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11 Aug 1961

Kennedy Decision WSAl/[ 65

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Theodore White Re-ports

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General McGarr Re-oorts

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27 Sep 1951

Nolting Reports

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President Kennedy agreed vith the Staley Report (of k August) tha,t security requirements demanded first priority5 that economic and social programs had to be accelerated^ that it vas in the US interest to promote a viable Vietnamo He agreed to support an ARW increase to 200^000 if Diem in turn agreed to a plan for using these forces. The 270,000 level was thus disapproved. But the plan for using MW forces had not yet been dra-vm. Diem had not yet designed -•- much less imiplemented -" social reforms supposedly required in retujrn for US assistance.

Although collapse of the Saigon regime might com.e by a coup or from Diem^s death, its fall because of a "prolonged and difficult" struggle was not predictedc

"The situation gets worse almost week by week..," particularly the militsjry situation in the delta. If the U.S. decides it must intervene, White asked if we had the people, instruments or clear objectives to make it successful.

The PJNE has displayed increased efficiency, a spirit of renewed confidence is "beginning to permeate the people, the GW end the Armed Forces

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Kolting was "unable report.o.progress toward attainment task force goals of creating viable 8Jid increasingly democratic society," called the-government and civil situation unchanged from early September. A series of lo.rge scale VC attacks in central Vietnam, the day-long VC seizure of Phuoc Vinh, capital of ffoTiaerJ Phuoc Thanh Province --55 miles from Saigon — in

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27 Sep 1961 (Continued)

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1 Oct 1961

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Diem Request

1 Oct 1961

State "First

12--Month Report"

5 Oct 1961

The "Rostow Proposal"

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9 Oct 1961

JCSM 717-61

DESCRIPTION

vhich the VC publicly beheaded Diem's province chief ajad escajDed before government troops arrived and increased infiltration through Laos demonstrated "that the tide has not yet turned" militajrily.

Diem requested a bilateral trea^ty with the U.S. This surprised Kolting but proba.bly did not surprise the White House^ alx-eady •wa^rned by White of the grave military situation.

i^^

This political assessment mirrored Nolting's "no progress" report but State found the military situation more serious than Embassy reports had indicated.

Suggested a 25,000-man SEATO force be put into Vietnam to guard the Vietnam/Laos border between the D^ and Cambodia. (The Pathet Lao had gained dujring September^ as had VC infiltration through Laos to the GWI. This prompted pla,ns for U.S. action.)

The JCS rejected the Rostow proposal: forces would be stretched thin^ they could not stop infil-traction, and would be at the worst place to oppose potential DRV/CHICOM invasion. The Chiefs wanted to make a Concentrated effort in Laos where a firm stand can be tadien saving all or substantially all of Laos which would^ at the saane time^ protect Thailand and protect the borders of South Vietnam." But if this were "politically unacceptable" the Chiefs "provided..«a possible limited interim course of action": deplo^^ment of about 20^000 troops to the central highlands near Pleiku to assist the GVI^I and free certain GVl^T forces for offensive action against the VCo

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"Concept of Intervention in Vietnam"

11 Oct 1961

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NSC Meeting on Vietnam

Drafted by Alexis Jolmsonj the paper blended Rostov's border control jpro--posal -^/rith the JCS win-control-of-the-highlands co'onter-proposal for the initial mission of U.S. forces in Vietnam, "The real and ultimate objective" of U.S. troops was al?o addressed. To defeat the Vietcong and render Vietnam seciire imder a. non-Communist government, Johnson "guessed" three divisions would be the ultiraate force required in support of the "real objective." The paper estimated a satisfactory settlement in Laos would reduce but not eliminate infiltration into South Vietnam, that even if infiltration were cut down, there was no assurance that the GV1\^ could "in the foreseeab-le futui^e be able to defeat the Viet Cong." Unilateral U.S. action would probably be necessary. The plan's viability was dependent on the degree in which the GV1\T accelerated "political and military action in its own defense."

The NSC considered four papers: the Alexis Joh_nson draft;an NIE estiiaate that SEATO a.ction would be opposed by the DRV, Viet Cong and the Soviet Union (airlift), that these forces stood a good chance of thv^arting the SEATO intervention; third, a JCS estimate that ^0,000 U.S. troops would be required to "clean up the Viet Cong threat" and another 128,000 men would be needed to Oiopose DRV/CHICOM intervention (draining 3 to i| reserve divisions). Finally, a memorandum from William Bundy to McNamara which said "it is really now or never if we are to arrest the gains being made by the Viet Cong

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and gave "an early and hard-hitting operation" a 70 percent chance of doing that. Bundy added, the chance of cleaning up the situation "de-oends

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Saigon Message i|88

lU Oct 1961

New York Times

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CINCPAC Recoixmendation

I8-2U Oct 1961

Taylor Mission to VoBtnam

23 Oct 1961

Ch MA/IG Message

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on Diem's effectiveness^ which is very problems.tical^'^ D^avored going in with 7O-3O odds "but figured the odds would slide down if the U.S. "let5 say5 a month go by" before moving.

Reversing his previous position^ Diem requested an additional fighter-boiaber squadron^ civilian pilots for helicopters and C-^7 transports and U.S. combat units for a "combat-training" mission near the Dt!iZ^ possibly also in the highlandso He asked consideration be given a possible request for a division of Chiang Kai-shek's troops to support

the GWI. Nolting recommended serious and prompt" a;btention for the requests.

In an article leaked by the government -- perhaps by Kennedy himself --leaders were called reluctant to send U.S. combat units into Southeast Asiao Obviously ujatrue, the leak was probably designed to end speculation a.bout troop deployment and guard Kennedy's freedom of action«

Admiral Felt felt the pros and cons of U.S. troop deployment added up in favor of no deployment until other means of helping Diem had been exhausted.

On the 18th5 Diem said he wanted no U.S. combat troops for any missionc He repeated his rec[uest for a bilateral defense treaty^ more support for ARW and combat-support equix^m.ent (helicopters^ aircraft^ etc.).

General McGarr suggested that the serious Mekong River flood could provide a cover for U.S. troop deployment: combat units could be disguised as huma.nitarian relief forces and be dispatched to the delta.

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25 Oct 1961

EVENT OR DOCUMEOT

Saigon Message.53^

1 Nov 1961

MGUIO Message OOO5

1 Nov 1961

MGUIO 0006 EYES ONLY FOR THE PRESIDED

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Taylor reported the pervasii^e crisis of confidence and serious loss in Vietnamese national morale created by Laos and the flood^ weakened the war effort. To cope with this Taylor recommended: Improvement of intelligence on the VC; building ARVN mobility; blocking infiltration into the highlands by organizing a border ranter force; introduction of U.S. forces either for emergency^ short-term assistance_j or for more substantial^ long-term support (a flood relief plus military reserve task force). Diem had reacted favorably "on all points."

Taylor told the President^^ Rusk and McNamara "we should put in a task force (6-8^000 men) consisting largely of logistical troops for the purpose of participating in flood relief and at the same time of providing a UoSo military presence in Vietnam capable of assuring Diem of our readiness to join him in a military showdown with the Viet Cong..."

Taylor concluded that the commi.inist strategy of taking over Southeast Asia by gu-errilla warfare was "well on the way to success in Vietnam";

TT

he said the GVN was caught in interlocking circles" of bad tactics and bad administrative arrangements" which allow VC gains and invite a political crisis. He recommended more U.S. support for paramilitary groups and ARVN mobility; the MAAG should be reorganized and increased and the task force introduced to "conduct such combat operations as are necessary for self-defense and for the security of the area in which (it) is stationed/' among other things. Taylor felt the disadvantages of deploynent were outweighed by gains^ said SVN is "not an ex-

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1 Nov 1961 (Continued)

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3 Nov 1961

Taylor Report

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cessively difficult or unpleasant place to operate" and the "risks of backing into a major Asian war "by way of SVN" are not impressive: North Vietnam "is extremely viilner-able to conventional bombing...there is no case for fearing a mass onslaught of communist manpower... particularly if our air power is allowed a free hand against logistical targets..."

The "Evaluation and Simimary" section suggested urgency and optimism: SVN is in trouble_j major U.S. interests are at stake; prompt and energetic U.S. action -- military^ economic^ political — can lead to victory without a U.S. take-over of the war_j can cure weaknesses in the Diem regime. That the Vietnamese must win the war was a unanimous view — but most mission participants believed all Vietnamese operations could be substantially improved by America's "limited partnership" with the GVN. The GVN is cast in the best possible light; any suggestion that the U.S. should IJjnit rather than expand its commitment -- or face the need to enter the battle in full force at this time — is avoided. Underlying the summary was the notion that "graduated measures on the DRV (applied) with weapons or our own choosing" could reverse any adverse trend in the South. And ground troops were always possible. The Taylor Report recommended the U.S. make obvious its readiness to act; develop reserve strength in the U.S. "to cover action in Southeast Asia up to the nuclear threshold in that area" and thereby sober the enemy and discourage escalation. However^ bombing was a more likely Vietnam contingency than was use of ground troops; the latter

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3 Nov 1961 (Continued)

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option "vras tied to a U.S. response to renewed fighting in Laos and/or overt invasion of South Vietnam. But Taylor suggested troops be sent t'o Diemj the Taylor Report and cables recoramend combat troop deployment to Vietnam. (A message from Nolting sutranarizing the Diem-Taylor meeting on which the recom-^ mendations apparently rest (Saigon message 5^1^ 25 Oct 61) does.not indicate a.ny enthusiasm on Diem's part to deployment of troops ^ however. He hinted U.S. troops for training might be requested, then drojDped the subject.)

Appendices to the Taylor Report written by members of the grouj^ give a slightly different picture. There is less optimism about the GVN*s chances of success, less optimism about chances of U.S. actioji -- political or military — tipping the balance. For example: William Jordan (State) said almost all Vietnamese interviewed had em-phasi2.ed the gravity of the situation, growing VC successes and loss of confidence in Diem. The ARVl^I lacked aggressiveness, was devoid of any sense of }xcgency^ short of able leaders. Sterling Cottrell (State) said: It is an open question whether the GW can succeed even with U.S» assistance. Thus it wovild be a mistake to make an ir:oaYocabls U»So commitment to defeat coi/imunists in South Vietnam. Foreign military forces cannot win the battle at the village level --■ vrhere it must be joined; the primary responsibility for saving Vietnam must rest with the GVN. For these reasons Cottrell argued against a treaty which would either shift \iltimate responsibility to the U.S. or engage a full U.So cojranitment to defeat the Vietconp".

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EVEAiT OR DOCIJf'/iEl--;T

S_NIE 10-J|"6l

8 Nov 1961

McNamara Memorandujn for the President ■

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This estimated the DRV i/ould re-■spond to an increased U.S. troop corairitment "by increasing support to the Vietcong. If U.S. coriHiit™ ment to the GVi'T grew^ so, would DRV support to the VC- Four possible U.S. courses vere given: airlift plus more help for ARVl^I; deployment of 8-10^000 troops as a I'lood relief task force; deployment of 25-^05 000 comoat troops; with each coui'^se^. warn Hanoi of U.S. determination to hold SVI^^ and U.S. intention to bomb the DRV if its support for the VC did not cease. The SNIE estimated air attacks agaj.nst the North would not cause its VC support to stop and figured Moscow and Peking would react strongly to air attacks.

Secretary McNamara, Gilpatric and the JCS were "inclined to recommend that we do comxait the U.Sc to the clear objective of preventing the fall of South Vietnara to coi^ioiunism and that we support this commitment by the necessary military actions," The memorandujn said the fall of Vietnam would create "extremely serious" strategic imxDlications worldwide, that chances were "probably sharply against" preventing that fall without a U.S. troop commitment but that even with major troop deploynent (205,000 was the ma>:jjnum number of groujid forces estimated necessary to deal with a large overt invasion from the. DRV and/or China) txhe U.S. would still be at the mercy of external forces -- Diem, Laos, domestic political problems, etcc -- and thus success could not be guaranteedo McNamara recommended against deployment of a task force (the 8,000-man group mentioned in the Taylor Report) "unless \je are willing to msike an affirmative decision" to full support a commitment to save South Vietnam.

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11 Nov 1961

EVEilT OR DOCIMhS-TT

Rusk/McNejnara MemO' randimi for the President

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DEPTEL 619 to Saigon

DESCRI PTION

This may have been prepared at Kennedy's specific instruction; it recoiTxrnended what Kennedy wanted to hear: that the decision to coimnit major groiind forces coiild be deferred. In this paper, rhetoric is escalated from that of McNajnara's 8 IJovember memorandixTi but U.3, actions recommended are far less significant^ less committing. Mili-tej:y courses are divided into two phases: firsts promptly deploy support troops and equipment (helicopters^ transport aircra.ft, maritime equipment and trainers^ special intelligence and air reconnaissance groups5 other men and materiel to improve training, logistics^ economic and other assistance programs). Then study and possibl y deploy ma.jor ground combat forces at a., later date. Despite the clear wai-n-ing that even deployment of major U.S. units could not assure success against communism, the memoranduxn's initial recommendation was that the U.S. ^'commit itself to the clear objective of preventing the fall of South Vietnam to Commimism," be prepared to send troops and to "strike at the source of aggression in North Viet-.nam." A number of diplomatic moves (in the U.N., in NATO and SEATO councils^, etc.) are suggested to signal U.S determination; economic, social and other programs designed to help South Vietnam are suggested; ways to elicit ■ improvements from Diem are recommended.

This was Nolting's guidance, based on the Rusk/McNamara memorandum. Nolting was told the anti-guerrilla effort *'must essentially be a GVN taskc.No amount of extra aid can be substitute for GV1\ taking measujres to permit [itj to assum.e offensive

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-■^ov 1961

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NSAM 111

7 Dec 1961

Alexis Johnson/Rostow Redrafi: ("Clarification'') of Nolting's lU KoyemlDer guidance

DESCRIPTION

and strengthen the administrative and political bases of government c «o.Do not propose to introduce into GW the U.S. combat troops novv^ "but propose a phase of intense public and diplomatic activity to focus on infiltration from ]\'Orth. Shall decide later on course of action should infiltration not be radically reduced." Diem's talking necessary measures -- political^ military5 economic --to improve his government ajid relations v/ith the people were a prerequisite to further U.S. assistance: "Package should be presented as first steps in a partnership,in which the U.S. is prepared to do more as joint study of facts and GVN performance makes increased U.S. aid possible and productive." Strictly for his ovm information^ Nolting was told Defense was "preparing plans for the use of U.S. combat forces in SW under various contingencies^ including stepped up infiltration as well as organized..«(military) intervention. However, objective of our policy is to do all possible to accomplish purpose without use of U.S. combat forces." And^ Nolting was to tell Diem: "We would expect to share in the decision-making process in the political^! economic and military fields as they affect the security situation,"

Called the "Pirst Phase of Vietnam Program" this NSAli approved all Rusk/Mcllamara recommendations of 11 November except the first one: their initial recoffimenda,tion that the U.S» commit itself to saving South Vietnam was omitted.

"What we have in mind is that in operations directly related to the security situation, partnership will be so close that one p^irty

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7 Dec 1961 (Continued)

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11 Dec 1961

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]N[ew York Times

15 Dec 1961

New York Times

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will not take decisions or actions affecting the other without fu.ll and frank prior consultation." This is different from the idea that Anieric3.n involvement should be so intimate that the GVN would be reformed "from the bottcun uio" --despite Diemo

(Although Washington ■o;ave in -- or gave up — on the kind and degree of pressirfe to exert on Diem^ Washington did not soften on Lansdaleo Despite four requests from Diem and the recommendations from. Cottrell, the Taylor Report and William Bundy that Lansdale be sent to Saigorij he did not get there until late I965.)

Two U.S. helicopter companies (33 H-2ICS5 kOO men) arrived in Vietnam^ the first direct U.S. military support for the GVNo

ICC reaction: shall vre continue functioning here in the face of U.S. assistance (increase barred by the Geneva Accords)?

Reported the formal exchange of letters between Kennedy and Diem annomicing a steT:)ped"Up aid progrsm for Vietnam o

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IV.B.l.

KEWJTCDY PROGRAM. kW> COMMZL^MEKTS: I96I

TABLE OF COKTEOTS kW) OUTLIKE

CHAPTER I

Page 1

I. MTRODUCTIOW,

II. THE CONTEXP

1

3

The VC Insurgency Itself

Problems With the Diem Government

Problems With the Soviets

The Situation in Laos

The Special American Commitment to Vietnam

III. SUMMARY.

CHAPTER II - THE COUNTERINSURGEWCY PLAN.

I. WINTER, 1961

II. LANSDALE'S REPORT

III. NEGOTIATING THE CIP

9

11

13

IV. DURBROW'S TACTICS I6

CHAPTER III - THE SPRING DECISIONS - I.

I. THE "PRESIDENTIAL PROGFAf/l"

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19

1. The Security Situation in Vietnam

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2. The Administration's Special Interest in Coujiter-Insurgency

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3. The Apparent Futility and Divisiveness of the Durbrow (pressure) Tactics for Dealing With Diem

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The Weakness of US Policy in Laos, and the Need for a Signal of Firra Policy in Vietnam

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II, THE APRIL 26 REPORT 23

III. LADJSDALE\S ROIE ' 28

I\r. KEroiEDY'S APRIL 29 DECISIONS 29

V. THE LAOS AIMEX 31

VI. THE MAY 1 REVIEW : 32

VII. STATE'S REDRAFT 35

VIII. WIDENING THE OPTIONS 36

K. TIJE TROOP ISSUE kO

CHAPTER IV - FROM MAY TO SEPTEMBER 52

Ic THE JOHNSON MISSION o 52

II. DIEt'l'S cTUNE LETTER ' 58

III. THE STALE! MISSION ' = 6l

IV. U.S. COMBAT TROOPS &\-

V. THE TREATY REQUEST 69

VI. THE SITUATION IN SEPTEMBER 71

CHAPTER- V - THE FALL DECISIONS - 1 76

I. THE DECISION TO SEND TAYIOR 76

II. THE NEWSPAPERS AND TPIE CABLES 85

III. CINCPAC RECOMMENDS "NOT NOW" 88 .

IV. TAYIjOR in SAIGON. . ." o 90

V. THE TAYLOR REPORT 100

VI. SOME CABLES FROM SAICrON ' IO9

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CHAPTER VI - THE FALL DECISIONS - II o 11^

I. CONTEXT

114

II. FINAL RECOMMENDATIONS 122

III. AFTERMATH 135

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EVOLUTION OF THE WA P. KEIMEDY PROGRAM MD COMMITMENTS: 19^1

IV.B.l. CHAPTER I

I. INTRODUCTION

In the summer of 1959^ it vas hard to find an American official worried about Vietnam. This vas not because things vere going veil. They were not. A National Intelligence Estimate published in August portrayed Diem as unpopular^ his economy as developing less rapidly than its rival in the North^ and his government under pressure from guerrillas encouraged and in part supported from the North. Nevertheless^ the NIE suggested no crisis then or for the foreseeable future. What the NIE ■ called "harassment" (i.e.^ support for the'VC) from the North would continue^ but overt invasion seemed most unlikely. Neither communist nor anti-coimnujiist enemies tfithin South Vietnam vere seen as an immediate threat. Diem vould remain as President^ said the NIE, "formany years." In G^um, the NIE sav the situation in Vietnam as unhappy^ but not unstable. That was to be about as close to good news as we would hear from South Vietnaai for a long tijne. l/

From then on, the classified record through the end of 19^1 shows a succession of bleak appraisals of the regime's support in the cities,

■ and among the mi].itary, aMost always accompanied by increasingly bleak

estimates of increased VC strength and activity in the countryside. A dispatch from our Embassy in Saigon in March, I960, described the situation in grave terms, but ended on the hopeful note that as of January Diem was recognizing his problems and promising to do som-.ething about them. 2/ In

i . . August, an NIE analysis reported a "marked deterioration since January." 3/

In November, a military coup barely failed to overthrow Diem.

In January, I961 an old coujaterinsurgency hand. General Ed^^ard Lansdale, went to Vietnam to look things over for the Secretary of Defense. He returned v/ith a report that "the Viet Cong hope to win back Vietnam south of the ITth parallel this year, if at all possible, and are much further along towards accomplishing this goal than I had realized from reading the reports received in Washington." hf

Nevertheless, the situation was never seen as nearly so grave as I these reports, read years later, might suggest. We 'VTill see that at least

up until the fall of I96I, while appraisals of the situation sometimes * suggested ijnminent crisis, the recommendations made to the President (by the

authors of these frightening appraisals) always implied a less pessimistic

view.

The top levels of the Kennedy A.dministration dealt only intermittently mth the problem of Vietnam during I96I. There was a flurry of

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of activity in late; A jri], and early May^ which we will see was essentially an offshoot- of the Laos crisis which had come to a head at that time. .A much more thorough review was undertaken in the fall^ following Genera,l Taylor's mission to Saigon^ which then led to an important expansion of the American effort in Vietnam.

No fundamental new American decisions on Vietnam were made until the Buddhist unrest in the last half of 1963^, and no major new military decisions were made until I965. Consequently, the decisions in the fall of 1961 (essentially_, to provide combat support -- for example^ helicopter compa-nies — but to defer any decision on direct combat troops) have come to seem very important. This paper tries to describe what led up to those decisions^ what alternatives were available and what the implications of the choices were.

The story is a fairly complicated one. For although it is hard to recall that context today^ Vietnam in I961 was a peripheral crisis. Even within Southeast Asia it received far less of the Administration's and the world's attention than did Laos. The New York Tljnes Index for I961 has eight col-umns of Vietnam^ twenty-six on Laos. Decisions about Vietnam were greatly influenced by what was happening elsewhere. In the narrow Vietnamese context^ the weaknesses and peculiarities of the Diem government had a substantial^ if not always obvious^ impact on the behavior of both the Vietnamese officials seeking American aid and the American decision-makers pondering the nature and terms of the aid they would offer.

As it happens^ the Eisenhower Administration was never faced with a need for high-level decisions affecting the crisis developing in Vietnam during i960. A formal Counterinsurgency Plan^ intended to be the basis of au expanded prograra of assistance to Vietnam^ was being worked on through most of that year^ but(presumably reflecting a subdued sense of urgency)^ it took eight months to reach the White House. By that time_, a new Administration had just ta,ken office. President Kennedy promptly approved the plan_, but this merely set off lengthy negotiations with the Vietnamese about whether and when they would do their share of the CIP. In late April^ though^ a crisis atmosphere developed^ not because of anything fresh out of Vietnam^ but because of a need to shore up the Vietnamese and others in Southeast Asia in the face of a likely collapse of the U.S. position in Laos. This led to a UoS. offer to discuss putting American troops into Vietnam^ or perha^ps negotiate a bilateral security treaty with the Vietnamese. When^ however^ Vice President Johnson mentioned the possibility of troops to Diem in May^Diem said he wanted no troops yet. The idea of a bilateral treaty similarly slipped out of sight. Consequently^ although the United States had itself indicated a iriUlngness in May to discuss a deeper commitment^ the South Vietnamese did not ta>.e up the opportunity^ and the Administration had no occasion to face up to really hard decisions.

But by October^ the situation in Vietnatn had worsened. The VC were becoming disturbingly aggressive. Now^ Diem did raise the question of

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a treaty. This request^ coming after the American offer in May to consider such steps and in the context of a -worsening situation in VietnaiTij, could hardly be ignored. The Taylor Mission and the Presidential reviev and decisions of November followed.

The present paper is organized around these natural climaxes in -the policy process. The balance of Part I describes the situation inherited by the ne-w Administration. Part II covers the period through the May peak.. Part III covers the fall crisis.

II. THE CONTE}^

In January^ 1961^, there vere five issues that were going to affect American policy toward Vietnam. They turned on:

1. The VC Insurgency Itself

An illustration of the growth of the insurgency^ but also of the limits of U.S. concern can be seen in the I96O CINCPAC Comijiand History. For several years prior to I96O, CINCPAC histories do not mention the VC insurgency at all. In 196o_, the development of a counterinsurgency plan for Vietnam (and simultaneously one for Laos) received a fair amount of attention. But when^ in April_j MAAG in Saigon asked for additional transports and helicopters for the counterinsurgency effort^ CINCPAC turned doT/n the requests for transports^ and OSD overruled the recommendation CINCPAC forwarded for 6 helicopters. By December^ OSD was willing to approve sending 11 helicopters (of 16 newly requested) on an "emergenc;y" basis. But the emergency was partly a matter of reassuring Diem after the November coup^ and the degree of emergency is suggested by the rate of delivery: h in December^ and the balance over the next three months. 5/

The record_, in general^ indicates a level of concern such as that illustrated by the helicopter decisions: gro\-7lng gradually through 1960^ but still pretty much of a back-burner issue so far as the attention and sense of urgency it commanded among policy-level officials. As we will see_, the new Kennedy Administration gave it more attention_, as the Eisenhower , Adtuini strati on undoubtedly would haA'-e had it remained in office. But it is important (though hard^ now that Vietnara has loomed so large) to keep in mind how secondary an issue the VC threat to Vietnam seemed to be in early 1961.

2, Problems ¥ith the Diem Government

Yet^ although the VC gains were not seen -- even in the dispatches from Saigon -- as serious enough to threaten the iimuediate collapse of the Diem government^ those gains did have the effect of raising difficult ques-tic3ns about our relations with Diem that we had never had to face before. I For by late 1960^ it was a quite widely held view that the Diem government

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vas probably going to be overthrown sooner or later^ barring major changes from -vrithin. In contrast to the May 1959 KIE^s confident statement that Diem "almost certainly" vould remain president "for many years_," ve find the August i960 NIE predicting that the recent "adverse trends^" if continued^ would "almost certainly in time cause the collapse of Diem's regime." 6/

The simple_, unhappy fact vas that whatever his triumphs in 1955 BXid 1956^ by the end of the 1950s the feeling was growing that the best thing that could be said for Diem was that he .was holding the country together and keeping it from succumbing to the communists. Once even this came into doubt^ talk among Vietnamese and eventually among Americans of whether it might be better to look for alternative leadership became inevitable.

The sense of trouble shows through even among the optjjnists. ¥e find Kenneth Young^ U.S. Ambassador to Thailand and a strong believer in Diem^ warning him in October^ I960 that "there seems to be somewhat of a crisis of confidence in Vietnam." 7/

But the long list of measures Young suggested were all tactical in nature^ and required no basic changes in the regime.

Our Ambassador in Saigon (Eldridge Durbrow) was more pessimistic:

...situation in Viet-Nam /December^ 1960/ is highly dangerous to US interests. Communists are engaged in large-scale guerrilla effort to take over countryside and oust Diem's Government. Their activities have steadily increased in intensity throughout this year. In addition^ Diem is faced with widespread popular dissatisfaction with his government's inability to stem the communist tide and its own heavy-handed methods of operation. It seems clear that if he is to remain in power he must meet these two challenges by improvements in his methods of conducting var against communists and in vigorous action to build greater popular support. We ■ should help and encourage him to talie effective action. Should he not do so^ ve may -well be forced^ in not too distant future^ to undertaJce difficult task of identifying and supporting alternate leadership. 8/

But the difficulties (and risks) of that task looked forbidding. During the IJovemb.-r^ I960 coup attempt the U.S. had apparently used its influence to get the coup leaders to negotiate mth Diem for reforms^ allowing Diem to retain his position with reduced powers. Whether because of their o^m indecision or U.S. pressure^ the coup leaders allowed a delay that let Diem bring loyalist troops in to regain control. (Three years

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later^ a leader of the November^ 19^3 coup "somewhat emphatically" told, an Merlcan agent that "it would do no good to send anyone around to attempt to stop things^ as happened in November^ 1960/') 9/

The situation that was left -- with a number of American officials unhappy with Diem and doubtful that he was capable of winning the war^ yet unwilling to risk a coup -- produced strains within the American government. Short of encouraging a coup^ we seemed to have two alternatives: attempt to pressure Diem or attempt to so win his confidence that he would accept our advice willingly. The only effective form of U.S. pressure^ however^ was to withhold aid_, and doing so would sooner or later wealien the war effort.

Consequently a division developed^ mainly (but not purely) along the lines of Defense against State_, about the advisability of using pressure. The division was particularly sharp since Diem seemed willing to go part way^ at least^ in meeting our military suggestions^, so that the Defense view tended to be that the U.S. would be weakening the war effort if aid vrere withheld to seek to gain civil reforms that not many people in Defense regarded as crucial. Besides^ it was argued^ Diem would not succumb to pressure anyway. ¥e would just encourage another coup_, and the communists would exploit it.

Given this sort of argument^ there would always (at least through 1961) be at least two layers to decisions about aid to Vietnam: Fnat should the U.S. be willing to give? and ¥hat_, if any^ demands should be made on Diem' in return for the aid?

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3. Problems With the Soviets

But from Washington^ both problems within Vietnam -- hov?- to deal with the Viet Cong^ and how to deal with Diem -- seemed quite inconsequential compared to the problems of dealing with the Soviets. There were two elements to the Soviet problem. The first^ which only indirectly affected Vietnam^ was the generally aggressive and confident posture of the Russians at that time^ and the generally defensive position of the Anericans. To use W.W. Rostow's terminology^ the Soviets were then entering the third year of their "post-sputnik" offensive^ and their aggressiveness would continue through the Cuban missile crisis. On the U.S. side there was dismay even among Republicans (openly^ for example^ by Rockefeller; necessarily subdued by Mxon^ but reported by any number of journalists on the basis of private conversations) at what seemed to be an erosion of the American position in the world. The Coolidge Commission^ appointed by the President^ warned him I in January^ 1960^'to^ among other steps^'-close the missile gap" and gen-

erally strengthen our defenses. Kennedy^ of course^ made erosion of our position in the world a major campaign issue. All of this made I96I a peculiarly difficult year for Anericans to make concessions^ or give ground to the Soviets when it could be avoided^ or even postponed. That was clear

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in January_j and everything thereafter that was_, or could be interpreted to be a veak U.S. response^ only strengthened the pressure to hold on in Vietnara. lo/

A further element of the Soviet problem impinged directly on _ ■ Vietnam. The nev Administration_, even before taking office^ was inclined to believe that unconventional warfare was likely to be terrifically important in the 1960s. In January 196l_, K2rushchev seconded that view with his speech pledging Soviet support to "wars of national liberation." Vietnam was where such a. war was actually going on. Indeed^ since the war

in Laos had moved far beyond the insurgency sta^e_, Vietnam was the only place in the world where the Administration faced a well-developed Communist effort to topple a pro-Western government with an externally-aided pro-communist insurgency. It was a challenge that could hardly be ignored.

Y 4. The Situation in Laos

Meanwhile^ mthin Southeast Asia itself there was the peculiar |

problem of Laos^^ where the Western position was in the process of falling \

apart as Kennedy took office. The Eisenhower Administration had been giving strong support to a pro-Am.erican faction in Laos. As a consequence^ the ,

neutralist faction had joined in an alliance irlth the pro-communist faction. The Soviets were sending aid to the neutralist/communist alliance_j which they recognized as the legitimate governtnent in Laos; the U.S. recognized and aided the pro-western faction. Unfortunately_j it turned out that the neutralist/communist forces were far more effective than those favored by the U.S.^ and so it became clear that only by putting an American army into Laos could the pro-Western faction be kept in power. Indeed^ it was doubtful that even a coalition government headed by the neutralists (the choice the U.S. adopted) could be salvaged. The coalition government solution would raise problems for other countries in Southeast Asia: there would be doubts about U.S. commitments in that part of the world_j and (since it was obvious that the communist forces would be left with de facto ■ control of eastern Laos)^ the settlement would create direct security threats for Thailand and Vietnam* These problems would accompany a "good" outcome in Laos (the coalition government); if the Pathet Lao chose to simply overrun the country outright (as^ short of direct American intervention^ they had the power to do)^ the problem, elsewhere in Southeast | Asia would be so much the worse. Consequently^ throughout 196l_, we find 1 the effects of the Laos situation spilling over onto Vietnam.

5. The Special American Commitment to Vi etnam

Finally^ in this reviev;" of factors that would affect policy-making 1 on Vietnam^ we must note that South Vietnafn^ (unlike any of the other coun- [ tries in Southeast Asia) was essentially the creation of the United States. i

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^^ Without U.S. support Diem almost certainly could not have con-'

solidated his hold on the South during 1955 and 1956.

Without the threat of U.S. intervention^ South Vietnam could not have refused to even discuss the elections called for in I956 under the Geneva settlement without being jj:miediately overrun by the Viet Minh armies.

Without U.S. aid in the years following^ the Diem regime certainly, and an independent South Vietnam aOmost as certainly, could not have survived .

Further, from 195^1 on there had been repeated statements of U.S. support for South Vietnam of a sort that we would not find in our dealings with other countries in this part of the world. It is true there was nothing unqualified about this support: it was always economic, and occasionally accompanied by statements suggesting that the Diem regme had incurred an obligation to undertake reforms in return for our assistance. But then, vntll I96I, there was no occasion to consider any assistance that went beyond economic support and the usual sort of military equipment and advice, and no suggestion that our continued support was in doubt.

Consequently, the U.S. had gradually developed a special commitment in South Vietnam. It was certainly not absolutely binding, even at the level of assistance existing at the start of 196I, much less at any higher level the South Vietnamese might come to need or request. But the commitment was there; to let it slip would be awkward, at the least. ^ Whether it really had any impact on later decisions is hard to say. Given

the other factors already discussed, it is not hard to believe that in its absence, U.S. policy might have followed exactly the same course it has followed. On the other hand, in the absence of a pre-existing special re- . lation with South Vietnam, the U.S. in I961 possibly would have at least considered a coalition government for Vietnam as well as Laos, and chosen to limit direct U.S. involvement to Thailand and other countries in the area historically independent of both Hanoi and Peking. But that is the mootest sort of question. For if there had been no pre-existing commitment to South Vietnam in I961, there would not have been a South Vietnam to worry about anyway.

III. SUMMARY

Looking over the context we have been reviewing, it seems like a situation in which mistakes would be easy to make. The Viet Cong threat was serious enough to demand action; but not serious enough to compete with other crises and problems for the attention of senior decision-makers. A sound decision on tactics and levels of commitment to deal with the Viet Cong involved as much a judgment on the internal politics of non-communists in Vietnam as it did a judgment of the guerrillas' strength, and character, and relation with Planoi. (Even a judgement that the war could be treated as a strictly military problem after all, involved at least an implicit judgement, and a controversial one, about Vietnamese politics.) Even if Diem

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looked not worth supporting it would "be painful to make a decision to let him sink^ and especially so in the world context of I96I0 Faced with.a challenge to deal with wars of national liberation^j it would be hard to decide that the first one we happened to meet was "not our styleo" And after the U.S. stepped back in Laos^ it might be hard to persuade the Russians that we intended to stand firm anywhere if we then gave up on Vietnam. Finally^ if the UoS, suspected that the best course in Vietnam was to seek immediately an alternative to Diem^ no one knew who the alternative might be_j or whether getting rid of Diem would really make things better o

Such was the prospect of Vietnam as 196I began^ and a new Administration took officeo

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THE COUxiTEKIIiSURG-EKCY PLAIT

IV.B.

CHAPTER II

I. "WINTER, 1961

The Vietnam Counter-Insurgency Plan which vas being "worked on through most of I960 finally reached the White House in late January^ apparently just after Kennedy took office. We do not have a document showing the exact date^ but we know that Kennedy approved the main provisions of the Plan after a meeting on January 28th_j and negotiations with Diem began February I3. l/

The provisions of the CIP tell a good deal about how the Viet Cong threat looked to American and Vietnamese officials" at the beginning of 19^1^ for there is nothing in the record to suggest that anyone -- either in Saigon or Washington^ Vietnamese or American -- judged the CIP to be an inadequate response to the VC threat.

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The U.S. offered Diem equipment and supplies to outfit a 20_,000 man increase in his army. The cost was estimated at $28.4 million. The U.S. also offered to train_, outfit and supply 32^000 micn of the Civil Guard (a counterguerriJJa auxilliary) at a cost of $12.7 million. These two moves would help Diem expand the WNKF to a total of 170^000 men^. and expand the Civil Guard to a total of 68_,000 men. There were some further odds and ends totalling less than another million. The full package added up to less than $J+2 million^ which was a substantial but not enormous increment to on-going U.S.- aid to Vietnam of about $220 million a year. (Since most of these costs were for initial outfitting of new forces^ the package was mainly a one-time shot in the arm.) 2/

For their part_, the Vietnamese were supposed to pay the local currency costs of the new forces^ and carry out a number of military and civil reforms.

The key military reforms were to straighten out the chain of command^ and to develop an agreed overall plan of operations,

/The chain of com^nand problem was that control of the counter-insurgency effort in the provinces was divided between the local military commander and the Province Chief_, a personal appointee of Diem^ and reporting directly to Diem. Even at a higher level^ 3 regional fie3,d comraands reported directly to Diem^ by-passing the Chief of Staff. So a total of ^2 officials with some substantial (and overlapping) control of the war effort reported directly to Diem: 38 Province Chiefs^ 3 regional commanders_, and the Chief of Staff. The "reform" eventually gotten from Diem put

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the regional coinmanders under the Chief of Staff^ and combined the office of Province Chief (usually a Mlitary man in any event) and local field coimnander. But the Province Chiefs still were personally responsible to Diein_, and could appeal directly to him outside the nominal chain of command. Diem^s reform^ consequently^ turned out to be essentially meaningless. His reluctance to move on this issue vas not surprising. After all^ the division and confusion of military authority served a real purpose for a ruler like Diem^ mth no broad base of support: it lessened the chance of a coup that vould throw him out.

_^he overall plan issue^ on vhich not even a paper agreement vas reached during the period covered by this account, was really an argument over strategy. It has a familiar ring. -

^Diem seemed oriented very much towards maintaining at least the pretense of control over all of South Vietnam. Consequently, he favored maintaining military outposts (and concentrating the population in Agrovilles, the predecessors of the strategic hamlets) along "lines of strength" (generally main roads) which stretched throughout the country. To assert at least nominal control over the countryside between 'these lines of strength, the military forces would periodically organize a sweep. In contrast to this, the American plan stressed what MAAG called a "net and spear" concept. Small units would scour the jungles beyond the pacified area. ¥[ien this "net" found an enemy unit, they would call in reserves (the spear) for a concentrated attempt to destroy the unit. As new areas were thus cleared, the net would be pushed further out into previously uncontested areas. It is not clear how well refined either concept was, or (with hindsight) whether the American plan was really a great deal more realistic than Diem's. But the American interest in getting Diem to agree to a plan does seem to have been primarily oriented to getting him to agree to some systematic procedure for using forces to clear areas of VC control, instead of tying up most of his forces defending fixed installations, with periodic uneventful sweeps through the hinterland,7" 3/

On the civil side, the stress in the CIP was on trying to shore up the regime's support within the cities by such steps as bringing opposition leaders into the government, and giving the l^Iational Assembly the power to investigate charges of mismanagement and corruption in the

executive.

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The Plan also called for "civic action" and other steps to increase the change of winning positive loyalty from the peasants. \J

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A good deal of bureaucratic compromise had gone into the CIP. Mbassador Durbrow only reluctantly conceded any real need for the 20^000 man force increase. The stress on civil reforms^ in particular on civil reforms as part of a quid pro quo ^ came into the plan only after the Saigon Embassy became involved^ although there vere general allusions to such things even in the original military draft of the CIP.

ITevertheless, there vas at least a paper agreement_, and so far as the record shows^ substantial real agreement as veil. No one complained the plan vas inadequate. It vould_j "if properly implemented^" "turn'the tide." And^ by implication^, it vould do so vithout any major increase in American personnel in Vietnam^ and indeed^ aside from the one-shot outfitting of the nev units _, vithout even any major increase in American aid. 5/

None of this meant that the varnings that ve have seen in the Saigon Embassy's dispatches or in the August SEIE vere not seriously intended. What it did mean vas that^ as of early 196l_, the viev that vas presented to senior officials in "Washington essentially shoved the VC threat as a problem vhich could be pretty confidently handled^ given a little more muscle for the array and some sharping up by the Vietnamese administration. Any doubts expressed vent to the vill and competence of the Diem regime^ not to the strength of the VC^ the role of Hanoi;, or the adequacy of U.S. aid.

