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These agency views were^ however, read and assessed by the working group and^ although they were not furnished to the President, they were part of the background of the deliberative process. It would be mis-leading, therefore, to say that they were not considered or had no influence on the decisions taken. In any case, they provided some sense of the ideas and alternatives being considered and debated during these few frantic days of late February - early March, I968.

The CIA furnished three papers which v/ere considered in the reassessment. The first, dated 26 February I968, was prepared for the Director of Central Intelligence prior to the formation of the Task Group. Entitled "The Outlook in Vietnam," this paper stated the following conclusion:

We believe that the Comjnunists will sustain a high level of military activity for at least the next tv/o or three months. It is difficuJLt to forecast the situation which v;ill then obtain, given the nujnber of unknowable factors which will figure- Our best estimate is as follows:

a. The least likely outcome of the present phase

is that the Comjuunist side will expend its resources to such an extent as to be incapable thereafter of preventing steady advances by the US/gW.

b. Also unlikely, though considerably less so, is that the GVN/aRVN will be so critically weakened that it can play no further significant part in the military and political prosecution of the struggle.

c. More likely than either of the above is that the present push will be generally contained, but with severe losses to both the GW and Communist forces, and that a period vail set in during which neither will be capable of registering decisive gains. 20/

The second CIA paper, dated 29 February, was entitled "Communist Alternatives in Vietna^m." T\'/o main military a.lternatives were identified, as follows:

a, maintain widespread military pressure in Vietnam at least for the next several months;

b. increase the level of military pressures by one or m-ore of the following measures:

(1) commuting all of their reserves from NVN, tejitam-ount to an all-out invasion, to gain decisive results as cLuickly as possible;

(2) committing two or three additional divisions;

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(3) seeking one major battle which promised significant political gains.

(h) expanding current efforts in Laos. 2l/

Based on this analysisj Communist intentions were assessed as follows:

The Communists probably intend to maintain widespread military pressures in Vietnam for at least the next several months. A special effort will be made to harass urban areas and keep them under threat. They will probably calculate that the US/CtVN V7ill be forced to defend the towns and the countryside will be left more vulnerable to Communist domination. At some timeJ new Communist attacks will probably be launched to seize and hold certain cities and towns. Where conditions appear favorable they will engage US forces, seeking some significant local success which would have a major political return. The total result of their campaign, they hope, wil3- be to so strain the resources of the US and the GW/aRW, that the Saigon government will lose control of much of the country and the US will have little choice but to settle the war on Comiaunist terms. 22/

The third CIA paper, submitted on 1 March 1968, attempted to answer specific questions posed by the Secretary of Defense in his initial m.eeting v/ith his senior working group on 2$ February. Pertinent qviestions and the CIA a.ssessmient are listed below:

Q. "What is the likely course of events in South Vietnam over the next 10 months, assuming no change in U.S. policy or force levels?

A. In the assumed circiimstances a total military victory by the Allies or the Communists is highly unlikely in the next 10 raonths. It is manifestly imx)Ossible for the Ccnmiuj:iists to drive U.S. forces out of the country. It is equally out of the question for US/gVI^ forces to clear South Vietnam of Comiaunist forces. It is possible, hovrever, that the overall situatiozi in this period will take a decisive turn.

We think it unlikely that this turn could be in the US/gW favor....We see no evidence yet that the GVN/aPVN will be inspired to seise the initiative, go over to the attack, exploit the Coimnunist vulnerabilities, and quickly regain the rural areas.. We doubt they have the v/ill and capability to make the effort.

Far more likely is an erosion of the ARVlT's morale and effectiveness. We do not believe that the GVK will collapse, or that the ARVN vjill tptally disintegrate. But

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' there is a fairly good chance that Coimnunist presssures

I ! • will result in a serious v?eakening of the GW/ARVE" apparatus

and an end to its effective functioning in parts of the country. In these circumstances, virtually the entire burden of the war would fall on US forces.

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In sum, there is a high risk that both the ARVDJ and GVN will be seriously weakened in the next months, and perhaps decisively so. Our best estimate is that in the assumed circumstances the overall situation 10 months hence v/ill be no better than a standoff.

Q. What is the likely Communist reaction to a change in US strategy tovrard greater control over population centers, v/ith or v/ithout increased forces?

A. In general the Communists would view this move as a success for their strategy. Their tactical response in such circumstances would depend mainly on the nature of US enclaves. If these v;"ere fairly large and embraced much of the outlyiiig countryside, the Communists v/ould believe them to be porous enough to infiltrate and harass, much as they are doing now.- If the defensive perimeters were fairly solid, however, the Communists would not try to overrun them in frontal assaults. Instead, they would concentrate for a time on consolidating the countryside and isolating the various defended enclaves, in particular interdicting supply lines and forcing the US to undertake expensive supply movements from out of country. A Communist-controlled regime with a "coalition" facade wo-old be set up in "liberated" areas and attempts at terrorist activity inside the enclaves would be undertaken. Hanoi would hope that a combination of military and political pressiure, together with the dim prospect for achievement of the original US aims in the Vietnam struggle, would eventually persuade the US to extricate itself through negotiations.

Q. VJhat is the likely WA/vC strategy over the next 10 months if US forces are increased by 50,000, by 100,000, or by 200,000? ■ .

A. We vfould expect the Communists to continue the war. They still have resources available in North Vietnam and v/ithin South Vietnam to increase their troop strength. Their

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strong logistical effort and their ability to orga,nise and exploit the people under their control in the South enable them to counter US increases by smaller increases of their own. Over a ten-month period the Communists would probably be able to introduce sufficient new units into the South to offset the US maneuver battalion increments of the various force levels given above. 23/

These CIA assessments, then, painted very bleak alternatives for U.S. policynakers. If U.S. policy and force levels did not change, there was a high risk that ARVN and the GYN would be seriously weakened, perhaps decisively so. The US would assume the m.ajor burden of the v:ar, and the situation w^ould be no better than a standoff. If U.S. forces were increased by as much as 100,000, the Communists would probably be able to introduce sufficient new units in the South to offset this increase. If the U.S. changed its strategy toward greater control over population centers, with or without increased forces, the Communists would adjust their strategy so as to preclude the achievement of U.S. aim.s.

In his various papers for the Working Group, Assistant Secretary of State William Bimdy attempted a deliberate approach. He furnished one paper which outlined alternative courses of action which he considered ■ deserved serious consideration. 2k/ Another paper outlined a checklist

"to serve as a rough guide to the papers that need preparation under a * ' systematic code." 25/

The alternative courses listed by Mr. Bundy were:

a. Accept the V/heeler/vfestmoreland recommendation aimed at sending roughly 100,000 men by 1 May and another 100,000 men by the end of I968.

b. Change our military strategy, reducing the areas and places we seek to control and concentrating far more heavily on the protection of populated areas. ■

c. Adopt option b above in the south, but extend our bombing and other m.ilitary actions against the North to try to strangle the v/ar there and put greater pressure on Hanoi in this area.

d. Accept imiuediately those elements of the vn:ieeler/ Westm.oreland proposals that could hope to affect the situation favorably oYer the next four months or so, but do not go beyond that in terms of force plans and related actions.

e. "Cut and shave" the VTheeler/Westmoreland proposals and their action implications, but carry on basically in accordance with present strategy.

f. "A-ll-out option." 'Announce that we were prepared to hold in Vietnam no matter what developed." 26/

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The Department of State also prepared papers on the following subjects: _ •

a. Introductory Paper on Key Elements in the Situation 27/

b. Probable Soviet^ Chinese, Western European Reactions 28/

c. Ambassador Thom-pson's Cable on Soviet Reactions to Possible U.S. Government Courses of Action 29 /

d. European and Other Non-Asian Reactions to Major Force Increases 30/

e. Asian Reaction to a Major U.S. Force Increase 31/

f. Options on our Negotiating Posture 32/

These papers were presented to the Clifford Group a.t the meeting on 3 March I968. However, as will be seen, they were CLuickly overtaken by the rapidly moving situation and, with the exception of the paper on negotiating options, did not figure in the final memorandum which was forvmrded to the President on ^l- March.

General Max^^ell Taylor's paper on alternative courses of action is of greater interest in that it was furnished both to the Clifford Working Group and to the t^Jhite House directly through General Taylor's capacity as Military Advisor to the President. Although it is not known what weight was given to this paper, it was received by the President even prior to the Memorandum from the Clifford Group, and thereby could have gained som.e special v/eight in the deliberations of the President.

After a brief listing of the U.S. objectives in SVN, General Taylor concluded that, since there v/as no serious consideration being given at the moment to adding to or subtracting from our present objective, the discussion should be limited to considerations of alternative strategies and programs to attain that objective. 33/

General Taylor concluded that, basically, our government had only two choices:

a. We can tell General Westmoreland that he must make do with'"his present forces in Viet-Nam and ask him to report to us V7hat he is capable of accom.plishing therev/ith. This would be an invitation to him to cut back sharply upon the military objectives he has defined in his latest Combined Campaign-Plan (1968). Alternatively, while making this decision to provide no further forces, we could give new strategic guidance to General Westmoreland which would assist him in establishing the priorities for his efforts necessary to bring his mission within capabilities of the forces allotted

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"b- The other "broad alternative is to increase his present force's by. some amount varying from less than his figure of 205,000 and ranging up to the full amount. Also in this case, we might well consider giving h±m. revised strategic guidance in the light of what we have learned from the Tet offensive and its sequel-

General Taylor thus indicated that in the reassessment of our strategy, the government would be req.uired to answer the follov/ing q.uestions:

(1) Do v;e decide at this time to send any additional reinforcements to General Westmoreland?

(2) If the answer is affinnative, should vie agree to send all or part of the 205,000 requested by General Westmoreland?

(3) Whether the response is affirmative or negative, should we send General Westmoreland nevz strategic guidance, hoping to limit further demands on U.S. military manpower?

(k) VJhat Strategic Reserve should be retained in the U.S. in the foregoing situations?

General Taylor then listed some of the political considerations of the military course of action decided upon. He listed the follov/ing political actions as worth considering in connection vjith any decision on reinforcement :

(1) A renev/ed offer of negotiation, possibly x^ith a private comjnunication that we v/o"ald suspend the bombing for a fixed period v;ithout making the tim.e limitation public if we V7ere assured that productive negotiations would start before the end of the period.

(2) A public announcement that we would adjust the bombing of the North to the level of intensity of enemy ground action in the South.

(3) As a prelude to sharply increased bombing levels, possibly to include the closing of Haiphong, a statement of our intentions made necessary by the enemy offensive against the cities and across the frontiers.

(if) Announcement of the withdrawal of the. San Antonio foiTnuJLa in viev/ of the heightened level of aggression conducted by North Viet-Nam..

(5) Keep silent.

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In choosing among these alternatives. General Taylor argued that the present military situation in South Vietnam argued strongly against a new negotiation effort or any thought of reducing the bombing of the North. He further argued that, in any case^ v/e would appear well-advised to withdraw from the San Antonio formula.

Thus5 he concluded, there seemed to be at least three program-packages worth serious consideration. They were:

Package A

a. No increase of General Westmoreland's forces in South Viet-Nam..

b. New strategic guidance.

c. Build-up of Strategic Reserve.

d. No negotiation initiative-

e. Withdrawal of San Antonio formula.

f. Pressure on GVN to do better.

Package B

a. Partial acceptance of General Westmoreland's recommendation.

b. New strategic guidance.

c. Build-up of Strategic Reserve:

d. No negotiation initiative.

e. Withdrawal of San Antonio formula.

f. Pressure on GYE to do better.

Package C a.. Approval of General Westmoreland's full request. b- New strevtegic guidance.

c. Build-up of Strategic Reserve.

d. No negotiation initiative.

e. Withdrawal of San Antonio formula and announcement of "" intention to close Haiphong.

f. Pressure on GVN to do better.

g. Major effort to rally the homefront.

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The working group within ISA had access to all of these documents. In addition^ and at the request of the vzorking group, other papers were prepared within the Department of Defense by the Assistant Secretary (Systems Analysis) and the Assistant Secretary (Pu-hlic Affairs).

Initially, Systems Analysis undertook a capability study in order to-determine if the MACV requirement could indeed be met. They concluded that, with the exception of Army aviation units, the MACV manpovj^er request could be filled essentially as desired. This could even be done, the analysis concluded, without changing the one-year tour policy, without drawing down on Europe, and without widespread second tours with less than 24 months in COKUS. This assumed a reserve recall, added funds, and the required strength increases.

Our maximum capability would be to provide 6 maneuver battalions in May, 9 itiore in June, 9 in July and as many as 6 more in August — faster than the MACV request. These units v/ould have the necessary artillery, transportation and engineer support. Added tactical air units could deploy on a matching schedule.

The only significant shortfall irould be in Army Aviation. ^ Even v/ith a reserve recall, present deployment schedules cannot

,_ be significantly accelerated. Production limitations are such

that at least one year \'70uld be required to increase the output of UIi-l/AF-1 helicopters. Thus, it would be mid-1969 before any added aviation units could deploy and mid-1971 before the total MACV requirement could be met- 3^/

This SA paper also considered several other deployment options^ as follows: cut 50,000 from present authorization; no increase in current authorization; increase by 50,000; increase by 100,000; increase by 200,000. The imits required under all these options, it was concluded, could deploy to Vietnejn in a m^atter of months. The 50,000 man package could arrive in May and Jtine; the 100,000 man package by August; and the full 200,000 (with minor exceptions) by December, The principal exceptions under all options would continue to be A.rm.y aviation units. A sumjnary of the various options considered is shown below:

Optional Deployments

A B £ . 2 1 Cut Current Add Add Add 50,000 Plan 50,000 100,000 200,000

Total U.S. personnel ^185,000 535,000 585,000 635,000 631,000

U,S. Maneuver Bns IO3 112 II8 124 133

Artillery Bns 68 72 77 83 92

^^ Tac Air Sqds ^1+ ^5 51 56 60

( ■ Annual cost $23 Bil. $25' Bil. $28 Bil. $30 Bil. $35 Bil.

Reserve Recall " ." 65,000 200,000 250,000 35/

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other papers prepared by Systems Analysis during this period were furnished to the ISA working group upon their req.uest. Indeed, the subject matter and thrust of these papers indicated fairly early the bias of the people preparing them as well as the direction in v^hich the reassessment of U.S. strategy v/as moving, at least within the working group in ISA.

Papers were also furnished concerning pacification^ costs and probable results of alternative U.S. strategies in South Vietnam, the status of RWAF, problems of inflation, and data for analysis of strategies. Tlie main thrust of most of these papers was that "more of the same" in South Vietnam would not achieve decisive results and, indeed, would not be satisfactory. The paper on pacification indicated that:

Hamlet Evaluation System (HES) reports for CY I967 indicate that pacification progressed slowly during the first half of 1967, and lost ground in the second half. Most (60%) of the 1967 gain results from accounting type changes to the HSS system, not from pacificaption progress; hamlet additions and deletions, and revised population estimates accounted for half of the January-June increase and all of the June-Decem.ber increase- In the area that really counts--VC-D-E hamlets rising to A-B-C ratings--we actually suffered a net loss of 10,100 people between June and December I967. 36 /

Based on General Wheeler's statement in his report to the President, that "to a large extent the VC now control the countryside," the paper concluded that "the enemy's current offensive appears to have killed the program once and for all."'37/

In analyzing the status of RVM.F, the Systems Analysis paper concluded:

Highest priority must be given to getting RVKAF moving. In the short run re-equipping the Vietnamese and helping them regain their combat power insures that we can prevent unnecessary loss should the enemy attack the cities or put pressure there while hitting Khe SanJh. Further, present US force coinmitments mean that only a recizperated RVMF will permit release of US units for other missions and accomplish any objectives in pacification. Finally, restoration of security in the cities in conjunction with the National Police is a major new mission I for R\nSAF which requires forces.

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VJhat can we do? There are many indications that the manpower situation is worse than reported. Every effort must be made to determine hov; many deserters there are and to approach them. Rounding up trained manpower delinquent in returning from Tet w^ill help. US advisors ca^n pressure the JGS to upgrade selected RF/PF into ARVMin addition to measures already

initiated by RWI/iF.

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COMUSmcV must identify weak EVMF -units. Ill Corps need special study and preparation of revised contingency plans. Priority on reinanning, re-eq.uipping and retraining must be given to the RVimF elite units (V]>MG) vrhich constitute the general reserve. COMUSI-l^CV must plan for the use of thj.s reserve and earmarked US units to defect VC attack of weak RVIMF units during the interim period.

RVLIAF modernization should take precedence over equipping all US forces except those deploying to the combat zone. The remaining 82^000 Ml6 rifles must be delivered ASAP. It is also in the US interest to equip the RF/PF with Ml6s before equipping the US training base, which is already programraed.

Lastly, COJCFSMCV must m.ake decisions about what missions RVMF need not accomplish now. RVRAF is stretched too thin given its past and expected missions. It alone cannot protect the cities and hold the countryside where it is still deployed. Decision is needed to permit the build-up of v/eak units and better integrated use of US and RVMF against whatever enemy scenario develops. 38/

The paper entitled "Alternate Strategies" painted a bleak picture of American failure in Vietnaja:

We lost our offensive stance because we never achieved the momentujn essential for military victory. Search and Destroy operations can^t build this kind of momentum and the RVMF was not pushed hard enough. We becajne mesmerized by statistics of known doubtful validity;, choosing to place our faith only in the ones that showed progress. We judged ' the enemy's intentions rather than his capabilities because

we trusted captured documents too much. We were not alert to the perils of tim.e lag and spoofing. In short5 our setbacks were due to wishful thinking com.pounded by a massive intelligeiice collection and/or evaluation failure.

Indeed., in examining U.S. objectives in SYN, the picture of failure was - ma.nifest:

Since the original conmiitm-ent of large US forces in 1965? our stated objectives have been to:

■ (1) Make it as difficult and costly as possible for WN to continue effective support of the VC and cause IJW to cease its direction of the VC insurgency.

f^ (\'Jhile we have raised the price to KVN of aggression a-nd .

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support of the VC, it shovrs no lack of capability or will to match each new US escalation. Our strategy of "attrition" has not worked. Adding 206,000 more US men to a force of 525,000, gaining only 27 additional maneuver battalions and 270 tactical fighters at an added cost to the US of $10 billion per year raises the q.uestion of who is making it costly from whom-)

(2) Extend GVN dominion, direction and control over SVN.

(This objective can only be achieved by the GVN through its political and economic processes and with the indispensable support of an effective RWAF. The TET offensive demonstrated not only that the US had not provided an effective shield, it also demonstrated that the GVN and RVTTAF had not made real progress in pacification — the essential first step along the road of extending GVi^F dominion^ direction and control.)

(3) Defeat the VC and MA forces in SW and force their v/ithdrawal. (The TET offensive proves we were further from this goal than we thought. How much further remains

to be seen.)

