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that they quarreled publicly among themselves and overlooked their common interests. At other times, people vho disagreed strongly on major issues found themselves temporary allies with a coFimon objectxve.

Moreover, there is the curious problem of the distance between rhetoric and reality. Even during the dark days of I96U-I965, most Americans paid lip service, particularly in official, on the record statements, to the ultimate importance of pacification. But their public affirmation of the cliches about "winning the hearts and minds of the people" vrere not related to any programs or priorities then in existence in Vietnam, and they can mislead the casual observer.

The resurgence of nacification was dramatically punctuated by three Presidential conferences on Pacific islands with the leaders of the GVIT -- Honolulu in February, 1966, Manila in October, 1966 (with five other Chiefs of State also present), and Guam in March, 1967. After each conference the relative importance of pacification took another leav upward within the U.S. Government - reflecting a successful effort within the U.S. Governraent by its American proponents — and the U.S. tied the GVM onto Declarations and Communiques which committed them to greater effort.

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In addition, each conference was followed by a major re-organization within the U.S. Mission, designed primarily to mprove our m^anage-ment of the pacification effort. After Honolulu, Deputy Ambassador Porter was given broad new authority to run the civilian agencies. After Manila Porter was directed to re-organize the components of USIA, CIA and AID internally to create a single Office of Civil Operations (OCO) And after Guam, OCO - redesignated as CORDS - was put under the control of General Westmoreland, who was given a civilian deputy with the personal rank of Ambassador to assist him.

The low priority of pacification in 1965 vas the understandable ' result of a situation in which battles of unprecedented size were taking place in the highlands and along the coast, the air war was moving slowly north towards Hajioi, and the GW was in a continual state of j 1 , disarray.

But a series of events and distinct themes were at work which would ■ . converge to give pacification a higher priority. They were to meet at

! the Honolulu conference in February, I966.

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I. Threads That Met At Honolulu

A. Hop Tac

The first was the hold-over program from I96U-I965 -- pacification's one priority even then, the Hop Tac program. It had been suggested first by Lodge on his way home from his first Ambassadorship, and Taylor and Westmoreland had given it recognition as a high priority program. Although Westmoreland judged it repeatedly as a partial success, it appears now to have been a faultily conceived and clumsily executed program. It was conceptually unso"and, lacked the support of the Vietnamese, created disagreements within the U.S. Mission which were never resolved, and then faded away. So unsuccessful was it that during its life span the VC were able to organize a regiiaent -- I65A -- in the Gia Dinh area surrounding Saigon, and thus forced MACV in late I966 to commit three U.S. infantry battalions to Operation FAIRFAX to protect the capital. No one analyzed Hop Tac before starting FAIPvEAX. With the beginning of FAIRFAX, Hop Tac was buried quietly and the United States proceeded to other matters.

B. Ambassador Lodge and the True Believers

Henry Cabot Lodge returned as Ambassador in August of 1965^ sjid immediately began to talk of pacification as "the heart of the matter." In telegrams and Mission Council meetings, Lodge told the President, the GVN, and the Mission that pacification deserved a higher priority. Because he saw himself as an advocate before the President for his beliefs rather than as the overall manager of the largest overseas civil-military effort in American history, ^ Lodge did not try, as Ambassador Max^-^ell Taylor had done, to devise an .integrated and unified strategy that balanced every part of our effort. Instead, he declared, in his first month back in Vietnam (September, I965), that "the U.S. military was doing so well now that we face a distinct- possibility that VC main force units will be neutralized, and VC fortresses destroyed soon," and that therefore we should be ready to give pacification a new push. While his involvement was irregular and inconsistent. Lodge did nonetheless play a key role in giving pacification a boost. His rhetoric, even if vague, encouraged other advocates of pacification to speak up. The man he brought with him, Edward Lansdale, gave by his very presence an implicit boost to pacification.

C. The III Marine Amphibious Force

Meanwhile, to their own amazement, the Marines were discovering that the toughest war for them was the war in the villages behind them near the Da Nang air base, rather than the war against the main force, which had retreated to the hills to build up. In the first 12 months of their deployment, the Marines virtually reversed their em.phasis, turning away

* No other American Ambassador has ever had responsibility and authority even close to that in Saigon; only military commands have exceeded it in size.

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from the enemy to a grueling and painfully slow effort to pacify the villages of the central coast in their three TAORs. It was a job that Americans were not equipped for, and the Marine effort raised some basic questions about the role of U.S. troops in Vietnam, but nonetheless, the Marines began to try to sell the rest of the U.S. Government on the success and correctness of their still unproved strategy. The result was a major commitment to the pacification strategy by a sei^ice of the U.S. Armed Forces, and influence on the other services, particularly the Army. .

D* Washington Grimibles About The Effort

When Lodge was Ambassador, there was widespread concern about the management of the Mission. Lodge was admittedly not a manager. This concern led to a major conference at Warrenton in January of I966, during which increased emphasis on pacification and better organization within the U.S. Mission were the main topics. Improving the Washington organizational structure was raised, but not addressed candidly in the final report; Washington seemed far readier to tell Saigon how to reorganize than to set their own house in order. But Warrenton symbolizes the growing dissatisfaction in Washington with the Mission as it was.

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E. Presidential Emphasis on the "Other War" and Press Reaction

Finally, there was the need of the President, for compelling domestic political reasons, to give greater emphasis to "the other war." With the first full years of major troop commitment ending with victory not yet in sight, there was a growing need to point out to the American public and to the world that the United States was doing a great deal in the midst of war to build a new Vietnam. While this eraphasis did not necessarily have to also become an emphasis on pacification, it did, and thus the President in effect gave pacification his personal support — an act which was acutely felt by Americans in Vietnam.

F. Meanwhile, Back at the War ...

A summary of the MACV Monthly Evaluations and other reports is contained here, showing how the U.S. command saw its own progress. The simimary suggests that MACV foresaw heavy fighting all through I966, and did not apparently agree with Ambassador Lodge's predictions and hopes that a major pacification effort could be started, but the issue was not ■ analyzed before decisions were made.

II. Honolulu

A. The Conference - February 1966

The details of the working sessions at the Honolulu conference do not appear, in retrospect, to be nearly as important on the future

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emphasis on pacification as the public statements that came out of Honolulu, particularly the Declaration itself. The discussions and the Declaration are summarized, including the President's final remarks in plenary session.

B* Public Impact ...

The press reaction to the conference is summarized.

III. Honolulu to Manila

A. Saigon; Porter in Charge

The first reorganization now took place, and Deputy Ambassador Porter •was put in direct charge of the civilian agencies. His responsibility and his ability to carry out his responsibility were not equal from the outset, and Porter saw his role in different terms than those in Washington who had given him his difficult task. A major problem was the lack of fiill support that Porter received from Ambassador Lodge, who had never been fully in favor of the reorganization. Another problem was the lack of a parallel structure in Washin^on, so that Porter foxind himself caught between the Washington agencies and their representatives in Saigon, with Komer (see below) as a frequent participant. Nonetheless, Porter accomplished a great deal in the months this arrangement lasted; it just wasn't as much as Washington sought.

B. Wa shin^on; Komer As The Blo-yrborch

In Washington, the President selected a McGeorge Bundy deputy, R. W. Komer, to be his Special Assistant on non-military activities in Vietnam. Komer did not have the same kind of authority over the Washington agencies that Porter, in theory, had over the Saigon extensions. Komer pushed pacification hard, and became the first senior official, with apparently ready access to the President, who put forward the pro-pacification position consistently in high level meetings. His mandate was contained in a loosely worded HSAM, 3^3? dated March 28, I966. During the simmier of 19^6, Komer applied great pressure to both the Mission and the Washington agencies (thus earning from Ambassador Lodge the nickname of "Blowtorch"), with a series of cables and visits to Vietnam, often using the President's name.

C. Study Groups and Strategists: Summer I966

With Porter and Komer in their new^ roles, a series of Task Forces" and Study Groups began to produce papers that gave a better rationale and strategy to pacification. These included the Army study called PROVN, the Priorities Task Force in Saigon, and the Roles and Missions Study Groups in Saigon. At the same time, Westmoreland, w;hose year end wrap-up message on January 1, I966, had not even mentioned pacification, sent

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in a new long range strategy which emphasized pacification^ to Lodgers pleasui-e. MACV also produced a new position on revamping MYEy and briefed the Mission Council on it in August, I966. The Honolulu emphasis vras "beginning to produce tangible results on the U.S. side.

D. The Single Manager

Despite the movement described in the above three sections, Washington wanted more, and was not satisfied with the rate of progress. Komer, therefore, in August of I966 had produced a long paper which offered three possible changes in the management structure of the Mission. They were: (l) put all pacification responsibility and assets, including MACV Advisors, under Porter; (2) reorganize the civilian structure to create a single office of operations, and strengthen MACV internally, but leave the civilians and the military split; (3) give Westmoreland full pacification responsibility. The Mission rejected all these ideas, offering in their stead the proposal that Washington leave Saigon alone for a while, but the pressiure for results and better management was too great, and the inadequacies of the Mission too obvious, to leave it alone. Secretary Md^amara weighed in at this point with a draft Presidential memorand-um proposing that Westmoreland be gi^-en responsibility for pacification. Komer and JCS concurred in it, but State, USIA, AID, and CIA nonconcurred. McNamara, Katzenbach, and Komer then went to Saigon to talie a look at the situation* When they returned, Katzenbach, new to the State Department and previously uninvolved in the problem, recommended that Porter be told to reorganize the civilians along the lines previously discussed (similar to Komer^s Alternative Number 2). The President agreed, discussing it with Lodge and Westmoreland at Honolulu. But he added a vital warning: he would give the civilians only about 90 to 120 days to make the new structure work, and then would reconsider the proposal to transfer responsibility for pacification to I^CV-

E. The Manila Conference

The decision had not yet been transmitted to Saigon, but it had been made. At Manila, with six other heads of state in attendance, the discussion turned to other matters. At Manila, in the final Declaration, the GVN announced that they would commit half the armed forces to securing operations in support of pacification/RD. This had previously been discussed, but it was the public commitment that really mattered, and now it was on the record. . •'

IV. OCO to CORD

A. OCO on Trial: Introduction

The Office of Civil Operations was formed, creating confusion and resentment among the agencies, but also marking an immediate and major

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step foi-vard. The example of the civilians moving at this pace also created pressure and conflict within MACV, which was for the first time confronted with a strong civilian structtire. The GM indicated that it ■understood and approved of the new structure.

B. OCO on Trial; Too Little Too Late -- Or Not Enough Time?

• Although it was slower than Washington desired^ OCO did get off to a start in December of I966. Wade Lathram, who had been USAID Deputy Director, was chosen to head up OCO --a choice that was unfortunate, because Lathram, a skilled and cautious bureaucrat, was not the kind of driving and dynamic leader that OCO -- in a brink of disaster situation from its inception — needed.

Even worse, Porter was almost immediately diverted from OCO to pay more attention to other matters. While the planners had hoped that Porter would take OCO in hand and give Lathram direct giaidance, instead he left Lathram in control of OCO and was forced to turn his attentions to rionning the Mission, during a long vacation (one month) by Lodge.

The most dramatic action that was taken was the selection of the Regional Directors, a move which even attracted newspaper attention. They included Henry Koren, formerly Porter's deputy; John Paul Vann, the controversial former MACV advisor; and Vince Heymann of the CIA.

Slowly, the OCO then turned to picking its province representatives. All in all, OCO accomplished many things that had never been done before; given time it could no doubt have done much more. But it was plagued from the outset by lack of support from the agencies and their representatives in Saigon, and Washington made higher demands than could be met in Saigon.

C. Time Runs Out

It is not clear when the President made the decision to scrap OCO. He conffiaunicated his decision to his field commanders at Guam, but there was a two-month delay before the decision was announced publicly or discussed with the GVN.

D. The CORDS Reorganization , .

As Bunker took over the Mission, there was a considerable turnover in key personnel. Bunker asked Lansdale and Zorthian to stay on, but Porter, Habib, Wehrle, all left just as Locke, Kcmer, Calhoun, Cooper, and General Abrams all arrived.

In the new atmosphere, Komer took the lead, making a series of recommendations which maintained the civilian position within MACV, and Westmoreland accepted them.

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An example of Komer's influence was the question of the role of the ARYF divisions in the RD chain of conmiand, and here Westmoreland took Komer's suggestion even though it meant a reversal of the previous MACV position.

E. The Mission Assessment as GOKDS Begins

The situation inherited by CORDS vas not very promising. Measurements of progress had "been irrelevant and misleading, and progress by nearly all standards has been slow or nonexistent. At this pointy the study of CORDS and pacification becomes current events.

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IV, C. 11. EE-EMPMSIS GIT PACIFICATION: 196^-1967

TABLE OE COI^ITENTS AMD OUTLE'IE

I. THEEADS THAT l^T AT HONOLULU

Page

A. Hop Tac 1

. E. Ambassador Lodge and the "True Believers" 8

C. Ill Marine Amphibious Force I6

D. Washington Grumbles About the Effort 20

E. Presidential Emphasis on "The Other War" and

Press Reaction <, 28

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II. HONOLULU o . 36

A. The Conference - February I966 36

B. Impact on Public in US, on US !-Iission in Vietnam^

and on Vietnamese " k^

III. HONOLULU TO MANILA 53

A. Saigon: Porter in Charge 53

B. Washington: Komer as the Blo^rtorch 62

C» Study Groups and Strategists: Summer I966 7^

D. The Single Manager 9I

E. The Manila Conference o II6

IV. OCO TO CORDS o 119

A. OCO on Trial: Introduction ., II9

B. OCO on Trial: Too Little Too Late --Or Not

Enough Time? 122

C. Time Runs Out. 127

Do The CORDS Reorganization • 132

E. The Mission Assessment as CORDS Begins 135

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I. T hreads that Met at Honolulu A. Hop Tac

While pacification received a low emphasis during troubled 196^-1965? there was one important exception: the Hop Tac program, designed to put "whatever resources are required" into the area stirrounding Saigon to pacify it. The area was chosen by Ambassador Lodge in his last weeks as 11 Ambassador in June, 196^, and Hop Tac deserves study because both its

failures and limited achievements had many of the characteristics of our J ' ]_ater pacification efforts -- and because, like all pacification efforts,

' there was constant disagreement vrithin the Mission, the press, and the Vietnamese as to how well the program was doing.

' Hop Tac "- an intensive pacification effort in the provinces ringing

Saigon -- was formally proposed at a high level strategy session in Honolulu in July of 196^4 by Lodge, then on his way home from his first assi'^nment as Ambassador. In a paper presented to Secretaries Rusk and McEamara and incoming /onbassador Taylor at Honolulu (dated June 19, 19o^), Lodge wrote:

"A combined GVIT-US effort to intensify pacification efforts in critical provinces should be made..,The eight critical provinces are: Tay Hinh, Binh Duong, Hau Nghia, Long An, Dinh Tuong, Go Cong, Vinh Long, end Quang Ngai. Top priority and ma^xiiuvja effort should be concentrated initially in the strategically imx)ortant provinces nearest to Saigon, i.e.. Long an, Hau Nghia, and Binh Duong. Once real progress has been made in these^pro-vinces, the same effort should be made in the five others."i/

General Taylor and General Westmoreland began Hop Tac, setting up a new and additional headquarters in Saigon which was supposed to tie together the overlapping and quarrelsome commands in the Saigon area. TheVietnamese set up a parallel, "counterpart" organization, although critics of Hop Tac were to point out that the Vietnamese Hop Tac headquarters had virtually no authority or influence, and seemed primarily designed to satisfy the /jaericans. (ironically. Hop Tac is the Vietnamese word for "cooperation," which tui^ned out to be ^ust what Hop Tac lacked.)

Hop Tac had a feature previously missing from pacification plans: it sought to tie together the pacification plans of a seven-province ■ area (expanded f-om Lodge's thjree provinces to include the adjacent provinces of Phuoc Tuy, Bien Hoa, Phuoc Thanh, and Gia Dinh, which surroimd" Saigon like a doughnut), into a plan in which each province subordinated its own priorities to the concept of building a "giant oil spot" around Saigon. In a phrase which eventually became a joke in the Mission, the American heading the Hop Tac Secretariat at its inception. Colonel

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i ^ Jasper Wilson, briefed senior officials on the creation of "rings of

steel" which would grow outward from Saigon until the area from the

' Ce^hodian border to the South China Sea was secure. Then, according

I . ■ to the plan. Hop Tac would move into the Delta and North. Colonel

' Wilson ordered his staff to produce a phased plan in which the area (Map Ij

^ to be pacified was divided into four circles around Saigon. Each rxng

T^fl., to be pacified in four months, according to the original plan, which never heA any chance of success. But Wilson, under great pressure from his superiors, ordered the plan produced, got his Vietnamese counterparts to translate it, and issued it. The kickoff date for Hop Tac was to be September 12, I96U : the operation, a sweep into the VG-controlled pineapple groves just west and southwest of the city of Saigon -- the VC base nearest to the city, which had not been entered by the GTO since the last outpost had been abandoned in I96O.

The operation began on schedule, with elements of the 51st Regiment movinp toward their objective west of Saigon. During the second day of the operation, the unit ran into a minefield and took numerous casualoies. Shortly thereafter, instead of continuing the operation,,the unit broke off contact and, to the amazement of its advisors, turned back towards the city of Saigon. When nex^t located it was in the middle of Saigon participating in the abortive coup d' etat of Septejuber 13, 1964.

From that point on, Hop Tac was a constant soui^ce of dispute within the U S. Mission. Almost to a man, the civilian agencies "supporting J' „ Tac'felt that the program was unnecessary, repetitive, and doomed.

Thev claimed that they preferred to work through existing channels, although these, in MACV's view, were inadequate. This view was not stated openly however, since the Ambassador and General Westmoreland had committed'all U.S. agencies to full support. On October 6, I96U, for example General Taylor sent Washington an EXDIS cable in which he discussed Lnd rejected a suggestion to decentralize the pacification effort, and instead listed several actions that the Mission would talie. First among these was a "unanimous recommendation" that the Mission "give full J support to Hop Tac Plan, assuring it the necessary priority to give it

' _;rv chance to succeed.. .Vlhen Hop Tac priorities permit, concentrate on

i _ 3g2.ected weak areas." 2/ Thus there was a reluctance to criticize the

program directly.

Deadlines slipped continually; phase lines were readjusted; the official count of "pacified" hamlets climbed steadily. But a special study of the area made in October, 196^1, by representatives of USOM, USIS, and MACV concluded: "Generally speaking. Hop Tac, as a program, does'not appear to exist as a unified and meaningful operation." 3/

• The official view of Hop Tac was that the new coordinating machinery was doin^ some good. Thus, during a period in which cables on the general situation were rather gloomy. Ambassador Taylor could tell the President

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SOUTH VIETNAM

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in his -weekly KODIS that -while "pacification progress throughout the rest of Vietnam was minimal at best, largely because of the political climate.. .Some fovYfaxd movement occiirred. in the Hop Tac effort growing out of U.S. Mission discussions with the Prime Minister on September 25. The number of operating checkpoints in the Hop Tac area increased markedly; command areas were strengthened; available troop strength increased." h/ Minor statistical advances^ taken out of context, were continually being used in the above manner to prove overall progress.

The MACV Command History for 196^ reflects the" official view: "At the end of I96U5 Hop Tac was one of the few pacification areas that showed some success and greater promise." _5/ But subsequent events in the area do not beajr out this view. In February of I966 for example --18 m.onths after the birth of Hop Tac -- when the Hop Tac area was designated as one of the four "national Priority Areas/' the briefers were unable to show Am-bassadors Lodge and Porter any progress in the preceding year. They could not even produce a plan for the coming year. Originally Hop Tac was focused on cleaning out the nearest VG base areas5 but by February of 1966 -- with the GW unable to stop the growing VC build-up5 the emphasis was "placed on lines of communications, with I special attention to be given vital installations including Bien Hoa and

Tan Son Nhut air bases and ammunition and gasoline depots." 6/ The best the briefers could do, in the final briefing prior to the Honolulu Conference,was to say that they hoped to pacify 72 hamlets in the entire seven-province area, and "consolidate" ikk hamlets in Gia Dinh -•- which me'ant the hamlets ringing Saigon, including many which were really part of the city. Lodge and Porter were told that day "there has been a lessening of security in Hau ITghia and Gia Dinh provinces. RF and PF units generally are not up to authorized strengths. The new cadre program should be helpful in solving the problem of continued hamlet security after pacification.. .The I966 plan is not overly optimistic from a military standpoint." 7/ (The memorand-um recording of this meeting, made by a

(member of General Lansdale's staff, shows as the only Ambassadorial guidance after this sobering report: "Maps dra^-m to depict progress of Rui-al Construction (Pacification) should show as the goal only that area to be pacified dxxring the year...The U.S. Mission manpower committee should look into the use of refugees in the national labor force.") 8/

The Vietnamese were cynical about Hop Tac; it was something, speculation ran, that General Khanh had to do to keep the'Americans happy, but it was clearly an American show, clearly run by the United States, and the Vietnamese were reluctant to give it meaningful support. It was one of the first majcr programs with which the United States became publicly identified (since Diem had always kept the United States in as much of a background role as possible -- and its shortcomings were in part derived from this fact.

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All through i^mbassador Taylor's tenure. Hop Tac was something on which he and the Mission Council pinned hope. General VJestmoreland thought the program had been reasonably successful, vhen he- told the Mission Council about Hop Tac's first year:

"General Westmoreland said that while Hop Tac could be said only to have been about 5afo successful, it had londoubtedly averted a VC seige of Saigon." 9/

This same view was reflected in McGeorge Bundy's coroments in a memorandum to the President months earlier in February, 19^5^ when he said:

"The Hop Tac program of pacification in this area has not been an unqualified success, but it has not been a failure, and it has certainly prevented any strangling seige of Saigon. We did not have a chance to form an independent. Judgment on Hop Tac, but we did conclude that whatever its precise measure of success, it is of great importance that this operation be pursued with full vigor. This is the current policy of the Mission." lO/

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There were others who said that, as a matter of fact, Saigon was almost under seige and that the situation was deteriorating. Westmoreland's own headquarters, for example, sent to Washington in the June Mont lily Evaluation from MACV, the following statem^ent which seems to contradict Westmoreland's optimism:

"The sealing off of Saigon from surrounding areas, no matter how incomplete the sealing may be, has had and will continue to have serious economic as well as military effects." ll/

Shortly after he arrived in Vietnam for his second tour. Lodge asked for a private assessment of Hop Tac from an Embassy officer, who reported to htm in early September of 1965:

"1. Hop Tac did not achieve its original goals primarily because they were completely unrealistic and did not take into account the difficulty of the task. These goals were set quite arbitrarily and with no regard for the available resources and the strength of the enemy.

"2. The second reason for the failures of Hop Tac lies in its strategic concept. The idea of concentric circles outward from Saigon to be pacif:ed in successive waves of clearing, securing and developing may be sound in macroscopic tenas; when the Hop Tac area is looked at carefully, the viability of this strategy breaks down. The concentric phase lines around Saigon do not adequately take into account existing areas of GVN streng-th and existing Viet Cong base areas; rather

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they coirnriit the GW to a continual expansionary effort on all sides of Saigon simultaneously, an effort which is beyond its capabilities. Above all^ they ignore the political structure of the area around Saigon.

"3. The U.S. Mission has two broad courses of action available in regard to Hop Tac, First, the Mission Council may feel that the area encompassed by Hop Tac remains the first pacification priority of the U.S. and the GW. If this is the considered judgment of the Mission Council, then we must seek ways of re-emphasizing, re-invigorating and reorienting Hop Tac in order to achieve a dramatic and sustained success in pacification.

"i^-. There is an alternative open to the Mission Council. Perhaps it would be politically unwise to attempt to commit the GVII to re-emphasis of Hop Tac at this time. There are several facts which support this view:

"A. The GVH has never considered Hop Tac its own plan

and its o^m nimiber one priority. The staff planning J for the plan was done almost entirely by the United

States J and then translated into Vietnamese. It is, ' in the eyes of many Vietnamese, Hhe plan of the

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"B. It is perhaps the most difficult area in the country in which to attempt pacification. Since it surrounds Saigon (but does not include it), every political tremor in the capital is felt in the neighboring area...the High Command has created chains of commajid in the area vrhich are clearly designed primarily to prevent coups, and only secondarily to pacify the countryside. Another example: in the last 11 months, 2^- out of 31 district chiefs and five out of seven province chiefs have been changed.

"C. Prime Minister Ky will never feel that Hop Tac is his plan. If he is seeking a major public triimiph, and intends to devote his attention to achieving that

triumph, it is unlikely that he will choose Hop Tac, which as mentioned above, is publicly considered an American plan. Moreover, to the extent that any Viet' namese is publicly connected with Hop Tac, it is Nguyen Khanh. For this reason, more than any other, the dangers of re-emphasizing Hop Tac outweigh the possible gains..."

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"The situation in the Hop Tac area will not collapse if Hop Tac is not revitalized now. With the available forces^ and particularly with the impending arrival of the 1st Infantry ' Division to take up a position across the southern arc of Zone D^ Saigon itself is not going to he threatened any more than it presently is. The threat -- which is substantial — comes from the enemy within, and the solution does not lie within the responsibility of the Hop Tac Council: it is a problem for the Saigon police and intelligence commimities. This threat, serious as it is, is not directly affected by the presence of the Viet Cong's 506th battalion 20 miles away in Hau Nghia, nor by Zone D. The two problems can be dealt with separately, and solution of the internal security problems of Saigon are not contingent on ■j the success of clearing Hau llghia and Long An." 12/

I . In an effort to reconcile these opposing vievrs about Hop Tac, Lodge

I told the September 15 Mission Co-uncil that "the original reasons for the

\ emphasis placed on the area surrounding Saigon...were still valid, pri-

I uiarily because of the heavy density of population. Lodge noted, however,

! " lack of a clear corra:iitment to Hop Tac on the part of the GVIT, possibly

' ■ (i^e to the fact that the Vietnamese consider the program an American

scheme. The view was also expressed that the trouble may also lie in US/GVT? differences over some fimdamental concepts in Hop Tac. Finally, Ambassador Lodge said it was essential that all interested American agencies be agreed on concepts and tactics before an approach to the GVN Q^ould be made." 13/ After this meeting, no significant action was taken, and the matter lapsed.

I - The importance of Hop Tac is still difficult to assess; it is in-

V eluded here primarily because of its role as the one major pacification

j program that was tried during the 196^-1965 period when pacification

i was\ot receiving its present top-level emphasis. Ifhether or not it

■ averted a seige of Saigon, as General Westmoreland claimed, is a seman-

tic question: what constitutes a seige in a guerrilla war? Saigon, of course, never was under seige in the classic sense of the word, but it i: is hard to conceive of it ever being literally cut off as Lien Bien Phu

or Makefing were -- this would not be a logical objective to the Viet r Cong, who wanted to put pressure on the capital but knew they couldn't

seal it off (nor would have wanted to, since they got supplies from it).

'What is important is that the failures of Hop Tac were never adequately reported and analyzed prior to embarking on other pacification efforts. Thus, at one point General Westmoreland told each of his Senior Corps Advisors to start a Hop Tac in his area -- a strange request since Hqp Tac was designed to pull together a m-ultiplicity of commands not duplicated in any other area. Each Corps naturally responded by producing plans which concentrated their pacification assets around the Corps headquarters --Da Nang, and Can Tho or, in the case of II Corps,

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il , Q,i Khon. This in turn led natxzxally to the later National Priority Area

^ program, tut had no other value.

X^ithMACV reluctant to close do^m its Hop Tac Secretariat with the ■ • ^^ll^AcTs giving HOT. Tac only verbal support, and wxth the .

civilian Americj^s g o ^ ^^ ^^^ headquarters, Hop Tac could

Vietnamese lea/ing ^1^°;^^^^ ^^ ^^^ ^orrml chain of comand, as so

,.ell h-^^^^^^;^^,;^^S sSJ-five in Vietnam hecause no one wants to a^it many outdated f^^^^^^^f "^^^l Westmoreland saw a way to dispose of Hop faf^l^anSrr^^ietS ^Hhfs^er of I966, and he too. it. At the Mission Council meeting of July 7, 19o6:

■ • "General Westmoreland then turned to the subject of Hop

Tac %e suimnarized the p^orpose of the Hop Tac concept which ': 'implemented two years ago, and said that - while it has Inioved only modest success over the past two years --the sSuSion in the area surrounding Saigon/Cholon would be com-Sratively worse if we had not had the Hop Tac arrangement. . Se notid that recent organizational changes have taien place, which have resulted in the Capital Military Region becoming Se capital Military District (as part of the III Corps Tactical Zope) with Saigon remaining as an autonomous city. In view of thLe changes, there is some question of the veaidity of continuing with the original concept. More importantly, Til Corns has a Revolutionary Development Council and a Hop Tac Cou:kcil which results in some duplication of effort. ConseqSntly, the General believes that these two councils sSould be merged, with the Revolutionary Development Council absorbing the Ho^ Tac Council. General Westmoreland asked Se MiSfon council to endorse this proposal for him to carry out. After brief discussion, Ambassador Lodge indicated his approval." ih /

Bv this time Hop Tac had long lost the "highest priority" which was supposed to justify it, and both the American and the Vietnamese nad turned to other matters.

But HOP Tac was not adequately analyzed before embarking on other efforts Z ifs shortcomings were largely forgotten by the time that f ^tid^eteriorating situation in Gia Dinh led VACY to commit three the ^f ^-^^;'^'°^J3 ^o the inner area surrounding Saigon - the original U.S. Ariny battalions to the inn^ Operation Fairfax in November of

f^e ^n^Mfssfo^n, Sth n^iistitutioLl memory forgot - or never ifar^ed -- the lessons that Hop Tac could have offered.

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B. A mbas_sador Lodge and the "True Believers"

Many senior Merican officials have paid varying degrees of lip . service to the pacification effort since I962 -- a fact \jh±ch malces it extremely hard to determine vho really pushed pacification and who didn't. But about Ambassador Lodge, there can "be little question. He had repeatedly called pacification "the heart of the matter," and his unfailing belief in the importance of the effort can be clearly shown in his public aJid private statements and his cables.

His emphasis on pacification resxomed the day he returned to Saigon in August 1965, when in his arrival statement he said that the United States supported the "true revolution" of the Vietnamese people. His continual emphasis on the effort seems to have had a definite impact on the mood in Washington and in the Mission, and played a role in the events leading up to the Honolulu Conference in February I966 -- where pacification was given (or so it seemed to Americans and Vietnamese alike in Vietnam) the President's blessing.

It is true that Ambassador Taylor also felt that pacification was important and that it would deserve high emphasis; his push on Hop Tac clearly demonstrates this fact. But because Max\^^ell Taylor saw that it was his responsibility as Ambassador to reconcile competing requirements for limited resources, and develop a single overall strategy for the effort, he never let pacification consume too many resources prematurely. Lodge, on the other hand, did not see himself as an administrator or manager of the U.S. Mission, but as the President's personal representative and advisor in Saigon. Thus, he felt no qualms about advocating a certain course of action -- in this case, pacification. There is no record of Ambassador Lodge worrying about the way his latest proposals would affect the balance of the whole effort. He simply did not see himself as responsible for the actions of the operating agencies which represented AID, USIA, and the CIA, let alone DOL, in Vietnam ^ -- not even after receiving a strong letter of authority from President Johnson

in July of 1965: 15/

"As you take charge of the American effort in South Vietnam, I want you to have this expression of my confidence, and a reaffirmation of my desire that as Ambassador you exercise full responsibility for the work of the United States

■X- See for example, Lodge's HOBIS to the President, February 1, 19^6, in which he said: ."...I have learned of Zorthian's wire to Marks, which, of course, he has the right to send, since I hold that Zorthian, like U.S. agency chiefs here, has and should have an open channel to his agency. It is a statement of Zorthian's opinion which, of course, was sent without my approval or direction..." 16/ (The subject was apparently a suggestion that Lodge address the United Hations General Assar.bly in Hew York, although Lodge's cable cited does not explicitly state what

Zorthian's cable said.)

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Government in South Vietnam. In general terms this authority r "^ is parallel to that set forth in my letter to Ambassador Taylor

of July 2, 196)4." ^ 17/ _

Given his belief in the fundamental importance of the pacification effort, Lodge was ready to push it at any time he could. He did not examine the possibility that certain times were more favor?ble than others for an effort which needed the full participation of the Vietnamese in order to succeed, and, like many in the government, failed to'see that at certain tiiaes emphasis on pacification would not only not work but would be harmful to GVN/US relations, and would reduce the chances for a successful joint effort at some more propitious time.

Thus, it is not surprising tha.t one of his last major documents at the end of his first tour as i\mbassador proposed Hop Tac (see I. A.) --in the face of strong possibilities that the situation was not favorable to it -- and that on his return in August 1965 he was advocating more I effort in pacification.

Thus for example, meeting with his senior officers one month after he arrived, Lodge "began the meeting by stating that in his opinion the United States military was doing so well not that 'we face a distinct possibility that VC main force units will be neutralized and that VC fortresses will be destroyed soon. We should be ready to handle the VC in small units. This gives counter-subversion/terrorism or pacification or counterinsurgency — I am not overly concerned with what we call it --a new urgency for all of us here.'" 18 /

It is likely that if Lodge had clarified his view of pacification and repeated it continually in public and privately, as he did with anything he believed in, his view would eventually have taken hold in the United States Mission. But the problem of how pacification should work was — and is -- a very difficult one. It raises a number of extremely difficult questions on which the United States Government has never reached a unified position.

Sensing that Lodge was receptive to ideas which emphasized pacification but that he had no set views on details, many groups and individuals besies^ed hici with a resurgence of ideas and philosophies on pacification. They were all encouraged by his verbal support or his glowing cables to Washington. The whole atmosphere in the Mission became more favorable towards pacification and pacifiers; Lansdale, Colonel Serong (the Australian who was to organize the Police Field Force with support from

The letter to Taylor had said, among other points: "I wish it clearly understood that this overall responsibility includes the whole military effort in South Vietnam and authorizes the degree of command and control that you consider appropriate."

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Tr^Aa^) Sir Robert Thompson (whose Malayan experiences had led hijn to Lodge), Sir KODe ^^^^^^^ Bohannon (who began as a Lansdale deputy,

^uf^ho^: :• .si S a. different line), the Marines (with their pacifi-cation "f^orts and CAP's near. Da Eang) , the CIA (which produced vxth ?I^tp^s strong svpport, the PAT's-turned RD cadre), USIA and AID (with .

SeS LalibSt gfowing field P-^^^^)' .f ^^Se^ul^^Sh'lnfa^t^y iu+^ hut elicited from Lodge on visits to the U.S. 25th Intantry g?? sion^a^d tSith! ist infantry Division some of his longest and most glowing accounts of pacification in action. 19/)

These grou-os and individuals fought about details, sometimes

debating minor points like medieval monks but also disagreeing on

ffZTl^Tc points - such as whether the object was to gam the

""o^ lit ion's support or to control them by force. (A popular Marine population ssuppor ^^^^_ „^^^ ^^_^ ^^^^^^ ^^ ^^^

^Slf'aM their hearts aid'minds wi!l follow.") But each group fotmd somethinf that a.uealed to Lodge, .and each in turn gained encouragement from hl^! The slow chaiage in mood also affected Washington.

Tn dealing with his role in the re-emphasis of pacification, we m..<;t distinguish between Lodge's influence on our overall, or grand, stratefff- Sn which he was ultimately to have considerable impact --

fhifinfluence on the operational details of the policy. The latter ^, not Stere t him on a continuing basis, ^d it is thus easy to under-PstiSate his influence. There was, for exaxaple, a tendency in Saigon ^urSg his Ambassadorship to minimize his importance, since each agency ^S igiorrhim when he told them to do something and usually get away

+ h it But "this pomlar view overlooked Lodge's impact in encourag-"^t.ll'sorts of people to emerge from parts of the USG with renewed i ^. for ^IcJffcafioL It overlooked the impact of his cables a^d state-

nts which added up to a massive endorsement of pacification. In his Sis'wiSlles to the President, for example, pacification receives more attention than any other subject.

Alone, Lodge could have done little, if anything to move the USG ground But his influence seems clear, more so in retrospect than at Sniiie: at a tiane when frustrations were growing, he was emphasizing a different rhetoric and strategy.

The best way to show his emphasis is simply to quote from the .phles ajad memoranda of the period. Each one shows Lodge, either directly or indirectly, putting forth his general beliefs - sometimes ^^"^^^.i^etorv They form an important part of the background to Sfolulif w?e;e pacification was to get its biggest push to that date:

1 Lodge at the end of _hisJlrs t tour in Viet nam, defining ^^^^Iflcation in his paper pro posing hoP Tac;

"The first priority after the military have cleared an area is to bring about the selection of an able man for that area,

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vho vill in turn go about creating a basically civilian ll counter-terrorist organization on the 'precinct level, or ,

equivalent thereof.. .Its prime purpose mil be, notaoly wxth Tiolice help, to create security for the local government and free it fro-^ all intimidation by going through the precinct with a fine-toothed comb...Once the local government feels . i, safer it should move energetically to promote public saJety

II' for the people; the people should then rally more to the

■ sovernraent; and this should create an upward spiral as regards security organization...USOM and USIA vlll support these local 'precinct' organizations, will actually work through them, and ^cLll seek to make it attractive to be one_ of those who builds such a counter-terrorism precincu orgajiiza-tion The military should take special precautions m their operations not to injure in any way the non-combatants. It must also behave itself so well that the people like the Army..." 20/

2. L odge's Ten Poi n t Program for Succe ss: ~ ■

"In each city precinct and each rural hamlet immediately adjacent to a thoroughly pacified city (l^, the _ smallest unit from a public safety standpoint) the following . program should be underta2ien in the follomng order:

"1 Saturate the minds of the people with some socially I i conscious and attractive ideology, which is susceptible of

' being carried out.

