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IV. B. ii-. PHA SED W Tri-E)RAWAL OF U,S, FORCES

1962-^196^

TAB LE OP COriTEM'S and OUT'LBIE

P age

Introduction ' 1

The Secretary of Defense tlonolulu Decisions of July I962 3

National Camijaign Plan 5

Comprehensive Plan for South Vietnam 6

Secretary of Defense Honolulu Decisions of May 19^3 ^^

MAP Planning ' ^3

1000"Man Withdrawal 15

The Buddhist Crisis ' I6

McWama re "Taylor Mission to South Vietnam^ October I963 1<^

The rioveniber Coup and Overthrow of Diem 24

Assassination of President Kennedy ^5

Accelerated Model Plan of the CPSVN ' • • ^^

The 1000-Man VJithdrawal of December I963 30

The Vietnam Situation Worsens 30

Demise of the CPSVN 37

Build-Up of the U.S. Force Commitment 37

Postscript to Withdrawal Planning • « • 39

FIGU RES

1. CPSVK " Total U.S. Supported Forces . 8

2. CPS\n\- " Forecast of Phase-Out of U.S. Forces 10

3. CPSVN - Phase Dovm of U.S. Forces 27

l\. CPSVN " Phase Down of GVH Forces 28

5. CPSVK - MAP Cost 29

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IV. B. h. PHASED WITHDRAWAL OF U.S. FORCE S

1962-1964

IM'RODUCTION

From mid-1962 to early 196^! the U.S. government went through a formal planning process^ ostensibly designed to disengage the U.S. from direct and large-scale military involvement in Vietnam. In retrospect5 this experience falls into place as a more or less isolated episode of secondary importance; eventually abortive, it had little impact on the evolution of the Vietnam war. It does^ however, serve as a vehicle for understanding one long phase of the war and the U.S. role in it.

The genesis lay in a conjuncture of circumstances during the first half of 1962 that prompted the U.S. to shift its Vietnam perspective from the hitherto restricted one of largely tactical responses to cuj-rent, localized, and situational requirements, to fitting these to more strategic and purposeful long-range courses of action. The expanded perspective was programmatic in outlook, and oriented toward specific goals -- end the insu-Tgency and withdraw militarily from Vietnam.

. At the outset, the motivation for the idea of phased withdrawal of U.S. forces was threefold: in part, the belief that developments in Vietnam itself were going well; in part, doubt over the efficacy of using U.S.. forces in an internal war; and in part, the demands of other crises in the . world that were more important to Washington than Vietnam. In the course of materializing into policy and assujning form as plans, these premises were transformed into conclusions, desiderata institutionalized as objectives, and v/ish took on the character and force of jinperative.

For example, in March I962, Secretary McNamara testified before Congress that he was "optimistic" over prospects for U.S. success in aiding Vietnam, and "encouraged at the progress the South Vietnamese are making." He expressed conviction that the U.S. would attain its objectives there. But he emphasized that the U.S. strategy v/as to avoid participating directly in the war while seeking an early military conclusion: 1/

"l would say definitely we are approaching it from the point of view of trying to clean it up, and terminating subversion, covert aggression, and combat operations....

"...We are wise to carry on the operations against the Communists in that area by assisting native forces rather than by using U.S. forces for combat.

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"Not only does that release U.S. forces for use elsewhere in the world or for stationing in the United States^ but also it is probably the most effective way to combat the Communist subversion and covert aggression. To introduce white forces --U.S. forces -- in large numbers there today, while it might have an initial favorable military impact would almost certainly lead to adverse political and in the long run adverse military operations. And therefore, we think the prograjn we are carrying out is the most effective one and certainly it is directed toward termination of operations as rapidly as possible."

In late spring of I962, the military situation in South Vietnam showed hopeful signs of at last having turned a corner. The various programs under way, initiated the previous fall as a result of decisions in NSAM lo. Ill5appeared to be bearing out the basic soundness of the ne\j approach. Assessments and evaluations being reported from the field indicated a pattern of progress on a broad front, and their consistency through time reinforced the impression. By mid-year the prospects looked bright. Continuing favorable developments now held forth the promise of eventual success, and to many the end of the insurgency seemed in sight. This optimism was not without the recognition that there were unsolved political problems and serious soft spots in certain areas of the military effort. But U.S. leadership, both on the scene in Vietnam as well as in Washington, was confident and cautiously optimistic. In some quarters, even a measure of euphoria obtained.

At the same time, events outside Vietnam, some of them ostensibly unrelated, were asserting a direct and immediate relevance for U.S. policy and strategy in Vietnam. As competing priorities, they far overshadov/ed Vietnam. In the larger scheme of things, an indefinite military commitment in Southeast Asia was being relegated perforce to a parenthetical diversion the nation could then ill afford. More central issues in Berlin, Cuba, and in Laos were at stake, perhaps even to the extent of survival.

Looming foremost was the Berlin problem. Fraught with grave overtones of potential nuclear confrontation vrlth the USSR, it reached crisis proportions in the spring of I962 over the air corridor issue, and after a temporary lull, flared anew in early summer. By the first of July it was again as tense as ever. U.S. reserves ha.d been recalled to active duty, additional forces were deployed to Europe, and domestic Civil Defense activities, including shelter construction programs, were accelerated.

The burgeoning Cuba problem too was taking on a pressing urgency by virtue of both its proximity and grovzing magnitude. The Castro aspects alone were becoming more than a vexing localized embarrassment. Given the volatile Caribbean political climate, Cuba^n inspired mischief could raise tensions to the flash point momentarily. Moreover, by early si^mmer of 1962 increasing evidence of Soviet machinations to exploit Cuba militarily was rapidly adding an alarming strategic dimension. Though the

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nature and full significance of these latter developments would not be revealed until the climactic Cuban Missile Crisis a few months later, the U.S. was already apprehensive of serious danger on its very doorstep. Official interpretive evaluations at the time saw an intimate causal nexus between Berlin and Cuba.

Finally, another set of factors altering the strategic configuration in Southeast Asia and affecting the U.S. position there also came to a head in mid-summer of I962. These were developments regarding Laos, which impinged upon and helped reshape the U.S. relationship toward^Vietnam. In the fall of 196I and throu^gh the spring of I962 the U.S., its ^objectives frustrated in laos, had decided to salvage as much as possible by settling for neutralization. After lengthy and complex diplomatic maneuvering, this was essentially achieved by early summer. On 23 July 1962 the ill-nation declaration and protocol on the neutrality of Laos was signed formally, ending the 15-month Geneva Conference on Laos. The outcome had at once the effect of extricating the U.S. from one insoluble dilemma and serving as a stark object lesson for another. The Laos settlement now both allowed the U.S. a free hand to concentrate on Vietnam^and provided the incentive and determination to bring to a close its military commitment there as well -- but this time successfi^ly.

It was in this spirit and context that the U.S. decided to pursue actively the policy objective of divesting itself of direct military involvement of U.S. personnel in the Vietnam insurgency. The aim was to create militarily favorable conditions so that further U.S. military involvem-ent would no longer be needed. To this end, two prerequisites had to be satisfied: bringing the insurgency effectively under control; and^simultaneously, developing a militarily viable South Vietnam capable of carrying its own defense burden without U.S. military help. In phase with the progress^ toward both these goals, there then could be proportionate reductions m U.S. forces.

THE SECEETARY OF DEFENSE HOITOLULU DECISIONS OF JULY 196.2 2/

In July 1962, as the prospect of the neutralization of Laos by the Geneva Conference became imininent, policy attention deliberately^turned toward the remaining Vietnam problem. At the behest of the President, the Secretary of Defense undertook to reexamine the situation there and address himself to its future -- with a view to assuring that it be brought to a successful conclusion within a reasonable time. Accordingly, he called a fall-dress conference on Vietnam at CINCPAC Headciuarters in Hawaii. On 23 July, the same day that the l^l-nation neutralization declaration on Laos was formally signed in Geneva, the Sixth Secretary of Defense^ Conference convened in Honolulu.

The series of briefings.and progress reports presented at the conference depicted a generally favorable situation. Things were steadily

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improving and promised to continue. Most programs underway were moving forward5 as the statistical indicators clearly demonstrated. Those directly related to prosecution of the counterinsLirgency effort showed measurable advances being made toward winning the war. Programs for expanding and improving RVMF capability were likewise coming along well^ and in most cases;, were ahead of schediile. Confidence and optimism prevailed. -

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Impressed^ Mr. McNamara acknowledged that the "trem_endous progress" in the past six months was gratifying. He noted, however, that these achievements had been the result of short-term ad hoc actions on a crash basis. What was needed now was to conceive a long-range concerted program of systematic measures for training and equipping the RVM.F and for phasing out major U.S. advisory and logistic support activities. The Secretary then asked how long a period it would take before the VC could be expected to be eliminated as a significant force. COMUSMACV, in reply to the direct question, estimated about one year from the time the RVIMAF, the Civil Guard, and the Self-Defense Corps became fully operational and began to press the VC in all areas.

The Secretary said that a conservative view had to be taken and to assume it would take three years instead of one, that is, by the latter part of 1965. He observed that it might be difficult to retain public support for U.S. operations in Vietnam indefinitely. Political pressures would build up as losses continued. Therefore, he concluded, planning must be undertaken now and a program devised to phase out U.S. military involvement. He, therefore, directed that a comprehensive long-range program be developed for buj.ldlng up South Vietnamese military capability for takin_g over defense responsibilities and phasing out the U.S. role, assuming that it would require approximately three years (end I965) for the RVM.F to be trained to the point that they could cope with the VC. The program v/as to include training requirements, equipment requirements, U.S. advisory requirements, and U.S. units.

For the record, the formulation of the decisions made and the directives for action to be taken resulting from the Conference was as follows:

a. Prepare plans for the gradual scaling down of USMA.CV during the next S-year period, elminating U.S. units and detachments as Vietnamese were trained to perform their functions.

b. Prepare programs with the objective of giving South Vietnam an adequate military capability without the need for special U.S. military assistance, to Include (1) a long-range training program to establish an

^ officer corps able to man§,ge GVN military operations, and (2) a. long-range program and requirements to provide the necessary materiel to make possible a turnover to RVmF three years from July I962,

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The U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group^ Vietnam^ had been -augmented in I96I by aviation^ coiTnnunicatibns^ and intelligence vmits^ as well as by Special Forces and other advisers. The Secretary of Defense plainly intended that plans be devised for tenuinating the mission of the augraenting units.

Three days later on 26 July^ the JCS formally directed CINCPAC to develop, a Comprehensive Plan for South Vietnam (CPSVN) in accordance vith the Secretary's decisions of 23 July. 3/ CINCPAC; in turn, so instructed COI^SMACV on ik Aug-ust, at the same time furnishing additional guidance and terms of reference elaborating on the original SecDef decisions at Honolulu and the JCS directive. The stated objective of the CPSVN was given as:

Develop a capability within military and para-military forces of the GVN by the end of CY 65 that will help the GVN to achieve the strength necessary to exercise permanent and continued sovereignty over that part of Vietnam which lies below the demarcation line v^ithout the need for continued U.S. special military assistance.

" Development of the plan was to be based on the following assumptions:

a. The insurgency will be under control at the end of three years (end of CY 65).

b. Extensive U.S. support v/ill continue to be required during the tliree year period, both to bring the insurgency under control and to prepare GVN forces for early take-over of U.S. activities.

c. Previous lAP^ funding ceilings for SVN are not applicable. Program those items essential to do this Job. hj

MATIONAL CAlvlPAIGN FLAN

Planning, in two complementary modes, got underway Immediately. Concurrently with development of the unilateral U.S. CPSVN, USMCV planners prepared a concept and proposed outline of a GVN National Campaign Plan (NCP) for launching an integrated nation-wide campaign of offensive military operations to eliminate the insurgency and restore the country to (I'^l^ control. A central purpose was to reorganize and redispose the VNAP and streamline the chain of command, in order to improve responsiveness, coordination, and general effectiveness of the military effort against the VC. Greater authority would be centralized in the Vietnamese Joint General Staff (JGS); Corps Tactical Zones (CTZs) would be increased from three to four; and each CTZ would have its own direct air and naval support.

