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and was designed to bring the DRV to the negotiating table. If that occurred the pressures were to be suspended--although with the threat of resumption should negotiations break down.

In the course of the month, these"options converged and the distinctions between them blurred. In particular^ option A was expanded to include some low-level pressures against the North; the negotiations element of option B was^ in effect, dropped and the pressures were to be applied at a faster, less flexible pace; and option C was stiffened to resemble the first incarnation of option B--the pressures woxild be stronger and the negotiating position tougher. Thus, by the end of the m.onth when the Working Group's proposals were presented to the NSC Principals for consideration before a recommendation was made to the President, all options included pressures against the North, and, in effect, excluded negotiations in the short-run, since the terms and pre-conditions proposed in all three options were entirely unrealistic. The policy climate in Washington simply was not receptive to any suggestion that U.S. goals might have to be compromised. And, in proposing pressures against the North, the Working Croup was conscious of the danger that they might generate compelling v/orld-wide pressure on the U.S.^for negotiations. How large a role the specific perception of the President's views, validated or unvalidated, may have played in the Working Group's narrowing of the options is not clear. It seems likely, however, that some guidance from the VJhite House was being received.

During the last week in November, the NSC Principals met to consider the Working Group's proposals. They v^ere joined on November 27 by Ambassador Taylor. Taylor's report on conditions in South Vietnam was extremely bleak. To improve South Vietnamese morale and confidence, and to "drive the DRV out of its reinforcing role and obtain its cooperation in bringing an end to the Viet Cong insurgency," he urged that military pressures against the North be adopted. His report had a considerable impact on the Principals and later on the President. As the discussions continued through the several meetings of that week, opinion began to converge in favor of some combination of an "extended option A" and the first measures against the North of option C.

^In the end, the Principals decided on a two-phase recommendation to the President. Phase I would be merely an extension of current actions with some increased air activity by the U.S. in Laos and tit-for-tat reprisals for VC attacks on U.S. forces or other major incidents. During this period, the GVN would be informed of our desires for its reform and when these were \jell under\my, phase II, a campaign of gradually escalating air strikes against the North, would begin. This proposal was presented to the President on December 1. He approved phase I and gave assent, at least in principle, to phase II. In approving these measures, the President appears to have been reluctant to grant final authorisation for phase II until he felt it was absolutely necessary.

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If a consensus vms reached within the Administration in favor of military pressures against the Ncrth^ it certainly reflected no cornraonly held rationale for such action. Generally speaking the military (MA.CV, CIKCPAC, • JCS) favored a strong campaign against the North to interdict the infiltration routes 5 to destroy the overall capacity of the North to support the insurgency^ and to destroy the DRV^s will to continue support of the Viet Cong. The State Department (with the exception of George Ball) and the f civilian advisors to Secretary McHamara favored a gradually mounting series

of pressures that would place the North in a slo\j squeeze and act as both carrot and stick to settling the war on our terms. As would be expected^ State was also concerned vrith the international political implications of such steps. Bombing the North would demonstrate our resolve, not only to the South Vietne^mese but also to the other Southeast Asian countries and to- China, whose containment was one of the imiportant justifications of the entire American involvement. Walt Rostow, the Chairman of State's Policy Plan_ning Co^oncil^j took a slightly different view, .emphasizing the importance of pressures as a clear signal to the North and to China of U.S. determination and resolve and its v/illingness to engage the tremendous power at its disposal in support of the 195^ and 1962 Geneva agreements. Ambassador Taylor supported strikes against the North as a means of reducing infiltration and as a way of bolstering South Vietnamese morale.

As is readily apparent, there was no dearth of reasons for striking North. Indeed, one almost has the impression that there were more reasons than were required. But in the end, the decision to go ahead with the strikes seem.s to have resulted as much from the lack of alternative proposals as from any compelling logic advanced in their favor. By January, for example, William Bundy, while still supporting the pressures, could only offer the following in their favor:

"on balance we believe that such action would have some faint hope of really improving the Vietnamese situation, and, above all, would put us in a much stronger position to hold the next line of defense, nam.ely Thailand." _ /And it would put us in a better position in our Asian relations/ "since we vrould have appeared to Asiajis to have done a lot more about it."

It is interesting to note that during the deliberations of September one of the preconditions to such strikes had been generally acknowledged as a unity of domestic American opinion in support of such Presidentially authorized action. During the November debates, this is no longer an important factor. Indeed, it is openly conceded that such action is likely to evoke opposition in both domestic and international public opinion. Another interesting aspect of this policy debate v;as that the q,uestion of Constitutional authority for open acts of war against a sovereign nation was never seriously raised.

Phase I of the newly approved r-rogram went into effect in mid-December, The BARREL ROLL "armed recce" by U.S. aircraft in the Laotian panhandle began on a limited scale on December 1^. It had been foreseen that the

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nuinber of sorties would slov^ly increase vath each succeeding week. How-ever^ once the first week's level of two missions of four aircraft each vras determined by Secretary McNamara^ it became the guideline for the remainder of .December and January. Covert GW operations along the North Vietnaraese coast \reve continued at about the level of the previous months and JCS proposals for direct U.S. air and naval support were rejected. Furthermore, the public disclosure of information on DRV infiltration into the South was deferred at the request of Secretary McFamara. On December 2k:, the Viet Cong bom^bed a U.S. officers billet in Saigon killing two Americans. MACV, CINCPAC5 the JCS, and Ambassador Taylor all called immediately for a reprisal strike against the North of the kind authorized under phase I. For reasons still not clear, the Administration decided against such a reprisal. Thus, in purely military terms, the phase I period turned out to be little more than a continuation of measures already underv.^ay. (The BARREL ROLL activity apparently was not differentiated by the DRV from RL/VF strikes until well into January.)

One of the explanations for this failure to fully implement the December 1 decisions was the political crisis that erupted in South Vietnam. Ambassador Taylor had returned to South Vietnam on December 7 and iirimedi-ately set about getting the GVN to undertake the reforms we desired, ?naking cleax to both the civilian and military leaders that the implementation of phase II was contingent on their efforts to revive the flagging war effort and morale in the South. For his efforts, he was rewarded with a military purge of the civilian governjnent in late December and rumored threats that he would be' declared personna non p;rata . The political crisis boiled on into January with no apparent solution in sight in spite of our heavy pressure on the military to return to a civilian regime. And, while Ta-ylor struggled with the South Vietnamese generals, the war effort continued to decline.

At the same time that Taylor had been dispatched to Saigon a vigorous U.S. diplomatic effort had been undertaken with our Asian and MTO allies to inform them of the forthcoming U.S. intensification of the war, with the expected eventual strikes against the North. The fact that our allies now came to expect this action may have been a contributing reason in the February decision to proceed with phase II in spite of the failure of the South Vietnamese to have complied with ou-r req.uirem_ents. In any case, it added to the already considerable momentum behind the policy of striking the North. By the end of January I965, William Bundy, McNaughton, Taylor and others had come to believe that we had to proceed with phase II irrespective of what the South Vietnam.ese did.

Clear indication that the Administration was considering some kind of escale.tion came on January 25. Ambassador Taylor was asked to comjnent on a proposal to withdraw U.S. dependents from Saigon so as to "clear the decks." Previously, this action, which v/as now approved by the JCS, was always associated with pressures against the North, Vftiile there is no indication of any decision at this point to move into phase 11, it is clear that the preparations were already underv^ay.

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TOP SECRET - Sensitive MILITARY PKBSSUPES -AC-APLST NORTH VIET^^AM: ITQV 196^ - JM 196^ IV. C. CHRONOLOGY

DATE

16 Oct 6h

21 Oct 6k

f

27 Oct 6k

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1 Nov 6k

3 Nov 63

1

EVENT OR

rocuiviEifr

Embassy Saigon Message^ JPS 303^ Taylor to the President

JCSM 893-6^^

JCSM 902-6U

Viet Cong Attack Bien Hoa Airbase

¥bite House Decides Not to Retaliate

Civilian Nacned Premier

*

First Meeting of NSC Working Group

DESCFaPTION

Ambassador Taylor reports greatly increased infiltration from the Northj including North Vietnamese regulars^ and a steadily worsening situation in the South.

The JCS urge Secretary McNamara to back military measures to seize control of the border areas of South Vietnam and to cut off the supply and direction of the Viet Co^g by direct measures against North Vietnam.

On the basis of the new intelligence on infiltration levels^ the JCS 8-gain recommend direct military pressures against the North.

In a daring strike^ the Viet Cong staged a mortar attack on the large U.S. airbase at Bien Hoa^ killing four Americans^ destroying five B-57s^ and damaging eight others.

Concerned about possible further North Vietnamese escalation and the uncertainty of the Red Chinese response^ the White House decides^ against the advice of Ambassador Taylor^ not to retaliate in the tit-for-tat fashion envisaged by NSAM 31^, As a result of the attack^ however^ an interagency Working Group of the NSC is established to study future courses of U.S. action under the Chairmanship of William Bundy_, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs,

Tran Van Huong is named Premier in SVN.

The NSC Working Group'held its first meeting.. Other members are Michael Forrestal and Marshall Green from

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DATE

EVEIW OR DOCIMEIW

w

3 Nov 6h

President Reelected

k Nov 6k

JCSM 933-64

Ik Nov 6k

CGCS Memorandum to SecDef^ CM 258-64; and JCSM 955-64

IT Nov 6k

Working Group Circulates Draft "Options" for Comment

18 Nov 6k

JCSM 967-64

IX

DESCRIPTION

State ^ John McNaughton from ISA_, Harold Ford for CIA^ and Admiral Lloyd Must in from JCS. Work continues for three "weeks.

In a landslide victory^ President Johnson is re-elected v/ith a nev Vice President^ Hubert Humphrey.

The JCS place in writing their request for reprisal action against North Vietnam in retaliation for the Bien Hoa attack. Failure to act may be misinterpreted by the North Vietnamese as a lack of vill and determination in Vietnam.

In separate memos to the Secretary^ the JCS recommend covert GVN air strikes against North Vietnam and additional U.S. deployments to South East Asia to make possible implementation of U.S. strikes should these .be approved.

The Working Group circulates its draft paper on the "Options" available to the U.S. in South Vietnam. They axe three: (a) continuation of present policies in the hope of an improvement in the South but strong U.S. resistance to negotiations; (b) strong U.S. pressures against the North and resistance of negotiations until the DRV was ready to comply vrith our demands; and (C) limited pressures against the North coupled with vigorous efforts to get negotiations started and recognition that we would have to compromise our objectives. Option B is favored by the Working Group,

The JCS renews its recommendation for strikes against the North tempering it slightly in terms of "a

controlled program of systematically increased military pressures."

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DME

21 Nov 6^4-

EVENT OE DQCrUI^IEMT

Revised Working Grou-p Draft

23 Nov 6k

Rostov/" Memo to Sec State

2l| Nov 64

NSC Principals Meet' ing

27 Nov 6k

Taylor Meets vlth Principals

28 Nov 6k

NSC Principals Meet ing

DESCRIPTION

Having received comments from the different agencies_, the Working Group revises its draft slightly^ takes note of different viewpoints and submits its work to the NSC Principals for the consideration.

Taking a som.ewhat different tack^ the then Director of State's Policy Planning Staff^ W. ¥. Rostov^ proposes military pressures against the North as a method of' clearly signaling U.S. determination and commitment to the North.

No consensus is reached^ but Option A is generally rejected as promising only eventual defeat. Option B is favored by the JCS and CIA^ while State and OSD favor Option C. No firm conclusion is reached on the issue of sending ground troops to South Vietnam.

Having returned for consultations. Ambassador Taylor meets \j±th the NSC Principals and after giving a gloomy report of the situation in South Vietnam, recomm-ends that to shore up the GVM and improve morale we take limited actions against the North but resist negotiations until the GVN is im.proved and the DRV is hurting. He proposed an extended Option A Td-th the first stages of Option C« This proposal was adopted by the Principals as the recommendation to be made to the President.

In a follow-up meeting, the Principals decide to propose a two phase program to the President. The first phase would be a thirty-day

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DATE

EVEMT OF

roCUMENT

30 Hov 6k

NSC Principals Meeting

1 Dec 64

White House Meet' ing

3-Dec 6k

Taylor Meets President

DESCKEPTION

period of slightly increased pressure such as the resumption of the DE SOTO patrols and U.S. armed recce on the Laotian corridor while ve tried to get reforms in South Vietnam.. The second phase would involve direct air strikes against the North as in Option C. William Bundy vas charged -with preparing a draft NSM to this effect and an infiltration study was commissioned.

Meeting to review the draft prepared by Bundy^ the Principals decided not to call it a NSM. Its provisions are those recommended on 28 Nov. Phase II would be a graduated and mounting set of primarily air pressures against the North coupled with efforts to sound out the DRV on readiness to negotiate on U.S. terms, A recommendation on linking U.S. actions to DRV infiltration is deleted.

4

While the exact decisions made at this meeting of the Principals with the President are not available^ it is clear that he approved in general tenus the concept outlined in the Bundy paper. He gave his approval for implementation of only Phase I^ however. The President stressed the need for Taylor to get improvement from the GVN and the need to brief our allies on our new course of action^ and to get more assistance from them in the conflict.

The President meets privately with Taylor and gives him. instructions, that he is to explain the new program to the GVEy indicate to its leaders that the Phase II U.S.

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DATE

EVEM" OF DOCUMEIOT

h Dec 6h

Cooper Report on Infiltration

7 Dec 6k

Taylor Meets -^dith Premier Huong

.7 ". 9 Dec 6k

Priiae Minister "Wilson briefed

9 Dec 6k

Second Taylor-Huong-Khanh Meeting

10 Dec 6k

Souvanna Phourna Ap' proves U.So Laos Strikes

I I

11 Dec 6k

GVE Announces Greater Efforts

DESCRIP TION

strikes against the North are contingent on Improvement in the South^ and explain that these will be cooperative efforts.

A thorough study on North Vietnamese infiltration as commissioned by the Principals is submitted to the NSC and later forwarded to Saigon. Decisions on its release are continually deferred.

The day after his return to Saigon_, Taylor meets with Premier Huong and with General Khanh and outlines the new U.S. policy and states the requirements this places on the GVN.

In Washington on a state visit_, British Prime Minister Wilson is thoroughly briefed on the forthcoming U.S. actions. On k Dec._, William Bundy had gone to New Zea-' land and Australia to present the "new policy and seek support. Other envoys were meeting mth the remaining Asian allies.

At a second meeting iTith Huong and Khanh_, Taylor presents a detailed set of actions he desires the GVN to take to improve the situation and receives agreement from the two leaders.

The U.S. proposal for armed air recce over the Laotian corridor is presented to Souvanna Phoi:mia who gives his assent.

Complying with Taylor's request^ the GVN announces stepped-up efforts to improve the campaign against the VC and to reform the government. ■

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DATE

12 Dec 6k

Ik Dec 6k

18 Dec 6k

19 Dec 6k

EVEl^IT OF DOCUI^EM'

SecDef Approves JOS Proposal for Naval Actions

NSC Principals Approve Armed recce in Laos

BARREL ROLL Begins

Level of Laotian Missions Set

NSC Principals Meeting

Khanh Purges Civilian Governraent

20 iJec 6k

Taylor Meets With ARVE Leaders

I

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DESCRIPTION

The Secretary approves a JCS proposal for shore bombardinent^ naval patrols and .offshore aerial recce for the first thirty days. A decision on the Phase II vas deferred.

As planned^ the NSC approved armed air recce over the Laotian corridor with the exact nuxaber and frequency of the patrols to be controlled by SecDef.

■

The first sorties of U.S. aircraft in the ^fenned recce" of the Laotian corridor^ kno™ as BARREL ROLL^ take place. They mark the beginning of the thirty-day Phase I of the limited pressures.

Secretary McNamara sets two missions of four aircraft each as the ■weekly level of BARREL ROLL activity .

The NSC Principals approve McNamara's recommendation that BARRELL ROLL missions be held at constant levels through Phase I. It is revealed that adverse sea conditions have brought maritime operations against the DRV to a virtual bait. At McNaraara's insistence it is agreed that the infiltration study >7ill not be made public

Late in the evening^ the military high coramand_, led by Khanh^ moved to remove all pover from the civilian regime of Premier Huong by dissolving the High National Council. Khanh assumes power.

In a meeting >7lth the leading South Vietnamese military officers^ Taylor once again outlined the actions .

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DATE

22 Dec 6h

I

2k Dec 64

29 Dec Gh

E\7EI^JT OF DOCIMMT

Khanh Publicly Repudiates Taylor

Rumors of Taylor's Expulsion

U.S. BOQ Bombed; Embassy Saigon Message 1939; CINCPAC Message to JCS, 26225IZ Dec; JCa4 1076-64

NSC Principals Meeting

DESCRIPTION

required from the GW by the U.S. before Phase II could be started.

■

After having given initial appearances of understanding the difficulty that the military purge placed the U.S. in^ Khanh on Dec. 22 holds a news conference and states that the military is resolved not to carry out the "policy of any foreign power.

Rumors are received by the Embassy that Khanh intends to have- Taylor declared personna non grata . Vigorous U.S. efforts to dissuade him and the use of Phase II as leverage cause Khanh to reconsider.

In a terror attack this Christmas Eve, the VC bomb a U.S. BOQ in Saigon. T^to U.S. officers are

killed_, 58 injured, Taylor urges reprisals against the North. He is supported by CINCPAC and the JCS.

At the meeting of the NSC Principals, a decision against reprisals for the barracks bombing is taken in spite of the strong recommendations above. At the same meeting, ISA reported the readiness of the Phillipines, ROK, and GRC to send military assistance to South Vietnam.

31 Dec 64

Embassy Saigon Message 2010

Taylor proposes going for^-ra^rd "^-Tlth the Phase^ II U.S. strikes against the North in spite of the political crisis in the South and under any conceivable U.S. relations mth the GVN short of complete abandonment.

II

CJCS Memo to DepSecDef, CM 347-64

XIV ■

The JCS recommend the addition of several air missions to already approved operations, including two air strikes by unmarked Vl^AE aircraft

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DATE

E\7EI^T OF

IX)CUME1\IT

3 Jan 65

Rusk TV Inter' view

k Jan 65

Soviets call for new Conference on Laos

5 Jan 65

NSC Principals Meet

6 Jan 65

William Bundy Memo to Rusk

DESCRIPTION

against the North_, and U.S. air escort for returning GVN naval craft.

Secretary Rusk appears on a Sunday TV interview program, and defends U.S. policy^ ruling out either a U.S. "vrLthdrawal or a major expansion of the war. The public and Congressional debate on the war had heated up considerably since the Army take-over in South Vietnam in December. The debate continues through January id.th Senator Morse the most vocal- and sharpest critic of the Adxainistra-tion.

Renewing their earlier efforts^ the Soviets call again" for a conference

on the Laotian problem,.' . .

The Principals disapprove the JCS recommendation for Vl^TAE strikes with unmarked aircraft against the North, The JCS voice concern at the failure to begin planning for ■ Phase II of the pressures program. But no decision to go ahead is taken o

In view of the continued deterioration of the•situation in the South and the prevailing view that the U»S. was going to seek a way out^ Bundy recomjnended some limited measures^ short- of Phase II (i.e^ recce^ a reprisal^ evacuation of U.S. de-pendents_j etc.)^ to strengthen our hand. There were risks in this course but it would improve our position td.th respect to the other SEA nations if things got rapidly worse in SVN and we had to contemplate a i/lthdrawalo

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DATE

8 Jan 65

9 Jaa 65

11 Jan 65

1^4- Jan 65

17 Jan 65

22 Jan 65

23 Jan 65

27 Jan 65

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WMT OF

DOCUMEI^IT

First Korean Troops Go to South Vietnam

Generals Announce Return to Civilian Government

US-GW Aid Discus-sions Resume

U.S. Laotian 0"pera-tions Revealed

Buddhist Riots

Soviets Affirm Support- of DRV

USIS Library Burned in Hue

Mc]\[aughton paper^ "Obser\'-ations re South Vietnam After Khanh's 'Re-Cour)'"

DESCRIPTION

The first contingent of 2^000 South Korean troops leave for South Vietnam.

Under U.S. pressure^ the South Vietnamese generals announce that matters of state -^d-ll be left in the future in the hands of a civilian government. The joint Huong-Khanh con]muniq.ue promises to convene a constituent assembly.

With the retuxn to civilian government^ the U.S. resumes its discussions -^-rith the GVTT on aid and measures to improve the military situation.

A UPI story reveaJ_s the U.S. BARREL ROLL armed recce missions in Laos and tells the story of the YANKEE TEAM armed escort for the RLAF,

Shortly after the GVN announcement of increased draft calls^ Buddhist-protest riots breal^ out in several cities against the allegedly anti-Buddhist military leaders. Disturbances continue through the month.

In letters to Hanoi and Peking^ Gromyko affirms Soviet support for the DRV struggle against American Imperialism.

Rioting Buddhists burn the USIS library in Hue.

The U.S. stages in South Vietnam were defined as holding buffer land for Thailand and Malaysia and maintaining our national honor. They required continued prerseverance in a

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DATE

EVENT OF

3X)CUjyrHvTT

*

Generals Withdraw Support from Huong

28 Jan 65

General Oanh Natned Premier

DESCRIPTION

bad situation^ taking some risks such as reprisals. It was important to remember that our objective was the containment of China not necessarily the salvation of South Vietnam. In this effort^ however^ we should soon begin reprisal strikes against the North. They would not help the GVN much but would have a positive overall effect on our policy in SEA.

The generals under Khanh^s leadership act once again to eliminate the civilian government. This tim.e they succeed in their coup and the U.S. only protests.

General Nguyen Xuan Oanh is named acting Premier by Cxeneral Khanh.

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3. Working Group Assessments of the Utility of Pressures • ,

MILITARY PRESSURES AGAiriST NQETH VIETE'.^M NOVEMBER 1964 - JAI^^UARY 196^

Page !• POLICY DEBATE IN KO^/E.MBER • ... ; 1

1. Immediate Antecedents 1

2. Formation of the MSC Working Group 5

6

a. Sense of Urgency 7

b. Vievs of DRV Susceptibility • 8

h. Perceptions and Development of U.S. Pressure Options... 12

a. Perception of U.S. Objectives and Interests.' 12

b. Evolution of Options I8

c. Significance of rregotiations 23

■d. Perceived Reactions to Options • 27

•

5. Views from Outside the rISC Working Group 31

a. JCS Views ' 32

b. Rostow Views *. 35

II. POLICY DECISIONS 38

1. Reactions of Principals to Working Group Analyses 38

a. Consensus Among KSC Officials 38

b. Views Backing Consensus. kl

c- Policy Views From Saigon ^2

d. Discussions With Ambassador Taylor h^

2. Courses of Action Approved in the White House 5U

III. H.-IPLEMEITTIi^IG TIE POLICY '. 59

1. Early Actions., 59

a. GVTi Maritime Operations.. ..' " 59

b. Armed Reconnaissance in Laos 61

c. Surfacing Infiltration Evidence .' 63'

d. Consultations With "Third Co'ontries'' 65

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Page

2. Relations vrith the GVIT '-.. 6?

a. Joint Planning 68

t. GW Crises 69

c. Joint Reprisals 72

3. Policy Vievs in January 73

a. Public Debate. ...,.' 73

b- Policy Assessments 75

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"I. IV.C.2. POLICY DEBATE JU 1-IQ\^'IBER

In their Southeast Asia policy discussions of August-October I96U, Administration officials had accepted the view that overt railitary pressures against North Vietnam prohahly "vould be required. Barring some critical developments, hovever, it vas generally conceded that these should not begin until after the ne'v: year. Preparations for applying such pressui-es vere made in earnest during tTovember.

lo IiTjnediate Antecedents

In Administration policy discussions, the two developments most often cited as perha-os T-mrrsjiting lrriT)lementation of overt military pressures before I965 were: (l) increased levels of infiltration of guerrillas into South Vietnam and (2) serious deterioration of the GW. Evidence of both vas reported to Washington during October.

National intelligence estimates gave the GWi little hope of surviving the apathy and discoui-agem.ent vith which it was plagued. They reported, "Goverrirnent m.inistries in Saigon are close to a standstill, with only the most routine operations going on." U.sJQW planning was not being followed by GWI action-, A coup oy disgruntled South Vietnamese military figures was believed imr^iinent (one had been attempted unsuccessfully on 13 September). Moreover, the civilian goverr^ment which General Kxhanh had promised for the end of October was seen as unlikely to bring about any real im.provement. l/ .' " *

A thi^eat of GW capitulation to the NLF, in the^fonii^of accepting a coalition governmient, was also seen as a real possibility.^ Citing "numerous signs that Viet Cong agents have played a role in helping sustain the level of civil disorder...in the cities," intelligence reports estimated that it was the Comir.unist intention to seek victory through a "neutralist coalition" rather then by force of arms. Perhaps straining a bit, an estimate stated, "The principal G^/K leaders have not to our knowledge been in recent contact"with the Communists, but there has been at least one instance of informal contact betvreen a lesser governiaental official and mem^bers of the RI^o" 2/ Another estixaate portrayed the DRV and Chinese as regarding South Vietnam as a "developing political vacuum," soon to be filled "with a neutralist coalition government dom„inated by prO"Corii:Ti\inist elements." 3/

Reports of increasing infiltration began arriving in miid-October. Aiabassador Taylor cabled on the lUth that he had received indications of a "definite step-up in infiltration from North Vietnam, particularly in the northern provinces .«<, ." He went on to report: .

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"A recent analysis suggests that if the present rate of infiltration is laaintained the annual figure for I96U will . be of the order of IO5OOO. Eurthei-Tiiore.. .we are finding more and more '"bona fide' Worth Vietnaanese soldiers- among the infiltrees, I feel sui^e that we must soon adopt new and drastic methods to reduce end eventually end such infiltration if we are ever to succeed in South Vietnam. "U/

A sijnilar report was cabled directly to the White House on 16 October. In it^ i^jnbassador Taylor repeated his comitients on infiltration and advised the President of the steadily worsening situation in Sou.th Vietnam. The Ambassador reported the infiltration of northern-born conscripts and relayed GTO claims that they were coming in organi::ed units. He pointed out that with the advent of the dry season^ the problem would assume even greater miagnitude and urged that it be given immediate attention. 5/

The Taylor estimates of end-year infiltration totals probably were quite alarming. If acc-urate they indicated that the rate had risen sharply during September and early October: The total number of infiltrees for 196^ as of 1 September was then estimated as ^^700. 6/ Of particular concern^ no doubt, was the apparent em/ohasis on reinforcing Communist units in the Central Highlands and in the northern provinces of South Vietnam. These warnings came hard on the heels of vridespread press reports of badly weakened GTR control in thi*ee portions of the country, jj

The JCS seized on these fresh repox^ts and resubmitted their proposals for taking prompt measures qigainst North Vietnam. On 21 October^ they argued:

"Application of the principle of isolating the guerrilla force from its reinforcement and support and then to fragment and defeat the forces has not been successful in Vietnam ... oThe principle m.ust be applied by control of the national boimdaries or by eliminating or cutting off the source of supply and direction." 8/

On the 27th they submitted a major proposal for "strong military actions" to co^Linteract the trends cited in the national intelligence estimates e.nd in the Taylor cables. In language identical to that used in two Augu.st memoranda and at the September strategy meeting^ they stated that such actions were "required now in order to prevent the collapse of the U.S. position in Southeast Asia." They then recommended a program of actions to support the following strateg^^:

a. Depriving the Viet Cong of out of country assistance by applying military pressures on the...I)RV to the extent necessary to cause the DRV to cease support and direction of the insurgency.

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b. Depriving the VC of assistance within S'm by expanding the comiterinsurgency effort — military, economic^ and political -- within SW.

c. Continuing to seek a viable effective government in SW based on the broadest -oossible consensus.

that:

d. Maintaining a military readiness posture in Southeast Asia

(1) Demonstrates the U.S. will and caiDability to escalate the action if required.

(2) Deters a major Communist aggression in the area. 9/

The program recommended by the JCS included a list of actions to be tsj^en within South Vietnam and a separate list of actions outside. The Chiefs had listed them in order of increasing intensity, and they requested authority "to implement now" the first six actions within the country and the first eight outside. The latter included air strilies by GWI/fAPuMGATE aircraft against Commujiist LOC's in Laos and in the -southern portion of North Vietnam. lO/

In the context of the reported worsening situation in South Vie'cnejn, the JCS proposa.l was given serious consideration in DSD. Since Arabassador Taylor had expressed concern over initiating overt pressures against Korth Vietnam "before we have a responsible set of_ authorities to work with in South Vietnam," a copy of the JCS paper V7as forwarded to him for review and coimnent. The OSD's stated intention was to consider the Ambassador's views before developing a projposal to present to President Johnson. 11/

J While this proposal was still under consideration (l November 190^)5 Viet Cong forces attacked U.S. facilities at the Bien Koa airbase with Slrnrm mortar fire. Four American servicemen were killed, and five B-57 i^actical bom,bers were destroyed^ and major damage was inflicted on eight others. 12/

Administration attention was focused immediately on the question of what the United States should do in response to the Bien Hoa provocation^. It will be recalled that such an eventuality had been discussed at the September strategy meeting. The Presidential directive which resuJ-ted from it_ stated: "We should be prepared to respond as appropriate against the DRV in the event of 8.ny attack on U.S. units or any special DRV/VC action against SW." 13/ As of the end of October (in anticipation of resumed DE SOTO Patrols), elements of our Pacific forces were reported as "poised and ready" to execute reprisals for anv DRV aoTsac^cs on our naval vessels. Thus, there was a rather large expectancy among Administration officials that the United States would do som-ething in retaliation.