"2 Organize the people politically with a hamlet chief and comikttee whose actions would be backed by the police or I -' ■ Se Slitary using police-type tactics. This committee should

I . have representatives of the political, military, economic and

social organizations and should have an executive who direcus.

"3, With the help of the police or military, conduct a ; census.

; • "h. Issue identification cards.

4 1 ii^^ Issue permits for the movement of goods and people.

f , , "6, When necessary, hold a curfew.

"7 Thanks to all these methods, go through each ham.let mth a fine-tooth comb to apprehend the terrorists.

"8. At the first quiet moment, bring in agricultural experts, school teachers, etc.

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"9, The hamlet should also "be orgsjiized for its own defense against small Viet Cong attacks.

"10. After all these things have "been accomplished^ hold elections for local office." 21/

COM-IEl-iT- Lodge began his second tour as Mhassador vhere he had left ^fTth^'year before. The above paper, which he also transmitted to the •President in a KODIS message, again represented no official U.S. Dosition After writing it and giving it to everyone in the Mssion, he let the matter drop, and thus the paper did not assume any official character Since nothing was changed in the procedures of the Mission, ' and since the old criteria for pacification still applied unchanged,

Lodge had, in typical fashion, failed to affect the operating Mission.

3- The Assignment of Lansdale :

"Handpicked group of about ten experienced counter-subversion/counter terrorism workers under direction of EdwaT-d G. Lansdale will be going to Saigon to provide Ambassador Lodge v/ith special operating staff in field of political action both at central level and also in connection vith rural programs." 22/

"rOMlffilMT- From the beginning, there was misunderstanding over Lansdale's ^SlTI^'Lodge's anbassy. The first cable reflects this. The phrase '•counter-subversion/counter-terrorism workers," seems to contradict the latter part of the sentence, about "political action." From the start Lodge wanted him to "get pacification going." Thus, less than a month later, Lodge told the President:

"I appointed Edward Lansdale, \Tifh his complete approval, to be chaiman of the U.S. Mission Liaison Group to the newly c-eated Vietnamese governiaental body having to do with what we call 'pacification,' what they call 'rural construction,' and what means to me socially conscious practical politics, the by product of which is effective co unter-subversion/terrorism .

■ f^:th3IIiht' it was important for all 'concerned for him to have a definite allocation where he would have the best chance of

■ bringing his talents to bear. I trust that the hopes of some iournalists that he is here in an adversarial relationship with existing US agencies mil be nipped in the bud by making him the spokesman for the whole US Mission in this particular regard." (underlining added) 23/

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Thus another action which served to strengthen the pacification priority, although its primaiy reason probably was to get Lajisdale working on som.ething other than Saigon politics.

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It. Lodj^e on the Use of U.S. Troops in Pacification :

"The presence of American troops does provide the oppor-timity for thorough pacification of the areas in which they are stationed and full advantage should tie taken of this oppor-

{ -tunity It is a very big dividend from our investment of men

and money. For example, the TMrd Marine .Division has scored impressive successes north, south, and west of Da Nang...If our Anerican troops can emulate this performance (of the proto-CAC units) of 60 Americans and I50 Vietnamese, we ought to get a tremendous amount of small unit nighttime effective pacification and we would be neglecting sja opportunity not to use American troops for this purpose, thereby pacifying the country and transforming the ARW, m.aking it into a much more vital and effective element of Vietnamese society, able at some not too remote date to carry on by themselves mthout outside help...

i ■ We are already discussing with the Vietnamese the possibility

of singling out areas that look like good prospects, that are potentially pretty much over on our side, and then pacifying them so as to get a little smell of across-the-board success in the air I am not ready to say, 'VJhat areas would be chosen for pacification, when should the plan be started, what objectives

I . TOuld be best, ' but hope to be able to do so soon. I am now

encouraging General Ky to concentrate GW efforts and enthusiasm on pacification so that this ceji have sustained, wholehearted GVW participation...Development of popular electoral processes

* - is"part of all our current planning for counter subversion/

terrorism in 'i^iral construction (pacification)'." 24/

COmmm: Here, for the first time. Lodge addresses a key point: the T^T^ U S. troo-DS on pacification. The whole concept of the use .of . 5 S .troops was b^ing worked out during this period (see follomng , . 3;ction on Marines), and Lodge now began to weigh m with_qualified ,

^ support, for the Marine approach, based on an overly optamnstic view of I the situation. ,

I; 5, T ^.sdale's Weekly Report, October k, 196^ :

"Past week devoted to getting GVII into sound start again on pacification program...U.S. Mission Liaison Group shaping i ■ ' ■ up into realistic instrument for working level teamxrork on I , . pacification by all U.S. Missions..." 25/

* < Commi: Lansdale was responding to" the direction given him by Lodge.

6. T,ndg e on the GVlM's Attitude Towards Pacification :

"During my talk with C-eneral Co, the deputy Prime Minister in charge of six ministries, I was impressed by the am.ount of

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sustained analytical thought vhich he, with his colleagues, had given to how to orgajiize the government for the great new job of pacification which confronts them -- a nd which is clearly

their g overnment's most important sing le r esponsibility. " 26/

COMl-'EET'IT : Lodge had by this time let the GVTI know clearly what tune he wanted to hear, ajid with their usual skill the Vietnamese -- even General Co, who tiorned out to be worthless on pacification -- were playing the right song back.

7. "When the chance to win over the people was missed some years ago, a situation came into being in which it was indispensable for the VG large units to be defeated before true coinmunity building, with its mixtvire of political and security measures, would be possible. Otherwise, the VC battalions, emerging from imtouchable sanctuaries, would destroy whatever community building had painstakingly been achieved. Now it looks as though the VC know this and has already begun to act on the knowledge, transforming themselves into small units and individual terrorists, and into subversive political operators." 27/

COlt'lENT: Lodge's sequence of events -- destroy the main force enemy ■fJTst pacify second — is hard to argue with, but his assessment of VC capabilities and intentions falls short of accuracy.

As a final note to the examination of Lodge's emphasis on -pacification, it is worthwhile asking why he has so consistently put such a high priority on the effort -- regardless of methodology -- to gain control of the villages. The answer may lie in his strong views on the way the war will end in Vietnam. Lodge doubted that there would ever be meaningful negotiations with the Viet Cong. An old hand at negotiating with the communists, Lodge felt that the most likely end to the war was for the enemy to "fadeaway" after a prolonged period of conflict. In his view, therefore, control of the population became the best way to force the fadeaway. Fortheimiore, in the event that there was some sort of pro forma discussions with the comm^onists at some future date. Lodge felt that there were certain minimum conditions of a "satisfactory outcome" which must be met. An examination of his definition of a satisfactory outcome shows the overriding imnortance of the pacification effort in his mind. The following is from a telegram sent "For the President and the Secretary from Lodge" on October 21, I965, which Lodge considered one of his most important cables:

"Vlhat we consider a satisfactory outcom^e to be would, . of course, be a very closely kept secret. It v^ould include the following, not necessarily in this order:

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. "1.. The area around Saigon and south, of Saigon (all of the Delta) must he pacified. This area includes about

55 to Goio of the population of Vietnam. 'Pacified* is defined as the existence of a state of mind among the people that they have a stal^e in the goverm\ent j.s shovm hy the holding of local elections. It also means a proper local police force. In hrief, a pacified area is economically, socially, and politically a part of the RW.

"2. The thickly populated northeastern strip along the coast vhich includes 2.% of the population would be com-- pletely pacified.

"3. The (NE would retain its present control of all cities and all provincial capitals.

'%. All principal roads would be open to the Vietnamese military day and night,

"5. Those areas not pacified would not be safe havens for the'vC but would be contested by energetic offensive forays to prevent consolidation of a comraunist base.

"6 The VC disarms; and their weapons and explosives - are removed from their hands. Their main force units broken up.

"7. North Vietnam stops its infiltration.

"8. Chieu Hoi rehabilitation would be extended to individual VC who are suitable...

"9. Hardcore VC to go to North Vietnam.

"10. GVN to approve.

r ■ "COMMENT: This means that we would not be insisting on the

com-Dlete elimination of the VC although no sa:fe haven would be

(^ allocated them. It would mean that we and the GVIT would control

I . 3q ^,o 85/0 of the population oxid. that the VC would be limited

to the jungle and mountainous areas where they would go on as bandits, much as their counterparts in Malaya and Luzon -- and

. ' ' where the GYE would have the right to pursue them and try to

I j destroy thera." 28/

Lodgers fonuula for a satisfactory outcom^e is based on the absolute ■ necessity of controlling the villages. In day-to-day terms this meant that as Ambassador, Lodge had to push pacification as hard as possible. j Thus' he was quite pleased T-rith the emphasis that came out of the

.^ Honolulu conference in February of I966. - '

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' C. Ill Marine Amphibious Force

To what extent the growing Marine emphasis on pacification was a factor during the period before the Honoliau conference is impossible to deter-' mineTtt^e timing and, evidence would suggest that the impact of the Marine strategy was greatest in the period after Honolulu, as they became more sure of the rightness of their approach, and as they garnered more and more publicity for it. Nonetheless, in the first eleven months of their mission in I Corps, the Marines had. gotten deeply into the pacification program. The Marines thus becajne the most vocal advocates within the Armed Forces for emphasizing pacification more, and search and destroy less.

The Marine deployments and mission are covered in earlier decision studies in this series and will thus be treated only briefly here. The emphasis of this section is not on the influence the Marines had on the Honolulu conference, but on the way the Marines gradually moved into their -new role, and the difficulties with it. The material here applied, therefore, equally to the pre- and post-Honolulu periods, throughout which the Marine successes, as they reported them, had a growing impact on the thinking of civilian and military alike, in Saigon, CINCPAC, and Washington.

The Marines landed, their first troops -- two Battalion Landing Teams --in Da Nang in March of 1965. Their original mission, "to secure enclaves in the northern region of Vietnam containing air and communications in-|; . stallations", was simplicity itself." 29/ (From "U.S. Marine Corps Civic '""■ Action Efforts in Vietnam, March 1965-March I966, a study done by the USMC

Historical Branch, SECEET; hereafter referred to as MC History; from unpaged draft.)

By the time of'the Honolulu conference the Marines -- by now organized into the III Marine Amphibious Force -- had changed their mission considerably, and to a degree then unequalled among other American units was deeply engaged in pacification operations.

A monthly report issued by General Krulak, Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, indicates the evolution of Marine thinking on their mission. Reviewing the first seven months of their d,eploi'ment in I Corps, the Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, wrote in September, I965:

"The Mission assigned III MAF was initially confined to airfield sectirity. Subsequently, a limited offensive responsibility was added, which has gradually grown to an essentially urxrestrained authority for offensive operations. Finally, and.' largely on its own . III MAF has entered the pacification program, with the bulk of its pacification efforts taking place since June." /Emphasis added/ 32/

One month later, after chronicling their successes, the report indicated ^ the major shift in strategic thinking which was taking place at General Walt s headquarters in Da. Nang, and at General Krulak's in Hawaii:

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"V/hile accomplishing all this the Marines were feeling, with growing impact, a cardinal counterinsurgency principle: that if local forces do not move in promptly behind the ■ offensive effort, then first line forces must he diverted to provide the essential hamlet security, police and stabilization. The alternative is to risk the development of vacua, into which the VC guerrilla can flow. This condition grew during the period. The Popular Forces and police were inadequate in numbers and in quality to do their part of the job, as the Marines did theirs. This operated to complicate the Marines' problem by making the civic action effort more difficult, by permitting harassment of our forces, and by making possible a suicide attack on the Chu Lao and Marble Mountain areas.

■ "The end of the period saw the 676 square mile III MAP area of influence miore stable, more prosperous, and far more " hopeful, but it saw also an urgent need for efficient regional or local forces to take up their proper burden, so the Marines can maintain the momentum of their search/clear/pacification efforts. It is plain that the most efficient way to bring this about is to give III MAP substantial authority over the EP or PP serving in th-is area, in order that they may be properly trained and properly led." 3l/

This s-ummaiy, written in the headquarters of the man often regarded as the philosopher of the Marine Corps, shovrs the Marines in the process of swinging their emphasis around -- turning away from the offensive against the enemy waiting in the nearby hills, and towards the people and the VC guerrillas among the people inside their TAOR.

It was a crucial, difficult decision for the men who made it. Significantly, the indications are strong that the decision was made aOmost entirely inside Marine Corps channels, through a chain of command that bypassed COMUSMACV and the civilian leaders of our government, and ran from General Greene through General Krulak to General Walt. The files do not reveal discussions of the implications, feasibility, cost, and desirability of the Marine strategy among high-ranking officials in the Embassy, MACV headquarters, the Defense and State Departments. Yet in retrospect it seems clear that the strategy the Marines proposed to follow, a strategy about which they made no secret, was in sharp variance with the strategy of the other U.S. units in the country, with far-ranging political implications that could even affect the ultimate chances for negotiations.

It should be clear that the Marine concept of operations has a different implicit time requirement than a more enemiy-oriented search and destroy effort. It is not mthin the scope of this paper to analyze the different requirements, but it does appear that the Marine strateg;^^, which General Walt sometimes described as the

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"wringing out of the VC from the land like you wring water out of a sponge_,^' is slow and methodical^ requires vast numbers of troops^ runs the risk of turning into an occupation even while being called "pacification/civic action^" and involves Americans deeply in the politics and traditions of rural Vietnam. The strategy can succeed^ perhaps^ but if it is to succeed, it must be undertalcen with full awareness by the highest levels of the USG of its potential costs in manpower and time_, and the exacting nature of the work. Instead^ the documents suggest that the Marines determined their strategy basically on their o\my deriving part of it from their ovm traditions in the "Banana Republics" and China (where Generals ¥alt^ Krulak^ Nickerson^ and others had served in the 1930*s), and partly from an attempt to solve problem.s of an unprecedented nature which were cropping up inside their TAORs^ even on the ed^e of the great air base at Da Nang-.

As it was^ the Marine strategy was judged successful_, at least by the Marines_, long before it had even had a real test. It was applauded by many observers before the VC had begun to react to It^ and as such_j encouraged imitators while it was still unproven.

The Marine dilemma was how to support the pacification effort without taking it over. They thought they had succeeded in doing this by "self-effacing support for Vietnamese rural construction" after August of 19^5^ '^'^'^ there is much contradictory evidence on this point. The Marines themselves^ according to the classified historical study they recently produced_, understood that their pacification work had "to function through local Vietnamese officials. The tendency to produce Marine Corps programs or to work ^democratically' through individuals had to be strictly controlled. Only Vietnamese programs could be tolerated and support of these programs had to take place through Vietnamese governing officials..." 32/

But despite their good intentions to work through the existing GVN stru.cture_, the Marines found in many cases that the existing structure barely existed^ except on paper^ and in other cases that the existing structure was too slow and too corrupt for their requirements. And gradually the Marines got more deeply into the politics of rural Vietnam than they had intended_, or presum-ably desired.

Their difficulties were greatest in the area of highest priority_, the National Priority Area (as it was to be designated in October I965) south of Da Nang. In a nine-village complex ^just south of the air base^ the Marines urged upon the GVM successful completion of a special pacification program which had been designed by them in close conjunc-.tion with the Quang Nam Deputy Province Chief, The nine villages were divided into ti-ro groups_, and the first phase_, scheduled for completion first in Decem.ber of 19^5^ included only five of the villages^ with only 23^000 people living in them. By February^ 1966^ the plan had slipped considerably_, and the projected completion-date for the first

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"^^^ five villages was pushed "back to April, I966. The GVIM and the Marines

considered their control to extend to over l6,000 of the 23,000 people in the area, but, according to an Emhassy evaluation of the area, only 682 were young men between the ages of IT and 30. It was clear that \ the Marines were trying to pacify an area in which the young men no

■ longer lived, having either been drafted, joined the VC, or gone to Da IMang to work for the i^nericans, "The basic problem posed by this II lack of manpower must be solved before the area can be expected to

■ participate in its own defense," the Embassy report said. "Until it

is solved, the Marines and the ARVN will remain tied to defensive I mission involving them vrLth the population. No one in Quang Nam sees

I g^y iinmediate solution to this dilemma." The report concluded with a

description of how over-involved with local politics the Marines were becoming, unintentionally, and said:

"The plan, despite the valiant efforts of the Marines, .'■ is in trouble, caused by a confused and fragmented chain of command, a lack of skilled cadre, inability to recruit locally EE and PF -- and the open opposition of the WQJ)D." 33/

The WQJ3D, or Vietnam Q^oc Dan Dang, was the political party controlling the provinces of Quang Ngai, Quang Nam, and Quang Tin, The Marines knew little about them, although, according to the study, all the village chiefs in the area, were WQPD members. The VNQJ)D were not supporting the priority area plsji because they had not been consulted in its formulation, and for this reason, and others, the report predicted the failure of the plan, despite the heavy Marine commitment.

Like Hop Tac,"it was qh unusually difficult situation, but it illustrates the problexas that the Marines, and any other U.S. troops that got deeply involved in pacification, confronted in Vietnam.

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D. Wa_sh iJigton_GrH*leLAbou^±^

Throughout the -oerlod of the buildup in Vietnam, there was a_ . arnw^-ne chorus of discontent in Washington over the management of the TT q ""effort in Vietnam, most of it directed at the civiliazi agencies -nqxA AID and the CIA. Unhap-piness vrith the way the Mission ran was to lead to three major reorgaziizations in the 15-month period from the ■ Honolulu conference to the arrival of Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker. _The first reorganization tooh place immediately after Honolulu, and assigned to the Dewty Ambassador, William J. Porter, specific duties and responsibilities which had previously been dispersed througnout the • Sskon and handled on an ad hoc basis. The second reorganization, _ Ihich took place in November-December I966, reorganized the internal noi^onents of MD, USIA, and the CIA so that the Deputy Ambassador coX control directly a single Office of Civil Operation (OCO), by-^pqtine the agency chiefs. The latest reorganization, which was ^nnoinced in May Wol, transferred responsibility for OCO from the Deputylm^assador lo COI.fJSM/^.CV, who in turn was given a civilian Deputy Stfthe rank of Am.bassador (R. ¥. Komer). This section outlines events^ T^Sn^'p to the first reorganization in March I966, a reorganization which iffg^Ti^ritF^rthi-iiHK^tion effort, but left most of_the basic problems in the U.S. Mission unsolved. The actual reorganization, and its effects, will be covered in Part III. 1.

--^ Ffforts to reorganize the Saigon Mission are a recurring theme in

.^,.t history The impetus for reorganization has consistently come Som Wash-ingto;, and the Mission has usually resisted Its resistance ?rnot hard to understand, since almost every reorganization scheme ipnded to diminish the authority and autonoiny of senior members of the Mission Council such as the JUSPAO Director, the USAID Director, and the CIA Station Chief.

Ske-Dtics have said that whenever things are going poorly, "Americans reorganize." But the opponents of various reorganization schemes have J!^n miable to defend the existing Mission Council system, which must ' definSelyVe rated one of Vietnam's casualties. Hot since the beginning . of Se "country team" concept in the 1950's ("Mission Council being. Mother tern for the same structure) had the concept been tested the _

Swas to be tested in Vietnam. The pressure of events, the tension, the ^precedented size of the agencies and a host of other factors made the ^stem shaky even under the strong manager Maxwell Taylor. Under ■ Se mS wSo didl't want to manage. Lodge, it began to crumble. _Each • «^Pnc7had its own ideas on what had to be done, its o^ communication T^^lswith Washington, its own personnel and administrative structure -II tHtartSg in l9S-65;each agency began to have its own field personnel

11 SeratS under separa^^ and parallel chains of command. _ This latter

^^f i^s ultimately to prove the one x^hich gave reorganization efforts :rf for e s^- S begL to become clear- to people in Washington and ■Saigon aSke that the Americans in the provinces were not always working

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'_' on the sariie teean, and that they were receiving conflicting or overlapping instructions from a variety of sources in Saigon and Washington.

Still while General Taylor was Ambassador, reorganization was not something to he pushed seriously hy Washington. With Lodge back in charge, it was a different story. As a matter of fact, so serious were Lodge's managerial deficiencies that even during his first tour, when the U.S. Mission was less than 20,000 men, and the entire civilian component under 1,000, there was tali of reorganization. In a personal raessage to Lodge on May 26, is6k, the President made the folloxd-ng prophetic statement:

' "I have received from /Mike/ Forrestal a direct account of your belief that there is need for change and improvement in the civilian side of the country team. We have reached a similar conclusion here, and indeed we believe it is essential for you to have a top-ranliing officer who is wholly acceiDtable to you as chief of staff for country team operations. My oto im.pression is that this should be either a newly appointed civilian of vride governmental experience and high standing, or General Westmoreland " 3^/

This message becam.e irrelevant when Lodge suddenly resigned in June of 196)+ to assist Governor Scranton's bid for the Republican nomination, but it shows that the President, Lodge, and apparently other people in Washington had deep concern with the structure of the Mission at this early date.

By sending Taylor and Alexis Johnson -- then the State Department's MeheSt-ranking Foreign Service Officer -- to Saigon in July of 1964, the President in effect put off any Washington-initiated reorganizations for the length of Taylor's tour, since no one in Washington could tell the former Chairman of the JCS how to run a mission.

Taylor organized the Mission Council -- not a new invention, but a formalization of the country team into a body which met once a week, vith agendas, minutes, and records of decisions. Taylor was particularly ■ Pnncerned that the Mission Council should have a "satisfactory meshing with counterpart activities on the GW side." 35/ And while he was Ambassador the U.S. made a determined effort to m-ake the system work without reorganization. In a letter to Elbridge Rirbrow, who was once jtaierican Ambassador in Saigon himself, Alexis Johnson described the

system.:

II "Max and I dropped the title 'Countiy Team' and set up

''', vhat we called the 'Mission Council' on a fomalized basis.

In addition to Max and myself, the members were General Westmoreland, Barry Zorthian as JUSPAO (Joint United States Public Affairs Office -- this covered both MACV and Embassy

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— info as well as psychological operations in the field and against

the DRV), the Director of USOM and the CAS Station Chief. ¥e established an Executive Secretary who was first Bill Sullivan and later Jack Serfurt,who was charged with the preparation of agenda, the recording of decisions, and, nost Importantly, follo^ri-ng up and monitoring of decisions that were taken. ¥e met regularly once a week (with occasional special meetings as required), with paper circulated beforehand insofar as possible. One of the responsibilities of the Executive Secretary was to see that issues were worked out beforehand at staff level insofar as possible and the remaining issues

cleaT-ly defined It was normally our practice to keep all

members of the Council fully informed and to discuss all questions,

regardless of their sensitivity After an informal exchange

of views, we took xw questions on the agenda, doing our best to obtain the consensus of all members. When in rare cases this was not achieved, the i^jnbassador of course took the decision. We considered the full range of questions, including such fundamental ones as when and under what circumstances we should boDib the North.. .etc. . .Below the Mission Council level we established a series of committees in problem areas involving more than one agency of the mission, chaired by the agency of primary interest. These committees vrere responsible direct]^ •

to the Mission Council We persuaded the GW, on its side,

■ to set up a similar organization that was first called the 'Pacification Council' and later the 'Rural Construction Council.' The GW Council and the Mission Co-uncil met together once a week with an agenda prepared beforehand by the two Executive Secretaries...One of my theories, and to a degree I think it was borne out in Saigon, was that the Mission Council and the Joint Council were important not so much for what was in - fact decided at the meetings but for the fact that their existence, and the necessity of reporting to them, acted as a spur to the staff people to get things done and to resolve issues at their level. Organization stiucture of course does not assure brilliant performance, but I do take some satisfaction in feeling that, due to the organizational structure 111 that we established, we established the habit of the Mission ' elements and the GW and the Mission, working together in a

more effective way." 3§/

'*' ■ Whether or not the system described by Ambassador Johnson above

really worked the way he says it was supposed to is not the subject of +hi s study But it appears that within a few uonths after Lodge upturned as Ambassador the people ^^thin the USG advocating reorganization as at least a partial solution to the problems of the Mission were once again in full cry.

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The relationship of the reorganizers to the pacifiers must be explained. Those who advocated restructuring the Mission for more effective management were not necessarily the same people advocating a higher emphasis for pacification. But usually, since the organization of the Mission was so obviously deficient, both groups of people vould end up advocating some kind of change -- and even if they disagreed on the nature of the change, the most important fact was that they were generally pushing a similar mood of dissatisfaction with the Mission upon the high-ranking officials mth whom they might come m contact (It should be kept in mind that they were really not groups at all in the nonual sense of the word, but a shifting collection of individuals vjith varying degrees of loyalty to either their parent agency or their o™ sense of history; and on each individual issue a different set of allies and antagonists might well exist.)

The efforts of those advocating reorganization began to bear edible fruit in December I965 and January I966, when a conference was held at Warrenton, Va., to which the Mission sent an impressive collection of Mission Council members: Deputy Ambassador Porter, USAID m-sion Director Mann, JTJSPAO Director Zorthian, Political Counsellor Habib General Lansdale, CIA Station Chief Jorgenson, ajid Brigadier General Collins, representing Westmorelajid. From Washington came the second and third echelons of the bureaucracy: Leonard Unger, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State; Rutherford Poats, Assistant Administrator of AID; Major General Peers, SACSA; Alvin Friedm.aJi, ISA; Willism Colby and Peer da Silva, CIA; Chester Cooper, \«iite House; and Sanford Marlowe, USIA. Other participants included: Major General Hutchins CINCPAC; Rufus Phillips of Lansdale's group; Charles Z^-^ick and Henr-y Rowen of BOB; George Lodge, the Ambassador's son; Desraond Fitzgerald, CIA; and Leon Goure, of RAND.

The purpose of the meeting was to "bring together senior representatives of the U.S. Mission, Saigon, the Vietnam Coordinating Coiffiiiittee Washington, and several other individuals to (a) review ^ the 1oint'c-VlI-US pacification/rural construction program and seek xo ■nromote its more effective operation and (b) address the problem of the increasingly serious shortages and bottlenecks in manpower,

■ materials and transport in Vietnam and to designate priorities and machinery'for resources control and allocation." The major unstated ■nurpose in addition to those mentioned above, was to discuss the org^ization of the U.S. Mission in Vietnam.

Warrenton was to turn out to be a prel.ude to Honolulu, and as such ■its recommendations never were to become an integral part of the Ssslon's plans and strategy. But the direction that was developed at

■ Warrenton is significant, because it represents the clear and unmis-t«>able th-rust that existed at the time in the "working levels of both Sat^on and'Washington. Given the nomal time lag before individual thoughts can reach the stage of agreed-upon comjaittee-produced papers,

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Warrenton, we' can assume, reflected the evolution of thinking that had been going on, particularly among the civilians, as the first year of U.S. combat troop and deplojTnent began to end. Indeed, in its catch-all approach to pacification, Warrenton had something for everyone.

The final recommendations from the Warrenton conference were addressed to Secretaries aisk and McHamara, Admiral Raborn, Mr. Bell, Mr. Marks, and Mr. McGeorge Bundy, from the meeting's co-chairm.en, Ambassador Unger and Ambassador Porter. The conclusions included the following points (mth comments as required):

1, "There was a consensus thaf the designation of priority rural construction areas for I966 was importajat and that the modest goals set for these areas were realistic. However, it was emphasized that the contrast ■between the massive input of U.S. resources and the modest priority area goals made success in those areas imperative..." 37/

The National Priority Areas did not meet their I966 goals.

2, "In view of the prime importance to the U.S. of success in the four National Priority Areas, there was discussion of the need for designating U.S. team chiefs to head the U.S. advisory effort in those areas, it was agreed that the U.S. Mission Council would consider this matter promptly and report its conclusions to the VNCC." 38/ -

rOM^IENT- The designation of team chiefs for the priority areas did not tSi^ace. Here is another example of the Washington effort to reorganize Saigon, with Saigon resisting.

3, "There was widespread recognition of the need to provide mthin the U.s". Mission a single focus of operational control and management over the full range of the pertinent U.S. efforts in order to gear all such U S. activities and resources effectively into implementation or the rural construction concept. However, some concern was expressed that too drastic organizational changes vrithin the U.S. Mission would create problems with

■ the counterpart C-W organization and would not ensure success of rural construction programs. No agreement was reached on the precise form for organization changes but there \j-as general consensus that the focal point of control and management had to rest just below the Ambassador ajid that there must be a senior Mission official solely concerned with this subject. Disagreement was registered as to: . (l) vhetVier the Deputy Mbassador, assisted by a staff, should serve this function or whether another senior official

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(perhaps a second Deputy Ambassador) should be appointed; and (2) vrhat extent individual agency personnel^ funds_, and operations devoted to rural construction could and should be broken out of agency organizations and placed under the direction of the single focal point..." 39 /

CO?AiviE'MT: Here vas the compromise wording on the issue vhich concerned the participants at ¥arrenton a great deal. Each representative at Warrenton brought with him a proposed organization chart for the Mission (see below)^ but no agreement could be reached at that time. In the main body of the memorandum to the principals on January 13^, 1966^ linger and Porter wrote:

"The optimum organization for the U.S. Mission for its support-of the rural construction/pacification program --a senior official vrith a supporting staff with full-time responsibility in this field was considered necessary. (Coordination is also required mth Ambassador ■ Lodge and I4r, Bell on this point.) It would also be desirable for such an official to have in Washington a high-level point of liaison to assure the expeditious discharge here of urgent Vietnam business in this field..." ko/

When he reported to the Mission Liaison Group on Warrenton two weeks later^ on January 27^ 1966/Porter sharply downplayed the move for reorganization which was coming from Washington and changed the emphasis. He said:

"a. Ho decision was reached at Warrenton with respect to a U.S. in-country organization for r-ural-con-stiruction, although the possibility of a single manager was discussed.

"b. The U.S. Mission will continue to support Rural ConstinGt ion with th e same organizational structure it is now using^ placing particular reliance on the Mission Liaison Group.

"c. Officials in Washington were concerned about teamwork among the U.S. agencies in Vietnam but not about ability to do the job. Differences of opinion are expected^ and machinery exists to resolve them. Differences due to personalities cannot be tolerated.

"d. I- is clearly understood in Washington that military . o-oerations alone are not enough^ and that effective Rural " » Construction is-imperative. The highest levels in the USG are keenly a^-rare of the^ importajice of US/GVH work in Rural Construction " kl/ ^-phasis Added/

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Although not much raore than a footnote no>r^ the reorganization schemes that were presented at Warrenton deserve brief mention. At Warrenton^ the participants were still fishing for ways and means-^ ■ and their proposals reveal to a limited extent the intent of each agency when faced^ three months later^ \ri_th a new structure in "both Saigon and Washington -- with Porter in charge in Saigon and Komer in business in the V/hite House (discussed in III^ 1 Sc 2).

--Chester Cooper^^ working for lAcGeorge Bundy in the White House^ proposed a second Deputy Ambassador for Pacification^ with control over CIA, USAID, <I[JSPAO, and partial control (not clarified) over MACV^s Rural Construction advisors. Cooper also wanted a "Washington representative" in Saigon to expedite resource allocation. He was ambiguous about Lansdale^s role. Cooper advocated a unified field chain of command.

--Poats and Mann submitted a joint VJashington-Saigon proposal on behalf of AID (another clear indication of the fact that the real chains of comm^id ran through agency channels_, rather than through the Mbassador to Washington). They advocated a complicated arrangem.ent in which a Chief of Staff for Pacification would head up special task forces "dra"\m from operating agencies but staying in their operational job in their agencies," AID in effect w-anted no major change in the Mission_, and particularly opposed any change in the multiplicity of chains of command in the provinces. They also advocated a Theater CING_, a resources allocation committee chaired by the AID Mission Director_j and a MACV advisory structure that is partially under the Ambassador and partially separate (not clarified).

il Zorthian suggested that the Deputy Ambassador coordinate all

pacification activities but made it clear that he would make

'' no change in the chains of command. Indeed, he emphasized

the direct access of each Mission Council member to the Ambassador, the separateness of each agency*s field program.

SACSA proposed a division of MACV into a tactical unit command and a Pacification comimand. All civilian elements supporting pacification would be under the Deputy for . Pacification, who in turn would report to the Ambassador and Deputy Ajnbassador. The advisoiy structure would have been split down the middle between tactl.cal unit advisors and province/district advisors.

General. Collins suggested no major chajige in the structure of the Mission, but advocated the formation of "Task Groups to deal vrith specific problems organized on an ad hoc

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"basis from personnel provided by interested agencies. The Deputy Arribassador to "be relieved of routine duties and to spend substantially all Ms time on rural construction duties... ■

The State department proposed a "Central Pacification Organization" vhich v7ould have been not more than a coordinating committee for the existing agencies. 42 /

What these reorganization proposals seem to suggest^ in light of the ultimate direction that the Mission took^ is that vrhen agencies are asked to produce suggestions which may reduce or inhibit their prerogatives^ they are unlikely to do so in a manner responsive to the requirements of their politically-appointed chieftains. The prerogatives and privileges of the agencies inevitably come first. One does not reorganise voluntarily; the impetus comes from without. This is also seen in the different attitude that the reorganizers had towards Washington and Saigon. Although the same problem in coordination existed (and still exists) in Washington as in Saigon, the Washington officials always vrere ready to tell Saigon how to clean up its house, but were slow to suggest self-improvements. At Warrenton, perhaps prodded by the Saigon representatives, they did take note of the matter, although they were reluctant to suggest a clear solution:

"Note was also taken of the inadequacy of present U.S. Government machinery to handle Vietnam problems quickly and decisively. The need for referral of too large a number of problems to the Secretarial level was one of the problems mentioned. \Th±le the meeting did not have time to come to any firm conclusions, there was a view that the WCC because of its coordinating, rather than decision-cum-enforcement pov/ers could not perform this task except in part. If endowing the WCC or its Chairman with larger powers, and with a staff associated with no one agency, is not a feasible solution, it was considered that the required directing position might have to be set up at a higher level, perhaps related to the Rational Security Council," ^3/

■jn the Warrenton report, then, all the events of the coming year were foreshadowed, and, reading between the lines, one can now see what was coming.. Unfortunately, and obviously, this was not the case at the time--particularly for the Mission in Saigon.

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E. Presidential Emphasis on "The Other War" and Press Eeaction

At the end of 1965, with the bombing of the north in its tenth months and our ground forces growing steadily, the Administration was making a determined effort to emphasise those American activities in Vietnam which did not directly involve guns and fighting. This emphasis on what came to be called the "Other War" reached a high point during the conference at Honolulu in February of I966. The emphasis on the other war did not necessarily have to lead, as it did, to a re-emphasis of pacification; that was a by-product, at least in part, of the renewed support for pacification which had been coming from Ambassador Lodge, the Marines, the CIA (with their cadre), and the advocates of organizational reform (all covered in previous sections). But the two themes merged at Honolulu, and thus, out of the conference, came the first clear statement of Presidential support to pacification.

The need of the Administration to em,phasize and publicize the non-military aspects of the war needs little amplification. Fev;- documents show this em-phasis in the pre-Honolulu period, since it was so obvious. ■ In an exception, a joint State-USlA m.essage dated October U, 1965? Washington told the Saigon Mission:

" There is continuing; concern at the highest le vels here regarding need to emphasize our non-military programs ^ ^ in Vietnain and give them maximum possible public exposure

I ^■■' both in U.So and abroad.' ./Emphasis Added/

"We recognize that the Mission is fully cognizant of \ ^ this problem and already has underv^'-ay measures to broaden

public knowledge and understanding of non-military activities... I We are also conscious of difficulties involved in enlisting

- greater press interest in these developm-ents when it finds military actions more dramatic and newsworthy, nevertheless, ■ we hope will continue to give non-military programs increasing priority... " hh/

It is useful to recall the situation which existed in February of I966, when the President went to Honolulu to meet with Ky and Thieu. On January 30, I966, the bombing of the North began again, after a 37"day pause. There were 197,000 American servicemen in Vietnam by February 1. The Washing:ton Post -- which supported the Administration -- editorial-_ ized on February 1: ' .

"It is to be hoped that a new look is being taken at ■ the military tactics in the South so that greater emphasis i can be put on the safety of civilians, the rehabilitation

J f-^f the countryside, the furtherance of economic gro-^-rth....

Efforts behind the lines at economic and social programs must be increased." h^

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Senator Falbright had laiinched his public hearings on Vietnam, and ■ on February h had subjected David Bell of MD to a nearly four-hour grilling in the coirmiittee. That same day, the conference vas announced.

The emphasis at Honolulu vras clear from before the conference started. In his press conference announcing the meeting, the President said that he would take Secretary Freeman and Secretary Gardner, not . previously involved in Vietnam, as well as experts from their staffs. Freeman would go on to Saigon, the President added "to explore and inaugurate certain pacification prograras in the fields of health, education, and agriculture." The President then added:

"We are going to emphasize, in every way \re can, in line with the very fine pronouncements that the Prime Minister' /K^/ has Biade concerning his desires in the field of education and health and agriculture. We want to be sure that we have our best planning and our maximum effort put into it. But we will, of course, go into the military briefing very thoroughly;.." hS/

Even before the conference began, there were early reactions from the press to this emphasis. The New York Time s editorialized on Februarj-' 6:

"Programs in health, education and agriculture of the kind President Johnson evidently has in mind, can make an important contribution. To combat the revolutionary idea the Communists have set loose in Vietnam, a better idea is needed. Vigorous social reform -- and particularly, land reform, which has received little more than lip-service so far --'could well be made the price of increased economic ^ aid, which is now to be doubled.