(k) Deter the Chinese Communists from direct intervention in SEA.. (This we have done successfully so fa.r; however, greatly increased U.S. forces may becom.e coimter-productive.)

We know that despite a massive influx of 500,000 US troops, 1.2 million tons of bom.bs a year, ^00,000 attack sorties per year, 200,000 enemy KTA in three years, 20,000 US KIA, etc., our control of the countryside and the defense of the urba.n areas is now essentially at pre-August I965 levels. We have achieved stale-m.ate at a high comjaitment. A nev? strategy must be sought. 39 /

Several alternative strategies were briefly discussed and all but one were q.uickly dismissed as being unlikely to bring success:

(1) No cha nge b ut increase the resources .

This strategy alternative is implicit in the recominenda-

tions of mCV and CJCS In brief, the MCV and CJCS recomjnenda-

tions are for additional forces to regair this ground lost since January, 1968. Nothing is said as to whether still more US • forces will be req.uired to finish the job. Another payment on an open-ended conmiitment is req.uested.

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(2) Widen the War >

Adoption of tliis alternative would re-q.uire more forces than are now teing considered and it runs farther risks of involving China and the USSR. The course of events already set in motion could lead to adoption of this alternative; increasing US forces in SVN would undoubtedly increase 'the possibilities of it. And the option is open fcr North '^ Korea or other aggressive countries to test our will elsewhere. '

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(3) Opt Out of the v7ar .

The price of q.uitting now would include the undermining of our other commitments world-wide^ bitter dissension at home, and a probable resurgence of active Chinese-USSR territorial aggrandizements.

Before TET we could have done this with less risk than j now.

I W Resuscitate GVN and RVKAF .

This option is to return to the concept of a GVN war with US assistance instead of the present situation of a US war with dubious GVN assistance.

Adoption of this alternative requires:

(sl) a solid commitment to a US force ceiling.

■ This'^coimnitment must be communicated to the highest levels

. of GVM/RVMF and our own military leaders.

(b) A skillful conditioning of US and world opinion to the limited US commitment to the South Vietnamese war and to our right of withdrawal if GVU/rVKAF determination or perfozmance wavers.

(c) A statement that the US objective in SVN is to develop the GVN capability to defeat the VC and NVA forces in SVN and force their withdrawal, ko/

The remaining Systems Analysis paper cited statistics to show that, in the past, the North Vietnamese had been able to match the U.S. buildup j J in SVN wit±L their own buildup. Also statistics were used to project the

cost to the U.S. in casualties resulting from various deployment options and various strategies on the ground. These projections showed that a I fc"" shift to a population control strategy which was unchallenged by the enemy ' ' ■ would stabilize casualty rates, as some \mits would be underemployed. Ul/

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The paper prepared by the Assista.nt Secretary of Defense (Pablic Affairs) was entitled "Possible Pablic Reaction to Various Alternatives." Five alternative options were examined:

1. Increased mobilization and deployment. This includes sending General Westmoreland 50^000 to 200,000 more troops and the additional moves this would require at home -- calling reserves5 extending enlistments, extra expenditures, bigger tax bill; etc.

2. Increased mobilization/deploym.ent plus expanded bombin

of North Vietnam.

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3. Increased mobilization/deployment plus'a bom^bing pause.

h. Denial of the Westmoreland requests and continuation of the war "as is" — as it was being fought prior to the Tet

offensive and Khe Sanh.

5- Denial of the Westmoreland requests and a change in war-fighting policy vrith greater concentration on defending populated areas and less on search-and-destroy in unpopulated areas. This would include an announced prograjn to begin ) troop withdrawal eX a fixed date. k2./

The Assistant Secretary, Mr. Goulding, emphasized that all options were being examined from a public reaction standpoint only. He also emphasized that no action would unite the country. The question to be ■ attacked was which option will most coalesce supporters and most Isolate the opposition.

In analyzing the various options above, Mr. Moulding divided the public into havzks, doves, and middle-of-the-roaders. Under Option 1, he argued, increased m.obilization and deployment m_oves, vrithout other nev; actions:

...will make the doves unhappy because we become more

and more eiimeshed in the v/ar. They will m.ake the hawks unhappy beca^use we still vzill be withholding our military strength, particularly in the North. And the middle-of-

I I the-roaders who basically support the President out of

conviction 'or patriotism will be unhappy because they will

* ' see the ante going up in so many v/ays and stil3. will not

be given a victory date, a progress report they can believe or an argument they can accept that a,ll of this i.s in the national interest. (Further, they will read in the dissezit columns and'editorials that l8 months from now, when the Worth Vietnamese have added 30,000 more troops, we will be

j ^ '^ right back v/here we started.)

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^" ThuSj public reaction to this option would be extremely negative, and

vrould become increasingly so as the deployment numbers, the financial costs^ and the life-disrujjting actions increase.

The next two options, Mr. Goulding indicated, should be considered together since, from a public affairs standpoint, the decision to deploy additional troops of any significant number must be accompanied by some "new" move. The two options discussed were deplo;yT:nent plus expanded bombing of the North, and increased mobilization plus a bombing pause.

The first course, Goulding concluded,would elicit more support in I t the country than does the present course.

This course would clearly bring aboard more hav;ks and further isolate the doves. It would also make the v/ar much ' easier to accept by the middle-of-the-roaders. It v/ould help \mite the country. Some fence sitters, hovzever, would be added to those who already view the war as an unforgiveable sin. I think the campus and "liberal" reaction would sur-pa.ss anything we have seen.

The other option envisioned continuing to fight as we are in the I south, strengthening General Westmoreland with part or all of his request,

and coupling these moves with a visible "peace" campaign based upon a J cessation of the bombing in the Horth. This course, Go^olding concluded:

.♦.would alienate those who take the hardest line.

We would be adding much to our cost, both by the extra I deployment and the military price paid for the pause,

. without receiving any immediate or concrete results. If

the Communists took advantage of the bomi.bing halt, the ■ •

hav/ks and many of the military would react strongly....

The doves, of course, would enthusiastically endorse the

pause and V70uld immediately begin pleading and praying

that it be continued long enough to explore every possible

and conceivable corridor... .Additionally, the doves V70uld

deplore the e>ctra deployments. They would complain that

the pause v/as not unlimited or unconditional- They would

argue that the deployments plus the failure to be "uncon '

ditional" detracted from, the effort. This two-pronged

approach -- strengthen but seek negotiation -- would give

new confidence to the m-iddle-of-the-roaders. They would

applaud thfe goverriment for doing "something" different,

for seeking a way O'ut of the quagmire. They would be

more i^atient than the hawks to give the pause a chance,

and less disturbed than the doves at the m^obilization.

For them, it could be a way out -•- and even a "could be"-

is better than the frustration they now feel....The deploy/ ^ • pause option would be more favorably received by the nation 1 than the deploy/escale^^te Worth, since it would, in the public . '

mind, offer more hope of a'n eventual solution to the war. • j

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The fourth option;, denial of" the Westmoreland rec[uest and continue the vzar "as is/' wouJ.d please no one^ according to Mr. Goulding. The hawks (and the military) would protest vehemently. They would b'e less satisfied, and the doves v/ould be no more satisfied by this failure to take nev7 initiatives tovrard peace. However, Mr. Goulding concluded, since fevzer people would be affected by this course than by Option One, and therefore it would be preferable to that Option.

The advantages of Option Five - denial of General Westmoreland's requests and a change in strategy in South Vietnam -- from a public affairs standpoint were oven-;helming, the paper concluded.

....The pain of additional deployments, Reserve callups, increased draft calls, increased casualties, extended toiors would be eliminated. The hazards of bombing escalation would be eliminated. The dangers of a bombing pause would be eliminated. The frustration of more-and-more-and-more into the endless pit would be eliminated. l*Jhat the people want most of all is some sign that we are m.aking progress, that there is, somev/here, an end. VJliile this does not necessarily show progress, it does show change. It does show the search for new approaches....It would prevent the middle-of-the-roaders from joining the doves. While the doves want a pause, I would think they would prefer this to deplo;y7rLent-m-obilization plus pause. VJhile the hawks want to escalate in the North, most of them, (not all) also want an end to increased ground strength in the South. ■I believe that we would be successfal in getting members of Congress to make speeches in support of this.

In summary, then, and strictly from a public reaction standpoint, Mr. Goulding noted the options as follows:

Acceptable: Only #5 -- Denial of requests and a change in policy in the South.

Most acceptable of the others: #3 — Deploy and pause.

Next most acceptable: #2 -- Deploy and expand Air

■ War North.

Next m.ost acceptable: ffk -- Deny Westmoreland and continue as is.

Most objectionable; #1 -- Deploy and continue as is, north and south. U3/

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If. Drafting a Kemorandujn

There is, of course, no way of knowing hov; much consideration and weight vzere given to each of these papers by the small group of action officers in the Pentagon who were, in the last analysis, charged V7ith digesting all of these factors, considerations, and views and actually drafting the reassessment of U.S. strategy required by the President of his new Secretary of Defense. The predilections of these drafters, perhaps were hinted at by the subject matter of the backup papers prepared at their specific req.uest and summarized above.

By 29 February, this group had produced an initial draft of a memorandum for the President which examined the situation in SVN *'in light of U.S. political objectives and General Westmoreland's request for additional troops, as stated in General Tarheeler's report." kk/

This draft was slightly revised by senior officers in ISA and apparently was discussed within the Defense Establishiment on 1 March, k^ /

This paper began with an assessment of the current situation in South Viet Nam and a discussion of the prospects over the next 10 months. Quoting Genera.1 VJheeler's report, the draft m^emorandum indicated that the most im_por-tant VC goal in the winter-spring offensive was the takeover of the countryside. In many parts of the country, it V7as stated, they may have already ^ succeeded in achieving this goal.

The 'main event' thus is still to come, not in a one-night offensive but in a week-by-week expulsion of GW presence and influence from the rural areas, showing up on the pacification maps as a 'red tide' flowing up to the edges of the province and district tov/ns, and over some of them. hG /

Although kWE held up well under initial assaults, the ISA memorandum concluded that they would not soon move out of their defensive posture around the cities and towns. They would, in the future, challenge the VC offensively much less than before.

In the new, more dangerous envirorxaent to come about in the countryside, and as currently led, motivated, and influenced at the top, AEW is even less likely than before to ■ buckle dov/n to the crucial offensive job of chasing district companies and (with U.S. help) provincial battalions. In that environment, informers will claia up, or be killed; the VC will ffet m-ore information and cooperation, the GVN less; officials and police will be much less willing to act on information or VC suspects and activities. 4?/

The memorandum w^as even more pessmistic concerning the future direction "- ■ and abilities of the South Vietnam.ese Govermaent, and read rriore into the TET

offensive than had been noted there by other observers.

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It is unlikely that the GVN will rise to the challenge. It will not move toward a Government of National Union. Current arrests of oppositionists further isolate and discredit it, and possibly foreshadov; the emasculation of the Assembly and the undoing of all promising political developments of the past year. Fu-rthenaore, it is possible that the recent offensive was facilitated by a newly friendly or apathetic urban environment^ and a broad low-level cooperative organization tha,t had not existed on the same scale before. If, in fact, the attacks reflect new VC opportunities and capability in the cities, then the impact of the attacks themselves, the overall military response, and the ineffective G"^/TI political response may still further im-prove the VC cause in the cities, as v/ell as in the countryside. Even if the political makeup of the GYN should change for the better, it may well be that VC penetration in the cities has now gone or will soon go too far for real non-communist political mobilisation to develop. J48/

Based upon this bleak assessmient of the future of the Govermnent and Army of South Vietnam, the ISA draft memorandutn undertook to exaraine alternative military strategies. Two such strategies v/ere to be com.pared, the current one and an alternative vrhich emphasized population secujrity. (Actually, only one was analyzed in detail*) The two strategies were'to be compared at current force levels and with added increments of 50,000, 150,000 and 200,000.

In analyzing ou-r cvirrent strategy, the memorandum undertook a review of how our strategy in Vietnam evolved. At the time U.S. forces were first committed in South Vietnam in early 19^5; the draft Presidential memorandum indicated, the political situation was a desperate one. There wa,s imminent danger of a North Vietnamese-controlled seizure of power in SVN and the imposition of a communist regime by force. Thus, the imj:nediate objective of the U.S. was a military one--to arrest this trend and to deny to the NTA/VC the seizure of political control by force.

Once U.S. forces were committed in increasingly large numbers, however, the military and political situation began to improve significa,ntly. By the end of I966, our initial military objective had been achieved--no longer was it'possible for MN to impose its will upon SVIM by force. By this time, however our military objectives had been expanded at the expense of our political objectives.

In the absence of political directives limiting the goals to be attained by U.S. military force, our objectives became:

a. To m.ake it as difficult and costly as possible for I^TVN to continue effective support of the VC and to cause NVN to cease direction of the insurgency.

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b. To defeat the VC and NVA forces in SVW and force the v/ithdrawal of IWM forces

c. To extend GW control over all of SW.

Indeed^ in asking for increased forces. General l\Tieeler and General

Westmoreland described their current tasks as follows:

a. Security of Cities and Government. b- Secujrity in the Countryside.

c. Defense of the Borders^ the DMZj and the Northern Province-

d. Offensive Operations. Ug/

The question to be answered, then, suggested the memorandum, was what we could hope to accomplish with these increased force levels in pursuit of our current strategy. The answer was not encouraging.

With current force levels we cannot continue to pursue all of the objectives listed by General I-Jheeler, Can vje do so with increased forces?

MA.CV does not clearly specify how he would use the additional forces he requests, except to indicate that they would provide him with a theater reserve and an offensive capability. Even with the 200,000 additional troops requested by MCV, we will not be in a position to drive the enemy from SW or to destroy his forces. MA.CV*s description of his key problems makes clear that the additional forces would be used to open Route 1, north of Danang; support ARVN units, particularly in the Delta; and to maintain a reserve against enemy offensives. VJith lesser increases of 50,000 or 100,000, MA.CV would be in an even less favorable position to go on the offensive. Moreover, even before the TET offensive the enemy was initiating about two-thirds of the clashes and could, in response to oujt buildup, adopt a casualty limiting posture.

The more likely enem_y response, however, is that with which he has responded to previous increases in our force levels, viz., a matching increase on his part. Hanoi has maintained a constant ratio of one maneuver battalion to 1.5 U.S. maneuver battalions from his reserve in FM of from ^5-70 maneuver batta.lions (comprising 40,000-60,000 men in 5-8 divisions).

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Even if the enemy stands and fights as he did before TET;, the results can only be disappointing in terns of attriting his capability.

Over the past year the United States has been killing between 70 and 100 VC/WA per month per U.S. combat battalion in theater. The return per combat battalion deployed has been falling off^ but even assuming that additional deploym.ents will double the number of combat battalions, and assum.ing that the kill-ratios will remain constant, we could expect enemy deaths, at best, on the order of magnitude of 20,000 per month, but the infiltration system from North Viet Nam alone coirLd supply 13,000-16,000 per month, regardless of our bombing pattern, leaving the remainder — ii,000 -- to be recruited in South Viet Nam'— a demonstrably manageable undertaking for the VC.

The current strategy thus can promise no early end to the conflict, nor any success in attriting the ^n^-^:^ or eroding Hanoi's will to fight. Moreover, it would entail siibstantial costs in South Viet Ne-m, in the United States, and in the rest of the world, ^o /

These substantial costs, the paper indicated, would indeed preclude the attainm.ent of U.So objectives. In South Vietnam,

...the presence of more than 700,000 UoS. military can mean nothing but the total Americanization of the war. There is no sign that ARVN effectiveness will increase, and there will be no pressure from_ the U.S. or the GVIM for ARVN to shape up if the U.So appears willing to increase its force levels as necessary to maintain a stalem_ate in the country.

The effect on the GVN would be even more unfortunate. The Saigon leadership shov/s no signs of a willingness—let alone an ability--to attract the necessary loyalty or support of the people. It is true that the GVN did not totally collapse during TST, but there is not yet anything like an

■ urgent sense of national tmity and purpose, k large influx

■ of additional U.S. forces will intensify the belief of the ruling elite that the U.S. will continue to fight its vzar while it engages in backroom politics and permits widespread corruption. Tne proposed actions will also generate increased inflation, thereby reducing the effectiveness of the GVN and making corruption harder to control. Refoi-^ of the GVN will come only when and if they come to believe that our continued presence in South Viet Nam depends on what the GVN does. Certainly, a U.S. commitm.ent to a substantial troop increase before the GVN commits itself to reform.'and action can only be counterproductive. VJliatever

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our success on the battlefield;, our chances of leaving behind e.n effective functioning na.tiona.l government v^hen we at last withdraw will be sharply diminished.

In the United States, the effects would be equally unfortunate.

We will have to m-obilize reserves, increase our budget by billions^ and see U.S. casualties climb to lj300-lj^00 per month. Our balance of payments will be worsened considerably, and we will need a larger tax increase--justified as a war tax, or wage and price controls....

It will be diffic^xLt to convince critics that we are not simply destroying South Viet Nam in order to "save" it and that we genuinely wazit peace talks. This growing disaffection accompanied, as it certainly will be, by increased defiance of the draft and growing unrest in the cities because of the belief that we are neglecting domestic problems, runs great risks of provoking a dom.estic crisis of unprecedented proportions. 51/

Thus, if our cuj?rent strategy, even with increased troops, could not promise an early end to the conflict, v/hat alternatives V7ere available to the United States? No U.S. ground strategy and no level of U.S. forces, alone, could by themselves accomplish our objective in South Viet Nam, the draft memorandum stated.

We can obtain our objective only if the GVN begins to take the steps necessary to gain the confidence of the people and to provide effective leadership for the diverse groups in the population. ARVW must also be turned into an effective fighting force. If we fail in these objectives, a military victory over the NVN/vC main forces, follov/ed by a U.S. withdrawal, would on_ly pave the way for s.n NLF takeover.

Our military presence in South Viet Nam should be designed toUiy the tim,e during which ARVN and the GVN can develop effective capability. In order to do this, we must deny the enem;^^ access to the populated areas of the country and prevent him ■ from achieving his objectives of controlling the population and destroying the GVN.

The memorandum concluded that I^IACV should be told that his mission was to provide security to populated areas and to deny the enemy access to the population; that he should not attempt to attrite the enemy or to drive him out of the country. MCV should be asked to recommend an appropriate strategy and to determine his force requirexments to carry out this objective with the rfdnim^um possible casualties.

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However^ in the next section of the Presidential draft memorandum, the Working Group relieved MCV of this responsibility by sketching one possible strategy (obviously the preferred one) which should be able to be pursued "without substantially increasing our level of forces in South Viet Nam, thus avoiding the adverse domestic and foreign conseq.uences sketched above." 52/

*

The strategy outlined in the m.emorand-um was designed to attain the initiative along the "demographic frontier." It consisted of the following:

Those forces currently in or near the heavily populated areas along the coast should remain in place. Those forces currently bordering on the demographic frontier"^ should continue to operate from those positions, not on long search-and-destroy missions, but in support of the frontier. Eight to 10 battalions from the DMZ areas would be redeployed and become strategic research in I Corps; six battalions from the interior of II Corps vrould be redeployed to Dien Binh province as a strategic reserve for defense of provincial capitals in the highlands. As security is restored in the previously neglected popu-lated areas of coastal Viet Nam, additional U.S. battalions wouJ-d move forward to the demographic frontier....

