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and of divergent approaches betv:een, in the initial steps, the U.S. (focused on security measures) and Diem (concerned more vith control measures). Since the physical actions to achieve security and those to impose control are in many respects the same, there vas generated yet another area in which assessments of progress would be inconclusive and difficult to majie.

U.S. attention, once an apparent consensus had been forged concentrated on program management efforts in two categories: to convince

CtVj^T to proceed at a more measured^ coherent pace with a qualitative ' j improvement in the physical construction of strategic hamlets; and to schedule material assistance (fortification materials, etc.) and training for local defense forces to match the rate of desired hamlet construction.

U.S. assessments, at the same time, concentrated on the physical aspects of the program and on VC activity in areas where strategic hajnlets had been constructed. Assessments tended to be favorable from a security (or control) viewpoint and uneven with respect to political development. The general conclusion was aMost always one of cautious optimism when security (control) was emphasized, one of hopeful pessimism v/hen political follow-up was stressed. The impression in Washington was typically slanted toward the more optimistic appraisals if for no other reason than that hamlet constr'uction and seciirity arrangements were the first chronological steps in the long process to pacification. Was it not, after all, "progress" to have moved from doing nothing to doing something even though the something was being done imperfectly?

These U.S. assessments changed only marginally throughout the life of the progra:n. By the time, j.n 1963, that the hopeful pessinrist voices were clearer, it was also much clearer that the Ngo brothers had made the Strategic Hamlet Program into one closely identified with their regime and with Diem's rather esoterically phrased "personalist revolu !

tion." Fears grew that Diem was attempting to impose loyalty from the j

top through control rather than to build it from the bottom by deeds. These fears were not limited to the Strategic Hamlet Program, however; they extended to urban as well as rtiral phases of South Vietnamese life and were subsumed, as the Buddhist question moved to the fore, by the I

general issue of the viability of Diem's regime.

President Diem grew increasingly unwilling to meet U.S. demands for reform. He believed that to do so would cause his government to fail. U.S. observers held that failure to do so would cause the nation, not just the goverrmient to fall. In the event the government fell and the nation*s counterinsurgent program took a definite turn for the worse, but the nation did not fall. The Strategic Hamlet Program did. Closely identified witli the Ngo brothers, it was almost bound to suffer their fortunes; when they died it died, too. The new government of generals, presumably realizing the extent of peasant displeasure with resettlement and control measur^es, did nothing to save it.

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A number of contribixtory reasons can be cited for the failure of the Strategic Hamlet Prograia. Over-expansion of construction and poor , quality of defenses forins one category. This reason concentrates only on the initial phase of the progrmn, ho^^ever. While valid, it does little to explain vhy the entire program collapsed rather than only some hamlets vrithin it. Rural antagonisms "vrhich identified the program with its sponsors in the central government are more suggestive of the basis for the complete collapse as Diem and Khu departed the scene. The reasons why they departed are traceable in part to the different expectations which combined in the apparent consensus at the program^s beginning:^to^ Diem's insistence on material assistance and independence, to U.S. vrilling-ness to provide assistance only if its advice was heeded, and to the failure to resolve this question either by persuasion or leverage.

Having said this, it does not automatically follow that the prograin would have succeeded even if Diem had met U.S. demands for change. To point to the causes of failure is one thing; to assume that changes of style would have led to success is culte another. It may well be that the program was doomed from the outset because of peasant resistance to measures which changed the pattern of rural life "- whether aimed at sectirity or control. It might have been possible, on the other hand, for a well-executed program eventually to have achieved some me^-sure of success. The early demise of the program does not permit a conclusive evaluation. ■The weight of evidence suggests that the Strategic Hamlet Prograia was fatally flawed in its conception by the unintended consequence of alienat-—■ ing many of those whose loyalty it aimed to V7in.

^ This inconclusive finding, in turn, suggests that the sequential

phases embodied in the doctrine of counterinsurgency may slight some very important problem areas. The evidence is not sufficient for an indictment; still less is one able to validate the coujiterinsvnrgent doc-trine with reference to a prograiii that failed. The only verdxct that may be given at this time with respect to the mlidity of the doctrine is ji that used l^y Scots coiu:ts --■ "case not proved;*'

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IV»B.2.

CPIEC::OLOGY

DAT]

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1953-1959

1959

Late i960 Early I96I

May 1951 July 1961

15 September 1961

18 October I96I

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27 October I96I

3 I\[oveinber I96I

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13 P'Ovember I90I

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15 November I96I

22 November I961 15 December I96I

2 February I962

3 February 1962

OCClTFPvEiTCE

French and GVl'" early attanpts at population resettlement into defended communities to create secure zones.

Rural Community Development Centers (Agroville) Pro-grajii initiated by GWT.

USI^iAAG Counterinsiirgen cy Plan Vietnam completed,

Agroville ProgTam modified by construction of "Agro-Hamlets" to meet peasant objections.

Vice President Johnson's visit to RVI^I.

Staley Group report on increased economic aid and increase in RICTAF strength.

USMA^G Geographically Phased Rational Level Operation Plan for Couxiterinsurgency .

■

General Taylor arrives in RVI\"; President Diem declares national emergency.

R.G.K. Thompson submits to President Diem his Appreciation of Vietnam^ November 196 1-April I962 .

General Taylor siibmits his report and reconmiendations to President Kennedy.

RcG.K. Thompson submits his draft plan for pacification of the Delta to President Diem.

NSC drafts FS/:i 111. Cable to i^jnbassador Nolting^ instructing him to meet vith Diem^ lays out proposed U.S. assistance and expected GVN effoi't.

NSA.M 111,

First Secretary of Defense Conference^ Honolulu.

Roger Hilsman's A Strategic Concept for South Vietnaia.

Diem creates Inter-Ministerial Committee on Strategic Hamlets.

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19 March 19&2

22 March 19&2 8 August 1962 28 October I962

8 May 1962

2h August 1963

iO September 1963

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2 October I963

1 November 1963

OCCURRENCE

Diem approves Thompson's "Delta Plan'' for execution.

"Operetion SUrlRISE" commences in Binh Duong Province.

GVi^l LTational Strategic Ksjiilet Construction Plan.

GViv devotes entire issue of The Times of V ietnejn to "The Year of the Strategic Hamlet 7'

Buddhist controversy erupts "vxhen GW/ troops fire on demonstrators in Hue.

State to Lodge^ Message 2^135 says that U.S. can no longer tolerate LIhu's continuation in povfer.

General TCrulak and Mr. Mendenhall give contradictory reports on progress of var to I\SC.

Secretary McEajnara reports to President Kennedy following his visit to RVI-] with General Taylor.

Coup d^etat "by group of generals against Pi-esident Diem.

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THE STRATEGIC HAJVILET PROGRA M

1961 1963

TABLE OF COIMTEIITS AND OUTLINE

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INTRODUCTION

A. Scope and Terminology

B. Antecedents

C. The Situation in Late I961

II. THE FORMUT.ATION OF TIffi STRATEGIC HAMLET PROGRAM.

A. U.S.-GW Consultations

B. "Limited Partnership".

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G. U.S.-Proposed National Plans

D. Initial Vietnai'aese Reactions

Eo Thompson's Counterproposals

III. ■ DE\/ELOPING A CONSEISUS AMONG THE ADVISORS

■ # — ^ — p-

A. Initial Reaction of UoS. Military Advisors

B. Reactions in Washington

C. The Advisors Reach Agreement

IV. . THE ABVISORS "SELL" DIM (OR VICE^VERSA)

A. Where to Begin?

B. Concurrent GVN Activity

C. Early Signs of GVN Expectations

V. DIEFERING PERSPECTIVES AM) EXPECTATIONS

A. U.S. Military Advisors

B. UoS, Political Leadership,.

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15 16

17 18 18 18

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C. President Diem c ... ^

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D. The CentraH. Issue.

e «

20 E. The Problem of Assessment .,....»....«*•«••• • • • C

VI. THE mTION-AL PLAE" E^/[ERGES

A. Awareness of the Unifying Potential

B. "Operation Sunrise"

C. Other Early Programs

D. At Last -- A National Plar

E. Effect on U.S. Perceptions

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VIII. M IICOWCLUSIVE SUMMABT.

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20 20 22 22 24 2k 30

F. Differences Begin to Ernerge , „».«..

VII. THE PATH TO THE MTD • 35

» . . » .. » ^...—»■ . ■!» . t ■■-^ . .. .,..^~.r~-

A. Diem's Position Hardens, .,....».•«•» "^"^

B. The Program Dies With the Ugos * • • * ^^

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IV.B.2.

THE STRATEGIC IIAJ'^ILET PROGRAM, I96I-I963: (

AN APPRAISAL

I. IKTTROPUCTION

A. Scope and Terrainolo g/-

The Strategic Hamlet Prograra in the Republic of Vietnara (RW) --articulated and carried forward from late I96I until late I963 -- has created some confusion because of terminology. One source of confusion stems from the similarity betvreen the physical aspects of the program and earlier fortified communities of one kind or another. Another source of confusion rises because of the loose usage of "ham-let" as compared to "village" and because of the practice of referring to these communities as "defended/' "secure/' and fortified" as well as "strategic." But the greatest source of confusion lies in the distinction between a strategic haraJ-et £er se and the strategic hamlet program .

The ha7-Q_let is the smallest organized community in rural South Vietnam. Several hamlets (typically 3-5) comprise a village. During the strategic hamlet program both ham.lets and villages were fortified. The distinction is unimportant for the present analysis5 except as it bears on the defensibility of the community protected. The several adjectives coupled with hamlet or village were occasional3_y used to differentiate communities according to the extent of their defenses or the initial presumed loyalty of their inhabitants. More often no such distinction was m,ade; the terms were used interchangeably. Where a distinction exists^ the following account explains it.

The phrase Strategic Ham_let Program when used to represent the program is much broader than the phrase applied to the hamlets themselves. The program^ as explained below^ envisioned a process of pacification of which the construction of strategic hamlets was but part of one phase, albeit a YQTj important part. This paper exajnines the program, not just the hamlets.

B. Antecedents , .

Population relocation into defended villages was by no means a recent development in Southeast Asia. Parts of South Vietnam had experience with the physical aspects of fortified communities going back many

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years. As the intellectual godfather of the Strategic Hamlet Program has put it, the concept's use as one of the measures to defeat conmiunist insur-gency "...has only meant that the lessons of the past had to be relearn-^," 1/

( - The administration of President Diem had relearned these lessons much earlier than late I96I. There was, in fact, no need to relearn them because they had never been forgotten. The French had made resettlement and the development of "secure zones" an important element in their effort near the end of the war with the Viet Minh. The government of newly-created South Vietnam, headed since 19^k by President Diem, had continued resettlement schemes to accommodate displaced persons, to control suspected rural populations, and to safeguard loyal peasants in the threatened areas. None of these efforts involving resettlement had succeeded. Each had inspired 8.nta.gonism among the peasants who were moved from their ancestral lands and 8.way from family burial plots.

Diem*s actions in late I96I were thus inescapably tied to earlier actions by proximity in time, place, and the personal experiences of many peasants. Chief among the earlier programs W3.s that of the so-Gs.lled Agrovilles or "Rural Community Development Centers," launched in 1959-The Agrovilles, groupments of 3OO-5OO fa.milies, were designed to afford the peasantry the social benefits of city life (schools and services), to increase their physical security, and to control certain key locations^by denying them to the comraunists. 2/ They were designed to improve simultaneously the security and well-being of their inhabitants and the government's control over the rual population and rural areas.