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Over and above organizational considerations^ the ll^Y provided for systematic intensification of aggressive operations in all CTZs to keep the VC off balance^ while simultaneously conducting clear and hold operations in support of the expanding Strategic Hamlet Program. Priority of military tasks was first to concentrate on areas north of Saigon^ then gradually shift toward the south to Saigon and the Delta. ^Z

The proposed KCP vras submitted to the CTN in October and a month later was adopted in concept and outline. On 26 November^ President Diem promulgated the necessary jjnplementing decrees and directives to effect the reorganization of the SVN armed forces and realign the chain of command. An integrated Joint Operations Center (JOC) was also established and became operational on 20 December_j vrith representation from JGS and its counterpart in USMCV to centralize control over current operations. The following January the draft of a detailed implementing plan for the NCP itself was completed and subsequently approved. 6/

COMPREHENSIVE PLAN POR SOUT H VIETIVM

Meanwhile, the first cut at the CPSVN was also completed by the MACV planners. It was forwarded to CINCPAC on 7 December, but CINCPAC, upon reviewing the proposed plan, considered it infeasible because of the high costs involved and the marginal capacity of the RVNAF to train the necessary personnel in the required skills within the time frame specified. As a result of COTCPAC^s reaction to the initial version, the CPSVN was revised and resubmitted by COMUSIvIACV on 19 January I963. 7/ The new CPSVN covered the period FY 1963-19®- In transmitting it, COMUSIMCV reconijnended that future Military Assistance Programs (MAPs) be keyed therefore to the CPSVN. He also indicated that the CPSVN had been coordinated with the Ambassador, who concurred in it. 8/

Force levels laid out in the CPSVN provided for total personnel increases reaching a peak of i]-58,000 (regular and para-military) in FY 6^1-, with RVNAF manning strengt-h raised from 215,000 to a peak of 230,000 in the same FY period and remaining on that plateau thereafter. Order of magnitude costs (in $ millions) of the CPSVN would come to:

FY 63 TL Q\' FY 65 FY GG FY 67 FY @ TOTAL

187 218 153 138 169 113 97O

CINCPAC approved the CPSVN as submitted and sent it on to the JCS.

j( However^ in the interim, OSD had issued dollar guidelines for MAP planning

for Vietnam. The ceilings indicated therein were significantly at variance

11 . ' with the costing figures employed by MACV in developing the CPSVN. 9/ Wlien

CINCPAC foi-.7arded the plan, therefore, he went to considerable leng-bhs to explain the discrepancies and to support aiid justify the higher costs. Comparison of the DOD dollar guidelines with the CPSVN, projected through FY G^^ showed a net difference of approximately GG million dollars, vrith

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the preponderance of the increase occurring in FY ft. lO/ Most of this difference was accounted for by additional Packing-Crating-Handling-Transportation (PCHP) costs associated with the CPSVN but not accommodated in the DOD guideline figures.

The body of the CPSVN laid out the costs in relation to the DOD dollar guidelinesJ as follows:

-■"■ ■ CPSW " DOD DOLLAR GUIDELII\1ES COST COMPARISON ($ millions)

PY ft FY 63 FY 66 FY 67 FY ffl FY 69 TOTAL

CTSYm "2i8~ 153 ~8" "Tg9~ 113 110 901 ■

DOD Guidelines l6o 165 16O I50 l40 122 897 Difference +58" -12 -22 +19 -27 -12 +?

PCHT Added "^l^ lii lii iii ±10 +8 t^ Difference ' +^9 -1 -11 +30 -I7 ~^ +^

^"Excludes PCHT.

The rationale offered was that^ in order to prosecute the counter-insurgency to a successful conclusion^ while at the same time building up GVN capability to allow early withdravral of U.S. forces^ the major costs of the program had to be compressed into the FY 63-65 time frame; with a particular increase in FY ft and another following U.S. withdrawal in FY 67. ll/ But clearly most of the greater cost throughout the period reflected PCHT.

The pattern of force levels for all South Vietnamese forces that the CPSVTJ provided for, including the separate non-^lAP funded Civilian Irregular Defense Group, is shown in Figure 1. ' .

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1963

1964

1965 1966

FISCAL YEAR

1967

1968

12-9-68-1

FIGURE 1

CPSVN -Total U.S. Supported Forces (U)

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Since the ultimate objective of the CPSVN was early withdrawal of U.Se special military assistance, the plan provided for phasing out U.S. advisory forces. The affected major coimnands of USMACV that would largely not be req,uired after FY 66 were;

1. The U.S. Marine Element which provided helicopter transportation support.

2. The 2d Air Division which provided the USAF portion of the special military assistance support perforraed in SVN. This support- included "Famigate" (Fighter), "Mule Train" (Transportation), and "Able Mable" (Reconnaissance). It also provided USAF administration and logistical support for USAF personnel and equipment engaged in special military assistance to SM.

3. U.S. Army Support Group Vietnam (USASGV) which provided the U.S. Arn^y portion of the special military assistance support for SVN (except that performed by MAAG and Headquarters MACV), including helicopter and fixed wing air transportation, signal con-jmunications, and special forces. It also provided U.S. administrative and logistical support for assigned and attached personnel and equipment engaged in the special military assistance.

h. Headquarters Support Activity Saigon (hSAS) which provided

administrative support to the U.S. Headquarters and other U.S. government sponsored agencies and activities located in Saigon.

5. I^AG Vietnam would have its strength reduced by one-half after FY 65. Only 1,500 MAAG personnel were to remain in country after FY ''''

The target schedule for U.S. force withdrawal, as then forecast, is contained in Figure 2. 12/

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(thousands)

12-9-68-2

FIGURE 2

CPSVN - Forecast of Phase-Out of U.S. Forces (U)

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On 7 March 1963, the JCS accepted the iViACV CPSVW in toto and forwarded it to the Secretary of Defense. They reconmiended approval_, and proposed that it be the basis for both revising the FY 6^ I^LAI^ and development of the FI 65-69 MAPS. They rec[uested an early decision on the CPSVN because the greatest increase would occur in the FY 6k MAP. The JCS fully supported the higher costs of the CPSVN above the WD dollar guidelines. I3/

In OSD; the proposed CPSVN underwent staffing review in ISA MA Plans and elsewhere. Draft responses to the JCS were prepared and then withdrawn. Secretary McNamara was not satisfied with either the high funding levels or the adequacy of the plan regarding exactly hov?" the RVN forces Mere to take over from the U.S. to effect the desired phase-out of the U.S. military commitment. In mid-April he decided to withhold action pending full review of the CPSVN at another Honolulu conference which he expressly scheduled for that purpose for 6 May. Meantime^ the various OSD agencies concerned were instructed to prepare detailed analyses and background studies for him- 1^!-/

The main focus of interest of the Secretary of Defense was on the policy objective behind the CPSVN;, namely^ to reduce systematically the scale of U.S. involvement until phased out completely. Hovrever^ the beginnings of a counter-current were already evident. New demands for increases all around were to overwhelm the phasing out objective. Ad hoc requirements for more U.S. forces were being generated piecemeal^ each in its own right sufficiently reasonable and so honored. This current^ counter-current dynamic can be illustrated well by Mr. McNamara's decisions of late March. As part of the Secretary's policy of demanding strict accounting and tight control on authorized U»S. in-country strength ceilings^ he asked for the latest reading on projected U.S. military strength to be reached in Vietnam. He was reassured by the Chairman^ JCS_, that the estiinated peak would not exceed 15^0-1-0 personnel. Yet^ on this very same day^ the Secretary approved a substantial force augmentation;, requested earlier^ for FAMGATE and airlift support; involving 111 additional aircraft and a total of approximately 1^75 additional personnel. I5/ Other similar special requirements and ad hoc approvals soon were to follow.

Assessments of continuing favorable developm^ents in the improving Vietnam situation in the spring of I963 seemed to warrant more than ever going ahead with the planned phase out. The general tenor of appraisals at the USMACV level v/ere that the RVNAF had regained the initiative from the VC and that the GW position had improved militarily^ economically,, and polj-tically. Evaluations expressed in the "Sumjiaary of Highlights" covering the first year of MACV*s existence cited in detail the record of the increasing scale^ frequency^ and effectiveness of RVNAF operations^ v;hile those of the VC v^ere declining. Casualty ratios favored RVNAF by more than two to one^, and the balance of weapons captured vs weapons lost had also shifted to the GVN side. Cited as perhaps the most significant progress was the Strategic Hamlet Program. The future looked even brighter^ e.g.; "...barring greatly increased resupply and reinforcement of the Viet Cong by infiltration^ the mil3.tary phase of the war can be virtually v7on in 1963." 16/

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Other evaluations^ though more conservative,, still tended to corroborate this optimism. NIE 53-63^ issued 17 April 19^3; fomid no particular deterioration or serious problems in the military situation in South Vietnam; on the contrary^ it saw some noticeable itnprovements and gen&ral progress over the past year. The worst that it could say was that the situation "remains fragile." 1T/

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE HONOLULU DECISIONS OF MAY 1963 -

At the 6 May Honolulu Conference; briefing reports again confirmed gratifying progress in the military situation. Addressing the CPSTO^ Mr. McNamara q.uestioned the need for more Vietnamese forces in FY ffi (224.4 thousand) than the present level of 215 thousand. His reasoning was that a poor nation of 12 million like Vietnam could not support that many men under arms. Qualitatively_, furthermore^ the planned evolution of VMF seemed overambitious in terms of sophisticated v;eaponry such as fighter aircraft. In s-um^ the Secretary felt the CPSVI^ assumed an unrealistically high force level for the SVN military establishment and assigned it equipment that was both \anduly complicated to operate and expensive to procure and maintain.

Based on these considerations^ the Secretary of Defense concluded that^ if the insurgency came under control in FY 65 as anticipated^ the U.S. MAP investment in SVN thereafter should not be more than at the rate of about $50 million per year. In his view^ thus^ the $573 million MAP proposed in the CPSVN for the period FY 65 through FY 63 was at least $270 million higher than an acceptable program.

With regard to phasing out U.S. forces^ the Secretary of Defense stated that the pace contemplated in the CPSVN was too slow. He v^^anted it revised to accomplish a more rapid withdrawal by accelerating training programs in order to speed up replacement of U.S. units by ^'^ units as fast as possible. Wliile recognizing that the build-up of RVNAF was inherently a slow process^ he stressed that in the instance of some U.S. units which had been in SVN since I96I; it would be possible more rapidly to transfer functions to Vietnamese. Specifically toward this end, he decided that 1^000 UoS.- military personnel should be withdrawn from South Vietnam by the end of CY 63 and directed that concrete plans be so drawn up. I8/

On returning to Washingt.on the Secretary of Defense instructed the ASD(ISA) on 8 May to develop^ in coordination with the Joint Staff; a plan for replacing U.S. forces currently deployed in Vietnam with indigenous SVN forces as rapidly as possible^ and particularly^ to prepare a plan for withdrawing 1;000 U.S. troops before the end of 1965- In another memorandum the same day to the ASD(ISA) regarding the MP; he noted that "the plan needs to be completely reworked." He therefore instructed ISA also to develop a neW; lovrer I^lAP for Vietnam for the period Yi 65 through 69; requesting that the ISA reconimendations be submitted by the first of September. I9/

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A day later^ on 9 May^ the JCS formally directed CINCPAC to take the necessary actions resulting from the Honolulu Conference and revise the CPSVN. Guidance and terms of reference were provided reflecting the Secretary of Defense reactions and specifying the decisions reached. Singled out especially was the req_uirement for U.S. force withdrawal. The JCS directive read:

As a matter of urgency a plan for the withdrawal of about 1;000 U.S. troops "before the end of the year should be developed based upon the assijmption that the progress of the counter-insurgency campaign would warrant such a move. Plans should be based upon withdrawal of US units (as opposed to individuals) by replacing them with selected and specially trained RWAF units. 20 /

COMUS-IACV in turn was tasked to draft the revised CPSW and prepare a plan for the 1000-man reduction. CINCPAC^ after some changes and revisions^ concurred in the proposed plans and forwarded them to the JCS on 11 May. The revised outline CPSVN nov; provided for the following SW force levels (in' thousands):

FY (h FY 6$ FY 66 FT 6j FY 68 FY 69 Total Military and Para-military l^^T.i^ ^^^5.5 362.9 317.1 263.8 2lij-.7

MAP levels provided for were as follows (in $ millions): .

