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8 Feb 67

President's letter to Ho Chi Minh

The President invites Ho to indicate what reciprocity he might expect from a bombing halt. The letter is transmitted in Moscow Feb. 8.

8-lU Feb 67 Tet truce

15 Feb 67

Ho Chi Minh letter to President

19 Feb 67

Moscovr msg 3568

21 Feb 67

Vance memo to Katzenbach

21 Feb 67

W. Bundy memo

Maxwell Taylor mem.o to the President

1 I

While this truce was in effect frantic efforts were undertaken by UK VIA Wilson and Premier Kosygin in London to get peace talks started. In the end these failed because the enormous DRV resupply effort forces the President to resume the bombing after having first extended the pause.

Replying to the President's letter5 Ho rejects the US conditions and reiterates that unconditional cessation of the bombing must precede any talks.

Amb. Thompson indicates the Soviets would react extremely adversely to the mining of Haiphong.

Vance sends Katzenbach a package of proposals for the President's night reading. Eight categories of new targets are analyzed; none can seriously undercut the flow of supplies South.

Bundy notes that mining of the waterways and coastal areas of the DRV panhandle could be approved without the mining of Haiphong.

Taylor again considers the question of ceasefire5 political settlement and sequencing of agreements. No direct bearing on the situation.

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22 Feb 67

Mining waterv/ays approved

The President approved the aerial mining of the waterways and the attack on the Thai Nguyen Iron and Steel works.

27 Feb 67

10 Mar 67

1st aerial mining

Thai Nguyen plant struck

The first aerial mining of the waterways begins.

The Thai Nguyen Iron and Steel complex is hit for the first time-

Bundy gives Thieu assurances

20-21 Mar 67 Guam Conference

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8 Apr 67

RT 55

20 Apr 67

JCSM 218-67

Bundy in Saigon sees Thieu with Lodge and assures him the President believes that more pressure m.ust be applied in the North before Ho will change his position.

The President leads a full delegation to a conference with Thieu and Ky. Questions of constitutional progress and war progress in the South dominate the discussions. During the conference Ho releases the exchange of letters during Tet. A decision to base B-52s in Thailand is also taken.

RT 55 includes the Kep airfield, Hanoi power transformer and other industrial sites.

The Chiefs endorse Westmoreland's request for 100,000 more troops and 3 r^iore tactical fighter squadrons to keep up the pressure on the North,

Haiphong power plants struck

After numerous weather aborts, the two Haiphong power plants are struck for the 1st time.

2k Apr 67

Airfields attacked

Two MG fields come under first-time attack shortly after their authorization.

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2k Apr 67

R. W. Komer memo

Moscow msg ^566

Komer leaves behind some vievrs on the v/ar as he leaves for Vietnam. Negotiations are now unlikely, but bombing v/on't m.ake Hanoi give in, hence the "critical variable is in the South."

Amb. Thompson reports the bad effect of the recent Haiphong attacks on Soviet attitudes.

27 Apr 67

Westmoreland sees the President

/:.

1 May 67

W- Bundy memo to Katzenbach

h May 67

SNIE 11-11-67

Back in the US to speak to LBJ about his troop request and address Congress, VJesty tells Johnson, "l am frankly dismayed at even the thought of stopping the bombing

Tt

* • •

As a part of the policy review in progress since 2k April, Bundy v/rites a strategy paper opposing more bombing (among other things) because of the likely adverse international effects.

Soviets will likely increase aid to the DRV but not help get the conflict to the negotiating table.

McGeorge Bundy letter to the President

5 May 67

CM-3218-67

Bundy argues for a ceiling on the US effort in Vietnam and no further escalation of the air war, particularly the minini of Haiphong harbor.

General Wheeler takes sharp exception to Bundy's views. Haiphong is the single most valuable and vulnerable NVN target yet unstruck. Also explains the rationale for the attack on the NVN power grid.

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5 May 67

McNaughton DM

6 May 67

W. W« Rostow memo

8 May 67

W. Bundy memo

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12 May 67

CIA Memo Nos. 06^2/67 and 06^3/67

16 May 67

Hanoi power plant authorized

19 May 67

Hanoi power plant "bombed

McKamara DB4 (given to the President)

16

As a part of the policy review, McNaughton drafts a prop'osal for cutting the bombing "back to 20'^, The action was to enhance military effectiveness not improve negotiation prospects, which were dim.

After considering three options: closing Haiphong, heavier attacks in the Hanoi-Haiphong area and restriction of "bombing to the panhandle only, Rostow recommended concentrating on the panhandle while holding open the option to up the ante farther north if we desired later-

Bundy considers five' different bombing packages and finally favors levelling off at current levels with no new targets and more concentration on the Dan-handle•

The bombing has not eroded NVN morale, materially degraded IWN ability to support the war, nor significantly eroded the industrial-military base.

As the debate continues, the President approves the Hanoi power plant.

The power plant, 1 mile from the center of Hanoi, is hit for the first time.

McNamara considered tv70 courses: approval of the military recommendations for escalation in both North and South; de-escalation in the North (20^) and only 30,000 troops in the South. In spite of unfavorable negotiations climate, the second course is recommended because costs and risks of the 1st course were too great.

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20 May 6?

JCSM 286-67

20 May 6?

McRamara memo

23 May 67

CIA m.emo 06^9/67

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26 May 67

CIA memo

1 Jun 67

JCSM 307-67

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Helms letter to McKamara

The Chiefs relDut -the DBA and call for expansion of the air war "...to include attacks c.i all airfields 5 all port complexes^ all land and sea lines of communication in the Hanoi-Haiphong area, and mining of coastal harbors and coastal waters."

McNam.ara asks CJCS, Dir. CIA, SecNav, and SecAF to analyze (a) cutting back bombing to 20*^; and (b) intensifying attacks on LOCs in route packages 6A and 6B but terminating them against industrial targets.

CIA opposes the mining of the harbors as too provocative for the Soviets.

With the recent attacks on NVN's power grid 87^ of national capacity had been destroyed.

The Chiefs take strong exception to the DPM noting its inconsistency with NSAM 288 and the jeopardy into which it would place national objectives in SEA because of the radical and conceptually unsound military methods it proposed, including any curtaiLnent of the bombing.

Responding to McNamara^s May 20 req.uest for analysis of two bombing options, Helms states neither will cut down the flow of men and supplies enough "to decrease Hanoi's determinat:"on to persist in the war.

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W. Bundy memo

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Bundy, like the Chiefs, rejected the reformulation of objectives in the May I9 DPM. He leaves aside the question of the courses of action to be follcrv/ed.

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2 Jun 67

JCSM-312-67

SecNav memo to McNamara

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3 Jun 67

SecAF memo to McNamara

8 Jun 67

Katzenbach memo to McNamara

11 Jun 67

Kep Airfield struck

12 Jun 67

McNam^ara DPM

t

15 Jun 67

17 Jun 67

INE memo to Rusk

Saigon msg 28293

'21 Jun 67

CINCPAC msg 2IO43OZ Jun 67

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The Chiefs, replying to McNamara's May 20 req.uest5 again reject all suggestions for a cutback in the bombing.

The Secretary of the Navy con-cluded, in reply to the May 20 request, that the cutback to the panhandle would be marginally more productive than the current cam.paign.

Harold Brown favored the expanded cam.paign against LOCs in northern NVN in his reply

to McNamara *s May 20 req.uest.

Katzenbach favors concentrating the bombing against LOCs throughout the country and abandoning attacks on "strategic" target

s

The Kep airfield comes under attack for the 1st time and ten r.'UGs are destroyed.

Three bombing program.s are offered:" (a) intensified attack on Hanoi-Haiphong logistical base; (b) emphasis south of 20*^; (c) extension of the current program. McNamara, Vance & SecNav favor B; JCS favor A; SecAF favors C.

Hanoi was possibly reconsidering the desirability of negotiations.

Bunker doubts the effectiveness of bombing at interdiction and therefore urges the rapid completion of the barrier.

Sharp argues that results of the bom-bing in recent months demonstrate its effectiveness and are a pcn-^erful argument for its expansion.

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23-25 Jun 67 Glassboro Conference

3 Jul 67

5 Jul 67

18 Jul 67

9 Aug 67

SecAF memo to McNamara

JCSM 382-67

7-II Jul 67 McNamara trip to Vietnam

JCS msg 1859

Addendum to RT 57

9-25 Aug 67 Stennis Hearings

11-12 Aug 67 Hanoi struck

19 Aug 67

Attacks on Hanoi suspended

20 Aug 67

Largest attack of the var

President Johnson meets Soviet Premier Kosygin at Glassboro, N.J, Wo "breakthrough on the vrar.

In a lengthy analytical memo Brcvm argues for option C, a general expansion of the bombing.

The Chiefs reject a Canadian proposal to exchange a bombing halt for re-demilitarization of the DMZ-

During McNamara's five day trip, CINCPAC argues against any further limitation of the bombing.

RT 57 V7ill be only a limited extension of previous targets. No cutback is planned.

Sixteen JCS fixed targets are added to RT 57 including six ■within the 10-mile Hanoi zone.

The Senate Preparedness Subcommittee hears two weeks of testimony on the air war from Wheeler, Sharp, McConnell and finally McNamara. The committee's report condemns the Administration's failure to follov/ military advice.

Several of the newly authorized Hanoi targets, including the Pa.ul Doumer Bridge are struck

CINCPAC is ordered to susperd attacks on Hanoi's 10-mile zone from 2h Aug to h Sep.

209 sorties are flown, the highest momber in the war to date.

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21 Aug 67

1 Sep 67

7 Sep 67

10 Sep 67

20 Sep 67

21 Sep 67

22 Sep 67

US aircraft lost over China

President's press conference

Hanoi prohibition extended

Campha port struck

CINCPAC msg 202352Z Sep 67

CINCPAC msg 210028Z Sep 67

CM-2660-67

Two US planes are shot down over China after having strayed off course.

The President denies any policy rift within the Administration on the bombing.

The prohibition of attack in the 10-mile Hanoi zone is extended indefinitely.

For the first time the port of Cam.pha is struck including its docks.

CINCPAC recommends hitting the MIGs at Phuc Yen air field and air defense controls at Bac Mai-

Sharp urges lifting the 10-mile prohibition around Hanoi.

General Johnson (Acting CJCS) agrees with CINCPAC: hit Phu Yen and Bac Mai and lift the 10-mile restriction-

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29 Sep 67

San Antonio Formula

6 Oct 67

8 Oct 67

CM-2679-67

CINCPAC msg O8O762Z Oct 67

The President offers a new basis for stopping the bombing in a San Antonio speech: assurance of productive discussions and that no advantage will be taken of the cessation

Specific authority to hit the Hanoi power plant is recLuested

Sharp again requests authority to strike Phuc Yen.

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/Ti

JCSM 555-&7

Reviewing the objectives and limitations of the bombing policy for the President^ the Chiefs recoimnended ten new measures against NVi^I including mining the ports and rem.oval of all current restrictions on the bombing.

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20 Oct 67

San Antonio Formula rejected

In an interview with a western conmiunist journalist, WN's Foreign Minister rejects the San Antonio formula.

21 Oct 67

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23 Oct 67

23 Oct 67 25 Oct 67

27 Oct 67

9 Rov 67

l6 Nov 67

Pentagon anti-war demon^ stration

JCSM 567-67

JOS msg 967^

Phuc Yen struck

CM-2707-67

Reduction of Hanoi-Haiphong zones refused.

Haiphong bombed

A massive demonstration in Washington against the war ends with a 505000-man march on the Pentagon.

The Chiefs oppose any holiday standdowns or pauses at year's end.

Phuc Yen authorized for attack.

Phuc Yen is hit for the 1st time.

Wheeler proposes reducing the H8.noi-Haiphong prohibited areas to 3 and 1.5 n.m. respectively.

The White House lunch rejects the proposal to reduce the Hanoi-Haiphong prohibited zones

Haiphong's #2 shipyard is hit for the 1st time.

17 Nov 67

22 Nov 67

Bac Mai hit

SEACABIN Study

Bac Mai airfield near the center of Hanoi is struck for the 1st time.

A joint ISA/jS study of the likely DRV" reaction to a bombing halt lays stress on the risks to the US.

27 Nov 67

JCSM-663-67

The Chiefs present a plan for the next four months that calls for mining the harbors and lifting all restrictions on Hanoi-Haiphong5 except in a 3 and 1.5 n.m. zone respectively, In all, 2^ new targets are recommended.

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28 Nov 6?

McNamara's resignation

li|-15 Dec 67 Hanoi RR Bridge struck

16 Dec 67

22 Dec 67

2k Dec 67

1 Jan 67

2 Jan 68

3 Jan 68

Rusk-McNamara agreement on new targets

IDA JASON Study

JCSM 698-67

Pope asks bombing halt

Christmas truce

31 Dec 67 New Year's truce

CMCPAC msg OIOI56Z Jan 68

CO^IQSmCV msg 02891

JCS msg 6k02

McNamara's resignation leaks to the press-

The Paul Doumer isle.nd highway bridge in Hanoi is struck again.

The two secretaries reach agreement on ten of the 2^ new targets proposed by the Chiefs in late Nov.

IDA'S JASON Division again produces a study of the bombing that emphatically rejects it as a tool of policy.

Noting that the SEACABIN study did not necessarily reflect JCS viev^-s, the Chiefs advise against any bombing halt.

The Pope calls on both sides to show restraint and on the US to halt the bombing in an effort to sta-rt negotiations. The President visits him the next day to reject the idea.

A 2^-hour Christmas truce is observed.

Another 24-hour truce-

CINCPAC ^ s year end wrapup asserts RT was successful, because of materiel destroyed, and manpower diverted to military tasks.

Westmoreland describes the bombing as "indispensable" in cutting the flow of supplies and sustaining his men's morale

Bombing is completely prohibited again v:ithin 5 n.m. of Hanoi and Haiphong5 apparently related to a diplomatic effort.

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16 Jan 68

\ftLite House meeting

Tv^o nevr targets are authorized but the 5 n.m, zones are reaffirmed.

25 Jan 68

Clifford testimony

29 Jan 68

31 Jan 68

3 Feb 68

5 Feb 68

10 Feb 68

Tet truce begins

Tet offensive

JCSM 78-68

Warnke memo to McNamara

Haiphong struck

23-25 Feb 68 Wheeler visits Vietnam

27 Feb 68

Wheeler Report

CIA memo

28 Feb 68

Clifford Group

Clark Clifford in his confirmation hearings states that■

"no advantage" means normal resupply may continue.

The Tet truce begins but is broken almost immediately by

communist attacks.

The VC/JWA attack all major towns and cities, invade the US Embassy and the Presidential Palace- Hue is occupied and held vrell into Feb.

Citing the Tet offensive, the Chiefs ask for reduction of the restricted zones to 3 and 1.5 n.m.

Warnke opposes the reduction of the sanctuary because of the danger of civilian casualties. Reduction not approved.

.After a month of restriction, Haiphong is again struck.

Gen. VJheeler at the President's direction goes to Vietnam and confers with Westmoreland on required reinforcements.

Wheeler endorses Westmoreland's request for 200,000 more men.

Hanoi unlikely to seek negotiations but rather will pr-^ss the military campaign-

The President asks Clifford to conduct a high-level "A to Z" review of US policy in Vietnam. The Group meets at the Pentagon and work begins. It continues until a DR'l is finally agreed on Mar.. 4.

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29 Feb 68

W. Bundy memo to Warnke, et• al.

29 Feb 68

Taylor m-emo to the President

1 Mar 68

Moscow msg 2983

3 Mar 68

DPM

Clifford Group meeting

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DPM

Bimdy considers several alternative courses including mining the harbors and all-out bombing. Without indicating a preference he indicates no unacceptably adverse Soviet or Chinese reaction to any course except invasion.

Taylor proposes three possible packages of responses to Tet and Westmoreland's request. All three called for removal of the San Antonio formula and no new negotiating initiative.

Thompson gives his assessment of Soviet reactions to various US actions, "...any serious escalation except in South Vietnam would trigger strong Soviet response...."

The 3 Mar. draf^ memo rejects any-bombing escalation, particularly mining the harbors or reducing the Hanoi-Haiphong restriction circles. It also rejects VJest-moreland's troop requests.

The Clifford Group rejects the dim's "demographic frontier" tactical concept for SVN and is divided about the bom_bing. Wheeler is adamant for an escalation.

A new draft is completed and Clifford sends it to the President. It proposes no new peace initiative and includes both the JCS proposal for escalation of the bombing, and the ISA position that it should be stab:Mized In transmitting the Dm, Clifford apparently also suggested to the President the idea of halting the bombing north of 20^, an idea discussed in the Clifford Group.

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k Mar 68

SecAF memo to Nitze

5 Mar 6Q

Rusk "Draft Statement"

Brovm presents three alternative air war escalations that might produce better results,

A note to VTheeler for information from Clifford transmits a "draft statement" by Rusk announcing a bombing halt north of 20*^. An attached rationale does not foresee negotiations resulting but indicates the time is opportune because of forthcoming bad weather over much of KVN.

11 Mar 68

New Hampshire Primary

l6 Mar 68

Kennedy announces

ISA DM

18-19 Mar 68 "Senior Informal Advisory

Group"

22 Mar 68

Westmoreland reassigned

25

President Johnson only narrowly defeats Eugene McCarthy in a great moral victory for anti-Administration doves.

Robert Kennedy, spurred by the New Hampshire results, announces for the Presidency.

An ISA draft mem-O that never gets SecDef signature proposes the concentration of the bombing south of 20*=^ on the infiltration routes, with only enough sorties northward to prevent relocation of DRV air defenses to the south.

Nine prestigious former Presidential advisors gather at the White House for briefings on the Vietnam situation. Af1:er hearing a report from State, DoD and CIA, they recommended against further escalation '.n favor of greater efforts to get peace talks started.

The President announced that Westmoreland would return to become CofS Arm.y in the summer-

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25-26 Mar 68 Abrams confers with the

President

30 Mar 68

State msg 139^61

31 Mar 68

The President withdraws

General Abrams, DepCOIvIUSMACV, returns unexpectedly to Washington and confers with the President. He is presumably told of his new assignment to replace Westmoreland and of the President's decision for a partial bombing halt.

US Ambassadors to the allied countries are informed of the forthcoming announcement of a partial bombing halt. The likelihood of a DRV response is discounted.

The President announces the partial bombing halt on nation-vade TV and ends his speech with the surprise announcement of his own withdrav/al as a candidate for re-election.

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VOLUME I

THE AIR WAR IN NORTH VIETNAM

TABLE OF CONTENTS A ND OUTLINE

Page

I. JULY 196^ TO THE YEAR-END BOMBING PAUSE 1

A. Introduction - Where We Stood at Mid-Suminer 1

I B- The July Escalation Debate 5

C. Incremental Escalation I6

. D, The "Pause" -- 2k December I965 to 3I January I966. . 20

1. The Pre-Pause Debate 20

2, Resumption -- VJhen and At V/hat Level? 26

E. Accomplishments by Years-End. • 50

FOOTNOTES- 58

II. THE POL DEBATE -- NOVEMBER 196^ - JTOTE I966 63

A* Background 63

1. JCS Recommendations 63

2. The Intelligence CommiUnity Demurs 68

B. The Issue Focuses 73

1. POL and the Pause 73

2. February Debate 76

3* The -CIA Recommends Escalation 80

k. McNamara Endorses POL, the President Defers It.. 84

C April and May -- Delay and Deliberation 90

1. Reasons to VJait 90

2. The April Policy Reviev^ 92

3. Exogenous Factors IO8

D. The Decision to Strike 120

FOOTNOTES 128

III. McKAMARA'S DISENGHANTi^^NT — JULY-DECEMBER I966 I38

A. Results of the POL Attacks I38

1. Initial Success I38

2. ROLLING THUNDER 51 i l40

3. POL - Strategic Failure ll|2

B. Alternatives -- The Barrier Concept IU5

1. Genesis 1^5

2. The JASON Summer Study Reports IU9

3. A Visit to Vietnam and a Memoz^andum for the President l62

C. The Year End Viev; I70

1. Presidential Decisions , I70

2. Stabilization of ,the Air- Vlar I7U

3. 1966 Sumraary * 177

FOOTNOTES •

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THE AIR WAR IN NORTH VIETMM

j^ JTJLY 1965 TO THE YEAR-END BOIVIBING PAUSE

A. Introduction -- VJhere We Stood At Mid-Summer

By the summer of 1965^ a- U.S.. campaign of sustainedj almost daily air strikes against NVN was well unden-zay, with token GVN participation- Most of the important bombing policy issues had been settled^ and the general outlines of the campaign had become clear. Military proposals to seek a q.uick and decisive solution to the Vietnam War through bombing NVN -- proposals which called for an intensive cam^paign to apply maximum practicable military pressure in a short time -- had been entertained and rejected. Instead;, what was undertaken was a graduated program, nicknam.ed ROLLII^S THUNDER, definitely ascending in tempo and posing a potential threat of heavy bombing pressure, but starting lo\r and stretching out over a prolonged period.

U.S. decision-makers apparently accepted the military view that a limited, gradual program would exert less pressure upon NVN than a prograra of heavy bombing from the outset, and they apparently granted that less pressure vras less likely to get NVN to scale dovm or call off the insurgency, or enter into reasonable negotiations. They felt, however, that all-out bombing would pose far greater risks of widening the war, would transmit a signal strength out of all proportion to the limited objectives and intentions of the U.S. in Southeast Asia, V70uld carry unacceptable political penalties, and would perhaps foreclose the promise of achieving U.S« goals at a relatively low level of violence.

The decision-makers accordingly elected to proceed with the bombino" in a slow, steady, deliberate manner, beginning with a few infiltration-associated.targets in southern NVN and gradually moving northward with progressively more severe attacks on a wider variety of tarp:ets. The pattern adopted was designed to preserve the options to Tiroceed or not, escalate or not, or q.uicken the pace or not, depending on NVN*s reactions. The carrot of stopping the bombing was deemed as important as the stick of continuing it, and bombing pauses V7ere provided for. It was hoped that this track of major military escalation of the war'could be accom-panied by a parallel diplomatic track to bring the war to an end, and that both tracks could be coordinated.

By the summer ofl965? bombing WN had also been relegated to a secondary role in U.S« military strategy for dealing with the war. Farlier expectations that bom-bing and other pressures on NVIT would

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T constitute the primary means for the U.S. to turn the tide of the war

had been overtaken by the President's decision to send in substantial U.S. ground forces for combat in SYN. With this decision the main - ' hope had shifted from inflicting pain in the North to proving, in the South, that DJWI could not vrin a military victory there. ROLLING THUNDER was counted as useful and necessary, but in the prevailing

I view it v^as a supplement and not a substitute for efforts within SVn.

I From the first, strike req.uirements in SVN had first call on U.S. air

assets in Southeast Asia.

Nonetheless, ROLLING THUMER was a comparatively risky and politically sensitive component of U.S. strategy, and national authorities kept it imder strict and careful policy control. The strikes were carried out only by fighter-bombers, in low-altitude precision-bombing modes, and populated areas were scrupulously avoided. Final target determinations were made in Washington, with due attention to the nature of the target, its geographical location, the weight of attack, the risk of collateral damage, and the like. Armed reconnaissance was authorized against targets of opportimity not individually, picked in Washington, but Washington did define the types of targets which could be hit, set a sortie ceiling on the number of such missions, and prescribed the areas within which they could be flown.

National authorities also closely regulated the rate of escalation by discouraging the preparation of extended campaign plans which might permit any great latitude in the field. They accepted bombing proposals only in weekly target packages. Each target pa.ckage, moreover, had to pass through a chain of approvals which included senior levels of OSD, the Department of State, and the White House, up to and including the principals themselves.

Within this framework of action the ROLLING THUNDER program had been permitted to grow in intensity. By mid-1965 the number of 1 g^-^j^^gg agaanst targets in the JCS master list of major targets had

' increased from one or two per week to ten or twelve per week. The geo-

graphic coverage of the strikes had been extended in stages, first across the 19th parallel, from there to the 20th, and then up to 20^30' North. The assortment of targets had been widened, from military barracks, ammunition depots, and radar sites at first, to bridges, airfields, naval bases, radio facilities, railroad yards, oil storage sites, and even power plants. The targets authorized for strike by armed reconnaissance aircraft were also expanded from vohicles, locomotives, and railroad cars to ferries, lighters, barges, road repair eq,uipment, and .bivouac and maintenance areas; and aircraft on these missions were authorized to interdict LOGs by cratering, restriking, and seeding I ^ chokepoints as necessary. The number of attack sorties — strike and

flak suppression -- had risen to more than 5OO per week, and the total ,.—. gQ3^-tj_es flo-vm to about 9OO per week, four or five times what they had

been at the outset. _ ^ ^ .

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This early ROLLING- THUNDER program had already scored- some immediate political and psychological gains. Prior to the bomhing, U.S. authorities were coping with what Presidential Assistant McG-eorge Bundy called a "widespread belief" that the U.S. lacked the will and determination to do what was necessary in Southeast Asia, The initiation of ROLLING THUNDER, followed by a series of military actions which in effect m.ade the U.S. a full co-belligerent in the war, did much to correct that belief. The South Vietnamese were given an important boost in morale, both by the show of greater U.S. support and by the inauguration of joint retaliation against their enemy in the North. Thailand and other countries in Southeast Asia, \rh±ch had been watching SVN slide rapidly downhill while the U.S. seemed to be debating what to do, no doubt received the same kind of lift as well.

The bombing had also served several unilateral U.S. interests. It gave a clear signal to NTN — and indirectly to China --that the U.S. did not intend to suffer the takeover of SVN without a fight. It served notice that if pressed the U.S. would not necessarily recognize privileged sanctuaries. And it provided the U.S. with a new bargaining chip, something which it could offer to give up in return for a reduction or cessation of NVN*s effort in the South.

Despite such gains, the overall effect of initiating ROLLING THUNDER was somewhat disappointing. The hopes in some quarters that merely posing a credible threat of substantial damage to come might be sufficient "pressure" to bring Hanoi around had been frustrated. U.S. negotiation overtures had been rejected, and Hanoi*s position had if anything hardened. Infiltration South had continued and intensified. The signs indicated that Hanoi was determined to ride cut the bombing, at least at the levels sustained up to mid-1965, while continuing to prosecute the war vigorously in the South. It was evident that the U.S. faced a long-haul effort of uncertain duration.

Although the real target of the early ROLLING THUNDER program was the will of NVN to continue the aggression in the South, the public rationale for the bombing had been expressed in terms of N\TT's capability to continue that aggression. The public vras told that NVN was being bombed because it was infiltrating men and supplies into SVN' the targets of the bombing v/ere directly or indirectly related to that infiltration^ and the purpose of attacking them was to reduce the flow and/or to increase the costs of that infiltration. Such a rationale was consistent v/ith the overall position which m.orally justified U.S. intervention in the war in terms of NVN's own intervention; 'and H specifically put the bombing in a politically acceptable military idiom of interdiction. .

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This public rationale for the bombing had increasingly become the most acceptable internal rationale as well^ as decisionmakers sought to prevent runaway escalation c-nd to hold down the bombing in what they thought should be a secondary role in the war. As a venture in "strategic persuasion" the bombing had not worked. The most obvious reason was that it v^as too lights gave too subdued and uncertain a signal^ and exerted too little pain. Hardly any of the targets most valued by Hanoi -- the "lucrative" targets of the JCS m.aster list -- had been hit. If the main purpose of ROLLIK THUNDER was to ijnpose strong pressure on Hanoi's v^ill, the "lucrative" targets in the Hanoi/Haiphong area, not those in the barren southern Panhandle5 vrere the ones to go after^ and to hit hard. Aerial bombardment could then perform in its proven strategic role, and even if the risks of such a course were greater it was precisely because the potential payoff was greater.

If, however, the emphasis could be shifted toward interdiction, it would be easier to confine targets to those of direct military relevance to the VC/WA campaign in the South, and it would be easier to contain the pressures to escalate the bombing rapidly into the northern heart of WN's population and industry. A continuing emphasis on the Panhandle LOCs could be defended more easily, if the main purpose was to actually handicap RVl^rs efforts to support and strengthen VC/WA forces in the South, and it vras less likely to generate adverse political repercussions.

The interdiction rationale had come to the fore by mid-1965, both V7ithin the government and before the public. There were still internal and external pressures to proceed faster and farther, of course, because interdiction effects had not been impressive either. Official spokesmen conceded that complete interdiction was impossible: the flovr of men and supplies from the North, however vital to the enemy effort in the South, was quite small and could hardly be cut off by bombing alone. They explained that the bombing had "disrupted" the flow "slowed" it down, and m.ade it "more difficult" and "costly." Thev showed dramiatic aerial photos of bridges destroyed, and implied that the enemy was being forced "off the rails onto the highv/ays and ' off the highv/ays onto their feet." They could not, however, point to

anv specific evidence that bombing the North had as yet had any impact on the war in the South. Almost inevitably, therefore, even within the interdiction rationale, the conclusion was that the bombing had been too restrained. It was argued that the predictably gradual pace had allowed NVH to easily adjust to, circumvent, or otherwise over-'corne the effects of the -disruptions and other difficulties caused bv the'bombing, and that only an expanded bombing program could produce significant material results.

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Thus, the outlook in niicl.-1965 was for some f\arther escalation of the bombing, with a certain amount of tension between pressures to speed it up and counter-pressures to keep it in check. With the debate increasingly forced into the interdiction context, the prospect was for gradual rather than sudden escalation, and strong resistance to going all the way if necessary to break Hanoi's will could be predicted. There was still a gap between those who thought of the bombing as a primarily political instrument and those who sought genuine military objectives, and this would continue to confuse the debate about how fast and far to go, but the main lines of the debate were set.

Still unresolved in mid-1965 was the problem of the diplomatic track. Could the U.S. continue to escalate the bombing, m.ain-taining a credible threat of further action, while at the same time seeking to negotiate? Could the U.S. orchestrate communications with Hanoi with an intensifying bom.bing campaign? As of mid-1965 this vzas an open question.

B. The July Escalation Debate

The full U.S. entry into the Vietnam War in the spring of 1965 -- with the launching of air strikes against IMVN, the release of U.S. jet aircraft for close support of ARVN troops in STO, and the deployment to STO of m-ajor U.S. ground forces for combat — did not bring an immediate turnabout in the security situation in SVN. The VC/nVA may have been surprised and stunned at first by the U.S. actions, but by the siimm-er of I965 they had again seized the initiative they held in late 1964 and early I965 and were again mounting large-scale attacks^ hurting ARW forces badly. In mid-July Assistant Secretary McNaughton described the situation in ominous terms:

The situation is worse than a year ago (when it was worse than a year before that)...-A hard VC push is on....The US air strikes against the North and US com.bat-troop deployments have erased any South Vietnamese fears that the US v/ill forsake them; but the government is able to provide security to fewer and fewer people in less and less territory, fewer roads and railroads are usable, the economy is deteriorating, and the government in Saigon continues'to turn over. Pacification even in the Hop Tac area is making no progress. The government-to-VC ratio overall is nov7 only 3""to-l3 and in combat battalions only 1-to-l' governjnent desertions are at a high rate, and the Vietnamese force build-up. is stalled; the VC reportedly are trying to double their combat strength. There are no siRns that the VC have been throttled by US/gVN interdiction efforts; indeed, there is evidence of further PAVN build-up in the I an'd II Corps areas. The DRV/VG

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seem to "believe that SVN is near collapse and show no signs of being interested in settling for less than a complete cake-over, l/

Faced with this gloomy situation^ the leading question on the U.S. agenda for Vietnam was a farther major escalation of troop commitments, together with a call-up of reserves, extension of military tours5 and a general expansion of the armed forces.

The question of intensifying the air war against the North was a subsidiary issue, but it was related to the troop question in several ways. The military view, as reflected in JCS proposals and proposals from the field, was that the war should be intensified on all fronts, in the North no less than in the South. There was political merit in this view as well, since it was difficult to publicly justify sending in masses of troops to slug it out on the ground without at least trying to see whether stronger pressures against NVN would help- On the other hand, there was continued high-level interest in preventing a crisis atmosphere f^om developing, and in avoiding any over-reaction by NVN and its allies, so that a simultaneous escalation in both the North and the South needed to be handled with care. The bombing of the North, coupled with the deployment of substantial forces should not look like an effort to soften up NVN for an invasion.

During the last days of June with U.S. air operations against North Vietnam well into their firth month, with U.S. forces in South Vietnam embarking for the first time upon major ground combat operations, and with the President near a decision that would increase American troop strength in Vietnam from 70,000 to over 200,000, Under-Secretary of State George Ball sent to his colleagues among the small group of Vietnam "principals" in Washington a memorandum warning that the United States vras poised on the brink of a military and political disaster. 2/ Neither through expanded bombing of the North nor through a substantial increase in U.S. forces in the South would the United States be likely to achieve its objectives, Ball arsued. Instead of esca.laticn, he urged, "we should undertake either to extricate ourselves or to reduce our defense perimeters in South Viet-Nam to accord with the capabilities of a limited US deployment."

"Th is is our last clear chance to make this decision ," the Under-Secretaiy asserted. And in a separate, memorandum to the President, he explained why:

■ The decision you face now, therefore, is crucial. Once large nuBibers of US troops are committed to direct combat they vdll begin to take heavy casualties in a

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war they are ill-eq.uipped to fight in a non-cooperative if not downright hostile countryside.

Once v/e suffer large casualties we will have started a well-nigh irreversible process. Our involvement will "be so great that we cannot — without national humiliation — stop short of achieving our complete objectives. Of the two possibilities I think humiliation V70uld be more likely t han the achievement of our objectives — even after we have paid terrible cos ts. 3/

"Humiliation" was much on the minds of those involved in the making of American policy for Vietnam during the spring and sum.-mer of 1965. The word^ or phrases meaning the same thing, appears in coujitless memoranda. No one put it as starkly as Assistant Secretary of Defense John McNaughton, who in late March assigned relative weights to various American objectives in Vietnam. In McNaughton's view the principal U.S. aim was "to avoid a hum.iliating US defeat (to our reputation as a guarantor)." To this he assigned the weight of 70*^. Second, but far less important at only 20fo v/as "to keep SVN (and then adjacent) territory from Chinese hands." And a minor third, at but 10^, was "to permit the people of SW to enjoy a better, freer way of life." k/

Where Ball differed from all the others was in his willingness to incur "humiliation" that was certain -- but also limited and short-term — by*withdrawing American forces in order to avoid the uncertain but not unlikely prospect of a military defeat at a higher level of involvement. Thus he entitled his memorandum "Cutting Our Losses in South Viet-Nam." In it and in his companion memorandum to ■ the President ("A Compromise Solution for South Viet-Nam") he went on to outline a program, first, of placing a ceiling on U.S. deployments at present authorized levels (72,000 men) and sharply restricting their combat roles, and, second, of beginning negotiations with Hanoi for a cessation of hostilities and the formation in Saigon of a "governjiient 1 * of National Union" that would include representatives of the National

' ' Liberation Front. Ball's argument was based upon his sense of relative

■ priorities. As he told his colleagues:

The position taken in this memorandum does not suggest that the United States should abdicate leadership in "ohe cold war. But any prudent military commander carefully selects the terrain on which to stand and fight, and no great captain has ever been blam^ed for a successful tactical withdrawal. • "

From our point of view, the terrain in South Viet-Nam could not be w^orse. Jungles and rice paddies are not designed for modern arms and, from a military point

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of vievr^ this is clearly what General de Gaulle described to me as a "rotten country."

Politically, South Viet-Nam is a lost cause. The country is bled v/hite from twenty years of war and the people are sick of it. The Viet Cong -- as is shown by the Rand Corporation Motivation and Morale Study -- are deeply committed.

Hanoi has a Government and a purpose and a discipline. The "government", in Saigon is a travesty. In a very real sense^ South Viet-Nam is a country with an army and no government.

In my view, a deep commitment of United States forces in a land war in South Viet-Nam vmuld be a catastrophic error. If ever there was an occasion for a tactical v/ith-dravral, this is it. ^

Ball's argument was perhaps m.ost antithetic to one being put forward at the same time by Secretary of State Rusk. In a memorandi:mi he wrote on 1 July, Rusk stated bl\mtly: "The central objective of the United States in South Viet-Nam must be to insure that North Viet-\i . -^^-^ not succeed in taking over or determining the future of South

Viet-Nam by force. We must accomplish this objective without a general •v;ar if possible ." 6/ Here was a statement that the American commitment to the Vietnam war was, in effect, absolute, even to the point of risking general war. The Secretary went on to explain why he felt that an absolute commitment was necessary:

The integrity of the U.S, commitment is the principal pillar of peace throughout the world. If that commitment becomes unreliable, the commionist world would draw conclusions that would lead to our ruin and almost certainly to a catastrophic war. So long as the South Vietnamese are prepared to fight for themselves, we cannot abandon them without disaster to peace and to our interests throughout the world.

In short, if "the U.S. commitment" v/ere once seen to be unreli able the risk of the outbreak of general war would vastly increase. Ther-efore prudence would dictate risking general war, if necessary, in order to demonstrate that the United States would m.eet its commi-o-ments In either case, some risk would be involved, but in the latter

the risk would be lo>;-er. The task of the statesman is to choose among unpalatable alternatives. For the Under-Secretary of State, this meant an early withdrawal from Vietnam. For the Secretary, it meant an open-ended commitm.ent.

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Ball was, of cou-rse, alone among the Vietnam principals in ' arguing for de-escalation and political "compromise." At the same

' time that he and Rusk v^rote these papers, Assistant Secretary of State

William Bundy and Secretary of Defense McNamara also went on record

with recommendations for the conduct of the war. Bundy's paper, "A

t 'Middle Way' Course of Action in South Vietnam," argued for a delay

in further U.S. troop commitments and in escalation of the bombing campaign against North Vietnam, but a delay only in order to allow the American public tim.e to digest the fact that the United States v/as engaged in a land vrar on the Asian mainland, and for U.S. commanders to make certain that their men were, in fact, capable of fighting effectively in conditions of counter-insuxgency v/arfare without either arousing the hostility of the local population or causing i the Vietnamese government and army simply to ease up and allow the

Americans to "take over" their war. 7/

For McNamara, however, the military situation in South ' Vietnam was too serious to allow the luxury of delay. In a memoran-

dum to the President drafted on 1 July and then revised on 20 July, immediately following his return from a vreek-long visit to Vietnam, he recom.mended an immediate decision to increase the U.S.-Third Country presence from the current 16 maneuver battalions (15 U.S., one Australian) to kh (3^ U.S., nine Korean, one Australian), and a ■ change in the mission of these forces from one of providing support and reinforcement for the ARVN to one which soon became knovm as "search and destroy" -- as McNamara put it, they were "by aggressive exploitation of superior military forces..-to gain and hold the initiative.-.pressing the fight against VC/dRV main force units in South Vietnam to run them to ground and destroy them." 8/

At the same time, McNamara argued for a substantial intensification of the air war. The 1 July version of his memorandum recommended a total quarantine of the movement of war supplies into North Vietnam by sea, rail, and road, through the mining of Haiphong and all other harbors and the destruction of rail and road bridges leading from China to Hanoi; the Secretary also uj:ged the destruction of fishter airfields and SAM sites "as necessary" to accomplish these objectives. 9/

On 2 July the JCS, supporting the views in the DPM, reiterated a recommendation for immediate implementation of an intensified bombing ■oroeram against NVN, to accom.pany the additional deployments which were ■under consideration. lO/ The recommendation was for a sharp escalation of the bombing, with the emphasis on interdiction of supplies into as - 11 es out of NVN. Like the DH4, it called for interdicting the movement of "war supplies" into Wm by mining the major ports and cutting „ .. rail and highway bridges on the LOCs fromi China to Hanoi; mounting ■

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within NVN; destroying the "war-making" supplies and facilities of' NVIT especially POL; and destroying airfields and SAM sites as necessary to accomplish the other tasks. The JCS estimated that an increase from ohe then 2000 to about 5OOO attack sorties per month would be required to carry out the program.

The elements of greater risk in the JCS proposals vrere obvious. The recommendation to mine ports and to strike airfields and SAM sites had already been rejected as having special Soviet or Chinese escalatory implications5 and even air strikes against LOCs from China were considered dangerous. U.S. intelligence agencies believed that if such strikes occurred the Chinese might deliberately engage U.S. aircraft over NVN from bases in China. CIA thought the chances were "about even" that this would occur; DIA and the Service intelligence agencies thought the chances of this would increase but considered it still unlikely; and State thought the chances "better than even." 11 /

Apart from this element of greater risk, hov^ever, intelligence agencies held out some hope that an intensified bombing program like that proposed by the JCS (less mining the ports, which they v^ere not asked to consider) would badly hurt the WTE economy, dam^age ]WN*s ability to support the effort in SVN, and even lead Hanoi to consider negotiations. An SIMIS of 23 July estimated that the extension of air attacks only to military targets in the Hanoi/Haiphong area v/as not likely to "significantly injure the Viet Cong ability to persevere" or to "persuade the Hanoi government that the price of persisting was unacceptably high." Sustained interdiction of the LOCs from China, in addition, vrould m.ake the delivery of Soviet and Chinese aid more difficult and costly and would have a serious impact on the Wf^ economy, but it would still not have a "critical impact" on "the Communist determination to persevere" and would not seriously impair Viet Cong capabili ties in SW? "s^t least for the short term." However:

If, in addition, POL targets in the Hanoi-Haiphong area were destroyed by air attacks, the DRV's capability to provide transportation for the general economy would be severely reduced. It would also complicate their mili-'tary logistics- If additional PA VIM forces were em,ployed in South Vietnam on a scale sufficient to counter increased US troop strength'_/which the SNIE said was "almost certain" to happenY this would substantially increase the amount of -supplies^needed-in the South. The Viet Cong also depend on supplies from the North to maintain their present level of large-scale operations- The accumulated strains of a prolonged curtailment of supplies received from North Vietnam would obviously have an impact on the Communist ■ effort in the South. They would certainly inhibit and

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might even prevent an increase in large-scale Viet Cong militaiy activity, though they would probably not force any significant reduction in Viet Cong terrorist t tactics of harassment and sabotage. These strains,

particularly if they produced a serious check in the development of Viet Cong capabilities for large-scale (multi-battalion) operations might lead the Viet Cong to consider negotiations. 11a/

There were certain reservations with respect to the above estimate. The State and Army intelligence representatives on USIB registered a dissent, stating that even under heavier attack the LOC capacities in NVN and Laos were sufficient to support the war in SVN at the scale envisaged in the estim.ate. They also pointed out that it was impossible to do irreparable damage to the LOCs, that the Com-mionists had demonstrated considerable logistic resourcefulness and considerable ability to move large amounts of war material long distances over difficult terrain by primitive means, and that in addition it was difficult to detect, let alone stop, sea infiltration. On balance, however, the SNIE came close to predicting that intensified interdiction attacks would have a beneficial effect on the war in the South.

Facing a decision with these kinds of implications, the President vmnted more information and asked McNamara to go on another fact-gathering trip to Vietnam before subm-itting his final recommendations on a-coiirse of action. In anticipation of the trip, McNaughton prepared a memo summarizing his a^ssessment of the problem, McNaughton wrote that "meaningful negotiations" were unlikely imtil the situation began to look gloomier for the VC, and that even with 200,000-l|00,000 U.S. troops in SVN the chances of a "win" by I968 (i.e., in the next 2I. years) were only 5O-5O. But he recommended that the infiltration routes be hit hard, "at least to put a 'ceiling' on what can be infiltrated;" and he recommended that the limit on targets be "just short" of population targets, the China border, a.nd special targets like SAM sites which might trigger Soviet or Chinese reactions. 12/

McNam.ara left for Vietnam on July 1^ and returned a week later with a revised version of his July 1st DPM ready to be sent to the President as a final recommendation. The impact of the visit was to soften considerably the position he had apparently earlier taken. His 20 July memorandum backed off from the 1 July recommendations --■nerha-ps although it is im.possible to tell from the available materials -■ because of intimations that such drastic escalation would be unacceptable to the President. Instead of mining North Vietnam's harbors as a Quarantine ireasure, the Secretary recommended it as a possible "severe reprisal hould the VC or DRV commit a particularly dam.aging or horrendous act" h as "interdiction of the Saigon river." But he recommended a gradual

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increase in the number of strike sorties against North Vietnam from I the existing 2^500 per month to U^OOO "or more/' still "avoiding

striking population and industrial targets not closely related to the LRV's supply of war material to the VC."

The urgency which infused McNamara's recommendations stemraed from his estimate that "the situation in South Vietnam is worse than a year ago (when it was worse than a year before that)." The VC had launched a drive "to dismember the nation and maul the arm.y"; since 1 J-une the GVN had been forced to abandon six district capitals and had only retaken one. Transport and communications lines throughout the country were being cut, isolating the towns and cities and causing sharp deterioration of the already shaky domestic economy. Air Marshal Ky presided over a goverra:nent of generals which had little prospect of being able to unite or energize the country. In such a situation, U.S. air and ground actions thus far had put to rest Vietnamese fears that they might be abandoned, but they had not decisively affected the course of the vrar. Therefore, McNamara recommended escalation. His specific recommendations, he noted, were concurred in by General Wheeler and Ambassador-designate Lodge, who accompanied him on his trip to Vietnam, and by Ambassador Taylor, Ambassador Johnson, Admiral Sharp, and General Westmoreland, with whom he conferred there. The rationale for his decisions was supplied by the CIA, whose assessment he quoted with approval in concluding the 1 July version of his mem.orandum. It stated:

Over the longer term we doubt if the Communists are likely to change their basic strategy in Vietnam (i.e., aggressive and steadily mounting insurgency) unless and until two conditions prevail: (l) they are forced to accept a situation in the yiq.t in the South which offers them no prospect of an early victory and no grounds for hope that they can simply outlast the US and (2) North Vietnam itself is under continuing and increasingly damaging punitive attack. So long as the Communists think they scent the possibility of an early victory (which is probably now the case), we believe that they will persevere and accept extremely severe damage to the North. Conversely, if North ■Vietnam itself is not hurting, Hanoi's doctrinaire leaders will probably be ready to carry on the Southern struggle almost indefinitely. If, ho^'/ever, both of the conditions outlined .above should be brought to pass, we believe Hanoi ■probably would, at least for a period of time, alter its basic strategy and course of action in South Vietnam.

McNamara's memorandum of 20 July did not include this quotation although many of these points were made elsewhere in the paper. Instead it concluded with an optimistic forecast:

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The overall evaluation is that the coiirse of action • ■ • recommended in this memorandxam -- if the military and

political moves are properly integrated and executed with continuing vigor and visible determination — stands a good chance of achieving an acceptable outcome within a reasonable time in Vietnam.

Never again while he was Secretary of Defense would McNamara make so optim.istic a statement about Vietnam -- except in public.

This concluding paragraph of McNamara^s memorandijm spoke of political, as well as military, "vigor" and "determination." Earlier in the paper, under the heading "Expanded political moves," he had elaborated on this point, writing;

Together with the above military moves, we should

j take political initiatives in order to lay a groundwork

for a favorable political settlem-ent by clarifying our objectives and establishing channels of comjnunications. At the sam.e time as we are taking steps to turn the tide in South Vietnam, we would make quiet moves through diplomatic channels (a) to open a dialogue with Moscow and Hanoi, and perhaps the VC, looking first toward disabusing them of any misconceptions as to our goals and second toward

I laying the groundwork for a settlement when the time is ripe;

(b) to keep the Soviet Union from deepening its military in

I the world until the time when settlement can be achieved;

* and (c) to cement support for US policy by the US public,

allies and friends, and to keep international opposition at a manageable level. Our efforts m,ay be unproductive

) until the tide begins to turn, but nevertheless they should

be made.

Here was scarcely a program for drastic political action. McNamara*s essentially procedural (as opposed to substantive) recom.-mendations amounted to little more than saying that the United States ' should provide channels for the enemy's discrete and relatively face-saving surrender when he decided that the game had grovm too costly. This was in fact, what official Washington (again v^ith the exception of Ball) meant" in mid-1965 when it spoke of a "political settlement."

(As McNamara noted in a footnote, even this went too far for Ambassador-desiroate Lodge, whose view was that "'any further initiative by us now /before we are. strong/ would simply harden the Communist resolve not to stop fighting.*" In this view Ambassadors Taylor and Johnson concurred except that they v/ould m.aintain "discreet contacts with the

Soviets.") 13/

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McN£imara*s concluding paragraph spoke of "an acceptable outcome/' Previously in his paper he had listed "nine fundamental elements" of a favorable outcome. These were:

(a) VC stop attacks and drastically reduce incidents of terror and sabotage.

(b) DRV reduces infiltration to a trickle, v/ith some reasonably reliable method of o^or obtaining confirmation of this fact.

(c) US/gVN stop bombing of North Vietnam.

