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(much less any debate) on these questionSo General Taylor's report of his mission to Saigon implies an unambiguous convergence of interests betv'jeen the advisors and the advised. All that was needed v/as greater competence. More UoS. advisors at more places woricing on problems of Vietnamese training and operations could not but have an overall beneficial effect«

It is necessary to surmise the expectations in the policymakers minds "of just how this v\fould come about. First, they seem to have expected the increased UoS. advisory presence to lead directly to increased RVNAF competence in technical and tactical areas. Basic military skills — how to move, shoot, and communicate -- could be improved and the improvements sustained by a continuing U.S. presence at many operational levels. Second, the U.S. policymakers could receive reports from an omnipresent U.So "network" which would permit them to become better informed about what was really taking place in Vietnam, not only with respect to VC activity but with reference to ARVN plans, operations, and problems as well. Finally, the U.S. expected to realize increased influence within RVNAF from the presence of advisors. (And it expected, as NSAM 111 made clear, to realize increased influence with GVN in exchange for increasing its visible commitment to South Vietnamese independence.)

Increased influence can, of course, be gained in many ways. U.S. advisors could, by example, promote more aggressive Vietnamese leadership and improved standards of conductc A well-coordinated advisory network could exert persuasive pressure throughout RVNAF to adopt certain policies or practices. And the U.S» providers of the material resources could, if they wished, keep a tight hand on the spigot and control the flow. They could exert influence negatively. The U.S. was anxious to avoid this last-mentioned approach to increased influencec "Leverage," as it is now commonly known, was a subject rarely discussed, much less practiced. The "limited partnership" finessed the whole issue of sanctions by assuming (or hoping or pretending, one cannot know which) that no problem existed.

PACIFICATION A ND STRATEGIC HAMLETS

The process of countering insurgency, most commonly called pacification, received a great amount of attention and publicity at the same time the U.S« was increasing its field advisors with ARVN from a handful to over 3,000. Earlier, in I960, the USMAAG had pressed upon the GVN a national Counter insurgency Plan for Vietnam (CIP) which was really an organizational blueprint for reordering the GVN-RVNAF lines of command to permit effective action. The nub of the problem was that the political leaders in rural areas (Province and District Chiefs -- almost all military officers) vjere responsible to Saigon directly while RVNAF had a separate chain of command. In 1961, the MAA6 presented its complementary Geographically Phased Plan which specified the relative priority for clearing out the VC, holding, then building GVN at the "rice roots."

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The objects as the U.S„ advisors saw it, vjas to have a v^/orkable national plan upon which to base the entire US-GVN effort.

The Strategic Hamlet Program soon became the unifying vehicle to express the pacification process. The theory vjas that of physical security first> then government programs to develop popular allegiance. The fact vjas over-expans ion> counter-productive coercion in some areas, widespread mismanagement, and dishonesty. U.S. policymakers were not, however, aware of how badly things were going until they became much worse» Optimism dominated official thinking. No need was perceived for new departures. Throughout the period of the Strategic Hamlet Program -- that is, until Diem*s regime was toppled in late I963 "" the number of U«Se advisors remained relatively stable at its new (1962) plateau.

The expectation that more LI.So advisors would mean better information for UcS. policymakers was not realized. One cannot judge accurately the reasons why U.S* leaders in Vietnam and Viashington thought the counter-insurgent effort was making headway, but the fact that it was not is crystal clear in retrospect. The expectation that GVN and U.S. interests were sufficiently parallel to permit greater U.S. influence solely as a result of a larger U.S. presence foundered on the personalities and the felt necessities of the Ngo brothers. The extent to which RVNAF technical-tactical competence was increased during this period remains a subject of disagreement but it was not increased sufficiently to "turn the tide" of the war. That much is indisputable.

ANOTHER ROUND OF INCREAS ES

After Diem*s fall there was a brief period of optimism based on the expectation that the new military regime in Saigon would be more receptive to U.S. advice than its predecessor had been. By the summer of 196^+, when the decision was made to expand the advisory effort again, this optimistic hope had foundered on the fact of continued VC victories and instability within the GVN.

NSAM 288 had, in March \SGh^ stated U.S. objectives in Vietnam in the most unambiguous and sweeping terms. If there had been doubt that the limited risk gamble undertaken by Eisenhower had been transformed into an unlimited commitment under Kennedy, that doubt should have been dispelled internally by NSAM 288's statement of objectives:

We seek an independent non-Communist South Vietnam. V/e do not require that it serve as a Western base or as a member of a Western Alliance. South Vietnam must be free, however, to accept outside assistance as requ i red to ma i nta in i ts secur i ty» Th i s ass i stance should be able to take the form not only of economic and social measures but also police and military help to root out and control insurgent elements.

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If we cannot save South Vietnanij the NSAM continued in a classic ^— ' statement of the "domino theory," all of Southeast Asia v^ill probably

fall and all of the Western Pacific and South Asian nations will come under increased pressure.

There were at this time several steps which the U.S. could have talcen to increase its assistance to the GVN. Carrying the war to Hanoi was one; introducing UcS. combat forces was another. Neither appealed much, however, in terms of helping the South Vietnamese to ^'^^ ^hei r war. Both were anathema in the midst of Presidential election year politics. Bombing was discussed and plans laid, but no action taken. Troop commitments were not even discussed -- at least in the written record of proposals and decisions. Rather, a number of palliative measures to help the GVN economy and RVNAF were adopted and the advisory effort was expanded.

The 1964 expansion of the advisory effort consisted of the beefing-up of the battalion advisory teams and the establishment of district (sub-sector) teams. Thus, a new dimension of American presence was added and the density of U»Sc advisors in operational units was increased There is nothing in the available record to suggest either a challenge to the old, unstated assumption that more U,S. advisors would lead to increased performance or any change in the assumed expectations of U.S. policymakers had changed. The determination remained to advise rather than to command, to develop Vietnamese leadership rather than to supplant it, and to induce the GVN to take the steps necessary to pacify its own f dissident elements.

ADVISORS TEMPORAPx ILY FORGOTTEN

The expansion to district level placed UoS« military advisors throughout almost the entire RVNAF hierarchy (from JGS to battalion, with enough men at the lower level to advise companies on a "when needed" basis) and the political hierarchy as well (sector/province and sub"sector/di str let). U.S. advisors were not present in large numbers with the old Civil Guard and Self-Defense Corps -~ now relabelled the Regional Forces and Popular Forces under province and district control respectively -- but they advised the military men in political positions who controlled these paramilitary forces.

St i11 the s i tuat ion cent i nued to deter I orate, Poli t ica1 insta-bility within the GVN had by I965 become a perennial rather than a transitory problem. The U.S. had initiated a continuing series of military air war measures to dissuade North Vietnam from support of the war in the South. The results were obviously inadequate; they may even have been opposite to those expectedc Then ARVN suffered a series of disastrous defeats late in the spring of IS65 vjhich led knowledgeable observers to fear an imminent GVN collapse. U.S. combat units -- a fe of which were already in-country with restrictive missions -- began to be deployed to South Vietnam in earnest.

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VJhen the build-up of U.S. combat forces got underway the build-up of U.S. advisors had already been essentially completedo Being an advisor in the field had been the most challenging assignment a U»S. soldier could seek; being vjith a U.S. unit in combat now became the aim of most. The advisory effort sank into relative obscurity as the attention of policymakers (and of the press and public) focused on the U.S. force deployments, on building the base complexes from which U.S« military might could project itself into the countryside, and in exploring the new relationships and new opportunities occasioned by the commitment of U.S. land forces to the Asian mainland.

A number of measures which would have changed materially the U.S. advisors' relationship to their Vietnamese counterparts were examined briefly in mid-1965. Each was dropped. The encadrement of U.S. and ARVN units was favored by President Johnson. General Westmoreland opposed it — apparently because of language problems and the difficult logistic support problem it would create "- and the issue quickly died, except for the experimental Combined Action Platoons (CAPs) formed by the Marinese The subject of a combined U.S.-RVNAF command was brought up. Secretary McNamara was more favorably disposed toward achieving "unity of command" than were his senior military advisors and the U.S. Mission representatives in Saigon, They were keenly aware of GVN sensitivity to any measures which would explicitly finger the increasing Americanization of the war effort.. So combined command was shelved, too. The GVN even opposed a joint US-JGS staff to coordinate the war effort. The staff was never formed.

PACIFICATION REEMPKASIZED

As the build-up of U.S. combat forces reached a level permitting offensive forays against the VC (and North Vietnamese Army) forces, there gradually evolved a division of responsibilities between UoS. and Vietnamese forces in which the former were to concentrate on defeating the main forces of the VC/NVA and the latter were to give primary emphasis to the pacification program. Half of ARVN was to operate in support of pacification.

This division of effort threw most U.So advisors into pacification with ARVN units as well as in the province and district advisory teams. It also threw the U.S. military advisors into closer contact --• and competition and conflict -~ with the growing number of advisors on civil functions (many of whom were U.S. military men on "loan") representing the CIA, AID, and USIA. The question was raised of the optimal internal U.S. organization to support the Vietnamese pacification program.

The result of a drawn-out, occasionally acrimonious debate on this question was an intermixed civil-military organization embracing the entire pacification effort, headed by a civilian of ambassadorial rank under COMUSMACV*s direction. Called Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS), it replaced a bilinear system in which

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military advisors were controlled through a military chain of command and all civilian advisors were controlled (at least in theory) through an Office of Civil Operations (OCO). The creation of CORDS was hailed as a victory for the "single manager" concept even though some very substantial U.S. programs were defined as outside the pacification program and, hence, beyond CORDS' competence.

RF/PF ADVISORS

The creation of CORDS affected only the organizational context of U.So advice to the South Vietnamese. It did nothing to change the relationship between advisor and advised. U.S. expectations continued in the v/ell"Worn furrows in Vsihich they had travelled from the beginning: better information, more U.S. influence over Vietnamese plans and actions, and improved GVN (including RVNAF) performance were the hoped for products of the advisory effort.

This pattern was repeated in I967 when an increase of over 2,000 military advisors was proposed by HACV to assist the Regional and Popular Forces -- whose security missions were almost exclusively devoted to support of the pacification program. The RF and PF vjere, at that time, the only RVNAF components without a sizeable U.S. advisory complement. Vihen the question of improving their effectiveness was addressed the old assumption that more U.S. advisors would equate to improved effectiveness again went unchallenged.

The question debated was whether this new dimension of the U.S. advisory effort should be structured to give continuing advice to RF companies and PF platoons or should be constituted on a mobile training basis. The decision was to form mobile teams for both tactical and logistical support trainitig. Advisors were detached from their parent U.S. combat units and detailed to these duties pending the manpower accounting change vjhich would transfer these individuals to MACV advisory control and replace them in U.S. units with newly deployed f i1lers,

AVOIDED ISSUES

This was the situation when the VC/NVA launched a massive series of attacks against urban population centers and surrounding pacification program forces during the I968 lunar new year (Tet) offensive. In the confused aftermath of this radical change in VC/NVA strategy the U.S. announced in V/ashington its intention to give renewed attention to modernizing RVNAF so that a larger share of the war effort could be turned back to the Vietnamese. This policy decision, follovjing as it did an unprecedented six-year period of U.S. attempts to wage counter-insurgent war by proxy^ constituted an adequate reason to reexamine the experience of the past and to explore more fully some difficult questions which have been consistently avoided in the desire to assist South Vietnam.

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The most basic of these questions is whether the U.S, can in any way serve as a makeweight sufficient to change the continuing unfavorable trend of the war in South Vietnam? Can it, that is, overcome the apparent fact that the Viet Cong have "captured" the Vietnamese nationalist m.ovement while the GVI-^ has become the refuge of Vietnamese who were allied with the French in the battle against the independence of their nation? Attempts to answer this question are complicated, of course, by the difficult issue of Viet Cong allegiance to and control by Communist China. But this is the nature of the situationc The issue of whether the U.S. can energize the GVN has been too long submerged by repeated assertions that it must do so.

A part of any tentative answer to this fundamental question will turn on the issue of how the UoS. might better promote a more adequate pace of GVN reform and improved RVNAF effectiveness to cope with the VC/NVA threat„ (A related question, of course, is whether reform ajid increased effectiveness can proceed simultaneously0 Asking this question would open for examination two aspects of the advisory program that have come to be treated by reflexive response: where are advisors needed and what should be the relationship of the advisor to the advised?

The continuing U.S. unstated assumption has been that more advisors somehow equate to better performance. This can be traced in the successive expansions of the military advisory effort -- first to the provinces and down to battalion level within ARVN, then to the districts, and most recently to the paramilitary forces within RVNAF. It may be that large numbers of advisors are, in fact, the best way to influence events but one cannot reach such a conclusion validly without first aslcing the quest ion.

The relationship of advisor to advised has gone through recurrent changes relative to judging an advisor's performance according to the performance of his counterpart. It has almost never deviated, however, from the belief that the conscious and continuing use of leverage at many levels would undercut Vietnamese sovereignty and stultify the development of Vietnamese leadership. Given the results of this policy over a number of years it is fair to ask whether the stick ought not to be more routinely used in combination with the carrot. Again, the answer is not obvious but it is obvious that there can be no sound answer in the absence of inquiry.

Finally, and closely related to any examination of the leverage issue, there is the question of the adequacy of counter insurgent theory and doctrineo The progression from physical security through the establishment of socially oriented programs (political and economic) to the objective of earning and winning popular allegiance seems both simple and logical. It may also be simplistic, for its transformation into operational reality bumps head-on into some very difficult questions Is security a precondition to loyalty, for instance, or must some degree of loyalty be realized as a precondition to intelligence information

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adequate to make security feasible? This chicken-and-egg argument has been debated for years without leading to any noticeable consensus on guides to operational action.

Seeking answers to any of these questions is a difficult, frustrating business. There exists no "control" by which laboratory comparisons of alternative courses can be made. There is almost surely no hard choice which will not carry with it very real liabilities along with its advantages. But if the lives and effort expended in the U.S. military advisory effort in South Vietnam in the 1360*s are to be justified, a substantial portion of that justification will consist of a closer examination of past assumptions in order better to guide future policy.

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TEE ADVISORY BUILD-UP^ 1961-67

CHRONOLOGY

21 Jul 5J4

Geneva Cease-fire Accord

22 Sep 54

11 Oct 5^

19 Oct ^k

22 Oct 5^^-

26 Oct ^k

17 Nov 54

20 Jan 55

21 Jan 55

Memo^ JCS for SecDef, Retention and Developnent of Forces in Indochina

Letter^ J. F. Dulles (See State) to C. E. Wilson (SecDef)

Memo5 JCS for SecDef^ Development and Training of Indigenous Forces in Indochina

Msg^ State to Saigon 1679

Memo^ SecDef to JCS

Memo^ JCS for SecDef^ Indochina.

Memo, Gen. J. Lawton Collins for SecState, Report on Vietnam for the National Security Council

Memo, JCS for SecDef, Reconsideration of U.S. Military Program in Southeast Asia

Ended fighting between Viet Minh and French; divided Vietnarti at 17th parallel; limited U.S. military personnel in RVN to current level (3^^2).

U.S. resources could better be used to support countries other than RVTf.

Only sm^all U.S. training forces to RVN to promote internal stability-

Opposed U.S. training RVN army. Risk not v^orth the gamble.

Set in motion "crash program." to improve RVN forces.

JCS to prepare long--ra,nge program to improve EVl^ forces.

Developraent of effective forces and prevention of communist takeover cannot be prevented without Vietnamese effort that is probably not forthcoming.

Vietnam might be "saved" with U.S. aid; would be "lost" without it.

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Outlines alternative U.S. courses of action in EYNt present program, advice with leverage5 U.S. forces, or withdrawal.

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2i| Oct 55 31 Aug 60

9 Dec 55

16 Dec 55

1959

7 Jnn 59

27 Feb 60

10 Jun 60

1 Sep 60 -

5 Mar 62

k Jan 61

17 Jan 61

I

Memo for SecDef^ Raising U.S. Military Personnel Ceilino; ±n M_AAG Vietnara

"■tj

Memo5 Director CIA from SecState

Report, The President's Committee to Study the United States Military Assistance Program

Msg, State-Defense-ICA" CAS to Saigon 28

Msg, Saigon to State 2525

U.S. Army Command & General Staff College, Study on Arm,y Aspects of the Military Assistance Program in Vietnajn

Counter Insurgency Plan for South Vietnam (CIP), enclosux'e to msg, Saigon to State 276

Memo, General Lansdale for SecDef, Vietnam

Lt Gen Samuel T. Williams, Chief of MkkG to Vietnam.

MAAG needed twice the current 3^2 personnel to train RVME.

TERM also to serve as cover for intelligence gathering.

Emphasized need for promoting internal security; coined term "mirror Imaging."

Forbids ©.dvisors to participate in combat.

Abolished TERM but added equal nufnber of spaces to MAAG, Vietnam, increasing it from 3^2 to 685.

Prepared for Gen. Lionel C. McGarr, described Viet Cong strategy but deprecated ARVN pa.rticip3.tion in pacification.

Lt Gen Lionel C. McGarr, Chief of MAAG to Vietnam.

Blueprint for RVMAF reorganization, containing Gen McGarr's recommendations for integrating ARVl^F and CG/sdC in a comonon chain of command to promote internal security.

Proposed extra-bureaucratic advisory effort carried out by specially selected and qualified personnel.

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15 Mar 61 1 Aug 63

28 Mar 61

12 Apr 61

19 Apr 61

20 Apr 61

27 Apr 61

1 May 61

3 May 61

11 May 61

15 May 61

NIE 50-61, Outlook in Mainland. Southeast Asia

Memo, Walt W. Rostov to the President

Memo, Qen. Lansdale to SecDef, Vietn3;na

Memo, SecDef for DepSeQSef

Memo, DepSecDef for President, Program of Action for Vietnam

Memo, R, L. Gilpatric for Presidentia.l Task Force

Memo, State Department to members of Task Force on Vietnam

KSAI^ 52

Msg. Saigon to State 17^-3

Frederick E. Nolting, Ambassador to South Vietnam

Report that VC controlled most of countryside.

Suggested appointment of PresidentJ.al Agent to oversee Vietnaiu programs in Washington.

Proposed creation of inter-departanente^l task force on Vietnam.

McNam-ara asked Gilpatric for program to "prevent communist domina/tion" of Vietnam., in response to Lansdale proposal.

Recommended expa.nded UcS. effor't in Vietnam., MAAG increase of 100, MAAG takeover of CG/SDC, U.S» advisors in field operations creation of Presidential Task Force. Foreshadovred later decision.

Recommended augmenting l^'IAAG by 2 training commands (I600 each) and deploy ^tOO Special Forces (increasing MAAG from 685 to 2285). Marked shift to conventional approach.

Recommended revision of Gilpatric task force, proposed interdepart-menta.l task force under State leadership.

Recorded President's decision to increase UoS. forces slightly and re-emphasi zed U.S. coiimiitment.

Recorded Diem's refu-sal of U.S. combat troops on bilateral treaty.

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18 May 6.1

23 May 6l

27 May 6l

9 Jun 6l

15 Sep 61

1 Oct 61

Oct 6l

5 Oct 61

10 Oct 61

n

Memo BG Lansciale for DepSecDef;> Vietnam

Memo5 Vice President Johnson for President Kennedy

Letter from President to each American Ambassador abroad. (See Memo, President for Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, 29 May I96I5 "Responsibilities of Chiefs of American Diplomatic Missions/' Eederal Registerj, Vol. 26 Nr 225 1? Nov I96I5 p.10749 (F.R« Doc. 61-11012).

Letter, President Diem to President Kennedy

Recorded Diem's acceptaaice of U.S. forces for training but not for fighting.

Report from Johnson*s trip to Vietnam that "deeds must replace words."

Set for'bh coordinating authority

for amba.ssadors.

MAAG, Vietnam, Geographically Phased National Level Plan for Counter-insurgency

Msg, Saigon to State ^21

JCSM 717-61

DF, Distribution Division, DCSPER, DA to Multiple Addres s ees, Improvement of Personnel Continuity

and Effectiveness in Short Tour Overseas Areas.

SmE 10-3-61, Probable ComiTiUnist Reactions to Certain SKA.TO Undertakings in South Vietnajn

k

Proposed 100,000 increase in

RVNAE 3.nd corresponding expansion of MAAG.

Suggested operational sec[uence of priority areas for coordinated counterinsurgency effort under single chain of comjnand.

Diem asked for bila/leral defense treaty with U.S.

JCS proposal to send 20,000 UeSo combat troops to central highlands.

OSD decision to increase tour of duty to 30 months with dependents, I8 without, instead of 2k and 12. Never put into effect.

Examined proposal for U.S. troop intervention.

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11 Oct 61

11 Oct 61

25 Oct 61

25 Oct 61

1 Nov 6l

3 Nov 61

li| Nov 61

22 Nov 61

22 Nov 61 25 Nov 61

Dec 6l

Study-;, Concept of Intervention in South VietnaiUj n.d,5 discussed a/b NSC meeting5 11 Oct 6n.

Memo for Record Roswell Gilpatric

Msg;j Saigon to State

Msg;, Saigon 537jj General Taylor to VJhitc House, State;, Defense;, JOS; Msg, Baguio 005^ 1 Nov 6l, Eyes Only for the President from General Taylor

State Dept^ Burea.u of Intelligence and Research^ RFE-35 1 Nov 6I5 Communist Threat Mounts in South Vietnam

Report on General Taylor's Mission to South Vietnam.

Msgj State to Saigon 619

NSAM 111, First Phase of Vietna^m Program

Msg, Saigon to State 687; Msg5 Saigon to State 7O8.

Msg, State to Saigon 693

Proposed sending U.S. combat troops.

Recorded decision to send Taylor to Vietnam and outlined alterzia/bives to be considered.

Diem^s assurance that he favored deployraent of U.Se troops.

Proposed sending 6-8000 troops under guise of "flood relief."

Reported increa.sed VC activity in first half I96I: 5OO assassinations ^ 1000 kidnappings 5 1500 RVNAF KIA.

Discussed VC strategy and threat and the weaknesses of the Diem regime. Proposed shift in U.S. effort "from advice to limited pa.rtnership."

Recorded U.S. expectation of sharing in GVN decision-making.

Outlines U.S. actions and expected improvements in GVN.

Ambassador Nolting reported that Diem refused to bovr to U.S. pressure.

Dropped insistence on explicit U.Se influence on GVN decisions;,

but assuj'fied such influence as by-product of close partnership.

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16 Jan 62

r

13 Feb 62 1 Aug 6h

23 Jul 62

1 Aug 63

1 Jul 6^1-

2 Oct 63

1 Nov 63

1 Nov 63 ■

16 Aug 6^4-

26 Nov 63

7 Mar 6k

Hq, CINCPAC5 Record of Second Secreta^ry of Defense Conference

Record of 6th Secretary of Defense Conference

White House Statement

Military Revolutionai*y Council

NSAJ^4 273

Briefing Paper^ Establishment of Critical District Advisory Teajns (c)^ Briefing Book for McNaughton^ Saigon ^ay 196^7

Recorded decisions of Honolulu Conference: establish battalion advisory teams5 province s.dvisors CG/SDC training.

Gen. Paul D. Harkins, C01vIUSMA.CV

McNamara. plan for phe.sed withdrawal of U.So forces^ based on optimistic I962 expectations,

Henry Cabot Lodge;, Amb8.ssador to South Vietnam.

Announcement by President Kennedy of UeSo hopes for planned pha,sed withdrawal of troops.

Diem overthrov/n by military coup d'etat.

Duong Van Minh^ Chief of State and Chairman5 Military Revolutionary Council.

Reaffirmed and continued Kennedy administration policies in Vietnam; placed emphasis on Mekor.g Delta; maintained military assistance at least as grea.t as to Diem.; reiterated plans for troop withdrawal; proposed no new programs nor increased U.S. assistance; authorized operations up to 50 km. within Laos.

MACV extended U.S. advisory effort to district level in I3 key districts around Saigon.

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17 Mar 6k

I

I

17 Apr 6k

ii

22 Apr 6^

May 6k

I

12 May 6^4

22 May 6k

23 May 6k

NSAJ/I 288, Implementation of South Vletnajn Programs

Memo^ DIA for SecDef, Statiis of the Vietna^rnese Hamlet Survey

Memoj DepSecDef for CJCS

Briefing Book, Miscellaneous Messages, Status Reports, and Recormnenda.-tlons for Secretary McWamara, n.d.

Draft Memo for the Record, Lt. Col, S. B* Berry, Jr., Mil. Asst. to SecDef, n.d., U,Sc Embassy B riefing,_S3J:gon.

12-13 May 6k McNamara trip to Saigon

Msg, JCS to COMUSmCV 6kk8, Vietnamese Civil Guard and Self-Defense Corps.

Msg, CINCPAC to JCS 23oi|l8s,Vietnamese Civil Guard and Self Defense Corps

7

The situation in Vietnajn had deteriorated and was grave; VC controlled much of country; North Vietnamese support of V.C. had increased; RVm? should be increa.sed by 5C5OOO; contingency plains for opera/bions in Laos a.nd. Cajnbodia and overt retaliation against DRV should be developed; hov/ever, no major increase of U.Se advisory effort was called for.

Aerial photo reconnaissance revealed far fewer fortified hainlets than province officials

claimed-

Secretary insisted tha.t he persona^lly approve every m^an-power space for M/ICV.

Reported grea;t instability in province governments, decline in GVN controlled popula.tion, increase in VC control; important provinces vrere in "critical condition."

USOM 25/0 ujiderstrength, half this shortage in rural affairs

staff.

Situation appeared critical.

COMJSmcv asked to study encadrement of CG/SDC with U.S. teams similar to V&ite Sta^r teazns in Laos. JCS was examining a.lternative a.dvisor expaAisions (1,000, 2,000, 3.000).

MACV opposed to "flooding" RVW with U.S. personnel; preferred build-up on selective basis, challenged "encadrement/'

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t--

25 May 6^1-

27 May 6k

27 May Gk

27 May 6k

r

28 May 6k

30 May 6k

30 May 6k

30 May 6k

Msg, JCS to CINCPAC 6^73? Vietnamese Civil Guard and Self Defense Corps

Msg, COMUSMACV to CINCPAC

^1-259, 2700^-5^.

Msg, CINCPAC to JCS, 270805s, Vietnamese CG and SDC

Msg, White House to Saigon (Personal for Gen. Paul Harkins)

Msg, Saigon to State 2338

JCSM-li6U-6U, Pilot Program for Provision of Advisory Assistance to Pa.ramilitary Forces in Seven Provinces

JCSM"3-f65"6U, U.S. Advisory Assistance to the Vietnamese Civil Guard and Self-Defense Corps.

JCSI^/[-'Jl66"6^, Provision of U.S. Advisors to Company Level Within Vietnamese Regular Ground Forces

8

JCS plan for 6 Mobile Training Teams in each province and training center, 70 advisors to each critical province, increase of 1000 personnel.

Gen- Plarkins disputed the value of UcS. conducted training for CG/sdC and of Mobile Training Teams; proposed advisors be used at district level for opero^tions; accepted 1000 man increase.

CINCPAC agreed T^ith COMUSM^CV and outlined specific a.dvisory build-up recomuiended: 956 personnel by end CY 65«

Gen. Harkins req,uested to return to U.S.

USOM desire for gradual, not rapid, build-up; need for effective local administration and security.

One of two JCS proposals submitted to McNamara outlining pilot program for advisory build' up: teams in k^ districts over 6 month period, 3OO advisors.

Second proposa.l - Broader advisory increase program: 1000 personnel for all 239 districts over l-^lg" years.

JCS opposed extending U.S. advisors to company level, because of increased casualties, language problems, ARVN opposition.

TOP SECRET " Sensitive

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date; 2011

■Jl

TOP SECRET - Sensitive

O

1 Jxxn Qa 25 Juri 6^

1 Jul Q\ ■ 31 Jul 65

17 Jul 9\-

28 Jul 0\

Jul G\

1 Aug 6^-l-30 Jun 68

2 Aug Q\

h Aug G\

5. Aug Q\

7 Aug 64

Honolulu Conference

Msg, COIviUSMACV to JCS, MAC 7325380, Extension of U.Se Advisory Assist' ance

Msg, COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, MACJ"3l6l80, Support Requireraents for Extension of U.S. Advisory Prograi^a.

Msg, COMUSmCVAto JCS, MA.CJ1 70^^!-, Personnel Augmentation.

Hop Tac

Tonkin Gulf Incident

JCSM-665-64, Additional Support in RVN on Accelerated Basis

Tonkin Gulf Resolution

Memo, SecDef for CJCS, Additional Support for Republic of Vietnam on an Accelerated Basis,

El8.borated decision of Honolulu conference to expand advisory effort to district level, and to increase batta.lion~level advisory groups to make company level exlvisory teams a,vallable.

Maxwell Taylor^ Ambassador to South Vietnam.

COMJSMACV reached ^200 personnel in additiozi to 926 I battalion and district advisoz's -• "the straw that broke the camel*s back" of the over-"bu-rdened support base.

COMJSMACV requested 4200 personnel by 1 Dec 0\ and remainder of 4772 total increase by 1 Feb 65.

Idea for Hop Tac^ special combined US/gVN effort to secure critical area round Saigon^ proposed by Amb. Lodge at Honolulu Conference-

Gen. William C. Westmoreland, commavnder of MACV.

U.S.S. Maddox allegedly attacked by Horth Vietnamese torpedo boats.

McNamara wanted additional m,en provided more q.uickly than Westmoreland's plan.

Congress passed joint resolution supporting "all necessary action" to protect U.So forces and assist Vietnajn.

McNamara directed that accelerated deployment be completed by end of September.

TOP SECRET - Sensitive

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

TOP SECRET - Sensitive

11 Al3g 6k

I

15 Aug 6^

16 Aug 6k 26 Oct 6k

12 Sep 6k

k 'Nov 6k 11 Jun 65

Dec 64

Dec 6k

Msg, comsmcv to cincpac^

MACJ3 7738, Additional Support for RW

Msg, JCS to CSA, CWO,

CSAF' et al^ JCS 7953, Additional Support in RW.

Khanli coup.

Hop Tac

"Troika sign-off" for piasters a^bolished

Westmoreland replied tho.t he could not absorb build-up in time req^uested by McNamara,.

McNamara cancelled accelerated deployment, services instructed to deploy personnel in a,ccordance with Westmoreland's initial

recommendations.

Nguyen Khanh, President, Head of State and Chief, Revolutionary-Military Council (30 Jan 6k to 26 Oct 6k, 27 Jan-65 to 21 Peb

65).

Hop Ta.G launched with a sweep through Gia Dinh Province. Mission aborted follov/ing day by coup-

Phan Klac Sun, Chief of State

Crisis betv/een Amb. Taylor and Gen. Khanh resulted from Taylor's attempt to use U.S. decision to begin bombing DRV as lever to get GVN reform, Taylor abandoned further attempts at leverage.

USOM Director Killen decided to abandon joint sign-off for release of piaster funds for pacification - importa.nt leverage tool.

23 Jan 65

7 Feb 65

10

McHam^ara approved RTOAF force increase proposal for MAP support. New strength authorizations: 275,058 Regular Forces, 137,187 W and 185,000 PP. (Alternat ive 1).

FIAI^IING DART reprisal attacks against DRV launched.

TOP SECRET - Sensitive

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

- 2'i

I

I

22 Feb 65

26 Feb 65

26 Feb 65

6 Mar 65 16 Mar 65

20 Mar 6

5

21 Mar 65

26 Mar 6

5

1-2 Apr 65

6 Apr 65

12 Apr 65

15 Apr 65

TOP SECRET - Sensitive

JCS message O936

COmSMiACV message I566

MACV "Coimiander's Esti mate of the Situation"

NSAM 328

MACV Command History I965

Defense Department message 00916^1-5 Joint State/Defense Message

11

Gen. Westmoreland recommended sending two Marine Battalion Landing Teams to DalTang for base security*

ROLLING TI-IUITOER^ sustained bombing of DRV, initiated.

Decision to send Marines to DaNang made in Washington.

Marines went ashore at DaNang.

Gen, H. K. Johnson returned from trip to Vietnam with recommends/cion for deployi^aent of U.S, combat forces and crea.tion of joint command.

Westmoreland rec^uested authorization to implement Alternative 2 RVNAF strength increase (greater than a3-ternative 1 by l^^OOO)^

Westmoreland opposed any forma.l merging of coimnands, preferred informal cooperation.

As a stra.tegy alternative, Westmoreland rejected proposal for accelerated RVNAF build-up as insufficient to prevent VC victory.

Washington strategy conference with Brig Gen De Piiy, Anib. Taylor.

President approved dispatch of two more battalions and an air wing and authorized their employment for active combat missions.

McNamara approved JCS recorraiaenda-tion for RVNAF expansion of 17,2^7. 160 additional U.S. advisors approved.

Defense Department sought to have U.S. Army civil affairs officers introduced in provinces to improve civil administration. Axnb. Taylor's opposition killed -^roposaA.

TOP SECRET - Sensitive

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

TOP SECRET - Sensitive

15 Apr 65

15 Apr 65

18 Apr 65

Apr 65

3 May 65

11 May 65

1^1- May 6

5

Department of State message 2332

DOD message I51233E

Honolulu ConferenceJ MACV Command History

MACV Command ?Iistory 1965

Hop Tac pacificB.tion

JCS message 1^22282

McGeorge Bundy informed Amb. Taylor that Presidejat we.nted to try "encadrement of U.S* troops with Vietnamese/'

DOD requested COICISM/VCV's opinion about feasibility of encadrement of U«S, officers in ARVN divisions to improve effectiveness.

Based on study by Gen. Throckmorton 5 encadrement proposals were rejected beca.use of language problem;, expa.nded support req.uirement^ and adverse effects on South Vietnamese morale -

Westmoreland suggested joint M/iCV-JGS staff. Gen. Thieu and Gen. Minh were opposed.

Corps commanders for I^ II, IV Corps presented Hop Tac plans for their zones5 each to extend "oil blot" pacification from its headq.ua.rters city. (By end of 1965 became schem.e for National Priority Areas.)

Viet Cong attached and overran Song Be5 capital of Phuoc Long Province, and a UoS. advisory compound in the city.

McNamara authorized creation of formal, combined command in Vietnam and coordinating MCV-JGS staff.

21 May 6

5

26 May 65

COMaSMACV message Combined Command; JCS messagr2iro6032

CINCPAC msg to JCS 3027, 260332:

■ S

Westmoreland recom^nended against proposed combined command because of Thieu*s .and Ky*s opposition.

CINCPAC supported COMaSMACV's opposition to combined command because of fears of Vietnamese hostility.

12

TOP SECRET " Sensitive

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

TOP SECRET - Sensitive

late May 65

Z^'

Jun 65

7 Jun 65

19 Jun 65 present

Jun 6

5

25 Jun 65

26 Jun 65

Jul 65

Jul 65

7 Jul 65

Origin 01" CAP

MA.CV message to CINCPAC and JCS I9II8 '

MA.CV Military Report^ 19-26 June

MACV Cor/ffiiand History;, 1965

13

VC force ambushed and decimated ARVN 51st Regiment and 2 ba.ttalions near Ba Gia^ west of Quang Ngai City.

Several Marines assigned to v/ork with local PP near Phu Baij I Corps.

Mora.toriiMi on RVMAF build-up req,uired because trainees needed as fillers in existing units to replace heavy casua3.ties. Westmoreland requested kk additional U.S. battalions; reported severe ARVN deterioration.

Nguyen Van Thieu^ Chief of State and Chairman;» National Leadership Council^ 20 Jun 65 to 9 Nov 67? elected President 31 Oct 67.

Viet Cong attacked Special Forces camp at Dong Xoai with more than two regiments.

VC Central Highlands offensive began;, district headquarters at Tou Morong^ Kontim Province, was overrun.

MACV noted 5 ARVN regiments and and 9 battalions combat ineffective.

18 US/fw combat maneuver battalions vrere in Vietnejn.

11 of 15 ARVN training battalions had to be disorga.nized to 'provide fillers for line units due to heavy casualties.

Six district capitals had been abandoned or overrun.

TOP SECRET - Sensitive

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

.?y

TOP SECRET " Sensitiye

(

20 Jul 65

25 Jul G'^j

28 Jul G3

7 Aug 65

Sep 65

Sep 65

1 Oct 65

16 Oct 65 18 Oct 65

21 Oct 65

SecDef Memorandum for the President

Saigon message 266

MA.CV Command History 1965.

Lodge Ajnbassador

M/ICV Command History, 1965.

State Dejjt msg IO39 Saigon msg 132^

McNama,ra urged U.So to lay dovm teiTas for continuing assista^nce before introduction of more forces; su-ggested exercise leverage through control, of rice policy.

Amb* Taylor did not want to appe3.r to impose conditions for increa^sed aid.

President announced expanded U.So effort and increased troop conmitment to Vietnam.

CG III MF designated as Senior Advisor to ARVN I CTZ Comjmnder.

Lodge returned to Vietnam for second term as ambassador. Term of office: 31 J*^l 65 -Apr 67-

COMJSMCV evaluated 3-rt^onth experiment with "single manager" teams in 3 provinces^ found it partia.lly successful but scrapped the idea.

MACV created separate contingency fund for each subsector advisor for urgent projects, in attempt to overcome de3-ays in Vietnam.ese pacification system.

USOM sought to restore troika sign-off but State Dept. opposed this idea. The attempt was abandoned.

Commander of HQ Field Force, Vietnam (FFORGEV) designated as II CTZ Senior Advisor. (At insistance of ARVN Corps commanders, who felt they vxould suffer loss of prestige if advised by less than Senior U.Sc officer in corps.)

\h

TOP SECRET " Sensitive

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

r

?

TOP SECEET - Sensitive

3 Nov 6

5

5 Nov 6^

Kov 65

28 Nov 6

5

15 Dec 65

SecDef Draft Me^riorandiJjni for the President

MA.CV Command Plistory

CAP Program.

Lodge memoranduju for Gen. Lansdale; MA.CV Command Plistory

8-11 Jan 66

¥arrenton Conference Report

Jan 66

MACV Analysis of RVNAF for CY 66

McNamara recorded im-patience with GVNj recommended giving larger role to advisors at province e.nd district level.

Westmoreland recommended increased RVNAF force levels for FY 66 and FY 675 to limit of available

manpower.

Agreem.ent betv^een I Corps Com.-mander and CG III MAF permitting integration of Marine sqviads into PF platoons in DaNang area to form Combined Action Platoon (CAP): MarJ.ne Rifle Squad (ik) and PF Platoon (32-38)-

McNamara trip to Saigon;, approves RVNAF force increase recormnenda-tion.

Lodge specified that GVN pacification effort was primarily civilian^ conseq.uently on UeS. side the two civilian agencies^ USAID and CAS5 should be generating support agencies.

Members of Saigon Mission^ Viet-na,m Coordinating Comjnittee and other senior officials met at VJarrenton^ Virginia, to review pacification problem. It foreshadowed a redirection of advisory effort toward pacification.

At Mission Council meetizig^ Amb. Lodge expressed concern that the number of U.S. advisors not smother the Vietnam.ese at all levels.

k Feb 66

State to Saigon 2252

r>

U.S. requested Honolulu meeting with Thieu^ Ky to express concern about pacification^ economic problems, GVN lack of popular support.

15

TOP SECRET - Sensitive

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3

NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

I-

TOP SECRET - Sensitive

6-8 Eeb 66

Honolulu Conference

28 Feb 66

Mission Council Minutes, Feb 285 1966

Feb 66

Mar 66

PROVN Study Smmary Statement5 Mar 66

23 Apr 66

Saigon to State ^Il60,

Apr 23, 1966; ^i200, Apr 265

^^135, May 7; 55^-1-6, June I5

Jul 66

LBJ" concern about the "other v/ar/' Tliieu and Ky made pledges of increased pacification;, promised elections. Amb, William Porter was assigned responsibility for civil support of RD,

Porter described his understanding of his duties to Mission Council: coordinating effort for all civil aspects of revolutionary development; through the Mission Liaison Group.