Consequently^ among the assumptions listed as underlying the CIP^ ve find (vith emphasis added):

That the Government of Viet-Nam has the basic potential to cope vlth the Viet Cong guerrilla threat if necessary cor rective measures are talien and adequate forces are provided . 6/

That of course vas the heart of the CIP bargain: the U.S. vould provide support for the "adequate forces" if Diem vould take the "necessary corrective steps." The hinted corollary vas that our commitment to 'Diem should be contingent on his'performance: - ," .

That at the present time the Diem government offers the best hope for defeating the Viet Cong, 7/ ■.

II. lAIJSDALE'S REPORT

Running against these suggestions (of a fi3:Tia bargaining position contingent on Diem's performance)^ vas concern that if Diem vere overthrown his successors might be no better; and that the VC might exploit the confusion and perhaps even civil var folloiring a coup. Further^ there vas an argujnent that part of Diem's reluctance to move on reforms vas that he vas

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afraid to make any concession that might weaken his grip: consequently the U.S. needed to reassure him that he could count on our firm support to hijn personally.

A strong statement of this point of view is contained in a report submitted in January by Brig. General Edward Lansdale^ then the' Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Special Operations. Lansdale had become famous for his work in the Philippines advising on the successful campaign against the Huk insurgents. In 1955 ^^^ 195^^ he was a key figure in installing and establishing Diem as President of South Vietnam. As mentioned in the Introduction^ Lansdale visited Vietnam in early January. Here_j from his report^, are a few extracts on Diem and how Lansdale felt he should be handled:

.. .We must support Ngo Dinh Diem until another strong executive can replace him legally. President Diem feels that Americans have attacked him almost as viciously as the Communists^ and he has withdrawn into a shell for self-protection. ¥e have to show him by deeds_, not words alone^ that we are his friend. This vrill make our influence effective again.

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.If the next American official to talk to President Diem would have the good sense to see him as a himaan being who has been through a lot of hell for years — and not as an opponent to be beaten to his knees — we would start regaining our influence y±th him in a healthy way. VJhatever else we might thinly of him^ he has been unselfish in devoting his life to his country and has little in personal belongings to show for it. If we donH- like the heavy influence of Brother Ehu^ then let's move someone of ours in close. This someone^ however^ must be able to look at problems with understanding^ suggest better solutions than does Nhu^ earn a position of influence....

Ambassador Durbrow should be transferred in the immediate future. He has been in the 'forest of tigers' which is Vietnam for nearly four years now and I doubt that he himself realizes how tired he has become or how close he is to the individual trees in this big woods. Correctly or not^ the recognized government of Vietnam does not look upon him as a frlend_j believing he sympathized strongly with the coup leaders of 11 November.

.. .Ngo Dinh Diem is still the only Vietnamese \r±th executive ability and the required determination to be an effective President. I believe there mil be another attempt to get rid of him soon^ unless the U.So makes it clear that we are backing him as the elected top man. If the 11 November coup had been successful^ I believe that a numher of highly selfish and

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mediocre people vouJLd be squabbling among themselves for power while the Communists took over. The Communists will be more alert to exploit the next coup attempt...* 8/

Lansdale*s view was not immediately taken up^ even though Hilsman reports that his presentation impressed Kennedy enough to start the President thinking about sending the General to Saigon as our next Ambassador. 9/ Instead^ Kennedy made what was under the circumstances the easiest^ least tim.e-consuming decision^ which was simply to let the Ambassador he had inherited, from the Eisenhower Administration go forward and make a try with the plan and negotiating tactics already prepared.

Durbrow's guidance specifical3,y tells him (in instructions he certainly found suited his own view perfectly):

...considered U.S. view (is) that success requires implementation entire plan...If Ambassador considers GVN does not provide necessary cooperation; he should inform Washington with recommendations which may include suspension U.S. contribution. lO/

III. KEGOT^IATIN G THE CIP

Kennedy's approval of the CIP apparently was seen as quite a routine action. None of the memoirs of the period give it any particular attention. And^ although both Schlesinger and Hilsman refer to General Lansdale's report as shocking the President about the state of things in Vietnara^ that report itself does not criticize the dP^ or the adequacy of its programs.

The guidance to Dirrbrow assumed agreement could be reached "within two weeks." This choice of language in the guidance cable implies that we believed Diem would quickly agree on the terms of the CIP; and the question of using pressure against him ("suspension of U.S. contribution") would only arise later^ should he fail to follow through on his part of the agreement, ll/

As it turned out; Durbrow's efforts took a more complicated form. Even reaching a nominal agreement on the CIP took about 6 weeks. Then; Durbrow recommended holding up what is constantly referred to as "the green light" on increased aid until Diem had actually signed decrees

implementing his major promises.

On March 8 (in response to a Washington s\iggestion for stepping up some aid prior to agreement on the CIP); Saigon cabled that:

...despite pressure of Biibassy and MAAG; GVN has not decreed the required measures and will continue to delay unless highly pressured to act. 12/

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But by the l6th both the MAAG Chief and the Mbassador vere taking a gentler line. Durbrow^s cable of that date reports that agreement on military reforms had reached a poi:ot "vhich MMG considers it can live -with provided GVE follows through ^vith proper implementa-tioUc" He -was more concerned about the civil reforms^ but nevertheless concluded the cable >7lth: ' •

Comments: Diem -was most affable_, exuded confidence and for first time expressed some gratitude our CIP efforts which he promised implement as best he could. ' Again before giving full green light believe ve should avfait outcome detail discussion by GW-US officials. In meantime MAAG quietly ordering some equipment for 20^000 increase. 13/

And a veek later^ Washington replied^ agreeing that the "green light" should be held up until the CIP was approved^ but also noting that since success depended on the mlling cooperation of the Vietnaraese^j the Etiibassy ought not to push Diem too hard in the negotiations. 1^/ j

Following this_, the CIP negotiations dragged on inconclusively^ I and there is a ghostly quality to it all. There are cables giving en '

couraging progress reports which^ in fact^ seem limited to vague promises ! which^ with hindsight^ we know to have been quite meaningless. MAAG (and j eventually the JCS in Washington) grew increasingly Ijupatient with Durbrow^s insistence on further holding up the "green light." They wanted to get on mth the war.

By the end^ Durbrow was simply holding out for Diem to actually complete the paperwork on some steps he had long ago said he intended to take. His very last cable (May 3) gives a good feeling for the flavor of the negotiations that had been going on between Diem and Durbrow for the nearly 3 months since the CIP talks began (and indeed it gives the flavor of Durbrow's relations with Diem at least since the previous October).

During the inauguration reception at Palace April 29^ Diem took me aside and asked if I had given green light for , US iraplementation of our part of coimter insurgency plan (CIP). I replied franlily that I had not and noted that as stated in my letter of February 13 certain minimum actions must be taken by the GW first if CIP is to produce results. I listed following actions: (l) Establishment of a central intelligence organization; (2) assignment of operational control for counter insurgency operations within military chain of command; and (3) implementation of reforms announced by Diem on February 6. Diem replied that he would do all these things^ but that time was requj.red to work out details. He said various GW Cabinet members and Joint

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General Staff studying proposals and have different ideas. Since he wants to be sure that whatever done is veil thought out^ will be successful and not have to be changed in future he letting responsible officials thoroughly consider proposals. Diem stated that Secretary Thuan working on detailed statute for central intelligence organization^ but it required more vrork and needs to be polished up. I replied that frankly time was slipping by and as yet there no action on these three points^ which essential before 1 can give "green light" on equipment for 20^000 increase in armed forces.

In connection Diem remarks^ Vice'President Tho told me April 28 that he had not seen CIP^ although he had heard of its existence_, and he does not believe other Ministers have seen it either. Question thus arises as to whether Diem's statement that various Cabinet members studying CIP refers only to Thuan. I gave Tho fairly detailed fill-in on CIP contents. Tho said action now by President^ at least implementation of reforms^ needed in order .capitalize on present ups^-ang in popular feeling about situation following GW success in carrying out elections despite VC efforts to disrupt. Stating he did not know when if ever reforms will be implemented^ he commented that failure take such action after so many promises would lose all momentum gained from elections. Tho added that^ aside from psychological impact-_, reforms likely take (sic_; 3}is-ke) little change unless*Diem himself changes his method of opera-ting. Ke noticed that if "super ministers" mthout real authority the?/ likely becorae 'ju.st additional level in bureaucracy ^'D-thout making GYT^T more effective.

On May 2 in course my formal farewell call I asked Diem if decrees yet signed on intelligence organization^ chain of command and reforms. Diem stated he working on these matters but went through usual citation of difficulties including problem of convincing available personnel that they capable and qualified carry out responsibilities. He stated he already naraed Colonel I^lguyen Van Yankee to head intelligence organization^ Colonel Yanlvee has selected building for his headquarters and in process recruiting staff^ while Secretary Thuan working on statute for organization. Re chain of command^ I strongly emphasized that this one of most important factors in CIP^ GVN must organize itself to follow national plan with one man in charge operational control and not waste time chasing will of wisps. Diem replied that he not feeling well (he has cold) and with inauguration he has not had time focus on this question but he' will do it. Pie stated that he realizes only effective way is to place counter insurgency operations under Joint General Staff^ but that his generals disagreed as to exactly how this should be done.

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Diem^ referring Sihanoui^'s Vientiane press conference (Vientiane's 1979)^ stated he did not believe there would be lunation conference and he afraid Laos almost lost already. Diem argued that since PL occupy almost all of southern Laos_j ve must agree increase in RVMF to provide additional personnel to train self defense corps which in very bad shape.

Comment: Although Thuan has indicated to /mMG Chief/ General McGarr decree designating single officer to conduct counter insurgency operations being signed iinminently^ I asked him morning May 3 when seeing off Harriman and Lemnitzer whether I would receive before departure "present" he has long promised me. He replied presents often come when least expected^ which apparently means Diem not yet ready sign decree.

While we should proceed v^ith procurement equipment for 20^000 increase as recommended my l6o6; I do not believe GVN shou].d be informed of this green light^ particularly until above decree signed. Durbrow. I5/

The February 6 reforms referred to involved a cabinet re-organization Diem had announced before the start of the CIP negotiations. The intelligence re-organization was to consolidate the 7 existing services. The chain of command problem has been discussed above. Diem finally issued decrees on all these points a few days after Durbrow went home. The decrees were essentially meaningless: exactly these same issues remained high on the list of "necessary reforms" called for after the Taylor Mission^ and indeed throughout the rest of Diera's life.

IV. DURBROW'S TACTICS

Did Durbrow's tactics make sense? There is an argument to be made both ways. Certainly if Durbrow's focus was on the pro forma paperwork^ then they did not. Mere formal organizational re-arrangements (unifying the then 7 intelligence services into 1^ setting up at least a nominal chain of command for the war) often change very little even when they are seriously intended. To the extent they are not seriously in-tended^ they are almost certain to be meaningless. Vice President Tho^ of course^ is cited in the cable as making exactly that point. The very fact that Durbrow chose to include this remark in the cable (without questioning it) suggests he agreed. But if squeezing the formal decrees out of Diem really did not mean much^ then v?'hat was the point of exacerbating relations with Diem (not to mention relations with the military members of the U.S. mission) to get them? In hindsight^ we can say there was none^ unless the U.S. really meant what it had said about making U.S. support for Diem contingent on his talking "corrective measures." Then the function of those tactics would not have been to squeeze a probably m^eanlngless concession from Diemj for the cable quoted alone makes it pretty clear that it would

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have been naive to expect much follow-though from Diem. The purpose would have been to begin the process of separating U.S. support for . Vietnam from support for the Diem regijiie^ and to lay the basis for stronger such signals in the future unless Diem underwent some miraculous reformation. That^ of course^ is exactly the tack the U.S. followed in the fall of 1963^ once the Administration had really decided that we coiald not go on with the Diem regime as it then existed.

*

Ml this can be said wi.th hindsight. It is not clear how much of this line of thinking should be attributed to American officials in Washington or Saigon at the time. There is no hint in the cables we have that Durbrow was thinking this way. Rather he seems to have felt that the concessions he was wringing from Diem represented real progress^ but that we would have to keep up the pressure (presumably with threats to suspend aid — as his guidance considered — even after the "green light" was given) to keep goading Diem in the right direction. Meanwhile^ the predominant view (pushed most strongly_j but hardly exclusively by the military) was that we should^ and could effectively get on with the war with as much cooperation as we could get from Diem short of interfering with the war effort: it was all right to try for a quid pro quo on aid^ but not very hard. The Lansdale view went even fi;.rther_, stressing the need for a demonstration of positive^ essentially unqualified support for Diem if only to discourage a further coup attempt^ which Lansdale saw as the main short-run danger.

In a significant way^ Lansdale*s view was not very different in its analysis of tactics from the view that Diem was hopeless. Both Lansdale^ with his strong pro-Diem view^ and men like Galbraith with a strong anti-Diem view^ agreed that Diem could not be pressured into reforming this regime. ("He won't change^ because he can't change^" \rrote Galbraith in a cable we will quote in more detail later.)

"Where the Lansdale and Galbraith views differed — a fundamental difference^ of course^-- was in their estimate of the balance of risks of a coupo Lansdale^ and obviously his view carried the day^ believed that a coup was much more likely to make things worse than make things better. This must have been an especia3-ly hard view to argue against in I961, when Diem did not look as hopeless as he would later^ and when a strong argument could be made that the U.S. just could not afford at that time to risk the collapse of a pro-Western government in Vietnam. It must have seemed essentially irresistable to take the route of at least postponing^ as seemed quite feasible^ a decision on such a tough and risky course as holding back on support for Diem. The President^ after all^ could remember the charges that the Truman Administration had given away China by holding back on aid to Chiang to tiy to pressure him toward reform. As a young Congressman^ he had even joined the chorus.

Meanwhile Durbrovr was about to come hom^e (he had been in Vietnam for k years); security problems in Vietnam were^ at best^ not improving;

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and the repercussions of Laos vere spilling over and -would make further moves on Vietnam an urgent matter« By the middj,e of April_, the Administration vas undertaking its first close look at the problan in Vietnam (in contrast to the almost automatic approval of the CIP during the opening days of the nev Administration).

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IV.B.

THE SPRING DECISIONS - I

CHAPTER III

I. THE "PRESIDENTIAL PROGRAM"

The development of what eventually came to be called "The Presidential Program for Vietnam" formally began with this memorandum from McNamara to Gilpatric:

20 April 1961 MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

This will confirm our discussion of this morning during which I stated that the President has asked that you:

a. Appraise the current status and future prospects of the Communist drive to dominate South Viet-Nam.

b. Recommend a series of actions (military^ political and/or economic^ overt and/or covert) which^ in your

■ - opinion^ will prevent Communist domination of that

country.

The President would like to receive your report on or before Thursday^ April 27.

During the course of your stLidy^ you should draw^ to the extent you believe necessary_, upon the views and resources of the State Department and CIA. Mr. Chester Bowles was present when the President discussed the matter with me^ and I have reviewed the project with Mr. Allen Dulles. Further^ the President stated that Mr. Walt Rostow would be available to counsel with you. l/

GilpatriCj although obviously given a completely free hand under the terms of the memo_, nevertheless set up an interagency task force to work on the report. A draft was ready April 26^ and Gilpatric sent it to the President the following day. But this turned out to be only the first,, and relatively unioiportant phase of the effort. For the Laos crisis came to a boil just ac the first Gilpatric report was finished^ and the Task Force was continued with the essentially new mission of a recommending additional measure to keep our position from falling apart in the wake of what was happening in Laos- Consequently^, to understand these late-April^ early-May decisions^ we have to treat separately the initial Gilpatric effort and the later^ primarily State-drafted revision^ dated May 6. The same general factors were in the background of both efforts^

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although Laos vas only one of the things that influenced the April 26 effort^ vhile it became the overvheltning element in the May 6 effort. It is worth setting out these influencing factors^, specifically:

1. The security situation in Vietnamo

2. The Administration's special interest in counter-insurgencyo

3o The apparent futility and divisiveness oT the Dujrhrow (pressure) tactics for dealing with Diem.

4o Eventually most important^ and substantially narrowing the range of options realistically open to the Administration^ the weakness of US policy in Laos^ and the consequent strongly felt need for a signal of firm policy in Vietnamo

lo The Security Situation in Vietnam

The VC threat in Vietnam looked worse in April than it had in Januaryo We will see that Gilpatric's report painted a bleak pictureo Yet^ there is no hint in the record that concern about the immediate situation in Vietnam was a major factor in the decision to formulate a new program..

VC strength was estimated at 3-15^000 in Lansdale's January memorandum; 8-10^000 in a March NIE; 10^000 in an April briefing paper (apparently by Lansdale) immediately preceding — and recommending -- the Gilpatric Task Force; then 12^,000 one week later in the Gilpatric report proper. VC incidents were reported high for April (according to the Task Force report^ 650 per month_j k times higher than January)^ but an upsurge in activity had long been predicted to coincide with the Vietnamese electionso As would happen in the future^ the failure of the VC to prevent the elections was considered a sign of government strengtho 2

On the basis of the Task Force statistics^, we could assume that the situation was deteriorating rapidly: taken literally^ they indicate an increase in VC strength of 20 percent in about a week; plus the large increase in incidentso But neither cables from the field; nor the Washington files show any sense of a sharply deteriorating situationo And; as we will see; the initial Task Force Report; despite its crisis tone; recommended no increase"in military strength for the Vietnamese; only more generous US financial aid to forces already planned under the CIPo

2. The Administration's Special Interest in Counter-insurgency

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of supervising policy"than the Eisenhower Administration's elaborate National Seciirity structure o The effort in Vietnam obviously required some coordination of separate efforts by at least State^ Defense^ CIA_, and ICA (a predecessor of AID). Further^ once a coordinated program was vorked out,, the idea appears to have been to focus responsibility for seeing to it that the program was carried out on some clearly identified individualo This search for a better way to organize policy seems to have been the principal motive behind the initial Gilpatric effort^ although it became inconsec^uential after the original submissiono

3« The Apparent Futility and Divisiveness of the Durbrow (Pressui'e ) Tactics for Dealing With Diem

Late April was a peculiarly appropriate time to undertake the sort of sharpening up of policy and its organization just describedo It was probably clear by then that Durbrow's pressui-e tactics were not really accomplishing much with Diemo Besides^j Durbrow had been in Vietnam for four years by Aprils and a new Ambassador would normally have been sent in any evento Fritz Nolting had been chosen by early April; and he was scheduled to take over in early Mayo Fuxther^ Diem had just been reelected^ an essentially meaningless formality to be siore^ but still one more thing that helped make late April a logical time for taking a fresh look at US relations with Diemo And even to people who believed that a continuation of Durbrow's pressure tactics might be the best approach to Diem^ events elsewhere and especially in Laos must have raised questions about whether it was a politic time to be threatening to withhold aid.

^o The Weakness of US Policy in Laos^ and the Need for a Signal of Firm Policy in Vietnam

■ Tb.e situation in the world that April seemed to create an urgent requirement for the US to do something to demonstrate firmness^ and especially so in Southeast Asiao The Task Force was set up the day after the Bay of Pigs invasion force surrendered^ and at a time when the Laos crisis was obviously coming to heado There had been implicit agreement in principle between the US and the Soviets to seek a cease fire in Laos and to organize a neutral coalition governmento But it was not clear at all that the cease-fire would come while there was anything left worth arguing about in the hands of the pro-Western factiouo Gilpatric's initial Task Force report reached the President the day of a crisis meeting on Laos; and the more important second phase of the effort began then^ in an atmosphere wholly dominated by LaoSo

But even before the Laos crisis reached its peak, there was a sense in Washington and generally in the world that put strong pressirres on the Administration to look for ways to take a firm stand somewhere; and if it wa:s not to be in Laos^ then Vietnam was next under the gun.

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Something of the mood of the time can be sensed in these quotes_, one from a March 28 I^IE on Southeast Asia_, another from Lansdale's notes^ and finally a significant question from a Kennedy press conference:

From th e NIE :

There is a deep awareness among the countries of Southeast Asia that developments in the I^otian crisis^ and its outcome_, have a profound impact on their futureo The governments of the area tend to regard the Laotian crisis as a symbolic test of strengths between the major powers of the West and the Communist bloc. 3/

From Lansdale^s notes (about April 2l ):

lo Psychological — YE believed always they main targeto Now it comes — 'when ou-r tu:m comes_, will we be treated the same as Laos?» Main task GW confidence in US. hj

And suggesting the more general tone of the time (even a week before the Bay of Pigs^ prompted by the Soviet orbiting of a man in space) this CLuestion at Kennedy's April 12 news conference:

Mto President,, this question might better be asked at a history class than at a news conference^ but here it is anyway^ The Communists seem to be putting us on the defensive on a number of fronts -- now^ again^ in spacoo Wars aside^, do you think there is a danger that their system is going to prove more durable than ourSo 5/

The President answered with cautious reassuranceo Eight days later^ after the Bay of Pigs^ and the day he ordered the Task Force to go ahead_, he told the Association of Newspaper Editors:

• 000

it is clearer than ever that we face a relentless struggle in every corner of the globe that goes far beyond the clash of armies_3 or even nuclear armaments. Tlie armies are there<> But they serve primarily as the shield behind which subversion^ infiltration^ and a host of other tactics steadily advance^ picking off vulnerable areas one by one in situations that do not permit our own armed intervention^ooo We dare not fail to see the insidious nature of this new and deeper struggleo We dare not fail to grasp the new concepts^ the new tools^ the new sense of urgency we will need to combat it -- whether in Cuba or South Vietnamo 6/ (Notice Kennedy's exp3.icit assumption about US armed intervention as a means of dealing with insurgencies. Not too much can be read into his remark^ for it probably was inspired primarily by criticism of his refusal to try to save the Bay of Pigs contingent. But the balance of the record adds significance to the comment.)

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IIo THE APRIL 26 REPORT

The available Gilpatric file consists mostly of drafts of the report and memos from Lansdaleo It contains a memorandum dated April 13; in vhich Lansdale advised Gilpatric of a meeting with Rostow^^ at which Rostov shoved Lansdale a copy of a memorandum to Kennedy recommending a fresh crack at the Vietnam situationo Here is Rostov's memorandum:

April 12^ 1961

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDED

FROM: WR

I^ov that the Viet-Nam election is over^ I believe ve must turn to gearing up the whole Viet-Nam operationo Among the possible lines of action that might be considered at an early high level meeting are the following:

lo The appointment of a full time first-rate back-stop man in Washington o McNamara^ as veil as your staff^ believes this to be essential.

2. The briefing of our new Ambassador^ Fritz Nolting^ including sufficient talk with yourself so that he fully imderstands the priority you attach to the Viet-Nam problemo

3o A possible visit to Viet-Nam in the near future by the Vice President.

ko A possible visit to the United States of Mto Thuan^ acting Defense Minister^ and one of the fev men around Diem with operational capacity and vigor 0

5o The sending to Viet-Nam of a research and development and military hardvrare team which would explore with General McGarr vhich of the various techniq.ues and gadgets nov available or being explored might be relevant and useful in the Viet-Nam operationo

60 The raising of the MAAG ceiling;, which involves some diplomacy^ unless we can find an alternative way of introducing into the Viet-Nam operation a substantial number of Special Forces types.

7<. The question of replacing the present ICA Chief in Viet-Nam^ who_j by all accounts^ has expended his capital*, We need a vigorous man who can vrork veil vith the military^ since some of the rural development problems relate closely to guerrilla operations.

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8o Settling the q_uestion of the extra funds for Diezno

9o The tactics of persuading Diem to move more rapid2.y to broaden the base of his government; as veil as to decrease its centralization and improve its efficiency.

Against the backgroimd of decisions we should urgently take on these matters^, you may wish to prepare a letter to Diem which would not only congratulate him^ reaffirm our support^ and specify new initiatives we are prepared to take_j but would make clear to him the urgency you attach to a more effective political and morale setting for his military operationj, now that the elections are successfully behind him^

Neither this memo^ nor other available papers^ give us a basis for judging how far the stress on the importance of Vietnam was already influenced by developments in Iaos_j and how much it reflects a separable interest in taking on the challenge of "wars of liberatiouo" Both were undoubtedly important. But this Rostov memo turned out to be pretty close to an agenda for the initial Task Force report. It seems very safe to assujiie that the "full-time_j first-rate^ back-stop man in Washington"" Rostow had in mind was Lansdaleo (Gilpatric himself obviously could not be expected to spend full-time on Vietnamo) Presiuaably the President's request for the Gilpatric report was intended as either a' method of easing Lansdale into that role^ or at least of trying him out in it.

Following the description of the Rostow memo^ Gi2,patric's file contains several carbon copies of a long paper^ unsigned but certainly by Iansdale_5 which among other things recommends that the President set up a Task Force for Vietnam which would lay out a detailed program of action and go on to supervise the implementation of that program. The date on the paper is April 19^ but a draft must have been prepared some days earlier; probably about the time of lansdale's discussion with Rostow on the 13th; since the available copies recommended that the Task Force submit its report to the President by April 21. The paper explicitly foresaw a major role for General Lansdale both in the Task Force^ and thereafter in supervising the implementation of the report.

This Task Force was apparently intended to supersede what the paper refers to as "one of the customary working groups in Washington" vhich was "being called together next week by John Steeves^ Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairso"

In view of all this^ it is not surprising to find that the first phase of the Task Force effort appears^ from the record^ to have been very much a Gilpatric-lansdale show. The first meeting of the group (which included State and CIA representatives) was apparently held April 2ky four days after Gilpatric was told to go aheado A draft report

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was ready the 26th, following individaial raeetings between members and Gilpatric and Lansdale, Present files do not show whether there v?as another fiill meeting of the group before the first version of the report (d3,ted April 26) >?as sent to the President on the 27th.

Here are the opening sections, which introduce the list of proposed auctions which malie up the program, j/

■ A PR0GR/\I--1 OF ACTIQI';! TO PRFn/ENT CQMI-'IUITIST D0MIMTI01\^ OP

SOUTH VIETNMl

APPRAISAL OF THE SITUATION • After meeting in Hanoi on 13 May 1959; the Central Com:Qiittee of the North Vietnamese Communist Party publicly announced its intention "to smash" the government of President Diem. Following this decision^ the Viet Cong have significantly inc3-eased their progrein of infiltration, subversion, sabotage and assassination designed to achieve this end.

At the North Vietnamese Comiaujiist Party Congress in Septe^mber i960, the earlier declaration of underground war by the Party's Control Committee v/as reaffirmed. Tliis action 'bj the Party Congress took place oii'ly amonth after Kong Le's coup in Lp.os. Scarcely two months later there vTas a mllitai^f uprising in "Saigon. The t'ormoil created throughout the area by this rapid succession of events provides an ideal eirvironment for the Communist "master plan" to take over all of Southeast Asia.

Since that time, as can be seen from the attached map, the . internal secuj'ity situation in South Vietnam has become critical-VJhat amounts to a state of active guerrilla vjs.rfare now exists throu^iout the country. The nuxaber of Viet Ccng I:.ard-core Communists has increased from J-S-UoO in early 190O to an estimated 12^000 today. The number of violent incidents per month now averages 650. Casualties on both sides totaled more than U5OO during the first three months of this year. Fifty-eight percent of the coiaitry is under some degree of CommiJinist control^ ranging from harassment and night raids to almost complete adjiiinis-trative jurisdiction in the Communist "secure areas."

The Viet Cong over the past two years have succeeded in stepping up the pace and intensity of their attacks to the point where South Vietnam is nearing the decisive phase in its battle for survival. If the situation continues to deteriorate, the Cominunists mil be able to press on to their strategic goal of establishing a rival "National Liberation Front" government in one of these "secuxe areas" thereby plunging the nation into open civil v/ar. They have publicly announced that they will "take over the country before the end of I90I."

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This situation is thus critical,, but is not hopeless. The Vietnamese Government^ with American aid^ has increased its capabilities to fight its attackers^ and provides a base upon which the necessary additional effort can be founded to defeat the Communist attack. Should the Communist effort increase^ either directly or as a result of a collapse of Laosy additional measures beyond those proposed herein would be necessary.

In shorty the situation in South Vietnam has reached the point where^ at least for the time being^? primary emphasis should be placed on providing a solution to the internal security problem.

The US Objective : To create a viable and increasingly democratic society in South Vietnam and to prevent Communist domination of the co-untry.

Concept of Operations : To initiate on an accelerated basis^ a series of mutually supporting actions of a military^ political economic^ psychological and covert character designed to achieve this objective. In so doings it is intended to use^ and where appropriate extend^ expedite or build upon the existing US and Government of Vietnam (GVI^) programs already underway in South Vietnam. There is neither the time available nor any sound . justification for "starting from scratch." Rather the need is to focus the US effort in South Vietnam on the immediate internal security problem; to infuse it with a sense of urgency and a dedication to the overall US objective; to achieve^ through cooperative inter-departmental support both in the field and in Washington^ the operational flexibility needed to apply the available US assets in a manner best calculated to achieve our objective in Vietnam; and^ finally^ to impress on our friends^ the Vietnamese^ and on our foes^ the Viet Cong^ that come what may^ the US intends to win this battle.

The program that followed this strongly worded introduction was very modesty not merely compared to current US involvement^ but to the effort the US imdertook following the Taylor Mission in the fall. The program is essentially sjjnply a moderate acceleration of the CIP program approved in January^ with a great deal of stress on vigor^ enthusiasm^ and strong leadership in carrying out the programo

In particular^ the program proposes no increase in the Vietnamese army^ and only a moderate (in hindsight, inconsequential) increase in the size of our MMG mission. The main military measures were for the US to pr.ovide financial support for the 20j000-man increase in the RVMF and to provide support for the full complement of counter-insurgency auxiliary forces (Civil Guard and Self-Defense Corps) planned by Diem. Both were

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modest steps. For under the CIP we -were already planning to pay support costs for 150;,000 men of the RYEAF and 32^000 men of the Civil Guard o This Task Force proposal^ which had been urged for some weeks by MAAG in Saigon^ simply said that we would provide the same support for all the Vietnamese forces that we had already planned to provide for most of them.

For the rest_j the Presidential Program in its final form^ issued May 19j turned out (after a great deal of stirring around) to be close to that proposed in the April 26 drafto

Two comments are needed on this material. Firsts the program Lansdale and Gilpatric proposed was not so narrowly military as the repeated emphasis on priority for the internal secirrity problem might suggesto Rather^ the emphasis was on stabilizing the countryside^j in contrast to pressing Diem on political and administrative reforms mainly of interest to Diem' s ■urban criticSo This reflected both Lansdale's judgments on counter-insurgency^ which look good in hindsight,, and his strongly pro-Diem orientation^ which looks much less goodo

Second^ the reference to a communist "master plan" for Southeast Asia (and similar language is found in a number of other staff papers through the balance of I961) suggests a view of the situation which has been much criticized recently by men like Galbraith and Kennano Public comjnents by those who were closely involved (both those critical of policy since 19^5^ such as Sorenson and lillsrcis/a, and those supporting the Administration^ such as William Bundy) suggest a more sophisticated view of the problem. Here we simply note that the formal staff work available strongly supports Galbraith and Kennan_j although this does not necessarily imply that the senior members of the Administration shared the view that North Vietnam was operating (in the words of another staff paper) as the "implementing agent of Bloc policy" rather than in fairly conventional^ mainly non-ideological pursuit of its own national interests 8/

III. lANSDALE^S ROLE

In his April 27 memorandum transmitting the Report to the President^ Gilpatric noted that:

.o.in the short time available to the Task Force it was not possible to develop the program in complete detailo However^ there has been prepared a plan for mutually supporting actions of a political^j military^ economic_j psychological^ and covert character which can be refined periodically on the basis of further recommendations from the fields

Toward this end^ Brigadier General EoG. Lansdale^ USAF^ who has been designated Operations Officer for the Task Force^ will proceed to Vietnam immediately after the program receives

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Presidential approval. Following on the spot discussions with US and Vietnamese officials^ he \-i±ll forv/ard to the Director of the Tasli Porce specific recommendations for action in support of the attached program.

This appears to have "been the high point of Lansdale's role in Vietnam policy. Lansdale hj this time had already sent (with Gilpatric^s approval) messages requesting various people to meet him in Saigon^ May 5- This is from a memorandiim he sent to Richard Bissell^ then still a Deputy Director of the CIA^ requesting the services of one of his colleagues from the 1955-195^ experience in Vietnam:

I realize Redick is cornmitted to an important joh in Laos and that this is a difficult time in that trouble spot. I do feel^ however^ that we may ^^et save Vietnam and that our best effort should be put into it,

Redick_, in my opinion^ is now so much a part of the iininhib-ited communications between President Diem and myself that it goes far beyond the qu.estion of having an interpreter. His particiaar facility for appreciating iny meaning in words and the thoughts of Diem in return is practically indispensable to me in the role I am assigned in seelring President Kennedy *s goal for Vietnam. 9/

But none of this \;as to be. Present files contain a thermofax of McNamara's copy of the mamorandujn Gilpatric sent to the President. In McNamara's handv/riting the words (Lansdale) "will proceed to Vietnam immediately" are changed to "will proceed to Vietnam when requested by the Aml:>assador." As we \fill see below^ when the Task Force Report was redrafted the nezt week^ Lansdale's key role disappears entirely^ at the request of the State Depajrtment, but presumably with the concurrence of the V/liite House.

IV. KEIMSDY'S APRIL 29 DECISIONS

Although our record is not clear, it appears that the cover memorandum was sent to the President as Gilpatric had signed it^ and that McNeinara's correction reflected a decision made after the paper vrent to the President, rather than a change in the language of the memo. In any event, at a meeting on April 29^ President Kennedy approved only the quite limited military proposals of the dra^ft report it transmitted. Decisions were deferred on the balance of the paper, which now included an annex Issued April 28 on much moz'e substantial additional military aid believed required by the situation in Lao&. The military measuj^es approved dur-ing this first go-around were:

(1) Increase the I^IAAG as necessary to insure the effective implementation of the military portion of the program including the training of a 20,000-m3,n addition to the present GVN armed.

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forces of 150^000o Initial appraisal of nev tasks assigned CHMMG indicates that approximately 100 additional military personnel will be required immediately in addition to the present complement of 685o

(2) Expand MAAG responsibilities to include authority to provide support and advice to the Self Defense Corps with a strength of approximately 40_j000o .

(3) Authorize I^-lAP support for the entire Civil Guard Force of 68^000o MAP support is now authorized for 32jOOOj the remaining 36^000 are not now adequately trained and equippedo

(h) Install as a matter of priority a radar s-arveillance capability which will enable the GW to obtain warning of Communist over-flights being conducted for intelligence or clandestine air supply purposeso Initially^ this capability should be provided from US mobile radar capability.

(5) Provide MP support for the Vietnamese JuJik Force as a means of preventing Viet Cong clandestine supply and infiltration into South Vietnam by water o MAP support^ which was not provided in the Counterinsurgency Plan^ will include training of junk crews in Vietnam or at US bases by US Navy personnelo lO/

The only substantial significance that can be read into these April 29 decisions is that they signalled a willingness to go beyond the 685-man limit on the size of the US military mission in Saigon^ which,, if it were done openly^ would be the first formal breech of the Geneva Agreements.' For the rest; we were providing somewhat more generous support to the Vietnamese than proposed in the CIPo But the overall size of the Vietnamese forces would be no higher than those already approved. (The 20;000-man increase was already part of the CIP.) No one proposed in this initial draft that the Administration even consider sending American troops (other than the 100-odd additional advisors). It was not; by any interpretation^ a crisis responseo

Indeed; even if Kennedy had approved the whole April 26 program^ it would have seemed (in hindsight) most notable for the "come what may^ we intend to win" rhetoric in its introduction and for the supreme role granted to Task Force (and indirectly to Lansdale as its operations officer) in control of Vietnam policy. Lansdale's memoranda leave no real doubt that he saw the Report exactly that way -- which presujnably was why he made no effort to risk stirring up trouble by Dutting his more controversial views into the paper. For example^ although Lansdale believed the key new item in.Vietnam policy was a need for emphatic support for Diem; only the barest hint of this view appears in the paper (and it is not even hinted at in lansdale*s preliminary draft of the report distributed at the April 24th meeting of the Task Force)c ll/

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That is when this opening phase of the Task Force effort has to be separated from what followed. As just noted^ it was remarkable mainly for the strength of the commitment implied to South Vietnam^, which the President never did unambiguously endorse^ and for the organizational arrangement it proposed^ with the key role for Lansdale and Gilpatric_j which was eliminated from the later drafts, All of the factors behind the May reappraisal (cited at the beginning of this chapter) undoubtedly contributed to the decision to set up the Task Force. But Rostow's memorandum and the modest ditnensions of the resulting proposals suggest the main idea really was to sharpen up existing policy and its administration,; rather than to work out a new policy on the assumption that the existing program had become substantially obsolete. Immediately after April 27_, this changes. Although Gilpatric and Lansdale continued to head up the Task Force through the Presidential decisions of May 11^ their personal role became increasingly unimportant. The significance no longer was in putting new people in charge of a new style for running the program^ but in developing a new program that would offset the impact of Laos.

V. THE LAOS ANKEX

On April 28^ an annex had been issued to the basic report which went far beyond the modest military proposals in the original. The most reasonable assumption is that the annex was drawn up in response to ccmnents at the April 27 NSC meeting at which the Report was to have been considered_j but which turned out to be devoted to the by-then acute state of the crisis in laos. On the grounds that the neutralization of Laos would solidify communists de facto control of eastern Laos (inc3-uding the mountain passes which were the historic invasion route to southern Vietnam)^ the annex advocated U.S. support for a two-division increase in the RVNAF. To rapidly train these forces^ there was now a recommendation on U.S. manpower commitments that dwarfed the previous recommendation for a MAAG increase: specifically^ a l600-man training team for each of the two new divisions^ plus a 400-man special forces contingent to speed up counter-insurgency training for the South Vietnamese forces: a total of 3600 men; not counting the MAAG increase already authorized.

It is interesting that in the annex this force increase (and the bulk of the U.S. troop commitment) was specifically justified as insurance against a conventional invasion of South Vietnam- Some earlier drafts show the evolution of this concept. There is an alternate draft^ apparently by Lansdale^j which was not used but which recommended a U.S. troop commitment as reassurance to the Vietnamese of U.S determination to stand by them. It did not recommend any increase in South Vietnamese forces. Instead; it stressed very heavily the damage to U.S. prestige and the credibility of our guarantees to other countries in Southeast Asia should we go through with the Laos settlement without taking some strong action to demonstrate that we were finally drawing a line in Southeast Asia.

