Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

TOP SECRET - Sensitive

vorking relations with those forces." 36/ The concept of a military assistance advisory group had also been approved, although the President did not refer to MAAG in his public statement. 37/ Also, in June, following the recomraendation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Southeast Asia Aid Policy Committee was established,

e. Erskine Mission

The military mission dispatched by the President and headed by Major General Graves B. Erskine, USMC, arrived in'Saigon on July 15, and reported its findings on August 5. General Erskine reported that a permanent solution of the Indochina crisis went beyond military action alone, the core of the problem being a deep-seated hatred and distrust of the French by the population that precluded their cooperation in the -prosecution of the war. The mission also reported that the amount of aid and the scope of the assistance thus far requested by the French were inadequate to the needs of the situation. 38/

The first elements of the U.S. MAAG were assigned to Indochina on August 3, I95O; Brigadier General Francis G. Brink, USA, assumed command as the first Chief of hlAAG on October 10. The mission of the MAAG was limited to provision of material assistance to the French forces and indirect provision of military aid to the forces of the Associated States; General Brj,nk was directed not to assume any training or advisory responsibilities toward the indigenous armies. But from the outset, the French rigorously limited end-use inspections of MAAG to a small number of carefully prescribed visits. 39/

f • JCS Reevalua.tion

After the initial decision to provide assistance to France and the Associated States had been taken, the formation of an economic mission had been announced, the first shipment of arms and equipment had arrived in Indochina, and the MAG had been approved and was in the process of formation, concern mounted over the soundness of these moves. The Joint Chiefs of Staff were again asked by the Secretary of Defense to fox'mulate a position on future U.S. actions with respect to Indochina, and the Southeast Asia Aid Policy Coinmittee (SEAAPC) published, on October 11, I95O, .a draft "Proposed Statement of U.S. Policy on Indochina." The SEAAPC statement proposed adding another dimension to U.S. assistance policy: "Regardless of cirrrent U.S. commitments for provision of certain military assistance to Indochina, the U.S. will not coimnit any of its armed forces to the defense of Indochina against overt, foreign aggression, "under present circumstances." ^Q / Tile paper also recommended that the U.S. support the "prompt acceleration of the formation of new national armies of the three Associated States," and a covering memorandum to the Secretaries of State and Defense recommended that if negotiations were conducted with the French, U.S. representatives should:

.•. secure French acceptance of the following conditions which shall attach to the extension of U.S. assistance in the

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number; NND 63316. By: NWD Date; 2011

TOP SECRET - Sensitive

formation of national armies in Indochina: (l) French Union Forces would not be withdrawn from Indochina until such Associated States armies are fully trained and ready to act effectively in replacement; (2) France would not decrea.se its outlays for Indochina "below the 1950 rate dui^ing the period of the American military aid requested; (3) the national armies project would have the approval of the three Associated States governments; (h) the High Commissioner for Indochina^ the French Command^ and the three Associated States woiiLd maintain full consultative relations v;ith the Legation and T-IAAG during the period of the formation of the armies."

The Joint Chiefs of Staff reevaluation appeared on October 27: military aid should be continued on an expedited basis. Again the judgment V7as offered that genuine autonomy and self-government had to be extended to the people of Indochina to ajueliorate the basic cause of the deterioration of security in Indochina: lack of popular support for the authorities., kl / But the most clearly articulated and complete expression of the Joint Chiefs' over-all position at year end is found in NSC 6U/1;, k2 / a November 28 paper by the Chiefs which takes account of a report from General Brink Us/ and the Southeast Asia Aid Policy Committee's draft of October 11; in fact^ this statement of short- and long-run objectives contained in NSC 6U/l was to remain the basis of United States policy toward Indochina for the duration of the French-Indochina war.

"SHORT TERM OBJECTIVES

"a. The United States should take action^ as a matter of urgency^ by all means practicable short of the actual employment of United States military forces^ to deny Indochina to Communism.

"b. As long as the present situation exists^ the United States should continue to insure that the primary responsibility for the restoration of peace and security in Indochina rests with the French.

"c. The United States should seek to develop its military assistance program for Indochina based on aui over-all military plan prepared by the French, concurred in by the Associated States of Indochina^ and acceptable to the United States.

