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their recointnendations tended tox-rard immediate and forceful military measures. The State-ISA planning group^ on the other hand, viewed it as a contingency plarjilng exercise and its scenarios and recomraendations stressed a more deliberate, cautious approach, carefully tailoring proposed U.S. actions in SEA to the unique political context of each country. Ambassador Lodge, in turn, developed yet a third "carrot and stick" approach, stressing a diplomatic effort at persuasion, i>e ., combining a threat of punitive strikes with an offer of som-e economic assistance to the DRV. Ihese divergences in approach and concept persisted, though varying in degree and em-phasis, throughout the planning period.

By June, with increasing recognition that only relatively heavy levels of attack on the DRV would be likely to have any significant compelling effect, with a greater awareness of the many imponderables raised by the planning effort, and with the emergence of a somewhat more hopeful situation in STO and Laos, most of the President's advisers favored "holding off on any attempts to pressure North Vietnam through overt military operations. Only the JCS, Aiabassador Lodge, and Walt Rostow continued to advocate increased military measures, and even Rostow qualified his recommendations with the claim that a firm public stance, and supporting actions giving the impression of increased military operations, would be the best assurance of avoiding having to employ them. Moreover, most of the advisers recognized the necessity of building firmer public and congressional support for greater U.S. involvement in SEA before any wider military actions should be undertaken.

Accordingly, with the political conventions just around the corner and the election issues regarding Vietnam clearly dratm, the President decided against actions that vrould deepen the U.S. involvement by broadening the conflict in Laos, Cambodia or North Vietnam. In his view, there were still a number of relatively mild military and intensified political actions in the South open to him that v?ould serve the national _ interest better than escalation of the conflict.

(

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MILITARY FRESSURES AGAIJ^TST ITORTH VIETIMAM ACTION AM) DEBATE, FEB - JUI\[ 196h

TASIE OF CONTENTS AM) OtjTLINE

SUI^vIARY,

CHRONOLOGY,

C. Concept axid Rationale: Convince DRV to Desist by Raising the Cost •.

l\^

Page

1

Vlll

I. PIITIATION OF COVERT OPERATIONS 1

A. Covert Action Program: Scope and Character 1

B. Origins and Development: Presidential*Support

and Approval ^ o 2

2

D. Implications: Greater Pressure on Hanoi o... h

" , II. PL/^JD^'IING FOR LARGER PRESSURES '. 5

A. Conceptual Origins and Motivations 5

1. Limited potential of covert program

2. Concern over deterioration in Laos and SVN So Broader concern for disproving "wars of

liberation" strategy

B. Interagency Study, February-March l^Gk 6

1. Three alternative approaches to pressuring DRV ! 2. JCS inputs

3. Summary of study provided McNamara on March trip to SVI^

C. Study Group Analysis of Proposed Actions • o .7

1. Concept: To exploit DRV concern over loss of industry

2. Multiple objectives >dth coercion primary

3. Necessary public emphasis on DRV violations of SVI'J

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if. Air strikes (in contrast with other actions) imply "commitment to go all the way"

5. Overt pressirres: enhancing U.S. determination without influencing the DRV

D. McNamara Against Overt Pressures

Pa^e

1. Against immediate overt actions

2. Hot pursuit and. "border control operations into Laos (Recommendation #ll) '

3. "Preparations" for retaliatory actions and graduated, overt military pressures on 30 day notice (Recommendation #12)

III, DIFFEREITT POLICY PERCEPTIONS IN PMMING H

A. Two B3.sic Approaches: JCS and State-ISA ^JL

1. JCS approval of COTCPAC OPIAN 37-64

2. State/ISA development of political scenarios to accomm.ods.te graduated military pressures only

B. Different Approaches.: Perceptions of the

Strategic Problem in Southeast Asia H

1. Laos recce controversy: JCS for lov/-

level recce and ground probes from SW --State/lSA- against • 2. JCS: SVN as key to SEA security; sensitivity of Laos minimized.

3. State-ISA: SEA problems dependent on long-term political solxitions

k. Short-term/long-term policy dilemma 5. President Johnson: long-term approach

with political concessions to Laos as

groundwork for Lao-Viet agreement on

cross-bord.er operations

C. Planning Overt Actions on Contingency Basis

(April-May) 1^

1. ISii scenario: three seQuential phases:

a. Current political-military actions

b. Overt GVN-US.^.f/fARIvI}ATE operations plus political activities surfacing in Saigon

c. Overt joint GVN and U.S. actions

r

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2. E\rolution of scenario and JCS influence

3. Saigon and mCY discussion of scenario

a. Lodge: intermediary to convey "carrot and stick" approach to pressure DRV

"b. Agreement from Canada to act as intermedi-ary^ "but no "carrot and, stick"

D. Conflict of Short and Long Term Views:

Caution Prevails

1. Rostov/- and Lodge: prompt measures to exert pressures

2. JCS: inclusion of more-immediate border control and retaliatory operations in plan-

ning scenario

3. The deliberate^ cautious approach

a, McNamara to Khanli: no drastic measures; improve counterinsurgency in SVIT

IV. DEALING VJITH THE LA.OTIAII CRISIS

A. Laos in Da^nger: "Pressure Planning"

1. JCS and prompt measures to prepare for recommended actions

2. Lodge: need action against Wm to achieve improved. GVI^l effort

3. Scenario development resumed: overt opera-against WIE as principal focus

B. A Hev; Scenario: 30 Days of Seq.uential Politico Military Action

1. Initial air strikes leading to U.S. participation and parallel efforts to enter negotia.-tions

2. Effects of scenario: communists to intensify insurgency

C. Rejection of Scenario: "Use Eorce if Necessary ..

1. Intelligence assessments: limited GVN-USAF/ mWGATE^ might induce insurgency temporarily but stronger actions might produce intensified insurgency

^* ^^^ vill as crucial target b. Intensified actions by U.S. seen as causing Hanoi to doubt limited U.S. aims

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20

20

22

25

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Page

2, ExCom Recommendations: Presidential "decision to use force" if necessary and if recommended deployments and. signals 5 plus operations undervray fail to achieve objectives

a. Abandon time-phase scenario leading to overt military action as goal

b. Retain in scenario as future actions: Canadian mission, Honolulu conference, UN diplomacy. Congressional Resolution, force deployments, and initial strike coupled with diplomatic initiative

3. Approval of Honolulu Conference and Canadian Mission

V. THE QUESTION OF PRESSlIPvES AGAINST THE NORTH 28

A. The Honolulu Conference: Defining the U.S.

Commitment 28

1. ■ Basic assumption: Security of SEP^ is vital

to U.S.

2. Administration view: Situation in SVN must be stiffened,

B. At Honolulu: Exerting Pressure on IWI 28

1. JCS for actions to destroy DRV support of insurgency

2. Lodge and Khanh: attacks against WN forces to improve situation in SW

3. Serious discussions of contingency "pressvires" to meet a vrorsenin^, laotian situation

a. Bilateral consultations with SEATO allies to start with Thailand

b. Congressional Resolution considered necessary

c. Harsh communist reactions expected from . large "deterrent" deployments

d. Need to delay wider military actions: public opinion, military necessity, and GVDT weakness

C. The Need to Refine Plans and Resolve Issues 3^

■

T^ 1. Military planning inadequate on:

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, 1. Augmentation of Army contingency stocks

H in Thailand

2. Public affirmations of U.S. intention to

defend. SKA. allies 3- Public information program k. Congressional Resolution 5. Assessment of different views on U.S. commitment

a. Rostov's views

b. CIA assessment of "domino theory"

VI. FOOTNOTES

Page

a. Forces for Laos contingency

b. Trade-offs between force build-up " and. limited objectives; and.

c. Targeting objectives for NW

2. Greater effort required: public information and. political intelligence

D. The Aftermath of Honolulu 35

E. Sources of Moderate Advice 3^

1. CIA: U.S. retains leverage in SEA even with loss of Laos and SW to ITVIT

2. SecDef and CJCS: limited objectives and more cautious pace than JCS

F. The Presid.ent Decides 38

1. Congressional resolution seen as incurring a greater commitment

2. Vfliite House against further vrork on overt pressures

3. White House: other actions with no increa^sed commitment initially will serve U.S. interests

kl

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o

o

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o

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CHRONOLOGY

I

DATE

11 May 63

9 Sep 63

1 Nov 63

20 Wov 63

23 Nov 63

26 Nov 63

11 Dec 63

EVENT OR DOCmiENT

NSAM 52

CINCPAC OPLM 3U-63

Diem overthro-^m

Vietnam Policy Conference 5 Honolulu

President Kennedy-Assassinated

NSM 273

State Department Views on Operations in Laos

DE SCRIPTION

Authorised CIA-sponsored covert operations against IWN.

JCS approved this program for non-attributable "hit and run" GVN covert operations against NVNj supported by U.S. military advisory materiel and training assistance.

Military junta led by General Minh assimied control.

During high-level USG discussions of the probable consequences, political and military, of Diem's dovmfall, conferees agreed military operations against the Viet Cong had not been and would not be particularly upset by the changed political situation. Development of a combined MACV-CAS program for covert operations against WN was directed.

Authorized planning for specific covert operations, graduated in intensity, against the DRV.

State (and ISA) opposed overt ^ military operations in Laos. Extension of CIA-sponsored covert activity in Laos was okayed; this neither threatened Souvanna's sovereignty nor openly violated the Geneva Accords which State tenried basic to eventual political stability in the region.

1

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DATE

19 Dec 63

EVENT OR

DOCUMENT

OPIAN 3^A Submitted by CINCPAC

I I

I

DESCRIPTION

The MACV-CAS plan providing a "spectrum of capabilities for the RVNAF to execute against North Vietnam" vjas forwarded to the JCS with CINCPAC's comment that only air attacks and a few other "pLinitive or attritional" operations were likely to achieve the stated objective of convincing Hanoi to cease supporting insurgents in SVN and Laos.

30 Dec 63

Memo for the Director^ CIA

2 Jan 6k

Krulak Committee Report

b

Assessing "Probable Reactions to Various Courses of Action with Respect to North Vietnam" the Board of National Estimates studied 13 proposed covert operations. The BNE did not think any would convince NVN to change its policies. Hanoi's reaction to them was forecast as mild.

"Least risk" activities drawn from the 2062 in OPLAN 3^A formed the basis of a 12-month3 three-phase program of covert operations. MACV would exercise operational control, CAS and CINCPAC would train and eq.uip the GVN or third-nation personne]. involved. Phase One (February-May) included intelligence collection (through U-2 and special intelligence missions), psychological operations and some 20 "destructive" undertakings. Similar operations would be increased in number and intensity during Biases Tv;o and Three, destructive acts would be extended to targets "identified with North Vietnam's economic and industrial!, well-being." Committee members reasoned 'that Hanoi attached great

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DATE

EVEiW OR DOCUI'IENT

22 Jan 6k

JCSM k6'6k

f

30 Jan 6^

Early Feb 6k

Coup in Saigon

Situation in Laos and South Vietnam

1 Feb 6k

20 Feb 6k

OPIAN 3^A

Lodge Msg. to McGeorge Bundy

20 Feb 6^

NSC Meeting

DESCRIPTION

importance to economic development^ that progressive damage to the economy - or its threatened destruction - would convince Hanoi to cancel support of insurgency. But the committee cautioned, even successftil execution of the program might not induce Hanoi to "cease and desist."

Criticizing "self-imposed restrictions" on operations in Laos, arguing that Laotian security depended on that of South Vietnam, the JCS requested authority to initiate reconnaissance operations over and into Laos, Without them the task in Vietnam, wa.s made "more complex, time consuming... more costly."

Minh's junta was ousted by one headed by General KhanJi.

NVA troop influx into Laos rose significantly and a similar rise was feared in SVNj Viet Cong-terrorism continued to increase.

*

Phase One of the covert activities program began.

Ambassador Lodge urged adoption of a "carrot and stick" approach to North Vietnam (first presented to Governor Harriman on 30 October 1963). Lodge envisaged secret contact with Hanoi to demand NVN . cea.se supporting the Viet Cong. In exchange the U.S. would offer economic aid (especially food imports). If Hanoi refused the offer, previously threatened punitive strikes would be initiated. The U.S. would not publicly admit to the attacks.

President-. Johnson ordered more rapid contingency planning for

X

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DATS

EVENT OR

DOCUMENT

p

25 Feb 6k

Draft

Presidential

Memorandum

26 Feb 6k

JCSM 159-6U

29. Feb 6^

Director, DIA Memorandum for the Secretary

DESCRIRTION

pressures - covert and overt -against North Vietnam and ordered pressures shaped to produce the maximum credible deterrent effect on Hanoi.

This decision reflects the convergence of (1) fear that the Laos situation could get worse; (2) knowledge that this would affect U.So operations and policies in Vietnam; (3) recognition that more U.S. military assistance to the GVN vas required to execute OPLAN S^A; (k) and the increasing articulation by policy maimers (JCS, SecState) of a direct relationship between the cha^llenge of halting NVN assistance to insurgents and broader U.S. strategic interests. Together5 these factors increased the attractiveness of proposals for punitive, overt actions against NVN.

*

State recQmm.ended 12 F-100*s be deployed to Thailand to deter further NVTT activity in Laos and to signal U.S. determination. •

"Steps to Improve the Situation in Southeast Asia with Particular Reference to Laos" asked authority to initiate low-level reconnaissance flights over Laos for intelligence collection and to visibly , display U.S. pov/er. The JCS argued the "root of the probleiji is in North Vietnam and must be dealt with there," but if operations against IWIJ had to be ruled out, operations in Laos must not bCo They urged that Laos and South Vietnam be treated as an integrated theatre.

'^,

Reporting on "North Vietnamese Support to the Viet Cong and Pathet Lao/' DIA said certain

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DATE

EVENT OR

DOCUI-'IEr'IT

1 Mar 6k

InterJJTi Report: "Alternatives for the Imposition of Measured Pressure against NTO"

li

c

^

1 Mar 6h

Embassy Vientiane Message 9^7 foi" SecState

DESCRIPTIOI^'

"intelligence gaps" related to kinds and amounts of arms^ supplies and men infiltrating SWJ through Laos. The JCS favored closing such gaps by overt military operations; State opposed.

An Interagency Study Group under State's Vietnam Committee listed these as U.S. objectives: make Hanoi cease support of the Viet Cong; strengthen GVN and Asian morale and reduce VC morale; prove to the_ world U.S. determination to oppose Communist expansion.

Military means to attain those ob-_ Jectives were explored -- ranging from the air defense of Saigon and US/gV¥ cross-border operations to the massive deployment of U.S. ground troops and air strikes against North Vietnam. The group believed unilateral U.S. actions •would not compel Hanoi to call off; the Viet Cong (and doubted Hanoi could do that anyvvay); operations against NVII vere termed no substitute for successful counterinsur-gency in SVII.

However, expanded activity could demonstrate U.S. pover, determination and restraint to the world^ reduce somewhat ITOT support to the Viet Cong, cause "some reduction" Viet Cong morale, and possibly improve the U.S. negotiating position. "New U.S. bolstering actions" in South Vietnam and considerable improvement of the sitiration there were required to reduce VC activity and make victory on the ground possible, according to the report.

Reasoned .that if current USG policy towexd Laos is changed (e.g., if the Geneva Accords

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P

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DATE

EVENT OR DOCUlffiNT

2 Mar 6k

JCSM 168-6U

2 Mar 6k

JCSM 174-6^

f

I

15 Mar 6^

Lodge Msg, for the President (State 1757)

l6 Mar 6k

SecDef Memo for the President

DESCRIPTION

were openly violated)5 large

numbers of U.S. troops v/ill

eventually be required to enforce political stability.

Requesting "Removal of Restrictions for Air and Ground Cross Border Operationsj" the Joint Chiefs said direct action had to be taken to convince NVN the U.S. was determined to eliminate the insurgents' Laotian sanctuary. "...The time has com.e to lift the restrictions which limit the effectiveness of our military operations."

The Chiefs recommended direct strikes against North Vietnam. In line with their view (JCSM 159-6^) that the "root of the problem was North Vietnam, the JCS justified the need for overt action against NVN on two grounds: firsts, to support the short-term policy objective of stopping ' Hanoi's aid to the insurgents; second, to support the long-range objective of forcing a change in DRV policy by convincing Hanoi the U.S. was determined to oppose aggression in Southeast Asia.

Reitera-ting his preference for the "carrot and stick" approach to Planoi, Lodge opposed initiation of overt actions against North Vietnam,.

Reporting on his recent trip to Honoliilu and Saigon, McNamara recomm.ended against overt actions (U.S. or GVN) against NVN "at this time" because of the problems of justification, communist escalation and pressures for prema.ture negotiations. McNamara felt the practics.l range of overt actions did not allow assured achievement

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DATE

EVmT OR DOCUI-iENT

17 Mar 64

asm 288

17 Mar 6k

President's Message to Lodge (state ik^k)

DESCRIPTION

of practical U.S. objectives. (Like the Interagency Group, the Secretary distinguished between the stated aim of eliminating Planoi's control of the Viet Cong and the practical objective of building the morale of the Khanh regime while eroding VC morale.)

The Secretary did favor military action against WN in Laos. He recoimnended initiation by GTO forces of "hot pursuit" and small-scale operations across the Laotian border^ plus continuation of U.S. high-level reconnaissance flights over Laos. He recommended the U.S. prepare planning for 72-hour readiness to initiate Laos and Cambodian border control actions and prepare plans for "retaliatory actions" (overt high and/or lovr level reconnaissance flights, "tit-for-tat" bombing strikes, commando raids) against KW. He also recomi^iended ■ planning for 30 days' readiness to initiate the "program of Graduated Overt Military Pressure" against North Vietnam. '^

Approved Mr. McHamara's report and his twelve recormendations to improve the military situation. Planning was to "proceed energetically."

On North Vietnam, the President indicated agreement with Lodge's "carrot and stick" approach and said he had reserved judgment on overt U.S. measures against NTO.

On Laos, the President said he was reluctant to inaugurate overt activities xinless or until he had Souvanna's support and a stronger case had been made for the necessity of overt operations. Otherwise the

I

•^ Here McNaraara probably referred to the various plans for graduated pressure against NVN then being discussed; no actual "program" had yet been finalized or approved.

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DATE

EVENT OR DOCWIEKT

DESCRIPTION

TT

17 Mar 64

Lod^e Message to

-CD

o

SecState (State 1767)

18 Mar 6k

JCS Message 5390 to CINCPAC

n

20 Mar 6k

President's Message to Lodge (state 148^+)

31 Mar 6k

State/lSA Draft Scenarios

President felt such action might have only limited military effect and could trigger wider Communist action in Laos."