MACV subsector pacification contingency fond abandoned after 4-month trial period due to opposition of GVIM RD Minister Thang; it would encourage Vietnamese dependence on U^S.

Program for Pacification and Long Terra Deve]-opraent of South Vietnam (PROVTT) completed for interna.1 8.rmy use. Revealed lack of coordination among U.S. agencies in pacification.

Lodge reviewed prospects for introduction of U.S.leverage in Buddhist "Struggle Movement"; desired to bring dissidents lU'ider GVN control;, but saw no way to achieve decisive results. Recommended to Washington that a sign-off system be reinstated to reduce corruption and increa^se U.So inf3-uence at lov^-er levels.

Stepped-up pacification effort: Operation Lam Son, combined ED "Search and Seal" operations with U.S. 1st Infantry Division and ARVN 5th Division in Bihli Duong. U.S. 25th Division "adopted" districts in Han Nghia Province.

16

TOP SECRET - Sensitive

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By; NWD Date: 2011

r

TOP SECRET - Sensitive

Jul 66

Sep 66

29 Sep 66

Komer^ "Memorandum for Secretary McNamara"

23-25 Oct 66

Manila Conference

Oct 66

7 Nov 66

MACV/JCS Combined

Campaign Plan I967 (AB 1^2)

7 Nov 66

Memorandum; Amb. Lodge for the Secretary of St9.tej SecDef and Komer; message5 Saigon 11125^ Nov. 17-

i

17

"Roles and Missions" Study Group began work for Arab. Porter. Completed in August. Recommendations for support for a reemphasis on pacification.

Mc]\[3.ma.ra proposed that responsibility for sole management of pacification be a.ssigned to COiyiaSMCV, who would have a Deputy to command a.ll pacification activities. AID, CIA, USIA opposed such reorganizationj Komer and JCS concurred.

Komer stressed that unified ma.nagement of pacification was needed.

At Manila. Conference Thieu and Ky formally accepted commitment of ARVN to support RD, and "National Reconciliation" progi-am to attract VC back to government wa.s announced.

McNamara trip to Saigon. Kj agreed to shift in combat mssicns for U.S. and RVNAE forces: U.S. to conduct large-scale offensive operations, RVNAF to provide security to RD.

Spelled out new division of labor betvj^een U.S. and RVNAF. JGS 1 agreed to keep 53 ARW battalions (50/0 of ARVN combat units) assigned* to support RD.

Lodge defined terms of reference for what was established as the Office of Civil Operations (OCO).

TOP SECRET - Sensitive

\. f

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

TOP SECRET " Sensitive

8 Dec 66

mCV msg 52U4 to CINCPAG

17 Dec 66

27 Dec 66

9 Jan 67

18 Jan 67

20 Jan 67

2k Jan 67

W* W. Rostov?-; Memorandum to Secretary of Defense and Acting Secre-tari'- of State5 draft I^rSAM attached

JCS Memorandwii for the Secretary of Defense^ JCSM-792-66, line-in, line-out revised draft NSAJvJ attached.

MACV msg 009i|9

mcv msg O21U9 to CINCPAG from MACCORDS

ASD(ISA) John T- McNaughton Memorandnm for the Secretary of Defense5 Subject: Draft NSAM on "Strategic Guide3,ines for I967 in Vi etnam j" McNaught on's line-in, line-out revised draft and the JCS revision attached,

MACV msg 029165 Westmore-la.nd sends

Westmoreland reported to CINCPAG on poor quality and perform,ance of ARW. First 10 months of I966, the number of ARVN maneuver battalions ^^rith minimally acceptable operational strength fluctuated from 31 to 78 of total of 121 organized units.

Po.cification listed as third strategic objective and five programs concerned with pacification were outlined, heralding re-emphasis on pacification in I967-

JCS replied to Rostov/'s draft after consulting CINCPAG; stiffening and making more specific UoSo comjraitment to v/ar, introducing terra "revolutionary development," eliminated references to "national reconciliation" for ex-VC, and v/atered down commitment to constitutional-electoral efforts undervray.

In Dec 1966 a 12-officer team from- each ARVN had undergone tra/lning on RD support so that each might instruct its division on the new duties. The division training programs began in Jan 67.

MACV described nevi Ham.let Evaluation System (EES) to CINCPAG.'

McNaughton draft for Vietnam strategic guidelines incorpora.ted most JCS recommendations, emphasized security, anti-infrastructure and intel3.igence in support of r/d, pushed "National Reconciliation."

Westmoreland stated that the effectiveness of RVNAE must be increased and that its image must be improved.

18

TOP SECRET - Sensitive

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

I- c2

TOP SECRET - Sensitive

28 Jan 67

Feb 68

18 Mar 67

20-21 Mar 67

25 Mar 67

Mar 67

1 Apr 67

Deputy SecDef Cyrus Vance letter to W. ¥- Rostow

"Pacification Slowdoma" Southeast Asia Analysis Report, Feb 68, OASD(SA) SEA Programs Directorate

MA.CV msg 09101, Westmore land sends

Guam Conference

Embassy Saigon msg 21226, Eyes Only for the President from Lodge

Vance sent McNaughton version to Rostov/ as Defense Department reply to his memora.ndnm. No NSAl^i was ever prormlga-'ued.

OASD(SA) reported that pacifica' tion effort in I967 had failed.

Westmoreland cabled CINCPAC req.uesting an "optimism force" Increase of ^1-2/3 divisions (201,250 men) or as a "minmum essential force", 2-1/3 divisions (100,000 men). No major expansion of RVNAF called for: 6,307 more spaces for ARVN, 50,000 more RF'/PF.

President Johnson met with Thieu and Ky in Guamo They presented draft constitution and agreed to a proclamation on National

Reconciliation,

Johnson decided to transfer control of pacification to MACV and send Robert Komer to head new operation in Saigon.

Lodge stressed importance of RVNAF for MACV success, praised Abrams as man to oversee RVEAF improvement.

Gen. Creighton Abrams became Westmorels.nd deputy and assumed responsibility for U.S. advisory effort to RVNAF.

New South Vietnamese Constitution promulgated..

(

19

TOP SECRET - ...ansitive

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

.?3

TOP SECRET " Sensitive

2h Apr 6?

1 May 67

7 May 67

9 May 67

12 May 67

13 May 67

15 May 67

I

28 May 67

May 67

/^

R- W. Komer Memorandwii for the President

MA.CV msg 1506^1

NSAM 362

Embassy Saigon Airgram 6225 Subject: Revolutionary Development

Ambassador Bunker state^ ments to the press in in Saigon, May I3, I967

Embassy Saigon msg, 25839

State Departm.ent msg DTG O923OUS; MA.CV Dir 10-12, 28 May I967.

JCSM-530-67, Subject: Increase in FY I968 RVKAF Force Level, 28 Sep 67 (a revj.ew of the yea,r*s actions).

20

Komer asserted that decisive contest leiy in pacification in the South, rejected Westmoreland\s request for additional 200,000 troops, proposed methods to improve RVKAF and pacification, suggested increa-sed pressure on GVN for reforms.

New Ambassador, Ellsworth Bunker, arrived in Saigon.

Reported Jan. decision to make a unit by unit effectiveness eva.l-uation and to cut off support for superfluous or belovr standard units. Resulted in several warnings but no suspension of support. Also reported RVMF desertions were vron for Jan-Feb 1967 from Jan-Feb I966.

Kom.er's appointment as single manager for pacification announced internally.

Gloomy account of progress of

RD in first three months of I967.-

Announcement of transfer of OCO to MACV, Bunker stressed combined civil-military nature of pacification.

First meeting of Komer vrith Ky.

Ky declined to place GVN RD efforts

under JGS.

c

MACV issued directive with instru tions on new RD organizational

arrangements.

McNamara imposed a temporary ceiling on RWAF to prevent further inflation in Vietnam and to arrest some of the bala^nce of payments flow of U.S. spending.

TOP SECRET - Sensitive

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

TOP SECRET - Sensitive

lil- Jun 67

l4 J\in 67

17 Jun 67

k Jul 67

13 J^-1 67

l4 Aug 67

Ainb. R. W- Korner;, Me:r:oran' dimi for General W. C. Westraoreland^ Sub J ect: Organization for Attack on V.C. Infrastructure

Embassy Saigon msg 28O95, For the President from Bunker

MA.CCORDS, Project Takeoff^ prepared by the ACofS, CORDS, Headquarters

MA.CV

ASD(SA) Alain Enthoyen Memo for the SecDef, Subj: Improvement in RVimF Force Effectiveness

ASD(SA) Alain Enthoven Memorandum for the Record, Suba: Fallout for SecDef Trip to South Vietnam (TS-SENS-EYES ONI.Y for Dr. Heyinan); and OASD(SA) Genere.l Purpose Forces, W.K. Brelim, Mem.o for the Record, Subj: SFA Deployments, Jul 1^, 1967

ASD(SA) Alain Enthoven Mem.o for the Secretaries of the Military Departments, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Assistant Secretaries of Defense, Subj: Southeast Asj.a Deployment Program #5

21

Pvomer recommended consolidation, under his direction, of U.S. anti"infrastructure intelligence effort. Desired unified GVN/uS, civil/milit8.ry "management stru.c-ture targeted on infrastructujre." ICEX (intelligence Coordination and Exploitation) structure vas developed.

Bunker described MCV actions TonderiT'ay to j-mprove RVDLA.F: improving leadership, better pay, improving coimnand structure and eq.uipment of RF/pF training, integra;bed US/rVMF operations, reviews.

Project TAKEOFF contained analysis of reasons for part failu-re, apxjraisal of cujrrent situa-tion, and recommendations for future emphasis in RD; suggested increased use of UcSe leverage and control,

Enthoven claimed that primary reason for RVNAF ineffectiveness was the c[uantity and q.uality of lea^dership and recomjiiended that the Secretary q.uery MCV on leadership problems.

In Saigon, McNamara gave plavUning authorization for UeS, augmenta,-tion up to 525,000 spaces, a.nd civilianiz8.tion of 10,000 additional spaces to fulfill Westmoreland's lower force alternative.

New U.S. force level of 525,000 prom.ulgated as Deployment Program

TOP SECRET - Sensitive

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

TOP SECRET - Sensitive

30 Aug 67

31 Aug 67

7 Sep 66

15 Sep 67

r^

16 Sep 67

19 Sep 67

28 Sep 67

7 Oct 67

rASD(SA) Memo for the SecDef

Dept of State Msg 3OO23

COmsmCV Memo for Ambassador Lodge

JCSM 505-67, Subjt U,S„ Forces Deployments Vletziam (Refined Troop List)

Review and Analysis SyS' tem for RVmF Progress^ MACV-J3HI

Embassy Saigon msg 7II3

JCSI^4"'530-67, Subject: Increase in FY 68 RVMF Force Level

SecDef Memo for CJCS, Subject: Increase in FY 68 RVKAF Force Level, and attached OASD(SA) memo for the SecDef, 5 Oct 67

Amb. Komer complained that the CORDS advisory element's actual strength was seriously below authorization due to birreaucratic dela.ys.

Study of leverage by Ha^ns Heymann and Lt Col Volney Warner recoxiimended increased use.

Westmoreland disagreed with Roles and Missions Study Group recommendation to remove division from chain of corrmiand below CTZ level and strengthening role of Province Chief*

JCS submitted final detailed troop list for Program ■//5' Contained 2^577 additional advisors and 666 Special Forces to -pevtcym advisor-like functions.

First published Review and Analysis for RYMF appeared: long catalogue of RVMF deficiencies •

Komer replied to recommendation for increased use of U.S. leverage that it must be done discreetly. Proposed comprehensive system of country-wide levercige was never adopted.

JCS forwarded with endorsement the MACV-CINCPAC recommendation on FY 68 RVITAF force increases: total increase of 63,586j ^7,839 for RF/pF and 15,7^7 for regular forces. MAGV req.^iested further increase of 78;20li for FY 1969*

McNamara* approved the requeste FY 68 augmentations for RVMF, against the wishes of Enthoven. v/ho would have authorized only half as many.

22

TOP SECRET - Sensitive

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

:a;

26 Oct 67

15 Dec 67

TOP SECRET - Sensitive

"information on MTs (Mobile Advisory Teams) and MALTs (Mobile Advisory Logistics Teams)/' 8 May 19685 working paper prepared by the ACofS MA, MACV

31 Jan 68

Tet Offensive

MACV conference on RF/w^ convened to study problems of RF/PE expansion and to pla.n for expansj.on of advisory effort 5 recoimncnded complete reorientation of advisory concept- for RF/pE, establishment of Mobile Advisory Teams to be used on a rotating basis.

Westmoreland approved new RF/pe advisory system: MATs and MALTS; to be phased in dirring 1968.

VC/WA initiate massive attacks on population centers throughout Vietnam during Lunar New Year (Tet) holida^y period.

n

23

TOP SECRET - Sensitive

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

lb!

i

1

'3^

f

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

TOP SECRET - Sensitive

IV. Bo 3.

THE ADVISORY BUILD-UP, I96I-67

TABLE OF COr^TEIslTS andOUTLIFE

INTRODUCTION,

e e • «

Page 1

PART ONE - ADVISORY STABILITY, 19^14-1960 ^ ...... 3

A. TinC U,S. GAMBLE WITH LIMITED RESOURCES . 3

Origins of the U^So Involvement in RVl\f • 3

Initial Military Reluctance ,.,*..... ^.... ^ 3

The Decision to Ganiblc with Limited Cormnitment h

From Internal to Conventional Defense 5

The Early MAAG and the Eq.'Ltip^ent Recovery Mission -. 6

B. THE TRANSITION PERIOD: 19^91961 8

Early Steps Toward Emphasis on Internal Security 8

Tlie McGarr Emphasis on Counterinsurgency o

The Counterinsurgency Plan for South Viet-.Nam o 9

The Supporting Operational Plan c, -'•1

Stability in the Number of U.S. Advisors • H

PART TV70 - TPIB ADVISORY BUILD-UP, 196l-196 _7 ' ^'^

A. The Kennedy Programs (196I-I963)' " * * -*-3

^ ^ . ..l ii w

The Context of Decisions ^ ^3

Proposal for Extra-Bureaucratic Advisors 15

Back to Normal Channels ». • -» * lo

Planning Begins in Earnest c c ^2

GVN Asks for Additional U. S. Assistance 23

The Taylor Mission to Saigon • • • ^^

The Kennedy Decisions : NSAJ4 111 ^ ^6

Working Out the Basis for U.S. Advice ^7

U.S. Expectations: The Benefits from More Advisors 29

Implementing the First Build-up • <^ 31

The U.S. View: I962 - I963. - • - - 33

The Actuality: I962 - I963. -. - - 3^^

The Stage is Set for "Better GVN Receptivity" 36

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District Advisors amljbhe Beef-Up of Battalion Advisory Tearas (l^Vo^SJT^

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Optimism Turns to Frustration. •..«

WSAM 288... B...... c „,» o ....*... o o... * • * " '

Increasing Political Instability in the Provinces MACV's Gradualistic Approach to Expansion McNaniara*s Willingness to Approve Expansion

The Initial Proposals and Responses

MACV Focuses on Operations Rather Than Training

The JCS Alternative Programs.. . . c -

MACV^s Preferred Approach Accepted

Unresolved Issues: Speed and Discretionary Authority

Secreta.rial Pressure for a Speed-Up

MACV's Preference Upheld Again « "'

Events Overtake Implementation of the Expansion

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U.S. Corn-bat Forces and the Possibility of New Relation ships~7l9637 ^* * * •' •

The Abortive Limited Expansion of ARVN,

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evce..**

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New Po s s ib ilit i e s..

Encadrement Considered a.nd Rejected ••••

Marine Combined Action Platoons (CAPs)

Joint Command Considered and Rejected.......•

TAORSj Senior Advisors^ and a Combined Staff.

Leverage: The Hidden Issue

Withdrawing fro^n Overt Influence -

McNamara's Minority Position on Leverage

U.S. Proposals for GVN Execution: An Example

^- 0?gangzation as the Key to Effectiveness in Pacification Cl95^^1^7rr7777T,

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37

37 38 1|2

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51 52

53

58

58

59

59 60

61 62

63 6)+

65 66

The Ba.sis for Organizational Procedures

Unresolved Issues =

>/ho Shall Lead?

COEDS Replace s OCO

RVmF' s Role in Pacification

The 1967 Combined Campaign Plan

Leverage and Sovereignty

The Inconclusive Debate Over Leverage..

No Decision as a. Decision

Groping Toward Better Information

RVHAF Effectiveness • •

The Latest Expansion of Advisors

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70 71 71

7^ 82

81i 92

9^ 97 99

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FOOTNOTES

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APPENDICES

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I. U,S. Advisory Effort - Manpower 1*^5

II. Distribution of U.S. Army Field Advisory Effort 126

III. Total Cost of RVN Army Regional Forces and Popular

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Forces .,..,, r -^^-'

IV. Distribution of US Financial Resources in Support

of RVN Army, Regional Forces, and Popular Forces 128

V. Distribution of RW Army Financial Resources in Support of RVN Army, Regional Forces, and Popular

Forces , * < ' -'-^9

VI. Annual Per Capita Costs for RVN Army, Regional

Forces and Popular Forces • -^-^

VII. Distribution of U.S. Army Advisors by Assigrmient 131

VIII. RVNAF Total Strength -"^32

IX. Distribution of U.S. Field Advisors by Assignm.ent. . . 133

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IV- B, 3-

THEAJ)^nSORY BUILD-UP, I96I-67

I

INTRODUCTIQr;

Froxa shortly after the founding of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) in 195^- until the first year of the Kem:ecly Ad-ministration the U.S. supported RVN v/ith a Military Assistance Advisory Group (MA/VG) v/hich was reasonably stable in size. Beginning in I96I the number of U.S. military advisors to RVN increased sharply. This increase continued unevenly throughout I967 and into I968.'

This UoS. military advisory buildup did not mark the first U.S. attempt to conduct "advisory warfare" in the post-V/orD.d War II era. The first such attempt v/as in Greece. T'cr did it mark the initial U.S. prograjn aimed at creating a modern military force from meager beginnings in a foreign nation. The first attempt of this kind was made in the Republic of Korea. I'Jhat it did m.ark was the first sustained U.S. effort to advise foreign national forces engaged in combatting what the commuj^ists have termed a "vzar of national liberation," a struggle which took the form of a civil war with external assistance to both antagonists and in which winning the adherence of the population vas at least as central an issue as was the tide of military battle. This has been the first sustained U*So advisory effort to be concerned in a m^ajor way with "pa^cification by proxy."

The present study exaanines the major decisions to undex'take and to expand this large military advisory effort. It attempts to describe the context in which successive decisions were raade to send advisors to South Vietnam^ to record the expectations of the policy)n3.kers or, when appro-prlate, to note the absence of explicit expectations,, and to trace the expansion of the U.S. military presence in the advisory role through the various levels of the South Vietnamese military and administrative m.achinery. Finally, this study a.ttem.pts to assess the impact of the U.S. advisory buildup in terms of the exl-.ent to vrfiich U.S. expectations have been realized or frustrated.

The main study is divided into tv/o pa,rts. Part One describes briefly the U.S. advisory effort in 'RW from I95I; through I96O, It sets the stage, as it vrere, for the more com-prehensive examination of the advisory buildup from 1961 through I967 in P9.rt Two. (The latter year marks roughly the final period for which information is available at this writing, not any necessary end to the general process described.) The summary and analysis "which accompanies this study constitutes in effect Part Three of the study. It assesses the U.S^ advisory effort in terms of expectations and developments a.nd examines persistent issues throughout the period under discussion. Finally, the grov/th of the U.S. military advisory effort and related data

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is Bhomi in tabular form at the end of the study.

The development of the U.S. military advisory effort from 195^^-1959 is presented in another docujiient in the present series.^"" Tlie purpose of the initial part of the present study is not to replow the same furrows but to highlight the legacy of this earlier period as it affected the later advisory buildup. Although the U.S. attemvpt to conduct revolutionary warfare by proxy may be said to have begun in I96I5 it did not proceed entirely free of the inheritance from earlier situations^ attitudes^ and actions.

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•^ Vol. IV.A. 5 Evolution of the V7ar: U.S. Training; of the Vietnamese

National Army, 1 95^-19597

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PART OI^IE

ADVISORY STABILITY, 195^-1960

A- 'Uhe U,S. Gamble With Limited Resources

ORIGIA'S OF TliE U.S, IKV O LVEMEMT IN WN

The U.So decision to atterapt, generally v/ithin the strictures imposed by the Geneva Accords^ to shore up the Governxnent of South Vietnam (GVN) and to prevent the ne\f nation ^s fall into communist hands appears in retrospect to have been, in Wellington's phrase, "a close run thing." The prevalent Ajnerican attitude in 195^ was that the deplojorient of large U.S. forces to the mainland of Asia should be permitted "never again/' Spending on national security was to be pegged at tolerable levels vrhich would not threaten the well-being of the domestic economy, yet comjinmlst expansion v/as to be deterred by the threat of massive retaliation cora- . bined vd.th UoS. support for free nations ca.pable of managing their ovm internal order and insuring that any act of armed aggression would appear as just that — the unambiguous precondition for nuclear retaliation.

IMITIAL MILITARY RELUCTANCE

The policy solution to this probJ^em in national security strategy has been accurately and exlaaustively described in recent literature, l/ It need not be repeated here. The important thing to note is that the attempt to achieve stability in RVI^^ v;as recognized to be a marginal ga.mble to retain a small but potentially important piece in the larger jig saw -pMzzlQ which was U.S. national security policy. As such, it seemed worth the risk of a moderate outlay of assistance and advice. General J. Lawton Collins stated the case succinctly in his assessment for the National Security Council;

...There is at least an even chance that Vietnam can be saved from Communism if the present programs of its government are fully implemented.,..1 cannot guarantee that Vietnam will remain free^ even with our aid. But I know that without our aid Vietnam will surely be lost to Communism- 2./

The gamble consisted in making available to the GVN that material support and advice which v^oiild enable it to assure its own viability. Much of the military equipment was already in RVN, the residue of earlier efforts to suiTport the French war against the Viet Minh. The framework for military advice was present, too, in the form of I^IAAG Indochina which had assisted (and attempted to influence -- generally unsuccessfully) the French struggle.

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The military establishment was not eager;, however^ to ujidertake this effort. Tlie JCS feared that the advisory limit imposed by the Geneva Accords (3^4^ military personnel) was too restrictive to permit a successful training program even if all administrative tasks were performed by civilians and all military personnel freed for advisory duties in training the army of the new nation. Even this would create a situation, the JCS argued, in which the U.S. would have only very limited influence, yet assume the responsibility for failure. 3/ The sdjme resource al.locatlons would bring a. grea^ter retuj-n, in the JCS view, if devoted to the support of military forces in other nations, h/ The Joint Chiefs were agreed that the creation of a Vietnamese Army miglit not even be adequate to the task of establishing a stable GTO, let alone to protecting that nation from external aggression:

The Joint Chiefs of Staff further consider that the chaotic internal political situation within Vietnam will haraper the development of loyal and effective security forces in the support of the Diem Government and that it is probable that the development of s\ich forces will not result in political and military stability within South Vietnam. Unless the Vietnamese themselves show an inclination to make the individual and collective sacrifices required to resist commmiism no amount of external pressure and assistance can long delay a complete Communist victory in South Vietnam. 5/

Tlieir conclusion, ''from a military point of view," was that the risk v/as not woi'th the gamble:

.../T/he Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the United States should not participate in the training of Vietnamese forces in Indochina. However, if it is considered that political considerations are overriding, the Joint Chiefs of Staff would agree to the assignment of a. training mission to MAAG, Saigon, with safeguards against French interference with the US training effort. 6/

THE DECI SION TO GAMBLE WITH L IMITED COMMITMENT

Political considerations v/ere indeed overriding. Reasonable fears of failure, claims about the inadequacy of resources, and caveats on the necessity for Vietnamese initiatives are iniaerently inconclusive arguments when one is speakj.ng of a calcula^ted gamble. Indeed, low value chips for high stakes made the gamble all the more appealing. Secretary of State Diilles' position aumiediately prevailed: only relatively small military forces were needed^ their principal purpose should be to promote internal stability rather than to guard against external aggression; nations acting in concert (under the mibrella of U.S. nuclear superiority)

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wouJ.d guard against external aggression, jj On 22 October I95U Ambassador Heath and General 0'Daniel in Saigon v/ere instructed to "collabora..te in setting in motion a crash prograjri designed to bring about an improvement in the loyalty and effectiveness of the Free Vietnamese forces/' 8/ Four days later the JCS were directed to prepare a "long range program for the reorganisation and training of the minimum nujnber of Free Vietnamese forces necessary for internal secujrity." The earlier objections of the JCS were neither refuted nor ignored; they were accepted tacitly as part and parcel of the policy gamble.

FEOM IJlCTERmi. TO COIWEI\!TIOML DEFENSE

The language of this decision to train the Vietnamese National Army (VEA), as it was then called, would in.dicate that internal (rather than^ external) security \/ou].d be the principal purpose of that force. That is not the wa.y it developed, for three reasons. First, basic U.S. national strategy (embodied in NSC 162 and NSC 5602 during the period under examination) and Southeast Asia policy (NSC 5^29 and NSC 5612) were both ajjibiguous on a key point: to what degree were indigenous military forces to be expected to defend against a conventional, "limited vrar" attack by an aggressor? The continuous, unbroken tendency throughout the 1950s v/as to desire ever more ce^pability for conventional defense.

Second, U.S. military forces vrere unprepared by their own experience to assist in the structuring of forces designed for other than conventional warfare. The U.S. advisory experiences that were ciirrent in terms of institutj.onalized memory were those of aj.d to Greece and Korea where the job had been one of training for technical and tactical competence along conventional lines. It was eminently natuj:al for the U.S. advisory effort to follow in this identifiable path. Indeed, to have expected the advisory effort to have stressed "counterinsurgency" early in this period would have been completely unrealistic: the term had not been invented and its concepts had not been either developed or articulated. This natural tendency to develop conventional forces was not only in step with the dominant trend in U.S. military strategy, it was also reinforced by a third factor, the generalized assujiiption that the ability to promote internal secua:ity was automatically provided for in the creation of forces capable to promote external security.

The confluence of all three factors led, in fact, to an attempt to create Vietnamese forces along lines which were later called "mirror images" of conventional U.S. force structures. MA.A.G Vietnam proposed and led in the creation of the Arm-y of Vietnam (ARVN) in formations comprising divisions, regments, battalions, and companies organized as closely parallel to^U.S. organization as local differences in equipment and support would permit. 9/ This was not, for the reasons already indicated, an unreasonable or indefensible development -- at least not until about 1959 or I96O -- and by that time efforts were underway to transform the focus of ARVN to internal security. These later efforts were faced with the reality of a sizeable

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army — conventionally organized^ trained^ a,nd equipped -- which had been created under different circumsta.nces and for different purposes. One is forced to wonderj if Vietnamese institutions are as difficuJ-t to remould as their American coxmterparts, whether the later advisory effort was not faced from its inception with an almost insiirmountable task.

THE EARLY MMG- AND THE EQUIBIElTr RECOVERY MISSION

The nujiiber of U.S. advisors to the fledgling Republic of Vietnam Arm_ed Forces (RVEAE) were^ as already indicated^ limited by the Geneva Accords. Article l6 of the Accords limited mi3J-tary personnel in Vietnajn to the miinbcr present at the time the Accords V7ere signed. The magic number xms 3^42. The U.S. MlikG Chiefs General O'Daniel^ complained that he needed twice this nujnber to train the new RVMF and to oversee the redistribution of U.S. equipment already in RVH as a result of U.S. support for the French during the war just ended. lO/ The eventual outcome ^ v^hen it was learned informally that the Indian Government would instrvict its representative on the ICC to interpose no objection^ vras the creation of the Temporary Equipment Recovery Mission (TERI'^) with 35O military personnel. TERM served as the principal manager for the redistribution of equipment, assisted in developing RVNAF's embryonic logistical support system^ and provided a convenient cover for a larger intelligence effort. 11/

This combined a.dministrative-advisory force remained stable in size diu''ing the period prior to I96I. American milita.ry advisors were located physica].ly 3.t only a very few locations in RVH* They were notable by their absence in field units. The U.S. effort was concentrated in training centers and in Saigon. In the former it was largely technicalj in the latter it consisted prim.arily of attempts to persuade GVN to adopt measures recommended by the U.S. advisory group. It vras essentially an attempt to give a.dvice from the top. This does not mean that the question of leverage wa.s never considered; it was. Early in our involvement, in Ja.nuary 19555 the JCS la.id out available U.S. co-arses of action in South Vietnam and urged that a decision be made at "the highest level" to indicate which of these should be followed:

a. To continue aid to South Vietna^m as currently being developed with the cooperation of the French and Vietnamese.

b. To institute a unila.teral program of direct guidance to the Vietnajnese government tloi'ough an "advisor" system. Under this course of action, the amount of U.S. aid should be dependent upon Vietnamese adherence to U.Sc direction.

_£. In the event the courses of action In a and b above are not sufficient to insure retention of South Vietnam to the

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Free Worlds to deploy self sustaining U.S. forces to South Vietnam either unilaterally, or as a part of a SKA.CDT /Southeast Asia Cormaon Defense Treaty -- a term used prior to SEATO/ force•

d. To withdraw all U.S. support from South Vietnam I and concentrate on saving the remainder of Southeast Asia. 12/

Ko such decision was made. Indeed^ as explained in the summary and analysis J there is no reason to believe that the need for such a decision was even seriously considered at "the highest level."

MAA.G Vietnam was by I96O still q.uite sm.all in size, though it loomed ever larger in importance. (it was the only U.S. MAAG comjnanded by a Lieutenant Genexcil; all of the other MAA.G Chiefs were officers of lesser rank.) It was essentially city-boujid, training center and Saigon-oriented, devoted to technical-tactical training and high level persuasion aim,ed at influencing EVmF organif-'ation. The personnel lirnita-tions imposed upon it resulted in highly centralized advice. But through its efforts and material support this MAAG assisted in the creation of a sizeable (1^10,000 man) conventional army and of small naval and air forces of approximately 5,000 men each.

The U.S. FAAG was also concerned with the establishment and training of paramilitary forces, but it was not as directly concerned as it was with the creation of conventional forces in ARVTJ. The Civil Guard (CG) and Self Defense Corps (SDC) were at various times under the control of the Ministry of the Interior or directly \mder President Diem. In the field they were invariably under the direction of the Province Chiefs. The U.S. civilian advisors who had been called in to give assistance with police and internal security matters tended to favor making these paramilitary forces less military per se and more police inte3.1igence-minded. MAAG tended to favor raaking them more consciously military and territorially oriented in order to free ARVl^ for mobile, offensive operations rather than tying its forces down in static defense duties. I3/ By i960, when Civil Guard training was passed to MAAG control, neither course of action had been followed consistently but it was highly probable that MAAG's views would henceforth prevail. Thus, auestions of local physical security would a.Tjiiost inescapably be decided with reference to the effect they would have on the functions of ARVN, itself created with an eye to external defense. This may be said to be an avjla-.^ard structure from v/hich to launch an effort aimed primarily at internal security. It was, however, the structure that existed.

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B - The Transition Period: 19?9"196l

EARLY STEPS TOWARD EMPHASIS ON INTKRNAL SECURITY

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By the time of the Draper Coiraiiittee (The President's Coimiittee to Study the United States Military Assistance Program) in 1958-1959^ there was an aljnost imperaptible but growing U.S. awareness of the req.uire-ment to promote internal stability. The committee's papers,^for^instance, sought to popularize military civic action prograias and to link them to politically acceptable precedents — such as the U.S. Arm.y's role in the development of the American West. iH/ The very term "mirror imaging was coined in a Draper Committee staff study. 15/ One of the committee s studies questioned even the easy assumption that internal security was a "lesser included capability" of forces structured to promote external security:

It is seldom that a government considers its military forces to have only a mission of maintaining internal security. Their size, organization, eciuipment, habitual deployment, and so on, are nearly always related to real or supposed requirements of defense against external attack. They are usually considered capable of performing internal security missions as part of ^ ■ ■ this larger role. However, the requirements of the two missions

are different, if overlapping; and tailoring a military force to the task of counterinp: external aggression -- i.e., countering another regular military force -- entails some sacriiice oi cap3.bilities to counter internal aggression. The latter requires widespread deployiaent, rather than concentration. It requires small, mobile, lightly equipped units of the ranger or comm^ando type. It requires different weapons, command systems, communications, logistics.... 16 /

THE_McGARR EMPHASIS_ ON COUNTERIHS URGENCY

These developments were only harbingers of a dawning awareness, how-■ ■ . ever, not indicative of a fundajiiental shift in focus which had already

occurred. The degree to which ARW and paramilitary forces should be consciously structured to deal with internal security rather than to protect against external invasion was the subject of a developing debate rather than a settled issue. It fell to Lieutenant General Lionel^C. McGarr to head the U.S, RAAG during the confusing period of transition vzhich " ■ accompanied this debate. He did not come to Vietnam unaware of the issues;

a long study prepared for him by his staff at the Army's Cowaand and General i Staff College (his post before coming to Saigon) laid out in som.e detail

I the Viet Cong's strategy as adapted from the Viet Minh's struggle with

the French:

This form of warfare permitted the Viet Minh to ^ retain the mobility so essential to jungle and mountain operations, facilitated the gathering of detailed, accimite, and timely

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intelligence inforrnationj kept the level of violence at a lo\r enough level to preclude the active intervention of another major power, accomplished the slow attrition of the French while permitting the Viet Minh to build the regular forces necessary for the final battles, offset the serious logistics problem by the very primitiveness of transxjortation methods^ and surmounted the manpower shortage by making political and economic operations inseparable from military operations. I?/

One could conclude from this assessm-ent that RVMF should be restruc-tured to deal with this essentially internal challenge to South Vietnamese stability. In a statement which may reflect the difficulty of reversing institutional thought patterns ~- at the U.S. Army's principal doctrine formulating instit'ation^ in this instance -- it was clairaed that pacification operations were undesirable because they detracted from training-The suggestion was that the CG and SDC takeover of pacification should be expedited:

The /South Vietnamese/ Army is still req.^ircd to engage from time to time in major pacification (internal security) operations 5 pending the development of a higher state of operational effectiveness of the Civil Guard and the Self-Defense Corps. Since units have considerable personnel turnover and are filled out vri-th drai'tees^ who have had only basic and perha^ps advanced individual training before arrival in units5 the ordex-ly pursuit of a progressive unit training schedule is essential to uji.it effectiveness. Each comjnitment to e.n operational (pacification) mission^ though of some training value^ in general interrupts the planned training of participating units and delays arrival at a satisfactory state of operational readiness. 18/

TIffl COUICTERIK SIJRGEN CY PLAN FOR SOUTH VIET-NAM

General McGarr's approach v/as to give emphasis in his advice to recommendations designed to integrate the activities of ARVN and the CG/sdC. He consistently (and persistently) recomm.ended the establishment of a single chain of military command to guide all three forces. He also pushed for steps which would free ARVN from static security (pacification) missions in favor of offensive operations against the Viet Cong. The vehicle for the first of McGarr^s desired reforms was the ^'Counter-insurgency Plan for Viet-Ram" (CIP);, produced in late I96O. I9/ The CIP was a blueprint for RVMF reorganization^ not an outline of the strategy to be pursiied. Not until September I96I did MAA.G present GVN with a set,of operational proposals in the form of a "Geographically Phased National Level Operations Plan for Counterlnsurgency." 20/

The CIP marks something of a halfV/ay house between concern with external defense and internal seciu^lty. Both m.lllt3.ry tasks were recog-nized, but Internal security assumed primacy for the first time:

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Military force^ in the form of increased commimist insurgency;, is clearly the irmediate threat to the stability of Viet-Nam today. South Viet-Kam is iiniq.ue in that it is the only country in the world which is forced to defend itself against a conniumist internal subversion action^ v/hile at the • sarnie time being subject-to the militarily supportable threat of a conventional external attack from communist North Viet-Nam. The RVNAF. force basis is inadequate to meet both these threats.

The problem is tv/ofold^. although at present the counter-insurgency phase is the more dangerous and immediate. In this counterinsurgency fight RVNAF is on the defensive. Approximately 7% of ARVl^ is committed to pacification missions^ about hs.lf of these being cojimiitted to ste.tic gua.rd 8.nd secujrity roles....The guerrilla problem has _/as a result of fragmented lines of authority/ "become much more serious than the Civil Guard can m^anage^ thereby requiring a disproportionately large RVNAF comjnitraent;^ which has further resulted in a serious weakening of the RVNAF capability for defense against internal or overt attack in force. 2l/

This last point reflected General McGarr*s apparently Ycry real concern that ARVN \re,s becoming incapable to meet internal (as well as external) threats posed by the VC in conventional troop form^ations. As the VC became stronger and formed larger regular units -- as distinct from guerrilla bands "- the differences between conventional and "uncon-ventiona.l warfare seemed to disappear. The problem^ as I^A.G viewed it^ became one of guarding against a spectrum of dangers by means of a short run emphasis on meeting the internal challenge in both its conventional and UJiconventional (guerrilla) form. In this view ARVN should become the conventional offensive and mobile defensive force, the CG should be the static force in support of pacification efforts. The t\io should be under a common chain of command, it v/as argued in the CIP, as should the logistical organization for their support. Such a common chain of command did not exist in I96O-I96I:

The military chain of command has usually been violated at the expense of unity of effort and command. No adequate operations control or overall planning system presently exists....The President has exercised arbitrary control of operations J by-passing command channels of the JGS _^oint General Staff/ and often Corps and Division steiff. Resources he-ve been fragmented to provincial control. The above practices appear to have been designed to divide responsibility in order to guard against the possibility of a military coup through placing too much povrer in the hands of a single subordinate. 22,

Poor organization, then, was seen as the principal roadblock in the way

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of organizing the military and paramilitary forces of South Vietnara into an effective combination• Only th_rough a single chain of command could ARM be freed to take the offensive, the CG be built up to cope with local guerrillas5 and the GWI place itself in a position to start developing useful intelligence -- a field which was judged to have been, thus far, a notable faiD-ure. 23/

TH E SUP PORTING- OPERATIONAL PIAN

^ ■ m I ! ■ m il ■i»*«^i^^Bi— — III iM w i ■ ■ ■ n ui" !■<■■■■ fc 1^ ■ I fc ■ m >■ ■ ■ ■ I m ill! ■ ■ 11 i > ■■ ^ i ■ i i

The Geographically Phased National Plan laid out the priority areas for tlirls coordinated effort under a single chain of command.^ A three phase seq.uence of actions (preparation, military action to clear and seciire, and combined action to establish civilian political control and consolidate intelligence and security programs) would take place, sequentially, in each of these priority areas- The process would be repeated in expanding spheres as successive areas became pacified* 2^1/

Together these two American-generated and proposed plans constituted a comprehensive blueprint for GVN action to end the insurgency- Two things comxaon to each should be noted for the purposes of the present inoLuiry. The first is the simple fact that each was UcS.-generated and proposed. The proposals addressed President Diem's persistent fears of a coup by asking him'to ignore those fears. The second point is that neither had anything to say about U.S. advisors. Each was an attempt to give advice, hnt neither recommended that the U.S. advisory effort in RVN be expanded in scope, size, or content.

STABILITY IN TIJE NUMBE R OF U.S. KDYISORS

The nimbev of military advisors had remained fairly level throughout this transition period (roughly, 1959 to mid-196l). TERM had finally been abolished but an approximately eqiial number of spaces \ms added to MAAG Vietnam, increasing it from 3^2 to 685. 25/ The ICC agreed that this increase was consistent with the limitations imposed by the Geneva Accords. 26/ I^UIG advisors had been authorized down to regimental level but ex-pressly forbidden to participate directly in combat operations or to go near the South Vietnamese national boundary. 27/ The U.S. had begun to provide Special Forces teams to GVIM in an effort to tram Vietnamese ranger companies in anti-guerrilla tactics, but this was regarded as ^ temporary undertaking. 28/ As late as November I96I, the total U.S. mill tary strength in South Vietnam vas only about 9^0 personnel. 29/ ^Discussions and arguments had been underrro-y for some time, however, with a view toward increasing U.S. involvem.ent in South Vietnam. The nature of this debate, v/hich took place largely during I96I and terminated in_the decisions at the end of that year to establish a "limited partnership with GVK, is important to an accoimt of the U.S. advisory build-up. It was in the shadow of opposing contentions about how to make the U.S.