Based just beyond the populated areas, the forces on the demographic frontiers would conduct spoiling raids, long-range reconnaissance patrols and, when appropriate ta.rgets are located, search-and-destroy operatiozis into the enemy's zone of movement in the unpopulated areas between the demographic and the political frontiers. They would be available as a quick reaction force to support RVMF when it was attacked within the populated areas. Ifliere RVI\[A.F patrolling in the populated areas is inadequate, U.S. forces would be in a position to assist. 53/

The advantages of the "demographic strategy of population security" were listed as follows:

1. It V70uld become possible to keep the VC/nvA off

balance in their present zone of movem.ent. This area is no\J largely available to them for maneuver and massing, no more than a day's march from any of the miajor cities north of Saigon.

2. It V70uld lengthen enemy LOC's from their sanctuaries in Laos and Ca^.bodia.. Base areas and LOC's vzithin SVN would be the subject of attack and disruption^ without extending the war to neighboring countries.

^r7chis"frontier' runs along the eastern foothills of the Annajnite chain, from Quang-Tri Province to Pban Thiet in Binh Thuan, cuts across SVl^I along the northern edge of the Delta from Phuc Tuy to the Cambodian Border in Tay Ninh. Garrisons wouJ-d be established as at Bong Son

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3. RVKAJFj linov/ing the availability of support from U.S. reaction forces^ would perform more aggressively.

h. This would permit the patrolling and securing of populated areas to be accomplished primarily by Vietnamese forces. \ -

5. U.S. forces would keep active in v^hat is now the enemy's zone of movement^ no longer presenting static positions against which the enemy can mass 9.nd attack. This^ plus his increased logistical problems, would reduce U.S. casualties while increasing his. In effect, we would force him to come to us, fight on terrain of our choosing.

6. The increased patrolling of the populated areas by RVMF combined with U.S. actions in the zone of m-ovement woixld make it harder for the enemy to mass against and attack targets within the populated areas. This would reduce civilian casualties and refugee generation.

7. G-arrisoning U.S. forces closer to EVW.F would facilitate joint operations at the m^aneuver level (battalion, company), again increasing ETRkF aggressiveness.

8. With RVMF thus supported by U.S. forces, it can be expected to remain in unifoim and engage in operations as-long 'as it is paid and fed. ^h/

No disadvantages of this strategy were noted, or listed in the memoran-

dum.

^

Details of this strategy, by Corps area, vzere examined in an appendix In I Corps, our present precarious position could be relieved.

¥ere MA.CV to be provided guidance to forego position defense in areas rem.ote from population centers and concentrate upon m.obile offensive operations in and contiguous to the coastal plain, one division eq.uivalent - eight to 10 U.S. m-aneuver battalions - could eventually be relieved from operations in, or related to defense of Khe Sanh. Undoubtedly, however, these eight to 10 battalions would be required to restore tactical flexibility to and insure logistical sufficiency for the forces presently disposed in the Quang-xri-Hue-Danang area. MA.CV presently is planning operations in the Aeschau /sic/ Valley after April I968; the new guidance would preclude these.

Guidance to MACV.in II Corps

"...should counsel continued economy of force and should specifically exclude determined defense of all but province

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■capitals in the highlands• Permission to withdraw from Special Porces camps (e.g.^ Dak To)^ and other exposed positions remote from the coastal plain should be included. Under this guidance, six U.S. battalions could be withdrawn from border defense operations in the highlands for use as a mobile reserve or for operations on the coastal plain.

In III Corps, no redeployment from present positions, with U.S. forces concentrated in the immediate environs of Saigon were envisaged. j

The guidance to MA.CV should be to concentrate on offensive |

operations in and around the densely pop-ulated portions of III CTZ- MACV should m^aintain a mobile strike force for defense of remote province capitals, but he should otherwise forego long range or regional search-and-destroy operations. Withdrawals from Special Forces camps should be authorized.

Fourth Corps - the Mekong Delta region - is the only region of SVN in which the burden of the war was still borne, chiefly by RVMF. U.S. strategy should avoid Americanizing the conflict there. Instead, our jl • efforts should be aimed at catalyzing increased RVMA.F efforts there.

Guidance provided to MACV should be geared to galvanizing RVKAF by a strategy of:

i. Defending province capitals, major towns, principal com-munication centers, and commiercially important routes.

2. Extending GTO control into the coijintryside, consistent with PVNAF capability to defend RD teams and other public administration there.

3. Stimulating RVKAF operations by providing U.S. forces on an occasional basis for combined operations age^inst particu-larly promising targets, or in conjunction with key defensive operations. U.S. forces in the Delta for this effort should draw on the existing Dong Tam and Saigon bases.

\. Providing limited assistance to RVMF with sophisticated engineer eq,uipment and reconnaissance apparatus v;here such V70uld improve their ability to perform the missions sketched above.

5. Bringing serious pressure to bear on RVN leaders in Saigon and within IV CTZ to m,ount active, sustained, offensive operations consistent with the foregoing m-issions. Consideration should be given to:

Providing additional RVTtfi^ battalions to IV CTZ on a temporary basis from III CTZ--conceptually, battalions or regim.ents from, the 5th or l8th ARVN Divisions would be deployed to IV CTZ minus dependents, for periods of one month or more of active operations, ^ll

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In another appendix^ the memorandurn analyzed the effects of this strategy on those interior provinces outside the "demographic frontier." It voiild be desirable to maintain all interior Province capitals^ the appendix concluded, because "the political conseq.uences of v;ithdrawal from •whole Provinces would be to recreate the atmosphere of 195^ or 19^5? 9,xid while the situation may be that grim, w^e should at least strive to make it appear otherv7ise-"56/

The Province capitals would be garrisoned v/ith ARVIM units of the 22nd and 23rd Divisions and, initially, some American units. These units wouJ-d have as their mission the holding of the Province town for a minimum of fo'or days, giving time for the arrival of a relief strike force.

Having secured the Province capitals, however, this strategy envisaged evacuating other installations in the interior Provinces,

...such as the frontier series running from Bu Dop to Dak To and the interior but vull.nerable points as Vo Dat and Vinh Thanh, Although these points are not held by allied main force units, they do tie down othei- assets, such as Special Forces, CIDG, PP, and RF. Furthermore, their combined existence represents a potential strain for the limited reaction ability currently available since we >' must respond, as we did at Dak To, when the enemy m^vssed

for an attack. If a presence is required in some of these areas, it should be in the form of a mobile striking unit, and not a garrison.

:^sed upon this "analysis" of our current strategy and a strategy of protecting the demographic frontier, the draft memorandum recommended the follov/ing actions to the President:

1. Approve a NSAI^^I, stating that our political objective is a peace which will leave the people of South Viet Nam free to fashion their own political institutions... .The NSAI^ should state that the primary role of U.S. military forces is to provide security in the populated areas of South Viet Nam rather than to destroy the VC/nvA or drive them out of the country. We should plan on maintaining the posture necess6.ry to accomplish this objective for a considerable period.

2. Approve the imjaediate dispatch of an additional ' 10,500 mi3.itary personnel to South Viet Nam.

3. Approve an accelerated and expanded program of

'' * increased fire power and mobility for ARW and other ele-

I ments of the GVN Armed Forces.-

.^-^ If. Send General Taylor to Saigon to explain the NSAM

to MOV and the GVL"^, and to request General ^-lestmoreland to develop a strategy and force requirements to implement the milita'ry objectives stated in the NSAM.

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5. Dispatch one or two high-level civilians to Saigon with General Taylor to warn the GTO that it must broaden their base of political support^ end its internal bickering, purge corrupt officers and officials, and move to develop efficient administration and effective forces. They should also begin a discussion of negotiations while informing the GVN of the increased support to be provided for AK^IN*

6. Deliver a Presidential address to the American public, explaining our new strategy in light of the enemy's new tactics. ^7 /

In short, then, this initial reassessment of our strategy in SVIT indicated to the President that no ground strategy and no level of additional U.S. forces alone could achieve an early end to the war. That coul-d be done only if the GVE took the steps necessary to provide effective military and political leadership to its population. In order to speed up this process, the U.S. should limit its objectives in SVN and adopt a strategy of population security. This would give the GVN time to organize and develop democratic institutions, a.nd would give RVMF time to grow in effectiveness while our forces provided a protective screen for the populated a.reas at minimum cost in resources and casualties.

..^^ This paper was discussed within the military community at a meeting

in the Secretary of Defense^s office on 1 March. General VJheeler, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was appalled at the apparent repudiation of American military policy in South Viet Nam contained in the ISA Draft Memorandum. He detected two "fatal flaws" in the population security strategy.

1. The proposed strategy would mean increased fighting in or close to population centers and, hence, would result in increa.sed civilian casualties

2. By adopting a posture of static defense, we would allow the enemy an increased capability of massing near population centers, especially north

I of Saigon.

In addition. General Wheeler xms equally appalled at the statement in the ISA Draft Presidential Memorandum to the effect that "MACV does not clearly specify how he v/ould use the additional forces he requests, except to indicate that they would provide him with a theater reserve and an offensive capability." MACV had indeed clearly and specifically indicated to CINCPAC on 27 February, concurrent with General VJheeler's original memorandum to the President, the locations and missions of the requested a^dd-on units. These had been transmitted through the Joint Staff to each of the Services, vjho indeed were engaged in studying and staffing these proposals. 58/ Apparently, this inform^ation had not specifically been furnished to the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

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The debate v/ithin the Defense Establishment continued into the following day. In a memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, dated 2 Max-ch, Assistant Secretary of Defense Warnke gave his ansv/er to General Itoeeler's "two fatal flaws" of the population control strategy,

1. Increasing Fighting in the Cities. General VJheeler is concerned that the proposed strategy will mean increased fighting in or close to population centers and, hence, will result in increased civilian casualties. This argument overlooks, I believe, the fact that the enemy demonstrated during the TET offensive his willingness and ability to a.ttack popu-lated centers regardless of our strategy. He is demonstrating that capability again right now in the Quang Tri-Hue area and may soon do so in the Delta* If the enemy continues to choose to fight in the cities, we will have no choice but to engage him in those a,reas at the cost of civilian casualties. The proposed strategy may actually reduce civilian casualties if we can succeed in attacking enemy concentrations before he can attack the cities. Moreover, in attacking the cities, the enemy will face Am.erican as v/ell as ARVN forces engaged in offensive patrolling operations around the cities.

.- This should result in fevrer casualties than have come from the

liberation of cities in. the post-TET period. By freeing forces now engaged along the DMZ and in lightly populated high-j i lands for active offensive operations near population centers,

vze should make the enemy effort against cities less effective.

2. Enemy Ability to Mass Near Population Centers . General "Wheeler's concern that under the proposed strategy the enemy will be more capable of m.assing near population centers north of Saigon is difficult to understand. In fact, prior to TET, because we v/ere operating primarily along the coast^ along the DMZ;, and in the highlands, we were permitting the enemy to mass along the demographic frontier as he did prior to the TET offensive. In fact, one of the advantages of the new strategy is that we will be able to keep the enemy off-balance in this area. General \{heeleT may believe we advocate a posture of static defense. This is not true. In the strategy sketched in the paper, one of the primary missions of U.S. forces would be to operate in this area, remain highly m-obile and carry out attacks against suspected enem-y base camps. 59/

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General I^Jheeler fought back with argiimients contained in two documents. The first was a backchannel message from COMUSMA.CV5 dated 2 Marchj which answered specific q,uestions concerning the planned use of additional forces. These q.uestions had "been asked by General "^/[heeler in a backchannel message the previous day* The first question concerned the military "and other" objectives additional forces were designed to advance. General VJestmoreland was ambitious, indeed;, and stated that these objectives were to:

(1) Defeat and evict from SW the new IWA units now present in VJestern Quang Tri and Central Thua Trien provinces, to include the Ashau Valley and base areas I3I and llU.

(2) Maintain positive governmenta.1 and military control over Quang Tri and Thua Thien provinces^ particularly the populous areas of the coastal lowlands and the DMZ area. Be prepared to block or interdict the infiltration/invasion routes from WN through Laos.

(3) Destroy VC/nVA main force units and base areas in the remainder of I Corps and in the northeastern coastal and northwestern Laos border areas of II Corps.

(k) Reduce the "calculated risk" currently entailed in cur economy of force posture in II and III Corps by providing the added flexibility and "pimch" of an armored cavalry regiment-

(5) Conduct aggressive and continuing offensive campaigns th-TOughout the coastal areas of II Corps and into traditional enemy base areas and sanctuaries in III Corps along the Cambodian border^ especially in v/ar zones "C" and "d". Restore the offensive combat and pacifica^tion momentum lost in III Corps as a result of the enemy's TET offensive and the requirement

to transfer the 101st Airborne Division (-) to I Corps to stem the ]WA incursion into Quang Tri.

(6) Be prepared for contingency operations if required. The second question asked by General VJheeler was:

Question B: "What specific dangers are their dispatch to SVN designed to avoid; and what specific goals would the increment of force aim to achieve -

In the next 6 months?

Over the next year?

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In bis answer^ General Westmoreland was eq.ually optimistic

..•additive forces would serve to forestall the danger of local defeats due to the tactical degeneration or temporary disorganization of some ARM units in the event of another general eneny offensive coupled with a ma.ssive invasion across the DMZ. The need to be prepared to support or reinforce ARVN units that are surprised by the nature and intensity of VC/nVA attacks became manifest during the enemy's TET drive and must be recognized in US troop requirement and deployment plans for the foreseeable futirre. By providing a tv/o division mobile "swing force" which could be positioned and employed as required5 the need to draw down on forces directly engaged in territorial security tasks probably would be reduced. Thus the danger of losing popular confidence in and support for GW/US capabilities5 policies and aspirations as a result of temporary military or psychological setbacks would also be diminished.

(2) Provision of the immediately rec^uired additional forces also vrould make it possible to apply continuous pressure

./"^ to some degree in all corps areas and thus reduce the danger

of allowing the enemy the opportunity to solicit support from the population and to reorganize, refit and recoup so that he . could soon field rejuvenated units^ despite heavy losses suffered during the TET offensive. This is particularly important in view of the enemy capability to move additional divisions south through the panhandle or DMZ without any clear intelligence indicators of such action. (This matter is of particular concern to m-e) these forces will also make it possible to retain that degree of flexibility and rapid responsiveness necessary to cope with an apparent new enemy tactic of searching for thin spots in our force structure or deployment in order to laimch his concentra.ted mass attacks.

(3) I*^" "t^-^ next six months the presence of the armored cavalry regim.ent in U or III Corps would reduce the degree of calcula,ted risk inherent in the economy of force posture in those areas 5 provide added territorial seciu^ity and further the goal of providing added combat flexibility- Addition of another Marine re.^iment and its division headq.uarters in 1 Corps would thicken troop density in critical I CTZ, add to combat flexibility and improve com-mand and control capabilities in that critical

area.

(k) Over the next year the increm^ent of force would make /"^^^ it possible to:

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A. Move progressively from north to south with a continuing series of hard hitting offensive campaigns to invade base areas^ interdict and disrupt infiltration routes, and eliminate or evict VC/kvA forces from SVN.

B. At the sam.G time, the highly mobile exploitation force (two divisions) would be available to covmter enemy aggression or to exploit opportunities for tactical success any^-zhere in SVN without reducing the minimal essential force necessary to guarantee maintenance of security in those areas where successful military campaigns have already been waged.

C. Addition of the new division in III Corps during this time frame v/ould re-establish the capability for conducting constant operations in and around war zones "C" and "d" and make possible the constant use of a division size force in the

IV CTZ which capability was removed v/ith transfer of the 101st Airborne Division (-) to I Corps. In addition, combat operations conducted by this division would provide added security for LOC and the vital seat of government and economic center of Saigon.

D. VJith the toteJ additive combat forces requested it will be possible to deal v;ith the invader from the north, and to face with a. greater degree of confidence the potential tank, rocket and tactical air threat as w^ell as the ever present possibility that

. he may reinforce with additional elements of his home army- 6o/

The second docuinent available to General VJheeler vzas an a,nalysis of the military implications in South Vietnam of the deployment of various increm.ents of U.S. forces. This analysis v^as done by the Short Range Branch, Plans and Policy Directorate, Joint Staff. It was an informal staff document which had not been addressed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff or any of the m.ilitary services separately. 6l/ The five options addressed were those indicated by the Secretary of Defense in his m.eeting of 29 February (see pages 7-8). This paper documented the large enem.y buildup in South Vietnam:

1, The enem.y, since November, has increased his forces in South Viet Nam by at least ^!-l m.aneuver battalions, some armored elem.ents, a large number of rockets, and additional artillery. There are indications he is preparing for the use of limited air support, including logistical air drops and bombing missions. ■

The Joint Staff paper took exception to COMJSMCV*s stated first priority of insuring "the security of the GVN in Saigon and in the provincial capitals."

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The basic strategy which must be followed by MA.CV in any circumstances is to defeat the current enemy offensive both in Northern I Corps Tactical Zone v/here it is the most formidable, j_j^ -tVie Highlands where it is highly dangerous^ and throughout South Vietnam in defense of the government and the cities and towns...•Allied forces are not conducting offensive operations of any great magnitude or frequency and therefore they are not wresting control of the coimtryside from the enemy.,..

If the enemy offensive can be broken with sustained heavy casualties 5 then, and only then, will the cities be secure and the countryside reentered. Even v^ith the largest force contemplated (Option l) it will not be possible to perform adequately all of the tasks unless the cui'^rent enemy offensive is decisively defeated. This, therefore, is the first and most important task upon which all else depends....

If the forces now in Vietnam or the forces under any of the options prove to be inadequate to break the enemy offensive, or if, conversely, the enemy sustained offensive breaks the Vietnamese armed forces (even short of destroying the GVN), then our objectives in South Vietna.m and the ta^sks associated with them v/ill be unobtainable. Specifically, we would be unable to regain the initiative, that is, we would not be able to conduct offensive operations a.t the scope and pace required either to prevent further enemy buildup or to reenter the countryside. This would force US and allied forces into a defensive posture around the major population centers....

Therefore, immediate action to break the enemy's current offensive is not only the first but the decisive requirement.

In specifically addressing each of the options, the Joint Staff reach' ed the following conclusions:

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OPTIONS I

Add approximately I965OOO to the present MCV Program 5 authorized level (525,000) plus 6 additional bns already deployed (10,500). Relaxation of restrictions on operations in Cambodia/ Laos/]\IVN. TOTAL - 133 maneuver bns

I-A

Same additive forces as Option !•

No relaxation of restric tions on operations.