FY 6^- FY 63 ' .FY 66 . FY 67 FY 6B FY 69 Grand Total

178.9 i^-9-O 130.3 120J^ 100.5 85.0 76^^-1.

' The proposed plan for withdrawal of the first increment of U.S. forces_, in compliance with instructions^; emphasized units rather than individuals^ but the list of so-called "units" scheduled to be included were all smaller than company size. All Services were represented. The criteria employed^ also based on earlier guidance^ were to select most of the personnel from service support and logistics skills most easily spared and whose release would have least effect on operations. The total came to 1^003 U.S. military personnel to be withdrawn from South Vietnara by the end of December 1963- 2l /

MAP PLAMING

ISA meanv/hile developed tentative dollar guidelines for MAP planning for Vietnam. The first cut^ based on the Secretary of Defense's own suggested total for the FY 65-69 period; was rejected by the Secretary of Defense as too high and returned^ with various desired reductions entered by the Secretary of Defense. 22/ Reconciling the ^lAP with the CPSVN proved to be a difficult problem. As CPSVN succeeded^ it was logical that I4AP would have to increase; yet CPSVN tried to cut back MAP as well. >—>. For instance^ the contemplated phase-out of U.S. artillery-spotter aircraft

sq_uadrons entailed an add-on to MAP to accom-modate the sq_uadron*s equipment and maintenance after transferral to the Vietnamese.

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Toward the end of May the MAP dollar ceiling for FY 6^ was established at $l80 million* But for the period after PY 64 both the MAP and the CPSVN were far from being settled. On 29 May CJNCPAC was directed to develop three a3_ternative plans in comparative terms based on the following total dollar levels for the FY 65-69 period:

a. $585 million (derived from the current proposed CPSVN) .

b. $450 million (compromise).

c. $365 million (SecDef goal).

Funding guidelines for each of the three versions were provided as follows:

Plan ($ millions) FY 65 ¥1 G6 FY 67 FY "g3 FY 69

585 150 130 120 100 85

450 150 .120 70 ■ 60 50

365 125 90 50 50 50

Implied was that a choice would be made somev?-here v/ithin this range. 23/

A new^ complex MAP-CPSW planning cycle was thus set in motion that would not fully run its course for almost a year longer. CINCPAC responded by preparing the comparative analysis of the alternative MiAP levels^ as instructed_j but besides the three plans req^uired^ introduced a fourth version developed by the Joint Staff and identified as "Plan j/' which fell mid-range and came to $^50.9 million. Submitted to the JCS on I8 July^ the four plans were reviewed at lengthy with the upshot that the JCS added a fifth plan identified as the "Model M Plan^ " the total cost of which fell closer to the bottom-range figure but still came to $ifOO million. It provided for higher force levels deemed necessary during the critical period FY 65 and FY GG, and thus go above the Secretary of Defense desired ceiling of $365 million. The breakout of the Model M Plan was as follov^j

s:

FY 65 FY GG FY 67 FY 68 FY GS

SVN rnilitary strength > '. ' , " "■ .

(thousands) 225.5 ^25.5 ikQ.Q 122.0 121.2

MAP costs ($ millions) lh'^.2 117.2 51.2 h^.l lH.3

<

All five plans were forwarded by the JCS on 27 August^ with the recommendation that the Secretary of Defense approve the Model M Plan. 2hJ

.ISA concurred in the JCS recomraendation with certain minor reservations^ 25 / and on 6 September^ the Secretary of Defense accordingly approved the Model M Plan as a basis for development of the FY 65-69 MAPs.

However^ the Secretary at the same time advised the JCS that U.S. materiel turned over to SVN units would henceforth be charged to the MAP. Such costs

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therefore would have to be absorbed within the authorized Model Plan ceilings. 26/

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Nonetheless^ there were still further refinements made. As finally published^ the approved MAP reflecting the Model M Plan version of the CPSVN provided for the following SVN active military strength levfels (in thousands):

FY gl EY 63 FY 66 FY 6T FY 68 FY 69 ARW 207.5 201.3 177.5 121^, 5 10^1- -8 103.9

Total (All Services 442.5 437.0 340.2 l42.1 122.2 120.2

regular and para-military)

Costing levels were as follows (in $ millions):

FY 6^ . FY 65 FY 66 FY 67 FY @ FY 69 Total

180.6 153.0 107.7 46.2 44.6 40.7 392.2

This final product represented a radical reduction in both force levels and financial investment after FY 66_, consistent with the Administration's original policy goal of ending the war and the U.S* military involvement by December I965. 27/ '''

lOQO-MAN WITPIDRAW AL PLAN

Meanwhile^ planning for the 1000-man withdrawal directed by the Secretary of Defense on 6 May was split off from the CFSVN proper and the MAP; and was being treated as a separate entity. On 20 August^ the JCS; concurring in the proposed plan developed by COmSMACV and CINCPAC^ forvj-arded it to the Secretary of Defense. They recommended approval at this time for planning purposes only; final decision vras to depend upon circumstances as they developed. The JCS also seconded CINCPAC's added proposal to withdrav/ the 1000 troops in three or four increments_, rather than all at one time. The reasons given were that this would be more practical and efficient for the U.S.^ would miniraize the impact on on-going military operational activities within South Vietnam^ and would afford the opportunity for "news prominence and coverage over an extended period of time." 28/

ISA; v/ith certain reservations^ recommended approval of the withdrav^al plan submitted by JCS. ISA pointed out to the Secretary of Defense that the plan as it stood would not drai-T all of the 1000 troops from U.S. units that were to be relieved by adequately trained SVN -unitS; as had been intended. Many of the so-called "units" designated therein actually were not bona fide existing units but were specially formed "service support units" made up of random individuals most easily spared throughout USI'lACV. ISA cautioned that the arbitrary creation of such ad hoc "units" solely for the purpose of the withdravral might backfire in press reaction. ISA also recom-mended; in order to show credibly that the final year-end U.S. in-country

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strength had-dropped by 1000 from peak strength, that U.S. military stren^h figures in Vietnam be made public, and that the actual strength as well as the authorized ceilings at any given tirde be carefully monitored to insure that the desired reductions were indeed achieved. 29/

A few days later the Secretary of Defense approved the 1000-man withdrawal plan forwarded in JCSM-629-.63 as reconmiended. He agreed, however, with ISA and advised the JCS against creating special units if their only purpose was to be a holding unit as a vehicle for withdrawal of individuals. He also requested that he be provided with a projection of U.S. military strength in South Vietnam, by month, for the period September through December I963. 30/ ' . .

The following week the Chairman, JCS, responded to the Secretary of Defense*s request and furnished the following projection of end-of-month U.S. military strengths in South Vietnam:

August — 16,201

September- 16,^83

c October — l6,T32

November — 16,^1^56

December — 15,732

«

It was noted that the planned lOOO-man withdrawal wou2d represent a reduc- ■ tion based on the October peak strength. The first increment of 276 personnel would be withdrawn during November and the remaining increments in December. 31/ This, as it turned out, was destined to be changed somewhat before the withdrawal was executed.

THE BUDD HIST CRISIS

VThile the CPSVN-KiAP and withdrawal planning were going on, significant developments altering the character of the entire situation to which the planning effort vms addressed--in fact threatening to invalidate the very premises from which the planning sprung--were occurring within South Vietnam. The Buddhist crisis was rocking the foundations of v^hat precarious political stability the Diem government enjoyed and there was growing concern about its effect on the prosecution of the war against the VC and on improvements of EVN/vF.

A series of incidents beginning early in May revealed the deep divisions betv/een militant Buddhist factions, who purported to speak for the buJ.k of the South Vietnamese population, and the Government, tock of popular support for the Diem regime had now turned to open opposition. As passions flared

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and Buddhist activism was met with increasingly severe counterrneasures^ violence spread and grev more serious. A tenuous truce was reached briefly betvrcen Buddhist leaders and the GVN on 10 June (formally signed on l6 June) in a mutual effort to reduce tensions—but proved short-lived. Almost immediately the actions of both sides repudiated the agreements. 32/

The U.S. began to be apprehensive about the possible consequences of the Diem governm.ent falling as the result of a coup. By early July, the crisis was recognized as serious at the highest levels of the U.S. Government. 33/

Through mid-July assessments remained reasonably reassuring. There was little evidence of Impact on the military sector. In fact, indications pointed to the military situation continuing to ijnprove. DIA reported on 17 July that the general level of VC-initiated actions during the first six months of I963 was considerably lower than for the same period the year before. Battalion and company-size attacks were at about half the 1962 level. It was noted, however, that despite reduced activity, VC capability remained essentially unimpaired. Regarding the progress of South Vietnamese counterinsurgency efforts, the DIA evaluation was cautiously optimistic: though there was still a long way to go, GVN prospects "are certainly better than they were one year ago." 3^/

Quite abruptl^r, a disturbing element began to emerge. Little more than two weeks later, the DIA Intelligence Bulletin of k August reported a significant increase in the level of VC offensive actions. Moreover, the rate was high for the third week in a row since mid-July. 35/ The clear iiiiplication was that the VC at last were taking advantage of the opportunity presented by the Buddhist crisis. It had been expected--and feared—that they would seek to hasten political collapse and exploit whatever military vulnerabilities there were. The U.S. was thus justifiably concerned lest the recent revived VC aggressiveness be the opening phase of a stepped up insurgency. Within ten days of this DIA report, however, a reevaluation of the significance to be attached to the increased rate of enemy actions allayed fears somewhat. On 1^^ August, SACSA, reporting to the Secretary of Defense, discounted the upsurge in VC activity over the past month. Its magnitude, comparatively, was below the average of the preceding year and fell far short of the previous high. In this perspective, . SACSA saw no cause to read undue implications into developm-ents that were as yet neither particularly salient nor of long duration. 36/

The political crisis meanwhile took a turn for the worse. President Diem, in an attempt to regain control, declared martial law on 20 August. The decree was accompanied by forcible entry into pagodas and mass arrests of Buddhist leaders and laity, and was immediately followed by a series of preem_ptoi-y repressive measures. Any hope of reconciliation was now shattered, and the Diem government was irrevocably isolated.

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The Director^ DIA^ in a special report to the Secretary of Defense^ expressed concern that the declaration of martial law "will have serious repercussions throughout the country." He foresaw further coup or counter-coup activity in the making^ though for the time being the military had effectively assumed full control. So far^ he saw little military effect on the war effort; relatively few troops had been withdrawn from noiTnal missions. 37./ At an August 31 review of the problem for Vice President Johnson; Secretary of State Rusk and Secretary McNamara agreed that U.S. planning had to be based on two principles-~that the U.S. would not pull out of Vietnam until the war were won, and that it would not participate in a coup d^etat against Diem. 38/

For the next month; as the precarious political situation balanced on the brink of imminent disaster,, U.S. anxieties mounted. The Administration was confronted by a dilemiTia. It was helpless to ameliorate conditions as long as Diem remained in power--nor did it want to.approve and support such a regime. Yet at the same time^ it was equally helpless to encoujrage a change of government--there was no feasible replacement anywhere on the South Vietnamese political horizon. The upshot was an ambivalent policy of watchful waiting tovrard the aVN^ while the main preoccupation and focus of attention was on the conduct of the South Vietnam^ese military forces and the progress of the counterinsurgency programs. These still remained the first order of business.