(d) GVW stays independent (hopefully pro-US, but possibly genuinely neutral).

(e) GVN exercises governmental functions over substantially all of South Vietnam.

(f) Communists remain quiescent in Laos and Thailand-,

■ (g) DRV withdraws PAVN forces and other North Vietnamese infiltrators (not regroupees) from South Vietnam.

(h) VC/nLF transforni from a military to a purely political organization.

(i) US combat forces (not advisors or AID) withdraw.

These "fundsunental elements," McNamara said, could evolve with or without express agreem.ent and, indeed, except for what might be negotiated incidental to a cease-fire they were more likely to evolve v/ithout an explicit agreement than with one. So far as the difference betvzeen a "favorable" and an "acceptable" outcome was concerned, he continued, there was no need for the present to address the 'question of whether the United States should "ultimately settle for something less than the nine fundamentals," because the force deployments recomjnended in the memoran-dutp would be prerequisite to the achievement of any acceptable settle-. mert' "a decision can be made later, when bargaining becomes a reality, whether to com.promise in any particular."

In summary, then, McNam.ara's program consisted of first substantially increasing the pressure on the enemy by every means short of those such as the bombing of population centers in the North, that would run sizeable risks of precipitating Soviet or Chinese direct intervention . .-^^ ^j^-^ and then seeking a de facto political settlement essentially

on US/GVN term-s.

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The July 20 memo to the President was followed up by two others on specific aspects of the problem before the end of July. On July 285 he replied to a series of eighteen points made by Senator Mansfield with respect to the Vietnam war. In so doing. Secretary McNamara informed the President of his doubts that even a "greatly expanded program" could be expected to produce significant WN interest in a negotiated settlement "until they have been disappointed in their hopes for a quick military success in the South." Meanwhile he favored "strikes at infiltration routes" to impose a ceiling on what NVF coiad pour into SVTT, "thereby putting a ceiling on the size of war that the enemy can wage there." He warned that a greatly increased progrsjn woiild create even more serious risks of "confrontations" with the Soviet Union and China. Ik/

McNamara stated that the current bombing program was on the way to accomplishing its purposes and should be continued. The future program, he said, should:

a. Emphasize the threat > It should be structured to capitalize on fear of future attacks. At any time,

'pressure' on the DRV depends not upon the current level "^

of bombing but rather upon the credible threat of future destruction which can be avoided by agreeing to negotiate or agreeing to some settlement in negotiations.

■

^' Minim.ize the loss of DRV 'face.' The program should be designed to make it politically easy for the DRV to enter negotiations and to make concessions during negotiations. It may be politically easier for North Vietnam to accept negotiations and/or to make concessions at a time vrhen bombing of their territory is not currently taking place.

c. Optimize interdiction vs. political costs . Interdiction should be carried out so as to maximize effectiveness and to minimize the political repercussions from the methods used. Physically, it makes no difference whether ■ ■ a rifle is interdicted on its way into North Vietnam, on its way out of North Vietnara, in Laos or in South Vietnam. But different amounts of effort and different political prices may be paid depending on how and where it is done. The critical variables in this regard are (l) the type of targets struck, (e.g., port facilities involving civilian casualties vs. isolated bridges), (2) types of aircraft (e.g.5 B"52s vs. E-105s), (3) kinds of weapons (e.g., napalm vs. ordinary bombs), (1+) location of target (e.g., in Hanoi vs. Ijaotian border area), and (5) the accompanying ■ declaratory policy (e.g.,' unlimited vs. a defined interdiction zone).

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. d. Coordin ate with o ther influences on the DRV- So '

Mill! " ' ' ' ^—^^^^——^—^-^^ ■ 11 , I , |- ,

long as fi^-11 victory in the South appears likely, the effect of the bombing program in promoting negotiations or a settlement will probably be sm-all. The bombing program now and later should be designed for its influence on the DRV at that unknown time when the DRV becomes more optimistic about whe.t they can achieve in a settlement acceptable to us than about what they can achieve by continuation of the war.

e. Avoid undue risks and costs . The program should avoid bombing vmich runs a high risk of escalation into war with the Soviets or China and which is likely to appall allies and friends. I5/

C. Incremental EscalatJ-O n

•

Secretary McNam-ara's 5 principles prevailed. The bombing continued to expand and intensify, but there v/as no abrupt switch in bombing policy and no sudden escalation. The high-value targets in the Hanoi/Haiphong area were kept off limits, so as not to "kill the hostage." Interdiction remained the chief criterion for target selection, and caution continued to be exercised with respect to sensitive targets. The idea of a possible bombing pause, longer than the last, was kept alive. 16/ The Secretary refused to approve an overall JCS concept for fighting the Vietnam War which included much heavier ROLLING THUNDER strikes against key military and economic targets coordinated with a blockade and mining attack on NVN ports, I7/ and he also continued to veto JCS proposals for dramatic attacks on major POL depots, power plants, airfields, and other "lucrative" targets. 18 /

The expansion of ROLLING THUroER during the rest of I965 followed the previous pattern of step-by-step progression. The approval cycle shifted from one-week to two-week target packages. New fixed targets from the JCS list of major targets, v/hich grew from 9^- to 236 by the end of the year, continued to be selected in Washington. The number of these new targets was kept down to a few per week, most of them LOC-related. Few strikes vrere authorized in the vital northeast quadrant, north of 2']P N. and east of IO6 E., which contained the Hanoi/Haiphong urban complexes, the major port facilities, and the main LOCs to China. In addition, de facto sanctuaries V7ere maintained in the areas w^ithin 30 nautical miles from tne center of Hanoi, 10 from the center of Haiphong, 30 from the Chinese border in the northwest (to 106*"^ E ) and 25 from the Chinese border in the northeast.. I9/

The scope of armed reconnaissance missions was also enlarged but kept within limits. The boundary for such missions was shifted to the north and west of Hanoi up to the Chinese buffer zone, but it vms ket)t back from the northeast q.uadrant,- where onJLy individually approved

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fixed target strikes were authorized. The operational latitude for armed reconnaissance missions was also widened. They were authorized to strike small pre-briefed fixed military targets not on the JCS list (e.g.? minor troop staging areas, warehouses, or depots) in the course of executing their LOG attacks, and to restrike previously authorized JCS targets in order to make and keep them inoperable. An armed reconnaissance sortie ceiling continued in effect. It was lifted to 600 per week by October, but then held there until the end of the year. 20/

By the end of I965 total ROLLING THUNDER attack sorties had levelled off to about 750 per week and total sorties to a little over 1500 per v^eek. All told, some 55,000 sorties had been flov/n during the year, nearly half of them on attack (strike and flak suppression) missions, and three-fourths of them as armed reconnaissance rather than JCS-directed fixed target strikes. Altogether, ROLLING TmLE)ER represented only 30 percent of the U.S. air effort in Southeast Asia during the year, in keeping with the rough priorities set by decisionmakers at the outset. 2l /

■Although bombing NVN had done much to generate^ as Secretary McNamara put it, "a new school of criticism among liberals and 'peace'

groups," whose activities were reflected in a wave of teach-ins and ' other demonstrations during 1965^ £2/ the bombing also drew abundant

criticism from m.ore hawkish elements because of its limited nature. As a result, the Secretary and other officials were freq,uently obliged to defend the bombing restrictions before Congress and the press.

Most of the hawkish criticism of the bombing stemmed from basic disa^greement with an air campaign centered upon a tactical interdiction rationale rather than a punitive rationale more in keeping with i strategic uses of air pov/er, a campaign in which the apparent target

I ' ^as the infiltration system rather than the economy as a whole, and in

which, as one CIA report put it,

■ '■ ...almost 80 percent of North Vietnaja's limited modern

industrial economy, 75 percent of the nation's population,

! , and the most lucrative military supply and LOC targets

have been effectively insLilated from air attack. 23/

' ' This kind of criticism, of the bombing concentrated on the most conspic-

uous aspect of the program, the strikes against fixed targets, and it faulted the program for failing to focus on the kinds of targets which strategic bombing had made familiar in VIorld VJar II -- power plants, oil depots, harbor facilities, and factories. .- ^

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Such "strategic" targets had not "been entirely exempted from attack^ of course^ but they had been exempted from attack where they counted most^ in the sanctuary areas, •i'his occasioned some embarrassment in the Administration because any attack on such targets seemed inconsistent with a purely interdiction rationale, while failui^e to attack the m-ost important of them did not satisfy a strategic bombing rationale. Secretary McNamara was pressed hard on these points vrhen he appeared before the Congressional armed services and appropriations comiuittees in August I965 with a major supplemental budget request for the Vietnam War. Senator Cannon asked:

I know that our policy was to not attack power stations and certain oil depots and so on earlier. But within the past two weeks we have noticed that you have attacked at least one or more power stations. I am wondering if your policy has actually changed now in regard to the targets. In other words, are we stepping up the desirability of certain targets?

Secretary McNamara replied:

I would say we are holding prim.arily to these targets I have outlined. This week's program, for example, includes primarily, I would say, 95 percent of the sorties against fixed targets are against supply depots, ammo depots, barracks. . .but only one or two percent of the sorties directed against /one power plant/-

I don't want to mislead you. We are not bombing in the Hanoi...or the Haiphong area. There is a very good reason for that. In Haiphong there is a substantial petroleum dump /for example/. First, there is question whether destruction of that dump would influence the level of supply into South Vietnam. Secondly, General ■ Westmoreland believes that an attack on that would lead to an attack on the petroleum dumps outside of Saigon that contain eighty percent of the petroleum storage for SVN. Thirdly, there is the real possibility that an attack on the Haiphong petroleum would substantially increase the risk of Chinese participation..•.for all those reasons it seems unwise at this time...to attack that petroleuia dump

In defending the policy of" not attacking the powerplants and POL sites concentrated in the Hanoi/Haiphong area, the Secretary did not stress the interdiction purposes of the bombing but rather the risks of widening the wa-^. He explained that an attack "on the powerplants and POL sites would require also attacking Fnuc Yen^ airfield and the surrounding SAM

sites:

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I had better not describe hov?- we would handle it but it would be one whale of a big attack... .this might well trig.ier, in the view of some, would trigger Chinese I I intervention on the ground... .This is what we wish to

avoid. 2k.

k

Before the House Comjnittee on Armed Services tvro days later. Secretary McRamara stressed both the irrelevance of targets like the POL facilities at Haiphong to infiltration into the South and the risks of Chinese intervention:

At present our bombing program against the North is directed primarily against the military targets that are associated with the infiltration of men and equipment into the South, ammo depots, supply depots, barracks areas, the particular lines of comjnunication over which these move into the South. For that reason, we have not struck in the Hanoi area because the targets are not as directly related to the infiltration of men and equipment as those outside the area....As to the Haiphong POL....if we strike that there will be greater pressure on Communist China to undertake military action in support of the Worth Vietnamese... .We want to avoid that if we possibly can.

On other occasions the Secretary put such stress on the limited interdiction purposes of the bombing that it seemed to virtually rule out altogether industrial and other "strategic" targets:

...we are seeking by our bombing in North Vietnam to reduce and make more costly the movement of men and supplies from North Vietnam, into South Vietnam for the support of the Viet Cong operations in South Vietnam. That's our primary military objective, and that requires that we bomb the lines of cormnunication primarily and secondarily, the amjnunition and supply depots... .The great bulk of our bombing...is directed against traffic moving on roads and railroads, and the other portion...is directed '" against specific targets associated with the lines of communication, primarily supply depots and...bridges....We think our.bombing policy is quite properly associated with the effort to stop the insurgency in South Vietnam. We've said time after time; It is not our objective to destroy the Government of North Vietnam. We're not seeking to wider the war. We do have a limited objective, and that's T^hy OUT targeting is limited as it is. _

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When asked whether the U.S. refrained from bombing NVN's more vital installations because it v/ould escalate the war, the Secretary added:

Well, I'm saying that the other installations you're speaking of are not directly related to insurgency in the Southj and that's v/hat we're fighting. And that our targeting should be associated with that insurgency....our objective is to sho\j them they can't win in the South. Until we do shovr that to them it's unlikely the insurgency in the South will stop, 26/

The Secretary's arguments had difficult sledding, however. As 1965 ended, the bombing restrictions were still under attack. The U.S. was heavily engaged in the ground war in the South, and a limited bombing campaign in the North did not make much sense to those who wanted to win it. The hawks v/ere very much alive, and there was mounting pressure to put more lightning and thunder into the air vmr. At that point, in not very propitious circumstances, the Administration halted the bombing entirely, and for 37 days, from 2k December I965 to 3I January 1966, pursued a vigorous diplomatic offensive to get negotiations started to end the war.

D. ■ The "Pause" --• 2^ December 196g to 3I January I966

1. The Pre "Pause Debate

An important element of the program developed by McNamara and his Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs, John McNaughton in July I965 was a pause in the bombing of North Vietnam. There had been a five-day pause in May, from the 13th through the l8th, apparently inspired by the President himself in an effort to see if the North Vietnamese government — which had previously indicated that any progress towards a settlement would be impossible so long as its territory was being bom^bed -- would respond with de-escalatory measures of its own. Yet the President also saw a pause as a means of clearing the way for an increase in the tempo of the air war in the absence of a satisfactory response from Hanoi. The May pause had been hastily arranged — almost, so the record makes it seem, as if on the spur of the moment -- and advance knowledge of it was so closely held, not only within the international community but also within the U.S. government, that no adeq.uate diplomatic preparation could be made. Its most serious shortcom.ing as an effective instrument of policy, however, lay in its very brief duration. To have expected a meaningful response in so short a tim.e, given the complexity of the political relationships not onlv within the North Vietnam.ese government and party, but also between Hanoi and the NLF in the South, and between Hanoi and its separate (and quarrelling) supporters within the Communist world, was to expect the imno^sible. 27/ Therefore, in his 20 July m-emiorandum to the President,

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Secretary McNamara wrote: "After the hh US/third-country battalions have been deployed and after some strong action has been taken in the. program of bombing the North (e.g.^ after the key railroad bridges north of Hanoi have been dropped) ^ we could, as part of a diplomatic initiative, consider introducing a 6-8 week pa,use in the program of bombing the North."

The pause which eventually occurred — for 37 days, from December 1965 until 3I January I966 — was somewhat shorter than the six-to-eight weeks McNamara suggested, but it was clearly long enough to allow the North Vietnamese fully to assess the options before them. They were not very attractive options, at least in the way they were ■ seen in Washington. McNam^ara summarized them in a memorandum to the President on ^0 November:

It is my belief that there should be a three- or four-week pause /note that McNamara himself no longer held to the six-to-eight week duration/ in the program of bombing the North before we either greatly increase our troop deployments to Vietnam or intensify our strikes against the North. The reasons for this belief are, first, that we must lay a foundation in the mind of the American public and in v7orld opinion for such an enlarged phase of the war and, second, we should give North Vietnam a face-saving chance to stop the aggression. 28/

In other words, Hanoi should be given the implicit (although, natur3.11y, not explicitly stated) choice of either giving up "its side of the war," as Secretary Rusk often put it, or facing a greater level of punishment from the United States. In an earlier memorandum, dated 3 November, and given to the President on the 7th, McNam.ara had remarked that "a serious effort would be made to avoid advertising /a pause/ as an ultimiatum to the DRV," 29 / yet Hanoi could sca^rcely have seen it as anything else. John McNaughton had perfectly encapsulated the Washington establishm.ent's view of a bombing pause the previous July, when he had noted in pencil in the margin of a draft mem.orandum the words "PT /i.e., ROLLim THUNDER/ (incl. Pause), ratchet»" 3p/ The image of a ratchet, such as the device which raises the net on a tennis court, backing off tension between each phase of increasing it, v/as precisely what McNaughton and McNamara, William Bundy and Alexis Johnson at State, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, had in mind when they thought of a pause. The only danger was, as McNamara •put it in his memorandum of 3 November, "being trapped in a status-auo cease-fire or in negotiations which, though unaccompanied by real concessions by the VC, made it politically costly for us to terminate

the Pause."

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McNamara and McNaughton v/ere optimistic that, by skillful diplomacy^ this pitfall could be avoided- Rusk, Bundy and Johnson, who had to perform the required diplomatic task, and the Chiefs, who were professionally distrustful of the diplomatic art and of the ability of the political decision-makers in Washington to resist the pressures from the "peace movement" in the United States, v/ere not so sure. The Chiefs (echoing General Westmoreland and Admiral Sharp) were also opposed to any measures which would, even momentarily, reduce the pressure on North Vietnam, The arguments for and against a pause were summarized in a State Department memorandum to the President on 9 November:

The purposes of — and Secretary McNamara's arguments for -- such a pause are four:

(a) It would offer Hanoi and the Viet Cong a chance to move toward a solution if they should be so inclined, removing the psychological barrier of continued bombing and permitting the Soviets and others to bring moderating arguments to bear;

(b) It vrould demonstrate to domestic and international critics that x^e had indeed made every effort for a peaceful settlement before proceeding to intensified actions, notably the latter stages of the extrapolated Rolling Thunder program;

(c) It would probably tend to reduce the dangers of escalation after we had resumed the bombing, at least insofar as the Soviets were concerned;

(d) It would set the stage for another pause, perhaps in late I966, which might produce a settlement.

Against these propositions, there are the following considerations arguing against a pause:

(a) In the absence of any indication from Hanoi as to what reciprocal action it might take, we could well find ourselves in the position of having played this very important card without receiving anything substantial in return- There are no indications that Hanoi is yet in a mood to c.gree to a settlement acceptab-'^.e to us. The chance is therefore, very slight that a pause at this time could lead to an acceptable settlement.

(b) A unilater9,l pause at this time would offer an excellent opportujaity for Hanoi to interpose obstacles to • our resumption of bombing and to demoralize South Vietnam

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by indefinitely dangling "before us (and the -world) the prospect of negotiations \;ith no intent of reaching an acceptable settlement. It might also tempt the Soviet Union to make threats that tjould render very difficult a decision to resume bombing.

(c) In Saigon^ obtaining South Vietnam.ese acquiescence to a pause vould be difficult. It could adversely affect the Government's solidity. Any major falling out betveen the Government and the United States or any overturn in the Governm.ent' s political structure could set us back very severly ( sic ).

(d) An additional factor is that undertaking the second course of action following a pause /i-_e_. ^ "extrapolation" of ROLLING THUDIDER/ vould give this course a much more dram.atic character^ both internationally and dom.es-tically^ and "would^ in particular_, present the Soviets -with those difficult choices that -we have heretofore been successful in avoiding.

After this summary of the competing arguments^ the State paper --speaking for Secretary Rusk -- came down against a bombing pause. The paper continued:

On balance J the arguments against the pause are convincing to the Secretary of State ^ who recomjaends that it not be undertaken at the present time. The Secretary of State believes that a pause should be undertaken only when and if the chances were significantly greater than they now appear that Hanoi would respond by reciprocal actions leading in the direction of a peaceful settlem.ent. He further believes that^ from the standpoint of international and dom_estic opinion^ a pause might become an overriding requirement only if we were about to reach the advanced stages of an extrapolated Rolling Thunder program involving extensive air operations in the Hanoi/Haiphong area. Since the Secretary of State believes that such advanced stages are not in them-selves desirable until the tide in the South is more favorable^ he does not feel that^ even accepting the point of view of the Secretary of De:^ense^ there is now any international requirement to consider a "Pause," 31/

Basic to Rusk's position_, as John McNaughton pointed out in a memorandum to Secretary McNam.ara the same day^ was the assumption that a bombing pause was a "card" which could be "played" only once. In fact McNaughton wrote ^ "it is more reasonable to think that it could be played any number of times^ with the arguments against it_,'

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"but not those for it^ "becoming less valid each time." 3^ / I"t vas this argument of McKaughton's which lay behind the Defense position that one of the chief reasons for a pause vas that even if it vere to -nroduce no response from Hanoi^ it might set '.^he stage for another pause perhaps late in 1966^ vhich might "be "productive."

The available materials do not reveal the President's response to these arguments^ but it is clear from the continuing flow of papers that he delayed positively committing himself either for or against a pause until very shortly before the actual pause began. Most of these papers retraced old ground^ repeating the arguments vhich ve have already examined. A State mem^orandum by William Bundy on 1 December however^, added some new ones. 33 / '^^ summary_j they were:

F OR a bombing pause (in addition to those we have already seen):

--Soviet Ambassador Dobiynin had "recently urged a 'pause' on McGeorge Bundy and had pretty clearly indicated the Soviets would make a real effort if we undertook one; however^ he was equally plain in stating that he could give no assurance of any clear result."

--"American casualties are mounting and further involvement appears likely. A pause can demonstrate that the President has taken every possible means to find a peaceful solution and obtain domestic support for the further actions that we will have to take."

--"There are already signs of dissension between Moscow^ Peking_, Hanoi and the Viet Cong, The pause is certain to stimulate further dissension on the other side and add to the strains in the Communist camp as they argue about how to deal with it." Moreover^ it would decrease the ability of Hanoi or Peking to bring pressure on ■Moscow to escalate Soviet support.

--"Judging by experience during the last war_, the resumption of bombing after a pause would be even more painful to the population of North Vietnam than a fairly steady

■ rate of bombing."

--"The resumption of bombing after a pause^ combined with increased United States deployments in the South^ would remove any doubts the other side may have about U.S. determination to stay the course and finish the job."

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AGAINST a bombing pause ^ fever new arguments were adduced. Those vhich ve have seen^ however^ vere restated -with greater force. Thus it vas noted that while Hanoi had said it could never "negotiate" so long as the bombing continued^ it had given no sign whatsoever that even with a complete cessation (this^ the paper pointed out^ and not a "pause/' was what the DRV really insisted upon) it would be led to "meaningful" negotiations or to de-escalatory actions. It mighty for example^ offer to enter into negotiations on condition that the bombing not be resmned and/or that the NLF be seated at the conference on a basis of full equality with the GVN. Both of these conditions would be clearly unacceptable to the U.Soj which would run the danger of having to resume bombing in the face of what m,ajor sectors of domestic and international opinion would regard as a "reasonable" Hanoi offer: "In other words^ instead of improving our present peace-seeking posture^ we could actually end up by damaging it severely." And in doing so^ the U.S. would "lose the one card that we have which offers any hope of a settlement that does more than reflect the balance of forces on the ground in the South." (Here^ it may be noted^ was the ultimate claim that could be m.ade for the bombing program, in the face of criticism that it had failed to achieve its objective of interdicting the flow of men and materials to the South.)

To these arguments_, essentially restatements of ones we have previously seen^ were added:

--"There is a danger that^ in spite of any steps we may take to offset it^ Hanoi may misread a pause at this time as indicating that we are giving way to international pressures to stop the bombing of North Vietnam and that our resolve with respect to South Vietnam is thus weakening." This danger had recently increased_, the paper noted^ because of peace demonstrations in the United States and the first heavy American casualties in South Vietnam.

--Just as a pause would m.ake it m.ore difficult to cope with the domestic "doves^" so it would the "hawks" as well: "Pressure from the Rivers/Nixon sector to hit Hanoi and Plaiphong hard might also increase very

sharply....

■ --"If a 'pause' were in fact to lead to negotiations (with or without resumed bombing)^ we would then have continuing serious problems in maintaining South Vietnamese stability. We must also recognize that^ although we ourselves have some fairly good initial ideas of the positions we would take^ we have not been able to go over the ground with the GVN or to get beyond general propositions on some of which we and they might well disagree."

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These statements amounted, then, to the contention that just as the United States could not afford to initiate a bombing pause that mig^it fail to produce negotiation.; and a de-escalation, neither could it afford to initiate one that succeeded.

Bundy's memorandum of 1 December contained no recommendations- It was a draft, sent out for comment to Under-Secretary Ball Ambassadors Thompson and Johnson, Johja McNaughton, and McGeorge Bundy. Presumably, although there is no indication of it, copies also went to Secretaries Rusk and McNam.ara. By 6 December, William Bundy and Alexis Johnson were able to prepare another version, repeating the same arguments in briefer compass, and this time making an agreed recom-mendation. It stated: "After balancing these opposing considerations, we unanimously recommend that you / "i>e, , the President/ approve a pause as soon as possible this month. The decision would, of course, be subject to consultation and joint action with the GVN." gV Thus, at some point between 9 November and 6 December (the available documents do not reveal when). Secretary Rusk evidently dropped his objection to a pause.

Getting the agreement of the Ky government to a pause was no easy task. Ambassador Lodge reported that he himself opposed the notion of a pause because of the unsettling effects it would have on the South Vietnam political situation. Only by m.aking very firm commitments for large increases in American force levels during the coming year, Lodge warned, could Washington obtain even Saigon's grudging acq.uiescence in a pause. This is not the place to describe the process by which the GVN's consent was obtained; it is sufficient to note that nowhere in Saigon, neither within the government nor vrithin the American Embassy and Military Assistance Comm.and, was the prospect of any relaxation of pressure on the North — for any reason — greeted with any enthusiasm.

2, Resmaption — Wien and At What Level?

Implicit in the very notion of "pause," of course, is the eventual resumption of the activity being discontinued. Among the nrincipals in Washington concerned with Vietnam, consideration of the circumstances and conditions in which the bombing of North Vietnam would be resimied went hand-in-hand with consideration of its interruption. "Relatively early in this process, in his Presidential memorandum of ? November Se .iretary McNamara distinguished between what he termed a "hard-line" and a "soft-line" pause. "Under a 'hard-line' Pause," he wrote "we v/ould be firmly resolved to resume bombing unless the Com-rrunists were clearly moving toward m-eeting ovx declared terms... .Under

'soft-line' Pause, we would be willing to feel our way with respect to termination of the Pause, with less insistence on concrete concessions by the Communists."

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McNamara himself came down on the side of a "hard-line" pause -- a "scft-line" pause would make sente^ he noted, only if the U.S. sought a "compromise" outcome. The words "hard-line" and "soft-line" became terms of art, employed by all of the principals in their papers dea^ling with the question of a pause. Throughout this discussion, it was taken for granted that bombing v/ould be resumed. The only point at issue was how. On 3 December, John McNaughton v/rote an "eyes only" memorandum ( whose eyes was not specified, but presumably they included those of the Secretary of Defense) entitled, "Hard-Line Pause Packaged to Minimize Political Cost of Resuming Bombing." He specified four conditions, all of which would have to be met by the enemy in order to forestall the res\;miption of bombing:

"a. The DRV stops infiltration and direction of the war.

b. The DRV moves convincingly toward withdrawal of infiltrators.

c. The VC stop attacks^ terror and sabotage.

d. The VC stop significant interference v/ith the GVN's exercise of governmental functions over substantially all of South Vietnam." 36/

Clearly it was unlikely that the enemy would even begin to meet any of these conditions, but Hanoi^ at least (if not the NLF) , might move towards some sort of negotiations. In that event, the resumption of bombing when "peace moves" were afoot v^ould incur a heavy political price for the United States. In order to maintain the political freedom to resume bomhing without substantial costs, the U.S. government v;'Ould have to make clear from the outset that it intended only a pause, certainly not a permanent cessation of the bombing^ and that its continua^tion would depend upon definite actions by the enemy. Yet there v/as a problem, as McNaughton saw it, as to which definite actions to specify. He recognized that the United States could not easily list the conditions he had put forward earlier in his memorandum. McNaughton expressed his dilemma in the following terms:

In consistent objectives . A Pause has two objectives--(a) T"iJ-i'l^s^'^^ "^^^ ^^^ ^^ back out o."* the war and (b) to create a public im.pression of US willingness "to try everything" before further increases in military action. To maximize the chance that the DRV would decide to back out would reQuire presenting them with an ex plicit proposal, in a form where some clearly defined conduct on their part would assure ■ them of no more bombings. The truth of the matter, however, is that the hard-line objective is, in effect, capitulation

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'by a CoiTHAunist force vhich is far from "beaten^ has unlimited (if unattractive) reserves availatile in China^ and is confident that it is fighting for a just principle. To spell out such "capitulation" in explicit terms is more likely to subject us to ridicule than to produce a favorable public reaction. It follows that the hard-line objectives should be blurred somevhat in order to m.aximi2e favorable public reaction^ even though such blurring -would I ■ reduce the chances of DRV acceptance of the terms.

If McNaughton was reluctant to spell out U.S. "hard-line" objectives_, he was nevertheless anxious not to allov a situation to ; develop vhere the enemy could make its mere participation in negotia-

tions a sufficient quid pro quo for a continuation of the pause. Regard-I ing negotiations^ McNaughton suggested_, the Am.erican position should be:

j "We are villing to negotiate no matter "what military actions are going

on." Moreover^ when bombing was resum.ed^ the ending of the pause should be tied to Hanoi's failure to take de-escalatory actions. "People might criticize our Pause for not having been generous _," McNaughton wrote^ "but they will be unlikely to attack the US for having failed to live up to the deal we offered with the Pause.'" 37/

McNaughton recommended that the first strikes after a resumption should be "identified as militarily required interdiction/* in order to minimize political criticism.. "Later strikes could then be escalated to other kinds of targets and to present or higher levels." I ■ (j\t the time McNaughton wrote^ the pause had not yet gone into effect.)

Similar advice came from William Bundy^ writing on 15 January during the

pause:

Resumed bombing should not begin with a dram.atic strike that was even at the margin of past practice (such as the power plant in December). For a period of two-three weeks at least^ while the world is digesting and assessing the pause^ we should do as little as possible to lend fuel to the charge -- which will doubtless be ' the main theme of Communist propaganda -- that the pause was intended all along merely as a prelude to more drastic action.

I Moieover^ from a m.ilitary standpoint alone^ the

I ' ^Qg-t i mjnediate need would surely be to deal with the

communications lines and barracks areas south of the 20th parallel. A week or two of this would perhaps make sense from both military and political stand-^^^-^g^ After that we could m^ove against the northeast ^ ^gj_X and road lines again, but the very act of gradual-

ness should reduce any chance that the Chicoms /the

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Chinese Conirriunists]r vill react to some nev or dramatic vay vlien ve do so. Extensions of past practice^ such as Haiphong POL /petroleum^ oil^ and lulDricants/^ should be a third stage. 38/

McNaughton and Bundy were in essential agreement: the bombing should be re summed; it should be resumed on a low key at first; but after a decent interval it should be escalated at least to the extent of striking at the Haiphong POL storage facilities^ and perhaps other high-priority targets as well. In their own eyes the two Assistant Secretaries were cautious^ prudent men. Their recomimendations were in marked contrast to those of the Joint Chiefs of Staff ^ who (as this paper shows in greater detail later) pressed throughout the auturmi and winter of 1965-66 for permission to expand the bombing virtually into a program of strategic bombing aimed at all industrial and economic resources as well as at all interdiction targets. The Chiefs did so^ it may be added^ despite the steady stream pf m.emoranda from the intelligence comm.unity consistently expressing skepticism that bombing of any conceivable sort (that iS; any except bombing aim.ed primarily at the destruction of North Vietnam's population) could either persuade Hanoi to negotiate a settlement on US/gVN terms or effectively limit Hanoi's ability to infiltrate men and supplies into the South.

i These arguments of the Chiefs were essentially an exten-

sion and amplification of arguments for large-scale resumption received

'I " from the field throughout the pause. Apparently^ neither Lodge^ VJestmore-

land^ nor Sharp received advance intimation that the suspension might

i| continue not for a few days_, as in the preceding May^ but for several weeks.

When notified that full-scale ground operations could recommence_, following

I the Christmas cease-fire_, as soon as there was "confirmed evidence of

significant renewed Viet Cong violence_," they were simply told that air operations against North Vietnam would not immediately resume. They were assured^ however^

We, will stand ready to order inmiediate renewal of ROLLING THUNDER...at any tim^e based on your reports and recomjrnendations. 39 /

None of the three hesitated long relaying- such recommendations. "Although I am not aware of all the considerations leading to the continuation of the standdown in ROLLING THUI^ER/' General Westmoreland cabled on December 27^ "I consider that their immediate resumption is essential." He continued,

"...our only hope of a m.ajor impact on the ability of the DRV to support the war in Vietnam is continuous air attack over the entire length of their LOC's from the Chinese border to South Vietnam.,..Notwithstanding the

heavy pressure on their transportation system in the

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past 9 montlis^ they have demonstrated an ability to deploy forces into South Vietnam at a greater rate than ve are deploying U.S. forces,...Considering the course of the "war in South Vietnam and the capahility vhich has been built up here by the PAVl^l/VC forces -- the full impact of which we have not yet felt -- the curtailment of operations in North Vietnam is unsound from a militaiy standpoint. Indeed^ we should no/w_7 step up our effort to higher levels, ^o/

Ambassador Lodge seconded this recommendation^ and Admiral Sharp filed his own pleas not only that ROLLING THUNDER be resumed "at once" but that his previous recomjraendations for enlarging it be adopted. The aim should be to "drastically reduce the flow of military supplies reaching the DRV and hence the VC/* he argued^ adding "the anned forces of the United States should not be required to fight this war with one arm tied behind their backs." Ul/

One reason for ignorance in Saigon and Honolulu of the bombing suspension's possible continuation was that the President had apparently never fully committed himself to the timietable proposed by McNamara. Replying to Lodge on December 28^ Rusk cabled a summ.aiy of the President's thinking. As of that mom.ent^ said the Secretary of State^ the President contemplated extending the pause only "for several more days^ possibly into middle of next week_," i.e.^ until January 5 or 6. His aim in stretching out the pause was only in small part to seek negotiations .

We do not_, quite frankly^ anticipate that Hanoi will respond in any significant way.... There is only the slimm.est of chances that suspension of bombing will be occasion for basic change of objective by other side but communist propaganda on this subject should be tested and exposed.

The key reasons for extending the pause^ Lodge was told^ were diplomatic and domestic. Some hope existed of using the interval to "drive [b.J rift between Communist powers and between Hanoi and NLF." Even more hopeful were indications that the government's act of self-abnegation would draw support at home. The latest Harris poll^ Lodge was informed^ shoved 73^ favoring a new effort for a cease-fire _, 59*5^ in favor of a bombing pause, and 6lfo in favor of stepping up bombing if the pause produced no result.

The prospect of large-scale reinforcem.ent in men and defense budget increases of som.e twenty billions for the next eighteen month period requires solid preparation of the American public. A crucial element will be clear demonstration that we have explored fully every alternative but that aggressor has left us no choice. ^/

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This message v/ent to Lodge as "EYES ONLY" for himself and Ambassador Porter. To vrhat extent its contents vrere shared with General Westmoreland or other military or naval personnel^ available doctiments do not indicate. In any case, the Embassy in Saigon had received from the very highest authority the same kind of intim^ation that opponents of the pause had been given in Washington. If the period of inaction would prepare American and world opinion for more severe measures, it followed that the next stage would see such measures put into effect. ■ .

As the pause continued beyond the deadline mentioned to Lodge, military planners in Saigon, Honolulu, and Washington worked at defining what these severe measures ought to be. On January 12, Admiral Sharp sent the Joint Chiefs a long cable, summarizing the conclusions of intensive planning by his staff and that of COMUSMACV.

We began Rolling/ Thunder/ with very limited objectives, at a time when PAVN infiltration was of less significance than it is nov/,

CINCPAC commented,

....When RT began, there was considerable hope of causing Hanoi to cease aggression through an increasing pressure brought to bear through carefully timed destruction of selected resources, accompanied by threat of greater losses...But...the nature of the war has changed since the air campaign began. RT has not forced Hanoi to the decision which we sought. There is now every indication that Ho Chi Minh intends to continue support of the VC until he is denied the capability to do so....We must do all that we can to make it as difficult and costly as possible for Hanoi to continue direction and support of aggression. In good conscience, we should not long delay resumption of a RT program designed to meet the changed nature of the war.

Specifically, Admiral Sharp recommended:

1. "....interdiction of land LOC's from China and closing of the ports ... ._^he7 northeast q.uadrant... .must be opened up for armed recce with authority to attack LOC targets as necessary." . . ■

2 "Destruction of resources within WVN should begin

with POL. Every known POL facility and distribution activity should be destroyed and harassed until the war is concluded. Denial of electric power facilities should begin at an early date and continue lontil all

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plants are out of action....All large military facilities should be destroyed in Northern NVW...,

3. We should mount an intensified armed reconnsaissance program without sortie restriction, to harass, disrupt and Q.ttv±t/eJJ the dispersed and hidden military facilities and activities south of 20 deg/reesj....

These three tasks well done will bring the enemy to the conference table or cause the insurgency to wither from lack of support. The alternative appears to be a long and costly counterinsurgency -- costly in U.S. and GVN lives and material resources. U3/

Writing the Secretary of Defense on January 18, the Joint Chiefs offered an eq.ually bold definition of a post-pause bombing campaign. The Chiefs argued that the piecemeal nature of previous attacks had permitted the DRV to adapt itself to the bomb-i , -ing, replenish and disperse its stocks, diversify its transportation

system and improve its defenses. Complaining about the geographic and num.erical restrictions on the bombing, the Chiefs recommended that "offensive air operations against WN should be resumed nov7 with ^ a sharp blow and thereafter maintained with uninterrupted, increasing

pressure, hk/ The Chiefs further argued that,

. These operations should be conducted in such a manner and be of sufficient magnitude to: deny the DRV large-scale external assistance; destroy those resources already in WN which contribute most to the support of aggression; destroy or deny use of military facilities; and harass, disrupt and impede the movement of men and materials into SVN. h^ /

The shutting off of external assistance would req.uire3

...closing of the ports as v;ell as sustained interdiction of land LOCs from China....Military considerations would dictate that mining be conducted now ; however, ^Yie Joint Chiefs.. .appreciate the sensitivity of such a j I ' measure and recognize that precise timing must take into

account political factors. U6 /

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unhampered by the existing restrictions on sortie number, that ^INCPAC has recommended, the Chiefs urged the reduction of the size of the sanctuaries around Hanoi, Haiphong and the China border. More impor-■ tantly the Chiefs requested authorization to eliminate the airfields if req.uired and permission for operational comjnanders "to deal with the 3MA threat, as req.uired to prevent interference with planned air operations." ^

The Chiefs acknowledged the likely adverse response to this sharp escalation in the international community, but urged the necessity of the proposed actions. In dealing with the an_xieties about Chinese commiunist entry into the war, they neatly turned the usual argument that China would enter the war in response to escalatory provocation on its head by arguing that a greater likelihood was Chinese entry through mi s calculat i on.

The Joint Chiefs...believe that continued US restraint may serve to increase rather than decrease the likelihood of such intervention ^hinesej by encouraging gradual responses on the part of the Chinese Communists. This is in addition to the probable interpretation of such restraint as US vacillation by both the Communist and Free World leadership. ^8/

The Chiefs spelled out their specific proposals in their concluding recommendations:

a. The authorized area for offensive air operations be expanded to include all of NVN less the area encom.passed by a ten-mile radius around Hanoi/phuc Yen Airfield, a four-mile radius around Haiphong, and a tv/enty-mile China buffer zone. Exceptions to perm.it selected strikes within these restricted areas, in accordance with the air campaign described herein, will be conducted only as authorized by the Joint Chiefs

b. Numerical sortie limitations on armed reconnaissance in NVTI be removed.

c. No tactical restrictions or limitations be imposed upon the execution of the specific air strikes.

d. The Joint Chiefs...be authorized to direct CINCPAC to conduct the air campaign against the DRV as described

herein. ^9 /

On the same day as the Chiefs* Memorandum, and perhaps in tion to it John McNaughton set dovm V7hat he termed "Some Observations about Bombing North Vietnam." 50/ It is not clear to whom the

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paper was addressed, or v/ho saw it. But it comprises perhaps the most effective political case that could have been made for the bombing program in early 1966, by a writer who was intimately involved with every detail of the prograra and vrho was fully aware of all its limitations. As such its most important sections are worth extensive quotation here- They were the following:

3* Purposes of the program of bombing the North . The purposes of the bombing are m.ainly:

a. To interdict infiltration.

b. To bring about negotiations (by indirect third-party pressure flowing from fear of escalation and by direct pressure on Hanoi).

c. To provide a bargaining counter in negotiations (or in a tacit "minuet").

d. To sustain GVN and US morale.

Short of drastic action against the North Vietnamese population (and query even then), the program probably cannot be expected directly or indirectly to persua,de Hanoi to come to the table or to settle either (l) while Le Duan and other militants are in ascendance in the politburo or (2) while the North thinks it can win in the South. The only questions are tv7o: (3) Can the program be expected to reduce (not just increase the cost of) DRV aid to the South below what it would other\iise be — and hopefully to put a ceiling on it -- so that we can achieve a military victory or, short of that, so that their failure in the South will cause them to lose confidence in victory there? (Our World War II experience indicates that only at that time can the squeeze on the North be expected to be a bargaining counter). And (k) is the political situation (vis a vis the "hard-liners" at home, in the GVN and elsewhere) such that the bom^bing must be carried on for morale reasons? (The negative morale effect of now stopping bombing North Vietnam could be substantial but it need not be considered unless the interdiction reason fails.)

h* " Analysis of past interdiction efforts. The program • so far has not successfully interdicted infiltration of men ' and materiel into South Vietnam (although it may have caused the North to concentrate its logistic resources on the trail, to the advantage of our efforts in support of Souvanna). Des"Dite our armed reconnaissance efforts and'strikes on rail-roads bridges, storage centers, training bases and other key

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links in their lines of communications, it is estim-ated that they are capable of generating in the North and infiltrating to the South U5OO men a month and between 50 and 300 (an average of 200) tons a day depending on the season. The insufficiency of the interdiction effort is obvious when one realizes that the 110 battalions of PAW (27) and VC (83) forces in Vietnam need only 20 or so tons a day from North Vietnam to sustain "1964" levels of activity and only approxim.ately 80 tons a day to sustain "light combat" (l/5th of the force in contact once every 7 days using l/3d of their basic load). The expansion of enemy forces is expected to involve the infiltration of 9 new PAVN and the generation of 7 new VC combat battalions a month, resulting (after attrition) in a leveled-off force of 155 battalions at end-1966. The req.uirements from the North at that time — assuming that the enemy refuses, as it can, to permat the level of corn-bat to exceed "light" --should approximate 1^0 tons a day, less than half the dry-season infiltration capability and less than three-q,uarters the average infiltration capability.

5. The effective interdiction program . The flow of propaganda and military communications cannot be physically interdicted. But it is possible that the flow of men and materiel to the crucia^l areas of South Vietnam can be. The interdiction can be en route into North Vietnam from the outside world, inside North Vietnam, en route from the North by sea or through Laos or Cambodia to South Vietnam, and inside South Vietnam. It can be by destruction or by slow down. The effectiveness can be prolonged by exhausting the North's repair capability, and can be enhanced by complicating their communications and control machinery. The ingredients of an effective interdiction program in North Vietnam must be these:

a. Intensive around-the-clock armed reconnaissance throughout NVN.

b. Destruction of the LOC targets heretofore tar targeted.

-, Destruction of POL.

d. Destruction of thermal pov^-er plants.

e. Closing of the ports.

.It has been estimated (without convincing back-up) that an intensive progre.m could reduce Hanoi *s capability to supply

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forces in the South to 50 tons a day — too little for flexibili':y and for frequent offensive actions, perhaps too little to defend themselves against aggressive US/gvN forces 5 and too little to permit Hanoi to continue to deploy forces with confidence that they could be supplied.

6. Possible further efforts against the North . Not included in the above interdiction program are these actions against the North:

f. Destruction of industrial targets.

g. Destruction of locks and daims.

h. Attacks on population targets (per se).

The judgment is that, because North Vietnam's economy and organization is predominantly rural and not highly interdependent, attacks on industrial targets are not likely to contribute either to interdiction or to persuasion of the regime. Strikes at population targets (per se) are likely not only to create a counterproductive wave of revulsion abroad and at home, but greatly to increase the risk of enlarging the war with China and the Soviet Union. Destruction of locks and dams, however --if handled right -- might (perhaps after the next Pause) offer promise. It should be studied. Such destruction does not kill or drown people. By shallow-flooding the rice, it leads after time to widespread starvation (more than a million?) unless food is provided — which we could offer to do "at the conference table/'

7. Nature of resiHued program against the North . The new ROLLING THUNDER program could be:

a. None, on grounds that net contribution to success is negative-

b. Resi:ime where we left- off, with a "flat-line" extrapolation.

c. Resume where we left off, but with slow continued escalation.

d. Resume where we left off, but with fast escalation.

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On the judgment that it will not "flash" the Soviet Union or China -- we should follovr Course d (fast escalation). Failure to resuine would serve none of our purposes and make us appear irresolute. A "flat line" program would reduce infiltration (but not belov? PAVN/vC needs) and would placate GVW and domestic pressures. But this is not good enough. A fast (as compared-with a slow) escalation serves a double purpose — (l) it promises q.uickly to interdict effectively^ i.e., to cut the DRV level of infiltration to a point below the VC/PAVN requirements, and (2) it promises to m-ove events fast enough so that the Chinese "take-over" of North Vietnam resulting from our program will be a visible phenomenon, one which the DRV may choose to reject. There is some indication that China is "smothering North Vietnam with a loving embrace•" North Vietnam probably does not like this but, since it is being done by "salami slices" in reaction to our "salami-slice" bombing program, North Vietnam is not inspired to do anything about it. This condition, if no other, argues for escalating the war against North Vietnam more rapidly --so that the issue of Chinese encroachment will have to be faced by Hanoi in bigger bites, and so that the DRV m.ay elect for a settlement rather than for greater Chinese . infringement of North Vietnam's independence. The objections to the "fast" escalation are (l) that it runs serious risks of "flashing" the Chinese and Soviets and (2) that it gets the bombing program against the North "out of phase" with progress in the South. With respect to the first objection, there are disagreements as to the likelihood of such a "flash"; as for the second one, there is no reason why the two programs should be "in phase" if, as is the case, the main objective is to interdict infiltration, not to "persuade the unpersuadable." .

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9. Criticisms of the program . There are a number of criticisms of the program of bombing North Vietnam:

Q-* Cost in men and materiel . The program of bombing the North through I965 cost 10C(?) airmen (killed and missing or prisoner) and I78 US or South Vietnamese aircraft (costing about $250 (?) million) in addition to the amjnunition and other operating costs. The losses and costs in 1966 are expected to be 200(?) airmen and 300(? ) aircraft.

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"b* Damage to peaceful image of the US . A price paid for because of our program of bombing the North has been damage to our image as a country which eschews armed attacks on other nations. The hue and cry correlates with the kind of weapons (e.g., bombs vs. napalm), the kind of targets (e.g., bridges vs. people), the location of targets (e.g., south vs. north), and not least the extent to which the critic feels threatened by Asian communism (e.g., Thailand vs. the UK). Furthermore, for a given level of bombing, the hue and cry is less now than it was earlier, perhaps to some extent helped by Communist intransigence toward discussions. The objection to our "warlike" image and the approval of our fulfilling our commitments competes in the minds of many nations (and individuals) in the world, producing a schizophrenia....

c. Impact on US-Soviet d etente. The bombing program -- because it appears to reject the policy of "peaceful co-existence," because it involves azi attack on a "fellow socialist country," because the Soviet people have vivid horrible memories of air bombing, because it challenges the USSR as she competes with China for leadership of the Communist world, and because US and Soviet arm-s are novr striking each other in North Vietnam -- has seriously strained the US-Soviet detente, making constructive arms-control and other cooperative programs more difficult... .At the same time, the bombing program offers the Soviet Union an opportunity to play a role in bringing peace to Vietnam, by gaining credit for persuading us to terminate the program. There is a chance that the scenario could spin out this way; if so, the effect of the entire experience on the US-Soviet detente could be a net plus.

d. Impact on Chicom role in DRV . So long as the program continues, the role of China in North Vietnam will increase- Increased Chinese aid will be req.uired to protect against and to repair destruction. Also, the

t ■ strikes against North Vietnamese "sovereign territories,"

by involving their "honor" more than would otherwise be the case increases the risk that the DRV would accept a substantially increased Chinese role, however unattractive that may be, in order to avoid a "^national defeat" (failure of the war of liberation in the South). •

e. Ri sk of escalation . The bombing program — especially as strikes move toward Hanoi and toward China and as encounters vrith Soviet/chinese SAI-Is/MTGs/vessels-at-sea occur — increases the risk of escalation into a

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"broader v;ar. The most risky actions are mining of the ports, bombing of cities (or possibly dams), and landings in North Vietnam.