CONCLUSIONS (To Defeat the VC/nvA in SVN)

This Option would:

a. Assuming no additional deployments break enemy offensive and permit early and sustained operations against the enemy.

b. Permit s imultaneous operations against enemy main force, base areas, and border sanctuaries.

c. Permit resumption of progreim to develop effectiveness of RVNAF.

d. Permit greater employm.ent of air assets in conducting an expanded air campaign against NVN, Laos, Cambodia.

Essentially the same as Option I except:

a. The rate of conducting operations would be reduced by higher military risk.

b. The enemy would enjoy sanctuary across the Cambodian/l^otian/NVN borders.

c. The rebuilding of the RVliAF would be at a slower pace.

II

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No change to present MA.CY Program 5 authorized level (525,000) plus 6 additional bns already deployed (10,500). TOTAL - 112 maneuver bns

US objectives in SVN cannot be achieved as allied forces must remain in defensive posture.

At present levels, allied forces can expect increasingly grave threats to their security with high casualty rates.

Ill

Add 50,000 US troops to the approximately 535?000 in Option II. TOTAL - 118 maneuver bns

This option could probably secure the cities but would be insufficient to counter the current enemy offensive or to restore security in the countryside.

IV

Add 100,000 to the approximately 535,000 in

Option II.

TOTAL - 12i+ m^aneuver bns

The results of this Option are essentie.lly the sarae as Option I, except:

a. The rate of progress would be slower.

b. The enemy would retain the initiative in the border areas.

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The paper^ then^ concluded that the larger forces of Option I and lA wouJ-d ^^greatly reduce risks to Free World forces in SVN and will accomplish U.S. cbjectives nore rapidly than the forces of the other options5'^ and recommended that immediate action be taken to provide the forces of Option I.

Read another way^ however^ the Joint Staff analysis could be taken to indicate that the United States couJ_d successfully pursue a strategy of "population security" by adopting Option III^ adding 50,000 troops to the current level in SVN.

At the 2 March meeting of the senior m.embers of the Secretary of Defense's Working Group conducting the reassessment, no consensus was reached on a new U.S. strategy. Apparently, Mr. Warnke and Mr. Goulding were given the task of drafting a new memorandiom for the President which would be less controversial than the initial ISA document.

The draft memorandiun for the President, dated 3 March 1968^ which was prepared by these two individuals, differed markedly in tone from- the initial memorandum presented to the Clifford Group on 2 March. Gone was any discussion of grand sti^ategy. This memorandum recommended simply:

1. Meeting General VJestmoreland's request by deploying as close to May 1 as practical 20,000 additional troops (approximately 1/2 of which would be combat).

, 2. Approval of a Reserve call-up and an increased end strength adeq.uate to meet the balance of the req,uest and to restore a strategic reserve in the United States, adecLuate for possible contingencies.

3. Reservation of the decision to deploy the balance of General Westmoreland's nev7 req,uest. While we would be in a position to ma-ke these a.dditional deployments, the future decision to do so vrould be contingent upon:

a. Continuous reexamination of the desirability of further deployments on a week-by-week basis as the situation develops;

b. Improved political performance by the GVR and increased contribution in effective military action by the

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c. The results of a study in depth, to be initiated immediately, of a possible new strategic guidance for the conduct

of US m.ilit£iry operatipns in South Vietnam.

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T\'^o appendices to this paper addressed the "basis for these recommendations and the context in which additional troop cominitments to Vietnam shovJ-d be examined.

In explaining the basis for the recomraendation to deploy 20^000 troops^ the memorandum indicated that the first increment of forces requested by General Westmoreland should be provided as an emergency measure to meet the prospect of continued abnormal levels of enemy activity- "This would^ by May Ist, furnish him with an additional 20,000 troops, 10,500 of v/hom would be for combat purposes. Because of the possibility that the North Vietnamese leaders m.ay decide to launch a larger scale invasion by m_ain force units, we should put ourselves in a position to provide the other 185^000 ground, sea, and air forces involved in General Westmoreland's req.uest." 63/

Additionevl forces, however, should not be dispatched imtil the situation in Vietnam developed.

A continuing and intensive review should focus not only on future enemy activity but also on the demonstrated ability of the GVN and the ARVI^ to pull themselves together, to get back into business, and to demonstrate significant iinprovements both in their ability to win popular support and their vallingness to fight aggressively for their own security. Unless these qualities are evidenced, there can be no real hope for the accomplishment of oui- political aims.

Finally, we believe that the striking change in the enemy's tactics, the willingness to coimnit at least two additional divisions to the fighting in the South over the past few weeks, the obvious and not v^holly anticipated strength of the Viet Cong infrastructure, there can be no prospect of a quick military solution to the aggression in South Vietnam. Under these circumstances, we should give intensive study to the development of a new strategic guidance to General Westmoreland. This guidance should make clear the fact that he cannot be expected either to destroy the enem_y forces or to rout them completely from South Vietnam. The kind of American commitanent that would be required to achieve these military objectives cannot even be estimated. There is no reason to believe that it could be done by an additional 200,000 American troops or double or triple that quantity....

The exact nature of the strategic guidance vzhich should be adopted cannot now be predicted. It should be the subject of a detailed inter-agency study over the next several v/eeks. During the progress of the study, discussions of the appropriate strategic guidance and its nature and implications for the extent of our military conimitm-ent in South Vietnam should be undertaken vrith both General Westmorelazid and Ambassador Bunker. 6^/

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In placing these additional troop commitments in a larger context^ an additional appendix concluded:

No matter what the result in South Vietnam itself, we will have failed in our purposes if:

a. The war in Vietnam spreads to the point where it is a major conflict leading to direct military confrontation with the USSR and/or China;

b. The war in Vietnam spreads to the point where we are so committed in resources that our other v/orld-wide

comJiiitments -- especially NATO — are no longer credible;

c. The attitudes of the American people tov/ards "more Vietnams" are such that our other commitments are brought into q,uestion as a matter of US will;

d. Other countries no longer wish the US commitment for fear, of the conseqiuences to themselves as a battlefield between the East and the West."

Under these circumstances, we recommend that under the leadership of the State Department;, with the assistance of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the JCS, and the Treasury, a review of our Vietnamese policy in the context of our global politico-military strategy be undertaken with a due date of May I5. 65/

Thus, the net result of this period of frantic preparation, consul-ta.tion, writing, and reassessing was similar to all previous requests for reinforcement in Vietnam. The litany was familiar: "We will furnish what we can presently furnish without disrupting the normal political and economic life of the nation, while v/e study the situation as it develops." No startling reassessment of strategy was indicated, although for the first tiBie it was recognized that such a reassessm^ent was needed, that a limit to U.S. involvem.ent in SVN had to be determined, and that any number of U.So troops could not achieve ovx objectives without-significa.nt improvement in the ability of the GY'N to win popular support and to fight aggressively for their own security.

5 • Recom.me ndation to the President

This draft m-emorandum was discussed again within the Defense Department on 3 March, and several changes vrere m-ade. The h March draft mem.oranduin for the President was apparently approved by the Secretai^ of Defense and for\farded to the President. The paper which was fcrv/arded to the President bore a great resemblance to the 3 Me^rch draft, although the Systems Analysis influence on the k March paper was evidenced by its greater detail, especially concerning actions to be required of the GVN.

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The memcrandijmi recapitulated General Westmoreland's req.uest for personnel and indicated that General ^Jheeler believed that v/e should meet this request, and should act to increase and improve our strategic reserve in the United States. To achieve both these goals, the paper stated^ staff examination indicated that the following actions would be required:

a.- A call-up of reserve units and individuals totaling approximately 262,000 (l9l]-,000 in units, 68,000 as individuals).

b. Increased draft calls. "

c. Extension of terms of service. These actions would produce a total increase in end strength in the Armed Forces of approximately 511,000 by June 30, 1969* (The staff examination referred to above included spaces to add 31^500 troops in South Korea and

a US naval proposal to add two cruisers and fifteen destroyers to the naval forces in Southeast Asia,. If these proposals are disapproved in their entirety, the figures above will be decreased to approximately 2^2,000 and if5^,000 respectively.

The Secretary of Defense then recommended:

1. An iirmiediate decision to deploy to Vietnam an estimated total of 22,000 additional personnel (approximately 60^^ of which would be combat). An irmnediate decision to deploy the three tactical fighter squadrons deferred from Program 5 (about 1,000 men). This would be over and above the four battalions (about 3700 men) already planned for deployment in April which in themselves would bring us slightly above the 525,000 authorized level....

2. Either through Ambassador Bunker or through an early visit by Secretary Clifford, a highly forceful approach to the GVN (Thieu and Ky) to get certain key commitments for improvement, tied to our own increased effort and to increased US support for

the ARW . .

3. Early approval of a Reserve call-up and an increased end strength adequate to meet the balance of the Westmoreland request and to restore a strategic reserve in the United States, adequate for possible contingencies world-wide....

k. Reservation of the decision to meet the Westmoreland request • in full. VJhile we v/ould be putting ourselves in a position to make these additional deployments, the future decision to do so would

be contingent upon:

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a. Reexamination on a week-by-week basis of the desirability of further deployments as the situation develojjs;

b. Improved political performance by the GVN and increased contribution in effective military action by the

arvn;

c. The results of a study in depth, to be initiated immediately, of possible new political and strategic guidance for the conduct of US operations in South Vietnam, and of our Vietnamese policy in the context of o-or world-vride politico-military strategy.

• *

5. No new peace initiative on Vietnam. Re-statement of our terms for peace and certain limited diplom.atic actions to dramatize Laos and to focus attention on the total threat to Southeast Asia....

6. A general decision on bom.bing policy, not excluding future change, but adeq.uate to form a basis for discussion with the Congress on this key aspect. Here your advisers are divided:

a. General Wheeler and others would advocate a substantial extension of targets and aiithority in and near Hanoi and Haiphong,

' ' mining of Haiphong, and naval gunfire up to a Chinese Buffer

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b. Others would advocate a seasonal step-up through the spring, but without these added elements. 66 /

In proposing this course of action, the Secretary of Defense indicated that he recognized that there were m^any negative factors and certain difficulties. Nevertheless, he indicated the belief that this course of" action, at least in its essential outline, was urgently required to meet the immediate situation in Vietnam, as well as wider possible contingencies there and elsewhere.

Eight tabs to the draft memorandum elaborated upon the reasoning which led to the recommendations contained therein. TAB A reviewed the justification for imm^ediately sending additional forces to Vietnam. ■ The situation in SVN v/as analyzed as follows:

j i ■ Hanoi has m-ade a basic change in its strategy and scale of

operations. Perhaps because they thougho they were losing as the war and pacification-were going, Hanoi is pressing hard for

I . * decisive results over the next few months. They are committing

a high proportion of their assets, although it appears likely that

-|^;t-^ey vould retain both the capability and will to keep up the

pressure next year if this effort does not succeed. There is hope

that if this year's effort could be thwarted, Hanoi and Viet Cong

morale would be sufficiently affected to open up possibilities of

peace,*but this cannot be assessed as likely.

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Within South Vietnam^ there are key variables that could move the situation sharply, one way or the other^ in the coming months. Specifically:

a. The degree to which Hanoi and the VC are able to keep pressing, and how effectively they are

countered in the military sphere.

b. The degree to which the VC are able to extend their control in the countryside a,nd recoup their losses — or whether conversely the South Vietnamese can take the initiative and either neutralize such recoupment or set in motion a new favorable trend.

c. The degree to which the GVI^ improves its performance and galvanizes potentially greater popular support than it can now have.

Thus, there was created an urgent need, both practical and psychological, to send such forces as could be effective within the next four or five months.

The following additional forces of about 22,000 men could be deployed by June 15 in accordance with the schedule set forth below:

Six Tactical Fighter Squadrons - 3?000 men

2 Squadrons by - 1 April

3 Squadrons by - 1 May 1 Squadron by - 1 June

4th Marine Expeditionary Force (minus) - 18,100 men

by - 15 June

Naval Mobile Construction Battalion - 7OO men

by " 1 May

In addition, it was reiterated that an urgent effort was required to ■ improve and modernize the equipment of the SVN Armed Forces.

Tab B elaborated on wha.t shouJ.d be done to increase the effectiveness of Vietnamese efforts in conjunction with the U.S. troop increase. Tv70 possible GWI reactions were foreseen to the deployment of additional U.S. forces. The rea,ffirm-ation of the U.S. coimnitment would be welcomed, wou3-d add to the feeling of confidence, and might stiffen the GVN's will at a timiC *'when the tasks it faces are rather monixmental." On the other hand, there was always the danger that the Vietnamese would be tem.pted to relax beh-ind the refuge of Axaerican power, and the sense of anxiety and urgency which had resulted from the TET offensive could suffer. The memorandum indicated however, that the CrVN had the capacity to take those civil and military actions which would m.aterially improve the political and security

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climate of South Vietnam^ as well as the image of the GYN in the United States. This involved, the memorandum indicated, a readiness for the U.S. to make specific demands upon the GVI1 in order to get it to take a wide range of decisions and actions. Among those things considered essential and feasible, the following actions were listed:

1. Mobilization - The Vietnamese Armed Forces should be increased to the maximum. As a first step, present plans to increase Vietnamese forces by 65^000 men should be amended to provide for an additiona^l 3^,000 men under arms by the end of 1968. The draft of I8 and I9 year olds should proceed as presently scheduled. This should be consistent with the ability to train and supply the forces, but avoid undercutting the need for key civilians in other governmental functions by diversion of skilled persomiel.

2' The Thieu-I<y Relationship and Unity of Leadership -The failure of Thieu and Ky to cooperate fully and apply their individual ta^lents to the needs of the situation has continued to plague the effective management of the Vietnamese effort. In turn this has had ramifications down the line in both the military and civilian chain of cormiiand. It has also complicated the chances of rallying the various elements in the society, as the rivalry translates itself into interference with attempts at forming a national anti-cornraunist front.

Thieu and Ky and their follov/ers, as well as other elements in the society not associated directly with them, must be brought to realize that we are no longer prepared to put up with anything but the maxim_um effort on their part. A clear and precise role for Ky should be defined. Thieu and Ky must bring their followers into line. The government should be prepared to engage the services of people with administrative and executive talent who are nov/ not participating in the common task. Our expectations in this regard have to be made crystal clear to each and every Vietnamese leader in and out of Goverimient. Without this fundam_ental change in the attitude and dedication of the leadership, the necessary reforms and the necessary inspiration of the Vietnamese people will not be forthcoming q.uickly or sufficiently.

3. Gettin g the G o vernraent Back into the Countryside -Vfe must wTrTThe race to the countryside, go on the offensive, re-establish security in the rural areas, and restore the goverrjnent's presence in the villages. The ARVIi and other security forces must deploy aggressively, the ED cadre must return to-their tasks, and governmental services reach out from the province capitals.

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In the final analysis rural security, the sine qua non of popular identification with the GVN, must be provided by the Vietnamese themselves. The two keys here are (l) the calibre and role of the 4^ province chiefs (and their supporting staffs) and (2) a properly offensive sense of mission on the part of ARVN units - and their commanders - assigned to rural security support missions. In every area (village, district, province, DTZ and corps) the RVMF unit commanders responsible for security in that area must be graded (i.e. promoted, corm-aended or sacked) prim.arily on their ability to find, fix and eradicate the VC Force indigenous to that area. They must also be graded (with commensurate effect on their careers) with respect to the behavior of their troops vis-a-vis the populace in that area.

4. Drive on the Viet Cong Inf ra structure - In our concern over the behavior of ovjc allies, we must not neglect our enemies and the present opportunity to compound and exacerbate comjnun.ist problem-S. Operation Phoenix which is targetted against the Viet Cong must be pursued more vigorously in closer liaison with the US. Vietnamese armed forces should be devoted to anti-infrastructure activities on a priority basis. The Tet offensive surfaced a good deal of the infrastructua?e and the opportunity to damage it has never been better. This would force the VC on the defensive and head off the establishment of local VC administrative organizations and VC attempts to set up provisional govermnental conmiittees.

5. US-ARVN Command Relationshi ps - l^ile we accept the Mission's reluctance to create a joint coimiiand, we believe that alternative arrangem.ents which give the US a greater role in ARVN employment are necessary- This can be done at the Corps level and below. It would involve US participation in the planning and control of ARWI operations. It might even call for the prior approval by US advisors of ARVN operational plans — this now exists in certain cases depending upon individual advisor relationships. We

should request MACV to study the m.atter and come up with a specific plan to meet the requirement.

6- Governjnent Ref orm, and AntiCorruption Cam.paig n -The beginning steps at adm-inistrative reform v/hich President Thieu has t.nnounced must be accelerated. This should be directly associated vrith a new deal on corruption, v^hich must be dealt v/ith by relief of a specified list of corrupt officials now and the promise of severe action in the future. A capable Inspectorate should be established. Incompetent ARVN officers must be removed, beginning with a specific list that should be m.ade available, by MACV. Incompetent province chiefs vrho have plagued our efforts in the past must be removed. The removal of incompetent com:rianders

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and officials is now more feasible in the light of performance during the Tet offensive. We shoiild not hesitate to make our desires known and back them, up by refusing to provide support for the incompetent. For key comjnanders, we should require the right of prior approval on a secret and discreet basis. The precise tools of leverage to be applied in this regard should be left to the US Mission, but could include v^ithholding advice and assistance at local levels in extremie cases«

7" The Prime Minister - We should solicit Axabassador Bunker's views on the desirability of replacing the Prime Minister. If he is to be repla^ced we should agree on his successor beforehand, in consultation vath Tliieu and Ky.

8. The United Front - A nationalist spirit of cooperation and xmity came to the fore in the immediate v/ake of the Tet offensive. It is being m^anifested incom.pletely in attempts to organize groups in support of the national task. Despite the personal misgivings of old antagonists there has been some success. This is now threatened by personal rivalries, and most significantly by differences between Thieu and Ky. We need to find a formula for joint efforts. Ambassador Bunker suggests that the optimum, result would be a "super front*' of the anti--comimunist groups. Although not directly tied to the government, such a front could serve to rally the people broadly and em.otionally against the Viet Cong. To succeed it must be backed by the leadership of the govermnent - both Thieu and Ky - but not appear to com.pete v/ith the National Assembly. It should encom.pass all elements in the society,

but not be the vehicle for any one power group.

9. Economic Measures - There will be increased inflation in Vietnam this year, and additional US troops will make it more severe. Steps need to be taken now to counter the threat of inflation, if we are not to be faced w^ith a severe crisis next fall a.nd winter. The GVN needs to move on tax increases, and U.S, and GVN expenditures for non-essential progra,ms in Vietnam should be restrained. On the other hand, wage increases for civil and military personnel in the GVN

are needed if inflation is not to v?eaken their v/ill and support.