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contribution most effective in helping GVN to defeat the insurgents that the advisory build-up was to b-gin in earnest in late I96I. These opposing viev;-s^ in turn;^ vj-ere cast against the situational developments^ already outlined: U,S. military desires to make RVMAF more effec' tive in couaiterinsurgency by improving the military chain of comms-nd;, Increasing the mobility and effectiveness of ARVW-, and upgrading the CG/sdc for the performance of pacification tasks.

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PART TWO

THE ADVISORY BUILD-UP, 196l-ig67

k. The Kennedy Pro-ams (1961-1963)

THE CONTEXT OF DECISIONS

By the end of I96I5 the U.S. had decided to double its military advisory effort an South Vietnam by establishing advisory team.s at the province (sector) level and within ARVN's battalions. The decision to take this step was one of a large number of decisions designed to "buy time" in RVTT so that GVN could mobilize its resources and swing over from the defensive to the offensive. A3.1 of the m_ajor participants appear to have agreed that the situation in RVN was bad and becoming worse5 that additional U.S. actions were needed if South Vietnam was to be saved^ and that the issue was of sufficient importance in terms of U.S. interest to justify doing whatever v/as necessary. The q.uestion was what should be done5 not if anything could be done* Defea/fc v/as too catastrophic an outcor:' to bear examination. Moreover^ decisions about Vietnam in I96I were^ until the very end of the year^ m.ade in the shadow of more pressing emergencies--the Berlrin crisis and events in Laos/^" It n.s most important to recognize this relative lack of centrality if one is to understand the apjjarently incomplete process by vrhich decisions on Vietnam were reached. Moreover, the dimensions of the Vietnamese problem were clear and agreed to by all. E3.usive so.lutions had to be sought in the interstices, as Jt. were, of the policyTiiakers' limited time.

It is difficult to imagine any responsible individual or group, for instance, taking exception to the litany of problems ticked off by General Taylor in his report following his importo.nt October I96I mission to South Vietnam:

Lack of intelligenc

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ARVN^s defensive posture

Poor command and control

Poor GVN administr8.tive procedures

Lack of Initiative

GVN failure to comjiiunicate with and mobilize its people, particula/rly the intellecturals and the young people. 30/

"X- This period is described more fully in a volujiie in the present series, IV.B.l., Evolution of the War: The Kennedy Programs, Igol.

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But various individuals and groups would stress the importance of different shortcomings and propose quite different methods of "persuading" GWI to overcome them.

The prevalent military viev^ a.s already suggested in the summary explanation of the CIP and the Geographically Phased Plan, was that^organ-i2^.tional reform and national planning were prerecLuisites to effective action. If these could be achieved, the military foresaw a pacification process which would proceed from the provision of physical security^in the rural a.reas through the establishment (or reestablishment) of civilian political administration to a state of political stability. The first nut to crack was that of military secuj^ity. Political axmlysts, including those of the Department of State, em_phasized the need for the Diem government to liberalise itself, to attract dissident groups at least into a lo;^ral active opposition and away from indifference and disaffection. In this view the heart of the matter v/as essentially political, rather than military.

In both views, it should be noted, advocates agreed that the GVN must be persuaded to take certain necessary steps. Just how such persuasion was to be achieved was a prime subject for discussion. l*to was to persuade whom and in what organizational framework was another such subject. But^although these subjects were bound to be discussed, neither v/as the central issue — by late I96I the question of whether or not to send U.S. combat forces to South Vietnam had clearly earned that title.

'^ The U.S. determination of what steps to take was driven^as much by

events as by arguments. By late I96I the com^se of events dictated that physical security would take primacy over governmental liberalization, not because the arguments for security were inherently more persuasive but because of the very real fear that there wouJ-d be no GVN to save if the U.S. did not do something very quickly. During the first half of I96I, terrorists and gu,errillas had assassinated over 5^0 local officials and civilians, kidnapped more than 1,000, and killed alanost 1,500 RVT^/VF personnel. 31/ The VC had gained the upper hand in most_ of the coimtryside and were drawing an increasingly tight cinch around Saigon* 3^ Viet Cong regular forces were now estimated to nuraber 25,000 and v^ere being organized into increasingly large regular fonmtions. The terrorist-guerrilla apparcvtus had grown to embrace an estimated YJ^000. 33/ The operative question was not whether the Diem goverimient as it was then moving could defeat the insurgents but v/hether it could save itself.

The deteriorating situation \ms one reason vrhy the military seCTTity arg-oment quickly gained the ascendancy. Another reason was ^the military's recognition that, vrhile secvirity was an important precondition, political, economic, and social reforms were necessary to the realization of viability within South Vietnam. Thus, security was recognized as a means to a political end. The process outlined in MAAG's Geogra,phically Phased Plan, described earlier, gave recognition to this fact. This process would shortly become known as the "pacification process," widely accepted throughout^ ^ important places in the U,S, Government (specifically to include what is

usually referred to euphemistically as "the highest level") and stilL widely accepted at this writing (I968).

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A PROPOSAL FOR EXim^HIPl^ATTni^ATTn ATWT.qn^.q

If the deteriorating situation and the potential "breadth of the rrdlitary^s view of the pacification process both augiired for at least the short run primacy of security considerations;, that still left the question of how best to enhance security and to lay the groundv:ork for the governmental programs which vrould, hopefuaiy, begin to operate behind a geographically expanding security screen. These questions v/ere addressed^ but in a rather one-sided way. An approach to U.S. advice-giving and the ^organizational context in which it should proceed vj-as tabled as a radical proposal. First the approach^ then the organizational frejnework were struck down. The U.Sc decided to take an opposite advisory approach in a very different organizational context as much because of disagreement with the debated proposals as because of reasoned elaboration of the benefits to be realized from the course vAich was eventually followed. In the process5 the difficult question of U.S. leverage got shunted off L "^^ "^^^ side. GVI^ reform v^as simply stated as an expected quid pro quo for

increased U.S. aid. What the U.S. should do if no reforms materialized . was apparently a subject too unpleasant to be considered.

The radical proposals were first floated in January I96I by a uniquely qualified professional military officer serving in Secretary McNamara's office: Brigadier General Edward Lansdale. Although an Air Force officer, Lansdale had worked closely in the Philippines with Ramon Magsaysay in the latter's successful, campaign against the Huk rebellion and served later as head of the U.S. intelligence mission in South Vietnam in the mid-50's. He knew President Diem well and was trusted by the GVN leader. He had gained some notoriety as the real-life hero of the pseudo-fictional best seller

The Ugly Americe.n." His vlev/s on counterinsurgency coimnanded attention.

Lansdale's proposals lend themselves to summarization, not to comprehensive description. Tnat is, he put forv-^ard a proposed attitude of mind which should govern U„S. actions, not a program, in the usual sense. The thrust of his argument pertaining to advisors was that the U.S. should select dedicated Americans with empathy for the Vietnamese and send them to advise GVN "with sensitive understanding and wisdom/' 3^^ / The course of action he recomraended v/as to get such men on the scene, give them total responsibility to match their total commitment, and free them from the encumbrances of the regular buree.ucratic machinery (be it military or

civilian) in order that they might operate effectively according to the situation:

j When there is an emergency, the wise thing to do is to pick

the best people you have, people who are experienced in dealing with this precise type of emergency, and send them, to the spot v^ith orders to remedy the situation. V/hen you get the people in position and free them, to work, you should then back them up in every practical way you can. The real decisions v^ill be made in little daily actions in Vietnam, not in Washington. That's

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vrhy the best are needed on the spot.

Our U.S. teeia in Vietnam should have a hard core of experienced Ainericans who knovr and really like Asia and the Asians, dedicated people who are willing to risk their lives for the ideals of freedom, and who will try to influence and guide the Vietnamese tov^ards U.S. policy objectives with the v/ann friendships and affection which our close alliance deserves. ¥e should break the rules of personnel assignment, if necessary, to get such U.S. military and civilians to Vietnam. 35/

Not only should the U.S. depend on advisors who earn the trust of their counterparts, Lansdale argued, it should depend on them to get the job done without coercion and threats. Leverage should be the product of persuasion and trust, not the result of control over funds arid materiel:

...Many of the Vietnamese in the coimtryside who were right up against the Viet Cong terror were full of patriotic spirit. Those who seemed to be in the hardest circumstances, fighting barefoot with makeshift weapons, had the highest morale. They still can lick the Viet Cong with a little help. There ^s a lesson here on oiir giving aid. Maybe we should learn that our funds canjQot buy friends or a patriotic spirit by mere materialistic giving. Perhaps we should help those who help themselves, and not have a lot of strings on that help. 3§j

If the U.S. could adopt this free-wheeling approach to advice, said Lansdale, it vrould do well to do it at the action level, to get down^and share the risks and discom.forts of the ARVN rather than to restrict its advice to pa.per plans and confrontations in offices:

...U.S. military men in Vietnam should be freed to work in the combat areas. Our MAA.G has a far greater potential than is now being utilized. U.S. military men are hardly in a position to be listened to when they are snug in rear areas and give advice to Vietnamese officers who have attended the^ same U.S. military schools and who are now in a combat in which few Americans are experienced. MAAG personjiel from General McGarr on down expressed desire to get more into real field^ viTork; let^s give them what they want as far as U.S. ^permission is concerned and let them earn their way into positions of greater influence with the Vietnamese military in the field. 37/

BACK TO NOPvMAX CHA.]Mli;LS

In SLun, General Lansdale ixrged an extra-bureaucratic, uninhibited ^ advisory system consciously built on shared U.S.-Vietnamese goals (vali dated by shared experiences) and based on mutual trust and admiration.

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It was-"he v^ould be the first to admit-"the kind of. unstructured^ unpro-graroned, "non-organisation" which v/as antithetical to that v/hich the professional military might be expected to propose and so foreign to the typical vievjs of the State Department, with its traditional anti-opere.tlonal bias., that diplomats v;ould inevitably regard it as a proposal for power without responsibility. Thus, one contemporary account suggests that Lansdale^s approach vzas eventually rejected because of governmental inertia and bureaucratic in-fighting:

VJhen Lansdale returned to Washington ■- after he had submitted his report to his own superiors - he was sudden3-y surmnoned one afternoon to the Iftiite House and, much to his surprise, ushered into 8. conference room vrhere the President v/as presiding over a mixed group of high Pentagon, State Department, and National Security Council officials. To his further surprise, President Kennedy, after commending his report, indicated that Lansdale would be sent back to Vietnam in a high capacity. Kennedy's declaration at the meeting obviously raised the hackles of many officials whose agencies had been criticized by Lansdale. The upshot was that nothing fua-^ther happened a.bout Lansdale *s appointment. It is now knov/n that objections to it were raised in the highest levels of the Kennedy administration; in fact, there were threats of resignation. In the sense that some drastic action in Vietnam should have been taken at this time, whether it Involved Lansdale or not, this vras another vital turning point in the long and tortuous history of America's Vietnamese involvement. Tliere was still a chance to do something to S8.ve the Diem regime, depending largely on getting Ehu out of the country. Difficult as it would have been to achieve at this late date, Lansdale might have been able to persuade Diem to do it, because he had remained one of the few Americans Diem had ever trusted. More important, some feasible ideas about how to fight a guerrilla war might have been set in motion, and the miscalculation of what had always been essentially a revolutionary situation might thereupon have been altered. 38/

This account simply does not sq.uare with the existence of several cogent objections to Lansdale's proposals for "unfettered quality"--though there most certainly vras a fair share of bureaucratic in-fighting as the proposals were studied, expanded, and reshaped. Moreover, it compresses the time frame within which Lansdale's two major theses were struck down. His first proposal, for selected individuals to act as advisors, implied --at the very minimum--contlnulty of personnel selected by an extra-bureaucratic process. Extra-bureaiicratic selection was dead by mid-196l; the issue of continuity v/as finally settled in favor of year-long tours in December I962 (and has remained in effect since that time). The issue of a supra-departmental organization was fought out in mid-196l. It succumbed to an organizational principle v/lth very deep roots.

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The specific form which Lansdale^s supra-departrnental organisational proposal advanced was that of a Presidential Agent to manage the U.S. effort in RW, On 12 April I96I, Walt W. Rostow sent a memorandum to President Kennedy which suggested^ among other things^ that it was imperative to appoint a "fulltime, first-rate back-stop man in Washington" to oversee the U.S. involvement in R"\/I\[. 39/ Lansdale was either aware of a meaning not conveyed llters.lly by the memorandum or interpreted it to fiu his preferences. In any event, he used this springboard to propose, in a 19 April meraorandum to Secretary McNamara and his deputy, Roswell Gilpatric, that the President create an interdepartm_ental task force on Vietnam to "supervise and coordinate the activities of every U.S. agency carrying out operations. . .in Vietnam to ensure success of the ^/President's/ approved plan." kO/ On the following day Secretary McNamara, presumably after discussing the matter with the President, requested Gilpatric to prepare within a week a report for the President, setting forth any actions necessary to "prevent communist domination of that country." Ul/

On 27 April Secretary Gilpatric submitted his recommendations. Much of the flavor of the earlier Lansdale pleas for a select, individualistic advisory effort v^as missing from this product of an interdepartmental committee. The earlier recommendations for an expanded U.S. effort were still there, however. These included an RVMF force Increase of 20^000 with a corresponding increase of 100 MAAG advisors, a MAAG takeover of the entire CG and SDC programs, the employment of U.S. advisors in field operations, the continuation of U^S. Mission efforts to get GVN to carry out reforms, the initiation of covert operations with CIA assistance against lines -of communications in Laos and North Vietnam, and a U.S. economic team to help GVN speed up national developm.ent. k2/ One would be hard pressed to identify any other document which, over six months before the operative decision, so closely foreshadov/ed the U.S. actions that would be agreed to at the end of I96I.

But beyond these programm.atic recommendations (hence, contrary to Lansdale*s initial proposals) Gilpatric recoirmiended the creation of a Presidential Task Force to provide "over-all direction, interagency coordination and support" for this program of action. Gilpatric was to be Director of the Task Forces lansdale its operating head in Vietnam. In order to appear not to fly into the face of Ambassadorial primacy in Saigon the memo vj-as forced into some rather fancy obfuscation;

The Ambassador as head of the Country Team, is assigned the authority and the responsibility to see that the Progroin is carried out in the field and to determine the timing of the actions. He is authorized to advise the Director of the Task Force of any changes which he believes should be made in the Program.

In carrying out his duties in the field, the operations 1 officer of the Task Force will cooperate with the Ambassador

; V ^^^ "ti^e Coimtry Team. Us/

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This equivocation ch-arged directly against the mainstream of current thought as it related to the question of integrs-ting operations abroad. The "Country Team" concept of the late 1950's^ buttressed by a series of increasingly comprehensive Executive Orders on the subject, assigned clear primacy to the Ambassador. The State Department was not long in asserting its claim to leadership in accordance with this prevailing concept. On 3 May it provided a recomjnended revision of Gilpatric^s task force proposal in which it propposed an interdepartmental task force under State Department leadership to coordinate the Washington effort and a coujiterpart task force in Saigon under Sterling J. Cottrell^ then POLlAD to CINCPAC. ^4;/ It was this proposal which was incorporated into NSAM 52 later in May. k^

In retrospect, the Lansdale-Gilpatric proposal to conduct the U.So participation in the Vietnamese war through a supra-departmental agency--whether by a Presidential Task Force or by some other means--probably never had much of a chance. The Department of Defense had too large an operational role to agree to leadership of such an undertaking by anyone other than one of its own principals. (Thus, Gilpatric vzas acceptable, but few others would have been; Lansdale almost surely was not acceptable as the operating chief in RVN.) The State Department had at stake both the legacy of theoretic interdepartm.ental primacy and the oft-expressed hope of giving this theory more m.eaning abroad. Indeed, it was during this same month (May I96I) that President Kennedy sent his oft-quoted letter to each American Ambassador, reminding the recipient of his coordinating duties even while reaffirming that these did not extend to supervising operational military forces. The effect in South Vietnam, as distinct from some other coujitries, was to preserve claims for Independent authority for each of the major goverrmiental departments involved. The Presidential letter to Ambassador Frederick E. Nolting in Saigon read in part:

In regard to your personal a.uthority and responsibility, I shall count on you to oversee and coordinate all the activities of the United Sta.tes Government in the Republic of Vietnam.

You are in charge of the entire United States Diplomatic Mission, and I shall expect you to supervise all of its operations. The Mission includes not only the personnel of the Department of State and the Foreign Service, but also the representatives of 8.11 other United States agencies which have programs or activities in the Republic of Vietnam, I shall give you full support and backing in carrying out your assignment.

Needless to say, the representatives of other agencies are expected to communicate directly v/ith their offices here in Washington, and in the event of a decision by you in v/hich they do not concur, they may ask to have the decision reviewed by a higher a.uthority in Washington.

However, it is their responsibility to keep you fully

1 informed of their views and a.ctivlties and to abide by your

decisions unless in some particular instance you and they

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are notified to the contrary.

If in your judgment individual members, of the Mission are not functioning efi'ectively, you should take whatever action you feel may be rec[uired5 reporting the circunistances^ of course5 to the Department of State.

In case the departure from the Republic of Vietnam of any individual member of the Mission is indicated in your judgment^ I shall expect you to make the decision and see that it is carried into effect. Such instances I am confident will be rare.

Now one word about your relations to the military. As you know, the United States Dlplom.a-ic Mission includes Service Attaches, Military Assistance Advisory Crroups and other Military components attached to the Mission. It does not, however, include United States military forces operating in the field where such forces are under the cori-and of a United States area military commander. Tlie line of authority to these forces runs from me, to the Secretary of Defense, to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in We.shington and to the area commander in the field.

Although this means that the chief of the Ajnerican Diplomatic Mission is not in the line of military command, nevertheless, as Chief of Mission, you should work closely with the appropriate area military commander to a.ssure the full exchange of information. If it is your opinion that activities by the United States military forces may adversely affect oujt over-all relations with the people or governments of the Republic of Vietnam you should promptly discuss the matter with the military commander and, if necessary, request a decision by higher authority. _^/

It is reasonable to surmise that in mid-196l events did not seem pressing enough to cast aside a developeci--if imperfect--concept of operational integration in favor of an ^^ntried substitute arrangement. In fact, if one wanted firm leadership one -.rould have had less radical alternatives to which to turn. To mention tv;o. Secretarial Jnvolvement to a degree tantamount to taking charge of the v^ar (much as Secretary McNamara did in I962) or the appointment of an Am.bassador to KVN with such military preeminence that he need not defer to other military judgments (as, General Taylor in I96U).

The decision to supervise the American effort in a more or less conventional way had a direct bearing on the nature of the advisory buildup then, being discussed. It was highly unlikely that General Lansdale^s radical advisory proposals would be kindly received under a system managed along conventional lines. Even before the Presidentia.1 Task Force idea

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wa,s abandoned L-ansdale's proposals for a select^ committed advisory group had been reshaped by interdepartmental committee. Instead of "old Vietnam hands" in key spotsj the discussion turned to the use of existing organizations and much larger numbers of advisors:

Augment the MAAG with two US training comm.ands (comprised of approximately l600 instructors each) to enable the MAAG to establish in t]ie "high plateau" region of South Vietnam two divisional field training areas to accelerate the U.S, training program for the entire GVIV army

Deploy-j as soon as possible^ a Special Forces Group (approximately 400 U.S. military personnel) to Wlia Trang in order to accelerate GVN Special Forces training, hj/

Under this proposal the size of ^{[AAG Vietnam v^ould be increased from 685 to 2285^ not Including the Special Forces or training corixmands mentioned above or the 100 mian increase already proposed to advise the 20,000 men v/hich were to be added to RVNAF. ^{8/

After the shift to thinking in terms of existing military organizations (or, alternatively, of individuals drawn as it were by "requisitions" in normal channels) and the understandable—if not inevitable—demise of the Gilpatric-Lansdale proposal for supra-departmental direction, U„S, thinking about possible steps in Vietnam remained firmly within conventional channels. There were subseq^uent attempts to reintroduce an alternative advisory scheme and an organizational framework compatible with it but these appear to have not been seriously considered.

President Kennedy did not permit the Gilpatric Task Force recommendations to commit him to action. Rather, he used them in an attempt to demonstrate the U.S. commitment to Vietnam. The proof of this contention is in NSAM 52, which records the President's decisions. Only about l4 personnel were to be assigned, for instance, in U.S. Army civic action mobile training teams to assist ARVN with health, welfare, and public works projects. Although it was decided to deploy the Special Forces group of 1|00 men to Tourane /Da Nang/, this was in support of a CIA-directed effort v/hlch could be kept largely covert. Increased aerial surveillance assistance required only 6 U.S. personnel. The establishment of a Combat Developm,ent and Test Center in RVW req.ulred only h additional U.S. personnel, k^/ The point is not how much was done but, in retrospect, how firmly the probable lines of future actions had been drawn as a result of v/hat it had been agreed not to do.

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PIAWI'n:NG BEGINS IN FAEI\TC8T

The President did, however, issue several "hunting licenses." The Defense Department was directed to examine ful.ly (under the guidance of the State Department's Director of the continuing Task Force on Vietnam) "the size and composition of forces v/hich would be desirable in the case of a possj.ble cojmitment of U.S. forces to Vietnam. 50/ The Ambassador was authorized to sound out Diem on a bilateral defense treaty. 51/ President Kennedy also apparently decided to feel out Diem's reaction on the subject of U.S. combat troops ^ in Vietnam. Vice Pi^esident Johnson left almost immediately to visit South Vietnam and other Asian nations. He was empowered to bring up the question of troops as well as the treaty.

But discussions are one thing; firm commitm.ents are quite 8.nother. The range of alternatives that President Kennedy was willing to consider seems clear. What he v?as vj-illing to d£ was quite another matter. Unless he v/as most unlike other politicians and unless the many personal accounts of his style are completely erroneous he vzas v/illing to do what he believed ^^ li^l ^^ ^o — and events in mad-1961 did not force action even though the drill that the Administration went through \ms instrumental in defining the probable responses when events did force action.

As it quickly turned out, President Diem v/anted neither U.S, troops nor a treaty at that time. He told Vice Pi^esident Johnson that he wanted troops only in the event of overt invasion and shov/ed no interest in a treaty.52/ Nevertheless^ the Vice President, upon his return, was trenchan in his observations that the time for deeds to replace words v/as fast approaching if the U.S. was to make its declared commitment credible:

Our mission arrested the decline of confidence in the United Sta.tes. It did not — in my judgm.ent -- restore any confidence already lost. The leaders were as explicit, as courteous and courtly as men could be in making it clear that deeds must follovr words — soon.

We. didn't buy time -- we V7ere given it«

If these men I saw at your request Mere bankers, I vrould know -- without bothering to ask -- that there would be no further extensions on -mj note. 53/

Diem may not have been OAiite so disinterested in U.S. troops as he appeared to be. NSAT-l 52 of 11 May had discussed, inconclusively, the proposed buildup of RVNAE from 170,000 to 200,000 in order to create two new divisions to help seal the Laotian border, t'/hen President Diem responded (on 9 June) to Vice President Johnson's invitation to prepare a set of proposals on South Vietnam's military needs, he recoimnended a quantuii\ jump in strength to 270,000 and suggested a substantial increase in the US NAAG, perhaps even in the form of U.S. units:

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To accomplish this 100^000 man expansion /above the strength recommended in the CIP^ v.^hich was 20,000 above the existing strength/ of our military forces, which is perfectly feasible from a manpower viewpoint, will require a great intensification of ova? training programs in order to produce, in the minim-um of time, those qualified combat leaders and technical specialists needed to fill the new units and to provide to them the technical and logistical support required to insure their complete effectiveness. For this -pur-cose a considerable expans ion of the TJTLJj^d Stp .tes Militar y Advisor y Grou p is an e ssential re quire-ment. Such an exDansion, in the form of sele cted ele m.ents of the Ame rican Armed Forces to establis h tr aining centers f or the Vi etnam,ese Armed Forces, would serve the dual purpose of providing an expression of the United States^ determination to halt the tide of co]3.iir:unist aggression and of preparing our forces in the m.inimiujn of time. 5^/

The response to this letter is not part of the available record. No doubt the initial reaction was one of surprise. The U.S. vras not accustomed to GVi^ initiatives; it seldom sought them. "We have not becom.e accustomed to being asked for our ovm views on our needs," Diem rema.rked in his letter to Kennedy. 55/ But Diem\s proposal did certainly strike one appealing chord: the Joint benefits of training coupled to demonstrated commitment through the deployment of existing troop units. As the situation in South Vietnam, continued to deteriorate throughout the summer and early fall the issue of U.S. military advice continued to be addressed in terms of U.S. units^ These could, of course, do even more than had been suggested by President I)iem_: they could fight as units. Diem's generally consistent position, however, continued to be that he would accept U.S. combat forces, but only to train G-VN forces. He had said as much to Vice President Johnson:

General McGarr, vrho v/as also present at this discussion /between Johnson s.nd Diem/ reported that while President Diem would not want U.S. combat forces for the purpose of fighting Comimunists in South Vietnam, he v/ould accept deplo;^/ment of U.S. combat.forces as trainers for the Vietnamese forces at any time. 56

GVN ASKS F OR ADDITIOML U.S. ASSISTA NCE

By October the situation within South Vietnam had become sufficiently grim for President Diem to reverse his earlier sentiments and to ask for a bilatere.l defense treaty \vith the U.S. 57/ His new willingness, coupled with the deteriorating situation, kicked off a new series of proposals within the U.S. Government. Walt Rostow proposed that the U.S. x^l^^ce an internationalized force of about 2^,000 men into RVN to perform a border sealing mission. The JCS responded v/ith a counter proposal emphasizing Laos and calling for the deployment of a sizea^ble (initially 20,000) U.S^ contingent to the central highlands. 58/ Another proposal blended elements

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of both the JCS and Rostow papers. ^SJ ^ Special National Intelligence Estimate v/eighcd in with a hard Iccr: at this rash of proposals. GoJ The President's reaction^ on 11 October^ was to decide to send General Taylor on a mission to South Vietnam to examine several alternative courses of action:

(a) The plan for military intervention discussed at this morniiig's meeting on the basis of the Vietnam task force paper entitled "Concept for Interver.ticn in Vietnam";

(b) An alternative plan for stationing in Viefeiam fev^er U.S. combat forces than those called for tinder the pla-n referred to in (a) above and with a mere limited objective than dealing ■with the Viet Congj in other -.-rords, such a sm_all force would proba-ble go in at Tourane Jj)z. l^oxigf and possibly another southern port principally for the purpose of establishing a U.S. "presence" in Vietnam;

(.c) Other alternatives ir. lieu of putting any U.S. comba,t forces in Vietnam^ i.e. stepping up U.S. assistance and training of Vietnam* units, furnishing of more U.S. equipment;, particularly helicopters and other light aircraft, trucks and other ground transport, etc. 6l/

jIFIE TAYLOR MSSIOH TO SAIGON

This range of alternatives suggests, even without "20/20 hindsight," that if som ething was going to be done, and if the President v/ere to decide not to send U.S. combat units to Vietnam, there would be an advisory buildup of some kind almost by default. Thj s is close enough to what happened to warrant the risk of oversimplification. It does not do justice to the Taylor Report, of course, but Taylcr's mission and his reports have been covered fully in another study in the present series."^ For their impact on the advisory effort, and to place this in perspective, it is sufficient to describe only a few salient features. First, the Viet Cong were pursuing, in Taylor ^s appraisal, a political-military strategy aim.ed at overthrowing Diem and opening the -.ray to unification of Vietnam on Hanoi's terms. Military action by the insurgents wa.s aimed at this objective rather than at a complete military victory:

The military strategy being p'orsued is, evidently, to pin down the ARVN on defensive missions; to create a pervasive sense of insecurity and frustration by hit-and-run raids on self-defense corps and militia /cg/ units...and to dramatize the inability of the GVN to govern or to build....

Despite the considerable guerrilla capabilities of the Viet-Cong, Coimnunist strategy now appears, on balance, to

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aim at an essentially political denouement rather than the total military capture of the country^ as in the case of Mao^s caa^ipaign in China....The enemy objective seems to be to produce a political crisis by a combination of military and non-military means out of which v/ould come a South Vietnamese Souva.nna Phouma^ willing to contemplate ujiifica,tion on terms acceptable to Hanoi^ including disengagement from the U.S. 62/

In order for the Diem government to defeat this insurgency;, General Taylor reasoned, the Saigon regime must reform itself. It had allowed two vicious circles to develop v/hich vitiated its effectiveness. In the first, poor military intelligence resulted in a defensive military posture which put most of the forces under provincial control. This, in tu-rn, meant that reserves could not be expeditiously employed. The resultant high losses in unsuccessful defensive battles further dried up the sources of intelligence and completed the circle. The second vicious circle was attributable to Diem^s instinctive attempts to centralize pov/er in his own hands v.^hile fragmenting it beneath him. His excessive mistrust of criticism and fea^rs of a coup caused large elem.ents of society to stand aside from the struggle while the province chiefs and generals were forced into frustrating struggles^ further increasing Dlem^s fears and his inclination to fractionalize authority. The task, then, was to strengthen Diem while, at the same time, inducing him. to reform so as to break botl'i of these vicious circles.

In order to strengthen Diem with a U.S. military presence— very much along the lines of the smaller US deployment discussed at the NSC meeting prior to his trip—Taylor recommended the deployment to South Vietnam of a task force of 6-8,000 troops under the guise of flood relief work. This task force, primarily logistic8>l, would necessa^rily become involved in some defensive operation and sustain some ca-sualties, but its deployment need not commit the U.S. to a land war on the Asia.n mainland:

As the task is a specific one, we can extricate our troops w^hen it is done if we so desire. Alternatively, we can phase them into other activities if we vzish to remain longer....

Needless to say, this kind of task force will exercise little direct influence,on the campaign against the VC. It will, however, give a rauch needed shot in the arm to national morale, particularly if combined V7i th other acti ons showing that a more effective wor kin g relationship in the commo n cause has been established between the GVN and the U.S. 6h/

Taylor had already received President Diem*s assu-rances that he favored the deployment of U.S. forces for tliis pujrpose. 65/

. 1 In conjunction with this U.S. troop deployment, Taylor argued that

'" f the U.S. should initiate increased assistance to GVN in a new relationship:

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A shift /should occiir/ in the American relation to the Vietnamese effort from advice to l:united partnership. The present character and scale of the war in South Vietnam decree only that the Vietnamese can defeat the Viet-Cong; but at all levels Americans must^ as friends and partners--not as arms "length advisors--show them how the job might be done—not tell them or do it for them. 66/

General Taylor v/as most explicit that the purpose of the proposed troop deployments and the new "limited partnershjp" v/as to buy time for the Vietnamese so that they couJ_d marshall their considerable resources and assi^jne the offensive against the VC. As mentioned above^ this would require internal reform in GVN. The limited partnership would contribute to both of these interacting objectives:

The present war cannot be won by direct US action; it must be won by the Vietnamese, But there is a general conviction among us that the Viennamese performance in erery domain can be substantially improved if Americans are prepared to work side by side with the Vietnamese on the key problems. Moreover j there is evidence that Diem is^ in principle^ prepared for this stepj and that most--not all--elements in his establishment are eagerly awaiting it. 6?,

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THE KEM^EDY DECISIOHS: NSAM 111

It is useful to a.pproach the effect of General Taylor's mission on the advisory effort from the sim.ple recollection of what President Kennedy decided not to do. lie decided not to deploy U.S. combat forces to South Vietnam, This meant -- given the U.S. assessment of the importance of HW and the felt necessity to do something ~ that the expansion of U.S. assistance was a. foregone.conclusion. This was the general course of action that would be followed as the ineluctable result of having decided not to do something else vrhich was more dramatic, involved m.ore risk, and was more contentious.

Given the decision not to send troop units, then, the general thrusts of U.S. actions were determined — but the specifics were not. Just how did Taylor's "limited partnership," for instance, propose to influence GVN's attitudes and organisation, to develop initiative matched by comipe-tence, and to insure that the Vietnamese would assume successfully the responsibility for winning the struggle which it was said only they could win? How was this expanded U.S. effort to be organized? From whence would come the new junior partners of the firm? \Iha.t would be their preparation, their instructions, their duties?

The first of these two groups of q.uestions is more easily answered than the second; the ansvj-er to neither of them is retrospectively very

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satisfying in terms of suggesting that the U.S„ entered into its eiKpanded effort at the beginning of I962 v/ith its eyes wide open and fully aware of oust what It was doing. The available record indicates that the U.S. hopefully assumed that material aid and good Intentions would be adequate to the task^ that a larger U.S. presence would spur the Vietnamese to effective action without incurring the stigma of a U.S. "takeover," and that the increase in assistance would be -- in and of itself -•- accepted as an adequate quid £ro quo for the desired reforms within GVN,

^GVN org?.nizational reform would be realized^ MSM 111 suggested, by getting Diem to agree to clean vip his lines of authority in exchange for the U.S. commitment to the limited partnership. One section of the document is a list of approved U.S. actions; another sets forth the expected improvements to be accomplished by GW. 68/ Ambassador Nolting was instructed to use the substance of these decisions in talks to secure Diem's approval. He found Diem despondent that the U.S. asked so much in retu-rn for so little, played into the hands of those who claimed u.ndue American infringement upon Vietnamese sovereignty, and p.laced him in a position where he feared even to make knov/n to his own cabinet the American expectations. 69/ Unless the U.S. were to suspend its increased aid, and at the very t:hne it was just gearing up to provide it, Diem had made it clear at the beginning that he would govern South Vietnam in his way e.nd that the U.S. had no choice but to support him v/holeheartedly, get out, or find an acceptable alternative to him. The U.S., in turn, had refused to consider the last two of these alternatives- It was stuck with supporting him, at least for the time being.

WOEKING OUT TIIE BASIS E QP U.S. ADVICE

But the U.S. approach vras only partially framed to secure Diem's acceptance. There was a parallel suggestion that the existence of U.S. advisors in the field, working hand-in-hand in a counterpart relationship with Vietnamese, would reform GVN from the bottom up. This line of policy was neither spelled out in detail nor thought out in terms of operational implications, risks, and costs. But it clearly existed:

Through this working association at all levels, the U.S. must bring about de facto changes in Diem\s method of administration and seek to bring all elements of the Vietnamese Government closer to the Vietnamese people -- thus helping break the vicious political circle.

By concurrent actions in the fields of intelligence, command and control, mobility, and training, the U.S. must bring about a situation where an effective reserve is mobilized and brought to bear offensively on clearly established and productive offensive targets — thus helping

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break the vicious military circle.,..

Behind this concept of a strategy to turn the tide and to assutJie the offensive lies a general proposition: when an interacting process is yielding a degenerative situation^ the Vfise st course of action is to create a positive thrust at as many points as are accessible . 707

Thus^ the U,S. addressed the critical leverage issue as the expected product of its ovm willingness to increase its participation in the countorinsurgency effort. It did so^ moreover, without any conscious examination of the question beyond stating its expectations. There was no plan to me.ke the provision of additional assistance contingent upon GVN actions5 only a statement that GVN actions were expected. There was no willingness, in fact, to consider the conscious exercise of leveragej the situation was too critico-1, the available tme too short, the issue too important.

The effect of this avoidance of hard choices -- for good and understandable reasons, but avoidance nonetheless -- was to place a vevj large burden on the benefits to be realized by an expansion of the advisory effort. The language of General Taylor*s report is reminiscent of Lansdale's earlier proposals for an unstructured, flexible advisory effort comprising totally committed, carefu.lly selected individuals who would earn the respect and cooperation of the Vietnamese. Lansdale had renewed these proposals at the time the Taylor Report was prepared. Vj But when it vras suggested to the GVN that the U.S. would expect to share in decisions the Vietnamese reaction led the U.S. aliaost imjnediately to modify this expectation. The original communication on the subject to Ambassador Nolting stated that "...we would expect to share in the decision-making process in the political, economic and military fields as they affected the security situation" as compared to the earlier arrangement of "acting in an advisory capacity only." 72/ By early December insistence on this point was quickly dropped in favor of a view which suggested that close collaboration would produce automatic uns^nimitv:

What we have in mind is that, in operations directly related to the security situation, partnership vj-ill be so close that one party vn.ll not take decisions or actions affecting the other without fall and frank prior consultations. ... 73/

Unless such exchanges invariably resulted in unanimity one of the partners would have to give way to the other or inactivity would result. "What line to follow if this occurred seems not to have been examined. This simply v/'ould not happen.

■ The "close partnership" envisaged by General Taylor -- and endorsed by President Kennedy — suggested something akin to the "total comjnitment" which General Lansdale had earlier urged as one criterion in selecting

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advisors for South Vietnajn* This, in turn, implied at the very mini-mun a period of long exposure to the operational problem (and personalities) with which these advisors would deal. In the event, it vms decided to expand both the military and sector (provincial military) advisory efforts without any such long term, exposure- These q[uestions were settled in detail when Secretary McNamara met in mid-January I962 at Honolulu with the principal managers of the U.S. effort. It was decided to establish battalion level military advisory teams within ARW; each to consist of either 5 (infantry battalion) or 3 (artillery battalion) personnel. Each province (sector) would receive 3 U.S. advisors, one officer and 2 enlisted intelligence specialists. The Civil Guard wouILd be trained in a series of 6 training centers by 120 advisors (20 in each center) plus 12 mobile teams of 3 men each. The SDC would be trained in 30 centers, jh/ Secretary McNamara made it clear that he wanted these deployments completed as quickly as possible. He suggested that if an ARVN unit was not prepared to receive its advisors the designated individuals be sent to RW and placed temporarily with another unit to gain experience. 75/ He agreed that temporary duty assignments to Vietnam were generally undesirable and asked the JCS to address the question of optimum tour length for advisors. 76 /

The length of time a military meniber spent in Vietnam at that time varied slightly from service to service, according to vrtiether or not dependents accom-panied the serviceman and whether he served in Saigon or in some other part of the country. In October I96I it v/as allegedly decided at OSD level — without consulting the services ~ to make the tour of duty 30 months with dependents and I8 without dependents rather than the 2l|- and 12 mionth tours that were then typical. 77/ The effect of this decision vmuld have been to increase the field advisors' tours of duty from one year to one and a half years. Each of the assignment branches within the Army opposed this change as one which would be ineq.uitable unless reflected in changed tour length for other "unaccompanied" (by dependent) tours. The order was not put into effect. Thus, there v/as some backgroujid against which to reexamine the time which advisors (among others) should spend in RVN. The decision ~ again based on considerations of equity in "hardship" assignments, health, and resultant morale issues — was to retain the one year tour in the field.

U.S. EXPECTATIONS: THI] BENEFITS FROM MORE ADVISORS

To sujii up the decision to expand the advisory effort to battalion and province level, it was one reached without extended study or debate-There v/as neither opposition to it nor any comprehensive explication of

5r^t has remained basically unchanged, it should be noted, until the present. An unstructujred program of voluntary 6 month extensions was inaugurated throughout Vietnam j.n 1967? a volujitary extension prograiri begun for "selected officers" in key positions in the same year, and a sm-all program initiated in I968 by which selected Province Advisors would agree to serve two years in Vietnam, then receive aliaost one " year's training prior to deployment. No officers have departed the U.S. under this last program as of the present writing (mid-1968).

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what would be involved and the benefits to be expected* This was due in large part to the fact that it was a decision made almost offhandedly in the shadow of a larger issue^ the deploy^nent of U.S. combat forces to ?m^, When it v-^as decided not to send the combat forces it was a foregone conclusion that m-ore advisors would be sent. This v/as consistent with the U.S. desire in late I96I to demonstrate its coimmitment to South Vietnam and apparently compatible with the oft-expressed belief that only the South Vietnamese could bring their struggle to a satisfactory conclusion.