10. Req.uirements of a program designed to "persuade" (not i nterdict ). A bombing progra.m focused on the objective of^'persuasion" would have these characteristics:

a. Emphasize the threat . The program should be structured to capitalize on fear of the future. At a given time, "pressure" on the DRV depends not upon the current level of bombing but rather upon the credible threat of future destruction (or other painful conseq.uence, such as an unwanted increased Chinese role) which can be avoided by agreeing to negotiate or agreeing to some settlement in negotiations. Further, it is likely that North Vietnam, would be more influenced by a threatened resumption of a given level of destruction -- the "hot-cold" treatment -- than by a threat to maintain the same level of destruction; getting "irregu-larity" into our pattern is important-

b. Minimize the loss of DRV "face." The program should be designed to make it politically easy for the DRV

to enter negotiations and to make concessions during negotiations. It is politically easier for North Vietnam to accept negotiations and/or to make concessions at a time v/hen bombing of their territory is not currently taking place. Thus we shall have to contemplate a succession of Pauses.

e. Maintain a "military" cover . To avoid the allegation that we are practicing "pure blackmail," the targets should be military targets and the declaratory policy should not be that our objective is to sq,ueeze the DRV to the talking table, but should be that our objective is only to destroy military targets.

Thus, for purposes of the objective or promoting a settlement three guidelines emerge: (l) Do not practice "strategic" bombing; (2) do not abandon the program; and (3) carry out strikes oily as freq.uently as is req.uii ed to keep alive fear of the future. Because DRV "face" plays a role and because we can never tell at what time in the feature the DRV might be willing to talk settlement, a program with fairly long gaps between truly painful strikes at "military" targets would be optimum; it would balance the need to maintain the threat v/ith the need to be in an extended pause when the DRV m^ood changed. Unfortunately, so long as full VC victory

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in the South appears likely, the effect of the bombing program in promoting negotiations or a settlement will probably be small. Thus, because of the present balance in the South, the date of such a favorable DRV change of mood is not likely to be in the near future....

11. Elements of a com-promdse program . There is a conflict between the objective of "persuading Hanoi," which would dictate a program of painful surgical strikes separated by fairly long gaps, and the objective of interdiction, which would benefit from continuous heavy bombings-No program can be designed which optimizes the chances of achieving both objectives at the same time. The kind of program which should be carried out in the future therefore depends on the relative importance and relative likelihood of success of the objectives at any given time. In this copjiection, the following questions are critical:

a. How likely is it that the Communists will star t talking ? The more likely this is, the more emphasis "should be put on the "pressure/bargaining counter" program (para 10 above). The judgment is that the Communists are not likely to be interested in talking at least for the next few months.

"^ • How important to the military campaign is infiltration and how efficiently can we frustrate the flovr? The more important that preventable infiltration is, the more emphasis should be put on the interdiction program, (para 5 above). Unfortunately, the data are not clear on these points....

12. Reconciliation. The actions which these considerations seem now to imply are these, bearing in mind that our principal objective is to promote an acceptable outcom.e:

a. Spare non-interdiction targets. Do not bomb any non-interdiction targets in North Vietnam, since such strikes are not consistent with either of the two obiectives. Such painful non-interdiction raids should

be carried out only occasionally, pursuant to the rationale explained in para 10 above.

b. Interdict. Continue an interdiction program in the immediate future, as described in para 5 above, since the Conmiunists are not likely to be willing to talk very soon and since it is possible that the interdiction program will be critical in keeping the Communist effort in South Vietnam within manageable proportions.

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c. Study politically cheaper methods. Conduct a study to see whether most of the benefits of the interdiction cajnpaign can be achieved by a Laos-STO barrier or by a bombing program which is limited to the Laos-SVN border areas of North Vietnam^ to Laos and/or to South Vietnam (and, if so, transition the interdiction program in that direction). The objective here is to find a way to maintain a ceiling on potential communist military activity in the South with the least political cost and with the least interference with North Vietnam willingness to negotiate.

McNaughton prepared a second memorandiJim complementing and partially modifying the one on bombing. It concerned the context for the decision. Opening with a paragraph which warned, "We...have in Vietnam the ingredients of an enormous miscalculation," it sketched the dark outlines of the Vietnamese scene:

...the AJRVN is tired, passive and accommodation-prone.... The PAVN/vC are effectively matching our deployments.... The bombing of the North...m.ay or may not be able effectively to interdict infiltration (partly because the PAVN/vC can simply refuse to do battle if supplies are short)... .Pacification is stalled despite efforts and hopes. The GVN political infrastructure is moribund and weaker than the VC infrastructure among most of the rural population....South Vietnam is near the edge of serious inflation and economic chaos. 51/

The situation might alter for the better, McNaughton conceded. "Attrition — save Chinese intervention -- may push the DRV 'against the stops' by the end of I966." Recent RAND motivation and morale studies shewed VC spirit flagging and their grip on the peasantry growing looser. "The Ky government is coming along, not delivering its promised 'revolution' but making progress slowly and gaining experience and stature each week." Though McNaughton termed it "doubtful that a meaningful ceiling can be put on infiltration," he said "there is no doubt that the cost of infiltration can...be made very high and that the flov/ of supplies can be reduced substantially below what it would otherwise be." Possibly bombing, combined with other pressures, could bring the DRV to consider terms after "a period of months, not of days or even weeks." . ■

The central point of McNaughton's memorandum, following from its opening warning, was that the United States, too, should consider coming to terms. He wrote

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c. The present US objective in Vietnam is to avoid hu miliation . The reasons why we v?-ent into Vietnam to the present depth are varied; but they are now largely academic Why v;e have not withdravm from Vietnam is^ by all odds,

one reason: (1) To preserve our reputation as a guarantor, and thus to preserve our effectiveness in the rest of the world. We have not hung on (2) to save a friend, or (3) to deny the Communists the added acres and heads (because the dominoes don't fall for that reason in this case), or even (U) to prove that "wars of national liberation" won't work (except as our reputation is involved). At each decision point we have gambled; at each point, to avoid the damage to our effectiveness of defaulting on our commitment, V7e have upped the ante. We have not defaulted, and the ante (and commitment) is now very high. It is important that we behave so as to protect our reputation. At the same time, since it is our reputation that is at stake, it is important that we not construe our obligation to be more than do the countries whose opinions of us are our reputation.

d. We are in an escalating military stalemate . There is an honest difference of judgment as to the success of the present military efforts in the South. There is no question that the US deplo;^T:nents thwarted the VC hope to achieve a quick victory in I965. But there is a serious question whether we are now defeating the VC/PAVl^ main forces and whether planned US deploym-ents will more than hold our position in the country. Population and area control has not changed significantly in the past year; and the best judgment is that, even with the Phase IIA deployments, we will probably be faced in early I967 with a continued stalemate at a higher level of forces and casualties.

2. US comjtiitment to SVN . Some will say that we have defaulted if we end up, at any point in the relevant future, with anything less than a Western-oriented, non-Communist, independent government, exercising effective sovereignty over all of South Vietnam. This is not so. As statec. above, the US end is solely "^.o preserve our reputation as a guarantor. It follows that the "soft^est" credible formulation of the US comraitmient is the follov/ing:

a. DRV does not take over South Vietnam by force. This does not necessarily rule out:

b. A coalition government including Communists.

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c. A free decision by the South to succvmh to the VC or to the North.

d. A neutral (or even anti-US) government in SVN.

e. A live-and-let-live "reversion to 1959»" FurtherraoreJ we must recognize that even if we fail in achieving this "soft" formulation^ we could over time come out v/ith minimum damage:

f. If the reason was GVN gross wrongheadedness or apathy.

g. If victorious North Vietnam "went Titoist."

h. If the Coimnunist take-over v/as fuzzy and very slow.

Current decisions, McNaughton argued, should reflect aware-I ness that the U.S. commitm-ent could be fulfilled with something consider-

I ably short of victory, " it takes time to make hard decisions, " he v/rote,

"It took us almost a year to take the decision to bomb North Vietnam; it took us weeks to decide on a pause; it could take us months (and could involve lopping some vjhite as well as brov/n heads) to get us in position to go for a compromise. We should not expect the enemy's molasses to pour any faster than ours. And we should *tip the pitchers' now. if we want them to 'pour* a year from now."

But the strategy following from this analysis more or less corresponded over the short term to that recomm_ended by the Saigon mission and the military commands: More effort for pacification, more push behind the Ky government, more battalions for MOV, and intensive interdiction bombing roughly as proposed by CINCPAC. The one change introduced in this memorandum, prepared only one day after the other, concerned North Vietnamese ports. Now McNaughton advised that the ports not be closed. VJhy he did so is not apparent. The intelligence community had concurred a month earlier that such action wo\ild create "a particularly unwelcome dilemma" for the USSR, but would provoke nothing more than vigorous protest. 5^/ Perhaps, however, someone had given McNaughton a warning som.etime on January l8 or 19 that graver conseq.uences could be involved. In any case, McNaughton introduced this one modification.

The argument which coupled McNaughton's political analysis ' with his strategic recommendations appeared at the end of the second

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The dilemma, We are in a dilemma. It is that the situation may be "polar." That is^ it nay be that v^hile going for victory v^e have the strength for compromise, but if we go for compromise we have the strength only for defeat -- this because a revealed lowering of sights from victory to compromise (a) will unhinge the GVN and (b) will give the DRV the "smell of blood." The situation therefore req.uires a thoroughly loyal and disciplined US jl ' team in Washington and Saigon and great care in what is

said and done. It also requires a v/illingness to escalate the war if the enemy miscalculates, misinterpreting our willingness to compromise as Implying we are on the run. The risk is that it may be that the "coin must come up heads or tails^ not on edge." ^3/

Much of McNaughton's cautious language about the lack of success — past or predicted- -- of the interdiction efforts appeared six days later, 2h January, in a memorandum from McNa3m,ra for the President. _5V ^'^^ mem.orandum recommended (and its tone makes clear that approval was taken for granted) an increase in the number of attack sorties against North Vietnam from a level of roughly 3,000 per month -- the rate for the last half of I965 -- to a level of at least ^,000 per month to be reached gradually and then maintained throughout I966. The sortie rate against targets in Laos, which had risen from 5II per month in June I965 to 3?0^7 in December, would rise to a steady ^,500? ^-^d those aga,inst targets in South Vietnam, having risen from 7^23^ in June to 13,11^ in December, would drop back to 12^000 in June 1966, but then climb to 15,000 in December- By any standards^ this was a large bombing program, yet McNam.ara could promise the President only that "the increased program probably will not put a tight ceiling on the enemy's activities in South Vietnam," but might cause him to hurt at the margins, with perhaps enough pressure to "condition /him/ toward negotiations and an acceptable /to the US/gVN, that isT end to the war -- and will maintain the morale of our South Vietnamese allies."

Most of McNamara's memorandum, dealt with the planned expansion of American ground forces, however. Here it indicated that the President had decided in favor of recomjriendations the Secretary had brought back from his trip to Vietnam on 28 and 29 November, and had incorporated in memoranda for the President on 30 November and 7 December". 55/ These v^'ere to increase the number of US combat batta-*lions from S^at the end of I965 to 7^ a year later, instead of to 62 as previously planned, with com-parable increases for the Korean and Australian contingents (from nine battalions to 21, and from one to two respectively). Such an increase in US combat strength would raise f 1* total US personnel in Vietnam from 220,000 to over UOO5OOO. At the ■ - g time McNam-ara noted in his mem-orandiim of 7 December, the Depart-

ment of Defense would com.e before the Congress in January to ask for a

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supplemental appropriation of $11 billion of nevr obligational authority to cover increased Vietnam costs.

The Secretary recommended these measures, he said, because ■ of "dramatic recent changes in the situation — on the military side." ■Infiltration from the North, mainly on greatly improved routes through Laos J had increased from three battalion equivalents per month in late 196^ to a recent high of a dozen per month. With his augmented forces, the enemy was shovring an increased willingness to stand and fight in large scale engagements, such as the la Drang River campaign in November. To meet this growing challenge the previously planned US force levels would be insufficient. Identical descriptions of the increased enemy capability appeared in both McNamara's 30 November and 7 December memorand; In the former, but not the latter, the following paragraph also appeared:

We have but two options, it seems to me. One is to go now for a compromise solution (something substantially less than the "favorable outcome" I described in my memorandum of November 3)3 Q'^-d hold further deployments to a minimum. The other is to stick v?ith our stated objectives and with the war, and provide what it takes in men and materiel. If it is decided not to move now toward a compromise, I recommend that the United States both send a substantial num-ber of additional troops and very gradually intensify the bom^bing of North Vietnam. Ambassador Lodge, General Wheeler, Admiral Sharp and General Westmoreland concLir in this two-pronged course of action, although General Wheeler and Admiral Sharp would intensify the bombing of the North more quickly.

McNamara did not commit him-self — in any of these papers, at least — on the question of whether or not the President should now opt instead for a "compromise" outcome. The President, of course, decided against it. He did so, it should be noted, in the face of a "prognosis" from McNamara that was scarcely optimistic. There were changes in this prognosis as it went through the Secretary's successive " Presidential memoranda on 30 November, 7 December and 2h January. The first of these stated simply:

We should be aware that deployments of the kind I have recommended will not guarantee success. US killed-in-action can be expected to reach 1000 a month, and the odds are even that we will be faced in early I967 with a "no decision" at an even higher level. My overall evalu-' ation nevertheless, is that the best chance of achieving

our stated objectives lies in a pause followed, if it fails, by the deployments mentioned above.

^ In the latter two memoranda, McNamara elaborated ox\ this prognosis, and

made it even less optim.istic. The versions of 7 December and 2k January

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were similar, but there were important differences. They are set forv/ard here with deletions from the 7 Decemoer version in brackets, and additions in the 2U January version underlined:

/Deployments of the kind we have recommended will not guarantee success_^7 Our intelligence estimate is that the present Commimist policy is to continue to prosecute the war vigorously in the South. They continue to believe that the war will be a long one, that time is their ally, and that their own staying povzer is superior to ours. They recognize that the US reinforcements of I965 signify a determination to avoid defeat, and that more US troops can be expected. Even though the Communists will continue to suffer heavily from. GW and US ground and air action, we expect them, upon learning of any US intentions to augment its forces, to boost their own commitment and to test US capabilities" and will to persevere at a higher level of conflict and casualties (US killed-in-action with the recommended deployments can be expected to reach 1000 a month).

If the US were willing to commit enough forces — perhaps 600,000 men or more -- we could probably ultimately prevent, the DRV/VC from sustaining the conflict at a significant level. V/hen this point was reached, however, the q.uestion of Chinese intervention v/ould become critical. (We are generally agreed that the Chinese Communists will intervene with com^bat forces to prevent destruction of the Communist regim.e in North Vietnam; it is less clear that they would intervene to prevent a DRV/vC defeat in the South.) 56/ The intelligence estimate is that the chances are a little better than even that, at this stage, Hanoi and Peiping would choose to reduce their effort in the South and try to salvage their resources for another day_^ [\ but there is an almost equal chance that they would enlarge the war and bring in large numbers of Chinese forces (they have m-ade certain preparations vzhich could point in this direGtion)^^

It follows, therefore, that the odds are about even that even with the recommended deployments, -we will be faced in early I967 with a military stand-off at a miuch higher level, with pacification _^till stalled, and with - * any prospect of military success marred by the chances of i an active Chinese intervention/ hardly unden^/ay and with

! . the requirement for the deploym.ent of still more US forces. 57/

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On 25 January 1966^ before the bombing had yet been resumed^ George Ball sent to the President a long memorandum on the matter. Its first page warned:

I recognize the difficulty and complexity of the problem and I do not wish to add to your burdens. But before a final decision is made on this critical issue, I feel an obligation to amplify and document my strong conviction: that sustained bombing of North Viet-Nam will more than likely lead us i nto war with Red China — probably in six to nine months . And it may well involve at least a limited v/ar with the Soviet Union. 58/

There were. Ball said, "forces at work on both sides of the conflict that v/ill operate in combination to bring about this result.""

^ The Under-Secretary dealt with the U.S. side of the conflict

I P first. The bombing, he wrote, vrould inevitably escalate; the passage (

time, he contended, had demonstrated " that a sustained bombing program ' ' ac quires a life and di^namism of its own." For this there were several

p. "' reasons^ First was that the U.S. " philosophy of bombing req.uires gradual

escal ation ." Ball explained:

Admittedly, v;e have never had a generally agreed rationale for bombing North Viet-Nam. But the inarticulate major premise has always been that bombing will somehow,

I some day, and in som-e manner, create pressure on Hanoi to

stop the war. This is accepted as an article of faith, not

' only by the military who have planning and operational

responsibilities but hj most civilian advocates of bombing in the Administration.

Yet it is also widely accepted that for bombing to have this desired political effect, we m.ust gradually extend our attack to increasingly vital targets. In this way -- it is contended --we will constantly threaten Hanoi that if it continues its aggression it will face mounting costs -- with the destruction of its economic life at the end of the road. . *

On an attached chart. Ball demonstrated that in the eleven months of bombinp" target selection had gradually spread northward to a point where it was'^nearing the Chinese border and closing in on the Hanoi-Haiphong area "steadily constricting the geographical scope of immunity."

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Just as the geographical extent of the "bombing would inexorably increase. Ball argued, so would the value of the targets struck. "Unless we achieve dramatic successes in the South -- v,^hich no one expects /Ball Mvotej -- we will be led by frustration to hit increasingly more sensitive targets." He listed four categories of likely operations: (l) the mining of Haiphong harbor, and the destruction of (2) North Vietnam*s POL supplies, (3) its system of power stations, and (U) its airfields. Each of these targets had already been recommended to the President by one of his principal military or civilian advisors in Washington or Saigon, Ball noted, and each had "a special significance for the major Communist capitals." The mining of Haiphong harbor would impose a major decision on the Soviet Union. "Could it again submit to a blockade, as at the time of the Cuban missile crisis," Ball asked, "or should it retaliate by sending increased aid or even volunteers to North Viet-Nam or by sq.ueezing the United States at some other vital point, such as Berlin?" Would Hanoi feel compelled to launch some kind of attack on crowded Saigon harbor or on U.S. fleet units — perhaps using surface-to-surface missiles provided by the Soviet Union? Similarly, the bombing of North Vietnam's POL supplies might bring in response an attack on the exposed POL in Saigon harbor. Then there were the airfields. Ball wrote:

■ The bombing of the airfields would very likely lead the DRV to request the use of Chinese air bases north of the border for the basing of North Vietnamese planes, or even to request the intervention of Chinese air. This would pose the most agonizing dilemma for us. Consistent with our decision to bomb the North, we could hardly permit the creation of a sanctuary from which our ov/n planes could be harassed. Yet there is general agreement that for us to bomb China would very likely lead to a direct war with Peiping and v/ould -- in principle at least — trigger the Sino-Soviet Defense Pact, vrhich has been in force for fifteen years.

I The same process of action-reaction. Ball noted, would

• also apply-to surface-to-air missile sites (SMIs) within North Vietnam. The wider the bombing the greater the number of SAM sites -- manned substantially by Soviet and Chinese technicians -- the North Vietnamese ' would install.' "As more SAMs are installed, we will be compelled to

take them out in order to safeguard our aircraft. This v/ill mean killing m.ore Russians and Chinese and putting greater pressure on those two nations for increased effort." Ball summarized this process in general terms: "Each extension of our bombing to more sensitive areas will ircrease the risk to our aircraft and compel a further extension ^^ qj bomb-in^ to protect the expanded bombing activities we have staked

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These risks V70uld be run. Ball observed, for the sake of a bombing program that would nevertheless be ineffective in producing the political results being asked of it. Ten days before sending his memorandum to the President, Ball had asked the CIA*s Office of National Estimates to prepare an estimate of likely reactions to various extensions of the bombing^ and also an assessment of the effects they would be likely to have on North Vietnam's military effort in the south. ^9/ He cited the estimate's conclusions in his Presidential memorandum.. None of the types of attacks he had specified -- on Haiphong harbor, on the POL5 or on power stations — "would in itself, have a critical impact on the combat activity of the Comjnimist forces in South Viet-Nam." This was, of course, scarcely a new conclusion. In various formulations it had figured in intelligence estimates for the preceding six months. From it Ball was led to the premises v^hich motivated him to write his vigorously dissenting paper: "if the war is to be vron -- it must be won in the South," and "the bombing of the North cannot win the war, only enlarge

it."

Ball's paper was at its most general (and perhaps least persuasive) in its discussion of "enlargement" of the war. He started from a historical example -- the catastrophic misreading of Chinese intentions by the United States during the Korean war -- and a logical premise:

Quite clearly there is a threshold which we cannot pass over without precipitating a major Chinese involvement. We do not know -- even within wide margins of error — where that threshold is. Unhappily we will not find out until after the catastrophe.

In positing his own notions of possible thresholds, Ball could only reiterate points he had already made: that forcing the North Vietnamese air force to use Chinese bases, by bombing their own airfields, would be likely to escalate into armed conflict between the U.S. and China, and that the destruction of North Vietnam's industry would call in increased Chinese assistance to a point "sooner or later, we will a.lmost certainly collide with Chinese interests in such a way as to bring about a Chinese involvement / ■

There were, strikingly enough, no recommendations in Ball's memorandum. Given his assumption that "sustained bombing" would acq.uire "a life of it^ own," and invariably escalate, the only consistent recom-' mendation v/ould have been that the U.S. should not resume bombing the

North but should instead confine the war to the South. There were no I . compromise positions. To a President who placed the avoidance of v/ar

with China (not to mention with the U.S.S.R.) very high on his list of obipctives and yet who felt -- for military and political reasons --'''^ that he was unable not to resiuae bombing North Vietnam, but that, once

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resumed J the bc.mbing must be carefully controlled, Ball offered disturbing analysis but little in the way of helpful practical advice.

■ The week including the Tet holidays (January 23-29)

' saw some final debate at the White House on the question of whether

to resume at all in which Ball's memo surely figured. The outcome was a Presidential decision that ROLLING THUKDER should recommence ' on January 31. The President declined for the time being, however,

' ■ to approve any extension of air operations, despite the strong recommendations of the military and the milder proposals of the Secretary of Defense for such action.

E. Accomplishments by Years-End

After 10 months, of ROLLING THUNDER, months longer than U.S. officials had hoped it would require to bring NWI to terms, it was clear that NVN had neither called off the insurgency in the South nor been obliged to slov; it down. Still, decision-makers did not consider bombing the North a failure. While willing to entertain the idea of a tem-porary pause to focus the spotlight on the diplomatic track they vrere pursuing, they .were far from ready to give up the bombing out of hand. VThy not? What did they think the bombing was accomplishing, and what did they think these accomplishments were worth? What did they hope to achieve by continuing it?

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As already noted, certain political gains from- the bombing were evident from the start. Morale in SVN was lifted, and a certain degree of stability had emerged in the GVN. NVN and other countries were shoi^m that the U.S. v/as willing to back up strong words with hard deeds. These were transient gains, hovrever. After the bombing of the North was begun, other U.S. actions — unleashing U.S. jet aircraft for air strikes in the South, and sending U.S. ground troops into battle there -- had as ffreat or even greater claim as manifestations of U.S. will and determination. Similarly, breaking through the sanctuaiy barrier had been accom-■ plished and once the message was clear to all concerned it did not require daily and hourly reinforcement. The acquisition of an important bargaining chip v/as a gain of uncertain value as yet, since it might have to be weighed against the role of the bombing as an obstacle to e;etting negotiations under'way in the first place. As one high-level group stated in the fall of I965:

...it would be difficult for any government, but especially an oriental one, to agree to negotiate while under.sustained bombing attacks. 60/

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If this particilar chip had to be given up in order to establish what the group called "the political and psychological framework for initiating negotiations/' the gain in leverage might be small.

Public opinion about the bombing was mixed. On the hav/k side, as Secretary McNamara summed it up for the President:

Some critics, who advocated bombing, were silenced; others are now as vocal or more vocal because the program has been too limited for their taste- 6l/

People vrho believed that the U.S. was justified in intervening in the v/ar and who identified Hanoi as the real enemy naturally tended to approve of the bombing. People who questioned the depth of U.S. involve' ment in Southeast Asia and who feared that the U.S. was on a collision course with China seemed to be more appalled by the bombing than by any other aspect of the war. The peace fringe attacked it as utterly reckless and immoral. Abroad, in many countries, the U.S. v^as portrayed as a bully and NVN as a victim. Even U.S. allies who had no illusions about Hanoi's complicity in the South were unhappy with the bombing. As McNamara viewed it:

The price paid for improving our image as a guarantor has been damage to our image as a country which eschews armed attacks on other nations....The objection to our 'warlike' image and the approval of our fulfilling our commitments competes in the minds of many nations (and individuals) in the world, producing a schizophrenia. Within such allied countries as UK and Japan, popular antagonism to the bombings per se, fear of escalation, and belief that the bombings are the main obstacle to negotiation, have created political problems for the governments in support of US policy. £2/

Bombing HVTT, the Secretary added, had also complicated US-Soviet relations, mostly for the worse though conceivably -- barely so -- for the better:

The bombing program -- because it appears to reject the policy of 'peaceful coexistence,' because the Soviet people have vivid horrible memories of air bombing, because it challenges the USSR as she competes with China for leadership of the Communist world, and because US and Soviet arm.s are now striking each other in North Vietnam^ -- has strained the US-Soviet detente, making constructive arms control and other cooperative programs difficult. How^serious this effect will be and v/hether the detente can be revived depend on how far we

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carry our military actions against the North and how long the campaign continues. At the sa^iie time, the "bombing program offers the Soviet Union an opportunity to play a role in bringing peace to Vietnam, by gaining credit for persuading us to terminate the program. There is a chance that the scenario could spin out this way: if so, the effect of the entire experience on the US-Soviet detente could be a net plus. 63/

In addition, the Secretary continued, more countries than before were "more interested in taking steps to bring the war to an end." The , net effect of this, however, was generally to increase the international

) i pressures on the U<S. to seek an accommodation, not Hanoi, so that it

was hardly an unmixed blessing.

Immediate gains and losses in the domestic and international political arenas were less important, however, than the overall influence of the bombing on the course of the v/ar itself. Short-term political penalties were not hard to bear, at home or abroad, if the bombing could materially improve the prospects for a favorable outcome. This did not necessarily mean that the bombing had to contribute to a military victory. ■ ROLLING TIIUM)ER was begun at a time when the war was being lost and even the minimuim task of preventing an outright defeat was far from assured. Almost any military contribution from the bombing could be viewed as a boon.

It V7as not easy to assess the contribution of ROLLING THUNDER to the war as a whole. Decision-makers like Secretary McNam.ara received regular monthly reports of measurable physical damage inflicted by the strikes, together with a verbal description of less readily quantifiable economic, military and political effects within NVN, but it was difficult to assess the significance of the results as reported or to relate them to the progress of the war in the South. Reports of this kind left it largely to the judgment or the imagination to decide what the bombing was contributing to the achievement of overall U.S. objectives.

CIA and DIA, in a joint monthly "Appraisal of the Bombing of North Vietnam" which had been requested by the SecDef in August, attempted to keep a running tabulation of the theoretical cost of repairing or reconstructing damaged or destroyed facilities and equipment in NVN. According to this, the first year of ROLLING THUI^JDER inflicted $63 million worth of'^measurable damage, $36 million to "economic" targets like bridges and transport equipment, and $2? million to "military" targets " like barracks and ammunition depots. 6k/ In addition to this measurable

damage the bombing vras reported to have "disrupted" the production and ''^ distribution of goods; created "severe" problems and "reduced capacity"

in all forms of transportation; created more "severe problems" in man-• • XT the economy; reduced production'; caused "shortages" and "hardships";

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forced the diversion of "skilled manpower and scarce resources" from productive uses to the restoration of damaged facilities and/or their dispersal and relocation; and so on.

In terms of specific target categories^ the appraisals reported results like the following:

Power plants. 6 small plants struck^ only 2 of them in the main power grid. Loss resulted in local power shortages and reduction in power available for irrigation but did not reduce the power supply for the Hanoi/Haiphong area.

POL storage, h installations destroyed, about 17 percent of IWIT^s total bulk storage capacity. Economic effect not significant, since neither industry nor agriculture is large user and makeshift storage and distribution procedures will do.

Manufacturing. 2 facilities hit, 1 explosive plant and 1 textile plant, the latter by mistake. Loss of explosives plant of little consequence since China furnished virtually all the explosives required. Damage to textile plant not extensive.

Bridges. 30 highway and 6 railroad bridges on JCS list destroyed or damaged, plus several hundred lesser bridges hit on armed reconnaissance missions. NVDI has generally not made a major reconstruction effort, usually putting fords, ferries, and pontoon bridges into service instead. Damage has neither stopped nor curtailed movement of military supplies.

Railroad yards. 3 hit, containing about 10 percent of pjVl\T*s total railroad cargo-handling capacity. Has not significantly hampered the operations of the major portions of the rail network.

Ports. 2 small maritime ports hit, at Vinh and Thanh Hoa in the south, with only 5 percent of the country's maritime cargo-handling capacity. Impact on economy minor.

Locks. Of 91 known locks and dams in NVTT, only 8 targeted as significant to inland waterv/ays, flood control, or irrigation. Only 1 hit, heavily damaged.

Trans-Dort equipment. Destroyed or damaged 12 locom.o-tives* 819 freight cars, 805 trucks, IO9 ferries, 75O

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forced the diversion of "skilled manpov/er and scarce resources" from productive uses to the restoration of damaged facilities and/or their dispersal and relocation; and so on.

In term-S of specific target categories ^ the appraisals reported results like the follovang:

Power plants. 6 small plants struck, only 2 of them in the main power grid. Loss resulted in local power shortages and reduction in power available for irrigation hut did not reduce the power supply for the Hanoi/Haiphong area.

POL storage, h installations destroyed, about 17 percent of NVN's total bulk storage capacity. Economic effect not significant, since neither industry nor agriculture is large user and makeshift storage and distribution procedures will do.

Manufacturing. 2. facilities hit^ 1 explosive plant and 1 textile plant, the latter by mistake. Loss of explosives plant of little consequence since China furnished virtually all the explosives required. Damage to textile plant not extensive.

Bridges. 30 highway and 6 railroad bridges on JCS list destroyed or damaged, plus several hundred lesser bridges hit on armed reconnaissance missions. FTO has generally not made a major reconstruction effort, usually putting fords, ferries, and pontoon bridges into service instead. Damage has neither stopped nor curtailed movement of military supplies.

Railroad yards. 3 hit, containing about 10 percent of HVDJ^s total railroad cargo-handling capacity. Has not significantly hampered the operations of the major portions of the rail network.

Ports. 2 small maritime ports hit, at Vinh and Thanh Hoa in the south, with only 5 percent of the country's maritime cargo-handling capacity. Impact on economy minor.

Locks. Of 91 known locks and dams in NTOI, only 8 targeted as significant to inland waterways, flood control^ or irrigation. Only 1 hit, heavily damaged.

Transport equipment. Destroyed or damaged 12 locom.o-tives 819 freight cars, 8O5 trucks, IO9 ferries, 750

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barges, and 35^ other water craft. No evidence of seri-our problems due to shortages of equipment. 6^/

What did all of this amount to? The direct losses, in the language of one of the monthly appraisals,

*

...still remain small compared to total economic activity, because the country is predominantly agricultural and the major industrial facilities have not been attacked. 66/

The "cujiiulatlve strains" resulting from the bombing had "reduced industrial performance," but "the primarily rural nature of the area permits continued functioning of the subsistence economy." The "economic deterioration so far has not affected the capabilities of North Vietnam's armed forces, which place little direct reliance on the domestic economy for material." The bombing had "still" not reduced W^ capabilities to defend itself from attack and to support existing INA/yC forces in Laos and SVN, but it had "limited" "freedom of movement" in the southern provinces, and it had "substantially curtailed" NVA capabilities to mount "a major offensive action" in Southeast Asia. Altogether, however, "the air strikes do not appear to have altered Hanoi's determination to continue supporting the war in South Vietnam." 6?/

An evaluation which had to be couched in such inexact and impressionistic language was of little help in com.ing to grips with the most important questions about the bombing: (l) Plow much "pressure" was being applied to NVN to scale dox-zn or give up the insurgency, and how well was it working? (2) In what ways and to what degree v/as the bombing affecting NVN's capacity to wage war in the South? Whether the bombing program V7as viewed primarily as a strategic-punitive campaign against Planoi's will or a tactical-interdiction carapaign against NVN's military capabilities in the South -- or, as some would have it, both -- these were the questions to address, not the quantity of the damage and the quality of the dislocations.

In dealing with the above questions, it had to be recognized that NVN was an extremely poor target for air attack. The theory of either strategic or interdiction bombing assumed highly developed industrial nations producing large quantities of military goods to sustain mass armies engaged in intensive warfare. NVN, as U.S. intelligence agencies knevr was an agricult\iral country with a rudimentary transportation system and little industry of any kind. Nearly all of the people were rice farmers who worked the land V7ith water buffaloes and hand tools, and whose well-"being at a subsistence level was almost entirely dependent on what they grew or m.ade themselves. VJhat intelligence agencies liked to call the "modern industrial sector" of the economy was tiny even by Asian standards, producing only about 12 percent of a GNP of $1.6 billion

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in 1965. There were only a handf\il of "major industrial facilities." When NVN was first targeted the JCS found orly 8 industrial installa-. tions worth listing on a par with airfields, military supply dumps, barracks complexes, port facilities, bridges, and oil tanks. Even by the end of 19^55 after the JCS had lowered the standards and more than doubled the number of important targets, the list included only 2h . industrial installations, I8 of them povrer plants which were as important for such humble uses as lighting streets and pumping water as for operating any real factories. 68 /

Apart from one explosives plant (which had already been demolished), JWDJ's limited industry made little contribution to its military capabilities. IWN forces, in intelligence terminology, placed "little direct reliance on the domestic economy for m-aterial." NVN in fact produced only limited q_uantities of simple military items, such as mortars, grenades, mines, small arms, and bullets, and those were produced in I ■ small v^orkshops rather than.large arsenals. The great bulk of its

military equipment, and all of the heavier and more sophisticated items, had to be imported. This was no particular problem, since both the USSR and China were apparently more than glad to help.

The NW transportation system was austere and superficially looked very vulnerable to air attack, but it was inherently flexible and its capacity greatly exceeded the demands placed upon it. The rail system, with single-track lines radiating from Hanoi, provided the main link-up to China and, via the port of Haiphong, to the rest of the world; it was more important for relatively long-haul international shipments than for domestic freight. The latter was carried mostly over crude roads and simple waterways, on which the most common vehicles were oxcarts and sampans, not trucks or steamers. The system was quite primitive, but immensely durable.

Supporting the war in the South was hardly a great strain on NYN's economy. The NVA/vC forces there did not constitute a large army. They did not fight as conventional divisions or field armies, with tanks and airplanes and heavy artillery; they did not need to be supplied by huge coriYOY^ of trucks, trains, or ships. They fought and moved on foot, supplying themselves locally, in the main, and simply avoiding combat when supplies were low. What they received from NVN was undoubtedly critical to their military operations, but it amounted to only a few tons per day for the entire force -- en amovnt that could be carried by a handful of trucks or sampans, or several huridred coolies. This small amount did not have to be carried conspicuously over exposed routes, and it was extremely difficult to interdict, by bombing or any other

means.

f j^ g^jjji then, NVN did not seem to be a very rewarding target for

air attack. Its industry was limited, meaningful targets were fev7, and

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they did not appear critical to either the viability of the economy, the defense of the na.tion, or the prosecution of the war in the South. The idea that destroying, or threatening to destroy, NVN's industry would pressure Hanoi into calling it q.uits seems, in retrospect, a colossal misjudgTaent. The idea was based, however, on a plausible assumption about the rationality of NVN^s leaders, which the U.S. intelligence coimnunity as a v^hole seemed to share. 69/ This was that the value of what little industrial plant NW possessed was disproportionately great. That plant was purchased by an extremely poor nation at the price of considerable sacrifice over many years. Even though it did not am^ount to much, it no doubt symbolized the regime's hopes and desires for national status, power, and wealth, and was probably a source of considerable pride. It did not seem unreasonable to believe that NVN leaders would not wish to risk the destruction of such assets, especially when that risk seemed (to us) easily avoidable by cutting down the insurgency and deferring the takeover of SWI until another day and perhaps in another manner — which Ho Chi Minh had apparently decided to do once before, in 195^* After all, an ample supply of oriental patience is precisely what an old oriental revolutionary like Ho Chi Minh was supposed to have.

For 1965, at least, these assumptions about Hanoi's leaders were not borne out. The regime's public stance remained one of strong defiance, determined to endure the worst and still see the U.S. defeated. The leadership directed a shift of strategy in the South, from an attempt at a decisive military victory to a strategy of protracted conflict designed to wear out the opposition and prepare the ground for an eventual political settlement, but this decision was undoubtedly forced upon it by U.S. intervention in the South. There was no sign that bombing the North, either alone or in combination with other U.S. actions, had brought about any greater readiness to settle except on their terms.

■ In the North, the regime battened down and prepared to ride out the storm. With Soviet and Chinese help, it greatly strengthened its air defenses, multiplying the number of AAA guns and radars, expanding the number of jet fighter airfields and the jet fighter force, and introducing an extensive SA!4 system. Economic development plans were laid aside. Imports v;ere increased to offset production losses. Bombed facilities were in most cases simply abandoned. The large and vulnerable barracks and storage depots were replaced by dispersed and concealed ones. Several hundred thousand workers were mobilized to keep the transportation system operating. Miles of by-pass roads w^ere built around choke-points to make the system redundant. Knocked-out bridges were replaced by fords, ferries or alternate structures, and methods were adopted to protect them from attack. Traffic shifted to night time, poor weather, and canoufla'^e. Shuttling and transhipm.ent practices were instituted. Construction material, equipment, and workers were prepositioned along key

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routes in order to effect quick repairs. Imports of railroad cars and trucks were increased to offset eq.uipment losses.

In shorty NVN leaders mounted a major effort to withstand the bombing pressm^e. They had to change their plans and go on a war footing. They had to take drastic measures to shelter the population and cope with the bomb damage. They had to force the people to work harder and find new ways to keep the economy operating. They had to ■greatly increase imports and their dependence on the USSR and China. There were undoubtedly many difficulties and hardships involved. Yet, JWI^T had survived. Its economy had continued to function. The regime had not collapsed, and it had not given in. And it still sent men and supplies into SVN.

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1. Draft memorandum^, "Analysis and Options for South Vietnam," 7/13/65;, TOP SECRET, filed with compila-^-ion of data assembled by Secretary McNamara for his 1^-21 July I965 trip to Vietnam.

2. Memorandiom for Rusk, McNamara, McG. Bundy, W. Bundy, McNaughton^ •* Unger, "Cutting Our Losses in South Viet-Nam," TOP SECRET. Ball

distributed this paper in two parts, a summary on 28 June I965 and the paper itself on the 29th.

3. Memorandum for the President, "A Compromise Solution for South Viet-Nam," 1 July I965, TOP SECRET. (Underlining in original.)

k. Dran, "Plan of Action for South Vietnam," 2k March I965, TOP SECRET.

5. From Ball's summary, 28 June 1965? of his memorandum of the 29th, cited above, n. 2.

6. Memorandum, "Viet-Nam," 1 July 1965^ TOP SECRET. (Emphasis added.) Rusk's name is typed as drafter at the foot of the memorandum.

7. Bundy's memorandum, 1 July I965 (TOP SECRET), summ^arized points Bundy made in a longer paper, "Holding on in South Vietnam,"

30 June 1965 (TOP SECRET).

8. Memorandiim for the President, "Recommendations of additional deployments to Vietnam," 20 July I965, TOP SECRET.

9. Memorandum for the President, "Program of expanded military and political m-oves with respect to Vietnam," first draft 26 June 1965^ revised 1 July, TOP SECRET. The copy used here is the typed draft of 26 June with extensive pencilled revisions in McNamara's ovm hand and his signature.

10. JCSM 515-65, 2 July 1965, "Deployments to South Vietnam," TS; Fact Sheet, "Military Pressures Against NVN," in Cable File 3^, SecDef Saigon Trip, 1^-21 July I965.

11. SKEE IO-9-65, 23 July 1965? "Communist and Free World Reactions to a Possible US Course of Action," TOP SECRET.

11a. Ibie.

12. Draft Memorandum, "Analysis and Options for South Vietnam," 7/13/65:. TS

l':i Footnote on p. k of McNamara's memorandum of 20 July I9655 cited above, n. 8.

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Ilk. Memorandum for the President, ?-8 July 1965, UNCLASSIFIED, commenting en 18 points made by Senator Mcnsfield to the President on the Vietnam situation.

15. Memorandum for the President, "Evaluation of the Program of • * Bombing North Vietnam," 3O July 1965; TOP SECRET.

16. Even as early as 7 July the SecDef apparently planned to take up the idea of a 6-8 week bombing pause with Ambassador Taylor and General Westmoreland. See OSD 5319 to Saigon, O7/2352 Z July I965, TS, NODIS.

17. JCSM 652-65, 27 Aug 1965, "Concept for Vietnam," TS; Mem.orandum for the SecDef from ASD/iSA, 1-361^/65? "Concept for Vietnam," 9/8/65, TS; and Mem.orandiom for the CJCS from the SecDef, "Concept for Vietnam," 9/1^/655 TS.

18. JCSM 670-65, 9/2/65; JCSM 686-65, 9/11/65; SecDef Memorandum for CJCS, "Air Strikes on North Vietnam," 9/15/65, TS. JCS recommendations along these lines continued to be submitted throughout I965. See JCSM 8IO-65, II/10/65, and JCSM 8II-65, II/II/65, both TS.

19. The Planoi and Haiphong" circles and the Chinese buffer zones developed into sa.nctuaries during I965 from a decision in August to exclude them from an authorization to strike SAM sites at v/ill, provided photography had shown them to be occupied. See JCSM 238-66, Ik April 1966, "ROLLING THUNDER Study Group Report -- Air Operations Against North Vietnam," Annex B to Appendix A to Section II, "Chronology," TS. .

20. JCSM 238-66, ik April I966, op, cit ., contains a chronological account of ROLLING THUNDER missions to March I966. See also CINCPAC Command History, I965, Vol. II, pp. 32U-389, TS.

21. The statistics are taken from CIA SC No. Oi|l|l|2/675 Jan. I967, "The ROLLING THUNDER Program." _ ' ,

22. Memorandum for the President, 30 July I965, op. cit .

2^. CIA SC No. 0828/665 "The Role of Air Strikes in Attaining Objectives in North Vietnam."

2li Testimony before Senate coram^ittees on Armed Services and Appropriations, if August 1965, SECRET.

25 Testim.ony, House Committee on Armed Services, 6 August I965, SECRET.

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26. SecDef Backgroujid briefing for the press, 21 October 1965, OUG.

27. The circumstances and the diplomacy of the May pause are treated in detail in another paper in this project.

28. Memorandum for the President, 30 November 1965^ TOP SECRET. This paper, written immediately following a visit to Vietnam by McNamara and General VJheeler on 28 and 29 November, was intended as a supplement to the Secretary's memorandum of 3 November, cited below.

29. Memorandum for the President, "CoTirses of Action in Vietnam," -3 November 1965;, TOP SECRET. This paper is headed "1st Rough Draft," but a note in McNam-ara's handwriting states: "A copy of this was sent to the Pres. by courier thru Mac's office on 11/7 & discussed with him by me, George, & Mac on ll/7* RMcN."

30. McNaughton draft, "Analysis and Options for South Vietnam," I3 July 1965, TOP SECRET.

31. Memorandum, "Courses of Action in Viet-Narn," 9 November I965, TOP SECPvET. A pencilled note by McNaughton on the copy used here indicates that Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson v;as the author of the paper.

32. Memorandum for Secretary McNam.ara, "State's Memo to the President (Courses of Action in Viet-Nam)," 9 November 1965, TOP SECRET -EYES ONLY.

33. Draft Memorandum for the President, "A Pause," 1 December 1965? TOP SECRET. A cover note indicates that this is an up-dating of a paper originally circulated on 16 Novemiber.

3^. Memorandiua, "Possible Political Actions, Specifically a 'Pause',"

TOP SECRET. A pencilled note indicates the paper was by Johnson and

Bundy, on 6 December 1965-

35. McNamara's memorandum of 3 November 19o5? ££• cit .

36. McNamara's memorandum, 3 December I965, TOP SECRET - EYES OITLY. ^.

37 Sl^-

^8 Bundy draft, "Scenario for Possible Resumption of Bombing," I5 January

. ' 1966, SECRET.

39 state 1786 to Lodge, MA.CV, and CINCPAC, 2h Dec I965, CF i|^.

1^0. imCV ^5265, 27 Dec 65, Ibid^

i^l CINCPAC 262159Z Dec I965, CF hk; CINCPAC 271955Z Dec I965, Ibid-

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k2. State 1805 to Lodge and Porter, 28 Dec 1965? Ibid . (This cable is misfiled under 23 Dec I965-)

43'. CIKCPAC I202O5Z Jan I966, Ibid. kk. JCSM kl'GG, 18 Jan I966.

^5. Ibid.

lj-6. Ibid , (emphasis added)

U7. Ibid.

48. Ibid.

49. Ibid. -

50. McNaughton 2nd Draft, "Some Observations about Bombing North Vietnam/' I8 January I966. (TS-SENSITIVE) in McNaughton Book 11, Tab DD.

51. McNaughton 3rd Draft, "Some Paragraphs on Vietnam," I9 Jan I966 (TS-Sensitive), in McNaughton Book, Tab BB.

52. SNIE 10-12-65, 10 Dec I965, p. 9 (TS).

53. McNaughton Draft "Some Paragraphs...," op. cit .

54. Memorandum for the President, "The Military Outlook in South Vietnam," 2h January I966, TOP SECRET.

55. These were: Memorandum for the President (no title), 30 November 1965? TOP SECRET, and Memorandum for the President, "Military and Political Actions Recommended for South Vietnam," 7 December I965, TOP SECRET.

56. In the 7 December version, this parenthetical sentence was a footnote.

57. The follov.dng footnote, expressing the reservations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, v;as appended to the 2k January I966 version of McNamara's memorandum:

"The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe 'that the evaluation set forth in paragraph 7 is on the pessimistic side in view of the constant and heavy military pressure which our forces in Southeast Asia will be capable of apploying. While admittedly the following factors are to a degree imponderables, they believe that greater weight should be given to the following:

"a. The cumulative effect of our air campaign against the

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PRV on morale and DRV capabilities to provide and move men and material from the DRV to South Vietnam.

"b. The effects of constant attack and harassment on the ground and from the air upon the growth of Viet Cong forces and on the morale and combat effectiveness of Viet Cong/PAVTT forces.

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"c. The effect of destruction of Viet Cong base areas on the capabilities of VC/PAV]}J forces to sustain combat operations over an extended period of time.

"d. The constancy of will of the Hanoi leaders to continue a struggle which they realize they cannot win in the face of progressively greater destruction of their country,"

58. Memorand^om for the President, "The Resiimption of Bombing Poses Grave Danger of Precipitating a Vlar with China/' 25 January I9665 SECRET-NODIS. Ball noted in a covering letter that he sent copies only to the President and to Secretaries Rusk and McNamara.

59. Letter, Ball to Raborn, I6 January I966, SECRET.

60. Memorandum for the SecDef from Ambassador-at-Large Llewellyn E. Thompson, 12 October I965, SECRET, forwarding a study of ROLLING THUNDER options. The study, Thompson wrote, "was i.argely prepared in State and was reviewed by General Taylor, l-'Ir. McNaughton, Mr. William Bundy, Mr. Unger, and myself."

61. Memorandum for the President, 30 July 1965? op. cit.

62. Ibid.

6.3. Ibid. Although this was written at the end of July, the basic situation continued essentially as Secretary McNamara described it and there is no reason to believe his comments would have been different at the end of . the year. -^

6U. CIA/dIA, "An Appraisal of the Effects of the First Year of Bombing in North Vietnam," SC No. 08^37/66, 1 June I966. A I967 CIA publication, "The Rolling Thunder Program -- Present and Potential Target Systems," SC No. Ol|ifi|2/67, January 1967^ upped the value of military damage in I965 to $33*6 million and the total to $69-8 million.

65 CIA/dIA, "An Appraisal of the Effects of the First Year of Bombing in North Vietnam," op. cit .

66. Memorandum for the SecDef from Gen. J. F. Carroll, DIA, "An Appraisal of the Bombing of North Vietnam," 17 November I965-

67. I^i^

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JCSM 16-66, 10 Jan I966 (TS).

69. CIA/dIA, "An Appraisal...," op. cU

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Yl, THE FOL DEBATE -- NOVEMBER 196^ - JLOME I966 A. Back^^round

When the 37-day bombing pause v/as terminated at the end of January I9665 the principal issue before decision-makers was not whether to intensify the bombing but whether the intensification should be gradual as before or be sharply accelerated.