Additionally, v?e must demand of the GVN som.e m.easure of action on their part to compensate for the effect of additional US troops on the US balance of pa;yTients. This can be done by having the QVN provide to the US at no cost the additional piaster costs incurred by our troop increase. We should also insist that GVN reserves be reduced to $250 million from the present maximum reserve level of $300 m.illion and that a significant portion of the reserve be invested in medium and long term US securities'. The details of these

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economic measures cannot be discussed in this paper, but a comprehensive economic package should be prepared and presented to the GVN - to include what the US is prepared to do in the way of increased financing of commercial iraports.

10. Resource Allocation - Non-essential use of resources should be eliminated. Present government programs to elirainate new luxury construction, must be tightened and continued. Bars and night clubs should rem.ain closed. Austerity should be fostered. 68 /

The Appendix recommended that a high-level mission, probably headed by the Secretary of Defense, should go to Saigon to emphasize to the GVN that we consider improved GVN performance essential; that any further U.S. support must be m^atched by GVN actions; and that the above recommendations would be used as a checklist for judging Vietnamese performance. In addition, this Appendix emphasized that we should do what was necessary to improve the capability of RWAF. Although no details vrere given, the statement was m-ade that: "On the basis of cujrrent planning estimates, this would involve additional expenditure of about $^75 million over a period of l8 months."

Tab C of the Memorandujn for the President consisted of a brief justification for increasing the stra^tegic reserve. The basic argument wa.s that v/e woTj-ld then be prepared to provide the additional ground, sea, and air forces involved in General Westm,oreland^s request if the military situation required. In addition, the paper indicated:

If these additional forces are not deployed to Vietnam, our action in thus reconstituting the strategic reserve would nevertheless be fully warranted. Our strategic reserve has been appreciably depleted because of Vietnam dem.ands. At present, the active division forces in the Continental United States, Hawaii and Okinawa, and including the Marine units in the Caribbean and Mediterranean, consist of ^-2/3 Army divisions and l-l/S Marine divisions. This compares with the 9 Army divisions and 3 Marine divisions in our strategic reserve on 30 June I965. A call-up of 2^-1-5,000, with no deployments to South Vietnam in excess of the 20-30,000 now recommiended, would yield a strategic reserve of 7 Army divisions and 2 Marine divisions. The unsettled situations in many parts of the world m.ake this build-up a prudent action entirely apart from possible Vietnam contingencies. 69/

Relegated to Tab D of the Memorand'om. for the President was what had begun as the m.ajor task of the Working Group--the necessity for in-depth study of Vietnam policy and strategic guidance.

General Westmoreland*s request, this Appendix pointed out, does not •purport to provide any really satisfactory answer to the problem, in Vietnam.

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There can be no assurance that this very substantial additional deployiiient would leave us a year frora today in any more- favorable military position. All that can be said is that the additional troops would enable us to kill more of the enemy and would provide more security if the enemy does not offset them by lesser reinforcements of his ov/n. There is no indication that they v/ould bring about a q_uick solution in Vietnam and^ in the absence of better performance by the GVN and the ARVN, the increased destruction and increased Americanization of the war could, in fact, be coimter-productive. 70/

There were many other reasons for conducting a study of our Vietnamese policy in the context of the U.S. v/orldwide political/military strategy. No matter what the result in Vietnam itself, we will have failed in our purpose, the memorandum stated, if:

a. The war in Vietna^n spreads to the point where it is a major conflict leading to direct military confrontation with the USSR and/or China;

b. The war in Vietnam spreads to the point where we are so committed in resources that our other world-wide commitments — especially MTO -- are no longer credible;

c. The attitudes of the American people towards "more Vietnsjns" are such that our other commitments are brought into q_uestion as a m^atter of US will;

d. Other countries no longer wish the US coim-nitm-ent for fear of the conseq.uences to themselves as a battlefield between the East and the West. 7l/

In addition, any intensive review should focus on the ability of the GVN and the ARVN to demonstrate significant improvement, both in their ©ability to win popular support and their willingness to fight aggressively for their own security.

Finally, the m.emorandum stated:

' ...the striking change in the enem-y's tactics, his

willingness to commit at least two a.dditional divisions to the firhting in the South over the past few weeks

^ and the obvious and not v/holly anticipated strength of

the Viet Cong infrastructure, shows that there can be no prospect of a quick military solution to the aggression

j in South Vietnam. Under these circumstances, we should give

1 intensive study to the development of nev; strategic guidance

to General Westmoreland. This study may show that he should not be expected either to destroy the enemy forces or to rout them com-pletely from South Vietnam. The kind of Araerican commitment that m-ight be required to achieve these malitary

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objectives cannot even be estimated. There is no reason to believe that it could be done by an additional 200^000 American troops or double or triple that Quantity....

The exact nature of the strategic guidance v/hich should be adopted cannot nov/ be predicted. It should be the subject of a detailed interagency study over the next several weeks. During the progress of the study^ discussions of the appropriate strategic guidance and its nature and implications for the extent of our military commitment in South Vietnam shonJ_d be undertaken with both General Westmoreland and Arabassador Bunker. _72/

Thus^ the "A to Z reassessment" of U.S. strategy req.uested by the President was relegated by the Working Group to a future date.

Tab E remained intact from the original 29 February draft memorandiim. Prepared by the State Department, it discussed negotiating options and possible diplom^atic actions in connection with a buildup of U.S. forces. Concerning our negotiating posture, three broad options were listed:

1. Stand pat on the San Antonio formula and on our basic position toward the terms of a negotiated settlement -- the Geneva Accords plus free choice in the South, rejecting a coalition or any special position for the WLF.

2. Take some new initiative, either privately or publicly, that might involve a change in our position on the San Antonio formula a.nd/or a change in our position on the elements of a settlement. •

3. No change in our position for the present, but pitching our course of action toward a strong move for negotiations when and if we have countered Hanoi's offensive — i.e., in a m.atter of four months or so perhaps. 73/

The crucial q.uestion, the paper indicated, was really to examine what we could conceivably do by way of a new initiative under Option 2. After examining the situation, however, the conclusion was reached that:

.. .any change in our position on the terms of a peaceful settlement would be extremely unwise at the present time. We may well v/'ish to work on opening up channels to the NLF, but this must be done in the utiaost secrecy and in full consultation v/ith the GVIT. We dO' not know v/hat the possibilities may be in this direction, but any public stress on this avenue would feed the fires of a VC propaganda line that has already had significant disturbing effect in South Vietnam.

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As to oiir conditions for stopping the "bombing and entering into talks, we continue to believe that the San Antonio formula is "rock bottom." The South Vietnamese are in fact talking about much stiffer -londitions, such as stopping the infiltration entirely. Any move by us to modify the San Antonio formula dovmward would be extremely disturbing in South Vietnam^ and would have no significant offsetting gains in US public opinion or in key third countries...-

This being said, we believe that it would strengthen our over-all posture, and involve no significant risks in Vietnam, if we vrere to reiterate our basic position on oujt terms of settlement in South Vietnejn. A systematic restatement of our position on the Geneva Accords and free choice in the South could be a vital part of selling our whole course of action to the public, to Congress, and the world. Although we have stated all the elements at different times, we have not pulled them together for a long time and we could get a considerable n impression of freshness, even novelty, and certainly reasonableness by identifying more precisely the elements of the Geneva Accords; our position on free choice, and perhaps adding something on external guarantees, which have always been a ■ generalized part of our position and that of the South Viet-nam.ese. tV

Further diplomatic actions, the Appendix indicated, v/ould be designed to dramatize the Comjnunist threats to Laos, Thailand, and Cam^bodia. Among the actions suggested were the following:

First, that the restatement of our position on South Vietnam include substantial emphasis on restora.tion of the La.os Accords of 1962 and on the presei'*vation of the neutrality and territorial integrity of Cambodia under the 195^ Accords.

Indeed, we could go still further and take the occasion to talk in terms of an over-all settlement for Southeast Asia that would specifically provide that each nation v;as free to assume vzhatever neutral or other interna-tional posture it wished to take. We could explicitly state that we v;ere prepared to accept a Southeast Asia that was "neutral" in the sense of not adhering to any power bloc or forming a part of any alliance directed s,t others.

We could say a favorable vjord about regional arrangements in Southeast Asia consistent with the concept, and " could indicate cur willingness to join with other outside nations to consider what kind of general assurances of support could be given to such a Southeast Asia....

Second there are strong diplomatic steps that could be

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taken to dramatize the situation in Laos. We could encourage Souvanna to take the case to the UN where Laos and Souvanna have strong appeal. Concurrently, but -we believe less effective in practice, Souvanna could press the British and Soviets to take action or even to reconvene the Geneva Conference of I962.

•

Third, we could attempt similar action for Cambodia. This

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might be through the Australians, to get Sihanouk to take his case also to the UN. Even if he made some accusations against us in the process, he would be likely at the present time to highlight his internal Chinese-backed threat, and the net result could be useful.

A further possibility v;ould be to seek to enlist India more deeply in the Cambodian situation. This is v;orth trying, but the Indians are a weak reed for action or for effective diplomatic dram^atization.

Fourth, we could consider getting the Thai to dramatize their situation more than they have done. This takes carefuJL thought, since they do not wish to alarm their own people. 75/

Other possibilities discussed were the enlisting and engaging of other Asian nations in the search for peace in Vietnam and the Soviet Union in an effort to find peace in Southeast Asia.

In Tab F appeared a discu-ssion of military action against North Vietnam. This tab contained two contrary views concerning the bom.bing camj^aign against NVN, and is discussed in detail in another Task Force paper. This is the first place that any written discussion of the bom.bing campaign against the North appears in any of the papers of the VJorking Group. It is interesting to note, in the light of subseq.uent developments, that neither the Chaii^.an of the Joint Chiefs of Staff nor the Secretary of Defense made mention of e. -oartial or complete bombing suspension of the North at this time. They differed only on the extent to v/hich the bombing campaign ao-ainst North Viet Nam should be intensified. 76/

Tabs G and H, the final Tabs, considered the public affairs problems in dealinp- with increased U.S. troop commitments to SVN and to the calling up of reserve forces. In dealing vrith public opinion and with Congress, these Appendices concluded that from a public affairs viewpoint:

Beyond the basic points of establishing that the war is in the national interest, that there is a plan to end it satis-factoT^ily and that \je can identify the resources needed to carry out that plan, we must prove:

1. That General Viestm-oreland needs the additional troops being sent him.

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~«.<,

2. That he does not need further additional troops at this time.

3. That the Strategic Reserve does need reconstitution at this time-

4. That the possible need of General Westmoreland for possible future reinforcement is sufficiently important

to merit the callup.

5« That there is not a bottomless pit.

6. That the nation still has the resources for the ghetto fight. 77/

Thus5 the mem-orandum forwarded to the President by the Secretary of Defense in response to the Presidential req.uest for an "A to Z reassessment"-of our Vietnam policy again represented a com.promise. In this case^ it was a compromise brought about by differences between the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs and his staffs and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and his officers. Initially^ ISA had prepared a draft Presidential memorandum which had indeed reassessed U.S. strategy in SVN, found it faulty, and recommended a nev/ strategy of protecting the "demographic frontier" with basically the U.S. forces presently in-country. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff fomid "fatal flaws " in this strategy, could not accept the implied criticism of past strategy in the ISA proposal, did not think that the Defense Department civilians should be involved in issuing specific guidance to the military field commander, and supported this field commander in his req^uest for the forces required to allow him to "regain the initiative." The compromise reached, of course, was that a decision on new strategic guidance should be deferred pending a complete political/military reassessment of the U.S. strategy and objectives in Vietnam in the context of our worldwide commitments.

The recommendation for additional forces was also a compromise and was based, as had past decisions of this nature, on what cou-ld be done by the forces in-being without disrupting the nation. However, there were additional reasons adduced for not meeting all of COMUSM^CV's req.uirements for forces. The situation in SVI\^ was not clear. The ability of the Government and of the Army of South Vietnam to survive and to improve v/ere in serious q_uestion- The ability of the U.S. to attain its objectives in SVK by military force of whatever size was not clear. Weighing heavily upon the minds of the senior officials who prepared and approved the h M3,rch memora^ndum to the President v^as, indeed, v/hat difference in the war, what progress toward .victory such a buildup as req.uested by MCV would make. These leaders were, finally, prepared to go a long way down the road in meeting COMUSMCV's request. They recomjnended to the President that the first increm-ent of this request be met. They also recommended a partial m.obilization so as to be prepared to meet additional req.uirem_ents if and V7hen it vjas demonstrated that these forces were necessary and would make a strategic difference.

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More importantly, hwever, these officials finally came to the realization that no military strategy could be successful unless a South Vietnamese political and military entity was capable of vinning the support of its people* Thus, for the first tijne, U.S. efforts v:ere to be made contingent upon specific reform measures undertaken by the GVN, and U.S. leverage was to be used to elicit these reforms. South Vietnam was to be put on notice that the limit of U.S. patience and commitm^ent had been approached.

Concerning negotiations and the bombing of the North, the Memorandum for the President was conventional. No changes in our negotiating position v/ere recommended and no really new diplomatic initiatives were suggested. Concerning the bombing of the North, the only issue indicated concerned the degree of intensification. There v/as no mention made of a partial reduc' tion or cessation.

Thus, faced with a fork in the road of our Vietnam policy, the Working Group failed to seise the opportunity to change directions. Indeed, they seemed to recommend that we continue rather haltingly dovm the same road, meanwhile consulting the map more frec[uently and in greater detail to insure that we were still on the right road.

6. The Clim-a.te of Opinion

This memorandum was presented to the President on Monday evening, h March, and at his req.uest, the recommenda^tions x^^ere passed to General Westm-oreland for his comments. These comments were received by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and passed to the Secretary of Defense on 8 March I968. General Westmoreland welcomed the additional airpower which "would greatly enhance the tactical air support available to groujid units." The chairman indicated, however, that there had been no change in General Westmoreland's req.uirem-ents as originally proposed and, indeed, additional combat service-support forces had been req,uested.

General Westmoreland states that although imj:nediate authorisation for deploynent of 22,000 additional personnel would provide much needed combat and combat support forces, the combat service support forces now in Vietnam are insufficient to support our present force structure. This is especially critical in view of the recent deploym.ent of the 3rd Brigade of the 82d Airborne Division and RLT 27 to the I Corps tactical zone without the appropriate slice of corn-bat support. He emphasizes the absolute req.uirement to provide the support forces identified with the increased deployments prior to or at the sam.e time the tactical forces are deployed. In this regard General Westmoreland has this date forwarded his specific streng'fch recommendations for the immiediate essential comJbat sevrice support forces to provide adeq.uate support for combat units in I CTZ, including the 3rd Brigade of the 82d Airborne Division, RLT 27 and Army un.its which have been redeployed to Northern I Corps tactical zone. This req,uest

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has not yet "been validated by CINCPACj but is currently under consideration here by the Joint Staff in anticipation of early action by Admiral Sharp's headq.uarters.

Finally, General V7estmoreland recognizes that the forces V7hich were contained in the Coimulttee's recommendations were * apparently based upon the capabilities of the Services to produce troops for deployment. He states that there has been no change in his appraisal of the situation since my visit to Vietnam and thus there has been no change in his req.uirements I as originally proposed- 78/

I! From the Hh of March until the final Presidential decision was announced

to the country^ the v/ritten record becomes sparse. The debate vzithin the Administration was argued and carried forward on a personal basis by the officia.ls involved, priifxarily, the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State.

The decision, however, had been placed sq.uarely on the shoulders of the President. The recommendations of the ^f- March memorandum had left him a profound political/military dilemma- The memorandum had recommended "a little bit more of the same" to stabilize the military situation, plus a level of mobilization in order to be prepared to meet any fu.rther deteriori-ation in the ground situation. Any new strategic guidance, any new direction in policy, however, were to be left to a subsequent study.

But many political events in the first few vzeeks of March 1968 ga,ve strong indications that the coimtry was becom.ing increasingly divided over and disenchanted with the current Vietnam strategy, and V70uld no longer settle for "more of the satne" with no indication of an eventual end to the conflict. That the President was aware of these external political pressures and that they influenced his decision is evident.

Focus to this political debate and sense of dissatisfaction vzas given by a startlingly accurate account, published in The Nev? York Times on 10 March, of General Westmoreland^s request and of the strategic reassessment which V7as being conducted v/ithin the executive branch of the governmient. It also indicated the growing doubt and unease in the nation concerning this policy review.

Written by Neil Sheehan and Hedrick Smith, the article stated:

General William C. Westmoreland has asked for 206,000

more American troops for Vietnam., but the req.uest has touched

off a divisive internal debate within high levels of the Johnson Administration.

^ number of sub-Cabinet civilian officia.ls in the Defense

^^ Department, supported by some senior officials in the State

Department' have argued against General Westmoreland's plea

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for a ho per cent increase in Ms forces *to regain the initiative' from the enemy*

....Many of the civilian officials are arguing that there should "be no increase beyond-the movement of troops now under v^ay....

The contention of these high ranking officials is that an American increase will bring a matching increase by North Vietnam, thereby raising the level of violence without giving the allies the upper hand.

Senior Pentagon civilians have put forx^/ard a written counter-proposal to President Johnson^ calling for a shift in American strateg^^ to a concept of close-in defense of popvilated areas with more limited offensive thrusts than at present. Much of the military hierarchy is reported to oppose this approach,.,.

The President has not yet decided on the question of substantial increases in American forces in Vietnam....

Nonetheless J the scope and depth of the internal debate within the Government reflect the vrrenching uncertainty and doubt in this capital, about every facet of the war left by the enemy's dram-atic wave of attacks at Tet, the Asian -New Year holiday, six weeks ago. More than ever this has left a sense of weariness and irritation over the war.

Officials them.selves comment in private about widespread and deep changes in attitudes, a sense that a W8.ter-shed has been reached and that its meaning is Just now beginning to be understood.••.

But at every level of Govern}"ri.ent there is a sense that the conflict, if expanded further, can no longer be called 'a lim-ited war.' Officials acknowledge that any further American involvement carries serious implications for the civilian life of the nation--not only the call-up of military reserves and enactm-ent of a tax increase but problems with the budget, the economy and the balance of payments.

In Congress, uneasy and divided, as the Senate debate on Thursday showed, there is a rising demand that Capitol Hill be consulted.before any critical new step is taken. Even supporters of Administration policy, such as Seziator Richa.rd B. RiTssell, Democrat of Georgia, who is chairman of the Senate Armed Services Cc)m:mittee, are openly critical of American corn-bat strategy. Mr. Russell has suggested that the

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United States has lost the battlefield initiative not only through the enemy's bold tactics but by what he calls its own defensive, gradualist psychology.*,.

General V/estmoreland*s rec^uest for another 206,000 troops, beyond the present authorized 5255 000-man level to be reached by next fall, v/as brought from Saigon last month by Gen. Earle G. VJheeler, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.,..

General VJheeler presented the req.uest to President Johnson at the Vvliite House on Feb. 28, vzhen he delivered a report on his three-day survey of the war situation in South Vietnam. The request was also forv/arded to the President by the Joint Chiefs as a body 'with our approval'....