"(l) Both the plan and the program should be developed and implemented as a matter of urgency. It should be clearly understood, however, that United States acceptance of the plan Is limited to the logistical support which the United States may agree to fiirnish. The aid provided under the program "should be furnished to the French in Indochina and to"the Associated States. The allocation of United States military assistance as between the French and the national armies of Indochina should be approved by the French and United States authorities in Indochina.

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 20II

TOP SECRET - Sensitive

"(2) Popular support of the Government by the Indochinese people is essential to a favorable settlement of the security problem of Indochina, Therefore^ as a condition to the provision of those further increases in military assistance to Indochina necessary for the implementation of an agreed over-all military plan^ the United States Government should obtain assurances from the French Government that:

"(a) A program providing for the eventual ■self-government of Indochina either vrithin or outside of the French Union -will be developed ^ made public ^ and jjnplementa-tion initiated at once in order to strengthen the national spirit of the Indochinese in opposition to Communism.

"(b) National armies of the Associated States of Indochina v/ill be organized as a matter of lorgency. While it is dovibtful that the buildup of these armies can be accomplished in time to contribute significantly to the present military situation, the direct political and psychological benefits to be derived from this course would be great and would thus result in immediate, although indirect, military benefits,

"(c) Pending the formation and training of Indochinese national armies as effective units, and as an interim emergency m^easure, France will dispatch sufficient additional armed forces to Indochina to insure that the restoration of peace and internal security in that country "will be accomplished in accordance with the timetable of the over-all military plan for Indochina.

"(d) France will change its political and military concepts in Indochina to:

_i. Eliminate its policy of 'colonialism.'

ii. Provide proper tutelage to the Associated States.

iii . Insure that a suitable military command structure, unhs^mpered by political interference, is established to conduct effective and appropriate military operations...

"(3) At an appropriate time the United States should institute checks to satisfy itself that the conditions set forth in subparagraph £.(2) above axe being fulfilled.

"d. The United States should exert all practicable political and diplomatic measures required to obtain the

13'

TOP SECRET - Sensitive

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number; NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

TOP SECRET - Sensitive

recognition of the Associated States "by the other non-Communist states of Southeast and South Asia.

"£. In the event of overt attack by organized Chinese Communist forces against Indochina, the United States should not permit itself to become engaged in a general war with Communist China but should, in concert with the United Kingdom, support France and the Associated States by all means short of the actual employment of United States military forces. This support should include appropriate expansion of the present military assistance program and endeavors to induce States in the neighborhood of Indochina to commit armed forces to resist the aggression.

"f. The United States should immediately reconsider its policy toward Indochina whenever it appears that the French Goverrmient may abandon its military position in that country or plans to refer the problem of Indochina to the United Nations. Unless the situation throughout the world generally, and Indochina specifically, changes materially, the United States should seek to dissuade the French from referring the Indochina question to the United Nations.

"g. Inasmuch as the United States-sponsored resolution, 'Uniting for Peace,' has been adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations, and should a situation develop in Indochina in a manner similar to that in Korea in which United Nations forces were required, the United States would then probably be morally obligated to contribute its armed forces designated for service on behalf of the United Nations. It is, therefore, in the interests of the United States to tal^e such action in Indochina as would forestall the need for the General Assembly to invoke the provisions of the resolution, 'Uniting for Peace

I n

o

The JCS also proposed long-term objectives, urging the development of an underground guerrilla warfare capability, a psychological warfare program ("to demonstrate the evils of Comjnianism.. • - and to warn„..of renewed Chinese imperialism"), and encouragement of an appropriate regional secui'ity arrangement. These concepts formed the heart of an NSC Staff Study of December 28. hh/ The initial decision to give assistance was con^ firmed after nearly one~~year's continual re-exatnina-tion, and remained basic to U.S. policy for the remainder of the war.

7. MAP for Indochina

a, Ma.gnitude

The U.S. military assistance program to the French and Associated States was iirplemented rapidly, considering the major U.S.