"But an effort- to seek political 'victory' in South Vietnam is likely to prove as fruitless as the long attempt at m.ilitary 'victory. ' A^more limited and realistic objective is essential." hj_/

The conference itself, and its repercussions both in Washington ■ and VietnEan, will be discussed in a follo^/ing section, so there is ,.|; little need to dwell on the pre-Honolulu period. In Saigon, where

' I • +jie word of the conference barely preceded the departure of the

I ( T)articip8Ji.ts, the New York Times bureau chief wote a perceptive

^rticl^ which reflected thiaking of many junior and mid-level officials in both the U.S. Mission and the (?/N. The theme it stated was not new then, and still has a very familiar ring today:

"...There are now 230,000 to 250,000 pro-Communist ' troops'in South Vietnam, including the Vietcorig guerrillas

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and about 11 tough regiments of the North Vietnamese Amiy, That is at least tv/ice as many enemy troops as there were at the start of last year_, despite the major United States build-up since then.

"This does not mean that the American build-up has been futile: the build-up was all that saved South Vietnam^ in the view of most experts. It does mean that no way has yet been found to prevent the enemy from matching an American build-up with a build-up of his own.

"About 200^000 American troops are now in South Vietnam along with 550^000 South Vietnamese anaed men^ of whom about half are well-trained amiy troops.

"American and South Vietnamese military officers have asked for more Ajnerican troops^ requesting a force of about 400^000 men by the end of I966. Not all of this strength has been promised by President Johnson^ but major reinforcements are already in the offing...

"But while I966 mil be en important year militarily^ one in which all generals assume that there will be bloodier fighting^, it mil also be a year of increased emphasis on the subtle political and social aspects of the struggle.

"The Honolulu conference v/ill in fact concentrate largely on economic^ social and political problems^ according to informed sources.

"It is felt in Saigon^ however^ that the Johnson Administration cannot^ even with the best of intentions^ guarantee the allegiance of the Vietnamese to their Government merely by pumping more money and technical skill into South Vietnam to give people the ^better life^ of which officials speak.

"At least 20 to 25 per cent of the country^ s area is so firmly in control of the Vietcong guerrillas that no civic and political programs are possible there at all. Other large areas are so sharply contested that for the time being pacification and rural-improvement workers cannot operate.

"Thus rural-pacification work in 1966 is to be concentrated in one-third or fewer of the rural hamlets that the Government already claims to control. The limitation implies an admission that after five years of war the allies are starting from scratch in this field^ and that progress must be slow..

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"With American enthusiasm, the United States may msh to STDsed the pace of pacification, but there mil be serious obstacles. Most of the sadder but wiser veterans of previous programs in Vietnam seem convinced that pressure from Washington for higher and more seductive statistical goals is a major danger. They counsel 'slowly but surely.'

"As an example, the South Vietnamese Government is trying to turn 23,000 rural-affairs workers, most of them originally trained only in armed propaganda work, into more rounded rural-construction workers.

"It then plans to recruit and train 19,000 more workers, for a total of 42,000. In the opinion of some officials, it will be very difficult even to reach this goal, and any great expansion carries a risk of substituting numbers for real training.

"The present pacification plan is considered Imaginative and sound by experts w-ith long experience in Vietnam, but it is considered certain that the plan could be improved ■ at Honolulu.

"Experience has sho™ that the crucial matter in Vietnam is alirays execution rather than planning. The scarcest resources in the country are manpower and leadership .

"It is generally agreed that it would not be enough, I , say for the United States to offer help in improving

agriculture in the South Vietnamese countryside. The i ' Mericans must also consider, it is felt, whether their

suggested Tjlan is one that the South Vietnamese understand

and actually -- rather than merely politely -- approve, and ! whether the badly strained South Vietnamese administration

can execute the plan.

"Merican experts in Saigon also assert that the highly ideological Vietcong m.ovement cannot be offset merely by offers of a 'better life' for the peasants.

"The Vietcong have a loyal, dedicated and highly dis-ci-plined underground political structure that operates in the heart of Saigon itself and in thousar.ds of hamlets. So far the peasants have shown little inclination to infonii on this structure and to help the Government activity.

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• "This is the central problem of the South Vietnamese I ^ Charles Mohr

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F. M eanvhile, Back at the War

The re-emphasis of pacification was, of course, a far more disorderly process than any -^vritten review can suggest, and unfortunately must overlook many events and recommendations which were not central to the re-emphasis of pacification. But it is usefxil and important to review briefly what the Mission was reporting to Washington about the overall effort during 19^5? since Saigon*s reports should have formed an important part of the background for decision.

This selection should be read not as the "objective" story of what was happening in Vietnam -- such an objective study is simply not possible at this time, even if we had access to enemy thinliing -- but as a reflection of the beliefs of the Americans in Saigon, and as a reflection of wha.t the Mission wanted Washington to believe.

This selection is entirely direct quotations from MACV's Monthly Evaluation Report. Each month this report began with a summary of the month's events, and the following items represent the running evaluation for 1965: _/Emphasis Added/

"Janua ry, 196^: Review of military events in January tend to induce _a decidedly mor e optimistic vie w than has b een seen in recent.months . Despite adverse influence exerted by national level political disorders and localized Buddhist/student rioting, the military experienced the most successful single month of the counterinsurgency effort... Pacification made little progres s this month . Although some gains were made in the Hop^Tac area, effort in the remainder of RW was hampered by political activity and religious and student disorders...If the RWAF capability can be underwritten by political sta bilit y and dm-ability, a significant turning point in the war could be forthcoming.

" Februar y , 196^ : ...GW forces continued to make progress in III and "iV CTZ, maintained a tenuous balance over the VC in I CTZ, and suffered general regression in II CTZ...The indicators of RMAF operational effort., .all showed a decline. However, losses on both sides remained high due to the . ;

violence of enco-'onters and VC tenacity.. .The long term effect of events in February is impossible to foretell. It is obvious that the complexion of the vxar has changed. The VC appear to be mailing a concerted effort to isolate the northern portion of RVIT by seizing a salient to the sea in the northern part of II CTZ. Here RWIAF has lost the initiatiA^-e,. at least temporarily. However, US/gVI^^ strikes against DRV and increased us e of U.S. jet aircraft in RW has had a salutary effect on

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both militsTy and civilian morale which may result in a greater national effort and^ h opefully^ reverse the dovmward trend .

" MarchJ 196^ : Events in March \<fere encoirraging.. .RWAP ground operations "v.ere highlighted by renewed operational effort...VC activity was considerably below the norm of the preceding six months and indications were that the enemy was engaged in the re-supply and re-positioning of units possibly in preparation for a new offensive^ probably in the II Corps area.. . In summary ^ Marc h has given rise to some cautious optimism. The current government appears to be taking control of the situation and ^ if the p rese nt stat e of po pular morale can be susta^ined and strengthened^ the GW^ with continued U.S. support^ should be able to counter future VC offenses successfully .

" April^ 196 ^: Friendly forces retained the initiative duri ng April and a review of events reinforces the feeling of o ptim ism generated last month... In summary, current trends are highly encouraging and the GVII may have a c tually t urned the tide at long la st. However, there are some disquieting factors which indicate a need to avoid overconfidence, A test of these trends should be forthcoming in the next few months if the VC la.unch their e x pected counter-offensive and the period may well be one of the most important of the war.

" May, 19 6^: The encouraging trends of the past few m^onths did not cany through into May and there were some serious setbacks .' However, it is hoped tha.t the high morale eiid improved disci- ■ pline and leadership which has developed during that period will sustain future GVIT efforts...

" June, 196^: During June the military situation in the RVIl con tinued to worsen despite a few bright spots occasioned b y RVjMAF su ccesses . In general, however, the VC..-retained the initiative having launched several well-coordinated^ savage attacks in

regimental strength...

" July, 1963: An overall analysis of the military situation at the end of July reveals that (TT^ forces continued to make progress in IV Corps, maintained a limited edge in I Corps with the increased USMC effort and suffered a general regression in the northern portion of III Corps as well as in the central highlands of II Corps.. The VC monsoon offensive, which was so effe ctive in Ju ne., falter ed during July as VC casualty figures reached a nevr high...

"Au gust, 196$: An evaluation of the overall military effo r t in -AuSust r eveals several en couraging facts . The m.ost pronounced Ts the steady increase in the number of VC casualties and the

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number of VC "ralliers" to the GVTT...In sijuimary, the general increase in offensive operations by GW, U.S. and Third Country ■ forces and a correlative increase in enemy casualties have kept the VC off balance and prevented his interference with the build-up of U.S. forces. The often spoken of VC "monsoon offensive" has not materialized, and it now appears that the VC have relinq uished the initiative in the conduct of the war .

"September, I965: As the end of the monsoon season approached, th^'milit^"situation appears considerably brighter than in May when the VC threatened to defeat the RV^IAF. Since May the build-up of Free World Military Assistance Forces, coupled with aggressive combat operations, has thwarted VC plans and has laid the foundation for the eventual defeat of the VC...

"October , 196^ : ...an increase in magnitude and tempo of engage-mentsTs^'the GW/FvJF maintained the initiative. . .In summary, the military situation during October continued to favor the Allies as the VC experienced heavy casualties from the overwhelming Allied fire power...

"Novem ber, 19 6^: The increasing temDO of the war was^ reflected ■ in casualty to ta ls which reached new highs for. VC/PAVN and fTii^ nyTorc es. . .While keeping the enemy generally off balance, CVf/iWIAF were able to maintain and, to some degree, to increase the scope and intensity of friendly-initiated operations.

"December, 196^: Military activity in December was highlighted by an ilicrease- in the number of VC/PAVIn[ attacks on isolated outposts, hamlets, and districts, towns, and the avoidance of contact with large GWI and Free World Forces. The effective ness of this_^r ate.^^ was attested by the hi ghest monthly friendly casualty total of the war, by friendly weapons losses in excess of weapons captured for the first time since July, and by 30fo fewer VC casualties than in November...

"Januar y, I966 : The Free World peace offensive, coupled with TET festivities and the accompanying cease-fire, resulted in a period of restricted military activities for both friendly and enemy forces.. .Despite this decrease in activity, GWI and Free World Forces continued to force inroads into areas long conceded . . -as VC territory..." U9/ /Emphasis Added/

» This is not the place for a detailed ariali'sis of the reporting of

the war, or of the implications of the above-cited evaluations. But

several points do seem to emerge:

1. The reports are far too optimistic from January through April, 1965, and a big switch seems to com.e in June, 19^5^ ^hen

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General Westmoreland had already made his U^-"battalicn request and y'-arned of disaster if they were not forthcoming. May's report begins to shov the change in mood,, but its ambiguous evaluation is in sharp contrast to the - brief backward look offered in September.

2. Pacification is mentioned in the January evaluation, but fades away to virtually nothing in the months of the buildup.

3. The evaluations do not suggest that the main force threat is in any way diminishing by the end of 1965- Indeed, they accurately predict larger battles in I966. They do not suggest, therefore, that the time had come to start emphasizing pacification at the expense of exertin g more pre ssure directly on the enemy. The evaluations do not address this question directly, of course, but they do suggest that if any greater emphasis was to be put on pacification, it could be done only if there was not a corres pending reduction in the attack effort against the VCT This, in turn, would imply that if pacification was to"receive greater emphasis at the beginning of I966, it would require either more Allied troops or else might

lead to a lessening of pressure on the VC.

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II. Honolulu

A. The Conference - Februaj:'y I966

The details of the closed meetings at Honolulu do not appear, in retrospect, to be nearly as important on the future emphasis on pacification as the mere fact that the public statements of all participants carried for\-7ard the theme that had been enunciated in the Declaxation. This may often be true of conferences; it certainly appears true of this one, vhich was convened hastily and took place without any preparatory staff work on either side of the Pacific. In addition, the political upheavals in the spring of I966, v/hich follovj-ed the conference closely, contributed to a reduction in the importance of the details of the conference as it related to pacification-Pacification was discussed frequently during the closed sessions. The first tiine canie during the plenary session, when i\mbassador Lodge delivered his statement to the President.

Speaking before a large audience which included General Thieu and Air Vice Marshal Ky, Lodge made a general statement about vrhat he called "the subterranean war," and then discussed the four T^ational Priority Areas which.the GW and the U.S. imd established in October 1965:

"I would like to begin by saying that the successes and

the sacrifices of the military, both the Vietnaiaese and the American military, have created a fresh opportunity to win the so-called * subterranean war'...

"...VJe can beat up North Vietnamese regiments in the high plateau for the next twenty years and it will not end the war -" unless we and the Vietnamese are able to build sjjnple but solid political institutions under which a proper police can function and a climate created in which economic and social revolution, in freedom, are possible.

"The GVN has organized itself to do this job and you will hear a presentation by General Thang, who is in charge. The American contribution consists of training and equipping of personnel; advice; and material. .. ■ ■' - ;

"Four priority areas have been chosen. Three are places of great importance and difficulty. The "^ourth is largely pacified and is the place where they want to get the economic ejrl social development program going. We think the areas are well chosen. The three tough ones are close to the Vietnamese and American armies which m.eans that the military presence helus pacification. And, as pacifica^tion gets going, it im-- proves the base for the military.

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"In the four priority areas are 192 haialets, including 2385600 people 5 to be secui^ed by the end of I966. But GW efforts are not limited to these four priority areas. An . effort is underway which aims to raise the percentage of the . whole comtry which is pacified by about \h^lo\ i.e., from the current figure of about 52fa to about G&jo by the end of the year..." -x- l/

After the statements of Lodge and VJestmoreland (v/ho discussed only military matters), the President said:

"I hope that out of this conference we will return with clear views in our own minds as to how vre can apply more m.ili-tary pressure an.d do it better, how we can build democracy in Vietnam and what steps must be tal^en to do it better, how we can search for peace in the world, honorable and just peace, and do it better.

"If we can do the first, namely, develop better methods for defeating the Viet Cong and better methods for developing a democracy, I have no doubt but tha.t the third will be much easier to do because you can bargain much better from strength than you can from weakness." 'i/ '

-X- On March U, 1966, Lodge transmitted the text and charts of this briefing to Secretary McITamara and apparently at the same time to the White House, at the request of Jack Valenti. Lodge wrote;

"Dear Bob:

"At the request of Jack Valenti, I have put together a book containing the text and maps used in my presentation at the Honol-olu Conference. It is intended to serve as a current indicator of pacification progress being made within the I966 l^^ational Priority Areas —

"I think I should call attention to the fact that for /jneri-cans, it is natural to set goals and then work to achJ.eve them by'a specific date. . ■ ^

"This, however, is not the traditional Vietnamese way. While they ha.ve set a goal of I90 hamlets in the four priority - areas, lay guess would be that by the end of I966, they may , have achieved somewhat more than this, but not necessarily the

. ones which are listed here. In fact, if they ran into unexpectedly heavy opposition in one place and find a particularly good and < unexpected opportunity elsewhere, they probably ought to change

)' ^ the plan.,." 2/ ^

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^~^ After a short recess, Secretary Rusk then discussed the reasons

why Hanoi .ms not yet ready to negotiate, and said that if the_GW built "the kind of society which is indestructible, then Haxioi would ^roba.hlY cone to the conference table more rapidly. Anything that can move faster rather than raore slowly on our side and your side, he said, "anything that can cause them to realize that an epidemic _ . of confidence is building in the South and that momentum is gathering I could hasten the time when Hanoi will decide to stop this aggression. 4/

The President then said: "I hope that every person here from the TI S Sid- will bear in mind that before I teJie that plane back, I want 1 to have the best suggestion obtainable as to how we can bring better

^inary pressure on Hanoi and from the pacification side how we can trin- a better program to the people of South Vietnam and "naily, third what other efforts we can mal^.e to secure a gust and honorable lice HOW, I want to have w little briefcase filled with those three tarp-ets - a better military program, a better pacification program that includes everyt.hing, and a better peace program. 5/

General Thang then presented the GVH's pacification plans, in a briefing later made public.' Thang said:

"The objective of the whole people of my country is a unified democratic and strong Vietnam...To reach this objective, our National Leadership Committee has promoted three main policies: first, military offenses; second,

rxiral pacification; and third, democracy.

"...But it'is necessary, Mr. President, to define what this means by pacification. In my opinion, that is a failure of the past government, not to define exactly what we mean by pacification...

"I think that it is necessary to...define pacification as an effort to restore the public security first, and carry-in^ out a government policy which aims at improving the standard of living in this area in every respect — political, economic, social.

• "...the prerequisite is security. .'.So our concept of pacification is based on four main points:

Point Ho. 1': The rural pacification operation can only l^^JliS^nFthrough the real solidar-ity among the people, the armed forces, and the administration...

Point Ho. 2: O-or government should be very clea'r when ir'i'ai^^rTh^ it would like to build a new society for a better life in rural areas. That is meaningless to the peasant if you don't develop that in a concrete package.

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/At this point J Thang lamched into a lengthy explanation of what he ineant by a ne^vr society. In a vague discussion^ he described the social, economic, exid . political attributes of the ne\J society, all of which ■were general and idealised statements^//

Point Ko. 3: The clear and realistic policy of the govern-laent contributing to a better life in a new society I Just mentioned should be widely knovrn among the population and the cadres...

Point ITo. U: Rural pacification operations will open TaTtlng'peace if the enemy infrastructure is destroyed and permanently followed up, our own infrastructure created and supported by the people...All provinces have promised to the government that 75 percent of the-following facts maybe can be accomplished by the 1st of Jaiiuary I967:

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"Pacification of 963 new hamlets; pacification of 1,C83 existing hamlets; building of 2251 classrooms; 913 Kilom.eters of roads; 128 bridges; 57 dems; and 119 kilometers of canals ...While we have selected four areas of priority, the pacification operation has been pushed forward as usual, but with less efforts...

"Rural pacification will be a long-tena operation. We have modest and practical, rather than spectacular, goals for

1966..." 6/

After General Tharg's remarks, the plenary session records show reDeated references to the pacification effort, although there is confusion as to what it means. General Thieu made additional summary remarks on pacification, then Minister Ton gave a hriefmg on the economic situation, followed by David Bell on the same subject.

The next day, February 8, the working groups presented their findings to the President. First, Secretary Susk and Foreign Minister Do discussed ^ the session on negotiations. Then General Thang and Secretary FreemaJi r-por-ted on their session on rural construction. The details of the working groups session itself are covered below, but in plenary. Thang ■ emphasized the following points:

Our future should be developed mainly in four priority areas...Hajidicraft should be introduce! and developed in those areas also...Rural electrification should be ■ , developed and the number of generators increased in

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Land refoiin efforts should be pushed forward-

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Vfe ask that construction material and cement be sent to

Vietnam as soon as possible so our school programs can

be developed... • .

The training of officials at hamlet and village levels is vital... 7/

Secretary Freeman, who was about to make his first trip to Vietnam, summarized for the Americans:

"Having spent a good deal of tme yesterday listening to the very eloquent ^presentations by the Chairman and the Prime Minister, as well Is by Minister Ton, this is pretty much what we would call a nuts and bolts discussion session.

"One thing that was decided for United States purposes, for purposes of phraseology, was that the word 'pacification' really did not have the right tone. The term 'social construction might better be used...

"There was some discussion, considerable, about the selection of province chiefs. It was strongly emphasized that it was un-portant that the men be of integrity eJid ability, and that they be selected and maintained and backed up.

"The Prime Minister, General Thleu, arid then General Thang both said that you /General Thleu/ were personally Interested m this, and that-you were going to select them shortly, that they would have a duration of at least a year, but would be carefully reviewed and would be changed if they didn't do the job, but wouldn't be changed for other reasons, which we thought was ex-treDiely ixfiportant and we were gratified to find it ouo.

"You also explained to us, your associates General Ky 8Jid Gen-ral Thang, the change of command, saying m the past they were confused, and that they were now clear, so that everyone Imew exactly what their function would be.

■ "Then you discussed the training of the cadre...

'1 want to review the REA question and find out a bit more about why tha:b seemed to have some lag.

"Finally, we discussed the possibility of a joint training ■nroc^ram for the village and haxolet chiefs who presumably would he %3e-ted, but that some background in the philosophy, purpose and aims of governjaent, and the techniques of governing and administration, were felt to be needed by those people, b/

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The President then responded to the remarks of Thang and Freeiaaji by urg-Ip ing "all of you connected with our prograra.. .to give very special atten-.

tion to refugee ca:rips and the schools in the refugee camps." 9/ He then turned to Minister Ton and David Bell for a discussion of the economic situation. Then Secretary Garcljier, who had co-chaired a -working group

Pon health and education -- the distinction betvjeen rural construction and the health/education programs was not clarified -- made his remarks. He set out perhaps the m-ost clearly-defined objectives of the session (except for the economic negotiations) ^ describing the new contract with the AMA for training personnel^ the new goal for provincial medical teams, and the plans for a nev medical logistics system. In large part his goals were more specific than those of the other working group because the USAID Public Health Chief in Saigon, Major General James Humphries, had already laid groundwork for an excellent program of health services and assistance, and Gardner was able to work from a specific plan.

Gardner went on to discuss education, where his goals and objectives ' were less clear, and the President asked several detailed questions, con-

cluding by asking General Ky to ask the Ambassador to request an educational team to go to Saigon after the agricultui-al team headed by Secretary Freeman returned.

The Vietnamese then thanked the Americans for the conference, and in turn some of the senior members of the American delegation -- in order, Admiral Sharp, Leonard Marks, General VJheeler, Ambassador Lodge, Ambassador Eaxriiaan -- made brief statements about the m-eajiing of the conference. The President then made his final statement:

"...Preserve this communique, because it is one we don't want to forget." It will be a kind of bible that we are going to follow. When we come back here 90 days from now, or six months from now, we are going to start out and make reference to the announcements that the President, the Chief of State and

I ■ . ■ the Prime Minister made in para.graph 1, end vrhat the leaders

and advisors reviewed in paragra.ph 2...You m.en who are respon-. slble for these depe.rtments, you ministers, and the sta.ffs

I associated with them in both governiiients, bear in mind we are

going to give you en examination and the finals will be on just what you have done.

' "In para.graph 5; how have you built dem.ocracy in the rural ■ . -( areas? Hovf much of it have you built, when and V7here? Give us

1 dates, times3 numbers.

"in paragraph 2; larger outputs, m.ore efficient production to improve credit, handicraft, light industry, rural electrification -'• are those just phrases, high-sounding words, or have you coonskins on the wall ... . •

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"Next is health and education^ Mr. Gardner, We don't want to talk ahout it; \re want to do something aloout it. 'The President pledges he will dispatch teams of experts.' V^ell, we better do something besides dispatching. They should get out there. Vie r^„re going to train health personnel. How many? You don't want to be like the fellow vrho was playing poker and when ■ he made a big bet they called him and said 'what have you got?' He saidj 'aces' and they asked 'how many' and he said 'one aces'...

"Next i^ refugees. That is just as hot as a pistol in my

country. You don't want me to raise a white flag and surrender so we have to do something about that...

"Growing military effectiveness: we have not gone in because we don't want to overshadow this meeting here with bombs^ with mortars, with hand grenades, with 'Masher' movements. 1 don't know who names your operations, but 'Masher. ' I get kind of mashed myself. But we haven't gone into the details of growing ■ military effectiveness for two or three reasons. One, we want to be able to honestly and truthfully say that this has not been a military build-up conference of the vrorld here in Honolulu. We have been talking about building a society following the outlines" of the Prime Minister's speech yesterday.

"Second, this is not the place, with 100 people sitting around, to build a military effectiveness.

"Third, I. want to put it off as long as 1 can, having to make these crucial decisions. 1 enjoy this agony...! don't want to come out of this meeting that we have come up here and added on X divisions and Y battalions or Z regiments or D dollars, because one good story about how many billions are going to be spent can bring us more inflation that we are talking about in Vietnam. We want to work those out in the quietness of the Cabinet Room after you have made your recommendations, General VHaeeler^^ Admiral Sharp, when you come to us... "10/ ^/Emphasis Added/

The President's remarks candidly indicated the type of pressure and the expectations that he had for the effort.

But beyond the high-level interest so clearly demonstrated publicly for the first tim.e at Honolulu, wliat was accomplished? As mentioned earlier, Honolulu's importance lay in two things: (l) the public support sho^v-m for the "other war"; and (2) the sections of the Declaration which committed the GVN to the electoral process. If nothing else was accomplished at Honolulu, that made the conference-worthwhile. Thus, it is perhaps petty to criticize the details of the conference. But they do

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ouegest an unfortunate failure to come to grips with any of the basic issues concerning pacification, and, moreover, a skillful performai.ce bv the GTi^ to please their American hosts. Thang's statement to tne President after the working session, for exaiaple, with its emphasis on rural e^ectrifica.tion, handicrafts, and the need for "materials and cement" -- none of which were major GW concerns at that time — can fc Vest be explained, in retrospect, by the Vietnamese desire to emphasize

those things they felt the Secretary of Agriculture, the co-chairman of the-American working group, was most interested in.

Although the inner workings of. the conference do not seem to have had much importance on the development of the pacification effort, a record does remain of the "rui^al construction working group, and it deserves a brief summary. The meeting is useful to examine not because of its ultijoiate importance, which was marginal, but because it provides ■ us with a record of a type of discussion between Americans and Vietnamese which has been replayed constantly since (and before). To some weary participants, the very words used have seemed to be unchanged since 19b2.

A summary cannot, unfortunately, recapture the flavor of confusion which surrounds the memorandim for the record (A-225U, February 15, 1956). The m-eting began with a discussion of terminology (see footnote on "revolutionary development") in which it was decided to use the phrase "social construction" in place of pacification in English. Then, according to the memorandum, everyone lapsed back into using the phrase "pacification."

The Aiaerican representatives then pressed the issue of the role of the province chief, im.plying strongly that they thought the province chiefs should have more power and autonomy. The Vietnamese, led by ^ General Co, neatly answered this issue, "referring to the establislmienx of Rural Construction Councils and Division and Corps levels,_wnere such matters as the disposition and use of military forces are arbitrated and decided upon." When Leonard Unger, asked if the military commanders would be committed to providing the necessary military forces for the pacification eff-ort, "General Co again responded, saying that in the past senior com.^and;rs tended to pull troops away from Provincial control for search and destroy operations. This is a natui-al desire on the part of these Smanders who tend to feel that this is a more important role for such , troops. NOW, however, their missions have changed. These senior commanders are now directly involved in the pacification program, are members . of th-^ respective Rural Construction Coimcils...In other words, things b.ve chan-ed for the better, /mbassador Unger continued to pursue his roint stressing our concern that vestiges of the past may still remain. General Thang re-entered the discussion, explaining that the GVl^I now has ■ f new chain of coB-umr^d, clear and clean from Saigon to the Corps to the division to the Province to the District; there is only one chaianel m • • the country and it is a military channel.,.Still on the same suojeca,

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Mr Poats raised the question: What is the primary mission of the Division ^^ Comander? Is it pacification? General Thang answered in the affirmative.

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The discussion continued along these lines, and the airgrem candidly concludes: "Generals Co ar.d Thang were being pressed hy rather pointed Questions at this junctu.re and seemed to be trying to indicate that pacification is a primary task, although other military tasks must continue to be performed. It was fairly apparent that troops charged with securing the pacification area axe liable still to be withdrawn on a temporary basis to meet situations which mW senior corrmanders judge to be critical.

II ■ ' " The meeting then discussed the cadre program; the renewed emphasis on

village goveriffiient; the role of the province chief (at this point General , Co made his statement that the GVM would appoint province chiefs for one

I year minii>ium period, a decision which was never carried out); the intro-

duction of t^oo-Ds; the cadre (again); the six areas where the effort needed improvement (agriculture, hajidicraft, lajid reform, rural electrification, construction materials, and training of local officials); land reform (with Minister Tri presenting his fouj:-month old plan again, and Poats expressing "concern about the performance to date"); and the general question of pacification goals.

And then, after reporting back to the President in the meeting described earlier, the participants broke up, returning to Saigon arid Washington to give "the other war" a new emphasis; to reorgajiize the Mission in Saigon; to appoint a new Special Assistant to the President in Washington; to start the quest for coonskins (the phrase was in common use in Saigon within a few days); to await the public and press reaction (see following section); and to walk without warning into a major political crisis which almost brought the government down, set back every tim.e-sch-duie made at Honolulu, forced a postponement of the next scheduled conference from June-July until October, and - through an ironic twist of fate — left the Gm stronger than before, following a remarkably successful election.

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B. In£8£t_m^_Pub3i^inJJS,_^^

"This week the word 'pacification' was on everyone's lips af the Honolulu on? rex c on Vie^n^," .rrote Charles Hohr in the NewYork . Honoxuiu con important members of the Johjnson

ISSistfaSreSkced the idea with all the enthusiasm of a horse pj^yer Sth a new hetting system. The main purpose of the Honolulu player ^^^' flramatnze this American enthusiasm for the I966

^Sr;a:?fi::ti n :om:ti;^s caned 'nxral const^ction' - program S tie ?^verment of South Vietnam and to pledge more Mer.can assistance for the program."

Mohr's article may have heen slightly --^ri^^^f'JllJ'fl'' ^"" te little doubt that the President's pledge on oehalf^of the US r-Sverm^nt to the pacification effort began a new period for the US Government xo ^\ ^ Honolulu on it was open and unmistakable

rs'Tlfe/'to sSp?:; pI;rficTiorand the "other war/' a.d those who s;w these activitSs as unimportant or secondary had to submerge their sentSents under a cloud of rhetoric. Despite this fact, of course, sentmenxs una ^^ ^^^ Mission on program

X/ r Jai :ndTa;:y S^ haJtles remained to be fought. Porter Sd Komer would fight them, as viill be sho™ later.

This was the great impact of Honolulu - on pacification. But there were o?her rLifications of the Honolulu conference -1-=^ ^ver-

shadowld the emphasis on non-m.ilitary -\-i^^f^!,;\Jf ^^^ftl al up-followed Because of these events - particularly the political up heavSs that rocked Vietnam from March until June - the follow-up Conference tentatively .planned for June did not take place and the !^oXin pacification'; im.portance was probably set back about six Sniis Xle this study does not tr-y to cover the concurrent events o? the'period, it should be emphasized that the most important parts o? the Honolulu Declaration were not those dealing with pacification at all but rather the sections which connnitted the GVl^f to fomulate a Smocratic constitution to the people for discussion and modification; to seeS its ratification by secret ballot; to create, on the basis of P^ectlons rooted in that constitution, an elected government... 11/ Sth these words, the GVl^ was openly committed, under U.S. P-ssure, to !Lcess which Ihey probably did not desire or appreciate. In the

fui elections for a Constitutional Assemoly (September 11, 1966).

' The following collection of newspaper items is selected to show . ?? i .Zre dffferinP- opinions vrLthin the U.S. Mission and am.cng that there were J.^J^^f"J-^^^°^^^^ ^^^ ^^,,^^^, from Honolulu did get Vietnamese, but xnat in gener ^ ^^eporter in Saigon had

SS^S StS: "r S;meS^S t^ Mssio^f ^o^.ere telling hi.a their

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honest feelings (the Saigon Mission^ it vas once said by Barry ZorthJ.an^ could not keep a secret 2k hours)^ the stories from Saigon do reflect what the Mission thought in the days just after Honolulu. The editorials and columnists from Washington indicate to vhat degree the Administration succeeded in convincing the press corps (vrhich is not^ of course^ the U.S. puhlic) that the emphasis at Hoxiolulu vas really on pacification.

EDITORIAL: The TTew York Herald Tribune ^ February 8: . '

"The meeting presents the prospect of our resuming the war in m^ore favorable circumstances. The m.eeting of the heads of the American and South Vietnaraese governments is a fresh and stronger demonstration of mutual confidence. On this basis they can now proceed to miount measures for dealing with the equally important militaiy and civilian aspects of the war.

"The two are intimately related...the loyalty and support of the peasants in the interior are essential. President Johnson is bidding for them by offering some of the benefits of his Great Society program to the South Vietnamese. It will not be easy^ in time of war^...but,..they must be pursued ^rith the same vigor as we press the war on the battlefield."

EDITORIAL: The Washington Evening Star , February 7:

"It is particularly significant that the American delegation included JIM Secretary Gardner and Orville Freeman, Secretary of Agriculture. Their presence cer-tain]y mieans that a greater 'pacification^ effort will be made as the fighting goes on..."

COLII^INIST: Marquis Childs, February 9 (from Honolulu)

"This conference called by President Johnson is a large blue chip put on the survival value of the vaiy, exuberajit Air Vice Marshal Nguyen Cao Ky, and the generals who rule with him. It is expected that Ky mil not only survive but that with massive economic help from the U.S. the national leadership comimittee will eventually win the support of the peasant in the countryside...Any sensible bookmaker would quote long odds against the bet paying off. But after so many false starts this seems to be the right direction -- a determined drive to raise the level of living in the countryside and close the gap of indifference and hostility betvreen the peasant and the sophisticated city dweller...Over and over we have been' told that only by winning the hearts and minds of the Vietnamese people will

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ve achieve a victory that has meaning beyond the grim choice of _ pulverization of Am.erican occupation into the indefinite future ...This is the reason teams of American specialists in agriculture^ healthy and education are going to Vietnam..."

■ EDITORIAIi: The l]e\T York Herald Tribune , February 9:

"Perhaps the most constructive part of the Honolulu conference was the emphasis it placed on this_ hitherto badly neglected aspect of the Viet Ham war /Pacification/. It is unfortunate that Chief of State Thieu diverted attention from it by heaping more fuel on the controversy over whether the Viet Cong should or should not sit at a peace conference table. . ."

EDITOKEAL: The Nev Yor k Times , February 9 and 13:

"The Honolulu conference has followed the classic pattern of Summit meetings that are hastily called without thorough preparation in advance; it has left confusion in its wake, with more questions raised than answered...The one important area of agreement at Honolulu, apart from continuation of the military efforts, was on an expanded program of 'rural construction.' The prospective doubling of American economic aid, however, will be futile unless it is accomipanied by a veritable social revolution, including vigorous land reform. Premier Ky cast some doubt in his emphasis on moving slowly. His mnister of Rural Pacification envisages action in only 1,900 of South Vietnam's 15,000 haralets this year.

"Vice President Humphrey evidently has his work cut out for him in his follow-up visit to Saigon. Unless some way can be found to give more moment^xm to this effort, the new l! . economic aid program may go dom the same drain as all previous

programs of this kind.

"It would be a cruel deception for Americans to get the idea that social reforms carried out by the Ky governmient vlt.h American money are going to mal^e any perceptible difference in the near future to the Vietnamese people or to the course of the war."

COLIM'UST:

Ted Lewis, New York Daily Hews , February 10 (from ViTashington):

"Why, all of a sudden, has President Johnson begun to come to grips \T±th the ^other vrar' in South Vietnam?... Johnson, ^d.th his typical oratorical flourishes, has gi 4-1.^ -ivr,r^rPssion that he lamched something totally new

the impression

ven at

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Honolulu...The fact is that for several years this problem of the 'other vrar' has been recognized as vital by the State Department^ the Pentagon and even by the White House. But nobody did much about it, except in an offhand way,..

"Johnson is a master of timing. He has definitely gained a political advantage over his Viet policy critics by stressing right now the need of winning over the peasants.../Senator Robert/ Kennedy complained in a Senate speech just ten days ago that there were 'many indications that we have not yet even begun to develop a program...It is absolutely urgent/ the Senator said, 'that we now act to institute new prograras of education, land reform, public health, political participation...'."

KEI7S MALYSIS: Richard Critchfield in The Washington Eve ning

Star , February 9 (from Saigon):

"President Johnson's historic decision at Honolulu backing an Aiierican-sponsored brand of social revolution as an alternative to communism in South Vietnam was warmly hailed today by veteran political observers. The Honolulu declaration was viewed as ending postwar era of American foreign policy aim.ed at stabilizing the status quo in Asia.

"The key phrase, in the view of many diplomats here, was the offer of full American 'support to mieasures of social revolution, including land reform based upon the principle of building upward from the hopes and purposes of all the people of Vietnam.

" .Johnson's decisions to put political remedies on a par with military action are also regarded here as a major personal triujnph for Ambassador Heniy Cabot Lodge and his top aide, Maior General Edward G. Lansdale, the two main aavocates of 'social revolution' in South Vietnam...The Honolulu declaration appears to signify a major shift away from the policy of primarily military support established by President Kennedy m 1961 and closely identified with General Maxvfell Taylor, Defense Secretary McMamara, and Secretary of State Rusk...The Lodge-Lansdale formula was a striking departure.in that it saw the eventual solution not so much in Hanoi's capitulation as in successful pacification in South Vietncffli...The Honolulu decla-atlon aurounts to almost a point by point acceptance of this fomula and both its phraseology and philosophy bear Lansdale's urmiistaliable im^print..."

EDITORI/iL: The Bal timiore Sun , February 10:

"Unless there was more substazice to the Honolulu Conference than meets the eye, it could be summed up as much ado - not

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much ado about nothing but simply much ado...It was all spectacular and diverting but so far as we can see the problem of the war is where it was hefore the "burst of activity began...It is probably worthwhile to have a reiteration of the social and economic measures needed in South Vietnam. ..It is essential to underscore the political nature of the war, along with the continuing military operations. But these matters were generally understood before the Honolulu meetings. Perhaps^^events to come will maJce the purpose of the meeting clearer.

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EDITOKEAL: The Wew York Post , FelDruary 9:

"The Hawaii meetings vere advertised as the beginning of a vast new movement of economic ajad social refonn in Vietnam, President Johnson, we were told, went to Honolulu to launch the new approach with maximum drama.

"Instead, the session inadvertently underscored the lack of interest of the junta in Saigon in anything hut military conquest of the Viet Cong, to be carried out by stepped up U.S. armed efforts..."

KEWS STORY: AP, February 10 (from Honolulu):

"Vice President Humphrey left for Saigon today with South Vietnam's top leaders to spur action on programs attacking hunger, disease, ajid ignorance in that war-torn country...