Military leaders also contend that only a massive infusion of troops will restore the allied initiative. They say it would also permit the allied forces to resume the pacification of the countryside and the war of attrition against the Vietcong that they contend was being successfully waged before the Tet offensive.

The main lines of the case against General Westmoreland's request are contained in a position paper prepared over the last weekend by senior civilian officials in the Defense Depa.rtm-ent, including assistant secretaries. Most of these officials were brought into the Government by former Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara.

The argviment goes like this:

Since the United States military build-up began in I965, Hanoi has gradually increased its forces in South Vietnam and m.aintained a reasonable ratio to the fighting strength of the American Forces. There is every reason to believe, these officials contend, that Hanoi is able and willing to continue to do so if more American troops are sent to Vietnam vzithin the next year.

The reinforcements that General Westmoreland wants would thus not restore the initiative. They would simply raise the level of violence. The United States would spend billions more on the war effort and would suffer appreciably higher casualties.

North Vietnam would likewise endure su.bstantially greater losses. But the experience of the Tet offensive shows, according to this line of reasoning, that American Military commanders have gravely underestimated the capacity of the enem_y to absorb such punishment and to be still able to launch bold offensive operations.

V ) I go there would just be a lot more killing,' one analyst said.

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The Wiite House is also reported to have received an analysis from the Central Intelligence Agency that support this view of Eorth Vietn.fLm*£ manpower resources and its will to resist.

'Essentially^' said one official, 'we are fighting Vietnam's birth rate.*

The Defense Department's paper was verbally endorsed by Deputy

Secretary of Defense Paul T. Nitze and for^-/arded by him to Clark

M. Clifford, the new Defense Secretary, for transmittal to the President on Monday.

Mr. Clifford was impressed with the caliber of the analysis, informants said, but it is not known whether he endorsed the document personally.

The thrust of the argument in the Penta^gon paper is reported to have gained the sympathetic support of a number of senior State Department officials, including Under Secretary Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, William P. Bundy, Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, and others close to Vietnam policy.

11 "^ 'I can tell you that all of us in this building are against a

troop increase, ' one State Departm^ent official said. However^ Secretary Rusk's position on the matter v/as unknown.

The defense position pa-per concludes by proposing a change in American strategy in South Vietnam. This would entail withdrawing from exposed positions like Khesanh in the sparsely populated frontier regions and concentrating on a m^obile defense of the cities and populated areas nearer the sea.

But soiae military officials contend this is not a realistic option. ^ '

'Each tov/n will becom^e a Khesanh, ' they assert, and civilian casualties will soar.

Although most civilian officials declined to use the term 'enclave' to describe their proposed strategy, some conceded that it does amount to a m^odification of the theory advanced by Lieut. Gen. James M. Gavin, retired. He has for months urged that the allies pull back to defensive positions around cities and other important enclaves along the coast.

The Pentagon document suggests that on the political side the United States encouraged the Saigon regime to broaden itself by including non-Comjuunist opposition elements such as the followers of the militant Buddhist leader Tri Quang. A broader base vrould help the regime establish a better relationship with its population and make its army more effective, the paper asserts.

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In their discussion of the American predicament in Vietnam, some civilian officials go significantly further and suggest

that the Administration should concede that 'you cannot completely

defeat the enemy.' The United States, they say, should instead 'buy time' with its present forces while the non-Communist South

Vietnamese can strengthen themselves to the point where they 'believe in their ability to survive against the Communists

after some sort of internal compromise.'

Officials are vague about the ingredients of this compromise, but they acknowledge that it would probably involve negotiations between the Vietcong and the non-Conuriiinists in the South.

Although it clearly entails abandonm^ent of the military solution that is implicit in current Administration policy, they argue that such a compromise would not violate any public American conmiitment to South Vietnam.

While avoiding any decision so far. President Johnson has gained time by putting pressuj^e on General Westmoreland to obtain maximum use of the troops he nov; has. The President has instructed the general to justify in detail his req.uest for reinforcements.

Mr. Johnson has also set in motion extensive staff studies of the full politica^l, economic and military ramifications of giving General Westmoreland more troops. Included among these may be an examination of the possibility of acq.uiring additiona.l forces from vrashington's allies in South Vietnam--Australia, South Korea, Thailand and the Philippines.

The thrust of the President's concern, however, has been v/ith the consequences of troop increases. There is no indication at this time that Mr. Johnson and his closest advisers, I-lr. Rusk, Mr. Clifford and Mr. Rostow are seriously interested in extending the war to Cambodia and Laos or in changing to a strategy of close-in defense of populated areas.

They reject e> political compromise with the Vietcong at this point. Some senior civilian officials, in fact, believe ^ir. Johnson is 'still intensely committed to a military solution.'

I I These officials consider General VJestmoreland's req.uest for

an additional 206,000 men 'unrealistic,' however, and do not believe the Pi^esident will grant it. 79/

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Even prior to this article, there had been a great deal of speculation in the press concerning the need for additional troops in SVN, and the general conclusion seemed to be that some additions would be required. Members of Congress had already demanded that Congress be consulted before any decision was made to increase troop strength in Vietnam significantly. A number of prominent senators had interrupted debate on civil rights on 7 March to make this demand because of "disturbing inform^ation that a Presidential Decision was immiinent," 8o/

The Sheehan article appeared one day before Secretary of State Dean Rusk appeared to testify before the Senate Foreign Relations Comm-ittee. His 2-day grilling indicated a considerable growth in open dissent within the Committee concerning U.S. policy in South Vietnam. Rusk even came under criticism from one of the few Administration supporters on the Committee;, Senator Karl E. Mundt (R-SD), who warned him^ "You are as aware as we are that the shift of opinion in this country is in the v/rong direction" - meaning away from support of U.S. policy in Vietnam. "Som.ething m-ore convincing," said Miondt, "has to come from the Administration as to w^hat this is all about 'to match' the sacrifices .we are marking." Rusk sidestepped all attempts by Senators Fulbright, Gore, and other questioners to pin him down on a possible increase in troops or other element of future Vietnam strategy. It would "not be right for me to speculate about numbers of possibilities," said Rusk, "v7hile the President is consulting his advisors." 8l /

Later, on 12 March, both friends and foes of the President's policy in Vietnam served notice that the present course must be reassessed before more troops were sent to Vietnam.

"Senator Fulbright (D-Ark), Foreign Relations Committee chairman, warned against an escalation that could lead to 'all-out war,' and insisted dviring a televised hearing with Dean Rusk, Secretary of Sta.te, that Congress be consulted before crucial new decisions are m.ade."

But Senator Russell (D-Ga), Armed Services Comraittee chairman, took a different tack, contending that air and sea power should be used to the fullest extent before ground-force levels are increased.

"if we are not willing to take this calculated risk," Russell told a Veterans of Foreign Wars dinner, "we should not still be increasing the half-million m.en in Vietnam who are exposed to danger daily from weapons that mdght have been kept from the hands of our enemies." 82/

These commients from two powerful comjnittee chairmen demonstrated the cross-currents of opinion swirling around the President as he contemplated General Westmoreland's request and the recoimnendations of his advisors.

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Adding fuel to this controversy was the unexpected triiomph in the Nevj- Hampshire Presidential Primary on 12 March of the Democratic "peace" candidate. Senator Eugene McCarthy. This tri-iomph was widely heralded as a repudiation by the voters of the present Administration and its Vietnam policies, and it encouraged another critic of these policies, Senator Robert Kennedy, to announce on l6 March his intention to seek the Democratic Presidential nomination.

7* The President Ponders

At a meeting at the VJhite House on 13 March, the President decided to deploy 30^000 troops to South Vietnam in addition to the 10,500 emergency augmentation already made. This would substantially meet General Westmoreland's initial package req.uest. Army forces v/ould replace those Marine Corps forces requested, as the Marine Corps could not sustain the requested deployments. Also an additional Army brigade (7^363 personnel) would be deployed to replace Marine RLT 27, and its associated support. RLT 27 sould begin to return to CONUS on I5 July. The forces to be deployed v/ere as follov/s:

Deployment Date

A.

C. USN

WSA Da rfeng Support SUB-TOTAL

D. TOTAL MCV

71

1,775 1,775

30,000

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There would be two reserve callups to meet and sustain these deployments, one in March and one in May. The callup in March would support the 3O3COO deployment. The one in May would reconstitute the strategic reserve at seven active divisions. Other ground rules decided upon were: (1) those Reservists to be called in May -would not now be notified; (2) there would be no extensions of terms of service for personnel presently on active duty; (3) no individuals would be recalled, only units. 83 /

This decision was formalized by the Deputy Secretary of Defense in a memorandum to the Chairraan of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on ik March I968. Mr. Nitze asked the chairman to inform. General Westmoreland of these proposals, and to ask him whether he considered the substitutions satisfactory. 8k /

On 1^ March, the Secretary of the Arm.y for-vrarded to the Secretary of Defense his recomm-endations concerning these Program Six deployments, and the Reserve callup necessary to sustain them and to reconstitute the strategic reserve. Secretary Resor pointed out, however, that an additional 13,500 m.en would have to be added to the figure of 30,000 to be deployed, "if the 3d Brigade of the 82nd Airborne is to be left in-country permanently and if the Arm.y is to replace the RLT with an infantry brigade on a perm.anent basis then units with TO&E strength of 13,500 must be included in the March I5 call-up and deployed..,.In addition, the MACV ceiling will have to be increased from 565^000 to 578,500, unless MCV can provide trade-off spaces for all or part of this add-on."

The strength of units to be called up in March would be ^4-5,000, as follows:

a. Units to provide for the additional deploym.ents - 31,563-

b. Units to provide the sustaining troops for 82d Airborne and RLT 2? replacem.ent - 13^.^37-

The May 15 callup v/ould comprise the following:

1 division plus 1 ISI 32,000

1 brigade ^,000 Post, camp and station com,ple-

ment to open 1 additional station 5,000

Total 157000

I This would reconstitute the STRAF at the following levels:

Division 6 ISI 6

SSI

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In addition, the Secretary indicated that the Chief of Staff of the

Army reconnnended:

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,..that one division, its ISI and the station complement, a total of 375000 TOE strength, be alerted 15 March and called up 15 April instead of 15 May in order to provide an earlier ca,pability to react to the unpredicted, a stronger STRAF in light of growing uncertainties in Southeast and Northeast Asia and to assure an earlier improvement of the sustaining base to support the increased deployments and to avoid drawdown on Europe. 87/

The approval of an additional 13,500 deployment to support the em^er-gency augmentation was apparently approved very q.uickly.

In a memorandum for the record on 16 March, the latest tentative plan for Vietnam Deployments and reserve call-ups were listed as follows by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Systems Analysis):

-^' Deployment

Program #5 525,000

Emergency Augmentation 10,500

Support for 10,500 13^500

• Additional Deployment 3 0^000

Total 579.000

2. The Mar ch r eserve call, to be annoimced around 20 March will be:

Support deployment . 36,621

Support persomael for the 10,500 I3,^37

Total 50,05^

The March call will waive the 30 days notice, so troops will report around March 27.

3, Around a week or 10 days later, "after a study" there vzill be a second call of ^8,393-••-These reservists will be given

30 days, therefore reporting around 1 May. 88/

Still, the "President was troubled. In public he continued to indicate firmness and resoluteness, but press leaks and continued public criticism continued to compound his problem. On March I7, the New York Times , again amazingly accurate, forecast that the President would approve dispatch of an additional 33^000 to 50,000 m.en to Vietnam over the next six months.. 89; On March I8 nearly one-third of the House of Representatives, a total of 139 m-em-bers, - 98 Republicans and ^1 Deiriocrats - joined in sponsoring a resolution calling for an immediate Congressional review of the United States policy in Southeast AsiS.. 90/

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On that same day, l8 March^ Mr. Johnson answered these critics, as he charged in a speech before the National Farmers' Union Convention in Minneapolis, that Hanoi is seeking "to win in Washington v;hat it cannot win in Hue or Khe Sanh. Your President welcomes suggestions from commissions, from congressm.en, from, private individuals or groups," he continued, "or anyone who has a plan or program which can stand inspection ^ and open a hope of reaching our goal of peace in the world/' 91/

At this time, the President sought the advice of a group of his friends and confidants outside of government. These men came to Washington on 18 March at the request of the President to receive briefings on the latest developments in the vrar and to advise the President on the hard decision he faced. Present were: former Undersecretary of State George Ball; Arthur Dean, a Republican New York lawyer who was a Korean Vfar negotiator during the Eisenhower Administration; Dean Acheson, form.er President Truman's Secretary of State: Gen. Matthev; B. Ridgevray, the retired commander of United Nations troops in Korea; Gen. Max^fell Taylor, former Chairraan of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Cyrus Vance, former Deputy Defense Secretary and a key troubleshooter for the Johnson Administration; McGeorge Bundy, Ford Foundation President who had been special assistant for National Security Affairs to Mr. Johnson and former President Kennedy; form^er Treasiiiy Secretary C. Douglas Dillon and Gen. Omar Bradley.

The only published account of this consultation, which is considered reliable, was written by Stuart H. Loory and appeared in the Los Angeles Times late in May. According to this report, the group m-et over dinner "with"Secretary of State Dean Rusk; Defense Secretary Clark M. Clifford; Ambassador W. Averell Harriman; Walt W. Rostow, the President's special assistant for National security affairs; General Earle G. VJhee2.er, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Richard Helms, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency; Paul Nitze, Deputy Defense Secretary; Nicholas Katzenbach, Under Secretary of State; and William P. Bundy, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs.

The outsiders questioned the government officia.ls carefully on the vrar, the pa.cification program and the condition of the South Vietnamese government after the Tet offensive. They included in their deliberations the effect of the war on the United States.

After dinner the government officials left and the group received three briefings.

Philip C. Habib, a deputy to William Bundy and now a membier of the American negotiating team in Paris, delivered an unusua,lly frank briefing on the conditions in Vietnam after the Tet offensive. He covered such m^atters. as corruption in South Vietnam and the growing refugee problem. ■ _,

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Habibj according to reliable sources^ told the group that the Saigon government was generally weaker than had been realized as a result of the Tet offensive. He related the situation, some said, with greater frankness than the group had previously heard.

In addition to Habib, Maj • Gen. William E. DePuy, special assistant to the Joint Chiefs for counterinsurgency and special activities, briefed the group on the military situation, and George Carver, a CIA analyst, gave his agency's estimates of conditions in the v/ar zone-

The briefings by DePuy and Carver reflected what many understood as a dispute over enemy strength between the Defense Department and the CIA which has been previously reported. Discrepancies in the figures resulted from the fact that DePuy's estimates of enemy strength covered only identifiable militaiy units, while Carver's included all knov/n military, paramilitary and parttime enemy strength available *

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The morning of March 19, the advisory group assembled in the VJhite House to discuss what they had heard the previous evening and arrived at their verdict. It was a striking turnabout in attitude for all but Ball.

After their meeting, the group met the President for lionch. It was a social affair. I^o business was transacted. The meal finished, the advisers delivered their verdict to the President.

Their deliberations produced this verdict for the chief executive:

Continued'escalation of the war—intensified bombing of North Vietnam, and increased American troop strength in the South—would do no good. Forget about seeking a battlefield solution to the problem, and instead intensify efforts to seek a political solution at the negotiating table.

He v/as repoi^tedly greatly surprised at their conclusions, VJhen he asked them where they had obtained the facts on which the conclusions v?ere based, the group told him of the briefings by Habib, DePuy and Carver.

Mr. Johnson knew that the three men had also briefed his governmental advisers, but he had not received the sarae picture of the war as Rostow presented the reports to him.

As a result of the discrepancy, the President ordered his own direct briefings. At least Habib and DePuy--and alm.ost certainly Carver--had evening sessions with the President.

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Ha"bib was reportedly as frank with the President as he had been with the advisory group. The President asked tough q.uestions. 'Habib stuck to his guns,* one source reported,

VJhatever impext this group's recommendations and the direct briefings he received had on the President was not immediately apparent in any decision which affected the deployment of forces. Even as the President announced, on 22 March, that General William C. Westm-oreland would be recalled from Vietnam to become the Army Chief of Staff, 93/ the Defense Department continued to plan for the deployment of ^3,500 additional troops. In a m.emorandujn to the Secretary of Defense on 23 March I968, the Assistant Secretary (Systems Analysis) forwarded his Prograra #6 Summary Table based on 579^000 men in South Vietnam, 5^,000 over the approved Program #5 ceiling. This 5^,000 was made up of the 10,500 emergency reinforcement package, the 13,500 support forces for it, and the 30,000 additional package. The Assistant Secretary added, that upon notification of approval and desire to announce the nev; plan, the tables would be published, 9V

Hovjever, these particular tables were not to be published. The President sought further advice as he wrestled v/ith the problem which had plagued his Administration. On March 26, Genera.1 Creighton Abra-ms, Deputy COMUSMCV, arrived suddenly and without prior announcement, and was closeted with the President and his senior officials. These ■conferences were conducted in the utmost secrecy amid press speculation that Abrams would be named to succeed General Westmoreland. Further press speculation vzas that the conferences dealt primarily with expansion and modernization of the South Vietnamese armed forces and that this tended to buttress earlier predictions that any increase in Am_erican forces in South Vietnam would be modest. 95 /

S* The President Decides

'Apparently the Presidential decision on deployment of additional U.S. forces to Vietnam was m^de on 28 March and concurred in by General Abram.s* In an undated memorandum (probably written on 27 or 28 March) for the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations, Lt General Lemley, indicated that the Joint Staff' 'had inform-ed him of: •

...tentative decisions arising from the recent conference between the"President, the Chairman, and General Abrams, as well as telecons between the Chairman and General VJestm.oreland. It is believed that a Pi-esidential decision m-ay be m^ade by Friday (29 March) morning.

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T^ew ceiling in WE: 5^9,500

a. Program 5: 525^000-

b. Emergency deplo^mient of 82d Abn, 27th RLT: 11,000.-^

c. Support and sustain emergency deployment: 13^500,-^-

d. Total: 5^9.500.

•^Includes estimated 1^44^ Air Force and Navy.

1st Bde, 5t>a Inf Div (Mech) will replace 27th RLT. Reserve call-up of approximately 62,000.

a. Army 53,957

(13,301 - Support of 3/82d Abn Biv & l/5th Inf Div) (405656 - Reconstitute STRA.F)

b. Navy 1,453

c. Air Force 6,590

d. Total

62,000 96/

A Joint Staff paper entitled "MACV Troop List of Program 6 Add-on," dated 28 March, sujiiinarized service capability to satisfy "MACV's 28 March 1968 req.uest for U.S. forces" as follows:

Tv-70 Eriga.de Increment (Combat For

STRENGTPI

USARV

7th AF

Total Support

- Inf Bde, Sep

- Mech Bde, Sep

- Armored Cav Sq.dn

- 2 TFS (F-lOO) (469 ea) Brigade Increment Increment (Combat Support

"57S39^.