±k TOP SECRET - Sensitive

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number; NND 63316. By: NWD Date; 2011

TOP SECRET - Sensitive

coimnitment to the Korean war. In a somewhat premature judgment of outcomes ^ a progress report on the implementation of NSC 6^1- (March 15? 1951)" stated that "Anierican military aid furnished the States' forces and the Army of the French Union may have been the decisive factor in the preservation of the area against Commtinist aggression." h^ / Through 1952 and into 195^ "the ^©AP shipments to Indochina increased steadily k6/: by February 3^ 1953? the United States had shipped 137,200 long tons of material (22^1 ships' cargoes); by July 195^? approximately I5O5OOO long tons had been sentj including 1^800 combat vehicles^ 30,887 motor transport vehicles, 361;,522 small arms and machine guns, ^38 naval craft, 2 World War II aircraft carriers, and about 5OO aircraft. By the conclusion of the Geneva agreements in July, 195'4-, the U.S. had delivered aid to Indochina at an original cost of $2,600 million. Wj/ Nonetheless, protests of the French at the slowness of deliveries and the "interference" of MAAG with French requests were recurrent, and peaked, during the crisis days of 195^* Yet these complaints probably reflected less genuine U.S. shortcomings than French resentment of American efforts to advise, screen, inspect, and verify, and sheer frustration. Moreover, the vagaries of the French logistic system not only made the MAAG job more difficult, but firrther mpeded combat supplies.

b. Effectiveness

In spite of the conditions under which U.S. assistance to France and the Associated States was given, the MAAG during the period of the Indochina war was little more than a small (70 in 1950, 3^2 in 195^) supply-support group which exerted far more influence upon U.S. decisions than on the French. The French, never eager for American advice, not only succeeded in limiting the function of MAAG to order-taking in the corrimercial sense, but in fact -- through adroit pressuring of officials above the MAAG -- sometimes reduced MAAG to the position of taking their military orders. Available data do not permit detailed evaluation of the efficiency of I4AP, but it seems clear that French restrictions on the U.S. MAAG reduced it to virtual impotence, US/

However, to relate any judgment of the effectiveness of the United States assistance program simply and directly to the outcome of the war would clearly be inappropriate. For the most part, U.S. expectations were not high. In the words of the Ajnerlcan Ambassador to France in February, 1950, "obviously any program of external assistance was ma.rginal in character and entirely dependent for its success upon the solidity of the base -- in this case, the firmness of French policy and actions in Indochina." J49/ French determination to resist American advice vras not matched by firmness in proceeding with granting independence to Vietnam, or otherwise meeting the political situation in Indochina. Hence, as the U.S. apparently expected, a favora.ble outcome to the Indochina v/ar continued to elude France, even vrith Anierican material and financial help. U.S. assistance enabled France to wage a military battle while it lost its political v?ar -- in Saigon and in Paris. (The military defeat at Dien Bien Phu was iraportant primarily from the point of view of its psychological and political impact on the French, and was so interpreted in the relevant U.S. intelligence estimates.) 50/

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

TOP SECRET - Sensitive

If it would be an error to evaluate the effectiveness of the U.S. program in terms of v/ar outcome, and if the efficiency of MP and MAAG cannot meaningfully "be analyzed^ it remains to evaluate the degree to vhich France met the conditions under which assistance was tendered, which presumably impinged directly on U.S. political objectives:

(l) The United States objective of insuring "that the.■ primary responsibility for the restoration of peace and security in Indochina rests with the French" was fulfilled; in fact, it was insisted on by the French. On the one hand^ U.S. military forces were never directly engaged in the Indochina war. On the other hand, the French, in retaining this primary responsibility, preserved the prerogative to determine policy and the freedom to reject U.S. advice. U.S. "leverage" was minimal.

• . (2) The condition of basing the assistance program on

"an urgently prepared French plan acceptable to the Associated States and to the U.S." was frustrated in several ways. At the outset no overall plan was presented, and those portions of existing plans to which U.S. authorities were privy ( e.g. , Allessandri's pacification plan for the Tonkin Delta) were not acceptable to U.S. thinking. Second, when the Letourneau-Allard and Navarre plans were finally prepared (in 1953? three years after the U.S. decided tha^t a plan was a necessary precondition for aid), some U.S. observers realized that these were more concepts than plans. U.S. acceptance of the plans vms more reluctant than the granting of $385 million in additional assistance might indicate. 51/ Finally, the plans, once "accepted," were not vigorously carried out. ^2/

(3) The French raet ipro forma the condition that they provide the U.S. assurances that they vrould grant self-governirient for Indochina, and form national armies for the Associated States. But it was clear throughout the war that, regardless of the amounts of U.S. assistance rendered, France's declarations of intent were grudgingly issued, and were seldom . ■ followed by action. The French Indochina war had to be lost before Vietnam was granted genuine independence.