Reported GW-RLG agreement on political and military issues. Diplomatic relations had been reestablished. Laos granted free passage into southern Laos to GVTT forces^ the right to bomb infiltration areas with unmarked T-28s and to conduct hot pursuit, comraando raids ■ and sabotage operations "without limit" into Laotian territory to combined RLG-GVN units. A combined Laotian-Vietnamese staff was to be created.

The JCS directed CINCPAC to begin . "Planning Actions, Vietnam" in line with Recommendations 11 and 12 of USA}-! 288. The program was to"permit sequential iraplementation" of three actions (border controls, retaliatory cross-border operations with 72-hour responsiveness, graduated overt military press-ores against JN¥^ with 30-days responsiveness) .

Confirmed that actions with North Vietnam as the target m.entioned in NSAI-i 288 were regarded strictly as contingency planning and that interagency study was so oriented.

State/lSA planners presented three papers. The first was a scenario for current actions (political steps to increase Congressional and international understanding of U.S. aim-S plus continued military action by GVR with U.S. advisory assistance). The second scenario called for overt GVN/covert U.S. action against ITVN (characterized by the GVN-USAP FARI-IGATE operation); it emphasized political initiatives

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DATE

EVENT OR DOCUI-'ISITT

13 Apr 6k

J-5 Meiaorandum for the ASD(ISA)

8 and 17 Apr 6k

Scenario Drafts

18 " 20 Apr 6k

Saigon Conference

DESCRIFTION , .

vhich would stirface in Saigon and thus retain credibility for GW sovereignty. The third scenario -- associated with overt U.S.' response to DRV-CHICOM escalation — also included diplomatic and political preparations for overt U.S. activity.

Commenting on the 31 March scenario^ the Joint Staff outlined a continually intensifying program of military pressures -- and gradually increasing U.S. military involvement. "J-5 urged the 31 March scenario be fused with OPLAN 37-6U and border control operations be moved into the scenario for the current time period. Approximate time-phasing of the draft's then separate scenarios vras recommended.

Reflecting the JCS influence toward development of a continuous • scenario, current political activities were treated in a separate section, "Steps Which Shoiad be Taken Now." The other political-military scenarios inclvided increased FARMGATE operations, separate Laotian and Cambodian border control actions, separate GVN retaliatory actions against NVI^, and graduated overt U.S. military pressures against IWII. The detailed scenario for GW/FARl-iOATE operations was given D-Day minus X time-phasing; apparently it was the basis for discussions held in Saigon on 19-20 April.

Scenarios and other issues were discussed by Lodge, Vlilliem Brandy, Rusk, Wheeler, and others. Lodge objected to planning for - or adopting -massive publicity and massive de- ■ struction actions before trying a well-reasoned, well-planned diplomatic effort to convince Hanoi to "call off the VC." His "carrot/stick"

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K^

DATE

EVEOT OR DOCUl.'ISNT

23 Apr 6U

SecDef Memorandum to CJCS

DESCRIPTION

approach vras expanded: Lodge suggested a third country-interlocu-teur be selected to tell Hanoi of U.S. resolve, that the threat of air strikes be combined vith an economic assistance offer and that as part of the "carrot" the U.S. offer to withdraw some personnel from South Vietnam.

Rusk wanted the extent of IWIl infiltration and support to be satisfactorily proved to U.S. citizens^ allies and neutrals; he wanted Asian military support for the U.S. Rusk did not think China v/ould intervene militarily without Soviet support and thought we could pressiore the Chinese economically thrcough our allies. He doubted elimination of DRV industrial targets vrould have much adverse Impact on any WTR decision to stop aiding the insur-gency.

Results: Canada would be asked to act as interlocuteur. Also, Secretary RtivSl^ recoitimended the U.S. seek "more flags" to support the GVl"}, deploy a carrier task force to Cam Ranh Bay to establish a peimanent U.S. Naval presence, initiate anti-junk operations to "inch northv/ard" along the coast and enlist SEATO support in isolating the DRV from economic or cultural relations with the Free World.

This forwarded the 20 April scenario ■which contained three stages: un-coxomitting steps to be taken now; graduated overt pressures on the DRV (FARIvIGATE) ; and a contingency plan for overt U.Sc response to DRV/CHICOM escalation. The first stage could stand alone, but stage two could not be launched unless the U.S."was prepared to take the third step — perhaps within 10 days of the previous "D-Day."

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k

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DATE

23 Apr 6k

\

30 Apr 6^^

k May 6k

7 May 6k

EVEIJT OR DOCUI^IEIMT

Rosto-w MenoranduQi for SecState

Rusk visit to Ottawa

Lodge to SecState (State 2108)

Talking Paper for the Secretary

12-13 May 6k

l6 May 6k

McNamara/Sullivan trip to Vietnam

JCSM U22-61^

I

DESCRIPTION

Reasoning that deterioration in Laos

*

and SVN would make it very difficult to win Hanoi's adherence to the Geneva Accords and predicting deterioration was iiinninentj Rostow implied necessary (U.S.) actions should be taken soon.

Set up the Seaborn Mission (inter-locuteur) to Hanoi for mid-June.

This reflects the deliberate, cautious approach then dorainant. In talking with General Khanh (who suggested putting SW fully on a war footing and wanted to tell ]WN that further interference in GTO affairs would bring reprisals). Lodge urged Khanh to keep cool and asked that McNaraara similarly emphasize, the need to avoid such drastic measures during his 12 May meeting with Khanh.

In addition to the Lodge suggestions, McNamara was to tell Khanh the U.S, did "not intend to provide military support nor undertake the military objective of 'rolling back' comniunist control in FTO."

Khanh and McNamara met and apparently discussed the issues mentioned above.

JCS criticized the final draft scenario for omitting the imraediate actions mentioned in NSAM 288 (border control and retaliatory operations); advocated incorporating retaliatoiy and overt military pressures against FVN in the second stage, as well as battalion-size border control ope"^a-tions in Laos to include striking brides and armed route reconnaissance. These were justified in JCS eyes because military operations against the DRV to help stabilize either the Laos or SVN situation involved

xv±xx

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DATE

EVENT OR DOCUf^GSTT

K

DESCRIPTION

17 May 6h

Pathet Lao Offensive

19 May 6k

JCSM k26'6k

21 May 6k

At the UN...

21 May 6k

Baltimore Sun Report

21 May 6^

Rusk Message to Lodge (state 2027)

23 May 6k

JCSM kk3"6k

\i

attaclcing the same target systems and to a large extent 5' the same targets. JCS felt attacks would assist "...in the achievement of the objective" and offer "...the possibility of a favorable long-term solution to the insurgency problem in Southeast Asia."

The Pathet Lao seized a significant portion of the Plaine des Jarres in Laos — a major setback for RLG forces.

Clearly indicating the crisis management aspects of the scene created by Pathet Lao gains, the JCS now called for new, more intensive covert operations during the second phase of OPLAN 3^A.

Adlai Stevenson's major speech explaining U.S.. policy toward Southeast Asia was the first such UcS. move at the UN.

With Souvanna's permission, the U.S. began low-level reconnaissance operations over enemy-occupied areas in Laos.

Rusk said Washington saw the fragility of the SW situation as an obstacle to further U.S. military involvement in Southeast Asia. He asked Lodge to suggest ways to achieve greater solidarity in SVN saying, "we need to assure the President that everything hvmianly possible is being done both in Washington and the Goverimient of Vietnam to'provide a solid base of determination from which far-reaching decisions could proceed.^'

The JCS renewed their plea for prompt "Readiness to Implement NSAM 288." Larger border control and retaliatory operations were

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DATE

WEFiT OR

DOCUT^IENT

23 May 6^

Draft Presidential

MemorandurrL

o

25 May 6k

SNIE 50-2-6^

DESCRIPTION

called for; prompt consultations with the GVIM and immediate joint operations vere said to "be needed.

The crisis in Laos had focused interest on but one stage of earlier scenarios; overt operations against IWlu The scenario for steps to be taken now had been dropped (as Rusk explained to Lodge on 22 May - State SO^i-Q -because initial attacks without acknowledgement were not feasible; publicity seemed inevitable). The scenario called for 30 days of graduated military/political pressures (including initiatives to enter negotiations with Hanoi). A Congressional Resolution supporting U.S. resistance to DRV aggression was called for; air strikes would continue -- despite negotiations -- until it was clear that WN had ceased subversion. Negotiating objectives vrere: terrorism^ armed attack and armed resistance would stop; "communications on networks out of the North would be conducted entirely in \mcoded form."

An estimate of the likely consequences of actions proposed in the 23 May DPM (discussed by the Executive Committee, or ExCom, on Zk^ 25 and 26 May). NVN might order guerrillas to reduce "the level of insurrections for the moment" in response to U.S. force deployments or FARl'IGATE attacks; with Peking and Moscow, Hanoi might count on international actions to end the attacks and stabilize communist gains. If attacks continued, Hanoi might intensify political initiatives and possibly increase the tempo of insurgency. If these failed to bring a settlement and if attacks damaged

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DESCRIFTION

25 May 6h

McGeorge E'Lindy Memorandum to Rusk5 et.al.

Wm considerably, the SNIE estifnated liWJ would lover negotiating demands to -oreserve its regime -- and plan to renew insurgency later. The SNIE saw "significant danger" that Hanoi wo\ild fight because (l) Wm did not think the U.S. would commit ground forces and (2) even if U.S. troops were sent, KVIJ believed they could be defeated ^ la 195^. Affecting the will of IWIST leaders was emphasized. None of the actions forecast in the DR4 would affect enemy capabilities because the major sources of "communist strength in SVN are indigenous." The SNIE said the DRV must (be made to) understand that the U.S. — not seeking to destroy N7TT — is willing to "bring ascending pressure to bear to persuade Hanoi to reduce the insurrections ." The report added "... retaliatory measures which Hanoi might take in Laos and South Vietnam might make it increasingly difficult for the U.S. to regard its objectives as attainable by limited means. Thus difficulties of comprehension might increase on both sides as the scale of action mounted."

• The ExCom abandoned the scenario

approach — perhaps because entering into escalating conflict might obscure the limited U.S. objectives. The ExCom .recommended the President decide that the U.S. will use graduated military force against WE after appropriate diplomatic and political warning and preparation; evident U.S. determination to act -- ^^ombined with other efforts --"should produce a sufficient improvement of non-communist prospects in South Vietnam and in Laos to make military action against North Vietnam unnecessary."

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DESCRIPTION

26 May 6k

Lodge Message to Rusk (State 2318)

27 May Sk

Polish Initiative

29 May 6k

State Message to Rusk (TOSEC 36)

OR: The ExCom explicitly assumed that a decision to use force if necessary -- backed by resolute deployment and conveyed every way possible "...gives the best present chance of avoiding the actual use of such force." Other actions recoininended were: ccimnunicate U.S. resolve through the Canadian inter-locuteur; call a high-level Southeast Asian strategy conference; begin diplomatic efforts at the IM to present the case for DRV aggression; consult with SEATO allies and obtain allied force commitments; seek a Congressional Resolution in support of U.S. resistance to EYN in SEA; deploy forces periodically to the region; consider an initial strike against IJTO "designed to have more deterrent than destructive Impact" and accomapny it by an active diplomatic offensive to restore stability -- including an agreement to a Geneva Conference.

Lodge said only fixTn action against l^orth Vietnam by the U.S. and GW could lead to a significant improvement in the GW effort, (A "new wrinkle" in Lodge's view.)

Poland proposed a Laos conference format which avoided many undesirable aspects of those formerly supported by communist governments.

The ExCom; preferring to initially treat Laos independently of Vietnam^ recommended the President accept the Polish proposal. The U.S. would not be willing to \rrite off Laos to the communists and would assure Souvanna: "We would be prepared to give him prompt and direct military support if the Polish Conference..." failed.

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DATE

30 May 6k

EVENT OR D0CUT4ENT

JCSM if60-6U

2 Jun 64

JCSM k6l-6h

(CJCS non-concurred)

2 Jun 6k

SECTO 37

1-2 Jun 6k

Honolulu Conference

XXlll

DESCRIPTION

Advocating "Air Strikes Against North Vietnam," the JCS felt WE support to insurgents could be reduced by armed reconnaissance of highways leading into Laos, striking airfields identified with supporting insurgents, striking supply, axiimunition and POL storage sites and military installations connected with PL/vC support. The JCS said Hanoi's "military capability to take action against Laos and the RWI" would result from hitting "remaining" airfields, important railroad and highway bridges, depots in northern NVN and from aerial mining and bombing of POL stores in Hanoi and Haiphong. The Chiefs also outlined the capability to effectively destroy the entire NVTT industrial base.

•

Recommended the U.S. seek to destroy Hanoi's will and capabilities, as necessary, to support the insurgency. They called for "positive, prom.pt and meaningful military action" --mainly air strikes -- to show NVN "we are now detennined that (its support to insurgency) will stop" and to show NVl^I v/e can and will make them incapable of rendering such support•

Rusk reported General Khanh's views; Khanh felt the GVI^J could not win against the Viet Cong without some military action outside its borders; he wanted insurgent forces in eastern Laos cleaned out -- by GVN forces and U.S. air support; he recommended selected air atta-cks against N\rN" "designed to minimize the chances of a drastic communist response."

Conferees assessing overall U.S. policy toward Southeast Asia agreed with State that the point of departure "...is- and miust be that v^e cannot a.ccept (the) over-running of Southeast Asia by Hanoi and Peking."

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DATE

EVErjT OH

DOCWffil'IT

3 Jun 6^

William Eimdy Memorandum for SecState

Mid-Jun 6^

Post-Honolulu Military Actions

DESCRimON

"Operational" -~ not pplicy --aspects of air operations against WU vrere the main points of discussion, with attention centered on the effect of pressures in Laos^ preparatory steps necessary for a Laotian contingency and probable repercussions.

Evaluating possible communist reaction to pressures against IIYN, Mr, McNamara said the "best current view" was an appropriately limited attack-against ITVjM;, which would not bring CHICOM air or JWlVCHlCOM ground forces. Westmoreland felt there was no significant unused capability left to the VC; Lodge said the VC had a major capability for terrorism;, even for military action against Saigon, Like Khanh, Lodge also felt selective bombing would build morale and imity in South Vietnam.

Results: The U.S. would seek international (beginning with U.S.-Thai consultations) and domestic support (through a Congressional Resolution) for wider U.S. actions. ("V/ider" could mean committing up to seven U.Sc dix'-isions and calling up the reserves "...as the action unfoldsc") But actual expansion of the U.S. role would be postponed for these and other politico-military reasons.

The report to the President on Honolulu was probably based on this paper, in which Bundy recapped talks there and called for time to "refine" pla: s and estimates, to "get at" basic doubts about the value of Southeast Asia and the importance of the U.S. stake there.

Mr. McNati^ara discussed FVH targets, troop movement capabilities with the JCS (8 June); he wanted facts

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DATE

EVEI'JT OR DOCUlvIEI^IT

i

Mid"Jun 6k

Post "Honolulu Ilon-Military Activity

9 Jun 6U

Memorandum for the Director, CIA

10 Jim 64

SecDef Memorandum to CJCS (Response to CM-lU5i-6U, 5 Jun Gh)

DESCRIPTION

and statistics on Haiphong traffic, existing plans for and estitiated impact of mining the harbor, altei^-native DRV importation facilities. He ordered immediate improvement in effectiveness and readiness plus some expansion of prepositioned stocks in Thailand and Okinava.

State began gathering information on prevalent public questions about the U.S. in Vietnam, in Southeast Asia; interagency groups studied ijnplications of a Congressional Resolution; Rusk {ik June), President Johnson (23 June) and others spoke publicly on U.S. goals in Asia, U.S. determination to support its Southeast Asian allies.

President Johnson asked: "Would the rest of Southeast Asia necessarily fall if Laos and South Vietnam came under NVN control?" The CIA response said Cambodia "might" but no other nation "vrould quickly succumb." U.S. prestige, credibility and position in the Far East would be profoundly damaged but the vider U.S. interest in containing overt military attacks would not be affected. All of this ■was predicated on a clear-cut communist victory in Laos and South Vietnam and U.S. withdrawal from the area, Ihe Agency called results of a "fuszy" outcome harder to evaluate.

McWamara supported Taylor's criticism of JCSM k6l-6h (2 June)5 agreeing that the two courses of action pre-sen'^ed by the Chiefs were neither accurate nor complete. Taylor saw three ways in which air power could be used to pressure IWl^ -- and opted for the least dangerous. He recommended demonstrative strilies against limited military targets to show

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DATE

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12 Jim 6k

William Bundy Memoi-^axidum

15 Jim 6k

McGeorge Bundy Memorandum to SecState, SecDef, et.al.

I

DESCRIPTION

U.S. readiness and intent to move up the scale if NVN did not reduce insurgent support. Up the scale meant moving from de^nonstrative strikes to attacks against a significant part of the DRV military target system and ultimately^ to massive attacks against all significant military targets in NVI^I. By destroying them the U.S "would destroy NVN's capacity to support insurgency.

Called for a Congressional Resolution right away to demonstrate U.S. resolve (especially to Souvanna and Khanh) and provide flexibility for executive action.

One subject \ias made the agenda for final talks about a Congressional Resolution: actions still open to the U.S. if both major military operations and a Congressional Resolution are rejected at this time. White House guidance indicated that by taking limited military and political actions^ the U.S. could demonstrate firm resistance vithout risking m^ajor escala-"-tion or loss of policy flexibility.

McGeorge Bundy suggested these possible limited actions, military; reconnaissance, strike, T-28 operations in all of Laos; small-scale reconnaissance strilces — after appropriate provocation — in IJVN; ■ WAF strikes in Laotian corridors; limited air and sea, more limited ground deployments. (Bundy said major grotmd force deployments seam more questionable vrithout a decision "to go north" in some form.) Political; "Higher authority" vants a maxitrrum effort to increase allied real and visible presence in support

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I

of Saigon; make intensive efforts to sustain Souvanna; rapidly develop province and information programs^ strengthen the country team, shift the U.S. role from advice to direction; opposing both aggressive adventure and withdrawal, explain the above lines of action (especially in the U.S.) and leave the door open to selected military actions.

Unless the enemy provoked drastic measures, the ExCom agreed that defense of "U.S. interests...over the next six months" is possible within limits. Both a Congressiona.1 Resolution and wider U.S. action were deferred.