Some kind of escalation if the bombing pause failed, i.e., if the North Vietnamese did not give "concrete evidence of a willingness to come to terms," was foreshadowed by the October paper from State recommending the pause:

We would have to convey our intent to reinstitute the bombing if the North Vietnam.ese refused to negotiate or if their willingness to negotiate is not accompanied by a manifest reduction of VC aggression in the South. If it is necessary to reinstitute bombing, we should be prepared to consider increasing the pressure, e.g. through striking industrial targets, to make clear our continuing, firm resolve, l/

According to this thinking, failure of the pause would indicate that the bombing had not exerted enough pressure; greater effort was needed to convince Hanoi that the U.S. intended not only to continue the bombing but to do so on an increasing scale. Moreover, the pause had improved the political atmosphere for escalation. U.S. willingness to negotiate and NVN^s unreasonableness had been amply and dram.atically displayed for all the world to see. If the U.S. now decided to intensify the bombing, the decision could at least be presented as one that was made reluctantly after trying to find a more peaceful alternative.

The debate over the form of escalation in early I966 was a continuation of the debate over bombing policy which had surfaced again in the fall of I965, and which had mixed into the debate over the long pause. Regardless of any pause, it was clear by November that even the gradual rate of escalation of I965 v/as approaching a point at which any further increase would be possible only by attacking the sensitive targets in the Hanoi/plaiphong sanctuaries and the China buffer zone. As of the end of October^ 126 of the 2^1-0 existing JCS targets had been struck; and of the remaini-ig llU, two thirds (75) were i.i the off-limits areas, and 29 of the other 39 remaining were in the touchy northeast quadrant. 2/ As the debate gathered momentum in the winter of I965 without a clear decision to begin attacking "the hostage," the bombing actually levelled off During November and December only 8 more JCS targets were struck and'armed reconnaissance missions were held to a sortie ceiling of 1200 per two-week period. 3/ . .

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Apart from general cautiousness about the next obvious escalatory step, one of the reasons for the Administration's hesitancy was apparently the fear that the timing might not be right. As the bombing drew closer to Hanoi and Haiphong, some officials felt forcing the pace might oblige IWN to confront the issue of negotiations versus greater Chinese and/or Soviet involvement prematurely, i.e. before IWN was sufficiently convinced that it could not outlast the U.S. and v^in in the South. The theory was that so long as Hanoi was hopeful there was a greater risk that it would opt for escalation rather than a compromise settlement. As the October paper from State put it:

We may be able to recognize the optimum time for exerting further pressure by increasing the level of our bombing, but an increase in our bombing of the North at the present time may bring matters to a head too soon, kf

In addition, of course, there was good reason to hold off any escalation until a substantial bombing pause was undertaken, both to test Hanoi's intentions and to disarm critics on the dovish side who felt that the Administration had not gone far enough to m.eet Hanoi halfway.

1. JCS Recomjnendations

Dissatisfied with the measured pace of the bombing program from the start, they again began advocating a sharp intensification of the bombing in early November. Diplomatic and political considerations were secondary. Their position was that ROLLING THUNDER had succeeded in making it "substantially" more costly and difficult for NYN to support the insurgents in Laos and SVN, and had "substantially" degraded NVN's capability to conduct a conventional invasion of the South, but they agreed that the cam^paign had not materially reduced NVI^'s other military capabilities, damaged its economy, deterred it from supporting the war in the South, or brought it closer to the conference table. It was not because of any difficulty in applying pressure on Hanoi by bombing or in interdicting support South that the program had not been more successful, hov^ever; it v/as because numerous "self-imposed restraints" had limited the potential effectiveness of the program:

...we shall.continue to achieve only limited success in air operations in DRV/Laos if requir-^d to operate within the constraints presently imposed. The establishment and f observance of de facto sanctuaries within the DRV, coupled

with a denial of operations against the most important military and war supporting targets, precludes attainment of the objectives of the air campaign....Thus far, the DRV has been able and willing to absorb damage and destruction at the slow rate. Now required is an immediate and sharply accelerated

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program which will leave no doubt that the US intends to win and'achieve a level of. destruction X'/hich they will not be able to overcome. Following such a sudden attack, a follow-on program of increasing pressures is necessary, but at a rate of increase significantly higher than the present rate. 5/

The JCS accordingly recommended an immediate acceleration in the scale, scope, and intensity of the bombing, beginning with heavy strikes against POL targets and power plants in the Hanoi/Haiphong area and continuing with aerial mining of WN ports and air strikes against the remaining "military and war-supporting" targets. Specifically, the JCS proposed an immediate sharp blow against the remaining 9 of the original 13 major POL tank farms, most of them in the Hanoi/Haiphong area, and against 5 key power plants, 2 in Hanoi and others at Uong Bi, Thai Nguyen, and Hon Gai, in order to "materially reduce enemy military capabilities." These strikes would be follov;ed by an accelerated program of fixed target and armed reconnaissance strikes to cut dov/n KVN's ability to direct and support the war in the South. The follow-on program would attack first the major airfields in the Hanoi/Haiphong area5 then the rail, road, and waterway LOCs throughout IWN, including the major LOC targets in the Hanoi/Haiphong area, "at a rate of destruction that would exceed the recuperability rate"; then the ports at Haiphong, Hon Gai, and Cam Pha; and finally military installations and other targets of military significance, such as the Ministry of Defense, the Radio Transmitter Station, and the Machine Tool Plant in Hanoi; the Ammiunition Depot at Haiphong; and the Iron-Steel Combine and Army Supply Depot at Thai Nugyen-SAM installations and other antiaircraft defenses would be attacked in order to keep friendly losses down. According to the proposal, most of the significant fixed targets in IWN would be destroyed within three or four'months. Thereafter, the effort would concentrate on keeping the targets inoperative and maintaining the pressure on LOCs. 6/

The JCS proposal to escalate all aspects of the bombing was largely oriented toward greatly increasing the pressure on Hanoi's will. On the same day, however, in a separate m.emorandum, the JCS made a strong pitch for an immediate attack on the IVJ^ POL system as an interdiction m.easure:

Attack of this system, would be more damaging to the WN capability to move war-supporting resources within country and along the infiltration routes to SVN than an attack against any other single target system. 7/

It is not surprising that the JCS singled out the POL target 'svstem- for special attention. HVN had no oil fields or refineries, and had to import all of its petroleum products, in refined form. During 1965? 't imt)orted about 170,000 metric tons, valued at about $4.8 million. Nearly 11 of it came from the Black Sea area of the USSR and arrived by sea at

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Haiphong, the only port capable of conveniently receiving and handling bulk POL brought in by large tankers. From large tank farms at Haiphong with a capacity of about one-fourth of the annual imports, the POL was transported by road, rail, and water to other large storage sites at Hanoi and elsewhere in the country. Ninety-seven percent of the I^JVN POL storao-e capacity was concentrated in 13 sites, k of which had already been hit. The other 9 were still off limits. They were, of course, highly vulnerable to air attack. 8/

In making the recommendation, the JCS emphasized the interdiction effects. They pointed out that the strikes would not hurt the industrial base or the civilian economy very much. They would directly affect the m.ilitary establishment, which consumed some 60 percent of all POL, and the "government transportation system," which consum.ed nearly all the rest. Supplying the armed forces in ]WN as well as in Laos and STO depended heavily on POL-pov^ered vehicles, and this dependence had if anything increased as a result of air attacks on the railroads:

The flow of supplies to all communist military forces, both in and through the country to SVN and Laos, would be greatly impeded since POL-fueled carriers are the principal vehicles for this transport. Further, the interdiction of rail lines and destruction of railroad rolling stock has resulted in the need to move increased tonnages by alternate means, primarily trucks and motor driven water craft. Thus, the most effective way to compound the current interdiction of DRV LOCs^ and to offset the introduction and use of substitute modes and routes, is to reduce drastically the available supply of POL. 9/

The JCS also suggested that POL in IWN was becoming increas-' ingly important to the effort in the South. There were now 5 confirmed and 2 suspected 3WA regiments in SVTT, increasing the load on the supply lines through Laos, and the roads there were being improved, indicating that KVN planned to rely more heavily on trucks to handle the load. Significantly, the importation of trucks was increasing, and despite losses inflicted by ROLLING THUNDER strikes, the size of the truck fleet was growing.

The JCS recomjnehded hitting the most important target, Haiphong POL storage, first- followed closely by attack on the remaining 8 targets. The weight of effort req.uired w.is 336 strike and 80 flak supp-^ession aircraft, with not m.ore than 10 losses predicted. All POL targets could be destroyed with only light damage to surrounding areas and few civilian casualties (less than 50).

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According to the JCS^ the destruction of the Haiphong target "would drastically reduce the capahility to receive and distribute the major portions of DRV bulk POL imports." Destruction of the others would "force reliance upon dispersed POL storages and improvised distribution methods," Recovery would be difficult and time-consuming. As stated in an annex to the JCSM:

Recuperability of the DRV POL system from the effects of an attack is very poor. Loss of the receiving and and distribution point at Haiphong would present many problems. It would probably require several months for the DRV, with foreign assistance^ to establish an alternate method for importing bulk POL, in the quantities required. An alternative to bulk importation would be the packaging of POL at some point for shipment into WN and subsequent handling and distribution by cumbersome and costly methods over interdicted LOCs. Loss of bulk storage facilities would necessitate the use of sm-all drioms and dispersed storage areas and further compound the POL distribution problem. 10/

Any further delay in carrying out the strikes, on the other hand, "will permit further strengthening of DRV active defenses of the POL, as well as the improvem^ent of coLintermeasures, such as dispersed and underground storages." On the latter point, the appendix to the JCSM added detailed intelligence information that boded ill for any procrastination:

Current evidence shows that the DRV has in progress an extensive program of installing groups of small POL tanks in somewhat isolated locations and throughout the Hanoi area. Photographs reveal groups of tanks ranging in number of l6 to 120 tanks per group. The facilities are generally set into shallow excavations and are then earth-covered leaving only the vents and filling apparatus exposed. This construction was observed at several places in the Hanoi area in August and appeared to be an around-the-clock activity.... \ In addition, considerable drum storage has been identified. 11/

It appeared that NVN had already begun a crash program to drastically reduce the vulnerability of its POL storage and handling system. As in other instances, NVN expected further escalation of the bombing, and was preparing for it.

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■ 2* The Intelligence Community Demurs

There vras no immediate action on the November I965 JCS recommendations, "but they were taken under study. Secretary McNamara asked for intelligence evaluations, and on 27 November and 3 December, respectively, he received special reports from the Board of National Estimates on (a) U.So air attacks on WHl petroleum storage facilities, and (b) a generally stepped-up effort involving doubling or tripling U.S. troop commitments, bombing military and industrial targets in the Hanoi/Haiphong area, and mining NVN harbors. 12/

The Board reported that strikes against POL targets in the Hanoi/Haiphong area v/ould represent "a conspicuous change in the ground rules" which the U.S. had hitherto observed, but would not appreciably change the course of the war:

...the Commiunists .would unq_uestionably regard the proposed US attacks as opening a new stage in the war, and as a signal of US intention to escalate the scale of conflict. ... -V7e do not believe, however, that the attacks in themselves would lea.d to a major change of policy on the Communist side, either toward negotiations or toward enlarging the war.... 13/

The strikes v^ould cause strains and embarrassment but would not have a major military or economic impact:

Hanoi would not be greatly surprised by the attacks. Indeed...it has already taken steps to reduce their impact. It has developed some underground storage facilities, and some capacity for dispersed storage in drums....We believe that the DRV is prepared to accept for some time at least the strains and difficulties vrhich loss of the major POL facilities would mean for its military and economic activity. It is unlikely that this loss would cripple the Communist military operations in the South, though it would certainly embarrass them, ik/

NVN might possibly ask the Chinese to intervene with fighter aircraft to help defend the targets but would probably not ask for ground troops. The Chinese v/o.ild probably decline to inter^^ene in the air and would not volunteer ground forces, though they would urge Wl^ to continue the war. •The Soviets would be "concerned" at the prospect of a further escalation of the bombing:

The Soviets would find their difficulties and frustrations increased...-They are committed to provide defense for North Vietnam, and — their inability to do so effectively

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would "be dramatized... .We believe that they would not change their basic policy of avoiding overt involvement in combat .while giving extensive military equipment and economic assistance to NVIT. But their relations with the US would almost certainly deteriorate^, for it is the bombing of North Vietnam which is, for Moscow, the most nearly intolerable aspect of ^he War^y^ 15/

In its estimate of the likely reactions to the wider course of substantially expanding the U.S. effort in the South, together with the bombing and aerial mining of the North, the Board similarly offered little hope that the escalation would produce any marked improvement in the situation. They characterized JWN's will to resist in the North and to persevere in the South as virtually unshakeable in the short run and extremely tough even in the long run:

Present Communist policy is to continue to prosecute the war vigorously in the South. The Communists recognize that the US reinforcements of I965 signify a determination to avoid defeat. They expect more US troops and probably anticipate that targets in the Hanoi-Haiphong area will come imder air attack. Nevertheless, they rem^ain unwilling to damp down the conflict or move toward negotiation. They expect a long war, but they continue to believe that time is their ally and that their ovm staying power is superior. 16/

Heavier air attacks by themselves would not budge them:

The DRV would not decide to quit; PAVN infiltration southward would continue. Damage from the strikes would make it considerably more difficult to support the war in the South, but these difficulties would neither be immediate nor insiirmoiintable. I7/

Aerial mining would create serious problems, but NVN would keep supplies moving by resorting to shallow-draft coastal shipping and intensive efforts to keep the rail lines open. As for the South, NVN would accept the challenge:

Rather than conclude in advance that the tide of battle would turp. permanently against them, the Communists would choose to boost their own commitm.ent ard to test US capabilities and will to persevere at a higher level of conflict and casualties. Thus the DRV reaction would probably be a larger program of PAVN infiltration. 18 /

The Board's picture of Hanoi was one of almiost unbelievably strong comjnitment and dogged determination, by contrast with previous estimates. Thus, if the U.S. ^committ-ed enough forces in the South to

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prevent NVA/vC forces from sustaining the conflict at a significant level -- and the Board would not estimate how many U.S. forces were "enough" --

...they might "believe it necessary to make a m-ore fundamental choice between resorting to political tactics or enlarging the war. /But/ We believe that it would take a prolonged period of military discouragement to convince the DRV and the VC, persuaded as they are of their inherent advantages J that they had reached such a pass. 19/

Even if it found itself in such straits^ however^ the chances were close to 50-50 that NVn would bring in Chinese forces rather than q.uit:

If this point were reached....Prudence would seem to dictate that Hanoi... shouJ_d choose...to reduce the effort in the South, perhaps negotiate, and salvage their resources for another day. We think that the chances are a little better than even that this is what they would do. But their ideological and emotional comjnitment, and the high political stakes involved, persuade us that' there is an almost equal chance that they would do the opposite, that is, enlarge the war and bring in large numbers of Chinese forces. 20/

The two CIA intelligence estimates of the probable con-seq.uences of the proposed escalatory measures were apparently closely held, but the available documentary evidence does not reveal how influential they m.ay have been. Secretary McNamara's response to the JCS was merely that he was considering their recommendations "carefully" in connection with "decisions that must be taken on other related aspects of the conflict in Vietnam." 2l/ He was apparently not satisfied with the estlm-ate of reactions to the POL strikes, however, which was largely confined to an estimate of political reactions, and asked CIA for another estimate, this time related to two options: (a) attack on the storage and handling facilities at Haiphong, and (b) attack on the facilities at Haiphong together with the other bulk storage sites.

The new estimate was submitted by Richard Helms, then Acting Director of CIA, on 28 December (with the comment that it had been drafted without reference to any pause in the bombing "such as is now the subject of various speculative press articles." 22/ The estimate spelled out with greater force than before what "strains" the POL strikes might create in the North and how they might "embarrass" NVA/vC military operations in the South, and its tone >;as much m-ore favorable to carrying out the strikes.

The estimate m.ade little distinction between the two options. Haiphong vras by far the most im.portant and m.ost sensitive of the targets and the closest to a m.ajor city; the attacks on the others were

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of secondary Importance. Neither option was likely to bring about a change in KW policy;, either toward negotiations or toward sharply enlarging the 'v^ar, but either option would substantially increase NVN's economic difficulties in the North and logistics problems in the South.

First, the estimate said, NVN would have to resort to much less efficient methods of receiving, storing and handling POL:

Destruction of the storage tanks and bulk unloading equipment at Haiphong would substantially increase the Comm.unists' logistic problems and force them to improvise alternate POL im.port and distribution channels. These could include, subject to the hazards of interdiction, the use of rail or highway tankers and the transport of POL in drums by road, rail, or coastal shipping. The DRV is already increasing its use of dreams because this facilitates dispersal and concealment, Hov/ever, handling POL this way also requires .greater expenditures of time and effort, and very large num.bers of drums. Resort to these methods v/ould necessitate transhipping through Chinese ports or transport directly across China by rail, which would in turn not only involve physical delays and difficulties but also increase the DRV's political problems in arranging for the the passage of Soviet supplies through China. 23 /

This in turn would interfere with the production and distribution of goods in NVN:

The econom^y would suffer appreciably from the resultant disruption of transportation. This.. .vrould somewhat curtail the output of the DRV's modest industrial establishment and complicate the problems of internal distribution. 2h/

And make it more difficult to support the war in the South (although it would not force a reduction in such support):

The loss of stored POL and the dislocation of the distribution system would add appreciably to the DRV's difficulties in supplying the Comjuujiist forces in the South. Hovrever-5 we have estimated that the Communist effort in South Vietnam, at present levels of combat, does not depend on imports of POL into the South and rrq.uires only relatively small tonnages of other supplies (say 12 tons per day, on an annual basis). Accordingly, we believe that adequate quantities of supplies would continue to m.ove by one means, or another to the Communist forces in South Vietnam, though the su-pplies wo-uld not move as fast and it would, hence require more to keep the pipeline filled 25/

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But was not likely to break Hanoi's will:

Although there presumably is a point at which one more turn of the screw would crack the enemy resistance to negotiations 5 past experience indicates that we are unlikely to have clear evidence when that point has been reached,... Though granting that each increase of pressure on the DRV bears with it the possibility that it may be decisive, we do not believe the bombing of the Haiphong facility is likely to have such an effect. 26/

With the exception of State's INR^ other intelligence agencies appeared to look v^-ith favor upon escalating the bombing. In a SNIE issued on 10 Decem-ber, they agreed that intensified air attacks, beginning with POL facilities and key povrer plants and extending to other targets in the Hanoi/Haiphong area and mining the harbors, would not bring about any basic change in WN policy but would in time hamper IWN's operations and set a lid on the war in the South:

We believe that Hanoi's leaders would not decide to quit and that PAVDI infiltration southward would continue. Though damage from the strikes would m.ake it considerably more difficult to support the war in South Vietnam, these difficulties would not be immediate. Over the long run, the sustained damage inflicted upon North Vietnam might impose significant limitations on the num.bers of PAVN and . VC m.ain force units which could be actively supported in South Vietnam from North Vietnam. 27/

Mining the ports, despite the dilemma created for the Soviets, would probably succeed in blocking all deep-water shipping:

The difficulty of clearing such mine fields and the ease of resowing would virtually rule out efforts to reopen the ports. The Soviets would protest vigorously and might try for some kind of action in the UN. We do not believe, however, that the Soviets would risk their ships in mined Vietnamese harbors. Peking and Hanoi would try to compensate by keeping supplies moving in shallow-draft coastal shipping and overland. 28/

J^IA, NSA, and the 3 Service intelligence agencies even recorded a judgment that the intensified air strikes, combined with the projected build-up of U.S. ground forces ,in SVE to about 350,000 troops *bv the fall of I966, might ultimately result in a change of heart in Hanoi. In a footnote to the SNIE they said they believed:

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...that as time goes on and as the impact of sustained bombing in IJVN merges with the adverse effects of the other co\irses of action as they begin to unfold, the DRV would become clearly aware of the extent of US determination and ■ thus might reconsider its position and seek a means to achieve a cessation of the hostilities. 29/

IKR dissented. Its Director, Thomas L. Hughes, wrote that the escalation vrould evoke stronger reactions than indicated in the SNIE, "because it would be widely assumed that we were initiating an effort to destroy the DRV's modest industrial establishment":

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The distinction between such operations and all-out war would appear increasingly tenuous. As. these attacks expanded, Hanoi would be less and less likely to soften its opposition to negotiations and at some point it would com.e to feel that it had little left to lose by continuing the • fighting 32/

B. The Issue Focuses

1. POL and the Pause

' Meanwhile, the flow of JCS papers urging POL strikes as

the next step continued. Secretary McNamara sent the Chairman, General Wheeler, the 27 November CIA estimate which had suggested that the strikes would not have great impact on the war (they vrould only "embarrass" operations in the South). General VJheeler commented that the loss of POL storage v/ould do m.uch more:

It would, in fact, have a substantial impact not only on their military operations but also would significantly impede their efforts to support the anticipated build-up of VC/PAVN forces in South Vietnam during the coming months. 3^/

General ^^eeler also forwarded a Joint Staff-DIA study of the POL target system, with the comment that destruction of the system would force HVTI to curtail all but the m.ost vital POL-povT-ered activities and resort to "more extensive use of porters, anim.al transport, and non-powered water craft." The net result wouJId be to considerably reduce IJVN's capability to m.ove large units cr q.uartities of eq.uipm.ent, an I important consideration in view of the fact that motorable segments of

.the Ho Chi Minh trail were being extended- 32/

The Joint Staff-DIA study 33/ showed that JWW's bulk POL storage capacity was greatly in excess of what NVM req.uired to sustain current consumption levels -- 179,000 metric tons available as compared

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with 32,000 metric tons needed -- indicating that the strikes would have to be very damaging in order to cause IWIT any major difficulties. The study also hinted that an adequate substJ^tute system could be improvised, with lighterage from ocean tankers and dispersed storage, but it nonetheless concluded that the strikes would result in "a reduction of essential transport capabilities for military logistic and infiltration support opeations," i.e., as a result of a deprivation of necessary POL. SV

As already noted, during the 37-day Pause, the JOS continued to recommend not only the resumption of the bombing but resumption v/ith a dramatic sharp blow on major targets, including POL, followed by uninterrupted, increasing "pressure" bom.bing. They v^ished, in short, to turn the limited bombing program into a major strategic assault on JWl^. In mid-January I966 they sent Secretary McNamara a memo reiterating old arguments that the current ROLLING THUMDER program would not cause WN to stop supporting the war in the South, and that the piecemeal nature of the attacks left JWN free to replenish and disperse its supplies and contend with interdictions. The way to achieve U.S. objectives, the JCS said, was to implement the bombing program they had recommended long ago, in JCSM 982-6^ of 23 November 196^, which called for the rapid destruction of the entire NVIM target system. In order to get the program started, the JCS recommended extending arm.ed reconnaissance to all areas of NTN except the sa.nctuaries, which they would shrink (to a 10-mile radius around Hanoi and Phuc Yen airfield, a 4-mile radius around Haiphong, and a strip 20 miles along the Chinese border); lifting the sortie ceiling on armed reconnaissance; and removing "tactical restrictions" on the execution of specific strikes. The strikes would be heavy enough to deny NVN external assistance, destroy in-country resources contributing to the war, destroy in-country resources contributing to the war, destroy all military facilities, and harass, disrupt, and impede movement into SVN. 35/

The idea of resuming the bombing with a large and dramatic bang did not appeal much to decision-makers. Apart from the old problem of triggering an unwanted Chinese reaction, the Administration was interested in giving the lie to NVN and Chinese claims that the Pause was a ■cynical prelude to escalation. Although it was possible that res-uming merely where the bombing left off (following as it would an extended pause and a display of great eagerness for peace) might signal too much irresolution and uncertainty, there was good reason to put off any escalatory acts for a while. As Assistant Secretary of State William Bundy wrote:

For a period of two-three weeks at least, while the world is digesting and assessing the Pause, we should do as little as possible to lend fuel to the charge -- which will ■ doubtless be the main them^e of Communist propaganda -- that the Pause vras intended all along merely as a prelude to more drastic action. 3§J

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Bundy in fact suggested resuming at a lesser level, opening with strikes loelow the 20th parallel, and only after a fe-j weeks again moving northward. McNaughton wrote:

No consideration argues for a 'noisy' resumption.•.. The program at first should be at the level and against the kinds of targets involved prior to the Pause (only two vreeks later should the program begin...to escalate ), 37/

He also suggested that criticism would be less if the first strikes were clearly identified with the effort to stop the southward flow of men and supplies, which had been greatly increased during the Pause.

The decisions went against ending the Pause with a bang. When the bombing was resumed on 31 January (Saigon time) it was limited "until further notice" to armed reconnaissance. No new major targets were authorized. The former sanctuary restrictions and the sortie ceilings were maintained. 38/

It was also decided to postpone any serious escalation for the time being. Secretary McNamara infonued the JCS that their proposals for rapid escalation were being considered, and on 2k January he sent the President a memorandum on the overall Vietnam program which sidestepped the issue. For I966, the memorandum said, the bombing program against NTO should include ^000 attack sorties per month "at a minimum." It should consist of day and night armed reconnaissance against rail and road targets and POL storage sites. The present sanctuaries should be preserved. There should be more intense bombing of targets in Laos, along the Bassac and Mekong Rivers running into SVN from Cambodia, and better surveillance of the sea approaches. 39/

The use of interdiction rather than pressure terms in the Presidential memorandum, and the emphasis on bombing infiltration routes into SVN, rather than the flow of supplies into or within NVN, indicates that the Secretary was still interested in keeping the objectives of the bombing limited and any escalation in check. The memorandum said that the bombing had already achieved the objective of raising the cost of infiltration, and was reducing the am.ount of enemy supplies reaching the South. In NVN it had also diverted manpov/er to air defense and repair work interfered with mobility, and forced the decentralization of many activities- It could further reduce the flew of supplies to NVA/vC forces in the South, and limit their "flexibility" to defend themselves adeq.uately

undertake frequent offensive action, but it was doubtf\il that even heavier bombing would put a "tight ceiling" on the NVN effort in the South, ho/

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Despite the application of the brake on ROLLING THUNDER operations5 the debate over escalation wore on. Further proposals were made and farther studies and reviews were req.uested. DIA was asked to conduct a special analysis of the NTN POL system- The study said that the exceptionally high ratio of storage capacity to consumption allowed the system to "absorb a high degree of degradation," and noted that the dispersed sites in the system were "relatively invulnerable," but concluded nonetheless that (a) the loss of storage at Haiphong would be "critical to the entire bulk distribution system" and would rec[uire either a "modification" in the handling of marine imports or a switch to importation by rail or truck through China, and (b) the loss of the other facilities would produce local POL shortages and transportation-bottlenecks until substitutes and alternatives could be devised. Ul/

2» The February Debate

In February a SNIE was published, estimating how I^IWI's physical capabilities (not its will) to support the v/ar in the South would be affected by increasing the scope and intensity of ROLLING THUNDER. The enlarged program which the estimate considered included attacks to destroy all knov/n POL facilities, destroy all large military facilities except airfields and SAM sites (unless they seriously interfered with our operations), interdict the land LOCs from China, (a) with or (b) without closing the ports, put and keep electric power plants out of action, and restrict the use of LOCs throughout WN but especially south of Hanoi. k2/

The SNIE concluded that although the increased bombing might set a lim.it somewhere on the expansion of NVA/vc forces and their operations in SVN, it would not prevent their support at substantially higher levels than in 1965* The destruction of electric power facilities would practically "paralyze" NVN*s industry, but

...because so little of what is sent south is produced in the DRV, an industrial shutdown would not very / seriously reduce the regime's capability to support the insurgency. k3 /

Destruction of POL storage facilities v^ould force NTN to almost complete dependence on current imports, but NVN could manage. Destruction of military facilities would mean the loss of some stockpiled munitions, "although most such storage is now well dispersed and concealed." Closing the ports and interdicting the LOCs from China would reduce the level of imports--leaving the ports open v^ould not--but NVN could continue to brine in enough supplies that were critical to the survival of the regime and essential military tasks, including the "small q,uantities" necessary for transshipment to SVN*

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Importation of POL would be a key problem, but would be surmountable in a comparatively short time, probably a few weeks, since quantities involved would not be large, even if increased somewhat over previous levels. Soviet POL could be unloaded from tankers at Chan-chiang in South China, moved thence by rail to the DRV border and from there to the Hanoi area by truck. It could also move from the USSR by rail directly across China, or down the coast from Chan-chiang in shallow-draft shipping, kk/

Restricting the LOCs south of the Hanoi region would create logistical problems for NVN military forces in Military Region IV south of the 20th parallel, but would not stop the relatively small amounts of m^aterial foi^arded to SVN.

The cumulative effect of the proposed bombing program would make life difficult for ]WN, therefore, but it would not force it to curtail the war in the South:

The combined impact of destroying in-country stockpiles, restricting import capabilities, and attacking the southward LOCs would greatly complicate the DRV war effort. I ' The cumulative drain on material resources and human energy

^ would be severe. The postulated bombing and interdiction

campaign would harass, disrupt, and impede the movement of men and material into South Vietnam and impose great ' overall difficulty on the DRV. However, we believe that,

with a determined effort, the DRV could still move substantially greater amounts than in 1965- ^$/

The bombing program would not prevent WN from further expanding NVa/vC forces in the South at the projected reinforcement rate of ^500 men per month and from further providing them with heavier weapons, but it might set some limit on their size and their operations:

...an attempt by the Communists to increase their strength...to intensify hostilities...or...to meet expanded US/gVN offensive operations...will use up supplies at a higher rate.-.^hisj might raise supply requirements to a level beyond the practical ceiling imposed on their logistic capabilities by the bombing campaign.••-There are, however, too many uncertainties to permit estimating at just what level the limit on expansion would be. 46/

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' Also in February, Secretary McNamara asked the JCS to

develop an optimum air interdiction program "to reduce to the maxi-

(mum extent the support in men and materiel being provided by North Vietnam to the Viet Cong and PAVN forces in South Vietnam," 47/ The study, fon-;arded to the Secretary on Ik April, managed to frame an interdiction program which embraced virtually everything the JCS had been recommending• It pointed out that less than half of the JCS targets, "the most critical to North Vietnam's support of the insurgency, ) I military capabilities, and industrial output," had been hit, "due to

self-imposed restraints":

These restraints have caused a piecemealing of air operations which has allowed the enemy a latitude of freedom to select and use methods that significantly increase his combat effectiveness. It has permitted him to receive war supporting m^ateriel from external sources through routes of ingress which for the most part have been immune from attack and then to disperse and store this materiel in politically assured sanctuaries. From these sanctuaries the enemy then infiltrates this materiel to SVN/Laos... .Throughout the entire movement, maximum use is made of villages and towns as sanctuaries. These and the Hanoi, Haiphong, and China border buffer areas cloak and protect his forces and m-ater-iel, provide him a military training and staging area free from attack,, and permit him to mass his air defense weapons.

....The less than optim-um air campaign, and the relatively unmolested receipt of supplies from Russia, China, satellite countries, and certain elements of the Free World have undoubtedly contributed to Hanoi's belief in ultimate victory. Therefore, it is essential that an intensified air campaign be promptly initiated against specific target systems critical to North Vietnam's capability for continued aggression and support of insurgency. k8 /

The study went on to outline an intensified bombing campaign to cause MN to stop supporting the insurgency in the South

by making it difficult and costly for North Vietnam to • continue effective support of the NVN/vC forces in South • Vietnam and to im-pose progressively increasing penalties

Qj^ jjY])^ for continuing to support insurgency in Southeast

Asia. h9/

Its language left no doubt that v/hile the strikes were intended "to restrict NVN capability to support and conduct armed aggression in

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SMsia^" the ultimate purpose was to apply pressure against Hanoi's will:

The strategy of this plan req.uires initial application of air attacks over a widespread area against the WN military base structure and war supporting resources. The intensity of air operations and the numher of targets to be attacked gradually increase. Under such pressure of attack^ ]NIW must further disperse or face destruction in depth of its military base and resources. The dispersal will increase the stresses on command, control, and logistic support and should cause some concern in the Military Command of the wisdom of further aggression....The combined effects of reducing and restricting external assistance to IWN, the progressive attacks against NVN military and war supporting resources, the interdiction of infiltration routes in NVN and Laos, and the destruction of NVN/vC forces and bases in SVN and Laos should cause a reappraisal in Hanoi as to NVN's military capability to continue aggression. _50/

The plan, which was merely "noted" and not red-striped by the JCS, called for the "controlled and phased intensification of air strikes" and a "modest adjustment" in the sanctuaries (to 10 miles around Hanoi, k around Haiphong, and 20 from the Chinese border, as previously recommended by the JCS). A first phase extended armed reconnaissance to the northeast, and struck 11 more JCS-listed bridges, the Thai Nguyen railroad yards and shops, ih headc[uarters/barracks, k ammunition and 2 supply depots, 5 K)L storage areas, 1 airfield, 2 naval bases, and 1 radar site, all outside the (reduced) sanctuaries. The second phase attacked 12 "military and war supporting installations" within the Hanoi and Haiphong sanctuaries: 2 bridges, 3 POL storage areas, 2 railroad shops and yards, 3 supply depots, 1 machine tool plant, and 1 airfield. The third phase attacked the ^3 rem.aining JCS targets, including 6 bridges, 7 ports and naval bases, 6 industrial plants, 7 locks, 10 power plants, the WHi ministries of national and air defense, and assorted railroad, supply, ra.dio, and transformer stations.

The plan also provided for three special attack options for execution during any of the phases "as a counter to enemy moves or when strong political and military action is desired." The options were: attack on the K)L center at Haiphong; aerial mining of the channel a-pproaches to Haiphong, Hon Gai, and Cam Pha, the three principal maritime ports; and strikes against the major jet airfields at Hanoi, Haiphong, and Phuc Yen. 5l/

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The JCS were apparently not in complete sympathy with the gradual phasing of stronger attacks ovex several months^ as proposed in the study- In their formal memoranda to the SecDef they continued to restate their mid-January recommendations for the sharp blows with maximum, shock effect as "the soundest program from a military standpoint" which offered "the greatest return for the air effort expended." 52/ Apparently sensing that this was m-ore than the traffic would bear^ however, they began to push for early strikes against POL as "one of the highest priority actions not yet approved." They pointed out that JWI^'was busily expanding and improving its LOCs, and its "offensive and defensive" air capabilities; it was expediting its import of trucks. POL was becoming increasingly significant to NTO^s war effort, and its destruction would have an "imjnediate effect on the military movement of war supporting materials." ^3 /

3* The CIA Recommends Escalation

t While the JCS kept up its barrage of recommendations during

March, CIA broke into the debate with an apparently very influential report on the past accomplishments and future prospects of the bombing. The report virtually vnrote off the bombing results to date as insignifi-

i " cant, in terms of either interdiction or pressiore; blamed "the highly

restrictive ground rules" under which the program operated; and took the bold step, for an intelligence document, of explicitly recommending a preferred bombing program of greater intensity, redirected largely against "the will of the regime as a target system." ^h j

The report held that the economic and military damage sustained by NYN had been moderate and the cost had been passed along to the USSR and China. The major effect of the bombing had been to disrupt nonnal activity, particularly in transportation and distribution, but with considerable external help the regime had been singularly successful in overcoming any serious problems. It had been able to strengthen its defenses, keep its economy going, and increase the flow of men and supplies South. Most of the direct damage so far had been to facilities which WW did not need to sustain the military effort, and which the regime merely did v/ithout. It had been able to maintain the overall TDerformance of the transportation system at the levels of 1964 or better. It had increased the capacity of the LOCs to the South and made them less vulnerable to air attack by increasing the number of routes and bypasses. Despite the bombing, truck movement through Laos, with larger vehicles and heavier loads^ had doubled.

The program had not been able to accomplish more because it had been handicapped by severe operational restrictions:

./^^ Self-ii^-posed restrictions have limited both the choice

^ ^ ■ Q^ targets and the areas to be bombed. Consequently, almost

80 percent of North Vietnam.'s limited modern, industrial

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economy^ 75 percent of the nation's population and the most lucrative military supply and LOG targets have been ij effectively insulated from air attack. Moreover, the - ■

authorizations for each of the ROLLING THUNDER programs often have imposed additional restrictions, such as limiting the number of strikes against approved fixed targets. The policy decision to avoid suburban casualties to the extent " " possible has proved to be a major constraint•

The overall effect of those area and operational restrictions has been to grant a large measure of immunity to the military, political, and economic assets used in Hanoi's support of the war in the South and to insure an am^ple flow of military supplies " from North Vietnam's allies. Among North Vietnam's target systems, not one has been attacked either intensively or extensively enough to provide a critical reduction in national capacity. No target system can be reduced to its critical point under existing rules. 55/

Moreover, the bombing had been too light, fragmented, and slov/ly paced:

The ROLLING THUNDER program has spread bomb tonnage over a great variety of military and economic targets systems, but the unattacked targets of any one system have consistently left more than adequate capacity to meet all essential requirements. Furthermore, the attacks on major targets have often been phased over such long periods of time that adequate readjustment to meet the disruption could be accomplished. _56/

VJhat was required was a basic reorientation of the program;

Fundamental changes must be made if the effective-

(ness of the campaign is to be raised significantly. First, the constraints upon the air attack must be reduced. Secondly, target selection must be placed on 1 .a more rational basis militarily. 57/

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Putting the program on a "more rational" military basis apparently involved abandoning interdiction as a prim.ary goal. The report held out little promise that any acceptable bombing program ' could physically interfere with the flow of supplies to the South* The NVN econov:^:^:, it stated, was not "an indigenous economic base heavily committed to the support of military operations in the South," but rather

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a "logistic funnel" through which supplies from the USSR and China flowed. As su'ih, it was a hard target, easy to maintain in operation and quite large for the load. This was particularly the case in the Icn^rer half of the "funnel", where the bombing had been concentrated:

...the rudimentary nature of the logistic targets in the southern part of North Vietnam, the small volume of traffic moving over them in relation to route capacities, the relative ease and speed with which they are repaired, the extremely high frequency with which they would have to be restruck — once every three days — all combine to make the logistic network in this region a relatively unattractive target system, except as a supplement to a larger program. A significant lesson from the ROLLII^IG THUNDER program to date is that the goals of sustained interdictions of the rudimentary road and trail networks in southern North Vietnam and Laos will be extremely difficult and probably impossible to obtain in 1966, given the conventional ordnance and strike capabilities likely to exist. ^8 /

The upper half of the "funnel" was a much more lucrative target — not, however, because attacking it would choke the volum^e of supplies flowing into the South, but because it would inflict more pain on the regime in the North.

The flow of military logistics supplies from the USSR and China cannot be cut off, but the movement could be made considerably more expensive and unreliable if authorization is granted to attack intensively the rail connections to Communist China and if the thz-^ee major ports are effectively mined. About 2/3 of North Vietnam's imports are carried by sea transport and the remainder move principally over the rail connections from Communist China- Mining the entrances to the three major ports would effectively transfer all imports to rail transport, including the flow of imports needed to maintain economic activity. The rail connections to Communist China would then become a m-ore lucrative target and the disruptive effect of interdiction would then be more immediately felt- Sustained interdiction would then force Hanoi to allocate considerable am.ounts of manpower and materials to maintain the line. _59/

Bombing the supplies and supply facilities at the top of the "funnel" was therefore a "preferred LOC target system." It v^as not advanced as an interdiction measure, ho^^ever, but as a means of increasing the penalty to Hanoi (and its allies), in terms of economic,

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social^ and political consequences, of supporting the war in the South, and thus presunably to reduce the desire to continue it. Other targets which might be attacked in order to similarly influence the will of the ' regime were: 26 military barracks and/or supply facilities on the JCS

. J list, the neutralization of v/hich would "impede the flow of military

supplies and disrupt the military training programs of NVN"; 8 major POL storage facilities, which had a "direct bearing" on the regime's ability

, to support the war in the South, but which had to be hit almost simul-

taneously in order to reduce IWN to the critical point in meeting essential requirements; the Haiphong cem.ent plant, the loss of which would "create a major impediment to reconstruction and repair programs" until cement could be imported; 3 major and 11 minor industrial plants which, though

i ■ they made "no direct or significant contribution to the war effort" and

"only a limited contribution" to the economy, v;ere "highly prized and nominally lucrative" targets; or, as an alternative miethod of knocking out industrial production, the main electric power facilities. 60/

As for other potential targets in WfR -- the command and control system, agriculture, and manpower —

Attacks on these targets are not recommended at this timie* In each case the effects are debatable and are likely to provoke hostile reactions in vrorld capitals. 6l/

The March CIA report, with its obvious bid to turn ROLLING THUNDER into a pionitive bombing campaign and its nearly obvious promise of real payoff, strengthened JCS proposals to intensify the bombing. In particular, hovzever, the report gave a substantial boost to the proposal to hit the POL targets. The POL system appeared to be the one target system. in NVN to which, what the report called, "the principle of concentration" might be applied; that is, in which enough of the system could be brought under simultaneous attack to cut through any cushion of excess capacity, and in which a concentrated attack might be able to over^fhelm the other side's ability to reconstruct, repair, or disperse its capacity. 62/

The POL targets had other qualities to commend them as the next escalatory step in ROLLING THUNDER. They really v/ere pressure targets but they could be plausibly sold as interdiction targets. The main ones were in the Hanoi/Haiphong sanctuaries, so that over and above any economic or military impact, strikes against them would signal that the last sanctuaries were going and the industrial and other targets there were now at risk. They fit the image of "war-supporting" facilities which strategic bombing doctrine and ample military precedent had decreed to be fair same in bringing a wa;r machine to a standstill. They had, in fact, beer struck before in other parts of MN without any unusual political repe-^cussions. They v^ere situated in the arbitrarily-defined urban/ industrial centers, but somewhat set apart from the densest civilian housing areas, and thus m-ight not entail as many civilian casualties

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as other targets in those areas.

Moreover5 even if the impact of POL strikes v/ould be within WIl\ itself -- because IWN supplied no POL at all to MA/yC forces in the South and used next to none in transporting other goods there — POL was at least relevant as an interdiction target. It did power trucks and boats which were involved in carrying men and supplies South. If any truck in the IWN fleet was an acceptable interdiction target, vzherever it was and whatever its cargo, why not any POL?

k. McNamara Endorses POL, The President Defers It

Resumption of ROLLING THUNDER, as initiation of the pause, did not, of course, constitute a final decision on escalation. The views of CINCPAC and the JCS remained unaltered, and Secretary McNam.ara stood committed, unless he reversed himself, to enlarging the area and intensity of interdiction bombing and to destroying North Vietnamese POL. Neither in OSD nor the VHilte House had anyone opposed these measures on other than prudential grounds -- the risk of alienating allies or provoking Chinese or Russian intervention or uncertainty that results would justify either the risks or the costs. Everyone seemed agreed that, were it not for these factors, intensified bombing of the North would help to accomplish American objectives. Nevertheless, the position of the decision-makers can best be characterized as hesitant.

The services naturally undertook to tip the balance toward the rapid and extensive escalation they had all along advocated. To McNamara*s memorandum to the President, the JCS had attached a dissent. They felt that the Secretary underrated the "cumulative effect of our air campaign against the DRV on morale and DRV capabilities" and overestimated the "constancy of will of the Hanoi leaders to continue a struggle which they realize they cannot win in the face of progressively greater destruction of their country." 63 /

When McNamara reported to the Chairman the President's ruling on ROLLING THUNDER, he apparently spoke of the difficulty of making out a convincing case that air operations against North Vietnam could seriously affect PAVN/vC" operations in the South. In any event, following a conversation with the Secretary, General \fneeler ordered formation of a special studv group to devise a bombing effort "redirected for optimum military effect." He explained, "the primary objective should be to reduce to the maximum extent the support in men and materiel being provided by North Viet-Nam to the Viet Cong and PAVN forces in South Viet-Nam." 6V Headed 'by a Brigadier General from SAC, composed of five Air Force, three Navy, two Army, and one Marine Corps officers, and making extensive use of CINCPAC assistance, this study group went to v/ork in early February, with an assignment to produce at least an interim report by 1 March and a final report no later than 1 August. 65/

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Meanv/hile, routine continued, vrith CINCPAC recommending programs thirteen days prior to the beginning of a month and tHe JCS acting on thes3 recommendations two days later. 66/ In consequence^ McNamara received from the Chiefs on 19 February the same advice that had been given during the pause. 6? / He and the President responded much as before, though now permitting armed reconnaissance within the geographical limits fixed just before the pause and authorizing a significant increase -- to above 5?000 -- in numbers of sorties.

On 1 March, when this slightly enlarged campaign opened, the Chiefs filed a memorandum stressing the special im.portance of an early attack on North Vietnamese POL. 69/ They had singled out POL somev;-hat earlier, writing McNamara in November, I965? that attack on this target "would be more damaging to the DRV capability to move war-supporting resources within country and along infiltration routes to SVN than an attack against any other single target system." While causing relatively little damage to the civilian economy, it would, they reasoned force a sharp reduction in truck and other road traffic carrying men and supplies southward. They held also that the attack should be made soon, before North Vietnam succeeded in improving air defenses and in dispersing POL storage. 70/

McNamara had rejected this recommendation, not only because of the planned pause, but also because CIA sources q,uestioned some of the Chiefs* reasoning and stressed counterarguments which they tended to minimize. Assessing the probable results of not only taking out North Vietnam.ese POL, but also mining harbors and bombing military and industrial targets in the northeast quadrant, the Board of National Estimates said, "Dam^age from the strikes would make it considerably more difficult to support the war in the South, but these difficulties would neit?ier be immediate nor insurmountable." Jl/ With regard to the POL system alone, the Board observed "it is unlikely that this loss would cripple the Communist military operations in the South, though it v/ould certainly embarrass them." Pointing out that the bulk of storage facilities stood near Haiphong and Hanoi, the Board went on to say that "the Communists would unquestionably regard the proposed U„S. attacks as opening a new stage in the war, and as a signal of U.S. intention to escalate the scale of conflict." 72/ This appraisal did not encourage adoption of the JCS recommendation.

The Chiefs continued nevertheless to press for a favorable decision. Before and during the pause, they presented fresh memoranda to McNamara. 73/ A more detailed CIA study, obtained just after Christmas provided"~somewhat m-ore backing for their view. It conceded that the Communists were dispersing POL facilities and that an early attack on those at Hanoi and Haiphong "would add appreciably to the DRV's difficulties in supplying the Communist forces in the South." Nevertheless, it forecast that "adequate quantities of supplies would continue to move by one means or another to the Communist forces in South Vietnam." jh/

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In mid-January, the DIA prepared an estimate considerably more favorable to the scheme. 75/ But in early February appeared a SNIE estimatin^j effects on "DRV physical capabilities to support the insurgency in the South" of the various measures, including attacks on POL, previously recommended by CINCPAC and the JCS. Its conclusion, subscribed to by all intelligence services except that of the Air Force, was that, even with a campaign extended to port facilities, power plants, and land LOC's from China, "with a determined effort, the DRV could still move substantially greater amounts than in I965." 76/

In renewing their recommendation on 1 March, and again on 10 March, the JCS once more disputed such assessments. In an appendix to their long March 1 memorandum to the Secretary, the Chiefs outlined a concept of operations upon which they proposed to base future deployments. With respect to the air war, they urged that it be expanded to include POL and the aerial mining of ports and attacks on Hanoi and Haiphong. Their rationale was as follows:

I To cause...NVN to cease its control, direction, and

support of the coimnunist insurgency in SVN and Laos, air strikes are conducted against military and war-sustaining targets in all areas, including the Hanoi/Haiphong complex and areas to the north and northeast. Armed reconnaissance within NVN and its coastal waters is conducted to interdict LOCs, harass, destroy and disrupt military operations and the movement of m-en and m.aterials from NVN into Laos and SVN.

I Aerial mining of ports and interdiction of inland waterways

and coastal waters, harbors and water LOCs are conducted to

I reduce the flow of war resources. Air reconnaissance and

special air operations are conducted in support of the over-

' all effort." 77/

Ten days later the Chiefs again req.uested attacks on the POL together with authorization to mine the approaches to Haiphong. This time they noted that Ambassador Lodge and Admiral Sharp had each recently endorsed such measures (no documents so indicating are available to the writer). Supporting their rec[uest they cited recent intelligence reports of North Vietnamese orders for expedited delivery of additional trucks. With the arrival of more trucks, POL would become even more critical to the North Vietnamese logistical effort. Once POL reserves were initially destroyed, however the mining of Haiphong harbor would be the next immediate priority to prevent resupply by North Vietnam's allies. 78 / The Chiefs argued that the elimination as a package of these high value targets would significantly damage the DRV's war-sustaining capability.

This tim-e, moreover, the Chiefs possessed support in the intelligence comm.unity. A study by CIA addressed the question vrhich had been deliberately omitted from the terms of reference for the k February

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! SNIE, i.e., vrhat effect bombing might produce on the will of the

; North Vietnamese regime. Judging from a summary with some extracts^

preserved in Task Force files, it made a stiong case for almost

t unlimited bombing such as CINCPAC and the JCS had steadily advocated.

