected against purge, solely by reason of religious or political affiliation. The Commander in Chief, the officers of the Joint General Staff and commanders down the line, must be given some assurance the^t their careers a-nd reputations will not be sacrificed, for political expediency to the ambitions or interests of politica.l or religious blocs.

B. The Officers* Corps, must be assured that its members v/ill not be punished or expelled from the armed forces

( if they faithfully execute the orders of constituted authority

in connection with the ma.intexvance of law and order. They must be assured the>t their superiors will not a^ccede to the arbitra^ry demands of pressure groups whose interest it is to destroy the discipline of the armed forces and to render P ineffective the forces of law and order.

"3- If I interpret correctly the events of the past two weeks, neither of these miniraum conditions have been met. To the contrary, auctions best calculated to destroy the miorale, the unity, the pride a.nd confidence of the armed forces have transpired in a. manner whidi leads me to believe that a relative free hand has been given to those \iho aim to destroy the armed forces. The demands of the Buddhists for the resignation of the Commander in Chief, the Chief of Staff, Commander of II Corps, the Prefect of Saigon aaid the Director of Na.tional Police, to na,me a few, appear to be b3_ows directed at the heart of the security forces vjhich stand between the Viet Cong and victory. I cannot believe that it is in the interests of the Illation to accede to these dem.ands. To the contrary, I am persuaded that acceptance is a formula for political and military disaster. Wliile aware that the insurgency cannot be overcome by mllitaz-^y m.eans alone, I a,m equally av/are that without a strong military foundation no prograia will ever achieve

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victory. I am concerned tha,t th-c Government of Vietnam has already moved some distance dovm the wrong road in dealing with its Amred Forces. I do not knov/ v/hether the Armed Forces will collapse or whether, finding the present course intolerable 5 they will make a desperate move to regain pov/er-Neither course of action is compatible with, the objective we seek.-" 3l/

In Washington^ Taylor, Rusk, McNamara and Wneeler reached a consensus 'that (l) Khanh and GVN were too exhausted to be thinking about moves against the North, (2) GVN needs reassurance, and (3) Klianh is likely to stay in control, but not to get much done on the pacification progra^m. 3^/ There followed NSAM 31U, whose main point was that "first order of business at present is to take actions which will help strengthen the fabric of the GVN." 33/

5 • The HNC Goes to Wo rk Amid Fu.rther Turb ulence

Helping strengthen the fabric of GVN proved to be easier said than done.

Another coup attempt on September 13 failed v/hen Ky and Thi, along with other young officers, supported the existing government. The USG opposed the coup, and also opposed overt violence to suppress it; in particular, USG opposed VNAF bombing of Saigon, which v/as threatened at one point when the coiip general.s gained control of m.uch of the city. 3V Wlien Khanh and Ky asked for U.S. Marines,- the USG refused; State authorized a strong line in favor of the Triumvirate, and e.gainst internecine W8.r:

"(a) It is imperative that there not be internecine war

withi.n VN Arm.ed Forces. ■ . ■

(b) The picture of petty bickering among VN leaders has created an appalling impression abroad..-

(c) The U.S. has not provided Liassive assistance to SVN,

in military eq,uipra.ent, economdc resources and personnel, in order to subsidize continuing c].uarrels among SVN leaders... , .

(g) Emphasize that VN leaders must not take the U.S. for

granted. _ . ■

"2. In line with above you should make it emphatically clear whenever useful, that we do not belie^^^e a Phat/Duc government can effectively govern the country or command the necessary popular support to carry forward the effort against the VC. U.S. support for the GVN is based on the triumvirate and its efforts to bring about a b3?oa,dly based and effective government satisfactorily reflecting the interests and concerns '. of a].l groups." 35/ . - "'

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After the coup failed, the Embassy pressed Khanh to exile the coup leaders q.uietly; and in the upshot they were acquitted of the charges against thern, 36/

A fresh problem blew up on September 20 when Rhade tribesm.en in four CIDG camps advised by U.S. Special Forces revolted against Saigon*s authority. It arose from a long-festering mistrust and contempt between the Montagnards, encouraged by the VC, and the lowland Vietna.mese. This problem also vexed US/gVT^" relations, because the U.S. Special Forces ad-^ visors generally got along well with the tribesmen, and some may have s^nnpathlzed with them; and in particular, it added to Khanli's suspicions of U.S. Jn.tentions. l\io or three Rhades had become officers in ARW, and Westmoreland suggested using .them as interm.ediarles with the rebelling units; but 1-Cb.anh turned the Idea down flat. He also declined to m.ake concessions to Montagnard discontent. Then Taylor sent General DePay as his intermediary to tell the Rhades they were off the payroll until they submitted _ to GY'N authority. This move produced a temporary settlement, but trouble continued to boil up for another two or three weeks. 37/

The High National Council began its deliberations on September 2ki Taylor took the occasion to comment that Khanh conceded too much to organized pressure groups. Noting that GVN effectiveness and morale had virtually collapsed, he disliked the purely civilian makeup of the Councl.!, and hoped that it would take its time about v/rlting a permanent constitution. GVN set a deadline of October 27 for this exercise. 38/ Watching on the sidelines, here as at other times, Taylor opp)Osed unsettling change, and opposed excessive civilian influence because of their presiun.ed factionalism and lack of fervor in prosecuting the wa.r.

6' The HN C Ingtalls Civilian Leadei-ship^_October , 196^-

The view that bombing the North was the key to success received , a fresh airing, this time in a public revelation of what USG v/as thinking. Assistant Secretary of State William Bundy said in a speech delivered in Tokyo on September 3O that such bombing would cut down the threat to GVN in a m^atter of months.

Early in October, Khanh succeeded In exiling General Khiem., a meniber of the triuirivirate, whom he had suspected of instigating the Septem.-ber 13 coup attempt; Khiem became Ainbassador to the U.S. 39/

As the PINC deliberated. State sent Taylor its guidance on the ' USG position during the formation of the new government-to-be:

' "!.' We concur that we must. . .avoid any public espousal of charter or people, although we v/ill undoubtedly be charged in any event with considerable responsibility for the selection of the form and personnel of any new government...We cannot privately " . . dlsclalmi any preference for individuals or form of goveriment because of our Intense interest in seeing a nevj government having^sound organization, able m.em-bers, and broad basis of popular support. We also

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want to avoid any private irapression that we are dumping Khanh and that as far as we are concerned everything is up for grabs...

"2. As seen from here;, evolving political situation in Saigon contains at least two major problems for U.S. EmbTel 105^ strongly suggests HNC is leaning toward parliamentary form of government with all the weaknesses which were so apparent in the French ^th Republic. The second problem, highlighted in EmbTel 983. is to avoid a sharp spl'it between the only real powers in the country, the military, and the civilian HNC, This split could occur over form of government or its personnel. U.S. must try to bring stable government of persons acceptable to both military and civilian."

Then there followed three suggestions on form of governiaent and a paragraph on people.

"7. Finally, there is a delicate problem, during this transition period, in our relations with General Khanh and his military supporters. The present truth is they hold such power as exists in SVN. Their acceptance is prereaui-. ' site to any successful constitution of a new government. Our problem is that we must not abandon one horse before there is another horse which can run the course. I would suggest: That you have full and frank discussion with General Khanh about how he sees the development of the . , situation so that what we ourselves do is in consonance^ with the consensus among military and civilian leadership which it is now our highest purpose to build...The im-portcant thing is that during thi.s period we not find ourselves in a position where there is no one with whom

we can work." 40

^

Meanwhile, Minh allied himself with the High National Council to put provisions for civilian control in the new constitution opposed bv Khanh and the now powerful junior membership of the MEC, Taylor tried to persuade them to resolve their differences q.u.ietly, and to make sui^e a widely acceptable document was cleared all around before publication. Thinldnp that things were more likely to get worse rather than better, Secretary Rusk suggested that the USG should prefer IQian_h. and the Young Turks" to Mihh and the HNC: ■

■■ "Bob McNamara and I have following reaction to political moves you hs.ve reported during last week.

"A struggle seems to be developing between Minh and HNC on one hand and Khanh and Young Turk military on the other. Between these two groups it seems to us our best interests are served if Hianh comes out on top...Problem is to get

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government with Klianh in a leading role, ideally as chief executive unless some strong civilian shows up who is not now apparent- At least Khanh should remain as leader of Army v/ith co-eq.ual position to civilians in a government, whose mandate will run for at least l8 months,..We believe it shouli be made clear that U.S. does not repeat not support Minh as powerful chief executive.