But the decision to expand the advisory effort attempted^ at the same trijne, to finesse the o[uestion of leverage. GVKf was informed that the U.S. expected certain reform measiires to be adopted in exchange for increased U.S. assistance. It received no clear signals about witMrioDxling U.S. help if these actions were not taken. The U.S. had, in fact, m.ade no decisions along this line; it had avoided addressing the issue because of conflicting desires to act forcefully, yet to a,void Americanizing the v/ar. Thus, the U.S. did not know what it would do if GVN failed to respond as it was hoped that it would. In this sense the U.S. advisors became potential pawns in a leverage game of uncertain intensity with no set rules. This dc facto position was in continuous potential conflict with the expressed hope that a greater U.S. presence v/ould lead -- by example, persuasion, and mutual interest — to increased effectiveness both within ARVN and in the political administration of the provinces governed by U.S.-advised ARVTT officers.

Not only did the Kennedy Administration decide to enter in General Taylor's "limited partnership" without a careful examination of the relationships being established, it also apparently did not state or debate precisely what benefits were expected as a result of an increased advisory effort. There was, it appears, a generali^-ed and unchallenged assumption that more A,m.ericans in m_ore places addressing Vietnamese training and operations could not but have an overall beneficial effect. Tlie available record reflects no explicit discussion of expected benefits. Wiiile oral discussions must have addressed this point at some time, it seems most likely that policymakers agreed tacitly on three over3-apping categories of expectations — each susceptible to varying interpretations and degrees of relative importance and emphasis -- vi^hich were neither clearly stated nor critically examined.

The first, and most obvious, v/as the expectation that an increased U.S. military presence with tactical units and at training centers would lead to improved technical-tactical competence within ARVN. The assumption which underlay this expectation v/as that the teaching of basic military skills v/as probably a sufficient (rather than merely necessary) condition to enable ARVN to begin to operate more effectively — and more energetically and aggressively. Earlier experience in Greece and Korea would have seemed to valida.te this expecta.tion v/ithin reasonable limits.

Second, U.S. policymakers probably expected the increased military advisory effort to result in a more effective informational "netv/ork.".

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It must have seemed reasonaI-)le to expect that an increased but diffuse U.S. presence v/ould not only enhance information on VC actions and probable plans but also improve U.S. knowledge of AP71\F plans and performance .

Finally -- and most difficult to pinpoint in terms of what po-licy-maker or policymaking group emphasized which aspects — the U.S. expected to gain' additional influence from an increased advisory effort. General Taylor viewed this as the natural product of individuals with parallel interests working hand-in-glove in the field (as distinct from large headq,tiarters). Hils v/ould enable them to escape the petty differences which grow up in the absence of operational responsibility and permit the U.S. advisors to "lead by example" even though they would not be technically em.powered to lead.

Other expectations of increased U.S. influence could take a variety of forms. Improved information, for instance, in a hierarchically ordered U.S. advisory system., would permit the U.S. to push more effectively any line of endeavor which it wished GW to adopt. This potential for improved

sa.lesmanship' W8.s not unrelated to an increo.sed potential for coercive influence. Wliat the U.S. would give in material support it might also withhold selectively. Influence need not be dependent upon example alone.

I\Ione of these expectations were, however, articulated fully or spelled out in terms which V70uld provide operational guidelines for the new U.S. advisors who were being deployed to SVN. The expectations of benefits were implicit and generalized. The potential existed for a comprehensive, coordinated U.S. approach to advising but the potential was not the reality.

II4PLEMENTING THE FIR ST BUILD-UP

The decision just exa-mined to increase the U.S. advisory effort was preceded by a series of marginal increases in the U.S. military strength in Vietnam. (Actual "in-country" strengths are available for only a fev; months during the early build-up period so it will frequently be necessary to use authorization figures and to rea^lize that nev/ly authorized spaces were generally not filled vj}.t±l some tim_e had passed after their establishment.) Presidential decisions in April and May I96I, taken in the light of a central concern with Laos rather than Vietnam, increased the authorized size of MAAG Vietnam from 685 to 785. The 100-man increase V7as divided almost equally between technical advisors and e^dvisors for ARVN^s tactical training centers. 78/ In October I96I the authorized strength v/as increased again, to 9^2, of which 9^18 spaces were for U.S. Army personnel; 603 of these 9^8 spa.ces were actually filled by the end of November. 79,

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The increases in advisory strength which reflected the NSAM 111 decisions were authorized In Deceiriber I96I and January I962, By the end of 1961 MM.G's authorized strength had been more than doubled, to 2067. This number vras increased again in January to more than 3OOO. Included in these increases v/ere the new dimensions of U.S. advice: battalion advisors, province advisors, and an additional 5OO Special Forces advisors (making a new total of 8O5 in the Special Forces program under CIA control). 80/

It has already been noted that Secretary McNamara gave forcefu-1 impetus to manning these new3.y created positions in the shortest possible time. They were, indeed, filled quickly. By April I962 the total number of Army field advisory personnel in RVN exceeded the authorized nujnber. By this time, too, the authorized total for all services had been stabilized at about 3^00. This total was reduced in November to 3150, then remained essentially constant until a new roimd of increases was inaugurated in mid"196U. 81/ Thus, the build-up associated with the Taylor mission L consisted of a fourfold increase in U.S. advisory presence (a much larger

increase if one counts U.S. support units). After the build-nip v/as completed, in the spring of I962, the number of advisors remained stable until many months after the fall of the Diem government.

While the total number of advisors remained fairly constant, however, shifts occurred in the distribution of advisory personnel. From the completion of the build-up, for instance, until the coup which overthrew Diem, the number of field advisors at corps and division level increased severalfold and the number of province advisors doubled while other field advisory strengths rem.ained about the same. These developments are shomi in detail in the tabular summary at the end of this study and simnarized in the following table:

Selected Field Advisor^p_A.pril 1962 and Noveii^ er_1963 Q^J

Activity Advised April I962 November I963

Corps 63 380

Divisions , l62 ^-^^6

Regiments I5O 13^

Battalions 366 ^17

Province a 117 ^35

Schools & Training Centers 212 201

cg/sdc 281 215

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THE U.S. VIEW: I962 - I963

Six months after Diem fell the U.S. would conclude that these advisory levels were inadeqiuate, but during the Diem area the predominant official attitude was one of sustained optimism. The war was being won^ it was m-aintained^ by adherence to the newly articula^ted theory of counterinsurgency. The U.S. even made tentative plans to begin reducing the American presence in Vietnsjn. By the time the U.S. began seriously to consider attempts to exercise leverage against the Ngo family's conduct of affairs Diem's regime was already well down the road to its eventual overthrow.

The Strategic Hamlet Program vras the principal operational vehicle by which the recently articulated theory of counterinsurgency was to be translated into reality. In general^ the plan was to begin by providing to the rural populace a degree of security sufficient to serve as a precondition for fm-ther military and political action. In the military field the peasants' increased secui'ity was to be the wedge by which more effective intelligence gathering could take place. Ihe rural population could not be expected to inform on VC v^hereaboutSj it vms reasoned, ujiless it was safe from retaliatory acts by the insurgents. Political action to promote identification between the central government and the rural popu-lation was also to take place in the shadow of these improved physical secujTity arrangements. Security was viewed, then, as the precondition to the military and political gains at which General Taylor's mission had ■ aimed its recomraendations.

The evolution and demise of the Strategic Hamlet Program is examined in another volume of the present series.* It is pertinent to the present study, however, to note the points of stress in this program as they pertained to RVKA.E. Most of the new American advisory effort was directed to improving ARVN, in its equipment and mobility capability and in its aggressiveness. The central U.S^ expectation v/as that a greater capability to move q.uickly could be combined with improved leadership so that ARVN could, on one hand, be capable of responding quickly and in force wherever and whenever the VC chose to concentrate for local superiority and, on the other, be m.ade aggressive enough to beat the Viet Cong at their own game ~ to "take the night away" from the VC and to use guerrilla techniq.ues to hunt down and defeat the insurgents in their own bailiwicks.

The realization of these expectations was dependent upon several developments, each of which had to occur if APVN was to become capable of turning the tide in the insurgent battle. .First, the CG and SDC had to become sufficiently effective to permit ARVN to be used as a mobile reserve for protective purposes rather than as part of the static protection force. Second, ARVi^ had to be given adequate capability to move quickly, whether in reacting or in seizing the initiative. Finally, both ARVN's leaders and the political leaders to v.liom they were responsible \ had to accept and put into operational practice a spirit of aggressiveness

to take advantage of the existing static defenses and the new.ly-gained m.obility.

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THE ACTUALITY: 1962 - I963

V'/hat happened during I962 - I963 is that only the second of these developments actually occurred to any significant degree* The U.S. provided helicopter companies for rapid tactical transport, small arms and automatic weapons for Increased firepower5 and tactical air and artillery support to assure ARVN firepower superiority over the insurgents. There were complaints -- as there have been ever since — that individual weapons were too heavy for the Vietnamese, that one helicopter company for each Corps area was too little, and that supporting air and artillery were an inducement to rely on- indiscriminate firepower as a substitute for aggressiveness. But the basic tools were provided.

The other developments did not take place. Training of the CG and SDC was speeded up at Secretary McNamara's insistence in order to get a more effective protective force quickly in being. Even by cutting the course of instruction in half it required the remainder of CY I962 to give a basic familiarization course to even the bu3-k of the CG- and SDC, GW v/as not eager to put weapons into SDC hands, fearing that the weapons might v/lnd up in the possession of the VC. 83/ In the event, both forces emerged as something much less effective than had been expected. The strategic hamlets which they were to protect proliferated in quantity in an ujicontrolled manner and varied widely in quality. It never reaJ-ly became possible for AEVN to free itself from static defensive duties.

Even if it had become possible for ARW, to be cut loose from static duties it is questionable that it could have risen to U.S. expectations. The period in question is one in \fhich the rigo family felt itself constrained constantly to play off the military against the provincial officials (who controlled the CG and SDC) in order to forestall attempts at a coup d'etat . Military leaders seem.ed inclined to rely increasingly on firepower as a substitute for aggressive maneuver. Rosy reports from the provinces made it unappealing to sustain casualties engaging an enemy who was said to have already been driven from the area. 8^ / The all-too-common result was that ARVN did not im.prove as the U.S. had expected it would. U.S. advisors became frustrated and embittered. Even rare opportunities for decisive engagement on the ground were allowed to pass or were mishandled. The deba.cle at Ap Bac-, in , I962, stands as a landmark of this

continued impotence.

The failure of ARVIT to develop as expected was, however, not officially recognized until much later. Even then the reasons for this failure were variously interpreted. In mid-1962, after the initial advisory build-up had been completed, the comrp.ander of the recentDy established U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (M^CV), General Paul D, Rarkins, estimated tha,t the U.S* task was simply one of training ARVH leaders on a one-time basis and that the VC cou]_d be eliminated as a disturbing force within a year after this had been accomplished, (This was a clear instance of .

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the "technical"tactica,l competence" expectation.) Secreta^ry McN9.m3.ra -" probably wishing also to form prudent contingency plans and to have the capability to exert pressiire on the Diem regime — directed tha.t the U.S. plan for a phased withdrawal of UoSc forces over a three year period. 85/ This decision and the subsec[iient plans for its implementa-tion^ chronicled in another volinne of this series5"^" indica^tes the extent to which optimistic expectations existed at some high official U.S., levels even v/hile (as we v/ere later to lea.rn) the situation in the countryside continued to deteriorate. This^ in turn;, helps to explain why the advisory build-up com.pleted in April I962 v/as not followed by any additional increases in advisors' for more than tv/o years.

The central problem in this regard was that the U.S. had neither a firm grasp on reliable indicators to determine how the war was progressing nor a V7i3.1ingness to accept claims th3.t it was not going well.. The second of these tendencies was attributable to the approach which finally emerged from the decisions following the Taylor mission: The U.S. would support Diem unstintingly and expect5 in return5 meaningful reforms and improvements v/ithin GVN. But it was caught in a dilemma when the expected reforms did not take place. To continue to support Diem v^ithout reforms meant q.uite simply that he, not v/e, would determine the course of the counterinsurgent effort and that the steps he took to assuz-e his continuajice in power would continue to take priority over all else. To deny him support in any of a variety of v.^ays would erode his power without a viable alternative in sight. The tendency may not have been precisely to "sink or svn.m with Ngo Dinh Diem/' as Homer Bigart phrased it, but it came very close to this.

The inability to know just how things were going presented an even more difficult problem. The tendency was to use forces retrained or newly equipped, strategic hamlets constructed, and trends in VC activity, as indicators of the progress of the w8.r. But training does not necessarily ec[ual effectiveness, the iixmbex of hamlets constructed does not tell one of the loyalty of their populations, and enemy attacks might be a misleading guide. Were GVN making progress in a contested area, for instance, Viet Cong rea.ctions might be expected to increase ra^ther than to diminish.in freq.uency a.nd intensity. Conversely, the insurgents would have no good reason to attack populated areas vrhich they had already succeeded in penetrating and over which they had established effective de facto control. 86 / Data and observations could be va^riously interpreted -- so variously, in fact, that President Kennedy was led to a.sk two observers just returned from Vietnam v/ho gave him divergent reports, "You two did visit the S8.me country, didn^t you?" 87/

-X- Volume IV.B.^4-., Evolution of the War: Phased Withdraw a l of U.S. Forces; >

1962-19611- (TS).

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TOE STAGE IS SET EOR "BETTER GVN RECEPTIVITY

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While the U.S. groped for a better way to determine how the counter-insurgent effort was going and debated how (or if) to exercise leverage against Diem, it was overtaken by events. The I963 Buddhist crisis in VN^ V7as met by increasingly repressive measures by the GVN. These developments finally led the U.S. to reassess its support for Diem and to consider other non-comjiiunist alternatives to his leadership. On 1 November I963 Diem v/as overthrown by a military coup d'etat > The pacification effort organized around the Strategic Haiialet Program died with him; the advisory effort was left untouched in terms of size and scope. To the extent that Diem and his family were the ones preventing ARVN from meeting the expectations of late I96I5 it was reasoned, now was the time for the military advisory system to begin to function m.ore effectively. To the extent that ARVN commanders in the field had been unresponsive to U,So advice because of indifference and opposition in the Gia Long Palace, it was hoped the difficulties of the p3.st might be rectified by the new military regime.

^- See Volume IV.B. in the present series, Evolu tion o f the Wa - The Overthrow of I^feo Dinh Diem, May-November I963 (TS).

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B> District Advisors and the Bee f-UEof

Battalion Advisory Teams Tl96V"19^I

The initial U.Se reaction to the Diem coup was thus one of modest optimism. Even given the U.S. disappointment at the death of the Ngo brothers the fact remained that the new regime in the Saigon saddle v^as expected to be more responsive to U.S. advice than the previous government had been. It v^as necessary that GVIv programs be redirected into more realistic channels^ that the efficiency of operations be increased^ that additional steps be taken to seal the infiltration routes through Laos, and that the U.S. reaffirm its coimaitment to GW in a credible way. The key to success«-the pacification process—had already been discovered; the task was one of skillfu-l, sustained execution.

Each of these points was addressed by National Security Action Memorandum 273^ approved 26 November I963. The immediate cause for NSAl-1 273 was the assassination of Bresident Kennedy four days earlxer;^ newly-installed President Johnson needed to reaffirm or modif-y the policy lines pujTsued by his predecessor. President Johnson q.uickly chose to reaffirm the Kennedy policies. Emphasis should be placed; the document stated; on the Mekong Delta area, but not only in military terms. Political, economic, social, educational, and informational activities must also be pushed: ''We should seek to turn the tide not only of battle

but of belief " 88/' Military operations should be initiated, under

close political control, up to within fifty kilometers inside of Laos. U.S. assistance programs should be maintained at levels at_ least eq.ual to those under the Diem government so that the new GVN would not be tempted to regard the U.S. as seeking to disengage. 89/

The same document also revalidated the plan_ned phased withdrawal of U.S. forces announced publicly in broad terms by President Kennedy shortly before his death:

The objective of the United States with respect to the withdrav/al of U.S. military personnel remains as stated in the vniite House statement of October 2, I963. 92/

No new programs were proposed or endorsed, no increases in the level or nature of U.S. assistance suggested or foreseen. The emphasis was^on persuading the new goveriiment in Saigon to do well those things which the fallen government was considered to have done poorly.

OPTI MISM TUENS TO ERUSTRATIQN

This attitude of cautious optimism changed gradually by the early summer of 196'l to one of deepening gloom. No radical shift marked this

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transition; it was one of a heightened at^/areness of instability in the central government in Saigon (the IC'.ani-i coup and maneuvering for advantage by the generals);, of a deteriorating situation in the country-sidej and of the discovery that things had been v^orse to begin with than the U.S. had suspected. I\[ot only did events indicate a Viet Cong ascendancy in the coujitryside; the U.S. vas not even able to determine with assurance just how things stood. The informational returns were inadequate from the existing advisory effort, ARVF had not become an effective fighting force, and the extent of U.S. influence was questionable.

^This deterioration of the couriterinsurgent effort (including the growing a\v^areness that earlier reports had been unrealistically rosy) vzas one factor v^ich was to lead to an expansion of the U.S. military advisory effort. A second, s.nd complementary, factor was the increasing conviction in official circles that the struggle in Vietnam was so ij.nportant that we could not afford to lose it. Although these two factors in jujxtaposition created a determination to take whatever steps were necessary to ensure a free non-conimunist South Vietnam, this commitment operated in the shadow of an equal determination to work tlxrough the GVN rather than around it and to avoid radical policy departm-'es dujring the Presidential elections.

A further buildup in U.S. advisors v/as not the major product of this determined commitment. Rather, there \7as in 196^- a growing conviction that only by consciously expanding the war --by "going North" in order to punish and dissuade the DRV from support of the insurgency -- could the deteriorating situation be arrested and reversed. Governmiental stability in South Vietnam and the reduction, if not the elimination, of pressures from the north came to be regarded as desiderata which would turn upon actions outside RVN rather than within it. The decisions to expand the U.S. advisory effort were overshadowed by plans to ca.rry the war to the DRV.^'

NSAJ-l 288

NSAM 273 had, as described above, limited cross-border operations to an area 50 kilometers within Laos. NSAI/I 288, published in March 196^, reaffirmed these mea.sures but went considerab.ly fujrther in authorizing contingency preparations to be employed in the event that border control operations proved inadequate:

To prepa.re immediately to be in a position on 72 hours' notice to initiate the fu.ll range of Laotian and Cambodian "Border Control actions" (beyond those authorized...above) and the "Retaliatory Actions" against North VietnaBi, and to be in a position on 30 days' notice to initiate the program of "Graduated Overt Military Eressaire" against North Vietnam. 91/

■5^ The sensitive files of the Secretary of Defense for the period under discussion consist in large part of .detailed plans to bring increasing military pressure against DRV under careful political coirbrol and under "scenarios" v/hich would ensure adequate domestic and foreign sup)port for these actions.

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This Initial official signal to prepare to expand the war was cast against a conviction that U.S» objectives in South Vietnam were critically important:

We seek an independent non-Cormnunist South Vietnam. We do not require that it serve as a Western base or as a member of a Western Alliance. South Vietnam must be free, however, to accept outside assistance as required to ma.intain its security. This assistance should be able to take the form not only of economic and social measures but also police and military help to root out and control insurgent elements.

Unless we can achieve this objective in South Vietnam, almost all of Southeast Asia will probably fall under Communist dominance (all of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia), accommodate to Communism so as to remove effective U.S. and anti-Communist influence (Burraa), or fall under the domination of forces not now explicitly Communist but likely then to becom_e so (Indonesia taking over Malaysia). Thailand might hold for a period with our help, but would be vmder grave pressujre. Even the Philippines would become shaky, and the threat to India to the west, Australia and New Zealand to the south, and Taiwan, Korea, and Japan to the north s.nd east would be greatly increased.

All of these consecLuences would probably have been true even if the U.S. had not since 195^^ and especially since I96I, become so heavily engaged in South Vietnam. However, that fact accentuates the impact of a Commujiist South Vietnam not only in Asia, but in the rest of the world, where the South Vietnam conflict is regarded as a test case of U.S. capacity to help a nation meet a Comjmmist "wa.r of liberation."

Thus, purely in terms of foreign policy, the stakes are high....

The situation has unq.uestlonably been growing worse, at least since September:

1. In terms of govermhent control of the countryside, about kO% of the territory is under Viet Cong control or predominant influence. In 22 of the ^3 provinces, the Viet Cong control 50/^ or more of the land area, including 80/, of Phuoc Tuy; 90/^ of Binh Du.ong; ^% of Hau Nghia; SOPjo of Long An; 90fa of Kien Tuong; 30% of Dinli Tuong; 90% of Kien Hoaj and 85^

of An Xuyen.

2. Large groups of the population are now showing signs of apathy and indifference, and there are some signs of frustration within the U.S. contingent:

a. Tile ARVN and paramilitary desertion rates,

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and particularly the latter;, are high and increasing.

b. Draft dodging is high while the Viet Cong are recruiting energetically and effectively.

c. The morale of the harnlet militia and of the Self Defense Corps^ in which the sec-urity of the hamlets depends^ is poor and falling.

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3- In the last 90 days the v^-eakening of the government's position has been particularly noticeable. For excfj-fiple:

a. In Quang Fam province^ in the I Corps^ the militia in I7 ham2.ets turned in their weapons.

b. In Binli Duong province (ill Corps) the hamlet military vzere disarmed because of suspected disloyalty.

c. In Binh Dinh province, in the II Corps^ 75 hamlets were severely dam3.ged by the Viet Cong (in contrast, during the twelve months ending June 3O; 1968;, a.tta.cks on strategic hamlets were few and none was overrun).

d. In Quang Ngai province^ at the northern edge of the II Corps, there were 14-13 strategic ha.mlets londer goverrmient control a yes^r ago. Of tha.t number5 335 ha.ve been damaged to varying degrees or fa.Uen into disrepair^ and only 275 remain under governjnent control.

e. Security throughout the IV Corps has deteriorated badly. The Vict Cong control virtually all

■ facets of peasant life in the southernmost provinces and the government troops there a.re reduced to defending the administrative centers. Except in An Giang province (dominated by the Hoa Hao religious sect) armed escort is req,uired for almost all move-laent in both the southern a/nd northern areas of the IV Corps.

h. 1!he political control structua?e extending from Saigon down into the hamlets disappeared following the J^Iovember coup. Of the kl incujnbent province chiefs on rj'ovember 1^ 35 have been repla.ced (nine provinces had three province chiefs in three months; one province had four). Scores of lesser officials vj-ere replaced. Almost all m.ajor military commands have changed hands twice since the November coup. The

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faith of the peasants has been shaken by the disruption in experienced leadership and the loss of physical security. In iiiany areas, power vacuums have developed causjng confusion 8.mong the people and a rising rate of rural disorders.

5* North Vietnamese support, always significant, has been increasing. 92/

The major new action under consideration to help achieve critically important UeS. objectives in the face of this gloomy recording of recent events was, as already noted, that of carrying the v/ar to North Vietnam. Secretary McNam.ara, whose memorandum to the B-esident v/as published en toto as NSAM 288, did not foresee the need at that time for a further major buildup of the advisory effort or for U^S. steps to take greater control of the v/ar. Again, the approach already selected was deemed adequate. Only qualitative improvement was needed:

A. The military tools and concepts of the GVN/uS effort

are generally sound and adequate Substantially more can be

done in the effective employment of military forces and in the economic and civic action area.s. These improvem.ents m.ay require some selective increases in the U.S. presence, but it does not appear likely that major equipment replacement and additions

m U.S. personnel are indicated under cuj:*rent policy,

B. The U.S. policy of reducing existing personnel where South Vietns.mese are in a position to assume the fimctions is still sound. Its application will not lead to any major reductions in the near fivture, but adherence to this policy as such has a sound effect in portraying to the U.S. and the world that we continue to regard the war as a conflict the South Vietnamese must win and take ultim.ate responsibility for. Substantial reductions in the numbers of U.S. military training personnel should be possible before the end of 1965, Hov/ever, the U.S. should continue to reiterate that it will provide all the assistance and advice required to do the job regardless of

how long it takes. 93/

Two actions v/hich were explicitly considered and rejected indicated that the^U.S. would still adhere to its oft-stated (and sometimes ignored) position that the South Vietnamese must win their own war through their own efforts:

Furnishing a U.S. Combat Unit to Secure the Saigon Area. XT, IS tne un.ivers5.1 judgment of ouj? senJ.or people in Saigon, with which we concur, that this action would now have serious adverse psychological consequences azid should not be undertaken.

•

UeS. Taking Over Comn-iand . It has been suggested that the U.S. move from its present advisory role to a role that would

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amount in practice to effective comraemd. Again^ the judgraent of all senior people in Saigon, with which \je concur, is that the possible milita.ry advantages of such action would be far out-weighed by its adverse psychological impact. It would cut across the V7hole basic picture of the Vietnamese winning their ovai war and la.y us wide open to hostile propaganda both ' within South Vietnam a.nd outside. Moreover, the present responsiveness of the GVN to our advice — although it has not yet reduced military reaction time — raa.kes it less urgent. At the same time, MA.CV is steadily taking actions to bring UoS. and GVIJ operating staffs closer together at all levels, including Joint operating rooms at key coiranand levels. 9V

Thus, it was stated national policy that the critically important struggle in South Vietnam must be won by the South Vietnamese, that the U.S. would do all within its power to help o.rrest and reverse a deteriorating situation, and that plans should be made to employ graduated overt military pressures against the supporters of the insurrection, the. DRV. This \ias the principal thrust of KSAM 288 even though a sizeable portion of the docijunent was devoted to programmatic steps which GVN and the U.S. should take in order better to mobilize South Vietnam's assets. Specifically, RVNAF needed to be increased in size by at least 50,000 men, reorganized, and provided with selected items of modern eq.uipment. 95/ These programs presaged more U.S. advisors because there would be more RVKAF units to advise, but there was no mention of more advisors for given* ujiits or advisors to perform nev7 fujictions.

INCREASING POLI TICAL INSTABILITY IN THE PROVINCES

The dark picture painted in NSAl'-I 288 in March had become even darker by May 196^4. Secretary McNamara visited Saigon on 12 and I3 May to inquire into progress in the "oilspot^' national pacification program. What he learned could scarcely be called encouraging. A follow-on conference was scheduled for 1 Jujie in Honolulu and the planning wheels began to turn — or, more accurately, the vzheels began to churn -- for there was barely two weeks' time in which to propose 8.nd coordinate U.S. actions acceptable to the GVN which might reverse the dov/nward spiral of events, and ^'going North" was not yet feasible in terms of domestic U.Sc politics.

Illustrative statistics (the same which Secretary McNamara saw) give the tone of events in South Vietnam. In an effort to determine exactly how many rural cominunities even existed — much less whose control they were under — the Department of Defense had earlier initiated an aerial photogre^phic survey of the rura^l areas of RVI\f* Even this expensive undertaking left great factual gaps. In Tay Ninh Province, for example, photointerpreters identified 39 fortified hamlets; U.S. reports from provincial officials claimed that there V7ere IO6. 96/ The discrepancy was not one to appeal to those who vzished to base policy determinations ■ on solid facts.

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Other facts v/ere more easily ascertainable. Since the Diem coup^ for instance, only 5 of WE's k2 provinces had not experienced a change in Province Chief. Change is, of coiirse, inescapable in the aftermath of a coup, but by 8 May I5 provinces were under their third chief since 1 ATovember I96U, 7 had their fourth, and 2 provinces were governed by the fifth officer since the Diern government fell. Instability in administration was accompanied by a marked GVR decline in nujiibers of population controlled and a comparable increase in VC population control. These trends were reflected in the official estimates (them.selves suspect of being overly optimistic) of control in the rural villages:

Comparison, Number of Rural Villages Controlled 97

RVN

VG

Contested

Sep 63 1682

709

139

Apr 6k

11^-85 866

187

Of the 1^- provinces considered critical in terms of location and population, all V7ere reported by their advisors to be in "critical" condition. The prospects in 10 of these were judged to be "poor." Four provinces were regarded to have "fair" prospects. 98/ It was apparent that the U.S. could not depend on eventual actions against DRV to save the day in South Vietnam. By the time such actions were politically feasible there might be nothing to save. It v/as time to take some further direct action within South Vietnam itself — and to take it quickly. Increasing U.S. advisors was an obvious and available action.

MCV'S GR/^DUAL]^I^£^A mOACH TO EXPANSION

As early as December I963, MACV had studied the desirability of extending the U.S. advisory effort to district level in I3 certain key districts, mostly around Saigon. No action was taken at that time but the proposal was revived in February and implemented during late March 196^. 9.9/ Each of the original I3 "key districts" was assigned one Captain and one noncommissioned officer. Of the original 26 persons selected for this pilot project, 21 were newly arrived in RVN. lOO/

This gradualistic, experimental approach to expanding the advisory effort typified the method preferred both by the military and civilian agencies in Vietnam -» although for somev^hat different reasons. .MACV was concerned with the experience and skill levels it could command ajnong necessarily lower ranks as it expanded deeper into ARVN and the political (staffed by ARVN) hierarchy, about increased support requirements, and about increased casualties. USOM claimed that its operatives could work effectively at the "spigot" end of tlie aid pipeline only where the local

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administration was energetic and effective and vrtiere some modicum of security had already been provided. 10l/ USOM had severe recruiting difficulties5 too. Secretary McNamara discovered on his 12-13 May visit to Saigon that it v^-as about 25 per cent understrength and that approximately half of this personnel shortage was concentrated in the expanding rural affairs staff. 102/

McMMRA^S WILLCTGKESS TO APPROVE EXPANSION

Thus5 the general attitude among the U.S. agencies in Saigon was to go slov^-ly, to avoid the danger, as it \ras frequently expressed^ of ^'strewing Americans all over the coimtryside." Secretary McNamara appa^rently had other thoughts after his May visit in Saigon. The available record does not reflect that he directed an expansion of the advisory effort "- but the Joint Staff was almost immediately hard at work examining which of several levels of increase would be most desirable. The available record leaves little doubt that the Secretary of Defense wanted it made clear that he V70uld approve any reasonable proposals for personn-el, materiel, or funds. Those sections of NSAM 288 which dealt with recommenda.tions for South Vietnam ha.d concentrated on programs which vT-ould assist GVN to mobilize its resources. By May it was clea.r that the hoped-for actions had not taken effect. The obvious conclusion — given the importance which the U.S. attached to success in South Vietnam -- was that additional steps must be taken to halt the deterioration in the countryside.

THE INITIAL PROPOSALS AWD RESPONSES

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The initial recorded exchange among the planners occurred when COMUSMACV was asked on 22 May I96U to provide an input to a JOS study then in progress on "...encadrement of South Vietnamese Civil Guard and Self Defense Corps with U.S. teams along lines of IVhite Star teaais in Laos, with objective of making these units as effective as possible in Vietna.mese pacification plan." IO3/ The message made it clear that the JCS was examining alternative levels of increased advisory effort (1,000, 2,000 and 3,000 personnel), not asking if the advisory effort should be increased. The compressed time frame 8.vail3.bl^ for prior coordination on a recommended course of action was also clear: C0I4USMCV v^as asked to provide his comments on the draft JCS proposal by the following day (23 May). "Regret circumstances do not permit more time," the message stated. lO^t-/

The reply from Saigon, processed through CINCPAC, adhered to the established MA.CV preference to ■uiiderta.ke new departures only in a selective, experimental way:

I do not think we should flood RVN with number of personnel you mention. Think better solution is to do /thls^/ on selective basis starting with critical districts and provinces and once we get feel of problem expand to remainder of RVN as experience dictates. IO5/

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Then^ in a significant ps^ssage^ the reply from the field asked in bl-uait language Just what the intended pui-pose was for the proposed expansion of the advisory effort. The "White Star Teams" used in Rios, the message noted, had the p'orpose and effect of establishing U.S. control over foreign forces:

The question arises as to whether you mean encadrement or increase of "advisory" effort. Do you want to take control or improve the perfoz-mance of CG and SDC by step-up within current policy? 106/

Although this direct question was never answered, the JCS'^initial proposal for encadrement was q.uietly dropjjed. The U.S. might wish to be in a position to control elements or all of EVMF but it woiad not consciously follow any scheme explicitly aimed at such control. Instead, the JCS coLintered with a plan for six Mobile Training Teajns in each province backed up by a Training Center Team and a small Provincial Training Detachment. This proposal would put an additional 70 U.S. training advisors in each selected province in an effort to improve the level of effectiveness of the paramilitary forces. Its reconmiendation was that the U.S. military advisory effort should be increased by 1000 personnel, enough to provide this new dim^ension of advice in the fourteen critical provinces which had experienced so m.uch recent instability- 107/

This JCS proposal for Mobile Training Teams for the EVMF paramilitary forces was tied to an explicit statement of how best to organize this effort without any mention of how much influ ence or leverage the U.S. would or cou^d exert through this expanded system. The problem was treated as one in the development of technical proficiency^ the issue of the extent of U.S. control was largely ignored—though surely not forgotten:

Conce pt of US Advisory Effort a. Genera.!

(1) An underlying principle in the oil-spot^concept is accordance of maxmum flexibility to province officials in solving individual province problems which vary widely from province to province. This study recognizes that principle and outlines a plan for assignment of additional US instructor and training resources to the province to provide the training and advice needed to improve the effectiveness of the provincial paramilitary forces.

(2) The shortage of trained personnel is acute in the paramilitary forces because of the nature of the forces ^themselves. They are recruited at province or district level to perform military tasks in those same regions. V?hile the CG and SDC are considered full-time troops, many of the individuals, in fact, must combine earning their livelihood with military duties. Movement of these people long distances away from their homes to training centers disrupts their lives, creates morale problems, and

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undoubtedly contributes greatly to the high desertion rates which have been experienced. It appears a.ppropriate;, there-Tore j to bring the trainers and training facilities to the areas where the pa.rarailitary forces live and operate.

(3) According to US standards5 the military training needs of the Vietnamese paramilitary are extremely modest. There is no requirement for elaborated technical schools or complex instructional courses. Instead^ the Vietnamese paramilitary re quire military schccling at the m-ost basic levels^ gjiljl. ■^jg pfr^-^^^s o^ basic infantr-y vzeapons and small unit t actics. S.V^'^Jl, ,J'-^s'fc^'"^-<^tion would be provided by the additional nutnbers of US military pe rsonnel ,

b. Organization for Adviscry Effort . The training deficiencies and problems of the paramilitary/' are as many and varied as the number of provinces and districts in which those forces operate. Needs in Quang Ngai^ for example5 may be extremely different from those in Dinh T-aong. Within the provinces^ each district also may have different training needs. The reasonable method of approaching this prcblemj then, appears to be establishment of highly flexible training detachjnents operating under supervision at province level^ which can provide local mobile training teams5 small training centers; and temporary encadre-ment for the smaller pa.ramilitary units when dictated by a specific situation. 108/

MACV POCUSES ON OPERATIONS RATHER Ysik'N TMIMNG

COI^JSMACV and CINCPAC were asked to comment within two days on this study which had been "...considered at the highest levels^ where initial reaction has been favorable." IO9/ Their replies, in which the thea^ter commander supported his nominal subordinate in Saigon, contested the value of U.S.-conducted tr aining for RVKA_E ps.ramilitary forces5 proposed that advisors be used at the district level to assist in operations^ accepted the l,000-man magnitude, but stretched out the target date I8 months — thereby proposing a gradualistic approach without ca.ndidly saying so. General Plarkins devoted most of his reply to the question of training teams:

A. A basic premise of the study is that training at the established centers is at the root of many morale and desertion problems. This premise is incorrect as rega.rds the Civil Guard (Regional Forces). It is in part true with respect to SDC (Popular Forces); but the underlying cause thereof ~ lack of per diem - is in the process of being removed by the new allowances that are a^bout to be pro::ulgated. This is not to say there

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are not formidable morale problems (one manifestation of which is desertion) within both categories of forces. These need to be and are being ta.ckled. However^ basic point is that they do not stem from the present system of training.

B.' Mobile training teams have been organized iinder special circrimstances when units have ha.d prior combat experience and/or as an expedient mea.sure only. Experience has proved tha.t units trained by such teams have subsequently req.uired formal training at an established training center where proper facilities are available. The Civil Guard and Self Defense Corps had many units trained by mobile training team_s in I962 in order to provide an iimnediate operational force. Almost all of these units have since been retrained in the complete miit poi /program of instruction/ because it was determined that the mobile team training was inade-q,uate. The mobile training teams consisted of U^S. personnel and Vietnamese interpreters.

C. "While the training requirements of paramilitary forces are relatively m.odest by U«S» standa^rds, an adeq.ua.te poi must be backed up by firing ranges^ training areas;> class rooms^ training aids and other facilities. These requirements are met by the regional and popula.r forces training centers. There are five regional force unit training centers; nine regional force/popular force leader

;^^. training centers; and thirty-seven popular force training centers.

They are properly distributed geographically; they are staffed with qualified Vietnam^ese instructors; and can be expanded^ with little difficulty to support programmed force increase. Some augmentation of the U.S. a^dvisory element at these severa.l centers is desirable5 on a selected basis-

D. The concept of U.S. personnel conducting training for the paramilitary forces on either a training center or MTT basis (and especially the latter) is not realistic-

(1) The Vietnamese have an adequate training ba.se with experienced instructors; the latter are doing a satisfactory job. For the U.S. to assujne the instructional effort5 vice the Vietnamese-, would generate serious morale problems and would probably be imacceptable.

(2) The interpreter support requirements would be prohibitive.

(3) Previous experience (sub-paragra.ph B above) of using U.S. a.dvisors as instructors was unsuccessful due to the inability to commujiicate.

2, As indicated above ^ the current method of training both the 1 ; regional 8.nd popula^r forces is a^dequate^ although we do have

under review the length and content of the training. Where the

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U.S. can iiiake its best contribution to the paramilitai-'y forces effectiveness is in the area of operations. Our formula^ discussed in 23 May telecon on this subject^ is to increase greatly the UcS. advisory effort at the district level. Therefore^ strongly urge that you support om? position that approximately 1000 advisors 5 in the general proportion of one officer to three nCO's be a.uthorized as district detachm.ents^ with the precise composition and deployment of said teams lefl: to the determination of COJ\lUSmcv. 110/

CINCPAC Informed the JCS that he agreed with COMaSMCV's arguiiients and quoted the telecon referred to above to explain the course of action pre ferred by the military commanders in the field:

1. Our coBiment is based on CG/SDC reorganization concept of 7 May v/hich includes elimination CG Bn PIq. in provinces and establishment 90 man sector Hq. in .lieu thereof with TAG CP capability;, and sub-sector Hq. I6 men at each 239 districts. This is expected to be accomplished in two to three months.

2. Recommend use of one team, composed of mature company grade officer and other specialist as you suggest (Wpns/Demo, Commo Med) per district.

3. I^oposal para 2 represents end req.uirement for 239 teams^ totaling 239 officers, 717 enlisted spec aggregate 956 personnel, by end calendar year 65.

h. MA.CV current plans call for 1 officer and 1 NCO at II6 districts by June 65. Req.ulsitlons have been submitted for 100 of these by end CY 6h. Tvm man detachments now assigned to I3 districts.

5- Assume GVW will agree to use US teams at district which represent reasonable security risk. At present time approx 40 of 239 districts are not sufficiently secur-e to enable use of US advisors. 111.

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WE JCS ALTERmTIVE PROGRAMS

The JCS, given the very few ds.ys remaining until Secretary McNamara was to meet in Honolulu with COMJSMACV and Ambassador Lodge, did not attempt to reconcile the time-phasing and eventual size of the proposed advisory effort at district level. Rather, it submitted to the Secretary, just prior to his departure for the conference, two separate raemoranda: One laid out a prospective program for district advisors throughout WN; the other outlined a pilot program at the district level. The purpose of both outline advisory efforts was the same — "improving the effectiveness of these paramilitary units in the Vietnamese pacification plan" — but the rate of advisor buildiip differed.