The Agroville program was generally unsuccessful. The peasants^ had many com.plaints about it ranging from clum.sy, dishonest administration to the physical hardship of being too far from their fields and the psy- ■ chological wrench of being separated from ancestral hom^es and burial plots. 3/ By i960, President Diem had slowed the program in response to peasant complaints and the Viet Cong's ability to exploit this dissatisfaction, k/

The transition from Agrovilles to strategic hamlets in I96I was marked by the so-called "Agro-hamlet" which attempted to meet some of the peasants' obj ections:

The smaller 100 family Agro-hamlet was located more closely to lands tilled by the occupants. Construction was carried out at a slower pace filled to the peasant's planting and harvesting schedule...By the end of 196I, the Agro-hamlet had become the prototype of a vast civil defense scheme known as strategic hamlets, A^ Chien Luoc . ^

It was inevitable, given this lineage, that the strategic haml.et program be regarded by the peasants as old wine in nev/ly-labelled bottles. The successes and failuj^es of the past were bound to condition its acceptance--and by late I96I the Diem governm.ent was having m^ore failures than successes.

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C. The Situation in Late 1961

By late I96I5 if not earlier, it had become clear in both Siagon and Washington that the yellow star of the Viet Cong was in the ascendancy. Following the I96O North Vietnamese announcement of the twin goals of ousting President Diem and reunifying Vietnam under communist rule^, the Viet Cong began sharply to increase its guerrilla, subversive, and political warfare. 6/ Viet Cong regular forces, now estim.ated to have grown to 25,000, had been organized into larger formations and employed with increasing frequency. The terrorist-guerrilla organization had grown to an estimated 17,000 by November I96I. 7/ During the first half of I96I, terrorists and guerrillas had assassinated over 5OO local officials and civilians, kidnapped more than 1,000, and killed almost 1,500 RVNAF personnel. 8/ The VC continued to hold the initiative in the countryside, controlling major portions of the populace and drawing an increasingly tight cinch aroimd Saigon. 9/ The operative question was not whether the Diem government as it was then moving could defeat the insurgents, but whether it could save itself.

Much of this deterioration of the situation in RVN was attributable, in U.S. eyes, to the manner in which President Diem had organized his goverza-ment. The struggle -- v/hether viewed as one to gain loyalty or simply to assert control -- was focused in and around the villages and hamlets in the cou-iitryside. It was precise>^ in those areas that the bilineal GVN organization (ARVN and civilian province chiefs) most lacked the capability for concerted and cohesive action. The Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) was developing a potentially effective institutional framework under U.S. tutelage, but that effectiveness against the VC, Diem realized, could potentially be transferred into effectiveness against himself. The abortive coup of late I96O had made Diem even more re3.uctant than he had earlier been to permit power (especially coercive power) to be gathered into one set of hands other than his own. Still, the establishment of an effective military chain of command which could operate where necessary in the countryside remiained the prim^e objective of U.S. military advisors. lO/

A unitary chain of command had recently been ordered into effect within ARVN, but this had not solved the operational problems, for military operations were inescapably conducted in a.reas mider the control of an independent political organization with its own military forces and influence on opera.tions of all kinds -- military, paramilitary, and civic action. The province chiefs, personally selected by President Diem and presumably loyal to him, controlled politically the territory in dispute with the VC and within which ARVN must operate. They also controlled territorial forces comprising the Civil Guard (CG) and Self Defense Corps (SDC).

For President Diem's purposes this bilineal organization offered an opportunity to counterbalance the povzer (and coup potential) of the generals by the power of the province chiefs. It was a device for sui'vival. But the natural by-product of this duality, in terms of the effectiveness of actions against the VC, was poor coordination and imperfect cooperation

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in intelligence collection and prodaction^ in planning^ and in operational ^^ _ execution in the countryside, where the battles were fought -- both the

"battle for men*s minds" and the more easily understood battles for control of the hamlets^ villages, districts, and provinces.

The U.S. and GVN were agreed that in order to defeat the insurgency it was necessary that the rural populace identify with at least the local representatives of the central government. They were agreed, too, that some measure of physical security must be provided the rural population if this end were to be achieved. Both agreed that the GVN must be the 1^ principal agent to carry out the actions which would bring the insurgency

to an end.

The high level U.S.-GVN discussions held during President Kennedy's first year in office focused on what the U.S, could provide GVN to assist the latter's counterinsurgency efforts and on what GVN should do organizationally to make its efforts more effective. A subsidiary and related discussion revolved around the U,S. advisory organization to para.llel the GVN reorganization. The problem of how additional resources in some improved organizations^l framework were to be applied operationally was fragmented into many sub-issues ranging from securing the border to building social infra.structure.

The story of the Strategic Hamlet Program, as it came to be called, is one in which an operational concept specifying a sec[uence of concrete i steps was introduced by an articulate advocate, nominally accepted by 8,11

i . , of the princ3.pal actors, and advanced to a position of appa.rent centrality

in which it became the operational blueprint for ending the insurgency. But it is also the story of an apparent consensus built on differing, some-I times competing, expectations and of an effort which was, in retrospect,

' doomed by the failure to resolve in one context the problem it was designed

I . to alleviate in another — the .problem" of GW stability,"

II. THE FORMULATION O F THE STRATEGIC HAMLE T PROGRAM

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A. U.S.-GVN Con sultations

Beginn.in.g in May I96I, the U.S. and GY'!^ conducted a series of high level conferences to fashion responses to the insurgent challenge. The first, of these was the visit to Saigon by the Vice President, Lyndon B. Johnson. The Vice President's consu2_tations were designed to reinforce the U.S. commitment to RVN and to improve the image of President Diem's government.

In a comm.uniq.ue issued jointly in Saigon, it was agreed that the RVNAF was to be increased to 150,000 men, that the U.S. would support the entire Civil Guard v/ith military assistance funds, that Vietnamese and U.S. military specialists would be used to support village-level health and public works activities, and that the two governments vrould "discuss

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new economic and social measures to be undertaken in rural areas to accompany the 6.nti-guerrilla effort...." ll/ These discussions implied tha.t more GVN effort should be devoted to rural pacification and civic action and acknowledged that more regular militaz-^y forces were needed, but they did little to clarify the relationships of these parts to the whole or to an overall scheme by which the process V70uld develop.

The Staley group, a joint economic and financial committee co-chaired by Dr. A. Eugene Staley, Stanford Research Institute, and Vu Quoc Tuc, GVN, follov^ed m_uch the same pattern. Meeting in Saigon in Jime I96I, the comjnittee agreed that RVMF strength should be increased to 200,000 during CY I962 and that U,S. f\mding should be provided to various emergency economic and social programs. 12/ But the group did noghing to tie together the strands of what it recognized as the central problem: to achieve a simultaneous "breakthrough" on both the military-internal security front and the economic-socia.1 front. I3 / Its recommendations v/ere restricted (in part, no doubt, because of its limited charter) to specific program increases and to a restatement of the dimensions of the problem.

The devastation caused by the September m.onsoonal floods (320,000 refugees, 1,000 kilometers of road destroyed, 10 million acres of rice and other crops lost), combined v/ith the losses attributable to increased insurgent activity, led President Diem to declare a state of national emergency on 19 October I96I. This declaration coincided with the visit to Southeast Asia (15 October - 3 November) of General MaxweU- D. Taylor, heading a mission asked by President Kennedy to appraise the situation in South Viet-[ ^-^ nam. The President stated the scope of Taylor* s mission in the broadest

terras:

While the military part of the problem is of great importance in South Viet-Nara, its political, social, and economic elements are eq.ually significant, and I shall expect your appraisal and your recommendations to take full account of them, ik/

In his report to the President, General Q'aylor sketched out the nature and aim.s of the Viet Cong threat and assessed the strengths and weaknesses of the Diem government. He proposed a U.S. strategy for "turning the tide and for assuming the offensive in Vietnam." I5/ The report warrants summarizing in some detail, not because it outlined the main thrust of the pacification effort (it did not), but because it represents the best document to portre.y the ra.nge of U.S. concerns at the time the U.S. v^as making a major commitment to South Vietnam and because it lays out the major elements of the U.S. strategy of response.

The Viet Cong, Taylor judged, were militarily powerfu.1 and becoming more powerful. But they were not yet ready to move to the third, climactic phase of Mao's classic format for guerrilla warfare:

«

The military strategy being pursued is, evidently, to pin down the ARVN on defensive missions; to create a pervasive sense of insecurity and frustration by hit-3.nd-run raids on self-defense corps and militia units, ambushing

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the reserve forces if possible as they come up to defend; 8.nd to dramatize the inability of the GVN to govern or to build;, by the assassination of officials and the sabotage of public works. 16/

The purpose of this military strategy^ Taylor asserted, was apparently not to capture the nation by force. Rather, in concert v/ith non-military means, it wSvS to produce a political crisis which would topple the goverranent and bring to power a group willing to contemplate the unification of Vietnam on Hanoi * s terms. YjJ

It was in the U.S. interest, Taylor reasoned, to act vigorous3-y --with advice as well as aid --- in order to bioy the necessa.ry time for Vietnam to mobilize and to organize its real assets so that the Vietnamese themselves might "turn the tide" and assume the offensive. 18/ But U.S. aid and U.S. advice on where to use it were not enough. The Diem Government itself ha^d to be reformed in order to permit it to mobilize the nation. Diem had, in Ta.ylor^s assessm.ent, allowed two vicious circles to develop which vitiated government effectiveness. In the first of these circles poor military intelligence led to a defensive stance designed primarily to guard against attacks, which in turn meant that m.ost of the military forces came under the control of the province chiefs whose responsibility it v^as to protect the populace and installations. This control by province chiefs meant that reserves could not, because of tangled lines of command and control, be moved and controlled quickly enough to be effective. The effect of high losses in unsuccessful defensive battles served further to dry up the basic sources of intelligence. 19/

The second vicious circle stemmed from Diem's instinctive attempts to centralize power in his own hands while fragmenting it beneath him. His excessive mistrust of many intellectua.ls and younger Vietnam-ese, individuals badly needed to give his administration vitality, served only to alienate them, and led them to stand aside from constructive participation thereby farther increasing Diem's mistrust. 20/ This administrative style fed back, too, into the military equation and through it, created another potentially explosive political-m-i2.itary problem:

The ine,bility to mobilize intelligence effectively for operational purposes directly f3-ov/s from this fact /piem's administrative pra.ctice/ as do the generally poor relations between the Province Chiefs and the military comma.nders, the former being Diem*s reliable agents, the latter a povzer base he fears. The consequent frustration of Diem's military commianders --a frustration well-knovm to Diem and heightened by the November I96O coup — leads him to actions which further complicate his problem; e.g., hj.s unwillingness to delegate military operations clearly to his generals. 2l/

General Taylor*s recoiranended actions for the U.S. were designed to demonstrate U.S. commitment in order to strengthen Diem*s stand and.

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simultaneously, to broaden U.S. participation in the hope of "bringing , about necessary reforms in Diem*s regime. The President's emissary rejected

the alternatives of a military takeover v/hich would make the generals dominant in all fields. He rejected^ too, the alternative of replacing Diem with a weaker figure who vrould be V7illing to delegate authority to both military and civil leaders. 22/ The first course would emphasize the solution to only one set of problems while slighting others; the second would permit action, but not coordinated action.