McMMARA-TAYLOR MISSION TO SOUT H V IETWAI^l, OCTOBER 19^3

By the middle of September^ the President was deeply concerned over the critical political situation^ but more iraportantly; over its effect on the war, A decision juncture had been reached. At issue was the U.S. military commitment in South Vietnam; a redirection of U,S. policy and objectives might be required. On 21 September, the President directed the Secretary of Defense, in company with the Chairman, JCS, to proceed to South Vietnam for a personal examination of the military aspects of the situation. The President gave as the purpose of the trip "... my desire to have the best possible on-the-spot appraisal of the military and paramilitary effort to defeat the Viet Cong." He stated that there had been, at least until recently, "heartening results, " but that political deterioration since May had raised serious questions about the continued effectiveness of these efforts and the prospects for success. The President, therefore, needed an assessment of the present situation, and if the McNamara-Taylor prognosis were not hopeful, they were to recommend needed actions by the SVW and steps the U.S. should take to bring about those actions. 39/

The Secretary of Defense and the CJCS, accompanied by a team of civilian and military assistants to help in the survey, arrived in South Vietnam on 26 September and returned to Washing^bon on 2 October. During their visit, detailed data were compiled for them, presentations prepared, extensive briefings given, conferences convened, and consultations held. Baerging from the investigations and appraisals was a body of positive evidence

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indicating that conditions were good and prospects improYing. In fact,^ in the course of these reassurances^j the Secretai-y of Defense decided to order a speed up of the planned program for release of U.S. forces. In guidance fui'nished at the time^ he directed that the projected schedules for force reduction provided for in the cvirrently approved Model M Plan version of the CPSTO be accelerated by approximately six nionths. Accordingly^ necessary planning revisions were undertaken iirMediately on a priority basis

.s.

In contrast to the generally favorable military situation^, however^ there v/ere grave laisgivings about the political state of affairs. Earlier^ a draft te>ct of a proposed letter from the President of the United States to President Diem of the WN had been for\'/arded by cable to the Secretary of Defense and the Ambassador^ with a request for their reaction and comments. Pi^esident Kennedy himself, thought the letter too extreme^ and would reluctantly resort to it only if the situation was found so serious that such direct US Presidential pressure was necessary. The text of the proposed letter was characterised by harsh^ blunt candor. In effect it laid dov/n an ultimatmi: unless the GVN changed the repressive policies^ methods_, and actions practiced by some individual officials and gained for itself a broad base of popular political suj^port; the United States might have to consider disassociating itself from the Diem Government^ and further US support of Vietnam might become impossible. The Secretary of Defense and the Atnbassador prompt3.y responded with a strong recommendation against tra'nsmitting the proposed letter. Both agreed that the situation was indeed very^^serious^ but that it \ms not likely to be influenced by such a letter to Diem."^

The proposed Presidential letter was not sent. Instead^ many of the points v^ere conveyed in conversations with Diem/^^ and^ just before the departure of the McNamara-Taylor Mission from Vietnam,, another letter to President Diem was composed and sent in its place. The new version was not only much softer in tone and more circumspect but went out over the signature of General Taylor as Chairman^ Joint Chiefs of Staff. The letter was dated 1 October 1963,, but was delivered on 2 October^ v^ith the approval of the Secretary of Defense and with the concurrence of the US Ambassador to Vietnam. (Lodge).

In this letter the CJCS offered his personal^ professional comments on the military situation^ in response to Diem's earlier expressed interest in receiving them. After acknowledging the encouraging military progress over the preceding two years^ the CJCS stated^ "it vras not until the recent political disturbances beginning in May and continuing through August and beyond that I personally had any doubt as to the ultimate succeris of our campaign against the Viet Cong." He then added:

:K-

Msg State VfE to Saigon^ 2k Sep 63^ TOP SECHEP EYES OI^Y for AT^IBASSADOE LODGE and SECFETARY MciMAlIAPvA; MSG Saigon 593 to State^ 24 Sep 63^ TOP SECKKT EYES Ol'ILY for PRESIDELIT EBQ-l McKMAM.

^

-5^ Airgram^ Saigon Py-^hh to State^ 3 Oct 63; Subj: "McEamara-Taylor Mission Memo of Conversation with President Diem^ Sep 29^ I963/' SECRET.

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"]^Io\r^ as Secretary Kcl^amara has told. yoU; a serious doubt hangs over our hopes for the futujre. Can ve win together in the face of the reaction to the measures taken by your Government against the Buddhists and the students? As a military man I -would say that we can vin providing there are no further political setbacks. The military indicators are still genei^ally favorable and can be made more so by actions readily within the power of your Government. If you will allow me^ I would mention a few of the military actions which I believe necessary for this

improvem.ent."

The Chairm.8n noted that though the military situation in I; 11^ and III Corps-areas was generally good^ some of the hard-core war zones of the Viet Cong remained virtually lontouched. There were not enough offensive actions against the enemy in the field and'^ in his opinion^ the full potential of the military units was not being exploited^ for "...only a ruthless^ tireless offensive can win the war."

The principal military problems_, he pointed out_, were now in the Delta; and the time had.come to concentrate efforts there. An overhaul of the Strategic Hamlet Prograon was needed. For it to succeed^ there must be a related clear-pnd-hold campaign by the combat units of IV CorpS; and the tactics shouJLd be oriented to the waterways that were a natural characteristic of the region. Furthermore^ infantry line Linits would have to operate at full strength, without diversion of combat poorer to rear echelon functions. The CJCS suggested that this latter problem was the case in ARVN generally^ which President Diem might v^ant to examine closely.

Finally he summed up what was intended as the statement of the US position:

"In closing, Mr. President, may I give you my most important overall impression? Up to now, the battle against the Viet Cong has seem.ed endless; no one has been willing to set a date for its successful conclusion. After talking to scores of officers, Vietnamese and Ajiierican, I am convinced that the Viet Cong insurgency in the north and center can be reduced to little more than sporadic incidents by the end of 196^. The Delta will take longer but shoiad be completed by the end of 1965, But for these predictions to be valid, certain conditions must be met. Your Goverraiient should be prepared to energize all. agencies, military and civil, to a higher output of activity than up to now. Ineffective comiuanders and province officials must be replaced as soon as identified. Finally, there should be a restoration of domestic tranquility on the homefront if political tensions are to be allayed and external criticism is to abate. Conditions are needed for the creation of an atmosphere conducive to an effective campaign directed at the objective, vital to both

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of us_, of defeating the Viet Cong and of restoring peace to your cozmriunity."'^

The results of the survey conducted by the McHainara-Taylor mission were consolidated into a lengthy^ formal report to the President containing specific findings^ general evaluations^ and recoinmendations. The substance of the report was presented in an hour-long; oral briefing to the President iimiiediately upon the return of the mission on the morning of 2 October. Attending the briefing were the Under Secretary of State^ the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs^ the Director of the CIA; and the Special Assistant to the President for Mtional Security Affairs. Following the personal report^ the President called for a special m_eeting of the full National Security Council^ which was held from six to seven that saiiie evening.

*

The McKamara-Taylor Report generally was optJJulstic about the military situation and saw little direct effect of the political crisis on the prosecution of the war. Their conclusions^ inter alia^ were that despite serious political tensions and the increasing unpopularity of the Diem-LIhu regime^ "The military cejvipaign has m^ade great progress and continues to progress." GW military officers^ though hostile to the government and its repressive policies^ continued to perfonn their military duties in the larger cause of fighting the Viet Cong enemy. This reassuring evaluation^ however^ was caveated to the effect that "...further repressive actions by Dieiu and Fnu could change the present favorable m.ilitary trends c"

Specific findings in their appraisal of the military situation bore out the general evaluation. In the body of the report they stated:

"With allowances for all uncertainties^ it is oue firm conclusion that the GVN m.ilitary program has made great progress in the last year and a half; and that the progress has continued at a fairly steady rate in the past six months even through the period of greatest political unrest in Ssigon. The tactics and techniques employed by the Vietnamese under U.S. monitorshlp are sound and give jJ^o^lse of ultimate victory."

Expecially notewortb^^^ in their vieW; was the progress clearly being achieved in the northern areas (l and II Corps). Their appraisal of the progress of the Strategic Hamlet Program was also largely favorable. In both connections; they cited the effectiveness of the U.S. military advisory and support effort.

Included among their militaiy reconmendations were:

a. General Harkins /cOlCfSMCV/ review with Diem the military changes necessary to complete the military cam2:)aign in the Northern az^d Central areas (l; II; III Corps) by the end of I96J+; and in the Delta (lY Corps) by the end of I965.

b. A program be established to train Vietnamese so that essential functions now x;erformed by U«S. military riersonnel can be

* Ltr CJCS (Taylor) to President Diem of RVN; 1 Oct 63 (delivered 2 Oct 63)y TOP SECRET.

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■carried out by Yietnamese by the end of 19o5- ^ should be possible to withdraw the bulk of U.S. personnel by that time.

c. In accordance with the program to train progressively Vietnamese to take over military functions^ the Defense Department should announce in the near future presently prepared plans to withdraw 1000 U.S. military personnel by the end of I963. This action rhould be explained in low key as an initial step in a long-term program to replace U.S. personnel with trained Vietnamese without Impairment of the war effort.

Germane to the above recommendations^ however; it was stated elsewhere

in the report, "No further reductions should be made until the requirements

of the I96U campaign becom_e firm." ko/

Following the NSC meeting of 2 October, the White House issued a ■ formal public announcement of the major policy aspects of the McNamara-Taylor Mission Report. The White House statem.ent is reproduced below.

U.S. POLICY ON VIET-NM: WHITE HOUSE STATS^IEMC, OCTOBER 2, I963 W

■ Secretary /of Defense Robert Sj McNamara and General /^axwell dJ Taylor reported to the President this morning and to the National ■ . Security Council this afternoon. Their report included a number of classified findings and recommendations which will be the subject of further review and action. Their basic presentation was endorsed - by all members of the Security Council, and the following statement of United States policy was approved by the President on the basis of recommendations received from them and from Ambassador /Henry ■ Cabot/ Lodge.

1. The security of South Viet-Nam is a major interest of the United States as other free nations. We will adhere to our policy of working with the people and Government of South Viet-Nam^to deny this country to communism and to suppress the externally stljuulated and supported insurgency of the Viet Cong as promptly as possible. Effective performance in this undertaking is the central objective of our policy in South Viet-Nam.

2. The military program in South Viet-Nam has made progress and is sound in principle, though improAz-ements are being energetically sought.

3. Major U.S. assistance in support of this military effort is needed only until the insurgency has been suppressed or until the national security forces of the Government of South Viet-Nam are capable of sujjpressing it.

Secretary McNamara and General Taylor reported their judgment that the major part of the U.S. military task can be completed by the end of 1965, although there may be a continuing requirement for a Ijjaited number of U.S. training personnel. They reported that by the end of this year, the U.S. program for training Vietnamese should

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have progressed to the point where 1^000 U.S. military personnel assigned to South Viet-Warn can he withdrawn.

^. The political situation in South Viet-Nam remains deeply serious.. The United States had. made clear its continuing opposition to any repressive actions in South Viet-Nam. While such actions have not yet significantly affected the military effort^ they could do so in the future.