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In the proposed "pilot prograra," for instance, the concept envisaged

the phased establishjiient of teams in h9 districts of seven key provinces during a six-month period. This would require approximately 300 additional advisors. 112/ The broader program called for an additional 1,000 8.dvisory personneD., plmsed over a. period of I-I2 years, to cover all ^39 districts'by the end of CY I965. 223/ T^e more comprehensive program estimated that 63 districts (compared to ^1-9 districts in the "pilot prograan") would be m.ann.ed by the end of CY 196^. Both were represented as suitable bases for the Secretary's impending discussions^in Honolulu. Both were hu_rriedly drawn up alternative schemes for expanding the advisory effort to district level. Both, moreover, incorporated the^ argujnents of COMU'SmCV: concentration on operations rather than training and a time-phased buildup with due attention to existing security conditions and interpreter availability. The point was also m.ade that the total n™ber of additional personnel would necessarily include a support slice of approxima,tely 35^. llU/

One other question of expansion was addressed before the Secretary of Defense's conference in Honolulu in June. The JCS studied the possibility, also in late May, of extending the advisory effort to regular ARVN u_nits at the com^pany level. The JCS agreed with the COMQSMCV and CINCPAC reasoning that such an extension would be un.desirable because it would lead to greatly increased U„S. casualties, would be unsupportable ^ in terms of necessary language training (one year to I8 m.onths necessary

to provide 5OO "bilingual" advisors), and would meet resistance^from ARVN commanders faced with strange new relationships and potential loss of face. 115/

MACV'S PREIERRED APPROACH ACCEPTED

The prevailing military advice, then, when the Secretary met on 1 June with the principal U.S. m_anagers of the Vietnamese effort, was that it was desirable to expand the advisory effort to district level on a careful basis in order to promote better effectiveness in the paramilitary forces engaged in pacification activities, but that U.S. advisors should not be extended to company level In the regular forces. The available record does not make clear the exact positions and^argu-ments put forward at Honolulu. VJhat is clear is that it was decided, following basically the revised estimates proposed by COMUSMCV, to expand the advisory effort to district level at some rate (to be worked out later in detail) and to increase the size of battalion-level advisory groups by two noncommissioned officers in infantry battalions and cavalry ■.. troops and by one commissioned and two noncommissioned officers m artillery battalions. 116/ The acknowledged effect of the latter decision was to make company-level advisory tearas gA^-la^ble on an ad hoc basis without assignin g them on a permanent basis, llf/ It ^-s unclear how this scheme solved the previous reservations relative to language O* training, higher casualties, and Vietnamese sensibilities. A likely

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explanation Is that MACV was mader a nev/ coiiimander^ General Westmoreland^ •v^ho was more willing to expand the advisory effort and less inclined to cite^the potential disadvantages of a larger American presence. General Harkins had already returned to the United States to receive the DJ.stinguished Service Medal in a ceremony on 2.k Jiine and^ at the reauest of President Johnson, remained in the U.S^ until he retired. 118/

At any rate, it was a new COMUSMCV who cabled on 25 June his proposals for the buildup discussed at the beginning of the month in Honolulu. In sum, he asked for 900 additional advisors for battalions and districts, suggested a small increase at province level, and noted that "significant" nujiibers of personnelwoiild be needed for administrative and logistical support of the new advisors. He also suggested, in the emphasized pox^tion of the message q_uoted below, that many of the district advisory teams could complete their work and be moved to new areas for pacification within a year:

1. Augmentation of current UvS Advisory detachments at the battalion level 8.nd further extension of the advisory effort at the district level a.re necessary now to influence the successful planxiing and execution of the National Pacification Plan. These additions to the currezatly authorized advisory detachments have been discussed v/ith and agreed to by GVN, and will enable us to place advisors at the lowest level, as needed, in order to insure that all possible actions are properly coordinated,...Extension of US Advisory effort to the districts as an initial step toward intensifying the Pacification Program at the lowest level is essential. Tliis will insure supervision and coordination in the employment of para.m-ilitary forces and a general reinforcement of the pacification effort at district level. Initially, teams of two (2) officers and three (3) enlisted men (one (l) of vjhom will be a radio operator) be placed in the forty-five {k'}) districts of the eight (8) priority provinces. In ten of these districts, and in three (3) districts of two other provinces, a limited effort is novr being made by district team-s of one (l) officer a.nd one (1) enlisted man; these teams will be increased to fall strength district tea.m.s. In the provinces outside of the eight top priority provinces teams will be placed in another sixty-eight (68) districts. Starting 1 Jan 6^ it is envisaged that an additional fifty (50) teams can be placed, and that by 1 Jul 65 teams from the original districts can be placed into the remaining districts in SVN. This extension of US Advisory effort to the district level must be conducted on a phased basis V7ith actiial composition and employment as determ_lned by COMUSMACV. Tv70 (2) officers and three (3) enlisted men are considered as average team strengths for planning purposes

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^ • ggCAP ITTOATIQH OF REQUIR R r-CSmS

Capts/Lts e6 E5/U

123 Inf Bns (incl k Marine) 123 123

29 Arty Bns (incl 1 Mardne) 29 58

Ik MII3 Troops 5 Armd CA Sq.dns 1^ l4

^5 District Adv Teams (Priority province) 90 90 k^-

68 District Adv Teams (Other provinces) I36 I36 68

255 363 308 TOTA.L5 adjusted for 13 districts teaans now in place, 9OO (2^2 officers; 658 enlisted).

3. While this message deals only with the increased advisory effort at the battalion and district levels consideration is also being given to increases at sector level, also discussed at Plonolulu. Those recommendations which will be submitted separately will not approach the m.agnitude of the increases recommended in this message for battalion and district levels

•' 5- Administrative and logistical support personnel and eq.uip-ment req.uirements will be studied separately. From our earlier studies it is apparent that req.uirements will be significant.

6. An increase of approximately eighty (80) US Naval ^Advisors will also be recommended. Chief US Naval Advisory Group,'in coordination with CNO VNM, has identified areas in need of additional advisory effort. I concur in the need and will support recominendation to be submitted separately. II9/

UNRESOLVED ISSUES: SPEED AND DISCgETIO NA.RY AUTHORITY

The decision to increase the advisory effort in the magnitude and fashion just cited ha.d already been made in effect. It was necessary, however, for the Secretary or Deputy Secretary of Defense personally to approve every manpower space for MCV or MA.AG Vietnam — not because such decisions could not be delegated but because the Secretary chose to reserve them to himself. 120/ The q,uestions which rema^ined were, first, how much freedom to adjust numbers to situations (a discretionary 8.uthority COMUSMCV had consistently requested) would be permitted and, second, the rate at which the agreed expa.nsion would take pla.ce. There could have been other q.uestions, of course: should the district advisory effort spread in close geographic relation to the pacification plan or follow some other schem.e; should the advisors be conscious agents to increase U.S. leverage or essentially technical-tactical assista.nts to their counterpa.rts; how deeply involved should a^dvisors become in local political a.dmlnistration? There is no indication that these and other related q,uestions of the advisors* role were brought ^'up the tape" for examination. The principal issue was simpl;/ how q.uickly they should be brought' ( into South Vietnam and at what level discretionary authority would be

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The latter question was settled by default. MkCY^s proposed Joint Table of Distribution (JTD) of 15 May.196^5 replete with errors and omissions and antedating the decision to expand the advisory effort^ bec8.me the base line for authorizations to expand. Nobody in the game seemed CLuite able to keep the detailed numbers straight. OSD came quickly to focus on the total authorization for U.S. personnel in Vietnam and^ as the papers in the Secretary's files demonstrate;, found itself pencilling new numbers in even final draft copies which had \mdergone several checks and redrafts. IP.lf The product of th:l s concentration on minutiae at high Washington levels was almost complete freedom of em-fjloyment in the field. The Washington policymakers asked hov7 many men were 8,uthorized in various activities a.nd how many were assigned. There is no evidence thSvt^ once the decision was made to establish district advisory teams, these same policymakers probed into priorities of employment or the roles of these advisors.

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The rate of the build--up was a much more complicated matter 5 not because of the additional battalion advisors and the new district advisors bixt because the numbers represented solely by the e.dditional advisors quickly became a relatively sm_all percentage of the total U.S. build-up "« all of which was justified as contributing to the GVN pacification plan and a sizeable portion of which was specifically earmarked to provide administrative and logistical support to the newly arriving advisors. By mid-July COI^SmCV V7as recommending feOO personnel in addition to the 926 battalion and district advisors^ at least two more helicopter companies, one Caribou company^ and nujnerous major items of equipnent as part of the required build-up. 122/ The increased advisory effort was identified as the cause of this large increase:

The increa.ses envisaged.. .will provide for the extension and reinforcement of the advisory effort at the combat unit level andj concurrently, a major extension and reinforcement of the advisory effort at the district level in order to improve and ©.ccelerate pacification operations. That extension and augmentation of effort has an immediate impact upon the administrative and logistical support base. In a sense the addition of advisors in this quantity becomes the "straw that broke the ca.mel's back" to e.n already overburdened support base. I23/

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SECRETARIAL PRESSURE FOR A SPEED-UP

The Secretary of Defense and JOS met on 20 July to discuss these requirements. The JCS supported C0J\1USMACV. Secretary McNamara had no argument with the levels of men and equipm.ent requested; his question was why they could not be provided more quickly than indicated by the time-phasing in General Westm.oreland^s detailed breakdown. 124/ COIViUSMACV

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had asked for almost ^-200 personnel by 1 December 1964 and the ba.lance (comprising only Special Forces miits) of the ^772 total increase by 1 February I965. 12^/ Secretary McNamara asked the JCS to study the feasibility of accelerating the build-up so that it V70uld be comxjleted by 30 September- The JCS replied that the advisory personnel could be made available this q,uickly but that several support ujiits — particularly aviation units — could not reach South Vietnam by 30 September without causing extreme difficulties and the degradation of tests of the airmobile concept then in progress. 126/ The Secretary of Defense directed on 7 August that the accelerated deplo^/ment^ except for certain critical aviation items and jeeps^ be completed by the end of September-He farther directed that COI^QSR/VCV be queried as to his ability to absorb these personnel and units by that date. 127/

Genera.l Westmoreland's reply stated that he could not reasonably absorb this build-up in the time desired by Secretary McNam.ara. To do SO5 he saidj v/ould generate an unorderly situation with respect to support facilities and an undesirable h-ump in personn.el rotation. The proposed acceleration would not, moreover, satisfy the desired standards of advisor training or dovetail with the planned expansion of the advisory effort:

The required training/schooling of Bn/District advisors will be fX)xVaBx sacrificed ujider the proposed compression. A two week in-country orientation is being established to ha.ndle the Sep-Oct increments which will not receive COMJS schooling prior to arrival. Any further compression would create a requirement for in-country training which is beyond our capability.

Districts must be able to accept advisors based on their status of pacification. The present schedizling of district advisors is phased with the pacification plan and projected to coincide with its progress..

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In summary;, the compression of personnel e.nd units wouJLd overlo8.d our existing facilities and create administrative problems beyond our capacity to handle in an orderly manner. COMJSMCV has discussed v/ith Amb. Taylor who concurs. 128 /

MA.CV'S PREFERENCE UPHELD AGAIN

Faced with this reply from the individual responsible for me.naging the U.S. contribution to the advisory a.nd support effort. Secretary McNamara cancelled the accelerated deployment. The military services v/ere instructed to deploy personnel and ujiits to South Vietnam in accordance vrith General Westmoreland*s initial recoBMondation fox^'/arded to Washington. a month earlier, in mid-July. 129/

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The effect of this sequence of decisions stretching from mid-Ma.y to mid-August 196^4 was to increase the advisory effort by over 1000 personnel:

District Advisors: 553

Battalion Advisors: 350

Naval (and Marine) Advisory Group: 82

Air Force Advisory Group: 80

TOTAL 1065 130/

This expansion, and the rate at which it was to proceed^ was the product of what m3.y be termed '^tacit bargaining'' between Washington and Saigon, Washington typically assumed the initiative in proposing increases and in reconiQiending that they be accomplished as q.uickly as possible. The domina.nt concern was the fear that the countryside was being lost to the VC and that the impending U-S. moves to exert direct military pressure against DRV might come too late unless the pacification program coul.d be vitalized, U.S. officials in Saigon tended to prefer to expand gradually and to insure that adeq,ua.te support facilities were in place before additional advisors were deployed to the field. The product of desires driven ' ' by political awareness of impending failujre, on one hand, and desires

driven by ma.nagerial av/areness of operationa.l conditions, on the other, was an advisory increase almost precisely of the magnitude and rate preferred by the managers in the field.

EVENTS OVERTAKE IMP LEJVIEIMTATIQN OF THB_ EXPANSION

The really important points to be noted, however, do not concern the relative influence of General Westmoreland, Secretary McNamara, the JOS, or other participants in determining the size and rate of this buildup. Rather, the important points are, first, that the carefully studied decisions did not address some central issues and, second, that events a-cted ■ to overtake the decisions which were made. The policyma^kers did not really examine how district a.nd additional battalion advisors would improve the execution of the pacification plan: they simply assumed that a grea/ter U.S. presence would produce beneficial effects. The basis for opeDr'ationa.l (

advisors for the paramilitary forces was, q.uite simply, COMUSIvlACV^ s reasoned elabora.tion of the disutility of training advisors. There wa.s no comple-menta^ry assessment of the usefulness of opera^tional advisors. It v/as necessa.ry to do something in South Vietnam to try to reverse a clearly deteriorating position. The provision of more advisors came very close to being a. reflexive response to this situation.

^^^ The overall magnitude of the advisory i.ncrease bears directly on the

second ma^jor point, in which events in RVN overtook the new U*S. response, lliis is particularly true in the instance of the new dimension in the

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advisory effort;, the provision of advisory teams at the district (sub-sector) level. Thirteen teams of one officer and one noncoiiimissioned officer had been deployed in critical dJ.strlctS;^ it will be recalled, in March ISGh. The final August decisions to make 553 district advisors available in RVN by 1 Deceinber was designed to provide for a larger team (2 officers, 3 EM) for each of II3 of the total 239 districts. The MCV plan, then, was to provide U.S. military advisors only to about one-half of the total number of districts in RTO.

By the end of CY 196^ all II3 teams were actually deployed. Their total strength at that time was 532 as against the authorized total strength of 565/^ By January I965 the n-omber of district advisors assigned exceeded the mirnber authorized. These teams were deployed, it will be recalled, in the expectation that by some time in I965 a substantial number of them would have worked themselves out of a Job and be available for reassignment to new areas. This expectation was, to put it mildly, not validated by events.

In February I965, roughly a month after the limited expansion to district advisors had been completed, the IChanh government was replaced by the Quat regime. Over a year of U.S. effort to bring about political stability within the GVW seemed to have been fruitlessly wasted. The U.S. began the sustained bombing campaign against North Vietnam, ROIilNG THUPTDER, on 26 February. Shortly thereafter, two Marine Battalion Landing Teams (BLTs) were landed at Da Nang for air base security. These measures presaged a growing U.S. material commitment; the trend was heightened by ARVN's performance later in the spring of I965.

During May and June ARVN suffered a series of near catastrophic defeats that were Instrumental in deciding the Johnson Adialnistration to act on General Westmoreland's recorranendation for a greatly expanded U.S. ground combat role in the war. On 11 May, the Viet Cong attacked and overran Song Be, the capital of Phuoc Long Province, and a U.S. advisory compound in the city with more than a regiment of troops. Both the U.S. and Vietnamese took heavy casualties. Before the end of the m-onth, a VC force of undetermined size ambushed and decimated the ARVN 51st Regiment near the small outpost of Ba Gla a few kilometers west of Quang Ngal City in I Corps. The ARVN commiander in the area Immediately rushed reinforcements to the battle scene only to have them become victilms of a second ambush. The battle dragged on for several days, but ended in a total defeat for ARVN. Two battalions were completely decimated, but more importantly, the ARVN senior comm-anders on the scene had displayed tactical stupidity and cowardice. With a crisis of confidence in leadership clearly developing

-X- The discrepancy between the 553 additional authorization and the total district advisor authorization of"'565Ts"accounted for by the transfer of some of the spaces involved in the initial experimental program at district level. 565 is the correct tote^l — 113 teams of 5 i^^n each.

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within the arraed forces^ the very real possibility of a complete KR\m collapse could not be excluded. COMJSmCV suMiiarized the situation in his 7 June cable to CINCPAC:

ARVN forces..,are already experiencing difficulty in coping with this increased VC capability. Desertion rates are inordinately high. Battle losses have been higher than expected; in fact^ foui- ARVN battalions have been rendered ineffective by VC action in the I and II Corps zones. Therefore, effective fighting strength of many infantry and ranger battalions is unacceptably low. As a result, ARW troops are beginning to shov/ sigias of reluctance to assujne the offensive a.nd in some cases their steadfastness iinder fire is combing into doubt. I3V

If a.nything, Westrnorel6.nd's assessment may have been too generous. The next week the Viet Cong launched an attack on the new Special Forces camp and adjoining district headquarters at Dong Zoai on the northwest corner of War Zone D. ARVN forces were committed piecemeal to the engagement and successively chewed up by more than two regiments of enemy troops. The battle lasted for five days and marked some of the bitterest fighting of the war to that date. The VC sunmier offensive continued unabated through June and July. On 25 June, the long expected offensive in the central highlands began v/hen a district headquarters at Tou Morong in Kontiom Province v/as overrixn, reportedly by an NVA regiment reinforced with local guerrillas. Other remote district capitals came under attack in the following weeks and by 7 July a total of six had been abandoned or overrun.

Casualties soared on both sides; ARVN alone sustained 1,672 in the second week of June. But the important factor was the dangerous degradation of ARVN unit integrity. By the end of May, the heavy fighting had rendered two ARVN regiments and three battalions combat ineffective by MACV ratings. By 26 June, MACV was forced to rate-5 ARVN regiments and 9 separate battalions ineffective. I32 / Losses were so high that in July, 11 of 15 ARVN training battalions had to be temporarily disorganized to provide fillers for the line units. 133/ It was this major degradation of unit effectiveness that evoked the alarm and sense of crisis in Saigon and Washington and constituted the seemingly incontestable arguments in favor of substantial American forces. ARVN units were defeated in most causes by their own tactical ineptness, cowardice, and lack of leadership rather than by overall weight of numbers or inferiority of firepower. The U.S. advisory effort had sought to strengthen precisely these military intangibles, in addition to eqLuipping, training and generally supporting ARVN troops. These skills and qualities are, of course, difficult to teach or impart, but a successful advisory effort must at some point produce a force ca.pable of engaging the enemy and defeating him when the ratios of strength and firepower are roughly equal.

Far from finding many of its advisory teams finishing their task and moving on to new areas or to new units, the U.S. found itself in

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mid-1965 beginning the coiimiitment of major ground forces to South Vietnam. The deployment of these forces m.arked the end of a m^ajor phase in '^advisory warfare." From this time forv^ard the role of U.Sc military and political-military advisors would be determined and practiced in a radically changed environment.

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Cj_. U.S. Combat Forces and the Possibility of Hew Relationships (I96FJ

THE ABORTIVE LIMITED E XPANSION OF ARVN

During the spring of I965 General Westmoreland's staff prepared a full-blovm "Commander's Estimate of the Situation." The estimate, delivered to Washington at the beginning of April, examined three courses of action for dealing with the crisis in South Vietnam, Among these was an accelerated WNKF build-up.

Even by accelerating the rate of ARVN expansion^, C»IUSMACV concluded, the ratio of ARVN to VC battalions would decline by the end of 1965 from 1.7;1 to 1.6:1. General Westmoreland rejected this alternative on the grounds that it could not prevent a VC victory. It would take too long to accomplish the build-up and there was little assurance that ARVN performance would match that of a constantly improving enemy. (His lack of confidence in ARVN is further reflected in his argument for U.S. forces, in v^hich he estimated that one U.S. Army battalion is the fighting equivalent of two ARVN battalions and one Marine BLT the equivalent of three ARVN battalions.) I3V

These reservations notwithstanding, Westmoreland had requested authorization on 20 March to implement the Alternative 2 RVNAF strength increases proposed by him the previous November. After the April 1-2 conference in Washington and a review of the "Commander's Estimate," the JCS recommended approval o.nd Secretary McNamara agreed on 12 April to expand RVMF by an additional 2.'J,2k7 spaces. An additional I60 U.S. advisors were approved at the same time. I35/ In late May, the JCS asked the Secretary of Defense to authorize MAP sirpport for another 2,369 ARVN spaces to fatten out division bases for the eventual creation of a tenth ARVN division out of existing separate regiments. I36/ This request was approved on h June. 137/

Thus, while it was decided not to continue to depend exclusively on la.rger Vietnamese forces with U.S. air and naval support, the plan was to conduct a modest expansion of ARVN in conjunction with the deployriient of U.S. forces. In the event, even the modest plans went down the drain in the aftermath of the heavy casualties sustained in combat during late May and early June. On 7 June, General Wesfanoreland informed CINCPAC and the JCS that a moratorium on RVNAF build-up was unavoid8,ble because trainees in the pipeline would have to be used as fillers for existing units. 138/

The U.S. build-up continued during the spring and early sunFner, particularly as a resiilt of ARVN reverses in combat. By the end of July there were I8 US/fw combat maneuver battalions deployed in South Vietnam. In the same message in which he advised of the halt in ARVN

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expansion^ General Westmoreland had requested a significant increase in the number of U.S. troops for Vietnam (the famed "J-t^!-Battalion request). After more than a month of deliberation, the President finally approved the request sometime in mid-July» His historic announcement of the expanded U.S. effort came on 28 July. Understandably, this momentous expansion of the U.S. involvement in the war completely overshadowed the advisory program and the growth of RVNAF during the remainder of I965.

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But the deployment of U.S. forces to South Vietnam did, however, open up a new range of possible relationships which would not have been possible without the presence of substantial U.S. combat forces. Each of these relationships might conceiva^bly promote one or all of the several piorposes which this study has reasoned to be behind the U.S. military advisory effort: the developm_ent of improved tactical and technical competence in RVMF, the generation of better intelligence (both friendly and enemy), and increased U.S. influence.

Tvjo categories of new relationships were considered: the encadre-ment of U.S. and ARVN units (in several forms) and the establislmient of a joint coimncand to conduct the war. Both of these coui-ses were rejected by COMUSMA.CV, In their place General Westmoreland attempted to create a Joint US-RVMF staff to coordinate independent national efforts. The basic arrangement enabling tactical independence—within limits--was the creation of mutually exclusive Tactical Areas of Responsibility (TAORsJ for each combat maneuver force.

ENCADREMEIW CONSIDERED AM) R EJECTED

Deficiencies in ARVN leadership had long been recognized by U.S. military advisors as one of the key impediments to increased ARVN performance. In April, when the first major imput of U.S. combat troops took place, consideration was given to the encadrem.ent of U.S. officers in ARVN units as a way of solving this problem. The proposal was touched off by a DoD request on I5 April for COMUSMCV^s opinion about the feasibility of using U.S. cadres to improve effectiveness in the ten ARVN divisions. 139/ The same day, McGeorge Bundy sent^a personal^^NODIS message to Ambassador Taylor stating among other things, that The President has repeatedly emphasized his personal desire for a strong experiement in the encadrement of U.S. troops with the Vietnamese. lj£/ Genera,l Westmoreland turned the issue over to his deputy. General Throckmorton, for a recommendation. Throckmorton's study considered

-X- See Task Force Paper IV.C.6., Phase One in the Bui Id-U;^ of U.S. Forces The Debate, March-July I965.

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three alternative encadrement possibilities: (l) assujnption of officer and senior NCO command positions by U.S. persomiel within the designated ARVN battalions; (2) assignment of U.S. personnel as staff officers^ and in technical and specialist positions within the battalions; and (3) the emplo-yment of U.S. troops as fire support elements within ARVN-commanded battalions. Two critical difficulties applicelile to all of these schemes were identified: the language barrier and the expanded support requirement that would be generated for U.S. personnel. Another negative factor was the expected adverse effect of any such step on South Vietnamese morale. These formed the basis for General Throclanorton's reconimendation that encadrement be rejected. COMUSMCV endorsed his deputy*s recommendation and the general encadrement idea was officially pronounced dead during the I8 April Honolulu Conference, l^l / Only three days had elapsed, from the birth of the proposal to its burial.

MARiro; C0]-4B1]\^D ACTION PLATQOHS (CAPs)

But while general encadrement v/as effectively killed by COmSmCV a specific, limited experiment in encadrement v/as beguJi later in the year almost off^-handedly by the U.S. Marines near Phu Bai- Since the Marine \inits had been assigned TAORs larger than they could secure, innovative conmianders sought ways to maximize local security resources. In June, a company commander of the 3d Battalion, Uth Marines near Phu Bai assigned a few Marines to the villages in his tactical area to work with the Popular Forces platoons. Marine leadership, training, and access to powerful fire support brought measurable improvement in the PE units. As a result the Commanding General, 1st ARVN Division, placed six PF platoons under the operational control of the Marine battalion.

By November, the effort had achieved such results that it v?-as brought to the attention of the CG III M/IF. Later that month an agreement was reached between the I Corps Commander and the CG III MAE permitting the integration of Marine squads into PF platoons in the DaNang area to improve their effectiveness and stiffen their combat performance. The ba.sic unit of the new venture was the Com.bined Action Platoon (CAP) form.ed by adding a Marine Rifle Squad of 1^- m.en plus a Navy corpsm_an to a PF platoon (32-38 authorized strength). The PE platoon retained its own organization and the integrated Ma.rines advised the entire unit, living with it, sharing its food, conducting combined patrols, and training counterparts. At the end of I965, there were seven such Combined Action Platoons, but the success of the experiment in enha.ncing PE performance and extending security prompted a rapid expansion during the next year. The Marines have continued to press for expansion of this program and to see in it an effective methodby which to produce increa,sed perform.a.nce in PE units. Critics have noted that the Marine advisors quickly become de facto leaders of the CAPs and argued that a higher level of current performance is purchased at the cost of stultifying the development of South Vietnamese leadership. No general consensixs has developed on the relative merits of this assumed trade-off.

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JOINT COMMA.ND COlVTSIDERED AED INJECTED

The 1965 conmitment of U.S. forces also prompted a high level U.S. debate on the advisability of creating some form of unified combined command. The question was first raised in Washington in mid-March when General H. K- Johnson^ Army Chief of Staffs returned from a visit to Vietnam with the recoiimiendation for deployinent of U.S. combat forces. Ik2/ The idea had the same conceptual origins as the encadrement proposals j nam.ely that if RVMAF could be commanded by or associated with U.S. troops it might be molded at last into an effective fighting force. In addition, such a unified allied cormnand would have given the senior commander-'-presumably COI-IUSMACV far greater freedom to deploy forces and fight the war in the straightforward pu:rsuit of unambigu.ous objectives, rather than restricting him to coordination with Vietnamese counterpa^rts whose motivations at all times were a composite of political and personal as well as military considerations.

When queried on the matter, General Westmoreland ^opposed any formal merging of comms^nds, preferring instead the maintenance of informal cooperation and coordination together with a limited combined staff under an American chief with a Vietnamese deputy. This arrangement would better assuage the GVN's sensitivities to questions of sovereignty and "neo-colonialism." Full integration of comma,nd. General Westmoreland advised, should be deferred until some later time V7hen the influx of U.S. forces might require it and GVN sensibilities might be more disposed to its acceptance, iks/ In May, Secretary McNamara authorized the creation of a formal combined authority in Vietnam. iM/ ^^"^ since both Ky and Thieu had just publicly condemned any joint coimnand idea in press interviews, both Ambassador Taylor and General Westmoreland recomjnended against the proposed action, ik^/ CINCPAC backed up CO^^SMACV's concern about alienating the South Vietnamese:

Refs A and B /Saigon m.essage 3855. 2^ May; and COMUSMACV message 17292, 2U0603Z May/ again point out the formidable disadvantages which obstruct early establishment of any formal combined coiiMand authority in South Vietnam. I am fully in accord with the views of the Ambassador a,nd General Westmoreland in this regard.

The long-range nature of the actions directed by Ref C /JCS msg 3159> IU2228Z May/ is recognized. At the sam.e^time it is apparent that we should anticipate continued public speculation as to the purpose and motive of any consolidation of multi-national forces into a single command if we pursue even the most limited measures. Although a combined coimnand might generate an outward illusion of imity, many divisive influences will remain at work beneath the surface to exacerbate claims of American neo-colonialism and self-assujned leadership.

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Conventional operations of Corps-level magnitude, In contra.st to counterinsurgency opere^tlons, would of course reauire closer coordination and possibly some form of international command mechanism. Until a combined corrmiand is clearly in our best interests we should continue to stimulate RVN resolve to fight a counterinsurgency v^s^r which is and must remain their primary responsibility. B:em_ature experimentation with ne\j comjnand arrangements would be counterproductive should it weaken national ujiity within the RVFAF or promote a feeling of apathy in the countryside. ikG/

^A,^S;,...glSgOR ^VlSQRS, AND A CO^IBIMID STAFF ■ . '

These exchanges effectively ended the question of miified command. In the absence of unity of comjiiand. General Westmoreland had already accepted^the concept of the Tactical Area of Responsibility (TAOR), an expedient coordinating mechanism originally worked out between the local ARVN commanders and the Marines defending the DaNang perimeter. The concept was a practical one for a war in which there are no front lines and in which military units operate throughout the country. Specific geographic areas were assigned to specific units v/ho then had exclusive authority and responsibility to operate within them. Military^units could not enter or fire into another unit's TAOR without the perm-ission of its commander. Subsequently, the concept would raise some problem.s as the requirement for rapid redeploy^nent and the extensive use of air mobility made such formal, fixed arrangements awkward. But in 1965 the TAOR provided a simple and effective solution to the coordination problem raised by units under different commands operating throughout the country. Its adoption may be viewed as an attem_pt to provide limited, territorial unity of command in the absence of an overall, national unifying mechanism.

General Westmoreland attempted to compensate for this absence of unity (which he had endorsed for non-military reasons) by the creation of a combined coordinating staff at the national level and by making the senior U.S. military comm.anders also the senior military advisor within their respective areas of concern. In April he decided to raise with the GVN the question of a combined M/ICV-JGS staff. (He had already extended the tour in RM of the general officer he had chosen to head this staff.) Such a staff might have permitted the development of agreed operational plans based upon agreed priorities. It would have been a possible intermediate step toward unity of effort. But the GVN (represented by Generals Thieu and "Little" Minh) resisted any. suggestion for an integrating mechanism of this kind. The proposal was quietly dropped. 14?/

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On the U.S. side^ vAere his suggestions had the force of orders^ General Westmoreland took one step to integrate the U.S. combat and advisory functions. The Conmianding Generals-Ill Marine Amphibious Force^ the senior U.S. officer in the area, was designated on 7 August as the Senior Advisor to the ARVF I CTZ Comraander. The former U.S. Senior Advisor became the Deputy Senior Advisor mider CG, III MAF^ although no further integration of the advisory structure into the U.S. chain of command was attempted. This pattern was soon extended to the other two Corps areas vAere major U.S. units were operating. Tlie latter changes were made at the insistence of the ARVW Corps Commanders who felt that they would suffer a loss of prestige if they were "advised" by anyone other than the senior U.S. officer in the zone. Thus, on 21 October, the commander of Ka? Field Force, Vietnam (FFORCEV), with operational control of all U.S. units in II Corps, was also named II Corps Senior Advisor. On 1 Pecember, CG, 1st Infantry Division was named III Corps Senior Advisor, following the pattern already established. No such arrangement was made, however, in IV Corps since the U.S. had no major units deployed there. 1^-8/ La.ter, when U.S. force deployments had led to the establishment of another FFORCEV headquarters, each ARVN Corps Comjnander was advised by a U.S. Lieutenant General with equivalent U.S. responsibilities and a U.S. general officer was appointed Senior Advisor in the Delta area, which had no U.S. combat maneuver units.

LEVERAGE: TPIE HIDDEN ISSUE

It is relevant to ask vrhy COMUSMACV (backed up without exception by the Ambassador and CINCPAC) uniformly opposed integrative measures designed to provide that which vras and is almost an article of faith in the military profession--unity of coimnand. U.S. troops in both World Wars and in Korea had fought under at least nominal command unity. There had been reservations for national integrity, to be sure, but the principle of unified conmiand was both established and generally accepted. Why then did the U.S. military commander in Vietnam recommend against its adoption?

The answer to this question is not to be found by an examination of military factors. The issue, rather, was a political one, as CINCPAC's message quoted above makes clear. The U.S. military leaders feared the exacerbations of US-SVN differences vrhich they thought would accom.pany an overt Americanization of the war. They wished to increase U.S. influence in the conduct of the war but only as a result of persuasion and example. They tended to eschev/ the use of leverage. A imified command arrangement would have provided--"assuming that a U.S. officer would have been the over3.11 comim3.nder""an open and obvious means by v/hich to exercise leverage. The U.S. leaders in Saigon rejected its adoption for this reason.

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WITHDR./l>Hl^JQ p^o^ QYmT IMPLUENCE

The rejection of a -unified military comimnd is only one example of the tendency in I965 to renounce leverage oriented mechanisms at the very time that the U.S. v/as committing major land forces to the v^ar. It was as though the U.S. increased its determination to avoid arrangements vzhich smacked of direct^ open leverage at the sam.e time that the inadequacy of ea^rlier, indirect measures was made obvious by the deploy:nent to South Vietnam of U.S. ground combat forces.

This may5 in fact^ be what happened. Some sporadic earlier attem-pts at leverage had not borne the desired fruit. Ambassador Taylor had had a disastrous experience in trying to use the U.S. decision to commence bombing North Vietnam as a lever to get GVI\f reform in December 1964. The net outcome v/as a violent reaction by General Khanhj v/ho very nearly had Taylor thrown out of the country as personna non grata , In the end, it v/as Klianh who went^ but the political turmoil that this produced in the first months of I965, when the course of the v/ar v/as taking a dramatic turn against the GVN, convinced Taylor that such attempts should not be made again at the national level/^^

Concurrently, one of the most direct U.S. tools for influencing policy implementation at lower levels, the Joint sign-off for release of piaster funds for pacification, was also being abandoned. The decision was m^ade in Decem.ber lS)6k by the USOM Director, Mr. Killen. Early in 1965;. AID stopped buying piasters for the U.S.-controlled sector funds and, in June, agreement was reached with the GVN for province chiefs to begin requisitioning and releasing AID commodities on their own authority. 1^9/ Thus, the "troika sign-off" came to an end. "While elaborate arrangements were made for getting reports of U.S„ advisor concurrence or non-concurrence, the practical effect was to remove the advisor's leverage and restrict his influence. In October, USOM began to have second thoughts on the wisdom of abandoning control of its resources In the field and proposed a restoration of the "troika sign-off." The Mission Council endorsed the plan and had already launched discussions with the GVN when the State Department objected to the idea, insisting that it would undermine our efforts to make the Vietnamese more Independent and effective. I50/ There the matter died.

In a somewhat related effort to overcome the delays in the Vietnamese pacification system, MACV acceded to its advisors* recoimnendations and, on 1 October, created a separate contingency fund of 50,000 piasters for each subsector (district) advisor to be used for urgent projects. Sector advisors were also given access to special funds. The program was highly successfu-1 and toward the end of the year consideration \ms given to permianent establishment of such revolving funds. I51/ The plan was

^ See Task Force Paper IV.C, Evolution of the War: US/gVN Relations , 1963-67 . Part I, pp. 5I1-.59.

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abandoned^ hov/ever^ after the four-month trial period due to the strong opposition of the GVN Minister for ED^ Genera.l Thang, who contended that such funds were un.dermining the legitimate efforts of his organization to meet urgent province needs; it would encoura.ge Vietnamese dependence on the. U.S. I52/

But USOM did use successfully a form of direct-, selective leverage in the late summer of I965. The Province Chief of Binh Tuy Province, Lt Colonel Chi;, v/as accused of m.isusing som.e $250,000 in AID funds. When USOM pressure on the GVN for his removal produced no results, aid to the province vzas suspended on 23 September, ^^nd USOM field personnel were withdrawn. In spj.te of Chi*s friendship with the Defense Minister and Deputy Premier, General Co, Premier Ky removed him six weeks later. Aid to the province then resumed, but Ambassador Lodge made it clear to the Mission Council that he disapproved of the action and did not W8.nt it repeated (particularly the press coverage). 1^3/

As already indicated, both Ambassadors Taylor (after his near-disastrous experience in December 196^) and Lodge preferred not to force the GVN or attempt to use high-level pressure to reach solutions we felt necessary. The fragility of the political arrangements in Saigon at any point in time seemed to dictate against any U.S. action that might precipitate coups or disi'uption from elements even less disposed to be cooperative than the cu:rrent group, whoever they m.ight be. In this view, the successive Ambassadors were strongly supported by the State Department. Thus, while we resented the Ky coup in June, we did nothing to exacerbate our delicate relations with Ky. In July, during Secretary McNamara's visit, the GVN req.uested a devaluation of the piaster and a hefty increase in aid. l^k/ Rather than use the request as an opjjor-timity to press the GVN for action on m^atters of U.S. concern. Ambassador Taylor preferred to restrict our counter-demands in the interest of quick 8.greement:

We would avoid giving the impression of asking for new agreements or imposing conditions for our increase AID...-We do not want to rs.ise conditions in terms likely to be rejected or to req[uire prolonged deba.te. 155/

Consequently, agreement v^as reached between the two governments on 28 July, providing only for "Joint discussions to precede policy decisions...for control of inflation," and scarcely mentioning GVN obligations.- I56/

McNAJ-IARA'S MNORITY POSITION ON LEVERAGE

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The only consistent supporter of increasing and exercising U.S. leverage vrlth the GVN during I965 "was Secretary McNamara. As previously noted, he was one of the principal proponents of the joint command idea and a supporter of the encadrement proposals. In April, the Defense

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Department had J^aunched an ill-fated effort to have U.S. Army civil affairs officers introduced in the provinces to assujre competent^ corruption-free civil administration in the combat zones. 1^?/ Ambassador Taylor's stout opposition had killed the proposal^ but the Secretary continued to push for stronger U.S. action with the GVN. After his Ju.ly visit to Saigon he sent a memorandum to the President urging the U.S. to lay down terms for its continuing assistance before the introduction of more U.S. forces. He suggested that we exercise leverage through our control of rice policy and gain a 'Veto on major GVN commanders^ statements about invading wm^ and so on/' 1^8 /

Again in Novem:ber5 McNamara recorded hj.s impatience with the GVW and his belief that we should give a larger and more active role to our advisors at the province and district level. 159/ But the overall U.S. approach to the GVN in I965 was dominated by oixr felt need for any kind of governmental stability which would provide a base from which to conduct the war. Proposals for taking a tough line were widely regarded as rugs that if pulled out from u-nder the GVN would bring it crashing down, rather than as levers that might bring effective change.

U.S. PROP OSALS FOR GVN EXECUTION: AN EXAJVCPLE

With leverage-oriented arrangements effectively ruled out, U.S. advisors in South Vietnam were left with the alternatives of advising their coixnterparts only on hov/ best to coziduct a decided course or of expanding their advice to embrace what ought to be undertaken. The tendency was to follow the latter course, to urge upon GVN plans and programs American in concept and design for execution by the South Vietnamese. The Chieu Hoi ("Open Arms" for VC who return volujitarily to GVN control) program was one example of this tendency. The Hop Tac ("cooperation," in Vietnamese) program., to clear and hold the immedia.te area around Saigon, is another. Hop Tac's significance with respect to U.S. advisory activities resides in the fact that it was the most concerted attempt to apply the "oil blot" concept to rural pacification since the demise of the Strategic Hairilet Program. Its failiire can be attributed in large measure to GVN lack of interest in and support for what was widely regarded as an "American" program.