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Contrasting sharply vith Lansdale's draft was tlie first draft of the paper that was finally issuedo This vas by Gilpatric's military aide^ Colo EoFo Blacko It concludes that South Vietnamese forces would have to be increased by two divisions,, mainly to deal with threat of increased infiltration. Black stressed that the President would have to decide that the US would no longer be boimd by the limitations of the I95U Geneva Agreements (which Defense had long been lobbying against) o But his paper recommends no substantial troop commitmento The reference to the Geneva Agreem_ents apparently referred to a relatively modest increase in manpower beyond the 685-.man ceiling^ and to the introduction of new types of equipment not in Vietnam in 195^•

So the record contains three versions of the Annex -- Black's first drafts lansdale's alternate draft; and then Black's revised paper^ which was finally isssued as the annex to the Reporto The effect of considering them all is an odd oneo The initial Black paper recommends an increase in Vietnamese forces to deal with the infiltration problem^ but no substantial US troop commitment. The Lansdale alternative recommends a substantial US troop commitment_5 but no increase in Vietnamese forceso The final paper recommends both the RVT^AE increase and the US troop commitments^ but changes the reason for each: the reason for the RVNAF increase became a need for better protection against overt invasion^ not an increased infiltration threato And the reason for the US troop commitment became a desire to rapidly train the new Vietnamese troops^ not for political reassurance. 12/

If taken literally^ all of this implies an extraordinarily rapid series of reappraisals and reversals of judgment. But surely^ the only realistic interpretation is that in this case (because a series of rough drafts happens to be included in the available file) we are getting a glimpse at the way such staff paperwork really gets drafted^ as opposed to the much more orderly impression that is given if we saw only the finished products. Gilpatric (undoubtedly in consultation with at least McNajnara^ although the files do not show any record of this) was presvimably interested primarily in what recommendations to make to the President; and secondarily in providing a bureaucratically suitable rationale for those recommendationso .This rationale may^ or may not; have coincided with whatever more private explanation of the recommendations that McNamara or Gilpatric may have conveyed to the President or people like McGeorge Bundy and Rostow on the White House staff« The lesson in thiS; which will not come as a surprise to anyone who has ever had contact with the policy-making process^ is that the rationales given in such pieces of paper (intended for fairly wide circulation among the bureaucracy; as opposed to tightly held memoranda limited to those closest to the decision-maker) do not reliably indicate why recommendatiohs were made the way they were.,

.VIo THE MAY 1 REVIEW

Manwhile; Kennedy; as noted earlier; did not act on the annex at the April 29 meeting when he approved the much more modest military proposals

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of the "basic Report, Biit on that day, there ras a cable alerting CIKCPAC to he ready to move 5000-men tas> forces to Udorn, Thailand, and to Toiiraine, (Da I^Iang), South Vietnam. Classified records available for this study do not explain this alert. But the public memoirs indirectly refer to it, and as vroi-ld be expected, the alert v/as intended as a threat to intervene in Laos if the communists failed to go through mth the cease fire which -W3.s to precede the Geneva Conference. Here is the cable:

From: JCS

TO: ClivTCPAG

DTFO: CPMAAG VIMmTIAIIE

CHJU3MAAG BM^^GKOK THAILMD Cm^-IAAG SAIGON VIETIl/U^

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JCS DA 995131 From JCS

1. Req,u_est you prepare plans to move brigade size forces of approximately 5,000 each into Udorn or vicinity and into Tourane or vicinity. Forces should include all arms and appropriate air elements. Plans should be based sole.ly on US forces at this time.

2. Decision to make these d.eplo;.'ments not f iim . It is expected that decision as to Thailand mil be made at meeting tentatively scheduled here on Monday. Decision regarding Vietnam will be even later due to consideration of Geneva Accords.

3- It is hoped that these movements can be given SEATO cover but such possibility must be explored before becoming a firm element of your planning. State is taking action to explore this aspect.

k. Decision was not repeat not reached today concerning implementation of SEATO Plan 5/6O.

The crisis in Laos was now at its peak. According to Schlesinger's account, reports reached Washington April 26 that the Pathet Lao were attacking strongly, \r±th the apparent intention of grabbing most of the country before the cease-fire went into effect. At 10 p.m. that night, the JCS sent out a "general advisorjr'-" to major comma^nds aroujid the world, and specifically alerted CINCPAC to be prepared to undertake airstrikes against North Vietnam, and possibly southern China.

■ The next day -- the day the Task Force Report came to the President-there were prolonged crisis meetings in the vrnite Rouse. The President later called in Congressional leaders, who advised against putting troops into Laos. Schlesinger quotes Rostow as telling him the NSC meeting that day was "the worst White Plouse meeting he had ever attended in the entire Kenned^^ administration." 12a /

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The I^os annex to the Gilpatric Report was issued on the 28th^ in an atmosphere wholly dominated by the crisis in Laos. On the 29th^ Kennedy's go-ahead on the Task Force's original military recommendations was squeezed into a day overwhelmingly devoted to Laos. This was the day of the cable^ just cited^ alerting CINCPAC for troop movements to Thailand and possibly Vietnam. The ''SEATO Plan 5/60" referred to in the closing paragraph of the cable was the plan for moving major units into Laos.

On May 1 (the Monday meeting referred to in the cable)j Kennedy again

deferred any decision on putting troops into Laos. According to available

accoxints^ there is a strong sense by now (although no formal decision)

that the U.S. would not go into Laos: that if the cease-fire failed; we

would make a strong stand^ instead^ in Thailand and Vietnam. (On the 28th;

in a speech to a Democratic dinner in Chicago^ the President had hinted at this:

We are prepared to meet our obligations^ but we can only defend the freedom of those who are determined to be free themselves. We can assist them -- we will bear more than our share of the burden^ but we can only help those who are ready to bear their share of the burden themselves.) 13/

Reasonable qualifications^ undoubtedly^ but ones that seemed to suggest that intervention in I^os wou2d be futile.. On Sunday (the 30th); another hint came in remarks by Senator Pulbright on a TV interview show: he opposed intervention in LaoS; and said he was confident the government was seeking "another solution."

So the decision anticipated Monday^ May 1; in the JCS cable to CINCPAC was not made that day after all. But that day a new draft of the Task Force Report was issued. It contained only one significant change (other than blending the April 28 annex into the basic paper). The original draft contained a paragraph (under "political objectives") recommending we "obtain the political agreement /presumably from the SEATO membership/ needed to permit the prompt implementation of SEATO contingency plans providing for military intervention in South Vietnam should this become necessary to prevent the loss of the country to Communism."

In the May 1 revision^ the following sentence was added to the paragraph: "The United States should be prepared to intervene unilaterally in fulfillment of its commitment under Article IV; 2.of Manila Pact; and shoiild make its determination to do so clear through appropriate public statements; diplomatic discussions; troop deployments; or other means." lA/ (The cited clause in the Manila (SEATO) Pact; which the paper did not quote^

If; in the opinion of any of the Parties; the inviolability or the integrity of the territory or the sovereignty or political independence of any Party in the treaty area or of any other State or territory to which the provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article from time to time apply is threatened in any way other

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than by armed attack or is affected or threatened by any fact or situation which might endanger the peace of the area_j the Parties shall consult immediately in order to agree on the measures which should be taken for the common defense.)

The May 1 draft also cleared up^ or papered over^ part of the confusion described earlier regarding the rationale for the military measures recommended in the Laos annex: the increased RTOAF force levels were attributed now both to concern over increased infiltration and to concern over overt invasion. But the US troop commitments are still described solely as for training^ with no mention of the original political rationale

1~L1. STATE'S REDRAFT

Lansdale circulated the May 1 draft among the Task Force_, with a note that comments should be in May 2^ with a final Task Force review schediiled the morning of May 3^ all in anticipation of an NSC meeting on the paper May 4.

George Ball^ then Deputy Under Secretary of State^ asked to postpone the meeting for a day. Lansdale sent Gilpatric a memorandum opposing the postponement. "it seems to me that George Ball could appoint someone to represent him at the meeting;, and if he has personal or further comments they could come to us later in the day at his convenience." But Gilpatric delayed the meeting a day^ and State produced a drastic revision of the paper. I5/

On the organizational issues^ the State draft was brutally clearcut. It proposed a new version of the Gilpatric memorandum transmitting the Report^j in which:

1. The paragraph (quoted earlier) describing lansdale's special role is deleted.

2. A new paragraph is added to the end of the memorandum^ in ' which Gilpatric is made to say: "Having completed its assignment...! recommend that the present Task Force be now dissolved."

Later sections of the paper were revised accordingly^ giving responsibility for coordinating Vietnam policy to a new Task Force with George Ball as chairman, (in the final version^ the Task Force has a State Department director^ but no longer included Presidential appointees representing their departments. The whole Task Force idea had been downgraded to a conventional interagency working group. Although it continued to function for several years^ there wi3.1 be little occasion to mention it again in this paper.) I6/

State's proposal on organization prevailed. From the record avail-able; the only thing that can be said definitely is that State objected;

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successfully_5 to having an Ambassador report to a Task Force chaired by the Deputy Secretary of Defense^ and with a second defense official (Lansdale) as executive officer. There may have been more to it. ¥e know Lansdale's experience and his approach to guerrilla warfare initially won him a good deal of favor at the ^^ite House. But his memoranda suggest that his ideas on a number of issues (support for Phoumi in Laos^ liberation of North Vietnam_j essentially unqualified support for Diem in South Vietnam) went well beyond what the Administration judged reasonable. So it is quite possible that the President would have had second thoughts on Lansdale^ aside from State's objections on bureaucratic grounds.

In any event^ lansdale's reaction to State's proposal on organization was to advise McNamara and Gilpatric that:

My strong recommendation is that Defense stay completely out of the Task Force directorship as now proposed by State...Having a Defense officer^ myself or someone else^, placed in a position of only partial influence and of no decision permissibility would be only to provide State with a scapegoat to share the blame when we have a flop...The US past performance and theory of action^ which State apparently desires to continue^ simply offers no sound basis for winning^ as desired by President ■ Kennedy. 17/

But the final version of tfye Task Force Report^ dated May 6^ followed very closely the State revision submitted May 3^ including the shift in control of the Task Force.

VIII. WIDENING THE OPTIONS

What is most striking about ;the revised drafts is that they excluded a tone of almost unqualified commitment to Vietnam_j yet on the really important issues included qualifications v/hich left the President a great deal of freedom to decide whatever he pleased v/ithout having to formally overrule the Task Force Report.

For example^ the assertion (from the April draft) that the US should Impress on friend and foe that "come what may^ we intend to win" remained in the final paper. But this hortatory language is from the introduction; it described one of the effects the program in the balance of the paper was supposed to achieve_, but did not ask the President to do or say anything not spelled out in the body of the paper. (We will see_j when we come to the fall decisions^ that the wisdom of an unqualified commitment to save Vietnam'from Conmiunism is treated afresh_j with no suggestion that any such decision had already been made in May.)

On. the other hand^ the explicit recommendation in the Defense draft that we make clear our "determination...to intervene unilaterally...should this become necessary to save the country from communism..." was dropped, instead^ there is a recommendation for exploring a "new bilateral arrange-

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ment" which might (the text is not explicit) extend to fighting the guerrillas_; if that should become necessary to save the country^ but also might only cover overt Worth Vietnamese invasion. l8 /

Further^ the need for these arrangements \ms now tied to the "loss", of Laos. The May 3 draft suggests ve "undertake military security ar- ' rangements which establish beyond doubt our intention to stand behind Vietnam's resistance to Communism.-." since "it is doubtful whether the Vietnaxaese Government can weather the pressures which are certain to be generated from the loss of Laos without prompt^ and dramatic support for its secujrity from the U.S." 19/

In the May 6 final drafts "establish beyond doubt" was toned down to "emphasize" and the flat reference to the loss of Laos was changed to "if Laos were lost." 20/

Similarly^ the recommendations on the two new South Vietnamese divisions^ and the two l600-man US combat units to train them was described as a firm recommendation in the military section of the May 3 draft (which State left untouched from the Defense version)^ but were indirectly referred to as something for study in State's re-drafted political section. In the final paper^ they were still firm recommendations in a military annex^ but not in the main paper^ where Defense was only described as studying this and other uses for US troops short of direct commitment against the guerrillas. US troop coimuitments v^-ere no longer recommended^ only referred to as something "which might result from an E[SC decision following discussions between Vice President Johnson /whose mission to Asia had been announced May 5.7 snd President Diem." 2l/

Yet an interesting aspect of the State redraft is that^ although its main impact was to soften the commitments implied in the Defense draft_j a quick reading might give the contrary impression. We will see this same effect in the political sections to be discussed below. What seems to happen is that the very detail of the State treatment creates a strong impression^ even though the actual proposals are less drastic and more qualified than those proposed by Defense. The contrast is all the sharper because the Defense draft leaned the other way. Eor example^ the profoundly significant recommendation that the US commit itself to intervene unilaterally_j if necessary^ to prevent a Viet Cong victory in South Vietnam^ is tossed into the Defense version most casually;, with a reference to the Manila Treaty that makes it sound as if such a commitment^ in fact^ already existed.

In contrast^ here is the State language referring to the proposed bilateral treaty (which in effect is a substitute for the Defense pro-;^osed -unlimited linilateral commitment):

The Geneva Accords have" been totally inadequate in protecting South Vietnam against Communist infiltration and insurgency. Moreover^ with increased Communist success in Laos dramatic

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US actions in stiffening up its physical support of Vietnam and the remainder of Southeast Asia may be needed to bolster the will to continue to resist the Communists. The inhibitions imposed on such action by certain parts of the Geneva Accords^ which have been violated with impunity by the Communists_j should not prevent our action* ¥e should consider joining with the Vietnamese in a clear-cut defensive alliance which might include stationing of US forces on Vietnamese soil. As a variant of this arrangement certain SEATO troops might also be employed.

Bilateral military assistance by the United States pui'suant to a request by South Vietnam along the lines of that undertaken during 1958 in response to the request by Lebanon for military assistance^ would be in keeping with international law and treaty provisions. The provisions of the Geneva Accords of 195^; which prohibited the introduction of additional military arms and personnel into Vietnam; would not be a bar to the measures contemplated. The obvious^ large-scale and continuous violation of these provisions of the Geneva Accords by North Vietnam in introducing large numbers of armed guerrillas into South Vietnam would justify the corresponding non-observance of these provisions by South Vietnam. Indeed^ authorization for changing PEO Isos into an ordinary MAAG was justified on this legal theory. It should be recognized that the foregoing proposals require careful and detailed consideration and preparation particularly with regard f ^ to the precise mansion of US forces used.

In addition to the previously cited advantages such an action might have at least two other important political and military advantages:

(a) It could release a portion of the ARVN from relatively static military functions to pursue the war against the insurgents and

(b) It would place the Sino-Soviet Bloc in the position of risking direct intervention in a situation where US forces were already in place_, accepting the consequence of such action. This is in direct contrast to the current situation in Laos.

Alternatively^ there are several potential political and military disadvantages to such an action^ principal among these being:

(a) Some of the neutrals^ notably India^ might well be

, opposed; and the attitude of the UK and j^'rance is uncertain.

(b) This would provide the Communists with a major propaganda opportunity.

_ (c) The danger that a troop contribution would provoke a

DRV/CPIICOM reaction with the risk of involving a signficant

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commitment of US force in the Pacific to the Asian mainland<. The French tied up some 200^000 troops diiring the imsuccessfiil Indo-China effort.

This might significantly weaken the Diem regime in the long run^j having in mind the parallel of Rhee in Korea. 22 /

This language is not solely the State Department'So In a Gilpatric memo to be cited shortly^ we will see that the JCS^ for example,, had a hand in describing the role for US troops« Even so^ the overall effect of the draft^ as already noted^ tones down very drastically the commitment implied by the May 1 Defense version:

lo The proposal is no longer for a unilateral^ -unlimited commitment to save Vietnam from communismo It only proposes consideration of a new treaty with South Vietnam (unlike the Defense draft which proposed reading a unilateral commitment into the existing Manila Treaty); and its purpose is to "bolster the will" of the South Vietnamese to resist the communists^j not (as the Defense draft apparently meant) to guarantee that the US would Join the war should the South Vietnamese effort prove inadequate.,

2o It gives pro and con arguments for sending US troops_, in contrast to the Defense draft which included a flat recomjnendation to send at least the 360O men of the two division training teams and the special forces training teamo

A reasonable judgment,, consequently^ is that State thought the Defense draft went too far in committing the US on Vietnam^ (And in view of the positions he would take in 196^^ George Ball's role as senior State representative on the Task Force obviously further encourages that interpreta-tiouo) But that is only a judgment. It is also possible to argue^ in contrast^ that perhaps State (or State plus whatever White House influence may have gone into the draft) simply was tidying up the Defense proposals: for example^j that the redrafters felt that a new bilateral treaty would be a- -fiiiner "ba.sis for a commitment to save Vietnam than would reliance on a reinterpretation of the SEATO Treaty, Similar arguments can be made on the other points noted above.

Consequently^ on any question about the intent of the redrafters^ only a judgment and not a statement of fact can be provided.

But on the question of the effect of the redraft^ a stronger statement can be made: for'whatever the intent of the redrafters^ the effect certainly was to weaken the commitments implied by the Defense draft;, and leave the President a great deal of room for maneuver without having to explicitly overrule the recommendations presented to himo

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IX. THE TROOP ISSUE

To return to a question of judgement^ it is difficult to assess how far this gradual hedging of proposals for very strong coinmitraents to Vietnam simply reflected a desire (very probahly encouraged by the VJhite House) to leave the President freedom of action. To some extent it surely reflects a growing hope that perhaps the laos cease-fire would come off; the country would not be flatly lost; and consequently^ that the May 1 Defense draft,, and even the May 3 State draft^ reflected a somewhat panicky overestimate of how far we needed to go to keep Southeast Asia from falling apart. The two motives obviously overlapped.

There are indications that^ as late as May 5; "the estimate for saving something out of Laos remained bleak- On May h^ after a visit to the President^ Senator Fulbright (who had opposed intervention in Laos along with other Congressional leaders) announced from the steps of the White Hou^e that he would support troop commitments to Thailand and Vietnam. An I^SC meeting the following day (May 5) was devoted to discussing steps to reassure Vietnam and Thailand. Then in the afternoon^ the President announced Vice President Johnson's visit to Asia at a press conference^ which included this garbled exchange:

Q. Mr. President^ there have been reports that you would be prepared to send American forces into South Vietnam if that became necessary to prevent Comjnu-nist domination of that country. Could you tell us whether that is correct^ and also anyt.hing else you have regarding plans for that country?

A. Wellj we have had a group working in the government and we have had a Security Council meeting about ■ the problems which are faced in Vietnam by the guerrillas and by the barrage which the present government is being subjected to. The problem of troops is a matter -- the matter of what we are going to do to assist Vietnam to obtain _/retain?7 its independence is a matter under consideration. There are a good many /issues_?7 which I think can most usefully wait until we have had consultations with the government J which up to the present time — which will be one of the matters which Vice President Johnson will deal with; the problem of consultations with the Government of Vietnam as to what further steps could most usefully be taken. 23 /

On May 8^ the reconstituted International Control Commission (established by the Geneva Agreement of 195^) arrived in laos^ hoping to supervise a cease-fire. The cease-fire had been agreed to in principle by both sides as early as May 1. The question was whether the Pathet Lao

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would really stop advancing. Aside from American intervention^ a ceasefire was the only hope of the larger^ but less effective^ pro-Western forces led by Phoumi. Certainly hopes were higher by the 8th than they were a week earlier_, but this might not be saying much. The documentary record is atnbiguous. The final draft of the letter Vice President Johnson would deliver to Diem was dated May 8^ and in this letter Kennedy did not go much beyond the proposals in the April 27 version of the task force report. There was no mention of U.S. troop commitments_, nor of a bilateral, treaty. Even on the question of a further increase (beyond 170^000) in the RWAP^ Kennedy promised Diem only that this will be "considered carefully with you_j if developments should so warrant." 2hl

But the same day_j Gilpatric sent a memo to the JCS asking their views on U.S.' troops in Vietnam:

. . In preparation for the possible commitment of U.S. forces to Vietnam_, it is desired that you give further review and study of the militaiy advisability of such action^ as well as to the size and composition of such U.S. forces. Your views^ which 1 hope could include some expression from CINCPAC^ would be valuable for consideration prior to the NSC meeting this week (currently scheduled for Friday^ May 12). 25/

This in turn was based on .a statement in the May 6 Task Force draft^ which said that such a study was being carried out_j with particular consideration being given to deploying to South Vietnam

>

...two U.S. battle groups (with necessary command and logistics units)^ plus an engineer (construction-combat) battalion. These units would be located in the 'high plateau' region^ remote from the major population center of Saigon-Cholon^ under the command of the Chief^ MAAG, To help accelerate the training of the G.V.N. anTiy_, they would establish two divisional field training areas. The engineer battalion would undertake construction of roads^ air-landing strips and other facilities essential to the logistical support of the U.S. and Vietnamese forces there..

to

The purpose of these forces (again_, from the May 6 draft) would be

o. .provide ma:ximum psychological impact in deterrence of further Comjnunlst aggression from North Vietnam^ China^ or the Soviet Union^ while rallying the morale of the Vietnamese and encouraging the support of SEATO and neutral nations for Vietnam's defense;

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"- release Vietnamese forces from advanced and static defense positions to permit their fuller coBimitment to counterinsurgency actions;

— provide maximum training to approved Vietnamese forces; and

— provide significant military resistance to potential North Vietnam Communist and/or Chinese Communist action. 26/

The JCS reply^ dated May 10, deferred details on the composition of U.S. forces, but quite emphatically recommended that we do send them, "assuming the political decision is to hold Southeast Asia outside the communist sphere." Here is the JCS memo:

In considering the possible commitment of U.S. forces to South Vietnam, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed the overall critical situation in Southeast Asia with particular emphasis upon the present highly flammable situation in South Vietnam. In this connection the question, however, of South Vietnam should not be considered in isolation but rather in conjunction with Thailand and their overall relationship to the security of Southeast Asia. The views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the question regarding the deployment of U.S. forces into Thailand were provided to you by JCSM-311-61, dated 9 May 1961. . The current potentially dangerous military and political situation in Laos, of course, is the focal point in this area. Assuming that the political decision is to hold Southeast Asia outside the Communist sphere, the Joint Chiefs of Staff,are of the opinion that U.S. forces should be deployed immediately to South Vietnam; such action should be taken primarily to prevent the Vietnamese from being subjected to the same situation as presently exists in Laos, which would then require deployment of U.S. forces into an already existing combat situation.

In view of the foregoing, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the decision be made to deploy suitable U.S. forces to South Vietnam. Sufficient forces should be deployed to accomplish the following purposes:

Provide a visible deterrent to potential Worth Vietnam and/or Chinese Communist action;

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Release Vietnamese forces from advanced and static defense positions to permit their fuller commitment to counterinsurgency actions;

Assist in training the Vietnamese forces to the maximum extent possible consistent with their mission;

Provide a nucleus for the support of any additional U.S. or SEA.TO military operation in Southeast Asia; and

Indicate the firmness of our intent to all Asian nations.

In order to maintain U.S. flexibility in the Pacific, it is envisioned that some or all of the forces deployed to South Vietnam would come from the United States. The movement of these troops could be accomplished in an administrative manner and thus not tax the limited lift capabilities of CINCPAC.

In order to accomplish the foregoing the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that:

President Diem be encouraged to request that the United States fulfill its SEATO obligation_, in view of the new threat now posed by the Laotian situation, by the immediate deployment of appropriate U.S. forces to South Vietnam;

Upon receipt of this request, suitable forces could be immediately deployed to South Vietnam in order to accomplish the above-mentioned purpose. Details of size and composition of these forces must include the views of both CIITCPAC and CHMAAG which are not yet avail-. able. 27/ *■ . ■ -

The NSC meeting that dealt with the Task Force Report was held the next day (the 11th, rather than the 12th as originally anticipated). The President avoided committing himself on the troop issue any further than he had already been committed by the time of his May 5 press conference. The resulting NSAM 52 (signed by McGeorge Bundy) states only that:

The President directs full examination by the Defense Department under the guidance of the Director of the

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continuing Task Force on Vietnam^ of the size and composition of forces which would be desirable in the case ■ of a possible commitment of U.S. forces to Vietnam." 28/ (The Task Force Director at this point referred to Sterling Cottrell, a Foreign Service Officer^ rather than to Gilpatric).

So the President went no further^ really, than to take note of a study that was already well underway. The record does not help us judge what significance to attach to the qualification that the study be done under:the guidance of the State Department officer now heading the Task Force.

On other issues relating to our military commitments the President again, with minor alterations, endorsed the proposals of the May 6 draft. On the question of a formal alliance with South Vietnam E-jA!! 52 reports that:

' The Ambassador is authorized to begin negotiations looking toward a new bilateral arrangement with Vietnam, but no firm commitment will be made to such an arrangement without further review by the President.

The President also "confirmed" the decisions quoted earlier accepting ^ the April 27 military recommendations, and accepted the following further ^^ recommendations (all from the May 6 report) "with the objective of meeting

the increased security threat resulting from the new situation along the

frontier between Laos and Vietnam."

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1. Assist the G.V.N, armed forces to increase their border patrol and insurgency suppression capabilities by establishing an effective border intelligence and patrol system, by instituting regular aerial surveillance over the entire frontier area, and by applying modern technological area-denial techniques to control the roads and trails along Vietnam^s borders. A special staff element (approximately 6 U.S. personnel), to concentrate upon solutions to the unique problems of Vietnam's borders, will be activated in MAAG, Vietnam, to assist a similar special unit in the RVNAF which the GoV.N. will be encouraged to establish; these two elements working as an inte-

*■ ■ grated team will help the G.VoN. gain the support of nomadic

■ tribes and other border inhabitants, as well as introduce j advanced techriiques and equipment to strengthen the security

j of South Vietnam's frontiers. ■ '

2. Assist the G.V.N, to establish a Combat Development and , Test Center in South Vietnam to develop, with the help of

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modern teclinology^ new techniques for use against the Viet . Cong forces (approximately 4 U.S. personnel).

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3. Assist the Go V.N. forces with healthy vrelfare and

public work projects by providing U.S. Arm;^- civic action . ■■

mobile training teams^ coordinated with the similar civilian effort (approximately l4 U.S. personnel).

4. Deploy a Special Forces Group (approximately 400 personnel) to Mia Trang in order to accelerate G..V.N. Special Forces training. The first increment^ for immediate deployment to Vietnara^ should be a Special Forces company (52 personnel) .

5. Instruct JCS, CINCPAC, and MAAG to undertake an assessment of the military utility of a further increase in the G.V.N. forces from 170,000 to 200,000 in order to create two new division equivalents for deployment to the northwest border region. The parallel political and fiscal implications should be assessed. 2£/ ■ ' .

In general Kennedy did not seem to have committed the U.S., by these decisions, significantly further than the U.S. had already been committed by the President's public speeches and remarks at press conferences. In the expanded military aid program approved by the President, there was no item that comraitted the U.S. any further than we had gone in the case of Laos (that is, beyond providing advisors, materiel, and some covert combat assistance).

A debatable exception was the decision to send 400 special forces troops to speed training of their South Vietnamese counterparts. The idea of sending some Green Berets antedates the Task Force effort. Rostow mentioned it in his April 12 memo, quoted above. It can be argued whether it was really prudent to view this decision as separable from the "combat troops" issue (which also were being considered nominally, at least, for training, not necessarily combat). But obviously the President was sold on their going, and since ."the Vietnamese Special Forces were themselves supported by CIA rather than the regular military aid program, it was possible. to handle these troops covertly. In any event, although there would eventually be 1200 Green Berets in Vietnam (before the first commitment of U.S. combat units) they were apparently never cited as a precedent for or a commitment to a more overt role in the war.

These, then, were the measures relating to military commitments undertaken as a result of the April/May review. The principal objective of these measures (together with the non-military elements of the program) as stated in the Task Force report, and formally adopted in the WSAM, was "to prevent Communist domination of Vietnam." There was no uncertainty about why these

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steps were taken: quite aside from the Administration's strong feelings that ve had to deal with the challenge of wars of national liberation^ the program adopted seems quite minimal as a response to what was -- even after the cease-fire was confirmed — a serious setback in Laos. No one in the government^ and no one of substantial influence outside it^ questioned the need for some action to hold things together in Southeast Asia.

For the fact was that our stake in Vietnam had increased because of what had been happening in Laos^ quite aside from anything that we did or said. Collapse in Vietnam would be worse after Laos than it might have seemed before. And to do nothing after Laos would not really have made the U.S. look better if Vietnam fell; it would only have increased the likelihood both that that would happen^ and greatly increased the extent to which the U.S. (and within U.S. politics^ the Kennedy Administration) would be blamed for the collapse.

The Laotian situation did not even provide_, then^ a precedent for seeking to settle the Vietnamese situation through the same coalition governraent route. Eor in Laos^ the pro-U.S. faction was plainly being defeated militarily in open battle despite a good deal of U.S. aid. The only U.S. alternative to accepting the coalition solution was to take over the war ourselves. Further^ there was a strong neutralist faction in Laos_, which could provide a premier for the government and at least a veneer of hope that the settlement might be something more than a face-saving way of handing the country over to the communist faction,

Neither of these conditions held for Vietnam^ aside from, all the other factors reviewed in the introduction to this paper which left the Administration no realistic option in the neutralist direction^ even assuming that there was any temptation at that time to move in that direction. To have • ■ simply given up on Vietnam at that pointy before any major effort had been attempted to at least see if the situation could be saved at reasonable cost^ seems to have been^ even with the hindsight we now have^ essentially out of the question.

That is why_, in the context of the time^ the commitments Kennedy actually made seem like a near-minimal response which avoided any real deepening of our stake in Vietnam. ...

There is far more of a problem with the things that we decided to talk: about (troops_, and a formal treaty with Vietnam) than with the measures Kennedy fully endorsed. Certainly putting troops into Vietnam would increase our stake in the outcome^ rather than merely help protect the stake we already had. So^ surely^ would a formal treaty^ even if the treaty nominally required U.S. support only in the case of overt invasion. How much so would depend on the nature of the troop commitments and the nature of the treaty. But^ as we will see in the next chapter (in reviewing Vice President-Johnson's visit) Diem turned out to want neither troops nor a treaty for the time being. And so these issues were deferred until the fall.

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Aside from questions relating to our commitments to Vietnam, there vere also the parallel questions relating to our commitment, if any, to Diem. As noted in the introduction, discussions about Vietnam always had this dual aspect, and this part of the problem was treated with increasing explicitness as time went on (and as the Administration got to know Diem better). In the CIP, it was treated essentially by implication. In the Gilpatric/Lansdale draft of April 26, it was also handled that way: no explicit statement of a change in our relations with Diem was offered, although by implication it was there.

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¥here the CIP (by implication) saw our increased aid as contingent on Diem's performance, the April 26 program left out any suggestion of a quid pro quo. To the contrary, it simply states that "those portions of the plan which are agreed to by the G.V.II. will be implemented as rapidly as possible."

And where the CIP saw Diem's government as our best hope "at the present time" this note of limited commitment to Diem is dropped^^in the April 26 draft. Instead we have a bland statement that we will "assist the GVl^ under President Diem to develop within the country the ■^^^idest consensus of public support for a government dedicated to resisting communist domination." /^einphasis added/" 30/

The May 3 State draft and the May 6 final draft dealt with this issue much as they had with the questions of militaiy commitm.ents: that is, these did not so much conspicuously weaken the proposals of the Gilpatric/ Lansdale version, as to qualify and elaborate on them in ways that in effect (again, we cannot make a statement on intent) left the President a ready option to reconsider his position. State explicitly asserted that we were changing our policy on Diem, and spelled out some reasons for doing so.

Here are some extracts from the May 6 final draft; (the language is essentially the same in the May 3 draft).

*...we must continue to work through the present Vietnamese government despite its acknowledged weakness. Wo other remotely feasible alternative exists at this point in time which does not involve an unacceptable ■ degree of risk...Diem is not now fully confident of United States support. This confidence has been undermined partly by our vigorous efforts to get him to mend his waySj and partly by the equivocal attitude he is ■ convinced we took at the time of the I^ovember 11, I96O, attempted coup. It is essential that President Diem's full confidence in and comiTiunication with the United States be restored promptly...Given Diem's personality and character and the abrasive nature of our recent

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relationships^ success or fai3.ure in this regard vill depend very heavily on Ambassador Nolting's ability to get on the sam^ wavelength vith Diem...

The chief threat to the viability of President Diem's administration is_j without a doubt^ the fact of communist insurgency and the government's inability to protect its ovm people. Thus military measures must have the highest priority. There is^ nevertheless^, strong discontent \rith the government among not only the elite but among peas-I ants^ labor^ and business. Criticism focuses on the

dynastic aspects of the Diem rule^ on its clandestine' political apparatus^ and on the methods through which the President exercises his leadership. This is aggravated by Communist attempts to discredit the President and weaken his government's authority. All this is made the easier because of a communications void existing between the government and the people. For many months United States efforts have been directed toward persuading Diem to adopt political^ social^ and economic changes designed . to correct this serious defect. Majiy of these changes

I are included in the Coujiterinsurgency Plan. Our success

" has been only partial. There are those who consider that

Diem will not succeed in the battle to win men's minds in Vietnam.

Thus in giving priority emphasis to the need for internal security^ we must not relax in our efforts to persuade Diem "of the need for political social and economic progress. If his efforts are inadequate in this field our overall objective could be seriously endangered and we might once more find ourselves in the position of shoring a leader who had lost the support of his people. 3l/

. Although the paper expresses the hope that through "very astute dealings" ("a combination of positive inducements plus points at which discreet pressure can be exercised") Diem could be successfully worked with^ the net effect of the State draft is hardly enthusiastic. The paper tells the President that his Task Force "believes" that the policy will work. But it is a large order: for the aijn had been referred to as nothing less than "a major alteration in the present goverrmient structure or in its objectives."

In effect^ t-he silence on Diem in the Gilpatric/lansdale draft was replaced by a detailed statement which^ in the course of reaffirming the need to take prompt steps to show confidence in Diem^ nevertheless leaves the strong impression that we really did not have much confidence in him at all. Support- for Diem became tactical: based explicitly on the hope that he might reform^ and implicitly on the fact that trying to overthrow him would

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be terribly risky in the aftennath of Laos^ even if the U.S. had someone to overthrow him with. Further^ although the paper explicitly conceded first priority to military needs^ there was a strong argument that military efforts alone mil not be enough.

It vas apparently this equivocal attitude toward Diem (aside from any personal considerations) that led to Lansdale's prediction that State could never "vin this battle." Thus in the main paper of the May 6 draft the general political objective was stated as:

Develop political and economic conditions which will create a solid and widespread support among the key polit.-.. ical groups and the general population for a Vietnam which has the "VTill to resist Communist encroachment and which in turn stems from a stake in a freer and more democratic society. 32/ ■ .

Lansdale^ in a pencilled comment to Gilpatric^ complained:

The elected President of Vietnam is ignored in this statement as the base to build upon in countering the communists. This will have the U.S. pitted against Diem as first priority^ the communists as second. 3 , 3/

Nevertheless^ it seems that the May program went a very long vray in Lansdale's preferred direction: although the U.S. was expanding its contribution to the Vietnamese effort it was no longer asking for any quid pro qu£. The U.S. envisioned "discreet pressure" but certainly not^ for then anyway, any hint of withholding aid. The U.S. flatly asserted that it saw no "remotely acceptable alternative to Diem/' for the time being, any way. The U.S. thought it vital that Diem do better, but increasing his confidence in the U.S. had top priority. The strongest guidance given the new Ambassador was to "get on Diem's wavelength." 3^/

More of this tentative adoption of the Lansdale approach can be seen in the discussion of Vice President Johnson's trip (from the May 6 draft):

The Vice President's visit will provide the added incentive needed to give the GYE the motivation and confidence it needs to carry on the struggle. We believe that meetings between the Vice President and President Diem \rill act as a catalytic agent to produce broad ■agreement on the need for accelerated joint Vietnamese-U.S. actions to resist Communist encrcachment in SEA. These meetings will also serve to get across to President Diem our confidence in him as a ma'n of gi'eat stature and as one of the strong figures in SEA on whom we are placing our reliance. At the same time, these conferences should impress Diem with the degree of importance

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we attach to certain political and economic reforms in Vietnam vhich are an essential element in frustrating Commianist encroachments. Recognizing the difficulties we have had in the past in persuading Diem to take effective action on such reforms_, as specific an understanding as possible should be solicited from Diem on this point.

It was this sort of guidance (plus_, perhaps_, a memo from Lansdale describing President Diem in terms that bear comparison with those Jack Valenti would later use in connection with another President) that accounts for Johnson's famous reference to Diem as the Churchill of Asia. 3^/

In sum^ what emerges from the final version of the report- is" a sense that the U.S. had decided to take a crack at the Lansdale approach of trying to win Diem over with a strong display of personal confidence in him. "What does not emerge is any strong sense that the Admiini strati on believed this new approach really had much hope of working^ but undoubtedly this pessimistic reading is influence by the hindsight now available. The drafters of the paper very probably saw themselves as hedging against the possible failure of the policy_, rather than implying that it probably would not work.

If we go beyond the paperwork^ and ask what judgments might "be ms-xle about the intent of the senior decision-makers^ and particularly the President^ it seems that here_, even more than in connection with the military commitments discussed earlier^ the Administration adopted a course which^ whether in hindsight the wisest available or not^ probably seemed to have no practical alternative.

Presumably the top level of the Administration believed there was at'' least some chance that the new policy toward Diem might produce useful results. ■ - ■

But even to the extent this prospect seemed dim^ there were political advantages (or at least political risks avoided) in giving this plan a try^ and there must not have seemed (as even now there does not seem) to have been much cost in doing so. • . ■

Finally^ whatever the President thought of the prospects and political advantages of this approach to Diem^ it might have been hard at that time to see any drastically different alternative anyway. After all^ the heart of the Laos embairassment was that the U.S. was ("vrith some face-saving cover) dropping an anti-communist leader who had come into power with the indispensable assistance of the U.S. This dropping of Phoumi in Laos in favor of support for the neutralist government Phoumi had overthrown mth U.S. encouragement and assistance remained an essential part of whatever outcome developed in Laos. In the wake of this embarrassment^ the U.S. was

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nov trying to reassure other governments in Southeast Asia. Was it possible to carry out this reassurance while threatening Diem^ another . anti-Gornrtiunist leader totally dependent on" U.S. support^ -with withdrawal of our support (our only available form of pressure) unless he reformed himself accordin£, to U.S. prescription? Was this a prudent time to risk a coup in South Vietnam^ which was the widely predicted effect of any show of lack of confidence in Diem?

It is obviously impossible for us to strike a balance among these reasons (or perhaps some others) why the decisions were made the way they were. More interesting^ though^ is that it seems to have been unnecessary for even the decision-maker himself to strike such a balance. For it seems that whatever his view, the policy of trying to reassure Diem (rather than pressure him, or dissociating from him) seemed like a sensible tactic for the moment, and very possible the only sensible tactic for that particular moment.

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IV.B. FROM MY TO SEPTEi\IBE Fv

CMPTE'R IV

At the end of September^ Admiral Harry Felt, Commander-in-Chief of U.S. forces in the Pacific, stopped off in Saigon on his way to a SEATO meeting in Bangkok. Felt, Ambassador Nolting, and several of their senior aides met with Diem at Independence Palace, on the evening of the 2Sth, According to Kolting's cable the following day:

In course of long discussion...Diem pointed the questiono He asked for a bilateral defense treaty with the U<S. This rather Isxge and unexpected request seemed to have been dragged in by the heels at the end of a far-ranging discussion, but we discovered upon questioning that it was seriously intended. .. ]_/

Although the available record does not explicitly say so, this request presumably triggered the intensive attention to Vietnajii planning that began early in October (bolting's cable arrived October l) and led to the decision on the 11th to send the Taylor Mission.

- The balance of this chapter reviews the me.jor developments between the Presidential decisions on the Task Force Report (May ll) and the axrival of Aolting^s cable on the treaty request (October l)-

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TIIS JOHT^SO^ I-ilSSIOK

The available record tells us almost nothing about the Vice President's visit to Saigon beyond what is described in the public memoirs. We know from Kolting's cables that Johnson brought up the possibility of U.S. troops in Vietnam and of a bilateral treaty after Diem (in an after-dinner conversation) began to talk about the problems the.t eormunist gains in Laos would create for him. We know that Diem replied that he wanted U.S. combat troops only in the event of open invasion and that he also did not show interest in a treaty^ 2/

But we do not know what, if anything, Johnson was authorized to say if Diem ho.d reacted affirmatively. And this could have ranged any^'fhere from attempting to discourage Diem if he did show interest, to offering some specific proposal and timetableo l^o strong inference can be drawn from the fact that Johnson, rather than Diem, raised the issue. Even if the President xhad decided against ms-king troop commitments to Vietnam at that time, there would have been nothing outrageous about instructing Johnson to refer to such a possibility once Diem began to talk about his concerns due to Laos. After all, the vrhole point of the Johnson

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mission vas to reassure Diem and other Asian leaders^ that the U.S. could, despite Laos^ he counted on in Asia. Simply reading the American newspapers would have told Diem that at least as of May 5? the Administration was seriously considering sending American troops to Vietnam, and that Johnson was expected to discuss this with Diem. A quite reasonable tactical Judgment would have heen that nothing would have "been more likely to make Diem ask for U.S. troops than for Johnson to remain eerily silent on this issue.