. (k) Although France did expand its forces in Indochina,

these forces were never sufficient to the task. French draftees were never employed in Indochina. France

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 20II

r

TOP SECRET - Sensitive

continually pointed to its European defense posture in explanation. In at least one case^ U.S. personnel were requested ( e.g « ^ as aircraft mechanics)^ and 200 were provided^ when a pool of suitable personnel existed in Metropolitan France.

(5) Statements to the contrary notwithstanding, the French did not ameliorate neo-mercantilism or other colonial policies, or provide "proper tutelage"

to the Associated States; nor did it develop a command structure suitable to the United States.

(6) The U.S. "checks to satisfy itself that the conditions" imposed were being satisfied, were, by and large, few and far between, and were conducted at the pleasure and within the specifications of the French.

(7) The French chose not to refer Indochina to the United Nations. Certainly the U.S. assistance program bore on this decision; whether or not it was the deciding factor is unclear.

The effectiveness of the United States assistance program as an instrument of United States policy — q.uite aside from the outcome of the war -- was thus q.uite low.

8. Critique

As earlier sections of this paper have suggested, the U.S. was persuaded to involve itself in the Indochina war by the perceived need^ following the fall of Nationalist China, to hold a line against comm~anists. This strategic drawing of the line at the Chinese-Indochina border was reinforced by the belief that the fall of Indochina would undoubtedly lead to the fall of the other mainland states of Southeast Asia, and that tbe fall of Southeast Asia would eventuate in the virtually complete denial to the United States of the Pacific Littoral of Asia. Prospects for a French victory in Indochina were assessed in contemporary U.S. intelligence documents as poor; nonetheless, the U.S. provided military and economic assistance to the French and the Associated States in the belief that a prompt, coordinated United States program of military, political, and economic aid offered some prospect that France might succeed in gaining the initia.tive in the struggle in that area. Six major points of critique of U.S. policy follow:

a. The-U.S. Misestim.ated France

U.S. policymakers apparently realized that the conditions they imposed upon the French were impracticable to some degree. Nonetheless, they believed that pre-conditions were necessary and could assist

TOP SECR ET - Sensitive

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

TOP SECRET - Sensitive

in convincing the French to mend their colonial ways and to pursue the war with American methods;, diligence, and aggressiveness. Tlie French^ long noted for proficiency and precision in logic, required no Descartes to realize that the United States v^as thus asking France (l) to regain full responsibility for the Indochina War, and in particular for fighting and taking casualties in that war; (2) to follovr the "guidance" and "advice" of the United States on the exercise of this French responsibility; and (3) having fought the war, presumably to a successful conclusion, to re-linguish control over Indochina, In view of the French willingness to retain responsibility for the war, it is not surprising that they were reluctant, at best, to accept propositions (2) and (3)* Despite French pronouncements on their role in fighting coimnunism, there is little reason to believe that they regarded the Indochina war in the same light as the U.S. viewed the Korean War. Rather, their behavior resembled that of other colonial powers who had fought to retain profitable colonies.

b. Slim Chance Acce-pted by the U.S.

Had U.S. policymakers recognized the slimness of the chance of persuading France to accept the three propositions specified above, they might have sought alternative courses of action in Indochina. As it was, the possibility (as opposed to the probability) of success was their prime consideration, and, overestimating U.S. leverage for influencing a favorable outcome, alternatives were not considered.

c. Circular U.S. Policy

Suppression of alternatives, both on the general and the particular level (see Note 48 for an exajnple of the latter), led to a circularity in and reinforcement of existing policies -- constant forced choices between "bad" and "worse." 53/

d. Poor Barsainins

Having taken a hard policy line toward the French, the United Ste.tes failed to bargain effectively. Thus, in circumstances not totally dissimilar from those prevailing in Vietnam in subsequent time periods, the U.S. continued to provide assistance disregarding infi-actions of preconditions; moreover, the pre-conditions for aid vrere not modified. Without modification, the conditions became worse than meaningless: standing testajnents to U.S. impotence, to be recognized only when and how the French chose. The U.S. becajne virtually a prisoner of its ovm policy. Containment of communism, concern for the French in relation to the postwar Europe of MTO, EDC, and the Soviet threat in the West, combined with a fear, based on World War II strategy, that a French withdrawal from Indochina would leave exposed the U.S. flank in Korea, all compelled the U.S. to continue aid. Yet none of these considerations should have precluded modification of the U.S. bargaining strategy.

e. Misinformation

The U.S. policyma^king machinery was highly vulnerable to spoofing, on at least three counts: (l) the very strength of the U.S.