The idea of a special combined US/gVN effort to secure the critical area ringing Saigon v/as first advanced by Ambassador Lodge in July 196^1, at the Honolulu Conference. His concern with the problem went back to late 1963 when the re-appraisals of the war following Uiem's overthrovr revealed b. dangerous deterioration in the III Corps area. A special USOM report on Long An Province ha^d particull.arly troubled the Ambassa.dor. In July 1964, as he V7as returning from, his first tour in Vietnam, he proposed a special effort in eight provinces (Tay Ninh, Binh I^aong, Hau Nghia, Long An, Dinh Tuong, Go Cong, Vinh Long, and Quang Ngia), all but one of which was near Saigon. The proposal was picked up by Ambassador Taylor and the program, set in motion during the summer of 196^1. The

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initial objective was to stabilize the situation around Saigon and protect the capital^ then extend the zone of security in an ever V7idening ring around the city. MCV appointed Colonel Jasper J. Wilson to head the effort and by September 196^!- a plan had been produced and the Vietnamese reluctantly induced to set up a special council to coordinate the multiple commands operating in the area. The plan created four roughly concentric zones arom:td the capital, each to be successively cleared and secu-red;> working from the "inside of the doughnut out." Conceptue^lly, three phases were involved in each zone: first, search and destroy missions to eliminate main force units; then a clearing phase using primarily sq.uad and platoon size forces in patrols and ambushes; and finally, the securing phase in which ARVN turned over responsibilities for seciu?lty in a zone to Kf/pf and national police and in which heavy emphasis was to be laid on positive rural economic and social development efforts.

Hop Tac was launched on 12 Septem.ber 196^, with a sweep through Gia Dinh Province to the west and southwest of Saigon by the ARVN 5lst Eegiment. The mission was aborted the following day, however, by with-draw3.1 of the forces to participate in a coup. Nevertheless, organizational efforts continued and more ARVN forces were concentrated in the Kop Tac area. A special survey of the area by USOM, USIS, and MACV in October revealed that little real progress was being made. In spite of the lack of any visible evidence of genuine mom.entumi, the Ambassador and MACV continued to be encoua^aged by the modest statistical progress of Hop Tac at a time when nearly every other activity in the country looked blacker and blacker. The 196^ I4A.CV Command History reflects the official view: "At the end of 196Ii-, Hop Tac was one of the few pacification areas that showed some success and greater promise." I60/

Whether in response to Hop Tac or not, the VC substantially increased their forces in the Hop Tac area in the first six months of 1965. MA.CV estijnated the growth at 65 percent and also noted that the new troops were freq.uently equipped with Chinese weapons. This growth j.n enemy strength in turn prompted some redeployment of RVNAF to strengthen capabilities in the Capital Military Region. In February, 1965^ Just at the time the U.S. was initiating the sustained bom.bing of North Vietnam and beginning the first Marine combat deployments in the South, CO^iU■SMACV asked the I and IV Corps senior advisors to review current programs and to develop Hop Tac-like plans for their respective 8.reas as a basis for discussion with their counterparts. General Westmoreland hoped to concentrate the a^vailable resources of each Corps into its most critical areas at a time when VC activity and successes were continually mounting and enemy control of the country increasing dangerously. Again, the operative concept vms to be the oil blot. By April General Westmoreland ha.d convinced Minister of the Armed Forces Minh to ask each of the ARVN Corps Commanders (except III Corps, in whose area Plop Tac was being conducted) to drav/ up smilar plans for their own a.reas of responsibility.

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The U.S. effort was clearly aimed at sp'orring the practical application of the "oil blot" analogy. The effects, however, were to demonstrate hov? difficult it v^as to translate simple counterinsurgent theory into practice, how convoluted and personal were the ARVN lines of influence, and how frustra,ting it was under these circumstances to exercise influence by persuasion.

In May, the Prime Minister proposed organizational changes in Hop Tac to retirt'n much of it to the operational control of the III Corps commander. These changes were rejected by COMUSMACV, but he did agree that the III Corps commander might be named chairman of the Plop Tac Council. In June, before anything could be done on this proposal, a coup with General Ycj at its head returned the military to power. By the sujnmer of I965, Hop Tac was being completely overshadowed by the build-up of U.S. forces.

In September, Lodge returned to Vietnam for his second stint as

Ambassador. He iTiimediately asked a U.S. Mission officer for a private

assessment of the Hop Tac program. The report frankly described Hop Tac

as a failure and stressed as reasons the unrea.listic goals of the program,

the irrelevance of the concentric circle concept to actual areas of GVN

and VC strength, the fact that it was an American plan never really given

first priority by the Vietnamese, the area's political vulnerability to

fallout from Saigon political changes, and General Ky's lack of support

for it. The report recommended letting Hop Tac slowly die. On September

15; the Mission Council deliberated inconclusively on the fate of the program:

General Westmoreland said that while Hop Tac could be said only to have been about 50'^ successful, it had undoubtedly averted a VC seige of Saigon. Ambassador Lodge then briefly reviewed the original reasons for the emphasis placed on the area surroujiding Saigon and said that they v/ere still valJd, primarily because of the heavy densj.ty of population. He noted, however, lack of a clear commitment to Hop Tac on the part of the GVN, possibly due to the fact that the Vietnamese consider the program an American scheme. Hie view was also expressed that the trouble may also lie in US/gVN differences over some fundamental concepts in Plop Tac. I61/

By the end of 1965, the proposal for Plop Tac programs in I, II, and IV Corps had refined itself into tPie scheme for National Priority Areas that became the focus of attention in I966. Hop Tac itself, in the Saigon vicinity, continued on into I966 to be finally phased out at the end of the year and replaced by the III Corps r/d Council and a U.S. military effort to protect the capital known as Operation FAIRFAX.

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As a. test case for the ever popular oil blot theory of paclflca-tion. Hop Tac left much to be desired. It did, hav^ever, point up soim of the difficulties to be encountered in any attempt to implement this appealingly simple--and perhaps simplistiC""*concept. The oil blot theory, like all abstract analogies;, emphasizes the similarity between phenomena and ignores the differences. The important similarity of the pacification problem to the oil blot is the expressed goal of progressively extending the secure 2one until it embraces the entire country. Unlike a blank piece of paper, hov^ever, the environment in which pacification must take place is neither neutral nor passive; and ujilike the oil blot, the pacification forces are not impervious. Moreover, implicit in the theory is the notion that the secure area, like the oil blot, will expand in all directions simultaneously, at roughly the same speed, and that expansion is irreversible and irrevocable. Further, the analogy fails to take into account unique problems of terrain or variances in government and insurgent strength in different areas. One need not belabor the pointj the concept is fine as a theory, but not as a program, design. In fairness, it must be said that the idea does focus the need for concentration of resources in priority areas. All this notwithstanding. III Corps was less than the optimum place to test such a program. It contains several longtime Viet Cong strongholds and base areas and is extraordinarily sensitive to political changes in Saigon (28 of 31 district chiefs were replaced during the lifetime of Hop Tac).

The most important reason for the failure of Hop Tac, however, was the lack of South Vietnamese support for it. From its inception to its demise, it was an American idea, plan, and program. While the GVN adopted it, established a high-level council to supervise it, and committed some troops and other resouj.-'ces to it, this was seen as a way of appeasing the Americans. The South Vietnamese never accorded Hop Tac a high priority in their own thinking. Moreover, its low^ status v/as further emphasized by the massive U.S. force build-up. As this U.S. build-up became relatively routinized, however, the issue of pacification reasserted itself.^" When it did so, the prim-ary U.S. concern C3.me to focus on the issue of how best to organize the m.ilitary, paramilitary, and civilian advisory efforts. Since even the civilian advisors in the field were military personnel on loan in many instances, the account of the military advisory build-up decisions became essentially an account of organizing advice for pacification.

^ See Task Force Pamper, Vol. IV.C.8., Reemphasis on Pacification: I966 -1967 >

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D. Organization a.s the Key to Effectiveness in Paci ficaHorrTl96r" 1^

TH E BASIS FOR OEGAJ^IZATIOmL PREOCCUPATION

Several factors contributed to the persistent U.S. preoccupation in 1966 and I967 with reorganizing the advisory effort in order better to support pacification activities• Firsts it had been an article of faith for several years within U.S. policymavklng circles that only by winning the "other W8.r" of pacification could the U.S. hope to realize its objectives in South Vietnsjn.. Secondly, the pacification struggle was still regarded essentially as a task to be performed by the GW "-as the "main force war" no longer was after the introduction of inajor U.S. combat forces. Reinforcing this belief was a third factor, the widely held conviction tha.t U.S. forces could best concentrate on the main force war while RVKA.F focused on pacification.

Such a U.S.-RVMF division of effort, it was reasoned, would permit U.So forces to take advantage of their greater tactical mobility and fire support vrithout endangering civilian life and property, employ RVMF in a manner calculated to minimize the adverse effects of its persistent inability to generate an offensive-minded esprit, and avoid the cultural acclimitization and language difficulties which would face U.S. forces in the pacification role. It seemed, in short, that RVMF concentration on pacifica.tion and U.S. concentre.tion on the main force enemy would constitute the optimal use of a.vailable resources.

This division of effort meant that most U.S. military advisors vj-ould be directly involved in pacification -- at least periodically if not continuously. Advisors to regu_lar ARVN units could expect to spend a considerable portion of their time secuj:'ing pacifica.tion programs. Tliose advisors whose counterparts had political and administrative responsibilities (e.g., province and district 8.dvisors) and paramilitary advisors (RF and PF) could expect pacification to be their major concern.

But while the majority of U.S. military advisors would be engaged in pacification activities they would not be the only U.S. advisory personnel whose responsibilities focused on pacification programs. Advisors from USOM, CAS, and USIS had overlapping and in som.e Instances competing responsibilities. Thus it was logical for the U.S. to a^ttempt to devise an organizational fraraework which woul.d serve to coordinate adequately the activities of the large and diverse body of advisors and which v7ould be capable to integrate their overlapping functions.

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UKRESOLVED IS.SUES

At the beginning of I9665 three mportant issues concerning the pacification effort were unresolved. Each of these issues v/as tentatively resolved during late I966 or in I967 -- in the sense that decisions were made rather than that these decisions were final. The remainder of I967 and early I968 (mitil the Tet offensive) constituted a period of consolidation and refinement based on limited experimentation. The shock caused by the Tet offensive then brought to the fore new questions of RWAF effectiveness and of U.S.-RVMF roles and missions.

The first of the unresolved issues in I966 v/as that of v/hich U.S. agency or group should take the lead in coordinating pacification programs. The role which RVmF should assujne in support of pacification v/as the second unresolved issue. Finally, the extent to which the U-S. should be willing to exert leverage in order to influence pacification activities was also unresolved at the beginning of I966-

The following account of the decisions addressed to these three issues may seem to suggest that a master list of problems was somehow approached as part of an orderly, comprehensive, logicaj- process. This is not, of course, the way it happened. Hie policy process was confusing and the policymakers were occasionally confused. Decisions were made in the ref3-ection of both U.S. and South Vietnamese domestic pressures and in the shadow of an on-going W3.r. They were affected by personalities on all sides and involved no small am.ount of bureaucratic in-fighting. The account that follows attem.pts to reorder and to explain this evolution, not to recreate it.

WHO SHALL LEAD?

The "reemphasis on pacification," as another study in this series aptly names it, may conveniently be dated from the Honolulu Conference of February 1966,'"^ With the build-up of U.S. combat forces proceeding rapidly and with expectations high that I966 v/ould see the U.S. take the offensive, policy attention returned to address the "other war" in v/hich the object v^-as to provide rural security followed by steps to improve living levels and establish a link between the GVN and its populace. President Johnson made it clear in his informa.l remarks to the conferees at Honolulu that he wanted concrete resuJ-ts to follow the splendid phrases of the U.S.-GW communiq.ue:

Preserve this communiq[ue, because it is one \re don't want to forget. It will be a kind of bible that we are going to follow. When we come back here 9^ da^ys from now, or six months from now, we are going to start out to the

^- Task Force Paper, Evolution o f the War: Reemphasis on Pacification, 196^-1967 , Part II.

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the amouncements that the President^ the Chief of State

and the Prime Minister made You men \iho are responsible for

these departments5 you ministers and the staffs associated with them in both goverimients, bear in mind we are going to give you an examination and the "finals" will be on just what you have done,

...How have you built democracy in the rural a.reas? How much of it have you built^ when and where? Give us dates^ t im.e s 5 nujiib er s.

...Larger outputs, more efficient production to improve credit, handicraft, light industry, rural electrification --are those Just phrases, high-sounding words, or have you "coonskins on the wall?" I62/

All parties rega.rded it as necessary for some mechanism to coordinate the U.S. advisory activities v/hich would help the Vietnamese to turn promises into solid accomplishments. But they did not agree on how broad should be the unit of the coordinator. Was he, or his office, to be primus inter pare_s or a single manager? Did effective coordination req.uire policy primacy or operational supervision -- or both? Above all, the participants did not agree on vrhich individual or agency should exercise whatever supra-departmental authority v/as needed.

Ambassador Lodge, v/-ho had consistently stressed the centrality of the other war," began by assigning responsibility for all civil support for Revolutionary Development (read "pacification") to his deputy. Ambassador Porter. The latter described his concept of his duties in traditionalist Foreign Service Officer terms:

Ambassador Porter described briefly his new responsibilities as he sees them in the pacification/rural development area. He pointed out that the basic idea is to place total responsibility on one senior individual to pull together all of the civil aspects of revolutiona^ry development. He sees this primarily as a coordinating effort and does not intend to get into the middle of individual agency activities and responsibilities. As he and his staff perceive areas which require attention and auction by a responsible agency, he will call this to the attention of that agency for the purpose of emphasis; he intends to suggest rather than to criticize. I63/

Porter's "cooi^dination by suggestion" approach was not only an example

or extremely limited effective authority, it v/as also restricted explicitly

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to the civil side of support for pacification. I-'Jhether the coordinator-in-chief emerged a,s a persuader, or a director it was clear that his charge had to embrace both military and civil advisors, {in this respect "civil" is more accurate than "civilian", for a sizeable niomber of the civil advisory duties had devolved upon active duty military officers who were "loaned" to other agencies for this purpose.)

It is not surprising that MACV viewed itself as preeminent in this area. It was^ as General Westmoreland rightly claimed^ the only U.S. organization advising the GW at all levels and -- in one v^ay or another --in all functions» It >ras to MA.CV that General Thangj the Minister of Rural Construction (read "pacification") looked for advice and assistance. 16V It is ec[ually unsurprising that Ambassador Lodge was of a different pers\3,asion, as he explained clearly in a memo setting forth his views to General lansdale in December I965:

I consider the government of Vietnam's effort in this domain (apart from, the military clearing phase) to be primarily civilian^ economic^ socie;l and political in nature and in its aims. Consequently5 on the American side;, it is preferable that the tv/o civilian agencies miost directly concernedj i.e. 5 USAID and CAS^ be the operating sui3port agencies upon v/hom, you should rely for the implementation of the necessary programs as they develop. Other sections of the Mission^, including MCV^ JTJSPAO... should consider themselves associated with...USAID and CAS, but not as agencies directly responsible for operations.

The foregoing is intended to insure that the number of persons and agencies contacting the GVN and particularly the Ministry of Rux-al Construction^ on the subject of pacification and development is reduced5 and in fact is limited to yourself or your representative^ plus the representatives of the two operating agencies, USAID and CAS. I65/

Operational and coordinative responsibilities remained on this particular wicket throughout most of I966 while Washington fumed over the slow pace of pacification. These months saw the development of sufficient frustration in Washington to permit the grovrth and final acceptance of the proposal that all U.S. advice for pacification be placed -under MACV. An account of this development is treated m.ore fully in a/nother document in this series and will only be s"ummari?.ed here."^

President Johnson's Wa.shington coordinator for pacification, Robert W. Komer, set forth in August I966 three al.ternative organiza^tional approaches:

^>, -x- Task Force Paper, Evolution of the War: Reem-phasis on Pacification, l^'G"^-' 1967.

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Altern8.tive J\ro> 1 — Give /^eputy Ambassa.dor 7 Porter operational control over all pacification ac tivity,

«»• •

AlternatJAre No. 2 "- Retain the present separate civil and military coimaand ch annels bnt strengthen the manageraent structu-re of both mCV and the U.S. Mission.

• • •

Alterna tive Uo. 3 -- Ass 1 gn res ponsibility for pacification^ civil and milita ry^ to COMUSmCV. 16^7 '

Mr. Komer's ca.tegorization was prescient- Ambassador Lodge's personal preference and the fact that most pe.cification advisors were military seemed to rule out the first course of action. 16?/ The second alternative described essentially the organiza.tion followed mader the Office of Civil Operations (OGO) from November I966 mrbil June 1967- By this late date the U.S. decided to follow the third of Komer's alternatives.

The first of these reorganizations5 that which created OCO5 vj'as q,ulte literally forced upon Ambassador Lodge. Particularly in view of the fact that OCO was to be given only a 90-120 day trial to produce identifiable results^ he was not eager to imdergo the turmoil and lost motion of one major reorganization only as a prelude to yet another reorganization. He wanted to retain as much non-milita^ry flavor to the pacification effort as possible -- regarding it as compleraentary to military programs;, yet separate from them. Military security activities were^ in his view^ essentially the negative precondition to pacification activities which were the positive acts leading the GVN to vitalize itself at the same time that it developed real ties to its own people. 168/

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CORDS KEPIACES OCO

Thus OCO entered the world foredoomed by the combination of too short a prescribed life span and the tendency of some of its uxiwilling partners to do more than support it tacitly while they maneuvered to get their blue chips into another basket. Secretary McNamara had recommended in October I966 that MACV take responsibility for pacification. Undersecretary of State Katzenbach had marshalled a strong case s,gainst this step at least until embassy leadership of civil operations v/as given a chance. The upshot was that it was given half a chance — which may have been worse than none at all.

OCO didj however^ accomplish the creation and selection of Regional Directors and OCO Province Representatives. One individual was made responsible for all civil operations in each Corps Tactical Zone (CTZ) and in each province. The U.S. military chain of command had already adapted itself to parallel the RV1\LAF organization^ but below Corps level it was more complex. Each division within ARVN was advised by a senior advisor (a colonel) who was given supervisory authority over the military Sector (Province) Advisors within the Divisional Tactical Area (DTA)

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for which his division had responsibility. Thus, while civil lines of authority went directly from corps level (the region) to province, the military advisory chain added an additional link at division. Sector advisors under this arrangement found themselves working under a military officer whose advisory responsibilities were actually military whereas theirs were only partly (and sometimes only nominally) milita.ry.

OCO attempted to have the ARVN divisions removed from pacification responsibilities, but without success. When the Office of Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (COEDS) was established under MCV in mid-1967 as the single manager for all pacification advisors, tlie issue could not be argued with the same force. For by^the time COMUSMCV assumed responsibility for pacification (through a civilian deputy --Ambassador Komer), ARVN had also expanded its role in the pacification effort. The ARVN division, it could be argued, was as much a part of the pacification effort as were the programs supported by the U.S. civil agencies.

But although the argument for removing the Senior Division Advisor from the U.S. chain of command over provincial advisors lost theoretic weight with the creation of CORDS, the new civilian deputy to CO^'IUSMCV secured General Westm^oreland's approval to remove the division advisors from the pacification chain of commaaid and to work to get ARVN to take parallel action. This step illustrates the extent to which civil influences were able to operate within this new section of MCV. CORDS was of such size that it became quasi-independent. One would have to carry an issue in dispute all the way to COMUSMCV before it moved outside of CORDS channels.

The comprehensiveness of this reorganization may be seen in the I following MCV Directive, reproduced in its entirety, and especially m

the schematic diagram laying out the new U.S. command structure for a Corps area:

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■ MACVDir 10-12

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HEAEOUAriTSRS UNlTiCD STATES MIUTAJlY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VTSTNAM

- APO San Francisco 96222

DIRECTIWi NUMJ3ER 10-12*

28 May 1967 (MACCORDS)

ORGANIZATIONS Af^EUNCTTONS

2J±g^j^igAT£QNS_AND FlJNCflONS FORCIVIL OPE RA TIONS

A^^jgil^OLUTIQNARY DEVELOPMENT SUPPORT

"^* I'^J^^^.'^^'^'jt, '-f'o provide for (he integration of Civil Operations . and nevoliitionary Development Support activities v/ithin MACV. . ' • '

2. GEl^RAU

a. To provide: for single manager direction of all US civil/military Revolutionary Development activities^in 'ihe Republic of Vietnam, responsibility has been assigned to COMUSMACV. ' "

b. The position of Deputy for Civil Operations and Revolutionary Davelopmcnt Support to COMUSMACV is established and carries the per-soiial rank of Ambassador. The Deputy for Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support to COMUSMACV assists COMUSMACV in discharging his responsibilities in the field of military and civilian support to the GVN's Kevolutionary Development Program. Specifically, ho is chai'gedby COMUS-MACVvvith supervising the formulation and execution of all plans, policies and programs, military and civilian, v/hich supoort the GVN's Revolutionary Development program, and related programs.

c. All activities and functions of the former Office of Civil Operations (OCO) and the MACV Directorate for Revolutionary Development {VCD) Support are con^.bined in the office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Civil Operations and Revolutionary Developm.ent Support (CORDS).

cl. Tne Assistant Chief of Staff for Civil Operations and Hcvo-lutionary Development Support is assigned functions as follov/s:

■' (1) Ad\dses COMUSMACV, MACV staff'elements and all US civilian agencies on all aspects of US civil/milita.ry support for tlie Government of Vietnam's RD Program. .■ .\ '

*This„diroctiye_Rup3j:£edas.XACV.Direc^

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. MACVDir 10-12 . 28 May 19 G7

(2) In conjunciion v/iih Governi^^ont of Vietnain authorities, develops joint and combinsd plans, policies, concepts and programs con-cerninv?; US civiVmilitary support for Revolutionary I^evelopinent. _.

(3) Supervises the execution of plans and programs for US civil/military support of Revolutionary Development.

(4) Provides advice and assistance to the Government of ^ • Vietnam, includdng tlie Mirdstry of Revolutionary Development, the Rspuolic

of Vietnam Armed Forces Joint General St.aff and other GVN agencies on US I civil/military support for Revolutionary Development including US advisory

and logis-cica.1 support. I

(5) Develops requirements for military and civil assets (US and GVN) to support Revolutionary Development.

: " ■ ' ■ (6) Serves as the contact point v/ith sponsoring agencies for

RD programs. Maintains liaison v/ith sponsoring agencies in represenang ..tlieir interests in civil non-RD programs and activities in the field. Maintains clirect operational communications v;ith field elements for these programs.

• ■'••" • (8) 'provides MACV focal point for economic warfare to . include population and resources confeol, and for civic acnon uy US ior^Cb.

(9) Evaluates all civil/military RD activities including pro-vision of security for RD by US/Fw7vIA/GVN military forces ana reporu-. on I progress, status and problems of RD Support.

(10) Acts on all RD Support policy matters pertaining to svJo^ ordin?.te echelons. • . .

(11) Directs advisory relationships with GVN on RD and RD" related matters. ■ ■ ■ ' -. ..

3. IMPDEMENTATiON.

v/ill be ace

ince and district.

a. Integration and consolidation of OCO and RD Support^actiNdtlos xomplished at all levels: Ileaceuarters MACV, region/CiZ, prov

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MACVDir 10-12 ... 28 May 19G7

•b. Organization for CORDS v,'ill conform generally to the schematic orgajilnational diagram at-aclied at Anr.ax A, allov/ir.g for difiereuces in ihe situations in the various regions/CTZ's, j;royinces and districts.

'c. Additionally, in developing detailed orgamzations and functions ac each level, force commanders/senior advisors v/ill be guided by the fol-lovving principles: , • .

(1) Region/CTZ. .

* # ■ - "

. : ■ • (a) The OCO regional director v^^ill be designated the ■...

Deputy for Civil Operaiions and Revolutionary Development Support to the . force conirno-nder/serior ad\nsor. As such;, he v/ill be charged with supervising the formulation and execution of all military and civiJian plans, policies and programs which support tiie GVN's RD program to include civic . action performed by US units. ' '

0^) For all matters relating to RVNAF military support . for Revolutionary Development, the deputy senior advisor v/ill operate under

the supervision of the Deputy for CORDS. . ■ ■ ■.■.'■

■. ■ •

(c) Itie deputy OCO regional director v/ill be designated the Assistant Deputy for Civil Operations and Revolutionary DeveJopment Support or the Assistant Chief of Staff, CORDS. In this capacity, he v/ill head an integrated civil/military staff v/hich parallels, as appropriate, the , MACV CORDS organization. Further, he \yill direct headqu?a'ters-based RD-related a.nd non-RD technical programs.

(d) Except for psychological operations and intelligence, tliose elements of the staffs of the force commander/senior advisor and deputy semor advisor engaged primarily in RD Support activities v/ill be integrated into the staff of the Assistant Deputy for Civil Operations and Revolutionary r/3velopment Support or the Assi'stant Chief of StaJf, CORDS. At a later date, after on-going studies are completed, further guidance may be issued if needed for tlie integration of civil and military intelligence and psychological warfare functions v/Mch represent special cases. "■ ■

. (2) Province. ■ ■

. (a) At province, an integrated pro\dncial advisory team composed of tlie current OCO provincial team and MACV sector.advisory team v/ill be organized, '.'.-.■.

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MACVB-ir 10-12 2 8 M':iy 19 C7

(b) T'm nev/ provir.cial toarr: V7ill continue to carry out

(c) A single team ciiie-, designated the Senior Provincial

qualii^ications and experience of the current OCO senior pro\'lncial ad\dsor ana MACV sector advisor. T.hc individual not selected v/ill serve as tlie otiier s deputy as v/ell as being his orinci~oal advisor for civil operations or military sv.p-,oi-t as th.e case rnay be. ^

,!■; ,.

(fi) The province senior advisor v/ill receive operational direction from and report tlirough the Deouty for CORDS to the force commander/senior ad\dsor. The military element of ma provincial team v/ill

receive logisucal and administrative support from the division advisory team. '■ ■

J, , (®) V/here RVI\^A? units are attaciied to the province

chiei ior direct support of RD, advisors to tliese units ^vin come under tlie- ■ ' operational control of the senior province advisor.

(f) 'Die senior province advisor v/ill serve 8.s tJie Viet- ' namese province chief's principal advisor. Hov/ever, technical advice, military or civil, should continue to be given to the province chief or his representati.ve_by the most qualified member of the provincial team. In all cashes, the senior province advisor must be av/are of the advice given an( will set the policies to v/lucli advice vvill conform.

(3) District. . • ■ . :

(a) At dlstiict an integrated dist3.ict advisory team composed of the current MACV sub-sector team and OCO di.strict repre sentativc v/i.n be organized.

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(b) Tne nev/ district team v/ill be responsible for civil/ military advice to thie GVN district organization and for the implementation of all US.ciyil^uid..military,support programs at district.

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MACVBIr 10-12 '. . ^8 May 1967

(c) A sinijle toa:;^ ciiie:, desli^nated Sorior District Advisor will bG assigned to each dislrici. The senior disfxicl advisor v/ill bo chosen by [lie sciiior province advisor v:ica the concurrence of (he I>opuiy CORDS to liio force coinn^and^r/senior advisor on (he basis of securiiy in

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tho district, civil-nulitary b?ilanco in fee RD effort and quallficalions and

experience of the current CCO district representative aiid V^ACV sub-sector

advisor. The individual not selected v,'iirserve as the oth.er's deputy as well

as being his principal advisor lor civil operations or military support as t::\e case ina.y be.

(d) V/iicre no GCO district representative is present, the jvoACV sub-sector team v/ill become the district Civil Operations and Revolutionary l^velopment sfeaf and the sub-sector adnsor v/ill be designated senior district adadsor.

(4) The ra CTZ organization for Civil Operations and Revo-Kraonary Development Support v/ill conrornj generally to the schematic organi' xationai clia£ram attached at Annex B. .

(^) For the tiTne being there v/ill be no change in the present IV CTZ organization. Im.plernenting instructions for ihe IV CTZ organization for Civil Operations and Revolutionary Cevelopment Support mil be pro\dded at a later date,

4

(C) Force commanders/senior advisors v/ill revise their orgardzations and redj^aft their statements of functions to comply v/ith the guidance set out in this directive. Tne revisions v/ill bo forv/arded to this headquarters for approval by 15 Jun 87.

y

4. ADMINiSTRAl^VE AND I^GISTICS SUPPORT.

a. For tiie time being, there v/ill be no change in administrative and logistics support. Civilian elements of the integrated organization v/ill continue to be supported (funds, personr:el, and other requirements) by their respective agencies, i.e., Embassy, AID, JUSPAO, USIA and OSA,

b. It is intended that a continuing effort be undertaken tov/ard logistic and admiiiistrative economy through consolidation and cross-f-ervicing of appropriate support acUvlties. .

5.

REFEK ^NCE. State iDepartment MSG DTG'09230'1Z May 19 67 (C),

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MACVrcr 10-^12 28 May 1967

Force

General Staff

US

Units

■*ii»»--»*h—•-^•-fcrf^* .^.^t«.t.kj<

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Mgmt. vSupport

Force Co:-;'i:^.ianclcr/Senior Adviso:'

Deputy Fore Connma.ndej

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Deputy For CORDS

hie I 01 btcLii

Asst Chief 01 St'ciii

for

CORDS

Deputy Senior Advisor (Milit?.3'y)

1

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A

Reports

—*

Refugee

Psy Ops

Public Safetv

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A

Provincial Rcpr c s entativc

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Advisory Team „

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<f'^^\ Advisory

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Coordination-—Military and CO^RIOS matters. Operationcd_Cont3:.ol_v/hen^Ui4t_^vSsigned on RD direct support mission.

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KVmF'S EOLE IN PACIFICATION

It has already been noted tha.t the U.S. gradually came to espouse a division of effort between U.S. forces and RVNAP in which the former would concentrate on defeating the main forces of the insurgents in the unpopulated areas while RVHAF concentrated on securing pacification operations in the populated areas.

General Westmoreland first informed Washington of his intention to follow this general division of effort in late August I966. But his emiihasis was one of degree, he made clear, rather than of mutually exclusive categories:

...Our strategy will be one of a general offensive with maxijnujn practical support to area, and population security in further support of Revolutionary Development.

The essential tasks of Revolutionary Development and nation building cannot be accomplished if enemy m^in forces can gain access to the popula.tion centers and destroy our efforts, US5 Free World Forces5 with their mobility and in coordination with RVEAF, must take the fight to the enemy by attacking his main forces and invading his base areas. Our ability to do this is improving steadily. Maximum emphasis will be given to the use of long ra.nge patrols and other means to find the enemy and locate his bases. Forces and bases thus discovered will be subjected to either groimd attack or quick reaction B-52 and tactical air strikes. When feasible 3-52 strikes will be follov;"ed by ground forces to search the area. Sustained ground combat operations will maintain pressure on the enemy.

The grov;-ing strength of US/Free World forces will provide the shield that will permit ARVN to shift its weight of effort to an extent not heretofore feasible to direct support of Revolutionary Development. Also, I visualize tha^t a significant nujnber of the US/Free VJorld maneuver battalions will be committed to tactical area,s of responsibility (TA.OR) missioias. These missions encom.pass base security and at the same tme support Revolutionary Development by spreading security radially from the bases to protect more of the population. Sa.turation pa^trolling, civic action, and close association with ARVN, regional and popular forces to bolster their combat effectiveness are a^nong the tasks of the groujid force elements. At the same time ARVN troops will be available if required to reinforce offensive operations and to serve as reaction forces for outlying security posts a.nd governjnent centers under attack. Our strategy will include opening, constructing and using roa.ds, as vrell as a start toward opening

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

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and reconstructing the national railroad. The priority effort of ARYN forces will be in direct support of the Revolutionary Development prograjn; in rnany instances^ the province chief will exercise operational control over these imits. This fact notwithstanding the ARVN division struc-ture must be maintained and it is essential that the division commander enthusiastically support Revolutionary Development. Our highly capable US Division Commanders, \jho are closely associated with corresponding ARVIT commanders, are in a position to influence them to do what is required.

¥e intend to employ all forces to get the best results measured^ among other things, in terrr^s of population secured^ territory cleared of enemy influence; VC/lWA bases eliminated; and enemy guerrillas, local forces, and main forces destroyed.

Barring unforeseen change in enemy strategy^ I visualize that our strategy for South Vietnam will remain essentially the same throughout I967. I69/

General Westmoreland had already reached agreement v/ith Genera^l Vien, Chief of the Joint General Staff (JGS), to reorient ARVN to pacification support. General Tillson, MACV J-3, had briejT'ed the Mission Council in Saigon on the general plan:

In the 1967 campaign plan, we propose to assign ARVN the primary mission of providing direct support to RD and US/w Forces the primary mission of destroying VC/nVA main forces 8.nd base area^s. Agreement ha^s been ree.ched between General Westmoreland and General Vien that, in I, II, and III Corps areas, ARVN will devote at least 50f, of its effort directly in support of the RD progra^i. In IV Corps, v/here there are no US forces, it was agreed that ARVN might have to devote up to 75fo of its effort to offensive operations I7Q/

Genera.l Taylor, now serving as a personal advisor to President Johnson, immediately recognized the importance of this communication. A considered response should be sent to CO^fJSMCV, he advised the Bresi-dent, lest General V7estm.oreland regard silence as tacit consent for his proposed strategy. Taylor was enthusiastic about the expressed intent to reemphasize revolutionary development (pacification), seeing in it the best hope for bringing the war to a speedier concH.usion. But he was uneasy about futua:»e charges that the U.S. had taken over the main war and was sustaining larger numbers of casualties than RVNAE. He v^as also concerned about involving any U.So troops in pacification — suggesting that U.S. displacement of GVN leadership would, in the lon-g run, be counterproductive. I71/

I

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f'

Ambassador Lodge^ on the other hand^ waxed ecstatic over the involveraent of U.So units in pacification work. The crux of the prob-lem, he argued^ was seciority. To promote security U^S. units should be used in a kind of advisory function. They would energize ARW by exajnple:

To meet this need we must make more U.S. troops available to help out in pacification operations as we move to concentrate ARVN effort in this work. U.Se forces would be the cata.lyst; would lead by example j and would work with the Vietnejiaese on the 'buddy* system. They would be the 10 percent of the total force of men xmder arms (90 percent of whom would be Vietnamese) which wouD.d get the v/hole thing moving faster.

This has been done on a small scale already by elements of the U.S. Marines, 1st and 25th U.S. Infantry Divisions, and the Koreans. We think it can be made to work and the gains j^ under such a program, while not flashy, would hopefully be

solid. Everything depends on v/hether -vie can change ARW habits. Experi already made indicate that U.S. casualties would be few. 172/

General Taylor's doubts about the benefits of involving U.S. troop ■units in pacifica.tion carried some v/eight in Washington. State was later to signal Saigon to go slow on U.S. participation:

We understand General Westmoreland plains use of limited number of US forces in buddy system principle to guide and motivate Rd/p. However, we have serious doubts about any further involvement US troops beyond tha,t....We feaj? this would tempt Vietnamese to lea.ve this work more and more to us and \je believe pacification, with its intimate contact with population, more a^ppropriate for Vietnamese forces, who must after all as arm of GVE" esta.blish constructive relations with population. Hence we be3J.eve there should be no thought of US taking subst antia l share of -pac^ification . The ui^gent need is to begin effectively pressing ARVN . 1737

THE 1967 COI-ffilMCD CA?-lPAIGI\r PLM

The upshot of these exchanges, which illustrate the wide acceptance in UcS. quarters of the proposed division of effort between UcS, forces and RVMF, was that the MACV/JGS Combined Campaign Plan for I967 (AB 1^2), published 7 November I966, reflected "primary missions" for US/Ft-&IA.E and RVNAF and implied that few U.S, forces would be comtnitted direct2.y to the pacification effort. The exact number of such forces was not specified; it was left to COMUSMCV's discretion within the restraints already suggested by Washington. The JGS did agree, however, to keep 53 ARVN battalions in support of revolutionary development duaring 1967- In addition, 230-odd RE com-panies and over 8OO RE platoons were to support the pacification ^^' prograjn.

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Conceptually^ the regular ARVN units were to conduct the more difficult clearing operations and then turn over responsibility for the "securing phase" to the KP/PF outfits. All of this was outlined in considerable detail in the Conibined Campaign Plan^ with specific assignments to certain kinds of units for each phase of the pacification effort. The pertinent sections of AB 1^2 follow:

W

2o (c) mrn regumr foplCes

'

PH/iSfi

AHVN REGUJ..AR FORCES

i^aw wwttKc:; 1 :sv3 aJgyaiwjggBrr; v- j^-:^s4*xa^^Ki^i^ >tsauMnr«aiicraaaCTBB:wofc>;-.c:Tir'-rc

r;E.v"iCJj--»^ana>jc3'ciciO:2.TC'-t;_-C«3.

OiGsrinr^

fc?

. Tj

Tasko in direct GUpport of ED activitiR.qS

le Conduot operations to clear VC/rlVA rrain forco imits from provincial priority areas and other critical areas in accordance Tjith establl-isbod provincial RO plans«

2 c Conductp in conjmction vrith prorln-cial Military forces and civil intelligence and police elements^ operations to destroy VC guerrillas and infrastructure in specified hamlet or %dllago ejc^eas in accoi^.ance i-rf.th established provincial RD planso

)r«:£kr^iVa«-Q„£^'7jSn:C;ic^XS£;;:LCXti'«"] T'rTT"T--rnr-ri'^MTiTr-MMJiwriili

Securing

t*K=™js»"<^Ka^ iTstWSSTTfiira.-!JJW2^ ti

TasksJnJJ^ect^ju^^

3e Conduct J in conjunction \rith pr-o-vincial military forces and eivil^intelli^ gencG and police elements;^ operations to destroy VC guerrillas and infi'astructuro yfaBXi provincial forcoa aro inadequate for .this task©

ilLiiiiN .mill ■! !■■ ■ liMi I 'ini niTi-^ I i--r—r~"'T""

r

85

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By; NWD Date: 2011

llir^

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. <}

)-crv

ARVN R]53UL/iR FORCES

m

ho Frovj-dop in conjunction ^rith proYin cial military forces and llationrJ Police, local area sccv-riiy and seciu^lty for tho population and GVN cadro olemants vhen provincial forces are inadequats for this tasJco

C--J

iiL=;:;'.iucsTvwi- _

DoYolopin3

T

^0 Fi'oYido^ in conjunction -jith pro-vincial military forces and National Police, locivl area securcity and security for tha popu nation and G7TJ cadre cleraents vihon provinoial forces are iJie.deouate for this tasko

CO

.triCMrtV,

All Ph?.De3

f •

6o Conduct military PSIOP in eupport of RD activities irith emphasis on op3rations_ in eupport of th3 Chieu Hoi programo

7c-' Conduct, in coordination vdth sactor conunandsrs, military ciTlc action to help \rln the support of the people for tho governxaont vdth ejnphasio on tho proper bohavloi' cM dis-' cipline of troopso

8o Assist' sector coMmndors in the re cimitin;?: and traininf' of RF/I

C3

''r 0

Related taskss

9o Conduct offensive search and destroy operations against VC/lIYA nain forces to pro-vent their incursion into areas undergoing ?Do

3.0* ProTide elements for reserve/reaction ■forces in support of military forces in areas imderKoin'^ RD«

Ml • ilT" ■ —JJJirr^-r— r^T-irrj: •

.■^(iwKi^

• t

86

TOP- SECRET - Sensitive

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! --

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TOP SECRFrT - Sensitive

,.'V

3« (0) US/FVJiLW

■I

*\

ij

K-iaiAntf u9H«)uKX^b«>..-%*'

v\\/ifm

Cloarinr'

Tr.'3/FVJ*I.^l''

p.dEr«Ed%Ci;>4:^hi«0M«Ctf^l^£v1IJA«O=ftBgfc7H^>

yj« jt.j&am 'cu jm g -jJ

j;auc»cux>v.**n

Tasks 'in direct support of Ig^actiyitica

•iit!-«j 111 ■'I a p»s.aii>-«.—mj^-ijit-' ii*-^ rj-^ ■=««~.ni..ti;-»,ojwrf.'i™

I'o Conduct combined and unilateral oporations to cloar VC/NVA main forces from provincial priority areas and other critical areas in accord?Jico vrf-th established provin-cial RD planso

2* Conduct combined operations in conjunction v/ith mVN and/or provincial iaili~ tary forces and police olemap.ts, operations to destroy VG guerrillas and infrastructure in specified hamlet or village areas in accordance vji.th established provincial RD p3-anso

■ ■ nw ■, » j i a ai m. ^ -r m cm t n i ^ t

i-j-^^^wTVfVf tyiwi -f J"

All Fhasjos

Tasks in direct support of HD f^^ivUdess

3o .Conduc-b othe-^^ corabincd ba'otalion and smaller unit oparations vrlth }miK!? to accomplish spociric RD tasks in areas undergoing clearing^ ceouilngp mc\ developing as appropriate0

lio' Conduj3b^ in coordination \A'Va sector and subsector comriianders, railltar/

clvie action to liGlp \:in ths supporb of

the people for the govo-rnmont vith eiaphasis to ensiu'o that credit is given to the QiJlU

■"'" ^* 'Assist sector cor.imsr.ders in the training of R5'/P?o

Related taskss

•tt».««i=i

6« Gonducb combined and unilateral offensive seai'ch and destroy operations against YG/IP/A main forces to prevent their inouraion into areas undergoing KD,

mg)^"Y.KiBW>a <Ka!i

iiKVMU9V3kJ^.-faruT*Q*n»''°

■i»r»jj!»jfc-M-ttJCT"--at.'a--s'p-'^- /r -^^^.;J^s'a-■ag^»»^i;c;^^lJttfca w^l^-»«^T^ ^^ • ^ ^ ':^^a^*.--Jl^^-!»■

87

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1

■asffiwrw-=tip:2^>«»e^-«?--'rE*==*i;: '-J^^if. iC?t,ri5T>JUi«?5ca^t>«'»avv«y»Wffir^;:au.vr.ii^^

u^^irj-.-r-ift-ifMaas^^.- ■

G3.oai^W3

rogiilA.^ fore03 and/ 6? ■US/tKJaa? to oloQ^ VO/

rsriKi"mi7*-sar.::jT^

nv:^*hi2

:-r-.35cair«eE."C5Cr«*'^P'aasrt-3:^^^!

iT-.^^^,- .7^ ^^'^■t>>T.<!=ra3ifeeBeagyj:=caa:Ta:!:agz ^i,:^::^: -

3o Co(:5r.gt^ ^Ji conjaS7o1>ion uit!i civil intoX34.soi:oa and poHoo b^c::oat3;> cporatlong • . to doD^xoY' W riUorri:iJ.ac3 ciia ^aiJyaybsT^tiiS'Oa

I

pv^J.oi^i-&7 to mjDv* ■ c on:junicatioE^o. eoza^cGsoo • .. Cvifl Ot'no? ooiaoitivo c.rocoo. . ' '

^cctoo * . ' ■ -

*

3uitic^i'c^a rosonrccj control cM/o:? td iioin-t:dn Icxj c:^' ordca' cvnd pxst^st piiblio o^'jtyo .