"This is consensus here and we would much appreicate your coicmente" ^£1/

Once again the policy was to limit change and to limit civilian inf].uence. Taylor replied:

"The views which you and Bob MclX^ajuara express.. .are very much the sa.me conclusions we have reached and acted upon ,. here." U2,

. Minh expected to be the new Chief of State and to name the Primie Mini.ster. Taylor talked to him_ about the selection problem, saying that he wished to be consulted. Minh asked Taylor's view of Saigon's Mayor Huong and of Minister of the Interior Vien. Tayloi' diplomatically gave his very high opinion of Vien. ij^/ State urged Taylor to use his influence freely while he could still influence the shape of the new government, kh/

The High Katlonal Council finished on schedule on October 27, and surprised the Embassy by electing its chairman, Phan Kliac Suu, an-elderly and respected politician, to be the new Chief of State. Religious group leaders pressured the HNC into this decision at the J.ast minute. Taylor had hoped and expected Minh would be elected^ although the action. met IQ-ianh's promise in August that the military wonJ,d get out of politics. lOianh and his ca,binet resigned and went into caretaker status. The HNC stayed on as the legislative body. Ta,ylor tried to make the best of it, but protested to Suu about the failure of the imc to consult him about Suu's election^ Suu responded by discussing the composition of the new cabinet with hm, naming Huong as Prime Minister. Taylor also gave Suu the usual polite lecture about the need for strong government. State went along reluctantly with the new government; IQmnh and the Young Turks also went along. h^J

7- A Qu iet H ovember, 1 96^

At the end of October, the VC staged a mortar attack on the Bien Hoa air base, de;.troying several U.S. aircraft and killing four Ainericans. • Taylor urged a reprisal bombing like the one in August following the Tonkin Gulf incidents, but Washington declined to approve. Huong told Taylor he hoped the U.S. would respond, in a meeting to consult on Huong's pending cabinet appointments, but the issue was already decided and Taylor had to discourage the idea. hSj

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The new cabinet froze out Minhj no dou.bt to improve the palatability of the ne\i government to the dominant group in the imC. Minh then packed up and went abroad on a good will tours Taylor found the cash cost to the U.S. running high, but recommended paying it. k^J In his overall assessm.ent of the balance of power in the new government, Taylor thought that the MRC had allowed civilians to get power (as promised in August) because .the FiRC feared mob violence, and thought it expedient to let the civilians make a mess of it so that military rule would again become acceptable. That is, he hoped and expected that a military retur-n to power would become widely acceptable. Taylor thought the overall politi-cal'prospects were "faintly encouraging." Commenting in reply, State once again emphasized the accepted links between U.S. commitment and GVN morale and efforts; , ^ . ' ■

"a key element in either the immediate program or the long-range coui'se of action will be the nature of our discussions with the GVN. Sullivan has impressed on us the seriousness of SM doubts a.s to U.S. intentions.. .More basically, we believe no course of action can succeed unless we are able to stiffen GVN to set its house in order and take every possible measure for political stability and to push forward-the pacification program.." ^8/

These links received a full airing between Taylor and State and between Taylor and Huong. To State, Taylor said:

."We have had a great deal of discussion here as to the minimum level of government required to justify mounting military pressure against the North. I would describe that minimum governiaent as one capable of maintaining law and order in the urban areas, of secuj:*ing vital military bases from VC attaclis, and giving its efforts with those of USG. As Reference B indicates we do not expect such a government for 3^to h months...perhaps not then if the current attem_pts to chip away at the Huong go\/-ernment continue However, if the government falters and gives good

reason to believe that it will never attain the desired . level of performance, 1 would favor going against the North anyv/ay. The purpose of such an attack v/ould be to give pul-motor treatment for a government in oxtreffii£ and to make ■ sui-e that the DRV does not get off "unscathed in any final settlement." Ug/ ' . • ' ■

In his conversation with Huong, the latter req.uested:

"That I obtain a reaffirmation of U = S. policy toward VN. Pluong referred to U.S. action in Gulf of Tonkin and the lift in m.orale W had received at this display of determination by the U.S. to strike against the North. Subseq.uent.ly, however, U.S. had appeared to em.phasize aMost excliisivel-y necessity considering war within SVN

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itself. I responded that reciprocal responsibilities were ^ involved. On the OVN side it was essential that a stable government be established capable of directing affairs of the Nation and particularly of directing the national paci- ■ fication effort...Should his government demonstrate it was capable of achieving satisfactory degree of government stability and effectiveness a wider range of possibilities would u-ndoubtedly be open for discussion. . .Huong indicated his complete understanding of the situation." _50/

At this time another case of non-consultation blew up. RV.mF reorganization plans had passed back and forth between the MRC and M&CV since July. Then, on November 10, the ffiC produced a plan that differed materially from the last one mcv had seen, Huong signed it, and it was ■ published on November 11 before MA.CV could review it. Westmoreland and Taylor both protested to their respective contacts in the strongest terms; the decrees were withdrawn, changed to mCV's satisfaction, and reissued. ^

On November 26, Westmoreland squelched an apparent coup planned by Ky. He heard of unusual activity at VNA,F headq.uarters and asked Ky to . his office. Ky bluntly stated a case for a change of leadership. Westmoreland

said:

"After pa^tiently listening to the foregoing, I informed Ky in no uncertain terms that the U.S. government would not support a change of command by other than orderly and legal process. (This statement was cleared in advance with Ambassa- ^ dor Johnson.) Ky was obviously impressed by my statement and said that he would not take action for three months, but if the situation continued to deteriorate he would be constraineJ to act in national interest." 52/

This episode was the first sign of Young Turk action against the new government, and the first recorded sign of Ky's own ambitions. The U.S. reaction • underlined the USG's opposition to sudden change without broad supporo, even though it was expected that the military would return to power eventually.

8. A Lecture And a Program For G VN

NSAM 31^1, September 10, which had called for actions to strengthen cm had set wheels in motion toward spelling out a U.S. program within SVl'to complement the contemplated actions against the North. Taylor returned to Washington for consultations at the end of November. In the NSC he argued that a strong message to GA^N about its problems would most likel\r produce the optimum response. He said a threat by the U.S. to withdraw unless they improve would be too much of a gamble. There was no discussion of intermiediate leverage or sanctions between this extreme H threat and none at all. The discussion also highlighted the fear that

' yjj ^^^Yit coUa-Dse or be replaced by neutralists who would ask the U.S.

" to withdraw; all agreed that neutralism could not be accepted, and that

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O tbe U.S. should mnimize this risk hy full hacking of the existing GVN. 53/

Taylor returned to Saigon with an approved ^^^'■■-^'^^l\^llir for GVN tha,t embodied his principal recormnendatxons. I^^/f.l^^^3^.^f^,^:.^t3 fas an across the hoa,.rd increase in the approved ^^l^^^^:^

v?Ss at the highest levels that had developed in the f.rsb half of the year. As presented to GVN, it said:

"It was the clear conclusion of the recent review in _ Wash-lngton of the situation in South Vietnam that the unsatis-factory progress heing made in the Pacification Program was the reL?t of two primary causes from which m.any seconaary causes stem. The primary cause has heen the gover-nmexital ■ • inst°hil5ty in Saigon, and the second the continued rem-fo -ci-ei; Ld direction of the Viet Cong by the government of

■ North Vietnam. It was recognized tha. to ^^^ft^f^l'^T^^elY ward trend of events, it will be necessary go deal adequately

with both of these factors.

"however it was the clear view that these factors are ■ not of eciual'im.portance. First and above all, there m.ust be a stable, effective Vietnamese Govermaent able ^o con-^ duct a successful campaign against the Viet Cong even if the

aid from North Vietnam for the Viet Cong should end. It was the view that, while the elim.ination of North Vietnam intervention would raise m.orale on our side and make it M ■ easier for the Government of Vietnam to ftmction, i. would

not in itself bring an end to Viet Cong insurgency. It would rather be an important contributory factor ^°J;^^ creation of conditions favoring a successful campaign agam.t the Viet Cong within South Vietnam.

"Thus, since action against Worth Vietnam would only be contributory and not central to winning the ^^f'^^

the Viet Cong, it wo^ad not be P^^^^^'^^^^ ^!^?!^^f ^^^f t>,ere which are inherent in an expansion of hostilities until there ^erf a g^vern^nent in Saigon capable of handling the serious problems inevitably involved in such an expansion and capa lie of promptly and fully exploiting the favorable effects ■ • Sich may be anticipated if we are successful in terminating Se support and direction of the Viet Cong by North Vietnam.

Then it went to the poi.nt:

" In the view of the United States, there is a certain minimum ;ondition to be brought about in South Vietnam before nw measures against North Vietnam would be either justified or practicable. At the minlmura, the Government m Saigon

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,-''""^ should be able to speak for and to its people who will need

special guidance and leadership throughout the coming critical period- The Government should be capable of maintaining law and order in the principal centers of population, assuring their effective execution by military, and police forces completely responsive to its authority. The Government must have at its disposa.l m^ea^ns to cope promptly and effectively with enemy reactions which mu.st be expected to result from any change in the pattern of our operations.

"To bring about this condition will require a demonstration of f8.r greater national unity against the Communist enemy at this critical time than exists at present. It is a matter of greatest difficulty for the United States Government to req.uire great sa.crifices by American citizens on behalf of South Vietnam when reports from Saigon repeatedly give evidence of heedless- self-interest and shortsightedness 8.mong so many major political groups.

As a c[uid pro q^uo, it said:

"...While the Government of Vietnam is making progress toward achieving the goals set forth above, the United States Govermient would be willing to strike harder at infiltration routes in Laos and at sea. V/ith respect to Laos, the Un3.ted States Government is prepared, in conjunction with the Royal La.os Government, to add United States air power as needed to restrict the use of Laotian territory as a route of infiltration into South Vietnam. With respect to the sea, the United States Governraent would favor an intensification of those covert maritime operations which have proved their usefulness in harassing the enemy. Tlie United States would regard the combination of these opex-a^tions in La^os and at sea as constituting Phase I of a measured increase of military pressures directed toward reducing infiltra.tion and warning the Government of North Vietnam of the risks it is running.