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MILIT AEY PRESSURES AGAINST NORTH VIETNAiM ACTION AND DEEATE, FEB - JUN I96U

I. Initiation of Covert Operations

I On 1 February 196^, the United States embarked, on a new course of ■

action in pursuance of its long-standing policy of attempting to bolster the security of Southeast Asia. On that date, under direction of the American military establishment, an elaborate program of covert military

* - operations against the state of North Vietnam was set in motion. There

■were precedents: a variety of covert activities had been sponsored by the Ajnerican CIA since I96I. Intelligence agents, resupplied by air, had been dispatched into North Vietnam; resistance and sabotage team.s had been recruited inside the country; and propaganda leaflets had been dispensed from "civilian mercenary" aircraft, l/ But the program that began in February 196^ was different, and its impact on future U.S. policy in Southeast Asia was far-reaching.

■ ■ ^' Covert Action Program: Scope and Character

The covert action program beginning in February 196^ vras different, first of all, because it was a program . Designed to extend over a period of 12 months, it was divided into three phases distinguished by the character and intensity of their respective operations. The first phase (February through May) called for intelligence collection through U-2 ^" and communications intelligence missions and psychological operations

involving leaflet drops, propaganda kit deliveries, and radio broadcasts. It also provided for about "20 destructive undertakings, all vfithin... early prospective /GVN/ capabilities.../and/ designed to result in substantial destruction, economic loss and harassment." The second and third phases involved the same categories of action, but-of increased tempo and magnitude, and with the destructive operations extending to

I "targets identified with North Vietnam's economic and industrial well-

being." Once started, the program was intended to inflict on North

I Vietnam increasing levels of punishment for its aggressive policies. 2/

I

\ The 196^ program was different also because-it was placed under

( ■ control of an operational U.S. military comm^and. Though the program vms

designed to be carried out by GVN or third country personnel, plans were developed by COKUSMACV and the GVN jointly and given interagency clearance in Washington through a special office under the JCS. CINCPAC and the appropriate CIA. station furnished the necessary training and equipment support and COMJSIvlACV exercised operational control. 3/ Since subsequent phases of the covert program were to be based on a continuous evaluation of actions e,lready taken, operation reports were submitted periodically through JCS staff channels for review by various vJashington agencies.

m

Normally such routine staffing arrangements tend to encourage expectations of continued program actions. Moreover, they foreshadow "bureaucratic pressures for taking stronger measures should previous ones

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fail to produce desired results. In the case of the covert operations program^ these tendencies were reinforced through the evocation of a GVN policy conimitment and the involvement of GVN officials in its impleraentation. • ■

B. Origins and Development: Presidential Support and A pproval

The covert program v:as spamed in Kay of 19^3 ^ vhen the JCS directed CINCPAC to prepare a plan for GVTI "hit and^ run" operations against mT\[. These operations were to he "non-attrihutable" and carried out "with U.S. railitary materiel, training and advisory assistance." U/ Approved by the JCS on 9 September as CINCPAC 0?U1^ 3^-63^ ^^^ plan was discussed during the Vietnam policy conference at Honolulu, 20 November 1963. Here a decision was m.ade to develop a combined COMuSMACV-CAS, Saigon plan for a 12-month prograja of covert operations. Instructions forv.^arded by the JCS on 26 Novem.ber specifically requested provision for: "(l) harassment; (2) diversion; (3) political pressure; (4) capture of prisoners; (5) physical destruction; (6) acquisition of intelligence; (?) generation of inteDligence; and (8) diversion of DRV resources." Further, that the plan provide for "selected actions of graduated scope and intensity to include comunando type coastal raids." |/ To this guidance was added that given by President Johnson to the effect that "plamiing should include... estimates of such factors as: (l) resulting daiaage to N\^N; (2) the plausibility of denial; (3) possible N^/N retaliation; and {h) other international reaction." 6/ The^M/^CV-CAS plan, designated OPKAII 3^A, and providing for "a spectrum of capabilities for RVNAJ to execute against F«J," was forwarded by CIrlCPAC on I9 December 1963^ 7/

The idea of putting direct pressure on North Vietnam met prompt receptivity on the part of President Johnson. According to then Assistant

■Secretary of State, Roger Hilsman, it was just a few days before the military-CIA submission that State Departm.ent Counselor, Walt Rostcw passed to the President "a well-reasoned case for a gradual escalation." 8/ Rostow was well-knovm as an advocate of taking direct measures against the external sources of guerrilla support, having hamm.ered away at this theme since he first presented it at Fort Bragg in April I96I. In any event, on 21 December, President Johnson directed that an interdepartmental comraittee study the l-IACV-CAS vle^n to select from it those least risk." This corrimAttee, under the chainaanship of Major General Krulak, USMC, completed its study on 2 January 196^^ and submitted its report for review by the principal officials of its various m^em.ber agencies. The report

■ recommended the' 3"Phase approach and the variety of Phase I operations described earlier. £/ President Johnson approved the cominittee's recommendations on 16 January and directed that the initial U-mionth phase of the program be implemented beginning 1 February. lO/

C. Concept and Rationale: Convince DRV to D esist by R aisinp; the Cost

J. . _ - _ .^^ -1 — -1 — _ -_ _r-- WT _ ____ .. ' -..■■■■I 1—^^^^^^ - - - —

In view of program. perfoim:ance and later decisions, the conceptualization underlying the prograra of covert operations against North Vietnam is particularly significant. JCS objectives for the initial CINCPAC form-lation were to increase the cost to the DRV of its role in the South

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Vietnamese insurgency. The catalogue of operations submitted from Saigon was intended to "convince the DEV leadership that they should cease to support insurgent activities in the RW and Laos." Although^ in its forwarding letter^ CINCPAC expressed douht that all but a few of the 2062 separate operations detailed by MACV-CAS could have that kind of effect. In his view, only air attacks and a few other "punitive or attritional" operations had any probability of success in achieving the stated objectives, ll/

Rationale accompanying the interdepartmental committee's program recommendations5 apparently accepted by higher authority, reflected both the coercive objectives and the reservations associated with the earlier documents. Through its recommended program of "progressively escalating pressure/' the committee aijned "to inflict increasing punishment upon North Vietnam and to create pressures, which may convince the North Vietnam-ese leadership, in its ovm self-interest, to desist from its aggressive policies." However, it expressed the caution that "it is far from clear v?hether even the successful conduct of the operations, would induce Hanoi's leaders to cease and desist." Still, after enumerating a num^ber of specific risks involved, it expressed the opirJ,on that they were "outweighed by the potential benefits of the actions jixj recommended." In selecting these actions, the committee stated the assumiption that the DRV's current strategy was to support the Viet Cong "at little cost' to itself and at little risk to its Industrial complex, while counting for victory upon U.S. and South Vietnamese war weariness..." It calculated:

"The importance attached by Hanoi's leaders to the development of North Vietnam's economy suggests that progressive damage of its industrial projects, attrition of its resources and dislocation of its economy might induce I a decision to call off its physical support of the Viet

Cong. This reaction might be intensified by the traditional Vietnamese fear of Chinese domination, where expanded operations by oui^ side could arouse concern in Hanoi over the likelihood of direct Chinese Communist intervention in North Vietnamese affairs." 12/

Interagency commentary on the proposed operations provides additional insight into the rationale and expectancies associated with the initial ii-month program. After reviewing 13 of these operations, the Board of National Estimates concluded that "even if all were successful," they ' would not achieve the aim of convincing the DRV to alter its policies.

The Board thought it possible that North Vietnamese leaders might view these operations "as representing a significant increase in the vigor of U.S. policy, potentially dangerous to them," but with a likely reaction no more significant than a DRV effort to try to arouse greater international pressure for a Geneva-type conference on Vietnam. In addition, it cautioned that at least three operations proposed for the initial period were too large and complex to be plausibly denied by the

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GVN. 13/ The coinnaittee noted this CIA caution but suggested it might provide a psychological advantage "for South Vietnam to acknowledge publicly its responsibility for certain of the retaliatory acts taken against the aggressor." Hovrever, the State Department member demurred, urging that only those operations that were covert and deniable by both the GVN and the United States be undertaken- His caution reflected recognition "of the risks and the uncertainty as to whether operations against North Vietnam will m_aterially contribute to our objective of ending the war." ih/

D. Implications: Greater Pressure on Hanoi

Thus, l)y early February 196^, the United States had committed itself to a policy of attempting to improve the situations in South Vietnam and Laos by subjecting North Vietnam to increasing levels of direct pressure. Despite explicit assessments that the contemplated early steps could not achieve its objectives, it had embarked on a program v;hich demanded a significant comrnitm-ent for its South Vietnamese allies and which in its expected later stages could expose them to considerable risk. Moreover, by initiating a program recognized as giving little promise of achieving its stated objectives through early actions, it raised expectancies for continued and intensified operations in later stages. It can be concluded that either the Administration (l) intended to continue to pursue the policy of pressuring North Vietnam until these pressures showed some propensity for success, or (2) sought through the covert operations program to achieve objectives different from those anticipated during the initial planning.

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II. Planning for Larger Pressures

As indicated "by reser^/ations expressed by an ad hoc interdepartmental coimnlttee en "pressures" against North Vietnam chaired by General Krulak, covert operations tfere seen as possessing several shortcomings vith respect to influencing decisions in Hanoi. In appraising these operations, attention vas dravn increasingly to the potential for undertaking punitive measures that appeared likely to be more compelling. The Krulak committee assessed the likely North Vietnamese response as follows:

"Toughened^ as they have been, by long years of hardships and struggle, they will not easily be persuaded by a punitive program to halt their support of the Viet Cong insurgency, tmless the damage visited upon them is of great magnitude." 1^/

Moreover, the comraittee rationale reflected the idea generally held that the DRV would be responsive to more damaging actions. For example, V/alt Rostow pressed the view on Secretary Rusk tlmt "Ho /Chi Minh/ has an industrial complex to protect: he is no longer a guerrilla fighter with nothing to lose." 16/

A. Conceptual Origins and Motivations

■

In early February, several conceptual elements converged to focus Administration attention on the question of whether U.S. policy should^ embrace readiness to undertake larger punitive actions against North Vietnam. One element was the realization that the GVTi would be incapable of increasing the number or size of its maritime operations beyond the modest "pin pricks" included in the Phase I covert actions program. Should stronger pressures be called for before May or June, they would have to be applied through direct air strikes, probably with USAF/fAKMGATE assistance. 17/ Another element was the prospect of serious deterioration within Laos and South Vietnam, resulting from recent North Vietnamese troop inflirxes into Laos, fear of similar trends in South Vietnam, ^nd heightened VC activity in the wake of the latest GVN coup of 30 January. 18/ Concern within the State Department was such that discussions were held on the desirability of the President's requesting a congressional resolution, drawing a line at the borders of South Vietnam. 19/

A third element was the increasing articulation of a direct relation between the challenge of halting North Vietnam's assistance to the Southeast Asian insurgents and broader U.S. strategic interests. Stopping Hanoi from aiding the Viet Cong virtually became equated with protecting U.S. interests against the threat of insurgency throughout the world. For example, in support of their recon^.mendation to "put aside many of the self-imposed restrictions which now limit our efforts" and "undertalie a much higher level of activity" than the covert actions against external assistance to the Viet Cong, the JCS argued:

"In a broader sense, the failure of oui^ prograjus in South Vietnam would have heavi-- influence on the judgment of Burma,

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India, Indonesia, Mala^ysia, Japan, Taiwan, the Republic of Korea, and the Republic of the Fnilippines with respect to U.S. durability, resolution, and trustworthiness. Finally, this being the first real test of our determination to defeat the Cocununist wars of national liberation formula, it is not unreasonable to conclude that there would be a corresponding unfavorable effect upon our image in Africa and in Latin America." 20/

Similarly, in Secretary Rusk's perception.

"We must demonstrate to both the Coiiimunist and the non-Communist worlds that the wars of national liberation formula now being pushed so actively by the Communists will not succeed." 21/

B. Intera,p:ency Study, February-March 196U

The immediate effect of the heightened interest in causing Hanoi to alter its policies by exerting greater punitive pressures was to stimulate a variety of planning activities vathin the national security establishment. For example, on 20 February, at a meeting vath the Secretaries of State and Defense, CIA Director McCone, CJCS Taylor and mem.bers of the Vietnam Committee^ the President directed:

"Contingency planning for pressures against Worth Vietnam should be speeded up. Particular attention should be given to shaping such pressures so as to produce the maximum credible deterrent effect on Hanoi." 22/

B Underway at the time was a detailed interagency study intended to

determine ways of bringing measured pressures to bear against the DRV. Directed by Robert Johnson, of the Department of State Policy Planning Council, the study group was assembled under the auspices of State's Vietnam Committee. Its products were funneled through William Sullivan, head of the cocimittee, to its members and thence to the principal officials of the agencies represented. However, the papers produced by the study group did not necessarily represent coordinated interdepartmental views. 23/

The study examined three alternative approaches to subjecting Forth Vietnam to coercive pressures: (l) non-attributable pressures (simil8.r to the advanced stages of the covert actions program); (2) overt U.S. deployi^ients and operations not directed toward DRV territory; and (3) overt U.S. actions against T^orth Vietnam, including amphibious, naval and air attacks. In addition, it encompassed a number of "supporting studies" on such subjects as U.S. objectives, problems of timing, upper limits of U.S. action, congressional action^ control arrangements, information policy, negotia^ting problems, and specific country problems. By addressing such a range of subjects, participants in the study came to grips with a number of broader issues valuable for later policy deliberations (e_._p;., costs and risks to the U.S. of contemplated actions; impact of the Sino-Soviet split; possible face.-saving retreats). 2k/

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\ ■ In support of this study and in order to permit necessary politi-

cal evaluations concerning the military alternatives available, the JCS ■were asked to furnish their views on the following issues: (l) the overall military capabilities of the DRV and Chinese Communists with respect to logistical capacity^ geographical areas of operation^ time required to initiate operations, and capacity for concurrent reactions in different regions; (2) military actions against NW, using air and naval power only, which the GW might undertake alone or which the U. S. might undertake both with and without public acknowledgment; (3) IWN targets, attack of which would be most effective in inhibiting particular DRV military capabilities; (h) course of action likely to bring about cessation of DRV support for the conflicts in Laos and South Vietnam; (5) action most likely to deter communist attacks on various parts of Asia in the event of a large-scale communist reaction to attacks on ITOI; (6) the extent to which the United States could counter such reactions, using only air and naval operations and different ordnance combinations; and (7) modifications needed in cur-rent contingency plans to provide for U.S. responses depending "primarily upon air activities rather than the intervention of substantial U.S. ground forces." 25/

The work of the study group resulted in an interim report on 1 March 196k, Just prior to Secretary McNamara.'s and CJCS Taylor *s visit to South Vietnam. This they carried with them in the form of a summary analysis of the group*s findings. During a brief stopover in Honolulu, these findings and the issues raised by the Secretary's memorandum to the JCS were discussed. Particular emphasis was given to the possible advantage to be derived from converting the ciurrent operations into an "overt Vietnamese program with participation by /the/ U.S. as required to obtain adequate results." 26/

C. Study Group Analysis of Proposed Actions

The study group had given considerable attention to over U. S. actions against North Vietnam. Its analysis was based on a concept of exploiting "North Vietnamese concern that their industrialization achieve-^ ments might be wiped out or could be defended (if at all) only at the price of Chicom control" and of danonstrating "that their more powerful communist allies would not risk their own interests for the sake of North^Vietnam." The actions it proposed were aimed at accomplishing five objectives: (1) induce North Vietnam to curtail its support of the Viet Cong in South Vietnam; (2) reduce the morale of the Viet Cong; (3) stiffen the Khanh government and discourage moves toward neutralism.; (h) show the world that we will take strong measures to prevent the spread of communismi and (5) strengt.hen morale in Asia. However, the study group cautioned that public .Justification of our actions and Its- expressed rationale must be based^pri-marily upon the fact of Northern support for and direction of the war in the South in violation of the independence of South Vietnam." It then outlined a series of public infoimational, domestic political, and international diplomatic steps desirable for establishing this Justification, 27/

In seeking to achieve the objective cited"above, the study group suggested military actions with the best potential and raised some vital policy issues. In ascending order of the degree of national commitment, the study group believed each would entail, the military actions were as

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follows: (l) "deploy to Thailajid, South Vietnam, Laos and else^<rheTe the forces, sea, air and land, required to counter a North Vietnamese or Chicom response of the largest likely order"; (2) "initiate overt air reconnaissance activities as a means of dramatizing North Vietnamese involvement"; beginning with high-level flights and following with low-level missions; (3) ^'tai<:e limited air or ground action in Cambodia and Laos, including hot pursuit across the Cambodian border and limited operations across the Laos border"; (h) "blockade Haiphong," which would "have dramatic political effect because it is a recognized military action that hits at the sovereignty of North Vietnam and suggests strongly that we may plan to go further"; (5) "establish a limited air defense capability around Saigon"; and (6) conduct air strikes on key North Vietnamese LOC's, infiltrator training camps, key industrial complexes, and POL storage. It is important to note that the order of commitment perceived in early I96U was considerably different from the order which most observers would assign to such actions at the time of this writing. The ground force deployments (item l) were primarily deterrent deployments to Thailand, on the model of those made during the I96I-62 Laotian crisis. Blockading (item h) was considered a low-commitment, low-risk action through most of I96U. Significantly, the last set of actions "in any number" was cited as iraplying "a U.S. commitment to go all the way if necessary." Thus, the group cautioned that before embarking on such steps the Administration should consider how far it would be willing to go in the event of possible reactions. For example, how long woiad we persist "in defiance of international pressures for a cease-fire and conference"? Or, how far would we go, either within the proposed concept or by escalating beyond it, in continuing military pressures if the DRV did not comply -- or if it decided to escalate? 28/

Although warning of the need to be prepared "to follow through against Co]:i}munist China if necessary," the study group estimated that neither China nor the Soviet Union would intervene militarily, other than to supply equipment. In view of these estimates and the study group's . . basic assu^nption of DRV sensitivity to industrial losses, its assessments of the likely outcomes of the. actions it discussed are significant. Asserting that pressures against North Vietnam were "no substitute for successful counterinsurgency in South Vietnam," the group listed the probable positive gains: (l) U.S. action could demonstrate U.S. power and determination, along with restraint, to Asia and the world at large; (2) U.S. action would lead to some reduction in Viet Cong morale; and (3) U.S. action if carefully planned and executed might improve our negotiating position over what it would othervfise be. (The group saw negotiation as "virtually inevitable.") However, it then countered with the following judgment:

"It is not likely that North Vietnam would (if it could) call off the war in the South even though U.S. actions would in time have serioi^s economic and political impact. Overt action against North Vietnam would be unlikely to produce reduction in Viet Cong activity sufficiently to make victory on the gro\and possible in South Vietnam unless accompanied by new U.S. bolstering actions in South Vietnara and considerable improvement in the government there. .The most to be expected would be reduction of North Viet-nam.ese support of the Viet Cong for a while and, thus, the gaining of some time and opportunity by the government of South Vietnam to

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D. McNamara Ap;ainst Overt Pressures

mien he returned from his visit to South Vietnam, Secretary McNamara recommended against either the United States or the GVIJ undertaking overt actions against North Vietnam "at this time." One compelling reason^was

. General Khanh's expressed wish not to engage in overt operations until

♦ a firmer GW political base had been established, but there were others

as well. FiX. McNamara regarded such actions as "extremely delicate... -both from the military and political standpoints," because of specific problems. These were identified as: (l) the problem of justifying such actions; (2) the problem of "communist escalation"; and (3) the problem of pressures for premature negotiations. Moreover, he stated the judgment that the practical range of our overt options did not permit assured achieve ment of our practical objectives. In identifying these, he drew a distinction sirailar to that made by the interagency study group -- between the

J stated objective of eliminating Hanoi's control of the VC insurgency and

the "practical" objectives of "collapsing the morale and the self-assurance

i ' of the Viet Cong cadres...and bolstering the morale of the lOianh regime." 32

>Jhat Mr. McNamara did recommend for military actions outside South Vietnam reflected, the contemporary concerns over Laos. Prior to his visit, the increased WA activity in eastern Laos had prompted several recommendations for military measui^es to thvrart new communist territorial gains in that country and to interrupt the flow of men and materiel into South Viet-naia along the Laotian infiltration routes. In particular, elements within the Department of Defense urged efforts to lift existing restrictions on cross-border pursuit of engaged forces into Laos, including accompaniment of GVIT air and ground forces by U.S. advisory persorjiel. They also sought authorization for both G-VTI and U,S. aircraft to overfly Laos for reconnaissance purposes. 3l/ The JCS urged low-level reconnaissance flights over Laos as advantageous both for collecting badly needed, intelligence and for visibly displaying U.S. power. 32/ The State Departraent recommended deploying twelve F-lOO's to Thailand, with a view toward its potential deterrence and. signalling impacts on communist activities in Laos. 33/ On his return from South Vietnam, two of the actions for which Secretary McNamara sought Presidential authority dealt with activities affecting Laos: (l) (Recommendation ll) "hot pursuit" and small-scale operations across the Laotian border by GVIT ground forces "for the purpose of border control" and "continued high-level U.S. overflights" of the border; and (2) (Recommendation 12) preparations to be ready "to initiate the full range of Laotian and Cambodian border control actions" vrithin 72 hours. 3k/

Actions recommended by the Secretary to provide measures aimed directly at North Vietnam (Recommendation 12) fell into two categories: (l) preparation for "retaliatory actions," defined to include "overt high^^and/ or low level reconnaissance flights...over North Vietnam" as well as tit-for-tat" bombing strikes and commando-type raids; and (2) planjning and preparations "to be in a position on 30 days' notice to initiate the ./sic/ program of 'Graduated Overt Military Pressure' against North Vietnam," The wording of the latter recommendation is notable because, at the^time, there apparently v.^as no planned overt "program" in existence; the discussion of overt pressures appended to the Secretary's report was considerably less than even a recommendation for such a program-. The concept of retaliatory actions vras more explicitly defined, but here too, it was apparent

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that important q.uestions like, "Retaliation for what?" and. "Under what circumstances?" had. yet to be answered clearly. The scenario described in the report's appended, "illustrative Program" of retaliatory pressure seemed to mix elements appropriate for a continuous program of milite.ry actions against TTorth Vietnam with those suitable as tlt-for-tat response to specific provocations. 35/

Each of the Secretary's recommendations was approved by President Johnson at a National Security Council meeting on 17 March, with the directive for all agencies "to proceed, energetically" in executing them. 36/ Subsequent planning activities by different implementing agencies indicate that they did not share a common viev7 of the policy implications and assumptions contained in these recommendations.

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III. Different.Policy Perceptions in Planning

A• Two basic approaches: JCS and St3.te-ISA

The principal planning agencies responding to the President's directive regarding Reconmiendations 11 and 12 were the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Department of State together wi-*-h OSD/iSA^ and the two efforts took rather different approaches. The JCS respond.ed literally to the instructions and tasked CINCPAC to prepare an action prograjn of border control and retaliatory operations with 72-houi' responsiveness and one of "graduated overt military pressure by GYN and U.S. forces" against North Vietnam with 30-day responsiveness. The JCS preparation for near-term implementation of these recommendations went beyond the usual contingency planning as indicated by their instruction that CINCPAC's plan "permit sequential implementation" of the three actions. 3?/ The JCS approved the CINCPAC submission^ as OPLAiN 37-64, on 1? April 1964. 38/

The State-ISA planning activity proceeded under the apparent belief that the actions included in Secretary McNamara's Recommendation^ 12 were approved as contingency options, one or more or none of which might be selected for implementation at some time in the future. In fact. State believed the Secretary's categories of action were not in keeping \7ith likely developments -- "that /cross-border/ actions against Cambodia and Laos are d,epend.ent heavily on the political position in these coiontries at the time, and that, in general, it seem.s more likely that we would wish to hold off in hitting Cambodia until we had gone ahead hard against North Vietnam itself...there appear to be reasons not to open up other theaters until we have made clear that Noi'th Vietnam is the main theater and have not really started on it." Further, it questioned the utility of tit-for-tat retaliatory actions because of (l) the difficulty of responding in kind, or in a fitting manner, to the most likely -- terrorist -- variety of VC provocations and (2) their inappropriateness for conveying "the-picture of concerted and steadily rising pressures that reflect complete U.S. determination to finish the job." 39/ Accordingly, the State-ISA effort began by developing a political scenario d.esigned to accommodate only the graduated military pressures referred to in Recommendation 12. These were divided into three major categories: (l) covert GVN action against North Vietnam with covert U.S. support; (2) overt GVN action with covert U.S. support; and (3) overt joint GVI^ and U.S. action. The two categories involving overt activities were conceived of as possible future developments, contingent upon a Presidential decision that clearly had. not been made. ho[

B. Different Approaches: Perceptions of the Strategic Problem in Southeast Asia

The differences in approach taken in the two planning efforts cannot be explained simply by the obvious military and. political division of labor. It is clear from documents of the period that there was considerable coordination between the two groups, with the JCS planners looking to State and ISA for political guidance and the latter group looking to the forraer for recommendations for 8.ppropriate m3,litary actioiis. More fLUidajuental was the existence of different perceptions of the strategic

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f problem in Southeast Asia and different assumptions as to how the United States Govermnent should proceed to achieve its policy goals. During the early months of 1964, these are well illustrated in the different approaches taken to the problem of determining the extent and implications of the movement of men and supplies through Laos.

At the end of 1963 and early in 1964, there was general agreement among all Washington agencies that we lacked adequate information con-^ cerning the nature and magnitude of whatever movement of men and materiel was occurring along the Laotian infiltration routes. For example, citing the "lack of clarity" on the "role of external intrusion" in South Vietnam, Walt Rostow urged William Sullivan on the eve of his March visit to attempt to "come back from Saigon with as lucid and agreed a picture" as possible on the extent of the infiltration and its influence on the Viet Cong. 41/ A few days later, the Defense Intelligency Agency informed Secretary McNamara that "certain intelligence gaps" were- "related primarily to the types^ and amounts of weapons and materiel coming into South Vietnam,

the number of Viet Cong personnel infiltrating into South Vietnam

k2/ To alleviate this situation, the JCS favored such measures as ground probes into Laos by GVTT reconnaissance teams and low-level reconnaissance flights over the trail areas by GVTT and U.S. aircraft. The State Department, supported by OSD/iSA, opposed such operations as potentially damaging to our relations with the Laotian government.

In supporting its recommendations and in its comments on State-ISA proposals, the JCS argued that an integrated approach should be taken to the seciirity of Southeast Asia, with our actions in Laos closely related to those taken on behalf of South Vietnam. They saw the key problem for all of Southeast Asia as the DRV*s aggressive intent. As they stated, "the root of the problem is in North Vietnam and must be dealt with there." ksj Moreover, they felt that reconnaissance operations into and over Laos were justified because they saw Laotian sec-urity as dependent on that of South Vietnam. "Laos," they argued, "would not be able to endure the establishj^ent of a communist -- or pseudo neutralist ~- state on its eastern flank." They criticized our "self-imposed restrictions" as tending to make the task in Vietnam "more complex, time-consiming, and in the end, more costly" and for possibly signalling "irresolution to our enemies." khj Accordingly, they implied that the United States should convince the Laotian Premier of the need to take direct action against the Viet Minh infiltration through low-level reconnaissance and other cross-border operations -- but above all, to carry out these actions in order to . impress the DRV with our resolve to deny its insurgents a sanctuary. In the specific context of recommending these kind of actions, they stated "that the time has come to lift the restrictions which limit the effectiveness of our mili-^ary operations," 45/

The State-ISA policy view also regarded Laos and Vietnam as parts of the overall Southeast Asian problem, but in early 19^4 their conception of how U.S. objectives might be achieved extended beyond the need to thwart the communist guerrilla threat. In this view, policy success meant

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"bolstering the capability of all free countries in the area to resist coimnunist encroachment." This required cooperating with the sovereign governments of these countries and. being careful not to erode their authority or contribute to their instability, ^6/ Thus^ instead of cross-border groTond probes or low-level reconnaissance missions, which might prove politically embarrassing to the shaky regime of Laotian Premier Souvanna Phouma^ the State-ISA view favored extending the mission of Laotian ground reconnaissance teams^ which had been sponsored covertly by the- CIA with the Premier's support, ]vjj Moreover, this approach to policy included the view that, within the scope of broad regional policy goals, solutions to problems in individual countries should be tailored to the unique political context of each country. Insofar as Laos was concerned, this meant not only being sensitive to Souva-nna Phouiaa's political status, but also adhering to the letter and spirit of the 1962 Geneva Accords, on which it was conceded the structure of a stable political future must be erected. In the State-ISA view, the only alternative to this approach would be an eventual large-scale deployment of U.S. ground forces to drive out the Pathet Lao/NVA forces. U8/

The meaning of these different overall policy conceptions for the planning processes of April and early May I96U was that the U.S. Government was faced with a dilemjna — whether to take remedial military actions which might ease the short-term problems in South Vietnam or whether to dramatize our commitment to all of Southeast Asia with the long-term soliition in mind. The dilemma was particularly complex because elements of one alternative were needed to enable progress toward the other. Specifically, three accomplishments were considered vital to oirr long-term objectives in Southeast Asia: (l) to convince Hanoi, whose direction of the insiirgencies was certain, of our resolve to prevent the success of its aggressive policies;

(2) to maintain the cooperation of Souvanna Phouiria and the Laotian neutralist political structure (which also required the support of the Geneva members) and thereby preserve the framework of the 1962 Geneva Accords; and

(3) to build a stable, effective political authority in South Vietnam. Vital to the third accomplishment v^as our major short-term objective — of permanently reversing the trends in the guerrilla war in South Vietnam. These, in t-urn, were believed to be sustained in their currently deteriorating direction by the infiltration of men and supplies from North Vietnam. The possibility was recognized that determining the extent of this infiltration and eliminating it, if necessary, might be a decisive element in a solution of the short-term problem.

«

However, the short-term solution involved potential threats to the long-term policy elements: the most effective measures for obtaining the necessary intelligence involved actions likely to alienate Souvanna and damage the politxcal structure in Laos. Yet, some of this sam.e kind of intelligence would be impoz^r.ant in convincing the Premier of the need to permit low-level reconnaissance flights and other kinds of operations. On the other hand, the impact of the infiltration on the war in South Vietnam was far from certain. For example. Ambassador Unger reported in December that the recent use of the Laotian corridor was not extensive

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enough to have influenced significe.ntly the then intensive VC efforts in South Vietnam, ks/ Hence, if the desired, military operations were undertaken without Souvanna's approval, and. it vras discovered that the infiltration vras not really crucial to the v^ar in the South, a long-term interest would have been compromised without receiving any real short-term ad,vantage •

To further complicate the picture, direct strikes against North Vietnam were being advocated as a means to obtain both long and short-term goals- On the one hand, overt military actions had been recommended to convince the DRV of our resolve. On the other hand, they were proposed as a means to force Hanoi to stop the flow of material assistance to the South. 50/ Moreover, it was generally agreed within policy circles that , such actions must be supported by public disclosures of the kind of convincing evidence of Hanoi's support for the VC that the Administration did. not yet possess.

By the end of March, one aspect of policy puzzle had been resolved. On 17 March, Ambassador Lodge reported a long conversation betvreen General Khanli and a Laotian representative, with Souvanna's permission, at which a working agreement between military forces of the two governments was obtained. Khanh and, Phoumi Nousavan, Laotian rightist military commander, arranged to resume diplomatic relations between the two countries during that week and came to other more specific agreements as follows:

1. Laotians agreed to allow South Vietnam to have free passage in Southern Ls.os, to create a combined Laotian-Vietnajnese staff to use all the bases including Tchepone, and. to conduct bombardment vzith unmarked T-28 planes (in the areas vrhere FAR (Phoumi's) forces were engaged).

2. The lO-kilometer limit on hot pursuit is abrogated; comm3.nd.o raid.s and sabotage can be undertaken without limit by combined. laotian and South Vietnaanese units; South Vietnamese officers will serve the Laotian units to provide ad.ded leadership, ^l/

Previously, President Johnson had indicated approval of cross-border ground penetrations into Laos "along any lines which can be worked out between KhanJi and Rioumi with Souvanna's endorsement." Although asking Secretaries Rusk and McNamara to develop a joint recommendation concerning U.S. participation in air strikes within La.os, the Presid.ent went on to state a position consonant vrith that of the State-ISA viev/:

"My f?rst thought is that it is important to seek support from Souvanna Phouma and to build, a stronger case before we take action which might have only limited military effect and could trigger wider Communist action in f ■ Laos." ^

C. Planninp; Overt Actions on Contingency Basis (Aipril-May)

The planning efforts c:^ April and early May attempted to accommodate the remaining contradictory aspects of the policy dilemma. On the same

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day he signed NSAJ-I 288 approving Secretary McNamara'a visit report, the President sent the first of tvo closely spaced messages to Ambassador Lodge that could have set the tone for the planning ahead. (Presumably the President's views -were communicated to the principal officials in ' the agencies involved in planning for Southeast Asia.) Commenting on Lodge's critique of the Mcrlamara report, he indicated favor for the Ambassador's expressed preference for "carrot and stick" pressures short of overt military action, and specifically "reserve/dJ7 judgment on overt U.S. mieasures against Horth Vietnam." 53/ Three days later he cabled confirmation that actions being studied with ITorth Vietnam as a target were regarded strictly as contingency planjiing. ^k/

Principal focus for the planning during April was OSD/iSA, with assistance from the Far Eastern Bureau and the Vietnam Committee, in the Department of State, and from the JCS. During the first three weeks of April, it developed three or four versions of scenarios of political actions "to set the stage and to develop support both at home and abroad" for different categories of military action against North Vietnam. Initially, the categories, and their scenarios, were regarded separately, although the first "Covert SVIT action against the North (with U.S. covert support)," was recognized as the stage of political-military activity in which the United States was currently engaged. The others, (l) covert U.S. support of overt GW aerial mining and air strike operations and

(2) overt joint U.S. and GVN aerial reconnaissance, naval displays, naval bombardments and air attacks, vrould necessarily have to follow, 55/

^ In subsequent versions, the planning evolved more explicitly toward a

continuous scenario in three sequential phases.

In each version, however, the "current" scenario included such political measures as: (l) a speech by General Khanh stating GVlM-war aims; (2) a briefing for "friendly" senators and congressmen on our aims in Southeast Asia and the problem of DRV directions of the VC;

(3) public explanations of U.S. policy toward South Vietnam; and {k) diplomatic discussions with the United Kingdom and the North Atlantic Council. Each of the second scenarios, which came to be characterized by GVN-USAF/fARJ.'IGATE air operations, contained sijuilar actions but placed emphasis on political initiatives that would surface in Saigon rather than in Washington, "so as to maintain the credibility of the sovereignty of the GVN." This stage also included such measures as: (l) another trip to Saigon by Secretary McNamara for the specific purpose of obtaining General Khanh's agreement to begin overt GW actions against the North; (2) consultations with Thailand and the Philippines; (3) Presidential consultations with key congressional leaders; and (4) public release of

a new State Department VJhite 'Paper on North Vietnamese involvement in the insurgency. Each of the final scenarios, which came to be associated with our overt responses to DRV/CHICOM escalations, included diplomatic and political preparations for direct U.S. actions. Significantly, the scenarios also incorporated initiatives leading to an international conference on Vietnam at Geneva. 56/

The evolution toward a continuous sequential scenario reflects the influence of the JCS. Their response to. the 31 March drarb: (l) called

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for approximate time-phasing of the various steps in "the scenario"; ^ (2) urged a fusion-of the scenario with CINCPAC operational planning

(OPLM 37/6^); and (3) attempted to incorporate Secretary McNamara's requested "border control operations into the political actions recommended for the current time period. Moreover, the JCS developed a "political/military scenario" for graduated overt military pressure against North Vietnam, as called for in Secretary McNamara's Recommendation No. 12, 16 March I96U. Within this scenario the JCS included "expanded U.S. overt military pressures" against the DRV. In effect, they outlined a continually intensifying program of military pressures ■which increasingly involved U.S. military participation. ^7/

Complementing the thrust of JCS advice, the next draft, 8 April, removed current political actions from the list of political scenarios and treated them in a section entitled "Steps V/hich Should he Taken ■ Nov." The current scenarios included: (l) GWI/FARIvIGATE graduated oVert military pressures against North Vietnam; (2) separate Laotian and Cambodian border control actions; (3) separate GVN retaliatory actions against North Vietnam; and {h) overt U.S. graduated military pressures against North Vietna^n. The detailed scenario for the GVTT/FARICtATE opera-tions was reviewed by Mr. McNaughton with William Sullivan of the Department of State and Michael Forrestal of the Wiite House staff. The scenario version resulting from this conference, contains the JCS-recommended time-phasing, in terms of D-Day minus X approximations. It ^^ also incorporates specific military actions recommended by the JCS sub-

T mission. Apparently, only this scenario and the detailed description

of "Steps V/hich Should be Taken Now" were circulated for comment by other agencies. Apparently, this draft provided the basis for scenario discussions held in Saigon among Secretary Rusk, Assistant Secretary William Bundy, CJCS Wheeler, Ambassador Lodge and certain military and civilian members of the Country Team on 19-20 April 196^.