I

i".;sz^'i^-a ijvjCii'm.z^g; ::^:

in t-ho rconiivlris crz^l

•^■'S^^;^^ ^_:!3!rsE3»ic^.v'5XiEKoa3r^'Xj

«l

88

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Ci

121

I I

FrIASE

Dovoloping

e^' . ^:*'fit M ai O ' I ' . tm imn

4«a«i«*w«lWW^*-OfcJ"«->-'*^'-"^'^'"*'='••■'"

RTOT.ONaL FORCES

[J.—M < fli« r ~n —- -^-. —1^ -^ .->»ji:^rt..j

' 9* Assist GVIJ civil cadro^Glcmonto t^ oi'ganize and train peoplo's self-defenso

foixjeso

aa-xaKuKUSK.

Continuo taoka U and 5^ unfci:*, ro« by National Police or othor author-.-'ovincial police forces vfnich rmy

10c

lieved

ized provincial po

be Gstablishedo

lie Provide elements for i^esoi-vo/re-action forces to covintor tho return of VG/ OTA main or irregular forces into aroas undergoing developingo

120 Continue task 6o

130 ContiviP,o task 7 aa necessasyo

bo Popular Forces (PF)

r/s3s'J7::*^^:z:T'.

2?i2==s^jEs;;r.2.-3

^U.-«>r£: «^?^iJUC7:i>^L£Ur;c«r-.U3VK3r If ^Jax.ffi3s»x:iiM!Eu'll

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PMSB

tscuring

;^--^ j^ T< TT^TPjftvnjia'tiiSi

rJBafc<::»'»-7«i^KCPK:>ei3 ■.T\Tt^--fc»-'«»ti?a:n>'««i-^'-- :^. AJ-'^rsr^r:

popm^y^ I'oiiGEs

•.1a«,<>i '».j

ir.fjr a'. cJa ii- ■»*

o

I

1« PiX)vidG local security for the popu lation r;nd GVIf civil cadro eleinsnts in )iD.n-let end villj'.ga ai'easc

■ 2e Assist PiP to provide local area secuj'it/o

3o Assist GVVi civil cadre elements to perfora econoraic and social developirient projects i»

lu Assist National Police in population aiid resources contr-ol and/or to p^aintain Iza and order and pi-^otect public safety* ^

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13^

■i^««es««S!.-r»ie»*-'*'J>"* i. fc'i u *-' t'oui-pasitajesi

FHASE

^^■■ijitii TQii-r^rTTmra-T inniTTnn«

cgf^^g Trvf . Mr . jrw g a ^

POPUL/vR FORCES

. A» ^ M l* fTfc e i. «lfc*'T^*SJ>^ . Jl W B* iCJ > inM

P^tV^jH

$o Assist GVJI civil cadre elements to organize and train people's self-defense

forces

o o

ll _ ir^ » i PT?3,:jJ

Ds'^eloping

' 6o Continue tusks 1 and 2 imbil relieved by ^lational Police or other author-iaed provincial police foicea ^jhioh may bs establishedo

7o Gontiviue task 3o

80 Contimio task h as necessaryo

Co llatio'nol Police Forcea

E5Aa**»«l3trf

PrlAiSE

iIviji^isnBi*'

==-?="-

sr«we"Hwc«**»-a**s=T-'

mtional folicb forghs

Clear iAiR

&^3.3ss: CJAn3:]ac>n:Ai.«ico;Bi= ir t; J i i-ia j; -—CTj aisJ

lo' Develop and raaintain info'/raant neus and other Intelligence notso

2o -Supply intellisenoe to military for-cosc

1

3c Pa^/ticipate vith military forces in rations to destroy VG miorriUas raid in- ^

oper frastruGturOfi^

ii

Lie Assiirns custody of ar.d'intorrogate VC suspects 8 ■ • ■

■ nwKi g r w w tMiii iLn I i:rsxs/*j~<cfsrx%^:xx%it.

Sectij/lng,

j-j mc^ n X ?*' v ^T***. *>* it*: t^ja**-'" t^^^T-W

„ -5S--1W 5a»sru\»'iia»a-***W«-''* J

Hr:*:3^^v

$c Continue tasks 1 through h ebovoe

' 60 Initiate popalatlon and rasourcoa controlJ • "

rr-*M*:L^.j»Mi.jrt*rtK;3»««3

cM^asaacu... m i iniimi m n ■» i iiiiiT

;--^ yi ->..,-.j-L,-u>. a. jg-jcwmi 'oc BJ'*-' *E k:;^*^ t

i

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

r,

1 /?'

jpiflfciBnaetf-qCC a n u ' aj i»ja-«n'rjae;B.^;^wiTB»^flfc*wt j r i» a i30 i' gMJpj^-ga ■■ ■— u.^ ' Tm tiJK j

!*«»««»« ra

PJI/LSE

D&7olopin3

lIATIO?aL POLICE FORGES

■_- ..~—;w—.w. ^,..,—.-fli-..

r.^*<JCB<gJ>»^ .M ""■ nreUTtagn^T^i^watfJtat

7« Kcdntain lavr and order orxcl prooooo public saTet^c

^ * 8o Assist, uitlvin capabilities^ miK-tarj^ forces to'pro%ddo local aroa security . and*8eom^it7 for i.n3 pop-alatiou and Gv ' cexb.'G elements 0

.t<nC.cj)C«nKC»>c£urA

rX^WsB^

9c I'laintain population end rcsovvc^oj controlc

■ aOo Contin-as tasks Ij, ^^^ h mid 7 abovoo

f

llo Prevent tho reorgani7>ation of tbs VC iiifrrstruotureo

12 0 ' Prevent and control riots and cabotage of public secujrit^o

l3o Relieve railit-ary forces^ vhen capable; and pro-ride local area ssourUy and ' secmlty for tlio popul?.tion and GvJ eada-<3 eleinehtss ' ' .

itV

91

y

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LEVER4G-E A ND SOVEREIGNTY

The decision to effect a division of effort between RWAF and .US/fWMA.F suggests how far U.S. policymakers were willing to go (perhaps "determined" would be more accujrate)'to carve out an area for independent (^Vl] conduct of at least some major phase of the war- It suggests, too, ^ their relative dissatisfaction with RVMF improvement during the years

. in which the U.S. advisory effort had been directed toward such improve-

f ment- The question remained whether U.S. influence could be brought

I ' effectively to bear through exam.ple and persuasion or should be back-I stopped by more direct measures --by the use of a range of negative

, measures gathered under the rubric of "leverage,"

General Taylor's recomjnendations at the beginning of the U.S. advisory build-up in I96I, it will be remenfoered, emphasized a "limited partnership" in which U.S. advisors would actually work alongside their Vietnamese counterparts instead of merely "advising them at arm's length." By means of this closer working relationship in the field rather than just in various headquarters, Taylor had suggested, RVmF effectiveness would becom.e the product of m.utually shared goals pursued through mutually shared experiences. Conscious adoption of an alternative course, the use of leverage, would have changed the relationship from one of nominal ^- "partnership" to one of de facto^U.S. leadership -- bordering in some

instances on U.S. cormnand. This, in turn, would have been a very real infringement of Vietnamese sovereignty and an admission that the GVN could not manage adequately its ovzn affairs- It would have undercut Vietnamese independence in both a legal sense and in terms of GV1\[ competence.

Vftien the Diem regime did not respond as it had been expected (or hoped) it would, and after Diem's government was overturned, the U.S. again refused consciously to adopt leverage procedures to compel improved performance. First with General Minh, then with General Klianh, the hope was that improved receptivity (as compared to the most recent past experience) on the part of the GTN would permit the carrot to work effectively without the stick. The period just ended in mid-1965 >*en U.S. troops were committed to South Vietnam marked another occasion to examine the putative advantages and disadvantages of the use of leverage.

Generally speaking, Washington policymakers (less so in the State Departm-ent), were prone to suggest the use of leverage in the abstract. The U.S. Mission and MACV tended to oppose such proposals. Field advisors were, as a group, most favorably disposed toward the use of leverage. Those whose dealings included establishing a close working relationship with GVN" (to include RVNAF) officials found that the threat of leverage was a stumbling block to such a rela^tionship. Some also

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

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found that the price of acceptance without leverage v/as the virtual absence of influence. Robert Shaplen sufmnarized this phenomenon in a pessimistic I965 eval-uation of the U.S. advisory effort:

The advisory program^ while it had been a tribute to the politeness of both parties^^ had failed in its primary aim of persuading the Vietnamese officers to get their men out into the countryside and to stay there^ if necessary^ day and nighty for weeks on end in order to bea,t the Communists at their own game. This view of the failure of American efforts at persuasion was privately expressed to me by most of the advisers I spoke with during my trip through the vital plateau area^ and it was reinforced by what advisers from other battle areas told me. The consensus was that the system was inherently anomalous and unworkable in that it reflected the American predilection for trying to get a difficult and probably impossible job done in v/hat a British friend of mine described as ''jomt typical nice Aaaerican V7ay." Ijh/

Having rejected proposals for a combined command (presumably under U.S. leadership) and for the encadrement of U.S. troops with RWAF units, the U.S. was left -- in late I965 -- with the continuing and perplexing issue of v.^hether or not to adopt the use of leverage in some comprehensive and planned manner. Earlier decisions had been to avoid the issue by side-stepping it. But the isolated occasions on which its use had been attempted did little to substantiate the argument that cries of neocolonialism were simply the price one had to pay for short run effectiveness. Indeed, some backfires tended to have the opposite effect. Ambassador Taylor, for instance^ had had a disastrous experience in trying to use the U.S. decision to commence bombing North Vietnam as a lever to get GYN reform in December 1964. The net outcome vras a violent reaction by General Khanli who very nearly had Taylor thrown out of the country as pe rsonna non grata. In the end, it was Khanh who went, but the political turmoil that this produced in the first months of 1965? when the course of the vmr was taking a dramatic turn against the GVN, convinced Taylor that such attempts should not be made again at the national level/^" It was at this time that the "troika sign-off" was abandoned because of claims that it stifled GW development. Then in late I965 USOM began to have second thoughts on the wisdom of abandoning control of its resources in the field and proposed a restoration of the troika sign-off. The Mission Council endorsed the plan and had already launched discussions with the GVN when the State Department objected to the idea, insisting that it would undermine U.S. efforts to make the Vietnamese more independent and effective. 175/ There the matter died.

'^ See Task Force Paper, Evolution of the War: US/gVN Relations, I963-67, Part I, pp. 5^-59.

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In a related effort to overcome delays in the Vietnamese pacification program, MACV acceded to its advisors* recomjnendations and, in October, created a separate contingency fund of 50,000 piasters for each subsector advisor to be used for urgent projects. Sector advisors were also given access to special funds. The program was highly successful and toward the end of the year consideration was given to permanent establishment of such revolving funds. YjGj The plan was abandoned, however, after the four-month trial period due to the strong opposition of the GW Minister for RD, General Theing, v/ho contended such funds v/ere undermining the legitimate efforts of his organization to meet urgent province needs. . They would encourage, he said, Vietnamese dependence on the U,S. I77/

But USOM did experiment successfully with one nev7 form of direct, selective leverage in the late summer of I965. The Province Chief of Binh Tuy Province, Lt Colonel Chi, was accused of misusing some ^250,000 in AID fimds. "When USOM pressure on the GVN for his removal produced no results, aid to the province was suspended on September 23, and USOM field personnel were withdrawn. In spite of Chi's friendship with the Defense Minister and Deputy Premier (General Co) Premier Ky removed him six vj-eeks later. Aid to the province then resumed, but Ambassador Lodge made it clear to the Mission Council that he disapproved of the action and did not v^ant it repeated (particularly the press coverage). 178/

As already indicated, both Ambassadors Taylor (after his experience in December 196^) and Lodge preferred not to force the GVN or attempt to use high-level pressure to reach solutions v^e felt necessary. The fragility of the political arrangements in Saigon at any point in time seemed to dictate against any U,S. action that might precipitate coups or disruption from elements even less disposed to be cooperative than the current group, whoever they might be. In this view, the successive Ambassadors were strongly supported by the State Department. 179/ The one consistent Washington advocate for an increased use of leverage was Secretary McNamara. I80/ But the Secretary of Defense's views did not prevail in this issue as they did in so many others. The overall U.S. approach to advice in South Vietnam continued to be dominated by the felt U.S. need to avoid undercutting governjnental stability. U.S. support was figuratively regarded as a rug which if pulled out from under the GVN would cause it to fall, not as a lever whose use might spur increased effectiveness.

THE_. INCONCLUSIVE D ljgATE OVICR LEVEiy\.CxE

This persistent U.S. avoidance of the planned use of leverage was, until about I966, paralleled by an equally persistent avoidance of any candid examination of the vzhole pandora's box which was conjured up by the m.ere mention of the subject. But during I966, and continuing into 1967 and beyond, there were repeated attempts by lower echelons within the policymaking apparatus to promote an internal examination of the issue.

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Those who made such proposals were in favor of some kind of authorized, premeditated use of leverage, of course, else they would not have pushed for an examination of this hitherto avoided topic•

When operational groups — as distinct from policymakers who could defer when to implement -- urged the adoption of leverage measures the recommendations tended to be suimnarily struck down. In I966, for instance, an inquiry hy the MCV staff into the poor performance records of the 5th and 25th ARW Divisions — both stationed near Saigon --concluded that if other measures failed to im-prove these units, COMUSMCV should withdraw U.S. advisors and Military Assistance Program (MAP) support. General VJestrnoreland deleted from the study the recoimnendation for the withdrawal of MAP support. He further directed that sanctions against ARW be avoided. The U.S. 1st and 25th Infantry Divisions were instructed to assist the tvro ARW divisions and to Increase their ovra participation in pacification operations in Binh Duong and Hau Nghla Provinces. I81/ It was clear that the time was not ripe for actlonj there was no agreed basis upon which action might be taken.

But another Army staff effort, the PROW Study referred to earlier, set out to rectify this omission. Commissioned in mid-1965 by Army Chief of Staff General Harold K. Johnson, the PROW group was charged with "developing new sources of action to be taken in South Vietnam by the United States and its allies, which will? in conjunction with current_ ^ actions, modified as necessary, lead in due time to successful accom.pllsh-ment of U.S. alms and objectives." After eight months of intensive effort this select group of middle ranking officers produced a comprehensive argument calling for emphasis on the pacification effort. A radical decentralization of U.S. and GW directive authority was held to be necessary for this purpose. And to make sure that national plans were turned into concrete actions at the operating level, PROW called for the calculated use of leverage:

The situation in South Vietnam has seriously deteriorated. 1966 may well be the last chance to ensure eyenti^al success. 'Victory' can only be achieved through bringing the individual Vietnam.ese, typically a rural peasant, to support willingly the GVN. The critical actions are those that occur at the village, district, and provincial levels. This is where the v/ar must be fought; this is v/here that war and the object which lies beyond it must be won.' The following are the most Important specific actions required nov?-:

— Concenti-ate U.S. operations on the provincial level to include the delegation of command authority over U.S. operations to the Senior U.S. Representative at the provincial level.

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~ Reaffirm Rural Construction as the foremost US/gM combined effort to solidify and extend GW influence.

~ Authorize more direct U.S. involvement in GW affairs at those administrative levels adequate to ensure the accomplishment of critical programs.

-- Delegate to the U.S. An:bassador unequivocal authority as the sole manager of all U.S. activities, resources, and personnel in-country.

— Direct the Ambassador to develop a single integrated plan for achieving U.S. objectives in SVN. lo2/

The PROW Study proposed that leverage be employed at all levels within GW to achieve U.S. objectives. Noting that past uses had been haphazard, it recommended the eraployraent of a "continuum from subtle interpersonal persuasion to withdrawal of U.S. support following_u.b. ^ GW agreement on specific programs. The South Vietnamese would, in short, be aware that leverage would be employed if they failed to live up to agreed obligations. I83/

After an initial period during which no discussionof the PROW Study was permitted outside the Army staff, the study finally receivea wide distribution. Secretary McNamara was briefed on_it, as were t e Joint Chiefs of Staff. MACV's co'mments were also solicited. _ine care fully worded reply from Saigon stated succinctly the case against tne use of leverage.

MCV is in complete agreement with PROVII position that ■ immediate and. substantially increased. United. States direct

invo3.vement in GW activities in form of constructive in-. fluence and. manipulation is essential to achievement 01 u.b. objectives in Vietnam. PROW emphasizes that leverage nust originate in terms of reference establishea. oy^govern-I ■ ment agreement," and "leverage, in all its implications,

must be •understood, by the Vietnamese if it is to becor.e an effective tool." The direct involvement and leverage en-I visioned, by PROVN could, range from skillful diplomatic pre.s-

I ure to U.S. unilateral execution of critical programs. ^

MACV considers that there is a great danger that the e^^^^ent of involvement envisioned could, become too great. A government sensitive to its image as champion of national sovereignty profoundly affected by the pressure of militan. minorities, and. unsure of its tenure and legitimacy will

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resent too great involvement by U.S. Excessive U.S. involvement rn.ay defea,t objectives of U.S. policy: developjnent of free J independent non-coinniunivSt nation. PROWI properly recognizes that success can only be avttained through support of Vietnaniese people, v/ith support corrang fron the grass roots up. Insensitive U.S. actions can easily defeat efforts to accomplish this. U.S. manipulations couJLd easily become an American takeover justified by U.S. comjjulsion to get the job done." Such tendencies raust be resisted. It must be realized that there are substantial difficulties and dangers inherent in implementing this or any simi].ar program. 184/ " •

NO DECISION AS A DECISION

Events remained stuck on this fundamental disagreement. The subject of leverage came, during 1967, to be discussed more fully, but there v/as no real authoritative decision to employ it or to reject its use londer all circumstances. Thus, vrtien CORDS completed its first major study of pacification pi^ograms (Project TAKEOFF) in June I9675 ^-"t included some candid discussj.on of the need for some kind of leverage. Entitled "U.S. Influence -- The Necessity, Feasibility and Desirability of Asserting Greater Leverage," the analysis proceeded from problem to alternative courses of action:

A. Necessity of Leve rage.

1. The most crucial problem in achieving the goals and objectives of the RD.program is that the programs must be carried out by the Vietnam^ese. Present US influence on Vietnamese performance is dependent upon our ability to persuade, cajole, suggest, or plead. Political and practical considerations usually have argued against developing any systematic use of the various levers of power at our disposal. The potential reaction of the Vietnamese may become even greater now that they appear to be reasserting themselves and when the q.uestion of sovereignty is an increasingly sensitive one.

2. However, the factors of corruption, antique administrative financial procedures and regulations, and widespread lack of leadership probably can be overcome in the short run only if the US increases its influence on Vietnamese performance. The increasing raagnitude of corruption and its damage to any program make the need for developixig and applying a system of leverage which forces the Vietnamese to take US views into account greater now than ever before- Even the best conceived and executed RD program will result in failure in terms of gaining the allegiance of the people so long as such ex-tensive corruption prevails. I85/

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The study argued that leverage was feasible either at the national level with the GVN leadership in the classic "oriental" style or on a more systematic basis to be applied through the control of resources at all levels down to province and district. The study concluded:

B. Courses of Action, US influence over key decisions must be attained as quickly as possible. We recommend the "oriental" approach. However, should the other alternative of more open exercise of power be selected^ the system would have to include US control of resources. As a tactical measure, such control could be associated initially with the introduction of additional resources. The introduction of greater US control and the procedures that would be necessary to ensure an adequate US voice in the decision-making process should be tied to the "New Team" and the new US organization for RD. For that reason^ too long a delay would be unfortunate. 186/

Whether or not Komer approved this recoiimiendation, it did not figure in the presentations of pacification given to Secretary McNamara during his 7-8 July visit to Vietnam. The Saigon policymakers were simply not prepared to come down on one agreed line of conduct in this contentious area. This tendency was exhibited later in the summer of 1967 when a long study on leverage produced in Ambassador Komer's old Wliite House staff office by two staff members^ Dr. Hans Heymann and LTC Volney Warner5 was forvxarded from State to Saigon:

In anticipating the US/gW relationship in the postelection period, it is generally agreed that the US should find ways to exercise leverage with the Vietnamese government v/hich are more commensurate in degree with the importance of the US effort to South Vietnam's survival and which reflect

the climate of growing restiveness in the US In its impatience

to get results and make progress, the US has increasingly resorted to unilateral programs and action with inadequate consultation with the Vietnamese. On the other hand, the indiscriminate and careless exercise of US leverage could undermine the self-respect of the Vietnamese government in its own eyes and in the eyes of the South Vietnamese people.

To be effective, US leverage must be exercised in the -ext of a relationship of mutual respect and confidence,^

in ways commensuratR with the ob.iective sought. It must

context

and in ways commensurate with the objective also be backed by credible sanctions. I87/

Might not the post-election period, State suggested, be a proper time to consider such a new emphasis on the use of leverage. Ambassador Komer, who had been ardent in his advocacy of leverage while working as a Presidential assistant, replied in tempered language which reflected the chastening effect of several months on the firing line in Saigon:

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All of the above forms of leverage ^ and yet others ^ could be useful at the proper time and in an appropriate way. But they must be applied with discretion^ and alwe^ys in such manner as to keep the GVN foremost in the picture presented to its own people and the world at large....The exercise of leverage in a personal manner and hidden from the public view is likely to be most effective, while of the more operational means establishment of combined organization under a JCRR-type concept, to include joint control of resources, would be most desirable. In sum^ we're gradually applying more leverage in Pacification, but wish to do so in ways that least risk creating more trouble than constructive results. 188/

What Komer really meant -- as his opinions expressed in a time fra.me later than that embraced by the present inquiry would make clear — was the necessity to reserve the use of leverage for those few occasions in which all else had failed, in which copious records detailing the failure had been accumulated over time, and in which the proven offender could be severed from responsibility after his shortcomings were presented behind the scenes to his superiors. Thus, the GOT would serve as executioner, the U.S. as observer-recorder. Leverage would be a last resort rather than a continuing tool. The product of the intermittent debate on 3.everage was not so much a decision pro or con as it was a decision to resort to leverage when all else had failed. In this sense it dodged the difficult choices.

GROPING TOWARD BETTER INEORMATI ON

One of the programs that came under Komer's jurisdiction after he took over CORDS was the controversial Hamlet Evaluation System (HES). Secretary McNamara had requested, during his October I966 visit to Vietnam, the development of some ADP system for evaluating the status of rural security on an on-going basis — data which would m^ake possible com^para-tive JT-^cignients of progress over time. In November, he sent Mr. George Allen and Colonel Carter Clark to Saigon with a proposal. MACV revised their suggested system and recommended it to the Mission Council which endorsed it on 13 December. MACV described the new system to CINCPAC in January 1967 :

HES provides a fully automated procedure for evaluating hamlet Revolutionary Development progress and establishes a hamlet level data base. Data input for HES is provided by MACV subsector advisors and district representatives, where assigned, who evaluate all hamlets not under VC control. They record their assessments in terms of I8 entries on a hamlet evaluation worksheet utilizn'-ng six factors, each with three indicators. Also, eight problem areas are evaluated. I89/

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The system operated throughout the year as something of a barometer for the entire pacification effort. It also became one of the focal points of criticism of the excessive reliance on statistical measures of progress, a criticism favored by the press in particular. Nevertheless, it was the most systematic attempt to compare results over time ever used in the assessment of rural security in Vietnam. As such it is a useful indicator. The following tables give summary data from HES for 196?. IgO/ " The first table shows population distribution according to security and development factors. The second table depicts the distribution of hamlets according to different measures of security.

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1967

M A K C H

POPULATION WeiGHTLl) INDKX* StCU^'.h / GOUO A Ha.SLEIS (3 HAMLtrS

C HAMLF-TS ,>jUN-HAi'^LET TUTAL CUKTESTtD/PUOR 0 HAMLETS E HA'^LETS **aTHKR HAViLtTS NON-HAMLET TOTAL VC Ci;rjTkQLLLO VC HAMLtTS MON-HAHLLT TUTAL TUTAL PUPULATKJM

2.33

300.9 ?ti6l.9

10^9^.7 (63.3'fo)

2;^3'J.7 4BO.0

.0 ^ 7 --t . 0

2989.7 (17.9/,)

2955.8 19 6.4

3 r.>^.? fis.a; ,')

16736,0

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POPULATION DATA

TOTAL SCPRH - COUNTRYWIDE THKUUGH DFCb^.[iE^<f 19ft7

POPULATION IN THOUSANDS

JUNb

StPTEMDFR

DECE.VMFf^

NET CHANGE

2.A2

439.4 3120.7 43r50.5 3277.3

U2Sb.9 (65.6%)

2.50

646.0 3489.7 4044.2 3 13 5-1

2 .54

69/, .0

3 '• 'U . "\

4?79. 1. 3050./,

1976,-2 402.3 152.3

290.S

11315.^ (66.5^/;)

2087.2 33 7.2

91.7 237.4

115 1^.7 (67.0:0

215 7.6

68.3 2 61-6

2821.6 {16.k%)

2923.2

164.2

275 i. 5 (16.27;)

2 809.5 13''*. 1

2801-1 (16.3/,)

2748.4

1 1?.5

-^MlAA_aS..Qll

_ZI!±i^\_XlZ3;y.

w i 6 4.9

17 012.9

__2860.jj 1 fi H :)\ 7'

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10-4

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*1N HAMLETS RATED A =5 . 3 = '=» f C = 3 • 0 = 2, F = 1 t VC = 0 INCLUDES Al^ANDONEO, PLANNED.

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f-'.ARCH

SECURE / GOOD

A HAi-^LETS

3 C

hAi^LETS

HAMLETS TOTAL

cuntesteo/poor d hamlets

e hamlets **other hamlets

tqTal vc hamlets

TOTAL HAMlcTS

99

1639 3138

A876

2348

599

0

2947 4262

12035

ha^Lft OATA TOTAL SCORE - COUNTRYWIDE

THROUGH OECEMt^ER, 1967

NUMBER OF HAMLETS

JUNE

SEPTEMBER

DECEMBER

NET CHANf^^ MAR - DEC

166

1776 32z^5

51S9

21'56

528 686

3370 3978

12 5 3 7

**\Q\-EVALUATED 'HAMLETS- INCLUDES AtJANDONED , PL ANNEO

^1? 1902 3_1_37_ 5252

2206

4B3

713

34 02 3987

1264 1

231 1809 3300

53 40

2230 A45

825

3500 3882

12722

118 I 54

5 53

6 37'

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In February I968 an analysis of I967 pacification-R/D results as revealed in the HES was published by OSD Systems Analysis.

Hamlet Evaluation System (HES) reports for CY I967 indicate that pacification progressed slowly during the first half of 1967? and lost ground in the second half. Most (60/0) of the 1967 gain results from accounting type changes to the HES system, not from pacification progress; hamlet additions and deletions, and revised population estimates accounted for half of the January-June increase and all of the June-December increase. In the area that really counts—.VC-D-E hamlets rising to A-B-C ratings--we actually suffered a net loss of 10,100 people between June and December 1967, The enemy's offensive appears to have , killed the revolutionary development prograjn, as currently conceived. Recent reports state that to a large extent, the VC now control the country-side. I91/

Written in the pessimistic atmosphere of the I968 post-Tet period this view may over-emphasize negative factors. Ambassador Komer wrote a stinging dissent that appeared in the next monthly issue of the Systems Analysis Southeast Asia Analysis Report. I92/ Statistical analysis aside, pacification clearly failed to make the significant strides that the President had hoped for in I967. It certainly did not initiate any Revolutionary Development likely to transform the qualify of life for the Vietnamese farm.er or to alter fundamentally the course of the war.

Concurrently with attempts to improve information on the security programs, MACV exhibited increased interest in I967 in improving RWAF effectiveness. Early in the year it vms decided to undertake an extensive, unit-by-unit effectiveness evaluation. Units judged to be superfluous or consistently below standard were to be cut off from U.S. support. I93/ Decisions on support withdrawal were to be made semi-annually as new evaluations were received. MACV explained to CIHCPAC that the review would include:

...all VHAF, Vm, VHMC, ARVN tactical and logistical units, and RF/pf units in the current projected FY 68 force structure. The methodology for the evaluation includes: identification of the credibility and feasibility of current plans of RVMF officials to guarantee increased effectivenessj study of unit performance trends during the past six m.onths; determination of availability of necessary plans to train personnel in the required skills; and evaluation of the degree of command interest at all levels for improvement of the ineffective or non-productive imits. Considering these factors, units are categorized as improvement probable, x doubtful, or unlikely. For those units categorized as

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improvement doubtful or unlikely, justification for continued military assistance will be required or action will be initiated to reduce the FY 68 Military Assistance Prograia. I9V

The first review (completed in March) cut two marginal navy vessels from the list of U.S. supported units, but only vrarned JGS of the unacceptable effectiveness of two marginal ranger battalions and an armored cavalry squadron- The Jun.e review, v/hile producing recorrjraendations from U.S. advisors that aid be suspended in several cases, again resulted only in warnings and threats. There was no suspension of U.S. support,

RTOAF EFF ECTIVENESS

Quantitative efforts to rate RVMF effectiveness continued in the field, at MCV, and in Wa,shington throughout the year with no clear agreement on what set of statistical indicators best portrayed RWAF performance and potential. During I966 MACV had relied on a minimum present for duty strength as a means of evaluating ARW battalion effectiveness. This method permitted wide fluctuations and was unreliable. The 1967 statistics on RVMF desertions revealed an improving ability of units to hold their men. MACV soon began to use this trend as an indicator of effectiveness. In May, for Instance, COMUSMA.CV noted with satisfaction the marked reduction of January and February I967 desertions compared to desertions in the same period in I966. The average improvement for this period V:^as about 5O percent:

Desertions/Rates (per 1000 assigned) 195/

1966 1967

January

9,251/16.0 5,900/9.6

Februar y ll^,110/2ij.3 5,860/9.6

In the same message, MACV noted with satisfaction recent aggressive actions by the JGS to correct the unacceptably high Incidence of desertions, including the singling out of three regiments for special warning on their excessive desertion rate- Year-end statistics compiled by OSD Systems Analysis indicate that the figures q.uoted by mCV in May erred on the optimistic side somewhat by undercounting RF desertions in both months by about 1,000. Nevertheless, the trend to which MACV was pointing was confirmed during the rest of the year. After rising slightly to 8,127 in March, RVMF desertion rates leveled off at between about 6,000 -7,000 per month for the remainder of I967. I96/ Thus, I967 produced only 80,912 desertions compared with 117,740 in I906, an overall reduction of almost one-third. I97/ (it also should be noted in passing, that VC/nvA desertions reached a peak in March and thereafter fell off sharply.)

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At the Pentagon^ Systems Analysis sought measures of RWAF effectiveness in a comparison betvreen the i:)erformances of Vietnajnese and American units in selected categories: VC/lWA KIA ratios^ battalion days of operations, days of enemy contact, number of operations, weapons loss ratios, etc. Sumiriarizing the results of some of these statistical studies. Systems Analysis stated in September 1967*

Per man, Vietnamese forces were about half as effective as U.S. forces in killing VC/lTA during the eleven months (Aug 66 through Jun 6?) for which detailed data are available. Effectiveness differs vridely among Vietnamese vmits of the same type and between units in differing parts of the country. Poor leadership is the key reason for inefficiency in most cases, I98/

The MACV staff rebutted many of the premises on which the statistical comparisons had been based and again revealed the difficulty in developing meaningful statistical measures with respect to anything Vietnamese.. Their most telling criticism of the Systems Analysis compo.rison of U.S. and Vietnamese units was the following:

(a) It is generally accepted that US maneuver battalions have a combat effectiveness ratio of about 3:1 to RVKAE maneuver battalions due to their greater unit firepower and depth of combat support/combat service support forces; RVT^AF also lacks the mobility assets available to US units.

(b) Approximately one-third of the RVME maneuver battalions are coimnitted to direct support of Revolutionary Development, a mission which constrains the overall potential to find, fix, and fight the enemy forces. In this analysis an RVMF unit that is U5 percent as effective as US units which have three times the RVHAF combat effectiveness would appear to be doing very well. In fact, anything over 33 percent would reflect superior performance. 199/

But here again one can be misled. One reason that ARVTT was given the r/d support mission in the first place was its demonstrated inability to engage effectively and destroy the enemy main force, r/d was regarded as a residual and semi-passive role m.ore suited to ARVN capabilities. And so the statistical arguiaents raged, partisans marshalling whatever statistics they could to defend what in most cases were their own preconceived notions.

All of this is not to imply that qualitative estimates, diagnoses, prescriptions, and prognosis were lacking in 1967- At the Guam Conference with the President, General Abrams' appoizitment as the new Deputy COMUS-MACV had been announced along with the others already mentioned and his responsibility for overseeing the U.S. advisory effort with RVMF re-i f emphasized. Upon return to Saigon prior to his own departure. Lodge

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sent a message to the President stressing the importance of RVMF:

mCV's success (which means the success of the United States and of all of us) will.. .willy-nilly, be judged not so much on the brilliant performance of the U.S. troops as on its success in getting ART.I, W and PF q.uickly to function as a first-class counter terror^ counter-guerrilla force. 200/

Lodge concluded with a glowing endorsement of Abrams as the man to see that RVMF did become an effective force. There is ample evidence that Abrams did work with great energy to do just that.

In mid-June5 after Abrams' first quarterly review of RVMF, Bunker included a report on actions to improve RVMF in his weekly report to the President:

A; Improving the leadership and enhancing the personnel effectiveness of the APVir/RF/PF through such things as improvement in the awarding of commissions and promotions, selection procedures, training of officer candidates, the introduction of an effective personnel management and accounting system, tightening up on discipline, improvement in the treatment of veterans in order to clear the ^ rolls of those Incapable of f'orther active duty and an

e^s-nded advisory effort to support properly the Revolutionary Development prograjn^

B) To improve motivation and m.orale through more eq,uitable pay scales, improvement in rations, and revitalization of the dependent housing program;

C) Improvement in the command structure and equipm.ent of the Regional/PopuJLar Forces and a revised m.otivation and indoctrination program to reflect the role of the PF soldier in Revolutionary Development;

D) a comprehensive training effort to improve intelligence and reconnaissance operations and to improve the combat effectiveness of battalions; training of ARVN/rf/pF for support of Revolutiona^ry Development particularly in providing security and support to the civil population;

E) Experimentation with various forms of integrated US/rvNAF operations.. ./discussed already/;

F) Institution of quarterly reviews at which tme progress is measured against objectives, problems discovered 8.nd decisions taken. First of these reviews vras held last month. 201/

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In May^ General Abrams established a Program Review and Analysis System for RVIIAi"^ Progress. This was essentially an internal MACV effort to exaraine the problems facing RWAF in order that MCV might structure its advisory assistance to make the most headway against these problems. The first published review, covering the January-June 1967 period5 appeared in September. Like many similar efforts it was a long catalogue of RVMF deficiencies by U.S. standards. 202 / The benefits of these reviews were supposed to be reaped as they v^ere brought to bear during the quarterly RVMF self-review called for in the Combined Campaign Plan. There is no available information as to how effectively this has worked in practice. This plethora of programs and activities through which we sought either to improve the effectiveness of RVMF directly or to promote it indirectly by mproving the lot and life of the soldier received a full-blown exposition during Secretary McNamara's trip to Saigon in July. 203/ With respect to improving RVMF morale --in addition to the pay scale adjustments;, im.proved rations, and provision of dependent housing — the U.S. has helped the South Vietnamese develop a miniature U.S. style Conmiissary/PX system.

The leadership problem received very detailed attention by MCV durin the course of 1967* Prior to the Secretary's departure for Vietnam, Alain Enthoven, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Systems Analysis, sent McNamara a memo that flatly stated, "There are a number of reasons for the ineffectiveness of many of the WMF iHiits, particularly ARVN combat battalions, but the primary one is the q.uantity and q.uality of the leadership." 2.0k/ kftev itemizing the contributing factors to this deficiency, he recommended that the Secretary query MACV in detail on leadership problems during his visit. In the briefings for Secretary McNamara in July, fourteen different MACV/JGS actions or programs were cited as ways in which this problem was being addressed. These ranged from better officer career management to regular merit promotion procedures and the publication of leadership materials. 20^/ One example of the lengths to which we have gone in efforts to remedy the leadership deficit in RVI^F is the replication in South Vietnam of the U^S. elite officer schooling system — a four-year Vietnamese Military Academy, enlarged Command and General Staff College, and, most recently, a National Defense College.

THE LATEST EXPANSION OF ADVISORS

C0MUSM/\.CV faced difficult choices in determining whether he wished to emphasize more U.S. advisors for RVMF -- or advisors for new functions or to stress a build-up of the number of UcS. combat forces in-country. RVMF strength had increased by 152^ from 1960 to I966, going up by over 100^000 in the I8 months preceding the beginning of 1967* The table below shows the growth and distribution of RVNAF over the I965-I967 period. The slight decline in forces from January to April I9675 reflects efforts to weed out absentee personnel still being carried on padded unit rolls.