"...If the Government of Vietnam is able to demonstra.te its effectiveness and capability of achieving the minira.um conditions set forth above, the United States Government is prepa^red to consider a program of direct military pressure on IVorth Vietnam as Phase II,., . , . -

"As contemplated 1>y the United States Govermnent, Phase II would, in general terms, constitute a series of air a.ttacks on North Vietnajn progressively mounting in scope and intensity for the purpose of convincing the leaders of North Vietnam that it is to their interest to cea.se aid to the Viet Cong and respect the independence and security of South Vietnam..." ^h,

_.^ In short, the USG offered to add some of its aircraft immediately to the ^ "^ Vietnam.ese ones already bombing the Laotian corridor, in exchange for a

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GVN proiiiise of a shift to more energy and effectiveness; tlien when such energy and effectiveness actually became visible, the USG promised, the USG would "begin bombing North Vietnam-

The program included the following areas in whj.ch progress would aid pacification and would measure the GVN^s effectiveness:

1. and 2/ Increasing RVKAJ, paramilitary, and police to and

above existing authorised strengths.

3. Better performance by civilian and military officials.

II k. Speeding up budgetary procedures and spending in the

provinces,

5. Strengthening the province chiefs.

6. Strengthening police powers.

I I

7. More vigor in Hop Tac. ^ - .

8. After a delay, "review cases of political prisoners from previous regimes." 55/

To leave no doubt about what it wanted, the program said:

^.y . . "Better performance in the prosecution of the war against

the Viet Cong needs to be accompanied by actions to convince the people of the interest of their government in their well- . being. Better perform.ance in itself is perhaps the most convincing evidence but can be supplemented by such actions as frequent visits by officj.als and ranking military officers to the provinces for personal orientation and "trouble shooting." The avails.ble information media offer a channel of coimuuriication with the people which could be strengthened and more efficiently employed. The physical appearance of the cities, particularly of Saigon, shows a let-down :i.n civic .-pride which, if corrected, would convey a message of governmental effectiveness to their inliabitants. Similarly, in the country an expanded rural development program could carry the government's presence into every reasonably secure village 8.nd hamJ.et.-

"If governraental performance and popular appeal are^ signifitantly Improved, there will be little difficulty^in establishing confidence in the government. However, this confidence should be expressed, not merely implied. It.is particularly important that the military leaders continue to express public confidence in the governiflent and the firm intention to uphold it. VJhile not giving an impression of ' -submitting to pressure, the government might explore honorable

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vays of conciliating its most important opponents among the minority groups. The United Stcates Government is prepared to help by oral statements of support and by further assis- . tance to show our faith in the future of South Vietnam," 56/

Taylor, Westmoreland;, and Johnson met Huong, Deputy Premier Vien, and Ivhanh on December 7 to present them with the new U.S. program. The Vietnamese group politely suggested that they did not know what the USG meant by a stable effective government able to campaign successfully against the Viet Cong, and able to speak for and to its people. Moreover, they noted that the U.S. program said nothing about Viet Cong use of^^Cambodia. At the next meeting, on December 9, Taylor gave them the paper "Actions Designed to Strengthen the Government of Vietnam," Governing the eight areas of desired progress and measures of GVN effectiveness listed above.-The I^ime Minister replied that the issue of political prisoners from previous regimes was a very delicate mattery Khanli said there was no problem about military support of the existing government. Taylor cabled President Johnson that the USG propos8j.s:

"have been received with an understanding reasonableness in the light of the current situation but without great enthusiasm since they necessarily omit some of the more dramatic actions which the Vietnamese desire."

The only decisons reached were for joint study and consultation, ^jj This was the last time the USG tried to set GVl performance preconditions for U.S. force use and deploym.ents. Its effect, if■ any, was the opposite of that intended.

9 • The Govern iTient' s Support Vanishes^_^a/oj[J^

A new threat of crisis boiled up immediately; first, the leading Buddhists declared their opposition to the government and went on a forty-eight hour hunger strike. Huong stood fast, buf then the Young Turks picked a fight through a sudden demand that the HNG dismiss nine generals ^^ and thirty other officers. (These included some, like Minh and the "Dalat generals expelled by Kh.anh, who no longer had jobs but still held their rank and received Army pay,) Taylor backed Huong and the HNC against all comers, and tried to get Buddhists and others to support them. The HNC refused to retire the 39 officers. But the Youiag Turks, playing for Buddhist support, would not be denied,. In the early morning hours of Sunday, December 20, they arrested twenty-two or more officials and politicians, includ-11 ing several members of the HNC, and made dozens of other political arrests.

■ ■ They^also created an "Armed Forces Council" over or replacing the MRC,

, ■' to consolidate their power. 58/

Through Huong and indirect contacts, Taylor found out about the dissolution of the HNC several hours before Khanh announced it at a press ^! " conference; and one, hour before the conference ICbanh spoke to Taylor about

" it. Taylor protested in the strongest terms, but without effect; Khanh jl _. ^,e^t ahead with the announcement. Taylor and Johnson also met with the

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Yoiin^ TOTk leaders, Ky, Thieu, Thi, and Gang, and .gave them a stern lecture, speaking, as he later put it, "as one soldier to another," As recorded just aftervrard by the U.S. participants, the meeting went as follows:

"-..AMBASSADOR TAYLOR: Do all of you understand English? (Vietnamese officers indicated they did, although the understanding of General Thi was known to he weak.) I told you all clearly at General Westmoreland's dinner we Americans were tired" of coups. Apparently I wasted my words. Maybe this is because som.ething is wrong with my French because you evidently didnH understand. 1 made it clear that all the military plans which I know you would like to carry out are dependent on governmental stability. 'No^^ you have made a real mess. \Je cannot carry you forever if you do things like this. "Who speaks for this group? Do you have a spokesman?

"GEKERAL KY: I am not the spokesman for the group but I do speak English. 1 will explain why the Armed Forces took this action last night.

"We understand English very well. We are aware of our responsibilities, we are aware of the sacrifices of our people over twenty years. We know you want stability, but you cannot have stability until you have unity..-But stilly there are rumors of coups and doubts among groups. We think these "^ - rumors come from the HNC, not as an organization but from

some of Its m.embers. Both military and civilian leaders regard the presence of these people in the HNC as divisive of the Amred Forces due to their influence.

"Recently the Prime Minister showed us a letter he ■ had received from the Chairm-an of the HNC. Tliis letter ■ told the Prime Minister to beware of the military, and saxd that maybe the military would want to come back to power. Also the HNC illegally sought to block the retirement of the generals that the Armed Forces Council imanimously recommended be retired in order to improve unity in the Armed Forces.

"GEI\7!]RAL THIEU: The HNC cannot be bosses because of the Constitution. Its members must prove that they want to fight.

"GENERAL KY: It looks as though the HNC does not want unity. "It does not want to fight the Communists.

"It has been rumored that our action of last night was an Intrigue of Kh.anh against Minh, who must be retired. ,1 Why do we seek to retire these generals? Because they had

' ■ " their chance a-nd did badly...

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"Yesterday we met, twenty of us, from 1^30 to 203O. We reached agreement that we must take some action. We decided to arrest the bad members of the MC^ bad politicians,_ bad student leaders, and the leaders of the Committee of National Salvation, which is a Communist organization. We m„ust put the trouble-making organi^.ations out of action ■ and ask the Prime Minister and the Chief of State to stay ^ , in office.

"After we explain to the people why v/e did this at a press conference, x^e would like to return to our fighting units. We have no political ambitions. We seek strong, unified, and stable Armed Forces to support the struggle and a stable goveriiment. Chief of State Suu agrees with us. General Khanh saw Huong who also agreed.

"We did what- we thought was good for this country; we tried to have a civilian governm^ent clean house. If v/e have achieved it, fine. V/e are now ready to go back to our units,

"AMMSSADOR TAYLOR: I respect the sincerity of you gentlem-en. Now 1 would like to talk to you about the consequences of what you have done. But first, would any of the other officers wish to speak?

"ADMIRAL CANG: It seems that we are being treated as though we were guilty. What we did v/as good and we did it . only for the good of the country.

"AMBASSADOR TAYLOR: Now let me tell you how I feel about it, what I think the consequences are: first of all, this is a military coup that has destroyed the government-making process that, to the admiration of the vrhole vrorld, was set up last fall largely through the statesman-like acts of the Armed Eorces.

"You cannot go back to your units, General Ky. You military are now back in power. You are up to your necks in politics. . '

"Your' statement makes it clear that you have constituted yourselves again substantially as a Military Revolutionary Committee. The dissolution of the PINC was totally illegal. Your decree recognized the Chief of State and the Huong \\ ' Governm.ent but this recognition is something that you could

withdraw. This will be interpreted as a return of the military to power...

"AMBASSADOR TAYLOR: Who commands the Armed Forces? General Ktianh?

\\\ "GEM'^RAIi KY: Yes, sir...

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^'- "GEMRA.L THIEU: In spite of what you say, it should

be noted that the Vietnamese Conxmander-in-Chief is in a special situation. He therefore needs advisors. ¥e do not want to

force General Khanh; we advise him. We will do what he orders...

>

- " '^iLMBASSADOR TAYLOR: Would your officers "be willing to come into a government if called upon to do so by Huong? I have been im.pressed by the high q_uality of many Vietnamese officers. I am sure that m.any of the most able men in this country are in uniform. Last fall when the HNC and Huong GoverufTient was being formed, I suggested to General Khanh'there should be some military participation, but my suggestions were not accepted. It would therefore be natural for some of them _ now to be called upon to serve in the government. Would you be willing to do so?...