A later version was prepared on 20 April and for\^^arded to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, on 23 April. Significantly, it contained only three scenarios: I. "Unccimnitting" steps which should be tal^en now; II. GVN/ FARJ'ICtATE graduated overt pressures on DRV; III. Contingency Plan for U.S. overt response to DRV/CHICOM reactions. It also carried the following comment concerning their relationship:

"It should be noted that carrying out Scenario I does not necessarily conmiit the U.S. to commence Scenario II; and that Scenario II may be carried out without requiring resort to Scenario III, However, since Scenario II cannot be launched without ovT being prepared to carry out Scenario III, you should assume that it may be necessary'- for the D-Day of Scenario III to occur as soon as 10 days after the D-Day of Scenario II. Scenario III is a contingency plan of action which we would contemplate putting into effect only if the DRV's or Chicom's reaction to Scenario II vras judged by the President to require overt U.S. response." ^8/

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At the Saigon meeting^ the concerns of the local officials for initiating some immediate measures to relieve the situation in South Vietnam came into conflict with the longer-range scenario approach. Ambassador Lodge "questioned the wisdom both of massive publicity and of massive destruction actions before a well-planned and well executed diplomatic attempt had been made to persuade ]WN to call off the ^^•" .59/ He \v-ent on to propose communicating to Hanoi^ through a third-country "interlocutor/^ our intent to embark on a "carrot and stick program/^ combining the threat of increasing air strikes with the granting of some assistance to the DRV, His supporting rationale explicitly cautioned that the VC reaction to large-scale measures against the North might be violent and damaging to the South Vietnamese economy. More significant may have been the fact that the "large-scale meas-ures" proposed in the scenario came quite late in the second stage, a stage that may not have been entered -- at least for some time.

What the Arabassador had in mind regarding a carrot and stick approach was not entirely nevr. It had first been proposed in his memorandum to Governor Harriman on 30 October 1963, It was raised again in cables to the ^/Jhite Kouse on 20 February and 15 March 196^. 60/ Initially proposed in the context of a scheme to encourage the neutrality of North Vietnam, the carrot and stick concept envisioned a secret contact with Hajioi at which an ultiraatum would be delivered demanding the DRV's cessation of support for the VC insui'gency. Rewards for compliance would . include our making available food imports, to help alleviate the known

I ( shortages affecting North Vietnam in late 1963 (and early '6U). In the

case of non-compliance, we would undertake previously threatened punitive strikes to which we would not admit publicly. Wliat was new in the pro- • posal of 19 April were: (l) the suggestion for using a third coimtry intermediary and (2) that one element of the "carrot" might be ovo: pledge to withdraw some U.S. personnel from South Vietnam. The latter suggestion

' was criticized by V?'illiam Bundy on the basis that we didn^t yet know how

many and what types of American military personnel were needed in South Vietnam. Lodge countered with the comiaent that "it would be very hard indeed for Ho Chi Minh to provide a salable package for his own people and for other communist nations unless we can do something that Hanoi can point to, even though it would not be a real concession on oiir part." 61/

The ensuing discussion, on a variety of points, provided an indication of some of Secretary Rusk's paramoiTnt concerns, which may shed important light on later policy decisions. For example, he sought opinions on the likely GW reaction to a Geneva Conference specifically for Laos. In another context, he stated "his concern that the extent of infiltration and other provisions of support from the North be proven to the satisfaction of our own public, of our allies, and of the neutralists." During a discussion of the availability of other Asian troops to fight in Vietnam, Secretary Rusk stated "that we are not going to take on the m^asses of Red China with cvx limited manpovrer in a conventional war." He also stated the opinion that the Chinese would not opt to intervene militarily

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unless they felt they coiild count on Soviet support and that \ie could bring great economic pressu-re to bear on the Chinese through our allies. While expressing the opinion that Hanoi's renunciation of the Viet Cong v/ould "take the heart out of the insurgency/' he indicated doubt that elimination of North Vietnam's industrial targets would have much of an adverse impact on it. Moreover5 the Secretary acknowledged the possibility that such an act "would have forfeited the 'hostage' which we hold in the North.. .without markedly affecting the fight against the "Viet Cong, at least in the short run." 62/

I ' The major immedi?.te outcome of the meeting was a decision to go ahead

with the suggestion to arrange for the visit of a third country interlocutor to Hanoi. On 30 April, Secretary Rusk visited Ottawa and obtained an

A . . agreement from the Canadian Government to include such a mission among the

instructions for its new I.C.C. representative. According to the agreement, the new official, J. Blair Seaborn, vrould: (l) try to determine Ho's attitude tov^ard Chinese support, whether or not he feels over-extended, and his aims in South Vietnam; (2) stress U.S. determination to see its objec-

, tives in South Vietnam achieved; (3) emphasize the limits of U.S. aims in

i Southeast Asia and that it wanted no perm^anent bases or installations there;

• and (k) convey U.S. willingness to assist North Vietnam with its economic

problems. Other results of the Saigon meeting consisted of a variety of actions recommended by Secretary Rusk. Of these, only four were related

!. to the issue of military pressures against North Vietnam. Tliese were recom-

mendations to (1) engage "more flags" in efforts directly supporting the

I GVN; (2) deploy a carrier task force to establish a permanent U.S. naval

presence at Cam Ranh Bay; (3) initiate anti-Junk operations that v/ould "inch northward" along the Vietnam coast; and {k) enlist SKA.TO countries in an effort to isolate the DRV from economic or cultural relations with the Free World. 63/

'^' Conflict of Short and Long Term Views: Caution Prevails

During the last week of April and the early weeks of May, the contention between those urging prompt measures and. those counseling a deliberate, cautious pacing of our actions continued. Eor example, Walt Rostow urged Secretary Rusk to consider how difficult it would be to make a credible case in support of actions to force Hanoi's adherence to the Geneva Accords if political deterioration took place in Laos and South Vietnam. Predicting such an eventuality in the comJ.ng months, he implied that the necessary actions should be taken soon. 6k/ Similarly, Ambassador Lodge continued to advocate prompt implementation of his carrot and stick approach including, if VC provocations vrarranted, a well-timed reprisal just prior to Commissioner Seaborn's arrival in Hanoi. These views vrere communicated to Secretary McNamara and William Sullivan during their visit to Saigon, 12-13 May, and confirmed in a cable to the President three days later. 65/

The JCS commented on the final version of the State-ISA political-military scenarios and criticized, them for not including the more immediate actions req,uested in NSiU-I 288: namely, border control and retaliatory

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operations. Making a distinction between border operations already arranged for (Recommendation ll) and those intended by Recommendation 12, they advocated incorporating in the second-stage scenario retaliatory operations and overt military pressures against North Vietnam. They also -urged including border control operations of battalion-size I or larger, low-level reconnaissance by U.S. aircraft, and WAF air

^ operations in Laos that include strikes on bridges and armed route

reconnaissance. In justifying such actions, they stated:

*

j "...military operations against the DRV to help stabilize

the situation in the Republic of Vietnam, and other opera-

* tions planned to help stabilize the situation in Laos,

involve the attack of the same target systems and to a

\ considerable extent the same targets. Assistance in the

achievement of the objective in the Republic of Vietnam through operations against NVII could like\dse have a similar result in Laos, offering the possibility of a

. favorable long-term solution to the insurgency problem

] in Southeast Asia." 66/

However, the deliberate, cautious approach continued to hold sway. Secretary McNconara^s trip to Saigon, called for early in the second-4 stage scenario as a means to obtain General Khanh^s agreement to initiate

overt operations against the North, did not include this purpose. On the contrary, a week prior to the visit General Khanh had raised with Ambassador Lodge the issue of putting his country on a fully mobilized war footing — accompanying it with a declaration that further interference by Hanoi in South Vietnamese affairs would bring reprisals --and Secretary McNamara was instructed to impress upon Khanh that such drastic measures and threatening gestures were unnecessary at the m^oment. 6?/ More important, it vras stressed that the GVN "systematically and aggressively demonstrate to the world that the subversion of the South is directed from Hanoi," through sending "capable ambassadors ■ to the important capitals of the world to convince governments of this fact." Moreover, while assuring General KharJi that ovx commitment to his country and Laos "does not rule out the use of force...against North Vietnam," the Secretary was advised to remind him that "such actions must be supplementary to and not a substitute for successful counter-insurgency in the South" -- and that "we do not intend to provide military support nor undertake the inilita.ry objective of 'rolling back communist control in North Vietnam." 63/

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IV. Dealing -with the Laotian Crisis

A, L aos in Danger: "Pressure Planning"

In mid-May 196^, a ne\r factor entered the policy-shaping, process — a factor which cast a shadow of crisis management over the entire decision making environment. On 17 May, pro-communist "^orces in Laos hegan an offensive which led to their control of a significant portion of the Plaine des Jarres. On the 21st, the United States obtained Souvaniia Phouma's permission to conduct low-level reconnaissance operations over the occupied areas. 69/ For several weeks the offensive threatened to destroy the security of the neutralist-rightist position — and with it the political underpinning of U.S.-Laotian policy. These developments lent a greater sense of urgency to the arguments of those advisers favoring prompt measures to strengthen the U.S. position in Southeast Asia.

The most avid of those urging prompt action were the JCS. On 19 May they had recommended a new, more intensive series of covert operations for the four-month Phase II under OPLATJ 3^-A. 70,/ On the 23rd, referring to their earlier recommendations to incorporate larger border control and

( retaliatory operations and overt graduated pressures in the next-phase

scenario, they expressed opinions on the urgency of preparing for such actions. Particular emphasis was placed on the need to consult with the GW so that the necessary training and joint operational preparations could take place. The JCS prodded State with the comment, "The Department of

i State should take the lead on this but as yet has not," at the same time

recalling that the operations in question had been provided for under the . approved CIKCPAC OPLAl^I 37-6U (17 April 196U). In another plea for prompt

' implementation, they argued that since these operations were to be pla,usi- ^

bly deniable by the United States, "efforts to create the necessary climate of opinion should not be, of necessity, too time consuxoing." 71/

Figuring prominently in the retaliatory operations and the graduated pressures advocated by the JCS against North Vietnam were air strikes --some by the VNAF alone and some in cooperation with USAF/FARMGATE and other U.S. air units. What they thought these kinds of operations could accomplish varied according to the targets struck and the composition of the attacking force. Assimiing an air campaign ordered for the purpose of:

(1) causing the DRV to stop supporting the Viet Cong and Pathet Lao and

(2) reducing its capability to renew such support, the JCS perceived the following categories of accomplishment: Category A - They believed that undertaking "armed reconnaissance along highvrays leading to Laos," striking "airfields identified with supporting" the insurgents, and destroying "supply and aimaunition depots, petroleum storage and military (installations) connected with PL/VC support" would result in "a reduction of DRV supp ort. " Categ o ry B - They believed that str:king the "remaining airfields." destroying "important railroad and highway bridges" and "depots in northern F\ffl," conducting aerial mining operations, and bombing "petroleum storage

in Hanoi and Haiphong" would result in a reduced*t)RV military capability to take action against Laos and the RWJ." Category C - They cited the remaining capability for effectively destroying the North Vietnamese industrial base. 72

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In the saiae appraisal, the JCS went on to estimate the time required to achieve Q^i damage against the various target categories, using different force combinations in continuous operations. For Category A, they . estimated, it would take the YIIAJF alone more than seven months, if they could sustain combat operations that long; the VIIAJ' plus FAEl/IGATE B-57 s , would require over two months. By using, in addition, U.S. land and carrier-based air units readily availg.ble in the Western Ricific, they claimed that targets in Category A could be eliminated in only twelve days;

I those in all categories could be destroyed in k6 days. They added that

sustaining this destruction on LOC targets would require restrikes conducted, for an indeterminate period,."

The JCS were not the only Presidential advisers to sense the urgency created by the situation in Laos. Referring to "recent steps with regard to bombing operations in La,os and recomiaissance which step up the pace. Secretary Rusk cabled Ambassador Lodge to seek suggestions for ways to achieve greater solidarity in South Vietnam. He explained that m Wash-ing-t^on, the fragility of the situation in South Vietnam was seen as an obstacle to further U.S. military involvement in Southeast Asia. As he ^ stated, "We need to assure the President that everything humanly possible is being done both in Washington and by the government of Vietnam to V^°-vide a solid base of determination from which far-reaching decisions could proceed." 73/ Lodge's reply reflected a new wrinkle in his usual propo- ^ sals for prompt, but carefully masked actions. He expressed the attitude that some kind of firm action against North Vietnam by U.S^ and South Vietnamese forces was the only way to bring about a significant improvement in the GYE effort. 7^4/ This view complemented, an apparently growing belief among Presid,ential advisers "that additional efforts within South Vietnam by the U.S. wild, not prevent further deterioration there. 75/

This belief, together with the threat presented by the Pathet^Ls^o offensive, led to a resumption of scenario development. However, m the . new "crisis management" atmosphere, several new elements affected the process. One was the fact that the latest scenario was prepared as a draft memorandum for the President. Another was the expectation that it would be presented to and discussed among the principal officials of the participating agencies, serving as an Executive Comraittee of the national Security Council. And finally, the crisis in Laos apparently had focused ad,-visory interest praiaarily on one stage — that dealing with overt operations against Worth Vietnam. The scenario no longer contained a section d,evoted to "uncommitting steps V7hich should be taken now." 76/ The rationale behind this shift of emphasis was explained to Ambassador Lodge, an outspoken critic of both the overt approach and the scenario, by Secretary Rusk: •

- ^ "it is our present view here that /substantial initial attacks without acknowledgment/ would simply not be feasible. Even if Hanoi itself did not -oublicize them, there are enough ICC and. other observers in North Vietnam^wno^ . ^ might pick them up and there is also the major possibility .

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^ of leakage at the South Vietnam end. Thus, publicity seems ^

4 almost inevitable to us here for any attack that did signifi-

cant dexnage." 77/

B. A New Scenario: 30 Days of Sequential Politico-Military Action

On the same day that the JCS urged that the GVU be consulted regarding preparations for border control and retaliatory operations, the new scenario of political and military actions v/as completed. The scenario called for a 30-day sequence of military and political pressures coupled with initiatives to enter negotiations with Hanoi (see Table l). Military actions would not start until after "favorable action on a U. S. Congressional Joint Resolution" supporting U. S. resistance to DRV aggressions in Southeast Asia. Initially, the strikes would be carried out by GVi'J aircraft, but as they progressed, USAF/FARiMGATE and other U. S. air units would join in. These "v/ould continue despite negotiations, until there was clear evidence that DIorth Vietnam had stopped its subversion of the South." The negotiating objectives wovild be to obtain both agreement and evidence that (l) "terrorism, armed attacks, and armed resistance stop" and (2) "communications on the networks out of the North are conducted entirely in uncoded form." 78/

Presented along with the scenario were assessments of likely communist reactions and the possible U. S. responses to these moves. The mose likely military reactions to the scenario actions were seen as expanded insurgency operations, including possible "sizeable infiltration" of North Vietnamese ground forces, and a drive toward the Mekong by Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese forces. The Soviet Union was expected to intensify its diplomatic^ opposition to U. S. policies and China was expected to (l) augment North ' • Vietnamese air defense capabilities, and (2) successfully dissuade Hanoi from any willingness, (particularly after U. S. air operations began) to reduce its support of the Viet Cong. To counter communist reactions, the proposal specified in each contingency that intensified operations against North Vietnam would be the most effective option. In response to intensified insurgency, considered the least intense (though most likely) alternative available to the communist powers, the proposal included provision for augmenting South Vietnamese forces "by U. S. ground forces prepositioned in South Vietnam or on board ship nearby."

The May 23, 1964 scenario read as follows: (Table l)

"1. Stall off any 'conference on /Laos or/ Vietnam until D-Day.'

2. Intermediary (Canadian?) tell North Vietnam in general terms that U.S. does not want to destroy the North Vietnam regime (and indeed is willing 'to provide a carrot'), but is determined to protect .South Vietnam from North Vietnam.

3. (D-30) Presidential speech in general terms launching .^—v * Joint Resolution.

Up (D-20) Obtain Joint Resolution approving past actions and authorizing whatever is necessary with respect to Vietnam.

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Concurrently: An effort should, be made to strengthen the posture in South Vietnam. Integrating (interlarding in a single chain of command) the South Vietnamese and. U.S. military and civilian elements critical to pacificationJ down at least to the district level J might be undertaken.

5. (D-16) Direct CINCPAC to take all prepositioning and. logistic actions that can be taken 'auietly' for the D-Day forces and. the forces described in I^.ragraph 1? below.

6. (l)-15) Get Khanh's agreement to start overt South Vietnamese air attacks against targets in the North (see D-Day item 15 below), and ini^orm him of U.S. guarantee to protect South Vietnam in the event of North Vietnamese and/or Chinese retaliation.

7. (D-1^) Consult with Thailand and the Philippines to get permission for U.S. deployments; and. consult with them plus U.K., Australia, New Zealand, and. Pakistan , asking for their open political support for the und.ertaking and for their participation in the re-enforcing action to be und.ertaken in anticipation of North Vietnamese and/or Chinese retaliation.

8. (D-13) Release an e^cpanded 'Jordan Report,' including^ recent photography and evid.ence of the communications nets, giving full documentation of North Vietnamese supply and direction of the Viet Cong.

9. (D-12) Direct COTCPAC to begin moving forces and making specific plans on the assumption that strikes will be mad.e on D-Day (see Attachment B"^ in backup materials for deplo^oaents).

10. (D-10) Khanh makes speech demanding that North Vietnam stop aggression, threatening unspecified military action if he d.oes not. (He could refer to a * carrot.*)

11. (D-3) Discussions with Allies not covered in Item 7 above.

12. (D-3) President informs U.S. public (and thereby North Vietnam) that action may come, referring to Khanh speech (item 10 above) and. declaring support for South Vietnam.

13. (D-1) Khanh announces that all efforts have failed and that attacks are imminent. (Again he refers to limited goal and possibly to 'carrot.').

Ik. (D-Day) Remove U.S. d.epend.ents.