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Apparently^ the decision was made to do nothing -- b± least not of a retaliatory nature. At a White House meeting to discuss possible courses of action^ on 1 November^ "concern vas o^^ressed that proposed U.S. retaliatory punitive actions could trigger North Vietnamese/CHICOM air and ground retaliatory actSo" Questions rere raised about "increased security measui^es and precautionary moves of U.S. air and ground units to protect U.S. dependents, units and installations against such retaliation. 14/ Pollowing the meeting, a White House news release announced that the President had ordered the destroyed and badly damaged aircraft replaced. Administration officials stated that "the mortar attack must be ^ viewed in the light of the Vietnamese war "and of the whole Southeast Asian situation. If the United States is to retaliate against North Vietnam in the futui-e," they reportedly, said, "it must be for broader reasons than the strike against the Bien Hoa base." Moreover, they drew a contrast between this incident and the Tonkin Gulf attacks where oui^ destroyers were "on United States business." 15/

4' . . Source documents available do not indicate that any further

decisions were made on the Bien Hoa m.atter. A second meeting to discuss possible U.S. actions was "tentatively scheduled" for 2 November, but

; one available materials contain no evidence that it was held. 16/

Pi-^esident^Jolmson was scheduled to appear' in Houston that afternoon, for his final pre-election address, and it may be that the second VJhite House mieeting vas called off. In any event, imofficial reports from Saigon, two days later, stated that most of the B-57s had been withdraxm from the Bien Ploa base. V/hile acknowledging that "some" had been - removed to Clark Air Base, in the Philippines, official spokesmen in

I Saigon refused to comment on whether or" not a wholesale withdrawal had

I taken place. 17/ One thing is certain; there were no retaliatory

, ! s-crikes authorized following the attack on the U.S. bom.ber base.

I '. However, retaliatory measuires w^ere proposed* On 1 November,

the JCS suggested orally to Secretary McNamara that air striiies be authorized on key Communist targets in both Laos and North Vietnam. According to the JCS plan, those in Laos would be hit within 24-36 ho-ors

I j after approval, with forces already in place, and-these attacks would

divert attention from the preparation necessary for the stronger actions

^ I to follow. The latter would include a B-52 night attack on Phuc Yen

airfield (outside Planoi), to be followed by a dawn strike by USAF and Na^yy oactical aircraft against other airfields and POL storage in the Hanoi-Haiphong area, 18/

Ambassador Taylor immediately cabled a Saigon Erabassy-MCV recommendation for "retaliatory bombing attacks on selected DRV targets , by combined U.S./vl^AF air forces and for a policy statement that we will act similarly in like cases in the f^utui^e." I9/ In a later cable he made specific reference to "the retaliatory principle confirmed in NSAI'^f 31^5- ' stating that if his initial recoriimendation was not accepted at least a lesser alternative should be adopted. This he described as

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intensifying 3^-A operations and initiating air operations against selected targets as an interim substitute for more positive measures." 20/

On k l^oveniber, the JCS repeated in -^-friting their recommendations of the 1st 3 adding some e:cplanatory coinment and taking issue ^^ith certain aspects of the Taylor recoi):mendations, They e-:plained that they considered the VC attack on Bien Hoa airfield "a deliberate act of escalation and a change of the groimd rules under which the VC have operated up to now." They cautioned against "vjidue delay or restraint" in making a response^ since it "could be misinterpreted by our allies in Southeast Asia^ as v^ell as oy the DRV and Communist China" and "could encourage

the enemy to conduct additional attacks " Referring to Ambassador

Taylor's recOiimiendation to emnounce a policy of reprisal bom^bingj the JCS denounced a "tit-for-tat" policy as "imduly restrictive" and tending to "pass to the DRV substantial initiatives with respect to the nature and timing of further U.S. actions." 21/ They concluded:

"Early U.S. military action against the DRV would lessen the possibility of misinterpretation by the DRV and Communist China of U.S. determination and intent and thus serve to deter ■ further VC attacks such as that at Bien lioa."

In the meantime J there had been created what may have been the only concrete result frora the high-level policy deliberations following the Bien Hoa incident. An interagency task force^ lmo\m as the NSC Working Group^ had begun an intensive study of future U.S. courses of action. Recor/ioiendations from the JCS and others were passed on to that group for incorporation in their work. 22/

2. Forma tion of the NSC Working Group

The "NSC Working Group on SWi/SEA" held its first meeting at 0930 hours ^ 3 November5 thus placing the decision to orgejiize such a group at sometime earlier -- prob3,bly on 2 November or perhaps even at the high-level meeting on 1 November. Its charter was to study "iijmiediately and intensively" the fut-ujre courses of action and alternatives open to the United States in Southeast Asia and to report as appropriate to a "Principals Group" of NSC members. In turn^, this group of senior officials would then recommend specific courses of action to the President. Initiallj/-^ the working group was given approximately one week to ten days to complete its work. 23/ Actually^ it developed and recast its reports over a period of three weeks or more.

Four agencies were represented in the formal membership of the group. Txhe Department of State contingent included Assistan.t Secretary Bundy (Chairman)^ Marshall Green^, Michael Eorrestal (both of the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs), and Robert Johnson (of the Policy Planning Council). Assistant Secreteiy (ISA) McNaughton represented OSD. Vice Admiral Lloyd Must in was the JCS membero The CIA was represented by Harold Ford. Other staff members from these agencies assisted in work on specific topics. 2^/ " ■ ' '

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I

The Working Group's efforts were ax:)portionecl axaong seven tasks, the initial input for each being accomplished by a particular member .or subcommittee5 as follows:. 25/

TO'^IC

Assessment of the current situation in South Vietnam, including policy direction of interested powers.

U.S. objectives and staJees in South Vietnam and Southeast Asia.

Broad options (3) available to tiae United States.

Alternative forms of possible negotiation.

Analyses of different options vis-a-vis U.S. objectives a:ad interests.

RESPONSIBILITY

Intelligence

coBimujiity

William Bundy

Bundy and ISA

State/Policy Planning Council

JCS to propose specific actions; Policy Planning Council to exairdne political impacts of the most violent option-firs

O-

Immediate actions in the period prior to Presidential decision on options.

State/par East Bui^eau

Most inputs were made in the foimi of either (l) di-aft papers treating fully a topic intended for inclusion in the Working Group's final submission or (2) memoranda commenting on an initial draft paper and suggesting alterations. Because of the unique responsibilities and advisory processes of the JCS, their member apparently chose to make initial inputs lexgelj through references to or excerr^ts from regular JCS documents: he also contributed to the redrafting of the option analyses. 26/' The initial papers on each of the topics vere circulated among the Working Group members, reviewed in consiiltation with their parent organizations and modified. Some positions passed through as many as three drafts before being submitted to the Principals.

3• Working Group Assess^-nents of the Utility of Pressur-es

The NSC Working Group approached its work with the general assessm-ent that increased pressiores against ITorth Vietnajii \Toxild be both useful and necessary. However, this assessment embraced a wide range of considerations stemming from the developing situation in South Vietnam e.nd a variety of vieirpoints concerning vrhat kinds of pressures would be most effective.

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^' Sense of Urgency. As the Worliing Group began its deliberations^ exi avrareness that another Bien Hoa could occur at any tijne v/as prominent in both the official and the public mindo The tenuous security of U.So bases in South Vietnam had received vide publicity. 27/ Moreover, the ne^rs services were reporting the threat of civil protest against the new Saigon governrrient, and the increased level of guerrilla infiltration from the North was being publicly aired. 28/ These' developments lent an added sense of urgency to the Group's worko The Chairman of the Working Group was sensitive to these developments and to related attitudes within the Administration. For example, he indicated that the intelligence agencies were ^^on the verge of. ^'.agreement tha.t infiltration has in fact mounted," and that the Saigon mission was "urging that \re surface this by the end of this week or early next week." He stressed that "the President is clea^rly thinking in terms of maximum use of a Gulf of Tonl-^in Reprisal/" rationale." The nature of such a decision was expected to be:

either for an action that would show toughness and hold the line till vre can decide the big issue, or as a basis for starting a clear course of action under..obroad . options«

He implied that our intention to stand firm in South Vietneon was being corfimunicated to the USSR ("Secretary Rusk is tallying today to Dobrynin") and indicated the desirability of President Johnson signalling something similar rather soon through the public media. This was seen as particularly important "to counter any SW fears of a softening in our policy," prestmably in view of our not responding to the Bien Hoa attacks 29/

Chairman Bundy was aware also of the significance attached by some observers to the first U.S. actions after the Presidential election. As was pointed out to him, "all Vietnamese and other interested obsei-vers" would be watching carefulJLy to "see what posture the newly mandated Johnson Administration will assume." For this reason, William H. Sullivan^ head of the interagency Vietnam Coordinating Committee (and soon to be appointed the new U.S. Ambassador to Laos), urged "that ovx first action be...one which gives the appearejice of a deterraination to take risks if necessary to maintain our position in Southeast Asia." An immediate retaliation for any repetition of the Bien Hoa attack and armed reconnaissance missions in the Laotian Panhandle were cited as specific examples. He went on to recommend to l^lr. Bimdy:

"l feel that it is important...that the Administration go on record fairly soon placing our i^olicy in Viet Ham within the larger perspective of our policies in the Western Pacific, especially as they involve confrontation with Communist China." 30 /

A sense of urgency for the Working Group's efforts was also derived from assessments of the trends within South Vietnam. For example^ the intelligence parnel composed of CIA, DIA, and State/lMl members savr

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little prospect for an effective GM despite an acImoxTledged slowing of "adYerse -oolitical trends." In their vievr the political situation .fas "extremely fragile," with the Saigon administration plagued oy confusion, ar>athy and ^ooor morale" and the new leadership hampered hy the older factionaliRm.' The security situation in the ^countryside was assessed as having continued to deteriorate, with Viet Cong control ... spreading over areas heretofore controlled by the government. Although indicating "better than even" chances that "Ghe G\l^ could hang on for the near future and thus afford a platfonii upon wnich...^oo/ prosecute the we^ and attempt to tui^n the tide," the panel painted a griin pictujre of its pros^oects. 3l/ This assessment was^prooahly instrumental in promoting Assistant Secretary McEaughton s cr^-ptic observation that "Progress inside S-fil is ijaportant, buo it is unlii.eiy despite our best idess and efforts." Besides, he observed, if it cam at all it would taive "at least several months." In his view ^^he efio.-os of the Working Group, could in some measure compensate for this slow progress inside South Vietnam:

■ "Action against North Vietnam is to some extent_a substitute for strengthening the goverrjnent in South Vietnam. That is, a less active VC (on orders from DRV) can be handled by a less efficient GW (which we expect to havej. id/

b. Views of DHV Susceptibility. The extent to .;hich "action against Eorth VietnajTi" might affect that nation's support Ox ^^le conflicts in South Vietnem and Laos was a matter on which merabers of tne Working Group did not fully agree. The intelligence panel members . tended toward a pessimistic view. They pointed out tliat uhe basic elements of Cosmunist strength in South Vietnaia remain indigenous, and that "even if severely damaged" the DRV could continue to support the insurrection at a lessened level. Therefore, they suressea lihao the U.S. ability to com.pel a halt to the DRV support depended on eroding Hanoi's will and persuading the DSV:

that the m-ice of moujiting the insurrection in the South at a high level would be too great and that; it would be preferable to reduce its aid...and direct at least a temporary reduction of V.C. 8.ctivity.

As the -oanel members saw it, this respite would then provide an^^oppor-tunity to stabilise and iiirorbve the GVIJ. But, in their woras, Even so, lasting success would depend UTDon a substantial improvement m the energy and effectiveness of the RVN government and paciiication machinery." 33 /

However, the intelligence panel did not concede very strong chsjices for breaking the will of Hanoi. They thought it quite likely that the DHV was willing to suffer damage "in the com-se of a '^eso of ^^ wills with the United States over the course of events m South Vietnam. To sw3port this view, they cited Hanoi's belief that international

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pressure would develop against deliberate U.S. expansion of the var.

I Further5 that given present trends in South Vietnam, both Hanoi and

Peking had good reason to expect success without having to initiate

I actions carrying the risk of the kind of war which would expose them

I to "the great weight of superior U.S. weaponry." The panel also viewed

Hanoi as estajnating that the U.S. will to maintain resistance in Southeast Asia could in time be eroded -- that the recent U.S. election would

^ provide the Johnson Administration with "greater policy flexibility"

than it previously felt it had. 3^/

This view was challenged by the Working Group's JCS member as being too "negative." Interpreting the panel's non-specific reference to "policy flexibility" in an extreme sense, he wrote:

If this means that Hanoi thinks we are now in position to accept world-wide hujuiliation with respect to oujt formerly stated objectives in Vietnaaii, this is another reason why it is desirable that we take early measures to disabuse their thinking."

Moreover, he indicated the JCS view that the slightly improved hopes for government stability (acknowledged by the panel) were good reason irhy ' '. "early and positive actions" should be taken. This point was reinforced

by his judgment that (in contrast with its ijrapact on esprit and political effectiveness) the GVI^^'s "principal task is to afford the platform upon which the Km armed forces, with U.S. assistance, prosecute the war." 35/

In criticism of the intelligence panel's emphasis on the need to influence DRV will, Admiral Mustin indicated that enemy capabilities represented a m.ore appropriate target. He stated the JCS assessment that:

"ao The actual UoS. requiremisnt with respect to the DRV is reduction of the rate of delivery of support to the VC, to levels below their m,iniiauiri necessary sustaining level.

a .

"b. In the present unstable situation something far less than total destruction may be all that is required to accomplish the above. A very m_odest change in the government's /&r£l favor.,..may be enough to tiu-'n the tide and lead to a successful solution. Of coui^se it is not possible to predict in advance. • .the precise level of.m.easures vrhich will be required to^ achieve the above. This is the reason for designing a program of progressively increasing squeeze."

One of the factors encour-aging JCS optimism, he pointed out, was the assessment accepted by the panel that both Hanoi and Peking wanted to avoid direct conflict with the United States. This would act as a de terrent to Communist persistence, pai-ticularly if by a program of

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militsj^y pressures, ve V7ere able to revise their assessment that they could vih "witxhout much risk of having to feel the veight of U.S. response." 36/

Apparently as a result of these criticisrr.s and their influence on other VIorking Group members ^ the Group*s frial assessment of DRV susceptibility to mdlitary pressui*es vras somewhat modified. While continuing to emphasise that affecting Hanoi's will was important^ the crit-icality of it was obscured by concessions to the possible Impact of damage to PRV capabilities and by greater reliance on _conditional phrasing. For example:

"the nature of the war in Vietnem is such that U.S. ability to compel the DRV to end or reduce the VC insui^rection rests essentially upon the effect of the U.S. sanctions on the will of DRV leadership to sustain and enlarge that insurrection, and to a lesser extent tipon the effect of sanctions on the capabilities of the DRV to do so."

Although giving explicit recognition to "a rising rate of infiltrationj" and continuing to acknowledge limits to U.S. abilities to prevent the DRV's material support for the VC^ the assessment stated that "U.S.-inflicted destruction in North Vietnain and Laos vrould reduce these supporting increments and damage DRV/VC morale." It qualified this statement, how^ever, loy pointing out that the degi^ee to which such damage would provide the GV1\^ with a breathing spell would depend largely on "whether any DRV 'removal' of "its direction and support of the VC were superficial or whole." If su-oerficial or "limited to gestui-es.. .that removed only the more visible"evidences of the DRV increment," the report continued, "it would probably not be possible to develop a viable and free government in South Vietne-m." 3?/

In general, the final assessm^ent of DRV susceptibility to pressu-i'es was less discouj-^aging than the intelligence panel's initial submission, although it cou-ld not be considered particularly encoxoraging either. The reference to U.S. "policy flexibility," to which the JCS took such violent objection, was rem^oved, and the following non-committing statement was used instead: "Hanoi's immediate estiraate is probably that the passing of the U.S. election gives Washington the opportunity to take new military actions against the DRV and/or new diplomatic initiatives." If new military pressujres were applied, the report indicated that Hanoi's leaders would be faced with a basic question: "is the U.S. determined to continue escalatinp- its pressures to achieve its announced objectives ...or is the U.S. escalation essentially a limited attempt to improve the U.S. negotiating position?" It continued:

"Their decision...would be affected by the U.S. military postui-e in the area, by the extent and nature of the U.S. escalation, the character of the U.S. commamication of its intentions, and their reading of domestic UoS. and international .reactions to the inaugirration of U^S. attacks on the

North."

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The report made no attempt to predict ho^r the DRV might ans^rer the "basic question' given alternative assessments of the variables in the quoted paragraph, Hov/ever, it did offer the caveat that "comprehension of the other's intentions would almost certainly be difficult on both sides, and especially so as the scale of hostilities mounted." 38/

,1^ assessing Hanoi's ability and willingness to sustain U.S. attaclcs in order to r^ursue its goals ^ the re^Dort continued its balanced buo slightly pessimistic approach:

We have many indications that the Hanoi leadership is acutely and nervously aware of the extent to which North VieLnam's transportation system and industrial plan is vulnerable to attaclv. On the other hand, North Vietnam's economy is overwhelmingly agriculture and, to a large extent, decentralized... .Interdiction of iraports and extensive destruction of transportation facilities and industrial plants would^cripple DRV industry. These actions would also seriously restrict DRV military capabilities, and \vould degrade, though to a lesser extent, Hanoi's capabilities to support guerrilla warfare in South Vietnam 'and Laos.oc.We do not believe that attacks on industrial targets would so greatly exacerbate current economic difficulties as to creat un_manageable control problems..., DRV leaders.. .would probably be willing to suffer some damage to the country in the com-se of a test of wills with the U.S. over the cou-i^se of events in South Vietnam." 39/

_ ^ The assessment concluded with estimates of likely Chinese Communis o and Soviet efforts to offset pressures directed toward North Vietnajii. The Working Group recorded its belief "that close cooperation exists between Hanoi and Peiping and that Hanoi consults'Peiping on major decisions regarding South Vietnam." Because the VC insurrection served Peiping's interests in undermining the U.S. position in Asia" and because of the Sino-Soviet dispute, the gi^oup thought it likely that the Chinese would "feel compelled to demonstrate their readiness to support ^Hanoi in maintaining pressure on South Vietnam. However, it was no bed that "Chinese Commuiiist ca-^oabilities to augment DRV offensive and defensive capabilities are slight," being limited largely to modest quantities of air defense equipment, additional jet fighters and naval paorol craft. On the other hand, the group believed "Moscow's role in Vietnam is likely to remain a relatively minor one," Khrushchev's successors were believed unwilling to run substantial risks to undei-mine tne GW. Citing Hanoi's desire for continuing Soviet military and economic aid, the report stated an ironic judgment concerning the less-miliT^ant of the large Cormmiist powers:

»

Moscow's ability to influence decisions in Hanoi tends consequently to be proportional to the North Vietnamese regime s fears of American action against it, rising in

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■

moments of crisis and diminishing in quieter periods. Moscow's willingness to give overt backing to Hanoi^ however, seems to be in inverse proportion to the level of threat to North Vietnam." ko/ (Underlining -added)

^. Perceptions end Development of U.S, Pressure Options

The NSC Working Group began its deliberations with a variety of U.S. actions in mind and with an apparently flexible approach to the objectives that the Administration might reasonably seel-v to achieve. As ideas were exchanged and debated^ however, objectives became somewhat less flexible and options seemed to narrow. Such a process could have resulted from either: (l) preconceptions on the part of particularly influential members; (2) a bu]?eauGratic tendency to compromise; or (3) simply the lir/iited availability of practical alternatives. A combination j I of these factors may even have been at work in the case of the Working

Group. An assessment of this nat-ore is beyond the scope of this primarily docuraentary research effort. Still, the question is an important, one to reflect on in tracing the development of Working Group recommendations« . • ■

a. Perception of U.S. Object ives and Interes ts. National objectives in Southeast Asia were regarded in two categories: existing (sometimes called "initial") policy objectives and those comprising a possible fallback position. The former did not change and did not undergo a.ny reinterpretation diu^ing the couj^se of the V/orking Group's study. These were seen as (l) "helping a governraent /of South Vietnam/ defend its independence," and (2) "working to preserve /in Laos/ an international neutralized settlement." Three basic "factors" were recognized as "standing behind" these policy objectives:.

"ae The general principle of helping countries that try I ' to defend their o\m freedom against cor;:munist subversion and

attack.

■ t

*'b. The specific consequences of communist control of ' South Viet-Nem and Laos for the secui'ity of, successively,

^ . C^oabodia, Thailand (most seriously), Malaysia, and the

I I Philippines -- and resulting increases in the thjreat to

India and -- more in the realtn of morale effects in the short term -- the threat to /other nations in Asia/.

"c. South Viet-Nam, ^n.d to a lesser extent, Laos, as test cases of ccrmunist "wars of national liberation" -^/orId-wide." h_l/

f Current U.S. objectives in South Vietn8m and Laos i/ere seen as an integral -gaxt of the "overall policy of resisting Communist expansion world-^ride," and particuJ.arly a part of the "policy of resisting the

expansion of Cornjnunist China and its allies. North Viet-N?m and North

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Korea., ' Thus, for South Vietnam to come under Communist control, "in any i^orm/' vas seen as

a major blow to our basic policies. U.S. prestige is heavily coimnitted to the maintenance of a non-Coiamunist South Viet-Hana, and only less heavily so to a neutralised Laos." h^

* Unlike the cur-rent objectives^ those comprising a fall-back position dealt only tvith South Vietnam. Moreover^ they were modified dujTing the course of the Working Grounds efforts. The modifications occujrred m the way the objectives were presented -- in the context of the presentation — rather thsn in their specific plirasing. The words remained the same throughout:

^ -• To hold the situation together as long as possible so that we have time to strengthen other areas of Asia.

It

p

To taJve forceful enough measures in the situation so that we emerge from it, even in the worst case, with our standing as the principal helper against Communist expansion as little impaired as possible.

. "^^ liialie clear, o.to nations in Asia particularly, that^failure in South Viet-Nam, if it comes, was due to special local factors that do not apply to other nations ve are coimnitted to defend -- that,'in short, ovx will and ability to help those nations defend themselves is not im-pairedo" hzl

_^ At first, these fall-back objectives for South Vietnam were presentee as possible alternatives -- to be considered in conjunction with a reassessment of the costs and risks associated with currently acknowledged^ object iveSo Following its recognition of the extent to which

U.S. prestige had been committed, even the second draft (8 Igovember) sta-oed: . ^

^ Yet...we cannot gu.arantee to maintain a non-Communist

South Viet-Nsrd short of committing ourselves to whatever

degree of military action would be required to defeat North

Viet-ITam and probably Communist China militarily. S'uch a

commitm.ent-.rould involve high risks of a major conflict in

Asia, which could not be confined to air and naval action

buu^would alraost inevitably involve a Korean-scale ground

action and possibly even the use of nuclear weapons at some point c

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Despite all this, it was aclmo^fledged, South Vietnam "might still come apart, leaving the United States deeply committed but with much of its ini-cial justification disintegrated. "Hence," the evaluation continued,

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we must consider realistically what our over-all objectives and stakes are^ and just what degree of risk and loss we shouJ_d be prepared to inaJve to hold South Vietnain, or alternatively^^ to gain tire and secure our- further lines of defense in the world BXid, specifically in Asia." kh/

Significant 5 in shedding light on the subtle changes that occurred in this rationale during the ensuing three or four weeks, was its treatment of the third fall-back objective. Observing that "most of the TOrld had written off" both South Vietnam and Laos in 193k, an early^draft acknowledged that neither had acquired the international standing of such former targets of Communist aggression as Greece^ Iraai and^South Korea, it went on to point out several historical characteristics of South Vietnam and Laos that m.ade them such unique cases, including: (l) "a bad colonial heritage" and inadeqviate preparation for self-government; (2) a "colonialist war fought in half-baked fashion and^lost"; and (3) "a nationalist movement taken over by Communists ruling in- t>ie other half of an ethnically and historically united country.. _" it then added:

"The basic point, of coui'se^ is that we have never thought we could defend a governjnent or a people that had ceased to care strongly about defending themselves, or that v^ere unable to m^aintain the fundamentals of government. And the overwhelmdng world impression is that these are lacking elements in South Viet-IIam.... "

Moreover, the commentary noted that there was widespread expectancy that if South Vietnam w^ere lost it would be due to its lack of these elements. U5/

Subsequent to circulation of the initial draft of the "objectives and national interest" Section, a number of critical or related comments' were directed toward Group Chairman Bundy. On h ]\^ovember, Michael Forrestal suggested that "an important flavor" was lacking in the original analysis -- nemely, "the role of China" and her need for "ideological successes abroad." in his view, given Chinese policy, "the effect of oiu- withdrawal from a situation in which the people we were trying to help seemed unable to help themselves" would be m.ore politically pervasive in Asia than if China did"not exist. He thought the U.S. object should be to "contain" Chinese political and ideological influence "for the longest possible period," thus providing time to create "at the very least, Titoist regimes on the periphery of China., c." U6/ On 6 November, William Sullivan also urged placing U.S. policy in Viet-Kam in the "larger perspective" of the political confrontation with Com.munist China. Ixi an attached, longer ex-position of policy rationale for the Western Pacific, he presented conceptions of the U.S. problem quite similar to those advocated by Forrestal, The political future of the peoples of East Asia was portrayed as depending largely on a struggle between Washington

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and Peking. Chinese political and ideological aggressiveness was viewed as a threat to the ability of these peoples to determine their own futures5 3jid hence to develop along ways compatible with U.S. interests. The U.S. coiGinitinent to defeat ITorth Vietnamese aggression^ even at the ris.k of "direct military confrontation" with Ooinriiunist China^ was perceived as part of the longer-tena policy of establishing conditions which permit the independent nations of the region to develop the ability and confidence "to cope with the emerging and expanding power of China. "Vt/ Tcies^ coivvments may have influenced that part of the 8 November version which referred to current U.S. objectives as part of the broader policy of "resisting the expansion of Co:nvmunist China and its allies...."

The JCS member also stressed the iraportance of not falling bade from current policy aims. He stated that "in the eyes of the world" the United States was coirmitted to its initial objectives "as matters of national prestige, credibility, and honor." Further, that U.S retention of "a mea.sure of free-world leadership" required "successful defense" in South Vietnam against the wars of national liberation strategy. Admiral Mustin criticized the Bundy draft for overstating "the degree of difficulty associated with success for our objectives in S^/II." He asserted:

"Oui^ first objective is to cause the DRV to terminate support of the SEA insurgencies....To achieve this objective does not necessarily require that we 'defeat North Viet-Nam,' and it alraost certainly does not require that we defeat Cojrmunist China. Hence our commitment to SW does not involve a high probability, let alone 'high risks,' of a major conflict in Southeast Asia."

He characterised the draft's expression of concern over risks and costs as an inference "as though the harder we try the more we stand to risk and to loseo On the contrary, he stated, the "best hojpe for minimizing risks, costs, and losses in achieving our objectives" could be attained though "a resolute course of action." U8/

Admiral Mustin also attacked the ixaplica-tion that there w^as "some alternative to om^ holding South Viet-Nam. There is none," he stated, adding: "We have no further fall-back position in Southeast Asia in the stated view of the Joint Chiefs of Staff." Specifically, he warned that to attempt to strengthen other areas of Asia, "in the context of our having been pushed out of SVI^I, would be a thoroughly non-productive effort militarily...." Moreover, chara.cterising the draft's concessions to the unique difficulties in Laos and South Vietnam as "sour grapes," he attacked its asstcuptions that we could convince other na-tions that failure in South Vietnam was due to strictly local factors. He warned that other nations would regard any such explanation on our part as "completely transparent." Concerning any lack of G'^./TT will to defend itself, he commented, "A resolute United States would ensure...that this lack were ciu^ed, as the alternative to accepting the loss." The JCS member portrayed a U.S. failure in South Vietnam as an "abject hmailiation/'

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that V70uld be disastrous in shaking the faith and resolve of the non-Co3munist nations \rho rely on the United States for major help against CoimnuMst aggression. In that events he saw little possibility for effective U.S. reassurances, k^/

The iiapact of these criticisms can be seen in the Working Group's final assessment of U.S. interests in Southeast Asia. In explaining the need to consider a fall-back position^ the statement stressed the need m.erely to assess "the drawbacks" associated with it. jjsnding to this judgment vere admissions that "there is some chance that South Vietnam might come apart imder us whatever course of action ve p-uxsue" and "strong military action necessarily involves some risks of an enlarged and even conceivably major conflict in Asia." Then followed the statement:

These problems force us to weight in our analysis the d rawbacks and p ossib ilities of success of various options^ including the drawbacks of accepting only the fall-back objectives set forth below, (Underlining added)

Missing was the earlier cLrafti's reference to potential costs and risks involved in pursuing cuj:*rent objectives- Missing also was any suggestion that the Adrainistration might find some advantage in seeking an alternative to these objectives. 50/

The Working Group went on to assess^ in terms almost identical to those in the initia-1 draft^ the likely consequence of Coruiiunist control of South Vietnam for different world areas of interest to the United States. The- group sav^ important distinctions between the li}iely ii:iipact on U.S. interests in Asia end those in the world at large. For the latter 5 the most significant variable was seen as the degree to which adverse developments in Southeast Asia mdght produce domestic public revulsion against all U.S. comjiiitments overseas:

"VJithin NATO (except for Greece and Turkey to some degree), the loss of South Vietnam probably would not shal^.e the faith and resolve to face the threat of ComEmunist aggression or confidence in us for major help. This is so provided we carried out e.ny military actions in Southeast Asia without taking forces from NATO and without generating a wave of "isolationism" in the U.S. In other areas of the world, either the natui^e of the Communist threat or the degree of U.S. commitment or both are so radically different than in Southeast Asia that it is lifficult to assess the iJApact, The question would be whether the U.S. was in fact able to go on with its present policies." 51/ '" "

For Asia, other than Southeast Asia, the Working Group's assessment went as follows:

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The effects in Asia generally -vjould depend heavily on the^circiL^nstances in T^hich South Vietnsi-n was lost sr.d on whether the loss did in fact greatly weaJcen or lead to the early loss of other areas in Southeast Asia. National China, 0.5 South Korea^^ and the Philippines would need maximum reassurance. While Japan's faith in our military posture and detemination might not be sha]<:en^ the growing feeling that Coiimunist China must somehow he lived with might well be accentuated. India and Iran appear to be the Asian problem cases outside the Far East, A^U.S. defeat could lead to serious repercussions in these countries. There is a great deal we" could still do to reassiire these co-untriesj but the picture of a defense line clearly breached could have serious effects and could easily^ over time, tend to unravel the whole Pacific and South Asian defense structures. *' 52/

The consequences for Southeast Asia of CoiTHiunist control in South Vietnam were seen as highly differentiated and by no means automatic. The "domino theory" was viewed as "over-simplified." The Working Group felt that it might api^ly "if, but only if, Communist China...entered Southeast Asia in force and/or the United States was forced out of South Vietnam, in circumstances of military defeat." Nevertheless the group judged that "alifiost ixnmediately," Laos would ^. become extremely hard to hold and Cambodia would be "bending sharply

to tne Comnumist side." These developments were seen as placing great pressure on Thailand and encouraging Indonesia to increase its pressure on Malaysia. Thailand, it was noted, had "an historic tendency to malce peace with the side that seems to be win-ning," and Malaysia's "alr^eady serious Malay^Chinese problem" was cited. The Working Group concluded:

We could do more in Thailand and with the British in Malaysia to reinforce the defense of these coujitries, the initial shock wave would be great..."