It accepted previous judgraents that "the goals of sustained interdictions of the rudimentary road and trail networks in southern North Vietnam and Laos will be extremely difficult and probably impossible to obtain in 19665 given the conventional ordnance and strike capabilities likely to exist." Though arguing that more payoff could result from regarding North Vietnam as a "logistic funnel" and attempting to stop v;hat went into it rather than what came out, it conceded that the "flow of military

I logistics supplies from the USSR and China cannot be cut off." But the

report contended that such measures as mining harbors, maintaining steady pressure on LOC's with China, and destroying militarily insignificant but "highly prized" industrial plants would not only reduce North Vietnam's capacity to support the insurgency in the South but would influence her leaders' willingness to continue doing so. "Fundamental changes must be

; made if the effectiveness of the campaign is to be raised significantly,"

said the report, "First, the constraints upon the air attack must be reduced. Secondly, target selection must be placed on a more rational basis militarily." One point stressed was the importance of taking out all remaining POL storage facilities simultaneously and at an early date. 79 /

With memoranda from the JCS now reinforced by this CIA report. Secretary McNamara had to reconsider the POL issue. Conferring with I\Jheeler on 23 March, he put several specific questions, among them whether destruction of POL storage facilities would produce significant results if not coupled with mining of North Vietnamese ports, what exact targets were to be hit, and with how many sorties. 80/ Responding with the req.uested details, the Chiefs said that they attached the highest importance to the operation, even if enemy harbors remained open. They strongly recomm.ended, in addition, attacks on adjoining industrial targets and LOC's, in order to enhance the effect of destroying POL facilities. 81/

In a m.emorandum for the President on bombing operations for Aprilj McNamara endorsed most of these JCS recommendations. He proposed authorizing attacks on seven of the nine POL storage facilities in the I . Hanoi-Haiphong area. Of the two he omitted, one lay near the center of ^-

(Hanoi. In addition, McNamara recommended attacks on the Haiphong cement Tilant and on roads, bridges, and railroads connecting Haiphong and Hanoi and leading from the two cities to the Chinese border, and asked that the military comm-C-nders be permitted to run up to 9OO sorties into the northeast quadrant, at their discretion.

For this marked stepping-up of the air war, McNamara put on Daper a much more forceful presentation than that in his January meniorandum. Using as a point of departure the general estimate that bombing could neither interdict supply of the South nor halt flow from C^ina and Russia into the North, he argued that:

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....The movement can "be made considerably more expansive and unreliable (a) by taking action to overload the roads and railroads (e^g., by destroying the domestic source of cement)^ (b) by attacking the key roads5 railroads and bridge between Hanoi on the one hand and Haiphong and China on the other^ and (c) by pinching the supply of POL, which is critical to ground m.ovement and air operations.

Amplifying one of these recommendations, McNamara commented that destruction of the plant, which produced 50^ of North Vietnam's cement, v;ould make bridge and road rebuilding difficult. As for POL,, he observed that the facilities targeted represented 70-80^ of those in the country. Though the North Vietnam^ese possessed reserves and had probably already built up some in the South, their transportation system depended on a continuous supply. They were knovm to have recently doubled their orders for imported Soviet POL. Eventually, though not necessarily in the short run, he said, they were bound to suffer a shortage.

While McNamara conceded that he did not expect the proposed program to yield quick results in South Vietnam, he predicted that it would ultimately have some effect. Addressing som.e political issues that had influenced the previous hesitancy, he asserted that the South would probably do nothing more than adopt "a somewhat harsher diplomatic and propaganda line" and that the Chinese "would not react to these attacks by active entry — by ground or air," unless the United States took further steps, the decisions on which "at each point would be largely within our ovm control." And offsetting such risks stood the possibility of favorable political effects. McNamara ventured no promises. He said, "We would not expect Hanoi to change its basic policy until and unless it concluded that its chances of winning the fight in the South had become so slim that they could no longer justify the damage being inflicted upon the North." Nevertheless, he commented that destruction of POL facilities "should cause concern in Hanoi about their ability to support troops in South Vietnam" and concluded his m-emorandum by writing:

In the longer term, the recommended bombing program.... can be expected to create a. substantial added burden on North Vietnam's manpovj-er supply for defense and logistics tasks and to engender popular alienation from the regions should shortages become widespread. While we do not predict that the regime's r control would be appreciably weakened, there might eventually

be an aggravation of any differences which may exist within the regime as /""to/ "^^^ policies to be followed.

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Reading this memorandum, one might conclude that the Secretary, after passing through a season of uncertainty, had finally

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made up his mind — that he now felt the right action to be sharp escalation such as CINCPAC, the JCS, and McNaughton had advocated during the pause. But even nov;, despite the comparatively vigorous language of the memorandum, one cannot be sure that McNamara expected or wanted the President to approve his recommendations.

The memorandum was probably brought up at the White House Tuesday luncheon on 28 March. Just sixteen days earlier, in response to Marshal Ky*s removal of General Nguyen Chanh Thi from Command of the I Corps Area, Buddhist monks had initiated anti-ICy demonstrations in DaNang and Hue. Soon, with other groups joining in, dissidents dominated the northern and central part of the country. Many not only attacked the Ky regime but denounced the American presence in Vietnam and called for negotiation with the I^TLF- Controlling the Hue radio and having easy access to foreign newsmen, these dissidents won wide publicity in the United States. As a result, Americans previously counted as supporters of administration policy began to ask why the United States should expend its resources on people v/ho apparently did not want or appreciate help. Such q.uestioning was heard from both Dem.ocrats and Republicans in Congress. Quite probably, the political situation in Vietnam and its repercussions in America stood uppermost in the President's mind. Eq.ually probably, McNam.ara recognized this fact. If so, it should not have surprised him to find the President taking much the same position as that which they had both taken, and recorded in NSAM 288 in March, 196^, when the Khanh government trembled — that it was imprudent to mount new offensives "from an extremely weak base which might at any moment collapse and leave the posture of political confrontation v/orsened. rather than improved." 83/

In any event, the principal outcome of l^Jhite House meetings at the end of March was a string of urgent cables from Rusk to Lodge, suggesting steps which might be urged on the Ky government and saying, among other things,

....We are deeply distressed by the seeming unwillingness or inability of the South Vietnamese to put aside their lesser qiuarrels in the interest of meeting the threat from ■ the Viet Cong. Unless that succeeds, they will have no country to q.uarrel about....We face the fact that we our-

I selves cannot succeed except in support of the South Viet-

■ namese. Unless they are able to mobilize reasonable solidarity,

the prospects are very grim." 8^/

*As for McNamara's proposals, the President approved only giving commanders discretion to launch 9OO sorties into the northeast quadrant during April and -permission to strike roads, railroads, and bridges outside or just on the fringe of the prohibited circles around Hanoi and Haiphong. He did not consent to m.easures involving more visible escalation of the air war.

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McNamara returned to the Pentagon to inform the Chiefs that^ while these operations had not heen vetoed^ they were not yet authorized.

The President had authorized the extension of armed reconnaissance into the northeast quadrant and strikes on k of the 5 bridges recommended by McNamara but deferred any decision on the crucial portion, the strikes against the 5th bridge, the cem^ent plant, the radar, and above all the 7 POL targets. The JCS execution message for ROLLING THUNDER 50, which was sent out on 1 April, directed implementation of what had been approved. In addition, it ordered CINCPAC to "plan for and be prepared to execute when directed attacks during April" against the 5th bridge, the cement plant, the radar, and the 7 POL sites. 86/ A pencilled notation by Secretary McNamara with reference to these targets also mentions April: "Defer...until specifically authorized but develop specific plans to carry out in April." 87/

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C. April and May -- Delay and Deliberation 1. Reasons to Wait

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Although the President's reasons for postponing the POL decision are not known, and although the initial postponem.ent seemed short, a matter of weeks, it is evident from the indirect evidence available that the proposal to strike the POL targets ran into stiffening opposition within the Administration, presumably at State but perhaps in other quarters as well. Before the question was settled it had assumed the proportions of a strategic issue, fraught with military danger and political risk, requiring thorough examination and careful appraisal, difficult to com-e to grips with and hotly contended. The question remained on the agenda of senior officials for close to three months, repeatedly brought up for discussion and repeatedly set aside inconclusively. Before . it was resolved a crisis atmosphere was generated, requiring the continuing personal attention of all the principals.

There can be little doubt that the POL proposal instigated a major policy dispute. The explanation seems to be two-fold. One, those vfho saw the bombing program., whatever its merits, as seriously

' risking war with China or the USSR, decided to seize the occasion as perhaps the last occasion to establish a firebreak against expanding the bombing to the "flash points." Two, those who saw the bombing program as incurring severe political penalties saw this as the last position up to which those penalties were acceptable and beyond which they were

' not. Both points no doubt merged into a single position. Both turned the POL question into an argument over breaching the Hanoi/Haiphong sanctuaries in any major way.

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McNaraara's Memorandum for the President, which had treated the K)L strikes as a logical extension of the previous interdiction program into an area in which it might "be more remunerative, did not address these questions of sanctuaries- No other single docioment has been located in the available files which does. Pieced together and deduced from the fragmentary evidence, however, it appears that the view that POL strikes ran too great a risk of counter-escalation involved several propositions. One was that the strikes might trigger a tit-for-tat reprisal (presumably by the VC) against the vulnerable POL stores near Saigon. The Secretary of Defense had himself made this point as early as mid-1965 in holding off Congressional and other proponents of Hanoi/Haiphong area POL strikes, citing the endorsement of General Westmoreland- 88/ The JCS had recognized the possibility in their November I965 paper on POL strikes, although they considered it "of relatively small potential conseq.uence, minor in comparison to the value of destruction of the DRV POL system." 89/ General VJheeler had also gone out of his way to allude to it- 90/ Under Secretary of State Ball, in a January I966 memorandum, saw the possibility of an enemy reprisal in SVN as only the first act of a measure-count ermeasure scenario which could go spiralling out of control: a VC reprisal against POL in SVN would put unbearable pressure on the U.S. to counter-retaliate against the North in some dangerous manner, which in turn would force the other side to react to that, and so on. 91/

More important than the fear of a VC reprisal, one assumes, was the belief that the POL sites were the first of the "vital" targets, high-value per se but also generally co-located with and fronting for NVN's other high-value targets. NVN, with its "vital" targets attacked and its economic life at stake, would at a minimum defend itself strenuously (again, provoking us to attack its airfields in our defense, which in turn might set off an escalatory sequence); or, at the other extreme, NVN might throw caution to the winds and call on its allies to intervene-This might be only a limited intervention at first, e.g. use of Chinese fighters from Chinese bases to protect NVN targets, but even this could go escalating upward into a full-scale collision with China. On the other hand, the strikes at the "vital" targets might be the Southeast Asian equivalent of the march to the Yalu, convince the other side that the U.S. was embarked on a course intolerable to its own interests, such as the obliteration of the NVN regime, and ca^ise it to intervene directly. 92

These arguments were not new, of course; they were arguments which could be, and no doubt were, used against any bombing at all- They e-ained force, however, as the bombing became more intense and the more the bombing was thought to really hurt Hanoi, (it was an irony of the original concept of the air war North that the more pressure it really applied and hence the more successful it was, the more difficult it was to prosecute.)

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Tbe belief that POL strikes would overload the negative side of the scale on political grounds had to do with the possibility that5 since the targets were situated in relatively populated "urban" areas (even though outside of the center cities), the strikes would be construed as no less than the beginning of an attack on civilian targets and/or population centers. This possibility, too, could widen the war if it were taken by NVN and its allies as indicating a U.S. decision to commence "all-out" bombing aimed at an "unlimited" objective. But even if it did not widen the war, it could cause a storm of protest v/orld-wide and turn even our friends against us. The world had been told repeatedly that the U.S. sought a peaceful settlement, not a total military victoiy; .that the U.S. objectives were limited to safeguarding SVN; that bombing IWN vms confined to legitimate military targets related to the aggression against SW; and that great care was taken to avoid civilian casualties. Any or all of this could be called into question by the POL strikes, according to the argument, and the U.S. could be portrayed as embarking on a course of ruthless brutality against a poor defenseless population.

The argimient about the escalatory implications of the proposed POL strikes was difficult to deal with. Official intelligence estimates were available which said, on balance, that Chinese or Soviet intervention in the war was unlikely, but no estimate could say that such intervention was positively out of the question, and of course intelligence estim-ates could misjudge the threshold of intervention, it was said, as they had in Korea. 93/

The argument about the political repercussions made some headway, however. Progress became possible because of the development of military plans to execute the strikes with "surgical" precision, thus minimizing the risk of civilian casualties, and because of the development of a "scenario" for the strikes in which military, diplomatic, and public affairs factors were coordinated in an effort to contain adverse reactions. There slowly unfolded a remarkable exercise in "crisis management ."

2. The April Policy Review

Though McNamara^s m^emorandurn, and the President's indication that he might later approve POL, brought the Administration somewhat nearer to a decision for escalation, there was as yet no new consensus on how the air war against the ITorth might be ^ailored to serve American obiectives or, indeed, on what those objectives were or ought to be. The • study group in the Joint Staff, completing its work early in April, offered a straightforward answer: " "The overall objective is to cause ITOT to cease suT)X)0rting5 directing, and controlling the insurgencies in South Vietnam and Laos." With his understanding, they could recommiend a three phase

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campaign leading to destruction of between 90 and 100^ of all POL storage, bridges, airfields, rail facilities, power plants, communications, port structures, and industry in North Vietnam. Whether the Chiefs reasoned similarly is not apparent from the papers available. Although they came out with comparable recommendations, they merely "noted" this study. 9^/

Certainly, in spite of McWamara's memorandum recomimending escalation, no clear view prevailed within OSD or am.ong civilians elsevAere in the government occupied with Vietnam policy. Among the papers left behind by McNaughton are some fragments relating to an attempt early in April, I966, to rethink the question of what the United States sought in Vietnam. These fragments suggest an evolution between winter, 1965-66, and spring, I966, from hesitancy to perplexity.

The political situation in South Vietnam became increasingly explosive. On March 3I, 10^000 Buddhists had demonstrated in Saigon against the government and the demonstrations had spread to other cities in the next several days. On April 5, Premier Ky flew to Danang to quell the rebellion and threatened to use troops if necessary. 95/ In this context, a meeting was convened at the White House on Friday, 9 April- Vance and McNaughton represented Defense; Ball, Bimdy, and Leonard Unger the State Department; and George Carver the CIA. Walt Rostow, who had just replaced McGeorge Bundy, took part. So did Robert Komer and Bill Moyers.

In.preparation for this meeting, McNaughton, Ball, Unger, and Carver undertook to prepare memoranda outlining the broad alternatives open. Carver would make the case for continuing as is, Unger and McNaughton for continuing but pressing for a compromise settlement -- Unger to take an optimistic and McNaughton a pessimistic view and Ball to argue for disengagement. Then four options were labelled respectively. A, B-O, B-P,

and C.

Carver, advocating Option A, vrrote:

OPTION A

I. Description of the Course of Action

■ 1. Option A involves essentially persevering in our present r)olicies and program,s, adhering to the objectives of

f ■ ■' a. Preventing a North Vietnamese takeover of

South Vietnam by insurrectionary warfare, thus

(1) Checking Commtinist expansion in ,--^,, ■ Southeast Asia

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(2) Demonstrating U.S. ability to provide support v^hich will enable indigenous non-Communist elements to cope with "wars of national liberation" and, hence,

(3) Demonstrating the sterile futility of the militant and aggressive expansionist policy advocated by the present rulers of Commionist China.

b. Aiding the development of a non-Communist political structure within South Vietnam capable of expending its writ over most of the country and acquiring sufficient internal strength and self-generated momentum to be able to survive without the support of U.S. combat forces whenever North Vietnam ceases its present campaign of intensive military pressure.

To adopt this option. Carver reasoned, required, on the political side, work with all non-Communist Vietnamese factions "to insure that the transition to civilian rule is as orderly as possible and effected with a minimum disruption of current programs." The United States would have to m^ke plain in Saigon that continued support was "contingent upon some modicum of responsible political behavior" and would have to "initiate the Vietnamese in the techniques of developing political institutions such as constitutions and parties." An "intensive endeavor at provincial and district levels" would have to complement efforts in the capital.

On the military side. Carver judged the dem^ands of Option A to be as follows:

a. Current U.S. force deployments in Vietnam will have to be maintained and additional deployments already authorized should be made-

b. Efforts to hamper Communist use of I:aos as a corridor for infiltrating troops and supplies into South Vietnam should be continued and in some respects intensified. There should be farther employment of B-52*s against selected choke points vulnerable to this type of attack. Additional programs should be developed to make our interdiction attacks more effective.

c. The aerial pressure campaign on ]}Torth Vietnam should be sustained for both military and psychological purposes. Attacks should not be mounted against population centers such as Hanoi or Haiphong, but m.ajor POL storage depots should be destroyed and, probably, Haiphong harbor should be mined.

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d» Within South Vietnam we must recognize that the period of political transition now in urain -- even if it evolves in the most favorable fashion possible -- will produce some diminution in the effectiveness of central authority and some disruption in current programs. At best, we will be in for a situation like that of late 1963* It is essential that the Communists be prevented from. m.aking major military gains during this time of transition or scoring military successes which would generate an aura of invincibility or seriously damage the morale of our South Vietnamese allies. Therefore, it is essential that during this period, Comjnunist forces be constantly harried, kept off balance, and not permitted to press their advantage. The bulk of this task will have to be borne by U.S. and allied forces during the immediate future and these forces must be aggressively and offensively employed.

Option B-0, as developed by Unger, assumed a "policy decision that we will undertake to find a vray to bring to an end by negotiation the military contest in South Viet-Nam." (This paper, dated "if/l4/66," was prepared after the April 9 meeting but was filed with the other papers of that date.) It was the optimistic version of this option because Unger assumed the possibility of reaching a settlement "on terms which preserve South Vietnam intact and in a condition which offers at least a 60-^0 chance of its successfully resisting Communist attempts at political takeover."

In pursuit of this option the United States would persuade the GVN to negotiate with the NLF, offering amnesty and a coalition government, though not one giving the NLF control of the military, the police, or the treasury. The United States would withdraw troops "in return for the withdrawal of North Vietnamese military forces and political cadre." Perhaps, agreements betv^een South Vietnajn and North Vietnam would provide for economic intercourse and mutual recognition.

It would not be easy to persuade the GVN, Unger conceded. Doing so might require not only words but withholding of funds or withdrawal of some American forces. And once the GVN appreciated that the United States was in earnest, there v/ould be danger of its collapse. Even if these problems were surm.ounted, there would remain the difficulty of pressing the iiegotiations to conclusion. "There is no assurance," Unger v;rote "that a negotiated settlement can pass successfully betvreen the UDper millstone of excessively dangerous concessions to the VC/nLF and the nether millstone of terras insufficiently attractive to make the VC/l^F consider it v/orthwhile to negotiate."

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Militarily^ Unger reasoned^ Option B-0 would call for continuation of current efforts, perhaps witla a modest increase in ground forces but with no step-up in the air war. Total refusal to talk on the part of the Communists would, however, linger wrote,

...leave us with a question of what kind of stick we have to substitute for the preferred carrot and this might bring us up against the judgment of whether intensification and extension of our bombing in North Viet-Nam, coupled with whatever greater military efforts could be made in the South would bring the Communists to the table.

McNaughton's papers do not contain his original memorandum setting forth the pessimistic version of Option B. One can, however, infer its outlines from various other pieces in the McNaughton collection.

The difference between McNaughton and Unger presumably did not concern the objective — negotiating out. It lay in McNaughton's expressing less confidence in an outcome not Involving Communist control of South Vietnam. On the first Monday in April, he had talked with Michael Deutch, freshly back from Saigon. His notes read:

1. Place (VN) in unholy mess.

2. We control next to no territory.

3. Fears economic collapse.

h. People would not vote for 'our ride.'

5. Wants to carry out economic warfare in VC.

6. This is incorruptible and popular. Chieu fsloj is best successor for Ky.

7. Militarily will be same place year from now.

8. Pacification won't get off ground for a year.

If McNaughton himself accepted anything like this estimate, he would have been pessimistic indeed about prospects for the GVN's survival. Even if he did not take quite so gloomy a view, he probably felt, as he had intimated in one of his January memoranda, that the United States qhould prepare to accept som.ething less than the conditions which Unger sketched. VJhat practical consequences followed from this difference in view, one can only guess.

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Option C, as stated by Ball, rested on the assumption that "the South Vietnamese people will not be able to put together a government capable of maintaining an adeq.uat-; civil and military effort or — if anything resembling actual independence is ever achieved — running the country." On this premise, he concluded, much as in earlier memoranda, "we should concentrate our attention on cutting our losses." Specifically, he recommended official declarations that United States support depended on a representative government which desired American aid and which demonstrated its ability to create "the necessary unity of action to assure the effective prosecution of the war and the peace," Seizing upon the next political crisis in South Vietnam, the United States should, said Ball, "halt the deployment of additional forces, reduce the level of air attacks on the North, and maintain ground activity at the minimum level required to prevent the substantial improvement of the Viet Cong position."

Ball described two alternative outcomes from Option C. One was that the South Vietnamese might unify and "face reality," the other, far more likely in Ball's estimation, was that South Vietnam would fragment still further, "leading to a situation in which a settlement would be reached that contemplated our departure." He closed:

*

Let us face the fact that there are no really attractive options open to us. To continue to fight the war with the present murky political base is, in my judgment, both dangerous and futile. It can lead only to increasing commitments, heavier losses, and mounting risks of dangerous escalation.

In McNaughton's files are pencil notes vrhich may relate either to his ovm missing memorandum or to a conversation that took place among some of the officials concerned. Despite its cryptic nature, it is worth reproducing in its entirety, in part because it gives a clue to thoughts passing at this time through McNamara's mind:

Do we press VNese or do they move themselves^?y

What the point of probes if (w/oul/d be counterproductive otherwise)

Ball

1, Uo more US forces unless better govt

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2. Reemph^sisJ of aondifltloxi^J

(a) Rep govt ask^dT"

(b) Performance

3. Fashion govt unified and stable govt. Give time. Protect selves.

Defend selves.

if. Effect

(a) Nationalist

(b) VC deal by GYN

If sc[ueeze GVN firsts and go to _^all*s position/ later^ have contaminated Course C. Better to claim we want to win and they ■ • rush .out to settle.

Timing critical. 10 days ago. Not today. Will have new chance when advisors decide how election set up. Unless elections rigged^ Buddhists to streets.

Need Pres. statements re (a) cond/itio/ns and (b) optimism , i VNese moving that way.

w/oul/dn't the SVNese just comply and knuckle dovm and not do any better JjJ How do we move them toward compromise UJ i. Maybe second time^ we do throw in the towel and they make deal.

Lodge more likely to go for Ball ultimatum than B.

Anti-US govt likely to follow. How handle actual departure JjJ I . Do we want to precipitate anti-US fJJ

Must we condition US and vrorld public for 6 mos before 'ultimatim.. '

Pres. to pressj ans. q.n. giving bases of our help.

BUT why not get better deal for SVN by RSM approach? Give ■- • them choice now between (l) chaos 6 mos from now (via Ball)

|fr g^3^(j YQ govt, and (2) chance at compromise now with even

chance of something better.

Who can deal — Don, Thi?

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If we followed RSM approach, ruin our image (pushing for deal) and cause demoralization. Tri Quang may even say we selling out.

We ch^'Ued bids earlier.

Could there be an independent Delta? Already accommodation.

As McNaughton's notes reveal. White House on April 9 was preoccupied with crisis in South Vietnam. Early that morning a memo to Secretaries Rusk and McNamara sugg for "breaking Tri Quang's m.omentum." 97/ H form the subsequent solution took — called tactical concessions to the Buddhists on the Assembly in order to bring the regime-threat end. At the VThite House meeting later that were called on to prepare papers on the oris

the group that met at the the immediate political 5 Walt Rostow had addressed esting a course of action is .proposal — which was the for giving substantial

issue of the Constituent ening deomonstrations to an day several participants is.

Leonard Unger of the State Department drafted a paper outlining five possible outcomes of the crisis, the last two of which were a secession of neutralist northern provinces and/or a complete collapse of Saigon political machinery with the VC moving into the vacuum. 98/ His paper was probally considered at a meeting on Monday, April 12, as suggested by McNaughton's handwritten notes. 99/ At the same meeting, a long memorandum prepared by George Carver of CIA in response to a rec[uest at the Friday meeting, and entitled "Consequences of Buddhist Political Victory in South Vietnam," was also considered. lOO/ Carver argued that while a Buddhist government would have been difficult for us to deal with it would not have been impossible and, given the evident political strength of the Buddhists, might even work to our long ra,nge advantage. The three American options in such a contingency were: (l) trying to throw out the new government; (2) attempting to work vrith it; or (3) withdrawing from South Vietnsjra. Clearly, he argued, the second was the best in viev; of our commitments..

That same day, Max^-zell Taylor sent the President a detailed memo with recommendations for dealing with the Buddhist uprising. In essence he recommended that the U.S. take a tough line in support of Ky and against the Buddhists. In his words,

...we must prevent Tri Quang from overthrowing the Directorate (with or without Yij who personally is expendable) and support a conservative, feasible schedule for a transition to constitutional government. In execution of such a program, the GVN (Ky, for the present) should be encouraged to use the necessary force to restore and maintain order, short of attempting to reimpose government rule by bayonets on

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Danang-Hue which, for the time being, should be merely contained and isolated. lOl/

These recommendations, hov/ever, had been overtaken by events* The GVN had already found a formula for restoring order and appeasing the Buddhists. In a three day "National Political Congress" in Saigon from April 12-14, the GVN adopted a program promising to move rapidly toward constitutional government vrhich placated the main Buddhist demands, 102 / For a few weeks the demonstrations ceased and South Vietnam returned to relative political quiet, "t^ile not unusual as policy problems go, this political crisis in South Vietnam intervened temporarily to divert official attention from the broader issues of the v/ar and indirectly contributed to the deferral of any decision to authorize attacks on the POL in North Vietnam. Other issues and problems would continue to defer the POL decision, both directly and indirectly, for another two months.

With some semblance of calm restored momentarily to South Vietnamese politics, the second-level Washington policy officials could turn their attention once again to the broader issues of U.S. policy direction. On April lU, Walt Rostow sent McNaughton a memo entitled "Headings for Decision and Action: Vietnam, April 3-4, I966 ," (implying topics for discussion at a meeting later that dayfj"^ Item one on Rostow's agenda was a proposed high-level U.S. statement endorsing the recent evolution of events in South Vietnam and stipulating that continued U.S. assistance and support would be contingent on South Vietnamese demonstration of unity, movement toward constitutional government, effective prosecution of the war, and m.aintenance of order. His second topic vzas the bom-bing of the North, and subheading "b" re-opened the POL debate with the simple question, "Is this the time for oil?" IO3/ Other issues which he listed for consideration included: accelerating the cam.paign against main force units, economic stabilization, revolutionary construction, Vietnamese politics (including constitution-making), and negotiations between the GVN and the VC (if only for political warfare purposes).

On the sam.e day, the JOS forwarded to the Secretary the previously mentioned "ROLLING THUNDER Study Group Report: Air Operations Against NVN" with a cover memo noting that its recommendations for a g^ pg^ ^p bombing campaign were "in consonance with the general concept

(reconimended in JCSM-^1-66 " lOk/ The voluminous study itself recommended a general expansion of the bom.bing with provision for three special attack options, one against the Haiphong POL center; the second for the aerial mining of the sea approaches to Haiphong, Hon Gai, and Cam Pha; an;l the third for strikes at the major airfields of Hanoi, Haiphong, and Phuc Yen. 105/ In offering these options, the report stated that, "Military considerations would require that two of the special attack options, POL and mining, be conducted now. Hov^ever, appreciation of the sensitivity of such attacks is recognized and the precise time of execution must take into account political factors." IO6/ Somewhat optimistically, the report

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' ' estimated that the POL strike woiald involve only 13 civilian casualties,

and the mining would cause none. IO7/ While there is no specific record of the Secretary's reaction to this full-blown presentation of the arguments for expanded bombing, he had sent a curt m-emo to the Chiefs the previous day in reply to their JCSM 189-66 of March 26, in which they had again urged attacking the POL. Tersely reflecting the President's failure to adopt their (and his) recommendation, he stated, "I have received

J I ,. JCSM-I89-66. Your recommendations were considered in connection with

the decision on ROLLING THJITOER 50-" 108/

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As the second-echelon policy group returned to its consid-■ • eration of the four options for U.S. policy (previously known as A, B-0, I I . B-P, and C), the weight of recent political instability shifted its focus

I I somewhat. When the group met again on Friday, April I6, at least three

papers were offered for deliberation. William Bundy's draft was titled, I I "Basic Choices in Viet-Nam"; George Carver of CIA contributed "How We

Should Move"; and a third paper called "Politics in Vietnam: A 'Worst' Outcome" was probably written by John McNaughton.

Bundy began v^ith a sober appraisal of the situation:

*. The political crisis in South Viet-Nam has avoided outright disaster up to this point, but the temporary equilibriimi appears to be uneasy and the crisis has meant at the very least a serious setback of the essential non-military programs. 109/

But the closeness with which political disaster had been averted in the South in the preceding week, "forces us to look hard at our basic position and policy in South Viet-Wami. We must now recognize that three contingencies of the utmost gravity are in some degree, more likely than our previous planning had recognized..."110/ The three contingencies Bundy had in mind were: (l) a state of total political chaos and paralysis resulting from an uprising by the Buddhists countered by the Catholics, Army, etc.; (2) the emergence of a neutralist government with wide support that would seek an end to the war on almost any basis and ask for a U.S. withdrawal; and (3) a continuation of the present GVTi but in an enfeebled condition unable to effectively prosecute the war, especially the vital non-military aspects of it. Bundy's estimate was that the third contingency was the most likely at that moment, and that even the most optimistic scenario for political and constitutional e'^'-olution could not foresee a chano-e within the succeeding three to four months. Nevertheless, he outlined the four possible U.S. lines of action much as they had been presented

before:

Option A: To continue roughly along present lines, but to hope that the setback is temporary.

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Option B : To continue roughly along present lines, "but to move more actively to stimulate a negotiated soluticn^ ' specifically through contact between the Saigon government and elements in the Viet Cong and Liberation Front. This eptien ^ined out in McNaughton/ could be approached on an "optimistic " _^nderlined in McNaughtonT" or "ieeee^? leiek" ^ined out in McNaughton with "harder penciled in above and question m.arks in the margin/ basis, or on a " pessimistic " ^cNaughton MnderllneJ or "greate^-3?i9k" ^ined out in McNaughton with "softer" pencilled in/ basis. The opening moves might be the sam.e in both options, Tout more drastic indications of the U.S. position would /^be involved" penned in by McNaughton/ in the "pessimistic" approach /^ "which shades into option C belovr." penned by McNaughton/.

Option C : To decide now that the chances of bringing about an independent (and non-Communist) parenthesis added by McNaughton/ South Viet-Nam have shrunk to the point where, on an over-all basis, the US effort is no longer warranted ^ined out by McNaughton and replaced in pencil with "should be directed at a minimum-cost disengagement*" Stet pencilled in the m-argin./ This would mean setting the stage rapidly /circled by McNaughton/ for US disengagem-ent and withdrawal irrespective of whether any kind of negotiation would work or not." /question marks in the margin_^/ 111 /

Bundy did not identify in the paper his preferred option. The tone of his paper, however, suggested a worried preference for "A". In a concluding section he listed a number of "broader factors" which "cut, as they always have, in deeply contradictory directions." 112/ The first was the level of support for the Vietnam policy within the U.S. While it was adequate for the moment, continued G-VN weakness and political unrest could seriously undermine it. With an eye on the I968 Presidential elections, Bundy prophetically sumjned up the problem:

As vre look a year or two ahead, with a military program that would require m^jor further budget costs—with all their implications for taxes and domestic programs—and with steady or probably rising casualties, the war could well become an albatross around the Administration's neck, at least equal to what Korea was for President Trum.an in 1952. 113/

Moreover, if the prevailing malaise about the war among our non-SEATO allies de-enerated into open criticism, a far wider range of world issues * on which their cooperation was required might be seriously affected. With respect to the Soviet Union, no movement on disarm.ament or other matters of detente could be expected while the war continued. But since no

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significant change in Chinese or North Vietnamese attitudes had been expected in any circumstances, continuing the war under more adverse conditions in South Vietnam would hardly worsen them. Bundy ended his paper with an analysis of the impact of a U.S. failure in South Vietnam on the rest of non-communist Asia^ even if the failure resulted from a political collapse in Saigon.

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5* Vis-a-vis the threatened nations of Asia ^ we must ask ourselves whether failure in Viet-Nam because of clearly visible political difficulties not under our control would be any less serious than failure by-eHr-e>fn-ekeiee _^ined out in McNaughton/ without this factor. The question comes down^ as it always has^ to vrhether there is any tenable line of defense in Southeast Asia if Viet-Nam falls. Here we must recognize that the anti-Communist regime in Indonesia has been a tremendous "break" for uS;, both for in ^cNaughton/ i^moving the possibility of a Communist pincer movement, which appeared ir^eeiatible alm.ost certain ^^cNaughton/ a year ago, and in ^cNaughton/opening up the possibility that over a period "of some years Indonesia may become a constructive force. But for the next year or two any chance of holding the rest of Southeast Asia hinges on the same factors assessed a year ^ ago, whether Thailand and Laos in the first instance and

Malaysia, Singapore, and Burma close behind, would--in the face of a US failure for any reason in Viet-Nam—have any significant remaining will to resist the Chinese Comjnunist pressures that would probably then be applied. Taking the case of Thailand as the next key point, it must be our present conclusion that--even if sophisticated leaders understood the Vietnam.ese ^^cNaughton/ political weaknesses and our inability to control them--to the m^ass of the Thai people the failure would remain a US failure and a proof that Communism from the north was the decisive force in the area. Faced with this reaction, we must still conclude that Thailand simply could not be held in these circumstances, and that the rest of Southeast Asia would probably follow in due course. In other words, the strategi c stakes in Southeast Asia are fundamentally unchanged by the possible political nature of the causes for failure in Viet -Nam.. The same is aLnost certainly true of the shocfa^/aves that would arise against other free nations—Korea, Taiv/an, Japan, and the Philippines—in the wider area of East Asia. Perhaps these shock^^^aves can be countered, but they I 1 would not ^/McNaughton/ be mitigated by the fact that the failure

arose f^om internal political /sic/ causes rather than any US major error or omission." Hh/

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Once again, the domino theory, albeit in a refined case "by case presentation, was offered by this key member of the Administration as a fujidamental argument for the continuing U.S. involvement in Vietnam. Bundy rejected even the subtle argi:mient5 offered by some longtime Asian experts, that the uniq.ueness of the Vietnamese case, particularly its extraordinary lack of political structure, invalidated any generalization of our experience there to the rest of Asia. Thus, he argued the American comjnitment was both open-ended and irreversible.

George Carver of CIA argued quite a different point of view. His paper began, "The nature and basis of the U.S. commitment in Vietnam is widely misunderstood within.the United States, throughout the world, and in Vietnam itself." 11^/ Placing himself squarely in opposition to the kind of ana-lysis presented by Bundy, Carver argued that we had allowed control over our policy to slip from our grasp into the "sometimes irresponsible and occasionally unidentifiable hands of South Vietnamese over whom we have no effective control. This is an intolerable position for a great power. 116 / By inferring that our cominitment was irreversible and open-ended, Carver maintained we permitted the Vietnamese to exercise leverage over us rather than vice versa. To correct this mistaken view of our commitment and get our own priorities straight, Carver proposed a reformulation of objectives:

"Whatever course of policy on Vietnam we eventually decide to adopt, it is essential that we first clarify the nature of cur commitment in that country and present it in a manner which gives us maximujii leverage over our Vietnamese allies and maximum freedom of unilateral action. VJhat we need to do, in effect, is return to the original 195^ Eisenhower position and make it abundantly clear that our continued presence in Vietnam in support of the South Vietnamese struggle against the aggressive incursions of their northern compatriots is contingent on the fulfillment of both of two necessary conditions:

(a) A continued desire by the South Vietnamese for our assistance and physical presence.

(b) Some measure of responsible political behavior on the part of the South Vietnamese themselves including, but not limited to, their establishment of a

■ reasonably effective .government with which we can work. II7/

Carver vras careful to state, however, that tv/o to three months would be required to prepare the ground for this kind of clarification so as not to have it appear vre were reversing directions on Vietnam

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or presenting the GVN with an ultimatum. Effectively carried out, such a clarification would broaden the range of available options for the U.S. and place us in a much better position to effect desired changes. The mechanics of his proposal called for a Presidential speech in the near future along the lines suggested earlier that vreek by Walt Rostow. The President should express satisfaction at the evolution of political events in South Vietnam toward constitutional government and indicate "that our capacity to assist South Vietnam is dependent on a continued desire for our assistance and on the demonstration of unity and responsibility in the widening circle of those who v/ill now engage in politics in South Vietnam." 118/ Other speeches by the Vice President and members of Congress in the succeeding weeks might stress the contingency of our commitment 5 and press stories conveying the new message could be stimulated. Finally, three or four months in the future, the President would complete this process by making our position and commitment crystal clear, possibly in response to a planted press conference q.uestion. This public effort would be supplemented by private dj.plomatic communication of the new message to South Vietnamese leaders by the Embassy.

Carver argued that putting the U.S. in a position to condition its commitment would considerably enhance U.S. flexibility in an uncertain policy environment.

Once the U.S. position is clear we can then see whether our word to the Vietnamese stimulates better and more responsible political behavior. If it does, we will have improved ■ Option A's chances for success. If it does not, or if South Vietnam descends into chaos and anarchy, we will have laid the groundwork essential to the successful adoption of Option C with minimal political cost. II9/

Questions vrhich remained to be answered included: (l) v/hether to continue with scheduled troop deployments; (2) whether to give the GVN a specific list of actions on vfnich we expected action and then rate their performance, or rely on a more general evaluation; (3) whether the U.S. should continue to probe the DRV/iMLF on the possibility of negotiations; (k) whether to encourage the GVTI to make negotiation overtures to the VC.

The third paper, Politics in Vietnam: A "Worst" Outcome , (presumably by Mclfeughton) dealt v/ith the unsavory possibility of a fall of the current goverrmient and its replacement by a "neutralist" successor that sought negotiations, a ceasefire, and a coalition with the VC- After considering a variety of possible, although eq.ually unpromising, courses of action the paper argued that in such a case the U.S. would have "little 'choice but to get out of Vietnam. .. .Governing objectives should be: minimizing the inevitable loss of face and protecting U.S. forces, allied forces and those South Vietnamese who appeal to us for political refuge." 120/ An intriguing tab to the same paper considered the impact on the U.S. position in the Pacific and East Asia in the event of a withdravral from Vietnam.

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Unlike the Bundy paper this analysis eschewed pure domino theorizing for a careful country by country examination. The overall evaluation was that3 "Except for its psychological impact^ withdrawal from Vietnam 11 would not affect the present line of containment from its Korean anchor

down the Japan-Ryukyus-Taiwan-Philippine Island chain." 121/ Four possible alternate defense lines in Southeast Asia were considered: (l) the Thai borderj (2) the Isthmus of Kra on the Malay peninsula; (3) the "Water Line" from the Strait of Malacca to the North of Borneo; and {k) an "Interrupted Line" across the gap between the Philippines and Australia. Like other analyses of the strategic problem in Southeast Asia, this paper rejected any in-depth defense of Thailand as militarily untenable. The best alternatives were either the Isthjaus of Kra or the Strait of Malacca; alternative four was to be considered only as a fall back position. The paper stands as a terse and effective refutation of the fullblown domino theory, offering as it does cool-headed alternatives that should have evoked more clear thinking than they apparently did about the irrevocability of our commitment to South Vietnam.

What the exact outcome of the deliberations on these papers was is not clear from the available documents. Nor is there any clear indication of the influence the docujnents or the ideas contained in them might have had on the Principals or the President. Judgments on this score must be by inference. A scenario drafted by Leonard Unger and included by McNaughton with Carver's paper suggests that some consensus was reached within the group reflecting mostly the ideas contained in Carver's draft. Its second point stated:

On U.S. scene and internationally we will develop in public statements and otherwise the dual theme that the U.S. has gone into South Viet-Nam to help on the assiJimption that (a) the Government is representative of the people who do want our help (b) the Government is sufficiently competent to hold the country together, to maintain the necessary programs and use our help. President will elaborate this at opportune moment in constructive tone but with monetary overtones if there is any political turmoil or if Government unv/illing to do what we consider essential in such fields as countering inflation, allocating manpovrer to essential tasks and the like. 122/

In fact, however, while v/e did attempt to steer the South Vietnamese toward constitutional government on a democratic model, when the President spoke out in succeeding weeks it was to reiterate the firmness of our 'commitment and the qiuality of our patience, not to condition them. At a Medal of Honor ceremony at the VJliite House on April 21, he said:

There are times vrhen Viet-Nam miust seem to many a thousand contradictions, and the pursuit of freedom there an almost unrealizp.ble dream.

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But there are also tiineS"-and for me this is one of them— ^^rhen the mist of confusion lifts and the basic principles emerge:

—that South Viet-Nam^ however young and frail^ has the right to develop as a nation^ free from the interference of any other power^ no matter how mighty or strong ;

—that the normal processes of political action^ if given time and patience and freedom to work, will someday, some way create in South Viet-Nam a society that is responsive to the people and consistent with their traditions. ... 123/

The third point in the Unger scenario was to encourage the GW to establish contacts with the VC in order to promote defections and/or to explore the possibilities of "negotiated arrangements." This emphasis on contacts between the GVN and the VC may well have reflected the flurry of highly public international activity to bring about negotiations between the U.S. and the DRV that vras taking place at that time (considered in more detail below)* In any event, this entire effort at option-generation came to an inconclusive end around April 20.

The last paper to circulate was a much revised redraft of Course B that reflected the aforementioned ideas about GVN/vC contacts. It was, moreover, a recapitulation of ideas circulating in the spring of 1966 at the second-level of the government. That they were considerably out of touch with reality would shortly be revealed by the renewed I Corps-Buddhist political problem in May. The paper began with a paragraph discussing the "Essential element" of the course of action -- i.e. "...our decision now to press the GVN to expand and exploit its contacts with the VC/WLF." 12U / The point of these contacts was to determine v^'hat basis, if any, might exist for bringing the insurgency to an end.

The proposed approach to the GVN v^as to be miade with three considerations in mind. The first was the dual theme that U.S. assistance in South Vietnam depended on a representative and effective GVN and the genuine desire of the people for our help. Continued political turmoil in South Vietnam would force us to state this policy with increasing sharpness. The second consideration was the U.S. military effort. McNaughton specifically bifurcated this section in his revision to include two alternati'^'^es, as follows:

(b) Continuation of the military program including U.S. . deployments and air sorties.

(1) Alternative A. Forces increased by the end of

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the year to 385? 000 men and to attacks on the key military'-targets outside heavily popiilated areas in all of INTorth Vietnam except the strip near China.

(2) Alternative B » Forces increased in modest amounts "by the end of the year to about 3^0,000 (with the possibility of halting even the deployments implicit in that figure in case of signal failure by the GVN to ! • ■ perform) and air attacks in the northeast q.uadrant of

North Vietnam kept to present levels in terms of intensity and type of target. I25/

The third consideration vj-as a continuation of U.S. support for GVN revolutionary development and inflation control.

Two alternative GVN tactics for establishing contact with the NIF were offered. The first alternative would be an overt^ highly publicized GVN appeal to the YC/NLF to meet with representatives of the GVN to work out arrangements for peace. Alternative two foresaw the initiation of the first contacts through covert channels with public negotiations to follow if the covert talks revealed a basis for agreement All of this would produce5 the paper argued5 one of the following outcomes :

(a) If things were going passably for our side but

i • the VC/nLF showed no readiness to settle on terms providing

reasonable assurances for the continuation of a non-Communist regime in SVN, vre might agree to plod on with present programs (with or without intensified military activity) until the VC/ NLF showed more give.

(b) If things were going badly for our side we might feel obliged to insist on the GVN's coming to the best terms it could get with the VC/liLF^ vrith our continuing military and other support conditioned on the GVN moving along those lines.

(c) If things were going well for our side, the Vc/nLF might accede to terms which entailed no serious risks for

a continuing non-Communist orientation of the GVN in the

short teim. It would probably have to be assijimed that this

would represent no more than a tactical retreat of the VC/NLF. 126/

3- Exogeneous Factors

No precise reason can be adduced for the termination of ^—s. this interdepartmental effort to refine options for American action. In

a general way, as the preceding paper shows, the effort had lost some

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touch with the situation; the GVW was far too fragile a structure at I ' ■ that point (and about to be challenged again in May by I Corps'Com-

mander General Thi and his Buddhist allies) to seriously contemplate contacts or negotiations with the VC. In Washington^ the President and his key advisors Rusk and McNamara were preoccupied with a host of additional immediate concerns as well. The President had a newly appointed Special Assistant^ Robert Komer^ vrho had recently returned from a trip to Vietnam urging greater attention to the non-military^ nation-building aspects of the struggle. In addition, the President was increasingly aware of the importance of the war, its costs, and its public relations to the upcoming Congressional elections. McNamara and the JCS were struggling to reach agreement on force deployment schedules and req.uire-ments; and Rusk was managing the public U.S. response to a major international effort to bring about U.S. negotiations vzith Hanoi, These concerns, as we shall see, served to continue the deferral of any implementation of strikes against North Vietnam-ese POL reserves.

On April 19, about the time the option drafting exercise was ending, Robert Komer addressed a lengthy memo to the President (plus the Principals and their assistants) reporting on his trip to Vietnam to review the non-military aspects of the war. Presidential concern with what was to be called "pacification" had been piq.ued during the Honolulu Conference ia February. Upon his return to Washington, President Johnson named Komer to become Special Assistant within the White House to oversee the Washington coordination of the program. To emphasize the ijnportance attached to this domain, Komer*s appointment was announced in a National Security Action Memorandi:im on March 28. I27/ As a "new boy" to the Vietnam problem, Komer betook himself to Saigon in mid-April to have a first-hand look. His eleven page report represents more a catalogue of the v?'ell-known problems than any very startling suggestion for their resolution. 128/ Nevertheless, it did provide the President with a detailed vevievj of the specific difficulties in the BD effort, an effort that the President repeatedly stressed in his public remarks in this period. 129/

At Defense, problems of deployment phasing for Vietnam occupied a good portion of McNam-ara*s time during the spring of I966. On March 1, the JCS had for\^^arded a recommendation for meeting planned deployments that envisaged extending toiirs of service for selected specialties and calling up some reserve units. I30/ Whatever McNamara's own views on calling the reserves, the President was clearly unprepared to contemplate such seemingly drastic measu-^es at that juncture. Like attacks on North Vietnamese POL, a reserve callup would have been seen as a complete rejection of the international efforts to get negotiations started and as a decisive .escalation of the war. Moreover, to consider such an action at a tme when South Vietnam was in the throes of a protracted political crisis would have run counter to the views of even ■ some of the strongest supporters of the war. So, on March 10, the Secre-tarv asked the Chiefs to redo their proposal in order to m.eet the stipulated deployment schedule, stating that it was imperative that, "...all necessary

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actions...be taken to meet these deployinent dates without callup of reserves or extension of terms of service." "'31/ The JCS replied on April k that it would "be impossible to meet the deployment deadlines because of shortages of critical skills. They proposed a stretch-out of the deployments as the only remedy if reserve callups and extension of duty tours were ruled out. 132 / Not satisfied, the Secretary asked the Chiefs to explain in detail why they could not meet the req.uire-ments within the given time schedule. 133/ The Chiefs replied on April 28 with a listing of the personnel problems that were the source of their difficulty, but promised to take "extraordinary measures" in an effort to conform as closely as possible to the desired closure schedule. 13V The total troop figure for Vietnam for end CY GG on which agreement was then reached v/as some 276,000 men. This constituted Program 2-AR.

These modifications and adjustments to the troop deployment schedules, of course, had implications for the supporting forces as well. The Chiefs also addressed a series of memos to the Secretary on req,uired modifications in the deployment plans for tactical aircraft to support ground forces, and for increases in air munitions req,uirem-ents. 135/ These force expansions generated a req.uirement for additional airfields. I36 / When these matters are added to the problems created for McNamiara and his staff by the French decision that spring to req.uest the withdrawal of all NATO forces from French soil, it is not hard to understand why escalating the war was momentarily set aside.

Another possible explanation for delaying the POL strikes can be added to those already discussed. The spring of I966 saw one of the most determined and m.ost public efforts by the international community to bring the U.S. and North Vietnam to the negotiating table- While at no time during this peace initiative was there any evidence, public or private, of give in either sides' uncompromising position and hence real possibility of talks, the widespread publicity of the effort meant that the Administration was constrained from any military actions that might be construed as "worsening the atmosphere" or rebuking the peace efforts. Air strikes against- DRV POL reserves would obviously have fallen into this ca.tegory.