KEWS MALYSIS: Charles Mohr The Wew York TiJies , February 10

(from Saigon):

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'In the atmosphere of Honolulu, there was much emphasis on form, so much that in some ways it may have obscured substance. The Araericans appeared so delighted with Marshal Ky's 'style' -- with his shoT-ring as a politically salable young man with the right instincts rather than as ■ a young warlord -- that there seemed to be almost no emphasis on the important differences between the Governments. . .iNThat Marshal Ky told President Johnson was something he had often said before: South Vietnamese society is still riddled with social injustices and political weaknesses; there is not one political party worthy of the n8jae...The South Vietnamese leaders believe that they could not survive a 'peaceful settlement' that left the VC political structure in place, even if the VC guerrilla units were disbandea. Therefore the South Vietnamese feel that 'n.iral pacification ' of'which m-uch was said at Honolulu, is necessary not

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only to helTD them achieve military victory hut also to prevent a political^reversal of that victory...As the Vietnamese see pacification, its core is not merely 'helping the people to^a better life/ the aspect on >rhich many American speakers dwelled, it is rather the destruction of the clandestine VC political structure and the creation of an ironlike system of government political control over the population...

"But the two govemm-ents have never "been closer than they are in the aftermath of Honolulu, and the atmosphere of good feeling seems genuine..."

KEWS ANALYSIS: Roscoe DrLimmond, February lU (from Washington)

"...The decisions taken at Honolulu by President Johnson'and Premier Ky go to the heart of winning. They were primarily social, economic, and political decisions. They come at a malleable and perhaps decisive turn in the ■

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war...

KE¥S MALYSIS:' Tom Wicker in The Hew York Times, February 13

(from Saigon):

"Vice President Hiimplirey. . .has left Saigon reverberating ^-fith what he said was the 'single message' he had come to deliver. The message was that the war in Vietnam was a war to bring social justice aiid economic and political progress to the Vietnamese people... Humphrey said at a . news conference here: 'Social and economic revolution does not belong to the VC. Won-coirmmist forces are the ones for>ra,rdlng the revolution.'

"The emphasis on social refona could also quiet critics who contend that Washington has concentrated too much on the military problem and not enough on civic action to mn the loyalty of the Vietnamese people..."

KEVJS MALYSIS: Charles Mohr The I-Iew York Times , February 13

(from Saigon):

"By giving enorraous emphasis and publicity to it, an impression was left that pacification is something new. In a sense, there was some truth in this. The m.en running the program, both Vietnamese and Aitierican, are new. And the I966 plan itself is a new one in many respects.

"Pacification is vitally important to success in the guerrilla war in South Vietnam. Without it, purely military-success becomes empty even if all the battles -are 'won'."

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HEWS MALYSIS: Joseph Alsop, February 1^ (from Saigon):

"CART BEFORE HORSE.. .All that really mattered at Honolulu was a Presidential decision to provide the forces needed to keep the pressure on the enemy here in Vietnam. The odds are heavy^that the President, who seems to prefer doing good by stealth, actually took this decision behind the electorate smokescreen of talk about other matters. The question rem-ains whether the needed forces will be provided soon enough. One must wait and see. ' .

"But at the risk of sounding captious, and for the sake of honesty and realism, it must be noted that there was a big Madison Avenue elem.ent in all the talk about, •pacification' during the Hawaii meeting and Vice President Humphrey's subseq:aent visit to Vietnam,

"This does not mean that pacification of the Vietnamese count-r-yside is an unimportant and/or seconda-ry problem. On the contrary, it will eventually be all-important and primary. But one need only glance at the list of priority areas marked for pacification now, to see the adman's touch m the present commotion.

"There are: An Giang Province, which belongs to the Hoa Hao sect and has been long since pacified by the Hoa Hao- the Hop T^ac region near Saigon, where General Harkins experimented unhappily with the so-called oil spot technique; parts of Binh Dinh Province along the north-south highway; and the fringes of the Marine enclave at Da Kang. ■

"Each area differs from the others. In the case of the nine villages on the fringes of the Marines' Da Hang enclave, for instance, pacification is needed to insure airfield security from mortar fire. Most of these villages have been Viet Cong strongholds for over 20 years, and they could be dangerous,

",..Pacification by the Marines looks very fine...But it takes far too many Marines to do the job.

"Nonetheless, .the real objections to making a big--immediate show of pacification are quite different. The Hop Tac experience tells the story. Here a great effort was made by the Vietnamese - authorities with the strong support of General Plarkins. A good deal was initially accomplished. Boasts began to be heard. Whereat the enemy sailed forth from the nearest redoubt area, knocked do-vm everything that had been built up, murdered all the

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villagers who had worked with the government, and left things much worse than they had been before...An attempt to make a big immediate show of pacification needs to be warned against, because of the ¥ashington pressure to do .just that. A large element of the U.S. Mission, was called home a month or so ago. And in effect, these men were commanded to produce a plan for mailing a show as soon as possible,

"Fortunately, they had the courage to point out that the cart was being put before the horse once again. Fortunately, Ambassador Lodge is well aware of the dangers of putting the cart before the horse. The pressure for something showy may continue, but it is likely to be resisted.

"If so the pressure will not be altogether useless. The Vietnamese and the Americans here are getting ready for pacification on a big scale and in an imaginative way, partly because of that pressure.

"It is vital to have everything in readiness to do the job of pacification as soon as favorable circumstances arise. But it is also vital to bear in mind that really favorable circumstances cannot arise until the enemy's backbone of regular tmits is at last very close to the brealving point, if not actually beginning to break."

EDITORIAL: Christian Science Monitor , February 11:

"If Saigon and Washington fight South Vietnam's economic and social war as vigorously as they fight its military war, the Coiranunist thrust against tha.t country will fail. Yet this is the biggest 'if of the war. Over and over lip-service has been paid to the inescapable need of winning over the peasantiy. But time and again this has come to naught.

"¥e are cautiously encouraged "by the latest steps loeing taken. The strong emphasis laid in the Honolulu Declaration on civic reforms is a commitment in the right direction. The sending of Vice-President Etmphrey to study South Vietnamese reform programs on the spot is an even stronger earnest of Americans intention not to let this program slip "back into another do-nothing doldrum..."

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III. Hono lvilu to Manila

A. Saigo n: Porter in Charge

"Question. Mr. President, when you were in Los Angeles reporting orrthelfonolulu Conference, you listed eleven items which you said were discussed, and you said that in all these fields you set targets, concrete targets. Would it he possible to get a list of these concrete targets?

"Answer. I don't have any. I think what I had in mind there was " sayin^that we hoped to make certain progress in certain fields and

we expect to have"" another conference after a reasonahle length of time, in which we will take the hits, runs, and errors and see what we have achieved and everybody would be answerable, so to speak, as to the progress they have made and whether or not they are nearing their goals...I hoioe to be in Honolulu in the next few months, maybe in the middle of the yeax, and see what has been done. I thou.<^ht it was good that we could go there and have the Government aiid the military leader, General Westmoreland, and the Ambassador Slid the Deputy Arabassador, meet with the Vice President, the Secretary of Agriculture and technicians, and try to expose to ohe world for three days what this country is trying to do to feed the hungry, and educate the people, and to improve the life span for ■' ' people who just live to be 35 now...A lot of our folks think it is

iust a military effort. We don't think it should be that, and v^e don't want it to be that..." l/

As the President returned to Washington from Honolulu, the Vice President, Secretary Frem^an, and McGeorge Bundy headed up a large list of high-ranking officials that went on to Saigon. Bundy, about to leave th- goverment^ carried with him authority from the President to give the Deputy Arabassador wide authority over all aspects of the rural construction nroo-rsm. On February 12, I966, the President sent Ambassador Lodge a NGDIS^'telegram, which was designed to pave the way for Bundy's reorganization effort:

"QUOTE. I hope tha.t you share my own satisfaction with the Honolulu Conference. The opportunity to talk face to face with you, General Westmoreland and the Vietnamese leaders has given m.e a much better appreciation of the problems each of you face, but perhaps even rsore mportantly the opportunities open to us. I was particularly impressed with the apparent determination of Thieu, Ky and the other Vietnamese Ministers to carry forward a social policy of radical and constructive change. However, I full we]! realize the tremendous job that they and we have in putting this into practice. I intend to see that our organization back here for supporting this is promptly tightened and

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strengthened and I know that you will want to do the same at your end. I was impressed with Ambassador Porter and it seems to me that he prohahly has the necessary qualifications to give you the support you will need in thir field. ^-Jhile I know that he is already doing so, 1 suggest that your designation of hm as "being in total charge, under yo-or supervision^ of all aspects of the rural construction program would constitute a cle£.r and visible sign to the Vietnamese ajid to our o^/n people that the Honolulu Conference really ma^ks a new departure in this vital field of our effort there. We will of course be glad to give prompt support with whatever additional personjiel or administrative rearrangement this might require within the Mission or Embassy. Please let me know your ovm thoughts on this.

"I hope that in June w^e can have a full report showing real progress in our war on social misery in Viet Nam. In the meanwhile, I know that you will not hesitate to let me know how we c8J:a be of help. UITQUOTE

"The President has instructed that a copy of this message be given to McGeorge Bundy." 2/

The President also sent General Westmoreland a personal telegram that day, which did not mention the matter of civilian organization. To Westmoreland he wrote:

"QUOTE. I want you to know tha.t I greatly enjoyed the opportunity of tallying directly with you at Honolul'a and I hope you share my own satisfaction on the outcome of the.t conference. I was much encouraged by your presentation of the military situation and now have even more pride and confidence in what you and your men are doing. 1 feel that we are on the right

track and you can be sure of my continued support.

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"I kJiow that you share ray own views on the equal importance of the war on social misery, and hope that what we did at Honolulu will help assure that we and the Vietnam.ese move forward with equal vigor and determination on that front. As I have told j\mbassador Lodge and am'telling Thieu and Ky, I hope that in June I can have a report of real progress in that field. With continued progress in the military field, we should by that time be able to see aliead more clearly the road to victory over both aggression and misery.

"You have my complete confidence and genuine admiration and absolute support. I never forget that I have a lot riding on you. UI-IQUOl'E." 3/ ' ■

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After the mood at the Warrenton Conference, the push for reorgejii-zation should have come as no surprise to the higher ranking members of the Mission. Discussions centering around the role of the Deputy Pm- ^ bassedor (and earlier, the DCM) as a manager for the mushrooming Civilian Mission had been going on for a long time, as Lodge and Porter -11 knew. With Bundy in Saigon to ease the issue, lodge answered the President on February 15, 1966:

"I do indeed want to 'tighten and strengthen the organization for suTDport of the rural construction program at this end ' as you tell me you plan to do at yours. And I applaud You^ determination to treat 'rural construction' (for which there should be a better name) * as an end in itself and on a par with the military.

"As you say, Ambassador Porter is already putting a great dea] of effort into this work. I have never made a formal announcement of this fact because it seemed to me that the _ arrangement was working pretty well as it was and that public announcement was uiinecessary. Also, I felt the U.S. Goverrnnent

* Lod-e had for some time been troubled by the phrase rural construction the literal trar^slation of the Vietnamese Xay_DimgJIongJhon - which he felt suggested bricks and cement, rather than the entire program of "revolutionary uplift" which he advocated. Right after the Honolulu ■ B-eeting, he asked each member of the Mission Council for suggestions on how better to translate the Vietnamese phrase. Out of the suggestions that he received .(including Westmoreland's recommendation that ^e ought to leave the phrase alone, just translating the literal meaning of the Vietnamese as accurately as possible), Lodge chose the phrase "Revolutionary Development." At about the same time, the GVE dropped the word "rural" from the name of the Ministry of Riu-al Construction (thus, Xa^ Dun- Pon^ Thon was replaced by Xay Dung). Lodge and Ky then announced ^^-h^i^^^h the Vietnamese Ministry would be known m Englisn as the ■ ' Ministry of Revolutionary Development, and the overall program called Revolutionary Development (RD) . To this day, the sems^tic gap remains abridged: the Vietnamese call it the Ministry of Construction (^oXey Zo-) except when they are talking in English to an American; tne Sl?icans ckl it the MORD. The same applies to the prograxi: moreover, I , ■ tSe confusion is often compounded by the fact that m most mform-al

1, l^^cSssions between Americans and Vietnam^ese, the term most often used

' * ' Js still "pacification." See, for exam-ple, the Working Group session

i I 'at Honolulu, February 7, 1966: "it is perhaps significam: that this was ^ * ■ the oSy tii^e in the co^se of the meeting, i.e., at the outset, that

the newlv adopted U.S. term was heard. Throughout the remainder ox the

the newly ^aop_. pacification was used almost exclusively.

rti co^nLtl:: ^hrsaigon U.S."representatives present at the meeting are inclined to doubt the actual a.ppropriateness of the new term...)

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MSiS getting really enthusiastic work without thought of self from both Porter and Lansdale under present conditions, I felt public ajmouncements might make Lansdale feel less important • without any ^^ain for Porter who does not need or want a sense of importance', I believe that ^jnericans are pulling together here as never before and that there is a spirit here which is worth more than organization charts.

"But I can see the merit of the idea that a public designation of Porter as being in total charge of the i\riericeji aspects of the ruxal construction program would 'constitute a clear and visible sign to the Vietnamese and to our own people that the Honolulu Conference really marks a new departure.'

"There are pitfalls to be avoided. For example, I assume that if Porter's new allocation means that I am so taken up with U.S. visitors that I am in effect separated from 'rural construction, ' then we would take a new look at the whole thing. Much of the most time-consimiing job out here is not .rural construction but is the handling and educating of U.S. visitors. Althouf'h it must be done at the expense of the war effort within Vietnara, it is vitally important. But it was not until the end of January that 1 was free enough of visitors to start holding meetings of U.S. 'rural construction' workers to probe and to prod and to develop the 'check-up' maps which I showed you at Honolulu.

"I suggest, therefore that I make the following announcement- 'I have today designated Deputy Ambassador Vlilliam Porter to tke full charge, under my direction, of all aspects of work of the United States in support of the programs of community building, presently described as rural construction, agreed at the Honolulu Conference. This includes overcoming by police methods the criminal, as distinct from the military aspect of Viet Cong violence; and the training and installation of health, education and agricultural workers and of community organizers. Ambassador Porter will have the support of a small staff drawn from all elem.ents of the U.S. Mission, and he and I will continue to have the help of General Edward^Lansdale as senior liaison officer and adviser. Ambassador Porter will continue to serve as my Deputy in the full sense of the word, but he will be relieved as far as possible of all routine duties not connected with the Honolulu program. We are determined that this program for peace and progress shall be carried forward with all the en-rpy and skill of a fully coordinated U.S. Mission effort, always with full recognition that the basic task of nation- . building here belongs to' the people of Viet Nam and to their goverrment.' . •

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f "I know txhat YOU appreciate that this is essentially a

' Vietnamese program and that what Porter would be supervising

would be the .A^ierica^ end of it. I recognize the existence of the v^ew that we must in effect impose detailed plans and some- . how rmi the pacification effort ourselves. But I do not snar-e it. Hothing durable cbxi be accomplished that way.

"As far as 'administrative rearrangement' is concerned, I would like Sam Wilson to take the office now occupied by Porter, with the rank of Minister, and to serve as Mission _ coordinator. I intend to put Habib in the office now occupied I "by Chadbom-n with the rank of Minister....

"As soon as I receive word from you that this is satisfactory, I intend to make the announcement about Porter. The other appointments can be announced later. LODGE h/

From the beginning, Lodge, who felt that "a public aainoimcement was tmnecessary" except as a "clear and visible sign to the Vietnamese and to our own people that the Honolulu conference really marks a new de-Lrture " k/ was not overly enthusiastic about the public designation S hS'cIe-Dutv as being "in total charge" of something. The documen'cation ±1 virtually" nonexistent on the question of whether Lodge's feelings on thil point acted as a constraint on Porter, but it is hard to escape tne ctrong iinpression that from the outset. Lodge was going along with the ;ew authority for Porter only with reluctance - and that Porter had to Seep this in mind whenever he considered putting heavy pressure on an agency. . .

Porter also had his reservations about his role. Whether these were caused by a feeling that the Ambassador was not going to support him m showLms with the agencies, or whether his caution came fro. some more basic feelings, there can be no doubt that he did not, n.n the period between Honolulu and Manila, perform in his new role as the President and his senior advisors had hoped« And thus once again, at Manila, a ■ Organization was approved - this time a much broader and fax-reaching

one.

Porter's -intentions were accurately foreshadowed in his first state-,,ent to the Mission Coimcil on the subject, February 28, 19o6 He_sought then to allay the fears which the announcement had raised m the minds of the agency chiefs in Vietnam:

"jijiibassador Porter described briefly his new responsibilities as he sees them in the pacification/rural development area. ' He pointed out that the basic idea is to place total responsi-' biiny on one senior individual to pull together all of the civil

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aspects of revolutionary development. He sees this primarily as a coordinating ef fort and does not intend to get i nto__the TTi-irlri 1 ff"nf in'dividuad^agen ey activities and responsibilities .^ As"he""and'"lais staff perceive ai^eas which require attention and action "by a responsible agency, he vill call this to the attention of that agency for the purpose of emphasis; he intends to suggest rather than to criticize. . .i^mbassador Porter noted that the non-priority areas are still getting the bulk , of the resoui^ces, vrhich means that \re have not yet really concentrated on the priority areas and which also flags the necessity to bring the priority areas into higher focus. He will have a great interest in the allocation of resources such as manpower; yet he recognizes that under wartime conditions which prevail in Vietnam there will always be some inequity." 5/

It is important to emphasize that the appointment of Porter to his new role did indeed improve the organization of the Mission, and that Porter did accomplish some of the things that VJashington had hoped he would "- but, under the constraints outlined below, he did not get enough done fast enough to satisfy'- the growing impatience in Washington with the progress of the effort. This impatience was to lead to the second reorganization and the formation of the Office of Civil Operations (OCO) after the Manila Conference. Although the impatience of Washington was justified, the fact is that under the new and limited mandate Porter had, he did begin the process of pulling together CIA, USAID, and JUSPAO, and forcing them to work more closely together. He also tried to focus General Lansdale's liaison efforts with General Thaiig more closely on items related to o-or operational objectives. He presented a new and vastly improved image of the civiliaji mission to the press, many of whom came to regard him as the most competent high official in the Mission. To one semi-official observer, Henry Kissinger, who visited Vietna:n first in October of I965, and then returned in July, I966, the situation looked substantially improved:

"The organization of the Embassy has been vastly improved ' since my last visit. The plethora of competing agencies, each operating their omi program on the basis of partly conflicting and largely uncoordinated criteria, has been replaced by an increasingly effective structure under the extremely able leadership of Bill Porter. Porter is on top of his job. It

1 would be idle to pretend that the previous confusion is wholly

overcome. He has replaced competition by coordination; he is well on his way to imposing effective direction on the basis of carefully considered criteria. At least the basic structure for progress exists. \Jhere eight months ago I hardly knew where to begin, the problem now is how to translate structure into performance -- a difficult but no insuperable task." 6/

' Desnite Kissinger's hopeful words, there was a growing tendency in ■ ---^ Washirlgton-to demand more out of .the Mission that it was then producing.

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Tn a paper written in August, I966, Robert W. Komer, whose role in the re-emphasis of pacification vill be discussed in the next sectxon, wrote:

"There is a growing consensus that the US/GVN pacification effort needs to be stepped up, that management of our pacification assets is not yet producing an acceptable rate ■of return for our heavy support investments, and that paci-■ ficat-ion operations should be brought more abreast of our developing military effort against the MA and VC main force. The President has expressed this view, and so has ^anbassaaor Lodge among others." 7/ ■

Why did Porter not live up to the exi^ectations of Washington? \feile the docLentation is weak on this point, the following reasons can be ■ deduced from'the available evidence, including discussions with people who worked in both Saigon and Washington:

\ I !■ The Ambassador was not fully bac}iingjiis_jeputy,_and^^

ili^fT^-r^FToTi]II^.ort in Mission Council m_eetings,

i^rtil¥?Fi^sTTirdii^'iiI3ns with the agencies. Many senior

offictiS of'the USG, including the President, had Jold Porter

that he had their full support,' and that they expected him to

manage the Mission. But on a day-to-day basis, ^^^^^^ J^^ ;°

. • pet Ilong with the Ambassador, who was still (and legitimately

To) the boss. The result was a considerable gap between what high officials in Washington considered Porter's mandate,_and what Porter felt he would be able to do without antagonizing the Ambassador. -^

7lZ^[rZ^h^ foreshadowed in a remarkable >.ray in 1963-196^- After

tration 'This L; of course been stressed to him. both by Dean Rusk

aid iys^if (and also by John McCone), and I do not think he is con-t^io7slv re ecting our advice; he has just operated as a loner all his Tife Ind canS readily char.g^ now. Lodge's --ly-designated deputy Davld^V-es, was with us and seems a highly competent team player. I have ^fr.The situation frankly to him and he has sai'd he would do all he SS:f to' o^ tSiSwhat would in effect be a. executive committee opera-SS below the level of the Ambassador." It is fairly well established thai Ls, whatever his own ability and shortcomings was unable to establish an "executive comittee operating below the level of the Ambassador," and that, as a matter of fact his every attempt to move m the dire tion indicated by the Secretary further alienated him from ■ the Sbassador. The presumed lesson in the incident was that it is ISftculttnd dangerous to tell one man's deputy that he has to assume Scad resp'xsibility and authority if the top man does not want this designation made. ■ ^- ■

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2.' The agencies invQlved - A ID, USIA, and CIA — vera hostile to the ne^rdesi^ nation from the outset . Since every agency ^ald lip-service to the new role of the Deputy Aiahassador, it is difficult to docuiuent this fact. But it is virtually self-evident: since every agency was being told that its chief reiDresentative in Saigon now worked for the Deputy Amhassador, a career Foreign Service Officer, there was un-

M ■ ■ happiness with the systen in both, Saigon and Washington.

Men like the Director of JUSPAO, who had served in Vietnam

I I since January of 196^, and the CIA Station Chief, who re-

tained a completely independent conmunications channel to

j : Washington, were not going to yield any portion of their

autonomy without some quiet grumbling and invisible foot-dragging. To overcome this reluctance was not as easy for Porter as Washington had perhaps hoped, particularly in light of Lodge's attitude.

3. The Washington organization did not parallel the Saigon \ I "stinlc' tTO-e^iTlTas supposed to sup p ort, and in fact actually

^^verited__strong and continuous support. With legitimate ligaTand traditional responsibilities for programs overseas, each agency in Washington was understandably reluctant to channel their guidance through the Deputy Ambassador, whose authority did not seem to be derived from the normal letter of- authority to all Chiefs of Mission sent by President Kennedy in I96I. The agencies, moreover, also had a special problem with regard to Vietnam: Congress was being far more rigorous in its review of the Vietnam program than it was in most other areas. The Moss Subcommittee on Overseas Governmental Operations, for exajnple, was sending investigating teams to"" Saigon regularly, and issuing well-publicized reports criticizing the AID program across a broad front. The Sena-j torial group that reviews CIA programs was showing considerable

concern with the nature and size of the cadre and counter-( ' ' terror programs. And beyond that, there was the normal budge-

tary process, in which each agency generally handles its own requests th-rough an extremely complex and difficult process. t ' Each agency was bound to try to commujiicate as directly as

, , possible with their representatives in Saigon. Thus, while

I ' some major conflicting policies which had previously existed

were ironed out through the new system (such as the ro,le of j the cadre), many smaller, or second-level matters contained

to receive the traditional separate agency approach.

A good example of this was the vital issue of improving village/hamlet government. Although consistently identified as a key element in any successful nacification program, improving the war-torn village structure 1 '■ seem-d to escape the Mission organizationally. Responsibility for advice

ond'assistance to the GVI^ Ministry of Interior (later the Commissariat for

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Atoinistration), rested vith the USAID Public Atoinistration Division, ^SS in turn vL at the third level of the USAID reporting to the USAID Director only through an Assistant Director for Technical Ser-viS Sthin the Public Administration Division (PAD) itself, to make matters vorse, iinr,roving village/hamlet government was only one of a laSe number of activities for which PAD was responsible --_and in the eye! of many traditionally-minded professional public administrators, it did not automatically come first.

Other issues of obvious importance -- such as budgeting, strengthening the Ministry, improving the National Institute of Administration, ■ sSdin. officials to the U.S. for participant training - all came withm the normal PAD prograra as outlined in the AID Country Assistance Program CrAPl for lY 67, and, moreover, they required more resources more Americans more attention at high levels of AID, than the village/hamlet g^ernment problem. When Ambassador Porter directed AID, in May of 19o6, to begin massive efforts to improve village government, his orders were obeyed to the extent they could_bej^rithiri_th^_cont^^ comitm-iKt^T-ThiT^i^iFi^ a further stretching of the already taut UaAIDTr^^aff, since no previous commitments or programs were cut bacK to provide man and/or money for village government.

At the same time, other sections of the Mission which were expected to support the renewed emphasis on local government were not producing as requested. JUSPAO, asked to support the effort with psychological operations, agreed in principle but found its existing list of priorities basically mchanged. The Embassy Political Section, which should have supported the effort at least to the extent of urging through_its politi-ral contacts that the GW revitalize the village structure, simply had vett'r things to do. The CIA was also asked to support the effort; with thSr cadre assets, they were in a crucial position on the matter par-ScSartf since some of^he critics of the cadre had stated that _the cadre actually undercut village government instead of strengthening it fafthey claimed). Again, the CIA gave lip service to the idea, without i^ing Ly significai chLnge in their training of the cadre at Vung Tau.

in this situation, Ambassador Porter tried several times to get action each time received enthusiastic, but generalized words oi agree-^ent^d support from everyone, a^d finally turned his attention to other ZueTs- with the crush of business, there was always a more aimnediate .

crisis.

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B. Washington: KoiP.er as the Blovrtorch

The ¥arrenton conference had discussed not only the reorganization of the Mission in Saigon, but -- far more gingerly -- the need for a laore centralized management of the effort in Washington.

After the Honolulu conference the President decided to talkie action to Chajige the Washington structm^e on Vietnam, but not in quite the way suggested at Warrenton. While many people at Warrenton, particularly the 'state representative, had hoped that the President would designate one - man, with an interagency staff, as the overseer of an integrated political-military-dinlomatic-economic policy in Vietnara, the President decided to reduce the sco-oe of the job, and give one man responsibility for what was coming to be c^alled ^'The Other War." Thus, for the very first time, there would be a high-ranking official — a Special Assistant to the President ^- whose job would be to get the highest possible priority for non-military activities. In effect, the President had assured a place at the decision councils in Washington for someone with built-in pro-pacification, pro-civil side bias. This was Robert W. Komer, whose strenuous efforts in the I next few B^onths were to earn him the nicknacie of "The Blowtorch" (given

to him by Ambassador Lodge, according to Komer).

How much authority the President intended to give Kom.er is not clear. ' It is quite likely that the issue was deliberately left vague, so as to

i see what authority and what accomplishments Komer could carve out of an

^biguous YSMA and his ready access to the President.

On March 23, 1966 -- six weeks after Manila -- Joseph Califano, Special Assistant to the President, sent the Secretary of Defense an EYES ONLY draft of the NSAI'l setting up Komer *s authority. In the cover-in^ note, Califano said, "We would be particularly interested in whatever n suggestions you would have to strengthen Komer's authority." 8/ In response,

the Defense Department (the actual person making suggestion unidentified in documents) suggested only one minor change, and approved the ESAM.

The other departments also suggested minor changes in other parts of the NSA^'I, and on March 28, I966, the President issued it as NSAI-l 3^3- It said:

"In the Declaration of Honolulu I renewed our pledge of

common commitment with the Government of the Republic of Vietnam to defense against aggression, to the work of social revolution, to the goal of free self-governjaent, to the attack on hunger, ignorance and disease, and to the unending quest for peace. Before the Honolulu Conference and since, I have stressed re-oeatedly that the war on human misery and want is as fundamental to the successful resolution of the Vietn&jn conflict, as our military operations to ward off aggression... In my view, it is

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essential to designate a specific focal point for the direction, coordination and supervision in Washington of U.S. non-nilitary T,rograms relating to Vietnam. I have accordingly designated Mr. Eobert ¥. Komer as Special Assistant to me for carrying out this responsibility.

"I have charged hiifl and his deputy, Ambassador William Leonhart, to assure that adequate plans are prepared and coordi-• nated covering all aspects of such programs, and that they are promptly and effectively carried out. The responsibility vill include the mobilization of U.S. Hiilitary resoiu-ces in support of such programs. He will also assure that the Rural Construe-tion/Pacification program and the programs for combat force employment and military operations are properly coordinated.

"His functions'will be to ensure full and timely support of the U.S. in Saigon on matters within his purview...

"In addition to working closely with the addressee Cabinet officers he will have direct access to me at all times.

"Those CIA activities related solely to intelligence collection are not affected by this KSAI'I." 9/

Mr. Komer was in business, with a small staff and a mandate as he saw'it, to prod people throughout the government in both Washington and Saigon combined with a personality that journalists called abrasive, his mandate resulted in more press^ore being put on the civili^s associated with Vietnam than ever before, and in some understandable frictions.

Komer's significance in the re-emphasis of pacification is important, and must be dealt with briefly, although this section does not relate his story in detail.

First, there was Komer's influence on AID. With little difficulty, h^ established his ability to guide AID, and began to give them direct iistructions on both economic and pacification matters. AID, previously iiS iSited influence in the Mission's pacification policy, fomd its influence diminished still further.

Of more sigtiificance was Komer's emphasis on the ED Cadre program, , ,„n bv the CIA. Together with Porter, he recomir.ended a premature expan-Xp of the program! in an effort to get the progra^a moving faster. On Ipril 19,1966, aftir his first trip to Vietnam, Komer told the President:

"Cadre Exoansion. While the RD prograja has some question-^y,le T^^^^^t^TTT^ms the most promising approach yet developed. S,eW ministry led by General Thang is better than most, and . the VuPF ^au and Montagnard training centers are producing 5500 trainS men for insertion in 59-man team.s into 93 villages

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"But Porter sees even this rate as insufficient to keep up with 'the groving military capability to sweep the VC out of key areas.' He urges rapid expansion via building another training center (which he'd like to get Seabees to build). The aiia°is x'oughly to double cadre output from 19,000 to 39,000 trained^personnel per year. He thinks this rate could ■ be'reached by end CY 1966. I agree with Porter and will press this concept at the Washington end." lO/

Plans were approved, and construction began on the second training center. But by the end of I966 it was recognized that the atterapt to double cadre training would only weaken their quality, which was shaky to begin with. The construction of the second center was abruptly halted, Komer and Porter had miscalculated badly.

Komer also sought to influence the military in both Saigon and Washington to give more attention to the pacification effort.

In cables to Saigon -- m^ost of them slugged with his najue, and thus known as "Komergrams" — Komer sought to prod the Mission forward on a wide variety of programs. One of his most recurring themes was the Chieu Hoi prograjn * and in tiiae his urgings did contribute to a more successful program, with a high-ranking Americant official in Aiabassador Porter's office working on nothing else, in place of the previous ad hoc arrange- . ment between JUSAPO and USAID.

Another recurring theme was refugees, but here he was less successful, particularly since the U.S. Mission was never able to determine whether or not it desired to stimulate more refugees as means of denying the VC mam^ower. His cables on this complex issue were characterized by an absence'of objective, but at least he was addressing frontally questions few other people would raise at all:

"For Porter from Komer: W^e here deeply concerned by growing number of refugees. Latest reports indicate that as of Sl^August, a total of 1,361,288 had been processed...Of course, in some ways, increased flow of refugees is a plus. It helps

* For exaiaple: "Porter from Komer: Highest authorities interested in 1 • stepping up defection T^rograms. While recognizing limitations Chieu

Hoi program and inadequacies GVH administration, program has achieved i \ ' impressive results ajid she™ high return in terms modest U.S. support

costs Greatly concerned by two recent administrative decisions taken ■' • \)y"gVH..." 11/ Or: "To Porter from Komer: USIA eager help maximize

success'botlTchieu Hoi and RD programs, in which highest authorities

vitally interested..." 12/ Or: "For Mann and Casler from Komer: j Would appreciate your following through on coordinated set of action

woposals to energize lagging Chieu Hoi program.. .We are concerned.

about drop-off in returnees since Aprn;i. . .Bell and Marks concur. 13/

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r^ deprive VC of recruiting potential and rice gro.7ers, and is

'--^ pStiy indicative of growing peasant desire seek security on

Gur side.

"Question arises, however, of whether we and GW ade-■ auately set ap to deal with increased refugee flow of this maSItude. MD has prograimned i^uch larger refugee program ToTwSl] but is it enough7...0nly Mission wold have answers, fo intent this cable is merely to pose question, solicit bxds ?or increased support if needed, and assure you I would do all possible generate such support." 14/

Si.oJ^:f GenSarSeS^SSL'/a-epTtrin W, he - a.a appa.entl. t.e

President -- were still unsatisfied.

EfaarSrto^TrJlfelrication up, ana to constitute a one-.a.,

full-time, nonstop lobby for pacification withm the USG.

After his first trip to Vietnam, for exaiaple, Komer reported to the .t ! +^0+ 'S-h.-lP nrr snlendid military effort is going CLUite well. President that while oi,^ splendid ^ ^ necessary results, we must

^^^sS^es SerSgh rVr^o it*to°(:^d'eSand) certain Ly pacification IZTZZ Sreciafly cadres and police - ifj^.c„e^sar,^ai_so^^ th^jailJiH:£.effort^'' 15/

Komer's memoranda constitutes only a small proportion of the infor-.atiora^rsuggestions, reaching the Pres^ ■

''iri:^ S^iS ir^clSriSrsSAhe dlreSlon of O.B strategy xn any sen.e ^;^^"" ^^^^ K^^er was the first senior official

in lltlSTstonlo mak ri o^lffort to put pacification near the top of m Vvashing^on X ^ effort, and that he had a particularly aa-

oui^ combined ""l^ll^ ^^^"2^fl^^ ' ge had authorized back-channel com-"SSrns^wfthTh: tra:srdor^l;d Deputy Arabassador in Saigon, apparent "^essio the President, ar.d the umbrella of the White House.

His memoraiida to the President over his year in Washington showed considerable change in thinking on many issues, but a consistent support ■ ?or more pacification. A small sample is revealing:

"Kev aspects of pacification deserve highest priority --. and greater emT^hasis. Unless we and the GTO can sectors and . ,!^?d the covmtryside cleared by military operations, we either ■ face sn ever larger and quasi-permanent military commitment or risJ Stting the VC infiltrate again...I personally favor B.ore

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attention to the Delta (IV Corps) region, vhich contains eight ' out of Vietnam^s 15 million people and is its chief rice bowl ...Clearly we must dovetail the military's sweep operations and civil pacification. My impression is that, since the military are moving ahead faster than the civil side we need to beef up the latter to get it in phase. There's little point in the military clearing areas the civil side can't pacify. On the other hand, security is the key to pacification; people won't cooperate and the cadre can't function till an area is secure.

• .

"Somehow the civil side appears reluctant to call on military resources, which are frequently the best and most readily available. I put everyone politely on notice that 1 would have no such hesitations -- provided that the case was demonstrable -- and that this was the express request of the Secretary of Defense." 15/ /Cited Supra./

In August of 1966, Komer produced the longest of his papers, and the one he considered his most important. Its title was "Giving a Kew Thrust to Pacification." In addition'to discussing the substance of pacification, the paper ma.de some further organizational suggestions, which clearly foreshadowed the second reorganization of the Mission which took place after the Ma.nila conference. It is worth quoting in some length (all imderlining is part of the original):

"There is a growing consensus that the US/C-W pacification effort needs to be stepped up, that management of our pacification assets is not yet producing an acceptable rate of return for our heavy investments, and that pacification opera.tions shotild be brought more fibreast of our developing military effort ' against the IWA and VC main force. The President has expressed this view, and so has Ambassador Lodge among others.

"I. Wha t is pacificati on? In one sense, "pacification" can be used to encompass the whole of the military, political, and civil effort in Vietnexa. But the term needs to be narrowed down for operational purposes, and can be reasonably well separated out as a definable problem area.

"If we divide the US/gW problem into four main components, .three of them show encouraging progress. The caonpaign against the major VC/WA units is in high gear, the constitutional process seems to be evolving favorably, and we eixpect to contain inflation while meeting most needs of the civil economy. But there is a fourth problem a.rea, that of securing the countryside and getting the peasant involved in the struggle against the Viet Cong, where we 'are lagging way behind. It is this problem area which I would term pacification...

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"At the risk of over-siiaplificationj I see management of 4^ the pacification problem as involving three main sub-tasks:

(l) providing local security in the countryside -- essentially 1^ a inilitary/police/cadre task; (2) breaking the hold of the

VC over the people; and (3) positive programs to -win the active j • support of tne rural population.

y '"...Few argue that we can assure success in Vietnam without

I also winning the 'village war.' Chasing the large units around

the boondocks still leaves intact the VC infrastructure, with ij^ its local guerrilla capability plus the weapons of terror and

I intimidation. . .So winjiing the Village war' which I will loosely

call pacification, seems an indispensable ingredient of any high-confidence strategy and a necessary precaution to close the guerrilla option,

"...Yet another reason for stressing pacification is that the U.S. is supporting a lot of assets in being which are at ■ the moment poorly employed. Even the bulk of ARW, which increasingly sits back and watches the U.S. take over the more difficult pai^ts of the war against main eneBiy units and bases, might be more effectively used for this purpose.. .Thus, even if one contends that pacification as I have defined it is not vital to a win strategy, stepping up this effort would add little to present costs a.nd might produce substantial pay offs.

"Beyond this, the time is psychologically ripe for greater emphasis on pacification. South Vietnamese confidence is growing as the U.S. turns the tide. ]\^ew US/F// military forces are arriving to reinforce the campaign against the m.ain force; their presence will release much needed assets to pacification. The GVII5 fresh from success against the Buddhist led struggle and ■. confidently facing an election process leading toward a constitution, also has been making the kind of tough decisions --. devaluation, turnover of the Saigon port to military management, etc. -- that will be needed in pacification, too.