This^ assessment was cuite close to that made in the 8 November di^aft in which Bundy had gone on to point out that even if we succeeded in over-

^.T'^^f V^^ ^""^^^ "^^^^ ^^ Thailand and Malaysia, "the struggle would be upnill for a 3.ong tim.e to come." But in neither case vras much credence placed in the domino theory. 53/

^ ^ ■ ^ It should be noted that Admiral Mustin and the JCS did not agree with this assessment. The Admiral commented that the JCS believed the so-.called domino theory ''to be the most realistic estimate for Cambodia ana Thailand, probably Burma, possibly Malaysia."- In the contex-t of -l?.te I90U, these nations were expected to colla-ose "plainly and simply as the corollary to our withdrawal." 54/ Accordingly, a specific notation of the differing view-point of the JCS was placed in the Working Group's final report. 55/

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In s^crnvmarising its assessment of the consequences of Corfimujiist control in Soutii Vietnam^ the Working Group stated:

"There are enough *ifs^ in the above analysis so that it cannot oe concluded that the loss of South Vietnam vould soon have" the totally crippling effect in Southeast Asia and Asia generally that the loss of Berlin touM have in Europe; "but it could be that bad, dr^iving us to the progressive loss of other areas or to taking a stand at some point /so that/ there would almost certainly be a major conflict and perhaps the great risk of nuclear var." 56/

- b, E^/olution of Options , The alternative courses of action perceived by the Working Group went through a fairly rapid evolution. " As conceived by Chairman Bundy and John McKaughton, who apparently collaborated in their initial formulation, the options would offer a wide range of m_ilitary actions and diplomatic postures. As the views of other members and interested officials were expressed, and as it becaiae more apparent how little flexibility was perceived with respect to national objectives, subtle changes occurred. The effect was to narrow somewhat the range of'effects which the different options might achieve and to tend to blui- the distinctions between them. However, the process occurred so early in the life of the Woz^king Group that it is difficult to pin-point the changes and somewhat presumptuous, relying only on docum.entary evidence, to explain them.

The perceived options were three in nuniber, labeled A, B, and C. Option A essentially'was a continuation of military and naval actions currently underv/ay-or previously authorized, to include prompt reprisals for attacks on U.S. facilities or other VC ''spectaculars" in South Vietnam., These were to be accompanied by continued resistance to a negotiated settlement unless stringent preconditions, aiiiounting to agreem.ent to abide by U.S. interpretations of the Geneva Accords, were met. Option B consisted of current policies plus a systematic program of progressively heavy military pressures against North Vietnam, to be continued until current objectives were met. Negotiations were to be resisted, as in "A," although to be entered ultmately, but they were to be carried on in conjunction with continued bombing attacks. Option C combined current policies with (l) additional -- but somewhat m-ilder — military pressures against North Vietnam and (2) a declared willingness to negotiate. Once negotiations were begun_, the m^ilitaz-y pressures ^rere to stop, although the threat to resume was to be kept alive.

■

In a general sense, these distinctior.s remained constant throughout the Working Group's effort. However, subtle changes occurred. In the initial conception of "B, " it was perceived as "m^eshing at some point with negotiations," based on an underlying assmTiption that negotiations would probably be unavoidable. 57/ The full analysis of this earliest form of "B". (discussed more fully later) makes it clear that some kind of international discussions %rould probably begin fairly early and continue as the intensity of our military-pressures mounted, ^3 / Moreover,

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it is evident that these m-essm:es would he applied deliberately to permit evaluation of results at each step. Yet^ the initial form of "B" was intended to embrace high intensity options — in McTIaughton * s terminology, a "full squeeze." It will be recalled from the discussions earlier in the fall^ that this term was applied to graduated operations that included mining harbors, bombing bridges and LOG targets and eventually attacking industries. 59/ As Option B developed, ho\7ever, it became associated vrith prolonged resistance to a negotiated settlemento 60/ Moreovei-, although the intensity of the military operations it embraced reraained about the saiae, they were perceived as being applied at a faster, less flexible pace. For example, in a comment about this option on 1^ November, Adjniral Must in

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"...while the Joint Chiefs of Staff offer the capability for pursuing Option "b" as defined, they have not explicitly recommended that the operations be conducted on a basis necessarily that inflexibleo All implementing plans...would permit suspension v^henever desired "oy national authority." 61/

Perceptions of Option C became more like "B," Initially, the additional pressures in "C" were conceived as "additional forceful measures and military moves." 62/ They included such operations as extension of the current ariiied escort of reconnaissance flights in Laos to full-fledged armed route reconnaissance -- gradually leading to similar attacks against infiltration routes in the southern border regions of North Vietnejn. The initial Option C also provided for authori^^ation of the already planned for cross-border ground operations in Laos and possibly in Cambodia. By 8 November, hovrever, the pressure -cox-tion of this option was perceived as (1) including eventual attacks against other-than-infiltration targets in North Vietnam and (2) giving "the impression of a steady deliberate approach," the pace of which could be quickened if necessary. Moreover, in this later development of "c," the U.S. negotiating position would be to insist from the outset on full acceptance of the cu-rrent U.S. objectives. Initially this position would incorporate certain additional bargaining elements that couJLd drop out in the course of discussion^ 63/

This m^odification of the pressure and negotiation aspects of "c" led other m.embers of the Working Group to express reservations. Robert Johnson stated that this "proposed stiffer version" was little different from "B." He argued that the^only real differences now were (l) a declared willingness to negotiate and (2) our unwillingness under "C" to carry the action through to its ultiraate conclusions." He cautioned that the new version was xinlikely to produce the hoped for adve-Jitages of "pure C" and that it could convince the Commiinists that our negotiatory spirit was not sincere, ck/ Enclosed with his comments were the views of the CIA member, who also believed there would be confusion between "B" and the new "C" "- particularly as observed 'oy the DRV. Other reservations were expressed by Assistant Secretary McNaughton, who ux-ged that the proposed pace of the new "C" be slowed do^m. This vrould be accomplished by dividing the additional pressure operations into distinct phases, with

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only the armed reconnaissance in Laos as part of the first phase. The OSD representative also urged not yielding to pressmres to participate in a Geneva conference until after several military actions had been taken against the DRV. 65/ Of all the reservations stated above, only the last (delaying Geneva participation) vas reflected in subsequent descriptions of Option C,

„ „ ^^Even Option A was altered to sorae e>rtent. The main emphasis for A -continued to be the currently adopted policies. At some time prior to 3 November (when the final analysis was" drafted), interest was sho-jn in an extended A«" This version retained the policy of resisting negotiations in hope that the situation would improve, but it incorporated low-level pressure actions akin to the early stages of "C." The type and intensity of the actions "would vary in direct proportion to our success in convincing the world and our o^m public of the truth about Hanoi s support, direction and control of the VC." It miglit begin with armed reconnaissance in Laos, include greater naval activity along the coast, and gradually phase into strikes against LOG targets in North Vietnam. In terns of military actions alone, extended "A" resem;oled closely the initial version of "C." However, it was conceded that even an extended Option A did not offer a very promising means for moving toward negotiations. 66/

Why did these changes take place? The available documentary materials do not make this entirely clear. One factor which may hcve influenced the modifications in all three of the options was recognition of -Che problem of conflicting signals that could result from reprisal actions. If reprisals were designed to be forceful and punitive and intended to m^atch the seriousness of VC provocations, they might be so strong as to interfere with the messages'"to Hanoi which it was originally intended would be conveyed by the graduated pressures. Indeed, it was pointed^ out that operations orders already developed by CUTCPAC for retaliations in response to attacks on DE SOTO Patrols (should they be resumed) were "of magnitude which would not be politically viable" except under extremely serious provocations. 67/ Moreover, it was feared that improperly orchestrated reprisals m^ight create undue international pressui^es for negotiations that could upset the negotiating strategy appropriate for the selected option. 68^/"

it^^Y^ A^ s.nd "B" may have been altered as a result of changes made in C." The objections raised to the new "C" may have encouraged ' Chairman Bujidy to include an extended "A" that iras closer in the military sense to his and Mcllaughton's original concept of graduated pressures. Moreoever, it had been pointed out that the same negotiating'situations seen as appropriate for "c" (to include discussions of Laos and/or Cambodia as well as South Vietnam) could also apply to eventual negotiations arrived at through "A." 69/ Besides, with the stiffening of the C^ negotiating formula, the distinctions between the respective bar-gaming positions for "A" and "C" had become somewhat blui*red. Or)tion B's

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fa-ster pace in its later versions may have been an attempt to maJce a clear distinction between it and the new "C." Use of the term "fast /full squeeze" in reference to Option B began concurrently with descriptions of the stiffer version of Option C. 70 /

In addition^ it is possible that the emphasis on a fast-paced "B," with its harsher measures, was motivated in part by a desire to maJie this option unattractive to higher authority. This may explain the rather perplexed tone of the previously cited Mustin comment comparing the JCS and Working Group approaches. Other than the JOS member, most of the Working Group members appear to have favored less intensive pressu-res than those being advocated by the military. Despite a sense of high stakes in Southeast Asia, which ^^as shared by several members and other interested officials, many of these persons did not want the United States to plunge ahead with deeply committing actions as long as there was some doubt about the GW^s durability and commitment. 7l/

ITot incompatible with the foregoing argument is a possible additional explanation for the stiffening of Option C. As U.S. objectives came to be viewed somewhat less flexibly, it is possible that dominant elements in the Working Group thought it advisable to make "C" into a tougher position. There is little question that Option C was the natural heir of the concept of graduated pressures coupled v/ith a negotiated settlement advocated at several points earlier in the year. Several of the Working Group members had been instrumiental in shaping those proposals and were quite naturally attached to them conceptually. L^ow, advocates of the graduated approach were confronted with: (l) greater pressures from the JCS and their lil^e-thinkers in the Congress; (2) recognition of little flexibility among Administration officials regarding interpretations of national interest and objectives; and (3) an increasingly critical situation in South Vietnajii. It is likely that that these individuals viewed it necessary to stiffen their preferred approach in order to improve its compatibility with the cui^rent policy climate.

Whatever the reasons, the options for review and discussions were somewhat more closely alike than the original conceptions had beeno Option A provided for intensified efforts to improve the situation in South Vietncoii and for somewhat intensified militer'y actions in line with current policy. Inside South Vietnam it provided for rmprovements in the GWI administrative performance and for strengthening different elements of the pacification program. These internal actions were stressed as necessary regardless of v/hatever other measures were decided on^ Option A's provisions for measures outside the coimtry included: (l) . continuing and increasing the GTxV s covert maritime harassment program; (a) resuming the DE SOTO Patrol operations; (3) increasing the scope of Laotian T-28 attacks on infiltration targets in Laos and (U) when feasible5 undertaking small-scale cross-border GVi'I ground and air operations into

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the Laotian Panhandle. The option also included individual U.S. reprisal actions ^'not only against such incidents as the Gu3.f of Tonkin attacks but also against any recurrence of VC 'spectaculars' such as Bien Moao" The aim of these actions would be to deter repetitions of and to punish for such actions in South Yletmm^ "but not to a degree that would create strong international negotiating pressu3-es."

Basic to Option A was its provision for "continued rejection of negotiation in the hope that the situation vill improve." However;, it included recognition that "the GW itself, or individual South Vietnaraese ^ in potentially powerful positions" might initiate "discussions with Ha.noi

or the Liberation Front." If a coalition governLaent were thus arranged, the Working Group believed, the odds were that it would eventually "be f taken over by the Coinirainist element." In the event of such discussions,

I the U.S. response under Option A might be either (l) "stand aside," thus

disassociating the United"States fra-a such a settlement, or (2) "seek to cover a retreat hy accepting negotiations" thj-ough something like a Geneva conference, irhich might buy additional tione. 72/'

* ' Option B provided for everything included in "A" plus a program

I i • of U.S. military pressm-es against Horth Vietnam. These were to continue "at a fairly rapid pace and without interruption" imtil the DRV agreed to stop supporting and directing the war in South Vietnam and Laos. The pressures were to begin with attacks on infiltration targets and increase in intensity; however, the option included provision that an early attack on Phuc Yen airfield and certain key bridges in the northern part of North Vietnam might be required "to reduce the chances of DRV interference with the soectrum of actions" that were contemplated.

Although our public position on negotiations would be "totally inflexible" under Option B, it provided for recognition of the need to negotiate eventually. Under B, this would occur simultaneously with a continuation and escalation of the pressures and would be based on "inflexible insistence on our present objectives." Im evert he less, "B" aclmowledged the need "to deal with channels of /international/ communication, the UK, and perhaps -- despite our strong opposition -- a reconvened Geneva Conference of some sort" even before we agreed to enter into settlement taU^s. Moreover, while resisting negotiations, the option provided for (l) making "the strongest possible public case . of the importance, increase, end present intolerable level of DRV infiltration" and (2) "strengthexning the pictirre of a military situation in South Vietnam requiring the application of systematic military forceo "73^

Option C provided for every rcilitary action included in "A" plus "gz*aduated military moves against infiltration targets, first in. Laos and then in the DRV, and then against other targets in North Vietnam." The air strikes on infiltration routes v/ithin North Vietnam were to be preceded by low-level reconnaissaaice flights over, the sa:Ene genera.l areao Advantage was seen in initiating such measui^es "following either additional

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VC ^spectaculars' or at least strong additional evidence of major infiltration," Moreover^ Ootion C made provision for the rossiMlity of

I'll" ""

maximg a significant groxmd deployinent to the northern pajrt of South

Vietnam, either in the foriii of a U.S. corahat force or a SEATO-raernbers force as an additional bargaining counter. In any event, "C" was intended to give the impression of a steady deliberate approach" and

designed to give the U.So the option at any tiine to proceed or not, to escalate or not, oxid to quicken the pace or not."

In C, ' military pressures were to be accor:ipanied by "communications with Hanoi and/or Peiping" indicating in essence "a willingness to negotiate in an affirm^ative sense." From the outset "we vrould be... accepting the possibility that we might not achieve our full objectives." Accordingly, the concept for "C" included provision for an initial negotiating ^position that added "certain bargaining elements" to the basic U.So ob^jecoives. Once negotiations started the military pressures would cease. ^As in "B," these would be preceded by a vigorous program of public information efforts and political consultations with Congressional leaders^and foreign allies, surfacing information on DRV infiltration and explaining our rationale for action. The latter would be "that doci.imented DRy illegal infiltration of armed and trained insurgents, and over-all DRV direction and control of VC insxu'gency, had now reached en intolerable level and that it was no^; necessary to hit at the infiltration..«and to bring pressure on Hanoi to cease this infiltration and direction." Th/

^^ ^ggjjj-ca nce of N egotiations. One of the most significant aspects of the NSC VJorking Group^s anal-yses was its emphasis on a negotiated settlement as the final outcome of contemplated U.S. actions. Regardless of the option selected or the pressure actions employed, inter-ncotional negotiations in some form were perceived as the- means by which the situation in Southeast Asia would ultimately be relieved. Even in the event of a unilateral CTIT or a South Vietnamese splinter negotiation with the NLF, under circumstances of a relatively shallow U.S. commitment (Option A), negotiation under a Geneva format was regarded as a preferable outcome. 75/ However, it is also clear that a parallel aim was to insure that pressures on behalf of such negotiations did not become compelling before the U.S. bargaining position could be improved.

Also significant is the fact that the kind of settlement which was seen as the piu-pose of negotiation was one which woiad end North Vietnam's participation in the conflicts in Southeast Asia -- and concurrently, also end the United States' direct participation (as it was in 19o4) in those conflicts. In view of the prevalent Administration perception of North Vietnam as instigator and aggressor in the conflict ■ withm South Vietnajii, it is ironic that the Working Group's considerations of^a negotiated settlement did not include the problems of a political settlement in the South. In the available source materials, this subject was^raised only once and even then was not dealt with further. The^.one instance was in the conte:'ct of Robert Johnson's analysis of Option B. In it he pointed out that if a fully successful "b" negotiation

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resulted (one in \ih±oh the DHV in fact coraplied with our demands to the extent that we ceased our pressure actions) "we would then have to consider,. .vrhether or not to maiie com-oromises — such aS;, for example. accepo less than perfection for international supervisory mechanism^ agree to permit the KLF to become a legitimate political party in the South, or agree to political consultations between GW and DEV." jG/ In other words^ at the level of the 1-Jorking Group's analysis, the political stakes for which the game in Vietnam was really being played and Lhe very powerful and relevant cards held by the DRV and the VC were not really considered. To continue the analogy, the Working Group concerned itself only with the various opening bids the United States might make in order to achieve a position from which it could attempt a finesse.

The main problem apparently recognised by the Working Group was that, given its current"objectives, the United States had few bargaining points with which to negotiate- In essence, it was primarily to fill this lack that many group members and Administration officials favored initiation of direct m.ilitary pressures against North Vietnam. To some, bombing attacks were something that might then be removed as an inducement for the DRV to stoo or to reduce its support of the military operations, in South Vietnam^and Laos. To others, such vigorous measures might at least ser\re as a demonstration of U.S. resolve to combat external aggression but also as a screen behind which to extract ourselves should the situation in South Vietnam deteriorate further.

Gaining maxiiaum bargaining advantage from the military measures contemplated under each of the options was one of the major emphases in the Working Group's analyses. For example, under "A," emphasis was placed on obtaining moximum leverage from exploiting the thereat of fiirther escalation — to be demonstrated prirnarily through reprisal actions and deplo;^naents. Under "B," a similar kind of psychological leverage was to be achieved through the clearly ascending nature of the acLions, particularly if some^ii^ie were permitted to assess resuJ,ts« Under "C," the effect v/as to be achieved by the combined effects of (1) meximising the threat of im-oending escalation after each graduated and carefully paced step and (2) minimdz-ing the Communist governments' problems of "face" as they moved toward negotiation. 77/

It was the recognised lack of sti^ong ba^rgaining points that led the Working Group to consider the introduction of ground forces into the northern provinces of South Vietnam. In advancing this proposal, the State Policy Planning Council member pointed out that "whatever the stated U.S. intpntions," the Corrimunists wouJ-d probably expect to put an end to all air and naval attacks on Ilorth Vietnam merely by agreeing to enter negotiations, in that event, he pointed out, the United States could not use these pressures (or the promised relief from them) as a ■ bargaining counter during negotiations. If ground forces were deployed prior^to an obvious need to combat invading enemy troops, this disposition could be used as such a counter. Their deployment "would,

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moreover J carry with it the threat of siibsequent air and naval attacks against North VietnaTiU And," he continued, "threat may he as important as execution.•.in producing desired Communist reactionso" 78/

Although initially advocated as a val/iable bargaining piece for all the options, the concept of deploying ground forces for this purpose became associated .Tvith Options A or C. In the form.er case, it vas urged with recognition that "A" offered little leverage for bargaining other than hoped for improvement in the GW's internal administration and pacification efforts« For "C" it v/as perceived much in the sense in which it was originally proposed -- serving as an additional negotiating ploy before it might be needed as an operational military capacity. Such a force was seen as taking either of two forms: (l) a U.S. combat force, probably of division strength, or (2) a force composed of contingents from certain SEATO members (Australia, New Zealand, the UK, Thailand and the Philippines). Interesting, in view of subsequent events, is the fact that participation by South Korea and the Republic of China specifically was not to be sought c (This may also have been significant of the Administration's tendency at the time to view Communist China as co-instigator of the Vietna:iiese aggression.) The contemplated ground force deployment also was seen as serving some auxiliary functions: (l) to deter DRV ground force deplo;>a-iients into South Vietnaia; (2) by taking blocking positions, to reduce the infiltration into the South through Laos; and (3) (in the case of the multi-national force) to improve the international pict-ure of oui^ actions in South Vietnam by virtue of visible international participation. ^^

As stated previously, the prim-ary bargaining element in Option B was the application of clearly ascending military strikes against North VietnaiHo These would be halted only in return for dauonstrated DRV compliance with demands that it stop supporting and directing military operations in South Vietneja and Laos." It was pointed out that DRV compliance under pressu_re would be tantamount to surrender. Further, if we insisted that compliance include calling off all acts of VC terrorism and of resistance to pacification efforts in South Vietnam, it would mean "virtual unconditional surrender." 80/ To obtain such high stakes, the group recognised that intensive pressures would be required. However, it also recognised that the combination of extreme demands and hsjrsh actions would be most lilcely to produce adverse international reaction and increased pressuites for an early cease-fire and negotiations.

The basic political objective perceived for Option B was to "prevent international, consideration.. .from interfering with ouj: contfnu-ing pressures against the DRV until the DRV has taken the actions we desire of it." In view of the expected demands for an early cease-fire, it \icis believed advisable to present the U.S. case in the United Nations at the time "b" military operations were initiated. This, it was felt, would channel some of the international pressui-es into a controlled

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environiiient where the ensuing discussions vould likely consume considerable tlTne. Moreover^ taJcing such initiatives would avoid the defensive postui'e that the United States would be placed in if our military actions were introduced for condemnatory purposes "by another government. The Worlving Group stressed tliat under Option B, the United States should firmly resist a Geneva-type conference lontil it had chtaixied assurances of DRV compliance with its demands. Should the pressiores for negotiation become too fox^aidable to resist and discussions begin before a Coimaunist agreement to comply, it was stressed that the United States should define its negotiating position "in a way v?hich makes Comramiist acceptance unlikely/' in this manner it would be made "very likely that the conference would brealc up rather rapidly," thus enabling our military pressui^es to be resumed. 3l/

The only option that provided for bargaining in the usual sense of the word was Option C. The'^Working Group intended that with the initiation of this option and the U.S. declaration of willingness to negotiate, the Administration vionld have embarked on a bargaining course. In the group's view, we vrould stick to our full objectives at the outset "but we would have to accept the possibility that, as the whole situation developed, we might not achieve those full objectives unless ve were prepared to take the greater risks envisaged under Option B." In such cir-cuiiistsnces, it acknowledged, "it might become desirable to settle for less than complete assurances on ouj: key objectives." 82/ . -

Accepting in principle the possible need to compromise the initial U.Sc position under Option C, 'the Working Group specified a som.ewhat hardened definition of that position. The initial negotiating objective ("the complete termination of DRV support to the insurgency...") was refined to specify that it incorporated three ftLndanientals: (a) that the DRV cease its assistance to and direction of the VC; (b) that an independent and secure GVIT be reestablished; and (c) that there be adequate internatioxial siipervising machinery'." Specific areas of "give" for the bargaining process were identified as the question of free elections and the degree of verification we would require., The group further provided that during negotiations the intensity with which the United States would pursue its initial objectives would vary with the extent of improveraent within the GW. If the situation in South Vietnam got better the United States would press harder for acceptance of its initial position. If the situation grew worse, "we would have to decide whether to intensify our militajry actions, modify oior negotiating positions, or both." 83 /

Because of a declared willingness to negotiate from the outset, the approach to a negotiating situation under Option C was viewed by the Working Group as considerably different from that under Option B. Whereas, in the latter case it was believed that the IM would provide the most useful medium for discussions, the preferred approach under Option C was through a Geneva-type meeting. The channels, both direct and indirect^ to Hanoi were not believed useful for negotiating purposes. Although potentially helpful in relaying impressions of current attitudes and negotiating positions in Hanoi and Peking, the Soviet goverrjraent was not

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seen as a.useful negotiating intermediary. The Ull Tvas viewed as presenting a special problem "because of the approaching annual issue of Corcrnujiist Chinese membership. For this reason the Working Group felt that it \vould not provide an effective negotiating forum until late February or March 1965, although it acloio^Aledged the necessity of presenting the U.S. case before the Security Covmcil. In view of these considerations the Working Group viewed it most desirable to yield to the expected pressures for a Geneva conference -- but only af1:er conducting "a niB-ber of military actions against the DRV." 8^/

d. Perceived Reactions to Options. The Working Group evaluated the relative advantages and disadvantates of the three options and concluded that Option C provided the most promising co-urse of action. The evaluation 7ras based on thjree general criteria: (l) likely reactions of allied and non-aligned foreign governments; (2) reactions within South Vietnam; and (3) effectiveness in bringing desired responses from the Communist government. With, respect to the firsts the group reported:

Option A would cause no adverse reactions but if it failed it would leave a considerable after-taste of U.S. failui-e and ineptitude; Option B would run major risks of sharply exjjressed condemnation^ which \^ould be erased only if the course of action succeeded qtiite clearly and in reasoxnable time; Option C would probably be in between in both respects."

With respect to the remaining criteria, Option A seemed likely to achieve I little more than buying some time^ and in some respects it appeared

I coimterproductive. While Option B was viewed as standing "a greater

I chance than either of the other two of attaining our objectives," it

i also was seen as running "considerably higher risks of major military

1 conflict with Hanoi and possibly CoPTramist China," On balance, Option C

was considered "more controllable and less risky of major military action" than "B" and more likely "to achieve at least part of our objectives" than , "A." 85/

The Working Group reported that Option A appeared to offer "little I . hope of getting Hanoi out or an independent South Victnajn re-established."

It was recognised that the actions included in this option could not physically affect the extent of infiltration from the North and would not be likely to affect Ha:aoi's determination to continue its policies. At best,, the group believed, "they might...keep the DRV from engaging in further spectaculars, end thus keep the scale of the conflict in the south within some limits." However, Option A was conceded little chance of contributing to an improved GW, in the short period of additional time its effects might possibly make available. The group recognized sagging morale and doubts concerning U.S. intentions as the "miost immediate problem" in South Vietnejn. Several mambers felt that without further U.S. actions, political collapse was imminent -- that to add only reprisals for VC spectaculars might lift m,orale immediately thereafter, as in the case of

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the Tonlcin Gulf reprisals^^ but \-rould not have lasting effect. At best, under "A," it was believed that the gradual deterioration in the countryside of South Vietnam vould continue. 86/

Although the Working Group viewed a decision to continue Option A indefinitely as ruling out either "B" or "C/^ it did suggest the possibility of extending "A" to its limits and gradually phasing into operations like those in Option C- It vas suggested that this might, over time, generate "favorable, or at least not unfavorable," domestic and international reaction which along with the increasing cost of gradual disruption in North Vietnam might cause Hanoi to slow down its infiltration. However, the result of this process, at best, would be a gradual ixiprovement of the UcS. position without advancement toward a meaningful settlem.ent. 8?/ Lacking a deliberate attempt to phase into something like "C," Option A was viewed as "an indefinite course of action." As such, its "sole advantages" Mere seen as:

"(a) defeat would be clearly due to GW failure, and we ourselves would be less implicated than if we tried Option B or Option C, and failed ;

"(b) the most lilcely result would be a Vietnamese-negotiated deal, under which an eventually unified Comraujiist Vietnam would reassert its traditional hos-. tility to Comm.unist China and limit its own axabitions ' ^

to Laos and Cambodia." 88/

The group's assessment went on to indicate that should this occur, Thailand would likely conclude that "we simply could not be counted on, and would accommodate somehow to Communist China even without any m.arked military move by Communist China." 89/

The Working Group reported that the actions in Option B offered a number of unique advantages relative to the other options:

"1» Option B probably stands a greater chance than either of the other two of s/ctaining our objectives vis-a-vis Hanoi and a settlem.ent in South Vietnam.

IT,

2. Our display of real muscle in action would undoubtedly have a salutary effect on the morale of the rest of non-Comim-ujiist Asia,

Tt-,

3. The course of military events vls-a-vis Corrjaunist China might give us a defensible case to destroy the Chinese Cor'nnunist nuclear production capability." 90/

However Option B was also seen to present some unique problems and to possibly lead to some ur^desirable resu_lts. For example, most of

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the gi-^oup believed Option B would risk an impairinent of the ''U.S. standing in^the MTO and Eui^opean fraine^/rork/' The option v?as believed likely to produce a major conflict and these effects Tvere seen as quite probable if it produced anything less than an early and completely satisfactory outcoaie. ' 91/ ?roblems were also perceived at home. It vas pointed out that Buy U. S.-initiated military pressures against lM"orth Vietnam should be consistent with the provisions of the Joint Congressional Resolution passed following the Tonkin Gulf incidents;, but that Option B

would be difficult to Justify under the authorities cited in this resolution.

"Characterizing the use of force in the context of this alternative as a legitimate exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense in response to an "armed attack" from the North would be a major public relations effort."