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

TOP SECRET - Sensitive

position regarding communism must have been a constant temptation^ not always resisted, for other parties to cry "red" and thus to manipulate the U.S.; (2) dependence on official French sources for intelligence and other information Y/as potentially misleading; (3) reliance on the high-level mission technique for gathering information to be used as a direct input to policy decisions proved unsatisfactory. ^V

f. Costs Not Weighed

Finally, there is little indication that U.S. policymakers, their thoughts dominated by the objective of containing the monolithic communist bloc, faced up to the costs of winning the Indochina v/ar, even while direct U.S. intervention was being considered. 55/ Nor does the evidence suggest that consideration was given to the tangible and intangible costs of providing U.S. military assistance to a power losing a war, including the potential impact on the U.S. position in Asia. And, finally, available documents fail to reveal any consideration given to the notion of sunk costs. There were, of course, voices in the wilderness. An uji-signed, undated memorandum posed eight key questions to be ansv/ered by . the NSC durinp; the spring of 19^4 . 56/ Comment on the following four . questions, in relation to the time at which they were raised, is unnecessary:

-- Just how important is Southeast Asia to the security interests of the U.S.? Is the analysis in NSC 5^05 still valid? Is the area important enough to fight for?

— How important is Indochina in the defense of Southeast Asia? Is the "domino theory" valid? Is Indochina important enough to fight for? If not, what are the strategic consequences of the loss of all or part of Indochina?

— If the U.S. intervenes in Indochina, ca.n we count on the support of the natives? Can we fight as allies of the French and avoid the stigma of colonialism?

— Is there a strategic concept for the conduct of a war in Indochina which offers promise of early success...?

The decision of the United States to provide assistance to France and the Associated States during the Indochina War is usually treated lightly, if at all, in current histories. Yet, both the taking of the decision and its implementation were significant for and remarkably similar, to subsequent U.S. experiences in Vietnam.

TOP SECRET - Sensitive 19

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number; NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

TOP SECRET - Sensitive

r )

IV. A. 2

FOOTNOTES

.1. Department of State Circiilar to certain American diplomatic and

consular officers, January 23^ 19^6. The association of the l^ether-lands East Indies with French Indochina could not have been lost on the French.

2. Department of State, Office of Far Eastern Affairs^ Memo for Mr, Acheson fromJ.C.V.5 Jajiuary 8, 19^7.

3c Department of State outgoing telegram to AMElffl Paris U3I5 February 35 19^^7 (SECRET) . -

k. Department of State outgoing telegram to AMEIylB Paris ik^, January 17, 19^9 (SECRET).

'5. Joseph Buttinger^ Vietnam: A Dragon Embattled (Wew York: Praeger^ I9675 2 vols), II, pp. 706-707-

6. Bernard B, Fall, ed., Ho Chi Minh on Revolution (New York: Praeger, 1967), pp. 197-198.

7. Memorandum for the President from the Secretary of State, February 2, 1950.

8. Department of State Bulletin, May 22, I95O.

9. NSC U8/I, Report by the Executive Secretary, December 23, 19^9, p. 3 (TOP SECRET).

10. Cf. McCarran bill, introduced February 25, 19^9^ to provide $1.5 billion loan to Nationalist China, subsequent Bridges call for investigation of U.S.-China policy.

11. NSC U8/I, p, 13.

12. NSC 6k, Report by the Department of State, February 7, I95O, p. 3 (top SECRET).

13. The French Assembly ratified the bill which in effect established the Associated States on January 29^ 1950. The reasons for recognition advanced by the Secretary of State to the President are encoui^agement to national aspirations under non-coromunist leadership; establishment of stable non-communist goverimients in areis adjacent to Communist China; support to France; demonstration of displeasui-e with communist tactics. Department of State, Memorandum for the President from the Secretary, subject "U.S. Recognition of Vietnaiu, Laos and Cambodia," February 2, I95O.