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B.- "Lmited Rirtnershi-p"

In order to move in a coordinated way on the intermingled military, politice^l, economic, and social problems facing South Vietnam, General Taylor recommended that the U.S. initiate a "limited partnership" which would stop short of direct U.S. action but would also, through persuasion at many levels judiciously mixed with U.S. leverage, ". . .force the Vietnamese to get their house in order in one area after another." 23/ In-crea.sed ma.terial assistance from the U.S. would be accompanied with increased U.S. participation at all levels of government in which the American advisors must "...as friends and partners -- not as arms-length advisors -- show them how the job might be done -- not tell them or do it for them." If strongly motivated, tactf\il Americans were assigned primarily outside Saigon, thus avoiding the establishment of large headquarters not actually engaged in operational tasks, Taylor thought that this increased U.S. participation would not be "counter-productive"; e.g., lend substance to claims of U.S. imperialism and dominance of the Diem Govermnent. 2_^/

'.^ Thus, Taylor consciously opted for a U.S. course of action in which

the major thrust of effort would be to induce Diem to do the things that the U.S. thought should be done: to draw the disaffected into the national effort and to organize and eq.uip so that effective action would be possible. General Taylor did not a,rgue explicitly that success would follow automatically if Diem's practices could be reformed and his operational capabilities upgraded, but he implied this outcome. The question of an overall strategy ■ to defeat the insurgency came very close to being regarded as a problem in the organizs.tion and management of resources. Since GVN had no national plan, efforts were concentrated on inducing them to produce one. There v/as much less concern about the substance of the non-existent GVN plan. It was almost as though there had to be something to endorse or to criticize before substantive issues could be treated as relevant.

C. U.S.-Proposed National Plans

f Tliis priority of business is reflected in the U.S. plans which

were proposed to GVN for adoption by the latter. In late I96O the U.S. Country Team in Saigon produced an agreed " Counterinsujrgency Plan for Viet-Nam" (CIP). The plan was an attempt to specify roles and relationships v^ithin GVN in the counter insurgency effort, to persua.de Diem to abandon his bilinea,l chain of command in favor of a single command line with integrated effort at all levels within the government, and to create the governmental machinery for coordinated national planning. 25/ It

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v/as recognized that these recommendations were not pa,latable to President Diem^ but reorganization along the lines specified was regarded as essential to successfu.l accomplislrtnent of the counterinsurgent effort. 26/

The CIP was an indictment of GVJ^"" failure to organize effectively and to produce coordinated national plans. 27/ It advanced no operational concepts for adoption "by GVN, This obvious omission was corrected in the "Geographically Phased National Level Operation Plan for Counterinsurgency" which MAAG Vietnam published on 15 September I96I. 28/ Not only did this p].an specify the areas of primary interest for pacification operations --as its title indicates -- it also set forth a conceptual outline of the three sequential phases of actions which must be undertaken. In the first/ "preparatory phase/' the intelligence effort vras to be concentrated in the priority target areas^ surveys were to be made to pinpoint needed economic and political reforms, plans viere to be drawn up, and military and political cadres were to be trained for the specific objective area. 29/ The second, or "military phase," vrould be devoted to clearing the objective area with regular forces, then handing local security responsibility over to the Civil Guard (CG) and to establishing GVN presence. 30/ In the final, "security phase," the Self Defense Corps (SDC) v/ould assutne the civil action-local security mission, the populace was to be "reoriented," political control wa.s to pass to civilian hands, 8.nd economic and social programs were to be initiated to consolidate government control. Military units would be withdrawn as security v/as achieved and the target area would be "secured" by the loyalty of its inliabitants -- a loyalty attributable to GVN's successful responses to the felt needs of the inhabitants, 31/

Pirst priority in this plan (I962 operations) was to go to six provinces around Saigon and to the Kontum area. Second priority (I963) would be given to expansion southv/ard into the Delta and southward in the Central Highlands from Kont-oia. Third priority (196^) would continue the spread of GVN control in the highlands and shift the emphasis in the south to the provinces north and east of Saigon. Before any of these priority actions were undertaken, however, it v/as proposed to conduct an ARVN sv/eep in War Zone D, in the jungles northeast of Saigon, to reduce the danger to the capital and to increase ARVN^s self-confidence. 32/ (See Map 1.)

The geographically phased plan comp3.emented the earlier CIP. Together, these two U.S. efforts constituted an outline blueprint for action. It is, of course, arguable tha.t this was the best conceivable blueprint, but it was at least a comprehensive basis for refinement — for arguments for different priorities or a changed "series of events" in the process of pacification.

D. Initial Vietnamese Reactions

This is not how matters proceeded, ixi the event. Ambassador Durbrov;, General McGarr, and others urged acceptance of the CIP upon President Diem., but with only partial success. 33/ Diem stoutly resisted the adoption of a single, integrated chain of operational comjnand, showed no enthusiasm for detailed prior planning, continued his practice of cen--tralized decision-marking (sometimes tanta.mount to decision piegoiiLioling),

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and continued to play off the province chiefs against the generals. Some aspects of the CIP were accepted, bu": the "basic organizational issues remained unresolved and the strategic approach unresolved by default.

The unsuccessful U.S. attempts to secure organizational reforms within the Diem, govern-ment had assux-.ed psychological primacy by the time of General Taylor's October I96I mission to Saigon. The American position v/as essentially that no operational plan could succeed unless GVN were reorganized to permit effective Implementation. It was reorganization that Taylor em.phasized, as detailed above. But General Taylor did bring up the need for some coordinated operational plan in his talks with President Diem. Diem's response is iescribed in a cable to V/ashington '^ by Ajmbassador Nolting:

Taylor several times stressed importance of overall plan -- military^ political, eccnomic, psychological, etc. --for dealing with guerrillas. Diem tended avoid clear response this suggestion but finally indicated that he has a new strategic plan of his own. Since it was not very clear in spite efforts to drav?" hm ou- what this plan is, Taylor asked him, to let us have a copy in v^'riting. bV

E. Thompson's Counterproposals

Presj.dent Diem may have been whistling in the dark about a new plan of his own. It is likely, however, that he was already conversant with the ideas of a new high level advisor who had been in Saigon for several weeks and whose .approach to prosecuting the war he would scon endorse officially as his ovm. The advisor V7as RGK Thompson, a British civil servant who had come from the position of Permanent Secretary of Defense in Malaya. Thompson's British Advisory Mission was in Saigon in response to Diem's req,uest for experienced third country nationals to assist him in his counterinsurgent operations. There had been some initial U.S. objection to British "advice without responsibility," but fears had been temporarily allayed vrhen it was agreed that Thompson's charter would be limited to civic action matters.

Thompson provided Diem his initial "appreciation" (or, in U.S. terminology, "estimate of the situation") in October 196I. 35/ His assessment was well received by the President5 who asked him to follov; it up with a specific plan. Thompson's response, an outline plan for the pacification of the Delta area, was given to the President on 13 November. Thus, Thompson was in the process of articulating one potentially com,prehensive strategic approach at the sam,e time that the U.S. was deeply involved in fashioning a major new phase in U.S.-GVH relations in which major new U.S. aid would be tied to Diem's acceptance of specified reforms and, inferentially, to his willingness to pursue some agreed, coordinated strategy. Thompson's plan was, in short, a potential rival to the American-advanced plans represented by the CIP and the geographically phased MAAG plan of September I96I.

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In order to assess the similarities and differences betv^een tte U.S. plans and that advanced by the British Advisory Mission^ it is necessary to summarize Thompson's argument and proposals. Like Taylor (with whom he talked and to whom he gave a copy of his initial "appreciation" at the latter's request), Thompson saw the VC objective to be one of political denouement by combined military and political action rather than a military takeover of the entire nation. Like McGarr and the other U.S. military advisors, he recognized the probability and danger of VC attempts to control the unpopulated areas and to use them both as a base form which to project an image of political strength and as secure areas from v^hich (in the case of ¥ar Zone L, northeast of Saigon) to threaten the capital. But unlike the U.S. military advisors, Thompson viewed the primary threat to be to the political stability of the populated rixral areas. 36/ Consequently, he regarded McGarr*s proposed initial operation in War Zone D to be a step in the wrong direction.

The main governmient target, Thompson argued, should not be simply the destruction of VC forces. Rather, it should be to offer an attractive and constructive alternative to conmunist appeals. This could on2-y be done by emphasizing national reconstruction and development in the populated rural areas. To do so would require extensive and stringent seciu-ity measures, to be sure, but these measures required primarily police rather than regular military forces. The police could establish a close rapport with the populacei the army could not. The army should have the mission to keep the VC off balance by mobile action in order to prevent insurgent attacks on the limited areas in which GVJM would concentrate its Initial pacification efforts. 37/

This line of argument v^as more fully developed in Thompson's draft plan for the pacification of the Delta area, given to President Diem on 11 November. 38/ The objective of the plan was to win loyalties rather than to kill insurgents. For that reason Thompson selected a populous area with relatively little VC main force activity. The thrust of his proposal was that "clear and hold" operations should replace "search and destroy" sweeps. ARVN might be used to protect the villages while the villages were organizing to protect themselves and mobile ARVN forces must be available to reinforce local defense miits, but the process should be abandoned of "sweeping" through an area — and then leaving it. The peasants must be given the assurance of physical security so that economic and social improvements, the real object of the plan, could proceed without interruption.

The means by which the villagers would be protected was the "strategic harnlet," a lightly guarded village because it was -- by definition --in a relatively low risk area. More heavily defended centers, called "defended hamlets" and involving more relocation, wou3.d be employed in areas under more VC influence, particularly along the Cambodian border.

To control this effort in the Delta, Thompson recoimaended that the ARVN III Corps Headquarters be reinforced with paramilitary and civil components, relieved of its responsibility for the area around and north of Saigon, and function under the immediate supervision of the A^ational

Security Council -- presided over by President Diem, The province chiefs,

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already imder Diem's personal direction, would be responsible on all emergency matters to the reinforced III Corps HeadCLuarters (to be called the Combined Headc[uarters)^ but continue as before with respect to routine administration. 39/

Thompson presented this Delta plan as a program of wide potential:

...It should lead by stages to a reorganization of the government machinery for directing and coordinating all action against the comm.unists and to the production of S'H o verall strategic operational plan for the country as a whole defining responsibilities, tasks and priorities. At the same time it will lead to the establishment of a static secTJirity framework whj.ch can be developed eventually into a National Police force into which can be incorporated a single security intelligence organis^ation for the direction and coordination of all intelligence activities against the commimists. I agree with Your Excellency that it would be too disruptive at the present moment to try to achieve these immediately and that they should be developed gradually. Using a medical analogy, the remedy should be clinical rather than surgical. ^^0 '

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III. DEVELOPING A CONSENSUS AMOm Tffl] ADVISORS

A. Initial Reaction of U.S. Military Advisors

It is not difficult to imagine the shocked reaction to Thompson's proposals, especially in U.S. military circles. In fact, one need not imagine them; General McGarr has recorded a detailed rejoinder to Thompson's proposals. He was, to begin with, upset about the lack of prior coordination:

case

Following Mr, Thompson's medical analogy. . .we have the of a doctor called in for consultation on a clinical case, actually performing an amputation without consulting the resident physician -- and without being required to assume the overall responsibility for the patient, kl/

General McGarr's unhappiness with Thompson was not simply a case of injured feelings. He had four related categories of disagreements with the plan proposed by the British Advisory Mission. First, Thompson's recommended command arrangements, if adopted, would demolish the prospect of a unite.ry chain of comimand within ARVN, an objective toward which McGarr had been v/orking for over a year. Additionally, the Thompson proposals would leave Diem as the ultimate manager of an operation dealing with only a portion (the Delta) of RVN. The elimanation of practices such as this had been an explicit otjective of the entire U.S. advisory effort for a long time.