"GENERAL KX: Nonetheless, I v/ould object to the idea' of the military going back into the governoient right away. People will say it is a militcary coup.

"AMBASSADOR TAYLOR and MIBASSADOR JOHNSON: (Together) People will say it anyvmy. ...

i -

"AJffiASSADOR TAYLOR: You have destroyed the Charter. The Chief of State will still have to prepare for elections. ^, Nobody believes that the Chief of State has either the power

or the ability to do this without the HNC or some other advisory body. If I were the Prime Minister, I would simply overlook the destruction of the HNC. But we are preserving the HNC itself. You need a legislative branch and you need this particular step in the formation of a government with ' -National Assemb^.y. . -

- " "AMBASSADOR TAYLOR: It should be noted that Prime Minister

Huong has not accepted the dissolution of the HNC...

' • "GENERAL THIEU: Wh.at kind of concession does Huong want I I ■ from us?

' (' "Ambassador Taylor again noted the need for the HNC

1 function.

"GEI^ML KY: Perhaps it is better if we now let General Hrianh and Pr-ime Minister Huong talk-

"GE'NERAL THIEU: After all, we did not arrest all the ■ members of the ?INC. Of nine members we detained only five. These people are not under arrest. They are simply under controlled residence...

"AI^IBASSADOR TAYLOR: Our problem now, gentlemen, is to ^"^ organize our work for the rest of the day. For one thing,

the governiTient will have to issue a commamiq.ue.

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"GEJ\1ERA,L TlilEU: We v/ill still lia.ve a press conference ■ this afternoon but only to say why \^e acted as we did.

''AMBASSADOE TAYLOR: I have real troubles on the US side. I don't know v/hether we will continue to support you after this, Wry don't you tell your friends before you act? I regret the need for my blunt talk today but we have lots at stake.-. .

"AMBASSADOR TAYLOR: And was it really all that necessary to carry out the arrests that very night? Couldn't this have been put off a day or two?...

"In taking a friendly leave, Anibassador Taylor said: You people have broken a lot of dishes and now we have to see. how we can straighten out this mess." 5.9/

Amid the hustle and bustle of meetings between MCV officers, Embassy officials, and their Vietnamese counterpeirts, Khanh and the Young Turks, stood fast. 60/

On the next day, December 21, Taylor suggested to Khanli that he resign and leave the country. This meeting brought to a head the Khanh-Taylor personal feud which' then became public and continued for the balance of lamnh's tenure. Taylor's report of the meeting said his suggestion that Khanh leave the country came in response to Khanh's asking whether he should leave. But Khanh told a different story- to the AFC, who were still smarting from the sharp interchange that Ky, Thieu, Thi and Cang had had with Taylor. Imjaediately they accused Taylor of interfering in GVN affairs. Comm^enting afterward, he said:

"If the military get 8;way with this irresponsible intervention in governxaent and with flaunting proclaimed U.S.^^ policy, there will be no living with them in the future." '

State supported Taylor in taking a strong li.ne to bring the situation under control. It approved a Westm.oreland proposal, sent by military channels to State, that Huong get the credit for dismissing Khanh and that mCV should bargain with the Arm,ed Forces Council to offer a quid pro quo for reinstating the HRC. State spelled out the quid pro quo in detail:

"In support of your efforts persuade military to at least partially undo damage /Sunday's/ actions, we have also been considering possible leverage we might apply in event you conclude it was necess3.ry.

"If dispute continues unresolved, most obvious action might be withholding approval any pending U.S. assistance actions and letting this become kjiown. You are in best position to evaluate whether these would impress generals or

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conversely hurt Huong's position. In addition, following steps aimed more specifically at military have occurred to

us:

1. Suspend operation Barrel Roll — not certain it would affect generals -- might have wrong impact on Hanoi — obviously generals couldn't he told because that would imply commitment to resume if they behave.

2. Instruct all or selected Corps or division advisors make known our dissatisfaction, perhaps suspending for time being further contacts with counterparts. ■

' . ' 3. Stand domi FARiMGATE.

k. Suspend logistical airlift where critical supply shortages do not exist.

"On balance, we inclined believe none except possibly 1st and 2nd steps would produce desired results. Obviously any would hamper over-all war effort, especially if continued ■ for very long. _ • -

"We have also considered and rejected possibility of^ cutting essentials POL and direct military supplies. Similarly we do not favor suspension or interruption CIP, since ^ " ■ it would primarily affect civilian confidence in Huong government." 61/

Although Kl:anh talked to Taylor about travel arrangements for _ himself and several other generals on the 22nd, the Young Turks haa their backs up (or were convinced they could do what they pleased), and all stood fast. Klianh having rallied the military behind him, attacked Taylor for his undiplomatic actions. He spoke to the nation attacking_communism and colonialism, the latter an inference to the domineering position of Taylor. In a message to the President on the 22nd, Taylor commented:

"Generals acting greatly offended by my di.sapproval of their recent actions privately expressed to four of their nuiaber and resent our efforts to strengthen Pluong government against their pressures. One unfortunate effect has been to drive them closer to Kharli who has sensed the opportunity to solidify his position." 62/

• He feared KlianJi would air the ciuarrel publicly. Rusk cabled support: _

"I wish to compliment you on the vigor with which you have pursued this issue of unity since your return from Washington." 63/

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But Taylor backed off from the sanctions idea. Possibly still hoping '^ that Khanh would go, he said there was no need for action but that the

option should be kept open. In particular, he saw no value in suspending the bombing of Laos. Q\]

Also on the 22nd, while talking to Taylor of leaving, Khanh met with the Youjig Turks and agreed to break openly with Taylor by seeking his recall. State continued to back a tough line with them, and rejected Taylor's suggestion of a diversion in the form of a reprisal bombing on North Vietnam for the Brinks BOQ bombing early in the week.

"Hanoi would hardly read into it any strong or continuing signal in view overall confusion in Saigon...There might be suspici.on, at least internationally, that BOQ bombing was not in fact done by VC." ^ ^ .

■ Taylor urged Huong to insist on restoration of the HNC and declare the generals insubordinate if they refused. Khanh and the generals attacked Taylor publicly on December 23, as Taylor had feared, charging him with insulting them and abusing his power. Then on December 2h, Tarylor responded in kind, telling the press his version of the December 20 confrontation, and suggesting that Khanh had outstayed his usefulness.

Khanh then threatened privately to declare Taylor 2ersona_nDii_grata; the Embassy replied that asking Taylor to leave was equivalent to asking the U S to leave. The implied threat of U.S. withdrawal was enough to ,'^ ■ stop the Klmnh move, if he was ever serious about it. Taylor then suggested

that Alex Johnson and the generals should form an ad hoc joint arbitration committee to resolve the differences between Khanh and Taylor. The idea_ was evidently novel enought to distract Khanh and the generals or to satisfy their dignity; it disconnected the buttons that had been pushed when Khauh and Taylor each said he wanted the other to leave the country. The ad hoc committee never met, but the proposal generated caM discussion between the Embassy and the generals for several days and allowed xhem to cool off gracefully. 65/

However, the basic issue of the future of the HNC and of civilian governjiient remained unresolved. Huong consulted with Taylor continuously, and followed some of his advice, but stopped short of taking the strong public stance he urged. On December 31, Taylor said to Washington that the USG might have to accept a military government in Saigon, though he said that Khanh must not head it.' He said that plans for _Phase II (^omb-ing the North) should take into account various possibilities withm GVN. fob, Although Taylor had earlier favored the military's return to power, he objected to the means and to the timing of their present action.

10. Ongoing Progra m-s, Second Half 196^4 -

Wiile the political crises of Ambassador Taylor's first six months in Saigon built up to comic opera proportions, MCV and the couaatry team struggled valiantly to conduct business as usual.

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In March, MA.CV J-1 had completed a comprehensive review of ARVN personnel policies, the Murday Report, and forwarded it to JGS for actxon A tally at the end of the year indicated progress on only l6 of_28 specific recommendationB. One that received no response was the suggestion that the offacer appointment base be expanded. 6?/ In May, the Secretary of Defense had'ordered COWSM/iCV to develop, jointly with GVN, procedu-res for programming pacification operations with time-phased ie^uirements for manpower and _ money. A joint, com.bined (MA,CV-USOM-GVS) committee was established. It had completed a programing document in June. After approval by RVMF and MCV, joint US-GVN teams visited each Corps to acquaint selected personnel W3th the docujnents. As of August 31, fewer than half the provinces , had submitted pacification -plansj so the teams again visited each province

to reinstruct province chiefs and sector advisors. All province reports were finally received by October. 68/ In July, the first Senior Advisors, Monthly Report (SAiffi) was submitted: These put MCV in a better_position to advise, and in October it sent a detailed letter of deficiencies to CINCRVIiA.F.

A joint combat effectiveness inspection team started its work, and at year's end the ARVN IG faced the question whether the refresher course at the National Training Center was needed for two battalions de- . Glared ineffective by COMUSMCV. In October, U.S. advisors to RVKAF units submitted the first semi-ammal report of their personal observations of ■ the treatment and use of MAP equipment. Deficiencies were noted m a lett^er to JGS In one instance it was found that ordnance vans were being converued into rolling auarters fSr generals. After a threat to withdraw the vans, the fault was corrected and the vans were returned to their authori^.ed use.