4,882

1,049 994 11,564 and Combat Service

ces)

corns AVAIL D ATE-^-In-Country as 3d Bde/82d

Div Jul 68 Aug 68 Jun/jul 68

Support Forces)

USARV - 2 FA Bn (l55mjn)

- Engr Bn (Cbt)

- Other Support Units

NAVFORV 7th AF

III MF Total

Support Increment

STRENGTH 1,132 812

169 2,752

2,219

1,411 900

1,775

895

707

496

13,268

CONUS AVAIL DATE^ Aui/Sep 6'8~' Aug 68 Jun/jul 68 Aug 68 Sep 68 Oct 68

Unknown/May 69 Jun 68 Jun/jul 68 Unknov/n Apr/Sep 68

TOTAL DEPLOYIVIEIW

24,832

(Excess over 24,500 can be taken from existing credit/ debit account)

"^ CONUS availability date based on deci-sion to call up reserve elements. 97/

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9- The Decision is Annoujicecl

On Sunday^ 31 March, it was announced that the President would address the nation that evening concerning the war in Vietnam. The night before, Saturday, 30 March, a cable was dispatched to the U.S. Ambassadors in Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, Laos, the Philippines, and South Korea. This cable, slugged "Literally Eyes Only for Ambassador or Charge", instructed the addressees to see their respective heads of government and inform them of the following major elements of the President's planned policy annoLincement on Sunday night: 98/

a. Major stress on importance of GVN and ARVK increased effectiveness, with our equipment and other.support as first priority in our own actions.

b. 13,500 support forces to be called up at once in order . to round out the 10,500 combat units sent in February.

c. Replenishment of strategic'reserve by calling up ^8,500 additional reserves, stating that these would be (designed to strategic reserve.

d. Related tax increases and budget cuts already largely needed for non-Vietnam reasons.

3. In addition, after similar consultation and concurrence. President proposes to announce that bombing will be restricted to targets most directly engaged in the battlefield area and that this meant that there would be no bombing north of 20th parallel. Announcement v/ould leave open how Hanoi might respond, and vrould be open-ended as to time. However, it v?ould indicate that Hanoi's response could be helpful in determining whether \je were justified in assuinption that Hanoi v?ould not take advantage if v/e stopping (sic) bombing altogether. Thus, it would to this extent foreshadow possibility of full bombing stoppage at a later point.

This cable offered the Ambassadors some additional rationale for this new policy for their discretionary use in conversations V7ith their respective head^ of govern-ment. This rationale represents the only available statement by the Adm.inistration of some of its underlying reasons and p'orposes for and expectations from this policy decision.

a. you should call attention to force increases that would be announced at the same time and wou3.d m.ake clear our continued resolve. Also our top priority to re-equipping ARVI>[ forces.

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b. You should make clear that Hanoi is most likely to denounce the project and thus free our hand after a short period. Nonetheless 5 we might wish to continue the limitation even after a formal den^onciation, in order to reinforce its sincerity and put the monkey firmly on Planoi's back for v/hatever follows. Of course J any major military change coiild compel full-scale resumption at any time.

c. With or without denunciation, Hanoi might well feel limited in conducting any major offensives at least in the northern areas. If they did so^ this could ease the pressure where it is most potentially serious. If they did not, then this would give us a clear field for vzhatever actions were then req.uired.

d. In view of weather limitations, bombing north of the 20th parallel will in any event be limited at least for the next four weeks or so — which we tentatively envisage as a maximum testing period in any event. Hence, we are not giving up anything really serious in this time frame. Moreover, air power now used north of 20th can probably be used in Laos (where no policy change planned) and in SVN.

I ■—, e. Insofar as our announcement foreshadows any possibility

of a complete bombing stoppage, in the event Hanoi really exercises reciprocal restraints, we regard this as unlikely. But in any . case, the period of dem.onstrated restraint would probably have to continue for a period of several weeks, and V7e would have time to appraise the situation and to consult carefully with them before we undertook any such action.

Thus, in reassuring our allies of our "continued resolve", the cable clearly indicated that not very much was expected of this change in policy It could possibly reinforce our sincerity and "put the mionkey on Hanoi's back for vzha^tever follcv/s." It was not expected that Hanoi would react positively although they might "feel limited in conducting any major offensives at least in the northern areas", admittedly a highly dubious likelihood._

VJhat, then^ was the purpose of this change in policy? If it was not expected that Hanoi would respond positively, or that any other major military benefits would accrue, what then v?as expected? The answer to these question?'^ of course^ could only be speculation at the time^ ____ 'although mar-y of the answers were to be contained in the R-esident's speech on 31 March.

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10. I Shall Not Seek,"and I Will Not Accept..,

The President's speech to the nation on 31 March began with a summary of his efforts to achieve peace in Vietnam over the years. 99/

. . Good evening, my fellow Americans.

Tonight I want to speak to you of peace in Vietnam and Southeast Asia.

No other question so preoccupies our people. No other dream so absorbs the 250 million human beings who live in that ' part of the world. No other goal motivates American policy in

Southeast Asia.

For years J representatives of our government and others have travelled the world -- seeking to find a basis for peace talks.

Since last September, they have carried the offer that I made public at San Antonio.

That offer was this:

That the United States would stop its bombardment of North Vietnam when that would lead promptly to productive discussions — and that we would assiiune that North Vietnam would not take military advantage of our restraint.

Hanoi denounced this offer, both privately and publicly. Even while the search for peace was going on. North Vietnam rushed their prepara-tions for a savage assault on the people, the government, and the allies of South Vietnam.

This s>ttack during the TET holidays, the President indicated, failed to achieve its principal objectives:

It did not collapse the elected goverr-ment of South Vietnam or shatter its army — as the Communists had hoped.

It did not produce a 'general uprising' among the people of the cities as they had predicted.

The Commimists were unable to maintain control of any of |j * the more than 30 cities that they attacked. And they took very

heavy casualties.

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But they did compel the South Vietnamese and their allies to move certain forces from the countryside^ into the citieS.

*

They caused v/idespread disruption and suffering. Their attacks, and the battles that followed, made refugees of half a million human beings.

The Communists may renew their attack any day.

They are, it appears, trying to make I968 the year of decision in South Vietnam — the year that brings, if not final victory or defeat, at least a turning point in the struggle.

This much is clear:

If they do mount another round of heavy attacks, they vrill not succeed in destroying the fighting power of South Vietnam and its allies.

But tragically, this is also clear:' many men -- on both sides of the struggle -- will be lost. A nation that has alres.dy suffered 20 years of v/arfare v/ill suffer once again. Armies on both sides will take new casualties. And the war will go on.

There is no need for this to be so.

In dram.atically announcing the partial suspension of the bombing of North Vietnam as a new initiative designed to lead to peace talks. President Johnson did not voice any of the doubts of the State Department cable of the previous night that this initiative was not expected to be fruitful. Indeed, the central theme of this portion of the speech was that our unilateral action V7a.s designed to lea.d to early talks. The President even designated the United States representatives for such talks.

There is no need to delay the talks that could bring an end to this long and this bloody war.

Tonight, I renev/ the offer T m-ade last August -- to stop the bomba^rdment of North Vietnam. We ask that talks begin promptly, that they be serious talks on the substance of peace. We assume that during those talks Hanoi will not take advantage of ovx restraint.

We are prepared to move immediately toward peace through negotiations.

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So J tonight, in the hope that this action will lead to early talks, I am taking the first step to de-escalate the conflict. ?7e are reducing — substantially reducing -- the present level of hostilities.

And vre are doing so unilaterally, and at once.

Tonight, I have ordered our aircra.ft and our naval vessels to make no attacks on North Vietnam, except in the area north of the DeMilitarized Zone where the continuing enemy build-up directly threa^tens allied forward positions and where the movements of their troops and supplies are clearly related to that threat.

The area in which v;e are stopping our attacks includes almost 90 percent of North Vietnam's population, and most of its territory. Thus there will be no attacks around the principal popu],ated areas, or in the food-producing areas of North Vietnam,

Even this very limited bombing of the North could come to an early end -- if our restraint is matched by restraint in Hanoi. But I ca^nnot in good conscience stop all bombing so long as to do so vrould immediately and directly endanger the lives of our men and our allies. IVhether a complete bombing halt becomes possible in the future will be determined by events.

Our purpose in this action is to bring about a reduction in the level of violence that now exists.

It is to save the lives of brave m.en — and to save the lives of innocent wom-en and children. It is to permit the contending forces to move closer to a political settlement.

And tonight, I call upon the United Kingdom and I call upon the Soviet Union -- as co-chairm-en of the Geneva Conferences, and as perm.anent m.embers of the United Nations Seciu^ity Council --to do all they can to move from the unilateral act of de-escalation that I have just announced tovza^rd genuine peace in Southeast Asia.

Now, as in the past, the United States is ready to send its representatives to any forum, at any time, to discuss the means of bringing this ugly war to an end.

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r I am designating one of our most distinguished Ameri-

cans ^ Ambassador Averell Harriman, as my personal representative for such talks. In addition^ I have asked Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson, who retiirned from Moscow for consultation, to be available to join Ambassador Harriman at Geneva or any other suitable place — just as soon as Hanoi agrees to a conference.

I call upon President Ho Chi Minh to respond positively, and favorably, to this new step toward, peace.

i I If peace did not come through negotiations, ha-zever, the President

indicated tha,t our comjnon resolve was unshakable and our common strength invincible. As evidence of this, he listed the achievements of the South Vietna.m-ese nation.

Tonight, v^e and the other allied nations are contributing 600,000 fighting men to assist 700,000 South Vietnamese troops in defending their little country.

Our presence there has always rested on this basic belief: the main burden of preserving their freedom ^-^ must be carried out by them — by the South Vietnamese

J themselves.

We and our allies can only help to provide a shield — behind which the people of South Vietnam can survive and can grow and develop. On their efforts — on their determinations and resourcefulness — the outcome vzill ultimately depend.

That small, beleaguered nation has suffered terrible punishment for more than twenty years.

i I pay tribute once again tonight to the great courage

and endurance of its people. South Vietnam supports armed forces tonight of almost 700,000 men — and I call your ! I attention to the fact that that is the equivalent of m.ore

than 10 million in ourovzn population. Its people maintain ■ their firm, determination to be free of domination by the North. ^ . _ .

There has been substantial progress, I think, in building a durable government during these, last three vears. The South Vietnam of I965 could not have survived the enemy's Tet offensive of I968. The elected govern-m.ent of South Vietnam survived that attack — and is rapidly repairing the devastation that it wrought.

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The South Vietnamese know that further efforts are going to be required:

— to expand their own armed forces^

-- to move back into the countryside as quickly as possible,

-- to increase their taxes,

-- to select the very best men that they have for civilian and military responsibility,

— to achieve a new unity within their constitutional government,

— and to include in the national effort all of those groups who wish to preserve South Vietnam's control over its o\ra destiny.

Last week President Thieu ordered the mobilization of 135,000 additional South Vietnamese. He plans to reach — as soon as possible -- a total military strength of more than 800,000 men.

To achieve this, the government of South Vietnam started the drafting of 19-year-olds on March 1st, On May 1st, the Government will begin the drafting of 18-year-olds.

Last month, 10^000 men volunteered for military service -■ that wa.s two and a half tim_es the number of volunteers during the same month last year. Since the middle of January, m.ore than i|8,000 South Vietnamese have joined the armed forces — and nearly half of them volunteered to do so.

All men in the South Vietnamese armed forces have had their toiurs of duty extended for the duration of the war, and reserves are now being called up for imjriediate active duty.

President Thieu told his people last week:

"We must make greater efforts and accept more sacrifices because, as I have said m.any times, this is our country. The existence of our nation is at stake, and this is mainly a Vietnamese responsibility."

He warned his people that a m.ajor national effort is required to root out corruption and incompetence at all

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levels of government.

We applaud this evidence of deterraination on the part of South Vietnam. Our first priority will be to support their effort.

We shall accelerate the re-eq.uipment of South Vietnajn's armed forces — in order to meet the enemy's increased firepower. This will enable them progressively to undertake a larger share of combat operations against the Comm.unists invaders.

The token increase in U.S. troop deployments to South Vietnam which presaged for the first time a limit to our commitment and pointed to a change in ground strategy^ an issue which had caused such great speculation in the press and controversy in Congress and within the Administration, received short mention in the speech. It seemed almost a footnote to the dramatic sta.tements which had preceded it.

On many occasions I have told the American people that we would send to Vietnsja those forces that are req.uired to accomplish our mission there. So^ \vith that as our guide, we have previously authorized a force level of approximately , 525,000.

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Some weeks ago — to help meet the enemy's new offensive -" we sent to Vietnam about 11,000 additional Marine and airborne troops. They vrere deployed by air in ^8 hours, on an emergency basis. But the artillery, tank, aircraft, and other units that were needed to work with and support these infantry troops in combat could not accompany them on that short notice.

In order that these forces may reach maximimi combat effectiveness, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have recommended to me that we should prepared to send -- during the next five months — support troops totalling approximately 13,5^0 men.

A portion of these men will be made available from our a.ctive forces. The balance will come from Reserve Component units which will be called up for service.

The n::xt portion of the President's speech detailed the cost of the Vietnam War and made a plea for Congressional action to reduce the deficit by passing the surtax which had been requested almost a year

before.

In summary, the President reiterated the UcS, objectives in South Vietnam and gave his appraisal of what the U.S. in pursuit of those objectives, hoped to accomplish in Southeast Asia.

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I cannot promise that the initiative that I have announced tonight will be completely successful in achieving peace any more than the 30 others that we have -undertaken and agreed to in recent years.

But it is our fervent hope that North Vietnam^ after years of fighting that has left the issue unresoJ-ved, will now cease its efforts to achieve a military victory and will join with us in moving toward the peace table.

And there m.ay come a time when South Vietnam --on both sides -- are able to work out a way to settle their own differences by free political choice rather than by war.

As Planoi considers its course^ it should be in no doubt of our intentions. It must not miscalculate the pressures within our democracy in this election year.

We have no intention of widening this war.

But the United States will never accept a fake solution to this long and arduous struggle and cs.ll it peace.

No one can foretell the precise terms of an eventual settlement.

Our objective in South Vietnam has never been the annihilation of the enemy. It has been to bring about a recognition in Ha^noi that its objective --■ taking over the South by force -- could not be achieved.

Y!e think that peace can be based on the Geneva Accords of 195^ — under political conditions that permit the South Vietnamese — all the South Vietnamese — to chart their course free of any outside domination or interference, from us or from, anyone else.

So tonight I reaffirm the pledge that we made at Manila — that we are prepared to withdraw our forces from South Vietnam as the other side withdraws its forces to the North, stops the infiltration, and the level of violence thus subsides.

Our goal of peace and self-determination in Vietnam is directly related to the future of all of Southeast Asia —

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where much has happened to inspire confidence during the past 10 years. We have done a,ll that we knew how to do to contribute and to help build that confidence....

Over time, a wider, frajtiev7ork of peace and security in Southeast Asia m-ay become possible. The new cooperation of the nations in the area could be a foundation-stone. Certainly friendship vath the nations of such a Southeast Asia is what the United States seeks -- and that is all that the United States seeks.

One day, my fellov/ citizens^ there will be peace in South' east Asia.

It will com.e because the people of Southeast Asia want it -- those whose armies are at war tonight, and those who, though threatened, have thus far been spared.

Peace will com-e because Asians were willing to work for it -- and to sacrifice for it -- and to die by the thousands for it.

But let it never be forgotten: peace will come also ) because America sent her sons to help secure it.

It has not been easy — far from it. During the past tovoc and a half years, it has been my fate and my responsibility to be cornmander-in-chief. I have lived -- daily and nightly -- v^ith the cost of this V7ar. I knovj the pain that it has inflicted. I know perhaps better than anyone the misgivings that it has aroused.

Throughout this entire, long period, I have been sustained by a single principle:

-- that V7hat v^e are doing now, in Vietna^m, is vital not only to the security of Southeast Asia, but it is vital to the security of every American.

Surely we have treaties which we must respect. Surely vre have cornmitm.ents that we are going to keep. Resolutions of the Congress testify to the need to resist aggression in the world and in Southeast Asia.

But the heart of our involvement in South Vietnam — Uiider three Presidents,' three separate Administrations — has always been America's own security.

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And the larger pur-pose of our involvement has alvzays "been to help the nations of Southeast Asia become independent and stand alone^ self-sustaining as members of a great world communitsy.

-- At peace with themselves^ and at peace with all others.

With such an Asia^ our country -- and the world — will be far more secure than it is tonight.

I believe that a peacefuJL Asia is far nearer to reality^ because of what America has done in Vietnam. I believe tha.t the men v/ho endure the dangers of battle -" fighting there for us tonight — are helping the entire world avoid far greater conflicts^ far wider wars^ far more destruction^ than this one.

I pray that it \j±ll not be rejected by the leaders of North Vietnam. 1 pray that they vrill accept it as a means by which the sa^crifices of their ovm people may be ended. And I ask your help and your support^ my fello>7 citizens5 for this effort to reach across the battlefield toward an early peace.

Finally^ the President s^ddressed himself in a highly personal m-anner to the issue that had seemed uppermost in his mind throughout the preceding month of delibere-tion^ reassessment and reappraisal of our Vietnam policy — the issue of domestic unity.

Yet5 I believe that we must always be mindful of this one things whatever the trials and the tests ahead. The ultimate strength of our country and our cause will lie not in pov/erful weapons or infinite resources or boundless wealth, but will lie in the maity of oivc people.

This5 I be3-ieve very deeply.

Throughout my entire public career I he^ve followed the personal philosophy that I am a free man., an American, a public servant and a member of my Party, in that order always and only.

For 37 years in the service of our nation, first as a Congressman, as a Senator and as Vice President 8,nd now as your President, I have put the unity of the people first. I have put it ahead of any devisive partisanship.

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And in these times as in times before^ it is true that a house divided against itself by the spirit of faction^ of party5 of region^ of religion, of race, is a house that cannot stand.

There is division in the American house now. There is devisiveness among us all tonight. And holding the trust that is mine, as President of all the people, I cannot disregard the peril to the progress of the American people and the hope and the prospect of peace for all peoples.

So, I would ask all Americans, whatever their personal interests or concern, to guard against devisiveness and all its ugly conseq.uences.

Fifty-two m-onths and ten days ago, in a moment of tragedy and trauma, the duties of this office fell upon me. I asked then for your help and God^s, that we might continue Am.erica on its course, binding up our v/ounds, healing our history, moving forward in new unity, to clear the American agenda and to keep the American coimnitment for all of our people.

United vze have kept that commitment. United v/e have enlarged that commitment.

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Through all time to com.e, 1 think America will be a stronger nation, a more just society, and a land of greater opportunity and fulfilment because of wha.t we have all done together in these years of unparalleled achievement.