Moreover, given the pace and likely intensity of escalation in tliis option, it was suggested that "the constitutional prerogatives of the Congress, for exaraple, to declare war /would/ become pertinent." 92/

As seen by the Working Group the most disturbing aspect of Option B was its almost irreversible comm-itment to a major military effort, the ultimate naturce of which v/as difficult to predict. That Hanoi would yield to U.S. demands at an early stage of "b" was considered mlikely. The chances were considered "significantly greater" that the DRV would retaliate, either by air attacks on the South or a ground offensive either in Laos or into South Vietnam. It was considered most likely. however, that Hanoi would continue to hold firm, thus requiring the United States to "up the ante militarily." With further increases in our military pressm-e, the group argued, "the odds would necessarily start to increase that Hanoi..,would either start to yield by some real actions to cut dovm, or would m^ove itself to a more drastic military responseo" The Working Group then cautioned:

We could find ourselves di^awn into a situation where such militai^y actions as eji amphibious landing in the DRV

proposed as one of ovir further actions -" m^oved us very far toward continuing occupation of DRV soil. Alternatively, the volimie of international noise.. .could reach the point where, in the interest of our world-wide objectives, we would have to consider accepting a negotiation on terms that would relatively but not necessarily be wholly favorable to the attaimnent of our fvll objectives." 93/

Option C was particularly attractive to the Working Group because it^was believed to be more controllable and, therefore, less deeply committing than "Bo" Moreover, in the event of a GM collaT^se (recognized «-^ ^- danger under all of the options), the group argued, "our having talien ger measures would still leave us a good deal better off than under

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Op-cion A vith respect to the confidence and willingiiess to stajid firm of tne na-Gions in the next line of defense in Asia." 9V

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,r It ^"^? reactions to "c" expected by the ¥ori:ing Group differed irom^ B primarily as a result of the U.S. negotiating posture. The iniTGial strikes against targets in Korth Vietnen vera seen as a "first ' break-pointj marking the beginning of major international pressures for negotiation. Communist reactions to the early pressures were regarded as little different from "B," Some chance of a military response vas I conceded, but it was thought more likely that the DSY would "hold firm

. , wnile s-cimulating condemnation of /the United States/ by world opinion,

^Z'J^t,^^' ^®g°^iations, take a tough position/' Under "C," however, jf> j.r "^'°^^^ vould not necessarily be an immediate increase in pressure. It bne GTiT situation had improved "we would try to capitalise on /it/ .^.by pressing harder for acceptance of om- initial negotiating position." : erring success, the pressures would continue,-and the Working Groun

I ! ^^'^^SJi'^^'^ '^^^'^ '^^'^ likely dragging out of the wai' at this point would

probably^lead to a resuaption of deteriorating trends in South Vietnam. iu suated: m this case, we would have to decide whether to intensify I ■ °^ toilioary actions, modify oui- negotiating positions or both." If

"the ^"^ '^^^•^'" ^^easures were increased at this point it was expected that

t, wou_La be a progi^essively increasing chance of major Cornmvinist maiiT^ary^response," such as those considered imder "bJ' If the U.S. negooiaoing position were modified at this point, the group perceived V ^ gor proolem, in that key na,tlons on both sides would suspect that

I 'dri^?'^ getting ready for a way out." Therefore, it suggested that

aaditionai military actions, possibly including greater deplo;vTnents to boutneasc Asia, would need to accompajiy the modifying moves. 95/

The major disadvantages of Option C acknowledged by the Working thrunn'-e~^^ tendency to "stretch-out" the confrontation and ejcpose

■_ 1 2d S-cates to an increasing variety of pressures and criticism. i-or example, the group acknowledged that GW morale and effectiveness were likely^to suffer at several Doints in the course of the options: {1) upon initial U.S. agreement to enter negotiations; (2) as it became Clear tnat the war was dragging on; end (3) with modification of the U.S. negotiating position. It also recognized several measures that the Lomi-nunists might take during a prolonged, indecisive period to reduce our initial advantage: (l) imnroving air defenses in Korth Vietnam; (2) deploying Chinese ground forces southward; and (3) hardening their propaganda. While increasing the enemy's public coBimitment to its current line of policy, these measures wo^old not seri'-e as clear acts of escalation. 96/

_, . ihese difficuj.ties and other uncertainties encom-oassed by Opoion C illustrate the intensity with which most members^of the NSC f WoriLing Group wanted the United States to courile limited military com-

^ir'r^^f. Tr^i f, ^"-°S°ti^-ted settlement to relieve oui- position in Yietnajn. ihe fact tnat tne group judged "c" as preferable to "A" o.- "b," despHe Its rather obvious inherent problems makes this evident. (One might also

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have viewed it as evidence that United States policy in Southeast Asia vas fraught vith real contradictions o) For exexiple^ the one feature that gave Option "c" its most distinctive character --- early -willingness ■ to negotiate v.-ithout the concurrent effects of continually mounting military pressures -- >ras its most uncertain aspect. This particular part of the analysis was revised twice between the finaJ. drafting of the group's findings and their consideration by the Principals, Moreover^ the Working Group had received at least one informed judg?iient to the effect that, given Hanoi's high stakes in South Vietnam and its perceived opportunity to deal the United States a major blow, the DRV would not be likely to negotiate in response to any of the options. 97/ On the eve of the initial meeting with the Principals, Chaiman Buncly called early negotiations "the least satisfactory part of the present script." In particular it was recognised as diffictat to "keep up our show of determination and at the same tirr^e listen for nibbles," 98/

In many respects Option C seems to have been favored primarily for what it incorporated -- for the means it employed -- rather than for what it might achieve. It certainly was not presented as an opti-m-istic^ alternative. Under "C,." the group perceived that "at best/., the DRV might feign compliance and settle for an opportunity to subvert the South another day." This stood in marked contrast to what it perceived as the "at best" outcome of "B," namely that Hanoi "might be ready to sit doi-m and work out a settlement in some form that vrauld give a restoration of the 19511 agreements," hopefully with firmer guarantees. Moreover, with "c, " the group believed that in between the best ami worst outccm.es, the United States "m^ight be faced with no improvement in the internal South Vietnam situation and with the difficult decision whether to escalate on up to m.aJor conflict with China." 99/ This kind of outcome^promised little more than the group perceived as available through "A" -^ and without the additional commitment of national prestige and military force. But it was an outcome readily perceivable from a policy that clung tenaciously to rather major objectives but was reticent to accept miajor risks.

5' Zi£^s From Outside the IJSC Working C-rouo

While the NSC Working Grour) vras 7)reparing its findings for sub-mission uo tne Principals, other sou::ces of influential opinion were comraunicating their view^s to these individuals. In addition, it is important to^ consider that members of the VJorking Group w^ere m.ost liliely communicating their respective impressions of group progress to the principal official in the agencies they represented^ Thus, William Bundy no doubt shared ideas with Secretary'Rusk; John McNaughton with Secretary McNai^i-njra; Harold Ford with CM Dii^ector McCone; and Admiral" Mustm with General Wheeler, Some of these Principals no doubt had injected particular ideas into the group's deliberations. Whatever the source, these high officials were exposed to a variety of suggestions and viewpoints before reacting directly to the Working Group's submissions.

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The follo-i^fing sections deal i/ith tvo rather significant sources of ideas v;hose co^iitnunications reached Secretary KclTajnara. However^ their vievs were knovm to other rriembers of the Principals Group as well^ through the normal interde-oartmental coordination procedures. These proposals are significant also "because of their rather contending view- . points on the subject of U.S. courses of action.

^* JCS Views. On four different occasions during the period of the Working Group's existence, the JOS submitted forma], proposals for direct military strikes against North Vietnamese targets. On each occasion they took pains to remind the Secretary of Defense and other readers of their earlier recommendation for a preferred coui^se of action, which involved a systematic pattern of air attacks on major targets <>

On 1^4 November, t-/o such recorrjnendations were made. One was intended to bring about expansion of the GVN's covert operations, to include "air strikes by ura-aarked aircraft" of the VliAF. It specified that these vrere to be "separate and distinct from larger (more decisive) air strilLe actions recommended.. .on 1 November I96U." The JCS stated that such smaller attacks would be useful in: (l) continuing the pressure on the DRV; (2) encom-aging GW leaders; (3) providing useful air defense data; and (h) demonstrating patterns of DKV/Chinese reactions that could be helpful in planning larger operationsc lOO/ The other recommendations caxie in response to Secretary McNamara's request to examine possible DRV/CHICOM military reactions to U.S. air strikes against North Vietnam. In a^nswer, they discussed various Comjnunist military alternatives and UcSo means to cormter them, and they described what they viewed as the most likely enemy reactions. These, they felt, would be primarily in the propaganda and diplomatic spheres because of what was perceived as China's general reluctance to become directly involved in conflict with the United States„ In addition, the JCS repeated their recomiuendations of k November (with respect to the VC attacks on Bien Hoa) as retaliatory actions equally applicable to any other serious provocations. They went on to recorjmend deployments "to iLiprove capabilities to conduct the program of air strikes" recamiiended on k November 196^. 101/

Four days later they submitted another proposal, in response to Secretary McNamara's interest in a possible progrEnn of graduated U«S. pressures against North Vietna^n. This possibility was described as "a controlled progre^^i of systematically increased military pressures against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (BRY) applied in coordination 'v7ith appropriate political pressures." (interestingly, the Secretary's interest was exrjressed on the sajne day as McNaughton's reactions to the draft analysis of Option C.) The JCS referred to their statements of k ezid. ik November,, describing their preferred course of action for-causing the DRV "to cease supporting and directing the insi:u?gencies" in South Vietnam and Lao3« Eoireverp they also proi^osed an alternative series, of specific actions, "should a controlled program of system.atically Increased pressures...be directed," Moreover, they recommended a set of operational objectives which they termed "appropriate" for such a graduated program, as follovrs:

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a-c Signal the villingness and determination of the United States to employ increasing force in support of...an maependent and stable noncoramunist government in RW and a free and neutral Laos

I "^,

0. Reduce5 progressively, DRV support of the ins-urgencies in RW:" and Laos to the extent necessary to tip the

balance clearly in favor of the Governments of RW and Laos "by:

(l) Reduction of the amount of support available through destruction of men, material, and supporting facilities;-.

\2) .../and/ through diversion of DRV resoui'ces to

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increased homeland defenses and alerts; and

"(3) Reduction of the rate of delivery of available support through destruction of bridges and other LOG choice points...and through interruption of m_ovements,...

c. RLnish the DRV for DRV-supported military actions by the Viet Cong/Pathet Lao... .

"d. Terminate the conflict in Laos and RVjM only under conditions vhich vould result in the achievement of U.S. objectives." 102/'

The final JCS proposal to be submitted relative to the "courses of action" debate in November 196^ came in direct response to the IISO Working Group's draft papers, circulated to interested agencies for comment on I7 IJovember. 103/ Criticising the group's assessment of U.So staiies and^ interests, the JCS called Southeast Asia "an area of major strategic importance to the United States, the loss of ^faloh would lead to grave political and military consequences in the entire Western Pacific, and to serious political consequences irorld-wide." They reiterated their v±e\r that the best probability of success in attaining the currently recognized U.S. objectives in that region would be "by achieving the prerequisite objective of causing the cessation of DRV support and direction of the insurgencies in RVl^' and Laos." lOU/

Tne JCS also criticiired the three options described by the Working Group and outlined five alternatives to them, in six ascending order of intensity: . • '

1. Terminate 'coimnitments in South Vietnam and Laos and withdraw as gracefully as possible. The JCS called this "implicit in the content of the NSC Working Group paper but...not clearly identified as a separate and distinct option."

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2. Continue actions contained within present policies, includ ing reprisals for VC provocations. The JCS identified this as the group^'^s Option A but stated that the added demands it placed on the DEV were not commensurate with those imposed by DRV or RW." In essence, they agreed with the Working Group's evaluation that this alternative ■ would neither accomiolish oui^ objectives nor alleviate the critical situation in South Vietnam.

^3. Undertalvs graduated military and political initiatives to apply additional pressures against the DRV,

without necessarily determining in advance to what degree we will commit oui^selves to achieve our objectives, or at what point we might stop to negotiate, or what our negotiating objectives might bCo

_^ . . ^- Undertake a "controlled program" of graduated military and

political pressui^es, based on an "advanced decision to continue military pressures, if necessary, to the full limits of what military actions cai: contribute toward U.S. national objectives." The JCS called this "a variejit and logical extension" of Option C and cited their proposal of 18 November as a detailed description of it.

5» Undertake a "controlled program of intense military pres-siox-es. . .designed to have major military and psychological irapact from ■ the outset, and accom.pejiied by appropriate political pressures." The I JCS offered this alternative in'lieu of the Working Group's Option B

, which they stated "is not a valid formulation of any authoritative

views known to the JCS." In ^articular, they specified that their in-( I tensive program vjould

be undertaken on the basis that it \vould be carried through, if necessary, to the full lii^it of what militejry actions can contribute towai-'d national objectives- it would be designed, however, for suspension shoz't of those limits if objectives were earlier achievedc

Fqv a full description of this alternative, they referred to their -oro-posal of ik liovember. 105/

Of the five alternatives, the JCS stated their be_Uef that only the last two offered "a probability of achieving /Jui^rent U.S^/ objectives."

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S+pr -^°" ^° Pi^oviding foi^ stronger, more determined actions, these nabives also provided for sizeable force build-ups that "should

tionabr'' i?''^^^°'' °^ "•^- resolve less likely." Option C w,s objec-militar-^ ~v.'"'^f^^ "^i^^^ because it did'not permit "a clear set of agreed as dev'l^ ODjecti/es" and because it provided for "the contingency that les- II ''^^^^"-^ ^i^e analysed, it may be thought expedient to settle for 1=5 i> n^^ ^°^Plete achievement of our objectives for RYE and Laos." it stret I'f' "^° ^'^^^'^ '''^^""^ ^^ outlining the last two options, the JOS

mode oTAclSral^?: '^'i''' '^°^ "controlled" programs. 106/ In the ^ ^. ' xxcLx i'iusoin s memorandUiHj referred to earlier^ they vere mo-e ^JJ..'';^?'^t'^"^^^P"^^-ng to combat the Working Group's inferences that the It"is fe±^i^~''~^ actions which the JCS advocated were not controllable. f^v-fi-'OT^.^^n^-'^ clear that group members favoring Option C had tagged the

exoiem.e Opcion B vith a JCS label.

e

desj<Tned £2£!i2}lJVie^. Whereas the JCS emphasized damaging actions, their ca^^^VvT"^^"^ Hanoi's will be destroying a significant portion of eimph^sit'^ h^ 1 ^^^"^"^ Rostov; urged a different approach. In his view^ commitm-nt t ^^^"^ '^^^^ placed on signalling to Hanoi and Peking oxn:

-ron-v^r.---^*!' rP ^^^ ^^^^ vast resources to whatever extent required to reinsoaue p^'P-Poo+^-t- t j, i ^

• ^J^iectively tne provisions of the 195^+ and I962 Geneva Accords

Rostov ^ ' .-"^"^^^^^"f^ "to military moves most useful for this parpose, thouo-ht^°™''"T^^^^^^^ *° Secretary McNanara his concern that "too much enough tv^ tl^^^^ ^^^"^^ *° *^*^ actual damage we do in the Horth, not similar '^°^fu '^° ^^"^ signal we wish to send." Outlining a concept addit-'o-iol' i ^^-"^'^-iest Option C, he urged that the initial use of . mH-nol/ against Eorth Vietnam "should be as limited and unsan-gumary as possible" and that it

should be designed merely to install the principl that _/the mV/ will, from the present forward, be vulnerable to...attack...for continued violations of the 1954 and I962 Accords. In other words, we vould signal a shift from the principle involved m the Tonkin Gulf response." 10? /

addi'-ion^i"'''^?^'"^^"^^' ^^ ^^^ view, would be the signals communicated by Dlovine r q^'~ ""^ Cloves in the Southeast Asia region. He ui-ged de-fo^Pc; ■ - +^^°""*^ forces to South Vietnam and large-scale retaliatory comnt-/\'° i Western Pacific. Besides their value as a bargaining 'N,.e ^7"' ^°^'^°"-'^ saw a ground force coim-flitment as a clear signal that mounron'^th"^^^*^^' ^° m^°° *^°"'^ ^"^ ^°^^'^ °^ escalation Horth Vietneai migl Dossib-T-^ ?^r^"'^"" ^^^ argu-ed that such a move would rule out "the" the li^ / +^ ^^'^'^ Communists/ radically extending their position on + ho f° . "^'^-^ "^^^^ °'^ air and naval damage alone." He stated that

the increased retaliatory forces would signal:

-Lnaojfe are putting in place a capacity subsequently "to step up direct and naval pressure on the north,

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if that should "be required; /and/ that ve are putting forces into place to exact retaliation directly against Coiniaunist China, if peiping should join in an escalator^ response from Hanoi." 103/ * " ■

The "broader context of Rostov's views on military actions vas

described for Secretary Rusk on the eve of the first meeting of the

Principals to discuss the Working Group findings. Stating his agreement

with those portions of the latest intelligence estimate which stressed

the Asian Communist powers' desire not to become involved in a direct

conflict with the United States, he framed the ''most basic'' U.S. problem as f'ol 1 OT-T.q .

as follovj

"...ho^ to persuade /the Commvoiists/ that a continuation of their present policy will risk major destruction in Korth Viet Ram; that a preemptive move on the ground as a prelude to negotiation will be met by U.S. strength on the ground; and that Communist China will not be a sanctuary if it assists Korth Viet T^am in counter-escalation."

He then.repeated his prescription of military moves earlier urged on Secretary McNamara. However' he stressed that these moves would not;,

in themselves, constitute a decisive signal." V.ore significant in Communist eyes, he felt, would be signals to ansv^er the question.

Is the President of the United States deeply committed to reinstalling the 195^-62 Accords; or is he putting on a demonstration of force that would save face for, essentially a U.S. Dolitical defeat at a diplomatic conference?" 109/

In Rostow^s view, the Commtinists would not accept a setback until they were absolutely certain that the United States really meant business — an assessment that could only come as a result of firm public comiait-ments on the part of the President and a-opropriate follow-through actions« He stated:

,*'I have no doubt we have the capacity to achieve a reinstallation of the 195^-1962 Accords if we enter the exercise with the same determination and staying power that we entered the long test on Berlin and the short test on the Cuba ■ missiles. But it will take that kind of Presidential commitment and staying power."

Acknowleding that- the kind of conflict we faced lent itself to prolonged uncertainties and that the Commujiists could pretend to call off the guerrilla war, only to revive it again, he stressed the need to maintain pressijre on them for some time. The installation of ground forces and a. non-sanguinary" naval blockade were suggested as particularly useful for

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ohis purpose. Eostov urged trying "to gear this i;hole operation with the best counterinsurgency effort ve can mount vith our Vietnamese friends...and not withdraw U.S. forces from Viet Kam until the war is truly under control." lio/ . , ■ '

In closing, Hostow outlined a scenario of action that would follow from the kind of Presidential decision described above. This would include, in sequence:

(1) Immediate movement of relevant forces to the Pacific.

(2) Immediate direct communication to Hanoi...including a clear statement of the limits of cur objectives but our absolute commitment to them,

(3) Should this first coinmianication fail (as is likely) installation of o-ur ground forces and naval blockade, plus first attack in North, to be accompanied hy publication /of a report on infiltration/ and Presidential speech. Ill/

Thus, m their communications to senior officials in the latter half of November, both Walt Rostow and the JCS stressed a similar point. Although advocating different solutions, they both emphasized that the Aamxnistration could not expect to dissuade Hanoi and Peking from continued pursuit of the DRV's moortsnt and strongly-held echinitments IPS "^^ ^^^^^ correspondingly" strong commitments to resist them. The JCS, for their ovm reasons, sought to avoid a commitment of ground forces to Vietnam ejid argued instead for punitive air and naval actions, liostow felt that by forceful and meaningful demonstrations of national resolve, including the commitment of ground forces to South Vietnam, direct use of force against the Commimist nations need be minimal.

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II.

POLICY DECISIOriS

The efforts of the KSC Working Group.were intended to "be completed in preparation for a major policy review late in November 196U. Plans were made for /embassador Taylor to retm^n to Washin^on from Saigon to join in a series of strategy meetings. The expectations were that the meetings would result in a Presidential action order to supersede the one issued following the high-level conference in September (KSiM 31^).

Meetings with the President were scheduled for the week following Thanksgiving, when he retui^ned from his working holiday at the ranch. Preljoninary meetings between Ambassador Taylor and the principal officials from agencies with national security interests in Southeast Asia were held during the preceding weekend, 27-29 November. The whole episode took place amid widespread speculation that a major policy change was imminent and rumors that Taylor had returned to insist on the bombing of infiltration targets in North Vietnam and Laos. Public and Congressional speculation ran so high on the eve of the meetings that the White House and State Department sought to dampen it with statements that Taylor's reported comments "were not policy" and that his return did not mean that "any great, horrendous decision" would result. 112/

1- Pe actions of Principals to Workin.g; Group Analyses

Before their meetings with Taylor and the President, the Principals in Washington met to consider the Working Group's findings and to assess the major issues affecting future U.S. courses of action. Just prior to their initial gathering, on 2k November, William Bundy had forwarded a list of questions and comments pertaining to the Working Group's findings, and these served as a kind of agenda. Included were such issues as: (1) whether the relative advantages among the three options were actually as evident as the group had found; (2) whether or not the papers' assessment of U.S. stakes in Southeast Asia should be revised in the direction of JCS attitudes; (3) whether the actions associated with the various options could in fact be carried out to achieve the results expected; and (k) whether a deployment of ground forces to South Vietnam would in fact provide any advantages. 113/ (TAB A)

a. Consensus Aniong NSC O fficials . As the Principals meeting opened, Secretary Rusk raised an issue that was high among A.dministration concerns -- nam.ely that the i^jnerican public was worried about the chaos in the GTO, and particularly with respect to its viability as an object of an increased U.S. commitment. Secretary McNamara and General Wheeler conceded the piopriety of this concern but warned that the situation in the GVl^j would only get v/orse if additional steps were not taken to reverse present trends. Husk then presented a question which seem.ed basic to the

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whole rationale for contemplated U.S. courses of action. He asked whether the situation in South Vietnam could he improved in time to save it if the DRV were now to withdraw its support. CIA Director McCone conceded that the VC would still have plenty of capability remaining but expressed the view that the situation could be coped with from the standpoint of internal security criteria. At this point Under Secretary of State George Ball asked if bombing North Vietnam could improve the situation in South Vietnam directly. McKamara replied that it could not unless the bombing actually cut down the infiltration into the South. After agreeing with a Rusk comment that the struggle would be a long one, even with the DRV out of it, the group reached consensus that South Vietnam could be made secure, provided the Saigon government could maintain itself. llA/ This was the first of several major policy Judgments reached in the course of the meeting.

Other points of clear consensus (with no more than a single dissenting opinion) were as follows:

(2) That the situation in South Vietnam would deteri-( " orate further under Option A even with reprisals,

but that there was a "significant ch3.nce" that the II . actions proposed under "B" or "C" would result in

an improved GVN performance and "make possible" an 'I ' -, improved seciirity situation (George Ball indicated

doubt).

(3) That any negotiating outcome under Option A (with ■ or without U.S. negotiating participation) probably

would be clearly vrorse than under Option B or C.

(k) That it was doubtful (contrary to the view expressed in the V/orking Group papers) that Option B would have the best chance of achieving the full U.S. objectives (General Wheeler expressed agreem.ent with the Working Group statement)«

(5) That the requirement of Option C, "that we maintain a credible threat of major action while at the same tifiie seeking to negotiate," could be carried out despite acknowledged public pressures.

(6) That the Administration could safely assume that ■ - South Vietnam could "only come apart for morale

reasons, and not in a military sense," as a result of intensified VC effort.

(7) That early military actions against ITorth Vietnam xinder Option C should be determined, but low in scale -- that at this stage, strong damaging actions

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should be limited to reprisals (General Wheeler dis-sentedj stating that our losses might "be higher in the long run vith such an approach).

(8) That the loss of South Vietnam vould "be more serious than stated in Section II of the Working Group's draft papers and that the Admnistration's assessment should be revised at least in the direction of the JCS vieirpoint (George Ball argued against this Judgment). 115/

The context of the Principals' discussion of this last point contained some significant expressions of opinion. Secretary Rusk stated the vie"vrpoint that the confidence of other nations in the United States would be affected by the loss of South Yietnexi despite their possible indifference to the political struggle in Southeast Asia. He added that if vre did nothing to affect the course of events" in VietnaiTi it would have the effect of giving more to de Gaulle. However, Rusk did not accept the Working Group's rationale that we would obtain international credit merely for trying. In his view^ the harder we tried and then failed^ the worse our situation woul.d be. McGeorge Bundy disagreed with this last point, except to acknowledge that to attempt something like Option B and then quit would clearly be damaging. Secretary McllEmara seemed to support the (McGeorge) Bundy view, stating that "B^' followed by failure would clearly be worse than Option C followed by a compromise settlement. George Ball expressed strong agreement with the last Husk point, saying that de Gaulle would portray us as being foolish and reiterating that the damage to U.S. prestige would be worse if we tried either "B" or "C" and failed. General Wheeler stated the opinion that to do little or nothing at this point would be an act of bad faith. Mr. McCone pointed out a perpetual dilemma if the Administration continued to act despite South Vietnamese deterioration; hence, he urged great care. Il6 /

It is interesting to note the views and associations of the two occasional dissenters in the series of consensus judgments rendered by the Principals. General Wheeler, Chairman of the JCS, expressed viev7-points consistent throughout with the recorded JCS views on future courses of action. On the other hand, George Ball, Under Secretary of State, had no obvious jurisdictional or institutional influences to affect his judgments. Nevertheless, known to Administration observers as "the devil's advocate," he had developed something of a reputation as an independent thinker. At about the time of the Working Group deliberations, for example, he developed a paper suggesting U.S. diploma^tic strategy in the event of an imminent GVIn collapse. In it, he advocated working thj:ough the U.K., who would in tujrn seek cooperation from the USSR, in arranging an international conference (of smaller proportions than those at Geneva) at which to work out a compromise political settlement for South Vietnam. 117 / In addition. Ball's prevalent occupation with European affairs may have influenced him to view Southeast Asia as of lesser importance to the U.S.. national Interest.

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^- Views Lacking Consens-us * Also discussed at the 2^ NovemlDer Principals meeting vera several issues on "which consensus was not reached. Host of these related to immediate U.S. actions that would need to be taken irrespective of the option selected^ or to problems faced in carrying out a particular option. Since earlier a.^reements had indicated - little interest in Option A, only "b'' sjad "C" were exacained further.

Discussions of Option B dealt primarily with questions of the intensity of blows that might be struck at North Vietnam. With respect to whether DRV airfields should be struck early or as a part of a more gradual sequence. General Wheeler pointed out that early strilies on airfields were what made '"b" operations so different. It was these strikes at potential DRV capabilities to interfere with U.S. attacks, or to retaliate, that made systematic, intensive air operations possible. In response to a specific question from the Working Group, the possibility

j I ^'^ using nuclear weapons was also discussed. Secretary McITamara stated

that he could not imagine a case where they vrould be considered. McGeorge Bundy observed that under certain circumstances there might be great pressure for their use both from the military and from certain political circles. General Wheeler stated that he would not normally vote for their

I I "^se -- never, for example, in an interdiction role. However, he suggested

. • that they might be considered in e:d:remis -- for example, to hold off

an enemy to save a force threatened with destruction, or to knock out a I special target like a nuclear weapons facility. In response to Secretary

Rusk^s query as to their potential for cordoning off an area, both Mcilamara and Wheeler answered- negatively. 118 /

Discussions of Option C dealt with the problem of early negotiations and, at greater length, with that of deploying ground forces to South Vietnam. On the former, there was little interchange noted in the proceedings. Despite the Working Group's admitted frustration vrith this particular issue, only two Principals' comments were recorded. McGeorge Bundy stated the view that we should let negotiations come into play slowly. Secretary Rusk expressed concern that the GVI'^ would be very sensitive on the issue of a negotiating conference. Earlier, however, he indicated his opinion that pressure for a conference would not be a serious problem as long as military actions continued. II9 /

On the issue of sending groiind forces to South Vietnam in the early stages of Option C, there was no firm conclusion. Secretary Mclvsmara stated that there was no military requirement for ground forces and that he would prefer a massive air deployment. In response to General Wheeler's suggestion that some groimd forces could be justified for air defense and base sec-ority purposes, he acknowledged that "we might do both.'' Mr. McCone stated the opinion that U.S. ground, forces would help stabilize South Vietnam, similar to their effect on Lebanon in 1958. They might even provide a general security force in the South. McNamara^disagreed. Secretary Rusk and McGeorge Bundy suggested their utility in proving a "preemptive effect," presimaably to deter North /^^ Vietnamese offensive moves into the South. To this McCone added that

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these forces might "be equipped in ways to show our determination. In the end, it was agreed to raise this issue with Ambassador Taylor, at the Principals next meeting. Significantly, the value of ground forces as a bargaining counter apparently was not discussed, thus providing one more indication of the Principals reticen-e to deal with the issue of negotiations. (it is interesting to note in this respect that William Eundy's memorandum, formally summarizing the points of consensus and disagreement, does not deal with the early negotiating problem --despite its being a specific agenda item which he had suggested as Chairman of the Working Group.) 120 /

The only basic issue between the options on which the Principals did not arrive at a consensus was the question of the relative risks of major conflict entailed by Options B and C. General Wheeler stated that there was less risk of a major conflict before achieving success under Option B than under Option C. Secretary McNamara believed the opposite to be true^ Secretary Rusk argued that if "B" were selected, there would be no chance to apply the JCS variant of "C," whereas under the Working Group's "C," this would still be left available. He observed that entry into the JCS variant of "C'' would feel something like the Cuban issile risis. McNamara then suggested a four-week program of actions following the general pattern of Option C. Mr. McCone stated that they sounded "fine," but that in his opinion the "negotiating mood" interfered with their potential effects. He agreed to attempt a paper to deal more directly with the relation of risk to likely success, as between the two options. In the end, the only conclusion that could be drawn was that there was not complete agreement that "b" ran a higher risk of major conflict than "C," as alleged by the Working Group. 121/

During the meeting of 2k llovember there vras no clear decision as to which option was favored by the Principals. It seems likely that "A" was favored by Ball. Wheeler clearly favored "B," and he may have had support from McCone, although this is far from clear. On the basis of either their participation in the Working Group or from statements of preference made at the meeting, it is clear that "c" was favored by McNamara, McIIaughton, Rusk, and the Bundy brothers. However McGeorge Bundy and Mcl^amara apparently preferred a "firm C," whereas the other three wanted a more restrained, incremental approach. 122/

^' Policy Views from Saigon . The saxie group of Principals that met on the 2hth re-assembled on 27 IIovem_ber for their first meeting with Ambassador Taylor. Present also was Michael Forrestal \rho had gone to Saigon to help prepare Taylor for the forthcoming strategy meetings and to apprise him of the Working Group efforts. 123/ Taylor led off with a prepared briefing on the current state of affairs within South Vietnam.