Consequently, on the record available, we cen do no more than guess what would have happened if Diem reacted affirmatively at the time of Jolinson's visit. The m-ost reasonable guess is probably that the Taylor Mission, or something equivalent, would have been undertaken in the spring, rather than in the fall, and nothing very much would have been different in the long run. But that is only a reasonable guess.

For the rest, here are some extracts from a "report Johnson \?rote after his return. Essentially, Johnson argued for prompt moves by^the U.S. to shov; support for non-communist governments in Southeast Asia. He had in mind expanded conventional military and economic aid, and perhaps a new treaty to replace SEATO. But despite the shock of U.S. willingness to accept a coalition government in Laos, Johnson reported that U.S. troops were neither desired nor required. And although this might not always be the case, Johnson recommended that the U.S. must remain master of this decision." 3/

The Im pact of L aos ■

There is no mistaking the deep - and long lasting - impact of recent developments in Laos.

Country to country, the degree differs but Laos has created doubt and concern about intentions of the United Sta,tes throughout Southeast Asia. No amount.of success at Geneva can, of itself, erase this^ The independent Asians do not wish to have their own status resolved in like manner in Geneva.

Leaders such as Diem, Chiang, Sarit and Ayub more or less accept that we are making "the best of a bad bargain" at Geneva. Their charity extends no farther«

■ The Impact of the Mission

Beyond question, your judgexaent about the timing of our mission was correct. Each leader -- except I^Iehru -- publicly congratulated you on the "timing" of this mission. Chiang said -- and all others privately concurred -- that the mission had the effect of "stabilizing" the situation in the Southeast Asian nations.

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What happened, I believe, was this: the leaders visited want -" as long as they can -~ to remain as friends or allies of the United States, The public, or, more precisely, the political, reaction to Laos had drastically wesiiened the ability to maintain any strongly pro-US orientation. Neutralism in Thailand, collapse in Vietnam, anti-.American election dema^oguery in the Philippines vere all developing prior to our visit. The show of strength and sincerity -- partly because you had sent the Vice President and partly, to a greater extent than you may believe, because you had sent your sister — gave the friendly leaders something to "hang their hats on" for a while longer•

O-or mission arrested the decline of confidence in the United Statesc It did not -^ in my judgment -- restore any confidence already losto The leaders were as explicit,- as courteous and courtly as men could'be in malting it clear that deeds must follow words -- soon

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V7e didn't buy time '-- we were given it. .

If these men I savr at your request were bankers, I would know -" without bothering, to ask -- that there would be no further extensions on my note. ■ ■

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The Importance of Follow-Through

I cannot stress too strongly the extreme importance of following up this mission with other measures, other actions, and other efforts. At the moment -- because of Laos -- these nations are hyjoersensitive to the possibility of American hypocrisy toward Asiac Considering the Vienna talks with Khrushchev -- which, to the Asian mind, emphasi2;e Western rather than Asian concerns -- and considering the negeitive line of various dom_estic American editorials about this mission, I strongly believe it is of first importance that this trip bear fruit irmiiedi3.telyo

Personal Conclusions from the Mission

I took to Southeast Asia some basic convictions about the problems faced there. I have come away from the mission there -" and to India 8n.d Pakistaji -- with many of those convictions sharpened and deepened by what I saw ajid learned. I have also reached certain other conclusions which I believe may be of value as guidance for those res-consible in formulating policies.

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These conclusions are as follows:

lo The battle against Corarnunism must be joined in Southeast Asia with strength and determination to achieve success there --^ or the United States^ inevitably, must surrender the Pacific and take up our defenses on our* own shoreso Asian Communism is compromised and contained by the main-tenance of free nations on the subcontinents Without this inhibitory influence, the island outposts -- Philippines^ Japan^ Taiwan -- have no security and the vast Pacific becomes a Red Sea.

2. The struggle is far from lost in Southeast Asia and it is by no means inevitable that it must be lost. In each country it is possible to build a sound structure capable of withstajiding and turning the Communist sujrge. The will to resist -- while now the taxget of subversive atfeck --is there. The key to i/hat is done by Asians in defense of Southeast Asian freedom is confidence in the United States.

3. There is no alternative to United States leadership in Southeast Asia. Leadership in individual countries — or the regional leadership and cooperation so appealing to Asians -- rests on the knowledge and faith in United States power5 will and understanding.

4. SEATO is not now and probably never will be the answer ^ because of British and French unwillingness to support

decisive action. Asian distrust of the British and Trench. is^outspoken. Success at Geneva would prolong SEATO's role. Failure at Geneva would terminate SEATO^s meaningfulness. In the latter event, vre must be ready with a new approach to collective security in the area.

We should consider an alliance of all the free nations of the Ps.ciflc and Asia who are willing to join forces in defense of their freedom. Such an organization should:

a) have a clear-cut command authority

b) also devote attention to measures and programs of social justice, housing, land reform, etCc

5. Asian leaders --. at this time -- do not want American troops involved in Southeast Asia other than on training missions.

. Ajmerican combat troop involvement is not only not required, it is not desirable. Possibly Americans ~- fail to appreciate fully the subtlety that recently-colonial peoples would not look with favor upon governments which invited or accepted the return this soon of Western troops. To

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J . the extent that feax of gro-und troop involvement dominates

■■ our political responses to Asia in Congress or elsewhere, it seems most desirable to me to allay those paralyzing fears in coni'idence, on the strength of the individual * statements made by leaders consulted on this trip. This does not minimir.e or disregard the probability that open attack would bring calls for U.S. combat troops. But the present probability of open attack seems scanty and vre might gain much needed flexibility in our policies if the spectre

II ' of combat troop commitment could be lessened domestically.

6. Any help -- economic as well as military -™ we give less developed nations to secure and maintain their freedom must be a part of a mutual effort. These nations cannot be saved by^United States help alonec To the e>cbent the Southeast Asian nations are prep8jred to -take the necessary measur^es to make our aid effective^ we can be -- and must be — unstinting in oua- assistance. It would be useful to enuncia^te more cle8J:^ly than we have -» for the guidance of these young and ■unsoiDhisticated nations -» what we expect or require of theme

7. In large measure^ the greatest -danger Southeast Asia offers to nations like the United States is not the momentary threat of Communism itself, rather that danger stems from hunger, ignorance5 poverty and diseaseo We must -- whatever strategies we evolve "-- keep these enemies the point of our attack, and make imaginative use of our scientific and technological capability in such enterprises.

8. Vietnam and Thailand are the imm-ediate-and most important-trouble spots, critical to the UcS. These areas require the attention of our very best talents -- under the very closest Washington direction -- on matters economic, military and politicalc

The basic decision in Southeast Asia is here. We must decide whether to help these countries to the best of our ability or throw in the towel in the area and pull back our defenses to San Francisco ajid [a/J "Fortress America" concept. More important, we would say to the world in this case that we don't live up to treaties and don't stand by our friends. This is not my concept. I recommend that we move forward promptly with a major effort to help these countries defend themselves. I consider the key here is to get otor best M\AG people to control, plan, direct and exact results from our military aid programo In Vietnam and Thailand, - , we must move forward together."^

a. In Vietnam,' Diem is a complex figure beset by many problems. He has admirable qualities, but he is remote from the

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people, is siirrovmded "by persoiis less admirable and capable than he. The country can be saved -- if we move quickly and wisely. We must decide whether to support Diem -- or let Vietnam fallo We must have coordination of purpose in our country team^ diplomatic and military. The Saigon Embassy^ USIS, ViAAG and related operations leave much to be desired» They should be brought up to maximum efficiencyo The most im-portant thing is imaginative, creative^ Ajnerican management of our military aid program. The Vietnamese and our VAP.G estirricite that $50 million of U.S. military and economic assistajice will be needed if we decide to support Vietnam. This is the best information available to us at the present time and if it is confirmed by the best Washington militaa-y judgment it should be supported. Since you proposed and Diem agreed to a joint economic mission, it should be appointed 3..nd proceed forthvrith.

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b. In Thailand, the Thais and our own ¥u\^.G estimate probably as much is needed as in Vietnam -- about $50 million of military and economic assistancec Again, should our best military judgoaent concur, I believe we should support such a progrsm. Sarit is m-ore strongly and sta.unchly pro-Western than many of his people. He is and must be deeply concerned at the consequence to his country of a communist-controlled Laos. If Sarit is to stand fi3:m against neutralism, he must have — soon "" concrete evidence to show his people of United States military and economic support. He believes that his armed forces should be increased to 150,000. His Defense Minister is coming to Washington to discuss aid matters.

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To recapitulate, these are the main impressions I have brought back from my trip.

The fundamental decision required of the United States -- and time is of the greatest importance — is whether we are to attempt to meet the challenge of Communist expansion now in Southeast Asia by a major effort in support of the forces of freedom in the area, or throw in the towel. This decision must be made in a full realization of the very hea.vy and continuing costs involved in terms of money, of effort and of United States prestige. It must be made with the knowledge that at some point we may be faced with the further decision of whether we commit major United States forces to the area or cut our losses and withdraw should our other efforts fail. We must reDiain master in this decisiono What we do in Southeast Asia should be part of a rarbional program to meet the threat we face in the region as a wholec It should include a clear-cut pattern of specific contributions to be expected by each partner according to his ability and resources. I recommend we proceed with a clear-cut and strong progrsaa of e^ction.

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II. DIEM'S JUNE LETTER

Daring his visit Johnson^ on behalf of Kennedy^ invited Diem to prepare a set of proposals on South Vietnamese military needs for consideration by Tfashington, In a letter May 15_, Diem told Kennedy that the definitive study would be ready in a few weeks„ (He appreciated this invitation^ Diem told Kennedy^ "particularly because we have not become accustomed to being asked for our own views on our needs.)"

On June 9^ Diem signed the promised letter. It was carried to Washington by a key Diem aide (Nguyen Dinh Thuan) and delivered on the l4th, (Thuan played a key role on the Vietnamese side throughout I961, He was the man Durbrow^ in the cable quoted in full earlier^ suspected was the only cabinet member Diem had told about the GIF. In a memo to Gilpatric^ Lansdale described him as Diem's "Secretary of Security^ Defense^ Interior^ etCo") k/

*

In the letter^ Diem proposed an increase in the RVNAE to 270^000 men^ or to double the 150^000 strength authorized at the start of 1961^ and 100^000 men more than envisioned under the GIF. That was a large request: for up until the end of April^ the U.S. and South Vietnamese were still haggling over the go-ahead for a 20^000-man increase. Further^ Diem made it clear that he saw this force requirement as a sem.i-permanent increase in South Vietnamese strength^ which would continue to be needed even should he eliminate the Viet Cong.

Here are some extracts from Diem^s letter:

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/The/ situation...has become very much more perilous following the events in Laos^ the more and more equivocal attitude of Cambodia and the intensification of the activities of aggression of international communism, which wants to take the maximum advantage to accelerate the conquest of Southeast Asiao It is apparent that one of the major obstacles to the communist expansion on this area of the globe is Free Vietnam because with your firm support^ we are resolved to oppose :* ' ■ ■ it with all our energies. Consequently^ now and henceforth^

we constitute the first target for the communists to overthrow at any cost. The enormous accumulation of Russian war material in North Vietnam is aimed^ in the judgment of foreign observers^ more at South Vietnam than at Laos. We clearly realize this dangerous situation but I want to reiterate to you here^ in my personal name and in the name of the entire Vietnamese people^ our indomitab3-e will to win.

On the second of May^ my council of generals met to evaluate the current situation and to determine the needs of the Republic of Vietnam to meet this situation. Their objective

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evaluation shows that the military situation at present is to the advantage of the communists and that most of the Vietnamese Armed Forces are already comjnitted to internal security and the protection of our 12 million inhabitantso For many months the communist-inspired fratricidal war has talien nearly one thousand casualties a month on both sides, Doc-uments obtained in a recent operation^ along route NOo 9 which runs from Laos to Vietnam^ contain definite proof that 2^860 aiTned agents have infiltrated among us in the course of the last four months. it is certain that this number rises each day. However^ the Vietnamese people are showing the world that they are willing to fight and die for their freedom, not withstanding the temptations to neutralism and its false promises of peace being drutmiied into their ears daily by the communistso

In the light of this situation, the council of generals concluded that additional forces numbering slightly over 100,000 more than our new force level of 170,000 will be required to counter the ominous threat of communist domination. ..

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After considering the recommendations of our generals and consulting with our American military advisors, we now conclude that to provide even minimum initial resistance to the threat, two new divisions of approximately 10,000 strength each are required to be activated at the earliest-possible date. Our lightly held defensive positions along the demilitarized zone at our Northern border is even today being outflanked by communist forces which have defeated the Royal Laotian Army garrisons in Tchepone and other cities in Southern Laos. Our ARVK forces are so thoroughly committed to internal anti-guerrilla operations that we have no effective forces with which to counter this threat from Southern Laos. Thus, we need'immediately one division for the First Army Coi-ps and one for the Second Army Corps to provide at least some token resistance to the sizeable forces the communists are capable of bringing to bear against our Laotian frontier. Failing this, v^e would have no recourse but to withdraw our forces southward from the demilitarized zone and sacrifice progressively greater

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Diem's number implies an infiltration rate about \ times as high as that estimated by U.S. intelligence in I961, and twice as high as the hindsight revised I961 estimates now in use^

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areas of our country to the coimnimists. These divisions should he mobilized and equipped^ together vith initial logistic support units^ immediately after completion of activation of the presently contemplated increase of 20^000 . which you have offered to support.

FoUomng the activation of these units^ which should begin in about five months^ we must carry on the prograni of activation of additional units until over a period of two years we will have achieved a force of 1^ infantry divisions^ an expanded airborne brigade of approximately division strength and accompanying (support?),.. The mission of this total 270^000 man force remiains the same^ namely^ to overcome the insurgency which has risen to the scale of a bloody^ communist-inspired civil war within our borders and to provide initial resistance to overt^ external aggression until free world forces under the SEATO agreement can come to our aid. The question naturally arises as to how long we shall have to carry the burden of so sizeable a military force. Unfortunately^ I can see no early prospects for the reduction of such a force once it has been established; for even though we may be successful in liquidating the insurgency within our borders^ communist pressure in Southeast Asia and the external military threat to our country must be expected to increase^ I feaXy before it diminishes. This means that we must be prepared to maintain a strong defensive military posture for at least the foreseeable future in order that we may not become one of the so-called "soft spots" which traditionally have ■ attracted communist aggression. We shall therefore continue to need material support to maintain this force whose re-quiremients far exceed the capacity of our economy to support

o • o e

To accomplish this 100,000 man expansion of our military forces, which is perfectly feasible from a manpower vie^fpoint^ will require a great Intensification of our training pro-gratns in order to produce, in the minimum of time, those qualified combat leaders and technical specialists needed to fill the new units and to provide to them the technical and logistic support required to insure their complete effectiveness. For this purpose a considerable expansion of the United States Military Advisory Group is an essential require-mento Such an expansion, in the form of selected elements of the American Armed Forces to establish training centers for the Vietnamese Armed Forces, would serve the dual purpose of providing an expression of the United States' determination to halt the tide of Gomm.unist aggression and of preparing our forces in the minimujn of tlmeo

While the Ck)vernment and people of Vietnam are prepared to carry the heavy m.anpower burden required to save our country,

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we well know that we cannot afford to pay_, equip, train and maintain such forces as I have described. To make this effort possible_, we would need to have assurances that this needed material support would be provided« 5./

The record is unclear on the immediate response to this letter. In particular, we have no record of the conversations Thuan had in Washington when he delivered the requestso The issue of the RVJ^AE increases somehow became part of the business of an economic mission then about to leave for Vietnam (the Staley Mission, discussed in the following section). The request for "selected elements of the American Armed Forces", raised in the next-to-last quoted paragraph, is left thoroughly obscure in the records we have-"to the point where we are not at all sure either what Diem meant by it or how the Administration reacted to it« But, as will be seen in the section below on "U.S. Troops", nothing came of it.

III. THE STALEY MISSION

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One of the continuing negotiating items through most of 19^1 was the extent to which the South Vietnamese should finance their ovm effort. The UoS. view was that the South Vietnamese vere not doing enough. The result was American pressure on Diem to undertake what was called tax "reform." Diem was most reluctant to move. It is pretty clear that a large part of Diem's reluctance to move flowed from the saane (well-founded) sense of personal insecurity that made him avoid establishing a clear military chain of command. On the latter issue, the risk of weakening the

I I war effort obviously struck him as less dangerous than the risk of miaking

a coup easier by concentrating military authority in his generals instead

I j of dividing it between the generals and the 38 province chiefs. Similarly,

for a ruler so unsure of his hold on the country, a serious effort at imposing austerity looked more risky than holding out for the Americans to provide a few more millions out of their vast resources. But Diem, of course, was hardly likely to admit such reasons to the Americans, assuming he admitted them to himself. Consequently, on these issues (as on many others) the record is a long story of tediously extracted promises, excuses for inaction, and American com.plaihts about Diem's administrative styleo

On the economic issue, the substance of the argument was this:

The deficit between what Diem raised in taxes and what his budget required was made up by the U.S. through a commercial import prograan. The regim.e sold the goods provided by the UoS. to South Vietnamese businessmen, and used the piasters thus acquired mainly to meet the local currency costs (mostly food and pay) for the armed forces. U.S. dissatisfaction with the South Vietnamese effort showed clearly in the decision to ask the South Vietnamese themselves to provide the local, currency costs for the 20,000 man force increase proposed in the CIP, although the UoS. had been paying these costs (through the import' program) for the balance

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of the forces. The South Vietnamese insisted^ for the outset^ that they could not raise the piasters required.

The basic question of whether the South Vietnamese were bearing a reasonable-share of the burden devolved into a number of technical issues^ such as the effect of the program on inflation in South Vietnam^ and the piaster/dollar exchange rate. The Gilpatric/Lansdale draft of the Task Force Report proposed that Diem be flatly assured that the U.S. would make up any deficit in the Vietnatnese budget. But State objected from the start to giving any such assurance. Instead a Joint coimiiission of UoS. and South Vietnamese economic experts was proposed to work out a Joint program dealing with these economic issues. This was one of the proposals Vice President Johnson carried with him on his mission. Diem accepted the proposal. And the UoS. team^ headed by Eugene Staley (president of the Stanford Research Institute) was dispatched to South Vietnam in mid-June.

By the time the Staley Mission left^ though^ Diem had written the letter Just quoted'asking for U.S. support for a large further increase in his forces. Staley's group^ MltYi its Vietnamese co-unterpart^ found themselves serving as the vehicle for the discussions on force levels. The report they issued is mostly about military issues_, on which the economists stated they simply reflected instructions passed on by their respective governments. Here are seme excerpts on the military issues (in addition^ the report of course contained a discussion^ rather vague as it turned out^ of the economic issues which were nominally its purpose^ and it also contained a good deal of very fine^ vigorous language on the need for "crash programs" of economic and social development).

Viet Nam is today under attack in a bitter^ total struggle which involves its survival as a free nation. Its enemy^ the Viet Cong^ is ruthless^, resourceful^ and elusiveo This enemy is supplied^ reinforced^ and centrally directed by the international Communist apparatus operating through Hanoi. To defeat it requires the mobilization of the entire economic^ military psychological^ and social resources of the country and vigorous support from the United States,

The intensified program which v/e recommend our two countries adopt as a basis for mutua.1 actions over the next several years is designed not Just to hold the line but to achieve a real breakthrough. Our Joint efforts must surpass the critical threshold of the enemy's resistance^ thereby put-ing an end to his destructive attacks^ and at the same time ve must make a decisive impact on the economic^ social^ and ideological fronts

The turn of events in Laos has created further serious problems with regard to the maintenance of the GVN as a free

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and sovereign non-Communist nation. In particular^ the uncovering of the Laotian-Viet Main border to DEV or DRV-supported forces creates a serious threat of increased covert infiltration of personnel, supplies, and equipment to the Viet Cong. With such increased support, the Viet Cong undoubtedly hope to seize firm military control of a geographic area and annoixnce the establishment therein of a ''rebel" goverra'aent for South Viet Nam which vould then be recognized by and receive military support from the DRV, CoiTimunist China, and Soviet Russia. (Example: The present situation in Laos.)

The joint VI\^-US group does not consider itself competent to make specific recommendations as to desired force levels for the defense of Viet Naaii. They iiave,^ however, after cons\ilta.tion with their respective military authorities, adopted for economic planning purposes certain estimated strength figures for the GVN armed forces under two alternative assumptionso Alt ernative A assumes that the Comm-unist-led insurgency effort remains at approxiiiiately its present level of intensity and the Government of Laos maintains suTficient independence from, the Comjmmist Bloc to deny authority for the transit of BW or Communist Chinese troops across its borders. Alternative B assumes that the Viet Cong are able to significantly increase their insurgency campaign within Viet Nam and that the situation in Laos continues to deteriorate to the point where the Communists gain de facto control of that country.

Alternative A called for a build-up of Diem's forces to 200,000 (vs. 170,000 then authorized). Alternative B called for continuing the build-up to 270,000. On this basis, Kennedy agreed to provide support for the increase to 200,000. The 200,000~man approval was supposed to ■ be contingent on South Vietnamese agreement to a plan for using the forces. The question of a farther increase to 270,000 was deferred, since it did not need to be faced until the lower figure was being approached, sometime late in 1962. 6/

A consequence of the Staley Mission was the South Vietnamese troop levels needed little attention in the fall review: the U.S. simply decided to support the increase to 200,000 even tho'agh the agreed plan for using the farces did not yet exist (as in May the U.S. had agreed to support the increase to 170,000 which also, re will be recalled, was supposed to have been contingent on such a plan).

A few points about the Staley Mission seem useful to keep in mind in reviewing the fall process:

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lo It is another reminder of the prevailing (although not universal) over-optimism of U.S. appraisals of the Vietnam problem,

2o One of the follow-on actions to the report was supposed to I • be a Vietnamese announcement of a program of social refoim. Prodticing . • this piece of paper (and in the end it was not much more than a piece

of paper) took months. It was experiences such as this that gave questions about the viability of the Diem regime greater prominence in the fall review than they had received during April and May.

'3o The U.S. was still continuing to deal with Diem most gently. Nothing more was asked of Diem as a quid pro quo than that he finally work up a plan for the counterinsurgency. The President explicitly accepted the assumptions of the Joint Plan worked out by the Staley Mission and their Vietnamese counterparts.

This is from the formal record of decision:

Joint Program of Action With the Government of . Vietnam (Staley Report)

August ky 1961

The President agrees vrith the three basic tenets ■ on which the recommendations contained in the Joint Action Program are based^ namely:

a. Security requirements must^ for the present^ be given first priority,

b. Military operations will not achieve lasting results unless economic and social progrecns are continued and accelerated,

Co It is in our joint Interest to accelerate measures to achieve a self-sustaining economy and a free and peaceful society in Viet-Nam. T/

Similar language was used at the time of the May decisions. So It is not new« It is only that^ in the light of Diem^s inactivity^ the phrases implying that non-military efforts are also important had come to sound a little hollow,

IV. U.S. COMBAT TROOPS

From the time of the Laos Annex io'the original Gilpatric/Lansdale draft of the Task Force Report (April 28)5 the record shows persistent activity on some level or other on the issue of sending U.S. combat troops to Vietnam,

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At the time of the Task Force review^ it -will be recalled^ Defense recommended sending two l600-man combat units to Vietnatn to set up two training centers for the Vietnamese in the highlandSo In later drafts of the Task Force report^ this proposal was broadened to consider sending American troops for wider purposes, short of direct combat against the Viet Cong. But the proposal was downgraded to a subject for study and was no longer a definite recommendaAion.

Here is a summary of the items (on the issue of U.S. combat troops) in the record available to this study following Kennedy's decisions on the Task Force Report (May ll).

On May 12 Vice President Johnson discussed the question with Diem, as described in an earlier section. This seems to have resolved the issue (negatively) so far as Johnson was concerned, and possibly as far as ■president Kennedy was concerned. ' But if it did, the President's view was not YBTY emphatically passed on to subordinate members of the Administration. For a week later, Lansdale sent: a memo to Gilpatric noting that Diem did not want U-B. combat units as such, but that, he might accept'these units if they had a mission of training South Vietnamese forces:

Ambassador Nolting /said/ that President Diem would welcome as many U.S. military personnel as needed for - training and advising Vietnaraese forces. A^-A.3 Chief/ General McGarr, who was also present at this discussion /between Johnson and Diem/^ reported that while President Diem would not want U.S. combat forces for the purpose of fighting Communists in South Vietnam, he would accept deployment of U.So combat forces as trainers for the Vietnamese forces at any time. 8/

This language leaves it unclear whether McGarr was merely stating his opinion (which supported his o^m desire to bring in UoS. comliat units), or reporting what he understood Diem to have said.

(About the same day of Lansdale's memo—May l8—the JCS had restated its recommendation of May 10 that combat troops should be sent to Vietnam; and McGarr, from Saigon, had recomjfiended sending a l6,000 man force, or if Diem would not accept that, a 10,000 man force with the nominal mission of establishing training centers for the Vietnamese, The similar recommendation made in the Task Force drafts had suggested 3200 men for the force.) 9/

In any event, Lansdale's memo makes it q.vite clear that he (along with McGarr and the JCS) were primarily interested in getting U.S„ combat units into Vietnam, with the training mission a possible device for getting Diem to accept themo After a discussion of JCS and CITTCPAC planning and of alternative locations for the troops, Lansdale comments:

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any of the above locations have good areas for training of Vietnamese forces^ if this vere to be a ' ■ mission of the U.S. forces.

In the available papers^ no one at this time talked about using Merican units to directly fight the Viet Cong. Rather it was mainly in terms of relieving Vietnamese units to undertake offensive action. We can only guess what people were really thinkingo As the training-the-Vietnamese rationale seems essentially a device for getting Diem to accept the units^ the non-combatant role for U.S. troops may have been (and probably was in the minds of at least some of the planners) mainly a device for calming those members of the Administration who were reluctant to involve American units in fighting the Viet Congo Certainly in hindsight^ it seems most unrealistic to suppose that American combat units could have been stationed in a center of Viet Cong activity (a numiber of papers postulate the insurgents were attempting to establish a "liberated area" in the high plateau^ which was the principal locale discussed) without themselves becoming involved in the fighting.

Lansdale concluded his memo by reminding Gilpatric that Diem was sending Thuan ("Secretary of Security^ Defense^ Interior^ etc.") to Washington to deliver his letter on Vietnam's "definitive military needSo" Lansdale recommended that Gilpatric take up the question of whether Diem would accept UoS. troops vrLth Thuan. "With concrete information^, you will then have a firm position for further decisions."

But apparently someone did not want to wait for Thuan. For on May 27_, Kolting reported that he had brought up the question of what Diem meant in his conversation with Johnson directly with Diem, and that Diem did not then want U.S^ com.bat units "for this or any other reasono 10/

Nevertheless^ on June 9^ Diem signed the letter to Kennedy that^ as quoted above^ asked for:

• • o

selected elem.ents of the American Armed Forces to establish training centers for the Vietnamese Armed Forces^ ... '

a move which Diem stated:

.♦owould serve the dual purpose of providing an expression of the United States* determination to halt the tide of comm.ujiist aggression and of preparing our forces in the minimum of time. ll/

This certainly sounded very much like the recoimnendation of the Task Force draft, or McGarr's later expanded version of that proposal; particularly since Diem explicitly stated that he had McGarr's advice in

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drafting the proposals. But where the American proposals vere for training whole South Vietnamese divisions^ Diem said the training centers vould be for combat leaders and technical specialists. Consequently, it seems that Diem did not have the same thing in mind in referring to "selected elements of the Merican Armed Forces" as did McGarr and others interested in bringing in American combat units. It may be that Diem agreed to put in this request that sounded like what McGarr wanted as a concession to the Americans in return for support of the large increase in the RWAP he was asking o

Presumably this was clarified during the discussions Thuan had after delivering the letter. But^ as noted earlier^ we have no record of the conversations. In any event, nothing came of the proposal.

(a summar-y of Diem*s letter^ cabled to the American mission in Saigon the day after the letter was received in Washington^ did not use the phrase "selected elemients of the American Armed Forces." -Instead it said that Diem asked for an increase of "American personnel" to establish the training centers. The crucial issue^ of course, was whether Americans would be sent to Vietnam in the foriTi of organized combat units, capable of^ if not explicitly intended, for conducting combat operations. We do not know whether the wording of the summary reflected Thuan's clarification of the proposal when he arrived in Washington,or a high level Administration decision to interpret Diem's letter as not asking for combat units^ or merely sloppy drafting of the cable.)

It seems clear that either Diem (despite the language of the letter he signed) really did not want American units^, or that Kennedy (despite the activity of his subordinates) did not vrant to send those units, or both

Sorenson, in his memoir, says that in May Kennedy decided against sending combat units despite the recommendations he received at the time of the Task Force Report. But his account of the Task Force is in error on a number of details, and so it is hard to know how much to credit his recollection. 12/

But there is a final item apparently from this period that seems to support Sorenson. It is a handwritten undated note on a-piece of scratch paper from Rostow to McIJamara. It looks like a note passed at a meeting. From its location in the file, it was probably written about June 5, that is, a few days before Thuan arrived with Diem's lettero It reads:

Bob:

We must think of the kind of forces and missions for Thailand now, Vietnam, later.

We need a guerrilla deterrence operation in Thainland's northeast-

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We shall need forces to support a counter-guerrilla war in Vietnam:

aircrafi^ helicopters coiomunications men special forces militia teachers

etc.

\i\m 13/

Two things are striking about this note: firsts it is a quite exact description of the sort of military assistance Kennedy finally dispatched to Vietnam (i.e., combat support and advisors but not i^Jiierican units capable of independent combat against the guerrillas). Second^ it cer--tainly suggests that desioite what Lansdale, McGarr, and others were doing, those close to the President were not at this time thinking about sending American combat units to Vietnam (or any American forces, for even the units Rostow lists are for '^later" in contrast to "Thailand now"). Nevertheless on July 20, McG-arr again raised the question of combat units for training with Diem, and reported again that he did not want them^

In general, we seem to be seeing here a pattern that first began to emerge in the h&mdling of the Task Force Report and which will be even more strikingly evident in the President's handling of the Taylor Report.

Someone or other is frequently promoting the idea of sending U.S. combat units. Kennedy never makes a clear-cut decision but some way or other action is always deferred on any move that would probably lead to engagements on the ground between American units and the Viet Cong.

We have no unambiguous basis for Judging just what had really happened in each case. But we do see a similar pattern at least twice and possibly three different times: in May, perhaps again in June (depending on details of Thuan's talks in Washing"ton not evailable to this study), and as we will report shortly, again in November« In each case, the record seems to be moving toward a decision to send troops, or at least to a Presidential decision that, in principal, troops should be sent if Diem can be persuaded to accept them. But no such decision is ever reached* The record never shows the President himself as the controlling fig-ure. In June, there does not seem to be any record of what happened, at least in the files evailable to this study. In May and, as we will see, in November, the President conveniently receives a revised dj:'aft of the recommendations which no longer requires him to comxait himself.

if

No reliable inference can be drawn from this about how Kennedy wouJ-d have behaved in I965 and beyond had he lived. (One of those vrho had advised retaining freedom of action on the issue of sending U.S. combat

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troops was Lyndon Johnson.) It does not prove that Kennedy behaved soimdly in I96I0 Many people ifill think so; but others irill,argue that the most difficult problem of recent years might have been avoided if the U.So. had made a hard commitment on the ground in South Vietnam in I96I.

Vc THE TREATY REQUEST

■ As to Diem^ ve have^ of course, even less in the way of a record from vhich to judge what he really thought he vas doing. But it is not hard to understand vhy he should be reluctant to accept U.S. combat troops. His stated reason was always that sending U.S. combat units wou].d signaJ the end of the Geneva Accords. But this explanation explains little. Diem thought the Geneva Accords were betrayal of Vietnam in 195^f-^ and a farce, freely violated by the communists, latero Consequently, he would be con--cerned about their demise only if North Vietnam could use this as a pretext for an overt Invasiono But ITorth Vietnam had long had a suitable pretext for an invasion in Diem's refusal to discuas the elections called for under the Geneva AccordSo Diem's shield was +he threat of U.S. intervention, not the Geneva Accords, and it is mighty hard to see how this shield could'be wealiened by putting American troops on the ground in South Vietnamo

• But there were other reasons for Diem to be wary of U.S. troops. For one thing, not even Diem's severest critics questioned his commitment to Vietnamese nationalism. The idea of inviting foreign troops back into Vietnam must surely have been distasteful even once he decided it was unavoidable. Further, the presence of American troops in Vietnam had a very ambivalent effect on the risk to Diem of a military coupo To the extent American troops increased the sense of security, they would lessen the likelihood of a coup, which the military rationalized mainly on the grounds that they could not \u.n the war under Diem. But the larger the American military presence in the country, the more Diem would have to worry about American ability and temptation to encourage a coup if Diem incurred American displeasure <,

The net impact of these conflicting effects would depend on the security situation in Vietnam. If Diem felt strong, he would probably not want American troops j if he felt weak, he might see no choice but to risk inviting the Americans in. Even at the time of the Taylor mission, we will see Diem is m.ost erratic on this issue.

Against this background, it is easy to understand why Diem, when the situation got worse in September, should have "pointed the question" at whether the U.S. would give him a treaty, rather than whether the U.S. would send in troops. As far as we can see, he was mostly concerned about what the latest VC attacks were doing to confidence in his regime, rather than any fear that the VC, still estimated at fewer than 20,000 strong, were going to defeat the quarter million regulars and auxiliaries in his own forces. What he probably wanted was an unambiguous public commitment

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that the Americans would not let Vietnam fallo For this vould meet his immediate concern about confidence in his regime^ perhaps even more effectively than the dispatch of American troops^ and -without the dis--advantages that vould come iTith accepting American troops^ For Diem^ a clear-cut treaty probably seemed the best possible combination of maximizing the American commitment while minimizing American leverage. And that^ of course^ would help explain why the Administration was not terribly attracted to such a.proposa],.

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Vic THE SITUATION IN SEPTEMBER

So far as the available record shows^ there was no sense of imminent crisis in the official reporting to Washington as fall of 1961 begano An NIE published in mid-August concluded that Diem faced a "prolonged and difficult struggle" against the insurgency^ and noted that "the French with their memories of the Indochina that vas and the British vith their experience in Malaya tend to be pessimistic regarding GVN prospects for combating the insurgency." l4/ But the NIE also reported that Diem's army had been performing better in 1961 than in I96O0 Warning of possible trouble looked monthsJ rather than weeks^ aheado The danger foreseen "was a coup: "if the fight against the Viet Cong goes poorly during the next year or the South Vietnamese Army suffers heavy casualties^, the chances of a military coup vould substantially increaseo" I5/

The judgment of the NIE on the effects of such a coup vas entirely negative:

If there is a serious disruption of GVN leadership as a result of Diem's death or as the result of a military coup^ any momentum of GVN*s counterinsurgency efforts had achieved will be halted or re-versed_j at least for a time. The confusion and suspicion attending a coup effort could provide the communists with an opportunity to seize control of the government« 16/

There is no mention of any offsetting hope for a coup leading to more effective prosecution of the war^ The overall impression left by the NIE is that Diem is not a very effective leader^ but that he is getting along well enough to make the risks of a coup look more dangerous than the risks of the war being imwinnable under his leadershipo In particular^ a coup (or Diem's death) were seen as the only thing that could bring a quick collapse of the Saigon regime^, as opposed to the loss over time of a "prolonged and difficult" struggle.,

MAAG Chief McGarr^ in a report dated September 1^ spoke of the "enhanced sense of urgency and offensive spirit now present within both the RVNAE and the Government of Vietnam.o." Under the heading "Outlook for Next Year/' he reported:

With the increased effectiveness of the Armed Forces beginning to be demonstrated oy the recent operations in the Delta Region and the manifest intent of the U.So to continue and even step up its vital support of the Vietnamese in their struggle against Communism_j there is a spirit of renewed confidence beginning to permeate the people^ the GVN^ and the Armed Forces« I7/

The political reporting from Saigon was less optimistico Generally^ these reports argued that Diem was not doing much to strengthen his supporto

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But there was no disagreement with McGarr's fairly optimistic assessment of the military situation and no sense of crisiso

Through unofficial channels^ though^ the White House was receiving a , • far bleaker view of the situation. Schelsinger reports:

I 'The situation gets worse almost week hy week/ Theodore Ho White

wrote us in Augusto *co.The guerrillas now control amost all the . southern delta - so much so that I could find no American who would

" drive me outside Saigon in his car even by day without military con-

I • voy,' He reported a 'political breakdown of formidable proportions:

oooWhat perplexes hell out of me is that the Commies^ on their side,, ; seem to be able to find people willing to die for their cause., ol

find it discouraging to spend a night in a Saigon night-club full of young fellows of 20 and 25 dancing and jitterbugging (they are called 'la jeunesse cowboy') while twenty miles away their Communist contemporaries are terrozing the countryside.' An old China ?iand^ White was reminded of Chungking in the Second World War^ complete with Madame Nhu in the role of Madame Chiang Kai-sheko *If a defeat in South Vietnam is to be considered our defeat; if we are responsible for holding that area^ then we must have authority to acto And that means intervention in Vietnam politicSo..If we do decide so to inter-. vene^ have we the proper personnel^ the proper instruments^ the proper clarity of objectives to intervene successfully?' l8/

It did not take long to confirm White's pessimism^ although this must have made the dilemma of what to do about it seem all the more acutec In September^ the number of VC attacks jum.ped to nearly triple the level (about i]-50 vsc 150) that had prevailed for some months previouslyo The most spectacular attack; which seems to have had a shattering effect in Saigon^ was the seizure of Phuoc Thanh; a provincial capital only 55 miles from Saigon. The insurgents held the town a good part of the day; publicly beheaded Diem's province chief; and departed before government troops arrived. The official reporting to Washington by the end of the month pictured the situation as stagnating; if not dangerously deteriorating; although there continued to be no sense of the imminent crisis that Theodore White foresaw.

Here is an end-of-month report that Nolting sent just prior to the meeting at which Diem asked for the treaty:

Status report on political items as of Sept 28: , ■

General: Governmental and civil situation at end of month much same as at beginnings While neither of these gave open signs of deterioration; Diem government did not significantly improve its political position among people or substantially further national unity. On positive side several fifty-man district level reconstruction teams were sent to each of h provinces; and there was

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commendable ajnoTint coiKitry-side travel by ministers o On other hand^ report was received of high-level bickering over powers and authority of new central intelligence organization (FVS-6487)^ and Diem expressed dissatisfaction with pace of field command's planning of counter-insurgency operations^ but he has still not delegated sufficient authority to field command• All in all we unable report that Sept saw progress toward attainment task force goals of creating viable and increasingly democratic societyc Some such 'shot in arm' as proposed joint communiq.ue seems desirable..

Series large scale VC attacks in various areas central Vietnam during month highlighted increased VC infiltrations through Laos and underscored urgency of free world policy toward Laos which would bring this situation under control. These VC actions plus temporary VC seizure of provincial capital of Phuoc Thanh demonstrated that tide not yet turned in guerrilla war... 19/

The ''shot in the arm" Nolting referred to was the communique on social reforms that was agreed to some weeks earlier at the time of the Staley Mlssionj it would finally be issued^ in a watered down form^ early in January. The contrast between White's and Nolting's reporting is sharp: White obviously would not have seen the issuing of a communique as a significant "shot in the arm," or commented on the VC show of strength in such mild terms as demonstrating "that tide not yet turned." Consequently^ although Diem's request for a treaty (a day after this cable was sent) surprised Nolting^ its effect at the White House was presumably to confirm the warning that had already been received through Whiteo

The State Department's view of the situation seems also to have been graver than that of the Embassy in Saigono We have a situation SLimmary on Southeast Asia that refers to Nolting's cable but not to Diem's treaty request^ and which consequently must have been distributed about October 1. On the political situation in South Vietnam^ the summary quotes Nolting's "no progress" comments. But the military situation is described more bleakly than Nolting did.