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15/ (D-Bay) Launch first strikes (see Attachment C^-^ for targets). Initially^ mine their ports and strike North Vietnam's transport and related ability (bridges^ trains) to move south; and then against targets v^hich have maxinun psychological effect on the North*s villingness to stop insurgency — POL storage^ selected, 8.irfielcls^ barracks/training areas^ bridges, railroad. ya.rds, port facilities, com^auni cat ions, and industries. Initially, these strikes vrould be by South Vietnamese aircraft; they could, then be orpanded by adding PAffi-GATE, or U.S. aircraft, or any combination of them. . •

I. 16. (D-Ba^y) CaU. for conference on Vietnam (and go to OTi).

' ■ State the limited objective: Not to overthrovr the North Vietnam

regime nor to destroy the co^ontry, but to stop BRV-directed Viet Cong terrorism and resistance to pacification efforts in the

, South. Essential that it be made^clear that attacks on the North

' ' will continue (i.e., no cease-fire) until (a) terrorism, armed

attacks, and armed resistance to pacification efforts in the South stop, and. (b) communications on the netvrorks out of the North are conducted entirely in uncod_ed. form." JC)J

The scena-rio ■^.-.'•as circulated among members of the ExCom and. discussed d.iuring their meetings of 2U and 25 May. Apparently, modifications v^ere made in the course of these mtcetings, as notations in the SecBef files indicate scenario versions of 2^, 25 and 26 May. In addition to the assessments that a,ccompanied. the scenario proposal, the discussants had available to them an estimate of likely conseq.uences of the proposed actions, prepared by the Board of Na,tional Estimates, CIA, with State and DIA assistance, and concurred in by the U.S. Intelligence Beard. 80/

The national estimate agreed essentially with the proposal's assessment of Soviet and Chinese reactions and concluded that Hanoi's would, vary

, ^ with the intensity of the U.S./cWf actions. The national intelligence

boards believed, that Hanoi "would order the Viet Cong and. Pathet Lao to refrain from dramatic new attacks, and might reduce the level of the in-

j surrections for the moment" in response to U.S. force deployments or GVN-

, USAF/FAK-rrATE attacks. Tae expected BRV rationale, supported by Peking

and Moscow, would be to bank on "a ne\-i Geneva Conference or UII action.., JtoJ bring a cessation of attacks" and to stabilize communist gains in Vietnam and. Laos. Communi.st agitation of world, opinion v^ould be employed to bring on the conference. If attacks on North Vietnam continued, the intelligence boards saw Hanoi intensifying its political initiatives, but also possibly increasing ^the tempo of the insurrections in South Vietnam and Laos." If these tactics failed to produce a settlem.ent "and North

1 Vietnam began to suffer considerable destruction," the boards estimated:

"V/e incline to the'viev^ that /bRV leaders/ would lower their term.s for a negotiating outcome; they would do so in I the interests of preserving their regime and in the expectation

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of being-able to renew the insurrections in South Vietnam and Laos at a later date. There -^ntouM nevertheless be a significant danger that they vould fight, believing that the U.S. would still not be willing to undertake a major ground war, or that if it was, it could ultmately be defeated by the methods which were ■ successful against the French." 8l/

*

In its discussion of the problem of compelling Hanoi to halt the VC insurgency, the national estimate emphasized that this depended on affect ing the will of the DRV leaders. It stressed that the measures called for in the scenario "would not seriously affect conmiunist capabilities to continue that insurrection," stating that "the primary sources of communist strength in South Vietnam are indigenous." On the other hand, it predicted that withdrawal of material assistance from North Vietnam would badly h-ort the Pathet Lao capability. Because of the crucial importance

°ifh'^"°i +>.-^^^^' "^^^ estimate argued that the DRV "must understand that although the U.S. is not seeking the destruction of the DRV regime, the U.b.^is fully prepared to bring ascending pressures to bear to persuade Hanoi to reduce the insurrections." But, while comprehending U.S. purposes in the early phase of the scenario actions, they may "tend increasingly to _ doubt the limited character of U.S. ahns" as the scale of the attacks increases. The report adds;

Similarly, the retaliatory measures which Hanoi might

!5^i|-^^J^°^ ^^ ^°^'^^ Vietnam might maie it increasingly dilticiat for the U.S. to regard its objectives as attainable by limited means. Thus difficulties of comt)rehension might increase on both sides as the scale of action mounted." 82/

^' ^^i^£ll2ILSl_§Senar io: "use Force if Necessary" . " ,

At Its meeting on 25 May, the ExCom apparently decided not to retain

■preq^r^'?^^°fl+^^^°^'^^^ ^^ ^^^ courses of action it would recommend to the

Z. ^^J^""^- At least, it abandoned the time-phasing aspects of the series or dcxions contained in the scenario proposal, and it made explicit its purpose_not to embark on a series of moves "aimed at the use of force as an ena m itself. 83/ The available evidence is far from conclusive on +h +^fr°^^+ ^^^ scenario approach was cast aside, but it seems clear tnax tne potential for entering into an escalating conflict in which our ±3jnited Objectives might become obscured weighed heavily in the decision.

In addition to the evidence already cited, a strong indication of the ^xuom s desire to avoid the possibility of escalation is contained in the drait memorandum prepared for President Johnson, as a res-alt of the 25 May meexing. in this memorandum, it was recommended that the President decide:

...that the U.S. will use selected and carefully graduated military force against Worth Vietnam, under the following conditions: (1) after appropriate diplomatic end political warning and preparation, (2) and unless such warning and preparation — in comoination with other efforts — should produce a sufficient improvement of non-Communist prospects in South Vietnam and in Laos to make military action against North Vietnam urmecessary." 8k/

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The recommendation was based on an explicit assvmiption "that a decision to use i^orce if necessary^ backed, by resolute and extensive deployment^ and conveyed, by every possible means to our adversaries^ gives the best present chance of a^voiding the actual use of such force." Reflecting the influence of the national intelligence boards' rationale concerning "U.S. preparatory and low-scale action," the ExCom also stated the belief that "selective and carefully prepared military action against North Vietnam will not trigger acts of terror and military operations by the Viet Cong which vrould engulf the Khanh regime." 8^/ VJhat the ExCom meant by "selective and carefully prepared military actions" is suggested by its re-a^iest, on the same day^ for JOS views on the feasibility of telegraphing intended action through military deployments. 86/

j Despite its aband.onment of the paced scenario approach, the ExCom

i^ . proposed that many of the actions incorporated in the scenario be undertaken. Although proposing a particular order for these actions, the committee suggested that the sequence may need to be modified in reaction to specific developments, especially in view of different choices available to the enemy. In addition to the Presid.ential decision, the recommended actions included: (l) communication of our resolve and limited objectives to Hanoi through the Canadian intermediary; (2) conducting a high-level Southeast Asian strategy conference in Honolulu; (3) diplomatic initiatives at the m to present the case for DRV aggression; {h) formal and bilateral consultation with SEATO allies, including the question of obtaining allied . force comraitments; (5) seeking a Congressional Resolution in support of U.S. resistance to communist aggression in Southeast Asia; (6) periodic" force deployments tovrard the region; and (7) an initial strike against North Vietnam, "designed to have more deterrent than destructive impact" and accompanied by an active diplomatic offensive to restore peace in the area -- including agreement to a Geneva Conference. Further, the ExCom recommended that in the execution of these actions, all functional and geographic elements "should be treated as parts of a single problem: the

protection of /all/" Southeast Asia from further communist encroachment." 87/

•

If all of the decisions and actions contained in the draft memorandum were in fact recommended to the President, all of them were not approved immediately. It is doubtful that the President made the decision to use force if necessary, since some advisers were still urging the same kind of decision on him in the weeks to follow. The plan to convey a message to Hanoi by Canadian channels was carried out on June I8, but it may have been decided on already before the meeting, given the earlier negotiations with Ottawa. 88/ The President did approve the calling of a conference in Honolulu "to review for /his/ final approval a series of plans for effective action" in Southeast Asia. 89/ U.S. policy toward Southeast Asia was explained, by Ambassador Stevenson in a major UN speech on 21 May. He did not address the Security Council on this subject again until 6 August, after the Tonkin Gulf episode. It is doubtful if less publicized statements at the UI^ contained the "hitherto secret evidence" suggested in the ExCom sessions as "proving Hanoi's responsibility" before the world dlplo-^ mats. 22/ I"^ ^^ likely that q^uestions of consulting with SEATO allies,

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deploying additional forces to Southeast Asia^ and requesting a congressional resolution were held in abeyance pending that meeting-

One of the kinds of developments which the ExCom thought would necessitate a flexible approach to its proposed action sequence occurred prior to the Honolulu meeting. Its effect was to remove some of the "crisis management" pressure from further policy deliberations. On 27 May^ the Polish Government proposed a conference format for Laos that avoided many of the undesirable features of the Geneva proposals v^hich had been supported by communist governments in the past. After tvro days of deliberations^ d.uring vrhich time Secretary Rusk departed for Nehru's funeral in New Delhi, a policy group composed of several ExCom members determined that the United States should attempt initially "to treat /the/ Lao a^estion separately from /the/ STO-ITOT problem." Reasoning that "if f^J/ satisfactory Lao solution /were/ not achieved, /"a__/ basis should have been laid for possible subsequent actions that would permit our dealing more effectively with NVN with respect /t^ both SVN and Laos," the group decided to recommend to the President that he accept the Polish proposal. Integral to the approach would be a "clear expression of U.S. determination.. .that U.S. /is/ not willing /to/ write off Laos to /the/ communists," and assurances to Souvanna Phomra "that we would be prepared to give him prompt and direct military support if the Polish Conference was /sic/ not successful." 9l/ With respect to our larger objectives in Southeast Asia, the proposed discussions among representatives of Laosy the I.C.C. and the Geneva co-chairmen would have the ad.vantage of permitting Souvanna to continue to insist upon his preconditions for any resumed 1^-nation conference, and would avoid the issue of Vietnam.

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V. The Question of Pressures Against the North

With the policy line and. the courses of action for dealing with Laos determined, and vrith the Laotian military situation having become somevrhat •stabilized, the Administration turned to the broader issues of its Southeast Asian policy. These were among the principal concerns of the Honolulu Conference 5 1-2 June 196^1-.

A. The Honolulu Conference: Defining the U.S. Commitment .

The Honolulu Conference vras approached with the realization that the "gravest decisions are in front of us and other governjnents about /the/ free world* s interest in and commitment to /the/ security of Southeast Asia." 92/ The State Department saw such decisions focusing on three "central questions": (l) Is the security of Southeast Asia vital to the United States and the Free World? (2) Are additional steps vrhich carry risks of escalation necessary? (3) Will the additional steps accomplish our goals . of stopping intrusions of Hanoi and Peking into South Vietnam? The Corjfer-ence apparently began v?ith the answer to the first q.uestion as a basic assumption. Again State:

"Our point of departure is and must be that we cannot accept ftYioJ overrunning of Southeast Asia by Hanoi and Peiping." 93/ , ' .

In addition to considering specific proposals for improving conditions in South Vietnam (Administration officials entered the Conference with another assumption that "we must do everything in our power to stiffen and strengthen the situation in South Vietnam" ShJ ), the discussions in Honolulu were intended to help clarify issues with respect to exerting pressures against North Vietnam,.

B. At Honolulu: Exerting Pressure on WT^

In preparation for the conference, CINCPAC and COMU&'MACV had been asked by JCS Chairman Taylor to develop their views on such q.uestions as:

> "(1) VJhat military actions might be taken in ascending order of gravity to impress Hanoi with our intention to strike NVN?

(2) VJhat should be the purpose and pattern of the initial air strikes against NVN?

(3) Wbat is your concept of the actions and reactions which may arise from the progressive implem.entation of CINCPAC 37-6^ and 32-6^? How may NVI^ and Communist China respond to our escalating pressures?

(h) If at some point Hanoi agrees to desist from fiirther help to VC & PL, how can we verify fulfilment? How long shou3.d we be prepared to maintain our readiness postui'e while awaiting verification?

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(5) \Jha.t help shoiild be sought from SEA.TO nations in relation to the situation (a) in Laos? (b) in SW?" 95/

Just prior to the conference^ the JCS also submitted their views, to vfhich General Taylor did not subscribe. 96/ Expressing concern over, "a lack of definition" of U.S. objectives, the JCS asserted that it was "their first obligation to define a militarily valid objective for Southeast Asia and then advocate a desirable military course of action to achieve that objective." With its basis identified as "military considerations/' they then made the recommendation that:

"...the United States should seek through military actions to accomplish destruction of the North Vietnamese will and capa.bilities as necessary to compel the Democratic Governjaent of Vietnam (DEV) to cease providing support to the insurgencies in South Vietnam and Laos. Only a course of auction geared to this objective can assure that the North Vietnamese support of the subversive efforts in Laos and South Vietnam will terminate." ^7/

However, the JCS went on to note that "some current thinking appears to dismiss the objective in favor of a lesser objective, one visualizing limited military action which, hopefully, would cause the North Vietnamese to decide to terminate their subversive support..." Drawing a distinction between destroying DRV capability to support the insurgencies and.^^"an enforced, changing of policy.. .which, if achieved, may well be temporary," they stated their opinion that "this lesser objective" was inadequate for the current situation. They agreed, however, to und.ertake a course of action to achieve this lesser objective as an "initial measure."

"What the JCS proposed as this "initial measure" were a pair of sustained attacks to destroy target complexes directly associated with support of the comjiiunist efforts in Laos and South Vietnam. Military installations at Vinh, vrhich served as a major resupply facility for transshipping war materiel into Laos, and a similar facility at Dien Bien Phu vrere recommended In support of these operations, which would require U.S. participation to achieve "timely destruction" as necessary to achieve the objectives, the JCS stated a need to demonstrate forcefully that our pattern of responses to Hanoi^s aggression had changed. They argued:

We should not waste critical time e/nd. more re-

- sources in another protracted series of "m.essages," but rather we should take positive, prompt, and

■meaningful military action to underscore our meaning that after more than two years of tolerating ■ ' • this North Vietnamese support we are now determined that it will stop. 98/

Aside from the JCS, whose views v^ere not shared by their spokesman at Honolulu, the main voices in support of the idea' of attacking the North in early June I96U seemed to come from Saigon. But this source of advocacy

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seemed, to anticipate short-term impacts on South Vietnam, rather than vQ-tima^te effects on the DHV. On the way to Honolulu, Secretary Rusk had talked with General Khanh, who argued that South Vietnam could not win against the Viet Cong without some military action outside its borders. In particular, the General urged clearing out the communist forces in eastern Laos, who might move across the border and attempt to cut South Vietnam in two, with the implication that GW forces could carry out the task if given air support. He also favored, attacks directly on North Vietnam, but said that they "should be selective and designed to minimize the chances of a drastic communist response." 99/

At the conference's Initial plenary session, Ambassador Lodge also argued in favor of attacks on the Horth, In answer to Secretary Rusk's query about South Vietnamese popiilar attitud.es, which supported Hanoi's revolutionary aims, the Ajabassador stated his conviction that most support for the VC would fade as soon as some "counter-terrorism measures" were begun against the DRV. He urged "a selective bombing campaign against military targets in the North" 8.nd predicted this vrould "bolster morale and give the population in the South a feeling of unity." \Ihen asked by Mr. McCone how the political differences, among Vietnamese leaders might be overcome, he stated the opinion that "if v;e bombed Tchepone or attacked the /nvN motor torpedo/ boats and the Vietnamese people knew about it, this vrould tend to stimulate their morale, unify their efforts and reduce /their/ quarreling." lOO/

If other comments, either pro or con, were made at the plena^ry session about the d.esirability of attacking North Vietnam, they were not reflected in the record. General Westmoreland discussed the "military and security situation" in South Vietnam and. apparently did. not mention the potential impact of measures against the North. Similar discussions of the military situations in Laos and Cambodia apparently did not includ.e the subject either. The discussion of North Vietnam, as indicated by the record, was limited to assessments of the IBY^s military capabilities, particularly its air defenses, and their implications for the feasibility . of an air a.ttack. Policy aspects of air operations against the North were not mentioned. 101/

On the second day of the conference, possible pressures to be applied, against North Vietnam were a prominent subject. However, as reported by William Bundy, the main context for the discussion was Laos — what might have to be done in the event the current diplomatic track fa-iled or the military situation deteriorated. Not contemplated, it seems, v/ere initiatives against the North to relieve the current levels of pressure on Laos or South Vietnarc. Rather, considerable attention v;as given to preliminajry steps that would, need, to be ta-ken in ord.er to prepare for actions necessary within the context of a Laotian military contingency. 102/

One such step vrould be consultation with allies who might contribute to a ground force contingent needed, for the defense, of Laos. The UK and other SEATO nations were cited as.particularly important contributors. The conferees agreed., however, that contingency preparations for Laos should

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be undertaken outside the SEATO framework. As Secretary Risk pointed out, "Souvanna Phouna might well call on individual SEATO^ nations f^^^^^lP' ^^^

II was less likely to call on SEATO as an organization. Besides, the ^rencn *' and mkistani were expected to be obstructive and the Philippines Govern-

■ ment was regarded as resenting a constant threat of untimely leaks, consensus was reached thlt the starting point for our bilateral consultations should be Thailand, since that government's confidence m the sincerity of the U.S. conmitment seemed mrticularly needful of being shored up. At the meeting, Ambassador Martin echoed the themes which he had reporxea. earlier in cables - that the Thais were not convinced, that we meant to stop the course in Southeast Asia and probably would not participate m or per mit allied troop build-ups in their country without firmer assurances than had. been given in the past. IO3/

Another preliminary step discussed by the conferees was the desira-I bility of obtaining a Congressional resolution prior to wider U.b. action

in Southeast Asia. Ambassador Lodge questioned the need for it il we were 1 to confine our actions to "tit-for-tat" air attacks against North Vietnam.