Ambassador Taylor's estimate of the situation in South Vietnam was rather bleak. Confirming many of the assessments made v^eeks earlier

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in intelligence estimates, he reported continued deterioration of the pacification program and continued weakness in the central government. The former v/as portrayed as. related to increased direction and support '" ' of VC operations from Hanoi and increasing VC strength despite "very

heavy losses inflicted almost daily" by the AP.TO. Particular areas of concern were Identified as the area surrounding Saigon and the northern ^ provinces, which were "now in deep trouble." Taylor related C-VIi weak-

ly ness to political factionalism, mounting war weariness and hopelessness^

T "particiaarly in the urban areas," and a lack of "team play or mutual

loyalty" among many central and provincial officials. Calling such chronic weakness "a critical liability to future pla.ns," he warned that ^ lack of an effective central government caused U.S. efforts to assist

\ South Vietnam to have little impact. IgU/

To alter the course of what Taylor called "a losing game in South Vietnam," he recommended three measiires: (l) "establish an adequate government'; (2) Improve the counterinsurgency effort; and (3) "persuade or force the DRV" to stop aiding and directing the insurgency. With respect^to the first, Taylor allowed that it was "hard to decide what is the minimum government which is necessary to permit reasonable hope" of • success. However, he stated:

...it is hard to visualize our being willing to make added outlays of resources and to ruii increasing political risks without an allied government which, at least, can speal^:, for and to its people, can maintain law and order in the principal cities, can provide local protection for the vital military bases and Installations, can raise and support Armed Forces, and can gear its efforts to those of the United States. Anything less than this vrould hardly be a government at all, and under such circumstances, the United States Governjnent might do better to carry fon^-^ard the war on a purely unilateral basis.

With regard to the coionterins'jrgency effort, he opined, "We cannot do much better than what we are doing at present until the government improves." 125/

Ambassador Taylor saw U.S. military actions directed at the DRV ■as fulfilling a twofold pijurpose. On the one hand, he believed that even if an effective government were established, "we will not succeed in the end unless we drive the DRV out of its reinforcing role and obtain its cooperation in bringing an end to the Viet Cong insurgency." On the other hand, he saw actions outside South Vietnam as a means to improve GVI'^ morale and confidence. Acknowledging that using our aid, advice and encouragement on behalf of programs to stabilize the government would probably be insufficient for this purpose, he suggested additional measures:

"One way to accomplish this lift of morale would be to increase the covert operations against Eorth Viet i^am by sea

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and air and the coimterinfiltra.tion attacks within the Laotian corridor. While the former vould "be covert.. .knovrledge of their occurrence could be made known..-to give the morale lift which is desired. Additionally we could engage in reprisal bombings, to repay outrageous acts of the Viet Cong in South . Viet ITam "

However, he added that even all these actions might not be sufficient "to hold the present government upright," in which case we would have to reconsider our policies. Our alternatives, he said, would be either to support one fo3rm or another of a replacement governjnent or to "limit our contribution to military action directed at North Viet-Nam." 126 /

In addition to the military actions already identified with morale-raising purposes, Taylor suggested:

"...we could begin to escalate progressively by attacking appropriate targets in Tlorth Viet-Nam. If we justified our action primarily upon the need to reduce infiltration, it would be natural to direct these attacks on infiltration-related targets such as staging areas, training facilities, communications centers and the like.... In its final forms, this kind of attack could extend to the destruction of all

(important fixed targets in north Viet-IIam and to the interdiction of movement on all lines of communication. 12?/

i\mbassador Taylor's views regarding the circTjimstances under which such escalatory actions should be initiated were not entirely clear in his briefing to the Principals. After reiterating the "necessity of stepping up the 3^A operations, increasing those in Laos, and undertaking reprisals as part of the efforts to raise morale and strengthen the GTO, he stated two somewhat different, although not necessarily contradictory, vie^rpoints on the question of stronger military actions:

"if this course of action is inadequate, and the government falls, then we must start over again or try a new approach.,,. In any case, we should be prepared for emergency military action against the Ilorth if only to shore up a collapsing situation.

"if, on the other hand...the goverrjnent maintains and * proves itself 5 then >7e should be prepared to embark on a methodical prograau of mounting air attacks in order to accomplish our pressuTe objectives vis-a-vis the DRV.../*

He then proposed a scenario for controlled escalation, the actions in which were quite similar to an extended Option A or a low-order Option C vrithout declared negotiating v;illingness. 128/

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.. ■'. ■ The impression is that Taylor visualized graduated air operations having primarily psychological impact on the Uorth following logically from successful political efforts in the South — but that he also wanted an (perhaps somewhat stronger) air campaign held in readiness as a punitive measure in the event of a critical reversal in the South. This impression is strengthened by his earlier comment about U.S. alternatives and by the second of "three principles" which he recoKimended to the Principals:

«

a. Do not enter into negotiations until the DRV is hurting,

"b. Never let the DRV gain a victory in South Vlet-lTam without having paid a disproportionate price.

c. Keep the GVI\' in the forefront of the combat and the negotiations." 129/

Involving the GVM in all phases of our operations was an important aspect of the i\mbassador * s thinking about next courses of action He stressed that before making a final decision on the co'orse we vrould follow^ it would be necessary to obtain the reactions of Prime Minister Huong and General Khanh to our various alternatives. He explained:

They will be taking on risks as great or greater than ours so that they have a right to a serious hearing. V7e should make every effort to get them to ask our help in expanding the war. If they decline, we shall have to re-■ think the whole situation."

If^ as is likely, they urge \is^" Taylor added, we should take advantage of their^enthusiasm "to nail down certain important points" on which we want their agreement. Included were (PJJl pledges to maintain military and police strength, to replace incompetent officials, and to suppres disorder and agreements to stipulated divisions of responsibility for conducting military operations". I30/

Taylor's briefing made clear his commitment to limited U.S. objectives in Southeast Asia and his believe in the necessity of assuring the DRV of this limitation. Further, he made explicit his expectation that the DRV would not accept U. So offensive actions without some intensified military reaction in the South and that any DRV submission to our demands might well be temporary.

d- Discussions with Ambassador Taylo r. Following the briefing, the Principals commented on a number of the Ambassador's observations and discussed fijrther the question of future courses of action. Secretary Rusk^ asked what could be done to make the GVII perform better. ' Taylor replied that he must be able to convey a strong message but that we

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couldn't threaten the Saigon government* For exexrple^ a threat to "withdra^'7 unless" would be "quite a gamble." The issue of neutralism was raised and "Ambassador Taylor noted that 'neutralism* as it existed in Saigon appeared to mean throwing the internal political situation open and thus inviting Communist participation," Mr. Ball observed that a neutralist state could not be maintained unless the VC were defeated and that the GW must continue to be free to receive external aid until that occurred. Therefore, "neutralism in the sense of withdrawal of external assistance" did not seem to be a hopeful alternative. In apparent reply to Taylor's briefing comments to the effect that the United States might continue military action against North Vietnam despite a GVi'T collapse5 Rusk commented that he "couldn't see a unilateral war" in this event. Taylor indicated that he meant "only punitive actions." Secretary McNamara agreed with Rusk, but added that if the ■ GVTJ continued to vreaken we would need to try Option C or A. "The consensus was that it was hard to visualize continuing in these circumstances /if the GVIT collapsed or told us to get out/, but that the choice must certainly be avoided if at all possible." 131 /

After a discussion of some of the administrative problems in • the GVIT, "/\mbassador Taylor noted that General Westmoreland had prepared a report of the military situation" in South Vietnam. (The report was later distributed to the group.) He indicated that "Westmoreland was generally more optimistic than he (Taylor)" and that he saw better morale, increased defections and the like as signs of i improvement in the military situation. Further, he stated that

Westmoreland would be inclined to wait six months before taking further actions in order to have a firmer base for them. However, Taylor added that "he himself did not believe that we could count on the situation holding together that long, and that we must do something sooner than this." Secretary McRamara also disagreed with Westmoreland's view, expressing doubts that the military situation would improve. In answer to specific questions, McNamara stated his opinions that (l) no, the political situation would not become stronger, but (2) yes, we would be justified in undertaking Option C even if the political situation did not improve. Taylor replied that "stronger action would definitely have a favorable effect" in South Vietnam, "but he was not sure this would be enough really to improve the situation." Others, including McNamara, agreed with Taylor's evaluation, but the Secretary added that

("the strengthening effect of Option C could at least buy time, possibly measured in years." 132/

i I . ' Ambassador Taylor then urged that "over the next two months

we adopt a progre^u of Option A plus the first stages of Option C." He argued that the GVN was badly in need of some "pu.lmotor treatment," that any other alternative would probably result in a worsened situation — perhaps militarily, lie added that the likelihood of GW. improvement seemed so doubtful that "we should move into C right away." Secretary Rusk asked if Option C would give Taylor the "bargaining leverage"

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needed with the GWi. The /onbassador replied by suggesting certain details of the message he would propose passing to the Saigon government. In effect these called for the Gm: to agree, to the kind of internal policies and command arrangements suggested in his briefing, in return for a prompt U.S. implementation of "Option A plus" and acknowledgment of the intention to go further if the GVII stabilized itself. 133 / It is important to note that the official m-emorandum of the foregoing discussion implies agreement among the Principals that Option A plus early stages of C should be recommended. The memorandum states, "It vras urged that ... and to get what improvements we could it was thought that we sho^old move into some parts of C soon."

There followed a discussion of the infiltration evidence, during which Ilr. McCone indicated that an intelligence team had made a further investigation of it.

It was agreed that State and Defense should check statements made by Secretary Rusk, Secretary McKamara, and General Wheeler on this subject, so that these could be related to the previous IvIACV and other estimates and a full explanation developed of how these earlier estimates had been made and why they had been wrong in the light of fiaier evidence." 13^/

Before the meeting adjourned (with agreement to meet again the next day), Ambassador Taylor raised a number of questions which he thought the Working Group papers had not covered adequately (TAB B). Only a few received answers during the meeting, and he agreed to furnish the Principals with the complete list. However, it was indicated that Option B or C could be initiated from a "standing start" -- presumably with no incidents necessarily occurring first. The GViM-were acknowledged to have "plenty of capabilities" to participate -- even before arriving at the intended four-squadron strength of A-1 aircraft. It was stressed that the VIIAF role would be in North Vietnajai only -- not in Laos -- and Secretary McrTsjnara indicated a strong role for them against targets below the 19th Parallel. Finally, a time-span of three to six months was indicated as the expected duration for Option C. 135/

On the following day, when the Principals reassem.bled, William Bundy circulated a di-aft scenario of actions proposed in the event a decision were made to undertake measures like those contained in Option A. It had been agreed at the end of the initial meeting that these would be reviewed by the group with the assumption that they could be implemented "with or without a decision to move into the full Option C program at some time thereafter." 136/ (it is important to note how readily the attention of the Principals focused on the similarity of preparatory auctions and early military m-easures in the various options, apparently without regard to the pai-ticular negotiating rationale which each option incorporated.) Bmidy's scenario of early military, political and diplomatic actions vras based on a similar assumption "that a decision is or ^s ^Q^ /going to be/ taken to go on w4th Option C thereafter if Hanoi does

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not bend or the GVE come apart," He indicated, hov^ever, that the Working Group believed "that at least a contingent decision to go on is now required." To facilitate discussion on the part of the Principals^ worksheets indicating proposed language or procedures were distributed, to include the following action categories. 13? /

1* U.S. public action

a. White House statement following 1 December m^eeting

b. Background briefing on infiltration

c. Congressional consultation ci. Major Presidential speech

e. Public report on infiltration

2. Consultation with the CW.

3. Consultation with key allies

h. Coramuni cat ions with CoiHmunist nations

5' Existing forms of military actions (including reconnaissance and RMP strikes in Laos, GVU maritime operations, etc)

6, Reprisal actions resulting from DE SOTO Patrols and

spectaculars"

7* Added military and other actions

Certain of these topics received more attention than others in the coiirse of the meeting, with emphasis being placed on "spelling out" the exact steps that the Principals would be asking the President to approve. With respect to actions aim.ed at the U.S. public, McGeorge Bundy stressed that the Presidential speech must both (l) affirm U.S. determination and (P) be consistent with the infiltration evidence. General Wheeler stated that earlier infiltration reports could be defended because of their small data base and suggested that the discrepancies could be used to explain how the VC operated. It was determined that one man should be put in charge of assembling the available infiltration data for public release, and Chester^Cooper was suggested for the job. With respect to coordination with the GVI-I, Ambassador Taylor pointed out the need to prepare a draft statement to the G'/l^I for the President's review and agreed to prepare a table of the specific GW actions needed. Secretary Rusk acknowledged the possible desirability of delaying until GYi}l leadership issues were resolved, but that "anything now would cause problems." Mr. Ball reminded that it vrauld be necessary to query the . GVk regarding release of som-e of the infiltration evidence. 133/

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Military and other related actions vere also discussed: Secretary Rusk indicated the need to surface the GW maritime operations, and Ambassador Taylor suggested that they and other morale-raising actions could he m_ade public "in one package." In discussing the possible need for additional airfields in the northern part of South Vietnam, it vas pointed out that a new jet field might take two years. Secretary Mci^Tamara said he thought there v:ere enough fields to support Option C novr if certain readily accessible improvements were added. He and the generals (Wheeler and Taylor) reminded the group that stopping the movement of U.S. dependents to South Vietnam or withdrawing those already there could not be concealed and that this problen must be resolved promptly -- certainly within the initial.30 days. Taylor cautioned that actions regarding dependents could not be takien until our full co^arse was decided, presuraably because of potential GVIT fears of a U.S. withdrawal. The question of resumed DS SOTO Patrols was raised with the reminder that CIKCPAC wanted them for intelligence purposes. Taylor, McNamara and McGeorge Bundy opposed the idea, while General Wheeler strongly supported it. Notes'^of the meeting indicate resolution to the effect that the patrols should not be resumed diuring the first 30-day period. It was also agreed to recommend joint U.S/GVil planning of reprisal actions and of further escalatory measures. 139 /

At some point during the meeting it was determined that Williejn Bundy would undertake preparation of a draft national security action paper containing policy guidance for the approaching period. The paper was to describe the strategic concept, outline the actions to be taken during the initial 30-day period, and indicate likely follow-on measures and the conditions under which they might be Implemented. It was decided that the paper would be reviewed at another meeting of the Principals on 30 November, before submission to the President. A White House meeting had been scheduled for the following day. iko /

On the afternoon of the 30th, in Secretary Rusk's conference room, the Principals met again. Bundy's draft paper had been distributed to them earlier after being generally approved (re format) by Rusk and reviewed for substance by Messrs. McITaughton and Forrestal. 1J4I/

In describing the basic concept, the paper presented U.S., objectives as "unchanged," although giving prnnary emphasis to our aimis in .South Vietnam. However, getting the DRV to remove its support and direction from the insurgency in the South, and obtaining their cooperation in ending VC operations there, were listed among the basic objectives -- not presented as a strategy for attaining them. The objectives were to be pursued in the first 30 days by measure^ including those contained in Option A^ plus U.S. armed route reconnaissance operations in Laos, tfhey were linked with Am.bassaior Taylor's rationale that these actions would be intended primarily ""to help GW morale and to increase the costs and strain on Hanoi." The concept also included Taylor's emphasis on

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pressing the GWi to mal^e Itselx'* more effective and to push forvard its pacification efforts. For the period beyond the first 30 days^ the -concept provided that

".. .flist-phase actions may "be continued ^/ithout chejige, or additional military measures may be taken including the vithdraval of dependents and the possible initiation of strikes a short distance across the border against the infiltration routes from the DRV. In the latter case this vould become a transitional phase." 1^2/

The kind of actions that the transition would lead to vere described in a carefully qualified manner:

"...if the GYl\ improves its effectiveness to an acceptable degree and Hanoi does not yield on acceptable terms, or if the GVII can only be kept going by stronger action, the U.S. is prepared -- at a time to be determined -- to enter into a second phase program...of graduated military pressvires directed systematically against the DRV.*'

The concept continued vrith a mixtxire of suggested actions and rationale . sitnllar to that in Option C- The air strikes vo'al.d be "progressively more serious" and "adjusted to the situation." The expected duration vas indicated as "possibly running from two to six months." "Targets in the DRV.vould start -with infiltration targets south of the 19th Parallel and "u^ork up to targets north of that point." The approach vould be steady and deliberate, to give the United States the option "to proceed or not;, to escalate or not, and to quicken the pace or not." It concluded vith the following:

"Concurrently, the U.S. wou.ld be alert to any sign of yielding by Hanoi, and would be prepared to explore negotiated solutions that attain U.S. objectives in an acceptable manner., The U.S. would seek to control any negotiations and would oppose any independent South Vietnamese efforts to negotiate." 1^3 /

Bundy*s draft I7SM also included a summation of the recommended JCS alternative concept and a brief description of the various military, political and diplomatic measures to be taken during the first 30 days following implementation of the concept. Significantly, the latter included reprisal actions "preferably within 2^ hours" for a wide range of specified VC provocations. It also contained a specific provision that DB SOTO Patrols would not be resimied during the initial 30-day period, but would be consider'ed for the follow-on period.

In the documents available there was no record of the proceedings of the meeting on 30 ITovember. The only evidence available was

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the notations appearing on the original draft I^TSAI-l, filed with other papers from the I\SC Working Group at the State Department, Therefore, the following assessment of what occurred is limited to inferences from that sparse evidence. Moreover, based on this evidence, it is not absolutely certain that the changes indicated came as a result of the Principals meeting.

Several changes apparently were made in order not to ask the President to commit himself unnecessarily (e.g., the language was changed from "take" to "resume" a specific action in the second phase to "be prepared to take," etc.)- Others had policy implications. The only significant change in the first category was to remove any reference in the title to NSAjVI and to call it merely a "position paper." In the latter category, several changes seem significant. For example, keeping the G-VI'I going through the effects of stronger U.S. action v^as deleted as one of the circumstances under which we might initiate a program of "graduated military pressures" against the DRV. Apparently based on Secretary xMcIIemara's comment, reference to the United States seeking to control the negotiations and blocking South Vietnamese efforts in this direction was removed. The sunmiary of JCS views vras also reanoved from the concept, in effect presenting a united front to the President. From the description of 30-day actions, all reference to the intent to publicize infiltration evidence or present it to allied and Congressional /^ leaders was eliminated, including the intention to linJi reprisal actions

to DRV infiltration to develop "a common thread of justification." Also removed was reference to a major Presidential speech, apparently on the advice ofMcGeorge Bundy. ikk /

Although there is a bare minimum of rationale or explanation for these changes in the available evidence, the pattern described by the changes themselves is significant. In effect, Option A along with the lowest order of Option C actions were being recommended by the Principals in a manner that would represent the least possible additional commitment. This represented a considerable softening of the positions held at the end of the first Principals meeting, on the 2Uth.

It also represented a substantial deviation from the findings of the Working Group. It will be recalled that the group conceded Option A little chance of contributing to an improved GV1\ and saw its likely Impact on South Vietnamese morale as no more lasting than the effects of the Tonkin Gulf reprisals. Moreover, even extended "A" was believed "at best" to be capable of little more than an improved U.S. position -- certainly not of a meaningful settlement, ik^ / In effect, the Principals were returning to the initial concept of Option C held in the Working Group "oy Bundy, Johnson and McIIaughton — but without the initially flexible attitude toward national interest and objectives in Southeast Asia.

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It is iinportarit to consider the factors that may have 'brought about the change, (l) it may have resulted as a reaction to the persuasiveness of General Taylor's arguments• (2) It may have represented a genuine melloving of individual vie^^^points after the opportunity to consider other judgments and weigh .^11 the factors. (3) It may have resulted from the Principals' uneasiness with the negotiating track included in Option C. (h) It may have reflected concern over public pressure for harsher measures that could have resulted from too much public emphasis on the increased infiltration. (5) It may have represented an attempt to enhance the chances of the President's approving some kind of stepped up U.S. action outside of South Vietnam. With regard to the latter, McGeorge Eundy, as the President's Assistant for r^ational Security Affairs, was in a position to convey President Johnson's mood to the grout). Moreover, notes taken at the White House meeting tend to confirm that the President's mood vras more closely akin to the measures recommended than to those in Option B or full Option C. Then again, it may be that all of these factors operated on the Principals in some measui^e.

Also significant, in the series of discussions held by the Principals, was their apparent lack of attention to the policy issues related to negotiations. Despite the fact that Option C measures were stipulated for the second phase of U.S. actions, the early negotiating posture intended to accompany that option was apparently paid little heed. According to the meeting notes, the only reference to our bargaining capability was Secretary Rusk's concern as to whether Option G actions would enable Ambassador Taylor to bargain in Saigon. Among the documents from the Principals meetings, the only reference to Hanoi's interest in negotiating occurred in Bundy's draft NSAM, where he reflected apparent Administration expectations that after'more serious pressures were applied the DRV would move first in the quest for a settlement. 1^6/

In retrospect, the Principals appear to have assumed rather low motivation on the part of the DRV. Either this or they v.^ere overly optimistic regarding the threat value of U.S. military might, or both.

For example. Ambassador Taylor's perception of how a settlement might be reached -- which apparently produced little unfavorable reaction among the others — indicated the assumption that DRV concessions to rather major demands could be obtained with relatively vreak pressures. In his suggested scenario (acknowledged as "very close" to the concept accepted by the Principals), 1^?/ the U.S. negotiating posture accompanying a serie"> of attacks, limited to infiltration targets "just north ■of the DMZ/' was intended to be as follows;

"...in absence of public statements by DRV, initiate no public statements or publicity by ourselves or GVIL If DPV does make public stateraents, confine ourselves and '.

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GW to statements that GTiT is exercising right of self-defense and ve are assisting disclose to selected

allies, and possibly USSR, U.S./gVI-T tems for cessation of a ttacks as follows:

A. Demands:

1. DRV return to strict observance of 195^ Accords with respect STrl — that is, stop infiltration ■ and bring about a cessation of VC anned insur gency .

B. In return:

1. U,S. .will return to 195^ Accords with respect to military personnel in GW and GVN would be willing to enter into trade tallcs looking toward norraalization of economic relations between DRV and GW,

2. Subject to faithful compliejice by DRV-with 195^ Accords, U.S. and GVI^ would give assurances that they not use force or support the use of force by any other party to upset the Accords with respect to the DRV-

3. ..-the GVE would permit VC desiring to do so to return to the DRV without their anns or would grant aa^inesty..."

Taylor went on to suggest that "if and when lianoi indicates its acceptance" the United States should avoid (l) the danger of a cease-fire accompanied by prolonged negotiations and (2) "making conditions so stringent" as to be Irapracticable. lU8 /

Significantly, the terms were to be conveyed to Hanoi privately They did not constitute a declaratory policy in the usual sense of that term. Hence, it must be assumed that they would be presented to the DRV V7ith the attitude of "acceptance or else" — that they were not perceived primarily as conveying a firm public image. Moreover, the terms were designed to accom_pany what becaone kno-i-m as "phase two," the gradu- ' ated pressures of Option C -- not the 30-day actions derived from Option A. They were meant to represent the "early negotiating" postiure of the United Spates — not the "no-negotiation" posture associated with Option A.

This general attitude toward negotiations was apparently shared by other Principals. This is indicated by changes made in Option C procedures, in the Summary of the Working Group's findings*, following

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the first Principals meeting. Essentially, these involved an adamant resistance to "any formal Geneva Conference on Vietnam," Formerly, such a conference vas regarded as the "best forum" -- after conducting a number of military actions against the DRV. Under the revised approach, the U.S. Governraent would merely "wtch and listen closely" for signs of weakening from Hanoi and Peking. If the DRV held firm in response to initial military actions against I-lorth Vietnam and if along with these actions an improvement had occurred in the GVIT, the Administration would press harder for acceptance of the initial negotiating position, IU9 / Thus, it is fairly clear that the policy position formulated by the Principals before presentation to the President included no provision for early bargaining at the conference table.

2. Courses of Action Approved in the White House

On 1 December, the Principals met with President Johnson and Vice President-elect Kumr)hrey in the White House. During a meeting that lasted two-and-a-half hours, Ambassador Taylor briefed the President on the situation in South Vietnam, and the group reviewed the evidence of increasing DRV support for the conflicts in South Vietnaan and Laos. Ways of countering the impact of infiltration and of improving the situation were discussed. At the conclusion of the meeting Secretary Mc]^Iamara was reported to have been overheard saying to the President, "it would be impossible for Ma^c to talk to these people ^ Raiting reporter_s7 without leaving the impression that the situati-

is going to hell." Accordingly, Ambassador Taylor slipped out the White House rear entrance, and only a brief, formal statement was given to the press. I50/

The source documents available at the time of this writing do J not indicate the precise nature of the President's decisions. Since a

tl NSAM was not issued following the meeting, one would have to have access

to White House case files and I^ational Security Council meeting notes to be certain of what was decided. Even then, one might not find a clear-cut decision recorded. However, from handwritten notes of the meeting, from instructions issued to action agencies, and from later reports of diplomatic and military actions taken, it is possible to reconstruct the approximate nature of the discussion and the decisions reached.

The revised "Draft Position Paper on Southeast Asia," containing the two-phase concept for future U.S. policy and the proposed 30-day action program, provided the basis for the White House discussions. Handwritten notes of the proceedings refer to various topics in approximately the same order as they are listed in that portion of the position paper dealing with the 30-day action program. There is no indication that the over-all concept v/as discussed. However, it is evident from the notes that the various actions under discussion were considered in terms of the details of their implementation^ 151/ This fact --together w'ith the content of the formal instructions later issued to

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Ambassador Taylor — make it clear that, in general outline at least, the concept submitted by the Principals was accepted by the President. Hovrever, as vill be seen, it is also clear that he gave his approval to implement only the first phase of the concept.

In addition to Ambassador Taylor's report, the meeting dealt mainly with tvo subjects: (l) Taylor's consultations vith South Viet-

Inaiiiese leaders and (2) conversations vith other U.S. allies, vho had. an interest in the Vietnamese situation.

The President made it clear that he considered that pulling the South Vietnamese together was basic to anything eJ se the United States might do. He asked the J^jnbassador specifically which groups he might talk to and what more we might do to help bring unity among South Vietnam's leaders. He asked whether we could not say to them "we just can't go on" unless they pulled together. To this, Taylor replied that we must temper our insistence somewhat, and suggested that we could say that "our aid is for the Huong government, not necessarily I for its successor." The President asked whether there was not some way

I • we could "get to" such groups as the Catholics, the Buddhists and the

Army. Possible additional increments of m.ilitary aid were then discussed as means of increasing U.S. leverage among military leaders. The President also asked about "the Communists" in South Vietnam. Taylor's reply ,.x-.. >^as noted rather cryptically, but the impression given is that the

Communists were being used already, but that he questioned the desirability of trying to pressure them. He apparently stated that they were "really neutralists," but that the French were "not really bothering" to use them. The President observed that the situation in South Vietnam '^'does look blacker" to the public than it apparently was. He wondered if something could not be done to change the mpression-being given in the news. 152/

Toward the end of the discussion of consultations with the South Vietnamese, President Johnson stated his conviction that the GVE w^as too weak to take on the DRV militarily- He aclinowledged that the South Vietnamese had received good training, but emphasized that we "must ^ have done everything we can" to strengthen them before such a conflict occurred. 153/ This attitude was reflected in the guidance given to Ambassador Taylor and in the statement he was authorized to make to the GVI^I. The statement contained a passage asserting that the U.S. Government did not believe

"that w^e should incur the risks which ai-e inherent in any expansion of hostilities w^ithovit fir it assuring that there is a government-.in Saigon capable of handling the serious problems involved in such an expansion and of exploiting ■ the favorable effects which may be anticipated "

- ■— The statement v:ent on to emphasize that before the-United States could

move to expand hostilities, the GVII would have to be capable of

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"naintaining law and order," of ensuring that its plans for further operations vould be carried out, and of coping v^'ith "the enemy reactions vhich must be expected to result" from changes in the current pattern of operations. 15!}-/

The White Eouse discussions of U.S. consultation vrith other allies vere prefaced by the President's strong affirmation that ve needed "new dratnatic, effective" forms of assistance from several of these countries. Australia, New Zealand, Canada and the Philippines were specifically mentioned. Secretary Rusic added that the U.K. also could do more. A possible Hepublic of China contribution was discussed, but the Secretary expressed concern that introduction of GRC combat units would tend to merge the problem of Vietnajn with the conflict between the two Chinese regim^es. Apparently, the Principals* proposal to send a representative to the governments of Australia,""l-Tew Zealand, and the Philippines was approved, in each case, the representative was to explain our concept and proposed actions and request additional contributions by way of forces in the event the second phase of U.S. actions were entered. Vice President elect Humphrey was suggested for consultations with the Philippine government. The President asked about the possibility of a vTest German contribution, but Secretary McLIatuara emphasised that German political problems would inhibit such a pledge from Bonn. Pinally, it was agreed that Pjh-bassador Taylor would cable the particular kind of third country assistance that would be welcomed after he had a chance to consult with the GYT:. 155/

At the close of the meeting, the White House released a press statement which contained only two coir^ents regarding any determinations that had been reached. One reaffirmed "the basic United States policy of providing all possible and useful assistance" to South Vietnam, specifically linking this policy with tlie Congressional Joint Resolution of 10 August. The other stated: ■ .

"The President instructed Ambassador Taylor to consult lurgently with the South Vietnamese Government as to measures that should be tal^en to improve the situation ■ in all its aspects." 156/

During the subseauent press briefing, George Reedy indicated

to reporters that Taylor would be working on the specific details of his

forthcoming conversations in Saigon "for another two to three days" and

would have at least one more meeting with the President before his

returji. 157/ Mov^ever, it seems clear that most of what he would say

to (Wl-, officials was settled during the initia.1 White House meeting. A

proposed text was appended to the Principals' draft position paper, and

it is clear that this was discussed on 1 Eecember. Apparently, the only

change made at that time vras to remove a proposed U.S. pledge to furnish

air cover for the G\^.^ maritime o-oerations against the Korth Vietnamese coast.- 158/

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After the meeting^ the statement vas recast in the form of Presidential instructions to Ambassador Taylor -- vith specific authorization for the .'^jnbassador to alter the phrasing as he thought necessary to insure effective comnunications vith the C-VT-T. However, the concept and the specific points for communication vera unchanged. The instructions made specific provision for him to inform senior Gv7T officials of the U.S. villingness (l) to cooperate in intensifj^ing the GW maritime operations and (2) ''to add U.S. airpower as needed to restrict the use of Laotian territory as an infiltration route into S"/iT/' These pledges vere prex^aced by statements to the effect that U.S. actions directly against the DHV could not be taken mitil GVIT effectiveness was assured along certain specified lines. The statements made explicit the policy view that "we should not incur the risks v^hich are inherent in such an e:sq)ansion of hostilities" until such improvem.ents w^ere made. As evidence of our desire to encourage these developments, however, the rationale stressed that the Administration was "willing to strike harder at the infiltration routes in Laos and at sea." 159/

^he instructions also included specific provision that the U.S. Mission in Saigon vras to work with the GVI^i in developing joint plans for I reprisal operations and for air operations appropriate for a second

phase of new U.S. actions. The general relationship between the two contemplated phases was explained^ and the Phase Two purpose "of convincing the leaders of D?iV that it is to their interest to cease to aid the Viet Cong" was stated. The joint character of the "progressively mounting" air operations against irorth Vietnam, should they be decided on later, was emphasized. l6o/

As indicated earlier, there was no liSM'l issued following the strategy meeting of 1 December. The reasons why are clear. In effect,

I ^ the actions recommended by the Principals and approved by the President

- did not constitute a significant departure from the actions authorized

to; i^^ I\S/il-i 3li+ (9 September 196^). That docviment had already provided for

discussions wath the Laotian government leading to possible U.S. armed reconnaissance operations along the infiltration routes. Further, it had provided for resumption of the 3^A maritime operations, w^hich had continued throughout the fall. In effect, the December strategy meeting produced little change except to make more concrete the concept of possible future operations against Korth Vietnam and to authorize steps to include the GVxi in preparations for these possibilities.