SOUTH VIET-NAM - MILITARY

lo Although GVN military capabilities have increased^ Viet Cong capabilities are increasing at more rapid rate and Viet Cong attacks have increased in sizeo

2o Viet Cong 'regular' forces have increased from about 7^000 at beginning of year to approximately 17^000.

3<. Viet Cong have moved from stage of small hands to large units. During September Viet Cong mounted three attacks with over 1^000 men in eacho Viet Cong strategy m^ay be directed at 'liberating' an area in which a 'government' could be installed^

4. Although vast majority of Viet Cong troops are of local origin_, the infiltration of Viet Cong cadres from North Viet-Nam via

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LaosJ the demilitarized zone^ and loy sea appears to be increasing. However^ there is little evidence of major supplies from outside sources^ most arms apparently being captured or stolen from GYN forces or from the French during the Indo-China war. 20 /

On Laos^ the situation summary showed no such pessimism. But^ overall the absence of bad news from Laos only added to the worry about South Vietnam o For the paper reported:

There probably have been some Viet Minh withdrawals from northern Laos but Viet Minh movement into Southern Laos bordering on South Vietnam has increased. Thus it appears enemy may be accepting stalemate for time being within Laos and giving priority to stepping up offensive action against South Vietnam., 21/

Two final items are worth bearing in mind in trying to see the Vietnamese problem as it might have appeared to the White House in the fall of 1961. First, this warning of the effect of UoSo policy in Vietnam, from the A-ugust 15 NIE quoted earlier:

International Attitudes . In providing the GVW a m^aximum of encouragement and extensive support in its struggle against the Communists, the US will inevitably become identified with the GVE^s success or failure. The US will be uader heavy pressure from other members of the non-Communist world, many of whom view the Vietnam struggle in differing terms. For example, the neighboring countries, such as Thailand, Cambodia, Burma, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Nationalist China, have all to some extent viewed developments in Laos as a gauge of US willingness and ability to help an anti-Communist Asian government stand against a Communist 'national liberation' campaigno They will almost certainly look upon the struggle for Vietnam as a critical test of such US willingness and ability. All of them, including the neutrals, would probably suffer demoralization and loss of confidence in their prospects for maintaining their independence if the Communists were to gain control of South Vietnam. This loss of confidence might even extend to India« 22/

Second, a couple of newspaper quotes may serve as a reminder of the extent to which the Kennedy Administration had been londer a constant sense of foreign policy crisis throughout its first year, with every evidence of more to comeo In late September, in a review piece on Congressional appraisals of Kennedy's first year, Russell Baker comraents that not even Congress seems much interested in debate about Kennedy's effectiveness in pushing through legislation:

What makes it particularly irrelevant this autiomn is that Congress itself has been 'far more concerned ever since January

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with the President's performance as guardian of the national security than with how he came out as chief warrior for a legislative programo

Erom Laos to Cuba to Vienna to Berlin to the Soviet nuclear

testing site at Semipalatinsk to New York's East River^ crisis after

crisis has fallen across the White House with a rapidity and gravity

that has absorbed l^o Kennedy's energy since his inauguration and

reduced the Congressional program to secondary importanceo 23 /

I.

And a couple of days later^ James Reston^ describing the imminent risk of a nuclear crisis over Berlin_, reported:

Specifically^ Khrushchev told one of Mr. Kennedy's political emissaries that once Krushchev signs a separate peace treaty with the Communist East Germans^ not only all of the West's rights in Berlin will cease^ but all traffic to Berlin will cease until the West negotiates new rights of access with the East German regimeo

Khrushchev was questioned minutely on this key point« His reply was ianeq_uivocal: Not one truck^ or barge^ or train^ or plane would leave from West Germany for West Berlin after the separate peace treaty until the new arrangements with the East Germans were negotiatedo

Nowj this is not precisely the same as Lfro Gromyko's bland assurances o This is blockade;, and blockade is an act of waro Washington has made clear that it is not going to get stirred up if the East Germans merely replace the Russians on the borders between East and West Germany and approve the flow of adequate supplies<. But Mr. Khrush chev did not support this procedure^ and went on to threaten that any effort to break his blockade by force would lead to waro 24 /

Since Khrushchev had repeatedly pledged to sign the East German treaty by the end of the year^ the showdown was not far offo

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1!BF, FALL DECISIOIMS - I

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I. TPIE DECISION TO SEND TAYLOR

As of early October_j there were several proposals for more active intervention in Southeast Asia on the table. One was the JCS-favored plan to intervene on the ground in Laos to seize and hold major portions of the country^ principally to protect the borders of South Vietnam and Thailando A second plan (referred to in a staff paper as the "Rostow proposal") would hava put a SEATO force of about 25^000 men into Vietnam to try to movocit a guard on the Vietnam/Laos border between the DMZ and Cambodiac Finally^ there were various schemes^ dating from the Task Force review^ for putting a UoS, force into the highlands^ or at DaNang with or without a nominal mission of training South Vietnamese troops.

Except for the Rostow proposal all these plans pre-dated the spurt of _ Viet Cong activity in September and Diem's subsequent request for a treaty. The record does not tell when and why the Rostow proposal was drawn up^ It was probably a direct response to Diem's request^ but it may have been simply a part of the on-going Laos contingency planning^ In any event; Rostow's proposal was submitted to the JCS for Comment October 5- On the 9thj the JCS responded with a counter-proposal for a substantial (initially about 20^000 men^ but expected to grow) commitment of UoS., forces in Vietnam^ centered on Plelku in the highlands o l/

In hindsight^ the JCS reasoning in rejecting the Rostow proposal looks ■unchallengeableo The JCS stated:

a^.. SEATO forces will be deployed over a border of several hundred miles^ and will be attacked piecemeal or by-passed at the Viet Cong's own choiceo

b. It may reduce but cannot stop infiltration of Viet Cong personnel and material.

c» It deploys SEATO forces in the weakest defense points should DRV or CHICOM forces intervene„

d. It compounds the problems of comm^jnications and logistical support o

The Chiefs also argued against an alternative border proposal to put the SEATO force along the lyth parallel. Their first preference,, very emphatically^ was to go into Laos:

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As stated in your ^Gilpatric's/^-^^^^''®'*^^™^^ ^^~^ proposed concept set forth must be analyzed in the total context of the defense of Southeast Asia. Any concept which deals vxith the defense of Southeast Asia that does not include all or a substantial portion of Laos is5 from a military standpoint, unsound. To concede the majority of northern and central Laos vould leave three-quarters of the border of Thailand exposed and thus invite an expansion of communist military action. To concede southern Laos vould open the flanks of both Thailand and South Vietnam as well as expose Cambodia. Any attempt to combat insurgency in South Vietnam, while holding areas in Laos essential to the defense of Thailand and South Vietnam and, at the sai'iie time^ putting troops in Thailand, would require an effort on the part of the United States alone on the order of magnitude of at least three divisions plus supporting units. This would require an additional two divisions from the United States.

Wha,t is needed is not the spreading out of our forces throughout Southeast Asia, but rather a concentrated effort in Laos where a firm stand can be taken saving all or substantially all of Laos which would, at the same time, protect Thailajid and protect the borders of South Vietnam.

But, if the Laos plan vras "politically unacceptable at this tijiie/' the Chiefs "provided" (but did not explicitly recomi'nend) "a possible limited interim course of action" which could..c

provide a degree of assistance to the Government of South Vietnam to regain control of its o\m territory, and could free certain South Vietnamese forces for offensive actions against the Viet Cong. ^^Thile the Joint Chiefs of Staff agree that implement at ion of this limited course of action would not provide for the defense of Thailand or Laos, nor contribute substantially or permanently to solution of the overall problem of defense of Southeast Asia, they consider the Plan preferable to either of the two military possibilities described in referenced memorandum. 2/

The following day, there appeared a new paper called "Concept of Intervention in Vietnam." The paper, according to a pencilled note on the available copy, was drained mainly by Alexis Johnson, who was then a^_ Deputy Under Secretary of State. We know from a note William Bundy (then principal Deputy to Paul Nitze, who was then Assistant Secretary of Defense, ISA) sent to McNamara that a "talking paper" by Johnson was to be discussed at a meeting that included, at least. Rusk and McNamara on the afternoon of the 10th, But we do not know whether the uraft we have available is the "taliing paper" or a revision put together later in the day, afi^er the meeting.

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The proposal (*'an effort to arrest and hopefully reverse the deteriorating situation in Vietnam") vas a blend of Rostov's border force and the Chief's "possible limited interim course of actiono" Johnson's paper listed both the Rostov mission of the force (attempt to close the 'border) and that of the Chiefs (vin control of the central highlands); otherwise the paper folloved the JCS piano What probably happened^ considering the haste vith vhich the paper must have been drafted^ vas that Johnson simply blended the tv70 proposals together and assumed the fine points could be vorked out latere For if the paper is somevhat confusing on the immediate military proposal^ it is clear on the long-run thinking that underlays the proposal. And this long-run thinking made the immediate military mission relatively inconseq.uential^ since as vith the earlier combat-troops-for-training proposalsj, it vas pretty clear that the main idea vas to get some American combat troops into Vietnam^j vith the nominal excuse for doing so q,uite secondaryo

The plan vas described under the heading "Initial Phase." A subseq.uent section^ titled "Anticipated Later Phases" states:

This initial action cannot be taken vithout accepting as our real and ultimate objective the defeat of the Viet Cong; and making Vietnam secure in the hands of an anti-Communist governmento Thus supplemental military action must be envisaged at the earliest stage that is politically feasibleo The ultimate force requirements cannot be estimated vith any precisiouo JCS are nov consideringo Three divisions vould be a guessooo

Earlier the paper;i in a similar vein^ had remarked:

While a staisfactory political settlement in Laos vould considerably reduce Viet Minh infiltration through Laos into South Vietnam^ it vould not entirely eliminate it. While such a reduction vould materially assist the GVN in m.eeting the Viet Cong threat^ there is no assurance that; even imder these circumistanceS; the GVM vill in the foreseeable future be able to defeat the Viet Cong. Under these circum-stanceS; although the need of South Vietnam for outside assistance such as proposed in this plan vould probably still be very strong^ it vould be much more difficult to find a political base upon vhich to execute this plan^ 3./

This judgment vas probably influenced by a special NIE issued October 5th; vhich stated that 80-90^ of the estimated 17^000 VC had been locally recruited, and that there vas little evidence that the VC relied on external supplieso

The relation of this paper to Diem's req_uest for treaty can only be guessed at^ The paper never mentions Diem^ or any South Vietnamese request for further assistanceo But the paper supplemented one published about a

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week or so earlier (probalDly prior to Diem's request) titled "Limited Holding Actions in Southeast Asia©" This earlier paper discussed various steps short of major troop deploymentso h/

The impression is that both papers were part of contingency planning (short of major intervention in Laos) for saving something in Southeast Asia should the Laos negotiations continue to drag on with no satisfactory reso-lutiono Thus although the timing of the Vietnam paper was sui^ely influenced and probably triggered by Diem's req^uest for a treaty,, it looks essentially like a sxjggestion (but not a formal recommendation) to the President that if he is unwilling to intervene to try to save Laos^ he should at least take strong and unambiguous action to make sure that Vietnam would not also be lost. In this interpretation it is easy to make sense of the emphasis on a deteriorating situation in Vietnam^ and the implied warning that it might be best to set this plan in motion before a settlement is reached in Laos_, when it seemed relatively easy to provide a politically plausible basis for the actiono

(in a recent column^ Joseph Alsop q_uoted Aver ill Harriman as telling him that Kennedy had told Harriman to get whatever settlement he couJ_d on Laos^ but that the U.So really intended to make its stand in Vietnam^) 5/

At the end of the Vietnam paper there is a list of "Specific Actions to be Taken Now" which goes no further (on Vietnam) than to list:

»

Use of UoSo naval aircraft and ships to assist GVW in inter-,1 diction of sea traffic^ to assist self defense of GVN. This is to

some extent camouflagable. ■ ■ '

i -If necessity arises _, use of UoSo military aircraft for logistic

support^, including troop lift within Laos and South Vietnamo

Further^ there is a long list of pros and cons^ with no judgment stated on the balanceo

This (and other statements to be cited below) suggests^ again^ that the paper was prepared for a discussion on Southeast Asia planning in the KSC^ rather than in response to a request for a set of recommendations»

Three other points need to be mentioned:

lo The paperj although nominally presenting a SEATO plan^ explicitly assumes that "planning would have to be on the basis of proceeding with whichever SEATO Allies would participatec"

2o The paper warns (in the balance of the paragraph quoted earlier) that the ultimate force requirements would "much depend" on the capabilities and leadership of the SEATO forces

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and above all on vhether the effort leads to much more better fighting by Diem's forceSo They alone can win in the end.

3o Very clearly foreshadowing the Taylor mission (and perhaps indicating a White House hand in the drafting) the paper states:

The viability of this plan would be dependent on the degree to which it could and would also result in the GW accelerating political and military action in its own defenseo A judgment on this can only be reached after thorough exploration on the spot with the country team and the GWo

Finally_j here is the list of pros and cons presented (but not evaluated) in the papere

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Cons

"lo The plan would not in itself solve the underlying problem of ridding SYN of communist guerrillas,

"2, It would not seal off the borders of SW except for the limited area of operations.

"3o It breaks the Geneva Accords and puts responsibility on the UoSo for rationalizing the action before the UcKo and the worldo

"4. It raises questions of UoS. troop relationships with the Vietnamese peasants^ m.ontagnards_, GVN and its armyo

"5o The use of SEATO forces in SVW distorts Plan Five ^or major intervention in LaosT" although these forces are not a net subtraction.

"6. The risk of being regarded as interlopers a la the French must be considered.

"7« Communist change of tactics back to small-scale operations might leave this force in a stagnant positiouo

"Pros

"1. The effect on GW morale of SEATO engagement in their struggle could be most heartening.

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"2o It could prevent the Viet Cong move to the next stage of battalion-size^ formal organization to challenge the ARVNo

"3« The relatively sophisticated SEATO arms^ air power^ communications and intelligence might spark a real transformation in ARVN tactics and action.

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"4o Capitalizing on U.S. intelligence sources now unavailable to the GVN could lead to effective attacks on Viet Cong nerve centers of command and communications o

"5o The SEATO force commitment could be used to get from Diem a package of actions McGarr feels are needed to step up the GW effort ^ainly the fainiliar items of clarifying the chain of command and establishing an overall plan/o

"6o Introducing SEATO forces would give us for the first time some bargaining position with the Russians for a settlement in Vietnamo

7o - If we go into South Vietnam now with SEATO^ the costs would be much less than if we wait and go in later^ or lose SVT^.

The available record shows three other papers prepared prior to the NSC meeting^ October 11^ at which this paper was considered:

1. A special NIE commented on the plan in terms that were a lot less than encouraging:

In the situation assumed^ we believe that the DRV would seek at first to test the seriousness and effectiveness of the SEATO effort by subjecting the SEATO forces and their lines of communication to harassment; ambush^ and guerrilla attacko The Communists would probably estimate that by using their Viet Cong apparatus in South Vietnam^ and by committing experienced guerrilla forces from North Vietnam in guerrilla operations in territory long familiar to them^ and by exploiting the oppor-tuaities offered by the sizable junk traffic in coastal waters^ they could severely harass the SEATO land forces and penetrate ■" the SEATO blockade c The Commionists would expect worthwhile political and psychological rewards from successful harassment and guerrilla operations against SEATO forces^ including lowered GVN morale and increased tensions among the SEATO memberso

While seeking to test the SEATO forces^ the DRV would probably not relax its Viet Cong campaign against the GVW to any significant extents Meanvrhile^ Commimist strength in south laos wo-uld probably be increased by forces from North Vietnam to guard against an effort to partition Laos or an attack against the Pathet Lao forces. The Soviet airlift would probably be increased with a heavier flow of military supply into south Laos^ and the Communists wouJ^d probably intensify their efforts to establish a secure route for motor traffic into the southo The establishment of a coalition government in Laos under Souvanna Phouma probably would not significantly reduce CommiHiist infiltration of m.en and eq_uipment from North to South Vietnam throu^gh Laos.

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If the SRA.TO action appeared to be proving effective in reducing the present scale of infiltration the Coimnmiist probably would increase their use of the mountain trail system through Cambodia, This is a longer and more difficult route but its use could keep at least minimum support flowing to the Viet Congo At the same time^ in order to reduce the appajrent success of the SE/ITO action^ they could intensify small unit attacks5 assassinations^ and local terrorism in South Vietnam; they could also commit more DRV irregular personnel for the harassment of the SEATO forces. In any event, the SEATO commitment in South Vietnam would probably have to be continued over a prolonged periods It might be part of Communist tactics to play upon possible SEATO weariness over maintaining substantial forces and accepting losses, in South Vietnam over a long period of time...

The reaction to the assumed SEATO action among concerned non-Communist governments wouJLd vary v/idely. The Asian members of SEATO would find renewed confidence in the organization and the US5 if the plan were to go well- If, on the other hand, the SEATO action were to become costly, prolonged, or to involve heavy casualties, the Asian members'would soon become disenchanted and look to the US to 'do something' to lessen the burden and to solve the problem. The UK and France wo-uld be likely to oppose the assuraed SEATO action, and their reluctejice to participate could be overcome only with great difficulty, if at all.

In this instance, and as v^e will see, later, the Intelligence Community's estimates of the likely results of U.S. moves are conspicuously more pessimistic (and more realistic) than the other staff papers presented to the President. This SKIS was based on an assumption that the SEATO force would total about 25^000 men. It is hard to imagine a more sha.rp contrast than between this paper, which foresees no serious impact on the insurgency from proposed intervention, and Supplemente.l Note 2, to be quoted next.

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2. "Supplemental Note 2" to the paper; issued the day of the NSC meeting^j contained^ among other comments^ a JCS estimate of the size of the American force needed "to clean up the Viet Cong threat." It reads:

"Wi der Military Implications a As the basic paper indicates^ the likelihood of massive DRV and Chicom intervention caanot be estimated with precisionc The SNIE covers only the initial phase vhen action might be limited to 20-25^000 men. At later stages^ when the JCS estimate that 40;, 000 US forces will be needed to clean up the Viet Cong threat^ the chances of such massive intervention might well become substantial^ with the Soviets finding it a good opportunity to tie down major US forces in a long action^ perhaps as part of a multi-prong action involving Berlin and such additional areas as Korea and Irano

Because of this possibility of major Bloc intervention^ the maximum possible force neeis must be frankly faced. Assuming present estimates of about 40^000 US forces for the stated military objective in South Vietnam^ plus 128^000 US forces for meeting North Vietnam and Chicom intervention^ the drain on US- ■ based reserve forces could be on the order of 3 o^ ^ divisions and other forces as wello The impact on naval capabilities for blockade plans (to meet Berlin) would also be majoro In light of present Berlin contingency plans^ and combat attrition^ including scarce items of equipment^, the initiation of the Vietnam action in itself should dictate a step up in the present mobilization^ possibly of major proportionso 7/

3« Finally^ there is the following memo from William Bundy (then acting Assistant Secretary of Defense^ ISA) to McNamarao It is of interest because it is the only piece of paper available for this period ■ ■ that gives anyone^s candid recommendations to his boss_, as opposed to the more formal staff papers:

Even if the decision at tomorrow's meeting is only preliminary -- to explore with Diem and the British^ Australians^ and New Zealanders would be my guess — it is clearly of the greatest possible importance. Above all^ action must proceed fasto

For what one man's feel is worthy mine -- based on very close f - touch with Indochina in the 195^ ^^^ s-^id civil war afterguards till

■ {'■ ■ Diem took hold — is that it _is really now or never if we are to

arrest the gains being made by the Viet Cong. Walt Rostow made the point yesterday that the Viet Cong are about to move^ by every indication^ from the small unit basis to a m.oderate battalion-size basiso Intelligence also suggests that they may try to set

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up a ^'provisional government* like Xieng Khuang (though less legitimate appearing) in the very Kontum area into which the present Initial plan would move SEATO forces. If the Viet Cong movement 'blooms' in this way^ it will almost certainly attract all the back-the-winner sentiment that understandably prevails in such cases and that beat the French in early 195^ and came within an ace of beating Diem in early 1955°

An early and hard-hitting operation has a good chance (70^ would be my guess) of arresting things and giving Diem a chance to do better and clean up. Even if we follow up hard^ on the lines the JCS are working out after yesterday's meeting^ however^ the chances are not much better that we will in fact be able to clean up the situationo It all depends on Diem's effectiveness^ which is very problematicalo The 30^ chance is that we would wind up like the French in 19^h} white men can't win this kind of fighto

On a 70-30 basis^ I would myself favor going ino But if we letj say^ a month go by before we move^ the odds will slide (both short-term shock effect and long-term chance) down to 60~kO^ 50-50 and so on^ Laos under a Souvanna Phouma deal is more likely than not to go sour_, and wiJl more and more make things difficu3-t in . South Viet-Nam^ which again underscores the element of timeo 8/

Minutes of the NSC meeting of October 11 were not available for this study, But we have the following Gilpatric memorandiom for the recordo (The JIMGLE JIM squadron — 12 planes -- was an Air Force unit specially trained for counter-insurgency warfareo Short of engaging in combat itself^ presumably it would be used to train Vietnamese pilots):

At this morning's meeting with the President the following course of action was agreed upon with relation to South Vietnam:

lo The Defense Department is authorized to send the Air Force's Jungle Jim Squadron into Vietnam to serve under the MAAG as a training mission and not for combat at the present timeo

2o General Maxwell Taylor accompanied by Dr. Rostow from the White House^j General Lansdale_; a representative of JCS^ Mr. Cottrell from State and probably someone from ISA will leave, for Vietnam over the weekend on a Presidential mission (to be announced by the President at this afternoon's press conference as an economic survey) to look into the feasibility from both political and military standpoints of the following:

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(a) the plan for military intervention discussed at this morning's meeting on the basis of the Vietnam task force paper entitled 'Concept for Intervention in Vietnam';

(b) an alternative plan for stationing in Vietnam fewer UcSo combat forces than those called for under the plan referred to in (a) above and vith a more limited objective than dealing with the Viet Congj in other words_j such a small force would probably go in at Tourane ^aHang/ and possibly another southern port principally for the purpose of establishing a U.So 'presence' in Vietnam;

(c) other alternatives in lieu of putting any UoSo combat forces in Vietnam^j ioeo stepping up U.So assistance and training of Vietnam imits^ furnishing of more U.S. equipment,, particularly helicopters and other light aircraft_j trucks and other groiond transport^ etc,

3. During the two or three weeks that will be required for the completion of General Taylor's mission^ State will push ahead with the following political actions:

(a) protest to the ICC on the step-up in North Vietnamese support of Viet Cong activities^

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(b) tabling at the UN a white paper based on Mto William Jordan's report concerning Communist violations of the Geneva Accords^ and

' " (c) consultation with our SEATO allies^ princi-

I ' ■ . pally the British and Australians^ regarding SEATO actions in i support of the deteriorating situation in Vietnam^ 9/

I That afternoon^ the President announced the Taylor Mission^ but he did

not make the hardly credible claim that he was sending his personal military advisor to Vietnam to do an economic survey. He made a general announcement^ and was non-committal when as.ked whether Taylor was going to consider the need for combat troops (there had been leaked stories in the newspapers a fe\j days earlier that the Administration was considering such a moveo) Nevertheless^ the newspaper stories the next day flatly asserted that the President had said Taylor was going to study the need for U<,S. combat troops_, which waS; of course^ true^ although not exactly what the President had said« 10/

II. THE NM-ISPAPERS AND T HE CABLES

The day after Kennedy's announcement of the Taylor mission^ Reuters sent this dispatch from Saigon:

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Saigon^ Vietnam^ Oct 12 (Reuters) -- South Vietnamese military sources welcomed today President Kennedy's decision to send his military adviser^ General Taylor^ here this weeko

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Sources close to President Ngo Dinh Diem said he did not feel there was a need here yet for troops of the United States or Southeast Asia Treaty Organizationo

The sources said the South Vietnamese President was convinced that Vietnam's Arm_y increased in size and better equipped by increased United States aid can defeat the CommimistSo ll/

But a day later;, the public position of the Vietnamese had shifted noticeablyo From a i^Iew York Times dispatch'from Saigon:

One question receiving considerable attention here in the light of the Taylor mission is the desirability of sending United States troops to South Vietnamo

The prospect of United States troop involvement is understood to have advanced a step here in the sense that the South Vietnamese Government is reported to be willing to consider such involvement which it had formerly rejectedo

However^ it is \anderstood that South Vietnamese deliberations still fall far ^ort of the stage wherein Saigon would be ready to request United States forceso 12 /

But in private discussions with the UoS. ambassador^ Diem had turned around completelyo From Nolting's cable:

Following major requests:

(1) An additional squadron of AD-6 fighter bombers (in lieu of programmed T-28's) and delivery as soon as possibloo

(2) The sending of US civilian contract pilots for helicopters and transport planes (C-^Y^),^ for 'non-combat' operationSo

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.(3) US combat unit or imits to be introduced into 3VN as 'combat-trainer units'o Proposed use would be to station a part of .this force in northern part of SVN near 17th parallel to free ARW forces presently there for anti-guerrilla combat in high plateauo Thuan also suggested possibility stationing some US forces in several provincial seats in highlands of central Vietnamo

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(k) US reaction to proposal to request gOArt Nationalist China to send one division of combat troops for operations in southwest provinceso

^ * * ^ -x^ ^ -X-

When Thuan raised question of US combat-trainer units^j I asked specifically whether this was President's considered request^ mentioning his oft-repeated views re US combat forces hereo Thuan confirmed that this was considered request from President; confirmed that Diem's views had changed in light of worsening situation^ Idea was to have 'symbolic' US strength near 17th parallel^ which would serve to prevent attack there and free up GW forces now stationed there for combat operations; Thuan said President Diem also thought similar p\rrpose could be achieved by stationing US combat units in several provincial seats in highlands^, thus freeing ARW guard forces therec I told him this represented major request coming on heels of President Diem's request for bilateral security treaty with United States. I asked whether this request was in lieu of the security treaty., Thuan first said that it represented a first step_j which would be quicker than a treaty^ and that time 'was of essencco After some discussion of the pro's and con^s of a possible defense treaty (effect on SEATO^ ICC^ ratification pro-cedures_, etCo)_j Thuan said he felt that proposal for stationing token US forces in S\T)J would satisfy GVN and would serve the purpose better than a mutual defense treaty« (He had evidently not thought through this nor discussed it with Diem.)

•;f 4f 4f -)f -Jf ^ -x- -)f Nolting then indicated he reacted skeptically to Dlem's suggestion of bringing in Chiang's forces^ and comments to Washington that he thought "this was a trial balloon onlyo" He concluded the cable:

The above questions will undoubtedly be raised with Gen Tayloro While it is obvious that GYN is losing no opportunity to ask for additional support as result our greater interest and concern this area^ situation here^ both militarily and psychologically_j has moved in my judgment to point where serious and prom.pt consideration should be given to these requests, 13/

This cable arrived in Washington the night of October 13=. The following day an unidentified source provided the New York Times with a detailed explanation of what the Taylor Mission was to doo From the way the Times handled the story it is plain that it cam_e from a source authorized to speak for the President,' and probably from the President himself o The gist of the story vfas that Taylor was going to Saigon to look into all sorts of things^ one of which^, near the bottom of the list_, was the question of U.S, troops at some time in the indefinite future o Along with a lot of more

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iDimediate questions about intelligence and such_, Taylor was expected to "o..recouanend long-range programs^ including possible military actions^ but stressing broad economic and social measureSo" Furthermore^ the Times was told^

Military leaders at the Pentagon^ no less than General Taylor himself are uciderstood to be reluctant to send organized U.So combat units into Southeast Asiap Pentagon plans for this area stress the importance of countering Communist guerrillas with troops from the affected coimtries_, perhaps trained and equipped by the UoS.^ but not supplanted by UoSo troopso ik/

In the light of the recommendations quoted throughout this paper^ and particularly of the staff papers just described that led up to the Taylor Mission^ most of this was simply untrue„ It is just about inconceivable that this story could have been given out except at the direction of the President^ or by him personally. It appears^, consequently^ the President was less than delighted by Diem's request for troops o He may have suspected^ 1'^ite reasonably^ that Diem's request was prompted by the stories out of Washington that Taylor vras coming to discuss troops; or he may have wished to put a quick stop to expectations (and leaks) that troops were about to be sent^ or both. This does not mean the President had already decided not to send combat units. Presumably he had noto But he apparently did not want to have his hands tied.

The Times story had the apparently desired affect. Speculation about combat troops almost disappeared from news stories^ and Diem never again raised the question of combat troops: the initiative from now on came from Taylor and Molting^ and their recommendations were very closely heldo .

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IIIo CINCPAC RECOMtyEKDS "NOT NOW

On the way to Saigon^ Taylor stopped off in Hawaii to talk to Admiral Felt at CINCPAC o Felt did not give Taylor a flat recommendation on combat troops at the time. But a couple of days later he cabled Washington a list of pros and cons:

A. 'Pro

(l) Presence of UoS. forces in SVN_j particularly if deployed to important defensive areas such as plateau region^ would mean to Communists that overt aggression against SVN will involve US forces from the outsets This eliminates possibility of sudden victory by overt aggression in SVN before US could reacto This would settle the question for SVN_j and SE Asians as a whole^ as to whether we would come to their helpo Further^ agreement by SEATO to principle of force introduction would strengthen SEATO in world eyeSo

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(2) Px-esence of strong UoSo combat forces will influence greatly South Vietnamese will to eliminate the Viet Congo

(3) If "we use U.So engineers with U.S. military protection to finish Dakto-Ban Net-Attapeu Road in order to enable US to operate near plateau border area^j a military corridor of sorts will cut an important part of VC pipeline from northo

(4) UoS. forces will make available larger number ARVl^ forces for employment against VC. RVTJAF^ tasks accomplished by UoS. forces will decrease proportionately certain RVWAP deficiencies^ particularly in logistics^ coramuaications^j and air supporto

(5) U.S. forces in SVN would tend to strengthen Diem's government against pro-Red coup^ but would not necessarily preclude non-Communist coup attemptso

(6) Dividends would accrue from fact our troops could provide variety training for ARVN forces^, broadening base now provided by MAAG.

Bo Con- " -

(1) Would stir up big fuss throughout Asia about reintro-duction of forces of white colonialism into SE Asiao Little question that a propaganda issue will be made of this in all world forums including UTJo .

(2) Action could trigger intensification of Commie aggression against SE Asia^ This may not be all-out overt aggression^ but could consist^ for example^, of the DRV moving full blown combat units through the mountain passes into southern Laos under excuse that we initiated invasion of SE Asia and they are protecting the flank of North Vietnamo

(3) Politically^ presence of U^So forces could hasten Commies to establish so called "representative government" in South Vietnamo

(4) Aside from offering Viet Cong a political target,, US troops would constitute provocative military one^ inducing VC to attack/harass it in manner/degree where issue might ultimately force American lonits active military campaign^ or suffer defensive alternative of being pot-shot at to point of embarrassment.

(5) Presence of US troops could induce Commies to resort to related actions such as introduction of Red Air Force elements

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in North Vietnam and accelerate modernization of DRV" military forces.

(6) This -would probably mean garrisoning a UoS. division in SE Asia for an extended period of time in same sense as Army divisions in Korea. Hovever_j circumstances differ from Korea^ For example_j nature of VC warfare such that US units cannot remain long in isolation from conflict realitieso Ultimately^ they likely to be forced into varying forms of military engagement with VC if only for security against attacks ranging from assassination/sabotage to tactical harassmento In shorty we should accept fact that likelihood our troops becoming combat engaged increases in proportion to duration of their stay.

2. A summary of the above appears to me to add up in favor of our not introducing U.S. combat forces -until we have exhausted other means for helping Diem. 1^/

IVo TAYLOR IN SAIGON

The Taylor Mssion arrived in Saigon on the l8th. They had barely arrived when Diem went before his National Assembly to declare that the increasing gravity of the Viet Cong threat now required a formal proclamation of a State of Emergency. Diem then went off to meet with the Americans^ and after such a spectacular opening shot must have then astonished his visitors by indicating that he did not want American combat troops after alio What he wanted^ he said^ was the treaty^ American support for larger GVN forces^ and a list of combat support items that nicely paralleled those Rostow listed in the note to McNainara quoted earliero It was Taylor (according to

Nolting^s cable 5l6^ 20 October) who brought'up the question of Aiiierican combat troops.

Taylor said he understood there had been recent discussions of introduction of American or SEATO forces into Viet-Nam and asked why change had occurred in earlier GVN attitude. Diem succinctly replied because of Laos situation. Noting it will take time to build up GVDJ forces he pointed to enemy's reinforcements through infiltration and increased activities in central Viet-Nam and expressed belief that enemy is trying to escalate proportionally to increase in GVN forces so that GVN will not gain advantage. He asked specifically for tactical aviation^ helicopter companies^ coastal patrol forces and logistic support (groimd transport),,

Diem indicated he thoi:ight there would be no partic-ular adverse psychological effect internally from introducing American forces since in his view Vietnamese people regard Communist attack on Viet-Nam as international problem. Rostow inquired whether internal and external political aspects such move could

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be helped if it were shown clearly to world that this is inter-1 national problem.. Diem gave no direct comment on this suggestion*,

' ' He indicated two main aspects of this problem: (l) Vietnamese

j .. " people are worried about absence formal commitm_ent by US to Viet-

Eamo They fear that if situation deteriorates Viet-Nam might be abandoned by USo If troops are introduced without a formal commitment they can be withdrawn at any time and thus formal commit- ■ . ment is even more important in psychological senseo (2) Contingency plan should be prepared re use American forces in Viet-Nam at any time this may become necessaryo In this connection Diem seemed to be talking about combat forces o While it was not completely clear what Diem has in mind at present time he seemed to be saying that he wants bilateral defense treaty and preparation of plans for use American forces (whatever is appropriate) but under questioning he did not repeat his earlier idea relayed to me by Thuan that he wanted combat forces. l6/

Here^, as earlier;, we get no explicit statement on Washington's attitude toward a treaty^ Further^ no strong conclusion can be drawn from the fact that Taylor took the initiative in raising the issue of troops_, since it might have been awkward not to mention the issue at all after Thuan's presentation to Nolting a few days previouso

But on the 23rd; we find this in a cable from MMG Chief McGarr:

Serious flood in Mekong delta area.o»(worst since 1937) raises possibility that flood relief could be justification for moving in US military personnel for humanitarian purposes with subsequent retention if desirable. GeUo Taylor and Ambassador evaluating feasibility and desirability*. l6a/

Taylor met with Diem and Thuan again the following day_, the 24th» Taylor provided the Vietnamese a written summary of items he described as "personal ideas to which I was seeking their reaction." Item E was headed "Introduction of U.S. Combat troops," It proposed "a flood relief task force_j largely military in composition^ to work with GVN over an extended period of rehabilitation of areas. Such a force might contain engineer^ medical^ signal; and transportation elements as well as combat troops for the protection of relief operations." Diem now seems to have changed his mind again on combat troopso Here is the cable:

lo The essential conclusions which, we have reached, at the end of a week of briefings^ consultations^, and field trips follow:

Ao There is a critical political-military situation in SVN brought on by western policy in Laos and by the continued build-up of the VC and their recent successful attacks. These circumstances coupled

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1 with the major flood disaster in the southwestern provinces have com-

bined to create a deep and pervasive crisis of confidence and a serious loss in national morale«

B. In the field_, the military operations against the VC are ineffective because of the absence of reliable intelligence on the ■ enemy, an unclear and unresponsive channel of command responsibility in the Armed Forces, and the tactical immobility of the W ground forceso This immobility leads to a system of passive, fragmented defense conceding the initiative to the enemy and leaving him free to pick the targets of attack. The harassed population exposed to these attacks turn to the government for better protection and the latter responds by assigning more static missions to the Army units, thus adding to their immobility^ In the end, the Army is allowed neither to train nor to fight but awaits enemy attacks in relative inaction« .

C. The situation in the Saigon is-volatile but, while morale is down and complaints against the government are rife, there is not hard evidence of a likely coup against Diem, He still has no visible rival

or replacemento

2o To cope with the foregoing.situation, we are considering recommending a number of possible forms of GM-US cooperation to reverse the present dox-mward trend, stimiolate an offensive spirit and buildup moraleo In company with Ambassador l^olting, Dr^ Rostow and Mr. Menden-hall, I discussed some of these Oct 2^ with Diem and Thuan, advancing them as personal ideas to which I was seeking their informal reaction« The following outline, distributed in French translation at the start of the interview, indicates the scope of the discussiono *

Ao Improvement of intelligence on VoC: the available intelligence on V.Co insurgency is inadeq_uate both for tactical requirements and for basis of judgment of situation at governmental levelso A joint GW-US effort should be able to improve organization, techniques and end product to mutual advantage both parties.

B, joint survey of security situation at provincial level: The current situation can best be appraised at provincial level where the basic intelligence is found, the incidents occui^, and the defenses are tested. The problems vary from province to province and hence require local analysis on the spot. Such a survey should result in better understanding of such important matters as quality of basic intelligence on V.Co, needs of civil guard and self defense corps, command relationships between provincial and Army officials and conditions under which assumption of offensive miglrit be possible.

Co Improvement of Army mobility", it appears that size of ARM can not be much increased before end 1^62) to make it more

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effective and allov it to cope vrLth increasing niimber of V.C._, it must f be given greater mobility. Such mobility can come from two so'jjrces, (l)

freeing Army from static missions and (2) marking available to it improved means of transport^ notably helicopters and light aircraft. Both methods should be considered.

D. Blocking infiltration into high plateau: increase in enemy forces in high plateau requires special measures for defense and for coujiter-guerrilla actions. It is suggested that a carefully tailored "border ranger force" be organized from existing ranger ujiits and introduced into the difficult terrain along the Laos/Vietnam frontier for attack and defense against the Viet Cong. This force should be trained and equipped for extended service on the frontier and for operations against the communications lines of the VC who have infiltrated into the high plateau and adjacent areas.

E. Introduction of U.S. Military Forces: GVN is faced wD-th major civil problem arising from flood devastation in western provinces. Its allies should offer help to GYN according to their means. In the case of U.S.^ two ways of rendering help should be considered. One is of emergency type, such as offer of U.S. militar^r helicopters for reconnaissance of conditions of flooded areas and for emergency delivery medical supplies and like. A more significant contribution might be

a flood relief task force, largely military in composition, to work with GVN over an extended period for rehabilitation of area. Such a force miglit contain engineer, medical, signal, and transportation elements as well as combat troops for the protection of relief operations. Obviously, such a military source would also provide U.S. militar;^'- presence in Viet Kam and would constitute military reserve in case of heightened military crisis.

F. Actions to emphasize national emergency and beginning of

a new phase in the war: we should consider jointly all possible measures to emphasize turning point has been reached in dealing with Communist aggression. Possible actions might include appeal to United fetions, an announcement by GVN of governmental changes to cope vrith crisis and exchange of letters between the two heads of State expressing their partnership in a common cause.

3. Diem's reaction on all points >7as favorable. Pie expressed satisfaction with idea of introducing U.S. forces in connection with flood ■ relief activities, observing that even the opposition elements in this Congress had joined with the majority in supporting need for presence of U.S. forces. In the co-jrse of the meeting, nothing was formally proposed or approved but the consensus was that the points considered might form framework for a program of increased GVl^I-US cooperation offering promise of overcoming many of the current difficulties of GVN. There were no specific figures discussed with regard to such matters as troop strengths, additional equipment, or flood relief...