Our reward v/ill come in the life of freedom, peace, and hope that our children will enjoy through ages s.head.

>?hat we won vjhen all of our people united just m-ust not now be lost in suspicion, distrust, selfishness, and politics araong any of our people.

Having eloquently stated the need for unity in a nation divided, the President then made the dramatic arj20uncem.ent which shocked and electrified the nation and the world, an announcement intended to restore unity to the divided nation:

Believing this as I do, I have concluded that I should not permJ-t the Presidency to become involved in the partisan ■ divisions that are developing in this political year.

With America's sons in the fields far away, with America's future ujider challenge right here at home, with our hopes

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and the world's hopes for peace in the balance every day^ I do not believe that I should devote an hour or a day of my time to any personal partisan causes or to any duties other than the awesome duties of this office — the Presidency of your country.

AccordinglyJ I shall not seek, and I will not accept, the nomination of my Party for another term as your President. ■

But let men everywhere know, however, that a strong, a confident, and a vigilant America stands ready tonight to seek an honorable peace -- and stand ready tonight to defend an honored cause -- whatever the price, v/hatever the burden, whatever the sacrifices that duty may req.uire.

Thank you for listening.

Good night and God bless all of you.

11. E pilogue

On April 4, 1968, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, in a memorandum for the Secretaries of the Military Departments and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff established Southeast Asia Deployment Program #6. This progrejn added 2^,500 persomiel to the approved Program #5, and placed ' a new ceiling of 5^9^500 on U.S. forces in South Vietnam, lOO/ None of

the some 200,000 troops req.uested by General Westmoreland on 27 February were to be deployed.

La.te in the afternoon of April 3, 1968, the "White House released the following statement by President Johnson:

Today the Government of North Vietnam made a statement which included the following paragraph, and I q.uote:

"However, for its part, the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam declares its readiness to ' . appoint its representatives to contact the United States representative v/ith a view to determining with the American side the unconditional cessation of the United States bombing raids and all other acts of war against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam so that talks m.ay start."

Last Sunday night I expressed the position of the United States with respect to peace in Vietna^n and Southeast Asia as follows:

"Now, as in the past, the United States is ready to send its representatives to any forum, at any time, to discuss the means of bringing this war to an end."

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Accordingly^ we will establish contact with the representatives of North Vietnam, Consultations with the Governiuent of South Vietnam and our other allies are now taking place- lOl/

The first step on what would undoubtedly be a long and tortuous road to peace apparently had been taken. In one dramatic action^ President Johnson had for a time removed the issue of Vietnam from domestic political contention. In an unexpectedly prompt and responsive reply to his initiative ;, Hanoi had moved the struggle for South Vietnam into a nev/ path.

As has been indicated^ little had been expected to result from the partial bombing halt and the limitation upon U.S. troop comm.itments to South Vietnam. Why, then^ were these steps taken?

In March of I9685 the President and his principal advisers vrere again confronted with a dilemm-a which t^iey had faced before, but which they had postponed resolving. Although seldom specifically stated, the choice had a3-v/ays been either to increase U.S. forces in South Vietnam as necessary to achieve military victory or to limit the U.S. commitment in order to prevent the defeat of our South Vietnamese allies while they put their political-military house in order. In the past, the choice had not been . so clear-cut. Progress tov/ard military victory had been promised with sm-all increases in force levels vzhich did not req.uire large reserve call-ups or economic dislocations-. Military victory would then assure a viable South Vietnamese political body capable of protecting and gaining the suppoi^t of its people.

In March of I968, the choice had become clear-cut. The price for military victory had increased vastly, and there was no assurance that it v/o\ild not grov/ again in the future. There were also strong indications that large and growing elements of the America.n public had begun to believe the cost had already reached unacceptable levels and would strongly protest a large increase in that cost.

The political reality v/hich faced President Johnson vzas tha.t "more of the sam-e" in South Vietnam, with an increased comjnitment of American lives and money and its consequent im.pact on the country, accompanied by no guarantee of military victory in the near future, had becom-e unacceptable to these elem-ents of the American public. The optimistic military reports of progress in the war no longer rang true after the shock of the TET offensive.

Thus, the President's decision to seek a new strategy and a new road to peace was based upon two m.ajor considerations:

(1) The convictions of his principal civilian advisers, particularly Secretary of Defense Clifford, that the troops requested by General Westmoreland would not make a military_ victory any more likely; and

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(2) A deeply-felt conviction of the need to restore unity to the Americavn nation.

For a polic^r from which so little was expected, a great deal v/as initiated. The North Vietnamese and the Americans sat dcvm at the conference table in Paris to begin to travel the long road to peace; the issue of Vietnam largely was removed from Araerican political discord; a limit to the comjnitment of U.S. forces was established; and the South Vietnam.ese were put on notice that, with ovx help, they would be expected to do more in their ovm defense-

The "A to Z" reassessment of U.S. strategy in South Vietnam in the wake of the TET offensive did not result in the announcement of a new ground strategy for South Vietnara. But in placing General Westmoreland's request for forces squarely in the context of the achievement of U.S. political-military objectives in South Vietnam,"the limited political nature of those objectives was for the first time affii*med. A new ground strategy, based on tlBse limited objectives and upon the ceiling on U.S. troops became a corollary for the new U.S. conmiander.

American forces initially were deployed to Vietna^m in order to prevent the South Vietnamese from losing the war, to insure that aggression from the north would not succeed. Having deployed enough troops to insure that KVN aggression v/ould not succeed, it had been almost a reflex action to start planning on hov7 much it would take to "win" the war. Lip service was given to the need for developing South Vietnamese political institutions, but no one at high levels seem^ed to question the assumption that U.S. political objectives in South Vietnam could be attained through military victory-

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However, it was quickly apparent that there was an em.barrassing lack of knowledge as to how much it would take to win the war. This steiraned from, uncertainty in two areas: (l) how much effort the North Vietnam.ese were willing to expend in terms of men and m-ateriel; and (2) how effective the South Vietnam-ese armed forces would be in establishing security in the couj-itryside. As the war progressed, it appeared tliat our estim.ates of the form-er were too low and of the latter too high. However, committed to a military victory and having little information as to what was needed mdli-tarily, the civilian decision makers seemed willing to accept the field commander's estimate of what was needed. Steady progress was promised and was apparently being accomplished, although the commitment of forces steadily increased.

The TET offensive showed that this progress in m.any ways had been illusory. The possibility of military victory had seemdngly become remote

P'and the cost had becom.e too high both in political and economic terms. Only then were our uJ-tim,ate objectives brought out and re-examined. Only t then was it realized that a clear-cut military victory was probably not

possible or necessary, and that the road to peace would be at least a-s

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dependent upon South Vietnamese political development as it would be on Ajaerican arms. This realization^ then^ made it possible to limit the American military commitm.ent to South Vietnam to achieve the objectives for which this force had originally been deployed. Ajnerican forces would remain in South Vietnam to prevent defeat of the Governraent by Comiaunist forces e.nd to provide a shield behind which that Government could rally;, become effective^ and win the support of its people.

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FOOTI^JOaES

1. COMUSMAC^ 6iT'i-2^ 260T55 Jan 68^ Sia'bject: "Annual Assessment."

2. "U.S, Aides Predict All-Out Red Drive as Prelude to Talks/' by George R. Packard^ Philadelphia Bulletin ^ 11 Jan 68^ p. 1.

3. JCS-1 91-68, 12 Feb 68, Subject: "Emergency Reinforcement of COMUSviACV."

h. JCS Msg 9926, I30218Z Feb 68, Subject: "Deployment of Brigade Task Force of 82nd Airborne Division to SVTJ (S)o"

5. Ibid .

6. JCS Msg 9929, 1303^12 Feb 6Q, Subject: "Deployment of Marine Corps Regiment (Reinforced) to SVW (S)."

7. Ibid.

8. CIWCPAC Msg to JCS/CINCSiraKS, I50125Z Feb 68, Subject: "Deployment of Marine Regiment (u)" JCS in 12316.

9. DJSM 259-68, Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, Subject: "Marine Deployments to Vietnam (u)," dated 6 Mar 68.

10. JCSf'I 95-68, 13 Feb 68, Subject: "Emergency Reinforcement of COMUSf/iACV(C). "

11. Report of Chairman, JCS on Sj.tuation in Vietnam and MACV Force Requirements, 2? Feb 1968 (TS).

12. Ibid ., pp. 1-2.

13. Ibid., p. 12. ill-. Ibid,, pp. 12-13.

15. Ibid., p. 13=

16. Ibid., p. iJ^.

17 Handwritten notes by Morton Halperin from conversation with Paul'Warnke, 29 Feb I968 (TS-EYES OHLY) .

18. Memorandum from V/illiam Bundy to General Taylor and Mr. Warnke, 29 Feb'1968 (TS-EODIS).

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19. Halperin notes, op* clt.

20. Office of National Estimates^ Central Intelligence Agency^ Memorandujn for the Director^ Subject: The Outlook in Vietnam_, dated 26 Feb I968 (s).

21. Central Intelligence Agency^ Memorandujn^j Subject: Coranrunist "Alternatives in Vietnam^ dated 29 Feb I968 (S)

22. Ibid.; p. 1 ' . '

23. Central Intelligence Agency^ Memorandum^ Subject: Questions Concerning the Situation in Vietnam^ dated 1 March I968 (s).

2^1-. W. P. B-undy^ Draft Memorandum for the Group^ Subject: Alternative Courses-of Action^ dated 29 Feb I968 (TS).

25. Department of Statej Memorandum for the Group^ Subject: Checklist of Factors Affecting Alternative Courses of Action^ dated 29 Feb 1968^ initialed by Nicholas deB. Katzenbach (TS-NODIS)o

26. ¥0 P. Bujidy^ Draft Memorandiijn for the Group_, op. cit .^ 29 Feb 68.

( ■. 27. W. P. Bundy^ Draft Memorandum for the Group^ Subject: Intro5.uctory

^ ' Paper on Key Elements in the Situation^ dated 29 Feb I968 (TS).

28. Department of State^ ^'Possible Soviet Responses to Various US Actions in Indochina — Vietnam^ Laos and Cambodia;*' ^'Probable Chinese Responses to Certain US Courses of Action in Indochina--Vietnam^ Laos and Cambodia;" "Probable Western European Reaction to Various US Coirrses of Action in Indochina — Vietnam^ Laos^ Cambodia," vm-■ dated papers (TS).

29. Cable; MOSCOW 2983, OII5I5Z March I968, TS-LIIERAILY EYES 0I\rLY for Under Secretary from Ambassador.

30. V^- P« Bundy; Draft Memorandum^ Subject: Eiuropean and Other Non-Asian Reactions to a Major US Force Increase, dated 1 Mar 19'o8 (TS) .

31. Wo P. Bimdy, Draft Memorandum^ Subject: Asian Reaction to a Major U.S. Force Increase, dated 1 Mar 68 (TS) .

32o W. P. Bundy; First Draft; Subject: Options on Our Negotiating Posture, dated 29 Feb 68 (TS).

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33.

Undated Memorandum^ Subject: Viet-Kam Alternatives^ signed M.D.T.^ General Taylor took^ as the U.S. objective^ the statenient of Pres. Johnson in his speech at Johns Hopkins University in April 19^5: "Our ohjective is the independence of South Viet-Najn and its freedom from attack. We vant nothing for ourselves^ only that the people of South Viet-Nam be allowed to guide their country in their own

way.

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34. OASD/SA^ Draft Memorand-um_j Subject: Deploionents - A Discussion of Alternatives^ undated (s).

35. Ibid.

36. OASD/SA^ Draft Memorandum^ Subject: Pacification Slowdovm^ undated (C)

37. Ibid .J p. 2

38. OASD/SAj Draft Memorandujn^ Subject: The Status of RVNAF^ xmdated (TS).

39, 0ASD/SA_, Draft Memorand-ujn^ Subject 29 Feb 1968; pp. 1-2 (TS).

^0. Ibid., pp, 2-i]-.

Alternative Strategies, dated

Ij-1. OASD/SA, Draft Memorandtijn, Subject: Data for Analysis of Strategies, undated (TS).

li-2. Phil G. Go-ud-ding, Draft Memorandum, Subject: Possible Public Reaction to Various Alternatives, undated (TS).

^3. I^id c, p. 5

l^l[-. Mem.orandum for the President, Subject: Alternative Strategies in SVW, 1st Draft, 29 Peb I968 (TS-SSLJS)

1^.5. Ibid., 3rd Draft, 1 Mar I968 (TS-SENS) 46. Ibid., p. 3 Ij-T. - Ibid ., pp 5-^-48. Ibid., pp. 6-T.

^p lip ipp«, I »■ p*

^9- l^-^ PP- ^"^°' " ■

50. Ibid*. Annex II, Alternative Couxses of Military Action, pp. 8-10»

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51. I"bid,j pp. 12-13. . ^

52 Iljid ,^ AnnexZI^ Population Security^ P* 15-

53. Ibid ,^ p. 16.

54. IMd.^ pp. 16-17.

55. rbid.^ Appendix^ Strategy "by Corps Tactical Zon e^ pp. A-3 - A-8.

56. I'bid,;, Appendix^ Effects of Strategy on Interior ProvinceS j pp. A-l - A-3

57. rbid.^ p. 2.

58. Brig. Gen. Harris W. HoUis^ Director of Operations^ ODCSOPS^ DA; Memorandimi for LTC Lemley^ SulDject: CIITCPAC Force RecLUD-rements^ dated 27 Feb 1963 (s); Lt Col Spiller^ ODCSOPS^ DA^ Suppleraental Information^ Subject: 14ACV Requirements and Major Ground Forces Deployment by Option^ 1 Mar 1968 (s).

59. Assistant Secretary of Defense^ ISA^ Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense_, Subject: General Wheeler's View of the T\-7o Fatal

Flaws in the Popiilation Control Strategy^ dated 2 Mar, I968 (TS-SEHS).

60. MAC 02951^ 0209^72^; from General VJestmoreland to General Wheeler, (TS-LD^E)IS,EYES OKLY)o

61. Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Plans and Policy Directorate, Short Range Branch, J-5, Su.bject: Ana.lysis of COl^SJ-lA-CV Force Requirements and Altermtives, dated 1 Mar I96S (TS-SEIIS) .

62. Memorandum for the President, 3 Mar Draft (Goulding -Warlike) (TS-SENS).

63. Jbido, p. 8.

6*4. Ibid., pp. 8-10.

65. Ibid .^ pp. 5-6.

GS> Draft Memorandum for the President, ij-. Mar 1968 (TS-SENS), pp. 1-2.

67. Ibid.; Tab A, The Justification for Ixomediate Additional Forces in South Vietnam, pp. 1-2.

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68. Ibid.J Tab B^ Increasing the Effectiveness of Vietnamese Efforts Tn"Gonjunction with a U.S. Troop Increase^ pp. 1-7.

69. Ibido^ Tab C^ Justification for Increasing the Strategic Reserve^ PP- 1-2.

70. Ibid.J Tab D^ Necessity for In-Lepth Study of Vietnam Policy and Strategic Guidance^ po 1.

71. Ibid .J pp. 1-2.

72. Ibid., pp. 2-3-

73. Ibid.; Tab E_, Negotiating Posture Options_, and Possible Diplomatic Actions, p. 1.

7I4-. Ibid .; pp. h-6,

76. Ibid., Tab F, Military Action Against North VietnaiUo

^, Y7. Ibid., Tab G, Difficulties and Negative Factors in the Course of

Action; Tab H, Problems We Can Anticipate in U.S. Public Opinion, p. k.

78. CM-3098-68, Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, Subject: COLiU^'IACV Force Req.uirements, dated 8 Mar 68 (TS-SSHS).

79. Neil Sheehan and Hedrick Smith, "Westmoreland Req^uests 206,000 More Men, Stirring Debate in Adiainistration, New York Times 3 10 Mar 19^8, pp. 1,11-

80. Joseph R.L. Sterne, "War Critics Denounce Any Troop Rises," Baltirnor e Sun , March 8, I968, p^ 1; John W. Finney, "Criticism of War~\'jTdens in Senate on Build-Up Issue," N ew York Times ^ 8 Mar 68, p. 1.

Joseph R.L. Sterne, "For Different Aims, Rnssell, Fulbrlght Ask Viet Restudy," Baltimore Sun , 13 March I968, p. 1.

82. Ibid. " " "■

8So Handv/ritten notes by Alain Enthoven from meeting with Secretary • Clifford l-'Ir. Vfarnke, Mr. Resor, General V/heeler,, I3 Mar. I968. (s)

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8k. Deputy Secretary of Defense^ Memorandum for Chairm?on of the Joint Chiefs of Staffs Subject: Southeast Asia Deployments^ dated Ik Mar 1968. (TS) •

85- Secretary of the Army^ Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense_, Ik Mar 1968 (S).

86. Ibid.

87- Chief of Staff ^ USA^ Memorandum for the Secretary of the Army^ Subject: Call-Up of Reserves and Program 6 Deployoaent^ dated Ik Mar 1968.

88. Alain Enthoven^ Memorandujn for the Record^ 16 Mar 1968,

89. Robert H. Phelps^ "More U.S. Troops Going to Vietnam/' New Y ork T im.es^ 17 1/Iar. 1968^ p. 1.

90. John W. Finney^ "Third of House Wants Review of War Policy_j" ■ ^ York Times , I9 Mar. 1968^ po 32.

91. Muriel Dubbin, ^^War Foes Censored by Johnson," Baltiiaore Sun , 19 Mar. 1968, p, lo

92. StLxart H. Loory,

93o Charles W. Corddry, 'Vestmoreland Attains Ho. 1 Goal," Baltimore Sun , 23 l^r. 1968, pp. 1, 25.

9li-. ' Assistant Secretary of Defense (Systems Analysis), Memorandum for

Secretary of Defense, Subject: Prog-ram 7^6 Sujnmary Table (Tentative) (U), dated 23 Mar. I968, (TS). ■

95 o Miirray l-lardes, "General Abrams, LBJ Confer on Vietnam," W ashington Post, 27 Mar. I968, p. 1; Neil Sheehan, "Gen. Abrams in Capitol, Sees President and Aides," New York Times , March 27, I968, p. 2,

96. Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations, Memorandum for Chief of Staff, U,S. Army, Subject: MA.CV Requirements, undated, (S)

97. Joint Staff, Pacific Division, J-3, Subject: mCV Troop List, Program 6 Add-On, dated 28 March I968. Corrected 5 April I968.

98 ' D^p^rtment of State Message 139^31, 30 March I968 (TS-NODIS LITEMLLY I I . E^S ONLY, FOR AIvIEASSADOR-OR CHARGE).

Qo. Remarks of the President to the Nation, March 3I, 1968.

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100. Deputy Secretary of Defense, Memorandum for Secretaries of the Military Departments, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Assistant Tecretaries of Defense, Subject: Southeast Asia Deployment Program #6(11), dated k April 1968(s).

it 101. White House Press Release, 3 April 1968-

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