On October 5, COffiJSMA.CV forwarded to the Embassy the report of ' a month-long study instigated by the Ambassador on how to revitalize the entire civil action program. It recommended that a USOM-USIS-MCV stuay ■^ group develop a joint, integrated mechanism to gun.de and coordinate civic _ action." The groups' recomm.endations were to provide a basis for discussions with the Vietnamese on how best to channel and revitalize the combined civic action effort.

On the subject of command relationships, JCS looked ahead to the possible deployment of U.S. ground forces and anticipated operational control of RVN forces in combined operations. However, that idea would be dropped la,ter. §9/ ■ ■ •

Following a Taylor-Khanh agreement to launch "Hop Tac on October 1, USOM and the Vi.etnamese NSC met on Septemher 25 to discuss paclfica' tion, after which Ta.ylor commented:

"In general, I consi.der the meeting was satisfactory continuation of our bi.lateral effort and that top priority . is at last being given to Hop Tac operati.on. Also that general result of meeting focused attention on priority .problems. The pay-off will be quality of follow-up." 70/

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State suggested decentralization of pacification control to Corps and Province; to bypass tlie central government; USOM disagreed. MCV contacted all senior EVNAF officers and found them taking a responsible atti^ tude tov/ard continuing the war effort; however^ M^ICV noted that the coup leaders had talked the same way just before the September 13 coup attempt Therefore MCV was candidly sceptical, 7l/

In response^ a COMUSMA.CV memorandum of November 1^ entitled "Assumption by US of Operational Control of the Pacification Program in SW-/' states his position on the US role and is indicative of his later views on combined command/ He recognized that any plan to encourage GVN in its efforts should include measures for developing US approved plans^ as well as m.eans for controlling money and people during execution of plans, and he envisaged s.n arrs/ngement whereby GVN 8.gencies would be provided complete planning guidance. Pie saw a danger of exerting influence over GVN which might be interpreted as excessive and which mi^ght boomerang on US interests. Instead;, he suggested/'as a less drastic alternative^ the Hop Tac idea might be extended to each of the other three tactical

zones."

*

As discussed more fully in Re-emphasis on Pacification 196^-67^ Hop Tac (working together) was formally proposed at a high level in the US government by Ambass3.dor "Lodge on his v/ay inome in July I96U. Ambassador Taylor and General Westmioreland mplem.ented the idea. It tied together the pacification plans of the seven provinces around Saigon to insuj^e security and extend governmient control. A headiuarters for US Hop Tac 'elements was established in Saigon. The Vietneaiiese set up a parallel organization primarily to satisfy the US;, for their group had no authority or influence. '

Meanwhile5 the US/gVN study and planning activity continued and gave the impression of accom-plishm_ent. A US/gVN Survey Teami reviewed PVNA.F structure req.uirements for supporting the GVN National Pacification Plan. After visits to each corps headq^uarters^ it proposed two alterna--tive force increases-^ one to achieve progress in priority one Plop Tac • areas, the other to attain more overall progress. On November 2^, COMLFSMACV formally requested approval of the first alternative from CINCPAC v/hile ■at tPie same time the US Embassy recommended approval to the State Department. 72/ Meetings of USOM/p^SC mentioned above (pp. 32 and 39) continued till December 5, after which the crisis of the Am_bassador's return and its sequel stopped all pretense of joint pacification planning for several weeks. 73/ . ' . ■

But the Joint General Staff accepted all MACV suggestions on how . RVPIA.F should be employed to improve the pacification program and issued its implemienting Directive A-B 3-39 as a Christmas present on December 25, 19645 in mid"crisis. tV

The USM\CV staff reviewed the RVN Defense Budget for I965 and US Mission approval was received iii late 1964. However, on order of the " ' -Ambassador, due to the political crisis, MACV v/ithheld the budget from "^ GVN until January 13> 1965- 75/ ' . '

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11. January 1965: Prelude to theJBoHfeing

The first week of January was filled with comings and goings with the issue of the HWC's dissolution still unresolved. The Embassy supported Huong publicly and privately, but stopped short of threatening U S withdrawal and admitted indirectly to Huong that the U.S. might be fo>'ced to accept military govermiient. Then on January 7, the generals backed off slightly and reached a compromise solution, which they announced January 9 ajuid rumors of a military takeover. The Armed Forces Council_and Khanh agreed to release -the HHC prisoners and to continue backing civilian govermnent, referring to their August promises; the civilian GVF would convene a new civilian group to legislate and write a new constitution, preparatory to Assembly elections. Taylor saw the statement before its release, and accepted it as the best available compromise. It was followpd by a statem_ent agreed on January 11 to patch up US/GW relations, at which tim.e Khanh agreed also to put several of the Young Turks m the cabinet. The crisis seemed to be over.

e

However, the end was not yet in sight. The Buddhists started ' demonstrating and dem.anding that Huong resign. On January 14, Taylor reacted to Khanh's proposals on the new cabinet by suggesting that he was moving with unseemly haste. Taylor received a complete cabinet list on , Jenuary l8, and Khanh conferred with Westmoreland on the effects of cabi-net roles for the generals on the 19th. Cabinet installation was scheduled for the 19th. However, at aliaost the last minute Khanh asked for Postponement of the cabinet installation, saying afterward that Huong had defaulted on promises to change some of the civilian ministers. Leading Buddhists went on another hunger strike, and a new crisis built up; m Hue the Ubib building was sacked and burned, and the USIS building in Saigon was sacked. ^ On the 2Hh, they demanded that all Vietnamese businessmen, nigh g clubs, etc., refuse to sell to Americans, and a majority a.pparently complied. On the 25th, Khanh, having allied himself with the Buddhists,_told deputy Ambassador Johnson that Huong and Rresldent Suu wanted to resign and let the mUltary take over, as demanded by the Buddhists. Johnson replied that the Buddhists must not be allowed to veto the government, and that tne military roust not take over. 77/

Then on January 27, the AFC voted no confidence in the Suu-Huong fi-overnm.ent and directed KlianJi to take charge and resolve the crisis. Taylor's comments to State made it clear that events were entirely out of hjs control; again he objected to the means and to the timing of the milTtary return to power. When he r'aised the possibility of non-recognition, State authorized him to use his own judgment but advised him "co play along . with Kha-nh for the time being, while scouting around for fresh options, • Although'suu was technically ousted, he stayed on at Khanh's request; and^ _ Oarjh again became acting Prime Minister. 78/ '

In the midst of the crisis Westmoreland obtained his first «nthorUv to use U.S. forces for combat within South Vietnam. Arguing that the VC might go for a spectacular victory during the disorders, he fsked for and received authority to use U.S. jet aircraft in a strike role

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/^ in emergencies5 subject to Embassy approval in each instance. This move

finessed all previous ideas of using potential U.S. force commitments as leverage to bring the GVN into line; but these ideas had no doubt been abandoned anyhow. 7

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III

THE U.S. EMTERS THE WAR

__Flaming Dart to the Stead y Influx.oOJ_^._j:or£e£^jJune^^

1. "Phase II" Befiins and CouE S_Conti nue, February, I965

' mile the Embassy stood by doing what little it could to undercut

Khanh's personal position, VC attacks on the American advisors' barracks at Pleiku, and on three other installations, provided the pretext for US/vimF bombing attacks on infiltration staging areas in the southernmost province of North Vietnam, February 7~8. Acting Prime Minister Oanli

! I spoke"for GVH during the coordination of the attacks and announcements.

j I (The raids were called reprisals, as was the subseauent raid on February 12

following the attacks on the American barracks at Quihon.) U.S. dependents

1 , were ordered to leave SVN. 1/

McGeorge Bundy was in town, and in keeping with the going tactics, ' ■ stayed at arms length from IQianh, though meeting him and the generals socially

As an aside at this point, Taylor gave one last bow to the idea that cutting off the flow of help from the North would turn the tide of the war against the VC: He remarked that perhaps the smell of victory within six months , would now lead Klaanh to ta,ke over again.

On his return to Washington, McGeorge Bundy wrote a Memorandum to the R.-esident, dated February 7, 1965- In evaluating the U.S. team ^ and policy, he stated, "U.S. mission is composed of outstanding men and U S policy within Vietnam is mainly right and well directed. However, he proceeded to point out two important differences between his current assessment and that of the mission. Taylor had concluded that: (1) the Khanh goverimient was impossible to work with, and (2) the Buddhists (lOianh s ally -in the recent struggle) must be confronted and faced down, using force if necessary. Bandy disagreed on both points, stating that Kh.anh. was still the best hope in sight in terms of pursuing the fight against the communists and that the Buddhists should be accommodated and incorporated rather than confronted.

t

With respect to the scheduled reprisal actions, he stated, "For immediate purposes, and especially for the initiation of reprisal policy, we believe the govermnent need be no stronger than it is today with General Khanh as the focus of raw power, while a weak caretaker government goes ■ throuo-h the motions. Such a government can execute military decisions and it can give formal political support to joint US-GVN policy. That is ^- about all it can do." He further stated that reprisal actions themselves

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should produce a favorable reaction which would provide an o-pportunity for increased U.S. influence in pressing for a more effective government.

He acknowledged the latent anti-Aiaerican sentiments in the coujitry and their potential explosiveness^ as had been evidenced in Hue the preceding week- He noted that these feelings limited the pressuj?e that the. U.S. could bring to bear on ambitious forces like Khanh and the Buddhists.