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$i. Because of the importance of acting rapidly once we have made up our minds^ I -will cable my recommendations to Washington enroute home. I7/

Simultaneously vith this cahle^ Taylor sent a second "eyes only" for the President; Chairman of the JCS^ Director of CIA^McNamara^ and Rusk and . Alexis Johnson at State 0 The cable is a little confusing; for although it sets out to comjuent on "U.S. military forces" it concerns only the flood Task Force; not mentioning the various other types of military forces (helicopter companies^ etco) which were envisioned. The same slight confusion appears in the "eyes only for the President" cable on this issue to be quoted shortly^ The impression Taylor's choice of language leaves is that the support forces (helicopter companies^ expanded MAAG; etCo) he was recommending were essentially already agreed to by the President before Taylor left Washington^ and consequently his detailed justification went only to the kind of forces on which a decision was yet to be made -- that iS; ground forces liable to becoBie involved in direct engagements with tne Viet Cong.

Here is the cable from Saigon^ followed by the two "Eyes only for the President" from the PLiilippines which sum up his "fundamental conclusions."

FROM SAIGON . ■

- WHITE HOUSE EYES ONLY FOR THE PRESIDENT STATE EYES ONLY FOR RUSK AND UNDER SECRETARY JOHNSON .■ DEFENSE EYES ONLY SECRETARY MCNAMAR/l

JCS EYES ONLY GENERAL LEMNITZER ' .

FROM GENERAL TAYLOR

■X- ^- -X- -X- ^ -)f ^ '

With regard to the critical question of introducing U.So military forces into VN:

My view is that we should put in a task force consisting largely of logistical troops for the purpose of participating in flood relief and at the same time of providing a UoSo military presence in VN capable of assuring Diem of our readiness to join him in a military showdo^m with the Viet Cong or Viet Minho To relate the introduction of these troops to the needs of flood relief seems to me to offer considerable advantages in VNand abroado It gives a specific humanitarian task as the prime reason for the coming of our troops and avoids any suggestion that we are taking over responsibility for the security of the countryo As the task is a specific one^ we can extricate o\nr troops when it is done if we so desireo Alternatively^ we can phase them into other activities if we wish to remain longero

The strength of the force I have in mind on the order of 6-80OO troops. Its initial composition should be worked out here after study of the

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possible requirements and conditions for its use and subsequent modifications made vith experience.

In addition to the logistical component^ it will be necessary to include some combat troops for the protection of logistical operations and the defense of the area occupied by UoSo forces« Any troops coming to W may expect to take casualties.

Needless to say_j this kind of task force vill exercise little direct influence on the campaign against the V.C. It will_j however^ give a much needed shot in the arm to national morale_, particularly if combined with other actions showing that a more effective working relationship in the common cause has been established between the GW and the U.So l8/

FROM THE PHILIPP IITES .' ■ •

EYES ONLY FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM GENERAL TAYLOR

1« Transmitted herewith are a summary of the fundamental conclusions of my group and my personal recommendations in response to the letter of the President to me dated 13 October I961. -x- -x- ^ -x- ^ -J^ -x-

2o It is concluded that:

ao Communist strategy aims to gain control of Southeast Asia by . methods of subversion and guerrilla war which by-pass conventional U.So and indigenous strength on the ground. The interim Communist goal -- .' en route to total take-over — appears to be a neutral Southeast Asia^ detached from UoSo protectiono This strategy is well on the way to success in Vietnamo

bo In Vietnam (and Southeast Asia) there is a double crisis in confidence: doubt that UoS. is determined to save Southeast Asia; doubt that Diem' s methods can frustrate and defeat Communist purposes and methodso The Vietnamese (and Southeast Asians) will undoubtedly draw -- rightly or wrongly — definitive coiaclusions in coming weeks and months concerning the probable outcome and will adjust their behavior accordinglyo What the UoSo does or fails to do will be decisive to the end resulto

Co Aside from the morale factor^ the Vietnamese Government is caught in interlocking circles of bad tactics and bad administrative arrangements -viiich pin their forces on the defensive in ways which permit a relatively small Viet-Cong force (about one-tenth the size of the GVN regulars) to create conditions of frustration and terror certain to lead to a political crisis^ if a positive turning point is

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not soon achievedo The following recommendations are designed to achieve that favorable turn^ to avoid a further deterioration in the situation in South Vietnam^ and eventually to contain and eliminate the threat to its independence,

It is recommended:

General

ao That upon rec[uest from the Government of Vietnam (GVN) to come to its aid in resisting the increasing aggressions of the Viet-Cong and in repairing the ravages of the Delta flood which^j in combin-ation^j threaten the lives of its citizens and the security of the coimtry^ the UoSo Government offer to join the GTO in a massive joint effort as a part of a total mobilization of GW resources to cope with both the Viet-Cong (VC) and the ravages of the floodo The UoS. representatives will participate actively in this effort^ particularly in the fields of government administration^ military plans and operations^ intelligence_j and flood relief^ going beyond the advisory role which they have observed in the past. " '

Specific

b. That in support of the foregoing broad commitment to a joint effort with Diem^ the following specific measures be undertaken:

(1) The UoSo Government will be prepared to provide individual administrators for insertion into the governmental machinery

of South Vietnam in types and numbers to be worked out with President Diem.

(2) A joint effort will be made to improve the military-political intelligence system beginning at the provincial level and extending upward through the government and armed forces to the Central Intelligence Organization.

(3) The UoSo Government will engage in a joint survey of the conditions in the provinces to assess the social^ political^ intelligence^ and military factors bearing on the prosecution of the coimter-insiorgency in order to reach a common estimate cf these factors and a common determination of how to deal with them. As this survey will consum.e time^ it should not hold back the immediate actions which are clearly needed regardless of its outcom.eo

{h) A joint effort will be made to free the Aimy for mobile^^ offensive operations. This effort will be based upon improving the training and eq_uipping of the Civil Guard and the

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Self-Defense Corps ^ relieving the regular Army of static missions^, raising the level of the mohility of Army Forces "by the provision of considerably more helicopters and light aviation^ and organizing a Border Ranger Force for a long-term campaign on the Laotian border against the Viet-Cong infiltratorso The U.S. Government vill support this effort vith equipment and with military units and .personnel to do those tasks which the Armed Forces of Vietnam cannot perform in timeo Such tasks include air reconnaissance and photography^ airlift (beyond the present capacity of SW forces)^ special intelligence^ and air-ground support techniqueso

(5) The UoSo Government will assist the GVE in effecting surveillance and control over the coastal waters and inland waterways^ furnishing such advisors^ operating personnel and small craft as may be necessary for quick and effective operationso

(6) The MAAG^ Vietnam^ will be reorganized and increased in size as may be necessary by the implementation of these recommendations.

(7) The UoSo Government will offer to introduce into South Vietnam a military Task Force to operate under UoS. control for the following pur*poses:

(a) Provide a UoS. military presence capable of raising national morale and of showing to Southeast Asia the seriousness of■ the UoSo intent to resist a Communist take-over^

(b) Conduct logistical operations in support of military and flood relief operations«

(c) Conduct such combat operations as are necessary for self-defense and for the security of the area in which they are stationedo

(d) Provide an emergency reserve to back up the Armed Forces of the GVM in the case of a heightened military crisis.

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(e) Act as an advance party of such additional forces as may be introduced if CINCPAC or SEATO contingency plans are Invoked.

(8) The UoS. Governraent will review its economic aid program to ta'ke into account the needs of flood relief and to give priority to those projects in support of the expanded counter-insurgency program. I9/

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FROM TlIE FHILIPPIEES

Eyes Only for the President from General Taylor.

This message is for the piirpose of presenting my reasons for recommending the introduction of a U.So military force into South Vietnam (SW)o I have reached the conclusion that this is an essential action if we are to reverse the present downward trend of events in spite of a full recognition of the following disadvantages:

ao The strategic reserve of UoSo forces is presently so weak that, we can ill afford any detachment of forces to a peripheral area of the CommuQist bloc vrhere they will be pinned down for an uncertain duration o

- bo Although UoSo prestige is already engaged in SM^ it will become more so by the sending of troops,

Co If the first contingent is not enough to accomplish the necessary resiats^ it will be difficult to resist the pressure to reinforce o If the ultimate result sought is the closing of the frontiers ■ and the clean-up of the insurgents within SW^ there is no limit to our possible commitment (unless we attack the source in Hanoi)o

do The introduction of UoSo forces may increase tensions and risk escalation into a major war in Asiao

Gn the other side of the argument^ there can be no action so convincing of UoS„ seriousness of purpose and hence so reassuring to the people and Government of SVTJ and to our other friends and allies in SEA as the introduction of UoS. forces into SVNo The views of indigenous and UoSo officials consulted on our trip were unanimous on this pointo I have just seen Saigon 5^5 to State and suggest that"it be read in connection with this message, ^c- ■ . ■ - , - \

The size of the UoS. force introduced need not be great to provide the military presence necessary to produce the desired effect on national morale in SW and on international opiniono A bare token^ however J will not suffice; it must have a significant value o The kinds of tasks which it might undertake \h±ch would have a significant value are suggested in BAGU^^^ (jprevious cable^ 3-"b.(7))- "^^^Y ^-^e:

(a) Provide a US military presence capable of raising national morale and of showing to Southeast Asia the seriousness of the US intent to resist a Communist take-overo

(b) Conduct logistical operations' in support of military and flood relief operationso

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(c) Conduct such combat operations as are necessary for self-defense and for the security of the area in vhich they are stationed.

(d) Provide an eraergency reserve to back up the Armed Forces of the GW in the case of a heightened military crisis a

(e) Act as an advance party of such additional forces as may be introduced if CINCPAC or SEATO contingency plans are invokedo

It is notevorthy that this force is not proposed to clear the jungles. and forests of Viet Cong guerrillaso That should be the primary task of the Armed Forces of Vietnam for which they should be specifically organized^ trained_, and stiffened with ample UoSo advisors down to combat battalion levelso However^ the U.S. troops may be called upon to engage in combat to protect themselves^ their working parties^ and the area in which they live. As a general, reserve^ they might be thrown into action (with UoS. agreement) against large^j formed guerrilla bands which have abandoned the forests for attacks on major targets o But in general^ our forces should not engage in small-scale guerrilla operations in the jungleo

As an area for the operations of U.So' troops_, SVN is not an excessively difficult or unpleasant place to operateo While the border areas are riogged and heavily forested_, the terrain is comparable to parts of Korea where U.So troops learned to live and work without too much efforto However^ these border areas^ for reasons stated above^ are not the places to engage our forces« In the High Plateau and in the coastal plain where UoSo troops would probably be stationed^j these jungle-forest conditions do not exist to any great extent. The most Tonpleasant feature in the coastal areas would be the heat and^ in the Delta^ the mud left behind by the floodo The High Plateau offers no particular obstacle to the stationing of U.S. troops.

The extent to which the Task Force would engage in flood relief activities in the Delta will depend upon further study of the problem there <> As reported in Saigon 537^ I see considerable advantages in playing up this aspect of the Task Force mission. I am presently inclined to favor a dual mission^ initially help to the flood area and subsequently use in any other area of SVN where its resources can be used effectively to give tangible support in the struggle against the Viet Congo However^ the possibility of emphasizing the humanitarian mission will wane if we wait long in moving in our forces or in linking our stated purpose with the emergency conditions created by the floods

The risks of backing into a major Asian war by way of SVN are present but are not impressive« NVN is extremely vulnerable to conventional bombing_j a weakness which should be exploited diplomatically in

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convincing Hanoi to lay off SW. Both the DRV and the Chicoms vo-ald face severe logistical difficulties in trying to maintain strong forces in the field in SEA^ difficulties vhich ve share but by no means to the same degree. There is no case for fearing a mass onslaught of Communist manpower into SW and its neighboring states^ particularly if . ■ _ ovr airpower is allowed a free hand against logistical targetso Finally^ the starvation conditions in China should discourage CommiHiist leaders there from being militarily venturesome for some time to comeo

By the foregoing line of reasoning^ I have reached the conclusion that the introduction of a UoS. military Task Force without delay offers definitely more advantage than it creates risks and difficultieso In factj I do not believe that our program to save SW will succeed without it. If the concept is approved^ the exact size and composition-of the force should be determined by the Secretary of Defense in consultation with the JCS^ the Chief MMG^ and CINCPAC. My own feeling is that the initial size should not exceed about 8000^ of which a preponderant number would be in logistical-type unitso After acquiring experience in operating in SW; this initial force will require reorganization and adjustment- to the local scene.

As CINCPAC will point out^ any forces' committed to SW will need to be " replaced by additional forces to his area from the strategic reserve in the UoSo Also^ any troops to SW are in addition to those which may be required to execute SEATO Plan 5 in Laos. Both facts should be taken into account in current considerations of the FY I963 budget which bear upon the permanent increase which should be made in the U.So military establishment to maintain our strategic position for the long pullo 20/

These cables^ it will be noticed^ are rather sharply focused on the insurgency as a problem reducible to fairly conventional military technique and tactics. Together with the cables from Saigon^ the im.pression is given that the major needs are getting the Army to take the offensive^ building . up a much better intelligence setup^ and persuading Diem to loosen up Administrative impediments to effective use of his forces.

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V. THE TAYLOR REPORT

A report of the Taylor Mission was published November 3p in the form of a black loose-leaf notebook containing a letter of transmittal of more than routine significance^ a 25-page "Evaluation and Conclusions/' then a series of memoranda by members of the mission. Of these^ the most important^ of course; were the Taylor cables^ which; being ^'E^^es only for the President/* were deleted from all but one or a very few copies of the reports There is no separate paper from Rostow^ and his views presumably are reflected in the unsigned summary papero

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The impression the "Evaluation" paper gives is more easily summarized than its detailso For the impression is clearly one of urgency combined vith optimism. Essentially^ it says South Vietnam is in serious trouble; major interests of the United States are at stake; but if the UoS. promptly and energetically takes up the challenge^ a victory can be had without a ■ UoSo take-over of the waro

For example:

Despite the intellectuals vho sit on the side lines and complain; despite serious dissidence among the Montagnards^ the sects^ and certain old Viet Minh areas; despite the apathy and fear of the Viet-Cong in the countryside^ the atmosphere in South Vietnam is^ on balance^ one of frustrated energy rather than passive acceptance of inevitable defeat <>

Tt cannot be emphasized too strongly^ however^ that time has nearly rim out for converting these assets into the bases for vic-toryo Diem himself--.and all concerned with the fate of the country --are looking to American guidance and aid to achieve a turning point in Vietnam's affairso From all quarters in Southeast Asia the message on Vietnam is the same: vigorous American action is needed to buy time for Vietnam to mobilize and organize its real assets; but the time for such a turn around has nearly run outc And if Vietnam goes^ it will be exceedingly difficult if not impossible to hold Southeast Asia. What will be lost is not merely a crucial piece of real estate^ but the faith that the U.S. has the will and the capacity to deal with the Comjnunist offensive in that areao 2l/

The report^ drawing on the appendices^ includes a wide range of proposals o But the major emphasis^ very emphatically^ is on two ideas: Firsts there must be a firm^ unambiguous military commitment to remove doubts about UoSo resolve arising out of the laos negotiations; second^ there is great emphasis on the idea that the Diem regime's own evident weaknesses--from "the famous problem of Diem as administrator" to the Army's lack of offensive spirit--could be cured if enough dedicated Araeri-cans_, civilian and military^ became involved in South Vietnam to show the South Vietnamese^ at all levels^ how to get on and win the waro The much-urged military Task Force^ for example^ was mainly to serve the first purpose^ but partly also to serve the second:"the presence of American military forces in the ^lood/ area should also give us an opportunity to work intensively with the civil guards and with other local military elements and to explore the possibility of suffusing them with an offensive spirit and oactiGSo"22

Here are a few extracts which give the flavor of the discussion:

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"It is evident that morale in Vietnam will rapidly crunible ^- and in Southeast Asia only slightly less quickly -- if the sequence of / expectations set in motion by Vice President Johnson's visit and climaxed by General Taylor's mission are not soon followed by a hard UoSo commitment to the ground in Vietnamo" /Emphasis added/

"The elements required for buying time and assuming the offensive in Vietnam are^ in the view of this mission;, the following:

lo A quick UoSo response to the present crisis which would demonstrate by deeds -- not merely words -- the American commitment seriously to help save Vietnam rather than to disengage in the most convenient manner possibleo To be^per- _■ Suasive this commitment must include the sending to Vietnam of some U.So military forceso

2 c A shift in the American relation to the Vietnamese effort from advice to limited partnershipo The present character and scale of the war in South Vietnam decree that only the Vietnamese can defeat the Viet Cong; but at all levels Americans must^ as friends and partners -- not as arms-length advisors --show them how the job might be done -- not tell them or do it for them. 23/ ^ ^

"Perhaps the most striking aspect of this mission's effort is the unanimity of view -- individually arrived at by the specialises involved -- that what is now required is a shift from UoS.^advice to limited partnership and working collaboration with the Vietnamese« The present war cannot be won by direct U.So action; it must be won. by the Vietnamese<. But there is a general conviction among us that the Vietnamese performance in every domain can be substantially improved if Americans are prepared to work side by side with the Vietnamese on the key problems« Moreover^ there is evidence that Diem is^ in principle^ prepared for this step^ and that most -- not all --elements in his establishment are eagerly awaiting ito 24/

Here is a section titled "Reforminc^ Diem's AdaT^lnistrative Method":

The famous problem of Diem as an administrator and politician could be resolved in a number of ways:

-- By his removal in favor of a military dictatorship which would give dominance to the military chain of commando

-- By his removal in favor of a figure of more dilute power (eog.^ Vice President Nguyen Kgoc Tho) who would delegate authority to act to both military and civil leaders«

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-- By bringing about a series of de facto administrative changes via persuasion at high levels; collaboration with Diem's aides who want improved administration; and by a U.So operating presence at many working levels^j using the UoSo presence (eogo^ control over the helicopter squadrons) for forcing the Vietnamese to get their house in order in one area after another.

¥e have opted for the third choice^, on the basis of both merit and feasibilityo

Our reasons for these: First_, it would be dangerous for us to engineer a coup under present tense circujnstances^, since it is by no means certain that we could control its consequences and potentialities for Communist exploitation. Second^ we are convinced that a part of the complaint about Diem* s administrative methods conceals a lack of first-rate executives who can get things done. In the endless debate between Diem and his subordinates (Diem complaining of limited executive material; his subordinates_, of Diem's bottleneck methods) both have hold of a piece of the trutho

The proposed strategy of limited partnership is designed both to force clear delegation of authority in key areas and to beef up Vietnamese administration until they can surface and develop the men to take over

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This is a difficult course to adopts We can anticipate some friction and reluctance until it is proved that Americans can be helpful partners and that the techniques will not undermine Diem's political positiouo Shifts in UoSo attitudes and methods of administration as well as Vietnamese are required« But we are confident that it is the right way to proceed at this stage; and_j as noted earlier^ there is reason for confidence if the right men are sent to do the right jobs. 25/

On many points the tone_, and sometimes the substance^ of the appendices by the lesser members of the Mission (with the exception of one by Lansdale) are in sharp contrast to the summary paper o

William Jorden of State begins a discussion of "the present situation" by reporting:

One after another^ Vietnamese officials_, military men and . ordinary citizens spoke to me of the situation in their country as * grave* and * deteriorating«' They are distressed at the evidence of growing Viet Cong successeso They have lost confidence in President Diem and in his leadership. Men who only one

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or two months ago would have hesitated to say anything critical of Diem_j now explode in angry denunciation of the man^ his family^ and his methodso

And after a page of details_, Jorden sioms up with:

Intrigue^j nepotism and even corruption might be accepted_, for a time_j if combined with efficiency and visible progress,, When they accompany administrative paralysis and steady deterioration^ they become intolerableo 26/

But the summary paper^ under the heading of "The Assets of South Viet-name^" lists:

With all his weaknesses^. Diem has extraordinary ability^ stubbornness^ and gutSo

Despite their acute frustration^ the men of the Armed Forces and the administration respect Diem to a degree "Aich gives their griimbling (and perhaps some plotting) a somewhat halfhearted character; and they are willing -- by and large — to work for him^ if he gives them a chance to do their jobs. 27 /

The military annex contains this summary comment on the South Vietnamese ^^ Army:

The performance of the ARW is disappointing and generally is characterized by a lack of aggressiveness and at most levels is devoid of a sense of urgencyo The Army is short of able young trained leaders^ both in the officer and TTCO ranks 0 The basic soldier^ as a result; is poorly trained,, inadequately oriented^ ■ lacking in desire to close with the enemy and for the most part unaware of the serious inroads communist guerrillas are making In his country^ 28/

But the main' paper^ again in the summary of South Vietnamese assets_, reports that the South Vietnamese regulars are "of better quality than the Viet Cong Guerrillas 0" 29/

The point is not that the summary flatly contradicts the appendices« For example^ the statement about the superior quality of ARVW^ compared to the Viet Cong^ is qualified with the remark "if it can bring the Communists . . to engagement/' and can be explained to mean only that the more heavily ^

armed ARVT^ could defeat a VC force in a set-piece battle c But the persistent tendency of the summary is to put Saigon's weaknesses in the best light; and avoid anything that might suggest that perhaps the UoSo should consider limiting; rather than increasing; its commitments to the Diem regime; or alternatively face up to a need to openly take over the war^

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In contrast^ the appendices contemplate (if not always recommend) the more drastic alternativeso The military appendix argues (in a paraphrase of the JCS position quoted earlier) that the UoSo ought to move into Southeast Asia^ preferably Laos^ in forceo The appendix "by Sterling Cottrell of State (Chairman of the Vietnam Task Force) suggests an opposite view:

Since it is an open question whether the GM can succeed even with UoS. assistance^, it would be a mistake for the UoS. to commit itself irrevocably to the defeat of the communists in SWo 30/

And Cottrell^ in the only explicit statement in the available record on why the UoS. would not want to give Diem the treaty he had asked for^ states; - . ■ '

The Communist operation starts from the lowest social level -- the villages. The battle must be joined and won at this pointo If not; the Communists will ultimately control all but the relatively few areas of strong military concentrations. Foreign military forces cannot themselves win the battle at the village level. Therefore^ the primary responsibility for saving the country must rest with the GVNo

For the above reason^ the UoSo should assist the GWo { '\_ This rules out any treaty or pact which either shifts ulti-

mate responsibility to the U.So^ or engages any full UoS. commitment to eliminate the Viet Cong threats 3l/

(And a treaty which did not apply to the Viet Cong threat would hardly be a very reassuring thing to Saigon; while one that did would face an uncertain future when it came to the Senate for ratificatiouo)

yet_; Jorden and Cottrell had nothing much to recommend that was particularly different from what was recommended in the summaryo The effect of their papers is to throw doubt on the prospects for success of the intervention proposedo But their recommendations come out about the same way^ j j ^ so that if their papers seem more realistic in hindsight than the main

paper^ they also seem more confused«

_ Cottrell_j after recommending that the U<,So avoid committing itself irrevocably to winning in South Vietnam^ goes on to recommend:

The world should continue to be impressed that this situation of overt DRV aggression^ below the level of conventional war-fare_; must be stopped in the best interest of every free nationo 32/

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The idea that^ if worse comes to worst,, the UoS. could probati y save its position in Vietnam by bombing the north^ seems to underlie a good deal of the optimism that pervades the summary papero And even Cottrell^ in the last of his recommendations^ states:

If the combined U.So/gW efforts are insufficient to reverse the trend_j we should then move to the "Rostow Plan" of applying graduated measures on the DRV with weapons of oior own choosing. 33/

Taylor^ in his personal recommendations to the President (the cables from Baguio quoted earlier)^ spoke of the "extreme vulnerability of North Vietnam to conventional bombingo"

The summary paper^ in its contrast between the current war and the war the French lost^ states: ' •

Finally_, the Communists now not only have something to gain — the South -- but a base to lose -- the North --if war should comeo 3^/

Bombing was not viewed as the answer to all problems« If things did not go well^ the report saw a possible requirement for a substantial commitment of UoSo grouad troopso In a section on South Vietnamese reserves^ there is the comment that

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it is an evident requirement that the United States review quick action contingency plans to move into Vietnam^ should the scale of the Vietnam/Viet Cong?/" offensive radically increase at a time when Vietnamese reserves are inadequate to cope with ito Such action might be designed to take over the responsibility for the security of certain relatively quiet areas^ if the battle remained at the guerrilla level^ or to fight the Communists if open war were attemptedc 3^/

And the concluding paragraphs of the siimmary state that:

One of the major issues raised by this report is the need to develop the reserve strength in the UoSo establishment required to cover action in Southeast Asia up to the nuclear threshold in that area^ as it is now envisaged. The call up of additional support forces may be requiredo

In'our view^ nothing is more calculated to sober the enemy and to discourage escalation in the face of the limited initiatives proposed here than the knowledge that the United States has prepared itself soun.dly to deal with aggression in Southeast Asia at any levels 36-

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But these warnings were directed to an unexpectedly strong Viet Cong showing during the period of buildup of ARVN^ and more still to deterring the likelihood of a Communist resmiption of their offensive in Laos^ or of an overt invasion of South Vietnamo The Vietnam contingencies^ in particular^ were not viewed as likelyo . But the possibility of bombing the North was viewed otherwise. The clearest statements are in General Taylor's letter of transmittal:

While we feel that the program recommended represents those measures which should be taken in our present knowledge of the situation in Southeast Asia^j I would not suggest that it is the final wordo Future needs beyond this program will depend upon the kind of settlement we obtain in Laos and the manner in which Hanoi decides to adjust its conduct to that settlemento If the Hanoi decision is to continue the irregular war declared on South Vietnam in 1959 vith continued infiltration and covert support of guerrilla bands in the territory of our ally^ we will then have to decide whether to accept as legitimate the continued guidance^ trainlng_, and support of a guerrilla war across an international boundary^ while the attacked react only inside their borders o Can we admit the establishment of the common law that the party attacked and his friends are denied the right to strike the source of aggression^ after the fact of external aggression is clearly established? It is.our view that our government should undertake with the Vietnamese the measures outlined herein^ but should then consider and face the broader question beyond.

¥e cannot refrain from expressing^ having seen the situation on the ground^ our common sense of outrage at the burden which this kind of aggression imposes on a new country^ only seven years old^ with a difficult historical heritage to over- . come^ confronting the inevitable problems of political^ social^ and economic transition to modernizationo It is easy and cheap to destroy such a country whereas it Is difficult undisturbed to build a nation coming out of a complex past without carrying the burden of a guerrilla waro

We were similarly struck in Thailand with the injustice of subjecting this promising nation in transition to the heavy military biordens it faces in fulfilling its role in SEATO : security planning along with the guerrilla challenge beginning to form up on its northeast frontiero

It Is my judgment and that of my colleages that the United ■ States must decide how it will cope with Krushchev's "wars of liberation" which are really para-wars of guerrilla aggression.

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This is a nev and dangerous Communist technique which bypasses our traditional political and military responses. While the final ansver lies beyond the scope of this report^ it is clear to me that the time may come in our relations to Southeast Asia when we must declare our intention to attack the source of guerrilla aggression in North Vietnain and impose on the Hanoi Government a price for participating in the ciorrent war which is commensurate with the damage being inflicted on its neighbors to the southo 37/

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VIo SOME CABLES FROM SAIGON

To a current reader^ and vei-y likely to the officials in Washington who had access to the fiill Taylor Mission Report (including Taylor's personal recoimnendations)_j there really seem to be three reports_^ not oneo

lo Taylor's own cables read like^ as of course they were_, a soldier's crisp_, direct analysis of the military problem facing the Saigon government. With regard to the Diem regime^ the emphasis is on a need to build up intelligence capabilities^ clear up administrative drags on efficient action^ and take the offensive in seeking out and destroying VC units.

2. The main paper in the Report (the "Evaluations and Conclusions") incorporates General Taylor's views on the military problemso But^ it is ^ much broader^ giving primary emphasis to the military problem^ but also some attention to what we now call the "other war^" and even more to conveying an essentially optimistic picture of the opportunities for a vigorous American effort to provide the South Vietnamese government and army with the elan and style needed to wino This paper was presumably drafted mainly by Rostow^ with contributions from other members of the partyo

It is consistent with Rostow's emphasis before and since on the Viet Cong problem as a pretty straight-forward case of external aggression. There is no indication of the doubts expressed in the Alexis Johnson "Concept of Intervention in Vietnam" paper that Diem might not be able to defeat the Viet Cong even if infiltration were largely cut offo At one pointy for example,, the paper tells its readers:

It must be remembered that the 1959 political decision in Hanoi to laTmch the guerrilla and political campaign of I96O-61 arose because of Diem's increasing success in stabilizing his rule and moving his country forward in the several preceding years« 38/

On the very next page (perhaps reflecting the vagaries of committee papers) the paper does not itself "remember" this description of conditions when the war started« For it states:

The military frustration of the past two months has..omade acute_j throughout his administration^ dissatisfaction with Diem's method of rule^ with his lack of identification with his people^ and with his strategy which has been endemic for some years. 39 /

But that seems only a momentary lapse from the general line of the paper^ which is fairly reflected in the recommendation that we tell Moscow to:

use its influence with Ho Chi Minh to call his dogs off^ mind "his business J and feed his people, ko/

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3^ Finally^ there were the appendices by the military and especially the State representatives on the Mssion which^ as indicated by the extracts given in the previous section^ paint a much darker picture than the reader gets from the main papero Even when^j as is frequently the case^ their recommendations are not much different from the main paper^ the tone is one of trying to make the best of a bad situation^ rather than of seizing an opportunityo

Because of these distinctions between the different parts of the Report^ two people reading the full Report could come away with far different impressions of what sort of problem the UoSo was facing in Vietnam_, depending on which parts of the Report seemed to them to ring truest o Presumably^ officials' judgments here were influenced by their reading of the series of cables that arrived during and just after the Taylor visit; many of which touch on critical points of the report.

Here are some sampleso

The day Taylor left^ Nolting sent a cable describing the immediate mood in Saigon in pretty desperate terms. All parts of the Taylor Report^ including the main paper^ did the same. The distinctions in describing the situation were in how deep-rooted the immediate malaise was seen^ The main effect of this cable from Nolting was presumably to add weight to the warning of the Report that something dramatic had to be done if the UoSo were not ready to risk a collapse in Saigon within a few months. As the Taylor Report stressed and the cable implies^ the very fact of the Taylor Mission would have a very negative impact if nothing came out of ito

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There has been noticeable rise in Saigon's political temperature during past week. Taylor visit_, though reassuring in some respects^ has been interpreted by many persons as demonstrating critical stage which VC insurgency has reached.o.Following deterioration of general security conditions over past two months cancellation October 26 national day celebrations to devote resources to flood relief and terse^ dramatic declaration national emergency caught an imprepared public by surprise and contributed additional unsettling elements to growing atmosphere of uneasiness

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This growing public disquietude accompanied by increasing dissatisfaction with Diem's methods of administration on part senior GVN officials 0 There is considerable cabinet level criticism and growing though still inchoate determination force organizational reforms on President. Similar attitude seems be developing in ARYN upper levelso Though trend of thinking these groups taking parallel courses^ there nothing indicate at this moment that collaboration between them taking place,, Beginnings of this would_, of course^, be serious indicator something brewings

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At same time CAS JcIAJ also has from Vietnamese government sources reports (C-3) of movement of certain platoon to company-size VC units (totalling perhaps 200-500 men) toward Saigon to profit from any disturbances or confusion vhich may occur. Knowledge these reports within GVN apparently tending deter disaffected officials from developing radical pace at this memento

Situation here thus one of insecurity^ uneasiness and emergent instability. A genuine and important military victory over VC would do more than anything else to redress balance and allay for moment high-level mutterings of need for change o On other handj further deterioration of situation over next few weeks or months or new VC success similar Fhuoc Hhanh incident might veil bring situation to heado 4l/

• From MAAG Chief McGarr^ Washington received an account of Taylor* s meeting with "Big Minh^" then Chief of Staffs later Head of State for a while after Diem was overthrowno It is interesting because it was one of the very few reports from Saigon in the available record suggesting that the Diem regime might be in need of more than administrative reforms. Minh com ^

plains that the Vietnamese army was "losing the support of the people" as

indicated by a "marked decrease in the amount of information given by the I

populationo" He warned^ further^ that "GVE should discontinue favoring certain religionSo o«" But McGarr stressed the administrative problems_j particularly the need for an "overall plauo" His reaction explicitly concerns what he saw as the "milltar/aspects of Minh's complaints. But Ambassador Nolting's cables and the main paper of the Report show a very similar tendency to take note of political problems^ but put almost all the emphasis on the need for better military tactics and more efficient admin- . istrative arrangementso

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.Big Minh was pessimistic and clearly and frankly outlined his personal feeling that the military was not being properly supported. He said not only Viet Cong grown alarmingly^ but that Vietnamese armed forces were losing support of the people. As example^ he pointed out marked decrease in amount of Information given by populationo Minh said GVW should discontinue favoring' certain religions^ and correct present system of selecting province chiefs o At this point Mlnli was extremely caustic in commenting on lack of ability^ m-ilitary and administrative_j of certain province chiefs« Minh was bitter about province chief's role in military chain of command saying that although Gen^ McGarr had fought for and won on the single ... command which had worked for few months^ old habits were now returning. Also^ on urging from Geuo McGarr he had gone on offensive, but province chiefs had not cooperated to extent necessary© He discussed his Inability to get cooperation from GVTT agencies on developing overall plans for conduct of Gounterinsurgencyo Minh also discussed need to bring sects back into fold as these are anti-communist. Although above

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not new Minh seemed particularly discouiraged.. .When analyzed, most of Minh's comments in military field are occasioned by lack of overall coordination and cooperation. This re-empha.-sizes absolute necessity for overall plan which would clearly delineate responsibility and create a team effort, o. _^2/

Nolting concerned himself, of course, with the civil as well as military a^rrangements, but with much the same stress on organizational and administrative formalities. A striking example was when Nolting reported that Diem was willing to consider (in response to American urging of top level administrative reforms') creating a IX^ational Executive Council patterned after the UcS. National Security Council. Nolting was favorably impressed. His cable notes no concern that under Diem's proposal, Diem's brother Nhu would be chairman of the NEC, although a year earlier (and of course even more urgently a year or so later) getting Nhu, and his wife, out of the picture entirely had been seen as the best real hope of saving the Diem regime.

The report Nolting sent on Taylor's final meeting with Diem also contains some interesting material. It leaves the impression that Diem was still not really anxious to get American troops deeply involved in his country, despite his favorable reaction at the meeting of the 2Hh, which, in turn, was a reversal of his reaction at the meeting on the 19th. Because of this, the impression left by the whole record is that Taylor came to the conclusion that some sort of ground troop commitment was needed mainly because of what he heard from Diem's colleagues and his military people, rather than from Diem himself.

According to Nolting*s cabled account. Diem, although raising half a dozen issues relating to increased American military aid, did not mention the flood task force, or anything else that might imply a special interest in getting some sort of ground troops commitment« As seemed the case earlier, it was the Americans who pressed the idea of getting American military people involved in combat. In the only exchange Nolting reported touching on this issue, he said:

1. Diem stressed importance of reinforcement of aviation: particularly helicopters. Taylor and I jolting/ used this opportunity to make clear to Diem that we envisaged helicopters piloted by Americans and constituting American units under American commanders which would cooperate with Vietnamese military commands o.c ^3/

(At a meeting with McGarr November 9- Diem again raised the helicopter question, this time talking the initiative in saying he needed Ajnerican pilots, but he did not mention the flood task force, or anything else that might imply a request for ground troops«) hk/

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On the question of better performance by Diem's regime, we have this exchange5 which does not seem likely to have prepared Diem for the fairly substantial quid pro quo which turned out to be part of the package proposed by Was_hington:

o.w3. Taylor told Diem it would be useful if he and 1 could develop specifics with respect to political-psychological point in paper which Taylor presented to Diem October 2U. ^ Taylor pointed out this would be very useful to him in Washington because he v/ill be faced with question that^ if progrsjn he proposes is adopted^ what will be chances of early success. In response Thuan's question asking for exact meaning of this point in Taylor's paper, latter said there has been loss of confidence among both Vietnejaese and American people about situation in Vietnam and we need to determine together what measures can be taken to restore confidence. Rostow coiiomented that secret of turning point is offensive action^ Diem stated complete psychological mobilization required so that everything can be done to raise potential GM forces and damage enemy's potentials He referred to GW efforts in past to collaborate more closely with US in military planning and said these efforts had run up against wall of secrecy surromiding US and SEATO military plans. <.<> k^f

Finally, there was this exchange, which does not appear to provide much support for the high hopes expressed in the Taylor Report that Diem was anxious for UcS. guidance and "in principle" ready to grant a role for Americans in his administration and army^

...k, Taylor referred to Diem's comjnents in earlier talk about shortage of capable personnel and suggested US might ■ assist by lending personnels Diem replied that US could help in this respect in training fieldc Thuan then brought up dilemma facing GVN re instructors at Thui Due Reserve Officers' School.oo kG/

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Paragraph 12 .of Taylor's cable reporting the meeting. Quoted in Section IV, above.

"Actions to emphasize national emergency and beginning of a new phase in the war: we should consider jointly all possible mea^siires to emphasize turning point has been reached in dealing with communist aggression^ Possible actions might include appeal to United Nations, an announcement by GViV of governmental changes to cope with crisis and exchange of letters between the two heads of State expressing their partnership in a common cause.^oo" hj/

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.Tfia FAIL rSCISIOITS - II IV.Be CHAPTER VI

I. COOTEXT

Taylor's formal report^ as noted^ vas dated November 3^ a day after the Mission came back to Washington. (A good deal of it had been written during the stopover at Baguio^ in the Philippines^ vhen Taylor's personal cables to the President had also been VTritten and sent.) The submission of Taylor's Report was followed by prominent news stories the next morning flatly stating (but without i ' attribution to a source) that the President "remains strongly opposed

to the dispatch of American combat troops to South Vietnam" and strongly implying that General Taylor had not recommended such a commitment, l/ Apparently^ only a few people^ aside from Taylor^ I Rostov and a handful of very senior officials^ reaJ-ized that this was

not exactly accurate—for the summary paper of the Report had not been very explicit on Just what was meant by "a hard commitment to the gro-und." Thus only those, who knew about the "Eyes Only" cables would know just what Taylor was recommending.

Diem himself had given one of his rare on-the-record interviews to the Wew York Tim.es correspondent in Saigon while Taylor was on his vay home^ and he too gave the impression that the further American aid he expected would not include ground troops« £/

Consequently^ the general outline of the American aid that wou].d be sent following the Taylor Mission was common knowledge for over a veek before any formal decision was made. The decisions^ when they were announced stirred very little fuss^ and (considering the retro- ■ spective importance) not even much interesto The Taylor Mission had received much less attention in the press than several other crises at the JJEy in the Congo^ on nuclear testing^ and most of all in Berlin^ where there had just been a symbolic confrontation of Soviet and , ■ American tanks« The Administration was so concerned about public

reaction to Soviet aggressiveness and apparent American inability to deal with it that a campaign was begun (as usual in matters of this sort^ reported in the Times without specific attribution) to "counter-I attack against what unjiame'd ^high officials' called a 'rising mood of

i , national frustrationo'" The Administration's message^ the Times

reported^ was that a 'inature foreign policy^' rather than "belligerence of defeatism" was what was needed. 3/ What is interesting about such a message is what the necessity to send it reveals about the mood of the times„

In this sort of context^ there was no real debate about whether the U.S. ought to do anything reasonable it could to prevent Vietnam from going the way of Laos. There is no hint of a suggestion otherwise in the classified record^ and there was no real public debate on

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this point. What was seen as an issue was whether the limits of reasonahle U.S. aid extended to the point of sending American troops to fight the Viet Cong. But even this was subdued. There had been^ as noted before^ the leal^ed stories playing down the prospects that combat troops would be sent, and then, immediately on Taylor^s return, the unattributed but obviously authoritative stories that Kennedy was opposed to sending troops and Taylor was not recommending them.