20

TOP SECRET - Sensitive

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

>.-.• ■ -

TOP SECRET - Sensitive

l4. The import of Secretary Acheson's statement of February 1 is made clear by the first paragraph of the Department of State press release of that date: "The recognition by the Kremlin of Ho Chi Minh's communist movement in Indochina comes as a surprise. The Soviet acknowledgment of this movement should remove any illusions as to the 'nationalist' nature of Ho Chi Minh's aims and reveals Ho in his true colors as the mortal enemy of independence in Indochina ..."

15' As President Truman was later to v/rite concerning his view of Chinese operations in November 1950, "The situation in Korea...was not the only instance of a new aggressiveness on the part of Communist China. There vras evidence that the communist rebel forces in Indochina were receiving increasing aid from Peiping. Also^ in the last days of October^ Communist China had moved agaj-nst the - ancient theocracy of Tibet. We were seeing a pattern in Indochina

and Tibet timed to coincide with the attack in Korea as a challenge . to the Western world." Memoirs of Harry S. Truman , Volume 2, p. 38O.

16. On May 3^ 19^9? General Chennault told two Congressional Committees that unless the U.S. took immediate steps to save the Nationalists, all Asia would fall to the communists.

17. Memorandujn for the Secretary of Defense, from Joint Chiefs of Staff, Subject: Strategic Assessment of Southeast Asia^ April 10^ I95O (TS).

18. NSC 48, 6k series, 12k series, 177, 5^05.

19. NSC 6k, p.2.

20. NIE 55 Indochina: Current Si.tuation and Probable Developments , December 29, 1950, p.2 (TS). ' ' .

•

21. NIE 5, p. 2. Luclen Bodard in his The Quicksand War (pp. 228-229) contends that the French High Command "systematically put out false intelligence that was meant to end up in Washington" en this and related issues. Only subseq.uent events showed the French that there was a real Chinese threat.

22. Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, April 5, I95O (TS).

23. NIE 5, pp. 1, 2.

24. Ibid., p. 1.

25. See Department of State Outgoing Telegram to AlA Consul Saigon 25, Personal for Jessup from Butterworth, January 20, I95O, "...marked opposition has been encountered which demonstrates at least that Bao Dai's popular support has not yet widened."

26. NIE 5, p. 1. ■

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 20II

TOP SECRET - Sensitive

27. Department of State Incoming Telegram from Paris 837, February 22, 1950.

28. NSC 6hy The Position of the United States with Respect to Indochina, February 27, 195O, p. 3 (ts).

29. Department of State letter from Deputy Under Secretary Rusk to Major General James H. Burns, March 7, I95O (TS).

30. Memorandum for the President from the Secretary of Defense, approved by SecDef, March 6, I95O (tS).

31- By March 6, State and Defense had agreed on a military assistance

program for Indochina and Thailand in the amounts of $15 and 10 million respectively. Draft memorandum to the President, "Allocation of Funds to Provide Military Assistance to Thailand and Indochina Under Section 303 of Mutual Defense Assistance Act, March 6, I95O (TS).

32. Ninth Report to Congress of ECA, 1951, p. 99.

33* Quoted in Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense from Secretary of the Navy, "Aid to Indochina," March 28, 1950, p. 2. (tS)

3^. Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "strategic Assessment of Southeast Asia," April 5, 195O (TS).

35* Department of State Outgoing Telegram to AmEmbassy London 20i^9, May 3, 1950 (TS), - ,

36. Statement of the President, June 27, 1950.

37- Memorandum for the Joint Chiefs of Staff from Secretary of Defense, June 6, 1950. 'Cited in U„S , Policy Toward Vietnam Since 19^5 ^ OCMH Draft TS-62-5-3 (ts).

38. Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Annex 2, October I6, I95O (S); see also The U.S. A7:my Role in the Conflict in Vietnam . OCMH Draft TS-64-7-1 (TS), pp. 22-23; the generally pessimistic conclusions of the mission are also presented in Anjiex 2 to Southeast Asia Policy Committee "Proposed Statement of U.S. Policy in Indochina for NSC Consideration," October 11, I95O (tS).