5. It remains the policy of the United States,, in South Viet-Nam as in other parts of the worlds to support the efforts of the people of that country to defeat aggression and to build a peaceful and free society.

Considerable emphasis was given to the White House statement^ and to the McNamara-Taylor Mission generally^ in news media. Played up particularly was the U.S. force vrithdrawal^ especially the prospective 1000-man reduction

Three days later^ on 5 October;, in another meeting with the President^ followed by another NSC meeting^ the McNamara-Taylor recommendations themselves were addressed. The President "ai^proved the military recommendations contained in the report." The President also directed^ in line with their suggestion; that no formal announcement be made of the Implementation of plans to withdraw 1000 U.S. military personnel from South Vietnam by the end of 1963. ^2/

The effect of the McNamara-Taylor mission^ thus^ was to revalidate the existing U.S. policy position regarding Vietnam. Reaffirmed were the ■ military objectives^ courses of action^ and programs essentially as they V7ere laid out by the Secretary of Defense at the Honolulu Conference over a year earlier on 23 July I962. The underlying premises and soundness of the rationale seemed more cogent than ever. In fact^ a new impetus was thereby given to pursuing the same goals with even greater thrust and purpose. Such an outcome could have been forecast^ as noted earlier^ when Mr, McNamara set in motion another CPSVN planning cycle to revise the Model M Plan and develop an accelerated plan to v^ithdraw U.S. forces.

Part of the motivation behind the stress placed on U.S. force with-drav^al^ and particularly the seemingly arbitrary desire to effect the 1000-man reduction by the end of 1963^ apparently was as a signal to influence both the North Vietnamese and the South Vietnamese and set the stage for possible later steps that would help bring the insurgency to an end. With regard to the SVN; the demonstration of determination to pull out U.S. forces was intended to induce the South Vietnamese to increase the effectiveness of their military effort. ^3/ Staters instructions to Ambassador Lodge resulting from NSC action~n the McNamara-Taylor mission indicated that;

"Actions are designed to indicate to Diem Government our displeasure at its political policies and activities and to create

significant uncertainty in that government and in key Vietnamese groups as to future intentions of United States. At same tme^ actions are designed to have at most slight impact on military or

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counterinsurgency effort against Viet Cong^ at least in short term. • . ." kk/

m

With respect to Hanoi^ it might present an opportunity for a demarche— exploiting i/ithdrawal of U«S. forces from South Vietnam by a specified . -date as exchange for DIorth Vietnam's abandoning its aggression against South Vietnam. But events vere already conspiring other>,'ise_, and would soon frustrate sueh expectations and intentions as developed. The internal SVN situation was about to undergo rapid transformation.

By late October^, there was increasing skepticism in some quarters about the military situation in South Vietnam. Indeed^ it was beginning to be suspected that reports of progress by U.S« military sources actually cloaked a situation that Vv'-as not only bleak^ but deteriorating.. A State Department inteLligence evaluation of 22 October showed markedly pessiraistic statistical trends since July 1963; in most areas of enemy-friendly relative progress measurement^ indicating an unfavorable shift in the military balance. What was disquieting was that the pattern showed steady decline over a period of more than three months* duration, h^/

Circulation of the 11\[H evaluation occasioned controversy and no little recrimination. Substantive differences" degenerated into a procedural issue. The outcome was a personal m.emorandum from- the Secretary of State to the Secretary of Defense on 8 Novem^ber^ amounting to an apology for the incident The Secretary of State stated in regard to IMR's RFE-90 of 22 October:

ti

.it is not the policy of the State Department to issue military appraisals without seeking the views of the Defense Department. I have requested that any memoranda given inter-■ departmental circuJLation which include military appraisals be coordinated with your Department." hG /

TPIE NOVM--IBER COUP AI^^ OV ERTKRQW OF DIEM

On 1 November^ the political situation fell apart. The long-anticipated coup occurred. The Diem regime was overthrown^ and both Diem and Nhu were assassinated. A military junta of politically inexperienced generals took over the government as their successors.

The significance of the great change,? for good or ill^ was not readi3„y apparent. Over the next three weeks the feared political chaos^ civil vmr^ i and collapse of the war effort following a coup did not seem to be mater-

ializing. For the United States^ the important question was what did the new circumstances mean militarily for existing policy and plans oriented to ; ( bringing the insurgency under control and to phasing out US force commitments

On 20 November^ at the. President*s direction^ a special all-agencie conference on Vietnam was convened in Honolulu for a "full-scale review" in depth of all aspects of the situation and to reassess U.S^ plans and policies in the political^ military^ economic and 3.nformation fields since the change of governiuent. Attending were scjme h^ senior U.S. officials^ military and civilian^ including: the Secretary of State^ Secretary of Defense^ Special Assistant to the President for National

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Security Affairs^ Chairoaan^ JCS^ Director of CIA^ CINCPAC^ Atnbassador to to Vietn^mi; and COMUSTvIACV". Ambassador Lodge assessed the prospects for VietnaBi as hopeful. In his estituation the new gOYernnaent was not v^ithout promise, Vietnamese military leadership appeared to be united and determined to step up the war effort. The Ambassador advocated continuing to pursue the goal of setting dates for phasing out UcS. activities and turning them over to the Vietnamese^ and he volunteered that the announced withdrawal of 1000 troo2:)S by the end of I963 v/as already having a salutary affect. COl-iUSFLkCY agreed with the Ambassador that the conduct of the war against the VC vras coming along satisfactorily. Admitting that the VC-incidents rate shot up 3OO to 400 percent after the coup^ he noted that since 6 November^ however^ it had dropjjed down to "normal" and remained so to the present. Military operational statistics nov^ generally showed a more or less favorable balance. In shorty the briefings and assessments received at the conference constituted "an encouraging outlook for the principle objective of joint U,S,-Vietnamese policy in South Vietnam—the sviccessful prosecution of the war against the Viet Cong coimnunists." More-over^j "excellent working relations between U.S. officials and the members of the new Vietnamese government" had been established. All plans for the UoS. phasing out v/ere to go ahead as scheduled.

In this light the U.S. military plans and prograjus for Vietnara were addressed. The revision of the Model M Plan of the CPSVIV^ ordered by the Secretary of Defense during his last visit to Vietnam in October was progressing apace and the finished Accelerated Plan was expected to be forwarded shortly. It would cost $6,k million more than the Model Plan^ however. Indications were that the FT &l- MAP would also cost more because of the acceleration^-to a total now of $187.5 million. The Secretary of Defense made it clear that he felt that the proposed CINCPAC MAP could be cut back and directed that the program be reviewed to refine it and cut costs to stay as close as possible to the OSD celling of $175'5 raillion. He was equally emphatic^ howevei*,, that vrhile he would not tolerate fat or inefficiency in the program he was prepared to provide whatever fiuids might be required under MAP to support the GYB. In fact^ he observed that the GVN v?as already rimnlng into "tremendous financial deficits^ " and opined that neither AID nor MAP had budgeted enough to provide for the emergencies whl.ch were likely to arise during 196^1-. ^7 /

ASSASSBIATION OF PR ES IDENT EEimi EDY

On 22 November 1963^ President Kennedy was assassinated. The con-' sequences were to set an institutional freeze on the direction and momentum of U.S. Vietnam x-^olicy. Universally operative was a desire to avoid change of any kind dm ing the critical interregnuin period of the new Johnson Administration. Both the President and the governraental establishment consciously strove for continuity^ vrlth respect to Vietnam no less than in other areas. In. Vletn£im this continuity m.eant that the phase-out concept^ the CPSVN withdrawal plan^ and the MAP program^s probably survived beyond the point they might have oth.er"v?-ise.

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The iimnediate Jolinson stamp on the Kennedy policy came on 26 Noveraber. At a NSC meeting convened to consider the .results of the 20 JMovember" Honolulu Conference^ the President "reaffirmed that U,S. objectives with respect to vithdra^/7al of U.S. military personnel remain as stated in the White House statement of October 2^ I963/' k8/ The only hint that something might be different from on-going plans came in a Secretary of Defense memo for the President thjree days prior to this NSC meeting. In that memo^ Mr. McNamara said that the new South Vietnamese goverrmient was confronted by serious financial problem^s, and that the U.S. must be prepared to raise planned IvIAP levels, kg/

In early December,, the President began to have;, if not second thoughts_, at least a sense of uneasiness about Vietnam, In discussions vith his advisors^ he set in motion what he hoped would be a major policy review^ fully staffed in depth^, by Administration principals. The President wanted "a fresh new look taken" at the whole problem. In preparation for such a basic reappraisal^ an interdepartmental meeting of second-echelon principals accordingly convened on 3 December and laid out a broad outline of basic topics to be addressed and staff papers to be developed by various departments and agencies. 50/ This attempt at a systematic and comprehensive reexamination^ however;, did not cuQjninate in a fundam.ental national reassessment .

A CCELEPxATED MODEL PM N OF THE CP_SVg

With no Indication of policy change in the offing^ U.S. military planning thus went forv^ard with hardly a break in stride. On 5 December CII\"CPAC submitted the Accelerated Model Plan to the JCS. It was the revision to the Model M Plan version of the CPSVN that the Secretary of Defense had ordered during his early October visit to Vietnam. The Accelerated Plan provided for m-ore rapid phase-out of the bulk of U.S. military personnel and ujiits and a decrease in the residual strength remaining thereafter (see Figure 3). It also provided for building up GVN forces at a faster pace but on a more reduced scale^ then cutting back from the peak sooner and leveling out somewhat lov^er (see Figure k). IVlAP costs for the FY 1965-69 period would be a little higher than the $392.2 million under the Model M Plan^ coming to $399.h million in the Accelerated Plan (see Fig^ure 5). 51/

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t i

M

13

12'—

11 —

10 —

8

to

6 —

5 —

3 —

2 —

371 b'4

2^

3; 409

AP MP 1964

12-9-68-3

13,190

11,560

9,097

;687^

2k^

■

2]] 06

3,406

^^;■:■:■:■::

MACV AND SPECIAL ASSISTANCE UNITS (FY66AND AFTER LEVEL AT 36 PERSONNEL)

STARCOM AND RKU

MAAG AND SUPPORT

AP -ACCELERATED PLAN MP -MODEL PLAN

3,195 021

2rj38;

3,499

;6Bi;

/

382

(C-123 SQUADRON: TELECOMMUNICATIONS)

2,782

2,516

1,034

r;7T2

LijjXiI-Im:

2,560

^681/ 7^4

i';879

Li i v^ i ' i 'i i ' iiu. li' . i i 'iV ' ^'r^

2,622

m w

^5i[7:

2,385 12%

i'Mk

/

2J68 729/

1,639

AP MP 1965

AP MP AP MP

1966 1967

END FISCAL YEAR

AP MP

1968

AP MP 1969

FIGURE 3 (S). Comprehensive Plan Soufh Vietnam (CPSVN)

Phase Down of U.S. Forces (U)

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550

500

400

350

"1 300

V)

D O

o

5 250

t/1

200

150

100

50

]22.6

225.5

■ r'' f'' '•

122.0

225.5

AP MP 1964

12-9-68-4

122.0

21 "3;'3

122.0

''-'''r'T'-'fri Vi'-'i'i' ■ '1 Vi'

3.6

5'2...6

2'25.'5

197.4

AP MP 1965

Lv^'-'■'—• 1, r ■ 'i' i' iv^

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152:6

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225.5

. J I " H 11 U J I,

131.2;

;142.

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i-1 ^ '. .Tf yTT.

i.*^ ■;'*;■'■."■

^

^

CIVILIAN IRREGULAR DEFENSE GROUPS

JUNK SAILORS SELF-DEFENSE CORPS

CIVIL GUARD

REGULAR ARMED FORCES

MP -MODEL PLAN

AP -ACCELERATED PLAN

4dV0

T-'^m-T^V!