However, Secretaries McNamara and Rusk and CIA Director McCone all argued i in favor of the resolution. In support, McITamara pointed to the need to ^

guarantee South Vietnam's defense against retaliatory air attacks^and ^g^-inst more drastic reactions by North Vietnam and Coirmunist China. He aadea. zn&x, it might be necessary, as the action unfolded.. .to deploy as many as seven divisions." Rusk noted that some of the military requirements might involve the calling up of reserves, always a touchy Congressional issue: He^aiso -^ stated that public opinion on our Southeast Asian policy was badly aiviaea

in the United States at the moment and that, therefore, the President needed an affirmation of support. 10V

■ ■ Next, the discussion turned to present estimates of conimunist reaction to attacks on North Vietnam:

"General Taylor summarized the present Washington view, to the effect that there would certainly be stepped-up Viet Cong activity in South Vietnam, Communist Chinese air might be sent to North Vietnam, Hanoi itself might send, some ground, forces south (though probably cinly on a limited scale), and there was the final possibility that the Communist Chinese would respond with significant military action. As to the last, he made clear that he did not visualize a 'yellow horde' of Chinese . pouring into Southeast Asia, and that air interdiction could have a significant effect in reducing the number of forces the Coromimist Chinese could send down and support..,In any case, he said, that the military judgment was that seven ground, divisions would, be needed,^ if the Communist Chinese employed their full capabilities in the dry season,' and five divisions even in the wet season. The needed five-seven divisions could come in part from the Thai and. others, but a rm^or 'share would have to be borne by the U.S.

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Secretary McNamara said that "before we undertook attacks against the North^ we certainly had to be prepared to meet threats at the level stated by General Taylor. Mr. McCone agreed with this pointy, but went on to say that there was a serious q.uestion about the effect of major deployments on Communist Chinese reactions. The intelligence community was inclined to the viev7 that the more substantial the deployment^ the greater the possible chance of a drastic Communist Chinese reaction. General Taylor commented, that under present plans it was not contemplated that we should have deployment of all the potentially necessary forces at the outset. Vie were thinking along the lines of a brigade to the northern part of South Vietnam^ two to three brigades to Thailand, considerable na-^/al deployments, and some alerting of other forces in the U.S. and elsewhere. Even this, however, added up to a significant scale of activity...

Secretary McNamara noted, that all this planning was on the basis that a really drastic communist reaction was possible, and was not based on any judgment that it was probable. The best current vievr was that appropriately limited attacks on the North would not bring in Communist Chinese air or North Vietnam, or Communist Chinese ground forces. Hovrever, it was still essential that \re be prepared against these eventualities.

Ambassador Lodge asked whether the Communist Chinese could not in fact mount almost any number of forces they chose. General Taylor and Admiral Felt said they could not do so and support them'to the extent reauired...Secretary McNamara then went on to say that the possibility of major ground action also led. to a serious q,uestion of having to use nuclear weapons at some point. Admiral Felt responded emphatically that there vras no possible way to hold off the communists on the ground without the use of tactical nuclea^r weapons, and that it was essential that the commanders be given the freed.om to use these as had been assumed under the various plans. He said, that without nuclear weapons the ground force req.uirement was and had always been^completely out of reach. General Taylor was more doubtful as to the existence or at least to the d,egree of the nuclear weapon reCLuirement, and again the point was not really fo]_lowed up-

Secretary Rusk said that another possibility we m.ust consider would be the Soviets stirring up trouble elsewhere. We should do everything we could to minimize this risk, but it too must be considered. Ke went on to stress the nuclear q.uestion, noting that in the last ten years this had. come to include the possibility of a nuclear exchange, with all that this involved.

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General Taylor noted that there was a danger of reasoning ourselves into inaction. From a military point of vievr, he said that the U.S. could function in Southeast Asia about as well as anyvfhere ±n the world except Cuba. Mr. McCone made the point that th" passage of the Congressional resolution would in itself be an enormous deterrent. This led to brief discussion of the text of I the resolution^ which v/as read by I^. Sullivan...

Discussion then shifted to what the Viet Cong could do in South Vietnajn if we struck the North. General Westmoreland thought there was not a significant imused Viet Cong capability, but Ambassador Lodge thought there was a major capability for terrorism and even for military action against Saigon, and that in sum the Viet Cong 'could make Saigon uniniiabitable.'" 10^/

Finally, the conferees d.ealt with the crucial question of how soon the United States and the GVN would, be prepared to engage in wider military actions should the need arise. For several reasons, the consensus seemed to be that such actions should be delayed for some time yet. "Secretary Rusk thought we should not be considering quick action unless the Pathet Lao lunged toward the Mekong." Discussion yielded several things we could do in the interim to streng-then the current government position in Laos (i.e., re-eq.uip Kong Le's neutralist forces as an aid to Hiouma's FAR; back Souvanna's d.emand for preconditions before any reconvening of the Geneva Conference; support the RLAF T-28 operations). General Taylor pointed to the prior need to educate the American public regarding U.S. interests in Southeast Asia. Secretary McNamara thought this would require at least 30 days.

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Generals Taylor and Westmoreland then listed a number of military factors that affected the question of timing, although stating that these referred to "an optimum military posture":

1. The additional Vietnamese aircraft would not be available until July for two squadrons and. September for another. However, B-57's could be introduced at any time.and operated on a FAKMGATE basis.

2. There were logistic factors, shipping requirements, and the call-up of some logistic reserve units involved in having five-seven divisions ready for action, and these Tould take two months to be sorted out properly.

3. It was desirable if not essential to build up military manpower in South Vietnam. He would like to be in a position to have 12 battalions that could be freed for deployment along the Laos border.

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4. The rainy season was a factor precluding any substantial offensive in the panhandle area until mid-November.

They added that General Khanh's political base was not as strong as we wished and that it might not be so until the end of the year. This factor was also cited by other conferees as being a reason for delay. 106/

* C. The Need to Eefine Plans and Reso].ve Issues .

Iinmediately following the Honolulu Conference^ its Chairman, Secretary Rusk, reported to President Johnson, presumably making some recommendations. Although a record of this discussion is not available, , Ass't Secretary Bundy's brief to Rusk just prior to his White House meeting may provide a clue to the thrust of the Secretary's remarks. Citing

! a "somewhat less pessimistic estimate" of conditions in South Vietnam,

the "somewhat shaky" but hopeful situation in laos, and the military tim-j ing factors reported, above, Bundy counseled taking more time "to refine

I ' our plans and estimates." Criticizing CIl^ICPAC's presentation on military

planning, he stated that it "served largely to highlight some of the difficult issues we still have." These he identified as: "(l) the likely effects of force requirements for any significant operations against the /Laotian/ Panliandle"; (2) the trade-off between the precautionary advantages of a ma.jor build-up of forces prior to v/ider action and'the possible disadva,ntages of distorting the signal of our limited objectives; (3) the sensitivity of estimates of. communist reactions to different levels and tempos of a military build-up; and (h) the need for "more refined targeting and a clearer definition of just what shoixld be hit and how thoroughly, and above all, for what objective." 10?/

In particular, Bundy emphasized to Secretary Rusk the need, for immed.iate efforts in the information and intelligence areas. These were needed., he said, "both for the sake of refining our plans and. for preparing materials to use for eventual support of wider action if decided, upon" --particularly to support the diplomatic track in Laos. He called for "an urgent U.S. information effort" to "get at the basic doubts of the value of Southeast Asia and the importance of our stake there..." Hovrever, noting the problem of "handling the high degree of expectations flowing from the conference itself," Bundy recommended, "careful guidance and consid.eration of high-level statements and speeches in the next two weeks" to assure that I our posture appeared firm. 108/ . . . .

Rusk was accompanied at the VJhite House meeting by other high-ranking Honolulu conferees. Bundy*s reactions to Honolulu were for^v^arded to Secretary McNamara, Mr. McCone and, General Taylor prior to the meeting.109/ Events which follov/ed. the late afternoon meeting of 3 June provide an indication of the discussion that probably occurred.

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D. The Aftermath of Honolulu .

The importance of combining appearances of a firm posture with efforts to reduce public doubts on U.S. interests in Southeast Asia apparently struck a responsive chord, in the White House* In the military area, the President apparently recognized the need, for more and better information, but did not convey a sense of urgency regarding its acq.uisition. Possibly just following the meeting, Secretary McNamara expressed his wish to-discuss North Vietnamese targets and troop movement capabilities with the JCS on 8 June. IIO/ The following day, he communicated, interest to the Joint Staff in obtaining "facts and statistics" on Haiphong harbor traffic; existing plans for mining the harbor; impacts of such operations on different import categories; and alternative DRV importation facilities. Ill/ On the other hand, non-committing military actions which could, improve our image in Southeast Asia were given immediate approval. On the same day he received the req.uest for Haiphong mining information, the Director of the Joint Staff informed the Army of a McNamara directive calling for "immediate action...by the Army to improve the effectiveness and readiness status of its materiel prestocked for possible use in Southeast Asia." Specifically, the Secretary ordered (l) augmenting the stockage at Korat, in Thailand, to support a RO/J) Infantry Brigade and (2) giving first priority at the Okinawa Army Forward Depot to stocking non-air-transportable equipment required by an airlifted ROAD Infantry Brigade. 112/ In keeping with the-Administration's current policy rationale, the augmentation of contingency v;ar stocks in Thailand was given extensive press coverage. 113/

In non-military areas, the President apparently encouraged further examination of the vital issues which impacted on national commitment and public support. Soon after the 3 June meeting, vrork v/as begun under State Department guidance to assemble information in answer to some of the prevalent public q.uestions on Southeast Asian involvement. For example, on 10 June, the Department of Defense was asked to furnish responses to 27 questions developed in State, as a fall-out of the discussions in Honolulu. llV Similar questions became a frequent focus for interdepartmental correspondence and meetings in the coming weeks. Paralleling this effort was an examination of the desirability of requesting a Congressional resolution. On the same day that OSD received State's request to furnish information, an interagency meeting was held to discuss the implications which a resolution would have for the U.S. policy position and the public rationale which its acceptance would demand. The relative advantages of having or not having a resolution v;ere also consid.ered. 115/

To supplement recommendations coming from Honolulu, the President apparently sought additional guidance to help sort out the alternatives available to him. Soon after receiving reports from the Honolulu conference, he sent a request to ¥alt Rostow to prepare a public statement for him, detailing a Governmental view of U.S. policy and commitments in Southeast Asia. As most likely expected, the rationale and discussion which resulted took a more aggressive approach than the prevailing views at Honolulu and were not used. 116/ In fact. President Johnson did not deliver

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a major policy address during the coming weeks, relying on news conferences and speeches hy other officials to state the official view. In contrast to the Rostow approach, his news conference of 23 J'one and Secretary Rusk's . speech at Willi&jns College, 1^+ June, emphasized the U.S. determination to support its Southeast Asian allies, "but avoided any direct challenge to Hanoi and Peking or any hint of intent to increase our military commitment. 117 /

■

In addition, the President asked his advisers the basic question, '^^7ould the rest of Southeast Asia necessarily fall if Laos and South Vietnam came under TTorth Vietnamese control?" On 9 J^^ine, the Board of National Estimates, CIA, provided a response, stating:

"With the possible exception of Cambodia, it is likely I that no nation in the area would quickly succumb to com-

munism as a result of the fall of Laos and South Vietnam. Furthermore, a continuation of the spread of commimism in the area would not be inexorable, and any spread which did occur would take time -- time in which the total situation might change in any of a number of ways unfavorable to the communist cause." 118 /

The statement went on to a^gue that the loss of South Vietnam and Laos "would be profoundly damaging to the U.S. position in the Far East," because of its impact on U.S. prestige and on the credibility of our other commitments to contain the spread of communism. It did not suggest that such a loss would affect the wider U.S. interest in containing overt military attacks. Our island base, it argued, would probably still enable us to employ enough military power in the area to deter Hanoi and Peking from this kind of aggression. It cautioned, however, that the leadership in Peking (as well as Hanoi) would profit directly by being able to justify its militant policies with demonstrated success and by having raised "its. prestige as a leader of World Communism" at the expense of the more moderate USSR.

♦

E. Sources of Moderate Advice

The stren^h of the Board's warning was weakened by two signifi^ cant caveats. The first United the estimate's less-than-alarmist view to a clearly "worst case":

"This memorandiara assumes a clear-cut communist victory in these coixntries, i.e . , a withdrawal of U.S. forces and virtual elimination of U.S. presence in Indochina, either preceded or soon followed by the establishment of communist regimes in Laos and South Vietnam. The results of a fuzzier, piecemeal victory, such as one staged through a 'neutralist' phase, would probably be similar, though somewhat less sharp and severe." 119/

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The second, indicated that even in the worst case, the United States would retain some leverage to affect the outcome. They argued that "the extent to which individua.1 countries would move away from the U.S. tovrards the commimists would, be significantly affected, by the substance and manner of U.S. policy in the period following the loss of Laos and South Vietnam."

\ The largely moderating tone of this estimate of the degree to

which U.S. vital interests were in jeopardy in Southeast Asia tended to be reinforced, by the views of the President's highest-level advisers on

\ military matters. On his way to the Honolulu Conference, CJCS Taylor had

forwarded without detailed, comment the JCS recommendation for courses of action in Southeast Asia. 120/ On 5 June, after his return, he submitted

'■ highly critical comments, together with his preferred alternative to the

JCS proposal, to Secretary McNamara. 12l/ Five days later, the Secretary communicated his approval of General Taylor's vievrs and no doubt conveyed the flavor, if not the details, of them to the V/hite House- 122/

The nature of these views shared by the President's tvro top military advisers indicates a rejection of the concept of trying to force the DRV to reverse its policies by striking North Vietnam with punishing blows. The JCS had stated, the view that only by initiating m.ilitary actions designed to destroy the DRV^s v?ill and capabilities could we reasonably expect to compel it to terminate its support of the insurgencies in South Vietnam and Laos. But they had exxiressed their support of certain recommended limited actions as "an initial measure" directed toward causing the DSV "to decide to term3.nate their subversive support." 123/ General Taylor argued, that these tvro alternatives were not "an accurate or complete expression of our choices." He suggested, three patterns from which the United States "may choose to initiate the attack on North Vietnam," in descending order or weight:

"a. A massive air attack on all significant military targets in North Vietnam for the purpose of destroying them and thereby making the enemy incapable of continuing to assist the Viet Cong and the Pathet Lao.

b. A lesser attack on some significant part of the military target system in North Vietnam for the dual purpose of convincing the enemy that it is to his interest to desist from aiding the Viet Cong and the Pathet Lao, and, if possible, of obtaining his cooperation in calling off the insurgents in South Vietnam and Laos.

c. Demonstrative strikes against limited military targets to show U.S. readiness and intent to pass to alternatives b or a above. These demonstrative strikes would have the same dual purpose as in alternative b."

Stating a personal preference for the second, he noted the probability that "political considerations will incline our responsible civilian officials to opt for /the third/" alternative." Therefore, his recommendation

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to the Secretary v^as that the JCS "be asked to develop a strike plan based on the assumption that a decision was made to implement the third alternative. 12V

It is clear that the JCS not only preferred the larger attacks — directed against both DRV capabilities and will -- but intended that they be implemented in the near future. However, there is no indication that the CJCS urged prompt implementation -- even of the limited measures he linked v/ith pressures against DRV will alone.' Neither view was supported with an explanation of why it vras expected that the preferred course of action might be successful or with any analysis of what lesser results might lead to in the way of next steps by either side or of likely public reactions.

F. The President D ecides.

The Presidential reaction to these various patterns of advice and the different assessments of national interest is not evident in the available documents. However^ it can be surmised from the pattern of events surrounding the effort to obtain a Congressional resolution. As will be recalled, a resolution was recommended to the President in late May as one of a series of events to include the Canadian's mission to Hanoi^ the Honolulu Conference, and consultations with allies. It also fit in with the emphasis on public information and. a firm posture that stemmed from the Honolulu meeting. Its intended purpose was to dramatize and make clear to other nations the firm resolve of the United States Government in an . election year to support the President in taking whatever action was necessary to resist communist aggression in Southeast Asia.

The week of 8 June saw the planning for a Congressional resolution being brought to a head. By 10 June there was firm support for it on the part of most agencies, despite recognition that obtaining it would require a vigorous public campaign, a likely requirement of which would be a "substantial increase in the commitment of U.S. prestige and power to success in Southeast Asia." Therefore, at the meeting held on that day, five basic "disagreeable questions" were identified for which the Administration would have to provide convincing answers to assiire public support. 12^/ These included: (l) Does this imply a blank check for the President to go to war in Southeast Asia? (2) "^Jhat kinds of force could he employ under this authorization? (3) V/hat change in the situation (if any) requires the resolution now? (h) Can't our objectives be attained by means other than U.S. military force? (5) Does Southeast Asia mean enough to U.S. national interests?

w

By June 12, after a temporary diversion caAised. by Souv^-nna Phouma^s vrithdrawal and rea^ffirmation of permission to continue the reconnaissance flights, much of the rationale in support of the resolution was formulated. Even though the Administration did not expect "to move in the near future to military action against North Vietnam," it recognized that significant changes in the local situations in both Laos and South Vietnam were beyond

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our control and could compel us to reconsider this position." Although our diplomatic track in Laos appeared hopeful, and our now firm escorted reconnaissance operations provided an image of U.S. resolve to complement the Polish negotiating scheme, we needed to be able to augment this posture in the event negotiations stalemated. If Souvanna were to become discour-aged, or if Khann were to view our efforts to obtain a Laotian settlement as a sign of willingness to alter our objectives, we would need additional demonstrations of our firmness to keep these lead.ers from being demoralized. Since additional military actions in Laos and South Vietnam did not hold, much promise, actions or the strong threat of actions against the North might need to be considered. For these reasons, an immediate Congressional^reso-lution was believed required as "a continuing demonstration of U.S. firmjiess and for complete flexibility in the hand^ of the Executive in the coming political months." 126/

A crucial interagency meeting was held at the State Department on 15 June to hold final discussions on the recommendation for a resolution to be sent to the President. The meeting vras sched,uled from the TThite House and included Secretaries Rusk and McNamara, their principal advisers on the subject, and McGeorge Bundy. 127/ On the afternoon of the meeting, a memorand.um was distributed by Bundy to the participants, which provided a rather clear picture of current l^ite House attitudes toward the resolution -- and by implication, of the President's judgment on the issue of preparing to take harder measures against North Vietnam.

The memorandum d.ealt with one subject only — "actions that would remain open to us in varying combinations in the event that we do not now d.ecid.e on major military operations against North Vietnam and do not now decide to seek a Congressional resolution." It then listed under the categories of "military" and "political," those actions which were within an acceptable range of U.S. capability, as follows:

"Possible military actions

a. Reconnaissance, reconnaissance-strike, and T-28 operations in all parts of Laos.

b. Small-scale reconnaissance strike operations, after appropriate provocation, in North Vietnam (initially VNA.F?).

c. VMF strike operations in Laotian corridors.

d. Liraited air and. sea deployments toward. Southeast Asia, and still more limited ground troop movements. (Major ground force d.eployments seem more questionable, without a decision "to go north" in some form.)