On February 9^ Taylor again firmly recommiended that the program of continuous graduated attacks on North Vietnam should begin. Nothj.ng but political turmoil had followed his early-December attempt to induce the GVN to do better by promising these attacks as a q.uid pro q.uo. Now he disregarded this idea^ and spoke only of the hope that the attacks would convince North Vietnam to abide by the Geneva Accords of 195^^ and 1962^ and would unify and encourage the South Vietnamese. On February 135 State cabled authority to begin the plan of graduated strikes with Vietnam^ese participation. It directed Taylor to get GVN approval and to get their agreem_ent to appear at the UN if that should prove necessary; the condition of stopping the bombing would be the halting of aid by North Vietnam to the VC.

Sta-te's guidance to Taylor on political matters was that the U.S. hand should not be too obvious in the governmient-shuffling outcome and that the povrer of the Buddhists and of the military must be reflected in the new government being formed. After two political hopefuls failed to roiond up enough support^ Quat formed a cabinet starting February I6. The AFC chose to keep Suu as Chief of State and appointed a National Legislative Council of twenty members balanced to represent all interests including the m.ilitary. The Buddhists'quietly acquiesced in the new government, installed just in time to be greeted by a coup attempt. 2/

On February 19;j a new coup group (consisting of Thao and Phat am.ong other neo-Diem proponents) seized most of Saigon, Tan Son Nnut airfield, and the radio station. In this instance, as in September, 196^1-, MACV had to intervene to stop Ky's threat of W3AF bom_bing; this time it would have been the airfield, with several thousand Americans in the area. By midnight the leading members of the A5'C had rallied forces and faced down the coup group; and the next day they voted Klianh out. On February 2U, Khanh left the country: the Embassy and Saigon settled back in relief. The bom]3ing phase of graduated pressures on the North (Rolling Thunder) began, and the decision to land Marines at Danang v.'as in the works. Taylor now opposed the introduction of U.S. combat forces in SVN — except for base security. His acquiescence in the Marine deplojniient to Danang was in large part due to VJestmoreland\s strong recormriendaticn to do so. 3/ .

2• Tlie^_Continuin^ Civilian Interre gnuj'ii and First U.S. Groun.d Forces,

Marcl i-May, 196$

For several weeks an unaccustomed calin settled over US/cVN relations. The USG white paper on Vietna^m issued February 28 without prior clearance with GVN caused no vJ.slble upset. The proposal to land the first two BLT^s of Marines received prompt approval in an am.ic8.bl.e atmosphere .in the first few days of March, and the III I^'ffiF became the III MAF

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without fanfare. An abortive Buddhist "peace" movement died away^ and religious groups generally laid low. hj

Eollowing a State message expressing renev/ed concern, the USOM resumed meetings with the Vietna^mese Internal Security Council (an en3.arge-ment of its old NSC) on February 27 to discuss pacification.

"It-vras agreed that both sides would prepare joint proposals for accelerating pacification and for solving manpower problems and go forward together in program for effective "execution of agreed programs."

At a March 13 meeting, General Thang gave a "pessimistic but realistic" account of Binh Dinh Province, and Quat said measui-es would be te.ken to prevent the situation from spreading. Tlie USG and GVN reverted to the pattern of a year earlier of urging and advice politely received. 5/

Throughout early'I965, it was evident that Pacification plans were failing. Even Hop Tac v^as at a standstill, vmen a stop gap allocation of 3 million piasters per province was made, pending release of regii-lar funds, province chiefs were reluctant to spend the funds. They v/anted specific authority and direction from higher authorities. ■ ,

■ Plazming continued unabated between MACV an,d GVN. Development of a revised budget began on March 6, 1965^ when guidelines for budget preparation were firrnished the RVN Ministry of Defense. The proposed revision was duly received from RVN. 6/

On March 2ky Ambassador Taylor formulated a 1^-1-point program for stability and pacification in preparation for a trip to Washington. This program, v/ithout any hJ.nt of leverage on GVN, in fact put pacification on the back bujr^ner, v^hile main attention focused on bombing and deployments. 7/

In April I965, General "Little" Minh, Minister of Armied Forces, directed I, II, and IV Corps comm^anders to devel.op Hop Tac plans for their areas. Tlae delay between the COWSMACV memorandum of the previous December that recommiended the extension and the order itself is not explained, but in May the Vietnam.ese indicated to the U.S. Ambassador their dissatisfaction with the Hop Tac program. The Vietnamese wanted to m.ake Region A of the Hop Tac area part of the Capital Military Region and the remaining regions part of the III Corps Commander^s area of responsibility. COiWS-MACV told the mission council that the Hop Tac organisation should be retained for the foreseeabH.e future because Hop Tac had been unique in providing a forum for military and civil authorities to address common problemiS ...

'Quiet consu2.tation continued on the evaluation of Vietnamese counterparts in the provinces, on Third Country Forces, on military and paramilitary pay^ and so on. Following Taylor*s return from Washington early in April, he presented his pacj.fication ideas (now having the stamip of President Johnson's approva,l), and discreetly got approval for the

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deployment of the third of the Marine BLT^s. Quat discussed the military leadership frankly with Taylor and Westmoreland^ and around the middle of ^ April started considering a move to clip their wings. On May 5, the AFC obligingly dissolved itself^ and seemed to give Quat a free hand. 8/

The Plonolulu Conference of April 20^ v/hich rebuffed the idea of encadrement and U.S. takeover (discussed later), approved additional de-ployraents and U.S. force to about 80^000 men and to introduce Korean and Australian troops. After several days of hesitation, Quat approved the increases. Pacification, under the new name "Rural Construction/' still gave no cause for rejoicing; and GVN resisted Taylor's proposal to install some civilians as province chiefs. 9/

Analysis by members of the U.S. mission council of a RVMF J-3 paper, "The Organization and Operations of the Pacification System," revealed considerable variance between U.S. and GVN views on:

(1) The role of the corps commander in pacification.

(2) The relationship of provinces with,a proposed Bureau for Pacification Affairs.

(3)' The position of Minister of Interior in pacification.

MACV forwarded reauirements to increase the number of subsector advisory teams to l80, of which 33 in particularly remote locations would be filled initially by Special Forces teams. It was envisioned that in case of escalation by the VC, these teams would perform appropriate civil affairs functions, provide intelligence, and support allied forces in many ways. Should the VC refrain from extensive overt action, the teams would push vigorous rural construction.

In the last half of May, fresh trouble blew up. After an alleged abortive coup attempt on May 20-21, and disorders in the streets, Quat tried to reshuffle his cabinet, without first clearing it with Suu. Suu objected, and the two disagreed on who had the right to decide; such a mismiderstanding was understandable, in view of the lack of any recognized constitution and in view of the chaos of the preceding months. The crisis siirmered past the end of Ma,y, and Taylor correctly predicted the end of civilian goverroiaent, with evident relief. 10/

3'. First Moves on Comm and and Contro l, March and April, 196^

When the Marines arrived in March, the control measure devised for the employment was the TAOR. Under the overall suzerainty of the Vn' Corps Commander, the Marines were given a well defined geographical area in which U.S.'forces exercised command authority over military forces and for which the U.S. accepted defensive responsibility." 11/

On March 3, Ambassador Taylor cabled his fears that GVN would "shuck off greater responsibility on the USG," 12/ and the same day, in a-nother message, he said he had no idea what the GVN attitude to- a Marine Landing Force might be. 137

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,.~^ The first battalion of Marines splashed ashore at Danang ahout

^ ' ; 0900, March 8. The next day a second battalion came in by air.

The trip of Array Chief of Staff Johnson to Saigon in mid-March, 1965, signalled the beginning of consideration and planjiing for the introduction of significant numbers of gromid combat forces. General Johnson observed j.n closing his report:

"In order for the USG to evaluate his (COMUSMACVs) request properly when sifomitted, a policy determination must be made in the very near future that will answer the question, what should the VK be expected to do for themselves and how much more the U.S. must contribute directly to the security of VN." iV ^ ■

Secretary McNamara answered on the margin of his copy of the report, "Policy is: Anything that will strengthen the position of the GVN will be sent. 15/

On Marcb 8, Taylor talked with Erime Minister Quat about his con-ce-Dt of ioint command, a m-atter which had been raised with General Johnson . on the'occasion of his visit March 6 (EmbTel 2877)- Taylor found Quat s , ideas very hazy, but:

"his purpose was very clear. He hopes by some joint command device to bring his maverick generals under the steadying influence of General Westmoreland. Taylor told ■"~ . him he sympathized with motive but had never hit upon a

command relationship which offered much hope of accomplish-, ■ ing this end. Although Quat's ideas hard to disentangle, he seems to have in mind a mixed US/ARVN staff element reporting to General Westm.oreland and a VN c/staff. He visualizes the staff element as a clearing house for joint studies which would pass recommendations on to the two senior officers. By implication General Westmoreland would have the power of ultimate decision based upon an unofficial understanding which Quat hopes generals would accept. Quat concedes their acceptance far from certain." ILf

Washinx^ton was looking toward combined command arrangements that would recognize"that the U.S. was no longer limited to the role of advisors to RVMF. When asked for his input COMUSMiACV replied that gradual transition would be more palatable to GM and suggested onJ.y cooperati.on m the initial Bhase followed by establishment of a small combined coordinating staff headed jointly by himself and CINCRVHAF. The staff's powers would be limited solely to coord-i'.nating combined operations. 17/