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Second^ the proposed priority in the Delta clashed with McGarr's priorities which placed War Zone D first^ the area around Saigon second, and the Delta third. There was a lack of unanimity among the U.S. advisors about the relative importance of the War Zone D operation but the military, in particular, were looking for an important operation to help the (hopefully) revitalized ARVN demonstrate its offensive spirit and mobile capabilities- This desire gave rise to the third and fourth objections -- or fears.

The "static security framev/ork" in the villages to which Thompson referred struck General McGarr as an unwarranted downgrading of the need for a sizeable conventional military force to play an important role in pacification. Thom.pson's stated desire to emphasize police forces in lieu of regular military forces was regarded by the U.S. military advisory chief as unrealistic -- a transferral of Malayan experience to a locale in which the existing tools of policy were very different.

Related to this objection was a final set of disagreements* Thompson had wanted to go slowly and to let a new GVN organization grow from the effort. The U.S. military advisory chief also wanted to go slowly -• but not that slovjly. Not only would the Viet Cong not wait, it was simply unsound policy not to use the tools at hand. It would not do to reduce the ARVN and increase police forces while the VC continued thier successes. It was necessary, in sum, to act in a lim.ited area but to act q.uickly. Thompson's recommendations did not look to quick action, emphasized the wrong area, were designed to em.phasize the wrong opera.tional agency, and proposed unacceptable command lines. W^

It is important to note that in' spite of these explicit disagreements there v/ere broad areas of apparent agreement between Thompson and his U.S. counterparts. ( Apparent , because the "areas of agreement" concealed' differences, too.) The U.S. MAAG was am.enable to the development of strategic hamlets. General McGarr claimed. W^ Indeed, MAAG's long, diffuse doctrinal "handbook" for advisors in the field did devote three pages -- without any particular emphasis --to the "secure village concept," hh j MAAG did not stress the centrality of strategic hamlets -p^T se , but neither did Thompson. Strategic hamlets were to Thompson a way station enroute to his real objective -- winning the loyalty of the rural peasants. This was apparently compatible with the sequential steps to pacitication outlined in MAAG*s own Geographically Phased Counterinsurgency Plan. If the com.peting approaches of the U.S. and British advj.sors had not been made compatible, there was, at least, some agreed ground from which to launch the effort to make them compatible,

B. Reactions in Washington

That such ground existed was fortunate, for Thompson's evolutionary plan v/as not only finding a warm reception at the Presidential Palace, it was also v/-inning an attentive ear in Washington. As already mentioned, Thompson talked v/ith General Taylor during the latter's October I96I mission to Saigon and provided Taylor a copy of the initial British "appreciation."

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Copies of the Thompson memorandum on the Delta were also forwarded to Taylor at the latter*s req.uest. "^ Then in January 1962^ Thompson, again responding to Taylor^s request, sent the latter a long letter outlining his views. In less tha.n a month. General Taylor could present to President Kennedy a plan entitled "A Strategic Concept for South Vietnam" by Roger Hilsman which was an unabashed restatement of most of Thompson's major points and toward which President Kennedy had, not incidentally, already expressed a favorable disposition. ^4-6/

Hilsman's "strategic concept" avowedly flowed from three basic principles: that the problem in Vietnam presented by the VC was political rather thaamilitary in its essence; that an effective counterinsurgency plan must provide the people and villages with protection and physical security; and that counter guerrilla forces must adopt the same tactics as those used by the guerrilla himself. ^7/

To translate these principles into operational reality, Plilsman called for "strategic villages" and "defended villages" a la Thompson, with first priority to the most populous areas; i.e., the Delta and in the vicinity of Hue. U8/ ARVN would, much as in Thompson's proposal, secure the initial effort, when necessary, and be employed to keep the VC off balance in those areas already under Viet Cong control. The plan envisaged a three-phase process by which GVN control would progressively be expanded from the least heavily VC-penetrated provinces with large populations (phase l), into the more heavily penetrated population centers (phase II), and finally into the areas along the Laotian and Cambodian borders (phase III). 49/ Hilsman eschewed use of the "oil spot" analogy but the process and rationeJ_e he put forth were the same. His plan moved "strategic villages" to a place of prominence greater than that in Thompson's Delta plan and far in excess of the offhanded acceptance which had thus far been afforded them by U.S. military advisors. Strategic haml.ets were not the heart of the Hilsman plan -- civic action was that -- but they were the symbol the easily recognizable, easily grasped initial step by which GVN could begin, following Hilsman's second principle, to "provide the people and the villages with protection and physical security." 50/

C. The Advisors Reach Af^reement

Thompson's basic ideas were gain3.ng wide dissemination at the highest level within the U.S. government in early 1962. What of his relations with the U.S. MAAG in Saigon? These had been significantly improved as the result of a meeting between Thompson, Ambassador Nolting, and British Ambassador Hohler. Thompson agreed to revise his paper so as to remove the objection to his proposed coimnand arrangements. Ambassador Nolting reported that Thompson was now working "closely and amicably" with MAA.G. 51/ This took care of one of McGarr's objections. Thompson had apparently decided, too, to allow the issue to drop for the time being of police primacy in pacification vis-a-vis ARVN. It was not, after all, a change that could be made quickly; President Diem was convinced that some start wa.s needed to save his administration. That had been his reason, after all, in reluctantly inviting increased American participation in the war.

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Secretary McNamara played an important role in disposing of still another issue in dispute -- that of where to begin. In mid-December I96I5 after President Kennedy had decided to adopt essentially all of General ^ Taylor's November recommendations except the introduction of major U.S. ■ forces into Vietnam, Secretary McNamara m.et in Honolulu with the U.S. principals in Vietnam to discuss futuire plans. A central q,uestion was that of what could be done in the short'term future. The Secretary of Defense made it clear that RVN had "number one priority/' 52/_ McNamara urged concentration on one province: "I'll guarantee it"7^he m.oney and eq.uipmen_t7 provided you have a plan based on one province. Take one place^ sweep it and hold it in a plan." ^3/ Or, put another way, let us demonstrate that in some place, in some way, we can achieve demonstrable gains.

General McGarr, immediately upon his return to Saigon, vrrote to Secretary Thuan and passed on this proposal:

I vrould like to suggest that you may wish to set aside one specific area, say a province, and use it as a "test area," in establishing this type "pacification infrastructure." My thinking is that all the various elements of this anti-VC groundwork be designated irrmiediately by your government and trained as a team or teams for the actual reoccupa-tion and holding of the designated comjmmist infiltrated area when it has been cleared by RVMF military action. ^

Such teams would embrace, McGarr suggested, police, intelligence, financial, psychological, agricultural, medical, civic action, and civil political functions. 55/

IV. TI-IE ADVISORS "SELL" DIEM (OR VICE-VERSA ) A. VJhere to Begin?

GVN did indeed have a province in mind. It was not a Delta province, however. Nor was it a province relatively secure from VC infiltration. Quite to the contrary, Binh Duong Province, extending north and northwest of Saigon, had been heavily infiltrated. Its main comm.unications axis (N3.tional Highway 13, extending northv,-ard from Saigon into Cambodia) sliced directly betvreen War Zone D and War Zone C. The province was crossed by important routes of communications, lia.ison, and supply between two insurgen redoubts. Hardly the logical place to begin, one might say, but "logic" was being driven by events and desires more than by abstract reasoning.

One desire was the widely held wish to do something concrete and productive as a symbol of U.S. determination and GVN vitality. Another desire was GVN's wish to commit the Americans to support of Diem's government on terms V7hich would be in fact acceptable to that government and would — equally important — appear to be U.S. support for GVN-initiated actions- If one were Vietnamese one m-ight reason that Binh Duong was an

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area of unq.uestionable strategic importance — and one in which GVN had already initiated some pacification efforts. If the Americans wish to concentrate in one province and if they are willing to underwrite the effort with resources J why not begin in an important strategic area where w^ork, is already underway?

GVI^ had initiated^ in August 1961;, a "Rujral Reconstruction Campaign" in the Eastern Region of South Vietnam to secure the provinces of Tay Ninh, Binh Duong, and Phuoc Tuy. 56/ Most of the effort prior to December I96I had been concentrated in the Cu Chi District of Binh. Duong. Xom Hue Hamlet of Tan An Hoi was, during December, in the process of being fortified as a strategic hamlet. $7/ General McGarr was under the impression that "considerable progress" had already been made in these three provinces in the establishment of the GVN village level activities so necessary to winning popular support. ^8/

In mid-January General McGarr met (just prior to his departure for Honolulu) with President Diem and Secretary Thuan to discuss pacification plans. As McGarr told Secretary McNamara, Diem stressed that the MAAG-endorsed military operation in War Zone D might merely close the string on an empty bag. Such a failure would be detrim^ental to ARVN morale. Besides, the President observed echoing Thompson, "sweeps" solved nothing; the problem was to hold an area and to separate the VC from the rest of the populace. Diem preferred a concentrated effort in Binh Duong, a heavily infiltrated province, close to Saigon, of great strategic importance, and in which only 10 of k6 villages were under GVN control -- but in which the groundwork for a sound government infrastructure had already been laid. 59/

The discussions at the Secretary of Defense's Conference in Honolulu turned on whether or not the War Zone D operation offered more hope for a concrete gain than a "single province" pacification scheme. McNamara concluded that it did not. General McGarr dissented mildly from the selection of Binh Duong. He would have favored Phuoc Tuy (v:here U.S. troops were scheduled to land if a decision were ever made to commit them). But Binh Duong -was GVN^s plan and the "limited partners" finally agreed to back Diem's preferred attempt. 60/ Thus, the U.S. came to a roundabout decision to support as a "test" of what would later be called the "strategic hamll,et program" an operation about whose details they knew little, in an area that al3- recognized to be difficult, because it al3.egedly represented a long-sought example of GVN initiative in planning and civil-military preparation. Much of the public image of the stra^tegic hamlet program was to be established by this operation, as it turned out. Its name was "Operation Smarise." But it was not -- U.S. desires to the contrary --the only strategic hamlet effort to be carried fort-zard during this period. It wa,s only one of several -- and several grew very g[uickly into m.any.

B. Concurrent GVN Activity

It has already been suggested that President Diem responded with some enthusiasm to the early proposals from Thompson's British Advisory Mission. In mid-February 1962, President Diem approved orally Thompson's

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"Delta Pacification Plan" and said he would like to see it executed vath-out delay. 6l/ Earlier, on 3 February, he had created "by presidential decree the Inter-Ministerial Committee for Strategic Hamlets (IMCSH) , comprising the heads of various ministries (Defense, Interior, Education, Civic Action, Rural Affairs, etc.)- 62/ The IMCSII was, as its membership indicates, a coordinating body designed to give national direction and guidance to the program. Its importance is not in its work -- for it apparently did very little -- but as an indicator of Diem's early I962 thinking of strategic hamlets as a national program and of the central role which his brother^ Fgo DinJi IMhu, would play in this program.