Political actions

a. Internationally --a continued and increased effort to maximize support 'for our diplomatic track in

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Laos and our political effort in South Vietnam. Higher authority particularly desires a maximum effort with our allies to increase their real and visible presence in support of Saigon.

b. Laos -" an intensive effort to sustain Souvanna and to restrain the right wing from any rash act against the French. Possible increase of direct support and assis-

. tance to Kong Le in appropriate ways.

c. South Vietnam -- rapid development of the critical province program, and the information program, strengthening of country team, and shift of U.S. role from advice toward direction; emphatic and continued discouragement of all coup plots; energetic public support for Khanh Government-

d. In the U.S. — continued reaffirmation and expanded explanation of the above lines of action, with opposition

to both aggressive adventure and withdrawal, and a clear open door to selected action of the sort included in above Possl -• ^le military actions ." 128/

The files contain no record of the discussion that occurred at the 15 June meeting, but in this memorandum, the guidance provided from the VJhite House was evident: Unless drastic measures were provoked from, "the other side," there were still a number of political and military actions available which appeared to enable the United States to demonstrate an Increasingly firm resistance without the need to risk major escalation. Moreover, such actions would not risk embarking on a depth or direction of commitment in which the United States would sacrifice policy flexibility . As the VJhlte House memorandum concluded, the actions were listed with the assumption that "d.efense of U.S. interests is possible, within these limits, over the next six months." Igg/

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VI. FOOTNOTES

1. This program v;as approved by President Kennedy on 11 May I96I, in NSAM 52. ^ ,

2. "Program of Operations Against Worth Vietnam" and undated^Memoran-d.um for the President, "Operations Against North Vietnam, both attached to Krulak memo to Mr. McNamara, "North Vietnam Operations Paper," 2 January 1964 (in Vietnam 38I: Jan file).

3. Attachment to Rusk letter to Secretary McNamara, "Mechanism for Political Control and Guidance of Cross-Border Operations, 11 December I963 (in file of materials prepared for SecDef prior to SVN Conference, March 196^1, CF8 - Sec VILA.). See also Anthis memorandum for Deputy SecDef, "Division of Responsibility Between CIA and DOD for the Planning and Execution of Operation S^-A, 16 April 196i^ (in Vietnam 38I: Sensitive file).

i|. Memoranda, "Covert Operations Against North Vietnam," December 1963, p.l. (In file of materials prepared for SecDef, "Back-up Book, Saigon Trip, 18-20 December I963.")

5. Ibid .

6. Prom KSMI 273, 26 November I963.

7. CIWCPAC letter to JCS, "Combined mCV-CAS Saigon Plan for Actions Against North Vietnam," 19 December I963. (in O92 Worth Vietnam, 1-35033/63.)

8. Roger Hilsman, To Move a Nation (New York: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1967), p.527.

9. "H-ogram of Operations Against North Vietnam," 2 January 196h.

10. Agenda papers (item e), "OPLAW 3i|A-6if (North Vietnam)," c. End-February I96I+, p.l. (In file of papers prepared for Mr. McNaughton prior to S^Tf meeting, March 196^1, McNaughton Vl).

11. CIKCPAC letter, 19 December I962. (in O92 Worth Vietnam: 1-35033/63.)..

12. "Program of Operations AgsJnst Worth Vietnam," 2 January I96U, p.l.

13. Memorandum for the Director, CIA, '■'Probable Reactions to Various Courses of Action with Respect to North Vietnam," 30 December I963 (Tab D to Ibid.).

I

Ik. "Program of Operations Against North Vietnam," 2 January 19Gk, pp. 6-7-

f

I d^^l 15. Ibid . 3 vv- 1"2 (■underlining add.ed).

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16. Rostov memorandum to Secretary Rusk, "Southeast Asia/' 13 February 1964, p.3^ (in State Dept Material, Book I.)

17. Agenda papers - "OPIAN 3^A-6i+ (iTorth Vietnam)."

18. SME 50-6^5 "Short-Term Prospects in Southeast Asia/' 12 February 196^1.

19* Rostow letter to Rusk, I3 February 196^, p-^.

20. CJCS memorandum to SecDef,. "Vietnam and Southeast Asia," 22 January 196^ (JCSM U6-6U). (In Vietnam 38I: Sensitive File.)

21. Rusk letter to Secretary McNamara, 5 February 196^. (in Vietnajn 38I: February file.) Also Ibid ,, p.3.

22. White House Memorandum for the Record, "South Vietnam," 20 February I96U. (in Vietnam 38I: February file.)

23. Robert Johnson memorandum to William Sullivan, "Alternatives for Imposition of Measured Pressure Against North Vietnam," 13 March 196^. (In 092 North Vietnam: I-35316/6U.)

2k. Johnson memorandum to Sullivan, "Alternatives for Imposition of Measured Pressiire Against North Vietnam," I9 March 196^ (with attachments). (In 092 North Vietnam: 1-353^13/6^.)

25. SecDef memorandum to CJCS, "Vietnam," 21 February I96U. (in Vietnam 381: February file.)

26. Rusk message to Saigon Embassy and CINCPAC, 25 February I96U (State 1307)5 giving agenda of Honolulu and Saigon meetings, (in McNaughton VI.)

27. These included a "VJhite I^per" d.etailing Hanoi's role; a Presidential statement of our rationale and limited intent; a Congressional Resolution; and diploma.tic consultations. Annex A to SecDef Memorandum

to President Johnson, "South Vietnam," I6 March I96U (U.S. Military Action Against North Vietnam -- an Analysis), pp. A-1, 2. (In Pressures Planning," McNaughton V.) ■

28. Ibid ., pp. A-3, A-^, A-6.

29. Ibid ., pp. A-75 A-8, A-10, A-11.

30. SecDef Memorandum to President, I6 March 196^, pp. 7-83 15-

31. SACSA, Agenda Item Number Cll, "Modification of Restrictions Placed on Cross Border Operations Beyond. South Vietnam's International Boundaries," 27 February I96U (in McNaughton Vl),

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32. CJCS Memorandum for SecDef^ "Steps to Improve the Situation in ■ Southeast Asia with I^rticular Reference to Laos" (JCSI-I-159-64), 26 February 1964. (in Vietnam 38I: February file.)

33. Draft Memorandum for the President, "Stabilizing the Situation in Southeast Asia," 25 February 1964. (in Vietnam 38I: February file.)

34. SecDef Memo to Pres, I6 March 1964, p.l8.

35. Ibid,., pp. 6-7, 15, l8j. Annex D.

36. NSAI^ 288, 17 March 1964.

37. JCS msg to CINCPAC, "Planning Actions, Vietnam," I8 March 1964 (JCS 5390). (in "South Viet-Nam Back-up Material for 12 McNamara Recommendations, as of 8 May 1964," CF9 - Sec 12.)

38. "Recommendation No. 12 -- Status Report on 12 Recommendations," 5 r-lay 1964. (in file of materials assembled for Secy McNamara prior to Saigon Conference, May 1964, CFIO - Sec 3.)

39. William Bundy (Ass*t Sec. of State) letter to Ambassador Lodge, 4 April 1964 (Section C in "Pressures Planning," McNaughton v).

40. "Political Scenario in Support of Pressures on the North (Third Draft)," 31 March 1964 (Section B in McNaughton V). Also referred to as Tab A in the Bundy letter to Lodge, 4 Apr 1964.

41. Rostow memo to W. Sullivan, "The External Element in Vietnam," 26 February 1964. (in Vietnam 38I: February file.)

42. Lt. Gen. J. F. Carroll memo for SecDef, "North Vietnamese Support to the Viet Cong and the Pa.thet Lao," 29 February 1964. (in Vietnam 38I: February file.)

43. JCSM-159-64, 26 February 1964.

44. JCSM-46-64, 22 January 1964.

45- CJCS memo to SecDef, "Removal of Restrictions for Air and Ground Cross-Border Operations," 2 March 1964 (JCSM-168-64). (in Vietnam 38I: Sensitive file.)

46. "Political Acceptability of Cross-Bord.er Operations Involving Laos and Cambodia," attachment to Rusk letter to McNamara, 11 December I963. (in "SecDef : South Vietnam March Conference," Vol II, CF8 - Part VII.)

47. CIA msg to OSD, 10 December I963. This policy view prevailed, as Secretary McNamara d.ecid.ed, on 21 December, not to recorpmend operations

. _ across the Laotian border. See CIA memo for SecDef, et al , "Operations

V into Laos," 7 February 1964. (in CF8 - Part VI.)

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il8. Vientiane Embassy msg to SecState, 1 March 196^1 (Vientiane 92?). (In CF8 - Part VI.)

. 1+9. Vientiane Embassy msg to SecState^ 13 December 1963 (State 682). (In CF8 - Part VI.)

50. CJCS memo to SecDef, "Vietnam," 2 March I96U (JCSM-17^-6U). (in Vietnam 38I : Sensitive file.)

51. Lodge msg to SecState, 1? March 1964 (State I767). (m Vietnam 38I: 16-31 March file.) . .

■

52. ■ President's msg to Ambassador Lodge, 1? March 196^ (State 1^5^)-(in Dept of State Material, Book I.)

53. Ibid . See also Lodge msg to President, 15 March 196k (State 1757). 5I1. President's msg to Ambassador Lodge, 20 March 3-96^. (State lUS^l-).

' . 55. Tab A, Bundy letter to Lodge, k April 196^+-

56. Scenario drafts prepared on 3I March, 8 April, 17 April and 20 April. (in "Pressures Planning," McNaughton V.)

57. Clay memo to Ass't SecDef' (ISA), "Political Scenario on Vietnam," J ( 13 April 1964 (w/attachme.nts). (in "Pressures Planning, McNaughton V.}

58. SecDef memo for Chairman, JCS, "Draft Scenarios for Recommendation 12 (NSA14 288)," 23 April 1964. (in Vietnam 38I : 16-30 April file.)

59. Saigon Embassy Conference Memo, "Meeting of April 19, 1964," 22 April 1964. (in Dept of State Material, Vol I.)

60. Lodge msg to President Johnson, 20 February 1964 (State 159^); Lodge msg to McGeorge Bundy, I5 March 1964 (State 1757). .

61. All in Embassy Conference Memo, 22 April 1964.

62. Ibid. .

63. "Summary of Rusk's Recommendations for Additional Steps in South Vietnam," 20 April 196i+. (In CFIO - Yellow Tab.)

6k. Rostov memo to Secretary Rusk, "On How Much Flesh and. Blood Can Stand,: ^ Laos and Vietnam," 23 April 196^1. (in Vietnam 38I : I6-3O April file.;

4 S^, Lodge msg to President Johnson, I5 May 196^ (State 2212). (Excerpt

in back-up notebook.)

66. CJCS memorandum to SecDef, "Draft Scenarios for Recommendation 12

(KSAI4 288)," 16 May 196U, JCSi-I-l|22-6U. (in Vietnam 38I : 16-30 May file.) • •

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67. Khanh's proposals were reported in Lodge msg to Secretary of State, k May 196^ (Saigon 2108). (in CFIO - Orange Tab)

68. Talking Paper for Secretary of Defense, "General Khanh's Conversation with Lodge," 7 May 196^. (in Vietnam 38I: 1-15 May file)

69. Baltimore Sun, 22 May I967.

70. JCSM-^26-6U, referred to in McNaughton memorandum to Deputy SecDef, "North Vietnam Operations," 25 May 1964. (in Vietnam 38I: I6-3I May file)

71. CJCS memorandum to SecDef, "Readiness to Implement WSM 288," 23 May 1964 (jCSM-445-64). (In Vietnam 38I: l6-31 May file) ■

72. CJCS memorandum for SecDef, "Air Campaign Against North Vietnam," 30 May 1964 (JCSM-460-41|). (in Vietnam 38I: l6-31 May file)

73. Rusk msg to Ambassador Lodge, 21 May 1964 (State 2027).

74. Lodge msg to Secretary Rusk, 26 May 1964 (State 2318). (Excerpt in Back-up Notebook)

75. From a draft memorandum to President Johnson, "Scenario for Strikes on North Vietnam," 23 May I965. (in State Dept Material, Vol l)

76. Ibid .

77. Rusk msg to Ambassador Lodge, 22 May 1964 (State 2049). (in file of materials prepared for Secretary McNamara, "Honolulu Conference on Southeast Asia," CFll)

78. Draft memorandum to President, 23 May 1964.

79. Memo for Record, "Possible Items for Back-up Book," 27 May 1964. (in Vietnam 38I: I6-31 May file)

80. SNIE 50-2-64, "Probable Consequences of Certain U.S. Actions with Respect to Vietnam and Laos," 25 May 1964.

81. Ibid ., pp. 2-3

82. Ibid ., pp. 5-6 (\inderlining added)

83- McGeorge Bundy meiuorandum to Secretary Rusk, et.al . , Draft - Basic Recommendation and Projected Course of Action on Southeast Asia," 25 May 1964 (w/Attachment). (in State Dept Material, Vol l)

84. Attachment to Ibid., p. 1

85- Ibid., pp. 1-2

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86. CJCS memorandum to SecDef, "Scenario for Strikes on Worth Vietnam (Noise Levels - Telegraphing Actions)," 30 May 196^^ (jCSM-il69-64). (in Vietnam 38I : Sensitive file.)

87. Attachment to Bundy memorandum to Rusk, 25 May 196^+, pp. 2-5, passim.

88. Canadian delegation (Saigon) msg to Dept of State, 20 June 196^^. (in Vietnam 38I : II-30 June 196^.)

89. President's msg to Ambassador Lodge, 26 May 196^ (State 208?)• (In CFll.)

90. Attachment to Bundy memorandum to Rusk, 25 May 196^, p.3-

j ■ 91. State msg to Secretary Rusk (New Delhi Embassy), 29 May 196^1 (State

• TOSEC 36). See also Ball msg to diplomatic posts, 29 May 196^ (State Circular 2229). (in CFll.)

92. State msg to Saigon and New Delhi Embassies, 2? May 196^ (State 2095). (In CFll.)

93. Ibid . 91+. Ibid.

l(^ 95, Taylor msg to Admiral Felt and General Harkins, 28 May 19Gk (JCS 2625-

■^^ 6h). (In CFll.)

' 96. Taylor memorand.um to SecDef, "Transmittal of JCSM-I+71-6J+, 'Objectives

and Courses of Action -- Southeast Asia,'" 2 June 196h (CM-1^50-64). (In Vietnam 38I : 1-10 June 196^.)

97. JCS memorandiom to SecDef, "Objectives and Courses of Action — Southeast Asia," 2 June 196^1 (JCSM-1+71-64). (in Vietnam 38I : 1-10 June I96I1.) . .

98. Ibid .

99. Rusk (CINCPAC) msg to State, "Highlights of General Khanh Conversation with Secretary, May 3I/' 2 June 1964 (SECTO 37). (in State Dept Material, Vol I.)

II 100. Enclosure to CINCPAC letter to SecDef, "Summary Record of Plenary

Session, Special Meeting on Southeast Asia, 1-2 June I96I+," 8 June I96U. (In Vietnam 38I : 1-10 June file.)

101. Ibid . • •• ■ ■

102. VJm. Bundy Mem-O for Record, "Tuesday Afternoon Session in Honolulu, June 2, I96U," 3 J^ane I96U. (in State Dept Material, Vol I.)

103. Ibid., pp. 2-k, passim .

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10l|. Ibid > J p.4.

105. lipid ., pp. i|-7^

106. Ibid ., pp. 7-9-

107. Wm. Bandy memorandum to Secretary Rusk, "Highlights of Honolulu Conference," 3 June 196^. (in State Dept Material, Vol I.)

108. Ibid., pp. 5-6.

109. Bundy note to Secretary McNamara, General Taylor, Mr. McCone, with } ■ Ibid, attached, 3 June I96U. (in Vietnaja 38I : 1-10 June fxle.J

110. SecDef Mil Ass't memorandum to Chairman, JCS, 3 June 196^. (in Vietnam 381 : 1-10 June file.)

111. SecDef Mil Ass't memorandiim to General Burchinal, k June I96U. (In Vietnam 38I : 1-10 June file.)

' 112. airchinal memorandum to Army Chief of Staff, "Actions Stemming from

Honolulu Meeting, 1-2 June I96I1," k June 196^+ (DJSM-941-64) . (In Vietnam 38I : I-10 June file.)

113. See New York Times , 21 June 196^+.

llif. Manning memorandum to Secretary McNamara, "Southeast Asia Information I Requirements," 10 June 196^+. (in Vietnam 38I : 1-10 June file.)

1! 115. Memorandum for discussion, "Alternative Public Positions for U.S.

' ' on Southeast Asia for the Period July 1 - November 15, 10 June 1964.

(in State Dept Material, Vol I.)

f i 116. Rostov memorandum to President Johnson, "Southeast Asia: June 6, 196^1,"

(w/Attachment: Draft Presidential Statement -- Southeast Asia). (In Vietnam 38I : 1-10 June file.)

117. See Washington Post , I5 June 196^, for coverage of the Rusk speech; New York Times , 2k June 196^1, for the President's news conference.

118. Kent meraorand.um for Director, CIA, "Would the Loss of South Vietnam and Laos Precipitate a 'Domino Effect' in the Far East?" - 9 June I96U, pp. 1-2. (In State Dept Material, Vol I.)

119. Ibid ., p.2. . •

120. CM-1^1-50-6^, 2 June 196^1. . ' ■

121. Taylor memorandum to SecDef, "Comments of the CJCS on JCSM-^71-6U, Objectives and Courses of Action -- SEA," 5 J™e 196^1 {Cli-lk'^l-Gk). (in Vietnam 381 : 1-10 June I96U file.)

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122. McNamara memorandiom to CJCS, 10 Jime 196^.

123. JCm-h^l-Gk, 2 June I96U. 12l|. CM-1^51-6^4, 5 June I96U.

125. Memorandum for discussion^ 10 June I96U-

126. Wm. Bundy memorand,um to discussants, "Probable Developments and the Case for a Congressional Resolution/' 12 June 196^? PP- I-63 passim , (in State Dept Material, Vol I.)

127. McGeorge Bundy memorand.um to SecState and SecDef, 15 June 196^4-(w/attachments). (in Vietnam 38I : 11-30 June 196^ file.)

128. Memorandum, for meeting on June I5, 1964, "Elements of a Southeast Asian Policy that Does Not Includ.e a Congressional Resolution," 15 June 196^1. (in Vietnam 38I : 11-30 June 1964 file.)

129. Ibid., p.2.

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