In February, after the resumption of the bombing, Nkrumah and Nasser unsuccessfully attempted to get negotiations started, the former touring sever?! capitals including Moscow to further the effort. LeGauUe replied to a letter from Ho Chi Minh with an offer to play a role in settling the dispute, but no response was forthcoming. Prime Minister Wilson met with Premier Kosygin in Moscow*from Feb. 22-2^ and urged reconvening the Geneva Conference; the Soviets countered by saying the U.S. and DRV must arrange a conference since the conflict was theirs. Early in March, Hanoi reportedly rejected a suggestion by Indian President Radharrishnon for an Asian-African force to replace American troops in South Vietnam.

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Later that mcntli Canadian Ambassador Chester Ronning went to Hanoi - ■ -to test for areas in v^hich negotiations might be possible. He-returned

with little hope, other than a vague belief the ICC could eventually play a role. ■ ' .

■I . Early in April, UN Secretary General U Thant advocated

I Security Council involvement in Vietnam if Communist China and North

Vietnam agreed, and he reiterated his three point proposal for getting the parties together (cessation of bombing; scaling down of all military activity; and vrillingness of both sides to meet). No response was forthcoming from the DRV, but later that month during meetings of the "Third National Assembly" Ho and Premier Pham Van Dong reiterated the I ' unyielding North Vietnamese position that the U.S. must accept the four

points as the basis for solving the war before negotiations could start. On April 29, Canadian Prime Minister Pearson proposed a ceasefire and a gradual withdi^awal of troops as steps toward peace. The ceasefire was ' t' seen as the first part of peace negotiations v/ithout prior conditions.

Phased withdrawals would begin as the negotiations proceeded. The U.S. 1 endorsed the Pearson proposal which was probably enough at that stage

p to insure its rejection by Hanoi. On the same day, Danish PM Krag urged

the US to accept a transitional coalition government as a realistic step toward peace.

, In May, Netherlands Foreign Minister Luns proposed a mutual

reduction in the hostilities as a step toward a ceasefire and to prevent any further escalation. Neither side made any direct response. On May 22, Guinea and Algeria called for an end to the bombing and a strict respect for the Geneva Agreements as the basis of peace in Vietnam. In a major speech on May 25, U Thant called for a reduction of hostilities, I ■ but rejected the notion that the UN had prime responsibility for finding

a settlement. Early in June press attention was focused on apparent Romanian efforts to bring Hanoi to the negotiating table. Romanian intermediaries made soundings in Hanoi and Peking but turned up no new sentiment for talks. In mid-June Canadian Ambassador Ronning m.ade a second trip to Hanoi but found no signs of give in the DRV portion (detailed discussion below). Near the end of jMae a French official, Jean Sainteny, reported from Hanoi and Peking through Agence France-Presse that the DRV had left him with the impression that negotiations might be possible if ' the U.S. committed itself in advance to a timetable for the withdrawal of

I forces from South Vietnam. With pressure again mounting for additional U.S.

measures against the North and the failure of the Ronning mission, the ? State Department closed out this international effort on June 23 (the day

after the original POL execute order), stati^ng that neither oral reports nor public statements indicated any change in the basic elements of * Hanoi's position. On June 27^ Secretary Rusk told the SSATO Conference in Camberra, "I see no prospect of peace at the present moment." 137/ The bombing of the POL storage areas in Hanoi and Haiphong began on June 29. '

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The seriousness with v/hich these international efforts were being treated within the U.S. Government is reflected in two memos from the period of late April and early May. On April 27, Maxwell Taylor, in his capacity as military advisor to the President, sent a memo to the President entitled, "Assessment and Uses of Negotiation Blue Chips." The heart of his analysis vras that bombing was a "blue chip" like ceasefire, withdrawal of forces, amnesty for VC/JWA, etc., to be given away at the negotiation table for something concrete in return, not abandoned beforehand merely to get negotiations started. The path to negotiations would be filled with pitfalls, he argued,

Any day, Hanoi may indicate a willingness to negotiate provided we stop permanently our bombing attacks against the north. In this case, our Government would be under great pressure at home and abroad to accept this precondition whereas to do so would seriously prejudice the success of subsec^uent negotiations. I38 /

To avoid this dilemma, Taylor urged the President to clearly indicate to our friends as well as the enemy that we were not prepared to end the bombing except in negotiated exchange for a reciprocal concession from the North Vietnamese. His analysis proceeded like this:

To avoid such pitfalls, we need to consider what we will want from the Communist side and what they will want from us in the course of negotiating a cease-fire or a final settlement- What are our negotiating assets, what is their value, and how should they be employed? As I see them, the following are the blue chips in our pile representing what Hanoi would or could like from us and what we might consider giving under certain conditions.

a. Cessation of bombing in North Viet-Nam.

b. Cessation of military operations against Viet Cong units.

c. Cessation of increase of U.S. forces in South Viet-Nam.

d. Withdrawal of U.S. forces from South Viet-Nam.

e. Amnesty and civic rights for Viet Cong.

f. Economic aid to North Viet-Nam.

The Viet Cong/Hanoi have a similar stack of chips representing actions we would like from them.

a

Cessation of Viet Cong incidents in South Viet-Nam.

b. Cessation of guerrilla_military operations.

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c. Cessation of further infiltration of men and supplies from North Viet-Nam to South Viet-Nam.

d. Withdrawal of infiltrated North Vietnamese Army units and cadres.

6- Dissolution or repatriation of Viet Cong. 139/

Continuing his argument, Taylor outlined his views about which ""blue chips" we should trade in negotiations for concessions from the DRV.

If these are the chips, how should we play ours to get theirs at minimum cost? Our big chips are a and d, the cessation of bombing and the withdrawal of U.S. forces; their big ones are _c and £, the stopping of infiltration and dissolution of the Viet Cong. We might consider trading even, our a and d for their £ and e except for the fact that all will req.uire a certain amount of verification and inspection except our bombing which is an overt, visible fact. Even if Hanoi would accept inspection, infiltration is so elusive that I would doubt the feasibility of an effective detection system. Troop withdrawals, on the other hand, are comparatively easy to check. Hence, I would be inclined to accept as an absolute minimura a cessation of Viet Cong incidents and military operations (Hanoi a and b) which are readily verifiable in exchange for the stopping of our bombing and of offensive military operations against Viet Cong units (our a and b). If Viet Cong performance under the agreement were less than perfect, we can resume our activities on a scale related to the volume of enemy action. This is not a particularly good deal since we give up one of our big chips, bombing, and get neither of Hanoi's two big ones. However, it would achieve a cease-fire under conditions which are subject to verification and, on the whole, acceptable. We would not have surrendered the right to use our weapons in protection of the civil population outside of Viet Cong-controlled territory. 1^0,

" Summing up, Taylor argued against an unconditional bombing halt in these words:

Such' a tabulation of negotiating blue chips and their . ' purchasing power emphasized the folly of giving up any one

in advance as a precondition for negotiations. Thus, if we gave up bombing in order to start discussions, we would not have the coins necessary to pay for all the concessions required for a satisfactory terminal settlement. ¥^ estimate J ^ of assets and values may be challenged, but I feel that it is

important for us to go through some such exercise and make up our collective minds as to the Value of ovxr holdings and how

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to play them. We need such an analysis to guide our own , thoughts and actions and possibly for communication to some of the third parties who^ from time to time, try to get . " negotiations started. Some day we may be embarrassed if some country like India should express the view to Hanoi that the Americans would probably stop their bombing to get discussions started and then have Hanoi pick up the proposal as a formal offer. To prepare our ovm people as well as to guide our friends, we need to make public explanation of some of the points discussed above. l4l/

In conclusion he sounded a sharp warning about allowing ourselves to become embroiled in a repetition of our Korean negotiating experience, where ca.sualties increased during the actual bargaining phase itself. It is hard to assess how much influence this memo had on the President's and the Administration's attitudes tovrard negotiations, but in hindsight it is clear that thinking of this kind prevailed within the U.S. Government lontil the early spring of I968.

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Taylor's memo attracted attention both at State and Defense at least down to the Assistant Secretary level. William Bundy at State sent a micmo to Secretary Rusk the following week commenting on Taylor's ideas with his own assessment of the bargaining value and timing of a perm^anent cessation of the bombing. Since they represent vlev/s on the bombing v^hich v^ere to prevail for nearly two years, Bundy's memo is reproduced in substantial portions below. Recapitulating Taylor's analysis and his own position, Bundy began,

Essentially, the issue has always been whether we would trade a cessation of bombing in the North for some degree of reduction or elimination of Viet Cong and new North Vietnamese activity in the South, or a cessation of infiltration from the North, or a combination of both. 1^2/

Worried that Taylor's willingness to trade a cessation of US/gVN bombing and offensive operations for a cessation of VC/nVA activity might be prejudicial to the GVN, Bundy outlined his own concept of what would be a reciprocal concession from the DRV:

...I have m^yself been more inclined to an asking price, at least, that would include both a declared cessation of infiltration and a sharp reduction in \c/nVA military operations in the South. Even though we could not truly verify the cessation of infiltration, the present volume and routes are such that we could readily ascertain whether there was any significant movement, using our own air. Moreover, DRV

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action concerning infiltration woiild be a tremendous psychological blovr to the VC and would constitute an admission which they have always declined really to make.

Whichever form of trade might be pursued if the issue even arose -- as it conceivably might through such nibbles as the present Ronning effort — I fully agree with General Taylor that we should do all we can to avoid the pitfalls of ceasing bombing in return simply for a willingness to talk. 1^3 /

Concerned that the current spate of international peace moves might entice the Administration in another bombing pause^, Bundy reminded the Secretary that 5

...during our long pause in Janua-ry, we pretty much agreed among ourselves that as a practical matter, if Hanoi started to play negotiating games that even seemed to be serious, we would have great difficulty in resuming bombing for some time. This was and is a built-in weakness of the "pause" approach. It does not apply to informal talks with the DRV, directly or indirectly, on the conditions under which we would stop bombing, nor does it apply to possible third country suggestions. As to the latter, I myself believe that our past record sufficiently stresses that we could stop the bombing only if the other side did something in response. Thus, I would not at this m.oment favor any additional public . statement by us, which might simply highlight the issue and bring about the very pressures we seek to avoid. l^U/

Hence, he concluded.

As you can see, these reactions are tentative as to the form of the trade, but q,uite firm that there must in fact be a trade and that we should not consider another "pause" under existing circumstances. If we agree merely to these points, I think we will have made some progress. 1^^/

Bombing was thus seen from within the Administration as a counter to be traded during negotiations, a perception not shared by large segments of the international community where bombing was alvrays regarded as an im-oediment to any such negotiations. Hanoi, however, had always clearly seen the bombing as the focal point in the test of wills with the U.S.

While Secretary Rusk was fending off this international 'pressure for an end to the bombing and de-escalation of the war as a means to peace, the President was having increasing trouble with war-dissenters within his own party. The US had scarcely resumed the bombing

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of the Worth after the extended December-January pause when Senator Fulbright opened hearings by his Senate Foreign Relations Committee into the Vietnam war. Witnesses who took varying degrees of exception to U.S. policy as they testified in early February included former Ambassador George Kennan and retired General James Gavin. Secretary Rusk appeared on February l8 and defended U.So involvement as a fulfillment of our SEATO obligations. In a stormy confrontation with Fulbright the Secretary repeatedly reminded the Senator of his support for the iggij. Tonkin Gulf Resolution. The next day^ Senator Robert Kennedy stated that the KLF should be included in any postvrar South Vietnamese government. Three days later, he clarified his position by saying that he had meant the NLF should not be "automatically excluded" from power in an interim government pending elections. Speaking no doubt for the President and the Administration, the Vice President pointedly rejected Kennedy's suggestion on February 21. On the other side of the political spectrum, Senator Russell, otherwise a hawk on the war, reacted in April to the continuing political turmoil in South Vietnam by suggesting a poll be taken in all large Vietnamese cities to determine whether our assistance v/as still desired by the Vietnamese. If the answer was no, he asserted, the U.S. should pull out of Vietnam.

The President was also regularly reminded by the press of the possible implications for the November Congressional elections of a continuing large effort in South Vietnam that did not produce results. Editorial writers were often even more pointed. On May 17^ Jajues Reston wrote:

President Johnson has been confronted for some time with a moral q.uestion in Vietnara, but he keeps evading it. The question is this: What Justifies m.ore and more killing in Vietnam when the President's own conditions for an effective war effort --a government that can govern and fight in Saigon -- are not met?

By his own definition, this struggle cannot succeed without a regime that commands the respect of the South Vietnamese people and a Vietnamese army that can pacify the country. Yet though the fighting qualities of the South Vietnamese are now being demonstrated more and more against one another, the President's orders are sending more and more Americans .into the battle to replace the Vietnamese who are fighting c-^jnong themselves. lU6/

Public reaction to the simmering political crisis in South Vietnam was reflected in declining popular approval of the Rresident's performance In March 68fa of those polled had approved the President's conduct in office but by ¥b.J^ l^is support had declined sharply to only 5^fo. 1^?/

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Some indication of the concern being generated by these adverse U.S.. political effects of the governmental crisis in South Vietnam is offered by the fact that State, on May 21, sent the Embassy in Saigon the results of a Gallup Poll on v:hether the U.S. should continue its support for the war. These were the q.uestions and the distribution of the responses:

1. Suppose South Vietnamese start fighting on big scale among themselves. Do you think we should continue help them, or should we withdraw our troops? (a) Continue to help 28 percent; (b) Withdraw 5^ percent; (c) No opinion 18 percent.

2. If GVW decides stop fighting (discontinue war), what should US do — continue war by itself, or should we withdraw? (a) Continue l6 percent; (e) Withdrav/ 72 percent; (c) No opinion 12 percent. Comparison August I965 is I9, 63 and I8 percent.

3. Do you think South Vietna^nese will be able to establish stable government or not? (a) Yes 32 percent; (b) No 48 percent; (C) No opinion 20 percent. Comparison January 1965 is 25, kZ and 33 percent. 1^8/

Lodge, struggling with fast moving political events in Hue and DaNang, replied to these poll results on May 23 in a harsh and unsympathetic tone.

We are "in Viet-Nam because it cannot ward off external aggression by itself, and is, therefore, in trouble. If it were not in trouble, vre would not have to be here. The time for us to leave is when the trouble is over — not when it is changing its character. It makes no sense for us here to help them against military violence and to leave them in the lurch to be defeated by criminal violence operating under political, economic and social guise.

It is obviously true that the Vietnamese are not today ready for self-government, and that the French actively tried "to unfit them for ^elf-government. One of the implications of the phrase 'internal squabbling' is this unfitness. But if we are going to adopt the policy of turning every country that is unfit for self-government over to the communists, there won't be much of the world left. 1^9/

Lodge rejected the implications of these opinion polls in the strongest possible terms, reaffirming his belief in the correctness of the U.S.

course.

The idea that we are here smply because the Vietnamese want us to be here — which is another implication of the

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phrase 'internal squabbling' -; that we have no national interest in being here ourselves; and that if some of them don't want us to stay, we ought to get out is to me fallacious. In fact, I doubt whether we would have the moral right to make the commitment we have made here solely as a matter of charity towards the Vietnamese and without the existence of a strong United States interest. For ono. thing, the U.S. interest in avoiding VJorld War III is very direct and strong. Some day we may have to decide how much it is worth to us to deny Viet-Na>m to Hanoi and Peking -- regardless of what the Vietnamese may think. l^O/

Apparently unable to get the matter off his mind, Lodge brought it up again in his weekly NODIS to the President on May 25,

I have been miolling over the state of American opinion as I observed it when I was at home. I have also been reading the recent Gallup polls. As I comjnented in my MBTEL ^880, I am quite certain that the number of those who want us to les.ve Viet-Nam because of current 'internal squabbling' does not reflect deep conviction but a superficial jjnpulse based on inadequate information.

In fact, I think one television fireside cliat by you personally -- with all your intelligence and compassion — could tip that figure over in one evening. I am thinking of a speech, the general tenor of which would be; 'we are involved in a vital struggle of great difficulty and complexity on which much depends. I need your help.'

I am sure you would get much help from the very people in the Gallup poll who said we ought to leave Viet-Nam — as soon as they understood what you want them to support. 151/

Lodge's reassurances, however, while welcome bipartisan political support from a critical member of the team, could not m.itigate the legitimate Presidential concerns about the domestic base for an uncertain policy. Thus, assailed on m.any sides, the President attempted to steer what he must have regarded as a middle course.

-The President's unwillingness to proceed with the bombing of the POL storage facilities in North Vietnam continued in May in spite of the near consensus among his top advisors on its desirability. As already noted, the JCS recommendation that POL be included in Program 5O of the ROLLING THUl^ILER strikes for the month of May had been disapproved. 1^2 / An effort was made to have the strikes included in the ROLLING THUNDER

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series for the month of May, which ordinarily vrould have been ROLLING THUJTOER 5I5 but the decision was to extend ROLLING THUNDER 5O until further notice , holding the POL q,uestion in abeyance. 1^3/ On May 3^ McNaughton sent Walt Rostow a belated list of q^uesticns, "to put into the 'ask-Lodge' hopper." The first set of proposed q[ueries had to do with the bombing program and included specific q.uestions about attacking K)L. Itoether Rostow did, in fact, query Lodge on the matter is not clear from the available cables, but in any case, Rostow took up the matter of the POL attacks himself in an im.portant memorandum to Rusk and McNamara i on May 6. Rostow developed his argument for striking the petroleum

' reserves on the basis of U.S. experience in the World War II attacks on

I German oil supplies and storage facilities. His reasoning v/as as follows

From the moment that serious and systematic oil attacks started, front line single engine fighter strength and tank mobility were affected. The reason was this: it proved much more difficult, in the face of general oil shortage, to allocate from less important to more important uses than the simple arithmetic of the problem would suggest. Oil moves in various logistical chan-nels from central sources. VJhen the central sources bega-n to dry up the effects proved fairly prompt and widespread. VJhat look like reserves statistically are rather inflexible commitments to logistical pipelines. I5U/

The same results might be expected from heavy and sustained attacks on the North Vietnamese oil reserves,

With an understanding that simple analogies are dangerous, I nevertheless feel it is quite possible the military effects of a systematic and sustained bombing of POL in North Vietnam may be more prompt and direct than conventional intelligence analysis v/ould suggest.

I vrould underline, however, the adjectives 'systematic and sustained.' If we take this step we must cut clean

through the POL system and hold the cut -- if we are looking

for decisive results. 155/

On May 9^ recalling that the VC had recently attacked three South Vietnamese textile factories, Westmoreland suggested that to deter * further assaults against South Vietnam.ese industry, the U.S. should strike

i . a North Vietnamese industrial target with considerable military signifi-

cance such as the Thai Nguyen iron and steel plant. 156/ Concurring with ^2;^g basic intent of the proposal, CINCPAC recommended that the target be

I ^j^g North Vietnamese POL system instead, "initiation of strikes against

f • ■jNjY]\[ POL system and subsequent completed destruction , would be more meaningful and further deny NVN essential war making resources. I57/

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Lending further support to these military and civilian recommendations x-/as a study completed on May k by the Air Staff- which suggested that civilian casualties and collateral damage coiild be minimized in POL strikes if only the most experienced pilots, with thorough briefing were usedj if the raids were executed only under favorable visual flight conditions with maximum use of sophisticated navigational aids5 and if weapons and tactics v/ere selected for their pinpoint accuracy rather than area coverage. 158/ On May 22, COMUSMCV sent CINCPAC yet another recommendation for retaliatory air strikes against North Vietnamese industrial and military targets. He called for plans that would permit the U.S. to respond to any VC terror attacks by an air strike against a similar target in the North. In particular, the Hanoi and Haiphong oil storage sites v/ere recoimnended as reprisal targets for VC attacks against UoS. or South Vietnamese POL. 1^9/

Intervening again in mid-May, however, was yet another round of the continuing South Vietnamese political crisis. It is not clear whether or not a decision on the strikes against Hanoi/Haiphong POL was deferred by the President for this reason, but it is plausible to think that it was a factor. In brief, the Buddhists in Hue and DaNang, with the active support and later leadership of General Thi, the I Corps commander, defied the central government. Thi refused to return to Saigon when ordered and only when Ky flev7 to DaNang and intervened vrith troops and police to recapture control of the two cities was GVN authority restored to the area. The crisis temporarily put the constitutional processes off the track and diverted high level American attention from other issues. l6o/ The effect of this dispute on public support for the U.S. involvement in the war has already been discussed. Concern with bringing an end to this internal strife in South Vietnam and with pushing a reluctant GVN steadily along the road to constitutional and dem-ocratic government preoccizpied the highest levels of the U.S. Government throughout May. These concerns momentarily contributed to forcing the military aspects of the war into the background for harried U.S. leaders whose time is always insufficient to the range of problem.s to be dealt with.

D, The "Decision to Strike

The POL decision was rapidly coming to a head. On May 31, a slight relaxation of the restrictions against attacking POL was made when ■ six minor storage areas in relatively unpopulated areas were approved for attack. l6l/ Apparently sometim^e in late May, possibly at the time of the approval of the six minor targets, the President decided that attacks on the entire North Vietnamese POL netv/ork could not be delayed 'much lon-^er. In any case, sometime near the end of the month he infoiTned British Prime Minister Wilson of his intentions. When Wilson protested, McNamara arranged a special briefing by an American officer for Wilson and Foreign Minister Michael Stev/art on June 2. Ihe following day, Wilson

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cabled his appreciation to the President for his courtesy^ but expressed his own feeling of obligation to urge the President not to make these new raids. Thus^ he stated:

I was most grateful to you for asking Bob McNamara to arrange the very full briefing about the two oil targets near Hanoi and Haiphong that Col, Rogers gave me yesterday....

I know you will not feel that I am either linsympathetic or uncomprehending of the dilemma that this problem presents for you. In particular, I v/holly understand the deep concern you must feel at the need to do anything possible to reduce the losses of young Americans in and over Vietnam; and Col. Rogers made it clear to us what care has been taken to plan this operation so as to keep civilian casualties to the minimum.

However,...I am bound to say that, as seen from here, the possible m-ilitary benefits that may result from this bombing do not appear to outweigh the political disadvantages that would seem the inevitable conseq.uence. If you and the South Vietnamese Government were conducting a declared war on the conventional pattern...this operation would clearly be necessary and right. But since you have m^ade it abun.dantly clear — and you knov/ how much vre have welccm.ed and supported this — that your purpose is to achieve a negotiated settlement, and that you are not striving for total military victory in the field, I remain convinced that the bombing of these targets, without producing decisive military advantage, may only increase the difficulty of reaching an eventual settlement....

The last thing I wish is to add to your difficulties, but, as I warned you in my previous message, if this action is taken we shall have to dissociate ourselves from it, and in doing so I should have to say that you had given me advance warning and that I had made my position clear to you....

Nevertheless I want to repeat...that our reservations about this operation will not affect our continuing support for your policy over Vietnam, as you and your people have made it clear from your ^pril ISG^J Baltimore speech onwards. But, v/hile this will remain the Government's position, I know that the effect on public opinion in this country -- and I • believe throughout Western Europe -- is likely to be such as to reinforce the existing disq.uiet and criticism that we have to deal with. I62/

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The failure of the special effort to obtain Wilson's support must have been disappointing, but it did not stop the onward flow of events. Available information leaves unclear exactly how firmly the President had decided to act and gives no specific indication of the intended date for the strikes. A package of staff papers prepared by McNaughton suggests that the original date was to have been June 10. A scenario contained in the package proposes a list of actions for the period 8-30 June and begins with strike-day minus 2. The suggested scenario was as follows:

B-Jstvike/ day minus 2: Inform UK, Australia, Japan N . S-day minus 1: Notify Canada, New Zealand, Thailand, Laos,

Philippines (Marcos only), CRC (Chiang only), Korea S-hour minus 1: Inform GVN S-hour: Strike Hanoi, Haiphong S-hour plus 2: Announce simultaneously in Washington and

Saigon S-hour plus 3""5- SecDef press backgrounder (depends on

strike timing and com.pleteness of post-strike reports) I63/

The package also included a draft JCS execute message, a draft State cable to the field on notifying third countries, a draft public announcement, a talking paper for a McNamara press conference, a list of anticipated press q.uestions, and maps and photographs of the targets.

The circle of those privy to this tentative Presidential decision probably did not.include more than a half dozen of the key Washington advisers. Certainly the military commanders in the field had not been informed. On Jujie 5^ Westmoreland iirged that strikes be made against POL at the "earliest possible" moment, noting that ongoing North Vietnamese dispersal efforts would make later attacks less effective. l6k/ Admiral Sharp took the occasion to reiterate to Washington that the"~s^rikes, besides underscoring the US resolve to support SVN and increase the pressure against NVN, would make it difficult for Hanoi to disperse POL, complicate off-loading from tankers, necessitate new methods of transshipment, "temporarily" halt the flow to dispersed areas, and have a ■ "direct effect" on the movement of trucks and watercarft — perhaps (if imports were inadequate) limiting truck use. Sh^rp called the POL targets the most lucrative available in terms of impairing NVN's military logistics capabilities. I65/ Two days later, in reporting the results of a review of the armed recce program, CINCPAC again urged that POL be attacked. He particularly noted the importance of,

...the effort being made by the NVN to disperse, camouflage and package things into ever smaller increments. This is particularly true of POL....This again em-phasises the importance of souce /sic/ targets such as ports and major POL installations.

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I It is hoped that Jiine will see a modification to

I the RT /rolling THTOIDKR/ ^rules with authorization to

syrike /J'^£l ^^Y K)^ targets;, selected targets in the Hon Gai and Cam Pha compleses /si^c/^ ^^^ relaxation of the restrictions against coastal armed recce in the KE. In addition5 reduction in the size of the Hanoi/Haiphong restricted areas would be helpful.... 166/

The CIA5 however^ remained skeptical of these expectations for strikes against POL. On June 8^ they produced a special assessment of the likely effects of such an attack, probably in response to a req[uest from the Principals for a last minute evaluation. The report emphasized that "neutralization" of POL would not in itself stop North Vietnamese support of the war^ although it would have an adverse general effect on the economy.

It is estimated that the neutralization of the bulk petroleum storage facilities in IWN will not in itself preclude Hanoi's continued support of essential war activities. The immediate impact in JWN will be felt in the need to convert to an alternative system of supply and distribution. The conversion program will be costly and create additional burdens for the regime. It is estimated, however, that the infiltration of m.en and supplies into SVN can be sustained. The impact on normal economic activity, however, would be more severe. New strains on an already burdened economic control structure and managerial talent v;ould cause reductions in economic activity, compound existing distribution problems, and further strain m.an-power resources. The attacks on petrc3-eum storage facilities in conjunction with continued attacks on transportation targets and armed reconnaissance against lines of coirimunica-tions will increase the burden and costs of supporting the war. 167/

The sequence of events in the POL scenario drawn up by McNaughton was interrupted on June 7 by yet another international diplomatic effort to get negotiations started, or at least to test Hanoi's attitudes toward such a possibility. Canadian Ambassador Chester Ronning had been planning a second visit to Hanoi for June 1U-I8 with State Department approval. Thus, when Rus.k, who was travelling in Europe, learned on June 7 of the possibility of strikes before Ronning's trip, he urgently cabled the President to defer them.

...Regarding special operation in Vietnam we have had under consideration, I sincerely hope that timing can be I"! postponed until my return. A major question in my mind is

j^onnin^ mission to Hanoi occurring June ik through I8. This

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is not merely political question involving a mission with which we have ftilly concurred. It also involves importance of c^Jir knowing whether there is ary change in the thus far harsh and unyielding attitude of Hanoi. 168/

Much on his mind in making the request^ as he revealed in a separate cable to McNamara the following day, was the likelihood of "...general international revalsion...." toward an act that might sabatoge Ronning's efforts.

...I am deeply distixrbed by general international revulsion, and perhaps a great deal at home, if it becomes known that we took an action which sabotaged the Ronning mission to which we had given our agreement. I recognize the agony of this problem for all concerned• We could make arrangements to get an Immediate report from Ronning. If has a negative report, as we expect, that provides a firmer base for the action we contemplate and would make a difference to people like Wilson and Pearson. If, on the other hand, he learns that there is any serious breakthrough toward peace, the President would surely want to know of that before an action which would knock such a possibility off the tracks. I strongly recommend, therefore, against ninth or tenth. I regret this because of my maximum desire to support you and your colleagues in your tough Job. 169/

The President responded to the Secretary's request and suspended action until Ronning returned. VJhen Ronning did return, William B^JJidy flew to Ottawa and met v;ith him on June 21. Bundy reported that he was "markedly m.ore sober and subdued" and had found no opening or flexibility in the North Vietnamese position. I7Q/

While these diplomatic efforts were underway, McKamara had informed CINCPAC of the high level consideration for the POL strikes, but

stated:

Final decision for or aga.inst will be influenced by extent they can be carried out without significant civilian ■ casualties. What preliminary steps to minimize vrould you recommend and if taken what num.ber of casualties do you believe would result? 171/

CINCPAC replied eagerly listing the conditions and safeguards for the attack that the Air Staff study had suggested in early May. He would execute only under favorable weather conditions, with good visibility and no cloud cover, in order to assiire positive identification of the targets and improved strike accuracy; select the best axis of attack to

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avoid populated areasj select -weapons with optimum ballistic characteristics for precisions make maximum use of ECM support in order to hamper SA-2 and AAA radars and reduce "pilot distraction" during the strikes; and employ the most experienced pilots^ thoroughly "briefed. He added that IWN had an excellent alert system^ which would provide ample time for people to take cover. In all^ he expected "xmder 50" civilian casualties. 172/ (This was the Joint Staff estimate^ too, but CIA in its 8 June report estimated that civilian casualties might run to 200-300.)

McNamara cabled his approval of the measures suggested and indicated that they would be included in the execute message. He stressed that the President's final decision would be greatly influenced by the ability to minimize civilian casualties and inq,uired about restrictions against flak and SAM suppression that might endanger populated areas. 173/ On June 16;, CINCPAC offered farther assurances that all possible measures would be taken to avoid striking civilians and that flak and SAM suppression would be under the rightest of restrictions. 17^/

The stage was thus set, and when the feedback from the Penning mission revealed no change in Hanoi's position, events moved quickly.

On 22 June the execution message V7as released. 175./ I"t authorized strikes on the 7 POL targets plus the Kep radar, beginning with attacks on the Hanoi and Haiphong sites, effective first light on 2^ Jiine Saigon time.

The execution message is a remarkable document, attesting in detail to the political sensitivity of the strikes and for some reason ending in a "never on Sunday" injunction. The gist of the message was as follows:

Strikes to commence with initial attacks against Haiphong and Hanoi POL on same day if operationally feasible. Make maxmum effort to attain operational surprise. Do not conduct initiating attacks imder marginal weather conditions but reschedule when weather assures success. Follow-on attacks authorized as operational and weather factors dictate. ■

At Haiphong, avoid damage to merchant shipping. No -attacks authorized on craft -unless US aircraft are first fired on and then only if clearly North Vietnamese. Piers servicin;^ target will not be attacked if tanker is berthed off end of pier.

Decision made after SecDef and CJCS v/ere assured every feasible step vrould be taken to minimize civilian casiial-ties would be small- If you do not believe you can accom-> plish objective vrhile destroying- targets and protecting

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crews, do not initiate program. Take the following measures: maximum use of most experienced ROLLING THUNDER persopjiel, detailed briefing of pilots stressing need to avoid civilians, execute only when weather permits visual identification of targets and improved strike accuracy, select best axis of attack to avoid populated areas, maximiim use of ECM to hamper SAi-I and AAA fire control, in order to limit pilot distraction and improve accuracy, maximum use of vreapons of high precision delivery consistent vrith mission objectives, and limit SAM and AAA suppression to sites located outside populated areas.

Take special precautions to inspire security. If weather or operational considerations delay initiation of strikes, do not initiate on Sunday, 26 June. 176/

The emphasis on striking Hanoi and Haiphong POL targets on the same day and trying to achieve operational surprise reflected an acute concern that these targets were in well-defended areas and U.S. losses might be high. The concern about merchant shipping, especially tankers which might be in the act of off-loading into the storage tanks, reflected anxiety over sparking an international incident, especially one with the USSR.

With the execute message out, high-level interest turned to the weather in the Hanoi/Haiphong area. The M4CC began to send Secretary McNamara written forecasts every fe\f hours. These indicated that the weather was not promising. Tv/ice the strikes were scheduled but had to be postponed. Then, on 2}\ June, Philip Geyelin of the Wall Street Journal got hold of a story that the President had decided to bomb the POL at Haiphong, and the essential details appeared in a Dow Jones news wire that evening. This was an extremely serious leak, because of the high risk of UgS. losses if NYN defenses were fully prepared. The next day an order was issued cancelling the strikes. 17? / . ■

The weather watch continued^ however, under special security precautions. The weather reports, plus other messages relating to the strikes, continued, handled as Top Secret Special Category (SpeCat) Exclusive for the SecDef, CJCS, and CINCPAC. (It is not known whether the diplom.atic scenario vrhich involved informing some countries about the strikes ahead of time was responsible for the press leak; in any case^, the. classification and handling of these m.essages kept them out of State 'Department channels.) The continued activity suggests that the cancellation of the strikes on the' 25th may have been only a cover for security purposes.

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On the 28th Admiral Sharp cabled General Wheeler that his forces were ready and the v/'eather was favorable for the strike?; he requested authority to initiate them on the 29th. 178/ General Wheeler responded with a message rescinding the previous cancellation^ reinstating the original execution order, and approving the recommenda^ tion to execute on the 29tho The message informed Admiral Sharp that preliminary and planning messages should continue as SpeCat Exclusive for himself and the SecDef. 179/

The strikes were launched on 29 June, reportedly with great success. The large Hanoi tank farm was apparently completely knocked out; the Haiphong facility looked about 80 percent destroyed. One U.S, aircraft was lost to ground fire. Four MIGs were encountered and one was probably shot dovm. The Deputy Comm.ander of the 7th Air Force in Saigon called the operation "the m^ost significant, the most irrrportant strike of the War."

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FOOTNOTES

1. Memorandiim for the SecDef from Ambassador-at-Large Llewellyn E. Thompson^ 12 October 1965? op. cit ,

2. JCSS Armed Reconnaissance Study Group Report, "An Analysis of the Armed Reconnaissance Program in North Vietnam^" I5 November I965? Appendix 1 to Annex C.

3. JCSM 238-665 ROLLING THUNDER Study Group Report, "Air Operations Against North Vietnam," ±k April I966, Tab B to Annex C to Appendix A to Section II, and Appendix B to Section II.

h. Memorandum for the SecDef from Ambassador-at-Large Llewellyn E. Thompson, 12 October I965? 2R' £ii*

15. JCSM 811-65, 10 November I965, "Future Operations and Force Deployments with Respect to the War in Vietnam."

6. Memorandum for the DepSecDef from McNaughton, 9 November 1965^ summ.arizing the JCS position.

rY. JCSM 810-65, "Air Operations Against the North Vietnam.POL System," 10 November 1965-

8. "Attack on the North Vietnam Petroleum Storage System -- A Study," prepared by J-3 in collaboration with DIA, 23 April 1965? revised 22 December 1965*

9. JCSM 810-65, 10 November 1965? op. cit.

10. Ibid ., Appendix, Annex D.

11. Ibid.

' ' 12. Memorandum for the Director, CIA, from Sherman Kent, for the Board

of National Estimates, "Probable Reactions of the DRV, Communist

' China, and the USSR to US Air Attacks on Petroleum Storage Facilities

in North Vietnam," 27 November I9655 and Memorandum for the SecDef from Admiral W- F. Raborn, 3 December 1965^ f03rwarding Memorandum for the Director, CIA, from. Sherman Kent, for the Board of National Estimates, "Reactions to a US Course of Action in Vietnam," 2 December

1965. ^ " •. *

is. Memorandum for Director, CIA from Sherman Kent, 27 November 1965^ op. cit .

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16 Memorandum for the Director, CIA, from Sherman Kent, 2 December 1965? £P- £ii-

17 Ibid .

18. Ibid.

19. Ibid .

20. Ibid.

21. Memorandum for the CJCS from the SecDef, 8 December 1965, "Military Operations in North and South Vietnam."

22. Memorandum for the DepSecDef from the Acting Director, CIA,

28 December I965, "Probable Reactions to US Bombing Attacks on POL Targets in Worth Vietnam."

23. Ibid. 2k. Ibid .

25. Ibid.

26. Ibid .

27. SIHE 10-2-65, 10 December I965, "Probable Communist Reactions to a US Course of Action."

28. Ibid.

29. Ibid.

30. Ibid.

31. CM-IOO6-65, Memorandum for the SecDef, "Probable Reactions of the DRV, Communist China, and the USSR to US Air Attacks on the

■Petroleiom Storage Facilities in North Vietnam," 2 December 196.5.

32. CM 1071-65, MemorandiHu for ASd/iSA, 28 December 1965-

33. "Attack on the North Vietnam Petroleiim Storage System—A Study" prepared by J-3 in collabroation with DIA, 23 April I965, revised-22 December 1965-

3I1. ■ Ibid.

35. JCSM Ul-66, 18 January I966.

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36. Drafts W- P. Bundy^ 1/15/66^ "Scenario for Possible Resiiiription of Bombing."

37. Drafts McNaughton, 1/18/665 "Some Observations About Bombing North Vietnam."

38. JCS 2830, 292126Z January 1966, directed the resumption. This was the beginning of ROLLim THUNDER ^8.

39. Memorandum for the President^ "The Military Outlook in South Vietnam," 2k January I966.

kO. Ibid.

1^1, DIA Special Report AP-I-63O-I-I5-665 "Relationship Between Petroleum Storage and Distribution System and Petroleum Consum^ption in North Vietnam," January I966.

1|2. SNIE 10-1-66, "Possible Effects of a Proposed US Co-arse of Action on DRV Capability to Support the Insurgency in South Vietnam," h February I966.

I If 3. Ibid'.

^ Iflf. Ibid.

^5. Ibid *

k6. Ibid.

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i|-7. CM-11^7-66, 1 February I966, "interdiction Operations Against the DRV."

1|8. JCSM 238-66, Ik April 1966, "ROLLING THUNDER Study Group Report," op. cit ., Section I, Basic Report.

I49. Ibid .

50. Ibid.

51. Ibid.

52. JCSM 113-^6, 19 February I966.

53. JCSM 130-66, 1 March I966; JCSM 153-66, 10 March I966.

5I1. CIA SC No. 0828/66, "The Role of Air Strikes in Attaining Objectives in North Vietnam," March I966.

55. Ibid.

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56. Ibid .

57. Ibid . . ' "

58. Ibid.

59. Ibid .

60. Ibid .

61. rbid.

62. Ibid .

63. Memo, SecDef to President, 2k Jan I966, op. cit.

6k. CM 11^7-66: Memo, Chairman to Director, Joint Staff, 1 Feb I966,

JCS Study Group Report, Sect. I, App A, Annex B; JCSM 238-66: Memo, Director, Joint Staff to SecDef, 1^ Apr I966, states that the Study Group was formed "in furtherance of your conversation with the Chairman...."

65. JCS Study Group Report, Sect. I, App A, Annex B, and App B.

66. Ibid., Sect. II, App A, Annex D, pp. 12-13.

67. JCSM 113-66 (19 Feb 1966)-

68. JCS Study Group Report, Sec. II, App A, Annex B, p. I3. ■ 69. JCSM 130-66 (1 Mar I966).

70. JCSM 810-65 (10 Nov 1965)-

71. ■ Memo, Sherman Kent to Director, CIA, 2 Dec 1965-

72. Memo, Sherman Kent to Director, CIA, 27 Nov 1965-

73. Ibid . 7k. Mem.o, Acting Director, CIA, to DepSecDef, 28 Dec 1965*

75. DIA Special Report AP-I-63O, 15 Jan I966.

76. SNIE 10-1-66 {h Feb I966).

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77. JCSM-I3O-66, 1 March I9665 Appendix A, p. A-3 (TS), emphasis added-

78. JCSM-153-66, 10 March I966 (TS).

79. CIA SC No. 0828/665 ''The Role of Air Strikes in Attaining Objectives in North Vietnam/' March I966.

80. JCSM 189-665 26 Mar I966.

81. Ibid.

82. Memo^ SecDef to President (no date^ but late March 1966), Subject: April Program of Air Strikes Against North Vietnam and La^os" (in McNaughton Book 11, Tab V.)

83. NSAM No. 2885 17 Mar I96U.

Qk. State 288^^ to Lodge, 30 Mar I9665 CF k9.

85. Notes on Memo^ SecDef to President, "April Program.../' copy in McNaughton Book VII, Tab L.)

86. JCS 7^80, 010112Z April I966.

87. Memorandum for the President, "April Program...," _^. cit.

88. Testimony before the Senate Committees on Armed Services and Appropriations, k August 1965, SECRET.

Q(^. JCSM 810-65, 10 November 1965? ££• cit .

90. CM-IOO6-65, 2 December 1965? £P* cit .

91. Memorand^om for the President from Under SecState Ball, 25 January I966.

92. Ibid.

93. Ibid . .

9I1. JCS Study Group Report, Section III, Appendix A, pp. 2-3; JCSM 238-66, II+ April'1966.

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96. The papers and notes presented at this meeting for consideration and described^ in detail below are all contained in McNaughton Book II5 Tab W (S-Sensitive).

97. W. ¥. Rostow Meaaorandum for Secretary Rusk and Secretary McNamara, April 9^ 1966 — 7:00 a.m., Subject: Breaking Tri Quang's Momentum (S), in McNaughton Book 11, Tab S.

98. Leonard Unger, State, Far East, Flanjiing for Viet-Nam Contingencies , April 11, 1966 (TS), in McNaughton Book II, Tab R.

99. McNaughton*s handwritten notes dated ^'U/l2/66" suggest such a meeting; they begin withha list of names (of participants?) and contain a numbered summary of probable discussion points. (McNaughton, Book II, Tab R.)

100. George A. Carver, CIA, Memorandum for the Honorable John T. McNaughton (copies to Rostow, Bundy, Moyers, Unger, Ball, Vance, Komer),

12 April 1966, with attached Memorandum entitled "Conseq.uences of a Buddhist Political Victory in South Vietnam," 11 April I966, (S-SENSITIVE); McNaughton Book II, Tab Q,. .

101. Maxwell D. Taylor, Memorandum for the President, Subject: "Current Situation in South Vietnam," April 12, I966 (s); in McNaughton Book II,

Tab P.

102. U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Background Information Relating to Southeast Asia and Vietnam (Uth Revised edition), (Washington; GPO, March I968), p. 28; for a good review of events at the time see Embassy Saigon msg. 4o33, I6 April I966 (S-LIMDIS).

103. W- W. Rostow, Headings for Decision and Action: Vietnam, April l4, 1966, April 1^1, 1966 (S), copy for Mr. McNaughton; in McNaughton Book II, Tab 0. "

IQh. JCSM-238-66, op. cit .

105. JCS ROLLING THUNDER Study Group Report: Air Operations Against , ■ NVN, 6 April I966 (TS), Section III, Annexes D, E, and F.

106. Ibid., Se-tion III, Appendix B, p. 6.

107. Ibid . ■

108 Robert S. McNamara Memora,ndum for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of

Staff Subject: Air Operations Against North Vietnam, April 13, .I966.

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109. DMFT5 FE: WPBundyjmk^ k/lG/GG, Basic Choices in Viet-Nam (S); in McNaughton Book II, Tab N-

no. Ibid ,

ill. Ibid.

112. Ibid.

113. Ibid. lli|. Ibid . 3 emphasis added.

115. Plow ¥e Sh ou ld Move^ unsigned^ Lindated paper (TS-SENSITIVE, "By Carver, U7T5/66" pencilled in by McNaughton) in McNaughton Book 11, Tab Mc.

116. Ibid. XI7. Ibid. 3 emphasis added.

-■ ' 118. Ibid .

119. Ibid.

120. Politics in Vietnam: A "Worst" Outcome, I6 April I9665 unsigned paper in McNaughton Book II, Tab M (S)V

121. Ibid., Tab A.

122. Scenario , EE: LUngerjhjh, V^^ in McNaughton Book II, Tab Mc.

123. Weekly Compilation of Presidentia.l Documents , vol. 2, no. I6, . Monday, April 25, I966, p. 555, emphasis added.

12^. Course B, linger k/ls/GGl McNaughton revision U/20/66; Unger re-revision k/2l/GG (S-SENSITIVS) in McNaughton Book II, Tab J. '

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125. Ibid.

■ '■'• 126. Ibid.

127. NSAM 3^3^ March 28, I966 (s).

i \ 128. R. W. Komer Mem.orandum for Secretaries Rusk and McNamara, and

* Administrators Bell, Marks and Raborn, April I9, I966 (s); with attached Memorandi:mi for the President, April I9, I966 (s).

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129. See5 for instance, his Statementoon Vietnam during a News Conference at the White House, June 18, I9665 in Weekly Compilation of Presi-dential Documents, Monday, June 27, 196^, pp. 8O5-7.

130. JCSM-130-66, 1 March I966 (TS). ■

131. Robert S, McNamara Memorandum to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Subject: "Deployments to Southeast Asia," 10 March I966 (TS)

132. JCSM-218-66, h April 1966 (TS).

133. Robert S. McNamara Memorandum for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Subject: "Deployment Program for South Vietnam," 12 April 1966 (TS).

I3I1. JCSM-27^-66, 28 April I966 (TS).

135. See JCSM-215-66, 2 April I966 (TS); JCSIvI-233-66,- 15 April I966 (TS); and JCSM-375-66, h June I966 (TS) on Tac Air requirements; and JCSM-317-66, 10 May I966 (TS) on air munitions req,uirement£.

136. JCSM-26U-66, 27 April 1966 (TS).

137. The New York Times , 28 June I966.

138. Maxwell D. Taylor Memorandiom for the President, Subject: "Assessment and Use of Negotiation Blue Chips," April 27, I966 (S); in McNaughton Book II, Tab H. . ^

139. Ibid.

140. Ibid.

litl. Ibid .

ll|2. VJilliam P. Bundy Memorandum'to the Secretary [of StateJ, Subject:

"General Taylor's Memorandum of April 27 on Negotiation Blue Chips," May \, 1966 (S-NODIS); in McNaughton Book II, Tab K.

1^3. rbid. 1U1|. Ibid. 11^5.. Ibid ."

lii-6. Jam^es Reston, "Washington: The Evaded Moral Question in Vietnam," New York Times , May I8, I966.

1I+7, Tabular presentation of Presidential popularity showing Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson- in SecDef Cable File 52, Tab E.

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ikQ. State Department message 3553? May 21, I966 (c). 11^9. Embassy Saigon message ^880, May 23, .T,966 (C-LIMDIS).

150. Ibid .

151. Embassy Saigon message ^952 for the President from Lodge, May 25, 19665 7:20 a.m. (S-NODIS).

152. Robert S. McNamara Memorandiim for the Chairman, JCS, April I3, I9665 op. cit .

153. JCS 9326, 2618U2Z April 1966.

15^. W. W. Rostow Memorandiim for the Secretary of State /and/ the Secretary of Defense, May 6, I966 (TS-SENSITIVE) .

155. Ibid.

156. COMQSMACV message to CINCPAC O91226Z May I966 (S).

157. CINCPAC message to JCS IOO73OZ May I966 (s); emphasis in original.

158. Memorandum apparently prepared in the Air Staff, "Safeguards for Success," May 4, I966.

159. COMUSMA.CV message for CINCPAC I76O3, 22IIU5Z May I966 (S).

160. Eor a complete review of these political events and the U.S. reactions and involvement in them, see Task Force Vol. IV. C, "Evolution of the War: US-GVN Relations: 1963-1967, part II"

(ts-sensitive).

161. History of Restrictions on Attack on NVN POL System , briefing paper prepared by the JCS, 10 August I967 for Secretary of Defense Backup Book for appearance before Preparedness Subcommittee of the Sena.te Armed Services Committee, 25 Aug 1967^ Section IV, Tab A(s).

162. State Department msg. kQ to OSLO (ToSec), 3 Jun 66^ For Secretary and Ambassador Bruce, transmitting "for your ey^^ only" msg. received by President from P. M. Wilson (S-NODIS).

153^ 1-35728/66 (no date). Memorandum for the SecDef from ASd/iSA. 16^. COMUSMCV msg O5I2OIZ June I966, personal for CINCPAC (TS).

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165. CINCPAC to JCS, O6O7O5Z June I966.

166. CINCPAC asg. to JCS 080757Z June I966 (TS).

167. CIA SC No. 08^^0/665 "The Effect of Destruction of NVN Petroleum Storage Facilities on the War in SVN" 8 June I966.

168. Brussels msg 79 to State, Literally Eyes Only for the President from the Secretary, 7 Jme I966 (TS-NODIS).

169. Brussels msg, 87 to State, Eyes Only for Secretary McNamara from the Secretary, 8 June I966 (TS-NODIS).

170. State Department Memorandum of Conversation, "Visit of Ambassador Ronning to Hanoi^ June 1^-17? I966," 21 June I966.