AThu was the real driving force behind GVN's uneven but discernible movement tov/ard adoption of the strategic hamlet theme as a unifying concept in its pacification efforts. In the early period under discussion he masked his central role, however. He was not announced as the Chairman of the IMCSH (nobody was), but the committee v/as responsible to him. 63 / He did not, however, lead it actively. As two American observers remarked at the time, "Nhu seems to have consulted the committee seldom and to have shared his policy-making power with it even less freq.uently." 6U/

C. Early Signs of GVN Expectations

But although brother Nhu was behind the scenes in late I96I and early I962, an occasional fleeting glimpse of his thinking and the direction in v/hich he was heading has still managed to show through. A CIA report from Saigon summarized Khu*s instructions to a dozen province chiefs from the Delta in a meeting held on l4 December I96I. Primary emphasis was to be placed on the strategic hamlet program, Hhu sa.id, and this program was to be coupled with a "social revolution" against "Viet-Nam's three enemies: divisive forces, low standard of living, and communism." 6^ / The CIA Task Force - Vietnam observed, in forwarding this report, that Khu's "social revolution and strategic hamlets appear to be fuzzy concepts with little value in the fight against the Communists." 66/

l^o doubt these concepts seemed fuzzy at the end of I96I. But within another twelve months, as events would prove, they would be widely recognized as the twin spearheads of GVN^s counterinsurgent effort, fuzzy or not. The strategic hamlet program would have broad support within the U.S, governm-ent and financial resources to underpin tha,t support. The "social revolution" to which ffliu referred in December I96I would be surfaced as Diem's "personalism." drive. The important thing for the present analysis is that all of the expectations of the several participant groups — both U.S. and GVN -- were identifiable by very early I962 at the latest, and that the concept of the strategic hamlet program in the broad sense had been fully adumbrated. The skeleton — the rationale -- was complete; the body -• operational programs — had not yet taken form. Each group could, however, work toward construction of a slightly different body (and for differing reasons) and claim with some pla^usibility to be working from the same skeleton.

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V- DIFFERING PERSPECTIVES AM) EXPECTATIOJMS

Three somewhat different viev^s may be categorized which are of interest to the present inq^uiry: those of the U.S, military advisors, of the U.S. political leadership, and of the Diem government's leaders. Such generalizations are admittedly risky and easily overdrawn; there were, of course, differences between the perceptions and expectations of, say, the U.S. military advisors. For example, those farthest from Saigon tended to be less patient -- with Diem and in expecting results — than were those closer to the area of operations. Still, discernible differences of outlook and expectations may be said to represent the prevailing views in each of these three groups.

A. U.S. Military Advisors

The U.S. military advisors mistrusted argiunents which stressed the Vietnamese struggle as essentially political rather than military. They were CLulte willing; to concede that the struggle was multi-dimensional but they feared instinctively any line of reasoning which might appear to argue that military considerations were relatively unimportant in Vietnam. So, too, they were wary of schemes which might lead ARVN to perpetuate Its defensive tactical stance. Both dangers were present in the strategic hamlet program. The same military advisors were more forceful than others In stressing the need for the Diem regime to rationalize its comjnand arrangements and to plan comprehensively and in detail from the highest to lowest levels. Their operational interest concentrated on making ARVN not just more mobile but more aggressive. Their creed, developed through years of experience and training (or vicarious experience) was to "close with and destroy the enemy." One could expect them, then, to be more than willing to turn over the job of static defense to the CDC and CG at the earliest opportunity, to keep a weather eye out for opportunities to engage m-ajor VC formations in decisive battle, and to chafe under the painfully slov;-evolutionary process which was implicit even in their own I96I geographically phased plan.

B. U.S. Political Leadership

'The U.S. political leadership, and to varying degrees the leaders in the Saigon Embassy and in USOM, were more attimed to the political problems -- both with respect to GVN-U.S. relations and to the problem of winning broad support among the Vietnamese for the Diem administration. This made members of this group inherently more sympathetic to proposals such as the Thompson plan for the Delta than they were, for Instance, to increasing ARVN*s size and capabilities. They found compelling the logic of analyses such as Hilsman's which cut to the political root rather than treating only the military symptoms. One suspects -- though documentation would never be found to support it -- that they were attracted by an argument which did suggest some hope for "demilitarizing" the war, de-em^phasizing U.S. operational participation, and increasing GVN's ability to solve its own lnterna-1 problems using primarily its own human resources.

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C. President Diem

Ngo Dinh Diem's perspective and expectations were the most different of all. U,S- groups differed in dregre; Diem's expectations were different in kind. He v^anted^ first of all, to obtain unequivocal U.S. support, not just to his nation but to his adiainlstration. It vras essential, in his eyes, that this support not compromise his authority or Vietnamese sovereignty. Pie did not vrant to give credence to communist claims that he was a puppet of the U.S., on one hand, or concentrate the coercive instruments of power in the hand of potential antagonists, on the other.

A revealing assessment of Liem's frame of m.ind is provided by Ajnbassador Nolting. Diem invited increased U.S. aid and U.S. participation because he feared that, especially with an impending settlement in Laos, South Vietnam, v/ould come under increasing communist pressures. If Diem*s goverziment could not win over these pressures -- and Diem feared it could not -- it had only the choice of going down fighting or of being overthrown by a coup. Thus, in req.uesting additional U.S. help. Diem had "adopted an expedient which runs against his own convictions, and he is apparently willing to accept the attendant diminution of his avin stature ■as an independent and self-reliant national leader." 6?/

But when Ambassador Nolting presented to Diem the U.S. quid pro quo for its lirflited partnership," this apparent acceptance of decreased stature and independence suddenly seemed less apparent. 68/ Then, as I Nolting reported, President Diem feared the reaction even among his own

' cabinet aides. 69 / Secretary Thuan, in whom Diem did confide, said that

the President vzas brooding over the fact that the U.S. was asking great concessions of GVN in the realm of its sovereignty in exchange for little additional help. JOj Diem argued that U.S. influence over his government, once it was known, would play directly into the communists* hands. The first priority task, he added, was to give the people security, not to make the government more popular. To try it the other way around was to place the cart before the horse. Jl/

Diem savr himself caught in a dileimna in v^hich he was doomed if he did not get outside assistance and doomed if he got it only at the price of surrendering his independence. To him the trick was to get the U.S. committed without surrendering his independence. One possible solution lay in getting U.S. m-aterial aid for a prograan that would be almost wholly GVN-implemented. The strategic hajolet program offered a convenient vehicle for this purpose and one which was also appealing for other reasons. It put 9.chieving security before wirjiing loyalty -- in an operational context in which it V7as difficult to differentiate between security for the rural populace and control of that populace, since many of the actions to achieve one were almost identical to the acts to realize the other.

D. The Central Issue

The U.S., for its part, was asking Diem to forego independence by accepting the wisdom of the American recommendations for reform. The

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central question vas whether he would -- or could -- do so. Among those who responded to this question in the negative^ J. Kenneth Galbraith was most trenchant:

In my completely considered view . , . Diem will not reform either administratively or politically in any effective way. That is because he cannot. It is politically naive to expect it. He senses that he cannot let povrer go because he would be thrown out. 72/

The U.S. decided that Diem could make meaningful reforms and that he would do so -- or at least it decided that it was likely enough that he would do so and that support for his adiriinistration constituted the best available policy alternative.

E. The Problem of A ssessment

The differences in perspectives and expectations outlined above are Important in their own right. They loom even larger^ however^ when one considers the difficulty of assessing progress in the program about to be undertal^en. These groups were about to embark upon a long^ arduous joint voyage. Their only chart had never been to sea. This was the newly-articulated and imperfectly understood doctrine of coujiterinsurgency which stressed the interaction and interdependence of political^ military^ social^ and psychological factors. It posited the necessity for certain actions to follow immediately and successfully behind others in order for the process of pacification to succeed. Above all -- and this point cannot be overstressed -- while this doctrine recognized the need for both the carrot and the stick (for coercive control and appealing programs) it made gaining broad popular acceptance the single ultimate criterion of success, Neither kill ratios nor construction rates nor the frequency of incidents was conclusive^ yet these were all indicators applicable to phases within the larger process. The gains of doing well in one phase_j however_, could be wiped out by inactivity or mistakes in a subsequent phase. It was^ in shorty very difficult to know how well one was doing until one was done.

VI. THE MTIONAL PLAN EMERGES

A. Aw areness of the Unifying Potential

Before examining the quality of execution of the operational programs for which some detailed record is available it will be useful to outline the process by which the strategic hamlet program became -- by late 1962 --a comprehensive national program embodying the major effort of GW in pacification.

r^

Operation Sunrise in Binh Duong Province was launched on 22 March I962 in what was initially called the ''Ben Cat Project." 73/ The Delta project^ however^ languished in a "planning stage" until May^ when it first became kno'^-m that Diem was considering incorporating it into the Strategic Hamlet Program, ih / By August the IMCSH proposed a priority plan for the construction of strategic hamlets on a nation-vride basis.

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Later the same month^ the U.S. Inter-Agency Coiranlttee for Province Rehabilitation concurred in this plan (with minor reservations) as a basis for planning and utilization of U.S. assistance. 15/ By October_, the Diem government had made the Strategic Hamlet Program the explicit focus and unifying concept of its pacification effort. The government-controlled Times of Viet Nam devoted an entire issue to "I962: The Year of Strategic Hamlets." 76/ Ngo Dinh Hhu was unveiled as the "architect and prijue mover" of the program which was the Vietnamese answer to communist strategy. As Fhu proclaimed: "Strategic hatnlets seek to assure the security of the people in order that the success of the polit- -ical^ social^ and military revolution might be assured by the enthusiastic movement of solidarity and self-sufficiency." 7T/ President Diem had earlier put the same thought to an American visitor in clearer words:

The importance of the strategic hamlets goes beyond the concept of hamlet self defense. They are a means to institute basic democracy in Vietnam. Through the Strategic Hamlet Program^ the government intends to give back to the hamlet the right of self-government with its own charter and system of community law. This will realize the ideas of the constitution on a local scale which the people can understand. Jo/

By this time^ too^ influential American circles regarded the Strategic Haralet Program as the shorthand designation for a process which represented a sensible and sound GVW effort. Roger Hilsman had said so in February to President Kennedy_, and found the latter highly receptive. He continued to say so. 79/ As he advised Assistant Secretary of State Averell Harriman in late 1962^ "The government of Vietnatu has finally developed^ and is now acting upon^ an effective strategic concept." £0/ Even so lukewarm an enthusiast as the CJCS^ General Lyman L. Lemnitzer could report that "... the Strategic Hamlet Program promises solid benefits^ and may well be the vital key to success of the pacification program." 81/

The public record also shows early support from high U.S. officials for the Strategic Hamlet Program and recognition of its central role in GVN's pacification campaign. Speaking in late April 19^2^ Under Secretary of State George ¥. Ball^ commented favorably in the progressive development of strategic hamlets throughout RVW as a method of combating insurgency and as a means of bringing the entire nation "under control • of the government." 82/ Secretary McNamara told members of the press^ upon his return to Washington from a Pacific meeting in July 1962^ that the Strategic Hamlet Program was the "backbone of President Diem's program for countering subversion directed against his state." £3/

It is reasonable to conclude from the evidence that official U,S. jj awareness kept abreast of Diem's progressive adoption of the Strategic

Hamlet Program as the "unifying concept" in his counterinsurgent effort. The same officials were constantly bombarded by a series of reports from a variety of sources describing the progress of the hamlet program and assessing its efficacy.