These comments were sketchy, but indicative, for in Saigon COi«S-MACV and his staff were putting together the Commander's Estimate of the SituatiOT^ a standard document i.n the military planning process. Started , nn March 13 the day after General Johnson left Saigon and issued on March 26, it more clearly revealed the MACV concept of command. VJhile

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M.., p^ ■■■ J I .-Li.-i fra il ■» ■ r ■■ [ ■■ < ■■■»■ > i ' — — - ■ ■ .. —. - i ^ ^^—«>■ j.hph^ .^ ,

recognizing that there was no longer an effective ARVN chain of eonmand because of the irresponsible game of musical chairs among the top leadershri.p, ' the estimate cautioned that the Vietnamese generals would accept integrated command only to the extent that the United States contributed troops; and it advised against U.S, commitment to any rigid arrangement hecau£e_CTN and RVPOi§i^-J^2l,-M^^ievM_l]ifTici^

mcv"omltted forther"discussion of the fimction or authority of such integrated staffs. When command arrangements were covered in the detailed description of the most likely course of action, the intent was clear. U S commanders would control American troops except in,certain clearly defined zones within which they would also be responsible for "controLlmg and coordinating" operations of both U.S. and RVW forces. A collateral function envisioned for each U.S. division command was that of Deputy Command Support to the ARW Corps Commander. 18/

k. The Rise and De cline of Encadrem.ent, April.2^J;96Ji

Ambassador Taylor returned to Washington in late March and was present at the April 1-2 NSC meeting at which General Johnson's 21 recommendations and Taylor's J+1 points were appro\'ed.. 19/ Albaost as soon as Taylor returned to Saigon wide differences of opinion developed on what should happen next.

The State/Defense "7 point message" of April 15 to Ajnbassador Ta-ylor and General Westmoreland set the pot boiling, following Westm_oreland s urgent request via military channels for more forces. The message directed:

(1) Experimental encadrement of U.S. troops into RVNAF,

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(2) The introduction of a brigade force into Bien Hoa/vung Tau for security and later counterinsurgency.

(3) The introduction of several additional U,S. battalions into coastal enclaves. _ '

{k) Expansion of Vietnamese recruiting^ using proven U.S.-

techniq.ues. .:■-

(5) Expansion of the MEDCAP program using mobile dispensaries.

(6) Experimentation in 2 or 3 provinces with a team of U.S. civil 8.ffairs personnel.

(7) Supplement of low RVMF pay through provision of a food ration. 20/

Taylor objected to the new forces, to encadrement, and to the whole tone^of the 7 point message. He sent two principal messages with these objections5 one setting out a reasoned comment on the message and I ' a second', personal to McGeorge Bundy, saying how he really felt about it:

"I am greatly troubled by DOD 152339Z April 15- First, it shows no consideration for the fact that, as a result of

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decisions ta-ken in Washington during my visits this mission is charged \jlth securing implementation by the t\jo month old Quat government of a 21 point military program., a ^1 point non-milit8.ry program, a l6 point Rowan USIS progra^a and a 12 point CIA progrs.m. Now this nev; cable opens up new vistas of further points as if we can win here somehow on a point score. We 8.re going to staU the machine of government if we do not decla^re a moratoriujn on new progx*ams for at least six months.

"Next, it shovrs a far greater willingness to get into the ground war than I had discerned in Washington durin_g my recent trip. Although some additional U.S. forces should probably be introduced after we see how the Marines do in counter-insurgency operations, my own attitude is reflected in Einb-Tel 3384, v/hich I hope was called to the attention of the President,

"l^dy greatest concern arises over para 6 reftel which frankly bewilders me. \'Jb.at do the authors of this cable think mission has been doing over the months and years? We have presumably the best (iu8.1ified personnel the Washington agencies (State, AID, DOD, USIA and CIA) can find working in the provinces seven days e. vreek at precisely the ta^sks described in para 6. It is proposed to withdra.w these people and replace them by Army civil affairs t^^es operating on the pattern of military occupation? If this is the thought, " I-would regard such a change in policy which will gain wide . publicity, as disastrous in its ].ikely effects upon pacification in general a,nd on US/gVN relations in pai^ticular.

"Mac, can't we be better protected from oui' friends? I know that everyone wants to help, but there's such a thing as killing v/ith kindness. In particular, we want to stay alive here beca,use we think we're winning -- and will continue to win unless helped to death." 21/

Another State/Defense message told the Aiabassador to discuss with Quat several possible uses of U.S. combat forces beyond the NSC decisions of April 2. He replied, "l cannot raise these matters with Quat without further guidance...! need a clarification of our puj:pose for the large . , scale introduction of foreign troops unless the need is clear and explicit." 22/

^ The plaintive v/ords did not sound convincing to the JCS, for they told SecDef, almost cavalierly, in JCSM 281/65? "JCS is confideuG the Ambassador \j±11 be able to accom^plish such measures as are required for an appropriate acceptance of these deployments as approved by the highest authority."

As directed in the 7 point message, study commenced in Saigon on f^ ■ the m^/tter of combined coimriand. The message suggested tv^o approaches:

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Integration of substantial nuiabers of U.S. combat personnel (e,g.^ 5^) into each of several ARW battalions (e.g., lO); or combined operations of three additional U.S. battalions with three or more ARVN battalions. General Westmoreland asked his Deputy to give detailed study to three methods: ' . -.

(1) Assu-mption of officer and senior NCO command positions ■within the ARYN battalion by U.S. personnel.

■ (2) Assigimient of U.S. personnel as staff officers, and in technical and specialists positions, within the ARVN battalion.

(3) Employment of U.S. troops as fire support elements within the ARVN battalion.

These approaches were studied in relation to: Language, secu-rity, support, mutual US/gVN acceptance, conditions and capabilities within ARVN units. Problems common to all three were the language barrier, increased exposure of U.S. personnel, difficulty of U.S. personnel adapting to ARVN living conditions, and the greatly expanded support requirement that would be generated. The following conclusions were reached: _ -; -

Method (l) vras not feasible nor desirable owing to the language barrier, as well as to probable non-acceptance by GVN,

Method (2) would not materially iraprove ARVN capabilities.

Method (3), therefore, was the only concept that would benefit ARVN and not detract from GVN morale. A fire support element of ^ six U.S. officers and k9 enlisted men was suggested for each ARVN battalion.

Because of the difficulties of supply and service support, m.edical support, leadership in ARVN battalions, and anticipated miorale problems amongst those U.S. personnel assigned to ARVN battalions. Deputy COMUSMCV opposed the adoption of the principle of encadrement. He recommended that COMUSMACV not support it and that if it were directed, it be initially applied to only one battalion. 23/

At the same time, as a result of the Wa.rrenton conference of mid-January, serious consideration v/as being given in Washington to the use of military governm-ent by means of Army civil affairs procedures. A straw in the wind v/hich indicated what the Saigon reaction was to be at the forthcoming Honolulu conference was the response by Ambassador Taylor on April 15 to notification that General Peers was coming to Saigon, "if . GVN gets word of these plans to impose U.S. military government frejtiework on their country...it will have a very serious impact on our relations. We are rocking the boat at a time when we have it almost on an even keel." 2h/

■ 5• Honolulu Conference', April 19"gQ, 196^; Encadrement and Combined

At Honolulu General Westmoreland had his way with respect to military encadrem.ent. Notes of the meetings reveal:

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"General Westmoreland states that individual encadrement of ARVN units neither required nor feasible."

Instead the plan was to "brigade" U.S. forces with ARVW_troops. Consideration of the issue was ended with the understanding that General Westmoreland "will submit a written statement describing the command re--lationships which will prevail when U.S. forces are engaged in offensive combat actions, alone or with Vietnamese or other forces."

The introduction of U.S. Army Civil Affairs tearas into the pro- . vincial governjiient structure was also considered at Honolulu. It was decided to experiment in three provinces with U.S. teams designed to provide ample civil as well as military Initiative and advice. At least one of the three teams was to be headed by a civilian. Ambassador Taylor was instructed to seek the concurrence of GVW, "recognizing that a large number of questions must be worked out subsequently." 25/

Early in May, General Westmoreland submitted his detailed command concept. It traced the evolution of the relationship between U.S. and ARVN armed forces. Initially, U.S. forces were strictly advisory. In the period from I960 to I.962 the U.S. had in addition provided military capabilities such as helicopters and tactical air support. The advisory effor was extended to ARVf^ battalions, and advisors accompanied units into com-: bat. With the large scale commitment of U.S. ground forces m Vietnam, a logical extension of this evolution was the suggested command concept of coordination and cooperation. Operational control of each^nation's forces v/as normally to be exercised by commanders of that nation.

COICfSMACV envisioned that the initial mission of U.S. forces would be security of base areas, a function to be coordinated through senior ARVN commanders. Subseq.uent deep patrolling and offensive operations by U.S. forces wouI.d occux within specified Tactica,l Areas of Re- -sponsibility (TAOR's) with ARVN in separate and clearly defined areas. Eventually, on search and destroy operations, U.S. forces would provide combat support at the request of the senior RVMF comj-QSJider. The U.S. commander would move to the RVMF command post to agree on details, but close and intricate maneuver of units of the two nations' forces was to be avoided. 26/

This Saigon proposal did not settle the matter. SecDef urged formation of a joint cormnand with GVN and the creation of a "small com-bined coordinating staff to be Jointly headed by COMJSM/ICV and CINCRVEAF as a useful device at this stage of developm.ent of the U.S. force structure. 27/ .