39- OCMH Draft 13-6^^-7-1, P- 23.

^0. In their comment on this paper, the Joint Secretaries recommended strengthening this restriction by including in it the contingency of "augmented internal communist offensives." Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense from the Joint Secretaries, October I8, I95O (TS).

TOP SECR ET - Sensitive 22 —

f

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

ill. Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Subject: Possible Future Action in Indochina^ October 27, 195O (TS).

1+2. Report to the National Security Council by the Secretary of Defense on the Position of the United States v^ith Respect to Indochina, December 21^ 195O (TS).

kS' Department of State Incoming Message from U.S. Minister Saigon 763? November ky I95O (TS).

kh. NSC staff Study on Position of the United States with Respect to Indo-china, December 28, I95O (TS).

U5. Progress Report by the Under Secretary of State to the National Secujrity Council on the Implementation of NSC 6k, March I5, I95I (TS).

kS. OCMH TS-6i|-7-lj pp. 365 il7-U8. All numbers are taken to be approximations.

i+7* Irving Heymont, et.al ., Cost Analysis of Counterinsurgency Operations , RAC-TP-232, June 1967, Vol 1, p. 10 (S). "

^^' ^■^' 3 informal memorandum from Mr. Max Lehrer to General Bonesteel of April 213 195^1: "This /attached/ report makes it clear that the U.S. MAG has little information available on which it could operate. The written report actually understates the deficiencies in information. Our people find that the morale of the MAAG in Indochina is virtually . non-existent and the MAA.G is reduced to relative impotence."

I49. Departm^ent of State Incoming Telegram from Paris 837? February 22,

1950 (S).

50. NIE 63-5^1, Conseq.uences Within Indochina of the Fall of Dien Bien Phu , April 30, 195^ (S).

51. Regarding the Letourneau-Allard plan, General Trapnell, Chief I^AA^G, reported, "v7hile this plan is slow and expensive, the other course of action is to accept a stalemate which is also not only expensive, but in the long run, favors the Viet Minh and offers no solution." (Memorandum from General Trapnell, OSD files, March 3I5 1953)

52. Although General 0*Daniel, in his report of July I5, I953 (TS) waxed enthusiastic over the successor Navarre Plan, broadly and attractively described to him by General Navarre himself, it was clear to others that the plan v/as hollow. "There is no concrete evidence that the French Union forces v^ill be able to take decisive action to win the war in the foreseeable future..." (Comments by Army Attache, Saigon, November 2^^, I953 (s))

• 23 TOP SECRET - Sensitive

V ^

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number; NND 63316. By: NWD Date; 2011

TOP SECRET - Sensitive

53. Thus the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 195^1: "There are two basic military concepts for the defense of Southeast Asia: a. Static type defense (Korea type), b. An offensive to attack the source of communist military power being applied in Southeast Asia /i.._e,., China/." It is interesting that in this assessment the Chiefs selected b.^ although The force requirements and logistic support.-.have not been fully developed." Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Subject: -"Defense of Southeast Asia in the Event of Loss of Indochina to the Communists," May 21, I95U (TS).

5h. C.f. 3 the reports of General 0^Daniel following his three missions to Indochina. Following the second mission, O'Daniel reported that

prospects for victory appear increasingly encouraging and I heartily recommend continuation and intensification of United States support." (Rrogress Report on Military Situation in Indochina as of November 19> 1953 (TS).) Follov/ing the third mission, which General Navarre tried unsuccessfully to prevent, 0*Daniel was even more optimistic in his remarks, including those on Dien Bien Phu, given the circimstances. (Report of U.S. Special Mission to Indochina, February 5, 195^ (TS))

55* Secretary of the Army Robert T. Stevens found it necessary to write, . even following the U.S. experiences of the Korean war, "l am becoming Increasingly concerned over the freq,uency of statements by individuals ■ of influence within and v^ithout the government that United States air and sea forces alone could solve our problem in Indochina, and equally so over the very evident lack of appreciation of the logistics factors affecting operations in that area." Memorandiira for the Secretary of Defense, Subject: Indochina, May I9, 195^^ (TS). See also Note 53-

56. NSC 5^05 file of OSD,

'«