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

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The first operational effort in vMch the U.S. had a hand^ "Operation Sunrise^" got under vay in Binh I>uong Province on 22 March I962 vhen vork commenced on Ben Tuong^ the first of five hatnlets to be constructed for relocated peasants in the Ben Cat District in and around the Lai Khe rubber plantation^ (See Map 2.) Phase I of the operation -- the military clearing phase -- was conducted by forces of the 5th AEW Division reinforced by ranger companies^ a reconnaissance company^ two reinforced CG companies^ and a psychological warfare company. The Viet Cong . simply melted into the jungles.

With the Viet Cong out of the way — at least for the time being -the relocation and construction of the new hamlet commenced. The new program got off to a bad start. The government was able to persuade only seventy families to volunteer for resettlement. The 135 other families in the half dozen settlements vrere herded forcibly from their homes. 8k/ Little of the $300^000 in local currency provided by USOM had reached the peasants; the money was being withheld until the resettled families indicated they would not bolt the new hamlet. Som.e of them came with most of their meager belongings. Others had little but the clothes on their backs. Their old dwellings — and many of their possessions — were burned behind "t-hem. 85 / Only 120 males of an age to bear arms were found among the more than 200 families -- indicating veiy clearly that a large number had gone over to the VC^ whether by choice or as a result of intimidation. ^Q

' ^** Other Early Programs

Progress in Binh Duong continued at a steady pace^ beset by diffi-|l ^^' culties. By midsummer '2900 persons had been regrouped into three strategic

hamlets. 87 / Elsewhere^ the pace quickened. Although the Delta Plan^ as a coordinated effort^ had not been im.plemented by the sumimer of 1962^ Secretary McNamara found in May an aggressive effort under way without U.S. help near Ca Mao:

Here the comma.nder of the 31st Infantry Regiment had gone into an area 95^ controlled by the VC^ declared martial law^ and resettled 11_,000 people (some under duress) in 9 strategic hamlets_, while fighting the VC wherever he foiond them. Since inception I of the program^ none of his villages have been attacked^ and the

freedom from VC taxation (extortion) is proving most appealing to the people. It is the commander^s hope (doubtless optimistic) that he will be able to turn the whole area, over to the civil guard and self defense corps mthin 6 months. 88/

These resettlement efforts in areas which had been under VC domination were not the extent of the early hamlet "program^" however. Many existing hamlets and villages were "fort-ified" in one degree or sjiother early in 1962 follo\^7ing no discernible pattern. This appears to have been the natural product of the varied response to ffiiu's injunction to emphasize strategic hamlets. In April^ the GW Ministry of the Interior informed the U.S. that I3OO such hamlets were already completed, 89 / "Operation Sunrise" had by this time been broadened to embrace efforts in several provinceso 90 / Several other Strategic Hamlet Programs were begun: "Operation Hai Yen II" (Sea Swallow) in Phu Yen Province with a goal of

281 hamlets^ 157 of which were reported, as completed within two months:

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■ ■*>.

MAPS,

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"Operation Dang Tlen"(Let^s go)'In Blnh Dinh Province with a goal of 328 strategic hamlets In Its first yearj and "Operation Phuong Hoang" (Royal Phoenix) in Quang Nai Province vith a goal of 125 strategic harnlets by the end of I962.

D- At Last -- A National Plan

The GW drew all of the partiallstlc programs together in its August 1962 national priority plan_, mentioned earlier. The nation was divided into four priority zones (Map 3). First priority was assigned to the eleven provinces around Saigon. This included essentially the area of the Thompson Delta plan plus the original area of "Operation Sunrise" plus Gla Dinh Province (Map k), Priorities within each zone were further specified. Within the zone of first national priority^ for example_j the provinces of Vinh Long^ Long An^ and Phuoc Try were assigned the highest priority; Blnh Duong -- where operations were already in progress -- was given priority three (Map 5). Dy the end of the summer of 1962 GW claimed that 3^225 of the planned 11^3l6 ham.lets had already been completed and that over 33 percent of the nation's total population was already living in completed haralets (See Table l).

October 1962^ when Diem made the Strategic Hamlet Program the avowed focus of his counterinsurgent campaign_, marks the second vmtershed in the development and implementation of the program. The first such watershed had been the consensus^ on the potential value of such a pro-gram_j which had been developed at the end of I961 and early I962. There .--. would be no others until the program died with Diem.

E. Effect on U.S.'Perceptions

1 The effect of the G Ws concentraion on strategic hamlets was to

I make U.S. assessments focus on several sub-aspects of the problem. Atten-

; tion tended to be directed toward how well haralets were being fortified and

whether or not the implementation phase was well managed; i.e._, whether peasants were paid for their labor^^ reirabursed for their losses^ and given adequate opportunity to attend their crops. Conversely^ attention was - ■ directed away from the dlfficult-to-assess question of whether the follow-

up actions to hamlet security were taking place -- the actions which would convert the peasantry from apathy (if not opposition) to identification ' with their central' government.

This focusing on details which diverted attention from the ultimate objective took the form of reports^ primarily statistical^ which set forth the construction rate for strategic hamlets^ the incident rate of VC activities^ and the geographical areas in which GW control was and was not in the ascendancy. These "specifics" were coupled to generalized assessments which almost invariably pointed to shortcomings in GW s execution of the program. The shortcomings^ however^ were treated as problems in efficient management and operational organization; the ineluctability of increased control (or security) leading som.ehow to popular identification

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TABLE 1

GVII REPORT ON STATUS OF STPx.'^.TSGIC K^u'ILETS

/-,

As of 30 September 1962 *

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SOUTESRI^:

Saigon

Strategic

Hamlet ^^

SUB-^TCyrAL

CENTRAL:

Central Lowlands

High Plateau

Sli3"T0TAL

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Planned

— ■ ^ fa»-»jj

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Eastern Rcovincfts 1^595 VJestern Provinces h,'J2Q

6,756

3.630 930

i^,560

GRAim TOTAL 11^316

Strategic Hcunlets

Completed

Strategic Eamlcts Under Population in Const:nJ.ction Co:npleted Hejclets

105

291 1,236

1,632

l,ii90

10^

1,593

3,225

115 501 702

1,31s

682

217

899

2,217

26l,ii-70

Ji23,o6o

1,87^1,790

2,559,320

1,65^^,^70

108,2J!-'l

1,762,71'^

^,322,03^^

Percentage of planned havnlets ccapleted 28.14-9^

Percenta.Ge of total population in completed hamlets 33'39io

* Adapted frora Tha Times of Vietnara, 28 October 1962, p. I7.

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29

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TABLE 1

I

GVK REPORT ON STATUS OF STPATSGIC IIAl^fliSTS

/-,

As of 30 Septem'ber 1962 *

Area

SOUTHESK:

Saigon

Strategic Hojnlets Planne d

^33

Eastern Provinces 1>595 VJestern Provinces h,'J2Q

SUB-TOTAL

6,756

Strategic

Haralets Completed

105

' 291

1,236

1,632

Strategic Hamlets Under Population in Construction Completed Hejilets

115 501

702

1,318

263., 1^70

J+23,060 l,07'i,790

2,559,320

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Central Lowlands 3^630

High Plateau

•930

SUB-T0TA>L hj 560

GMKD TOTAL ll,3l6

1,1+90 103

1,593

3,225

682

217

89^^

•.

2,217

108,2't'+

1,762,711+

U, 322,03^1-

- Percentage of planned hamlets completed. .28.49>j

- Pei'centage of total population in completed hamlets... 0.33-39p

* Adapted from The Times of Vietnam, 28 October 19^2, p. 17-

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■ I ■ ■ ■ . ^ «-^ m- I ■ ^•' ■ » ■ ■ —

•-•

by a process akin to the economic assiitnption of "flotation to stability through development" vent xmchallenged as a basic assumption. Critics pointed to needed improvementsj the question of T.^hether or not these could be accomplished^ or vliy_j almost never was raised.

^ "Operation Sunrise"^ for exaraple^ vas criticized in some detail

by the US MA.A.G. Much better planning and coordination was needed in order to relocate effectively: Aerial surveys were necessary to pinpoint the

( , number of families to be relocated; ujianticipated expenditures needed to

be provided for; preparation of sites should begin before the peasants were moved; and (WE resource commitm-ents should be carefully checked by U.S. advisors at all levels. 92/ There was no discussion of the vulnera-: , bility of the strategic hamlets to VC infiltration (as against VC attacks) or of the subsequent steps to \rlnning support. That was not^ one may

assume^ the military's prime concern.

Political observers who examined this follow-on aspect were cautiously optimistic:

The strategic hamlet program is the heart of our effort and deserves top priority. "While it has not — and probably i will not -^ bring democracy to rural Vietnam^ it provides truly

; ■ local administration for the first time. Coupled mth measures

to increase rice production and farmer income^ these local administrations can work a revolution in rural Vietnam. 93/

. I The same tone wa.s reflected in Michael Forrestal^s report to President

■ Kennedy in February I963 following his visit to Vietnam with Roger Ililsmaxi. 94/ The visitors found Ambassador l^o3-ting and his deputy^ William C. Trueheart^ optimistic about the results which the program might achieve once the materials for it^ then just beginning to come in^ reached full volume. 95_/

The Department of Defense was devoting considerable effort to insuring that these materials did reach Vietnatn In^ the quantities needed and in timely fasliion. Secretary McHamara had been stuck with this problem during his May I962 visit to "Operation Sunrise". He saw especiaiay a need to program SDC^ CG^ and Youth Corps training so that it would match the role of hamlet building and to insure the provision of proper commu-nications for warning purposes. 96/ A substantial amount of the MAAG-DoD effort subsequently went into programming. The Agency for International Development had agreed to fujid the "Strategic Hamlet Kits" (building materials^ barbed \7ire and stajies^ light weapons^ a^mnunition^ and communication equipment)^ but in August I962 it demurz^ed, stating that supporting assistance funds in the MAP were inadequate for the purposeo 97/ Secretary McNsmara agreed to ujidertalie the financing for I5OO kits (13 million) but asked if the additional 35OO kits requested were real3y necessary and^ if so^ on vrhat delivery schedule. The target levels and^ delivery dates under^vrcnt more or less, continuous revision from then until the question became irrelevant in late I963. 98/ A separate but related effort went into expediting the procurement^ delivery^ and installation of

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radios in the strategic haiinlets so that each vould have the capability to somid the alartu and request the employiiient of mobile reserves when attacked.