40.0

119.7;

■■■i-.v■■;■■:.:■« L--1.1J

2.5

2.0

30.0

121.2

119.5

'ASiSui 'li- ViiiSiJjki

30.a

2.0

120.2

AP MP AP MP

1966 1967

END FISCAL YEAR

AP MP 1968

AP MP 1969

FIGURE 4 (S). Comprehensive Plan Vietnam (CPSVN)

Phase Down of GVN Forces (U)

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S

190

180

170

160

150

140

130

120

110

C

J 100

5 90

o

u

80

70

60

. 50

40

30

20

10

12-9-68-5

$180.0

:':-:-:-:-n:-

1964

$153.0

«1

$107.7

LhM Ji M Ji

1965

1966

$46.0

1967

FISCAL YEAR

m

ACCELERATED PLAN

iiili MODEL PLAN

$53.0

$44.7

1968

1969

FIGURE 5 (S). Comprehensive Plan Vielnam (CPSVN) tiAP Cost (U)

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THE lOOQ-MN WH'HDRAWAL OF DECEMBER I963

Daring the month of December^ the planned lOOO-man reduction was executed. It proved essentially an accounting exercise. Technically^ more than a thousand U^S. personnel did leave^ but many of these were part of the normal turnover cycle^ inasmuch as rotation policy alone^ not to mention medical evacuation or administrative reasons^ resulted in an average rate of veil over a thousand returnees per month. Though the replacement pipeline v/as slowed somewhat^ year-end total in-country strength nevertheless was close to 16^000. 5^/ This did not even represent a decline of 1000 from the October peak of l6/r32.

That the avowed goal of 1000 would not be reached had in fact been anticipated and acknowledged before mid-December. Despite close monitoring of authorized ceilings and actual strengths_, the force level kept rising. On 11 December^ for example_, the estijnate of projected year-end U.S. strength in Vietnam had to be revised upward to reflect additional deployments approved since September, The adjusted figure now came to 15^89^.? a net increase of 162 over the. earlier estimate. This nev/ strength ceiling was what would be left after the lOOO-man withdrawal then in progress v.^as completed. ^3 /

THE VIETNM SITUATION WORSENS

In December conflicting estmates of the situation in Vietnam indicated that the bright hopes and predictions of the past were increasingly less than realistic. A McNamara memo to the President written following a trip to Vietnam of 21 December^ was laden with gloom. 5^/ He wrote: "The situation is very disturbing. Current trends^ unless reversed in the next 2-3 months_, will lead to neutralization at best and more likely to a communist-controlled state." He went on to note that "the new government is the greatest source of concern^ *' and. that "it is indecisive and drifting." The Country Team^ he added^ "lacks leadership^ and has been ■ poorly infoi^med." One of the most serious deficiencies he found was a "grave reporting weakness" on the U.S. side. "Viet Cong progress has been great during the period since the coup^ with my best guess being that the situation has in fact been deteriorating in the countryside since July to a far greater extent than we realise because of our undue dependence on distorted Vietnamese reporting." Mr. McNamara clearly concluded that none of these conditions could be reversed by the influx of more American personnel^ nor did he even mention that the U.S. could continue to withdraw troops at all or as scheduled. His proposal was to hold the line: "U.S. resources and personnel^" he said; "cannot usefully be substantially increased...^" although he did announce his intention to increase staffs "to sizes that will give us a reliable_, independent U.S. appraisal of the status of operations." In his concluding paragraph^ however^ the Secretary of Defense admitted that his o\ra estim_ate "may be overly pessimistic^ " inasmuch as the Am^bassador^ COrCfSr-lACV, and General Minh were not discouraged and looked forvrard to significant mprovements in January, ^h/

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Vestiges of optajnism still persisted in one degree or another in some quarters. The earlier sense of confidence that had been established was deep-rooted and not easily shaken• A retrospective evaluation of the Vietnam situation ostensibly covering the period I96O through 19^3; prepared by SACSA (General Krulak) is indicative. Although intended as a broad overview (and so called)_, and though actually cut off as of soine-tinie in October 1963;, it was forwarded in late October or November directly to the Secretary of Defense. The SACSA report presented nothing less than a glowing account of steady progress across the board in the military situation. Significantly^ it contained no hint that the rate of progress possibly might have temporarily slowed somewhat in the second half of 1963^ despite the fact that it expressly treated events as late as October. 55/ Yet by this time^ other evaluations giving a quite different picture \rere already asserting themselves. Near the close of 1963 the Director^ DIA; reported to the Secretary of Defense that year-end review and reassessment of the enemy situation revealed VC capabilities had not been impaired over the past year. On the contrary^ the VC had in many regards improved in combat effectiveness and novr enjoyed a generally improved force posture for insurgency. 56/

Hopeful bias alone does not explain the endurance of past firmly rooted optimism--such as the SACSA overview. The difference between those v7ho stressed the positive and those who saw decline waS; in part^ the product of viewing the situation in greater or shorter time frames. Those who applied a macroscopic perspective^ believed--and not without certain logic—that current unfavorable reports were^ at worse_j a temporary lapse in the larger curve of progress over the years. Those who took spot . checks tended to be more impressed by the immediate situation^ and at this time; the immediate situation was critical. The feelings of this latter group were buttressed when on 30 January another coup^ this time largely bloodless^ ousted the ruling Minh government. It was a factional power struggle in which one military group replaced another^ this time with General IQianh emerging as Premier. The latest development held forth little promise of giving the country the political stability so desperately needed in the midst of a v/ar for survival. The event would prove only symptomatic as part of a sequence of similar government upheavals that were to follow.

In the U.S.; the coincidence of domestic tragedy and patent instability in Vietnam evoked a chorus urging a l£ios-like resolution of the Vietnam conflict. In late August^ 1963^ President de Gaulle had issued a policy stateraent on Vietnam which was subsequently officially interpreted as a proposal for "independence and neutrality" foi- Vietnam—meaning eventual U.S. withdrawal. In the aftermath of the assassinations^ speculation turned increasingly to this solution. For example^ Senator Mansfield wrote to President Johnson to propose a division of Vietnam between the GVN and the Viet Cong; coupled with a U.S. withdrawal. In early January; 196-^1-; Secretary McNamara furnished the President the following counters to Senator ^ Mansfield's arguments:

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"l. We should certainly stress that the var is essentially a Vietnamese re spon sibility , and this ve have repeatedly done^ particiLLarly in our announced policy on U.S. troop withdrawal. At the same time we cannot disengage U.S. prestige to any sig- . ■ nificant degree....

"2• The security situation is serious^ but we can still win ^ even on present ground rules....

"3 Any deal either to divide the present territory of

South Vietnam or to 'neutralize' South Vietnam would inevitably mean a new government in Saigon that would in short order become Communist-dominated .

"^. The consequences of a Communist-dominated South Vietnam are extremel y ser ious both for the rest of Southeast Asia and for the UcS. position in the rest of Asia and indeed in other key areas of the world....

"5- Thus_, the stakes in preserving an anti-Communist South Vietnam are so high that^^ in our judgment^ we must go on bending every effort to win....And_, I am confident that the American people are by and large in favor of a policy of firmness and strength in such situations." 57/

Secretary McNamara in his testimony before Congress on the fiscal year I965 budget in early February^ l^&-\-^ declined to link the previously planned U.S. withdrawals with either "pessimism" or "optimism" regarding events in Vietnam,, saying simply that the withdrawals had all along been conditioned upon Vietnamese capability to assume full responsibility from the UoS. trainers,, and that there would be a "substantial reduction in our force as we train them." Farther:

"Last fall...I wasn't as optiiaistic perhaps about the course of the war as I was about being able to bring back our personnel in certain numbers by the end of last year and also in increments between then and the end of I965 .

"1 still am hopeful of doing that. We did;, of course^ bring back 1;000 men toward the latter part of last year. I am hopeful ve can bring back additional numbers of men later this year and certainly next year . I say this because I personally believe that this is a war that the Vietnamese must fight...I don't believe we can take on that combat task for them. I do believe we can carry out training. We can provide advice and logistical assistance.

"But after a11^ the training^ by the very nature of the work^ comes to an end at a certain point. We will have started this expanded training and carried it out for a period of k years^ by the end of next year. We started at the end of I96I. The end of next.year will have been h years later and certainly v/e should

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have completed the majority of the training task by that time. ThiS; in General Taylor's view and mine^ is what we should he able to do. If we do^ \re should bring our men back.

A

"l don't believe we should leave our men there to substitute for Vietnamese men who are qualified to carry out the task^ and this is really the heart of our proposal, I think it was a sound proposal then and I think so no\r. ..."

Unsureness about the actual state of affaij?s in Washington spread eventually to the highest levels of government, and prompted the dispatching to South Vietnam in early February of a CIA "Special CAS Group" for an independent evaluation of the railitary situation. A series of four reports^, dated 10, 11, l^i- and l8 February 196^-, were produced, each transmitted by the Deputy Director, CIA, to the Secretary of Defense, Secretary of State, and others as soon as it came out. Instead of finding progress, these reported a serious and steadily deteriorating situation. Cited were VC gains in the past several months, and particularly noted was that VC arms were increasing in quantity and quality. As for the Strategic Hamlet Program, they found it "at present at virtual standstill." The Special CAS Group's concluding appraisal was pessimistic: "Tide of insurgency in all four corps areas appears to be going against GVN." 58/ COMUSMACV (who had no prior knowledge of the Special CAS Group's reports) took issue with the Group's findings, contesting less the data used than the conclusions, especially the "personal" evaluational opinions as to degree of deterioration. He suggested that in the future such reports be first coordinated before being dispatched. 59/

On 6 March a major Secretary of Defense Conference again convened at CINCPAC headquarters for a broad reassessment. The consensus was that the military situation was definitely deteriorating. No longer was the issue whether it was progressing satisfactorily or not. The question now was how much of a setback had there been and what was needed to make up for it. An opinion shared by many was that the insurgency could be expected to go beyond 1965- This general reorientation of perspective was reflected in the Secretary of Defense's observation that attention should be focused on the near-term objectives of providing the greater U.S. support that \/ould' be necessary, and suspending for the tiirie being consideration of longer-range concerns such as 5-year MAP projections. 60/ The visit to Vietnam on 8 March corroborated the gravity of the immediate problems at hand.

Following his return from Vietnam, Mr. McNamara, on I6 March, submitted to the President a formal report. In it the Secretary of Defense acknowledged, "The situation has unquestionably been growing worse, at least since September." RVNAF desertion rates v/ere increas-ing, and the GVN military position generally was weakening noticeably. The VC position, on the other hand, showed signs of improving. He referred pointedly to the increase in North Vietnamese support. The conclusion was that greater UoSo support was needed.

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J In describing what \ras required to improve the situation in South

Vietnam,, Mr, McNamara identified measures that "will involve a limited increase in UcSe personnel and in direct Defense Department costs. More significantly they involve significant increases in Military Assistance Program costs...c/* plus "additional U.S« economic aid to support the increased GW budget." The estimated additional annual MAP costs would come to between $30 and $^0 million each year^ plus a one-time additional cost of $20 million for military equipment. In the recommendation section of the report^ the Secretary listed the following 12 itaus:

1. To make it clear that we are prepared to furnish assistance and support to South Vietnam for as long as it takes to bring the insurgency under control.

2. To make it clear that we fully support the Khanh government and are opposed to any further coups.

3- To support a Program for National Mobilization (including a national service law) to put South Vietnani on a war footing.

h. To assist the Vietnamese to increase the armed forces (regular plus paramilitary) by at least 50^000 men. ■

5- To assist the Vietnamese to create a greatly enlarged Civil Administrative Corps for work at province^ district and hsmlet levels.