It is clear that the President did not make any commitment at this point to expand the war through future operations against Ilorth Vietnajffl. The assurances intended for the G\". in this regard were conditional at best. The extent to which the President was committed to such a course in his mind, or in discussions with his leading advisors, was not made explicit in the sources available. It is implied, however, in brief notes which vrere apparently intended to summarize the mood of the meeting on 1 December. In what may have been a s\:immation of the ^"^ President's expressions, these notes indicate several themes: (i) it is

necessary to weigh the risks of careful action versus the risks of loss

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(of South Vietnam?) without action; (2) it may be necessary to act from a "base not as strong as hoped for; (3) it is not certain, however, how public opinion can be handled; and {k) it is desirable to send out a "somewhat stronger signal." In addition, a comment not entirely legible stated "Mearures can't do as much (l) U.N. and (2)

international _/negotiationsj7*" In the context of the discussions, the impression left by these notations is that the VJhite House was considerably less than certain that future U.S. actions against North Vietnam would be taken, or that they would be desirable. l6l/

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III

IMPi;S2^IITIITG Tm POLICY

When Ambassador Taylor next met with the President on the afternoon of 3 December, McGeorge Bundy vas the only other official present. Prior to- this occasion^ Taylor had sat with the other Principals to review specific features of the Administration's position and to work out details of the scenario that was about to.go into production. When he left the President's office, presumably having received the final version of his instructions, the Ambassador told reporters that he was going to hold "across-the-board" discussions with the GVIT. Asserting that U.S. policy for South Vietnam remained the same, he stated that his aim would be to improve the deteriorating situation in South Vietnam. Although he hinted of changes "in tactics and method," he quite naturally did not disclose the kind of operations in which the United States was about to engage or any future actions to which immediate activities could lead. I62/

1. Early Action s

Phase One actions to exert additional pressures against I^Jorth Vietnam were quite limited. Only two, the GVl"^ maritime operations and U.S. armed reconnaissance missions in Laos, were military actions. The others involved stage-managing the public release of evidence of the increased Communist infiltration into South Vietnam and the acquisition of additional assistance for that country from other governments.

9-* GVTI Maritime OT>erat ions. Maritime operations under OPLMT 3^A represented nothing nevr. These had~been underway steadily since h October, and their November schedule was in the process of being carried out at the time the decisions on immediate actions were being made. On 25 I\'Ovember, six FTP craft bombarded a barracks area on Tiger Island with Sltrnn mortars, setting numerous fires. Moreover, a proposed schedule for December had been submitted by CO>rjSi'ACV on 27 November. This included a total of I5 maritirae operations involving shore bombardments, a Jtink capture, a kidnap mission, and a demolition sortie against a coastal highway bridge. iGh / According to the concept, these were to be intensified during Phase One.

Soon after the decisions had been mavde to begin Phase One^ the JCS tasked COMUSMACV with deve2.oping a revised December 3^A schedule to better reflect the newly adopted pressure concept. CINGPAC was requested to submit revised 3liA plans so as to arrive in Washington not later than 8 December. The instructions specified that these were "to include proposed sequence and timing for increased frequency of maritime operations" in two packages. The first was to begin on 15 December, extend over a period of 30 days and provide for "shallow penetration raids...on all

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I ' types of targets vhich vould. provide the greatest psychological benefits

..." Destructive results and military utility were to "be strictly secondary considerations. Package Tvo was to add ^4- to 6 U.S. aitrcraft to afford protective cover and incorporate action against certain ITorth Vietnaiaese coastal targets above the 19th Parallel. This package was intended to begin approximately 30 days following initiation of the first, although the instructions cautioned that the plans should be "prepared to provide for an indefinite period" of operations under Package One. I65/

KACY^s new proposal for maritime operations was submitted on ■ 5 December5 with proposals for psychological operations and aerial ' resupply/reinforce missions follovring close behind. On the lOth^ appro-

j val for the latter two was communicated back to the field. At the time,

the I#J^OPS proposals were still under consideration within the JOS. I66/ On the 12th, the JCS submitted their two-package" proposal. Included in their first 30-day package were coastal bombardment of radar sites, barracks, and PT boat bases plus a maritime equivalent of aerial armed route reconnaissance. Patrol boats would make "fire sweeps" along the coast against "targets of opportunity." In addition, upon their return from bombardment missions, it was proposed that the GWI PT boats attempt the capture of WN junks and S^-JATOW craft. With the single exception of the coastal fire sweeps, all of these initial package operations were approved by OSD, and instructions v:ere issued to implement the initial incrQTient of such operations on or about 15 December. I67 /

In accord with the instructions initially issued regarding inten^ sified maritime operations, OSD decisions on the proposed second package were deferred. The JCS indicated that the addition of U.S. air cover, and the necessary command and control procedures needed'to support such operations, could be implemented on or about 15 January. They went on to recommend that if this were decided, the "maritime operations should be sujTfaced...prior to /implementation of/ Package Two." I68 /

The JCS were disconcerted over disapproval of the fire sweeps along the Ilorth Vietnamese coast. -However, their concern stemmed not so much from the lack of support for those particular operations as from their view that the disapproval removed from the package the only significant intensification beyond the level already attained before the President's Phase One decision. At a Principals meeting on 19 December, Acting JCS Chairman, General Harold K. Johnson, pointed out that with the modifications now made to it, the 3l'A program was, in effect, not intensified at all, Moreover, as discussion revealed, seasonal sea conditions were now so severe that no maritime operation had been completed sucess-fully during the previous three weeks. 169/ In effect, therefore,. the '^intensified" Decem.ber schedule of approved maritime operations still remained to be implemented as the month drew to a close.

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For January^ the JCS urged that several air missions he added to the kind of operations already approved. Included were two WAF air strikes, using unmarked aircraft and U.S. air escort for returning surface craft, 170/ However, hoth of these items were disapproved; only the air operations in support of psychological and resupply operations gained acceptance. 17l/^ Apparently there was little additional KAROPS activity during January, I965; the normal documentary sources include very little for this period.

b. Armed Reconnaissance in Laos . Like the maritime operations, armed reconnaissance in Laos was, in some respects, a continuation of operations that had been underway for some time. At least, U.S. aircraft ^ had been operating over Laos since the previous May, performing recon-

naissance functions and Droviding armed escort for these and (since October) the RL/iF strike'missions. Of course, armed escort was carried out under strict rules of engagement that permitted attacking ground targets only in response to hostile fire. Given the operational code YAiHCSE TEAM, these carrier and land-based missions had been following a constant pattern for several months. This had included roughly four daylight reconnaissance flights in the Plaine des Jarres - Route 7 area every two weeks, and during a like period, approximately ten reconnaissance flights in the Panheiidle, and two night-reconnaissance flights along Route 7. Complementing these efforts were those of the RLAT, whose T-23's harassed the Pathet Lao, gave tactical air support to Royal Laotian Army units, interdicted Route 7 and the Panhandle, and performed armed route reconnaissance in Central Laos. During the period 1 October-30 December, there were a total of Y2k T-28 sorties in the Panhandle alone. These had already precipitated several complaints from the DRV, alleging UoS.-sponsored air attacks on Korth Vietnamese territory. 172/

The intended U.S. policy was discussed with Premier Souvanna Phouma on 10 December by the new U.S. Ambassador to Laos, Willia^a Sullivan. He reported that Souvanna "fully supports the U.S. pressures program and is prepared to cooperate in full." The Premier particularly wanted interdiction of Routes 7, 3, and 12, but he insisted on making no public admission that U.S. aircraft had taken on new missions in Laos. The Administred:ion had indicated to the Vientiane Embassy a few days earlier that it wished the RIAF to intensify its strike program also, particularly "in the Corridor areas and close to the DRV border." 173/

In the meantim^e, the JCS developed an air strike program to complement the YAiTKEE TEAI-l operation in accordance with cur-rent guidance, and had instructed CIITCPAC to be prepared to carry it out. The program included missions against targets of opportunity along particular poitions of Route 8 and Routes 121 and 12. It also included secondary targets for each mission that included barracks areas and military strong points. The second mission w^as to be flown not earlier than three days follov;ing the first. ITV I'^'^e progrom was briefed at a 12 December m.eeting of the

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Principals by Deputy Secretary Vance and was approved by them with one exception. They ejiiended the ordnance instructions v^^hich had been prepared for CIKCPAC to specifically exclude the use of napalm. For its first use against targets in Laos, they felt, the RLAE would be the only appropriate user. McGeorge 3undy stated that the amended program "fulfilled precisely the President's vrishes/' and that he (Bundy) would so inform the President. He further stated that-, barring separate advice to the contrary, the program should be executed. It was also agreed at this meeting that there would be no public statements about armed reconnaissance operations in Laos unless a plane were lost. In such an event, the Principals stated, the Government should continue to insist that we were mierely escorting reconnaissance flights as requested by the Laotian Governjnent. I75/

Armed reconnaissance operations in Laos, called BARREL ROLL, got underway on ik December. This first mission was flown by USAP Jet aircraft, along Route 8. It was followed on the 17th by carrier-based A-1 axid Jet aircraft, striking along Routes 121 and 12. On the l8th, this pattern of two missions by four aircraft each was determined by Secretary of Defense or higher authority to be the weekly standard — at least through the third week. I76 / Just a day earlier, the JCS had proposed a second week's program that included repetition of the first week's operations plus missions along Route 7? 9 and 23. Their proposals were prepared with a statement of JCS understanding "that a gradual increase in intensity of operations is intended for the second week." Recalling Souvanna Phouma's reported requests for such operations, they also included a strong recommendation that Route 7 he struck as pairt of the second week's missions. 177 /

This same rationale was voiced by General Johnson in the Principals meeting on 19 December. He pointed out that the B.^T.REL ROLL program briefed there by Deputy Secretary Vance did not represent any intensification beyond the previous week's effort. Vance confirmed that not intensifying the program had been one of the criteria applied in selecting the second v.^eek's missions. Consensus was reached by the Principals xhat the program sho^ald remain about the same for the next two weeks, in accordance with the most recent guidance. I78 /

I I . ^ At the end of December, when there was serious question about

the efficacy of maintaining the direction of U.S. policy in South Vietnam,

I Defense^officials requested an evaluation of the BARREL ROLL program.

In particular, they were concerned as to "why neither the DRV nor the Communist Chinese have made any public mention of or appeared to have

. taken cognizanc- of our B.'IRREL ROLL operations." 179 / In response, a

^^; assessment indicated that the Communists apparently had made no 'distinction between Bi^J^RSL ROLL missions on the one hand and the Laotian T-28 strikes and YAITKEE TEAIvf missions on the other." Attributing all stepped up operations in Laos to the United States and its "lackeys," they had lumped all operations together as "U.S. armed interference in

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tian's /sic/ affairs, gross violations of the General Agreements, and nts which are causing; a 2;rave situation in Laos and Indochina." DIA

Laot

vent on to observe that "it would be most difficult to distinguish, between YMISS TRAIvl with its. flat suppression aircraft from the BAEEEL ROLL missions." Further^ the assessment obser^/ed that "BARREL ROLL strikes have followed T-28 strikes by varying periods of time and have been of lesser intensity. They probably appear to be a continuation of the Laotian program." It concluded:

"On balance, therefore, while the Corfimunists are apparently avrare of some increased use of U.S. aircraft, they probably have not considered the BARREL ROLL strikes to date as a significant change in the pattern or as representing a new threat to their activities." iSo/

Despite the lack of discernible Communist reaction to BARREL ROLL by the end of the year and considerable concern among the JCS, there was little change in the operation during early January. On the Uth, CraCPAC was authorized to go ahead with the fourth week's program:

"One U.S. armed reconnaissance/pre-briefed air strike' missions in Laos for the vreek of U-10 January 19^5? is approved. Additional missions will be the subject of later message." (Underlining added)

The approved mission called for night armed reconnaissance along Route 7, the first of its kind. l8l/ At"The~time, the JCS were awaiting a decision on their proposals for aTTomplementary mission, but the Department of State had objected to their choice^of a secondary target because it was located near Cambodian territory. Earlier in the series, the Tchepone barracks had been deleted as a secondary mission by the ^.Thite House because a Hanson Baldwin article had named it as a likely target. On 5 January, the JCS representative reminded the Principals that the currently approved BARREL ROLL mission constituted the fourth week of these operations and, therefore, would terminate the initial 30-day period of Phase One pressures. The JCS were cuite concerned that there had not yet been plans made for a "transition phase" of stepped up attacks to begin around mid-January. 182 /

c. Surfacing Infil tration Evidence. An integral part of the Administration's pressures policy,'particularly if U.S. forces were to be involved in direct attacks on Horth Vietnam, was the presentation to the public of convincing evidence of DRV responsibility for the precarious situation in South Vietnaia, As seen earlier, a former intelligence specialist, Chester Cooper, was selected to compile a public acco^unt of the infiltration of trained cadre and guerrilla fighters, to be used for this purpose. His account was to be developed from the various classified reports that had been produced and was to lay particular stress on the alaiining increase in the rate of infiltration in the latter half of I96U.

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Cooper su'bmitted his report on k December, It was based on (1) a State-sponsored updating of the so-called Jordan Report, which described also the DRV^s direction, control and materiel support of the insurgency (this had been discussed during the policy discussions in the Spring an,d initiated during the Summer;^; (2) the MCV infiltration study, based on interrogations of VC prisoners and completed in October; and (3) reports from a DIA/cIA KR team who went to Saigon in mid-I:ovember to evaluate the MCV report (they confirmed its validity). His report consisted of four items: (l) a summary statement and a m,ore detailed public discussion of VC infiltration /TAB bJ; (2) a list of possible questions and suggested answers for use with the press or the Congress; (3) "a reconciliation, or at least an explanation of past lo\r estimates of infiltration given in Congressional testimony and to the press^; and (k) a listing of available documentary evidence and graphic materials to aid in public presentations. In his covering memorandum. Cooper urged that the materials be forwarded to Saigon so as to malce llkCV and rinbassy officials fully aware of the proposed approach and to make consistent its use by U.S. and GVi^: personnel. 183/

The Cooper materials were forwarded for review to the Saigon Embassy on 8 December, and to the Principals on the 9th. 18V Shortly . thereafter, Secretary Rusk cabled Aiabassador Taylor, expressing his concern that early release of the infiltration data 'Vould generate pressures for actions beyond what we now contemplate." Me sought

Taylor's advice as to whether release would be wise. In the Ambassador's reply, he urged early release. He stated, '^I do not feel that, at this point, the substance of the release will generate pressure for extreme action. Moreover, he expressed the view that release would serve to qaiet the currently rife speculation among news correspondents and parts of the GVi'I concerning what the United States was intending to do in SVII. Citing a New York Daily Hews article (7 December) as an example of what he felt v;ere increasingly likely lealis, he expressed his desire to make planned^ deliberate announcements of what the United States was now doing and what might be done in the future, rie expressed his intention to have the Q'^n'i release the report on infiltration, complete with press briefings and statements, between 10-17 December. ISB/

•

Despite strong reccmjiiendations from the field to release the ini^iltration data, the Principals determined that it should not yet be made public. During the first part of December, the chief advocate for not releasing it was Secretary McHamara. At their meeting on 12 December, Mr. Vance stated that Mr. McHamara wanted to withhold the infiltration data for the time being. His rationale was not recorded in the minutes. The State Department opinion in response was that the Department "did not consider it of any great m,oment." Thereafter, the Principals decided that release should be withheld, at least until their next meeting, 19 December. 136 /

By the time they met again, a week later, several expressions of sivpport for releasing the data had been received. On the lUth

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Ambassador Taylor recalled that the A"RVIj intelligence chief had reviewed the original I^JJV infiltration report and the proposed press release and had "concurred in coMaending declassification." On the loth /onbassador Siaiivan praised the Cooper report and suggested passing it to Souvanna Phoima prior to what he hoped would be a prompt public release, 18? / At the Principals meeting these views were cited in a strong statement by WilliaQi Bundy concerning the problems of keeping the infiltration evidence out of the press."^ General Johnson, Acting Chairman, JCS, favored release as a morale boost to U.S. personnel in South Vietnam. McGeorge Bundy and Carl Rowen (USL^i) favored gradual or piecemeal release. However, Mr. Vance repealed Secretary McITamara's wish to continue suppression of the infiltration report -- possibly for an indefinite period. This view finally prevailed, as^the Principals agreed not to release the Cooper report either in Saigon or T-Jashing-fcon. Instead, they felt that the President might disseminate some of the inforraation through such vehicles as his State of the Union message or in a contemplated Christmas address to U.S. forces in Saigon. 188/

Following the meeting, but before receiving reports concerning the current political upheaval in Saigon, the State Department cabled the Adiainistration's decision not to rtieke a formal GVI</US release of the infiltration data. It gave as rationale the feeling that formal release "could be misinterpreted and become vehicle /for/ undesirable speculation," and suggested alternative procedures. Stating that "general background briefings...should continue to indicate infiltration has increased without getting into specifics," it indicated that under pressure, the Saigon Embassy "could have one or more deep background sessions with /the/ American forces." The cable cautioned, however, that specific numbers and comparisons with previous years' estimates should be avoided. These would not be released, it was advised, until late in January after senior A.dministration officials had testified to Congress in a scheduled inquiry. The current aim was stated "to get general picture into survey stores such as Grose article of ITovember 1 rather than as spot news commanding wide attention." The cable concluded by acknowledging a "just received" Taylor message and approving his stated judgment to proceed with periodic background briefings in Saigon, along lines outlined above. 189/

Following the rift between the South Vietnamese military leaders and the American Embassy, resistance to the release of infiltration data hardened. In cables of 2k December, .^jnbassador Taylor was instructed to avoid background briefings on the infiltration increases until the po- . litical situation clarified. :ie was counseled that release of the data would be "unwise" unless he were to obtain evidence that the South Viet-nesiese military was planning to go ahead with a unilateral release. 190/ These instructions prevailed until well into January, 1965-

^' C onsultati ons with "Th ird Countries." In the days immediately following the policy decisions of 1-3 December, several U.S. allies were consulted concerning the intended U.S. approach in Southeast Asia. In

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accord with the Principals' viev;s^ the governments of Thailand and Laos were "briefed by the respective U.S. Ambassadors to those countries. -Foreign Minister Thuan Khoman later visited the President in vx^ashington and presumably pursued the matter further. The Canadians were contacted in both Ottawa a_id Washing-ton. '^•'ailiam Bundy held discussions in Kew Zealand and Australia on k»^ December. Prime Minister Tvilson of the United Kingdom was thoroughly briefed during a series of meetings in Washington, Y-9 December. Later, William Bundy told the Principals that the U.K. ^ Australia and IJew Zealand received the full picture of immediate UcS. actions and its stipulations to the GVl^i and the potential two-phased concept of graduated pressures on Ilorth Vietnam. The Canadian Government vras told slightly less. The Philippines, South Korea and the Republic of China were briefed on Phase One only. I91/

One of the aims stressed by President Johnson in the meeting of 1 and 3 December, and continually thereafter, was obtaining increased assistance for the GW and for our efforts on its behalf from our allies. During the 12 December Principals meeting, for example, William Bundy related the President's recent wish to obtain assistance even from governments without strong Southeast Asia commitments, like Deiimark, West Germany and India. This was mentioned in the context of a stimmary rer^^ort on current "third-co^antry assistance of all kinds to South Vietnam." I92 /

At the time, however, not only general assistance from many countries but specifically military assistance from a select few was particularly sought. Dwing the consultations with allied goverriments, "both Australia and ITew Zealand were pressed to send troop units to assist ARVH. Both supported the U.S. policy decisions as probably necessary, but neither was willing at the-time to make a commitment. r;ew Zealand officials expressed grave doubts that Phase II would lead to negotiations, predicting instead that the DRV would only increase the clandestine troop deployments to the South. They expressed doubts about the advisability of sending allied ground forces into South Vietnam. 193/

The concept -under which the allied troop deployments were believed desirable^was related to that which the I-^SC Working Group had recommended as ^deserving further study. Contemplated was an international force built around one U.S. division, to be deployed just south of the DLiZ in conjunction with stepped-up US/gVlI air operations against Korth Vietnam. In essence, therefore, it was a Phase T^to concept, dependent in som.e respects on the degree of success achieved during Phase One activities. The concept was exexiined in detail by the Joint Staff in early December, and their staff study was forwarded to the services and the Joint Pacific Headquarters "fcr comment and recommendations" on 10 December. The purposes cited for such a force deployment by the Joint Staff were stated as follows: (1) to deter ground invasion by the DRV; (2) to hold a "blocking position against DRV attacks down the coastal plain and m3lce more difficult DR\r_eff^orts to bypass"; and (3) to be "capable of holding the defensive positions against attack until reinforcements arrive if required." 19^1/ ■

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The degree to which the international force was believed to offer a useful option seems to have been in question* While the State Departraent and other non-military agencies apparently favored it^ the Department of Defense was less than enthusiastic'^. At the 19 December Principals meeting;, for example, all of those present agreed that "suitable planning toward such a force should go forward'^ except Assistant Defense Secretary IvlcHaughton. He stated that he thought the idea had been shelved- 195/ Later, in their review of the Joint Staff's study, the services expressed reservations concerning the concept. They questioned its military utility, due to the deployments being framed-essentially within a narrow deterrent context. They recommended instead a continued adherence to the deployment concept in the approved SEATO plans, which in their totality were aimed at the military defense of all Southeast Asia. The Army, in particular, expressed concern regarding routes and modes of possible DRV advance into South Vietnam that differed from those assumed by the study's below-the-DMZ concept. The Air Force pointed out that the international force concept conflicted with the JCS concept for deterring and dealing with overt DRV/CHICOM aggression as submitted on lU Novem:oer (JCSI1-955-6U) 196/

Mr. McITaughton's comments on 19 December seem to have been correct. The case files containing the service comments on the international force concept indicate no further action by the JCS after mid-January.

• In the meantiifie, however;, a different approach to attracting wider allied participation in the military defense of South Vietnam appeared promising. On 29 December, OSD/ISA reported readiness on the part of the Philippine, ROK and GRC Governments to provide various forms of assistance to South Vietnam. Included in the available Philippine and Korean packages were an assortment of military forces. The ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff offered a combat engineer battalion, an engineer field maintenance team, an Army transportation company, and a Marine Corps combat engineer company. The Philippine Government stated its willingness to send a reinforced infantry battalion, an engineer construction battalion, and some Special Forces units. 197 / - ■

2. Relations with the GW

Follox^ing his second meeting with President Johnson, Ambassador Taylor returned to Saigon. He arrived on 6 December amid press speculation concerning the details of his instructions and subsequent UcS. actions. 193 / The basic chaxge given him by the President had been well publicized since their meeting on the 1st: *'to consult urgently with the government of Piime Minister Tran Van Huong a^ to measures to be taken to improve the situation in all its aspects." However, such a diplomatically worded statement left much room for imaginative interpretation -- particularly in view of the Ambassador's "unannounced stopover in Hong Kong to get a briefing by U.S. 'China watchers' in that listening post." Several correspondents speculated on the likelihood of air action

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against the I';orth. One^ ivith an apparent inside soijrce^ even reported that these vould be held in abeyance pending the outcome of strikes in ■ Laos end the G7il reactions to U.S. suggestions for improvement. 198/

^* Joint Planning . In the days immediately folloving his return^ ^i^jmbassador Taylor's schedule precipitated press reports of fran tic activity within the Embassy and other parts of the U.S. Mission in Saigon. Taylor first briefed his lanbassy Coujicil and the PJmbassy staff on the policy discussions in VJashington and the joint US/gV^ courses of action which it was hoped would be followed in South Vietnam during ensuing weeks. On 7 December, he met with Premier Pluong and his senior ministers and with General Khanh. On these occasions he outlined the military^and diplomatic actions which the U.S. Government intended to take^dwing Phase One and explained how the Administration related the possibilities of Phase T\70 actions to GTOj performance. The Ambassador described in general terms the.kinds of administrative improvements and Joint planning activities which U.S. officials thought the GVix should undertake. I99/

Similar sessions were held during the next few days, as the details for the joint GVIT/us efforts were worked out. On the evening of the Sth, /onbassador Taylor held a reception for members of the High National y^. Council and General Westmoreland hosted the top AEvTI generals at dinner.

At both occasions, Taylor briefed the assembled on U.S. attitudes toward the GVli and, presumably, on the Administration's calculations of U.S. risk^relative to GVl: capability. On the following day, he held a lengthy session with Premier Huong, Deputy Premier Vien and General Khanh. On this^occasion, he distributed a paper outlining nine specific actions which^the U.S. Governraent believed were needed to strengthen the GW and in which the local U.S. mission was committed to help. Taylor reported that the "paper was generally well received" and that "specific joint action responsibilities" had been agreed on. These were to be confirmed in writing on the following day. On that same day, he submitted a proposed GTr; press release, describing in general terms the natujre of the new U.S. assistance to be given and the new areas of GV^ and joint G-VN/uS planning, designed to improve the situation in South Vietnam. 200/

On the 11th, having obtained Administration approval, an official Gp statement was released to the press. It related that "a series of discussions with the U.S. Mission" had just been completed and that the " U.S. Goverranent had offered additional assistance "to improve the execution^ of the Goverranent' s programs and to restrain /not 'offset' as originally word^-.d/ the mounting infiltration of men and equipment" from ITorth Vietnam. Among military measures, it specified that U.S. support would enable "increased numbers of /South Vietnamese/ military, paramilitary and police forces" and would permit "the strengthening of the air^defense^of South Vietnam." It also mentioned assistance "for a ' ' , variety of forms of industrial, urban and rural development" and promised

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a GTO effort to improve "security and local government in the rural areas." The statement closed with the following two paragraphs^ which suhsecuent events made to appear ironic but which were jioxtaposed "with great care:

"Together, the Government of Vietnam and the United States mission are making joint plans to achieve greater effectiveness against the infiltration threat.

"In the course of the discussions^ the United States representatives expressed full support for the duly constituted Government of Prim_e Minister Huong." 201/

As the following section will show, the joint planning that had just gotten underway for reprisal actions and Phase II operations was soon to be halted. It was deferred for a period of about three weeks during the forthcoming GV:! crisis. However, as implicit in the quoted paragraphs above, its resumption provided'effective U.S. leverage to help bring about an accommodation between the militery dissidents and the civilian regime.

^' S^^L^IHIS. Late in the evening of 19 Decaraber, high-ranking South Vietnamese military leaders, led by General Khanh, moved to remove all power from the civilian regime of Premier Euong. The move came in the announced dissolution of the High national Council, which had been ^--^ serving as a provisional legislature pending adoption of a permanent con-

stitution, and the arrest of some of its members. Air Commodore Ky, acting as spokesman for the military, claimed that their intent was "to act as a mediator /to resolve/ all differences in order to achieve national unity." 1!he immediate apparent conflict was with the Buddhists who had been demonstrating and threatening to provoke civil disorders in protest against the Huong governonent. In Ambassador Taylor's view, however, the underlying motive was growing antipathy with particular members of the High national Council, brought to a head by the Council's refusal to approve a military plan to retire General (Big) Minh from active service (and thus remove him from a position to contend with the ruling military clique). Moreover, the military had become quite impatient with the civilian officials. 202/

The general consensus among the Embassador, General Westmoreland and State Department officials v/as that General Khanh's relationship with the other influential generals and younger officers was rather uncertain. Therefore, they sought to bolster Premier Huong's resolve to remain in office on the basis of an understanding with the generals — even to the extent of seeking IQianh's resignation or dismissal. When presented with

] ( U.S. view's, Khanh gave initial appearances of recognizing that the mili-

tary seizure had directly defied the U.S. policy position and the stipulated basis for continuing joint GW/US efforts, and of accepting the need to withdraw. However, he quickly attempted to turn the crisis into a direct

^ confrontation between himself and Ambassador Taylor. 203/ On the 22nd,

he issued a strong public affirmation of the military leaders' actions,

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of the need to avoid situations "favorable to the common enemies /communism and colonialism in any form/?" and of the military's resolve "not to carry out the policy of any foreign country." On the sUth, information was received that he intended to pressure Premier Huong into declaring .^jnbassador Taylor personna non grata . 20U /

Administration reaction to this challenge indicated that it considered IQianh's defiance as a threat to the foxondations of U.S. policy in South Vietnam. Anhassador Taylor vras instructed to inform Huong that the U.S. C-overnment regarded the PilG issue as a "matter of gravest importance/' and that "any acceptance of ^/lOianh's/ demand or hesitation in rejecting

I it would make it virtually impossible...to continue support /of the/ GW

effort." Suggesting that Huong might asked if he thought the "American People could be brought to support continued U.S. effort in STO in face [ofj PI\G action against trusted Ajifoassador," the Administration urged persistence in encouraging Huong to seek an accommodation with the other military leaders. Moreover, high-^rariking MCV personnel were urged to exploit their close relationships with South Vietnamese counterparts to i encourage such an arrangement. As leverage^ Taylor was encom-aged to

emphasize the intended directions of U.S. policy* subsequent to a strengthened and stable GW. Specifically, he was urged to point out that joint reprisals for unusual VC actions and "any possible future decision to initiate /the/ second phase" were impossible as long as ^^--^ current conditions persisted. He was told, "without offering anything

beyond tenns of your instructions you coiLLd use these to their fullest to bring /Ky and the other generals/ around." 20^/

There is no indication in the available sources that this advice was directly employed. It is evident, however, that Ambassador Taylor had explained the dependency of further U.S. actions on GVH progress very clearly to the key military leaders on 8 and 20 December. 206 / Therefore, they were well aware that continued U.S. assistance along the policy line explained to them v:as predicated on their cooperation, and this was demonstrated early in the crisis. Even before IQianh's public declaration of independence from U.S. policy, it became kno^m that joint talks concerning increased aid to the South Vietnamese war effort had been suspended. A few days later that fact was given additional circulation, with emphasis that this suspension included particularly any discussions of measures to reduce the infiltration from Laos and North Vietnam. 2^7/

The degree to which the suspensions of joint planning actions affected the judgments of the South Vietnainese generals is, of coiorse, not clear. Tvhat is apparent, ha: ever, is that this factor together with careful Embassy and Administration efforts to clarify possible misunderstandings led the generals to reconsider. 3y 28 December, Ambassador Taylor was reporting encouraging signs of an accommodation. 208 / On the ' 29th, Secretary Rusk advised the President that the "generals were having

seco]]d thoughts" and that "he hoped to see signs of political unity in Saigon soon." These comments were made in close cooperation with reports

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that the Administration nov/ felt that Premier Huong's cabinet might require broader representation. Finally, on the ^th, the generals pledged to return to terms agreed to during the previous August thereby matters of state vould be left in the hands of a civilian government. The joint commuiiique issued by Huong and Khanh also promised to speedily convene a representative constituent assembly to replace the High National Council. 209/

The generals' reassessments vere no doubt helped by a strong U.S. public statement, directed toward the South Vietnamese press, explaining the U.S. policy position to^rard that coimtry's political situation. In language strikingly similar to the President's draft instructions to Taylor, it included the follo^^ing:

"The primary concern of the United States Government and its representatives is that there be in Saigon a stable governiaent in place, able*to speak for all its components, to carry out plans and to execute decisions. Without such a government, United States cooperation with and assistance to South Vietnam carmot be effective.