I

II r-

F. Differences Begin to Emerge

All of these "program management" activities were based on the imstated assumption that the strategic hamlet program wo\ild lead to effective pacification if only Diem wotild malve it work. As it toirned out^ there was some disagreement between what the U.S. considered needed to be done and what }?resident Diem knew very wel,l he was doing. He was using ■the Strategic Hamlet Program to carry forvrard his "persona^ist pliilosophy." 99/ As brother Ehu visibly took the reins controlling the prograsn and began to solidify control over the Youth Corps it became increasingly clear that Diem was emphasizing government control of the peasantry at the expense (at least in U.S. eyes) of pacification. lOO/

■ ■ ■! I ■ ■ PI ■ ■ -■ I ■■ . ■ ■11*

. As awareness in Washington increased that strategic hamlets could serve several purposes^ there developed also a divergent interpretation of v/hether or not the GW was "winning the war." >?hen General KrulaJi^ SACSA^ and Joseph Mendenhall^ an ex«counselor in Saigon then at State^ visited RW in September I963, President Kennedy -^nryly asked upon receiving their conflicting reports^ "ibu two did visit the same country^ didn't you?" 101/ The answer is that they had^ but the general stressed that the m,ilitary war was going well while the diplomat asserted that the political war was being lost. The arguraent was not^ it'should be stressed, one between the generals and the diplomats; experienced diplomats disagreed fundamental]^ \dth Mendenhall. The disagreement was between those who pointed to signs of progress and those who held up examples of poor planning, corruption, a.nd alienation of the peasants whose loyalty was the object of the exercise. Criticisms ^" frequently accompanied by counterbalancing assertions that "lijuited progress" was being achieved .-« mentioned corvee labor, GW failures to reimburse the farmers for losses due to resettlement, the dishonesty of some officials, and Diem's stress on exhortations rather than on the provision of desirable social services, 102 /

Those who emphasized that the program, was sho-^^dng real progress --usually mth a caveat or two that there was considerable room for Improvement — stressed statistical evidence to portray the exi^onential increase in strategic hamlet construction (Table 2), the declining trend in Viet Cong-initiated incidents (Table 3), therise in VC defections (Table 4), and the slow but steady increase in GVW control of rural areas (Table 5).

The JCS observation \rith respect to the estaJ^lishment of strategic hamlets, for instance, was that since fewer than two tenths of one percent (0.2/0) of them had been overrun by the VC, "The Vietnamese people must surely be finding in them a m.easure of the tra.nquility which they seek. 103/

RGK Thompson later claimed that the ve3ry absence of attacks was an indicator that the VC had succeeded in infiltrating the hamletso 10^/ The point is not Thom,pson^s prescience but the difficulty of reasoned assessment to which this analysis has already pointed. The U.S. course,

30

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

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VIET CONG INITIATED INCIDENTS BROKEN DOWN INTO CATEGORIES (AHACKS, TERRORISM, SABOTAGE, PROPAGANDA).

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

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VIET CONG DEFECTIONS

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COMPARISON OF CONTROL;"GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM AND VIET CONG JULY. OCTOBER AND DECEMBER 1902, ••■ AND APRIL 1963 ■

'* -*

'\j

(

SITUATION

AS OF 1 JULY 1962

SITUATION

AS or

I OCT 1962

SITUATION

AS or

t DEC-1962

SITUATION

AS OF I APRIL 63

CHANGES

JUL 62 TO

APRIL 63

NUMBER OF VILLAGES

RURAL POPULATION

%Or RURAL POPULATION

NUMBER or VILLAGES

RURAL POPULATION

% OF RURAL POPULATION

NUMBER or VILLAGES

RURAL POPULATION

% OF RURAL POPULATION

NUMBER OF VILLAGES

RURAL

POPULATION

% or RURAL POPULATION

NUMBER or

VILLAGES

RURAL POPULATION

% or RURAL POPULATION

.GOVERNMENT or VIETNAM EFFECTIVE CONTROL

859

5,600.000

47%

929

6,071.000

19%

951

6,300,000

51%

935

6.724.000

54%

+ 76

+ 924,000

+ 7%

GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM IN ASCENDANCY

710

3,622.000

29%

613

3, 246, 000

27%

666

3.331,000

27%

73!

3.356.000

27%.

+ 21

-266. 000

-2%

NEITHER GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM NOR VIET CONG CONTROL

34 ■. •

137.000

1%

148

717.000

6%

120

643.000

■ 5%

139

609.000 ■

5%

+ 105

+ 472, 000

+ 4%

I <

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N.". .

NOtt":" IN ORDER TO PRESENT A BETTER PICTURE OF CONTROL OF or RURAU vmTNAM, 1. 600, 000 POPULATION Or AUTONOMOUS -'CITIES OF SAIGCT4. DANANG. HUE. At-O DALAT UNDER GVN COfnROL WAS HOT USED IN THIS STUDY. (POPULATIONS ARE

ESTIMATES) ■'•^^"--■'-^ "-- -^ •<-"-

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in the face of these cautiously optimistic and hopefully pessimistic reports^ was to continue its established program of material support coupled Y^ith attempts to influence Diem to make desired changes.

VII* TEE PATH TO TIIS EliD

A. Diem'g Position Hardens

The obvious U.S. alternatives, by mid"19b3;. remained the sailie as they vere in late I96I: (l) to induce changes vrithin the Strategic li'amlet Program (among others) by convincing Diem to make such changes-

(2) to allow Diem to run things his o>:n vray and hope for the best^ and

(3) to find an alternative to President Diem. The U.S. continued to > pursue the first course; Diem insisted increasingly on the second. Finally, due to press'ores from areas other than the Strategic Hamlet Program, the U.S. pursued the third alternative. The Strategic Hamlet Prograra, in the event, died vith its sponsors.

Far from becoming more reasonable, in U.S. eyes, President Diem by mid-1963 had become more intractable. He insisted, for example, that the U.S. cease to have an operational voice in the Strategic Hamlet Program. 1!he multiplication of U.S. advisors at many levels, he claimed, was the source of friction and dissension. The remedy ^^'as to remove the advisors. 10^/ The essence of Diem's position was that Taylor's "lianited partnership" would not work.

. Other U.S. missions visited Vietnam to assess the conduct of the war. The result was much the same as reported by Krulak and Mendenhall. This was essentially the findings of the McKaniara-Taylor mission in September; the military campaign is progressing, political disaffection is growing; U.S. leverage is questionable. 106 /

B. The Program Dies With the IT^os

The rest may be summarized: the U.S. attempted to insist on a program with more emphasis on broad appeal rather than control; Diem, findixig himself increasingly embroiled in the Buddhist controversy, increased repressive measures; a coup toppled the Diem regime on 1 KoveBiber; the deposed President and his brother llhu, "architect of the Strategic Hamlet Program," were killed. The Strategic Hamlet Program— or at least the program under that name which they had made the unifying theme of their counterinsurgent effort--died with them. The inhabitants who had wanted to leave the hamlets did so in the absence of an effective government. The VG took advantage of the confusion to attack and overrun others. Some offerred little or no resistance. The ruling'junta attempted to resuscitate the program as "Kew Life Hamlets" early in I96U, but the failures of the past provided a poor psychological basis upon which to base hopes for the future.

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VIII. M INCOI^CLUSIVE Sm^I/U^Y

The dominant U.S. view has been that the Strategic Haialet Program failed because of over-expansion and the establishment of hsmlets in basically insecure areas. 10?/ That there vas overexpansion and the . establishinent of inany poorly defended hamlets is not questioned. ^This contributed, beyond doubt^ to the failure of the program. But this view finesses the problem of the process for \&i±ch the strategic hamlets^vere but the tangible s:jnnbol. The present analysis has sought to emphasize both the essentially political nature of the objective of the Strategic 'Hamlet Program and the political nature of the context in which the process evolved -- of expectations, bargaining^ and attempts to exert^ influence on other participants in policy formulation and implementation. In this context it is the U.S. inability to exert leverage on President Diem (or Diem's inability to reform) that emerges as the principal cause of failure.

Yet, both of these attempts to pinpoint the reasons why the strategic hamlet program did not succeed fail to get at another whole issue: the validity of that body of writings which one may call the theory and doctrine of counterinsurgency. ITeither the military nor the political aspects of this doctrine can be upheld (or proved false) by an examination of the Strategic Kamlet Program. Quite aside from f whether or not Diem was able to broaden the program's appeal to the

peasantry, what would have occurred had he made a determined and sustained effort to do so? V?ould this have led in some more-or-less direct way to stability or to even greater dissatisfaction? V;e simply do not know. The question is as unanswerable as whether tlie appetite grows with the eating or is satisfied by it. The contention here is that claims of mismanagement are not sufficient to conclude that better management would necessarily have produced the desired results.

- In the military sphere the unanswerable questions are different. It is said that the military phase of the Strategic Kamlet^lYogram progressed reasonably well in many areas; the failure was in the political end of the process. But did the military actions succeed? Might failures to develop adequate intelligence and to weed out VC infrastruccare m these hamlets not as easily be attributable to'the fact that the inhabitants knew they were not really safe from VC intimidation and reprisals? Does the analogy to an "oil spot" have operational meaning when sruall bands can carry out hit and run raids or when many small^ bands can concentrate in one location and achieve siu-prise? Where is the key to this vicious circle -- or is there a key?

In conclusion, while the abortive Strategic Kamlet Program of 1961-1963 may teach one something, the available record does not permit one to conclude either that the program fell because of the failure of a given phase or that other phases were, in fact, adequate to the challenge. One may say that the program was doomed by poor execution and by the inability of the ilgo family to reform coupled with the inability of the U.S. to induce them to refonii. The evidence does not warrant one to proceed further.

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lY. B. 2

FOO^^IOTES

■» ■ ^

1. Sir Robert Thompson^ D efeati ng, C oEimmiist Insurgency (Kew York: Praeger, I966), p. 123. . ■

2. Seven Years of the ITgo D inli Diem AcM jJiistra tion, 19 3^L-J:96l (Saigon: 26 October l^oll, pp. 357-3^0.

3. See

Are

J J.J. Lasloff, " Rural Resettlerosnt in South Vietnff nj__Tii3 ■■oville Program ", Pacific Affairs, Vol. XXXV^, Kr n- (Win-ce 1952-63), PP. 327-3^0.

k. Despatch, Saigon to State Er 278, 7 March I960, Iiitelligence

Eo-i:>ort Ir 2137251, 7.^. ik (s/HF)

, *■' 1 " ■!■■—■-■T — * ■■■'■■■■■■'■■ "^ "*"

5. William A. Kighswmger, Rural PacifiGation _in. Vlctnsjn (Nev? York: Praeger, I966), p. 46.

6. Si^IIE 10-Jt-6l, 7 November 1961, P robable Coim miigtjteactions in South Vietnara, p. 3 (TS)

7. Brie Di

riefing Paper, n.rl.. The Korth Vietnej nese Rol eJji_theJ3jagin, Irection, and Su-oport of t he War in South Vietnaia, p. iv {S) ; State Departiuent Bureau of Intelligence .and Research, RFE-3, 1 November lOol^ Coinmunist Threat Mounts in South Vietnsjin,

p. 4 (s)

8. Ibid .3 p. 5

9. NIE 50-^61, 28 March 1961^ Outlook in Mairagi^^Soirtjga^t^^^ p. T (S)

10. MAAG, Vietnaia, 1 September I96I, Fi^stJ^fe]^^ Chiex' KMG, Vietnajn , p. 10 (S)

11. U;S. Senate Camriiittee on Foreign Relations^ 89th Congress^ 2nd Session^ Backgr o -jr>d In formation Rela-tog_to_So}jtljga

and Vietngjn (2nd Revised EdTJ^V3.sh±nB'^<)r., GPO^ 19^6, pp. c)6"T.

12. Letter of Traismittal to President Diem end President Kennedy, n.Q. (June I961), Joint Action Progrej.i P roposed by the _ Viet Eajn. United States Special Financial Groups (S)

13. See Ibid.^ Introduction^ p. 1^ passim ^

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15.