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RVNAF STRMGTPIS

In March, two days before the Guam Conference was to meet. General Westmoreland sent an important cable to CINCPAC requesting an ^'optimum force" increase, above and beyond the approved Deployment Prograin k, of k-2/3 U.S. divisions (201,250 personnel spaces), or a "miniimim essential force" of an additional 2-1/3 U.S. divisions" (8^,100 spaces). 207/ The optimum force wouid have raised total UoS. manpower in Vietnam to over 670,000 troops. This reciuest was to kick off (after Guam, where it was not specifically addressed) another prolonged internal administration debate and review of forces in Vietnam which would eventually culminate in Secretary McNamara's July trip to Saigon and the subseq.uent decision to adopt deplo;yment Prograjn 5, raising total authorized strength to 525,000. COI-lUSMCV's orientation toward RVKAF's role in the war is clearly revealed in this message:

Whereas deployment of additional US forces in FY 68 will obviate the req.uirem.ent for a major exjjansion of the RVKAF, selective increases will be necessary to optimize combat effectiveness. Regular forces proposed for FY 68 total 328,322, an increase of 6,367 spaces over the FY 67 authorization. As US, Free World and RVmF operations are expanded, additional " areas will be made available for the conduct of Revolutionary Development operations. Based on experience gained thus far, an increase of 50,000 RF/pf sps.ces will be required to provide a planning figure of 350,000 spaces for this force. The increase will acconmiodate necessary support of Revolutionary Development and concomitantly, will be"compatible with requirements incident to implementation of the constabulary concept. 208/

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Without going into detail on the debate and decision on Program^5, from the advisory standpoint the important development was COI-IUSMCV' s view of RVMF. In March, RVIMAF had been regarded almost as a residual, but by September, when the ambitious U.S. force proposals had been rejected in favor of only a modest j.ncrease of about I^5,000 COI^SMACV reasserted the importance of RVmr and asked for a major increase in its authorized strength. Slowly, then, the realization that there was a ceiling on the number of U.S. forces which could be deployed without calling up reserves turned everyone's attention once again to RVMF.

The one significant increase proposed in the MACV message cited above vras the increase of 50,000 in RF/pf. This was not to be immediately forthcoming. In May I967, Secretary McRamara imposed a temporary ceiling on RVME at the level authorized for end FY 66 to prevent further inflation in South Vietnam and to arrest some of the balance of pa,yments imbalance stemming from U.S. Vietnam spending. 209/ Subsequently, |» CINCPAC was authorized to ms-ke adjustments among the various components

within that limit, thereby permitting augmentation of m^/TF at the expense of AWN. , -

The question of additional U.S. troops had refined itself considerably by the time the Secretary went to Saigon in July. Of the two force mcreas; proposals presented by mcv at that tme, the first was merely a restate-(_• ment of the old "minimum essential force" which would have brought total

U.S. troops to 571,071 (2--1/3 division force eq.uivalents); the second proposal was a much smaller req.uest for an authorized strength of 535;390 (1-1/3 division force equivalents). 210/ Both of these proposals contained a request for 2,577 additional advisors — primarily to support the anticipated expansion of Rf/pF and to flesh out the sector and sub-sector advisory teams supporting the pacification effort. The following table shows the breakdown of the I967 advisory increases, including the request presented to McWamara in July and subsequently approved.

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(u)

22 Oct 6?

• ■

. Other Nctioiv...! .Level

Air Force Ad\-:t.r;ca;v- Gr'on.p

AlWrl and mypF

Corps Ilq end Siijipojpt (/,) Capital Kilita-j Dlc-oilct

• l)iv:i.r:iono (lO) c: 24t.h Sp-cdal Zone and 5ur;y.o/. t

ft

r" BattalioiiG (120 Iiifc-ntrr)

r

JRancex- CcTi^iond (5 G]:,r;/20 Bn) Kogional Force BattaiLxonrj (12)

I Ai-jL-orcd Cavalry Squadroiio (lo)

Avd-h

740 517 493

1,147

59

a66

9S

613 130

31

Popular Force Trainij:- centers ■ • 122

107

Socior Advicor Tc:.an3 (Rc^ov.bic^O ^-y^

Subooctor Adviror Tenuis (Dir>ti^ct) 969 J^c^:lono.l Force Conipanlos

}io-;:Lonf^l ro--co Cvt\pa (ConvorLcd

from CIDG). ■ "'

Rcqiurcd Add- or.Ls

23

30

29

eu

12

'l/;3

-12

21

"13

56

137

20

52

V.1

3/;"

294

8

• 6

1

11

120

92

2.2/..

.32 50

rot el

296

828

517 493

1,176

67

861

•-*.''

110

590 • 118

109 107 1.342" 1,406

2 2''^

'p^ A

Totals

6,910

251 '699 2,577 10,/,37 211/

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The large Rf/pf advisory element in this rec^uest included spaces for 82i| W Company Advisory Teams of tvo men each and 119 Company Training Teams of five men each. Before returning to Washington, the Secretary gave planning authorization for a U.S. augmentation not to exceed 525,000 spaces, but fulfilling VIestm-oreland* s lower alternative by civilian!zing an additional 10,000 military spa^ces. 212/ A month later, after approval by President Johnson, this new force level was promulgated as Program #5. 213/ The final detailed troop list for Program #5 submitted by the JCS on September 15 contained, in addition to the regular advisory spaces already mentioned, a 666--man Special Forces augi^ientation to perform advisor-like functions with their Vietnamese coujiterparts. 2lJj-/

Even before the Pi-ograza #5 troop list was completed by MCV and submitted by the JCS, however, Ambassador Komer was complaining^that the CORDS advisory element actual strength was seriously below its authorization and that bureaucratic delays had forestalled even the deployment of the 100 priority advisors requested in July- 215/ The following day, OSD Systems Analysis advised Secretary Mclamara that the shortfall in the actual strength of the overall advisory complement was a longstanding problem. In March, the advisory program had been^under-strength 600 men while VMM headquarters exceeded its authorization by 1^73- In response to Systems Analysis prodding this discrepancy had been partialD.y rectified, but as late as July the advisory staff was still short 237 while MACV had an overage of I3O. Systems Analysis further advised the Secretary"that while total strength authorizations had been made, MACV^s delay in submitting detailed lists of grades and specialties of desired personnel had, in turn, engendered delays at this end m filling the billets. Moreover, the requirement that advisors receive preliminary Stateside background and lang-aage training further delayed the actual deployments. Only priority recLuests could be filled very rapidly, and these necessarily could only constitute a small percentage of the total.

In order to study the problems presented by the anticipated expansion of RF/pf and to plan for the significant expansion of the U.S. advisory effort to these forces, MACV convened a conference on RF/PF matters on 26 October for all interested elements of MCV and USARV. 216/ The conference recommended a complete reorientation of the advisory concept for RF/pf. Rather than assigning tea.ms to RF companies and PF^ platoons on a permanent basis, the conferees recommended the establishment of 35U seven-man Mobile Advisory Teams (mis) to be used on a rotating basis under the direction of the Province Advisor to whom they would be assigned. Itirther, the conference recommended the deployment of an Engineer Advisor to each province, an S-1 advisor to all provinces without one, increasing the Administrative and Direct Support Logistics (ADSL) companies from three to seven, and creating 7 seven-man Mobile

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Advisory Logistics Teajiis (M/lLTs) to support the EF/pf. Altogether^ the conference produced some fifty-odd recommendations from vAich a 30-polnt package was fonvarded to COmSMCV.

On 15 December^ General V/estmoreland gave his approval to the nev/ system which was to be phased in d-'^ing 1968^ the first half by the end of March and the rest by the end of that year. By the end of December 1967;* MACV v/as recommending a further increase of 366 advisors fox the FY 1969 program^ primarily for district level intelligence slots.

Meanwhile, on September 28, the JCS had for^'rarded with their endorsement the MACV-CINCPAC recoimnendation on EVMF force increases, of which the KF/PF component was the largest. 21?/ Requested \ms an increase in FY 68 RVNAT' authorized strength frcm 622,153 to 685,739? a net of 63?586. Of this number, ^7,839 were P^f/PF spaces, and only 15,7^-1-7 were for the regular forces (of which AHVN's share was 1^,966). To achieve these higher levels, MACV proposed the reduction of the draft age from 20 to 18 and the extension of tours of duty for active RVMF personnel. The advisory support for these new Vietnamese forces had already been provided for by Program #5. In their concluding paragraph, the JCS took note of a MACV request, to be considered separately, for an FY I969 RVWAF authorised strength of 763,9585 a farther increase of 78,20^ over the newly proposed FY I968 level. Of these new troops, 69,000 were to go to RF/PF (including some draftees) and only 9,000 to ARVl^. Secretary McNamara approved these requested FY I968 augmentations for RVTIAF against the recommendation of Ms Systems Analyst, Alain Enthoven, who V70uld have authorised only half of the request pending better justification. 218/ But the JCS were informed that a judgment on the proposed FY I969 increase would be reserved until the military had responded to a series of questions relating to equipment availability, officer supply, costs, and distribution of the new forces between ARVIT and RF/pF.

Thus, by the fall of I967, two factors were pushing U.S. leaders toward increasing the size and role of RVMF in the war -- a step which would increase the importance of the U.S. as advisor rather than combatant: (1) the approaching ceiling on U.S. forces deployable to Vietnam v/ithout mobilization (politically unpalatable in an election year); and (2) a growing U.S. Congressional and public clamor for a larger South Vietnamese contribution to the war and assumption of burdens.

This was essentially the situation that existed when, on 3I January 1968, the VC/WA launched a series of major attacks on South Vietnamese population centers. This radical change in enemy tactics challenged the efficacy of the division of effort between U.S. forces and RVMAF, shook U.S. public support for the war, and marked the beginning of a new, imcharted phase in the history of UoS. attempts to advise the government and armed forces of the Republic of Vietnam.

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FOOTNOTES

!• Warner R. Schilling, Paul Y. Haimnondj Glenn H. Snyder, Strategy , Z2^i:tj££_a£d^ (New York, Columbia University Press,

19o2); Henry A. Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Po licy (New York, Published for the Council on Foreign Relations by Harper, 1957).

2. Memoj Gen. J. La.wton Collins, for SecState, 20 January 1955? Rep ort on Vietnam for the National Security Council (TS).

3. Memo, JCS for SecDef, I9 October 195^, Development and Training of lnM g_enous Forces in Indochina (TS).

k. Memo, JCS for SecDef, 22 September 195^, Retention and Development o f_Forces in Indochina (ts).

5. Memo, JCS for SecDef, I7 November 195^+, Indochina (TS)-

6. Memo, JCS for SecDef, I9 October 195^, 0£. cit.

7. See letter, J. F. Dulles (SecState) to Charles E. Wilson (SecDef), 11 October I95I1 (is).

8. Msg, State to Saigon 1679, 22 October 195^ (TS). 8a. Memo, SecDef to JCS, 26 October 195^ (TS).

9. The similarities and differences are depicted graphically in Vol. IV.A., this series, pp. 27-29,

10. Memo for SecDef, 9 December I955, Raisi ng US Military Personnel Ceiling in MAAG Vietnajn (s),

11. See memo. Director CIA for SecState, I6 December 1955 (S).

12. Memo, JCS for SecDef, 21 January 1Q5S. " Reconsideration of US Military ^logram in Southeast A5^1 a (ts).

13. John D. Montgomery, The Pol:Itics of Forej^gnjUd (New York: Praeger, 1962)5 pp. 6U-70; Robert Scigliano, South Vietnam; Nat i on Under S:^:es£ (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 19*^7 PP- 163-^7-

li|-. The President's Comjnittee to Study the United States Military Assistance Program, Report, Volume 11, passim.

15. Ib^^-, Voliune III (Classified Studies), Study No. k by the Committee Staff, "Mirror Imaging," pp. 115-14?.

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16. rbl^., Volime III (Classified Studies), Study No. 2 by the Institute for Defense Analyses, "The Role of the Military in Promoting Internal Security in Underdeveloped Areas," pp. 33-3^'

17- U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 10 June I96O5 Study on

Army Aspects of the Military Assistance Program in Vietnam (S), pT^lO,

18. Ibid., p. 13.

19. The plan is contained as an inclosure to message, Saigon to State 276, h January I96I, Counte r Insurg ency Plan for South Vi et-Nam (S), Cited hereafter as CIP.

20. MAA.G, Vietnam, I5 September I96I, Geof^ra-phically Phased N ational Level Plan for Counterinsurgency (s). Cited hereafter as Geogra.phically Phased Plan.

21. CIP, pp. )4-5.

22. Ibid., p. 5.

23. Ibid., pp. 7-8. 2^. Geographically Phased Plan ^ pp. A-1 - A-7.

25. Message, Saigon to State 2525, 27 February I96O (s).

26. Message, Saigon to State 3O36, 23 April I96O (s).

27. Message, State-Defense-ICA-CAS to Saigon 28,, 7 July 1959 (S).

28. See Message, Saigon to State 212, 2k July 1959 (s); Saigon to State 24^6, 18 February I96O (c)^ CINCPAC Command History , I96O, pp. 162-63

(ts/np).

29. Enclosure to SM-139^"6l, 19 December I96I, Project BEEF-UP (TS)

30. Adapted from Report on General Taylor^s Mission to So u th Vietn am,

3 November 19*5iV looseieaf (TS), Section on Summary and Conclusions. Cited hereafter as Taylor Report .

31. State Department Buree.u of Intelligence and Research, RFE-35 1 November 1961, Commu^iist Threat Mounts in South Vietnam (S), p. 5-

32. NIE 50-61, 28 March I96I, Outlook in Mainland Southeast Asia (S), p. 7.

33- RFE-3, 1 November I96I, op. cit., p. k; Briefing Paper, n.d.. The North Vietnamese Role in the Origin, Direction, a^nd Support of the /^^ Wa^r in South Vietnam (sJV P- iv.

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3^. Memo, General Lansdale for Secref, 17 January I96I, Vietnam (S), p. 1;

35. Ibid., p. 3.

36. Ibid. , p. 11.

37. Ibid ., p. k.

38. Robert Shaplen, The Lost Revolution , Rev. Ed., (New York: Harper and Row, 1966), pp. 11+8-149.

39. Memo, wm /wait W. Eostow/ to the President, 12 April I96I, no subject (S).

kO. Memo, I9 April I96I, Vietnam (s).

kl. Memo, SecDef for DepSecDef, 20 April I96I, no subject (s).

k2. Memo, DepSecDef for Presrldent, 2? April I96I5 Erogram of Action for Vietnam (TS).

Ibid.

Memo /state Department/ to Members of Task Force on Vietnam;, 3 May I96I (TS

NSAM 52, 11 May I96I (TS).

Memo5 President for Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, 29 May 19615 Responsibil ities o f Chiefs of Am.eric an Di plomatic Missionsj forv?-arding letter of 27 May to each American Ambassador abroad. Federal Register , Vol. 26, Nr. 22, I7 November I96I, p. 10749 (F.R. Doc. 6l"11012)"T""

if7. Memo, R.L. Gilpatric for I^esidential Task Force, 1 May I96I (TS).

48. Ibid .

49. NSAM 52, 11 May I96I.

50. Ibid .

51. Ibid .

52. Msg, Saigon to State 17^3, I5 k'ay I96I,

53. Memo, Vice President Johnson for President Kennedy, 23 May I96I.

54. Ltr, President Diem to President Kenjiedy, 9 June I96I. (Emphasis added.) 55 Ibid.

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56. Memo, BG Lansdale for DepSecDef, l8 May I96I5 Vietnam.

57. Msg, Saigon to State 1+21, 1 October I96I.

58. JCSM 717-61.

59- Study, Concept of Intervention in South Vietna gi^ n.d., discussed at NSC meeting, 11 October I96I.

60. SNIE 10-3-61, 10 October I96I, R;obableCominun^^ SEATO Undertakings in South-Vietnam (TSl

61. Memo for Record, Roswell Gilpatric, 11 October I96I.

62. Taylor Report , Evaluations and Conclusions, pp. 2-3-L 63. Ibid., pp. 6-9.

0\. Msg, Saigon 537, General Taylor to White House, State, Defense, JCS,

25 October 1961 (TS/Eyes only) (Emphasis added); See also fg^ fsuxo 00„ 1 November I96I, Eyes Only for the R-esident from General Taylor (TSj.

65 Msg, Saigon to State 536, 25 October I96I (TS).

66. Taylor Report , p. 9.

67. Ibid., p. 11.

68. NSAM 111, 22 November I96I, F2£,Et_Jh^^.oOM2^HL^:2SHl (^S).

69. Msg; Saigon to State 687, 22 November I96I (S); Msg, Saigon to State 7O8, 25 November I96I (s).

70. Taylor Report , op. cit . , pp. 9~10. (Em.phasis added.)

71. Ibid., Appendix G (Unconventional Warfare), Memo, BG Lansdale for General Taylor, n.d., "Siimmary of Recommendations. (.Sj.

72. Msg, State to Saigon 619, ih November 1961.

73. Msg, State to Saigon 693, December I96I.

7I+. Ha CINCPAC, 16 January I962, Record of^Second_Secreta ry of De fense Conference (tS), pp. h-l - U-C

75. Ibid ., p. k-k.

76. Ibid ., pp. l|-5 - U-6.

77. DF, Distribution Division, DCSPER, DA to Multiple Addressees, 5 October 1961, Improvem,ent of P e rsonnel Continuity a nd^ffec tiveness m Short Tour Overseas Areas ^TsT*

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study, ODCSOPS, DA for Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, I5 September I965, Ti me Phased Build-u p of Unit Advisory Effort in RVW (s). Cited hereafter as Time Phased Advisory Build-up .

79. Ibid.

80. Ibid.

81. Ibid .

82. Ibid.

83. US CINCPAC, Com ijiand History, I962 (TS), pp. 173-75.

8l-. David Halberstam, The Making of a Quagmire (New York, Random House, 1965).

^5 Record of 6th Secretary of Defense Conference , 23 July I962 (o?s), p. 2-1.

^G. Sir Robert Thompson, Defeat ing Comm unist Insurgency (New York: Eraeger, 1966), p. 136.

87. Roger Hilsman, To Move a Nation (Garden City: Doubleday, I967), p. 502.

88. NSAM 273, 26 November I963 (TS).

89. Ibid.

90. Ibid.

91. NSAM 288, 17 March 1964, Implementation of South Vietnam Pr ograms.

92. Ibid.

93. Ibid .

9^. Ibid . ■

95. Ibid.

96. Memo, D.1A. for SecDef, I7 April 196^^ Sta tus of the Vietnamese Ha mlet Survey (ts), •" ~—

97. Briefing Book, Msce llaneous Messages, Status R ep orts, and Recommenda' tions for Se cretary McNJ mara. n.d. /Mav"l964/ fTS").

98. Ibid., Re ports on Critical Provinces.

33-

Briefing P3,per, Briefing Book for McNaughton, Saigon ^ay 196^,

7 March I96U, Establishxaent of Critical District Advisory Team.s (c).

100. Ibid.

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101. Msg, Saigon to State 2338, 28 May 1964 (S).

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102. Draft Memo for Record, Lt Col S. B. Berry, Jr., ^dl Asst to SecDef/, n.d., U.S, Embassy Briefing, Saigo n, 12 Ma y 1SQ-\ .

103. Msg, JCS to COJ^iaSi^CV 64^8, 22 May I96U, Vietnamese Civil Guard and Self Defense Corps (s).

lOU. Ibid ."

105. Msg, CINCPAC to JCS 230I+I8Z Kay I96J+, Vietnamese Civil Guard and Self Defense Corps (S).

*

106. Ibid .

107. Msg, JCS to CINCPAC 6^73, 25 ].:ay 196^-, Vietna.mese Civil Guard and Self Defense Corps (s).

108. Ibid. (Emphasis added.)

109. Ibid.

110. Msg, COmSMiACV to CINCPAC ^^259, 2700i|5g May 196^ (s). (Emphasis added.) '^ 1^1- Msg, CINCPAC to JCS, 27O8O5Z Kay 1964, Vietnamese CG and SDC (s).

112. JCSM-U6^-6J!, 30 May I96U, Pilot Program for Provision of Advisory Assistance to Paramilitary Forces in Seven Provinces (S)."

113. JCSM-^65-6U, 30 May 196^, U.S. Advisory Assistance to the Vietnamese Civil Guard and Self Defense Cor-ps (S).

llif. Ibid .

115- JCSM"^66-6J|, 30 May 196^, Provision of U.S. Advisors to Company Level Within Vietnamese Regular Ground'Fo rces (¥)".

116. Msg, COMUSmcV to JCS, MAC J32 538O, 25 June 1964, Extension of U.S . Advisory Assistance (s).

117. Ibid.

118. Msg, VJhite House to Saigon (Personal for General Paul Harkins), 27 May 1964 (C).

119. Msg, COMUSMiACV to JCS, MAC J32 5380, op. £it. (Emphasis added.) \\ 120. Memo, DepSecDef for CJCS, 22 April 1964 (u).

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121. See, for example, the papers in Secretary of Defense files, Vietnam 381 (16 January 196^0 for July-September 196^.

122. Msg, COICFSmCV to CINCPAC, MACJ-31618O, 1? July 196^4, Support Req.uirements for Extension of U.S. Adviso ry Program (SJiT

■ mw I ■> I II ■■■■*■«!■ M^w. — - 1 ■ ■ 111 I . . i_ ■ ■ ■ I I ■ I I ■ I ■ 1 ■■ ^ !■ ■■■■> ■-■ » ■ - ■> - ■ ■ ■ ' ■' ——ll." ■ ■■ ™

123. Ibid.

12H. JCSM-665-6'4, k August 196^1-, Additional S up port in RVW on Acce lerated Basis (s).

125. Msg, COMUSmCV to JCS, MAC Jl 70^^, 28 July 196'+, Pg£spnnel_Augmenta-tion (S).

126. JCSM-665-6J1, op. cit .

127. Memo, SecDef for CJCS, 7 August 196^, Additional Support for Republic of Vietnam on an Accelerated Basis (S).

128. Msg, COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, MAC J3 7738, 11 August 196^4-, Additional Sup port RVN (S).

129. Msg, JCS to CSA, CNO, CSAF et al, JCS 7953, 15 August 196!^-, Additional Support in RVW (S).

130. Msg, COMUSMACV to JCS, MAC Jl 70^1, 0£. cit.

131. MACV Msg 19118, op. cit.

132. MACV Military Report, 19-26.June 1965-

133. MACV Command History, op. cit., p. 60.

13^. MACV "Commander's Estimate of the Situation," 26 March 1965.

135. 1965 MACV Command History, 0£. cit., p. 58-

136. JCSM ^17-65, 27 May I965.

137. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, k June I965.

138. Msg, MACV to CIRGPAC and JCS I9II8, 7 J^me 1965-

139. Dod Message I51233Z April I965 (TS).

ll^-O. Department of State message 2332, I5 April 1965, 3:^^6 p.m. (TS-RODIS). lla. 1965 MACV Command History , pp. 81-82. II+2. JCS message O936, I6 March I965 (TS)

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143. COMUSMACV Message I566, 21 March I965 (TS). Ikk. JCS Message, l42228s May 1965-

II1-5. COMUSMA.CV Message, 21 May I965, Cmbined_£oj™and; COWSm.CY Message 17292, 2I1O6O3Z May 1965; Msg, Saigon to State 3855, 24 May 19o5.

146. Msg, CINCPAC to JCS 3027, 260332Z May I965 (TS).

147. 196g MACV Comrmnd History , p. 101.

148. 1965 MA.CV Command History , pp. 98-99*

149. Memo, Vincent Riritano to James P. Grant, "Joint Provincial Sign-Off Authority," with attachiaent, 25 Sep 65. (Both officials were with AID, Vietnam Section.)

150. State Department message 1039, October I6, 1965; Saigon message 1324, October I8, I965.

151. 1965 MACV Commaiid History , p. 240.

152. Pu.ritano Memorandiim, op.cit .

153. New York Times, October 5, 7. 8 and NovemlDer 26, 1965; Mission Council Action Memorandum No. 15, October 7? 1965-

■

15^. Saigon Airgram A-665 July 27, 1965* 155- Saigon Message 266, July 25, 1965*

156. Saigon Message 290, 28 July I965; Saigon message 36^, 3 August I965.

157. Defense Department message 00916^, Joint State/Defense Message, 15 April 1965 (TS-NODIS).

158. Memo, SecDef for the President, 20 July 1965-

159. , Draft Memo, SecLef for the President, 3 November I965 (TS)-

160. 1964 MACV Command Histor y, p. 68.

161. Mission Cou:acil Minutes, September 15? 19o5«

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162. Pr-esident Johnson's final statement to Honolulu Conference, Plenary Documents, 9 February I966.

163. Mission Council Minutes, 28 February I966. (Emphasis added.)

164- 1965 MA.CV Conmiand History, p. 2k3; Memo, MACJS, Rural Const ruction Cadre (S).

165. Memo, Ambassador Lodge to General Lansdale, 15 December I965, Roles of Dif f erent U,S. Agencies in the Three Phases of Rural Reconstructi o n, i,e.; Milita ry Clearing^ Pacification, and Development [c); q.uoted in I965 MACV Command History, pp. 2^5-^f-6.

166. Memo, Robert W. Komer, 7 August I966, Giving a Nev/ Thrust to Pacification . (Emphasis in original.)

167- A similar plan was, hov-^ever, espoused by an influential study by a select group of officers on the Department of the Army General Staff. See Study, Progr am for the Pacification and Long-Term ^YgJigPEggJ^Qf South V ietnam (Short "Titl e; P ROVN) , March 19^6. Cited hereafter as PROVl^ Study .

168._ Lodge's definitions do not agree with this explanation but it is a fair oversimplification of his views.

169. Msg, COMLISMACV to CINCPAC (info to White House, State, SecDef, JCS, and CIA), 26 August I966, Concept of Military Operations in Sou th Vietnam (TS).

170. MajGen JCF Tillson (j-3, MiACV), Briefing to Mission Council, 8 Aug 66

171. Memo, General Maxwell D, Taylor to President, 30 August I966, Concept of Military Orierations in South Viet-Nam (TS).

172. Msg, State to Lodge 83699, 12 November I966 (Emphasis added.)

173- MACV/JGS Combined Campaign Plan, I967 (AB 1^2), 7 November I966, pp. 193-205.

17^. Robert Shaplen, The Lost Revolution (New: Harper and Row, 1965)5 pp. 329-330. "^ ^

175. State Department message IO39, October I6, 1965; Saigon message 132^^, October 18, 1965.

176 MACV Command History, I965, op^ cit., p. 2^0.

177 Puritano Memorandiim, op. cit.

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178. New York Times, October 5, 7, 8 and November 26, I965; Mission Council Action Memorandum No- 15? October 7? 1965*

179. For a review of this entire period, see Task Force Paper IV.C, Evolution of the War: US/gVN Relation s,_1963;:67? Part II, pp- 1-10.

180. See, for example; Memo, SecDef for President, 20 July I965; Draft Memo, SecDef for President, 3 November 1965-

181. 1966 M/5.CV Command History, p. U65.

IS2. PROVN Stu dy, op. cit ., Summary Statement, pp. 1-2.

183. Ibid., p. 67.

l8i|. Msg, MACJ33 I82I+U, 12 May I966.

185. Study, MACV, ACofS CORDS, 1? June I967, Project_TAMK)FF, Vol. II, p. XI-1.

186. Ibid., p. XI-U.

187. Msg, State to Saigon 3OO23, 3I August 19^7.

188. Msg, Saigon to State 7II3, 19 September 1967-

189. Msg, MACV to CINCPAC 0211+9, I8 January I967.

190. Sm Hajnlet Evaluation System Data _Book^ through December I967, pp. I-l and 1-k; OASD/SA, SEA Prograjns Directorate.

191. "Pacification Slowdown," So utheast Asia A mly£is.ReEort, February 1968, prepared by OASD/SA SFA Programs Directorate, p. hb.

192. "Ajnbassador Komer Rebuts our February Pacification Article, South e ast Asia Analysis Report , March I968, pp. 33-34-.

193. Msg, MACV 009ij9, 9 January 1967-

194. Msg, MACV to CINCPAC l^OGk, 7 May 19^7.

195- Ibid >

196. Southeast Asia Statistical Tables, OASd/SA SEA. Programs Directorate, Table kk (as of January 196^)-

197. Ibid.

198. Southe ast Asia Analy sis Report, August I967. prepared by OASD(SA) SEA Programs DirectorarteTTsJ^ P- ^6.

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-^99* Sout heast Asia Analysis Rep ort; November 196?:> prepared by OASD(SA) SEA Programs Directorate^ Cs)7 p. l6.

200. Embassy Saigon message 21226^ EYES OKLY FOR THE PRESIDED from Lodge, March 25, I967 (TS-NODIS).

201. Embassy Saigon message 28095, For the President from Bunker^ June lif, 1967 (S-NODIS).

202. Review and Analysis System for RVNAF Pr o gress , MACV"J3^1> I6 Sep 67 (S)

203. "MACV J-3 Quality Improvement of RVNAP" and "MACV J-1 RWAF Personnel Status," in Briefin gs G iv en the Secret ary of Defense, Saigon, South Vietnam, July 7 and'57T95TTTST^ompi'led by QASD(SA) SEA Programs Directorate, pp, 163-170, pp. 249-279.

20^1-. ASD(SA) Alain Enthoven Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense,

U July 1967? Subject: Improvement in RVNAF Force Effectiveness (s).

205. Ibid ., pp. 257-259.

206. Briefin gs for the Secretary of Defense , op . cit ., p. 2^9.

207. MACV message O9IOI, Westmoreland sends, I8 Mar 67 (TS).

208. Ibid.

209. JCSM-530-675 28 Sep 67? Subject: Increase in FY I968 RVMP Force Level, (S); contains a review of the yea,r's actions to that date.

210. Briefings for the Secre tar y of Defense , op. cit., pp. 171-176.

211. MAC-J3II;, Supplemental Data Sheet A, dated 22 Oct '67? Subject: MACV Recognized Advisory Requirements (u).

212. ASD(SA) Alain Enthoven, Memorandum for Record, July 13, I967, Subject: Fallout from Secretary of Defense Trip to South Vietnam, (TS-SENSITIVE-EYES only Dr. Heyman); and OASD(SA) General Purpose Forces, W. K. Brehm, Memora.ndum for the Record, Subject: SEA Deployments (TS), July 1^1, 1967*

213- ASD(SA) Alain Enthoven Memorandum for the Secretaries of the Military Departments, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Assistant Secretaries of Defense, l4 Aug 67? Subject: Southeast Asia Deployment Rrogram #5 (TS); refers to SecDef decision memorandum, 10 Aug 67.

214. JCSM 505-67, 15 Sep 67? Subject: U.S. Force Deployments Vietnam (Refined Troop List) (TS).

215, OASD(SA) Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, 30 Aug 67 (S-EYES only) . ')

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216. Information in the paragraph is from "Information on MA.Ts (Mobile Advisory Teams) and MLTs (Mobile Advisory Logistics Teaaiis),"

8 May 68, working paper prepared by the ACofS MA, MACV.

217. JCSM 530-67, 28 Sep 67, Subject: Increase in Yi 68 RVMF Force Level (S).

218. ■ Secretary of Defense Memorandum for Chairman of the Joint Chiefs

of Staff, 7 Oct 67, Subject: Increase in FY 68 RTOAF Force Level (S) and attached OASD(SA) Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, 5 Oct 67 (s).

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(

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is.

i

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CO

)

o

APPEM)1X I U.S. Advisory Effort - Manpower l/

{ )

Hq. MA.CV

HcL MAAG USA Section USN Section USMC Section USAF Section Total

H

f-3

o

o

I

CO

CD

H-Cf H-<!

(T)

Date

Jun 1956-^un 1959 April 1961 November I96I

June 1962

■\

December I962 June 1963 DecemTDer I963 June 1964 December 196^ June 1965 December I965 June 1966 Decem-ber I966 June 1967 December I967

Auth Asgnd Auth Asgnd Auth Asgnd Auth Asgnd Auth Asgnd Auth Asgnd Auth Asgnd

216 206

335 35^

291 330

339 321

921 910

1072 1107

1820 1820

2kQ2 2030

2535 . 2527

2571 2636

2797 2831

3067 3268

^59 2/ 89

172

ll|2 225

170 530

169 2658 2lf09

16^ 2586 2h66

171 2585 2598

169 2)+93 2582

2276 l85)i

22

111

53

123

li+3 1^3 li^3

3i+ 73 7h

335 685 7k6

119 123

135 i4o

135 130

3067 3135 215 216

505I1 3573 ^66 ^71

5I4O9 ^411.52 1516 617

<^kk6 53U1 710 718

21

19 15 17

19 20

30 32 38

21 211 216 3401 3138

17

111

261 219 31+85 3280 271 232 3510 31+80

Ik 2I+5 388 3I+62 361I+

15 229 ^11 3580 3320

29 305 306 1+619 ,^793

29 1+22 3I4O 7792 6233

33 ^99 391 9938 7523

35

505 502 923^ 9123

539^ ^575 ^65 ^67 38 32 1+93 ^88 8961 9123

5607 5380 1+79 1+85 5811 5995 ^75 ^79

30

y

37 493 ^9^ 9^15

39

9227

35 kSh .U77 9856 1025^

^

1/ Data on Assigned manpower not available prior to June I962

2/ Includes 350 men in TERM

Source: I956-I96I data.ODCSOPS (OPS OD), 15 September I965; I96I-I967 data, MACV Monthly Strength Report,

RCS CINCPAC 531^1-

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Distribution of U.S. Army Field Advisory Effort

Subsectors

RF Units

PF Units RF/PF Units

Other

Total

Auth Asgnd Auth Asgnd Auth Asgnd Auth Asgnd Auth Asgnd Auth Asgnd

Source: ODCSOPS (OPS OD), 15 September I965, MACV Monthly Strength Report, RCS CINCPAC 531^

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CO

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$293.2

'l3.71-J

U

APPENDIX III

$312.9

$250. :>

$258.3

$2^5.0

z^.6%

$230.5

■537.1 J

$V8;/,o

m

mUwV:

m

-$35.8'' :i 4.39V

S20S.0 83.0%"

, n .'.v/;---

1958

1959

~'jn-rJUj^,'-V

I960

5213.0

S2.4^b

til5.,6.V^-^^^$290.8 5.39.3;

iii^l

S260.0

83*1 /o

w*i UWfcAAJ-;

:s2i.9 :j/.5'?c

^362.6

:$76.2;

• • • • • '

• • •

: 1*2.7%'

$60.A^

.$30.9'^

10.6^b

5238.0

81 .b%

m

J6.7%

$256.0

70.6%

1961

1962 1963

fiscal' year

1964

$558.1

:$39.9: '. • •

'7!i%:

• « *

y//A

10.4:0 ////

4>460.C

32.4%

^Oj'fcv;-^.'..

1965

$737.1 :-:-:-3

-$72.2 3

- • • < :9.8?^*:

5552.0

74.9%

1966

$745.9

;s2.o

n.0%

.■.•.■.■.v.".'

;■:•■^

5S35.0

71.7%

I

n

».ij~'-^~^

1967

r^

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-Tola! Cosf of RVN Army Regioiia! Forces and .

Popular Forces

(In Millions of dollars)

F^ojjular Forces

[/^ F^egional Forces

127

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/

1

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APPEMDIX IV

$433.5

V

$360.7

'J 2.5%

m

$204.6

29.4%

199.4

/»- ■

1| I

I

ill

$244.9

:■:-: i-

li

ii

1^

28.3""'

/o

71.7-7o

:;:;::ix

$207.3

1958

1959

1960

1961

i

li 11^

1962

;w%^ 50.35

A

m

m

Ml

m

....... ^

li

1963

$215.6

46.5?c

49.5%

3.9%

3.7%

:|'>^39.3%

48.1%

■.■:■:.(.

/

'm

>

!>3

::-::f^

v.-w

m il

ii

i;iX

:'>9

1

il

■.'■J / ■.\//

^■^^ ■:-rv

if

60.9%

31.3%

1964

1965

FISCAL YEAR

5.6%

\'yA\

\'.'-^

4.2%

/i?

56.S%

29.2%

1966

DistribuHon of US Financial Resource-^ in Support of RVN Anny, Rccjiona! f'orces^ and Populor f"crcos

(Cost in millions of dollars)

rr^^."^

^ RVN Army ^22 Regional Forces [?^ Populor Forces ^^ US Suppor: of RVN Budget ^^ //.ilitcry Assistance Funds

128

ft

$429.2

■VK ^-^^^

■. IV

-.■.■ • X\

i

m

I

/i.K6.B%

:■: ;■!

::{>>;45.6%

;■:■:•)

31.9%

1967

"t."

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ni

AEEENDIXJZ

$317.0

$^6.3

1958

$-11.8

$57.3

$45.2

23.9>;:;:

1960

1961

$67;o

$34.4

vx-:-:-:-:-:-:':^ /;-:':-:'-:vi:';-'-'

■:-;:-.-::;vX>x ;fc:::::::x::::5

^j^-^^^^-j^

1962 1963

FISCAL YEAR

$147.5

.25.6 ^/c:

i46.2%::

1964

y*.

$198.5

• ■ •

'15.0%

64.5%>;

$304.2

1965

■ ■ «

18.05:-

■ *

53.9%!:;

>:ii;i

iiiiil

•-^^Wiii'-V**

1966

Disfribulion of RVN krmy Financicil Resources in Support of RVN Army, Regiona! \^o\coz, oui f^opulcir Forces

(Cost in millions cf dollors)

:i6.6%:

i:i^

:•'■*• .-.■J

63.9%^:

U

■'—'j J

1967

r^

■y:-:'.-zr-^

\ Popular F-oiccs Y//\ Regional Forces |||| RVN Army

129

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4 ■

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• ■

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•■-'

■•-■.■.-.■* o.

FY 1958 FY 1959 FY 1960 FY 1961 FY 1962 FY 1963 FY 1964 FY 1965 FY 1966 FY 1967

■ Annual. Per Capita Costs for RVH Army, Regional Forces and Popular Forces

Pay & Allowcnces ^m§[ Moleriel & Mainfenoncc [v/J ^^^^'^

V

130

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

m

\>\J^^)iiL\JY.Ul inh

APPENDIX VII

y

7*.

FY 1965

FY 1966

FY 1967

-41«^J.I-<%A^^J

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::-::;::-:::■:■:-;■:■:':■:'')/'L'^::>: iXv-i-xv/t-x-x/O/Ov:'

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•••••

. . . . I O/c • • • •

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1 00%

100%

-Disiiibution of US Army Advisors By Assignment

r:v:?^=f

Corps Hq and Kq Units and Capita! Military Region [Hi Divisions Y/A Sector and Subsector [^^ Army training installations

V-X-l Other non-divisionol elements p|^ F^egionol and Popular Forces

r

131

cor^i-iDLfrjTi/iL

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APPENDIX-VIII

RVMF TOTAL STRENGTH (End of Period in OOO)

Subtotal

Source: Table lA, OSD(SA) Statistical Tables, July I968.

i960 1961 1962 1963 196^ 196^ 1966 1967

RVMF Total Strength

Regular i^e.O I79.3 218.8 216.0 25O.O 302.6 322.9 3lf2.9

Regional 55.2 66.6 77-0 85-9 96.0 I32.2 li+9.9 151.i^

Popular ^^.^ 60.1 99.5 95.5 168.3 136.^ 150.1 li|8.8

2^7.7 306.0 395.3 397.^ 51^1.3 571.2 622,9 6i|3.1

CIBG .5 15,0 18.0 21.5 28.4 3^.7 38.3

Armed Combat Youth 10.0 I5.0 kO.O 9O.7 4^.5 39-6 20.0 n.a.

National Police 16.7 I6.7 I6.9 I9.7 31-^ 52.3 _58.3 73-4

Grand Total 27^.!+ 338.2 i|67.2 525-8 6II.7 69I.5 735-9 75^.8

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APPEKDIX IX

DISTRIBUTION OF U,S , FIELD ADVISORS BY ASSIGME.NT

(End oFfy)

Corps Combat Sector Training

Hq.s a/ Units b/ Subsect or wJjF Installations Other c/ Tota^

a/Includes Capital Military District Advisors.

b/ Includes ARVN divisions, regiments, battalions, ranger, airborne, and armor units.

c/ Includes MAT, intelligence, and logistic units, d/ May 1968.