There were continuing indications from USG representatives in SPipon of a sensitivity to South Vietnamese criticism that the United States acted as though we were fighting all by ourselves. On May 17, Ambassador Taylor felt it wise to relay to Washington a Saigon Post colmmi to that effect. 28/

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On May 2k, both the Ambassador and'cOMJSMACV sent lengthy messages to their senTors discussing the matter of combined min.itary command. Ambassador Taylor referenced both the JCS and MACV proposals and said, "I must say we are far from ready to propose to GVN anything like a plan for a more formal combined command authority. . .If U,SG intends to take the position that U.S. conmand of G-VN forces is a prerequisite to the introduction of more U.S. combat troops, that fact would constitute an additional strong reason for recommending against bringing in the reinforcements," 29/

COMUSmCV also voiced strong opposition to the Washington proposal for coFibined command. He recalled recent discussion of the subject with General Mini who seemed agreeable at first but then moved perceptibly away from anything suggestive of a combined headquarters. Press reports of the views of General Thieu and Air Marshall Ky, as well as the recent Saigon Post coliuim, were referenced to substantiate that there was no prospect of such a combined staff evolving. Instead, a U.S. Army brigadier general staff. "The positioning and accrediting of Brig. General Collins is as far as we can go." 30/

There appears to have been no strong objection by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In JCSM 516-65 they reviewed the course of events and recommended augmentation of MCV by seven'bil3.ets (l Brigadier General, 3 officers, and 3 enlisted) to provide "the requisite staff assistance on comhined and operational planning matters associated with the coordinated operations of U.S., RVI\T, and third country forces in Vietnam."

A Joint State/Defense message to Saigon on May 2? deferred any approach to GVN on combined command until it was politically feasible and directed that no planning discussion be undertaken with R-VIM,F without A-mbassador Taylor's approval, 31/

There were two major battles in late May and early June, Ba Gia and Dong Zoal. Although U.S. troops were available to assist in both instances they were not committed and in both cases RVm.F were defeated.

General Westmoreland continued to press Washington for greater freedom of discretion in the use of U.S. ground forces with RVNAF. A June 12 message recalled the three stages envisioned in his May 8 discussion of combined command. So far, in view of statements in Washington by the Secretary of State and by the mite House, movement from stage 2 130 3 had been deferred, but it 'sounded as though some measure of Joint planning was in progress.

"The fact is we ha\'e moved some distance down the road toward active commiitment of U.S. combat forces and have done so hand--in-hand with our Vietnsmiese ally. They and we recognize that the time has come when such support is essential to the survival of any governm.ent of South Vietnam and the integrity of RVME." 32/

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^e message concluded with a reduest for modification of the letters of

instructions on use of U.S. troops,

A riunor note, not unrelated to combined coinmand, was raised in

by the li) year oxa x ^.-..tarv forces an Vietnam were enjoying V3.rtual

SS:2tifS^;y;"o-the M?7sfnS: judge advocate --loped^-^^" ^^demonstrate that raising f ^ issue^as not .nj.e .n er t^^ goverr^-ent. They were i«.ssed to U.euW source ot t ^^^^^ ^^^^ use at ministerial m.eetxngs on the subject. ineiL. xt. GW formally discussed status-of-forces with the Embassy. _33/ ■

After extended negotiations between Quat, Suu, and other leaders failed toinrtS: gover^me^.t crisis that started ^^^^^^^^ n,..f a^kpd the generals to mediate the dispute. Iney did. On dvuie x-

rrSe -a1eS;:airra1.:%B0TeU ?rra L ..^.e ... to accept

the new government, Tcaylor cabled State:

"..,It will serve our best interests to strengthen, support and endorse this governtumt." 3^

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FOOTNOTES

1. Shaplen, Los t Revolution , pp. 213-218, 223

2. Secretary of Defense Memoranda to the President, 6 and 21 Decem-ber I963

3^ Secretary of Defense Pi^esidential Memorandmi, 21 December I963, paragraph 8

'k. Report of the Honolulu Conference of 20 November I963, Military Section, pp. 10 and 13 5. rbid^' Brent Suimary, p. 5; Message, Lodge to State 975, 8 November I963

' 6 USOM Quarterly Report to State for October-December, I963; Secretary of Defense Presidential Memorandum, 6 December 19o3

7. I]^^:-' October-December, I963;' Secretary of Defense Presidential Memorandxm, 21 December 19^3

8. Message, State to Saigon 803, 15 November 1963 ^ 9. Message, Lodge to State 975, 8 November I963

10. Message, Lodge to State 1257, 6 January 196^^

11. Secretary of Defense Presidential Memorandum, 21 December 19o3

HP Message, State to Saigon 78I, 13 November I963, end 922, 9 December I963; LoS to State 11^2, 11 December; State to Saigon 931, 12 December 19o3

13. Message, State to Saigon 1000, 30 December I963

nk Vincent T>ar1tano memoranduia to James P. Grant (both were officials in Vietnam "- qectSn of'AID), Moing Provincial. Sign-Off Authority," wxth attachment,

g sSe^oer I965; additional information obtained in conversation wrth

Puritano, February, I968

35 OPj-^i.^--' October-December, I963

16. Honolvilu Report, Op;^_cit^, P- 5 " .

17. JCS, SACSA m.emorandu.m to Secretary of Defense Military Aide, 20 February 196^ "3_8. pjeseutation by M. G. Timmes,' MAi^.G, at Honolulu Conference, 20 November I963 19. Shaplen, Op^^i^^ PP- 220-232

00 Message, State to Saigon 1025, 6 January196^

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III.

FOOTNOTES

1. Shaplen, O^^^U, pp. 305-306; Message, State to Saigon 1^38, 6 February; Saigon to State 2^26, 7 FelDruary and 25-1-95 5 11 February I965

2. Message, State to Saigon 1601, 3 February and 1677^ 10 February; Saigon to State 2399, h February; 2^4-09, 6 February; 2583, 1^ February and 2617,

16 February, Shaplen, Op. cit., pp. 302-303, 306-307. SNIE 53-65, "Short-Term Prospects in SYN^^T February I965

3. Shaplen, Op. cit_^, pp. 307-312; Message, MACV telecon to MCC, I9 February; CAS^FVS 113"5^ 19 February; Saigon to State 2685, 20 February; 2698, 22 February; 2720, 23 February, 2731, 2U February, 27^^7, 25 February and 2789, 28 February; COMUSMACV to CINCPAC 2^l600Z February

\. Shaplen, Op. cit., pp. 318-322; Message, Saigon to State 2800, 1 March; 2810, 2 March; 2822, 3 March and 29085 11 March I965

5, Message, State to Saigon 1820, 25 Fe"br-aa:fy; Saigon to State 2787, 27 February; 2953, 13 March; and 30^16, 22 March 1965

6. COlvIUSMACV Command History I965 , p. 132

O 7. Message, Saigon to State 2065, 2U March I965

8. Message, Saigon to State 3097 and 3100, 26 March; 21^10, 31 March I965

9. Message, Saigon to State 3559, 28 April, 3599 and 36o6,.l May; and 3681 7 May 1965

10. Shaplen, Op. cit., pp. 3^2-3^5; Message, Saigon to State 3878, 25 May and 3989, 1 Ju-ne; State to Saigon 2752, 29 May I965

11. Edwin H. Simmons Monograph, "The Marine Corps Response to Vietnam," Santa Domingo, 15 May 1965, pp. '+i+-^^5

12. Message, ElfflTEL 3112, 3 March I965

13. Message, EI'-'IBTEL 201^, 3 March I965

ill. General Harold K. Johnson, "Report on. Trip to Vietnam," \h March I965

15. Secretary of Defense margin notes on copy of Johnson Trip Report in Task ■ :^orce File 38I ' ■ '

16. Message, Saigon to State 299I, 8 March I965

17. Message, COI^raSMACV 1^463, 17 March and I566, 21 March 1965

18. Message, COMUSMACV MAC J-3 971^-, 27 Mar-ch I965

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19. NSAM 328, 6 April I965

20. Message^ Department of Defense 916^5 15 April; State to Saigon 2332, 15 April 1965

21. Message^ Taylor (Saigon) to McGeorge Bundy 3^21^ 17 April I965

22. Message, Saigon to State 3^^23, 17 April I965; Saigon to State 3373, 337^, and 338^^, ih April, and 3^19, 3^22, and 3^32, 17 April I965

2S. COMJSMACV Corniaand History I965, p. 8I; Message, COMUSMACV 21^5 I90635Z April

■2^. Message, Saigon to State 3^19, 17 April I965

25. Assistant Secretary of Defense McNaughton^s Minutes of Honolulu Meeting, 23 April 1965

■' 26. Message, COMUSMACV O807OOZ May

27. Message, JCS 2159 20l8o6z May

28. Message, Saigon to State 3622, 3 May 1965

29. Message, Saigon to State 3855, 2h May 1965

30. Message, COMUSMACV JOO 17292, 2^0603Z May

31. Message, Joint State/Defense Message 80U66, 27 May 1965

32. Message, COMUSMCV MC J-3 to CINCPAC 19912 120828Z June

33. Message, Saigon to State ^^05, 8 June 1965

3I4. Shaplen, Op. c it,, pp. 3^5-3^-6; Message, Saigon to State ^065, h June; hll9, 9 June; ^056, 11 June, ^190, l4 June; and ^312, 21 June 1965

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