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Letter^ President Kennedy to General Max\-/ell D. Taylor^ 13 October 1951 (C)

Report on General Taylor^s Mission to SouthJ/ietn8,m^ 3 November 1961^ borad in loose' leaf vitli letter'of trcinsinittal, evaluations and conclusions^ and Appendices A-I, (TS) Cited hereafter as Tnvlor ReiDort. All references are to tbe section on evaluations and conclusions. . .

16. Ibid .J p. 2

17. Ibid ., p. 3 13. Ibid ., p. 8

19• ™^'^ PP- 6"T.

20. Ibid ., p. 9

21. Ibid., p. 7

22. Ibid ., p. Ik

23.

2k.

25.

Poid. , See also pp. 11-lo. Ibid., pp. 11-12

The plan, cited hereafter as CrP-196o, is contained as axi inclosure to Despatch ITr. 276, Saigon to State, k Januar;y' I96I; Covaater Insurgencj^ Plan for So'iith Vietnam. (S)

^■M fl »■ J I *■ ■ ■!!> ■! fc'l"! ■ ■ P — H IB^ ■! ■■!■ ■ ■ — II I ■■■^■^^ I flPP^ »»■! P'«-*l JPPjfcl Jil l

26. Despatch ITr. 276^ Saigon to State, op. cit., p.3

27. See for example. Ibid., Annex 3.

28. MAAG Vietnam, 15 September I961, Georgrap hically Pha^Jfetional Level Operation Plar. for Co uJiterins urgengyTc) (Secret), cited hereafter as Georgra-ohiically Phased Coia^terins urgency Plan .

29.. Ibid., pp. A1«A3.

30. Ibid., pp. A3-A4.

31. Ibid.,, pp. Ali--A7.

32. Ibid., p.C2.

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"« *■

33. Soe^ for example^ Telegrco-a^ Saigon to State I^Tr. l466^ l6 March IQol (S), 8Jid"Aide Memoire, McGarr to Dien^ 3 July I96I, Hevievr of Milit'ary Situation and Eecoirjuendations fo r Continued Improvement (s).

—■■ I I ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ * ■

k. Telegram^ Saigon to State, ITr. 508, I8 October I96I (S).

35. Study^ HGK Thompson to President Diem, 2? October I90I, Appreciation of Vietnam, ITovember I 96I-April ig6g (S), Incl. to letter Lt. Gen. Lionel C, McGarr to Secretary of Defense, 20 ITovember 19ol^ SecDef Control I'Tr. 2G^k (s).

36. Ibid.

37- Ibid.

38. Copies of Thompson's covering letter' and m.ejnorandiirn to Diem are .-.enclosed mt>rmsg, Saigon to State; Er. 205; 20 liiovember I96I, Thompson Mission Recoir aT iendations to Presiden t Diem (S). The memorandi:jn is cited hereafter as Thompson Memorandum.

39. Ibid.

».■■ » " .1 I'M, -

i{-0. Ibid., letter of transmittal. (Emphasis added). '

111. Letter, McGarr to Admiral H.D. Felt (CE-ICPAC), 27 November I96I

(S), Incl. to letter, McGarr to Secretaiy of Defense, 27 November 1961, op» cit.

k2. Ibid. if3. Ibid.

kk. U.S. Militar-y Advisoiy Group, CH-iAAG Guidance Paper to Pield

Advisors in Coxnrte.T Insurgency, Fourth Revision, 10 Februaiy I962, Tac tics and Techniques of Co uxiterinsurge nt Operations (S)

45. Despatch ITr. 205, Sa,igon to State, 20 Hoveraber 19^1; op. cit.

46. D-partment of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research,

2 February I962, A Strate gic Coiicept for South Vietnam (s); on the President's interest and Thompson's effect on Hilsma^a^ see Roger Plilsman, To Move a l?atior^ _The^Politics of Foreign --" ■ *' •' •Policy in the Admiiiistrati on of Job^- F. Kennedy ^new York: Doubledsy ,'1967), pTdT ^27-39.

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50. 51.

52.

53.

5h.

55. 56.

57

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A Strategic Concept I'or^ Sout h Vietnam, op_. cit,, pp. 9~l'^. The third principle i's Hilsmsri's owii contribution, drawing heavily on his personal experiences with the OSS during World War II.

i^8. 'ibid., pp. 15-19. k9. Ibid., pp. 15^-2l^.

Ibid,, p. 9

Department of State^ Task Force Vietnsan^ ih December 196l_, Status Report of Developments Sirce Decemb er 8 ^ p. 3 (S)

HQCraCPAC, l6 December I961, Transcript, Fir st Secretary of Defense Conference, pp. 1-2 (S) ^

Personal notes of Assistant Secretar^^ of Defense Arthur Sylvester, 16 December 1961, SecDef Conference, Honolulu.

Memoranduju, McGarr to Mr. Thus2i, I8 December 19^1^ Civi^,, Covernment Paxamj.lit-ary Infrastructure (Or gan!z a-U.on)_gequire£_^£^ Integrate^ P?:r-rof Military Phase of Pacification Effort (sj^

Ibid.

"——■—•— . .

The GW plan and actions are not well ddcujnented but are referred to in U.S. UkliQ Vietnam Report, 31 July I962, i^esso^^is^J^efm]^ Nr. 19.

John C. Donnell and Gerald C. Hickey, Th^J/i^tnamese^J^trat^^ Hamlets:" A Preliminary Report (RAND Memoraxidum Wi 320b-ARPA, 30 August 1962), p. 2^ (C).

58. Letter McGarr to Pelt, iB December I96I, op. cit_.

59. HQCMCPAC, 15 Januarjr 1952, Record of Second Sec retary of Defense ' Co rif erence, pp. 5A-1 - 5A--3 JsJ~

60. Ibid., pp. 6-1 - 6-5.

61. Department of State, Research Project 63O, ^QriX^Merlc&n^V^^ and Diplomacy Concerning Vietnam, 1960-1963 ^ P. 99 (^''8)

62. Telegraxa, Saigon to Sts,te, Kr. 1031^ 10 February 19^2 (S).

63. Donnell and Kickey, op. clt., pp. 3-^;-.

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Gh. Ibid,, p. \.

65. Department of State, Task Porce Vietneiu, 28 December I96I, Status ReT)ort of Developraents Since December 21, p. 2 (S),

4 ■

66. Ibid., p. 3.

67. Telegram, Saigon to State Nr. ^95^ I6 October I961 (S).

The UoS. proposals are recorded in National Security Action Memorariduin No. Ill, 22 ITovember 1961, First Phase of Vietnejn Program (TS) .

■ II ■ I ■ r I

G^. Telegrcm^ Saigon to State'Er. 687^ 22 November I9SI (S). . ,

TO. Ibid . •., ■ " . .

71. Telegrojtn, Saigon to State Kr. 708, 25 November I961 (S).

72. Telegrain^ CAS New Delhi to Director Ko 99^1^ ^^o'" Ambassador Galbraitii for the President, 21 November I96I (TS).

73. See Homer C. Bigart, " VietnaineseOpen a Drive o n_Reds," New York Times 29 March I962. ~~

ih. Telegram Saigon to State Nr. 1367, 22 Mcly I962 (S),

75. Telegram, Saigon to State Nr. 133^ 8 August 19^2 (c); Airgrams,^^ Saigon to State, Krs. A-85 and A~110, 9 August and 27 August I962 (C).

76. "The Times of Vietnam, "Vol IV, Nr \'i, 28 October I962.

77. Ibid,, p. 6. ■

78. Ru.fus Phillips, A Report on Counter--Ir^sjargency^ 31 August 1962, p. 5 Cc).

79. See for example, De-oartment of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research Research MemorandujJi RPE..27; l8 June 19^2, P£0£E5^^.-5ai9£i on South Vietnajn (sAlP),

80. Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Research Memoranduju RPE-62, 5 December I962, Saigon^s Strategic Concept for Counter "Insurgency a Progress Report (S/iCf'j.

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I 81. Visit to Southeast Asia by the Secretaxy^of^DeTense^, 8---11 Maylgfe,

57^^"Tt§77 Inclosure to Memo, CJCS to SecDefTT^May 19^2, Visit to Southeast Asia.

82. Vie tnam; ?ree-World CliallengG in Southeast Asia (Department of State .Publication T338)^ pp. 16-^17. .

83. Remarks to press, 2l| July I962, in OSD Historical Files.

8^. Homer C. Bigart, ^^US Helps Vietnen in Test of Strategy" IJew York Times , 27 March I962.

IS ' * '

85. Ibid . . . ■ • .•

86. "No \l±n," The Nev Rep ublic , 9 April I962.

87. US I/IAAG, 31 July I962, Lessons Learned Nr. 19, P- 2. (c).

Visit to Soy.thea-,st Asia by the Secretaryof Defensj^j:;3J__May_1962, op. cit .j p. 2

89 Buream of Intelligence and Research, RFE^27; l8 June 1962, op. cit. '^ 90. MAAG Lessons Learned Fr. 19, op. cit .

91. C0I4US]/iAGV lless8^e DA IN 262596, 8 September I962, Province Rehabilitation Program (S).

o

■■>- ■' » «-

92. I-IAAG, Lessons Learned l\^r. I9 , op. cit.

93. Theodore J.C. Ee8,vTLer, Deputy Director Working Group Vietnam; Report on Visit to Vietnam, October l8"Kovember^_26^jL9H2;» P- ^ (S)

9l|.- Michael,V. Porrestal, Memorandum for the President, A_Repoi;t_on South Vietnam. • ' _

95. Hilsmaai, To Move a Iva^tion , op. cit . ^ p. ^53*

96-. Visit to Southeast Asia by t he Secretary of Defense, 8-11 May I962 , op . cit.

97. Memo, ASD/iSA to SecDef, 9 August I962, Fundln^of_Stx^ Kits, Vietnam.

98. See, for example, JCSM 73^-62, 22 Septem.ber 19^2, Funding of Strategic Hamlet ICits, Vietnam.

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<^^. CIA M5.BO for SecDef, 28 September 19o2 (S).

100. Depajrtment of State, Burea;a of Intelligence srtd Research^ RFE-42^ 27 May 1963, lEiplications of GW Difficulties in Vietnam (s).

101. Eilsrnan^, To Move a Nation , op. cit. ^ p. 502.

102. See^ for example^ USOM Rural Affairs Office^ 1 Septem"ber 19^3^ Second Inforraal Appreci ation of the Sta tus of th e Strategic fej alet Pr ogrsm, Incl. to Manioraji-duan^ Michael V. Forrestal to Secretary Mcj^laniaraj 20 September 1963^ Vietnam^ S'JcDef Control Nr. i|97.

103. Joint Chiefs of Staff^ 11 May I963, Trends in the Counterinsurgency Effort in South Vietnam, p. 60 (S/Fif^TT"

10^. Thompson, Defeatin g Co mir.ur:ist Insurgency ^ ^, cit . ^ p. I36.

105. Department of State, 'W^.A?.^ 27 May I963, op. cit .

106. Memorsn.dum for the President, 2 October 19o3, Report of the McIIgmara-Taylor Mission to South Vietnam (TS).

107. See, for example, Depajrtment of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, RFE-102, 20 December 19o3, Trends in the War Effort i n South Vietnam (S): See also William A. Nighswi'^nger, Rural Pacification in Vietnam.

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