In a most important sense, this situation distorts the story told in this account. For this account inevitably devotes a great deal of space to the decision that was not made — that of sending ground troops ^^ and very little space to the important decisions that were made. There is simply nothing much to say about these latter decisions: except that they were apparently taken for granted at the time. Even today, "VJlth all the hindsight available, it is very hard to imagine Kennedy or any other President responding to the situation faced in I961 by doing significantly less about Vietnani than he did. The only choices seen then, as indeed even today the only choices seem to have been, whether to do more. And it is on how that question was resolved^ inevitably, that any account of the period will be focused.

The Administration faced (contrary to the impression given to the public both before and after the decisions) two major issues when Taylor returned.

1. What conditions, if any, would be attached to new Anerican aid? The Taylor Report implicitly recommended none. But the leaked stories in the press following Taylor's return showed that some in the Administration inclined to a much harder line on Diem than the suin-mary paper of the report. For exaiTiple, A Times dispatch of Tlovember 5, from its Pentagon correspondent, reported that Diem would be expected to "undertalie major economic, social, and military reforms to provide ^ a basis for increased U.S. support." hj

2. Would the limited commitment of ground feces recommended by Taylor be undertaken? The news stories suggested they would, although this would be apparent only to those who had seen Taylor's ''Eyes Only" cables. The story appearing the day after the report was submitted, despite the flat statements against the use of combat troops, also stated that Taylor had recommended "the dispatch of more specialists in anti-guerrilla warfare to train Vietnam.ese troops, communications and transportation specialists, and army engineers to help the Viet namese government combat its flood problems ," The November 5 story was more explicit. It is noted that officials seemed to rule out the use of U.S. combat forces, "the move considered here a few weeks ago." But "at the same time it appears that Army engineers, perhaps in unusually large numbers, may be sent to help on flood control work

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and other civil projects and to fi ght if necessary o" This last phrase was explicitly (and correctly) linked to the fact that the area in which the floods had taken place (the Delta) was "orecisely the area of greatest Viet Cong strengths 5/

■^ A final question of great importance did not have to be resolved during this review: for although the Taylor Report had stressed the idea of eventually bombing the north^ no iinmediate decision or commitment on this was recommended.

r

On the first of these issues (the quid pro quo for U.So aid) our record tells us that demands were made on Diem, as we will see when we come to the actual decision. The newspaper stories strongly suggest that the decision to ask for a quid pro quo vras made, at the latest, XDmediately following the return of the Taylor Mission. But the record does not show anything about the reasoning behind this effort to pressure .Diem to agree to reforms as a condition for increased U.S. aid, nor of what the point of it was. It certainly conflicted with the main drive of the Taylor Mission Report. The report not only suggested no such thing, but put a great deal of stress on a cordial, intiJiiate relationship with the Diem regime. Pressure for reform (especially when publicly made, as they essentially were in the leaked stories) was hardly likely to promote cordiality. Durbrow's experience earlier m the year had shown that pressure would have the opposite result.

Consequently, the President's handling of this issue had the effect of undermining f^rom the start what appeared to have been a major premise of the strategy recommended to the President: that Diem was "in principle" prepared for what plainly amounted to a "limited partnership," with the"^ U.S. in running his country and his Ari-ay, -^ 6/ ^

The advantages, from the American view, of the President's decision to place demands on Diem were presumably that it might (contrary to realistic expectations) actually push Diem in the right direction; and that if this did not work, it would somewhat limit the American commitment to Diem.,. The limit would come by making clear that the U.S. saw a good deal of the problem as Diem's own responsibility, and not just a simple matter of external aggression. J?he balance of this judgment would turn substantially on whether whoever was making the decision judged^ that the "limited partnershi-v'" idea was really much more realistic than the trying to pressure Diem, and on whether he v/anted to limit the U.S. commitment, rather than make it unambiguous. Further, the cables from^Saigon had clearly shown that many South Vietn&iriese were hoping the Americans would put pressure on Diem, so that although such tactics

* A^ cable to Saigon November k asked Kolting whether he thought Diem . might agree to, among other things, a proposal to establish a National Emergency Council which, in addition to the senior members of Diem's army and ac^ninistratioxi would include a "mature and hardheaded American...to participate in all decisions."

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would prejudice relations with Diem^ they would not necessarily harm relations with others of influence in the country^ in particular his generals.

Finally_, a3.though Kennedy's decisions here were contrary to the implications of the suinmary paper in the Taylor Report^ they were not particularly inconsistent vrith the appendices by the State representatives. For these^ as noted^ took a far less rosy view of Diem's prospects than appeared in the svm^SuTy.

On the second issue -- the U.S. combat military task force — the available record tells us only the positions of Taylor and of the Defense Department. ¥e are not sure what the position of State was --although Sorenson claims that all the President's senior advisors had recommended going ahead with sending some ground troops. 7/

Even Taylor's position is slightly ambiguous. It is conceivable that he argued for the Task Force mainly because he thought that the . numbers of U.S. personnel that might be sent as advisors^ pilots_, and other specialists would not add up to a large enough increment to have much of a psychological impact on South Vietnamese morale. But his choice of language indicates that a mere question of numbers was not the real issue. Rather Taylor's argiment seems to have been that ■ specifically ground forces (not necessarily all or even mainly infantrymen^ but ground soldiers who would be out in the countryside where^they could be shot at and shoot back) were what was needed. Combat engineers to work in th. VC-infested flood area in the Delta would meet that need. Helicopter pilots and mechanics and advisors, who might accompany Vietnamese operations, but could not undertake ground operations on their own apparently would not. There is only one easily imagined reason for seeing this as a crucial distinction. And that would be if a critical object of the stepped up American program was to be^^exactly what Taylor said it should be in his final cable from Saigon: "...assuring Diem of our readiness to join him in a military showdown with the Viet Cong " 8/

• •

Thus the flood task force was essentially different from the balance of the military program. It did not fill an urgent need for military specialists or expertise not adequately available within Vietnamj ^it v/as an implicit commitment to deny the Viet Cong a victory even if major American ground forces should be required.

Taylor clearly did not see the need for large U.S. ground involvement as at all probable. ("The risks of backing into a major Asian war by way of SVH are present but are not impressive/' in^large part because "HVIT is extremely vulnerable to conventional bombing.') At another ' point, Taylor warns the President, "If the first contingent is not enough, ... it will be difficult to resist the pressure to reinforce. If the ultimate result sought is the closing of the frontiers and the

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cleanup of the insurgents vithin SVII^ there is no limit to our possible commitment (unless we attack the source in Hanoi. )^' 9/

We have a good record of the DoD staff work^ which preceded the President's decision on this issue^ but only a bit from State and none from the "White House. Rusk^ in a cable from Japan on I^ovember 1^ contributed this note of caution (which also bears on the previous discussion of demands on Diem for a quid pro quo for increased itaierican aid): ." ' ' "

Since General Taylor may give first full report prior my return, believe special attention should be given to critical question whether Diem is prepared take necessary measures to give us something worth supporting. If Diem unwilling trust military commanders to get job done and take steps to consolidate non-communist elements into serious national effort, difficult to see how handful American troops can have decisive influence. While attaching greatest possible importance to security in SEA, I would be reluctant to see U.S. make major additional commitm-ent American prestige to a losing horse.

Suggest Department carefully review all Southeast Asia measures we expect from Diem if our assistance forces us to assume de facto direction South Vietnamese affairs. 10 /

But the view of the U.S. Mission in Saigon contained no such doubts, nor did most Vietnamese, according to this cable Nolting sent while Taylor was enroute home:

Our conversations over past ten days with Vietnamese in various waUks of life show virtually unanimous desire for introduction U.S. forces into Viet-Nani. This based on unsolicited remarks from cabinet ministers. National Assembly Deputies, University professors, students, shopkeepers, and oppositionists. Dr. Tran Dinh De, levelheaded Minister of Health, told Embassy officer Oct 29 that while GVT^ could continue resist communists for while longer if US troops not introduced, it could not win alone against commies. National Assembly members, according to Lai Tu, leader Personalist Community, tinani-mously in favor entry US forces. Diem told us while General Taylor was here that he had consulted National Assembly Committee on this question and had received favorable response. Even an oppositionist like Ex-Foreign Minister Tran Van Do has told us US forces are needed and is apparently so strongly convinced of this

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that he did not suggest any conditions precedent about political changes by Diem. AmConsul Hue reports that opinion, among intellectuals and government officials in that city is also almost unanimously in favor of intro-jj . duction of Am.erican combat troops. MAAG believes on basis

private conversations and general attitude Vietnamese military personnel toward us that Vietnamese armed forces would likei-Tise welcome introduction US forces.

General Vietnamese desire for introduction US forces, . arises from serious morale decline among populace during

recent weeks because of deterioration in security and horrible death through torture and mutilation to which Col Nam subjected. Expanded VC infiltration has brought fully home to Vietnamese the fact that US has not intervened militarily in Laos to com.e to rescue of anti-communists. Now that they see Viet-Wam approaching its own crucial period^ paramount question in their minds is whether it will back down when chips are down. Vietnamese thus want US forces introduced in order to demonstrate US ! determination to stick it out with them against Communists.

They do not want to be victims of political settlement with communists. This is especially true of those publicly

I , identified as anti-communist like Dean Vu Quoc Thue who

collaborated with Dr. Eugene Staley on Joint Experts Report.

Most Vietnamese whose thoughts on this subject have been developed are-not thinking in tems of US troops to fight guerrillas but rather of a reassuring presence of US forces in Viet-Nam. These persons undoubtedly feel_, however^ that if war in Viet-Nam continues to move toward overt conven-\ I tional aggression as opposed to its guerrilla character^

combat role for US troops could eventually arise. U./

The special commitment involved in committing even a small force of jI . ground troops was generally recognised. ¥e have notes on an ISA staff

paper^ for example^ which ranked the various types of increased U.S. military aid in ascending order of commitment^ and of course^ placed the flood task force at the top. According to the notes^

Any combat elem.ents^ such as in the task force^ would come under.attack and woiad need to defend themselves^ committing U.S. prestige deeply. U.S. troops would then be fighting in South Vietnam and could not "VTithdraw under fire. Thus^the introduction of U.S. troops in South Vietnam would

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be decisive act and must be sent to achieve a coinpletely decisive mission. This mission would probably require^ over time, increased numbers of U.S. troops; DRV intervention would probably increase until a large number of U.S. troops were req,uirod, three or more divisions. 12/

■ This assessment differed from that in General Taylor's cables only in not stressing the hope that a U.S. willingness to bomb the north would deter North Vietnamese escalation of its own commitment. ■

A special KIE prepared at this time reached essentially the same conclusions."

This SNIE, incidentally,' is the only staff paper found in the available record which treats communist reactions primarily in terms of the separate national interests of Hanoi, Moscow, and Peiping, rather than primarily in terms of an overall communist strategy for which Hanoi, is acting as an agent. In particular, the Gilpatric Task Eorce Report, it will be recalled, began with references to a communist ^master plan* for taking over Southeast Asia. The Taylor Mission Report, similarly, began with a section on "Coimnunist Strategy in Southeast Asia" and opening:

At the present time, the Communists are pursuing a clear and systematic strategy in Southeast Asia. It is a strategy of extending Communist power and influence in ways which bypass U.S. nuclear strength, U.S. conventional naval, air, and ground forces, and the conventional strength of indigenous forces in the area. Their strategy is rooted in the fact that international law and practice does not yet recognize the mounting of guerrilla war across borders as aggression justifying counterattack at the source. 13 /

The November 5 SNIE presumably indicates the principal courses of action that were under formal review at the time:

I

ji The courses of action here considered were given to the

intelligence community for the purposes of this estimate and were not intended to represent the full range of possible courses of action. The given courses of action are:

A. The introduction of a US airlift into end within South Vietnam, increased logistics support, and an increase in FAAC- strength to provide US advisers down to battalion level;

Be The introduction into South Vietnam of a US force of about 8,000 - 10,000 troops, mostly engineers with some ■ combat support, in response to an appeal from President Diem for assistance in flood relief;

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, ■ C. The introduction into the area of a US com-

bat force of 25^000 to 1-1-0,000 to engage with South Vietnamese forces in ground, air, and naval operations against the Viet Cong; and

D- An announcement hy the US of its determination to hold South Vietnam and a warning, either private or puhlic, that Worth Vietnamese support of the Viet Cong must cease or the US would launch air attacks against North Vietnam. This action would be taken in conjunction with Course A, B, or C. VjJ

These proposed courses of action correspond to those outlined for consideration by the Taylor Mission, with the exception that the flood task force proposed by Taylor has been substituted for the former "intermediate" solution of stationing a token U.S. force at DaNang, and that an opinion is asked on the prospects of threats to bomb the north, again reflecting the Taylor Mission Report- *

The gist of the SME was that North Vietnamese would respond to an increased U.S. commitment with an offsetting increase in infiltrated support for the Viet Cong. Thus, the main difference in the estimated communist reaction to Courses A, B, and C was that each vrould be stronger than its predecessor. On the prospects for bombing the north, the SNIE implies that threats to bomb would not cause Hanoi to stop its support for the Viet Cong, and that actual attacks on the Worth would bring a strong response from Moscow and Peiping, who would regard the defense of Worth Vietnam against such an attack as imperative." 15/

*See Gilpatric memo quoted at conclusion of Section I, Chapter V.

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II. FINAL RECOM'IEKDATIOIMS

On November 8^ McNamara sent the following memorandum on behalf of himself5 Gilpatric, and the JCS:

MEMORAM)UM FOR TIIE PRESIDENT

The basic issue framed by the Taylor Report is whether the U.S. shall:

■a. Commit itself to the clear objective of preventing the fall of South Vietnam to Communism^ and

b. Support this commitment by necessary immediate military actions and preparations for possible later actions..

The Joint Chiefs, Mr. Gilpatric, and I have reached the following conclusions:

lo The fall of South Vietnam to Communism would lead to the fairly rapid extension of Communist control, or complete accommodation to Communism, in the rest of mainland Southeast Asia and in Indonesia. The strategic implications worldwide, particularly in the Orient, would be extremely serious.

2. The chances are against, probably sharply against, preventing that fall by any measures short of the introduction of U.Sc forces on a substantial scale. We accept General Taylor's judgment that the various measures proposed by him short of this are useful but will not in themselves do the Job of restoring confidence and setting Diem on the way to vanning his fight.

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3- The introduction of a U.S. force of the magnitude of an initial 8,000 men in a flood relief context will be of great help to Diem. However, it will not convince the other side (whether the shots are called from Moscow, Peiping, or Hanoi) that we mean business. Moreover, it probably will not tip the scales decisively We would be almost certain to get increasingly mired do\m in an inconclusive struggle«

4. The other side can be convinced we mean business only if we accompany the initial f^orce introduction by a clear comjnit-ment to the.full objective stated above, accompanied by a vrarning . through som? channel to Hanoi that continued support of the Viet Cong will lead to punitive retaliation against North Vietnanu

5« If we act in this way, the ultimate possible extent of our military commitment must be faced. The struggle may be prolonged and Hanoi and Peiping may intervene overtly. In view of the

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logistic difficulties faced by the other side^ I believe ve can assume that the maxltnum U.S. forces required on the ground in Southeast Asia "I'/ill not exceed 6 divisions^ or about 205,000 men (CINCPAC Plan 32-59, Phase IV). Our military posture is, or ■with the addition of more National Guard or regiilar Army divisions, can be made, adequate to furnish these forces without serious interference with our present Berlin plans.

6o To accept the stated objective is of course a most serious decision. Military force is not the only element of what must be a most carefully coordinated set of actions. Success will depend on factors many of -which are not within our control -- notably the conduct of Diem himself and other leaders in the area. Laos will remain a major problem. The domestic political implications of accepting the objective are also grave, although it is our feeling that the country will respond better to a firm initial position than to courses of action that lead us in only gradually, and that in the meantime are sure to involve casualties. The over-all effect on Moscow and Peiping will need careful weighing and may well be mixed; however, permitting South Vietnam to fall can only strengthen and encourage them greatly.,

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7. In sum:

a. We do not believe major units of UoSo forces should ( be introduced in South Vletnatn unless we are willing to make an

affirmative decision on the issue stated at the start of this memor andum.

b. We are inclined to recomjnend that we do commit the U.S. to the clear objective of preventing the fall of South Vietnam to Communism and that we support this commitment by the necessary military actions o

c. If such a commitment is agreed upon, we support the recommendations of General Taylor as the first stejos toward its fulfillment.

Sgd: Robert S. McNamara I6/

A number of things are striking about this memorandum, including of course the judgment that the "maximima" U.S. ground forces required, even in the case of overt intervention by not only North Vietnam, but China as well, would "not exceed" 205^000 men. This estimate of the requirement to deal with a large scale overt Invasion is consistent with the Chief's earlier estimate that the addition of ^0,000 U.S. troops to the South Vietnamese forces would be sufficient to "clean up" the Viet Congo

But the strongest message to the President in the memorandum (growing out of points 3, i|, and 7c) was surely that if he agreed to sending the r^ military task force, he should be prepared for follow-up recommendations

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' for re-enforcements and to threaten Hanoi with bombing• Unless the SNIE

was wholly ^^rrong, threats to bomb Hanoi would not turn off the war, and Hanoi would increase its infiltration in response to UoS. commitments' of troops. Even should Hanoi not react with counter-escalation, the Presi- . dent knew that the Chiefs, at least, were already on record as desiring a prompt build-up to U0,000 ground troops. In short, the President was being told that the issue was not whether to send an 8,000-man task force, but whether or not to embark on a couTse that, without som.e extraordinary good luck,would lead to combat involvement in Southeast Asia on a very substantial scale. On the other hand, he was being warned that an^rthing less than sending the task force was very likely to fail to prevent the fall of Vietnam, since "the odds are against, proba.bly sharply against, preventing that fall by any means short of the introduction of U.S. forces on a substantial scale" (of which the task force would be the first increment ).

Although the Chief's position here is clear, because their views are on record in other memoranda, McNamara's own position remains a little ambiguouso For the paper does not flatly recommend going ahead; it only states he e.nd his colleagues are "inclined" to recommend going ahead. Three days later MclMajnara joined Rusk in a quite different recommendation, and one obviously more to the President's liking (and, in the nature of jj^ such things, quite possibly drawn up to the President's specifications).

As with the May revision of the Gilpatric Report, this paper combines an escalation of the rhetoric with a toning doTm of the actions the President is asked to talie. Since the NSAI^i formalizing the President's decisions was taken essentially verbatim from this paper, the complete text is reprinted here. (The KSAl/I consisted of the Recommendations section of this memorandum, except that Point 1 of the recomraendations was deleted.)

Of pajrticular importance in this second memorandum to the President was Section k, with its explicit sorting of U.S. military aid into Category A, support forces, which were to be sent promptly; and Category • B, "larger organized units with actual or potential direct military missions" on which no immediate decision was recommended. There is no explicit reference in the paper to the flood relief task force; it sicnply does not appear in the list of recommended actions, presumably on the grounds that it goes in Category Be Category B forces, the paper notes, "involve a certain dilemma: if there is a strong South Vietnam_ese effort, they may not be needed; if there is not such an effort. United States forces could not accomplish their mission in the midst of an apathetic or hostile population."

If McKamara's earlier memorandum is read carefully, the same sort . of warning is found, although it sounds much more perfunctory. But that such warnings were included shows a striking contrast with the last go-around in May. Then, the original Defense version of the Gilpatric

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Task Force Report contained no hint of such a qualification, and there was only a q^uite vague warning in the State revisions. Part of the reason, undoubtedly, was the 6 month^s additional experience in dealing with Diem. A larger part, though, almost certainly flowed from the fact that the insurgency had by now shown enough strength so that there was now in everyone's minds the possibility that the U.S. might someday face the choice of giving up on Vietnam or taking over a major part of the war.

These warnings (that even a major U.S. commitment to the ground war would not assure success) were obviously in some conflict with the recommendations both papers made for a clear-cut U.S. commitment to save South Vietnam. The contrast is all the sharper in the joint Rusk/McNamara memo-randum, where the warning is so forcefully given.

Here is the Rusk/McNamara memorandum. 17/

TOP SECRET November 11, I96I

■ MEMORMDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: South Viet-Nam

1.■ United States National Interests in South Viet-Nam .

The deteriorating situation in South Viet-Nam requires attention to the nature and scope of United States national interests in that country. The loss of South Viet-Nam to Communism would involve the transfer of a nation of 20 million people from the free world to the Communist bloc. The loss of South Viet-Nam would make pointless any further discussion about the importance of Southeast Asia to the free world; we would have to face, the near certainty that the remainder of Southeast Asia and Indonesia would move to a complete accommodation with Communism, if not formal incorporation within the Communist bloc. The United States, as a member of SEATO, has commitments with respect to South Viet-Nam under the Protocol to the SEATO Treaty. Additionally, in a formal statement at the conclusion session of the 195^ Geneva Conference, the United States representative stated that the United States "would view any renewal of the aggression . . . with grave concern and seriously threatening international peace and security."

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The loss of South Viet-Nan to Communism would not only destroy SEATO but would undermine the credibility of American commitments elsewhere. Further, loss of South Viet-Nam would stimulate bitter domestic controversies in the United States and would be seized upon by extreme elements to divide the country and harass the Administration.

2. The Problem of Saving South Viet-Nam .

It seems, on the face of it, absurd to think that a nation of 20 million people can be subverted by 15-20 thousand active guer-• villas if the Government and people of" that country do not wish to be subverted. South Viet-Nam is not, however, a highly organized society with an effective governing apparatus and a population accustomed to carrying civic responsibility. Public apathy is encouraged by the inability of most citizens to act directly as well as by the tactics of terror employed by the guerrillas throughout the countryside. Inept administration and the absence of a strong non-Communist political coalition have made it difficult to bring available resources to bear upon the guerrilla problem and to make the most effective use of available external aid. Under the best of conditions the threat posed by the presence of 15-20 thousand guerrillas, well disciplined under well-trained cadres, would be difficult to meet •

3. The United States^ Objective in South Viet-Nam .

The United States should commit itself to the clear objective of preventing the fall of South Viet-Nam to Communist . The basic means for accomplishing this objective must be to put the Government of South Viet-Nam into a position to win its own war against the guerrillas. We must insist that that Government itself take the measures necessary for that purpose in exchange for large-scale United States assistance in the military, economic and political fields. At the same time we must recognize that it will probably not be possible for the GVN to win this war as long as the flow of men and supplies from North Viet-Nam continues unchecked and the guerrillas enjoy a safe sanctuary in neighboring territory.

We should be prepared to introduce United States combat forces if that should become necessary for success. Dependent upon the circumstances, it may also be necessary for United States forces to strike at the source of the aggression in North Viet-Nam.

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h. The Use of United States Forces in South Viet-Nan .

The commitment of United States forces to" South Viet-Ham in-I volves two different categories: (A) Units of modest size required

for the direct support of South Viet-l^amese military effort ^ such as communications 5 helicopter and other forms of airlift, reconnaissance aircraft, naval patrols, intelligence units, etc., and (B) i larger organized units with actual or potential direct military mis-

sions . Category (A) should "be introduced as sipeedily as possible . ■ ( Category (B) units pose a more serious problem in that they are much

more significant from the point of view of domestic and international political factors and greatly increase the probabilities of Communist bloc escalation. Further, the employment of United States combat forces (in the absence of Communist bloc escalation) involves a certain dilemma: if there is a strong South-Vietnamese effort, they may not be needed; if there is not such an effort, United States forces could not accomplish their mission in the midst of an apathetic or hostile population. Under present circumstances, therefore, the question of injecting United States and SEATO combat forces should in large part be considered as a contribution to the morale of the South Viet-Namese in their own effort to do the principal job themselves.

5f Probable Extent of the QQxmitjmnt of Unite d States Jorcgs .

If we commit Category (b) forces to South Viet-Nam, the ultimate possible extent of our military commitment in Southeast Asia must be faced. The struggle may be prolonged, and Eanoi and Peiping may overtly intervene. It is the view of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff that, in the light of the logistic difficulties faced by the other side, we can assume that the maximum United States forces required on the ground in Southeast Asia would not exceed six divisions, or about 205,000 men (CINCPAC Plan 32/59 PHASE IV). This would be in addition to local forces and such SEATO forces as may be engaged. It is also the view of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff that our military posture is, or, with the addition" of more IJational Guard or regular Army divisions, can be made, adequate to furnish these forces and support them in action without serious interference with our present Berlin plans.

6. Relation to Laos .

It must be understood that the introduction of American combat forces into Viet-Nam prior to a Laotian settlement would run a considerable risk of stimulating a Communist breach of the cease fire

r

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and a resumption of hostilities in Laos. This could present us with a choice between the use of combat forces in Laos or an abandonment of that country to full Communist control. At the present time, there is at least a chance that a settlement can be reached in Laos on the basis of a weak and unsatisfactory Souvanna Phouma Government. The prospective agreement on Laos includes a provision that Laos will not be used as a transit area or as a base for interfering in the affairs of other coimtries such as South Viet-ITam. After a Laotian settlement, the introduction of United States forces into Viet-Nam could serve to stabilize the position both in Viet-Nam and in Laos by registering our determination to see to it that the Laotian settlement was as far as the United States would be willing to see Communist influence in Southeast Asia develop.

7. The Heed for Multilateral Action ,

. From the political point of view, both domestic and international, it would seem important to involve forces from other nations alongside of United States Category (B) forces in Viet-Nam, It would be difficult to explain to our own people why no effort had been made to invoke SEATO or why the United States undertook to carry this burden unilaterally. Our position would be greatly strengthened if the introduction of forces could be taken a^ a SEATO action, accompanied by units of other SEATO countries, with a full SEATO report to the United Nations of the purposes of the action itself.

Apart from the armed forces, there would be political advantage in elisting the interest of other nations, including neutrals, in the security and well-being of South Viet-Nam. This might be done by seeking such assistance as Malayan police officals (recently offered Diem by the Tunku) and by technical assistance personnel in other fields, either bilaterally or through international organizations.

8. Initial Diplomatic Action by the United States .

If the recommendations, below, are approved> the United States should consult intensively with other SEATO governments to obtain their full support of the course of action contemplated. At the appropriate stage, a direct approach should be made by the United States to Moscow, through normal or special channels, pointing out that we cannot accept the movement of cadres, arms and other supplies into South Viet-Nam in support of the guerrillas. We should also discuss the problem with neutral governments in the general area and get them to face up to their own interests in the security of South Viet-Nam; these governments will be concerned about (a) the introduction of United States combat forces and (b) the withdrawal of United States support from Southeast Asia; their concern, therefore, might be usefully expressed either to Communist bloc countries or in political support for what may prove necessary in South Viet-Nam itself.

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RECOMMENDATIONS

In the light of the foregoing, the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense recommend that:

1. ¥e now take the decision to commit ourselves to the ohjective of preventing the fall of South Viet-Nam to Communism and that, in doing so, we recognize that the introduction of United States and other SSATO forces may be necessary to achieve this objective. (However, if it is necessary to commit outside forces to achieve the foregoing objective our decision to introduce United States forces should not be contingent upon unanimous SEA.TO agreement thereto,)

2. The Department of Defense be prepared with plans for the use of United States forces in South Yiet-Nam under one or more of the following purposes:

(a) Use of a significant number of United States forces to signify United States determination to defend South Viet-Waiu and to boost South Viet-Nam morale.

(b) Use of .substantial United States forces to assist in suppressing Viet Cpng insiirgency short of engaging in detailed

countei^-guerrllla operatlona but including relavant op§rati©n§

in North Viet-Nam.

(c) Use of United States forces to deal with the situation if there is organized Communist military intervention.

3. We immediately undertake the following actions in support of the GVN:

(a) Provide increased air lift to the GVN forces, including helicopters, light aviation, and transport aircraft, manned to

■ the extent necessary by United States uniformed personnel and under United States operational control.

(b) Provide such additional equipment and United States uniformed personnel as may be necessary for air reconnaissance, photography, instruction in and execution of air-ground support techniques, and for special intelligence,

(c) Provide the GVN with small craft, including such United States uniformed advisers and operating personnel as may be

^ necessary for quick and effective operations in effecting sur-

j veillance and control over coastal waters and inland waterways.

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(d)^ -Provide expedited training and eq.uipping of the civil guard and the self-defense corps with the objective of relieving I the regular Army of static missions and freeing it for mobile

offensive operations.

\e) Provide such personnel and eq_uipment as may be necessary ^to improve the military-political intelligence system beginning at the provincial level and extending upward through-the Government and the armed forces to the Central Intelligence Organization.

(f) Provide such new terms of reference, reorganization and additional personnel for United States military forces as are req_uired for increased United States participation in the direction and control of GVN military operations and to carry out the other increased responsibilities which accrue to MAAG under these recommendations.

■ to -oe -t f^*^*^^^^ ^^^^ increased economic aid as may be reauired tation^^ ^^^ "^^ pursue a vigorous flood relief and rehabili-effort -^^^f^f^' "^^ supply material in support of the security panded' . ^^^^ priority to projects in support of this ex-in ^„., .^^^^"^^^-^^surgency program. (This could include increases

* as food "^^d^""^' ^ ""^^^ ^^^^^^ Of a vid© ra-ngg of materials §uch

tions e' ^^ *^ supplies, transportation equipment, communica-■ assist th^"^r-f^"^' ^^^ ^'^'^ other items where material help could

GTO m winning the war against the Viet Cong.)

reouest h ^J^^^^^^ ^^^ support (including financial support) a

rnptir^ 1 ^^^ "^^ ^^^ ^^0 or any other appropriate inter-^nH^f^^^f?^''^^^'^^'''' ^^^ multilateral assistance in the relief -nd rehabilitation of the flood area.

insert" ^-^^"^^de individual administrators and advisers for in tvD^^^ ^?^ "^^^ Governmental machinery of South Viet-Mm ypes and numbers to be agreed upon by the two Governments.

co^^diti -^^^^^^^ personnel for a joint survey with the GW of politi ^1^' ^^ ^^^^ ^^ ^^^ provinces to assess the social, prosecuti' ^^^^'^-^^^^^^^ ^ and military factors bearing on the

^ ^^m^^ -^? counter-insurgency program in order to reach a common estim^-fci ^-^ ^^ o */ x- o

of -h^. -u ^^^^®^^e of these factors and a common determination ol Jaow to deal vi+.y, +v,^™

of how to deal with them.

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k. Ambassador I^Iolting be instructed to make an immediate ap-■ " proach. to President Diem to the effect that the Government of the United States is prepared to join the Goverriment of Viet-Nam in a sharply increased joint effort to cope vith the Viet Cong threat ji and the ravages of-the flood as set forth under S-, above^ if, on

its part, the Governiaent of Viet-I\^am is prepared to carry out an effective and total mobilization of its own resources, both material and human5 for the saane end. Before setting in motion the United States proposals listed above, the United States Government would appreciate confirmation of their acceptability to the GVI^, and an expression from the GVN of the undertakings it is prepared to make to insure the success of this joint effort. On the part of the United States, it would be expected that these GVN undertakings would include, in accordance with the detailed recommendations of the Taylor Mission and the Country Team:

(a) Prompt and appropriate legislative and administrative action to put the nation on a wartime footing to mobilize its entire resources. (This would include a decentralization and broadening of the Governm.ent so as to realize the full potential of all non-Communist elements in the country willing to contribute to the common struggle.)

(b) The establishment of appropriate Governmental wartime agencies with adequate authority to perform their functions effectively.

(c) Overhaul of the military establishment and command structure so as to create an effective military organization for the prosecution of the war.

5. Very shortly before the arrival in South Viet-Nam of the first increments of United States military personnel and equipment proposed under S.^ above, that would exceed the Geneva Accord ceilings, publish the "Jorden report" as a United States "white paper," transmitting it as simultaneously as possible to the Goverments of all countries with which we have diplomatic relations, including the Communist states.

6. Simultaneous with the publication of the "Jorden report," release an exchange of letters between Diem and the President.

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(a) Diem's letter would include: reference to the DRV violations of Geneva Accords as set forth in the October 24 GVN letter to the ICC and other documents; pertinent references to GTO statements with respect to its intent to observe the Geneva Accords; reference to its need for flood relief and rehabilitation; reference to previous United States aid and the compliance hitherto by both countries with the Geneva Accords; reference to the USG statement at the time the Geneva Accords were signed; the necessity now of exceeding some provisions of the Accords in view of the DRV violations thereof; the lack of aggressive intent with respect to the DRV: Gm intent to return to strict compliance with the Geneva Accords as soon as the DRV violations ceased; and request for additional United States assistance in framework foregoing policy. The letter should also set forth in appropriate general terms steps Diem has taken and is taking to reform Governmental structure.

(b) The President's reply would be responsive to Diem's request for additional assistance and'acknowledge and agree to Diem's statements on the intent promptly to return to strict compliance with the Geneva Accords as soon as DRV violations have ceased,

7. Simultaneous with steps 5 and 6^ above, make a private approach to the Soviet Union that would include: our determination to prevent the fall of South Viet-Nam to Communism by whatever means is necessary; our concern over dangers to peace presented by the aggressive DRV policy with respect to South Viet-Nam; our intent to return to full compliance with the Geneva Accords as soon as the DRV does so; the distinction we draw between Laos and South Viet-Nam; and our expectation that the Soviet Union will exercise its influence on the CEICOMS and the DRV.

8. A special diplomatic approach made to the United Kingdom in its role as co-Chairman of the Geneva Conference requesting that the United Kingdom seek the support of the Soviet co-Chairman for a cessation of DRV aggression against South Viet-Nam.

9. A special diplomatic approach also to be made to India, both in its role as Chairman of the ICC and as a power having relations with Peiping and Hanoi. This approach should be mace immediately prior to public release of the "Jorden report" and the exchange of letters between Diem and the President.

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10. Immediately prior to the release of the "Jordan report" and the exchange of letters bet%*?-een Diem and the President, special diplomatic approaches also to be made to Canada, as well as Burma, Indonesia, Cambodia, Ceylon, the UAH, and Yugoslavia. SMTO, NATO, and OAS members should be informed through those organizations, \T±th selected members also informed individually. The possibility of some special approach to Polaad as a member of the ICC should also be considered.

When v/e reach this memora-ndum in the record, the decision seems essentially sealed. Kennedy, by every indication in the press at the time and according to the recollections of all the memoirs, was, at the least, very reluctant to send American ground forces to Vietnam, and quite possibly every bit as "strongly opposed" as the leakied news stories depicted him. He now had a Joint recommendation from his Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense telling hiia just what he surely wanted to hear: that a decision on combat forces could be deferred*, Consequently, Kennedy's decision on this point can hardly be considered in doubt beyond I\'ovember 11, although a formal YiSC meeting on the question was not held until the 15th, On the question of demands on Diem, again there is no reason to suspect the issue was in doubt any later, at most, than the 11th. The only questions which are in doubt are the extent to which the Rusk/McNamara memorandum simply happened to come to the President in such convenient form, or whether the President arranged it so; and if so, how far this formal paper differed from the real recommendations of the President's senior advisors. The record available gives no basis for even guessing about thiSo As noted earlier, even McNamara, who is on record with a previous, quite different memorandum, cannot be flatly said to have changed his mind (or been overruled). There is too much room for uncertainty about what he was really up to when he signed the memorandum.

In any event, Kennedy essentially adopted the Rusk/McNamara set of recomjnendations, although the record is not entirely clear on when he did so. There v/as an NSC meeting November 5; but although at least the Chairman of the JCS was there, the record shews that even after this meeting there was some uncertainty (or perhaps reluctance) in the JCS about whether the decision had been made. The record shows that McNamara phoned General Lemnitzer to assure him that this was the case. But the cables transmitting the decision to Saigon were dated November 1^1, the day before the NSC meeting. The formal decision ps-per (NSAM 111) was not signed until November 22nd. As noted earlier, the NSAM is essentially the recommendations section of the Rusk/iucNama.ra paper, but with the initial recommendation (committing the U.S. to save Vietnam) deleted. 18/

The NSAl-1 vzas headed "First Phase of Vietnam Program," which, of course, implied that a further decision to send combat troops was in prospect.

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Both Sorenson and Hilsman claim this was really a ruse "by the President, who had no intention of going ahead with combat troops but did not choose to argue the point with his advisors.

Schlesinger, apparently writing from diary notes, says the President talked to hixi about the comba^t troops recommendations at the time, describing the proposed first increment as like an alcoholic's first drink:

The Taylor-Rostow report was a careful and thoughtful document, and the President read it with interest. He was impressed by its description of the situation as serious but not hopeless and attracted by the idea of stiffening the Diem regojue through an infusion of American advisers. He did not, however, like the proposal of a direct Araerican military commitment. "They want a force of Am^erican troops," he told me early in November. "They say it's necessary in order to restore confidence and maintain morale. But it will be Just like Berlin. The troops .v^ill march in; the bands will playj the crowds will cheer; and in four days everyone will have forgotten. Then we will be told we have to send in m-ore troops. It's like taJ^ing a drink. The effect wears off, and you have to take another." The war in Vietnam, he added, could be won only so long as it was their war. -If it were ever converted into a white man's war, we v/ould lose as the French had lost a decade earlier. I9/ ■ •

Whether, in fact, Kennedy had such a firm position in mind at the time cannot be surmised, though, from the official record itself. It is easy to believe that he did, for as Sorenson points out, Kinnedy had strong views on the difficulties of foreign troops putting do>m an insuj?-gency dating from his bleak, but correct, appraisals of French prospects in Vietnam as early as I95I, and again in Algeria in the late 1950'so And he was hardly alone in such sentiments, as shown in columns of the . period by Reston and Lippman, and in a private communication from Galbraith to be quoted shortly.

But, Kennedy did not need to have such a firm position in mind to make the decisions he did« There was a case to be made for deferring the combat troops decision even if the President accepted the view that U.S. troops commitments were almost certainly needed in Vietnam and that putting them in sooner would be better than waiting. There was, in particular, the arguments in the R-ask/VicT^emaxa memorandima that putting combat troops into Vietnam just then would upset the Laos negotiations, and the unstated but obvious argument that the U.S. perhaps ought to hold back on the combat troop commitment to gain leverage en Diem.

General Taylor's advice, as shown in the record, gave a different ground for delaying. Taylor argued that the ground troop coiranitment was essentially for its psychological, not military, impact. Taylor's judgment was that it

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t j ; was "very douTotful" that anything short of a prompt commitment of ground

troops would restore South Vietnamese morale. But such a commitment would obviously be a costly stop. The President was thoroughly fore-' warned that such a move would lead both to continual pressure to send more troops and to political difficulties at home that would inevitably flow from the significant casualties that had to be expected to accompany a ground troop commitment- The risk of delaying the groimd troop commitment might easily have been judged not worth the certain costs that would accompany it. And of course^ in hindsight, we know that the limited program approved by the President was sufficient to put off any imminent collapse of the Diem regijne. Consequently, Kennedy's decisions do not tell us just what his view was, and indeed he did not need to have a firmly settled view to make the decision, which after all, was only to put off, not to foreclose a decision to send ground troops. He had only to decide that, on balance, the risks of deferring the troop

j decision were no worse than the costs of making it, and he could have

reached that judgment by any nijimber of routes. The reasons stated in the various papers may or may.not accurately reflect the President's

' ' state of mind. The only thing we can be sure of is that they conveyed

I his judgment of the tactically most suitable rationale to put in writing.

The most detailed record we have of this rationale and explanation of is the following cable to Nolting:

.* •

.Review of Taylor Report has resulted in following basic decisions:

■1. Must essentially be a GW task to contain and reduce the VC threat at present level of capability. Means organizing to go on offensive. We are prepared to contemplate further assistance after joint assessfaent establishes needs and possibilities of aid more precisely.

2. i\^o amount of extra aid can be substitute for GVN taking measures to permit them to assume offensive and strengthen the administrative and political bases of government.

■ ^

'3- Do not propose to introduce into GVII the US combat troops now_, but propose a phase of intense public and diplomatic activity to focus on infiltration from North. Shall decide later on course of action should infiltration not be"radically reduced.