"In sum, the assets are available, and the time is ripe for an increased push to win the 'village war.'

"III. What is Kolding U p the Pacificatio n E fforts? The long history of the Vietnam struggle is replete with efforts to secure the countryside. Most of them, like Diem's strategic hamlet program, proved abortive. ...Some of the chief difficulties we confront are suggested below: .

"A. We had to g o after the major VC/WA units first ... It was a matter of "first things first...

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"3, The YC/MA have "been able to select the veakest point in any emb ryonic GW pacification effort and destroy it vith _a ■ Tig htening attack *,•

"C. There are inherent difficulties :,n the pacification process itself ...

"D. Lack of high q uality asset s. Pacification has also had to take a"~back seat' in the sense that it generally gets only the lowest grade GW assets -- and not enough of these...

"E. Last but not le ast, neither the U.S. nor the GW have

3-2 yet develQ-ped an. adequate plan, program, or management structure for dealing with pacification...

"1. The JCS and MACV are so preoccupied, however Justifiably, with operations against the major VC/l^]^/A units that they are not able to pay "enough attention to the local security aspects of pacification...

"2. There is no unified civil/military direction within the GW...

"3. A similar divided responsibility prevails on the U.S. side...

"U.. Kor does there yet appear to be a well-understood ■ chain of coinmand from Porter even to the civilians operating in the field... ■

"5. There is no integrated civil/military plan for pacification on either the U.S. or GW side...

"IV. How do we step up Pacification? ...It demands a multi-faceted civil-militaxy response...

"A. Provide mor e adeq uate, continuous security for the locales in which pacification is taking p lace._ This is the iTsential. prerequisite. None of our civil programs in the countryside can be expected to be effective lonless the area is reasonably secure. Nor, irnless the people are protected, and their attitudes likely to change in favor of the GW... To provide security requires the assignment on a long term ba.sis of env^^ugh assets to defeat these rer>ident VG compajiies and battalions, in addition to providing 2U-hour security to the people until they are able to assist in providing their own protection. This is primarily the task of RE a_nd PF, •suT)t)orted by the RD cadres and police.. .Some knowledgeable

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experts contend that even if we improve the...RF, PF, police, and cadre, they are together insufficiently to extend local security much beyond existing secured areas. They feel that lacking mobility and hea^vy firepower, these forces must be thickened wHh a liberal sprinkling of rerul.ar ARTO units working in the area outside the immediate area undergoing pacification, I do not suggest that MW regulars gainfully employed in battle against the enemy main forces be so diverted. I do urg e that those ABYN forces not now fully engaged -- a lubsta ntial-fYlction of the total be used to co^ribut e directly to improving local security .

"B. We must devote more effort to breaking the hold of the VG over the people ...

"C. Carry out posit ive revolutionary development programs to win'actTT Ti^^alar support . The cliche of winning support by"5ffi?ing the people a better life through a series of interrelated RD°progrsms has great relevance in Vietnam.. .

"D. Establ ish functioning priorities for pacification. ..

"E. Bett er Area Priorities ... A greater stress on pacification logically means greater stress on the Delta...

"F Concent rate additionaj. resources on pacification. .. Arguments made in the past thaiTJ^^ill^^on is a delicate sub- . iect to be approached only with care and precision have lost some of their relevance as the intensity of warfare has increased

...Increase:

Police.■.

RD Cadre ..■

M^/H.al Sun-port for Pacification...

■ The U.S."Agricultural Effort...

ChieuHo i...

Villag'eT'Hamlet Administration...

"G* Set more performance goals...

' . "H. Rapidl y extend the security of key roads...

1 . "I. Systemati ze the flow of refugees...

I "J. Get b etter control over rice...

"V.' How can Pacification be Managed More Ef f ectively? "A. T^estructuri ng the GVTT...

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-- Place the RD and PF under the RD Ministry...

"" Estab lish a single line of coiriiuand to the province chiefs...

-^ Remove the Division from the pacification chain of corffiuajid.. ■

-- Stren gthen the authority of the Province Chiefs...

— Appoint civilian chiefs in selected provinces and districts...

"B. Parallel strengthening of the structure i s essential. U.S. leadership has often sparked major pacification steps hy the GW. The structure for managing pacification advice to the GW, and direct U.S. military/civilian support^ have evolved slowly as the U.S. contributions heve grown. Once it was possible to coordinate the U.S. pacification effort tlirough an interagency committee for strategic hamlets. Later the Mission Council concept was used extensively. In the wake of the Honolulu Conference, the President appointed Ambassador Porter to take charge of the non-military effort in Vietnam. Several highly qualified people now give Porter the nucleus of a coordination end operations staff. However...the U.S. management structure must be strengthened considerably more.

"There are three basic alternatives, each building on the present ' structure, which could provide the needed result. Two of them-are based on the principle of a 'single manager* over both civilian and military assets by assigning comxiand responsibility either to Porter or Westmoreland. The third accepts a continued division between the civil and military sides for nuiuerous practical reasons, but calls for strengthening the management structure of both.

"Alterna.t ive No. 1 -- Give Porter operational control over all ILj_^__'^ci fication activity...

"Alternati ve No. 2 -- Retain the present separate civil and militarv com:na,nd_ch5iinels but strengthen the management structure ^. ]3o W ^iACY"~and the^U.S. Missio n. "^This option, recognizing the ^^^Htical difficulties of putting U.S. civilian and military personnel under a single chief, would be to settle for improved coordination at the Saigon level. ^ . ,

"To facilitate improved coordination, however, it would require strengthening the organization for pacification within MACV and the U S. Mission^ MACV disposes of by far the greater number of Americans working on pacification in the field. It has advisory teams spending most of their time on pacification in 200 out of 230 districts and in all U3 provinces. These teams -- not counting

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i V y advisors at division, corps and all tactical units dovm to

battalion -- number about 2000 men compared with about one-eighth this number from all other U.S. agencies combined.

"Hovrevei 5 the senior officer in I'lACV dealing with pacification as his principal function is no^A'- a colonel heading the J33 staff division. Moreover, with UOO^OOO U.S. troops soon to be committed, General Westmoreland, his subordinate commanders, and his principal staff officers must spend increasing time on military operations associated with defeating the VG/NVA main formations. Therefore, management of the tremen-I I ■' dou-s advisory resources with MACV inevitably suffers regardless

of General Vlestmoreland^ s persona,l effort to give balanced attention to both.

"Hence there might be merit in COMUSMACV. having a senior deputy to manage pacification within MACV and pacification advice to the JOS, as well as throughout the Vietnamese military chain of coirmand. Key staff sections, such as J33, Polwar Directorate, Senior Advisor for RF/PF, could be controlled by a chief of staff for pacification responsive to the Deputy. Advisory teams at corps and division would receive guidance and orders on pacification from the Deputy. Province and district advisors v/ould receive all orders, except routine administrative instruc-■^^■■. tions, through the pacification channel.

"To parallel the MACV organisation and provide a single point of liaison on the civil side. Ambassador Porter should have his own field operations office formed by merging USAID Field Operations,- JUSPAO Field Services and CAS Covert Action Branch. Control over the people assigned wo-'old be removed, as in Alternative I]o. 1, from their parent agency. All civilian field personnel in the advisory business would also receive their guidance and orders from the Deputy Ambassa.dor.

"For this dual civilian-military system to operate effectively, the closest coordina.tion would be repaired betvreen the offices of , the MA.CV Deputy and the Deputy Aiabassador. Since it is difficult and dangerous to sepa^rate military and civili.an aspects of pacification at the province level, m-ost policy guidance and instructions to the provinces hopefully would be issued jointly and be received by the senior military and civilian advisors who would then develop their plans together.

"I would still favor a single civil/military team chief in. the province, even though he would have two bosses in Saigon talking to him. through different. and parallel chains of comniand. Alternatively, since I-IACV already has a senior advisor in each province^ it would be possible similarly to assign a single civilian as the

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Vietneiaese province chief ^s point of contact on all non-military matters. All other civilians in the province vroiild be under his control*

"Altern? tive I'To . ' ^ -- Assign responsibility for pacification civilXnir militaxy, to COM^JSmCV. This is not a nev suggestion, and harT"lot to recommend it. In 196^5 General Westmoreland proposed that he be made "executive agent" for pacification. MACV at that time had an even greater preponderance of field advisors than it does today^ an.d was devoting the bull: of its attention to pacification. Since the military still has by far the greatest capacity among U.S. agencies in Vietnam for management and the military advisors outnumber civilians at least 8 to 1 in the field, MACV could readily take on responsibility for all pacification matters.

"Turning over the entire pacification management task to COMUSMACV vould req.uire him to reorganize his staff to hajidle simultaneously the very large military operations business involving U.S., Free World and Vietnamese forces and the civil/military aspects of pacification at the same tLme. The USAID, JUSPAO, and CAS Covert Operations staffs >rould come Tinder COMaSIvIAGV * s control where they would be used as additional "component commands." In this case, _it__migh t be desirable to have a civilian deputy to COMSMACV for pacifica tion.

"Also appropriate under this concept would be a single U.S. advisory team, under a team chief, at each subordinate echelon. The result wouJLd be a single chain of command to the field and coordinated civilian/military pacification planning .and operations on the UoS. side. The U.S. Mission would speak to Vietnamese corps and division commanders, province chiefs and district chiefs with a single voice." 16/

In the latter part of this lengthy memorandum, Komer clearly foreshadowed both the formation of OCO after the Manila conference -- his Alternative I^o. 2 -- and the merger of OCO and K^CV into l^IACCORDS after Guam — his Alternative No. 3. But when he sent the paper to Saigon with his deputy in mid-August, the reaction from Lodge, Porter, and Westmoreland was uniformly negative: they asked him, in effect, to leave them alone since they were satisfied with their present org^ization. .

But Komer had also distributed his paper around Washington, and was lobbying for another change in the structure of the Mission, althoiigh he remained, in August, vague as to which of the three alternatives he put for-^ard he uersonally favored. IJhen other senior officials of govern-meht began to voice feelings that additional org.anizational changes were necessary in the Mission in Saigon, the die was cast.

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Another major attribute of Kcmer -ras his strong public and private optimism. He. produced for any journalist willing to hear him out facts and figures that suggested strongly that the war was not only winnahle, but being won at an accelerating pace.

To the President he sounded the same theme:

"After almost a year full-time in Vietnam, and six trips there5 I felt able to learn a good deal more from my 11 days in country, 13-23 February. 1 retur n m.ore optimistic th an ever before. The cumula.tive change since my first visit last April is dramatic, if not yet visibly demonstrable in all respects. Indeed, 1*11 reaffirm even more vigorously my prognosis of last November (which few shared then) that growing momentum v^ould be acxhieved in 1967 on almost every front in Vietnam/' 1?/

Komer believed in the concept of "sheer mass" -- that in time we would just overwhelm the Viet Cong:

"Wastefully, expensively, but nonetheless indisputably, we are winning the war in the South. Few of cur programs -- civil or military -- are very efficient, but we axe grinding the enemy do^.m by sheer weight and mass. And the cimiulative impact of all we have set in motion is beginning to tell. Pacification still lags the most, yet even it is moving forward.

"Indeed, my broad feeling, with due allowance for oversimplification, is that our side now has in presently programined levels all the men, money and other rescuxces needed to achieve success..." 18 /

In summary, Komer's 13 months in Washington were spent steadily raising the priority of the pacification and other non-military efforts in Vietnam. While he never was in a controlling position within the Washington bureaucracy, he succeeded in making those who were m.ore aware of the "other war" (a term he used continually until Ambassador Bunker anno^anced in May of I967 that he did not recognize that there was such a thing). VJhile it can be no more than speculation, it would also appear that Komer played an Important role in inserting into high-level discussions, including Presidential discussions, the pacification priority. Thus, when General Westmoreland visited the President at th LBJ ranch in August, I966, Komer put before the President a series of -oacification-related subjects to be used during the discussions. This hanpened again at Manila, where some of the points in final commuxLique were similar to things Komer had been pushing r.arlier, as outlined in . his August memorandum.

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C. St udy Groups and Str ategis ts: Suoiaer I966

In the aftermath of Honolulu, task forces and. study groups were sud.denly

assembling, prod.ucing papers on priorities, on -S^^f ^^ ^J/^fJ^on ' on th- role and mission of various forces. They were all manifestations o? the new mood that had come over the Mission and Washington on P^cxfi-cftlon ihe advocates of pacification - with their widely differing view-TlTs - all saw their chance again to put foi^.ard their own concepts ?o a newly interested bureaucracy, starting with Komer and. Pori^er.

The most important of the numerous studies were:

1 The R-ogram for the Pacification and Long-Term Development of

■ South Vietnam (Short Title: PROW) -- comraissioned_by the Army Chief of Staff in July of 1965, completed and submitted m March I966;

2 The Priorities Task Force - formed in Saigon in April I966 by Deputy Ambassador Porter, completed, m July 1966;

3 The Inter-Agency "Roles and Missions" Study Group - form^ed by Porter in July 1966, completed in August.

While the recommendations of these studies were never accepted in_toto, .y^.J^llTel iZToles in the development of strategic thinking in Washmg-tof and sSjL dLing the latter part of I966, and they continue to be m-fluential today.

PROW - As early as the summer of I965, General Johnson saw the need . ^ —fz . ^uT^erior group of officers, and set them to work on a long-T t,^dv o? Se proSem in Vietnam. The study was intended for internal

llZ . s^a.l wa ?or a while after its completion treated with such d.eli-

7r th'l Armv Officers were forbidden even to discuss its existence outside Tn7 S;L was mJortLate, because in content it was far-ranging and, thought. ^Z: aS set a precedent for responsible forward, planning and analysis which should be duplicated in other fields.

PFOVN was charged with "developing new sources of action ^ be taken in S™ Vietnam by the United States and its allies, which will, in con-^" ^° '^ Jth curr-nt actions, modified as necessary, lead m d.ue time r ZZ^l accoiplishm^nt of U.S. aims and objectives." With this broad ^ndet pSw tSf s^en^ eight m-onths c^uestioning returning^officers from ■ TieSlS studying the history of the country, drawing parallels with other lomtSes analyzing the structure of the U.S. Mission; and m.ak.ing recom-countries, a -^ ^ q^j ^^^^ decided that there was 'no unified

SJSiive iatSrn-'trthe then-current efforts in Vietnam, and submitted a broad, blueprint for action. Its thesis was simple:

"The situation in South Vietnam has seriously deteriorated. 1966 may well be the last chance to ensure eventual

'Victory' can only be achieved through bringing

succes

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the individual Vietnamese, typically a rural peasant, to support willingly the GW. The critical actions are those that occur at the village, district, and provincial levels, This is where the v/ar must be fought; this is where that war and the object which lies beyond it must be won. The following are the most important specific actions required

now

lT

Concentrate U.S. operations on the provincial level

to include the delegation of command, authority over U.S. operations to the Senior U.S,_Representative at the provincial level. " ■

Reaffirm Rural Construction as the foremost US/gW combined effort to solidify and, extend. GVN influence.

Authorize more direct U.S. involvement in GVN affairs at those administrative levels adeauate to ensure the accomplisliment of critical programs.

Delegate to the U.S. Ambassad.or unequivocal authority as the sole manager of all U.S. activities-, resources,

and. personnel in-country.

Direct the Ambassador to develop a single integrated plan for achieving U.S. objectives in SW.

-- Reaffirm to the world at large the precise terms of

1^ the ultimate U.S. objective as stated in NSA^'l 288: ^^ ■

A free and ind,epend,ent non-communist South Vietnam..." 19/

I Beyond this frank and direct summary, the study had hundredis of recom-

mendations, ranging from the specific and. realizable to the vague and I hortatory.

In summary, the PROVN was a major step forward, in thinking. Although . es mentioned above, its value was reduced for a long time by the restrictions placed on its dissemination, the candor with which it ad,dressed matters was probably possible only because it originated within a single service, and thus did not require the concurrences of an mter-agency

study.

1 po^ exemtjle, the PROM study ad.dressed directly a point of such potential

I ■: embarrassment to the U.S. Goverrjuent that it is quite likely an inter-agency

group would not have addressed it except perhaps in oblique terms:.

"A PROW survey...revealed that no tvro agencies of the U.S. Government viewed our objectives in the sam.e manner. Failure to use that unequivocal statement of our fund.amental objective --a free and ' independent, non-communist South Vietnajn -- set forth in IlSi^Jvl 288, hinders effective inter-agency coordination and the integrated, application of U.S. support efforts." 20/

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^^-^ As for the study's "highest priority" activities^ PROVN recoimended:

i ' "(l) Combat Oioerations -- the bulk of U,S, and WIAA

Forces and designated RWAF units should, be directed against

i enemy base areas and against their lines of communication

in SWj Laos, and. Cambodia as req.uired.; the remainder of Allied, force assets must ensure adequate momentum to activity in priority Rural Construction areas.

"(2) Rural Co nstruction --in general, the geographic priorities should.'be, in order, the Delta, the Coastal Lowlands, and the Highlands; currently the highest priority areas are the densely populated and rich resource Delta provinces of An Giang, Vinh Long, Dinh Tuong, Go Cong, and the Plop Tac area surrounding Saigon,

"(3) Economi c Stability -- current emphasis must be directed toward curbing inflation and reducing the e.xcessive demands for skilled and semA-skilled labor imposed upon an over-strained economy..."

On the management of the United States effort -- which PROVrl found ex-tremeJ^ poor -- the recommendation was to create a single manager system, with the Ambassador in charge of all assets in Vietnam and the mission of. „ . , producing a single integrated plan. PROW suggested major steps in the

direction of giving the Ambassador a stronger hold over the military.

Of greatest importance -~ aside from the reorganizational suggestions --was the PROW conclusion on the supremacy of Rural Construction activities over everything else:

"Ruxal Construction must be designated unequivocally as the major US/gW effort. It will require' the commitment of a preponderance of RVMF and GW paramilitary forces, together with adequate U.S. support and coordination and assistance. Without question, village and hamJLet security ■ must be achieved throughout Vietnam...RC is the principal means available to broaden the allied, base, provide secuj:-ity^ develop political and mi,litary leadership, and provide necessary social reform to the people..." 2l/

To this end, PROVII suggested a division of responsibility among the forces: . , ,

"The need to sustain security pervades every ramification of RC.-The various forces capable of providing this environment must be vmified...at the province level. They must in-■clude the ARW as a major component --as many of its battle-tested units as can possibly be devoted to this mission. /^ These integrated national security forces must be associated

•

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and intermingled vrith the people on a long-term basis.

Their capacity to establish and maintain public order and

stability must be physically and continuously credible.

The key to achieving such security lies in the conduct

of effective area saturation tactics, in end around popu •

lated. areas, which deny VC encroachment opportunities." 22/

Finally, the study advocated, a far stronger system of leverage for American advisors in the field - "mechanisms for exerting U.S. influence must be built into the U.S. organization and its methods of operation. 23/

The PROW study concluded, with a massive "Blueprint for National Action" ^ which was never imDlemented. But the influence of the study was substantial Within the Arny staff, a responsible and select group of officers had recommended top priority for pacification. Even if the Army staff still rejected parts of the study, they were on notice that a study had been produced within the staff which suggested a substantial revision of priorities.

' The mom study had som-e major gaps. Proceeding from the unstated

assi-imption that our commitment in Vietnam had no implicit time limits,

, ■ it proposed a strategy which it admitted would take years - perhaps well

' irto the 1970's -- to carry out. It did not examine alternative strate-

gies that might be derived from a shorter time limit on the war. In fact,

t the report made no mention of one of the most crucial variables m the

Vietnam equation - U.S. public support for the Administration.

Further, the report did little to prove that Vietnam was ready for mcification. Trds "fact" was taken for granted, it seems -- a fau_lt common to most American- produced pacification plans. VJhile PROVN d,id, suggest geoo-rai^hic priorities, they were derived not even in part from the area s receptivity to pacification but exclusively from the location and strategic importance of the area. Thus, the same sort of error made m Hop Tac was being repeated in PROWs suggestions.

mCV analyzed the report in May of 1966, calling it "an excellent overall approach in developing organization, concepts and policies .. . In

a lengthy analysis of PROVN, FACV cabled:

"As seen here, PROVDI recommends two major initiatives essential to achieving U.S. objectives in South Vietnam: creation of an organization to integrate total U.S. civil-military effort, and exercise of greatly increased direct U.S. involvement in GVM activities.

"MACV has long recognized need for the greatest possi-* ble unity of effort to gain U.S. objectives in South Vietnam. mCV agrees with PEOVTI concept to achieve f^ll integration of effort in attaining U.S. objectives in South Vietnam. ^ Evolution of U.S. organization in Saigon is hee^ding towards

^^ -this goal. Deputy Ambassador now has charge of revolutionary

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and economic development programs and MACV is charged with military urograms. In addition, special task force has been established by Deputy Ambassador to draft mission-wide statement of strategy, objectives, and priorities. In effect this task force is engaged in integrated planning . which under PROW concept would be performed by supra-agency staff • PROVII proposal for designation of a single manager with supra-staff is a q.uantum jump to achieve the necessary degree of military-civil integration. Ihis final step cannot be implemented by evolutions here in Saigon. It would have to be directed and supervised from highest level m Washington.

"MACV is in complete agreement with PROW position that immediate and substantially increased United States direct involvement in GW activities in form of constructive influence and m,anit)ulation is essential to achievement of U.S. objectives in Vietnam. PROW emphasizes that "leverage must orif^inate in term.s of reference established by government a-rlem-ent," and "leverage, in all its implications, must be -understood by the Vietnamese if it is to become an effective tool." The direct Involvement and leverage envisioned by PROW could range from skillful diplomatic pressure to U.S. unilateral execution of critical programs. MACV considers that there is a great danger that the extent of involvement envisioned could become too great. A government sensitive to its image as champion of national sovereignty profoundly affected by the pressiire of militant minorities, and unsure of its tenure and legitimacy will resent too great involvement by U.S. Excessive U.S. involvement m.ay defeat objectives of U.S. policy: development of free, independent non-communist nation. PROW properly recognizes that success can only be attained through support of Vietnamese people, with support coming from the grass roots up. Insensitive U.S. actions can easily defeat efforts\o accomplish this. U.S. m.anipulations coula easily become an Am.erican takeover justified by U.S. compulsion to "get the job done." Such tendencies must be resisted. It must be realized that there are substantial difficulties and dangers inherent in implementing this or any similar program.

"Several important aspects of proven concept require ■ comment, further consideration and. resolution or emphasis. Som.e of the more significant are:

" "Regarding U.S. organization, MACV considers that any

maior reorganization such as envisioned by PROW mu^t be phased and deliberate to avoid confusion and slow-down m ,.-^. . ongoing programs...

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I "There appears to be an overeirxphasis on milita,ry control

in PROVII which may be undesirable* For instance;, the study states that all senior U.S. representatives (SUSREPs) initially will be U.S. military officers. This should not necessarily be stated policy. Tlie senior U.S. representative, particularly at province level, should, be selected on basis of major tasks to be performed, program emphasis in a particular area and other local considerations. PEOVN also limits ' U.S. single manager involvem.ent in military activities. If single manager concept of a fully integrated civil-military effort is to be successful, military matters, such as roles and missions, force reCLuirem.ents, and, deployments must be d,eveloped in full coordination and be integrated with civil aspects.

"PROW proposal for enlarged U.S. organization for revolutionary development, particularly at sector and sub-sector levels, will reauire both military and civilian staff increases. It will necessitate further civilian recruiting and increased military input. Pi^esent shortage of q.uali-fied civilian personnel who desire d,uty in Vietnam must be considered. It may fall to the military, as it is now happening to some degree, to provide personnel not only for added military positions, but also for miany of civilian . functions as vrell.

"Regardless of what U.S. might desire, however, our efforts to bring about new Vietnamese organizational structure must be tempered by continuous evaluation of the pressure such change places on Vietne^mese leaders. Our goals cannot be achieved by Vietnam-ese leaders who are identified as U.S. puppets. The U.S. will must be asserted, but we cannot afford to overwhelm the structure we are attempting to develop.

"Accordingly, 1/IA.CV recommends that PROVII, reduced primarily to a conceptual document, carrying forward, the main thrusts and goals of the study, be presented to National Security Coimcil for use in developing concepts, policies, and actions to improve effectiveness of the American effort in Vietnam." 2hJ . ' . / ■

The "Prior ities Task F orce" -- This group was set up at Ambassador Porter's '^i^Pection~in April I966, following Komer's fi"':'st trip to Vietnam, du-ring which Komer had strongly urged that the Mission try to establish a set of interagency priorities. The actual work of this task force, which had full interagency representation, was considered disappointing by almost all its "consuirxe-rs," particularly Komer, since it failed to come up with , a final list of priorities from which the Mission and Washington could ■ derive their programs. But it was by f3.r the most ambitious task force the Mission had ever set up, and, it provoked considerable thought in the

» Mission.

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Its introductory section was a rather gloomy assessment of the situation. As such^ it was at variance with the then current assessment of the situation ■-- but in retrospect, it is of far greater interest than the recommendations themselves I

P "After some 15 months of rapidly growing U,S, military

and political commitment to offset a major enemy military effort, the RVIT has been m^ade secure against the danger of ' military conquest, but at the same time it has been subjected to a series of stresses which threaten to thwart U.S. policy objectives •. •

"The enemy nov/ has a broad span of capability for interfering with progress toward achievement of U.S. objectives. He can simultaneously operate offensively through em.ployment of guerrilla and organized forces at widely separated points throughout the country, thus tying down friendly forces, while concentrating rehearsed, surprise attacks in multi-battalion or even mitLti-regimental strength. ...The v/ar will probably increase in intensity over the planning period (two years) though decisive mili -

1 tary victory for either sid e is not like ly. Guerrilla

activity will ma^ke much of the countryside insecure. More of the rural population will be directly affected, and the

I . num-ber of refugees and civilian casualties on both sid.es

seem bound to rise... " .

I "Reasons for lack of success of the overall pacification

I program -- including all the stages from clear and secure

operations to sustaining local government -- were varied. First, the primary hindrance to pacification was the low level of area security given active Viet Cong opposition. Second,, political instability prevented, continuing and } j coherent GVTT direction and support of any pacification.

program. Third, pacification execution has been almost vrholly Vietnam.ese and can be supported only indirectly by the U.S. This has.made it less susceptible to American influence and more subject to political pressiores and the weaknesses of Vietnamese administration and motivation. Fourth, no pacification concept since the strategic ham3_et program has been sufficiently clear in definition to pro-vid.e m.eaningful and consistent operational guidance to those executing the program. Fifth, given the pressure for success and the difficulty of measur'ing progress the execution of pacification failed to emphasize the political, social and psychological aspects of organizing the people and thus eliciting their active cooperation. The material aspects, being both visible and less difficult to implement, have ij received, too much attention. Sixth, there was an absence

of agreed, definitely stated pacification roles and missions not only within the GVI^I and the U.S. Mission but also between

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the GW ajid the U.S. Mission. This absence caused proliferation of various armed and unarmed elements not clearly related to each other. Seventh, a quantitative and qualitative lack of trained and motivated manpower to carry out pacification existed. In addition, insufficient emphasis has been given to training and orientation of local officials associated with the pacification progra:n. Eighth, lack of a well defined organizational structui^e in the U.S. Mission created some confusion and conflicting direction of the pacification effort.

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"During 1965, military plans were developed to support revolutionary development; national priority areas were selected where special emphasis would be placed on revolutionary development, and a structure was established by the GVN extending an organizational framework for revolutionary development from national to district levels. Meanwhile, the U.S. Mission has begun action to centralize direction for revolutionary development to enstire coordination of all Mission activities in support of revolutionary development .

"A new approach was also taken in I965 to bring coherence to the use of cadre in the pacification process. Drawing on a concept of armed political action teams, whose relative success locally was at least partly owing to direct U S sponsorship and control, a combined cadre team approach wis developed. A new orge-nization, the Revolutional Development Cadre, was established, which brougl* together and replaced a number of disparate cadre organizations. The combined cadre team approach includes armed units and special skills of relating to and assisting the people. The combined teams form the basis of the present pacification program.

"While these measures have helped to alleviate some of the problem areas which previously frustrated pacification efforts, some areas of major concern remain: First area security where Revolutionary Development is being initiated is not always adequate because of manpower problems; second, continued existence of various overlapping security forces further reduces effectiveness; third, approved pacification concepts, roles, and missions agreed to by the U„S. and the GVII are lacking; fourth, the effectiveness of the new RD cadxp teams remain to be tested and evaluated; fifth, extensive training of local and other officials associated with ED still must be accomplished; sixth, emphasis on rapid expansion and the desire for immediate visible and statistical progress would operate against lasting results; and, seventh" organizational development and functioning on both the GVH and U.S. sides are as yet incomplete. 25/

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"The situation described, above suggests that the course of events in Vietnam during the next tv;o years will be significantly influenced by the follov/ing principal current trends.

; "The \ra.r can be expected to increase in intensity, but decisive military victory should not be expected. It will be basically a war of attrition. Troop casualties should increase on both sides, and civilian casualties and refugees I as we31. The enemy can, if he chooses, increase still further

\ the rate of his semi-covert invasion and the level of combat.

"The enemy will continue to build up his forces through infiltration from ITVII and recruitment for main force VC units in SW to achieve a favorable relationship of forces.

"At the same time, he will continue to reinforce his capabilities for political action in the urban areas, to exploit anticipated future political disturbances, to increase his terrorist acts in the cities, and co isolate the urban population from the countryside.

"GW control of the countrysid.e is not now being extended through pacification to any significant degree and pacification in the rural areas cannot be expected to proceed at a rapid rate. A new approach to pacification has been developed, but it is too early to judge its effectiveness. In ad,dition, ija-portant problems req.uiring resolution remain...

"The Vietnamese will continue to face grave problems in creating an effective system of government. Under present conditions we cannot realistically expect a strong GVl'I to emerc^e over the planning period, nor can we expect political unity or a broadening of the base of popular support. O^ie increased American presence, rising inflation and an image of considerable corruption are issues which will be increasingly exploited by unfriendly and opportunistic elements. U.S. influence on political events continues to be limited while our responsibility for Vietnam's futui-e is increasing." 26/

The Task Eorce divided all activities in Vietnam into categories of im-nortance, and assigned them priorities in groups. Unfortunately, the divisions were either too vague to be useful, or else they designated ^Tiecif-'c activities, such as agriculture, to such a low position that Washington foun^' the selection unacceptable. In its first rank of im-■ portance the Task Force placed:

"1. Those activities designed to prepare a sound

pacification program prim.arily through strengthening the human resources element of pacification, and thorough coordinated, planning

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"2. Those activities which draw strength away from the

enemy and add to GW's strength and image of concern . for all its citizens...

- "3. Tlose psychological activities ihat support the vrar effort...

"4. Those activities that persuade the people that

RWIAF is wholly on the side of the people and acting in their interests*..

down through:

"l6. Those activities vrhich develop the leadership and organization of non-governmental institutions, particularly youth groups..." ^7/

It was scarcely a list from which one could assemble a coherent program. Moreover, the above list of l6 "highest priority" tasks, was followed by a group of ten "high priority" tasks -- including strengthening provincial governm.ents, autonomous municipa^l governments, better budgetary procedures, better refugee programs, minority programs, and so on. These, in turn, were followed by a nine-point list of "high priority programs." Into at least one of the 35 highest, high, or just plain priority activities, one could fit every program and project then being pursued in Vietnam. Furthermore, the proposal seemed to confuse inputs and outputs,

■ placing in'the same category "wishes" like "minimizing the adverse impact of and exDloiting the opportunities provided by the American presence" (which was only "higli priority") with "programs" like "creating a sound base for agricultural development."

The Priorities Task Force recommendations vrere used, unlike those of PROW. In the FY 6? Country Assistance Program^ (CAP), submitted by AID to Congress that fall, the Task Force Strategy statement was used as a foreword, with Ambassador Lodge's approval. Moreover, the concept of p^-iorities outlined in the final paper v/as applied to the AID program in Vietnam, with each activity being placed in one of the categories of priority. This did not result, however, in the original objective of reducing the size of the progra.m and focusing it: instead, the AID program more than d.oubled in 1967, and a year later people were still complaining about the lack of clear-cut priorities. (As a matter of fact, when Deputy ^Ambassador Eugene Locke returned to Washington in September of I967 with a Blueprint for Vietna,m," he was told that it lacked any sense of priorities, - and was too much of a "shopping list.")

■ The- "T^olesand_Missi ons" Study G roup -- One of the Priority Task Force T^^^^S^iiFdatTons was that the Mission should establish another group to examine th- question of the nroDer role of each military and paramilitary ^and police

^ ' 'and civilian force in the country. This group was set up, mider the chair-

— manship of Colonel George Jacobson in July of 1966, and submitted its final

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'"^ re-Dort to the Mission Council on August 2h. The group was once again •

iJera-ency, and. it produced, a paper of consid,erable value -- indeed, a paper which could well have served as a basic policy d.ocument for the Mission and Washington.

I The Study Group niad,e 8l recommendations, of which 66 were acceptable

\ to all agencies of the Mission. But even these 66 were not immediately

' adoT^ted as basic doctrine. Because of inertia and weariness, rather than

1 deliberate sabotage, the recom:mendations were never treated as basic policy,

i and simply were carried out or not d.epending on the drive and desire of the

f individ.ual officials associated with each individual recommendation.

The report began, as aljnost all Vietnam studies seem to, with a defini-; tion:

"Revolutionary Development consists of those military and civil efforts designed to liberate the population of South Vietnam from conimunist coercion; to restore public security; to initiate economic and political development; to extend effective GV^I authority throughout SVI^^; and to win the willing support of the people to these ends. 2«/

From there it d.eveloped, the most logical and coherent approach to returning an area to GVN control and then gaining its support that had yet been produced, by a group in either the Mission or Washington. The report was hailed by Porter, by Komer, and by various mid.-level officials. _Jacobson himself was to be named. Mission Coordinator four months later, a position from which he could present his ideas directly to the Ambassadors.

Vihile, as mentioned above, the recommendations were never issued as Mission policy in a group, many of them found their way into the mam Sream of the Mission through other means. Some of the more controversial ones -- for example: "that Division be removed from the RD Cham of Com-mand" - remained as potent ideas to be discussed within the government and with the Vietnamese, and to be acted on slowly.

Since the report foreshadowed several major developments in pacification, and since it still has today an intrinsic value of its own, it is worth quoting some of its major points:

"High hopes are now pinJied on the RD cadre; as the criti-cal element of success in RD. Unfortunately, there is a real danger it is being regarded as a panacea with curative T^owers it does not, of and by itself, possess. The int ro-duction of RD Cad_r_^^a nnot alone achieve_success_ir^any_of ThTtls^Tdl^^^sed.. above. Even cadre such as may be avail-iwJT"sT£li5^ShI77:7annot compensate for the current failings and limitations of other fundamental elements bearing directly on the RD process. ■

■^ '^...RD demands for its success' radical reform within

the GVi^f'including its Armed Forces. This refo rm must start

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at the top. . .These radical changes in the GW and RWAF f " seem most unlikely to occur without a strong, focused and

j . coordinated exertion of U.S. influence at high levels...

RECOM^M^I): -- That M^IAF give increased emphasis to improving the performance and conduct of GW military forces through combined operations...

-- That as the increase in ¥MK^ strength permits, these forces engage vith RTOIAE in clearing operations in support of RD with the primary objective of improving the associated GTO forces...

— That in view of the deployment and capabilities of YMK^ in Vietnam and recognizing the necessity for increased security support to RD, the bulk of ARVJ^I Divisional combat battalions be' assigned to Sector corrij^ianders with only those , Divisional battalions not so assigned to be under the control of Divisions. ...

-- That the Division be removed from the RD chain I _ of comjiiand... -

' ~" -- That Ranger units because of their frequently

intolerable conduct toward the populace, be disbanded with individual Rangers reassigned ^

...

— That KF' and PF become Provincial and District Constabulary... ■ .

— That the Constabulary be placed under the Ministry of RD...

-" That National Police (Special Branch) assume primary responsibility for the destruction of the VC "infrastructure". . .

-- That Police Field Force be integrated into the Constabulary...

— That the Vietnamese Inform^ation Service (VIS) terminate its rural information cadre operations and assume

a supporting role...for RD Cadre, technical cadre, and hamlet officials..." 29/

^ This was a recommendation which MCV particularly opposed, arguing that it "would seriously reduce ARVN combat strength." Westmoreland added that he could not countenance the disbanding of units which had iust received a Presidential Unit Citation.

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And so on. VJhat lay behind each reconmendation was an effort to unify the . various GVIi agencies and ministries working on pacification, streamline their operations, and, at the same time, increase U.S. influence, over those operations.

While many items the Study Group recommended have still not been carried, out there has been growing acceptance of the bulk of the recommendations. In its initial reaction to the paper, M^CV's Chief of Staff wrote to Ambassador Lodge "that many actions have been taken or are being considered by KACV which support and complement the overall objectives envisioned by the report. There are, however, certain recommendations with which we do not

agree, ju/

The most important reservation that MACV had, concerned, the allocation of resources for the RD effort:

"We are confronted vrith a determined, well-organized force operating in regimental and division strength. As long as this'situation exists, it is imperative that the regular military forces retain first priority for the available m.an-power. Once the threat of the enemy's regular forces has diminished and the defeat of external aggression is accomplished, then other programs should have the first priority for recruiting...

In addition, MCV opposed the removal of Division from the ED chain of command; suggested a^further task force to examine the Constabulary issue' in detail; and OTjposed the suggestion that Special Branch Police — which meant on the American side the CIA — take over the anti-infrastructure effort. (On this latter point, the issue was finally resolved, by an ingenious compromise structure uiider Westmoreland and Kom-er called ICEX --Intelligence Coordination and Exploitation — in July 1967.) Finally, We"stmoreland rejected any internal changes in the I'lACV structure, as suggested by the Study Group. Ihese had included:

" — the establishment at WJZV Division ad.visory level of a Deputy Senior Advisor for RD, at Corps a Deputy Senior Advisor for RD, and. at COmSLACV level a Deputy COMLJSIvIACV for the entire MACV advisory effort and for RD...