6. To assist the Vietnamese to improve and reorganize the paramilitary forces and to increase their compensation.

7. To assist the Vietnamese to create an offensive guerrilla force.

8. To provide the Vietnamese Air Force 25 A-IH aircraft in exchange for the present T-28s.

9« To provide the Vietnamese army additional M-113 armored personnel carriers (withdrawing the M-ll^s there)^ additional river boats^ and approximately .$5--10 million of other additional material.

f^

10* To announce publicly the Eertilizer Program and to expand it

with a viev? within tv/o years to trebling the amount of fertilizer made available.

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11. To authorize continued high-level U.S. overflights of South

Vietnam's borders and to authorize "hot pursuit" and South Vietnamese ground operations over the Laotian line for the purpose of border control. More ambitious operations into Laos involving units beyond battalion size should be authorized only with the approval of Souvanna Phouma. Operations across the Cambodian border should depend on the state of relations with Cambodia.

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12. To prepare lifmiediately to be in a position on 72 hours' notice to initiate the full range of laotian and Cambodian "Border Control" actions (beyond those authorized in paragraph 11 above) and the "Retaliatory Actions" against North Vietnam^ . and to be in a position on 30 days' notice to initiate the program of "Graduated Overt Military Pressure" against North Vietnam.

As for the future of the phased-withdravral plans,, the Secretary of Defense's report contained the following:

"The U.S. policy of reducing existing personnel where South Vietnamese are in a position to assume the functions is still sound. Its application will not lead to any major reductions in the near future^ but adherence to this policy as such has a sound effect in portraying to the U*S. and the world that we continue to regard the war as a conflict the South Vietnamese must win and take ultimate responsibility for. Substantial reductions In the numbers of U.S. military training personnel should be possible before the end of 1965. However^ the U.Sc should continue to reiterate that it will provide all the assistance and advice required to do the job regardless of how long it takes." 62/

By formal decision at the NSC session of IT March; the President approved the Secretary of Defense report of 16 March 196^-' and directed all agencies to carry out the 12 recommendations contained therein. 62 / A White House statement_, reproduced below^ was issued the same day.

„ ■ . IMMEDIATE RELEASE March 17, 19^

Office of the VJhite House Press Secretary

THE WHITE HOUSE

Secretary McNamara and General Taylor^ following their initial oral report of Friday^ today reported fully to President Johnson and the manbers of the National Security Council. The report covered the situation in South Vietnam^ the measures being taken by General Khanh and his government^ and the need for United States assistance to supplement and support these measures. There ■ vras also discussion of the continuing support and direction of the Viet Cong insurgency from North Vietnam.

At the close of the meeting the President accepted the report and its principal recommendations^ which had the support of the National Seciority Council and Ambassador Lodge.

Comparing the situation to last October^ when Secretary McNamara and General Taylor last reported fully on it; there have unquestionably been setbacks. The Viet Cong have taken maximum advantage

*

of two changes of government; and of more long-standing difficulties;

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including a serious v/eakness and over-extension which had developed in the basically somid hamlet program. The supply of arms and cadres from the north has continued; careful and sophisticated control of Viet Cong operations has been apparent; and evidence that such control is centered in Hanoi is clear and unmistakable.

To meet the situation^ General Khanh and his government are acting vigorously and effectively. They have produced a sound central plan for the prosecution of the var^ recognizing to a far greater degree than before the crucial role of economic and social, as well as military_, action to ensure that areas cleared of the Viet Cong survive and prosper in freedom.

To carry out this plan. General Khanh requires the full enlistment of the people of South Vietnam, partly to augment the strength of his anti-guerrilla forces, but particularly to provide the administrators, health workers, teachers and others who must follow up in cleared i

areas. To meet this need, and to provide a more equitable and common basis of service. General lOianh has informed us that he proposes in the near future to put into effect a National Mobilization Plan that will provide conditions and terms of service in appropriate jobs for all able-bodied South Vietnamese between certain ages.

In addition, steps are required to bring up to required levels the pay and status of the paramilitary forces and to create a highly trained guerrilla force that can beat the Viet Cong on its own ground. Finally, limited but significant additional equipment is proposed for the air forces, the river navy, and the mobile forces.

In short, where the South Vietnamese Government now has the power to clear any part of its territory. General Khanh's new program is designed to clear and to hold, step by step and province by province.

This program will involve substantial increases in cost to the South Vietnamese economy, which in turn depends heavily on United States economic aid. Additional, though less substantial, military assistance funds are also needed, and increased United States training activity both on the civil and military side. The policy should continue of withdrawing United States personnel where their . roles can be assumed by South Vietnamese and of sending additional men if they are needed. It will remain the policy of the United States to furnish assistance and support to South Vietnam for as long as it is required to bring Communist aggression and terrorism under control.

Secretary McNamara and General Taylor reported their overall conclusion that with continued vigorous leadership from General Khanh and his government, and the carrying out of these steps, the situation can be significantly mproved in the coming months.

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DEMISE OF THE CPSVN

Before the month of March VT^as over the CPSVN^ as veil as the MAP planning that had been such an integral part of it^ finally received the coup de grace. Sacrificed to the UoS. desire "to make it clear that ve fully support" the GYNy they were formally terminated^ for the record^ on 27 March in the OSD message reproduced helov:

FROM: OSD WASH DC DEF 963028 Date: 2J March 196*4

(Colo ¥• J. Yates) TO: CINCPAC KEFS: a. CBICPAC IIO626Z Mar 6^

b. DEF 959615 DTG 132352Z Mar &^

1. As indicated in ref. b.^ ceiling for Vietnam FY 66 MAP is $143.0 million against $l43.1 million for FY 65. Requirements above these program levels should be identified as separate packages.

2. Submission of five-year programs FY 66-70 for Vietnam is suspended until further notice. Your best estrlmates of FY 66 requirements are necessary inasmuch line detail as feasible by

, 1 Jul 6h in order that (a) the Military Departments can review for pricing^ lead time^ availabilities^ and prepare for procurement action and (b) requirements can be processed within DoD^ State/AID and BoB for budget/Congressional Presentation purposes.

3. Previous guidance re Model Plan projection for phasedown of U.S. forces and GVN forces is superseded. Policy is as announced by Ttolte House 17 Mar 6^1-: Quote The policy should continue of withdrav^ing U.S. personnel where their roles can be assimied by South Vietnamese and of sending additional men if they are needed. It will remain the policy of the U.S. to furnish assistance and support of South Vietnam for as long as is required to bring Communist aggression and terrorism under control. Unquote.

k. No further action required or being taken here relative to accelerated model plan.

Thus ended dejure the policy of phase out and withdrawal and all the plans and programs oriented to it. Shortly^ they would be cancelled out de facto.

BUILD-UP OF TI-I E UcS. FORCE COIMrrMETJT

Soon the whole evolutionar;^'- direction of the U.S. military commitment began to change. Rather than diminishing_j the magnitude rose thereafter. In early May the approved U.S. military strength ceiling for South Vietnam was raised by more than I5OO so that total in-country authorization CEUiie to over 17^000. Fiu'-ther increases were in sight. 63/ As the military situation in Vietnam failed to show signs of amerliorating, pressures

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began to develop in late spring for an even more significant increase in UcS. forces

o •

■ ' A special meeting on Southeast Asia was called at PACOM Headquarters

in Honolulu for 1-2 Jime because of the unsatisfactory progress in execution of the National Pacification Plan. There^ COMUSf^iACV proposed extending and intensifying the U.S. advisory effort in order to improve the operational effectiveness of the VKAP performance generally. The idea was discussed and supported in principle^ and a staff v/orking paper outlining the concept was prepared by the conferees. Kear the end of June^ COMUSMACV submitted to JCS (info CIKCPAC^ DOD^ State^ I'/hite House) his formal proposal recommending enlargement of the advisory assistance program. He reiterated^ and offered further justification for^ the need to augment the current advisory detachments at the battalion level and to extend the advisory effort at both the district and sector levels- His detailed breakout of priinary personnel requirements came to a total of 9OO more advisors, as the net in-country increase; but conceded that additional administrative and logistic support ■ requirements would be substantial and would be submitted separately. Also_, approximately 80 additional U.S. Navy advisors would be requested^ in connection v;-ith recommendations made earlier in the "Bucklew Report" for a Junk Force and other measures to counter infiltration by sea. COTCPAC indicated concurrence and recommended approval of the proposal on h July. 6k/

In the middle of JuJ.y^ the new U.S. Ambassador to Vietnam^ General Max^.rell Taylor, sent an evaluation of the military situation to the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, and JCS that lent strong support to COMUSMACV*s proposal. The Ambassador advised that formal estimates of regular VC strength in South Vietnam had been revised and now were raised to between 28,000 and 3U,000. He explained that this did not reflect a sudden dramatic increase, but had been suspected for the past tvro or three years, though confirmatory evidence had become available only in the last few m.onths. There was thus no occasion for alarm, but the new estimate emphasized the growing magnitude of the problem and the need to increase the level of U.S. /gVN efforts. Therefore, additional requirements were being formulated, including U.Sc military personnel requirements, to support U.S. plans during the ensuing months to cope with the new understanding of the realities of the situation. He forecast an increase in U.S. military strength to around 21,000 over the next six-month period to meet projected needs. 65/

Jjumediately the size of the estimated force requirements connected with the proposed expansion of the advisory effort began to cliiab. On 16 July COMUSMCV submitted the support requirements associated with the I • program. For the next year he v.'ould need, over and above the original

! ' 900 additional advisors requested, more than 3200 other personnel, for a

total gross military strength increase of about ^200. 66 / The Ambassador in Saigon concurred in COIvruS^IACV^s proposed increase in U.S. military strength by 4200 over the next nine months, bringing the total in-country ^ '. to nearly 22,000, and he urged prompt action. The Secretary of State also

recor.iinended approval, as did CINCPAC and JCS, and on 20 July, at the JCS-SecDef meeting, overall support was given to the COMUSMACV requested

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deployment package. The following day^ at the NSC meeting of 21 July^ the President gave it final approval^ though that action was not included [ in the NSAM issued the next day. Gj/

As eventually refined^ the total force increment actually came to over ii900 UcS, personnel. In addition^ other requirements not directly related to the advisory effort itself were being generated and met independently. By the close of 196^1 the year-end U.S. in-country strength figure had clitnbed to approximately 23^000 personnel and further authorized deployments were under way or in preparation.

The actual effect of "phased withdrawals" was minimal- Though l/OOO spaces among the personnel authorized FiACV vrere eliminated in 19^3; add-ons overtook cut-backs. As an example^ U.S. Aimy strength in Vietnam--the bulk of the advisory effort—was allocated as follows:

\] PEHCEICTAGE OF U.S, ARMY STRENGTH IN VXETNAT/I ffi/

Total Army Hq & Spt Aviation Conimunica- Special Other Strength Units Units tion Units Forces Advisers

Nov 63 10,000 17 , 35 15 6 -^ 2T

^-, Mar &^ 10,000 19 3!^ 13 T 27

Nov 6^4 l4,000 28 30 12 8 22

POSTSCRIPT TO V/ITHDRAWAL PLANNING

The official termination of formal planning towards withdrawal by no means ended its attraction as one issue in the growing public debate over Vietnam policy. In August, 196^1, the Tonkin Gulf crisis brought Congressmen back in peo-plexity to Secretary McNamara's statements on withdrawals, and elicited the following exchange:

"..-Secretary McNamara, you/ ^ave again always indicated that you hoped that by the end of this year there would have been a substantial reduction. .. .V/here we had a planned reduction of the number of troops, and what appeared to be a withdrawal of the United States from the area, then this attack comes, which would put us firmly in t?ie area, or at least change our mind. The whole thing, . to me, is completely, at least, not understanding.