*

'h. On flood_, decide best coarse to treat' as primarily civil problem^ and occasion should be used to draw in as many nationals of other countries as can be used in GVN flood plan. Have been encouraged this course on advise of Desai of Indian Foreign Office who observed a good thing if some Indians and Burmese involved constructively in SW and subject to VC attack. We prepared to put maximum, pressure on FAO. Do not exclude ad hoc US military aid in flood area, ' . .

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5* Diplomatically position that the violations to be docu-,mentcd in Jorden report c»nd strong references to DRV attack against SVN in DM's letter to Kennedy^ need not confirm to the world 'and Cornraunists that Geneva accords are being disregarded by our Increased aid. Need not accuse ourselves publicly^ make Coaur.unist Job easier. GVN should be advised to counter charges by leveling - charges against DRV and insisting that if ICC investigates in SVW must equally investigate in MN..' Appreciate approach will make ICC task difficult but will explain position to Canadians and Indians to get their support. ' . .'

'• 6. A crucial element in USG willingness to move forward is concrete demonstration by Die:ri that he is now prepared to work in an orderly way on his subordinates and broaden the political base of his regime.

7v Package should be presented as first steps in a partner*-■ship in which US is prepaa-ed to do more as joint .study of facts and GVK performance m-akes increased US aid possible and productive.

8. Still possible Laotian settlement can be reached peii:aining ^our iainimum objective of' independent I/^os on the basis of a neutral

coalition^ (although weak and unsatisfactory)^ headed by Soubanna. Woul.d include provision .Laos not be used as transit area or base for interference in SWl. Therefore must keep in mind impact of action in SVN or prospects for acceptable Lhos settlement.

■

:9r Introduction of US or Sr:?.to forces into SWT before Laotian settlement might v:reck cli;;ngesVfor agreement^ lead to break up of Geneva conference^ break L/ c- cease fire by cornraunists .With resumption of hostilities.

10. Decision to introduce US combat forces in GVN would have to be taken in light of GVN effort^ including support from people^ I^otian situation^ Berlin crisis^ readiness of allies or sharply j.ncreased tension with Bloc^ and enormous responsibilities which would have to be borne by US in event of escalation SEA or other areas.

11. Hope measures outlined in instructions will galvanize and supplement GVN effort, making d.eclslon on use of US combat forces unnecessary and no need for decision in effect to shift primary responsibility for defense of SV"N to USG. '

*

12. We are fully cognizant of extent to which decisions if Imple-inented through Diem's acceptance will sharply increase the commitment of our prestige struggle to save SVIT.

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IS* Very strictly for your own information^ DOD has been instructed to prepare plans for the use of US combat forces in S^}^ under various contingencies^ including stepped up infiltration as veil as organized Inventory (sic) Military/ intervention. However objective of our policy is to do all possible to accomplish purpose without use of US combat forces. 20/ * ^ . • '

An accompanying cable also provided this additional comment on troops question:

...U. It is anticipated that one of the first questions President Diem will raise with you after your presentation of the above joint proposals will be that of introducing U.So combat troops. You are authorized to remind him that the actions we ajjready have in mind involve a substantial number of UoS. lailitary personnel for operational duties in Viet-Nam and that we believe that these forces performing crucial missions can greatly increase the capacity of GW forces to win their war against the Viet Cong. You can also tell him that we believe that the missions being undertaken by our forces, -under present circimistances, are more suitable for white foreign troops than garrison duty or missions involving the seeking out of Viet Cong personnel submerged in the Viet-Nam population. You can assure him that the USG at highest levels -will be in daily contact with the situation in Viet-Nam and will be in constant touch with him about requirements of the situation..o. 20a/

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III. AFTERM/ITH

The President's decisions were apparently sent to Nolting on the" l^J-th^ in a cable that is ta.ken essentially verbatim from the description of the Rusk/McNamara memorandum (paragraphs 3 and k) of the program the U.S. was offering and the response expected from Diem, But the cable added some new language5 putting still more emphasis on pressuring Diem:

...It is most important that Diem come forth with changes which will be recognized as having real substance and meaning. Rightly or wrongly^ his regime is widely criticised abroad and in the U.S., and if we are to give our substantial support we must be able to point to real administrative political and social reforms and a real effort to widen its base that will give maxim.\:mi confidence to the American people, as well as to world opinion that ovx efforts are not directed towards the support of an unpopular or ineffective regime, but rather towards supporting the combined efforts of all the non-Communist people of the GW against a Communist take-over. You should make this quite cleax, and indicate that the U.S. contribution to the proposed joint effort depends heavily upon his response to this point.

You should inform Diem that, in our minds, the concept of the joint undert3Jk:ing envisages a much closer relationship than the present one of acting in an advisory capacity only. We would expect to share in the decision-making process in the political, economic and military fields as they affect the security situation. 21/

Overall, then, what Kennedy ended up doing was to offer Diem a good deal less than he was expecting, and nevertheless to couple this offer with demands on Diem for which, on the basis of the available record, we can only assume he was totally unprepared. Noltlng's first cable, though, reported Diem listened quietly and "took our proposals rather better than I expected."

Here are some extracts:

...As anticipated y^y 'Washington/, his first question was re introduction US combat tioops. I replied along line para k reftel..o.

Diem said that he presumed I realized that our proposals involved the question of the responsibility of the Government of Viet Nam. Viet T^^am, he said, did not want to be a protectorate.

I said that this was well understood; ve for our part did not wish to mal^e it one. Diem also pointed out that GVN was constantly in process of making refoims but major action could not be taken without thorough consideration and without having always in mind

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that there vas a war to be vorio Object was to restore order^j not to create disorder<. I said I recognized that this was a delicate judgment^ in my opinion,; as a friend of his country and of him^ his greater risk was to stand pat^ or act too cautiously.o.

On the whole^ I am not discouraged at Diem's reactiono In fact J he took our proposals rather better than I had expected <, He has promised to call me as soon as he has been able to reflect upon our proposals and^ until we have heard his considered reaction^ I think it would be idle to speculate on outcomeoo. 22/

On the 20th^ Nolting met with Thuan^ who among other things said the U.So offer-had set Diem to wondering "whether UoSo getting ready to back out on Vietnam, ooas we had done in Laos." Nolting hoped Thuan's bleak report was only a bargaining tactic.

Thuan said that Diem had not yet discussed fully with him US proposals presented last Friday; but had given him impression of being 'very sad and very disappointedo' Thuan said Diem had said he now hesitates to put proposals before even his cabinet ministers^ fearing that they would be disappointed and lose hearto He had intended to discuss US proposals with both cabinet and selected members of assembly who had been consulted re advisability of US forces at time of Taylor Mission^ but now thought contrast between hig earlier question and our proposals too striking. Thuan conveyed impression that Diem is brooding over US proposals and ■ has made no move yet to develop specific ideas on actions GVN expected to takeo Thuan said President's attitude seemed to be that US asking great concessions of GW in realm its sovereignty^ in exchange for little additional help; that this is great disappointment after discussions with General Taylor involving^ in particular^ concept of Delta Task Force; that Diem seemed to wonder whether US was getting ready to back out on Viet Nam^ as he suggested^ we had done in Ia.oSo £3/

There followed a long discussion in which Thuan described all the difficulties that would be involved in doing what the U»So was asking, including the risk of looking like a UoS. puppet.

There is nothing in our record to indicate any U.Sg reconsideration of the decision against sending the military task force« Thus, if Diem and Thuan's response was a bargaining tactic to get the task force, it failedo On the other hand, if Diem was using disappointment over the failure to send the task force as a bargaining counter to get the U.So to relent on its demands for reforms, then he got just what he wantedo But what amoixnted to a complete U.S<, reversal on these demands also may have been influenced by the advice Kennedy -received from John Kenneth Galbraith at this time^ Kennedy had asked Galbraith to stop by Saigon on his return to

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India. Galbraith did so_j and after three days cabled "back^ among other things^ the advice that it was a waste of effort to bargain with Dienia

On the 20th^ the day of Thuan's meeting with Nolting^ Galbraith ■ cabled the President:

There is scarcely the slightest practical chance that the administrative and political reforms now being pressed upon Diem will result in real changeo.oothere is no solution that does not involve a change in government.

On the insurgency^ though^ Galbraith was optimistic^ provided Diem was replaced:

While situation is indubitably bad military aspects seem to me out of perspective,, A comparatively well-equipped army with paramilitary formations number a quarter million men is facing a max-imiom of 15-18^000 lightly armed men. If this were equality^ the United States would hardly be safe against the Sioux. I know the theories about this kind of warfareo <>. .Given even a moderately effective government and putting the relative military power into perspective^ I can't help thinking the insurgency might very soon be settled. 2h/

The following day^ Galbraith^ now in Wew Delhi^ sent a more detailed appraisal_j covering essentially the same ground. Here are some extracts.

,.. THE VIET CONG INSURRECTION IS STILL GRa/ING IN EFFECT. THE OUTBREAK

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ON THE NORTHERN HIGHLANDS IS MATCHED BY A POTENTIALLY EVEN f/.ORE DAMAGING IMPACT ON THE ECONOMY AND ESPECIALLY ON THE MOVEMENT OF RICE TO SAIGON.

■^ (N THE ABSENCE OF KNa/LEDGE OF THE ADMIXTURE OF TERROR AND ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL EVANGELISM WE HAD BEST ASSUME THAT IT IS EMPLOYING BOTH. WE MUST' NOT FOREVER BE GUIDED BY THOSE WHO MISUNDERSTAND THE DYNAMICS OF REVOLUTION AND IMAGINE THAT BECAUSE'THE COMMUNISTS DO NOT APPEAL TO US THEY ARE ABHORRENT TO EVERYONE. ' • .'

IN OUR ENTHUSIASM TO PROVE OUTSIDE INTERVENTION BEFORE WORLD OPINION WE HAVE UNQUESTIONABLY EXAGGERATED THE ROLE OF MATERIAL ASSISTANCE ESPECIALLY

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. IN THE MAIN AREA'OF INSURRECTION IN THE FAR SOUTH. THAT LEADERS AND RADIO ■■■■...GUIDANCE COME IN V/E KNO.V. BUT THE AMOUNT OF AMMUNITION AND WEAPONRY THAT A _

■ MAN CAN CARRY ON HIS BACK FOR SEVERAL HUNDRED KILOMETERS O^/ER JUNGLE TRAILS ' . ■ V/AS 'not .increased APPRECIABLY BY MARX. NO MAJOR CONFLICT CAN DEPEND ON . SUCH LOGISTIC SUPPORT. ' " '

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A MAXIMUM OF l8,000 LIGHTLY ARMED MEN ARE INVOLVED IN THE INSURRECTION. • THESE ARE GVN ESTIMATES AND THE FACTOR'OF EXAGGERATION IS UNQUESTIONABLY CONS ID-

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ERABLE. TEN THOUSAND IS MORE PROBABLE. WHAT WE HAVE IN OPPOSITION INVOLVES A ' HEAVY THEOLOGICAL D|SPUTE. DIEM IT IS SAID IS A GREAT BUT DEFAMED LEADER. IT . IS ALSO SAID HE HAS LOST TOUCH WITH THE MASSES, IS IN POLITICAL DISREPUTE AND . ■ OTHERWISE NO GOOD. THIS DEBATE CAN BE BYPASSED BY AGREED POINTS. IT IS ' AGREED THAT ADMINISTRATIVELY DIEM IS EXCEEDINGLY BAD. HE HOLDS FAR TOO MUCH ■ POWER IN HIS OWN HANDS, EMPLOYS HIS ARMY BADLY, HAS NO INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION ■ WORTHY OF THE NAME, HAS ARBIl^RY OR INCOMPETENT SUBORDINATES IN THE PROVINCES

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AND SOM£ ACHIEVEMENTS NOT\'/ITHSTANDING, HAS A POOR ECONOMIC POLICY. HE HAS ALSO EFFECTIVELY RESISTED IMPROVEMENT FOR A LONG WHILE .IN FACE OF HEAVY DETERIORATION. .THIS IS ENOUGH. WHETHER HIS POLITICAL POSTURE IS NEPOTIC, DESPOTIC OUT 0F_ TOUCH WITH THE VILLAGERS AND HENCE DAMAGING' OR WHETHER THIS DAMAGE IS THE _ FIGMENT OF SAIGON INTELLECTUALS DOES NOT BEAR ON OUR IMMEDIATE POLICY AND, MAY ■• BE BY-PASSED AT LEAST IN PART. ' ■ " ,• '

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'■. THE SVN ARMY NUMBERS 170,000 AND WITH PARAMILITARY UNITS OF THE CIVIL ■"■" GUARD AND HOME DEFENSE FORCES A QUARTER OF A MILLION. WERE THIS WELL DEPLOYED

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ON BEHALF OF AN EFFECTIVE GOVERN'MENT 'IT SHOULD BE OBVIOUS THAT THE VIET COm WOULD HAVE NO CHANCE OF SUCCESS OR TAKEOVER. WASHINGTON IS CURRENTLY HAVING AN • • INTELLECTUAL ORGASM ON THE UNBEATABILITY OF GUERRILLA VMR. WERE GUERRILLAS EFFECTIVE IN A RATIO OF ONE TO' FIFTEEN OR TWENTY-FIVE .IT IS OBVIOUS THAT NO ■' •.

■ GOVERNMENT V/OULD BE SAFE. THE VIET CONG, IT SHOULD BE NOTED, IS STRONGEST

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IN THE SOUTHERN DELTA WHICH IS NOT JUNGLE BUT OPEN RICE PADDY. ' ' •■

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THE FUNDA^'£NTAL DIFFICULTIES IN COUNTERING THE INSURGENCY, APART FROM ABSENCE OF INTELLIGENCE, ARE TWO-FOLD. FIRST IS THE POOR COMMAND, DEPLOYMENT, TRAINING, MORALE AND OTHER WEAKNESSES OF THE ARNfT AND PARAMILITARY FORCES. AND SECOND WHILE THEY CAN OPERATE - - SWEEP - - THROUGH ANY PART OF ' •THE 'country AND CLEAR OUT ANY VISIBLE INSURGENTS, THEY CANNOT GUARANTEE '- ■ . SECURITY AFTERWARDS. THE VIET CONG COMES BACK AND PUTS THE ARM ON ALL WHO ' ' ; HAVE COLLABORATED. THIS FACT IS VERY IMPORTANT IN RELATION TO REQUESTS FROM AMERICAN Mu^NPOWER. OUR FORCES WOULD CONDUCT THE ROUND-UP OPERATIONS WHICH THE RVN ARMY CAN ALREADY DO. WE COULDN'T CONCEIVABLY SEND ENOUGH MEN TO

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■ PROVIDE SAFETY FOR THE VILLAGES AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR AN EFFECTIVELY TRAINED ' CIVIL GUARD AND "home DEFENSE FORCE AND, PERHAPS, A POLITICALLY COOPERATIVE COMMUNITY. ' . . -. • .•

, THE KEY AND INESCAPABLE POINT, THEN,' IS THE INEFFECTUAL ITY (ABETTED DEBATABLY BY THE UNPOPULARITY) OF THE DIEM GOVERNMENT. THIS IS THE STRATEGIC FACTOR. NOR CAN ANYONE ACCEPT THE STATEMENT OF THOSE WHO HAVE.BEEN EITHER TOO LONG OR TOO LITTLC IN ASIA THAT HIS IS THE INEVITABLE POSTURE OF THE

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ASIAN Mj\NDARlN. FOR ONE THING IT ISN'T TRUE, BUT WERE IT SO THE ONLY ."

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POSSIBLE CONCLUSION V/OULD BE THAT THERE IS NO Fl/TURE FOR MANDARINS.

THE COMMUNISTS DON'T FAVOR THEM. =' . .'•

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I COfC NO^ TO A LESSER MISCALCULATION, THE ALLEGED V/EAKENI NG -EMPHASIS OF THE MEKONG FLOOD. FLOODS IN THIS PART OF THE WORLD ARE AN . OLD TRAP FOR WESTERN NON-AGRICULTURISTS. THEY ARE JUDGED BY WHAT THE OHIO DOES TO ITS lO.-mS. NOW AS THE FLOOD V/ATERS RECEDE IT IS ALREADY EVIDENT THAT THIS FLOOD CONFORMS TO THE ASIAN PATTERN, ONE REPEATED .

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EVERY YEAR IN INDIA. THE MUD VILLAGES WILL SOON GRO-V AGAIN. SOME UPLAND ' RICE WAS DROWNED BECAUSE THE WATER ROSE TOO RAPIDLY. NEARER THE COAST THE

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PRESSURE ON THE BRACKISH WATER WILL PROBABLY BRING AN OFFSETTING IMPROVENENT. NEXT YEAR'S CROP WILL BE MUCH BETTER FOR THE SILT. '

I COME m^ TO POLICY, FIRST THE BOX WE ARE IN PARTLY AS THE .

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RESULT OF RECENT MOVES AND SECOND HOW WE GET OUT WITHOUT A TAKEOVER. WE HAVE JUST PROPOSED TO HELP DIEM IN VARIOUS WAYS IN RETURN FOR A PROMISE OF ADM'INISTRATIVE and POLITICAL REFORMS. SINCE THE ADMINISTRATIVE (AND POSSIBLY,POLITICAL^ INEFFECTUALITY ARE THE STRATEGIC FACTORS FOR SUCCESS. THE ABILITY TO GET REFORMS IS DECISIVE. WITH THEM THE NEW AID AND GADGETRY

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WILL,BE USEFUL. WITHOUT THEM THE HELICOPTERS, PLANES AND ADVISER'S WON'T

MAKE APPRECIABLE DIFFERENCE.

IN MY COMPLETELY CONSIDERED VIEW, AS STATED YESTERDAY, DIEM WILL NOT REFORM EITHER ADMINISTRATIVELY OR POLITICALLY IN ANY EFFECTIVE

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V/AYV THAT IS BECAUSE HE CANNOT. IT IS POLITICALLY NAIVE TO EXPECT IT. HE SENSES THAT HE CANNOT LET POWER GO BECAUSE HE V/OULD BE THRO.VN OUT. ". HE MAY DISGUISE THIS EVEN FROM HIMSELF WITH THE STATEMENT THAT HE LACKS EFFECTIVE SUBORDINATES BUT THE CIRCUMSTANCE REMAINS UNCHANGED. HE PROBABLY SENSES THAT HIS GREATEST DANGER IS FROM THE ARt'^. 'HENCE THE REFORM THAT WILL BRING EFFECTIVE USE OF HIS MANPOV/ER, THOUGH THE MOST . URGENT MAY BE THE MOST IMPROBABLE. ' . ' ■ ' '

THE POLITICAL REFORMS ARE EVEN MORE UNLIKELY BUT THE ISSUE IS ACADEMIC. ONCE THE IMAGE OF A POLITICIAN IS FIXED, WHETHER AMONG OPPOSITION INTELLECTUALS OR PEASANTS, IT IS NOT CHANGED. NOR DO POLITICIANS CHANGE THEMSELVES. DI EM'S IMAGE WOULD NOT BE CHANGED BY HIS TAKING m OTHER NON-COMMUNISTS, INITIATING SOME SOCIAL REFORMS OR OTHERWISE MEETING THE REQUIREMENTS' OF OUR DEMARCHE.

HOWEVER HAVING STARTED ON THIS HOPELESS GAME WE HAVE NO ALTERNATIVE, BUT TO PLAY' |T OUT FOR A MINIMUM TIME. THOSE WHO THINK •THERE IS HOPE OF REFORM WILL HAVE TO BE PERSUADED.'

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It is a cliche that there is no alternative to Diem's regime. This is politically naive. Where one man has dominated the^ scene for good or ill there never seems to be. Ko one considered Truman an alternative to Roosevelt. There is none_for Nehru. There was none I magine for Rhee. This is an optical^illusion arising from the fact that the eye is fixed on the visible figures. It is a better rule that nothing succeeds like successors. ,

We should not be alajrmed by the Army as an alternative.^ It^ ■would buy time and get a fresh" dynamic. It is not ideal; civilian rule is ordinarily more durable and more saleable to the world.

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But a change and a new start is of the essence and in considering opinion we may note that Diem's flavor is not markedly good in Asia.

A time of crisis in our policy on South Vietnam will come when it becomes evident that the reforms we have asked have not come ^ off and that our presently preferred aid is not accomplishing anything. Troops will be urged to back up Diem. It will be sufficiently clear that I think this must be resisted. Our soldiers would not deal with the vital weakness. They could perpetuate it. They would enable Diem to continue to concentrate on protecting his own position at the expense of countering the insurgency. Last springy following the Vice President's promise of more aid, proposals for increased and reform taxes which were well advanced^ were promptly dropped. The parallel on administrative and political reform could be close.

It will be said that we need troops for "a show of strength and determination in the area. Since the troops will not deal with fundamental faults -- since there csix't be enough of them to give security to the countryside — their failure to provide security could create a worse crisis of confidence. You will be aware of my general reluctance to move in troops. On the other hand I would note that it is those of us who have worked in the political vineyard and who have committed our hearts most strongly to the political fortunes of the I^ew Frontier who worry most about its bright promise being sunk under the rice fields. lilies in 195^ saw the dangers in this area. Dean Acheson knew he could not invest men in Chiang.

* * * *

My overall feeling is that despite the error implicit in this last move and the supposition that Diem can be reformed, the situa- -tion is not hopeless. It is only hopeless if we marry^our course to that of a man who must spend more time protecting his own position and excluding those who threaten it than in fighting the^insurgency. Diem's calculation instinctive or deliberate is evident. He has already been deposed once and not by the Communists. He can see his clear and present danger as well as anyoneo o/

Two things are particularly worth noting about Galbraith's advice: the first, to the extent it had an influence on Kennedy, it counselled him to avoid sending troops, but also not to take seriously the quid pro quo with Diem because Diem was not going to do anything anyway. Consequently, Galbraith, with a limitlessly bleak view of the prospects for success under Diem, really had no_ quarrel with those who argued against putting pressure on Diem and for trying to win his confidence. He had no argument, because he thought both approaches (pressure and no pressure) were equally hopeless. And indeed, both had been tried during the year —

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the pressure approach in the CIP negotiations; the "get on his wave length" approach following the Task Force review -- and both produced an identical lack of results.

Second^ Galbraith^s analysis of the situation really has a good deal in coiranon with that of the Taylor Mission. Obviously^ he thought we must be rid of Diem_, and he apparently thought it was a mistake to put this ■ move off by making new aid offers to Diem rather than letting word get around that we would be prepared to offer more support to Vietnam if Diem should be removed. But at this time^ even people like Galbraith (and Schelsinger^ as is clear from his memoir) saw no alternative to continuing to support Vietnam^ although not to continuing to support Diem personally, Galbraith was^ if anything^ more optimistic about the chances of putting down the insurgency (given a change in Saigon) than was the Taylor Report. For his optimism was not at all contingent on any hopes of the efficacy of bombing threats against the north. For all we know^ he may have been right in supposing any "moderately effective" Saigon government could do all right against the insurgents; but we now know all too well how over-optimistic was his fairly confident expectation that a military replacement of the Diem regime would be at least moderately effective.

To return to the negotiations in Saigon_, in late November^ we now had the following situation:

1. It was clear that Diem was^ to say the least^ disappointed with the bargain Kennedy had proposed.

2. Kennedy was obviously aware that he had offered Diem less than Diem expected^ and demanded much more in return,

3. Both supporters of Diem_, like Lansdale and Kenneth Young^ and his severest critics^ like Galbraith^ were agreed that it was futile to try to force Diem to reform. Kennedy had already had his own experiences with such efforts earlier in the year.

k, PresiHnably_, although we have nothing to show it in the avail- ■ able record, there was some unrest within the Administration about the limited offer that was being made, the demands being pressed, and the delay it was all causing. To put off an agreement too long raised the dual threat of an awkward public squabble and renewed pressure on the President to send the task force after all.

It is hard to think of any realistic counter-arguments to the case for settling the dispute and get on with either trying to do better in the war, or get rid of Diem.

The next phase was a brief flurry of anti-American stories in the government-controlled Saigon press. The U.S. was accused, among other

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things_, of trying to use Vietnam as a "pawn of capitalist imperialism." 26 / Nolting went to Diem to complain about the damage that such stories would do to U.S.-Vietnamese relations. But Diem disclaimed responsibility^ and suggested they were an understandable reaction of the South Vietnamese to what they had learned about the U.S. proposals from U.S. press reports. Nolting's final comment in his report on this meeting was a suggestion that the U.S. concentrate on "efficiency in GVIT rather than on more nebulous and particularly offensive to Diem concept of political reform." 27/ The impression given by the cable is that Nolting felt on the defensive^ which was probably the case since the package Washington had proposed must have been disappointing to him as well as to Diem.

It did not take long for Washington to back away from any hard demands on Diem. A sentence from the original guidance telegram stated "we would expect to share in the decision-making process in the political^ economic and military fields as they affected the security situation"...as opposed to the previous arrangement of "acting in an advisory capacity only." 28/ Alexis Johnson and Rostow drafted a cable on December 7 that "clarified" this and a nimber of other points to which Diem had strongly objected^ in this case to explain that^

. ...what we have in mind is that^ in operations directly related to the security situation^ partnership will be so close that one party will not take decisions or actions affecting the other without full and frank prior consultations... 29/

This was quite a comedown from the idea that American involvement in the Vietnamese government should be so intimate that the government could be reformed "from the bottom up" despite Diem. Once the U.S. backed away from any tough interpretation of its proposals^ agreement was fairly easily reached with Diem^ and one of the usual fine sounding statements of agreed " principles and measures was drawn up. . " '

On one seemingly m.odest request from Diem^ Washington was curiously firm. Diem repeatedly^ both while the Taylor Mission was in Saigon^ and after its return^ asked for Lansdale to be sent. (Our record shows four such requests, one directly by Diem to Taylor; a second from Thuan; and in a memorandiom to McNamara William Bundy referred to two further requests relayed through McGarr.) Cottrell, the senior State representative on the Taylor Mission, strongly endorsed sending Lansdale, and the main paper of the Taylor Report seemed to endorse the idea. William Bundy was in favor of sending Lansdale, and Lansdale wanted to go. But nothing happened.. Lansdale never got to Vietnam until Cabot Lodge brought him out late in 1965.

The first contingents of helicopters arrived in Saigon December 11 (having been put to sea several weeks earlier). On the following day a Mew York Times dispatch from Saigon began:

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Two United States Army helicopter companies arrived here today, • The helicopters^ to be flown and serviced by United States troops^ are the first direct military support by the United States for South Vietnam's war against Communist guerrilla forces.

The craft will be assigned to the South Vietnamese Army in the field^ but they will remain under United States Army control and operation.

At least 33 H-21C twin-rotor helicopters^ their pilots and ground crews^, an estimated total of 400 men^ arrived aboard the Military Sea Transportation Service aircraft feriy Core. 30/

The Times story ended by describing the force as "the first fruits" of the Taylor Mission, with more to come. The Times did not find the story important enough to put it on the front page.

A day later, the Times published a story about the ICC reaction to the arrival of the helicopters. It began:

The International Control Commission for Vietnam was reported today to be considering whether to continue functioning here in the face of an increase in United States assistance to South Vietnam's struggle against Communist guerrillas.

The Commission, made up of representatives of India, Canada, and Poland, has been holding emergency sessions since the arrival here yesterday of a United States vessel loaded with at least 33 helicopters and operating and maintenance crews. 3l/

A few paragraphs later^ the dispatch noted that:

With the arrival yesterday of the Core, a former escort carrier, bearing the helicopters, four single-engine training planes and about 400 men, the United States military personnel here now are believed to total about 1,500, Many more are expected, 32/

Again, the Times ran the story on an inside page.

Finally, on the 15th, a formal exchange of letters between Presidents Diem and Kennedy was published, announcing in general terms a stepped-up U.S. aid program for Vietnam.

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V.B.^. THE KEI^^TJEDY PROGRAM MB COi^MITI^EPITS: I96I

FOOTNO TES - CmPTERI

1. ME 63-59, 26 May 1959, "Prospects for North aad South Vietnam"

2. Durbrow (Saigon) message to State (61)

3c KIE 63.1-60, 23 August i960, "Short Term Trends in South Vietnam"

1^-c Brigc Gen Lansdale Report to Secretary of Defense, 1? January 196I

5. CINCPAC Command History, 196O, p. lll2

6. NIE 63.1-60, 23 August i960

7. Young Memorandum to Diem (copy attached to Young Letter to Deputy Secretary of Defense Gilpatrlc, 2k April)

80 Saigon message to State I656, k December I96O

9. CAS message (Lodge) to White House (65)

10. Coolidge Commission Report, January 196O (item 1, Recommendations)

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FOOTNOTES - CHAPTER II

' ' . - 1. DEPTEL 105^ to Saigon, 3 Fe"bruary I96I

2. Saigon message 2765 h January I96I

3. Charles von Luttichau of Office, Chief of Army History, "U.S. Army Role in the Conflict in Vietnam," 196^, Chapter 5 (TS). For detail on the chain of command problem, see page 7ff5 fo^ the dispute on an operations plan, see page 15ff•

k. Saigon message 276, h January I96I.

5. Ibid .

6. Ibid.

7. Ibid.

8. Memorandim, Lansdale to Secretary of Defense, 17 January I96I. Tab 1, R. L. Gilpatric Task Force File.

9. Hilsman, Roger, To Move a Nation (Doubleday), p. ^19 ■ 10. State message 105^, op. cit .

11.' Ibid,

12. Saigon message ikkk, 8 March I96I

13. Saigon message 1^66, I6 March I96I Ik. DEPTEL 1218 to Saigon, 23 March I96I 15. Saigon message I65O, 3 May I96I

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FOOTi>rOTES - CHARTER III

I !• Secretary of Defense Memorajid\mL to the Deputy Secretary of Defense,

' _ 20 April I96I5 confirmed by Secretary of Defense Memorandum .for the

President5 20 April I961

2. NIE 5O-6I5 "Outlook in Mainlexid Southeast Asia" 28 March 196I; Lansdale Memorandum to Secretary of Defense, 1? January I96I; Saigon

j message to State I656, 3 May I96I; Draft Report of Task Force on

Vietnam^ 26 April I96I

3. l^IE 50-61

k. Gilpatric Task Force Pile, handwritten note among drafts on impact on Vietnam of Laos, at Tab 20.

5. Public Papers of the President: John F. Kennedy, I96I, p« 26l ^* Ibid ., p. 306

7- W. W. Rostow Memorandum to the President in Secretary of Defense files (File Copy). Lansdale's Memorandum describing it is found at Tab 2, Gilpatric Task Force file. Copy of 26 April Draft of .'—^, Task Force Report in Gilpatric Task Force file.

8. The "implementing agent" language is from an SIHE dated 5 October on Bloc support for the Viet Cong. But similar formulations are commonplace throughout the record. See, for example, the opening section of the Taylor Mission Report, or the opening section of the Ru^k/HcNamara Memorandum for the President dated 11 ITovember 1961.

9. Lansdale Memorandum to Richard Bissell (CIA), Gilpatric Task Force, Tab 19

10 o KSAInI 52, 11 May I96I

11. Gilpatric Task Force file, Tab 13

12. Ibid ., Tab 20

12«a, . Schlesinger, Arthux, A Thou sand Days (Houghton Mifflin), po 337 13c Public Papers of the President: John F. Kennedy, I96I, p. 3^0 . ik. Gilpatric Task Force file, Tab 23 I 15o Ibido, Tab 26 •

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l6. Ibid ., Tab 29 .

17c Ibid ., Tab 28

18. Ibi^., Tab 29 (Line-in/Line-out draft from State which shows-both

the Defense draft and the State-proposed revisions). The changes ^^

cited are from the section headed "Political and Economic Objectives.

19. Ibido

20. Ibido, Tab 31. (Copies of the summary section only were distributed as attachments to NSMI 52. )

21. Gilpatric Task Force, op. cit .

22o Politica,! Annex to May 6 (Final) Draft

23o Papers of the Presidents, op. cit ,, po 35^

2^. President Kennedy's Letter to Ego Dinh Diem, 8 May I961

25. Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum to Chairman, JCS, 8 May 1961, Subject: "Vietnam."

26. Gilpatric Task Force Draft, May 6, Military Recoimendations

27. JCSM 320-61, 10 llay 1961 . - '

28. KSM 52, 11 May I961

29. Ibid . • ■

30. Gilpatric Task Force Drafts, Political and Economic Section

31« Ibid.

32. Ibid.

33. OSD Task Force (Vietnam) files - Dr. D. Ellsberg Paper 3I1. Ibid.

35. Deputy Secretary of Defense files» Among other things, states that Vice President Johnson will find Diem "as interested in cattle as any Texan, and as interested in freedom as Sem. Houston." Concludes "Here is our- toughest ally in Asia..«a 60-yeax old bachelor who gave up roma-nce with his sweetheart to devote his life to his country.

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FQOTTTQTES - CMPTER IV

1. Saigon message ^^21^ 1 October I96I

2. Saigon message 17^3, 15 May I96I

3. Vice President Johnson Memorandum for the President^ 23 May I96I

k. Lansdale Memorandum for Gilpatric, I8 May 1961^ Subject: "Vietnam."

5. President Diem Letter to President Kennedy, 9 June I96I

60 Joint Action Program Proposed by the Vietnam-United States Special Financial Groups, undated, but submitted to President Kennedy approximately July 25. '

7. I^^SAM 65, 11 August 1961

8. Lansdale Memorandum for Gilpatric, I8 May I961, Subject: "Vietnam."

9. According to notes in the Task Force files. We do not have citations for the JCS Memorandum or McGarr's messages. Lansdale's Memorandum to Gilpatric also alludes to such proposals«

10. Saigon message I803, 27 May I961

11. Diem Letter to Kennedy, 9 June I96I

12. Sorenson, Kennedy (Harper 8c Rowe), p. 736

13. Kote found in Secretary of Defense files.

ik. l^IE lU.3/53-61, 15 August 1961, "Prospects for Worth and South Vietnam.."

15. Ibid. ' • " ■

16. Ibid .

17. State Department, "First 12-Month Report/' 1 September I96I 18« Schlesinger, op. cit ., p« ^hk

19. Saigon message, 29 September I96I

20. Quoted froL. an untitled, mimeographed paper in Secretary of Defense's files. The only marking on the paper is the usual note "Secretary of Defense has seen." Probably it was a product of a Laos^ or Southeast Asia working groups

21. Ibid.

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22. NIE lif.3/53-61

23. New York Tmes , 23 September I96I

2k. New York Times, 27 September I96I5 Editorial Page, Reston Column

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FOOTNOTES - CHA.PTER V

1. JCSM 717-61

2. Ibid.

3. "Concept of Intervention in South Vietnam," considered at an NSC MeetingJ 11 October.

ii-. SNIE 53-2-61, "Bloc Support of the Coimnunist Effort Against the Government of SVE," 5 October 196I

5. Washington Post , 10 April I968

6. SNIE 10-3-61, "Probable Communist Response to Certain SEATO ^Undertakings in SEA."

7. Supplemental Note 2, 11 October I961, to "Concept of Intervention in Vietnam," 10 October I961.

8. William Buady Memorand-um "for Secretary McNamaxa, 10 October 1961.

9. Gilpatric Memorandum for the Record, U October 1961.

10. New York Times , 12 October I96I5 p. 1. Transcript of Press Conference at po 20.

11. New York Times, I3 October I96I, p. 16

12. New York Times , lU October I96I, p. 1^

13. Saigon message ^88, 13 October 196I lU. New York Times , I5 October I96I, p. 1

15c CINCPAC message to JCS, 20 October 1961, Subject: "Pros and Cons of Introducing U.S. Combat Forces Into South Vietnam."

16. Saigon message 516, 20 October I96I

16a., ChMAAG Saigon message to JCS, 23 October I96I , 1^

17. Saigon message 536, 25 October 1961 '

18. Saigon message 537^ 25 October I96I

19. BAGUIO message OOO5, 1 November I96I

20. BAGUIO message OOO6, EYES ONLY FOR THE. PRSSIDEWT, 1 November I96I

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21. Summary Section, Taylor Mission Report, p. 8

22. Ibid., ^. 2k

23. Ibid ., pp 8, 9 2U. Ibid ., p. 11

25. Ibid ,, p. Ik

26. Appendix C, Taylor Report, pp 2, 3

27. Summary, Taylor Report, p. 8

28. Appendix A, Section III, Taylor Report

29. Summary, Taylor Report, p. 7.

" 30« Appendix B, Taylor Report, p. 1

31. Ibid., p. 2

32. Ibidc, po 1

33. Ibid., p. 1

Sk. Summary, Taylor Report, pc 5

35. Ibid., p. 19 '

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36. Ibid., p. 25

37o General Maxwell Taylor's Letter to the President, transmittal of Taylor Mission Report

38. Summary, Taylor Report, p, 5

39. Ibid., p. 6 ' UOo Ibid o, p. 11

Ul. Saigon message 5^+55 25 October I961

k2. ChlWAG Saigon message to JCS, 2ii October I96I

k3» Saigon message 5U1, 25 October I961

kk. ChMAAG Saigon Letter to Secretary of Defense, 11 November I961

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^5- Saigon message 5^1, 25 October I961

kS. Ibid ,

I17. Saigon message 536^ 25 October I96I

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FOOTNOTES - CHAPTER VI

1. Nev York Times , k November I96I5 p. 1

2. New York Times, 29 October I96I5 p. 28

3. New York Times , 21 October I96I, p. 1 k. New York Times , 5 November I96I, po 1

5. Ibid.

6. DEPTEL 5^5 to Saigon, k November I961. The language cited in the footnote is the only completely unambiguous indication of how far the U.So hoped to go in putting Americans into a direct position of influence in the Vietnamese government and ariny. But there is plenty of language in the Taylor Mission Report that suggests as much and there is a rather blunt statement, quoted at the end of Section II of this chapter, which Nolting was told to pass on to Diem in explaining the U.S. offer,

7o Sorenson, " op, cit ,, p. 737, says senior advisors "on Vietnam," which presimiably did not include someone like George Ball, then Undersecretary of State, who has been widely reported to have opposed any combat troop commitments.

As we will see, Galbraith is also on record against troops. Rusk is on record as deferring combat troops in a Joint McNamara/Rusk memorandum which appears to have been drafted after the President had made his decision (it contradicts a memorandum McNamara signed only three days earlier). We do not know whether Rusk, like McNamara was reversing his position.

80 Saigon message kSl? 25 October I961

9. BAGUIO message OOO6, 1 November 1961, EYES ONLY FOR THE PRESIDENT

10. USDEL Hakone to State, Section 6, 1 November I96I 11„ Saigon message 575, 31 October I96I

12. Staff memoranda, 2 and 6 November 1961^ by Colonel Kent, OSD(ISA)

13. Summary, Taylor Report, p. 1

ik. SNIE lO-U-61, 5 November I961, "Probable Communist Reactions to Certain U.Sc Actions in South Vietnam," 5 November I96I

l5o Ibid.

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16. Memorandum for the President from McNamara^ Gilpatric^ JCSj 8 November I96I (TS)

17. Rusk/McNamara Memorandum for the President, 11 November I96I (TS)

*

18. NSAM 111, 22 November I96I 19 Schlesinger, o^. cit ., p. 5^7

20. DEPTEL 618 to Saigon, lU November I96I 20.a. DEPTEL 6I9 to Saigon, 1^ November I96I

21. Ibid. '

22. Saigon message 678, I8 November I96I ■ r\ 23. Saigon message 687, 22 November I96I

24. Bangkok message, Galbraith to the President, 20 November I96I

25. New Delhi (Galbraith) message 99^1 for the President, 21 November I96I ( ^ 26. Reuters dispatch from Saigon in The Washington Post , 25 November I96I

27 Saigon message 708, 25 November I96I

28, DEPTEL 619 to Saigon, l4 November I96I

29. DEPTEL 693 to Saigon, 7 November I96I

30. New York Times , 12 December I96I

31. New York Times , I3 December I96I

32. Ibid.

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