" -- changes in the advisory rating system to emphasize the quality of the advice and the accuracy of reports, rather than the performance of the organization/Vietnamese they advise.,." 3l/

USAID reacted favorably to the study. In his memo to Lodge, the Acting u'si^ID Director said that the-report "presents an antid.ote to olit having be-n too indulgent with the GVN in the past to our peril and theirs." i Once a^ain, however, as with l-I/i.CV, USAID ad.ded some- reser^/ations — and

I .---.. ^Yie reservations all fell in areas in which USAID would, have the action i responsibility if something was to be done. USAID feared that the report

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recommended steps that would give the Ministry of RD too much strength, ' reflecting the worry of their Riblic Safety Division. The Constahulary

recoKmendations, which had far-reaching im.plications, were given a

T)articularly rough going-over. For example, to protect its own embryonic ■ structure the Police Field Force USAID m.ade the following comment on the

recommendation that the PFF be integrated as units into the Constabulary:

"USAID concurs with the reservation that PFF remain a separate entity with its essential police powers." 32/

The CIA also thought the report was "constructive and helpful," but listed a few "disagreements." Once again, these pertained to those items in which the ICA had a strong vested interest. They opposed strenuously, for example, the suggestion that the M^.CV subsector advisor_^- the only_ American at the district level in aljaost every district - be given_pri-mary responsibility for monitoring the activities of the cadre. Using the argument that everything possible be done to retain the civilian nature of the cadre, the CIA refused to let the FACV subsector advisors do what they were already doing in many cases.

11 The CIA and MACV both opposed the suggestion that a single Director

of Intelligence be appointed to command civilian and military intelligence structures! Tae CIA said that_this was "unwieldly and unworkable because "this is not a theater of war." 33/

The Political Section of the Eitfoassy also thought the study was "valuable," but added that "it appears to neglect a number of political considerations." Beyond that, they supported every specific suggestion, while noting how hard it would be to carry some of them out. ■

■ JUSPAO shared the fears of USAID that the report would concentrate more power in the hands of the Ministry of BB than it could usefully employ. JUSPAO thought that the Constabulary should ^^ createa, therefore, bufplaced under the Ministry of Defense. JUSPAO also found the removal of the Svision from the RD chain of command "hardly feasible or realistic at this juncture" - begging the issue of whether or not the United States should seek this as a valuable objecxive.

When the exercise was over, there were many in the Mission in Saigon who felt that the Study Group recommendations should have formed a blue-

I rnr action throuphout the Mssion. They pointed out that alm.ost all ?Je reco™daSo.;s ::re concurred in by every agency, and that these could he cLried out immediately. The remaining 15 v:hich were still not unanimously accepted could then be discussed and perhaps resolved.

In Washington, at least one high official, R.W. Komer, felt the same W.V and urged the Mission to use the recommendations as policy. But !oSwhere between August 2l|, when the paper was submitted, and the end o? 1066 the paT^er wL relegated to the useful but distinctly seconaary °^^^ l\^^^y,L^".^.u^.r .ro,™." as its nam.e suggests. While everyone, was

role of another "study group,' as its nam.e

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complimentary about the paper;, no machinery was set up in Ambassador Porter's office to oversee the implementation of the recommendations. V/hile the agencies said that they agreed v/lth m.ost of the recommendationsj> the all-important decisions as to how fast and how hard to push forward, with each recommendation was left to whichever agency "had the action" on it., ■ This in effect left some crucial decisions -- the variables in cur' effort --outside the Deputy Ambassador's hands. He had no machinery for checking to see what the agencies were doing to carry out the suggestions they said they agreed with. He had virtually no staff to observe how the agencies were actually handling each problem, although it was obvious that success or failure on each item lay to a large extent in the method, it was handled. Ind.eed.5 Porter had no good, way to even find out whether the agencies really did accept the recommendations. He was reliant on a knovrledgeable but small staff which could, only meddle in the internal matters of other agencies to a limited degree.

It was these shortcomings in the new m-andate to Porter that were becoming evident in the late sumjner of 1966, and pressure began to build in Washington for another reorganization.

The pressure and emphasis on pacification was also prod.ucing visible results in MCV. On August 8, I9665 the J-3 of FACV, Major Genera,l Tillson, briefed, the Mission Council on how RA.CV intended, to "give maximum support to RL." The briefing v:as general, simplistic, a,nd. shallow, but it was a clear indication that G-eneral Westmioreland and M^CV were beginning to respond, to the pressure from outside their command, that they should give ' ' RD more support. As such, it marked, a m-ajor step for MA.CV, Tillson said

that "military operations must be used to assure the security necessary for RD to,begin. All military operations are designed tov/ards this goal,.,"

He then vrent on to trace the degree to which criticism of ARW was justi fied, and examine the suggestion that ARW be re-oriented to support RD --something which was to becom^e part of the Manila communique only two months later:

"The ARVTI has been at v^ar continuously for a period of over ten years.,,The fact that ARVIT today even exists as an organized fighting force is a tribute to its stamina and. morale.

"Since its inception, ARVTI has been oriented., trained, and led towards the task of offensive operations, .,It is difficult, in a short period of tme, to redirect the motivation and training of years, and, to offset the long indoctrination that o ffensive action against the VC is the reason for the existence of the Army...

"In the 1967 campaign plan, we propose to assign ARVW the primary mission of providing direct support.to RD and. US/Fr"? Forces the primary mission of destroying VC/lfVA main forces and. base areas. Agreement has been reached, between

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General Westraoreland and General Vien that, in 1, II and III' Corps areas 5 AR'/IT will devote at least 3^o of its effort directly in support of the RD progra^m. In IV Corps, where , there are no U.S. forces, it was agreed that ARVjM might have to devote up to 75fo of its effort to offensive operations.,.

"general Vien has issued a airective that/ flatly states that, while some progress has been made, desired results are still lacking on RD. It emphasizes that RD efforts must be on a par with efforts to destroy the enemy...Ihese directives of General Vien resulted from his conversations with General Westmoreland..." sV ^mphasis Added/

This was by far the strongest verbal support that MACV had ever given pacification, and it actually contained the kernel which developed into the important passage in the Manila communiq.ue that committed the RTil^F to support of RD.

The change in mood in Saigon among the Americans was reflected by Ambassador Lodge in his Weekly NOBIS to the R^esident." On August 3I5 1966, he began his cable with:

"The biggest recent American event affecting Vietnam was giving pacification the highest priority which it has ever had -- making it, in effect, the main purpose of all our activities...

"The above was brought about in several ways -- by word in General Westmoreland* s "Concept of Milita.ry Operations in South Vietnam" of August 2k, and by the deeds of .the U.S. 1st and 25th Divisions and the III MF. There has also been the new I^LACV proposal to revamp ARW and turn it into a force better suited to pacification. Also at a special meeting of the Mission Council a stimulating paper was pre-sented,"by the "interagency Roles and Mission Study Group" which would take RF and PF, now a part of the Vietnamese Armed Forces, make them into a "constabulary" and call it -that. Police Field Force would also be included in the Constabulary under this concept." 35/

A week earlier, Westmoreland had sent forward to CINCPAC and JCS a broad strategy statem_ent for the coming year. He saw the time as "appro--priate in light of the fact that "we are on the threshold of a new phase in the conflict resulting from recent battlefield successes and from the co-^tinuin^ FW7-'IAF buiMuT3." After reviewing the course of battle since the introduction of U.S. troops, Westmoreland projected his strategy over the period until May 1, I967., as "a general offensive with maximum practical support to area and population security in further support of RD. He then add.ed: ■ ■ •

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"The growing strength of US/FW" Forces will provide the shield and will permit ARW to shift its weight of effort to an extent not heretofore feasible to direct support of RD. Also^ I visualize that a significant nimiber of UQ/W maneuver battalions will be coimnitted to tactical areas of responsibility (TAOR) missions. These missions encompass base sectzrity and at the same time support RD by spreading security radially from the bases to protect m.ore of the population. . .

"The priority effort of ARWT forces will be in direct support of the RD program; in many instances the province chief will exercise operational control over these units... 11 This fact notwithstanding;, the ARVN division structure must

be maintained..." 36/

This long message, with its "new look" emphasis on pacification, was sent apparently not for GlNCPAG's routine consideration, as-would be the normal case in the military chain of command, but for the edification of high-ranking civilian leaders in Washington.- It ended with a comment added by Ambassador Lodge -- an unusual procedure in a military message:

"I wish to stress my agreement with the attention paid ^ in this message to the importance of military support for

RD. After all, the main purpose of defeating the enemy through offensive operations against the m.ain forces and ,, bases must be to provide the opportunity tbjrough RD to get

' at the heart of the matter, which is the population of SW." 37/

The new emphasis on RD/pacification was thus coming from many sources in the late summer of I966. Porter and Komer, pushing the civilians harder than they had ever been pushed before, had not only improved their !' performance, but also to create pressures inside IvLA^CV for greater empha-

sis on RD. Westmoreland, responding to the pressure, and finding the VG/nVA increasingly reluctant to give battle, was pla.nning a two-pronged strategy for late 1966-early I967: attack and destroy enemy base areas, and use more forces to protect and build up and expand the GVN population centers.

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D. The Single Manager

.By the late summer of I9665 as has been shown in detail in the preceding sections, the flavrs in the structure of the U.S. Mission had, been openly criticized, in studies or reports by the U.S. Ariny Staff (in VROYN) , by the Priorities Task Force and by the Roles ana Missions Study Group in Saigon, by Robert Komer in repeated memoranda, and by various other visitors and observers. In addition to the vrritten record, there were undoubtedly nimerous private comments being mad.e both in Saigon and Washington, some of which \ieTe reaching senior officials of the government.

The options before the USG were, in broad outline, fourfold. The Mission could either remain unchanged, or else it could reorganize along one of the three general lines which Komer had outlined in his August 7? 1966 memorand.um:

Alternative On e -- Put Porter in charge of all advisory and

pacification activities, including the military;

Alternat iv e T\^jo -- Unify the civilian agencies into a single

civilian chain of command, and strengthen the military internally -- but leave civilian and milita,.ry separate;

Alternative Three -- Assign, responsibility for pacification to

Westmoreland, and MACV, and. put the civilians in the field under his command.

The Mission, as usual, argued for leaving the structure the way it was. Their argioments in this direction were unfortunate, because in Washington the m.ood was certainly in favor of some further changes, and by resisting all suggestions uniformly, the Mission was simply causing friction with Washington and reducing influence on the ultimate decisions.

The issue was joined more rapidly than anyone in Saigon had expected, beceaise in mid-September, 1966, the Secretary of Defense weighed in on the issue in a direct vra.y, producing a Draft Presidential Memorand.um which advocated handing over responsibility for pacification to COMUSMCV.

McNamara's draft said: , . .

"Now that a Viet Cong victory in South Vietnam seems to have been thwarted by our emergency actions taken over the past 18 months, renewed attention should be paid to the longer-run aspects of achieving an end to the war and building a viable nation in South Vietnam.

"Central to success, both in ending the war and in winning the peace, is the pacification program. Past progress in

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pacification has been negligible. Many factors have contributed, but one major reason for this lack of progress had been the existence of split responsibility for pacification on the U.S. side. For the sake of efficiency — in clarifying our concept, focusing our energies, and increasing the output vre can generate on the part of the Vietnamese.-- this split responsibility on the U.S. side must be eliminated.

"We have considered va.rious alternative methods of consolidating the U.S. pacification effort. The best solution is to place those activities which are primarily part of the pacification program, and all persons engaged in such activities, under COMQSMCV.. .In essence, the reorganization would result in the establishment of a Deputy COJ^JSMCV for I^cification who would be in comm^and of all pacification staffs in Saigon and of all pacification activities in the field.

"It is recognized that there are many important aspects of the pacification problem which are not covered in this recommendation, which should be reviewed subsequent to the appointment of the Deputy COmsmCV for Pacification to determine whether they should be part of his task -- for example, the psychological warfare campaign, and the Chieu

■ Hoi and refugee programs.. Equally important, is the question of how to encourage a similar ma,nagement realignment

■ of the South Vietnamese sid.e, since pacification is regarded as primarily a Vietnamese task. Also not covered by this recormnendatlon are important related national programs .. .Finally, there is the question of whether any organizational modification in Washington is required by the recommended change in Vietnam.

"I recommend that you approve the reorganization described in this memorandum as a first essential step toward giving a new thrust to pacifice.tion. Under Secretary Ball, Administrator Gaud, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Director Helms, Director Marks, and Mir. Komer concur in this recommendation." 38/

This memorand.iam was apparently never sent to the President, but it was distributed, with a request for comments and concurrence, to Ball (Rusk being out of the country), Gaud, the JCS, Helms, Marks, and Komer. Only Komer and the JCS concurred, with the others producing alternate

restions. The entire question v^as handled as an "EYES Oi^ILY" matter.

su

The positions that ^^ere taken were:

State opposed the recommendation. In informal discussions with Komer, Alexis Johnson cited the failure of Hop Tac (which seems irrelevant), the

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"optics" of militarizing the effort, and the need, to check with Lodge as reasons against actions. 39/

AID agreed that the present program had its faults, but resisted the idea"of a MCV takeover- Instead, they proposed a complex system of committees and deputies for RD, who would report to a Deputy Ambassador for Pacification. W

The JCS found that the proposal "provides an excellent rationale for an approach to the problem of appropriately integrating the civil and military effort in the important field of pacification" and concurred in the idea of a Deputy cbl^JSMCV for RD. Ul/

CIA and USIA both opposed the reorganization, although their written comm'ents are not in the files. h2J

Komer v/eighed in with a lengthy rationale supporting the idea. Although he may not have known it at the time, he was talking about the organizational structure he was going to fit into later. After agreeing that the need to get pacification moving v^as great, and that "the military are much better set up to manage a huge pacification effort," he said that 60-7(>)'o of "real job of pacification is providing loca.1 security. This can only be done by the military../' Komer then raised some additional points:

1. The Ambassador should remain in overall charge.

2. MCV should not assume responsibility for everything, only the high payoff war-related activities.

3. Logistic support should remain a multi-agency responsibility. U3/

■ As the discussions on the subject continued, Deputy Ambassador Porter arrived in the United States for a combined business-personal trip- Waen he found out what was being considered, he immediately made strong representations to MciNiamara, Komer, and Rusk. He also sent a personal cable back to Lodge, alerting him for the first time to what was afoot in Washington:

"I>rincipal topic under discussion here is DOD proposal to bring both U.S. military and U.S. civilian resources needed to advance RD program under direction of Deputy CG^IUSM^ICV. This plan will be discussed with you d,uring McNamara visit. It would detach all civilian field operations from direct control of Saigon civilian agencies and would place them under Deputy COMJSM^CV for RD. In addition to controlling civilian field resources, latter would also manage U.S. military resources with view to increasing their effectiveness in furthering RD programs. Deputy ■ COMJSM^CV would be responsible to Ambassador or Deputy ' ' Ambassador through COMUSIvIACV. This a.t least is my urider-standing of proposal v/hich is being strongly pushed here.

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"I have taken position that this proposal and certain counter proposals put forward by civilian agencies here require carefUl field study. In its existing form, as I understand it, it does not take into account the fact, that militarization of our approach to this important ^ . ■

civilian program runs counter to our aim of de-militarizing GW through constitutional electoral process...

"I have been stressing here that our military are already heavily loaded with responsibility for achieving military measures required to further civilian BD programs, such as evoking adeq.uate cooperation from RVN.. .1 have emphasized need for I'lkCY to grapple with problem of VC guerrilla activity during night, as distinct from main force activity during daytime which we now know can be dealt with. These areas would appear to offer great possibilities for application of military talent and I repeat that in my view question of burdening MCV further with comT)lex programs (cadre, police, etc.) rea^uires ca.reful field study which I would.have done promptly, if you agree, by group similar to that which carried out * Roles and Missions' study."'Ml/ .

This was the background as Secretary McNamara, Under Secretary Katzenbach, General VJheeler, and Mr. Komer went to Saigon in October. The issue had been deferred, and when the visitors returned, they vrould make recommendations to the President. Katzenbach, making his first trip as Under Secretary, was requested to look at the problem with a new eye and no prior prejudices.

When they came back from Saigon, Katzenbach and McNamara both sent the President an important memorand^am. Katzenbach argued for a strengthening of Ambassador Porter's role, and a deferral of the question of turning the RD effort over to MA.CV. McNamara concurred, but with a different emphasis. The memorand,ums were dated October ik and 15j, 1966, less than two weeks before the Manila conference, and the recommendations were accepted by the President. Katzenbach* s memorand,um was, for a first effort after a short YIP trip, an unusually interesting one. Excerpts:

"...I believe decisive, effective RD depends on a clear and precise common vuiderstanding of the security as we all recognize to be the foundation of success in the 'other

■war.'

"To illustrate the divergency of meanings, let me report briefly on a conversation I had with a small group of reporters in Saigon. It quickly degenera^ted into a debate, not between the reporters and me, but between Ward Just of the Washington Post and Charles Mohr of the New York Times ,

"Just argued heatedly that RD could not begin to be effective unless security were first guaranteed both to the peasants

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and to RD workers. 'An AID man cannot do his job/ he said^ 'while being shot at by the VC. '

"Molir responded just as heatedly^ that security could not come first -- because security froni guerrillas is meaningless and impossible until the peasant population is motivated to support the GW and deprive the guerrillas of havens, secrecy, and resources.

"Obviously, the easy answer to this circular chicken-egg debate is to say that both are necessary -- military protection and public motivation against the VC. And yet even that answer is incomplete for it defines security oriLy in the American

frame of reference...

"l knovr of no one who believes we have begun effectively to achieve the goal of gaining the population's active support, despite a series of pacification progra^ms and despite even the budding early efforts of Ambassador Porter's new program.

" The Militar y As-pect. ' Secretary Mcriamara, Mr. Komer, Ambassadors Johnson^ Lodg'e, and Porter, l-lr. Gaud, I, and all others who have approached the problem are perfectly agreed that the military aspect of RD has been spindly and weak." k^/

-K X ^ -Jf -je- -5^ *

"This probably is the result of the entirely understandable preoccupation by MA.CY in recent months with the main force military em^ergency. However justifiable this has been, a major effect has nonetheless been our failure effectively "to press RMAF to even start meeting their crucial RD responsibilities.

"(l know of no one who believes that these should be met principally by American forces -- unless we should wish the whole RD effort to colla,pse once we leave.)

" The Civil As-pect . Similarly, the work of civilian agencies has fallen short -- largely, but not only because of the failure of RVIIAF to provide a military screen behind which to work...

"Rather than engage in a civil-militaiy debate, I think we should devote our efforts toward trying to devise an administrative structiare that capitalizes on the assets each agency can offer to BD.

"V/hat should be the elements of an ideal organization?

"1. It should, have m-axim-um leverage on RVTIkE to engage in clear and hold operations in direct support of RDM efforts.

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"2. It should have a single American "negative," anti-VC channel -- that is a single commander for all action against communist guerrilla forces. This commander would calibrate and choose among the various force alternatives -- depending on whether he believed the need to be milita-y, para-military, or police.

"This command would include complete responsibility for all anti-VC intelligence -- that is, concerning all VC suspects either in the infrastructure or in guerrilla units.

"3, It should have a single, unified channel for all 'positive* pro-people aspects of RD^ irrespective of the present lines of comm^and within civilian agencies, allowing a single commander to calibrate and assign priorities to relevant positive programs on behalf of the peasantry.

"This, too, would include the inmiediate expansion of and control over all 'pro-people* intelligence -- that is, detailed district-by-district and province-by-province reporting on the particular gains most wanted by the populace (land reform, for example, in one province; or schools in another; or agricultural assistance in another).

"1+. Sensitivity to political inputs and wise political^ guidance of the whole process are needed to ensure that military programs support rather than negate efforts to win public support and participation. Failure to assure this -- which characterized French efforts in Indochina and Algeria, in contrast to civil-led, successfia, British efforts in Malaya and the Filipino campaign against the Huks -- means that the very process of gaining security would be weakened and prolonged, at increased, cost in Vietnamese and American lives.

"Thus, overall civilian coimnand of the RD program is needed for fundamental practical reasons, by no means for considerations of international image alone (though on the latter point, it must be observed that as soon as we put 'the other war' under-obvious military control, it stops being the other war). In ■ particular, it is important not to block or reverse -- by the way we organize our efforts — the current genuinely hopef^al Vietnamese trend towa-rd increased civilian influence and participation in government.

"In short, it is not the precise form of organization or the precise choice of flow chart that is important. What is important is:

"1. An immediate and effective military screen for RD efforts; and

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"2. Authoritative and compelling administration of the efforts of civilian agencies*

• 1^ "I believe we can institute effective administration of

J,. • the RD program -- which Ambassador Lodge has aptly described

' as the heart of the matter -- achieving all of these ideals:

. ■ ■ "1. Maintain the effect and. the appearance of civilian

^,: • control by immediately assigning overall supervision of all

KD activities to Ambassador Porter (and assigning a second deputy to Ambassador Lodge to absorb the' substantial other |-.' responsibilities now met by Ambassador Porter).

"2. That the several civilian lines of comjnand within agencies be consolidated into one. Thus, USAID, JUSPAO, OSA, and. the Embassy personnel assigned to RD all would continue under the nominal administrative control of their respective agencies but full, unified oi oerational control would rest solely vrith Ambassador Porter.

"3. That Ambassador Porter^s authority be mad-e clear and full to each constituent agency of the RD team, including:

— relocation of personnel;

— the establishment of priorities irrespective of agency priorities;

-- and the apportionment of the funds allocated by each agency to Viet-Nam^ bounded only by statutory

liraitations.

I

"if. That MACV imm.ediately give highest-level comjnajid focus and consolidation to its RD concerns and staff, now that it is no longer so completely distracted from RD by the compelling req.uirements of main force com.bat. This would be organized around the thesis that the central need is the most effective persuasive power or leverage on RVIiAF. This thesis is strengthened substantia^lly by:

-- The firm intent, expressed to us in. Saigon last week, of Rresident Thleu and Prime Minister Ky to shift ARW infantry to revolutionary d,evelop-ment vrork starting in January;

-- The enhanced powers they intend to give to General Thang, already an able chief "of RD for GW.

"5. That the MACY effort embrace at least ad.visory control over all levels of force -- starting with ARW but also includ-\ ing .RF, PF, CIDG, and the para-military operations of the RB

, cadre, PFFj and PRV. , .

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"These steps would greatly strengthen both the military and civil lines of command. They vrould contribute significantly to the success of RD. But not even these changes v/ould be decisive without a strong link between them .

"The civil side reauires the capacity to influence military movement which no organizational chart can provide. The MCV side requires the political and substantive expertise which a military organization does not -- and is not expected to -- possess-

"Thus the fundamental recommendation 1 would m^ke is:

"6, To appoint, as principal deputy and executive officer to Ambassador Porter, a general of the highest possible ability and stature -- of two^ three or even four-star rank. To do so would win the following advantages:

"a. Compelling indication of the seriousness with which the Administration regards ED.

"b. The rank-, and stature to insure optimum RD performance from MCV.

"c. The rank and stature to afford maximiom impact on GVII military leaders and capacity to persuade them properly to prod RVNAF v/hen necessary.

"d. Demonstrated comjnand administrative capacities with which to assist Ambassador Porter, vrhile bridging the inevitable institutional difficulties that might well otherwise develop from one arm of MCV's taking orders from a civilian.

"e. A solution to the military control image problem^ by which the advantages of close military support would be veiled by civilian control.

"f. The capacity and position to formulate an effective qualitative plan encompassing both military and civil realities. Previous plans have focused on numbers of provinces, volume of RD cadre trained, and so on. They have put an unrealistic premium on quantitative, "statistical" success. Meaningful criteria, however, must be q.ualitative. I would envision such a qualitative plan intended to cover at least the next 12 months.

"There would be an additional prospective advantage as well. If it should later be foimd that dual lines of authority --even given this strong link -- are not successful, then we could more readily fall back to a unitary, military command structure — with the new KD general taking charge.

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"He would have the benefit, in that situation, of having been under civilian control and his relationship to RD would already be evident, making the change to military control less abrupt and less susceptible to criticism." ^

Secretary McNamara's memorandum -- sent the day before Katzenbach's — was of greater importance, and stands out as one of the most far-reaching and thoughtful documents in the files. V/hile this study concentrates on pacification, it is necessary to view McNaraara's remarks about pacification in this memorandum within the context of the entire paper.

He said that the military situation had gone "somewhat better" than he had anticipated a year earlier, and that "we have by and large blunted the commLuiist military initiative." But he found little cause for hope _ that the overall situation woui.d turn dramatically in our favor withm the__ next two years. "l see no reasonable way to bring the war to an end soon, he said, and described the enemy strategy as one of "keeping us busy and waiting us out (a strategy of attriting our national will).

"Pacification is a basic disappointment. We have good, grounds to be pleased by the recent elections, by Ky's l6 months in power, and by the faint signs of development of . national political institutions and of a legitimate civil goverr-ment. But none of this has translated itself into political achievements at Province level or^below. Paci-■ fication has, if anything., gone bacfa-rard..."

Thus, the Secretary found us "no better, and if anyt.hing worse off -- from^_ the point of view of the important war (for the complicity of the peopleJ.

He did not think at that time that major increases in U.S. force levels or bombin-- programs would make a big difference in the short run. Rather, he suc^':^ested a series of actions designed to emphasize to Hanoi that we wer-- setting definite limits on the cost in men and money of the war, while settling down for the long haul -- "a posture that makes trying to 'wait us out' less attractive." His,strategy was "five-pronged.

First, he suggested that we stabjaij^eJJ^S,_jPorc^levels in Vietnam, "barring a dramatic change in t he war." The limit he proposed was the ITto'OOO" total then under"consideration. (CIKCPAC had requested 570,000 bv end 1967). This limit would "put us in a position where negotiations wovad be more likely to be oroductive, but if they were not we could pur-■ sue the all-imoortant pacification task with proper attention and resources and without the spectre of apparently endless escalation of U.S. deploy-

• ments.

Second, he recommended a barrier near the DMZ and "across the trails

of laos.

a gams c

Tliird he suggested, that we " stabilize the Rolling Thunder pro g r a m nst the North." He thus recommended against the increase in the level

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of bombing and the broader target systems that the JCS was then req.uesting. Again, his reason was to "remove the prospect of ever-escalating bombing as a factor complicating our political posture and distracting from the main job of pacification in South Vietna.m."

Fourth, he said, we should " pursue a vigorous T)acification program ."

"The large-unit operations war, which we know best how to fight and where we have had our successes, is largely irrelevant to pacification as long as we do not lose it. By and large, the people in rural areas believe that the GVN when it comes will not stay but that the VC will; that cooperation with the GW will be punished by the VC; that the GVIT is really indifferent to the people's welfare; that the low-level GW are tools of the local rich; and that the GW is ridden with corruption.

"Success in pacification depends on the interrelated functions of providing physical security, destroying the VC apparatus, motivating the people to cooperate, and establishing responsive local government. An obviously necessary but not sufficient requirement for success of the ED cadre and police is vigorously conducted and adequately prolonged clearing operations by military troops who will ^stay' in the area, v/ho behave themselves decently and who show respect for the people.

"This elem^ental requirement of pacification has been missing. In almost no contested area designated for pacification in recent years have AEVN forces actually 'cleared and ste.yed' to a point where cadre teams, if available, could have stayed overnight in hamlets and sui-vived, let alone - accomplish their mission...

"Now that the threat of a communist main-force military victory has been thwarted by oui- emergency efforts, 'we must allocate far more attention and a portion of the regular military forces (at least half of ARVN and perhaps a portion of the U.S. forces) to the task of providing an active and permanent security system behind which the RD teams and police can operate and behind which the political struggle with the VC infrastructure can take place.

"The U.S. cannot do this pacification security 30b for the Vietnamese. All we can do is 'massage the heart.' For one reason, it is known that we do not intend to stay; if our efforts vrorked at a,ll, it would merely postpone the eventua.1 confrontation of the VC ^n^. GVIJ infrastructares. The GVN must ^.o the job, and. I am convinced that drastic reform is needed if the ^m is going to be able to do it.

*

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^ "The first essential reform is in the attitude of GW

officials. Tliey are generally apathetic, and, there is corruption high and lovr. Often appointments, promotions, and draft deferments must "be bought; and kickbacks on salaries are common. Cadce at the bottom can be no better than the system above them. ' -

"Tlae second needed reform is in the attitude and conduct-of the ARW. The im^age of the government cannot imi-; prove unless and until the APOTJ improves miarkedly. They 'do not understand the importance (or respectability) of poxification nor the importance to pacification of proper, disciplined conduct. Promotions, assignments and award.s are often not made on merits but rather on the basis of having a diplom^a, friend,s, or relatives, or because of bribery. The ARW is-V/eak in dedication, direction and discipline.

"Not enough ARW are devoted to area and population security, and, when the ARW does attempt to support pacification, their actions do not last long enough; their tactics are bad despite U.S. prodding (no aggressive sm^all-'onit satui'ation patrolling, hamlet sea^rches, quick-reaction contact, or offensive night ambushes); they do not miakegood use of intelligence; and their leadership and-discipline are bad.

"Furthermore, it is m^^ conviction that a part of the problem undoubtedly lies in bad management on the American as well as the G'vTI side. Here split responsibility -- or *no responsibility* -- has resulted, in too little hard pressure on the GVII to do its 30b and no really solid or realistic planning with respect to the whole effort. We must deal" with this management problem now and deal with it effectively.

"One solution would be to consolidate all U.S. activities which are primarily part of the civilie.n pacification program and all persons engaged, in such activities, providing a clear assignmient of responsibility and a i^nified command under a civilian relieved of all other duties. (if this task is assigned to Aribassador Porter, another individual must be sent iimnsdiately to Saigon to serve as Ambassador Lodgers deputy.) Under this approach, there 'would be a carefully delineated division of responsibility between the civilian-in-charge and. an elem^ent of COPIUSMACY under a senior officer, vrho would give the subject of planning for and providing hamlet security the highest priority in attention and resources. Success will d.epend on the'men selected for the jobs on both sides (they must be among the highest rank and, m.ost competent adrndnistrators in the U.S. Government) 5 on complete cooperation fimong the U.S.

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elements5 and on the extent to which the South Vietnamese can be shocked, out of their present pattern of behavior. The first work of this reorga^nized U.S. pacification organi-^ zation should be to produce within 60 days a reali.stic and detailed plan for the coming year.

*'Frcm the political e.-nd, public-relations viewpoint, this solution is preferable -- if it works. But we cannot tolerate continued failure. If it fails after a fair trial, the only alternative in my view is to place the entire pacification program -- civilian and military -- und,er General Westmoreland.. This alternative would result in the establishment of a Deputy COMQa-'ACY for Pacification who would be in command of all pacification .staffs in Saigon and of all pacification staffs and activities in the field; one person in each corps, province and district would be responsible for the U.S. effort."

, j • *'(lt should be noted that progress in pacification^ more than

anything else, \vill persuade the enemy to negotiate-or with-ar£iw.;

Fifth, the Secretary recorQmend.ed a renev^ed effort to get negotiations started, by taking steps "to increase our credibility" with Hanoi, by .- -, considering a shift in the pattern of our bomibing program considering

the possibility of cessation of bombing, by trying to "split the VC off, from Hanoi," and by "developing a rea-listic pl^.n providing a role for the VC in negotiations, postw-ar life, and governm^ent of the nation."

His suoiimation was somber. VJhile repeating his prediction that the next two years would not see a satisfactory conclusion by either large-unit action or negotiations, McRamiara advocated pursuing both routes although "we shou].-d recognize that success from them is a m.ere possibility, not a probability."

"The solution lies in girding, openly, for a longer war and, in taking actions iimsiediately vrhich will in 12 to 3_8 months give clear evidence that the continuing costs and risks to the American people are acceptably limited, that the formula for success has been found, and that the end of the war is merely a matter of time. All of my recommendations will contribute to this strategy, but the one most difficult to implement is perhaps the m.ost important one --enlivening the pacification program. The odds are less than even for this task, if only because we have failed so consistently since 196I to make a dent in the problem. But, * because the 1967 trend of pacification will, I believe, be the main talisman of ultimate U.S. success or failure in Vietnam, extraordinary imagination and effort should, go ] ^-^^Q changing the stripes of tha.t problem.

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Ky:

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''They told, me that they do not expect the enemy to negotiate or to modify his program in less thn.n tvro yearrs. Rather, they expect the enemy to continue to expand and, to increase his activity. They expressed agreement with us that the key to success is pacification and that so far pacification has failed. Ihey agree that we need, clarification of GVN and U,S. roles and that the bulk of the ARW should be shifted to pacification. Ky will, between January and JuJ.y 196?5 shift all ARW infantry d.ivisions to that role. And he is giving Thang, a good Revolutionary Development director, ad.ded powers. Thieu and Ky see this as x^rt of a two-year (:i.967~1968) sched.ule5 in vzhich offensive operations against enemy main force units are continued., carried on primarily by the U.S. and other Free World forces. At the end. of the tvro-year period, they believe the enemy may be willing to negotiate or to retreat from his current course of action," k7/

McNamara's memorand^oia marked, a strong new emphasis on pacification by him, and the ripples that this new emphasis set off were inevitably to spread tliroughout the USG, changing emxjhasis and officical rhetoric up and d,ow-n the line. His first reactions were official: comj:iients on his memoranduxi'from George Carver, Helms' Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs at the CIA; and from the JCS. Carver agreed, with the evaluation o-f the situation, but objected to some of the reconmiended actions, po.rticu-larly the "press for negotiations" items which he felt would be "counterproductive." Carver made the provocative statement that he considered the prognosis "too gloomy." If the od.ds for enlivening the pacification program are indeed "less than even, present U.S, objectives in Vietnam are not likely to be achieved."

In his mem;oranduTn, Carver took issue with McNamara on pacification. Carver felt that "despite the errors and administrative wealmesses of present pror/rams, in the concept of RD we have found the right formula, a catalyst that is potentially capable -of inspiring the Vietnamese into effective action. .^.Serious and systematic effort in this field is really a post-Horoaulu Conference development and it would'be unrealistic to expect dramatic, readily quantifiable progress in the short span of eight m^onths."

Carver supported the new stress on pacification, adding that he would support "wholeheartedly" a "real reorganizational change under which the ci^dlian director would have a joint staff of sufficient scope to ena.ble him to"^plan, control, and direct the U.S. effort and have operational control over all -- not just civilian -- elements engaged in R_D..." He opposed a "carefully d.elineated division between the civilian in charge and an element of COI-raSMCV under a senior officer."

"A civilian pacification'structure cannot be given a 'fair trial* uriless the civilian director has the necessary authority," Carver said. "Also, the

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tri?.l will not be fair if major quantifiable results are anticipated in a matter of months.''

Carver's vision of pacification rested to a large degree on the idea of gaining the active support of the population. He seemed opposed to the use of troops to merely protect terrain and the people who lived on itj saying, "if an attempt is made to im.pose pacification on an un.enga,ged populace by GW or U.S. military forces^ that attem„pt will fail.""

!T

He concluded^ as he had begun:

">Ie agree with Secretary McNamara's prognosis that there is little hope for a satisfactory conclusion of the war within the next two years. We do not agree that "the odds are less than even" for enl.ivenixig the pacification program. If this were true; the U.S. would, be foolish to continue the struggle in Vietnam and should seek to disengage as fast as possible. We thii-il^ that if we esteJjlish adequate management and. control on the U.S. side and. ensure that the Vietnamese follovr through on redirecting their military resources as promised; there are at least fair prospects for'substantial progress in pacifica^tion over the next two years." kO/

The JCS review of McUamara's memorand."am vras far more severe. V/hile agreeing that "There is no reason to expect that the war can be brought soon to a successful conclusion/' the Chiefs made a strong case, as usual, for increased bombing, no predetermined, force ceilings, and, stated, several times in differerrc ways that the vj-ar v/as going very well indeed, -- although this same point had been made by McNama,ra. The Chiefs also disagreed strongly with the FlOvc for negotiations which McNamara had, suggested,. Any bombing pause, they said, would be regarded by Hanoi, by the GVH, and by our Allies, as "renewed, evidence of lack of U.S. determination to press the v^ar to a successful conclusion."

On pacification, the JCS "adhered, to their conclusion" that "to achieve optim;am effectiveness, the pacification program should be transferred to COHUS]-i/\.CV. However, if for political reasons a civilian type organiza.tion should, be consid,ered mand,atory by the President, they would interpose no objection.

"Nevertheless, they are not sanguine that 8.n effective civilian-type organization can be erected, if at all, except at the expense of costly delays. As to the use of a substantial fraction of ARVU for pacification purposes, the JCS concur. However, they desire to flag that ad-option of this conce-pt will und.oubtedly elicit che4,rges of a U.S. takeover of combat operations at increased cost in American casualties." k^/

The JCS requested, that their vievrs be brought to the attention of the President. . ' ■ '

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!^^ On the record., Secretary McNamara and Und.er Secretary Kat^f^enbach had

been quite frank in telling the American public that they had. found pacification lagging during their October trip to Vietnam, Katzenbach said he v/as "concerned" and, after emerging from the m.eeting with the Fresid.ent, told the vmite House press corps that "V;e have to do a good deal more to get the 'other \var' moving and 1 think we can." 50/ Even Komer, who remained more optimistic than' McNam.ara and Katzenbach, was quoted as "acknowledging" ■ that pacification was lagging.

vmile "military progress has exceeded our expectations," the Defense Secretary said, progress in pacification has "been very slow indeed." His trip also raised fears, for the first time, in Saigon that the military would, take over the pacil'ication effort. Thus, at almost the very moment that the President was hearing Katzenbach's recommendation that the civilians be reorganir^.ed, s.nd given a last chance (see previous action), Ward Just was writing from Saigon:

"McNamara left behind the impression that his visit to South Vietnam, last week marked, the beginning of the end. of civilian supremacy in the American effort* •«

"Sources liere were saying today that McNam.ara, a stickler for d.etail, vras unimpressed with civilian d.escriptions of progress, or lack of it, in the pacification effort. The Axierican V7ho bea^rs most of the authority for that, Deputy ;'"""^" _ Ambassador William C. Porter, was in the U.S. during the

McNamara visit,

"There has alv7s;ys been, as one official here put it, a 'military component' to pacification. But it is understood nov that that component will be increased, and, the military will more and more take control of pacification -- the task called nation-building.