"...The sole object of United States activities has been and continues to be the reestablishment as quickly as possible of conditions favorable to the more effective prosecution of the var against the Vietcong." 210/

Consistent v^-ith the expressed U.S. policy position, discussions between U.S. and GV^; officials"concerning expanded assistance to the South Vietnamese war effort were resumed on 11 January. 211 /

However, the apparent reconciliation of South Vietnam's military and civilian leadership was short-lived. Close on the heels of an announced GVDI decision (17 January) to increase its military draft calls — long advocated by the U.S. Mission — student and Buddhist riots swept through Hue and Dalat. On the 20th, as arrangements were completed to appoint four leading generals to Premier Huong's cabinet, a leading Buddhist official issued a proclamation accusing the Huong Government of attempting to split the Buddhist movement. On the 21st, Tri Quang issued a statement ch^arging that the Huong Government could not exist without U.S. support, a charge that, gained in intensity in the days to follow. On the 23rd, Buddhist leaders ordered a military struggle against the United States. Denouncing Premier Huong as a lackey of the U.S. Ambassador, they accused Taylor of seeking to wipe out Buddhism in Vietnam. In Hue, student-leC demonstrators sacked the USH. library and destroyed an estimated 8,000 books. TvnD days later, riots and strikes were in progress in Hue, Saigon and Da Hang, and Hue was placed under martial law. Meanwhile, military leaders were attempting to convince Buddhist spokesmen to call off their demonstrations against the GViv and the united States. Finally, on the 27th, the generals withdrew their support from the Huong

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Governrient^ and General IQianh issued a statement that he was resaming power "to resolve the political situation." Soon after, the Buddhist leaders issued orders to their i^ollowers to halt their demonstrations^ at least ujitil they had sufficient opportimity to observe the perfor-majice of the new regime. 212/

Thus, in late January, the United States Government was faced with a dilemma, in December, it had spoken out quite clearly to the effect that its continued assistance along previously determined policy lines was dependent upon the effective functioning of a duly constituted South Vietna^nese Government. By its actions and statements during the initial^Becember crisis, it had indicated that what it had in mind was a civilian regime governing without interference from any particular group. Now, less than a month from the settlement of the former crisis along lines compatible with the preferred U.S. solution, it was faced with another military coup. A time for reassessing former policy decisions and taking stock of the shifting debits and assets in the U.S. position had arrived.

^' Joint Reprisal s. Meanwhile, an issue of great significance to the Administration, as well as to future relations with the GYrl^ was adding to the growing dissatisfaction with progress achieved in other Phase One actions. One of the basic elements in Phase One policy was to have been Joint GTii/us reprisal actions in response to any "unusual actions' by the VC. When faced with a significant provocation at the end of Beceiiiber, the Administration failed to authorize such actions. At the^time, the circumstances in South Vietnam provided cogent reasons for nou doing so, but it nevertheless represented a significant departure from the agreed policy position.

At the height of the first government crisis, on Christmas Sve, the Brink U.S. officers billet in do-l^,TItown Saigon was bombed and severely damaged. Two ^^mericans were killed and 58 injured; 13 Vietnamese also were^ injured, 213 / Ko suspicious person was observed near the bui.lding, so the reponsible party was unknown^ In reporting the incident, Ambassador Taylor treated it as an occasion for reprisal action. The immediate Administration assessment was that under current political circumstaiices, neither the American public nor international opinion might believe that the VC had done it. Moreover, with clear evidence lacking, it felt that a reprisal at this time might appear as though we are trying to shoot our way out of an internal political crisis." Given the political disunity in Saigon, the Administration believed "it would be hard for /the/ American people to understand action to extend /the/ war.'' Therefore, so the reasoning vrent, it would be undesirable to undertake reprisals at that time. However, in cabling this assessment^ Secretary Rusk added: "but we are prepared to make quick decision if you /Taylor/ make recommendation with different assessment of above factors or with other factors not covered above." 2lU/

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Kecoiimiendations to tatce reprisal action came from several quarters. Citing what it called "a further indication'^ of Viet Cong respon-^ sibility, and cautioning against adding the Brink affair to the Bien Hoa

instance of unreciprocated enemy provocation, ClKCPAG urged a reprisal attack. He argred'^that the "homoing of Brink EOQ, was an act aimed directly at U.S. armed forces in R'Tl^" and that failure to respond would only encourage further attacks. 215/ /jnbassador Taylor • forwarded what he termed "a unanimous recommendation" by himself and members of the U.S. Mission Council "that a reprisal bombing attack be executed /as soon as possible/" on a specified target ''accompanied by statement relating this action to Brink bombing." He stated that "no one in this part of the , world has /the/- slightest doubt of VC guilt" and pointed out that the TIL?

was publicly taking credit for the incident. 2l6/ Citing Taylor's . request and concurring in his recomjnendation, even to the specific target selection, the JCS added their voices to those arguing for reprisals. In their proposed execute message to CIKCPAC, they proposed a one-day mission by kO strike aircraft against the Vit Thu Lu Army barracks. Further/they recominended that the WAP should participate if their _ state of readiness and time permitted. 21?/

In spite of these strong reconmiendations, the decision was made not to retaliate for the Brink bombing incident. On 29 December, the following message was dispatched to the U.S. embassies in Southeast Asia and to CECPAC:

"Highest levels today reached negative decision on proposal ...for reprisal action for BOQ bombing. We will be sending fuller statement of reasoning and considerations affecting future actions aft.er. Secretary's return from Texas tonight." 213/

Available materials do not include any fui'ther explanation.

3- Policy Views in January

As the new yea.r began, the Adniinistration was beset with frustration over an■ apparent lack of impact from Phase One operations, over its failure to tak:e reprisals after an attack on U.S. personnel, and over the still troublesome crisis within the GVl\. In this mood, U.S policy was subjected to various kinds of criticismx and comiment. Some came from within the Administration^ various reactions came from outside it. . ■ . .

a. Public Debate. At the height of the GT£ crisis, a nuaiber of newspapers anX^periodicals joined with the already committed (in opposition) and influential Eew Yo rk Tim es and St. Lou is Post Dispatc h in questioning U.S. objectives in'Southeast Asia and/or advocating U.S. withdrawal from the entanglements of South Vietnam. 219 / In the midst of this kind of public questioning, a major debate arose among members of Congress and enmeshed, on occasion, leading officials in the Administration. Leading off in opposition (26 December) was Senator*Church,

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who criticized U.S. involvement in South Vietnain and urged a shift of policj'- in support of the neutralization of all Southeast Asia. Senator Dirksen voiced agreement (2 January) with the need for a policy reassessment, preferalsly involving both the Administration and bi-partisan Congressional leadership, but he stated his own view that "to give up in Vietnam means a loss of face throughout the Orient." 220/

The debate blossomed in January. In a particularly active television day, Sunday, 3 January, Secretary Pvusk defended Vietnam policy in the context of a year-end foreign policy report. Ruling out either a U.S. withdrawal or a major expansion of the war. Rusk gave assurances that with internal unity, and o-or aid and persistence the South Vietnamese could themselves defeat the insurgency. On another network, three Senators expressed impatience with U.S. policy in Vietnam and urged a public reevaluatiori of it. Senator Morse criticized our involvement in South Vietnam on a unilateral basis, while Senators Cooper and Monroney spoke in favor of a full-fledged Senate debate to "come to grips" with the situation there. Senator Mansfield also appeared on the 3rd, to urge consideration of Church's neutralization idea as an alternative to c-orrent policy but in keeping with the President's desire neither to withdraw nor carry the war to Korth Vietnam. 221/ On the 6th, in response to an Associated Press survey, the views in the Senate were shown to be quite divided. Of 63 Senators commenting, 31 suggested a negotiated settlem^ent after the anti-communist bargaining positions were iiiproved, vhile 10 favored negotiating imm.ediately. i^'ight others favored commitment of U.S. forces against I^iorth Vietnson, 3 urged Immediate withdrawal of U.S. advisers and military aid, and 11 stated that they didn't know what should be done other than to help strengthen the GVlJ. On 11 January, Senator Russell reacted to a briefing by CIA Director McCone with a statement that "up until now we have been losing gro^and instead . of gaining it." He urged reevaluation of the U.S. position in South Vietnam, cautioning that unless a more effective government developed m Saigon the situation would become a prolonged stalemate at best. 222/

On Ik January, as a result of reports of the loss of two U.S. jet combat aircraft over Laos, accoxmts of U.S. air operations against Laotian infiltration routes gained wide circulation for the first time. One in particular, a U.P.I, story by Arthur Domiaen, in effect blew the lid on the entire YAlJTffiE TSAT.' operation in Laos since May of 19o4. 223/ Despite official State or Defense refusal to comment on the nature^of the Laotian air missions, these disclosures added new fuel to the public policy debate. In a Senate speech the following day, in which he expressed his uneasiness over "recent reports of .f^jnerican air strikes in Laos and Ilorth Vietnam," Senator McGovern criticized what he called "the policy, now gaining suiDnort in Washington, of extending the war to the north." He denied that'bombing Horth Vietnam could "seriously weaken guerrilla fighters 1,000 miles\way" and urged seeking a "political settlement" with Horth Vietnam. On the 17th, Senator Saltonstall told a radio audience that he thought bombing the supply lines in Laos was

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was "the right thing to do." Senator Long and Congressman Ford indicated on a TV program that they didn't feel that such operations v^ere "a particularly dangerous course" for the nation to follow and that they were the kind of actions that could help protect oux forces in South Vietnam-Senator Morse criticized the bombings as part of the Administration's . "foreign policy of concealment in Southeast Asia-" On the 19th5 in the Senate5^he repeated his blasts, charging that the air strikes ignored the 19o2 Geneva Accords and violated the nation's belief in "substituting the rule of law for the jungle law of military might." Broadening his attack^he warned that "there is no hope of avoiding a massive war in Asia if the U.S. policy tovrard Southeast Asia were to continue without change. 22U /

"^- Policy Assessm.ents. The intensifying public debate and the events and forces which precipitated it brought about an equally searching reassessment of policy within the Administration, While there is little evidence in the available materials that shows any serious questioning^ of ^ former policy decisions among the Principals, questioning did occur within the agencies which they represented. It is clear that some of the judgments and alternative approaches were discussed with these ITSC members, and presumbably, some found their way into discussions with the President,

One very significant and probably influential viewpoint was registered by the Saigon Embassy- In a message (TAB E) described as ' the reflections of Alexis Johnson and Ambassador Taylor on which General Westmoreland concurred, the thrust of the advice seemed to be to^move into Phase Two, almost in spite of the political outcome in Saigon. ^After listing four possible "solutions" to the then-unsettled Qr^h^. crisis, ^Taylor identified either a military takeover coupled with Huong s resignation or a successor civilian govermaent dominated by the military as equally the worst possible outcomes. (it is Important to note here that, depending on how one interprets the structure of the January 27th regime, one or the other of these was in fact the case at the beginning of the air strikes in February, 1965.) In the event of such an outcome, Taylor argued that the United States could either

carry on about as we are now" or "seek to disengage from the present intLmacy of relationship with the G\a^" while continuing "to accept responsibility for /its/ air and maritime defense. - .against the DEV." In the case of disengagement, he argued, the United States could offset the danger of South Vietnamese leaders being panicked into making a deal with the ilL? "if we were engaged in reprisal attacks or had initiated Phase II operations against DRV." The message then s^omiaarized the three different conditions under which the Mission officials thou-rhtPhase^Two" operations could be undertaken:

"A. In association with the GW after the latter has proved itself as a reasonably stable government able to control its armed forces-

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B. Under a situation such as now as an emergency stimulant hopefully to create unity at home and restore failing morale.

C* As a unilB.teral U.S. action to compensate for a reduced in-country U.S. presence." (Underlining added)

^In other vords, under any conceivable alliance condition short of complete U.S. abandcrmient of South Vietnam, /jiibassador Taylor and his top-level associates in Saigon sav the graduated air strikes of Phase Two as an appropriate course of action. As they concluded, "Without Phase II operations, we see slight chance of moving toward a successful solution." 225/

Within the more influential sections of the State Department, policy reexamination took a similar, though not identical, tack. Rather than adjust the substance or projected extent of the pressures policy,. the tendency vras to recalculate and adjust the conditions under which it was considered appropriate to apply it. The motivation for a reassessment was the sense of impending disaster in South Vietnam. What the Saigon Embassy reports appear to have portrayed at the time as concrete instances of foot-dragging, political maneuvering, and sparring for advantage among political and military leaders seem to have been interpreted in Washington as an impending sell-out to the xILF. Por example, the Assisoant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs, who had been an important participant in the policy and decision-making processes through most of 19o4, offered the following prognosis:

...the situation in Vietnam is now likely to come apart more rapidly than we had anticipated in 'November. We would still stick to the estimate that the most likely form of coming apart would be a government or key groups starting to negotiate covertly with the Liberation Front or Hanoi, perhaps not asking in the first instance that we get out, but with that necessarily following at a fairly early stage." 226/

The perceived impacts of a collapse in Saigon on other nations — perhaps even more than the political fortunes of South Vietnam itself — were^a significant part"of the State Department calculations (Tab F) . If • a unilateral "Vietnam solution" were to be arranged, so the thinking went in January I965, not only would Laos and Cambodia be indefensible, but Thailand's position would become unpredictable. Bundy wrote:

Most seriously, there is grave question whether the Thai m these circumstances would retain any confidence at all in our continued support....As events have developed, the itoeri-can public would probably not be too sharply critical, but the real question v/ould be whether Thailand and other nations were veakened and taken over thereaft-er."

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The reasons vhy this kind of impact vas "believed likely >/as related to a perceived lack of realism or effectiveness in U.S. policies during the late autumn. Bundy reflected an appajrently videly shared concern that Administration actions and statements since the election had convinced the VietnaBiese and other Asians that the U.S. Govermnent did not intend to take stronger action and vas "possibly looking for a way out." Moreover, he saw this impression being created by our ''insisting on a more perfect government than can reasonably be expected, before ve consider any additional action -- and that ve might even pull out our support unless such a government emerges.'' 22?/

To change this impression and reverse the disturbing trends, Bundy and others in State suggested stronger actions, even though recog-nir.ing that these actions incurred certain risks. Hoirever the immediate, actions suggested fell somewhat short of Phase T\ro (a term that vas not used^in the correspondence). They included: (l) ''an early occasion for reprisal action..."; (2) "possibly beginning lov-level reconnaissance of the DRV,.."; (3) ^'an orderly withdrawal of our dependents," which v/as termed "a grave mistake in the absence of stronger action"; and (U)

introduction of limited U.S. ground forces into the northern area of South Vietnam...concurrently with the first air attacks into the DRV." They downgraded the potential of further intensifying the air operations m^Laos, indicating that such actions "would no_t meet the problem of Saigon morale" and might precipitate a "Communist intervention on a

substantial scale in Laos " The perceived risks of the suggested

actions were: (l) a deepened U.S. commitment at a tim^e when South Vietnamese will appeared weak; (2) the likelihood of provoking open opposition to U.S. policies in nations like India and Japan; (3) the imcertainty of any meaningful stiffening effort on the GW.; and (k) the inability of "limdted actions against the southern DRV" to sharply reduce infiltration or "to induce Hanoi to call it off." 223/

If the graduated, "progressively mounting," air operations of

Phase^11 were iraplied by these suggestions, it appears that they were

perceived as being entered rather gingerly and with little intent to

intensify them to whatever extent might be required to force a decision

in Hanoi. Rather, the expectancies in State vrere quite different: "on

balance we believe that such action would have some faint hope of really

improving the Vietnamese situation, and, above all, would put us in a

much stronger position to hold the next line of defense, namely Thailand."

Moreover, Bundy and others felt that even with the stronger actions, the

negotiating process that they believed was bound to come about could not

be^expected^to bring about a really secure and independent South Vietnam.

Still, despite -^his shortcoming, they reasonel that their suggested

^'^stronger actions" would have the desirable effect in Southeast Asia:

...we would stiir have appeared to Asians to have done a lot more about it." 229/

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Underlying the State Department's concerns over the impact of U.S. Vietnam policy on the rest of Southeast Asia were current developments in the communist vorld. For one thing, the Soviet Union h^d re-entered Southeast Asian politics in an active way, after a period of nearly three yeais of diligent detachment. Following a reported Soviet, pledge in Fovember to increase economic and military aid to North Vietnam, the Administration held a series of conversations in December with representatives of the new Soviet regime. During at least one of these -- in addition to exchanging the now standard respective lines about who violated the Geneva Accords -- Secretary Rusk stressed the seriousness of the situation created by Hanoi's and Peking's policies, implying strongly that we vrould remain in South Vietnaiii until those policies changed or had resulted in "a real scrap.*' Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko replied that if the United States felt so strongly about improving^ the situation in Vietnam, "it Sxhould be willing to attend an international conference to discuss Laos and Vietnam. - However, he would not agree with P.usk's request for assurances that Laos would be represented by Souvanna Phouma. 230/

Vlithin a few weeks of this conversation, I-^lr. Gromyko sent assurances to the DRV that the Soviet Union would support it in the face of aggressive actions by the United States. Further, he expressed the official Soviet view that it was the duty of all participants in the Geneva agreements to take txhe stens necessary to frustrate U.S. military plans to extend the war in Indo-China. This note, sent on 30 December, was made public in a renewed call on h January for a conference on Laos, to be convened without preconditions On 17 January, Pravda carried an authoritative statement'warning that "tlie provocations of the armed forces of the United States and their Saigon puppets against North Vietnam carried dangers of "large armed conflict," and citing naval attacks on the DRV coast and U.S. air attacks in. Laos as examples. On the 22nd, in letters to both Hanoi and Peking, Gromyko reiterated the Soviet pledge to aid north Vietnam in resisting any U.S. military action. 231/

In addition to renewed Soviet activity in Southeast Asia, that of Communist China also a-opeared ominous. Fanned by Svikarno^s abrupt withdrawal of Indonesia's"'participation in the U.N., some U.S. officials voiced concern over the development of a "Peking-Jakarta axis" to prom^ote revolution in Asia. North Vietnam, together with North Korea, were seen as natijral allies who rnAght join in to form an international grouping exerting an attraction on other Asian states to counter that of the U.N. Peking was viewed as the insti^-'-ator and urime benefactor of such a grouping. 232/ ■ . " ^

in OSD.

Complementing the State Department policy assessments, were those For example, in early January, Assistant Secretary LIcNaughton regarded U.S. stakes in South Vietnam as: (l) to hold onto "buffer real estate" near Thailand and Llalaysia and (2) to maintain our national

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reputation. In his view the latter was the more important of the two. Sharing the State view that South Vietnam was being lost (''this means that a government not unfriendly to the DRV will probably emerge within two years"), he believed that the U.S. reputation would suffer least "if we continue to support South Vietnam and if Khanh and company continue to behave like children as the game is lost." However, he pointed out that "dogged perseverance" was also recoimnended because the situation might possibly improve. 233 /

In specific terms, Llcrlaughton defined perseverance as including the following course of action:

"a. Continue to take risks on behalf of SViT. A reprisal should be carried out soon. (Dependents could be removed at that time.)

b. Keep slugging away. Keep help flowing, BUT do not ■ increase the ni-Mber of US men in SVrl. (Additional US soldiers are as likely to be counter-productive as productive.)

c. Do not lead or appear to lead in any negotiations. . Chances of reversing the tide will be better and, if we don*t reverse the tide, our reputation will emerge in better condition.

d. If we leave, be sure it is a departure of the kind which would put everyone on o^or side, wondering how we stuck it and took it so long."

In the event of inability to prevent deterioration within South Vietnam, he ui^ged the developraent of plans to move to a fall-back position by helping shore-up Thailand and Malaysia. 23V

An OSD assessment made imiaediately after the Khanh coup in late January adds perspective to this vie^Toint. In it, McITaughton stated and Secretary McUsjiiara agreed, "U.S. objective in South Vietnam, is net to *help friend^ but to contain China." In particular, both Malaysia and Thailand were seen as the next targets of Chinese aggressiveness. Neither official saw any alternative to "keep plugging" insofar as U.S„ efforts inside South Vietnam were concerned. However, outside the borders, both favored initiating strikes against Morth Vietnam. At first, they believed, these should take the form of reprisals; beyond that, the Administration would have to "feel its way" into stronger, graduated pressures. McUaughton doubted that such strikes would actually help the situation in South Vietnam, but thought they should be carried out any^'-ay. McIIamara believed they probably would help the situation, in addition to their broader imua^ts on the U.S. position in Southeast Asia, 235/

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Though different in some respects, all of these policy views pointed in a similar direction. In his own way, each Principal argued that it was unproductive to hold off on further actions against ITorth Vietnam until the GVIT began to operate in an effective manner. Each suggested broadtr benefits that could be gained for the United States if firmer measures were taien directly against the DRV.

The impact of these views can be seen in the policy guidance emanating from V/ashington in mid and late January 1965o For example, on the llth, Anibassador Taylor was apprised of Administration doubts that General Khanh had put aside his intentions to stage a coup and was given ccansel for such an eventuality. Essentially, the guidance was to avoid actions that would further commit the United States to any particular form of political solution. The underlying rationale expressed was that if a military goverrmient did emerge, "we might well ■ have to swallow our pride and^/ork with it." 236/ Apparently, the A.dministration's adamant insistence on an effective GVl:- along lines specified by the United States had been eroded. However, on the iHh, guidance to Taylor indicated that the Administration had not yet determined to move into a phase of action more vigorous than the current one. In the immediate wake of public disclosures concerning the bombing operations in Laos, Secretary Rusk concurred in Taylor's proposal to brief the^GVil leaders on these operations, but cautioned against encouraging their expectations of new U.S. moves against the r.orth. Rusk considered "it "essential that they not be given /the/ impression that _^ARRSL ROLL, etc^Z i-^epresents a major step-up of activity"^ against the DRV or that it represents an important new phase of U.S. operational activity." 237 / The jjmnediate matter for speculation was the striking of a key highway bridge in Laos, but the program still called for two missions per week.

Clear indication that the Administration was contemplating some kind of increased military activity came on 25 January. Ajnbassador Taylor was asked to comment on the "Departmental view" that U.S. dependents should be withdrawn to "clear the decks" in Saigon and enable better concentration of U.S. efforts on behalf of South Vietnam. 238 / Previously, the JCS had reversed their initial position on this issue and requested the removal, a view which was for^^/arded to State "for consideration at the highest levels of government" in mid-January. £39/ Recalling the Bundy policy assessment of 6 January (T./\B F) , it will be noted that clearing the decks by removing dependents was recommended only in association with "stronger actions." However, there is no indication of any decision at this point to move into Phase Two. The Rusk cable made specific reference to a current interest in reprisal actions. Moreover, consideration of later events and decisions compels the Judgment that it was only reprisals which the Administration had in mind as January drew to a close.

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IV'.C. FOOTNOTES

October 196k - Jcnui^ry 19^5

I. SNIE 53-2-6^1, 1 October 196i;, pp. 1-3 passim . (ITOP SECRET). 2- IbM., p. 7; see also pp. 1, 2, 9 (TOP SECRET).

3. S?TIS 10--3.-6^, 9 Octobsr 196^^, p. 2 (TOP SECRET).

k, Taylor to Itepaa^tnent of State, ik October ISoh (TOP SECRET).

5. Taylor messs^e to President Johnson, l6 October ISSk (jF^ 303, DTG

1610303), dascrlbed in CJCS msmorandi-Lm to SecD-af, "Courses of

Action, Southeast Asia," 27 October 19o^ (JCS M-902-650 (TO? SECR'S) .

6. "Cha-onolosicia Study of Infllbre.tlon from North Vietnam", 24 Cctobsr 196k (secret).

■7. See Peter Gro^e, in Nov York TirriCs , 2 Octobor 196h.

8. CJCS Eiemorandira to SscBa-^, "Ana.lV3is of South.iast Asia Actions," 21 October lS)Sk {jCSlA-'B33^6k) (in Viatnsm 38I: Sensitive file) (TOP SECRET).

9. JCSM-902-6it, 27 October 196h (TOP SECRET).

10. Ibid.

II. SecDof Menvore.nd-'xm to CJCS, "Ccnrees of Action, Southeast Asia," 29 October 1951^ (In Vietnam 38I: Sensitive file) (TOP SECRET). See also Joint State/D^fenss mcssasc to /unbassador Taylor, 29 October 2S6k (D^fens?; ■'3lf-2) (in Vietnara 38I: ITovcmbsr file) (TOP SECRET).

12. S22Ll2£LIi22.E^ 2 November 1951^.

13.

NS/uM 3IU, 10 SeptCTiber 1961f (TO? SECRET).

Ik. CJCS Kessage to CINGPAC, r-^AGV and Ambassador Taylor, 1 November 190'+ (JCS 11^51) (in vietnaia 38I: Novcmbar file) (TOP SECRET).

15. Sea Tad Szu].a, Kov_Y ork Times , 2 November 190!;. ' •

*

16. CJCS to CniCPAC, et e.l, .1 November 196'^ (TOP SEGP.ET). IT- l^ad-tinq-bon Po^t, 5 November 196^.

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18. Described in CJCS mcraorendura to ScsD'?ij "Recoimendod U.S. Courses of Action in delation to Viet Cong Attack on Bien Hoa Airfield,

1 November 196^ (SECRET)" It Korember 196h (jCS.l-933-6^r) (TOP SECRET).

19. Saigon 1357, in Taylor msssasa to SecDaf, 5 Novembsr 196^^- (Saison 251) (In Vietnsra 38I: November file) (TOP SECEEl').

20.' Tr.ylor to Secl>?f, 3 November 1964 (TO? SECRET).

21. JCSM-933-6'+, h Novorabar 1964 (TOP SECRHT).

22. See McNeiiara mcmorEndira to CJCS, "Eecotinisnded U.S. Courses of Action in Relation to Viet Con"' Att'^ck on Bicn Hoa Airfield, 1 Novembsr 1964 (SECRET)", 13 Kovcaber 1964 (in Vistneum 38I: November file (TOP SECP.ST).

23. Jonathan Moore meiaoranduni, 3 November 1964 (in Stato Department Materials, Vol. Il) (CONFIDSI^IAL).

24. Ibid .

25. "ProjGct Cjutline," 3 November 1964, attachment to Corcorezi laemorandun to Michael Forrestal, 3 Novcraber 1964 (in State Departmont Materials, Vol. II) (TOP SECRET).

26. See his d3scription of vork in I^ustin meraorandura to ChalriTian, NSC Working Group on Southeast Asia^ "Additional Material for Project on Courses of Action in Southeast Asia", l4 November 1964 (in State Departraont Materials, Book III) (TOP SECRET).

27» For exsjtnple, see New Yo rk Times and Ne'.r York Journ al A'nerican,

2 November 1964 and Chicnio Tribune, 3 November 196-!^;

28. Peter Grose, New York Tlmso, 2, 6, and 8 November 1964.

29« Bu.nay draft working papsr^, "Conditions for Action and Key Actions Surrcvmdlng Any B^^cision," 5 Kovenfber 196^v (in State Department Materials^ Vol II.) (TOP£SCREr)c

30e Siaiivcai meraorrjidum to AssistsP-t Secretary Bundy, ''Courses of Action in Vietntxni," 6 KovemlDcr 195^1- (in State Department Materials^ Vol II) (top BSCRST)^

31. CLA.-DIA~IIIR Panel draft paper^ "Section I - The Situr^/tion," 6 Ilovember 196h (In use Workins Group 'forking Papers") (TOP SECPvET).

32o .McIJaughton dr^ft outline, "Action for South Vietna.-ajs"'7 rio^amhor 196*1-(In Stats Department Materials, Vol, II) (TOP EECPvILT).

33 • Intelliscnca panel draft p^.per, 6 Kovember 196h (TOP SECRZiT). •

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I III II II I III T [ T I ■- — ■ ""~

3h. Ibid ,

35. Mnctin working pap^r^ "Cornmants on CIA-DLA.-INR Panel Dreuft Section I -The Situation," enc^looxiro to joint Staff memor^Jidiicn, 10 ITovember l$6k (In State B-parfcnent iMaterials^ Vol. II) ['£0F SilCRET).