171. OSD msg. to CINCPAC 3339-66, 132l46z June I966, SECDEF to CINCPAC Eyes Only.

172. CINCPAC msg to SecDef, 1^6659^ June I966, Exclusive.

173. OSD msg 3395-66, I52OOOZ June I966, SecDef to CINCPAC, Eyes Only.

174. CINCPAC msg to SecDef, I6092OZ June I966, Exclusive.

175. JCS 5003 to CINCPAC, 222055Z June I966. This execute message was drafted as an amendment to JCS 9326 of 26 April, which had extended ROLLING THUNDER 5O until further notice. The amendment simply made provision for an A, or Alpha, element to ROLLING THUNDER 5O consisting of these particular JCS fixed targets. The operation thus came to be identified as ROLLING THUNDER 5O-A.

176. Ibid ,

177. JCS msg 53II5 to CINCPAC, 251859Z June I9665 New York Times, 1 July 1966.

178. CINCPAC msg 28IOI5Z June I966, SpeCat Exclusive to SecDef and CJCS.

179. JCS msg"5^1^ to CINCPAC, 2813UOZ, SpeCat Exclusive.

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III« McNAiViARA'S DISENCimrTMECT -- JULY-DECEMBER I9 66

The attack on North Vietnam's POL system was the last major escalation of the air war recommended by Secretary McNamara. Its eventual failure to produce a significant decrease in infiltration or cripple l^Iorth Vietnamese logistical support of the war in the South, when added to the cumulative failure of the rest of ROLLINGr THIMDER, appears to have tipped the balance in his mind against any further escalation of air attacks on the DRV. As we shall see, a major factor in this reversal of position was the report and recommenda-"tion submitted at the end of the summer by an important study group of America's top scientists. Another consideration weighing in his mind must have been the growing antagonism, both domestic and international, to the bombing, which was identified as the principle impediment to the opening of negotiations. But disillusionraent with the bombing alone might not have been enough to produce a recommendation for change had an alternative method of impeding infiltration not been proposed at the same time. Thus, in October when McNamara recomjnended a stabilization of the air war at prevailing levels, he vras also able to recommend the imposition of a multi-system anti-infiltration barrier across the Df/iZ and the Laos panhandle. The story of this momentous policy shift is the most important element in the evolution of the air war in the summer and fall of I9660

Ao Results of the POL Attacks

lo Initial Success

Official Washington reacted with mild jubilation to the reported success of the POL strikes and took satisfaction in the relatively mild reaction of the international community to the escalation. Secretary McNamara described the execution of the raids as "a superb professional job," and sent a message of personal congratulation to the field commanders involved in the planning and execution of the attacks shortly after the results were in. l/

In a press conference the next day, the Secretary justified the strikes "to counter a mounting reliance by NVN on the use of trucks and powered junks to facilitate the infiltration of men and equipment from North Vietnam to South Vietnam." He explained that truck movement in the first half of I966 had doubled, and that daily supply tonnage and troop infiltration on the Ho Chi Minh trail were up 150 and 120 percent, respectively, over I965. The enemy had built new roads and its truck inventory by the end of the year was expected to be double that of January 19^5^ an increase which would require 50-70 percent more POL. 2/

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The Department of State issued instructions to embassies abroad to explain the strikes to foreign governments in counter-infiltration termso The guidance was to the effect that since the Pause, the bombing of NW had been carefull/ restricted to actual routes of infiltration and supply; there had been no response whatever from Hanoi suggesting any willingness to engage in discussions or move in any way tovrard peace; on the contrary, during the Pause and since, IWTJ had continued to increase the infiltration of regular ]\IW forces South, and to develop and enlarge supply routes; it was relying more heavily on trucking and had sharply increased the importation and use of POL. The U.S. could no longer afford to overlook this threat. Major POL storage sites in the vicinity of Hanoi and Haiphong were military targets that needed to be attacked.

The targets, the guidance continued, were located away from the centers of both cities. Strike forces had been instructed to observe every precaution to confine the strikes to military targets and there had been no change in the policy of not carrying out attacks against civilian targets or population centers,, There was no intention of widening the war. The U.S. still desired to raeet Hanoi for discussions without conditions or take any other steps which might lead toward peace. 3/

The strikes made spectacular headlines every^^here. Hanoi charged that U.So planes had indiscriminately bombed and strafed residential and economic areas in the outskirts of Hanoi and Haiphong, and called this "a new and extremely serious stepo" The USSR called it a step toward further escalation^ The UK, France, and several other European countries expressed official disapprovalo India expressed "deep regret and sorrow," and Japan was understanding but warned that there was a limit to its support of the bombing of NVN. Nevertheless, according to the State Department's scoreboard, some 26 Free World nations indicated either full approval or "understanding" of the strikes, and 12 indicated disapproval. Press reaction to the attacks was shortlived, however, and within a week or so they were accepted as just another facet of the war. k/ • ■ .

Meanwhile in the U^S., follomng a familiar pattern of the Vietnam war, in which escalations of the air war served as preludes to additional increments of combat troops. Secretary McNamara informed the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Service Secretaries and the Assistant Secretaries of Defense on July 2 that the latest revision of the troop deployment schedule had been approved as Program .f3«> 5/ The troop increases were not major as program changes have gone in the Vietnam -vrar, an increase in authorized year-end strength from 3835500 approved in April to 391^000 and an increase of the final troop ceiling from ^25,100 to 431,000o 6/ But McHam.ara had personally revnritten the draft memo submitted to him by Systems Analysis inserting as its title, "Program #3," His hand\^^ritten

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changes also included a closing sentence which read^ "Requests for changes in the JE¥ogram may be submitted by the Service Secretaries or JCS whenever these appear appropriate." 7/ This language clearly reflected the following instruction that McNamara had received from the President on June 28:

As you knowj we have been moving our men to Viet Nam on a schedule determined by General Westmoreland's requirements.

As I have stated orally several times this year, I should like this schedule to be accelerated as much as possible so that General Westmoreland can feel assured that he has all the men he needs as soon as possible.

Would you meet with the Joint Chiefs and give me at your early convenience an indication of what acceleration is possible for the balance of this year. 8/

While the Chiefs were unable to promise any further speed-up in the deployment schedule, the Secretary assured the President on July 15 that all possible steps were being taken. 9/ S^"^ ^s in the air war, -SO also in the question of troop deployments a turning point was being reachedo By the fall of I966 when Program =ffh was under consideration, the President would no longer be instructing McNamara to honor all of General Westmoreland's troop requests as fully and rapidly as possible.

2o ROLLING THUNDER 31

In the air campaign strikes continued on the other major POL storage sites, and were soon accepted as a routine part of the bombing program. On 8 July, at a Honolulu conference, Secretary McNamara was given a coroplete briefing on the POL program. He informed CINCPAC that the President wished that first priority in the air war be given to the complete "strangulation" of NVN's POL system, and he must not feel that there were sortie limitations for this purpose. (He also stressed the need for increased interdiction of the railroad lines to China0) 10/ As a result, ROLLING THUNDER program No. 31, which went into effect the next day, specified a "strangulation" program of armed reconnaissance against the POL system, including dispersed sites. The ceiling for attack sorties on NVN and Laos "vras raised from 8IOO to 10,100 per month. 11/

McNamara left CINCPAC with instructions to develop a comprehensive plan to accomplish the miaximum feasible POL destruction while maintaining a balanced effort against other priority targets. On July 2k, CINCPAC for\iarded his concept for the operation to Washington. 12/ In addition to the fixed and dispersed sites already under attack, he recommended strikes against the storage facilities at Phuc Yen and Kep airfields;

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against the DRV's iniportation facilities (ioe.^ foreign ships in Haiphong harbor, destruction of harbor dredges, destruction of doc s, etc.); ^^^ "^^^ expansion of the reconnaissance effort to provide more and better information on the overall POL system. Also recommended vas a step-up in attacks on rolling stock of all kinds carrying POL, and strikes on the Xom Trung Hoa lock and dam. In spite of this recommendation and a follow-up on August 8, ROLLING THUOT)ER 51 was only authorized to strike previously approved targets plus some new bridges and a bypass as outlined in the July 8 execute order. 13/

■ While CINGPAC and his subordinates were making every effort to hamstring the DRV logistical operation through the POL attacks, the Secretary of Defense was keeping tabs on results through specially commissioned reports from DIA. These continued through July and into August. By July 20, DIA reported that 59*9?^ of North Vietnam's original POL capacity had been destroyed. lh/ By the end of July, DIA reported that "J0% of ]WN's large bulk (JCS-targeted) POL storage capacity had been destroyed, together with "]% of the capacity of knovm dispersed sites. The residual POL storage capacity was do-vm from some 185,000 metric tons to about 75,000 tons, about 2/3 still in relatively vulnerable large storage centers -- two of them, those at the airfields, still off limits ■ and 1/3 in smaller dispersed sites, 15/ This still provided, however, a fat cushion over NVN's req.uirementSo Waat became clearer and clearer as the summer wore on >7as that while we had destroyed a major portion of North. Vietnam's storage capacity, she retained enough dispersed capacity, supplemented by continuing imports (increasingly in easily dispersable drums, not bulk), to meet her on-going requirements- The greater invulnerability of dispersed POL meant an ever mounting U.S. cost in munitions, fuel, aircraft losses, and men. By August we were reaching the point at which these costs were prohibitive. It was simply iirrpractical and infeasible to atteirrpt any further constriction of North Vietnam's POL storage capacity.

As the POL campaign continued, the lucrative POL targets disappeared and the effort was confined more and more to the small scattered sites. Finally, on September U, CINCPAC (probably acting by direction although no instructions appear in the available documents) directed a shift in the primary emphasis of ROLLING THUMDER strikes« Henceforth they were to be aimed at, "o «> .attrition of men, supplies, equipment and.ooPOL..oo" I6/ Stressing the new set of priorities CINCPAC instructed, "POL will also receive errrphasis on a selective basis." 17/ By mid-October, even PACAE reported that the campaign had reached the point of diminishing returns. I8/

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■3* POL - Strategic Failure

It was clear in retrospect that the POL strikes had been a failure. Apart from the possibility of inconveniences^ interruptions^ and local shortages of a temporary nature^ there was no evidence that ]WN had at any time been pinched for POL. NVU's dependence on the unloading facilities at Haiphong and large storage sites in the rest of the country had been greatly overestimated. Bulk imports via oceangoing tanker continued at Haiphong despite the great damage to POL docks and storage there. Tankers merely stood offshore and unloaded into barges and other shallow-draft boats^ usually at night, and the POL was transported to hundreds of concealed locations along internal waterways. More POL was also brought in already drummed, convenient for dispersed storage and handling and virtually immune from interdiction. 19/

The difficulties of svritching to a much less vulnerable but perfectly workable storage and distribution system, not an unbearable strain vihen the volume to be handled was not really very great, had also been overestimated. Typically^ also, LIVN's adaptability and resourcefulness had been greatly underestimated. As early as the summ^er of I965, about six months after the initiation of ROLLING THUKDER, IWN had begun to import more POL, build additional small, dispersed, underground tank storage sites, and store more POL in drums along LOCs and at consumption points. It had anticipated the strikes and taken out insurance against them; by the time the strikes came, long after the decision had been telegraphed by open speculation in the public media, NVN was in good position to ride them out. Thus, by the end of I9665 after six months of POL attacks, it was estimated that IMVN still had about 26,000 metric tons storage capacity in the large sites, about 30-^0,000 tons capacity in medium-sized dispersed sites, and about 28,000 tons capacity in smaller tank and drum sites. 20/

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One of the unanticipated results of the POL strikes, which further offset their effectiveness, was the skillful way in which Ho Chi Minh used them in his negotiations with the Soviets and Chinese to extract larger commitments of economic, military and financial assistance from them. Thus, on July 17 he made a major appeal to the Chinese based on the American POL escalation. 2l / Since North Vietnam is essentially a logistical funnel for supplies originating in the USSR and China, this increase in their support as a direct result of the POL strikes must also be discounted against whatever effect they may have had on hampering Worth Vietnam's transportation.

The real and imm.ediate failure of the POL strikes was reflected,* however, in the undiminished flow of men and supplies down ■ the Ho Chi Minh trail to the war in the South. In early July, the

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intelligence commimity had indicated that POL could become a factor in constricting the truck traffic to the South. The statement was, however, qualified.

The POL requirement for trucks involved in the infiltration movement has not been large enough to present significant supply problems. But local shortages have occurred from time to time and may become significant as a result of attacks on the POL distribution system. 22/

By the end of the month, however, the CIA at least was more pessimistic:

Hanoi appears to believe that its transportation system will be able to withstand increa.sed air attacks and still maintain an adequate flow of men and supplies to the South.

...Recent strikes against North Vietnam's POL storage facilities have destroyed over 50 percent of the nation's petroletom storage capacity. However, it is estimated that substantial stocks still survive and that the DRV can continue to import sufficient fuel to keep at least essential military and economic traffic moving. 23 /

DIA continued to focus its assessments on the narrower effectiveness of the strikes in destruction of some percentage of North Vietnamese POL storage capacity without directly relating this to needs and import potential. 2hl By September, the two intelligence agencies were in general agreement as to the failure of the POL strikes* In an evaluation of the entire bombing effort they stated, "There is no evidence yet of any shortage of POL in North Vietnam and stocks on hand, with recent imports, have been adequate to sustain necessary operations." 25 / The report went even further and stated that there was no evidence of insurmountable transport difficulties from the bombing, no significant economic dislocation and no weakening of popular morale.

Powerful reinforcement about the ineffectiveness of the strikes came at the end of August when a special summer study group of top American scientists submitted a series of reports through the JASON Division of the Institute for Defense Analyses (treated comprehensively below). One of their papers dealt in considerable detail with the entire bombing program, generally concluding that bombing had failed in all its specified goals. With respect to the recent petroleum attacks to disrupt North Vietnamese transportation, the scientists offered the following summary conclusions: ■ ,

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In view of the nature of the North Vietnamese POL system, the relatively small quantities of POL it requires, and the options available for overcoming the effects of UcS. air strikes thus far, it seems doubtful that any critical denial

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of essential POL has resulted^ apart from temporary and local shG~?tages. It also seems doubtful that any such denial need result if China and/or the USSR are v^illing to pay greater costs in delivering it.

Maintaining the flow of POL to consumers within North Vietnam will be more difficult, costly, and hazardous, depending primarily on the effectiveness of the U.S. armed reconnaissance effort against the transportation system. Temporary interruptions and shortages have probably been and can no doubt continue to be inflicted, but it does not seem likely that North Vietnam will have to curtail its higher priority POL-powered activities as a result.

Since less than 5 percent of North Vietnamese POL requirements are utilized in supporting truck operations in Laos, it seems unlikely that infiltration South will have to be curtailed because of POL shortages; and since North Vietnamese and VC forces in South Vietnam do not req.uire POL supplied from the North, their POL-powered activities need not suffer, either. 26/

Coming as they did from a highly prestigious and respected group of policy-supporting but independent-thinking scientists and scholars, and coming at the end of a long and frustrating summer in the air war, these views must have exercised a powerful influence on McNamara's thinking. His prompt adoption of the "infiltration barrier" concept they recomm.ended as an alternative to the bombing (see below) gives evidence of the overall weight these reports carried.

McNamara, for his part, made no effort to conceal his dissatisfaction, and disappointment at the failure of the POL attacks. He pointed out to the Air Force and the Navy the glaring discrepancy between the optimistic estimates of results their pre-strike POL studies had postulated and the actual failiire of the raids to significantly decrease infiltration. 27/ The Secretary was already in the process of rethinking the role of the entire air campaign in the U.S. effort in Southeast Asia. He v^as painfully aware of its inability to pinch off the infiltration to the South and had seen no evidence of its ability to break Hanoi's will, demoralize its. population, or bring it to the negotiation table. The full articulation of his disillusionment would not come until the following January however, when he appeared before a joint session of the Senate Armed Services and Appropriations Committees to argue against any farther extension of the bombing. To illustrate the ineffectualness of bombing he cited our experience v/ith the POL strikes:

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There is no question but what petroleum in the North is an essential material for the movement^ under present circiomstances, of men and equipment to their borders. But neither is there any doubt that with, in effect^ an unrestricted bombing campaign against petroleum^ we were not able to dry up the supply.

The bombing of the POL system was_ carried out with as

much skill, effort, and attention as we could devote to it,

starting on June 29, and we haven't been able to dry up those supplies....

We in effect took out the Haiphong docks for unloading of POL and v/e have had very little effect on the importation level at the present time. I would think it is about as high today as it would have been if we had never struck the Haiphong docks. And I think the same thing would be true if we took out the cargo docks in Haiphong for dry cargo....

I don't believe that the bombing up to the present has significantly reduced, nor any bombing that I could contemplate in the future would significantly reduce, actual flow of men and materiel to the South. 28 /

Thus disenthralled with air power's ability to turn the tide of the war in our favor, McNamara would increasingly in the months ahead recommend against any further escalation of the bombing and turn his attention to alternative methods of shutting off the infiltration and bringing the war to an end.

B. Alternatives— The Barrier Concept 1. Genesis

I; The fact that bombing had failed to achieve its objectives

i did not mean that all those purposes were to be abandoned. For an option-

I . , oriented policy adviser like McNamara the task was to find alternative

-^^ays of accomplishing the job. The idea of constructing an anti-infiltration

^ I j ' barrier across the DMZ and the Laotian panhandle was first proposed in

January I966 by Roger Fisher of Harvard Law School in one of his periodic memos to McNaughton. 29 / The purpose of Fisher's proposal was to provide the Administration with an alternative strategic concept for arresting infiltration, thereby permitting a cessation of the bombing (a supporting sub-thesis of his memo v/as the failure of the bombing to break Hanoi's will)* He had in mind a primarily air-seeded line of barbed wire, mines

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and chemicals since the terrain in question would make actual on-the-ground physical construction of a barrier difficult and would probably evoke fierce military opposition. In his meno^ Fisher dealt at length with the pros and cons of such a proposal including a lengthy argument for its political advantages.

The memo must have struck a responsive cord in McNaughton because six weeks later he sent McNamara an only slightly revised version of the Fisher draft. 30/ McNaughton*s changes added little to the Fisher ideas; they served merely to tone down some of his assertions and hedge the conclusions. The central argument for the barrier concept proceeded from a negative analysis of the effects of the bombing,

B. Present Military Situation in North Vietnam

1. Physi cal consequen ces of b ombing

a. The DRV has suffered some physical, hardship and pain, raising the cost to it of supporting the VC.

b. Best intelligence judgment is that:

(1) Bombing may or may not - by destruction or delay - have resulted in net reduction in the flow of men or supplies to the forces in the South;

(2) Bombing has failed to reduce the limit on the capacity of the DRV to aid the VC to a point below VC needs;

(3) Future bombing of North Vietnam cannot be expected physically to limit the military support given the VC by the DRV to a point below VC needs.

2. Influence consequences of bombing

a. There is no evidence that bombings have made r it more likely the DRV v/ill decide to back out of the war.

b. Nor is there evidence that bombings have

! ■ resulted in an increased DRV resolve to continue the war to

■ an eventual victory, fisher's draft had read "There is some evidence that bombings '^

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C. The Future of a Bombing Strategy

Although bombings of North Vietnam improve GV^ morale and provide a counter in eventual negotiations (should they \ take place) there is no evidence that they meaningfully reduce

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either the capacity or the will for the DRV to support the VC- The DRV knows that we cannot force them to stop by "bomhing and that we cannot^ without an unacceptable risk of a major war with China or Russia or both, force them to stop by conquering them or "blotting them out/' Knowing that if they are not influenced we cannot stop them, the DRV will remain difficult to influence. With continuing DRV support, victory in the South may remain forever beyond our reach.

Having made the case against the bombing, the memo then spelled out the i case for an anti-infiltration barrier:

II. SUBSTANCE OF THE BARRIER PROPOSAL

A. That the US and GVN adopt the concept of physically cutting off DRV support to the VC by an on-the-ground barrier across the Ho Chi Minh Trail in the general vicinity of the 17th Parallel and Route 9- To the extent necessary the barrier would run from the sea across Vietnam and Laos to the Mekong, a straight' line distance of about 160 miles.

B. That in Laos an "interdiction and verification zone," perhaps 10 miles wide, be established and legitimated by such measures as leasing, international approval, compensation, etc.

C. That a major military and engineering effort be directed toward constructing a physical barrier of minefields, barbed wire, walls, ditches and military strong points flanked by a defoliated strip on each side.

D» That such bombing in Laos and North Vietnam as takes place be narrowly identified with interdiction and with the construction of the barrier by

1. Being within the 10-mile-wide interdiction zone in laos, or

2. Being in support of the construction of the barrier, or

3- Being interdiction bombing pending the completion

of the barrier.

E.- That, of course, intensive interdiction continues at sea and from Cambodia.

(it might be stated that all boml)ings of North Vietnam will stop as soon as there is no infiltration and no opposition to the con-^ struction of the verification barrier.) 32/

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Among the McNaughton additions to the Fisher draft were several suggested action memos including one to the Chiefs asking for . military comment on the proposal. Available documents do not reveal whether McNamara sent the memo nor indicate what his own reaction to the proposal was. He did^ however^ contact the Chiefs in some way for their reaction to the proposal because on March 2k the Chiefs sent a message to CINCPAC requesting field comjnent on the barrier concept. 33/ After having in turn queried his subordinates, CINCPAC replied on April 7 that construction and defense of such a barrier would require 7-8 U.S. divisions and might take up to three and one half to four years to become fully operational. sV It vrould require a substantial diversion of available combat and construction resources and would place a heavy strain on the logistics support system in Southeast Asia, all in a static defense effort which would deny us the military advantages of flexibility in employment of forces. Not surprisingly, after this exaggerated catalog of problems, CINCPAC recommended against such a barrier as an inefficient use of resources with small likelihood of achieving U.S. objectives in Vietnam. These not unexpected objections notwithstanding, the Army (presumably at McNamara *s direction) had begun an R&D program in March to design, develop, test and deliver within six to nine months for operational evaluation a set of anti-personnel route and trail interdiction

devices. 3^/

At approximately the same time an apparently unrelated offer was made by four distinguished scientific advisors to the Government to foiTn a summer working group to study technical aspects of the war in Vietnam. It is possible that the idea for such a study really originated in the Pentagon, although the earliest documents indicate that the four scholars (Dr. George Kistiakowsky - Harvard; Dr. Karl Kaysen - Harvard; Dr. Jerome Wiesner - MIT; and Dr. Jerrold Zacharias - MIT) made the first initiative with Adam Yarmolinsky, then working for McNaughton. 36/ In-any case, McNamara liked the idea and sent Zacharias a letter on April I6 formally requesting that he and the others arrange the summer study on "technical possibilities in relation to our military operations in Vietnam." 37/ On April 26 he advised John McNaughton, who was to oversee the project, that the scientists' group should examine the feasibility of "A 'fence' across the infiltration trails, warning systems, reconnaissance (especially night) methods, night vision devices, defoliation techniques, and area-denial weapons." 38/ In this way the barrier concept was officially brought to the attention of the study group.

During the remainder of the spring, while McNamara and the other Principals \ieTe preoccupied with the POL decision, the summer study '^roup was organized and the adm-inistrative mechanics worked out for providing

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its members with briefings and classified material. The contract^ it was determined,would be let to the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) for the study to be done through its JASON Division (ad hoc high-level studies using primarily non-IDA scholars). The group of "47 scientists (eventually to grov/ to 6? with the addition of 20 IDA personnel);, representing the cream of the scholarly community in technical fields, finally met in Wellesley on June 13 for ten days of briefings by high-level officials from the Pentagon, CIA, State and the White House on all facets of the war. Thereafter they broke into four sub-groups to study different aspects of the problem from a technical (not a political) point of view. Their work proceeded through July and August and coincided with McNamara's disillusionment over the results of the POL strikes.

2. The JASON Summer Study Reports

At the end of August the Jason Summer Study, as it had come to be known, submitted four reports: (l) The Effects of US Bombing in North Vietnam^ (2) VC/nvA Logistics and Manpov^er; (3) An Air Supported Anti-Infiltration Barrier; and (k) Summary of Results, Conclusions and Recommendations. The documents were regarded as particularly sensitive and were extremely closely held with General VJheeler and Mr. Rostow receiving the only copies outside OSD. The reason is easy to understand. The Jason Summer Study reached the conclusion that the bombing of North Vietnam was ineffective and therefore recommended that the barrier concept be implemented as an alternative means of checking infiltration.

Several factors combined to give these conclusions and recommendations, a pov/erful and perhaps decisive influence in McNaraara's mind at the beginning of September I966. First, they were recomm.endations from a group of America's most distinguished scientists, men who had helped the Government produce m.any of its most advanced technical v;eapons systems since the Second World War, and men who were not identified with the vocal academic criticism of the Administration's Vietnam policy. Secondly, the reports arrived at a time when McNaiaara, having witnessed the failiu-e of the POL attacks to produce decisive results, was harboring doubts of his own about, the effectiveness of the bombing, and at a time when alternative approaches were welcome. Third, the Study Group did not mince words or -f^^ge its conclusions, but stated them bluntly and forcefully. For all these reasons, then, the reports are significant. Moreover, as we shall see they apparently had a dramatic impact on the Secretary of Defense and provided much of the direction for futuri policy. For these reasons, then the reports are significant. Moreover, as we shall see, they .apparently had a dram.atic impact on the Secretary of Defense and provided much of the direction for future policy. For these reasons important sections of them are reproduced at some length below.

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■ The report evaluating the results of the U.S. air campaign against North Vietnam began with a forceful statem.ent of conclusions:

SUM^IAJIY AND CONGLLISIONS

1. As of July 1966 the U.S. bombing of North Vietnam (NVN) had had no measurable direct effect on Hanoi's ability to mount and support military operations in the South at the current level.

Although the political constraints seem clearly to have reduced the effectiveness of the bombing program, its limited effect on Hanoi's ability to provide such support cannot be explained solely on that basis. The countermeasures introduced by Hanoi effectively reduced the impact of U.S. bombing. More fundamentally, however, North Vietnajn has basically a subsistence agricultural economy that presents a difficult and unrewarding target system for air attack.

The economy supports operations in the South raiainly by functioning as a logistic funnel and by providing a source of manpower. The industrial sector produces little of military value.. Most of the essential military supplies that the VC/ NVN forces in the South require from external sources are provided by the USSR and Communist China. Furthermore, the volume of such supplies is so low that only a small fraction of the capacity of North Vietnam's rather flexible transportation netv/ork is required to maintain the flow. The economy's relatively underemployed labor force also appears to provide an ample manpower reserve for internal military and economic needs including repair and reconstruction and for continued support of military operations in the South.

2. Since the initiation of the ROLLING THUNDER program

the damage to facilities and equipment in North Vietnam has been more than offset by the increased flow of military and economdc aid, largely from the USSR and Communist China.

The measurable costs of the damage sustained by North Vietnam are estimated by intelligence analysts to have reached approximately $86 million by I5 July 1966. In I965 alone, the value of the military and economic aid that Hanoi received from the USSR and Communist China is estimated to have been on the order of ^^^O-kOO million, of which about $100-150 million was economic, and they have continued to provide aid, evidently at an increasing rate, during the current year. Most of it has been from the USSR, which had virtually cut off aid during the I962-6U period. There can be little doubt, therefore, that

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Hanoi's Communist backers have assimted the economic costs to a degree that has significantly cushioned the impact of U.S. bombing.

3. The aspects of the basic situation that have enabled Hanoi to continue its support of military operations in the South and to neutralize the impact of U.S. bombing by passing the economic costs to other ComJtiunist countries are not likely to be altered by reducing the present geographic constraints, mining Haiphong and the principal harbors in North Vietnam, increasing the number of armed reconnaissance sorties and othejrvrise expanding the U.S. air offensive along the lines now contemplated in military recommendations and plarjiing studies.

An expansion of the bombing program along such lines would make it more difficult and costly for Hanoi to move essential military supplies through North Vietnam to the VC/nvN forces in the South. The low volume of supplies required, the demonstrated effectiveness of the counter-measures already undertaken by Hanoi, the alternative options that the WTN transportation netvrork provides and the level of aid the USSR and China seem prepared to provide, however, make it quite unlikely that Hanoi's capability to function as a logistic funnel would be seriously impaired. Our past experience also indicates that an intensified air campaign in-NVN probably woiold not prevent Hanoi from infiltrating men into the South at the present or a higher rate, if it chooses. Furthermore, there would appear to be no basis for a-ssuming that the damage that could be inflicted by an intensified air offensive would impose such demands on the North Vietnamese labor force that Hanoi woiold be unable to continue and expand its recruitment and training of military forces for the insurgency in the South.

k. While conceptually it is reasonable to assume that some limit m-ay be imposed on the scale of military activity that Hanoi can maintain in the South by continuing the ROLLING THULIDER program at the present, or some higher level of effort, there appears to be no basis for defining that limit in .concrete terms or, for concluding that the present scale of VC/lMVN activities in the field have approached that limit , ■ .

The available evidence clearly indicates that Hanoi has been .infiltrating military forces and supplies into South Vietnam at a,n accelerated rate during the current year. Intelligence estimates have concluded that North Vietnam is capable of substantially,increasing its support.

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5. The indirect effects of the bomhing on the will of the North Vietnamese to continue fighting and on their leaders' appraisal of the prospective gains and costs of maintaining the present policy have not shown themselves in any tangible vray. Furthermore^ we have not discovered any basis for concluding that the indirect punitive effects of bombing will prove decisive in these respects.

It may be argued on a speculative basis that continued or increased bombing must eventually effect Hanoi's will to con-tinue^ particularly as a component of the total U.S. military pressures being exerted throughout Southeast Asia. However, it is not a conclusion that necessarily follows from the available evidence; given the character of North Vietnam's economy and society, the present and prospective low levels of casualties and the amount of aid available to Hanoi. It would appear to be eq.ually logical to assimie that the major influences on Hanoi's will to continue are most likely to be the course of the war in the South and the degree to which the USSR and China support the policy of continuing the war and that the piinitive impact of U.S. bombing m^ay have but a marginal effect in this broader context. 39/

In the body of the report these simmary formulations vrere elaborated in more detail. For instance, in assessing the military and economic effect of the bombing on North Vietnam's capacity to sustain the war, the report stated:

*

The economic and military damage sustained by Hanoi in the first year of the bombing was moderate and the cost could be (and was) passed along to Moscow and Peiping.

The major effect of the attack on North Vietnam was to force Hanoi to cope with disruption to normal activity, particularly in transportation and distribution. The bombing hurt most in its disruption of the roads and rail nets and in the very considerable repair effort which became necessary. The regime, however, was singularly successful in overcom-ing the effects of the U.S. interdiction effort.

f

Much of the damage was to installations that the North Vietnamese did not need to sustain the military effort. The regime made no attempt to restore storage facilities and little to repair dam-age to power stations, evidently because of the existence of adequate excess capacity and

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because the facilities were not of vitcl importance. For somewhat similar reasons, it made no major effort to restore military facilities, but merely abandoned barracks and dispersed materiel usually stored in depots.

The major essential restoration consisted of measures to keep traffic moving^ to keep the railroad yards operating, to maintain communications, and to replace transport equipment and eq.uipment for radar and SAM sites. hO^ j

A little further on the report examined the political effects of the bombing on Hanoi's will to continue the war, the morale of the popu-lation, and the support of its allies.

The bombing through I965 apparently had not had a major effect in shaping Hanoi's decision on whether or not to continue the war in Vietnam. The regime probably continued to base such decisions mainly on the course of the fighting in the South and appeared willing to suffer even stepped-up bombing so long as prospects of winning the South appeared to be reasonably good.

Evidence regarding the effect of the bombing on the morale of the North Vietnamese people suggests that the results v/ere mixed. The bombing clearly strengthened popular support of the regime by engendering patriotic and nationalistic enthusiasm to resist the attacks. On the other hand, those more directly involved in the bombing underv;'ent personal harships and anxieties caused by the raids. Because the air strikes were directed away from urban areas, morale was probably damaged less by the direct bombing than by its indirect effects, such as evacuation of the urban population and the splitting of families.

Hanoi's political relations with its allies were in some respects strengthened by the bombing. The attacks had the effect of encouraging greater material and political support from the Soviet Union than might otherwise have been the case. While the Soviet aid complicated Hanoi's relationship with Peking, it reduced North Vietnam's dependence on China and thereby gave Hanoi more room for maneuver on its own behalf. h\J

■This report's'concluding chapter was entitled "Observations" and contained some of the most lucid and penetrating analysis of air war produced to that date, or this I It began by reviewing the original objectives the bombing was initiated to achieve:

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...reducing the ability of North Vietnam to support the Connnur.ist insurgencies in South Vietnam and Laos, and...increasing progressively the pressure on NVN to the point where the regime would decide that it was too costly to continue directing and supporting the insurgency in the South. k2j

After rehearsing the now familiar military failure of the bombing to halt the infiltration, the report crisply and succinctly outlined the bombing's failure to achieve the critical second objective --the ( psychological one:

...initial plans and assessments for the ROLLING THUNDER program clearly tended to overestimate the persuasive and disruptive effects of the U.S. air strikes and, correspondingly, to underestim^ate the tenacity and recuperative capabilities of the North Vietnamese. This tendency, in turn, appears to reflect a general failure to appreciate the fact, well-documented in the historical and social scientific literature, that a direct, frontal attack on a society tends to strengthen the social fabric of the nation, to increase popular support of the existing government, to improve "the determination of both the leadership and the populace to fight back, to induce a variety of protective measures that reduce the society's vulnerability to future attack, and to develop an increased capacity for q.uick repair and restoration of essential functions. The great variety of physical and social counter-measures that North Vietnam has taken in response to the bombing is nox-/ well documented in current intelligence reports, but the potential effectiveness of these counter-measures was not stressed in the early planning or intelligence studies. ^3/

Perhaps the most trenchant analysis of all, however, was reserved for last as the report attacked the fundamental weakness of the air war strategy -- our inability to relate operations to objectives:

■ In general, current official thought about U.S. objectives in bombing NWI implicitly assumes two sets of causal relationships:

1. That by increasing the damage and destruction of resources in NVN, the U.S. is exerting pressure to cause the DRV to stop their support of the militaiy operations in SVN and Laos; and

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2. That the combined effect of the total military effort against NVTT -- including the U.S. air strikes in KVTT and Laos, and the land, sea, and air operations in SVIT — will xiltimately cause the DRV to perceive that its probable losses accruing from the var have become greater than its possible gains and, on the basis of this net evaluation, the regime will stop its support of the war in the South.

These two sets of interrelationships are assumed in military planning, but it is not clear that they are systematically addressed in current intelligence estimates and assessments. Instead, the tendency is to encapsulate the bombing of W^ as one set of operations and the war in the South as another set of operations, and to evaluate each I separately; and to tabulate and describe data on the physical,

economic, and military effects of the bombing, but not to address specifically the relationship between such effects and the data relating to the ability and will of the DRV to continue its support of the war in the South.

The fragmented nature of current analyses and the lack of an adequate methodology for assessing the net effects of a """^ ' given set of military operations leaves a major gap between the

quantifiable data on bomb damage effects, on the one hand, and policy judgments about the feasibility of achieving a given set ■ of objectives., on the other. Bridging this gap still requires the exercise of broad political-military judgments that cannot be supported or rejected on the basis of systematic intelligence indicators. It must be concluded, therefore, that there is currently no adequate basis for predicting the levels of U.S. military effort that would be required to achieve the stated objectives — indeed, there is no firm basis for determining if there is any feasible level of effort that would achieve these objectives, kh/

The critical impact of this study on the Secretary's thinking is revealed by the fact that many of its conclusions and much of its analysis would find its way into McNamara's October trip report to the President.

Having submitted a stinging condemnation of the bombing, the Study Group was under some obligation to offer constructive alternatives and this they did, siezing, not surprisingly, on the very idea McNarnara had suggested -- the anti-infiltration barrier. The product of their summer's v/ork was a reasonably detailed proposal for a multisystem barrier across the DMZ and the Laotian panhandle that would make g^gj^g^Yg ^3e of recently innovated mines and sensors. The central _^ portion of their recommendation follows:

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The barrier would have two somev^hat different parts^ one designed against foot traffic and one against vehicles. The preferred location for the anti-foot-traffic barrier is in the region along the southern edge of the DMZ to the Laotian border and then north of Tchepone to the vicinity of Muong Sen J extending about 100 by 20 kilometers. This area is virtually unpopulated^ and the terrain is q.uite rugged, containing mostly V-shaped valleys in which the opportunity for alternate trails appears lower than it is elsewhere in the system. The location of choice for the anti-vehicle part of the system is the area, about 100 by kO kilometers, now covered by Operation Cricket. In this area the road network tends to be more constricted than elsewhere, and there appears to be a smaller area available for new roads. An alternative location for the anti-personnel system is north of the DMZ to the Laotian border and then north along the crest of the mountains dividing Laos from North Vietnam. It is less desirable economically and militarily because of its greater length, greater distance from U.S. bases, and greater proximity to potential North Vietnamese counter-efforts.

The air-supported barrier would, if necessary, be supplemented by a manned "fence" connecting the eastern end of the barrier to the sea.

The construction of the air-supported barrier could be initiated using currently available or nearly available com^ponents, with some necessaiy modifications, and could perhaps be installed by a year or so from go-ahead. However, we anticipate that the North Vietnamese would learn to cope with a barrier built this way after some period of time which we cannot estimate, but which we fear may be short. Weapons and sensors which can make a much more effective barrier, only some of v^hich are now under develop-

(ment, are not likely to be available in less than l8 months ■ ■ to 2 years. Even these, it must be expected, will eventu-

I : ally be overcome by the North Vietnamese, so that further

improvements in weaponry will be necessary. Thus we envisage a dynamic "battle of the barrier," in which the barrier is repeatedly improved and strengthened by the I ; introduction of new components, and which will hopefully

permit us to keep the North Vietnamese off balance by continually posing new problems for them.

I ^^^ This barrier is in concept not very different from

what has already been suggested elsewhere; the new aspects « are: the very large scale of area denial^ especially mine

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fields kilometers deep rather than the conventional 100-200 meters; the very large numbers and persistent employment of weapons^ sensors^ and aircraft sorties in the barrier area; and the emphasis on rapid and carefully planned incorporation of more effective weapons and sensors into the system.

The system that could be available in a year or so wouldj in our conception^ contain /sic/ the following components:

— Gravel mines (both self-sterilizing for harassment and non-sterilizing for area denial).

— Possibly^ "button bomblets" developed by Picatinny Arsenal^ to augment the range of the sensors against foot traffic.^

— SADEYE/bLU-26b clusters,^ for attacks on area-type targets of "uncertain locations.

— Acoustic detectors5 based on improvements of the "Acoustic Sonobuoys" currently under test by the Navy.

— P-2V patrol aircraft, equipped for acoustic sensor monitoring. Gravel dispensing, vectoring strike aircraft, and infrared detection of campfires in bivouac areas.

— Gravel Dispensing Aircraft (A-1's, or possibly C-123's)

— Strike Aircraft

— Photo-reconnaissance Aircraft

— Photo Interpreters

--(possibly) ground teams to plant mines and sensors, gather information, and selectively harass traffic on foot trails.

1? These .are small mines (aspirin-size) presently designed to give a loud report but not to injure when stepped on by a shod foot. They would be sown in great density along well-used trails, on the assiimption that they would be much harder to sweep than Gravel. Their purpose wo-uld be to make noise indicating pedestrian traffic at a range of approximately 200 feet from the acoustic sensors.

-5Hf CBU-2^ in Air Force nomenclature.

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The anti-troop infiltration system (which would also function against supply porters) would operate as follows. There would be a constantly renewed mine field of non-sterilizing Gravel (and possibly button bomblets)^ distributed in patterns covering interconnected valleys and slopes (suitable for alternate trails) over the entire barrier region. The actual mined area would encompass the eq.uivalent of a strip about 100 by 5 kilometers. There would also be a pattern of acoustic detectors to listen for mine explosions indicating an attempted penetration. The mine field is intended to deny opening of alternate routes for troop infiltrators and should be emplaced first. On the trails and bivouacs currently used^ from which mines may--we tentatively assume--be cleared without great difficulty^ a more dense pattern of sensors would be designed to locate groups of infiltrators. Air strikes using Gravel and SADEYES would then be called against these targets. The sensor patterns would be monitored 2k hours a day by patrol aircraft. The struck areas would be reseeded with new mines.

The anti-vehicle system v/ould consist of acoustic detectors distributed every mile or so along all truck-able roads in the interdicted area^ monitored 2k hours a day by patrol aircraft^ with vectored strike aircraft using SADEYE to respond to signals that trucks or truck convoys are moving. The patrol aircraft would distribute self-sterilizing Gravel over parts of the road net at dusk. The self-sterilization feature is needed so that road-watching and mine-planting teams could be used in this area. Photo-reconnaissance aircraft would cover the entire area each few days to look for the development of new truckable roads, to see if the transport of supplies is being switched to porters, and to identify any other change in the infiltration system. It may also be desirable to use ground teams to plant larger anti-truck mines along the roads, as an interim measure pending the development of effective air-dropped anti-vehicle mines.

The cost of such a system (both parts) has been estimatea to be about $800 million per year, of which by far the major fraction is spent for Gravel and SADEYES. The key req.uirements would be (all numbers are approximate because of assumptions which had to be made regarding degradation of system components in field use, and regarding the magnitude of infiltration): ■ 20 million Gravel mines per month; possibly 25 million button bomblets per month;

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10,000 SA.JEYE-BLU-26B clusters"^ per monoh; l600 aco-astic sensors per month (assiiming presently employed batteries with 2-week life), plus 68 appropriately eq.uipped P-2V patrol aircraft; a fleet of about 50 A-l's or 20 C-123's for Gravel dispensing (l^OO A-1 sorties or 600 C-123 sorties per month)j 500 strike sorties per month (f-4c equivalent); and sufficient photo-reconnaissance sorties, depending on the aircraft, to cover 2500 sq.uare miles each week, with an appropriate team of photo interpreters. Even to make this system work, there would be req.uired experimentation and further development for foliage penetration, moisture resistance, and proper dispersion of Gravel; development of a better acoustic sensor than currently exists (especially in an attempt to eliminate the need for button bomblets); aircraft modifications; possible modifications in BLU-26B fuzing; and refinement of strike-navigation tactics.

For the future, rapid development of new mines (such as tripwire, smaller and more effectively camouflaged Gravel, and various other kinds of mines), as well as still better sensor/information processing systems will be essential, h^/

Thus, not only had this distinguished array of American technologists endorsed the barrier idea McNamara had asked them to consider, they had provided the Secretary with an attractive, well-thought-out and highly detailed proposal as a real alternative to further escalation of the ineffective air war against North Vietnam. But, true to their scientific orientations, the study group members could not conclude their work without examining the kinds of counter-measures the North Vietnamese might take to circumvent the barrier. Thus, they reasoned:

Assuming that surprise is not thrown av;ay, countermeas-ures will of course still be found, but they may take some time to bring into operation. The most effective counter-measures we can anticipate are mine sweeping; provision of shelter against SADEYE strikes and Gravel dispersion; spoofing of sensors to deceive the system or decoy aircraft into ambushes, and in general a considerable step-up of North Vietnamese anti-aircraft capability along the road net. Counter-countermeasures must be an integral part of the system development.

^ These q.uantities depend on an average number of strikes consistent with the assumption of 7OOO troops/month and I80 tons/day of supplies bv truck on the infiltration routes. This assumption was based on likely upper limits at the time the barrier is installed. If the assumption of initial infiltration is too high, or if we assume that the barrier will be successful, the number of weapons and sorties will be reduced accordingly.

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Apart from the tactical countermeasures against the barrier itself, one has to consider strategic alternatives available to the North Vietnamese in case the barrier is successfi^l. Among these are: a move into the Mekong Plain; infiltration from the sea either directly to SVN or through Cambodia; and movement down the Mekong from Thakhek (held by the Pathet I^o-Horth Vietnamese) into Cambodia.

Finally, it will be difficult for us to find out how effective the barrier is in the absence of clearly visible North Vietnamese responses, such as end runs through the Mekong plain. Because of supplies already stored in the pipeline, and because of the general shakiness of our q.uan-titative estimates of either supply or troop infiltration, it is likely to be some time before the effect of even a v/holly successful barrier becomes noticeable. A greatly stepped-up intelligence effort is called for, including continued road-watch activity in the areas of the motorable roads, and patrol and reconnaissance activity south of the anti-personnel barrier.

This, then,was the new option introduced into the Vietnam discussions in Washington at the beginning of September.

Their work completed, the Jason Group met with McNamara and McNaiighton in Washington on August 30 and presented their conclusions and recommendations. McNamara was apparently strongly and favorably impressed with the work of the Summer Study because he and McNaughton flew to Massachusetts on September 6 to meet with members of the Study again for more detailed discussions. Even before going to Massachusetts, however, McNamara had asked General Vflieeler to bring the proposal up with the Chiefs and to req.uest field comment, h'j / After having asked CINCPAC for an evaluation, Wheeler sent McNamara the preliminary reactions of the Chiefs, 48/ They agreed with the Secretary's suggestion to establish a project manager (General Starbird) in DDRScE, but expressed concern that, "the very substantial funds req.uired for the barrier system would be obtained from current Service resources thereby affecting adversely important current programs."

CINCPAC's evaluation of the barrier proposal on September 13 was little m-ore than a rehash of the overdrawn arguments against such a system advanced in April. The sharpness of the language of his simmary arguments, however, is extreme even for AdmJral Sharp. In no uncertain terms he stated: - .

• The combat forces req.uired before, during and after construction of the barrier; the initial and follow-on logistic support; the engineer construction effort and time required; and the existing logistic posture in Southeast Asia with respect to ports and land LOCs make construction of such a barrier impracticable.

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....Military operations against North Vietnam and operations in South Vietnam are of transcendent importance. Operation"', elsewhere are complementary supporting undertakings. Priority and emphasis should be accorded in consideration of the forces and resources available to implement the strategy dictated by our objectives, hs /

To some extent, the vehem-ence of CINCPAC's reaction must have stemmed from the fact that he and General Westmoreland had just completed a paper exercise in which they had struggled to articulate a strategic concept for the conduct of the war to achieve U.S. objectives as they understood them. This effort had been linked to the consideration of CY 196? force requirements for the war^ the definition of which required some strategic concept to serve as a guide- With respect to the war in the North, CINCPAC's final "Military Strategy to Accomplish United States Objectives for Vietnam/' stated:

In the North - Take the war to the enemy by imremitting but selective application of United States air and na-val power. Military installations and those industrial facilities that generate support for the aggression will be attacked. Movement within, into and out of North Vietnam will be impeded. The enemy will be denied the great psychological and material advantage of conducting an aggression from a sanctuary. This relentless application of force is designed progressively to curtail North Vietnam's war-making capacity. It seeks to force upon him major replenishment ^ repair and construction efforts. North Vietnamese support and direction of the Pathet Lao and the insurgency in Thailand will be impaired. The movement of men and material through Laos and over all land and water lines of communications into South Vietnam will be disrupted. Hanoi's capability to support military operations in South Vietnam and to direct those operations will be progressively reduced. ^O/

With this formulation of intent for the air war, it is not surprising that the barrier proposal should have been anathema to CINGPAC-

McNamara, hov;ever, proceeded to implement the barrier proposal in spite of CINCPAC's condemnation and the Chiefs' cool reaction. On September 15 he appointed Lt. General Alfred Starbird to head Joint Task Force 7^8 within DDR&E as m.anager for the project. _5l/ The Joint Task Force was eventually given the cover name Defense Communications Planning Group to protect the sensitivity of the project. Plans for implementing the barrier were pushed ahead speedily. Early in October, iust prior to the Secretary's trip. General Starbird m.ade a visit to Vietnam to study the problem on the ground and begin to set the administrative wheels in m-otion. In spite of the fact that McNamara was

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vigorously pushing the project forv/ard^ there is no indication that he had officially raised the matter with the President, although it is hard to imagine that some discussion of the Jason Summer Study recommendations had not taken place between them. In any case, as McNamara prepared to go to Vietnam again to assess the situation in light of new requests for troop increases, he made arrangements to have General Starbird remain for the first day of his visit and placed the anti -infiltration barrier first on the agenda of discussions, ^2/

3, A Visit to Vietnain and a Memorandum for the President

McNamara *s trip to Vietnam in October I966 served a variety of purposes. It came at a time when CINCPAC was involved in a force planning exercise to determine desired (required in his view) force levels for fighting the war through I967. This was related to DOD's fall DPM process in which the Pentagon reviews its programs and prepares its budget recommendations for the coming fiscal year. This in turn engenders a detailed look at requirements in all areas for the five years to come. As a part of this process, just three days before the Secretary's departure, ; the Joint Chiefs of Staff had sent him an important memo reviewing force

posture the world over and recommending a call-up of the reserves to meet anticipated 19^7 requirements. ^3 / This recommendation as a part of the overall examination of force requirements needed his personal assessment on the spot in Vietnam. Other important reasons, for a trip were, no doubt, the ones to which we have referred in detail: McNamara's dissatis-' faction with the results of the POL attacks; and the reports of the Jason

:-. Summer Study. Furthermore, the off-year Congressional elections were

only a month away and the President had committed himself to go to Manila for a heads of state meeting later in October. For both these events the President probably felt the need of McNamara* s fresh impressions and recommendations.