"...The other likely outcome of McNajmra's four days in Vietnam is that the role of ARVN will change.

"Informed, sources said that McNamara heard, no complaints vrhatsoever from American military sources regarding the performance of the AEW, but the fact is that he did. It has been an open secret in Saigon that the role of the ARVN would change next year. Their work would, be in pacification, not in striking at m.ain force units...

" "There is now increased certainty that the war effort despite public hom.age to the 'other war' and the 'hearts and minds of the people' is more thorough3.y military than ever --and more thoroughly American.

■"In the end..^ the military is thought to have carried the '^'^ day not by force or logic or force of wisdom, although their

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position here can "be argued platisibly vith "both logic and \r±sdon^ but by sheer weight of what one official called the Juggernaut...

"'Westmoreland says do this, do that^ and something happens^^ one informed observer said. 'When Lodge says do this, do that, sojnetirnes something happens, and sometimes it doesn^t happen.*

"The men here who wanted to see one ideology beaten by a better one, to see the Vietnamese character (not to mention the countryside) preserved and not submerged by the war, vrho viewed the struggle as an exercise in counterinsurgency, have now certainly lost.. .

"it remains to be seen whether the problems of Vietnam lend themselves to military solutions and Vviiether changing conditions in this war are better handled by colonels than diplomats." ^l/

JustVs article was wrong, of course, since the decision to give MGV responsibility for pacification had not been m.ade. Indeed, within a few days this fact had also leaked to the press, exid. stories in the Ne w Yo rk Traies, datelined Saigon, spoke of the "abortive effort" by MA.CV to take over^the effort. But the Importance of the stories was not in their accuracy or inaccuracy, but in the fact that they indicated the emotions that had been raised by the subject du:cing and after the McHamara-Katzenbach-Komer visit. In truth, no one in Saigon, not even Lodge a:ad Westmoreland, Imew at this time what the final decision was to be. Bitt the subject was up for discussion, and the pressure from Washington had been measiu-abry increased.

With the Mcllaniara and Katzenbach m.emoranda in hand, the President apparently indicated tentative agreements to give the civilians a short trial period to get pacification moving. Then he left for his Asian tour, which vras to clim.aK with the Seven-Nation Conference at Manila. He left behind him instructions to prepare a message to Lodge and Porter and VJestmoreland, instructing them in his decision. Since the m.essage was drafted and sent on to the President in Wellington on October l8, before. Manila, but not sent on to Lodge and Porter in Saigon until November U, after Manila, there apparently remained some imcertainty as to his decision, which was not clarified until most of the principals were united briefly in Manila. But this is of marginal importance - The fact was that the-President had approved the idea of giving the civilians a final chance. ■

The Cable Excha nge: November, I966

By October I8, McNamara, Katzenbach, and Komer had an agreed-upon telegram for the President to send Lodge. It was forwarded to Wellington, where the President had begun his Asian tour:

"State/Defense and Komer recommend your concurrence in the general plan recon-imended by both Secretary llcNamara and

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Under Secretary Katzenbach regarding reorganization on the America.n side of the administration of the Revolutionary Development (RD) program in Viet-Nam. V/e therefore recommend that you approve our sending the following State-Defense message to Amba.ssador Lodge:

BEGIN TEXT ■ • ■

^'Personal For Lodge. You have described, the RD program as" the heart of the matter in SW. We agree. Also, you have reported, and V7e agree that progress in the RD program, so far has been slight and, unsatisfactory. We all agree that progress must be made in this crucial area if the war is to be won in the South and if the North is to be persuaded to negotiate. It is clear to us that som_e organizational changes are recj,uired on the American side to get RD m.oving -- to bring harder pressure on the GWT to do its job and to get solid and realistic planning vrith respect to the w^hole effort.

i i ''We had considered, putting the entire progrsjn un.der COMUSMCV

to achieve these ends; and this m-ay ultimately prove to be the best solution. But recognizing certain objections to thj.s approach, we are prepared, to try a solution which lea^ves the civilian functions under civilian mana.gement. As we see it, - the trial organization would involve the follov/ing changes:

"l. The several civilian lines of command, within U.S. agencies vrould. be consolidated into one* Thus, line responsibility for all personnel assigned, to BB civilian functions would, rest solely vfith one high-ranking civilian. (VJe presume this man would be Amibassa^dor Porter, If so, he would have to be relieved of all other duties, a.nd you would have to have another deputy assigned, to absorb the substantial other responsibilities novr met by Ai'abassad,or Porter.) The authority of this civilian would, be made clear and, full to each constituent agency of the civilia^n RD team, including relocation of personnel, the establishment of priorities irrespective of agency priorities, and, the a/pportionmient of the funds allocated for RD by each agency to Viet-NajiL (bounded, only by sta.tutory limitations).

"2. To strengthen Porter administratively, -it might be v/ell to assign him a competent Principal Deputy and. Executive Officer -- a military officer of two or three-star rank. If this officer is desired. General Westmore]and can supply him or, if he requests, the officer can be provided from here. This officer would, not be to comma^nd U.S. military forces or operations or to performi I-IAGV^s functions of ad.vising and, urod-ding the ARVN, but w^ould be to provide adm.inistrative strength on the clvilia^n side and. to serve as a bridge to I'L;\CV, ensuring efficient interfa>ce between the .civilian and. military structures. ■■ .

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"3. We understand General VJestnioreland is already considering a MACV Special Assistant for Pacification or a Deputy for Pacification. We presume that the appointment of such a Special Assistant or Deputy could be tiraed to coincide with the changes on the civilian side, making possible the highest-level cornraand focus and consolidation to MACV's RD concerns and staff.

"1-U Careful definition and delineation of responsibili-■■ ties of the U.S. civilian and U.S. military sides v/ould be necessary in the whole RD establisliment in South Viet-Nam to ensure that nothing falls between the stools and. that the two efforts fully mesh.

"We 9..re most anxious, as we know you are, to make progress in RD. So this new organiza^tional arrangement would be on trial for 90-120 days, at the end of which we would take stock of progress and reconsider v/hether to assign all responsibility for RD to COIvfJSIlACV." 5l/

As mentioned above, this cabli^ was not repeated to Saigon until after the Manila Conference. Presumably, in the intervening period, the Pt^esident had, had. a chance to talk directly to Lodge and, Westmoreland about the matter, since they were both at Manila (Porter v/as not). In addition,' Komer had

' gone from Manila back to Saigon for a week's stay, and had given Porter a clear v^arnlng that the reorganization v/as impending. \Ih.en he left, Komer left behind two members of his staff to assist Porter with the planning for the reorganization, although Porter and Lodge, for some reason not

■ clear today, still seemed, doubtful that the reorganization VJashington was pressing on them vras really necessary, and really desired by the President.

The cable "-- unchanged from the text cited above -- arrived in Vietnara on November ^f-, 1966- 53/ It vras slugged "Literally Eyes Only for /imbassa-" dor from Secretary, SecDef, and Komer," and beca,use Lodge decided to interpret that slug line literally, the entire process v/as delayed one week --a sorry spectacle and wholly unnecessary on all counts. When Lodge answered the cable by requesting permission to discuss it with his assistants, there vras an understandable suspicion in V7ashington that he was simply doing so to delay action a little while longer. But on the other hand, the cable had received, the highest slug normally available to State Department messages -•- "Literally Eyes Only" -- and Lodge- could say truthfully that he was just following instruction.

In any event, Lodge s-ent his answer to Washington November 6:

M ' ' "l agree that progress has been 'slight and unsatisfac-

tory' and, undoubtedly some organizational changes can be helpful-. However5 before commenting on that I would like to set cut some basic consideravtions.

"Crux of the problem is not defective organization. It is secur^ity. Civilian reorganization can affect progress only

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( * indirectly, because security will remain outside civilian

purviev/. . .

"To meet this need ve must make more U.S. troops available to help out in pacification operations as we move to concentrate ARW effort in this v/ork. U.S. forces would be the catalyst; would lead, by example; and would work with the Vietnamese on the 'buddy^ system. They would be the 10 psr-■ ■ cent of the total force of men under arms (90 percent of \ihom would, be Vietnair.ese) which would get the whole thing m^oving faster.

"This has been done on a small scale already by elem^ents of the U.S. Marines, 1st and 25th U.S. Infantiy Divisions, and the Koreans, VJe think it can be m^ade to work and. the gains unde^r such a program, whii.e not flashy, would, hopeful_ly be solid. Everything depends on v/hether we can change ARVN habits. Experiments already made indicate that U.S. casualties would be few. mile it would take tim.e, it would be clear to everyone at home that time was working for us and it might create a 'smell of victory.* It would eventually get at Viet Cong recruiting -- surely an achievement which would fmidam^entally affect the course of the war-

"I vonder whether the above result could not be achieved if the phrase 'offensive -operations* were to be redefined so that instead of defining it as m^eaning 'seek out and destroy,' which I ^understand i^ now the case, it would be defined as 'split up the Viet Cong and keep him off balance.'

"This new definition of the phrase 'offensive operations' would mean fewer men for the purely 'military war, fewer U.S. casualties and, more pacification.

"It wouJ.d also hasten the revamping of the ARW, v*ich Ky says is now due to have been completed by normal Vietnamese bureaucratic methods by July I967 (which seems optimistic to me), vmat I propose in this telegram would in effect revamp the ARVLM by ' on-the-job-training. ' It is the only way that I can think of drastically to accelerate the present pace.

■X- -X- ^- ^ *

"The question of tra.nsferring Revolutionary Development civilian functions to C0^SJS:4!VCV raises q.-^iestions and. I understand you recognize certain objections. I doubt whether it would solve any existing problems, and it would certainly create many new ones. I agree with your second pa.ragraph in'whiQh you say civilian functions should be left under civilian management.

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"I agree that civilian lines of conumand within U.S. agencies dealing with Revolutionary Developrxent should be consolidated imder Ambassador Porter. He should take unto himself the direct opera^tion of the five categories of man- • power now in the field. I refer to USAID public safety, USAID province reps; JUSPAO; Cm and the civil functions performed by the military advisers.. They would all stay exactly where they are as fa,r as rationing, housing and administration is concerned. Porter would have the operational authority and responsibility.

"I am not clear what another Deputy Ambassador would do and advise e^gainst such an umiecessary and unwieldy struc-t^ore. AifLbassador Porter does not now absorb ' substs/ntial other responsibilities' which distract his attention from revolutionary development. Administrative matters involving the U.S. Mission as a v^hole are handled by the Mission Coordinator, and political affairs are handled by me with close support fropj. the political counselor. Economic affairs, in which Porter as the man responsible for revolutionary d.evelop-ment is intimately and necessarily involved,, are well covered by AID BMd. the Economic Counselor. Public affairs not connected with field operations associated with revolutionary development are well in hand and do not take Ambassador Porter's

"The only ' svibstantial other responsibility' which Porter carries outside of RD, is to take charge in my absence. I see no need, and vrould find it most inappropriate, for this to be changed.,

"I think there is great merit in the idea of having a high-ranking military man involved, in pacification work. He should be in charge of all the milita^ry aspects of pacification — working with ARW and selecting, expediting, and assigning the U.S. troops who would operate as suggested in para 3 above. He should be an officer with proper knowledge of and talent for the subject and I, of course, think of General Weyand,. If the decision is mad.e by all hands to put the military into pacification as suggested in para 3, the decision as to where to place such a general should not be too difficult, _ - , .

"I agree that caref-al definition anddBlineation of re-■ - ' sponsibilities of the U.S. civilian and military sides is necessary. We intend that the two efforts fully mesh.

"Clearly there is very little that can be done economically, ■ socially, psychologically, and politically for the 'hearts and . minds' of men, if these men have knives sticking into their

^ > . collective bellies. The kjiife must first be removed. It is

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not the case -- as has so often been saad -- of which came firsts the hen or the egg...

X -x- * * -x-

"This is obviously not reflected in our present organization und.er which^ nonetheless, much ha.s been accomplished. Vjhen Mac Bandy told me in February, after the Vice President's visit, • of the decision to relieve Porter of all of his duties as Deputy (except that of being Charge d/Affaires in case of my absence) so that he could take charge of the civilian aspects of pa,ci-fication, 1 did not at first welcome the id.ea. I m-ust, however, recognize that und.er Porter a real asset has been built.

"To sum up, therefore, the first priority is more U.S. troops to be allotted to pacification as set forth in paragraph 3; the second priority is better operation and tightening up of the present organiza.tion; thirdly, are organizational changes.

"Considering that your message was "EYES ONLY," I request authority to discuss it and my comments and plans v/ith the head.s of the different Mission agencies involved here. V7e are all anxious to make progress in RD, and the effort v/ill involve all of us. It requires security and time. V/hatever the trial period m,ay be, I suggest we maintain a constant taking stock of progress and of problems. Lodge." $V

Ba-ck came Washington's answer on November 12, giving Lodge permission to discuss the matter and show the cables to Porter, Westmoreland, and "once plans mature, inform members Mission Council." With the civilians in Washington already feeling that their trial period, was underway, they sought to get the Mission mioving faster to reorganize. Tlie cables becam.e a series of hints and threats and detailed guidance. The difficulty in communication was quite high. Thus, the November 12 cable, drafted by Arabassador Unger and clea.red with McNamara, Helms, Gaudj Komer, Marks, Katzenbach, a.nd Rusk, and slugged "for Aniloassador from Secreta.ry, SecDef, and Komer," laid out for Lodge and Porter a detailed description of how the new structure should look -- although everyone knew that the plans had already been drawn up and were sitting on Lodge and Porter's desks in Saigon -~ and began with this vrarning-hint:

"Following steps need to be taken promptly if we a.re, in the time available, to give adequate test to organization which is intended to keep PD civilian functions under civilian

m.anagement, an objective to which we know you attach consider-a.ble important." 55/

The cable went on to outline the organization, and discuss the question of the use of U.S. troops:

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"...Vfe understa,ncl General Westmoreland plans use of limited number U.S. forces in buddy system principle to guide and motivate AWE in RD/p. However, we have serious doubts about any further involvement U.S. troops beyond that in straight pacification operations. We fear this would tempt Vietnamese to leave this work more and more to us and we believe pacification, with its intimate contact with population, more appropriate for Vietnamese forces, who m.ust after all as arm of GYN establish con-■ structive relations with population. Hence we believe there should be no thought of U.S. taking substantial share of pacification. The urgent need is to begin effectively pressing ARW." 56/

In Sair.-on, the Mission moved'slowly. Three days later, with still no answer from Saigon, the State Department sent out the following very short and curt ca-ble:

"Personal for Lodge and Porter from the Secretary

"Ref State 83699

"PvEFlfeh was discussed today at highest levels, who wished to emphasize that this represents final and considered decision and who expressed hope that indicated, m^easuxes could be put into effect just as rapidly as possible." 57/

This OToduced,, at last, two long answers from Lodge and Porter, which laid out what the new structure was going to look like, and ad.ded, some personal comments from Lodge:

"FOR THE SECRETARY, SECDEF AlID KOMER

tTT\T

KODIS

"1. This is in reply to your 83699 as amended, by your 85196 concerning which General Westmoreland, Porter and I have had extensive consultation.

"2. We will, of course, carry out yoirr instructions just as rapidly as possible, and our plamilng is already far ad.vanced.

"3. It is very gratifying that you feel as we do on the urgent need to revamp the ARVl^, on the importance of putting all civilians in the field, under Porter and of having single cxvilian reSDonsibility in province and corps -- measures which we have long ad.vocated.. Doubt whether we can change over night habits and organization of ARVS acquired during the last ten years. Unless our success against main force d.aytime activity is equ-Ued by success against guerrillas during the night, swift imwovement cannot be expected, to result simply by reorganization on the U.S.. civilian side. It is our ability to infuse

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courage and confidence into all the Vietnazaese under arms who are involved in pacification - both military and polxce --which is at stcake.

"1+ As regards your instruction for a military deputy for Porter' General Westmoreland, proposes Major General Paul Smith, who is acceptahle to Porter. Porter believes General Smitn should, be attached to civilian agency (State Department - Emoassy Saigon) while on this d.uty, along lines preced.ents already establisned.. He couJd wear civilian or military garb as circumstances require.

* -x- -X-

"6 General Westmoreland does not wish to have a separate de'putv for Revolutionary Development, but has nominated. Brigadier Genera] William Knowlton as Special Assistant for Pacification.

•X- * *

"8. Concerning paragraph ^(c). Mission d,irective will state clearly that Deputy A::ibassad.or Porter will be primarily occupied. with'RD and that other Mission business will be handled, by appro-•nriate"sections of Mission. There are certain other aspects to consid,er, however. Porter has assumed charge when I have been absent. Any change in that respect could, only derogate xrom his position in eyes of Am^erican community and GW. He believes and ? concur, that his assuni.ption of charge caimot be_ nominal without risk of d,owngrad.ins him in local eyes. Add.itlonally, _it is essential that there be a point of decision m Mission, ^'l^^^-^f eLu^vltY. in-practice, Porter intends to leave routine f-onctions of Mission (political, protocol, adm,inistrative, personnel, consular, visitors, etc.) to sections normally handling them He expects, however, to remain closely cognizant of politicaa developments and together with political counselor and CAS chief lo consult and deci.de covirse of action to take or recommend to depa,rtment as circumstances dictate. I believe this is reasonable approach and, have full confidence in his intention to con-centrate on RD.

* * *

"10 Your mragraoh 5- I have always believed that Revolutionary Develo-oment/Pacification must be carried out by Viet.namese forces, who,- a's you sa,y, must establish constructive relacions with the population. I have never advocaoed U.S. forces taking on 'substantial' share of this task. I do believe, however, ■ that an American presence in this field amounting to a_very '.nell -nerce-otap-e of the total manpower involved could mauce Ami to take tSe proper attitude by 'on the job' training and, ■could give the^necessary courage and confidence to the Vieo-namese. Lodge" 3§J . '

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\ "FOR TlIE SECRETARY, SECDEF AND KOi-'IER

"NODIS

I

"1 Herewith I transmit our reconmendations carrying out your 83699 and 85196. This is the hest we can do in the irmne-dlate future and. we think it is a forward, step. But I believe that you imy wish to change it as we advance along this untrod, path and learn more about circumstances and people. Our proposal is as follows:

■ "8 Tlie establishment of an office of operations, headed by a Director of Operations. This headquarters office of o-oe^ations will include the present staff of: (1) USAID/ Field Operations; (2) USAID/Public Safety; (3) USAID/Refixgees; (in JUSPAO/Pield. Services (minus North Viet-Kam branch}; (5) CP.s/c&dre Operations Division. The Office of Operations will be organized so that the above offices will not necessarily remain intact when they are merged into a single office. For example, I intend to disband USAID/FO's cadre office, and put ** ■ those T)eople now representing AID on cadre affairs directly un-

der the cadre office. Thus there may be a net saving m man-povfer.

"b. All other divisions of AID and JUSPAO will remain under the control of their respective directors -- MacDonald and Zorthian - who will be responsible to Porter, as they are now, for their operations. (I exempt from this the special question of press relations, on which Zorthian will continue to revort to me directly.) Thus, for example, MacDonald will continue to oversee to Agriculture, Education, Health, Industry, etc.. Divisions, as well as continue, along with the economic counselor Wehrle, to be responsible for the anti-inflation efforts, ^he Director of USAID will be freed from responsibilities for tbe field, operations, but his job continues to be one of vast importance". I think it will now become more manageable.

•x- * ■)«■

"d. At province level we will select a single civilian to be in charge of all other U.S. civilians in the province, - nn seme way as mcv senior ad.v3£ or is responsible for uhe military involved in the ad.visory effort in the province. This senior civilian representative will be the U.S. counterpart for civilian affairs to the W province chief and, together with ■ the M^\CV seni.or ad.visor (sector) and the province chief, will ' form the provincial coordinating commiittee. The practice of ' ' assamt^ng the nrovince chief with a multiplicity of ad.visors,

onen giving conflicting advice, should cease under this arrangement The senior civilian representative will write the efficiency reports of the Aiflerican civilians in the province,

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regardless of their parent agency^ and those reports will be reviev^ed. by Porter^s office;, which will also control tra^nsfers and assignments.

^ ^ "^ '

''f. At the raore complex region/corps level, we will consider a similar system, with a senior civilian representative responsible for the overall U.S. civilian effort in the corps area. He will work with the MA.CV senior advisor, and will in effect be my agent (and Bill Porter's) at the corps. 1 have long believed in the need for a sophisticated politically-minded man in chc.rge of our effort with the politically volatile corps commanders, and, this is a step in that direction. Porter and I will be looking carefully for the best men for these four diffi cult jobs...

"2. I do not want another deputy Ambassador. 1 intend to provide office space for Porter in the new chancery (his present office will remain at his disposal even after he moves). There is sim-oly no job for s.nother deputy Ambassador, particularly since the present political counselor works closely with me, reporting directly.

*'3. There is no doubt that the steps mentioned above are major ones. Clearly I cannot predict now how long they will take to achieve, or how much disruption they will cause in their early stages. For one thing, 1 feel that a physical relocation . of certain offices now spread out across the city is vital, and we are now studying the details of how to do this. Porter will probably need, to establish his offices in a building other than the Chancery, in order to give the office of operations a firm guiding hand. He will, however, keep an office close to me, and he will be kept closely informed of policy developments.

^ -x- -x-

"5. I will need yom^ personal support during the period which lies ahead. I am svire that all hands here, regardless ■ of agency affiliation, will support this effort to unify the U.S. teajn. The same must be true of the agencies that must continue to backstop us in Washington. Personnel recruitm^ent will remain in your hand.s, and, it ultimately determines the caliber of our efforts. Porter will send you separate messages on the question of personnel, so that new guidan^.e and requiremonts can be put into effect as quickly as possible.

"6. We look forvra^rd through reorganiza^tion to tightening and. simxjlifying contacts, advice and coordination with GW authorities repsonsible for ED. 5^/

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E. The M3.nila Conference

President Johnson arrived in Manila on October 23^ I9665 to attend the seven-nation conference of troop contributing countries to the Vietnam war. "^'aiile the meeting "vj-as hectic and short, it did produce a communiq^ue ■Vfhich contained some major statements about policy, strategy, and intentions. The three most important points in the communicLue of October 25 were:

a. The pledge tha.t "allied forces. .. shaJ_l be withdravm, after close consultation^^ as the other side withdraws its forces to the Tlorth^ ceases infiltration, and the level of violence thus subsides. Those forces will be withdrawn as soon as possible and not later than six months after the above conditions have been fulfilled."

b. The announcement of a new program, which had been thought up in Washington, for "National Reconciliation." Since the GVN was not in genuine agreem^ent with the idea, but under great pressure from the Americans to comjiiit themselves to it, the communiq,ue was quite vague on what difference there was, if any, between the new Rational Reconciliation program and the old Chieu Hoi program.->^

c. The formalization, in public, of the move towards getting ARVN more deeply involved with the RD program: ''The Vietnamese leaders stated their intent to train and assign a substantial share of the armed forces to clear-and-hold actions in order to provide a shield behind which a nevr society can be built." This public confirmation of the tentative steps that MACV had been taking was iiriportant. Classified documents could not be used as the basis for a far-reaching reform of the ARVN; they would never have received wide enough distribution, nor would they have been fully accepted as doctrine by the doubters within both the RVNAP and MACV. But here was a piece of paper signed by the President and by General Thieu which said in simple language that a new direction and mission was given to the ARVN. After Manila, MiACV and the JCS began in seriousness the formation of the miobile training teeaiis which were designed to retrain every RVNAP unit so that it was more aware of the importance of the population.

Whose i^jaericans who hoped that National Reconciliation would become a major new appeal to VC at middle and higher levels were to be in for a disappointment in the year following Manila. The GVN did not agree with the philosophy behind total forgiveness to the enezoY:, and continually hedged its statemicnts and invitations to the VC so that they resembled surrender with amnesty rather than "national reconciliation." In fact, the GVN did not malie an internal announcement on the National Reconciliation program until Tet, 196?^ almost four months after the Manila bonference^ and three m^onths after the GVN had "promised" the U.S. that it would make the announcement. Then, 'vfaen the Vietnamese finally did make the announcement, they used the phrase "Loan Ket," which is accurately translated as "National Solidarity," rather than "National Reconciliation." The difference in m^eaning is, of course, significant, just as the earlier mlstraj-islation of "Xay Pung" into "Revolutionary Development" reflected a divergence of views.

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The reasoning behind the move to coEnnit more troops to the relatively static 'missions involved in pacification had been laid out in documents and brief-in-o-s by people as varied as Major G-aneral Tillson, in his August briefings of the liission Council (cited in Section III.C?) and Robert Komer, in his meTiOrandum to the President. But a key assuraption underlying'the new emphasis on population control was the growing belief, in late°1966, that the main force war was coming to a gradual end. No other single factor played as great a ro-le in the decision to commit troops to pacification as the belief that they were going to be less and less needed for offensive missions against main force units. Tlie enemy-initiated large unit action statistics showed a sharp drop all through 1966, with a low point of less than two battalion sized or larger enemy initiated actions"per month in the last quarter of I966. There was increasing talk of the "end of the big battalion war," both in the press and in the Ivlission. Moreover, the first big U.S. push into VC base areas was gettiijg under way, and it was possible to beli.eve that when operations like Junction City and Cedar Falls were completed, the VC would have few placed left to hide within the boundaries of South Vietnam. Thus, some people were arguing in late I966 and early I967 that the number of troops that could be committed to RD was considerably higher than the amount that Genera.! Westmoreland was then contemplating; that the "substantial number" of the Manila comiaunique could well be over half of all APVIT. These ar^-uments were usually made orally and tentatively, rather than in formal written papers, since they usually raised the ire of the military. When military onnosition to such a large RD comiiiitment stiffened, the suggestions of civilians were often hedged or partially withdraw. But nonetheless, the fact remains that the undeniable success against the main forces in I966 was the major justifying factor for those advocating increased corrnuitment of regular units — even some U.S. units -- to pacification. At that tim_e, officiad-S were less worried about the possibility of a inajor resurgence of the enemy than about the possibility of a new guerrilla war phase. The fighting in and near the J)¥& during Operations Hastings and Prairie (August-December I966) had been the heaviest of the war, and had been judged not only as a major defeat for_ the enemy but as a possible turning point for the enemy, after which he had begun to shift SOT^K of his effort away from conventional, or 'mobile warfare, to-a2.-d the more productive (from his standpoint) guerrilla tactics. oO/ Th.e Marines considered Hastings and Prairie a foolhardy aberration on the enemy's part, although they noted that the region of the DMZ is remote, fa-voring him with interior lines and working to our disadvantage through extension of our ox'rn supply lines." 61/ ■ .

me Marines felt that the enemy attacks at the DMiZ had been designed nrim-rily to draw dovm resources from the Marine pacification efforts near^Da Hang, an interesting example of how important they thought their embrvonic pacification effort was. But, the Marines added, whenever the Pnemv probed or patrolled, he was "pursued by Marine infantry and pounaed bv air, artillery, and naval gunfire. Tlie effort cost him an estimated 5 000 to'6,000 IWA troops killed or disabled and ^li^^ weapons lost... and meant a severe loss of prestige, and a further erosion of the morale of his troops." 62/ . • .

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Thus, the slowdovm in large eneray actions^ according to the Marine estiraate, and signs that the future would see an increase in guerrilla activity -- "Major main force and INA formations have been rel.atively inactive since September, as far as large unit actions are concerned. However, by the end of December, corresponding increases were already beginning to appear in rates of guerrilla activity," 63/

■ To what extent other mJAitary and civilian leaders accepted the Marine assessment of enejay capability and intentions is not clear from the documents, but the mood of the time was not far removed from the sentiments cited above. The end of the "big war" was coming, and pacification was the next step. It all fueled the proponents of greater pacification efforts by regular troops^ and now, after Manila, the debate was already being conducted on terrain favorable for the first time to the pro-pacification advocates. ,

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IV* OCO to CORDS

^ • OCO on Trial: Introductio n

Vllth the cable exchange conipleted^ except for a few minor matters, Ambassador Lodge announced the fonnation of the Office of Civil Operations on Koveinber 26, I966 -- one month after the original go~ah,ead signal had been given in Washington^ and three weeks after the cable to Lodge telling him that the President wanted rapid action. V/hile delays of this kind are common in government and do not norm,ally affect events^ in this case the delay got OCO off to a visibly slow start despite the fact that the President had clearly indicated to Lodge and Porter that he was putting OCO on trial and would review its accomplishments in a fairly short tim.e

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The reasons for the Mission's slow start revealed again just how far apart Washington and its representatives in Saigon v^ere in their philosophy sxxd. approach to the war.

Wa shington officialg consistently underestimated the difficulty of the actions they wanted the Mission to do, and continually expected movement at speeds literally beyond the capability of the Mission. They held these ambitious expectations and exerted pressure accordingly -- not primarily because of the situation in the pacification program in South Vietnaxn (which was fairly static)^ but because of growing pressure from the publiC) the press, ajid Congress for visible prog ress in the war, because of growing American domestic dissatisfaction vrith the course of the war. If the American public could not see progress in Vietnajn, the support the Administration had for the v/ar would drop steadily.

In its efforts to show progress som.e members of the Administration were continually interpreting statistics and eA^ents in the most favorable light possible, aaid its critics -- particularly the press -- w^ere interpreting the same events in the most unfavorable light possible. Since events in Vietnam were usually open to at least two different interpretations, the gap between the Administration and its critics over the basic question of How are We Doing? grew steadily during I966 and I967. But beyond the disagreements over facts and statistics, there was a continual effort by Washington officials to prod Saigon forward at a faster pace. Thus,, if the Mission had Just started a crash program, at the highest speed ever achieved by the Mission, Washington officials, particularly Komer, acting (he said) in the President's na^ie, would dem.and that the Mission redouble its efforts again. Komer, in a reflective moment, called it "creative tension.''

The Saigon Mission responded to this pressure with resistance and ■ hostility towards its Washington "backstops." Mien warned, for exazaple, that the President was giving OCO 90 to 120 days to prove itself, Lodge and Porter both shot back pointed comments to the effect that this was an inadequa.te time period, and at the end of it results would probeibly

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not yet be visible. They were right^ of course^ but being right was not good enough. They fought the tiine deadline -with too great a vehemence and did not do enough to' "prove"' OCO^s worths The result was the decision of March I967 to put OCO -under MACV.

The Mission thought that because they were "on the ground" they had a unique understanding of the problems of Vietnam, and that because they were on the ground they were the only accurate judges of the rate at which events needed to move. Tills point of view did not take into account domestic pressures in the United States; or, worse, it deliberately disregarded them.. Thus, the Mission in Vietnaxn" has generally tended to formiulate strategy as though the United States will be fighting a slow war in Indochina for decades, while the Washington policymakers and strategists have tended to behave as though time runs out in ITovember of 1968. {Tae mood of the Mission towards Washington is seen more clearly in press leaks than in cables. Thus, for exejnple, the Evans and Novak column, from Saigon, on November 30, I966, as OCO was being formed and the trial period beginning: "A note of quiet desperation is creeping into the top echelons of the U.S. Mission charged with winning the war in Vietnam. It grows partly out of frustration with what one top Embassy official describes as *the hot blow torch on our rear ends* that comes from Washington, and, particularly, from the White House in search of ever-nev/- victory proposals. . .Much of this frustration and gloom would vanish if attention in Washington were centered not on impossible trance tables for ending the vmr next m,onth or next year but on a realistic projection of the modest gain now being made at great and. painstaking effort." The difference in mood is reinforced by the climate of Vietnam., which is sluggish and humid, and by the Influence of the Vletnam.ese, who after miany years of war are rarely ready to race out and seek Instant im.mortality on the field of battle or in the Ministries.

The one exception to this dangerous generalisation has often been the individual American officer, usually military, serving in advisory or combat positions. There, with a 12-month tour standard, the /vmerlcans have pushed their Vietnamese counterparts hard, and often encountered great resistance. Indeed, the Americans in Vietnam often think they are already pushing the Vietnamese as hard as is desirable, and tha.t Washington- is asking the Impossible when they send out instructions to get more out of the Vietnamese.

Ih-ese were some of the backgromd factors which were playing themselves out in late I966 and early IjS?- T'^ile tension between Washington and Saigon had existed before, and is inevitable betv/een headquarters and the field, the pressure had by now reached a level higher than ever before. (It is Ironic to note that the sam^e tensions that exist between Washington and Saigon tend to exist between the Americans in Saigon and the Am.erlcans in the fleldo The phrase "Saigon commando" is used continually to castigate the uninform.ed officials in Saigon« . There are too few T)eo"ole serving in Saigon with previous field experience, an unavoidable byproduct of the 12-month tour, and this Increases the gap.)

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So Washington officials talked about the lack of a sense of urgency in the Mission in Vietnsua, and the Americans in Saigon talked ahout the dream vorld that Washington lived in, and the Americans in the provinces tal^-ed ahout the lack of understanding of the Americans in Saigon who had never seen the real war. Washington was dissatisfied with the progress in Vietnam, and since it could not influence the real obstacle, the Vietnamese, except through the Am^erican Mission, it deliberately put extra heat on the Mdssion. At least one high official involved in this period in Uashinc^ton felt that it was a necessary and deliberate charade, and that only°by overdoing its representations to the FJ.ssion could Washington assure that some fraction of its desires got through. More than one high-ranking official in Saigon felt that the only way to handle Washington was to hold out to them promises of progress and generally caLm the home front down, or else run the risk of inflaming Washington and bringing still more reorganization down upon the Mission's head.

Rather than try to apportion responsibility for this sorry state of affairs, it would be useful to see the situation as the by-product of , tensions produced by the Viet Gong strategy of survival a.nd counter-punching at GVW weak spots, and the GVW's inability to be as good as we dreara they should be. The United States could perhaps live with these problems in an age in which communications were not instantaneous, and publicity not so unrelenting.

Beyond this broad philosophical point, however, the fact is that the Mission in Vietnam was badly organized to conduct aljiiost any kind of large and complex operation, let alone a war. Thus Washington was _ right to reorganize the Mission, and Saigon's reaction to eacn reorganization inevitably suggested that still more was needed.

Beyond that, the Mission in Vietnam'did not have the full confidence of the Washington bureaucracy and Porter still lacked Lodge s full support.

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B. OCO on Tri al: Too Little Too Late -.Or Jfo,t_Enough_Time?

With the fomiatioii of OCO in late November the civilian mission be^an to move at a more rapid pace' than it had in the post-Honolulu T^erioa MoBt of this motion, of course, vas internal to the UoS„ Mission and could not produce visible results against the VC, an understandable fact vhen one considers the amount of vork that the decision involved.

First, a Director of Civil Operations had to be chosen. Since ^ Washington demanded rapid action, it was decided that the choice had oo be someone already in Vietnam and ready to vork, which sharply narrowed the Tist of possible men. The final selection was L. Wade Latliram, who had been the deputy director of USAID. Lathraia was to prove to be the vrong man at the wrong time, a methodical and slow worker with strong respect for the very interagency system that he was supposed to supercede In normal bureaucracies, Lathran could, and had, compiled excellent records, but OCO was demanding extra-ordinary results, and these required leadership and dxive which Lathram did not possess.

It had been anticiDated that Porter, a popular Ambassador and a knowledpeable and realistic man, would supply that leadership and drive, and that Lathram would sim.ply run the OCO staff below Porter But neither Porter nor Lathram saw their roles that way. Once OCO was formed, Porter to an unexpected degree stayed away from the day to day decisions, leaving them to Lathram. And Lathram simply did not have_the ^^sition ior the stature to stand up to the full members of the Mission Sur,cil, whose assets he now partially controlled. (l^ere was continued confusion over what was the responsibility of OCO and what remained_under the control of the USMD, CIA and JUSPAO directors, and this confusion was never resolved - and continues today under the CORDS structure.)

Moreover, Porter, who had not wanted a second Deputy Ambassador to . come in'to relieve him of all non-RD matters, soon found himself tied down in the business of the Embassy. Lodge went on a long leave shortly a?ter the formation of OCO, taking about one month's vacation m Europe and the United States. This left Porter with responsibiliiy lor the full ™t of Ambassadorial activities, and he unavoidably became less, and fSfconcerned wixh the progress of OCO, even though it was m its first Critical month. He had been given an office in the new OCO building (anpropriated from AID), but he rarely used it, staying in the Embassy i^nSher part of Saigon, and showing, in effect by his failure to use his OCO office often that he could not devote much time to OCO.

The failure, therefore, to isolate Porter from all non-ED matters and provide Lodge .nlth a full time DCK turned out to be a serious error. Samara had clearly foreseen this in his 15 October mem^orandx^n to the Presfde^t. In retrospect, we can see that Porter should have been given one job o; the other, and the vacancy filled - as Washington had suggested.

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But Washington had just finished craiiLraing an unpleasant action down the mssion's throat, and It vas felt that there were limits to how much the Mission should be asked to tal^e, especially since Lodge and Porter were so adejnant on the subject, l/ Mso, no one could foresee how diverting other matters would become to Porte.-, or how much he would delegate to Lathram.