36. rbid>

37* NSC Working Group on Vietnt?jn (Southsast Asia)j "Section I: Intelligence Asso^oinent: The Situation in Vletne;n/^ 2!i- Novcnxber 195^4-, ppo 6, 7-8 (Ln State Department Materials, Vol. IV) (TOP SECRET).

39» Ibid., p. 12. . ■

^^0" I^'h:^ PP* 1^J--15; p assim .

fa. NSC Working Group on Southe^Bt Asia^ "Section II: U.S. ObjGCtiven and Stak.!is in Soutii Vietnam end Southeast Asia," 8 November 196h , (In Dr^ft Papers of NSC Working Group, 17 Wovcmber 196^r, AFXPDR3 QlSO-Sk) (TOP SECHETT). S02 also draft (quoted in parts) in enclosuTG to Kustin memorondum to Chcixr.i;.n, NSC Working Group, "Comm^^nt on Draft for Text II of Project Oixtlins on Courses of Action in Southei',st Asia," 10 Novoniber 195^ (TOP SECRET) and Revised Drc-ft, ''Svnmoxy - Courses of Action in Southca^it Asia," 21 November 19^^-i- (TOP SECRET) (Both in State Dopartiasnt Materials, Vol. II and Vole IV).

lv2o Ibid.

k^. Ibid.

kh. NSC VJorkins Group, Section 11, 8 Kovecber 2.96k (TOP SECRET).

k3^ ll)id.

1^6. Forrestal m-sn:ora.ndura to Assistant Secretary &JU.dy, "Comments on

Input - II U.S. Objectives and Stages in South Vietnam and So\itheast Asia," k NoveiTibcr 196ii- (in Stats E-spartmsnt Materials, Vol. II) (TOP SECPJJT) o

h'J. Sixllivan to' Etmciy, vith attached xxnclassificd paper, 6 NoveiTiber 196^

(to? sECisa.0.

hd, Mustin to Chainaan, 10 ITovoinber 196*;, pp. 1, 2, 3 (TOP SECEST).

h9. Ibid., pp. k, 5, 6.

50. Revised Draft, "Syrarasry," 21 Noveiaber 196^4, pp. 3-4 (TOP SECRET).

,•83 TOP SECRET- ~ Sensitive

Declassified per Executive Order 13^26, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

3 J- 4

TOP SSCRST -._S-"g^s jJiJ:X£

^lo Rid .J pc 6.

52. Ibid ., pp. 5-6.

53. Ibid., pp. 5|-5. ss^ also KSC vJoi'king Grcap. "Section 11," 8 Novcnbcr 19Sk (top 3ECRET).

5!^. iMustin to Chaiannsun, 10 Korcja-ber 19^^ (TO? SECHIM).

55. See Revised Draft, "Svranary," 21 Novembar 19^^, p. 7 (TOP SECRET).

57. "i^oject Oiitlina/' 3 iJovember 19^^ (TOP SECRET). 58 c

59. HcNaughton's first di.'ai't oiitlino, "Action for South Vietnwa/'

5 IIover:b£r I96U (m Mdlaughtcn II) (SECRET). See also his "Pl8,n of Action for South Yietnem/' 3 Ssptsmbor 196'^ sxil "Aaids and Options in Southeast Asia," I3 October 195'-!- (TO? SECR3T).

60. S

VI

ae KSC vforkinc. Group, "Section III", 17 November 3.96h, and "Section I," 11 Hovembar 196^ (TOP SECRIi^T).

61. Must in to Chairaian, Ik November 196ij- (TOP SECRET)

62. "Project Outlin.2," 3 Kovembsr 196k (TOP SECRET). 63.

Vol. II).

6'i. Robert Johnson Kieaorandum to Assistant Secretary Bimdy, "Comments

on Draft Material for Report of KSC Vorkins Group," 10 ITovamber 196^1-(in Str.te Department Materiais, Volo II) (TOP SECRET).

65 e See McKaugli-tou's penciled cc^aents in margin of Bimdy di'aft^ "Analysis

of Option C^" attached to Bitndy moi's.orandu.ii to ITSC Working Groupj.

10 Novern.ber 195^ (TO? SECSFi')« «

66. use l.'orkins Group, "Section V," 8 Kovsmber 196^ (TOP SECRET).

67. S^ollivtcn to Bi-mdcr, 6 Kovernbcr 196^4 (TO? SECRET).

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date; 2011

TOP SSCKST " Sensitive

68. Ses Bvnaj draft, "The Eroad 0:>tionsj" 7 Hovcnbor 19o!+ (TOP SECRET)

and its discussion of Option.A (incliidad as p-'jort of ell other options).

69. Johnson to Bundyj 6 Kovcm"ber 196h (SECRET) o

70. Bundy d^-cffc^ "The Broad Options/' 7 TIovenilDer 196k (TOP SECBSl).

71. Sos Sullivan to Bimdy, 6 llovesfoev 196k (TOP SECFvSlO; Johnson to Bundy, 6 rjovembsr IpS^i- (TOP SSCPJilT); CLA.-DU~IFR Par.el draft pcpcr, 6 Koveaher I96U (TOP SECRET). ...

72. 522 KSC Working Group, "Section III/' and "Section V," 8 Kovemher 196^^ (TOP SECRET); also I^«vised Draft "Summaay," 21 November 196^, pp. 10, 12-15 (TOP SECRET).

73.. 2&(^mc Working Group, "Section III," 17 November 196hj end."Section VI," 11 November 19Dii- (TO? SECRET); slso Revised Draft, "Su':mary," 21 Rovembar 195^^, pp. 10, I7 (TOP SECRET).

7^!-. See VII

NSC Working Grou.p, "Section III," 17 November 19o'4-, ?,nd "Section

," 13 Novfflsbar 196^1- (TOP SECE3T)j alao Revised Dr,aft, "Sur-Eitirj-," Novcjiibar 1Q?^1.!._ r.r,_ in„TT o^-oc; /"nr-np r.FnR^r^.

vAj., J.J, u^jveincsr iyb4 (TOP SECEKT;; a.LKO nevis 21 Novmbor I96I:-, pp. 10-11, 23-25 (TOP SECF.5I)

75. Sse Eevissd Draft, "Sur;mary," 21 November 196^!-, VI?' 1^-15 (TOP

:CP£T).

76. "Alternative Foras of Ne<yoti&tionG — Alternative E," 6 Noveicbsr 19^'-i-p. 20 (secret).

77. "Altsi'?ip.tive Forms of Negotiations — Sane Ccmpaisons of the Negoti.ating Sitmitions Under the Thi'ce Policy Alten^z^tives," 6 November 196'+ (SECRET).

7^' Jbid.; see also Johnson to Bandy, "Furthsr Thoughts," 6 Novenbor 19514-(SECRET).

79. KSC Working Group, "Section VII," 13 Novenibsr 196!+ (TOP SECRET);

Revised Draft, "SuTiiainy," 21 Novenbar 19^^, pp. 2!4-25 (TOP SECRET),

80.. "Mtarnativa Forms of Negotiation — A-lternative B," 6 November 196''i-, pp. 1-2 (secret),

81. See Ibid., pp. 12-19 passim. (SECFJIT).

■82.- NSC Working Group, "Stction III," 17 Noveabsr 196'!- and "Section Yl," 13 Novcabcr 3-96Ii. (TOP SECRET); see al^o Bundy draft, "The Eroad Options," 7 November I96J1- (TOP SECRSI').

83. Ib_id.; Revised Di'aft, "Summary," 21 November 196'-l-, pp. 25-26, 27 (TOP SECRET).

,85 TOP SECRET - Sensitive

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

TOP SECRET - Sensitive

^^* 2li^»; s^^ £j-so draft, vith penciled carjnentSj "An^aysis of Option C,*' 10 Koveinber 196^4- (TOP SECRET).

85. Revised Draft, "Sionun^ry/* 21 Noveniber ISSh, pp. 8-9, 15, 21-22^ 28^29 (TOP SECRET)o

86. rbide, pp. 13^ 15; ijQQ Uorking Grou-o^ ''Section V," 8 KovOT.'ber 196^ . ItOP SECIiST).

87. KSC Working Group, "Section V," 8 Ilovem'ber 19^'^ (TOP SECRET)*

88. Revised Draft, "Summary," 21. November 19^^, P- 15, (TOP SECRET).

89. Ibid., p. l6.

90. KSC VorkiPs Group, "Seation VI," 13 November 196*^ (TOP SECB2T)o

91. H3C Working Grom:), "Seotion II" (poi=tion completsd 11 November I96IO (TOP SEOREP).

92. "A3.ternative Forms of Negotiation — Alternative B," 6 ITovaiober 196h, pp. 'i, hv,j kh (SECPJilT). ^ .

93* Revised Draft, "S\2mriary," 21 Kovsraber 196'+, P?. 17-21, Hi^SlS' ('^^^ ■ SECRET); sae also NSC Working Group, "Section VI," 13 KovcinbGr 196^ (TOP SECRET).

S)h, rbid., ppo 28, 29o ■ ' ■

95. IM^'j pp. 25-2TJ KGc Working Group, "Section VII," 13 November 19Sk (TOP SECRET).

96. .Ibid.

97. Marshall Green mcmorcJidum to Assistant Secretary Bunoy, "Negotiating Positions on Vietnam," 16 November 196^ (in Stats Eepartaent Materials Vol. HI ) (TOP SECRET).

98. Bi.indy memorandum to tha Principals, "Issues Raised by Papers on Southeast Asia, ** 24 Noveniber 196k (in State D^psrtment Materials, Vol. IV) (TOP SECRET').

99. Revised Draft, "Summary," 21 November 196^^, pp. 20, 28 (TOP SECRET)»

100o CJC3 laemorandim to SecDef, "Operation Plan SkA - Additional Actions (SECRET)," lif November 196h (CM-258-6U) (in Vietnm 38I: Sensitive file) (TOP SECRET).

101. CISC neraorandixu to Secl>2f, "Ccarrsas of Action in Southeast Asle," 1^4- Novsmber I96U (JCSM-955-6'4) (TOP SECRET).

*

QS ■ TOP SECRET - Sensitive

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

TOP SECFlET - Sensitive

102., CJCS mamorand^jini to SecEef, "Courses of Action in Southeast Asia^" 18 No-e-tib-r lS6h (jCS'l-SSl-^k) (in Vietn^ 38I: Sensitive file) (TOP SECRET)

/ *

103

B

■iindy ne-'iorarxdun to SecDsf, Director CIA^ sJid CJCS, "Review of Working Draft on Coiirse of Action in Southeast Asia/' 1? Kovenibsr 1964 (In State Department Matcrisas, Vol, III) (SECRET),

104. CJCS meaorandum to SecDef, "Courses of Action in Southeast Asip.j"

23 Nove.-nber 1S6U (JC3M-982-64) (top SECRET).

105. Ibid.

106. Ibid. .'

107. Rostov; Eiemorandi:b-n to Secretary McNamara, "Military Dispositions snd Political Signals," 16 Koverober I96J+ (in Yietnsja 38I: November me) (TOP SECRET).

lOS. Ibia.

■

109. R03tCT7 sicm.orana.um to Sscret,?.rj,- Rusl:, "Seme Obsei'vations As Ve Ccm^ to the Ci-unch in Southeast Asia/' 23 November 19-6^^ (in Vietnaa

r~^ ' 381: November filo) (TOP SECPiET).

110. Ibid,-

111. Ibid .

■

112 0 Nev YoT\ Tjjqes . 2^ and 28 November 1961^.

113. Bjnay to Principals, 2!! November 196!!- (TOP SSCRSl).

11'4-, Eu-ndy riemorandutn to the PrincipcJLs, "Issues Raised by Papers on Southeast Asia," 25 November lS6k (in State Depaiiiment Materials, ■ Vol, IV) (to? SECRET); hcjidwritten notes of Principals Meeting, 24 November lS6h (COI'JFIDEI-?I'IAL).

115. rbid.

116. Htmdvrritten meeting notes, 2k November 19^4 (CONFIDEKi'IAL).

117. Ball draft'paper in four parts (yjidated) (in State Department Materials, Vol. iv) (sECPJS)o

118. Handwritten meeting notes, 2h November 19^'+ (CONFIDStfTLAi) o

119. roid.; see also LMndy to Principals, 25 Noveraber 196h (TOP 5ECPST).

120. Ibid,

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date; 2011

TOP SECRITT - Sensitive

121. Ibid.

122o Hraid/a-itten naetlns notesj 2k Noveiaber 1^5^^ (COIIFIDET'ITIAL), 123 o Sea Nct York Ti7!i.£!3 . 25 riovamber Ip^^!-.

12U. Taylor brief jn^, "Th.s Cu.i'rent Situation in So^-ith Yiet-NOT - Itova-absr, 196^^" 27 November .T9oi!- (in State Dspartmsnt Materials, Vol., IV) (TOP BECRIST).

125. Ibid.

126. Ibid.

127. Ibid.

t

128. Ibid. 129 o Ibid .

130o Ibid. ■ '

133-

132. Ibid.

133. Ibid .

IS't. Bundy to Principals, 2? Novorabar JS-Sk (TO? SECRET).

135. HeJid'.a-itton neatins notes, 2? Kovenber 19^^ (COHFIDSTITIAL) .

136. Bimcly to Princip.sJ.s, 27 November I96H (TOP SECRHl).

137. Bundy memoranduio to Southeast Asia Principals, "Scenario for Iramediat" Action Rt'cgram," 23 IJovsmbcr 19^^ (in State Dspartmcnt Materials, Vol. v) (TOP SECRET).

138. nand^Tritten notes of Pi^incipals Meeting, 28 NoveEiber 1961i- (CCtlFIDSITIIAi).

139. Ibid.

l':0. Ibi^;''* '^^® ^"i-so William P. Biuidy "Kemorandaii to Southeast Asia EL-incip.^ls," ,29 Novc-nber 196i^ and attachment, "Draft iTSAI-l on Southeast Asia" (in State D-partmant Materials, Vol. V) (TOP SECHBT).

lli-l. Eundy to Principals, 29 Novembsr 196'4- (TOP SECRET).-

' 88 TOP SECRET - Sensitive

Declassified per Executive Order 13^26, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

«

TOP EECKST - Serisitive

11^2. "Drafi; IISM/' 29 Noverabsr 196k (TOP SECRET).

1^3» Ibid .

lUlv. PenGiled notss ou original "l&'cn IISM/' 29 Novarabsr 196h (TOP SEGIffiT).

IU5. See KSC Working Group, "Section V/' 8 Kovc-mljer 196'4 (TOP SECRET).

*

lk6. "■Drs.ft mm," 29 November 19^^^ (TOP SSCPJ3T).

11^7. B'ondy to Principals, 28 November 19^^ (TOP SSCEST).

ll|8, Amex I to Taylor "briefing, 27 November 196'!- (TOP SECRET).

11^9. Rerioed Draft, "Sunirrary," p?. 25, 26, revised 25 November 1964 (TOP SEGPxST).

150. Nay York TM qs and Ths Was hington Post , 2 December 196li-.

151. Eandw'ritten notes of VJhite House meeting, 1 Decenibar 1961^. (CONFIDENTIAL).

152. Ibid . 153.. Ibid.

1511-. Statement to the Govcrment of the Republic of Vietnam.

155. Hand-?-rrittsn mseting notes, 1 December 19oh (CONFIDENTIAL).

156. Te;d; in Kaw York Ti mes, 2 Docember 19oh.

157. Tae 17^.5bingtQn Poet 3 2 Deca:n*ber 195^.

158. Handwritten maatin^ notes, 1 I)eceni''osr 196^- (CONFIDENIAL)»

159. Cc^npars "Draft Statan^nt to G\l'f," T53 B to "Dra^ Position Paper on

Southeast Asia," 30 November 1964 (TOP SECRET), trith Draft Instn:ctions from the President to Ambassador Taylor, as revised on 2 December 1954, Ei-

•rom the President to Ambassador Taylor, as revicea on d jjeccmo^ inclosui-e B to Joint Sec-'-etariat meiriorandam to JGS' "Ambassador Baylor's Visit," 3 Dscembsr 196'+ (JCS 23!'r3/499) (TOP SECKEIO.

160. "D-caft Insti-uotions from the President," 2 December 1964 (TOP SECRET).

161. Handwritten meetixis notes, 1 Deceuber 1964, (COI-IEIDENTIAL).

162. The E-ltimor^ S\m, 4 December 1964.

163. NEC viorkins Group, Working Paper, Fart VIII, "lm.mcdiate Actions in the Period Prior to Decision," 7 November 1964 (in State Dopartment Materials, Vol. Il) (TOP SECRET).. "OPLail 34a Missicnc" 26 November 1964 (in Vietnam 3SI: Sensitive file) (TOP SECRET).

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

TOP SECRET " Sensitive

l6h. COMUSMACV to JCS (SACSA)^ 270830SHoyemb£rl96^ (MACSOG 15081^) (TO? SECRET).

165. SAC3A to CIKCPAC^ "OPLAK 3!+A-M3Jritimc! Op^rs-tions (s)/' 2 Dscaniber 196k (jCS 00252I4-) (TOP.SECrSl).

166. see COMUEMCV to JCS(SAC3A), 0302h3^Dsc(^mberl96k (i-LICSOC- 15735) (TOP SZCT3T); SACSA to CINCPAC md COMUS>LfiCV, "OPMN S'i-A/' 10 December ISSh (JC3 CO2SIO) (TOP SSCPvET).

167. CJCS msmorenaiim to SccDef, "intenaification of OPLAH 3UA-Maritims Operations/' 12 December 196^!- iJCSl-i-10h2~6k); Deputy SeoDef mcEioranduin to CJCS, "intensification of OIIMJ 3^:-A~MrD.ritinie Operations," li|- Deceraber ISSk (Both in Vietnam 58I: Sensitive file)

(TOPSECEET).

168. JCSM-10!^-2-.6!l-.

169. Joint Secret.-j'iat menorandum to JCS, "meeting of KSC Principals,

19 December 196'+, on Southeast Asia," 19 D-^ccTibsr 196^!- (jCS 2339/1^6)

(top secret) .

170. CJCS mc'sorandum to Deputy Secpef, "CPLWI 3^iA-Air Operations, Je^iuaiy, 1965," 31 Decembsr I965 (CM Zh7'6h) (TOP SECRET).

171. Section 2, "Mseting of tho Principals, 5 January I965" (A 3-2rin2 binder^ XPD?37i!-25-65, in US/Jj Directorate of Plans Repository) (TOP SECRET),

172. NSC IJorking Group, "Iniraediete Actions," 7 November ISSk; also DIA memorananjii to CJCS, "Evaluation of CoinnimiBt Rccction to Barrel Roll," 31 Decc3iber 195^!-, attachraent to JCS meaorandu'n to Deputy SscD^f (subject as above), 2 Janiiar^r 196U (CM-353065) (in Vietnajn 38I: December file) (TOP SSCPjST).

173. Joint Stata/Dsfense mcsss-se to Vientiane Bnbassy, "Intensification of mAF Air Operations," 8 Dscsmber 196^1- (Sts.ta 508j Sullivan to SccState, 10 Dsccmber 19614- (Vientiana 868) (Both, in "Meeting of the Principals, 12 December l^Skj " a 3--ring binder, XPDP.b896766'l, in USAF Dia-ectorate of Plans Repository) (TCP SECRET).

Yjk., JCS to crSCFx\C, "Or.eretions in Laos," 11 December 195ii- (JCS 0028^^8) (TOP SECRET) . *

175. Joint Secretariat msmorcndui:i to JCS, "Meeting of NSC Principals, 12 December 196^!-, on Southeast Asia, " 12 DecTinber 19^^ (jCS 2339/16^0 (top SECPuST).

176. Section 1, "Meeting of the Principals, 19 Dacsaber 196^," (A 3-ring binder, XPDRL8908-6!!-, in U3AP Directorate of Plans Repository) (TOP SECRET).

177. JCS mesor.andum to SecDaf, "Operations in Laos^" 17 December 19^4

(jcsM--i050"6-'i) (top secret).

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

I

I- t

TOP SECRET - Sensitive

178. Section 1, "Meeting of the Principals, 19 December 196h/' (TOP SSCHE'i?).

179. Deputy SecR'jf nenorandiam to CJCS, 29 Decsmber 196h (in Vietnam 38I: December file); (TOP SECRET)

180. DIA to CJCS, 31 December I96U (TOP SECRET')*

181. JC3 to CIIICPAC, "Barrel Roll/' k Ja^ary 19^5 (JCS OOSl^fH) (TOP

SECRET).

182. Section 1, "Meeting of the Frincinals;, 19 December 196h}" Section 1, "Meeting of the Principals, 5 January 19^5/' (TOP SECPJL'T)»

183. Cooper raemorondum to Willicm Bmdy, "Public Statement on VC Infiltration (v/attachment)," h December 196k (in Vietnam 38I: r.p..-'r>m>,:a-^. -f•-!^^^ /r.A%^rr:,-r-nmrT^-rAT \. — "I SO Section kj "McctiHg of the

December file) (COirFIDEI'JTI/i); see al Principals, 12 December 196!-!-."

18?4-. Bui:iay me^oraxidum to Secretary Kiisk, et.sJ. *, "Cooper Materials on North Vietnamese Infiltration," 9 December 19^^ (in Vietnem 38I: December file) (SECRET).

185. Rusk to Taylor, 9 Deceraber 1961^- (State I23O); Taylor to SecState,

10 December 1964 (Saison I775, I776) (all in Section \, "Meeting of the Principals, 12 Deceraber 196!{-") (TOP SECRET).

180. JCS 2339/164, 12 December 1964 (TOP SSCRSi).

187. Taylor to SecState, l4 December 1964 (Saigon I808) (TOP SECRET)] Sullirrai to UilliGTH Bundy, 16 D3ce:;ibsr 19^4 (Vienti?jie 904) (COITFIDEJITIAL) (Both in Section 3, "Meeting of the Princip-als, 19 ■ December 1964").

l83. JCS 2339/166, 19 Deceaiber 1964 (TOP SECRET).

189. State message to Saigon Snbarsy, 19 Deoorber 19^^ (State I312) (in Vietnam, Deceniber 1Q64, CF-20) (TOP SECRET).

190. RiiPk messages to /.mbassador Taylor, 24 December 1964 (State I347 in CP-20) (state I349—in "Meeting of the Principals, 5 January I965") (TOP SECRET).

191. At the Rriucip.als meeting, 12 Deceraber 1964, JCS 2339/l64.

192. Ibid .

193' "f^e''^ Zealand Note," attachricnt to Bundy memorandum to Secretary Rusk, £ii'i^»j ^5 December loSlj. (1-37154/64) (in "Policy-Vletnaia, 15-.31Dec64, PvLC6Ir)38-.9^ USAF Directorate of Plans Repo3ito::y) (TOP SECRET).

91 TOP SECRET - Sensit ive

<r\, II

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

TOP SECKE.T " Sensitive

19^. Joint Staff Director's nemorandijan to the ChiefSj CINCPAC and

COMUSMACVj "Establishnent of Interjiational Force in South Vietnam, (S)," 10 December 196^1- (DJSM-1938-6i^) (TOP SECKST) »

195- JCS 2339/166, 19 r>3ces:"ber 196^ (TOP SECRET).

196. Service memoranda to the Joint Staff, "Establishment of International Force in South Vietnem, (s)," 6, 7, 9 and 1& January 196i|- (jCS

■ 23f|-3/505-l,2,3, end h) (TOP SECfST)o

197. Enclosure to ISA memorandum to Depaty SecDef, "third Country Assistsnce to Vietnam," 29 Beceiaber IQS^!- (in Vietnam 38I: Becem-oer file) (SECRET).

198 • See Joseph Fried^ Nov York Daily Nevs j 7 December 196^-; see also lle'j _York Times and Waohins-bon Post, 7 Decanbsr 196^.

199. Taylor message to SecState, 9 December 196-'4- (Saigon I763) (in

"Meeting of the Principals, 19 Eecei-iber 196H") (TOP SECRET); sec also

John Maffre, in story filed from Saigon, Washington Post, 9 D?!ceinber ^^g^^ ^ .

200. Ibid.; Taylor messages to SecState, 9 Eeceraber 196^1- (Saigon I76O, in

'Meeting of the Roincipals, 19 D^ceaiber 196^1-") (Sai^on 1762-in Vietn?aa 381: December file) (COKFIDETITHL).

201. Full text in Hevr York Tjmes , 12 Dscember 196'f.

202. Taylor message to Secretary Rusli, 20 Xteccrriber lS)6k (Saigon I877) (in CF--20) (SECRFT); see also Peter Grose, IJew York Tinics. 22 December 196^. ■ ■ -—"

203* I'bi^.; Taylor messages to Secretary Rusk, 21 December 196^ (Saigon 1881) Kid 22 December (Saigon 189O, l895; I897, I9OO); Rusk messages to Ambassador Taylor, 21 December 1964 (State I318, I320) (In CF~20) (TOP SECRET).

20^. Rusk message to jijabassador Taylor, 2k December 196k (State 13'47) (in CF-20) (top SECIST); see also Peter Grose, Kev York Times , 23 and 24 December 1964, ...

205. Rusk to Taylor (State 13^7) (TO? SECRET).

2C6. See Taylor message to SecState, 25 December I96I;- (Saigon I939) (in CF-20) (TOP SECRET).

207. See- Peter Grose coliimns filed from Saigon in Hew Yorl: Times , 23 end 27 December 1964. ~

208» See Ta^^lor messages to SecState, 28 December 1964 (Saigon I969, I976) and 29 December I964 (Saigon I98I) (oil in CF-20) (SECRET).

209. Charles Mohr, Neif York Times, 30 .December I964; Seymour Topping, New York Times j 10 January I965.

92 I'O? BECFET - Sensitive

^■J " -Aan'K^ mm mm^ ^^. >■

I

' I

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

TOP SECRKT ^ Sengitive

■

210. Jocli Lavgguthj in story filed from Saigon^ riey York Times , 6 January 1965.

211. Seyiaoiir Topping, Nev York Time., 11 January 1965.

212. See T.e\j York Tling s. I8, 21, 22, 2^!-, 25, 26, end 2? Jenuary 19^5; also tha Baltimore Sun , I8 and 25 January 1965.

213. Reported "by Peter Grose, Nev York Ttoes , 25 December 196k,

21^. Rusk to Taylor (State 13^1-7); State-Defense message to Saigon Esfoassy, ^ 25 December 196k (state I355) (in CF-20) (TOP SECRET).

215* CINCPAC message to JC3, 2622513Dec£r;iberl96^ (in Vietnan 38I: December file) (top secret).

216. Taylor message to Secretary Rusk, 28 December 196k (Saigon 1975) (in CF-20) (TOP SECRET),

217. CJCS memorand^aa to SecDef, "ReccnEnended Reprisal Actions in Retaliation to Break BOQ Incident (ts), 28 December 196^ (JCSM-1076-6I^) (TOP SECRET)

218. Rusk message to Saigon Embassy, 29 December 196^1- (State I365) (in CP-20)

(top secret) .

2

19 • For example see editorials in Providonce Jout-nal, 2^^ December 196^; Ilev York Journa l fcaricon, 28 IViGeniber~W6¥;' and Life , 8 January I965.

220.- See Il2]U2iL.SiB££j 27 December 196t!- end 3 Janiiary. I9S5.

221. See The Eo 'ltlmore Sim, llf^-j York Times, and Washington Post, k January 1965": -^ —

222o See Kgv Yorl: Times , 7 and 12 Jexiu^xy 19^5• ■

223. See The Ealtim.ore Sun , New Yorlc Times and Wall Stre et Jotirnal^ ik Januexy 1965; in parbicular7"seo Artlr.ir Icninen^ UPI teletype nsvrs reles^se from Saigon^ ik Jemiory I965.

22^. See Neir Yorl: Times . 16 and 20 JoXiXuiry 19^5; Ifeshington Post ^ I8 ■ Jaimary 19o57^

225 o Taylor mesnage to SecStatC;, 3I December ,196'-v (Saigon 2010) (in "Saigon Crisis, January 19o5/' CF-.21) (TO? S^^CPJ^^T).

«

22o. BXindy memorandtia to Secretar:/- Paisk^ "Notes on the South Vietnamese . Situation and Alternatives/''6 January 19-55 (in State Deparbnient Materials^ Vol. V) (TOP SECI12T)c . ■ .

Ihld. (top SECRET) . 228. Ibid . '(TOP SECRET).

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date; 2011

TOP SECRET -^ Sens it ive

229- Ibid , (top SECRET).

230. Depa^.'tnent of State Msmorandtn of conversation^ "South East Asia" (Conversation;:^ "bet-i^een U.S. and Soviet officials, Part V of VIl), 30 Docera'be- is6h (in Vietnam 38I: Deceir^oer file) (SECRET).

231 • See lie-.' York Tfe.es^ 5, lU and 23 January 19^5; Washin.'^on Fost^

18 January 19^0

232 o See Tad Saulc, Hev York TL^es , h Jamiary I963,

233= McNausi'-hcin drcft evrmnaxy, "ClDservations re Sovith Vietnam," h Jantiary 1965 (in "Drafts 1965/' McNoA-^^hton II) (TOP SECRET)»

235. Mclfeughton draft snumary with McNrj-nara cosiients penciled in, "Observations re South T^etn^m after Klianh's 'Re-Coupj" 2? Jsoiuaiy 1965 (in "Drafts I965/' MGlIaughton II) (TOP SECRET).

236. Rush mecsftge to Saigon Enfcasjsy, 11 Januaary 19^5 (Stats IU36) (in CF-21) (SECRET).

237. R-^sk tiessage to Sai0;on Enfoassv, l^^ Januaiy I965 (State II17I) (in CF-21) (TOP SECRET). .

238. Rusk nessage to Saigon Embassy, 25 Jajiuaiy 19^5 (Copy trEjiscribed by OSD in Victnsa 38I: January file) (TOP SECRET),

239' See CJC3 ine-morejn.dum to SecBcf, "Evacuation of U.S. Dependents frcci Soixth Vietnam/' 1^ Joaiuary 19o5 (CM-358-65) (SECRET) and Rc<;hs memorandum to the Joint Secretariat (Subject as above), 19 January 1955 (SECPJDT) (Both in Vietnarii 38I: Januaiy file).

9^ TOP SECHBT - Sensitive

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