SECRETARY McNAI^iARA: "The'period, December I961, through the sumraer of I963 was a period of great progress within South Vietnam, in countering the effort of the Viet Cong to overthrow that government. However, starting in May, 1963; you will recall, a series of religious riots developed, controversy'within the country developed, leading eventually upon November 2nd to the overthrow of the ■ Diem government. Prior to that time in September, 1963; General

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Taylor and I had advised and visited that country. At that time^ the progress of the comiter insurgency effort was so great it appeared that we would be able to vithdrav/- much of our training force by the end of 3-965; and not V^Q-\-^ and v/e would — we so stated upon our return. But following that -- and I should also mention that in that same statement^ we made in September^ 19^3^ "we pointed out the very serious nature of the political difficulties that were building up in South Vietnam_, because of the conflict betv/een the Buddhists and the Catholics^ and the government.

"In any events as I say_, in November^ 19^3^ "the government was overthrown. There was another change of government January 30th^ and this completely changed the outlook and the political instability that followed the two coups has given the Viet Cong an opportunity to take advantage of the political and military weakness. They have taken advantage of it. It is now necessary to add further U.S. military assistance to counter that Viet Cong offensive

* a . •

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"We have never made the statement since September^ 19^3^ that we believed we could bring the bulk of the training forces out by the end of 19^5; because the actions in November and January made it - ■ quite clear that would not be possible.

"We have said -- as a matter of fact^ I say today — as our training missions are completed^ vre will bring back the training forces. I think this is only good sense^ and good judgment. V/e have certain training missions that I hope we can complete this year^ and others next year^ and the forces associated with those missions should be brought back.

"We have forces there training the Vietnamese to fly spotter aircraft^ for artillery spotting purposes. I am very hopeful that we can bring the U.S. forces out as the Vietnamese acquire that capability.

"On the other hand^ the Vietnamese quite clearly need additional assistance in training for counter guerrilla operations^, because of the increased guerrilla activities of the Viet Cong; and v^e are sending additional special forces to Vietnam for that purpose.

"There will be a flow in both directions^ but I am certain in the next several months the net flow will be strongly toward South Vietnam." ^/

After Tonkin Gulf^ the policy objective of gradual disengagement from Vietnam was no longer relevant. The hope^ as well as the concept of phase out and withdrawal^ dwindled; since such withdrawal was now seen as tantamount to surrendering SVN to Hanoi- The issue for the future would no longer be withdrcawalS; but what additional U.S. forces would be required to stem the tide—and h'ow fast they would have to be thrown into action.

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IV. B. h. FOOTNOTES

1. Secretary of Defense McNamara^ testimony "before the U.S. Congress^ House Comraittee on Appropriations^ March l6^ I962.

2. CINCPAC Ltr 3010 Ser 000223 to SecDef 26 July 19^2^ "Record of the /^sixth/ Secretary of Defense Conference held 23 July I962 at Headquarters, Commander in Chief Pacific (u)/' End. "Summary Record of Conference" (s).

3. Msg JCS 5^55 to CINCPAC 262318Z July I962, SECRET. h.' Msg CINCPAC to CaviuSCMCV 1^0423Z August I962, SECRET.

5. Hq USMACV "Summary of Highlights 8 Feb I962-7 Feb I963/' 20 March 1963, TOP SECRET; SACSA, OJCS, "An Overview of the Vietnam War (I96O-63)/' 16 January I9&I-, SECRET.

6. Ibid .

7. Ibid .

8. Ltr COMUSMACV MACJ5 to CMCPAC 3010 Ser 0021 "Comprehensive Plan for . South Vietnam/' I9 January I963, SECRET.

9. Msg OSD (ISA) DEF 923923 to CINCPAC 2222l^3Z January 1963, SECRET. 10- Ltr CINCPAC 3010 to JCS Ser 0079, 25 January 19^3; SECRET.

11. CPSVN, end to CINCPAC Ltr 3OIO to JCS Ser 0079. 25 January I963, SECRET.

12. Ibid.

13. Memo JCSM-180-63 for SecDef 7 March I963, SECRET-

iJ^. Memo for Record, MA Planning Div, OASD (ISA), 25 May I963, SECRET.

15. Memo CM-439-63 for SecDef, 26 March I963, CONFIDENTIAL; Memo, SecDef for CJCS, 26 March I963, SECRET.

'' ■ 16. USMACV "Summary of Highlights 8 Feb 1962-7 Feb I963/' 20 March I963,

i( TOP SECREI'.

'' 17. NIE 53-63; 12 April I963, SECRET.

18. CINCPAC Ltr Ser 000223 to SecDef "Summary Report on Secretary of ,1 Defense Conference, Honolulu, 6 May I963 (u)," 7 May 1963^ TOP SECRET.

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19. Two memos SecDef for AsstSecDef (ISA), both 8 May 1963; "both SECRET.

20. Msg JCS 9820 to CU^ICPAC O91805Z May I963, SECRET.

21. CIKCPAC Ltr 3010 Ser OOUT-63 to JCS, 11 May 1963; SECRET.

22. AsstSecDef (ISA) Memo for SecDef I-23l+6o/63, 17 May I963 (with handwritten marginal notations by SecDef on original copy), SECRET.

23. Msg DEE 928638 from OASD (ISA) to CIWCPAC 291T52Z May I963, SECRET. 2ij-. Memo JCSM-&I-O-63 for SecDef, 27 August 1963; SECRET.

. 25. Memo AsstSecDef (ISA) for SecDef, I-23369/63, 5 September I963, SECRET.

26. Memo SecDef for CJCS, 6 September 1963, SECREC.

27. OASD(lSA)OnMA I~2lt609/63, MAP Vietnam, "Military Manpower," 16 September 1963, and "Financial Summary," 27 September 1963; both SECRET.

28. Memo JCSM-629-63 for SecDef, 20 August 1963; SECRET.

29. Memo AsstSecDef (ISA) for SecDef, I-2600^t/63; 30 August 1963; SECRET. ' 30. Memo SecDef for CJCS, 3 September 1963; SECRET.

31. Memo CJCS for SecDef, 11 September I963, SECRET.

32. Air gram A-78I, State to AmErabassy Saigon et al, 10 JuJie 1963; COl^IDEMIAL.

33. State Dept Memo of Conversation, Under SecState, U.S. Arabassador to Vietnam, et al, 5 July I963, SECRET; State Dept Memo for Record, "Briefing for the President," k July 1963; TOP SECRET EYES ONLY.

^k. BIk Intelligence Summary Supplement (RVU), 17 July 1963; SECRET.

35. DIA Intelligence Bulletin, k August I963, SECRET.

36. Informal memo SACSA for Secretary of Defense, 1^ August I963, SECRET.

37. Director, DIA, memo for Secretary of Defense, 5-lQ9-^Q/^~3, 21 August 1963, SECRET.

38. SACSA, "Remarks at a Meeting on Vietnam with Vice President Johnson, Secretary Rusk, et al, at the Department of State, 31 August 1963;, Summarized by General Krulak."

^-^ ' 39. Memo President for the Secretary of Defense, 21 September I963, trans-

' mitted as attaclriment to White House memo McGeorge Bundy for Secretary

of Defense, 21 September 1963^ TOP-SECRET.

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kO. Joint Memo, SecDef-CJCS for President, 'keport of McWamara-Taylor Mission to South Vietnam/' 2 October I963 (TOP SECRET).

kl. Department of State Bulletin, October 21, 19^3; P- 623.

k2. KSAM 263, 11 October 1963^ TOP SECRET EYES ONLY.

k3. This explanation^ retrospectively developed by General Maxv/ell Taylor during an interview on I8 January 19®^ vas one of the primary reasons operative at the time,

kh. State 53^ to Saigon of 5 October I963.

45. Dept of State Jim Research Memo^ REE-9O; 22 October 1963-

kS. Memo SecState for SecDef^ 8 November 1963^ SECRET.

1 kj. CINCPAC Ltr 3OIO Ser 001218 to SecDef "Record of the Special Meeting

* on the Republic of Vietnam^ held 20 November I963 at Headquarters

CINCPAC.../' 22 November I963; SECRET.

k8. NSA!4 273^ 26 November 1963^, TOP SECRJiT.

49. Memo SecDef for President^ 23 November 19^3; SECRET.

< 50. Dir FERISA Memo for AsstSecDef (ISA), "Review of the South Vietnam

Situation^" 3 December I963.

51. Tab iJi "Accelerated Model Plan (CPSVN);" Back Up Book Saigon Trip 18-20 December I963; prepared by OSD for SecDef. TOP SECRET SENSTTIVE

52. NOTE: U.S. in-country strength figures for Vietnam vary widely depending on source. Discrepancies are accounted for by different standards for computing total according to administrative criteria^ such as distinctions in personnel assignment category, e.g., Joint Table of Distribution (JTD), Permanent Change of Station (PCS), Temporary Duty (TDY), replacement and rotational pipelines, etc.

53. CM-1079-63 for SecDef, 11 December I963, SECRET: Msg JCS 39^^ to CINCPAC 112lii8Z December I963.

5^^. Memo SecDef for the President, 21 December 19^3^ SECRET.

55. SACSA "An Overview of the Vietnam War (196O-63)/' no date (OSD handwritten entry on coversheet giving file date as I6 January 196^t} SECRET. Provided to SecDef for use in his December trip to SVN).

56. Dir DIA Memo for SecDef" S-'l8982/p-3, 13 December I963 SECRET.

57. Memorandixm'for the President from Secretary McNamara, dated^7 January ^ ' 196^-, subject: "Comment on Memoranda by Senator Mansfield.

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58. DepDlr CIA Memos for SecState^ SecDef, et al^ 10, U; 1^, l8 February

■ 1964, SECRET.

59. Msgs JCS 73^! CJCS to COl^IUSMCV, l8 February 1964 (s); COMUSMACV MAG 610 to CJCS, 19 February 1964 (TS); COMUSMACV MAC 665 to CJCS,

■ 21 February 1964 (TS).

&:>. Msg CINCPAC to ASD (ISA) 110626/z March 196^4, TOP SECRET.

61. Memo SecDef for the President, 16 March 1964.

62. WSAM 288, 17 March 1964, SECRET.

63. Msg CINCPAC to COMUSMACV 062l45Z May 1964, SECRET.

64. Working Paper, Special Meeting on Southeast Asia, Hq.. PACOM, 1-2 Jime 1964, Extension of U.S. Advisory Assistance in RW, 2 June 196-1; SECRETi Msg CO.^IUSMACV MlACJ 32538O to JCS, info DOD, State (Sullivan), White House (Forrestal), CMCPAC, DA, 25OOO5Z June 1964, SECRET, Msg COMUSIvLACV MACJ 325580 to CINCPAC info JCS 272357Z June 196*+, SECRET; Msg CDICPAC to JCS 04232OZ July I96J4, SECRET.

65. Msg AmEmbassy Saigon IO8 to SecState (Taylor to Rusk and McNamara) info JCS and CINCPAC I509OOZ July I965, SECRET.

(iG. Msg COI^SMACV to CINCPAC MACJ-31 618O l6l045Z July 19^4, SECRET.

67. Msg AmEmbassy Saigon to SecState info l^/hite House, DOD, JCS, CINCPAC I712IOZ July 1964, SECRET; Msg CINCPAC to JCS 2OOO36Z July 1964, SECREL'; Msg SecState 205 to AmEmbassy Saigon 21 July 19^4, TOP SECRET; Msg JCS 7492 to CnCPAC 2II917Z July 1l3G\, SECRET.

68. Department of the Army, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Periodic Report, Subject: Southeast Asia Military Forces (CFP-ODCSOPS-7), various dates.

, G). Secretary of Defense McNamara, Testimony Before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, August 6, 1964 (Executive Session).

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