The second major decision for OCO was the selection of the Regional Directors -- men who would be given full control over all American

' civilians in their respective regions. Here. Porter presented Lathram

with three nominees (ll Corps was left unfilled until a few weeks later) ■ and th- choices appeared to be quite good ones: in I Corps, Porter's former As-d slant-Le-Duty Ambassador, Henry Keren; in III' Coits, the former MACV Division Senior Advisor, then with AID, John Paul Vann; and in the Delta, the CIA's former support chief, Vince Heymann. These were three respected men and they csme from three different agencies, which emphasized the

' interagency nature of OCO. In picking Vann, Porter had made a m.ajor

decision which involved possibly antagonizing both the CIA and MAC^'', for Vann vras without question one of the most controversial Americans in

' Vietnam He stood for impatience with the American Mission, deep and

often publicly-voiced disgust with the course of the past five years, strong convictions on what needed to be done, driving energy and an encyclopedic knowledge of recent events in Vietnam -- and was a burr in the siae of the CIA, with which he had frequently tangled, particularly over the cadre program, and MACV, with which he had fought ever since disagreeing publicly >/ith General Harkins in I963 (a fight which led to his resignation from the Army and vras extensively discussed in David Halberstam's book, 33T£jlaM£ig_o£_a__^ia^i^

11 The Importance of the appointments was not lost on the Mission or

the press. -Vmile Latliram's appointment had stirred the bureaucracy but not the press, the regional directors came as a surprise and a major

i< story In a front-page story in Th^JfeshingtonJost Ward Just described

V-nn%s "one of the legendary Arnerica^ns in Vietnam,'^ and said that Koren s anointment indicated the great irjportance the Mission attached to the ! iobs Just added that "there were indications that, if OCO did not

succeed, the military command would take charge of pacification, or

n 'Revolutionaxy Developmient:" 2/ . . ^

' Next came the selection of OCO Province Representatives, to be chosen

t of the available talent in each province. Here'the slo^mess of the civilians began to tell, and it was not until January that the appointments "could be made for every province. Trying to pick men on the basis of \heir knowlefge and ability takes time and requires trips to each province, consultations with other Mission Council members, etc., and the civilians set out to do all this.

Meanwhile, a huge job which no one in Washington could fully appreciate 1 ■ . ^a_s uji'derv^ay -- the physical relocation of offices that Lodge had

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described as necessary in Ms November l6 cable. Even in Washington it may be difficult to get furniture and phones moved, except for veiy h-igh-renkinP people; in Saigon a major relocation was more difficult to mount than a'ririlJtarjr operation, mile this was going on, Involving literally over one thousand people, work in OCO was even more confused ajad sporadic than usual.

None of these minor organizational events would be of any importance if jt were not for the fact that they were eating away at the mieager time allotted to the civilians to prove that OCO should remain independent of MCV. But they did consume time, and this was to prove to be a factor in evaluating OCO.

Th^ documents do not answer the question of whether or not OCO ever real]y had a chance to survive, or whether it was just allowed to start UT) by people- who had already decided to turn ED over to l-iAC\^ in a few months Both possibilities fit the available facts. An educated guess . would be that the decision to give Westmoreland control was tentatively m.ade by the President in the late fall of I966, but that he decided he would gann by alloirlng the civilians to reorgaiiize first. If OCO proved to be a major success, he could always continue to defer his decision. If OCO fell short of the mark, then it still would be an organization in-being ready to be pla.,ced into MCV mthout further internal changes, and that in itself would be a major gain. Moreover, if the changes caiae when j,oa,ge and Porter were gone, there would be less difficulties.

If OCO moved too slowly for Washington's satisfaction, it nonetheless accomplished m.any things wh.ich had previously been beyond the Mission s . ability: ' ■

- Uniting personnel from AID, CLA, and JUSPAO into a single Plans & Evaluations Section, OCO produced the first integrated plans for ED on th- U S side. These plans were ambitious and far-reaching, and rec.uired°MACV inmts. The fact that the civilia;ns were asking MACV for inputs to thkr ow planning, rather than the reverse, so startled 1#CV that mCV, in turn, began more intensive discussions or plans. The ■nipnnin^ effort involved several military officers on loan to OCO, a fact Shich furt^^er heightened tension between OCO and MCY. When the plans ^ first formulated were presented to General Westmoreland,, he indicated tnau he was-not going to be bound by any plans which reduced his flexibility «nd ability to respond to military pressure whenever and wherever it

he was reluctant to conmiit many roilitary assets to

stated their intent to train and assign a substantial share of the armed forces to clear-and-hold actions in order to provide a shield behind which HZ society can be built") all were working against C-—-^ T.r..+-,..-.«i... and towards the assignmient of ARW units to i^ mdssion:

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^ ._„ rjj^o civi3iaiis in the provinces spoke vith a single voice for the

first time' The province ch3.efs welcomed the change for this reason, according to mont observers. Within the /^erlcan team in each province, Sere vas now a built-in obligation to consult vith each other, instead ^^ ^^o previous situation in ^whlch more and mere agencies were sendj.ng down to the provinces their oxm men who worked alone on their o^m projects.

- The very act of physical reloccition of the five major bra,nches of OCO into a single building changed attitudes and. behavior patterns m th'^ civUican mission. Public Safety and the Special Bra,nch advisors, for example now were co-located, and began working together closely, PrPviou-.lY 'they had both advised the same people through com.pletely ^et)«rate channels wMch m^et only at the top; i.e., when the chief of the Public Saf-ty branch and the deputy CIA station chief had something si^ecific and urgent they had to resolve. On the day-to-day matters, there had actually been a deliberate compartmentalization before OCO was

fonaed.

Th°se exsrn-nies of gains could be repeated across a broad front. Thev were first"' steps in a direction which might ultimately have created a strong civilian mission, given time, better lea.ders, and more supporc from Washington. But even vrlthout these things, OCO was a definite plus.

The period between Deceirlber and /ipril was a period in which every-^ one P'^rld lip service to the Idea of supporting OCO, but in reality it ■ ' vas sn-iped at a,nd attacked alanost from the outset by the bureaucracies

in Saigon, Zorthian, ar.d Hart, Directors of JUSPAO and CIA respectively, i"de il clear that they wanted to remain vex^' much involved m any decision iJf'cting'their respective fields of endeavor. While this was a reasonable ^oint of view, it meant that CIA and even USIA officers m the fiela oiten ?efused'to accept any guida,nce from the OCO representative, arid cases began to come Z light in which major actions were being initiated by the cS vithout any consultation with OCO. (The CIA reasoning and defense Sisted on the fact that one of Halt's deputies was ostensibly en assistant director of OCO.)

i In Washington, there was open, skepticism to OCO from almost all

o-m-;t- TDarticul^lY MB, which found itself footing most of tne Dill. T?m and'cS botfSdLated that they would continue to deal directly vith ?helr field personnel. In theory, eveiyone in Washington was to Sticipate" in the backstopping of the interagency OCO, but in practice, ^^h.ut a sinole vonce in charge, this meant that no one was helping OCO no one was Wng to sell tiem as a going concern in Washington, rnmir^s ?ole here was ambiguous; he supported OCO as long as it was m oSmtlon, and probably contributed more to Its achievements xhan an,-one else in Wariaington, but at the sa..e time he was already on tne Record, as favoring a m.llltary takeover, which was the ve,ry thing OCO souglit to avoicl.

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Washington had decreed OCO^ exid had given Porter great responsibility Unfortunately^ they had failed to give him authority and stature needed to Bialie the a.-gencies work together.

As pointed out before^ this might well hove been overcome if time had not been so short. The slow methodical way of moving bureaucracies may be more effective than sweeping changes^ anyway^ if one has"time. But in Vietm-mi no one was being given much tiiue.

Shortly after OCO was formed^ Komer's deputy^ Ambassador William Leonhart^ visited Vietnam^ and when he returned, wrote the following penetrating assessment, which was sent to the President, Secretaries

Rusk and McHamara, and Mr. Gaud and FxT. He Iras:

"Fnether Porter^ s new Office of Civil Opere.tions (OCO) is viewed as a final organizational solution or as an inevitable intermediate step it is achieving a number of useful purposes. It establishes, on the civil side for the first time, unified interagency direction with a chain of command and coirmranication from Saigon to the regions and provinces. It centralizes US-GW field coordination of civil matters in one US official at each level. It affords a civil-side frsmevrork which can work more effectively with US militar;>^- for politico-military coordination and more integrated pacification planning.

"At the time of my visit, OCO's impact had been felt mainly in Saigon. Its headquarters organization was largely completed. Three of the four Regional Directors had been named, all were at work, and one was in full time residence in his region. Regional staffs were being assem-bled but not yet in place. At province level, teams were being interviewed for the selection of Provincial Representatives. Porter expects them to be designated by January 1. Some slippage is possible, and it n:ay be 90 -^-ays or so before the new organization is functioning. I participated in the initial briefings of the province teaias I visited, passing along and emphasising BobKomer's admonitions against over-bureaucratization of effort and for fast and hard action. These were well-received. Morale was good. All the GW Province Chiefs mth whom I talked thought the new stractiu^e a great improvement." 3/

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C. Time R-'ons Out

The decision to turn pacification over to MACV, with an integrated civil-military chain of comiiiand, was announced in Saigon on May 11, 1967> by Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker. In his announcement, Bunker said that the decision was entirely his.

But Bunker had been in Vietnam as Ambassador for less than two weeks, and he was therefore clearly acting under strong guidance, if not orders, from Washington. The decision to give MACV ^responsibility had actually stemmed from the clear and unmistakable fact that the President now considered such a reorganization highly desirable.

It is not clear when the President decided this in his own mind.

I The doctmients do not shed any light on this point, and, indeed, they

simply fail to discuss the pros and cons of the decision in the early jnonths of 1967, when the subject was a hot one in Washington and Saigon.

1 This "all sug,<5;ests that whatever consideration of the issue was going on

was^confined^^trictly to private sessions between principals, and that the stsff work previously done on a highly restricted basis was no longer considered necessary by the principals.

It has been suggested that the President had been strongly in favor of the move for months before he finally gave the go-ahead signal, and that he was held back by the strong opposition from Lodge and Porter, from Katzenbach, from the agencies in Washington ■-- and by the fact that it would appear to be a further "militarization" of the effort. This may we31 be the case; certainly nothing in the record disproves this possibility But since there is no way that this study can answer the question, it must be left undecided.

Whenever the President made his decision in his own mind, he chose the Guam meetins; as the place to discuss with a group of concerned officials outside his own personal staff. In a private meeting on March 20, or 21, 1967, with senior officials from Washington and Saigon, the President indicated that he felt the time had come to turn pacification over to M-ACV. The President enjoined those in the room at that meeting not to discuss the decision with anyone until it was announced, and he did not inform the GVN.

■ At the end of the Guam meeting, the President ^ent Komer back to Saigon with Westmoreland and Lodge, and Komer spent a week there, working out preliminary details of the reorganization. By this time Komer Icnew that he was to become Deputy to General Westmoreland, although many details remained to be ironed out.

When Komer returned to Washington, with the preliminary plans, a ■period followed during which no further action on the reorganization was taken In all, nearly two months vrent by from the President's statement

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at Guarfl to the public announcenent, d'oring which only a handful of people in Washington and Saigon knew vha,t was going to happen. The delays were caused by a combination of factors: Bmiker's understandable desire to spend some time on personal business before going to Saigon, the President's desire to have Bunker make the final anrouncement himself after . he'had reached Saigon, the need to work out final details. Since the President was the man who had pressed everyone else working on Vietnam to greater and greater effort, and sjjice he stood to lose the most from loss of time, it is surprising that he was now willing to see two months lost, with a tired and leme-duck Mission in Vietnam, waiting for the new team'in a highly apprehensive state, and confusion at the higher levels. But fo-'- reasons which are not readily apparent, the President did not push his new team, and it was not until May 13, 196?, that Bunker made his announcement (which had been drafted by Komer):

"Since being appointed U.S. Ambassador to Vietnam I have been giving a great^deal of thought to how to organize most effectively the U.S. Advisory role in support of the Vietnamese governm-ent' s Revolutionary Development effort. Like my predecessor, I regard PH -- often termed pacification --as close to the heart of the matter in Vletnaju.

"Support of Revolutionary Developm.ent has seemed to me and my senior colleagues to be neither exclusively a civilian nor exclusively a militaj-y function, but to be essentially civil-military in character. It involves both the provision of continuous local security in the countryside -- necessarily a primarily military task and the constructive programs conducted by'the Ministry of Revolutionary Development, largely through ■ its 5'9-member RD teams. The government of Vietnam has recognized the dual civil-military nature of the RD process by assigning responsibility for its execution to the Corps/Region Commanders and by deciding to assign the bulk of the regular ARVIf, as well as the Regional and Popular forces, to provide the indispensable security so that RD can proceed in the countryside. As senior Aiaerican official in Vietnam, I have concluded that the U.S. Advisory and supporting role in Revolutionary Development can be made more effective by unifying its civil and military aspects under a single management concept. Unified management, a single chain of command, and a more closely dove-• tailed advisory effort will in my opuiion greatly rmprove U.S. support of the vital RD program. Therefore, I am giving General Westmoreland the responsibility for the performance of our U.S. Mission field programs in fupport of pacification or . Revolutionary Development. To assist him in performing this function, I am assigning Mr. Robert Komer to his headquarters to be designated as a deputy to COMUSMACV- with personal rank of - ambassador,

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"I have two tasic reasons for giving this responsibility to General Westmoreland. In the first place, the indispensable first stap-e of pacification is providing continuous local security,"a function priiri.arily of EVNAF, in which MACV performs i a supporting advisory role. In the second place, the greater

' . part of the U.S. Advisory and Logistic assets involved in

support of Revolutionary Development belong to MACV. If unified management of U.S. Mission assets in support of the Vietnamese program is desirable, COMUSMACV is the logical choice.

"I have directed that a single chain of responsibility for advice and support of the Vietnamese Revolutionary Development program be instituted from Saigon down to district level. Just as Mr. Komer will supervise the U.S. Advisory role at the Saigon level'as Deputy To General Westmoreland, so will the present OCO regional directors serve as deputies to U.S. field force commanders .

"At the province level, a senior advisor will be desig-^ nated, cither civilian or military, following analysis of the

local situation.

"While management will thus be unified, the integrity of the Office of Civil Operations will be preserved. It will continue to perform the same functions as before, and will continue to have direct communication on technical matters with its field echelons. The present Revolutionary Development support division of MACV will be integrated into OCO, and its chief wil.l serve as deputy to the Director of OCO. Such a unified civil/military U S advisory effort in the vital field of Revolutionary Development is un-orecedented. But so too is the situation which we confront. 'rD is in my view neither civil nor military but a uniaue merging of both to meet a unique wartime need. Thus my resolution°is to have U.S. civilian and militejry officials work tof'-ether as one teejfl in order m-ore effectively to support our Vietnamese allies. Many fui'ther details will have to be worked out, and various difficulties will doubtless be encountered, but'l am confident that this realignment of responsibilities is a sound managem.ent step and I count on all U.S. officers and^^ officials concerned to malte it work effectively in practice. 4/

Bunker outlined to Washington the line he proposed to take during a question and ansver period with the press:

"Besides the above announcement, I intend to stress the fo]lowing basic points in answer to press questions.or in backgrou.iding: (a) I made this decision not because I think

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that U S. civiliexi support of RD has been imsatisfactory - on the^o^trary I a.^ pleased with progress to date - but because I think it is essential to bring the U.S. railitary more fully into the r« advisory effort and to pool oui' civil/military resources to get optimum results: (b) indeed I regard all official Americans in Vietnam as part of one team, not as r,art of competing civilian and military establishments: (c) as senior U.S. official in Vietneum, I intend to keep a close eye on all U.S. activities, including pacification ~- I am _ not abdicating any of my responsibilities but ratner am having the entire U.S. T)acification advisory effort report to me throu^^h General Westmoreland rather than through t..o channels If in^the past: (d) during 3^^ years in the business world I have learned that unified management with clear lines of authority is the way to get the most out of lai^ge scale and highly diversified progrSs: (f) since continuous local security, which RWAP must SSarily provide, is the indispensable first stage of the pacification process, the mCV chain of coimiiand can obviously be helpful to the RViW: and (f) I intend to see that the civilian element of the U.S. effort is not buried under the military -?n m^y instances soldiers will end up working for civilians as iei? as the reverse - in fact Ambassador Komer will be General Vrestmoreland's principal assistant for this fmiction while General Knowlton will be deputy to Mr. Lathram of OCO. I _intend to keep fully informed personally about all developments in this field and to hold frequent meetings with General Westmoreland ■ and Ambassador Komer for the purpose of formulating policy. 5/

The reaction of the civilians in Vietnam to the announcement of Ambassador Bunker was one of dismay. In the first confused days, before ^tailfof the reorganization could be worked out and announced, the Sess was able to write' several articles which probably were accurate reflections of the mood of most civilians:

"Civilian reactions today ranged from the bitter ('We don't think they can do their own job - how can they do ours, j to the resigned ('I'll be a good soldier and go_along ) to the very optimistic ('We've finally got a civilian in_a:aong the lenerals'). Almost nowhere was there much enthusiasm for^what Bimker called 'a unique experiinent in a unique situation.

"Nor was there jubilation at the American military command. Westmoreland, who wanted to take charge of the pacification pro-grair. two years ago, is now reported to be deeply skeptical of Ihf possibility of producing the kind of quick resulus the Wnite House apparently want

"'1 did not volunteer for the job/ he is reported to have said privately this morning, »hut now that rve got it, I 11 do lay best with it. '

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"...Serious officials -- both civilian and military --rea,lize there axe limitations on hov7 far an officer will go in re-oorting 'negative' information^ and how hard a civilian^

now his subordinate, will fight for realism.

"...Officials today sought to mitigate the effect of the annoimce:-iient by saying that Komer and his staff, physically located in the American Military Com:aiand in Saigon, will be in a far better position to influence the course of Pacification then he xrould among 'all the guys with glasses and sack suits' in the Office of Civil Operations." 6/

The Vietnamese reaction to the -reorganization >ras more difficult to gauge. Ward Just, in the same story cited above, said "There v/as surprisingly little comiaent today from South Vietnaraese, vrho have seen so many efforts at pacification and so many efforts to attempt to organize and reorgaiiize themselves. One high American who professed to have spoken with the South Vietnamese command reported they are 'delighted,'" But Komer's talk with General Nguyen Due Thang, the Minister for Construction (ED), did not reveal any delight on Thang's part. Indeed, Thang's first reaction vras that the GVN should emulate the U.S. and turn pacification over to the Ministry of Defense -- an action which would have run directly counter to the U.S. objective of encouraging civilian government in Vietnam,

There .is no telegraphic record of the first series of talks that Komer and Bunker had with Ky, Thieu, Vien, and Thang on the reorgeniza-tion. Not until a Komer-Ky talk of May 15 does the cable traffic reflect the GW reaction to the reorganization. By this time, it should be noted, the GVN Imew that the U.S. did not want the GVN to follow suit, and it loiew all our arguments and could play them back to us with ease:

"Ky said that General Thang had suggested that the RD effort be brought under Defense Ministry to conform to the U.S. reorganization. Ky and General Vien had demurred on grounds that such a reorganization on the GVTT side would be far m-ore complex than on U.S. side, would disrupt RD process, and would stretch General Vien ajid MOD too thin. Besides it would not be politically advisable at the very time when there was a hopeful trend toward a m.ore civilianized and representative government. Komer agreed with Ky-Vien reasoning..." ?/

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D, The C0glg_ Re organization

With Bu-nlcpr's announcement, the Mission hegan its second massive reorganization in five months. This time, the reorganization >;-as Lcommnied by one of the periodic turnovers ■ n Mission Council per-qnnne] which have characterized the Mission: for some reason, the • tours "of many high-ranking officers seem to end at roughly the same time and thus, in 196^, I965, and again in the spring of I96T, , several key members of the Mission Council all left within a few weeks of each other. This time, in addition.to Ambassador Lodge, . Pnrter Habib, and Wehrle all left within a short period of cime, and nnlv a'hirh-level decision - announced by Bunker at the same time as the reorganization - kept Zorthian and Lansdale on for extensions. Into the Mission ca^.e Bunker, Locke, Komer, General Abrams, the new D-puty COMUSMACV, and Charles Cooper, the new Economic Counselor, and Archibald Calhoun, the new Political Counselor.

DesTDite the turnover, the reorganization seemed to proceed with r.nnT,3rative ease. Perhaps the fact that OCO had already been formed .°f Sitilal her;, since it meant that instead of MACV dealing with_ three'.gencies simultaneously, the first discussions could be restricted r^^lm-rilv to mCY and OCO. Moreover, because OCO was already a going concern the civilians were better organized than ever before to maintain their own position in dealings with the militaiy.

But above all it was the decision by Westmoreland and Eunlier to let Komer take the lead in the reorganization which was important Komer now made major decisions on how the new structure would look wSch were usually backed up by Westmoreland. The result looked m-uch better than m.any people had dared hope.

The details of the reorganization are not worth detailed discussion here But one point can illustrate the way CORDS could resolve previously unresolved issues: the question of the role of the Mm Division in the chain of command.

As noted in an earlier section, study groups had over the years ^r^vocated removing the ARW Divisions from the chain of comaand on ?ac?fication/I^. But MACV had large advisory team.s .ri-th the Divisions ^nd these teams controlled both the sector (Province) advisory teams Sd p"J-i"ental advisory teams below them. The str-aeture followed nox^^al military lines, and m.ade good sense to most of the _officers m the higher levels of MA.CV.

The counter-argLunent was that Division was a purely military ipc^trimient and could not adequately control the integraced civilian-

lita^^ effort that was needed at the Province level. Thus the Roles '"^Mi4^-ons Study Grou-o, for example, had recomniended that "Division ?f Rlm^v^d from the RD bhain of Cormnand. . .that the role of the Province

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Chief be uiDgraded. . .that Province Chiefs have operational control (as a minimum)" of all military and paramilitary forces assigned to operate exclusively in their sector." 8/ The Study Group recognized that "the power structure being what it is in the GW, major progress toward this goal will not be short range or spectacular." But, they urged, the U.S. should begin to push forward on it.

mCV had nonconcurred in tM.s recomm.endation. General Westmoreland, in'a mem.orandujfl to Lodge on September J, I966, had said that he did not agree \r±th the idea, and that, if carried out, "the Corj^s span of control would be too large for effective direction." The suggestion, he added, was "illogical." 9,/

This was still the position of 14ACV when Kom.er arrived. In his attempts to find a workable civilian-military chain of command, he received two suggestions on the di.fficult ciuestion of the role of the Divjsjon advisory teams. The first, and more routine, was to continue the existing MACV system --in which, no m.atter how good or bad the G-W chain of cormand may be, the U.S. simply duplicates it on the advisory side. This would mean that all American civilians and military at the Province level would come under the Division-Corps chain of cor£irnand,

Th

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MACV staff assumied that this would happen.

John Paul Vann and a few colleagues had a different suggestion. Vann mairtained that the evidence suggested that when the Americans made their desires kno™ clearly to the Vietnamese, without the vagueness and contradictoriness which so often characterized them, then the Vietnamese usually would follow suit after a suitable period of time. Thu-, sand Vann, if the Americans remove the Division advisory team from'the U.S. chain of comm.and, except for tactical matters and logistical support, the GVH may follow, and reduce the power of their politically potent Divisions.

The thesis Vann was putting forv-rard -- that the GW would follow a strong U.S. example -- was untested and hotly disputed. Secondly, there was the Flatter of MACV's stand against downgrading the role of the ARVl^ Divisions. Pew people observing the discussions thought that the Vann suggestion had a chance of success..

But Komer, persuaded by the argument, did overrule many of his staff and make the recomffiiendation to ¥estm_oreland. 'Westmoreland approved it and in Jime, I96T, the new chains of command were announced to the U S Mission. After years of arguing, during all of which the trend hsd'been towardr stronger ARVI^ Divisions, the U.S„ had suddenly reversed coun-e on its own, without waiting for the Vietnamese to act. The change was so comi3lete that it even extended to that last (and, to career off-icers most imroortant) question: who writes the efficiency report. Und=r the new MACV guidance, the Senior Province Advisor would be rated

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ot bv the Division Senior Advisor, but by the Deputy for CORDS and the Corps level - thus confirming the new conmand arrangements.

While it is still too early to tell if the GW will completely It TT q iPad the early evidence suggests that the Venn f oo^h^s" v* ' CO Sect! and tSt following the U.S. action, the GW hypo.hesi. v.-s coi , divisions in ED. There are now

iSicS onf thS the'Sw is seriously considering a plan in which the

•onrwould no longer have area responsibility but rather be fJ^oeTtolZoTt o? their forward ...its, and operational coxnmand on large operations of troops.

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E, The M ission Assessment as CORDS Beg ins

The situation that CORDS and Anibassador Kcmer inherited was "not a ■ very promising one. Despite all the lip service and all the "top ■nriorities" assigned RD hj the Americans in the preceding 18 months, Sro-ress in the field was not only not satisfactory, it was, according to many observers, nonexistent. The question of whether ve were inching forward star-ding still, or moving haclward always seemed to the Mission and Washington to be of great importance, and therefore much effort was spent trying to ajialyze our "progress."

A strong- case can be made for the proposition that we have spent ' ' too much tme looking for progress in a program in which m.easureraents

are irrelevant, inaccui-ate, and misleading. But, nonetheless, the Mission did try to meas-ore itself, and in May of I967, as OCO tujrned into CORDS, produced the following assessment of RD for the first quarter

of 1967.

"In truth, there has been little overall progress in RD activities, and the same must be said for the painful process of building a meaningful dialogue between the government and the people. A number of factors have been reported from Region III to account for this unhappy situation, but they might well apply to the rest of the country:

"a. The RD program for I967 involved many new and different concepts, com.mand arrangements, administrative and procedural functions and allocation of resources. Only recently have the majority of provincial officials involved become aware of the prograsu.

I "-b. Many Ap Doi Moi (Real New Life Hamlets), through

guidance from MORD, were located in fringe security sxeas. In most of these cases a great deal of military and jxmgle clearing opera.tions were necessary. These take time, and, as a result, the deployment of the RD teaip.s often were delayed.

"c. The hobbling effect of ineffectual officials f . has retarded the program.

' ■ "d. The people have had to develop new working re-

i. . lationships with the RD workers,* the ARVIJ, and the RF/PF.

- During this process, there has been a 'wait and see' attitude.

^"'■^orkers" was another one~of the special words the U.S. began using 'instead of accurate translations of the Vietnamese. This one was also Lodge's idea, as a m-ore imderstandable word than "cadre" to describe the mem-bers of the 59-man teams.

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"If, however, the picture is sombre, it is not unrelieved. The 1967'prograin may look at this point unencoui^aging statisti- ■ cally, hut its progress is of a different and more importejit so-t.' In critical^'areas, progress has been registered. There has evolved an jjnplicit understanding by iiany in the GW that RD is a longer-tena progress than hitherto believed, requiring a p-reater concentration of resources. In fact, there is increasing evidence that programming for 1967 has so concentrated scarce resources in the 11-point Ap Doi Moi that the GVW presence and services are spread very thin indeed m areas of lower priority. The fact that in general each ED team will remain in each hamlet for six months throughout the year, is a fundament8,1 improvement in the program.

"As a result of the finer definition of the intent of RD and more interest in its possibilities, the I967 program has become more vital than its predecessors. This vitality has^ produced new ideas, an increasing flexibility, which marks uu-portsnt progress in the program. Moreover, what the country has been engaged in is the process of laying a base for development; a long drawn out process which sees little initial reward, but without which nothing of pemanence will be achieved. In other words, the first quarter of the year has not been witness to a vital social revolution, but has instead foujid evidence of a growing imderstanding of the nature of the revolution to come, and in so doing has taken a further step in the painful process of building a nation." lO/

With the formation of CORDS, this history becomes current events. CORDS is charged now with solving what have previously been iinsolvable problems - energizing the GW to do things which it is not as interested in as we are; winning the hearts and minds of people who do not understand us or speak our language; working under intense pressure for immediate results in a field in which success - if possible at all -- may reauire years. ¥e have concentrated on the history of the United Stages bui^eaucracy in this study because that, in retrospect, seems to have been where the push for pacification came from -- not the Vietnamese. ¥e have not been able to analyze properly the actual course of the effort m the field, where contradictory assessments of progress have plagued the U.S. In the final section which follows, we try to draw a few lessons from the coui'se of events described in this study.

*

When completed, CORDS had produced a structure in which, regardless of c3vll-military tensions that cannot be wished away, all hands were vorkinff together under a single chain of cominand. The structure was massive, so massive that the Vietnamese were in danger of being almost

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for'^otten — aiid for that there can be no excuse. But at least the Mi 4ion was better run and better organized than it had ever been >.pfore and this fact may in tij^ie lead to a more efficient and successful effort Vlitnout a unified voice in dealir- vith the Vietnamese, we can never hope to influence the GW to do the things ve believe they . must do to save their own country.

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VI. FOOTrlOTES

T THREADS THAT MET AT HONOLULU

1. Anbassaclor Lodge memorand-'jm to Secretaries Rusk and McHaitiaraj and Ambassador Taylor, June 19? 19^^

2. Message, SAIGCH 1035 to Washington, October 6, ISGk, EXLIS I 3. 14ACV CoBimand History, I96U5 p. 68

If. Message, SAIGON 1000, October 7? 196^

5. IviACV Command History, 196^5 P- 68

6. Memorandura, February I966 - Report of Meetings on Rural Construction, February 1-U, 1966

7. Idem .

8. Idem.

9. Mission Co-oncil Minutes, September 15, 19^5

10. McGeorge Bundy memorandum for the President, February 7? 19^5

11. MACV Overall Monthly Evaluation, Jime I965

12. Private Assessment of Hop Tac to Ambassador Lodge from Embassy Personnel, September 10, I965

13. Mission Coimcil Minutes, September 15, 19^5 li^. Mission Council Minutes, July 7? 1966

15. President Johnson's letter to Ambassador Lodge, July I965

16. Message, SAIGON 276I, February 1, 1966, KODIS to the President

17. President Johnson letter to General Taylor, July 2, I96U

18. Ambassador Lodge quoted in memorandum for record, September 27, 1965; Special Meeting in Embassy Conference Room; p. 1

19. See. for example, SAIGON U323, August 2h, I966, NODIS to the

President

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20. Ambassador Lodge memorandum dated June 19? 19^^

21. Message, SAIGON 1100, September 30, 1965> NCDIS to the President

22. Message, STATE 36?^ August 7y 1965. to Ambassador Lodge

23. Message, SAIGON 716, September 2, 1965? NODIS to the President 2h. Message, SMGON 952, September I8, 1965. NODIS to the President

25. Message, SAIGON 1059. October hy I965, NODIS to the President

26. Message, SAIGON II90, October 6, 1967> NODIS to the President

27. Message, SAIGON 1273. October 13. 1965. NODIS to the President

28. Message, SAIGON 1377. October 21, I965. NODIS to the President

29. USMC Historical Branch Study: "US Marine Corps Civic Action Efforts in Vietnam, March 1965-March I966," (MC History), prepared in early 1967 (Draft with Unnurabered Pages).

30. General Krulak, CG of Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, Monthly Report on Activities of III l^IAF, September I965. p. ^

31. General Krulali^s report on III MAF, October I965. P- 12

32. MC History (See Footnote 29)

33. Embassy POL Study of Quang Nam, February 15. I966, p. 5

3U. Message, STATE 2087. May 26, I96U, Personal from the President

35. Message, SAIGON O7IOIOZ, JLily 7. 1964, to Secretary of State

36. Alexis Johnson letter to Ambassador Durbrow, November 26, I965; Official-Informal

37. Warrenton Conference Study, January 22, 1965. Annex D, par.l

38. Ibid., Annex D, par. 2

39. Ibid., Annex D, par. 9

I4O. ll)i^--? Annex D, p. 4

ifl. Record of Mission Liaison Group Meeting, prepared by Colonel Sam Karrick, SM, January 27. I966

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k2. Warrenton Conference Report, Annex E, contains all the proposals "brought to Warrenton

Us. Warrenton Conference Report, Annex D, par. ik

hk. Message, STATE 951. October k, I963, LB©IS

U5. The Washington Post editorial, February 1, I966

kS. President Johnson's Press Conference, February U, I966

U7, The E e^/?- York Times editorial, February 6, I966

^<

i\8. The Key York Times , Charles Moto, Februsxy 7, 19oo

49. MACV Monthly Evaluation Report, I965

II. HONOLULU

I. Ambassador Lodge's briefing to Honolulu Conference, February I966

" 2. Ambassador Lodge's letter to Secretary McNamara, March 1|, 1966

3. President Johnson's comments to Honolulu Conference February I966

k. Secretary Rusk's comments to Honolulu Conference, February I966

5. President Jolrinson's coiaments to Honolulu Conference, February I966

6. General Thang briefing to Honolulu Conference, February 7, 1966

7. Honolulu Conference, Plenary Documents, February 8, I966

8. Secretary Freeman's comments to Honolulu Conference, February 8, 1966

9. President Johnson's coimients to Honolulu Conference, February, I966

10. President Jolinson's final statem^ent to Honolulu Conference,

■ Plenary Documents, February 9, 1956

II. Declaration of Honolulu, Part II, February 8, I966

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III. H ONOLUL U TO MMILA

1. President Johnson's Press Conference in Saigon, February 11, I966

2. Message, STATE 2368, February 12, I966, KODIS

3. Message, SMGON 2365, February 12, I966, NOD IS If. Message, SAIGON 2959? February 15, 1966, NOBIS

5. Mission Council Minutes, February 28, I966

6. Henry Kissinger letter to Robert VJ. Komer, August 8, 1966, EYES ONLY

7. Robert W. Komer paper, "Giving a New Thrust to Pacification," August 7, 1966

8. Joseph Califano memoranduiu to Secretary of Defense, March 23, 1966 EYES ONLY

9. NSAM 3^35 March 28, I966

10. Robert W. Komer memorandum to the President, April 19, I966, p. 3

11. Message, STATE 321^, April 26, I966

12. Message, STATE 33^^^> May 7. 1966

13. Message, STATE 3760, Jme U, I966

iH. Message, STATE 83089, November 10, I966

15. Robert W. Komer memorandum to the President, April 19? I966

16• Robert V/. Komer paper, "Giving a New Thrust to Pacification," August 7J 1966

17. Robert W. Komer memorandum to the President, February 28, I967

18. Idem .

19. PROVII Study Team SuTomary Statement, March I966, pp. 1-2

20. Ibid. , pp. U6-U7

21. Ibid., p. 67

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22. Ibid.

23. Ibid.

2U. Message, MACJ33 1821^^, May 12, I966

25. Priorities Task Force Summary, July 1966 '

26. Ibid .

27. Ibid .

28. Roles and Missions Study Group Report, p. 1

29. Ibid.

30. Roles and Missions Study Group memorandusi to Ambassador Lodge September 7? 19^6

31. Roles and Missions Study Group Report, Section V, pp. 2-^, August 1966

32. USAID memorandura to Arnbassador Lodge, September 8, I966

33. CIA coiiiments on Roles and Missions Study Group Recommendations

3I1. Major General Tillson (j-3, l^i/^^CV) briefing to Mission Council, Augvist 8, 1966

35. Message, SAIGON ^923, August 31, 1966, KODIS to the President

36. Message, COMUSMACV to CINCPAC 2£0Zh2Z, August I966

37. Ibid . .

38. Draft Presidential memorandum by Secretary of Defense, September 15, I966

39 Ibid ., State Department's opposition

UO. Ibid., aid's recommendation

Ul. Ibid., JCS concurrence in idea of a Deputy COMUSMCV for RD

\\2. Ibid., CIA and USIA opposition

I13. Robert ¥. Komer memorandum to Secretary McNamaxa, September 22, 1966

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hh. Message5 STATE 6125I, OctolDer 6, I966 to Ambassador Lodge

U5. Mr. Katzenbach's memorandum to the President^ October 15^ I9665 "Adi:ainistration of Revolutionary Development"

kG. Ibid .

hT. Secretary McNamara's memorandum to the President, October 1^, I966

1+8. Mr. George Carver's memorandum to Richard HeMs (Director of CIA) , October 15, 1966, Reference Footnote U?.

kS. JCSM-572--66, October l^l, 19^6

50- The Washington Evening Sta r article on President Johnson's meeting with White House Press Corps, October 15, I966

51. Ward Just article. The Washington Post , October 1?, 1966

52. Message, STATE 68390, October 20, I966, NODIS

53. Message, STATE 78865, IJovember k, I966

5U. Message, SAIGOM 1020U, November 6, I966, NOBIS to the President

55. Message, STATE 83699, November 12, I966, to Ambassador lodge

56. Ibid .

57. Message, STATE 85196, November 15, I966

58. Message, SAIGON 1112U, November 17, I966, NODIS

59. Message, SAIGON 11125, November 17, I966, NODIS

60.. Ill MAE Summary of I966 Operations by M'^/Pacific, December I966, p. 22

61. Ibid., p. 21 - ■ .

62. Ibid. , p. 21

63. i^ia. , p. 22

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

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IV. OCO to CORDS • J

1. Messages, SklGQS 1112U and 11125, 1966 (See Footnotes 58 and 59, of III., above)

. 2. The Washing;ton Post article ty Ward Just, December 3, 1966

3. Wiliain Leonhart memorandum for the President, December 30, 1966

k. Ambassador Bunker statement in Saigon, May 13, 196?

5. Ambassador Bunker Press Conference in Saigon, May 13, 196?

6. Ward Just, The Wash in gton Post, May 12, I967

7. Message, SAIGON 25839, May I6, I967

8. Roles and Missions Study Group, Appendix A, August 1966 (Saigon)

9. General Westmoreland memorandu:a to Ambassador Lodge, September 7, 1966

10. U.S. Mission Assessment of RD for 1st Quarter of I967 (A-662, May 12, I967)

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