. "Whatever the combination of reasons, McNamara left Vfashington

on October 10 and spent four days in Vietnam. Accompanying the Secretary on the trip were Under Secretary of State Katzenbach, General Wheeler,

' Mr. Komer, John McNaughton, John Foster, Director of DDP&E, and Henry

Kissinger. In the course of the visit McNamara worked his way through

I . a detailed seventeen item agenda of briefings, visited several sections

i of the country plus the Fleet, and met with the leaders of the GVN.

I i ^ His findings in those three days in South Vietnam must have

confirmed his disquiet about the lack of progress of the war and the \ ' ineffectualness of U.S. actions to date, for when he returned to Washington

he sent the President a gloomy report with recommendations for leveling I off the U.S. effort and seeking a solution through diplom^atic channels. 5^ McNamara recommended an increase in the total authorized final troop strength in Vietnam of only about ^0,000 over Program #3, for an end strength of ^70,000. This was a direct rejection- of CINCPAC's request for a 12/31/67 strength of 570,000 and marked a significant turning point

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in McNamara^s attitude toward the force buildup. _56/ The issue would ■ continue to b3 debated until the President's decision shortly after

the election in November to approve the McNamara recommended total of ^69,300 troops under Program #^.

With respect to the air war he stated that the bombing had neither significantly reduced infiltration nor diminished Hanoi's will to continue the fight, and he noted the concurrence of the intelligence community in these conclusions. Pulling back from his previous positions, he now recommended that the President level off the bombing at current levels and seek other means of achieving our objectives. The section of the memo on bombing follows:

Stabilize the ROLLING THUNDER program against the North . Attack sorties in North Vietnam have risen from about 4,000 per month at the end of last year to 6,000 per month in the first quarter of this year and 12,000 per month at present. Most of our 50 percent increase of deployed attack-capable aircraft has been absorbed in the attacks on North Vietnam. In North Vietnam, almost 84,000 attack sorties have been flown (about 25 percent against fixed targets), ^5 percent during the past seven months.

Despite these efforts, it now appears that the North Vietnamese-Laotian road network will remain adequate to meet the requirements of the Communist forces in South Vietnam — this is so even if its capacity could be reduced by one-third and if combat activities v^ere to be doubled. North Vietnam's serious need for trucks, spare parts and petroleiom probably can, despite air attacks, be met by imports. The petroleum requirement for trucks involved in the infiltration movement, for example, has not been enough to present significant supply problems, and the effects of the attacks on the petroleum distribution system, while they have not yet been fully assessed, are not expected to cripple the flow of essential supplies. Furthermore, it is clear that, to bomb the North sufficiently to make a radical impact upon Hanoi's political, economic and social structure, would require an effort which we could make but which would not be stomached either by our own people or by world opinion; and it would involve a serious risk of drawing us into open war with China.

The North Vietnamese are paying a price. They have been forced to assign some 300,000 personnel to the lines of communication in order to maintain the critical flow of personnel and materiel to the South. Nov; that the lines of communication have been manned, however, it is doubtful that either a

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large increase or decrease in oiir interdiction sorties woiild substantially change the cost to the enemy of maintaining* the roads, railroads, and waterways or affect whether they are-operational. It follov/s that the marginal sorties — probably the m^arginal 1,000 or even 5^000 sorties -- per month against the lines of communication no longer have a significant im_pact on the war.

■When this m^arginal inutility of added sorties against I^orth Vietnam and Laos is compared with the crew and aircraft losses implicit in the activity (four men and aircraft and $20 million per 1,000 sorties), I recommend, as a minimum, against increasing the level of bombing of North Vietnara and against increasing the intensity of operations by changing the areas or kinds of targets struck.

Under these conditions, the bombing program would continue the pressure and would remain available as a bargaining counter to get talks started (or to trade off in talks). But, as in the case of a stabilized level of US ground forces, the stabilization of ROLLING THUNDER would remove the prospect of ever-escalating bombing as a factor complicating our political posture and distracting from the main job of pacification in South Vietnam.

At the proper time, as discussed on pages 6-7 below, 1 believe we should consider terminating bombing in all of North Vietnam., or at least in the Northeast zones, for an indefinite period in connection with covert moves toward peace. ^7/

As an alternative to further escalation of the bombing, McNamara recommended the barrier across the DMZ and Laos:

I nstall a barrier . A portion of the ^70,000 troops --perhaps 10^000 to 20,000 -- should be devoted to the construction and maintenance of an infiltration barrier. Such a barrier would lie near the 17th parallel — would run from the sea, across the neck of South Vietnam (choking off the new infiltration routes through the DMZ) and across the trails in Laos. This interdiction system (at an approximate cost of $1 billion) w^ould comprise to the east a ground barrier of fences, wire, sensors, artillery, aircraft and mobile troops; ' and to the west — mainly in Laos -- an interdiction zone covered by air-laid mines and bombing attacks pin-pointed by air-laid acoustic sensors.

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The barrier may not "be fully effective at first, but I believe that it can be made effective in time and that even the threat of its becoming effective can substantially change to our advantage the character of the war. It would hinder enemy efforts, would permit more efficient use of the limited number of friendly troops, and would be persuasive evidence both that our sole aim is to protect the South from the North and that we intend to see the Job through. ^8/

The purpose of these two actions would be to lay the groundwork for a stronger U.S. effort to get negotiations started. With the war seemingly stalemated, this appeared to be the only "out" to the Secretary that offered some prospect of bringing the conflict to an end in any near future. In analyzing North Vietnamese unwillingness to date to respond to peace overtures, McNam.ara noted their acute sensitivity to the air attacks on their homeland (recalling the arguments of the Jason Summer Study) and the hostile suspicion of U.S. motives. To improve the climate for talks, he argued, the U.S. should make some gesture to indicate our good faith. Foremost of these was a cessation or a limitation of the bombing.

As a.way of projective /si^c/ U.S. bona fides, I believe that we should consider two possibilities with respect to - our bombing program against the North, to be undertaken, if at all, at a time very carefully selected with a view to maximizing the chances of influencing the enemy and world opinion and to minimizing the chances that failure would strengthen the hand of the "hawks" at home: First, without fanfare, conditions, or avowal, whether the stand-down was permanent or temporary, stop bombing all of North Vietnam. It is generally thought that Hanoi will not agree to negotiations until they can claim that the bombing has stopped unconditionally. We should see what develops, retaining freedom to resume the bombing if nothing useful was forth-,; ■ coming.

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1 Alternatively, we could shift the weight-of-effort away

from "Zones 6A and 6b" — zones including Hanoi and Haiphong

; and areas north of those two cities to the Chinese border.

I ■ This alternative has some attraction in that it provides

the North Vietnamese a "face saver" if only problems of

"face" are holding up Hanoi peace gestures; it would narrow

the bombing down directly to the objectionable infiltration

(supporting the logic of a stop-infiltration/full-pause

■ deal); and it v/ould reduce the international heat on the

US. Here, too, bombing of the Northeast could be resumed at

any time, or "spot" attacks could be made there from time

to time to keep North Vietnam off balance and to require

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her to pay almost the full cost by maintaining her repair ' crews in place. The sorties diverted from Zones 6a and 6b could he concentrated on the infiltration routes in Zones 1 and 2 (the southern end of North Vietnam^ including the Mu Gia Pass)5 in Laos and in South Vietnam.g^/

a/ Any limitation on the bombing of North Vietnam will cause "serious psychological problems among the men who are risking their lives to help achieve our political objectives; among their commanders up to and including the JCS; and among those of our people who cannot understand why we should withhold punishment from the enemy. General Westmoreland^ as do the JCS, strongly believes in the military value of the bombing program. Further, Westm^oreland reports that the morale of his Air Force personnel may already be showing signs of erosion -- an erosion resulting from current operational restrictions. 59/

The Secretary's footnote was judicious. The Chiefs did indeed oppose any curtailment of the bombing as a means to get negotiations started. They fired off a dissenting mxcmo to the Secretary the same day as his m.emo and requested that it be passed to the President.

With respect to the bombing program per se they stated:

The Joint Chiefs of Staff do not concur in your recommendation that there should be no increase in level of bombing effort and no modification in areas and targets subject to air attack. They believe our air campaign against NVN to be an integral and indispensable part of our over all war effort. To be effective5 the air campaign should be conducted with only those minimum constraints necessary to avoid indiscriminate killing of population. 60/

As to the Secretary's proposal for a bombing halt:

The Joint Chiefs of Staff do not concur with your proposal that;, as a carrot to induce negotiations, we should suspend or reduce our bombing campaign against NVN. Our experiences with pauses in bombing and resumption have not been happy ones. Additionally, the JoJnt Chiefs of Staff believe that the likelihood of the war being settled by negotiation is small, and that, far from inducing negotiations, another bombing pause v;ill be regarded by North Vietnamese leaders, and our Allies, as renewed evidence of lack of US determination to press the vmr to a successful

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conclusion. The bombing campaign is one of the two triomp cards in the hands of the President (the other being the presence of US troops in SW). It should not be given up without an end to the W^ aggression in SVN. 6l/

The Chiefs did more than just dissent from a McNamara recommendation^ however. They closed their memo with a lengthy counterproposal with significant political overtones clearly intended for the President's eyes. In their own words this is what they said:

The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the war has reached a stage at which decisions taken over the next sixty days can determine the outcome of the war and, con-seq.uently5 can affect the over-all security interests of the United States for years to come. Therefore, they wish to provide to you and to the President their uneq.uivocal views on two salient aspects of the war situation: the search for peace and military pressures on ]WN.

a. The frequent, broadly-based public offers made by the President to settle the war by peaceful means

■ on a generous basis^ which would take from ]Wn nothing it now has, have been admirable. Certainly, no one - American or foreigner - except those who are determ.ined not to be convinced, can doubt the sincerity, the generosity, the altruism of. US actions and objectives. In the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff the time has come when further overt actions and offers on our part are not only nonproductive, they are counterproductive. A logical case /sic/ can be made that the American people, c^ur Allies, and'^our enemies alike are increasingly uncertain as to our resolution to pursue the war to a successful conclusion. The Joint Chiefs of Staff advocate the following:

(1) A statement by the President during the Manila Conference of his unswerving determination to carry on the war until JWN aggression against SW shall cease;

(2) Continued covert exploration of all avenues leading to a peaceful settlement of the war; and

(3) Continued alertness to detect and react appropriately to withdrawal of North Vietnamese troops from SVN and cessation of support to the VC.

b. In JCSM-955-6^, dated lU November 196^, and in jQgj^_o62-6^, dated 23 November 196^, the Joint Chiefs of Staff provided their views as to the military pressures which should be

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brought to bear on JWN. In siunmary^ they recommended a "sharp knock" on WTN militar^^ assets and war-supporting facilities rather than the campaign of slowly increasing pressure which was adopted, "Whatever the political merits of the latter course^ we deprived ourselves of the military effects of early weight of effort and shocks and gave I to the enemy time to adjust to our slow quantitative and

q_ualitative increase of pressure. This is not to say that it is now too late to derive military benefits from more effective and extensive use of our air and naval superiority. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend:

(1) Approval of their ROLLING THUKDER 52 program, which is a step toward meeting the requirement for improved target systems. This program would decrease the Hanoi and Haiphong sanctuary areas, authorize attacks against the steel plant, the Hanoi rail yards, the thermal power plants, selected areas within Haiphong port and other ports, selected locks and dams controlling water LOCs, SAJ-I support facilities within the residual Hanoi and Haiphong sanctuaries, and POL at Haiphong, Ha Gia (Phuc Yen) and Can Thon (Kep).

(2) Use of naval surface forces to interdict North Vietnamese coastal wa^terborne traffic and appropriate land LOCs and to attack other coastal military targets such . as radar and AM sites.

5. The Joint Chiefs of Staff request that their views as set forth above be provided to the President.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff

(Sgd) EARLE G. "WHEELER 62/

Such a memo from the Chiefs represents more than a dissent or an alternative recomjnendationj it constitutes a statement for the record to guarantee that in the historical accounts the Chiefs will appear having discharged their duty. It always comes as a form of political notification not merely a military recommendation.

The available documents do not show what the reaction at the State Department was (apart from I4r. Katzenbach's apparent endorsement) nor do they indicate the views of the T^Jhite House staff under 'w W. Rostow. McNaughton's- files do contain a commentary on the McNamara recommendations prepared by George Carver of CIA for the Director, Richa-^d Helms. Carver agreed with the basic McNamara analysis of the I quits of the air war but did not think they constituted a conclusive

statement about possible results from an escalation. Carver wrote,

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"We concur in Secretary McNamra's analysis of the effects of the ROLLING THUKDER program^ its potential for reducing the flow of essential supplies, and his judgment on the marginal inutility of added sorties against lines of communication. ¥e endorse his argument on stabilizing the level of sorties. ¥e do not agree, however, with the implied judgment that changes in the bombing program could not be effective. "We continue to judge that a bombing program directed both against closing the port of Haiphong and continuously cutting the rail lines to China could have a significant ijnpact. 63/

Carver also opposed any halt or de-escalation of the bombing to start negotiations, arguing that we could either pursue negotiations or try to build up the GVN but we could not do both. His preference was to build in the South. Hence, a bombing halt or pause was not required. As to a reduction, he argued that.

Shifting the air effort from the northeast q.uadrant to the infiltration areas in Laos and southern North Vietnam would be q.uite unproductive. Such a course of action would not induce Hanoi to negotiate (since it would still involve bombing in the north) and would probably have little effect in changing present international attitudes. Furthermore, a concentration of sorties against the low-yield and elusive targets along the infiltration routes in the southern end of North Vietnam and in Laos would not appreciably diminish North Vietnam's ability to maintain the supply of its forces in South Vietnam. Q\J

As for the anti-infiltration barrier, neither the Chiefs nor Carver had a great deal of comment. The Chiefs reiterated their reservations with respect to resource diversion but endorsed the barrier concept in principle. Carver somewhat pessimistically observed that^

In order to achieve the objectives set for the barrier in our view it must be extended well westward into Laos. Air interdiction of the routes in Laos unsupplemented by ground action will not effectively check infiltration.

To no one's su-^prise, therefore, McNamara proceeded with the barrier project in all haste, presumably with the President's blessing.

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C. The Year End View

1. Presidential Decisions "

The President apparently did not react immediately to the McNamara recommendations^ although he must have approved them in general. He was at the time preparing for the Manila Conference to take place October 23-25 and major decisions before would have been badly timed. Thus, formal decisions on the McNamara recommendations, particularly the troop level question would wait until he had returned and the elections were over. At Manila, the President worked hard to get the South Vietnamese to make a greater commitment to the war and pressed them for specific reforms. He also worked hard to get a generalized foimulation of allied objectives in the war and saw his efforts succeed in the agreed comm.uniq.ue. Its most important feature was an appeal to the North Vietnamese for peace based on a commitment to withdraw forces within six months after the end of the war. It contained, however, no direct reference to the air war.

"While in Manila, the President and his advisors also conferred with General Westmoreland. As McNaughton subsequently reported ^ ^o McNamara (who did not attend), Westmoreland opposed any curtailjnent

^ of the air war in the North, calling it "our only trump card." 66 /

J • Unlike the Jason Study Group, Westmoreland felt the strikes had definite

military value in slowing the southv^ard movement of supplies, diverting DRV manpower and .creating great costs to the North. Rather than stabilize or de-escalate, Westmoreland advocated lifting the restrictions on the program. Citing the high level of aircraft attrition on low priority ■ ■ targets, he warned, "you are asking for a very bad political reaction."

He recomm.ended that strikes be carried out against the MTG airfields, the missile assembly area, the truck miaintenance facility, the Haiphong port facilities, the twelve thermal power plants, and the steel plant. When McNaughton pressed him on the question of whether the elimination of these targets would have much payoff in reduced logistical support for the Southern war, Westmoreland backed off stating, "I'm not responsible for the bombing program. Admiral Sharp is. So I haven't spent much time on it. But I asked a couple of my best officers to look into it, and they came up with the recommendations I gave you." In any event, he opposed any .pause in.the bombing, contending that the DRV would just use it to strengthen its air defenses and repair air fields. McNaughton reported that Westmoreland had repeated these views to the President in the presence I -I r. ^ Q_^^ Thieu at Johnson's request; moreover, he planned to forward

them to the President in a memo ^ot available/ at the request of Walt

Rostow.

As to the barrier, McNaughton reported that, "Westy seems + be fighting the barrier less (although he obviously fears that it ^ is designed mainly to Justify ^stopping RT /ROLLING THUIIDE^, at which

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he 'shudders'-..." 69/ Apart from that his concerns about the barrier were minor (although he did propose a NIKE battalion for use in a surface to surface role in support of the ba^^^rier).

On his way home from Manila, the President made the now famous dramatic visit to U.S. troops at Cam Ranh Bay. Once home, however, he deferred any major decisions on the war until after the elections. Several "peace" candidates were aggressively challenging Administration supporters in the off-year Congressional contests and the President wished to do nothing that might boost their chances. As it turned out, they were oveivheljTiingly defeated in the November 8 balloting.

(Meanwhile, at the Pentagon the dispute over the level of effort for the air war continued. Even before Manila, the Chiefs had j attempted to head off McNamara's recommendation for stabilizing the

i bombing with a request for a 25 percent increase in B-52 sorties per

' month. 70/ The Secretary, for his part, was showing considerable con-

cern over the high attrition rates of ROLLING THUNDER aircraft. Among other things he questioned the utility of committing pilots to repeated risks when the operational return from many of the missions was so small and the expectations for achieving significant destruction so minimal. 71/

The force level arguments had continued during the President's trip too. On October 20, CINCPAC forwarded his revised Force Planning Program containing the results of the October 5"!^ Honolulu Planning Conference to the JCS. 72/ In effect, it constituted a reclama to the Secretary's October 14 recommendations. CINCPAC requested U.S. ground forces totalling ^93,969 by end CY I967; 519:.310 by end CY I968; and 520,020 by end CY I969. But the total by end CY I969 would really be 555,262 reflecting an additional 35,721 troops whose availability was described in the planning document as "unknown." 73/

With respect to the air war, CINCPAC stated a requirement for an additional ten tactical fighter squadrons (TFS) and an additional aircraft carrier to support both an intensification of the air war in the North and the additional maneuver battalions requested for the war in the South. These new squadrons were needed to raise sortie levels in the North above 12,000/month in CY I967. Of these ten TFS, the Air Force indicated ' that three were unavailable and the Secretary of Defense had previously deferred deployment of five. Nonetheless, the requirement was reiterated, jkj They were needed to implement the strategic concept of the air mission in SEA that CINCPAC had articulated on September 5 ^-nd that was included again here as justification. 25/ Moreover, the objective of attacking the ports and water LOCs was reiterated as well- 76/

On November ^, the JCS sent the Secretary these CINCPAC force planning recommendations with their own slight upward revision of the troop figures to an eventual end strength of 558,^32- 77/ In the bodv of the memo they endorse the CINCPAC air war recommendations in

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principle but indicated that 3 TFS and the carrier woTild not be, available. They supplemented CINCPAC's rationale with a statement of their own on the matter in appendix A. The two objectives of the air war were to . "make it as difficult and costly as possible'"^ for NYN to support the war in the South and to m-Otivate the DRV to ^''cease controlling and directing the insurgency in South Vietnam." 78/ Their evaluation of the effectiveness of the bombing in achieving these objectives was that:

Air operations in TTVN have disrupted enemy efforts to support his forces and have assisted in preventing the successful mounting of any major offensives. The NVN air campaign takes the war home to NVTT by complicating the daily life, causing multiple and increasing management and logistic problems, and preventing the enemy from conducting an aggression from the comfort of a sanctuary. 79/

Failures to date were attributed to the constraints imposed on the bombing by the political authorities, and the Chiefs again urged that these be lifted and the target base be widened to apply increasing pressure to the DRV.

These were the standard old arguiaents. But on October 6, the Secretary had addressed them a memo with an attached set of 28 "issue papers" drafM:ed in Systems Analysis. One of these took sharp issue with any increase in the air war on purely force effectiveness grounds. The Chiefs attempted to rebut all 28 issue papers in one of the attachments to the November U memo. The original Systems Analysis "issue paper" on air war effectiveness had argued that additional deployments of air sq.uadrons should not be made because: (l) the bulk of the proposed new sorties for North Vietnara v/ere in Route Package I (see Map) and could be attacked m-uch more econcm.ically by naval gunfire; (2) although interdiction had forced the enemy to make greater repair efforts and thereby had diverted some resources, had forced m.ore reliance on night operations, and had inflicted substantial casualties to vehicular traffic, none of these had created or were likely to create insuperable problems for the DRV; and (3) CINCPAC's increased sortie req.uirements would generate 23O aircraft losses in CY I967 and cost $1.1 billion while only doing negligible damage to the WN* QoJ The similarity of much of this analysis to the conclusions of the Jason Summer Study is striking.

The Chiefs rejected all three of the Systems Analysis arguments. "Naval gunfire, in their view, shoulc be regarded as a necessary supplement for the bombing, not as a substitute since it lacked flexibility^ 'and responsiveness. As to the question of com.parative costs in the air war, the Chiefs reasoned as follows:

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The necessity for this type of air campaign is created by constrcints imposed^ for other than rllitary reasons^ upon the conduct of the war in NVN. These constraints result in maximizing exposure of larger numbers of aircraft for longer periods against increasingly well defended targets of limited comparative V3slu.es./sic/ The measure of the effectiveness of the interdiction effort is the infiltration and its conseq.uence which would be taking place if the air campaign were not being conducted. The cost to the enemy is not solely to be measured in terms of loss of trucks but in tenns of lost capability to pursue his military objectives in SW. Similarly^ the cost to the US must consider that damage which the enemy would be capable of inflicting by infiltrating men and supplies now inhibited by the interdiction effort; this includes increased casualties in RW for which a dollar cost is not applicable. 8l/

Sensing that the thrust of the OSD analysis v/as to make a case for the barrier at the expense of the bombing, the Chiefs at last came down hard against any diversion of resources to barrier construction. In no uncertain terms they stated:

The Joint Chiefs of Staff agree that improved interdiction strategy is needed, but such improvem^ent would not necessarily include the barrier operation. As mentioned above and as recommended previously, an effective air campaign against WN should include closing the ports, destruction of high value military targets, attack of their air defense systems and airfields and the other fixed targets on the target list that have not been struck. These improvements have thus far been denied.

Preliminary information developed by Task Force 7^8 indicates that the forces and cost for the barrier will be substantial. The concept and eq.uipment for the barrier have not been subjected to a cost analysis study. Its effectiveness is open to serious q.uestion and its cost could well exceed the figure of $1.1 billion given for- projected aircraft losses' in this issue paper. 82/

Ar- already indicated, these issues were all decided upon bv the President immediately after the election. On November 11, McNamara sent the Chiefs a memo with the authorized levels for Program #4. CINCPAC's •nronosed increases in sortie levels were rejected and the McNamara recommendation of October 1^ for their stabilization was adopted. 83/ As a reason for rejecting expansion of the air war, the Secretary simply stated that such would not be possible since no additional tactical fighter squadrons had been approved. The one-upward adjustm-ent of the air v/ar

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2, Stabilization of the Air War

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with the President's decision not to increase sq.uadrons or sorties for the air campaign in I967 added to McNamara's strong recommendation on stabilizing the level of the bombing, activity for the remainder of I966 was kept at about the current level. Among the continuing constraints that was just beginning to alleviate itself was an insufficiency of certain air munitions to sustain higher levels of air combat. 8^/ The real constraints, however, as CINCPAC and the JCS correctly stated were political.

The principle supporters of halting the expansion of the air war, as we have already seen, were the Secretary of Defense and his civilian advisors. The arguments they had used during the debate over Program #^ and its associated air program were reiterated and somewhat enlarged later in November in the backup justification for the FY I967 Southeast Asia Supplemental Appropriation. Singled out for particular criticism was the ineffective air effort to interdict infiltration. The draft Memorandum for the President began by making the best case possible, on the basis of results, for the bombing, and then proceeded to demonstrate that those accom-plishments were simply far below what was req.uired to really interdict. The section of the memo in q.uestion follows:

A substantial air interdiction campaign is clearly necessary and worthwhile. In addition to putting a ceiling on the size of the force that can be supported, it yields three significant military effects. First, it effectively harasses and delays truck movements down through the southern panhandles of NVN and Laos, though it has no effect on troops infiltrating on foot over trails that are virtually invisible from the air. Our experience shows that daytime armed reconnaissance above some minimum sortie rate makes it prohibitively expensive to the enemy to attempt daylight ■movement of vehicles, and so forces him to night movement-Second, destri;ction of bridges and cratering of roads forces the enemy to deploy repair crews, equipment, and porters to repair or bypass the damage. Third, attacks on vehicles, parks, and rest camps des:^.roy some vehicles with .their cargoes and inflict casualties. Moreover, our bombing campaign may produce a beneficial effect on U.S. and SVW morale by making IWN pay a price for its enemy. But at the scale we are now operating, I believe our bombing j_g yielding very small marginal returns, not worth the cost in pilot lives and aircraft.

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The first effect^ that of forcing the enemy into a system of night movement ^ occurs at a lower freq.uency of armed reconnaissance sorties than the level of the past several months. The enemy was already moving at night in 1965, before the sortie rate had reached half the current level; further sorties have no further effect on

(the enemy's overall operating system. The second effect, that of forcing the enemy to deploy repair crews^ equipment , and porters, is also largely brought about by a comparatively low interdiction effort. Our interdiction campaign in I965 and early this year forced NVN. to assign roughly 300,000 additional personnel to LOCs; there is no f indication that recent sortie increases have caused further

increases in the number of these personnel. Once the enemy system can repair road cuts and damaged bridges in a few hours, as it has demonstrated it can, additional sorties may work this system harder but are unlikely to cause a significant increase in its costs. Only the third effect, the destruction of vehicles and their cargoes, continues to increase in about the same proportion as the number of armed reconnaissance sorties, but without noticeable impact on VC/WA operations. The overall capability of the jWN transport system to move supplies within WE apparently improved in September in spite of 12,200 attack sorties.

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In a summary paragraph, the draft memo m_ade the entire case against the bombing:

The increased damage to targets is not producing noticeable results. No serious shortage of POL in North Vietnam is evident, and stocks on hand, with recent imports, have been adequate to sustain necessary operations. No serious transport problem in the movement of supplies to or within North Vietnam is evident; most transportation routes appear to be open, and there has recently been a major logistical build-up in the area of the DMZ. The raids have disrupted the civil populace and caused isolated food shortages, but have not significantly weakened popular morale. Air strikes continue to depress economic growth and have been responsible for abandonment of some plans for economic development, but essential economic activities continue. The increasing amounts of physical damage sustained by North Vietnamese are in large measure compensated by aid received from other Communist countries. Thus, in spite of an interdiction campaign costing at least $250 million per month at current levels no significant impact on the war in South Vietnam is evident. The monetary value,of damage to NVN since the

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start of bombing in February 19^5 is estimated at about $ll|0 million through October 10, I966. 87/

As an alternative method of arresting the infiltration the memo proposed the now familiar barrier, preparatory work on which was proceeding rapidly. No new arguments for it were offered, and its unproven q^ualities were acknowledged. But it seemed to offer at that point a better possibility of significantly curtailing infiltration than an escalation of the ineffective air war. Its costs were estimated, however, at an astounding $1 billion per year.

While these considerations were dominant at the Pentagon, the air vrar in the North continued. The only exceptions to the even pattern of air strikes at the end of I966 were strikes authorized in early December within the 30-mile Hanoi sanctuary against the Yen Vien rail classification yard and the Van Dien vehicle depot. 88 / The former was attacked on December k and again on the 13th and lUth with extensive damage to buildings but little destruction of rolling stock. The Van Dien vehicle depot was struck six times between December 2 and 1^ with some two thirds of its l8^ buildings being either destroyed or damaged. Hanoi's reaction was prompt and vociferous. The DRV accused the U.S. of blatantly attacking civilian structures and of having caused substantial civilian casualties. On December 13, the Soviet Press Agency TASS picked up the theme claiming that U.S. planes had attacked residential areas in Hanoi. This brought a prompt State Department denial, but on December 15 further attacks on the two targets were suspended. Three days later there were new charges. This time the Communist Chinese claimed the U.S. had bombed their embassy in Hanoi. On December 1? the Rumanians made a similar allegation. The net result of all this public stir was another round of world opinion pressure on Washington. 92/ ^^ this atmosphere, on December 23? attacks against all targets within 10 n.m. of Hanoi were prohibited without specific Presidential authorization.

The most important result of these attacks, however, was to undercut what appeared to be a peace feeler from Hanoi. In late November, the DRV had put out a feeler through the Poles for conversations in Warsaw. The effort was given the code name Marigold , but when the attacks were launched inadvertently against Hanoi in December, the attempt to staH talks ran into difficulty. A belated U.S. attempt to mollify North Vietnam's bruised ego failed and formal talks did not materialize. Some significant exchanges between Hanoi and Washington on their respective terms apparently did take place, however. 91/

The controversy over civilian casualties from the bombing continued through the end of the year and into January 1967* Harrison Sali'sbury a respected senior editor of the New York Times , went to Hanoi at Christmas and dispatched a long series of articles that attracted much world-wide attention. He corroborated DRV allegations of civilian

Ities and damage to residential areas including attacks on Nam Dinh,

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llorth Vietnam's third city, and other towns and cities throughout the country. 92/ The matter reached a level of concern such that the President felt compelled to make a statement to the press on December 3^ to the effect that the bombing was directed against legitimate military targets and that every effort was being made to avoid civilian casualties, 93/

At no time in the fall of I966 is there any evidence that a second major "pause" like that of the previous year was planned for the holiday period to pursue a diplomatic initiative on negotiations* But as the holidays drew near a brief military standdown was expected. The Chiefs went on record in November opposing any suspension of military operations5 North or South, at Christmas, New Years or the Lunar New Year the coming February. 9h/ The failirre of the initiative through Poland in early December left the U.S. with no good diplomatic reason for* lengthening the holiday suspensions into a pause, so the President ordered only U8-hour halts in the fighting for Christmas and New Year's. The Pope had made an appeal on December 8 for both sides to extend the holiday truces into an armistice and begin negotiations, but this had fallen on deaf ears in both capitals. _95/ As windovr-dressing, the U.S. had asked UN Secretary General U Thant to take whatever steps were necessary to get talks started. He replied in a press conference on the last day of the year that the first step tov/ard negotiations must be an "unconditional" U S. bombing halt. 96/ This evoked little enthusiasm and some annoyance in the Johnson Administration.

Thus, 1966 drew to a close on a sour note for the President. He had just two months before resisted pressure from the military for a major escalation of the war in the North and adopted the restrained approach of the Secretary of Defense, only to have a few inadvertent raids within the Hanoi periphery mushroom into a significant loss of world opinion support. He was in the uncomfortable position of being able to please neither his hawkish nor his dovish critics with his carefully modulated middle course. t

3, 1966 Summary

*

ROLLING THUNDER was a much heavier bombing program in I966 than in I965. There were 1^8,000 total sorties flown in I966 as compared with 55 000 in I965, and 128,000 tons of bombs were dropped as compared with 33 000 in the 10 months of bombing the year before. The number of JCS fixed targets struck, which stood at 158 at the end of 1965? increased to 185, or 27 more, leaving only 57 unstruck out of a list of 2li-2. 97/ Armed reconnaissance, which was still kept out of the northeast q.uadrant at the end of I965, was extended during I966 throughout NVN except for the Hanoi/Haiphong sanctuaries and the China buffer zone, and beginning with ■ROLLING THUI^DER 51 on 6 July was even permitted to penetrate a short way into the Hanoi circle along small selected route segments. Strikes had

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even been carried out against a few "lucrative" POL targets deep within the circles.

The program had also become more expensive. 318 ROLLING THUKDER aircraft were lost during I9665 as compared with I7I in I965 (though the loss rate dropped from ,G6% of attack sorties in I965 to .39^ in 1966). CIA estimated that the direct operational cost of the program (i.e., production costs of aircraft lost, plus direct sortie overhead costs — not including air base or CVA maintenance or logistical support -- plus ordnance costs) came to $1,2^7 million in I966 as compared with $^60 million in I965. 98/

Economic damage to ]WN went up from $36 million in I965 to $9^ million in I9665 and military damage from $3^ million to $36 million As CIA computed it, however, it cost the U.S. $9.6 to inflict $1 worth of damage in I966, as compared with $6.6 in I965.

Estimated civilian and military casualties in WN also went up, from 13,000 to 23-21^,000 (about 80f, civilians), but the numbers remained small relative to the I8 million popula ion. 100/

The program in I966 had accomplished little more than in 1965? however. In January 19^7? an anlaysis by CIA concluded that the attacks had not eliminated any important sector of the NVTT economy or the military establishment. They had not succeeded in cutting route capacities south of Hanoi to the point where the flow of supplies required in SVN was significantly impeded. The POL attacks had eliminated 76^ of ■ JCS-targeted storage capacity, but not until after NVN had implemented a system of dispersed storage, and the POL flow had been maintained at adequate levels. 3^'^ of WN's power-generating capacity had been put out of action, but the remaining capacity was adequate to supply most industrial consiomers. Hundreds of bridges were knocked down, but virtually all of them had been quickly repaired, replaced, or bypassed, and traffic continued. Several thousand freight cars, trucks, barges, and ether vehicles were also destroyed or damaged, but inventories were maintained through imports and there v/as no evidence of a serious transport problem due to equipment shortages. The railroad and highway networks were considerably expanded and improved during the year. lOl /

The main losses to the economy, according to the CIA analysis, had been indirect — due to a reduction in agricultural output and the fish catch, a cut in foreign exchange earnings because of a decline in exports, disruptions of production because of dispersal and other passive defense measures, and the diversion of effort to repair essential transportation facilities. On the military side, damage had disrupted normal military practices, caused the abandonment of many facilities, and forced the widespread dispersal of equipment, but overall military capabilities had continued at a high level. 102/

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The sioininary CIA assessment was that ROLLING- THUMER had not helped either to reduce the flow of supplies South or to shake the will of the North:

The evidence available does not suggest that ROLLING THUNDER to date has contributed materially to the achievement of the two primary objectives of air attack --reduction of the flow of supplies to VC/nVA forces in the South or weakening the will of North Vietnam to continue the insurgency. ROLLING THUNDER no doubt has lessened the capacity of the transport routes to the South — put a lower *cap* on the force levels which North Vietnam can support in the South -- but the 'cap' is well above present logistic supply levels. IO3/

The bombing had not succeeded in materially lowering morale among the people, despite some "war weariness." The leaders continued to repeat in private as well as public that they were willing to withstand even heavier bombing rather than accept a settlement on less than their terms. As to the future:

There may be some degree of escalation which would force the regime to reexamine its position, but we believe that as far as .pressure from air attack is concerned the regime would be prepared to continue the insurgency indefinitely in the face of the current level and type of bombing program. 10V

A key factor in sustaining the will of the regime, according to the CIA analysis, was the "massive" economic and military aid provided by the USSR, China, and Eastern Europe. Economic aid to NVN from these . countries, which ran about $100 million a year on the average prior to the bombing, increased to $150 million in 1965 and $275 million in I966. Military aid was $270 million in I965 and $^55 million in I966. Such aid provided NVN v/ith the "muscle" to strengthen the insurgency in the South and to maintain its air defense and other military forces; and it provided the services and goods with which to overcome NVN's economic difficulties. So long as the aid continued, CIA said, NVN would be able and willing to persevere "indefinitely" in the face of the current ROLLING THUNDER program. 105/

The military view of why ROLLING THUNDER had failed in its objectives in ,1966 was most forcefully given by Admiral Sharp, USCINCPAC, in a briefing for General I^/heeler at Honolulu on January 12, I967. Admiral Sharp described three tasks of the air campaign in achieving ^" j_^g objective of inducing Hanoi to "cease supporting, controlling, and

directing" the insurgency in the South: "(l) reduce or deny external assistance; (2) increase pressures by destroying in depth those resources that contributed most to support the aggression; and (3) harass, disrupt and impede movement of men and m^aterials to South Vietnam." 106/ CINCPAC

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had developed and presented to the Secretary of Defense an integrated plan to perfoi-m these tasks, but much of it had never been approved. Therein lay the cause of whatever failure could be attributed to the bombing in Admiral Sharp's view.

The rest of the briefing was a long complaint about the lack of authorization to attack the Haiphong harbor in order to deny external assistance, and the insignificant number of total sorties devoted to JCS numbered targets (1*5^ of some 81,000 sorties). Nevertheless, CINCPAC was convinced the concept of operations he had proposed could bring the DRV to give up the war if "self-generated US constraints" were lifted in I967. 10?/

Thus, as 1966 drew to a close, the lines were drawn for a long fifteen m.onth internal Administration struggle over whether to stop the bombing and start negotiations. McNamara and his civilian advisers had been disillusioned in I966 with the results of the bombing and held no sanguine hopes for the ability of air power, massively applied, to produce anything but the same inconclusive results at far higher levels of overall hostility and with significant risk of Chinese and/or Soviet intervention. The military, particularly CIRCPAC, were ever more adamant that only civilian imposed restraints on targets had prevented the bombing from bringing the DRV to its knees and its senses about its aggression in the South. The principle remained sound, they argued; a removal of limitations would produce dramatic results. And so 1967 would be the year in which many of the previous restrictions were progressively lifted and the vaunting boosters of air power would be once again proven wrong. It would be the year in which we relearned the negative lessons of previous wars on the ineffectiveness of strategic bombing.

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FOOTNOTES

1. DEF 5517, 29I238Z5 to CINCPAC, COMUSMCV, CINCPACFLT, and CINCPACAF.

2. USAF Historical Division Liaison Office, "USAF Plans and Operations: The Air Campaign Against North Vietnam^ I966."

3. State Circular 2568, 29I3OOZ June I966. k. "Current Foreign Relations/' 6 July I966.

5. Robert S« McNamara Memorandum for Secretaries of the Military Departments J Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Assistant Secretaries of Defense^ Subject: "Southeast Asia Deplo;^anent Plan,"

2 July 1966 (S).

6. Alain Enthoven, ASd/sa, Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, Subject: "Southeast Asia Deployment Plan," 30 June I966 (TS), transmitting the recommended changes and a draft mem.o to the JCS, Services and ASDs. ■ . .

7. McNamara's handwritten and signed changes to the draft mem.o submitted by Alain Enthoven, ASd/sA, ibid.

8. President Lyndon B. Johnson Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, Tuesday, June 28, I966, 5:05 p.m. (s).

9. David L- McDonald, Acting CJCS, MemorandT:im for the Secretary of Defense, JCSM-^50-66, 8 July 1966 (TS); and Robert S. McNamara Memorandum

for the President, Subject: "Schediile of Deployments to South Vietnam," 15 July 1966 (TS). For a full treatment of the troop deployment issue see Task Force paper IV.C.6, "U.S. Ground Strategy and Force Deployment, 1965-1967," (TS-Sensitive). • ' '

10. USAF Historical Division Liaison Office, "USAF Plans and Operations: The Air Campaign Against North Vietnam, I966," op. cit.

11. CINCPAC msg. O8O73OZ July I966 (TS).

12. CINCPAC msg. to JCS 2i|2069Z July I966 (TS).

13. CINCPAC msg. to JCS 081937Z August 1966 (TS); and CINCPAC msg. O8O73OZ July 1966, o£. cit.

ll^ DIA Special Intelligence Suiomary, "NVN POL Status Report," 20 July I966 (TS] IS DIA Special Intelligence Summary, "NVN POL Status Report," 1 August I966.

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16. CINCPAC msg to CINCPACAF OU2059Z September I966 (TS-LIMDIS).

17. Ibid .

18. USAF Historical Division Liaison Office^ "USAF Plans and Operations: The Air Campaign Against North Vietnam, I966."

19. CIA SC 1^0. Ohkk2/67y January 196?? "The Rolling Thunder Program^ Present and Potential Target Systems/*Appendix A-

20. Ibid.

21. SffiE 13-66, "Current Chinese Communist Intentions in the Vietnam Situation," if August I966 (s).

22. KEE lU.3-665 7 July 1966, "North Vietnamese Potential for Fighting in South Vietnam," (TS), p. 12.

23. CIA Intelligence Memorandum No. 1684/66, "North Vietnamese Intentions : and Attitudes Toward the War/' 25 July I966 (s), pp. S-k.

n ,'"^' 2if. See the daily DIA Special Intelligence Summaries, "NVN POL Status — - Report" for July and August I966.

25. Joint CIA/dIA Report, "An Appraisal of the Bombing of North Vietnam through 12 September I966/' (TS).

26. Institute for Defense Analysis Study, IDA TS/HQ66-U9, "The Effects of US Bombing on North Vietnam's Ability to Support Military Operations in South Vietnam and Laos: Retrospect and Prospect," 29 August 1966 (TS), p. 585 emphasis added.

27. USAF Historical Division Liaison Office, "USAF Plans and Operations: The Air Campaign Against North Vietnam, I966."

28. Quoted in the Washington Post, I5 February I967.

29. Roger Fisher, Memorandum, A Barrier Strategy , Draft/I-30-66, in McNaughton Book II, Tab AA (S-Eyes Only).

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^0. Unsigned -'MemorandTarii for the Secretary of Defense, Subject: *A Barrier Strategy'5" dated in pencil in McNaughton's hand I/30/66 with additional pencil note, "copy given to RSI4 3/22/66" (S-Eyes

Only). 31. Ibid^ - ,

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32. Ibid ,

33. JCS msg. 2339/222 to CINCPAC 2k Mar I966 (TS); and JCS msg. 2523O5Z Mar 1966 to CINCPAC (TS).

3lf. CINCPAC msg. to JCS O71925Z April I966 (TS).

35. Prograjn is referred to in DA msg. to COMUSMACV 77^060, l6l456z July

1966 (S).

36- Adam Yarmolinsky (Principle Deputy ISA) Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, 3O March I966.

37. Robert S. McNamara letter to Jerrold Zacharias, I6 April I9665 copies to Kistiakowsky, Kaysen and Wiesner.

38. Robert S. McNamara Memorandum for the Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs, 26 April I966 (s).

39. Institute for Defense Analyses Report, IDA TS/hq66-^95 "The Effects

of US Bombing on North Vietnam's Ability to Support Military Operations in South Vietnam and Laos: Retrospect and Prospect/^ 29 August I966 (TS), pp. V"Viii.

kO. Ibid ., pp. 10-11.

kl. Ibid., pp. 12-13. . '

1|2. Ibid ., pp. 37-38.

I13. Ibid. , p. 39.

kk. Ibid. , pp. ii5-^6.

U5. Institute for Defense Analyses, JASON Division, Study S-255 (TS), August 1966, "Air-Supported Anti-Infiltration Barrier," pp. 2-6.

k6. Ibid,, p. 7-

kl, Robert S. McNamara Mem.orandum for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of

Staff, Subject: "Proposal for Barrier Systems," 3 September I966 (s).

1[8. JCS msg. 1975 to CINCPAC, O72155Z September I966 (TS); JCS msg. 2l60 to CINCPAC, O823O7Z September I966 (s); and CM-1732-66, 8 September

1966 (S).

k9. CINCPAC msg. to JCS I3O7O5Z Septem.ber I966 (TS) .

•^0 CINCPAC msg. to field comm^ands, O5205O September I966 (TS).

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51. Robert S. McNamara Memoranduin for Lieutenant General Alfred D, Starbird^ 15 September I966 (s).

52. Defense msg. ^2^^, from SecDef to AmEmbassy Saigon, 02l801Z October

1966 (S).

53. JCSM"6i+6-66, 7 October I966 (TS).

54. SecDef's Saigon Trip, October I9665 CF-5^^ Tab C.

55. Robert S. McNamara Memorandiom for the President, Subject: "Actions Recommended for Vietnam," 1^1 October I966 (TS), A note at the end of the memo states, "Mr. Katzenbach and I have disctissed many of its (the memo's) main conclusions and recommendations — in general, but not in particulars, it expresses his views as well as my own."

56. See Task Force paper IV.C.8 for a detailed examination of the back-^ ground and decision on Program #U-

57. Ibid .

58. Ibid . '

59. Ibid .

60. JCSM-672-66, Ik October I966 (TS).

61. Ibid .

62. Ibid.

63. George A. Carver, Jr., Memorandum for the Director, CIA, Subject: "Comments on Secretary McNamara's Trip Report," I5 October I966 (TS). A pencil note in the margin in McNam^ara's hand says, "prepared by Dick at my request."

• 6h. Ibid . ,,,■..'.

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I i 65. Ibid.

(■' 66. John T. McNaughton, ASD/iSA, Memorandum for Secretary McNamara,

Subject: "McNaughton in Manila, October 23-25, I966," 26 October I966 (S-Eyes Only); with a copy of the Manila Communic[ue annotated in McNaughton's hand attached.

67. Ibid, quoted in the McNaughton memo.

68. Ibid., a^ioted in the McNaughton memo.

69. Ihid*

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70. JCSM-667-66, 15 October I966 (TS); reg.uests an increase in B-52 sorties from 6OO to 8OO per month beginning in February 196?. Tiie Chief 1 also noted they had a proposal for foiT^ard basing the B-52s under study and would forward a recommendation later.

71. Memo to ¥a:. Vance, I8 October 1966, signed ^^ACG" (Col Abbot C. Greenleaf, military assistant to the Deputy Secretary) with a summary of McNamara's views of an attached JCS study of attrition

■ factors.

72. CINCPAC letter to JCS 3OIO, Ser: OQOh'^^, 20 October I966, Subject: "Calendar Year I966 and I967 Force Req.uirements/Capabilities Programs," in three volumes (TS).

73. Ibid .;, Vol. II, p. 1. ■ i^. Ibid. 5 Vol. I5 p. C-2.

75. See above, p.

76. CINCPAC letter 3010, op. cit., p. B-7.

77. JCSM-702-66, ^ November I966 (TS) with appendices A-C, p. B-1. ■ 78. Ibid ., p. A-1.

79. Ibid. ■ • .

80. Robert S. McNamara Memorandum for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Subject: "CINCPAC Additional CY I966 and CY I967 Force Requirements," 6 October I966 (TS), with appendix.

81. JCSM-702-66, op. cit.. Annex C, p. 68.

82. Ibid ., p. 70-

83. Robert S. McNamara Memorandum for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs -of Staff, Subject: "Deployments to Southeast Asia," 11 November I966

(TS).

Qlj.. For a complete treatment of the issues and background to the Program

M\ decision on ground forces see Task Force paper IV.C. 8 (TS-Sensitive).

85. Chairman's Memoranda to the Secretary of Defense, CM-1770-66, 22 September 1966 (TS)j CM-179^-66, 29 September I966; and 201^-66, 22 December

1966 (S).

h 86 Draft Memorandum for the President (For Comment), Subject: "Recom-

^ ^ ■ * mended FY67 Southeast Asia Supplemental Appropriation," 17 Nov. I966

(rji3) pp. 13-lif, in McNaughton Book VII5 Tab Q.

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87. rbid.

88. Authorized in RT-^2, November 12, I966.

89. Information on both targets is in CINCPAC Command History - 1966 , Vol. II, pp. 5OU-5O5 (TS).

90. Ibid >, and New York Times , Dec. I3, 1^;, I6, 1?, I966.

91. Kraslow and Toory, The Secret Search for Peace in Vietnam , (Random House, NY, I968), p.

92. See the New York Times , December 25, I966 - January 30, I967.

93. New York Times, Jan. 1, I967.

9lf. JCSI^^x-727-66, 22 November I966 (s).

95. New York Times , December 9, I966.

96. New York T imes , January 1, 1967-

97. CIA.SC No. Okkk2/67:, "The Rolling Thunder Program Potential Target Systems," January 1967-

— Present and

98. Ibid . •

99. Ibid .

100. Ibid .

101. Ibid .

102. Ibid.

103. Ibid. 10k. Ibid.

105. Ibid.

106. CINCPAC Command History - 1966 , op . cit ., vol. II, p. 5II

107. Ibid., pp. 511-51^-

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